iwtrxm . ,ffi^v/iifiij«7;>i^»»a'iiijjCTivjm^tff«.''LTOiBimMMi')/nai:
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Given By
_%^ i^A ^J^
3^
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
^
f-.-
HEARINGS
BEFORE THB
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAEL HAEBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 17
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. Ill THROUGH 12S
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
in*"
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
--re.JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAEL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGKESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT. RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES-
RELATING THERETO
PART 17
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. Ill THROUGH 128
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
70716 WASHINGTON : 1946
•'OC^
>p^ . 1 Co . i n ^ ^
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEAKL
HABBOB ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARELBY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER P. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER. Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GBARHART, Representa-
HOMBR FERGUSON, Senator from Micbl- tive from California
gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin
North Carolina
•^2) 7 (.7
COUNSEL « / *>^
(Through January 14, 1946) /^ tj
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel
Gebhard a. Gesell, Chief Aaaiatant Counsel
JULE M. Hannaford, Assistant Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
Sbth W. Richardson, General Counsel
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Cou7^sel
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
II
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
Pages
Transcript
No.
pages
1
1- 399
1- 1058
2
401- 982
1059- 2586
3
983-1583
2587- 4194
4
1585-2063
4195- 5460
5
2065-2492
5461- 6646
6
2493-2920
6647- 7888
7
2921^378
7889- 9107
8
3379-3927
9108-10517
9
3929-4599
10518-12277
10
4601-5151
12278-13708
11
5153-5560
13709-14765
Hearings
Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31. 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
No.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 through 25
26
27 through 31
32 through 33
34
35
36 through 38
39
Exhibits Nos.
1 through 6.
7 and 8.
9 through 43.
44 through 87.
88 through 1 10.
Ill through 128.
129 through 156.
157 through 172.
173 through 179.
180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
Roberts Commission Proceedings.
Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2457
EXHIBIT NO. Ill
The Under Secretary of State,
Washington, December 5, 1941.
The President,
The White House.
My Dear Mr. President: The Australian Minister called to see me last night.
The Minister told me that Sir Keith Murdock, a leading newspaper publisher in
Australia, had now suggestetl that Wendell Willkie visit Australia. You may
remember that this matter was discussed some months ago but nothing came of it.
The Minister showed me a telegram which he had received from his Prime
Minister stating that if Mr. Willkie were now to visit Australia with the
"imprimatur" of the Pi-esident his visit would be most welcome to the Australian
Government.
The Prime Minister in his cable to Mr. Casey expressed the hope that this could
be arranged or possibly that you might appoint him your personal representative.
The telegram from the Prime Minister concluded with a message to the effect
that the Australian Government "welcomes the leadership of President Roosevelt
in these critical times."
I told the Minister that I would have to submit the question to you and that
I would let him have any comment which you wished me to make.
Will you let me know what your wishes may be?
Believe me.
Faithfully yours,
/s/ S. Welles.
Decembeb 5, 1941.
Dear Wendell : The enclosed has just come to me from Sunnier Welles and
I want to assure you that it would give me very great pleasure if you would
care to make a short trip to Australia. I could arrange the official procedure
any way you like — and because it would follow precedent I could give you
special letters as a Special Representative of the President to the Prime Min-
isters of New Zealand and Australia — in which case you would travel at gov-
ernment expense. Or you could go as a private citizen with the letters from
me to the Prime Ministers giving your visit my blessing.
I leave this matter wholly in your hands, as I think you should consult your
own convenience— and I think both of us should be extremely careful, if you
do go, lest it be said that I am sending you "out of the country" !
It would, of course, be of real value to cement our relations with New Zealand
and Australia and would be useful not only now but in the future. There is
always the Japanese matter to consider. The situation is definitely serious
and there might be an armed clash at any moment if the Japanese continued
their forward progress against the Philippines, Dutch Indies or Malays or
Burma. Perhaps the next four or five days will decide the matter.
[2] In any event, I do wish you would let me know the next time you
come to Washington as there are many things for us to talk over.
Always sincerely,
s/ F. D. R.
[In longhand the President wrote:] This was dictated Friday morning — long
before this vile attack started. F. D. R.
Honorable Wendexl Willkie,
15 Broad Street, Neiv York, N. Y.
fdr
ggt/dj
Enclosure. Let. from Welles to the President 12/5/41 saying that if Mr.
Willkie were now to visit Australia with the "imprimatur" of the Pres. his
visit would be most welcome to the Australian Govt.
The White House,
Washington, December 8, 1941.
Memorandum for the President:
The attached letter which you dictated to Wendell Willkie but which did not
get out before the Japanese trouble is brought to your attention because I know
you will want to change it.
Q.
2458 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Memorandum for Sumner Welles :
The White House,
Washington, December 8, 1941.
I have sent the following letter to Wendell Willkie. I will let you know what
he says.
F. D. R.
Enclosure.
Transmitting copy of President's letter of 12/5/41 to Hon. Wendell Willkie,
in re appt. of Mr. Willkie as a Special Representative of the President to the
Prime Ministers of New Zealand and Australia.
EXHIBIT NO. 112
Dispatches and Othee Material Referred to in Footnotes to Admiral Kimmel's
Statement
[/] Dispatches and Other Material Referred to in Footnotes in Admiral Kimmel'^
Statement
PART I
Page of
state-
ment
Foot-
note
4
2
4
3
9
5
9
7
10
8
10
9
10
10
16
14
16
15
19
19
20
20
21
22
21
23
22
r.11
24
23
27
24
28
24
29
28
32
Reference
Pagei
Cine File, Pl6-3/(0217)
Personal letter to Admiral Nimitz, February 16, 1941
Dispatch, OpNav to CinCPac, April 4, 1941, 041700
Official letter CNO to CinCPac. April 3, 1941, Serial 038612
Official letter CNO. May 26, 1941, Serial 060512
Official letter CinCPac. July 25, 1941. Serial 063W
Official letter CNO to CinCPac, September 9, 1941, Serial 098912
Dispatch, OpNav to CinCPac, May 24, 1941, 242130
Dispatch. OpNav to CinCPac, May 13, 1941, 132019
Dispatch, CinCPac to OpNav, May 15, 1941, 150625
Official letter Con; 14 to CNO, October 17, 1941, ND14 (01084)
Cominch 1st endorsement to Coml4 letter, A16-1/ND14
Letter from ComHto CNO, December 30, 1940 (ND14 (629))
Letter from ComHto CNO, Mav 7, 1941, (ND14).
CNO to CinCPac and Coml4, Novenibei 25, 1941, Serial 0135412
OfflcialletterCNOtoCinCPac, February 15. 1941, Serial 09330
CNO to several Commandants, February 17, 1941, Serial 010230 ,
CNO to several Commandants, June 13, 1941 . Serial 055730
Secret dispatch, CinCPac to COMTASKFOR 3, Coml4, December 4, 0941
040237.
I
5
7
8
11
13
15
16
18
17
19
21
22
28
31
34
37
39
41
PART II
[Ml
30
1
31
2
35
9
35
10
39
16
39
17
39
18
42
21
42
22
44
23
45
24
47
27
48
28
48
29
Dispatch, CNO to CinCUS, January 21, 1941, 212155
Dispatch ALUSNA, London to OpNav, February 3, 1941, 031400, passed to
CinCUS as OpNav 032300.
CinCPac File No. A4-3/FF12 (13), Serial 01254, August 13, 1941, rec'd OpNav,
September 3, 1941.
Dispatch, OpNav to CinCPac, May 24, 1941, 2421,50.
Dispatch, CinCPac to COMSUBSCOFOR 170.354 and 170426, October 17.
1941.
Dispatch, CinCPac to Com 14, 170319, October 17, 1941, and dispatch, Coml4 to
CinCPac, 170356.
Dispatch, CinCPac to COMPATWINQ 2, 170429, October 17, 1941
Dispatch. CNO to CinCPac, November 26, 1941, 270040
Dispatch, CNO to CinCPac, November 26, 1941, 270038
Message No. 489, November 29, 1941, War Dept. to Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department.
Dispatch, CinCPac to OpNav, November 28, 1941.280627.
Official letter CinCPac to CNO, December 2, 1941, Serial 0114W
Dispatch, OpNav to CinCAF, info CinCPac, 1 December, 011400
Dispatch, OpNav to CinCAF, info CinCPac, November 28, 1941, 281633.
Dispatch, CmCAF to OpNav, info CinCPac, December 6, 1941, 061255..
42
43
44
48
49-50
51-52
53
54
55
66
67
68
67
68
70
> Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages
of original exhibit.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2459
Dispatches and Other Material Referred to in Footnotes in Admiral KimmeVs
Statement — Continued
PART II— Continued
Page of
state-
ment
Foot-
note
Reference
Page»
50
32
34
43
44
47
51
53
54
56
Dispatch. Coml6 to OpNav, info CinCPac, Decembers, 1941, 080333
71
53
64
64
Memorandum for the Roberts Commission from Lt. Comdr. E. T. Layton,
Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet, dated January 5, 1942.
Dispatch, CinCPac to COMPATWING 2, November 28, 1941, 280450
Mailgram COMTASKFOR 9 to COMPATRONS 21 and 22, November 30,
1941.292103 -_
72
74
75
75
67
Letter CinCPac to CinCUS, January 7, 1942, Serial 059
77
73
Dispatch, CNO to CinCPac, November 29, 1941. 282054 .
95
75
75
Dispatch, CinCPac to Pacific Fleet, info OpNav, November^, 1941, 280355
Official letter CinCPac to CNO, Feb. 11, 1941, Serial 0243
96
97
76
Dispatch, USS Helena to OR 1.5— info CinCPac, November 28, 1941, 028835
108
PART III
96
35
Dispatch, ALUSNA Batavia to OpNav, December 5, 1941, 031030.
109
^ Pages referred to are indicated by italic.flgures enclosed by brackets and represent pages
of original exhibit.
[i] CinOFileNo.
Pi6-3/(0217)
Confidential
United Statks Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Pearl Harbob, T. H., February 7, 1941.
From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Recommended Complements.
Reference: (a) Secnav Rest. Itr. FS/S80/ (400525) of 1 June 1940.
Enclosures :
(A) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. Itr. P16-1(C) (04447) of 21
December 1940 (Recommended complements for Battleships).
(B) Senior Member Com{plement, Board's Conf. Itr. P16-1(C) (035) of 18
January 1941 (Recommended complements for Aircraft Carriers, and
Tenders and Seaplane Tenders).
(C) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. Itr. P16^1(C) (04) of 4
January 1941 (Recommended complements for Heavy Cruisers).
(D) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. Itr. P16-1(C) (046) of 25
January 1941 (Recommended complements for Light Cruisers, BROOK-
LYN and ST. LOUIS class).
(E) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. Itr. P16-1(C)(049 of 28
January 1941 ( RecoUimended comiJlements for Light Cruisers, OMAHA
Class).
(F) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. Itr. P16(C) (04551) of 31
December 1940 (Recommended complements for Destroyers).
(G) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. Itr. P16-1 ( C ) ( 024 ) of 11
January 1941 (Recommended complements for Light Mine Layers, Fleet
Mine Sweepers, Submarines, Submarine Auxiliaries and Train Ships).
(H) Combasefor Conf. Itr. P16-1/MM/(0103) of 22 January 1941 (Proposed
compliments for ships of the Train).
(I) Senior Member Complement Board's Conf. Itr. P16-1/S1(C) (026) of
14 January 1941.
1. The additional armaments which have been placed on combatant ships in
accordance with the directive established by reference (a), and the need for
manning additional stations incident to reported experience in the present war,
requireid that consideration be given to increasing the complement of ships to
meet these added war-time requirements.
[2] 2. Enclosures (A) to (G), forwarded herewith, are the reports of the
"Fleet Personnel Board" with Rear Admiral R. A. Theobald, U. S. Navy, as
2460 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Senior Member, appointed to determine the fomplement required to fight and
maintain ships of the included types in accordance with the above requirements.
These reports are submitted after the board had held exhaustive hearinjis and
made a thorouRh study for each type. Before arriving at their conclusion the
Board took the following steps :
(a) Members of the Board visited each type of ship and ob.served the stationing
of the crews, the manning of batteries and the supplying of ammunition.
(b) Provided for the maximum utilization of the services of each man on
board.
(c) Included the assignment of all available flag personnel to ships' battle
stations.
(d) In so far as possible considered every phase ot battle an<l justified the
demand for each additional man.
3. The C5ommander-in-Chief concurs in the recommendations of the Board
regarding all the complements necessary to fight the ships efficiently, subject
to the following comments:
(a) Further study after submission of the report on destroyers, enclosure)
(F), by the Board makes the following modification in the recommendations
for high speed minesweepers (DMs) advisable:
(1) HOVEY and LONG. Increase number of Seamen second class recom-
mended to 10 (add 3) to make total complement 146.
(2) HOPKINS. Decrease number of Seamen first class recommended to one
(decrease by 2) and number of Seamen second class to 4 (decrease by 3) to
make total complement 138.
(b) The total complement of the Fleet minesweepers (AMs), enclosure (G),
may be reduced from 96 to 85. This may be effected by reducing the recommended
number of Seamen first class from 16 to 11, and Seamen second class from 18 to 13,
[3] and Mess Attendant second class from 1 to 0. This would eliminate the 7
non-watchstanders in Condition II, and require the Type Commander to make
readjustments in the stationing of personnel to operate without the other four.
In connection with the recommended complements for Train ships, enclosure
(H) is submitted for consideration.
4. The major part of the increases recommended result directly from personnel
required to man the additional armament installed in compliance with reference
(a) , and to provide for increased demands for battle lookouts.
5. A considerable part of the increases result also from the studies made by the
Board of the ammunition supply for previously existing armament. The result of
these studies and comments thereon are included in enclosure (I). Particular
attention is invited to this enclosure, and to the increased number of men required
in the ammunition train as a i-esult of this study.
6. The information furnished by the Department regarding the numbers of men
assigned to ships of the various types in the British Navy is of great interest.
From the differences in complements of similar types in the two services, the
following is apparent :
(a) British ships are mechanized to a considerably greater extent than our, or
(b) They accept much lower rates of fire or standards of performance than we
are willing to accept.
7. We are forced to operate our ships as they are and the number of men
required to man them has been determined by the considered judgement of the best
(Officers we have available. In view of the large numbers of men required for
newly commissionetl ships, both now and in the future, and in view of the fact
that only at sea can men-of-warsmen be adequately trained, every seagoing ship
should be filled to capacity now. In this connection it cannot be too strongly
emphasized that stabilization of personnel, both officers and enlisted, will con-
tribute more to the efficiency of the fleet than any other single factor.
[4] 8. The study of the Board definitely indicates that the recommended
complements can be housed and fed and, until conclusively proved otherwise,
should be accepted.
9. Subject to the comments made in this letter, it is reconmiended that the
complements contained in enclosures (A) to (G) inclusive be approved and that
the additional men be assigned as quickly as possible by the Bureau of Navigation.
10. By copy of this letter, Force and Type Commanders will initiate necessary
changes in existing ships to provide for the additional complement.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2461
11. It is further reconnuended that the Bureau of Ships provide funds and
equipment for the accoiuplislinient of these changes as originated by the Type
Commanders.
H. E. KiMMEL.
Copy to: (Less enclosures)
R. Adm. Theobald (Sr. Member Fit. Pers. Board)
All Force and Type Comnjanders
BuNav
BuShips
[5J Comma Nin;a-iN-CHii;K
tJNlTEII) StATKS Fi.KKT
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Confidential
At Sea, Hawaiian Area, February 16, lOJ/l.
My Dear Nimitz : Your letter of 29 January which reached me on 15 February,
in regard to the detachment of Ordnance Post Graduates now in the Fleet to
provide a supervisory force for shore duty under the Bureau of Ordnance, causes
me the greatest concern.
I realize in some degree the necessity for the services of competent personnel
under the Bureau of Ordnance. I am, however, faced with a very real situation
here in the Fleet. During the past year the detachment of so many competent
oflBcers has reduced the number of experienced officers remaining in ships of the
Fleet to sucli a point that I consider it dangerous to make further considerable
reductions in our best officer personnel at this time. The Fleet is just now recover-
ing from the heavy officer personnel shake-up which it has experienced.
In general, the Ordnance P^st Graduates occupy key positions in the Fleet.
They were selec»^ed originally for Post Graduate work because of their outstanding
qualities. They have quite naturally been placed in positions of responsibility in
the Fleet. If you detach them you will detach our best qualified officers, and I
can see no source from which qualified reliefs will be furnished. We are now
lending every effort to qualify subordinate and reserve officers to fit them for
positions of greater responsibility. This process takes time.
While I appreciate to some extent the deficiencies of the Bureau of Ordnance
and the urgent necessity to remedy them, I must sound a note of warning that we
cannot spare any considerable number of qualified officers from the Fleet without
assuming an enormous risk. The condition of the Fleet now and in the near
future may well be of much greater importance to the nation than the production
of a two-ocean Navy by 1946.
Within all reasonable limits I feel that the existing Fleets should have priority
assignment of personnel as well as supply of material. I suggest that you furnish
me the names of the Ordnance Post Graduates which the Bureau of Ordnance
desires and that I have an opportunity to comment on each case prior to his
detachment from the Fleet.
[6] The list of officers which you furnished me includes a large number who
are in positions of gi-eat responsibility. My staff is now checking the present
actual assignment of each officer listed and the importance of his job. I sincerely
trust that you will not detach any of them without providing a qualified relief, and
even so, such relief cannot reach a reasonable standard of efficiency until many
months have elapsed.
While on this subject of personnel, I would like to add that the continued detach-
ment of qualified officers and enlisted men renders it next to impossible for the
ships to reach the high state of efficiency demanded by a campaiga. This Fleet
must be kept ready to fight, and that is impossible unless we stabilize the personnel
to a much greater degree than has been done in the past. I realize, of course, that
we must have .some changes in the normal course of events. I realize also that
you agree with everything that I have said herein, that you have many demands
to meet, and that you must weigh all factors before reaching a decision.
We have submitted the report of the Fleet Personnel Board, and by now your
Bureau has had opportunity to make a study of the recommendations made. I
have ordered the Medical Board to report on the health and comfort features as
2462 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
directed, and they will expedite their proceedings. I cannot urge you too strongly
to fill the ships to capacity with both enlisted men and oflScers.
I request that you kindly show this letter to Admiral Stark.
My kindest personal regards and best wishes.
Most sincerely yours,
s/ Kinimel
H. E. KiMMfX.
Rear Admiral C. W. Nimitz, V. S. 'Navy,
Chief of the Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
[7] 4 April 1941 Top secret
From: OPNAV
Action : CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 1 .3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Info: CINCLANT, COMBATFOR, COMSCOFOR, COMBASEFOR, COMDTS
NAVY YARDS BOSTON, PORTSMOUTH, NEW YORK, PHILADEL-
PHIA, NORFOLK, CHARLESTON, MARE ISLAND, PEARL HARBOR,
PUGET SOUND, NAD PUGET SOUND, MARE ISLAND, OAHU &
CAVITE
041700
Except DESDIV 50 (S-27, S-28 and NTS) vessels on routine supply trips fill
allowances and obtain supplies required for mobilization. At discretion fleet com-
manders will accept final increment of mobilization supply ammunition. Strip
ship in accordance with orders action Adees. Ships assigned availability for
drydocking at Addees discretion. For this purpose ships of the Pacific Fleet are
not to return to mobilization jwrts on the continent.
[8] 48
Copy • ,
In reply refer to initials and No. Serial 038612
Secret
Navt Department,
Officb of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, April 3, T941.
From : The Chief of Naval Operations.
To : The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet.
Subject : Observations on the present international situation.
1. You are requested to disclose the contents of this letter to your seconds in
command and to your chiefs of staff, and to no other persons.
2. Staff conversations with the British have been completed and a joint United
States-British war plan drawn up. Two copies of the Report (Short title
ABC-1) of these conversations are being supplied each addressee by officer
messenger. Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, founded on the United States-
British plan, is in preparation and will be distributed at an early date. The
general nature of Rainbow No. 5 will l)ecome evident to you upon perusal of
the Joint Report. This Report has been approved by the Chief of Staff of the
Army and by myself, and, at an appropriate time, is expected to receive the
approval of the President. You are authorized to discuss matters pertaining to
Rainbow No. 5 with other officers of the Army and the Navy, as may be
appropriate. ^, , , „^ ^
3. The basic idea of the United States-British plan is that the United States
will draw forces from the Pacific Fleet to reenforce the Atlantic Fleet, and
that the British will, if necessary, transfer naval forces to the Far East to
attempt to hold the Japanese north of the Malay Barrier. The U. S. Asiatic
Fleet would not be reenforced, but would be supported by offensive operations
bv the U. S. Pacific Fleet.
4 From the viewpoint of the defense of the United States national position,
the proposed naval deployment gives adequate security in case the British Isles
should fall From the viewpoint of bringing immediate heavy pressure in the
Atlantic, which we consider the decisive theater, the plan leaves something to
be desired in the initial stages of the war.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2463
[5] 5. The diflaculties are our present uncertainty as to Japanese action,
and' British insistence on the vital importance of holding Singapore, and of
supporting Australia, New Zealand, and India. Their proposals, which I
rejected, were to transfer almost the whole of the Pacific Fleet to Singapore to
hold that position against the Japanese. In my opinion, the resiflt of such a
move on our part would almost surely be a British defeat in the Atlantic, and,
thereafter, a difficult period for the United States. I have agreed to the present
plan for the initial stages, but have insisted that the deployment at any one
time must depend upon the situation which exists at that time. Elasticity
and fluidity of planning are therefore assured.
6. There seem to be two principal dangers which immediately threaten the
United Kingdom. The first is the very grave threat to its sea communications
from submarines, aircraft, and raiders. The recent activity of the large German
naval raiders foreshadows a wider, and even weaker, deployment of British
surface forces capable of dealing with such raiders. The British are badly
deficient in anti-submarine escort craft, and have as yet devised little defense
of convoys and single ships against heavy bombers. Shipping is now being lost
about three times as fast as it can be replaced. The only remedy, in my opin-
ion, is a radical strengthening of the defense against all three forms of shipping
attack, by greater forces and new ideas, to such an extent that the hazard to
the attackers will be too great for them to overcome. The entire United States
naval strength could be usefully employed in the Atlantic, were it to become
possible to send it there.
7. The second great danger is the continued deterioration of British produc-
tion and morale through heavy bombing. This will become more serious as
shipping losses become greater. At the same time the situation in the Medi-
terranean might become dangerous at any time ; on the other hand, in spite of
uncertainties, favorable elements are visible in that theater.
8. The Japanese attitude will continue to have an extremely important bear-
ing on the future of the war in the Atlantic. For some time past, Japan has
shown less and less inclination to attack the British, Dutch, and ourselves in
the Far East. Her people are distinctly tired of the war in China and of the
privations they now must undergo. Whether Matsuoka's visit to Berlin and
Rome will strengthen the wish of some of them to help Germany, or will deepen
their caution against rash action, may be disclosed within the next month. I
advise you to watch this situation keenly.
[10] 9. Unquestionably the concentration of the U. S. Pacific Fleet in Ha-
waii has had a stabilizing effect in the Far East. I am more and more of opinion
that Japan will hesitate to take further steps, perhaps even against Indo-China,
so long as affairs do not go too badly for Britain. What the effect on her would
be were the United States to transfer a large part of the Pacific Fleet to the At-
lantic can, as yet, be only surmised. In any case, we shall rigidly avoid making
any indication that we contemplate such a transfer until the last possible moment.
10. The question as to our entry into the war now seems to be when, and not
ichether. Public opinion, which now is slowly turning in that direction, may or
may not be accelerated. My own personal view is that we may be in the war
(possibly undeclared) against Germany and Italy within about two months
but that there is a reasonable possibility that Japan may remain out altogether.
However, we can not at present act on that possibility.
11. Your Operating Plan for Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 3 will, with
little change, be equally effective for Rainbow No. 5. I advise you to study
the Rei)ort of the staff conversations in order that you will be in a position to
to issue your new plans as soon as practicable after receipt of the new Basic
Plan, and, if war comes before you receive it, so that you can promptly modify
your present orders.
12. In the meantime, I advise that you devote as much time as may be avail-
able to training your forces in the particular duties which the various units may
be called upon to perform under your operating plans. The time has arrived, I
believe, to perfect the technique and the methods that will be required by the
special operations which you envisage immediately after the entry of the United
States into war.
/s/ H.R. Stark
H. R. Stabk.
cc : Rear Admiral Ghormley.
2464 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
111] Secret
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Opkkations,
Washington, May 20, 1941.
Oi)-12H-.V»]M(C
(SC)A16(R-5)
Serial 060512
From : The Chief of Naval Operations.
To : Distribution List for WPL-46.
Subject: Promulgation of Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46).
Enclosures: (A) Pages for WPL-46, Registered No. 47, including List of Effective
Pages.
(B) Receipt form in duplicate.
1. Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46) is promulgated herewith.
2. Report receipt, and check of contents, on the form provided as enclosure (B).
3. The highest priority in the preparation of war plans is assigned to plans re-
quired by WPL-46.
4. It is desired that the preparation and distribution of these plans be accom- ,
plished with the least possible delay. To this end, all planning based upon the
directives of WPL-13, WPL-14, WPL-42, and WPL-44 will be discontinued until
plans based upon WPL-^6 are completed.
5. Appendix II, Chapter IX, prescribing the composition of the Naval Trans-
portation Service will be issued a sa change to this plan. If this plan is executed
prior to the issue of Chapter IX, specific directives will be issued to provide for the
initial sea transportation requirements of the plan.
6. The extreme importance of the security of this Navy Basic War Plan —
Rainbow No. 5, cannot be over-emphasized. In this respect, attention is invited
to the instructions contained in "The System of War Planning", ami in the
"Registered Publication Manual".
7. Plans and estimates of requirements for the preparation for war service of
vessels to be taken over from private sources, as indicated in the tables of Ap-
pendix II, will be classified as confidential. Attention is invited to paragraph
110.J of WPL-8.
Original, May, 1941 WPL-46
[12] 8. This plan shall not be carried in aircraft except by authority of the
Chief of Naval Operations, and when not in use shall be kept in Class "A" stowage
as prescribed in the "Registered Publication Manual".
9. It is forbidden to make extracts from or copy portions of this publication
without specific authority from the Chief of Naval Operations, except in subor-
dinate plans based upon this publication.
H. R. Stark.
[13] Secret
Cincpac file no.
A16/WPPac-46 (16)
Serial 063W
Unitki) States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Pearl Harbor, T. H., July 25, 1941.
From : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.
Subject: WPPac^6.
1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has not yet been
approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in effect prior to the
receipt of such approval.
2. Attention is invited to the Introduction, Chapter III, article 0301 of the Plan
concerning the preparation of supporting plans by Task Force Commanders. At
the present time it is desired that the following submit supporting plans for
approval by the Commander-in-Chief:
Commanders Task Forces Two, Three, Six, Seven and Nine. (Commander Task
Force Nine may, if he desires, delegate preparation of the plan to the Senior
OflUcer of that type in the Hawaiian Area.)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2465
The Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers addressed may provide for the
accomplishment of such tasks as are assigned them in this 0-1 Plan by including
suitable measures in their 0-4 or other plans, rather than to prepare separate
supporting plans for this O-l Plan. The Commander Southeast Pacific Force
(Commander Cruiser Division Three) is required to submit the plan for operations
of that force after its detachment from the Fleet to the Chief of Naval Operations
for approval.
3. Supporting Plans as required above will be submitted for approval of the
Commander-in-Chief prior to 20 August 1941. After approval they will be incor-
porated with the Fleet Plan as annexes as prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.
4. Further annexes prepared by the Commander-in-Chief to cover operations to
be undertaken in later phases of the war will be distributed when completed
and approved.
[14] 5. Suitable binders for this Plan will be forwarded as soon as received
by this command.
ts] H. E. Kimmel
H. E. Kimmel.
115]
Op-12B-2-<ijm
(SC) A16/EF12 (FF12)
Serial 098912 D-33956
Secret
Sep 9 1941.
From : The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: The U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-1,
Rainbow No. 5) WPPac-46, review and acceptance of.
Reference: (a) CinCPac Secret let. Serial 0&4W of 25 July, 1941.
1. The Chief of Naval Operations has reviewed subject Plan and accepts it.
2. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the
addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore
authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the conti-
nental limits of the United States.
H. R. Stabk.
[16] 24 May 1941 Top Secret
From : OPNAV
Action : CINCPAC
Info: CINCLANT, COMDG GEN 2 MAR DIV, COMBASEFOR, COMTRANS-
BASEFOR, COM 11
242130
A courier is being sent to commanding general of the Second Marine Division
carrying orders for an organization of a reinforced regiment for duty with the
First Marine Division X Direct HEYWOOD, FULLER, BIDDLE, MANLEY,
LITTLE, McKEAN, STRINGHAM under appropriate transport commander to
combat load this regiment at San Diego at earliest practicable date then proceed
Canal Zone transit and report to CINClant for duty on arrival Cristobal X This
movement is to be kept in the strictest secrecy X Advise what itinerary you
plan to make.
[17] 15 May 1941 Top Secret
From: CINCPAC
Action: OPNAV
150625
Following are movements and compositions of task groups:
GEORGE 71: COMCRUDIV 8 in SAVANNAH and MISSISSIPPI; COMDES-
DIV 15 in LANG, STERRETT, and WILSON ; depart Hawaii 19 May arrive Canal
Zone 2 June. (Refer your 132019)
GEORGE 72: COMBATDIV 3 in IDAHO and BROOKLYN; COMDESRON 8
in WINSLOW, WAINWRIGHT, and STACK ; leave 20 May transit 4 June night.
GEORGE 73: NEW MEXICO and NASHVILLE; COMDESDIV 17 in MORRIS,
BUCK, and ROE ; depart 20 May thru Canal June 6.
79716 O— 46 — pt. 17 :^.
2466 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
GEORGE 74 : PHILADELPHIA leave tins area Zi May ; DESDIV 3 leave from
SAN DIEGO 29 May ; 30 May meet at sea arrive Taboga Island 8 June.
Forwarding OPOKD copv. Can deliver to units concerned without use COM15
radio if info similar COMIS ()513(]00 April is received by 18 May from OPNAV.
[18] 13 May 1941 Top Secret
From : OPNAV
Action : CINCPAG
132019
OPNAV Serial 6538 instructions modified as below :
Organize 3 groups each consisting of 1 battleship, 1 light cruiser, 3 DDS from
units contained in that serial. Wish these groups to leave at intervals of 1 or
2 days. Fourth group to be composed of 1 light cruiser plus DESDIV 3, latter
DDS to join cruiser at sea prior arrival Panama this group to follow third group
through canal at 1 or 2 day interval. Utmost secrecy desired about the fact
ships are leaving Hawaiian area or west coast for Atlantic X Wish ships leav-
ing Hawaii to go direct to Canal Zone and all groups transit at night. Advise
as soon as possible composition of groups, proposed departure dates, and expected
arrival dates at Canal Zone so arrangem'ents for transit can be made by OPNAV.
As soon as practicable initiate these movements. Small groups like YORKTOWN
can apparently make transit without publicity.
[19] A16-1/
ND14( 01084)
Office of the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 11 October 1941.
Secret
From : Commandant, 14th Naval District
To : Chief of Naval Operations.
Via : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subj : Re-appraisal of local defense forces of Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.
Ref :
(a) Coml4 conf. Itr. to OpNav of 30 Dec. 1941, Ser. 629.
(b) CINCUS conf. 1st end. to Coml4 Ser. 629, CINC File A16(022) of 7
January 1941.
(c) Coml4 conf. Itr. to OpNav of 7 May 1&41, Ser. 0430.
(d) CinCPac secret Itr Ser. 038W of 20 May 1941 to OpNav.
(e) Coml4 conf. Itr. to OpNav of 31 Oct. 1940 Ser. 510.
1. All of the al)ove references bear on the local defense forces and security
measures of this area.
2. The only increment that has been made to these forces during the past year,
exclusive of net vessels, is the U. S. S. SACRAMENTO which has no batteries,
to speak of, with which the vessel can fight, and no speed with which she can run.
3. Altho\igh the writer of this letter is aware that the Depjirtment has been
fully informed alxnit the deficiencies in this District, he feels it necessary to again
bring the subject to attention.
4. Recently, the Commandant endeavored to obtain, without much success,
from the Commander-in-Chief the assignment of certain planes which could be
used in connection with anti-submarine patrol. The only planes now available
for this purpose are Army planes, and the types and numbers are inadequate
for the purpose.
5. The only anti-submarine vessels now in the District are the four destroyers
of Destroyer Division Eighty, one being still unequipi>ed with listening gear,
and three Coast Guard Cutters. These vessels will not only have to be used for
hunting and tracking down submarines but will also be required for escort and
security patrol in a very extensive front.
[20] 6. It is urged that the Department send a number of .small, fast craft
to this District equipped with listening gear and depth charges for this purpose.
It is further urged that the Department send to this District at least two squad-
rons of VSO planes which can be used for patrol against enemy submarines.
7. Nearlv all of the failures of the British have been cjiused by what may be
expres.sed "in the cliche "Too little and too late." It is hoped that we may profit
from their errors.
0. C. Block.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2467
[21] ND14/(18)
Serial 096W
Secret
United States Fi-ebt My
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
1st Endorsement to Com-14 secret Ur S-A16-1/Nt)14 (01084) of 17 October 1941.
From : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
To : Chief of Naval Operations.
Subj : Re-appraisal of local defense forces, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.
1. Forwarded.
2. There is a possibility that the reluctance or inability of the Department
to furnish the Commandant, 14th Naval District, with forces adequate to his
needs may be predicated upon a conception that, in an emergency, vessels of
the United States Pacific Fleet may always be diverted for these purposes. If
such be the case, the premise is so false as to hardly warrant refutation. A
fleet, tied to its base by diversion to other purposes, of light forces necessary for
the security at sea, is, in a real sense no fleet at all. Moreover, this fleet has
been assigned, in the event of war, certain definite tasks, the vigorous prosecu-
tion of which requires not only all the units now assigned, but as many more
as can possibly be made available.
3. The necessities of the case clearly warrant extraordinary measures in
meeting the Commandant's needs.
4. Transmission of this document within the continental limits of the United
States by registered mail is authorized.
H. E. KIMMEL.
cc: Com-14
[22] C-A16-1/A7-2/ND14
(629)
Confidential
Office of the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District and Navy Yard,
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 30 December 1940.
From : Commandant, 14th Naval District.
To : Chief of Naval Operations.
Via : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Subj : Situation concerning the security of the Fleet and the present ability of
the local defense forces to meet surprise attacks.
Ref:
(a) OpNav dispatch 092135 of October 1940.
(b) OpNav dispatch 182128 of October 1940.
(c) CNO's personal Itr addressed to CINCUS dated 22 November 1940.
(d) Coml4 dispatch 150055 of October 1940.
« (e) Coml4 dispatch 220230 of October 1940.
1. In view of the inquiry contained in reference (a), (b), and (c), I consider
it desirable to write this letter to set forth the present ability of the 14th Naval
District to meet surprise hostile attack of an enemy with the equipment and forces
at hand.
2. Aircraft raids.
Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly be brought by
carriers. Therefore, there are two ways of repelling attack. First, by locating
and destroying the carrier prior to launching planes. Second, by driving off
attacking bombers with anti-aircraft guns and fighters. The Navy component
of the local defense forces has no planes for distance reconnaissance with which
to locate enemy carriers and the only planes belonging to the local defense forces
to attack carriers when located would be the Army bombers. The Army has
in the Hawaiian area 59 B-18 bombers. All of these are classified as being
obsolete. The model is six years old and the planes themselves are five years
old. Therefore, it is my opinion that neither numbers nor types are satisfactory
for the purposes intended. New bombing types of planes are expected some time
in the future. However, not before July 1941. For distance reconnaissance,
requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat for such as could be
spared by the Fleet.
2468 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
To drive off bombing planes after they have been launched will require both
fighter planes and anti-aircral't guns. The Army has in Hawaiian area, 36
pursuit pines, all of which are classified as obsolete. Some of them are six
years old and some of them are four years old. In numbers and models, there
is a serious deficiency existing. New fighters are expected when the P-40 is
in production to the extent that the 185 projected for Hawaii can be delivered.
This does not appear to be probable before the end of 1941 ; this number does
not appear adequate.
[23 J The Army is charged with the protection of the Pearl Harbor Base by
anti-aircraft guns. Tliere are in Hawaii 26 fixed 3" guns and 44 mobile 3" guns.
There are projected 24 more, to be deliveretl in 1941. Tliere are no 37-mm and
only 109-.50 caliber out of the projected 120 37-mm and 3a8-.50 caliber machine
guns. The Army plans to place the greater part of the 3" guns ai-ound Pearl
Harbor and only a few near other main objectives. In my opinion, it will be
necessary to increase the numbers of guns around Pearl Harbor greatly to have
any semblance of anti-aircraft defense. Furthennore, I express my doubt as to
the efficacy of a 3" gun with a 21-second fuse for driving off high altitude bombers.
The Army made no plans for the anti-aircraft defenses of Lualualei or Kaneoho;
furthermore, it will be necessary to have a considerable concentration of anti-
aircraft guns to defend the shipping terminals and harbor or Honolulu in order
that lines of communication may be kept open. With a limited number of anti-
aircraft barges affoat, I am of the opinion that at least 500 guns of adequate size
and range will be required for the efficient defense of the Hawaiian area. This
number is in addition to 37-mm and .50 caliber machine guns.
In addition to the above, the Army has planned an aircraft warning center
which will consist of eight radar stations. Three of these stations are fixed and
five are mobile. When completed at an indefinite date in the future, this warning
net should be adequate.
3. DEFENSE AGAINST SUBMARINES.
The additional defense against submarines would be continued by patrol vessels
and aircraft working in conjunction. The District has no aircraft for this
purpose. Recently, there have arrived here three vessels of Destroyer Division
Eighty which is assigned to the local defense forces. These vessels have listening
gear and, when repaired and ready for service, will be a valuable contribution for
anti-submarine and escort work. No anti-submarine nets are planned, nor are
any considered desirable. Anti-torpedo nets are projected for the entrances of
Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. They will probably be delivered about 1 March 1941.
The net depot will be completed somewhat later.
4. DEFENSE AGAINST MINES.
The District has recently built and equipped one sweeping barge and three
tugs are being equipped for towing and energizing the coil. This barge can
probably work out of Honolulu and Pearl Harbor until such time as it is seriously
injured' The District has no vessels available for use as sweepei-s for anchored
mines. A number of minesweepers are being built or purchased, but their deliv-
ery dates here are uncertain. A large number of sweepers will be required in
order to keep the harbors of Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, und Kaneche clear and, in
addition, Hilo on Hawaii, Kahului and Lahaina on Maui, and Port Allen and
Nawiliwili on Kauai. With the delivery of sweepers now being built or pur-
chased, the general situation will be improved immeasurably.
[24] 5. DEFENSE AGAINST BOMBARDMENT,
The coast defenses of the Army are considered adequate except that Kaneoho
receives verv little protection from the batteries.
6. SABOTAGE.
There are two tank farms, the upper and the lower. The lower is entirely
contained in the Government resei-vation and, by the use of roving patrols, is
considered reasonably secure. The upper farm is adjacent to a public highway.
The farm is surrounded by an unclimable fence and each tank has an earth berm.
Its chief exposure is along the highway. To counteract this, three elevated sentry
stations have been erected, each equipi>ed with searchlights. This enables
sentries to keep a continuous lookout over the entire fence line day and night;
the upper farm is considered fairly secure.
7. WATER AND ELECTRIC SUPPLY.
Recently a guardhouse has been erected and an alarm has been made, the
Marines alternating with the Army, for constant guai-d on the water supply.
A constant guard is kept on the electric supply lines through which outside
power is received.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2469
8. An elaborate system of photograph passes, search and examination is in
effect. There are over 5,000 Civil Service employees who come into the yard each
day. In addition, there are about 5,000 aniployees of civil contractors and several
thousand enlisted men. In addition to the above, there is a constant stream of
trucks and vehicles of all descriptions carrying supplies, stores, etc. It is
impossible to maintain absolute security without disruption of the work of the
yard. However, surprise searches and periodic stops, etc., are in effect in order
that the alert may be emphasized. The main gate has been strengthened to
prevent rush ; there have been two drills for the purpose of giving surprise train-
ing to the yai-d garrison in the event of a surprise riot in the yard. In addition
to tlhe above, a survey has been made, not only of the yard, but of all the outlying
stations, and every effort is being made to close holes and stop gaps. While the
Commandant is not satisfied, he feels that the precautions taken are reasonably
effective but that they are susceptible to improvement, which will be made as
occasion warrants.
[25] 9. It should be borne in mind that until comparatively recently, none
of us in this country had very much conception of what measures were necessary
and what provisions were desirable in order to effect any measures of protection
against aircraft, against submarines, against mines, and against subversive
elements. The officers and men of this command have been alert, zealous, and
vigilant in executing all measures under their control in order to properly
prepare the District for any exigencies.
10. It should be assumed that the War Department is fully aware of the
situation here and that it will proceed vigorously with a view to overcome
deficiencies. It may be that they have failed to recognize the necessity for
large numbers of anti-aircraft guns and pursuit planes. I suggest that the Chief
of Naval Operations make inquiry from the War Department as to what their
plans are and on what dates they predict that they will be accomplished and
then, if the numbers and dates are not satisfactory, these features may be dis-
cussed at length.
11. It is considered highly undesirable from my point t»f view that the War
Department should in any way come to believe that there is lack of agreement
between the Army authorities aiid Navy authorities here, or that the officials
of the 14th Naval District are pressing the Navy Department to do something
in regard to Army matters.
C. C. Blooh.
[26] A16/
Serial 022
Confidential
United States Fiji;t,
U. S. S. New Mexico, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., January 7, 19^1.
1st Endorsement to Coml4 conf. Itr.
A16-1/A7-2/ND14 (629) of 30 Dec. 1940,
From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To : Chief of Naval Operations
Subj : Situation concerning the security of the Fleet and the present ability of
of the local defense forces to meet surprise attacks.
1. Forwarded. The Commander-in-Chief has conferred with the Commandant,
14th Naval District, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
As a result of this conference with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, and an inspection in company with him, information was furnished on
which the Commandant, 14th Naval District prepared the basic letter. The
Commander-in-Chief concurs with the Commandant, 14th Naval District in
the opinion that the present Army pursuit squadrons and anti-aircraft batteries
are adequate to protect the Fleet at Pearl Harbor against air attacks. When
established, the proposed pursuit strength will be adequate. The proposed total
of 68 mobile three-inch guns for this area is not considered adequate. With the
almost continuous high ceiling prevailing in this area, a materially greater num-
ber of larger and longer range anti-aircraft guns are necessary to counter high
altitude bombing attacks on Pearl Harbor.
2. If neither the increased anti-aircraft batteries nor the augmented pui-suit
squadrons will be available for an extended period, the defense of Fleet units
within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet
2470 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
which may be in Pearl Harbor in event of attack by hostile aiicraft. Plans for
cooperation with the local defense forces are beinj? made. At present, the con-
tinuous readiness of carrier fighter squadrons or anti-aircraft batteries is not
contemplated. The improbability of such an attack under present conditions
does not, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, warrant interrupting en-
tirely the training required by fleet air units which would have to be largely
curtailed if constant readiness with fighter squadrons were required.
[27 J 3. There does not appear to be any practicable w-ay of placing tor-
pedo baffles or nets within the harbor to protect the ships moored therein against
torpedo plane attack without greatly limiting the activities within the harbor,
particularly the movements of large ships and the landing and take-off of patrol
squadrons. Inasmuch as Pearl Harbor is the only operating base available to the
Fleet in this area, any passive defense measures that will further restrict the
use of the base as such should be avoided. Considering this as an impossibility
of such an attack under present conditions and the unlikelihood of an enemy
being able to send a carrier sufiiciently near in war time in the face of active
fleet operations, it is not considered necessary to lay such nets.
4. The defense against submarines and mines are considered adequate under
present peacetime conditions, but early installation of under-water sound-sub-
marine detection system should be made. Also the delivery of the required ships
to the 14th Naval District defense forces should be expedited, particularly ships
for sweeping magnetic and anchored mines.
5. In this connection, is urgently recommended that local defense forces, ade-
quate for the protection of Naval installations at Pearl Harbor and the Fleet units
based thereon, be provided the Commandant, 14th Naval District. In order to
provide freedom of action for the United States P'leet. and further, to avoid the
necessity of detailing important fleet units (because no other ships are available)
to tasks i-equiring only part of their full capabilities, it is considered that the
forces provided should be sufiicient for full protection and should be independent
of the presence or absence of the ships of the United States Fleet. It is further
considered that the provisions of adequate local defense forces for the 14th
Naval District should be given high priority than continental Naval Districts,
where both the possibility of, and objectives for, attack are much less.
J. O. Richardson.
cc: Com-14
Office of the Commandant,
[28] Via Clipper Mail 14th Naval Distmctt,
Confldential Pearl Harbor, T. H., 7 May lOU-
From : Commandant, 14th Naval District,
To : Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Local Defense Measures of Urgency.
1. A careful study indicates that the only way that submarines can be kept
out of an area or destroyed is by the use of :
(a) Small fast seagoing vessels equipped with listing gear, depth charges and
guns.
(b) Aircraft.
(c) A combination of (a) and (b).
(d) Mines.
2. In any Pacific war, it appears very obvious that the principal effort of our
enemy will be to concentrate its submarine activity in the area outside and near
Honolulu, Pearl Harbor, the Island Bases and the other ports of the Islands.
The protection supplied by existing arrangements for this area, exclusive of the
Fleet, is very weak and unsatisfactory.
3. At the present time, the District Commandant has four old destroyers only,
and these vessels, in addition to the anti-submarine activities, also act as e.scorts
and patrols in the Coastal Frodtier ; he has no aircraft and complete reliance
has to be placed (exclusive of the Fleet) on Army iilanes. This necessarily
requires much indoctrination of pilots and much training to qualify them for
the recognition of various types of vessels and other matters-pertaining to the
sea before they become proficient in spotting and attacking submarines.
4. At the Island Bases, harbors with some degree of security will be at Mid-
way, Johnston and Palmyra, but it is thought that craft as indicated in sub-
paragraph (a) of paragraph one of this letter will be required at these ])laces.
5. This is particularly true at Wake where it wul be a couple of years before
* EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2471
the harbor is dredged out. The quickest tinre ever made in unloading a ship
at Wake is ten days. Imagine a vessel moored ten [^.9] days off Wake
Island to transfer freight and provisions to the men working there and to the
garrison. This would appear to the undersigned as being a submarine picnic.
Accordingly, it is believed that at that place it will be necessary to have several
of the craft indicated in paragraph 1 (a).
6. Summarizing, the object of this letter is to invite attention to the weakness
of the local defense forces in protecting the vital comnumication lines at Oahu
and the island bases and to recommend that every effort be made to supply this
District at the earliest possible time with the necessary implements to combat the
most probable form of attack.
(C) C. C\ Bloch.
CO : CinCPac.
[30] Attached thereto is a routine slip, CIIN'CUS routing No. 04122, con-
taining a number of unintelligible initialings and bearing the notation under the
heading Remarks, "All too true".
[3J] In reply refer to initials and No.
Op-12B-7-dlm.
(SO A16-1/ND14.
Ser. 0135412.
Secret
NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OflSce of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, November 25, 1941.
From : The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commanderin-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and The Commandant, 14th
Naval District.
Subj : Local defense forces, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.
Ref.:
(a) CinCPac secret Itr A16/.(038W) of May 20, 1941 to CNO.
(b) W. P. L. — m.
(c) W. P. Pac— 46.
(d) CNO secret Itr Op-12B-7-djm. (SC) A16-1/ND14, Ser. 070312, of June
23, 1941, to CinCPac, copy to Coml4.
(e) Coml4 secret Itr (SC) A16-1/ND14 (01084) of Oct. 17, 1941.
(f) CinCPac end. N'D14/16, S'er. 096W of no date, to ref. (a).
(g) CNO conf. Itr. Oi>-22-A2, (SC) A16-3(9), Ser. 0115422 of Oct. 23, 1941.
1. The request of the Commandant, 14th Naval District, in reference (e), for
a number of small anti-submaripe craft and at least two squadrons of VSO planes
for anti-submarine patrol, and the endorsement thereon by Comroander-in-Chief,
U. S. Pacific Fleet, reference (f ), have been given full consideration by the Chief
of Naval Operations.
2. The previous letter of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, reference
(a), pertaining to the same general subject, was replied to in reference (d).
3. The Chief of Naval Operations notes that the Commander-in-Chief, U. S.
Pacific Fleet, in his War Plan, reference (c), has taken full cognizance of his
responsibilities in connection with his tasks pertaining to the Hawaiian Naval
Coastal Frontier. The forces available in the Hawaiian area, both fleet and local
defense forces, in the actual operations of our own and hostile forces, will, of
course, indicate the numbers of fleet vessels or aircraft required to be assigned
to local defense tasks.
[32] 4. Neither the local defense forces operating plan — Rainbow No. 5
(Naval District Plan 0-5, Rainbow No. 5) nor the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan, both required by reference (b), have yet been received by the Chief of Naval
Operations. The joint plan should indicate what assistance in anti-submarine
or other patrols will be rendered by Army Air Forces. A recent joint letter of
the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, contained in reference (g),
provided for joint exercises of Army and Navy Frontier forces and called attention
to the necessity of early completion of both defense plans.
5. The augmentation of the local defense forces of the 14th Naval District is
proceeding as fast as the availability of ships, funds, personnel, material, and
priorities will permit. The current situation in this I'egard may be summarized
as follows :
(a) The Department now has authority to acquire and convert four small and
ten larger types of privately-owned vessels for the Naval local defense forces
2472 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK '
of the 14th Naval District. These are generally of the yacht type and do not
have very high speeds. The delivery of under-water detection devices is slow,
but every effort will be made to give priority for such gear assigned to these
vessels.
(b) The completion of the 173-ft. subchasers (TC) is progressing slowly, and
they will not be turned out in any quantity until about May 1942. Eight of these,
due for completion in May 1942, are tentatively assigned to the 14th Naval Dis-
trict. The date of completion of the llO-ft. subchasers (PC) is indefinite, due to
the engine situation.
(c) The Commandant now has under his command, the Coast Guard of the
14th Naval District. Of the Coast Guard vessels under his command, the fol-
lowing are equipped with depth charges and under-water detection gear : TANEY,
RELIANCE, and TIGER.
(d) Ten YMS's, expected to have depth charges and sound gear when availaUe,
are tentatively assigned to the 14th Naval District. Two of these are due for
completion in the third quarter.
(e) The Department has no additional airplanes available for assignment to
the 14th Naval District. Allocations of new aircraft squadrons which become
available in the near future will be determined by the requirements of the
strategic situation as it develops.
[33] 6. Transmission of this document by the following means is necessary
and is authorized : within the continental limits of the United States by regis-
tered airmail ; beyond the continental limits of the United States via P. A. A.
locked box.
/S/ H. R. Stark
H. R. Stark
Coml4 told to comply with paragraph four, * * * of 12/17/41.
[34] In reply refer to initial and No.
Op30Cl-AJ
(SC) N20-12
Serial 09330
Confidential
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, Fehruary 15, 1941.
From : Chief of Naval Operations.
To : Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.
Subj : Anti-Torpedo Baffles for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attacks, Pearl
Harbor.
1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl
Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the
relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl
Harbor. In addition, the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room
limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.
2. Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in
planning the installations of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which
the following may be considered :
(a) A minimum depth of water of 75' may be assumed necessary to successfully
drop torpedoes from planes, 150' of water is desired. The maximum height
planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250'. Launching speeds are
between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height for drop is 60' or less. About 200
yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this
may be altered.
(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching
and leaving berths.
(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.
(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges and
harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.
(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by
shipping.
[35] (f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to
insure the vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle.
(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane
attack from the land side more difficult.
EXHIBITS OF JOINIV COMMITTEE 2473
(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be placed as to compel attacking
planes to come within effective range of antiaircraft batteries before they can
range their torpedoes.
(i) Availability of shore and ship antiaircraft protection, balloon barrages,
and aircraft protection.
(j) Availability of natural, well-protected anchorages within the harbor from
torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as
a fleet is based, the installation baffles would be difficult because of the congestion.
3. As a matter of interest, the successful attacks at Taranto were made at very
low launching heights at reported range by the individual aviators of 400 to
1,300 yards from the battleships, but the depths of water in which the torpedoes
were launched were between fourteen and fifteen fathoms. The attacks were
made in the face of intensive and apparently erratic antiaircraft fire. The
eastern shore line of the anchorage and moorings were protected by numerous
balloon barrages, but there was no trawler balloon barrage to the west. The
torpedoes were apparently dropped inside of the nets, probably A/T nets.
[36] 4. It is considered that certain large bays and harbors, where a fleet
or large force of heavy ships may be anchored and exposed with a large body
of water on an entire flank, should have that flank protected by a series of baffles
if the water is deep enough for launching torpedoes there. The main fleet
anchorage at Scapa Flow, for instance, has an A/T net extending slightly to the
north of a line between Calf of Flotta and Cava Island, protecting the main fleet
anchorage. The depth of water where this net is laid is approximately 17
fathoms. On the other hand, constructed harbors, in which practically all avail-
able space is taken up by anchorages, and which are relatively deep, probably must
depend upon other defense measures. It might be possible and practicable to
provide in some places, which are not protected by relatively shallow water,
antitorpedo baffles practically surrounding a limited number of berths for large
ships, such as battleships or carriers. An extreme example of this is furnished
at the present time by the French at Dakar, where double nets surround the
Richelieu ; she is placed similarly as in a dry dock, and evidently would have to
open a section of the net to be hauled clear. The depth of water at Dakar, how-
ever, is very shallow.
5. The present A/T nets are very expensive, extremely heavy, are heavily
anchored and moored, take up about 200 yards of space perpendicular to the line
of the net, take a long time to lay, and are designed to stand up under heavy
weather conditions. There is apparently a great need for the development of a
light efficient torpedo net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within
protective harbors and which can be readily removed. It is hoped that some
such net can be developed in the near future.
6. Recommendations and comments of the Commander in Chief are especially
desired.
H. R. Stabk.
cc : CinCLant
CinCAsiatic
[37] Op30Cl-AJ
(SC)N20-12
Ser. 010230 »
Confidential
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Febi-uory 17, 1941.
From : The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commandant, First Naval District.
The Commandant. Third Naval District.
The Commandant, Fourth Naval District.
The Commandant, Fifth Naval District.
The Commandant, Sixth Naval District.
The Commandant, Seventli Naval District.
The Commandant, p]ighth Naval District.
The Commandant, Tenth Naval District.
The Commandant. Eleventh Naval District.
The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.
The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.
The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
2474 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The CoiiiiiiiUKlant, Fifteentli Naval District.
The Coinniaiidaiit, Sixteenth Naval District.
The ConiiiiaiKlaiit, Naval Station, Guaiitanamo.
Suhj : Antitorpedo Batfle for Protection Against Tori)e(lo Plane Attacks.
1. In previous corresi^ondence, the Commandants and local joint planning
committees have heen requested, where considered necessary, to suhmit recom-
mendations concerning the employment of nets and hooms in their defenses. lu
nearly all cases the reconnnendations i-eceived were limited to hai-hor entrances.
One of the reasons for this was tiiat the Department, after previously nmking a
.study of many harbors, submitted certain proposals for consideration by the
districts, but did not specifically proteose any protection against torpedo plane
attacks.
2. The Commandants and local joint planning committees are requested, if
they have not' already done so, to consider the employment of and to make recom-
mendations concerning antitorpt^do battles, especially for the protection of large
and valuable units of the Fleet in their respective harbors, and especially at the
laige fleet i)ases.
3. In considering the use of A/T baffles, the following limitations, among others,
may be borne in mind :
[;jS] (a) A minimum depth of water of ^^^ feet may be assumed necessary to
succe.ssfuUy drop torpedt)es from planes. About 200 yards of tor])edo run is neces-
sary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.
(b) There should be ample maneuvering rctom available for vessels approach-
ing and leaving berths.
(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.
(d) Room nuist be available inside the baffle for tugs, fuel oil barges and
harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual .ships.
(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by
shipping.
(f ) Baffles should be sufficient xlistance from anchored vessels to insure the
vessels' safety in case a torpedo expbxles upon striking baffle.
(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage nuikes a successful airplane
attack from the land side most difficult.
(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking
planes to come within effective range of antiaircraft batteries before they can
range their torpedoes.
(i) Availability of shore and ship antiaircraft protection, balloon barrages,
and aircraft protection.
(j) Availability of naturally well-protected anchorages within the harbor
from torpedo plane attack on a number of large sbiiis. Where a large force such
as a fleet is based, the establishment of certain baffles would be difficult because
of congestion.
■ R. E. Ingersoll,
Acting.
cc: CinCPac , CO, NavNetDep, Tiburon BuOrd
CinC Atlantic CO, NavNetDep, Newport Od-12
CinC Asiatic
[3.91 Op-30Cl-AJ
(S(')M20-12
Serial 055730
Confidential
Navy Depaktmknt,
Office of the Chief of Navat. Operations,
Washington, June 13, 1941.
From: The Chief of Naval Operation.s.
To: The <'ommandant. Fiist Naval District
The Conunandant, Third Naval District
The conunandant, Foui-th Naval District
The ('(muiiandant. Fifth Naval District
The Commandant, Sixth Naval District
The Commandant, Seventh Njival District
The Conunandant, P]ighth Naval District
The Conunandant. Tenth Naval District
The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2475
The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District
The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District
Subj : Antitorpedo Baffles for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attack.
Ref : (a) CNO conf. Itr. Op-30C1 Ser. 010230 of Feb.l7,lWl.
1. In reference (a), the Connnandants were requested to consider the employ-
ment of and to make reconunendations concerning antitorpedo baffles, especially
for protection of large and valuable units of the Fleet in their respective harbors
and especially at the major Fleet bases. In paragraph three were itemized
certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles, among which the follow-
ing was stated :
"A mininuun depth of water of 75' may be asumed necessary to successfully
drop torpedoes from planes. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before
the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."
2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes
may be dropped from phines at heights of as nuich as 300', and in some cases
may initiate dives of considerably less than 75', and make excellent runs. Hence,
it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable
vessel is safe when at anchor from' this type of attack if surrounded by water
at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run
to arm the torpedo.
[40] 3. While no mininmm depth of water in which Naval vessels may
be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo
plane attack, it may be asumed that depth of water will be one of the factors
considered by any attack force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water
(10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.
4. As a matter of information, the torpedoes launched by the British at
Taranto, were, in general, at thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although
several torpedoes may have been launched at eleven or twelve fathoms.
R. E. INGERSOIX.
cc: CinCPac; CinCLant; CinCAF ; Co, NavNetDep, Tiburon ; Co, NavNetDep,
Newport ; Comdt., NavSta Guautauamo ; Comdt., NavSta Samoa ; BuOrd ; Op-12.
Ul] 4 December 1941 Secret
From: CINCPAC
Action: COMTASKFOR 3]
COMFOURTEEN [Mailgram
COMPATWING 2 J
Info: COMBATFOR ]
COMBASEFOR U/roii„vor«
COMAIRBATFORr^'^S^^^
LEXINGTON J
040237
Myser 01825 of 10 Nov marine scoron two three one will base eighteen planes
Midway X Lexington provide transportation X On 5 Dec aftei- sortie I*earl form
Task Force Twelve under COMCRUSCOFOR consisting of Lexingtou Chicago
Astoria Portland Desron Five less DESDIV Ten X Task Force Twelve proceed
by direct route to arrive four hundred miles 130 degrees from Midway at 2230
GCT on 7 Dec X From that vicinity fly off Marine planes to Midway X Return
operating area and resume normal operations after planes have arrived Mid-
way X COMTASKFOR Nine direct patrol planes fi-om Midway cover Lexington
flying off position provide security while that area and guard Marine plane
flight X Communications radio condition 19 guard continuously NPM primary
fox X COM 14 inform Midway planes expected arrive about 0200 GCT on 8
Dec and require Midway report arrival to Com 14 by coded dispatch X COM
14 pass this report to COMTASKFOR 12 X Midway submarine patrol will be
advised.
U21 From: CNO
Action: CINCUS, CINCAF, COMROLFOR (Mailgram)
Date : 21 January 1941
212155
The international situation continues to deteriorate X It now appears to me
that if war eventuates its general character will be according to plan DOG my
2476 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
memorandum to the secretary X If this estimate proves correct I contemplate
ordering mobilization according to plan RAINBOW Three with following modifi-
cations Atlantic Fleet principal concentration New England and Canada execute
all tasks except atirm expect early reenforcement from Pacific and much stronger
British Isles detachment X Pacitlc Fleet waiting attitude or execute assigned
tasks in area eastward of 160 degrees ?ast depending on action by Japan X
Asiatic Fleet can not expect early reenforcement alert status or carry out tasks
accordiu^ to circumstances.
[43] From: Alusna, London • Top Secret
Action: OPNAV
Date : 3 February 1941
03140 Passed to CINCUS CINCLANT CINCAF for info as OPNAV 032300
I have been officially informed that Japanese are apparently planning an offen-
sive on a large scale presumed against Indochina Malay Peninsula or the Dutch
East Indies no doubt to be coordinated with attack on Great Britain approximately
February 10. It is definite that the Jap and German relations are becoming most
intimate and that the Japs are conducting a hatred campaign against the British
even in ordinarily pro-English press also two large Japanese Merchant vessel
sailings have been cancelled. Reports believed reliable state that all Jap ship-
ping being called home to be taken over by the government. Request your
knowledge of this. The Japanese mediating that Indochina scene meeting aboard
Jap cruiser. Price of umpire's services unreliably reported to be bases on the
west coast of Siam that are usable by light craft for cutting Singapore communi-
cations via the Malacca Straits.
[U] CINCPAC FILE NO. Sn
A4-3/FF12/(13)
Serial 01254
CONFIDENTIAL
United States Pacifto Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Pearl Harbor, T. H., August 13, 1941.
From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander Battle Force (Commander Task Force ONE).
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force (Commander Task Force TWO).
Commander Scouting Force (Commander Task Force THREE).
Commander Base Force.
Commanding General, Second Marine Division.
Subject: Employment Schedules; U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal
Year, 1942.
Reference :
(a) Cincus Itr. A4-3/FF1 Serial 1773 of 16 May, 1038.
(b) U. S. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No, 4CL-41.
(c) Cinpac Conf. Itr. A4-3/FF1-1 Serial 07r.0 of 8 May, 1041.
Enclosure (Under separate cover) : (A) Copy of subject schedule — Action Ad-
dressees 10 each, information addressees 3 each.
1. Encl(;sure (A) has been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations and is
the general directive for preparation of the subject of this letter.
2. Second quarter employment schedules will be submitted for approval by 5
September, printed and distributed by 15 September, 1941, as follows:
(a) Task Force Commanders inform Type Commanders and Commander Base
Force of the times in the schedule to be devoted to inter-type tactics in their
respective Task Forces, as soon as practicable.
(b) Type Commanders submit two Task Force Commanders, information Com-
mander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, recommendations for type training indicat-
ing priorities in exercises. Coumiander Scouting Force assign submarines and
Patrol Squadrons to Task Forces.
r4'51 (c) Ta.sk Force Commanders an<l Commander Base Force prepare and
submit to Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for approval, the quarterly
employment schedule coordinating the requirements of types in their re.spective
Forces.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2477
3. Fleet units in Hawaiian Area are divided for training and operations be-
tween three Task Forces, Base Force, and Naval Transportation Service as
follows :
TASK FORCE OiVjB— Commander Battle Force.
Batdivs TWO and FOUR
SARATOGA and planes
Crudiv NINE
Desfiot ONE less Desron FIVE
Mindiv ONE, OGLALA
% available submarines
2 Patrol Squadrons
TASK FORCE TWO— Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.
Batdiv ONE
ENTERPRISE and planes
Crudivs THREE and FIVE
Desflot TWO, Desdiv FIFTY
Mindiv TWO
% available submarines
2 Patrol Squadrons
TASK FORCE THREE— Commander Scouting Force.
Crudivs FOUR AND SIX
LEXINGTON and planes
Desron FIVE plus Minron TWO
Transports, Base Force (wben present)
Second Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detach-
ment.
Submarines, Scouting Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet (to include Subdiv
TWENTY-ONE) leos % available submarines.
Aircraft, Scouting Force,. U. S. Pacific Fleet, less 4 Patrol Squadrons.
146] BASE FORCE, U. S. Pacific Fleet, less transports (when present).
NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE— Vessels operating under Opnav
and Com 14.
4. Units are assigned in accordance with reference (b). Units omitted from
reference (b) have been included in tlie Task Force Organizations for training
purposes.
5. Force and Type Commanders may, to suit individual ship requirements,
shift units from one Task Force to another, maintaining proportion of upkeep
and operating time.
6. One Task Force will be at sea at all times. When Task Forces enter and
leave Pearl Harbor the same day, the departing force will clear before the entry
of the other force commences.
7. Reference (c) remains effective, when practicable.
8. Schedules will provide for as many tenders and Base Force vessels as prac-
ticable to participate in Fleet Tactics during the period 21-25 November, 1941.
9. Operating and upkeep periods are assigned as follows :
Operating
Task Force One-
Task Force Two.
[7,7] Task Force Three.
10-18 Oct
1-10 Nov
22-28 Nov
13-20 Dec
31 Dec
24 Sept-2 Oct
18-26 Oct
10-17 Nov
28 Nov-f) Dec
18-26 Dec
2-10 Oct
23 Oct-1 Nov
17-25 Nov
5-13 Dec
26-31 Dec
Upkeep
28 Sep-9 Oct
19-31 Oct
11-21 Nov
29 Nov-12 Dec
21-30 Dec
3-17 Oct
27 Oct-9 Nov
18-27 Nov
6-17 Dec
27 Dec
20 Sei>-1 Oct
11-22 Oct
2-16 Nov
26 Nov-4 Dec
14-25 Dec
2478 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
10. Periods assigned for Fleet Tactics:
Task Forces Two and Three— 23-26 Oct.
Task Foi-ces One and Three— 22-25 Nov.
Task Forces One and Two— 18-20 Dec.
Copy t(t : Comdesbatfor
Opnav Conisubscofor
CincLant Coiuairscofor
CincAF Coniinron TWO
Coiubatships Coinpatwing TWO
Comcrubatfor Coinpatwing ONE
H. E. KlMMEL.
Coiuinbatfor Com 14
Comcruscofor
P. C. Crosley,
/S/ P. C. Crosley,
Flag Secretary.
[48] Date: 24 May 1941 Top Secret
From : OPNAV
To : CINCPAC
242150
The Department in the interest of morale will consider visits of small detach-
ments or individual ships to the Pacific Coast. It is not desired that detachments
of such size make these visits as to indicate the breaking up or reducing of
Hawaiian concentration. Your recommendations are requested.
[49] Date : 17 Oct 1941 Secret
From : CINCPAC
To : COMSUBSCOFOR
Info to : COM 14
170354
When in all respects ready for war service send two submarines to Wake X
Patrol radius fifteen miles of Wake X Direct submarines report contacts and be
prepared take offensive action only if attacked or if ordered to do so by CINCPAC.
Secret
[50] Date: 17 Oct 1941
From: CINCPAC
To: COMSUBSCOFOR
Info to : COM FOURTEEN
170426
Direct' submarines now operating Midway assume war patrol ten mile radius X
Report contacts X Take offensive action only if attacked or if ordered to do so
by CINCPAC.
[51] Date: 17 Oct 1941 Secret
From: CINCPAC
To: COMFOURTEEN
170319
Direct an alert status in outlying islands.
[52] Date: 17 OCT 1941
Originator : COM 14
Action : Naval Air Stations, Midway ; Johnston ; Palmyra ; Marine Detachment
at Wake.
Written up for CINCPAC Info
170356 Secret
In view international situation assume alert status.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE * 2479
[53] Date : 17 OCTOBER 1941 Secret
From: CINCPAC
To: COMPATWING 2 (TWO)
Info to: COMFOURTEEN
17<M29
When in all respects ready for war service send one squadron patrol planes
to operate from Midway until further orders X Carry out daily patrol within
100 miles of island X Report contacts X In addition be prepared on further
orders to send six of the above planes to Wake and replace them at Midway by
six planes Form Pearl X Planes will take offensive action only if planes or
bases are actually attacked or on further orders from CINCPAC.
[54] November 26 1941 Secret
From : Chief of Naval Operations
To: CINCPAC
270040
Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for reenforcing
defense battalions now on station if you consider tiiis desirable X Army also
proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases, which you may
occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft units X Take this
into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops
desired and recommended armament.
Copy to : War Plans Division, U. S. Army.
[55] 26 November 1941 Secret
From : Chief of Naval Operations
To: CINCPAC
270038
In order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for
expeditionary use OPNAV has requested and Army has agreed to station twenty-
five Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you
consider this feasible and de.sirable X It will be nece.ssary for you to transport
these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an Aircraft Car-
rier X Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in
boats essential spare! parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or
on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels X Army understands these forces
must be quartered in tents X Navy must be responsible for supplying water and
subsistence and transporting other Army supplies X Stationing these planes
must not be allowed to Interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to
Philippines X Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary X
Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which
may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations X Confer with com-
manding general and advise as soon as practicable X
Copy to : War Plans Division, U. S. Army.
[Telegram]
[56] Standard Form No. 14A [Stamped] Secret.
Approved by The President March 10, 1926.
From War Department
Bureau A. G. O.
AG 381 ( 11-29-41 ) MC-E
EHB/cdm-1712 •
November 29 1941
Cablegram
Commanding General,
Hawaiian DepaitniPnt, Fort Shaffer, T. H.
Sent No. 489, 11/29.
Consult C in C Pacific Fleet reference his dispatch number two eight zero six
two seven to Chief of Naval Operations period In view of information contained
in above dispatch comma the movement of the two Army Pursuit Squadrons as
indicated in War Department cable number four six six comma November two
2480 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
six comma one nine four one comma will be siisijended period These squadrons
should however he prepared to move on short notice period Paragraph War
Department has offered to take over defense of Pacific advance bases from the
Navy except for furnishinjr antiaircraft equipment period Consult C in C Pacific
Fleet reference requirements and areas to be defended peiiod War Department
has also assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton period It
is contemplated that you will form base defense units from the Hawaiian Gar-
rison specially organized as task forces for particular areas period If these units
are moved from Oahu comma necessary replacements from the United States will
be furnished period Report your conclusions and recommendations to the War
Department at the earliest practicable date.
Adams.
Official : Secret.
/s/ (Illegible)
Adjutant General.
47 AGO Dec 8 1941 Received
True copy :
Based on : WPD 4571-5, 11/29/41.
Green cy w/d & destroyed by
burning. 12/30/41, CDM-1705
[Stamped] Secret.
[57] Nov. 28, 1941 Top Secret
From: CINCPAC
To : OPNAV
Action : 12 (
28 0 627
Reference Urdis 270040 and 270038 ; Wright now at Wake to discharge ground
crews and material to operate one squadron of marine planes. It proceeds after-
wards to Midway to land similar items. Arrangements have already been made
to send each of those places essential ground material for temporary Operation of
12 B-17 Army bombers, to leave Pearl about Dec. 1st, but at present only 6 such
planes of the 12 on Oahu are in operating condition. An acute shortage of Army
bombs precludes any shipments to outlying bases but Navy bombs are now avail-
able there. These may be used by the Army with minor alterations. Useful-
ness of Army pursuit planes for insular defense is radically limited by their
doubtful capability of operating over 20 miles offshore. Their use is possible
but inability to land on carrier freezes them to island where landetl, and flex-
ibility dispositions is thereby curtailed. Additional antiaircraft guns needed
this area for Army & Marine defense battalions. Consider use of Army troop
reinforcements for outlying bases inadvisable as long as Marines are available
but plans are being made for such use of Army troops. All outlying forces must
be exclusively under Navy command, 12 marine fighters leave Nov. 28 in carrier
for Wake. Expect send other Marine planes to Midway later. On Dec. 1st
sending 12 patrol planes to Wake from Midway, and replacing those at Midway
from Pearl. The feasability and advisability of relieving Marine planes with
Army pursuits will be investigated more thoroughly.
[58] EG61/(16)
Serial 0114W My
Secret
Peakl H.xrhor, T. H., 2 December 19^1.
From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval (>i)eration.
Subject: Defense of Outlying Bases.
Reference :
. (a) Opnav despatch 270038 of November 1941.
(b) Opnav despatch 270040 of November 1941.
(c) Cincpac despatch 280027 of November 1941.
(d) Opnav despatch 282054 of November 1941.
(e) War Dept. despatch 48 of Nov. 29, 1941.
(f) Cincpac secret serial 0113W of Dec. 3, 1941.
(g) Cincpac secret serial 090W of Oct. 21, 1941.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2481
1. Reference (a) advised that Army pursuit planes, could be made available
for Wake and Midway in order to retain 2d Marine Aircraft Wing available for
expeditionary use. Reference (h) advised that Army could make infantry
available to rcenforcc defense battalions now on station, and that Army proposed
to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, might occupy but that they could provide no anti-aircraft
units.
2. Reference (c) outlined certain measures that the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, had already taken to strengthen the air defenses of Midway and
Wake and others, including Army air cooperation, that were in progress. Ref-
erence (d) approved of the arrangements made and stated that the War De-
partment would instruct the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to
cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops
in suijport of Marines. It also asked for report on present defenses of outlying
bases and increases planned in immediate future. The report is furnished in
reference (f).
3. Reference (e) from the War Department to the Commanding General Ha-
waiian Department, which i-eferred to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's
280627, is somewhat at variance with Chief of Naval Operation despatches in
that it states the War Department has offered to take over defense of Pacific
advance bases from the Navy except for furnishing AA equipment. It also
stated that the War Department has assumed responsibility for defense of
Christmas and Canton Islands.
[59] 4. Reference (g) contained a study by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, of the defenses of outlying bases and recommendations as to personnel
and equipment therefor.
5. It is not completely clear whether or not the Navy Department has in mind
that the Army will ultimately relieve the Marine Defense Battalions. If so,
it is assumed that such action would be taken in order to have those battalions
and their equipment available to garrison positions taken by assault in the
Marshalls and the Carolines. Should such assumption be correct, it is perti-
nent to note that transports, travned assault troops, etc., are not now available
to make the seizures. Moreover,, the local Army authorities are not only short
of anti-aircraft equipment, but of most other armament necessary for defense
of an advanced island base. If the Marine Defense Battalions were withdrawn
at this time it would be necessary to leave behind most of their equipment, and
they would have none for use elsewhere.
6. To clarify the current situation to some extent, certain information and
considei'ations that may not otherwise be readily available in the Department
are mentioned below :
(a) Army is not only lacking AA guns for outlying bases, but has a serious
shortage on Oahu. It has insufficient suitable guns for replacing Marine 7"
and 5" guns without weakening the defenses of Hawaii. By taking 155 mm
guns from Hawaii the Marine 5" guns might be replaced but the 155 mm guns
would either cover a limited arc or else their mobility would be lost.
(b) Army can spare no .50 caliber machine guns but can supply rifles and
.30 caliber machine guns.
(c) Army has a lunited numbei" of 37 mm guns, badly needed for defenses in
Hawaii, but some few might be made available by weakening *lhe defenses here;
particularly as a considerable increase in the number of such guns is expected in
the near future. At present there is a marked shortage of ammunition for 37 mm.
[60] (d) (1) Army pursuit planes are available in sufficient numbers to
send at least one squadron each to Midway and Wake.
(2) Tbe fighting capabilities of those planes is superior to that of Marine
fighters or light bombers.
(3) They have no offensive capabilities against hostile surface craft or sub-
marines.
(4) They lack navigational equipment, their personnel are inexperienced in
flying over water and are much averse to operations more than fifteen miles
from land.
(5) Pursuit planes once having landed at Midway or Wake, cannot fly off
to carriers. It would be virtually impossible to take them out of Wake; and a
very slow and difficult undertaking to remove them from Midway.
(e) Army has personnel available in sufficient numbers to I'eenforce or relieve
the Marine Defense Battalions. The Marines have been organized, equipped,
and trained for work of this particular character. They are already established,
habited to the mode of life, and experienced in fitting their activities to accord
79716 O — 46 — pt. 17 4
2482 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
with the various other naval activities in these outlying places. It is no re-
flection upon the Army to say that their units would require considerable time
to acquire the in-oficiency in this specialized work that the Marines already have.
(f) In emergency, Army per.sonnel might replace casualties or reenforce Ma-
rines, but it would, for very obvious reasons, be highly preferable to have other
Marines available for that purpose.
(g) No spare armament for defense battalions is available. In fact, some
deficiencies in equipment for existing battalions exist; and the recommendations
of reference (g) as to armament for the outlying bases have not been completely
filled. Armament and equipment for any new defense battalions have not been
assembled.
[6'/] (h) The bases are being developed to facilitate fleet operations. Ir-
respective of the source of defense forces, various other naval activities will con-
tinue at these outlying bases. Placing the defenses in Army hands would bring
some ditficult problems of command relationships. Such problems would not, of
course, be insurmountable, but they would be avoided if the Marines are not
replaced.
(i) Twelve Marine fighting planes are now on Wake; a squadron of Marine
light bombers is in readiness to fly to Midway. These planes are accustomed to
long operations over water, and from carriers. The bombers have offensive
power against surface ships or submarines.
(j) Arrangements exist or will shortly exist on both Midway and Wake for
temporary offensive operations of Army B-17 bombers, using Navy bombs. Only
six such bombers (m Oahu are now in operating condition.
(k) Personnel and equipment, up to the limits given in reference (g), are
being transferred to the outlying ba.ses as rapidly as available and the condi-
tions at those bases make feasible.
(1) Prior to receipt of reference dispatches, arrangements for Army coopera-
tion in certain respects had been made; and close cooperation and liaison will
continue.
(m) Essential work is being pushed at outlying bases, and it is not intended
to withdraw civilian workers if hostilities develop. Plans have been made to
incorporate such workers into the defense organization insofar as practicable.
7. From the foregoing, it is concluded that at this time:
(a) Marine armament can be withdrawn from outlying islands to a very
limited extent.
[62] (b) If the Marines are replaced, the personnel relieved, lacking
equipment, will be valueless as a defense battalion.
(c) Replacing the Marines will very materially weaken the defenses because
of less proflcient personnel.
(d) Considering all asi>ects of the matter. Marine planes are more valuable
in the Advance Bases than Army pursuit planes.
8. The pre.sence of Army forces on outlying bases will inevitably bring up the
question of command. Midway, Wake, Johnston and Palmyra are Naval Air
Stations, designed and built primarily to support Fleet operations. Any other
activities there, including defense, must be subordinate to this purpose. Defense
itself exists solely for the purpose of insuring the availability of the bases. The
establishments are small and close coordination of all activities is mandatory,
extending to joint use of material and equipment and even to joint participation
by all hands in unusual tasks. This can be accomplished only by unity of
command, which must be vested in the cne officer qualified to insure that the
base fulfills its purpose, whether under attack or not and no matter what organi-
zation operates the defenses. The interests of the Navy are paramount and
unity of command must be vested in the Commanding Officer of the Station. The
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as already brought out in his despatches,
cannot too strongly emphasize this ptiint.
9. The Commander-in-Chief recognizes that unforeseen events may rapidly
develop that would nece.ssitate replacement of Marines by Army personnel, pro-
vided siiilal)le equipment is available. He has had conferences with the Com-
manding General, Hawaiian Department, on the matter and arrangements are
in progress looking toward
(a) Organization of three Army defense battalions of approximately 800 men
each (organization along the lines of Marine Defense Battalions) :
[63] (b) Training of such units with equipment. Army or Marine, available
on Oahu ;
(c) Army steps to obtain requisite annament ccmiparable to that called for in
reference (g) for use in the Advance Bases; •
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2483
(d) Army organization of three 18-plane pursuit squadrons to be kept in
expeditionary status with crews, ground crews and equipment ready for trans-
portation, on short notice, to Advanced Bases — planes to be transported by air-
craft carrier and flown off near destination.
(e) Bringing aforementioned units to a satisfactory state of readiness and
keeping them available for (1) relieving, supporting, or furnishing replace-
ments for Marine Defense Battalions, or (2) for garrisoning other islands or de-
velopments not now manned by Marines.
10. In connection with this whole question, the major point for the moment
appears to be that the Advanced Bases we now< have are, to a greater or lesser
extent, going concerns. Their development and provisions for defense have been
evolved after much work and study. The international situation is such that
active defense against hostile forces may l)e required on extremel.v short notice.
Any radical change in the defense arrangements should be made only if their
is compelling necessity therefor ; and a definite indication of clear cut gain for
over all operations.
11. The Commander-in-Chief is not aware of the particular circumstances
which have opened up the questions under discussion. If additional Advanced
Bases in our own or friendly territory are contemplated, it is highly important
that further information on the subject be furnished the Conmiander-in-Chief.
12. If, during the progress of the war, enemy positions are taken and require
garrisons they should, of course, be defended by Marine Defense Battalions.
It would be preferable to have Marine battalions with full equipment available
for such duty without disrupting the defenses of existing bases. At present, our
Advanced Bases should be defended by the most competent personnel available,
viz, the Marine Defense Battalions. [64] If our progress in the war has
brought more advanced positions under our control, then the most seasoned and
experienced personnel should be in the more exposed positions ; and the present
Advanced Bases which, by virtue of our forward movement, would be less liable
to enemy attack, could be manned by less skilled personnel. Even so, it would be
better to have new Marines rather than the Army take over their defense, but the
Army should be ready and qualified to do .so. In any event, the battalions pro-
jected into the new bases must have, their full equipment without withdrawing
that in the present bases.
13. The foregoing discussion has had particular application to Midway, Wake,
Johnston, and Palmyra. The situation as to Samoa is not greatly different. Con-
struction of Army airfields at Canton and Chri.stmas Islands has brought those
places into the picture. The Commander-in-Chief has felt that some defense at
Canton should be provided at once against an enemy raider. As the Army has no
suitable guns available for the purpose, he has arranged to send two five inch
guns with fire control equipment t^'om the Fourth Defense Battalion to meet tem-
porarily the existing situation, pending clarification of the Department's policy
regarding Canton. These guns will be manned by Army personnel.
14. Meantime, the Commander-in-Chief is making a study as to minimum
requirements for the defenses of Canton. This will be forwarded separately
within the next few days. The defenses contemplated will call for not more than
two or three batteries of three inch A A guns, not more than two batteries of
five inch guns and a limited number of smaller weapons. It is expected that not
more than 300 men will be required for manning the defensive armament. It is
probable that the requirements for Christmas would be less rather than more than
that for Canton.
15. In view of the Commanding General's information that, the War Department
had assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton Islands, no steps
have been taken toward defending Christmas, and agreement has been made
locally with Army authorities that Marine equipment now going to Canton would
be replaced as soon as possible.
16*5] 16. It seems aprpopriate to express the growing concern of the Com-
mander-in-Chief over the increase in number of Army and Navy stations that
may require support from the Fleet. Such support may involve logistics, keeping
open lines of communications, or active defense. Establishments at Wake,
Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Samoa are already well advanced. Our Army
is now engaged in building air fields at Christmas, Canton, Fiji, and New Cale-
donia, and consideration is being given to other installations in the New Hebrides
and Solomon Islands. In addition, discussion has been made from time to time
over the establishmet of American bases in the Gilberts, Bismarck Archipelago,
and other places.
2484 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
17. Whether or not the Navy is initially concerned in the huildinj; or logistics
or defense instaHations of these far flung establishments, it inevitably will become
involved with them if war develops. Such involvement may seriously intei'fere
with ottiensive operations of the Fleet. It can not be too strongly emphasized that
new development of this nature must be curtailed, and only those permitted that
will definitely contribute toward success in the Western Pacific. A Fleet in being
behind a series of defensive positions in the Central and South Pacific can not
contribute very much toward victory over a power some thousands of miles to
the westward.
18. To summarize: the Commander-in-Chief considers that the current setup in
the existing bases is in accordance with long and well considered plans that
should not now be changed. He intends to :
(a) Continue the Marine Defense Battalions at Wake, Midway, Johnston, and
Palmyra ;
(b) Continue use of Marine planes at such of those places as circumstances
require ;
(c) Transfer a battery of five inch guns to the Army for use by Army personnel
at Canton until the Army can obtain suitable replacement ;
[66] (d) Continue cooperation and liaison with local Army authorities to
develop and maintain in readiness Army units and equipment that may, on short
notice, reenforce or relieve Marines at aforementioned bases in whole or in part.
19. It is recommended that :
(a) Deficiencies in armament at existing Advance Bases, and in existing
Marine Defense Battalions, be remedied as rapidly as possible (see refer-
ence (g) ) :
(b) Fourth Defense Battalion and proposed new Defense Battalion be main-
tained as mobile battalions in Pearl Harbor in accordance with existing plans;
and that the organization and acquirement of equipment for this new additional
battalion be expedited ;
(c) At least two additional defense battalions be organized and equipped at
San Diego, with plans to use these battalions and those mentoined in (b) above
for garrisoning positions captured in the Marshalls ;
(d) An understanding with Army be reached now that in case Army takes
over defense of Advance Bases, command of such bases will remain in the Navy
(see paragraph 8) ;
(e) Commitments to further island developments in the Central and South
Pacific be held to a minimum as to number and logistic requirements ;
(f) No plans be made for relieving Marine Defense Battalions or air units
until Army has organized, equipped and trained for coordinated action suitable
units for taking over.
20. Transmission via U. S. Registered air mail is hereby authorized.
H. E. KlMMEL.
Copy to :
C. G., Haw. Dept.
Com 14
[67] Date: 1 December 1941
From : Opnav
To: CinCaf
Com Sixteen
Information : CincPac : Com Fourteen
Top Secret-Ultra
011400
Ambassador Tsubokami in Bangkok on twenty ninth sent to Tokyo as number
eight seven two the following quote conferences now in progress in Bangkok
considering plans aimed at forcing British to attack Thai at Padang Bessa near
Singora as counter move to Japanese landing at Kota Bharu X Since Thai
intends to consider first invador as her enemy comma Orange believes this
landing in Malay would force British to invade Thai at Padang Bessa X Thai
would then declare war and request Orange help X This plan appears to have
approval of Thai Chief of Staff Bijitto XX Thai Government circles have been
sharply divided between proBritish and proOrange until twenty five November
but now Wanitto and Shin who favor joint military action with Orange have
silenced anti Orange group and intend to force Premier Pibul to make a deci-
sion X Early and favorable developments are possible unquote
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2485
[68] Date: 28 November 1941
From : Opnav
Action : CinCaf
Information : CincPac ; Com 14 ; Gom^ 16
281633 Confidential
Top Secret
Following from State Department : Saigon — November 26 — 5 days ago Orange
troop and supply vessels began to put in at Saigon taking up all available quay
space, about 2U,000 troops have landed and 10,000 arrived from the north by rail
during same period. Troops in south Indo-China total about 70,000. Some esti-
mate 128,000 but this is yet too high. Many trucks landed moving troops and
supplies to interior. This movement which is of large proportions indicates
hostilities against Thailand may soon begin. Hanoi — November 26 — supplies
and military equipment particularly railway, rolling stock, gasoline, landing at
Paiphong even recently augniented and are being transshipped south. Among
recently landed artillery are anti-tank guns. Japanese have recently purchased
considerable number native boats along coast Tongking province. Reported they
desire purchase 500. These boats are being sent south, Hanoi — November 26 —
American consul received reliable information governor general has ascertained
from agent that around December 1 without either declaration of war or ulti-
matum Nippon navy will attack Isthmus Kra. Sinniltaneously armj' will
advance on Thailand. Great increased troop landings and movements south
during last few days about 4000 men landed. On November 25 and 26 1500 will
go south by special train. In Tongking there are approximately 25,000 Orange
troops and at Gialam around 90 airplanes. Hanoi — November 26 — Early on
November 25 all interested persons advised by Haiphong mayor that Japanese
intended sequester all freight en route to China. Nips had demanded keys to
all bonded warehouses by noon November 25. Mayor added [69] protest
had been lodged by French officials but individuals effected by demand must use
own judgment whether or not to comply.
[70] Dec. 6, 1941 ^ Secret
From : CINCAF
To : OPNAV
Action : 38W
061255
Copies : 12 ; 13 ; 16 ; 38 ; 388 ; Nayaide ; CNO ; 20 OP.
Report by Cine China "25 ship convoy with escort of 6 cruisers and 10 DD's
lat 08-00 N, 106-00 east at 0316 GMT today. Convoy of 10 ships with two
cruisers and 10 destroyers 07-40 north, 106-20 east two hours later. All on
course west. Three additional ships 07-51 north 105 east at 0442. course 310.
This indicates all forces will make for Kontron"
Sighted by my scouting force anchored Camranh Bay — 30 ships and one large
cruiser.
Info : CINCPAC ; COM 16 ; COM 14
[71] 8 December 1941 ' Secret
From : Com Sixteen
To: OpNav
Information : CincPac ; CinAF ; ComFourteen
080333
The following Japanese distributions are based upon radio call recoveriest
since December first and are conservative: There is a heavy concentration of
aircraft at Taiwan at the Kaki. Takao, and Taichu Airstations. South China
Airforceheadquarters is now in the Saigon area with at least four groups of
planes. Strength unknown. Eight Maru Airtenders in South China area esti-
mated distribution as follows : At Takao five, at Saigon one and two at Sama.
Intercepts of large volume of high precedence traffic from air activities in Saigon
area indicate that extensive operations may be imminent. Radio bearings indi-
cate that Akagi is moving south from Empire and is now in Nansei Islands area.
2486 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[72]
Secret
Uniteu) States Pacific Flei':t
U. S. S. I'KNNBYLVANIA, Flilgsllip
Memohandum for the Commission
5 January 1942.
In accordance with the Commission's verbal directive, the following Summary
is respectfully submitted :
In summarizing the frequency of occurrence of the periods when information
was lacking in regard to the location or activity or a group, type or unit of
the Japanese Fleet during the last six months of 1941, necessitates a general
review of the procedures and methods followed :
1. Due to the distances involved, it is seldom possible to intercept the original
direct transmissions from Japanese Fleet units at sea, consequently interception
depends on those naval communications handled by the more powerful shore
stations on broadcast schedules. Approximately 90%' of the intercepted traf-
fic is of this latter nature. A unit may be addressed by other units via direct
communication or the ship-shore channels (rebroadcast) whether in port or at
sea. During tactical exerci.ses ORANGE utilizes medium and low frequencies
which are inaudible here. During such periods it is necessary to rely on the
intercept activities at Guam and Cavite to observe and report on these activities.
When in port, a unit almost invariably shifts to the low-frequency, low-power,
limited range, "harbor frequency" depriving all intercept stations of originated
traffic. Thus occurs periods when little definite information is available relative
to a unit's activities except that inferred from the traffic addressed it either by
the routing or association with other units addressed or associations with the
originator.
2. Changes of call signs, addresses, use of alternate, secret, tactical, and special
calls, greatly complicates the identification of units and the reconstruction of
the naval organization afloat and ashore. The Japanese Navy shifted its call
signs on 1 May, 1 November and 1 December, 1941. Shortly after the 1 Novem-
ber change the Japanese begun using a "blanket broadcn.st" system in which
no originator or addressee appeared, these being presumably buried in the cipher
text.
3. It has been a general rule that when a unit was not heard originating traffic
or using tactical circuits it was presumed to be in port or in a navy yard in a
relatively inactive status.
4. It is to be noted that for the above reasons the shnul tan cons location of
each Division of Battleships, cruiser.s, destroyers, carriers, or [7^] sub-
marines is not possible. Therefore, the locations of Fleet Flagships and some
subordinate units of the al>ove types must be relied upon to establish the pre-
sumed locations or activity of the remainder of the related lower echelons.
5. During the past six months, Fleet Intelligence records show that the oc-
casions when uncertainty existed as to the exact location of certain types were :
Type
Battleships --
Cruisers (1st Fleet) ---
Cruisers (2nd Fleet, less CRUDIV 7).
CRUDIV 7 (very active on detached duty) --
Destroyers.. --
Carriers
(II Cardiv 2, formerly very active on detached duty, be
excepted from this analysis the following result is more
typical.)
Carriers (less Cardiv 2) -
(In both cases the longest period, 22 days, was in July
1941.)
Total days
uncertain
70.
Nearly all
113
63
Very indefinite
84
134
Number of
periods
Range of
periods
Seven 8-14 days.
Almost continual ab-
sence of positive indi-
cations.
Eight.
Six -.-
Seven.
Eight.
Twelve.
10-20 days.
8-16 days.
9-33 days.
8-22 days.
9-22 days.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2487
Respectfully submitted,
Edwin Thomas Layton,
Lieutenant Commander, U. iS'. Navy,
Intellifjence Officer, U. 8. Pacific Fleet.
Certified to be a True Copy :
/s/ J. M. Lee,
Comdr., JJ. fe'. Navy,
Flag Secretary, Staff, CINCl'AC-CINCPOA.
[77,] 2S Nov 1041 Secret
From : CINCPAC
To : COM I'AT WING 2
Info: COMSCOFOR
COMBATFOR
COM 14
COMBASEFOR
COMAIRBATFOR
280450
Direct 12 patrol planes now at Midway proceed Wake on 1 Dec search en-
route X Provide one squadi'on relieve Midway planes on 80 November X After
arrival both squadrons direct them comply my 2(S0447 X I'resent intention
x-eturn Wake squadron Pearl about 5 December.
[73] 11/30/41
ORIGINATOR CTF 9
Action: COMPATRONS 21, 22; COMTASKGROUP 9.2
Information: CINCPAC; COM 14; COMSUBSCOFOR ; CO NAS Midway: CO
NAS Wake 292103
Operation order 9S1 X Information CINCPAC 2S0447 and 2S04r,0 X Task
Force 8 ENTERPRISE, CHESTER, NORTHAMPTON, SALT LAKE CITY, 6
DD transijorting Marine FigRon which will base on W^ake X Planes will be
launched 200 miles bearing 070 from Wake at 2000 GCT on December 3 X
Enroute and returning Task Force 8 will pass point 400 miles south of Midway X
Departed Pearl forenoon 2.S Nov. X WRIGHT expected arrive Midway from
Wake 3 December X Mission cover route and provide security for TF 8 while
in vicinity of Wake In order to obtain information poissible enemy forces in
threatening position and provide readily available aerial striking power during
period carrier will l)e launching Marine planes X Tasks PatRon 21 search as
indicated : Nov. 30 depart Pearl daylight seaich sector 2(}0-2<S0 degrees to longi-
tude 165 degrees thence on track 270 to long 172-30 thence to Midway; Dec 1
sector 170 dash 224 to 500 miles using S iilanes: Dec 2 sector 209-237 to 525
miles using four planes; Dec 3 sector 206-248 to 525 miles using 6 planes; Dec
4 sector 170-224 to 500 miles using 8 planes Dec 5 sector 126-168 to 525 miles
using 6 planes X PatRon 22 Search as indicated; Dec 1 depart Midmay day-
light using 2 plane sections sector 226-249 to 525 miles thence on track 238 to
far perimeter of 120 mile circle from Wake thence to Wake; Dec. 2 sector
060-102 to 525 miles using 6 planes; Dec 3 take off at 1800 GCT sector 048-092*
to 500 miles using six planes ; one plane be 200 miles bearing [76] 070 from
Wake at 2000 GCT remain with Task Force 8 uiitil 2400 GCT unless otherwise di-
rected by visual remaining 5 planes each load with 2 500 pound bombs; unless oth-
erwise directed uhload bombs at 0230 <t(;T December 4 X On December four X
On Dec 4 take off daylight for Midway X On Decend)er five take off at daylight
for Pearl XRAY critical period entire operation forenoon 3 Dec. X Logistics
fuel as reipiired X Special provisions use Zone 0 times X Task Force 9 Basic
Communications and Aerological Plans X Frequency Plan FOX COMTASKFOR
9 with FAIRDET at NAS Pearl X Maintain radio silence except for contact
reports ami emergencies X Arrange for l)ases to broadcast MO's on schedule
without request X,
2488 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[77] United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. Pennslyvania, Flagship
A2-11/FF12
A4-1/VZ
A3/VZ(95) c/o Fleet Post Office,
Serial 59 Pearl Harbor, T. H., January 7, 19^2.
From : Coiumauder-in-Cluef, United States Pacific Fleet.
To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: Airplane Situation, Hawaiian Area.
Reference :
(a) ConiAirScoFor Conf. Ltr. Serial 0755 of December 18, 1941, addressed
to OpNav.
(b) ComAirScoFor Conf. Ltr. Serial 0767 of December 24, 1941, addressed
to Buaero.
(c) CincCPAC desp. 041001 of January 1942.
(d) CinCPAC desp. 000547 of January 1942.
Enclosure: (A) Conil'utWinK TWO Secret Ltr. Serial 003:3 of December 30, 1941
1. In recent despatches, references (c) and (d), the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, pointed out the vital need for improvement of the aircraft situation
in the Hawaiian area. This letter is written in amplification.
2. The following factors must form the basis for any consideration of aircraft
requirements here :
(a) The attack of 7 December ivill be foUoiced by others. The enemy has
exploited the element of surprise. He can however, use it again, although to a
lesser extent because of local alertness measures, if adequate search is not main-
tained. In any case, his strength in carriers and heavy ships is such that he
need not depend on surprise. His objectives in the first assault were aircraft
and ships. There remain untouched the very important and tempting objectives
of fuel supply, navy yard industrial establishment and drydock.s, commencial
docks and the city of Honolulu. There remains, furtlier, as an ultimate objective
the taking of the island of Oahu itself, retention of which is by no means assured
with the forces now available to us.
(b) Japanese aircraft carrier aviation, icith all due allowance for the advan-
tage of surprise, proved itself on 7 December to be in a very high state of devel-
opment. This applies with full force not only to material and to the training,
skill and determination of personnel, but also to the unquestionably brilliant
manner in which the entire expedition was conceived, [78] planned and
handled. This arm of the Japanese fleet has been greatly underestimated. Its
potentialities must be recognized from now on.
(c) Airnaft for Hawaiian defense must comprise adequate forces for long
range search, for striking and for local interception. All of these are vital for
effective defense. None of these can be effective if any of the three is inadequate.
It must be assumed that the Japanese will contiiuie to have excellent intelligence
reports of our activities here. An organization as perfect as that which pro-
vided complete information for every minute detail of the first attack cannot
safely be assumed to have been eliminated. It follows that inability to maintain
sin elVective search can hardly fail greatly to increase the probability of renewed
attack.
3. The objectives of long range search are to make it possible to strike any
enemy force bcfcire it can stiMke'Oahu and to give ample advance warning of
any such attempt. Provision for the first of these objectives covers the second.
As will readily be seen by simple mathematical analysis (see enclosure (A)),
the search should extend out to about 800 miles before planes turn homeward
each day in order to :
(a) Make it possible to reach the enemy with an air striking force during
daylight on the day he is discovered, and
(b) Prevent the enemy, if undiscovered on the previous day, from reaching
a position close enough for launching aircraft before the succeeding day's search
has reached him.
4. Search requirements are based on the following assumptions:
(a) Carrier aircraft may be launched SOU miles from Oahu. There is definite
evidence that carrier aircraft were launched and recovered on 7 December 225
and 300 miles respectively from Oahu. These launching and recovery points can
be interchanged without increasing the demand on Japanese aircraft endurance
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2489
that has already been met. It is possible that even greater ranges might be
used by substitution of bombs for torpedoes and with retention near enemy car-
riers of shorter range types for their local defense.
(b) Carrier speed for the run-in may be 21 knots. This speed is not unreason-
able and is believed to have been used on 7 December. The enemy can accept
the logistic problem in fuel, for he did so.
[79] (c) It cannot be assumed that any direction of approach may safely
be left unguarded. The fuel problem is no deterrent, for the approach was made
from the north on 7 December. Increase in diflSculty of the logistic problem would
not be proportionately great if even an approach from the east were attempted.
At the same time, as discussed above, neglect of any sector is apt soon to be
known.
(d) Air Search visibility is 25 miles. That is, aircraft during the majority
of the search are 50 miles apart, although they are closer together than this from
departure until they are 300 miles out. This visibility assumption is obviously
optimistic, particularly since clear weather will seldom extend over the entire
search area. It is, however, the best (and the most) that can be done with
aircraft available unless very large areas are to be entirely neglected. Although
each succeeding day's search tends to disclose, at closer range, what might have
been missed on the previous day, the long range search should be far more
positive than is now possible.
5. The upshot of the foregoing assumptions, ivhich include perfect visibility,
is that about 50 planes (the number varying slightly with type) are needed daily
for search. This number cannot be reduced, as suggested in the enclosure, if
and when reliable radar equipment for airplanes is available, for this equipment
will merely serve to counter the effect of poor visibility. Actually, toward meet-
ing at present the minimum requirement of 50 per day, the situation is as fol-
lows: With departure of Patrol Squadron Twenty-two for the Asiatic theater
and with completion of the current transfer here of three squadrons from the
mainland, the number of patrol planes here becomes 67, with 4 of these under
repair for at least a month. The number of Army heavy mombers (B-17's) here is
42, with 2 additional expected later. (Note that paragraph 2 of the enclosure is
not up to date on these patrol plane and Army bomber figures.) This leaves a
total on hand of 10^ long range planes.
6. With these it is not possible simultaneously and effectively to maintain nec-
essary long range search operations, to keep available a useful air striking force
and to meet constant requirements for special missions, such as covering sub-
marine contacts and guarding convoy approach and departure, without having
on hand for search alone at least three times [80] the number of planes
that are needed for search on any given day. There is no way of getting around
this if material and personnel are to maintain the pace. Neither one nor the
other can do more.
7. Search actually being made has had to be reduced to the following basis :
(a) The radius for the long range planes is 700 miles. Neither patrol planes
nor B-17's can go farther, with reasonable margin for safe return, while carrying
any bombs.
(b) 25 patrol plans and 12 Army Z-17's are being used daily for search
(18 B-17's are being held continuously ready as a minimum striking force).
The long range searching planes cover total sectors of about 290 degrees. Such
relatively ineffectual planes (VSO, VJ and Army B-18's) as are available are
used to cover remaining sectors totalling about 70 degrees to distances of 200
or 300 miles.
8. These figures vary somewhat from day to day, but the overall result is that
only fovr-fifths of the circle is being covered to a I'easonable range, and this
with mediocre effectiveness, although available material and personnel are being
strained to the limit. Furthermore, the remaining fifth is being covered very
poorly, to short and inconclusive ranges. Still further, this essential expenditure
of effort leaves no patrol planes available for support of ta.sk forces on special
missions and none for our outlying island bases, beyond the two each that are
now being maintained on an exchange basis at Johnston and Palmyra.
9. To improve the situation outlined above, which is not only critical but dan-
gerous, there should be earliest possible action toward increasing the patrol
wings in the Hawaiian area to at least twelve 12-plane squadrons of long range
planes. Commander Patrol Wing Two in enclosure (A), and Commander Scout-
ing Force in refei-ences (a) and (b), make entirely clear the very great advan-
tages of naval use of long range land planes where this is practicable. The patrol
wing increase to twelve squadrons should include the provision that at least one-
2490 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
half of these planes be of the B-24 type. This is essential not only because of
their superior characteristics but also because, otherwise, the limited seaplane
operating potentialities of this area would be too crowded for war conditions.
[SI] 10. It is realized that this expansion cannot be accomplished immedi-
ately. Neverthelss, the necessary machinery therefor should be set in motion now
at highest priority. Meanwhile, favorable consideration of reference (c), asking
for B-24 landplane bombers at once in place of the 17 PBY-3 planes now here, is
earnestly recommended. This is a small part of the necessary increase, but, as
pointed out in the reference, it is relatively ea.sy to do and it will make an im-
portant immediate improvement in the picture.
11. The request of the Conmianding General, Hawaiian Department, for a total
of 2(X) heavy bombers, with which the Conunander-in-Chief concurred in refer-
ence (d), is amply justified. It must be recognized that renewed attack will
almost certainly be in force as great or greater than that of the first attack,
which included at least four aircraft carriers, and it may in addition be divided.
The only way in which to have any assurance of decisive effect on major enemy
attack is to be prepared to strike a heavy blow. But the only available shore-
based striking force consists of 18 B-17's, held in reserve daily for this purpose,
and such patrol planes, neither searching nor undergoing maintenance, as are
not in use for special daily missions. The resultant air striking force is literally
trivial. It would be practically useless against surface forces comparable to
those that were in this area on 7 December. Its effect could not possibly be de-
cisive. With 200 heavy bombers on hand, however, availability of a powerful
striking force for all contingencies can be continuously assured.
12. In all of the foregoiiiii. Hau-aiian air (Jcfcnxe alone has been considered.
Any plans for any other uses in the Pacific area for the recommended types of
aircraft must include provision of appropriate numbers of additional aircraft.
13. Returning to the immediate situation : With present limited numbers of
searching and striking planes we are constantly confronted with the dilemma
resulting from the relative futility of either effective search at the expense of
striking force or u.seful striking force at the expense of search. There is no
answer to this except more planes. Unless we are to [82] play the in-
evitably losing game of local air defense alone, the recommended total increases
for both the patrol wings and the Hawaiian air force must be soon provided.
Meanwhile, it is reiterated that any immediate increase for either will vitally
improve the present situation.
14. Transmission via registered clipper airmail is authorized for this document.
C. W. NiMITZ.
Copy to :
ConiAirScoFor
ComPatWing TWO
BuAero
Opnav
Comdg. Gen'l., Hawaiian Dept.
[83] PATRor. Wing Two,
U. S. Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 30, 1941.
I>W2/A16-3
(0033)
Secret
From : The Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (The Commander Patrol
Wing TWO)
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacfic Fleet.
Subject: Long Range, Landplane, Bombers for Scouting in Hawaiian Area; Rec-
ommendati<m for Assignment of.
Reference: (a) Comairscofor Confidential Letter A4-1 (0755) dated December 18,
1941.
Enclosure :
(A) Determination of Search Group Requirements.
(B) Memorandum of Air Corps Liaison Officer.
1. By reference (a) the Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, set forth the
need for long range landplane bombers for use initially as scouts in protective
searches from Oahu, and stated brlefiy the advantages and further uses of such
aircraft. It is the purpose of this letter to amplify the presentation of this
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2491
subject and to present facts which will prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
immediate allocation of such equipment to Patrol Wing is vital, not only to de-
fense, but also to future offensive air operations.
2. There are currently 78 PBY aircraft available for flight in the Hawaiian
Area, of which 34 are recently received reinforcements. Present search opera-
tions require 30 of the available PBY planes to conduct a daily 700 mile radius
search from Oahu, covering a 240 degree sector. The remaining 120 degrees is
covered daily, with concomitant serious reduction of offensive power by B-17
aircraft of the Army searching to 800 miles ; or by B-17 aircraft and VO-VS
of VJ aircraft, the latter searching to 200-300 miles, when the B-17s available
for search are less than 16. It is evident that such a daily search is only par-
tially effective. The lack of exp>erience and training of Army Air Corps flight
crews in performing long range protective search missions over water is a con-
dition which was naturally to be expected. The result of this has the effect of
throwing the major part of the burden of search on the Patrol Plane units in this
area, and rightly so, for, at the present time, the few long range bombardment
aircraft available to the Army in this area, even if used solely as a striking force,
are totally inadequate. It is imperative that Hawaiian-based Patrol Wings
be provided with sufficient aircraft to take over Oahu searches and to [8^]
release Army bombers for the stand-by as a striking force. As a guide to the ma-
terial required a study has been made as outlined in enclosure (A), based upon
utilizing PBY aircraft, and upon alternate long range equipment having cruising
speeds of 150 and 200 knots. The results of this study are tabulated below :
Radius of daily search •
Number searching planes daily (25 mile visibility)
Flight time per search plane-hrs .-.
Total plane hours per month
Total number of planes required . . ., _ _ _ L
Number of flight crews required
Engine changes per month
Spare engines required
Fuel consumption per month-gal
Average search effectiveness (estimated)
With A. S. V. (40-mile visibility assumed)
Radius of daily search
Number searching planes daily
Flight time per search plane-hrs
Total plane hours per month
Total number of planes required
Number of flight crews required
Engine changes per month
Spare engines required
Fuel consumption per month-gal
Average search effectiveness (estimated)
150-knot
200-knot
PBY
airplane
airplane
(4 engine)
(4 engine)
800
. 840
860
50
54
54
16.5
11.7
9.0
24, 750
19,415
14, 580
150
162
162
225
243
243
82.5
129.6
97.2
182
286
214
1,980,000
2, 912, 2,50
2, 916, 000
50%
60%
60-70%
800
840
860
32
34
34
16.5
11.7
9.0
15, 840
11,934
9,180
96
102
102
134
153
153
52.8
79.5
61.2
117
175
137
1, 267, 000
1,790,100
1, 836, 000
75%
95%
100%
3. Conclusions which may be drawn from the above tabvilations and from the
study, enclosure (A), are as follows:
(a) PBY aircraft are too sloiv for the mission required of them. Their lack
of speed not only reduces search effectiveness because of their inability to cover
the required area during [85] daylight hours, but also because the exces-
sive duration of flight increases pilot and crew fatigue. The only alternative is to
provide planes of sufficient speed to conduct the required search in daylight hours.
(b) Regardless of how fast or how many planes are available, the effectiveness
of the search is dependent upon visibility. All planes utilized for search should
be provided with A. S. V. equipment with which search effectiveness can be in-
creased to near 1009^, despite low visibility. Not only would A. S. V. equipment
make the search effective but, by permitting wider coverage by each plane, would
reduce the numbers of planes and flight crews required. This, combined, with
shorter flight hours, would reduce fuel consumption, engine changes, spare engines
required, and other maintenance, as well as reducing crew fatigue. It is clear
that A. S. V. equiiiment also is a vital requirement and should be provided on a
not-to-delay basis.
2492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(c) The PB2"''-3 airplane has a cruising speed of about 150 knots and adequate
range. But the ojieration of 102 PH2Y-3 airplanes presents more difficulties
than the operation of a similar lunnber of landplane bombers. PB2Y-3s are not
fast enough. They are not immediately available. While a number of these
planes are needed for certain types of missions, the immediate requirement for
search is for landplanes of yet higher speed.
(d) Surveying the landplane field two tyi)es are available; the B-17 and the
B-24. Experience with the B-17 on search has been disappointing. Their cruis-
ing speed at the low altitudes required during search is about 155 knots. In order
to search to radius 800, auxiliary tanks must be installed in the bomb bays, pre-
cluding the carrying of bombs.
(e) The B-24 airplane most nearly meets the requirements of effective search in
this area. Available information on characteristics is given in enclosure (B).
Provision of 102 B-24 airplanes would provide not only for effective search but
also would provide a formidable reserve striking force. It is believed that a
number of B-24 aircraft could be made available immediately by diversion from
Lend Lease aircraft awaiting delivery. Such diversion is considered vital to the
defense of Oahu.
[86] (f ) From actual flight experience of our pilots in B-17-E aircraft, I
am convinced that experienced patrol plane crews can readily and in short order
take over the operation of four-engine landplane bombers.
(g) Some fields are available and othefs can shortly be made available in the
Hawaiian Group which are suitable for, or capable of rapid expansion as neces-
sary to accommodate 102 B-24 Navy long range landplane bombers. These fields
include Kaneohe, Ewa, Maul, Barking Sands on Kaul, and Hilo Airport at Hawaii.
4. Recomnievdations :
(a) It is strongly recommended that at least 102 B-24 bombers be allocated to
Hawaiian-based Patrol Squadrons, and delivered as rapidly as possible.
(b) Immediate equipping with B-24s of the three patrol squadrons now on the
West Coast equipping with PBY-5As is recommended as the first increment.
(c) For the second increment, it is recommended that the 17 PBY-3s now in
this area, 7 of which are now due for overhaul, be replaced with 24 B-24s, Patrol
Squadron TWENTY-TWO and Patrol Squadron TWENTY-ONE flying the PBY-3s
in succession to the West Coast, and, after a brief training period, returning with
B-24S.
(d) The following equipment should be provided for these planes on a not to
delay basis :
(1) A. S. V. equipment.
(2) Converter for use with YE homing device.
(3) I. F. F. equipment.
/S/ P. N. L. BEU.INGEB.
Enclosure "A"
[87] Determination of search group requirements
A. PBY Aircraft
Assumptions
1. Best sustained speed of enemy carrier — 27 knots.
2. Enemy carrier can launch an attack at a maximum distance of 300 miles.
3. PBY ground speed during search averages 100 knots.
4. Duration of daylight and dark :
(At Pearl)
Daylight.
Dark
Dec. 22
11.0 hrs.
13.0 hrs-
June 22
13.6 hrs.
10.4 hrs.
5. t>aily search must cover a radius such that enemy cannot reach the 300-mile
launching circle the following morning before the daily search reaches the 300-
mile circle.
6. Aircraft depart on search daily at dawn.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2493
Work
Launching Radius :
Enemy's night run (27X13)
Enemy's day run before search reaches 300 mile circle
^X27
Radius to cover effective at dark
22 Dec. 22 June
300 300
351 (27X10.4) 281
81
732
81
662
Let a=hours of daylight i-emaining when plane starts return leg.
Radius of search required is (r) 732+27 (a) 662+27 (a)
[88] Radius of search plus transfer (50 miles for 25 mile visibility) equals
distance plane goes before starting return leg, equals hours of daylight minus a,
times plane speed.
732+27a+50=(ll-a) 100
Q — 2 ^ ll 1*^
662+27a+50=("l3.6-a) 100
a=5.1
Radius of search (r)
Radius of search r
732+27 (2.5)
799.5
662+27 (5.1)
799.7
Conclusions
1. Radius of search 800 miles. Daily flight time 16.5hrs/plane.
2. For radius of visibility of 25 miles requires 50 search planes daily and a
total search force of 150 planes.
3. Since radius of visibility usually averages 15 miles, search effectiveness is
about 60%. On 22 December plane flys last 550 miles in darkness. This reduces
to 290 miles on 22 June. Effectiveness of search is further reduced by this to an
estimated 50% coverage over the entire year.
4. Plane hrs/mo — 24,750 hrs.
5. Fuel consumption/mo (at 80 gal/hr)— 1,980,000 gal.
6. Engines changes per month (at 600 hrs) — 82.5. Spare engines required
(220% of monthly changes)— 182.
[89]
B. PBY Aircraft with A. S. V. (Radar)
Intelligence reports (AirBatFor Summary of Air Operations No. 6-41A) stated
that British A. S. V. equipment in Coastal Command aircraft has the following
performance.
"Forward antenna system
Range — 30 miles.
Cone of search — 60° in azimuth (30° on either side of the "beam)
ahead and almost vertically downward.
directly
Lateral antenna system
Range — 80 miles on both sides.
Cone of search — 18° in azimuth
tion ; 30° in depression."
Weight 290 lbs)
(9° on either side of the beam) ; 30° in eleva-
From information received on the A. S. V. equipment being installed in our
PBY airplanes, it is understood that the performance is adversely affected by
lack of British-made cable and that the performance obtained, for this and other
installation reasons, is reduced, actual results varying between 10 and 40 miles
range. Equipment installed in PBM airplanes however is reported as effective
up to 70 miles, and it is expected that somewhat better results may be expected
from PBY airplanes when British cable, now on order is installed. (First ship-
ment sunk). Assuming that A. S. V. equipment may be depended upon for an
2494 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
effective range of at least 40 miles, tlie following benefits would result from
installation of A. S. V. in PBY aircraft :
For 40 mile A. ^. V. "visibility"
1. Reduce number of planes required for daily search from 50 to S2.
2. Increase search effectiveness from an average of 507f to about 75%.
3. Reduce plane hours per month for search from 24,750 to 15,840; reduce fuel
consumption for search from 1,980,000 to l,2»)7,fX)0 gallons per month ; reduce en-
gine changes per month from 82.5 to 52.8.
[90] 4. Reduce total planes required from 150 to 100; spare engines re-
quired from 182 to 117.
5. Reduce crew fatigue and number of plane crews required.
Conclusions
1. The immediate installation of A. 8. V. in search aircraft is vital to suc-
cessful protective aircraft search. It will greatly reduce the material and per-
sonnel required for any search.
C. 150 knot 4 engined aircraft
Assumptions as before, except for 150 knot ground speed of search aircraft
Work
Launching radium _
Enemy's night run (27X13)
Enemy's daylight run before succeeding day's search reached 300 mile circle
?Sx-
Radium to cover effective at dark _
705 80 27a=150 (11-a) 635 80 27a=150 (13.6-a)
a=4.87 a=7.5
Radius of search r=840 r=835
22 Dec.
22 June
300 300
351 (27X10.4) 281
54
705
54
635
Coticlusions
1. Radius of search 840 miles. Daily flight time 11.7 hours/plane.
[91] 2. With A. S. V. equipped planes, requires 34 search planes daily
(40 mile A. S. V. visibility) and a total force of 102 planes; without A. S. V. 54
planes daily (25 mile visibility) and a total force of 162 planes.
3. Search effectiveness 100% with A. S. V. ; 60% without.
4. Plane hrs/mo ;
With A. S. V '11,934
Without A. S. V 19,415
5. Fuel consumption/mo : (at 150 gal/hr)
With A. S. V 1,709,100
Without A. S. V .. 2,912,250
6. Engine changes/mo : (at 600 hrs) (4 eng/plane) '
With A. S. V 79.5 *
Without A. S. V 129.6
Spare engines required: (220% of monthly changes)
With A. S. V 175
Without A. S. V 289
D. 200 knot 4 engined aircraft
Assumptions as for A except for 200 knot ground speed of search aircraft.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2495
Launching radius - - -
Enemy's night run :--,-■-
Enemy's daylight run before succeeding day's search reaches 300 mile circle:
300x27
Radius to cover effective at dark ---'-
[92] 692+80+27a=200 (11-a) 622+80+27a=200 (13.6-a)
a=6.3 a=8.9
r=860 r=862
22 Dec.
300
351
41
692
22 June
300
281
41
622
Conclusions
1. Riidius of search 860 miles. Daily flight time 9 hours.
2. Requires 34 A. S. V. equipped planes daily ; or 54 non-A. S. V.-equipped.
Total force required :
With A. S. V 102 planes
Without A. S. V 162 planes
3. Search effectiveness 100% with A. S. V. ; 609c without. All search made
during daylight.
4. IMane hours/month :
With A. S. V 9.180
Without A. S. V 14,580
5. Fuel consumption/month (at 20O gallons/hour) :
With A. S. V 1,836,000
Without A. S. V 2,916,000
6. Engine changes/month (at 600 hours) :
With A. S. V 61.2
Without A. S. V 97.2
Spare engines required (220% of monthly changes) :
With A. S. V ■ 137
Without A. S. V 214
[93\ I. Flight crews should not be required to fly more often than one day
in three : i. e., fly one day, rest one day, stand-by one day.
2. Operating policy requires that all available planes not under maintenance
be manned and ready for take-off from 30 minutes before to one hour after sun-
rise, and from one hour before to 30 minutes after sunset. All available planes
are on one hour's notice otbei-wise during daylight, and on 4 hour's notice other-
wise at night. This requires services of one crew to stand-by each available
airplane on the ground.
3. To provide for special missions in addition to protective search, at least
three times the number of aircraft required for daily search should be provided.
4. Initially a minimum of 150%© plane crews will be required. The excess over
one crew per plane will be utilized to provide a surplus for rest status one day
in three and for conducting training until two crews per plane are available.
[9Ji'\ Confidential
Patrol Wing Two,
U. S. Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 30, 1941.
Memorandum to Lieutenant Commander Coe, USN
From : Major W. J. Holzapfel, U. S. A.
The following information on the B-24 airplane is gathered from pilots on
the ferry command in the United States and from mechanics who were on the
ferry command to England who used this type of airplane:
B-24 is equipped with Pratt and Whitney Twin row engines Model R-1830
with two stage engine driven blowers and developing 1250 horsepower during
take-off.
The gas capacity of these airplanes is 3,100 gallons divided into two 1,550
gallon wing tanks. These tanks are not bullet proof. The Consolidated Cor-
poration however is planning on putting in bullet proof tanks which will cut
down the gas capacity to 2,490 gallons.
2496 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
On these trips the thought of fuel economy is never considered. The air-
planes were cruised between 29 and 31 inches of mercury, 2,000 RPM at alti-
tudes of 7-10,000 feet. Carburetor, mixture was set at lean. Fuel consumption
at the.se altitudes at these settings, which is considered maximum cruising, was
150 gallons gasoline per hour and the indicated air speed was between 180-200
statute miles per hour.
This airplane has two bomb bays each with 10 bomb stations. Capacity of
the bomb bays is 8,000 pounds of bombs. The armament is composed of 9
.50 cal. machine guns and 1 .30.
The weight empty of these airplanes is 30,000 pounds. The authorized gross
weight of this airplane (maximum limit as set by manufacturer) is 57,000
pounds. However, convei-sations with a mechanic who made a trip to England
brought out the fact that one such airplane was once loaded to 72,000 pounds
and it is reported that the English have loaded one of these airplanes to 83,000
pounds. No difficulties were found in take-off or flying quality of this airplane.
/s/ W. J. HOLTZAPFEL
Deferred — Secret
[95] Date : 29 Nov 41
Originator; OpNav
Action : CincPac
28054
Arrangements described in your 280627 appear to be best that can be done
under the circumstances but suggest advisability of transferring VMF 221 from
San Diego to Hawaii via Saratoga X War Dept will instruct Comgen Hawdept
to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army
troops in support of Marines X War Dept will endeavor to expedite plans
for increase of AA defenses but it is doubtful if much improvement is possible
soon X Marine Corps will shortly receive 16 37 MM AA guns and receive
ammunition in February do you desire these guns for Midway and Wake X
Request air mail report on present defenses of all outlying bases and increases
planned in immediate future
Ref : 11-862 ; Wright now at Wake . . discharge Marine planes crews and
material afterwards proceeds to Midway to land similar items . . .
etc . . .
[96] Date : 28 Nov 1941 Classification— Secret
From : CincPac
To: PacFlt
Information to : OpNav (RDO)
280355
Exercise extreme vigilance against submarines in operating areas vicinity
Oahu especially during sortie and entrance X Our submarines will conduct
submerged operations in areas cast 5 and cast 7 only proceeding elsewhere on
surface X Depth bomb all sugmarine contacts suspected to be hostile in Oahu
operating areas except areas cast 5 and cast 7.
[97] (^inC File No.
A4-3/QL/0243
Confidential
United States Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Pearl Harbor. T. H., Feb. 11, 19^1.
From : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Submarine Contact 3-4 February 1941 — ^Report of.
Reference: (a) Base Force Operation Plan No. 1-41.
Enclosure :
(A) Copy of Comdesbatfor Conf. Ltr. file A8 Serial 0187 of 7 Feb. 1941 with
its enclosure.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2497
(B) Copy of Comdesbatfor Conf. Ltr. file A8 Serial 0189 of 7 February 1941.
1. Forwarded herewith is the report of the Commanding Officer, U. S. S. DALE,
of a sonic contact experienced off Diamond Head on 3-4 February (Enclosure
(A)), and a supplementary report thereto (Enclosure (B)).
2. It will be noted that the contact was developed outside the Defensive Sea
Area as established by General Order No. 118, and that at no time was there any
sonic indication of a contact within that area.
3. The concurrent air operations conducted with the destroyers are shown
in paragraph 3 of enclosure (A) and in the supplementary report, (Enclosure
(B)).
4. In this connection pertinent parts of reference (a) are quoted herewith
to indicate the orders under which the destroyers maintaining the Channel
Entrance Patrol operate :
"In case evidence of a submerged submarine is obtained maintain contact
and report to Commander Base Force.
"Talce no offensive action until directed, unless the submarine enters the
Prohibited Area (Defensive Sea Area, General Order one hundred eighteen)."
[98] 5. The Commanding Officer of the DALE is an officer of considerable
experience in sonic work. His reports and the despatches incident to the contact
indicate that he is convinced contact was established with a submarine. Our
own submarines were not operating in the area where the sonic contact was
made.
6. It is interesting to note that Destroyers had been on patrol in the particular,
and adjacent area since 1800 on 2 February. A submarine in the vicinity when
contact was made would, therefore, likely have operated submerged from that
time and during previous daylight hours. It is noted too, that contact was re-
tained for about 24 hours, beginning 0600 on 3 February ; that a daylight period
followed the loss of contact ; that a patrol was maintained on the night of 5
February; and a search was conducted on 5 February. This totals a submerged
operating period well in excess of anything that might have been expected.
7. When the Destroyer reported, that the contact appeared definitely to be a
submarine, the Commander-in-Chief was inclined to order depth charges dropped
in the area. However, he realized that to do so might create an international
incident of serious consequence at the time. As there seemed every reason to
expect that contact could be maintained, and that the suspected submarine
would eventually be forced to surface, he directed the Destroyers to retain
contact and drop depth charges only in the event that the suspected submarine
took aggressive action.
8. After a careful study of all attending circumstances, the Commander-in-Chief
does not subscribe to the contention of the Commanding Officer, U. S. S. DALE
that contact was established with a submarine. He cannot visualize any motive
for a foreign submarine to be operating submerged in this particular area. The
reported propeller noises, may have resulted from internal noises in the Destroy-
ers themselves, or from the propellers of small craft [99] in the area.
Attention is also invited to the statement in paragraph 3 (a) of enclosure (A),
regarding the presence of fish in that area. There had been also a decided change
in tlie direction of the wind just previous to this experience, with attending
cooler weather. This may have introduced a temperature gradient in the water
in this area.
9. It is the intention of the Commander-in-Chief to continue the present anti-
submarine patrol. He sees no reason to expand it incident to this experience.
He will continue to operate under the present directive as quoted in paragraph 4.
10. If the Department does not approve of the action taken, the Commander-
in-Chief will be delighted to issue orders for offensive action whenever a contact
similar to the one reported is made. In that event it seems wise to extrend the
limit of the Defensive Sea Area as prescribed in General Order No. 118, and to
make notification of same.
[s] H. E. Kimmel
H. E. Kimmel.
79716 O— 46 — pt. 17 — —5
2498 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[100] File A8
Serial 0187
CONFIDENTIAL
United States Fleet
DESTKOYEaiS, BATTI-E FORCE
U. S. S. Dktroit, Flagship
Pe.\rl Harbor, T. If., Feb. 7, 49J1I.
From : Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.
To : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Suhject : Submarine Contact 3-4 February 1941 — Report of.
Enclosure: (A) Report of Commanding Officer, U. S. S. DALE.
1. Enclosure (A) is the report of the subject contact submitted by the Com-
manding Officer, U. S. S. DALE who was designated as the officer in charge of
the operations by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force. This report incorporates
the observations of the following destroyers which were in company with the
DALE— AYLWIN, HULL, LAMSON and MAHAN.
2. A separate report submitted by the Commanding Officer, U. S. S. LAMSON,
adds nothing to the enclosure. The MAHAN is now at sea and will be directed
to submit a report immediately upon her return to Pearl Harbor.
3. Concurrently with the operations of destroyers the following air operations
were conducted :
(a) The area in the vicinity of the DALE was patrolled by the DETROIT
planes during the forenoon and afternoon of February 3. The DETROIT aviators
report that at about 1030 some porpoises were observed between the destroyers
and ahead of them and shortly thereafter several blackflsh were observed on the
port bow of the DALE. They further report sighting several blackfish at about
1400 in the same vicinity.
(b) Patrol planes patrolled the area throughout the day of 3 February.
(c) The sea area within a radius of 100 miles of Pearl Harbor was searched
by patrol planes during the forenoon of 4 February.
(d) No reports of sighting a strange submarine were received from any aircraft.
M. F. Draemcl.
[101] File
A8
Serial 0189
Confidential
United States Fleet
destkoyebs, battle force
U. S. S. Detroit, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., February 7, 19^1.
From : Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.
To : Commander-in-Chief, U. S- Pacific Fleet.
Subject : Submarine Contract 3-4 February 1941 — Report of.
Reference: (a) Comdesbatfor Itr. A8 Serial 0187 dated February 7, 1941.
1. Supplementing reference (a), the following additional data are submitted.
2. The first report of contact by DALE was received at 0813, February 3,
1941. DALE was immediately directed to maintain contact. The contact report
was retransmitted for information to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet,
Commander Base Force, Commander Battleship Division ONE (who was ajh
proaching Pearl Harbor enroute from the mainland), and all Task Group Com-
manders of Task Force One then operating at sea. Patrol planes were directed
to investigate and the patrol plane Task (Jroup Commander established a psitrol
over the area, which patrol was maintained until darkness 3 February.
3. The AYLWIN was in company with the DALE from 0736 to 0854. at which
time she pnKeeded on other assigned duty and was replaced by HULL about
1015.
4. The area in the vicinity of the DALE was patrolled by DETROIT planes
during the forenoon and afternoon of 4 February.
5. When the DETROIT finished her scheduled exercises about noon. 3 Feb-
ruary, she proceeded to visual contact with DALE. In reply to direct ques-
tions DALE stated that the contact was considered to be a submarine and that
the HULL (in company) concurred.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2499
6. Destroyer Division NINE was directed to rendezvous with Commander
Destroyers, Battle Force, at 1700, at which time the LAMSON and MAHAN
were directed to assist the DALE and HULL, and the DRAYTON and FLUSSER
to join Battleship Division THREE as antisubmarine screen. The four de-
stroyers engaged in the contact were directed to maintain contact and to take
offensive action only if attacked. They were authorized to use navigational
lights, and all other units directetl to keep clear. The DETROIT then proceed
to the Maui range for D. G. calibration.
[102] 7. During the night reports of losing and making contact were
received intermittently. In response to the question as to whether or not
there was good reason to believe that the contact was not a whale, the DALE
advised that good contacts were checked by several ships and propeller sounds
had been heard.
8. At daylight of the 4th the routine patrol plane flight covering the operating
areas was initiated.
9. At 0725, February 4, the DALE reported contact lost. After a reasonable
length of time in which to ascertain whether or not this was a repetition of
previous experiences, it seemed established that the contact would not be re-
gained. At 0925 the patrol planes were directed to search the sea area within
a radius of 100 miles of Pearl Harbor.
10. At 1120 DALE and HULL were directed to return to Pearl Harbor, leav-
ing the LAMSON and MAHAN to continue the search. The DRAYTON and
FLUSSER were directed to join the LAMSON and MAHAN. These four de-
stroyers continued the search until dark at which time the search was
abandoned.
11. At 1800, 4 February, the destroyer offshore patrol was established for
the sortie of Task Force Two the next morning. Destroyer Division NINE
was directed to patrol Areas S-1 and S-2 outside of the areas of the offshore
patrol.
12. After the contact was lost at 0725, February 4, no further evidence of the
presence of a submarine was forthcoming from either destroyers or patrol
planes.
13. Any estimate or conjecture as to whether a submarine was in this area
appears of little real value. Three ships reported hearing propeller noises;
two of these reported hearing propeller noises on two occasions. The Com-
manding Officer of the DALE has had two years experience in working with
our own submarines. His sound operators are experienced. If these reports
were correct the propeller noises can be explained only by the actual presence
of a submarine.
M. F. Draemel.
10/Fs
[103] In Reply Refer to File No. DD353/A9-8/S68 (57)
Confidential
U. S. S. Dale;, Pearl Habbob, T. H.,
February 7, 19^1.
From: Commanding OflBcer.
To : Commander Destroyers, BATTLE FORCE.
Subject : Submarine Contact 3-4 February, 1941, report of.
1. On Monday 3 February 1941, the U. S. S. Dale was on statioO as Off Shore
Patrol in Sector 3. Two Radiomen, graduates of the sound school and qualified
operators were on Echo Ranging Watch.
2. At about 0657, a contact was reported and developed. This contact was
maintained until 0638, 4 Februai-y 1941. A chronological record of events is
forwarded herewith : —
Zone (Time) Event
February 3, 19^1
0657 Made contact on QCA — stopped to develop. Maintained contact.
0720 Determined that submarine was on Southerly Course at very slow speed.
Notified Commander Destroyer Division TWO in Aylwin of contact.
0736 Position Lat. 20°09.3' N. long. 157°50' W. U. S. S. Aylwin approached
and made contact, verifying Dale contact.
2500 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
073(>-
OSnO Aylwin and Dale maintained contact.
08.10 Position Lat. 21°0r,.l' N. Long 157°r.<J' W.
0854 U. S. S. Aylwin ceased tracking and proceeded to station as Inner Patrol,
ordering Hull as her relief.
0929 Lost contact. Submarine aitparently circled. Last range 900 yards.
Position Lat. 21°02.7' N. Long. 157°5().3' W.
1000 Regained contact. Range 4100 yards. Lat. 21°02.3' N. Long. 157°50.8' W.
UO-'f]
1024 U. S. S. Hull made contact. Range 2,100 yards.
1085 Position Lat. 21°02.3' N. and Long. ir)7°r)3.4' W.
1(141 U. S. S. Hull lost contact.
1053 U. S. S> Dale lost contact. Submarine apparently circled. Last range
1,550 yards. Position Lat. 21°03' N. Long 157°54' W.
1125 U. S. S. Dale regained contact. Positi<m Lat. 21°03.S N. Long. 157°55' W.
Range 3,100 yards.
1144 IT. S. S. Dale lost contact. Range 1,000 yards.
1240 U. S. S. Dale and Hull regained contact. Range 2,200 yards. Subma-
rine apparently circling.
1250 Lost Contact. Position Lat. 21°U0.5' N. Long. 157°55.4' W. Range 1,800
yards.
1350 Dale regained contact an<l heard propellei- noises.
1353 Hull regained contact. Dale heard proi)eller noises.
1414 Hull lost contact.
1458 Maintaining contact. Position Lat. 21°02' N. Long. 157°55.8' W.
1536 Position Lat. 21°01.7' N. Long. 157°55.3' W.
1622 Lost contact. Position Lat. 21°01.8' N. Long. 157°54.4' W. Range 1,500
.vards.
1705 Dale regained contact. Position Lat. 21°00.3' N. Long. 157°55.3' W.
Range 1,900 yards.
[105^ 1747 Dale lost contact. Range 2,200 yards.
1800 Lamson and Mahan joined Task Unit formed scouting line interval 1,000
yards.
1847 Dale regained contact. Range 1,500 yards. *
1900 Submarine appeared to pass through formation on a southerly heading.
1913 Lams(»n made contact. Range 2,200 yards.
1917 Dale position Lat. 21°07' N. Long. 157°51.5' W.
1921 Mahan reported proi)eller noises.
1935 Mahan lost contact.
1938 Lamson heard slow beat of propellers.
1945 Lamson and Mahan lost contact.
2000 Dale position Lat. 2r05.3' N. Long. 157°50.9' W.
2140 Lamson detached to envestigate shore line east of Diamond Head.
2354 Dale regained contact. Range 540 yards.
February J,, 1941
0000 Dale maintaining i)revious contact.
0036 Dale position Lat. 21°a4' N. Long. 157°54.3' W.
0115 Mahan made contact.
0127 H<ill made contact. Range 2.0O0 yards.
0130 Dale position Lat. 2r06.8' N. Long. 157°53.3' N.
0150 Dale and Mahan contacts show submarine in same position.
[106] 0152 Mahan reported hearing propeller noises.
0158 Dale position Lat. 2ro7' N. Long. 157°53' W.
0209 Hull reiiorted lange 400 yards.
0247 Hidl reported range 1,400 yards, Lamson 2,100 yards.
0250 Dale position Lat. 21°07.5' N. Long. 157°52' W. Dale, Lamson and
Mahan l<»st contact, Hull maintaining contact; range 1,350 yards.
0326 Dale regained contact. Range 2.6(H) yards.
0328 Mahan regained contact. Range 4,1(M> yards.
0345 Dale position Lat. 21"'05.2' N. Long. 157°52.7' W. Range 1,800 yards.
0400 Dale contact, range 1,550 yards. Hull, contact 1,700 yards.
0413 Hull lost contact.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2501
0415 Hull regained contact.
0431 Hull lost contact.
0441 All ships lost contact, last range from Dale 2,600 yards.
0.555 Hull regained contact. Range 2,li0() yards.
0614 Dale regained contact. Kai.ge 2,450 yards.
0638 Hull and Dale lost contact. Lat. 2l°0a N. Long. 157°53' W.
0815 Went head continuing search without results.
0921 Sighted smoke bombs on starboard beam, being dropped by planes.
[107] Turned right into column at 20 knots, course 103° T. to investigate.
0934 Lajnson and Mahan detached to investigate smoke bombs being dropped
on starboard beam.
0935 Sighted four sanpans ranging from dead ahead to broad on the starboard
bovp.
0946 Changed course to pass close aboard one of sanpans which was making
about 15 knots and apparently attempting to evade.
0955 Sighted about ten men in sanpan.
0958 Passed close aboard sanpan Kasura Maru number FJ82.
1000 Changed course to rejoin Lamson and Mahan to continue search in
area S-1.
1034 Formed scouting line course 180° T. scouting interval 1000 yards scouting
speed 10 knots. Started echo ranging.
1125 Changed course to 270° T.
1132 Changed course to 000° T.
1215 Received message to return to port.
J. P. WOMBLE, Jr.
Secret
[JOS] Date : 28 Nov. 1941.
Originator : HELENA.
COMTASGR 1.5.
COMTASKFOR 1.
Action : COMTASGR 1.5 ; COMTASKFOR 1.
Information : CINCPAC ; COMTASKFOR 2.
280.S35
Radar operator without knowledge CINCPAC 280355/6 positive that a sub-
marine was in area cast 9 during HELENA firing approach about 1900.
[109] From : Alusna, Batavia.
Date : 5 Dec. 1941.
Addresses: OPNAV.
031030
From Thorpe for Mills War Dept. Code intercept: — Japan will notify her
consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end.
East wind rain United States ; north wind cloudy Russia ; West wind clear
England with attack on Thailand, Malay, and Dutch East Indies. Will be
repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be
introduced five times in general text.
Top Secret , Secret
2502 CONGKESSIOMAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 113
PACIFIC FLEET EiiPLOYMENT SCHEDULES
Fall and IVinter 1941
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2503
.X..
File No. UT:ITED STATE3 TAG I? 10 FLET.'
"/'\?1 U.S.S. ?S:X3Y1V;j:1A, Flagship
Pearl Harbor, T.II.,
A L August 13, 194-1.
i'rnn: ConKTiander-ln-Chlef , United Stctes Pacific I-'leet.
To : Cossnander Battle Force {Conmar.der Task Force 0"~j
Coiri-aander Aircraft, Battle Force (Comanucr Tus;:
Force T ;C) .
Corni&ander Scoutir.r Force (Cor.Euander Tas-'
TFiRFS ) .
Coirjnander I: .; ■ 1 '.ce.
CoiEnandin.' C-.i.ir.:.': , Second Marine Division.
ou^.ject: 2nt)loy:!ient ::ched'jles; U.S. Pacific Fleet, ;>econd
Q,uarter, Fiscal Year, 19i*2.
Reference: (a) C incus Itr. A4-3/FF1 Serial 1773 of I3 :.;av,
1938.
(b) U.S. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter : o.
tCL-i,l.
(c) Gincpac Conf. Itr. AC-3/FF1-1 Serial 075C
of 8 :.Siy, 19U.
^i.oj.osure: (A) Copy of' subject schedule - Action Addressees
(Under separ- 10 each, information addressees 3 each.
'■"" "vc-r)
I, FncloKure (A) has been approved by the Chief of
iiavQl Operations and is the general directive for preparation
-" '" subject of this letter.
.;. Second quarter enployr.-ient schedules v;ill be sub-
■■■■d for ar-pioval by 5 Septer^ber, printed and distributed by
■ :..:-:;•', 19^1," as fcllbws:-
{al Task Force Coriinandors inforn Type CcTxiander^ ft-.:u
':...■. lander Base Force of the tiries in the schedule to bt-
■• ■; :ted to inter-type tr.ctlcs in their respective T-.i.;;
rjcs, as scon as practicable.
Sb) Type Co.-.rmnders subnit to Task Force Cor-ianders,
■ -1 Conraander-in-Chief , U.S. Pacific Fl-rt, r. -; -
for tyne trainlnf^ indicatinc prioriti'--,- •
• ■' ,- "orce assif-n su'::.- .'
- 1 -
2504 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Cinopac File Ko.
M-3/Fn2/(13)
SeriQi 01254
C 0 !.• F I D E IT T I A L
Subject: Enployrjcnt Schedules, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Second
'Juarte£,_Ij_scriJ. Year^ 1942.
(c) Task Force Co:x".anders and Corjnander 3Qse Force pre-
pare and submit to Coanander-in-Chiof , U.S. Pacific Fleet,
for approval, the qucirteily employment schedule coordinating
the requirements of types in their respective Forces.
3. Fleet units In Kawaiian Area are divided for train-
ing and operations between three Task Forces, Base Force, and
Kavnl Transportation Service as follows:
T;vSK FORCr o:it: - Conmander Battle Force.
Batdivs T'./O and Fan
S.uUroa'v find planes
Crxidiv ]:-'T.
Desflot- (.,:£ lo'js Desron irVji
I'indiv' 01. J, oGL/:LA
1/3 available ^ubniarines
2 Petrol Squadrons
TASK FOnCS T'./O - Cormander Aircraft, Battle Force.
Batdiv o::e
2IITKRPRI£ji and planes
Crudivs THRSZ and FBTS
Desflot TWO, Desdiv FIFTY
Mindiv T'./O
1/3 available subnarines
2 Patrol Souadrons
^SK FonCZ TlgtZS - Corariandor Scoutinc Force,
Crudivs TOim and SIX
L^CirOTOi: and planes
Desron FBTE plus I.Iinron TV/0
Transports, Base Force (when present)
Second ."larine Division loss Defense Battalions
ana Advance Dctach.icnt.
Subnarin:!', "couting Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (to
incluJ V rmnY-Qy.E) loss 2/3 available
sub;nai' . .
Aircraft, Scouting I-'orce, U.S. Pacific Fleet, less
i+ Patrol Sou ad r on s.
3. . . -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2505
..cxiydules; "' ". ^'"-Ific Tin-:
*oal Year,
roscTit J .
SKI^VICI ~ Vessels o-r.
reference ( b) have bier, included ;
... . „. ="ixis purposes.
^oic>i <:.,u. '^yj^ Coamanders -^.-.v. *o s':'*
Llrenetits, shift units froin one ' '
una leave Pear, .mo. da;,
■.^, Reference (c) re.Tiiins effective, v.-lie:.
."jchedule. provide for es ■..iar.:- tsr
-s as prac-o.i-t. Jio to partici-^ "^ ^. - -
•cd 21-25 ;:oveiber, 1941.
0"'' \. . Operati:;. -sriods are
FOXE TWO
-cr 19- 3i CC
i-:q ;:ov 11-21
:::--2g i:ov 29 i:c'
:;5-2o DSC ~\- '■
:,' x-
27
y
2506 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
•: ,? I A L
:::irloyacr.t Schedules, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Second
Quarter, Piscal Year, 19i-2. _
0Pro-w7E:G UPiCSSP
17322 20 SEP - 1 OCT
2-10 OCT 11-22 OCT
23 OCT - 1 ::ov 2-i5 !;ov
17-25 rov 26 ::ov - /. dsc
5-13 :>■- 14-25 DEC
26-31 3r,c ^
10. Periods assigned for Fleet Tactics:-
Tr:s . a T'.;0 find TJZ^.ES - 23-26 OCT.
'I'-K.i iorcos Ciri and TOEE - 22-25 I'CV.
^as.: Forces 0!:2 and TWO - 13-20 DSC.
n
,,.r r.^0
Ki E. KE.CIEL
:lr.cAI;' «V*'^
• atfor
'. --. .r
or
- 4 _
^.^iiCl*
'FP 5 ?9.:
Jp J- 1.', v., ... ,
■,. ,. ■'" '-">*->.<..
•. ,. .;.;(OSLEy, ' ~^ '''"'- 2i7,
/- ■ ^ " ^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2507
■■^^O^a.'JcV
TASK FORCE ONE
EMPLOYMENT
SCHEDULE
• *
R'-,. • i'-f . ■.- C FILES
f <.m litic'i
SEP ;;i' ii<4i
SECOND QUARTER
itp F !(■ N". r-i' - 1942
■ No _ ^^_.
7 2^
2508 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A4-3/FFl(l)/(0896) UNITED STATES PAOITZO FLEET
TASKFORCEONE
U. S. S. CALIFORNIA, Flagship
Peari Harbor, T. H..
13 September 1941.
CONFIDENTIAL
From: Commander Taak Force ONE.
To Taak Force ONE.
Subject: Employment Schedule, Task Force ONE, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, 1942.
Reference: (a) Cincpac conf. Itr. A2-ll/FFl-l/A3/A16/(0690) of 30 April 1941.
(b) Cincpac conf. Itr. A4-3/fT12/(13)/(01254) of 13 August, 1941.
1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), the appended Employment Schedule, Task
Force ONE, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for the second quarter, 1942, is forwarded for information and
guidance.
2. The Train services required for this schedule will be furnished by Commander Base
Force.
3. Economy in fuel and mileage expenditures shall be given due consideration by all
commands.
4. If unforeseen circumstances arise that make it apparent that changes in this approved
schedule within a type would be advantageous. Type Commanders are responsible for making such
changes without reference to higher authority ; provided, these changes do not modify Fleet or
Task Force directive schedules.
W.&PYB
DISTRIBUTION;
List II, Case 1: A. B (less B4, B5).
List I, Case 2: B4, B6, C, D, E, F. G, H, I, JO, K, XI, X2. X4, X6, X6, X7, AAl, AAAl.
SPECIAL: BDIO (1); ENS (BO); EN3-6 (2); EN4 (20); ENS (3); EN6 (B); EN7 (6); EN9 (6); EN9-24 (H:
ENID (3); ENll (B); FPO (2); NDll (3); ND12 (3); ND13 (3); ND14 (3); NDIB (2); NM12 (1); NM13 (1);
NTl-9 (1); NTI-10 (1); NT4-4 (1); NT7-B (1); NY8 (3); NY9 (4); NYIO (3); BatFor Hail Clerk (2); QA(1).
H. 8. COVINGTON.
Flag SeereUrj.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
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2510 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2511
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79716 O— 46 — ot. 17-
2514 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE ONE, U. 8. PACIFIC FLEBT
U. S. S CALIFORNIA, FUgahip
IVOS
i;ATTLESHira — TASK FORCE ONE
WEST VIRGINIA (F)
BttdiT TWO
TENNESSEE (F)
CALIFORNIA (FF)
PENNSYLVANIA (FP)
VO-2 (9 VOS)
BatdiT FOUR
WEST VIRGINIA
COLORADO
MARYLAND
VO-4 (9 VOS)
(F)
AIRCRAFT — TASK FORCE ONE
SARATOGA (F)
2VM Planes — Flag Unit
1 VSB (Group Com. Plane)
VB-a [21 VSB)
VF-3 (18 VF, 2VM)
VS-3 (21 VSB)
VT-.-1 (12 VTB)
Utility Unit (3 VSO, 2 VJ)
CRUISERS — TASK FORCE ONE
HONOLULU (F)
Crudiv NINE
HONOLULU
(F)
PIIOF.NIX
BOISE (RF>
HELi'INA
ST. LOUIS
RICHMOND
VCS-9 (22 VSO)
DESTROYERS — TASK FORCE ONE
RALEIGH (F)
2 VSO Planes
DOBBIN (Tender)
WHITNEY (Tender)
DESTROYER SQUADRON ONE
360 PHELPS — Squadron Flagship
DESDIV ONE
DESTROYER SQUADRON THREE
361 CLARK — Squadron Flagship
DESDIV TWO
366 AYLWIN (F)
348 FARRAGUT (RF)
363 DALE
354 MONAGHAN
DESDIV SIX
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(RF)
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369
376
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349 DEWEY (F) , 370 CASE (F)
361 MACDONOUGli (RF) 365 CUMMINGS
352 WORDEN 373 SHAW
360 HULL 374 TUCKER
MINECRAFT — TASK FORCE ONE
OGLALA (F)
Mindiv ONE
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TRACY
PREBLE
SICARD
PATROL PLANES — TASK FORCE ONE
(VP-23) Patrol Squadron Twcntv-Three — (12 VPB)
(VP-22) Patrol Squadron Twenty-Two — (12 VPB)
(VP-24) Patrol Squndron Twenty-Four — (12 VPB)
SUBMARINES- T.iSK FORCE ONE
SUBMARINE DIVISION TWENTY-TWO SUBMARINE DIVISION MXTY-ONE
1
186 SNAPPER
186 STINGRAY
187 STURGEON
191 SCULPIN (F)
192 SAILFISH
193 SWORDFISH
198 TAMBOR
199 TAUTOG
200 THRESHER
206 GAR
207 GRAMPUS
208 GRAYBACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2515
•♦•♦•♦•♦•♦•
2/^
2516 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A4-S/12-HC/FF2-3 UNITED STATES PAOFIC FLEET
(0738) TASK FORCE TWO
U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship
Pearl Harbor, T. H.,
Septembo- 12, 1941.
CONFIDENTIAL
From: Commander Task Force TWO.
To Task Force TWO.
Subject: Employment Schedule, Task Force TWO, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, 1942.
Reference: (a) Cincpac Conf. Serial 01264 of August 13, 1941.
1. In accordance with reference (a), the appended Elmployment Schedule, Task Force
TWO, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for the second quarter, 1942, is forwarded for information and gui-
dance.
2. Type C. nmanders will make own arrangements for services required.
3. Economy in fuel and mileage expenditures shall be given due consideration by all
commands.
W. F. HALSEY
DISTRIBUTION:
Basis : List n, Case 1. ^
Fleet, Force and Type Commanders, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Units of Task Force TWO less
DD's, DM's, and Airons.
List I, Case 2.
DD's, DM's, and Airons of Task Force TWO.
List I, Case 1.
B2-2; B3-9; B4-01; B4-1; B4-3; B4-5; B5-1 ; Cl-01 ; D2-4; D2-6; El-1; F2: G4; H2-0;
H2-1; H2-2; H4-1; H4-3; H6-0: H6-1 ; 14; 16; 16-2; 16-4; 18; 19; 110.
SPECIAL:
AA-1; AB-1; AAA-1; EN-1; EN-3; EN-4; EN-6; EN-11; FATU; FPO; NA-8; NA-11;
NA-12; NA-37; ND-11; ND-12; ND-13 ; ND-14 ; H4-0 ; Comdg. Gen. Haw. Dept. ; Fleet
Post Office.
H. D. MOULTON,
Flag Secretary.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
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2520 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2521
ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE TWO, U. S. PACIFIC FLBET
(CV6) U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, Flagship
BATTLESHIPS - TASK FORCE TWO CARRIER - TASK FORCE TWO
BatDiv ONE CarDiv TWO
(BB39) ARIZONA (F) (CV6) ENTERPRISE (F)
(BB36) NEVADA
(BB37) OKLAHOMA
CRUISERS - TASK FORCE TWO
CruDiv FIVE
(CA26) NORTHAMPTON (F)
(CA25) SALT LAKE CITY
(CA24) PENSACOLA
(CA27) CHESTER
DESTROYERS - TASK FORCE TWO
(CL8) DETROIT (F)
(ADll) ALTAIR
(AD14) DIXIE
DESTROYER SQUADRON FOUR
(DD357) SELFRIDGE (F)
DcsDiT EIGHT 6e»Div SEVEN
(DD389) MUGFORD (F) (DD391) HENLEY <F)
(DD393) JARVIS (RF) (DD386) BAGLEY
(DD392) PATTERSON (DD388) HELM
(DD390) RALPH TALBOT (DD387) BLUE (RF)
DESTROYER SQUADRON SIX
(DD363) BALCH (F)
DesDiv TWELVE DeaDiv ELEVEN
(DD384) DUNLAP (F) (DD380) GRIDLEY (F)
DD398) ELLET (DD401) MAURY (RF)
(DD385) FANNING (RF) (DD382) CRAVEN
(DD397) BENHAM (DD400) MC CALL
(1) DESTROYER DIVISION FIFTY
(DD113) RATHBURNE (F)
(DDU4) TALBOT
(DD115) WATERS
(DD116) DENT (RF)
MINECRAFT - TASK FORCE TWO PATROL SQUADRONS - TASK FORCE TWO
MinDiv TWO (VP12) Patrol Squadron TWELVE
(DM15) GAMBLE (F) (VP14) Patrol Squadron FOURTEEN
(DM18) BREESE
(DM16) RAMSAY
(DM17) MONTGOMERY
SUBMARINES - TASK FORCE TWO
SubDiv FORTY-TWO SubDiv SIXTY-TWO
(55167) NARWHAL (F) (SS201) TRITON (F)
(55168) NAUTILUS (SS202) TROUT
(55169) DOLPHIN (SS203) TUNA
(SM 1) ARGONAUT (FF) 2) (SS209) GRAYLING
* (2) (SS210) GRENADIER
(2) (SS211) GUDGEON
(1) In reduced conunission. Operates with underwater sound training school.
(2) On reporting.
2522 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MINORANDDH
The attached document was Introduced
aa an exhibit before the examination to
record and preserve testimony pertinent to
the Japemese attack on Pearl Harbor, T.H.,
on 7 December 1941, ordered by Secretary
of the Navy's confidential precept dated
12 February 1944, addressed to Admiral
Thomas C. Hart, U.S. Navy, Retired.
It is highly important that attached
docuflient be retained on file indefinitely
where it will be certainly available for
future call.
Thos. C. Hart
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2523
CONHDENTIAL
TASK FORCE THREE
EMPLOYMENT SCHEDULE
*
M ^ MCEIVEns^:nLES
SEP 291941
ROU.
^^-^ Doc. No. ^
1 October - 31 December 1941
£>^
2-/1
W^^JMMtf'^^^^il^''
^/ ^
2524 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
C.S.F. File No. UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
A4-3/FF3/(90) TASK FORCE THREE
Serial 067C U.S.S. LOUISVILLE, Flagship
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
' September 11, 1941.
CONFIDENTIAL.
From : Commander Task Force THREE.
To Task Force THREE.
Subject : Schedule of Employment, Task Force THREE for the period 1 October - 31
December, 1941.
1. Appended is the Employment Schedule for Task Force THREE for the period 1
October - 31 December, 1941.
2. This schedule has the effect of orders. Attention is invited to United States Pacific
Fleet Regulations, paragraph 146.
3. Commander Base Force is requested to provide the necessary Train services required
by this schedule.
4. Fuel and mileage allowances impose the necessity for planning ahead. Type Commanders
and Commanding Officers will reduce expenditures and mileage to a minimum consistent with
efficient operations and training.
WILSON BROWN
DISTRIBUTION :
List I (Case2) : B (less B4-5),C, I(less 16-2), X, Al (At-
lantic). Al (Asiatic), JO. '
List II (Case 1); Al (Pacific), El-0, H (less H2-1,
H4-1, H4-3), M.
List III (Case 1): B4-B, D-2 El-1, F, G, H2-1, H4-1,
H4-3, 16-2, K.
SPECIAL
EN.'XSO), EN4(20), EN6(3), EN6(e), EN7(6), EN9(5), ENIO(B). ENIUB), EN24(1), EN26(1), KS3(3),
KS4(3), NA)1(2), NA12(2), NA26(2), ND1-10(2),ND11-13(3). NDI4(tO), ND1B(3), NMB-12-13(lea), NPl,
3,7,11, <3ea), NTl-9 to 11 (lea), NYl to 10(3), Des Base, San Diego (2), CO NITRO, SIRIUS, WM W. BURROWS.
REGULUS. KAULA, HENDERSON, WHARTON, VEGA, LASSEN, (2ea), Bd liS, Long Beach (3), Nav.
War College, Newport (3), 2nd Asst. Postmaster General, Washington (3), Postmaster, New York, CO USC(S
Hdqta. Los Angeles, Director and Instructor Naval Reserves, 11th Naval District Navy Civil Liaison Officer, Room
900Law Bldg. 13S N. Brdy., Los Angeles, Fleet Per. Off., Fed. BIdg., San Francisco, Branch Intelligence Off., Rin 463
Fed. BIdg. Los Angeles, (lea), Comdg. Gen. Hawaiian Dept. G3, Ft. Shatter (1), Lexington (30).
T.J. Casey,
Flag Secretary.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2525
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2528 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2529
79716 O — 46 — pt. 17-
2530 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE THREE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET
CRUISERS
(CA35) INDIANAPOLIS - - - Flagship
Ship Unit - - 4VS0 (Attached to VCS-4)
1 VSO - Flag Unit
CRUDIV FOUR
(CA29) CHICAGO (F)
(CA28) LOUISVILLE
(CA33) PORTLAND
(CA36) INDIANAPOLIS (FF)
VCS-4 SCOUTING SQUADRON
FOUR-16 VSO
CRUDIV SIX «
(CA36) MINNEAPOLIS (F)
(CA34) ASTORIA
(CA32) NEW ORLEANS
(CA38) SAN FRANCISCO
VCS-6 SCOUTING SQUADRON
SIX - 16 VSO
CARRIER AND MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWENTY ONE
(CV2) LEXINGTON
IVSB (Group Com. Plane)
VB-2 (21VSB)
VS-2 (21VSB)
VF-2 (18 VF, 2VM)
VT-2 (12 VTB)
Utility Unit (SVSO^VJ)
MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWENTY-
ONE
VMSB-231 (18 VSB)
VMSB-232 (18 VSB)
VMF-211 (18 VF, 2VM)
VMJ-252 (3VJ, 3VJR, 6VR)
DESTROYERS
DESRON FIVE
(DD356) PORTER - Flagship
DESDIV NINE
DD366 DRAYTON (F)
DD368 FLUSSER
DD367 LAMSON (RF)
DDS64 MAHAN
MINDIV FOUR
DMS17 PERRY (F)
DMS16 TREVER
DMSIB WASMUTH
DMS14 ZANE (RF)
DESDIV TEN
DD376 GUSHING (F)
DD378 SMITH
DD379 PRESTON (RF)
DD377 PERKINS
MINRON TWO
(DMS13) HOPKINS - Flagship
MINDIV FIVE
DMSIO SOUTHARD (F)
DMS12 LONG
DMS9 CHANDLER
DMSll HOVEY (RF)
MINDIV SIX
DMSl DORSEY (F)
DMS4 ELLIOT
DMS2 LAMBERTON
(RF)
DMS3 BOGGS
TRANSPORTS, BASE. FORCE ( When Present )
SECOND MARINE DIVISION
(Less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2531
ORGANIZATION OF TASK FORCE THREE, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET
SUBDIV TWENTY ONE
(SS182) SALMON (F)
(SS183) SEAL
(SS184) SKIPJACK
(55188) SARGO (FF)
(55189) SAURY
(55190) SPEARFISH
SUBMARINES
SUBDIV FORTY THREE
(SS170) CACHALOT
(SS171) CUTTLEFISH
(55179) PLUNGER (F)
(55180) POLLACK
(55181) POMPANO
SUBDIV FORTY ONE (On West
(SS123) S-18 (F) Coast)
(SS128) S-23
(55132) S-27
(55133) S-28
(55139) S-34
(55140) S-35
(DD336) LITCHFIELD
(ASRS) HOLLAND
(ASR6) ORTOLAN
(ASH) PELIAS
(AM30) SEAGULL
(ASRl) WIDGEON
PATROL WINGS
PATROL WING ONE
(VP-13) Patrol Squadron Thirteen (5PB2Y2)
(AVI) WRIGHT (Flagship Comairscofor)
(AVD6) HULBERT (F)
(AVDIO) BALLARD
(AVP4) AVOCET
PATROL WING TWO
(Less Patrons Assigned Task Forces ONE and
TWO)
(VP-11) Patrol Squadron ELEVEN (12
PBY5)
(VP-21) Patrol Squadron TWENTY ONE
(12PBY3)
(VP-24 ) Patrol Squadron TWENTY
(OLD VP-12) FOUR (6 PBY5)
(AV4)
CURTISS (F)
(AV8)
TANGIER
(AVDll)
THORNTON
(AVD14)
McFARLAND
(AVP7)
SWAN
PATROL WING FOUR
(VP41) Patrol Squadron FORTY ONE (6PBY5)
(VP42) Patrol Squadron FORTY TWO (6PBY5)
(VP43) Patrol Squadron FORTY THREE (6PBY5)
(VP44) Patrol Squadron FORTY FOUR (6PBY5)
(AVP12) CASCO (F)
(AVD2) WILLIAMSON (F)
(AVD12) GILLIS
(AVP5) TEAL
(AVP6) PELICAN
2532 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Cincpac File No.
A16 P16-3 (0300)
Confidential
United States Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Peabl Habbob, T. H., 21 February 1941.
EXHIBIT NO. 113-A
From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander Battle Force.
Commander Scouting Force.
Commander Base Force.
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force.
Commander Minecraft, Battle Force.
Commander Battleships, Battle Force.
Commander Cruisers, Battle Force.
Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force.
Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force.
Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.
Commander Submarines, Scouting Force.
Subject: Battle Organization and Condition Watches.
1. The problem of battle organization and Condition of Readiness for Action
for all types in the fleet is an acute one, requiring immediate and realistic solution.
The fleet at any moment may find itself faced with actual war conditions requir-
ing a state of alertness and readiness, at sea and in port, not experienced since
World War I and incompletely anticipated in the intervening years.
2. That our ships are properly organized for battle itself and personnel as-
signed to essential stations, especially in view of what has been revealed by the
Fleet Personnel Board, is not questioned. However, the various Conditions of
Readiness for Action based on these Battle Organizations need to be examined
in the light of modern needs, and they are, in the opinion of the Commander-in-
Chief, susceptible of great improvement.
3. It is not desired to require rigid and detailed standardization of battle and
condition watch bills for all types. But there is need of agreement in basic and
fundamental principles, so that Fleet and Task Force Commanders may know
what they are getting in the way of security, and in the way of rest for the
crews of their ships, when they order any Condition of Readiness for Action.
4. Since under modern war conditions it is impossible to man continuously all
battle stations without relief, except when battle is imminent or actually joined ;
since men without adequate rest are soon rendered unfit for battle ; and since,
however, each ship must at all times be prepared to meet a suiT>rise attack, the
three Conditions of Readiness for Action have been devised. One fundamental
consideration is stressed — these conditions were devised as much to give men
adequate rest as to keep all possible stations manned. If the sole requirement
is to keep every station manned — to provide maximum security — there can
be only one condition, Condition One,
The object of the other conditions is to give the crews adequate rest, thereby
bringing them fresh into battle, and at the same time to provide reasonable
security. If in any Condition of Readiness, security becomes no longer reasonable
and adequate, the next higher condition must be set. Operating, as we may
soon have to operate, in a large theatre of war this delicate balance between
security and rest must be carefully kept or we shall be worn out on the one hand
or caught unaware on the other.
5. The part that sound organization plays in this is to assign all men to their
various stations under all three conditions, so that each man may know where
he goes and when, in shifting from one of these conditions to another ; to permit
these shifts to be made without confusion ; and to insure that the maximum
number of essential stations is manned in each condition. What is desired is
a division of labor to avoid exhaustion. If we considered Condition Watches
as primarily involving men we shall get extra dividends in security by their
efficient use.
6. An examination of the Type reports of the Fleet Personnel Board reveals
that the complements recommended by that board permit the setting of a Con-
dition Two Watch, except in destroyers and certain auxiliaries, meeting latest
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2533
maximum requirements ; also that even with complements less than those recom-
mended, but equal to those provided for in the latest Fleet Operating Plan, a
fully manned A. A. battery can be provided in that Condition. This arrangement
is already in effect in the heavy and light cruisers. The Comrmmder-in-CJiief
has therefore recommended a change in the War Instructions requiring all,
instead of half, the A. A. battery bevng manned in Condition Tvx).
7. It follows that, if in Condition Ttco all of the A. A. battery can be manned,
in Condition Three at least one half of this battery can be manned. This should
be the minimum requirement for Condition Three. However, the number of wew-
available in all large ships permits the manning of much more than half, and in
some ships practically all, of the A. A. battery in this Condition on a basis of
a toatch in four. When this can be done a measure of security is obtained ap-
proaching that of Condition Two, insofar as the A. A. battery is concerned, with-
out the undesirable watch and watch feature of that Condition. Over long
periods such an augmented Condition Three Watch may not only be desirable but
essential to prevent exhaustion of our men.
8. That the above cannot be accomplished without the use of main battery
personnel is obvious. To man all A.A. guns in Condition Three without calling
on all personnel already available will require more than a ship can carry. Not
to man these guns to the fullest extent is to fail in providing every possible
defense and to neglect a reservoir of men, who in that Condition, have no other
duties to perform. It is not proposed to use main battery personnel when they
are needed in the main battery, nor is it intended to place too much stress on
A.A. protection to the detriment of main battery fire. But, when the situation
at sea permits the setting of Condition Three of the situation in port requires
the manning of A.A. guns only over long periods of time; to require the A.A.
battery personnel to continue a watch in two on the one hand or to man a
lesser number of guns on the other (while at the same time large numbers of
main battery personnel are idle) is to fail in making eflBcient use of the men and
material available. That this question is highly controversial is recognized.
But the Commander-in-Chief fails to see how we can come to any other conclusion
than to make full use of our men.
9. To insure the smooth functioning of condition watches requires strict ad-
herence, in those ships carrying sufficient personnel, to the time honored quadri-
lateral organization of 'two watches and four sections. This is essential, and
in no other way can the shift from one condition to another be accomplished
without confusion and without the imposition of seccessive double watches
on part of the personnel. In this connection the use of the terms "Watch One"
and "Watch Two", in lieu of Starboard and Port Watches, is not only confusing,
since the sections are already numbered "one" to "four" inclusive, but it dis-
guises the fact that these watches must actually be the starboard and port
watches throughout the ship to make a watch in four work. This confusion
already exists in some ships for sea watches; and will be further accentuated
in all ships, using this system, when Base Conditions of Readiness are established
in port.
10. To ipermit the use of the basic four section arrangement, and the employ-
ment of the main battery personnel in Condition Three, requires the longitudinal
division of main battery into starboard and port watches in Condition Two. This
may be accomplished by having all turrets half manned, instead of half the
turrets fully manned, in. Condition Two ; or it may be accomplished by having
half the turrets fully manned in four turret ships; or in three or five turret
ships by having one or two turrets fully manned and the odd turret half manned.
Turrets fully manned should have the entire turret crew in the starboard or port
watch and subdivided into only two sections. Turrets half manned should
have the turret crew equally divided between the starboard and port watch.
Of these systems the one should be adopted which will give the maximum return
considering the material installations in the individual ships and the diflSculty
of getting men into the turret while the turret is being fired. The past practice in
heavy cruisers of manning only one turret complete in Condition Two, thereby
falling far short of the requirement of having one half th€» battery manned, is
not approved.
11. The system of half manning all the turrets in Condition Two has been
in effect in some heavy cniisers and all 10,000 ton light cruisers and has proved
feasible. Indications are. since many of the installations in a triple turret arei
in duplicate rather than triplicate that fire can be oi)ened with all and continued
with two-thirds, rather than one half, the battery until the off watch responds
2534 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to general quarters. A firing test, shortly to be conducted in Light Cruisers
should settle this question conclusively for that type.
12. Certain types such as destroyers and some auxiliaries, and some activities
in he^vy ships, such as the M. E. and Radio Divisions, do not lend theniselves
to a four section arrangement. They have been organized on a three section
basis, partly from long established custom and partly because enough qualified
personnel cannot be carried to permit of a normal watch in four. When the
latter is truely the case This situation should be recognized and accepted. When
the A.A. battery is also the main battery, as in most destroyers, it is frequently
impossible to man all this battery in Condition Two on a basis of a watch in two.
If all the battery is required; Condition One must be set for its efficient service.
Howejver, it appears feasible to man half the battery efficiently on a basis of a
watch in three. The logical solution in such cases is to make Conditions Two
and Three identical — a straight watch in three.
13. The Commander-in-Chief desires that for all Types :
(a) Ships be organized on a strictly quadrilateral basis of two watches and
four sections (straight three section basis for such destroyers and auxiliaries as
cannot meet this requirement).
(b) In Condition Three one-fourth (or one-third where applicable) of the
ship's company, less certain men such as cooks, bakers, meiss attendants, etc.,
for essential services, be placed on watch.
(c) It be determined what essential stations can be manned by full and effi-
cient use of one-fourth (or one-third) of the ship's company and report made
to the Commander-in-Chief, so that the requirejments for Condition Three can
be changed in basic directives.
14. The Commander-in-Chief desires to impress upon Force and Type Com-
manders, in complying with paragraph 13, that the above sets forth principles
which are to be followed and that departures in detail will be necessary. The
end in view is a division of labor in order to avoid exhaustion.
H. E. KiMMEL,
Copy to :
CinClant
CinCaf
Compatwing TWO
P. C. Cbosuby,
Flag Secretary.
EXHIBIT NO. 113-B
Cincpac File No.
A2-11/FF12/
A3/(12)
Serial 01772
Confidential
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Peabl Habbob, T. H., October 31, IHl.
Pacific Fleet Confidential Lettek 14CL-41
From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet
To : PACIFIC FLEET.
Subject : Task Forces — Organization and Missions
Reference i
(a) Pacific Fleet Conf. Letter No. 4CL^1.
(b) Cincpac Conf. Ltr. A4-3/FF12/ ( 13 ) Serial 01254 of 13 Alig. 1&41 (Fur-
nished only to Type, Force and Task Force Comdrs. and CG, Second
Marine Div. ) .
1. Reference (a) is cancelled and superseded by this letter, effective 15 Novem-
ber 1941.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2535
2. To provide for all phases of type, inter-type, and Fleet training, concurrently
with performance of certain required patrol and escort duties, the following Task
Force organizations are prescribed :
Task Force One {Commander Battle Force)
Batdivs TWO, FOUR 6 BB
Cardiv ONE less LEXINGTON 1 CV
Crudiv NINE H CL
Desflot ONE less Desron FIVE 1 OCL, 2DL, 16 DD
OGLAIA, Mindiv ONE 1 CM, 4 DM
Primary Mission:
To organize, train, and continue development of doctrine and tactics for opera-
tions of, and in the vicinity of, the Main Body ; to keep up-to-date normal arrange-
ments and current plans for such operations ; and to accumulate and maintain
in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force in order to
provide an eflacient Covering Force available for supporting operations of other
forces; or for engagement, with or without support, in fleet action.
Task Force Tivo (Commander Aircraft, Battle Force)
Batdiv ONE 3 BB
Cardiv TWO 1 CV
Crudiv FIVE 4 CA
Desflot TWO 1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD
Mindiv TWO 4 DM
Primary Mission:
To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for reconnoitering and
raiding, with air or surface units,, enemy objectives, particularly those on land;
[2] to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations;
to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required
by the task force in order to provide an efficient Reconnoitering and Raiding Force
for testing the strength of enemy communication lines and positions and for
making forays against the enemy, and for operations in conjunction with other
forces.
Task Force Three {Commander Scouting Force)
Crudivs FOUR, SIX 8 CA
LEXINGTON plus Marine Air-Group 21 1 CV
Desron FIVE 1 DL, 8 DD
Minron TWO 13 DMS
Trainron FOUR 6 AP
2nd Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detach
ment
Primary Mission:
To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for capturing enemy land
objectives, particularly fortified atolls; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements
and plans for such operations ; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for
war all essential material required by the task force in order to provide an effi-
cient AmphiMous Force for attack, with or without support of other forces, on
outlying positions of the enemy.
Task Force Four {Commandant Fourteenth Naval District)
That part of Fourteenth Naval District Activities which involve the Island Bases.
Primary Mission:
To organize, train, and develop the Island Bases in order to insure their own
defense and provide efficient services to Fleet units engaged in advanced op-
erations.
2536 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Task Force Seven (Commander Submarines, Scouting Force)
Subron FOUR less Subdiv FORTY-ONE 1 SM, 8 SS, 1 AM, 1 ASR, 1 DD
Subron SIX 12 SS, 1 AS
Subron EIGHT* 6 SS, 1 AS '
Subron TEN* 4 SS, 1 AS
*
Upon reporting.
Primary Missions:
(1) To organize, train and, concurrently witli execution of the expansion
program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics in order to provide an
efficient Submarine Observation and Attack Force for independent operations
or operations coordinated with other forces.
[3] (2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Com-
mander-in-Chief, United States Fleet in order to improve security of Fleet units
and bases.
Task Force Nine (Commander Patrol Wing Two)
Patwing ONE 36 VPB (A), i AV, 2 AVD, 1 AVP
Patwing TWO 42 VPB (A), 2 AV, 2 AVD, 1 AVP
Primary Missions:
(1) To organize, train and, concurrently with execution of the expansion pro-
gram, to continue development of doctrine and tactics in order to provide an effi-
cient long range Air Scouting and Air Striking Force for independent operations
or operations coordinated with other forces.
(2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-
Chief, United States Pacific Fleet in order to improve security of Fleet units and
bases.
Task Force Fifteen (Commander Base Force)
Units assigned 4 CA or CL
Primary Mission:
To escort trans-pacific shipping in order to protect trans-pacific shipping against
possible attack.
3. Commanders of Task Forces ONE, TWO, and THREE, established by this
order, will perform the duties incident to the organization, training and opera-
tions of their respective Task Foi'ces. In addition, they will control the alloca-
tion of time for Task Force and Type exercises, in the at sea exercise periods of
the employment schedules of their respective Task Forces. The relation of the
Type Commanders to the Task Force Commanders, in matters relating to the
above will be the same as now exist between Type Commanders and Force
Commanders.
4. Commander Task Force FOUR, established by this order, will perform the
duties incident to organization, training, and development of the Island Bases.
5. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE, established by this order,
will perform the duties incident to organization, training, expansion and opera-
tions of their respective Task Forces. They will issue orders for and supervise
the conduct of prescribed patrols. In addition, they will control the allocation
of time within their respective Task Forces to operations (inclfiding type and
inter-type training) and upkeep, with due regard to sufficiency of upkeep for
maintaining material conditions of readiness for war service.
6. Commander Task Force FIFTEEN, established by this order, will perform
the duties incident to organization and operations of his Task Force. Fc^r the
present, cruisers will l)e assigned to this Task Force in rotation and in the propor-
tion of one each from Cruiser Divisions FOUR, FIVE, SIX and NINE, insofar
as overhaul schedules and other circumstances permit. Transpacific westbound
convoys will be formed on the West Coast by the Commandant Twelfth Naval
District or in the Hawaiian Area by the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District,
depending on circumstances. Eastbound convoys will be formed in the Manila
Area by the Commandant Sixteenth [4] Naval District. Commandant
Fourteenth Naval District will provide liaison between the three District Com-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2537
mandants and Commander Task Force FIFTEEN, furnishing information as to
makeup, schedules, and routing of convoys. Commander Task Force FIFTEEN
will issue the ordei-s for and supervise the conduct of escort duties. Cruisers
assigned to the Escort Force but not actually engaged in escort duty will be
available to their respective Type Commanders for routine training and upkeep.
7. Force and Tj'pe Coumianders will continue to exercise other functions as
now assigned, and' as required by U. S. Navy Regulations and basic instructions.
8. Unless already covered by appropriate publications, Task Force Doctrines
and Current Tactical Orders for Task Forces shall be prepared and issued in
tentative form. As soon as they have been sufficiently tested they shall be sub-
mitted to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, for final approval.
9. Units of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, not specifically detailed to the Task Forces
appearing herein, will remain under the Force Commanders as at present.
10. Communications. Effective with the organization set forth in this letter:
(a) Units in Task Organizations, while at sea or away from Pearl Harbor,
shall use tJie effective Task Force frequency plans, except,
(1) Island Base shore radio stations guard 4265 series.
(2) Units of Task Forces SEVEN and NINE ordered to patrol in vicinity of
Island Bases guard 4265 series.
(3) In Task Forces FOUR, SEVEN, and NINE, certain Task Group designa-
tions are assigned additional geographical area significance, as follows :
1. Midway
2. Wake
3. Johnston
4. Palmyra
in order that other components of the Fleet and Fourteenth Naval District forces
may know automatically how to communicate with the forces present in those
areas.
Exam>ple:
Task Group 4.1 — District Activities at Midway.
7.1 — Submarine Patrol at Midway.
9.1 — Patrol Planes operating from Midway.
(b) Units of each task organization, when in i)ort, will guard and use harbor
circuit (2562 kcs. currently in use in Pearl Harbor) and such other circuits as
may be prescribed. Senior Officer Present Afloat will also guard the harbor cir-
cuit, and establish communication, preferably by visual or landline, with the
nearest shore command activity.
11. Schedules. Current employment schedules for Task Forces ONE, TWO and
THREE, and units not assigned to Task Forces, remain in effect except for units
transferred to Task Forces SEVEN and NINE by this letter. Assignments to Task
Force FIFTEEN will be indicated in the Task Force ONE, TWO and THREE
schedules. Commanders Task Force SEVEN and NINE submit revised schedules
for the period 15 November to 31 December 1941, at the earliest practicable date.
For the present, required inter-type training of submarines and patrol planes
with surface types will be limited to the Fleet Tactical periods listed in reference
(b). Commanders Task Forces SEVEN and NINE will, if practicable, have at
least two divisions of [5] submarines and two squadrons of patrol planes
available for each of these Fleet Tactical i)eriods. Commanders of Task Forces
SEVEN and NINE will include in their schedules joint arrangements for exer-
cises between patrol planes and submarines in recognition signals, visual and radio
communications, and coordinated tactics. Commanders of Task Forces SEVEN
and NINE will also arrange for inter-type training in addition to that required
during Fleet Tactical periods by mutual agreement with Commanders of Task
Forces ONE, TWO, and THREE during the regular at sea operating period of the
surface Task Forces.
H. E. KiMMEL.
Distribution: (5CM-41)
List II, Case 1 : A, X, ENl, ENS, NA12, NDllAC, NDll-12-13-14, NY8-10,
(Al-Asiatic, Al-Atlantic).
P. C. Cbosley,
Flag Secretary.
2538 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 113C
I. Revised Employment Schedule of Task Force
Nine, for Remainder of 2nd Quarter of
Fiscal Year 19U2.
II. Watch and Duty Schedules for December, 19li}.
for Patrol Wing Two.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2539
Revised En5>lpyment Schedules of Task Force Nine,
submitted pwrsudnt to Pacific Fleet Confidential
Letter lliCL-l4l, together wLth documentB- Tfhich
approve sane*
2540 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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2541
CONFIDENT!/
Takra up by .»m Date ..19. ^OtT. I94L.... CINCUS Routiiv No. .
Offlcc of Origin JV2..iCoi^laakXor..9ti Date 19. KQT.JLS.y.
File No. .IW2yM.rJ/L0789i..
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No. copies rac«iv«l . .9xiS..A..3. Liat of Endoattrea raoaivad ...4'?..
Subject: Reviaftd Schedule for remainder of second quarter
fiscal year, 1942,
2542 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
lUSflDRANOUM
Froa: /^^^
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2543
W2/A4-3/
fe^"*
0780
PATROL WING TWO
U. & NAVAL AIR STATION
PEARL HARBOR. T. H.
19 NOV 1941
9«ibJ«ot:
Ih* C«HiflBd«r Task rare* UK.
Th* rriBiil T-ln-Chlsf , U. S. Paolfio Jl—t,
B*Tla«d Sohadttl* for B«a&ia4«r of 8«eood Quarter,
riseal Tmt, 1942.
Sieloaur*: (▲) Ttoo oepias of proposed r«Tla«d sohodula*
I. CliAiicad conditions hSTs nsosssitatsd a rsvision
of tb* sohsduls for units of Tiask Foros NIMB for His raaaindsr
of tlis saoond <iuart*r*
2* Approval of anelosura (A) is roqusstad.
P. N. L. BELLHOIB.
2544 CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2545
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2546 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Watch and Duty Schedules for Patrol Wing Two.
December 19Ul
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2547
BkltOh WIKG YVO
Fff2/A4-4/. U. a, N^V^ Hi A UTASIOK
Psarl Harbor, T. E.
(5298)
.5 NOV m
froa: The Conaand^r Patxol Win^i T</0.
To TLe CooDBDder Patrol Squadron TVidrTT-TiVO.
TbA CocoBiider Patrol Squadron Tj'flfi'Y-TUAAJ.
Tba Couaander iiatrol Squadron TJHTf-roOd*
The CooaBnder Patrol Squadron itLJfSi.
The CooEaoder Patrol squadron TuTi^Vii.
The ConBandar Bttrol Squadron 70UaT£iK<
subject: Watch and Duty Schedule for Lecaaber 1,44^41,
to January 1, 1942.
Aeloaure: (a) Match and Luty Schadula.
1. i^iclosure («) «111 be follovad aa the Watoh aofi
Duty Schedule for the period Decaaber 1, 1941, to JanuaJT 1,
L. C. tbdi^a,
By direetloa.
Copy to:
Cooipatwing 011^.
Coopatron 21.
2548 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2549
cpzitviic:: 3c:ii»T^LS no.
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paticl .a;:G t..o
0. 8 . lUTAL ACT JT.»nCN
P«arl Eerbor, T. K.
Ml
cuT/r:_.iS
VPJGHT
iiVoo:n'
. .J-!-'.
S?!I
PATO)!: 11 :G4 V8 ;
^.■^'^JILl?. ..J?2]112,
PATi(CK 1/. : IK
PATHCK 22
PArKCN 2?
.AB2
El
TYl- *tf J
Koveaber 25, 1941.
rjyt XW««*l si. }f^^2k - Dec. 2. 19U)
_ u::
Kr
STH
■Rii"
G4 Td
21
P^'iPOK ZJi. ; Yl VCO: VCIO i 01 Ik ,«. . JPl
25
3AT
«
in: : IK
•
srH :
"tip ":'
G2 LI :
RO
is: :
L2 VC9, : DP
«1
sey;
3^
JDK
I Dee.
JtDK
. jfflW
A£2
3h-.;
.Ti |._jn
<- - - • - - - -IP— —--».— •
3?H
~?
7.1.^8
Fl Y7
£1
-rcr'vr'^TxnT"
;L1 YCy
A3Z
n 18
Fl Y7
r.
U YC9
ABI
£1
Fl
A32
G2
Gl
FaiBili vlzatic ..
Froc or Flzod .'^chine Gun*.
Advance Base Operations.
Hl^ iiltitude Horiz />ntal Boabiag.
Master Horizontal Bi ibers,
C^ualif icetion ?ra«/ice.
G3 Anti-duboorins Boabi/ig.
GU Bonbin^ Uaneurerinf Target.
PG Plane Guard.
Fl Inspectloc.
HD Re^dy Du^.
o?.; Holiday Routine.
SPH Serrieos Pearl Harbor.
Tl Tastics.
UJBL Upl:eep.
Yl Ki^it Fljring.
CP Dawn Patrol.
31
EiW; • IXFTT T. / MJ
HULBSR?
L. C. SALEZr. /
Couiaander, U.S. Nevy,
Operetiono Officer,
Patrol \l\ts. T.X).
/
oqtiadr&Qs Tccc^) IC
Tenders (eash) 10
KAS PH n i«
K«S Kaaeoho 3aj 20
liJi OOD 3
PttrJlDG TU) P!lotc. U^t
2550 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
PATROL ./rXJ TWO
VH2/\ju--ifTL/ D. s. XA.V.U. AiH jT.jrio:: va
(3^7) Peapl Harbor, T. H.
:-{.:j2iI2'/ji>
Noveiaber 25, 1941.
J.l^7^-^\ I^^-T.^Ci.-.iT nC.T 7LYi:.-a SCH3D0L5 (VeelC Nor. 26— Dee. 2J9U)
Y/ednesduy. Noy. 26 ^Patron 2l» lanuioes anl alp tactics. For taotld
operate In area VU3 abore 2000 feet.
VJ-1 (3 lend plane a) j^ractlce landings 1800-1900.
2 (JR3 planes) will operate irithout liglits in
araaa C-7 and C-11 altitude 10,000 feet towline
7000 feet.
Carrier Air Groups and «^rine Jiir Group 21 land-
in3s end air tactics. For tactics operate in
areas V2, V3, V4 and VJl abOTO 2000 feet.
Thursday. Nov. 2?
Friday.
Nov.
28
Saturday. Nov. Z
Sunday.
Nov.
n
Ucnday.
DfeC.
-k
Carrier Air Groups and liarina Air Group 21 land.
ines and air tactics. For tactics oporate la
arecs V2, V3, V4 and VSl above 2000 feot.
VO-2 and' ¥0-4 (9 plane a) will retun to Pearl
Harbor fn>2 operating areas at sea.
Carrier Air Groups and ^^arine Air Group 21 land-
ingc and air tactios. For tactics operate in
areas 72, T3, V4 and VSl above 2000 feat.
2 V0-V8 planes exercise Aa-4 2130-2230.
YJ-1 (1 F3T) takeoff 1800. TViU operate with-
out lights in are&s C8, C9« CIO altitude 10,000
feet towlins 7000 feet.
NONE.
OP
Tuesday, Dec. 2
JSCB-Z '*^ planes) landings and air tactics,
tactios opepate in apsa ▼n3 above 2000 feet.
2 VO-TS pianos exepcise Aa-4 2130 - 2230.
Carrier Air Groups and liariae Air Opoup 21 lond-
in.^^s and aip tactics. Fop tactics opepute in
areas V2, V3, V4 and Y31 above 2000 feet.
Carrier Air Groups and Uerin'} Aip Opoup 21 land-
in«;s and aip tactics. Uevl^utioa flights to
Uani and petum. Fop tactics opepate in apeas
T2, V3, T4 and VSl above 2000 fset.
Units so desirjnated fupnish ni-ilit fl/lng details as pequiped
by Soction VI of Aip Opepations Manual, ■avjil Air Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H. (1941).
y
^
u, C. RAUJET,/
COHtnnder, U. a, /ncyj,
Opepotioas Offieor,
Patrol Viae T^o.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ^ 2551
PATROL VJI-iC no
F«2/A4-3(2)/ V. S. UAVAL AIR 31ATI0S Vb
P««rl Eax^Mr, T. H.
n strict:!)
ACCRA?? QU:rrEr.Y AHJA A33IGSUZ T DISlRISPTIOirt
^-CThCPac ♦^
-««0^ Ir ba t f o r
^OBacofor
>0«abatdiv OtrS
.j^iaratdlv POUR
^OfJcrujotfor *
maBKruacofor ^
AConcrutllv "Ein^ ^5
Opncrudiv FOUR *
-*Hncruolv FIVE ••
-•OfTcxnullv SIX *♦
-•wmcrudlv HIKE
•MtTilng o:i^ Units (each)
-rttWing TOO Units (each)
AwArngton Air Group
^fcrtWprlse Air Croup
Ik Saratoga Air Croup
•4lBrlne Air Groun 21
-♦t^r. U.S.S. LLXIIIGTON
-^.U., U.S.S. ^TiJ<PRISE
tC.O., U.S.S. SARATOGA }
^16;^ N.A.3.» Pearl Harbor
i^tcrT; II.A.S., Kanoohe Bay
JUi^fisher-IIeduaa At. Rp. Unit
Ji^^Tt 10th Wine Air Corp, Hickaa Field
Jiedqtarters, 14th Uins* fai«eler I'ield
iCtiuiiiuider Hawaiian Air Force
C^]}atfor
•6<Snaubacofor
<«osat. 14 i:.D.
flef^asefor
•4Ul5Inbatror
^onutwlns, Basetor .
J«ff5ron ?0'JR
JMrTSC, 3, Pwt DeRuasy
■flm^abatfor
^tOT, Ilarbor Defense, Pearl Harbor
.^■e-. . Ilarbor Defense, Fort Ri^;er
...dtcrr U.S.S. PKr.?SYLVA::iA
.--?srr6oD p:: ra
T
2552 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
^WZ/KU'^r^Z
t'jJsoL tfi.ya TWO
U. 8. SATAL AIK STATIOa
I^arl Uarbor, T. D.
irr.oiT! AT .7 Li^
'>wC-JaC7 h'lCHT TLnaO SCUZDOLZ DT:>TRIBDTTOgi
:orcr
itdlv Fu'JR
jnibftf^p
;r'ircofor
y :crcr;.d?.v TdRfZ
icru.'.iv SIX
-adiv irrhE
Cocfvitv/Ins Cl^
..Jtttrol '.Vin^ 0N2 (All lfdt« - MOh)
te«r»l Wine TWO (All tcilts <- •a«h)
-ij.ZTneton Ail- Group
— ftrr?rprl33 Air Croup
*.Carj-r,f« Air Group
-Iferlr.o Air Group 21
— «tO., 'JJS LTXIilGTOM
-•r©-. , U;- EKT2i{PRI3Z
<c.;). , bs:. CA':?ArocA
■■■' lO. , :.Ao r.-'i-rJ F:.rtor
£,.^ , NA.> Ku.jchc 3ay
•*«5r:sii'ji-ir'iu8c at. pp. Otait
77, leth v;ir. • Air Corp, 31eK«a TJeld
■JijL^UUartera, 14tl- >.Wiiic , Tlhttlar TinlA,
-yu, lluMiilc3 Air Force.
^.-acKbatfo.'
-»»^CC yH TH
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2553
P«/2/M-3AZ/
(3231)
RZo7RIC7i:r
PATROL' VHC TUC
u. s. iuval iJH jr..Tioi;
P«arl Harbor, T. H.
Ub
novaaber 18, 1%1«
riZZT AIR JZT^caiai^T lac:? /LYIWG SCISDLIa (Veek of MOT, ly . 2S. 19a)
V.:dne8gay. Hov. 19 IPatron 21 alght boobine 2030-2200 aroa VS2.
Carrier Air Groups laiMlia.,8 aol air tactics. 7or
tactics cpereta in areas Vl, T2, T3, Yk, VSl
aboye 2000 f^et.
Thursday. Ho v. 20
Friday, tlo". 21
Jaturday^ Mot. 22
Sunday 1 Nov. 23
Monday. Mot. 2A
Tuesday. Mot. 25
H0N3.
Carrier Air Croups lanoings and air taotios. For
tactics operate in areas Vl, V2, 73, Ik, 731
sbOTe 2000 feet.
2 VO-YS planes exeroise AA-4 2130-223C.
NOICC.
MOHE.
Carrier Air Groups and I^arlne Air Oxoup 21 land-
ings and air tactics. For taotios oparata ia
areas 71, 72, 73, 74. and 731 abOTS 2000 faat,
2 70-73 planes exsreisa M-4 2130-2230.
Carrier Air Groups and Uariae Air Group 21 land-
inee and air tactics. Ravigation flights to
Uoui end return* For taotios opsrata in araas
71, 72, 73, 74, s&t 731 abora 2000 fast.
#(Jnits so deaisnatad JUrnlah nlfht flying details as raqguirad
by Section 71 of Air Operations iisBual, Xaval Air Station, Fisarl
Harbor. T. B. (1941).
HOTZ: Drydock ohannel will be closed to sedplaaa traiffic
durinc this period except on pemission of tha Tovar
Duty Offioer.
2554 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATl'ACK
(3230)
RZGTfdCTa)
PATBOL '.a 23 T.<0
U. ^4 »iVAL LD. S7.:i'I0R
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
Un
MoTeabttr 16, 1941.
OTSSA'ilOi: JC.
: VZD :
THuas
XVeek cd
: "21
: ?RI
' BoYeober 19 - 25. 1«»1)
: a : 23 : U : 25 :
: J^ : SUI« : ^:{ : TU2S :
CORTIoS
: UK
u::
U^
: UiJ : U.: : SPH : SPK :
TAI!CI2R
: UK
uc
u-^
AB3
: Tl • Tl, Tl : Tl :
WRIGHT
: A32 :
ABB
: ABZ : ABZ : aBS : ABS ':
Mc7AHLA!{D
SFH
3Pa
£>jn
i Ui: : IK : 0:: : UK :
THowrroii
: PG ''.
PC
:... PG._
; .VS..
PC
! PG J PG J PG 5 PG
HUiS..hT
: PG
I Ui: : UK : UK : UK •:
s./Ai;
?C • PC • PG • PG •
Avocrp
: US
IK
UK
i UK i UK i UK i UK i
PA'xHON 11
: DP
:y5 V6 :
— as-;
1 q> n
» : aaw- : ?4 5 H
PATTOM 12
U TC10<
PI
^^ ' JX. ,.*. ..Tl....*. Tl •
PATRON U
: ABK
:U ICIO 5
U ¥010!
AB3 i
API ARlt : UK : UK :
PATRON 21
PATRON 22
i ABZ i
PATRON 23
i ABB i
A2B :
r- - - - ,
jtBB I A32 : a: : UK :
PATRON 21^
^ i
uJB i
HD : » ; n : n :
SI Faailiarlsatlon.
'1 Fra« or Fixed *^oliiii« Ouns.
«BZ AdTanoe Bas« (^r<>tloiia.
J2 Hleh Altitud* BorisoBtal Boii»lii«.
14 fioabing UuMttiMiliic TUrcat.
?6 Plena Guard*
?1 InapaotiOB.
aD Baad7 Duty.
JBW Hblidaj Bout la*.
.JPH 3arTlc«B Paarl Harbor.
Tl Tactic s.
OK Upkaap.
n Hi^t PlyiJie. ^, ^
OP Dbmb Patrol. Z, ^r^
^¥fy(^
L'. C. BAlUir, /
MBdar. U. 8. Ka9^.
Oparationa Offioar.
Patrol tfii« TdD.
. riaA)
Tndara (aaah)
10
10
VAD 000
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2555
(3^29)
FATBDL '..'lie r.;o
U. S. IUVi»L /JH STATION
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
Vb
NoTenber 16, 1941.
XZRCtUJi: GUtrSRY ARZa a.^ISIL^:T (yeek of Wovejber 19 » 25. 19U).
PATML '..Tir, Tf.O
Carrier A'r Croups
Marine Air Croup 21
VO Win«
CA Wing
CL Wing
VCS-5
V4, VCIO, LI, L2.
Yl, V2, V3, V51, L3. Illio Point target.
Xahuku Point Targot (e;ccept 2$ L 26 Nov.)
V7, T8.
VU3.
VA9, VC9.
Kahuku Point Target 25 and 26 November.
L. 0. RAItiZY, /
Cooaander, U. 8. Navy'
OperetiooB orfieer,
Patrol Mias TWO.
2556 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
f«/A4^(2)/
PATROL VIJO no
v. S. BAVAL AIR STATWH
Pearl Eai^wr, T. H.
AIRCRAFT Or.nigY ARi:A AS3I0aiS:T DISglBPTIOr »
CinCPac 5
CooAlrbatfor S
Comscofor S
Coabatshlps 5
CciribAtdiv 0H1£ S
CoAatdlv POUR 5
CoDcru'>atfor ^ 5
Comcrudl'v CRL£ S
CoocrudlT POm 5
ConcrudiT PIVE 5
CoiacrudiT SIX 5
Comcru'liT iniiE 5
Patvring ON^ Units (aaeb) S
Patffing no Units (each) 6
Lexington Air Group 11
Biterprise Air Group 11
Saratoga Air Group 11
I£arlne Air Grcu? 21 20
CO., U.S.S. LCXIWCtD9 10
CO., U.S.S. xJITEAPRISE 13
CO., U.S.S. SARATOGA 10
CO., H.A.S., Pearl Earbor 20
CO., H.A.S., Saneohe Bay 20
Elngfisher-Uedusa At. Rp. Unit 5
CG., 10th V/ing Air Corp, nickaa Field 27
Headquarters, 14th Wins, fiheeler I-'leld 27
Coisnander Hacailan Air Porco 5
Conbatfor 4
Conaubscofor 4
Co3idt. 14 U.D. 8
Socbasefor 2
Coxainbatfor 2
Comutving, Basefior 5
Subron PO'Jn 6
CO; KSC, 3, Port i>cRuasj 6
Coodesbatfor 6
CO.i Harbor Defense, Pearl Ilarbor 2
CO., Ilarbor Defense, Fort Rucsr 2
CO., U.S.S. PHr.ISYLVAl'IA 5
PAD OOD PH ni 5
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2557
FASBaLKEB TWO
U. S. KATAL AIX STiSiai
PmtI Barbor, T. H.
FLZET AIR p2T.j:R:zrrr hig^t tlitc scheduis rasrasOTioJ:
CinCPac
Cocaairbatror
Comscofor
Coabftt ships
Coabatdir OHZ
CoabatdlT rOOR
CcBcrubatfor
Couoruscofor
CoacrudlT TBREZ
CoaerudlT TOTS
CoacrudlT FIVZ
CoQcrtidlT SCL
ConcrudlT HIIG
Coapa twins OlS
Patrol Wli« OkZ
(All units - aeeli)
Patrol Viog THO (All units - Mdi)
Loxiogton Air Croup
Zntenrisa Air Croup
3aratoga Air Croup
Uariae <Ur Croup 21
CO., UJS IZiimTON
CO., USS aiTKiPRISZ
CO., U3S 2ABATCGA
CO.. MAS Pssrl Harbor
CO., NA3 Xaneohe Baj
Kin«^ aher-Uadusa At. Rp. Unit
CC. 18th Vii« Air Corp, Hickam Field
Headquarters, 14th Wing, Wheeler field.
CG, Hawaiian Air Force.
Coobetfor
?.J) OOD PH TH
VJ-1
VJ-2
2
2
2
4
2
2
2
2558 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(3176)
ICoTHICTtD
PATRQL-iJH; 7./0
U. S. KaV.J. ATx oT.S-IOK
?oarl 2arLor, T. R.
Vu
HoTflober 11, 1941.
OPZHAnOlT ^X^DULi: KO. 43-U (..'oe.i c
>f KoTezol;
15 :
•er 12 -
18. 19U
^
: 12 : 13 :
liL. :
" 'SfflT'i
16 :
mi :
oPH :
18 :
CL"RTI£S i CK i U:: ':
. . UK :
SFA :
. .J,?''L..i
ABZ
3r:l
7;j»ia< :. SPi! : S?H :
...IGhT : IT.: : ITl :
i>i?H :
cr^i :
3?H i
Ur?.JiL.i.'i' : AL3 : ;»3i :
.32
SPJ :
THORCTOi: : SlU : S?H :
.__srH_j
ABw
S?H
HU^Jl^T : A33 : A3J :
aB3
! A3J :
„ .A32 J
A3S :
._UK :
m: :
S".a1J : 3?H : 5?H :
AVOCZT : f.: : UII
SPK i
<
u:-
jl:,,
'. ui:
: : U^ G2
PATTON 11 : RD VI : U
62 U
: RO
:__>iB2 ..:
:.. ar;/__:
: itSE :
,.JE1_ j
.3i !
U L2 :
C2 U ;
El :
C2 L2 :
PATSOi: 12 : /:i : RD
PATiiCIC IL : A3i: : ^Z
: AB2
■ • * ■ "a? 01 ■ ':' yi Yf *
PA-r^o:: 21 :U 12 : vcio
:jircio._
:_jiBE _.
PATiCK 22 : A33 : a3Z
a3Z :
AB3 :
PATROJI 23 : iL23 : A5E
u:: :
PATROI! 24 : -^BS : «D3
: ABZ
: .;»/ :
jfj^ 2rae or. 71yed Ilachino Cund.
SI Parol larlzation.
RZaIV duty T2iDSR
.131: Advance Base Operations.
Gl Ucstei Horizontal Boab^rs,
IKGMnt
>H
Qualification Practice,
G2 Hi^ Altitude Tarizontal BaBiMi«.
RD Ready IXity.
Sir: Holiday Routine.
SPB Services Pearl !-:Arbor.
CK Upkeep.
..y
n Klsbt Flying.
UP Davm Patrol.
DIJ'i^BOTIOi:
Squbdrons (eacbJ
10
Tenders (eaca)
10
'KA5 PK TO
20
NAb Kaneohe Bay
20
NAb Uaul
23
Y.S> GOD
3
L. C. Iu.,ioIJTt /
Cojuonder, U. 8. MV7»
Operations Officer,
Patrol Vine V.'O.
1//
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2559
ro2/A4-3(2)
(5179)
RgSTMCTgD
U.S. HAYiL'Md 37AV::>iI
PmtI BUrter, T.K.
36TMb«r 11, 19U.
4?.'i-..l J^ :;iia3:.tT XCA ASSI'^l^gBT ( ■■[••l: of :ioveabT I2-I8. 19U),
Petrol "inj Two
Carrier Air Groups
Lerine Air arou? 21
VO /Inc
line
CL .'ing
7&, VCIO, U, L2.
▼6, V8, V9. VlO.VSl, L3, L$, L6, tthutoi
Point aad Tllio Point tar::et8.
▼1, 72, V3,
A7, AS, All.
7U5. VA3.
L. c. .uuazT, /-
CornnnnfftT, U. 8. lU^,
Oporationa Off! ear.
Patrol Wlog TJO.
2560 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
?:2/ku-^/n/{yin,)
PATBOL 'QK TUD
in o. HAYAL AIE JT^JION
Pearl Barber, T. H.
^Z3TRICTZD mcrfwkfT 10, 1%1.
■gjST .JB Dn.JSB0Oars CTC-T TLTUgg SCaZPUa (Waelc of »wr. JL2 - 16. 19U1
/•dnesday. *>▼. 12 Carriar Air Oroupa and UariAa Air Croup 21 land-
ings and air tactics. 7or tactics operats in
araas T7, V8, V9, ¥31 above 2000 feet.
Patron ZLETD (Eaneohe) ni.^t bojtbing 1830-2000
in area ¥32.
.Tmrsday. Nor. 13
■ridar.
»0T. 14
lat^m^ar. Hot. 15
Junday.
Nov. 16
'sa&aju.
POT. 17
"uesday. Itov.._\S
iPatron 'ZUSHTT-OKi night bouibii^ 1830-2000. Area
VS2.
Carrier Air Croups and ;ijarine Air Croup 21 land-
ing and air tactics. 7or tactics operate in
areas V7, V8, V9, V51 above 2000 feet.
TJ-2 (6 land planes) practice landings 1830-2100.
2 ?0-VS planes exercise Am-4*
HOUZ.
liiOIS.
#VC8-9 (10 planes) landint:8 and air tactics. Per
t&etics operate in arec VU3 cbove 2000 feet.
2 TO-VS planes jvircise Aa-4«
Carrier Air Croups and Marine Air Croup 21 land-
ings and air tactics. For tcctics operate in
areas V7. V3, Y9, VSl above 2000 feet.
Carrier Air Croups and Karine Air Croup 21 land-
ings end air tactics. Por tactics operate in
areas V7, ve, ¥9, ¥31 above 2000 feet.
#UDit8 so designated furnish ni^^t flfins details as reculrad
by Section VI of Air Operations lianual. Naval Air Stetioa,
Poarl Harbor, T. 3. (l^U).
1*0T2: Drydoc'x channel will be closed to seaplane traffic
during this period except on ^.eraiission of the
Tower Duty Officer.
y%
Co:c.i«nder, U. S. HrT*
Operations OfllCer,
Pr-trol Vlag T.B.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2561
PAIBOL VSC TWO
U. 3. lUViL AIB STmTKSI
P«ct1 Herbor, T. H.
JlLJl klR bJ:T.>gir2:>? HI5HT FLYIHG jCSaiCIS DI3TfJB0ri0W
ClnCF^c
Com&irbctfor
Conscofor
C<mb£.t3hips
Ccnbctdlv OKZ
Contxtdiv ?01R
Comcrubatfor
Coacniscofor
ComcrudiT 7HB2Z
ComcradlT TOIR
CcncrudlT yiVZ
Cojci-udiT 3EI
Comcradlv NIIG
Ccap^tv/lng OIG
?atrol *Jing el's
(all units « each)
Patrol Wins 7.0 (all units - eccb)
Lexington Air Group
Snteiprlse Mr Group
Saratoga Air Croup*
tCorine Air Croup 21
CO., U.O.J. USZTIK/TOK
CO., U.^.a. ZHTZ^IRISJ
CO., U.J..J. oARATXA
CO.., N.A.S., P«arl Harbor
CO., N. ...3., Kcneohe Ba^
Ein«:fi8hor^la4u8a At. Sp. Ilnlt
CO., iftth 9ing Air Corp, Riekoa 71«ld
He.Aquarters, ll»th Ving, Vhsaler PiaU
C.C., Havraiian Air Poroa
Combatfor
P.A.D. , O.O.D., I.E., T.H.
2
2
2
4
2
. 2
2
6
6
k
27
27
5
3
3
79716 O— 46 — pt. 17-
2562 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
PATIIOL- Wi:»0. TK)
P«2/A4-3(2)/ XJ. S. UAVAL AIH StATIOH Bto
Pearl Hartor, T. !».
R^>T-.lCTa;
AI?C?JU T GLir'g.Y .\ii^ AoaiCai:^ T DIST?>I5U7I0::t
.«««tfiCPac
.iAOEairbatfor
-^OHba tshipa
.-iOOTsbatdiv OHS
.CABbatdiv POUR
-XoncrujQtfor '^
•^Snciruacofor ^
^ ConcruJlv EHtLE ♦ 5
-acncrudlv PtJUR *
.^.flon'iruulv FIVE — *
*00Bcrudlv SIX •*
-^OTcrudiv HIIiE **
"^Sx'Hi.ns C''*i Units (•aeh) -*
'^tWing WO Xtalta (oaeh) 5
•*9Slngton Air Group 11
*lLBrprls« Air Grx^up "^^
d Sara to 3a Air i3roup #11
-*arlne Air Oi-oun 21 -*•
-«tTr., U.S.S. rZXIIJGTOH
-♦rer, 'J.S.S. x^ITiKPRISE ^
#C.O., U.S.S. SArjllOOA ^0
— «T0., IT. A .3., Pearl Eartoor -»
^^., U.A.S., Kaneohe Bay -W
-Jttncrisher-l'.eduaa At. Rp. Unit "V
n, 10th Wine Air Corp, Bickaa Field
irtcrs, 14th Wing, lihoeler Field
Ler Sanaiian Air Porco
■Qoabatfor
rnnnnlinrnfT
kt. 14 i;.D.
Rbasefor
itfor
i^aiHfftqicg, Daaefor
^ii*ron POia
-ae; KSC, 3, Fort i>cRussx
■ Oomleabatfor
^■»., ILarbcr Defense, Pearl larbor
-*rO., Ilarbor Defense, Fort Ruser
^p., U.S.S. PHIlISYLVAiriA
^Xb OOD Pu BI
•«r
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2563
PV2/A4.S(4)/
(3110)
RiatBICTiJ)
n. 8. i4mrAiR sukdi
PMrl Bu^r, T. B.
■oT«irib«r 4, 1941.
OPMUTIOH 3CE.J)0LK HO, 42-41 (WMk of IOT«Db«r S - n
L. 1941)
t 5
6
TnJRS
7
t Pia
t SAT 1
0 "
t SUB 1
r l!OH
"TI
t lUBB t
CORTISS
t A3E 1
A3B
t kUB
» ABB
t ABB
r SPE
1 !
c SPH 1
lAMOIJl
: 5?H s
SPE
t SPH
t SPH
t SPE ]
t SPH
t SPH X
T/RIEIT
t UK i
t UK
t UK
I UK
> UK 1
t UK
c UK t
Mc?ARLAIID
t ABw i
', ABE
t ABB
t ABB .
! A3B 1
t ABB 1
t ASB X
mORlITOK
J PG •
PO
:
X PO
» PO
f PO 1
1 PO )
1 PO t
nuLasRT
: SPli 1
t 8Pn
X SPE
t
J SPE
: SPH 1
t ABl 1
\ AM !
s\;ak
': sp::
t SPH
: SPTl
t SPH 1
f SPE i
1
t BPC 1
AVOCJT
1 PO
t PO
: ?0
r 1
t PO 3
t PO 1
1 PO 1
r PO »
PATOOII 11
:Y1 V4 J
t Tl V4
> 09 V4
r RD UK <
c dl^ i
t X.8 1
PA TOOK 14
: VK
UK
t vcio
t UK
i ABE 1
t ABB 1
m.^^ 1
> ABB t
PATOOi: 21
t VCIO
: VCIO
1 1
t DP 1
t RD i
IV 01 i
t U 9
>u;foiot
PATOOW 22
: A3Z
r A3£
t A3E
1 1
1 ABB )
» ASB «
t ABI )
t ABB t
PA TOOK 23
X \n
\ UK
t
X UK
1 I
1 ABi< <
# KB
1 ABB 1
PATOOI! 24
: D?
! ni)
:
: DP
t UK )
' g» '
1 ABF 1
! ABB \
El roBlliarizatlon.
Fl Free or PLxeU Ilriohine Ouns*
A3£ Ad Tine c Baso Opcrationa.
Gl Uaater Lorlsontal DoaberSf
Qiuillf ioation rraetiee.
02 nich /iltltutic i^rlsontal Ooablqg.
03 Antl-Subnarlne Doobing.
PC Plane Ouard.
RD Ready iXity.
SIIW Soliday Iwoutlnc.
SPT S«z>Tie«8 Poarl Larter.
UX Upkeep.
n Hlght Plylns.
DP Oavn Patrol.
BDLBSHT
SlIAX
5 - e BOT.
9 -U Bev.
/r:^
£. C. RAr48Br« /
Coi£jander, U. 8. BAfV,
Operation! Offlew^
Patrol ning flO*
0'
DI3TOI3UnOB
Sq\iadrons (oi
Tenciors (aaoh)
IAS PU IB
1L\S Kanooha Mf
IAS Uaui
PAS OOD
10
10
2564 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
PB2/A4-3AZ
(3109)
Pearl r^rbor, T. H.
m
UoTCDbcr 4, 1^41*
PL^T Aix d^t;.c:: j.:7 no: t flyttp scr.zjui^ (n>ek so^onbar s - ii. loc
TlcdncsdaT. Mov. 5
ttauradaT. I»ov. 6
Friday, i^ov. 7
Saturday, t.'ov, B
Sxmdiy. !!ov» 9
Monday. «Ioy> 10
Ttteaday. Kov« 11
aPatron 11 landings (Kaneohe) and air tactics.
Por tactics opcrcto In area V4 ubovc 2000 f««t«
Carrier Air Groups ana *-arlne /.J.r Oroup 21 land-
ings ond air tactics. Fcr tactics operate in
areas V7, VC, V9, VSl ab?»c 200C feet.
•Patron 11 landings dlanjohe) an^ air tactics.
Por taeticu operucs in a:xa V4 al>oTa 2000 feot.
Carrier Aii- Gruupa and \i rine Aii* O^^oup 21
Isndinoa ajid air tscti:*. Tor tistics operate in
crcas V7, V8, V9, VSl Ozvm 2000 feet.
♦VO-1 (9 alcnea) landinrs and air taotlcs. Por
tactics operoto in ar(.j 'lV<j abovt* 2000 feet.
VO-2 and VO-4 (12 plcnor total) a ill ratum to
Pearl ILxr^r frue oper:.tlor^ a^^oa with Fleet
ct about 2190.
Carrier .'.ir Oroitps and i'^vlno Air '}roap 21 land-
ivz't oncl dr tactics. Fov tactics o;iarato in
crcus "T , VO, V9, VSl abo*-j 2000 fact.
1:0:5;.
worx.
Carrf.cr Air Croups and ?!arinc Air Oroup 21 land*
in^'^a and air tactics. For tceties operate in
areas V7, Vd, VO, V81 abova 2000 feot.
2 VO-VS planes oxcrelac A.'.-l«
Carrier Air Oroupa and •'•ari.no Air Oi^up 2\ land*
in^a and air tactics. Por V.ctica opcrtira in
areas V7, V8, V9, VSl above 3000 feet.
•Units so desicnated furnish niglit flying iletails aa requl.*t,d
by Section VZ of Air Operations !!anual, !7fival Air Station*
Pearl Ilurbor, T. K. (19';i).
1:0 71. t DrydoeL eha.incl will be
elofcd to seaplane traffic durxas
this porXod e:xept en ..cnr.iasion
01 t:.e 'Xtver Duty Officer.
U
Cosoaander, U. 8* Ofltj,
•Operatiena Offte*!*,
Patrol nine 1*0«
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2565
FV2/A4>3(2)
(3106)
RiatRICTU>
PACWL 'ii/a 1U>
U. S. 3AV;X MR SliTIOTi
Pearl Harbor, 7. E.
Va
SoT«Bber 4, 1941.
AI1C.1A7T Qir:!lgTy AHSA A33IC>iLa:.T (Peck of BoT«i)er 5-11. 1941).
Patrol :.lnc ITO
t V4, VCIO, LL, 12.
t
Carrier Air Groups
r^rlnc Air Oroup 21
t
t V6, TS, V9« VIO, L3, L9, L6. KUtaillcu
t Point and Ulio Point targets.
VO T7ing
1 VI, V2, V5.
t
CA Uii«
t
t VUS, VA3.
t
CL TTlng
>
: A7, A8, All.
•
•
t. C. ' ILiHSJ,
CoBBsnder, U. S. "Sf^yj,
Operations Officer,
Patrol Uing ICO.
2566 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
, , , PATSOL WX1K5 TIO
na/k4'Z(2)/ V. s. nivAL 4ir station vh
Paarl Hai*>or, T. H.
R^SlRICTip
AIRCRAFT QCinHTY AK^ AoglOaiS T PIS1RICTTtO!:t
ilrbatfor ^^
►fop ' ■ e
itahlps
^i^OBatdlT FOUR
^^'Onc m*7A t f or*
— €db»c ruseo fop
pConcrudlv CRLS
^ QecicrmiLiv FOTR
■ fl^ucmaiv FIVE
.— 4oiaci*udiv SIX
^Oeacrvidiv HISE
-i^KtKlng 0:i^ Units leach)
B*WVllig Tm Units (oach)
_IiAsUagton Air Group
■ aitsf'prlse Air Oroup
(^ 3arato3a Air Oxmx^
'Ine Air Gi-cu? 21
U.S.S. IZXIHC1D3
U.S.S. iJITLRPRISE
U.S.S. SAHAIOOA
Ti.A.S.i Peapl Earbor
— ^>^»j H.A.S., Ksknaohe Bay
■WUllgl i3lier-i:«dusa Air, ^. Unit
-^'Oj* 10th 'Jlng Air Copp, Siekam Plaid
^WBCq-jartera, 14th Viag, Chaalop Field
— euCuiander Bavallain Air Pbrea
A Coabatfor
.i^Sflaaubseofor
.jCesMkt. 14 K.D.
^eiiflasefor
itfor
Lngf Basefor
^poua
*fl»rTCSC, 3, Port DeRuasy
ffsiflesbatfor
Harbor Defense, Pearl rartMO*
Ilarbor Defense, Port Sac«r
:, v.s.s. PB!L'sn.YA:n[A
-*HrooD Pu in
of
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2567
PAisaL trnro kd
rCZ/L^TihZ U. 0. 'JAViiL AIR SftlTIOn ' ttl
Pearl TJKfaov, T. C
R^PICTCD '
FLl^-T AI.; u,tkC:3..j:T riCLT PLYEP SCniPCI^ DI31«I3PTE0H
ainePac
^^■iilirLifor
JSflBbatslilps
.fiflS)i»atdiv orE
0uiil9Ut<Iiv POCR
^Ct— rubatror
_rwn mil iiriir
i ComcrudlT 1E3.-.I.
:ru41» ?oro ,
jrudllv yiVw
jrudlv SDC
jr»iiri udlY KdE
)1 Wli« o:rj (all units}- each)
>1 niT« TM) (all imlta'i each)
Cnston Air Group
. tiitBrprlac Air Sroup
^Sarato(3a Air Group
Ine Air Group 21
., U.S.S. LEXr.rGTOi.'
U.S.S. Ufrii .PRISE
^C.O., U.3.5. SAfJVIOGA
Lo .07", r.A.S., Pecrl narbor
■e.lJT, ll.A.S., Kanoohe Lay
_' *~0*'*-' '""^ Av. Rp. Unit
"nnic "^ ICth '.VL^ Air Corp. Hiekan . leld
-fluiBlquartara, 14tli ^.'ine, ki^eciur Field
J"wm\ c /T'n Zavaiian Air Force
^^oi^atfor
--^ ooL» ?:: E
— 9LBl>et»in£ (HI
2568 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 114
SECRET
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Cincpac file no.
A16/WPPac-46(16)
Serial 063 W
Pearl Harbor, T. H., July 25, 1941.
From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.
Subject: WPPac-46.
1. The subject publication is distributed herewith. This Plan has not yet
been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations but may be placed in effect
prior to the receipt of such approval.
2. Attention is invited to the Introduction, Chapter III, article 0301 of the
Plan concerning the preparation of supporting plans by Task Force Commanders.
At the present time it is desired that the following submit supporting plans for
approval by the Commander-in-Chief:
Commanders Task Forces Two, Three, Six, Seven and Nine. (Commander
Task Force Nine may, if he desires, delegate preparation of the plan to the
Senior Officer of that type in the Hawaiian Area.)
The Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers addressed may provide for
the accomplishment of such tasks as are assigned them in this 0-1 Plan by
including suitable measures in their 0-4 or other plans, rather than to prepare
separate supporting p.lans for this 0-1 Plan. The Commander Southeast Pacific
Force (Commander Cruiser Division Three) is required to submit the plan for
operations of that force after its detachment from the Fleet to the Chief of Naval
Operations for approval.
3. Supporting Plans as required above will be submitted for approval of the
Commander-in-Chief prior to 20 August 1941. After approval they will be
incorporated with the Fleet Plan as annexes as prescribed by the Commander-
in-Chief.
4. Further annexes prepared by the Commander-in-Chief to cover operations
to be undertaken in later phases of the war will be distributed when completed
and approved.
5. Suitable binders for this Plan will be forwarded as soon as received by this
command.
H. E. Kimmel.
H. E. Kimmel.
[i\ secret
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
CinCpac File
Al6/WPPac-46(16)
Serial 056W.
Pearl Harbor, T. H., July 21, 1941.
From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
To: Distribution List for WPPac-46.
Subject: WPPac-46, promulgation of.
Enclosures:
(A) Pages for WPPac-46; Reg. No. 5 including list of effective pages.
(B) Receipt form in duplicate.
1. U. S. PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan Rainbow Five (Navy Plan 0-1,
Rainbow Five) (WPPac-46) is promulgated herewith. Holders of Commander-
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Secret letter A16(R-5)O40W of May 27, 1941 and
the tentative Operation Plan promulgated thereby, will destroy them by burning
and make report of destruction to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
2. A receipt form is enclosed to be accomplished and forwarded to the Chief
of Naval Operations (Registered Publications Section).
3. This publication will be handled and accounted for in accordance with the
instructions contained in the Navy Regulations, the System of War Planning and
the Registered Publication Manual.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2569
4. This volume shall not be carried in aircraft, and when not in use, shall be
kept in Class "A" storage as prescribed in the Registered Publication Manual.
5. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY POR-
TIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY
FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED
FOR IN CURRENT EDITION OF THE REGISTERED PUBLICATION
MANUAL.
6. SPECIAL WARNING— the contents of this publication shall be given
the minimum dissemination compatible with thorough preparation of the sub-
ordinate plans.
P. C. Crosley, H. E. Kimmel.
P. C. Crosley,
Flag Secretary.
[ii] U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan — Rainbow Five {Navy Plan 0-1,
Rainbow Five)
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES— WPPaC'46
Subject Matter
Promulgating letter: CincPacfile A16/WPPac-46(16) Serial 056W
of July 21, 1941.
List of Effective Pages, 'WPPac-46
Table of Corrections _ - _ _
Distribution List-
Title Page
Table of Contents -
Parts I to V (incl.)
Annex I
Annex II.- --.•
Annex III
Annex IV
1
ii-
iii..-
iv.-
1
2, 2a, 2b
3-52 incl
52a-52h incl
53-56 incl-- -
56a-56d incl
57-74 incl
I-l to I-ll incl...
II-l toII-9incl--
III-l to III-5 incl
IV-1 to IV-3 incl-
Change
in Effect
Original
^ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages
of original exhibit.
[Hi] TABLE OF CORRECTIONS
Change No.
Date of
entry
Signatiire and rank of officer entering change
[iv] DISTRIBUTION LIST
Regis-
tered
Official to Whom Issued Nos.
Chief of Naval Operations-.. 1,2,3,4,5,6
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet -. 7,8
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet 9
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet 10. H
Commander, Task Force One (Combatfor) 12, 13
Commander, Task Force Two (Comairbatfor) - 14, 15
Commander, Task Force Three (Corascofor)-.. 16, 17
Commander, Battleships Battle Force 18
Commander, Battleship Division One - 18
Commander, Battleship Division Two. - - 20
Commander, Cruisers Battle Force- - 22
Commander, Cruiser Division Three 23
Commander, Carrier Division One 25
Commander, Destroyers Battle Force 26
Commander, Destroyer Flotilla One 27
Commander, Minecraft Battle Force . ^ 28
Commander, Cruisers Scouting Forpe 29
Commander, Cruiser Division Five 30
Commander, Cruiser Division Six ._ -- 31
Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force- 32
Commander, Patrol Wing Two- 33
Commander, Submarines Scouting Force 34
Commander, Base Force 35,36
Commanding General, Second Marine Division 37
2570 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[iv] DISTRIBUTION LIST— Continued
Regis-
tered
Official to Whom Issued Nos.
Commandant, Naval Station, Samoa 38
Commandant, Eleventh Naval District - _ 39
Commandant, Twelfth Naval District 46
Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District 41
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 42
Commandani, Fifteenth Naval District. 43
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet is holding registered numbers 21, 24, and 44 to 60 in
reserve.
(Secret)
[1] U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW FIVE
(NAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE)
WPPac-46
l»] TABLE OF CONTENTS
Subject Page Nos.'
Introduction:
Chapter I. Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) 3
Chapter II. Format of Fleet Plans 4
Chapter III. Subordinate Plans 6
Chapter IV. Mobilization 8
Part I. Task Organization, Assumptions, Information:
Chapter I. Task Organization 9
Chapter II. Assumptions.. 15
Section 1. General Assumptions 15
Section 2. Special Assumption 16
Chapter III. Information 17
Section 1. General Information 17
Section 2. Enemy Information 20
Sections. Estimate of Enemy Action... 21
Part II. Outline of Tasks:
Chapter I. Tasks Assigned by Navy Basic Plan, — Mission 24
Chapter II. Tasks Formulated to Accomplish the Assigned Missions 25
Part III. Task Assignment.
Chapter I. Phase I 28
Section 1. Task Force One 28
Section 2. Task Force Two 29
Section 3. Task Force Three 30
Section 4. Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) 32
Section 5. Task Force Seven (Undersea Force) 33
Section 6. Task Force Eight (Mining Force) 34
Section 7. Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) 35
Section 8. Naval Coastal Frontiers 36
Section 9. Tasks Jointly Applicable 38
lia] Chapter II. Phase lA ,.. 39
Section 1. Task Force One r 39
Section 2. Task Force Two 40
Section 3. Task Force Three 41
Section 4. Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) 42
Section 5. Task Force Seven (Undersea Force) 45
Section 6. Task Force Eight (Mining Force) 48
Section 7. Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) 49
Section 8. Naval Coastal Frontiers... 50
Section 9. Tasks Jointly Applicable 51
Chapter III. Phases Succeeding Phase lA 52
Section 1. Task Force One 52
Section 2. Task Force Two.. . 52a
Sections. Task Force Three _ 52b
Section 4. Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) 52c
Section 5. Task Force Seven (Undersea Force). 52d
Section 6. Task Force Eight (Mining Force) 52e
Section 7. Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) 52f
Sections. Naval Coastal Frontiers -- 52g
Section 9. Tasks Jointly Applicable... 52h
Chapter IV. Execution of the Plan 53
Chapter V. Initial Transfer of Units... 64
Part IV. Logistics:
Chapter I. General 56
Chapter II. Transportation .- 56a
Chapter III. Hospitalization and Evacuation 56b
Chapter IV. Prize Crews 56c
Chapter V. Salvage 56d
Part V. Special Provisions:
Chapter I. Time to be Used 57
Chapter II. Communications ...? 58
Chapter III. Location of Commander-in-Chief 59
Chapter IV. Tentative Operations Plans— Phase land lA 60
Section 1. Phase I 61
Section 2. Phase lA.... 68
' Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages
of original exhibit.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2571
TABLE OF CONTENTS— Continued
Subject Page Nos.>
[gb] Annex I. Patrol and Sweeping Plan I-l to I-ll.
Annex II. Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan II-l to II-9.
Annex III. Communication Plan _ III-l to III-5.
Annex IV. Command Relationship and Coordination of Activities at Outlying Bases IV-1 to IV-3.
1 Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages
of original exhibit.
[S] SECRET
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN RAINBOW FIVE
{NAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE)
Introduction
chapter i. navy basic war plan (rainbow five)
0101. Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) is the directive which this U. S.
PACIFIC FLEET Operating Plan (Rainbow Five) is designed to implement in
so far as the tasks assigned the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET are concerned. As the
Basic Plan is in the possession of most of the recipients of this Fleet Plan, only
particularly pertinent parts of it will be repeated herein. These parts have to do
chiefly with assumptions, concepts of enemy action, and tasks.
[4] CHAPTER II. FORMAT OF FLEET PLANS
0201. This Plan follows the standard War Plan form of WPL-8 except for small
variations made for the purpose of facilitating ready reference and quick dissemi-
nation on the outbreak of war. I^hese, in brief, are as follows:
a. In Part I the order of presentation is:
Chapter I — Task Organization.
Chapter II — Assumptions.
Chapter III — Information.
b. In Part II are incorporated:
Chapter I — Task assigned by Basic Plan.
Chapter II — Phases; and specific tasks, arranged by phases, for accom-
plishing the assigned mission together with (in a few in-
stances) decisions as to how they will be initially carried
out.
c. In Part III the first three chapters each cover one phase. Within each of
those chapters the tasks assigned to each task force are grouped in a separate
section, except the naval coastal frontiers, which are grouped together. Perti-
nent special information and logistic instructions are placed with the tasks given
therein or they are placed in an appropriate annex of this 0-1 Plan. Where a
task requires coordinated action with other task forces, reference is simply made
to the annex which comprises the plan for such coordinated action.
d. Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter IV, Part V are tentative fleet operation plans
which, when completed by the assignment of forces actually available at the time,
and modified to meet any change in the conditions which have been visualized
in this Fleet War Plan (U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan— Rainbow Five), are
considered suitable, together with the annexes, for placing into effect the measures
of Phase I and Phase lA of this Plan. In other words Chapter IV, Part V could
be omitted as the material therein is completely covered in the text that precedes
[5] them. They are included, however, for the sake of clarity and in
order to have immediately available tentative fleet operation plans in the con-
ventional form with which all concerned are familiar.
e. Annexes I, II, etc., are plans, special plans issued by the Commander-in-
Chief for a particular purpose. They may be made effective separately if occa-
sion requires. The forces affected are indicated in the annex itself. Some of
the annexes may ultimately be only guides for promulgation of an operation order
by despatch or letter.
f. Supporting plans of subordinate commanders, which are prescribed in the
next chapter, are to be appended as lettered annexes.
[6] CHAPTER III. SUBORDINATE PLANS
0301. Subordinate plans to support this Fleet Operating Plan will be prepared
as follows:
a. The Commanders of the forces designated in the Task Organization in
Chapter I, Part I of this Plan, will prepare supporting plans for each assigned
task, the accomplishment of which would be facilitated by further planning.
2572 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
b. These supporting plans will be, as closely as practicable, in the standard
form of operation plans, and will be incorporated as annexes to this Fleet Operat-
ing Plan. Where the nature of the tasks lends itself to such procedure, the plan
for their accomplishment may be in the form of a single annex. Where such is
not the case, as where tasks are assigned in one or more of the Commander-in-
Chief's annexes, several plans may be required.
c. Letter designations for annexes are assigned to each commander as listed
below. The first annex to be prepared will be designated as "Letter-1", the
second as "Letter-2", etc. It should be noted that if the nature of a task as-
signed at present does not require the preparation of a subordinate plan by a
commander, the annex assigned him below will be vacant.
Task Force One ---- A-1, etc.
Task Force Two B-1, "
Task Force Three C-1, ||
Aircraft Scouting Force D-1, ^^
Submarines Scouting Force E-1,
Minecraft Battle Force F-1,
Base Force H~^ '
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier H-1,
Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier J-1,
Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier K-1,
d. In the subordinate plans, forces should, in general, be listed in the task
organization by organizations and approximate numbers of types rather than
by name, unless it is known that specific units will be available.
e. If a commander considers it desirable to disseminate the considerations
which have governed his decision and task assignments, he should append a
brief and sum- [7] marized estimate of the situation as an addendum to
his plan. Auxiliary directives such as communication plans should also be ap-
pended as addenda to the task force commander's plan.
f. If the execution of the subordinate plans would be facilitated by still further
preliminary planning, task force commanders should require their group com-
manders to submit plans for the accomplishment of the tasks assigned them in
the task force commander's plans. These will be designated as addenda, but
will not be incorporated with this Fleet Plan. They need be submitted only to
the task force commander for acceptance.
g. If appropriate, each subsidiary plan will include in an addendum, the logistic
requirements for carrying out the plan in so. far as they can be foreseen. Such
addenda may or may not be incorporated in the Fleet Plan, but, in every case
copies will be supplied to Commander Base Force.
h. The plans must be predicated upon realities and must provide for maximum
possible utilization of forces presently available. Unless absolutely necessary,
plans should not be based upon either conceptions or material not reasonably
attainable. When material, equipment or personnel, not immediately available,
is necessary for the successful execution of the measures to be undertaken, this
shall be made the subject of an addendum. The commander concerned shall take
immediate action to remedv the deficiencies, forwarding necessary correspondence
through the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. Thereafter the Commander-
in-Chief shall be informed of corrections of these deficiencies as they occur.
i. Task force commanders will employ, in subdividing their forces, the decimal
system of numbering subdivisions.
j. In numbering the pages of the plans which form annexes of this Fleet Plan,
lower case letters to correspond to the letters assigned in subparagraph c above
will be used. Thus the first page of the plan of Commander Task Force One
will be "a-1".
[8] CHAPTER IV. MOBILIZATION
0401. At the date of issue of this plan, the U. S. Pacific Fleet has virtually
mobilized, and is operating, with intensive security measures, from the Pearl
Harbor base. It is expected, therefore, that the major portion of the Fleet can
be ready for active service within four days of an order for general mobilization.
To provide for the contingency of M-day being set prior to the date on which
hostilities are to open, the day of execution of this Plan is designated throughout
the Plan as W-day. The day that hostilities open with Japan will be designated
J-day. This may or may not coincide with W-day.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2573
[9] Part I. Task Organization, Assumptions, Information
CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION
1101. The forces available to the Pacific Fleet are listed in the current Appendix
II of the Basic Plan. In addition, the Commanders of the Pacific Southern,
Pacific Northern, and Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the Commandants
of the Naval Stations Guam and Samoa are considered to be officers of the U. S.
Pacific Fleet, and. through them, the local defense and coastal forces are subject
to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.
1102. For planning purposes, tasks are assigned to the commanders of the
current task forces in the Fleet and to certain other commanders who are to
become task force commanders as indicated in paragraph 1107 below.
1103. As of July 1, 1941, the major task forces, their commanders, and their
broad tasks for which they are training, are as follows:
Task Force One. — for covering operations — Commander Battle Force in
command.
Task Force Two. — for reconnaissance in force and raiding operations — Com-
mander Aircraft Battle Force in command.
Task Force Three. — for landing attack operations — Commander Scouting
Force in command.
1104. The subdivision of the Fleet which is made in paragraph 1107 below is
designed to provide a flexible overall task organization from which may be drawn
the task forces to accomplish the operations which can be visualized at this time.
It must be realized that, for most operations, certain units must be transferred
between task forces, some will be absent in the navy yard or for other reasons,
and, in some cases, two or more task forces will be merged under the command of
the senior officer concerned. Also many of the tasks assigned to a tas^: force in
this plan do not require the employment of the whole task force. In such cases
the task force commander will utilize such units of his force as are required to
accomplish the assigned task.
[10] CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION
1105. It is not expected that the Task Organization as shown below will be
effective throughout the campaign. Rather it will be the basis for making up
particular task organizations for the various operations that may be required.
It will be the specific plans and orders in effect at any given time which will show
the task organizations at that time.
1106. Units assigned to a task force or to a task group in the normal organiza-
tion that are subsequently assigned to another task force or task group will
thereafter continue as an integral part of the last organization to which assigned
until released by the commander thereof. The commanders mentioned will
release such units as promptly as the situation at the time permits when the
period of assignment to their commands has terminated or when further reassign-
ment is made by competent authority.
[11] 1107. The Normal Task Organization for this Plan is as follows:
1. TASK FORCE ONE Commander Battle Force
Batdivs 2, 4 6 BB
SARATOGA 1 CV
Crudivs 3, 9 5 CL
Desflot 1 less Desrons 5, 9 4 OCL#
2 DL
16 DD#
2 AD
(#Includes Southeast Pacific Force of 2 OCL and 4 DD.)
2. TASK FORCE TWO Commander Aircraft Battle Force
Batdiv 1 3 BB
Cardiv 2 less YORKTOWN 1 CV
Crudiv 5 . 4 CA#
Desflot 2 less Desrons 4, 8 and Desdiv 50 1 OCL
8 DD
2 AD
(flncludes Atlantic Reenforcement of 4 CA.)
2574 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. TASK FORCE THREE Commander Scouting Force
Crudivs 4. 6 8 CA
Cardiv 1 less SARATOGA 1 CV
Desrons 4, 5 2 DL
16 DD
Minron 3, less Mindivs 5, 6 5 DM
Available Transports Base Force — AP
— APD
2d Marine Div less Defense Batt.
2d Marine Air Group.
[12] 4. TASK FORCE NINE (Patrol Plane Force) Commander Aircraft
Scouting Force
All units of Aircraft Scouting Force 107 VP
2 AV
2 AVP
4 AVD
Utility Squadron from Base Force 10 VJR
5. TASK FORCE SEVEN (Undersea Force) Commander Submarines Scouting
Force
All units of Submarines Scouting Force except Sound School _. 30 SS
2 OSS
1 SM
1 ODD
3 AS
2 ASR
1 AM
6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (Mining Force) Commander Minecraft Battle
Force
All units of Minecraft Battle Force 1 CM
8 DM
7. TASK FORCE SIX (Logistic & Control Force) Commander Base Force
All units of Base Force except AP, APD and Minron 3 less 8 DMS
Divs 5 and 6 and 10 VJ. 4 AF
6 AT
1 AH
13 AO
2 AR
1 ARD
2 AK
2 AE
1 AKS
10 AM
4 AG
Utility
Wing
[IS] 8. TASK FORCE FOUR (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) Com-
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
Local defense forces.
9. TASK FORCE FIVE (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) Com-
mandant, Twelfth Naval District.
Coastal and local defense forces.
10. TASK FORCE TEN (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) Com-
mandant, Thirteenth Naval District.
Local defense forces.
[14] 1108. The Southeast Pacific Force and the Atlantic Reenforcement,
composed as indicated above, will operate under the Commander-in-Chief, U. S.
Pacific Fleet until specifically detached by the Chief of Naval Operations. They
will not, however, be sent to such distances from Pearl Harbor as would prevent
their arrival in the Canal Zone twenty-one days after their transfer is ordered.
1/5] CHAPTER 11. ASSUMPTIONS
Section 1. General Assumptions
1211. The general assumptions on which this Plan is based are:
a. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the
British Commonwealth, (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, the Govern-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2575
ments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers,
comprising either:
1. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
2. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.
Note. — As of 22 June war exists between the European Axis and Russia,
and the latter may be tentatively considered as an ally against that part of
the Axis but not necessarily against Japan.
b. That even if Japan and Thailand are not i nitially in the war, the possibility
of their intervention must be taken into account.
c. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive
elements, but will remain in a non-belligerent status unless subject to direct
attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will
be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense.
d. That the principal military effort of the Associated Powers will be in the
Atlantic and European Areas, and that operations in other areas will be so con-
ducted as to facilitate that effort. Therefore, transfer of units from the Pacific
Fleet to the Atlantic Fleet is provided for in the Navy Basic Plan, and additional
transfers may become necessary.
e. That the Asiatic Fleet will not be reinforced by the Pacific Fleet, but that
eventually, if Japan enters the war, heavy British reenforcements will be made
in the Far East.
[16] Section 2. Special Assumption
1221. That the Pacific Fleet is virtually mobilized and is based at Pearl Harbor,
but regular navy yard overhauls are in progress which would reduce forces
immediately available by about one-fifth.
[17] CHAPTER III. INFORMATION
Section 1. General Information
1311. a. The Pacific Area, which is under the command of the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, is that part of the area of the Pacific Ocean:
1. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East.
2. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East.
3. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American
Coast and Longitude 74° West.
4. Less waters in which Canada may assume strategic direction of military
forces.
b. In addition, the United States will afford support to British Naval Forces
in the regions south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.
c. The Southeast Pacific Sub-Area, when established, will be that part of the
Pacific Area south of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier and between the West
Coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West.
d. The Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone
extending from the northern boundary of California to the southern boundary of
Mexico.
e. The Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal zone of
the Northwestern United States north of the northern boundary of California,
and, in addition, Alaska.
f . The Pacific sector of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier includes the coastal
zone defined to be within a broken line drawn from the Mexico-Guatemala
boundary to a point' in Latitude 5° South, Longitude 95° West and thence to the
Peru-Ecuador border, and to include the sea routes near the southern and western
borders of that zone.
[18] g. The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier consists of Oahu, and all the
land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to
a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and
Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.
h. The Far East Area is defined as the area from the coast of China in Latitude
30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, thence east
to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on
the south coast, thence westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East,
thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence
north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.
i. In the Far East Area, responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval
forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the
2576 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
defense of the Philippines will be assumed bv the British Naval Commander-in-
Chief, China. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be
responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of
the Philippines.
j. The Australia and New Zealand Area comprises the Australian and New
Zealand British Naval Stations west of Lono'itude 180° and south of the equator.
The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, is responsible for the strategic
direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers operating in this Area.
1312. The foregoine delineation of principal areas and the agreements as to
cooperation between the United States and the British Commonwealth are con-
tained in the Report of United States -British Staff Conversations (ABC-1).
Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC 221 is now in the process of
preparation. Similar agreements with the Netherlands East Indies are being
made.
[19] 1313. The following principles of command will obtain:
a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the United
Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsi-
bility of their own Power.
b. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting
the forces of the other Power from temporarilv extending appropriate operations
into that area, as mav be required by particular circumstances.
c. The forces of either Power which are emploved normallv under the strategic
direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their
type, be employed as task forces charged with the execution of specific strategic
tasks. These task forces will operate under their own commanders and will
not be distribvted into small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power.
Only exceptional military circumstances will justify the temporary suspension
of the normal strategic tasks.
d. WTien imits of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised
by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of
time in grade.
e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate
under United States Naval command, and will remain an integral part of United
States Naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their
operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups.
1314. The concept of the war in the Pacific, as set forth in ABC-1 is as follows:
Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis
Powers, it would still be necessarv for the Associated Powers to deplov their
forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does
enter the war, the military strategy in the Far East will be defen- [W]
sive. The United States does not intend to add to its present military
strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet
offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power,
and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese
strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends to so augment its
forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas tlwit the British Common-
wealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.
Section 2. Enemy Information
1321. Information of the enemv will be disseminated prior to and on the exe-
cution of this Plan, by means of intelligence reports.
1322. Informution which is of special interest with respect to a specific task
is included with that task in Part III or in the Annexes.
[21] Section 3. Estimate of Enemy Action
1331. It is believed that German and Italian action in the Pacific will be
limited to commerce raiding with converted types, and possibly with an occasional
pocket battleship or heavy cruiser.
1332. It is conceived that Japanese action will be as follows:
a. The principal offensive effort to be toward the eventual capture of Malaysia
(including the Philippines) and Hong Kong.
b. The secondary offensive efforts to be toward the interruption of American
and Allied sea communications in the Pacific, the Far East and the Ihdian Ocean,
and to accomplish the capture of Guam and other outlying positions.
c. The offensive against China to be maintained on a reduced scale only.
d. The principal defensive efforts to be:
1. Destruction of threatening naval forces.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2577
2. Holding positions for their own use and denVing positions in the Central
and Western Pacific and the Far East which may be suitable for advanced
bases.
3. Protecting national and captured territory and approaches.
1333. To accomplish the foregoing it is believed that Japan's initial action
will be toward:
a. rapt"re of Guam.
b. Establishment of control over the South China Sea, Philippine waters, and
the waters between Borneo and New Guinea, bv the establishment of advanced
bases, and bv the [32] destruction of United States and allied air and
naval forces in these regions, followed by the capture of Luzon- *
c. Capture of Northern Borneo.
d. Denial to the United States of the use of the Marshall-Caroline-Marianas
area by the use of fixed defenses, and, bv the operation of air forces and light
naval forces to reduce the strength of the United States Fleet.
e. Reenforcement of the Mandate Islands by troops, aircraft and light naval
forces.
f. Possibly raids or stronger attacks on Wake, Midway and other outlying
United States positions.
1334. The initial Japanese deployment is therefore estimated to be as follows:
a. Troops and aircraft in the Homeland, Manchukuo, and China with strong
concentrations in Formosa and Hainan, fairlv strong defenses in the Carolines,
and comparatively weak but constantly growing defenses in the Marshalls.
b. Main fleet concentration in the Inland Sea, shifting to a central position
(possibly Pescadores) after the capture of Guam and the reenforcement of the
Mandates.
c. A strong fleet detachment in the Mindanao-Celebes area (probable main
base in Halmahera).
d. Sufficient units in the Japan Sea to counter moves of Russian Naval forces
in that area.
e. Strong concentration of submarines and light surface patrol craft in the
Mandates, with such air scouting and air attack units as can be supported there.
f. Raiding and observation forces widely distributed in the Pacific, and sub-
marines in the Hawaiian Area.
[23] g. Obsolete and weaker units on patrol of coastal areas and focal areas
of lines of communication.
h. Merchant ships in neutral ports or proceeding home via detours wide of
usual routes.
[24] Part II. Outline of Tasks
CHAPTER I. TASKS ASSIGNED BY NAVY BASIC PLAN-MISSION
2101. The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigns the following tasks
within the Pacific Area to the U. S. Pacific Fleet:
a. Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting
enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture
of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications
and positions;
b. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall
Island area, and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk;
c. Destroy axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading
directly or indirectly with the enemy ;
d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator as far west as
longitude 155° east;
e. Defend Samoa in category "D";
f. Defend Guam in category "F";
g. Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting,
covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances, and by destroying enemy
raiding forces;
h. Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent
the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying
hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy
the use of land positions in that hemisphere;
i. Cover the operations of the naval coastal frontier forces;
j. Establish fleet control zones, defining their limits from time to time as
circumstances require;
k. Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones.
79716 O — 46 — pt. 17 10
2578 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[£5] CHAPTER II. TASKS FORMULATED TO ACCOMPLISH THE ASSIGNED MISSIONS
2201. It will be noted that the tasks assigned in the previous chapter are based
upon Assumption a2 of paragraph 1211 (Japan in the war). In formulating tasks
the Commander-in-Chief has provided also for Assumption al and divides the
tasks to be accomplished by the Pacific Fleet into phages, as follows:
a. PHASE I — Initial tasks — Japan not in the war.
b. PHASE I A — Initial tasks — Japan in the war.
c. PHASE II, etc. — Succeeding tasks.
2262. Phase I tasks are as follows:
a. Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations; thereafter main-
tain all types in constant readiness for distant service.
b. Maintain fleet security at bases and anchorages and at sea.
c. Transfer the Atlantic reenforcement, if ordered.
d. Transfer the Southeast Pacific Force, if ordered.
e. Assign twelve patrol planes and tw'o small tenders to Pacific Southern and a
similar force to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier, on M-day.
f. Assign two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific Northern
Naval Coastal Frontier on M-day.
g. Protect the communications and territory of the associated powers and
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by
patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking groups
as necessary. In so doitig support the British Naval Forces south of the equator
as far west as Longitude 155° East.
h. Establish defensive submarine patrols at Wake and Midway.
[26] 2202. i. Observe, with submarines outside the three mile limit, the
possible raider bases in the Japanese mandates, if authorized at the time by the
Navy Department.
j. Prosecute the establishment and defense of subsidiary bases at Midway,
Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, Guam and Wake, and at Canton if authorized.
k. Continue training operations as practicable.
1. Move the maximum practicable portion of second Marine Division to Hawaii
for training in landing operations.
m. Guard against surprise attack by Japan.
Phase I A
2203. Phase lA tasks are as follows:
a. Continue tasks outlined in 2202 a, b, g, h, and k.
b. Accomplish such of the tasks in 2202 c, d, e, f, and j as have not been com-
pleted.
c. Make an initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and enemy raiders and
tenders in the northern Pacific.
d. Continue the protection of the territory and communications of the asso-
ciated powers, and of the naval coastal frontier forces, chiefly by covering opera-
tions.
e. 1. Make reconnaissance and raid in force on the Marshall Islands.
2. If available cruisers and other circumstances permit, make cruiser raids
against Japanese shipping in waters between Hansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto.
f. Establish and maintain maximum practicable submarine patrols against
Japanese forces and communications near the Japanese homeland.
g. Maintain air patrols against enemy forces in the approaches to Oahu and
outlying bases.
[27] 2203. h. Escort important shipping, including troop movements, be-
tween the Hawaiian Area and the West Coast.
i. Route shipping in the fleet control zone when established.
j. Augment the local defense forces of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier
as necessary.
k. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of the
Second Marine Division.
1. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Marshall Island Area.
Phase II and subsequent phases
2204. Tasks of Phase II and Subsequent Phases which can be formulated at
this time are:
a. Capture and establish a protected fleet anchorage in the Marshall Island
Area.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2579
b. Capture or deny other positions in the Marshall Island Area as necessary
for further advance to the westward.
c. Raid other Japanese land objectives and sea communications.
d. Capture and establish an advanced fleet base at Truk.
e. Continue uncompleted tasks of Phase lA.
[S8] Part III. Task Assignment
CHAPTER I. PHASE I
Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE
3111. Task Force One will perform tasks as required by the following para-
graphs of this section.
3112. When directed release two small light cruisers and one destroyer division
to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the navy basic plan.
3113. Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).
[29] Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO
3121. Task Force Two will:
Perform the tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).
[SO] Section S. TASK FORCE THREE
3131. Task Force Three will perform the tasks assigned in the following para-
graphs of this section.
3132. Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
3133. a. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of
the Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.
b. Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the
Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan
for capture of Eniwetok.
0. 1. Special Information.
As of July 1, 1941, the Marine defenses in Hawaii and the outlying islands are
as follows:
MIDWAY —34 officers
750 men
6 5"/51 caliber guns
12 3'750 caliber AA guns
30 0.50 caliber machine guns
30 0.30 caliber machine guns
4 searchlights.
JOHNSTON— 18 men
2 5"/51 caliber guns
4 0.30 caliber machine guns
PALMYRA —4 officers
101 men
4 5"/51 caliber guns
4 3"/50 caliber A A guns
4 0.50 caliber machine guns
4 0.30 caliber machine guns
\S1] OAHU —32 officers
620 men
4 5"/51 caliber guns
8 3"/50 caliber AA guns
20 0.50 caliber machine guns
16 0.30 caliber machine guns
Note: The above personnel are defense battalion person-
nel only and are in addition to personnel employed in guard
duty, barracks duty, etc.
WAKE —None.
2. Task
Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by the
Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Commander-
in-Chief.
[32] Section 4. TASK FORCE NINE (PATROL PLANE FORCE)
3141. Task Force Nine will perform the tasks assigned in the following para-
graphs of this section.
2580 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3142. On W-day transfer twelve patrol planes and two tenders to each of the
Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontiers. Continue admin-
istration of these forces and rotate detail at discretion.
3143. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).
[551 Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN {UNDERSEA FORCE)
3151. Task Force Seven will perform tasks as required by the following para-
graphs of this section.
3152. a. Special Information.
1 . There are indications that Axis raiders have been basing in the Marshall
area.
2. The imminence of the entry of Japan into the war requires a deploy-
ment suitable for this eventualitv.
3. NARWHAL and NAUTILUS are fitted to carry 13,500 gallons of
aviation gasoline each for fueling patrol planes.
b. Task.
Maintain patrols required by the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).
c. Special Logistics.
Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor and to a limited degree at Midwaj'.
3153. Assign one submarine division to Task Force Three as required for landing
attack training.
3154. On W-day transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to
Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaskan
sector. Continue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion.
[5-^] Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT (MINING FORCE)
3161. Task Force Eight will:
Continue operations and training under commanders Task Forces One and Two
[85] Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX (LOGISTIC & CONTROL FORCE)
3171. Task Force Six will perform tasks as required by the following paragraphs.
3172. Provide logistic service to the fleet and cooperate with Commander
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in providing logistic services to outlying bases.
3173. Perform tasks required by "The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
3174. Maintain in the office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an
officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the fleet, the
loading of base force and NTS vessels, and the routing and protection of U. S.
and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison with Commander Hawaiian Naval
Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.
3175. Transfer ten VJR to Commander Task Force Nine.
36] Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS
Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier)
3181. Special Information.
The Basic Plan assigns the following tasks to the Commander, Hawaiian
Naval Coastal Frontier:
a. Defend the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier in Category "D". (Category
"D" — May be subject to major attack). (N. B. The Commander-in-Chief,
U. S. Pacific Fleet, does not consider Category "D" will apply during Phase L)
b. Protect and route shipping within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.
c. Support the U. S. Pacific Fleet.
d. Support the Army and Associated Forces within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal
Frontier.
3182. By this Fleet Plan, Task Force Four is assigned the tasks below.
a. Assist in providing external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian
Naval Coastal Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned.
(As of the data of issue of this plan, the security plan of the Commander, Hawaiian
Naval Coastal Frontier (as Commander, Base Defense) is already in effect).
b. Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston,
Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton if authorized. Assist as practicable in the
development of Samoa and Guam.
c. Make the facilities of outlying bases available for Fleet units operating in
the vicinity; and directly and through own task group commanders cooperate
with other task force and task group commanders in coordinating the military
activities at these bases. (See Annex IV.)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2581
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW FIVE
{NAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE)
PART III. TASK ASSIGNMENT
CHAPTER I. PHASE I
[37] 3182. d. Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for
the purpose, to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized,
Wake and Canton.
Task Force Five {Pacific Southern) and Task Force Ten {Pacific Northern
Naval Coastal Frontier)
3183. Commanders Task Forces Five and Ten perform tasks assigned by the
Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
[38] Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE
3191. Until detached from the Fleet, all forces less those of Naval Coastal
Frontiers will perform the following tasks:
a. Units in the Hawaiian Area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor by the
end of four W-day; units designated for early operations complete mobilization
prior to the time designated for their operations to commence. Units on the
Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly as possible.
b. Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.
c. Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating
with commanders of naval coastal frontiers while within the limits of those
frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese forces.
d. Continue such training activities of the fleet as the commander-in-chief
may direct.
e. Reinforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.
f. Protect the territory and communications of the associated powers, the
operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other opera-
tions as directed by the commander-in-chief.
39]
CHAPTER II. PHASE lA
Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE
3211. Task Force One will perform tasks as required by the following para-
graphs of this section.
3212. Perform task assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).
3213. Reenforce and support operations of Task Force two as required in the
Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).
[40] Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO
3221. Task Force Two will perform tasks as required by the following para-
graph.
3222. Conduct reconnaissance and raid in force against the Marshalls as
required in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan (Annex II).
[41] Section 3. TASK FORCE THREE
3231. Task Force Three will perform tasks as required by the following para-
graphs of this section.
3232. Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required
in The Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
3233. Reenforce Task Force Two as required by the Marshall Reconnaissance
and Raiding Plan (Annex II).
3234. Move from San Diego to Hawaii the remaining units and equipment of
the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.
3235. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2.
[42] Section 4- TASK FORCE NINE {PATROL PLANE FORCE)
3241. Task Force Nine will perform tasks as required in the following para-
graphs of this section.
2582 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3242. a. Special Information.
1. Patrol plane operations from Midwaj', Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, and
Canton are feasible, the extent of such operations being dependent upon the
defenses, facilities and supplies available at the time operations commence.
Those defenses, facilities and supplies are being augmented. As of July 1, 1941
tenders cannot base at Wake or Canton, but Pan-American Airways' facilities
may be used by special arrangement or by commandeering. A project for the
improvement of Wake as a base is underway. No such project for Canton has
been approved.
2. No aircraft are assigned at present to the Commander, Hawaiian Naval
Coastal Frontier.
3. Our submarines will assist in the defense of Midway and Wake, and will
habitually operate offensively in enemy waters.
4. Land defenses exist on outlying islands, as described in paragraph 3133c,
1. Commander Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), is charged
with the defense of these outlying islands and will make them available for patrol
plane operations.
5. It is believed that enemy action in the area subject to our patrol plane search
will comprise:
(a) Submarine raids and observation off Oahu and outlying islands and along
our lines of communication.
[48] (b) Surface raids on our lines of communications.
(c) Surface and air raids against Wake and possibly against Midway, Johnston,
Palmyra and Canton.
(d) Possibly carrier raid against Oahu.
b. Tasks.
1. Perform patrols required by patrol and sweeping plan (Annex I).
2. Subject to the specific tasks prescribed elsewhere in this plan, operate patrol
planes in the Hawaiian Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest
possible information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only
when other types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of
damage to the planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on
the objective appears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.
3. Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces.
4. Perform tasks assigned in the Marshall reconnaissance and raiding plan
(Annex II).
5. Coordinate operations of patrol planes with submarines operating in same
general area.
6. Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid dis-
proportionate losses.
[44i 3242. b. 7. Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be VJ
Squadron from base force) based on Oahu at all times. During the absence of
major portions of the fleet from the vicinity of Oahu, such squadrons, at dis-
cretion, may be temporarily transferred to commander Task Force Fou»--(Hawai-
ian Naval Coastal Frontier).
c. Special Logistics.
Logistic support at outlying bases will be supplied by own tenders, Hawaiian
Naval Coastal Frontier, Base Force, and, if necessary, by Pan-American Airways
facilities.
[45] Sections. TASK FORCE SEVEN {UNDERSEA FORCE)
3251. Task Force Seven will perform tasks as required by the following paragraph.
3252. a. Special Information.
1. Surface units of the Fleet will initially conduct the operations required by
the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I) and the Marshall Reconnaissance and
Raiding Plan (Annex II). Thereafter operations will be conducted for the cap-
ture of the Marshalls and Carolines, with occasional sweeps toward the Marianas
and the Japanese Homeland.
2. Our patrol planes will be operating from Midway, and possibly Wake and
Johnston Islands.
3. Japan is developing extensively the defenses of the Mandated Islands.
Land planes are known to be based at Saipan, Truk and Jaluit and have been
reported at Marcus Island. Air fields are believed to exist at Wotje and Maloe-
lap. Port Lloyd in the Bonins is a minor operating base and some aircraft
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2583
usually base there and at Hachijo Jima. Aircraft may be present on Amami
Oshima.
4. Considerable air strength is based on the Japanese Homeland but it is be-
lieved that, with many commitments elsewhere and a general lack of patrol
planes, the air patrol surrounding the Homeland will not be particularly intensive.
5. The main units of the Japanese Fleet will probably be operating from the
Inland Sea.
6. All important harbors will probably be mined and netted against submarines
and are well fortified. A considerable number of small patrol craft must be
expected.
[46] 3252. a. 7. The southwestern and western lines of communications
from Japan may be considered vital needs and those toward the Mandates are
very important.
8. It is expected that all Japanese Merchantmen will be armed or will be
operating under naval control, and will therefore be subject to submarine attack.
Specific instructions on this subject will be issued later.
9. Arrangements will be made with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to
extend the Pacific Area sufficiently for submarines to pass through the Nansei
Shoto as far south as Latitude 28°-30' N.
10. Mining Japanese waters outside the three mile limit may be planned. The
specific authority for such mining will be issued later.
b. Tasks
1. Continue patrol of two submarines each at Wake and Midway.
2. Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese homeland and
thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating condi-
tions, giving Stations the following priority.
YOKOHAMA
BUNCO CHANNEL
KII CHANNEL
TSUSHIMA
NAGASAKI
SHIMONOSEKI
TSUGARU
3. Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces including shipping, utilizing
torpedoes and mines, and, if appropriate, gunfire.
\47] 3252. b. 4. Report important enemy movements by radio if success of
attack mission is not thereby jeopardized.
c. Special Logistics.
Utilize facilities at Midway as necessary- to increase endurance on patrol.
U8] Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT {MINING FORCE)
3261. Task Force Eight will:
Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the
local defense forces during this phase.
U9] Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX {LOGISTIC (fc CONTROL FORCE)
3271. Task Force Six will:
Continue tasks assigned for Phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the
patrol and sweeping plan (annex I) and the Marshall reconnaissance and raidi ng
plan (annex II).
[60] Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS
3281. Task Force Five (Pacific Northern) and Task Force Ten (Pacific Southern
Naval Coastal Frontier) will:
Continue tasks assigned for phase I and perform the tasks assigned in the
patrol and sweeping plan (annex I).
3282. Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) will:
Continue tasks assigned for phase I.
[51] Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE
3291. All task forces concejined:
a. Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3191.
b. Perform tasks assigned in the patrol and sweeping plan (annex I) .
2584 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[52] CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE lA
Section 1. TASK FORCE ONE
3311. Task Force One v,-i\l:
Cover operations of other forces as prescribed- in the Eniwetok plan (annex — ),
and other plans for the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.
[52a] Section 2. TASK FORCE TWO
3321. Task Force Two will:
Reenforce Task Forces One and Three as required in Eniwetok and other plans
and perform such reconnaissance and raiding as is directed.
[52b] Section S. TASK FORCE THREE
3331. Task Force Three will:
a. Continue training for landing attacks.
b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex — ) and other operations
involving landing attacks.
c. Patrol as directed in subsequent plans.
d. Continue task assigned in subparagraph 3133 c, 2.
[52c] Section 4- TASK FORCE NINE {PATROL PLANE FORCE)
3341. Task Force Nine will:
a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3242 b, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7.
b. Perform tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex — ) and other plans for
the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.
[52d] Section 5. TASK FORCE SEVEN {UNDERSEA FORCE)
3351. Task Force Seven will:
a. Continue tasks assigned in subparagraphs 3252 b, 1,2, 3, and 4.
b. Carry out tasks assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex — ) and other plans for
the capture of the Marshalls and Carolines.
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW FIVE
{NAVY PLAN 0-1, RAINBOW FIVE)
Part III. Task Assignment
CHAPTER III. PHASES SUCCEEDING PHASE lA
[62e] Section 6. TASK FORCE EIGHT {MINING FORCE)
3361. Task Force Eight will:
Perform such mining tasks as may be assigned in Eniwetok plan (annex — )
and other operations and continue to augment local patrols as directed.
[52f] Section 7. TASK FORCE SIX {LOGISTIC AND CONTROL
FORCE)
3371. TasA; Force Six will:
a. Continue tasks prescribed in paragraphs 3172 to 3174.
b. Prepare plans for the establishment of a fleet anchorage at Eniwetok and
a fleet base at Truk after the positions have been captured.
[52g] Section 8. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS
3381. Task Forces Four, Five, and Ten will:
Continue the tasks assigned in paragraphs 3182 and 3183.
[52h] Section 9. TASKS JOINTLY APPLICABLE
3391. All task forces concerned:
Continue tasks assigned in paragraph 3291.
[63] CHAPTER IV. EXECUTION OF THE PLAN
3401. The execution of this Plan may be in one or two steps depending on
whether Japan does or does not become a belligerent on the first day of execution.
a. If action against p]uropean Axis Powers onlv is to be taken the despatch will
be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE
PHASE ONE".
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2585
b. When action against JAPAN is to be taken the despatch for execution will
be "EXECUTE NAVY PLAN OPTION DASH ONE RAINBOW FIVE
PHASE ONE AFIRM".
3402. In the event of an overt act of war by a foreign power against the United
States prior to the existence of a state of war, it is the duty of the senior commander
on the spot to take such action in the defense of his command and the national
interests as the situation may require, and report the action taken to superior
authority at once.
[54]
CHAPTER V. INITIAL TRANSFER OF UNITS
3501. The table below gives, for ready reference, a summary of the transfers
to be made in going from the current peace time organization to the task organ-
ization as of W-Day and as of J-Day. Those transfers for W-Day will be made
upon the placing into effect of Phase I of this Plan. Those for J-Day will be
made when the execution of Phase lA is ordered. Units concerned will report by
despatch to the commanders of the task forces to which they are transferring.
From
To
Unit transferred
Transfer effected
Remarks
Taskfor 1.
Southeastern Pa-
cific For.
Taskfor 3
f2 OCL
When directed..
W-Day
1 Desdiv
1 CL
For rotation on patrol
Taskfor2-
Taskfor 3..
1 CA *
W-Day-- - -
until J-Day.
For rotation on patrol
until J-Day.
If Atlantic Reen. is de-
Atlantic Reen
Taskfor 2
4 CA
When directed..
When directed..
[w-Day
Taskfor 3 .
2CA
tached.
If Atlantic Reen. is de-
PSNCF-...
PNNCF
PNNCF
fl2 VPB
tached.
{1 AVD __
(Administration remains.
\ Units may be rotated.
11 AVP
[w-Day. .
fl2VPB
Taskfor 9 (Patrol
^1 AVD _
(Administration remains.
1 Units may be rotated.
Plane Force).
[l AVP
}w-Day-.
W-Day
}j-Day
Taskfor 7 (Under-
/2 SS
(Administration remains.
\ Units may be rotated.
Base Samoa. Released
\1 ASR
NARWHAL or
NAUTILUS.
fl CM
sea Force).
Taskfor 3 .
m
Taskfor 8 (Minfor).
Hawaiian NCF...
Taskfor 3
Taskfor 2
on J-Day.
Until further orders.
\8DM
W-Day
Taskfor 6 (Logistic
1 AO.
Base Samoa, released on
and Control For).
1 AO
J-Day
J-Day.
For fueling at sea ships
2A0
J-Day...
in initial sweep. To
revert when released.
For fueling at sea ships in
All Forces
Taskfor 9._.
Hawaiian NCF...
Taskfor 6 (Logistic
and Control
Force).
10VJR_.
As directed
Any ship passing
between West
Coast and Ha-
waii.
J-Day.
When directed..
Prior to sched-
uled date of
departure.
initial reconnaissance
of MARSHALLS.
To revert when re-
leased.
Until further orders.
For escort duty. To re-
vert on completion.
[66]
Part IV. Logistics
CHAPTER I. GENERAL
4101. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force) is charged
with the logistic supply of the Fleet and, in cooperation with Commander Task
Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier), with supplying the present out-
lying bases in the Mid Pacific. He will make requests for replacements as required
by paragraph. 4322 g of the Navy Basic Plan. He will maintain a liaison officer
in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal
Frontier) and, through him, will control the quantities and times of delivery of
material and personnel requirements to the Fleet. In so far as practicable, a
reserve of consumable supplies will be established and maintained at Pearl Harbor.
After capture of bases in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES a reserve of
supplies will be maintained at these places, as permitted by storage and transporta-
tion facilities available.
2586 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4102. The supply of units of the Second Marine Division after they have left
the West Coast will be included with that of the Fleet.
4103. Special logistic instructions affecting particular tasks have been included
in the task assignments in Part III and the Annexes of this Plan.
4104. For the benefit of Commander Task Force Six, Commanders of other
task forces will include, in the plans which they prepare, their logistic require-
ments as far as they can be foreseen.
4105. The requirements of the U. S. Pacific Fleet are placed in the second highest
priority classification by paragraph 4261 of the Navy Basic Plan.
[56a] CHAPTER II. TRANSPORTATION
4201. Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force), through his
liaison officer in the office of Commander Task Force Five (Pacific Southern
Naval Coastal Frontier), will coordinate the transportation of material and per-
sonnel by Fleet transportation facilities and the Naval Transportation Service.
4202. The Naval Transportation Service vessels assigned to assist in the sup-
ply of the Hawaiian and Alaskan areas will be shown in a revised Chapter IX,
Appendix II, of the Navy Basic Plan. If practicable, they will not be employed
for transportation farther westward than Hawaii.
4203. The employment of commercial vessels to assist in transportation from
the West Coast to Hawaii is most desirable and is acceptable to the Commander-
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
[56b] CHAPTER III. HOSPITALIZATION AND EVACXTATION
4301. The facilities of the Fleet including those of hospital ships, advanced
base hospitals and mobile medical units will, as far as practicable, provide hospi-
talization for sick and wounded personnel.
4302. As necessary, such personnel will, under the coordinated supervision of
the task force commanders responsible for the personnel and for the transportation
facilities employed, be evacuated to the nearest shore establishment having hospi-
tal space available.
4303. The, ships concerned will furnish hospitalization to embarked Army
forces until ineflfectives can be transferred ashore.
[56c] CHAPTER IV. PRIZE CREWS
4401. The Navy Department will furnish prize crews as follows: U. S. Pacific
Fleet — 8; Southeast Pacific Force — 8. If those for the Pacific Fleet are available
they will be placed aboard ships assigned to make the search for enemy merchant
ships in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I) .
[66d] CHAPTER V. SALVAGE
4501. All units, particularly of Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force)
and suitable units of Task Force Seven (Underseas Force) will render salvage
service, as practicable, to naval and other vessels in the Pacific Area outside of
a zone lying 500 miles from the continental United States, Alaska, and Panama.
Within the above mentioned zone, salvage service will be rendered by the shore
establishment.
[57] Part V. Special Provisions
CHAPTER I. TIME TO BE USED
5101. GREENWICH Civil Time wiU be used in carrying out this Plan.
[58] CHAPTER II. COMMUNICATIONS
5201. Communications will be in accordance with USF-70 as modified by
Annex III to this Plan.
[59] CHAPTER III. LOCATION OF COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
5301. The Fleet will be kept informed of the location of the Commander-in-
Chief.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2587
[60] CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS PHASES I AND lA
5401. Tentative Operation Plans Nos. 1-R5 and 1A-R5 as formulated below
are designed to facilitate the promulgation and execution of the tasks assigned for
Phases I and I A of this U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five). It
is expected that they will be modified and executed by despatch when the corre-
sponding Phase of this 0-1 Plan is placed in effect as prescribed in paragraph 3401.
[61] Section 1. Phase I
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date
Operation Plan No. 1-R5
Initial Task Organization
(See paragraph 1107 of this Plan for normal organization)
(a) Task Force One — Commander Battle Force. — Normal units this task force
plus % minecraft less 1 cruiser in rotation to Task Force Three patrol pool.
(b) Task Force Two — Commander Aircraft, Battle Force. — Normal units this
task force plus )^ minecraft less one cruiser in rotation to Task Force Three patrol
pool.
(c) Task Force Three — Commander Scouting Force. — Normal units this task
force plus 1 cruiser each from Task Forces One and Two for cruiser patrol pool plus
1 SS from Task Force Seven, 1 AO from Task Force Six, and (on request) 1 patron
and tender from Task Force Seven for South Pacific operations.
(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) (S. O. P. Airscofor Hawaiian Area). —
Normal units this task force less 24 VP and tenders transferred to Naval Coastal
Frontiers, and (if requested by Commander Task Force Three) 1 patron and tender
to Task Force Three.
[62] (e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force) — Commander Submarines,
Scouting Force. — Normal units this task force less 2 SS and 1 ASR to Task Force
Ten and 1 SS to Task Force Three.
(f) Task Force Eight (Mining Force). — Non-operative as such; normal units
thereof being divided between Task Forces One and Two.
(g) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) — Commander Base Force. —
Normal units this task force plus any units transferred from other forces for escort
duty West Coast-Hawaii less 1 AO to Task Force Three.
(h) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) — Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District. — Normal units this task force plus units from other
fleet forces when and if the Commander-in-Chief directs transfer.
(i) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) — Commandant,
Twelfth Naval District. — Normal units this task force plus 12 VP and tender from
Task Force Nine.
(j) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) — Commandant,
Thirteenth Naval District. — Normal units this task foroe plus 12 VP and tender
from Task Force Nine plus 2 SS and 1 ASR from Task Force Seven.
[63] 1. Information, Assumptions, etc., as previously given in Parts I, II
and III of Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five.
2. This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communica-
tions of the Associated Powers and will support British Naval Forces south of the
equator as far west as Longitude 155° East, while continuing training and guarding
against attack by Japan.
3. (a) Task Force One. — (1) When directed release two small light cruisers and
one destroyer division to become the Southeast Pacific Force as required by the
Navy Basic Plan.
(2) Perform the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
(b) Task Force Two. — (1) Perform the tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweep-
ing Plan (Annex I).
(c) Tias^ Force Three. — (1) Maintain the patrols required by the Patrol and
Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
(2) Move from San Diego to Hawaii the maximum practicable portion of the
Second Marine Division, employing attached transports.
(3) Make preparations and train for landing attacks on Japanese bases in the
Marshalls for purposes of capture or demolition, with particular emphasis on plan
for capture of Eniwetok.
2588 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[64] (4) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested
by Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier and approved by the Com-
mander-in-Chief.
(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force). — (1) Transfer twelve patrol planes
and two tenders to each of the Pacific Southern and Pacific Northern Naval
Coastal Frontiers. Continue administration of these forces and rotate detail at
discretion.
(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
(e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force). — (1) Maintain patrols required by the
Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
(2) Assign one submarine division to Task Force Three as required for landing
attack training.
(3) Transfer two submarines and one submarine rescue vessel to Pacific
Northern Naval Coastal Frontier to assist in defense of the Alaska sector. Con-
tinue administration of these units and rotate detail at discretion.
(f) Task Force Eight. (Mining Force). — (1) Continue training under Commander
Task Force One.
(g) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force). — (1) Provide logistic services
to the Fleet and cooperate with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier
in providing logistic services to outlying bases.
[65] (2) Perform tasks required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
(3) Maintain in the Office of Commander Pacific Naval Coastal Frontier an
officer to maintain liaison with respect to logistic requirements of the Fleet, the
loading of Base Force and Naval Transportation Service vessels, and the routing
and protection of United States and Allied shipping. Maintain close liaison
with Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier for the same purposes.
(h) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier). — (1) Assist in pro-
viding external security for units of the Fleet in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal
Frontier, in cooperation with the Army and the units concerned.
(2) Prosecute the establishment of subsidiary bases at Midway, Johnston,
Palmyra, and Wake, and at Canton is authorized. Assist as practicable in the
development of Samoa and Guam.
(3) Make the facilities of the outlying bases available for Fleet units operating
in the vicinity and cooperate with Commanders of Mobile Forces in coordinating
the military activities at these bases. (See Annex IV).
(4) Utilize units of the Fleet Marine Force, made available for the purpose,
to defend Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra, and, when authorized, Wake and
Canton.
(i) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier). — (1) Perform
tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
[66] (j) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier). —
(1) Perform tasks assigned by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I).
(x) (1) Units in the Hawaiian area complete mobilization at Pearl Harbor
within four days of date of execution of this Plan units designated for early
operations complete mobilization prior to the time designated for their operations
to commence. Units on the Pacific Coast complete mobilization there as rapidly
as possible.
( 2) Maintain vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.
(3) Maintain internal and external security of forces at all times, cooperating
with the Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers while within the limits of those
frontiers. Guard against surprise attack by Japanese Forces.
(4) Continue such training activities of the Fleet as the Commander-in-Chief
may direct.
(5) Reenforce local defense and coastal forces as directed.
(6) Protect the territory and communications of the Associated Powers, the
operations of coastal forces, and troop movements by covering and other opera-
tions as directed bv the Commander-in-Chief.
4. Logistic replenishment at Pearl Harbor, on the West Coast, and as specially
provided for in the Annexes.
5. (a) Communications in accordance with U. S. F. Seventy, as modified by
Annex III.
(b) Use Greenwich Civil Time.
(c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location.
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2589
[68] CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATION PLANS PHASES I AND lA
Section 2. Phase I A
Tentative
Operation Plan No. 1A-R5.
United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
Place
Date.
Initial task organization
(See Basic Fleet Plan for normal organization.)
(a) Task Force One. Commander Battle Force. — Normal units this task force
less any cruiser absent on patrol with Task Force Three less 1 CV and all other
large CL's to Task Force Two for reconnaissance of MARSHALLS.
(b) Task Force Two. Commander Aircraft, Battle Force. — Normal units this
task force plus 1 CV and available CL's (approximately 4) from Task Force One
plus 1 CV from Task Force Three less any cruiser absent on patrol with Task
Force Three.
(c) Task Force Three. Commander Scouting Force.— Same as for Operation
Plan 1-R5 less 1 CV to Task Farce Two less 1 SS and 1 AO from SAMOA returned
to their respective normal task forces plus 1 AO from Task Force' Six for fueling
at sea.
(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force; Senior Officer Present, Aircraft,
Scouting Force, HAWAIIAN AREA).— Same as for Operation PlanR5 1-.
\69] Part V. Special Provisions
CHAPTER IV. TENTATIVE OPERATIONS PLANS PHASES I AND lA
Section 2. Phase I A
(e) Task Force Seven
Force.
(Undersfea Force) Commander Submarines, Scouting
Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5
plus 1 SS returned from Task Force Three.
(f) Task Force Eight (Mining Force)
Non-operative as such, normal units thereof being detached from Task
Forces One and Two at end of Phase I and on commencement of Phase
I A being transferred to Task Force Four.
(g) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) Commander Base Force.
Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5,
plus 1 AO returned from Task Force Three
less 2 AO transferred to Task Force Two
less 1 AO transferred to Task Force Three.
(h) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant, Four-
teenth Naval District.
Normal units this task force
plus all units of Minecraft, Battle Force,
(i) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant,
Twelfth Naval District.
Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.
(j) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier) Commandant,
Thirteenth Naval District.
Same as for Operation Plan 1-R5.
1. Information, Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of this
Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five.
[70] 2. This Fleet, while protecting the sea communications and territory of
the Associated Powers in the Pacific Area, and supporting the operations of the
British Navy south of the equator as far west as Longitude one hundred fifty-five
degrees East, will:
(a) Conduct an initial sweep with light forces and aircraft against enemy
merchant ships and raiders.
(b) Raid .Japanese communications to westward of NANPO SHOTO with
cruisers.
(c) Patrol Japanese homeland with submarines.
2590 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(d) Conduct a reconnaissance and raid against the MARSHALLS, in order to
divert Japanese forces awav from MALAYSIA, and to prepare for the capture of
the MARSHALL-CAROLINE area.
3. (a) Task Force One.
(1) Perform task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy
Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five).
(2) Reenforce and support operations of Task Force Two as required in the
MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1,
Rainbow Five).
(b) Task Force Two.
(1) Conduct Reconnaissance and Raid in force against the MARSHALLS aa
required in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to
Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five).
[71] (c) Task Force Three.
(1) Conduct initial sweep against enemy commerce and raiders as required in
the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five).
(2) Reenforce Task Force Two as required by the MARSHALL Reconnaissance
and Raiding Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five).
(3) Move from SAN DIEGO to HAWAII the remaining units and equipment
of the Second Marine Division and continue training for landing exercises.
(4) Continue preparations and training for landing attacks on Japanese bases
in the MARSHALLS with particular emphasis on plan for capture of ENI-
WETOK.
(5) Furnish additional defenses for outlying bases as may be requested by
Commander Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier) and approved
by the Commander-in-Chief.
(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
(1) Subject to the specific tasks prescribed below, operate patrol planes in the
HAWAIIAN Area including outlying islands so as to gain the earliest possible
information of advancing enemy forces. Use them offensively only when other
types of our own are not within striking distance, and the risk of damage to the
planes is small; or when the importance of inflicting damage on the objective
apj>ears to justify the risk of receiving the damage which may result.
[7S] (2) Perform patrols required by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I
to Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five).
(3) Coordinate the service of information with the operations of other forces.
(4) Perform tasks assigned in the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding
Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five).
(5) Withdraw patrol planes from advance bases when necessary to avoid
disproportionate losses.
(6) Maintain not less than two squadrons (one may be VJ squadron from Base
Force) based on OAHU at all times. During the absence of major portions of
the Fleet from the vicinity of OAHU, such squadrons may, at discretion, be
temporarily transferred to Commander Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval
Coastal Frontier).
(e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force).
(1) Continue patrol of two submarines each at WAKE and MIDWAY.
(2) Establish maximum practicable initial patrol off the Japanese Homeland
and thereafter maintain it at the maximum strength permitted by operating
conditions, giving stations the following priority:
YOKOHAMA
BUNCO CHANNEL
KII CHANNEL
TSUSHIMA
NAGASAKI
SHIMONOSEKI
TSUGARU
[73] (The Commander-in-Chief will make arrangements for submarines to
pass through that part of the Far Eastern Area in the NANSEI SHOTO as far
south as Latitude twenty-eight degrees, thirty minutes North).
(3) Inflict maximum damage on enemy forces, including shipping, utilizing
mines and torpedoes and, if appropriate, gunfire. Mining of Japanese waters
outside the three mile limit may be planned. Specific authority for such mining
will be issued later.
(4) Report important enemy movements by radio if success of attack mission
is not thereby jeopardized.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2591
(f) Task Force Eight (Mining Force).
(1) Report to Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier to augment the
local defense forces during this Phase.
(g) Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force).
(1) Continue general logistic support of Fleet and assistance to outlying bases.
(2) Perform tasks assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy
Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five), and the MARSHALL Reconnaissance and Raiding
Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five).
(h) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).
(1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1-R5, with regard for the
probable increase in enemy activities.
[74] (i) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier),
(j) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).
(1) Continue tasks assigned in Operation Plan 1-R5 with regard for the
probable increase in enemy activities.
(2) Perform the tasks assigned by the Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to
Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five).
4. Logistic replenishment at PEARL HARBOR, on the West Coast, and as
specially provided for in the Annexes.
5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Plan 0-1,
Rainbow Five.
(b) Use GREENWICH Civil Time.
(c) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised of his location.
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Com m ander-in- Ch ief,
U. S. Pacific Fleet.
[I-l] ANNEX I
United States Pacific Fleet,
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date
Patrol and Sweeping Plan
No.
INITIAL TASK ORGANIZATION
(a) Task Force One.
(b) Task Force Two.
(c) Task Force Three.
(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
(e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force).
(f) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force).
(g) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).
(h) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier),
(i) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).
(Units of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1-R5.)
1. Information and Assumptions as previously given in Parts I, II, and III of
this Navy Plan O-l, Rainbow Five. Latest information of enemy dispositions,
estimated intentions, and location of merchant shipping will be furnished by the
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, at time of execution.
2. Phase I
This Fleet will, in the Pacific Area, protect the territory and sea communica-
tions of the Associated Powers by:
[I-2\ (a) Patrolling against enemy forces, particularly in the vicinity of
the Hawaiian Islands; and on shipping lanes (1) West Coast-Hawaii, (2) Trans-
Pacific westward of Midway and (3) in South Seas in vicinity of Samoa.
(b) Escorting as conditions require and forces available permit.
(c) Covering.
(d) Employing striking forces against enemy raids and expeditions.
(e) Routing shipping.
2592 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Phase I A
This Fleet will: (a) continue the operations of Phase I, except as to patrols
which will be modified or discontinued as necessary in order to carry out pre-
scribed oflfensive operations;
(b) attack enemy communications by making initial sweep for enemy mer-
chant ships and raiders, and by raiding Japanese sea communications westward
of Nanpo Shoto;
(c) reconnoiter and raid the Marshall Islands,
Subsequent Phases
This ^Fleet will: (a) continue operations of Phase I except as to patrols, for which
further directives will be issued later.
3. (a) Task Force One.
(1) Cover territory, forces and shipping of the Associated Powers as directed.
[IS] (2) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to Task Force
Three for cruiser patrol pool; and be prepared to furnish, on order, other patrols or
a striking force, or both.
(3) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding
Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1) conduct such sweep as information and circum-
stances at the time permit without interference with the primary task,
(b) Task Force Two.
(1) Furnish one cruiser (in rotation as practicable) to Task Force Three for
cruiser patrol 'ool. (In case of detachment of Atlantic reenforcement this sub-
paragraph is lapplicable).
(2) Be prepared to furnish, on order, other patrols or a striking force, or both.
(3) Develop contacts made by patrol planes from Oahu if vessels of Task Force
Three are not within supporting distance of such contacts.
(4) While en route in accordance with Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding
Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1) conduct such sweep as information and cir-
cumstances at the time permit without interference with the primary task.
(c) Task Force Three, reenforced with one cruiser each from Task Forces One
and Two (for cruiser patrol pool), NARWHAL or NAUTILUS from Task force
Sev.n (Undt .'sea Force), and one oiler from Task Force Six (Logistic and Control
Force), also further reenforced by one squadron of patrol planes and tenders from
Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) (by request on Commander Task Force
Nine) when the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilities there permit:
(1) Patrol against enemy units that may attack own and allied communication
lines, operating in general as follows:
[1-4] (a) Maintain two cruisers (one, if Atlantic Reenforcement is detached)
on patrol between Hawaii and the Pacific Coast in areas more than five hundred
miles from land, Reservice such ships either in Hawaii or on Pacific Coast.
(b) (i) Maintain two cruisers, two destroyers, one submarine and one oiler
in the South Pacific based on Samoa, normally keeping one cruiser on patrol
within one thousand miles of Samoa along routes to i^ew Zealand.
(ii) When the situation in the South Pacific requires and facilitates there permit,
request from Commander Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) assignment of a
patrol squadron and tenders; and advance it into that area for operations.
(iii) Coordinate activities of unit operating in the South Pacific with British
naval forces as far west as longitude one hundred fifty-five degrees East as the
situation at the time mak^s expedient; and in accordance with such directives
as may from time to time be issued.
(c) Maintain one cruiser, based on Midway, on patrol to the northward of the
Midway- Marianas line, in the vicinity of trans-Pacific trade routes.
(2) Upon commencement of Phase lA, dispatch two heavy cruisers in company
to raid Japanese communications westward of the Nanpo Shoto, and return to
base when fuel situation or other circumstances require. Arrange directly with
Commander Task Force Six for fueling such cruisers at or near Midway on out-
ward passage. and on return as may be feasible. The Commander-in-Chief will
make arrangements with the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, concerning the
utilization of the portion of the Far Eastern Area involved.
[1-5] (3) Upon commencement of Phase lA, discontinue patrols required
by paragraph 3 (c) (1) and sweep for enemy merchant ships, operating along the
following general lines:
(a) Samoa based cruisers and destroyers sweep northward to latitude twenty
thence to rendezvous designated by Tas"k Force Commander for operations in
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2593
conjunction with the Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan (Annex II to
Navy Plan 0-1). Other Samoa based units rejoin their normal commands.
(b) Cruisers on patrol between West Coast and Hawaii sweep or search for
specific enemy merchantmen, as Task Force Commander may require enroute to
rendezvous designated by him for operations in conjunction with Marshall Raid.
(c) Other available units conduct maximum practicable sweep in general area
bounded by Hawaiian Island chain, latitude forty-six North, and longitudes one
hundred sixty-seven West and one hundred eighty; such sweep to occupy about
six days, and to begin on or as soon after J-day as possible.
(d) Units operating in the foregoing northerly area originate radio traffic to
indicate an advance toward Japan via a northern route.
(4) (a) Upon completion of sweep directed in subparagraph (3) (c) above,
rendezvous with oiler supplied by Task Force Six (Logistics and Control Force) in
latitude twenty-seven North, and one hundred seventy-eight West, or other
rendezvous you may have designated. Fuel and proceed to join Task Force Two
(Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan, Annex II to Navy Plan 0^1) on
twelve J-day at rendezvous Tare in latitude sixteen North, longitude one hundred
seventy-seven East or other designated time and rendezvous.
(b) If any units will be delayed in joining Task Force Two, advise the com-
mander thereof as to the extent of the delay.
[1-6] (c) If conflict of tasks exists, operations against inferior enemy forces
within striking distance take precedence over joining Task Force Two.
(5) If Atlantic Reenforcement is detached, assign two heavy cruisers to Task
Force Two. (In such event the assignment of one cruiser from Task Force Two to
Task Force Three, hitherto mentioned will, of course, not be made).
(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
(1) Having due regard for time required to overhaul and upkeep planes and for
conservation of personnel, maintain maximum patrol plane search against enemy
forces in the approaches to the Hawaiian area.
(2) Initially base and operate one patrol plane squadron from Midway. At
discretion increase the number of planes operating from bases to westward of
Pearl Harbor to two squadrons, utilizing Johnston and Wake as the facilities
thereat and the situation at the time makes practicable.
(3) Be prepared, on request of Commander Task Force Three, to transfer one
patrol squadron and tenders to that force for prompt operations in the South
Pacific.
(4) Be particularly alert to detect disguised raiders.
(5) In transferring planes between bases, conduct wide sweep enroute.
(6) Planes engaged in training operations furnish such assistance to Naval
Coastal Frontiers in which based as may be practicable.
(7) Effect closest cooperation practicable with surface forces engaged in
sweeping during initial sweep of Phase lA.
[1-7] (8) Modify patrols as necessary in order to carry out tasks assigned
in Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1).
(9) Units operating from outlying bases cooperate, to the extent compatible
with assigned tasks, with other forces thereat. Be guided by principles of com-
mand relationship set forth in Annex IV to Navy Plan 0-1.
(e) Task Force Seven (undersea Force).
(1) Maintain two submarines on patrol at Wake and two at Midway for gain-
ing information and for attack on enemy units approaching those places.
(2) Be prepared, if Commander-in-Chief directs, during Phase I to conduct
observations, by submerged submarines from outside the three-mile zone, of
probable radar bases in the Japanese Mandates.
(3) At commencement of Phase lA, or earlier if so directed, establish patrols
off the Japanese homeland as prescribed in the basic Fleet Plan.
(4) Route submarines advancing to westward for patrols so as to cover wide
front. Coordinate such routing with other patrol and sweeping operations,
including that prescribed for cruisers in the area westward of Nanpo Shoto, so as
to avoid contact of submarines with own forces.
(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief and task force commanders concerned advised
as to location and routes of own submarines.
(6) Transfer NAUTILUS or NARWHAL to Task Force Three for operations
in South Pacific during Phase I.
j(f) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force).
(1) Through liaison with Commanders of Task Force Five (Pacific Southern)
and Task Force Four (Hawaiian [IS] Naval Coastal Frontiers) ensure
that routing of shipping is in accordance with general directives of the Com-
79716 O — 46 — pt. 17 11
2594 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
mander-in-Chief and is coordinated with the protection offered by Fleet patrols
and with the routing and protective measures of the British in the South Pacific.
(2) Escort important ships or convoys by using combatant vessels en route to
or from the West Coast and Hawaii, which vessels are made available for that
purpose. If escort is found necessary and suitable vessels will be not available
by modifying schedules of escorts or convoys, make suitable representations to
the Commander-in-Chief as far in advance as possible.
(3) During Phase I maintain one oiler at Samoa to operate under Commander
Task Force Three.
(4) Provide oiler to fuel at sea units of Task Force Three on eight J-Day in
latitude twenty-seven North, Longitude one hundred seventy-eight West, or at
time and place designated by commander of that Task Force.
(5) See also oiler requirements under Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding
Plan (Annex II to Navy Plan 0-1).
(g) Task Force Four (Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier).
(1) Coordinate, as practicable, patrol in coastal zone with patrols by other Fleet
forces.
(2) Through liaison with Commander Task Force Six (Logistics and Coastal
Force) and Commander TasA; Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier)
coordinate routing and escort of shipping in the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier
with that in the Fleet Control Zone, when and if established, and in the general
Pacific Area.
[1-9] (h) Task Force Five (Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Ii'rontierj.
(1) Coordinate routing of shipping with the protection afforded by Fleet forces
and by British forces in accordance with current situation, and with general
directives that may be issued by the Ccrmmander-in-Chief.
(2) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as practicable
with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of informa-
tion gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information
direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.
(3) In the initial stages of Phase lA, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet
forces in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying range of the
West Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicable.
(i) Task Force Ten (Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier).
(1) Conduct such search and patrols in vicinity of own theater as practicable
with available forces. Keep the Commander-in-Chief fully advised of information
gained. Also, when circumstances warrant, communicate such information
direct to any Fleet forces in the vicinity.
(2) In initial stages of Phase I A, particularly, cooperate with any Fleet forces^
in the vicinity in locating enemy merchantmen within flying range of the West'
Coast, obtaining assistance and cooperation of Army units as is practicable. It
is especially desired to cover until eight J-Day UNIMAK PASS and the maximum
area to the southward of Dutch Harbor that daily flights and available planes will
permit.
(x) (1) This plan effective simultaneously with Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five.
[I-IO] (2) All task forces make available to Commander Task Force Six
(Logistics and Control Force) for escort duty, all ships enroute between Hawaii
and West Coast.
(3) Destroy enemy combatant ships encountered.
(4) Capture or destroy enemy merchant ships encountered.
(5) Investigate neutral merchant ships encountered; send them to port for
adjudication if investigation warrants; or if necessary and permissible under
international law, destroy them. (See "Instructions for the Navy of the United
States Governing Maritime Warfare").
(6) Seize any opportunity to inflict disproportionate damage on the enemy,
modifying or discontinuing plans in operations if necessary in order to do so.
(7) Disseminate pertinent information to other Task Force Commanders as
conditions of radio silence and other circumstances permit.
(8) Aircraft attempt, without taking undue risk, to force merchant ships to
the vicinity of supporting surface vessels or to United States' ports.
(9) This plan effective with Navy Plan 0-1.
(10) Be prepared to transfer units of Southeast Pacific Force and Atlantic
Reenforcement on short notice. So employ such units that if transferred they
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2595
can reach Canal Zone within twenty-one days. If transferred, such units proceed
along routes and conduct such sweeps as the Commander-in-Chief may prescribe.
(11) Continue such trainhig as these and other prescribed operations permit.
[I-ll] 4. Logistics as in Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five.
5. Provisions of Part V Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five apply.
»
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.
[II-l] ANNEX II
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date
Marshall Reconnaissance and Raiding Plan No.
Initial Task Organization.
(a). Task Force One.
(b). Task Force Two.
(c). Task Force Three.
(d). Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force).
(e). Task Force Seven (Undersea Force).
(f ) . Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force) .
Units of these task forces initially same as in Operation Plan 1A-R5.
1. (a) Information. — (1) This plan covers the initial operations in the
MARSHALLS for carrying out the basic task of diverting Japanese strength
away from the MALAY BARRIER through the denial and capture of positions
in the MARSHALLS.
2. This force will:
(a) Reconnoiter the MARSHALLS, particularly ENIWETOK, preparatory to
a raid in force and to eventual capture, in order to develop the mobile and land
defenses and material installations therein.
(b) Raid the MARSHALLS with ships and aircraft and small landing groups
in order to destroy enemy mobile forces, fixed defenses and facilities.
[II-2] 3. (a) Task Force One. — (1) Transfer available large light cruisers
and carrier to Task Force Two on J-Day.
(2) About Five J-Day, depart PEARL HARBOR with remainder of force and
proceed to rendezvous with Task Force Two at Point Tare on Eleven J-Day.
If delay in arriving at rendezvous is in prospect, advise Commander, Task Force
Two, of the probable time of arrival. Transmit any such message prior to
departing from the PEARL HARBOR area, if possible. Sweef) as practicable
along the route as required by Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan
0-1, Rainbow Five.
(3) If the Commander-in-Chief is not present upon making the rendezvous,
Commander Task Force One assume general charge of all further operations in
connection with this reconnaissance and raid, and direct Commander Task Force
Two to commence the raid at a suitable time after he has reported ready.
(4) Upon making rendezvous, assume command of battleships of Ta^k Force
Two.
(5) Cover operations of Task Force Two, as reenforced, from the area to the
northward of the ]^ARSHALLS, furnishing such support to that force as devel-
opments require, and keeping its commander informed as to the location of Task
Force One. Detail escorts for any damaged ships of Task Force Two which it may
be necessary to return to base.
(6) Utilize security offered by operations of patrol planes at WAKE.
[II-S] (7) After Task Force Two has completed raids and rejoined, if the
Commander-in-Chief is not present, Commander Task Force One carry out
further operations of a similar nature or conduct the combined forces to PEARL
HARBOR at discretion.
(b) Task Force Two, reenforced as provided in this plan, reconnoiter and raid
the MARSHALLS, carrying out the following approximate procedure:
(1) On One J-Day, unless otherwise directed, depart PEARL HARBOR with
reenforcements provided by this Plan and proceed toward TAONGI; battleships
and destroyer screen at fifteen knots, remainder Of force at twenty knots. Sweep
2596 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
along the route in accordance with Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy
Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five) and furnish security as practicable to Task Force One.
Furnish destroyer escort to oilers as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) (1).
(2) Five J-Day, fuel the advance group from oilers at Rendezvous Tare or
other designated rendezvous.
(3) Six J-Day to Nine J-Day reconnoiter the MARSHALLS as follows:
(i) Reconnoiter bv air such atolls as weather conditions, forces, time and devel-
opments permit, giving particular attention to ENIWETOK, BIKINI, RONGE-
LAP, WOTJE, JALUIT, KWAJALEIN, MALOELAP and ARNO. Recon-
noiter ENIWETOK particularly with a view to an early attack for its seizure.
[II-4] (ii) So conduct reconnaissance as to leave the enemy in doubt as to
what further reconnaissance is about to be undertaken, or as to what particular
places may be attacked.
(iii) Supplement air reconnaissance by reconnaissance from surface units and
by landing patrols, and raid with forces immediately available if the situation
and developments at the time indicate that such supplementary action is desirable
and feasible.
(iv) Utilize both photographic and visual observations to determine as accu-
rately as practicable the opposition that may be expected to raids and landing
parties; and the targets suitable for air and surface bombardment. Of particular
interest are:
ships and aircraft;
storage tanks; '
power plants and radio installations;
docks;
air fields;
storehouses and other buildings;
guns and observation posts;
mines;
channel and beach obstructions;
other defense installations;
beaches suitable for landing operations;
extent of anchorage area;
hydrographic, topographic, and
meteorological features.
(v) Retire on own battleships or Task Force One for assistance should circum-
stances require.
(vi) Operate battleship group to furnish support as necessary.
(vii) Unless persistent bad weather or other unforeseen developments prevent,
adjust operations to complete reconnaissance in four days or less after making
initial flights over enemy territory.
[II-5] (viii) Upon the completion of reconnaissance, withdraw to join
Task Forces One and Three. Transfer battleships to Task Force One. Task
Force Three will merge hito Task Force Two at this time.
(ix) Study and analyze information gained in reconnaissance; determine upon
the atolls to be raided and the specific objectives for attack. Complete final
plans therefor, with due regard for subparagraph (4) below, and issue to those
concerned. Via destroyer, furnish the Commander, Task Force One and the
Commander-in-Chief, if present, with information and aerial photographs ob-
tained, and copy of raiding plan.
(x) Report by visual (or by destroyer if out of signal distance) to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, if he is within the general area, otherwise t(^ the Commander,
Task Force One, the time it is desired to place the raiding plan nito effect.
(4) Beginning about Thirteen J-Day, when directed, carry out the raiding
plan. In preparing and carrying out the raiding plan, be guided by the following:
(i) Make such additional air reconnaissance immediately prior to attack as best
meets the existing situation.
(ii) Attack the selected objectives with air and surface forces, the scheme of
attack being at the discretion of the Task Force Commander and designed to
provide the best economy of force. Avoid directing enemy attention in advance
to the objectives of attack.
\II-6] (iii) The priority of objectives is as follows:
combatant ships, tenders, and aircraft;
other ships;
fuel tanks;
power and radio installations;
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2597
troop concentrations;
storehouses;
other installations,
(iv) Except in unusual circumstances, no vessel expend more than twenty-five
per cent of bombs or ammunition on fixed objectives.
(v) Where conditions appear favorable, land personnel to demolish installa-
tions and eliminate enemy personnel,
(vi) Do not enter lagoons with ships.
(vii) ^Iake suitable arrangements for the protection of and withdrawal of
damaged ships, requesting escorts from Task Force One.
(viii) If sufficient weakly held positions are developed to warrant further raids,
carry them out, otherwise discontinue raids at discretion and join Task Force One.
(c) Task Force Three. — (1) If Atlantic Reenforcement has been detached,
transfer two heavy cruisers at PEARL HARBOR to Task Force Two.
(2) If carrier is available, assign it to Task Force Two for this operation begin-
ning J-Day.
[II-7] (3) While in the Northern Pacific carrying out the Patrol and Sweep-
ing Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five) employ radio to deceive
enemy as to intentions in the MARSHALLS.
(4) If available, assign combat unit of about one hundred fifty marines to each
cruiser which will eventually join Task Force Two.
(5) Upon completion of the task assigned in the Patrol and Sweeping Plan on
about Ten J-Day, join Task Force Two with cruisers and destroyers at Point Tare
or other designated rendezvous. Thereafter operate as part of Task Force Two
until released upon completion of the raiding operation of this plan.
(d) Task Force Nine (Patrol Plane Force) coordinate operations of patrol planes
with those of other forces as follows:
(1) Prior to Five J-Day advance maximum practicable patrol plane strength
to WAKE, MIDWAY, and JOHNSTON, leaving not less than two operating
squadrons at OAHU.
(2) JOHNSTON-based planes, during passage of units of other forces to the
westward, search along the route of advance from the vicinity of JOHNSTON
to longitude one hundred seventy-eight degrees west.
(3) MIDWAY-based planes search sectors to the southwestward of MIDWAY
to prevent surprise attack across that sector on units operating toward the
MARSHALLS.
[I I- 8] (4) WAKE-based planes make preliminary air reconnaissance of
TAONGI and BIKAR on Five J-Day, or as soon thereafter as practicable, and
acquaint Commander Task Force Two with the results. Thereafter, conduct
search, to the extent that available planes and supplies will permit, to prevent
surprise attack from the westward by enemy surface forces on own units operating
toward the MARSHALLS.
(5) On completion of the raiding operations of Task Force Two resume normal
operations as required by paragraph 3242b. of the Fleet Operating Plan.
(e) Task Force Seven (Undersea Force). — No primary tasks in connection with
this plan are assigned but:
(1) Submarines which may have been in the MARSHALLS in carrying out the
Patrol and Sweeping Plan (Annex I to Navy Plan 0-1, Rainbow Five) report
enemy information obtained.
(2) While en route to patrol stations to the westward:
(i) Seize opportunities to damage important enemy units,
vii) Avoid contacts with own forces.
(iii) Force Commander keep other forces advised of location and movements of
submarines.
(f) Task Force Six (Logistic and Control Force). Despatch two oilers to carry
out the following:
(1) Proceed on J-Day with de.stroyer escort provided by Commander TasA;
Force Two, to rendezvous with the advance group of Task Force Two on Five J-
Day at Point Tare, or as directed by Commander Task Force Two.
[II-9] (2) Thereafter conduct fueling and proceed as directed by Com-
mander Task Force Two.
(x) (1) Seize every opportunity to damage the enemy, but avoid engaging
at a disadvantage.
(2) Be alert to detect and destroy enemy mobile foTces, particularly raids or
expeditions which may be directed at ovir outlying islands.
(3) Restrict the use of radio to a minimum.
(4) This plan effective simultaneously with the execution of Phase lA of
U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow Five).
2598 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
/
4. (a) Fuel from oiler as prescribed in paragraph 3 (f) above.
<b) Fuel destroyers from large ships at discretion of force and group commanders.
(c) Logistic support for submarines and patrol planes as in U. S. Pacific Fleet
Operating Plan (Rainbow Five).
5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex III to Navy Plan 0-1,
Rainbow Five.
(b) Use GREENWICH Civil Time.
(c) Rendezvous Tare: Latitude sixteen degrees North; Longitude one hundred
seventy-seven degrees East.
(d) The Commander-in-Chief will keep the Fleet advised as to his location
Admiral,
Commander-in-Chief,
United States Pacific Fleet.
[III-l] ANNEX III
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Place
Date
Communication Plan No. 1, Rainbow Five
USF-70 effective as modified herein. The numbered parts, sections, and
paragraphs of USF-70 listed are effective in toto, or as indicated. Omitted
numbered parts, sections, or paragraphs are not effective unless specifically
made so by Task Force Commanders by supplementary communication plans.
1110. Effective.
1120. Effective. Unless otherwise directed this communication plan is effec-
tive coincident with the placing in effect of Navy Plan 0-1 Rainbow Five.
1170 to 1178. Effective.
1179. Effective. The above procedure shall be used for Radar contact reports.
No receiver not supplied by Bureau of Ships shall be used for this or any other
purpose until it has been thoroughly tested to assure that it does not transmit a
carrier from its oscillating circuit.
1180. Effective.
1190. Effective.
1212. Effective.
1220. Effective.
1330. Allied communications in Pacific Area are governed by SP 02376; in the
Eastern Theater by current Andus publications.
[1 1 1-2] 2120. Condition 19 effective.
2131. Effective.
2200. The radio frequency plans are as set forth in Appendix B, USF-70, except
that Naval Coastal Frontier Defense Communication Plans will be governed bv
Article 4005, 1(a) of WPDNC-46.
No transmission shall be made on 500 kcs. frequency without the authority of
the O. T. C. of a Task Force.
When the O. T. C. of a Task Force or component at sea considers that the risk
is justified by the importance of the traffic concerned he may transmit traffic to
the nearest shore radio station that guards the Naval Calling Frequency (355 kc)
or to Radio Washington or Honolulu on the 4235 kc series. He shall not, except
in extreme emergency and when he is sure that the situation justifies the risk,
answer calls or feceive traffic on 355 kc, except by interception.
The various circuit guards required shall be so disposed as to permit the maxi-
mum number of ships to set watches on the radio direction finder, underwater
listening equipment and other intelligence equipment as directed by Task Force
Commanders.
The Senior Commander of Units from different task organizations operating
in the same area shall arrange for rapid means of inter-conimunications, preferably
by available shore stations. Task Organization Commander in a port or operat-
ing area shall establish an area radio frequency for use under circumstances when
visual systems will not serve. In port radio shall not be used [III-S] for
inter-communication or communication with shore when a visual link or landline
exists or mav be established.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2599
Guard NPM Primarj' Fox regardless of geographical position. ,
^500. Effective.
2400. Effective.
2510. CSP-1161 effective with this communication plan and shall be used in
lieu of CSP-776 for Task Organization command traffic.
2520. Use effective Confidential Radio Call Sign lists and ciphers for adminis-
trative traffic.
2540. Effective.
2720.. Effective.
2740. Effective.
SOOO. Effective.
4120. Effective.
5000. Effective.
52S0. Until receipt of satisfactory radio recognition device for aircraft the
following approach and recognition procedure shall govern the approach of Naval
aircraft to either units of the Fleet or Naval outlying island bases. Separate
special procedure will be prescribed for major bases and areas.
Aircraft approach from outside of gun range in simple cruising formation (if
more than one plane) on bearing 045° T. or 225° T. [III-4] on odd days
(GCT), and 135° T. or 315° T. on even days (GCT), from center of formation or
station at 1000 feet or under. (These bearings may be changed if necessary by
local authorities.) They shall never approach from the bearing on the sun when
the sun is low.
If station does not recognize plane as friendly it challenges by making "Zs" on
searchlight, or by training searchlight with red filter on plane if available; other-
wise at shore bases use a red smoke bomb during daylight and a red rocket at night.
On seeing challenge plane, or leading plane if there is a formation, replies as
follows:
(a) Daytime. — On odd day of the month (GCT), leave formation, circle to the
right and, when back on the approach course, dip right wing twice, on even days
(GCT), leave formation, circle to the left and, when back on approach course,
dip left wing twice. This must be made distinctive, dipping the wing about 30
degrees to the prescribed side and returning to horizontal after each dip.
(b) Nighttime. — Turn on running lights and proceed as for daytime replies to
challenge, except circling may be omitted; or make emergency identification
pyrotechnic signal prescribed in effective CSP.
When approaching aircraft are recognized as friendly, the recognition station
shall [7/7-5] train on the approaching aircraft a powerful searchlight,
make "Fs" or show green colored light. Those signals indicate to planes that they
are recognized as friendly and will not be fired on.
In a Fleet formation the recognition stations will be, unless otherwise desig-
nated, those ships on the outer circle closest to approach bearings 045° T. and
225° T. or 135° T. and 315° T. (depending on the day) from Fleet center.
0131. Effective.
6200. Effective.
6400. Effective.
6500. Effective.
6610. Effective.
7000 (less 7100). Effective.
[IV-1] 4NNEX IV
Command relationships and coordination of activities at outlying bases
1. Forces operating from outlying stations or bases, under this Plan, may
consist, broadly, of the following:
(a) Local Defense Forces, consisting of the local garrison and the local defense
forces (which may include submarines and aircraft especially designated for this
purpose) , operating under the direct control of the base or station commander,
and with the primary mission of defending the base or station against hostile
attack.
(b) Fleet forces consisting of submarines, airplanes and possibly surface ships
or detachments, operating under a fleet task force comma.ider or commanders,
whose missions, while contributing indirectly to local defense, are primarily
dictated by broader strategical and tactical considerations in connection with
other operations.
2600 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. Command relationships, under these conditions, will be governed by the
following:
(a) The base or station commander will, normally, command and direct the
operations of local defense forces, in accordance with the directive of the Com-
mander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (Commandant, Fourteenth Naval
District) . This base commander, a task group commander under the Commander
Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier, who is himself a task force commander under
the Commander-in-Chief, may, on occasion, also have functions of command in
connection with Fleet units in the vicinity.
(b) Fleet forces will, normally, be operated in accordance with directives of
their respective Fleet task organization commanders. In entrance and egress,
use of facilities, arrangements for berthing and services, etc., they will conform
to and be guided by the local regulations.
(c) In the event of contact with enemy forces which may threaten the base,
or the forces operating [IV-2] therefrom or in connection therewith, the
senior officer present in the base area will assume command of all forces and activ-
ities in the vicinity as necessary to take appropriate action against the threatening
enemy. As it is entirely possible that such procedure may temporarily divert
Fleet forces from some broader task contemplated by their task force commanders
of the Commander-in-Chief, local commanders must bear this in mind and reduce
such diversion to a minimum. They must also, within the limits of the informa-
tion available to them, and as permitted by the urgent local situation, so direct
any action taken by Fleet units under their temporary command, as to further
the broad operating plan in eflfect.
(d) To obviate to a maximum the difficulties which are inherent in the com-
mand and communication relationships at such bases, it will be necessary to
insure that all interested commanders, including the commanders of bases con- .
cerned, are made information addressees of all appropriate plans, orders, and
reports of enemy forces. Commanders of all forces within the area will ensure
that the base or station commander, as well as the Senior Officer Present, is
familiar with th6 general nature of their orders and with their general operations
(unless specifically directed otherwise).
(e) In general, the question of command in such circumstances is covered by
articles 801 and 1486, U. S. Navy Regulations.
(f) The shifting of vessels, squadrons, or other units within an area may result
in consequent changes in seniority among those actually present.
3. (a) A Base Defense Plan and a supporting Communication Plan will be
prepared under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.
They must provide for the Fleet units present participating in the defense, and
for adequate communications among the various fixed and mobile forces, both
local and Fleet. Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier will furnish
copies of such plans to appropriate fleet force commanders. [IV-2] The
latter will, whenever practicable, supply copies to units of their command prior
to departure for operations at the outlying base. A unit commander arriving
in the area without receiving the plans in advance, however, will obtain them as
soon as possible after arrival.
(b) The Base Defense Plan should be analogous to the one currently in effect
for the Pearl Harbor area. The Senior Officer Present, in exercising his function
of command (paragraph 2 (c) of this Annex) should normally conform to the
Base plans.
(c) The Communication Plan should include provisions for:
(1) Inter-communication between units of the local defense forces, and between
such forces and the local defense commander.
(2) Communication between local defense commanders and fleet task organiza-
tion commanders.
(3) An area radio frequency which may be used within that area for both (1)
and (2) above and for inter-communication between the fleet task organization
commanders present.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2601
EXHIBIT NO. 115
Communication Inteixigence Summaries Concerning Locations of Japanese
Fi-EET Units
CONTENTS
" Pnge
A. 14th Naval District Summaries dated Nov. 1 to Dec. 6, 1941 2602
B: Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer Reports dated Oct. 27 to Dec. 2, 1941___ 2643
C. Pacific Fleet Intelligence Memorandum dated Dec. 1, 1941 2666
orrios or tbb comhakoant
POURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND
HAVT TARD. rSAJtL BAKBOB. BAWAII, O. I. A.
C OMMUNl CATION INTELLIGENCE SUmARY
■ 1 TOVEKteER 1 <) J* 1.
GENERAL- Traffic volume a little less than normal, receiving conditions
fair but traffic rather slow. The first day's yield of new
calls not very great. Fleet calls only changed, shore station
calls and shore artaresses not changed. It is believed that
tactical calls also remain unchanged but not enough intercepted
traffic to so .state definitely. The same garble table for
calls is employed so the change amounts to a reassignment
of calls previously used. New call:; have appeared but it la
thought that they were formerly assigned to obscure units or
were in reserve. All of the major Fleet calls are Identified
and a small amount of individual calls were recovered today.
Because the new calls are not yet lined up save for the major
Fleet Comiaanders and all time today was spent in call recovery,
this summary will deal only with general impressions,
COMBINED FLEET- The FIRST FLEET was not very active today in radio traffic.
The CINC SECOND FLEET appears to have originated quite a
bit of traffic to addresses placed in submarine and carrivr
category. No indications of movement of any of these
units. COMBINED FLEET tactical circuits were heard
but little tactical traffic copied dve to Interferenes
by NPM.
CARRIERS- The COUMANDER CARDIVS was mentioned in despatches from Toicyo
and h^ took a fair amount of traffic on the Fleet Broadcast*
SUBMARINES- Nothing to report. Calls of the Submarine Fleet not well
lined up yet.
THIRD FTT"tT- This Fleet very active as before. The SECOND and FIRST
BASE FORCES are still marshalling their UARUa and the
CINC Is very busy with Tokyo.
CHINA- The activity of HAINAN BASE continues. The KASHII sent several
messages from Saigon.
^- Siieet 1 of 1. ^"h^
2602 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COIJ.X'NICATION PITCLLIGENCS ST-^TAHY
2 Novenber, 191*1
GENERAL - Traffic volume nornal for Sunday. Receiving conditions
were fair but bulk of traffic derived from the major shore
circuits. Solution of new call system progressing satisfact
orily but volume of accumulated traffic in new system not yet
large enough to permit more than casual identification of
individual calls. The number of alternate calls for major
commands is increased over last system. So far there are
seven alternate calls for the Combined Fleet.
Third Fleet traffic is still on a very high level. The
combined air Force traffic is also very high with the Comitind-
er of the Combined Air Force originating many dispatches. It
appears that he is now in Taiwan. Traffic to SA1.''J\. and BAKO
is on a very high level. Tokyo and The China Fleet Intelli-
gence bureaus are originating periodic despatches, thoaa
from Tokyo being prefixed WIWI. There were several high
precedence dispatches from Tokyo with the major fleel; oon-
mandera as addressees.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2603
CCI-.ril'NI C /vTI K INTJLLIGKNC:; SUi:'.AfiY
3 November 1941
n"^fSRAL - Traffic volume slightly under normal although fair for
Monday, i^eceiving conditions gocd but flll circuits slow.
General messeges continue to eminate from TOKYO coranuniCBtions.
Such an amount is unprecedented and the import is not understood,
A mere call change does not account for activites oT tUla
nature. The impreoelon is strong that theee messages are
periodic roports to the Wajor '■^orimander of u certain nature.
DunL-iy traffic is again being sent on the TOiryO broadcasts.
N'aval Intelligence TOKYO addressed two v;r,.'I messages to Chief
of Staff Combined Fleet and to 'tUilLl 8 ( uniilentlfied) .
COMBIMIi:!) FLEET - Corjnander in Chief Combined Fleet sent an urgent
message to BUI.QL information all Major Commanders, Combined
Fleet, Naval Intelligence Tohyo , the Chief of Naval General Staff,
and Bureau of Pejsonnel. Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet also
was associated in traffic with offices in the mandates, princi-
pally RUO I'ALAO. The Commander in Chief, Combined continues to
be associated with the Carriers and Submarines.
THIRD FLEST - Third Fleet traffic continues at a high level. A
movement report by RATl66( unidentified) was addressed tc
Commander in Chief Third Fleet for Information.
AIR - A V/K address todt.y broke down as "ITIKCUKUU KANTAI". The liters!
reading of this as "l»t Air Fleet" is correct it indicates an
entirely new organization of the Naval Air Forces. There are
other i.oints which indicate thfit this may be the case, /ai old
call (YOMii?) while never identified seemed to be in a high
position with respect to the Carriers and the Air Corps. Upon
movement of air units to TAIV.AN the association of CarDlv 4
and CerDiv 3 with units of the Combined Air Force was apparent.
Their ascocation in a comriand sense betwwen shore based air
and fleet air had never occured before but under the concept of
an AIR FLKET can easily be accepted. Traffic in the Air Force
continues at a high level.
2604 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
C0X7JiaCATI0N IinKLLIGai^Cf!: 3UM1C.HY
u November lVt3
GENERAL - Traffic volume normal with all circuits eusUy reaaable.
More tactical traffic copied than for past few days. Confined
Fleet and Carriers heara on tactical circuits. TCCYO Neval
Intelligence sent four mesjjages to Major Comiunders. One of
these was for inforrnation Chief of Staff China Fleet ana one
other for Information of Chier of Staff Second Fleet.
AIR - High traffic level of air activities continues. Most signifi-
cant of the air despatches were some in which various air corps were
addressed and BAKO included foT information. One from YokoauKa
Air was addressed to 3ANCK0W Island Radio for information T.V1\0
Air Corps. BAKO wes also noted as an addressee in several
messages from "3AS230 and originated two messages to 3ASEB0 and
TOKYO. Commander Carriers also addressed a message to two unidenti-
fied calls for information of CoroKiander Combined Air Force,
Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, CarDivs Collective, BAKO
and others. The Commander Combined Air Force addressed a
message to Comuander in Chief Third Fleet.
MANDATES - The RKO PALAO was active today, being addressed by
Commiander in Chief, Fourth Fleet ana sent several messages to
TOKYO and TOKOSUKA. The PAI.^A weather station sent a Ions
, code message addressed to nearly all the islands of the Mandates.
MARCUS Island appears as an originator. No Change in the
location of Fourth Fleet units noted.
SUBMARINES - No activity noted.
i
:
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2605
17,
5 November 19^-1 * & m '
GUiSrui-L - Traffic volu-iie above normal. All circuits heard fud receiving
c^ditions VKcre fair to good. TOKYO very active as an originator,
sending cut many messages of general adareas. Two 'Km messages in
Kana Code sent by NGS to Chief of Staff CarDivs and TIYA44-
(unidentified) respectively. The Intelligence Offices of China
Fleet ana TOiOfO continue active with many despatches passing between
the two.
THIRD FL£ET - Two units of the Third Fleet appear today in TAKA.0 area.
Since these calls are as yet unidentified (RIGI4 and Y0A2) it la
not known how rauch of this fleet they represent. It is fairly
certain thut the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet has not yet left
the Sasebo area although it is expedted thet he will before long.
Cne message which may be a movement report from hiin was received late
on the 5th. The present state of call recovery on the Third Fleet
does not permit of an estimate of the movement involved*
A unit of the First Fleet, Identified today as CARDIV 4
appeared toaay at BAKO. This Carrier Division was addressed as "less
FUTA SHOTAI" (2nd Section ?) 'Miether or not there are other units
at BAKO is not Knovm. The Commander CARDIVS has been associftted
with 3AMA and BAKO in several dispatches today. The following »fere
also associeted, SANCHOW ISL.HD, TAKAO AIRCORPS, CANTON (China) and
YCKCHAl/Jl Air. The RNO TAIHOKD originated many despatches to TOKYO
and the French Indo China Forces. A TAIV;aN originator sent one to
Lieut. Comdr. SHIBA at the Embassy THAILAND for information to
HANCI and the Commander French Indo China Forces,
BAKO originated numerous despatches to the Empire and to
the Idajor Fleet Commanders,
The South China Fleet Y»as also the recipient of many
despatches from TOKYO.*
Despite the uncertainty due to the Change of Calls it is
"believed that there is now being effected a concentration of naval
forces in the BAKO area wnich will comprise the Third Fleet as
organized in SASEBO for the past month and will be augmented by
heavy air forces und Combined Fleet units to an uiilcnown extent.
2606 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
^JO^!M^^NICA.TION ihtelligemce sitoiai^y
6 November, 1941
GENERAL - Traffic volume slightly above normal. Receiving cqnriltions
were fair, regular strong but heavy static on night watches
interf erred somewhat. Today the specific call-up on the
Tokyo broadcast v/as elininated. Formerly Tokyo radio called
the unit concerned when the dispatch was address-sd to a member
of that unit. Beginning yesterday afternoon all broadcast
messages are addressed to a Sl9£j-e_call without regard to the
addr^gs^g of ^,}is ppfigaga. The recovery of the radio organiza-
tion will be hampered by this new advance in Cotrnunication
Security. Moreover there were nine messages today on this
broadcast from which the address and originator were missing.
This may be the start of complete elimination of headings on
broadcast circuits. Tokyo addressed a V/IVVI message to the
Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and Submarfne Force.
TAK.no -BAKO AREA - It is now certain that there is a very heavy air
concentration on Taiwan. This comprises practically the
entire Combined Air Force including the Commander and his
staff plus at least one carrier division and an unknown
amount of the fleet air arm. No additional units of the
Third Fleet were located there today but it' is believed that
CinC Third Fleet is now enroute Bt\KO from SASE30. From
traffic association it is believed that some Second Fleet
units are in Takao area but this has not yet been proven.
The South China Fleet Command has been active in dispatches to
Taiwan addresses.
COMBINED FLEET - A large amount of Combined Fleet traffic is now
appearing with secret (tactical) callg in use,
MANDATES - The Mandates traffic has dropped off somewhat. The Sixth
Defense Force at Truk and the RNO PALOA continue to be the
most active units.
Page 1 of 1.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2607
CO^JTJNICATION IHTELLlGENCx; SIM.1ARY
7 November. 1941
GEN":::RAL - Volume of intercepted traffic larger than usual. Due to the
use of the general call "All Major Force Flags" on the UTO for
delivery to all Combined Fleet units, affiliation of unidenti-
fied calls with forces to which attached is very difficult.
Use of large number of alternate calls for major fleet forces,
many of which have not yet been definitely identified or
associated with known calls, renders the picture more confus-
ing. Appearance of the prefix "JITSU" ( authenticator for
bonafide traffic) in several messages indicates that a conrauni-
cation drill is being held but without indication as to what
units are participating and therefore much of the traffic is
suspected of being "drill". Jaluit Radio is handling traffic
direct with Yokosuka Radio probably due to congestion of
Mandate circuits from the Karshalls caused by heavy concentra-
tir)ns in that area. "
AIR - Continued high traffic level for all classes of air activities,
mainly centered in the Taiwan area, but also with all air
activities in the Mandates included in headings of messages.
Despatches originated by Fourth Fleet Coonand Included Air
Forces, Base Forces, Air Stations, and all types of T.andate
activities in long headings.
FLSKT -Fourth Fleet Corariand remains in Truk area. There are indications
that portions of the First Fleet may be moving to the Takao
area but identifications are not sufficiently certain to
confirm this.
Greatest effort is being made to increase the number of identi-
fied calls to facilitate analysis of the traffic but Orange
changes in methods of handling fleet traffic renders this more
difficult than had been hoped.
2608 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COhgX'NICATION ]"T7.LLI0£NC.: 3UI.D7JiY
8 November 1941
OSNERAL -
Norrnnl volume of intercepted traffic wltK no "durinies" aj.f-earing
on the "TU. Ml i^TC traffic was broadcast to the general call
only. The Staff Conmunicution Officer of the French Indo-China
Force (Go. Exp. For.) sent a despatch action to S.CO. Combined
I "fro. S.CO. Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, unidentified fleet
unit, Radio Etitlons at Tokyo, Palao and Takao. This may indi-
cate a contenplatod coordination oi' coranuni cat ions between the
Indo-China-3outh China areas and the Pnlao Island-Taiwan area.
Secret calls were used very little as compared to the past few
days and only three circuits were heard using them, including the
Combined Fleet Comiianders circuit and Air Station Not. North
Japan-Ominato circuits were quiet. All mandate circuits v/ere
active, with heavy interchange of traffic involving all classes
of Mandate addressees in all areas, but with continued emphasis on
the P.alao area at one end and the Jaluit-ilarshall area on the
other. Chlchijima Air Station was included in -nuch of the
traffic between Empire Offices and Saipan Air with Jaluit Base
Force included for information. Inclusion of Chichijlma usually
presages an air movement between Mandates and Empire but the
Units Involved are unidentified. Comiaander of unidentified shore
activity ( NIIO 6o ) previously associated with the Fifth Fleet,
was addressed at Chichijina Air which tentatively identifies hin
as an air activity. Previous association of the Fifth Fleet
traffic with Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka terds to confirm the
belief thtit Fifth Fleet operations are, or will be, in the area
adjacent to Chichijima-Marcus, supiilementing the Fourth Fleet In
the lower Island areas.
FLEET -
Chief of staff First Fl-^ot originated a despatch through Kurc
Radio. Batdiv' Three of the First Fleet ap. ears to be operating
separately from the main force, possibly in connection with Car-
divs Three and Four in the Taiwan-Naha area. An apparent move-
ment report from Cerdiv Four was addressed to CinC Combined
Fleet, First Fleet, CarDLv Commander, Combined Air Force Com-
mander and to movement offices at Tokyo, Yokosuka, Kure, I'.aizuru
and Sasebo. Traffic from the Comriander Indo-China Force is h'^ndled
from the Japanese radio station at Saigon rather then from the
KASHII, indicating that the staff is based ashore at present. No
identifiable submarine activity was noted.
AIR - Takao and Mandates continue to be the center of air activities.
The area between Chlchijima, Naha, Takao, Palao and Jaluit
appears to be particularly concerned with movement of air forces
and auxiliaries, while the formation of a force under Combined
Air Conmander in the Takao-3ako area appears to be nearly com-
pleted as indicated by reports addressed to CinC. Combined,
Naval Minister, Coramandors of Cardivs, Combined Air Force, First
■1-1 -':(\
Page 1 of 2. . . .
Ws
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2609
co!."iTN'igATicii TNT::i.Liqj:i-JC'L r.^ni'AUY
6 MovembHr, 19'.-1
AIR - (Continued)
Fleet and shore addresses generally asnociated with novononts or
orcanlzation changes. This force is belived to include CarJiv
Four, and possibly CarDiv Three, with a number of aujtiliarles and
units of the Conbined Air iorce, also possibly soine units from the
First Fleet. Lack of identification renders comj/Osition of the
force highly speculative and area of operations obscure. Prior
to change of calls, much traffic was exchinged betv/een China, South
China and Indo-China while at present most traffic Includes Pelao.
79716 O — 46 — pt. 17 12
2610 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
coNcnuiicATioM •T!iT::Li.nw>^c-£: r.'r:,i:;.RY
9 K'ovenbtjr 19^1
GSKKI^AL
Traffic volume heavy for Sundey. Hecelviriji conditions fair but
heavy static caused numerous garbles and frasnentary nessapes.
liavy Minister sent several nessages of general address In-
cluding one to all First and Second class tJaval stations.
Practically all of the gen'jral mesSriLies carried SAJIA as an
information address. Carrier Uivision Three arrived at Ttkao
and there are indications that Carrier Division Four will
return to Sasebo from Takao. The Flagship of Carrier Divisions
is AKAGI and is in Sasebo area. Sone tactical traffic today
shows units of Combined Fleet still operatins- The associa-
tion of Detdiv Three and y.andate addresses, especially
Saipan may indicate operations of thet unit in the Mari-
annas. The JINGEl was corai.iunicat ing v/ith SAllA, HAK.7JI today.
The Chief of Staff of the French- Indo China Force is in
Tokyo .
One message today afldressed to CinC. Combined Fleet wa%
routed to I'AIZTRTI for delivery but this is believed a communi-
cation error. The Third Fleet appears to be still in Sasebo
area but it was noted thnt considerHble ^raffle passed
between Hainan, Taiwan addresses and the Third Fleet. The
Fifth Fleet is still being organized with no indications yet
that It has assenbled. The Tlighteenth Air Corps at Saipan
originated much traffic to Yokosuka Air Corps.
Ti^pe 1 of 1.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2611
COiaOTJICATION HfTSLLIOStTCE SmZIARY
10 November, 1941
GENTSRAL - traffic volume normal, receiving conditions good. There
were fewer general messages sent today than for the past
few weeks. Tokyo Intelligence still active and addreeslng
dispatches to all Major Commanders. The Mandates construc-
tion traffic has decreased considerably. Call recovery is
progressing but has been slewed down by the general call-up
used on yieet broadcast.
COMBINED FLEET - Believed to be mostly in Kure area. A staff offi-
cer of BatDiv Three v/as addressed there today and it is
likely that this whole division is there also. The CinC,
Second Fleet was located at Kure today as well as two
cruiser divisions.
THIRD FLEET - The greater portions of this fleet still in Sasebo
area. Several movement reports have been noted by units
of this fleet but none have been noted other than Individual
ships. At least two units of this fleet still at Takao.
CinC Three originated one movement report for information
of CinC Fourth Fleet.
FOORTH FLEET - Little activity. CinC. Fourth remains In vicinity
of Truk with major portion of his command. The Staff
Connwrnication Officer of Submarine Force nent a message to
the CinC. Fourth for information of Jaluit.
FIFTH FLEET - One unit of this fleet located at ChiJhlJima,
AIR - The Combined Air Force Comr.and is still talking to Sama •
and the South China Fleet. From one address it appears that
the Commander of Carrier Division Three is with the Com-
bined Fleet. Several units of the Carrier Divisions are
in port at Kure and Sasebo. CinC. Combined Air Force is
still in Takao.
Page 1 of- 1....
2612 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CQ-limi CATION INTCLIIGiNCH: SIHIIARY
'" l2 November 19tl.
Q5NERAL - Traffic volume normal for past two days with receiving
condition about average. The general character of the traffic
haa been administrative with most of It being between shorg
logistic and technical activities. The D. F. net was active
today with very little activity shown yesterday Intercept
operators have commented adversely on the major shore network
which comprises all of the major naval activities In the Smjire.
Traffic has been moving slowly over this circuit. The reason is
the non-cooperation of the operators ana the definite lack of
control exercised by TOKYO radio stations. TOKYO latelligence
la still sending messages to the major commands but the remainder
of TOKYO traffic has been mostly from the technical bureaus,
COMBINED FLEET - The Fleets remain relatively inactive in the KURE
area. The association of BATDIV 3 with the Fourth Fleet and
several Mandates stations Is born out by a D. F. position on the
flagship of BATDIV 3 which places him about halfway between
CHICHIJIMA and MARCUS Island. Their position was obtained on
the /»th when this unit was not yet identified. No subsequent
bearings have been obtained. Also associated with this BATDIV
are a Submarine Squadron and possibly CARDIV 4 although the
association of this CARDIV (Lately returned from TAKAO) Is not
positive. The Third Fleet remains at SASEBO with the only activity
exhibited In the Base Forces.
AIR - CARDIV 3 returned to KDRE from TAKAO as reported by CAVITE.
""^ost of air activity confined to dl^atchos between carrier and
shore establishments.
FIFTH FTitii'.T - Nothing to report.
FOURTH FLEET - The Defense Forces of the Mandates fairly active. The
volume of construction traffic has definitely fallen off. The
Commander Submarine Force is still adding JALUIT and today
COMSUBRON 2 addressed a message there. AIRRON 24 sent a movement
report but no indication of the direction. Communication eacercises
were held by JALUIT and several stations in that area. YOKOHAMA
Air Corps was addressed at RUOTTO.
CHINA - The previous activity of SAMA and the French indo China
Forces and bases continues.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2613
co^cOT^ICATION intelligence summary
13 November 19^1.
GENERAL - Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Several
messages of high precedence intercepted, some of them are:
1. UNIWIWI despatch in five numeral from TOKYO Intelligence to
Chief of Soaff Combined Air Force. INTO RNO TAIHOKO, BAKO
Naval Station.
2. vm/I from TI.G.S. to LL^IZITRU INFO Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.
3. NI?'A'ATV/I from N.C.S, to Comriander in Chief Combined Fleet,
IKFQ Commander in Chief South China Fleet, Commander Third
Fleet and 3AIU, HAINA^I.
U. UNi;/IWI from N.G.S. to Secretary First Fleet.
5. (2 messages) '.VBVI to same address as 3 above.
6. A 3 part NIKAVnv/I from N.G.S. to Commander in Chief Combined
Fleet, INFO Coniaander in Chief French Indo China Fieefi
7. One TJNI message from Commander in Chief China Fleet to SAMA,
INFO Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Coiimander in Chief
Combined Fleet.
This Is the only occurence in sone time of anyone save the TOKYO
intelligence activity using the VVIWI prefix. Both TOKYO and the
China Fleet Intelligence Bureau were active all day with despatches
to the Major Commanders,
The direction finder net was again active all day with
CHINKAI, ORU 7 (near CHINKAI) , JALUIT, SAIPAN, and TAIWAN sending
in bearing reports.
COMBINED FLKflT - The activity of a^TDTV 3 is not. clear. The flagship
is operating and was located by D. F. as reported yesterday. The
Connander of BATDIV 3 is located in YOKOSUKA. The Division Communica-
tion Officer IS communicating with TRTTK, SAIPAN and PALAO. The other
ships in this division remain unlocated but It is assumed, lacking
evidence to the contrary, that they are with the flagship. Other
units of First Fleet seem Inactive. One Cruiser Division of
Second Fleet is associated in traf ic with PALAO and may be in that
area.
THIH3 FLEST - Still located in S.^EBO, the Commander in Chief has been
active in the traffic, being addressed bv both TOKYO and Coraiaander
in Chief Combined Fleet. The First BASE FCRCK Commander originated
several messages but no indication of change of location.
70U:<TH FLEET - The Coiimander in Chief Fourth Fleet is in communicotion
with the Sixth BASEFO-tCS JALVIT. Several messeges were exchanged.
He appears to be preparing for .a move from TRUK but no movement has
yet occurred. SUBRON 2 is again in coioip.unlcation with- JALUIT and
today originated a movement report, but no indie ticn of direction.
Pa«e 1 of 2 no
2614 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
AIR - Carriers remain relatively Inactive, The SliTTSU is still with
them and a few may be engaged in target practice near KUPJi;. The
Combined AIRFORCE is still mostly located in TAIWAN and the usual
high traffic level between its oomponont Air Corps still eiista.
CHINA - The Comnander in Chief China Fleet was addressed in one b»f
?Ee RNO TAIHOKD. His Chief of Staff is still in SHANGHAI. O
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2615
COmurilCATION UlTELLIGEMCE SUMMARY
14 November. 1941
OEininAL - Traffic volume a little under normal due to poor to fair
receiving conditions throughout the day. The Naval Ministry
originated several AlNav dispatches-. There were three WIWI
neosapes originated today.
1. UNIwr.'/I from N.-O.S. and BUIOL to Chief of Staff Fourth
Fleet, Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and
YOKOSTTA.
2 V/r.VI from N.O.S. and BITMIL to Chief of Staff Combined
Fleet Chief of Staff Third Fleet, YOKOSUKA and SASEBO.
3. vnT.'n'.il from N.o.s, to ANI758 (Chief of Staff of an
unidentified unit), Information Chief of Staff Combined
Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.
Direction Finder Net active with SASEBO station sending in bear-
ings in addition to the others. Tactical circuits heard during
day with a fair amount of activity.
CO!:'n'^'''.D FLK'.T - Little activity noted. The flagship of BatDiv Three
"la still" operating but no further information on this division.-
Two Combined Fleet units appear active in the traffic. They
are DesRon Three (normally in First Fleet but has been operat-
ing with Second Fleet) and CruDiv Seven of Second Fleet. Both
of these units have been associated in traffic with the South
China Fleet and the French Indo China Force. They may proceed
to "the South China area in near future-
THinn FLKEJ- - still in Sasebo area. The CinC. has l>een addressed
by Tokyo to a great extent and is still associated with South
China activities in traffic. It has been noted that the asso-
ciation between the Third Fleet and units of the Combined Air
Force is growing. Especially the Second Base Force has been
talking with several Air Corps among whom is the Kure Air Corps,
■./ill air units be embarked in ships of the Base Force?
F0TJRT11 FLliKT - No movement yet from the TRUK area. It appears that
FFie Fourth Fleet Staff is fairly well split up. Various offi-
cers of the staff were addressed at Tokyo and at unidenti-
fied locutions.
SMT'fw'^IN.n - No particular activity. One unit evidently enroute
PALiVO and Submarine Squadron Two (now in Kure area) still being
addressed by Tokyo and Yokosuka originators.
AIR - On- Air 3quadron of the Combined Air Force Is at HOIHOW, HAINAN.
' The Comander of the Air Force is still at TAKAO with a good
representation of his command. Th^ Carriers remain in home
waters with most of theri in port.
Page 1 of 1.
2616 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COigTMlo .'I'ltV Tr."",:L ir.-.y: o" "'v
15 "November 1941
r.ifCf AL - Traffic volume normal, with a nunber of (^encTMl f.'l .riss;
fflessages originated by Con:.mnlc< ticn Division, Tokyo, to liudic
Officers, Oninato, U Ji 9 (P.F. JtKtion i'. .iarshullc), .Tisliijt.,
Palao, Truk, Saipan, Takao and Cana Radios, otaff Coa'.unicii t Icn
Officers All Major Flagships, Staff Connunic-:. Lion O'l io^.r- ^outh
Expeditionary Force and tv;o apparent collectivt; shore ;:>i '. rcsoor .
Traffic from all stations mentionad except Sap.a ttnl t.uinato to
D. F. Control and Plotting Room Tokyo Informs Lion to litaff
' Comnunication Officer Combined Flent v-^-- •••.)-: ..ri . t^o rassr-<i^i e
of the D. F. type were detected so it is presumed tf.at the ir.ter-
chanee had to do v/ith arrangements for drill or organizatlcn of
the net. The Minister of the Navj' originated one .vlnuv nr.d cn-^i
to all Major Commands and collecti,v«; shore. Tok;,'c ; orsonri*;!
and Tokyo Conmunication Division oj'ic'.inLittjd sevural to collec-
tive fleet euid shore. Significance is not deterrriinod though
it is believed possible thit a further pnrtiul ch'-ii;;;'- of shore
and air calls may be in pros^iect. The; iJT;lre aln st>iticn net
was nomiQlly active using tactical calls* Secri^tftry First Ilo-it
originated one Urgent Code to unidentified (::i!n 55), Staff
Communication Officer Carrier Division Four (at Sasebo) and
Co-nmonding Officer of Ba.tdiv Three flagship.
CCMBIKT'.D FLS^T - Same as yesterday, sane units { 3atdiv Three, Desrons
One and Three) associated through traffic with South i;/:pediticn-
ary Force, ClnC Second Fleat was the most active ori/inMtor
and appeared to be arranging operations of units invclving
First, Second, Carrier and Air Units.
T!?IPD FLHST - Inactive.
FOURT!' FL.C:T - Apparent moveicent of Fourth Flpot units in prospect or
underv.'ay, with continued emphasis on the Murshulls Area. CinC.
Fourth traffic still being bandied from the Truk area, with Air-
ron Twentj'-four (Kaimol) and associated Yokohajna &iid Chitose air
uiiits involved in some movement, direction unrteteriained. All
Marshall Island activities, including unidentified Army Foi'ces,
exchanging traffic freely.
SUBURI!."-; yC?.CZ -. Little activity detected. It is belioved thnt cone
submarine activity is operating or preparing to operate in the
Knrshcll area, from conmunication arrtngctients nnde'-v/ay between
Staff Conr.unication Officer Subnnrine Force and seme Fourth
?le«^t, information to Jalult. Jalult hes been heard working on
various frequencies, using tactical calls and procedure asg.oc-
i»t-'J -it'- sub'.arine operations, but no identifications of c&lls
'£■.•■; -vp been made.
1 age 1 of 2 '^ ^jtS
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2617
co;.:x":ucATicM i;rr:iLi.ir»KMCi:; sPTiL^'Ty
15 November 1941
AIR - Continued air traffic tc and fro-n Takao area, with uni'dentified
Airron (formerly TOJCi 7) including South Expeditionary Force and
Sana addrescees in traffic. Composition of this force and pur-
jose still speculative but believed to be preparing to move
30uthv;ard to work with the South Kxpeditionary Force.
The large number of alternate calls used by major forces renders
analysis of traffic headin{;s very slow and difficult, but identi-
fications end recoveries of alternates are improving as a greater
volume of November traffic becomes available for research.
Page 2 of 2.
2618 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cot.ia,riCATioii inteixiolnc: bv?.:^y
1.6 Movenbor 19^1
GSN^HAX - Traffic volun«" aprroxinately nonal for week-end period. A
new form of despatch headinc apr.eared in a series of dispatches
broadcasted on the regular UTCT,' series. Only the originptor or
the address of the dispatch appeared; it is asnnied thwt the
other pertinent call or address may be buried in the text. These
dispatches were with one exception (in 5 numeral text) all in the
nlne-Kana period separator systcr. and the single call in the
heading fitted in each case Line seven of the call garble
table.
A dispatch was ori(/inated by the Mtjvy Minister addressed to
all Major Fleets and general adaresses to this effect:
"Today the House of Peers and House of Heprenentatives
by means of a decision adopted the followinc resolution
transmitted as follows:
1. Resolution of House of Peers - (Expressed deepest
thanks and eraotion to Army and r'nvy for their
glorious service over a long period to the Kmpire
and expressed condolences, etc., for those fallen
in battle.
I
2. Resolution of Houpe of Representatives - 'Expressed
thanks, etc., to all officers and raen of /irniy, Navy
and Air Force for their 4i years service (in China
affair) ani for their contribution to the establish-
ment of a dermeneit world peace. Gave prayers for
well being of all hands, etc.."
FIRST AND SECOtro FLSETS - Majority of First and Second Fleet Units
remain in the general Kure area. The units of these two fleets
that have been most active from dispatch heading viewpoint in
the last ton days appear to be:
Airon Seven (3 Chltose class)
Carrier Division Four
Destroyer Squadron Seven
Destroyer Squadron Three
Battleship Division Three
Cruiser Division Seven.
It is rather sinfttlar that the CinC. Second Fleet has assumed
an important role' in addressing for action several first fleet
and other fleet units recently. In some of these dispatches
the call identified as Southern Sxpedlticnary Force {Indo-China
Forc«) appears. Associations of addresses in several dispatches
have thrown the Second and Third Fleists with the Combined Air
Force and in other dispatches, there appears to be an associa-
tion between First Fleet, Carrier Divisions and th«> Mandates.
>age 1 of 2.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2619
co!1:.^'IJICATIu^^ ir'rrsLLTo-jMc.:: surgvi/.RY
16 November 1941
FTn:;T xm ::r:co;n; fle'cts' - (continuea)
It is up ua rent that Destroyer Squadron One has been or is
ojieratlnR with the Carrier Divisions and Battleehlp Division
Three v/hlle Cruiser Division Seven end Destroyer Squadron
Three have been operating together. Iwalculn Air sent short
priority dispatch to the ATAOO, Second Fleet cruiser and
submarine units indicating some Joint minor exercises In that
area.
THT'^D FLD'^.T - Believed inactive in Sasebo - JCure area.
FOU:?TF FLJ'^T - F'.'AT'J, a Tokyo address originated one ITKI dispatch to
' — an unidentified fleet unit CHJM 33), Information to CinC.
Conhlned Flert, CmmunioRtion Officer, Fourth Fleet, Salpan
Base ForcR, Kure Hovenent Officer, CinC, Fifth Fleet, Tokyo
Intelligence, and tKO 66, believed to be a shore based air
activity in Chichi jlma-Mercus area.
FI"TT' FL3j;T - Trior to the chanr.e of calls on 1 November, the com-
— '' position of the I'Ufth Fleet v;as very indefinite but appeared to
contain several naval auxiliary type vessels. Since 1 Nov-
ember, little hns been recovered oV the composition of this
mythical fleet but it is definite that some units are opera-
ting in tho general Yokosuta Chichi Jiaa-llarcus.
^UB:.U!<i:-r.:S - Little activity. Connjunicetion Officer, Submarine
' Force originsted one priority dispatch to unidentified
address, inform&tioh to Combined Fleet Communication Officer.
Association of Sub-Mrine Force and Fourth Fleet ccmroands
continues.
Fage 2 of ?.
2620 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
17 November. 19^1
GENERA.L - Traffic volume normal with recelvinc conditions good. ;:ore
traffic with slncle call fjeading appeared on the broadcast cir-
cuit. These dispatches numbered serially and each call different
but all fitting the same line in the call c&rble table. Since
these messages are transnitted each hour on the hour tihd are of
approximately the same length it appears thnt they are dril3
messages. It is feared that they constitute a test of straiijht
broadcasting without a heading. Since none of this traffic hac
been found going in to Tokyo it is probably originated in the
Navy Ministry. Very few messages of {general aduress were noted.
Tactical circuits in the Mandates were heard durinj; the day with
radio Saipen controlling.
C OM PINED FLKE T - No movement from the Kure area of any major portion
of the First or Second Fleets. The CinC. oocond Fleet very active
as an originator today. He continues to address units which
are ■■*% normally under his command. He also addressed the
CinC. Third Fleet, Pal«^« Forces, and the Chief of Staff Fourth
Fleet.
THIRD FLEET - Inactive at Sasebo. The Staff Conraunication Officer of
Third Fleet was addressed by the R.N.O. PalSft.
FOmH'fri FLEET - The greater part of the activity in the Mandate area
centered about the Third Base Force at Palao and the Sixth
Base Force at Jaluit. Both these activities originated traffic.
AIR - The Commander of the Combined Air Force remains in Takao and was
addressed frequently by SAIIA, HAINAN and was in tv/o instances
addressed by the Fourth ■'leet. The carriers are mostlyin the
Kure-Sasebo area with the exception of a few which are operating
In the Kyushu area.
CHINA - Sama was again active today with dispatches to the Combined
jTeet Staff, Combined Air Force, Third Fleet and Bako. The
R.N.O. Taifeoku addressed a dispatch to CinC. China, Sanchow
Island, Sama, Bako, CinC. South China, and Chief of Staff
Combined Air Force.
^!^A
Page 1 of 1.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2621
COM.X'?IICATH;N IN'TELLIGxJNCa SUl^.J^RY
18 Nove-nber 1941'
azy.'SiikL - Traffic volume q little unaer normal with receivinc conditions
?alr to poor. Tokyo originators active with several messages of
general address enanatiag fron the Comnunication Section. The
dovible originator gn.HJ. and N.G^_. sent one NiriAlVIV/I to the
Chief of Staff Conbined FleerTBr information to all First Class
Naval Stations, gUlIIL also addressed an urgent dispatch to SAitA,
infornetion to R.K.O. TAINOJOf, Chief of Staff South China Fleet
and Chief of Staff Combined Fleet. Another Tokyo originator,
believed to be tl.O.S., sent an urjjent message to Chief of Staff
Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff French Indo China Force and Chief
of Staff second Fleet. IIAIZTCTI Naval Station also sent an urgent
message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, Conbined
Air Force, French Indo Chine Force and for infornation to M.O.E.
The Tokyo Direction Finder plotting section sent three long dis-
patches to the entire Direction Finder Het which was very active
today with many beirings reported. The Vice Chief Naval General
Staff sent one to Chief of Staff Carrier Divisions and Chief of
Staff French Indo China Force.
CO::gI^^p FLi:n::T - CinC. Combined Fleet very prominent as both an ori-
ginator and addressee. Since this officer is always included in
the adJress of every important message, he will no longer be men-
tioned as an addressee unless he is the only addressee. The
association between the CinC Second Fleet and the French Indo
Chins Forces and Conbined Air Force is very plain. He was addres-
sed by CinC. French Indo China Force today in an urgent NIKA
dispatch. Several units of the Combined Air Force also addresssd
several dispatches to him. Battleship Division Three, the Carrier
Divisions end two destroyer squadrons have been associated in
traffic. Several dispatches occured today, being addressed by
N.G.S. eind the Commander Carrier Divisions in several instances.
The CinC. Third i^'leet also addressed several dispatches to him.
These form the indication that CinC. Second Fleet will be in
command of a large Task 'Force comprising the Third Fleet, Com-
bined Air^ Force, some carrier divisions, and Battleship Division
Three. No movement frJsm home waters has been noted.
THIRD FLIJBT - The Commander Second Base Force originated what appears to
be a movement report. He also sent one to R.N.C. TAIHOKU, infonna"
tion to CinC. Third Fleet. There were other units Tentatively
placed in Third Fleet v/ho sent diepatches in which the Tokyo
movement report office was an addressee. It is expected that
the Third Fleet wJJ.l move from the Sasebo area in the near future.
This Second Base Force v.-as having quite a bit of traffic with
several Air Corps a while ago and may be transporting air units
or equipment.
vQTjrj'Tnj ri v:^T - ijot much activity in this fleet. The amount of traffic
between this fleet and Palao is noticeable with the submarines
still interested in Jaluit.
rage 1 of 1
2622 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
co;.3.a'NiCATitri irrriJLLiG::r;cr: sTnn a:'<y
19 Novonber, ig/.!
GSN'iJRA.L - Traffic volume normal. Traffic from Fourth Fleet and Mandates
was noticeably less than usual. Traffic on the ncrthorn circuits
also very light. Sone tacticnl traffic received from ComblnHd
Fleet units. There has been a noticeable increase in the uflont
traffic over the normal amount usually seen. Fleet units seem
to have a great deal of business with other Fleet units both within
and outside of their own orgemization. Staff Officers are fre-
quently addressed at other than their normal locations. The acti-
vity at Tokyo has subsided somewhat in that there were fev/er
general messages than for the past few days. Tokyo Intel lit^ence
sent out several messages addresr.ed to Second Fle'^t, Submnrine
Force and Carrier Divisions. One was sent to SAIIA for infornetion
to French Indo China Forces and South China Fleet. The Mavy
Uinister sent out two AlNavs. The Direction Finder not is still
active with all stations sending in reports and Tokyo plotting
station making reports to major commanders.
COMBINED FLEET - The flagship of Battleship Division Three appears
today at Sasebo, its southern Jaunt apparently having been com-
plated. Destroyer Squadron Four and Two appear associated with
the Third Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet continue? his activity,
being still associated with Combined Air Force, French Indo China
Force, Third Fleet, and today with Carrier Division Three. Car-
rier Division Throe was in Takao and returned to the Empire a
week ago and has been associated with Third Fleet since. A
Bako activity addressed the Chief of Staff- Second Fleet, Third
Fleet and Combined Air Force. The Chief of Staff Second Fleet
addressed an urgent dispatch to ClnC. French Indo China Fleet
information to Third Fleet and Commanaer Cruiser Division Five.
THIRD FLEET - Active as noted above. Several more units of this fleet and
of the Base Forces originated movement reports but no indication
of direction. CinC. Third Fleet is still in Sasebo.
FOURTH FLEET - Activity in Mandates still centers about the Third Base
Defense Force at Palao. Traffic between this force, Tokyo and
the Second Fleet was considerable. One call {SITI U) appears
at Jaluit today. This call has been identified as Car ier Divifion
Four and if the one message is correct it appears that this
Carrier Division {ZUIKAKl'T is in the Jaluit area. This in not
confirmed as no other indications have been found and its presence
at Jaluit is doubted, attributing the message to be a communi-
cation error.
FIFTH FLEET - Flagship located at Yokosuka. The CinC. Fifth Fleet
appeared in a few dispatches from Tokyo but no other activity seen.
Page 1 of 1.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2623
20 - 21 November 1941
GEME^<AL - Traffic volume for past two days has been higher than normal.
Tokyo originators active with icessaces addressed to all major
comaanders. N'.G.S. sent a UHI V/IV^I to Commandant BAKO for in-
formation to Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Canton. The
Personnel Bureau at Tokyo become very active on the 2l8t sendiog
out a series of long personnel messages. The activity at Tokyo
identified as R.D.F. plotting stations increased his recent high
volume of messages with a long four part message addressed to all
major commanders. He also addressed several dispatches to the
Direction Finder net, indicating the employment and results
being obtained by this activity. The traffic load on the
Tokyo-Takao circuit was very heavy on the 2l8t, so heavy that the
circuit was in duplex operation most of the mid-watch.
COMBINED FLK'^T - Flags of both First and Second Fleets are in Kure area
and most of both fleets remain in Kure-Sasebo area. Battleship
Division Three still in Yokosuka area. Traffic to and from the
CinC. Second Fleet continues obnormally high. A list of units
addressed by hira or who sent traffic to him and CinC. Third Fleet
over the past two days follows:
MIRA 9
(Carrier Division Three)
ENO 7
(Unidentified)
TAS 1
( Airron 7)
AKU 8
(Air U^lt;
KAKK 5
(Alrron 6)
KUSTT 7
(Unidentified
YA'..'I 1
(Crudiv 5)
SATU 88
(Unidentified
KEiru 3
(Crudlv 7)
KUNI 88
(Unidentified
RESE 4
(Desron 3)
OYU 9
(Unidentified
AKT 0
(Desron U)
KONA 0
(Unidentified
TIYA 7
(Coradr. Ist Base For)
NOTU 6
(Unidmtified
SASK 3
(Comdr. 2nd Base For)
NUTE 5
(Unidentified
Yf)MO 9
(Desron 5*
NSI 3
(Unidentified
REA 2
(Shiogama Air Corps)
SUTE 1
(Unidentified
KUWO 9
(3rimo)
YAYtJ 1
(Unidentified)
KIVC 3
(Air Unit?/*-,
MAHE 5
(Unidentified)
WS 7
(Unidentified!
Plus 11
Uarus.
This list is not the complete estimate of forces being assemb-
led by him but only the ones occurring in the oast two days. Eaoh
one aptjfcared not only with the CinC. Second Fleet but with the
Third Fleet and with one of the units now in South China or a
Taiwan-T. .t^ China Addi-ess. A complete list is being made up but
was not finished at this writing;. Assuming that the entire Second
Fleet will be included in this organization and that each unit
addressed will either participate or contribute someirtiat to the
Task Force it appears that it will comprise a good portion of tli*
navy. One item stands out - so far there has been practically
no submarine units mentioned by the Second or Third Fleets lo
connection with South China activities. Commander Sutnarinct 7oro«
has not been included in traffic. He does appear in TOkyo^
Fourth Fleet and Mandates traffic.
P.»ge 1 of 2
'-KHsse.
2624 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
'■ ' ii
COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE Sir^'ARY
20 - 21 November 1941
MANDATES AND FOTOTH FLEET - The R.N.O. Palao anrt Palao radio stations
have remainad active v/ith the Fourth Fleet ana Yokosuka for
days. This is taken to indicate a coning concentration cf
forces in Palao which would include the Fourth Fleet and sorat of
the Second Flcjt who hac also been active with the R.'I.O.
Since the activity of the Second Fleet Cormnnnder has been so
great it may be that he will assign some non-Second Fie ;t units to
that area but Just which ones is not yet known. Fron infornftion
from radio sources there is no indication of any concentration
now at Palao beyond the Third Base Force which is based there.
There has been ao traffic for other fleet units routed there and
the Maru traffic to Palao is far loss than the normal flow to
that area. V/ith the arrival of Sit^J* (yesterday reported as
either a carrier unit or submarin'^uSW and now identified as
a submarine squadron of the Submarine Fleet) the concentration
of naval forces in the Marshalls 1^ far greater than that existing
at Palao.
Page 2 of 2.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE' 2625
cohc.rNic.'TioN inti;lligf,mce summary
22 November 1941
OKNT.HAI. - Traffic volume somewhat greater than normal. Only one tactical
circuit heard today, indlcfiting that Combined Fleet tactical exercises
are now completed. The Navy Minister originated several AlNavs and
sent two otfier messages, one to CinC Fourth Fleet and one to Yokosuka
and Comriander Submarine Squadron Five. Tokyo Intelligence sent out
the usual long messages to CinC Combined Fleet, CinC Second Fleet
and CinC Third Fleet. BuMil addressed Fourth Fleet, Truk, Pagan
Civil Engineering Section at Peleliu and Yokosuka. Another unidenti-
fied Tokyo originator sent a priority message to all major flags and
China Fleet, informution to ANOS at Taihoku and Pelao. Sasebo addres-
sed one to Chief of Staff French Indo China Force, information Chief of
Staff Second Fleet, Bako, Sana, Chief of Staff South China, Chief of
Staff Third Fleet, Commander Cruiser Division Seven and Commander
Destroyer Squadron Three. ^Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squad-
ron Three to South China Area soon? V/hile the Direction Finder Net
is still active, the station at Palao sent in more bearings than usual
for that station.
COMBIW'-':d FLKT:t - CinC. Combined originated only one dispatch to two unidentl
fied calls, one a I.Iaru, for information to CinC. Third Fleet. CinC.
Second Fleet was again prolific with many messages addressed to Third
Fleet and Combined t-.ir Force. The amount of traffic interchanged
between these three commanders was very great. One message addressed
many units as follows:
CinC. Second Fleet. To: NETS 5 (Crudiv ?), KOO 2 (Subron 5)
TI'iTJ 66 (CinC. Third Fleet), SUYO 44 (CinC. Comb. Air Force),
niRA 9 (CarDiv 3), RKSE 4 (Desron_2), KORE 4 (Second Fleet)
(Collective), less Crudiv S. and unidentified 2nd Fleet unit), SUTI
2 (3atDiv 3) (at Kure and Sasebo), Airron 7 (at Kure), SUTI 1 (?)
(at Kure), SATU 8 ( ? ) ( at Kure), IffiTA jT ( AK.'VSHI ) ( at Kure) FffiTA 2
(ASAIII i.-ARTT), TUFU 2 (?), NASI 33 (CinC. China Fleet),
KAKK 66 (CinC. South China Fleet), KISI 66 (CinC. Comb. Fleet).
THIRD FLKKT - CinC. Third Fleet received a dispatch from "RIKUGUN SANBOUTEU
I.'J^DATI SHUZ3U (at T&inoku)., This is translated as "Army Chief of
Staff^vfteneral IIAEDATI and indicates the linking of the Taiwan Army
Forces with Third Fleet. The CinC Third Fleet continues his association
v/ith Combined Air Forces.
FQTJRT?' FL"::T - CinC Fourth Fleet was mostly occupied with the Sixth Base
Force at Jalult and AirRon 24 now in Jaluit area. The Third Base Force
at Palao and the RNO Palao are still addressing the CinC Fourth and
Yokosuka. He also received one from Commander Submarine Force.
CHiyjA - The CotTi.;ander French Tndo China Force sent one message to CinC.
fTombined yieet for information to CinC. Second Fleet. Bako "sent one
to Secretary Fourth Fleet and Secretary Submarine Fleet, Secretary Car-
rier Divisions, Secretary Fifth Fleet, Sama and French Indo China Fleet.
79716 O — 46 — pt. 17 1:^
7
2626 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
23 NovcFiher. l^Ul
C'^WjX^ii'L - Traffic volume normal. Hlgn precedence tra-flic Vias Increaseti.
Some of the high precedence dispatch headings ore listed:
1. HAYURTI (Tokyo address) to HOROMO I.niS2KTl (Colloctlv'e Shore
Precedence Information Chiefs of Staff Combined, /
fTTTT-TTlTl 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and Gouthernv/
Expeditionary Force. '
2. Third Fleet Chief of Staff to Second Fleet Chief of Staff
Infornntion Combined and Southern
i;iKA Expeditionary Force Chief of btaff.
3. KSSANA BONO (Tokyo) to Chiefs of Staff Third Fleet and oouuner
Expeditionary Force. Information
"S.'jnrtm'TI" at Sa-nu Hainan.
•.qui
k. SUTE 1 (Uniaentified Fleet unit) to I^adio Takao, Hainan, /
Fla£5ship ^^.;A 2, infornation Jtidio y
NIKA Tokyo and Second Fleet flacship.
5. Imakuni Air to Iwakuni Air Detach'tient at MA}'
Inforrcotion F'ure, lia. o, and T'.IIJO 3
KIU in Takao.
Personnel Tokyo also originated several priority dispatches to
First Fleet, Third Fleet, and others. The following ."H address
was followed by Sasebo TJadio in the delivery of a perronnel
Bureau dispatch "SAITOTI.T^ENGO.RI.SI".
An unidentified fleet unit (SUTE ]) listed recently in Kure
appeared on radio circuit with Takao Radio. Also on this cir-
cuit wese the following:
KENU 3 - CruDiv 7 Flagshlp*?
HOV/I 2 - Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.
EICE 8 - Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet,
irJSE 5 - Naval Auxiliary associated v^ith Second Fleet.
The above units received delivery of the long ."IIKA dispatch
originated by CinC Second Fleet on the 2lEt of Kovonber and
which appeared to outline the forces expected to operate in the
Indo-Chlna general area.
COMBINED FLEET - CinC Combined was included, as alwayf , in all exchan^s of
float corir.ender traffic, but no important messages originated by
him were intercepted. First Fleet was very quiet. Second Fleet
messages mentioned in summaries of 22nd were still being circulated
but. Third Fleet appeared as the most active unit in today's
traffic. Indications are that Third FJ^eet units are und^rv/ay in
rage 1 of 2 ^/^£,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2627
COMt.:UMICATIUN IIJTl^LLIGEKCE SUia'.AP.Y
23 NovPBber, 1941
a movement coorflJnated with the Second Fleet, Combined Air Force
and French Indo China Force. Commander French Indo China Force
(So. Kxp. For) was Included in all important traffic* from Second ,
Third and Coablacd Air Connanders, Kulnan addressees were Included
in nearly all high precedence messaces concerning these forces and
may indicate a rendezvous of forces in that area. Palao appeared
as an infornation addressee on a portion of the, traffic. ''Fourth
Fleet activity Involved Palao area on one end and MarshallB on the
other. ',Vlth no means of substantiating the impression. It is be-
lieved that more submarines are operating In, or from, the
l>!arshalls than it has been possible to definitely place from
radio interceptions. It is recalled that there was an exchange
between Staff Coranunl cation Officers of the Submarine Force and
Fourth Fleet v/ith Jaluit included as either action or information
around November 1st and that Jaluit opened a direct circuit to
Yokosuka early this month, apparently to relieve traffic congestion
from that area. Jaluit Radio Has been heard on various frequencies
using, and working v/ith units using tactical or secret ty^e calls,
while the main submarine frequency of 6385/12770 has be^n relat-
ively inactive.
AIH - Coflbin«d Air Traffic remains associated with Taiwan area,
while the I&ndate Air units continue high level of activity,
covering the" whole Mandate area. Carrier Divisions were relative-
ly quiet, but with Carrier Division Three definitely associated
with Second Fleet operations.
Ci:i:;A - ClnC. China and South China not included with the Second, Thirds
Air Force and Southern Expeditionary Force traffic and were quiet.
Bearings from Cavite and Guam place ClnC. South China east of
Taiwan, but this is believed questionable.
Nothing was seen to contradict Impressions gathered during the
past few ieys and summarized previously, that movement of forces
is either imminent or actually underway, at least in part, to
the southward, with covering forces operating from the Mandates,
and possibility of a striking force assembled or gathering in the
Palao area.
T>tt4V* O f\^ O
2628 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COMXTlICATICK IN'TDLIICKMCi: ^U^E .•J<Y
■ ' y
24 jjove'nber. 1941
•
GKNERAL - Traffic volume normal. High precedonce trafllc above nornal.
Traffic analysis impressions are ur.chenced from yesterday's
report. The difficulties of identifications have prevented more
definite information cf vessels (and fleet? to v/hich attochod)
that appear to be moving south fron Kure-Jiasebo area. If the poor
reception prevailinc here the lost two days can be disreearded
and the assumption made that T?adio Heeia intercepted their
"share" of the total traffic, the followlnt: inpressicnr are worth
something:
(a) The falling off of traffic to Chlr.n addresr,es.
(b) The increased activity amone third fleet addresses v;ith
a high percentage of v;hat ap'.iears to be movement repcrtr.
(c) The above normal activity in the !;andates both ashore
and afloat addresses.
The association of Second Fle.-'t, Tfiird Fleet and Southern :.xpedi-
tionary Force continues as usual. Taleo and Jaluit uy ; ear
prominently in despatch traffic, the Liecond Fleet Commander v/ith
the former, and the Submarine Force ComiiHnd.r v.-lth the If.tter.
FIRST AND SSCOHU Fl'^'-TS - Very little activity in First Flejt. The radic
call believed to represent the flagship of Cruiser Uivition iieven
originated a dispptch to Commander Cruiser Division Seven, CinC.
Second Fleet, Commander Southern Kxpeditionary Force, una ;-.adio
Sama, Taicao, Sasebo, and Tokyo. -The CinC. 3econd Fleet continues
to appear as the Task Force Connander of a large number of units
from First and Second Fleet plus Carrier Division Thrrre and
Combined Air Force units.
THIRD FLEET - Large, number of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some
of v^hich appear to be movement reports. The -fact that CinC.
'"hird Fleet appears as information addressee on many dispatches
to and from Second Fleet units indicates that these two fleets
will be closely associated in any future operations. Yesterday,
a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division Three with
CinC. Third Fleet.
FOURTH FLSKT AtrD 'lANDATES - Fourth Fleet appears to be concer.tratod in Truk
roa since all of the recent definite reports r^on Kcurtt Tleet
v 'easels have come from Truk. Air Squadron Twenty-fcur an:i per-
• ? a large number of submarines from the Oubmnrino Fo ce are in
tro I-'irshall Area.
Str3MAR-':'n^3 - Comparatively little activity.
CHINA - Comparatively quiet.
CARRIKRS -Mo definite indications of location.
CO^BI^^l:D Ain FO.^CE - Comnander Kanoya .Mr Sl; c-".- jr. 'h-^ "i" •' :i
Otherv/loe no chance. \
Pat;e 1 ri .
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2629
25 Mov ember. 19 4 \
G:i:Tr-jnAL - Traffic volume norraal. Receiving conditions much improved
over last two days. Tokyo personnel bureau active with
nessages to various units. Tokyo originated one UNI V/I'.Vl
to CinC. Combined Fleet, CinC. Second Fleet, CinC. Third
Fleet, CinC. Fourth Fle.^t and CinC. French, Indo China
Force plus Yokosuka, Kure and '':aizuru. The Navy Minister
originated several AlNavs. A Direction Finder Net, con-
trolled by Tokyo radio was active with secret calls being
sent by the rive stations . The entire fleet traffic level
is still high which leuds to the conclusion that oreanization-
al arraneenents or other preparations are not yet copipletev,
O'-.-.-.-.j '.'~.:.:? - Little activity oy CinC. First Fleut. CinC. Seccr.i
7} I ■ ' ■ J .-i'lE highly active as an originator, addressing
Thi;'-.l Flent, Air r'orcct; u.im ooutli China units. A Second
Fleet unit and a. sulinarine division or squadron arrived in
Takao communication zone today. Crudlvision Seven which
prt!vi.ousl:' .-.rrlved there has been associated with Destroyer
Squadron Three v/hich indicates the presence of that unit in
Takao vicinity. Palao and Second Fleet still exchanging
mesr.ases. Two new units to be associated with CinC Second
Fleet and the Task Force now forming are the North China
Fleet and Defense Division One.
AIR - Through the identification of a call made today Genzan Air
Corps has been in Saigon since the eighteenth. We believe
that other units of the Combined Air Force have moved from
Taiwan to the French Indo China Area although this is not
yet verified. One or nore_o^tlia Carrier Divisions are
present in the Mandates,
FOURTH FLEKT - CinC. Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive comnuni-
cations with the Connander Submarine Fleet, the forces at
Jaluit and Comnander Carriers. His other connuni cat ions
are with the Third, Fourth and Fifth 3ase Forces,
Page 1 of 1,
2630 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
OOta-'CTIICATION INTKLLIOKNCE SlTT-S^JiY
26 November, 19M
QSITSRAL - Trafflo volume normal. All circuits heard well except for
Toltyo-TakftO circuit which faded early. Traffic picture about
th« same as for the past week. Intra-fleet traffic still very
hoary and Tokyo Bureaus still dispatching /iillavp. The Tokyo
Intelllesnoe and Direction Finder plotting units addressed
a suooaasioD of urgent dispatches to the major coiumands and
to tha CinC. Second and Third Fleets in particular. The only
UAU aohedule was NR15 which was first broadcast on the twenty-
fifth. TaKao and Bako originated more traffic today than usual,
It waa addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the CinC. Second
Fleet and the China Fleets came in for their share. Tok^'o
radio Is working the ISUZU (flagship South China) FjAIIA and
CAMRANH Bay radio stations directly. Takao is also working
(i-nAsj^ ITSUBA (Sprat leys).
COMBINgD FIJ5KT - Cruiser Division Seven today began receiving traffic
via SA}!a, Indicating the arrival of that unit in Hainan waters. Thlle
no indications were seen that Destroyer Squadron Three also
arrived it is probable that this unit is still 5n company with
Cruiser Division Seven and is also present at Hainan. Th«
Takao, former flagship of the Second Fleet becane active in
the traffic today being associated with the Second and Third
Fleets. The tanker HATATOMO appeared in several of CinC.
Second Fleet's dispatches today as well as the SOYO tI'iRTT.
No movement is evident yet of any of the flags of the newly
formed force. The traffic between Second, Thl'-d, Fourth
Fleets and the Combined Air Force still continues at it's
high level.
FOURTH FLEET - No change in Truk location. CinC. held extensive
communication with Salpan forces as well as Palao forces.
The KATORI and ClnC. Submarine Fleet appear to be at or
near Chichljima./
FIFTH FLEET - The ClnC. Fifth Fleet was included in some of the dis-
patobes of the Second Fleet and is associated with the new
Task Force.
SUBMARINES - As noted above Commander Submarine Force is in Chichl-
J^» area. The Gtthmarine Squadron NETi;5's location is some-
irtiat uncertain today due to one dispatch being routed to
UAIZtlRU. The routing of this dispatch is doubted because of
the indication of her arrival at Takao yesterday and her
preTisoua association with Cruiser Division Seven-
Two MaruB of the Third Fleet left Bako for Sama today.
THPg) yuaT - Active as above but no indication of large scale nove-
' meat fro» the Sasebo area.
page 1 of 1
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2631
27 Ilovenber 1941
O'.Cif 'i^'AJ. - Traffic volume a little below norTnal due to poor signals on
the frequencies above 7000 kcs. Tokyo-Takao circuit unread-
able on raid-watch. Some tactical traffic Intercepted from
carrierE. Bako, Stuiia, and Salcph active as originators,
addressing traffic to each other and to the Chiefs of Staff
of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. Bako addressed
the Chief of Staff Third Fleet information Destroyer Squadrons
Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. The main Tokyo
originator today was the Intelligence activity who sent five
despatches to the major conmanders. The Direction Finder
activity was very high with all stations sending in bearings
ir.clucing the Ilarshall Islands Stations v/hich has been silent
Tor 1,;-', ;;i3t iour d?iys.
CO:: U''.-.j I'LK.::? - I.'o fiirthor inror;iatioft us to vh '."^.'-x ' r- cn\ jestroyi-
JquuJron Three is in Ttainan area but is believed to be etill
',.iti. Jruiser Division Sevan ill that area. There ic still no
evidcT.co ol any further movewent fron the Kuro-Sasebo area.
The Chief of otaff Cwnjined rle'it originated several mes-
Stt^es 01" ceneral adoress. He has been fairly inactive as an
orl^^inator lately. CinC. Second Fleet originated many
nessa^es to Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, and Bako.
TIUHL) FLi: '.T - still holling extensive connunication with 3aka, Sana,
South China Fleet and French Tndo China Force. The use of
\?Z addresses is increasing, those occurring today were:
")AI}UTIF:,'TA°r-rAIHA::30T.Cir (in Taihoku)
"XCHOir.'KITISIi-.I"
-■''i'ClZV'-IIY/vJ'/^-TTATTAI'' ( in care of R'/iTjo)
"ILiIi::;L'"'AIO';r!DAIOU;Ri;i'SK'J''
These is nothi.it^ to indicate any movement of the Third Fleet
as yet.
FOUPTH FT.'^~'T' - CinC. Fourth I'leet frequently addressed dispatches to
tTie defense forces in the I.andates. Jaluit addressed mes-
sages to the CoTX'-.aadsr : 'ibraarlne Force and several sub-
raarin'i units. The iiaiian Air Corps held comnunication
with Jaluit and CinC. Fourth r'leet. The Civil Engineering
Units at IMIIIJI and .v^irjTOi. v;ere heard fror. after being
silent for v,'ee<s. Chitore Air Cor;)S is in Saipan and
Air i>qmidron Twenty-four is still operating in the Ihrshails.
No further information on the presence of Carrier Division
Five in the i'.andntes.
Ain - An air uuit in the TaVao area addressed a dispatch to the
KCP.YU and SHCHAKU. Carriers are still located in home waters,
t'o inform-itlon of further noyeuent of any Combined Air Force
units to I'ainan.
S'JBIS,'v:^i:r.-:i: - Comrcander iubmerine Force still in Chichijima Area.
Pave 1 of 1. . ..
2632 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-• coij>:uNic:vnoN int..i.lio::ncs s'^cl-.ry
Noveiibor 2o, 194.1.
GSNER-VL - Traffic volume normal. •Coininunici.tionjs to and from South China
and between Mandates and iinplre very henvy/ No tactical traffic seen.
As has been previously reported the suspected Tiadio Intellij^ence net
is very active and is becoming mor« so. The TOCTO riottin^; activity
addressed more messages to the Radio net than :ireviously en.> nost of
these sent for information to the L'.ajor Conrianders. Mach traffic also
was directed to NREJJ (the TOJrifO D.F. Comnand) frota all eight stHtions
in the liandates and CLUNATO. This Corinand also oricinated messages
of high precedence to the Major Kleet Comnanders. This activity is
interpreted to indicate that the n.I. net is operating at full ■ .i |
strength upon U.S. Naval Corariunlcations and IS GSTTINO R'ObULTS. | |l I
TOKYO originatorr. were active with '-ddlkpfli B! B15R ^PAcedence
to the Commander in Chief's of the Second and Third Fleets and
Combined Air Force. The Navy Minister sent to Alnavs. The Chief of
the Navel General Staff sent one to the Chief of titaffs of Combined
Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fl^et, Third Fleet, French Indo -
China Force, Second Fleet and RNO PALAO. The BUAERO sent one to Chief
of Staff Fourth Fleet info D.n .SI and 11th Air Corps at SAir.VK.
COMBINED FLEST - No indication of movement of any CDrabined Fleet units.
Commejider in Chief Second Fleet originated his usual number of
despatches to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The units paid
particular attention to by the Comiriander in Chief Second Fleet were
CdDIVS Five and Seven and DESRONS Two and Efiur an(} SUSRCN FIvb-
fo traffic today from the TAKAO (CA).
TOIRD FIaSET - Little activity from Third Fleet units save for the
Commander in Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base
Force is not present with the bulk of the Third Fleet in GASEBO but
it Is not yet located elsewhere. The Army Comander in TAIHOKU is
still holding oommunictitions with the Commander in Chief Third Fleet,
Two Third Fleet units arrived at BAKO and are apparently returning
to KDRE from BAKO,
gOOTTO nJ':ET - Bulk of Fourth Fleet still at TRTJK. The Cowiander in Chief
Fourth addressed message to the Sixth Base Force at JALUIT and the
Fourth Base Force at TRUK. Yokohama Air Corps is at RUOTTO and UOTJE
and held coiiiraunic tions with AIRRON Twenty-Four and kMiOI.
SOUTH CHINA - SAI>IA sent several messages to shore addresses in the Empire.
S.i^UA also addressed the OMTTRA AIR CORPS in several messages which
went for imformation to SAIGON end TOKYO. TAKAO radio station addressed
the Chiefs of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, the French Indo China
Force and Combined Air Force, TAICAO Air '-orps addressed SUKUGAV/A Air
Corps and YOKCSUKA Air Corps. A representative of a R/ariA;! office now
at SAIGON originated several messages to the Havhl Bases at S.'JSEBO end
KURE. The Commander in Chief China Fleet originated more traffic than
usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information to the
Commander In Chief Sscond and Conmander in Chief Third Fleets.
3UBM.^PINB3 - Except for the mention of SUBHONS Five and Six in two
daspatcbes there was no submarine activity today.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2633
colli 7jiiicA.Ticri ii-iTfiLLi02Kci: su;'.:;..nY
, 29 ilovenber 1941
y.UkL - Truffle volune above normal. The trafllc to South China still
very hi^h. Autoinatic transmissions was atteni^ted on the Tokyo-
TakHo circuit but was a failure and traffic sent by hand. A good
share of today's traffic is nede up of messages of an intelligence
nature. TokjrgJLptelligence sent eleven messages during the day
to !:ajor Co'uiiunders both ashore and afloat, while the radia_lxitelli-
cence activity at Tokyo rent four long necsagos to the Major
Comr.Qn'^ers. In addition to the stations nornally reporting to
Tokyo, radio Yokosuke sent in reports. This station had not pre-
viously been seen to suhmit reports. The Direction Finder Met
controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much
activity. One message for Jaluit Radio Direction Fiadejr Station in
eluded ^To^iaander Subnarines for information. The Navj' I'.inlster
orif^inated his usual two' Alllavs arid the Meval General Staff addres-
sed"com.iianders Second Kleet, Third .Fleet, Combined Air Force and
the South China Units. The unit which has been ad'cTFessed as the
"103rd Air Group" originated one dispatch today whose address
was composed entirely of enciphered calls. It is apparent that
he has no 'lavy call list. One address was "JTrXTIKOUKUUKAfrTAI"
"11th MP. FLEL:T". Since this has appeared before it is evident
thnt the use of KfdlTXl is intentional making the existence of an
air fleet positive. Its composition is uijknovm.
CC^min::) FL,: :t - The arrlv-l of Air Squadron Seven in Takao area is con-
firmed. The presence of Crufeer Division Four in that area is
not confirmed' nor denied. The dispatches today indicate that the
fcllov/ing units are under the immediate command of CinC. Second
Fleet:
CARUIV THHlLi « "» ' » DKSRCN T./O * > tt- - 1 > «»P
SUBKCi; FIV.i (H/<»S,5 DiJSROII FC'JR ^ {U-UPP
dUJP.OI! SIX clrV^M IIIi:D._Fi2IiT
crcjDiY vrrz ^^a fr5:;ch b.'do china force
C?.t'DIV SE^rCN 4 'A
Associated with Third Fleet are t_wo Battleships but their
assignment is not yet definite. Aside from nessages which were
addressed to Third Fleet, China and South China Fleets, Combined
Air Fore and the Navbl Ggneral Staffs Co xiander in Chief Second
Fleet was mainly occupied with the units listed above. Only _oji!B
message from Comrartder In Chief Combined Fleet was seen. This was
addrnssed to YOKOSl.TCA, flombined Air Force, CRUDIV Four ahd
BUT'ILAFF. The HJtHLI sent one message to Chief of Staff Third Fleet
THIRD FLS^T - Comnander in Chief Third Fleet sent one message to Comdesror
FiLf, Mumber Two Base Force, Number .fiiie B&re Force, Deffiape
Divieion One .-.nd Condosron TVo and Four. He held extensive
coTO.iuiiic-'-itions with the Commander in "Chief Second Fleet and BAKfl.
Tv;c more unitr. of Third Fleet made nov ;nent reports.
FQTU'rni fL'';:T - llelatively inactive tu6ay. Sent one jaessn^-e to Co.-iitiander
in Chief Gecon'i \'l ;et, "'O'lVianaer in Chief Third Fleet nnd Combined
Air lorce. !ie is still in TRUK area. \A'S\(/(di
2634 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
STTBUARINBS - Traffic for Commander i;ubmarine Force who routed through
3AIPAN today. He was at CHICITIJII'JV yesterday,
SOUTO CHINA - CRUDIV Seven now In SAIIA made a movement report but
direction was not Indicated. The French Indo China Force
Commander addressed several messages to Ssoond and Third Fleets
as well as TOKYO. The Commander In Chief China Fleet was
active in addressing the South China Naval Bases and the South
China Fleets, all for information to Co:imand*r in Chief Second
Fleet.
2 -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2635
cc:.:n.'Nic.- tI'N iNrr^LLiOiSNCF s^Ji.rjmY
November 30, 19/»1.
G':>rCRAL - Trnffic volioie less than for past few days. Todays traffio
conelstud larf^ely of despatches bearing old dates, some as far back
as 26 Noveaber. No reason can be given for the retransmission of
these messages unless the high volume of traffic for past few days
has jTevpnted the repetition of desoatches. The number of despatches
oricinated on the 30th is very aiiall. The only tactical circuit
heard today was one with .4JCAGI_flXLi_Sfixeral^I;iABU8. The TOKYO Intelli-
gence activity originated tv/o V/IIVI despatches to Ivlajor Fleet Commanders.
One urgent despatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff, Combined,
Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, Combined Air Force;
Submyrine Force and China Fleets,
Cu.'!3irr-:Q ?'L':':'-:t - The chiefs of staff of the Combined Fleet -nd First
I'leet are in KUTiD. in the sane aess.ge the Chief of Staff Second Fleet
wss not at any loc tion. Other traffic indications are that he is at
sea. Corainander in Chief Second Fleet sent one to hie usual addressees
of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force but also included KOIIGO
and jiIYiJI, which (.laces them as members of his Task Force. The
Corcnander ir Chier Second Fleet is no longer adding tALAO activities
and hos not for oast two duys. The RNO VXLkO today addrnssed two
messages to TAI'/AJI GU/SMEIBD (TAP/AN Army Headquarters).
THIRD FLK:::T - Corimander in Chief Third Fleet addressed two messages to
COI .DHSRi. K Two, FQ.ar anci Five; CCHCRUDiy Five; First and Second Base
Forces and Defense Division One for information to Commander in Chief
Second Fleet. No information obtnined as to the location of the
CoTimander in Chief Third Fleet, which gives th* strong impression
thct he is underway.
rCt'RTH FL^^T - Believed to be still in TR'JK area. D.F. activity In
Marshalls a little greater today than normal, JALUIT addressed
Commander Submarine Force and AIRROIl 24 in one despatch. The
continued association of JALUIT and Commander Submarine Force plus
his known progress from the Empire to CFICHIJIMA to SAIPAN makes his
destination obviously the Uarshttlls. Since one of his large units
(SITI 4) arrived in the Ilarshalls some tlno ago this unit cannot
agree with Com 16 that ther6 is not a submarine concentration in that
area. Every evidence points to a concentrationof not only the small
Fourth Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of the Fleet
submarines of the Submarine Force. AIRRON 24 plus YOKORAilA AIR CORPS
presence in that area points to intended air-subnarine operations
frop the Ilarshalls. Also the presence of a unit of plane guard
destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier In the
r.Tsndates although this hac not been confirmed.
SOT'TI? C^IJI.'A - BAKD active with despatches to Second anO Third Fleets,
Combined Air force and SAIIA. Commander in Chief China Fleet becoming
more anu more active as an originator with despatches to the Task
Force. He sade a movement report with the South China Fleet as an
information addressee. The Staff Communication Officer of the South
China Fleet was adaressed at Shanghai today.
2636 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
'fT-
^-^■^ '*'- 'COMttJNICATION INTKLLir;7,NCt: SLTOUWY
1 December 19^1
GSNERAL - All service radio calls of forces afloat changed promrtly at
0000, 1 December, Previously, service calls chaneed after
a period of six months or more. Calls v/ere last changed on
1 November, 19'tl. The fact that service calls lasted only
nnt) jnr>i| t.h \,pti\ g« t. « aa -additional progressive stap ia. pre-
parla4.jCQr-Afitlve-oporatiion8 on a large ccale... For a period
of two to' three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk
of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from one to four
or five days old. It appears that the Japanese Navy is adopt-
ing more and more security provisions. A study of traffic
prior to 0000, 1 Deopmber indicates that an effort v/as made
to deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly
with the change of calls, there would be a minimum of un-
delivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromises.
Sither that or the large number of old messages may have
been used to pad the total volume and make it appear as if
nothing unusual was pending.
yiRST FUSET - Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is opere-
ting outside of Empire waters, i^m^mm^mti^mm^i^im^mmi^m
SBC CRD FLEET - Thie fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo
area in the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao
does not appear to play an Important role in today's traffic;
consequently, the assumption is made that this fleet is
passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task
Force are definl«tely in the Indo-China area (Cruiser Division
Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three most prominent).
THIRD FLEET - Nothing to report except that the sane association of
Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force with South China
and Indo-China Forces continues.
TOtJRTH FLEET - Mo change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area.
FIFTH FLEET - Nothing to report.
SUBMARINES - Large number of the Submarine Force believed to be in
the area to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijlma and Saipan.
Flagship somewhere in this general area.
CARRIERS - No change
COMBINED AIR FORCE - No change. AAHIC
Page 1 of 1.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2637
CGi.auwic/vTio:? iht^lligdnce smiARY
2 Decfinber 1941
OarKP AL - The nost proninent factor in today's traffic is the apparent
confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts
of th". Japanese Fli^-t. There were instances where the sarae
dispatch was repeated several times after it appeared on the
Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao Radio received the sarae
dispatch that it had previously sent. ComSiiteen reported
Second and Third Fleets in Takao area and that Takao Radio
was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. ' This broadcast
was not uncovered here and contrary to location report, there
v/as one indication that these two fleets v/ere not close to
Takao. In several instances Takao Radio forwarded traffic
to Tokvo for these fleets. Summing up all reports and indi-
cations, it is believed that the large fleet made up of
Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters
but is either not close enough to Takao for good communi-
cation or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao.
The change of calls on December first has prevented this
office from making definite statements at this date of the
units now in the Southern area. To further complicate the
situation, Shanghai Radio handled a considerable amount
of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined
for units in the Takao area. The Chief of Staff, South
Chine area continues to appear in Shanghai. ConSixteen
reported nine submarines proceeding south by Camranh Bay.
This group is believed to comprise both Submarine Squad-
rons five and six, which units normally operate with the
First Fleet but have been included repeatedly in the
Secftnd Fleet Task Force for Southern operations.
There was a very high percentage of high precedence
traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo.
Hainan continues as a prominent address. Palao and Third
Base Force is holding the sarae relative inportance.
FIRST FT.KKT - Dlspite the lack of positive identifications, the First
Fleet appears relatively quiet. From inconclusive evidence,
it appears as if there may have been a split in the original
or nornal Combined Fleet Staff and that these may be two
supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic
routing indicates one Combined Fleet call associated with
the Second and Third Fleets and apparently in company while
another Combined Fleet call appears not associated with the
Second and Third Fleets.
SSCOCT FLaP.T - No units have stood out prominently the last two or
tTTree days. This is partly due to lack of ne\i identifications
but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part
of the Second Fleet is underway in company . Cruiser
Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three are unlocated
and unobserved since change of calls.
Page 1 of 2.
2638 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
'jlV'i
•>T-^
5Ea
COHMUNICaTION intklligencs sutcury
2 December 1941
THIRD FT-1'^'r - Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in" an Indirect
way In oorae of the Third Fleet traffic.
MANDATES - Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet continues.
Some traffic for Fourth Fleet units still goins through
Truk.
CARRIERS - Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers
today. Lack of Identifications has soraev/hat promoteii this
lack of information. However, since over two hundred
serTioe calls have been partially Identified since the change
on the first of December and not one carrier call has
been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a
low ebb.
COMBINED AIR FORCB - This force continues to be associate* closely
with Second, Third and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of
the Combined Air Force have undoubtedly left the Takao area.
Pa«»e 2 of 2. .. .
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2639
16
. ; f t^ H FOURTEBNTH NAVAL DISTRICT
MATT tABD. riABL BAUOI, EAWAIt D. 1. A.
C0l1I.TOIiavfIQN INTELLIGENCE 3UUUARY - 3 DECEMHgR 1941
GSNERAL- Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions cood. Preamit
state of call recoverjf does not perait much detailed infor-
mation to be obtained. The extensive UF.e of alternate calls
by the major commands slows up 1.dentiflcation of even
these Units, Very fev; urits have been positively identified
so far. The Chief of the Haval General Staff originated
three long despatches to the CIKC COiEIMED, 33CMn) and
THIRD JXEETS. The Tokyo Intelligence originated nine deapatche*
to the same addresses.
The presence of the CIHC SECOIK) FLEET in Taiwan waters la not
revealed by radio traffic. In some traffic from Tahao the
CmC SECOND FLEET Is liidlouted as having previously received
the messages while In otters to ToJcyo he is indicated for
delivery by that -Jtutlon. It Is the impression that both
SECOIID and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified
by Radio Intelligence means.
There are some FOURTH FLEET Units in the Marshall laland^i .«r««
including some of the FOURTH FLEET Staff. The identity of
these units is not known. The SIXTH' BASZ FORCX at J'alult
addressed several ue?se£es to CINC FOURTH*
Some Cwatow Units were addressed at Saigon today indioatlaf
a movement of some South China Units to Saigon. Bako
originated many despatches to the RCTO Taihoku and the
Task Force Commander.
No information on submarines or Carriers.
Sheet 1 of 1,
2640 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
. . , , , COMMUKICATION IMTCLLIGKt^CK ST'Tg. ARY
*" U December 19'tl
GENERAL - TrAfflo volume normnl with fair receiving conrtitlons. Takao
Radio today instituted a fleet hroadcast^^systen using the
prefix tJTU in heading so that there are now two fleet broad-
oasts in operation. So far only a few messages have been
placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a lar^e nunber
of urgent messages today, most of these from Tokyo to the
major commanders. Among others Tokyo Intelligence oricina-
ted a seven part message to Chiefs of Staff China Flent,
Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-
Chlna Force and Same. In all, this activity sent twelve
massages to the major commanders.
COMBINBD FLEET - The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack
of Aeffsages from the ClnC. Second Fleet r^nd CinC. Third
Fleet. These previously very talkative coifimanders are now
Tery quiet. While the Fleet calls are not yet well identi-
fied, the lack of traffic from these comn^ands cannot be
ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent
as addressees. It is now believed that the CinC. Second
Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apuarently
conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the
Tokyo UTU broadcast which CinC. Second Fleet is still
copying. The n^pp, ^.^>mh^nHrt vt^.^.f. sent one message to an
\midentif led -unit for informntlon to Third Base Force Palao,
ClnC. StCflnd Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet.
yOUHTH FLEET - The ClnC. Fourth Fleet sent a message to Chief of Staff
Combined Air' Force, Infornstion to Eleventh Air Corps,
■Chitose Air, Air Squadron Twenty-four, Third Base Force at
Palao and Fourth Base Force at Truk. No further check could
be made today on the presence of Foirrth Fleet units in the
Marshalls. Jalult appeared many times in today's traffic
being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo
Radio and MDSI .88 (which is believed to be an oil tanker).
SOUTH CHINA - Bako continues as an active originator addressing many
messages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between
South China Commanders, all units in that area quiet.
7<.
Page 1 of 1. . . .
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2641
^ ;• ■•,. ,. i CCMTCTIICATION INT7:LLIGKNC-J SUl^.IARY
December 5. 1941
GENnnAX - Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo
broadcast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-ftondates circuit
in duplex operation. There were several new intercept sched-
ules heard. oriNATO radio v/orking SA11\ and 3AK0 sending
fleet traffic. The Takao broadcast handling traffic to
Second and Third Fleet while the Tokyo broadcast is still
handling traffic for these units also. It is noted that
some traffic being broadcast Is several days old which
indicates the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio
organization. ^, ..
Thflre were many nessages of high precedence which appears
to be caused by the Jammed condition of all circuits.
A plain language message war sent by the Captain,
O'V'^ Tv-v Tokyo to Takao probablv for further relay
aSJlrSssed to FLVIHARA, Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau
saying that " in reference to the Far iiastern Crisis, what
you said la considered important at this end but proceed
with what you are doing, specific orders will bo issued soon".
C0"3IIED FLS-iT - Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders hav»
— ' oFTginated cny traffic today. They are still frequently
addressed but are receiving their traffic over broadcast.
They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since
the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No
traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has
been seen either.
THIRD FLE .T - In one -.TE address a "Chief of Staff" sent a message
fo"Connander Fourteenth Amy aboard RYUJOUARU in Third Fleet.
HITOYONGUII.SATI (IRC 1 KSUZKU IIARU) . A number of MARUS
have been addressing the CinC. Third Fleet.
FOURTH FLSET - The Secretary, Fourth Fleet and Staff Communication
^""^ ^ficer of the Fourth Fleet were addressed at Jaluit today
strengthening the impression that the CinC. Fourth Fleet
is in the Jfershalls. The Comnander of the South China Fleet
has been addressing Palao radio Mwljthe HNO RAt-AOand the
Commander Second Fleet.
SOUTH CHINA - SAllA addressed much traffic to ClnC. Second Fleet.
5aK0 continues as an active originator with many dispatches
to Second and Third Fleet. The Cimmander Combined Air Force
appears to be busy with the movement of Air Gcrps. SITIOCAliA
Air and at least two unidentified corps are moving, pro-
bably to Indo-China.
^i
rage 1 of 1.
2642 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COMUUMICATION IMTELLIGgNCii: SUIAL^RY ,
becsfflbar 6, 1941
GtNgRAL - Traffiq to1uh« very h««Ty with a great da^J. of old traffic
balBf traasalttad. Uaaaagaa as far back as 1 Decaaber wera saaa In
the traffic. Thla la not ballarad an attampt to inalntaln a high
traffic larel but la tha reault' of oonfualon in traffic routing
with uaaartalnty of dellTery. Tha atatlons now hcldlng broadcasts
are TOETO (with 3 dlatlnct and separate broadcasts), SAIPAN,
OUIHATO and TAKAO.
yesterday's high lerel of traffic from TOKYO orlglnators-
was maintained with the Intelligence aotlrlty still sending periodic
messages. Practically all of TOKYO'S messages carry prefixes
of high priority.
COMBIHBD FLFIET - Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet
Coasoanders. These units are sending their traffic Tla the TAJKAO
and TOKYO broadcasts. The Commander In Chief Combined Fleet
originated sereral massages to the Carrlera, Fourth Fleet aad the
liajor Commaaders.
rOI3BTH FLSET - The Commander In Chief Fourth Fleet Is again in the
nUX area. X^^ is doubtfull that he erer went to JALUIT although
it Is certain that some members of his staff wore there OTsr tha
past few days. There Is a definite close association betwasn ths
Third Base Force at PALAO and the forces in South China. Thia unit
is constantly sending massages to the ghief of Staff of the Second
Fleet, Third Fleet, Indo-China Forces and BAKO. It la being almost
entirely neglected by Commander In Chief Fourth Fleet under whose
eommand It normally operates. RONCELAB radio addressed the FALAO
weather obserTer.
FIFTH FI3BT - This fleet appears dispersed about the JAPAN Sea with
omNATQ broadcasting traffic for this unit.
SUBMARiyS - The Commander Submarine Force originated two messages
to his command. These are the first two originated since I December
He is definitely in the UARSHALLS.
SOUTH CHIKA - Nothing new to report. BAKO, SAI.IA and TAKAO still
sending many messpiges to the Task Force.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2643
MTELLIGENCE F.EFCHTS
by
I^:0 FLEET IK'ri..L:GEKz; OFFICEH
I27 Cctober 1941 - i- Dt-Cumber 19/tl
B&»Wt8Bi»H^*WI»***(S^BM[»**w^>**»
2644 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SPStW
INTELLIGENCE REFOflT
Reliability
R*ting ^-1
Serial No.. ■> $ Date :i7 October 1941
Latest Infcrration cT locations of units of Oranr:e Fleet is:
T-^kao Arei: C73 . AVs
"■i}:Aia;
rnidentified
::cTORo
KEi.'Jo i.i^nu
1/3 ru Type
!.:arsi Type
DD {riane Guards)
DD " "
laKHo: ,. -.-
Inland .;.ea &,
Ariake Bay Area: FIB:?? £i .i!:CC:;D rliCiST plus JUDrORCS excet>t:
Yoko suka : TUZ-wI TRO
ireizuru : KONGO
Kano""
CVs: .VKAGI Klimj
K.GA HOoTiO
Ur; identify cd
Unidentified
Unidentified
Sasebo .Vrea: THIRD r'LI^ET
(continued)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2645
IHTSLLIgBKCS RBPORT
B«UAbillty
Rating
«.-! ^
S«ri«l No.
H
Oate
The follow:. iiv-^ infer
thoroui^'rslv reli^ibl^- •" *''■■•
lO'll.
x^ ro.T. ^ ..-,,. .
as follov.'s. oever. fi:
\ 1., 1.1 -1. t'
it the c:.:i::nel.
■ ■' ■■ 0" 3 ^ .'"■ ^' ' C ■
(3; .A--
4 decrees, 2.700
,ei buov i 7 •- " Tees,
(5) i?lag .buoy:
iron Ducy i4; i9u(170?) do-:rees, 5U0 ceters
( .27 nlles) .
Crie-roes, 4900 neters
I .
(7) Flac buoy:
:ti.71G.-iTI0M:
3, 500 rr.oter3{.27 ..iios)
and i-i .--jij. oc i:.
.■irea to •.vest of them
luo/ (1; a;-.
jrtherr. "
JO ac f '
-J
;) , the s.
ra:<8 care I
. - to t.;.e entrance
to vait.
ne by naval patr:
it point of *»g;-UjI
I h/.
2646 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
^iSSiST
iotslligencj: rspojc
Reliability
Rating »>-l
Serial No. V- Date Ifl NoYflabar 19U
Heliable Infornatio.. indicates the ZUUCAKU, NOTORO and two lUru
Tenders have returtjed to the Sasebo ~ Kure Area. RYUJO ia iltt
still in Taiwan. Tne KHWJO lURU is in the Saigon - Camranh Bay Area,
/
/^1
A
.90 ' q;
4l!kfii
/l-?^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2647
sC
Smrial Mo. «>» IM*
12 riovenbor 18-41
It is reli'-tbly reported ti.at ttie RYUJO ha3 returned to Kurs.
4-/7
2648 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SffgLLIGIKCE agORT
B«lUbUlty
Serial No.
11
Date 22 Mov 19U
Dutch Authoritiew in the NEI have received information that a Japanese
Sjcpeditionary Force which is strong enough to constitute a threat against
the KBl or Portugese Tiaor has arrived in the virlnitjr of Palau. If this
force movea past a line through Davao - *?aigea - Equator the Governor General
of the MSI will regard it as an act of hostility and will consider war
to have begun.
A-/8
16 I IjNi la I 86 I 20 ■■ 21 . 25 . ;6
W
Al^
^^
P
\\ '-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2649
SECRgpr
lOTSLLIGEKqE REPORT
ReliabUlty
Rating
A-1
S«ri»l Mo.
Date
23 :Jov 1941
CinC Fourth Fleet is now reported to hare returned to Truic
after a trip- to Saipan ir. the irCashlraa. Tlierc har- been increased
activity of the cruiser divioion and other units of the Fourth
Fleet in the Truk - oalpan area. The followinc incraases in
Base Forces are esti.-aated: Third (Palao), on© (1; division r.arus ;
Fourth (Truk), two divisions marus, two aaru air tenders, speaial
ag force {"i); Fifth (^aipan), two divisions rsarus; Sixth
{iTaluit), three divisions narus, three unideritii'ied shore coa:j.ands,
tv^o naru air t'ir;dftr£,
acitlvity of the Corahined ^vir Force is Increasinc. Th.e
ilcrenth Air Corpc is heli^evod to be at Palao and .viron Twenty four
Is concentrated in the ll^irshalls. The Fifth Fleet is apparently
at Chichi Jinui v/lth portions possibly at ilayeuc. There have been
a^p^oxinately seventy arrivals or departures of naru;. ^ince oae
Novenber, mostly in the Truk and Jaluit areas.
i^i^ sP i ^\ ^yT^.
0
A'/ 7
2650 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
■unaLLXQOiCE HirogT
RvIiablUtr
S«ri*l No.
i<
I>«t« iS.v ''9V jg^i
OiaCAF has -i" 'nforaatlon coiifinaine, t.na Dutoh report of
a Jap»ii«p« *xp*'i'. tioa^ry Forcf f ; r^lao. His infer'- ation.
do^s aot i»Jil*''''c- -eswnc© cf units other than the Fourth
?l««t In th» flwufcates a:
It JlB possiWe
t ransp03ftE «n«
'.u»ru8 ir the Sai;
* r- at Sal;--'!
nay ^Ifto be pre;= •:,...
.nusual concentration of that force.
■ *! Increase in the nunber of
T rv', has been a concentration of 30 - 40
irioe the iiadle of October. CinC Fourth
f ^sslble thTit .liron £4
.^i,:;' ,it one battleship
■iiyi&lon and two ■.■.".rrlt* '^ ire pr^p&ri.>^ to proceed to the mandates
but, »o far th«r« ^ - '^s'U no signs tiiat the raoveaei.t iias begun.
U,,!,;^ > n
;g. i 3^ ■ y I 2t , ^5 t ^6
:z:
>
»•»■ ■!
\
■)
A-/i>
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2651
ggptgr
RellabUity
Rating
ICTELLIGESJCE REPORT
Serial No. f" Date ^'^ "c^ve-ber ^^.U
The r.3. •. ^1
e .o >« 1
^3 ; X6 : 17 ; 18 ; 86 . 20 ; 21 , 25 t 26
A-is
I ^y
u
If
5?
■'*»JWs^»
2652 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
RalUbllity
I»tin«
LVraXIGSNCS R-vPORT
Serial No. '](
Date
';b -"ov 1941
The British report that Oerrr.finy Is obfi'ninfr rubber
frora Sel/ron In the foilowinr shipmants. All routin"' is
from Saipion to Bordeaui around C-ipe >'orB. 31x t!"7UP rd
tons was :ihinDed in two Ja-^anese ships on 15 Pctober iod
14 November repectfully. Five thousand tons is to be
shipped in a "ermam ship on about one December. The Cap
ships may he German vessels under Japanese charter. The
ships hare not yet been identified.
A-/V
■iiiiiiliil«iiili liiii'ijiiteiiiiiiaBiW ■'fili JJi'tWl'Mi
i^iiism
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2653
1
aacRgr
Reliability
RatinK
.1-1
i-Jj OX'LS
t
c ..... . 0 J t
or
doubtful.
St:; to-.:- 1; Its
Of t;.e
J
Sarifel Ko. ?2- Data -^ ?invftiataftr.,.l.ftfa.>
: •;,. ■ :. ...ic-js of any favoraHl© result
...t ..o.;,ot.L.;tj.ar.s -.vith' Japan are 7sry
■; or.inion t:.,it thiSjCoupled with the
St:; to-.:-t;its Of t;.e Jjjr-intjse ~ov..-.rtj..entj and the moveioeats of
ti.eir ailitary -izt r,:..',''al forces yinlicatss that tbey say ©aXf
y 3uririso. ..sive ;_ove.uoat in any d-freotion, inoludlais
o;. tjie ihilli^ ir.es or G-usm. The Chief of Staff
of I ---><rs in this opinion. Senior Arm Offiesra
in ci.e i:xv ^.,st, I.^cific _r.i .^est Coast areas (InoIudlQg PsAaasaJ
h-:)ve buon icforiried. Utcost secrecy Is enjoined regardlE* tMK
cpitiio:. ir. order to not .^urtter coapj-xcate tha present t«wi8«
situation or to precipitate Japanese action.
isr
ir
«2^x R "
ar
*8SC
IT
F
itiiimWBJii
•*:
Ml
2654 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A-l
Sarial No. t'^
/o p "Se c^cT^
Date
25 .'.'ov 19a
For the paat month the Corroander Second Fleet haa been organizing a
Force cowpoaed of the following:
3«cond Fiact - Third Fleet '(including Ist and 2nd Base Forces and
l«rt Defense i^J.viaion) - Combined Air Force - Desron three -
AinsAn 7 - Subron 5 - possibly units of Batdiv 3 (from First Fleet)
These antta are linked with the South China Fleet and French Indo-C)\ina
Fon-*- *«> '•■■*-\1 as the Naval Stations at 5ama, Takao and Bako. The
been
CoBsites--} vecortd fleet haa intenaily/interested in operations at Palao
and the Third Base Force which is at Palao.
The Cortbined Air Forcf has assembled at Takao with some indications
that certain unite have moved on to Hainan.
The Third Fleet is believed raovinr in the direction of Takao andf Pako.
The Second Base Force appears to t ran sporting; the evaitvnent of air
forces to Taiwan.
Ar unidentified Second Fleet unit aid a suV^oar ^ r, be
ir. •:t vicinity of TiJ--ao, Crudiv '' and Desror. 3 appear : . -.rice unit
and ma>' beonroute South Chv-.a. A Strong conci;. ... t. of su* -cxd
aircraft is believed 1 . •■ llarshtlls conprisinr Airron 2h, ~> ■ iiviiv
&nd o.>r '.] ■; rd of V.e sui marine force.
CcTO 'i~> believes the above indicates a stronr foro ariii/: t
Southiiaatern Asia v'hile certain units on.erate from Palac am •.],k- l.arsha. . v.
P5"
^
IT
18
20
21
25
90
95
O
A-/Z
- -24o A-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2655
page .5 iconti
8«rial le.
Tlj^ S^cituT
6. He oe 11 eyes that;
,aC Coi^bined Fit is in ^^vJ^::'.. (.33)
iiad " " "• 2^,^^ '^ ;-r- , :, area)
" '6t^ " " ■■ ^,J"!TZuu\ t.~r^i \xn j.A-.i;3u area)
&tn " - - iHICi^JL^ area
" Ota « « « :i^sHIlLi tCL] fin YOXDSUri-t ajfea but
ziiii is unreliable)
•. CinC 2nd Fit, CinC 3rd Jit e'ld CinC Southern ixpedittonary 7crc«
;:;; or -■?":'. -al appear to have Jciaed the
'. Ka x'l<>et (profcaoiy torpedo boats).
9. One Base 7orce v^nit apparently being used to atrengtlien
Jouthern Sxpfeditionary Force.
■gm- V«' #»'?;»( WW'f*'**
WM- ^ m
imr
- ;^t/c -
2656 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
BiOUbllltr
Utli«
8«rl«l Ro.
:ii
Oit«
^h S^cf^iT^
y
page 2. (cont)
Jearon 2 {From 2nd Fit) (1 CL, 2 ^e3Jivs(12 DD's))'
Uesron 4 (From 2nd /It) (1 CL, 3 JesdivadS JD'3))^
Subron 5 (From 6th Fit) (1 CL, 3 3ubdlYsl6 or 7 33* g))'^
iJe3dlv 23 (From Carrier Fit) (4 uD's) /
Igt Base Force (Froci 3rd Fit)/
3rd Base Force {>^X P>iL/iO)
5th Base Force (.it 3AIFAN)
Other lesser unitA (names not known)
It is possible but not &nown for sure that Bavdlv S
may be included herein. (From Ist Flt^ (4 BB' a— HITEI , KDNQO,
KIRISITiyji, H^RUNA) iHARUIv . may be undetgoiog Wijor Tepalra)
3. Disposition of remainder of 3r^ Fit in doubt but It i« assusMd
they will be stationed a -ound the B,\ZO-TAKA0 area or furthap
south.
4. Indications are that today (Nov. 26th) Uesroc ,3 {l«t Fit),
Crudiv 7 (2nd Fit) and Subron 6 (6th Fit) are In the t^KAO j^^
Units of Combined Air force from the empire are at TAKAO, HOfttOW,
PAKHOI, S«IGjN and other bdse? along the CHIMA COAST AAA la
TAI..AN.
5. He cannot confirm report there being large force of SS and CT**
in the ilAMiHTEG. Thinics all known carriers of let and 2nd
Fits areyltill in the irJ(Ri;-3r^3-B0 area. (cont)
•am- %i^ -mif ' r%ym%*m%^maft wwwm 'n-w.ini
F^.tti/
A'to
-/i6/8-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2657
R«li»btlity
Bating '^
DfrgLLiaaics rspokt
7©/ ^<c ieT
Serial No. _JJL__ D*t« November 26. 1941.
-fthe ris+, few .:
: • ; ■ -1 cViiluates the situation during
.::Siders it reliable:
..its of the Ist, 2nd, 2rd and 6th
,-: oy CinC 2.nd Fit in a loosely-icnit
r,-r st-tas that the organization appears
i.vO t'.vc o.ctions. ricd expects:
- tc operate in Jouth China .■^.re&.
oectior. II to operate in the ;.:and3tes.
/orces ./.'.ich a/pear to be uader CinC 2nd Flt>.
>:;ectiort I
Cruv^iv 7 lyro.;. ^nd ^It) (4 C...'s-*-.'aJIwvXO, U:o-'..itl.'J. L3PCUMA,
/^irori 6 ii-ror. Combined .lir Force) |3 X^'/'s— KALXLiV.'A ItAIlU,
let Jefense division {Frora 2rd Fit)
Jubron 6 { Froc 6th Fit) (1 CL, 2 3ubdivs(4 ^) )f'^' '^ ^'^:')
It is nosiible but not kno'.vn for sure that Cnidiv 6
nay be fncluj.-i h:rein. (Fror. 1st Fit) (4 CA'3— tC'JJo;
'^RUTJC., ,,c;]... •"■"••:;./:a)
iection II
Crudiv S ; F rot.; r . j ^•' 1 1 )
;5 C..«s(naybe 4)— LTO;:o, MnCKI,
;:..-/jao)
C^rdiv ,3 ( Fror:. Currier Flti (2 C7' s— IJTJJo?, rJ3HC)
(cont j
rt rj J y and 1 ...^
^\Vi Ml \ iST¥
iES
:s
V<(.
.■\^
;y L ^
r
,)
'ZUfi-
79716 O— 46 — pt. 17 15
2658 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SSCBS
lOTEajJGEKCE REPORT
R«li«bUity
Rating
Serial No;
^
Data
:.ovi;f:.bor L7, 1941.
.i. rcli'ible afjent states that there ■^inpearo to be C?. i""51
rt.r.-r.y -jctivit:' in the air that envolves Iir.periml ;"; ad-iuarters,
Cor.bir;ed .^ri-.vj f'orceo ar.d 3oi:ur.ander C] Tior: 'H"Z y.?l~C'., Cc.".i.''i9nder
Cj TIC'.' '.11 "j lyiX.. -tA Carabine .rn-.y ?ai-.'an and wocbined Amy
?orc-;.i -Jana.
2:
T
t
^gupizsr^
<.<■
^
2LJL
)J
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2659
COKTIu^.TI-kL
.mm.
laliablUtj ^ ^
S«rlal No.
95
Data 27 Xoveaber 194]
Information fror. 'r'ltlsh Intelligence (Far j,nst,} .sources states:
Japan -.all coi.unence I.;ilit'iry Operations on 1 jecenber
against the ;::i.^ T = r'".'js, Ihr-il-'M, with the objective
of inter, inkok ani Jin^apore.
Llain lanuin.:, and center of effort at Sll.'jult-i (oUI<K}iCHLA)..
Japanese .vssauit Forces to proceed direct froia T^l.iA'J
(ForckOJ.-i.) and Mvi:.'./' Is.
iSZSnMIE
mn^
JSU.SL
MMbMAMjDHfa*
i^:.^',Kl Ji<,.
■ H »>-; . • . >4w ■»;
?r^^^f
.•"v3K*>T%*'#:^- - '
2660 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
m^;^Mkim!m^mm^m
^\ ^..m^^:^^-?^m0m^^mw&^msmi^^im
^^2ki
pfraXIGPiCE REPORT
RaliAbillij
'TS^ Sfc,<eT'^
S«ri«l No. '?"] Date -^ ''^v >•!
Absolutely' rellal^ reports from Singapore arc that the following
procedur* will be carri«d out on Japant^se ne^vs broadcasts in the ever
diplomatic relations are on the verge of severance:
On ordinary Tc^o news broadcasto, the following words repeated five times at the
begin&iog and the and will hsye this significance:
KIGASHI HIGASKI i Japanese - American
OTA ICiTA : P.u— '•
( wr i , . , ^ or
NISHI NISHI « Sni£j.ti« ^if^-luding occupation of Thai pf4- invasion
of Kf.laya and Nil)
nerwa
Ob Jipai-»s« language foreignAroadcasta, the followln;^ sentences repeated
twice in the middle and twice at the end will he used:
■MMBK^'hIGA^J mo KAIE AiiS" (»«^-.-j ^ - < -^
•KITA J« KAJB KIM«I" (Russia) ' ' '' *
■NISHI NO KAZE KARE" (England)
.' i, ./ .
Th« British and Con 16 are monitoring the above bi^jodcasts.
!-■'./
-xL'if^-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2661
agf^
P^MTt"'^-'^ ppypr
Reliability
lUting
A-1
S«riml Ko. ^li
D*t« 26 yov 1941
Com 16 reports location of fillowins units:
I3UZU )
SubTender )
4 Subs (probably Subron 6} ) In Formosa Straits
MAGOYA I.;.vRU )
)
supplies,
rJIlTA^ I'JJiV sailing Yokosuka t^ Takao on 29th with military/
Two senior construction officers and 4000 men (status unknown J
order to the I»iandate8.
Unidentified CL (?) has apparently relisTed KASHE m fj-agsbip
of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and is, now in the
Cajoranh Bay Saigon Area,
2662 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
■'/''hlfl
•ntrpj^vnO& RflPOKT
R«ll*bUit7
S«rlia No», ''^^ 0«t« 29 Nov 1941
CoQ 16 reports recent develORments noted:
"COJiDR FIRST PrtTROL FORCS" has headciuarters apparently in Palao
or YoicosuJca along with other forces of this nature,
^TlTr-- ,\Tn HATTALIOT:" is at Takao.
■'wv.;.-u.v ,v-.u BCH:r2 troops'* (location unknown) •
"FRitCH INDO-CHI"-. '='' -.ETINa DST.vCirJilN'T'' in Saigon «rea, >
"THlRp FLZKT r ^S** probably at Yokosuka.
CinC Third has shifted flag fron ''.A to MHart.RA.
CinC JQ' ■ %ionary ?'orce .shifted flag from KjvSHII to CHCrLU.
: . j'^irat 3e{ltlon (oer, ,f94):
DESRON 4
^iRHOH 7 (CHIXJ:. tyre)
oectio:;
Completely rfa^jaoltf ir>i\
leave Kure iione at 0400 to "
1st and enter Bako Z,or.e at
- to be definitely in the First
sen noted,
n indicates that Cij;^C Gonbl :'.ed_ '.vl \J.
ea^e oasebo 3one at :i.T3"Tl"!;T'on the
■:.t 0". t'r.v 2nd,
ju ^ 1^ . 17 yie I a^ » a) 1 21 I 25 t %
■t- f
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2663
2XmUSS£S.jaQKL
RsIlabiJLliy
■•tint A-1,
SerliiL Mo. lO*
D**'< 3. ^ac 41
llisre have arrived in the Takao Area in the p%3t two days:
Conl^sHon 5 in the IL^TCRl; ILJi^ to join DssHon 4; Units of
r.'vCiber Two Base Forca; CHOGiS; (believed to bs tender for two
p'j':jdlvs]. ..U.1 of these units are under connand of ClnC Third,
... :: 3econd has Shifted fron Kure to Sasebo Area in the ATaGO
:.•'•:. *,!■/ enroiite £io-:th China V/aters,
w I <}{ik
Ig 1 9^ I ?? L a I i?5 1 26
\12TW
m
-"^'^
0
A'5
i ■• ^■>'
5,^^_
2664 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SSEBB
PffELLIGatCE RgQRT
lUllabillty .
lUting ^1
Serial No.
lOl
D.te lDecl9a
Absolutely reliable agent in Bangkok reports th» on the 29th
cot'erences were in progress considering plans to force the British
to attack Thai at Padang Bessa near Singora as counter move, to
Japanese landing at Kota Bharu. Thai, at present, intends to
consider the first invader as her enerty therefore Japan believea
this landing in Jialay would force the British to invade Thai at Padang
Bessa. Thai would then declare war against the British and call on
Japan for help. This plan appears to have the approval of the Thai
Chief of Staff Bijitto. Up until 25 November Thai government Circles
have been sharply divided between pro-British and pro-Jar>anese but now
those favoring Japan seem to have silenced the anti-Japan group and
intend to force Pxender Pibtil to make a decision. They expect early
and favorable develpawmts.
A2
-:m&ik^^ii&iiim.
V-'iiiaanifeii'"
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2665
fiSGBSr
uttslligemce report
RallftbUltjr ,
Rating ""
S«rlal No.
lOJ
Oato
li Jecfei.'.Der l\
CinC Second Fleet^tand the Cine Ti.iri ri'.-t ;.-.ve • u' in
their appearance in the T/uLhO ^^rea. The Co;ivr.:iiiIer Southern,
Expeditionary Force in the CKOKAI has arrived at 3^'..--i., - .•«.
The U. S. rtxnbassador at BanG^-cok on the 30th recuested
permission to destroy all but a limited nunber of Codes.'
Throe I-class subcarines were sighted bearing 070 distant
l&O n.iles froc o«.IGCN, course 160 speed 15.
I.'ine (9) Olul'dji. Gubmarines sighted at 0230 GOT 2nd Lati-
tude 13-10, lon-jitude 110-00 East course 180 speed 10.
Reported at C<-JilRANK Bay 21 0R/j;CJ2 transports with a six
plane patrol overhead.
J2 t 1^ » 16 I litlB t 86 1 20 » 21 {25 i a?
^
Ojv]^f
A- 1
iw^amAbMi
2666 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
•f
UOC^TI':' •■ • . ■- ' ■:'-7 UNITS
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2667
. ,nr,.iu- 1 ,1. No INITKI) STATKH «• ^'lii-y ,•; ' KJ^
r. S. S. I'KNNSVi.VAMA. HHKxhip
w-C-.t-y-I-J->/-4'.-X-I-/»-il^ l/ocBiiL.tjr 1, 1)1.1.
Frxa: KlJet Litolliijeuce Oflic^r. ■
lo J Adiiiral,
Sub^tKlt Ciijci-iik rXiiJr - Location of.
1. i-Toia best available iaforiiation unlto of the OJiWSSi tl*«t
**■• thow.-'it- to be locateii as listeJ belov s-
Yoko£a':a Area
TAi:i»C (Ca) 1 CA
/rd Fleet ri»< ?
yl Patrol r'orce 7
»»i.H QlJOP of Jtn Fleet (OialcldJ ---ia?V36 plitnea ?
.^
Total ■- 1 CA plus ? 36 planes
Kure - 6a3ebo area
Clxi.; Coublr..jU Fleet
CirC Fir»t Fleet
BatDiv I i 2 6 »B ? . , /W*
Crtidiv o - .ifcj- head for
liuMlates (?) A CA 7
Desron 1 1 CL
^A'-
t-et— ' — ^-ci.
qruiser Diviaion aCKT 2 CA
Totnl - 6 SB - 1« CA - ^ a - 16 DD * Cv/
Shonghai Area
CinC China Fleets in I2UUD 1 - OCA
Shanghai B^a* Force 1 - FG
- 1 ~
3 - ODD
2668 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CinV. Kik No,
",ȣJ
UNIVKU STATKS FI.EKT
U. H. S. PKNNSVI-VANIA. PUaiMilr
C-0-l»-P~I-D-t>-l.--T-I-A-X.
Subjoctt Uloil.'G.^ flLc"' - Ujc»t.lori of.
ihan/irAi A»-oa {Contlnuad}
plus .-.ilrcellfineoui! craft
iflO Air Oroup
Tot
36 pla.iM (7)
.al - 1
s;i; - 1 PG - 3 OED - 36 plane», etc.
Qako - Takao Area
AcSrons
1 -5
6 6ii (I)
THIkL* Flaet i.uh,«arine Squ
i;ubix>n-^
1 CL „.!^' ''
6 :>s
Sul)ron-6
1 CL
Desron-J less D«Bdiv-2?
1 CL
8 Dd
3 Cli
•
5 XPG or iPC
17 -P or AK ■y.i.jij.t-
Uoaron-i,
L2 DD "^?!W
Co.afdr. Co<atlji«d Air Force
T)
5th Air a*ltalion {kr:tff
11th ^lr Sroup
36 planw
Air Squadron 6
3 XAV
30 planes
Air Squadron 7
3 AV
UB planas
23 rd Air Group
26 planes
7 Air Sroup
36 pla/ies
? jvir Sroup
36 planes
? Air iroup
36 plar.es
Gcnzan Air Group
36 plcj-.es
3hiog£_jj Air jroup
36 pl&nea
Kanoya nXr Jroup
36 planes
Kftsuija Itoru
^ t-
1 XJV
36 planes
cue and KlTOt vilth unltfl
» Tai:ad
plus Crudiv-5
U Ca possibly 5 CA
U^Bron^Z
1 CL
16 ED
"
■ 2 -
n 7
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2669
rSnC f^W No. UNITED STATES Ft-EET
U. a 8. PENNSYLVANIA. FtaciOii*
C-O-K-F-I-D-^.VT-I-M-L
Subject! OiU^!Gi; FXiSfarr - Location of.
a«J<o - luk^o Ar«a (Continued)
C&rdlv-J. 2 JV it 4 DD
Car<iiv~3 2 CV it 3 DD
3atdiv-3 lass iURUIU 3 '^'ti (i-sayb* Z 33)
Total — 3 3b - /♦ JV - 7 CL - i»^ DD - dbfeSti - 4 S;i - 3 AV - 4 XAV -
4 CA - 3 C;: - 17 iAP - 5 -UC - 450 planoa.
Hainan - Janton Area
Ci«C South China (in ISUZU)
1 CL
( i-O ^- > f '^ ^-T 't
■ 1 CA
Crudiv*-?
4 CA
D«arQn-3
1 CI.
*
15 Di)
1st Bm« Force (?)
3 c;;
(pa'rt of this laay be in
12 AU's
ForoDsan waters)
6 XPtt
12 PC
27 AP i ■'<•
Total —ST CA - 2 CI. - 15 DD - 3 Ck - 12 AU'a - 6 XPG
12 PC - 27 AP
French Indo China
cioc. ^. atp. gie**^ i» caoui i ca
X wL
1 ci:
9 Torpedo 3oata
? XPG
Son of let & 2nd Base Force ~~ Total — 'irS ~ 1 CL -- > -
•^ «*(r-b« here (>■•'" '-; (7) • ,,. • 1 CU - 9 Torp. Boats k
IfiLscellaneous
QiJEA jJS ORCajp 36 planes
12 Air Group ) Some aay be 36 planes (?)
13 Air Group ) on 36 planes (?)
14 Air Group ) Hainan 36 planes (?)
ifendate j>re>
PALAO
16!li Air Group 3* planes
- 3 «
2670 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CinC File No.
UNITED STATES riEET
U. 8. 8. PENNSYLVANIA, rkfkip
C-0- Vi-i- I-D-i>-N-T- 1- A-1.
Subject: QRaICS VL£2!: - Location of.
..kmoate Ar«a (Continued)
'^tC £>ase Force
10 XPG
U SS (ho)
Tot.;.l ~ 36 planea - 10 :iJ=G - U i>3
CinC 4tl. Fleet
4th base forge
17th Air group
Saipar.
- d>cu
1 CL.
<«)CL
1 CL
8 DO
.V XAP
36 planes
Total — 3o planes - i CL - i^DCiT- S CD - /, apG
4 XAP - 4 xa:.
GinC Sub.aarine Force
plua suba (?) 1 Subron (?)
Chitose Air Group
IStl. Air Oroup
5th baae Force
1
CL
1
i^i>
7
S3
36 planes
36 planes
2
CLi
8
iPO
5
iAP
Total — 72 planes - 1 JL - 1 AS - 7 SS - 2 Oil
8 aPG - 5 XAP
Uarehall Area
19t(i Air Group
Yokoh&iaa Air Group
iiotj© Air Group
K»ajalein Air Group
36 planes
3t planes
ZU planes
2U planes
! /
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2671
Cincjwc Kile N'o. INtTKU STATKS CACIKSC Kl.KKT
V. S. S. l-KNNSYI.VAMA. KlaK'-hip
-o-;.-K-i-i>-£/-;.-i-i-,>-L
i.ub^ect: JivA-ui, K).^T - Location nf .
Marshall jirea (^ontlnucU)
<c:
Air Squatiroii 2i,
XiW
KUYU (7) plus
plane (^aards
1
.! plajies
Sub;uarine S<^uadron 7
i.
/
Subdiv (?)
u
iS d'^
SubuBurine Squadron 3
9
-3 (I)
6th Base Force
8
'J
PC
KAXStStKI
1
AC; (survey)
Total — UO planes - 2 XAV - 1 CV - 4 DD - 1 a5 - 22 £S
4Ja--6XPG-3PG-3PC~lAG.
Eespectfudly,
Lieutenant ^m,iancer, U.3.K.,
Fleet Ir.teiligence Officer.
2672 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 115A
COIOIUNICATICII mTELLIGiaiCE SUUUABIES
Of
9 & 10 D«c«iab«r 1941
showlnf
ASSUUED COUP06ITI0N Of JAPANESE SIRIKIMa FOBCI
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2673
COMMUNICATION INTgLLIGENCS SUMMARY
9 D»c«nber 1941
COUBINKD FLKKT - The Combined Fleet CoBmander-ln-Chief *ad Staff are
BiTT?7ed to be m Empire waters. There «PP"red ^o,f« * ^Pj^J. ^
in thia command in Mid-NoTcmber which Led to the belief that the
operations as mitlated by Second Fleet Commander in South East
Asia occasioned a supreme Commander in Empire waters with a
secondary Commander-in-Chief Combined Fleet in South Bast Asia
or elsewhere.
FIRST FLEET - First Fleet is beliered to be temporarily in the back-
^■^^^^ CT^und as some first fleet units should be operating with the
Second and Third Fleets and the majority of the remainder is
operating with the Carrier Divisions. Battle Ship Division
One and Two have disappeared as far as our identifications are
eoacemed. Battleship. PiTJa-io^ Three Iw believed to be operat-
w wl^h 6ar^i?Dl?St5nLwUi^]^utfil_iiri^
St -mTrjL_aM:XLRiSHIMA_are_ operating wlth_StrlkinOorce
#lln~the~'Blue_J*c.i^£iiL »nd HARtJNA and KONGO are probably with ^
iFe or aTZSliriking Force. Destroyer Squadron One aad_ ^..i*-
ABUKUMA are believed also in tErSrSSmXRS^£oT£ir^^omsa^
ailpa^crTn-pIain teit and_a»goslQtIong . It ftppgars JJ^AJj-that
5trvTWri7^yorcj^^rTa^still in the OahU;jlidway area (Lat. ^^A
Long.
ng fore
164 W).
SECOND FLEET - Cri^Uer Division Bight , of .this Fleet y? .^^^ °f ^^^^j^
Dj!.our^u T^^^^ strlkiirigF^<r-yi." Other units are probably ^th the
b-oamander-lg^nilef,- Second in Southeast Asia. One indication
is that the bulk of the Second Fleet is operating against
Malay and Singapore while the Third Fleet <^o£^eare of Luzon.
The indications continue that Second Fleet, Third ?!•«* »nd
Combined Air Force are under one command; also that Indo-
china Force and South China Force seem to have lost some of
the close association with this combination, probably be-
cause South China and Indo-China Force are holding the South
China Coast and Indo-China.
TniRD FLEET - Together with some units of the Combined Air Force is
Srobably operating against the Philippines and also in
Malay. The close connection of Palao with Third Fleet addresses
and Palao prior to war is the basis for this assumption.
FOURTH FLEET - Operating in the Mandates. No recent indications of
5^i?ations of this fleet outside of the Mandates. On one
hand there is a close connection between Fourth Fleet and
Fifth Fleet In the north; on the other hand Submarine Force
and Fourth Fleet must be working together in the defense of
the southern flank. Air Squadron Twenty-four figures pro-
minently in the traffic and is still in the Marshall area.
Saipan Radio initiated a broadcast similar to Takao. Jalult
appears to have taken over some of the promary duties of a
radio intelligence unit and Is assumed to be headquarters in
the "Field".
7^^
Page 1 of 1.
79716 O — 46 — pt. 17 16
2674 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COtaiTJNICATION INTELUGSNCTE SUMMAHY
9 December 1941
FIFTH TLgET - Definite Information that this fleet Is In the northern
area continues. OKlnato Radio handles traffic to and from the
Fifth. Fleet units. This fleet appeared to shift from Yokosuka
north to Oialnato area shortly before war opened. The composition
of this fleet Is still soaowbat obaeure but Is believed to hare
Tery few so called fleet Teasels. Probably as large percentage
of fleet auxiliaries and oonTerted air tenders?
CARRIBRS - #1 Striking Force operating in Blue Pacific. Believed to
comprise Carrier Division One - AiAOI (Flagship Cardivs)
KA^A
Carrier Division Two - HIRYD
Carrier Division
Four (or Five) - SHOKAKU
SORYTT
SHOKAJ
ZUIKAKU
Cruiser Division light
Destroyer Squadron One
KIBISHIMA - - First Section BatDlv Three.
HIYSI.
By deduction §2 StrUciag Force, if such an organization exists,
comprises Carrier Division Three - RYTJJO
HOSUO
Carrier Division
Five (or four) - KORYU
and probably other sombatant units. Carrier Division Three and
HYUJO were definitely associated with Second and Third Fleet
prior to war.
StraiARIHgS - A strong force of suhaarines believed to be operating
irlth Fourth Fleet and anpl^he^r force operating with parrier
Divisions. ^ "~~
CHIHA - China Fleet Connanders in normal bases or locations.
Page 2 of 2.
^OS
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2675
COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCS SUMMARY
10 December 1941
GENERAL - Traffic volume continues rery high with proportionate aaount
of high precedence traffic. The actual aaount of traffic inter-
cepted at Heeia has not increased naterially since the Eighth
but this is due to the concentration of efforts on obtaining
all transaissions of Japanese vessels in the Hawaiian area 8oa«-
what at the expense of obtaining the mazinua traffic on all
known circuits. There were very few signals Identified as
emanating from the immediate Hawaiiein area. A_great many bear-
ings haTe been obtained the last two days in the a^eotor £^i -
300 true from uanuy~¥Ince aosT^eHlls Involved have been tenta-
tively Identlftea' as vessels in the North China and Takao areas,
increased activity in that region may be the reason therefor.
The Navy Minister originated the following dispatch to the
Secretary of the Combined Fleet which was broadcasted from
Takao Radio:
"164. ?roB the Cabinet, Prime Minister and Adialral Arlhana
Takaza Igo received a request for a congratulatory telep^aa
as follows addressed to all hands (7).
"Congratulations (upon) there having been attained manifold
results (war results) (at) the outset of the naval war. We
pray for the success of the fortunes of war for all ranks of
officers and enlisted Ben*.
COMBIHED rLBET - No change.
FIRST rTiytT - No indications of any change. The calls Identified as
First Fleet have practically disappeared from the traffic lately.
This is sutnitted as a partial strengthening of the opinion that
the First Fleet has lost its identity as such and has been split
between Carrier Divisions and the large task force operating
in the Malay area. The report of United States bomber action
on a HARUNA type Battleship in the Philippine area, if true,
substantiates this.
SECOND AND THIRD FLEETS - ApRsar to be "intact" in the South eastern
Asia area.
FOURTH FLEETS - Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Fleet and some of the
Fourth Fleet vessels definitely show in the Mandates. It is
believed that Air Squadron Twenty-four is still in the Mar-
shall area and that the Co«nander-in-Chief , Fourth Fleet is
in the Truk area. While complete coverage at Heeia is not
possible under present conditions, the available traffic
does not indicate the previous association between Falao and
Second-Third Fleet combination.
^A
2676 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COMMUNICATION INTELLIGBNCg SUMMARY
riPTH rr.TCHT -. No apparent change in the available Information on this
fleet. Considerable actlrity has been noted in the High North
and Ominato area shore stations.
SUBMARINES - Comtander Sulmarine Force continues to show in the
routing of traffic to and from Mandate stations, particularly
the Marshall Island area. From all the reports of submarine
aotlTity in the Hawaiian area and the well established fact
that Subnarine Squadrons Fire and Six went south to Malay
prior to declarations of war, it appears that practically all
submarines are away from Empire waters or that our estimates
of Japanese submarine strength were lower than actual numbers.
CARRIERS - Very little radio actlrity the past twenty-four hours. One
possible significant clue to Carrier Dirlsions future operatioue
was contained in a despatch from Tokyo Radio to the Commander
of First Air Fleet flagship, AKAGI, listing a long string of
Tokyo Broadcast messages which it is assumed prorided a reminder
or check on those dispatches which should have been received
for the First Air Fleet during the period 7-10 December. To
this office, the inference is that for the past three days (dur-
ing radio silence in Hawaiian waters), a check up was not practi-
cable but now may be done without breaking radio silence. IVhile
this may be far-fetched, it still remains a possibility.
Page 2 of 2.
ffZs
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2677
EXHIBIT NO. 115B
PACIFIC FLEET
INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
#45-41
27 NOVEMBER 1941
2678 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Cincpac File No.
A8/FFl/(25)
Serial 01954
COOTIPaJTIAL
UNITED STAT2S PACIFIC FLEET
U.S. 3. PEIWSYLVAi^'IA, Flagship ,, . HRKv
Pearl Harbor, T.H.
November 27, 19/.1.
Conunander- in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
PACIFIC FLEET.
Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-Al.
(A) Subject Bulletin.
Enclosure (A) is forwarded herevdth for information.
From:
To:
Subject:
Snclosure:
1.
2. BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDSIfflAL NATURE OF BOTH THE SOURCE
AND INFORLIATION CONT/JNED HEREIN, IT IS OF rHE HIGHEST E.TORT/J.'CE THAT
THE CONFIDENTIAL CHARACTER OF THIS BE C^RLFULLY PRESERVED.
3. This information obtained from Naval Intelligence sources
has been reproduced by the Conviander-in-Chief, United States Pacific
Fleet. Any request for additional copies of this docu;Tient v/ill be made
to the Commander-in-Chief, and not to the Division of Naval Intelligence.
4» /»dditional copies shall not be ra^^e. This bulletin should
be retained for study and reference (plus subsequent additions or correc-
tions), during the present National Enert^encj'.
"^P. C. CROSLSY,
By direction.
DISTRIBUTION; (7ai-4L)
List I, Case 3; P, X.
^itl antic Fleet /'J.;
Asiatic Fleet Al;
One copy each to:
F/JU, NTS, NC4, ND11-ND14,
NB49, Rdo. k Snd. Lr.b.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2679
CCNTIDEOTIAL Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41
(A) ORaAJJIZATIOri C? T;^ J^rAiJE5i£ FLZloTS
Major Fleot Cori'^-.ands -
Coinbinjil F!; -3i.t auc' First Fleet -
Cor.'.bincd Fleet a.id Second Fleot -
Third Fleot -
Foui-th Fleet -
Fifth Fleet -
SL^ith Fleet - (3.ub.,iari le Fleet)
Carrier Fleet -
Combined Air Force -
Trai'. for Ccr.biiiod Fl.eat -
vTapfinese liaval Forces in C'-.i.ia -
Pai-^es 1 to 12 inclusive
a^c 1
2
3
4
5 fnd 6
I
7
S
9
10
11 and 12.
(D) J.nPATGSE F0:.:£3 a ';)
Pa-3er> 13 ^r\<^. 14.
Qen-':ra-l Situation.
Air D^.stribution.
Tsblc "A" sl:Ov/in: cistri'r.utioa o'2 .-.laterif.l and riersoniel forces
in i.andatcs (2 na ;co to be nasted tC;^ether) .
Gkotc^ of PALIC {vi^^X)
3k%.'tch of '.'..ALA!;^. !!-.rbor, olc.
Sketch of JALUIT i>rl-:.-r, etc.
2680 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDSTTTIAL-
Intelligence Bulletin Mo, 45-^1.
(A) ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANES5 FLEETS, October 30, 1941. (10574)
The following revision of 0p-l6-l'-2, O.N.I. Serial #27-41 supersedes
and replaces the former report on this subject.
The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of
fleet commands . This has arisea fron ihe regroupin,>T of aircraft carriers
and seaplane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special
task forces in connection vdth the southward advance into Indo-China.
The regrouping has resulted in a notable specialization within the 'various
coraniands, as shov<n below.
IIAJOR FLEET C0L3.1AMDS
I, Coabined Fleet
1. First Fleet
2. Second Fleet
3. Third Fleet
4. Fourth Fleet
5. Fifth Fleet
6. Sixth Fleet
7. Carrier Fleet
(Battle Force)
(Scouting Force)
(Blockade &
Transport Force)
(tiandate Defense
Force)
*
(Submarine. Fleet)
(Aircraft Carriers)
8. CoinbLned Air Force (Seaplane tenders,
etc.)
3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv,
2 Desrons
4 Crudivs, 2 desrons, etc.
Small craft.
1 Desron, 1 Subron and
many small units.
?
6 Subrons
5 Cardivs
4 Airrons, & shore
based planes.
II. Japanese Naval Forces (Staff Headquarters)
in China.
1. First China Exped. (Central China)
Fleet .
2. Second China iixped. (South China)
Fleet .
3. Third China Exped. (No: th China)
Fleet.
4. Southern E^tped. (Saigon)
Fleet.
1 PG and 3 DD's
Gunboats
1 CA, 1 CL and small
craft.
Torpedo Boats, etc.
1 CL, transports and
mino craft.
- 1 -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2681
OONFIDSNTIAL
Intelligence Bulletin No, ^5-^1 •
The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than
ever before. Liore merchant ships have been taken over by the Nav;-, and
the line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the
time. The base forces and guard divisions in the l.andated Islands have
also greatly increased the strenfjth of the Navy, which is on full-war-
time footing.
COMBINED FLEST AND FIRST FLEET
YAliAlIOTO Isoroku, CinC (Admiral)
NAGATO, Flagship
FIRST FLEET
Batdiv One
NnGATO (F)
Desdiv 27
LUTSU
SHIRATSUYU (F)
YAMASHIRO
ARi;JS
YUGURE
Batdiv Two
SHIGURE
FUSO (F)
ISS
Desron Throe
KYUGA
SEI®«I (F)
Batdiv Three
HIYSI (F)
Desdiv 11
KOIIGO
FUBUKI (F)
KIRI3im.iA
SHIRJiYUKI
♦ HARUIIA
HATSUYUKI
Crudiv Six
Desdiv 12
KhKO (F)
oHIR^'JOJlIO (F)
FURUTAKA
sHiNonc;^;
AOBA
USUGOMO
KDIUGASA
h:uR;jajMO
Desron One
Desdiv 19
ABUKUIJ. (F)
ISC'N.-iil (F)
SHIKIN.ill
Desdiv 6
x%lrti]r2>il
II'iAZUCHI (F)
URAN«tn
IWAZULiA
3iiZ>JJAL:i
Desdiv 20
KIBIKI
;aiagiri (f)
;^^GiRi
Desdiv 21
YUGIRI
IKIIOHI (F)
Si.GIRI
K^TSUHjjyj
* MOTS: The HxJlUN>» has been inactive
H«T3U3HII.O
during 1941, and is probably under-
V/AIL'vBA
goin^i major repairs.
TOTAL
10
BB
4
CA
2
a
!7
DD
- 2 -
2682 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDS?mAL Intelligence Bulletin No-.A5-U.
tX)lIBINED FLECT
S£COCT) FLEET
TAKAO, Flagship
Desron Two (Cont'd)
Desdiv 16
KATSnCAZE
YUKIKAZE
^ilATSUKAZS
TOKITSUKAZS
I
Desdiv 18
fCASUtil
iJiARS
KAGERO
SKIRANUHI
Crudiv Four
TAKAO (f)
ATAQO
CKOKAI
lAYk
Crudiv Five *
liTOKO (F)
NACKI
KAC3UR0
Crudiv Seven
KUtiAlio (f)
liOGAia
i:IKUl«IA
SUZUYA
Crudiv Sight
TONS (F)
CHIKUM
Desron Tvfo
JINTSU (F)
Desdiv 8
ASASHIO (F)
ARASHIO
OSHIC
MICHISHIO
Desdiv 15
KUROSHIO
OYASHIO
NATSUSKIO
HAYASHIO
Desron Four
NAKA (F)
Desdiv 2
YUDACHI (F)
iOJRASAi^E
karusaic:e
S/JiilD/iRE
Desdiv 9
ASAGUkO
YAkAGUMO
UINEGll-iO
NATSUGUliO
Desdiv 24
K.iVAICAZ3 (F)
YriiAKAZE
SUZUKi^ZE
UMIKAZE
* NOTE: There is a possibility that a new cruiser
has been added to Crudiv 5«
TOT 'J,
Ij Ca
2 a
28 DD
-3-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2683
CONFIPaiTlAl Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-/*l.
THIRD FLEET
TAX.-JlhSHI Ibo - Vice Admiral
NAG.'iRA, Flagship
NORTKEK] BLOCKADE FORCE
CIIOGSI (F)
Subdiv
Subdiv
2nd BLOCK.'J)E FORCE
Desron Five
NaTORI (F)
Desdiv 5
jiSiJCi^E
H.JIUKAZE
Mj'.TSUK.^E
HAT.JCAZS
Deadly 12
S..TSUKI
FUkllTSUKI
LiIN,.TSUKI
N^GATSUKI
Desdiv 34
HfJCitZE
<iKIK/lZE
yuio^zs
T..CHI1L.ZE
TOTAL
1 a
12 DD
1 AS
6 SS
6 CM
12 ai
6 XPG
12 PC
46 aP
1st BASE FORCE
Maru (F)
ianela;;^er D^ivisipn
ITSbTvUSHE,:.-
H;.Tb-UTAic;.
Tf7
Mine Sv>ecper Division 1 and 21
i^Jii-l .^-7
Ai:-3 i.Li-9
xJ'.i-4 AL-IO
^;-5 .'x-ii
Gunboat Division 1
6 Gunboats
(Converted Fishing Vessels)
SUBCHi.SER SQU.J)RON
(F)
Subchaser Division 1 and 11
PC-1 PC-7
PC-2 PC-8
PC-3 PC-9
Subchaser Division 21 and 31
PC-4 PC-10
PC-5 PC-11
PC-6 PC-12
27 ^iP - Ma-aes
Unknovm
2nd Base FORCE
Maru,
- 4 -
Minelayer Division 17
SHIRi.TAKn.
Yi.EYtl'-LiL
KUN.JIRI
At least 5 other men of war, and
17 merchant ships.
2684 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
OCNFIDSOT'IAL Intelligence Bulletin No. ^5-U..
FOURTH FLEgr
HIRATA - Vice Admiral
i'vASHBiA, Flagship
Crudiv Ei,';hteen
TEimYU (f;
TATSUTA
lOSKBIA
Desron Six
YUBARI (F)
Desdiv 29
CITE
KAYAT2
ivSAl'IAGI
YUKiJII
Desdiv 30
tUTSUKI (F)
KI3ARAGI
YAYOI
lIOCHITSTn'J
Subron Seven
JINGEI
Subdiv 26
RO-60
RO-61
RO-62
Subdiv 27
RO-65
RO-66
RO-67
Subdiv 33
RO-63
RO-64
RO-68
Subdiv
e XPG
Survey and Patrol Division
KOSHU
KAT3URIKI (Oi)
ko;:abashi (as)
Repair and Salvage Division
NAGAURii (ivIARU)
- 5 -
i 3rd B,>SE FORCE
Palao, Headquarters
luaru (F)
Guard Division 3
liaru
Subdiv 6
RC-56
RO-57
RO-53
RO-59
Subchaser Division 55
luaru (F)
XPG 551
yj>G >52
XPG 553
:^PG 554
(?)
(?)
(?)
(?)
9 /J' or AK
THIRD DUEMCE FORCE (HQ Pi'JJiO)
Liscellaneous Forces Ashore, in-
cluding rtlr Group #16 and TOBI
detacl-iraent of 4th Defence Force
Detach, 4th Def . Force
II
11
II
n
«
II H
II II
M II
It
11
H
(EstLivate these unknown locations to
be 3C3^L, HELEN PwE«!F, ULITHI, YAP and
.wMGU^).
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2685
C!0NFID5!ITIaL
Intelligence Bulletin Ho. Z^5-/^l.
FOURTH FL3ET (Cont'd.)
4th B..32 FORCE
Truk, Headcnaartera
'" I-Iaru (F)
Guard Division 4
FIFTH D5FSMCE F0RC3 (HQ - S/.IP;JJ)
Miscellaneous Forces .'kShore, includinf
Air Group #1S
Tenian Detachment, 5th Defence Force
P:.G:a\' " " n "
i-iaru (F)
6th BASS FORCE
4 «P or iX.
FOURTH DEFZ'JCS FORCE (H'5-TRUK
Liscellaiieous Forces ashore,
includiap «ir Group #17 and
Fonape Detachment of 4th Def . Force
Kusaie Detachment "
Clol Detachment '•
Greenwich Detachment
Uortlock Detachi7ient
Pingslap Detachment
Pulu'.vat Detach-nent
Lamotrek Detachjent
(Hall ?) "
Jaluit, Headquarters
T^jaJH.UJ IL^RU (F)
I'iine Sweeper Division 16
M..GATA i'^MJ W)
CHOKAI \Lm
IKUTA iim
(This may
5th B,^E FORCE
Saipan, Headquarters
SHOEi l:.jiu (F)
Guard Division 5
Ga.iposition unknc.vn
ilinelayer Division I9
CKINC3HB;.. 1JT~
TOKLV^
Subchaser Division ju
i:;.3!ii If)
JJ'G 561 (?)
:iPG 562 (?)
:{PG 563 (?)
Gunboat Division 8
Composition uakno^m
9 i'J' or ;JC
Maru be the S/JLVAGE
Liaru Unit known to
Maru be in 6th Base
Force)
Subchaser Division 5
PC-51
PC-52
PC-53
SIXTH DEFENCE FORCE (HQ-JALUIT)
KAIKEI iisru
*r'5 FUKU Liaru
Laru
Lliscellaneous Forces ashore
including AIR GROUP jfl9 at HIISJI,
Jaluit ntoll and probable ^ir
Groups at YfOTJE and Kl7,.J,Ji;iN and
RUCTTC Is. (Kv/ajalein Atoll)
Detachjnent 6th Defence Force
IC.;..j;iEIN Is. (Kwajaloin .-.toll)
T;J10A Is. (Laloelap .^toll)
El^irJETOK Is. (Eniwetok Atoll)
UJZL;JIG Atoll
EMY50R Is. (Jaluit Atoll)
EIIEJI Is. ( " " )
V.'OTJE ..toll - Detach, of 6th Def .Force
UTIRIK .;toll- " " " " »
TOT-i
- 6 -
4
CL
16
SS
15
XPG
9
DD
1
Survey Ship
3
PC
2
A3
3
Oi
4
X«il
41
.•,D
or
l\V
2686 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONFIDSHTLiL intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.
FIFTH FLEET
a (F)
The co-Tiposition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unl-Jiown.
The Flagship has been reported at liaijuru.
Subron One
T«IGEI (F)
Subdiv 1
1-9
1-15
1-16
1-17
Subdiv 2
I-IS
1-19
1-20
I Subron Two
KITAGjUJI (F)
Subdiv 7
I-l
1-2
1-3
1-7
Subdiv e
1-4
1-5
1-6
I Subron Three
NAGOn iiABU (F)
Subdiv 11
1-74
1-75
Subdiv 12
1-8
1-68
1-69
1-70
SIXTH FLEET
(Submarine Fleet)
KjiTORI, Flagship
Subdiv 20
1-71
1-72
1-73
Subron Ten
Subron Five
tURA (F)
Subdiv 28
1-59
1-60
S\ibdiv 29
1-61 (Sank 10-2-41)
1-62
1-64
Subdiv 30
1-65
1-66
K.JUSAKI (F) *
Subdiv 18
1-53
1-54
1-55
Subdiv 19
1-56
1-57
1-58
Subdiv 21
RO-33
RO-34
* HOTS: The old sub-tender
iC'iRASAKI appears to have been
recomnis sioned .
TOT/X
Subron Six
KniU (F)
Subdiv 9
1-123
1-124
Subdiv 13
1-121
1-122
-7-
3
CL
2
AS
1
IS-
42
ss
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2687
CO^^ID^rriAL Intellisence Bullt-tin IT-. v5-/J-.
CARRER FLSZT (Cardivs)
CV KAGA Flagship
:ardiv 1
AKAGI
KAGA (F)
Desdiv 7
ODORC (F)
USKIO
AKEBONO
AKATSUKI
Ce.rdiv 4
ZUIK.^JOJ
SKOKAI-IU
Desdiv 3
KCi'.AZS
SIIIOKAZS
N;jn:KAZS
KIJI'IkKAZE
Cardiv 2
SORYU (F)
HIRYU
Desdiv 23
UZUKI
KIKUTSUKI
LUKxvTSUKI
YUZUKI
Cardiv
CV KCRYU
CV KASUGA (LLiRU)
Cardiv 3
RYU JO (F)
HOSKO
Desdiv 17
ISflKAZE
URAK."iZS
ILiiftKAZE
TOTAL
10. CV
16 DD
- 8 -
2688 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(X)IIFID2MTI/>L Intclligenoe Bulletin No. 45-41.
OOLBIMED AIR FORCE
Kanoya Naval Air Station. Hdcitrs,
Shore-based land planes and seaplanes. The orfanization provides for
great nobility. Air units pre ordered to work with other forces, and re-
turn to the Combined Air Force pool v/hen their mission is fulfilled. The
named Air Groups (e.g. the Takao ."dr Group) are not tied do'.vn to their sta-
tions, but are sent freely whereever the;' are needed. Furthermore, the
various air s'^uadrons and air groups frequently split into smaller units,
and are scattered over wide areas.
Because of this extreme mobility, the picture is constantly changing.
Accordingly, the following list makes no attempt to indicate all the tem-
porary groupings into which the various units may be combined.
3i:ip-b;.3ed s^uad;
rtOMS I
shorh;-3.v3sd ..ir groups
j>ir Ron 6
KnI.iII0:.7A rjJ^U (F)
FUJIK^VA luRU
OJJO LiJlU
(Has been working with the 3rd Fleet)
;dr Ron 7
CHITOSE (F)
CHIYODa
LtlZUHO
(Has been working with the 1st Fleet)
Air Ron 24
K.uvIOI (F)
1 7^V
Yokohaj.ia lAr Group
Chitosc rtir Group
(Has been working ^d-th the 4th Fleet)
Patrol Squadron 2
MOTOHO
(Formerly with Air Ron 6)
- 9 -
8th idr Group
10th ^dr Group
nth idr Group
12th Air Group
14th *dr Group
l6th Air Group
17th Air Group
13th ^ir Group
19th rtir Group
23rd ^dr Group
Chichi jina
Chinkai
Genzan
Hyakurihara (or
liloribara)
Iv7al<uni
Kanoya (Hdqtrs.
)
Kashina
Kasumipaura
Sasebo
Kisarazu
Suzuka
Kure
Takao
llaizuru
Tateyama
Cita
Tsukuba
Oiidnato
Usa
Oraura
Yatabe
Saeki
Yokosuka
tot;j. 1
5 AV
3 XAV
35 Air Groups
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2689
C01TID:::m.X Intelli.'^eiice Bulletin ilo. U5-h2..
TILJJ! FCR CCiairED FLSET
SKIRETCKO
TSURUi:i
SKIRIY.i
ONX-
H..r..Toi-;o
.JL-vSHI
LiLTiOTO
OTC:-iiU
S]SrT3U
- 10 -
Total;
3
.-.c
1
.J
2
.Ji
1
..c
T_
Ice Breaker
1
Tar'^et Ship
79716 O — 46 — pt. 17 17
2690 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CWTIDE^jTIAL
Intellicence Bulletin I'o. 45-U..
JAPAI>IESE NAVAL FORCES IN CimiA
KOGA, Uineichi - Vice Admiral
IZUhiO, Flagship
SHAilGHAI BASE FORCE
ASUGA
TSUGA
YHBl
HASU
Shanghai Harbor Affairs oection
Special Haval Landim^ Force. Shanghai
NAnking Base Force
Special Neval Landing Force, Kanl-cing
TOTAL
1
1
3
OCA
PG
DD
CEI'ITRaL CKIKA fleet, or
FIRST EXPEDITIONARY FLEET
SOUTH CHI^'i. FLEET, or
SBCOiro EZf'EDITION.ilY FLEET
KOLJ^TSU, Teruhisa - Vice Adadral
UJI, Flagship
Patrol Division 11
ATAKA
SETA
LvTADA
HIRA •
HOZU
TDBA
ATAm
fut;iU
FUSHBII
SUlilDA
HA3HID/.TE
Air Group 10
Hankov; Base Force
Kiukiang Base Force
Gunboat Division ? ?
SHINFUKU 1:ARU (F)
HITONOSE
CHIIOJBU
TOTid,
4
10
1
PG
PR
NIBil, Llasaiohi, Vice i»drairal
ISUZU, Flagship
Crudlv 15
ISUZIJ (?)
.i£HIG;JLi
Patrol Division Ik
S/vGii
;jii-i7
iX-ia
Torpedo Boat Division 1
0T0.1I
HAY-i^'US.»
HIYOIiCRI
KAS:.SAGI
Guard Division 15
Guard Division 16
Canton Base Force
i'lmoy Base Force
Hainan Is. Base Force
13 Special Service Ships
TOTAL
1 CA
1 CL
4 TB
1 PG
2 tii.
13 Wise.
- 11 -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2691
CONFIDi::NTi;a intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.
j;j;j'issE Nav;i. forces i.i chi:... (Cont'c".)
NORTH chin;. FLSET, or
THIRD EXPEDITIOn.JlY FLEET
SUGIY.'v'Ii., Rokozo, Vice ..d-airal
r.V..TS, Flagship
Patrol Division 12
rv;.TE (F)
fuJIRI !-i;jIU
ToiTedo Boat Division 11
HATO
s;.Gi
K.JU
KIJI
Torpedo Boat Division 21
CHIDORI
WJi.ZURU
TOluOZURU
K«TSUK«RI
Gvinboat Division 1
Gunboat Division 2
Gunboat Divjeion 13
Gvyiboat Division 14
Tfin/^ao Base Forc9
S0UTH3RIJ E:PEDITI0N.>RY FLEsfl
K>\Si\ll (F) (CL
SHIMUSHU
AP
(CU)
LTOTAL 1
1
oc;.
1
DD
e
TB
1
AP
-12-
2692 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COMFIDS?T'T'IAL Intelligence Bulletin No. /,5-a-
(B) JAPANESE FORCES AND I'JSTaLUTIOIIS IN ai L^.ANDATSD ISLANDS.
1. FOURTH FLEET, which maj' be termed the LiivNDHTS FLEET, apparently
administers the Naval activities, afloat snd ashore and. also the Army
Garrisons units in the Landated Islands. Vft-iile the forces afloat ex-
ercise administrative jurisdiction over the Mandate area, the Yokosuka
Naval District is directly responsible for the suoply of stores, material
and provisions. Truk is the headi'uarters for supply and munitions and
has been principle Fourth Fleet operatinf^ base.
2. Up to the present the entire i Mandated Islands have been lii^htl^y
garrisoned, the majority of the garrison units being Naval Defence Forces
("special Landing Forces" corresponding to our Marine Corps) but some
Arcy troops are believed to be on SAIPAN, PALAO, POiIAPE, TRUK and JALUIT.
The total carrison force has been estimated at fifteen thousand. In
addition, there are Civil Engineering Units engaged in develonr.ient work
on various islands. Working in conjunction with these are naval en-
gineering units, naval ordnance specialists, nav3r yard units with civ-
ilian navy yard workers and tcci-jiicians. Thfj netv;oric of naval radio
stations has been greatly expanded, nctecrolo'p.cal stations snd hi^
frequency direction finders installed at strategic locations, aviation
facilities increased both in scope and number, and shore-batteries
emplaced on strategic islands of key Atolls.
3. It is apparent that a decision to expedite the fortification,
cxpcjision of facilities and niliterization of the Mandated Islands, v;as
made late in 1940, probably concurrently v;ith the si^nin^ of the Tri-
partite Pact. The movement of n?.val auxiliaries, snill and mediu;?. cargo,
freight-passenger vessels ( ex-roc rch^nt marine) to the Mandates began in
December, 1940, and hr.s increased in scope and number until some seventy
odd vessels are engaged in this ti'affic, the average nunber present in
the Mandate area at any one tine being some forty odd vcss.ils.
4. The function of supply of munitions, supplies, m?.terir.l and
provisions to the Liandates is under the YDI'OSUKA Naval District v/ith a
Headquarters for Civil Engineering, Munitions, Military Stores and
Supplies for the Kandatcs centered at Tiiik, although this function is
nomally under the jurisdiction of Yokosuka as the ilandates ere in the
First (HQ - YOKOSUKA) Naval District.
5. The Commanders of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, ."nd 6th Base Forces are
subordinate coniiiandcrs under CQruaander-in-Chi>,f , 4th Fleet; they have a
designated Flagship and a Headquarters or Administrative Section, the
latter remainin-^ ashore at the home base rerardless of the movements of
the command or the Flagship. Ea.ch Base Force contaias r. DEFE'ICE FOaCE,
detachments of which ar^ stationed on outlyia; islands of that general
area. Four Ro Class submarines have been reported to be attached to
the PALAO BASE FOKCE.
- 13 -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2693
conFiDE^rriAL
Intslligonce Bulletin No. 45-41.
6. Considerable air activity has baen in evidence in the SAIPAJ',
PALAO-PELELIU, TRUK, POWAPE and J.UUIT-CTaJALEIM crcf.s. Close coopera-
tion has been noted between the Defence Forces and the Aircraft activi-
ties at their hone bases. Foroifn stomers ncarinr: tho 3-'JF.'jI r.rca hf.vc
been subject to rircrr^.ft obscrv.tion ?rid closo scnitiny by P-^.trol plrjies,
Bombers r.nd Fighters. Heavy 1-nd p?L-'>,nc bonibars ?jnd patrol plf.ncs, un-
doubtedly OR.U'IGE, have mf>dc rccomrdssr.nco flights over the Gilbert
Islands (TARAiV;., BUTAHTiJlI, and BERU).
7. The distribution of material, personnel, end inst?J.lr.tion3 in
the Mandated Islands is indicated in table "A". V/hile this is '-djnittcdly
incomplete and may be subject to inaccure-cies, it represents the latest
and- best intelligence on this subject. In addition to those listed in
Table A, there are a number of potential bases, principally in the lagoons
of the naturallj'- protected atolls, v/hich may be used as eaergency bases
or may be earmariced for "priority tv;o" development.
8. The latest information (up to 25 Noveniber 1941) indicates that
the present distribution of the Mr forces (believed to be a teinpoi'ary
strategical disposition rather than a perr.ianent assignment) in the Mandates
is:
Identification Location Includes
Alrron 24
Harshall Area
11th Air Group PALAO Area
l6th Air Group PaLAO Area
17th Air Group TRUi:
18th Air Group SAIPAN
19th Air Group HiIEJI
Air Station (and Air Group?)
Air Station (and Air Group?)
? AIR GROUP TRUK
(AV) I^iiilOI
(AV?) Ham
ex-CKIT03E Air Group
ex-YOKOHAlJl Air Grouo
Is. (Jaluit Atoll)
'.VOTJE
The exact composition of these Air Groups is unknown and the estinates of
total/ strength in the liandates var^ widely; 62 - 263 pianos.
plane
Last Page of Intellif^ence Bulletin No. 45-41.
- 14-
2694 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2695
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2696 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Reef
OONFIDSynAL
PALAO ISLAtOS
(PEL3W)
ICAYANCEL
'.-^ * — ffumored
y Seaplane
A Base under
.'• constructiont
.-tossoi^PAssAQl. ■•/ ■
\-.\irLeet Vt::;. ,
\J&io^6rkige '
0
i I&aored
: /Fleet - V
, :' I Anchorage ^*s
(Ife«fabe««ng) •ni.x'aX.
Araka^aan-^
A Bil^lthu^ I
/(Babeldaop)
Observation tower (or
Batterv Control St»-
.on) and Shore Bat-
tery Emplacements
under construction*
Dismantled guns re-
cently unloaded from
Transports were "Ten-
foot" barrels six-
inch bore" 4
isirracks .
/UOTE: All Lighthouses are
• now undoubtedly being used
for observation posts or
Battexy Caitrol Stations.
Infonaazit believes batteries
are eoqxLaced near each light*
house. All are "PROHIBITn)
ABSAS".
Laad Plena
Barracks
Shore Batteries
Angaur I.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2697
2698 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
■ OONFIDENTIAL Intelligence Bulletin No. ^5-U.
NOTZS TO ACCOi.iPATJY SiCETCTi OF J;XUIT
1. Aviation Facilities - T-wo landing fields, each vrith a hangar cap-
able of housing twenty raedimi sized planes. En.?:inecrinf Shop (canoufla^,ed)
situated between the two fields, i.djacent storehouses (c^lv. iron) caia-
ouflaged. Diesel fuel and gasoline stora,7:e in canouflacod, above-ground
tanks adjacent to air fields. Diesel povier plant (June-1940). Eighty
planes reported based here (November, 1940) .
On beach opposite southern air fiold is Naval ^ir Station having
small rajnp and one h?.ngar for seaplanes (June 1940). This may be an aux-
iliai:;'' as present indications point to naval ?lr Base on Imieji (SlIDJ) Is.
2. Headquarters - T^vo stor;' concrete building. Lar^e buildiiir; to SE
of Headquarters is Post Office and Telephone centi^al. Flagstaff adjacent
to Post Office is also used as signal tov;er. In town are niai\v one storj''
concrete- stores. Good bitumen and powdered coral roads.
3. Radio tov/ers - T^vo steel combination radio and lookout tcPiWers 4oO
feet high. Diesel cn,-^inc power plant near southern tov/er (1940).
4. Shore Batteries - Bases and trunnions along the three quarter
mile v/r.torfront street called the iCarine Parade (1940) (guns not mounted
in June, 1940 but are now). ^.Iso three 6" guns and a battery of four
4,7" field pieces. Barracks for regular garrison of 500 soldiers (1940 J
(probably enlarged now) .
Mobile Batteries - Kiachine guns and i-j<. guns mounted on Diesel-
tractor towed trailers. 10" searclilights on pneum:.tic tired truck assem-
blies (1940).
5. Goveramcnt Pier - 600 feet long, 75 feet wide (l8'-25' alongside)
equipped with two railroad tracks and three 10 ton mobile ci'anes. Store-
house on end of pier (1940).
6. Mole - 150' concrete mole constructed parallel to shore line along
NW comer of Ji;BOR (1933).
7. Conspicuous red building (may be red- roofed building) (1936) .
8. South Seas Trading Go. PI2R (IJ.B.K. or "N;iSO") also called
"SICDNEY Pier". Two water tanlcs end warehouses. Co?l and briquette storage
(1938) .
9. Two buildings (reseiabling hangars) with tracks leading down to
water from one of them (beaching gear? — small maxine rralway?). A gas-
oline Btorago located near the tuo buildings. (1936).
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2699
2700 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 116
Op-SOC-MD
(SC)N20-12
Serial 07830
Confidential
February 11, 1941.
From : The Chief of Naval Operations.
To. The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance.
Subject : Experimental and Development Work on Nets and Booms.
Reference : ALUSNA London Dispatch 041625 of February 5, 1941.
1. Reference (a) requested information concerning all promising experimental
and development work on nets and booms done by the U. S. Navy since March 1940.
2. As far as this Office is aware, no such work has been done oher than the
making of minor modifications to the Admiralty designs. It is considered that
experimental and development work should be undertaken. If necessary, addi-
tional personnel for this purpose should be secured.
3. There appears an urgent need for an anti-torpedo net which can be laid and
removed in certain harbors in a short time for temporary u.se, and which will
give good if not perfect protection from topedoes tired from planes. The present
Admiralty type net is designed to withstand torpedoes armed with cutters, and
its appurtenances are very heavy. A lighter net which will stop a torpedo not
armed with cutters would furnish some protection, especially against torpedoes
which would explode on contact with a metal net.
4. Effort should be made to reduce the weights of the present Admiralty nets
and booms and their appurtenances without reducing their efficiency in order that
they may be more readily handled. As a beginning, it is also suggested that plans
be made to test .sections of the old A/S net and of the new, as well as indicator
nets, by attacking submarines. While such tests may duplicate British experi-
ments, valuable lessons may be learned. It is requested that this office be kept
informed of development work and all tests and experiments conducted with nets
and booms.
H. R. Staek. .
OP-30C1-AJ
(SC)N20-12
Serial 09330
Confidential
Navy Department
Office of the Chief of Navai. Operations
Washington, Feb. 15, 1941.
From : The Chief of Naval Operations
To: The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks. Pearl
Harbor.
1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T bafiies within Pearl
Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the
relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl
Harbor. In addition the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room
limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.
2. Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in
planning the installation of anti-torpedo baffles witiiin harbors, among which the
following may be considered :
(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be as.sumed necessary
to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. Cine hundred and fifty feet of water is
desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes
is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and ISO knots. Desirable height
for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is
necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.
(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching
and leaving berths.
(c) Ships should be able to get a\vay on short notice.
(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges and
harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.
(e) P>affles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by
shipping.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2701
(f) BaflOies should be suflBcient distance from anchored vessels to insure the
vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baflBle.
(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane
attack from the land side most difficult.
(h) Vulnerable areas in the battles should be so placed as to compel attacking
planes to come within effective range of anti-aircraft batteries before they can
range their torpedoes.
(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection, balloon barrages,
and aircraft protection.
(j) Availability of naturally well protected anchorages within a harbor from
tori)edo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as
a fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory baffles will be difficult because of
the congestion.
3. As a matter of interest the successful attacks at Taranto were made at very
low launching heights at reported ranges by the individual aviators of 400 to
13C0 yards from the battleships, but the depths of irutrr in which the torpetloes
were launched were between 14 and 15 fathoms. The attacks were made in the
face of intensive and apparently erratic anti-aircraft lire. The eastern shore
line of the anchorage and moorings were protected by luunerous balloon bar-
rages, but there was no trawler borne balloon barrage to the west. The torpedoes
were apparently dropped inside of the nets, probably A/T nets.
4. It is considered that certain large bays and harbors, where a fleet or large
force of heavy ships may be anchored and exposed with a large body of water
on an entire flank, should have that flank protected by a series of baffles if the
water is deep enough for launching torpedoes. The main fleet anchorage at
S'capa Flow, for instance, has an A/T net extending slightly to the north of a
line between Calf of Flotta and Cava Island protecting the main fleet anchorage.
The depth of water where this net is laid is approximately 17' fathoms. On the
other hand constricted harbors, in which practically all available space is taken
up by anchorages, and which is relatively deep probably must depend upon other
defense measures. It might be possible and practicable to provide in some places,
which are not protected by relatively shallow water, anti-torpedo baffles prac-
tically surrounding a limited [2] number of berths for large ships, such
as battleships or carriers. An extreme example of this is furnished at the pres-
ent time by the French at Dakar, where double nets surround the Richelieu ; she
is placed similarly as in a dry dock, and evidently would have to open a section
of the net to be hauled clear. The depth of water at Dakar, however, is very
shallow.
5. The present A/T nets are very expensive, extremely heavy, their heavy
anchors and moorings take up about 200 yards of si)ace perpendicular to the
line of the net, take a long time to lay, and are designed to stand up under heavy
weather conditions. There is apparently a great need for the development of a
light efficient torpedo net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within
protected harbors and which can be readily removed. It is hoped that some
such net can be developed in the near future.
6. Recommendations and comments of the Commander-in-Chief are especially
desired.
[s] H. R. Stabk.
Copy to : CinC Atlantic Fleet.
CinC Asiatic Fleet.
2702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[1] Oi>-30Cl-AJ
(SC)N20-12
Ser. 010230
Confidential _
Navy Department,
Offick of the Chief of Naval Operations,
February 17, 1941.
From : The Chief of Naval Operations.
To : The Commandant, First Naval District
The Commandant, Third Naval District
The Commandant, Fourth Naval District
The Commandant, Fifth Naval District
The Commandant, Sixth Naval District
The Commandant. Seventh Naval District
The Commandant, Eighth Naval District
The Commandant, Tenth Naval District
The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District
The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District
The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Naval Station, Guantanamo.
Subj : Anti-Torpedo Baffle for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attacks.
1. In previous correspondence, the Connnandants and local joint planning com-
mittees have been requested, where considered necessary, to submit recommenda-
tions concerning the employment of nets and booms in their defenses. In nearly
all cases the recommendations received were limited to harbor entrances. One
of the reasons for this was tliat the Department, after previously making a
study of many harbors, submitted certain proposals for consideration by the
districts, but did not specifically propose any protection against torpedo plane
attacks.
2. The Commandants and local joint planning conunittees are requested, if
they have not already done so, to consider the employment of and to make recom-
mendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles, especially for the protection of large
and valuable units of the Fleet in their respective harbors, and especially at the
large fleet bases.
3. In considering the use of A/T baffles, the following limitations, among
others, may be borne in mind :
[2] (a) A minimum depth of water of 75' may be assumed necessary to
successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About 200 yards of torpedo run is
necessary before the exi)loding device is armed, but this may be altered.
(b) There should l)e ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching
and leaving berths.
(c) Ships should be able to get away on short notice.
(d) Room must be available inside the baffle for tugs, fuel oil barges and har-
bor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships.
(e) Baffles should.be clear t)f cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by
shipping.
(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the
vessels' safety in case a torpedo explodes upon striking baffle.
(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane
attack from the land side most difficult.
(h) Vulnerable areas in tiie baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking
planes to come within effective range of anti-aircraft batteries before they can
range their torpedoes.
(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection, balloon barrages,
and aircraft protection.
(j) Availability of naturally wejl-protected anchorages within the harbor from
torpedo plane attack on a number of large ships. Where a large force such as
a Fleet is based, the establishment of certain baffles would be difficult because
of congestion.
R. E. Ingersoix,
Acting.
CO : CinCPac ' Co, NavNetDep, Tiburon BuOrd
CinC Atlantic Co, NavNetDep, Newport Op-12
CinC Asiatic
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2703
United States Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
CinC File No.
S81-5/0398
Confidential
At Sea, Hawaiian Area, Mar. 12, 1941.
From : Coraander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Anti-torpedo baflBes for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl
Harbor.
Reference: (a) CNO Conf. Itr. file Op-30Cl-AJ (SC) N20-12 Serial 09330 of
15 Feb. 1941.
1. In view of the contents of reference (a), the Commander-in-Chief, U. S.
Pacific Fleet, recommends that until a light efficient net, that can be laid tempo-
rarily and quickly is developed, no A/T nets be supplied this area.
H. E. KiMMEL.
C-N20-12/ND14
(0250)
Confidential 20 March 1941.
From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.
Reference: (a) CNO Classified Itr serial 010230 of February 17. 1941.
1. In reply to reference (a) the following comment and recommendation on
anti-torpedo baffles for vessels moored in Pearl Harbor is submitted.
(a) The depth of water in and alongside available berths in Pearl Harbor
does not exceed forty-five (45) feet.
(b) There is limited maneuvering area in Pearl Harbor for vessels approach-
ing and leaving berths which prevents the departure of a large group of vessels
on short notice.
(c) Most of the available bertlis are located close aboard the main ship chan-
nels, which are crossed by cable and pipe lines as well as ferry routes. The
installation of baffles for the fleet moorings would have to be so extensive that
most of the entire channel area would be restricted.
2. Other harbors in the Fourteenth Naval District have a water depth limita-
tion similar to Pearl Harbor.
3. In view of the foregoing the Commandant does not recommend the installa-
tion of baffles for moorings in Pearl Harbor or other harbors in the Fourteenth
Naval District.
C. C. Bloch.
cc: to
CINCPACIFIC
BUORD
Op-30C1-LH
(SC)N20-12
Serial 027830
Navy Department
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, Apr. 9, 19J^1.
From : The Chief of Naval Operations
To: The Chief of Bureau of Ordnance
Subject : Anti-Torpedo Nets
Refei'ence :
(a) Op-30C Serial 07830 of 11 Feb. 1941
(b) O. N. I. Serial 24-41, Monograph Index Guide 603-600
1. In reference (a) the Chief 'of Naval Operations brought forth the necessity
for experimental and development work in connection with nets and booms, and
especially the need for a light anti-torpedo net. The attention of the Bureau is
directed to reference (b) which gives certain details of an apparently much
lighter net now used by the Germans.
/S/ R. E. INGEBSOIX,
Acting.
2704 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Oi>-30Cl-AJ-5/19
(SO N20-12/ND14
Serial 046230
Confidential May 20, 1941.
From : The Chief of Naval Operations.
To : The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
Subject : Net Defenses, Fourteenth Naval District.
Reference :
(a) CNO Itr. OP-30C Serial 367330 of Dec. 7, 1940.
(b) CNO Itr. OP-30C Serial 375930 of Dec. 23, 1940.
(c) CNO Itr. OP-30C Serial 18530 of Jan. 21, 1941.
1. The Commandant is directed to lay the net defenses in the Fourteenth Naval
District, when the procurement of material permits, if this meets with the
approval of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The Bureau of Ordnance
has been requested to expedite the procurement of the necessary material.
2. The laying of the above defenses will necessitate certain protective measures
to shippinjr and to the nets, and will necessarily place tiie harbors to some extent
in a situation similar to that existing under war conditions. In reference (a)
the Commandant was directed to take preliminary steps to be prepare<l to lay
the nets and to properly tend them after laying. In reference (b) an estimate
of personnel necessary at the beginning of a war was submittetl for information.
In reference (c) th^ Commandants were authorized to confer with Local Coast
Guard authorities concerning necessary additional navigational aids. Local
regulations and instructions considered neces.sary for ihe information and control
of shipping should be taken up with the District Engineer, U. S. Army, and the
District Commander, U. S. Coast Guard.
3. The present standard A/T net is 30 feet in depth, which when suspended
protects to a depth of 35 feet when not affected by currents. Hence, it is possible
that magnetically fired torpedoes may be fired under the nets and exploded below
ships berthed inside of the nets. It is suggested, therefore, that the inner of the
double A/T nets be suspended as much as 15 feet in order to give necessary
vertical protection where the depth of water permits torpedoes being fired under
the nets and under ships berthed inside. The suspension of the inner net de-
creased partially the protection furnished by two nets for shallow running tor-
pedpes. Later it may be advisable to order aprons to be secured to the present
type of net.
R. E. Ingersoi.l.
Copy to : Activg.
BuOrd
Op-12
CinCpac
Op-30Cl-AJ
(SC) N20-12
Serial 055730
Confidential Navy Department
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washihgton, June IS, 194i-
From : The Chief of Naval Operations
To : The Commandant, First Naval District
The Commandant, Third Naval District
The Commandant, Fourth Naval District
Tl!e Commandant, Fifth Naval District
The Commandant, Sixth Naval District
The Commandant, Seventh Naval District
The Commandant, Eighth Naval District
The Commandant, Tenth Naval District
The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District
The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District
The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District
The Commandant. Fifteenth Naval District
The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District
Sybject : Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.
Reference : (a) CNO conf. Itr. Oi>-30C1 Serial 010230 of Feb. 17, 1941.
1. In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employ-
ment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2705
for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective
harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized
certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following
was stated :
"A mininnim depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully
drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is neces-
sary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be alteied."
2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes
may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in
some cases make initial dives [2] of considerably less than 75 feet, and
make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it can not be assumed that
any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type
of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to
be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.
3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored
can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpe<lo plane attack, it
may be assumed that depth of water will l>e one of the factors considered by
any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms
or more) is much more likely.
4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at
Taranto were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several
torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms.
R. E. Ingeksoll.
Copy to :
CinCpac
CinClant
CinCaf
C. O. Naval Net Depot, Tiburon
C. O. Naval Net Depot, Newport
Comdt. NavSta, Guantanamo
Comdt. NavSta, Samoa
BuOrd
Op-12
Op-30C1-FM
S81-3 (410916)
Serial 470330
September 16, 1941.
Restricted
From : The Chief of Naval Operations
To : The Chief of Bureau of Ordnance.
Subject : Experimental and Development Work on Nets and Booms.
Reference :
(a) Op-30C Serial 07830 of 11 February 1941.
(b) OP-30C1 Serial 027730 of 9 April 1941.
(c) Alusna London ONI Report Serial 1674, Mono. Index Guide No. 910-4000
of 24 July 1941.
(d) ONI Serial 1745 Guide No. 910-4000 of 1 August 1941.
1. It is suggested that in order that progress may be made in solving some of
the problems which confront us, that a small group of officers, engineers and
draftsmen be assigned exclusively to planning improvements in net and boom
designs and to development and experimental work. The group, it is suggested,
may be aided by using the facilities of the Net Depots at Tiburon and Newport.
It is suggested that these two depots appear suitable as centers for experimental
and development work.
2. In references (a) and (b) the Chief of Naval Operations indicated the
desirability of undertaking some research and development work. Among other
suggestions, the need for a lighter anti-torpedo net was stressed, which can be
laid and removed in harbors In a short time for temporary use, and which will
give good if not perfect protection from torpedoes fired from planes.
3. Designs are requested to be prepared giving A/T net protection to one or
more large ships moored in harbors against torpedo plane attack in which the
79716 O— 46 — pt. 17 18
2706 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A/T net may be placed completely around one or more large ships, similar to
placing the ship (or ships) in a "dry-dock" of A/T net. It may be assumed
that the currents inside of most harbors are not as great as at the entrances,
and the moorings of such nets may be of less weight and less extensive tlian for
the present A/T nets which are designed principally for harbor entrances. As
such nets may desired for advance bases, as little weight and volume of material
as possible is desirable. As little space as possible should be taken up by the
nets in order not to take up too much anchorage space.
4. Designs of A/T nets which might be attached to booms on ships or floating
off of ships at anchor are re^iuested to be pi-epared in conjunction with the Bureau
of Ships. In a design of this type it may be possible to do away with mooring
the nets. A net which deflects rather than stops the tori)edo may possibly be
designed.
5. Reference (c) is a preliminary Admiralty report on the development of a
tori>edo net defense for mei'chant ships at sea. It is requested that the Bureau
of Ordnance in conjunction with the Bureau of Ships undertake a similar de-
velopment work for the protection of ships underway at seti.
6. It is possible that in our Navy the assumption has been reached that an-
chorages protected by nets are secure. Nets are defensive me.isures and, in gen-
eral, are without destructive means. Patrol vessels are required in conjunction
with net defenses, and of the two measures of defense, the vessels, capable of
offensive action, are probably the more inqx>rtant. It is not believed that the
tests with nets conducted by the British should be accepted as conclusive. While
one test of torpedo firing against an A/T net has been conducted by the Bureau,
the torpedo was not equipped with cutters. No other tests have as yet been held.
It may be well to repeat and to extend the British tests. It may be worthwhile
to know the exact damage which will be done to an anti-toriK^do net from a
torpedo fired in the net.
7. Until the present in great measure reliance in this mode of defense has been
placed on British designs, experiments and tests. It is considered that now we
should be in a iK)Sition to take more progressive action. In this letter it is
realized that the requests made are not concrete and definite, but serve only to
indicate several of the problems toward the solution of which action may be
directed.
R. E. Ingersoll,
Acting.
Copy to : BuShips >>
UNiTia) States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FI.AGSHIP
Cincpac File No.
A16/ND14/(16)
Serial 086W Pearl Harbor, T., H., Sep 20, 19.',1.
Secret
From : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Connnandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
Subject: Blocking Pearl Harbor Channel.
Reference: (a) Com-14 Conf. Itr. C-A1(>/H3/ND14 (0800) (.f August 16, 1941.
1. In view of anti-submarine defenses apin-oved for and now in process of in-
stallation at Honolulu and Pearl Harbor, the (^)mniander-in-Chief does not
desire to reopen the question of anti-submarine nets thereat.
2. With reference to laying defensive mine fields off those harbors, it is believed
there is insufficient prospect of commensurate return for the .restricted man-
euverability and ri.sks involved to our own ships.
3. The Commander-in-Chief has noted with approval the action initiated to-
ward obtaining suitable radar for protection of chainiel entrance. He would
like to see this matter vigorously prosecuted. Please keep him informed as to
progress.
4. WPLr-40 assigns salvage in these waters as a task f<M' the forces afloat,
assisted, by such facilities as the shore establishment may be able to provide.
Organization and assembly of etiuipment is now in process under Commander Biise
Force. It is requested that the results of the study and inventory referred to in
paragraph Ci) of the reference (a) be made available to Connnander Base F()rce
and that, if and when necessity arises, appropriate local facilities and technical
facilities be furnished him.
H. E. KiMMhi..
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2707
Op-^OCl-HF
(SC)N20-12/ND12
Doc. 35904
Serial 0101130-
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, 3 October 194I.
From : The Chief of Naval Operations
To : The Chief of Bureau of Ordnance
Subject: A/T Net Defenses, San Francisco Bay.
Reference: (a) Proceedings of meeting of Local Joint Planning Committee,
Northern California Sector, Pacific Coastal Frontier, of Sep-
tember 17, 1941.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a).
1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information.
2. Attention is invited to paragraph 3 of the enclosure. The Chief of Naval
Operations considers it urgent to develop an anti-torpedo net which can be made
up, towed to a desired location, and quickly laid. The u.se of pontoons, as
suggested, does not appear to solve this question ; a reduction in the number of
moorings, at present necessary for the standard net, would seem to be required.
[S] R. E. Ingersoll,
Acting.
[1] PW2/A1 6-3/022 , Sr.
Confiidential
EXHIBIT NO. 117
Patrol Wing Two
U. S. Naval Air Station
Pearl Harbor, Hatcaii, U. 8. A., 16 Jan. 19^1.
From : The Commander Patrol Wing TWO.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: (1) The Commander Scouting Force.
(2) The Commander-in-Ch.ef, U. S. Fleet.
Subject : Patrol Wing TWO— Readiness of.
Reference: (a) OpXav Conf. serial 095323 to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S.
Fleet— "Protection of Fleet Aircraft."
1. I arrived here on October 30, 1940, with the point of view that the Inter-
national situation was critical, especially in the Pacific, and I was impressed
with the need of being ready today rather than tomorrow for any eventuality
that might arise. After taking over command of Patrol Wing TWO and looking
over the situation, I was surprised to find that here in the Hawaiian Islands,
an important naval advanced outpost, we were operating on a shoestring and the
more I looked the thinner the shoestring appeared to be.
2. (a) War Readiness of Patrol Plane Squadrons is dependent not only on
the planes and equipment that comprise these squadrons, but also on many
operating needs and requirements at Air Stations and outlying bases over which
the Patrol Wing Commander has no direct control. Needs and requirements
for War Readiness include: spare planes, spare engines, hangar and beach equip-
ment, squadron equipment, spare parts, stores, material, bombs, ammunition,
base operating facilities, overhaul and repair facilities, qualified personnel to
man all base facilities and shops, all in sufficient adequacy to in.sure continuous
operating readiness. These cannot be provided overnight. The isolation of
this locality from the source of supply, the distance, and time involved, make
careful and comprehensive long distance planning mandatory. I am informed
that in the past, the average interval between the normal request and receipt of
material has been nine months.
(b) Reference (a) reads, in part, as follows: "In about one year practically
all fleet aircraft except Patrol Wing TWO will have armor and fuel protection".
As there are no plans to modernize the present patrol planes comprising Patrol
Wing TWO, this [2] evidently means that there is no intention to replace
the present obsolescent type of patrol planes in Patrol Wing TWO prior to one
year and that Patrol Wing TWO will be practically the last Wing to be furnished
new planes. This, together with the many existing deficiencies, indicates to me
2708 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that the Navy Department as a whole does not view the situation in the Pacific
with alarm or else is not taking steps in keeping with their view.
3. (a) Presumably, the offices and bureaus concerned are familiar with the
situation in the Hawaiian Area over which they have particular cognizance;
certainly enough correspondence has already been written concerning patrol
plane needs to enable bureaus and offices to take the necessary steps to provide
and to anticipate such needs.
(b) If war should break in the Pacific, there is much work cut out for patrol
planes and undoubtedly much will be expected of them. Considerably more
attention will have to be paid to anticipating their needs and miction taken to
provide deficiencies by all the bureaus and offices concerned if patrol planes are
to perform according to expectations.
4. It is therefore urgently recommended that those concerned with War Plans
and those in the Planning and Procurement Divisions of all bureaus and offices
view the patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian Area in the light of the Inter-
national situation in the Pacific ; that each bureau and office check and recheck
their planning and procurement lists for present requirements and future needs
and that immediate steps be taken to furnish the personnel, material, facilities
and equipment required and under their cognizance, to meet the present emer-
gency and probable eventualities. The tremendous and all consuming work of
those in the Navy Department is fully appreciated and there is no intent to
criticize or to shift responsibility. This letter is written merely in an effort to
insure that we may not be "too late".
5. The following are some of the deficiencies and requirements referred to
above :
[3] (a) For Patrol Wing TWO:
1. Replace present obsolescent type patrol planes with high performance mod-
ern types having latest approved armor and armament features and in such
numbers as the readiness of base operating facilities will permit.
2. Provide squadron spares and squadron equipment in excess so as to have
available a sufficiency to provide for shift of operations to outlying bases.
3. Provide bomb handling equipment of latest design in sufficient amounts as
to reduce to minimum the time element involved in rearming both at normal base
and outlying bases.
4. Provide ordnance material to fill and maintain full squadron allowances.
5. Provide increased number of aircraft torpedoes when additional storage is
available. Twenty-four aircraft torpedoes are now stored at the Submarine Base,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
6. Expedite completion and assignment of patrol plane tenders. At present,
the tenders for Patrol Wing TWO consists of the U. S. S. WRIGHT and the
U. S. S. SWAN. The WRIGHT now is not available due to Navy Yard overhaul
until March 17, 1941.
(b) For Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. :
1. Increase capacity for overhaul and repair of patrol planes, engines, instru-
ments, radio and ordnance material, and provide manufacture and stowage of
breathing oxygen, to anticipate [^] operating needs both now and as esti-
mated for the future, through addition of shop space, additional shops, additional
personnel, additional equipment, additional supply of spare parts and stock.
2. Increase and improve bomb storage and ammunition storage through en-
largement and preparation of present storage and installation of bomb handling
equipment.
3. Construction of squadron's ready ammunition storage.
4. Additional bombs in Hawaiian Area.
5. Additional ferries or other suitable means for transporting bombs from
Ammunition Depot across water surrounding Ford Island to Naval Air Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
6. Increase supply facilities through additional stowage, additional supply
personnel (officer and enlisted), additional facilities for handling supplies, assist-
ance in obtaining and increasing the amount of spares and supplies on hand, and
simplification of requisitioning spare parts and supplies.
7. Increase machine gun and rifle range facilities in Pearl Harbor Area
to provide for more effective ground training for personnel of patrol squadrons
based on Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
8. Provide for torpedo wai* head stowage at some suitable location readily
accessible to the [51 Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
9. Increase barrack space to provide for increased personnel at Naval Air Sta-
tion and for personnel of additional patrol squadrons as may be assigned.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2709
(c) For- Naval Air Station, Kaneohe :
1. Expedite completion ; providing the operating facilities necessary to permit
basing and eflBeiently operating the number of patrol squadrons' intended to
base thereon, including dredging the i«itrol plane operating area to the extent
recommended, dredging ship cliannel, housing of the necessary personnel, supply-
ing equipment for the various buildings, supplying necessary boats and supply-
ing adequate station personnel. Anticipate engine and plane overhaul facilities
to meet War requirements.
(d) For Keehi Lagoon :
1. Take necessary steps to expedite the development of Keehi Lagoon for a
patrol plane base.
(e) Outlying Bases : Wake, Johnston, Palmyra:
1. Expedite completion of operating facilities with particular regard to dredg-
ing ship channels; dredging landing and take-off areas; providing gasoline and
oil reserves and issue facilities ; bomb and ammunition supply and stowage ;
concrete ramps and parking area.
(f ) For Midway :
1. Expedite completion and establishment of Midway as an outlying operating
base with the assignment of necessary personnel and with facilities and equip-
ment to provide for the basing thereon of two patrol plane squadrons.
(g) General:
1 Stop the normal shifting and rotating between sea and shore and between
other activities of personnel, officer and enlisted, in Patrol Wing TWO, Naval
Air Station, Pearl Harbor, and Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, until all personnel
complements have been brought up to the requirements necessary for war-time
operations.
2. Provide two sets additional beaching gear and two boats fitted with gaso-
line bowser tanks for use at each of the following outlying bases : Wake, Midway,
Johnston, Palmyra, Guam and Canton.
/s/ P. N. L. Bellinger.
Copy to:
Comairseofor.
Com. 14.
N. A. S., P. H., T. H.
Prosp. C. O., N. A. S., Kaneohe.
C. S. F. File No. A16-3/(035)
Confidential
United States Fleet
scouting force
U. S. S. Indianopous. Flagship
Pearl Harboe, T. H., Jan 21, 1941.
First endorsement to CPW2 conf. Itr. PW2/A16-^/(022) of 1/16/41.
From : Commander Scouting Force.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: Patrol Wing TWO— Readiness of.
1. Forwarded.
2. The Commander Scouting Force appreciates that the efforts of the De-
partment toward the completion of adequate defense measures must neces-
sarily be based upon the development of the entire Naval Establishment rather
than concentration upon one point. He believes, however, that the importance
of Pearl Harbor as the spear-head of our defenses in the Pacific, and the essen-
tial role of Patrol Wing TWO not only in the defense of Pearl Harbor but also
in any operations to the westward, warrant early and full attention to the
heeds cited by the Commander of that Wing.
3. Commander Scouting Force has, since his arrival in this area as Com-
mander Hawaiian Detachment, been much concerned at the lack of adequate
material and facilities for proper and efficient operation of Patron Wing TWO
in war. He has effected such remedial measures as lay within his power,
and has urged upon the Department such matters as the enlargement of the
originally-planned installation at Kaneohe Bay and the provision of gasoline
2710 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and liibricatiiifr oil reserve supplies at outlyiiiR-island bases so that these bases
might be utilized temporarily without awaiting the arrival of tenders.
4. In view of the location of Pearl Harbor and the island bases, and the
functions of Patrol Wing TWO in war in the Pacific, the Connnander Scouting
Force therefore reconnnends strongly that measures toward fulfilling the needs
cited by Commander Patrol Wing TWO be given the highest priority in the
Department's program and accomplished at the earliest practicable moment.
/s/ Adolphus Andrews.
Copy to :
Comairscofor Compatwing Two
Com FOURTEEN
NAS, Pearl Harbor
Prosp. CO, NAS, Kaneohe
[1] CinC File No. A16-1/A4-1/VZ/(0178)
Confidential.
United States Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania. Flagship
Pearl Harbor, T. H., J an 31, 1941.
Second endorsement to CPW2 conf. Itr. PW2/A16-3/ ( 022 ) of 1/16/41.
From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Patrol Wing TWO— Readiness of.
1. Forwarded, concurring with the basic recommendation and with the first
endorsement by Commander Scouting Force.
2. The Commander-in-Chief appreciates the spirit in which the basic letter,
urging action toward effective readiness for missions that may be demanded
of Patrol Wing TWO, has been written. He also appreciates the fact that
action has already been initiated or, in some cases, is not readily practicable
at this time with respect to a number of the basic recommendations ; and that
separate correspondence with respect to much of this material is already in
circulation.
3. It is the Commander-in-Chief's opinion, however, that the basic letter,
summarizing as it does the entire patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian area,
presents a very valuable picture of the overall requirements that are urgently
needed if the potentialities expected of patrol planes are to be even approxi-
mately realized. Therefore, full review of the subject, accompanied by appro-
priate action toward expediting or initiating needed developments, is urged.
4. Attention is particularly invited to :
(a) The desirability of better priority in the delivery of improved patrol
planes to Patrol Wing TWO.
(b) The great importance of increased bomb and torpedo supply, including
not only bulk storage, but also ready storage at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor,
together with suitable handling and loading equipment at the Air Station, and
improved transportation from • bulk storage. In this connection, provision at
the Naval Air Station should include two "fills" for five patrol plane squadrons
and owe aircraft carrier group,
(c) The vital necessity of expediting the readiness at outlying island develop-
ments of the basic essentials: gasoline and oil storage, bomb and ammunition
storage, parking area, ramps and dredged approaches thereto. This latter
.subject has been (liscus.sed informally with representatives of the Commandant
Fourteenth Naval District and is understood to be receiving full consideration.
Departmental support, if and as needed, is urged.
/s/ J. O. Richardson.
Copy to :
Comscol'or
Comairscofor
Compatwing-2
Com-14
NAS P. H.
NAS KANEOHE
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2711
Confidential
Op-23-H-KB 2/19
(SC)A16-1/PW2
Serial 015823 Feb. 27, 1941.
From : Chief of Naval Operations.
To : Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics.
Chief of Bureau of Ordnance.
Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks.
Chief of Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.
Subject : Patrol Wing Two — Readiness of.
Reference : (a) Compatwing Two Confid. Ltr. PW2/A16-3/022 of 16 January 1941.
Enclo-sure: (A) Copy of reference (a).
1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information.
2. In separate correspondence the Chief of Naval Operations has already
indicated his desires on the following items of paragraph 5 of reference (a)
(a) 1.
(a) 3.
(b) 2.
(b) 4,
(a) 2.
(a) 4. ■
(b) 3.
(b) 5.
3. In regard to the remaining items and to the general situation the Chief of
Naval Operations desires the addressees to be guided by the following policy :
In case of hostilities practically all the aircraft of the Pacific and Asiatic
Fleets may be dependent upon the Hawaiian Area for logistics. The Area should
be prepared expeditiously to handle this contingency. Needs that can be foreseen
should be supplied by the Bureaus in advance of requisition.
R. E. INGERSOLL,
, " Acting.
Copy to :
Cincpac, Comscofor,
Comairscofor, Compatwing 2,
Com. 14, NAS Pearl.
[1] Confidential
G-A16-l/A7-3(2)/
ND14(0135)
Headquarters Headquarters
Hawaiian Department 14th Naval District
Fort Shafter, T. H. Pearl Harbor, T. H.
14 Ferruaky 1941.
Subject : Army and Navy Aircraft in Hawaiian Area.
To : Officers named in par. 2, herein.
1. Reference is directed to the following :
A. Letter from the Comman(ler-in-('hief, Pacific Fleet, on the above subject,
dated 4 February 1941, (CinC serial (0195).
B. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Navy short title, 14ND-JCD-13 ;
Army short title, HCF-39) Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Headquarters
Fourteenth Naval District, dated 14 April. 1939.
2. In order to study and make recommendations to the Planning Repre.sent-
atives, (Paragraph 4, Reference B), for measures relating to increasing the
combat efficiency of Army and Navy aircraft stationed in Hawaiian waters and
to improve the effectiveness of the defenses again.'^t hostile air attacks, the fol-
lowing joint committees (Paragraph 5, Reference B) are appointed:
a. Air Operations Committee: To study and submit recommendations pertain-
ing particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraphs 5 a, c, and f/. Refer-
ence A, and to prepare plans for the conduct of joint exercises, on a weekly or
more frequent basis, to insure the readiness of joint defensive measures in
Oahu against surprise aircraft i-aids.
Army Members: Haw. Air Force: Lt. Col. W. S. Streett, AC; H. S. C. A. B. :
Major R. T. Frederick. 64th CA.
Navy Members: 14ND NAS Operations Officer. Lt. Comwr. H. F. Carlson;
Staff, Com. AirBatFor., Comdr. M. R. Browning; Patrol Wing 2 C. O. Patron 22,
Lt. Comdr. G. Van Deurs.
Enc. (A) Com 14 serial (0410) 1 May 1941
[2] b. Communications Committee: To study and submit recommendations
pertaining particularly to those subjects, listed in subpai'agraph 5 b., Reference A.
2712 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Army Members : Hq. Haw. Dept. : Lt. Col. W. H. Murphy, SC ; Haw. Air Force :
Lt. Col. C. f. Hoppough. SC; H. S. C. A. B. : Major I. H. Ititchie, ("AC.
Navy Members: PatWinsTwo C. O. Patron 22; Lt. Coindr. W. F. Cogswell;
14ND Coninmnicatioii Officer: Coiudr. H. L. Thoinpsoii ; Staff ConiAirBatFor
Comiminicatioii officer: Lt. L. J. Dow.
c. Air-Antiaircraft Committee: To stuily and submit recommendations pertain-
ing particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraphs 5 e, /, and h of Reference
A, to prepare plans for the effective coordination oi ship and shore antiaircraft
artillery gun Are against surprise aircraft raids, and to consider the desirability
of using balloon barrages in the defense of the Pearl Harbor-Hickam Field Area.
Army Members : Haw. Air Force : Lt. Col. Hegenberger, AC ; H. S. C. A. B. :
Major R. T. Frederick. 64th CA ; Capt. M. G. Weber, CAC\
Navy Members: 14ND District Marine Officer: Col. H. K. Pickett; BatFor
Gunnery Officer, USS Mississippi: Lt. Comdr. W. W. .Juvenal; Asst. Air Officer,
USS Yorktown : Lt. Comdr. H. F. Macomsey.
d. Armament Coinniittrc: To study and submit reconuuentlations pertaining
particularly to those subjects listed in subparagraph 5 r/ of Reference A :
Army Members : Hq Haw. Dept. : Lt. Col. M. W. Marsh, Inf. ; Major R. McK.
Smith.OD; Haw. Air Force: Lt. Col. A. B. Custis. OD.
Navy Members: 14ND IOC NAD Oahu : Comdr. W. W. Meek; Staff
ConiAirBatFor, Gunnery : Lt. Comdr. S. E. Burroughs, Jr. ; Staff. ComPatWing-
Two, Gunnery : Lt. H. P. Cooper.
[3] €. Cheniuni Warfare Committee : To study and submit reconnnenda-
tions pertaining particularly to measures to screen the Pearl Harbor-Hickam
Field Area from air attack by the use of smoke or by other devices ;
Army Members : Hq. Haw. Dept. : Col. J. W. Lyon, CWS ; Haw. Air Force :
Major M. E. Jennings, CWS ; H. S. C. A. B. : Major F T. Ostenberg, 64th CA.
Navy Members: 14ND CO Barracks Detachment: Major J. M. Smith, USMC;
PatWingTwo CO Patron 21: Lt. Comdr. J. W. Harris.
3. The studies and recommendations of the Conunittees will be based upon
existing conditions and steps which may be taken in the near future to improve
these conditions. The senior officer of each conmiittee will act as its chairman.
Direct consultation by connnittee members with any units under the ccmtrol of the
Department Commander or of the District Commandant is authorized and en-
couraged. Reports containing the recommendations of the committees will be
submitted to the Planning Representatives (Paragraph 4 Reference B) not later
than 1 March, 1941, with a view to the immediate preparation of joint operation
plans for defense against air attacks.
4. The Conunander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, has detailed the fleet members for the
committees as indicated in paragraph 2 above.
5. All members of all conunittees who are not temporarily absent from Oahu on
other duty will assemble at 0930 .seventeen February in Office of Assistant Chief
of Staff G-3 Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Fort Shaffer.
C. C. BLOCH
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.
COMMANDANT FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
WALTER C. SHORT
Lieutenant General. U. S. Army
COMMANDING HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Copies to :
C. G.. H. A. F. CinCus
Fort Shatter, T. H. ConiBatFor
C. G., H. S. C. A. B. ComScoFor
Fort DeRussy, T. H. ConiAirBatFor
C. G., Schofleld Barracks ComPatWingTwo
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2713
EXHIBIT NO. 117A ,
SECRET
Initials: C. G.
Date: 17 Feb. 1941
[1] Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 11, 1941.
In reply refer to : AG 354.2/JAX
Subject : Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area.
To : Commanding General, Hawaiian Division,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.
1. In a recent confidential letter of instructions to commanders of the six
major echelons of the United States Fleet, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Commander-
in-Chief. Pacific Fleet, expressed the pressing necessity for maximum readiness
in the Hawaiian area, particularly for Pearl Harbor defense, of all available
aviation components. I am in agreement with Admiral Kimmel in his belief
that much remains to be done for adequate future effectiveness in this respect,
but that much can now be done with means now available, to make arrange-
ments for local employment of aviation more effective than they now are.
2. With above in mind and under provisions contained in Joint Control Fron-
tier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and 14th
Naval District, 14 April 1939, joint planning representatives have been selected
from echelons concerned in order that detailed plans and recommendations may
be undertaken. Upon completion, plans and recommendations will have been
formulated to implement the following;
a. Joint Air Exercises. Desirability of intensified attention to this subject.
Frequency and scope. Degree of coordination. Improvement along practical
lines.
b. Communications. Fully satisfactory communications between all Army
and Navy air activities, both in. the air and on the ground. Direct and instan-
taneous communication, in particular, between all Army and Navy air fields.
Continuation of and renewed stress upon Joint communication exercises.
c. Air Command. Determination of responsibility and degree under various
conditions. Arrangements between the two services for such direct exercise of
air control as may be necessary.
d. Landing Fields, Mutual Use. "Scattering" plans, including dispersion of
patrol planes. Familiarization of Navy and Army aircraft personnel with one
another's landing fields and facilities, including actual practice in mutual use
and servicing.
[2] e. Aircraft Recognition and Familiarisation. Recognition signals be-
tween air and ground. Familiarization of all personnel — air, ground, and ship —
with all local Navy and Army types.
/. Alert Watches. Determination of suitable alert watch conditions. Require-
ments for all naval aircraft types. Size and composition of watches. Watches
with and without ship-based planes present. Conservation of personnel and
material.
g. Armament and Re-armament. Plans for adequate accomplishment with
means now available. Ready storage. Speed. Replenishment.
h. Alarm and Detection. Effective and instantaneous air alarm arrangements.
Detection by RADAR (and otherwise) and tracking of enemy planes. Possible
restriction of own planes to specific operating areas for this purpose. Simi-
larly, control of air traffic approaches.
i. Employment of balloon barrages, smoke and other special devices for im-
proving defenses of Pearl Harbor.
;. High priority to increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and
establishment of air warning net.
k. Effective coordination of Naval and Military aircraft operations, and ship
and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against .surprise aircraft raids.
I. Joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft
raids against Pearl Harbor.
2714 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
m. Joint exercises, at least once weelily, designed to i)repare Army and Navy
forces on Oaliu for defense against surprise aircraft raids.
3. In tile joint plainiig enumerated lierein it is directed that all echelons or
individuals concerned render every possible aid and cooperative assistance to
the end that maximum needs for Army-Navy joint action may be met.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. /S. Army,
Commanding.
EXHIBIT NO. 118
[ij Secret
Pearl Harbor, T. H.,
1200, SO N(wember, 1941.
Memorandum for the Connnander in Chief.
Steps to Be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War within the Next
Twenty-Four Hours
1. Despatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced,
2. Despatch to Task Force Commanders :
(a) WPL 46 effective.
(b) Sweeping plan cancelled.
(c) Comairbatfor and units in company with him (Task Force 8) carry out
present mission. Upon completion cover WAKE against enemy operations until
joined by Task Force Three. Remainder of Task Force Two (now at sea in
operating areas, return to PEARL HARBOR.
(d) Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan effective, modified as follows: Cancel
cruiser operations west of NANPO SHOTO ; delay reconnaissance until Task
Forces Two and Three are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One; Task
Force Three with units of Task Force Two present in PEARL HARBOR de-
part and rendezvous with Comairbatfor at Point "A" at
; Commander Base Force send two tankers to Point "A" with
utmost dispatch, report expected time* of their arrival.
(e) Send one Marine Bombing Squadron to MIDWAY.
[2] 3. (a) I would not modify the movements of the WRIGHT now enroute
WAKE to MIDWAY, nor RECJULUS, enroute PEARL to MIDWAY, nor ships
bound to CHRISTMAS and CANTON.
(b) I would continue WILLIAM WARD BURROWS to WAKE, directing
Comairbatfor (Com Task Force 8) ro have two destroyers join her as escort.
(c) I would not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.
(d) I would provide two destroyers to escort SARATOGA from longitude 150°
west to PEARL HARBOR. (Under present set-up, Commander Task Force Three
has been directed to furnish this escort from his force which would be at sea on
arrival of SARATOGA. Under the plan of paragraph 2, above, this order should
be transferred to Com Task Force One. This note added by Good).
(e) I would not direct any change in passage of shipping to and from MANILA,
nor would I send any added, escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward CALIFORNIA
or SAMOA until further developments occur.
[1] Secret
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
1200, December 5, 191,1.
Memorandum for the Commander in Chief.
Recommended Steps to be Taken in (^ase of Ame(rican-Japanh:se War within
the Next Forty-Eight Hours
1. Send despatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.
2. Send despatch to Ta.sk Force Commanders :
(a) WPL 46 effective. (Execute O-IA R5 except as indicated in (b) and (c)
below. (The SS and VP plans will become effective with'^ut siiecial reference to
them).
(b^ Cfimmence sweeping plan, including cruiser operations west of Nanpo Sboto,
cancelled.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2715
(c) Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan effective, njodlfied as follows : Delay recon-
naissance until Task Forces Two and Three ar joined ; Batdiv One join Task Force
One. Commander Base Force send two tankers with utmost despatch to ren-
dezvous with Task Force Three to eastward of Wake at rendezvous to be desig-
nated.
(d) Cpniairbatfor and units in company with him (Task for 8) return to Pearl
at high speed, fuel and depart with remainder of Taskfor Two, less BBs, to join
Task Force Three.
(e) LEXINGTON land Marine aircraft at IVIidway as planned (p. m. 7 Dec)
and proceed with ships now in company (Taskfor 12) to vicinity of Wake.
(f) Conitaskfor Three proceed to join LEXINOTON group. Return DMS to
Pearl.
[2] 3. (a) Do not modify the movements of REGULUS at MIDWAY (de-
parting 9th), nor ships bound to CHRISTMAS and CANTON.
(b) Direct that WILLIAM WARD BURROWS continue to WAKE but delay
arrival until 10th. Direct that LEXINGTON group send two destroyers to join
BURROWS prior to her arrival at WAKE.
(c) Do not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.
(d) Provide two destroyers to escort SARATOGA from longitude 150° west to
PEARL HARBOR.
(e) Do not change passage of shipping to and from MANILA nor send any
added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward CALIFORNIA or SAMOA until
further developments occur.
(s) C. H. McMoRRis.
2716 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 119
RADIO LOG
of
BISHOP'S POINT RADIO STATION
7 December X941
4111
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2717
BAOZO iOO
SZCTION BiSI
BISHOP'S POINT. OiHU, T.H.
WAICH HKglVIH »t
OOHTBOLd ^•'^'
C.E. GIBSON SUPIRViaOR ^ TT*/
R.B. MOYLE OPSRATOR PATE 7 DttifclimER i»4g;
1445 DZ5Y DBIL V DN3L AR
' r\tr' DN3L V DZ5Y K
* ■ DZ5Y DBIL V DN3L AS ONE MOMENT PLEASE STAND BY
DBIL DZ5Y V DnIl AR
V D75Y COME IN
DBIL K
DN3L WHAT IS THE DISTANCE OF THE SUBMARINE K
- ■JL WHAT WAS THE APPROXIMATE DISTANCE AND COURSE OF THE
SUBMARINE THAT YOU SIGHTED K
1450 . DN3L V DZ5Y THE COURSE. WAS ABOUT WHAT WE-WERE STFERIKG AT THE
^''^ TIME «20 MAGNETIC AND ABOUT im YARDS FROM THE
ENTRANCE APPARlNTLY HEADING FOR THE ENTRANCE K
an DZ5Y V DnIl BT do YOU HAVE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE
SUB K
DN3L V DZ5Y NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION K , ^ ^^ ^^^
DZ5Y V DN3L WHFN WAS THE LAST TIME APPROXIMATELY THAT YOU SAf
THF SUBMARINE K
DN3L V DZ5Y APPROXIMATE TIME 0350 AND HE WAS APPARENTLY HEADINq
^ FOR THE ENTRANCE K
1458 V DN3L R
1505 DZ5Y V DN3L AR PLEASE
DZ§Y V DN3L BT THANK YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION NOTIFY US IF YOU
r.M:^ ^ HAVE ANY MORE INFORMATION WE WILL CONTINUE SEARCH H
V DZ5Y R
DBIL V DZ5Y AR
DZ5Y V DBIL K
V DZ5Y WE ARE FINISHED K
V DBIL R , ,
DR7Y V DJ8A PM DRBR EARLY 0450 K
V DJ8A R
DW2X V ])B1L AR
DBIL V DW2X K
DW2X V DBIL CLEAR K
V DVi2X R
1555 DJ8A V DR7Y AR
■nptv V DJ8A K
DJ8A V Dfl7Y 815 FEMALE 0525 YOU GOT THAT MESP*GE BEFORE DID
YOU
DR7Y V DJ8A R BOTH MESSAGES R LAST TWO MESSAGES K
1557 DJ&A V DR7Y R
1630 nE2A V DW2X AR
DV.'2X V DR9Q K
DW2X V DN3L K
V DZ5I K
DE2A V DW2X Z PIME WING 071614 ISEE FILE) K
1641 V DN3L R
V DZ5I R
DW2X V DN3L AR
DN3L V DW2X K
1642 DW2X V DN3L ZCD DZ5I R AR
1643 DN3L V DW2X R
K2X
1647 DW2X V DZ5I AR
1650 DW2X V DR9Q ZCE DZ5I K
DR9Q V DZ5I ZSF K
DZ5I V DR9Q S3 K
DW2X V DN3L ZCE DZ5I AR
DZ5I V DW2X K
DW2X V DZ5I ZSF K
V DW2X S5 K5 K
1714 DR?"! DJ8A HAVE YOU ANYTHING FOR ME
DJSA V DR7Y YES 2307 COUNTER 0640 VA
1715 DR7Y V DJ8A R p^
2718 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6 June 1946.
I her«l>7 certify that tM.t Is the radio log or the exact
copjr of the log that was made \>y the Section Baeo, Bishop' •
Point, Oabu, T.H. , on 7 Deceml>er 1941.
Richard Vllmot HumahreT ' ^
Richard Vllaot Haophrey
438-06-63, SM3o, 7-3, U.S.9.R.
Thl* oopgr was certified in wj pretence.
Valter H. KozaolM
Lt.Coadr., D8IR.
/■ ; ;>
i?l^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2719
RADIO LOO
SECTION BASE
BISHOP'S POINT, OAHU, T.H.
WATCH BECKIVER k
„ rr ^.Dc-Au COHTROLd O.K.
G,E. GIBSON sUPgRYISOR ^ ^,_.
, FRS<. 2670KCS. l9^i/f.iOH
R.'B. MOYLE OPERATOR DATE 7' UbCbMBL'H t»»e
W. V Dilsf P^BJ^WE^HAVE BROPPEB^BEPTH CHAROES UPON SUBS
DW2X V DN3L STAND BY FOR MORC MESSAGES
DNRL V mim. IMI YOUR LAST PRIORITY K „„.„„,-„ ™-nTu
172^ DW2X V DN3L WE HAVE ATTACKED FIRED UPON AND DRIPPED DEPTH
\ld5 mcs unjL ^^^^^^ ^^^^^ SUBMARINE OPERATING IN DEFENSIVE SEA
*.■■'■•'■'•>' AREA AR
DW2X V DN3L DID YOU GET THAT LAST MESSAGE K
V DW2X R
V DN3L STAND BY FOR FUTHER MESSAGES
V DW2X R
DI2X V DN3L AR
DN3L V DW2X K
DIN2X V DN3L ZMA 0 BUT STAND BY AR
V DW2X R
1755 DW2X V DN3L AR
V DW2X K
DW2X V DN3L ZMA 0 BUT STAND BY FOR MESSAGE AT ANY TIME AR
1756 V DW2X R
18;}3 DJ8A V DN3L P P AR PLEASE
DR9Q V DNIl ZCG DJ8A AR
1 ^ AJ8A V DR9Q AR
' • DW2X V DN3L P AR
V DW2X K
V DN3L BT WE HAVE INTERCEPTED A SAMPAN INTO HONOLULU
PLEASE HAVE COAST GUARD SEND CUTTER '0 BELIEVE
US OF SAMPAN AR
18J>5 V DW2X R P K
V DN3L AS 1 MINUTE
V DJ8A K
V DN3L BT WE HAVE INTERCEPTED SAMPAN AND ESCORTING SAMPAH
INTO HONOLULU PLEASE HAVE CUTTER RELIEVE US OF
SAMPAN AR ^
DN3L V DK2X Z DW2X 371807 DN3L P GR 11 BT HELID ARUQS QLUAN
1810 SVDER LBVQY NEXKQ TPHQ2 BMMQH LBPBV ARUQS HELID K
-...-.; DR7Y V DU8A IMI GR 1
1813 DJ6a V DR7Y GR 1 402
De?Y V DJ6A fl
MOYLE AND GJ BSON OFF TO BANKS AND HUMPHREY
1817 DEIT V DW2X AR
1321 DN3L V DW2X AR
DW2X V DN3L K
V DW2X Z DW2X 071820 DEIT Q DN3L P GR 5 BT PROCEED
IMMEDIATELY AND CONTACT WARD AR
1826 DW2X V DN3L R
DR7Y V DJSa AR
DJoA V DR7Y K
DR7Y V DJ6a here is a MESSAGE Z DK3K 071801 DR7Y GR 4 BT
PROCEED CONTACT HARBOR PATftOL
DJ8A V DN3L lUI THAT EAST MESSASE
"UK
DJ8A V 1»
1830 AIR RAID BY' JAPANESE PLANES
1830 DW2X V DR6K ZMC ZCD DR6K DR9Q DUIP
DJ8A V DN^
1830 RECEIVER AND TRANSyiTTER HAVE GONE OUT- -POWER OFF
f ■'■')
2720 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6 Jiin* 1946.
X h«re^ certify that this It th« radio log or the exact copy
of the log that va» nade by the Section Bate, Bishop's Point, Oaba,
T.H. , on 7 December 1941.
-^jUW i^^d^^^idii
Blchard niaot Buiqphrey
438-06-63, KM3c, T-3, U.S.V.R.
This copy wss certified la ay presence.
Waiter H. Xozaeko CJ
Lt. CcBdr.. 08IE.
''s/
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2721
EXHIBIT NO. 120
[i]
KiMMEL Exhibit 5 to Report of Action
Patbol Wing Two,
U. S. Nav.\l Air Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 19, 1941.
Memorandum for Admiral H. E. Kiramel, U. S. Navy.
My Dear Admiral : In accordance with our conversation of yesterday, I am
forwarding to you the following information :
1. Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of 7 December,
1941:
Squadron
In commission
Total
available
for flight
Location
Under
repair
Ready
at
base
In air
VP-11
12PBY-5
12
11
1 10
Ul
1
12
12
5
KftTiPfihe
0
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
12
11
7
4
0
12
11
1
0
VP-12
12PBY-5..
Kaneohe
Kaneohe
0
VP-14
12 PBY-5
'3
VP-21
12 PBY-3
Midway
Pearl Harbor
Pearl Harbor.
Pearl Harbor
Pearl Harbor
» 7
VP-21...
1 PBY-3 (spare)
0
VP-21
1 PBY-3
0
VP-22
14 PBY-3
0
VP-24
6 PBY-5
34
RECAPITULATION
Squadron
In com-
mission
Total
available
for flight
Under
repair
Ready
at base
In air
At Kaneohe
36
33
12
'33
328
m
3
5
1
30
24
1
> 3
At Pearl
'4
It Midway
27
Total >
81
72
9
58
14
[«1
NOTES
* 3 planes armed with two depth charges each conducting search of assigned fleet operat-
ing areas in accordance with U. S. Pacific Fleet Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised) (Task Force
NINE Operating Plan (9-1). 3 planes in condition 2 (30 minutes notice).
' 5 planes conducting search of sector 120°-170° radius 450 miles ; departed Midway at
1820 OCT. 2 planes departed Midway at same time to rendezvous with U. S. S. LEXING-
TON at a point 400 miles bearing 130° 'from Midway to serve as escorts for Marine
Scouting planes. Four planes, additional plants, armed with 2-500 pound bombs each
were on the alert at Midway as a ready striking force. These four planes took off at about
2230 GCT upon receipt of information on the attack on Pearl Harbor, and searched sector
060° to 100° radius 400 miles. One plane was under repair in the hangar at Midway. A
spare plane was under overhaul at Pearl Harbor.
» Four planes conducting inter-type tactics in area C-5 with U. S. Submarine.
* All planes, except those under repair, were armed with machine guns and a full
allowance of machine gun ammunition.
[3] 2. Material condition :
( a ) Of the 81 available patrol planes 54 were new PBY-5's ; 27 were PBY-3's
having over three years service. The PBY-5's were recently ferried to Hawaii,
arriving on the following dates :
Squadron
Number
planes
Arrival date
Squadron
Number
planes
Arrival date
VP-11 _
12
6
12
28 Oct. 1941. -.
28 Oct 1941
8 Nov. 1941 .
VP-23
12
12
23 Nov. 1941.
VP-24 _.
VP-14
23 Nov. 1941.
VP-12
(b) The PBY-5 airplanes were experiencing the usual shake-down difiBculties
and were hampered in maintenance by an almost cornplete absence of spare parts.
In addition, a program for installation of leakproof tanks, armor, and modified
79716 O — 46 — pt. 17-
-19
2722 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
engine nose sections was in progress. They were not fully ready for war until
these installations were completed, nor were extensive continuous operations
practicable until adequate spare parts were on hand.
(c) The 12 PBY-8 airplanes at Pearl Harbor (VP-22) had returned from
Midway on 5 December after an arduous tour of duty at Midway and Wake since
17 October. This squadron was in relatively poor material condition because of
its extended operations at advance bases with inadequate facilities for normal
repair and upkeep. In addition 10 of its planes were [4] approaching 18
months service and were due for overhaul.
(d) It should be noted that the material situation of the patrol squadrons
made the maintenance of continuous extensive daily searches impracticable.
Under such conditions the PBY-5's were to be expected to experience numerous
material failures which would place airplanes out of commission until spare parts
arrived. The PBY-3's of Patrol Squadron TWENTY-TWO at Pearl were sched-
uled for a week of upkeep for repair and maintenance.
(e) Under the circumstances, it seemed advisable to continue intensive expan-
sion training operations and improvement of the material military effectiveness,
at the same time preserving the maximum practicable availability of aircraft for
an emergency. Under the existing material and spare parts situation, continuous
and extensive patrol plane operations by the PBY-5's was certain to result in
rapid automatic attrition of the already limited number of patrol planes imme-
diately available by the exhaustion of small but vital spare parts for which there
were no replacements.
(f) In this connection it should be noted that there were insuflBcient patrol
planes in the Hawaiian Area effectively to do the job required. For the com-
mander of a search group to be able to state with [5] some assurance that
no hostile carrier could reach a spot 250 miles away and launch an attack without
prior detection would require an effective daily search through 369° to a distance
of at least 800 miles. Assuming a 15-mile radius of visibility this would require
a daily 16 hour flight of 84 planes. A force of not less than 200 patrol planes,
adequate spare parts and ample well trained personnel would be required for
such operations,
(Signed) P. N. L. Beixingeb,
Rear Admiral, U. 8. Navy,
Commander Patrol Wing TWO.
PW2/A16-3/
016
Confidential
Patrol Wing Two,
^ U. S. Naval Aib Station,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 1 Jan. 19^2.
From : The Commander Patrol Wing TWO
To : Senior Member, Board Investigating Activities of December 7, 1941,
Subject : Data Requested by Board.
1. In accordance with your request I am sending herewith six (6) copies of
Report of Army-Navy Board of 31 October, 1941.
2. The dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid Drills were held are as follows :
24 April, 1941, 20 August, 1941,
12 May, 1941, 5 September, 1941,
13 May, 1941, 27 September, 1941,
19 June, 1941, 13 October, 1941
10 July, 1941, 27 October, 1941,
26 July, 1941, 12 November, 1941.
1 August, 1941,
P, N. L. Belli NGEE
CONFIDENTIAL
REa»oBT OF Abmt-Navy Board 31 October 1941
[/) In compliance with radiogram to the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Departmertt, dated 2 October 1941 and a similar radiogram to the Commandant,
14th Naval District, a Joint Army-Navy Board was convened to prepare recom-
mendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas for all purposes
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2723
for the entire Hawaiian Area with particular recommendations on the jurisdiction
of the Kahuku Point Area. The board met at 0900 October 7, 1941 and frequently
thereafter ufitil final recommendations were submitted. Present were:
Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. A.
Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. N.
Brigadier General H. C. Davidson,.!!. S. A.
Lieutenant Commander S. E. Burroughs, U. S. N.
1. A general discussion was held concerning the various Army-Navy aviation
activities, the available training areas, the present congestion of aircraft areas,
the expected Expansion of aircraft of both services in the near future with the
attending operational difficulties which such expansion would produce.
2. In order that the board could intelligently approach the problem which
confronted it, it was necessary to have such information as was available as to
the total number of airplanes of both services for which operating facilities
should be made available. The following lists show the number of airplanes
which were considered.
Navy
14th Naval District Aircraft: 84 Patrol planes, 48 VSO seaplanes.
Fleet Aircraft: 750 airplanes (10 Aircraft Carrier Groups).
Cruiser and Battleship Seaplanes: 75 seaplanes (approximately).
Patrol Wings One and Two: 98 Patrol planes.
[2] Marine Aircraft Groups: 162 airplanes
Utility Aircraft: 88 Airplanes (various types)
Total, 1305.
Army
54 Oroup program:
Combat Airplanes
B-17 : 170
A-20-A 27
P-40 163
P-38 163
C-^7 _— 20
Present Assignment:
Combat Airplanes
B-17 12
P-40 104
A-20-A 12
0-47 13
Obsolescent Airplanes
B-18 30
P-36 50
P-26 17
Total : 781
Air Fields Available:
Oahu
Army: Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Bellows Field.
Navy: Ford Island, Ewa, Kaneohe.
Air Fields Proposed: Kahuku, John Rodgers, (Commercial), Barbers Point,
Keehi Lagoon (commercial — under construction).
[S] Outlying Islands — Hawaiian Archipelago
Army: Barking Sands, Kauai; Burns Field, Kauai (Commercial — too small
for bombardment airplanes); Morse Field, Hawaii; Hilo, Hawaii (Municipal
Airport) ; Lanai (Under construction) ; Homestead Field, Mologai (Used joint-
ly Army-Navy and commercial).
2724 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Navy: Maui (Navy ai»d Commercial; Hilo (Temporary facilities patrol
planes).
3. The problem confrontinj? the board as it pertains to Naval aviation was
summed up by the Naval representatives as follows:
a. The Navy requires shore air bases for the use of carrier aircraft in order
to maintain them in a proper state of training for war readiness. With the im-
minent increase in numbers of Army and Navy aircraft operating from Oahu,
the congestion of air si)ace for training and the shortage of suitable sites for air
bases on Oahu must be recognized as becoming serious problems. Lack of
suitable harbor and dock facilities in islands of the Hawaiian group other than
Oahu precludes the development of these island.s as bases for carrier-based air-
craft, since it is essential that carrier planes be readily accessible to their parent
vessels. For this reason Oahu is the only logical islatid for the development of
additional facilities for shore basing of carrier air groups. Carrier aircraft,
when based on shore, must, on account of the nature of their functions, be con-
sidered in a mobile state of readiness and not definitely fixed or attached to any
shore base. Nevertheless, there must be provided on shore suitable and ade-
quate facilities for the basing and operating of such aircraft just as definitely
and specifically as if they were intended to be shore based permanently. It is
estimated that approximately ten carrier air groups will be shore based in the
Hawaiian Area at any one time. It is essential that shore bases be available
for these air groups in order that a proper state of training may be maintained.
These shore bases must necessarily be located on the island of Oahu where
transportation facilities are available between bases and berths of parent vessels
both for transferring personnel and equipment, and for reasons of readiness.
In addition, in order to provide air space and fields for the conduct of daily train-
ing of these air groups, adequate aviation facilities must be available not only on
Oahu but on other islands of the Hawaiian Group.
b. T'he Navy has under lease approximately 70 acres of land on Kahuku Point.
There is a landing strip and a dive bombing target on this area that is continually
in use by shore-based carrier aircraft in connection with training operations. If
this area is given over to the Army for construction of an air base, its loss will
be strongly felt even now, when congestion on Oahu is but a iwrtion of [4]
that of the future, and adjustments must be made not only for loss of the exist-
ing landing strip and target area, but also for the reduction of the Navy air space
involved. With the arrival of each additional carrier group in Oahu, further
adjustments will be required to permit the necessary training, to proceed.
c. The principal joint task assigned to Army and Navy forces permanently
based in the Hawaiian Islands is "to hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval base."
The importance of Oahu in the Hawaiian Group is due entirely to the existence
of the Pear) Harbor Naval Base and its attending activities. The existence of
Army Forces and Navy District Forces in great numbers in the Hawaiian Islands
is solely for the purpose of maintaining the usefulness of Pearl Harbor as a base
for the various units of the Fleet. The value of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to
the Fleet is in providing means for Fleet units to be maintained and continued in
effecting operating readiness at a point well advanced to the westward. It
therefore appears that any military or Naval air units on Oahu which unneces-
sarily interfere with the maintenance of proper readiness of Fleet units and
which are not required on Oahu for the security of Oahu, but are required in
the Hawaiian Area, should be based on other islands of the Hawaiian Group.
d. It appears necessary, to develop to maximum practicable capacity all sites
on Oahu considered suitable for air bases; to construct auxiliary fields where
practicable; and, at the .same time, to avoid creating an undesirable degree of
air congestion in the vicinity of Oahu that will defeat operating effectiveness.
In planning the above developments, due consideration should be given to provid-
ing adequate dispersion.
e. To provide for future requirements of Army and Navy air forces in the
Hawaiian Islands, it appears necessary to develop all suitable air base sites on
islands of the Hawaiian Group, other than Oahu, to their maximum practicable
capacities. In order to carry out estimated requirements, these developments
should precede or at least proceed with any further developments on Oahu. This
may not be entirely practicable of accomplishment, but every effort should be
made to do so. A far-sighted policy in which currently foreseen needs are sub-
ordinated to and coordinated with a general plan of ultimate development should
be adopted now. Otherwise, inevitable fhture expansion will cause a more
difficult problem to arise at a later date.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2725
f. There is every desire of the Navy to cooperate with the Army to the fullest
extent, but in the case under consideration there is insufficient space on the
island of Oahu for the numbers of aircraft involved, even in current plans, to
base thereon at the same time. As both services are basing their requirements
on the part they are expected to play in national defense, it follows that final
decision as to the action to be taken should be based on the effect of the various
alternatives on over-all national defense.
[5] 4. The problem confronting the board as it i)ertains to Army aviation
was summed up by the Army representatives as follows :
a. The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base
against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution to be made by the Hawaiian
Air Force in carrying out this mission is :
(1) To search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action by
bombardment aviation.
(2) To detect, intercept and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu
by pursuit aviation.
b. Due to the limited range of pursuit aviation and the uncertainty of ascer-
taining the direction of approach of enemy aircraft making an attack on the
Pearl Harbor Naval Base, it is mandatory that the air fields from which pursuit
aviation operates, in the performance of this mission, be situated on the Island
of Oahu. Under no other condition could there be assurance that enemy aircraft
could be intercepted before they reached their bomb release line. The minimum
requirements of pursuit aviation for its mission is two groups. The number of
airplanes at present allocated to a pursuit group, which is 163, necessitates two
air fields be available on this island. One of these groups is now permanently lo-
cated at Wheeler Field where atmospheric conditions at times offer an obstacle to
their continuous operation. To insure that at least one group of pursuit aviation
may operate without being hampJered by weather conditions, it should be located
at approximately sea level elevation. The Kahuku Point area has been selected
as having the necessary level ground and weather prevailing to satisfy these
conditions. Furthermore, by having all Army pursuit aviation located at Wheeler
Field and Kahuku Point, it makes it possible to carry out the pursuit mission
and training therefor on the north side of Oahu, removing all pursuit aircraft
from the air congestion which pervails over the Pearl Harbor area. The Kahuku
Point area also lends itself to the establishment of grounds targets, in its imme-
diate vicinity, which are so essential to proper progress in pursuit training. This
still leaves one group at Wheeler Field without proper ground gunnery facilities
which cannot be obtained on the Island of Oahu. The. nearest point where these
facilities can be made available is on the Island of Molokai where one gunnery
range has been established.
c. There is allocated to the Hawaiian Air Force 39 A-20-A airplanes which
form the support command to assist the ground forces of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment in their mission of defending the Pearl Harbor Naval Base. These air-
planes must, of necessity, be closely associated with the ground troops which
they serve, both for training and to facilitate their employment in time of war.
The home for the support command is established at Bellows Field.
[6] d. The bombardment command of the Hawaiian Air Force consists
of 182 heavy bombers. To relieve congestion, all of the training for heavy bom-
bardment is conducted over water or land areas removed from the Island of
Oahu. This number of heavy bombers over-taxes the capacity of Hickam Field,
their home station, to such an extent that provisions must be made for the train-
ing of approximately one-half of this force from outlying fields on other islands
of the Hawaiian Archipelago.
e. To establish permanent stations for air organizations on other islands in
this group entails changing the defense plans for these islands that security for
these bases may be established. This would require a decided increase in the
number of ground troops or such a dispersion of available forces as to destroy
their effectiveness. This cannot be done except at enormous expense of time
and money. For this reason the home base for bombardment aviation and
the large quantities of bombs and other supplies necessary for continued opera-
tions must be placed under the protection of the ground defense installations
on Oahu. Operations may be conducted from outlying fields in the Hawaiian
group in the beginning of the attack but as the attack is pressed home these
bombers will be forced to fall back upon their protected home bases. While the
training of bombardment units is normally conducted in areas distant from the
Pearl Harbor area, it wou]d be practically impossible to control this force in
2726 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
time of actual hostilities if the)' were stationed on outlj'ing islands. Radio is
the sole means of communication and is too susceptible to interference to furnish
a positive medium of conti'ol. A positive means of communication is a prime
requisite for successful air operations. It must be in being and constantly used
prior to the beginning of hostilities. Further, it must be pointed out that bom-
bardment aviation must be protected by every available means of ground and
anti-aircraft defense, i. e., pursuit aviation antiaircraft artillery and aircraft
warning service. Duplication of these defenses on outlying islands is mani-
festly prohibitive. Therefore, as pursuit concentrations for the defense of Oahu
must be located on Oahu, it is imperative that bombardment aviation must be
based on Oahu under the protection of the Interceptor Command.
f. The 20 transports must of necessity operate from Hickam Field as that
is the base at which technical supplies are concentrated for which the transports
furnish transportation to outlying fields where training is being conducted.
Supply and maintenance facilities also require the same protection from the
ground and air as is required for grounded bombardment aviation.
g. In the case of actual war, the majority of the Fleet units, with their carriers
attached, would be at sea, leaving ample air field facilities for such naval aviation
as might be left behind and for all Army aviation participating in the defense
of these islands. Therefore, the problem which confronts this board is to find
a solution which will permit the maximum use of existing air fields for aviation
training for both the Army and the Navy and to suggest such sites as might
be developed to increase these facilities.
[7] h. A careful survey has been made of the entire Island of Oahu for
sites on which landing fields can be constructed. On this island, with the excep-
tion of the Kipapa Gulch area, all level ground that might be available for air
fields is either so occupied, projects are underway for preparation of air fields, or
the turbulence in the air created by the close proximity of mountain ranges
precludes such development. The site commonly referred to as the Kipapa Gulch
area will accommodate two 5,000-foot runways free from obstructions. The
greatest handicap to the use of this area is that it is about two-thirds of the
distance between Pearl Harbor and Wheeler Field which would further increase
the congestion of the air over this part of the island. It would also remove
from cultivation a highly productive tract of land. The Kipapa Gulch area is
the only site remaining where an air field could be constructed. The principal
objection to the use of this site, which is congestion of the air over the Pearl
Harbor area, is much less of a handicap should this site be used for the training
of carrier groups than it would be as a station for Army pursuit aviation. The
use. of this site by the Navy would permit the concentration of carrier-group
training for Naval aviation on- the south side of the island of Oahu, at Barber's
Point, Kipapa Gulch, and Ford Island. As the training from these stations
would be entirely under Naval control it lends itself to aerial traflac regula-
tions which would be difficult to attain if large numbers of airplanes of the two
services were intermingled. The Kipapa Gulch area is advantageously located
for occupancy of carrier-group aviation in that the site is readily accessible
to the parent vessels of the carrier groups. It would permit facility in the
transfer of personnel and supplies to and from the parent vessel in Pearl Harbor.
It would be advantageous in making for ease of supervision of the training
of all carrier-based Naval aviation.
i. The Army is cognizant of the fact that with the increase in carrier-basetl air-
craft contemplated for this area, serious problems arise as to suflScient air and
ground space on Oahu. It is also cognizant of the fact that air units in Hawaii
will, within the next few months, be reinforced with pursuit and bombardment
aircraft for which bases must be available now, while the additional carriers
anticipated for this area will not be available for an elapsed time of from
one to three years.
j. That far-sighted and long-range planning must be done there can be no
doubt. But, provisions for aircraft which may be available within three years
should not be allowed to disrupt the plans, training and employment of the
Army Air Force units in this area at a time when they may be required for
immediate use against a )iostile threat.
k. This problem can be solved by restricting the number of carf-ier groups
to that which can be adequately accommodated on existing Navy facilities and
those Navy projects which are now under development.
[8] 5. ConclusionK:
That the board concludes that it has been presented with a problem for which
a satisfactory solution to all concerned cannot be obtained due to the fact that —
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2727
a. The Army estimates its requirements from directives emanating from the
War Department.
b. The Navy estimates its requirements from directives emanating from the
Navy Department.
c. There is insufficient space on the Island of Oahu to provide for the estimated
future requirements of both the Army and the Navy.
6. Joi7it recommendations :
a. That it be agreed that in order not to delay starting the development of an
important strategical base, the board recommends:
(1) That the Kahuku Point area be developed immediately by the Army as an
air base.
(2) That as the Army representatives hold that the Kahuku Point air base
should be available for Army air units solely and the Navy representatives hold
that the Kahuku Point air base should be available for temporary use by the
Navy when cii-cumstances so require, the extent of availability of this base to
the Navy as well as the extent of the availability to the Navy of all other Army
air bases on the Island of Oahu, be left to the determination of higher authority
as the solution of this problem transcends the perogatives of this board.
b. That progress be continued on the development of air bases on islands of
the Hawaiian Group, other than Oahu, which are now under construction.
c. That in order to reduce air congestion on Oahu, all existing and new sites
of strategical importance on islands of the Hawaiian Group other than Oahu,
suitable for air bases and auxiliarj- operating fields be expanded or developed to
maximum practicable capacities and that such developments have the same high
priority as any development proposed for the Island of Oahu.
d. That all sites on the island of Oahu suitable for air bases and auxiliary
operating fields be developed to maximum practicable capacities at the same time
avoiding the creation of an undesirable degree of air congestion in the vicinity
of Oahu.
e. That the existing revised Joint Army-Navy agreement relating to oi)erating
areas be placed in force — adjustments which may become necessary, from time
to time, to be accomplished by conference between local representatives.
P. N. L. Bellinger,
Rear Admiral, JJ. 8. N.,
Senior Naval Member.
F. L. Martin,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Senior Army Member.
Confidential
17 WAR
Washn, D. C, 210P Oct. 2, 1941
Commanding General
Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H.
One eight six second September twenty-three reurad Navy Department in-
structed Commandant Fourteenth Naval District in radio September twenty six
to confer with you and submit joint recommendations covering allocation aircraft
operating areas for all purposes for entire Hawaiian area stop This has War
Department approval stop Navy radio stated further joint recommendations on
Kahuku Point desired stop You are authorized to confer on this latter matter but
will be guided by instructions to you in General Marshall's letter of August nine-
t(>en. '
Adams.
156Py2
EXHIBIT NO. 121
Facts and Coerespondence About Admiral Kimmel's Retirement
Facts About Admiral Kimmel's Retirement
On 25 January 1942 I was informed by Rear Admiral Greenslade, U.S.N.,
Commander 12th Naval District, San Francisco, California, that Rear Admiral
Randall Jacobs, U.S.N., Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department,
2728 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Washington, D. C, had telephoned an oflBeial message to he delivered to me
which stated that Admiral Jacobs had been directed by the Acting Secretary
of the Navy to inform me that General Short had submitted a request for retire-
ment. I took this as a suggestion that I submit a similar request and on 26
January I submitted a request for retirement. Until I received this message
from the Navy Department I had not even thought of submitting a request for
retirement.
On 28 January 1 was informed by Rear Admiral Greenslade that Admiral
H. R. Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations, had telephoned a message for
me to the effect that my notification of General Short's request for retirement
was not meant to influence me.
I thereupon submitted my letter of 28 January in which I stated, "I desire
my request for retirement to stand, subject only to determination by the Depart-
ment as to what course of action will best serve the interests of the country and
the good of the service."
Subsequently I learned from Admiral Jacobs that the Official directing him to
inform me that General Short had submitted a request for retirement was not
the Acting Secretary, but the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox.
On 22 February 1942 in a letter to Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations,
I stated in part: "I submitted this request solely to permit the Department to
take whatever action they deemed best for the interest of the country. I did not
submit it in order to escape censure or punishment."
The approval of my request for retirement included the statement: "This
approval of your request for retirement is without condonation of any offense
or prejudice to future disciplinary action."
I was notified through the public press on or about 1 March 1942 that the.
Secretary of the Navy had directed that charges and specitications be prepared to
bring me to trial by General Court Martial at some future time.
Nav-3-HC
April 24, 1942.
From : The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.
To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N., Retired, 280 Bronxville Road,
Bronxville, N. Y.
Subject: Duty.
Reference: (a) Your letter of April 21, 1942.
1. The receipt is acknowledged of reference (a) in which you express your
readiness to perform any duty which may be assigned you.
[s] Randall Jacobs.
Certified a true copy.
[S] H. E. KiMMKL.
280 Bbonxville Road, Bbonxviljle, New Yobk.
21 April 1942.
Rear Admiral Randall Jacobs, U. S. Navy,
Bureau of Navigation,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Deab Jacobs : Enclosed herewith is my request for any duty to which the Navy
Department may see fit to assign me. I knovv that you and Admiral King under-
stand my desire to do anything to help, but I believe the enclosed request should
be on file to keep the record straight.
My kindest regards.
Sincerely, ,, „ ,^
fsl H. E. KIMMEX.
280 Bbonxville Road, Bbonxville, New Yobk,
21 April 19^.
From : Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired.
To: Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
Subject: Duty.
1. Supplementing the statement in my request for retirement dated 26 January
1942, I wish to again state that I stand ready to perform any duty to which the
Navy Department may assign me. „ „ ^, ,
[s] H. E. Kimmel,
H. E. KIMMEL.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2729
Letter from Admiral Stark
Febeuaey 23, 19^
Deajb Mustapha : I tried to get you by phone last night at the St. Francis where
Jacobs told me you were staying, only to find out you are not registered there.
I then called Johnny Greenslade, and I trust he got over to you what I wanted to
say, which was particularly to clear any doubts in your mind so far as I could
regarding the situation here.
Also, I should have so liked just to talk to you for a couple of minutes and,
incidentally, to send you some birthday wishes, which are almost due.
It might not have just fitted to have said "Happy Birthday", but I do wish it
and I also know that it will be just as happy as you will to make it, and that
the measure of that happiness will be commensurate with your innermost strength.
We all have a tough year head amid the present clouds of uncertainty, and we
all need courage that will enable us to think bravely, act wisely, and endure. I do
not have to tell you that my faith in one Husband Kimmel and in the fine fiber
in his innermost makeup is such that I know it will carry him through, regardless
of how rough the going.
I told Kit I was going to drop you a line this morning when I had failed to reach
you last night, and she said to be sure to join all her good wishes with mine to
you and to Dot.
Sincerely,
Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N.
c/o Rear Admiral J. W..Oreenslade, U. S. N.
Twelfth Naval District, San Francisco, California.
22 February 1&42.
Dear Betty : I started writing this letter a few minutes after Pye gave me your
letter of 21 February. I thank you for the letter and for the information con-
tained therein. I also thank you for your other letters which I have not answered.
I understand from your letter that I will not be retired for the present, that I
will be in a leave status until some further action is taken.
I submitted my request for retirement because I was notified that Short had
done so and took that notification as a suggestion for me to do likewise. I sub-
mitted this request solely to permit the department to take whatever action they
deemed best for the interests of the country. I did not submit it in order to
escape censure or punishment.
When I was notified that the notification in regard to Short was not meant
to put pressure on me, I submitted my second letter on the subject.
When the fact that Short and I had submitted requests for retirement was
published to the country, I was astounded that the department would put Short
and me in such light before the public.
On February 19, I received notification by the Secretary that I would be placed
on the Retired list on March 1, 1W2. Paragraph 2 of this letter states, "This
approval of your request for retirement is without condonation of any offense or
prejudice to future disciplinary action."
I do not understand this paragraph unless it is to be published to the country
as a promise that I will be disciplined at some future time.
I stand ready at any time to accept the consequences of my acts. I do not
wish to embarrass the government in the conduct of the war. I do feel, however,
that my crucifixion before the public has about reached the limit. I am in dally
receipt of letters from Irresponsible people over the country taking me to task
and even threatening to kill me. I am not particularly concerned except as it
shows the effect on the public of articles published about me.
I feel that the publication of paragraph two of the Secretary's letter of February
Ifi will further inflame the public and do me a great injustice.
I have kept my mouth shut and propose to continue to do so as long as it Is
humanly possible.
I regret the losses at Pearl Harbor just as keenly, or perhaps more keenly
than any other American citizen. I wish that I had been Smarter than I was
and able to foresee what happened on December 7. I devoted all my energies
to the job and made the dispositions which appeared to me to be called for. I
cannot now reproach myself for any la'^k of effort.
I will not comment on the Report of the Commission, but you probably know
what I think of it. I will say In passing that I was not made an interested
party or a defendant.
2730 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
•
All this I have been willing to accept for the good of the country out of my
loyalty to the Nation, and to await the judgment of history when all the factors
can be published.
But I do think that in all justice the department should do nothing further
to inflame the public against me. I am entitled to some consideration even
though you may consider I erred greviously.
You must appreciate that the beating I have taken leaves very little that can
be added to my burden.
I appreciate your efforts on my behalf and will always value your friendship,
which is a precious thing to me.
My kindest regards always.
/S/ H. E. KiMMEL.
To : Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations.
(Written in San Francisco, California.)
KiMMEL, Husband E.
Rear Admiral, U. 8. N.
(2218-11-Kn)
Febbuaby 21, 1942.
From : Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy
To : The Secretary of the Navy
Subject: Transfer to the Retired List after forty (40) years' service.
Reference: (a) The Secretary of the Navy's letter of February 16, 1942 inform-
ing me that I will be transferred to the retired list of officers
of the United States Navy.
1. I hereby acknowledge the receipt of reference (a) .
/s/ H. E. Kimmel.
H. E. Kimmel.
Letter from Admibai. Stark
OplO-KR
February 21, 1942.
Deur Kimmel: A few days ago I thought that you would have something
definite before long. I am inclined to think now that this is not the ease,
and that for the time being at least you will just be continued on leave. I
know that from your standpoint this is terxibly indefinite, but I believe that if
you knew all the cross-currents you would concur with this decision and that
it is made with muf'h thought regarding your own interest.
Pending something definite, there is no reason why you should not settle
yourself in a quiet nook somewhere and let Old Father Time help this entire
situation, which I feel he will — if for no other reason than that he always has.
I would like you to know the remark the Secretary made a day or two ago
and that was:
"As for Kimmel, he has conducted himself in an exemplary fashion since this
thing happened." And to which I believe the entire Navy would give a hearty
"Aye, Aye!"
We realize how tough it is, but again I am counting on you to rise above
it and be master of yourself in the future just as you always have been in
the past.
Every good wish.
Sincerely,
Admiral H. E. Kimmel,
Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, California.
Letter From Admiral Stark
21 February 1942.
Dear Kimmel: Unless I am mistaken, you have another landmark in the
near oflBng. May I send you some thoughts which I recall from something I
once read and which is in substance :
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ' 2731
On this occasion, instead of a wish for a happy birthday, knowing as I do that
it will be just as happy as you choose to make it, and instead of wishing you
the happiest year just ahead, knowing as I do that the measure of happiness
will be exactly commensurate with what you, in your innermost strength,
choose to make it ; I wish for you, amid the clouds of uncertainty, COURAOE —
courage that will enable you to think bravely, act wisely, and endure; courage
to defend all the virtues and therefore itself, the greatest of them; courage that
will steel the arm without clouding the brain; courage that can and will lift
both body and mind above their present levels and capacity. Make over your
own world. Let your courage be its architect. May God give you strength,
wisdom, balance, courage, and hope.
Affectionately,
Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, USN,
c/o Rear Admiral J. W. Greenslade.
[First endorsement]
Februaby 17, 1942.
From : The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.
To : Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Twelfth Naval District.
Via : The Commandant.
Subject: Transfer to the Retired List after forty (40) years' service.
1. Forwarded.
/s/ RANDALL JACOBS
[Second endorsement]
On Lettee From SecNav. Dated Fejb. 16, 1942, to Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel
From: Commandant, Twelfth Naval District and Naval Operating Base, San
Francisco.
To : Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy
Subject: Transfer to the Retired List after forty (40) years' service.
1. Delivered, February 19, 1942 at 11 : 05 A. M.
/s/ J. W. Greenslade.
Certified a true copy :
/s/ H. E. Kimmel
J. W. Greenslade.
The Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, February 16, 1942.
From : The Secretary of the Navy :
To : Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.
Subject: Transfer to the Retired List after forty (40) years' service.
Reference: (a) Your request for retirement, dated January 26, 1942.
1. Your request to be transferred to the retired list after the completion of
forty (40) years' service in accordance with the provisions of U. S. Code, Title
34, Section 381 is, by direction of the President, approved. You will be trans-
ferred to the retired list of officers of the United States Navy as of March 1, 1942.
2. This approval of your request for retirement is without condonation of any
offense or prejudice to future disciplinary action.
3. Acknowledgment of receipt is requested.
/s/ Frank Knox.
Certified a true copy :
/s/ H. E. Kimmel.
2732 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
KiMM£X, Husband E.
Rear Admiral, USN
(2208-11-Kn)
JANTTABY 28, 1942.
B*rom : Rear Admiral Husband E. Kiiumel, U. S. N.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: My Request for Retirement.
Reference: (A) My Itr. to the Secretary of the Navy of 26 January 1942 request-
ing retirement under the provisions of Article 1443 Revised Statutes.
1. Reference (A) was submitted after I had been officially informed by the
Navy Department that General Short had requested retirement.
2. I was officially informed today by the Navy Department that my notification
of General Short's request was not intended to influence my decision to submit a
similar request.
3. I desire my request for retirement to stand, subject only to determination
by the Department as to what course of action will best serve the interests of the
country and the good of the service.
/s/ H. E. Kimmel.
Husband E. Kimmex.
Lettee Fbom Admiral Stark
Op-10 Hu
27 January 1942.
Dear Kimmex: Yesterday Jacobs called up directing Greenslade to continue
you on leave.
Our feeling here is that until definite action is taken regarding your future
orders, it is better for you not to return to any temporary duty. We also think
that it would be well for the two Secretaries to confer before any final action is
taken and at the moment Colonel Knox is out of the City and will not be back
until Thursday.
I showed the Secretary and the President your splendid letter stating that you
were not to be considered and that only the country should be considered.
Marshall informed me yesterday while we were talking over the situation, that
Short had submitted a request for retirement. We all thought this information
would be of interest to you and Jacobs sent it on to Greenslade. I do not want
you in any Sense to consider the transmission of this information as request on
you by the Department to follow suit. We do not desire to influence your initia-
tive in any way. If and when we have any definite recommendations — sugges-
tions— we will definitely say so.
I do want you to know that we will try and solve the problem on the basis of
your letter — "whatever is best for the country" ; that is about all I can say.
That you are sitting on a question mark hoping for something definite at the
earliest possible moment, we realize and I can assure you you are very much in
our thoughts.
Every good wish as always.
Sincerely,
Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmejl, USN,
c/o Rear Adrdiral John W. Greenslade,
12th Naval District.
P. S. The information about Short is confidential. I do not know what action
will be taken on his request.
Copy to Adm. Jacobs.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2733
KiMMEL, Husband E.
Rear Admiral, V8N
(2207-00-Kn)
January 26, 1942.
From : Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N.
To : The Secretary of the Navy
Subject : Request for Retirement under the Provisions of Section 1443 Revised
Statutes.
1. After forty one years and eight months service in the Untied States Navy,
I hereby request that I be placed upon the retired list in accordance with the
provisions of Section 1443 Revised Statutes.
2. I hold myself in readiness to perform any duty to which I may be assigned.
/s/ H. E. Kimmel
HUSBAND E. KIMMEL.
[First Endorsement]
January 27, 1942.
From : Commandant, Twelfth Naval District and Naval Operating Base, San
Francisco, California.
To : The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject : Request for Retirement under the Provisions of Section 1443 Revised
Statutes.
1. Forwarded.
J. W. Greenslade.
Letter From Admiral Stark
HRS/hu 29 December 1941.
Dear Kimmel: Just received your note of 24 December 1941.
You certainly are entitled to a short leave and shall have it.
Don't worry about our finding duty for you. I value your services just as much
as I ever did and more and I say this straight from the heart as well as the head.
If there is any way in which I can help you when you arrive here, call on Kit
and me at once.
We had a great and wonderful surprise yesterday when Kewpie called up
from San Francisco. The head of the concern her husband works for had in-
formed me they were going to close their business out in Honolulu so it was a
joy that transportation was made available for them and I have just dropped
Admiral Bloch a line telling him of our appreciation.
Every good wish in the wide world as always and with the admonition of the
old Irishman who said "if you can't be cheerful, be as cheerful as you can."
Sincerely,
Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, V8N,
Fleet Post Offlce, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
Letter From Admiral Stark
HRS/hu
Ser. #9
17 December 1941.
Dear Kimmel : I want you to know how deeply I feel for you.
I am not going to tell you the developments here. Nimitz can.
Tell the Gang for me that it is almost superfluous for me to say that regardless
of their personal feelings, I know in a time like this, they will give Nimitz all
the support they have in every ounce and fiber of their makeup.
Suffice it to say that what is happening had never even occurred to Nimitz, but
like a good soldier he is obeying orders.
2734 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I wish there were something I could do for you, both officially and personally,
but I know you will keep your chin up regardless.
My best to all hands and good luck.
Sincerely,
Admiral H. E. Kimmel, USN,
Commander-in-Chief, U. K. Pueiflc Fleet,
VS8 Pennsylvayiia, c/o Postmaster, San Fratwisco, Calif.
P. S. King is here and echoes what I have to say.
Copy to Adm. Nimitz.
Letter From Admiral Stark
HRS/hu
#8
^ 11 December 1941.
Dear Mustapha : I am enclosing a page from the Congressional Record cover-
ing the remarks of Congressman Jimmie Van Zandt. Thought it might be of
interest to you.
Keep cheerful.
Good luck. '
We'll fight it out.
Betty.
Admiral H. E. Kimmfx, USN,
Commander-in-Chief, U. 8. Paeific Fleet,
USS Pennsylvania, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.
Letter From Admiral Stark
In reply refer to Initials and No. #7.
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Washinffton, December 8, 1941.
Admiral H. E. Ktmmel, U. S. N.,
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
USS Pennsylvania, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
Dear Admiral Kimmei. : We are feeling for you just as hard as we can in just
what you have been through and are biding our time until you can send us some
details which are eagerly awaited. We did not want to bother you while you
were applying first aid but will welcome news as soon as you can get some for us.
Hundreds of telegrams and messages are being received from the families of
ships and we know that as soon as you can you will start sending us a list so that
we may acquaint them with the facts. '
I dropped Admiral Bloch a line and will just repeat what I told him that I am
not going to bother you now knowing that you will give us reports as soon as
you can.
Very good wishes from all.
Sincerely,
Harold R. Stark,
Admiral, U. S. N.
P. S. Send us your needs and we will do everything we can to assist in any way
we can.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2735
EXHIBIT NO. 122
CinCPac File No.
A16-3/AD/(ll)
Serial 1836
United States Pacific Fua:T,
U. S. S.- Pennsylvania. Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., Aug. 16, 19.',t.
From: Comma iuler-in-('hief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Subject: Aircraft Warning Facilities for the Hawaiian Department.
Reference: (a) CG, Hawaiian Dept. Itr. File SIG. 676.3 AWS of 5 August 1941.
1. In reply to the suggestion that an officer of the Fleet serve as liaison officer
with your Headquarters, I am pleased to advise you that Commander Maurice E.
Curts, U. S. Navy, the Comnuinication Officer of my Staff, has been assigned to
that duty.
H. E. KiMMBn..
Copy to: Com FOURTEEN (with copy of ref.)
Headqu.\rters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shatter, T. H., .3 August 1941.
SIG.676.3 AWS
Subject : Aircraft Warning Facilities for the Hawaiian Department.
To : Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Pearl Harbor, T. H.
1. The Army's Aircraft Warning Facilities for the Hawaiian Departnjent are
rapidly approaching completion. Small scale operations is expected in the im-
mediate future. Subsequent to the original setup the AWS has been greatly
augmented. The results of this augmentation, however, are not expected to
materialize for some months.
2. The Department Air Warning Service Board, consisting of officers from all
instrumentalities associated with the Air Defense, has been reactivated and is
now constituted as a liaison and advisory council on AWS affairs. Inasmuch as
the Navy has shown considerable interest in the AWS and has initiated plans
for a similar system of their own, it seems greatly to the interest of both services
to have a Naval officer as contact or liaison officer between Army and Navy AWS
activities. I believe that in this manner our efforts along these lines will be
highly comulative and that the prospects for future joint Army-Navy cooperation
greatly enhanced.
3. Accordingly, your assistance would be appreciated in effecting arrangements
whereby an officer from your Headquarters be detailed to serve as liaison officer
between your Headquarters and mine.
(S) Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.
S-S67/RADAR
ND14(0576)
Secret
Office of the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District,
19 June 1941.
From : Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.
To : Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Combined Communication Training.,
Enclosure : (A) Copy of letter from Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, U. S. A.
to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (SECRET) dated
12 June 1941.
1. There is forwarded herewith enclosure (A) for such action as you may care
to take.
(S) CO. Bloch.
2736 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Secret
12 June 1941.
Rear Admiral C. C. Brx)CH, USN,
Commandant 14th Naval Dintrict,
Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H.
My Dear Admiral Bi-oc h : As you are doubtless aware, fifteen key enlisted men
and one officer of the Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, have recently gone
to sea on cruises on board the CALIFORNIA, CHICAGO, CHESTER, and
PENSACOLA. While at sea, these men received valuable instruction and ex-
perience in the oi>eration of RADAR equipment, preparing them for the opera-
tion of similar Army equipment. Upon their return, the personnel receiving
instructions were unanimous in expressing their gratitude for the consideration
accorded them on these cruises and for the opportunity to become associated
with the fleet personnel.
It is anticipated that the Army Aircraft Warning Service will be placed
in operation in the near future. Due to the interest expressed by the Navy
radio operators in the Army equipment, I will cause arrangements to be effected
to afford such naval personnel as you may desire to inspect the Army equip-
ment shortly after it has been placed in operation.
Will you transmit to Admiral Kimmel and to the other Naval Commanders
concerned my appreciation for the instructions afforded these men. Both serv-
ices should reap great benefit in the near future from the security which will
be afforded them from the increased efficiency of the Aircraft Warning Service
Personnel.
Very sincerely yours,
Waltes C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.
EXHIBIT NO. 123
Naval Message
Drafter ND1VN3-1 (Y&D)
From OPNAV
Releasee! by H. R STARK
Date 15 OCT. 1941
Navv Department
COMFOURTEEN
CINPAC
152227 OCT. 1941 NCR 425
URDIS 140400 to BUDOCKS X Request consideration be given to construc-
tion of combined operating center sufficient in size and facilities to accommodate
in time of emergency staffs of all essential operating activities of both Army
and Navy in Hawaii such as CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN COMTRAIN COM-
SUBFOR COMPATWING and parallel activties of Army X CNO considers con-
centration of Army and Navy activities in one building of proper construction
constitutes great advantage for emergency operations X Comment with recom-
mendations including location and estimates of cost requested
(This is a copy made from microfilm records) 10/ July 45
Confidential
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2737
fi] C-A16/A&N/ND14
(01171)
Confidential
Office of the Commandant
Fourteenth Naval District
and
Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U. S. A.
3 November 1941.
From : Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
To : Chief of Naval Operations.
Via : Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject : Combined Operating Center, Army and Navy.
References *
(a) CNO Confidential dispatch 152227 of October 1941.
(b) Letter of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated 29
October 19il.
Enclosure : ( A ) Copy of reference ( b ) .
1. It is recommended that no steps be taken at the present time to concentrate
the Army and Navy in a common building as proposed in reference (a).
2. Since the visit of Captain Mountbatten, R.N., who gave his views on this
subject and the experiences of the British along parallel lines, this and allied
matters have been under consideration by: (a) Commander-in-Chief, U. S.
Pacific Fleet; (b) Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; (c) Com-
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
3. On receipt of reference (a), a paraphrased copy of this dispatch was sent
to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department ; his comments in connection
therewith are given in reference (b), enclosure (A).
4. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, accompanied by the Comman-
dant, Fourteenth Naval District, has visited the underground chambers at Ali-
amanu Crater and had their functions explained in a brief way by the
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. If one or more of these chambers
were to be assigned to the Navy, it is not apparent that any real benefit would
be derived therefrom.
5. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, has oflSces ashore, as has
Commander Submarines, Scouting Force. It appears certain that at the out-
break of hostilities, even though the Commander-in-Chief may return to his
flagship, Commander Base Force will have to have offices ashore. Accordingly,
the Commander-in-Chief has requested that suitable offices be constructed for
the Commander-in-Chief. Commander Base Force, and Commander Submarines,
Scouting Force. I do not believe that the Commander-in-Chief or the Fleet
operations would be benefitted by being in a common office building with the
Commanding General and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. As a
matter of fact, I am inclined to believe that his best interests would be served
by being in a building with only agencies of the Fleet therein.
[2] 6. There has been established in this district a joint harbor control
post ; this is located at District Headquarters. Here there are provisions for
officers of the Coast Artillery, the Army Air Corps, the Fleet Air Detachment,
and the Submarine Force, all in addition to the district officers who work in
connection with the local defense forces. So far as can be ascertained without
actual experience in war, this post fulfills the requirements of the area.
7. In addition to the above, funds are available for and construction will soon
be undertaken on a bomb-proof communication center adjacent to District Head-
quarters. Provision will have to be made in case of air raids for certain
features of the harbor control p«jst to occupy this bomb-proof shelter.
8. The Commandant feels that no delay is acceptable in providing for the
present needs of the Commander-in-Chief. His needs are real and immediate.
What should be done later in connection with a combind operating center can
best be determined by actual experience.
(Signed) C. C. Bloch.
Advance copy to :
Chief of Naval Operations (by clipper mail).
79716 O— 46— pt. 17 20
2738 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[/] Confidential
Headquaktees Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commandek,
Fort Shatter, T. E.. 29 October, 194I.
Admiral C. C. Bloch,
Cotiimandant, 14th Naval District,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.
Dear Admiral Bloch : Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of October 21,
1941, file No. C-A16-1/A&N/ND14 (OllOl). with reference to a combined oper-
ating center and command post for Army and Navy functions in this Department.
While I am strongly in favor of combined operating centers for equivalent units
of Army and Navy forces, I do not believe that all of the operating centers should
be combined into one single building. There are strong strategic and tactical
reasons why the various Army functions cannot be located together in the same
structure. The Different elements have distinct missions, and while it is neces-
sary to establish close liaison and communications between these various Army
headquarters, it is equally necessary that they be located in separate command
posts "for eflBciency of individual operation. Also if the various Army head-
quarters were to be combined in one location, we would be confronted with tech-
nical problems involving communications to subordinate elements which would
be extremely difl5cult to solve. From a security standpoint, I do not believe that
this combination of Army activities would be advisable; a lucky hit effecting
either the structure or communication would have a far greater adverse effect
than a similar hit on one of the separate command posts.
The Army already has its command posts under construction and these will
be completed in the near future. The Department command post is in the Alia-
raanu Crater, the 18th Bombardment Wing is on the southwest outer slopes of
Aliamanu, and the Interceptor command post consisting of fighter planes, anti-
aircraft artillery and the aircraft warning service, is at Fort Shafter. The
command post of the Hawaiian Air Force is also to be located at Fort Shafter.
Communications facilities are now available to all these locations, and arrange-
ments can easily be made to expand each into a combined operating center for
the equivalent Army and Navy units. All of these structures are being built
underground by tunneling methods; this requires a minimum of material. A
combined operating center located in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor would probably
have to be a cut and cover type of structure and to afford the same protection
that we now have in the tunnels, it would have to be very massive. Under present
conditions securing the necessary materials would be diflScult.
[2] It is therefore suggested that instead of a single operating center, con-
sideration be given to the construction of additional space for Navy units adja-
cent to the existing command posts of equivalent Army units. This suggestion
would mean that the Navy structure for the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet,
the Commandant 14th Naval District, and various fleet echelons would be located
in the Aliamanu Crater, that the command post for Patwing two would be located
adjacent to the Army command post for the 18th Wing, and that the jNfavy
fighters could be located adjacent to the Army's interceptor command post, and
that space for the Navy Air Headquarters could be made available either adja-
cent to the headquarters of the Army Air Force, or with Patwing two.
Very sincerely yours,
/s/ Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, V. S. ARMY,
Commanding.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2739
[1] CinC File No. Al/A&N/ (18).
Serial 01810
Confidential
United States Fleet
U. S, S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
My
Pb:ael Harbor, T. H.
1st Endorsement on Cx)m-14 C-A16-1 A&N/ND14 (01171) dated Nov. 3, 1941
From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy.
1. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet has given careful consideration
to the question of a combined operating center for the Army and Navy in Havpaii.
On its face, the proposition sounds attractive, but unless it can be shown that
the advantages of such an establishment outweigh the disadvantages, its creation
is not only unjustified, but may be undesirable.
2. The conditions likely to exist on Oahu, in the event of war, are definitely
different from those prevailing in Europe and which dictated the establishment
of the combined headquarters and operating centers in Great Britain. Sustained
attack of any kind is unlikely. The mission ot the Army and the Fleet are con-
siderably different — the operation of one being defensive and local while the
operations of the other are offensive and far flung. Strategic, rather than tactical
cooperation, is indicated and therefore the necessity for rapid receipt and ex-
change of information and arrival at quick decisions is of less importance.
3. On the other hand, there are manifest disadvantages, among which are the
following :
(a) A combined operating center would not relieve the necessity for local
centers for individual forces and its communication system would be very com-
plex. This complexity might well complicate, rather than simplify, the flow of
orders and information.
(b) It might well result in over centralization for large scale operations and
thus tend to deprive subordinates of necessary initiative.
(c) It would result in loss of contact, by virtue of physical separation from
subordinate commanders, with those commanders and their activities. A location
suitable for the Army is not suitable for the Navy and vice versa.
(d) There would be serious consequences if such a center or its communication
system were damaged or destroyed.
(e) It would tie the respective commanders to an immobile post — with the
post necessarily in an inactive area.
(f) It would have at least a psychological tendency to divert Fleet units to
defensive tasks.
4. The above considerations primarily apply to a combined operating center
for the Army and the Fleet. They are applicable, also, but in less degree, to the
Army and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. Undoubtedly, there is
need for close cooperation and liaison between those commanders, much of which
is now provided for in current plans. The Harbor Command Post provides for
liaison and joint control of shipping, identification of vessels, fire of coast
artillery and related questions. Offensive air operates under unity of command
by the Navy. Defensive air operates under unity of command by the Army.
Command posts are in existence for the control of these operations and, as
pointed out by General Short, it is very doubtful that a central command, super-
imposed on these separate and local command posts, would add much to coopera-
tion. Nor would the disadvantages enumerated above be much reduced.
5. In view of the above, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, is of the
opinion that the establishment of a combined operating center for the Army
and Navy in Hawaii is not only unnecessary, but definitely undesirable. The
recommendation of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in paragraph
(1) is concurred in and it is further recommended that the construction of the
building for the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Commander Sub-
marines Scouting Force, and Commander Base Force be proceeded with without
further delay.
(Signed) H. E. Kimmel.
Copy to: Com-14.
2740 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In reply refer to Initials and No.
Op-12B-7-My
(SC)A16-3(9)
Serial 0134212
Confidential
Navt Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval OPEaiATioNB,
Washington, November 18, 191(1.
FiBST Memorandum Endorsement
From : The Director, War Plants Division.
To : The Director, Naval Districts Division.
Via : The Directox-, Radio Liaison Division.
Subject : Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy.
1. Forwarded for information, and for such recommendations and comment
as desired.
2. An informal joint working committee has been formed to endeavor to im-
prove cooperation of Army and Navy shore defense activities by the formation
of joint command centers. As the records of the conferences held by this
committee are being maintained in this Division, it is requested that all papers,
comment, and recommendations be returned.
(Signed) R. K. Turner.
In replv refer to Initials and No. /
Op-14/LJH
(SC)A16-3(9)
Serial 01114
Confidential
Navt Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, December 6, 1941-
Second Memorandum Endorsement
From : The Director, Radio Liaison Division.
To : The Director, Naval Districts Division.
Subject : Combined Operating Center for Army and Navy.
1. Forwarded.
2. Due to the many and complex facilities under the organization responsible
for defense in any given land area bordering the ocean, the most perfect set-up
for command is one in which the supreme comand is exercised by one officer
best equipped of any for the task, in direct and immediate touch with his staff,
comprising intelligence, plans, operations, and communications.
3. Because our defense is under two officers. Army and Navy, we must try
and arrange matters so that where component parts of the commands are inter-
woven these two can function as nearly as possible as one. If the duties of the
Commanders beyond command and operation duties, i. e., training duties, ma-
teriel duties, and comand of local units of their respective over-all commands,
will interfere with the most efficient exercise of their primary duty, which is
their higher duty in command of the over-all command, then the higher com-
mand should be relieved of detail duties (except for inspection for over-all
efficiency) of the lower commands under him, and additional subordinate officers
should be ordered to assume these duties. The two higher commands of the
two services will then be free to choose together the joint operating center, with
their respective staffs, without regard to the lower command duties.
4. Without opportunity for consultation and evaluation of the same informa-
tion, it is not possible for two widely separated staffs to prepare efficiently
decisions on complex matters of immediate urgency for the two opposite service
commanders as well as if they have immediate access to one another. This is
indisputable. Therefore, it should be accepted, and everything within reason
subordinated to that principle, as the most efficient high command possible is
necessary.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2741
5. In other words, if the duties of the Commandant at Pearl Harbor and the
Commanding General at Fort Shafter, in Hawaii, are such that their local
duties make it essential that they remain at the Navy Yard and with the troops,
respectively, my answer is that there should be additional officers assigned
specifically for the supreme command in Hawaii, and staff officers for Plans,
Operations, Intelligence, and Communications transferred to these officers, and
that a protected location for their offices be provided. Certainly the importance
of the broader duties is such that their efficiency should not be confused due to
the local duties and routine.
(Signed) S. L. Hooper.
Op-12B-7-Br
2669
CNO
Commanders all '
Naval Coastal
Frontiers less
Philippine
CinCpac
CinClant
Dec?embee 18, 1941.
It is essential that joint operations centers be established in all coastal frontiers,
sectors, and subsectors in which joint oi)erations are being or likely to be carried
on X Request funds by despatch if required X Immediate action directed X
A similar directive is being issued by the Chief of Staff US Army X Consult
Army authorities.
Copy to :
BuAero
BuNav
BuShips
BuDocks
Army WP Division
Confidential Top Secret
Com 14 13545
OPNAV RRRRRRR
29 December 1941
1731/29
Greenman
V Tucker
291535 CR019M
Propose to temporarily set up joint center in Army tunnels Aliamanu Comgen
and Com 14 agree this unsatisfactory and recommend bombproof building to be
placed in deep gulch hear Salt Lake in which center Army Navy Cincpac can be
properly accomodated. Estimate for building utilities and for lease of land
later. Your 182010 Cincpac concurs and has this.
Distribution
12
10/11 BUAER BUNAV BUSHIPS BUDOCKS ARMY 38N 13 38
20OP FILE FILE
Confidential Top Secret 29:535
13 KCS
COM 14 OPNAY RRRR
30 December 1941
CINPAC
Slade
Slade RRRR
292120 CR 0348
Mydis 291535 Salt Lake center primarily for Army and COM 14. CINPAC to
be provided for at new SITE near Makalapa as substituted for subbase site.
Action
10/11 13 38 38W BUNAV BUSHIPS BUDOCKS FILE FILE: 20-OP
COS Army
Confidential Top Secret 29212o
2742 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
lu reply refer to Initials and No.
Op-aOC-DG
(SO Alt>-3 (9)
Doc. 37746
Navy Department,
Office of the Chiej-' ok Naval Operations,
Washington, December 31, IdJfl.
Memo foe Captain Read
Subject: CJombined Operating Senter for Army and Navy (Ltr. from Com-14 to
CNO via Cincpac C-A16-1/A&N/ND14 01171 of 11-3-41)
1. Rather than make the basic document appear more ridiculous than it now
does, I am returning this informally.
2. The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, Commanding General, Hawai-
ian Department, and Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, have entirely "missed
the boat".
(Signed) R. W. Cary,
Room 1066.
In reply refer to Initials and No. (Du-Et)
OP-12B-6
(SC) A16-3 (9)
Doc. 37746
Serial 01212
Confidential
Navy De3>artment,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
7 Januury 1942, Washington.
Fourth Memorandum Endorsement
From : The Director, War Plans Division.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject : Combined operating center for Army and Navy.
References :
(a) CNO conf. despatch 182010 of December 1941.
(b) Com-14 dispatches 291535 (CR0190) and 292120 (CR0346) of December
1941.
(c) Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff's Joint letter on Joint
Operations Centers, dated December 31, 1941.
1. In view of the orders issued by Chief of Naval Operations in reference (a),
and the resulting action to establish a joint operations center in Hawaii as indi-
cated by reference (b), it is recommended that the basic letter be tiled without
further action.
2. Reference (c) is expected to implement the establishment of joint operations
centers in all coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors.
3. The remarks of the Director, Radio Liaison, in the 2nd Memorandum
Endorsement, have been noted as applicable to the problem of joint operational
connnand in general, as well as to the specific problem at hand in this corre-
spondence.
(Signed) R. K. Turner.
Copy to :
Op-12B
Op-14
Op-30
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2743
EXHIBIT NO. 123A
Jan. 10, 1942.
Confldential Memorandum
From : The Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans).
To : The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Subject : Joint Operations Centers.
Enclosure: (A) Letter on above subject to be signed by the Commander in Chief.
1. As a result of negotiations with the Array through the War Plans Division,
a joint letter on Joint Operations Centers for Coastal Frontiers was agreed on,
and the joint letter had been signed on December 6 by the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions but was awaiting signature of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, on December 7.
2. The letter was revised to conform to current directives and conditions and
was signed by both Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff, U. S. Army,
on December 31, 1941.
3. It is recommended that the joint letter be promulgated by the Commander
in Chief, U. S. Fleet, by means of the attached letter, enclosure (A), herewith
submitted for signature.
R. K. Ttjkneb.
Copy to :
CNO
F12Z-6
Received S-C Files. Room 2055, Jan. 10, 1942. Route to 30. Op File No. (SO)
A16-3 (9), Doc. No. 41197.
Cominch File FF1/A16-3 (9)
Serial 014
Confidential
Office of the Commander in Chief,
United States Fleet, Navy Department,
Washington, D. C, January 10, 1942.
From : Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
To : Commanders all Naval Coastal Frontiers, less Philippine.
Subject : Joint Operations Centers.
Reference: (a) Joint letter of Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff,
U. S. Army, of December 31, 1941, on Joint Operations Cen-
ters. I
Enclosui-e : (A) Copy of Reference (a).
1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded for information and guidance.
(S)
E.
J.
King
(T)
E.
J.
King.
(S)
C.
B.
Lanman
(T)
C.
B.
Lanman,
Acting Flag Secretary.
Copy to :
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
Chief of Naval Operations (10 copies)
CinCpac
CinClant
Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department
Received S-C Files, Room 2055, Jan. 14, 1942. Route to: 10-11. Op. File
No. (SO A-16-3 (9). Copy No. 1 of 10.
2744 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[1] Confidential Dec. 31, 1941.
From : The Chief of Naval Operations and
The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
To : The Chief of Staff, General Headquarters.
Chief of the Army Air Forces.
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Commander ; North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander; Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander; Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander ; Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander ; Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander ; Panama Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander; Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.
Subject : Cooperation in Joint Defense ; formation of Joint Operations Centers
in Coastal Frontiers.
Rcf GrcDCGS I
(a) Joint Action of the Array and Navy, 1935 (FTP-155).
(b) Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5.
(c) CNO and Chief of Staff's joint letter quoted in CNO confidential file
OP-22-A2 (SC) A16-3 (9), Serial 0115422 of October 23, 1941, sub-
ject: "Joint Army and Navy Training" and in AG 354.2 (10-3-41)
dated October 17, 1941, subject : "Joint Army and Navy Training".
(d) CNO despatch 182010 of December 1941.
(e) Adjutant General's message AG 370.26 of December 19, 1941.
1. Operations during the present war have demonstrated the value of close
personal contact of the commanders of Army, Navy, and Air Forces engaged in
a given theater of war. In nearly all cases the combatant forces which have
had such close personal contact or complete unity of command have been suc-
cessful.
2. Present instructions for Joint Action of the Army and Navy, reference (a),
provide for Joint Action of the Army and Navy, reference (a), provide for
mutual cooperation of the Army and Navy at all times, and for unity of com-
mand in certain contingencies by joint agreement or when directed by the
President. Instructions regarding joint planning are contained in references (a),
(b),and(c).
[2] 3. The ideal method of obtaining close personal contact between Army,
Navy, and Air Force commanders on shore is through the use of a joint opera-
tions center for each Frontier and subdivision of the Frontier. Commendable
progress in approaching this ideal has been made in the North Atlantic Coastal
Frontier, where a "Joint Operations Office" has been established, and in various
Coastal Frontiers where joint Harbor Entrance Control Posts have been placed
in operation. A layout plan showing one of these centers is enclosed for your
information.
4. The recent joint directive of the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of
Staff, reference (c), provided for a joint training program in the Coastal Fron-
tiers. Actual joint operations, as required by this directive, were expected to
indicate existing deficiencies of joint organization and planning and to point the
way towards improvement in joint military efficiency.
5. The establishment of Joint Operations Centers in Coastal Frontiers, sectors,
and sub-sectors where joint operations are being carried on or are likely to be
carried on has been directed by references (d) and (c). Early completion of
these operations centers is desired.
(S) G. C. Marshall, (S) H. R. Stark,
Chief of Staff. Chief of Naval Operations.
Inclosure: Copy of Comdr. North Atlantic N. C. F. serial 539 of December 13,
1941, with enclosures thereto.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2745
[/] Op-22-A2
(SC)A16-3(9)
Serial 0115422
Confidential
Navy Department, (hw)
Office of the Chie^ of Naval Opeeations,
Washington, October 23, 19Jtl.
From : The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.
The Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
The Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier.
The Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Fronier.
The Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
The Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.
The Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.
The Commander, Philippine Naval Coastal Frontier.
Subject : Joint Army and Navy Training.
1. The Following is quoted from J. B. No. 350 (serial 704), subject: Joint
Army and Navy Training, for necessary action :
"From : The Chief of Naval Operations, and
The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
"To : The Chief of Staff, General Headquarters.
Chief of the Army Air Forces.
Commanding General, Northeastern Defense Command.
Commanding General, Southern Defense Command.
Commanding General, Western Defense Command.
Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.
Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East.
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Philippine Naval Coastal Frontier.
"Subject : Joint Army and Navy Training
[2] Reference: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935 (FTP-155).
"1. There is need for frequent and closely coordinated joint training of army
field forces and naval operating forces, to the greatest extent compatible with
other urgent preparations for war.
"2. Due to the employment of the U. S. FLEET and the training program of
the niajor portion of Army forces, the scheduling of Grand Joint Exercises is
not practicable at this time.
^'3. Consideration is now being given to joint training for overseas expeditions
employing elements of the Third Division, U. S. Army, and the Second Division,
U. S. Marine Corps; and employing elements of the First Division, U. S. Army,
and First Division, U. S. Marine Corps, in Puerto Rico. Similar joint training
for other units of the Army will be initiated by the War and the Navy Depart-
ments, as the situation permits. In general, such training will be accomplished
by the assembly of a Task Force.
"4. A large field for joint training exists in the coordinate operations required
between the Army and the Navy in Coastal Frontiers. Such operations might
involve :
"(a) Joint air defense operation-^, both for attack and defense, including opera-
tions of antiaircraft, barrage balloon, and aircraft warning units.
"(b) Joint signal communications, between Army and Navy forces, including
ground, .sea, and air.
"(c) The operation of harbor entrance control posts and inshore patrol, and
the coordinated functioning of personnel in defense of the harbor. The coopera-
tion of the Coast Guard and other government agencies may be obtained.
"(d) The operation of internal security measures in Army and Navy posts and
stations ; exercises in passive defense measures for the prevention of damage
by hostile action or sabotage to Army and Navy defense installations; [3]
and liaison with Civilian Defense agencies.
2746 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
•'5. The preparation of Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans (and their sub-
sidiary plans) is a necessary preliminary to coordinated operations of ground,
sea and air forces required in defense of the Coastal Frontiers. Based upon
these plans, and closely paralleling actual operations which are likely to occur
and in anticipation of which the plans are drawn, joint training exercises shall
be held at frequent intervals with special emphasis on joint communications.
To provide for the use of mobile air forces, and other defensive measures pro-
vided by the Army Air Forces, situations should be assumed in the training
exercises, where nece.ssary, which place them in a higher category of defense
than that prescribed in the joint color plan. Provisions shall be made to alter-
nate command in the exercise of unity of command, and also for the conduct of
the exercises under the principle of mutual cooperation.
"6. Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders, Army Air Force Commanders in the
continental United States, and Army Defense or Department Commanders shall
undertake coordinated operations monthly, if practicable, and at least bi-monthly.
It is recommended that staff problems requiring coordinated action be conducted
at least weekly and that continuous training of joint signal communication
personnel be conducted. Where the use of mobile air forces and other defensive
measures are required, joint training shall be undertaken to the greatest extent
compatible with other urgent preparations for war.
"7. It is desired that:
"(a) Commanders concerned prepare promptly Joint Coastal Frontier, Joint
Sector, and Joint Subsector Defense Plans, based on the directives contained in
Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5, and in accordance
with Army and Navy Operations Plans as issued.
"(b) In accordance with the conditions in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this letter,
the Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers, Commanding Generals of the
Army Air Forces in the continental United States, and Commanding Generals
of" [4] the Defense Commands and Departments initiate a program of
minor joint exercises.
"(c) Copies of these programs be furnished the Chief of Naval Operations
and the Chief of Staff of the Army, as soon as prepared.
"(d) Reports of exercises be submitted in accordance with paragraph ll9.b.,
Chapter VII, Section II of reference ( a ) .
/S/ G. C. Mabshaix,
Chief of Staff.
/S/ H. R. Stark,
Chief of Naval Operations.
/S/ R. M. Griffin
/T/ R. M. Gbiffin,
By direction.
Copy to:
CinCPac
CinCLant
CinCAF
Op-12
Op-20 . J
Op-30
Op-38 '
K
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2747
Confidential
AG 354.21 (10-3-41) MC-E>-M
WAB DE3PABTMENT,
The Adjutant General's Office,
Washington, October 11, 1941.
Subject: J. B. No. 350 (Serial 704) — Joint Army and Navy Training.
To : Tlie Chief of Staff, GHQ ;
The Chief of the Army Air Forces ;
The Commanding Generals, Northeast, Southern, Western and Caribbean
Defense Commands ; U. S. Army Forces in the Far East ; and Hawaiian
Department.
Received S-C Files, Room 2055, Oct. 20, 1941. Route to : 12 Op File No. (SC)
P-11-1 (A&N). Doc. No. 36793. Copy No. 1 of 1.
The following is quoted from J. B. No. 350 (Serial 704), subject: Joint Army
and Navy Training, for necessary action :
"The following joint letter is furnished you for necessary action:
•'From : The Chief of Naval Operations, and
The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.
"To : The Chief of Staff, General Headquarters.
Chief of the Army Air f'orces.
Commanding General, Northeastern Defense Command.
Commanding General, Southern Defense Command.
Commanding General, Western Defense Command.
Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.
Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far East.
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier.
Commander, Philippine Naval Coastal Frontier.
"Subject : Joint Army and Navy Training.
"Reference: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935 (FTP-155).
[2] "1. There is need for frequent and closely coordinated joint training
of army field forces and naval operating forces, to the greatest extent compatible
with other urgent preparations for war.
"2. Due to the employment of the U. S. FLEET and the training program of
the major portion of Army forces, the scheduling of Grand Joint Exercises is
not practicable at this time.
"3. Consideration is now being given to joint training for overseas expedi-
tions employing elements of the Third Division, U. S. Army, and the Second
Division, U. S. Marine Corps; and employing elements of the First Division,
U. S. Army, and First Division, U. S. Marine Corps, in Puerto Rico. Similar
joint training for other units of the Army will be initiated by the War and
Navy Departments, as the situation permits. In general, such training will
be accomplished by the assembly of a Task Force.
"4. A large field for joint ti'aining exists in the coordinate operations required
between the Army and the Navy in Coastal Frontiers. Such operations might
involve :
"(a) Joint air defense operations, both for attack and defense, including
operations of antiaircraft, barrage balloon, and aircraft warning units.
"(b) Joint signal communications, between Army and Navy forces, in-
cluding ground, sea, and air.
"(c) The operation of harbor entrance control posts and inshore patrol,
and the coordinated functioning of personnel in defense of the harbor.
The cooperation of the Coast Guard and other government agencies may be
obtained.
"(d) The operation of internal security measures in Army and Navy
posts and stations : exercises in passive defense measures for the prevention
of damage by hostile action or sabotage to Army and Navy defense in-
stallations ; and liaison with Civilian Defense agencies.
2748 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"5. The preparation of Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans (and their imb
sidiary plans) is a necessary preliminary to coordinated operations of ground, r.ea
and air forces required in defense of the Coastal P'rontiers. Based upon these
plans, and closely paralleling actual operations which are [3] likely to
occur and in anticipation of which the plans are drawn, joint training I'xercises
shall be held at frequent intervals with special emphasis on joint eonimunications.
To provide for the use of mobile air forces, and other defensive measures provided
by the Army Air Forces, situations should be assumed in the training exercises,
where necessary, vvJiich place them in a higher category of defense than that
prescribed in the joint color plan. Provisions shall be made to alternate command
in the exercise of unity of command, and also for the conduct of the exercises
under the principle of mutual cooperation.
"6. Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders, Army Air Force Commanders in the
continental United States, and Army Defense or Department Commanders shall
undertake coordinated operations monthly, if practicable, and at least bi-monthly.
It is recommended that staff problems requiring coordinated action be conducted
at least weekly and that continuous training of joint signal communication per-
sonnel be conducted. Where the use of mobile air forces and other defensive
measures are required, joint training shall be undertaken to the greatest extent
compatible with other urgent preparations for war.
"7. It is desired that :
"(a) Commanders concerned prepare promptly Joint Coastal Frontier,
Joint Sector, and Joint Subsector Defense Plans, based on the directives con-
tained in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5*, and in
accordance with Army and Navy Operations Plans as issued.
"(b) In accordance with the conditions in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this
letter, the Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers, Commanding Gen-
erals of the Army Air Forces in the continental United States, and Command-
ing Generals of the Defense Commands and Departments initiate a program
of minor joint exercises.
"(c) Copies of these programs be furnished the Chief of Naval Operations
and the Chief of Staff of the Army, as soon as prepared.
"(d) Reports of exercises be submitted in accordance with paragraph
119.b., Chapter VII, Section II of reference (a).
/S/ H. R. Stakk, /S/ G. C. Marshall,
Chief of Naval Operations. Chief of Staff."
[4] * Sufficient information to carry out this directive is contained in
WPD WDOP-R5-41 and WPD WDCP-R5-41. However, Joint Basic War Plan
Rainbow No. 5 is undergoing revision and a copy will be sent to you in the near
future.
By order of the Secretary of War :
/s/ E. S. Adams,
Major General
The Adjutant General.
Copies furnished :
The Chief of Coast Artillery ;
The Chief Signal Officer ;
The Divisions of the War Department General Staff;
The Chief of Naval Operations.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2749
EXHIBIT NO. 124
SECRET
To I Tokyo
AMcuat X8, 1941
fvrpU (CA)
ftO»
(P*rt 1 »t 6)
At imlt |iaat four %hm mtt^ramm af th« Xfitli, X had a prlvkto
«ad •••r«t IxtttrTi** with th« iV««ldaat (th* ^—r^tkry 9t Stat* waa praMMt).
Tha Fraaldast, epanjAg hla rMnuiia by aayiag that h* had apvnt aaa* faw
day* aaJaylAc Xlfa at aaa, raaarkad that aalXltm waa tiaa« aad Xlttla fag
had )>aaa aiteoimtarad te aar tha pXaaaura at tha Tcqra.ga* Ka aamt on to aay
that ha aailad on hla yaoht, trasafarrad to a warahlp, and thaa kapt a rwa«
dairoua at a potat off tha Maltta aoaat. Than, apaaklag aa though tbora
wara aany adrooataa of i»ar, ha took up tha lyu«la«at «f tha iBtarrlaw aad,
heXdliif Dotaa in hla hajad, ha aald, "Tha Soaratary af ^tata, yott« aad I ara
eontin\Ung our afferta to hrlss about paaaa la tha Paalfta, bat no «m aXaa
la." I aald, "Thara ara aaay aaon? tha third poaari aha datlra aar in tha .
Paolfla." Ha arfimad thia, and oosttnaad by aayine« *T*'« Valtad Stataa,
Britain, and probably tha Seriat too, hopa for paaoa in tha faelfla. But
thara ara not aasy othars aho dasira it."
. -* r\ ■-^ /~\
ARMY
SECRET
rrana. 8/20/41 (1)
2750 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
ttoi Tokyo
Ai^TUt 16, 19a.
rwrylo (QA.)
rw.
(nurt 2 «C 5)
ktUtr jiMjag abomt *w Qmrtmm trlmmi' who akliitaiB* no woraklpo
In tiM PMl£U, Um Proddari mkU, "Holttwr yxra* «*m aMrotuy of SUte,
nor I, h«To ooao ap tlirengh tlM dLplMMtle rankn «nd, thoroforo, 40 not •!»-
M3TO dlpIcHMtlo o^RvoatlMM . Whtt «• hav« b«r« la not in tho form of n
41piLcNMtL« (SooTOMmt, nor lo 1% In t)io font of on nldo ■owolro b«t la aorol/
nbnt «• «ani to a^r«* Hnrlnc s«i4 VAt, ko ro«< in n oloar««ttt, oplrltoA
Manor too mtorinl ohloh Z laoorporoto« into mf fvrr* tatA toon sold, "I
hof* no doolro to put thooo toinco In writing.* Tot im ■■—■< to bo of tiio
opinion that It aheuld bo oxprooooA In orltLnc.
Boarlng In nind yvwr Imtntttlona
a — Wat a>irlloblo»
?1 231 Tr«ia. 0>2<Ka (1)
AKMY SECRET
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2751
SECRET 1
T©i tttkye
Au«urt 18, IMl
Purpl* (lOj
#70« (Part « «f 6*)
I •xpr»sa«d a^ivlf oii th« followlns pelntat
IXati - thf* JtLptkaam GovmmTit 1« •l&«w« la its A««lr* tc torlas
ab«ut aa adju«fe»«nt of J«paLii»AaiMrlo«LD dlpleoMtio r*l«tloaa,
niM - th« J»p»u«*« SorenoMnt would ilk* to bo luirlaod a* to
tho poaalbtllty of ixrajxi^Xa^ na latorYlow with Priaoo KOIOls..
Ifh3f - Tho Joponovo <i^vorsa«at uvuld lUco to bo adriaod oa to tfew
l>oaalbillt7 of laforMil eonToraotlooa bolnK roollxod la tho noor futuro
klwiC llnoa of eonroraotloaaa of tho poet fo« aontha.
ITisM • Tho Jopoiioao Oovorxnaont, horlac alrMtdy ox^oaaod Ita
▼ojrioue opinloaa vith rogord to tho Tronoh lado^Chlao fooatloa to tho
Soorotiury of Stota, foola that no addltlosial oxplanatloaa aro ivoooaniry.
ITiiJf - Tho Japonoao Sovonaottt wiahoa to adrlao that Priaoo
tOUOc ii wllliaf; for an oxohaugo of eplnloaa aloii^ goaoral Xlaoa froat tho
Tlovpoiat of world poaoo.
Itm " Tho Japanooo So-rontaaot ha a orory oxpoetatloB that tha
flaaat atataaaanahlp will ho ozoralaod hy tho liaitod Statoa Qpfrmtmit,
Tho aiapajoaao Govammont will rooiproeato in Ilka oaanor*
I wont on to aayi "fto havo aTory oonfldonoo ia yoiir oxanplary
atataa— nahlp ajid your ability to oottlo aattora." Th« Fraaidost llgtaood
<sloaaly to i^ raaMirka* tioldlng tho Jtanolro outllnod la t^ «708 In hia
band, he aaldi "Cioo^aphioally apoakinc, it la ii^poaalblo for na to go to
AKMY SLCRtl
2752 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL JIARBOR ATTACK
SECRET ' ^
HmmIuIu. Z wb m* ywraltt*« te «r«T*l In m ftlrpUa*.
B - Bat *v^Ubl«.
91 9 -5 p
ARMY * SECREI
tnaa. »/*0/U. (1)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2753
SECRET
VMS I liMhlnciaa
Ptnrpl*. (CA) Qint«nt.
iTOf.
(Pwr% A of 5)
(nrrarT) b*«B dtter t* (Vils aittr?) an* to SMittl*. Hew about Jtaaaan?
(It MNDBC to «• that im waa oaoa Id AXaakm (vial ting?) 3itlca , tboti^
I aa net a«ra.) Mav aa^ daya would It taka froai Japan?"
I rapUadi "About tan daya. I balla'va.''
"Haa about tha adlddla of .( ? )?'<-
I raplladt "I tiiXiik it aoald ba all right up until about
that tUw."
Aaa ha aoatlouad Iqr aajrlact 'fox ^mf raaaona I hav«
■ada a faw abaogaa la thia papar.* Ha Uian aaqplaiaad that It la Mraljr
far ga«(r«ptalaal raaaona tbat ha bad atrlakaa out the word "Praaldant"
fMa ttoa «H>i(lnal t«xt in vhish it imm »t$.UA that tha Praaidaat hiaaalf
vauld ba praaaot, aad im rmmi Hi* ptt^ar t« aa. Ha addad tha raauortci "It
ia act tfaat I aalaMM Vam 'alaaad doflur* auah mi «• bava taday, tout, aiaaw
«a taava baau faread to it tagr i^p<m*t aatlona, thara la only aaa ooastxy
tfaat aaa apaa tiaa daor. fhla Uaa It'a 4ff&*B tum." Ha niiMiit** hi*
Bubjaat te tbat of Plraaab Inda (%iaa, atatlng that aa afflolal rapraaaet-
lag tba Saarataiy mt Stata waa "■"■.
mm
a - f*r%^ 1, a, 3, aatf 5 af 5 ara not availabla.
b - aiatrlat, iOaaka, «. Oaaat of Baraaaf Zalaai.
21178
Mm
tMaa. S-X9-41 O)
j^^-^
79716 O— 46— pt. 17-
-21
2754 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
To I Tokyo
August 18, 1941
IMrpl* (CA)
»70« (P»rt 6 of 6)
Th« t'rmulAfttt trvm f f^nwlBg to ood naintalaod «n ■«•
tronely tkotful attitud* «asd r«««iT«d »• with kiAdn«aa. (I eet tho lai-
pr«a«ioa tliat h* «»• imdeubtodly thrilled at tli« rvaaptlOB gim b}- tha
Brltiah paopls t« tha jolat Brltlah-taerloaa paaeo tarma whlah ha had
attooaadad Is gattlng frcw CSISRCRltX In hia eanrarsatloaa inlth hla durlnc
tha paat Twm daya. (T]kU.llce tha Indapaodant daelaration by tha Jiaarloan
Ovr^rmumt la Kila«a*s Fourtaaa Polata, thla tlaa, baoatiaa of tka la-
■latasaa of tha Ualtad Statas, joiat j>aa«a tanna by Lnglaad aad inarloa
wara aohiarad*} la additloa, nrnt* 14 or 16 day* of Ufa at aa*,- whloh
ha lUcaa ae vail, hara laft hla la tha baat of spirits.) >urthan»ora.
tha Saoratary of Stata when wa parted aakad na to call aay tlaa that I so
desired. Tha chlaa queatloa, balar; a separata problSM, mls not referred
to at all la our ooRrersatlons today.
I'urlnf, tha eourae of our eoareraatiees, tha ^resident
casually aatoitloaed by Ba«e i^'osteaster General ^AXMS' as bela^ ardently
e&deaTorlaj; to brlag about Jap«Lseso>te«rlcaa good vlll aad, with regard
to the early realitetion of tha Bus;-ested laterrlew. It sesais that ha had
speksB la Its faror.
*X^ regard to our eoirreraatloas of thla day, I shall nake
a full report of ^y hiMble oplaloaa separately.
ARMY SECRET Trans. 8/20/41 (1)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2755
J?ror;: ..ashia,,ton (I.omxira).
To : Tokj^o.
19 .urunt 1941
(inirplft)
'719 (in 2 parts, oomjilQte) ,
The f.>ct that upon hia return to the
capital on :)undaj', th ; Proaidont '-.dslied to see ne oofore any otner
per-;on, -..Itii the exception of tho secretory ^'t' .'^. ff^ ,,-<^., vmom
hi T, liked, for S'^verbl hours, clearly indlcot . as with,
'.'.•eiij." hs views Japanaae-U.'J. rplutioaa. It i.-, .ij^u.Teat taut the
note conti,-lned in r.y ':8saat;;e r707* was prepared in ndveace of
*"- ""-'^rldent' s return. I have elri3ady reported tn.-it wnile read-
■ not'3, the ^'resident intermipted hliaaell' on several ocoaa-
ior.3 uo i.aKO .. iaor jnd major corsm >nta thereon.
Th note with I relayed to you as my
nesaage ,•708''*, on x-he ot.ier ;. a. , aeeraed to cu :tain mucr, ut.jt
■was thj Jrreaideat^s ov.ii atcituae anu opinion, /i-'^;:. tn.i.t, 't jeems
aa ir tae i'resideal was' i -olined to be la i.;vor oi oar r--poai.i on
cert'^in coeidi&iona.
.io..ev!r, v/.'ien I sulu i^.r. .tter
depended entirely on the President's 3tat9S;:.aa3htp, . . . iied
thtit the United jtatea was not in fnvyr of the "closed door" and
lui.t it v,a3 Jii^>ua's turn to 1 irure out visya and ;.;@8as of opening-
it.
'-^'ne Inpreseion I r.ot throuchout uiy
^ J ith hin v.';-e t(,;;t ha riarbored other cie: Ires. Thore is no
roOHi for doubt, ho- ever, tuet the iTeside.. -.atters will
t, ke a tarn ror tiiu better.
Accordi%i to rt;c .^t oorjiients in the
lewspapero, i.he rresident la feurful of the dua;-ers or the United
A-tes baia, drawn Into a war in the Far Kast. Apparently, he be-
lieves t -ire la u 50-50 chance th;.t Japan v/ill attempt furtiier
aiagreeeij:. .
It is tr.it: ;,_. t by our proposia that
- ;.-i bo h- veen tiie leaders of t'le two countrioa, th]. at-
o»tude or t... ..... 'iover.'inont hr.s been considerably ssusad. ^iow-
ever, it is of ca.) uti.iort iaportfiiica t,i;.;t th,la :..atter be Kept
-.tplctly socret fc '■ "■ '•-■lei onca 1o>-ik out, attempts v/ill be
.■a::de froii .ivery ...troy lao project, I feel above
all jioe t.i. t 11 i,...i -.it •. strict secrecy be r;aintalned
In >f!ipo.i, ;-;l30.
.e, too, are ;-,:virii. this t.atter otir
careful ;;tL ' ! .. and atudy, .xki arioal'i v;e st.^-.iblo on i" ^■^::^a i;oo&
tTD-l: ,',. {ooritinuectj (u) ;ravy Tr.j.is. 8~,.'2-i»l (2)
2756 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
lde«a, w* aiiall report thea to you for whjit«r«r valua thay may Jiav*.
*jr>-i: 4672.
"*JD-1: i»696 and _lIiiL__--'
JI>-1: (D) . . 8-2;:-4l (2)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2757
SECRET
FroKt JtAshlngtor. (Nomra)
Tot . Tokyo
Parpl». KUi)
#722.
(Pwt 1 of 2)
UuriiiK «"y «>»nr«r**tlon wtth a mwBber of th« C*hir rrt, h« mo-
iR&rked, " itiA Pmsldant ta*« a ln'«i(l-«iilnd*d Tlaw 4f tM world and la not snti-
Ja-^rMM. Ill- iilB laat Bpn«eh«a and In hit r«c«nt atatwMnt he haa mnrsr r«-
fcrr»d to oaptui. «ia soon aa m rctumad to 'as.hliic'ton ha had tha Saoratarjr
of stata tttka ^ip Uie qiMstion ol' the propouad Ja.)aBeoa-Ai»>rloan eonfaranoa
aiKl rapUad to you. r:da la an tuipraoadantad thln^ and It witmma that Japan
a|K>uld raeiprocaba xn a lUca aaoner." 3o X rapllad b/ !»a^ Ing tiiat. It vaa
anlth a atron^ raaolutlon ttiat tha JapaiMtaa ^<ir«nm»at had oome tht&* far Irt daal-
!»«; with thla qvMatlon} wharatipon tha Cmblnat aaabar rapliad, "It la aqaallgr
trua in tha oaaa of Urn Pnaldant. Abora eXl, «v«n If thara U \o rm»l Jaatl-
floatlon t0T itf tha avuDtry is raplata wtth anU-^apanaa* s«ntl«aiit.*
ARMY SECRET
2758 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SLCRtl
roi-: . . cDiura;
.;0, l'j4l
■11 ■ as i* Ju«1, r .
l<Miic» out there it uo uouiit l.'mt a str :,i-^.oi.
'Ul ii' thfc oonXerenoo euoceedi anu at u renuit pefcoe > -ineC
ia th« i'fcciric, the p«opl» wlil for th» flr«t timo . ^irioe
i iiiy«»Xf had andeavored ia th» ■•»« dir^otion, the •uooe»« would nmkt
fM ft«l th»t lijt/ Id worth ilTlns. in*»iimch as ther» i« nc way ol t«ll-
tUf *heth«r the J'rctident t411 oontlnu* to take •uoh an opeii-h»«rt««l
attitude In the future, I aameatXy wish that a way oould i>« found to
•ucoatifully tattle this quaation."
%
ARMY SECRET tr«.. e/a/" (t)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2759
SECRET
tramt Va*hlngten ({|««ur«}
Toi Talqro
Aucuat ao, 1941
Pun>l« (a) (Orgwnt)
#723. Pwrt 1 er 2.
It MNOS thJut th« Pr«al<teat IwUeTts that hm
fteuld nMt with Pr«Ki.ar KONOtK dtapandln^ on slrovaatMuva
(^r #723 ). It !• not hmrA tc iJMcliM that he la alae of tJw
opinion that ha would Ilka to taka thla aattar out of tha
hands of tha autborltlaa and sattla It .blaaalf bae«uaa of tha
g«nar*l altuation. It wmf be a*ld that tba Pmaidwnt had nad*
this propoa&l ao that ha eould aaka hla last polltloal stroka
at this WMMat whan Japanaaa-Anarloan faallnga «r« at thalr
wora««' It la wall for Japan te roapoad In a Uka ganaroua
spirit to thla marrm on th* part of th« Praaidsnt. It would b«'
wall also to XasTw thS' daolaloBS of tha ooncmts polnta until
aoas ftttura data --------- and ahoiw that tt.ara la nothing
that wwuld eo&fllet with - - and I «iink it la liQ?«r»tiTe
that wa thoa bring about tha rasutq^tlon of tha informal negotiations
whleh hava baan diaruptsd.
Proa thla atanc^lnt, I mm subaittlng a proposal
w« hawa draam up {- - - #72^ ). Thsra may ba points In it that
ns«d to bs dsalt with aora in detail. Should I t ink of any
points that should b« a4dad I will wlr« th«a latsr. This
ARMY
PNsa 1
SECRET
2760 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
propoMLl glT*» du* r«ap«et to tb* poUoy propoaad by tta* Uoltad
State* a«T«rm»nt.
^^m
• - S«« S.r.S. #21273 and #2127-4.
b - SM S.I.S. #21350 to #23356 InolauitT* - twtt of No«»r*»«
proposal •
trmiM. «/25/a (X)
ARMY SECRET
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2761
StCRLI
f
ARMY
Xoi Tidgra
Aag«at X), 19a
Pvvpl« (01} (Urg*nt)
#723. nuri a of 2.
1% wei>l*tn» tsb* iMnitAbl* paXloy of our g<nr«nawnt
bMMd en Mm laport&nt •t*t«a*n'Ui bjr Prlne Mlniatar Ymovt and
Mlniaten HIRANXIIA, hSatK and XfcTSUOKA and attwqtta to eorraot
■lawidarafndlHga r*sar<iln« thia policy. I baXiava that alaea
It la llalt*d to thaaa peinta laoludad In tha iuMrlsan propoaal,
it would ba aooaptad aa a aoffielant atat«iaant and la within tba
peaalMlltjr of tba Uhltad Stataa glrlng It oaraful oonaldaratlon.
Of eofiraa. It la net wlaa to rafar to ttooaa pelnta whieh tha
Flraaldiaat had not takaa t^. Thla la enljr a eonraolarit nathed for
op*alB( Japaaaaa-Aaariean nagetlatloiui and la not of a nature that
evuld be ;ipreolai»ad to tba wurld aa Japania oattonaX policy.
I vettld Uka to have thla propoaal oonaldared by
the l^relfn OEfflaa bearing In alad the pelnta I hare aantloned
a]M«*. IX tba Japaneae OoremMnt la datarvlnad to adjuat
JmM»ea*-A»arlaaa relatleaa« thla la the tlaa. Lealag this
•fyertanl^, tbara will be ae ether that wa oaa take. IT the
■eetlBg la to take pla«e abent tha ladddla of Seiiteater, aa the
President haa siicii^at*d, there la left for prelialnsry negotiations
lass thaa «»o smiths, in fast a little ware than a actnth. Besides,
XX the aeetinc is really to iak» plaoe, it would ba neoMMary to
Fsce 1
SECRET
^ • a : q
2762 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SLCRtl
tuiv* a Bhlp rakdjr Ami to MlAOt thomt «ho will •eovapany tlM
p«rt^ . For th«M r*Ason« I uig* thAt you teoidi on thla
aBtt«r quiokly.
«MMi« 8/a9/a (X)
ARMY SECRET
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2763
SECRET
KroB: rta«l^ngton (NoBur«)
To I Tokjro
«'a,:aat 20, 19^.
»7a. (Pwrt 1 or 7)
To *>« hAniil«d In .or»mmmT\t -ode.
Strictly ccrifidsntial.
tafamno* i» m*.i« to th« coaBstunioation oonveyed, on Aw.^u^t 17th,
lyil, to th« Jiipaaee* ••!i0&mm»doT by th? ^crr sjury o: t-at.« »nd t,S« ?y<»eid*nt
ol t.c iini t«J tat««.
ofvemaenl ^. , . .-.lu t^i-e« anntiTit ^fr'-al.-i clrciuftstAncee
a „ -,« ^ iioidered a» Inl.iacal u, a ^- --•■■' sf'-'.-'-lemnn* ' ■ Pacific
liiea, j;j an i»tn>o«?her« oX world erisxa aa .Ji;e. *<-i---' ■,, ,, -j;,^ j.^ jo dif-
I'i;. ij-v U> ascertain nrh©tv>«>r an avent xa a cau«« or » con&fqaence.
Acoordin^jly, siot anliJc* the pr»»« In Japan, miiel' news ird edil<3s>-
i.£j. coiancnt i.'; the itnlted tj»t- forwcautod tt- "
tut 'jutiiae of HBerican-r'ritish policy ir, t^..^ >-ar ;:;>■.. v> -uicca-
tions hare been aad* by the press to indio«t«
.■.u«sia, Japan wcrulrf b« deprived of natural rneourc t
ftsia r#i;ian. KAarwrhile, the Jrilted r.t,ateB ■ ;/j
j« l,'xt«rpr« t«d In Jajjan aa Uidioativ* of a oo'it^nui.ng urn'rieair: i^
vkriancB •••'', th our then cument audciult consreraatlo, s.
ARMY SECRET
T»-8n«. '-aS-^iX (?)
2764 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
Tr om.% '.Mtdt^ton (iiooura)
To i Tokyo
■1 I
24. (Pmrt 2 or 7)
Tl»« wOYernaent of U»« UniUd oUiU« ooncidara that o«rt*lft of it«
»«tione vX»-»r-Yi.» Japan n*T« ti—n only oouater-««»aure« to ;.olicl*« and proe*-
dure* pr«Jucuoi*l to «,«««rl<s»n iut«r««t« mnd priuciplB*. r. U.« oti.«r iUuid, tte
vovexiuMnit of japaii oonaidUirB that tt» oma actions iunr« ba«n aictat«d ty, oorwldar-
aui^rw ra«pon«iY« to haaarda, cia-cuastanfcial mui poKtloaX, *fi"eottr^ Urn
MiionaX eulfielaney and protaeti-r. ol Japan.
i.T, le ^uitte uoncaiTabi* Uiat botti uovsnwanta ara rlglit.
.,iU» «<toir»t>l« Bodabtij oi .u.iiu, il.« .^oTeniaant oi' the Unitad ^tataa
liii saaautd, fraquantly , unawara that the worda ol policy ara ««lght«d with tJtia
laEcnaa po»«r of Aonarlca'a natural andflmtent and potanUal might. ?ha Praal(4»nl
of th* Unitad SUtaa, and tha Saoratary of SUta, In thalr oan laaqueatlofting
adJ.eranca to tba way of peacaful prooaduraa, alght find It dlfflault to ba~
Uev« that othar nationals, anywhara, oould oonsldar thamaalya* thraatanaU by
the Jrdtad tataa.
Ut, ao lorib a* thay laalc that aaaoagaMint of poaalbla thraat (ao
oonvlnolngly allminatad froa South fuMrloa by tha gaod naighbor poUcy) thara
win >.?• »o»»a, gaographieally laaa wall andowad and, by natura, poor In •»»mar-
tlal reaouuraoB, who will fael oorapellad to conaldar dafanalYalgr thalr ralaUoM
wtth the United . tatea.
Tmia, a-aa-a (2)
ARMY SECRET
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2765
SECRET
FroBi rtasnin^on (homirm)
Tot Tokyo
. August 20, 19U.
Purple (EngllBb PX*tn Text)
#72l4
(P8rt 3 0/7}
It t» not, therefore, rurprlein,: that tsroporary tR»ft»ure8
t*k«r> by the GoTenBuent of J«pen for t?.a protection of ItB own equit-
able 4Uid necBeeejT)- »uppli- of liirlrtt; ccar-ioditles, arould be Interpreted,
thoui^ neyer ec jntended lor operated, pre.tudlclal to the procwrewent
by the United State* of eieenttal rwr oeterlala.
"^/jually. It Is not m;ri>rl»iRg trat, laekln,. such gutipanteee
as are Mentioned in the o««Bunlo*tlon of Aut,-u»t 17th, and In default
of a eonauamted understanding with the United Stataa, the 'jOTar'^<»it
of .hpan felt compelled by curr«mt condition* to take certain aeaaurea
of preoautionary defense.
AocordinKly, the Cjovoraaieat of japan appr»cl&te» that,
harlng indicated dlfflculttee, the aorernBent of the United .-.tatea
now enooura^ea an oxcifcan,^e of basic policieo and attitude* ae tlie
foundation of an undoratandint; that will condition laatin.^ and exten-
alTe peace in the I%oiflc area.
For aueh peace, the fjoremaient of Japan is roady for such
a united effort toward --a peaceful eettleaent coTrertn)-; the entire
Pacific eltuation- -the Tovemaent of Jaijan would be proud to sake
sacrifice*.
ARMY
■' 351
SECRET
Trawi. 8/22/la (2)
2766 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
/
To I t«ky«
August to, IMl
?urpl* (Kacllsta T«xt)
■n* (!• W hu>dl«4 iB Eormrammat owl*.) ?»rt 4 •f T.
Rm B«r«nHMRst af Jl^i>«a, «iMk lively ftyfr««laLtl«ai,
•adorM* »• It* «m, withwwt «t«»llfl««tl«i, %h» ««K«Ht "]^r«srMi
•,tt«lja»bl« by p«»«M»ful m^h«4s". A.« outlliuMt !» th« MHwnlMSiM
of Au^nrt IT, 19*1, th« pr*sr*ai !• mfk »• h»« !•«« *«Mn d«»lr»4 •»*
•eugist 1»y Jap«ja.
Th* soYcrsMiat «f Jayaoi 4««lr*«, f«r ItMlf and »U
vth»r*, th* appllouti»n 1b th« aotlr* faeltl* ar** «f tli« prlnalpl*
of aquallty Off aoHMrelal <>pp«rtuKlty aad traataaxt. Tha s«««r»-
>«Bt ef Japan daalra* to aaka poaalkXa for ItaaLf and all aeaHtrlaa,
aoaaat to raw ■atarlala and to all af bar aaaantlal iiwmdlttaa.
Tha i;eraraii!aat of Japan daalraa aeoporattaa by all aatiana of tlia
Paeifio, en a Toluntary and paaoaful baala, for tha vtillaatlwii af
available rsaouraee of eapltal. teehnloal aklllfall, and pregraaalire
eeonoalo loader ahlp for the purpoaa of bulldlnj op net oAly tkelr own
but alao the eaoMMy ef reclon* where the preduetlTe and dlvtrllnt-
tlTo oapaoltla* oari be Inprered, in suob Banner that far the i^tlene
and paoplee ooneemed, purohaelag pewer will be Inereaaed, llvlas
•taadarda raiaed and oondltleat e(mdttalTe to peaoe will be ereated.
ARMY SECRET Trao,. «/ai/4i («)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2767
SECRET
Yrmit M.iiIilsst«Mi (XoBurm)
To I Toky»
Augurt ao, 1941
Purple (fcagli^h T«tt)
VTM (I*rt 6 at 7)
(To te haatdlad la 0«r«rn«»«t Cods)
If »«oh it pnogyom, l»»«d «p«n j»«e»ful »n<i conrtmetiT*
priaclpl**. i« »«<»?t«d f«r th« ftwifl* ««a tf. th»rmt^»r, tay ot th»
ceuatrle. or «r««« 1« «»• ftwtfla wiro »«a»oo4, thm Qorrtrnmat. of
JspM iwuld •»«{»•«**• witJi tlMi othor a«ti«ii« ta «act«adlng •••i«t*»fl«
t« any nation ■» thr«»t«a»<l. ?h« aoreraaoat of Oapaa bolioro* that
•uoh a prosjMUR tf faithfully' oarrlod out, with th« eoaaidoration for
tho roUtiTO condltiOM of tho ▼ariou* satiema, woul« pr«clud« th«
«jct«Q»ion, Ijy aay ana ooiaatry, of political or jsilitary control to
attain •oonoale rifM of » dofinitoly mocopollltio or profarontial
oharaotar. Ii^thoaa caaoa ntvaro tho production an«! diBtrilwtion of
•aaontlal eossMxIitlsB aro. Toated in mcaopolloa. it i« axpcoted that th«
OoTorniB«nt Ito^ '..tato« will use IS* ,'.reat infliiaooe to see that
all e*untri«« *r« giran fair «»<* ..-Daranteed ei.&ro of ^.^m n of
the products of auch !isozxopoll»«» and at a fal? prioa,
;.or«oT»r, tha uororrimont of Japaa rejeota any >
o: torritorlai « „ rant-ijemaat or axploltatiaB of .o-chor pooplat. it
liaairaa tiva ordsrly •■tabllaisROOt of e; feotiTa, raapooaibla,
«oT«rols»ty iD a unitad Chiaa. tt. rteairet tha pclitioal inTioiaMilty
of all t>acl Qiis.
ARMY
prpprT rrao». ^/tt/K\ {'>■)
2768 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
#724. T tt hMtMM ti mrii'i— t C«M».
t.-wt t of 7;
■dm xrfirmmnX a/ J* <«« -to«c not 4Mir*, mlAM AurMtf thMwto ^f
pt>Xiti»*^i. ar aoonoKlt: a^eTiMBlni , t^»t th« Ka«t Aslaa r«(l«n ahonld tw ««k
away fro« • <rorXd aoAiuw^' of «>qsltaMa M»i ip»a(Mf«l |M-<4MaMM, but It 4««« <!•»
Blr« U..<t t • prta«l?la at ison— HaarlMnatt (wi aramia ba sparatlTa «»* •»•-
alaad hy other naV~nc, no Ir-.-a thxri <y Japan, far bot>t< altiMnrjr •»'
r>)« •ovamirnt cf Jxpan fuM a<jUi.M to wxpraaa. In iia inWrnatlorAl
tha aultural and aUdaai. Ida&ls or praoa and banaongr trt.lc.h arn part at JapMwa*
naUonad »ult«ra. Japan partial pa tad tn tha Ua«« af «iaUa»» asd «o<;^par*«»«
in varlTua dtaanMunant oni^rrtioar.. »ut vnlttpla JivimCa a; world taTMOll ~ af
diaarlalnaUon — af bajrooit and barriara •« of {wraonal lndl«itlUjaa and attack,
mUratad ttm .'«»ama»nta, r«ai>.> albl* for tha wwirara of iha J»p«*raa pMiO*, «•
ta}<* eartaln aeuatar aaaaitraa «Mah tray aoaia iiatra prafarrad t« *ve>t4. :imm
of thi*aa maauroa, «t«Uicr faetfon ->r «lliajMM, ir»r9 lnt«rtMratod aa atxraMilva.
>» ovamawnt of Japan hua n« latantlon and na alllaaaa and no pol>
ley of a«rr«aalno. tVw! ovnmaant of Japan eonaal««a Ita paapla aa nafcara 9t
tna faislly of natl >n* , aacn <tt tt mn ontcbt %o lit*, and lat 11*», ocvlar tfea
(Mtgno;- i«>t! of hroUjerliooa «ad j s»t toieranaa.
ARMY StCRtI ^•"- -2^- ^^^.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2769
SECRET
ARMY
n-Mi VMhington (HMnra)
Toi T«lc7»
Augu»t 20, 19la
Purpl* (En«ll«h f^^ T«ict) Urg«nt
I7J|4 (P»rt 7 of 7)
W« coMldw that th» B»tur*l Doeitlon wad clrcuMt«ic.« of
JapMi and h.r iM»ple i« aot incomparabl. to tbat of Britain} and the
daprlTatlon of acotw^lo opportunity by boycott and dlaorUdnatlor ar«
Mamiras atfalnet which, not !••• than at?aiji«t aLUitary attack, the
praaerlpta of natiomi aacurity and honor racfulra resistAnca. Tt la
tv^la polioy of raaiatanca, axtandad to arrawl conflict, timt hae b««n
lntamr«t»d by aoae aa aijeraaalra.
But, tha Govamment of Japan prefers a policy of cooparation
and daalraa to aincaraly raapond to tha .cordial, panetratlng proposala
of tha Praeidant of the Unitari .Utatae ajrid tha tjaoratar: of State by
tha rapid concixiaion of ove tufonnally aagotiatad, and almost oompl<'X»d,
undaretandliig. Tha aeatln,, or the raaponslble head of our raaria'-tlTa ■
GoTsmnanta would confirm and glra auch eanctlon to our purpoaaa that
paaca In the Pacific would b« Inaiatad with tha data of that aaetlni;.
It la with graat good wlU that tha Joraraaant of Japan
antlcipatae ttie ooiaplats raau»!tlcn of tra historic friandsMp with tha
Unltad Stataa.
SECRET
vi)
79716 O — 46— pt. 17 22
2770 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From: Tokyo.
To : rt'aahlaf.ton.
21 Au.uat 1941
(Purpie-CA)
- - - -(Preamble and first oouple of
llflos mlsaed) .
- in view of ttils request (the
3;.id iVabaaaador uotlfiod sae, also, on the 15tli), I had the various
cirolos coacerned moke InvestlGotioaa, I said. I w..nt on to say
tiu;t wa aro tryiiii-;. ^^'^ dlspoae of the laatter in accordance with
tho iasirea oxprossed b/ tha United 3t0t«o and that I was certain
th. t 1 '..ould bo obla to aubniit a reply to him at na early opportun-
ity.
Then, on condition that he keep it strict-
ly confidential .• nd "off the rucord" I talked to him for over two
Uoura CO icernint; tho :,atter conttiinad in my T.-assaee #452". I point-
ed out to nln, in accordance with th : lin-ja contained in my prer-
ious r.QBBHc^a, t:i ; obgolut necesfity of displaylne; oiae real
statesnaaship 1' sumount tho crisis which now confronts
ua.
So saying, I stroncly urged thnt the
proposed talks tt,k.> place. I added thut ainoe ho iiad worked so
tirelesfly (lurlu,;. the past nine years in behalf of Japanese-U.J.
frlsridsiiip, I '.aa countin;-, on his services in the promotion of
th;-?3e talks,
'i'i> ; above is for your inf orr.fetion.
'JD-1: Z.38O. Mb. Konura is diractod to f ;el out th ,- attitude of
ofi' ciuls on arraucin a j.,etin. between Pros, ioosevelt
.■o. -iar irlnce ik.onoe for « friendly diacuasion of ateps thct
' ■• '-1 for coacluaion- o: un "understaadiiii," to guarantee
*';.cific.
JD-1: (a) Kevy .rans. 8-22-41 (o-TT)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2771
From: Wastilneton.
To : Tokyo .
21 Aueust 1941
(Purpl«-CA)
#725
Acoordlne', to report* along the llrea of
thOMi ooQtalaed In no^ #722*, thore are Indications tiiat the
Praaident hliaseir ia boooming aerioualy iatsraated in partiopatine
in the reaumptioa of the negotUtlona to roviss «fapaue8e-U.3. re-
lations. It is 9-i?en aaid that the latter uulf of tho note v/Ulch I
■•nt to you aa my raeaaage if708** , was composad by the Prosidant
hims«lf. I have also heard thct ho expeota to have rae h«*.d our
reply to that note directly to him. for these r9«so..s, i boil-jve
that It •wo\ild be well if we omitted all of the involved &ud oom-
plioated points ia the composition of oar re ly &M iusteaol i.ave
It in the most simple and direct phraseology as possible. In iny
opinion, I think it would be to our intorest if w© omitted ex-
pressions like "continuance of snoirclenent" as it n .pears ia sec-
tion three of uy luassage i724*** . Other corrections which i would
make would include tho chancing of the ihrase "of discriainution,
of boycott, and barriars, of personal intofrities aud attack" as
it appears in section 18, to, simply, "circijiietances in th,; recent
pact". 1 also feel thut it is esseatial that v;e point out the ,
fact thai, we place Euoh ei-phasis on the point cone rnia«; the uaran-
teein,: of th-j safety of tne 'Far iast.
*J'i)-l: 4695. Nomura roportR i..': ist of u couverstj tioji vutu a
Cabinut ludBiber in which au is told of iTasident .tooaevelt's
Interest in tt.e i>rupoE< ' '-.jre^ice {vdth i.ouo,, ' :<
(tho Ccblnat neia er'sj or Its sucoesa.
**Jj-l; i+6,'6. Tex -m- .onui-^ by La-w Proaident.
'"^^u-l'. 4735. '.'ext . .o-.ura'a (,)ropo3«ai rooly to u..^ . rei.. icleat' »
note.
JD-1: (D) Navy ... .... a-25-4l (2)
2772 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
?rom: ToJcyo.
To : WasMnctOQ .
23 Auguut 1941
(Purpl«-CA)
#495
(atrlotly Confidential)
Aooordlnt to newipapar reports, it Is
allegsd that a Britlati-U.S. -Soviet oonferenoe will be iield early
In ^o'ote iber. This oomes at the saiae time as ttie reports tbat
the United istates Is shipping goods to aid the Sorlet Union, whlob
1b many respects confirms the already exiBttog ruiaors of "en-
oirolaiaent'*. Under these oiroumatanoes, if the proposed talks
between thu leaders of Japan and the United States comes subse-
quant to the above referred to tripartite conference, the general
Impreasion would bo tuat Japan had given in In the face of the
tureat of "encircleaant".
We are, therefore, doing everything
in our power to rush oxir reply to the United jtatee and at the
same tliao to bring about the "leaders oonferenoe" at an earlier aat«<
Under these oircumstaricea, will you please exert as much effort as
possible to accomplish this. At the same time will you please
draw tho United States* attention again to tho natter contained
in tho last part of :.'.. noeaa^e ,-,-487.*
•jD-1: 4694. Tokyo's intdutions regarding ho. northern policy
are outlined to /v b. I.omura for his inror:-L tion, with the request
thut saouid tho U.j. U\;Stion the increase of Jaj) troops in the
IJort^, it should be jiiilained as a precautionary weaeure ttiican
to offset daiv.ers th t iiJL,,ht arise frou a Soviet defeat and sub-
sequent politlc.il ooiil'usion in ^iastern Itusaia. -Also, that should
the "...o. ship vit. i Biatoriols to rfu.sia via «aj)ane8e coastal waters,
it would provoka tas feollnf.;B ot the Japanese people and have
an unfavoralle affect on the question of readjustint; U. 3. -Japanese
relations.
JD-l: (D) Navy 'i'rans. 8-25-41 (3-TT)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2773
from: WaBhiogton.
To : Tolcyo .
23 August 1941
(Purpl«-CA)
#739
I called on aeorstary Uull again at
5 o'clock tMa ( Saturday ) afternooa, aad in acoorduuce vdtb th»
oontanta of your rnasaaga #^£5 (''')*, reported tuat Japan waa pre-
pared to make an early reply and at tiie same time to hold the "lead-
er'a conference" at en earlier dat«* than previously proposed. Aa
you Inatruoted, I requested that tha i oaoow conference be de-
layed and the jropoaed material aid to the Soviet Union be v<ith-
txeld for the time being.
The 3ecretary r.ade no oonmunt with re-
gard to the firat part. With regard to the aeooud portion of ray
Btetement, he again - ae he did this norainr, - pointed to the
Japeaese-U.o.a.K. Neutrality Pact.
He did aaaure i&u, nowever, that my
•tatemunt would be relayed to tha President. According; to re-
porta -the Preside. it has meda Ijuiuiriea
as to whether Japan's reply had ar ived or not. In i.iy opinion,
the President is tha on<3 who sl.ows the most interest in the
"leader's conference".
*JQ-1: 4769. Tolcyo wires .(aahin^.tou th t avary effort is bein*:
made to rush a reply to the President's note, etc., etc.
?146j
JD-l:
(D) KtfTy Trans. 8-26-41 (2)
2774 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From: .Vaahlii, ton.
To : Tokyo.
2$ ALw-;uat 191*1
(Purple)
To Chief of Tele(^,rapti .ieotlon, from
Ic.uchl* .
.>e are expecting your reply coacernlag
ravlslona In U.^.-Japaneae relatloua within e very few dayo.
'"' m plasBe insert the one word "J.'^^'JO.-Ui" In plain laieuage
be(:,lnniiit of tiiut aosssc.e v/nea it la dlapotched so tciat
we :m.j decode it v.lthout losa of tlae.
Sadao Icuchl - Counselor.
-) 1 r; ,;
f
«n>-l: (D) Hevy XrauB. 8-28-i»l (1)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2775
SECRET
7o I HaaalnKton
Au,;u«t 26, 1941
Purpi* Ol (V«ry Urg«at)
#501
«• your r707* and 708*.
Ihla 1« « jsAtUr ol grant gravis <^»<i th« Pr«aii«x- la tMg^r
concamin^ thaaa conT«r«*tion» . Th»r»for», I ajt wtrtng you vsnimr
thla d»U, a»aaa^.a #502 eontAining » M«aa«^« trom thji Pramlar to the
?re^id«nt «ud lii ,/5Q3 the rapljF «•!•* tr* iapsrial OoinBrraBant, (in whloh
ooruieutioa sat- alao ^;04>}
i.iH you pl«a6« go «uio raporL tiiaa i«m«aUUtalji to both tha ■
Praalucrit and tha SacratATj of atJita.
- ^'" '"" ' ' ?122t a.nd for t708 sae S.I.S. fJlSK ". #21339
Pres; -sent .cooeeveit.
ARMY SECRET
2776 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
ARMY
iromi Tolr.'O
To I i«»hljit't<m
Au^-utt 2C, 11/41
^.502 (fart 1 of 2) (To b* handlwl In {>«rr*mMat Cod*}
I uA Tary auoh plMi««d to l««ni froa tho deoiaiwit fdiieh
yot) hiuMtod to .tabaaauler NOMtJRA on Auf»tst 17 th*t you uro In asraMMnt
«lth tho IdM eoatalnod In our propoaal rogardlng heXdini; a awattng
l>etw»»n you Wkci m««
fodky, «)i«a the «hol« world la is oenf^taion, for th* t«o
oo-xitriea of J»?»n and th* Wnlt*d St«t**, who hold th* koy 'to world
pomam, to drift a* w* ara driftiaf, tonwurd tha worat of ralatlona, not
erJLy la an urtfortunat* thlBS In ita*lf but alao noana th* downfall of
world olTl Illation. Th* rvaaon for Japan b*lag *o eonoamod ov«r th*
qu«atian of p«ae* In th* JKaolflc llaa In no othor thwn h«r daalr* not
only to InproTW th* r*latlona b*tww«n Japan and th* tJnltad Stat**, but
ftlso to contrlbutf) to tha raallcation of worlo p«ao« through th* oppor>
tiinity which auoh improrad ralatlooa would afford.
It aaana to ma th* r*aaan that Ja^an«**> nerloan mlatloaa
hitre ooma to b* ae bad at thay ara today 1* to b* fotad lars*ly in tli*
faot '*.«t tha ^-oramnanta of th* two ootmtrlaa hav* b*«n laeklag In
Butual undaratandint; and hava rapaatadly doubt*d and lalBOonatruad MMh
9t»T*r'* int«ntlon*. It **«aui alao to haT* b*«n du* to naohinatlona on
th« part of third-pow*r oountrl**. Ublaaa wa bagln with tha alijalixatiao
of (ui h eauaaa, wa eannot by any iMana hopa that the ralatioa* bataaau
th« two countrlaa nould ba adjuatad. }lar«in 11** th* raaaon for My pro-
poBlr.,: \ht t ' nnat ;'ou faea to faoa for tha jiurpoa* of frankly axohanslas
our Tlarwa.
^^^"^^ T«na. e/26/41 (S)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2777
SECRET
PVoBsi Tokyo
Tot A'a«hlngton
August 26, 19U
?urpl« (/ory lArgwnt)
■50? (P»rt 2 of 2)
hownvBr, Ui* iMtliod upon w:doh w« bxn hitherto b««n Mt^lylngj
vMMmXy, \j)» sMthod of infortafcl r,«goti»tionji, «hloh w»a disrupted In .hily—
though It may !.*»• b««n, on th« whoi«, appropriate In oonel<l»r«tlon «t
tha attltud* tn«n t«ic«n and of the B>»tt«ra dlseuaaed— •▼•« IX continued
froa now on with a riaiw of hairine the leader* of the ti«o j'ove-maenta
later glrlng recognition to the matter* dleeueseed, i« not a e'litabl*
neti'iod \mder the present elromst&ncea In which rapid change* are talcing
plaoe and the poaalblllty of an unfortunate oondltlon arising 1* unfora-
aeeabl*. I believe the need of the BMaent 1* for the leaders of the
two oouatcie* to aaet fao« to fao* and to dlaousa whether ther« la arqr
p«»*«lbillty of »*Tln;.- the present situation by atudylng together wltii
a proper perspeotlT* the Impertant questions whleh aTfeet tne whole ares
of the Pacific Ocean l/^iv: be'«in»«n t!M two sountries, and to do ttil* with-
out beln^ bouni by the customary inethod of negotlatlotUi. It would be all
right to haire the iatalle settled by those offloials speolallslng In siMh
natters aocortiltit as tiie neeessltsr •rlsea after the leadere hare oon-
ferreo on thera.
ihls la tie idea underlying ay proposal. It la m^ earnest
wlsii tiist you WDulu accept this proposal in an nnderstaadlnt spirit aad
reciprocate. The situatloa being 8u«h as exjjlalned above, 1 am eagerly
Page One
\ , ■ ■;
ARMY SECRET
2778 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
waiting Xor th« cl*y of our aacting. As to th« plmc* of th* iMetin^,
I b*Xl*vt UiAt, in veiw of ▼•rioua olrcunntano**, it would b«. bast If
it ware soiB«wh«r« In the vicinity of Hmrali.
ARMY SECRET ^^•- «/=*'/" ^'^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2779
^^R:
i!^9p||PHH^^K^%!'» tM'tt '^^^^S^^^^^^B
^^^^^^^^^^HjQp^R^-Cc/rW.
*-v^. it'^-'i t-t:
•m'^^m t%^^« l^^H
1
^m^^m^Mg *ai* ».♦-«--, v^-- ~v .
1
2780 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
9nm Site* '
iMT MMriM«K mAm»0m« immr*. mm .mmmmi -«i# *MiNM a«iii«i »»ais»
im »Mt»t litM»«> :iMwmf « '£» mm « «k(^ ^iMrfM*:** ii».««m> tMtat <ma i»
«Mlt IB «|»«4tiww«r mmata&amt mihumih:^-** •wMt— *'■• .--'V^—'«-
Him J «• im ummftM «» wff* ittih il* «hMM* «r -«.>« ««m«» i» «^«ii|f,«ar
t»«K«4 i^'S^'i:
0^147" Si^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2781
«* iriMEl M* ««tt«l«ttr •* iMkm Hm- Vkmm IMi^p «MM*
«M iMkSM «f TWMKt tiwiil«i»»»» «• fiai: ^llRt MHf iiiiiwnii,jp>r KHNbliWi
and :ta«i»^ iktail** itSi* fiaewimM «r «» «i*t»<»|w»f SfiMfe l^- ari^M%ilM
.■-„->^. .**■:.;■. .
2782 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
:W»
>■;»' W8**
ti. . — ^,..,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2783
2784 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
»wiiti»>»iia *i#i: » piinr <«»» »<■«»» ^>^ »*»«^ ^^^ ffH<^'^*«P««*
mmimn <*HAfA' mm mm tmjtm^ %»' .inMiiit me mmm. « :Im«& i«M*
%« nmkUitm* SmUmtm iM*» «* «fWsi«K»# •«# ^m m)}im •»«•*
«» «««» «%• iiiiw yiipiiam wii)|m>^ii|iiiiwiiwi liflf' 1^
«• tlw iiM* «r itd* ii.» 111% '.^iin «lil mi* «««««*.%•
21478 a^
4
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2785
;»a4^^^SftIA■■
•mttmmm^'* >»*•»
^ » «ff«i* W *• ***«*
79716 O — 46— pt. 17 23
2786 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
IRHfVHMt*
^^^^P"^^^
^ft dM^ MHiHk
aiiMiMiHBp. tf Imtir ' -'-
jsa» »D>»tiai(Mawt iM^h^t O # '*P» 'Mri(i»>ii ifcwgr* fwiwjliife -i»#iwi» a»^:
itoi ik^ mmntMii Ifcii JfiMiiirTiiwiMit'' M ^^fattM^lB'
^^ipHk m0 MM tMilii«''ilMM)ii» «- liiHito 'sm^^vk^ ''S^MsSm ^M^
i<A
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2787
%tm
Mto
2147?
2788 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ttet HHntMElM
>2 MAvin iSm% Urn tfglMm* «f fh> 'Si^urUi.
^i^Bs «aeii lis* SM,«i»ii MHMkltf mmtme <ta>i>— iw—tily «■< «Mwlr«rtlt«^
»nm'*ttM jN&at •« vt«ir it 1« i«r fiMnwft MUbif «te« f% wwdi
Iji fHiTiiawtt't D 'In ilHMttx'lMk£r vdMl ttMt InBfWMtMni tlBt Wiis itii l# 4Mi
«f «• IrilfMl ttirlHM 1« is Hm wla iJi«M9««i« ta tti» — trtUilwiiit «f
«ir]4 VMM* Mi «VM IMM «MUt« «» KMtpMM* MHt t« %te UsM •! «»
fm
SEttST
iW^^Wi^w ^^^W^f ^pfc \" *
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2789
SECRET
ftot (s*rt 1 <rf 5)
ft
R« ay f»SOS . ,
(A) For «i«T<mi«&««'s Mk*, la «acahacglnc lamatme^u la
th« futur* on this qucctloa, $)!•«•• Insert th* {wragrftph aunb«ra
la th* ordsr ua«d Ik th* oftr^ion t«l«KrcB.
1. (Th« •••tlwn b»gtimiBg "Th« QoT»rim«at of tho t^nitod
St*t«»" «Bd rop^ittag th« oaBtast of r»*«ntly roeolvwd doo«»«nt«)
2. (Th* MMition boglBnlng "Tbo borvraMiut of Jai>«ii
««anot holp but f»«l ^••ply r»srott«bl« that doapito Jap«j»'ii p*»t
pXodgo*. oto.")
8. ?Xt>« ••otiom i>«sinnin« "th« st^p* vihioh Jftp*B ha*
takoa for th« jolat def«n«« of i-rtineh iudo-thtaa, eto."]
4. (The ••otlon bei-tnnlnf, "Th» uov»mj«Mit of the tJaitod
^-tatoa h** goo* on rooord' »• h»rinr, ••iti that, etc.";
6. {Th« Mtotion bof.iiuilag "Th* Inpert*! J«pane»« aor-
•naB«int tsellores th*t the aoTernaeiit of the lJnit«Ki states camitiera,
•to.")
6. (Th» »»otion barionlni', "I b«il ioT« that th« oplaiona
of tho ijBporial uoT«rnKi«nt aa art forth »boT«, etc.")
(I) Ih* lollcmtnf, are cxplaaationa of t.h« point* in the
caption t«l»Kr«» •hieh ua#d apaoial attention i
U) 'Air opinions re,.ar<lln,; thia ijueation were aet
forth \M-lefly in reaponae te Uioae Tiarwa n^iloh the Utiited >.tatee
..oTemroent freely aubmltted with tha requeat ttiat »• do llkewlae.
ARMY Mlt*
2790 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECKET
*(• wmim •ur ri*** •Xvar. ballarlms that >y •• Aolac v* alctit fl»d
In ium tls* polat* upon whlsh th» t«« p*rti*« aMa acra* In • frliily
•plrlt (jMI th*t b««*ua« of this th« Mavtlag af tKa lMUl*r« •t th*
t«« oouktrlM wouU prvr* t« W afrMtlT*.
a - b.l.a. Hcs. tltrv-SO w) lok ^irm Jayaa'i ▼!— ytoM with r«0Ur4
to Aiuiri«aa>Jap«Ji<»a« a«Ga%latl«aa>
'^'*MY SECRET ^.^,^ a/^V" (i>)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2791
siCRtr
rroBi ToJcyo
Xoi asMnttton
„ W>9 (i'«rt e ol 5j
(2) itn r«puro to .«r. 3 , "Bhoulii • JuBt paaos h»
••t«ibXi»h«<J in th« y«r .A»t." Thi» rae*.n«, for exur.pXo, w^.eQ th«
C.'IAKU rmi,ija» J»*« ^>«coa»e ;'.«rslj * loc«.l rej;l«ri» as & r«nilt of th«
oloBlnf, of rout,»i a»«- to «iti tJoit ro^ijiej ..hen Japane«»-ChiiM(»e
rellttlon* h*T», on the whol», «i.otu«lly r«v.ur,i«. : -.o nom«lcyj «! n<3
when It !■ potaibl* to ••cure •fficioally •xm 'r:&tly 'la^erialt
from fT»nch Indo— hin*, Japeai will jo Kililn^, uc ct'.:sid«r 'Alth-
drmwlng h«r troop* oren it « ccnplat* ••ttie!i:,«»a oi' th« .hln» la-
oid«at ha« not b««n aohleTwd. In other words. It wmc t «t*tonent
nad« 'becliute of th« depir* to alio* «c jauoh flexibility a» poesible
when the conrereetlone are to be be;;un.
(!) i-.ith regMTl to rtfirt £. Cv). "... wtrieh will :je
»pplioable to thi> whole world, et«." ««• inaertod out of oocsidere-
tlor. of the feet thet if the prlcciplef, f»a«< <ie«ir«t erprftatt-d by
tie other Bide are applied marelj within the J eolf io area, we would
•uffer Tarlous reetrictiofl* within the iiAtt .i*ia aphere of co-
(iroaperity in which we ; ope to eateblieh a a«rw order, while the
'."nlted . tatea, or. the other >\tuid, woulrf mot be bouad by ajiy pledge
with rei^erd to iwr relation* with her acjaceat »reae, t.inoe thie
wovild reei It In «u: arran ;ome',t wl-V -Id >c .^nc-aided ineofar aa
it »ffeote Japeji, I thoui-.ht that i,he principln <; . . : s ;o ■. us
aey be applied to the entire worla,
a - The part* referred to do not oorreepooc to parta In the traiie-
latec. n>e»«a,-e) art 3 -r^atloned ebere eorreeponda to fart 6 la
t^ <• traaal*ted meeeane, «JB<1 I'ert b to i-art t,
ARMY - SLCREI ^ ^ _
TMlM. 8/te/41 (s)
2792 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
Troni r«ky«
T«i fl**hlnct«n
Aucurt 28. IMl
PurpI* (CA)
#«09 (Part S of 8.)
(B) With r«sard to that Motlm la whloh it !■ atat^d that
oountrlat anjoyiac favoorabXa ooodltioiu or harlnc a^Taatasoa onror
otiior oouRtrioa ahould asaum* an attltudo of (trlot Impartiality
with rogard to oooporatlea and to tho dittrlbutioa of luoh adTuitago*,
«• wish to point out tho loeioal roaooa* for aooporatloaa la tho appll-
eatlon ot loadorthlp t* tho ond «t brlngliij; about (top* for aa
•qultabla dlrtrlbutlon of roaouroo* by thoa* oexmtrloa irho aro ad»
▼aatagooualy altuatod, tJoA tho paaaago haa to do with tho propoaal
by tho Uoltod Statoa with roforoaoo to oquallty af oeottaaie opportunity
and troataoat. In <ith«r worda, it hlsta tho idoa that It la natural
that Japan ahould aaauae poaooful oooaaalo loadorahip within tho isAvt
Aoia Sphoro of Co-pro«porlty.
(C) Aa to tho worda to tho of foot that it la natural and
oaaanllal that adjuataonta idxeuld b« aada In a aplrlt of roolpreolty
la rolatloa to tho aroaa adjaooat, ato., tho paaaa^^o olarlfioa tho
foot thftt Japan la laovltably, aa wall aa naturally, ondoaTorlae to
brine (ibout poapo «» Vm baaia of tho prinolplo of oquality in hor
rolation with Manehukuo and China i that la to aay, on tho baaia of
the prinolplo of good noiehborlinoaa to tho and of atrtabllahinc tho
kaat Aala Sphoro of Co^proapority. It alao goo* to ahow that tho
Paifo 1.
ARMY SECRET
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2793
'xmv^^-'
SECRET
polloy of »dJ»oent ooisitrla* •«oh r»»p«otln, T.he couditlotB p«culi«r
to the other. It not « fjolicy, *« the inited teten allogei It to
o», of fovrir.r. a position luporlor to th* othort. This h«f. miiny
points iB oom»on with the AcwrioiUB onroe poiioy.
I'he p»i»gft/« in whioh appetir the word* "i'irBt of «11 »fttl».!yini
the requirement* eimenti&l to the exietenoe of » oountry" ,'»ro« from the
idee of eo-oelled ( joint defenee t ) whic;; ti.e i-niteti taten aoven-meat
referred to. ihi« petM.^e -oth? -iv^r. Ri-„ii tn» idee al«o of » joint
defense i:. -hUie In our xind,
Xr. ottior words, {Kj, v } an; ' , were .,'ro-),Kt out as «
preoRution aj-sihst the pcsflbility of o-^r btin, too narrowlj' restriated
whe^i t!ie disoussioc teltes plas« {jouoen.lr,.- t :.,. t^ttod ^^ w.,i ;,. the
£*et A«i« pnere of ^o-pro»ff>ri:j »iioulti tie « ttajiisiied.
ARMY
SlCRET irsiis. B/ilS/ii {I )
2794 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
Fromj Washington (Noaura)
To I Tokyo
Augurt 2P, I9I4I
Purple CA (V«ry Urgent)
#752
(Part 1 of 2)
I
Re my #7U8 ,
Today, the 28th, at lliOO a. a. In accordance with your
InatructlonE, I had an interview with the Preeident (the Secretary
of State was present.) I gave hlji at that time your MSMge as
well as the 2ni;llah text of yxmr #503 • While the Preeident was
readlnc the aeseage ha flatteringly co«aended It. Harlng re«d
it thoroughly, in discussing the point having to do with dle-
crlmination he smilingly aj>d cynically said, "Though I aa looking
forward to conversations with Prince lONOTB, I wonder whether
invasion of Thailand can be expected during those conversations
Just as an Invasion of Itwnch-Indo Chin* occurred during Socretary
HULL'S conversations with your Excellency." However, I could see
that he urns well pleased. He continued by saying, "I am looking
forward to havins; approxiaately three days talk with Prince KOKOTE.
The naln thin, that I aia interested in is the saving of ti»e. Hawaii
is out of the question for according to the constitution the President
Bust sl;n blll^ passed through the Houses of Congress within ten
days and i cannot have the Vice-president do it for ae."
a - Not available.
b - S.I.3.#21U7!i-80 inclusive, English text message containing
statement to be nadi to Roosevelt.
Trans. 8/30/!a (2)
AKMY
SECRET
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2795
SlCRtT
*oi Tokyo
i-urplo (Ca)
.71,2 (ifirt, i. oi :. ,
.K i-xplainod thut ia '.'.is respect it i« cilTtT^nt with
t/.* v)«.pt»..u4.6 .oY*rnn«iijt ic thtt the .!»->>>r\ei«i .cTenu8«it eoulti appoint
Hc aoting: miniater knd addsu t *s»t if it ii :oinr to b* in Jun«»u,
it would take three dti^m to .eattle, and the rounJ trip fro» that
point oc b«inf. tan day*, if •• had fourtoco iJaya in all, *• irould
ba abla to do it, hut it would >>• tapoaaible if it la Kolng to b«
in .tawail, »tnoti it woulU take three wsake. I, tt erai'ora, told
hill that loaofur »:> the ./ jyiuiese •ovananont is ooncernea, thalr
.-:iJ,ef o'jjeot is to holo a oonfrronoa, and question ol' tha placa
01 the oonfaronce is aacoiwiary. I progilsed that I would oonaauni-
cat,a cUc details to the government. I then said that »e Kould
liJce to nave tu-; sarliest ptsaiblv! dRt^ sot, ?.herauT,'On th« l^resi-
iK.nl replied that ho Jiti rjot object to havia- an early date set,
Sut he .ic not iv ti.c Ira^ediatft reply as to when.
•ihc iresiutat r.>.cli'.d also that the recant neetlnf, with
Rll! ,CT!IU. »a» to iare taken place la — — this year but had l>een
*
postponed on aacount of the r^alkan • ar a»sS that the meetlBC »*•
rsfcltJ after \.hv Joni.resa !>ad approired of it. The coBrersatlm
b«t»ioen the i'realdent and ite ».ms as tlren aboTC. Theee oonTeraa*
tlone will be continued.
a - i'art 1 of 2 not available.
ARMY SLCRtI
Trans. 8/i«/*l f*^
i
2796 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
1 romi a»hini.toii (heaura)
To I Tolryo
iiirpl« (CA)
v« iny ,;762 .
0 ii»e for th* Intsr^law «*• •nnouooad by tb«
. loueo, Uie ..•oret»ry of i.t»t« Inneil lately ekmJ* publto
.)ri(.riy ,!>«■ I"«ct i.h«t I had rt»llr«red to hln ai t*>r th« oonferan**
i'rcEiier r'fjHOTi^'t aassajfe to tha iTeaidant, which «*« dlaouaaad
b) u«. it waa a/^ead that no rafaranea ahould 'je nada to tb»
content ct the naaaar^at
a • i«rt 2 ur « arallahla, baiag traoalatad.
AKMY SICRLI ^ ^
trana. i/Z<i/K\ (7)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2797
yrom: Tokyo.
To : .iashiii<jton.
29 Au^uat 1941
(Purpl«-CA)
#510
As you have been advised by other
messages concernin;: this ratter, no Inforu'^tion of the "leaders'
conference" anould be allowed to leuic out until It ia definitely
settled upon. You snould be perfectly well aware that such leaks
aay '.iika it tmposaibla to get soiie things done which otherwise
would be v/ell wit,.in the rjalm of poaslbllity.
On the 2atu, however, the Jomei and other
press disp-.tohos, report tu t in an interview to t:ie press you
made rafereacey to j. renler Konoye's inessage, (..'a suppressed tnose
^.'—-- -.-■^w-.es Sf^T-si . .iorjaftax- v-lll you plovjse refrain from ruaking
.1^0. a u„iil you have ooamunicijted witn this office.
..Itaouc-i wo were able to supprass the
abov ^ ....itl'j.i;,.d dispsitches, in view o: ' ■ " 'siinal tnroucsh which
ay arrived, we are of tho opinion th irly large i.roup of
peonle are -" -nre of tiio aewa, ..e are <t .rrs^^"-'^ fio'>^rlng out
ways cajd av attkiao tno yast of tlw situ.ition. In the ivian-
ti;.;e, v^ll you - -ku overy ijroctiution n.'.ainct any 1 .r.kt.c.e of the
co'it'jats Ct' tue .'.ossueiO,
jD-1: O) l.-.v, ir. ::>. -30-i.l (J-TT)
4^5
2798 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
From: Tokyo.
To : Wsshla^ton.
29 Auguat 1941
(Purple-CA)
#511
Regarding my message ,/510*
In view of our domastlo altuotton and the
delicate Internet! onal fitiu^tlon, wo hud Intended to k ;ep tnia nat-
ter a strict secret for the tli.e belnc. iiowever, now thi-t the
matter has been made public In your area, we fear th.t there will
be further mlBundorstanding if we should attai.pt to suppress or
osiiaor the iiSWB .lere. Being of the opinion t.; t It would be best
to publicly a/inounce the contents of section 2 of paragraph 5 of the
separfcte ueaaat;), we did so at 2:30 li.n. on the 2Vth.
It should be superfluous to mmtion that
because we must tako iato consideration our rel'-tions with Jeri.any
and Italy, and in view of tno exceediniily complex doiiestic situation,
there is ^ uch danger th* t the projoct will fail if infon.Ltion is •
allowed to leak out before n settleraent ia resiched. Bear this in
nlnd and tokj every pr joaution to cuard afainst 1 ^aka. You should
coatiuct your nogoti'itiona, as they were bolri;: conducted durin;, your
unofficial t'all<3, in auch a :aannor so as wO i.void attractlnt any *,
attaatlon. ('.<e do not feel t;K>t tuo coutents of t:i'; discussion
on vhc Zdth should be uado public at this tiiie). i^reafter, will
you plsBse c.et in toch before you r.ako any public state;. jnts. We
realize, of course, -.-iu t you nay let an ops-tortunity slip by by thle
delay, :^ut ploaae look upon t^ich na occurrence as boini, unavoidable
under t;.tj presoat clrcui;.stunces,
'Vith regard to tii : loc tion ot w.'iicn the
"l-aders' conference" should takj place, we :_3niiou;d i.awuii after
; Ivin,; CO s derfition to our di^;,nity liJ jIso bjcauao oarly in the
discuasions t.id . nited states su^;so3ted .:awaii.
'..'o do not insist upon .iawsii, but if it
it! i.ot tu - 1 ,ots t.a~a, .,e feal tr. t v.-a ^;.ould (svold selecting
(J iac ..11 on, but aelact u spot on the
!.l .. s^ „., -^ --J . -_L ^ -._- tier Mlon t..osj Hues.
..-.th rofc.ird vo ...-^„ _..,»-. .oe of security,
in vie»v uT •.hi, itter contuned in /our nossage ,,?54**, will you
pi .aso ra i>. let uhu .x:e:lcana to ocopjrnte fully. (You are aware
thi.t our rol tlons v.ith Uer;.;iny .nd Italy t.ay uo unfavortbly
affoctevl b; aai.ouiico.ionts ;-.ade in tho United states. It is c^ulte
poe;3i.io tii't the United .>t.;tes proposed t.'i. t the ^.-nounceniant be
^ado to or^r - n J ■ r :to.ti Gor.jmy ;.-id I-al/. '.: oxTvjct t. 'ave
JO-1: (continued) { j) N;.vy Tr^ ;is. 3-30-41 (o-TT)
My6>
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2799
9-ranft
et 1 -act tt»ls tauo . cooper.ot loa fron them).
'..ita regard t-. ., ....ouaceaeiit ..t,de by
nc- '.'hich was mentioned early in %^Aa neesaot-, we fait triat time
was of th'^ ut'.r.OLt in*'ort :ico; .ve could .iOt oo-.QulV X,ixa ^.j. .irtit.
I-l are az-lain thla t.. ; ,
■.-.-i: :4y6d
'l.ot ava_i£i le.
JJ>-1:
(D) Kavy Trt.na. 8-30-U (3-TT)
2800 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
m- : .-1.
To : .o.<yo.
2v .. -Ht 1941
(i '. ", lu-'J i
,'75b ( - :■-• X, , 3 tr^; .,l,teu >,-:,!)
U, 1 usciiay i-ice Kouoyo will
•aod jpon t, .1 ot,-xiove titit t.- beat
^ter rri.iCt ..^^aoy/'a dopurture.
-'.. .^t.-ta ..;^,reed T-o oia-
c .y.- :o --re :. .yral, it .say be s.'.ld
a. ■, -ary 0-. 1,'iy C;:atioua jeraon.
-aor -ti-n ,.i;.-. t..la .jBtter fro;» rany
JD-1: 4899 (D) Navy Trans. 9-4-41 (1)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2801
EXHIBIT NO. 125
N. »ttf. 4*
(Mar, •w
/'-...
<0
LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP UllOia',
Passage
i
iANi ~irus ,JLa«
i P^
: lulB
haRomktek
if ;p
>. -J-'V
i Received—.
I On \mui
. . .. .j£aJ[ "X-i— ■ ■ ■■
ClXiViiH
1
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f
V'i>»tH9 K
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,.
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17
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tOri|itn«l (rtlibon) «op; of ihiB page t.. I"- Ki-ii( to Ilurt^au «f N«v)t'»ii..
79716 O — 46 — pt. 17 24
2802 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
iMi'
UNITED STATES SHIP
19 4i,
REIMARKS
.:. daricened, ii52 i..B.c,,
.. , bcilars ,fl,C:;3,5, and 6
COC lbs., avaraee H.l'.U. ,
.... 2C0 lbs..
,--■/-
. letiS noroEl.
£54"
. rca. Gunner
' V/
«Ca. Tot ac.iittsc
Kviiiiuii**.!:
<>ri^i*i.*l ri'jbon
-■«■■■. , /
(M-nl lo Bureau of Navigation oionlhly)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2803
Pat* 33i
20C
200
POO
0
LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP .-l-
pleSAGE"" ^''•^^ rjirhor, T.ii. to
ZONE DESCRIPTION . !n1g1!3 11. -
as*
P.EV't*
too
III?
^ ■ ■ ■'
-. ■ .
B'.c '1 -
a?. 5 1
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13
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i\ i^,.<it„ic 156. ;'4'i5"i;
/■l I^MiluA- 12. 0-x'OO -
jfl I"n«'<'i<l"- 1S3 Oi'GC-S
(Hot
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I On t.„;
11 '■•'■■
Draft :
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7-1.
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j-^,^^,-^;. tOrltflDftl <rlt>»>i>n) copy of thiw |mK^ t«^ hi-
2804 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
UNITED STATES SHIP
ZONE DtscHic'OM . .--. — • R EI MARKS
.31
1
19 '.l^
OC-O-I
C ".:>■- c,c "rue ii:,(J ~'Te , -
31.;.)it.a :■. ...... 1 rail in si,-, t
courses aproac ii.., '..a :e IsltHd,
starboarrt, diat uicc ore (1) isile.
off Vi'Blce IsluR'i on vurioiiS oc urses ir
l.yl..'' to .1. .!« .I i^j.:.. .. V.-:riO
fore, orcfl ■ ustei-ed ere or. st'_
l!f:.tar .slo!if.;sid'j starbourd I'.mrter. ^ - .;^ . ..^ .. -;
Fourteenth ruv.-.l District's itr. of HcVKber I'' 19-tl
x::)(;LD, VS..C, let- t:ie shi.^ t: r -•-. t ■".■( . -,.. '^
for oiity. iuysuart to Co ; un
1 yore-.y ::; 1" i;:'rUt
ri Jia- ■;.:•.. :-.i. ;,ct,.: ...
. . S':;;les; cor.flitior.s normal.
■ --, rill .]i. . .>:■■:■'. ■ : ■ :
^ -" • '^ as tefcrr. r&jiueveri
1.5 wiles '-o sp>!t ! v/estv.f ;•
. : itioh to :
l'''_:ii of :."cvf
, ro.or- tc OII'C ; av;. i idivit^
j "^: :--! -iesp. 1M213 !■.<• :-ove;..;'e:-
I i -"•. ' e : i.- :. ;■■:• crt \ .- ' ..,.
-TV t^iir.
. 0510
^v,.A.,,
' t T ■
1059
Recvj vf , ^ .r cj_,,.' -^
(Jnlly
i.-iS ■ cti".-. o" ;;iar.-s-.i:rer
?'(!d«
. ■'>kT ■■ •■ - ■•«■ < —: -'• ara
nry.
■'•'t'" si.
VJUawuot •'■ -
' • r -.1. c. . .,
.... ' — ,. . • . •; •*.*
tOrisinal <rlbbon> copy of thiM p*|{r to br »«nt to Burcnu of NnviKalion montKlyi
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2805
531
ADOiTlONAL SHEET.
in«*(>»iji.'
2806 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
or r.c Tiir UNITED STATES SHIP
TO
•
A\i':'
13.. - . '^r. s-unii-f)
- . ,. 19.1.
1 "
_.
" \
E:xe.Huiiie»
i«'nilt«»»t«ni.l».ii, , , |.^ ..r 11,1. i. ,K, I,. 1 .„ ,1, t,, ii„r,.„„ ,,f n,h1xu(1,.., ,n.i,,ilii.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2807
ADDITIONAL SHEET.
•A-/ ;
'■'- 3S2
■)' ^1'
'^^'^■d'^tc'K
I9c .-
ort^d ,
■^\
1.. liiiii-iiii of N;iws iil"ii lll.>lllhl^ «ilh l.i>x: -Ik
2808 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Hil
REMARKS
•/
dr. line. ,
) miles 1
s ciii-j;©.
Oriolo-il ir.l>K...%> uoity 9f thi» |V»Kr to bo Kill (o Burtrau oj ■NuvuirtM"" niviilblvi
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2809
Pair.
■jT)
LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP
^L..
SI.
»■
i
1
i""
ij-
11 ^"'" '
■^1 I^'tijr!' ,
M 1 ;« ilU!-.'
N 1 > ^^'iilliitt »HOlt ■ '
2810 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
r'
UNITED STATES SHIF
REIMARKS
.*f Navifinlton monthly'
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2811
ADDITIONAL SHEET.
2812 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
™ *
i»»>
^V
#
LOG BOOK
U. ;5. ;:5.
At
■urn'
at
ami ciiUiMt.'
at
OF THK
Rate,
(■|>.M:aAXi)El> BY
' ^ »
, U. S. Navy,
Division,
Squadron,
.c
Fleet,
»aL t,>/iJ^;x
U)41. ,
.1941.,
n'MK i>«gr i<> 1.^ «..iii to Hiirvttu >.t MttvlifiitKiu monthly wltb LosshecMO
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2813
LIST OF OFFICERS
Attached to and on hoard of the U. S. S. .i~<.. ' •
by -C^ W... MlEBiJC, Com-.nrjlgr, ,. , V. S. K., during tin- i-n
reporting for dtjlv. (l(>t;i»'imn'nl. Iransfcr, <■: .Ua*h. fmtt; XiACer^J:^*-" - ,
!Ll«ut. Corarir.
D-r., ",
.. .3'. ,;. D-V(J).
y
^pi.t*. .
'
rjiLKsc.r. , .a-: ,:.
....J - ,. ..-
Jiliii-' . '■ •- ■ ' c« "-'.
'..'}^ '- " -^ ■
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: 1
>
liAOI.'Si, Siu^ro C.J.
ill. . _
■;••
i- Lx, .,a;:tr:. ...
..UCJ^, J.Cii«i_ ...
;-.A.'t.-tl3 , Ch«rles I.
X'^ '..:\, . r« 'srl, > .1.
.-a».i'„I.. , i-rvln :,.
£JkM., Ci«rlo« 5.
.;~i:"i;-er ,
1
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iCHi-Pr, Jobs ;;.
^ ■ .
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1
.JBJLHiS, Crvli S.
Ca^-Leutar ,
- ^
.-...-,. fti-.^/...
.
^U''
As 5 :
Asa-.,
iThu jmiii. to l»f *.i-nt to llurrua .tf Vav)i;u(Ion uionlhly with I^i^ *h. ,
2814 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
LOG or THE UNITED STATES SHIP
OeX^-
MMrtBWUaB W— W)
:■ Ar
Paseag
TO
JONP DfCtliPTI ■
. .0-. Csy 1 Decenbe: \f»l.
HAKt.MPTrft
iKMrBruTi'Kr!
5
tuitl tntibnni ropjr o( tnia pnito to Iw laiml Co UurMU of Xovlgitiltin maattUj') <~ >
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2815
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79716 O — 46— pt. 17 25
2818 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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2828 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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2830 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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2832 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(The remaining portion of Exhibit 125 is a map reflecting the Dis-
position of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, 7 Dec. 1941 and particuhirly the
location of the USS Wright on 27 November and 7 December. 1941,
This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 88 in EXHIBITS-
ILLUSTRATIONS to proceedings of the Joint Committee.)
EXHIBIT NO. 126
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C, February 3, 1941.
General Order No. 143
Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States
1. General Orders Nos. 68 and 102 are hereby canceled.
2. Effective February 1, 1941, the Naval Forces of the United States are by this
order organized into:
The United States Fleet, comprising:
(a) The United States Atlantic Fleet,
(b) The United States Pacific Fleet,
(c) The United States Asiatic Fleet;
The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces,
Special Task Forces,
Special Duty Ships,
The Naval Transportation Service,
Naval District Craft.
The assignment and administrative organization of units pertaining to the fore-
going will be as prescribed by the Chief of Naval Operations either in special
orders or in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization of the Seagoing Forces
of the U. S. Navy," and the "Assignment of Units to Naval Districts and Naval
Stations."
3. The United States Atlantic Fleet, the United States Pacific Fleet, and the
United States Asiatic Fleet are administrative and task organizations, and
normally operate under the instructions or orders of the Navy Department. Each
is under the command of a flag officer having the title "Commander-in-Chief,
United States Atlantic (or Pacific, or Asiatic) Fleet." The geographical limits
of command of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, shall in-
clude the Western Pacific and the Indian Oceans and tributary waters. The
eastern limit shall be the 180th meridian south of latitude 50° north and the 160th
meridian east of Greenwich, north of latitude 50° north. The western limit shall
be Asia, Africa, and, south of Africa, the 20th meridian east of Greenwich.
4. The United States Atlantic Fleet, the United States Pacific Fleet, and the
United States Asiatic Fleet together comprise the Untied States Fleet, whose
commander-in-chief is appointed from among the commanders-in-chief of the com-
ponent fleets. The United States Fleet is an administrative organization for
training purposes only, and is a task organization only when two or more fleets
are concentrated, or are operating in conjunction with each other.
5. Under the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, United States
Fleet will, through Type Commanders, prescribe standards and methods of train-
ing for all of the .seagoing forces and aircraft of the Navy. Type Commanders
will be designated in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization of the Sea-
going Forces of the U. S. Navy", and customarily, so far as possible, the type
commander will be in the same fleet as the Commander-in-Chief, United States
Fleet.
[2] 6. The Comnmnder-in-Chief, United States Fleet, is senior to the other
Commanders-in-Chief. When two or more fleets are concentrated, or are operat-
ing in conjunction with each other, the senior Commander-in-Chief is responsible
to the Chief of Naval Operations for joint operations.
7. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, when formed, are administrative and
ta.sk organizations, and operate under the Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders.
Where Naval Coastal Frontiers have more than one Naval District in them. Naval
Coastal Frontier Forces are subdivided into "Naval (Coastal Forces" and "Naval
Local Defense Forces", operating under the Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders
and the Naval District Commandants, respectively. Where Naval Coastal Fron-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2833
tiers include but one Naval District, the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces consist
only of Naval Local Defense Forces. Commandants of Naval Districts and Com-
manders of Naval Coastal Frontiers have administrative responsibility direct to
the Navy Department for Naval Local Defense Forces and Naval Coastal Forces,
respectively. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers have task responsibility
to the Chief of Naval Operations for Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.
8. Special Task Forces may be formed from time to time under the Chief of
Naval Operations for the accomplishment of particular tasks.
9. Special Duty Ships are those assigned to outlying naval stations, to survey
duty, and to such other special details as may be designated. They operate under
orders of the commandants of the stations to which they are assigned or under the
Chief of Naval Operations, depending on the type of duty they are performing.
10. The Naval Transportation Service is composed of such units as may be as-
signed to it by the Chief of Naval Operations. This service operates directly
under the Chief of Naval Operations.
11. Naval District Craft are under the command of the commandant of the naval
district or station to which assigned. They consist of such naval craft and float-
ing equipment of the district as are not in the "Naval Local Defense Force."
Frank Knox,
Secretary of the Navy.
Navy REOtrLAxiONS Setting Forth the General Duties of a Commander-In-
Chief
"(1) The commander in chief shall take all practicable steps to keep the
ships of his command ready for battle. (Navy Regs. Article 687.)
"(2) He is responsible for the indoctrination, drill, training, and efficient ad-
ministration and operation of the fleet and the coordination of its varous units
in strategic and tactical employment.
"(3) He shall make recommendations to the Navy Department as to the com-
position and organization of the fleet and as to all matters pertaining to its
military efficiency and control. He shall submit schedules of employment and
cruising itineraries to the department in accordance with its instructions."
"The commander in chief shall carry out all drills and exercises in accordance
with the customs of the service, the instructions of the (iepartment, and the
drill books and other publications of ai similar nature. This shall be done in
such manner as will most conduce to maintaining the fleet in constant readiness
for war in all its phases." (Navy Regs. Article 692.)
"(3) He shall also be governed by the following rules :
"(a) He has the sole right to correspond directly with the Navy Department
concerning any official matter connected with the fleet.
"(b) He shall keep the Secretary of the Navy fully informed of the move-
ments of the fleet. These general reports shall not be considered as taking the
place of separate letters on separate subjects." (Navy Regs. Art. 699.)
"The use of force against a foreign and friendly state or against anyone
within the territories thereof is illegal.
"The right to self-preservation, however, is a right which belongs to States
^s well as to individuals, and in the case of States it includes the protection
of the State, its honor, and its possessions, and the lives and property of its
citizens against arbitrary violence, actual or impending, whereby the State or
its citizens may suffer irreparable injury. The conditions calling for the ap-
plication of the right of self-preservation cannot be defined beforehand, but
must be left to the sound judgment of responsible officers, who are to perform
their duties in this respect with all possible care and forebearance. In no
case shall force be exercised in time of peace otherwise than as an application
of the right of self-preservation as above defined." (Navy Regs. Article 723.)
"The Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet is vested with authority
to exercise control of the operations of fleet aircraft units from naval air sta-
tions, to allocate among units of the fleet the services, facilities, equipment, and
spaces made available to the fleet, and to establish priorities with respect to
repair and overhaul of aircraft of the fleet." (Navy Regs. Article 1554.)
79716 O — 46 — pt. 17 28
2834 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
BESTRICTED
STAFF INSTRUCTIONS— STAFF OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF UNITED
STATES PACIFIC FLEET— 1941
A2-12(05)
Serial 1525
United States Pacific Fleet
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship
Peabl Harbor, T. H., July 11 1941.
The following Staff Instructions are published for the guidaiue of all persons
attached to or serving with the Staff of the Connuander-iii-Chief, United States
Pacific Fleet, and also the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet,
while both commands are administered jointly.
The 1938 edition of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff Instructions are hereby
superseded and all copies should be destroyed.
W. W. Smith,
Captain U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff.
Approved :
H. E. KIMMEL,
Admiral, U. 8. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
U. S. Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions, 1941
Page No.*
Section I Composition, Organization and General Cognizance of Duty 1-3
Section II Individual Cognizance of Duties 3-15
Section HI Battle Stations 16
Section IV Flag Office Personnel and General Instructions 17-20
Section V Handling of Correspondence 21-28
Section VI Confidential and Secret Correspondence 29-30
Section VII Libraries 31
Section VIII Kapid Communications 32-39
Section IX Registered and other Secret and Confidential Publications 40
Section X Relationship between Flag and Ship 41-43
Staff Instructions 1941 — Distribution List
Command No. Copies
Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet 40
Opnav i 10
Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet 5
Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet 5
Commander Battle Force, Pacific Fleet 5
Commander Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet 5
Commander Base Force, Pacific Fleet (including Subordinate Command) (3 each) — 6
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet 2
Commander Battleships, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet 2
Commander Cruisers, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet i 2
Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet : 2
Commander Minecraft, Battle Force, Pacific Fleet 1
Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet 2
Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet 1
Commander Submarines, Scouting Force Pacific Fleet 2
Compatwing Two : 1
Commander Mine Squadron THREE 1
Commander Transports, Base Force. Pacific Fleet 2
Commanding General, Second Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force 5
Commandants 11th, 12th & 14th Naval Districts (each 2) 2
Fleet Flagship S
Fleet Personnel Officer 1
Total 107
Spares 40
Grand total 147
• Pages referred to are Indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages
of original exhibit.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2835
[1] Staff Instructions
section 1 — composition, organization and general cognizance of duty
111. The composition of the Staff of the Coniiuander-iii-Chief, United States
Pacific Fleet is as indicated in the following paragraphs.
112. The Commander-in-Chief is available to the entire Staff for consultation,
but all questions for decision or action should pass through the Chief of StafE
whenever such a procedure will not involve an undue delay.
113. The below tables indicate in general the assignment of duties to the
members of the Staflf. Primary functions are indicated at the top of each
column ; the officer whose number appears first after each of the subheads under
(a), (b), (c), or (d) is the leader in the duty specified :
2836 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEET
2837
Cognizance and Duty
114. The following numbers are employed to identify the duties of the oflBcers
attached to the Staff :
01— Chief of Staff.
02— Assistant Chief of Staff.
05 — Flag Secretary.
11 — Operations OflScer.
12 — 1st. Assistant Operations OflBcer.
13 — 2nd. Assistant Operations OflScer.
14— Staff Duty Officer.
15 — Flag Lieutenant.
16 — War Plans Officer.
17 — 1st. Assistant War Plans Officer.
18— 2nd. Assistant War Plans Officer.
19 — 3rd. Assistant War Plans Officer.
20 — Communications Officer.
21 — Communications Security Officer.
22— Radio Officer.
23 — Assistant Communication Officer.
24 — Assistant Communication Officer.
25 — Intelligence Officer.
26 — Assistant Intelligence Officer.
27— Public Relations.
30 — Assistant Communication Officer.
31 to 43 — Communication Duty and
Coding Officers.
50 — Maintenance Officer.
75— Medical Officer.
86— Marine Officer, (Assistant War
Plans Officer).
90 — Gunnery Officer.
95 — Aviation Officer.
96 — Aerological and Personnel Officer.
[3] 115. The following table shows the reliefs for members of the Staff
who may be absent for any reast)n :
2838 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2839
SE3CTION II — INDIVIDUAi? COGNIZANCE OF DUTIES
200. CHIEF OF STAFF— 01— Personal Aide.
(See Navy Regulations Articles 785-786.)
(a) Carries out policies prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief.
(b) Exercises general supervision over and coordinates work by members of
the Staff.
(c) Advises the Commander-in-Chief on all matters concerning the war readi-
ness and battle efficiency of the Fleet.
(d) Supervises the preparation of campaign orders and plans, as well as
strategical and tactical problems of the Fleet.
(e) Signs correspondence as follows :
(1) Routine Matters.
[4] (2) Minor recommendations, or minor forwarding endorsements on
same, to material Bureaus regarding repairs and alterations concerning which
a policy has been established.
(3) Orders to and requests from officers not in Command.
(4) Matters concerning which the policy is of long standing.
(5) Letters from the Navy Department noted for compliance, information, or
guidance.
(6) The Commander-in-Chief personally will sign correspondence regarding
questions of particular importance involving criticism, approval, or disapproval
of previous recommendations ; action on legal papers.
201. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF— 02— See Operations Officer (11).
202. FLAO SECRETARY— 05— Personal Aide.
(a) Responsible for the receipt, dispatch, recording, routing, and filing of all
official written correspondence. He shall be assisted by an officer (Assistant
Communication Officer) designated to handle the SECRET mail.
(b) Authenticates and checks the distribution of operation plans, orders,
movement orders and multiple address correspondence requiring authentication.
(c) In charge of the Flag Office organization and personnel connected there-
with.
(d) Ascertains that outgoing correspondence is in agreement with current in-
structions and properly distributed.
(e) Brings to the attention of the officers concerned all conflicting, inconsistent
or overdue communications.
(f) Responsible for the general dissemination of administrative information,
(g,) Supervises the handling of U. S. and Guard Mall within the Fleet.
(h) Printing.
(i) Legal and disciplinary matters.
(j) Signs correspondence "by direction" for:
(1) Papers forwarded or returned without comment.
(2) Correspondence consisting of Information or appropriate minor action
only.
(3) Receipts and tracers.
(4) Transmission of registered mail, or publications.
(5) Transfers and orders for enlisted personnel,
(k) Controls Flag Office Allotment.
(1) War Diary.
203. Operation.1 officer — ii— (Assistant Chief of Staff 02).
(a) Assists the Chief of Staff as required, signing correspondence in his
absence as "Assistant Chief of Staff".
(b) As head of Operations Section coordinates operations and employment
activities.
(c) Develops Fleet tactics and doctrine, and originates recommendations for
revision of same.
(d) Prepares problems and exercises.
(e) Assignments of vessels to special duties.
[5] (f) Prepares estimates of the situation, campaign orders, operations
orders, and plans and movement orders.
(g) Assisted by other members of Staff reviews and analyzes Fleet exercises,
(h) Acts as head of the Schedule Board for preparing the Fleet operation
plans.
(i) Navy Relief Force.
(j) Fleet anchorages, bases, and operating areas.
2840 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
204. First assistant operations officer — '12.
(a) Acts as Fleet Navigator with corresponding cognizance of navigational
equipment, charts, etc.
(b) Assists in all the duties under the cognizance of the Operations Officer.
(c) Coordinates the duties of Operations Officer with those of the War Plans
Section.
(d) Acts as member of the Schedule Board.
(e) Commander-in-Chief's Night Order Book.
205. Second assistant operations officer — 13.
(a) Assists the Operations Officer in all the duties of that office.
(b) Responsible for maintaining location plot and movement report system
for vessels of the Fleet.
(c) Edits Quarterly Fleet Organization information.
205A. Staff duty officer — IJ^.
(See paragraph 226).
206. Flag Lieutenant — 15 — Personal Aide.
(a) Acts as Fleet Signal Officer; supervises the dissemination of tactical
signals, under the Fleet Communication Officer ; is responsible for the efficiency
of Fleet signalling operations and material.
(b) Fleet Athletic Officer; liaison officer with Fleet Recreation and Morale
Officer based ashore.
(c) Boarding officer.
(d) Has cognizance of :
(1) Matters relating to ceremonies, salutes, honors, and official calls.
(2) Entertainments.
(3) Club privileges, invitations, etc.
(4) Uniform.
(5) Boats, boat crews, and official cars.
(6) Military and Medical Guard Duties.
(7) Band or orchestra.
(e) When on board during working hours, attends the side.
(f) Maintains flag combat bill.
(g) Acts on requests for bands, parades, visits to ships, etc.
(h) In charge of Admiral's mess attendants.
207. War Plans Officer— 16.
(a) As head of the War Plans Section is responsible, under the Chief of Staff,
for the preparation of War Plans for the Fleet and for all matters pertaining
thereto.
(b) Has general custody of War Plans and secret letters relative thereto.
(c) Member of Schedule Board.
(d) Maintains liaison with War Plans representatives of subordinate Com-
manders.
[6] (e) Maintains liaison with U. S. Army in War Plans matters, — via
District Commandant if appropriate.
(f) Makes recommendations on designs of new ships — general features — and
on alterations of old ships that affect military characteristics.
(g) Makes recommendations on matters pertaining to reserves of material,
particularly ammunition, mines, bombs, torpedoes, fuel, provisions, etc., and their
distribution.
(h) Maintains liaison with Commandants of Naval Districts in War Plans
matters.
(i) Is responsible for the review of War Plans of subordinate commanders and
of District Commandants and Coastal Frontier Commanders insofar as these
Plans may affect the Fleet.
208. Assistant War Plans — /7.
(a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following:
(1) Fleet estimates and plans.
(2) Collaboration with Naval Coastal Frontiers and Commandants of Naval
Districts.
(3) Liaison with Army on War Plans matters.
(4) Duties of 18 when that assignment is vacant.
209 Assistant War Plans— 18.
(a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following:
(1) Review of subordinate plans, including those of Naval Coastal Frontiers
and Naval Districts.
(2) Prosecution of current War Plans tasks and projects.
(3) Action on administrative matters and correspondence in which War Plans
has an interest.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2841
(4) Logistic studies and data.
210. Assistant War Plans — 19.
(a) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with following:
(1) Office administration and correspondence.
(2) Compilation and assembly of data.
(3) Specific custody of War Plans publications and files.
Fleet Marine Officer — 86. (See paragraph 222.)
211. Fleet Communivation Officer — 20.
(a) Responsible for the efficiency of Fleet communications.
(b) Supervises training in Fleet communications.
(c) Assists Operations Officers and War Plans Officers with strategic operations
and with war plans.
(d) Prepares Fleet communication plans.
(e) Directs activities of flag radio and sound schools and assignments of com-
munication personnel.
(f) Collaborates with "96" concerning radio and sound schools and assign-
ments of communication personnel.
(g) Supervises activities ashore of communications stations when manned by
Fleet personnel.
(h) Supervises the assignment and utilization of Fleet radio frequencies,
(i) Coordinates with "50" on matters of communication material.
[7] (j) Responsible for registered publications.
(k) Supervises communication watch officers.
(1) Crytographic and radio security, with "21".
212. Communication Security Officer — 21.
(a) Assist Fleet Communication Officer.
(b) Is responsible for security of Fleet Communications and directly those of
Fleet flagship :
(1) Inspection of radio traffic handled by Fleet flagship.
(2) Inspection of communication plans and orders of subordinate commanders.
(3) Supervision and control of monitor watch.
(4) Preparation of Fleet Letters and orders on communication security.
(5) Recommendations for improvement of crytographic aids.
(6) Recommendations for distribution and allowances of crytographic aids.
(7) By personal contact and instruction improve security of communications.
(c) Is in immediate charge of Radio Intelligence Unit.
.(d) Is in charge of Commander-in-Chief's registered publications library.
Signs all routine transfer and destruction reports and inventories "By direction".
(e) Is responsible for production and security of U. S. F. publications and
other classified publications and printed matter issued by the Commander-in-
Chief.
(f ) Advises concerning and ensures security of handling of secret and confi-
dential correspondence.
(g) Is resi)onsibIe for the organization and training of the Fleet Coding Board.
213. Fleet Radio Officer^22.
(a) Assists Fleet Communication Officer.
(b) Assists "50" in regard to technical aspects of Degaussing.
(c) Recommends assignment of Radio frequencies to 20.
(d) Supervises radio, sound and landwire communications and material in-
stallations of the Fleet.
(e) Initiation and conduct of radio training operations in the Fleet.
(f) Instruction and training of radio and sound personnel.
(g) Liaison with commercial radio and cable companies.
(h) Material inspection reports of radio and sound installations in the Fleet,
(i) Recognition and identification installations in the Fleet.
214. Intelligence Officer — 2.5.
(a) Directs assembly of Enemy Information and evaluates same, disseminat-
ing to various members of staff, indicating where action is required.
(b) Provides Operation Officer and War Plans Officer information essential for
current estimates (monograph material).
(c) Maintains Section II (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), and (g) of Estimate of
Situation (Enemy Forces). Maintains location plot of Fleets of possible enemy
or allies.
(d) Directs counter espionage and counter information.
(e) Maintains Intelligence Records (See Naval Intelligence Manual).
(f ) Prepares Fleet Intelligence Bulletins.
2842 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[8] (g) Evaluates Intelligence Information received of procedures or prac-
tices of other navies and prepares definite recommendation as to any action to
be taken within own Fleet.
(h) In charge of censorship.
(i) Internal Security of ships.
(j) Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities.
215. Assistant Intelligence Officer — 26.
In addition to assisting "25" in all duties of the Intelligence section, performs
the following additional assignments :
(a) Maintains Merchant Marine plot and analysis.
(b) Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemina-
tion to Fleet.
(c) Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of Enemy information.
(d) Maintenance of Current Estimate of Situation (Enemy Forces) and loca-
tion plot of Fleets of possible enemy or allies.
216. Public Relations Officer— 21.
(a) Liaison officer with the Press.
(b) Releases all Fleet publicity requiring the Commander-in-Chief's review.
(c) Maintains file of clippings from current periodicals.
(d) Maintains photographic file.
(e) Maintains biographical file of flag and commanding officers.
(f) Cognizance of Staff library.
(g) Motion Picture Officer.
(h) Assists in recruiting activities in collaboration with the Bureau of
Navigation.
(i) In charge of Staff photographer.
(j) Assists 15 (Flag Lieutenant) in connection with press release for visitors,
visits, social activities, athletics; and other recreational subjects.
(k) Publicity liaison with other U. S. government activities.
(1) Propaganda in time of war.
(m) When directed assists "25", and "26" with censorship and collaborates
in intelligence matters as necessary.
(n) Reviews ship's papers in the fleet.
(o) Reviews congressional records, bills, etc.
217. Assistant Communication officer — SO.
(a) In addition to the following, assists the Fleet Communication Officer as
directed.
(b) Is in charge of internal distribution and conduct of Flag rapid communi-
cations within the Flagship.
(c) Is in charge of the Flag Communications Office, including personnel,
routine operations, files, forms, and publications.
(d) Coordinates the duties of the Communication Watch Officers and Coding
Watch Officers.
[9] (e) Under Flag Secretary, has duty as officer responsible for receipt,
routing, custody, and dispatch of secret mail.
(f ) Responsible for cleanliness and upkeep of the Flag Communication Office
and communication spaces.
218. Communication Watch Officers— -31, 32, 33, 34.
(a) Communication Watch Officers stand communication desk watches, being
governed in the performance of these duties by the provisions of the Communi-
cation Instructions and such orders and instructions as may be issued by the
Fleet Communication Officer, Fleet Radio Officer, or Assistant Communication
Officer.
(b) A Communication Watch Officer is the Flag Division Officer. He Is assisted
in this assignment by the communication watch officers who are designated as
Junior Division Officers for the Flag Division.
(c) Communication Watch Officers must become proficient in the use of codes
and ciphers and be familiar with Fleet Operations, routine, and staff procedure.
In addition to performing routine code and cipher duties they may be assigned
coding board duties at a battle station.
(d) One Communication Watch Officer is detailed as custodian of non-
registered communication publications which he shall keep corrected.
(e) One Communication Watch Officer is detailed as custodian of the Regis-
tered Publications which he shall keep corrected.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2843
219. Coding Board Officers— S5, 36, 57, 38, (39, 40).
(a) Coding Board OflScers stand Coding Board watches, being governed in the
performance of these duties by the instructions issued by the Assistant Com-
munication Officer.
(b) They shall familiarize themselves with all cryptographic systems in use
and become proficient in their proper use.
(c) They shall assist the Fleet Security Officer in matters of Fleet Crypto-
graphic Security.
(d) They shall familiarize themselves with the duties of Commuilication Watch
Officers to the end that they may stand Communication Watch Officer watches
when required.
(e) All Coding Board Officers shall assist Fleet Security Officer in the correc-
tion, custody, preparation, and care of registered and classified matter.
(f ) The Coding Board of the Fleet Flagship is required to perform Flag Coding
Board functions, as directed.
220. Fleet Engineer And Maintenance Officer — 50.
(a) Docking and overhaul schedules.
(b) Engineering performances.
(c) Repairs, preservation and alterations of ships of the Fleet.
(d) Fleet repair and docking facilities.
(e) Tests and upkeep of material.
(f) Design, construction, and operation of machinery and governing instruc-
tions.
(g) Orders for and reports of military and material inspections,
(h) Damage Control.
(i) Allowance lists (Bureau of Ships), requisitions and surveys.
[10] (J) Ship's Service store activities,
(k) Training of engineering personnel.
(1) Member of Schedule Board.
(m) Fuel and provisioning schedules. \
(n) Ship's characteristics cards and logistics,
(o) Supply Department matters.
(p) Assists War Plans Officer in preparation of War Plans,
(q) Makes recommendations on design of new ships (Bureau of Ships
cognizance),
(r) Degaussing.
221. Fleet Medical Officer— 75.
(a) Keeps himself informed by inspections, and advises Commander-in-Chief
of the sanitary conditions of shli)s of the Fleet.
(b) Prepares a periodic Fleet Medical News Letter.
(c) Acts as liaison officer with civilian medical activities.
(d) Interests himself in making such provisions for medical services at bases
as may not be otherwise provided for.
(e) Customs and agricultural inspections.
(f) Shall obtain for, or advise Units of the Fleet in the obtaining of Bills of
Health and the securing of pratique in accordance with local and foreign health
regulations.
(g) Holds periodic conferences with medical officers of the Fleet for the purpose
of standardizing practices not specially provided for by regulations and for other
purposes in the interest of increased efficiency of the medical department.
(h) Has cognizance of religious activities.
(i) Has cognizance of and advises upon Damage Control Activities within the
purview of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
222. Fleet Marine Officer — 86.
(a) General cognizance of matters concerning Marine Corps and Fleet Marine
Force.
(b) Data on organization, strength, equipment, etc.. of Marine Divisions,
Defense Battalions, and Detachments.
(c) Assistant to War Plans Officer, specifically charged with the following:
(1) Plans for amphibious operations.
(2) Seizure, establishment, and defense of advance bases.
(3) Demolition and related operations.
(4) Logistic data (Marines and Army.)
•'5) Review of Marine Corps subordinate plans.
223. Fleet Gunnery, Officer— 90.
(a) Supervise.*! gunnery, training, gunnery exercises, and the care and upkeep
of the armament of the Fleet.
2844 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(b) Keeps informed of the eflBciency in gunnery and the condition of the
armament of the Fleet.
(c) Advises in regard to tactical maneuvers for obtaining advantageous range
bands, greatest fire eflfect, and dispositions for the best use of the armament.
[11] (d) Prepares outlines of schedules of gunnery exercises for the Fleet
and advises concerning detailed schedules prepared by Force Commanders.
(e) Supervises small arms training and exercises of the Fleet.
(f) Consults with Aviation OflScer in connection with aircraft and antiaircraft
gunnery.
(g) In charge of the following matters, consulting with Operations Officer
regarding tactical aspects :
(1) Mining and sweeping exercises and material.
(2) Torpedoes and torpedo practices.
(3) Smoke screens, both offensive and defensive.
(4) Chemical warfare service — Material and training of personnel. (In
collaboration with Fleet Maintenance Officer).
(h) Supervises courses of study in Ordnance and Gunnery technical schools
of the Fleet.
(i) Assists War Plans Officer in preparation of War Plans and in matters
of liaison with Army.
(j) Reviews military and material inspection reports.
(k) Consults with Fleet Maintenance Officer on Damage Control.
(1) Exercises particular supervision over recommendations for changes to
"Orders for Gunnery Exercises," "Gunnery Instructions" and other ordnance,
gunnery and fire control publications.
(m) Makes recommendations on designs of news ships (Bureau of Ordnance
cognizance).
(n) Member of Schedule Board.
(o) Advises on gunnery features of tactical plans and publications.
(p) With 86 has cognizance of matters involving landing forces.
(q) Handles matters affecting training, assignments, rating, and qualifications
of gunnery personnel (consults with 96).
224. Fleet Aviation Officer — 95.
(a) Advises with reference to:
(1) All aircraft operations and aviation matters including those pertain-
ing to policy with respect to :
(A) Material..
(B) Personnel.
(C) Gunnery and Bombing.
(D) Radio.
(2) Aircraft Operations, and aviation .shore facilities.
(3) Coordination of aviation activities of the Fleet.
(4) Employment of aircraft in tactical exercises, analysis and reports
thereon.
(5) The development of aircraft tactics, gunnery and doctrine.
(6) Naval air operating policy.
(b) Assists War Plans Officer in the preparation of War Plans.
(c) Keeps informed as to the effectiveness of aircraft units of the Fleet.
(d) Assists Operation Officer in the preparation of Fleet Schedules dealing
with aircraft and aircraft services.
(e) Consults with Gunnery Officer in connection with aircraft and anti-aircraft
gunnery. Handles Aircraft Gunnery Reports.
(f ) Member of Schedule Board.
(g) Has cognizance of. keeps informed of aircraft material matters.
[12] 225. Fleet Aerolof/icnl and Persomwl Officer— 96.
(a) In charge of the aerological office and keeps the Commander-in-Chief and
members of his staff advised of weather conditions as concerns the planning and
executions of Fleet Operations. Assists War Plans Officer.
(b) Advises with reference to the establishment of new aerological units in
matters concerning:
(1) Equipment.
(2) Personnel.
(3) Weather information required.
(c) Coordinates aerological activities in the Fleet, including:
(1) Collection and dis.seniination of weather reports.
(2) Weather forecasts and advisory storm warnings.
(3) Aerological research.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2845
(d) Exercises supervision over the training and instruction of aerological
personnel.
(e) Prepares such weather summaries as are required in connection with
orders for for Fleet Problems and Tactics.
(f) Consults with Gunnery Officer in connection with atmospheric ballistic
information pertaining to gunnery.
(g) Advises with reference to exchange of weather information between the
Fleet and the U. S. Weather Bureau or other activities maintaining meteorolog-
ical facilities.
(h) In charge of all matters relating to:
(1) Orders for officers and enlisted personnel.
(2) Naval Reserve Officers on active duty.
(3) Transportation in ships of the Fleet.
(4) Congressional mail regarding personnel matters.
(5) Action on leave requests for all officers and preparation of endorse-
ments for signature of Admiral, Chief of Staff and Flag Secretary, depend-
ing upon the rank of officer requesting leave.
(6) Examinations and promotions.
(7) Navy Relief and Red Cross.
(i) In charge of entertainment and welfare of enlisted personnel.
(J) Shore Patrol.
(k) Liberty for the Fleet.
226. Staff Duty Officer— IJf.
(a) Such Officers as may be designated by the Chief of Staff shall stand a day's
duty in port and a watch on the Flag Bridge at sea when a watch is established.
(b) The officer having the day's duty shall :
(1) Receive routine reports.
(2) Act on routine matters.
(3) Act as necessary on matters when the officer having cognizance and
his relief are absent, informing officers concerned of action taken as soon
as possible.
(4) Attend the side when the Flag Lieutenant is not available. The
procedure for tending the side is laid down in Section X of these Staff in-
structions.
(5) Regulate movements of Admiral's Barge, Chief of Staff's Gig, and
Staff boats in absence of Flag Lieutenant or outside of working hours.
The Officer-of-the-Deck will keep the Staff Duty Officer and Flag Lieutenant
informed of the movements of the Admiral's Barge, Chief of Staff's Gig, and
Staff Duty boats.
[15] (6) Keep Informed as to Staff Officers on board or absent from
the ship.
(7) In the absence of the Flag Lieutenant see that boarding calls on
visiting men of war are made by an officer from Fleet flagship.
(8) Receive aerological forecasts from the Aerologist and when bad
weather is forecast transmit the necessary information to the ships present.
(9) Initial all dispatches, taking action if necessary when action officer
is not On board.
(10) See that the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff are kept
informed of all important matters, and particularly that they are informed
proptly upon their return to the ship of all important matters that occur
during their absence; and similarly keep the Operations Officer informed
of all ship movements observed by the signal watch.
(11) Examine all mail received during the absence of the Flag Secretary
or his regularly designated relief, and decide what action if any shall be
taken.
(c) Day's duty will begin at 0900, except Sundays and holidays when it will
begin at 1100. The sequence will be uninterrupted by the fact that the ship
may be at sea when regular watches are set.
(d) The duties of the Staff Duty Officer assume particular importance when,
in the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff, or other members of
the staff, he is called upon to make decisions in cases of emergency, or on
matters which cannot be delayed for reference to higher authority or to the
officers having cognizance. This fact makes it imperative that all officers
standing duty keep themselves informed as to existing situations, the policies
of the Commander-in-Chief and the usual and proper manner of taking action
on all matters which may arise.
2846 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(e) In important emergency cases the Staff Duty Officer will take such action
as may be necessary. Instructions should be obtained by the most expeditious
manner of communication with the Chief of Staff and, failing to locate him,
with the Commander-in-Chief. The Operations Officer should, if practicable, be
fully informed of the situation.
(f) When civilians or officials, other than personal friends of the Commander-
in-Chief or officials whose status is a matter of doubt, come on board the flag-
ship to confer with the Commander-in-Chief, he shall first present them to the
Chief of Staff, Flag Lieutenant, or in their absence, to the Operations Officer.
(g) Should an emergency arise necessitating action involving the Fleet Relief
Force, the Staff Duty Officer will carry out the following :
(1) Notify the Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Staff and Operations Officer.
(2) Send staff boats to landing, keeping one at ship as may be advisable.
(3) Land field radio and signalmen if BASRAD is out of commission,
(h) Assignment of Berths.
Requests for berths are received occasionally by the Staff Duty Officer for
immediate action during the absence of the Operations Officers. To assist the
Staff Duty Officer in assigning berths, an anchorage chart is kept in the Opera-
tions Office, together with a copy of current instructions. See also the Com-
mander-in-Chief's current letter in regard to anchorage assignments.
(i) In the absence of the Commander-in-Chief, or Chief of Staff, he shall take
steps to correct any defects in external Fleet routine which would constitute an
adverse reflection on the Fleet.
(j) Leave — Relief for Day's Duty.
(1) The Day's Duty list for Staff Duty Officers is prepared on the basis
that the sequence will not be interrupted by the fact that the ship may be
at sea. Nor is it to be interrupted by absence on duty, illness or leave.
(2) Staff Duty Officers are "Relief Officers" in inverse order of seniority.
A Relief Duty List is posted in the Staff Duty Book. When an officer stands
a relief duty watch, he will inform the senior watch officer. The next
officer on the list then becomes the "Relief Duty Officer."
(3) For extended periods of leave, greater than 10 days the Relief Duty
Officer will take the duty for the officer scheduled for the Day's Duty. For shorter
periods of leave, officers are expected to arrange for their own reliefs by agree-
able shifts with other StalE Duty Officers. In every case, inform the Senior
Staff Duty OflScer of the arrangements made.
Sea Watches
(k) An officer of the Staff shall be on the bridge at all times when the Fleet
flagship is underway in company with vessels of the Fleet acting as a unit.
(1) He is the representative of the Commander-in-Chief on the bridge and
bears the same relation to him that the Offlcer-of-the-Deck bears to the Captain
of the ship. He shall keep himself informed of the location of all units and ships
in whatever disposition or formation the Fleet is at the time; whatever land
or lights are in sight ; whether either are likely to be seen ; and of all other
particulars which may be of use to the Commander-in-Chief in keeping the ships
of the formation out of danger.
(1) In case of emergency, when neither the Commander-in-Chief nor the
Chief of Staff is on the bridge* he shall make such signals as are required
by the circumstances, reporting his action immediately to the Commander-
in-Chief, the Chief of Staff and the Operations Officer. ACT FIRST,
REPORT AFTERW^ARDS. Under all other conditions the formation shall
not be maneuvered without the authority of the Commander-in-Chief or
the Chief of Staff. Furthermore, under these latter conditions, the Staff
Duty Officer shall report the circumstances to the Operations Officer. Also,
he shall call the Flag Lieutenant and Oi^erations Officer to the bridge at
once if immediate action is required — otherwise those officers shall be in-
formed of the time when their presence on the flag bridge will be required
and the reasons therefore,
(m) He shall promptly report to the Commander-in-Chief, through the Chief
of Staff, all land, shoals, rocks, lighthouses, beacons, buoys, discolored water,
vessels, or wrecks sighted; all changes of weather or shifts of wind; all' signals
made; all changes in speed, formation, disposition, or course; in general, all
occurrences worthy of notice.
(n) He shall handle all dispatches which in port are routed to the Officer hav-
ing the day's Staff duty.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2847
(o) When the Flag Lieutenant is on the Bridge he will handle all tactical
signals, relieving the Staff Duty Officer of this function of his usual duties.
(p) RECORD OF EVENTS: A Record of Events during the watch will be
kept by the Staff Officer on watch assisted by a duty yeoman. This record will
include items of importance, movements, major and minor contacts with the
enemy, aerial and submarine activity, weather information, etc. THE RECORD
OF EVENTS will be typed in quadruplicate, signed by the Officer on watch and
handled as follows: Original to be placed in a file folder in Flag Plot. (This
folder will be kept in Flag Plot, until the completion of the exercise, when it
shall be turned over to the file yeoman by the yeoman securing the watch.) At
0800 each day the three copies of the RECORD OF EVENTS covering the watches
of the preceding 24 hours shall be turned over to the Flag Office for the following
distribution : one copy to the Admiral, one copy to the Chief .of Staff, and one
copy to the Operations Officer.)
(q) When necessary to make a signal to change course or speed to avoid a
vessel or unit having the right of way, make such changes great enough, and ex-
ecute the signal soon enough to leave no doubt in the minds of the other officers
of the deck as to your intentions. Avoid crossing ahead of vessels or units
having the right of way.
[15] (r) When fog closes in :
(1) Order bridge radios manned if not already in effect.
(2) Order fog buoys streamed.
(3) Order fog searchlights manned.
(4) Comply with Fleet Communication letter — 2RL-41 summarized briefly
as follows :
(a) Take soundings at short intervals to ensure safety of the formation.
(b) Designate a ship to: At least half-hourly or oftener; obtain bearings
from shore radio direction finder stations, and radio bearings of ships in
company.
(c) Plot all bearings and soundings on a chart. This ensures safety.
(d) Establish a transmitting and receiving watch, (on distress frequency).
(e) Provided Radio restrictions so permit broadcast in plain language fol-
lowed by International Code: visibility conditions, names of ships in com-
pany, position, and time of origin OCT. If other ships reply to this safety
transmission shift to 422 kcs. and exchange information.
227. The night order book is written by the Commander-in-Chief for guidance
of officers having night watches. Each officer having a night watch shall initial
the book after reading the orders, and before relieving the watch. The night
order book is prepared by the Fleet Navigator (12).
228. Nothing herein is Intended to contravene existing regulations or to pre-
clude taking such additional precautions as may seem desirable.
[16] SECTION III — BATTLE STATIONS
300. The Combat Organization of the Staff is covered in a separate confidential
issue of this section. It Is distributed to the flagship and flag personnel only.
[17] SECTION IV — FLAG OFFICE PERSONNEL AND GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
401. The authorized Flag Allowance of yeomen is :
Chief Yeoman 3
Yeoman 1st class 4
Yeoman 2nd class 5
Yeoman 3rd class 6
Total 18
Yeoman on board are assigned in general as follows :
1 Yeoman — In general charge.
1 Yeoman — Admiral, Chief of Staff and Flag Lieutenant.
1 Yeoman — Flag Secretary and Division Officer.
3 Yeomen — Operations and Assistant Operations Officers.
2 Yeomen — War Plans Officers.
2 Yeomen — Communication, Radio, and Comm. Security Officers.
1 Yeoman — Intelligence Officer.
1 Yeoman — Aviation Officer.
2848 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1 Yeoman — Gunnery Officer.
1 Yeoman — Engineer and Maintenance Officer.
1 Yeoman — Aerological Officer.
1 Yeoman — Files and Correspondence Classification.
1 Yeoman — Outgoing Mail Desk.
1 Yeoman — Communication Office.
These assignments will be augmented by yeoman strikers. Yeoman strikers
will also be assigned to other Flag Office details, such as incoming mail, File Sec-
tion, Tracer desk, etc.
402. Assignment of yeomen will necessarily depend largely on their individual
aptitude for certain duties, and their availability. One Pharmacist's Mate is
included in the Flag Allowance and is assigned to the Fleet Medical Officer.
One Marine Sergeant Major is assigned to the Marine Officer.
403. Whenever an officer finds that he requires additional clerical assistance,
he will apply to the Flag Secretary. Additional clerical assistance can in this
way be secured with a minimum of delay and without interfei'ing with the
routine of the office.
404. The Chief Yeoman in charge has general supervision of the Flag Office
and personnel under the Flag Secretary, who is in direct charge of the offices
of the Commander-in-Chief. The Chief Yeoman in Charge is responsible for
the cleanliness of the offices and storerooms, for the carrying out of the office
instructions, for the conduct and proper performance of duty by the enlisted
personnel and for regulating watch lists, liberty and leave in accordance with
existing instructions and orders. He will supervise the drawing of office sup-
plies against the flag allotment, issuing of stationery, etc., and exercise care
that expenditures are kept within requirements.
405. Routine Duty.
(a ) Routine hours of duty in flag offices and print shop are as follows :
Daily 0800 to 1600
Half Holidays 0800 to 1130
(b) Ha/n4ling of work outside regular office hours. — Routine work outside
of regular office hours will be handled by the yeoman of the officer desiring
such work done, when that yeoman is on board, otherwise by the duty section.
There is always a duty printer on board who sleeps in the print shop.
(c) No uncompleted work shall be stowed away in office desk drawers, but
shall be kept above the desks in labeled baskets or envelopes, and available to
the staff officers concerned, or to the duty section, if required.
[18] 406 Handling of mail upon arrival in port. The taking up and
distribution of mail upon arrival in port will, without exception, be an "all
hands" job. All yeomen will prepare routing sheets and assist in clearing up
all mail received. No liberty will be granted on arrival in port until such mail
has been received, routed and distributed to the cabinets of the officers concerned.
407. Liberty and Leave.
(a) Liberty and leave for the flag office personnel will be regulated to con-
form, as closely as work will permit, to that of the flagship. Subject to the
approval of the officers for whom the yeomen work, after routine working hours,
or Saturdays after 1130, Wednesday afternoons, Sundays and holidays, will be
considered "routine liberty periods. Liberty cards are issued under the super-
vision of the Division Officer for all flag personnel.
(b) All requests for other than regular liberty shall first be referred to the
officer for whom the yeoman works, the Flag Division Officer and to the Chief
Yeoman in Charge for designation of relief if required, then to the Flag Secre-
tary for approval or disapproval. If the request is one for leave and is ap-
proved by the Flag Secretary as Head of Department, it will then be sent to the
Executive Officer for issuance of formal leave papers.
408. Cleanliness of Offices.
(a) The cleanliness of flag offices and storerooms will be under the super-
vision of the Chief Yeoman in Charge. Each yeoman will be required to keep
his own desk neat and clean, as well as the desk of the officer for whom he works.
Offices will be cleaned dally, prior to 0800, and a field day shall be held between
1200 and 1300 each Friday.
(b) Flag offices, shops, storerooms and other spaces will be included in the
commanding officer's inspection of adjacent ship spaces. Personnel in charge
of offices, shops, storerooms and other flag spaces shall have their spaces open
and ready and shall stand by for inspection at the times designated in the
. Exhibits of joint committee 2849
daily schedule issued by the flagship. Yeomen shall have the drawers of their
desks neatly stowed and ready for removal should they be directed to do so by
the inspecting oflBcers.
^09. Fluff Office Duty Section.
(a) The Flag Office personnel will be divided into duty sections of not less
than three men, one of whom shall be a comi)etent stenographer. Duty changes
at 0900 daily, Sundays excepted. The Duty Section will function in the Flag
Office during the following hours :.
Daily 0730 to 0815
1130 to 1300
1600 to 2200
Half Holidays 0730 to 0815
1130 to 2200
Whole Holidays 0730 to 2200
(b) The duty section will handle all emergency work outside of regular work-
ing hours and if the Outgoing Mail Yeoman is not on board, will mail all signed
outgoing correspondence. The entire duty section will remain in the flag offices
during the hours specified in subparagraph (a) except:
(1) Only one rated man need remain in the flag office during mealtimes.
(2) When the press of work permits and when in the discretion of the senior
duty yeoman their services are not immediately required, members of the duty
section may be allowed to attend the evening movies on deck, subject to call;
however, one rated member of the duty section shall remain in the flag. office
during the authorized absence of the rest to attend the movies. From time to
time, if the Staff Duty Officer grants permission to do so, the offices may be
locked and keys turned over to him. during movies, smokers, etc.
[19] (3) When the Flag is based temporarily ashore, the Duty Section
will maintain a continuous one-man security watch in the Flag Office during the
following hours :
Daily * 1600 to 0800
Half-holidays - 1200 to 0800
Holidays 0800 to 0800
This watch will be armed, the primary duty of which is to prevent unauthorized
persons from entering the Fleet War Plans Offices and all other Flag Offices of
the Commander-in-Chief. This Security Watch will normally be sufficient to re-
main in the Flag Office after working hours. The entire Duty Section is avail-
able for call by the Staff Duty Officer at any time.
(c) Handling of mail and coi~respondence. Before going on liberty the in-
coming and outgoing mail yoemen will inform the senior duty yoeman of any
special instructions, who in turn will inform his section. Special instructions
may be: — To watch for special correspondence expected in the incoming mail —
to see that certain U. S. or guard mail is dispatched. File numbers willl not
be entered on incoming mail by the duty section unless the correspondence is of
an urgent nature, in which case a file number will be entered on the routing
sheet and file yoeman notified when he returns from liberty. Incoming corre-
spondence shall be made ready for the examination of the Staff Duty Officer
with minimum delay and report shall be made to him that it is ready for his
examination. On board ship, immediately after the end of working hours, the
duty section shall gather up all confidential and other important correspond-
ence from the Staff Officers' rooms and retain such correspondence in the Flag
Office overnight, distributing it immediately after 0800 the following working day.
In offices ashore, immediately after the end of working hours, the duty section
shall gather up all confidential correspondence from the desks of the Staff officers
and deposit it in the locked cabinet provided for this purpose. Just prior to
0800 the next working day, the correspondence shall be returned to the respective
officers desks.
(d) Security of Flag Offices. The duty section will stand watch In the main flag
office. The offices will be secured promptly at 2200 and keys turned over to
the Flag Secretary, if on board, otherwise to the Staff Duty Officer. If, for any
urgent reason it is desired to keep offices open after 2200, permission should be
requested from the Staff Duty Officer. Flag offices shall never be left un-
guarded. Outside regular working hours a constant check should be kept on
the Staff offices, operations office, and file room to see that it is either occupied
by staff personnel, or locked. If it is necessary for everyone to leave fiag offices
on duty, the last person to leave will lock offices and take keys with him, posting
79716 O— 46— pt. 17 27
2850 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
a note on main flag office door as to who has keys. Offices should be reopened
as soon as possible.
(e) Visitors to flag offices. No general visitors will be permitted. Other than
flag personnel admitted by senior duty yoeman, only oflBcers and men on duty,
or persons accompanied by staff duty officer, will be permitted in the flag offices
outside of working hours.
(f) Waste paper baskets in Cabins and Staterooms. Waste paper baskets in
Admiral's Cabin, Chief of Staff's Cabin and Staff officers' staterooms will be
emptied and the contents burned, or stowed in flag office pending burning, at the
following times:
Regular working days 1500
Half and Whole Holidays 1115
[20] 410. Security of Classified Matter. All personnel of the staff of the
Commander-in-Chief, whose duties require handling of classified matter, shall
acquaint themselves with the Navy Regulations and other instructions pertain-
ing to the security of classified matter.
(a) Offices, Print Shop, Multilith Shop, Flag Plot, Officers' Staterooms. Flag
personnel are responsible that classified matter under staff routing, or in spaces
in which flag activities are paramount, is constantly attende<l. Attended, as
employed herein, signifies that the matter is receiving care while being used, ar
that it is under surveillance tvith respect to possible pilferage or perusal by
unauthoiised persons, or that it is under lock.
(b) Trash and waste. Will be removed from flag activities and burned at
times specified in subparagraph 40^ (f). Should the incinerator be secured, or
out of commission, such rubbi.sh will be returned to flag offices, flag plot, print or
multilith shops for retention awaiting suitable opportunity for its burning. The
Senior Duty Yeoman will personally supervise collection and burning as set
out in 409 (f). However, during routine hours of dury (see Article 405), this
may be done by a rated yeoman designated by the Chief Yeoman in Charge.
(c) Keys. The key to the flag storerooms, the keys to the flag offices and
mimeograph shop, and duplicate keys to the print shop and multilith shop are in
the custody of the Flag Secretary. The Chief Printer and the Duty Printer will
each retain a key to the print shop, and the Multilith Printer will retain a key
to the multilith shop. Keys to the Flag Office files will be in the custody of the
Flag Secretary, Gunnery Yeoman, File Yeoman, or Dut.\ Yeoman. At the end
of working hours, whenever classified matter is being produced in the print shop
or multilith shop, the keys to the print shop galley i-acks and stowage locker
will be placed in the main flag office key locker. During office hours the key to the
flag offices will be in the main flag office. When offices are secured for the night,
the keys to confidential flies will be placed in the main flag office key locker and
the keys to the flag offices turned over to the Flag Secretary, if on board, other-
wise to the Staff Duty Officer. Except as herein specified, personnel are forbidden
to have duplicate keys to flag offices and print shop spaces in their possession.
(d) Files, Lockers, Storerooms. Access to the flag storeroom by other than
regularly authorized personnel may be had upon application to the Flag Secre-
tary. In all cases when a confidential file jacket is to be removed from the flag
offices, a receipt will be required from the recipient.
(e) Nonconfidential file jackets should be obtained from the File Yeoman or
in his absence from the duty yeoman. If the file jacket is to be removed from
the flag office, a receipt will be signed by the recipient.
(f ) Classified matter may be removed from the Print Shop only at the instance
of the officer for whom the work is being done, or an officer of the Staff. Classi-
fied matter will not be allowed to remain in the multilith shop overnight, but will
be stowed under lock in the print shop stowage locker.
[21\ SECTION V — HANDLING OF CORRESPONDENCE
501. (a) Incoming Mail, is delivered to the Incoming Mail Desk.
(b) Upon receipt of Registered U. S. Mail in the Main Flag Office, it shall be
taken immediately to the Secret Mail Officer or the Chief Yeoman designated as
Secret Mail Yeoman. In their absence the mail shall be taken to the Duty
Communication Watch Officer who shall open it and extract the envelopes marked
"SECRET". A receipt for the envehipes so retained shall, in all cases, be obtained
on the "Incoming Registered Guard Mail Log". The envelopes marketl "CON-
FIDENTIAL" shall be returned to the Flag Duty Yeoman. All "SECRET"
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2851
mail received by the C W. O. sliall be logged in the book provided for that
purpose, and then taken to the Staff Duty Officer who shall open it in order to
determine its urgency. If the Staff Duty OflScer retains any of the Secret
Mail his receipt therefor shall be obtained. All Secret Mail shall be delivered
to the Secret Mail Officer at tlie hrst opportunity.
(c) Incoming personal mail for tlie Commander-in-Chief will be delivered to
his orderly and placed on his desk. If Admiral is not on board, it will be
placed in the routing cabinet in the Flag Office and will be delivered upon the
Admiral's return to the ship.
(d) Incoming personal mail for other staff officers will be delivered by a Flag
Office messenger immediately upon its receipt in the Flag Office. In the absence
of any Staff Officer his personal mail will be placed in the routing cabinet in
the Flag Office and delivered to him upon his return to the ship.
502. Urgent Correspondence. When URGENT correspondence is received on
board, routing sheets shall be prepared immediately, an URGENT tag securely
attached to and visible on the routing sheet, and correspondence delivered by
hand to the Flag Secretary, or in his absence, to the Staff Duty Officer. Such
correspondence shall be shown to Action Officer and a copy delivered to him if
desired, prior to routing to other officers. If a copy is delivered to Action Officer,
a notation of this fact will be made on routing sheet. If file yeoman are not
on duty or in the office when URGENT mail is received, such mail shall be
assigned a file number by tl>e Duty Yeoman and handled as indicated above.
No correspondence, or other papers, shall be kept visible as the top paper on
the correspondence. If correspondence or other papers are of an urgent nature
and no URGENT tag accompanies it, the officer concerned shall indicate to this
yeoman that the matter is urgent and the latter shall then attach an URGENT
tag.
503. Routine Correspondence.
(a) Incoming Mail Yeoman. Opens all incoming mail immediately upon its
receipt, except U. S. registered mail, which is handled in accordance with
subparagraph 501 (b), above. (See Section VI for method of handling registered
U. S. mail by receiving officers. )
Logs the envelope number and descriptive data of all correspondence received
via registered guard mail and U. S. Mail.
Carefully checks all incoming mail to insure that it is complete and the listed
enclosures are attached, or in case enclosures have been forwarded under separate
cover keeps a memorandum check-off record of such enclosures so that they can
be readily identified and properly distributed upon receipt.
Passes correspondence to File Yeoman and then, after File Yeoman has as-
signed office file numbers, prepares routing slips for all matter received except
certain routine reports designated by the Flag Secretary, and MAILGRAMS.
MAILGRAMS received by registered mail are logged and then sent to the Flag
Communication office witlu)Ut being taken up on routing slips.
After routing slips have been typed, detaches memorandum routing slip and
delivers mail to Chief Yeoman in Charge. From data shown on the retained
memorandum routing slips, maintains the Incoming Mail Log in loose-leaf form.
This log shall be a permanent record of all correspondence received and will
show:
[22] Date of receipt.
Office of origin.
File and serial number of office of origin.
Date of correspondence.
Subject.
Cincus file number of Jacket in which permanently filed.
Serial number of routing slip on which correspondence has been taken up.
(b) File Yeoman. Assigns file number's. (See Article 505).
(c) Chief Yeoman in Charge. Routes correspondence.
(d) Flag Secretary. Confirms routing of correspondence, or changes routing
where required.
(e) Tracer Yeoman. Removes routed correspondence from the outgoing basket
of the Flag Secreary, detaches duplicate routing sheet, stamps date of delivery to
first officer indicated in order of routing and delivers the correspondence (except
URGENT — see Article 502), through routing cabinet to officers concerned in
accordance with the assigned order of routing.
Files duplicate routing sheet as a tracer against outstanding correspondence in
the office.
2852 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(f) Yt'omnn Concerned. Takes cognizance of and removes all correspondence
from routing boxes of officers for wliom lie works and delivers to officers as
directed.
When the officer for whom he works is absent, he will return the correspond-
ence checked to that officer for Information, to the Tracer Yeoman, to be checked
to the next officer in the order of routing, and deliver Action correspondence to
the assigned relief officer.
(g) Officer concerned. In general, papers will pass from one officer to another
via Tracer Yeoman as indicated on the routing sheet.
Correspondence requiring action will be routed first, if the F'lag Secretary
deems it necessary, to the Action Officer, the latter being resiionsible that other
interested officers are consulted before letter or endorsement is prepared.
Corresp<Jndence routed for information should not be placed in the routing
cabinet for an officer temporarily absent until it has been noted by all other
officers checked for information.
Ordinarily, when necessary data is available, action should be completed on
correspondence within forty-eight hours after receipt.
Any officer desiring to hold correspondence, in order to compile data, reports,
etc., should return the correspondence to the files and draw it from the files when
needed.
A list will be furnished each officer on Tuesday showing all corresptmdence
which the records of the Flag Office indicate has been in his possession since the
preceding Tuesday. Officers indicated as being charged with the correspondence
should check this list and mark in the column provided the items which they have
in their possession.
(h) Yeoman Concerned. Prepares outgoing letter or endorsement as directed
(See Article 504).
[2S] Keeps outgoing basket of officer for whom he works empty — deliver-
ing routed correspondence on which action is required or taken to Tracer Yeoman.
Insures that officer concerned has initialed in the space provided on the routing
sheet and that notation is made when action is taken by a method other than a
letter or endorsement.
(i) Tracer Yeoman. Delivers through the routing cabinet, correspondence on
which routing is incomplete.
Scrutinizes all correspondence on which routing is complete to .see that no
correspondence requiring action goes to tile and that officers concerned have
initialed in the space provided on the routing sheet.
The correspondence to be finally cleared by the Tracer Yeoman falls into three
classes :
(1) Incoming letters on which no action is required, or on which dispatch
action was taken and so noted on the original routing slip.
(2) Incoming letters which were endorsed or are the basis for additional
correspondence.
(3) Letters originated by the Commander-in-Chief with no incoming cor-
respondence attached.
When correspondence described by (1) above has completed its routing the
Tracer Yeoman will destroy his duplicate routing slip, initial in the space pro-
vided on the original routing slip under "Tracer." and pass this correspondence
to the File Yeoman. However, if there is a cross file, the duplicate routing slip
shall not be destroyed but will be attached to the correspondence for filing.
When correspondence described by (2) above has completed its Bonting the
Tracer Yeoman will destroy his duplicate routing .slip (unless it has a cross file
n>imber) initial in the upper right-hand corner of the file copy of the Commander-
in-Chief's action, and on the original routing slip, and pass this correspondence
to the File Yeoman.
504. Outgoing Mail.
(a) General : Dates and serial numbers will be stamped by the Outgoing Mail
Yeoman after the letter is actually signed. The original sheet of correspondence
of a personal nature shall not bear a file or .serial number. The originator's
yeoman shall address envelopes for this class of correspondence.
The use of staples In fastening correspondence should be limited to printed or
mimeographed letters of two or more pages. Staples shall then be used in the
upper left hand corner.
Letterhead paper shall be used for the original sheet and all copies of corre-
spondence.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2853
(b) Correspondence for signature shall be prepared and assembled as follows:
(1) Sheets shall be arranged in numerical order from bottom to top, i. e., page
one on the bottom, last page or endorsement on top. Enclosures to the entire
correspondence shall be in alphabetical sequence, fastened directly behind the
letter or endorsement to which it is an enclosure and securely fastened by brass
fasteners, with ends turned over the face of the sheet. When enclosures are too
bulky to be attached, then a separate slip with notation should indicate that the
enclosures have been temporarily retained by the originator.
(2) In preparing endorsements, reference should be made to the basic corre-
spondence as prescribed by Fleet Regulations.
(3) In preparing a letter, the originator shall :
Indicate the distribution, acknowledgement (if desired), signature, and obtain
file number from file yeoman or, in the case of a reply, assign same file number
as has been placed on the routing sheet of the incoming letter plus the originator's
symbol number.
[2.'i] Ascertain that there is a:
(A) Green file copy (pinned on top of a complete copy of the incoming
correspondence with the routing sheet on the bottom.)
(B) Yellow information copy. The day following the mailfng of corre-
spondence, information copies shall be bound and routed to all officers. After
completion of routing, these copies shall be destroyed.
(C) Pink Copy. This is retained by the tracer yeoman until the corre-
spondence is signed, after which it is sent to the outgoing mail desk and sub-
sequently returned to the originator bearing the date and serial number.
(4) The original and all copies shall show in the upi)er night-hand corner the
initials of the yeoman typing the letter and the originator's symbol number im-
mediately following the file number.
(5) Correspondence shall be clipped together with paper clips in the following
order: Original and copies for information addresses; file copy (green); in-
formation copy (yellow) ; pink copy. The green copy shall extend at least an
inch to the right side of the correspondence to permit the initials of the originator
(indicated by red diagonal mark) as well as other interested officers (indicated
by pencil diagonal mark).
(c) Correspondence to be printed. Four copies shall be typed, original on green
paper, copy on white bond for the printer, one yellow information copy and one
pink copy. The word "PRINT" shall be typed on the left side of the last page,
opposite the signature, and immediately over the word "DISTRIBUTION."
When the green copy (original) has been signed, it will pass through the out-
going mail desk to be numbered and dated, and for the preparation of a printing
order.
(d) Correspondence to be mimeographed. In order to reduce the amount of
typing required for letters that will be mimeographed, the yeoman doing the
typing will insert a green sheet provided for this purpose under the stencil when
cutting the latter. When this impression copy has been signed by the Admiral
or Chief of Staff, the Flag Secretary affixes his authentication, using a stencil
stylus, and the stencil and impression copy are then delivered to the Outgoing
Mail Yeoman for entry of datt" and serial number, mimeographing, (done by the
Mimeograph Yeoman), and ultimate mailing. (Article .504 (j) (10).)
(e) Multiple Addreii.<i Letters. Multiple address letters are tho.se addressed to
more than one office. The original of the multiple address letter shall be made
on green paper, and one onion copy shall be made for each addressee. These
onion skin copies shall be checked off by the yeoman preparing the correspondence,
an arrow check being placed Immediately after the office addressed. All action
copies of multiple address letters shall l)e authenticated by the Flag Secretary.
The original (green), arranged in the manner prescribed in Art. 7)0A (b) (5),
will be signed by the Commander-in-Chief or Chief of Staff and is kept as the
file copy.
(f) When a letter js required to be rewritten, the pink copy shall be removed
from the file on the tracer desk and all copies of the letter as originally prepared
shall be immediately destroyed except the one copy on which corrections have
been indicated. This copy shall be attached to the pink copy of the letter as
rewritten and will be returned with the pink copy to the yeoman of the officer
taking action. With the exception of recommendations on a subject made by
various staff officers, these instructions .shall also apply to rough drafts of letters
or endorsements. Copies of letters on which corrections have been made and
2854 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
rough drafts of letters or ♦Midorsonu'iits shall not he filed in the cori'esi)ondence
files unless retention in the liles is indicated.
(g) Letters that have not heeii signed should l>e returned to the tracer yeoman
in order that the iattei- may inform the originatoi- accordingly, meanwhile re-
turning to him the pink copy.
I^.Tj (li) When correspondence is signed hy other than the Comnuinder-in-
Chief, the following words shall he typed immediately helow the name of the
officer signing :
Sifftird by iHyndturr Tiiixnrittcn
Chief of Staff — NAME
„ ^. .^oi ' I /,!,• £ * c.i. iv Chief of Stalt"
Operations Officer when Chief of Staff N VM^""
is absent Acting Chief of Staff
Flag Secretary or Flag Lieutenant NAMK
(Authenticat'ion of multiple address I^'lJi^ Secretary NAME
letters). (or Acting Flag Flag Lieutenant
Secretary)
Flag Secretary or Flag Lieutenant (for — NAME
single address letters). ^ hy direction
(i) When information addi'essees are directed to take action hy copy of letters
or endorsements, such copy shall be authenticated by the Flag Secretary.
(j) When correspondence is ready for signature the following procedure shall
be followed :
(1) I>eliver to Tryer Yeoman.
(2) Tracer Ycomati. Uses the
pink coi)y foi- tracing correspondence circulat-
ing through the staff for initialing. When c<Mrespondence is initialed by all
officers except Flag Secretary and Chief of Staff, delivel's to Chief Yeoman in
Charge.
(3) Chief Yeoman in Chavf/r. Checks correspondence to see that it is com-
plete and in agreement with regulations, policies and current instructions.
(4) Fl(i{/ ^('crctarii. Checks correspondence t<i see that it is complete and
that it is in agreement with regulsitions, jtolicies and current instructions.
Brings to the attention of othcers concerned any conflicting oi' inconsistent or-
ders or instructions.
Authenticates all nmltiple address letters, and copies of letters or endorse-
ments directing action. Signs single address letters.
Releases printed and niimeographed letters for mailing.
(;")) Tracer Yeoman. Removes coiTespondence from the outgoing basket of
Flag Secretary.
Delivers correspondence signed "By direction" to the Outg<»ing Mail Yeoman,
attaching i>ink.
Places unsigned corresr)ondence in the Chief of Slafl's box in the routing cab-
inet and indicates by notation on pink copy date and time that it has been placed
in Chief of Staff's box in the routing cjibinet for signature or initialing.
(6) Chief of Staff's OrderUj or Yeoniau. Ilcmoves correspondence from Chief
of StatFs box in the routing cabinet, and delivers to Chief of Staff for initials or
signature.
Removes corresi)on(lence from outgoing basket of Chief of Staff and delivers to
Tracer Desk.
(7) Tracer Yeoman. When correspondence is initialed by Chief of Staff,
places it in C(»inman(ler-iii-('liief's b(»x in the routing cabinet, indicating by no-
tation on pink coity date and time that it has been placed in Commander-in-
Chief's 1m)X for signature. Delivers mail signed by the Chief of StatT to the Out-
going Mail Yeoman, attaching pinks.
(8) Flaf/ Secretari/. Removes correspoiulence from the Conimandei-in-Chief's
box in the routing cabinet. Set's that all correspondence is initialed by Chief of
Staff and delivers to the Comniander-in-Chief for signature.
1 26'J Tracer Yeonitni. When correspondence has beeii signed by the Com-
mander-in-Chief removes pink copies from tracer tile, and attaches same to the
letters to which they belong; deliveis them to Outgoing Mail Yeoman.
Makes daily check on piidc coi)ies where letters are outstanding.
(10) Ontf/oinf/ Mail Yeoman. Insures that coirespondence is comi»lete; enclo-
sures, if any, attached; properly arranged (See Art. ~M (b) ; initialed by F'lag
Se<-retary ; signed; that there are sullicient coj)ies for all action and information
addres.sees ; that each copy of CONFIDF^NTI AL corresixindeiice is so marked;
that infcu-mation and pink copies have been prepared where necessary.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2855
Returns correspondence which is found to be delinquent in any of the above
respects to the Chief Yeoman in Charge f<ir corrective action.
Stamps serial number (except on personal letters) and date on original and
all copies ; stamps date of mailing on file informati<in jind pink copies, and initials
file copy.
Provides for the registry of all recoi-ds of proceedings of Naval Courts and
Boards, all SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL correspondence and other corre-
spondence as directed. Maintains a record of all registry numbers and records
the serial file number or other description of the correspondence for which each
register number is used.
Is responsible for the correct addressing of envelopes for all mail passing over
the Outgoing Mail Desk and for its being placed in the mail properly protected to
insure its delivery free from damage by normal handling. In connection with
the former, he shall keep himself informed of the location and prospective move-
ments of all ships and transfers of all Flags.
Requests instructions from Flag Secretary regarding mailing of multiple ad-
dressed letters, operation orders, plans, etc., to Commanders who are absent
when several of the vessels under their command are presiOnt with the Com-
mander-in-Chief.
Under the direction of Flag Secretary determines the distribution and num-
ber of copies necessary to be printed or mimeographed using "U. S. Fleet Mail
Distribution Lists" or such other distribution as may be assigned. Prepares Dis-
tribution Memorandum on Printing Orders.
Prepares Printing Order and forwards with White copy of the letter to be
printed to print shop. The print shop shall send the Printing Order with each
proof to the yeoman designated to proof-read it. This yeoman shall initial in
the space provided for each proof and when correct in all respects and con-
sidered ready for printing the yeoman shall refer the final proof and the printing
order to the originating ofiicer, who shall, if he approves for printing, initial
on the Printing Order in the space "Read and found correct". The Flag Secretary
will release all letters for printing and distribution. The green (file copy) is held
by the Outgoing Mail Yeoman until the letter is printed and maile<l. when it is
given to the Tracer Yeoman for necessary action. Yellow and pink copies, are
handled in the same manner as for other outgoing correspondence. The date
sent to the print shop, instead of the date of mailing will appear on the file copy.'
When distribution is made and entered in the outgoing mail log, a printed copy
with original "Printing Order" securely attached thereto, shall be sent to file.
Note : The Mimeograph Yeoman will mimeograph the required number of copies
shown on the Distribution Memorandum.
A copy of each mimeographed letter originating in the office of the Commander-
in-Chief will be marked "INFORMATION COPY", and will be handled in the
same manner as other "Information" copies.
[27] When the Distribution Memorandum is released for mailing by the
Flag Secretary, the Outgoing Mail Yeoman mails the printed or mimeographed
letter and furnishes the Tracer Yeoman with the necessary copies for a Staff
Distribution ; stamps date of mailing and initials on the Distribution Memoran-
dum; sends file copy to the Tracer Yeoman with the Distribution Memorandum
securely attached thereto.
Assigns and maintains a record of serial numbers, in their proper numerical
sequence, of Operation Plans, Operation Orders, U. S. and Pacific Fleet Letters,
Memoranda, Notices, etc.
Insures that when required, URGENT tags are securely attached to the corre-
spondence, and to the outside envelope. (See Article 502).
Removes any SPECIAL NOTICE tags before mailing.
Handles all guard mail, incoming and outgoing, and will promptly inform Flag
Secretary of any variation from the scheduled trips called for by Fleet Regula-
tions. Logs registered number, originator and addressee of all incoming regis-
tered guard mail. Delivers incoming mail to Incoming mail Yeoman, and has
outgoing mail ready for Guard Mail Petty Officers at the designated times. When
the ship is at the Navy Yard, is responsible that necessary guard mail trips are
made to the Commandant's Office.
At the end of each day, checks numerical sequence and enters In the outgoing
mail log, loose leaf form, all correspondence mailed that day. This log shall be
a permanent record of correspondence mailed and will show:
(1) Serial number of letter.
(2) CIncpac file number of jacket in which filed.
2856 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(3) To whom sent.
(4) Date of letter.
(5) Subject.
The above date shall also be entered for all mimeographed and printed letters
dated and serialled that day, even though they are not mailed on that day. A
note "Mailed on " shall be made in "Subject" column of log and the
date of mailing inserted on the date the mimeographed or printed letter is
mailed.
Confidential and Secret correspondence will be so designated in the log and, in
the case of secret correspondence, the subject will not be entered.
When correspondence has been entered in the log, gives file copies to Tracer
Yeoman, pink copies to the yeoman of the officer taking action as indicated by
the officer's number (not the initials of the yeoman).
Arranges yellow information copies in numerical sequence and prepares routing
sheets next morning and delivers to Chief Yeoman in Charge.
(11) Tracer Yeoman. Takes appropriate action being governed by the preced-
ing provisions of this Article.
(12) File Yeoman. Handles correspondence as directed in Article 506-1.
505. FILE NUMBERS. The file yeoman will assign file numbers to all corre-
spondence. If the File Yeoman is not on duty or in the office when URGENT mail
is received, such mail shall be handled as directed in Article 502. In assigning
file numbers to correspondence, the File Yeoman shall use the U. S. Navy Filing
Manual as the basis for filing arrangement. Correct file numbers are essential
in order to locate correspondence readily. A new jacket shall be prepared for
each new number so assigned.
506. In addition to the standard file numbers assigned to outgoing correspond-
ence, the originator's symbol number and a serial number will be used. The orig-
inator's symbol number shall be placed after the file number and enclosed in
parenthesis. The serial number will appear after the word "Serial" and will
not be in parenthesis. New serial numbers will be started on each [28]
January 1st. and will run throughout the calendar year. The first figure of all
CONFIDENTIAL serial numbers shall be a "0".
506.1 The File Yeoman shall :
Scrutinize correspondence to see that none goes to file unless complete action
has been taken ; that routing sheet has been initialed by all officers and the Tracer
Yeoman and that original routing sheet is attached to correspondence.
Prepare correspondence for file, retained spare copies in the spare copy file
when action is so indicated on routing sheet.
File correspondence. CONFIDENTIAL correspondence must actually be placed
in the jackets by the File Yeon)an himself. He may utilize his assistants for filing
correspondence of a lower classification.
Check off, in colored pencil, all entries in the incoming and outgoing mail logs to
see that all mail received and originated has been checked to file. Undue delays
shall be reported after check has been made with the Tracer Yeoman.
Keep an up-to-date Index of the files.
Cooperate with the Tracer Yeoman in preparing the Weekly List of Outstanding
Correspondence.
507. Where correspondence treats of more than one subject, it shall be filed
under the principal subject, and cross-index tracers prepared and filed under the
other subjects treated or referred to. Cross-index tracers shall be printed on
white paper.
508. Yeomen preparing correspondence shall type the file number appearing on
the routing sheet, the symbol number of the originator in parenthesis and the
word "Serial" below tlie'file number after which the serial luimber will be entered
by the Outgoing Mail Yeoman.
* 509. FILING OF PRINTED MATTER. Fleet Letters, Memoranda, Notices, etc.,
must be kept in an unbroken serial titled file for ready reference in addition to
being' placed in the subject file jacket. Care must be taken to make cross-index
files complete and to make sure that signed copy is filed.
None of the above matter will be removed from tlie files merely because it has
been cancelled or superseded, but a notation to this effect shall be made on the
file copy showing reference numbers of the dispatch or letter cancelling and super-
seding it. Extra copies held for issue will, however be destroyed. Whenever the
number of spare copies of a particular publication is low, or a request for spare
copies is large, the requests will be referred to the Flag Secretary. Normally re-
quests from ships should be handled by Type commanders.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2857
510. WEEKLY CHECK OF OUTSTANDING CORRESPONDENCE. On Tues-
days of each week a sight check will be made by the Tracer Yeoman of all out-
standing correspondence that records indicate has been in the possession of an
oflBcer since the preceding Tuesday, and a list prepared for each such officer show-
ing cori'espondence thus outstanding. The duplicate routing sheet will be used as
a "tickler" tracer for checking outstanding letters in the oflice. A notation will
be made on the outstanding correspondence sheet showing the date the check was
made and the officer who acknowledges having each piece of correspondence in his
possession on that date.
511. If, after making a thorough canvass of the offices, no trace can be found of
a letter that has not moved in its routing from one officer to another within the
past week, the outstanding corresjiondence sheet will be delivered to the Flag
Secretary with a report of the search.
512. Lists of outstanding correspondence checked to the Admiral and Chief of
Staff will be delivered to the Flag Secretary.
[29] SECTION VI CONFIDENTIAL AND SECRET CORRESPONDENCE
601. Confidential mail shall be handled in accordance with Article 410 and the
following :
(a) All cori'espondence classified as CONFIDENTIAL will have the word
"CONFIDENTIAL" stamped and typed, or printed in the upper left-hand corner,
under file number, of each sheet.
(b) All routing sheets for confidential correspondence shall be printed on blue
paper and are plainly marked "CONFIDENTIAL".
(c) All confidential correspondence will be filed in separate filing cases known
as "the CONFIDENTIAL files".
(d) All confidential correspondence placed in U. S. or Guard Mail will be placed
in double envelopes with the inner envelope stamped "CONFIDENTIAL". Con-
fidential correspondence forwarded by U. S. Mail or Guard Mail must be registered.
602. SECRET correspondence shall be handled in accordance with the following
instructions :
(a) Sto^cage and Handling.
(1) SECRET correspondence files shall be kept in a safe under the immediate
supervision of the Secret Mail Officer: except correspondence regarding War
Plans which may be retained by the War Plans Officer, and that concerning
Communication Intelligence which may be i-etained by the Fleet Security Officer.
(2) The yeomen assigned to the War Plans Officer and the Secret Mall Yeoman
are authorized to handle secret correspondence. Secret correspondence shall not
be typed or handled by any enlisted personnel other than the yeoman who have
been so authorized. Secret correspondence must not be permitted to pass out
of the personal custody of staff officers at any time.
(b) Incoming Mail.
(1) The Secret Mail Officer, or in his absence, his authorized relief, the duty
communication officer, will receive all incoming Officer Messenger Mail, and sho^
same to the Flag Secretary or in the latter's absence to the Staff Duty Officer.
(2) Incoming mail marked SECRET will be handled by the Secret Mail Officer
subject to instructions by the Flag Secretary.
(3) The Secret Mail Yeoman, under the supervision of the Secret Mail Officer,
shall log all incoming SECRET correspondence, attach secret routing slips, and
deliver to the Flag Secretary for routing.
(4) The Secret Mail Officer or the Secret Mail Yeoman shall deliver the SE-
CRET correspondence to the staff officers concerned. Receipts .shall be obtained
for all SECRET correspondence left in the custody of officers. Officers not having
authorized secret stowage shall not retain correspondence overnight.
(c) Outgoing Mail.
(1) An officer desiring to originate a SECRET letter shall prepare a rough
draft in long hand or dictate the letter to a yeoman authorized to handle secret
correspondence. The letter .shall be typed and delivered by personnel authorized
to handle secret documents to stafl' officers concerned for Initialling and signature.
(2) The file copy of outgoing secret correspondence prepared by the War Plans
Officer may be retained in his files. In such cases a copy of the letter shall be
delivered to the Secret Mail Officer for filing in the secret correspondence files.
[30] (3) SECRET corresponrlence will be forwarded in accordance with
Article 76 (4), U. S. Navy Regulations.
2858 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(4) Outgoing SECRET mail will be marked with an identitication number of
five figures preceded by CINCPAC or CINCUS as appropriate. Franked cards
bearing a return receipt shall be enclosed with each letter and will indicate the
identity of the letter by both the serial and shipment numbers.
[SI] SF.CTION VII — LIBRARIES
701. Every effort will be made to maintain an office library of official publica-
tions required for reference by members of the Staff. Officers are requested to
advise the Flag Secretary of publications they desire to have ordered.
The office library consists of various books and pamphlets, such as :■ — Annual
Reports, Regulations, Bureau Manuals, Registers, Directories and miscellaneous
publications. The library will be added to as publications are received from time
to time. Any publications carried in the library which have become obsolete will
be submitted to the Flag Secretary, who will issue the necessary instructions as
to their disposition.
Each publication is listed and assigned a serial number, and filed according
to that number.
The File Yeoman will be responsible for the proper classification and filing of
the library.
702. The Commander-in-Chief's Library is maintained under the supervision
of the Fleet Public Relations Officer. It consists principally of non-fiction,
although some works of fiction may be included. The books are kept in book-
cases in the Admiral's and guest cabins and elsewhere as necessary. The Fleet
Public Relations Officer will publish to the staff a list of Ijooks on hand and lists
of additions as received. All members of the staff are invited to make use of the
facilities afforded by this library. It is desired to augment and improve the Com-
mander-in-Chief's library. To this end suggestions as to books which should be
obtained are requested from all members of the Staff. Keys to the bookcase of
the Commander-in-Chief's Library will be kept in the key locker in the flag office.
[32] SECTION Vin RAPID COMMUNICATIONS OF COMMANDE^R-IN-CHIEF,
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
Part A — General
801. Drafting of Despatches.
(a) In order that the Commander-in-Chief may .set an example of propriety in
drafting of despatches, all officers of the Staff will familiarize themselves with
the provisions of Communication Instructions relative to that subject. Commu-
nication watch and coding board officers should bring to the attention of originat-
ing officers all violations of these instructions and recommend necessary
corrections. In no case will a change in a despatch be made without the consent
of the originating officer.
(b) An officer originating a non-classified or restricted despatch will have the
message typed by his own yeoman, or duty yeoman. After it has been initialed
by the originating officer it will be delivered to the communication watch officer
who will obtain the Initials of the information and releasing officers and super-
vise the transmission of the despatch.
(c) An officer originating a classified despatch will write or type the message on
an outgoing classified despatch blank. After initialing by the originating officer
it will be delivered to the communication watch officer who will obtain initials
of the information and releasing officers, have the despatch encrypted and super-
vise its transmission.
(d) All despatches will normally be released only by the Admiral or Chief of
Staff. In case of emergencies or special circumstances, despatches may be released
by other members of the Staff.
* (e) An officer desiring to have a message passed to supplementary addresses
for action or information will inform the communication watch officer who will
prepare the necessary despatch or procedure signal and obtain initials of originat-
ing, information and releasing officers.
802. Security of Communications.
(a) Visual methods ov landline will be used for transmi.ssion of despatches
whenever practicable. The use of radio for transmission of administrative des-
patches shall he kept at a minimum.
(b) If a delay in the delivery of a despatch is acceptable, such message should
be sent by despatch mail (mailgram). Mailgrams should be used particularly
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2859
for transmis.sioii of clesi«tches to information addressees when it is desirable that
their radio calls do not appear in the heading of the radio despatch.
803. Distribution of Desinitches.
(a) Copies of all outgoing and incoming non-classified and restricted adminis-
trative despatches are provided for the Admiral, Chief of Staff, Operations Officer,
Staff Duty Otticer, Flag Secretary and Communication Officer. Outgoing des-
patch books also contain a copy for the originating officer. Incoming despatch
books also contain an action copy and two information copies which are available
to any member of the Staff who may request such copies from the communication
orderly. The Communication Officer's copies of despatches will be placed on a
file in the Staff Oflice where they will be available for perusal by all members of
the Stafif.
(b) Only one copy of outgoing and incoming cla.ssified administrative des-
patches (other than restricted despatches) will be made. Paraphrases of secret
and confidential despatches shall be kept at a minimum and will be furnished only
at the specific request of officers, and must be returned to the coding room for
burning when no longer needed. Paraphrases of secret messages will be furnished
only to the action or originating officer, and shall be receipted for in the same
manner as registered publications.
[33] (c) Only four copies of the translations of tactical, despatches will be
made for distribution to appropriate boards.
804. Routing and Delivery of Despatches. (Internal)
(a) Correct and complete routing of despatches is a function of the commu-
nk'ation watch officer.
(b) The Staff Duty Officer should see all despatches when the action officer is
not on board. In such cases instructions will be requested by the orderly from
the Staff Duty Officer as to whether the latter will accept resiwnsibility for the
message or whether it should be held for the action officer.
(c) Whoever initials the message for the action officer and accepts the action
copy assumes full responsibility for taking the required action and for informing
the designated action officer of the action taken.
8(;5. Movement Reports.
(a) The movement report sheets and cards will be corrected and maintained
by communication personnel under the supervision of the communication watch
officer designated as Movement Report OflSeer.
yh) Movement reports of the flag plane will be originated by the pilot making
the flight and will be prepared and released by the flagship.
SOU. Fleet Coding Board.
(a) The fleet coding board will consist of four officers of the Staff and five
officers detailed by the Commanding Officer of the Fleet Flagship.
(b) The fleet coding board will be charged with encrypting and decrypting
messages sent or received by the Commander-in-Chief or the Fleet flagship, as
directed l>y the Fleet Communication Officer.
(c) The Communication Security OflBcer will be responsible for the organiza-
tion and training of the fleet coding board.
807. Shutting Donn Transmitters.
Except in case of emergency, permission for securing transmitters must be
obtained from the Fleet Communication Officer.
[3J^] Part B — Instructions for Communication Personnel
808. Administrative Comnnniicntion Organisation.
(a) The following stations will normally be manned:
(1) Main radio room;
(2) Signal bridge ;
(3) Main communication station ;
(4) ^lag communication office;
(5) Coding room.
(b)The communication watch will normally consist of:
(1) Communication Watch Officer
(2) Coding Board Ofiicer
(3) Communication Supervisor
(4) Communication Yeoman
(5) Communication Orderly
(fi) Radio Supervisor i
(7) Signal Supervisor
(8) Radio Operators
(9) Signalmen
2860 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(c) The communication watch oflBcer will stand a clay's duty, relieving the
watch at 08(X). He will inform his relief refrardinj; unfinished business, effective
organization, frequency plan in ellect, circuits up, visual signalling conditions,
and all pertinent information necessai'y for the proper conduct of his duties.
(d) The coding board ollicer will stand a day's duty, relieving the watch at
0800. He will inform his relief regarding unfinished business and all iiertinent
information necessary for the proi^er conduct of his duties.
(e) Relief Conmumication Watch Otficers. The first and second relief com-
munication watch orticers will maintain a continuous watch in the Flag Com-
munication Ottice during working hours. The second relief communication watch
oflBcer will stand watch from OSUO until after lunch. The first relief communi-
cation otticer will stand watch from after lunch until 1~)'M, at which time he will
be relieved by the communication watch otticer with the day's duty. Other relief
communication watch oflicers are available for duty when the traffic situation
requires.
(f ) The first and second relief coding board officers will maintain a continuous
watch in the Coding Room during working hours. The watches will correspond
to those stood by relief communication watch oflicers. Other relief coding board
oflScers are available for duty when the traffic situation requires.
(g) Communication Supervisor. The communication supervisor will stand a
day's duty under the administrative organization in the Main Communication
Station. He will act as an assistant to the communication watch officer. The
time of relieving and hours on watch will be the .same as those prescribed for the
communication watch officer. The watches for the communication suijervisors
will be arranged by the Senior Chief Radioman and will be approved by the
Assistant Connnunication Officer.
(h) The radio and signal supervisors shall maintain continuous watches in
the Main Radio Room and Signal Bridge respectively. The watches for super-
visors will be arranged by the leading radio and signal chief petty officers and
will be approved by the flagship's Radio and Signal Qflacers, respectively.
(i) Communication Yeoman. Communication yeomen will maintain a con-
tinuous watch in the Flag Communication Office. The watches will be arranged
by the Senior Communication Yeoman and approved by the Assistant Commu-
nication Officer. -
[S5] (j) The flagship will provide sufficient conuuunication orderlies to
permit a continuous watch in the Flag Communication OflSce. When the flagship
is underway a continuous watch will also be maintained on the Ftag Bridge.
Orders for the communication orderlies will be pronmlgated by the Assistant
Communication Ofiicer.
(k) Watches prescribed in the preceding articles will not be exchanged with-
out permission of the officers concerned.
809. Tactical Co)nmiiin cation Oiganizatiou.
(a) The following Stations will normally be manned:
(1) Main Radio Room ;
(2) Signal Bridge
(3) Main Communication Station;
(4) Flag Communication Office ''
(5) Flag Bridge Radio Station ;
(6) Flag Bridge Communication OflBce ;
(7) Coding Room.
(b) The comnmnicatlon watch noi-mally consists of:
(1) Connnunication watch ofBcer;
(2) Coding board ofiicer ;
(3) Two communication yeomen :
(4) Two communication orderlies ;
(5) Communication Supervisor ;
(6) Radio Supervisor ;
(7) Signal Supervisor ;
(8) Radio Operators;
(9) Signalmen;
(10) Additional menibers of coding board as necessary.
((•) Conmiuiiication watcli officers shall maintain a contiiuious watch in the
Flag Bridge (^imnuniication Office. Off-watch commmiication watch officers are
available for handling administrative traffic and coding duties as the situation
requires.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2861
(d) Coding Board Officers shall maintain a continuous watch in the Coding
Room. Off-watcli coding board officers are available for coding duties as the
situation requires.
(e) The Chief Radioman assigned to the Flag Allowance shall maintain a
day's duty watch in the Main Communication Station, and a continuous watch
as radio supervisor in the Flag Bridge Radio Station. This watch list may be
augmented by qualified first class radiomen as required.
(f) The radio and signal supervisors shall maintain a continuous watch in
the Main Radio Room and Signal Bridge.
(g) Communication yeomen .shall maintain continuous watches in the Flag
Bridge Communication Office and the Flag Communication Office.
(h) The fiagsliip will provide sufficient comnuinication orderlies to permit
continuous watches in the Flag Conmiunication Office and on the Flag Bridge.
810. Duties of Communication Watch Officer.
(a) The communication watch ollicer is in direct charge of the communica-
tions of the Commander-in-Chief.
(b) The communication watch officer is responsible for the efficiency of the
communication watch and will require an alert and military watch of all com-
munication i)ersonnel.
[36] (c) The communication watch officer is responsible for complete and
rapid internal distribution of despatches and for the expeditious handling of
outgoing traffic.
(d) The communication watch officer is responsible for the handling of
encrypted despatches and the efficiency of the coding watch.
(e) The communication watch officer must be fully cognizant of the effective
organization of the Fleet and is responsible for setting up and maintaining the
communication channels required by the organization.
811. Duties of Coding Board Officers.
(a) The coding board ollicer is in charge of the operation of the Commander-in-
Chief's coding room.
(b) The coding board officer is responsible for expeditious, accurate and
efficient encryption and decryption of despatches.
(c) The coding board officer must be fully cognizant of the rules for crypto-
graphic security and will en.sure strict observance of these rules in the handling
of the encrypted traffic of the Commander-in-Chief.
(d) The coding board officer is responsible for the custody of the cryptographic
aids, publications and devices in the coding room.
812. Qualification of Communication Watch Officers and Coding Board Officers.
Upon reporting for duty communication watch officers and coding board t)fficers
must undergo sufficient instruction to qualify taking over a watch. To be con-
sidered qualified a communication watch officer or coding board officer must:
(a) have a working knowledge of Communication Instructions, Basic Com-
munication Plan, Frequency Plans and Tactical In.structions ;
(b) have a working knowledge of rhe call systems, the General Signal Book
and Signal Vocabulary ;
(c) have a thorough knowledge of the U. S. Fleet Staff Instructions and Staff
Organization ;
(d) have a thorough knowledge of the operation of the communication plant
of the Fleet Flagship ;
(e) be proficient in the use of all cryptographic systems held by the Com-
mander-in-Chief.
(f) have a thorough knowledge of the principles and rules of communication
and cryptographic security and their application.
813. Routing of Despatches.
(a ) Full and complete routing of despatches is a function of the communication
watch officer. A despatch must be seen by every officer having a possible interest
in it. Intelligent and complete routing requires a thorough knowledge of the
Staff organization and a careful application of this knowledge to each despatch.
(b) Copies of dispatches concerning routine rejiorts md requests should not
be delivered to the Admiral. Such despatches will be marketl "NN" and the
Admiral's copy will be delivered to the Assdstant Communication Officer for
disposition.
(c) Classified despatches, other than restricted, .shall be routetl to the Chief of
Staff, Operations Officer, Communication Officer and Communication Security'
Officer in addition to action or information officers. The Chief of Staff shall be
the first to see classified despatches and shall approve the routing prior to further
2862 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
delivery. When the Chief of Staff is not available despatches may be shown to the
action officer prior to final approval of the routing.
(d) The flag is responsible for delivery of messages addressed to the flagship.
Copies of such messages and copies of messages which are not addressed to, but
which are of interet to the flagship, shall be delivered to the flagship communica-
tion office for internal distribution.
[57] 814. Delivery of despatches.
(a) The communication watch officer will be responsible for requiring orderlies
to deliver all messages promptly between 0800 and 2230 unless otherwise directed.
Between 2230 and 0700 messages will be delivered to action and information
officers when so directed by the communication watch oflScer. fn case of doubt,
messages will be delivered regardless of the hour. Priority despatches will
always be delivered to the action officer immediately.
(b) Delivery of all traffic accumulated during the night will be completed
by 0900 daily.
(c) Speed in delivery of despatches, especially those of priority precedence,
is essential and the system must not be allowed to delay action. However, it is
also essential that despatches be accurately written up. It is the responsibility
of the communication watch officer to insure that a complete and accurate
copy of all despatches is delivered to the proper officers as soon as possible.
815. Emergencies.
(a) The communication watch officer should bear in mind that speed in the
delivery of a message indicating an emergency is the primary consideration.
(b) Make use of the telephone as well as messengers. Above all, do not let
the system delay action.
(c) Call relief watches as necessary to assist in handling the situation and
retain them on watch as long as required.
(d) Be prepared to handle any emergency at night. Before turning in leave
clear and definite instructions to be notified immediately in the case of any
unusual occurrence.
816. Encrypted Despatches.
(a) If time permits, the encryption of each outgoing encrypted despatch will
be checked prior to transmission by an officer other than the one who encrypted
the despatch. If time does not permit the encryption to be checked prior to
transmission it will be checked as soon as possible thereafter.
(b) All intercepted encrypted despatches will be delivered to the coding room
where they will be decrypted for information if traffic conditions permit.
817. Intercepted Traffic.
Intercepted traffic of possible interest to the Commander-in-Chief will be
written up and distributed for information. Each copy will be marked "Written
up for Cincpac information."
818. Ttadio Logs.
Radio logs shall be kept in accordance with Articles 1413-1417, Communica-
tion Instructions, 1987. The communication watch officer will examine radio
logs carefully during his watch for despatches addressed to the Commander-in-
Chief, for violations of communication instructions, for intercepted despatches
of possible interest to the Commander-in-Chief, and to ascertain that circuit
discipline is being maintained.
819. Transmitting and Receiving Data.
Transmitting and receiving data will be recorded by the radio operator or
signalman as indicated below :
Radio
(1) Time of Delivery or Receipt
(2) Frequency ,
(3) Operator's sign.
Visual
(1) Time of Delivery or Receipt
(2) System
(3) Signalman's sign.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2863
[38] Communication Files.
(a) General File. The general file includes one copy of each message trans-
mitted or received. Service messages (except despatches) shall be stapled to the
message to which they refer. Procedure signals not classified as service mes-
sages and messages not bearing time groups shall be filed according to time of
receipt or delivery. Classified, mailgi'ams (other than restricted) shall be filed
in the classified files and a tickler filed in the general file.
(b) Shore station Schedule Files. A copy of each message received by I or F
method shall be filed in these files. A separate file shall be maintained for each
shore station. Messages shall be filed by shore station serial numbers.
(c) Movement Report File. A copy of each notice or modification to the Ship
Movement Report Sheets shall be placed in this file.
(d) Flag Files. The flag file includes one copy of each message originated by
the Commander-in-Chief, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, or written up for
information of the Commander-in-Chief. These messages shall be filed in chrono-
logical order of time groups under the headings incoming and outgoing.
(e) Alnav File. A copy of each alnav message shall be placed in this file in
order of alnav number.
(f ) Fleet File. A copy of each fleet message shall be placed in this file in order
of fleet number.
(g) Classified Files. Translations of classified despatches shall be placed in
these files in order of coding room serial number. Secret despatches shall be
placed in a file separate from the regular classified files.
(h) Tactical Translation Files. The tactical translation files contain one copy
of the exact translation of each encrypted tactical despatch and one copy of each
plain language tactical despatch. Messages will be filed in chronological order
of date time groups.
821. Composition and Standard Distribution of Message Books:
(a) Outgoing Circuit
Front cover General File
First copy Station File
Second copy ^ Flag File
Third copy Originator
Back copy Ship
(b) Outgoing Administrative
Front cover General File
First copy Flag File
Second copy Originator
Third copy Admiral
Fourth copy Chief of Staff
Fifth copy Operations OflBcer
Sixth copy Flag Secretary
Seventh copy Staff Duty Officer
Eighth copy Communication Officer
Ninth copy Station File
Back cover ^ Ship
(c) Outgoing Tactical
Front cover Translation File
First copy Flag Plot
Second copy Flag PJot
Back cover Coding Board
(d) Outgoing Umpire
Front cover Translation File
First copy Umpire
Back cover Coding Board
[39] (e) Incoming Circuit
Front cover General File
First copy Spare copy
Second copy Advance action
Back copy Check copy
2864 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(f ) Incoming Administrative
Front cover Flag File
First copy Action
Second copy Admiral
Third copy Chief of Staff
Fourth copy Oi)erations Officer
Fifth copy Flag Secretary
Sixth copy Staff Duty Officer
Seventh copy Information
Eighth copy Information
Back cover Communication Officer
(g) Incoming Tactical
Front cover Translation File
First copy Flag Plot
Second copy ._ Flag Plot
Back copy _"_ Coding Board
(h) Incoming Contact Jleport
Front cover Translation File
First copy Flag Plot
Second copy Flag Plot
Back cover Ship
(i) Incoming Umpire
Front cover Translation File
First copy Umpire
Back cover Coding Board
[40] SECTION IX — EEGISTERED AND OTHER SEX:BET AND CONFIDENTIAL PUBLICATIONS
901. The Communications Security Officer is responsible to the Commander-
in-Chief and to the Department for the custody of all registered publications.
902. A Communication Watch Officer, designated as Registered Publications
Officer, is the custodian of registered and other secret and confidential publica-
tons. He shall receipt to the Fleet Communication Security Officer for all regis-
tered publications and for other imix)rtant confidential, secret or restricted
documents which must be accounted for by the Commander-in-Chief.
903. All registered and other important publications shall be catalogued to
shovF their receipt and the safes in which they are stowed. No registered publi-
cation shall be issued except on written receipt of an authorized individual,
which receipt shall be obtained at the time of issue. Other confidential or secret
publications and important documents shall be handled in a similar manner.
904. In accounting for registered publications when preparing quarterly re-
turns, each publication actually must be sighted by the officers taking the
inventory.
905. Confidential and secret publications shall be kept only in authorized
stowages.
906. The Coding Board Officer on watch shall be responsible for the publica-
tions in the comnmnication office safes. The Registered Publications Officer
shall make a weekly Inventory of the contents of the communication office safes.
907. The Registered Publications Officer shall be the only person regularly in
liossession of the combinations of safes containing un-issued registered publica-
tion.s, except for : (a) coninninication office safes ; (b) War Plans safe; (c) Secur-
ity Officer's safe. In order that access to any safe may be had in the absence
of the regular custodian, the Registered Publications Officer shall maintain in
sealed envelopes the combinations of all safes assigned to the Staff. These sealed
enveloi>es shall be kept in the communication office secret safe. Prompt report
shall be made to the regular custodian of a safe whenever the envelope contain-
ing the combination thereto is opened for any purpose.
908. The Registered Publications Officer shall change the combinations of all
safes when he first receipts for the registered publications, and from time to time
thereafter; particularly subsequent to the opening of a safe by another officer.
909. The Registered Publications Officer shall keep a record of all "shipment
memoranda" to insure receipt of all new matter. He is responsible that all
publications in his custody are corrected to date. It is desirable that members
of the staff correct their own publications; but even though they do so, their
work shall be checked by the Registered Publications Officer, who is responsible
for their being corrected.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2865
910. When not actually in use, wa'r plans shall be stowed in the safes especially
provided for them. Corrections to the war plans shall be made under the direc-
tion of the War Plans Officer. War plans shall not remain out of the above safes
overnight. The War Plans Officer shall have custody of all War Plans in use by
the War Plans Section, receipting for them to the Registere^l Publication Officer.
[^i] SECTION X — RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FLAG AND SHIP
A — Station keeping and maneuvering of flagship
1001. When in formation, the flagship will normally maneuver in obedience to
signal in the same manner as other ves.sels of the formation.
1002. The Commander-in-Chief will, however, as circumstances warrant,
verbally direct the flagship to make clianges in course, speed, or position.
1003. When, for any reason, the movements of the flagship are no longer to be
directed by the flag, the Captain of the flag.ship will be so informed. He will be
further informed as may be practicable, of the interval during which he is
expected to act independently.
1004. When in position, the commanding officer is responsible for the station
keeping, course, and speed of the flagsliip as circumstances dictate.
B — Honors
1005. Responsibility for rendering proper honors lies with the flagship except
that no gun salutes shall be fire<l without the authority of the Commander-in-
Chief. Advance information as to honors shall be furnished by the Flag Lieu-
tenant or Staff Duty Officer.
C — Personnel
1006. Officers of the Staff shall be careful to preserve the unity of command of
the flagship. To this end they shall give no orders to the officer-of-the-deck ex-
cept in an emergency. Personal requests may be made to subordinate officers of
the flagship but official requests to the ship shall always be made direct to the
Captain or Executive Officer. Such requests should be headetl, "The Admiral
desires you Etc."
1007. The Flag Division Officer and the Junior Division Officers will be the
Communication Watch Officers or Coding Board Officers so designated.
1008. Leave and liberty for all men assigned special duty with the flag will
be regulated by the Flag Secretary who will regulate it to c<uiform as closely
to that of the flagship, as flag work will permit. (See Article 407 (a)). The
flagship will regulate, control, and administer the following functions pertaining
to flag personnel :
(a) Reports, inspections, records and accounts, and advancements in ratings.
(b) Personal requests (via Flag Secretary).
(c) Disciplinary matters.
(d) The division parade is assigned by the flagship. The Flag Division
Officer is in charge at division parade. He reports to the Executive Officer at
quarters, the number of unauthorized absentees.
1009. The following instructions govern the routine nuister of flag personnel:
(a) All flag personnel except the marines will muster at quarters with the
flagship.
(b) The marines assigned as flag allowance, will muster with the ship's
marine detachment.
1010. Flag Division personnel will be stationed for abandon ship drill and
will report at quarters for this drill unless excused. At fire and collision drills
and general quarters, Flag division personnel will, when men detailed by the ship
have failed to do so, secure ports, etc., in offices and other places devote<l strictly
to Flag activities. The Flag division, will not go to quarters for these drills
except that radio and visual communications will actually be manned.
[//2] 1011. The Flag division officer and the junior Flag division officers
will conduct bag and bedding inspections of the Flag Division. The ship will
provide berthing and messing for all personnel of the Flag Division. Flag
Division persoimel under the direction and supervision of the FMag Division
Officer will clean all compartments dedicated exclusively to Flag use. Boat
crews, under the direction of the Flag Lieutenant, will clean the barges and staff
boats; the signal force, under the direction of the Flag Lieutenant, will clean the
Flag Bridge and Flag Conning Tower.
79716 O — 46 — pt. 17 28
2866 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1012. All members of the Staff shall be assigned battle stations which will be
manned when "General Quarters" is sounded. Enlisted men of the Flag not
required for Staff Battle Stations will be assigned to ship battle stations.
Enlisted men of the Flag will stand Flag condition and cruising watches, but
will not stand ship cruising watches.
1013. The Flag Lieutenant i.s in direct charge of the boat crews, chauffeur,
signal force, Admiral's mess attendants, boats, and automobiles (Band and
Orchestra if assigned), and is directl.v responsible to the Commander-in-Chief
for their appearance, training and performance. The ship is responsible for
maintenance and upkeep. The Flag Lieutenant, and, in his absence, the Staff
Duty Officer, regulates the emplo.vment of the Staff motor boats and the Chief of
Staff's barge when it is used as the Staff duty boat. He will prepare the sched-
ules for all staff motor boats, prescribing the routine hours for securing and the
places of securing away from the ship and will furnish information as to liberty
of boat crews, after securing, to the PMag Secretary. The Offlcer-of-t he-Deck will
keep the Flag Lieutenant, and in his ab.sence. the Staff Duty Offcer, informed of
the movements of the barges and the staff motor boats.
1014. The Commanding Officer of the Flagship .shall be responsible that all
safety precautions of the barge and staff gig be made as are required by existing
regulations and instructions.
D — Routine Reports
1015. In order that the routine reports to the Commander-in-Chief may be
complete and uniform, the Commanding Officer of the flagship is requested to
promulgate the following instructions :
(a) At Anchor
(1) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall make reports to Commander-in-Chief as
follows :
(a) The houis of 0800, 1200 and 2000.
(b) Ship's Movements.
(c) All marked changes in the weather.
(d) Display of storm signals.
(e) All occurrences worthy of notice.
(2) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall rep(»rt salutes fired, exchanges of official
calls, .shifting of personal flags and movements of ships to the Commander-in-
Chief, the Chief of Staff, and to the Flag Lieutenant, or in the absence of the
Flag Lineutenant to the Staff Duty Officer.
(3) The Officer-of-the-Deck shall announce requirements for Staff attendance
at the accommodation ladder by loud speaker: "Staff (Jangway". Boat gongs
shall also be sounded in number equal to the number of side bo.vs required in
attendance; e. g., for Admiral and Vice Admiral, eight (S) gongs; for Rear
Admiral, six (6) gongs; and for Captain, four (4) gong.s. The above procedure
shall be carried out by the Officer-of-the-Deck In sufficient time for the Com-
mander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff, and the Flag Lieutenant, or, in his absence,
the Staff Duty Officer, to reach the Quarter Deck and properly meet visiting offi-
cers. When the Commander-in-Chief is leaving the ship, the Officer-of-the-Deck
will notify the Flag Lieutenant, or in his ab.sence. the Staff Duty Officer, and the
Chief of Staff, when the barge or automobile is alongside.
(4) The signal Bridge supervisor shall report all movements of ships getting
underway, or coming to anchor, shifting (»f personal flags, ext hange of salutes,
and any occurrences worthy of notice to the Officer-of-the-Deck.
[//3] (f)) When the Admiral has retired, the Officer-of-the-Deck shall make
necessary reports to the Staff Duty Officer who will indicate what action is to
be taken.
(6) During the night the Officer-of-the-r>eck shall report to the Staff Duty
Officer (mly such movements of .ships as he deems necessary. The Signal Bridge
supervisor will rejiort to the Flag Lieutenant or to the Staff Duty Officer, prior
to 0800, any movements of ships occurring during the preceding night.
(b) Underway (1) The Officer-of-the-Deek shall report to the Conunander-in-
Chief via the Staff Duty Officer on watch on the Flag Bridge :
(a) The sighting of land, rocks, .shoals, lighthouses, beacons, buoys, and
discolored water.
(b) All vessels or wrecks discovered.
(c) All maf"ked changes in the weather.
(d) All occurrences worthy of notice.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2867
If the ship is operating independently, the Officer-of-the-Deck shall make
the ahove listed reports direct to the Chief of Staff and officer with the day's
Staff Duty.
(2) If the Commander-in-Chief should be on the Navigating Bridge, the Officer-
of-the-Deck will make reports direct to him, reporting thereafter to the Staff
Duty Officer on watch.
(3) When underway making passage or outside the usual operating areas the
Navigator shall report the ship's position at 0800, 1200 and 2000.
EXHIBIT NO. 127
Confidential,
United States Pacific Fleet
aircbaft scouting force
Fleet Air Detachment,
Naval Air Station, San Diego, California,
Dec. 18, 1941.
From : Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via : The Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics.
Subject : Procurement of Long Range Bombing Landplanes for Patrol Wing Two.
1. Commander Patrol Wing Two has expressed an urgent need for long range
landplane bombers, for use initially as patrolling aircraft covering the approaches
to Oahu. Further uses of these planes in long range photographic reconnaissance
and in offense are many. He has stated further that he has temporarily under
his command from the Army a squadron of B-17 airplanes for such operations
in conjunction with his VPB's and that for purposes of liaison, indoctrination
and familiarization, he is assigning Naval Aviators to those aircraft as second
pilots on their joint patrol missions.
2. Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force concurs in the request of Commander
Patrol Wing Two and strongly recommends the immediate transfer from Lend
Lease or other source of 15 B-17 (Boeing) or B-24 (Consolidated) bombers for
this purpose and that an increase in that number in the future, as circumstances
and experience may dictate, be considered. With the high speed of these air-
craft, the additional area covered during daylight hours on a search adds im-
measurably to security. Particularly is this true during the shorter days in
winter.
3. Germane to this recommendation is the highly desirable possibility of the
early establishment of patrol plane operating facilities at IMagdalena Bay. Baja
California, from which could be covered effectively the southwest approaches to
the United States in conjunction with the patrol being conducted from San Diego.
Provision of a squadron of subject landplane bombers in the Hawaiian area
might serve to release for operation at Magdalena Bay, one of the three Patrol
Squadrons to be equipped presently at Alameda.
4. Tn view of the current situation, this is being forwarded direct. The ap-
proval or comment of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet is requested.
J. S. McCain.
Copy to : CinCpac, Com.scofor, Compatwing 2.
Secret— No. 18
Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force,
Office of the Air For<'e Commander,
Hickam Field, T. H., 22 December, 1941.
In reply refer to :
Memorandum to Roberts Commission :
1. Since my arrival I have issued orders or instructions for security and employ-
ment of the Hawaiian Air Force as follows :
a. Ordered immediate wider dispersal of airplanes, supplies and personnel.
6. Directed surveys to be made of additional fields for operation of aircraft on
the Island of Oahu.
c. Required the movement of pursuit into Hickam Field area for more jwsitive
protection in the event of adverse weather at the former base at Wheeler Field.
79716 O — 46— pt. 17 29
2868 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
d. Mover obsolescent B-18 and A-20s to Bellows Field to eliminate the air-
I)lane conjestion at Hickani Field. A-20s were later moved to Wheeler Field.
e. Moved one squadron B-17s to Wheeler Field to further relieve conjection at
Hiekam Field.
f. Directed that all planes be camouflaged. Those arriving from the mainland
to be painted immediately upon arrival.
g. Directed plans be completed for air transport of aircraft ammunition to Maui
and Molokai, capable of dispatch on two hours notice.
h. Have issued orders on alerts as follows :
"1. 30 before sunrise to 0800, and one (1) hour before sunset to 30 after sunset
1/3 Army Pursuit and Navy fighters in air.
"All other Army and Navy planes including pursuit excepting searching planes
warmed up, manned and ready to take off.
"2. Between 0800 and one (L) hour before sunset :
1/6 Army and Navy Pursuit in air.
1/6 Army and Navy Pursuit warmed up, manned and ready to take off.
"All other Army and Navy planes including lighters excepting searching planes
on one hours notice.
"3. One (1) hour after sunset, 30 minutes before sunrise V^ planes on one (1)
hours notice, % on four (4) hours notice."
e. I have visited all operating airdromes, made ground reconnaissance of
areas where additional airdromes are to be located, have discussed tactical
operations, administrative problems, morale and rew'ards with all major com-
manders.
;. I have conferred with Com. Pat. Wing Two and expect to submit to the
Department Conmiander within twenty four hours revised plans for the employ-
ment of the Air Force in the Hawaiian area.
k. I have directed that plans be made and they are well underway for the
use of certain elements of the Air Force in offensive opei'ations.
I. Commanding General, 18th Bombardment Wing, directed to have striking
force of minimum of 18 l)-17's available at all times.
m. Directed that a positive system of aircraft and surface ship Identification
be arranged.
(S) C. L. Tinker
C. L. Tinker,
Brigffdier General, U. S. Army, Commanding.
[1] Fl
Confidential
United States Pacific Fleet
AIRCRAFT scouting FORCE
Fleet Air Detachment,
Naval Air Station,
San Diego, California, Dec. 24, 1941.
From : Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet.
To : The Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics.
Subject : Procurement of Four-Engine Land Planes — Request for.
1. Contract 7S903 dated 10 November 1040, is for the delivery of 200 PB2Y-3
airplanes. A supplementary contract 78903 dated 30 June 1941, is for the de-
livery of ^^4 airplanes, presumably PB2Y-4"s. The progress report on this con-
tract submitted by the Inspector of Naval Aircraft, San Diego, for the period
ending 30 November 1941, estimates the delivery of the airplanes in quantity
in October 1942. The.se estimated delivery dates are extremely disappointing
as four-engine airplanes are urgently required. Experiences with Con.solidated
Aircraft, would indicate that this October 1942 delivery date will not be antici-
pated.
2. Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force believes that a part of our patrol air-
craft should be long range land plane types. So long as there are prepared
fields from which tlies(> planes may operate, the advantages to be derived from
their operation are numerous. Among them are:
(a) Greater ease and celerity in handling and servicing after flight (a
big item when number and fatigue of beach crews is considered).
(b) Quicker to get off on a mission.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2869
(o) Cover larger area in daylight search.
(d) Higher speed and ceiling permits of long range photographic recon-
naissance of enemy defended positions with infinitely less hazard.
(e) Greater striking power, particularly in a torpedo attack.
[2] Need for this type has heeu keenly felt in the last two weeks. The sea-
plane, however, still must be u.sed from advanced bases in areas where no landing
field exists.
3. A comparison of the iK'rformance of the B-24-D, and the PB2Y-3 airplane,
which information has been obtained from the specifications, is tabulated below
as a matter of interest :
B-24-D l'B2Y-3
Performance @ 41,(XX># V max @ Performance @ 6f),<)()0# V max @
25,000 ft. with military power— 316 20,(X)0 ft..— 236 MPH.
MPH.
Operating speed @ 25,000 ft.— 220
MPH.
Service ceiling— 34.000 ft. Service ceiling— 22,300 ft.
Service ceiling any two engine.s — 19,000
feet.
Range at operational speed carrying 8 Range at combat load carrying 4 1.000#
l.()()0# homb.s—2,0U0 miles. bombs— 2,370 miles.
Bomb Ijoad : Bomb Load :
4—2,000 lb. or 8—1,000 lb. or
8—1.000 lb. or , 8—500 lb.
8—500 lb. or In addition 4 1,000 lb. bombs can be
12 — 300 lb. or carried on external tanks.
20— KX) lb.
Armament : Armament :
1 .50 cal. Nose gun and 500 rounds 1 .,50 cal. bow gun and 400 rounds.
2 .50 cal. top guns (t\<>in mount) and 2 .50 cal. .side waist and 800 rounds.
800 rounds. 1 ..50 cal. tunnel and 400 rounds.
2 .50 cal. bottom guns (twin mount) 1 .50 cal. upper waist and 400 rounds,
and 000 rounds. 2 .50 cal. tail (twin mount) and 800
2.50 cal. tail guns (twin mount) and rounds.
1,000 rounds.
Total— 7 .50 caliber— 2,900 rounds Total— 7 .50 caliber— 2,800 rounds
ammuntion. ammunition.
[3] 4. This connnand has been infoi-me<l by Consolidated Aircraft officials
that the B-24— D is now in production, and will be pnxluced in increasing number.
Further the B-24-I) is a less expensive plane and lends itself to production
better than the PB2Y type.
5. Accordingly, Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force reconmiends that negotia-
tions be undertaken with the Army Air Corps to obtain a total of sixty B-24-D
airplanes at the earliest opportunity. Whether or not the PB2Y-3 contract could
be reduced by that number would depend on the course of events.
/s/ J. S. McCain
Copy to :
CinCus
Comscofor
From: CINCPAC 5385 K/C
Date : 4 January 1942. COMINCH
For: Coderopm 1210 PPPPP
Decoded by: Graydon • OPNAV
Paraphrased by : Graydon COMAIRSCOFOR
COMPATWING 13
041001 CR0442
Your 011145. Comairscofor 312013. Full.v agree. However the necessary
detachment patron 22 and nonavailability additional patrol ])lanes from mainland
for at least several months makes situation here very critical. Total patrol
planes 68, Army heavy bombers 44. Impossible satisfactorily meet simultaneous
requirements for effective daily research reasonable air striking force material
maintenance and personnel fitness. Best possible results being «n)tained but
2870 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
searches far from positive and air striking force too small. Replacement 17
PBY-3 planes here by Army B-24 planes would make vital improvement in situ-
ation for both search an<l striking. Attention this connection invited comair.sco-
for serial t>755 of December 18 with which CINd'AC heartily concurs. Subject
fully covered in separate correspondence being forwarded airmail. Crews can
be spared from here for taking over and ferrying B-24's. With background patrol
plane qualification this can be quickly accomplished. Urgently recommend fav-
orable consideration and immediiite initiation action.
Distribution Action COMINCH WAROP 20CP
Record 11 OPD 12 38 NAVAIDE 16 Personal
Top Secret
From : .CINCPAC COMINCH
Date : 5 January 1942. PPPPPPPP
Decoded by: Canning OPNAV
Paraphrased by : Reiss
050547 CR0804
Withdrawals of Army bombers and Navy patrol planes from this theatre even
though temporary for other projects leave us dangerously weak against aircraft
carrier and other forms of attack. Retention of Oahu is by no means assured
with present available forces. Navy patrol wings should be increased to 144
planes composed of both seaplane and landplane types for maintenance effective
search. Carrier squadrons should be filled and kept filled to full allowance of
spares to insure maximum effective seaborne striking force. To maintain even
present daily search imposes greater load on material and personnel than can be
much longer continued. See my 041001. See Commanding General Hawaiian
Departments despatch of even date to War Department with which CINCPAC
strongly concurs. ComdGeniHaw Detp informed by mail.
Distribution
COMINCH. Action
Record Copy— 11 12 38 OPDO NAVAIDE 16 Personal
CINCPAC WAROP File 20OF File
WAROPS Secret
Top Secret
EXHIBIT NO. 128
June 4th, 1941.
Air Mail
The Honorable The Attorney Generai,,
Washinffton. D. C.
(Attention: Wendell Berge, Assistant Attorney General.)
Sir : Reference is made to your letter dated May 22. 1941 in which you asked
my opinion concerning the prosecution of the several Japanese Sub-Consular
Agents in Hawaii and also my radiogram of May 31, 1941 relative to the same
matter.
Immediately after receiving your letter, I contacted Mr. R. L. Shivers, Special
Agent in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Agent F. G. Tillman,
who has been assigned to Japanese matters exclusively. Although I have been
aware of this general situation for some time, n<» reports concerning these mat-
ters have been submitted to this office. Mr. Shivers brought with him, at my
request, a copy of the investigative report of Special Agent F. G. Tillman, dated
at Honolulu. March 10, 1941. in reference to ITSUO HAMADA, concerning a
violation of the Registration Act. From my c(mversation with Mr. Shivers and
Mr. Tillman and from the information set out in the report. I think that a suc-
cessful prosecution could be had against this individual and other Japanese
Sub-Consular Agents in the Territory if the facts are substantially the same in
all of these cases. Mr. Shivers advises me that about forty of these cases have
been Investigated completely and wQuld be ready for immediate prosecution,
and that the facts in the remaining two hundred or so are approximately the
same and they could be brought up to date with very little notice.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2871
In a conference with representatives of the Army and Navy in which Captain
I. M. Mayfiehl represented the Admiral of the 14th Naval District and Colonel
M. W. Marsden represented the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment, Captain Mayfield state<i tliat it was the opinion of the Admiral that prose-
cution should he instituted immediately against these Japanese Suh-Consular
Agents and that it should he han<lled in a routine manner so as to cause as little
disturbance as possible. Colonel Marsden stated that it was the opinion of
the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department who is chai-ged with the
internal security of the Islands, that prosecution at this time would be detri-
mental to the general plans of the Army and would prob.ibly have a had effect
on work already done. It is also the Commanding Genei-al's oi)inion that the
majority of the American citizens of Japanese ancestry will be loyal to the
United States and tliat prosecution at this time of the Sub-Consular Agents
would oidy tend to aggravate the situation and probably materially effect the
loyalty of these individuals. The Army has conveyed the opinion to the Japanese
population as a whole that they will be taken care of and given full protection of
the law if they are lo.val to the United States.
It is my opinion that these prosecutions should be instituted at the earliest
possible time if they do not conflict with any policy of the State Department or
other Departments of the Government. I think it has been cleaily developed
from investigation that these Sub-Consular Agents exercise an enormous inllu-
ence on the Japanese popuhitiftn in the Terrritory and all evidence indicates the
fact that they Jire the scmrces of information for the Consul and the Agents
througli whom he delivers his instructions to the Japanese in the Territory.
I think that if we evei- hope to divorce the influence of the Consul and Tokyo
fioni the Japanese people in the Territory of Hawaii, it shoiild be begun imme-
diately and that this would be one of the best steps in that direction.
During the conference with the Ainiy and Navy and other conferences that
I have had with individuals in Honolulu in reference to this situation, it is im-
possible to predict just what reaction the Japanese population as a whole in
the Territory would have to such a step, but it is my opinion that the good that
would be done would far (mtweigh any evil that might result.
No further action will be taken on this matter until advice is received from
you.
Re.spectfully,
AMT : JB
Angus M. Taylor. Jr.,
United States Attonieij,
District of Huicaii.
A true copy. Attest :
/S/ Thomas C. Hart,
Admiral, U. S. Knrj/. Retired,
Exumi)iitig Officer.
Exhibit 32 (2).
Wendell Berge
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Justice,
Washington, June 13, 19'il.
Re: Co 800.01B11 Registration— Koike, Yoshio
The Honorable The Secretary of State.
Sir: This will acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated June 11, 1941, in
the above-entitled matter, in reply to our letter of April 10, IJMl. It is under-
stood that you have also receiveil a number of investigative reports from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation concerning Japanese consular officers in Hawaii.
The Criminal Division has concluded from the investigative reixnts that these
individuals have acted as agents of the Japanese Government. It appears that
the Japane.se Government requires detailed reports cfnicerning the lives and
activities of all per.sons in Hawaii whom it considers as Japanese citizens. How-
ever, the Japanese Goveriunent seems unwilling to emi»loy the necessary ccm-
sular staff to carry (tut this program. To accompli-sh its jjurpose, it appoints
numerous Japane.se citizens in Hawaii as agents to aid in this work. While these
agents receive no compen.sation from the Japanese Government, they are com-
missioned to act, and apparently can only act, with the consent of the Japanese
2872 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Government; their activities are for the benefit of the Japanese Government;
and their work is in furtlieranoe of matters require<l by the Japanese Government.
Apparently none «»f tiiese agents have been notified to the Secretary of State,
but there remains the question of whether or not they are "diplomatic or consular
officers or attaches". It is the view of the Criminal Division that they cannot
be so considered and that they have, therefore, violated Section 233 of Title 22
of the United States Code.
It is noted that you have inquired of the Japanese Embassy to ascertain
whether forms have been forwarded by the Enibassy to the Department of State
with regard to all Japanese Government officials on whose behalf exemption
is claimed from the provisions of the Act approved June in, 1917, and certain
other acts, and that you will advise us further in this matter when an answer
is received from the Japanese Emrbassy.
The United States Attorney for the District of Hawaii has recommended that
pi"Osecutions should be instituted at the earliest possible date against these agents
for violation (»f said Se^'tion 233, if said prosecutions do not conflict with any
policy of the Department of State or other Department. He states that the good
that would be done in restricting the enormous Japanese influence in Hawaii
would far outweigh any evil that might result.
It will be greatly appreciated if you will advise us as soon as possible whether
or not the Department of State considers these agents as "diplomatic or consular
officers or attaches" and of any statement the Department of State may be pleased
to make with reference to the contemplated prosecutions.
Respectfully,
For the Attorney General,
Wendell Berge,
Assistant Attorney Oeneral.
June 26, 194L
In reply refer to
Co 800.01B11 Registration— Koike, Yoshio
The Honorable Robert H. Jackson,
Attorney General.
My Dear Mb. Attorney General : I acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Berge's let-
ter of June 13, 1941 in regard to the matter entitled "Yoshio Koike — Registration
Act".
With reference to the inquiry concerning the status of Koike and other indi-
viduals whose names have been set forth in reports received from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation who are said to be performing certain services on
behalf of the Japanese Government in Hawaii, I may say that while this De-
partment has no information concerning the personal status of these individuals
with reference to the Japanese Government, they are not considered to have the
status of diplomatic or consular officers or attaches who are accredited to this
Government and, accordingly, the Department perceives no objection to the con-
templated prosecution of these individuals for violation of the provisions of
Title VIII of the Act of June 15, 1917 (Title 22, United States Code, section 233).
Sincerely yours,
Dean Acheson,
Assistant Secretary.
OR Co:EDK:MJY PR LE FE PA/H A-B
Department of State.
Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
August 13, 1941.
JWB
PA/H
MMH
In reference to the attached file, 800.01B11 Registration Koike, Yoshio/8, you
may note that :
Under date June 26, 1941. the Department wrote to the Attorney General, in
reference to re|M)rts received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation concern-
ing the performing of certain services in Hawaii on behalf of the Japanese
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2873
Government, stated that the Department i)erceives no objection to prosecution of
the persons concerned for violation of the provisions of the Act of 1917 requiring
the notification to the Department <»f agents of foreign goveriunenls.
The Secretary of War. in a letter of July 2o, 1941, to the Attorney General
on the same subject, expressed oppositicm to the proposed prosecutions and
strongly recommended that a warning be issued to any unregistered Japanese
Consular agents.
A copy of the July 25 letter of the Secretary of War was supplied to this De-
partment by the Department of Justice under cover of a letter of August 4, 1941,
which states that the enclosure is being transmitted to this Department for its
"information". The Department of .lustice does not indicate what is to be its
decision in the matter of the proposed prosecutions : but the fact that the objec-
tions of the Secretary of War are connnunicated to the Department gives rise to
the inference that the Department of Justice is not at present contemplating
proceeding with the prosecutions.
800.01Z11 Registration Koike, Yoshio/8
FE : Coville : MBW
#
Wendell Bebc;e
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Justice,
Washington, August Jf, 1941.
Re: Japanese Consular Agents in Hawaii, Your File Co. 800.01B11 — Registra-
tion, Koike, Yoshio
The Honorable, the Secretaky of State :
Sib: Reference is made to your letter dated June 26, 1941, concerning the
prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii under Section 233 of Title
22, United States Code.
There is inclosed herewith for your information a photostatic copy of a letter
dated July 25, 1941, from the Secretary of War, concerning this matter.
Respectfully,
/s/ Wendell Berge.
Assistant Attorney General.
War Department,
Washington, July 25, 1941-
The Honorable The Attorney General.
Dear Mr. Attorney General: Upon receipt of your letter of July 14, 1941 on
the subject of the prosecution of certain unregistered .Japanese consular agents
in the Territory of Hawaii I dispatched a secret radiogram io the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, directing him, to radio his recommendations
stating clearly his reasons and objections if any to the proposed prosecutions.
A paraphrased copy of his reply is attached hereto.
I concur in the statements and objections set forth by the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, and strongly recommend that a warning be
issued to these unregistered Japanese consular agents, through their accredited
Consul General in Honolulu, to register by a certain date, say within a period
of thirty days after promulgation of the warning, under penalty of prosecution
for violation of our laws.
I believe that .such a warning will effect the desired registration and con-
tribute materially toward the Connuanding General's campaign to secure the
loyalty of the Japanese population of the Territory.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Henry L. Stimson,
Hecretury of War.
1 Inclosure: Paraphrase of Radiogram.
2874 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Paraphrase ok Code Radiogram Reckived at the War Depautment at 9 : 58,
July 22, 1941
Hawaii, filed July 21. 1941.
We are at present engiiged in a counter propaganda campaign whose object
is to encourage loyalty of the Japanese populati(ni of Hawaii on promise of fair
treatment. The pre.sent outlook of results of this campaign on entire popula-
tion is very favortible. Success of the campaign would promote unity and
greatly reduce proiH)rtions of our defense problem. Espionage Act of June 15,
1917 referred to in your radio of July 19, 1941 has been in effect here since
August 1939 with no attempt at local enforcement. As result of careful survey
of situation, considering available facts and opinions FBI and other Federal
agencies I believe not over ten per cent of the unregistered consular agents
in Hawaii are aware they have violated our laws. I believe further that
prosecution at this time would unduly alarm entire population and jeopardize
success our current campaign to secure loyalty Japanese population.
In my opinion fair play demands that warnings be given to consular agents
to register by a certain date on penalty of prosecution. I believe development
of loyalty among Japanese population more important than punishment of a few
individuals. It is impracticable to place total Japanese population of one
hundred sixty thousand in concentration camps.
Short.
V
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