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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 18 
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 129 THROUGH 1S6 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

i^, JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAEL HAEBOR ATTACK 
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

;,. (As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 18 

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 129 THROUGH 156 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
79716 WASHINGTON : 1946 



\'l<f^ '■ Pi If ,9^ 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL / 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS. Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Mlchl- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFB, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 



(Throagh January 14, 1946) 

William D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JULE M. Hannafoed, Assistant Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 

Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samdel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel 
JOHN E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Pari 


Pages 


Transcript 


Xo. 




pages 


1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


2 


401- 982 


1059- 2586 


3 


983-1583 


2587- 4194 


4 


1585-2063 


4195- 5460 





2065-2492 


5461- 6646 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


7 


2921-3378 


7889- 9107 


8 


3379-3927 


9108-10517 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


11 


5153-5560 


13709-14765 



Hearings 



Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19 
Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 
Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 
Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18 
Dec. 31, 1945, and 
Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 
Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 
Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1 
Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 
Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, 
Apr. 9 and 11, and 



, 20, and 21, 1945. 

30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 
11, 12, and 13, 1945. 

19, 20, and 21, 1945. 
Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 

19, and 21, 1946. 

26, 28, and 29, 1946. 
, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 
, 13, and 14, 1946. 

and 20, 1946. 

May 23 and 31. 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 

Part 

Xo. Exhibits Nos. 

12 1 through 6. 

13 7 and 8. 

14 9 through 43. 

15 44 through 87. 

16 88 through 1 10. 

17 111 through 128. 

18 129 through 156. 

19 157 through 172. 

20 173 through 179. 

21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 

22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



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00 

3 

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XI 



t 
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p +J 



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XII 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



>iai 



^'V. 



V 

s 
t 

a 
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c3 



a 
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c 
c 

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CO 



fo 



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Q.S'-s 
XJ -^ O 
45 02 bC 

x; . bc 

S ►. Si 
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bC o 



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bC 

l§ 

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to o 

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DC CO 

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02 T3 






bC 


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a;"C 


aj 


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la 
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OS lO 

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•-c!, 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



xin 



s 

< 

c 



"S 



m O 

OS 

a; - 
o « 






Is 

•m O 

o3 > 



J3 fl 



go 

O o3 

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r-- Q5 



c o 

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W o 

IS bC 

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2 = 



« bC 
<V bC 

Q = 

l-i 

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0) O-fi 



bChN 

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O CO QJ 

TO a*^ 

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kC 




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XIV 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



K r-i 



5 Q 



iJQ 









•^ a: 

J- 0/ 



t:tci 



si o 
5!^ 



o3-r- 
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O O 

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is -Jl 



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0.0 c 



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S- -f t^ X 00" 



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OS-^ 


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1-H 1 


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wg 

























INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



XV 



Xi 

CO 



n^ 


3 


fe 


►-S 


B 


>> 


eS 


u 


■c 


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>o 


lO 


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10 


10 


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10 


10 


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<-< 1 


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IC 1 


10 1 


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<D 1 


1 


OS ■* 


o>^ 


OJ-< 


05'-< 


05^ 


Os—i 


05^ 


05-H 


05'-H 


Oi^ 


05'-i 


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oec 


oco 


OfO 


OCC 


000 


oco 


oeo 


oe«5 


OCC 


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C^ 1 


C^ 1 


(N 1 


(N 1 


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(N 1 


(N 1 


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C^ 


c<> 


C<l 


01 


(N 


(N 


w 


(N 


C<l 





s 



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XVI 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



o o 



'S S 0) 
bC 03 c 

C-Q.5 

3 «3 . 

£ ^' • 

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>i c c 

OJ t, 03 
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OJ 03 



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03 iS o 

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O e3 OJ 



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= £^i^ 

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£ "oa 
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sl 

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XI c 
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c 
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IXDEX OF EXHIBITS 



XVII 



w. 






' « 5 ii ■ 



Sec 



01 -r: 



is^e 



1X3 « 



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79716 O— 46-+-i>t. 18- 



XVIII 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



3 a> 

I- 1— ( 

o • 
« c 

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a - 

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Co '"9 -t^ 

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si 

«7 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



XIX 






o3 .23 



o 






X3 

c 

03 

O 
bC 

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m "s 



o i 
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-0 

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t-7 






NC^ C«C<I 






XX 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



n9 




« S e s 



^ 


ei 


Q 


OS 


M 


-*J 


C 


O 


C 














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83 


a 


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CC 



OS 



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u go 

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cc 


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« CO 

ST ST 



^ 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



XXI 




w 


N 


c« 


e« 


ec 


lO 


^ 


ec 


o 


lO 


CO 


,_, 


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cc 


cc 


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CO 




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US 


« 


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XXII 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 






.S « 

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0) « 



tc 


QJ 


-fj 


OS 






0) 




s 

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^ 
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a 




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Q 


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93 

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1-4 


CO 

ft 


CO 


CO 


CO 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



XXIII 



="3 



a 



"^ 2 »« 2 •« 

s « Si a s 

•a 5- ID'S § 

•rt ^^ rt ej a; 

c ^ ■■■ 

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« IT ° « 

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O '-' O C 08 
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XXIV 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2875 

EXHIBIT NO. 129 



2876 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2877 



Navy Department, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, May 26, 1941. 
Op-12B-5-McC 
(SC)A16(R-5) 
Serial 060512 

From: The Chief of Naval Operations. 
To: Distribution List for WPL-46. 

Subject: Promulgation of Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46). 

Enclosures: 

(A) Pages for WPL-46, Registered No. 92, including List of Effective Pages. 

(B) Receipt form in duplicate. 

1. Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46) is promulgated herewith. 

2. Report receipt, and check of contents, on the form provided as enclosure (B). 

3. The highest priority in the preparation of war plans is assigned to plans 
required by WPL-46. 

4. It is desired that the preparation and distribution of these plans be accom- 
plished with the least possible delav. To this end, all planning based upon the 
directives of WPL-13, WPL-14. WPL-42, and WPL-44 will be discontinued 
until plans based upon WPL-46 are completed. 

5. Appendix II, Chapter IX, prescribing the coinposition of the Naval Trans- 
portation Service will be issued as a change to this plan. If this plan is executed 
prior to the issue of Chapter IX, specific directives will be issued to provide for 
the initial .sea transportation requirements of the plan. 

6. The extreme importance of the security of this Navy Basic War Plan — 
Rainbow No. 5, cannot be over-emphasized. In this respect, attention is invited 
to the instructions contained in "The System of War Planning", and in the 
"Registered Publication Manual'^ 

7. Plans and estimates of requirements for the preparation for war service of 
vessels to be taken over from private sources, as indicated in the tables of Appendix 
II, will be classified as confidential. Attention is invited to paragraph 1105 of 
WPL-8. 

[ii] 8. This plan shall not be carried in aircraft except by authority of the 
Chief of Naval Operations, and when not in u.se shall be kept in Class "A" 
stowage as prescribed in the "Registered Publication Manual". 

9. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY POR- 
TIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY 
FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT IN SUBORDI- 
NATE PLANS BASED UPON THIS PUBLICATION. 

H. R. Stark. 



[ill] 



Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5. 

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES 



Subject Matter 



Letter of Promulgation, CNO Secret Serial 060512, (SC)A16(R-5) 
of May 26, 1941. 

List of Effective Pages _ 

Table of Corrections . 

Distribution List 

Title Page 

Table of Contents _ 

Introduction 

Part I _... 



V, VK 

1 



Original 

Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 

' I'aj;es referred to are inilieated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent i)ages 
of original exhibit. 



Chart 

Part I (Cont'd). 

Part II 

Part III 

Part IV 

Part V 

Appendix I 



Page or Sheet No. ' 



2 to 4 inc.. 
5 to 8 inc.-. 

9, 10__ 

11 

12 

13, 14 

15 to 60 inc. 
61 to 80 inc. 

81,82 

1 to 51 inc. - 



Change 
in Effect 



2878 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Navy Basic War Plan — Rainboic No. 5 — Continued 
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAiGlES— Continued 



Subject Matter 

Appendix II: 

Title Page 

Chapter I 

Chapter II 

Table ATF-1... 

Chapter III 

Table PAF-1... 

Table PAF-2.. 

Chapter IV: 

Table SEP-1_ 

Chapter V: 

Table ASF-1 

Chapter VI___- 

Table NE-1 

Table NE-2 

Chapter VII: 

Table CNO-1 , 

Chapter VIII .. 

Table NACF. 

Table SCF _ 

Table CACF 

Table PACF. 

Table PSCF 

Table PNCF.... 

Table HCF .. 

Table PhCF 

Chapter IX.-. 



Page or Sheet No. ' 



1 

2.3. 

4,5 

1 to 3 inc. 

6 

1 to 3 inc- 
1 

1 

1,2- 

7... 

1... 

1 

1.. 

8 to 10 inc 
1 to 5 inc. 
1 to 4 inc- 

1,. 

1 

1 to 3 inc- 

1 

1.... 

1 

11 



Change 
in Effect 



Original 
Original 
Oritrinal 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 

Original 

Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 

Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 
Original 



• Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages 
of orfginal exhibit. 
Uv] TABLE OF CORRECTIONS 



R. P. M. or Change No. 


Date of 
entry 


Signature and rank of officer entering change. 


1 


26-7-14 


Marion L. Monsen Ens. U. S. N. R. 







Navy Department, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, June 3, 1941- 
Op-12B-5-McC 
(SC)A16(R-5) 

Serial 064112 ^ 

Secret 

From: The Chief of Naval Operations. 
To: The Distribution List for WPI^46. 
Subject: Change No. 1, WPL-46. 

1. Make the following pen and ink corrections to WPL-46: 

(a) On Page 45 

Paragraph 3511.a.2.(f), first line— Change 13,400 to 6,400. 
Paragraph 3511.a.2(g), first line — Change 23,600 to 12,600. 
Paragrat)h 3511.a.2.(i), first line— Change 44,000 to 23,000. 

(b) On Page 80 

Paragraph 4601, first line, — after "will be" insert "prepared as". 

(c) On Page SO of Appendix I 

Paragraph 51. a. (13), first line — Change 13,400 to 6,400. 
Paragraph 51. a. (14), first line— Change 23,600 to 12,600. 

(d) On Page 31 of Appendix I 

Paragraph 51. a. (16), first line — (Change 44,000 to 23,000. 

2. Insert this letter in the front of WPL-46. 

3. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the 
addressees in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore 
authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the 
continental limits of the United States. 

R. E. Ingersoll, Acting. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2879 

[VI DISTRIBUTION LIST 

Official to whom issued Registered Nos 

Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. - 1 

Commander, Battle Force 2 

Commander, Battleships, Battle Force.. - - - 3 

Commander, Battleship Division One (issue withheld) - 4 

Commander, Battleship Division Two (issue withheld) - 5 

Commander, Battleship Division Three 6 

Commander, Battleship Division Five - - - 7 

Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force.. - 8 

Commander, Cruiser Division Three, Battle Force - 9 

Commander, Destroyers, Battle Force 10 

Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force. - - - 11 

Commander, Minecraft. Battle Force -- --- --- 12 

Commander, Scouting Force - 13 

Commander, Cruisers, Scouting Force - - 14 

Commander, Aircraft, Scouting Force - 15 

Commander, Submarines, Scouting Force — - - 16 

Commander, Base Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet 17 

Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet. 18 

Commander, Cruisers, Atlantic Fleet. - 19 

Commander, Cruiser Division Two, Atlantic Fleet - 20 

Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet - - - 21 

Commander, Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet 22 

Commander, Submannes, Atlantic Fleet - 23 

Commander, Support Force, Atlantic Fleet - - --- 24 

Commander, Train, Atlantic Fleet -- 25 

Commander in Chief. U. S. Asiatic Fleet --- 26 

Commanding General, Fleet Marine Division --- 27 

Commanding General, Second Marine Division - - 28 

Operations— Director, War Plans Division. - 29,30,31 

— Director, Naval Intelligence Division - 32 

—Director, Naval Communications Division --- 33 

— Director. Fleet Maintenance Division.. -- 34 

— Director, Ship Movements Division... - 35 

— Director, Naval Districts Division 36 

—Director, Naval Transportation Service (Issued to Director, Ship Movements 

D i vision) - - - 37 

Chief of Bureau of Navigation -.- 38,39 

Chief of Bureau of Ordnance. 40 

Chief of Bureau of Ships - - - 41 

Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks -- 42 

Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics. - -- -- 43 

Chief of Bureau of Supplies and Accounts ' 44,45 

Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery ■ . 46 

[VI] Judge Advocate General, U. S. Navy 47 

Major General Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps. -. 48 

Director, Shore Establishment Division (Oificeof Assistant Secretary of the Navy) 49 

War Plans Division, General Staff, War Department 50 

President, Naval War College. 51 

Commandant, First Naval District... - 52,53 

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland 54 

Commandant, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N. H 55 

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newport, R. I. 56 

Commandant, Third Naval District. - 57,58 

Commandant, Fourth Naval District— 59,60 

Commandant, Fifth Naval District 61,62 

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Bermuda 63 

Commandant, Sixth Naval District - 64,65 

Commandant, Seventh Naval District .-.' - 66 

Commandant, Eighth Naval District—. .-. 67,68 

Commandant, Ninth Naval District 69 

Commandant, Tenth Naval District 70 

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba 71 

Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Trinidad .-. 72 

Commandant, Eleventh Naval District - -- 73,74 

Commandant, Twelfth Naval District 75,76 

Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District. 77,78 

Commandant. Fourteenth Naval District 79 

Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District 80 

Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District .-. 81 

Commanding General. Department of Pacific, U. S. Marine Corps, San Francisco, California.— 82 

Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va.. 83 

Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, San Diego, Calif 84 

Commandant, Naval Station, Tutuila, Samoa— - 85 

United States Military Mission in London 86,87 

United States Naval Attache, Ottawa, Canada... 88 

British Military Mission in Washington 89 

U. S. Naval Attache, Melbourne, Australia - 90 

Registered Publication Section, — Working Copy 91 

Registered Publication Section, —Library Copy .-. - 92 

Registered Publication Section, —Reserve Copies -.. 93, 

94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107 



2880 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Op-12B-McC Navy Dkpahtment, 

(SC)A16(R-5) Officer of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Serial 071912 Washington, July 1, 1941. 

Secret 

From: The Chief of Naval Operations. 

To: The Distribution List for WPL-46. 

Subject: The establishment of Naval Coastal Frontiers. 

Reference : 

(a) GO No. 142. 

(b> GO No. 143. 

(c) WPL-46. 

1. The Naval Coastal Frontiers prescribed in paragraphs 3122, 3232 and 3312 
of WPL-46 are hereby established. 

2. The boundaries of the Naval Coastal Frontiers are as prescribed in Annex I, 
Appendix I, WPL-46. 

3. The command relations prescribed in Part III, Chapter I, Section 3, and 
Part III, Chapter II, Section 4, of WPL-46, are hereby made effective and, in 
accordance with the provisions of these sections, the conflicting provisions of 
General Order No. 142 are suspended. 

4. For the present, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces as prescribed in General 
Order No. 143 will not be formed. Vessels assigned to Naval Districts and Naval 
Stations will continue in these assignments, and, until further orders, new assign- 
ments of vessels will be made to Naval Districts or Naval Stations, rather than to 
Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, Naval Coastal Forces, or Naval Local Defense 
Forces. 

5. The Bureau of Navigation will issue orders assigning officers to additional 
duties as Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers as indicated: 

Commandant, 3rd Naval District — Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal 

Frontier; 
Commandant, 6th Naval District — Commander, Southern Naval Coastal 

Frontier; 
Commandant, 10th Naval District — Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal 

Frontier; 
Commandant, 15th Naval District — Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Fron- 
tier; 
Commandant, 12th Naval District — Commander, Pacific Southern Naval 

Frontier; 
Commandant, 13th Naval District — Commander, Pacific Northern Naval 

Frontier; 
Commandant, 14th Naval District — Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal 

Frontier; 
Commandant, 16th Naval District — Commander, Philippine Naval Coastal 

Frontier. 

6. The establishment of the Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the orders to the 
commanders thereof, is assigned a RESTRICTED classification. The limits of 
the Naval Coastal Frontiers remains in a SECRET classification. Correspond- 
ence relating to Naval Coastal Frontiers will be classified according to its nature. 

7. Transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental 
limits of the United States is authorized. 

/s/ H. R. Stark. 
[1] W. P. L.— 46 

NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN— RAINBOW NO. 5, UNITED STATES 

NAVY 

[S] TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Subject Page ' 

Introduction: 

Chapter I. Origin, Basis, and Scope of this Plan - 5 

Chapter II. Execution of this Plan 6 

Section 1. Execution of the Entire Plan - 6 

Section 2. Execution of a part of this Plan - 7 

Chapter III. Aprcements with Associated Powers other than the British Commonwealth 8 

Part I. Task Organization, Information and Assumptions: 

Chapter I. Task Organization. .. 9 

Chart Areas of Responsibility of the Associated Powers — 11 

Chapter II. Information and .\ssumptions -- 12 

' Pa^es referred to are indicated by italic fl^ures enclosed by brackets and represent pages 
of original exhibit. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2881 

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued 

Subject Page' 

Part II. Outline of Tasks: 

Ciiapter I. Concept of tiie War. , - - 13 

Ciiapter II. The General Task - 14 

Part III. Assignment of Tasks: 

Chapter I. Forces in the Western Atlantic Area - - 15 

Section 1. The U. S. Atlantic Fleet - - 15 

Section 2. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces - 21 

Sections. Command Relations - - - -- 25 

Chapter II. Forces in the Pacific Area -- 27 

Section 1. The U. S. Pacific Fleet _ - -.. 27 

Section 2. The Southeast Pacific Force... - - 31 

Section 3. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces 33 

Section 4. Command Relations 36 

Chapter III. Forces in the Far East Area 38 

Section 1. The U. S. Asiatic Fleet and the Philippine Naval Coastal Frontier 38 

Chapter IV. Forces in the United Kingdom and British Home Waters Area, 42 

Section 1. The U. S. Naval Forces, North Europe.. 42 

Chapter V. The Services _ -- 44 

Section 1. The Naval Transportation Service 44 

Section 2. The Naval Communication Service .-- 47 

Section 3. The Naval Intelligence Service - - --. 48 

Chapter VI. The Shore Establishment --- 49 

Chapter VII. Instructions lointly Applicable to Task Forces 50 

Section 1. Forming the Task Forces. 50 

Section 2. Mobilizat ion ^.. 51 

[.'?] Sections. The Routing and Protection of Shipping .-. 53 

Section 4. Rules of Warfare 58 

Section ,5. Intelligence Liaison between Commanders of Associated Forces in the Field - 60 

Pnri IV. Logistics: 

Chapter I. The Shore Establishment 61 

Chapter II. Oeneral Directives. . 62 

Section 1. Personnel --- 62 

Section 2. Material - 63 

Section 3. Transportation 64 

Section 4. Legal Services -- 66 

Section !>. Augmentation and Maintenance of the Shore Establishment 67 

Section 6. Priorities _ 68 

Chapter III. The Operating Forces and Services - - 69 

Section 1. Preparation for War Service ^ 69 

Section 2. Maintenance - 73 

Section 3. Augmentation 77 

Chapter I V . Ad vanced Bases 78 

Chapter V. Salvage . 79 

Chapter VI. Plans to be prepared by the Shore Establishment 80 

Part V. Special Provisions: 

Chapter I. Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure 81 

Chapter II. .loint Plans Covering Intelligence Service, Censorship and Publicity, and Mobiliza- 
tion of Resources 82 

APPENDICES 

Appendix I. The Joint .\rmy and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 1-36 

Annex I. Coastal Frontiers 37-51 

[4] Appendix II. The Composition of Forces 

Title Page 1 

C hapter I . Introduction . 2 

Chapter II. The U. S. Atlantic Fleet 4 

Table ATF-1 --- --- - - Sheets 1 to 3 

Chapter III. The U. S. Pacific Fleet -- 6 

Table PAF-l Sheets 1 to 3 

Table PAF-2- - Sheet 1 

Chapter IV. The Southeast Pacific Force 

Table SEP-1 - _•- Sheet 1 

Chapter V. The U. S. Asiatic Fleet 

Table ASF-1 - ---- - -- -- Sheets 1,2 

Chapter VI. U. S. Naval Forces, North Europe - 7 

Table NE-1 Sheet 1 

Table NE-2 - Sheet 1 

Chapter VII. Vessels Operating under the Chief of Naval Operations 

Table CNO-l... - - --- - Sheet 1 

Chapter VIII. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces - 8 

Table NACF - -- ..-- Sheets 1 to 5 

Table SCF Sheets 1 to 4 

Table CACF - Sheet 1 

Table PACE ---- - Sheet 1 

Table PSCF - Sheets 1 to 3 

Table PNCF ..-. Sheet 1 

Table IICF -- Sheet 1 

Table PhCF - Sheet 1 

Chapter IX. Naval Transportation Service _. H 

' Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages 
of original exhibit. 



2882 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[6] Introduction 

chapter i. origin, basis, and scope ov this plan 

0101. This Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 was prepared under the 
direction of the Chief of Naval Operations. 

0102. It is based upon the Report of the United States-British Staflf Conver- 
sations (Short Title ABC-1), the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan 
(Short Title ABC-22), and the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan— Rainbow 
No. 5. 

0103. The United States-British Staflf Conversations (ABC-1) and the Joint 
Canada-United States Defense Plan (ABC-22) will be given only a limited dis- 
tribution to holders of this plan. These documents are referred to in this plan 
by their short titles. Their essential features, so far as concerns war operations, 
are incorporated in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5, 
which is included in this plan as Appendix I. 

0104. This plan provides for the initial organization, composition of forces and 
tasks for the Naval Establishment in a Rainbow No. 5 War. 

0105. After the execution of this plan has been directed, no attempt will be 
made to maintain the tables of Appendix II corrected up to date. Changes in 
the composition of forces will be made by direction of the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions and shown subsequently in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization 
of the Seagoing Forces of the U. S. Navy," and in the "Assignment of Units to 
Naval Districts and Naval Stations." 

[6] CHAPTER n. EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN 

Section 1. EXECUTION OF THE ENTIRE PLAN 

0211. a. Upon the receipt of the following ALNAV despatch, the Naval 
Establishment will proceed with the execution of this plan in its entirety, includ- 
ing acts of war: "EXECUTE NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN RAINBOW No. 5". 

b. The date of the above despatch will be M-day unless it has been otherwise 
designated. 

[7] Section 2. EXECUTION OF A PART OF THIS PLAN 

0221. A preliminary period of strained relations of uncertain duration is antici- 
pated, during which time certain preliminary steps provided for in this plan may 
be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

0222. Mobilization may be directed prior to directing the execution of this plan 
or any part, thereof. The order to mobilize does not authorize acts of war. 

0223. This plan may be executed in part by a despatch indicating the nations 
to be considered enemy, the tasks to be executed, or excepted, and the preliminary 
measures to be taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan or addi- 
tional tasks thereof. 

[8] CHAPTER III. AGREEMENTS WITH ASSOCIATED POWERS OTHER THAN THE 

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH 

0301. The substance of agreements reached with Associated Powers other than 
those with the British Commonwealth, including Canada, insofar as they relate 
to the operation of naval forces, will be made available to the holders of this plan, 
as soon as made, by revision of this Chapter III of the Introduction. 

0302. Brazil, for the purposes of defense of the Western Hemisphere, has 
agreed to permit United States naval forces to use the ports of RECIFE and 
BAHIA. 

a. There is at present no time limit on the duration of stay in these ports. 

b. They are available for refreshment and upkeep, and for the purchase and 
delivery of fuel, consumable supplies and fresh provisions within the limited 
cap>acities of the ports. 

c. A United States Naval Observer is stationed at eac)i port. 

d. On first entry, two days confidential advance notice of arrival should be 
given to the United States Naval Observer at the port via the United States 
Naval Attache, Rio de Janeiro. This notice should include information in regard 
to communicable diseases and last port visited. Pratique and customs clearance 
are not required. 

e. For repeated entry, incident to extended op>eration8 in the vicinity, local 
arrangemeints as to notice may be made with the Brazilian Captain of the Port, 
through the United States Naval Observer. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2883 

[9] Part I. Task Organization. Information and Assumptions 

CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION 

1101. The task organization, by which this Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow 
No. 5 will be executed, under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, is 
prescribed below: 

a. THE OPERATING FORCES, under command of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, 

1. THE UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET, under command of 
the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. 

2. THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, under command of the 
Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. 

3. THE UNITED STATES SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, under 
command of the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE. 

4. THE UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET, under command of the 
Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET. 

5. THE UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, 
under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, 
NORTH EUROPE. 

6. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, under the command 
of the Commanders, NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, consisting of: 

(a) THE NAVAL COASTAL FORCES; 

(b) THE NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES. 

b. THE SERVICES, under command of the Chief of Naval Operations. 

1. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE. 

2. THE NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE. 

3. THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. 

c. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT, under the direction of the appropriate 
Chiefs of Bureaus, and Heads of Offices of the Navy Department. 

[10] 1102. Major areas of command and instructions concerning responsi- 
bility for the strategic direction of military forces therein are set forth in Appendix 
I, "Section V". In paragraph 3222 of this plan is defined an additional subarea, 
designated as the "SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA." In Annex I, of Ap- 
pendix I, are the sub-areas which are included in the Naval Coastal Frontiers. 

1103. Command over naval forces in the areas and sub-areas for which the 
United States has accepted responsibility for the strategic direction of operations 
will be exercised by the appropriate United States naval commanders listed in 
paragraph 1101 a. of this plan, subject to the special conditions set forth in 
Appendix I, "Section V." 



79716 O— 46 — pt. 18- 



2884 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



(-1 
Ui 

liJ 

'Si 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2885 

[12] CHAPTER II. INFORMATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 

1201. Assumptions are as stated in Appendix I, "Section III." 
[13] Part II. Outline of Tasks 

CHAPTER I. concept OF THE WAR 

2101. The Concept of the War is as stated in Appendix I, "Section IV." 

[14] CHAPTER II. THE GENERAL TASK 

2201. The Joint Army and Navy General Task is set forth in paragraph 24 of 
Appendix I. 

2202. The Navy General Task is as follows: 

a. The Naval Establishment, in cooperation with the Army and the forces of 
the other Associated Powers, will: 

1. Destroy Axis sea communications in the WESTERN ATLANTIC 
AREA, in the PACIFIC AREA east of 180°, and through the MALAY 
BARRIER in the FAR EAST AREA; 

2. Raid Axis forces and sea communications in the PACIFIC and FAR 
EAST AREAS, and in the EASTERN ATLANTIC and the WESTERN 
MEDITERRANEAN; 

3. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers in United 
States Areas, and support the defense of sea communications in the UNITED 
KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, in the FAR EAST 
AREA, and to the eastward of AUSTRALIA; 

4. Prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or 
Asiatic military p>ower, and support the defense of the territory of the Asso- 
ciated Powers in the FAR EAST AREA; and 

5. Prepare to capture the AZORES, CAPE VERDE, MARSHALL, and 
CAROLINE ISLANDS. 

[15] Part III. Assignment of Tasks 

CHAPTER I. forces IN THE WESTERN ATLANTIC AR£A 

Section 1. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET 

3111. The U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET (Chapter II, Appendix II) will initially 
be organized into task forces as follows: 

a. OCEAN ESCORT; 

b. STRIKING FORCE; 

c. SOUTHERN PATROL FORCE; 
• d. SUBMARINE FORCE ONE; 

e. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO; 

f. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE; 

g. NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE; 

h. U. S. NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA; 
i. ADDITIONAL TASK FORCES AS DIRECTED BY THE COM- 
MANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. 

3112. The U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within 
the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA: 

a. TASK 

PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED 
POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING, AS 
REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY 
RAIDING FORCES (see Part III, Chapter V, Section 1) ; 

b. TASK 

DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR 
DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY 
WITH THE ENEMY; 
[16] c. TASK 

PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS 
AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY MILITARY POWER 
INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, BY DESTROYING HOSTILE 
EXPEDITIONARY FORCES AND BY SUPPORTING LAND AND 



2886 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE OF LAND 
POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE; 

d. TASK 

IN COOPERATION WITH BRITISH FORCES AND THE U. S. 
ARMY, DEFEND BERMUDA IN CATEGORY "C": 

e. TASK 

COVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE U. S. NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER FORCES; 

f. TASK 

PREPARE TO OCCUPY THE AZORES AND THE CAPE VERDE 
ISLANDS. 

3113. a. So far as practicable, the naval forces in the WESTERN ATLANTIC 
AREA will be covered and supported against attack by superior enemy surface 
forces, by the naval forces of the Associated Powers which are operating from 
bases in the UNITED KINGDOM and the EASTERN ATLANTIC. 

b. Forces operating normally in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH 
HOME WATERS AREA, the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, and the SOUTH 
ATLANTIC AREA, which move temporarily into the WESTERN ATLANTIC 
AREA in pursuance of their assigned tasks, will remain under the strategic direc- 
tion of the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff. They will be supported bv the 
naval forces in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA as necessary and practicable. 

3114. a. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will operate under the strategic direc- 
tion of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until its arrival in 
the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA. 

[17] b. This force will be assigned the following task by the Commander in 
Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET: 

L TASK 

PROCEED FROM BASES IN THE UNITED STATES TO 
GIBRALTAR, WHEN SO DIRECTED BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS. 

c. After arrival of SUBMARINE FORCE TWO in the NORTH ATLANTIC 
AREA this force will execute the following task: 

1. TASK 

RAID ENEMY SHIPPING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH 
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, MEDITERRANEAN, ACTING 
THROUGH THE BRITISH (OR UNITED STATES) FLAG OFFI- 
CER COMMANDING NORTH ATLANTIC. 

d. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will remain a part of the U. S. ATLANTIC 
FLEET for administrative purposes. 

3115. a. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUBMARINE FORCE 
THREE will operate under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief, 
U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM 
AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA. 

b. These forces will each be assigned the following task by the Commander 
in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET: 

1. TASK 

PROCEED FROM BASES IN THE UNITED STATES TO 
BASES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME 
WATERS AREA, WHEN SO DIRECTED BY THE CHIEF OF 
NAVAL OPERATIONS. 

[18] c. Upon arrival in UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME 
WATERS AREA, the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUBMARINE 
FORCE THREE will be detached from the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and be 
assigned to U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE. Their tasks thereafter 
are to be found in Part III, Chapter IV, Section 1. 

3116. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, wiU arrange 
for the logistic support for the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET (see Part IV, Chapter 
III, Section 2) operating in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA from sources 
designated by the Shore Establishment in the continental United States and 
outlying possessions and bases in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, and from 
United States and foreign (outside the British Isles) commercial sources. For 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2887 

this purpose he will employ the transportation facilities of the U. S. ATLANTIC 
FLEET, which will be supplemented, as required, by those of the Naval Trans- 
portation Service. 

b. Logistic support for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, and other United States 
forces operating in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, will be arranged as indicated 
herein. Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service. 

1. Fuel and subsistence stores from United States naval auxiliaries, supple- 
mented as mav be practicable from British sources available in the NORTH 
ATLANTIC AREA. 

2. Personnel, technical supplies, and ammunition from United States 
sources. 

3. Repair and upkeep facilities from tender and cargo vessels, and tem- 
porary shore facilities erected by the United States, supplemented by use of 
available British facilities. 

4. Replacement of British fuel and subsistence stores from United States 
sources. 

[19] c. In emergency circumstances where the transportation facilities of 
the Naval Transportation Service are inadequate for the logistic support of 
SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, or of other U. S. Naval forces operating in the 
NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, the Senior U. S. Naval Officer of forces based in 
that area is authorized to charter, on a time charter basis, vessels immediately 
obtainable by him for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic 
deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be emploved, if available. 

d. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET," will establish in the 
office of the Chief of Naval Operations an officer of the staff of the Commander, 
TRAIN, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, who will have liaison duties with respect 
to the quantities and the transportation of logistic requirements, including per- 
sonnel, for the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. 

e. Logistic support for the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUB- 
MARINE FORCE THREE, after transfer to the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, 
NORTH EUROPE, will be provided as directed in Part III, Chapter IV, Section 1. 

3117. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will require the 
preparation of the following plans: 

1. U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW No. 
5 (Navy Plan 0-3, RAINBOW No. 5); 

2. NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE MOVEMENT PLAN— RAINBOW 
No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-3-A, RAINBOW No. 5), covering the movement of 
this force and the first movement of Army troops to ENGLAND, SCOT- 
LAND, and NORTH IRELAND (See paragraph 3511 a. 2. (b)) ; 

3. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE MOVEMENT PLAN— RAINBOW 
No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-3-B, RAINBOW No. 5) covering the movement of 
this force to the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS 
AREA; 

4. Such other subordinate task force operating [20] plans as the 
Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, may direct, including the 
movement plan for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO. No operating plan for 
SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, for operations after arrival in the NORTH 
ATLANTIC AREA, need be prepared. 

b. 1. Plans listed under a. 1, 2, 3, and 4, will be reviewed by the Chief of 
Naval Operations. 

2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance. 

[21] Section 2. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES 

3121. a. The organization of NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES is 
prescribed in General Order No. 143. 

b. The boundaries of Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frontiers, Coastal 
Zones, Sectors, and Subsectors, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and the 
Navy, 1935", as modified by Annex I of Appendix I. 

3122. The Naval Coastal Frontiers in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA 
are: 

a. THE NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER; 

b. THE SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER; 

c. THE CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER; 

d. THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER. 

1. All tasks assigned to the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 
are contained in this Section, including those for the PACIFIC SECTOR. 



2888 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3123. The NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES (Chapter VIII, Appen- 
dix II) in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA are assigned the following tasks: 

a. TASK 

DEFEND THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER IN CATEGORIES 
INDICATED BELOW: 

CATEGORY B— THE NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER. 
—THE SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER. 
CATEGORY D— TEE CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRON- 
TIER. 
—THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER. 
[22] b. TASK 

PROTECT AND ROUTE SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PART III, CHAPTER VIL SEC- 
TION 3; 
e. TASK 

SUPPORT THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET; 

d. TASK 

SUPPORT ARMY AND ASSOCIATED FORCES WITHIN THE 
COASTAL FRONTIER. 

e. In addition, the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES of the PAN- 
AMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER are assigned the following task: 

1. TASK 

SUPPORT THE U. S. SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE. 

3124. a. The following plans will be prepared: 

1. Local Joint Plans as prescribed in Appendix I, paragraph 48, of this 
plan; 

2. By the Commanders, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER, and SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER: 

(a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plans — RAINBOW No. 6, including 
an annex covering the operating plans of the Naval Coastal Force. (Naval 
Coastal Frontier Plans 0-4, RAINBOW No. 5); 

3. Bv Commanders, CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, 
and PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and by Commandants, 
FIRST, THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, SIXTH, SEVENTH, AND EIGHTH 
NAVAL DISTRICTS: 

[23] (a) Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans — RAINBOW 
No. 5 (Naval District Plans 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5); 
(b) Joint Embarkation Plans as required in Appendix I, paragraph 48; 

4. Additional subordinate task force operating plans as directed by Com- 
manders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, and Commandants of Naval Districts. 

b. 1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans, and other plans prepared by the 
Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, will be reviewed by the Chief of 
Naval Operations. 

2. Operating Plans prepared by the Commandants of Naval Districts will 
be reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers. 

3. Subordinate Task Force Operating Plans will be reviewed by the respec- 
tive Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, or Commandants of Naval 
Districts. 

4. (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Force Operating Plans for the NORTH 
ATLANTIC and SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, -and 
Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans for the CARIBBEAN and 
PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS will be forwarded to the 
Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for comment, prior to their 
review bv the Chief of Naval Operations, with a view to their coordination 
with the' Operating Plans of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. 

(b) Such portions of Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans and 
Naval District Contributory Plans, as relate to the protection of fleet anchor- 
ages and to services to the U. S. [24] ATLANTIC FLEET, will be 
referred to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for com- 
ment, if he so requests. 

5. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance. 

[26] Section 3. COMMAND RELATIONS 

3131. In order to provide for unity of command of task groups of the U. S. 
ATLANTIC FLEET and the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, in 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2889 

the execution of tasks requiring mutual support, the following provisions shall 
apply : 

a. On M-dav, or sooner if directed bv the Chief of Naval Operations, the 
Commander, NORTH ATLANTIC XXVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, the 
SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, the CARIBBEAN NAVAL 
COASTAL FRONTIER, and the Commander, PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER so far as regards operations in the ATLANTIC SECTOR, are 
assigned a dual status as follows: 

1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces 
operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations; 

2. As officers of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, operating under the orders 
of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, in command of 
task groups of that fleet, when and as directed by the Commander in Chief 
thereof. 

b. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, may thereafter require 
the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his command, tempo- 
rarily and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval Coastal Frontier 
Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will, when taking 
temporary command of such task forces, have due regard to the tasks assigned 
in this plan to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers. 

1. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will not require 

task groups of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces to leave the limits of their 

respective Coastal Zones, except in emergency, or upon the authority of the 

Chief of Naval Operations. 

[36] c. Conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended while 

the provisions of this paragraph are in effect. 

S132. The NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA, by this plan is as- 
sigtved as a unit of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, both for administrative and 
tasVi purposes. 

3133. In addition to having general authority over the operation of the Naval 
Local Defense Forces, the Commander, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER and the Commander, SOUTHERNNAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 
have authority to coordinate the activities of the Commandants of the Naval 
Districts within their respective Naval Coastal Frontiers, in matters that concern 
the Naval Communication Service, the Naval Intelligence Service, and the Naval 
Transportation Service. Due consideration will be given to the requirements of 
the tasks assigned to these services by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

3134. a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign temporarily to 
the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft as- 
signed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force. 

b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, Commanders of 
Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by the 
Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense 
Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations. 

3135. Command relations between United States and Canadian Forces will be 
set forth in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5, Appen- 
dix I, after ABC-22 has been approved. 

[27] CHAPTER II. FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AREA 

Section 1. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 

3211. The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET (Chapter III, Appendix II) will be organ- 
ized into task forces as follows: 

a. Task forces as directed bv the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET; 

b. NAVAL STATION, SAMOA; 

c. NAVAL STATION, GUAM. 

3212. The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within the 
PACIFIC AREA: 

a. TASK 

SUPPORT THE FORCES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE 
FAR EAST BY DIVERTING ENEMY STRENGTH AWAY FROM 
THE MALAY BARRIER, THROUGH THE DENIAL AND CAPTURE 
OF POSITIONS IN THE MARSHALLS, AND THROUGH RAIDS ON 
ENEMY SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND POSITIONS; 



2890 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

b. TASK 

PREPARE TO CAPTURE AND ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER 
THE CAROLINE AND MARSHALL ISLAND AREA, AND TO ES- 
TABLISH AN ADVANCED FLEET BASE IN TRUK; 

c. TASK 

DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR 
DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY 
WITH THE ENEMY; 

d. TASK 

SUPPORT BRITISH NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA SOUTH OF 
THE EQUATOR AS FAR WEST AS LONGITUDE 155° EAST: 
[28] e. TASK 

DEFEND SAMOA IN CATAGORY "D"; 

f. TASK 

DEFEND GUAM IN CATAGORY "F"; 

g. TASK 

PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED 
POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING AS 
REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY 
RAIDING FORCES (See Part III, Chapter V, Section 1); 
h. TASK 

PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS 
IN THE PACIFIC AREA AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF 
ENEMY MILITARY POWER INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
BY DESTROYING HOSTILE EXPEDITIONS AND BY SUPPORTING 
LAND AND AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE 
OF LAND POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE; 
i. TASK 

COVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 
FORCES; 
j. TASK 

ESTABLISH FLEET CONTROL ZONES, DEFINING THEIR LIMITS 
FROM TIME TO TIME AS CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE; 
k. TASK 

ROUTE SHIPPING OF ASSOCIATED POWERS WITHIN THE 

FLEET CONTROL ZONES. 

[29] 3213. a. Units assigned to the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT in 

Chapter III, Appendix II, will be transferred from the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, 

to the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, when directed bv the Chief of Naval Operations. 

b. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE (Chapter IV, Appendix II), will be 
established under the immediate command of the Chief of Naval Operations, 
when so directed by that officer. 

c. Until detached, the units assigned to the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT 
and the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE will be under the command of the 
Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and may be employed as desired 
by him, so long as they remain in the PACIFIC AREA. They shall not be sent 
to such distances from PEARL HARBOR as would prevent their arrival in the 
CANAL ZONE twenty-one davs after the Chief of Naval Operations directs their 
transfer from the PACIFIC AREA. 

3214. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will arrange for 
the logistic support of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET from sources in continental 
United States and in the FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT designated by 
the Shore Establishment, and from United States and foreign commercial sources. 
(See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.) For this purpose he will employ the 
transportation facilities of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, which will be supple- 
mented as required by those of the Naval Transportation Service. 

b. To the extent practicable, the services of the Naval Transportation Service 
will be restricted to supplementing the movement of logistic supplies, including 
personnel, between the continental United States and OAHU. 

c. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will establish in the 
Office of the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRON- 
TIER, an officer of the staff of the Commander, BASE FORCE, U. S. PACIFIC 
FLEET, who will have liaison duties with respect to the quantities and trans- 
portation of logistic requirements, including personnel, to be delivered into the 
Fleet Control Zones. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2891 

at his discretion, establish similar liaison officers in the offices of the Commanders 
of other Naval Coastal Frontiers. 

[SO] 3215. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will 
require the following plans to be prepared: 

1. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW 
No. 5 (Navy Plan ai, RAINBOW No. 5); 

2. A plan for the execution of TASK b. of paragraph 3212, assuming the 
availability of approximately 30,000 Army troops in addition to forces of the 
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and assuming that the task will be executed on 
180M; 

3. NAVAL STATION, SAMOA, NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE 
OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW No. 5 (Naval Station Samoa Plan 0-5, 
RAINBOW No. 5); 

4. Such other subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander In 
Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may direct. 

b. 1. Plans listed under a. 1. and 2, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 

2. The NAVAL STATION GUAM Naval Local Defense Force Operating 
Plan — RAINBOW No. 3 will be applicable, and no additional plan need be 
prepared. 

NOTE: The Commandant, Naval Station, GUAM, is not included in the 
distribution of this Navy Basic War Plan— RAINBOW No. 5. 

[SI] Section 2. THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE 

3221. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE (Chapter IV, Appendix II) will 
be established under the immediate command of the Chief of Naval Operations 
upon its arrival in the CANAL ZONE. 

3222. This force will base on the Naval Operating Base, BALBOA, or in 
SOUTH AMERICAN ports as mav later be directed, and will operate in the 
SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA, delimited as that part of the PACIFIC 
AREA south of the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and between 
the west coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West. 

3223. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE is assigned the following tasks: 

a. TASK 

DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING 
OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY 
WITH THE ENEMY; 

b. TASK 

PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED 
POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, OR PATROLLING AS 
REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY 
RAIDING FORCES; 

c. TASK 

SUPPORT THE OPERATIONS OF THE PANAMA NAVAL 
COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES IN THE PACIFIC SECTOR; 

d. TASK 

PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS 
IN THE NATIONS ON THE WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA. 
[S2] 3224. a. The Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, wiU 
arrange for the logistic support of the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE from 
Shore Establishment sources in the FIFTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and from 
foreign commercial sources (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2). Transporta- 
tion will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service. 

b. In circumstances where transportation facilities provided by the NAVAL 
TRANSPORTATION SERVICE are inadequate, the Commander, SOUTH- 
EAST PACIFIC FORCE, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis, vessels 
immediately obtainable by him, for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent 
logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if 
available. 

3225. a. The Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, will require 
the preparation of the following plans: 

\. U. S. SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE OPERATING PLAN- 
RAINBOW No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-3-C, RAINBOW No. 5); 



2892 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. Such subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander, 
SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, may direct, 
b. 1. The plan listed under a. 1. will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 

2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance. 

[33] Section 3. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES 

3231. a. The organization of the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES 
is prescribed in General Order No. 143. 

b. The boundaries of Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frontiers, Coastal 
Zones, Sectors, and Subsectors, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and the 
Navv, 1935," as modified bv Annex I of Appendix I. 

3232. The Naval Coastaf Frontiers in the PACIFIC AREA are: 

a. PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER; 

b. PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER; 

c. HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER. 

3233. The NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES (Chapter VIII, Ap- 
pendix II) in the PACIFIC AREA are assigned the following tasks: 

a. TASK 

DEFEND THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS IN CATEGORIES 
INDICATED BELOW: 

CATEGORY B— THE PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER. 
— THE PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER, EXCEPT THE ALASKAN SECTOR. 
CATEGORY C— THE ALASKAN SECTOR OF THE PACIFIC 
NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, 
EXCEPT UNALASKA. 
CATEGORY /)— UNALASKA.— THE HAWAIIAN NAVAL COAST- 
AL FRONTIER; 
[34] b. TASK 

PROTECT AND ROUTE SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PART III, CHAPTER VII, SEC- 
TION 3; 

c. TASK 

SUPPORT THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET; 

d. TASK 

SUPPORT THE ARMY AND ASSOCIATED FORCES WITHIN 
THE COAST A,L FRONTIERS. 

3234. a. The following plans will be prepared: 

1. Local Joint Plans as prescribed in Appendix I, paragraph 48: 

2. By the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER: 

(a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plan — RAINBOW No. 5, 
including an annex covering the operating plan of the Naval Coastal 
Force (Naval Coastal Frontier Plan 0-4, RAINBOW No. 5); 

3. Bv Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and by 
the Commandant, ELEVENTH and TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICTS: 

(a) Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans — RAINBOW No. 5 
(Naval District Plans 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5); 

(b) Joint Embarkation Plans as required in Appendix I, paragraph 
48; 

[35] 4. Additional subordinate task force operating plans as directed 
by Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, and Commandants of Naval 
Districts. 

b. 1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans and other plans prepared by Com- 
manders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 

2. Operating plans prepared by Commandants of Naval Districts will be 
reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2893 

3. (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plans for the PACIFIC 
SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and Naval Local 
Defense Force Operating Plans for the HAWAIIAN NAVAL 
COASTAL FRONTIER will be forwarded to the Commander in Chief, 
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET for comment, prior to their review by the Chief 
of Naval Operations, with a view to their coordination with the Operat- 
ing Plans of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. 

(b) Such portions of Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans and 
Naval District Contributory Plans as relate to the protection of fleet 
anchorages and to services to the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will be 
referred to the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET for 
comment, if he so requests. 

4. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance. 

[36] Section 4. COMMAND RELATIONS 

3241. In order to provide for unity of command of task groups of the U. S. 
PACIFIC FLEET and of the PACIFIC NORTHERN and PACIFIC SOUTH- 
ERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, in the execution of tasks requiring 
mutual support, the following provisions shall apply (see paragraph 3242) : 

a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the 
Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 
and PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will be 
assigned a dual status as follows: 

1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces 
operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations. 

2. As officers of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET operating under the 
orders of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, in com- 
mand of task groups of that fleet when and as directed by the Com- 
mander in Chief thereof. 

b. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may thereafter 
require the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his com- 
mand, temporarily and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval 
Coastal Frontier Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, 
when taking temporary command of such task forces, will have due regard 
for the tasks assigned in this plan to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers 
by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

1. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will not 
require task groups of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces to leave the 
limits of their respective Coastal Zones, except in emergency, or upon 
authority of the Chief of Naval Operations. 

c. Conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended while 
the provisions of this paragraph are in effect. 

[S7] 3242. The provisions of paragraph 3241 above, apply to the command 
relations of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and the Com- 
mander, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, except that the circum- 
stances under which its provisions are applicable are not restricted to the execu- 
tion of tasks requiring mutual support, but apply in all circumstances. 

3243. The Chief of Naval Operations will direct the Commander, SOUTH- 
EAST PACIFIC FORCE, to operate under the strategic direction of the Com- 
mander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, if coordinated action of that force 
and the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET becomes necessary. The Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions will be informed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, if 
this situation arises. 

3244. In addition to having general authority over the operation of the Naval 
Local Defense Forces, the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL 
COASTAL FRONTIER, has authority to coordinate the activities of the Com- 
mandants of the Naval Districts within his respective Naval Coastal Frontier in 
matters that concern the Naval Communication Service, the Naval Intelligence 
Service, and the Naval Transportation Service. Due consideration will be given 
to the requirements of the tasks assigned to these services by the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 

3245. a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign, temporarily, 
to the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft 
assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force. 



2894 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, Commanders of 
Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by the 
Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense 
Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions. 

3246. Command relations between United States and Canadian Forces will be 
set forth in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5, Appendix 
I, after ABC-22 has been approved. 

[S8] CHAPTER III. FORCES IN THE FAR EAST AREA 

Section 1. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET AND THE PHILIPPINE NAVAL 
COASTAL FRONTIER 

3311. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 16.b.: 

"Far East Area 

"Coordination in the planning and execution of operations by Military 
forces of the United States, British Commonwealth, and Netherlands East 
Indies, in the FAR EAST AREA will, subject to the approval nf the Dutch 
authorities, be effected as follows: 

"(1) The commanders of the Military forces of the Associated Powers 
will collaborate in the formulation of strategic plans for operations in 
that area. 

"(2) The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers will be 
the responsibility of the respective commanders of the Military forces 
concerned. These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual 
support as may be practicable and appropriate. 

"(3) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces 
of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting 
the defense of the PHILIPPINES, will be assumed bv the British Naval 
Commander in Chief, CHINA. The Commander in Chief, UNITED 
STATES ASIATIC FLEET, will be responsible for the direction of 
naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the PHILIPPINES." 

3312. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, is the immediate 
superior in command of the Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, 
who is also designated as the Commander, PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER (see Chapter V, Appendix II). * 

b. The organization of Naval Coastal Frontiers is prescribed in General Order 
No. 143. 

[S9] c. The boundaries of the PHILIPPINE COASTAL FRONTIER, 
and the extent of the PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, are 
defined in "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935", as modified by Annex I 
of Appendix I. 

d. The Commander, PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL- FRONTIER will 
employ the Naval Local Defense Force in the execution of tasks assigned by the 
Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, and will arrange for its joint 
tactical and strategical erAployment in cooperation with the Army, under the 
direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET. 

3313. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET is assigned the 
following tasks: 

a. TASK 

RAID JAPANESE SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND DESTROY 
AXIS FORCES; 

b. TASK 

SUPPORT THE LAND AND AIR FORCES IN THE DEFENSE OF 
THE TERRITORIES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS. (THE 
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED 
STATES ASIATIC FLEET, FOR SUPPORTING THE DEFENSE OF 
THE PHILIPPINES REMAINS SO LONG AS THAT DEFENSE 
CONTINUES.) ; 

c. TASK 

DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING 
OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY 
WITH THE ENEMY; 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2895 

d. TASK 

PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED 
POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING, AS 
REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY 
RAIDING FORCES; 
[40] e. TASK 

IN COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY DEFEND THE PHILIP- 
PINE COASTAL FRONTIER— CATEGORY OF DEFENSE "E"; 
f. TASK 

ROUTE UNITED STATES FLAG SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH AGREEMENTS REACHED WITH THE OTHER ASSOCIATED 
POWERS IN THE FAR EAST AREA. 

3314. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will shift base to 
BRITISH or DUTCH ports at discretion. 

3315. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will arrange for 
the logistic support of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET from sources in the SIX- 
TEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and in continental United States; from com- 
mercial sources in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; and from British and Dutch 
governmental and commercial sources (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.). 

b. Logistic requirements other than personnel, ammunition, and technical 
materials, will be obtained from sources in the FAR EAST AREA or from sources 
in the adjacent BRITISH AREAS. 

c. Personnel, ammunition, and technical materials will be obtained from sources 
in the United States. 

d. Transportation facilities available to the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET will be 
employed so far as practicable for the movement of logistic supplies. The Naval 
Transportation Service will provide transportation for shipments from the United 
States. The first two of these vessels to arrive in the FAR EAST AREA may be 
retained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, for use in that 

[41] e. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, mav acquire 
through the Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and in accordance 
with the provisions of existing law, any vessels of United States' or Philippine 
registry by requisition, time charter, or bare boat charter, to supplement the 
transportation facilities of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET. 

f. In circumstances where the transportation facilities of the U. S. ASIATIC 
FLEET, supplemented as provided for in paragraphs d. and e., are inadequate, 
the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, is authorized to charter on a 
time charter basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of 
providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States 
registry will be employed if available. 

3316. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will require the 
following plans to be prepared: 

1. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW 
No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-2, RAINBOW No. 5); 

2. Local Joint Plans required by Appendix T, Paragraph 48; 

3. SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE 
FORCE OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW No. 5. (Sixteenth Naval 
District Plan 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5); 

4. Such subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander in 
Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, may direct. 

b. 1. The plan listed under a. 1, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 

2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance. 

[42] CHAPTER IV. FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS 

AREA 

Section 1. THE U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE 

3411. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH 
EUROPE, is also the naval member of the United States Military Mission in 
London. 



2896 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

b. The U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will come under the 
administrative command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES 
NORTH EUROPE, upon the arrival of these forces in the UNITED KINGDOM 
AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA. 

3412. a. The U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE (Chapter VI, 
Appendix II) will be organized into task forces as follows: 

1. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE; 

2. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE. 

b. These task forces will operate under the command of the Commander in 
Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM 
AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA. 

3413. After their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME 
WATERS AREA, the task forces of the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH 
EUROPE, are assigned the following tasks: 

a. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE 

1. TASK 

ESCORT CONVOYS IN THE NORTHWEST APPROACHES, 
ACTING UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE 
BRITISH COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE WESTERN AP- 
PROACHES; 

b. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE 

1. TASK 

RAID ENEMY SHIPPING IN AN AREA TO BE DESIGNATED, 
UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH VICE 
ADMIRAL, SUBMARINES. 
[43] 3414. Logistic support for the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH 
EUROPE, will be arranged as indicated herein (see Part IV, Chapter III, Sec- 
tion 2). Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service, 
or from vessels assigned to the task forces. 

a. Fuel from United States and British sources. 

b. Personnel, technical supplies, ammunition, and subsistence supplies from 
United States sources. 

c. Repair and upkeep facilities from tender and cargo vessels and shore facili- 
ties assigned to this force, supplemented by a limited use of British facilities. 

d. Replacement of fuel to British storage from United States sources. 

e. In circumstances where the transportation facilities of the U. S. NAVAL 
FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, and those provided by the NAVAL TRANS- 
PORTATION SERVICE are inadequate, the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL 
FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis, 
or a bare boat basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of 
providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States 
registry will be employed, if available. 

3415. a. Outline operating plans for the employment of the U. S. NAVAL 
FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will be prepared bv the prospective Commander 
of the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE, and submitted to the prospective 
Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, for review 
by the British Commander in Chief, WESTERN APPROACHES. After 
review and acceptance, copies of this plan will be furnished the Chief of Naval 
Operations. 

[44] CHAPTER V. THE SERVICES 

Section 1. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE 

3511. The NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE (Chapter IX, Appendix 
II) is assigned the following task: 
a. TASK 

PROVIDE SEA TRANSPORTATION FOR THE INITIAL MOVE- 
MENT AND THE CONTINUED SUPPORT OF ARMY AND NAVY 
FORCES OVERSEAS, OTHER THAN THOSE WHICH ARE TO BE 
TRANSPORTED BY THE OPERATING FORCES. MAN AND 
OPERATE THE ARMY TRANSPORT SERVICE. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2897 

1. Deliveries may be made by commercial transportation or by vessels 
of the Naval Transportation Service as circumstances require. 

2. The initial movements of U. S. Army troops under this task are as 
indicated in this paragraph. Larger movements may be made eventually, 
as indicated in Appendix I, paragraph 51, but the Navy will make no plans 
for these later movements until so directed bv the Chief of Naval Operations. 

(a) NEW YORK to ICELAND, 26>00 troops, 73 aircraft. First 
contingent — 10,500 troops embark on 24M. Second contingent — 
16,000 troops embark on 57M. These two movements will be made by 
British transports if arrangements can be effected. If not, this plan 
contemplates use of United States transports. 

(b) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 7,000 troops embark on lOM. 
NEW YORK to IRELAND, 8,000 troops embark on lOM. 

(1) These two forces will move in one convov. 

(c) NEW YORK to BERMUDA, 3,700 troops, 38 aircraft, embark 
on 18M. Eight aircraft will fly to destination, 30 aircraft will be [45] 
transported. Part of this force may be moved before M-day. 

(d) GALVESTON to CURACAO-ARUBA, 6,000 troops, embark on 
15xM. 

(e) GALVESTON to TRINIDAD, 12,500 troops embark on 15M. 

(f) GALVESTON to PANAMA, 6,400 troops, of which 3,300 embark 
on 20M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships 
become available. Part of this force mav be moved before M-day. 

(g) GALVESTON to PUERTO RICO, 12,600 troops, of 4,000 em- 
bark 20 M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships 
become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-dav. 

(h) SEATTLE to ALASKA, 23,000 troops, of which 1,100 embark 
on lOM. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships 
become available. Part or all of these troops may be moved before 
M-day. 

(i) SAN FRANCISCO to HAWAII, 23,000 troops, of which 15,000 
embark on lOM. The remainder will be transported progressively as 
ships become available. Part of these troops may be moved before 
M-day. 

3. The supply levels for the support of overseas forces which are to be 
transported by the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, are indi- 
cated in Appendix I, paragraph 57. 

3512. Shipping will be routed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Coin- 
manders of the Operating Forces in accordance with instructions contained in 
Part III, Chapter VII, Section 3. 

[46] 3513. The Director, Naval Transportation Service, will prepare the 
Principal Naval Transportation Service Operating Plan — Rainbow No. 5, and 
will prescribe therein, the Naval Transportation Service Operating Plans — Rain- 
bow No. 5, which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval 
Stations, and Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Com- 
mandants of Naval Districts. 

U7) Section 2. THE NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE 

3521. The NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE is assigned the following 
tasks: 

a TA ^K 

INSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF COMMUNICATION FACILITIES 
AND A SYSTEM FOR THEIR EMPLOYMENT ADEQUATE TO THE 
NEEDS OF THE NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT IN THE EXECUTION 
OF THIS PLAN; 
b. TASK 

IN COOPERATION, WHERE NECESSARY, WITH OTHER GOV- 
ERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND INDEPENDENT OFFICES, AND 
SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PERTINENT LEGISLATION, 
PROCLAMATIONS, AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS, PROVIDE FOR 
THE OPERATION OR SUPPRESSION, CONTROL, OR SUPERVI- 
SION, AS NECESSARY, OF NON-MILITARY COMMUNICATION 
STATIONS IN AREAS UNDER UNITED STATES' CONTROL. 



2898 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3522. This Service, operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations 
(Director of Naval Communications) comprises the following: 

a. Office of the Director, Naval Communications, Navy Department; 

b. The Communication Organization under the command of the Commandants 
of Naval Districts and Outlying Naval Stations; and under command of com- 
manders of forces afloat, including aircraft. 

3523. The Director, Naval Communication Service, will prepare the Principal 
Naval Communication Service Operating Plan — Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe 
therein, the Naval Communication Service Operating Plans — Rainbow No. 5 
which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and 
Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of 
Naval Districts. 

[48] Sectwn 3. THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE 

3531. The NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE is assigned the following 
aska: 

a. TASK 

IN COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY AND ASSOCIATED 
POWERS. SECURE, AND DISSEMINATE AS ADVISABLE, SUCH 
INFORMATION, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING THE ENEMY, 
ENEMY AGENTS AND SYMPATHIZERS. AS WILL ASSIST AND 
FACILITATE THE EXECUTION OF NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN- 
RAINBOW No. 5 AND THE PROTECTION OF THE NAVAL ESTAB- 
LISHMENT; 

h TA Si/f 

IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPART- 
MENTS, PREVENT THE TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION OF 
MILITARY OR ECONOMIC VALUE TO THE ENEMY. 

3532. This Service, operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations 
(Director of Naval Intelligence), comprises the following: 

a. Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, including 
naval attaches, naval observers, and other personnel directly under the Director 
of Naval Intelligence; 

b. The Naval Intelligence organization under the command of the Comman- 
dants of Naval Districts, the Navy Yard, Washington, D. C, and Outlving Naval 
Stations, including the field units of the respective subordinate activities. 

3533. The Director, Naval Intelligence Service, will prepare the Principal 
Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plan — Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe 
therein the Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plans — Rainbow No. 5, which 
are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and Activi- 
ties or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of Naval 
Districts. 

[49] CHAPTER VI. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT 

3601. The task of the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT is prescribed in Part IV 

[60] CHAPTER VII. INSTRUCTIONS JOINTLY APPLICABLE TO TASK FORCES 

Section 1. FORMING THE TASK FORCES 

3711. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will be formed on M-day or sooner if 
directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

a. Units of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and 
U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, designated for assignment to NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER FORCES, when directed by the respective Commanders in Chief 
of the Fleets, will report to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, to 
which assigned. 

b. Vessels of NAVAL DISTRICT CRAFT (See General Order No. 143), 
designated for assignment to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, when directed 
by the Commandants of the Naval Districts, will report to the commanders of 
task organizations to which assigned. 

c. Vessels to be mobilized, upon completion of mobilization, and when directed 
by the Commandants of Naval Districts in which they mobilize, will report to the 
commanders of task organizations to which assigned. 

3712. The Chief of Naval Operations will issue special instructions to vessels 
of the Naval Transportation Service and to vessels operating directly under the 
Chief of Naval Operations as circumstances require. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2899 

3713. a. Coast Guard Districts, including vessels, aircraft and shore establish- 
ments within the Districts, upon M-day or sooner if directed by the President, 
will automatically come under the control of Naval Districts in the manner set 
forth in the "United States Coast Guard District Manual, 1940." 

b. The Commandants of Naval Districts will direct the Coast Guard units 
coming under their command to report to the commanders of the task organiza- 
tions as indicated in Appendix II of this plan. 

[51] Section 2. MOBILIZATION 

3721. a. Mobilization comprises two steps, vi?: 

1. Timely assembly at assigned Mobilization Districts of the forces to be 
mobilized preparatory to 2; 

2. Preparation for war service. This is a function of the Shore Establish- 
ment assisted to the extent practicable by the forces being mobilized, and is 
provided for in Part IV of thig plan. 

b. Under this plan the term "mobilization" is applied only to the Operating 
Forces and the Services, including their units ashore. The Shore Establishment 
does not mobilize, but, as stipulated in Part IV, increases its personnel and 
facilities as required to perform its assigned task. 

c. Mobilization is thus not a process confined exclusively to the initial days of 
the war but continues as long as there are additional forces to be mobilized. 
During and subsequent to mobilization, vessels and units are supported through 
the operation of the maintenance provisions of Part IV. 

3722. Most of the Naval Forces listed in the current Operating Force Plan 
have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan. Vessels so listed, 
even if not completely mobilized on M-day, will be considered available for 
immediate war service within the limits of their capabilities. They will complete 
their mobilization progressively as opportunity permits, and as directed by their 
superiors in command. Exceptions may be made by direction of the Chief of 
Naval Operations. 

3723. In view of the provisions of paragraph 3722, mobilization in this plan 
applies principally to vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service, to 
the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, and to Naval District Craft which are to be 
taken over from private sources or other government departments. 

[52] 3724. Instructions for the assembly at Mobilization Districts of 
.vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service will be issued by the Chief 
of Naval Operations. 

3725. Instructions for the assembly at Mobilization Districts of vessels assigned 
to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces are contained in Chapter VIII, Appendix II. 

[53] Section 3. THE ROUTING AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING 
3731. The following is quoted from Appendix I, "Section V"; 

a. "20. The British authorities will issue directions for the control and protec- 
tion of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which British author- 
ities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military Forces. United 
States authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping 
of the Associated Powers within the areas in which the United States authorities 
assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces. 

"21. United States and British shipping scheduled to pass from an area assigned 
to one Power into an area assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and pro- 
tected by agreement between the respective naval authorities. The British 
Admiralty is the supreme authority in the control of shipping in the North 
Atlantic bound to and from the United Kingdom. 

"22. The British Naval Control Service Organization will continue in the 
exercise of its present functions and methods in all regions pending establishment 
of effective United States Agencies in United States areas. The Chief of Naval 
Operations, immediately on entry of the United States into the war, will arrange 
for the control and protection of shipping of United States registry or charter 
within United States areas. Requests from the British Naval Control Service 
Organization for protection by United States forces within United States areas 
will be made to the Chief of Naval Operations." 

b. The term "control of shipping" as used in Appendix I, "Section V", includes 
all matters relating to the movement of non-combatant vessels on the high seas, 
except protection. 



79716 O — 46 — pt. 



2900 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Definitions 

3732. a. ROUTING. The term "routing of shipping" as employed in this 
plan relates to the sea routes to be followed; [54] the time of departure 
from port; whether or not ships will move singly or in convoy; the timing at meet- 
ing points (rendezvous) and along the sea route; and the delivery of instructions 
for routing. Instructions in regard to the assembly of vessels for convoys, the 
scheduling of ports of call or destination, and loading are not considered as a 
part of routing. 

b. INTRA-DISTRICT SHIPPING. That shipping of the Associated Powers 
proceeding from one port to another within the limits of a Naval District. 

c. INTRA-FRONTIER SHIPPING. That shipping of the Associated 
Powers proceeding from one Naval District to another within the same Naval 
Coastal Frontier. 

d. INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING. That shipping of the Associated Powers, 
not overseas shipping, proceeding from a port in one Naval Coastal Frontier to, 
or through the waters of, another Naval Coastal Frontier. 

e. FLEET CONTROL ZONE SHIPPING. All shipping of the Associated 
Powers while within the Fleet Control Zone. 

f. OVERSEAS SHIPPING is that shipping of the Associated Powers whose 
route, in whole or in part, lies outside the coastal zone of a Naval Coastal Frontier; 
except that shipping passing between the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL 
FRONTIER and the ATLANTIC COAST ports of the United States or Canada 
is considered INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING. 

Instructions for routing shipping 

3733. INTRA-DISTRICT INTRA-FRONTIER, and INTER-FRONTIER 
SHIPPING. 

a. The Chief of Naval Operations will issue general instructions to Naval 
Coastal Frontier Commanders for the routing of Intra-District, Intra-Frontier, 
and Inter-Frontier Shipping. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers and 
Commandants of Naval Districts will keep the Chief of Naval Operations and 
interested Commanders in Chief informed as to routing instructions issued by 
them. 

[55] h. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will route Intra-Frontier 
and Inter-Frontier Shipping. 

c. Intra-District shipping will be routed by the Commandant of the Naval 
District under the general direction of the Commander, Naval Coastal Frontier. 

3734. OVERSEAS SHIPPING. 

a. Overseas shipping is divided into two categories, referred to hereafter as 
Class A and Class B Overseas Shipping: 

1. CLASS A. Overseas shipping between two points in the areas of 
strategic responsibility of the United States; 

2. CLASS B. Overseas shipping between one point in the areas of strategic 
responsibility of the United States, and one point in the areas of strategic 
responsibility of the United Kingdom. 

b. WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA. 

1. The Chief of Naval Operations, in consultation with the United Kingdom 
Chief of Naval Staff, will arrange the routing details of Class B Overseas 
Shipping which passes between the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA and 
UNITED KINGDOM AREAS to the east or south. 

2. The Chief of Naval Operations will route all Class A and Class B Over- 
seas Shipping while it is within the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA. In 
the case of overseas shipping moving in convoy, he will issue the routing 
instructions to the convoy commanders, via the Commandants of the Dis- 
tricts in which are the ports of assembly of the convovs, with copies to the 
Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, appropriate Naval Coastal 
Frontier Commanders, and Commandants of other Naval Districts affected. 
In the case of overseas shipping moving singly, the [56] Chief of 
Naval Operations will issue general routing instructions to the Naval Coastal 
Frontier Commanders, with copies to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLAN- 
TIC FLEET, and to Commandants of Naval Districts affected. Under the 
general supervision of the Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers, Com- 
mandants of Naval Districts will issue routing instructions to commanders 
of vessels. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2901 

c. PACIFIC AREA. 

1. Under the general direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, the 
Commander of the PACIFIC SOUTHPJRN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 
wiU perform, in the PACIFIC AREA, all the routing duties performed by 
the Chief of Naval Operations in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, 
with the following exceptions: 

(a) The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will route 
shipping in the PACIFIC FLEET CONTROL ZONES; 

(b) The Commander, PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, 
will route shipping in the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA; 

(c) Routing details of overseas shipping bound to or from the 
AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND AREA will be arranged 
directly between the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL 
COASTAL FRONTIER, and the Chief of the Australian Naval Staff. 
The Chief of Naval Operations will make arrangements with the United 
Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff in case action is required by that officer. 

Instructions for the protection of shipping 

3735. a. Tasks providing for the protection of shipping are assigned to the 
Operating Forces. 

[57] b. Protection of shipping may be provided by sea or air escort, by 
covering operations, by patrol, by dispersal, by shifting of routes, or by a combina- 
tion of these methods. 

c. The shipping of the Associated Powers operating in the areas of strategic 
responsibility of the United States will be protected by the responsible Com- 
manders in Chief, Commanders of Sub-Areas, and Naval Coastal Frontiers, and 
by the Commandants of Naval Districts, to the extent required by the existing 
situation, and as may be practicable by the use of available forces. These officers 
will keep each other informed, as may be appropriate, as to the strength of naval 
forces, and the methods being employed, in the protection of shipping. 

d. The protection of embarked military personnel and valuable cargoes will be 
viewed as having an especial importance. 

[58] Section 4. RULES OF WARFARE 

3741. In the conduct of the war the Naval Establishment will be guided by 
the current "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime 
Warfare". 

3742. Except under extroardinary circumstances (as when no prize crews are 
available or great distances are involved, and it is impracticable for the capturing 
ship to leave her station), prizes should be sent promptly to a port within the 
jurisdiction of the United States, or to an allied port in which a United States 
prize court is sitting, or to an allied port where arrangements have previously 
been made by the commander in the Area for prizes captured by the United 
States to be received into custody of local officials until an opportunity presents 
itself of sending them to United States prize courts. When the State Department 
shall have made arrangements with other Associated Powers to permit United 
States prize courts within their jurisdiction, the forces afloat will be promptly 
notified. 

3743. Do not use poison gas except in retaliation for similar use by the enemy. 

3744. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, within the 
WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC 
FLEET, within the PACIFIC AREA, are authorized to declare such "Strategi- 
cal Areas" as in their opinion are vital. They must give wide publicity to the 
exact boundaries of the areas involved and, at the earliest opportunity, notify the 
Chief of Naval Operations of these actions. A "Strategical Area", as here used, 
means an area from which it is necessary to exclude merchant ships and merchant 
aircraft to prevent damage to such ships or aircraft, or to prevent such ships or 
aircraft from obtaining information, which, if transmitted to the enemy, would 
be detrimental to our own forces. 

[59] 3745. Should the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, 
or the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, desire to lay mines outside 
the territorial waters of the enemy, or of the United States or other Associated 
Powers, or outside of proclaimed Strategical Areas, they should make recom- 



2902 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

mendations to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the areas proposed to 
be mined and the time when the mines are to be laid. The Chief of Naval 
Operations will take the necessary steps to declare the mined areas and to notify 
shipping and foreign governments. In an emergency, mines may be so laid, 
before communicating with the Chief of Naval Operations, but in such cases 
appropriate local notification should be made by the Commander in Chief con- 
cerned, and the Chief of Naval Operations should be informed. 

[60] Section 5. INTELLIGENCE LIAISON BETWEEN COMMANDERS 
OF ASSOCIATED FORCES IN THE FIELD 
3751. The commanders of the Operating Forces and their subordinate task 
force commanders will, on their own initiative, exchange liaison officers with task 
force commanders of the Associated Powers for the purpose of coordinating mat- 
ters which directly affect their operations. (See Appendix I, paragraph 17. f.). 

[61] Part IV. Logistics 

CHAPTER I. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT 

4101. The SHORE ESTABLISHMENT is assigned the following tasks: 

a. TASK 

PREPARE FOR WAR SERVICE, MAINTAIN, AND AUGMENT 
THE OPERATING FORCES AND THE SERVICES; 

b. TASK 

PROVIDE PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL REQUIRED FOR ES- 
TABLISHING AND MAINTAINING ADVANCED BASES; 

c. TASK 

PROVIDE SALVAGE SERVICE IN THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC 
OCEANS, THE GULF OF MEXICO, AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA, 
WITHIN APPROXIMATELY 500 MILES OF CONTINENTAL UNITED 
STATES, ALASKA, PANAMA CANAL ZONE, AND OF OUTLYING 
UNITED STATES POSSESSIONS AND LEASED TERRITORY IN 
THE ATLANTIC OCEAN AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA. 

4102. Each Chief of Bureau or Head of an Office of the Navy Department, and 
each Commandant of a Naval District or an Outlying Naval Station will execute 
such parts of the tasks assigned to the Shore Establishment as fall under his 
cognizance by law or regulation, unless otherwise stipulated in Part IV. 

[6^] CHAPTER II. GENERAL DIRECTIVES 

Section 1. PERSONNEL 

4211. The Shore Establishment will supply the trained personnel required for: 

a. Preparing for war service, maintaining, and augmenting the Operating 
Forces and the Services; 

b. Augmenting and maintaining the Shore Establishment Activities; 

c. Establishing and maintaining Advanced Bases; 

d. Augmenting and maintaining Salvage Service. 

4212. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 54. 

"The Army and Navy requirements for increased personnel \Vill be met 
by the operation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940". 

4213. a. Personnel will be supplied in accordance with the Basic Priorities 
established in Section 6 (paragraph 4261). 

b. Where the requirements for personnel for the Operating Forces and the 
Services cannot be supplied from other sources, naval personnel assigned to Naval 
District Craft (see General Order No. 143) will be replaced with civilian personnel 
for such period of time as found to be necessary. 

[63] Section 2. MATERIAL 

4221. The Shore Establishment will supply material required for: 

a. Preparing for war service, maintaining, and augmenting the Operating Forces 
and the Services; 

b. Augmenting and maintaining the Shore Establishment Activities; 

c. Establishing and maintaining Advanced Bases; 

d. Augmenting and maintaining Salvage Service. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2903 

4222. The material to support this Plan will come from existing reserves of the 
Navy and from production sources developed under the approved Industrial 
Mobilization Plan, and Navy Procurement Plans. The procurement of material 
will be regulated and controlled by existing laws and regulations, Executive 
Orders, and in accordance with the instructions contained in the Joint Army and 
Navy Basic War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5 (Appendix I, paragraphs 56 and 58). 

4223. Bureaus having technical cognizance of material being procured for the 
Navy will take appropriate measures to insure that contractors safeguard such 
material from exposure to sabotage and from damage by sabotage or other means. 

4224. Material will be supplied in accordance with the Basic Priorities estab- 
lished in Section 6 (paragraph 4261). 

[64] Section S. TRANSPORTATION 

4231. a. Sea transportation will be provided by: 

1. THE OPERATING FORCES; 

2. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE. 

b. The Naval Transportation Service will arrange for delivery of personnel and 
material by commercial transportation facilities wherever practicable. 

4232. a. Bureaus will provide material at loading ports ready for loading. 

b. The Shore Establishment will furnish the Chief of Naval Operation? and 
the District Commandants concerned with the necessary information regarding 
material and personnel to be loaded at loading ports in order that sea transporta- 
tion may be provided. 

c. The Shore Establishment will load material and embark personnel in vessels 
designated by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

4233. a. The Army will furnish to the Chief of Naval Operations, or the Dis- 
trict Commandants, information regarding the numbers of troops and quantities 
of material to be transported overseas (see Appendix I, paragraphs 51 and 57). 

b. The Army will move Army material and troops to ports of embarkation, 
and load Army material and embark Army troops in vessels designated by the 
Chief of Naval Operations, subject to supervision by the Navy in matters regard- 
ing the safety of vessels. 

c. The Navy will furnish subsistence and medical supplies for Army personnel 
while embarked on transports operated by the Navy (including time-chartered 
vessels) ; the Army will provide subsistence and medical supplies for all animals 
embarked on such transports. Army medical and Army commissary personnel 
embarked will be available to perform their normal duties in relation to Army 
personnel. 

(65) 4234. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will 
establish in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in 
Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will establish in the Office of the Commander, 
PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, officers having liaison 
duties in regard to coordinating the transportation of material and personnel by 
fleet transportation facilities and the Naval Transpbrtation Service. 

[66] Section 4- LEGAL SERVICES 

4241. The Shore Establishment (Office of the Judge Advocate General of the 
Navy) will provide the legal services, charged to it by law and regulation, neces- 
sary for the execution of this plan by the Naval Establishment. 

4242. These services will include: 

a. The supervision of the administration of law throughout the Naval Estab- 
lishment; 

b. Securing the enactment of such legislation and the promulgation of such 
Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders as may be required by the 
Naval Establishment in the execution of this plan; 

c. In conjunction with the War Department, securing the enactment of legisla- 
tion and the promulgation of such Presidential Proclamations and Executive 
Orders affecting both the Army and the Navy as are deemed necessary for the 
execution of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5 
(Appendix I, paragraph 59). 

[67] Section 5. AUGMENTATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE 
SHORE ESTABLISHMENT 
4251. The Shore Establishment will augment and maintain its activities by 
providing personnel and material necessary for the accomplishment of its assigned 
tasks. 



2904 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

4252. Requirements for Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) in 
excess of those provided for in the current Operating Force Plan, will be met 
locally by the Commandants of Naval Districts. This may be done by taking 
over suitable craft from private owners, or by contracting with private owners 
for the operation of such craft in a pool under navy control, to meet both govern- 
ment and private requirements. 

[68] Section 6. PRIORITIES 

4261. Priority in matters of supply, delivery, and services will be in accordance 
with the basic priorities stipulated below. AH supporting efforts of the SERV- 
ICES and the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT will fall respectively under the pri- 
orities established by this general formula. For planning purposes, the several 
items listed under the same basic priority shall be considered of equal importance. 

a. PRIORITY ONE 

1. The transportation of Army troops and material in the initial move- 
ments to the UNITED KINGDOM, BERMUDA, CURACAO-ARUBA. 
TRINIDAD, PANAMA, PUERTO RICO, ALASKA, and HAWAII. 

2. The requirements of the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE, U. S. 
NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, and SUBMARINE FORCE 
THREE, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE. 

3. The requirements of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET. 

b. PRIORITY TWO 

1. Initial movements to ICELAND. 

2. The requirements of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and the U. S. 
PACIFIC FLEET. 

3. The requirements of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE 
not specified under PRIORITY ONE. 

c. PRIORITY THREE 

1. The requirements of the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES. 

2. The transportation of Army troops and material not specified under 
PRIORITIES ONE and TWO. 

d. PRIORITY FOUR 

1. New Construction. 

[69] CHAPTER III. THE OPERATING FORCES AND SERVICES 

Section 1. PREPARATION FOR ^^' AR SERVICE 

4311. Commencing on M-day. and before if directed, the SHORE ESTAB- 
LISHMENT will prepare for war services those vessels and units of the OPER- 
ATING FORCES and SERVICES listed in Appendix II, which are not then in 
condition of readiness for war service, by placing them in material condition and 
providing personnel to perform their war tasks. 

4312. The desired condition of readiness for war service as regards personnel, 
repairs and alterations, and supplies, is the STANDARD CONDITION pre- 
scribed by the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department concerned and 
approved by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

4313. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services listed in the 
current Operating Force Plan. 

a. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services, appearing in the 
current Operating Force Plan are not assigned to Mobilization Districts, as most 
of those vessels have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan. 
Vessels not completely mobilized on M-day will be considered available for imme- 
diate war service within the limitations of their capabilities. They will complete 
their mobilization progressively as opportunity permits, and as directed by their 
superiors in command. Exceptions may be made by direction of the Chief of 
Naval Operations. 

4314. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services NOT listed in 
the current Operating Force Plan. 

a. Vessels not appearing in the current Operating Force Plan, assigned in 
Appendix II to the Operating Forces and the Services, are assigned to Mobiliza- 
tion Districts for preparation for war service (mobilization). Commandants are 
responsible for preparing for war service all vessels assigned to their districts for 
mobilization. 

b. In cases where Appendix II indicates the day of arrival at the Mobilization 
District and the day required to be ready for service, the Commandant will 
employ the intervening period in the preparation of the vessel for war service. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2905 

[70] If essential items of conversion can not be completed by the "Day 
Ready" indicated in Appendix II, the Commandant will inform the Chief of 
Naval Operations and the Commander of the Operating Force concerned, as far 
in advance as practicable. 

c. In cases where the day of arrival at the Mobilization District and the "Day 
Ready" are not indicated in Appendix II, the Commandant will complete the 
mobilization as promptly as possible in accordance with the priorities established 
and other related instructions. 

d. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces, other than those assigned to the 
Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, will be degaussed, armed, and manned with 
navy personnel before being considered ready for war service. 

e. Vessels assigned to Naval C'oastal Frontier Forces will be placed in STAND- 
ARD CONDITION before being considered ready for war service, unless the 
Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, direct otherwise, in which case placing 
them in STANDARD CONDITION will be deferred until opportunity permits. 

f. Vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service will be placed in 
STANDARD CONDITION before being considered ready for war service, except 
as follows: 

1. Transports to be commissioned in the Navy will be considered ready for 
war service when degaussed, provided with fresh water, commissary, sani- 
tary, medical, berthing, and other facilities essential for the initial scheduled 
voyage; 

2. Transports to be operated on a time charter basis will be considered 
ready for war service when provided with fresh water, commissary, sanitary, 
medical, berthing, and other facilities essential for the initial scheduled 
voyage, and provided with a liaison group consisting of a communication 
group and such additional personnel (supply and medical) as may be required; 

[71] 3. All other classes commissioned in the Navy scheduled for 
voyages outside of the WESTERN HEMISPHERE will be considered ready 
for war service when degaussed and prepared for the particular service for 
which scheduled; 

4. All other clas.ses operated on a time charter basis will be considered 
ready for war service when degaussed and prepared for the particular service 
for which scheduled, and provided with a liaison group consisting of a com- 
munication group and such additional personnel (supply and medical) as 
may be required; 

5. Vessels of the Naval Transportation Service will not be delayed for 
the installation of batteries and magazines. 

g. Time chartered merchant vessels of the Naval Transportation Service to 
be taken over and commissioned will be placed in STANDARD CONDITION 
after their initial voyage, and when opportunity permits. 

h. Instructions for the mobilization of vessels assigned to the Naval Coastal 
Frontier Forces are contained in Chapter VIII, Appendix II. 

4315. a. The crews of all combat loaded transports and other vessels scheduled 
to unload at a destination having no stevedores available, will include competent 
stevedore personnel. These may be supplied from trained naval personnel, or 
by contract if suitable naval personnel is not available. This provision applies 
to vessels commissioned in the Navy and to time chartered vessels. 

b. Provision will be made for furnishing prize crews consisting of a suitable 
number of officers and men as follows: 

1. To the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET 6; 

[72] 2. To the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 8; 

3. To the SOUTHEAST PACJIFIC FORCE 8; 

4. To the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET 6. 

[73] Section 2. MAINTENANCE 

4321. The Shore I']stablishment will maintain the Operating Forces and the 
Services in condition of readiness for war by: 

a. Replacement of personnel and material; 

b. Repairs to units made available at Shore Establishment activities; 

c. Hospitalization of personnel; 

d. Provisions of facilities at Shore Establishment activities for recreation and 
welfare of personnel. 



2906 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Replacements 

4322. a. In order to provide for replacements of personnel and material for the 
Operating Forces and the Services, the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Depart- 
ment concerned will establish standard monthly replacement rates based upon 
estimated expenditures, plus a small excess for building up a reserve. These 
rates will be used by the. Shore Establishment as a basis for procuring personnel 
and material to>meet the replacement requirements of the Operating Forces and 
the Services. The estimates should be based on probable operations of each 
type of the Task Organization in each of the Areas and Sub-Areas listed in para- 
graph 1102 of this plan. 

b. These standard monthly replacement rates will be revised from time to 
time so as to accord with the requirements of the Operating Forces and the 
Services, as determined by war experience. 

c. In procuring personnel and material at the standard monthly replacement 
rates, no deduction will be made for probable losses in the forces to be supplied. 
A 10% surplus over the standard monthly replacements will be maintained 
available for shipment to provide for probable losses during sea transportation 
to destination. 

d. Should the established monthly replacement rates prove to be inadequate 
to supply the requirements, personnel [74] and material allotted to low 
priority units will be reassigned to higher priority units, as required, until defi- 
ciencies can be replaced under revised replacement rates. 

e. The Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department who provide replace- 
ments of personnel and material will designate the activities of the Shore Estab- 
lishment to which the Operating Forces and the Units of the Naval Transporta- 
tion Service will submit their requests for replacements. 

f. The rate of flow of replacements will be controlled by the timely submission 
of requests for replacements, stating the desired time and place of delivery. 

g. Requests for replacements will be submitted as follows : 

1. For the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, U. S. 
ASIATIC FLEET, and SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, and U. S. NAVAL 
FORCES, NORTH EUROPE by the commanders thereof, or by oflScers 
designated by them; 

2. For the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, by the Com- 
mandants of Naval Districts upon which the forces are based; 

3. For units of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE by the 
commanders thereof, through the appropriate local naval authorities where 
delivery is desired; 

4. For units ashore by the commanders thereof, through the Commandants 
of Naval Districts or Commanders of Outlying Naval Stations in which these 
units are established. 

h. Where Shore Establishment facilities are not readily available, units of the 
Operating Forces and of the Naval Transportation Service will obtain material 
replacements from local sources. (See par. 3116, 3214, 3224, 3315, 3414.) Replace- 
ments obtained in this manner will not be included in requests for replacements 
made to Shore Establishment activities. 

[75] 4323. Delivery of replacements to the Operating Forces the the Services 
will be effected, insofar as practicable, at the times and places requested. 

Repairs 

4324. a. The Shore Establishment will repair such units of the Operating 
Forces and Services as may be made available therefor at Shore Establishment 
activities. 

b. The assignment of availability of such units to an activity of the Shore 
Establishment for overhaul and repairs will be governed by the following: 

1. The geographic disposition of the various forces; 

2. The facilities available at certain activities for accomplishing the work 
required; 

3. The degree of urgency of the work required; 

4. The distribution of the work load among the various activities; 

5. The needs for repairs by units of the Associated Powers. 

4325. The Chief of Naval Operations will designate the shore activity to which 
a vessel will be assigned for overhaul and repairs and will fix the availability dates. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2907 

Hospitalization and evacuation 

4326. a. The Operating Forces will provide hospitalization for sick and wounded 
personnel within the capacity of the hospital facilities available in hospital ships, 
in Advanced Base Hospitals, and in Mobile Medical Units. 

[76] b. The Shore Establishment will provide hospitalization for sick or 
wounded naval and marine corps personnel which may be evacuated to Shore 
Establishment activities. 

4327. The sick and wounded personnel evacuated to Shore Establishment activ- 
ities will be transported in evacuation transports, hospital ships, and other 
available vessels having adequate medical facilities. 

4328. a. Army forces overseas will provide their own hospitalization, but will 
be evacuated to home territory in the same manner as naval personnel. 

b. Army forces embarked on naval vessels will be provided hospitalization by 
the Navy until such time as the sick and wounded can be evacuated to Army 
hospitals or field medical units. 

Recreation and welfare 

4329. a. The Shore Establishment will provide and maintain recreation and 
welfare facilities at Shore Establishment activities for naval and marine corps 
personnel. 

b. Provisions for these activities will include: 

1. Augmentation and maintenance of recreational facilities at Shore Estab- 
lishment activities where units of the Operating Forces and Services are 
concentrated, and at Training Stations; 

2. Augmentation and maintenance of religious and welfare facilities at the 
above activities, including cooperation with national and local welfare agencies 
and religious groups, operating for the welfare of naval personnel. 

[77] Sections. AUGMENTATION 

4331. The Shore Establishment will augment the Operating Forces and the 
Services by; 

a. New construction of vessels and aircraft; 

b. Acquisition from the Maritime Commission and from private owners of 
vessels and aircraft designated by the Chief of Naval Operations (Naval Supply 
and Transportation Service Section), and by their preparation for war service; 

c. Preparation for war service of vessels and aircraft transferred to the Navy 
from other Government Departments; 

d. Acquisition of material. 

4332. In preparing plans for the acquisition of small vessels, Commandants of 
Naval Districts will provide for consultation and cooperation between local 
representatives of the Army, Navy, and Maritime Commission. 

[78] CHAPTER IV. ADVANCED BASES 

4401. The Shore Establishment will provide personnel and material required 
for establishing and maintaining ADVANCED BASES in accordance with in- 
structions issued in separate directives. 

[79] CHAPTER V. SALVAGE 

4501. a. The Shore Establishment will provide salvage units and render sal- 
vage service to vessels, both private and public, of all nationalities, in the areas 
prescribed in paragraph 4101. c. 

b. The Operating Forces, assisted by such facilities as can be made available 
by the Shore Establishment, will render salvage service to vessels of their own 
forces and to other vessels where practicable, in the waters of the outlying United 
States possessions in the Pacific Ocean, of the Philippine Islands and of Advanced 
Bases, and in the open sea outside of the areas mentioned in paragraph 4101. c. 

4502. The Shore Establishment will cooperate with and assist the Army or 
other agencies responsible for clearing harbor channels of stranded vessels within 
the waters of the United States. 



2908 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

4503. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the President, the Navy will 
acquire the following vessels to be converted and equipped as salvage vessels: 

1. From the COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY 

PIONEER, 

GUIDE, 

DISCOVER; 

2. From the COAST GUARD 

REDWING, 
b. These vessels will be manned and operated as directed by the Bureau of 
Ships, and two will be stationed on the Atlantic Coast of the United States and 
two on the Pacific Coast of the United States. 

[80] CHAPTER VI. PLANS TO BE PREPARED BY THE SHORE ESTABLI.^HMENT 

4601. Contributory Plans, Rainbow No. 5, will be prepared as prescribed in 
Part V, WPL-8, with particular reference to paragraphs 5126, 5127, and 5128. 

4602. The Principal Contributory Plans, Rainbow No. 5, will prescribe the 
estimates of requirements, if any, to be made by the subordinate planning agencies. 

[81] Part V. Special Provisions 

CHAPTER I. exertion OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE 

5101. The following is quoted froin Appendix I, paragraph 60: 

"The Administrator of Export Control, jointly with the War and Navy 
Departments, is to prepare plans and programs for the application of economic 
pressure such as may be obtained through control of commodities, trans- 
portation, communication, financial relationships, and all related means." 

5102. The Chief of Naval Operations will cooperate in the preparation of joint 
plans for the Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure. 

[82] chapter II. joint plans covering INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, CEN- 

SORSHIP AND PUBLICITY, AND MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES 

5201. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 61: 

"Cooperation of Other Departments of the Government 

"The War and Navy Departments, jointly with other departments of the 
Government, shall have prepared plans or programs covering the following 
subjects: 

a. Intelligence Service; 

b. Censorship and Publicity; 

c. Mobilization of Resources." 

5202. a. The Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence) will 
act for the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for 
the Intelligence Service. 

b. The Secretary of the Navy (Director of the Office of Public Relations) and 
the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence) will jointly act 
for the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for Censor- 
ship and Publicity. 

c. The Under Secretary of the Navy, acting through the Navy Members of the 
Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board, will represent the Navy Department in 
the preparation of joint plans or programs for the Mobilization of Resources. 

[/] Appendix I. To WPL-46, The Joint Army and 'Navy Basic War 

Plan — Rainbow No. 5 

[2] SECTION I. DIRECTIVE 

1. The directive for Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5, 
contained in J. P. 325 (Serial 642-1), Section 1, paragraph 3e, approved October 
14, 1939, and revised April 10, 1940, is superseded by the directive contained in 
paragraph 2 of this paper. 

2. The Joint Board directs The Joint Planning Committee to submit Joint 
Army and Navy Basic War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5 based upon the Report of 






EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2909 

United States-British Staff Conversations, dated March 27, 1941 (ABC-1), and 
upon Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22), now in process of 
drafting. 

[3] SECTION II. DEFINITIONS 

3. The term "Associated Powers" means the United States and the British 
Commonwealth, and, when appropriate, includes the Associates and Allies of 
either Power. 

4. The term "Axis Powers" means Germany and Italy, and, if Japan and 
other Powers are at war against the Associated Powers, is to be understood as 
including all such Powers. 

5. "Malaysia" includes the Philippines, the Malay States, the Straits Settle- 
ments, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies. The "Malay Barrier" includes 
the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and the chain of islands extending in an 
easterly direction from Java to Bathurst Island, Australia, 

6. The term "United States naval forces" as used herein will be construed as 
including United States naval aviation. The term "air forces" will be construed 
as including only the United States Army Air Corps and the Royal Air Force. 

[4] SECTION III. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS 

7. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the 
British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, Greece, Yugo- 
slavia, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war 
against the Axis Powers, comprising either: 

a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or 

b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand. 

8. That the Associated Powers will conduct the war in accord with ABC-1 
and ABC-22. 

9. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility 
of their intervention must be taken into account. 

10. That United States forces which might base in the Far East Area will be 
able to fill logistic requirements, other than personnel, ammunition, and technical 
materials, from sources in that general region. 

11. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive 
elements, but will remain in a nonbelligerent status unless subjected to direct 
attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will be 
available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense. 

[5] SECTION IV. CONCEPT OF THE WAR 

12. The Concept of the War as sot forth in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of 
ABC-1 is quoted below, except that paragraph 13 (h) is quoted as modified by 
the Chief of Naval Operations' and the Chief of Staff's secret letter Serial 039412 
of April 5, 1941. 

"10. The broad strategic objectives of the Associated Powers will be the 
defeat of Germany and her Allies. 

"11. The principles of United States and British national strategic de- 
fense policies of which the Military forces of the Associated Powers must 
take account are: 

(a) United States 

The paramount territorial interests of the United States are in the Western 
Hemisphere. The United States must, in all eventualities, maintain such 
dispositions as will prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of 
European or Asiatic political or Military power. 

(b) British Commonwealth 

The security of the United Kingdom must be maintained in all circum- 
stances. Similarly, the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India must 
maintain dispositions wliich, in all eventualities, will provide for the ultimate 
security of the British Commonwealth of Nations. A cardinal feature of 
British strategic policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as 
will ensure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the 
maintenance of its war effort. 

(c) Sea Communications 

The security of the sea communications of the Associated Powers is essential 
to the continuance of their war effort. 



2910 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[6] "12. The strategic concept includes the following as the principal 
offensive policies against the Axis Powers: 

(a) Application of economic pressure by naval, land, and air forces and all 
other means, including the control of commodities at their source by diplo- 
matic and financial measures. 

(b) A sustained air offensive against German Military power, supple- 
mented by air offensives against other regions under enemy control which 
contribute to that power. 

(c) The early elimination of Italy as an active partner in the Axis. 

(d) The employment of the air, land, and naval forces of the Associated 
Powers, at every opportunity, in raids and minor offensives against Axis 
Military strength. 

(e) The support of neutrals, and of Allies of the United Kingdom, Asso- 
ciates of the United States, and populations in Axis-occupied territory in 
resistance to the Axis Powers. 

(f ) The building up of the necessary forces for an eventual offensive against 
Germany. 

(g) The capture of positions from which to launch the eventual offensive. 
"13. Plans for the Military operations of the Associated Powers will 

likewise be governed by the following: 

[7] (a) Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, 
the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. 
The principal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre, 
and operations of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted 
in such a manner as to facilitate that effort. 

(b) Owing to the threat to the sea communications of the United Kingdom, 
the principal task of the United States anval forces in the Atlantic will be 
the protection of shipping of the Associated Powers, the center of gravity of 
the United States effort being concentrated in the Northwestern approaches 
to the United Kingdom. Under this conception, the United States naval 
effort in the Mediterranean will initially be considered of secondary im- 
portance. 

(c) It will be of great importance to maintain the present British and 
Allied Military position in and near the Mediterranean basings, and to 
prevent the spread of Axis control in North Africa. 

(d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the 
Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy 
their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan 
does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. 
The United States does not intend to add to its present Military strength 
in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively 

. in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to 
support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength 
away from Malaysia. The United States intends so to augment its forces 
in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth 
will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East. 

[8] (e) The details of the deployment of the forces of the Associated 
Powers at any one time will be decided with regard to the Military situation 
in all theatres. 

(f) The principal defensive roles of the land forces of the Associated 
Powers will be to hold the British Isles against invasion; to defend the 
Western Hemisphere; and to protect outlying Military base areas and islands 
of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack. 

(g) United States land forces will support United States naval and air 
forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in 
the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability of trained 
and equipped organizations. United States land forces will, as a general rule, 
provide ground and anti-aircraft defenses of naval and air bases used pri- 
marily by United States forces. 

(h) Subject to the requirements of the security of the United States, the 
British Isles and their sea communications, the air policy of the Associated 
Powers will require that associated effort in the air will be directed toward 
providing the necessary naval and land air components for the accomplish- 
ment of naval tasks, for the support of land operations, and for independent 
air operations against the sources of Axis military power. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2911 

(i) United States Army Air Forces will support the United States land 
and naval forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or 
operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability 
of trained and equipped organizations, they will undertake the air defense 
of those general areas in which naval bases used primarily by United States 
forces are located, and subsequently, [9] of such other areas as may 
be agreed upon. United States Army air bombardment units will operate 
offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force,^ primarily against 
German Military power at its source. 

(j) United States forces will, so far as practicable, draw their logistic 
support (supply and maintenance) from sources outside the British Isles. 
Subject to this principle, however, the military bases, repair facilities, and 
supplies of either nation will be at the disposal of the Military forces of the 
other as required for the successful prosecution of the war." 

13. In addition, plans for the Military operations of United States forces will 
be governed by the following: 

(a) Under this War Plan the scale of hostile attack to be expected within the 
Western Atlantic Area is limited to raids by air forces and naval surface and 
submarine forces. 

(b) The building up of large land and air forces for major offensive operations 
against the Axis Powers will be the primary immediate effort of the United States 
Army. The initial tasks of United States land and air forces will be limited to 
such operations as will not materially delay this effort. 

[10] SECTION V. TERMS OF AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM 

RELATING TO WAR OPERATIONS 

14. Agreements have been reached between the United States and the United 
Kingdom relating to war operations. 

In this Section certain of these agreements are set forth (See ABC-1 and 
ABC-22). 

15. Principles of Command of the Forces of the United States and the United 
Kingdom, a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the 
United Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of 
responsibility of their own Power. 

b. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting 
the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations 
into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances. 

c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic 
direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their 
type, be employed as task (organized) forces charged with the execution of specific 
strategic tasks. These task (organized) forces will operate under their own 
commanders and will not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces 
of the other Power. Only exceptional Military circumstances will justify the 
temporary suspension of the normal strategic tasks. 

d. When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised 
by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of 
time in grade. 

e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate 
under United States naval command, and will remain an integral part of United 
States naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their 
operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups. 

/. Special command relationships pertaining to particular areas are set forth 
in paragraph 16. 

[11] 16. Responsibility for the Strategic Direction of Military Forces, a. 
United States Areas. Upon entering the war, the United States will assume 
responsibility for the strategic direction of its own and British Military forces 
in the following areas: 

(1) The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous con- 
tinental land areas, north of Latitude 25° South and west of Longitude 30° 
West, except: 

(a) The area between Latitude 20° North and Latitude 43° North which 
lies east of Longitude 40° West. 

(b) The waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility 
for the strategic direction of Military forces, as may be defined in United 
States-Canada Joint Agreements. 



2912 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(2) The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous con- 
tinental land areas, as follows: 

(a) North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East; 

(b) North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East; 

(c) South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South Ameri- 
can coast and Longitude 74° West; except for the waters and territories in 
which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of Military 
forces, as may be defined in United States-Canada Joint Agreements. The 
L^nited States will afford support to British naval forces in the regions south 
of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East. 

[13] b. The Far East Area Coordination in the planning and execution of 
operations by Military forces of the United States, British Commonwealth, and 
Netherlands East Indies in the Far East Area will, subject to the approval of the 
Dutch authorities, be effected as follows: 

(1) The commanders of the Military forces of the Associated Powers will 
collaborate in the formulation of strategic plans for operations in that area. 

(2) The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers will be the 
responsibility of the respective commanders of the Military forces concerned. 
These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual support as may 
be practicable and appropriate. 

(3) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the 
Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense 
of the Philippines will be assumed by the British naval Commander-in-Chief, 
China. . The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be 
responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense 
of the Philippines. 

(4) For the above purposes, the Far East Area is defined as the area from 
the coast of China in Latitude 30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, 
thence south to the equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence 
south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence 
westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, thence south to Lati- 
tude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence north to Latitude 
20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma. 

[13] c. Joint Land Offensives. Responsibility for the strategic direction of 
the Military forces engaged in joint offensive action on land will be in accordance 
with joint agreements to be entered upon at the proper time. In these circum- 
stances unity of command in the theatre of operations should be established. 

d. British Commonwealth Areas. The British Commonwealth will assume 
responsibility for the strategic direction of associated Military forces in all other 
areas not described in sub-paragraphs a, b, and c next above. These areas as 
initiallv delimited are: 

'(1) The AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AREA comprises the 
Australian and New Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180° 
and south of the equator. The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, 
is responsible for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated 
Powers operating in the Australian and New Zealand Area. 

(2) The UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA 
comprises the waters to the eastward of Longitude 30° West and to the 
Northward of Latitude 43° North and the land areas bordering on, and the 
islands in, the above ocean area. Administrative command of all United 
States land and air forces stationed in the British Isles and Iceland will be 
exercised by the Commander, United States Army Forces in Great Britain. 
This officer will have authority to arrange details concerning the organization 
and location of task forces (organization of units in appropriate formation) 
and operational control with the War Office and the Air Ministrv. 

(3) The NORTH ATLANTIC AREA. 

(a) Northern boundary. Latitude 43° North, 

(b) Southern boundary, Latitude 20° North, 

[14] (c) Western boundary. Longitude 40° West, 

(d) Eastern boundary, the coasts of Spain, Portugal, and Africa, and 
Longitude 5° West, together with the islands and land areas contiguous 
thereto. 

(e) Strategic direction of a United Sfates naval force basing on Gibraltar 
will be exercised by the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff except when 
he specifically delegates it for a stated period as follows: 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2913 

To the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for operations 
in the Western Mediterranean. 

To the Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, for operations 
in the Central Atlantic. 

(/) The Commander of United States naval forces basing in Gibraltar will 
be r^ponsible for administrative matters to the Commander-in-Chief, United 
States Atlantic Fleet. 

(4) The SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA comprises: 

(a) The area between Latitudes 20° North and 25° South, bqunded on the 
west by Longitude 30° West and on the east by the African Coast. 

(b) The South Atlantic Ocean, south of Latitude 25° South, between 
Longitudes 74° West and 33° East, together with the islands and land areas 
contiguous thereto. 

(5) The MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST AREAS comprise 
the Mediterranean Sea east of Longitude 5° West, the Suez Canal, and the 
islands and countries adjoining them, including the present theatres of opera- 
tions in North and East Africa. The Black Sea, Iraq, and Aden are also 
included in this area. 

[15] (6) The INDIA AND EAST INDIES AREA comprises: 

(a) India. 

(b) Indian Ocean, including the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, bounded on the 
West by the coasts of Africa and Longitude 33° East, and on the East by 
the western boundaries of the Far East Area and the Australian Station. 

(c) The islands in the above ocean area. 

17. Collaboration in Planning, a. The High Commands of the United States 
and United Kingdom will collaborate continuously in the formulation and execu- 
tion of strategical policies and plans which shall govern the conduct of the war. 
They and their respective commanders in the field, as may be appropriate, will 
similarly collaborate in the planning and execution of such operations as may be 
undertaken jointly by United States and British forces. This arrangement will 
apply also to such plans and operations as may be undertaken separately, the 
extent of collaboration required in each particular plan or operation being agreed 
mutually when the general policy has been decided. 

b. To effect the collaboration outlined in the preceding sub-paragraph, and to 
ensure the coordination of administrative action and command between the United 
States and British Military Services, the United States and United Kingdom will 
exchange Military Missions. These Missions will comprise one senior officer 
of each of the Military Services, with their appropriate staffs. The functions of 
these Missions will be as follows: 

(1) To represent jointly, as a corporate body, their own Chiefs of Staff 
(the Chief of Naval Operations being considered as such), vis-a-vis the group 
of Chiefs of Staff of the Power to which they are accredited, for the purpose of 
collaboration in the [16] formulation of Military policies and plans 
governing the conduct of the war in areas in which that Power assumes 
responsibility for strategic direction. 

(2) In their individual capacity to represent their own individual Military 
Services vis-a-vis the appropriate Military Services of the Power to which 
they are accredited, in matters of mutual concern in the areas in which that 
Power assumes responsibility for strategic direction. 

c. The personnel of either Mission shall not become members of any regularly 
constituted body of the government of the Power to which they are accredited. 
Their staffs will, however, work in direct cooperation with the appropriate branches 
and committees of the staff of the Power to which they are accredited. 

d. The United States, as may be necessary, will exchange Liaison officers with 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand for effectuating direct cooperation between 
United States and Dominion forces. 

e. To promote adequate collaboration and prompt decision, a military trans- 
portation service will be established between England and the United States. 
Ships and airplanes will be assigned to this service by the United States and the 
United Kingdom as may be found necessary. 

/. Existing Military intelligence organizations of the two powers will operate 
as independent intelligence agencies, but will maintain close liaison with each 
other in order to ensure the full and prompt exchange of pertinent information 



2914 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

concerning war operations. Intelligence liaison will be established not only 
through the Military Missions but also between all echelons of command in the 
field with respect to matters which affect their operations. 

[ / 7] Communications 

18. The United States and the United Kingdom will establish in London the 
"Associated Communication Committee" which is to be constituted as follows: 

a. A representative of the United States Army and a representative of the 
United States Navy, who are members of the staff of the United States Military 
Mission in London. 

b. Representatives of the British Combined Signals Board in the United 
Kingdom. 

19. The Associated Communications Committee will be the supreme controlling 
body with relation to intercommunications by radio (W/T), wire, visual, and sourid 
affecting the armed services and the merchant marines of the two nations. 

Control and Protection of Shipping 

20. The British authorities will issue directions for the control and protection 
of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which British authorities 
assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces. United States 
authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the 
Associated Powers within the areas in which the United States authorities assume 
responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces. 

21. United States and British shipping scheduled to pass from an area assigned 
to one Power into an area assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and 
protected by agreement between the respective naval authorities. The British 
Admiralty is the supreme authority in the control of shipping in the North Atlantic 
bound to and from the United Kingdom. 

22. The British Naval Control Service Organization will continue in the 
exercise of its present functions and methods in all regions pending establishment 
of effective United States Agencies in United States areas. The Chief of Naval 
Operations, immediately on entry of the United States into the war, will arrange 
for the control and protection of shipping of United [18] States registry or 
charter within United States Areas. Requests from the British Naval Control 
Service Organization for protection by United States forces within United States 
areas will be made to the Chief of Naval Operations. 

23. Special Relationship between Canada and the United States. Joint Agree- 
ments are being drawn up by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United 
States-Canada, regarding the cooperation of the Armed forces of the United 
States and Canada in the areas in which the United States has strategic direction. 
When completed, the substance of these agreements, (Short Title ABC-22), will 
be incorporated in this plan. 

[19] SECTION VI. GENERAL TASKS 

24. Joint General Task. In cooperation with the other Associated Powers, 
defeat the Axis Powers, and guard United States national interests, by: 

a. Reducing Axis economic power to wage war, by blockade, raids, and a 
sustained air offensive; 

b. Destroying Axis military power by raids and an eventual land, naval, and 
air offensive; 

c. Protecting the sea communications of the Associated Powers; 

d. Preventing the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic 
military power; and by 

e. Protecting outlying Military base areas and islands of strategic importance 
against land, air, or sea-borne attack. 

[W] SECTION VII. TASKS 

25. The tasks of the Army and Navy, as set forth in this section, are those 
listed in, or derived from, the tasks of ABC-1, Annex III. 

26. These tasks as stated do not include the assistance which may be furnished 
by the Armed Forces of Latin-American Republics. Such assistance may reduce 
the total of forces required but will not change the character of the operations. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2915 

The Western Atlantic Area 

27. Definition. The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with Islands and contiguous 
continental land areas north of latitude 25° South, and west of Longitude 30° West 
except the area between Latitudes 20° North and 43° North which lies east of 
Longitude 40° West. 

28. Army Tasks, a. In conjunction with Naval forces, protect the territory 
of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of Axis military power into 
the Western Hemisphere by destroying enemy expeditionary forces and by 
denying use to the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and Naval bases in that 
Hemisphere. 

6. In conjunction with naval forces, support Latin American Republics against 
invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling 
enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere. 

c. Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of 
the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications bj- 
offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating 
radius of occupied air bases. 

d. Relieve British forces in Curacao and Aruba. 

e. Provide defensive garrisons for Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, Trinidad, 
St. Lucia, Antigua, and British Guiana. 

[£1] f. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense 
Command Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in 
paragraph 47. 

g. Build up forces in the United States for eventual offensive action against 
Germany. 

h. Prepare to relieve Marine Forces in the Azores and Cape Verde Islands if 
such garrisons have been established. 

29. Army Forces, a. 1941 Troop basis plus all augmentations, less detach- 
ments. 

b. Local defense forces. 

c. One reinforced Corps of three divisions, including appropriate Air forces 
maintained in the L'nited States as a reserve for the support of overseas garrisons 
and Latin American Republics. 

Note: For overseas movements see paragraph 51. 

30. Navy Tasks, a. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers 
by escorting, covenng, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces. 

b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading 
directly or indirectly with the enemy. 

c. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of 
enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying hostile expe- 
ditionary forces and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the 
use of land positions in that hemisphere. 

d. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified 
localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47. 

[22] e. Protect and route shipping in the Coastal Zones. 
/. Prepare to occupy the .Azores and the Cape Verde Islands. 

31. Navy Forces, a. The Atlantic Fleet, less detachments. 
b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces. 

The Pacific Area. 

325 Definition. The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous 
contin*ental land areas, is as follows: 

a. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East. 

b. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East. 

c. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to South American coast 
and Longitude 74° West. 

33. Army Tasks, a. In conjunction with naval forces, protect the territory 
of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of Axis military power into 
the Western Hemisphere by destroying enemy expeditionary forces and by 
denying use to the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and naval bases in 
that Hemisphere. 

b. In conjunction with naval forces, support Latin American Republics against 
invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling 
enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere. 



79716 O— 46 — pt. 18- 



2916 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[SS] c. Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications 
of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by 
offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating 
radius of occupied air bases. 

d. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense Command 
Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47. 

34. Army Forces, a. Local defense forces. 

h. One reinforced Division, including appropriate air forces maintained in the 
United States as a reserve for the support of Latin American Republics on the 
West Coast of South America. 

Note: For overseas movements see paragraph 51. 

35. Navy Tasks, a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far 
East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the 
denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy 
sea communications and positions. 

b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading 
directly or indirectly with the enemy. 

c. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific 
Area. 

d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west as 
Longitude 155° East. 

e. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific area, and 
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by 
destroying [24] hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces 
in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Hemisphere. 

/. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall 
Island area. 

g. Defend Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa and Guam. 

h. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and sf>ecified locali- 
ties in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47. 

i. Route shipping in the Pacific Area. 

36. Navy Forces, a. The Pacific Fleet, less detachments. 
b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces. 

The Far East Area * 

37. Army Tasks. In cooperation with the Navy defend the Philippine Coastal 
Frontier — Category of Defense "E". 

38. Army Forces. Local Defense Forces, augmented only by such personnel 
and facilities as are available locally. , 

39. Navy Tasks, a. Raid Japanese sea communications and destroy Axis 
forces. 

b. Support the land and air forces in the defense of the territories of the Asso- 
ciated Powers. (The responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United States 
Asiatic Fleet, for supporting the defense of the Philippines remains so long as that 
defense continues.) 

[26] c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels 
trading directly or indirectly with the enemy. 

d. Protect sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, 
and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces. 

e. In cooperation with the Army defend the Philippine Coastal Frontier — 
Category of Defense "E". 

40. Navy Forces, a. The Asiatic Fleet. 

United Kingdom and British Home Waters 

41. Definition, a. Waters to the eastward of Longitude 30° West and to the 
Northward of Latitude 43° North. 

b. Land areas bordering on, and islands in the above ocean area. 

42. Army Tasks, a. In cooperation with the Royal Air Force conduct offen- 
sive air operations primarily against objectives in Germany, and against attempted 
invasion or blockade as demanded by the situation. 

b. Provide for the ground defense of occupied ba.ses and air defense of those 
general areas in the British Isles in which bases used primarily by United States 
Naval forces are located, and subsequently of such other areas as may be agreed 
upon. 

c. Provide a token force for the defense of the British Isles. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2917 

[26] d. Relieve, as soon as practicable, the British garrison in Iceland and 
in cooperation with the Navy defend that island — Category of Defense "D". 

43. Army Forces. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped forces: 

a. British Isles. 

3 Heavy Bombardment Groups 

2 Medium Bombardment Groups 

3 Pursuit Groups 

Approximately 10 Anti-aircraft Regiments 

Approximately 10 Infantry Battalions (Bases) 

One reinforced Regiment (Tok«n Force) 
h. Iceland. 

One reinforced Division. 
Note: For overseas movements see paragraphs 51. 

44. Navy Tasks and Forces, a. Northwest Escort Force. 

Task. Escort Convoys in the Northwest Approaches, acting under the strategic 
direction of the British Commander-in-Chief of the Western Approaches. 

b. Submarine Force Three. 

Task. Raid enemy shipping in an area to be designated later, acting under the 
strategic direction of the British Vice Admiral, Submarines. 

North Atlantic Area 

[27] 45. Definition. The North Atlantic Area is defined as follows: 

a. Northern boundary, Latitude .43° North. 
h. Southern boundary. Latitude 20° North. 

c. Western boundary. Longitude 40° West. 

d. Eastern boundary, the Coasts of Spain, Portugal, and Africa, and Longitude 
5° West. 

46. Navy Tasks and Forces, a. Submarine Force Two. 

Task. Raid enemy shipping in the Mediterranean under the strategic direction 
of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, acting through the Flag Officer 
Commanding North Atlantic. 

Note: As soon as the situation in the Pacific permits their transfer to the 
Atlantic, United States naval forces may be assigned the following tasks in this 
area, unless the strategic situation in the Atlantic at that time dictates a different 
decision. 

b. Protect the sea commuinlcations of the Associated Powers by escorting, 
covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces. 

c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading 
directly or indirectly with the enemy. 

d.' Raid Axis sea communications, territories and forces in the Western Medi- 
terranean. 

[28] 47. Categories of Defense. The Categories of Defense listed in this 
paragraph apply to all Defense Command Areas, Coastal Frontiers, Naval 
Coastal Frontiers and isolated positions. 

Northeast Defense Command and North Atlantic Coastal Frontier, 

except United States Bases in Newfoundland -< Category B 

United States Bases in Newfoundland ,_., Category C 

Southern Defense Command and Southern Coastal Frontier Category B 

Caribbean Defense Command and Panama and Caribbean Coastal 

Frontiers Category D 

Western Defense Command and Pacific Coastal Frontier, except 

Alaska Category B 

Alaska, Less Unalaska Category C 

Unalaska . Category D 

Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Category D 

Philippine Coastal Frontier . Category E 

Note: No Army reinforcements will be sent to the Philippine 
Coastal Frontier. 

Bermuda Category C 

Iceland Category D 

Midway, Johnston, Palmyra Category D 

Guam ^ : Category F 



2918 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

48. Joint Plans to be prepared. The provisions of paragraph 42 e. "Joint Action 
of the Ami}' and the Navy" in conflict with the provisions of this paragraph will 
be disregarded. 

a. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans. 

b. Joint Sector Defense Plans, except that the Sector Defense Plans for New- 
foundland, Nova Scotia, and the British Columbia Sectors will be made as 
required by ABC-22. 

c. Joint Subsector Defense Plans and Defensive Coastal Area Plans as directed 
by the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans. 

d. Joint P^mbarkation Plans for the embarkation of the Army units, specified 
in paragraph 51 a, to be prepared by the Commanding Generals, Army Ports of 
Embarkation and the Commandants of the Naval Districts in which these ports 
are located. 

[S9] SECTION VIII. OVERSEAS MOVEMENTS 

49. Army Tasks. Move troops to ports of embarkation as required. 

50. Navy Tasks. Provide sea transportation for the initial movement and the 
continued support of Army and Navy forces overseas. Man and operate the 
Army Transport Service. 

51. Overseas Movements of Army Troops. The plan in this paragraph 51 is 
based on the assumption that M-day will occur prior to September 1, 1941. 
Movements on the dates given in certain sub-paragraphs will not be made unless 
M-day has occurred before such date. 

a. The Navy will assemble material and make specific plans for the troop 
movements specified in this subparagraph a. 

(1) NEW YORK to ICELAND, 26,500 troops, 73 aircraft. 
First contingent — 10,500 troops embark on 24-M. 

Second contingent — 16,000 troops embark on 57-M. 

These two movements will be made by British transports if arrangements 
can be effected. If not, this plan contemplates use of United States trans- 
ports. 

(2) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 7,000 troops, embark on 10-M. 

(3) NEW YORK to IRELAND, 8,000 troops, embark on 10-M. 

These two forces, sub-paragraphs (2) and (3), will move in one convoy. 
The Northwest Escort Force will move with this convoy. 

(4) NEW YORK to BERMUDA, 3,700 troops, 41 aircraft, embark on 
18-M. Eight aircraft will fly to destination, 33 aircraft will be transported. 
Part of this force may be moved before M-day. 

[30] (5) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 8,000 troops, 73 aircraft, embark 
September 1, 1941. 16 aircraft will be transported, 57 aircraft will fly' to 
destination. 

(6) NEW YORK to IRELAND, 7,000 troops, 105 aircraft, embark October 
1, 1941. Aircraft will be transported. 

(7) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 6,600 troops, 60 aircraft, embark October 
1, 1941. 57 aircraft will fly to destination, three aircraft will be transported. 

These two forces, sub-paragraphs (6) and (7), will move in one convoy. 

(8) NEW YORK to IRELAND, 11,600 troops, 200 aircraft embark 
November 1, 1941. Aircraft will be transported. 

(9) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 7,000 troops, 38 aircraft, embark January 
1, 1942. 35 aircraft will flv to destination, 3 aircraft will be transported. 

. (10) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 13,000 troops, 76 aircraft, embark on 
February 1, 1942. 70 Aircraft will fly to destination, six aircraft will be 

(11) GALVESTON to CURACAO-ARUBA, 6,000 troops, embark on 
15-M. 

(12) GALVESTON to TRINIDAD, 12,500 troops embark on 15-M. 

(13) GALVESTON to PANAMA, 6,400 troops, of which 3,300 embark on 
20- M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become 
available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2919 

(14) GALVESTON to PUERTO RICO, 12,600 troops, of which 4,000 
embark 20-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships 
, become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day. 

[31] (15) SEATTLE to ALASKA, 23,000 troops, of which 1,100 embark 
on 10-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become 
available. Part or all of these troops may be moved before M-day. 

(16) SAN FRANCISCO to HAWAII, 23,000 troops, of which 15,000 

embark on 10-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ship^ 

become available. Part of these troops may be moved before M-day. 

b. The movements of the troops in this sub-paragraph b are contingent upon 

unpredictable eventualities. The Navy will not prepare material nor make 

specific plans for these movements in advance of M-day. 

(1) GALVESTON to WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA, 24,000 
troops, 80 aircraft will prepare to embark at Galveston on 45-M. If the 
Panama Canal is not open, these troops will embark at San Francisco. 

(2) NEW YORK and GALVESTON to EAST COAST of LATIN 
AMERICA, 86,000 troops, 56 aircraft, will prepare to embark 90-M. The 
56 aircraft may be flown to destination. 

(3) NEW YORK and GALVESTON to TRANSATLANTIC DESTINA- 
TIONS, 83,000 troops wUl be prepared to embark 20-M; desired minimum 
rate of movement 60,000 troops per month. 

(4) EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, One Army, two Corps, ten Divisions, 
will be prepared to embark at East Coast and Gulf ports beginning 180-M. 

SECTION IX. SUPPORTING MEASURES 

[32] 52. Theaters of Operation. The designation and delimitation of addi- 
tional land and sea theaters of operations to meet the developments of the situation 
covered by this Plan will be announced when the Plan is put into effect. 

53. Time of Execution. M-Day is the time origin for the execution of this 
Plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war or the occurrence of hostile 
acts. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate 
or put into effect certain features of this Plan prior to M-Day. 

54. Personnel. The Army and Navy requirements for increased personnel will 
be met by the operation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. 

55. Ports of Embarkation. The Army will establish, when required, additional 
ports of embarkation at: 

New Orleans, La. > 
Galveston, Texas 
Boston, Mass. 
Charleston, S. C. 

56. Material. The United States will continue to furnish material aid to the 
United Kingdom, but for the use of itself and its other associates, will retain 
material in such quantities as to provide for security and best to effectuate 
United States-British joint plans for defeating Germany and her Allies. Subject 
to the foregoing, the material to fill ihe requirements of the Army and Navy under 
this plan will come from existing reserves of the respective services and from pro- 
duction sources developed under Army and Navy Procurement Plans. In all 
cases where surveys indicate that reserves and existing production will not meet 
requirements, the War and Navy Departments will [33] each be responsible 
for providing the additional production necessary to meet deficiencies of their 
respective services, except in cases where one Department furnishes the other 
with the material involved. 

57. Supply Levels. Supply levels will be maintained for forces operating in 
the areas or positions as indicated by the tentative figures given in this para- 
graph. Final figures pertaining to building up initial levels will be established 
after a detailed joint e.xamination of the problems involved. 



2920 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

a. Supplies other than ammunition. 

(1) Iceland 30 days, build up to 60 days within six 

months. 

(2) British Isles Except pursuit aircraft, 30 days, build up to 

60 days within six months. 
Pursuit Aircraft 
60 days, build up to 120 days within six 

months. 

(3) Panama and Caribbean 30 days, build up to 45 days within six 

Coastal Frontiers. months. 

(4) Newfoundland and Alaska 30 days, build up to 60 diays within six 

(Less Unalaska). months. 

(5) Unalaska 60 days, build up to 90 days within six 

months. 

(6) Bermuda Maintain at 30 days. 

(7) Hawaii Maintain at 70 days. 

[SJf] (8) Philippines As the situation may permit, the desirable 

standard being the maintenance of stocks 
at 90 days' supply. 

h. Am.munition for places listed under 57 a: 

(1) For all troops included in a project; complete the project and then 
maintain at that level. 

(2) For ground troops not included in a project; establish and then main- 
tain five times the mobilization allowance. 

(3) For Air Corps troops not included in a project (less pursuit aviation 
in British Isles): Ammunition for 30 days' operation; build up to 60 days 
within six months. 

(4) Pursuit aviation in the British Isles: Ammunition for 60 days' opera- 
tions; build up to 120 days within six months. 

58. Industrial Planning. For Industrial planning purposes, and with due 
regard to decisions that may be made with respect to supplies to other Associated 
Powers, the industrial capacity of the nation will be allocated in conformity with 
the following general policy: 

a. The Army and the Navy shall each continue to plan for maximum industrial 
needs. 

h. When the available capacity of the nation to produce does not meet the 
requirements of the Army, Navy, and Associated Powers, such priorities as neces- 
sary to support the strategic situation will be established by The Joint Board 
and administered by the Army and Navy Munitions Board, in keeping with 
national policy. 

\S5] c. When plans contemplate that one Service procure for and deliver 
material to the other Service, the manufacturing facilities needed to produce such 
material shall be taken into consideration when a division of. capacity is made. 
Under this provision, all ship-building plants will be allocated to the Navy, and 
the Navy will furnish the Army with such overseas transportation as the Army 
may require, consistent with national strategic needs as a whole. 

59. Supporting Legiclative Program. The War and Navy Departments jointly 
shall have prepared by appropriate agencies, such drafts of legislation. Presidential 
Proclamations, and Executive Orders affecting both the Army and the Navy as 
are deemed necessary for the execution of this Joint Plan. 

60. Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure. The Administrator of Export 
Control, jointly with the War and Navy Departments is to prepare plans jand 
programs for the application of economic pressure such as may be obtained 
through control of commodities, transportation, communication, financial rela- 
tionships and all related means. 

61. Cooperation with Other Departments of the Government. The War and Navy 
Departments, jointly with other departments or agencies of the Government, 
shall have prepared plans or programs covering the fojlowing subjects: 

a. Intelligence Service. 

b. Censorship and Publicity. 

c. Mobilization of Resources. 

SECTION X. DIPLOMATIC MEASURES 

[36] 62. With respect to Latin American Republics, copfirmation should 
be sought that each State will make available to the armed forces of the United 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2921 

States, immediately as the necessity arises in carrying out operations for Hemi- 
sphere Defense, or in behalf of any State, the use of its available sea, air, and land 
bases. 

63. A special agreement should be sought with Brazil to the effect that the 
defense of the Western Hemisphere and the protection of its sea communications 
may require use by the United States of Brazilian sea, air and land bases and 
commercial port facilities for the projection of naval, land or air operations to the 
African continent. The most important areas in this respect are the coastal 
zones and territorial waters extending from Belem to Bahia and including the 
Island of Ferando do Noronha. 

64. Diplomatic and economic pressure should be directed towards securing 
the acquiescence of the powers concerned for the protective occupation when 
necessary of Eire, the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, and French North Africa. 

65. Diplomatic and economic support should be given to Governments in exile, 
to China, to neutrals and to populations in occupied territory in order to encourage 
opposition to the Axis Powers. 

66. Acquiescence of the Netherlands Government in London for protective 
occupation of Curacao and Aruba will be secured by the British Government. 

[37] ANNEX I. COASTAL FRONTIERS 

Reference: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935. 

1. For purposes of this Plan, this ANNEX I to Joint Army and Navy Basic 
War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5 temporarily amends Section IV of reference (a), 
as indicated herein. 

2. Change paragraph 33 of reference (a) to read: 
"33. Joint organization and command. 

"a. Coastal divisions with geographical coterminous boundaries within which 
an Army officer and a Naval officer will exercise command over the Army forces 
and the Navy forces, respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions, have 
been established in order to provide a joint organization and to ensure the effective 
coordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. 
These coastal divisions comprise coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors. The 
system of coastal frontiers includes certain outlying land, island and sea areas, 
as well as the coasts of continental United States. The joint organization, together 
with the commanders responsible for the execution of security measures on and 
after M-day and the necessary peacetime planning therefor, are as stated below. 

NOTE: The preceding sub-paragraph, for purposes of this plan, modifies 
Chapter V, paragraph 26 a, Section I, of reference (a). 

"b. A Defense Command is a geographical area within which an Army officer is 
responsible for the coordination or preparation, and for the execution of all plans 
for the emplovment of Army forces and installations Iving within the command 
boundaries; where pertinent, a Defense Command includes one or more coastal 
frontiers and may include isolated localities. (See map attached showing defense 
commands in contihental United (States.) 

"c. Normally a naval coastal frontier includes the coastal zone adjacent to 
the coastal frontier. In certain cases, two naval coastal frontiers may be included 
in a coastal frontier; in other cases the naval coastal frontier includes waters 
which extend bevond the limit(S of the coastal frontier. 

[38] "d. The provisions of ABC-22 may prescribe the extension of the 
North Atlantic coastal frontier and the Pacific coastal frontier to include part of 
the territory and coastal waters of Canada. 

"e. Coordination between Army and Navy forces in coastal frontier operations 
shall be by the method of mutual cooperation, subject to the provisions of para- 
graph 9 h." 

3. Change paragraph 34 of reference (a) to read as follows: 
"34. North Atlantic coastal frontier. 

"a. Boundaries. 

Northern. — Northern boundary of the United States, but including United 
States bases in Newfoundland. This may later be modified by ABC-22. 

Southern. — Diamond Shoals Lightship, Hatteras Inlet inclusive, southern 
and western boundary of Dare County (N. C), Albemarle Sound, Chowan 
River, Virginia — North Carolina boundary to the west, all inclusive. 



2922 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"b. Commanders. 

Army. — The Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command, or an 
officer, designated by him. 

Navy. — The Cornmandant, Third Naval District, who is designated as 
the Commander North Atlantic naval coastal frontier. This officer also 
commands the naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal 
force under his immediate command, and the naval local defense forces of the 
First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Naval Districts under the command of the 
commandants of the naval districts concerned. The officers named will 
arrange for the joint tactical employment in cooperation with the Army, of 
the naval forces assigned to their respective commands. 
[39] "c. Sectors. — The North Atlantic coastal frontier is divided into the 
following defense sectors: 

(1) Newfoundland sector. 

(a) Boundaries: These may later be established by ABC-22. 

The sector now consists of the United States bases in Newfoundland. 

(b) Commanders. 

Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast 
Defense Command. 

Navy. — Commander, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland. 

(2) New England sector. 

(a) Boundaries. 

Northern. — Northern boundary of the United States. 
Southern. — Nantucket Shoals Lightship, exclusive; Block Island, 
inclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary. 

(b) Commanders. 

Army. — As designated by Commanding General, Northeast 
Defense Command. 

Navy. — The Commandant, First Naval District. 

(c) This sector is subdivided into the Portland, Boston, and Newport 
subsectors, with boundaries as follows: 

[40] 1. Between the Portland and the Boston subsectors: 
Northern boundary of Massachusetts. 

2. Between the Boston and the Newport subsectors: Pollock Rip 
Slue Lightship, Monomy Light, Bishop and Clerk's Light, Cotuit 
Bay, Bourne, Taunton, northern boundary of Rhode Island, all to 
Boston subsector. 

(3) New York sector. 

(a) Boundaries. 

Northern. — Nantucket Shoals Lightship, inclusive; Block Island, 
exclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary. 

Southern. — Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both exclusive; Trenton, 
inclusive. 

(b) Commanders. 

Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast 
Defense Command. 

Navy. — Commandant, Third Naval District. 

(c) This "sector is subdivided into the Long Island and New Jersey 
subsectors with boundary as follows: 

Between subsectors: The Sandy Hook Peninsula and lower New York 
Bay to the Long Island subsector. 

(4) Delaware-Chesapeake sector. 

(a) Boundaries. 

Northern. — Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both inclusive; Trenton 
exclusive. 

[41] Southern. — Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, 
inclusive; southern and western ^boundary of Dare County (N. C), 
Albemarle Sound, Chowan River; Virginia-North Carolina bound- 
ary to the west, all inclusive. This sector will be subdivided into 
the Delaware and the Chesapeake subsectors, with the boundary as 
Winter Quarter Shoal Lightship (to Delaware subsector), southern 
and western boundary of Delaware. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2923 

(b) Commanders. 

Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast 
Defense Command. 

Navy. — There is no naval commander of this sector. The 
Commandant, Fourth Naval District, commands the naval local 
d'ifense force in the Delaware subsector, and the Commandant, 
Fifth Naval District, commands the naval local defense force in 
the Chesapeake subsector. The Commandant, Fifth Naval Dis- 
trict, coordinates operations and war planning of the naval local 
defense forces of the Fourth and Fifth Naval Districts." 

4. Change paragraph 35 of reference (a) to read as follows: 
"35. Southern coastal frontier. 

"a. Boundaries. 

Northern. — Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, exclusive; southern 
and western boundary of Dare County (N. C); Albemarle Sound, Chowan 
River; Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all exclusive. 

[42] Southern. — The Rio Grande. The coastal zone extends south- 
eastward and southward to the northwestern boundary of the Caribbean 
naval coastal frontier, so as to include the Gulf of Mexico and such parts of 
Bahaman waters and the Caribbean Sea as to lie to the northward of that 
boundary. 
"b. Commanders. 

Army. — The Commanding General, Southern Defense Command, or an 
officer designated by him. 

Navy. — The Commandant, Sixth Naval District, who is designated as the 

Commander Southern naval coastal frontier. This officer exercises command 

over the naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal force 

under his immediate command, and the naval local defense forces of the 

Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Naval Districts under the immediate command 

of the commandants of the naval districts concerned. The officers named 

will arrange for the joint tactical employment, in cooperation with the Army, 

of the naval forces assigned to their respective commands. 

"c. Sectors. — This frontier will be subdivided into defense sectors of Carolina, 

Florida, and Gulf, corresponding territorially to the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth 

Naval Districts, respectively." 

5. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraphs: 
"35A. Caribbean coastal frontier. 

"a. Boundaries. 

All United States territories and possessions, and United States military 
and naval reservations and activities on shore located within an area bounded 
as follows: 

[43] Beginning at latitude 18°05' North, longitude 87°32' West 
thence by a line bearing 63° true to the 25th parallel of latitude, thence by 
the 25th parallel of latitude to the 65th meridian of longitude, thence 
by a line direct to latitude 2° North, longitude 49° West, thence by a 
line direct to the place beginning. The coastal zone includes all of the 
waters within these boundaries, as well as the sea lanes and focal points 
beyond, but near, the eastern boundary. 
"b. Commanders. 

Army. — The Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, or 
an officer designated by him. 

Navy. — The Commandant, Tenth Naval District, who is designated 

as the Commander, Caribbean naval coastal frontier. This officer also 

commands the naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint 

tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army. 

"c. Sectors. — The Caribbean coastal frontier is divided into the following 

defense sectors: 

(1) Guantanamo sector. 

(a) Boundaries. — The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier lying 
westward of a line passing through Cape Isabela and Beata Point, His- 
paniola, extended to cut the northern and the southwestern coastal 
frontier boundaries. 



2924 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(b) Commanders. 

Army.^ — As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean 
Defense Command. 

[44] Navy. — Commander, Naval Operating Base, Guan- 
tanamo, Cuba. 

(2) Puerto Rico sector. 

(a) Boundaries. — The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier 
lying eastward of the eastern boundary of the Guantanamo sector, and 
' northward of the 15th parallel of north latitude. 
(6) Commanders. 

Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean 
Defense Command. 

Navy. — The Commandant, Tenth Naval District. 

(3) Trinidad sector. 

(a) Boundaries. — The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier 
lying eastward of the eastern boundary of the Guantanamo sector, and 
southward of the 15th parallel of north latitude. 

(b) Commanders. 

Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean 
Defense Command. 

Navy. — The Commander, Naval Operating Base, Trinidad." 

6, Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraph: 
"35B. Panama coastal frontier. 

[45] "a. Boundaries. 

All United States territories and possessions, and United States 
military and naval reservations and activities on shore located within 
the following area: British Honduras, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, and Ecuador; all land 
areas between the southwestern boundary of the Caribbean coastal 
frontier and the coasts of Central and South America; and all land areas 
between the coasts of Central and South America and a broken line drawn 
from the Mexico-Guatemala border to a point in latitude 5° South, 
longitude 95° West, and thence to Peru-Ecuador border. The coastal 
zone includes all the waters within these boundaries, as well as the sea 
lanes beyond, but near, the western and southern boundaries. 
"6. Commanders. 

Army. — The Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, 
or an officer designated by him. 

Navy. — The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District, who is desig- 
nated as the Commander, Panama naval coastal frontier. This officer 
also commands the naval local defense force, and will arrange for its 
joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army. 
"c. Sectors. 

The Panama coastal frontier is divided into the following defense 
sectors: 

(1) Atlantic sector. 

(a) Boundaries. — The area within the Panama coastal fron- 
tier lying between the northeastern boundary and the continen- 
tal divide. 

(b) Commanders. 

Army. — As designated by Commanding General Caribbean 
Defense Command. 

Navy. — The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District. 
(2) Pacific sector. 

(a) Boundaries. — The area within the Panama coastal frontier lying 
between the contiental divide and the western and southern boundaries. 

(b) Commanders. 

Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean 
Defense Command. 

Navy. — The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District." 

7. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraph: 

"35C. The Caribbean defense command includes all the land and water areas 
lying within the boundaries of the Caribbean coastal frontier and the Panama 
coastal frontier." 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2925 

8, Change paragraph 36 of reference (a) to read: 
"36. Pacific coastal frontier. 

"a. Boundaries. 

Northern. — Northern boundary of Washington except that Alaska is part 
of the Pacific coastal frontier. This frontier mav later be changed as required 
by ABC-22. 

[47] Southern. — Southern boundary of the United States. The coastal 
zone extends southeastward to abreast the southern boundary of Mexico. 

(1) Pacific naval coastal frontiers.— The Pacific coastal frontier is 
divided into two naval coastal frontiers, i. e., the Pacific Southern naval 
coastal frontier, and the Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier. The 
boundary between the two naval coastal frontiers is the northern 
boundary of California, 
"b. Commanders. 

Army. — The Commanding General, Western Defense Command, or an 
oflRcer designated by him. 
Navy. — 

(1) The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District, who is also desig- 
nated as the Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier. 

(2) The Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, also 
commands the Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier force, composed 
of the naval coastal force under his immediate command and the naval 
local defense forces of the Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts under 
the command of the commandants of the naval districts concerned. 

(3) The Commander, Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier, is the 
Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District. This officer also commands 
the naval local defense force assigned to his district. 

(4) The Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, and 
the Commander, Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier, will arrange 
for the joint tactical employment, in cooperation with the Army, of the 
naval forces assigned to their respective commands. 

[48] "c. Sectors. — This frontier is subdivided into the Southern California, 
Northern California, Northwestern, and Alaskan sectors, as follows: 

(1) Boundary between the Southern California and Northern California 
sectors, Santa Maria River. 

(2) Boundary between the Northern California and the Northwestern 
sector is the northern boundary of California. 

(3) Northern boundary of the Northwestern sector is the northern bound- 
ary of Washington. 

(4) The boundaries of Alaska define the Alaskan sector. 

"d. Sectors of this frontier are further subdivided into subsectors with bound- 
aries as follows: 

(1) San Diego subsector: Mexican boundary to San Mateo Point, inclusive. 

(2) San Pedro subsector: San Mateo Point, exclusive, to Santa Maria 
River, exclusive. 

(3) Monterey subsectors: Santa Maria River, inclusive, to Pigeon Point, 
inclusive. 

(4) San Francisco subsector: Pigeon Point, exclusive, to northern bound- 
ary of California. 

(5) Columbia River subsector: Northern boundary of California to 
Moclips, Wash., inclusive. 

(6) Seattle subsector: Moclips, Wash., exclusive, to northern boundary 
of Washington. 

[49] (7) Sitka naval subsector: Alaska east of longitude 141° West. 
(8) Kodiak naval subsector: Alaska west of longitude 141° West. 

9. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraphs: 
"36A. Hawaiian coastal frontier. 

"a. Boundaries. 

The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all of the land and sea 
areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a dis- 
tance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and 
Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef. 



2926 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"b. Commanders. 

Army. — The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 
Navy. — The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who is designated 
as the Commander, Hawaiian naval coastal frontier. This officer also 
commands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its 
joint tactical and strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army. 
"36B. Philippine coastal frontier. 
"a. Boundaries. 

The Philippine coastal frontier consists of Luzon, and all of the land and 
sea areas required for the defense of Luzon. The coastal zone includes all of 
the sea approaches to the coastal frontier. 
[50] "b. Commanders. 

Army. — The Commanding General, Philippine Department. 
Navy. — The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, who is designated as 
the Commander, Philippine naval coastal frontier. This officer also com- 
mands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint 
tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2927 




© 



7vas""^' 



h 
a.. 

t4 



2928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
[1] Appendix II to WPLf-46, Composition of Forces 

[3] chapter i. INTRODUCTION 

2-101. APPENDIX II prescribes the initial composition of the Operating 
Forces and of the Naval Transportation Service. 

2-102. a. Naval vessels and aircraft are listed by organization unit or number. 

b. Coast Guard vessels are listed by name. 

c. Units not listed in the current Operating Force Plan which are to be taken 
over by the Navy either temporarily or permanently are, for war planning pur- 
poses, designated in this Appendix II as "X" vessels in accordance with the 
system defined in WPL-10 (XAR 5, XAK 17, XPYc 20, etc.). 

2-103. a. When the Coast Guard becomes a part of the Navy, Coast Guard 
vessels will continue to be designated by their Coast Guard names. 

b. When vessels listed in the tables as "X" vessels come under Navy control, 
the Chief of Naval Operations (Director, Ship Movements Division) will assign 
to them names, symbols, and numbers in accordance with standard nomenclature 
(AP 60, AK 90, FY 50, etc.). The names will be recommended by the Chief of 
the Bureau of Navigation, and the symbols and numbers by the Chief of the 
Bureau of Ships. 

2-104. Units appearing in the current Operating Force Plan are not assigned 
to Mobilization Districts, as most of these vessels have already been mobilized 
at the time of issue of this plan. 

2-105. In the Tables of Appendix II, where capital letters appear under the 
heading "Sub-Group", these letters indicate the categories to which vessels and 
aircraft belong, as follows: 

A — Navy vessels and aircraft in commission on M-day; 
B — Navy vessels not in commission on M-day, including those under 
construction ; 

C — Vessels and aircraft belonging to other Departments of the Government 
to be commissioned in the Navy; 

[3] D — Merchant vessels to be commissioned in the Navy, either 
Navy-owned or on a bare-boat charter basis; 

E — Merchant vessels to be chartered on a time charter basis; 
CG — Coast Guard vessels. 

[4] chapter II. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET 

2-201. Table ATF-1 shows the initial composition of the U. S. ATLANTIC 
FLEET as of Julv 1, 1941. 

2-202. a. SUBMARINE FORCE ONE will be composed of submarines, sub- 
marine tenders and submarine bases, not assigned to SUBMARINE FORCE 
TWO. Not less than five submarines must remain based on the SUBMARINE 
BASE, COCO SOLO. 

b. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will be composed of submarines destined for 
the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA. 

2-203. When the units included in the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT, 
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, arrive in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, the 
Chief of Naval Operations will assign them to such existing or new task forces as 
may then be dictated by the existing strategic situation. 

2-204. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, 
the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will assign for task duty, 
patrol planes, and patrol plane tenders required for their support, to the Task 
Forces indicated herein: 

1. To the NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE. 

18 VPB and necessary tenders; 

2. To the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE 

12 VPB and necessary tenders; 

3. To the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE 

12 VPB and necessary tenders. 

b. The aircraft units assigned as prescribed in the preceding sub-paragraph 
will remain under the administration of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLAN- 
TIC FLEET. Rotation of units may be made periodically at the discretion of 
the Commander in Chief. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2929 



[6] 2-205. TRANSPORT DIVISION ONE wiU be assigned temporarily to 
the Naval Transportation Service, as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, 
for the transportation of Army troops. 

2-206. Destroyers assigned to experimental work and sound school, and sub- 
marines assigned to submarine school and sound school wiU normally continue in 
these assignments and will be withdrawn for other duties only under exceptional 
circumstances. 

TABLE ATF-1 



Unit— Vessel 


Symbol 


No. 


Notes 


BATTLESHIPS 

Batdiv 3. - 


BB 
BB 

CA 
CA 
CL 
CL 

AD 
ODD 
ODD 
DD 
DD 
DD 
DD 
DD 

CV 
CV 

VPB 
VPB 
AVD 
AVP 

VPB 
VPB 
AVD 
AVP 

PG 

ASR 
OSS 
OSS 

AO 
OSS 

SS 

ASR 
OSS 
OSS 

AS 
OSS 
OSS 

AF 

AG 
AKS 
AO 
AT 
AE 

DMS 

AM 

AP 
APD 


3 
3 

1 
4 
4 
4 

2 
3 
4 

4 
9 
9 
8 
8 

2 

1 

12 
12 
2 
2 

12 
12 
1 
2 

1 

1 
8 
7 

1 
2 
1 

1 
6 
6 

2 
3 

7 

2 
1 
1 
8 
2 
1 

4 

7 

4 
2 




Batdiv 5 




CRUISERS 

CA 31 




Crudiv 7. 




Crudiv 8 .- -. 




Cradiv 2 , - 




DESTROYERS 

AD 2, 12 - 




DD 141, 187, 343 




Desdlv 54 




Desdiv 22 --. 




Desron 2 




Desron 8 .-- 




Desron 9 


1,850 tons. 


Desron 13.. . .. .. .... ..... 




AIRCRAFT 

Cardiv3 




CV5 




Patwing S 

VP 31.. 




VP32... 




AVD4, 9 




AVP 1,9 




Patwing 6 

VP61.. 




VP52 




AVD 13 




AVP 3, 8 - 




SUBMARINES 

PO 53 - 




Svbron 1 

S/M Base, New London 

ASR2._ 

Subdiv 11 








Eidiv 1 
KQ 24 




SS 20, 48 




SS 204 




S« 67-07! 3 

S/M Base, Coco Solo 

A&R4 




Subdiv 31 - 




Subdlv32 -. 




Subrov 7 

ASS, 21 . -.. 




Subdiv 71 




Subdiv 72. --- 

Mobile Submarine Repair Unit No. 2 
S/M Base, St. Thomas 
TRAIN VESSELS 

AF1.9 ._ -.- - --- 


AF 1 to be assigned in August, 1941 


AO 17 - 




AKS3 - 


AKS 3 to be assigned in July, 1941 


AO 9, 11. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26 -. 




AT 37, 66 - - 




AE 2 


To be assigned in August, 1941. 


MINECRAFT 
Minron 7 

Mindiv 13 i.--- 




Mindiv 14 • 




TRANSPORTS 




Transdiv 11 





2930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

TABLE AT F-1— Continued 



Unit— Vessel 


Symbol 


No. 


Notes 


PATROL CRAFT 

Subch aserd i v 31 - - 


PC 
XPG 
XPG 
XPG 
XPG 
XPG 
XPG 
XPG 
XPG 
AG 

IX 


5 

1 




niJANE (CG) 




INGHAM (CO) --- 




CAMPBELL (CO) -.. 




SPENCER (CO) 




HAMILTON (CO) - - .- 




BIBB (CO) - 




NORTH STAR (CG) _ 




NORTHLAND (CO) _._ .- 




AG 29 




UNCLASSIFIED 

IX 20 




NAVAL OPERATING ^ASF. BERMUDA 
MOBILE BASK HOSPITAL NO. 1 
MARINE CORPS FORCES 








Fifth Defense Battalion 









[6] CHAPTER III. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 

2-301. a. Table PAF-1 shows the initial composition of the U. S. PACIFIC 
FLEET as of July 1, 1941. 

b. Table PAF-2 shows the initial composition of the ATLANTIC REIN- 
FORCEMENT, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. 

2-3o2. a. On M-dav, or sooner if directed bv the Chief of Naval Operations, 
the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET will assign for task duty, 
patrol planes and submarines, and tenders required for their support, to the Task 
Forces indicated herein: 

1. To the PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 
FORCE 

12 VPB and necessary tenders, 

2 SS and necessary tenders (for ALASKAN SECTOR) ; 

2. To the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 
FORCE 

12 VPB and necessary tenders. 

b. The units assigned as prescribed in the preceding sub-paragraph will remain 
under the administration of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. 
Rotation of units may be made periodically at the discretion of the Commander 
in Chief. 

2-303. Destroyers and submarines assigned to sound school will normally 
continue in these assignments and will be withdrawn for other duties only under 
exceptional circumstances. 

TABLE PAF-1 



Unit — Vessel 



BATTLESHIPS 

Batdiv 1-. 

Batdiv 2 ^.. 

Batdiv 4 

CRUISERS 

Crudiv4..., 

Crudiv 6 

Crudiv 9.... 

DESTROYERS 

Desflot I 

CL7 

ADS, 4 

Desron 1 (less one Desdiv) 
Dcsron 3, 5 

Desflot i 

CL8... 

AD 11, 14 

Desron 4, 6. 

Desdiv 50 



Sym- 
bol 



BB 
BB 
BB 

CA 
CA 
CL 



CL 
AD 
DD 
DD 

CL 
AD 
DD 
ODD 



No. 



Notes 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 

TABLE PA F-1— Continued 



2931 



Unit— Vessel 



MINECRAFT 

CM4- --.- 

Mindiv 1, 2- - 

AIRCRAFT 

Cardiv 1 

Cardiv 2 (less CV 5) - - 

Patwing 1 

VP 11 ---- 

VP 12 - 

VP 13.— 

VP 14 - 

AVI— - 

AVD 6, 10 

AVP4 

Patwing 2 

VP21 

VP22 

VP23.... 

VP24 

AV4 

AVD 11, 14..__ _. 

AVP7.. 

Patwing 4 

VP41 - 

VP42 

VP43 

VP44 

AVD 2. 12.. 

AVP5, 6 

SUBMARINES 

CL9 

Subron i 

AS 3 - 

ASR5.. 

Subdiv 21 

Subdiv 22„ 

Subron 4 

S/M Base, Pearl Harbor 

DD336 

AM 30 

ASR 1. _ 

Subdiv 41 

Subdiv 42.... 

Subdiv 43 

Subron 6 

Subdiv 61 

Subdiv 62 

BASE FORCE 

TRAIN VESSELS 

AE 1 

AF 7,8, 11 

AG 16, 31 

AH 1 

AKS 1, 2 

AM 3, 13, 10, 20, 24, 25, 26, 31, 43. 52 

A O 1, 3, 4, 5, 12, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29 

AR 1,4 

ARb 1.... 

ARD 1 

AT 12, 23, 33, 34, 64, 65 

TRANSPORTS 

Transdiv 2_. 

, Transdiv 4 

Transdiv 12 

MINE SQUADRON 3 

DMS 13 

Mindiv 4 

Mindiv 5 _ _ 

Mindiv 6 

NAVAL STATION, OUAM 

NAVAL STATION. SAMOA 

Seventh Defense Battalion 

MARINE CORPS FORCES 

Second Marine Division 

Second Marine Aircraft Group.. 

Second Defense Battalion 

Sixth Defense Battalion 



Sym- 
bol 


No. 


CM 


1 


DM 


8 


CV 


2 


CV 


1 


VPB 


12 


VPB 


6 


VPB 


5 


VPB 


12 


AV 


1 


AVD 


2 


AVP 


1 


VPB 


12 


VPB 


12 


VPB 


12 


VPB 


12 


AV 


1 


AVD 


2 


AVP 


1 


VPB 


6 


VPB 


6 


VPB 


6 


VPB 


6 


AVD 


2 


AVP 


2 


CL 


1 


AS 


1 


ASR 


1 


ss 


6 


ss 


6 


ODD 


1 


AM 


1 


ASR 


1 


OSS 


6 


ss 


4 


ss 


5 


ss 


3 


ss 


3 


AE 


1 


AF 


3 


AG 


2 


AH 


1 


AKS 


2 


AM 


10 


AO 


14 


AR 


2 


ARb 


1 


ARD 


1 


AT 


6 


AP 


2 


AP 


2 


APD 


4 


DMS 


1 


DMS 


4 


DMS 


4 


DMS 


4 



Notes 



To be formed about October 1, 1941. 



Includes SM 1. 



To be assigned in August, 1941. 



EXAD 13. 



79716 O— 46 — pt. 18- 



2932 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
TABLE PAF-2. THE ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT 



Unit— Vessel 


Symbol 


No. 


Notes 


CRUISERS 

Crudiv 5 


CA 


4 









CHAPTER IV. THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE 

2-401. Table SEP-1 shows the initial composition of the SOUTHEAST 
PACIFIC FORCE as of July 1, 1941. 







TABLE 


3EP-1 






Unit— Vessel 


Symbol 


No. 


Notes 


CRUISERS 

Crudiv 3 . . . - 


CL 
DD 


2 
4 




DESTROYERS 


As assigned by CinCpac. 







CHAPTER V. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET 



2-501. The Table ASF-1 shows the composition of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET. 

2-502. One stores ship (AF) and one cargo ship (AK) of the NAVAL TRANS- 
PORTATION SERVICE, upon arrival in the FAR EAST AREA mav be re- 
tained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET. 



TABLE ASF-1 



Unit— Vessel 



Symbol 


No. 


CA 


1 


CL 


1 


AD 


1 


ODD 


13 


VPB 


12 


VPB 


12 


AV 


1 


AVD 


2 


AVP 


1 


AS 


2 


ASR 


1 


OSS 


6 


ss 


4 


ss 


7 


PQ 


2 


PR 


5 


PY 


1 


AO 


2 


AT 


1 


AM 


2 


AM 


4 



Notes 



CRUISERS 

CA 30.- - ---- 

CL 12 

DESTROYERS 

AD 9 - 

Desron 29 -. 

AIRCRAFT 
Pat wing 10 

VP 101 ---. 

VP 102 

AV 3 

AVD 1,7 --- 

AVP 2 

SUBMARINES 
Subron SO 

AS 9,20 --- --. 

ASR 6 

Subdiv 201—- 

Subdiv 202— 

Subdiv 203 - --- 

PATROL CRAFT 

PO 21,22 

PR3,4,6,7,8 

PYIO 

TRAIN 

AO 6, 13 - - 

AT 32.- 

Mindiv 3 

Mindiv 9 

MARINE CORPS FORCES 
Marine Detachments 

Fourth Marines (Shanghai) 
Marine Detachments 

(North China) 

Marine Detachments 

(PhiUppines) .. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2933 



[7] 



CHAPTER VI. U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE 



2-601. The Tables for the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, 
show the initial composition as of Julv 1, 1941. 

a. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE— TABLE NE-1. 

1. Units of this table not prepared for overseas service will be temporarily 
assigned to the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for training and material prep- 
aration. 

b. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE— TABLE NE-2. 



TABLE NE-1. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE 



Unit— Vessel 


Symbol 


No. 


Notes 


DESTROYERS 

AD 15- _ 


AD 
DD 
ODD 
ODD 
DD 

VPB 
VPB 
VPB 
VPB 
AV 
AVD 

VPB 
VPB 
VPB 
VPB 
AVD 

VPB 
VPB 
VPB 
VPB 

AM 
AMc 


1 
9 
18 
5 
4 

12 
12 
9 
9 
1 
2 

12 
12 
12 
12 
1 

12 
12 
12 
12 

4 
6 




Desron 7 _ _ 

Desrons 30. 31 




DD 341, Desdiv 53 _ 

Desdiv 21... 




Mobile Destoyer Repair Units 1, 2 




AIRCRAFT 
Patwing 7 

VP 71 




VP 72 . 




VP73... . ,. 




VP74 ... 




AV5._ 




AVD 3,8 

Patwing 8 

VP81_. 




VP82__ 




VP83 




VP84__.. _ 




AVD 5.. 




Palwinq 9 

VP91.. 


1 


VP92 


iThis wing will be formed following 
completion of Patwing 8. 


VP93 


VP 94 


Mobile Aircraft Repair Units 1, g.. 

A IN VESSELS 

AM 73, 74, 75, 77. 

^ AMc 3fi, 42, 43. 46, 47. 50 

SlARINE CORPS FORCES 

Eleventh Provisional Marine Company.. 





TABLE NE-2. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE 



Unit— Vessel 


Sym- 
bol 


No. 


Notes 


SUBMARINES 
Subron 6 

AS 13 


AS 
ASR 
OSS 
OSS 
OSS 


1 
1 
7 
4 
6 


• 


ASR3. ... 




Subdiv 51 




Subdiv52 

Subdiv 53 




Mobile Submarine Repair Unit No. 3 





CHAPTER VII. VESSELS OPERATING UNDER THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

2-701. The Table CNO-1 shows the vessels assigned to special duty under the 
Chief of Naval Operations. 



2934 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

TABLE CNO-1. 



Unit— Vessel 



AG 1 

AG 23 

AG 25,26... 

AG 30, 32 

AM 40 

P052 

MTB Squadron 1 

MTB Squadron 2. 

Subchaser Squadron 1. 
COMANCHE (CG).. 
ALGONQUIN (CO).. 

M6D0C iCQ).. 

RARITAN (CG) 

IX 50--.. 

SS 206 to 211 incl 



Sym- 
bol 


No. 


AG 


1 


AG 


1 


AG 


2 


AG 


2 


AM 


1 


PG 


1 


FT 


6 


PT 


7 


PTC 


4 


XPY 


1 


XPY 


1 


XPG 


1 


XYT 


1 


IX 


1 


SS 


6 



Notes 



SecNav Yacht. 

President's Yacht and tender. 

Survey vessels. 

BuOrd duty. 

Tender for PT's and PTC's. 



Greenland Patrol. 

Greenland Patrol. 

Greenland Patrol. 

Greenland Patrol. 

Greenland Patrol. 

In commission or to be commis- 
sioned and to operate either un- 
der the CNO or CinClant for 
temporary duty. To be assigned 
to U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. 



CHAPTER VIII. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES 



[8] 

2-801. The tables in this Chapter VIII show the assignments to the NAVAL 
COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES. 

2-802. Units that are not listed in these tables but which have otherwise been 
assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Districts, outlying Naval 
Stations, or to activities excluded from Naval Districts, will continue in such 
commands. Commandants of Naval Districts and outlying Naval Stations will 
assign such units under their commands to Naval Local Defense Forces or to 
Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) in accordance with the following 
general rules: 

a. TO THE NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES 

1. Units other than auxiliary type (see "Standard Nomenclature, Ships' 
Data, U. S. Naval Vessels"). 

2. Units of the Auxiliary Type required for execution of the tasks of Naval 
Local Defense Forces. 

3. District Craft (see " Standard Nomenclature, Ships' Data, U. S. Naval 
Vessels"), as follows: YN, YNg, VMS, YP; those YT assigned for net and 
boom services; and other classes at the discretion of the Commandant. 

b. TO NAVAL DISTRICT CRAFT 

1. Units not assigned to the Naval Local Defense Force. 

c. 1. Units of the Naval Local Defense Force and of the Naval District Craft 
will be placed in the status "in service not in commission", or- in the status "in 
commission" as prescribed by article 636 (1), (2), U. S. Navy Regulations, in 
accordance with the current Operating Force Plan in effect, or in specific cases as 
directed by the Chief of Naval Operations. 

2. Units taken over from private sources will be placed "in service not in 
commission", or "in commission", depending upon the status in which units of 
the same classification appearing in the current Operating Force Plan^. are oper- 
ating. 

[9] 2-803. a. Units of the Coast Guard not otherwise assigned in succeeding 
paragraphs or in the tables of Appendix II, will be employed in the Naval Local 
Defense Forces of the Naval Districts in which they are based at the time the 
Coast Guard is transferred to the Navy, in the manner prescribed in the "United 
States Coast Guard District Manual, 1940." Commandants of Naval Districts 
will understand that, on assuming command of Coast Guard units, they also 
assume responsibility for the discharge of essential Coast Guard functions. Prior 
to M-day, Commandants of Naval Districts, in cooperation with local Coast 
Guard commanders, will plan the war operations of the Coast Guard. 

b. Lighthouse tenders will normally be employed in their peace-time duties, as 
modified by war requirements of the Army and Navy. 

2-804. a. The tables show the assignments to the Naval Coastal Frontier 
Forces in tabular form. 

1. Unit (vessel, aircraft, or organization unit) Column (1) . 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2935 



2. Sub-group Column (2) . 

3. From (indicating the fleet from which the unit is to be 

detached, the Naval District in which a private vessel is to 
be taken over, or that the assignment will be made by the 
Chief of Naval Operations) Column (3) . 

4. Mobilization District (indicating the Naval District in which 

the vessel is to be mobilized) Column (4). 

b. The symbol XAGs indicates a station ship. 

2-805. Units to be taken over will be manned by Navy crews in the Naval 
Districts indicated in Column (3) of the tables, and moved under the direction of 
the Commandant of that Naval District to the Mobilization District indicated in 
Column (4) , where mobilization will take place. 

[10] 2-806. It is undesirable to take over for use in Naval Coastal Frontier 
Forces vessels that will remain idle for a long period on account of inability to 
convert, equip, or man them. Commandants of Naval Districts in which units 
are taken over (Column (3)) will, therefore, arrange to do so after consideration 
of the following: 

a. Personnel available to take over and man the unit for mo\ement to the 
Mobilization; 

b. Conversion yards available and readiness to start conversion; 

c. Equipment available; 

d. Personnel available to man the unit upon completion of conversion; 

e. The desirability of placing the unit in immediate service with little or no 
conversion. 

2-807. Commandants charged with taking over and mobilizing Naval Coastal 
Frontier Forces will give the same priority to units assigned to the Naval Coastal 
Frontier Forces of other Districts as they give to units assigned to the Naval 
Coastal Frontier Forces within their own Districts. 

TABLE NACF.— NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 



Unit— Vessel 

(1) 



NAVAL COASTAL FORCE 
Navy Vessels 

PE 19, 27, 48,55, 56 5 PE 

PY 12, 13, 15, 16 4PY 

PO 17, 18, 54 3PO 

VPB 18VPB 

AV or AVD or AVP number as required.. 

ZNP 6ZNP 

Coast Guard Aircraft based at: 

Air Station, Salem, Mass. _ 

Air Station, New York, N. Y 

Air Station, Elizabeth City, N. C 

Vessels from Other Sources 

XPQ 1.- IXPQ 

XPQ 2,3 2XPO 

NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— FIRST 
NAVAL DISTRICT 
Navy Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 

2-802, Appendix II. 
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may 
be assigned by the Commander, North At- 
lantic Naval Coastal Frontier. 
Coast Guard Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 
2-803, Appendix II. 
Vessels from Other Sources 

XYP 1 to30incl 30 XYP 

XAGsl, 2 2 XAGs 

XAM 1 to4incl 4 XAM 

XAMb 1 to9incl. 9 XAMb 

XAMcl, 2 2XAMC 

Units Ashore 

As indicated in I ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW 
No. 5. 
Marine Corps Forces 

Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. 



Sub- 
group 

(2) 



From 

(3) 



USAF 
USAF 
IV ND 



CNO 
CNO 



I ND 
I NJJ 
I ND 
I ND 
I ND 



Mob. 
Dist. 



(4) 



I 
III 



Notes 

(5) 



{Administration in 
U. S. ATLAN- 
TIC FLEET. 



2936 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



TABLE NACF— NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER— Continued 



Unit-Vessel 


Sub- 
group 


From 


Mob. 
Dist. 


Notes 


(1) 


(2) 


(3) 


(4) 


(5) 


NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE-THIRD 










NAVAL DISTRICT 










Nary Vestels 










Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 










2-802, Appendix II. 










Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may 










bo assigned by the Commander, North Atlan- 










tic Naval Coastal Frontier. 










Coast Guard V^essels 










Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 










2-803, Appendix II. 










Vessels from Other Sources 










XYP31 1 XYP 


D 


III ND 


III 




XAM 5 to 13 incl - 9 XAM 


D 
D 
D 


I ND 
IND 
IND 


I 
I 
I 




XAMb 10 to 14 incl 5 XAMb 




XAMc 3 to 16 incl 14 XAMc 




UnH» Ashore 










As indicated in III ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW 










No. 5. 










Marine Corps Forces 










Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 










C-2, RAINBOW No 5 










NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— FOURTH 










NAVAL DISTRICT 










Navy Vessels 










Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 










2-802, Appendix II. 










Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be 










assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic 










Naval Coastal Frontier. 










Coast Guard Vessels 










Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 










2-803, Appendix II. 
Vessels from Other Sources 


















XCMcl... IXCMc 


D 


IND 


I 




XPYcl, 2 2XPYC 


D 


HIND 


III 




XPYcS, 4 2XPYC 


D 


IV ND 


IV 


.— 


XAQs3 1 XAOs 


D 


IV ND 


IV 




XAM 14 to 21 incl 8 XAM 


D 
D 
D 
D 


IND 
IND 
IV ND 
IND 


I 

I 
IV 

I 




XAMb 15 to 24 incl 10 XAMb 




XAMcl7 to 19 incl 3 XAMc 




XAMc 20 IXAMc 




Units Ashore 




As indicated in IV ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW 










No. 5. 










Marine Corps Forces 










Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 










C-2, RAINBOW No. 5 










NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE-FIFTH 










NAVAL DISTRICT 










Navy Vessels 










Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 










2-802, Appendix II. 










Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be 










assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic 










Naval Coastal Frontier. 










Coast Guard Vessels 










Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 










2-803, Appendix II. 
Vessels from Other Sources 


















XCMc2 1 XCMc 


D 


VND 


V 




XYP 32 to 38 incl 7 XYP 


D 
D 


VND 
VND 


V 
V 




XAGs4. 1 XAGs 




XAM 22,23 2 XAM 


D 


IND 


I 




XAMc 21 to 31 incl 11 XAMc 


D 


VND 


V 




Units Ashore 




As indicated in V ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW 










No. 5. 










Marine Corps Forces 










Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 










C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. 











EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2937 



TABLE SCF— SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 



Unit— Vessel 
(1) 



NAVAL COASTAL FORCE 
Navy Vessels 

None .- 

Coast Ouard Vessels 

MOJAVE, TAMPA 240' 2XPQ 

TALLAPOOSA Misc. 1 XPY 

MOHAWK 165' 1 XPY 

Coast Ouard Aircraft based at : 

Air Station, Charleston, S. C 

Air Station, Miami, Fla.- 

Air Station, St. Petersburg, Fla.. 

Air Station, Biloxi, Miss - 

Vessels from Other Sources 

XP0 4 - IXPO 

XPY 1 to4incl 4XPY 

NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE-SIXTH 
NAVAL DISTRICT 
Navy Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 

2-802, Appendix II. 
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be 
assigned by the Commander, Southern Naval 
Coastal Frontier. 
Coast Ouard Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 
2-803, Appendix II. 
Vessels from Other Sources 

XCMc3 - IXCMc 

XPYc5. 6 2XPYC 

XYP 39to44incl.... 6XYP 

XAQs5, 6 2XAQs 

XAM 24to27incl 4XAM 

XAMb 25 to 31 incl 7 XAMb 

XAMb32to34incl 3 XAMb 

As indicated in VI ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW 
No. 5. 
Marine Corps Forces 

Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. 
NA VAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— SEVENTH 
NAVAL DISTRICT 
Navy Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 

2-802, Appendix II. 
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may 
be assigned by the Commander, Southern 
Naval Coastal Frontier. 
Coast Guard Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 
2-803, Appendix II. 
Vessels from Other Sources 

. XPYc7,8 2XPYc 

XPYcO, 10 2XPYc 

XAGs 7, 8._ -.-- 2 XAQs 

XAM 28, 29 2 XAM 

XAMb 35, 36 2 XAMb 

XAMc 32 to 35 incl 4 XAMc 

Units Ashore 

As indicated in VII ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW 
No. 5. 
Marine Corps Forces 

Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. 
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— EIGHTH 
NAVAL DISTRICT 
Navy Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 

2-802, Appendix II. 
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may 
be assigned by the Commander, Southern 
Naval Coastal Frontier. 
Coast Guard Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 
2-803, Appendix II. 



Sub- 
group 

(2) 



CO 
CO 
CO 



From 
(3) 



VI ND 
VI ND 
IV ND 



CNO 
III ND 



III ND 
III ND 
VI ND 
VI ND 
I ND 
TND 
VI ND 



IND 
HIND 
VII ND 

IND 
IND 
IND 



Mob. 
Dist. 

(4) 



VI 
VI 
VI 



VI 

III 



III 
III 

VI 
VI 

I 
I 

VI 



I 
III 

VII 

I 
I 
I 



Notes 
(5) 



2938 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
TABLE SCF.— SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER— Continued 



Unit— Vessel 

(1) 



From 


Mob. 
Dist. 


(3) 


(4) 


III ND 


III 


IX ND 


VIII 


VIII ND 


VIII 


V ND 


V 


VIII ND 


VIII 


VIII ND 


VIII 


I ND 


I 


VI ND 


VI 



Notes 

(5) 



NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— EIGHTH 
NAVAL DISTRICT-Continued 
Vessels from Other Sources 

XCMc4 1 XCMc 

XPYcll to ISineL.. 8 XPYc 

XYP 45to50incl fi XYP 

XYP 51 to 55incl 5 XYP 

XAOsQto 11 incl 3 XAQs 

XAMb37to40incl.-. 4 XAMb 

XAMc36to40incl - 5 XAMc 

XAMc41 to 43 inch. 3 XAMc 

Units Ashore 

As indicated in VIII ND Plan O-S, RAIN- 
BOW No. 5. 
Marine Corps Forces 

Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. 



TABLE CACF.-CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 



NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE 
Navy Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 
2-802, Appendix II. 

ODD Desron 33 less Desdiv 67 5 ODD 

PY 18 1 PY 

VPB 12 VPB 

A V or A VP or A VD number as required 

Coast Guard Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 
2-803, Appendix II. 

Vessels from Other Sources 

XPQ 6,7_ 2 XPO 

XPC 2,3,4 3 XPC 

XPY 8 1 XPY 


A 
A 
A 
A 

D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 


USAF 

USAF 

CNO 
III ND 

V ND 
III ND 

III ND 
I ND 

IV ND 
I ND 

V ND 
I ND 
I ND 


X 
III 

V 
III 
III 

I 
IV 

I 

V 

I 
I 


(Administration in 
\ U. S. ATLAN- 
l TIC FLEET. 


XPY 9, 10. ._ 2 XPY 

XPYc 24 to 27 incl 4 XPYc 




XPYc28 to31 incl ... 4 XPYc 




XYP 128 to 131 incl ... 4 XYP 




X AM 42 to 47 incl 6 XAM 




XAMb 61 to 66 incl . 6 XAMb 




XAMb 67 to 70 incl 4 XAMb 




XAMc 93 to 102 incl 10 XAMc 




Units Ashore 

As indicated in X ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW 
No. 5. 
Marine Corps Forces 

Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 

C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. 
Fourth Defense Battalion, Naval Operating 
Base, Guantanamo, Cuba. 


• 



TABLE PACF.— PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 



NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE 
Navy Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 
2-802, Appendix II. 

ODD Desdiv 67... 4 ODD 

PG50 1 PO 

VPB... 12 VPB 

AV or AVP or AVD number as required 

Coast Guard Vessels: 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 
2-803, Appendix II. 

Vessels from Cfther Sources: 

XCMc6 IXCMc 

XPC 5,6 - 2XPC 

XPY 11 to 14 incl 4 XPY 

XPYc 32 to 43 Incl 12 XPYc 

XPYc 44 to 46 incl 3 XPYc 



USAF 
USAF 



V ND 
III ND 
IX ND 
III ND 

V ND 



V 
III 
VIII 
III 

V 



(Administration in 
\ U. S. ATLAN- 
I TIC FLEET. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2939 

TABLE PACF— PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER— Continued 



Unit— Vessel 



NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— Continued 
Vessels from Other Sowrces- Continued 

XPYc47 - 1 XPYc 

XYP 132 to HI-- lOXYP 

XAOs 16, 17.-- 2XAQS 

XAM 48 to 50 incl -.- 3 XAM 

XAMb71, 72 - 2 XAMb 

XAMclOSto 116 incl--- 14 XAMc 

Units Ashore 

As indicated in XV ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW 
No. 5. 
Marine Corps Forces 

Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. 



Sub- 
group 
(2) 



From 


Mob. 
Dist. 


(3) 


(4) 


VI ND 


VI 


IV ND 


IV 


VIII ND 


VIII 


I ND 


I 


V ND 


V 


V ND 


V 



Notes 
(5) 



TABLE PSCF.— PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 



NAVAL COASTAL FORCE 
Navy Vessels 

ODD Desdiv 70,83 8 ODD 

PE 32, 38 . 2 PE 

PY14 - 1 PY 

VPB 12 VPB 

AV or AVD or AVP number as required 



Coast Guard Vessels 

TANEY. 327' 1 XPG 

SHAWNEE Misc. 1 XPY 

Coast Guard Aircraft based at: 

Air Station, San Francisco, Calif 

Air Station, San Diego, Calif 

Vessels from Other Sources 

XPG 5 IXPG 

XPY 5, 6,7 3XPY 

NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— ELEV- 
ENTH NAVAL DISTRICT: 
Navy Vessels: 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 

2-802, Appendix II. 
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be 
assigned by the Commander, Pacific South- 
ern Naval Coastal Frontier. 
Coast Guard Vessels: 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 
2-803, Appendix II. 
Vessels from Other Sources: 

XCMc5 1 XCMc 

XPC 1 1 XPC 

XYP 93 to 97 incl 5 XYP 

XAGs 14 1 XAGs 

XAM 39 to 41 incl 3 XAM 

XAMb 51 to 60 inch- 10 XAMb 

XAMc 65 to 86 incl 1 -. 2? XAMc 

As indicated in XI ND Plan 0-5, RAI.NBOW 
No. 5. 
Marine Corps Forces: 

Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. 
NA VAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— TWELFTH 
NAVAL DISTRICT 
Navy Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 

2-802, Appendix II. 
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may 
be assigned by the Commander, Pacific 
Southern Naval Coastal Frontier. 
Coast Guard Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 
2-803, Appendix II. 
Vessels from Other Sources 

XYP 98 to 127 incl 30 XYP 

XAGs 15 - 1 XAGs 

XAMc 87 to 92 incl 6 XAMc 



CG 
CG 



USPF 
USPF 



IX V ND 
XII ND 



CNO 
XI ND 



HIND 
XI ND 
XI ND 
XI ND 
XI ND 
XI ND 
XI ND 



XII ND 
XII ND 
XIIND 



XI 
XII 



XII 
XI 



(Administration in 
\ U. S. PACIFIC 
I FLEET. 



Ill 
XI 
XI 
XI 
XI 
XI 
XI 



XII 
XII 
XII 



2940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

TABLE NACF.-NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER— Continued 



Unit— Vessel 
(1) 



Sub- 
group 

(2) 



From 

(3) 



Mob. 
Dist. 

(4) 



Notes 
(6) 



NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— TWELFTH 
NAVAL DISTRICT— Continued 
Units Ashore 

As indicated in XII ND Plan 0-5, RAIN- 
BOW No. 5. 
Marine Corps Forces 

Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 
C-2. RAINBOW No. 5. 



TABLE PNCF.— PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 



NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— THIR- 
TEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT 

Navy Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 
2-802, Appendix II. 

ODD Desdiv 82 -. 5 ODD 

P0 51. 1 PQ 

PE 57 1 PE 

SS 2SS 

ASR 1 ASR 

VPB.. 12VPB 

AV or AVD or AVP number as required 

Coast Ouard Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 

2-803, Appendix II. 
AURORA 165' B 1 XPC 

Coast Guard Aircraft based at: 

Air Station, Port Angeles, Wash. 

Vessels from Other Sources 

XPYc 19 to 23 incl 5 XPYc 

XYP56to92incl.- 37 XYP 

XAOs 12, 13.-. 2XAOs 

XAM 30 to 38 incl 9 XAM 

XAMb41 to 50 incl 10 XAMb 

XAMc 44 to 64 incl 21 XAMc 

XAOb 1, 2 2XA0b 

Units Ashore 

As indicated in XIII ND Plan 0-5, RAIN- 
BOW No. 5. 

Marine Corps Forces 

Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 
C-2, RAINBOW No. 



CO 



USPF 




USPF 




USPF 




USPF 




XI ND 


XIII 


XI ND 


XIII 


XIII ND . 


XIII 


XIII ND 


XIII 


XI ND 


XIII 


XIII ND 


XIII 


XIII ND 


XIII 


CNO 


XIII 



Administration in 
} U. S. PACIFIC 
FLEET. 



TABLE HCF.— HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 



NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE 

Navy Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 
2-802. Appendix II. 

ODD Desdiv 80 4 ODD 

PO 19 1 PG 

Coast Ouard Vessels 

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 

2-803, Appendix II. 
DAPHNE. 165'B 1 XPC 

Vesseis from Other Sources 

XCMc7 1 XCMc 

XYP 142 to 167 incl _ 26 XYP 

XAM 51 to 55 incl... .-.. 5 XAM 

XAM66 - 1 XAM 

XAMc 117 to 119 incl 3 XAMc 

XAOb3,4.-.. 2 XAOb 

XYF 1 to5incl 5 XYF 

Units Ashore 

As indicated in XIV ND Plan 0-5, RAIN- 
BOW No. 5. 

Marine Corps Forces 

Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 

C-2, RAINBOW No. 5 

First Defense Battalion 

Third Defense Battalion 



CO 

D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 



XII !nd 


XII 


V ND 


V 


XIV ND 


XIV 


I ND 


I 


XII ND 


XII 


XIV ND 


XIV 


CNO 


XIV 


XIV ND 


XIV 







EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2941 

TABLE PhCF.— PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER 



Unit— Vessel 

(1) 


Sub- 
group 
(2) 


From 
(3) 


Mob. 

Dist. 

(4) 


Notes 
(5) 


NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE-SIX- 
TEENTH NA VAL DISTRICT 
Such suitable vessels as are locally available and 
additional vessels and aircraft as assigned by 
Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC 
FLEET. 
Units Ashore 

As indicated in XVI ND Plan 0-5, RAIN- 
BOW No. 5. 
Marine Corps Forces 

Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan 
C-2. RAINBOW No. 5. 











[11] CHAPTER IX. NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE 

2-901. The Sections and Tables prescribing the composition of forces of the 
Naval Transportation Service will be issued as a change to this plan. 



EXHIBIT NO. 130 



Confidential 



Paraphrase of Code Radiogram Received at the War Department at 22 : 55, 

OOTOBEB 27, 1941 

M/nila, October 27, 1941. 
British sources report 2 Japanese aircraft carriers, one of which is the Kage, 
operating In Mandated islands. Following planes reported there : 
Wotje — 8 flying boats 
Jaluit — 8 flying boats, 12 fighters 
Truk — 6 fighters, 6 heavy bombers 
Saipan — 8 fighters, 6 heavy bombers 
Palau — 8 flying boats 
General southward movement of Japanese shipping in Western Pacific re- 
ported by British. 

BRINK 

IB #2 10/28/4],. 
Distribution : 

Mr. Lauchlin Currie 

Assistant Secretary of War 

Assistant Secretary of War for Air 

Chief of the Army Air Forces 

Chief of the Air Corps 

Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD 

Q. H. Q. 

State Department. 

Director of Naval Intelligence 

Situation Section 

Far Elastern Section 



Department of State. Received Nov. 29, 1941. Division of Communications 
and Records. 

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 

Paraphrase 

November 21, 1941. 
The following was received from the Naval Observer at Wellington November 
19, 1941 : 

"Source New 25ealand Naval Intelligence: On November 16 and 17 planes, 
apparently Japanese, were sighted over Gilberts. One day twin engined mono- 
plane next flying boat, course generally north and south with speed 125. Indi- 



2942 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

cates daily patrol from Jaluit over Gilberts to area south near shipping routes. 
Several unknown ships reported last 10 days near Gilbert apd Ellice Jap liners 
reported carrying troops or laborers to Mandates, Truk and Saigon each recently 
reinforced by V^ squadron fighters and 1/2 squadron bombers." 



Department of State. Received Nov. 30, 1941. Division of Communications 
and Records. 
Strictly confidential 

Paraphrase 

November 24, 1941. 

The following was received from the Naval Attache Singapore November 23 
1941: 

"DEPENDABLE REPORTS HERE OF RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER 
GILBERT ISLANDS ON NOVEJVIBER 15 BY MONOPLANE WITH TAPERED 
WINGS, SINGLE TAILFIN, TWIN ENGINES. NEXT DAY REPEATED BY 
MONOPLANE FLYING BOAT SILVER COLOR NUMBER OF ENGINES UN- 
OBSERVED." 
CC: Mr. Hamilton 
Mr. Hornbeck. 

Telegram received 
HRL Geay 

From: Tokyo 
Dated : November 29, 1941 
Rec'd 3 : 11 p. m. 
Secbetabt of State, 

Washington. 
1868, November 29, 6 p. m. 

The Embassy has received Foreign Office note no. 129 American 1 dated 
November 27 which is translated as follows. 

"Excellency: I have the honor to state that according to a report from the 
Japanese Naval authorities, an American airplane flew over Garanbi on the 
southernmost tip of Taiwan Island at 12 : 30 p. m. November 20, 1941 and after 
circling at an altitude of 2,000 meters flew away southward at 12 : 45 p. m. the 
same day. 

"It is believed that the Japanese Government cannot overlook such a violation 
of Japanese territoi-y by an airplane and it is therefore requested that the mat- 
ter be brought to the attention of the United States authorities concerned. Also 
I particularly bespeak Your Excellency's solicitude particularly the recurrence 
of such incidents at this time when the international situation is tense and the 
untoward events to which they might give rise are unpredictable. I avail my- 
self of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance's of my high- 
est consideration. Shigenori Togo, Minister for Foreign Affairs." Sent to the 
Department only. 

Grew. 
JRL 



Secret Navy Department, 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, December 2, 19^1. 

The following information has been received from the Commander in Chief 
Asiatic Fleet. 

"At a bearing from Saigon of 070 and a distance of 180 miles three type 1-61 
submarines were observed on December 2nd in cruising formation headed south 
at a speed of 15 knots. Also at Camaranah six planes patrolled overhead while 
21 transports anchored. 

"In Lat. 13- ION. Long 110-00 at 0230 Greenwich December 2nd a patrol plane 
observed 9 submarines headed south at a speed of 10 knots, [apparently headed 
for Camranh Bay.]" 

/S/ R. E. SCHUIRMANN. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINl COMMITTEE 2943 

Strictly confidential Paraphrase 

December 4, 1941. 

The following message was received from the Governor of Guam November 
24, 1941 : 

"At 1217 local time today unidentified two-engined plane sighted, circling 
southern end of island. Altitude approximately 15,000 feet. At 1226 local time 
plane passed out of sight to southwest." 



Telegram sent 

Depabtment o\ State, 

December 6, 1941. 
AMEMBASSY 
Tokyo (Japan). 
Your 1868, November 29, 6 p. m. 

The Foreign Office note has been brought to the attention of the appropriate 
authorities of this Government. 

In connection with this question, you may be interested to know that the Navy 
Department has been informed by the Governor of Guam that about noon on 
November 24 an unidentified two-motored airplane circled the southern extremity 
of Guam' for about ten minutes flying at an altitude of approximtaely 15,000 
feet. 

/S/ HXJLU 

/s/ S W 
FE:RLS:NHS FE 



EXHIBIT NO. 131 

(This exhibit was originally designed to incorporate the prior testimony of Rear 
Admiral H. E. Kimmel before (1) the Roberts Commission, (2) the Navy Court 
of Inquiry and (3) the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Inasmuch as the entire tran- 
script of testimony taken incident to each of these proceedings has been set forth 
as exhibits to the Joint Committee record, the prior testimony of Admiral Kimmel 
is not being printed at this point pursuant to direction of the Committee. For 
reference thereto, see index. ) 



EXHIBIT NO. 132 

Report on Confekence Befwejen Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the 
AMERICAN Ambassador 7 : 30 A. M. Dec 8, 1941 

1. I stated, "After my conference with you last night I succeeded in obtaining 
an answer from the Emperor to the personal telegram from President Roosevelt 
to the Emperor which you presented at that conference. Thus, His Imperial 
Majesty orders me to convey the following message to President Roosevelt 
through you : 

" We have heretofore commanded the Japanese Government to reply to the 
query of the President of the United States respecting the assembling of Japanese 
troops in French Indo China. Further, the withdrawal from French Indo China 
was one of the matters discussed in the Japanese-American negotiations and we 
have already had the Japanese Government state its opinions on the matter. 
Therefore, please consult these statements to understand our position. We be- 
lieve the President must be fully aware of the fact that the object of our wishes 
is the establishment of peace in the Pacific and throusrhout the world, and that, 
in accordance with our desires, the Japanese Government has up to the present 
time striven to attain that goal.' " 

The Ambassador listened to the Emperor's note with respectful attention and 
replied that he would transmit it to the President immediately. He then said 
that he had been instructed to request an audience of the Emperor to present 



2944 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the President's telegram personally, and since the relations between our two 
nations were now facing a grave crisis he requested that I take special pains 
to arrange for an audience. I answered that if his sole object in requesting an 
audience was to present the President's telegram, I doubted, considering the 
nature of the Emperor's note, that an audience was necessary. I pointed out, 
however, that I had no intention of standing in his way and if he had any further 
satement to make, in addition to the telegram, I would of course do everything I 
could to arrange for one. The Ambassador seemed very pleased and expressed 
his gratitude. (At his request, I have submitted a provisional translation of 
the English text of his application [for an audience] (as Supplement A)). 

2. Next I banded the Ambassador a copy of the note to the United States and 
said that, as he knew, the Imperial Government had done everything in its xwwer 
to bring the Japanese- American negotiations to a successful conclusion and that 
I myself had worked earnestly to that end. 

"However," 
I continued, 

"we have come to the conclusion that the attitude of the American Government 
unfortunately precludes any prospect of reaching an agreement even though the 
negotiations should be further continued, and we have therefore ordered this ntoe 
to be presented to the Government of the United States on the afternoon of 
December 7, Washington time. I am very sorry that things have worked out this 
way." 

[2] The Ambassador said that he would return to the Embassy to read the 
document and would refrain from making any statement at this time, whereupon 
he withdrew. 

3.' The conference lasted about half an hour, but at that time Ambassador Grew 
stated that President Roosevelt had sent a personal telegram to the Emperor and 
that he had been instructed to present it to the Emperor himself, and therefore 
he requested the Foreign Minister's help in arranging for an audience. The 
Foreign Minister answered that it was now late at night and steps for arranging 
an audience could not be taken before the next morning. He suggested that the 
Ambassador's chances for getting an audience would probably depend on the con- 
tents of the President's telegram. Ambassador Grew informally handed the 
Foreign Minister a copy of the telegram which he had with him (Supplement A), 
again requested that the Foreign Minister do everything possible to arrange for 
an audience in view of the gravity of the situation, and withdrew after arranging 
for another interview. 

4. The Foreign Minister proceeded to the Premier's official residence with a 
summary translation of the President's telegram, and there, at an emergency 
conference with the Pi'emier and the rest of the cabinet, determined in general 
the line of action to be taken on this matter. [Two lines illegible.] 

5. At about 3 A. M. the Foreign Minister returned to his residence. He waited 
as directed, until 6 o'clock on the morning of the 8th to notify the English and 
American Ambassadors of the rupture of Anglo-American negotiations. At this 
time he handed the following statement to Ambassador Grew as the Emperor's 
answer to President Roosevelt's wire : 

[Here follows the text of the Emperor's note as given above.] 



Gist of Confebence Between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the Bbitish 
Ambassador 8 :(X) A. M. Dec. 8, 1941 

Following my interview with the American Ambassador. I called the British 
Ambassador to an interview. I told him directly as I had the American Am- 
bassador that it had become unavoidably necessary to break off Japanese- American 
negotiations, and handed him a copy of the note addressed to the United States. 
At the same time I said "Although this is only the copy of a note to the United 
States, please understand that the Imperial Government, realizing Great Britain's 
great interest in these negotiations and that the interests of Great Britain and 
the United States are inseparably connected, has included in the note its opinions 
on all problems currently pending between Japan and Great Britain." The 
Ambassador thereupon remarked that he regreted the rupture of negotiations 
as deeply as I did. He went on to say that there were reports to the effect that 
Japanese vessels with a large number of troops aboard were proceeding westward 



• From this point on this would seem to be a totally different document, referring to 
what preceded the conference of the morning of the 8th. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2945 

through the Gulf of Siam and that it would seem that possibly part of them 
were headed for Thailand and part for the Malay Peninsula. The invasion of 
these areas by the Japanese Army would produce a most serious situation. As 
he had stated a little while ago ( here he referred to the interview with me on the 
6th) , Great Britain had no intention of violating Thai independence and territorial 
integrity provided that other nations respected them. Therefore he hoped that 
the Japaiiese Government would restrain its Military. 

1 answered that I was by no means certain of the situation since last evening. 
However, just this morning I had heard a report to the effec-t that the English 
had assembled Indian troops on the Thai border. I thought it probable that our 
vessels were cruising the waters adjacent to that area to be ready for anything 
that might come up in a situation which was plainly not normal. I had just 
ordered our ambassador to Thailand to report on the situation, and as sixm as that 
report arrived, would consider this mater in a general study of the situation. 
Whereupon the British Ambassador advised me to be wary of reports fabricated 
by elements seeking to disturb the peace, and withdrew. 



On the Declaration of War Against the Uniti<:d States and Great Britain 
Meeting of Privy Council Dec. 8, 1941 

Written by Matsumoto — Head of Treaty Bureau 

In the 11th item of Article 6 of the Internal Orders decided upon at the time 
of the Reorganization of the Privy Council in December 1938, was included a sec- 
tion on "The Declaration of War." It was unclear whether this gave the Privy 
Council the right to advise the decision to engage in war, or just the authority 
for advising the formal declaration of war. However, when war was declared 
against the United States and Great Britain, the decision to engage in war had 
already been made at the previous conference of Dec. 1, 1941, so the Privy 
Council was only to consider an address to the throne stating "We declare war 
against the United States and Great Britain." A draft of an Imperial Rescript 
declaring war was attached to the Address to the Throne for advisement. (The 
Address to the Throne and the draft of the Imperial Rescript were drawn up 
by the Cabinet.) 

Meeting of Committee of Advisement 
Dec. 8—7 : 40 A. M. 
In the Imperial Palace 
Tozo Room 
Those Present 

All members of the Advisory Council [Komonkan] 

All Cabinet ministers (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Togo, was absent, because 
he was holding interviews with the United States and British Ambassadors). 

Head of the Legal Bureau — Moriyama 
Foreign Affairs Officials : 

Yamamoto, Head of the American Bureau 
Sakamoto, Head of the Europe-Asia Bureau 
Matsumoto, Head of the Treaty Bureau 
Army Officials: 

Muto, Head of Military Affairs Bureau 
Navy Officials : 

Muto, Head of Military Affairs Bureau 
First, the Navy Minister reported on the military action against American 
and British Troops which had been in progress since this morning in the Malayan, 
Hongkong, and Hawaiian areas. 

1st President of the Council — I propose that a Committee of Advisement headed 
by the Vice-President of the Council, and constituted of all the members of the 
Advisory Council, meet immediately and consider this matter. 
Premier Tojo — explained the reasons for declaring war. 

Advisor Ishii — At what time will war be declared? It is necessary to make 
sure that America and Britain don't saddle us with the responsibility. 
Primier — We hope for an immediate declaration. 

[2] Advisor Kubota — A state of war already exists, but what is the view- 
point of the Imperial Headquarters, 



2946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Premier — At the conference of Dec. 1 they determined to commence hostilities 
against England, America, and the Netherlands. 

Advisor Shimizu — What is the attitude of Thailand? 

Premier — It is not yet clear, but negotiations are in prograss for a policy of 
Mutual Defense. 

Advisor Shimizu — Aren't we going to declare war on Holland? 

Premier — We are not declaring war against Holland because of military ex- 
pediency. 

Advisor Minami — What is Germany's attitude? 

Premier — German entrance into the war in our support is almost certain, 
and negotiations to that effect are now in progress. 

Advisor Nara — What is the attitude of the Soviet Union? 

Premier — The attitude of the Soviet Union is one of circumspection. 

Advisors Sugawara and Fukai submitted questions on the expenditure of war 
funds, matters of material, etc., which were answered by the Minister of Finance 
and the Premier. 

Advisor Sutakarai — Is it the question of whether or not we should declare war 
that you want us to consider? I mean, has an Imperial Rcesript already been 
issued on the beginning of the war? 

Premier — Yes. 

(Foreign Minister Togo enters and takes his place.) 

Advisors Futakami and (?Ikeda?) pointed out that the use of the word 
"America," [BEIKOKU] in the sugge.sted draft of the Imperial Rescript which 
had been appended for advisement, might be misunderstood to apply to all the 
Americas, and recommended a revision, but the Premier and the Head of the 
Treaty Bureau explained that no such misunderstanding was possible. 

Last of all, Foreign Affairs Minister Togo reported on the diplomatic situation 
which had preceded the commencement of war. 

[3] The documents under discussion were approved by a unanimous vote. 

Full session, 10 A. M. Dec 8, Imperial Palace, Higashidame Room 

His Imperial Majesty was present. 

The rest of the attendance was the same as at the meeting of the Committee 
of Advisement. 

Committee President Suzuki presented his advisement report which was unani- 
mously approved. 

EXHIBIT NO. 132A 

From : Wa.shington ( Nomura ) 

To: Tokyo 

30 September 1941 

Msg. #881 

Part 2(") — (conclusion of the message) 

Said Admiral is a man who thinks that war between Japan and America would 
bring about no advantageous results for either country and that it is impossible 
to solve economic problems by means of arms. He was cordial in his attitude 
toward me from beginning to end. So I told him how much I regretted that, since 
my arrival to take up my post. I had not been able to accomplish anything at all, 
to which he said, "All the people who know your Excellency deeply appreciate 
your efforts", and pointing out the apprehensions expres.sed in the Business Con- 
ditions Weekly (") regarding Far-Eastern problems (the gist of the article is to 
the effect that, while a showdown ('*) between Japan and America is imminent, 
war between these two comitries is unnecessary and that if Japan is able to change 
and readjust her policy, America will be mindful of her prosperity), he urged me 
to read the article and said that he would put forth due efforts in the matter. 

I would request that the above information be convej'ed to the Navy Minister. 
(Finis) 



• Part 1 appears under SIS-22987. 

* Expressed by the English words. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2947 

From : Tokyo 

To : Germany, Brazil, Canada, England, Australia, Russia 

Date : 8 November 11)41 

Msg No. Circular 2288 

With regard to the present stage in the Japanese-American negotiations: (Of- 
fice Ciiief's Code) 

1. Tiie government, since the formation of the labinet, has held daily conferences 
with Imi)erial Headquarters and lias given consideration to the fundamental aim 
in our national policy so as to meet the present grave crisis. We came to a de- 
cision on the matter at the conference held in the Emperor's presence on the 5th 
inst. together with a determination of fundamental plans relating to diplomatic 
adjustments between Japan and America. 

2. With regard to Japanese-American negotiations we decided to continue nego- 
tiating for diplomatic adjustments and Ambassador NOMURA has already begitn 
conversations in compliance with our new policy. However, although we on our 
part still have the same strong desire to come to an agreement in the negotia- 
tions, we are also determined to persist in our demands in so far as they pertain 
to the existence and authority of our Empire. However, in view of the way in 
which these negotiations have progressed in the past, there will be a great deal 
of divergency of opinion between us and them. On the other hand, since the situa- 
tion indicates imminent tension, the outlook does not permit optimism. In cas^ 
of a rupture in the negotiations, the situation throughout our Empire may be ex- 
pected to undergo a sudden change. 

3. At present the government will endeavor to save the situation by peaceful 
means. It expects to expedite the negotiations by urging the American govern- 
ment to reconsider its attitude. So exhausting every possible method to accom- 
plish this, and because we think it appropriate, we have decided with this in view 
to despatch Ambassador KURUSU to America (he is scheduled to arrive in Wash- 
ington about the 13th), so that he might himself inform Ambassador NOMURA 
of our decision, and aiding said ambassador in the final stages of the negotiations, 
bring about a new turn in the critical situation. 

4. In this way our government, while persistently adhering to our position, is 
trying in every possible way to prevent a break in Japanese-American relations, 
and by devoting its utmost efforts, is endeavoring to bring about a rapid and new 
turn in the critical situation. The above is for vour information alone. 

This messj^ge is addre.ssed to GERMANY, BRAZIL, CANADA. AUSTRALIA. 
ENGLAND and RUSSIA. Will you plea.se relay it to ITALY from GERMANY, 
and to the ambassadors and ministers in South America and MEXICO from 
BRAZIL. 



From: Tokyo (Togo) 

To : Peking, Nanking, Manchuria, Shanghai, Hongkong, Hanoi, Batavla, Thailand, 

San Francisco, Manila. 
Date : 12 November 1941 
Circular 2313 

With regard to the present stage in the Japanese-American negotiations : 
( Office Chief's Code. Urgent ) . 

1. The government, since the formation of the Cabinet, has held daily confer- 
ences with Imperial Headquarters and has given consideration to the fundamental 
aim of our national policy so as to meet the present grave crisis. We came to a 
decision on this matter on the 5th inst. together with a determination of our 
fundamental plans relating to diplomatic adjustments between Japan and America. 

2. With regard to Japanese-American negotiations we decided to continue 
negotiations on diplomatic adjustments on an etiuitable basis. And no sooner had 
conversations begun on the 7th than considerable divergence of opinion appeared. 
In view of the way in which the negotiations have moved in the past, it is doubtful 
whether an agreement will be reached in the negotiations, and while on our part 
we will try to put forth our utmost efforts to bring about an agreement, the 
situation is such that we shall not be able to make any further concessions, so 
that the outlook does not permit any optimism. In case of a rupture in the 
negotiations it is expected that the situation throughout our Empire will undergo 
a sudden change. 

This message is sent to : Peking, Nanking, Manchuria, Shanghai, Hongkong, 
Hanoi, Batavia, Thailand, Manila and San Francisco. Will Hongkong please 

79716 O — 46— pt. 18 7 



2948 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

relay it to Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, and will San Francisco relay 
it to the various Consuls in America, to Chicago, Honolulu and Vancouver. 



From: Tokyo 
To : Canada and Brazil 
Date : 10 November 1941 
Msg No. Circular 2193 

(Very Urgent. Office Chief's Code). 

The reason for the resignation of the entire Cabinet, as the Information 
Bureau ' has already announced, was that recently no unanimity of opinion within 
the Cabinet could be found. However, no matter what kind of a Cabinet will 
henceforth be formed, the intention is to give very careful thought to meeting 
the present crisis, and to continue the negotiations between Japan and America 
as well. This is for your information alone. 

This wire is addressed to Canada and Central and South American countries. 
Will Brazil please relay it to Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and 
Colombia. 



Minutes of an Interview H^ld on 19 August 1941 Between Vice-minister 
Amau and Ambassador Ott 

On the 19th August the German Ambassador Ott called upon the Vice-Minister 
and, after a"n exchange of courtesies and after a presentation of the war situation 
in Europe, advanced the idea (1) that it would be to the advantage of Japan 
also if at this time she attacked Russia from the east, and (2) stating that 
intelligence had been received to the effect that America was going to provide oil 
to Vladivostok by means of transport vessels, that the first of these ships had 
already sailed, and that after that they would sail in rapid succession, he remarked 
that this oil would doubtless be used for an attack upon .Japan too, and this 
would have a very important bearing on .Japan. Thus, he tried to find out what 
Japan's attitude was regarding these matters. (3) He also tried to sound out 
Japan's attitude on the problem of American vessels stopping at Japanese ports 
(the problem of the Pre.sident Coolidge). And (4) referring to Japan's attitude 
toward Thailand, he asked whether Japan was planning merely for the economic 
development of that country or whether she was thinking of a political or military 
penetration. He asked various questions in order to obtain intelligence of 
this kind. 

To this the Vice-Mlnister replied : '-For Japan to do a thing like attacking 
Russia would be a very serious question and would require profound reflection. 
As for the problem of American oil we are giving the matter very careful attention. 
And while we do not consider such a matter as American vessels stopping at our 
ports to be of such importance as to cause the world to get excited, we have not 
yet had time to investigate the facts in the case. (At this point Ambassador Ott 
interjected the remark that at the interview with the news reporters held today at 
the Information Bureau there were many questions and answers relating to the 
matter). Then with regard to Thailand, Great JJritain, in view of the fact that 
Thailand ( ?bears such a close relation?) to the defense of the British Empire, 
attaches very great importance to that country and Japan's attitude will therefore 
have to be decided by giving consideration also to the attitude of England and 
America." 

In the course of the above interchange of questions and answers Ambassador 
Ott stated that the Russo-German war was at present making progress in the 
southern sectors, that southern Russia would soon fall into the hands of Germany, 
that Moscow would fall perhaps during the first part of September, but in that, 
case wbether or not the Stalin regime would fall or not could not be affirmed. 



[1] Gist op a Consultation Held Bptween the Gekman Ambassador Ott 

AND VlCE>MlNI8TBR AMAir ON 29tH AUGUST, 1941 

At 6 p. m. on 29th August Ambassador Ott called and had the following inter- 
view with Vice-Minister Amau : 

The Ambassador: "According to a communique issued by the Japanese gov- 
ernment this afternoon. Ambassador Nomura handed a message from Premier 

" Joho Kyoku. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2949 

Konoye to President Roosevelt. Is tlmt correct V In fact, I had requested an 
interview with the Foreign Minister about this problem, but I have now come to 
you because I consider it my duty to get a detailed explanation on the question 
as to whether there would be any objection for us to understand that today's 
message does not depart from the policy which was determined at a conference 
held in the Imperial presence on 2nd July, at which time confidential informa- 
tion relating to the policy of the Japanese government in regard to the Axis 
was given to us, as well as on the question as to whether the present Cabinet 
is contemplating any change with regard to this point." 

The VicE-MiNisTEB : "I regret that the Foreign Minister could not see you be- 
cause of a previous engagement, but I will reply to your questions to the limit 
of my knowledge. It is true that Ambassador Nomura conveyed a message 
from Premier Konoye to President Roosevelt. But that does not mean that 
there has been a change in Japan's policy, nor that we are contemplating 
any change in our relations with the Axis. As you know, when Matsuoka was 
Foreign Minister, negotiations were carried on between Japan and America 
with regard to various problems, and at that time we sent confidential reports 
regarding the negotiations to your country. However, because of the Japanese 
Army's advance into French Indo-China a temporary rupture in these negotia- 
tions took place. And meanwhile in China, as well as in Japan and America, 
various questions arose between Japan and America, causing Japanese-American 
relations, contrary to our wishes, to become strained, so that in fact communi- 
cations between Japan and America have at present come to a standstill, and the 
situation is such that even economic relations have been broken off. It is natill- 
ral that no country would desire such a situation to persist for any length of 
time. I seems that America too desires a break in the deadlock, and the same 
thing is true of Japan. I understand that the reason for sending the message 
was to clarify the atmosphere in the Pacific." 

The Ambassador : "Although I am aware that negotiations had previously 
been carried on between Japan and America, that these negotiations had been 
discontinued, and that since then various incidents have come up, do the pro- 
posed negotiations between Japan and America involve only matters that have 
fallen into abeyance, or do they concern entirely new problems?" 

[2] The Vice-minister: "As I have just said, the idea back of the mes- 
sage which was sent from Premier Konoye to President Roosevelt was merely 
an attempt to start conversations between the two parties. It was not concerned 
with any concrete problem such as to what questions would be talked about. 
Furthermore we have not yet received any reply to the message from the 
President." 

The Ambassador : "How you received any notification from the American author- 
ities that they are prepared to consent to negotiations?" 

The Vice-Mini STER : "We have not received any such particular notification from 
the American authorities, but as I have just said, we have received the impres- 
sion that the American authorities are prepared to enter into negotiations in 
order to break the deadlock." 

The Ambassador : "As usual, America will try to gain time by beginning nego- 
tiations with Japan, and meanwhile will put forth still greater efforts to carry 
out her objectives. Therefore, I think that precautions must be taken against 
America's scheme to prolong these negotiations, so that this might work to her 
advantage." 

The Vice-Mini STER : "We have given those points full consideration. And we 
have also given the matter careful thought so that the carrying on of negotiations 
by Japan with Amer/ca might not have any disadvantageous consequences upon 
Germany and Italy. As you are aware from the Imperial edict and other proc- 
lamations issued by government authorities at the time, the original purpose of 
the Tripartite Alliance was the quelling of disturbances and the restoration of 
I)eace. So even if we begin negotiations between Japan and America, the objec- 
tive will always be to maintain peace, and therefore this will not conflict with 
the spirit of Axis diplomacy. 

"Moreover, if next I may express my own personal opinions, our aim at the 
time when Matsuoka was Foreign Minister was to keep America from partici- 
pating in the war, and for this reason we took a firm attitude toward America. 
In order to prevent her from joining in the war, we considered it necessary to get 
her to reflect upon her attitude, and, judging from the situation at the time, it was 
no mistake at all for us to think that it was quite proper for us to take a firm 
attitude toward her. Nevertheless the results proved to be just the opposite, and 



2950 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

we can not deny that American public opinion has grown stronger and stronger, 
speeding up American preparations for war. Meanwhile Germany took a very 
mild attitude toward America. That is, America in all kinds of ways gave aid 
to England, instituted a system of convoy, and invaded Iceland, on the other hand 
freezing German funds in America and even closing German Consulates, while 
Germany took a very gentle [3] attitude. Even at present Japan's policy 
of preventing America from participating In the war remains unchanged, and our 
aim is to keep her from joining in the war. Even now there is no change whatever 
in that objective. However it will be necessary for us to consider a policy that 
is adequate for the attainment of said objective, depending upon the time and 
occasion. In the present situation, America being a country of wide expanse 
and plentiful raw materials, we might possibly think it preferable, just at this 
time when the hostile feeling of the people toward the situation is on the point of 
becoming violent, to appease them and bring about a domestic disintegration, 
rather than to excite and unify them." 

The Ambassador : "Negotiations between Japan and America may prove to be 
quite troublesome. For instance, when we think of the China problem, since 
the sending of aid to Chiang Kaishek is one of the fundamental policies of Amer- 
ica, she will not readily give this up. And I think that it may be very difficult 
to come to an agreement with regard to various other problems. At any rate, 
since the contents of this message is considered to be of tremendously great 
importance to Germany also, even though I have not received any instructions 
from my government, would it not be possible for me to receive a secret report 
of Its contents since I will have to send a report about it to the government?" 

The ViCE-MiNiSTEB : "As I have just said, the message conveys a statement 
from Premier Konoye to the American President, and we have not received a 
reply from the President as yet, but I will convey the substance of your desire 
to the Foreign Minister." 

The Ambassador : "If that is the case, then will it be all right for the present 
for me to send a report to my government to the effect that the content of the 
message signifies that for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, negotiations 
are to be carried on between Japan and America on the basis of the Tripartite 
Alliance?" 

The ViCE-MiNisTEB : "As I have just said, the object of beginning parleys be- 
tween Japan and America is to clarify the atmosphere In the Pacific. And while 
there is no objection to the use of the words 'for the maintenance of peace', we 
think that it would be permissible to suppose that nothing like a concrete prob- 
lem, such as, for instance, the concluding of a non-aggression pact, is mentioned 
In the message." 

The Ambassador : "If so, do you have any idea of sending a special mission to 
America to carry on these negotiations?" 

[4] The VicE-MiNiSTEai : "As I have just said, it has not yet been settled 
as to whether or not negotiations will be begun, and preliminary arrangements 
regarding concrete problems have not yet been completed. So L understand that 
no decision has yet been reached as to such a problem as sending a mission." 

The Ambassador: "Is this problem to be worked out through Ambassador 
Grew?" 

The Vice-minister: (Hesitated to say anything for a moment). 

The Ambassador : "Is Ambassador Nomura to do it?" 

The VicE-MiNiSTER : (Nodded assent). 

The Ambassador: "Again may I ask you to tell the Foreign Minister that I 
wou!d like to have a confidential report of the contents of the message. In fact, 
it has also some bearing upon instructions which I recently received from my 
home government regarding the Russo-German war. Will you please make 
arrangements so that I might by all means have an interview with the Foreign 
Minister tomorrow." 

The ViCE-MiNiSTER : "I will tell the Minister." 



The Gist of an Interview Held Between Foreign Minister Toyoda and 
Ambassador Ott on 30th August 1941, at 3 : 00 p. m. in the Official Resi- 
dence (Administrative Official Yoshiuchi Acting as Interpreter) 

After Anibassadot- Ott made a statement relating to the situation in the Russo- 
German War, the conversation proceeded as follows: (Ambassador Ott is to be 
designated by "O" and the Minister by "Toyo" in the following account) . 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2951 

"O" : "In the notice sent to the German government on the 2nd July, the state- 
ment is made that Japan is making preparations for every possible eventuality 
in her relations with Russia and America, but are the intentions of the Japanese 
government still the same today? Is there any possibility that Japan may par- 
ticipate in the Russo-German vpar? 

"ToYo" : "Japan's preparations are now making headway, and it will take 
more time for their completion." 

"O" : "Are the intentions of Japan as given in the notice of 2nd July still the 
same?" 

"ToYo" : "There is no change in our intentions, which are, to make preparations 
in order to avail ourselves of any new development that may take place in the 
situation henceforth." 

"O" : "I learned of the message which Premier Konoye sent to President Roose- 
velt for the first time through the newspapers, and later according to Domi (in re- 
sponse to a question from the Minister Ott replied that this Domei dispatch was 
one that was "carried" by DNB on the evening of the 29th as Domei report). I 
learned that this message mentions the disposal of the China problem and the 
establishment of a Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere as the ultimate aims of 
Japan's national policy, and refers to the fact that as a result of the Russo- 
German War Japanese-American relations have become delicate. So far as the 
problems referred to in the message are concerned, from the viewpoint of the 
Tripartite Pact Germany has very grave apprehensions, and since a detailed report 
will have to be sent to my government, in disregard of propriety I must once more 
make inquiry about this matter. Yesterday Vice-Minister Amau gave me an 
explanation as to the contents of this message, but if you have anything beyond 
that to add, will you please state it." 

[2] "TOYO" : "The situation being what it is, all kinds of reports are bound 
to arise, but what I would like to tell you explicitly is that the report about prob- 
lems concerning which I have just now heard for the first time, is absolutely 
false. Vice-Minister Amau gave you the right explanation of the message." 

"O" : "If so, then the message does not concern any concrete matters?" 

"ToYO" : "It is just as Vice-Minister Amau explained." 

"O" : "I would like to inquire what your impression is as to how the message 
was received by them [the Americans]. Even if it does not deal with any con- 
crete matters, I would like to ask whether it was received in a friendly spirit, 
or whether their attitude was one of disapproval."^ 

"ToYO" : "I can't tell you, because I have as yet received no report whatsoever 
about the matter." 

"O" : "In Foreign Minister* Matsuoka's time the Japanese government author- 
ities thought that what America was planning to do was to get Japan to take an 
attitude in conflict with the Tripartie Pact, that is, to give up taking any posi- 
tive action in the Pacific area no matter what occasion might arise, and Germany 
is very grateful that at the time the Japanese government resolutely resisted 
these American designs, and we hope that it will continue to take that 'line'. I 
would like to ask what Your Excellency's views are concerning this point." 

"ToYO" : "In a word I may say that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact is to 
prevent American participation in the war, and that this view is the same as 
in the past ; nor will it change in the future." 



Basic Conditions for a Peace Settlement Between Japan and China 

(Agenda for a conference with the Army and Navy Military Affairs Bureau 
Chiefs held at the Foreign Minister's Official Residence at 2 : 00 p . m. on the 6th 
September, 1941). 

The Chungking regime accepts the basic treaty concluded between Japan and 
the Nanking government together with the agreements attached thereto, as well as 
the fact that the joint declaration issued by Japan, Manchoukuo, and China is 
based upon the following principles, and will join up with the Nanking govern- 
ment. 

1. The merging of the Chungking and Nanking regimes. 

2. Neighborly friendliness. 

3. Respect for sovereignty and territory. 

4. Joint defense (the maintenance of public order, the protection of rights 
and interests, and cooperation in defence of things jeopardizing the same). The 



2952 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

stationing of Japanese army units particularly in prescribed areas in Meng- 
chiang and North Cbina as well as in Aiuoy and Hainan Island for this purpose. 

5. Withdraway of troops. The Japanese army units which have been sent 
to China because of the incident are to be withdrawn attendant upon the settle- 
ment of the incident in accordance with a Sino-Japanese agreement. 

6. Economic coalition. Not : economic activities of third powers in China 
are not to be restricted so long as they are conducted on an equitable basis. 

7. Non-annexation." 

8. No indemnities. 

9. Recognition of Manchoukuo. 



Basic Conditions fob a Sino-Japanese Peace 

Decisions reached at a liaison conference held on the 13th September, 1941. 

1. Neighborly friendliness. 

2. Respect for sovereignty and territory. 

3. Sino-Japanese joint defense. 

Sino-Japanese cooperation to preserve public order and to checli communistic 
and other movements of a subversive natui'e which threaten the security of 
Japan and China. 

The stationing of Japanese army units for a necessary period in prescribed 
areas in Inner Mongolia and North China for the above purpose, as well as the 
placing of Japanese warships and units for a necessary period in Hainan 
Island, Amoy, and other localities on the basis of previous agreements and 
practices. 

4. Withdrawal of troops. The Army units which have been sent to China for 
the prosecution of the China Incident shall, with the exception of those men- 
tioned in the preceding item, be withdrawn attendant upon the settlement of the 
incident. 

5. Economic Coalition. 

(a) A Sino-Japanese economic coalition shall be put in operation, the main 
object of which shall be the development and use of important raw materials 
for national defense in China. 

(b) The economic activities of third powers in China shall not be restricted if 
conducted on an equitable basis. 

6. The merging of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the Wang government. 

7. Non-annexation. • 

8. No indeminities. 

9. Recognition of Manchoukuo. 



26 November, 1941. 

The last time I gave you the details up to the 18th November, but I will now 
inform you of developments since then. 

Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu called upon Secretary Hull on the 20th and 
presented our new proposal, stating that they were making this proposal with a 
view to bringing about a speedy settlement. But Secretary Hull without saying 
anything in particular about it, manifested great disapproval of that clause in 
the proposal which states that "America shall cease any activities that might 
interfere with the peace efforts between Japan and China", and replied that, 
unless Japan clarifies the meaning of the Tripartite Pact and positively asserts 
that she will pur.sue a peaceful policy, it will be difficult to cut off aid to Chiang 
Kaishek, and that the statement too to the effect that the President was to act 
as intermediary in a Sino-Japanese peace would necessarily be conditioned by 
Japan's adoption of a peaceful policy. But he did promise that after a study of 
the new proposal, he would have further consultations. 

On the next day, the 21st, when Ambassador Kurusu had a private interview 
with Secretary Hull, the latter stated that he had no objection to Japan and 
America holding leading positions through peaceful measures in East Asia and 
in the Western Hemisphere respectively, and that he hoped that both countries 
could conclude a Pacific agreement in a friendly spirit, the Japanese authorities to 



• Doubtless refers to non-annexation of China by Japan. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



2953 



see to it that the Tripartite Pact did not interfere with the execution of such 

a treaty. . . ..^ . v. 

On the 22iKl Secretary Hull, before he had an interview with Ambassadors 
Nomura and Kuriisu, held a conference with the Ambassadors and Ministers of 
England, Holland and Australia with regard to those parts of the proposal for a 
Japanese-American understanding wliich deal with matters in which these coun- 
tries are concerned, and these Ambassadors and Ministers said that they would 
send in a i-equest to their home governments and would be able to reply to the 
American government by Monday (the 24th). 

On the same day at the interview held between Ambassadors Nomura and 
Kurusu and Secretary Hull, the former asked for America's own reply to our 
proposal, but the Secretary avoided a definite reply to this. However, he said 
that what England, Holland and Australia desired was that the serious situation 
in the South Pacific areas might be alleviated at once, that the movement of the 
Japanese army units stationed in southern French Indo-China to the northern part 
of the country was not deemed sufficient, and further, that, while gradual progress 
in the restoration of trade conditions was desirable, when Japan once made clear 
her peaceful intentions, we could look for a sudden change within a few days. 
He also made the remark with regard to the cutting off of aid to Chiang Kai-shek 
by America, that he would like to have us acknowledge the fact that in such a 
matter America could not be an impartial intermediary. 

[2] With regard to the cutting off of American aid to Chiang Kai-shek, we 
issued orders to Ambassador Nomura on the 22nd to the effect that, since our 
Empire simultaneously with the conclusion of a treaty, in accord with our new 
proposal, would like through the good offices of America to get China to express 
her friendship toward Japan in line with a suggestion made by America on the 
12th inst., and to begin direct peace negotiations between Japan and China, he 
should make a representation to the American authorities to the effect that it 
would be natural to expect the American authorities to stop any activities that 
might obstruct these negotiations. 

Furthermore, in Tokyo I, the Foreign Minister ", asked the American Ambassa- 
dor in Tokyo to call on the 23rd, and I made it clear to him that, while it seems 
that England, Holland and Australia as well as America are not satisfied with 
merely the movement of the Jai)anese forces stationed in Southern French Indo- 
China to the northern part of that country, neither do we consider it sufficient 
merely to restore conditions as they were previous to the putting into effect of the 
freezing order, a thing which we with reluctance dared to propose and which we 
anticipate, and that it will be impossible to reach a settlement so long as no 
understanding with America is reached also with regard to the cessation of aid 
to Chiang Kai-shek and with regard to the securing of raw materials from the 
Dutch East Indies. 



» The word here used is Hondaijin, indicating that this message is a report sent out by 
Tokyo and made up in the main of information received from Washington. 



EXHIBIT NO. 133 

[secret] 

[a] STATEMENT BY MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT OF EVENTS 
AND CONDITIONS LEADING UP TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK, 
DECEMBER 7, 1941 

[a] Table of Contents 

Statement Major General Walter C. Short. Pp. 1-50 incl. Exhibits A-lR (incl.) 



Page 



Exhibit 



1. Paraphrased Radio, 16 Oct. 41 from Chief Naval Operations, 

2. W. D. Radio 472, 27 Nov. 41, from General Marshall..- 

3. Hawaiian Department Alerted 27 Nov. 41 

4. Alerts (Extracts from Standing Operating Procedure) 

5. Reasons for Calling Alert No. 1 

6. Extract from "Joiat Coastal Frontier Defense Plan". 

7. Annex #7 from "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" 



1 

1 

2 

2-10 incl.. 
10-13 incl. 
11-12 incl. 
12 



^ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent 
pages of original exhibit. 



2954 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[a] Table of Contents — Continued 



8. 28 Nov. 41 Radio Reply to W. D. Radio 472 (Qen. Marshall 27 Nov. 41) 

9. W. D. Radio 482. 28 Nov. 41, "Sabotage" 

10. E.xtract from MID-SC30-45 "Subversive Activities" 

11. 29 Nov. 41 Radio to W. D. (Steps Taken to Prevent Sabotage).. 

12. Events Transpiring from 27 Nov. 41 to 6 Dec. 41. 

a. Order for Detector Operation 

6. Conferences With Navy , 

c. Certificate "No Navy Request for Long Range Reconnaissance" 

d. Certificate "Statement Made by Naval Staff Officers" 

e. Arrival B-24 (Photo Mission) from U. S 

/. W. D. Radio 465, 26 Nov. 41 (Re B-24 Photo .Mission) 

g. 5 Dec. 41 Radio to Chief Air Corps (Re B-24 Photo Mission)... 
A. Unarmed B-17 Flight from U. S. Arrive Oahu During 7 Dec. 

Attack. 

i. RCA Radio (Commercial) from General Marshall "Japanese 
Ultimatum". 

;. \V. D. Radio 549, 9 Dec. 41, Requesting Time RCA Radio Re- 
ceived. 

k. Radio Reply to \V. D. Radio 549, 9 Dec. 41 "Time Received".. 

/. Japanese Submarine Sunk Pearl Harbor 7:15 A. M. 7 Dec 

m. Aircraft Warning Service Operation 7 Dec. 41 

13. Action at Time of Attack, 7 Dec. 41 

a. Alert of .\11 Units. 

b. An t i- A ircraft Art illery . 

[6] <;. Hawaiin Air Force 

d. 24th Division 

e. 25th Division 

/. Medical Teams and Civilian Relief Committees 

14. Martial Law Declared 8 Dec. 41 

15. Efforts to Improve Defenses of Hawaiin Islands 

a. Letter to Gen. Marshall Outlining Deficiencies Found 

6. Request for Funds for Dispersion Aircraft 

c. Request for Underground Maintenance Hawn. Air Depot 

d. Request for Fortification and Camouflage Funds 

e. Request for Funds for Camouffeging Air Fields 

/. Request for Funds for Roads, Trails 

g. Request for Additional Air Ports 

ft. Request for Kaneoho Bay Defenses 

i. Request for Funds for Improvement Landing Strips Wheeler 

Field. 

j. Request for Priorities on Aircraft AVarning Stations 

k. Request for Honolulu Office Production Manager 

I. Request for $1,000,000 Fund for Stocking Reserve Supplies 

m. Letter from C'hief Air Corps "Ferrying Operation Airfiedls"... 

n. Request for Increase in Engineer Strength 

0. Request for Increase in Coast Artillery Strength 

p. Request for Increase in Infantry and Artillery Strength 

q. Request for Increase in Air Corps Strength 

r. Request for Reorganization Hawn. Division and an Increase in 
Initial War Garrison. 

s. Request Activation of A. A. Artillery Brigade 

t. Request Information 37 MM Guns 

u. Standing Operating Procedure 

16. Efforts to Better Prepare Civilian Community for Defense 

a. Army Day Speech, 6 April 41 to Honolulu Chamber of Com- 
merce. 
6. Production and Storage of Food 

c. Organization of Doctors and Nurses 

d. Organization of Auxiliary Police and Fire Force.. 

[c] e. Evacuation Camps and Air Raid Shelters 

/. M-Day Bill _ 

17. Letters from Civilian Reference Efforts to Improvement of Civilian 

Defense. 

a. Unsolicited Letter to President. United States 

6. Unsolicited Letter from Major Disaster Council, Honolulu 

c. Unsolicited Letter from Gov. Poindexter '. 

18. Conclusions 



11 

13-14 incl 

14 

14-15 incl.. 

15-24 incl 

15-16 incl 

16-17incl.-.. 

17 

17 

18. 

18 

18-19 incl.. 

19 

20-21 incl 

20 :... 

20-21 

21.. 

21-24 incl 

24-26 incl 

24 

25 

25 

25 

25-26 incl 

26... 

26-27 incL... 

27-42 inch. 

28 par. 1 

28-29 par. 2 

29 par. 3 

29 par. 4. 

30 par. 5... 

30 par. 6 

30-32 incl. par. 7.. 
32-33 incl. par. 8.. 
33 par. 9. 

33 par. 10 

34 par. 11 

34-36 incl. par. 12 

35 par. 13 

36 par. 14 

36-37 incl. par. 15 
36-37 incl. par. 15 
38-40 incl. par. 16. 
40-41 incl. par. 17. 

41 par*. 18 

42 par. 19.. 

42 par. 20 

43-45 incl 

43..: 

43-44 incl.... 

44. 

44 

45 

45 ., 

45-47 incl. 

45-46 incl- 

47 

47a 

48-50 incl 



' Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent 
pages of original exhibit. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2955 

[1] STATEMENT BY MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT OF 
EVENTS AND CONDITIONS LEADING UP TO THE JAPANESE 
ATTACK, DECEMBER 7, 1941 

The following radiogram from the Chief of Staff was received October 16, 1941 — 
Exhibit "A": 

Note for commanding general Hawaiian department : 

The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval 
Operations which I have been directed to pass to you quote: 

Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave situation x if a new 
cabinet is formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly na- 
tionalistic X if the Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new 
mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States 
X either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible 
X since Britain and the US are held responsible by Japan for her present 
situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two 
powers X view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including 
siich preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor 
constitute provocative actions against Japan x. 
The following radiogram from the Chief of Staff was received 2:22 P. M., 
November 27th— Exhibit "B": 

"Hawn Dept, Ft. Shafter, TH: 

472 27th negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical 
purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government 
might come back and offer to continue stop Japanese future action un- 
predictable but hostile action possible at any moment stop If hostilities 
cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States 
desires that Japan commit the first overt act stop This policy should not 
comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course 
of action that might jeopardize your defense stop Prior to hostile Japanese 
action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures 
as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not 
comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent 
stop Report measures taken stop Should hostilities occur you will carry 
out the tasks assigned the Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan 
Stop Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum 
essential officers. 

Marshall, 

116P/27. 

[2] Upon receipt of the above radiogram, I gave consideration to the type 
of an alert which I should order, and, after talking the matter over with the 
Chief of Staff , Alert #1 was ordered by telephone , and put into effect at once. 

Standing Operation Procedure, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 5 Novem- 
ber 1941.— Exhibit "C": 

"section II — ALERTS 

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as 
indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department 
order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph / (8) below. 

14. ALERT NO. 1. a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and up- 
risings within the islands, with no threat from without. 

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, all General and Special Staff 
Sections will continue with their usual duties at their present stations, pending 
further orders. 

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending 
instructions from this Headquarters. 

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will: 

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector. 

(2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient 
to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice. 



2956 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(3) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS reservation and all vital instal- 
lations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations), in its assigned 
sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among 
the important ones: 

Police District No. 1, see paragraph 14 h (2) below. 

Command and Fire Control Cable System. 

Railwav and Highwav Bridges. 

Water supplv for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. 

Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA. 

WAIAU Generating Plant. 

Telephone Exchanges at WAIPAHU, WAHIAWA, WAIALUA (in HALE- 

IWA), LAIE and KANEOHE. 

Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAIALUA, KAHUKU KAILUA, 

WAIPIO AND EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO, WAHIAWA, 

SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, 

from KOOLAU switch station BELLOWS FIELD. 

[3] Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA. 

Pumping Stations at MO AN ALU A and KAPAHULU. 

(4) the 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping 
stations at AIEA and HALAWA. 

e. The HA'WAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND will: 

(1) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation 
and fire control installatigns, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft 
defense, 

(2) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command. 
(3^ Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island. 

(4) Provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and 
Tripler General Hospital. 
/. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will: 

(1) Protect all vital installations on posts of OAHU garrisoned by air forces. 

(2) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base 
detachments with District Commanders. 

g. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the Air Corps detachments 
within the districts, will: 

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, 
and maintain order in the civil community. 

h. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, in addition to his normal 
duties, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will: 

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU. 

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations. 

(3) Esta'blish liaison with the local police force. 

i. The STATION COMPLEMENTS OF HICKAM, WHEELER and BEL- 
LOWS FIELDS, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the 
protection of all vital installations on their respective posts. 

;. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD. Upon the formation of the Territorial 
Home Guard, recently authorized by the TERRITORIAL Legislature, it is 
anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the 
District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, 
except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installons ation 
Army and Navy Re.servations. 

[4] 15. ALERT NO. 2. a. This alert is applicable to a more serious con- 
dition than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, sur- 
face, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, 
is provided. 

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, only the G-2 and G-3 Sections 
will be required to operate on a 24-hour basis. All other sections of the General 
and Special Staffs will continue with their normal schedule. 

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending 
instructions from this Headquarters. 

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will: 

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector. 

(2) Maintain available all units at fifty percent (50%) of their present strength, 
except those required under (3), (4) and (5) below. 

(3) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient 
to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2957 

(4) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation and all vital installa- 
tions (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned 
sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among 
the important ones: 

Police District No. 1. 

Command and Fire Control Cable System. 

Railway and Highwav Bridges. 

Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. 

Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA. 

WAIAU Generating Plant. 

Telephone exchanges at WAIPAHU, WAHIAWA, WAIALUA (in HALE- 

IWA), LAIE and KANEOHE. 

Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAIALUA, KAHUKU. KAILUA, 

WAIPIO and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO, WAHIAWA, 

SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, 

from KOOLAU switch station BELLOWS FIELD. 

Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA. 

Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPAHULU. 

(5) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the Pumping 
Stations at AIEA and HALAWA. 

[6] (6) Place 240 mm howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards 
and; when directed, place ammunition at positions. 

(7) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155 mm guns) 
to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. 

(8) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 15 I below. 

e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attached Field 
Artillery, will: 

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that rail- 
way batteries will remain at FORT KAMEHAMEHA or where emplaced. 

(2) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational 
control. 

(3) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation 
and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft 
defense. 

(4) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, 
except FORT SH AFTER, For FORT SH AFTER, see paragraph 15 k (1) below. 

(5) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament. 

(6) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels. 

(7) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies. 

(8) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol, 

(9) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island. 

(10) Provide Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post. 
/. The Hawaiian Air Force will: 

(1) Maintain aircraft and creWs in condition of readiness as directed by this 
headquarters. 

(2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command. 

(3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival 
thereat, disperse on fields. 

(4) Disperse bombers with crews. 

(5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers. 

(6) Protect all vital installations on posts on OAHU garrisoned by air forces. 

(7) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base 
detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 15 g below. 

(8) In case of surprise hostile attack: 

[6] (a) Release to Navy for operational control all bombers in condition 
of readiness "A". The bomber commander will report to the Commander of 
Patrol Wing X TWO. 

(b) Receive all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighter planes in 
appropriate condition of readiness and release them to the Interceptor Command 
for operational control. 

g. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the air corps detachments 
within the districts, will: 

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, 
hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community. 



2958 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

h. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division 
Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will: 

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU. 

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations. 

(3) Establish liaison with the local police force. 

(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions includ- 
ing blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas. 

(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees. 

(6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 15 k (1). 
i. The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will: 

(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service 
and then release it to the Interceptor Command. 

(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for im- 
mediate employment. 

j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will: 

Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery 
(including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the Aircraft Warning 
Service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft 
measures of units not under military control, to include: 

(1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft. 

(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/ 
or HONOLULU HARBORS. 

(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies. 
k. STATION COMPLEMENTS: 

(1) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, undert the supervision of the Depart- 
ment Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER 
and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department 
Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital. 

(2) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS Complements, 
under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their 
respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks. 

I. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD. Upon the formation of the Territorial 
Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated 
that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Com- 
manders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the 
Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and 
Navy Reservations. See paragraph 15 d (4) and g above. 

16. ALERT NO. 3. a. This alert requires the occupation of all field positions 
by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations 
on outlying islands. 

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS: 

(1) All sections of the forward echelon will occupy their stations at forward 
command post, prepared to operate on a 24-hour basis. 

(2) All sections of the rear echelon will continue their usual duties at their 
present stations. Blackout instructions will be complied with. 

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will remain in condition of mobile readiness at 
their permanent stations, pending instructions from this headquarters. 

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will: 

(1) Defend its assigned sector on OAHU. 

(2) Protect all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy 
Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. 

(3) Release all available Bands to the Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD 
BARRACKS. 

(4) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping 
stations at AIEA and HALAWA. 

(5) Place 240 mm howitzers in position. 

(6) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155 mm guns) 
to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 16 e below. 

(7) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 16 to below. 

e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attacked 
Detachment Field [8] Artillery, will: 

(1) Occup3' initial seacoast and antiaircraft positions. 

(2) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament. 

(3) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels. 

(4) Support the Infantry Divisions. 

(5) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies. 

(6) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2959 

(7) Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post. 

(8) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational 
control. 

(9) Protect all vital installations on post and reservations of the command, 
except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 16 I (2) 
below. 

(10) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation 
and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft 
defense 

/. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will: 

(1) Destroy enemy aircraft. 

(2) Carry out bombing missions as directed. 

(3) Cooperate with Naval air forces. 

(4) On OAHU, defend all posts garrisoned by air forces against sabotage, air 
and ground attacks. 

(5) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local 
base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 16 h below. 

(6) Arm all planes, except that normally bombs will not be loaded on ships 
dispatched to outlying islands. 

(7) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival 
thereat, disperse on fields. 

(8) Disperse bombers with crews. 

(9) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers. 

(10) Perform observation, command and photographic missions. 

(11) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command. 
g. G-5 will be prepared to establish the following: 

(1) Food administration. 

[9] (2) A Labor Procurement Service. 

h. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS OF HAWAII, MAUI (includes MOLO- 
KAI) and KAUAI Districts, assisted by the air corps detachments present 
within the districts, will: 

Defend the air fields against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain 
order in the civil communitv. 

i. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division 
Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will: 

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU. 

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations. 

(3) Establish liaison with the local police force. 

(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in f 11 .\ir Raid Precautions includ- 
ing blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas. 

(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees. 

(6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 16 I (2) below. 

j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will coordinate and control the opera- 
tions of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including availaole Naval and 
Marine Corps AA Artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and 
will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under 
military control to include: 

(1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft. 

(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or 
HONOLULU HARBORS. 

(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies. 
k. The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will: 

(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service 
and then release it to the Interceptor Command. 

(2) Insure the joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate 
employment. 

(3) Be prepared to assume control over essential civilian communications. 
/. STATION COMPLEMENTS: 

(1) The SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Complement will protect all vital installa- 
tions on the SCHOFIELD Reservation. 

(2) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Depart- 
ment Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER 
and. in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department 
Headquarters and [10] Tripler General Hospital. 

(3) The HICKAM, ^^'HEELER and BELLOWS FIELD Complements, 
under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their 
respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks. 



2960 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

m. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.— Upon the formation of the Terri- 
torial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is 
anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the 
District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, 
except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on 
Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 16 d (2) and h above." 

Alert #1 is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprising within the islands 
with no threat from without. In addition to the duties prescribed in Alert #1, 
the Aircraft Warning Service was directed to operate all mobile aircraft warning 
stations from two hours before dawn to one hour after dawn. 

My reasons for ordering Alert #1 rather than Alert #2, which is applicable to a 
condition more serious than Alert #1, security against attacks from hostile sub- 
surface, surface and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and 
uprising, were as follows: 

1. There was a strong probability of sabotage by the Japanese population in 
Hawaii. 

2. I had no information to indicate the probability of an attack. 

3. Alert #2 or Alert #3, which provides for the maximum defense of OAHU and 
of army installations on outlying islands, interfere very seriously with training. 

These three reasons will be discussed in detail: 

1. Defense against sabotage can be carried out better where there is not too, 
much dispel sion of the command. Where the defense is against sabotage only 
the planes are grouped on the landing mats and the apron, while in a defense 
against air attack the pursuit planes would be dispersed in their bunkers and the 
bombardment planes would be sent to landing fields on outlying islands or placed 
in the air if time were available. If time were not available, they would remain 
in their bunkers. From this can be seen that the action for the two diflFerent 
types of defense is quite different. Since sabotage was considered far more prob- 
able [11] than air attack, the planes were dispersed to all of the landing 
fields on the island of OAHU, but were not placed in bunkers. This was especially 
desirable as man-proof fencing and fiood-lights had not as yet been provided for 
the fields. $240,000.00 for this purpose was requested on May 15, 1941, and the 
authorization of $102,000.00 was made on July Uth and $91,975.00 on August 
12, 1941. Orders for the material had to be placed in the mainland as it was not 
available in the Hawaiian Islands. Owing to the difficulties of obtaining priori- 
ties, both for material and for shipping, the District Engineer has not yet received 
the material. The Constructing Quartermaster was allotted funds for fencing of 
other than air fields, and a small amount of the material had been received and 
installed prior to December 7th. 

2. The Hawaiian Department is provided with no means of collecting informa- 
tion as to the location of Japanese or other ships throughout the world and is not 
responsible for distant reconnaissance. The "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense 
Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval 
District" — Section I, par. 3, 18 and 21, definitely place the responsibility for such 
reconnaissance upon the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. The 
following quotation makes this evident: 

EXTRACT from "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan"— Exhibit "D": 
"3. METHOD OF COORDINATION. The Commanding General of the 
Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District 
have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by 
mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein tne 
Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of 
command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935, 
Chapter 2, paragraph 9 b. 

H: H: :i: t * * ^ 

18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall 
piovide for: 

******* 
i. Distant reconnaissance. 

******* 

21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice 
in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until dis- 
approved in part or in whole by either the War or the Naw Department. This 
HCF-41 (JCD-42) supercedes ■HCF-39 (JCD-13) except that the annexes, Nos. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2961 

1 to VII of latter remain eflFective and constitute annexes 1 to VII inclusive, of 
this plan." 

[12] Annex #7 to the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" provides as 

follows— Exhibit "E": 

"When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval 
Base Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat 
of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each 
commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available 
without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his 
disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be con- 
ducted in accordance with the following plans: 

1. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the 
tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine 
the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due con- 
sideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes 
released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain 
available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the 
mission, when it will revert to Army control. 

2. Defensive Air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be 
executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense 
Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. 
With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter 
aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force 
will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for mainte- 
nance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, 
it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control. 

3. When Naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search opera- 
tions, and army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical 
control of the naval commander directing the search operations. 

4. In the special instance in which army pursuit protection is requested for the 
protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this situation will pass 
to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission". 

These documents make it clearly evident that the Hawaiian Department had 
no responsibility for distant reconnaissance, and that when army bombardment 
planes are actually placed under the command of the Navy whenever they 
operate upon distant reconnaissance missions, they receive their mission and all 
instructions from the [13] Naval Commander, and report to him upon 
the completion of their mission. This method of procedure has been followed 
strictly since March 21, 1941, including the period since December 7th. 

3. If upon consideration of the available facts the calling of Alert No. 1 would 
be sufficient to handle the situation Alert No. 2 or No. 3 should not be called 
because to do so would seriously interfere with the training of the command. 
When the troops are in battle positions it is practically impossible to carry on 
any orderly training. With the number of new man in the command it is highly 
important to conduct their training regularly. This was particularly true of 
the Hawaiian Air Force on Noveinber 27th due to the fact that they had been 
given the mission of training combat crews and ferrying B-17 planes from the 
mainland to the Philippine Islands. September 8th the Hawaiian Air Force sent 
nine (9) trained combat teams to the Philippine Islands. Previous to November 
27th eighteen (18) trained combat teams had been sent to the mainland, and 
seventeen (17) more combat teams were ready to go to the mainland for ferrying 
purposes. In addition, twelve (12) combat crews had to be trained for planes 
that were expected at ^n early date in this Department. With only six (6) 
B — 17 planes available for training combat teams, it was imperative that the 
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force mak'e the maximum use of these 
planes for training, and any order that would take them out of training for any 
considerable period would prevent him from carrying out the ferrying mission 
that had been assigned to him. 



2962 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I replied as follows to the radiogram from the Chief of Stafif of November 27th — 
Exhibit "F": 

"Chief of Staff, 

War Department, 

Washington, D. C: 
Reurad four seven two twenty seventh report department alerted to prevent 
sabotage period liaison with navy 

Short". 

Upon receipt of my radiogram of November 28th, I received the following 
replv from The Adjutant General — Exhibit "G": 
"Hawn Dept., Ft. Shafter, TH: 

482 28th critical situation demands that all })recautions be taken immediately 
against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of [^-41 

War Department Paren See paragraph three IVIID SC thirty dash forty five 
End paren Stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional meas- 
ures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma prop- 
erty comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your 
personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against 
espionage Stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are 
authorized Stop Protective meanures should be confined to those essential to 
security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm Stop To insure 
speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but 
this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions. 

AOAMS". 



This par. of MID SC 30-45 referred to in the above mentioned radiogram is 
attached as Exhibit "H", and this paragraph refers wholly to subversive 
activities. 

Careful consideration of the radiograms of October 16th, November 27th and 
November 28th discloses that the War Department emphasizes that action taken 
would not alarm the civil population, would not disclose strategic intention, 
constitute provocative actions against Japan, and would avoid unnecessary pub- 
licity. Alert #2 or #3 would have disclosed tactical positions and given more 
pubiicity to preparations and might have alarmed the civil population. 

If the War Department at that time had considered it necessary to alert the 
Hawaiian Department against air and ground attack, it undoubtedly would have 
so directed instead of sending a long radiogram outlining the various steps that 
should be taken in connection with sabotage and subversive activities. 

In my radiogram of November 29th 1 replied to the radiogram of the War 
Department of November 28th, and explained in detail the steps I wa.s taking to 
prevent sabotage and subversive activities, and of the authority that T had ob- 
tained from the Governor of Hawaii and of the Mayor of the City and County of 
Honolulu to legalize all the steps which I had taken — Exhibit "1": 

"The Adjutant General, 
War Department, 

Washington, D. C: 
Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth Comma Full precautions 
are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative re- 
sponsibility of War Department Paren Paragraph three MID SC thirty dash 
forty five End paren And military establishments including personnel and 
equipment Stop As regards protection [15] of vital installations out- 
side of military reservations such as power plants Comma Telephone ex- 
changes and highway bridges Comma This headquarters by confidential letter 
dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory 
to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act 
which provides Comma In effect Comma That the Governor may call upon 
the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the Territory 
of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence Comma Invasion Comma 
Insurrection etc Stop Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June 
twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand of this headquarters to 
furni.sh and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to 
prevent sabotage -Comma And lawless violence in connection therewith 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2963 

Comma Being committed against vital installations and structures in the Terri- 
tory Stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection 
is now being afforded vital civilian installations Stop In this Connection Comma 
At the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June 
thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordnance which permits the commanding 
general Hawaiian Department Comma to close Comma Or restrict the use 
of and travel upon Comma Any highway within the city and county of Hono- 
lulu Comma whenever the commanding general deems such action necessary in 
the interest of national defense Stop The authority thus given has not yet 
been exercised Stop Relations with FBI and all other Federal and Territorial 
officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all 
pertinent matters. 

Short" 

events transpiring from november 27th to december 6th 

From November 27th to December 6th the troops remained on the Alert for 
sabotage, and carried on routine training with the men not required to be on 
duty dviring this Alert. The Aircraft Warning Service operated daily from two 
hours before daylight until one hour after daylight. It also carried out this 
usual practice, closing the information center at 7:00 A. M., December 7th. 
Routine training was also carried out by this Detachment from 7:00 to 11 :00 A. M. 
except on Sunday. Memorandum of the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, 
states as follows — Exhibit "J": 

Subject: Detector Operation. 
To: Department Signal Officer. 

1. On November 27, 1941, after conference with Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, 
and receiving instructions to operate all mobile detectors from two hours before 
dawn until one hour after dawn, I, as Acting Department Signal Officer, gave 
immediate instructions [16] to Captain TETLEY, Commanding Officer 
of the Aircraft Warning Company, to initiate the above detector operation so 
long Alert No. 1 was in force. 

2. The detectors in question operated daily thereafter during the prescribed 
period except when having occasional operational trouble. In addition, the six 
detector stations operated daily except Sundays from 7:00 A. M. to 11:00 A. M. 
for routine training. Daily except Saturday and Sunday, to hours 12:00 noon 
until 4:00 P. M. were devoted to training and maintenance work. 

(Signed) W. H. Murphy, 
W. H. Murphy, 

Lt. Col., Sig. C. 



During the period November 27th to December 6th I had conferences with the 
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and the Commandant of the 
Fourteenth Naval District as follows: 

November 27th: Conference on the reinforcement of the marine garrisons at 
Midway and Wake Islands by squadrons of army pursuit planes. I was accom- 
panied on this conference by Major General Frederick L. Martin, Commanding 
General of the Hawaiian Air Force, and Lt. Colonel James A. MoUison, Chief of 
Staff of the Hawaiian Air Force. 

December 1st: Conference relative to the relief of the marine garrisons on the 
islands of Midway and W^ake, and the taking over of the defense of Canton Island 
by the army. 

December 2nd: Conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States 
Fleet with reference to a letter that he was sending to the Chief of Naval Operations 
relative to the relief of the marines at Midway and Wake by the army. 

December 3rd: Conference with reference to a radiogram I was sending to the 
War Department relative to the relief of the marines at Midway and Wake by 
the army. 

December 4th: Major Fleming, of my staff, conferred with Col. Pfeiffer, Fleet. 
Marine Officer on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet 
relative to the use of marine 5" guns at Canton Island. 

At these conferences the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and 
the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District had ample opportunity to 
acquaint me with information of the location of Japanese carriers, which would 



79T16 O— 46 — pt. 18- 



2964 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

render possible an attack on the island of OAHU. If they believed carriers 
so located, they unquestionably [17] would have discussed the possible 
danger to any troops attempting to effect a relief at Midway and Wake. There 
is at least a strong inference that they had no such knowledge of the location of the 
Japanese carriers which would have rendered an attack possible. The fact that 
the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District did not request the em- 
ployment under naval command of army bombardment planes for distant recon- 
naissance, as provided for by the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" indicates 
that they were satisfied with their information with reference to Japanese car- 
reers, and there was nothing new in the situation to cause me to change from an 
Alert for sabotage to an Alert for defense against an air attack. The following 
certificate shows that no request was made by the Commandant of the Fourteenth 
Naval District to the Hawaiian Air Force for long range aerial reconnaissance — 
Exhibit "K": 

HicKAM Field, T. H., 20 December 1941. 

I, JAMES A. MOLLISON, certify that during the period of 27 November 1941 
to 7 December 1941 the Navy made no requests to the Hawaiian Air Force for in 
shore or long range aerial reconnaissances. 

(Signed) Jas. A. MoUison, 
Jas. a. Mollison, 

Lt. Col, A. a, 

H.'A. F. C/S. 

To what extent such reconnaissance was made by the Navy planes is not 
known. 

At the conference on November 27th, a staff officer of the Commander-in-Chief 
of the United States Fleet made a statement about the improbability of a Japanese 
air attack in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief. This statement is covered 
by certificate of Lt. Col. James A. Mollison, as follows — Exhibit "L": 

"I certify that on November 27, 1941, I accompanied General Short and 
General Martin to Admiral Kimmel's office for conference relative to sending 
Army pursuits planes to Midway and Wake. As this would unquestionably 
weaken the defenses of Oahu, Admiral Kimmel asked a question of Captain 
McMorris, his War Plans Officer, which was substantially as follows: 

Admiral Kimmel: McMorris, what is your idea of the chances of a surprise 
raid on Oahu? 

Captain McMorris: I should say none Admiral . 

(Signed) James A. Mollison, 

Lt. Col., A. a 



[18] December 5th one B-24 plane arrived at Hickam Field from the 
mainland. This plane had insufficient armament for combat, only one .30 caliber 
and two .50 caliber guns in the tail, and was without ammunition for the guns 
that were installed. In spite of the fact that this plane arrived without being 
in condition to fire, the following radiogram was received from the War Depart- 
ment — Exhibit "M": 

"Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 
Ft. SJiafter, TH.: 

Four six five twenty sixth. 

Reference two B dash twenty four airplanes for special photo mission Stop 
It is desired that the pilots be instructed to photographic Truk Island in the 
Caroline group Jaluit in the Marshall group Stop Visual reconnaissance should 
be made simultaneously Stop Information desired as to the number and loca- 
tion of naval vessels including submarines comma airfields comma aircraft comma 
guns comma barracks and camps Stop Pilots should be warned islands strongly 
fortified and manned Stop Photography and reconnaissance must be accom- 
plished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity 
Stop AvoTd orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed Stop 
Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self pres- 
ervation Stop The two pilots and copilots should be instructed to confer 
with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advice Stop If 
distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great comma suggest one B*dash 
twenty four proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake comma then Philip- 
pines by usual route photographing Ponape while enroute Moresby Stop Advise 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2965 

pilots best time of day for photographic Truk and Jaluit Stop Upon arrival 
in Philippines two copies each of an.y photographs taken will be sent to General 
MacArthur comma Admiral Hart comma Admiral Kimmel comma the Chief 
of Naval Operations comma and the War Department Stop Insure that both 
B dash twenty four airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure 
from Honolulu. 

Adams. 

The combination of the arrival of the plane in this condition and of the instruc- 
tions for it to be placed in instant readiness for firing during the remainder of 
the journey plainly indicates that the War Department considered Honolulu not 
the subject of a probably attack, and that flying from the mainland to Honolulu 
the hazard of carrying the extra weight of ammunition was greater than the 
possibihty of being attacked by the Japanese. 

After the receipt of radiogram 46526, quoted above, the following radiogram 
was sent — -Exhibit "N": 

Chief of the Army Air Forces, 

Washington, D. C: 

Reference secret photographic mission of two B twenty fours Stop One of B 
twenty fours [19] Lieutenant Faulkner which landed Hickam this date 
short following equipment considered essential to safety and success of mission 
colon fifty caliber machine guns comma mounts comma adapters and accessories 
for upper hemisphere semicolon fifty caliber tunnel gun comma adapter and 
accessories semicolon fifty caliber guns comma adapters comma mounts and 
accessories for starboard and port sides semicolon second thirty caliber nose gun 
comma adapter and accessories Stop Guns can be removed from our equip- 
ment and ammunition is available Stop Strongly recommend that second B 
twenty four bring necessary equipment from mainland for installation on both 
planes prior their departure from Hickam field Stop Plane being held here 
until satisfactorily armed Stop Subject plane has no armor plate installation 
Stop Except for removal of passenger seats plane equipped as for ferry service 
North Atlantic Signed Martin HAF 141. 

Short 

In spite of radiogram quoted above, airplanes continued to be dispatched from 
the mainland without ammunition and with guns not in condition to fire. Twelve 
B- 17 airplanes, under orders from the War Department, left the mainland in two 
squadrons at 9:30 P. M., Dec. 6th, Pacific time (12:30 A. M., Dec. 7th, Eastern 
time) and 10:30 P. M., Dec. 6th, Pacific time (1:30 A. M., Dec. 7th, Eastern time). 
None of these guns were equipped with ammunition for the defensive armament. 
Machine guns were still cosmolined and had not been bore-sighted. Ferry crews 
were skeletonized, consisting of pilot, co-pilot, navigator, engineer and radio 
operator. Such crews were incapable of manning gun positions, even if the guns 
had been properly prepared for combat and supplied with ammunition. (Exhibit 
"O"). The inference is plain that up to 1:30 A. M., December 7th, the War 
Department felt that the hazard of carrying the extra weight in ammunition was 
greater than the danger of an attack by the Japanese. These planes actually 
arrived at Hickam Field in the midst of the first attack. Four of the twelve 
planes were destroyed by the Japanese without being able to fight. Had the War 
Department considered an attack by the Japanese probable, these planes would 
not have been permitted to leave the mainland without ammunition, and without 
guns in condition to be fired. Up to that moment the War Department had given 
me no indication of a crisis in the American-Japanese relations. 

Later in the^ morning of December 7th apparently alarming news was received 
and the Chief of Staff sent the following message to me by commercial radio — 
Exhibit "P": 

[W\ "Hawn Dept., 
Ft. Shaffer, T. H.: 
529 7th Japanese are presenting at one PM eastern standard time today what 
amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine 
immediately Stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not 
know but be on alert accordingly Stop Inform naval authorities of this 
communication 

Marshall". 



2966 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The message was filed at 12:18 P. M., December 7th, Eastern time (6:48 A. M., 
December 7th, Honohilu time). It was received by the R. C. A. in Honolulu at 
7:33 A. M., December 7th, and delivered to the Signal Office, Fort Shafter, at 
11:45 A. M. (Delivery probably delayed by the Japanese attack). The deci- 
phered message was delivered to the Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department, 
at 2:58 P. M., December 7th. Thus this important message was received seven 
hours after the attack. If the message had been telephoned by secret telephone 
direct to me as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time for encoding 
there would have been time to warm up the planes and put them in the air, thus, 
in all probability, avoiding a large loss of planes in the initial attack at 8:00 A. M. 
The fact that the War Department sent this message by radio in code instead of 
telephoning it in the clear and putting it through in the minimum amount of 
time indicates that the War Department, even as late as 6:48 A. M., December 
7th, Honolulu time, did not consider an attack on Honolulu as very probable. 

When the Chief of Staff, War Department, was informed by the Chief of Staff, 
Hawaiian Department, by secret commercial telephone of the first attack, he 
inquired if the message with regard to the Japanese ultimatum had been received 
prior to the attack. He was informed that it had not been received up to the 
time of that conversation. 

On December 9th the following radiogram was received from the War Depart- 
ment — Exhibit "Q": 

"Hawn Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.: 

Five four nine ninth please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our 
number five two nine repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact 
time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to staff and by what 
staff officer received. 

Cotton, Acting". 

The following reply was made by this Headquarters — Exhibit "R". 

[21] "Re your five four nine radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via 
RCA seven thirty three morning .seventh Stop Received signal office Fort 
Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh paren this time approximate but within 
five minutes paren Stop Deciphered message received bj- adjutant general HQ 
Hawn Dept two fifty eight afternoon seventh 

Short. 

Two instances occurred early on the morning of December 7th, which, if inter- 
preted differently at the time, might have had a very great result upon the action 
that followed. 

About 7:15 A. M. a two-man submarine entered Pearl Harbor and was destroyed 
by ships on duty. Had the Naval authorities foreseen this as a possible forerunner 
of an air attack and notified the army, time would have been available for the dis- 
persion of the planes. However, the naval authorities did not connect this sub- 
marine attack with a possible general attack. The army was not notified until 
after the attack at 8:00. 

After the Air Craft Warning Service Information Center was clo.sed at 7:00 
A. M., December 7th, the OPANA station remained in operation for further prac- 
tice. At 7:20 A. M. a very significant event occurred, as shown by the following 
affidavits — 

Exhibit "8": 

"Fort Shafter, T. H. 

Territory of Hawaii, ss: 

Personally appeared Ijefore me, the undersigned, authority for administering 
oaths of this nature, one Grover C. White, Jr. 0-396182, 2nd Lieut., Signal Corps. 
Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly sworn according 
to law deposes and .sayeth: 

1. At the request of the Control Officer and Naval Liaison Officer the AWS 
agreed to operate its detectors beyond the daily period of two hours before until 
one hour after dawn. The first schedule required operation of all stations from 
4 A. M. to 6 P. M. This schedule was modified to the hours of 4 A. M. to 4 P. M. 
A temporary schedule was next devised which required all stations to operate from 
4 A. M. to 11 A. M. and to have "staggered" operation, i. e., 3 stations from 11 
A. M. to 1 P. M., the remaining 3 stations from 1 P. M. to 4 P. M. On Saturday. 
December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to request authority to have all 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2967 

stations operate from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941; this 
was agreed to by the Control Officer. 

2. Staff Sergeant Stanley J. Wichas, SCAWH, acting RDF Officer, reports 
that he saw nothing that could be construed as suspicious in the information 
received [2S] by the AWS Information Center from 4 A. M. to Sunday, 
December 7, 1941. This is verified by Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, who was 
the only officer in the Information Center from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M. 

3. At approximately 7:20 A. M. a report was received from a Detector station 
at Opena that a large luunber of planes was approaching Oahu on a course North 
3 degrees E^ast at a distance of approximately 192 miles. This information was 
immediately transmitted by the switchboard operator, Pfc. Joseph McDonald 
to Lt. Tyler, who talked to Opana about the flight. The statement of Pfc. Joseph 
McDonald, SCAWH, the switchboard operator is attached. 

4. The Navy Liaison Officer's position within the Information Center was not 
manned when I reached the Information Center at about 8:30 A. M. This position 
was manned shortly thereafter by Technical Sergeant Merle E. StoufTer, SCAWH, 
who remained on the position until approximately 4:30 P. M. when the position 
was taken over by Naval Officers. 

Further the deponent sayeth not. 

(Signed) Grover C. White, Jr. 

2nd Lieut., Signal Corps, Signal 
Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of Dec. AD 1941, at Fort 
Shafter, T. H. 

(Signed) Adam R. Huggins, 

2nd Lt., Signal Corps, 

Summary Court. 
"Fort Shafter, T. H., 

ss: 
Territory of Hawaii, 
Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority for administering 
oaths of this nature, one Joseph P. McDonald, 13006145, Pvt. Icl, Signal Company 
Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly svVorn according to law deposes 
and sayeth: 

I was on duty as telephone operator at the AWS Information Center on Sunday 
morning, December 7, 1941. I received a telephone call from Opana at 7:20 
A. M. stating that a large number of planes were heading towards Oahu from 
North 3 points east. I gave the information to Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, 
78th Pursuit Squadron, Wheeler Field, T. H. and the Lieutenant talked with 
private Lockhard at the Opana station. Lt. Tyler said that it wasn't anything 
of importance. At that time the planes were 132 miles out. I asked if we 
shouldn't advise Corporal Beatty and have the plotters come back. The Opana 
Unit stressed the fact that it was a very large number of planes and they seemed 
excited. Lt. Tyler [23] said that it was not necessary to call the plotters 
or get in touch with anyone. Further the deponent sayeth not. 

(Signed) Joseph P. McDonald, 
Joseph P. McDonald, 
Stg. Co., Aircraft Warning, Hawaii. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of December A. D. 1941 at 
Fort Shafter, T. H. 

(Signed) Adam R. Huggins, 
Adam R. Huggins, 
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps, 

Summary Court. 
statement of lieut. kermit a. tyler 

20 December 1941. 

On Wednesday, 3 December 1941, I was first detailed to learn the operation 
of the plotting board in the Interception Control Center. I reported for duty 
at 1210, just as the crew on duty was leaving. I spoke with Lt. White, Signal 
Corps, a few minutes and he showed me the operating positions for Navy, Bom- 
bardment, Antiaircraft, Controller's position and Aircraft Warning Service. I 
remained on duty until 1600. Only a telephone operator was on duty with me. 

On Sunday, 7 December 1941, I was on duty from 0400 to 0800 as Pursuit 
Officer at the Interceptor Control Center. From 0400 until approximately 0610 



2968 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

there were no plots indicated on the interception board. From that time until 
0700 a number of plots appeared on the control board at various points sur- 
rounding the Island of Oahu. I particularly remember at least one plot South 
of Kauai and I believe there was- one South of Molokai. There were two plots 
at some distance north of Oahu and which I remember seeing on the historical 
record. At the time, I questioned the plotter of the historical record who stated 
that he makes a record of all plots as they come in. There were a number of 
plots over and around the Island of Oahu. Having seen the plotters work once 
before with about the same general layout, this did not seem irregular to me. At 
0700 all of the men except the telephone operator folded up their equipment and 
left. At about 0700 the operator at the OPANA RDF Station called me and 
said that the instrument indicated a large number of planes at 132 miles to the 
North. Thinking it must be a returning naval patrol, a flight of Hickam bombing 
planes, or possibly a flight of B-17 planes from the coast, I dismissed it as nothing 
unusual. (It is common knowledge that when Honolulu radio stations are 
testing by playing Hawaiian music throughout the night that coincidentally 
B-17s are apt to come in using the station [24\ for radio direction finding. 
The radio station was testing on the morning of 7 December, 0230-0400) . At about 
0750 I heard some airplanes outside and looking toward Pearl Harbor saw what I 
thought to be the navy practicing dive bombing runs. At a little after 0800, 
Sergeant Eugene Starry, A. C, Wheeler Field, called me to tell me that Wheeler 
Field had been attacked. I immediately had the telephone operator call all men 
back to duty. Most of the men had returned to duty by 0820 when Major L. N. 
Tindal arrived and took charge of the Control Center. I remained on duty 
assisting Major K. P. Bergquist and Major L. N. Tindal as Pursuit Control 
Officer until about 1615, 8 December 1941, with the exception of rest periods 
from 2000 to 2400, 7 December, and 0600 to 1000, 8 December. 

(Signed) Kermit A. Tyler, 
Kermit A. Tyler, 
1st Lieut., Air Corps. 

Had Lieut. Tyler alerted the Hawaiian Air Force instead of deciding that the 
planes were friendly, there would have been time to disperse the planes but not 
to get them in the air as they were not warmed up. Dispersion, in all probabil- 
ity, would have decreased the loss in planes, but would not have prevented the 
attack on Pearl Harbor. 

ACTION AT TIME OF ATTACK 

At 7:55 A. M., December 7th, the enemy planes attacked Hickam Field, Pearl 
Harbor and Wheeler Field. At 9: 00 a second attack was made, and a third about 
11:00 A. M., each lasting approximately fifteen minutes. At 8:03 A. M. the 
Chief of Staff reported the attack, and by 8:10 order had been given to all units 
(major echelons) by telephone to put Alert #3 in effect. 

Antiaircraft Artillery: All antiaircraft batteries had skeleton crews guarding 
them. All units had in their possession ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic 
rifles and machine guns. 3" ammunition had been placed in positions accessible 
to all batteries except four batteries of the 64th C. A. C. (AA). The first of 
these batteries began drawing ammunition at the Aliamanu Crater at 8:15 A. M. 
At 10:15 all these batteries had drawn the initial unit of fire. 

The automatic weapon batteries at Fort Kamehameha, Pearl Harbor and Camp 
Malakole took the enemy planes under firing during the eight o'clock raid. The 
first 3" gun fire was opened at 8:30, and all batteries of the south group were in 
action by 10:00 A. M. East group opened fire between 11:00 A. M. and 12:00 
noon. (For detailed firing of batteries, see Exhibit "S"). 

[S5] Hawaiian Air Force: During the first attack men started pulling planes 
out of the fire, and at 8:50 the serviceable pursuit planes took off. At 11:40 A. M. 
the serviceable bombers took off' on a mission under naval control. 

Before the attack December 7th status of planes in Hawaiian Department was 
as follows: 

Pursuit planes in commission 80 

Pursuit planes out of commission 69 

Reconnaissance planes in commission 6 

Reconnaissance planes out of commission 7 

Bombers in commission 39 

Bombers out of commission 33 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2969 

Damaged in Raid: 

Pursuit planes 88 

Reconnaissance planes 6 

Bombers • 34 

Status as of December 20th, 1941: m commission Reparable locally 

Pursuit planes 61 22 

Reconnaissance 6 2 

Bombersi 50 13 

' Includes 29 bombers from mainland. 

Exhibit "T" 

A comprehensive study of the losses inflicted on the enemy by the army places 
the number of enemy planes brought down by aviation and antiaircraft fire at 
twenty-nine (29). 

Exhibit "U" 

24th Division: Troops of the 24th Division at Schofield were attacked at 8:10 
A. M. Men with automatic rifles returned the enemy's fire. At 8:30 A. M. the 
Division started moving to its battle positions, and all units were in position by 
5:00 P. M. and had one unit of ammunition on the position. The second unit of 
fire was issued during the night. 

26th Division: The 25th Division opened antiaircraft fire at 8:30 A. M. It also 
started to move to battle positions at 8:30 A. M., and completed movement to 
position by 4:00 P. M. and had issued one unit of fire. The second unit of fire 
was issued during the night. 

All movement and action of troops was carried out as prescribed in [26] 
standing operating procedure (See Exhibit "B") without confusion. The value 
of planning and training with everyone made familiar with the plans was 
brought out very clearly. 

At 9:00 A. M. the first civilian surgical teams began reporting at Tripler Gen- 
eral Hospital. 

At 12:00 noon the Civilian Relief Committee began the evacuation of Hickam 
Field, Wheeler Field and Schofield, and continued throughout the afternoon and 
part of the evening. Most of the women and children were moved to school 
buildings, although a few from these posts and all of the women and children 
from Shafter, Tripler, Ordnance Depot and Signal Depot were sheltered in the 
incompleted underground Interceptor Command Post. 

During December 7th the foreign agents previously listed by F. B. I. and G-2 
were arrested and confined at the Immigration and Quarantine Stations as follows: 

Japanese 370 

Germans 98 

Italians 14 

Total 482 

The 804th Engineers began clearing the runways at Hickam Field and Wheeler 
Field as soon as the first attack was over. The fire fighters, while still fighting 
fire, assisted in moving the debris. During the evening of the 7th the District 
Engineer began repairing broken water pipes and other utilities at Hickam 
Field. 

Governor Poindexter put the M-Day Bill in effect on December 7th, and on 
December 8th declared martial law and requested the Department Commander 
to assume the responsibility as Military Governor. 

December 8th the District Engineer took over all building materials, supplies 
and equipment, called all construction companies into service and started the 
construction of bunkers and the extension of runways at the air fields. On the 
9th he started construction of evacuation camps for army dependents and ci- 
vilians. December 8th the Department Engineer distributed material to the 
troops and got field fortifications under way. December 9th he started construc- 
tion of slit trenches on posts and in the vicinity of school buildings and parks in 
the city, and started plans for construction of shelters throughout the city. 

Martial law was placed in effect on December 8th, and the following action 
was taken: 

1. Courts were closed. 

2. All civilian officials were asked to remain in their positions and carry on the 
work of their offices. 



2970 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[27] 3. An Advisory Committee headed by Governor Poindexter was 
appointed. 

4. A Military Commission and Provost Court were appointed. 

5. The sale of intoxicating liquors, beer and wine was prohibited. 

[S8] EFFORTS TO IMPROVE DEFENSES OF HAWAIIAN 1SLAND8 

My efforts to improve the defenses of the Hawaiian Islands has a bearing upon 
all work under me since assuming command of the Hawaiian Department, Febru- 
ary 7, 1941. The following are some of the most important items taken up and 
the action taken by the War Department. P^ach item is supported by exhibits. 

1. The need for additional facilities and troops in this Department became 
evident very soon after arrival. On February 19th a letter was transmitted to 
the Cheif of Staff of the Army outlining some of the deficiencies discovered and 
recommending action which should be taken to correct them. Among these 
points were: 

(1) Cooperation with the Navy, 

(2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and repair, maintenance and 
servicing of aircraft, 

(3) Improvement of anti-aircraft defense, 

(4) Improvement of the harbor defense artillery, 

(5) Improvement of the situation regarding searchlights, 

(6) Roads and trails, 

(7) Necessary bombproof construction, 

(8) Increase in the number of engineer troops. 
A copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit "V". 

2. On "February 19, 1941, a secret letter was submitted to the War Depart- 
ment, subject: "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft", file Engr. 452. This 
letter explains the urgent necessity of providing protective bunkers for bombard- 
ment and pursuit aviation in this Department and recommended that funds in 
the amount of $1,565,600.00 be allotted for this purpose. This cost included 
the costs of the necessary taxiways and hard standings to permit the dispersion 
of planes at Hickam Field. A large part of the ground surrounding the landing 
mat at Hickam Field is made up of a soft fill and it is not possible to disperse 
planes onto this ground without the provision of taxiways and hard standings. 
This correspondence was indorsed back to this Department by the 6th Ind., 
AG 600.12 (2^19-41) MC-G, September 12, 1941, which stated that the plans 
for revetments had been approved and that funds in the amount of $1,358,000.00 
[29] would be available about January 1, 1942. At the time of the 
attack on December 7th, no money had been received for this project and it was 
impossible to adequately disperse the planes at Hickam Field. Construction 
of these bunkers was initiated immediately after the attack under the Emergency 
Authority granted. — Exhibit "W". 

3. It was apparent that the facilities of the Hawaiian Air Depot which had 
been constructed in a very concentrated area at Hickam Fie'ld would be ex- 
tremely vulnerable to an attack. As a result, a letter was submitted to the War 
Department on September 10, 1941, file Engr. 600.96, subject: "Underground 
Repair Facilities Hawaiian Air Depot", which strongly recommended the ap- 
proval of bombproof facilities for the repair of aircraft in this Department, and 
requested funds in the amount of $3,480,650.00. This correspondence was 
indorsed back by 1st Ind., file AG 600.12 (9-10-41) MC-G, Adjutant General's 
Office, October 27, 1941, stating that due to the cost of providing bombproof 
facilities that it was the War Department's policy not to provide them, and 
suggesting that splinterproof installations be provided. During the attack of 
December 7th, the Air Depot was one of the main targets and suffered tremendous 
damage. Construction of an underground bombproof facility was started under 
the Emergency Authority subsequent to the attack. Steps have also been taken 
to decentralize the Hawaiian Air Depot to several smaller shops around the 
island.— Exhibit "X". 

4. Fortifications and Camouflage Funds. — A letter was submitted to the War 
Department on July 28th, file AG 121.2, subject: "Reallocation of Special Field 
Exercise Funds", requesting that these funds be made available for purchase of 
fortification and camouflage equipment. This letter was answered by confiden- 
tial radiogram No. 31, August 12, 1941, stating these special field exercise funds 
could not be made available for this purpose. This radiogram was followed by 
letter dated August 13, 1941, file AG 353 (7-28-41) MC-D, subject: "Realloca- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2971 

tion of Special Field Exercise Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage 
Projects", in which it was stated that the interest of the Hawaiian Department 
in providing field fortifications was appreciated by the War Department, but 
that funds could not be allotted for this purpose. This letter was returned by 
1st Ind. this headquarters, file AG 353 (7-28-41) MC-D, September 14, 1941, 
again recommending an immediate allotment of $125,000.00 for field fortification 
and camouflage purposes. In 2nd Ind. to [30] the same correspondence 
September 26, 1941, the Adjutant General stated that the allotment could not 
be made. Also on this same subject, this headquarters submitted to the War 
Department a clipper letter on October 28, 1941, file Engr. 400.312, subject: 
"Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Material", which recapitulated 
the previous correspondence on this subject, and requested an allotment of 
$1,445,542.00 be made available immediately for the purpose of fortification and 
camouflage materials. No funds had been received for this purpose at the time 
of the attack.— Exhibit "Y". 

5. Camouflage: The necessity of camouflaging treatment of all airfields in this 
Department was brought to the War Department's attention in letter File Engr. 
000.91, July 15, 1941, subject: "Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler 
Field". This letter stated, "There is definite need for camouflage treatment on 
all airfields in the Hawaiian Department. Up to this time no camouflage treat- 
ment had been undertaken at anv airfield in this Department." This proposal 
was finally approved in 3rd Ind.. file AG 007.5 (7-12-41) MC-G from the Adjutant 
General's Office to the Chief of Engineers which directed that funds in the amount 
of $56,210.00 be included in the next budget estimate for Wheeler Field. At the 
time of the attack on December 7th, no funds had been received for this purpose. 
The question of camouflage was also submitted to the War Department by letter 
this headquarters February 27, 1941, file Engr. 000.91, subjects "Camouflage of 
Defense Installations". This project was approved by 4th Ind., AG 007.5 
(2-27-41) MC-E, Adjutant General's Office June 27, 1941. At the time of the 
attack, no funds for this purpose had been received, and although considerable 
work had been done by troop labor to camouflage these installations, its eff'ective- 
ness was limited by our inability to buy the necessary materials. — Exhibit "Z". 

6. The revised Roads and Trails Project was submitted by letter this head- 
quarters, file Engr. 611, February 19, 1941, which recommended that funds in 
the amount of $1,370,000.00 be allotted for construction of the military roads, 
railroads and trails in this Department. At the time of the attack, only $350,- 
000.00 had been allotted for this purpose. — Exhibit "lA". 

7. The need for additional airports was brought to the War Department's 
attention in letters file Engr. 600.12, according to the following [31] sched- 
ule: 

(1) Bellows Field April 5,1941 

(2) Barking Sands May 2,1941 

(3) Hilo Airport . May 2,1941 

(4) Homestead Field May 2,1941 

(5) Morse Field May 2,1941 

(6) Haleiwa May 22, 1941 

(7) Burns Field May 22, 1941 

(8) Lanai May 22, 1941 

(9) Parker Ranch June 2, 1941 

(10) Kipapa : May 14.1941 

At the time of the attack no funds had been allotted specifically for construction 
at these airfields. The War Department disapproved the proposed site at Kipapa 
and directed construction at Kahuku. This relocation required protracted 
negotiations with the Fourteenth Naval District which had a bombing range on 
the Kahuku site. These negotiations were completed only a short time before 
the attack, but as no funds had been received, no construction had been started. 
In this connection, several expedients had to be adopted due to the non-availability 
of funds. Construction work at Molokai, Burns, Morse and Barking Sands was 
actually done by troop labor using materials provided by the WPA. The need 
of an additional airdrome on Oahu was recognized as acute. The only possibility 
for immediate development was in improving the field at Bellows, and the only 
funds which had been made available for construction work at Bellows Field 
applied to housing only. The project letter on Bellows Field included a request 
for funds for improvement of runways, installation of gasoline storage and other 
facilities to make this a first class operating base. As stated, no funds had been 
allotted for these improvements. Since the need for these vital facilities was 



2972 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

acute, this Department authorized the District Engineer to proceed with their 
construction, utilizing any funds which might be available to his office. At the 
time of the attack, provision had been made for gasoline storage at Bellows and a 
5000' runway was about half done, and the District Engineer was able to com- 
plete this ruuway by Thursday night following the attack. Bellows Field is now 
a useable base, but all construction which [32] has been done to make 
this an operating base has been done without any funds being allotted by the War 
Department. The improvement of other airdromes on Oahu at either the Kipapa 
or Kahuku area or at Haleiwa had not been undertaken at the time of the attack 
because no funds had ever been allotted for this purpose. — Exhibit "IB". 

8. Kaneohe Bay Defenses: It was recognized that the preceding arrangement 
under which the Army disclaimed any responsibility for the defense of the new 
Naval Air Station at Kaneohe Bay was a mistake. A letter was prepared and 
transmitted to the War Department on the 18th of February 1941, subject: 
"Defense of Naval Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file 381. This letter 
informed the War Department that this Department had assumed responsibility 
for the defense of this area. This subject was again covered in letter this head- 
quarters, file Engr. 600.96, dated April 14. 1941, subject: "Protection of Seacoast 
Defense Batteries" to the Adjutant General, and recommendation was made that 
a 12-inch gun battery sunilar to Battery Closson be obtained and shipped to this 
Department for installation in the Kaneohe Bay area. The War Department 
recognized the need of this protection for Kaneohe Bay, but was unable to supply 
a 12-inch gun battery for this. The project for the permanent defenses at Kaneohe 
Bay was submitted by letter of this headquarters 31 July 1941, file AG 381/20 
Kaneohe Bay project, subject: "Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station 
Kaneohe Bay", which recommended both additional^ personnel and additional 
armament required. This was answered by 3rd Ind. Adjutant General's Office, 
file AG 381 (7-31-41) MC-D, October 30, 1941, which approved the temporary 
utilization of armament now on hand in this Department. This indorsement 
also stated that the reinforcements of peace or war garrison of the Hawaiian 
Department for the beach and land defense of this area was not contemplated. 
The project for the utilization of temporary armament was submitted on the 18th 
of September 1941, file Engr 662/4 x 662/7 which recommended the provision of 
funds for the construction of Panama mounts for three 155-mm batteries and a 
railroad gun emplacement, and requested that funds in the amount of $215,265.00 
be alloted for the construction of these positions. This matter was also followed 
up in radiogram No. 320 this headquarters, September 18, 1941, which recom- 
mended that funds in the amount of $215,265.00 be made available for the con- 
struction at Kaneohe Bay and also that $117,256.00 be made available for the 
completion of the project for [33] construction of railroad gun positions. At the 
time of the attack no funds had been allotted for this construction. Exhibit "IC". 

9. The necessity of improvement of the landing strips at Wheeler Field was 
brought to the War Department's attention by letter this headquarters, file 
Engr. 686/d, 21 June, 1941. In 2nd Ind. on this correspondence, from the Office 
of the Chief of the Air Corps, August 25, 1941, question was raised as to the ade- 
quacy of the second proposed north-south runway, and the statement was made 
that no funds were available at that time for the construction and improvements 
recommended. In 2nd Ind. Chief of the Air Corps, Washington, D. C, September 
2, 1941, to this Department, statement was made that $25, 00b. 00 had been 
requested for the leveling of the main runway at Wheeler Field. At ttie time of 
the attack, however, no funds had been received for the improvement of this 
landing strip. Some improvements had been made utiUzing troop labor of the 
804th Engineers; however, due to tne lack of funds these improvements were 
limited and did not adequately solve the problem. — Exhibit "ID". 

10. The Aircraft Warning Service is probably the most important single 
project for the defense of Oahu. At the time of the attack, however, none of the 
three fixed stations in the original project had been completed due to the impos- 
sibility of securing materials under the priorities system. The Kaala station, 
for example, depended for its construction on construction of the cableway 
approach. In radiogram 3009 on June 10th, this headquarters reported to the 
War Department that this cableway material could not be delivered unless a 
higher priority rating was received, and in War Department radio 904, June 
26th, the Adjutant General reported that this priority rating had been advanced 
to an A-l-c rating. With this rating it was not possible to secure the material 
to install this installation and the others expeditiously. Revised estimates for 
engineer construction of the superseding project of six fixed stations and six mobile 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2973 

stations and preliminary estimates for the cost of the signal communications 
involved in this revised project, were submitted by letter this headquarters 29 
September, 1941, file Sig 676.3. Pending tne allotment of these additional 
funds, this Departme it authorized the District Engineer to proceed with con- 
struction of AWS stations with any funds available to his office. At the time 
of the attack, however, due to this priority difficulty, none of the three original 
fixed stations were in operation. — Exhibit "IE". 

[34] 11. The entire construction program in this Department has been 
delayed due to the situation regarding priorities. It was extremely difficult to 
secure materials for the construction program, not only those which were ordered 
specifically for a defense project, but particularly those materials which are 
ordinarily purchased as an "over the counter" transaction. From a study of the 
the priorities situation, and also of the shipping situation, it became evident in 
June that the local dealers who ordinarily maintain stocks and materials necessary 
for defense projects would not be able to secure delivery from the mainland until 
after a purchase order from a Government agency had been placed. This meant 
that after the priority was placed, if the item was not available in local stock 
that there would be a delay of from six weeks to two months even under the most 
favorable conditions before mainland delivery could be effected. To remedy 
this situation a letter was sent to the War Department by clipper airmail, file 
Engr. 523.07, subject: "Priorities and Preference Ratings," July 3, 1941. This 
letter presented the problem in detail and recommended to the War Department 
that action be taken to correct this situation. The letter was followed up by 
radio on the 14th of August, and was answered by 1st and 2nd Inds. from the 
Priorities Committee dated August 18, 1941, and the Adjutant General dated 
August 26, 1941. The problem was again presented to the War Department by 
letter dated October 23, 1941, file Engr. 523.07, which recommended that the 
Office of Production Management be opened in Honolulu. In 2nd Ind. on this 
correspondence, the Priorities Committee advised that the Office of Production 
Management had been requested to establish a field office in Hawaii. This 
field office had not been established at the time of the attack and due to this diffi- 
culty in securing materials, many of our projects were not completed at the 
time of the attack.— Exhibit "IF". 

12. Another effort was made to solve this supply problem by securing funds for 
the advance procurement of certain essential materials. It was originally re- 
quested in clipper airmail letter this headquarters July 28, 1941, file Engr. 600.12, 
which recommended that a revolving fund of $1,000,000.00 be set up to permit 
the advance procurement of essential materials before the specific allotments had 
been made for individual projects. This letter had not [35] been answered 
on the 13th of September when a follow-up radiogram was sent to the War Depart- 
ment, and on the same day the matter was brought to the personal attention of the 
Deputy Chief of Staff in the War Department, who very quickly secured a solution 
of the problem by the allotment of $500,000.00 for the advance purchase of essen- 
tial materials. Before these materials could be secured, however, the $500,000.00 
was diverted by the War Department for the construction of housing at Kaneohe 
Bay, with the result that on the day of the attack, no reserve supplies of materials 
other than lumber had been accumulated. — Exhibit "1G'\ 

13. The following letter shows appreciation by the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Air of the difficulties in the carrying out of the project for the creation of air 
fields to permit ferrying of planes to the Philippine Islands, and of the rapidity 
with which the arrangements were completed. — Exhibit "IH". 

November 27, 1941 
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, U. S. A., 
Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H. 
Dear Short: The copy of your report on the additional air routes has been 
received. The quantity of details requiring coordination, and the distances in- 
volved in the projects make the short time consumed in getting rolling almost 
unbelievably short. 

I extend you my personal thanks for the effort you have expended on this job 
and the results you are getting. 

The way things are working out now, it looks as if we will be using trans- Pacific 
airways almost continuously from now on. Our plans are O. K. for 4-engine 



2974 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

bombers, but what are the prospects for medium bombers? Do you think we 
should even study that phase of trans-Pacific operations? 
Best regards. 
Sincerely, 

/s/ H. H. Arnold, 
Major General, U. S. A., 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air. 

[36\ 14. Increase in Engineer Troops: 

February 10, 1941.— TAG sent 3d Ind., file AG 320.2 (11-1-40) M-C saying 
that 3d Engineer Regiment was to be increased. Regular Army personnel not 
available to further increase Engineer Regiment. Selectees prohibited from being 
sent and it was not possible to i id in creating Engineer Battalion here as requested. 
On 19 Feb. 1941, letter to TAG file Engr. 322.03 requested that War Department 
send an Eng. Regiment (Aviation) and an Eng. Regiment (General Service) here. 
1st Ind., May 15th, A. G. 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M; TAG, stated that 34th Eng. 
Regiment (C) would be activated and that the personnel would probably arrive 
in June. This Regiment was to take the place of the Regiment (General Service) 
requested. On June 18th, letter AG 320.2 (6-5-41) MR-MC, the War Depart- 
ment issued orders expanding 804 Eng. Company to the 804th Eng. Battalion. 
The troops for the 304th Eng. Battalion arrived in this Department 21 July 1941. 
Previous instructions concerning the activation of the 34th Eng. Battalion had 
been rescinded with the result that the unit was not activated u.itil 17 October 

1941. It hart not been completely trained and lacked many items of equipment 
at the time of the attack. See Exhibit "1 I". 

15. Increase in Coast A.rtillery Troops: 

February 18, 754/.— Letter written to TAG urgently requesting two (2) Regi- 
ments C A Mobile; 1 Battalion CA (AA) gun, Mobile (less searchlight battery); 
one Regiment CA (TD) 155 mm. gun; AA filler replacements (90 officers and 2064 
enlisted men); Harbor Defense Artillery reinforcements (150 officers and 2700 
enlisted men). TAG replied by first indorsement May 10, 1941, file AG 320.2 
(2-18-41) (56) that the Hawaiian Department CA Garrison would be augmented 
with a total of 276 oflScers and 5734 enlisted men between June 1941 and March 

1942, as follows: (See Exhibit "IJ"). 

June 1941: 

(1) A A fillers, 60 officers, 1337 enlisted men, 

(2) 98 CA 62 officers, 1329 enlisted men 

(3) Second Battalion, 97 CA less Battery H (Gun) Battery E (SL) (17 
officers, 359 enlisted men) 

[37] November 1941: 

(1) 97 CA less 2 Battalion, 3 Battalion— (48 officers, 885 enlisted men). 

(2) Battery H, 97 CA (4 oflScers, 134 enlisted men). 

(3) Medical Personnel, 98 CA (7 officers, 49 enlisted men). 
March 1941: 

(1) A A fillers (24 officers, 661 enlisted men). 

(2) 3 Battalion, 97 CA (37 mm. gun) less Battery H, 3 Battalion, 98 CA 
(37 mm. gun) less Battery M (54 officers, 980 enlisted men). 

February 25th, 1941.— Letter written to TAG, file AG 320.2/57 (Exhibit re- 
questing increase in enlisted men in 251st C. A. Regiment NG from 1181 to 
1450. Disapproved by TAG March 8, 1941 (Exhibit IJ) 1st indorsement, 
file 320.2/57. 

February 25th, 1941.— Letter written to TAG, file 320.2/58 (Exhibit IJ) re- 
questing following reinforcements of Hawaiian Department: 

(1) That CAC requested February 18th (Exhibit IJ) be given priority. 

(2) That nth F. A. be organized under T/0 dated November 1, 1940. 

(3) One Tank Battalion. 

(4) Two (2) M. P. Companies for guarding air fields. 

(5) Reinforcements of Inf. Regiments so as to be organized under T/0 
November 1, 1940. 

(6; That 11th F. A. Brig, {less 11 F. A.) be reinforced and organized under 
T/0 November 1, 1940. 
TAG replied by first indorsement, file 320.2 (2-25-41) (58) (Exhibit IJ) that 
CAC and Engineering increases would be considered separately; that reinforce- 
ments for F. A. and Inf. Regiments were not considered urgent; that Tank 
Battalion and 2 M. P. Companies for Hawaiian Department were disapproved; 
and that any reorganization of units was to be accomplished by reducing size 



EXHIBITS OF JOITSTT COMMITTEE 2975 

of existing units and by carrying others as inactive. On May 28th, orders for 
the shipment of CAC increases were rescinded file 320.2/70. On July 15, letter 
from TAG, file 320.2/82m (Exhibit IJ) activated the following units: 

[38] 97th CA Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2 Battalions, 

and Batteries F and G. 

98th CA Regimental Headquarters Battery (less band), Headquarters and 

Headquarters Battery 1st and 2nd Battalions, and Batteries A, B, C, 

D, F, G and H. 
16. Increase in Air Corps Strength: 

April 9th, 1941.— Letter from TAG, file 320.2 (3-5-41) (61) (Exhibit IK) 
directing that Air Defense Command be set up. First indorsement, May 3, 
1941 (Exhibit IK) to TAG called attention to the fact that the plan was presented 
to War Department in letter of April 25th, 1941, Paragraph 7 "Reorganization 
of Forces in Hawaiian Department" (Exhibit IK). 

April 24th, 1941.— Letter written to TAG from COHAF (thru channels) file 
320.2/94 (Exhibit IK) subject "Air Base Group" requesting: 

(1) Bellows Field as permanent Air Corps Station 

(2) Permanent Station 15 Pursuit Group 

(3) A redistribution of Air Base Groups 

(4) That two Air Base Groups be authorized. 

Bv second indorsement TAG to COHD dated June 26th, 1941, file 320.2 
(4-24-41) (94) (Exhibit IK): 

(1) War Department stated that Troop Unit Basis FY 1942 provided 
for two additional material squadrons for HAF. This is believed to provide 
sufficient air base units to care for Bellows Field. 

(2) Organization of Air Base Unit for 15th Pursuit Group held in obeyance 
pending decision on new station. By third indorsement CGHD to TAG, 
file 320.2/94 (Exhibit IK) request was made for two additional material 
squadrons to be stationed at Bellows Field. On August 7th, 1941, radio, 
file 320.2/100 (Exhibit IK) was sent to Chief of Air Corps requesting Head- 
quarters Detachment in absence of Air Base Group. On August 15th Radio 
No. 380 (Exhibit IK) was sent to TAG requesting information of status of 
Air Base Groups for Bellows Field. Administrative situation there very 
difficult. In answer. Chief of Air Corps sent radio no. 172, file 320.2/108c 
(Exhibit IK) stating [39] not favorably considered because it would 
exceed the 59,000 allotted and also that TAG had been requested to activate 
Headquarters Detachment. On September 27th, 1941, by letter (exhibit IK) 
from TAG, file 320.2/108d, subject "Activation of Air Corps Unit" a Head- 
quarters Detachment was authorized at Bellows Field but personnel had to 
be furnished bv the Department. 

On August 30, 1941, Radio No. 779, file 320.2/108 (Exhibit IK) was received 
asking: 

(1) What are total AC personnel requirements. 

(2) Total requirements for personnel for arms and services with AC. 

(3) Number AB groups needed and their locations. 

On September 9, 1941, Radio No. 272 to TAG, file 320.2/108a (Exhibit IK) 
answering Radio No. 779 requesting the following: 

(1) Two AB Groups (one for Bellows, one for Kahuku) 

(2) Air Corps enlisted men now in Department sufficient to organize 
these groups. 

(3) One Squadron (HB) (Exhibit IK) consisting of 27 officers, 220 en- 
listed men to replace 14th Bombardment Squadron transferred to Phillipine 
Islands. 

(4) Personnel for Bellows. Medical Department (1 officer, 7 enlisted 
men) Dental Corps (1 officer) Quartermaster (1 officer, 30 men) Ordnance 
Dept. (1 A. B. Co. of 4 officers and 60 enlisted men). 

(5) Personnel for Kahuku Point. Medical Department (3 officers, 12 
enlisted men) Dental Corps (1 officer) Quartermaster (1 officer, 30 enlisted 
men) Signal Corps (10 enlisted men specialists) 

(6) Following personnel needed: Air Corps (3871 enlisted men) Medical 
Corps (6 officers, 36 enlisted men); Dental Corps (1); Quartermaster (4 
officers, 70 enlisted men). 3 AB Squadrons one each at Barking Sands, 
Kauai; Morse Field; Hilo, Hawaii. 

(7) Near Future. Two (2) additional AB Squadrons — (1) Lanai (under 
construction) (2) Parker Ranch (project to be submitted). 

On November 8th Radio no. 786 was sent to TAG, file 320.2/126 (exhibit IK) 
requesting immediate assignment. 



2976 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(1) Three airdepot Groups to HAF 

(2) Procurement of civilian employees impossible and discharge of en- 
listed men for employment does not help. 

[40] (3) 30% tactical planes grounded due to shortage in depot 
maintenance. Becoming acute. 

(4) Must have personnel and material at. once. No personnel 

available here for activation of units. 

On November 15th Radio no. 402, file 320.2/126a, (exhibit IK) from TAG 

stating that three Air Depot Groups were under advisement but that groups 

not available now. If and when available, will it come within strength of war 

garrison? 

On November 19th Radio no. 889, file 320.2/126b (exhibit IK) to TAG— 
Increase of three Air Depot Groups will not come within authorized war garrison 
but should be furnished as soon as possible due to shortage in personnel. War 
garrison must be increased to accommodate Air Base Groups. 

On November 18th the War Department activated Seventh Airways Squadron 
from existing personnel in Department, file 320.2/127 (exhibit IK). On Novem- 
ber 18th Radio no. 873, file 320.2/128 (exhibit no. IK) was sent to TAG requesting 
Station Complements at Hickam, Wheeler, Morse Field and Barking Sands. 
Urgently requested. On November 25th 1941 Radio no. 455, file 320.2/128a 
(exhibit IK) from TAG stated that until war garrison limitation was lifted, no 
additional personnel could be sent to the Hawaiian Department. 

17. Reorganization Hawaiian Division & Increase in War Garrison April 25th, 
1941. Letter written to TAG, file 220.3/37, (exhibit IL) requesting that two 
triangular divisions be organized from the Hawaiian Division (Square) and the 
organization of station complements be made at Schofield Barracks and Fort 
Shafter; also Air Defense Command is to be created. By first indorsement 
dated July 29, 1941, file 320.3 (4-25-41) (37) (exhibit IL). TAG returned this 
letter without action. 

May 29th, 1941. TAG sent radio no. 837, file 320.3/37a (exhibit IL) stating 
that the initial war garrison would be reduced to 58,000. Reductions would 
come from troops other than Air Corps, Anti aircraft, and Aircraft Warning 
Service. 

[41] June 6th, 1941.— 'Letter was written to TAG. file 320.3/37b (Exhibit 
IL) subject "War Garrison for Initial War Operations" stating 

(1) That Table I, (Exhibit IL) shows forces recommending totaling 59,425. 

(2) Statement that proper defense of Kaneohe Bay, Airfields, beaches and 
provisions for mobile reserve cannot be successful with only 59,000 troops. 

(3) Statement of minimum increase for Kaneohe Bay as follows: 1 Regi- 
ment Inf; 1 Regiment Field Artillery, 155 How (T. D.) ; 1 Battalion C. A. 155 
guns plus one additional battery; 1 Regiment C. A. (AA); 1 Battery C. A. 
12" Barbette guns. 

(4) Urgently requested that strength be increased from 58,000 to approxi- 
mately 71,500 as follows: 2 Inf. Regiments; 1 Regiment Field Artillery, 155 
How 1 Regiment CA (AA) SM; 1 Battalion CA 155 guns; 1 Battery CA 12" 
Barbette guns . . . total 11,279. 

(5) Again recommended that station complements for Schofield Barracks 
and Fort Shafter be organized. This would give an increase of 731 officers 
and men for Schofield Barracks and 131 officers and men for Fort Shafter. 

(6) Plans are to be submitted in the near future for garrisoqg each of 
otitlying islands with a force consisting of approximately 1 regiment of 
Infantry and a composite battalion of Field Artillery, all of which will not be 
within war garrison strength. 

On July 22, 1941, 1st indorsement to exhibit IL file 320.3/37b (Exhibit IL) 
TAG said 

(1) War Garrison of 59,425 recommended by CGHD is reduced to 57,429 
and augmented by following units: 1 Regiment CA (AA) SM (less 1 gun 
battalion, band, basics), 1 Battalion CA 155 M guns with 1 additional 
Battery, 1 Battery CA. 

(2) Recommendation of war garrison for 71,500 officers and men is dis- 
approved. 

(3) Troops in excess of 59,690 authorized will be sent to Hawaii only in 
case the situation develops a need and if such troops are available. 

18. May 2nd, 1941.— Letter written to TAG, file 320.3/38 (Exhibit IM) subject 
"Organization of Anti Aircraft Artillery Brigade" requesting authority to activate 
the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 53 CA Brig, and the Intelligence 
Battery, 53rd CA Brig, about June 1, 1941. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2977 

June 12, 1941.— First indorsement from TAG to CGHD, file 320.2 (5/2/41) 
(38) (exhibit IM) gives authority to activate. 

[42] 19. November 6, 1941.— R&dio No. 759 to Chief Ordnance, file 320.2/121 
(exhibit IN) stated that 6-37 mm. batteries now in Hawaiian Department. Plans 
made for six more by March, 1942, but only twenty (20) guns on hand. When 
and in what quantities will the one hundred (100) 37 mm. guns listed under 1941 
funds be sent? Replv not vet received. 

20. STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE. Before February 7, 1941, 
Field Orders No. 1 (Landing Operations) No. IW (Sabotage) and 1 NS (Naval 
Security) had been prepared. It was found during Maneuvers, May 1941, that 
these field orders were too cumbersome. On July 14th, 1941, a tentative Standing 
Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department was issued to each officer in the 
Department with instructions that any suggested changes were to be reported to 
Department Headquarters by August 15, 1941. During the preparation of the 
final form of the Standing Operating Procedure, the tentative S. O. P. was in 
effect. The final form was issued on November 5, 1941. Each unit knew its 
mission in the event Alert No. 1, 2 or 3 was put into effect. Due to this planning 
(the S. O. P.) each unit was able to act quickly and promptly when the air raid 
took place on December 7, 1941. 

EFFORTS TO BETTER PREPARE THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY FOR DEFENSE 

[43] Soon after taking command of the Hawaiian Department I made a 
survey with reference to possible defense measures to enable the civilian popula- 
tion to meet any emergency which might arise. I had been asked to speak to the 
Chamber of Commerce on Army Day, April 6th, and decided that this day was 
the best opportunity to obtain publicity, as practically all the important business 
men of Oahu were present on this occasion. I proposed the following items of 
prime importance: 

1. Production and storage of food. 

2. Organization of doctors and nurses for care of injured and wounded. 

3. Organization of an auxiliary to the police force to guard utilities and prevent 
sabotage. 

4. Preparation of plans and provision for evacuation of women and children 
and preparation of shelters for workers in the vicinity of central industries. 

(For complete remarks on this occasion, see Exhibit "10". 

Production and storage of food: As a result of my talk and support by the papers 
and certain men of importance in the community, the storage of food in the pantry 
of the home was put into effect at once, and the purchases from the retailers 
increased about 20% during the first month. 

For some years a study had been made of food production required and possible 
in the islands. A committee completed this work, and made definite assignment 
of acreage and crops to all plantations on the Islands. Plantation managers 
and the five big companies which act as factors for the various plantations all 
agreed to this plan. Necessary implements for changing from cane and pine- 
apples to truck gardening were listed for each plantation. Orders for seed for 
planting the first crop were placed with firms in the mainland, orders to be filled 
upon telegraphic advice. — Exhibit "IP". 

On December 10th, after completion of the inventory of food on hand, a meet- 
ing was held with the Presidents of the five big companies and of the Governor's 
Food Committee. The District Engineer was directed to purchase the seed and 
equipment at once, as it was believed the matter could be handled in less time in 
this [44] manner instead of having each plantation make purchases. 

The committee on storage of food determined the articles and tonnage of the 
essential elements of diet necessary to provide for the civil population for six 
months. The cost of these items was estimated to be $2,500,000 for human con- 
sumption and $900,000 for feed for dairy cattle and poultry. This matter was 
taken up with the War Department. 

Governor Poindexter and Delegate Sam King gave the storage of food their 
full support. However, the item was eliminated by the Bureau of the Budget 
and no action was gotten through Congress. The purchase of this emergency 
food reserve by the Department of Agriculture and the allocation of shipping 
therefor was authorized December 17th. Recent press dispatches indicate that 
the President has made an allotment for food production. 

Organization of Doctors and Nurses for care of injured and wounded: The Medical 
Society of Honolulu got squarely behind my effort to prepare the doctors and 



2978 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

nurses for an emergency. Twenty (20) civilian-aid station groups were organ- 
ized and have had considerable practice in setting up their stations. They actu- 
ally functioned efficiently on December 7th. Sixteen (16) surgical teams were 
organised. They started reporting at 9:00 A. M. December 7th, and by 9:30 
all were employed. They are representative of the leading surgeons, anesthetists, 
etc., in the city. The regular operating staff at Tripler General Hospital was 
operating at 8: 45 A. M. 

After several conferences the Red Cross agreed to purchase and store in Hono- 
lulu $200,000.00 worth of medicines and surgical supplies and equipment. Much 
of the equipment and supplies had been received prior to December 7th. 

Buildings suitable for hospitals were surveyed, and many of the.se have actually 
been equipped and operated since December 7th. 

Organization of auxiliary police force: The organization of an auxiliary police 
force was effected and placed under the command of Major Douglas King by the 
Mayor of Honolulu. This force was given some training in taking over leading 
utilities and the use of firearms. It proved to be a very efficient force immedi- 
ately after the raid. 

Auxiliary fire fighters and fire wardens have been organized. Requests for 
fire-fighting equipment have been made to the Office of Civilian Defense, and 
also sent direct by the Governor to the same organization. 

[45] Evacuation and shelters: Detailed plans were drawn for evacuation camps, 
for trenches in parks, schools, etc., and for splinter-proof shelters in the vicinity of 
public utilities. A request for $2,800,000 for construction of these camps and 
shelters was made through the War Department and also direct by Governor 
Poindextcr. The funds were not provided until after the attack December 7th. 
Since that date the President has made funds available to the Governor of the 
Territory of Hawaii for this purpose. — Exhibit "IQ" 

M-DAY BILL 

At the request of the Senate of the Territory of Hawaii I appeared before that 
body and explained the value and the necessity for the passage of the M-Day bill. 
The passage was effected in the next few days and the measure was signed by the 
Governor. The bill enabled the Governor to organize emergency committees and 
carry out many things of great benefit in the medical work, evacuation and police 
work immediately following the attack on December 7th. 

LETTERS FROM CIVILIANS WITH REFERENCE TO MY EFFORTS TO IMPROVE CIVILIAN 

DEFENSE 

The following copies of letters have been received: Exhibit "IR" 

Honolulu, T. H., December 22, 1941. 
The President, The White House, Washington, D. C. 

Sir: We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social organi- 
zations in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest 
in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere 
appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by 
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short. 

We have found him at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he has 
exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an emer- 
gency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for this 
purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such plan. 

General Short's thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas to 
our "Territorial Legislature, to our local officials, and to our community in gen- 
eral have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound "M-Day" 
Bill; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard; (c) for the de- [46] cision 
to increase stored food and to produce food; and (d) for the prevention ot sabotage. 
He has shown a correct and sympathetic attitude toward the problems of the civil 
community in assuring cooperation of civilians. 

He has maintained a high morale in his Command and has conducted "alerts" 
from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing the troops and with plans, 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2979 

now looking for financing fi^om federal funds, for adequate and safe storage of 
sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a probable emergency. 
We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go into 
various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have 
selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned. 

Meanwhile, we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high esteem 
and our full confiden< e in the character and ability of General Walter C. Short 
as a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be. 

This letter is prepared without the knowledge or consent of General Short or 
any other officials, merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may accrue 
to the record of such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse publicity 
or otherwise. This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest in the 
adequate defense of Hawaii and our Nation. 
With ver> best respects and wishes, we are 
Yours very truly, 

Lester Petrie, City of Honolulu, Mayor; C. R. Hemenway, President, 
Hawaiian Trust Co., Ltd., A. L. Dean, Vice-President, Alex- 
ander & Baldwin, Ltd., Walter F. Dillingham, President, Oahu 
Railway & Land Co.; F. D. Lowrey, President, Lewers & Cook, 
Ltd.; H. H. Warner, Asst. Food Administrator, O. C. D.; J. B. 
Poindexter, Governor of Hawaii; S. B. Kemp, Chief Justice, 
Supreme Court; T. G. S. Walker, Director, Civilian Defense for 
Oahu; John E. Russell, President, Theo H. Davies & Co., Ltd.: 
George S. Waterhouse, Ex. Vice-President, Bishop National of 
Hawaii and Honolulu; Cyril F. Damon, Ex. Vice-President, 
Bishop Trust Co., Ltd.: Briant H. Wells, Executive Vice-Presi- 
dent, Hawaiian Sugar Plants Association; H. A. Walker, Presi- 
dent, American Factors, Ltd.; S. M. Lowrey, Treasurer, American 
Factors, Ltd.; P. E. Spalding, President C. Brewer & Co., Ltd.; 
Frank E. Midkiff, Trustee, Bernice P. Bishop Estate; Edouard 
R. L. Doty; Terr. Director of Civilian Defense; James Winne, 
Mgr. Mdse. Dept., Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd. (now acting as 
Food Administrator and Supply Officer). 
C. C. to General Walter C. Short. 



[47] Major Disaster Council 

city and county of honolulu 

Office of the Director, Island of Oahu 

Honolulu, Hawaii, December 20, 1941. 
Lt. General Walter C. Short, 

Fort Shafler. 
Dear General Short: Please allow me to express my sincere regret that our 
contact through Civilian Defense Plans has terminated. 

It was greatly due to your help and backing that our Civilian Organizations 
were so far advanced that they were able to function so splendidly during the 
attack. 

You will always be able to recollect that your determination to have our Civilian 
Groups Prepared saved many lives of our Sailors and Soldiers through the organ- 
ized effort of our Civilian Defense Medical committee and the many trucks that 
we had ready to be turned into ambulances at a minute's notice. 

Please be assured that you will carry the sincere thanks and Aloha of your many 
friends here who realize the distress you saved by urging and helping us to be 
prepared. 

Yours very sincerely, 

(s) T. G. S. Walker, 
T. G. S. Walker, 
Director, Civilian Defense, Island of Oahu. 



79716 O— 46 — pt. 18- 



2980 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[47a] seal of the territory of hawaii 

Territory op Hawaii 

Executive Chambers 

honolulu 

23 December 1941. 
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, 

Fort Shafter, T. H. 

My Dear General Short:. Having noted in the public press that an investiga- 
tion is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in 
Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a state- 
ment as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands for 
war when thev were so insidiouslv and treacherously attacked on December 7, 
1941. 

The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these Islands 
were important to National Defense from a military standpoint, but it has been 
only since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941 that it has been 
brought home to the civil population the importance of the part it would play 
in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens of these Islands 
met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud to be the Chief 
Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging the population to prepare to 
meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of the Army and civil 
population in planning and preparing for this emergency was magnificently re- 
warded. 

It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations 
whdch bore fruit on December 7, 1941: 

(1) The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act by a special session of Legislation 
called for that purpose. This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire civil 
economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in the event of 
disaster. By virtue of this act, civilian [4^b] defense was planned and 
many of its phases were brought to such a point of preparation that they were 
able to go into action immediately and to function effectively on December 7, 1941, 

(2) The production and conservation of food: Householders were persistently 
urged to stock their shelves in canned food. It is e.stimated that this resulted in 
increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than twenty 
percent. Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and storage for 
food reserve. This appropriation has, since December 7, 1941, been authorized. 
By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made for the procurement and 
storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas with quick growing food 
crops. Agreements were also made for the growing, in normal times, of these 
crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In furtherance of this plan, 
the War Department was induced to permit the purchase of Island grown pota- 
toes for the use of the Army although the price was above that of mainland 
potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies 6f food asked for in 
the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity for building an 
adequate warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is now available for 
the storage of food supply when it arrives. 

(3) The medical facilities for the care of the injured and wounded during any 
disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these Islands 
for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical profession of 
the Islands with all its medical facilities. Approximately three thousand persons 
were given training and instruction in First-Aid as required by the Red Cross. 
The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous tasks of evacuation. 
Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit consisting of personnel of about 
one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps of one hundred and forty im- 
provised ambulances were organized. The performance of their tasks by these 
groups was one of the highlights of the civil defense efforts on December 7, 1941. 

(4) Flans for the evacuation of women and children and the [47c] prepa- 
ration of shelters for workers in essential industries had reached a high state of 
perfection on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from 
areas attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner. 

(5) An auxiliary police force to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was 
organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly 
when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. Their work of this 
force was exceptional and excellent. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2981 

(6) Legislation authorizing a home guard was enacted at the special session of 
the Territorial Legislature. It was well planned and so organized that 1400 of 
such home guardsmen could and were placed on duty thereby relieving members 
of the Army for other military duty. 

(7) There were many other matters too numerous to detail here which weie 
planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the 
bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public 
bervice in times of emergency. 

All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local authori- 
ties, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded 
since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases 
of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly as 
a direct result of prior planning and training. 

It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil authori- 
ties. The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a treacherous 
attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in your demon- 
strated abilities. I wish to state that the magnificent way in which the Territory 
of Hawaii met its pioblem in its crucial hour was in a large measure due to your 
foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf of the Territory. 

You aie at liber tv to use this letter in any way which you see fit. THIS IS 
A TRUE COPY. 

Very sincerely yours, 

(S) J. B. POINDEXTER, 

Governor of Hawaii. 
L. W. Truman, 
Captain, Infantry. 

[48] I have presented many of my actions, both with reference to the military 
defense of the islands and the preparations of the civil community for defense, to 
show that I have taken both a very active and an intelligent part in this work from 
the time of my arrival in the Hawaiian Department. 

I should be very glad if this Committee would see fit to call before it a number 
of officers of my command, preferably from officers of high enough rank to know 
what I have accomplished, and from staff officers who are familiar with the work 
that has been carried out during the past ten months. I would also like very 
much to have the Governor and some of the leading business men called before 
the Commission to tell what the civil community thinks of the work that I have 
done over l^e past ten months. 

CONCLUSIONS 

1. The radiogram from the War Department thu CINCUS fleet UCS of October 
16th emphasized that measures taken by me during the grave situation of the 
Japanese negotiations should not disclose strategic intention nor constitute 
provocative actions against Japan. 

The radiogram of November 27th reiterated that action should be carried out 
so as "not repeat not to disclose intent", not alarm civil population, and avoid 
unnecessary publicity. 

When the War Department was notified that the Hawaiian Department was 
alerted against sabotage it not only did not indicate that the command should be 
alerted against a hostile surface, sub-surface, ground or air attack, but replied 
emphasizing the necessity for protection against sabotage and subversive meas- 
ures. This, taken in connection with the two previous radiograms mentioned, 
indicated to me a tacit consent to the alert against sabotage ordered by the 
Hawaiian Department. 

2. The Hawaiian Department is not provided with an agency for locating enemy 
ships in various parts of the world. Such information as it may acquire on this 
subject must be obtained from the Fourteenth" Naval District or from the War 
Department. 

The "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" places 
upon the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District the responsibility for 
distant reconnaissance. Annex # 7 to the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" 
provides that when naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search 
operations and army aircraft are made available, these will be under the tactical 
control of the naval command during search operations. That means that the 
army planes receive their missions and all instructions from the naval commander 
and carry out the search as he deems necessary in order to carry out his respon- 
sibility for distant reconnaissance. 



2982 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[49] During the period November 27th to December 6th, the Navy made 
no request for army planes to participate in distance reconnaissance. To me 
this meant that they had definite information of the location of enemy carriers 
or that the number unaccounted for was such that naval planes could make the 
necessary reconnaissance without the assistance from the army. During this 
period I was in frequent conferences with the Commander in Chief of the United 
States Fleet and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and at no 
time was anything said to indicate that they feared the possibility of an attack 
by the Japanese by air. In fact, the sentiment was expressed by a naval staff 
officer that there was no probability of such an attack. With a large part of the 
United States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with their sources of information, I 
was convinced that the Navy would be able either to intercept any carrier 
attempting to approach Oahu or at least to obtain such information from task 
forces or by reconnaissance as to make them aware of the presence of carriers 
in the Hawaiian waters and of the possibility of an air attack. 

3. Action of the War Department on December 5th and as late as 1:30 A. M., 
Eastern standard time, December 7th, in dispatching planes from the mainland 
to Honolulu without ammunition indicated that the War Department did not 
believe in the probability of an early Japanese attack upon Honolulu. 

I felt that I had a right to expect the War Department to furnish me by the 
most rapid means possible information should a real crisis arise in Japanese 
relations. I did not expect that when the crisis arose the desire for secrecy would 
be considered more important than the element of time. Had the message in 
regard to the Japanese ultimatum and the burning of their code machines 
been given me by telephone as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time 
for encoding and decoding, etc., I, in all probability, would have had approximately 
two hours in which to make detailed preparations to meet an immediate attack. 

4. I feel that my work in the Hawaiian Department should be judged by my 
activities throughout the complete period from the assumption of command on 
February 7, until my relief upon December 16th. I believe that any careful 
examination of my work during that period will prove that I have worked very 
seriously at the job and have accomplished measures of very considerable im- 
portance. I do not see how I could better have carried out what appeared to be 
the desires of the War Department unless I was supposed to know more than the 
War Department about the danger of Japanese attack and more than the Navy 
Department about the location of the Japanese carriers. To have taken more 
steps in preparation against a Japanese attack than I did would have alarmed the 
civil population and caused publicity contrary [50] to W^ar Department 
instructions. I do not believe that I should be found guilty even of an error in 
judgment because I did not have the vision to foresee that the War Department 
would not notify me of a crisis in the least possible time and that the Navy 
with its large fleet in Hawaiian waters would not be able to carry out its 
mission of intercepting Japanese carriers, or at least detecting their presence in 
Hawaiian waters and informing me of the fact. 

[57a] [Exhibit A] 

[57] copy 

[SECRET] 

U. S. Naval Communication Service 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, V. S. PACIFIC FLEET 

[Paraphrase] 

NOTE FOR COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT: 

THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF A DISPATCH FROM THE 
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WHICH I HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO 
PASS TO YOU QUOTE: 

Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave situation x if a new cabinet is 
formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic x if the 
Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not 
include rapprochement with the United States x either' way hostilities between 
Japan and Russia are strongly possible x since Britain and the US are held respon- 
sible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility Japan 
may attack these two powers x view of these possibilities you will take due pre- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2983 

cautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic 
intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan x 

CBO CRJ DATE 16 OCT 41 SERIAL NO. 10-340 

ORIGINATOR ACTION 

OPNAV CINCLANT INFORMATION 

CINCPAC 
CINCAF 
A True Copy: 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldeun, 
2nd Lt., F. A. 

- [Exhibit B] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department 

fort shafter, t. h. 
PI WAR PRTY 

Wash DC 611 PM Nov 27 1941 
C G 

Hawn Dept Ft Shafter T. H. 

472 27th negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical 
purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might 
come back and offer to continue stop Japanese future action unpredictible but 
hostile action possible at any moment stop if hostilities cannot comma repeat 
cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first 
overt act stop this policy should not comma repeat not comrna be construed as 
restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense stop prior 
to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and 
other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out 
so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent 
stop report measures taken stop should hostilities occur you will carry out the 
tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan stop limit dissemi- 
nation of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers 

True copy Marshall 

O. M. Cutler 

O M Cutler 116P/27 

Lt Col Infantry 

Note: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablegrams. One copy only to be submitted- 
The making of an exact copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such extracts as are 
absolutely necessary will be made and marked secret or confidential as the case may be. This copy will 
be safeguarded with the greatest care and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division. 
Adjutant General's OflBce, without delay. (AR 3S0-5) 

Form H. D. No. 1173 (Revised)— 1664 Honolulu 10-10-40 5M. 

[Exhibit C] 

[restricted] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 November 1941. 
Subject: Standing Operating Procedure 
To: Distribution "B", "L", and "G" less 1, 2, 3 and 5 

1. Attention is directed to attached Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian 
Department, which supersedes Tentative Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaii- 
an Department, 14 July 1941. 

2. Issuing headquarters will collect and destroy all copies of Tentative Standing 
Operating Procedure in the possession of units and officers. 

3. Department General and Special Staff Sections and Commanders of major 
echelons, districts, department troops and station complements directly under 
this headquarters will submit, for approval of this headquarters, Standing Operat- 
ing Procedures, Movement and Loading Tables. Chiefs of Special Staff Sections, 
HHD, will include in their SOP HD all installations under their supervision. 

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT: 

Robert H. Dunlop 
Robert H. Dunlop, 

Qolonel, A. G. D., 

Adjutant General. 
1 Inclosure: SOP HD 



2984 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[bestricted] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shafler, T. H., 5 November 1941. 
Subject- Standing Operating Procedure 
To: Distribution "B", "L", and "G" less 1, 2, 3 and 5 

1. Attention is directed to attached Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian 
Department, which supersedes Tentative Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian 
Department, 14 July 1941. ^ 

2. Issuing headquarters will colled and destroy all copies of Tentative Standing 
Operating Procedure in the possession of units and officers. 

3. Department General and Special Staff Sections and Commanders of major 
echelons, districts, department troops and station complements directly under 
this headquarters will submit, for approval of this headquarters. Standing Oper- 
ating Procedures, Movement and Loading Tables. Chiefs of Special Staff 
Sections, HHD, will include in their SOP HD all installations under their super- 

'vjsion. 

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT: 

Robert H. Dunlop, 
Robert H. Dunlop, 

Colonel, A. G. D., 

Adjutant General. 

I Inclosure: SOP HD 

RESTRICTED 

[a] [restricted] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shafter, T. H. 5 November 1941. 

Standing Operating Procedure 

Hawaiian Department » 

Section I— General 
Par Subject Page^ 

1 Purpose 

• 2 Unit Procedures 

3 Short Title 1 

4 Department Headquarters ; _ 

5 Tactical Principles 

6 Security 

7 Liaison 

8 Orders-- - ^ 2 

9 Movement ^- 2 

10 Antiaircraft Defense 3 

I I Installations and Alarm System 3 

12 Guides 3 

Section II— Alerts 

13 Alerts - 3 

14 Alert No. 1 3 

15 Alert No. 2 5 

16 Alert No. 3 8 

Section III— Condition of Re.\diness for Aircraft 

1 7 Condition of Readiness 10 

Section IV— Intelligence 

18 Intelligence Standing Operating Procedure 11 

19 Essential Elements of Enemy Information 11 

20 Measures to Obtain Information 11 

21 Measures for Handling 15 

22 Reports and Distribution - 15 

23 Department G-2 15 

24 G-2 Forms--^ 16 

■ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent 
pages of original exhibit. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2985 

Section V— Administration Page ' 

25 Supply 16 

26 Evacuation . 18 

27 Traffic .' 19 

28 Motor Transportation 19 

\1] SECTION I GENERAL 

1. PURPOSE. — The purpose of a "Standing Operating Procedure" is stated 
in paragraph 159, FINI 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, and paragraph 
56, FM 101-5, Staff Officers' Field Manual. 

2. UNIT PROCEDURES.— Conforming to the Department Procedure, sub- 
ordinate units and staff sections will develop appropriate Standing Operating 
Procedures. 

3. SHORT TITLE.— "SOP HD" will signify this Standing Operating Pro- 
cedure. 

4. DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS.— Department Headquarters may 
operate either as a whole or in two groups. When divided, the headquarters will 
consist of a forward and a rear echelon, the composition of which ordinarily will 
be as follows: 

a. FORWARD ECHELON.— 

Commanding General and Aides 
General Staff (less G-1 and G-5) 
• Secretary to General Staff 
Engineer Officer 
Signal Officer 
Chemical Officer 
Ordnance Officer 
Surgeon 

Headquarters Commandant 
Provost Marshal. 

b. REAR ECHELON.— 

G-1 
G-5 
Special Staff (less those in forward echelon) . 

5. TACTICAL PRINCIPLES.— See FM 31-10, Coast Defense. The chief 
tactical principles applicable to the problem of the defense of OAHU and the air 
fields on the outlying islands are as follows; 

a. Complete organization of the ground 
h. Position to be held lightly 

c. Large reserves, held mobile, with motor transportation sufficient to transport 
them 

d. Automatic counter-attack. 

6. SECURITY. — Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from 
hostile ground or air forces. See paragraphs 233 to 273, inclusive, FM 100-5. 

7. LIAISON. — a. OFFICERS. — During all operations and alerts, a li aison 
officer with motor transportation will be sent from each of. the following un-' ts to 
Department Headquarters and will remain thereat except when on a mission to 
their own headquarters: 

24th Infantry Division 
25th Infantry Division 
[2\ Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command 

Hawaiian Air Force 
86th Observation Squadron 
Each Department Reserve Unit. 

b. UNITS. — Both lateral and vertical liaison are mandatory. The responsi- 
bility therefor is from right to left and from front to rear. Combat teams operat- 
ing in areas where coast artillery group stations are in operation will establish 
liaison with those stations. 

8. ORDERS. — a. The Department Commander will issue orders covering the 
action of the Infantry Divisions, the Hawaiian Air Force, the Hawaiian Coast 
Artillery Command, Department Reserve units and all attached troops. 

b. Orders issued by the Department (except as in c below) will be brief written 
field orders with an operation map. Circumstances may require the issuance of 
an oral order, but this will be confirmed later in writing. 

^ I'ages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent 
pases of oriainal exhibit. 



2986 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

c. Fragmentary orders, oral or written, may be issued when appropriate. 
Copies of the Department Commander's decision or directives, together with a 
roughly sketched operation map, will be sent by staff officers to lower units as 
soon as issued in order that plans may be initiated prior to receipt of the field 
order from the Department. 

d. To e.xpedite issue and to conserve time, unit commanders and staff officers 
will dictate their decisions, directives, plans and orders. All commanders and 
staff officers will perfect themselves in the dictation of orders. Competent 
stenographer-clerks and draftsmen will be trained within each headquarters. 

9. MOVEMENT. — a. In general, all troops will be moved by motor. The 
maximum space in trucks will be utilized for the troops (standing if necessary) 
since all movements are necessarily for short distances. 

6. Trucks will not close up and every effort will be made to avoid halting in the 
open. Maximum use will be taken of overhead cover, and vehicles either in 
bivouac or assembly areas will always be dispersed when in the open, and will be 
dispersed to the maximum extent practicable when in concealed positions. 

c. In tactical movements, vehicles will be maintained at maximum speed 
authorized by law, consistent with safety. (This may be satisfactorily accom- 
plished by restricting the leading vehicle to 10 miles per hour less than the maxi- 
mum authorized; the others, not exceeding the maximum authorized speed). 

d. All tactical movements in daylight will be by infiltration, FM 25-10, the 
distance between vehicles being not less than 300 yards. Administrative marches 
will be made with not less than safe driving distance between vehicles, or 
any distance greater than safe driving distance which will facilitate the movement 
(paragraph .31, FM 25-10). When necessary, officers' control points and route 
markers (paragraph 94, FM 25-10) will be utilized. 

e. All movements under Alert No. 1 will be administrative. 

/. Motor vehicles operating at night, at the discretion of local commanders, 
will be (1) in convoy with standard blackout or blue lights with a shielded tail 
light on all vehicles, or (2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard 
blackout or blue lights on leading vehicle and a shielded tail light on the rear 
vehicle, and no lights on the others, or (3) no lights when operating on one-way 
secondarj- roads, and cross-country, on military reservations and leased lands. 
On two-way roads the distance between vehicles and/or serials will be sufficient 
to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic. 

fjf] g. Trucks attached to a unit for a specific mission will revert to control 
of the parent unit when the specific mission has been accomplished. 

10. ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE.— a. Antiaircraft defense is a responsibility 
of every unit. See paragraphs 261-273, FM 100-5. 

b. All Infantry units not occupying front line positions will have their automatic 
weapons habitually in readiness for antiaircraft defense, and all other units will 
be prepared likewise to engage hostile aircraft. 

c. On marches, all small arms suitable for use against aircraft will be in readiness 
for action. When enemy air action is imminent trucks normally will halt, troops 
will detruck, disperse and fire on enemy planes. 

d. All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following: 

(1). Maintenance of air guards to give timely warning of the approach of hostile 
aviation. 

(2) Adoption of necessary measures to prevent hostile observation and aerial 
photography through advantageous use of terrain, utilization of cover, and use 
of camouflage. 

(3) Reduction of vulnerability to air attack and observation by dispersion of 
personnel and materiel when in bivouac or in position and by increased speed 
during movement. 

11. INSTALLATIONS AND ALARM SYSTEM.— AW important installa- 
tions not protected by the Territorial Home Guard will be guarded by troops. 
An adequate alarm system will be established in connection therewith. 

12. GUIDES. — a. In ca.se of a relief, guides from the relieved organization will 
meet the incoming unit and remain with it until ordered back to their organization 
by the commander of the incoming unit. 

b. Whenever units are ordered to another sector for support or attachment, 
the sector commander will provide the necessary guides to assist the supporting 
or attached units. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2987 

SECTION II — ALERTS 

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as 
indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department 
order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15/ (8) below. 

14. ALERT NO. l.—a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and 
uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without. 

h. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, all General and Special Staff 
Sections will continue with their usual duties at their present stations, pending 
further orders. 

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending 
instructions from this Headquarters. 

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will: 

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector. 
(4] (2) Maintain one (I) infantry battalion with motor transportation suffi- 

cient to transport it, prepared to move on one (I) hour's notice. 

(3) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation and all vital installa- 
tions (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned 
sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among 
the important ones: 

Police District No. 1, see paragraph 14 h (2) below 

Command and Fire Control Cable System, see inclosure No. 1 

Railwav and Highwav Bridges, see inclosure No. 2 

Water supplv for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS 

Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA 

WAIAU Generating Plant 

Telephone Exchanges at WAIPAHU, WAHIAWA, WAIALUA (in HALEIWA), 
LAIE and KANEOHE 

Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAIALUA, KAHUKU, KAILUA, 
W^AIPIO and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO-WAHIAWA- 
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, 
from KOOLAU switch station— BELLOWS FIELD, see inclosure No. 3. 

Cold Storage Plant in W^AHIAWA 

Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPAHULU. 

(4) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping 
stations at AIEA and HALAWA. 

(5) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 14 j below.* 

e. The HAW^AIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND will: 

(1) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation 
and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft 
defense. 

(2) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command. 

(3) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island. 

(4) Provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and 
Tripler General Hospital. 

/. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will: 

(1) Protect all vital installations on posts on OAHU garrisoned by air forces 

(2) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying i.slands by cooperation of local 
base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 14 ^ below.' 

g. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the air corps^ detachments 
within the districts, will: 

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, 
and maintain order in the civil communitv. 

h. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, in addition to his normal 
duties, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, w^ill: 

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU. 

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations. 
[5] (3) Establish liaison with the local police force. 

i. The STATION COMPLEMENTS of HICKAM, WHEELER and BEL- 
LOWS FIELDS, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the 
protection of all vital installations on their respective posts. 

j. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.— Upon the formation of the Territorial 
Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated 
that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Com- 



2988 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

manders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the 
Command and Fire Control ('able System and those installations on Army and 
Navy Reservations. See paragraph 14 d (3) and g above. Instructions will be 
issued. 

15. ALERT NO. 2. — a. This alert is applicable to a condition more serious 
than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, 
and air-craft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is 
provided. 

h. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, only the G-2 and G-3 Sections 
will be required to operate on a 24-hour basis. All other sections of the General 
and Special Staffs will continue with their normal schedule. 

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending 
instructions from this Headquarters. 

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will: 

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector. 

(2) Maintain available all units at fifty percent (50%) of their present strength, 
except thosa required under (3), (4) and (5) below.. 

(3) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to 
transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice. 

(4) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Re.servation and all vital installa- 
tions (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned 
sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among 
the important ones: 

Police District No. 1, see paragraph 15 /i (2) below 

Command and Fire Control Cable System, see inclosure No. 1 

Railway and Highway Bridges, see inclosure No. 2 

Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS 

Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA 

WAIAU Generating Plant 

Telephone exchanges at WAIPAHU, WAHIAWA, WAIALUA(in HALEIWA), 
LAIE and KANEOHE 

Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAIALUA, KAHUKU, KAILUA, 
WAIPIO and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO-WAHIAWA— 
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, 
from KOOLAU switch station— BELLOWS FIELD, see inclosure No. 3 

Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA 

Pumping Stations 'at MOANALUA and KAPAHULU. . 

(5) The 25th Infantry Diision will assist the Navv in guarding the pumping 
stations at AIEA and HALAWA. 

[6\ (6) Place 240mm howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards 
and, when directed, place ammunition at positions. 

(7) Release Field Artilleiy units manning seacoast armament (155mm guns) 
to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 15 e below. 

(8) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 15 / below. 

e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, a-nd attached Field 
Artillery, will: 

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that rail- 
way batteries will remain at FORT KAMEHAMEHA or where emplaced. 

(2) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational 
control. 

(3) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation 
and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft 
defense. 

(4) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, 
except FORT SH AFTER.- For FORT SH AFTER, sec paragraph 15 k (1) 
below. 

(5) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament. 

(6) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels. 

(7) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies. 

(8) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol. 

(9) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island. 

(10) Provide Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post. 
/. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will: 

(1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this 
headquarters. See paragraph 17. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2989 

(2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command. 

(3) Prepare aircraft foi dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival 
thereat, disperse on fields. 

(4) Disperse bombers with crews. 

(5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers. 

(6) Protect all vital installations on posts on OAHU garrisoned by air forces. 

(7) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local 
base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 15 g below. 

(8) In case of surprise hostile attack: 

(a) Release to Navy for operational control all bombers in condition of readi- 
ness "A". The bomber commander will report to the Commander of Patrol 
Wing TWO. 

[7] (b) Receive all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighte 
planes in appropriate condition of readiness and release them to the Intercepto'" 
Command for operational control. 

g. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the air corps detachments 
within the districts, will: 

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, 
hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community. 

h. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division 
Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will: 

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU. 

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations. 

(3) Establish liaison with the local police force. 

(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions includ- 
ing blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas. 

(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees. 

(6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 15 A; (1). 
i. The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will: 

(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service 
and then release it to the Interceptor Command. 

(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for imme- 
diate employment. 

j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will: 

Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery 
(including available Naval and Marine Corps A A Artillery), the Aircraft Warning 
Service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft 
iiieiasures of units not under military control, to include: 

(1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft. 

(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or 
HONOLULU HARBORS. 

(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies. 
k. STATION COMPLEMENTS: 

(1) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Depart- 
ment Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FOPfr SHAFTER 
and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelonof Department 
Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital. 

(2) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS Complements, 
under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their 
respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks. 

[8] 1. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.— Upon the formation of the 
Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is 
anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the 
District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, 
except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on 
Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 15 d (4) and g above. Instruc- 
tions will be issued. 

16. ALERT NO. 3. — a. This alert requires the occupation of all field positions 
by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations 
on outlying islands. 

h. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS: 

(1) All sections of the forward echelon (see paragraph 4 a) will occupy their 
stations at forward command post, prepared to operate on a 24-hour basis. 

(2) All sections of the rear echelon (see paragraph 4 h) will continue their usual 
duties at their present stations. Blackout instructions will be complied with. 



2990 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION FEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will reiuain ir. condition of mobile readiness at 
their permanent stations, pending instructions from this headquarters. 

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will: 

(1) Defend its assigned sector on OAHU. 

(2) Protect all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy 
Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home 
Guard. 

(3) Release all available Bands to the Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD 
BARRACKS. 

(4) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping 
stations at AIEA and HALAWA. 

(5) Place 240mm howitzers in position. 

(6) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155mm guns) 
to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 16 e below. 

(7) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 16 m below. 

e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attached De- 
tachment Field Artillery, will: 

(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft positions. 

(2) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament. 

(3) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels. 

(4) Support the Infantry Divisions. 

(5) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies. 

(6) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol. 

(7) Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post. 
[9] (8) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for oper- 
ational control. 

(9) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, 
except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 16 1 (2) below. 

(10) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation 
and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiair- 
craft defense. 

/. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will: 

(1) Destory enemy aircraft. 

(2) Carry out bombing missions as directed. 

(3) Cooperate with Naval air forces. 

(4) On OAHU, defend all posts garrisoned by air forces against sabotage, air 
and ground attacks. 

(5) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base 
detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 16 h below. 

(6) Arm all planes, except that normally bombs will not be loaded on ships dis- 
patched to outlying islands. See paragraph 25 e (8). 

(7) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival 
thereat, disperse on fields. 

(8) Disper^ bombers with crews. 

(9) Dispersfe pursuit planes with crews to bunkers. 

(10) Perform observation, command and photographic missions. 

(11) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command. 
g. G-5 will be prepared to establish the following: 

(1) A Food Administration. 

(2) A Labor Procurement Service. 

h. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS of HAWAII, MAUI (includes MOLO- 
KAI) and KAUAI Districts, assisted by the air corps detachments present within 
the districts, will: 

Defend the air fields against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain 
order in the civil community. 

i. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division 
Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will: 

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU. 

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations. 

(3) Establish liasion with the local police force. 

(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions includ- 
ing blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas. 

(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees. 
[10] (6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 16 I (2) below. 

j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will coordinate and control the opera- 
tions of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2991 

Marine Corps A A Artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, 
and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under 
military control to include: 

(1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft. 

(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or 
HONOLULU HARBORS. 

(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies. 
A;. The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will: 

(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service 
and then release it to the Interceptor Command. 

(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for im- 
mediate employment. 

(3) Be prepared to assume control over essential civilian communications. 
/. STATION COMPLEMENTS.— 

(1) The SOHOFIELD BARRACKS Complement will protect all vital in- 
stallations on the Schofield Reservation. 

(2) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Depart- 
ment Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER 
and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department 
Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital. 

(3) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS Complements, 
under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their 
respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks. 

m. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.— Upon the formation of the Territorial 
Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated 
that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Com- 
manders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the 
Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and 
Navy Reservations. See paragraph 16 d (2) and h above. Instructions will be 
issued. 

SECTION III — CONDITION OF READINESS FOR AIRCRAFT 

17. Condition of readiness for aircraft will be prescribed by a combination of 
a letter and a number as indicated in paragraphs a and b below. The letter 
indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned 
task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed 
for that part. 

a. MATERIAL READINESS.— 

A — All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task. 

[11] B — One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready 
for a task. 

C — Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available 
and ready for a task. 

D — Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available 
and ready for a task. 

E — All aircraft conducting routine operations, none jeady for the purposes 
of this plan. 

b. DEGREE OF OPERATIONAL READINESS.— 

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of 
a unit to be in the air armed and prepared to carry out the assigned task. 

1 — For pursuit and VF types: Four minutes. Types other than fighters: 
Fifteen minutes. 

2 — All types: 30 minutes. 

3 — All types: One hour. 

4 — All types: Two hours. 

5 — All types: Four hours. 

SECTION IV- — INTELLIGENCE 

18. The Intelligence Standing Operating Procedure indicated below will be 
followed generally where applicable. 

19. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ENEMY INFORMATION.— 

a. Will the enemy attempt to destrov or neutralize NAVAL BASES at PEARL 
HARBOR, at KANEOHE BAY, and air fields on OAHU with the object of 
denying their use to the UNITED STATES without occupation? If so, will 



2992 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

his air attacks be accompanied by Naval bombardment and blockading operations? 

b. Will the enemv attempt to capture OAHU by expeditionary forces with the 
object of utilizing "the NAVAL BASES at PEARL HARBOR,' at KANEOHE 
BAY, and air fields thereon? If so, when, where, and with what strength will 
he make his main attack? 

c. Will the enemy attempt to capture any other of the principal islands of the 
Hawaiian Group with the object of utilizing the air fields and establish bases 
thereon? 

d. Will the enemy military operations be accompanied by acts of sabotage 
and terrorism on the part of resident sympathizers? 

e. Will the enemy utilize local foreign population, local aliens or nationals of 
foreign origin for sabotage operations, raids to assist landing operations, or 
other acts of assistance? 

20. MEASURES TO OBTAIN INFORMATION.— 

a. NAVY.— 

(1) Transmit, through the Joint Intelligence Loop, information received from 
the OflFshore and Inshore Patrols, from any escort or attack forces formed, and 
from any other Naval Ships relative to: 

(a) Location, composition, course, and speed of enemy units encountered, with 
particular reference to location of aircraft carriers and transports. 

[12\ (b) Indications of landings on any island of the main Hawaiian Group, 
with particular attention to the number and type of landing boats, and the 
composition of supporting Naval units. 

(c) Indications of attempts to block HONOLULU and/or PEARL HARBORS. 

(d) Indications of any hostile aerial activity in strength. 

(e) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops and installations. Dam- 
age to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage 
immediately. 

(f) Report damage by hostile Naval and air bombardment, incurred or ob- 
served. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of 
chemicals, immediately. 

(g) See paragraph 20 c below. 
i. ARMY.— 

(1) Hawaiian Air Force. — 

(a) Observe all waters within an area bounded as follows: 

Bv arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at OP AN A POINT, MAUI; 
KAtJIKI HEAD LIGHT, MAUI; LAUPAHOEHOE LIGHT, HAWAII; 
CAPE KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAWAII: KALAE LIGHT, HAWAII; SOUTH- 
WEST HEADLAND, KAHOOLAWE; LEAHI POINT, NIIHAU; LEHUA 
ISLAND, NIIHAU; KAILIU POINT, KAUAI; and arc of thirty (30) miles 
radius with its center at KAHUKU POINT, OAHU, and the tangents connecting 
these arcs in the order named. 

Report location, composition, course and speed of enemy units encountered. 
Maintain continuous contact with major subdivisions of enemy units. Particular 
attention to location of aircraft carriers and transports. First contact, material 
changes of direction, and definite location of aircraft carriers to be reported 
immeoiately by Joint Intelligence liOop; thereafter on the hour by department 
Intelligence Loop. 

(b) Report indications of landing on any island, giving location, number, type 
and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting Naval group. 
Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop. 

(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations. 
Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important 
damage immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop. 

(d) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment, incurred or ob- 
served by their operations. Important damage, including damage to landing 
fields, and use of chemicals, immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop; other 
damage at 1815 by Department Intelligence Loop. 

(e) Report any hostile aerial activity in strength, including number, type, 
direction and area of attack or observation, by Joint Intelligence Loop. 

(2) S6th OhHeruation Squadron. — 

(a) Same as for "HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE"— see 20 b (1) above. 
[IS] (b) Be prepared to provide, on call, observation for the control of 
long-range artillery fire. 

(3) Interceptor Command. — 

i,a) Report immediately any and all information of hostile air force or surface 
vessel. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2993 

(b) Report, upon completion of action by or with enemy air force, composition 
of enemy foices, diiection of approach, time of action, area attacked, and damage 
to enemy airplanes. 

(4) Each Infantry Division. — 

(a) Report location, number, type and formation of transports and landing 
boats and composition of supporting naval group. Report when observed there- 
after hourly, on the hour, by Department Intelligence Loop. 

(b) Report enemy front lines and boundaries between units. Report immedi- 
ately any significant change. Otherwise report every two hours, on the even hour, 
by Department Intelligence Loop. 

(c) Report location of own Jront lines. Report every two hours, on the even 
hour, by Department Intelligence Loop. 

(d) Report all identifications. Infantry identifications are most important. 
Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop. 

(e) Report indications of landing of artillery, including caliber of same, and 
tanks. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop. 

(f) Repoit damage by hostile naval and air bombardment. Important damage 
immediately; other damage at 1830, by Department Intelligence Loop. 

(g) Report time, place, kinds and method of employment of chemicals. Report, 
when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop. 

(h) Report weather and surf conditions on all favorable landing beaches. 
Report at 0300, 0700, 1200 and 1700 and 2200, by Department Intelligence Loop. 

(i) The 25th Division will assign G-2 personnel to assist the Provost Marshal 
in the examination and questioning of enemy documents and personnel in South 
Sector. 

(5) Hawaiian Coast Aitillcry Command. — 

(a) Report immediately, by Department Intelligence Loop, initial contact with 
enemy Units, giving location, composition and course of formation. 

(b) Report immediately, by Department Intelligence Loop, when an action is 
begun by hostile vessels or by the seacoast artillery, giving location of naval 
vessels, locality being attacked, and units engaged. 

(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations. 
Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage 
immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop. 

(d) Report upon completion of any action, by Department Intelligence Loop, 
important damage from hostile naval and air [14] bombardment, and 
report the use of chemicals immediately. Other damage at 1900 by Department 
Intelligence Loop. 

(e) Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop, location, num- 
ber, type, and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting naval 
force. 

(f) Report, when observed, bv Joint Intelligence Loop, indications of attempts 
to block HONOLULU HARBOR, PEARL HARBOR, or KANEOHE BAY. 

(g) Report as soon as practicable important damage to ground installations, 
including damage to use of chemical agents. 

(h) Report visibility at 0400, 0700, 1200, 1700 and. 2200, by Department 
Intelligence Loop. 

(i) Any of the above reports may be transmitted by telephone when necessary 
to avoid delay. 

(6) District Commanders of HAWAII, MAUI and KAUAI Districts. — Report 
when observed, by radio to Hawaiian Air Force, thence by Department Intelli- 
gence Loop: 

(a) Nature of hostile activity, including number, type, direction and area of 
attack or observation. 

(b) Damage by hostile naval and air bombardment. 

(c) Location, number, type and formation of landing boats and composition 
of supporting naval group. 

(d) Enemy front lines and boundaries between units. 

(e) All identifications. Infantry identifications are most important. 

(f) Time, place, kinds and method of employment of chemicals. 

(7) Department Signal Office. — 

Radio intercept and goniometric service. Report when obtained. 
c. ALL ELEMENTS OF HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT.— 
(1) Report presence of parachute troops and assemblies of enemy nationals or 
sympathizers and overt acts of sabotage or terrorism, giving location, time, num- 
bers involved, and probable intentions or damage accomplished. 



2994 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(2) Report of location of floating or stranded mines, in order that this infor- 
mation may be relayed to the Navy. No other action, i. e., attempts at destruc- 
tion, than to report location immediately, should be taken. 

d. MISCELLANEOUS.— 

(1) Transmission of G-2 Information. — 

In the absence of specific instructions as to transmission, or in the event of 
failure or overload of specified channels, G-2 information will be transmitted by 
direct line, where available, or by the most expeditious routing over the circuits 
set forth in current Signal Operations Instructions. [15] If wire and radio 
signal communication are out, important intelligence information will be sent 
back by any means at hand: Wire circuits of near-by units, motor messenger, 
commandeered vehicle, any means necessary commensurate with the value of 
the information. 

21. MEASURES FOR HANDLING.— 

a. PRISONERS: Examination stations will be located at all Prisoner of War 
collection points. 

b. DOCUMENTS AND CAPTURED MATERIAL.— 

(1) Documents will be sent to G-2's of Department or Divisions, with the 
minimum of delay, by regularly scheduled messenger service. 

(2) Reports of captured material will be sent to the same stations by the 
same means. 

(3) Documents and material identifying organizations or indicating the use of 
chemicals are of major importance. They will be given special priority in ship- 
ment to examination stations and will be reported to Department G-2 by the 
most expeditious means. 

(4) Liaison officers from the office of G-2, H. H. D., will be assigned to all 
Examination Stations, and will assist the Provost Marshal in examining enemy 
personnel, materiel and documents, and in determining destination of reports. 

c. MAPS. — Maps will be supplied initially by the Department Engineer. 

22. REPORTS AND distribution:— 

Distribution of reports from Department Headquarters: Summaries of In- 
telligence at 0800, 1300, 1800 and 2300. 

23. THE DEPARTMENT G-2 will: 

a. Keep the Commanding General and all interested staff officers informed 
regarding the enemy situation and of his deductions concerning it. 

b. Insure that counterintelligence measures are adequately provided for and 
adhered to. 

c. .Establish a counter-espionage service that will not only guard against the 
subversive activities of the external enemy, but will also enable the Department 
G-2 to keep the Department Commander constantly advised aS to the attitude, 
trend of thought, and probable course of action of the civil population, particu- 
larly that of alien extraction. This service will maintain close liaison with the 
Department Provost Marshal, with a view to: 

(1) Furnishing the Department Provost Marshal with all information gained, 
through the counter-espionage service of value in the prevention .of civil disorders, 
sabotage and incipient uprisings. 

(2) Receiving and evaluating information relative to the internal situation 
collected by the Department Provost Marshal through his agencies set up for 
the actual control of the civil population. 

d. Collect, evaluate, and disseminate information relative to assemblies of 
enemy nationals or sympathizers, and overt acts of sabotage and terrorisrn. 

[16] e. Prepare propaganda and publicity for the encouragement of the 
loyaltv and support of the civil population, particularly that of aliea extraction. 

24. 'G-2 FORMS.— 

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation, see Inclosure No. 4. 

b. Periodic Reports, see page 1, Inclosure No. 5. For combat Air Force see 
page 2, Inclosure No. 5. 

SECTION V ADMINISTRATION 

25. SUPPLY (See paragraphs 75-80, FM 100-10).— 
a. SUPPLY AREAS.— 

(1) Schofield Supply area includes the area of OAHU north and west of a gen- 
eral line extending LAE O KAOIO— PUU KAAUMAKUA— KIPAPA STREAM 
— KAMEHAMEHA HIGHWAY at (97.9— 91.0)— KAMEHAMEHA HIGH- 
WAY—PEARL CITY JUNCTION— PEARL HARBOR ENTRANCE. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2995 

(2) The Honolulu Supply area includes the remainder of OAHU and outlying 
islands. 

b. CLASS I SUPPLIES (rations) ; including QMC class II and IVS.: 
Schofield Supply Area— Quartermaster, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. 
Honolulu Supply Area — Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, HONULOLU. 

(1) Supplies, for a small unit of an organization, when moved nearby into a 
different supply area from the parent organization, may be continued thru the 
parent organization or may be obtained separately from the D. P. for the new 
supply area as warranted by the situation. 

(2) Distribution will be based on consolidated daily strength reports submitted 
by organizations to the Depot or Quartermaster supplying the area in which the 
organization is stationed (copy to Dept. QM) by 0800 daily. 

(3) Schedules of distribution will be arranged by issuing quartermasters by 
direct agreement with unit commanders supplied. Distribution schedules will be 
set up and copies furnished Dept. QM and 0-4, H. H. D. 

(4) A standard menu ration is established for Alert No. 3. 
f. CLASS III SUPPLIES.— 

(1; All units leaving their normal posts under any alert will take with them the 
authorized allowance of gasoline containers filled. Replenishment will be made 
in the following manner: 

(a) Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS will establish DPs at 
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS for all units operating in the SCHOFIELD BAR- 
RACKS area. 

(b) Commanding officers of each post in the Honolulu Supplv Area, except 
MALAKOLE, BELLOWS FIELD and KANEOHE, will establish DPs at their 
posts for the supply of all units operating in this area. MALAKOLE, BELLOWS 
FIELD and KANIOOHE will establish a DP at their respective posts for the 
supply [/7] of their own units operating in the immediate vicinity of 
their own post. 

(c) In the event units are moved, placing them in another supply area, gasoline 
will be supplied from the DP nearest the unit, regardless of supply area. 

(d) Normally, the supply of gasoline from DPs will be by 5 and 10 gallon 
drums, rather than filling individual trucks. 

(e) Units will furnish personnel for refilling of their containers at the DP. 
Post Commanders will provide suitable equipment for refilling containers. 

(f) 11th Tank Company will draw aviation gasoline from the nearest Air 
Corps Station. 

(g) Replenishment of stocks at posts will be accomplished in the normal manner. 
Following the period of the maneuvers, necessary monetary adjustments will be 
made through Department Headquarters. 

(h) Class III supplies on outlying islands will be the responsibility of the 
District Commanders. 

d. CLASS II & IV SUPPLIES (except Quartermaster Corps).— 

(1) Medical Supply: 

Schofield Supply Area — Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Medical Depot, SCHO- 
FIELD BARRACKS. 

Honolulu Supply Area— Hawaiian Medical Depot, FORT SHAFTER. 

(2) Signal Supply (except Signal Corps aircraft radio): 

Schofield and Honolulu Supplv areas — Hawaiian Signal Depot, FORT SHAF- 
TER. 

(3) Signal Supply — aircraft radio only: 

Schofield and Honolulu Supply areas — Hawaiian Air Depot, HICKAM FIELD. 
(4^ Chemical Supplies — all supplv areas — Hawaiian Chemical Depot, SCHO- 
FIELD BARRACKS. 

(5) Engineer Supplies — all supplv areas — Hawaiian Engineer Depot, SCHO- 
FIELD BARRACKS, T. H. Distributing points for class IV supplies will include 
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT RUGER, FORT KAMEHAMEHA, FORT 
BARRETTE and North Shore in vicinity of (86.9-04.2). Credits at DP's to 
major echelon commanders will be announced separately to commanders con- 
cerned. 

(6) Water Supply: Will be secured locally and will be inspected by a medical 
officer before use except from post and CITY of HONOLULU water systems. 

(7) Air Corps Supply: All supply areas — Hawaiian Air Depot, HICKAM 
FIELD and WHEP^LER FIELD Branch, when so designated, for types of serv- 
ices announced by Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. 



79716 O — 46 — pt. 18 10 



2996 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(8) Ordnance Supply (other than ammunition Class V). — 

Schofield Supplv area — Schofieid Branch, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, SCHO- 
FIELD BARRACKS. 

Honoluhi Supplv area — (General Storage and Shop) Hawaiian Ordnance 
Depot, HONOLULU. 

[18] e. CLASS V SUPPLIES: 

(1) Schofield Supplv Area — all types — Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Ordnance 
Depot, SCHOFIELD 'BARRACKS (See (3) below). 

(2) Honolulu Supply Area — all types — Ammunition Storage Area, Hawaiian 
Ordnance Depot. (See (3) below.) 

(3) Aircraft pyrotechnics and bombs, 8-inch railway and 240mm ammunition 
and chemical ammunition (other than grenades) — Ammunition Storage Area, 
Hawaiian Ordnance Depot — all supply areas. 

(4) Credits of an "initial issue" and of one "unit of fire" are automatically 
placed at the disposal- and under the control of all major echelon commanders 
whenever an Alert is ordered. Quantities of various types of ammunition in- 
cluded in the "initial issue" and in a "unit of fire" are shown in Inclosures Nos. 
6 and 7 herewith. Load of Aircraft Ammunition per airplane is indicated in 
Inclosure No. 8. 

(5) At the time Alert No. 2 or No. 3 is ordered, all units will draw such of 
their "initial issue" as has not already been drawn, except that for Alert No. 2 
the Infantry Divisions will draw initially only 1/5 of the "initial issue" and the 
balance thereof will be drawn after occupation of positions with their organic 
and/or sector weapons. Whenever issues cannot be made simultaneously, they 
will be made according to the following order of priority and according to a 
schedule to be mutually arranged between the Unit Supply Officer and the 
Supply Point concerned. 

Aircraft bombs and ammunition for aircraft weapons. 

Antiaircraft 3", 37mm and Machine Gun ammunition. 

Ground machine gun ammunition — all types. 

Other small arms ammunition. 

All artillery ammunition, less antiaircraft. 

(6) At the time Alert No. 1 is ordered, only small arms ammunition included 
in the "initial issue" will be drawn. 

(7) Aircraft bombs will not be issued in "initial issue" but will be held avail- 
able in bomb storage areas. 

(8) Two "units of fire" of bombs and machine gun ammunition will be main- 
tained on outlying islands for each airplane operating therefrom. 

/. Dumps and Ammunition Distributing Points will be established as directed 
by this headquarters. 
26. EVACUATION.— 
a. PERSONNEL: 

(1) North Sector Division by 24 Medical Bn. to Station Hospital, SCHO- 
FIELD BARRACKS. 

(2) South Sector Division by 25 Medical Bn. to Tripler General Hospital ex- 
cept for troops in the area west of the Une: PEARL HARBOR CHANNEL — 
EWA JUNCTION. The latter will be evacuated to Station Hospital, SCHO- 
FIELD BARRACKS. 

(3) Hawaiian Air Force. — 

(a) HICKAM FIELD, by the Surgeon, HICKAM FIELD to Station Hos- 
pital, HICKAM FIELD or Tripler General Hospital. [19] Additional 
ambulances, with drivers and orderlies, will be attached as needed. 

(b) WHEELER FIELD and HALEIWA Landing Field, by Surgeon 
WHEELER FIELD to Station Hospital Schofield. Additional ambulances, 
with drivers and orderlies will be attached as needed. 

(c) BELLOWS FIELD, by Surgeon, BELLOW^S FIELD to Tripler General 
Hospital. Additional ambulances, with drivers and orderlies, as needed. 

(d) Air fields on outlying islands, bv vehicle to local hospital or by air to 
Tripler General Hospital or Station 'Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. 
Collection by respective medical detachment. Details of evacuation to be ar- 
ranged by the responsible commanders for each field. 

(e) HCAC, by the Surgeon, HCAC (collection by respective medical detach- 
ments, reinforced if necessary). One ambulance eompany to be attached to the 
command prior to combat. Evacuation from the area north and west of the line: 
PEARL HARBOR Channel— EWA Junction— LAE O KAOIO Point to Station 
Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. Evacuation from the area south and 
east of this line to Tripler General Hospital. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2997 

(f) KAUAI District, MAUI District and HAWAII District to local hospitals 
as directed by District Commanders under provisions of letter, this headquar- 
ters to each Distiict Commander, dated 31 July 1941, subject: "Medical Service." 

(g) Elements not included elsewhere: North Sector by 24th Medical Bn., on 
call; South Sector by 25th Medical Bn., on call. 

b. ANIMALS: 

(1) North Sector to Veterinary Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, 
by provisional Veterinary Detachment attached to Hawaiian Pack Train. 

(2) South Sector to Veterinary General Hospital, FORT SHAFTER, by 
provisional Veterinary Detachment, attached to units having animals. 

c. SALVAGE: To supply points designated in paragraph 25 above for services 
indicated. 

d. PRISONERS OF WAR.— 

(1) Collecting Points— SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT SHAFTER, 
FORT RUGER, KANEOHE BAY. To be established and operated by De- 
partment Provost Marshal, assisted by Provost Marshals,^ Infantry Divisions. 

(2) Prisoner of War Inolosures — Establishment and operation by Department 
Provost Maishal, as directed by this headquarters. 

27. TRAFFIC— 

The Department Provost Marshal, Assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, 
will regulate traffic on OAHU. 

28. MOTOR TRANSPORTATION.— 

a. Motor pools will be established by the Infantry Divisions and the Hawaiian 
Coast Artillery Command. These pools will [ko] consist of all available 
tactical vehicles and administrative vehicles, the latter obtained by reducing to 
a minimum administrative requirements. 

b. The assignment of motor vehicles for one specific purpose will be the excep- 
tion. All motors will be used to the maximum for all purposes. 

c. Current movement and loading tables will be maintained by the Infantry 
Divisions and the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command as follows: 

(1) Number of vehicles, tactical and administrative in the pool, showing the 
number of men and amount of impedimenta that can be moved initially into 
position. See paragraph 9 above. 

(2) Number of vehicles, tactical and administrative, subsequent to move into 
position which are available for movement of reserves, and the number of men 
which can be moved. 

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT: 

Walter C. Phillips, 
Walter C. Phillips, 
Lt. Col., G. S. C, Chief of Staff. 
Official: 

Wm. E. Donegan, 
Wm. E. Donegan, 

Lt. Col., G. S. C, Asst. Chief of Staff. G-3. 
Inclosures: 

No. 1 — Map, Communications Installations. 

No. 2 — Map, Bridges and Police Districts. 

No. 3 — Map, Electric Installations. 

No. 4 — Estimate of Enemy Situation. 

No. 6 — Periodic Intelligence Report Forms. 

No. 6 — Allowances of Ammunition. 

No. 7— Unit of Fire. 

No. 8 — Load of Aircraft Ammunition. 

Inclosure No. 1 

(Inclosure No. 1 is a map of Communications Installations on the 
Island of Oahu, T. H. as of 7 July 1941. This map is reproduced as 
Item No. 34 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of 
Joint Committee.) 

Inclosure No. 2 

(Inclosure No. 2 is a map of the Island of Oahu, T. H., showing 
Police Districts, Railroad Bridges and Highway Bridges. This map 
is reproduced as Item No. 35 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to 
Proceedings of Joint Committee.) 



2998 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

RAILROAD BRIDGES 



Num- 
ber 



90 
92 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 



Location 



0.9 mi. \V of Honolulu.. 
1.0 mi. \V. of Honolulu. 
1.9 mi. W of Honolulu.. 

2.4 mi. W of Honolulu.. 
2.6 mi. W of Honolulu.. 

2.6 mi. W of Honolulu.. 

0.7 mi. E of Aiea 

0.2 mi. W of Aiea 

0.3 mi. E of Kalauao 

t).2 mi. E of Kalauao 

0.4 mi. W of Kalauao... 

Waiau Station 

0.2 mi. W of Waiau 

0.3 mi. W of Waiau 

0.4 mi. W of Waiau 

0.3 mi. W of Pearl City. 
0.8 mi. W of Pearl City. 
Waipahu. 
1.3 m " 

2.2 m 
0.6 m 

1.0 m 

2.5 m 

1.1 m 
0.5 m 

3.3 m 

3.4 m 
0.2 m 
0.1 m 
0.7 m 
0.5 m 
0.6 m 
Hale 

2.1 m 
0.7 m 
0.7 m 
1.0 m 

2.2 ip 
2.9 m 
4.0 m 
0.6 m 

2.0 m 

4.1 m 
3.4 m 

3.3 m 

2.7 m 
0.6 m 
0.4 m 
2.0 m 
2.3 m 
0.2 m 



W of Gilbert.- 

S of Nanakuli 

S of Nanakuli. 

N of Nanakuli 

S of Waianae 

Sof Waianae 

N of Waianae 

N of Waianae 

N of Waianae 

S of Makua — 

S of Makua. _. 

W of Mokuleia 

W of Mokuleia 

W of Waialua. 

wa -- 

N of Haleiwa 

S of Waimea. 

N of Waimea 

N of Waimea. 

N of Waimea. 

N of Waimea _ . 

N of Waimea. 

N of Waipahu 

N of Waipahu 

N of Waipahu 

S of Wahiawa 

S of Wahiawa 

S of Wahiawa 

S of Wahiawa 

N of Wahiawa 

N of Wahiawa. 

N of Wahiawa 

N of Brodie Junction. 



Type 



Bents 



Concrete pile... 
Concrete pile... 
Concrete pile... 
Concrete pile... 
ConcretP pile. .. 
Concrete pile... 
Concrete pile... 
Concrete pile... 
Concrete pile... 
Concrete pile... 
Concrete pile... 

Timber pile 

Timber pile 

Concrete pile... 
Concrete pile... 
Concrete pile... 
Concrete pile... 
Timber Trestle 
Timber Trestle 
Timber Trestle 
Timber Trestle 
Timber Trestle 
Timber Trestle 
Timber Trestle 

Timber pile 

Timber pile 

Timber Trestle 
Timber Trestle 
Timber Trestle 
Concrete pile... 
Concrete pile... 
Concrete pile... 
Timber Trestle 
Timber Trestle 
Concrete pile... 
Timber Trestle 
Timber Trestle 
Timber Trestle 
Timber Trestle 
Timber Trestle 
Concrete arch.. 
Wood Trestle. . 
Wood Trestle.. 
Wood Trestle.. 
Wood Trestle.. 
Wood Trestle.. 
Wood Trestle.. 
Wood Trestle.. 
Wood Trestle.. 
Wood Trestle. . 
Wood Trestle.. 



Girders 



Timber. 
Concrete 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber - 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber- 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber - 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 
Timber. 



Height 



14 

20. 

15, 

13. 

20. 

14. 

10. 

23. 

22. 

11. 

22. 

20 

30 

75 
115. 
107. 

55. 

13. 



Span 



100' 
32' 
160' 
160' 
ZV 
12' 
208' 
48' 
96' 
28' 
112' 
27' 
32' 
32' 
32* 
160' 
16' 
63' 
64' 
64' 
96' 
64' 
64' 
96' 
96' 
64' 
80' 
62' 
114' 
80' 
112' 
448' 
224' 
96' 
272' 
60' 
90' 
96' 
75' 
128' 
98' 
144' 
64' 
224' 
160' 
320' 
272* 
608' 
448' 
272' 
112' 



HIGHWAY BRIDGES— PRIORITY 



Number 



52 

49 

17 

16 

9 

74 

15 

45 

13 

127 

5 

6 

61 
99 
IGO 
161 
57 
109 



Location 



Kam Highway over Waiawa Stream.. _ 

Kam Highway over Kipapa Stream 

Kam Highway over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir 

Kam Highway over N. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir 

Kam Highway over Anahulu R. Haleiwa 

Kam Highway over Waimea R., Waimea.. 

Kam Highway over Poamoho Gulch 

Old Kam Highway over Kaukonahua Gulch, Schofield Barracks 

Kam Highway over Opaeula (Twin Bridges) at Waialua... 

Kam Highway at Kuapa Pond (Koko Head).. 

Between Waialua Mill and Thompson Corner.. 

Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa 

Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa 

Dillingham Blvd. at Keehi Lagoon.. 

Kam Highway at Kahana Bay 

East Range Road over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir....'... 

Waipahu cut-off over O. R. & L. RR at Waipahu 

New Kam Highway o\er Halawa Stream S. of .\iea 

Kmti Highway at Heeia fish pond 



Coordinates 



95-84. 12 
4 -87. 8 
46-95. 68 
37-96. 75 
98-07. 98 
82-13. 52 
27-98. 92 
72-96. 96 
78-06. 33 
45-70. 22 
06-04.57 
12-05.76 
52-06. 20 
76-76. 55 
34-03. 25 
7f>-95. 34 
56-82. 46 
82-80.30 
04-89.11 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2999 

Inclosure No. 3 

(Inclosure No. 3 is a map of the Island of Oalm, T. H., showing 
Electric Installations and Generating Plants. This map is reproduced 
as Item No. 36 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of 
Joint Connnittee.) 

Inclosure No. 4 

Title 
Place 
Date and hour 

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION 

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION. 

a. P^nemy Naval Operations. — Movements (by fleet or groups). 
h. Enemy land operations. 

(1) Enemy activities in forward areas and nevf identifications. 

(2) Movements, concentrations and establishments in rear areas. 

(3) Sabotage. 

(4) Terrain, weather, visibility and surf as thev affect the enemy. 

2. CONCLUSIONS. 

a. Enemy capabilities. — An enumeration of lines of action open to the 
enemy which may affect accomplishment of the mission of the command. 
(6) (1) A statement of the relative probability of adoption of the fore- 
going lines of action when such statement can be justified. 
(2) Reasons justifying any statement made in (1) above. 



Inclosure No. 5 



Chief of section. 

From: (Date and hour) 

To: (Date and hour) 

Issuing unit 

Place 

Date and hour of issue 

PERIODIC REPORTS 

No. 

Maps. (Those needed for an understanding of the report.) 

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD. 

a. Enemy front line (or nearest elements). — Location and nature. 
h. Defensive organization.- — ^Trenches, emplacements, observation posts, com- 
mand posts, obstacles, etc. 

c. Units in contact. — Composition of units-, with identifications if known; 
location of their flanks, estimated combat efficiency (strength, training, physical 
condition, morale, and other pertinent factors). 

d. Artillery. — Location and calibers. 

e. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention. — Location, strength, 
composition, dispositions, estimated combat efficiency, and where and when 
they probably can be employed. 

/. Supplv and evacuation establishments. — Location and nature. 

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD. 

a. General summary — action of enemy forces as a whole. 
h. Operations of component elements. 

(1) Enemy Naval Operations. — Movements (by fleet or groups). 

(2) Enemy Land Operations. 

(a) Landings. (By areas. Each entry to show, for that area, the front lines 
and identifications). 

(6) Operations of Land Components. 
/. Antiaircraft artillery. 

2. Antitank units. 

3. Armored forces. 
Jf. Artillery. 

5. Aviation, combat. 

6. Aviation, observation. 

7. Parachute Troops. 

8. Cavalry. 

9. Chemical warfare. 



3000 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

10. Engineers. 

11. Infantry. 

12. Tanks. 

13. Administrative elements. 

c. Sabotage. 

d. Miscellaneous. — Such enemy activities, movements or changes since last re- 
port as are not conveniently included in h above. 

3. MISCELLANEOUS.' 

0. Estimated enemy casualties, including prisoners. 
h. Morale. 

c. Supply and equipment. 

d. Terrain not under our control. 

e. Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation — observation, reconnaissance, 
prisoners and documents lost by us, inhabitants, etc. 

/. Weather, visibility and surf, by areas. 

g. Any enemy intelligence not specifically covered by headings of this report. 

4. ENEMY Capabilities. — a discussion of each of the lines of action open 
to the enemy which may affect the accomplishment of our mission, in the order 
of their possible imminence. For each capability, the effect of time, space, terrain, 
present known dispositions, and other factors in the situation should be evaluated. 
The earliest estimated time at which the enemy can put each into effect should be 
stated. When applicable, the possible fesult of the adoption by the enemy of 
any capability should be included. 

AC of S, G-2. 

INTELLIGENCE PROCEDURE IN AVIATION UNITS 

Form G 

A form for 

Periodic Intelligence Report 

for 

Air Combat Units 

(Adapted to telegraph printer transmission) 

Periodic Intelligence Report 

From: (Date and hour) 

To: (Date and hour) 

Issuing unit 

Place of issue 

Date and hour of issue 

1. ENEMY ACTIVITIES AIR.— (Appropriate resume.) 

2. ENEMY ACTIVITIES GROUND.— (Appropriate resume.) 

3. ENEMY ACTIVITIES NAVAL.— (Appropriate resume.) 

4. OBJECTIVE FOLDERS DATA.— (Additions or changes giving serial 
number of folder in each case.) 

5. IDENTIFICATIONS. — (Additions or changes in enemy units.) 

6. ENEMY KNOWLEDGE OF OUR SITUATION.— (Brief estimate.) 

7. ENEMY CAPABILITIES. — (list in priority of their probable adoption or, 
if no priority, so state.) 

8. MISCELLANEOUS.— (Any items not covered by above.) 

Note. — Information contained in previous intelligence reports will not be 
repeated; only changes or additions thereto. If no change has occurred under a 
given heading, the number of the paragraph only will be transmitted. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3001 



Inclosure No. 6. 

ALLOWANCES OF ORDNANCE AMMUNITION PER WEAPON (OTHER THAN 
AIRCRAFT) FOR INITIAL ISSUE HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT 



Weapon 


Arm or service 


N 


0. of rds 


per weapon 


AP 


Ball 


Tracer 


Total 


Rifle, cal. .30, M1903 _. 


CA.. 


25 


140 
40 
32 

112 

28 
40 
25 

105 
80 

162 

28 
64 
40 
48 
105 
460 
560 

""'"992 

240 

30 

525 

1,500 

3,500 

""i,'506" 

4, 725 

2,100 

28 

21 

340 

250 

440 

240 


20 


185 




Eng-. 


40 




FA 




8 
32 

8 


40 




Inf 


16 


160 




(Rifle Plat.) Inf. (except Rifle 
Plat.) 


4 


40 




QM 


40 




Sig 




"15" 

24 
46 

8 
16 


25 




Others 


30 
48 
24 

4 


150 


Rifle, US, cal. .30, Ml 


Eng. 


152 




Inf 


232 




(Rifle Plat.) Inf. (except Rifle 
Plat.). 


40 




Ord 


80 




Sig 




40 




MP 






48 




Others 


30 


15 

120 

60 

240 

120 

60 

20 

75 

250 

1,000 

1,200 

1,800 

900 

250 

1,350 

300 


150 


Rifle, automatic, cal. .30 


CWS.. 


08O 




CA . 


60 

960 

60 


6S0 




FA . _ 


1200 




Inf 


1,172 




Ord 


300 




QM 


30 

150 

250 

500 

4.800 

7,200 

3.600 

250 

675 

600 


80 




Others . 


750 


Machine sun, cal. .30, HB 


Eng . 


2,000 


(M1919A4) 


Inf 


5,000 




Tanks or Armd. Cars ... 


6.000 


Machine pun, cal. .30, WC 


CA 


9,000 


(M1917A1) 


(AW Bn.) CA (except AW Bn.). 
Eng 


4,500 
2,000 




Inf 


6,750 




Others 


3,000 


Pistol cal. .45 


CWS, CA, Eng., Inf 


28 




FA, Ord., QM, Sig., MP, others. 






21 


Submachine gun, cal. .45 




340 


Sig. (other than motorcycles) 

MP. 






250 




110 

60 

1.440 


550 




Others . . 




300 


Machine gun, cal. .50, WC (AA) 


CA... 


5,760 


7,200 




(AW Bn.) 






CA (except AW Bn.) . 


2,880 

2,880 

600 

960 

1,568 




720 
720 
150 
240 
392 


3,600 




Others 


3,600 


Machine gun, cal. .50, HB 


FA.... . 


750 




Inf 


1,200 


9 


Tanks or Armd. Cars.. 


1,900 




All - 


25K 


Grenades, hand, frag, (per Rifle 
Co.). 


Inf 








150K 


Inf 








25 




Sig (Avn or Wg Co ) 








5 




Sig (Opn or Tri Div. 








30 


Lights, Very signal (assorted) _. 
37mm gun, M1916 


Co.). 
All 








24 








240 


240 


37mm gun, Antitanlf (M3) 


FA 


200 
180 
180 




200 


Inf 




20 

1,620 

120 

132 

18 


200 




CA 


1,800 


60mm Mortar 


Inf • 


120 




Inf . 




Light. 
Heavy 


1 


75mm gun Truck-D 


All 




""""#459 


75mm gun. Antitank... __ 


FA 








iK144 


FA 








#205 




FA 








#117 


3" AA mobile 

90mm A A mobile 


CA 

CA . - 


15 
12 




285 
238 
300 
100 
60 


300 
250 


3" AA fl.xed . - 


CA ..-- 


300 


155mm gun, M1918M1 


All 






100 


240mm How M1918 


FA 






60 


8" Ry. Gun 


CA 


85 




85 



3002 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
Inclosure No. 6 — Continued 



Weapon 


Arm or service 


N 


0. of rds. per weapon 


AP 


Ball 


Tracer 


Total 


FIXED SEACOAST ARTILLERY 

3"gun, M1903 








505 


505 


6" gun 




i,666 

350 
335 
275 
300 
280 
250 




1 000 


8" gun - 






200 


550 


12" gun (Barbette Carriage). -. 




335 


12" gun (Disappearing Carriage) . 








275 


12" Mortar 


* 






300 


14" gun 








280 


16" gun 








250 













Notes: Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not avialable in Haw. Dept. 

Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution 
of other types suitable for the weapon will be made. 

# Proportions of types (Shrapnel, reduced charge HE, and normal charge HE) will be shown on requisi- 
tions kept on file at the designated supply points. 

Inclosure No. 7. 

UNIT OF FIRE (OTHER THAN AIRCRAFT)— HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT 



Weapon 




No. 


rds. for one (1) unit of fire 




AP 


Ball 


Tracer 


HE 


Total 


Rifle, cal. .30, Ml or M1903 


30 
150 
150 

600 

600 


105 
525 
525 

2,100 
20 
160 


15 




150 


Rifle, automatic, cal. .30 


75 




750 


Machine gun, cal. .30, HE (M1919A4) (other than 


75 




750 


combat vehicle). 
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A2or A4) (com- 


150 




750 


bat vehicle). 
Machine gun, cal. .30 (M1917-17A1) 


300 




3,000 
20 


Pistol, cal. .45 










40 




200 




720 
1,920 

960 


180 




900 


Machine gun, cal. .50, AA, WC (except in Gun 


480 




2,400 


Batteries). 
Machine gun, cal. .50, A A, WC (in Gun Batteries) . 


240 




1,200 


Grenades, hand, frag, (per Rifle Co.) 






150 












25 


Pistol, Very, Mklll 










24 


37mm gun, M19I6 








120 
36 
540 
400 
234 
66 


120 




84 
60 






120 








600 








400 








Light 


SOU 








Heavy 




3" Trench Mortar 








300 








SupQT .- 


36 
150 
114 

39 
225 
150 
285 
238 
300 

38 

60 


300 








Normal. _. , 










Reduced . 




75mm gun, antitank . ,. 


111 






150 


105mm How . 






225 


155mm How. M1918 








150 




15 
12 






300 


90mm A A gun, mobile . '. 






250 


3" A A gun, fixed 






300 


155mm gun, M1918 MI . 


112 






150 


240mm How. M 1918 






60 


8" Ry Gun 


85 






85 


4" Chemical Mortar 








200 


4.2" Chemical Mortar . . 










200 















Notes: Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. 
Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in suflBcient quantities, substitution 
of other types suitable for the weapon will be made. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3003 



Inclosure No. 8 

LOAD OF AIRCRAFT AMMUNITION PER AIRPLANE 



Type airplane 


Bombers 


Pursuit 


OBS. 
(C&D) 


Item.. 


Hv. 
(B17D) 


Med. 
(B-18) 


Lt. 
(A20A) 


(P-40) 


(P36A) 


(P-26) 


1-engine 
(0-J7) 


Ctg APCaiaO -- 
















Ctp. Ball Cal30 - 


480 
120 
600 
60 
900 
240 
1,200 


1,280 

320 

1,600 


1,920 

480 

2,400 


1,600 

400 

2,000 

20 

300 

80 

400 


400 
100 
500 

10 
150 

40 
200 


800 

200 

1,000 


640 


Cte. tr Cal30.._ 

Total Cal 30# 


160 

800 


Ctg. AP Cal 50 - 




Ctg ball Cal 50 










Cte tr Cal 50 










Total Cal 50# 










BOMBS 

Bomb frag. 30# and 




40 
12 
4 
2 

1 


10 




Bomb Demo. 100# or 


20 
14 
8 
6 
4 

'4 
3 
6 
20 
10 


32 
14 
6 
4 
2 

'4 
3 
6 

20 

7 








Bomb Demo. 300# or 










Bomb Demo. 500-600# or 










Bomb Demo. 1,000#1.100# or 










Bomb Demo. 2.000# -- 










PYROTECHNICS 

Bomb Photoflash 










14 


Flare M26 2 


1 

6 

20 








1 


Flare M9 -- 








5 


Sig. AC Asstd 








20 


Sig. Drift - 























' For Reconnaissance squadrons only. 

2 Flare M8A1 used as temporary substitute on the basis of 2-M8 or M8A1 flares per M26 flare. 



[corrected copy] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 10 December 1941 
Subject: Coordination of Traffic Control. (Paragraph 9h (TENTATIVE) 

added to SOP HD.) 
To: Distribution: Special, and Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H. 

1. The attention of all commanders is directed to provisions of Paragraphs 27 
and 9/, SOP HD, 5 November 1941, repeated below: 

"27. Traffic: The Department Provost Marshal, assisted by the Division 
Provost Marshals, will regulate traffic on OAHU. 

"9. /. Motor vehicles operating at night, at the discretion of local commanders, 
will be (1) in convoy with standard blackout or blue lights with a shielded tail 
light on all vehicles, or (2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard 
blackout or blue lights on leading vehicle and a shielded tail light on the rear 
vehicle, and no lights on the others. Standard blackout light or approved modifica- 
tions are authorized for use at all times and all places during hours of darkness on 
vehicles carrying military personnel on a military mission. On two-way roads the 
distance between vehicles and/or serials will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded 
flow of traffic." 

2. The following additional instructions are published for the strict compliance 
of all troops in this Department: 

Paragraph 9h (TENTATIVE), SOP HD. 

(1) The civil police (special and regular) and the Military Police will have 
COMPLETE and EXCLUSIVE control of traffic on the island of OAHU with 
the following exceptions: 

a. Guards on entrances to vital installations operating under special instructions. 

b. In case of accidents or other emergencies. 



3004 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(2) Route markers are ai'thorized for tactical or convoy movements. 

(3) Except in case of military necessity and except as otherwise hereinafter 
provided, the present civil regulations relating to traffic shall remain in force. 

(4) Only such nilitary and civilian personnel as are actually needed on defense 
work, public vtilities, and conducting emergency work or on a military mission 
will be authorized to operate motor vehicles on the highways between 1800 and 
0600 (6:00 P. M. and 6:00 A. M.), tactical movements excepted. In this connec- 
tion, contractors' trucks working on 24 hour basis on approved defense projects 
will not be delayed. All cars authorized to operate between the above hours 
(6:00 P. M. to 6:00 A. M.) shall have standard blackout, or blue lights using Mos& 
Blackout Blue Paint (quick-drying) or its equivalent. 

(5) All modified lights must conform to a standard pattern and be visible for a 
distance of not to exceed 100 feet. 

(6) The Military Police assisted by the civil police, will approve and check 
modified blackout lights and will not permit modified lights to be used that do not 
conform to the standard of blackout lighting equipment, as pertains to visibility 
from the air. Special instructions and detailed specifications will be issued later 
by the Provost Marshal. 

(7) Persons operating vehicles at night without approved blackout lights will 
be arrested promptly. 

(8) Parking is prohibited on the following streets in Honoluhi: 

School Street Nuuanu Avenue 

Lusitania Street Alapai Street between Lusitania and 

Beretania Street Beretania 

King Street Iwilei Road between King and railroad 

Waialae Street tracks 

Dillingham Boulevard Queen Street on mauka side between 

Middle Street Iwilei Road and Fort Street 

(9) During air raids all vehicles are prohibited from operating, except the follow- 
ing: 

a. Military vehicles on a military mission. 

b. Civilian police cars. 

c. Certain civilian vehicles specifically authorized by the Provost Marshal. 
All other operators will halt their vehicles off the main roads or streets where 
they will remain until authorized to be moved by the police (civil or military) 
or until ALL CLEAR is given. 

(10) Immediate action will be taken by all commanders to insure that their 
personnel are informed of the above contents. 

(11) The cooperation of all personnel, civil and military, is directed. 
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT: 

Walter C. Phillips, 
Colonel, General Staff Corps, 

Chief of Staff. 
Official: 

William E. Donegan, 

Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C, 
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3. 
Distribution: Special, plus 100 to Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H., plus 500 
for file w/SOP. 

[CORRECTED COPYJ 

(Please destroy all previous copies) 

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, 

Forward Echelon, 
0500 17 December 1941. 

Subject: Coordination of Traffic Control (Corrections to Par 9 / and 9 h (tenta- 
tive) SOP-HD) 

To: Distribution, Special, plus one to each holder of SOP-HD and Chief of Police, 
Honolulu, T. H. 
1. Reference letter, HHD, Corrected copy, subject "Coordination of traffic 

control", dated 10 December 1941, SOP-HD is further corrected as follows: 
o. "9 /. Motor vehicles operating at night at the discretion of local commanders, 

will be: 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3005 

"(1) in convoy with Standard Blackout lights or approved modifications with 
tail light shielded or painted all blue, on all vehicles, or, 

"(2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard blackout lights 
or approved modifications on the leading vehicle and a tail light shielded or painted 
all blue on the rear vehicle, and no lights on the others. 

"(3) Standard blackout lights or approved modifications are authorized for lise 
at all times and all places during hours of darkness on vehicles carrying military 
personnel on a military mission. 

"(4) On two-way roads the distance between vehicles and/or serials will be 
sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic. 

"(5) All motor vehicles not having standard blackout lighting equipment shall 
have modified lights conforming to the following specifications: 

"Headlights to be painted all black with the exception of a two and one-half 
inch circle, slightly below the center of the headlight lens. This circle will be 
painted with Moss Blackout Blue paint (quick-drying) or equivalent. Tail lights 
will be shielded or painted all blue. Sufficient coats of the Blackout Blue paint 
will be used to insure that the "modified lights" conform to the standard of 
blackout lighting equipment, as pertains to visibility from the air." 

b. Par 9 h (tentative), sup-par 4, changed to read as follows: 

"(4) only such military and civilian personnel as are actually needed on defense 
work, public utilities, and conducting emergency .work or on a military mission 
will be authorized to operate motor vehicles on the highways between 1800 and 
0600 (6:00 PM and 6:00 AM), tactical movements except. In this connection, 
contractors' trucks working on 24 hour basis on approved defense projects will not 
be delayed. All cars authorized to operate between the above hours (6:00 PM 
to 6:00 AM) shall have standard blackout lights or "approved modifications" 
using Moss Blackout Blue paint (quick-drying) or its equivalent and with tail 
light shielded or painted all blue." 

c. Par 9 h (tentative) sub-paragraph (.5) deleted. 

d. Par 9 h (tentative) sub-paragraph (6) delete the last sentence which reads as 
follows: "Special instruction and detailed specifications will be issued later by the 
Provost Marshal." 

2. The above corrections will be made on all copies of the corrected SOP-HD 
(see corrected copy of letter, same subject, HHD, dated 10 Dec 1941). 
By command of Lieutenant General EMMONS: 

J. Lawton Collins, 
Colonel, General Staff Corps, 

Chief of Staff. 
Official: 

Wm. Donegan 
William E. Donegan, 

Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C, 
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3. 



Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shaffer, T. H., 10 December 1941. 
Subject: Air Raid Alarm Instructions. (Paragraph II b, r, d, e and f (TENTA- 
TIVE) added to SOP HD.) 
To: Distribution Special, Plus 90 to Navv and 100 to Chief of Police, Honolulu, 
T. H. 

1. Paragraph 11, SOP HD, is repeated below and changed by inserting para- 
graph a and adding paragraphs b, r, d, e and /. 

"11. Installations and Alarm System. — a. All important installations not 
protected by the Territorial Home Guard will be guarded by troops. An adequate 
alarm system will be established in connection therewith." 

h. (ij A general Air Raid Alarm will be started bv sounding a long blast on the 
siren in the Aloha Tower. Orders for such Air Raid Alarm will be given only by 
the Air Corps Warning Service Information Center by direct communication 
with the Navy Detail at the .\loha Tower. 

(2) This alarm will immediately be taken up by units, small groups, patrols 
and individuals who will immediately sound the alarm by a continuous blast on 
their alarm equipment until it is picked up and relayed by adjacent groups. 
Usually one (1) minute duration should be sufficient. 



3006 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(3) Alarm equipment is listed below and will be used for no other purpose ex- 
cept in connection with Air Raid Alarm and recall therefrom or All Clear Signals. 

(a) Siren on Aloha Tower. 

(b) Stewart type Klaxon Horn. 

(c) Ambulance sirens. 

(d) Fire truck sirens. 

(e) Police sirens. 

(/) All other sirens not covered above. 

c. The "Recall from Air Raid Alarm" or "All Clear Signal" will be relayed by 
the alarm equipment indicated above, starting with the siren on the Aloha Tower, 
on instructions from the Air Corps Warning Service Information Center. The 
signal will be "broken short blasts" repeated until relayed by adjacent units. 

d. In addition to the above signals, Air Raid Alarms and "All Clear" instruc- 
tions will be announced over teletype networks, relayed over tactical communi- 
cation nets, and announced over KGNB and KGU. 

e. The above Air Raid Alarm signals will not be given except as indicated above 
unless units are actually attacked by enemy aircraft. 

/. The above Air Raid Alarms and All Clear Signals will be relayed to the Dis- 
trict Commanders of the outlying islands by the Department Signal Officer. 
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT: 

Walter C. Phillips, 
Colonel, General Staff Corps, 

Chief of Staff. 
Official: 

Wm. Donegan, 
William E. Donegan, 

Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C, 
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3. 

Distribution: Special, plus 90 to Navy and 100 to Chief of Police, Honolulu, 
T. H., 500 for file w/SOP. 

HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS 

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT 
Fort Shafter, T. H. Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, T. H. 

11 April 1941 11 April 1941 

[Exhibit D] 

[secret] 

Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, 
Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District 

SECTION I — directives 

[Extract] 

* * * * * * • * 

3. Method of coordination. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined 
that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation 
and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy 
operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, 
as prescribed in Joint Action of the .\rmy and the Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, para- 
graph 96. 

* * * * * :i>f * 

18. Navy. The Commandant. FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall 
provide for: 

* * * * 4: 4c t 

i.^ Distant reconnaissance. 

******* 

21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice 
in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until dis- 
approved in part or in whole bv either the War or the Navv Department. This 
HCF-41 (JCD-42) supercedes HCE-39 (JCD-13) except that the Annexes Nos. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3007 



I to VIT of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of 
this plan. 

(Signed) Walter Q. Short (Signed) C. C. Bloch 

Walter C. Short C. C. Bloch 

Lieut. General, U. S. Army, Rear- Admiral, U. S. Navy, 

Commanding, Commandant, 

Hawaiiant Department. Fourteenth Naval District 

True Extract Copy: 
O. M. Cutler 
O. M. Cutler 
l.t. Col., Infantry 

[Exhibit E] 

confidential 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department; 

Fort Shafter, T. H:, 20 March 1941. 

JOINT AIR OPERATIONS:— To be included as a part of Annex No. VII, 

HCF-39, (14-ND-JCD 13) RCT, Joint Security Measures for the protection 

of the PACIFIC FLEET and PEARL HARBOR BASE, (now in preparation). 

When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval 

Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14rth Naval District), agree that 

the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such 

action each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make 

available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces 

at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be 

conducted in accordance with the following plans: 

1. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the 
tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the 
Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due con- 
sideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment air- 
planes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force 
will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until com- 
pletion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control. 

2. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be 
executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense 
Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these mis.sions. 
With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter 
aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force 
will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for main- 
tenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, 
it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control. 

3. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search opera- 
tions, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the 
tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations. 

4. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for 
the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will 
pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission. 



Approved: 21 March, 1941 
(sgd) C. C. Bloch 
C. C. Block 
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy 
Commandant 

Fourteenth Naval District 
True Copy: O. M. Cutler 
O. M. Cutler 
Lt. Col., Infantry 



(sgd) Walter C. Short 

Walter C. Short 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 
Commanding 

Hawaiian Department 



3008 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Exhibit F] 
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT 

fort shafter, t, h. 
Chief of Staff 

War Department, Washington DC 
Reurad four seven two tv/enty seventh report department alerted to prevent 
sabotage period liaison with Navy 

Short 
Enc sec by 

Lt Jos Engelbertz SC 
5:40 P 27 Nov 41 

True copy 

O. M. Cutler 
O M Cutler, 

Lt Col Infantry 

[Exhibit G] 

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT 

fort SHAFTER, T. H. 



Signature and Title 
114 War Kr 189 WD PRTY 

C G Washn, D. C, 842 Nov 28, 1941. 

Hawn Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H. 
482 28th critical situation demands that all precaution be taken immediately 
against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War 
Department paren see paragraph three mid sc thirty dash forty five end paren 
stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessar}' 
to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and 
equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subver- 
sive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This 
does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop Protective 
measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding un- 
necessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical 
telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect 
your responsibility under existing instructions 

Adams 
True copy 

O. M. Cutler 
O. M. Cutler 
Lt col Infantry 

[Exhibit H] 

[CONFIDENTIAL] 

[Extract— UID-SR 30-45] 



3. DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITY, a. (1) By direction of the 
President, investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters 
are controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Depart- 
ment of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and 
the Office of the Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. In accordance 
with this directive, the War Department assumes responsibility for the investiga- 
tion of officers, enlisted men, and civilians employed on military reservations or 
under military control. Similar personnel of the naval establishment is covered 
by Naval Intelligence. The investigation of other civilians suspected of sub- 
versive activities, except in certain overseas possessions, is the responsibility of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, hereinafter referred 
to as the F. B. I. 

(2) Cooperation with the agencies of Naval Intelligence and the F. B. I. will be 
effected by appropriate echelons of our CS system, to the end that full protection 
may be obtained without duplication of effort. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3009 

b. Corps Area and Department Commanders are charged with the supervision 
of countersubversive operations, in accordance commands, including those of 
exempted stations and tactical units temporarily present, except the activities 
coordinated by the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General 
Staff. 

True Extract Copy 
O. M. Cutler 
O. M. Cutler, 

Lt. Col., Infantry 

[Exhibit I] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department 

fort shafter, t. h. 

Memorandum For Department Adjutant General: 



(date) 

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message 
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or 
having a different security classification. 
This message is Priority 

/sgd/Thomas H. Green, 
Thomas H. Green, 

Lt. Col. J. A. G. D., 
Department Judge Advocate. 
The Adjutant General, 

War Department, Washington, D. C. 
Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth comma full precautions are 
being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative respon- 
sibility of war department paren paragraph three mid SC thirty dash forty five 
end paren and military establishments including personnel and equipment stop 
as regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as 
power plants comma telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma this 
headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one 
requested the Governor of the territory to use the broad powers vested in him by 
section sixty seven of the organic act which provides comma in effect comma that 
the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the 
United States in the territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence 
comma invasion comma insurrection etc stop pursuant to the authority stated 
the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on 
this headquarters to furnish and continued to furnish such adequate protection 
as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connec- 
tion therewith comma being committed against vital installations and structures 
in the territory stop pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protec- 
tion is no w being afforded vital civilian installations stop in this connection 
comma at the instigation of this Headquarters the City and County of Honolulu 
on June T hirtieth Nineteen Forty One enacted an ordnance which permits The 
Command ing General Hawaiian Department comma to close comma or restrict 
the use of and travel upon comma any highway within the city and County of 
Honolulu comma whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary 
in the int erest of National Defense stop the authority thus given has not yet 
been exer cised stop relations with FBI and all other Federal and Territorial of- 
ficials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all 
pertinent matters 

Short 
Enc Sec by 

LT JOS ENGELBERTZ SC 

Lt Jos Engelbertz SC 

2:45 P 29 Nov 41 

True copy ^ 

O. M. Cutler, 
O. M. Cutler, 

Lt Col Infantry 



3010 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Exhibit J] 

SECRET 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department 

office of the signal officer 

Fori Shafter, T. H., 20 December, 1941. 
In reply refer to: 
Sig. 

Subject: Detector Operation. 
To: Department Signal Officer. 

1. On November 27, 1941, after conference with Assistant Chief of Staff G-3. 
and receiving instructions to operate all mobile detectors from two hours before 
dawn until one hour after dawn, I, as Acting Department Signal Officer, gave 
immediate instructions to Captain TETLEY, Commanding Officer of the Air- 
craft Warning Company, to initiate the above detector operation so long as 
Alert No. 1 was in force. 

2. The detectors in question operated daily thereafter during the prescribed 
period except when having occasional operational trouble. In addition, the six 
detector stations operated daily except Sundays from 7:00 A. M. until 11:00 A. M. 
for routine training. Daily except Saturday and Sunday, the hours 12:00 noon 
until 4:00 P. M. were devoted to training and maintenance work. 

W. H. Murphy, 
Lt. Col, Sig C. 
True Copv: 

O. M. Cutler 
O. M. Cutler, 

Lt. Col., Infantry. 

[Exhibit K] 



SECRET 



AFFIDAVIT 



HicKAM Field, T. H. 

20 December 1941. 



I, JAMES A MOLLISON, certify that during the period 27 November 1941 
to 7 December 1941 the Navy made no requests to the Hawaiian Air Force for 
in shore or long range aerial reconnaissances. 

JaS. A. MOLLISON, 

Lt. Col, A. C, 
H. A. F. C/S. 
True Copy: 

O. M. Cutler 
O. M. Cutler, 
Lt. Col., Infantry. 

[Exhibit L] 

CERTIFICATE 

I certify that on November 27, 1941, I accompanied General Short and Greneral 
Martin to Admiral Kimmel's office for conference relative to sending Army pur- 
suit planes to Midway and Wake. As this would unquestionably weaken the 
defenses of Oahu, Admiral Kimmel asked a question of Captain Mc Morris, his 
War Plans Officer, which was substantially as follows: 

Admiral Kimmel: Mc Morris what is your idea of the chances of a surprise raid 
on Oahu. 

Captain McMorris: I should say none Admiral. 

James A. Mollison, • 
Lieut. Colonel, A. C. 
True Copv: 

O. M. Cutler, 
O. M. Cutler, 

Lt. Col., Infantry 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3011 

[Exhibit M] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department 
fort shafter, t. h. 

November 26, 1941. 
RCA 831 US GOVT 

Washington, DC Nov 26 1941 L149P 
Commanding General, 

Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, Th. 
Four six five twenty sixth 

Reference two B Dash Twenty four airplanes for special photo mission Stop 
It is desired that the pilots be instructed to photographic Truk Island in the 
Caroline Group Jaluit in the Marshall Group Stop Visual reconnaissance 
should be made simultaneously Stop Information desired as to the number 
and location of naval vessels including submarines Comma airfields Comma 
aircraft Comma guns Comma barracks and camps Stop Pilots should 
be warned islands strongly fortified and manned Stop Photography and 
reconnaissance must be accomplished at high altitude and there must be no 
circling or remaining in the vicinity Stop Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing 
maximum altitude and speed Stop Instruct crews if attacked by planes to 
use all means in their power for self preservation Stop The two pilots and 
copilots should be instructed to confer with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at 
Honolulu to obtain his advice Stop If distance from Wake and Jaluit to 
Moresby is too great Comma suggest one B dash twenty four proceed from Wake 
to Jaluit and back to Wake Comma Then Philippines by usual route photo- 
graphing Ponape while enroute Moresby Stop Advise pilots best time of day 
for photographic Truk and Jaluit Stop Upon arrival in Philippines two copies 
each of any photographs taken will be sent to General MacArthur Comma 
Admiral Hart Comma Admiral Kimmel Comma the chief of naval opera- 
tions Comma and the War Department Stop Insure that both Bdash twenty 
four airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from 
Honolulu. 

Adams 
Decoded by: Lt. G E Haven SC, 147A November 27, 1941. 
True copy: 

O. M. Cutler 
O. M. Cutler, 
Lt. Col., Infantry. 
Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 465 — 26th 

[Exhibit N] 

(Copy) 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department 

FORT shafter, T. H. 

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General: 

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message 
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear 
or having a different security classification. 
This message is Priority. 

/s/ Cheney L. Bertholf, 

Lt. Col., A. G. D. 
Approved for Transmission: " Adjutant General 

/s/ O. M. McDole, 

Major A. G. D., 
Asst. Adjutant General. 

Chief of the Army Air Forces, 

Washington, D. C. 
Reference secret photographic mission of two B twenty fours stop One of 
B twenty fours Lieutenant Faulkner which landed Hickam Field this date short 
following equipment considered essential to safety and success of mission colon 



79716 O — 46 — pt. 18 11 



3012 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

fifty caliber machine guns comma mounts comma adapters and accessories for 
upper hemisphere semicolon fifty caliber tunnel gun comma adapter and acces- 
sories semicolon for starboard and port sides semicolon second thirty caliber 
nose gun comma adapter and accessories stop Guns can be removed from our 
equipment and ammuntion is available stop Strongly recommend that second 
B twenty four bring necessary equipment from mainland for installation on both 
planes prior their departure from Hickam Field stop Plane being held here 
until satisfactorily armed subject plane has no armor plate installation stop 
Except for removal of passenger seats plane equipped as for ferry service North 
Atlantic signed Martin HAF 141 C 

Short. 
Enc sec by Lt. G. E. Haven, S. C. 225P 5 Dec/41 
A True Copy 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2d Lt. F. A. 

[Exhibit O] 

20 December 1941. 
certificate 

On the morning of 7 December, 1941, the 18th Wing had 6 B-17s in commission, 
with 6 B-17s out of commission for maintenance. Of the 8 B-17s destroyed dur- 
ing the attack, 4 were from those stationed at Hickam Field, 2 from those in 
commission and 2 from those out of commission. The other 4 were lost while 
attempting to land upon arrival from the Mainland. These B-17s arrived at 
Hickam Field between 8:00 A. M. and 8:20 A. M., 7 December, 1941. These 
planes took off from Hamilton Field, California in two squadrons, one at 9:30 
P. M. December 6, Pacific time (12:30 A. M. December 7, Eastern time) and the 
other at 10:30 P. M. December 6, Pacific time (1:30 A. M. Eastern time). 

Of the 8 B-17s which arrived safely from the mainland, none had sufficient gaso- 
line to permit dispatching them on missions, nor were they equipped with ammu- 
nition for these defensive armament. Machine guns were still cosmolined and 
had not been bore sighted. Ferry crews were skeletonized, consisting of pilot, co- 
pilot, navigator, engineer and radio operator. Such crews were incapable of 
manning all gun positions even if the guns had been properly prepared for combat 
and supplied with ammunition. 

The B-24 which arrived at Hickam Field on 5th December, 1941, previous to 
the attack, had insufficient armament for combat, only 1 .30 cal. and twin .50 
cal. guns in the tail, and was without ammunition for the guns that were installed. 

James A. Mollison, 

Lieut. Colonel, A. C. 

True Copy 

O. M. Cutler, 
0. M. Culter, 
Lt. Col. Infantry. 

[Exhibit P] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department 

fort shafter, t. h. 

1549WS Washington D C 74/73 RCA USG ETAT 7 1218P 
C C 

Hawn Dept Ft Shafter TH 
529 7th Japanese are presenting at one pm eastern standard time today what 
amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine 
immediately stop just what significance the hour set may have we do not know 
but be on alert accordingly stop inform naval authorities of this communication 

Marshall. 
Decoded by: Lt. J. H. Babcock 251P Dec. 7, 1941 
Code Message No. 529 7th 
True Copy 

O. M. Cutler, 
O. M. Cutler, 
Lt. Col. Infantry. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3013 

[Exhibit Q] 
Headquarters Hawaiian Department 

FORT SHAFTER, T. H. 

P 4 war L 54 WD 1 Extra Urgent 

Washington DC 219P Dec 9 1941. 
CG 

Hawn Dept Ft Shafter TH 
Five four nine ninth Please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our 
number five two nine repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact time 
deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to staff and by what staff oflBce 
received 

Colton 

Acting. 
Decoded by: Lt L G Forbes SC 910AM Dec 9 1941 
True Copy 

O M Cutler 
O M Cutler 
Lt Col Infantry. 

[Exhibit R] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department 
fort shafter, t. h. 
Chief Signal Officer, 
Washington, D. C. 
Re your five four nine radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via RCA seven 
thirty three morning seventh stop Received signal office Fort Shafter eleven 
forty five morning seventh paren this time approximate but within five minutes 
paren stop Deciphered message received by Adjutant General HQ HAW dept 
two fifty eight afternoon seventh 

Short 
A true copy : 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

NoTK : This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablegrams. One copy only to 
be submitted. The making of an exact copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is for- 
bidden. Only such e.\tracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked secret 
or confidential as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care 
and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General's 
Office, without delay. (AR 380-5). 

Form H. D. No. 1173 (Revised)— 2892 Honolulu 10-31-41 lOM. 

[Exhibit S] 

Copy SECRET 

Fort Shafter, T. H. 

Territory of Hawaii, ss: 
Personally appeared before me, the undersigned, authority for administering 
oaths of this nature, one Grover C. White, Jr. 0-396182, 2nd Lieut., Signal Corps, 
Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii who after being duly sworn according 
to law deposes and sayeth: 

1. At the request of the Control Officer and Naval Liaison OflRcer the AWS 
agreed to operate its detectors beyond the daily period of two hours before until 
one hour after dawn. The first schedule required operation of all stations from 
4 A. M. to 6 P. M. This schedule was modified to the hours of 4 A. M. to 4 P. M. 
A temporary schedule was next devised which required all stations to operate 
from 4 A. M. to 11 A. M. and to have "staggered" operation, i. e., 3 stations from 
11 A. M. to 1 P. M., the remaining 3 stations from 1 P. M. to 4 P. M. On Satur- 
day, December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to request authority to 
have all stations operate from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941 ; 
this was agreed to by the Control Officer. 

2. Staff Sergeant Stanley J. Wichas, SCAWH, acting RDF Officer, reports 
that he saw nothing that could be construed as suspicious in the information 



3014 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

received by the AWS Information Center from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M. Sunday, Decem- 
ber 7, 1941. This is verified by Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, who was the only 
officer in the Information Center from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M. 

3. At approximately 7:20 A. M. a report was received from a Detector station 
at Opana that a large number of planes was approaching Oahu on a course North 
3 degrees East at a distance of approximately 132 miles. This information was 
mmediatxly transmitted by the switchboard operator, Pfc. Joseph McDonald to 
Lt. Tyler, who talked to Opana about the flight. The statement of Pfc. Joseph 
McDonald, SCAWH, the switchboard operator is attached. 

4. The Navy Liaison Officer's position within the Information Center was not 
manned when I reached the Information Center at about 8:20 A. M. This posi- 
tion was manned shortly thereafter by Technical Sergeant Merle E. Stouffer, 
SCAWH, who remained on the position until approximately 4:30 P. M. when the 
position was taken over by Naval Officers. 

Further the deponent sayeth not. 

/s/ Grover C. White, Jr., 

2nd Lieut., Signal Corps, 
Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii. 

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of Dec. A. D. 1941 at Fort 
Shafter, T. H. 

/s/ Adam R. Huggins, 

2nd Lieut., Signal Corps, 

Summary Court. 
A true copy: 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

Fort Shafter, T. H. 

Territory of Hawaii, ss: 
Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority for administering 
oaths of this nature, one Joseph P. McDonald, 13006145, Pvt Icl, Signal Com- 
pany, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly sworn according to law 
deposes and sayeth: 

I was on duty as telephone operator at the AWS Information Center on Sunday 
morning, December 7, 1941. I received a telephone call from Opana at 7:20 
A. M. stating that a large number of planes were heading towards Oahu from 
North 3 points east. I gave the information to Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, 
78th Pursuit Squadron, Wheeler Field, T. H. and the Lieutenant talked with 
private Lockard at the Opana Station. Lt Tyler said that it wasn't anything 
of importance. At that time the planes were 132 miles out. I asked if we 
shouldn't advise Corporal Beatty and have the plotters come back. The Opana 
Unit stressed the fact that it was a very large number of planes and they seemed 
excited. Lt. Tyler said that it was not necessary to call the plotters or get in 
touch with anyone. 

Further the deponent sayeth not. 

Joseph P. McDonald, 
Sig. Co., Aircraft Warning, Hawaii. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of December A. D. 1941 at 
Fort Shafter, T. H. 

Adam R. Huggins, 
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps. 

Summary Court. 
True copy: 

O. M. Cutler, 
O. M. Cutler, 
Lt. Col., Infantry. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3015 

Statement of Lieut. Kermit A. Tyler 

20 December 1941. 

On Wednesday, 3 December 1941, I was first detailed to learn the operation of 
the plotting board in the Interception Control Center. I reported for duty at 
1210, just as the crew on duty was leaving. I spoke with Lt. White, Signal 
Corps, a few minutes and he showed me the operating positions for Navy, Bom- 
bardment, Antiaircraft, Controller's position and Aircraft W'arning Service. I 
remained on duty until 1600. Only o telephone operator was on duty with me. 

On Sunday, 7 December 1941, t was on duty from 0400 to 0800 as Pursuit 
Officer at the Interception Control Center. From 0400 until approximately 0610 
there were no plots indicated on the interception board. From that time until 
0700 a number of plots appeared on the control board at various points surround- 
ing the Island of Oahu. I particularly remember at least one plot South of 
Kauai and I believe there was on South of Molokai. There were two plots at 
some distance North of Oahu and which I remember seeing on the historical 
record. At the time, I questioned the plotter of the historical record who stated 
that he makes a record of all plots as they come in. There were a number of 
plots over and around the Island of Oahu. Having seen the plotters work once 
before with about the same general layout, this did not seem irregular to me. 
At 0700 all of the men except the telephone operator folded up their equipment 
and left. At about 0720 the operator at the Opana RDF Station called me and 
said that the instrument indicated a large number of planes at 132 miles to the 
North. Thinking it must be a returning naval patrol, a flight of Hickam Field 
Bombing planes, or possibly a flight of B-17 planes from the coast, I dismissed it 
as nothing unusual. (It is common knowledge that when Honolulu radio stations 
are testing by playing Hawaiian Music throughout the night that coincidentally 
B-17s are apt to come in using the station for radio-direction finding. The radio 
station was testing on the morning of 7 December, 0230-0400). At about 0750 
I heard some airplanes outside and looking toward Pearl Harbor saw what I 
thought to be a navy practicing dive bombing runs. At a little after 0800, 
Sergeant Eugene Starry, A. C. Wheeler Field, called me to tell me that Wheeler 
Field had been attacked. I immediately had the telephone operator call all men 
back to duty. Most of the men had returned to duty by 0820 when Major L. N. 
TindaJ arrived and took charge of the Control Center. I remained on duty 
assisting Major K. P. Bergquist and Major L. N. Tindal as Pursuit Control 
Officer until about 1615, 8 December 1941, with the exception of rest periods 
from 2000 to 2400, 7 December, and 0600 to 1000, 8 December. 

(s) Kermit A. Tyler, 
Kermit A. Tyler, 
1st Lieut., Air Corps. 

True copy: 

O. M. Cutler, 
O. M. Cutler, 

Lt. Col. Infantry. 

Headquarters 53rd Coast Artillery Brigade (AA), 

Office of the Brigade Commander, 

Fort Shafler, T. H., 20 December 1941. 
Subject: Report on action bv 53d C. A. Brigade (AA) from 0755 to 2400, 7 Decem- 
ber 1941. 
To: General Short. 

]. At the beginning of the attack on Oahu 7 December 1941, the 53d Coast 
Artillerv Brigade (A A) was operating under the conditions of Alert No. 1, S. O. 
P., N. C. A. C, 26 November 1941. The 97th C. A. and the AA Detachments of 
the East Group had anti-sabotage guards at their fixed 3-inch gun Batteries. All 
anti-aircraft equipment was being guarded. 



3016 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. a. Fort Weaver. Headquarters 2nd Battalion 97th C. A. (\A). 
\lerted 0810 
Ready to fire 0813 
Engaged enemy at 0814 
Amnu fired: 407— .30 Cal. hall. 
117— .30 Cal. A. P. 
53- .30 Cal. Tracer. 
12— Pistol. 
South Group Command Post detail at stations at 0810. NO repeat XO inter- 
ruption in communications in South Group during this period. There was rifle 
and automatic rifle fire on low flying enemy planes by officers and men. 

Battery G 97th, were in camp at Fort Weaver. Its battle position is at fixed 
batterv at Fort Weaver. 
'Alerted at 0810 
Ready to fire 0830 
Engaged enemv 0830 

Fired 30 rds— 3" A. A. Shrapnel. Approximately 200 rds of .30 Cal. ball 
Amm. One .50 Cal. Machine Gun was in action at approximately 8:40 
A. M. During this firing Private YORK gunner was wounded while 
engaging the enemy, he stayed at his post although ordered to take cover. 
Lieutenant KING states that the battery fire broke up and definitely 
turned back one formation of 15 enemy pianos. Casualties — -One (1) 
Officer dead - Killed while proceeding through Hickam J^ield to his battle 
position. Four (4) enlisted men woimded. 
(Basic: Ltr., HO. 53d C. A. Brigade (AA). dated 20 December 1941. Subject: "Report on action by 53d 
r. A. Brigade (AA) from 0755 to 2400, 7 Dec. 1941".) 

Battery F 97th, was camped at Fort Weaver. Its battle position at Fixed 
Battery Closson, Fort Kamehameha, T. H. 

Alerted 0755, and moved to Batterv position across Pearl Harbor Entrance. 
Ready to fire 0855 
Engaged Enemy 0900 to 0920 
Amm. fired: 27—3" A. A., H. E., M. K. fuse M3. 
Approximately 400 rds .30 Cal. ball. 
Approximately 150 rds .30 Cal. A. P. 
Battery G 64th, was in barracks at Fort Shafter, battle position at Ahua Point. 
Alerted approximately 0815, and moved to battery position at Fort 

Kamehameha. 
R^ady to fire 1030 

Engaged Enemy with .30 Cal. M. G. at 1030 
Amm. Fired: Approximately 50 rds of .30 Cal. ball. 
Battery H 64th, was in barracks at Fort Shafter. Its battle position is at Fort 
Weaver. 

Alerted 0830 
Ready to fire 1145 
Engaged Enemy 2100 
Amm. fired: 40 rds— .50 Cal. ball. 
40 rds— .50 Cal. A. P. 
30 rds— .50 Cal. Tracer 
Marine detachment: The Fleet Machine Gun School at Fort Weaver. Opera- 
tions were in cooperation with South Group although not tactically assigned. 
Alerted 0800 
R^ady to fire 0810 
Engaged Enemy 0810 

Amm. fired: Approximately 8000 rds of .50 Cal. A. P. ball and tracer. 
Approximatelv 450 rds of 20 mm A. A. 
This Detachment shot down 4 enemy planes and saved a 4 engined bomber by 
causing enemy plane firing on it's tail to pull out and cease it's attack. Much 
shrapnel and some small arms bullets fell about Fleet M. G. School. There was 
excellent cooperation from Fort Weaver personnel in the liaison, phone, etc. 
b. 98th Coast Artillery, Schofield Barracks. 

Alerted at 0800 
The communications section at the Command Post, Wahiawa, shot down one 
enemy plane flying at less than 100 feet, with their automatic rifles at 0855. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3017 

1st Baiialion 98th C. A. (AA), was in position and ready for action at the 
following time: 

B— 98: 0955 
D— 98: lOOli 
C— 98: 1030 
Battery M 64th, stationed at Fort Shaffer, was alerted at 0815, moved to Wheeler 
Field, and was ready for action at 1155. 

2nd Battalion 98th C. A. {AA). This Battalion has two batteries at Kaneohe 
and one at Waipahu School. They were in position and ready for action at the 
following times: 

F— 98: 1315 
G— 98: 1315 
H— 98: 1330 

c. Cattip Malakole 251st C. A. (AA). All units were alerted at 0805 when fired 
upon by a single enemy plane. All units returned the fire with small arms and 
the plane was shot down. 

1st Battalion 251st C.A. {AA), was in position and ready for action as follows: 
B— 251: at West Loch, 1145 
C— 251: Ewa Beach, 1145 
D— 251: South of Ewa, 1145 
2nd Battalion 251st C. A. {AA), was in position as follows: 
E— 251: Navy Yard 
F — 251: Navy Recreation Area 
G— 251: Tank Farm 
H— 251: Navy Yard 
At 1120 and again at 1122, E, 251st fired on enemy planes, shooting down one 
plane. 100 rds of .50 Cal. were fired on the first plane and 200 rds of .50 Cal. 
were fired on the second plane. 

d. Fort Kamehameha. Battery A, 97th C. A. (AA) fired 1500 rds of .30 Cal. 
at one enemy plane offshore at 0835. 

c. Sand Island. The A A Detachment of Battery F, 55th C. A., present at Sand 
Island when the attack started was ready for action at 0815. This battery fired 
89 rds of 3" A A and shot down two (2) enemy planes at 0815. 

/. Fort Shafter. 

(1) Three (3) enemy dive bombers were fired on by the Headquarters Battery 
and the Intelligence Battery of this Brigade and by Battery E, 64th C. A. (AA). 
Ammunition Expended — 3,000 .30 Cal. 

(2) Enemv planes were fired on at 0900 and 1000 by Batterv A, 64th C. A. 
(AA). Ammunition Expended— 1000 .30 Cal. 

(3) All 3" gun batteries and Automatic Weapons batteries of the 64th C. A. 
(AA) were alerted at 0815 and were in position as follows: 

B— 64: at Aiea, 1000 

C— 64: at Aliamanu, 1030 

D— 64: South of Aliamanu, 1100 

F— 64: at Pearl City, 1105 

G — 64: See Par. 2 a, above. 

H — 64: See Par. 2 a, above. 

I — 64: at Aliamanu 

K — 64: at Hickam Field 

L — 64: at Hickam Field. 

M— 64: See Par. 2 b, above. 
All of these units except ]\I, 64th fired during the second attack from 1000 to 
1145. Ammunition expended as follows: 

3", 23 rds. 

.50 Cal, 2361 rds. 

.30 Cal., 2821 rds. 
g. Fort Barrette. Battery H, 97 C. A. (AA), was stationed at Fort Weaver. 
The battery was alerted at 0755, moved out of Fort Weaver at 0830, and arrived 
at Fort Barrette at 0910. Enemy planes were engaged by small arms fire at Fort 
Weaver, while enroute, and at Fort Barrette. The detachment on guard at Fort 
Barrette shot down one enemy plane at 0910 by small arms fire. 

3. Three (3) Marine AA Batteries were attached to the Brigade at 2245. 

4. Ammunition. Status at 0730, 7 December 1941. All units of the Brigade 
had in their possession, the initial issue of small arms ammunition. This included 
ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles and machine guns. In addition, 



3018 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the 3-inch ammunition was so positioned that it was readily accessible to all units 
of the Brigade except four (4) batteries for which ammunition was at Aliamanu 
Crater. These batteries completed drawing their initial allowance, 1200 rounds 
per battery, bv 1015. 

' ■ C. K. Wing 

C. K. Wing, 
Colonel, 53d C. A. Brigade (AA), Commanding. 

[Exhibit T] 

Status of aircraft of 7 December 1941 before a/^ar/:— Continued 

HICKAM FIELD 



Name 


Total 


Out 


In 


A-20A - 


13 
12 
32 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
2 
1 
1 


7 
6 
12 
2 

1 




1 

2 
1 

1 


6 


B-17 D - 


6 


B-18 : 


20 


B-12 A._ _ 





0-47 B . . 





BT2BR 





BT-2CR.-. 


1 


C-33 - -.1 - 


2 


A-12 _- .- - 


2 


P-26 A ..... 





P-26B 





B-24 ^- - - - 











72 


33 


39 



BELLOWS FIELD 



0-47 B 


10 
3 


6 

1 


4 


0-49 - _ 


2 







WHEELER FIELD 



P40 C . . . . 


87} 100 

44 

8—14 
6 
1 
3 
4 
3 
1 
2 
1 
2 


{ 32 
24 
1-4 
3 

2 
1 




2 


M 
55/ 




P40 B 




P3f) A 


20 


P26A 


7—10 


P26B 


3 


B 18.- ... " . . .... 


1 


B 12. 


1 


AT6 


3 


0A9 _ _ 


3 


47B 


1 


Pi. 12A 


2 


OA 8 


1 


VT2-- 










Type 


Damaged 
in raid 


Percent of 
damage 


HICKAM field: 

A-20. 


2 
10 
21 

1 

67 
21 

4 

2 


18 


B-17 


40 


B-18 


65 


B-24 


100 


WHEELER field: 

P-40 . 


65 


P-36 


55 


BELLOWS field: 

0-47 


40 


0-49 ' - . - - 


66 









A true copy 

Edward von Geldern 
Edward von Geldern 

2nd Lt. F. 



James A. Mollison 
Lt. Col. A. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3019 

Aircraft stalus an of ISOO, 20 Decemhcr 1941 





B-17 


n-18 


A -20 


P-40 


P-36 


0-47 


In Comrnission - 


31 

6 


9 
5 


10 


40 
2 
3 

8 


21 
3 


5 




2 


2nd Fclielon .. 






3rd Echelon . . 


2 



















TotHl . . 


■39 


14 


10 


53 


30 


. 







12 B-17 on hand Hickam 0000-7 Dec. 

1 29 B-17s arrived from the Mainland from 7 Dec. to 20 Dee. inclusive. 



J.AMKS A. A!oLLTSON, 

Lt. Col. A. C. 



A true coj^v 

Edward von Geldern 
Edw.^rd vun Geldern 

2nd LI. F. A. 

[Exhibit i:] 

Headquarter.s Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shatter, T. H., 
Forward Echelon, 21 December 1941. 
Memorandum to Lieut Col. Kendall J. Fielder. 

The following report of planes shot down, crashing or otherwise destroyed in 
the attack on Oahu, 7 December 1941, is submitted for your information. All of 
these losses have as yet not been verified, and it is very likely that some of the 
reports from different sources will be in reference to the same plane. Verifications 
are being received daily: 



Time 


Source 


Details 


Remarks 


Total 


0800-1000 


6 officers from emergency 
landing field at Haleiwa. 

CO Mil District of Kauai. 

Civilian report 


Accounted for 10 planes . 


Some of these may 
appear in other re- 
ports. 

Verified 


10 




1 plane crashed off North shore, 
1 wrecked on Niihau. 

1 plane crashed in Qulch, rear 
Aiea Hgts. 

3 planes crashing in Honolulu 
Harbor. 

2 planes destroyed by machine- 
gun fire. 

2 planes 


2 




Verified 


1 




Group of officers on fish- 
ing trip. 

Capt. Ebby, "B" Btry 
55th C. A. C. 

Btry "F", 55 CAC 

251st C. A. C 

Btry "H"97th CAC 

98th C. A.C 

Hq. Btry 15th CAC 

35th Infantry.--. 

27th Infantry 


Verified . 


3 


0940 


Verified 


2 


0922-1130 


0922 report not veri- 
fied. llSOrpt verfd. 
Verified 


2 


0805 


1 plane, 200 yds. off Malikoli 

1 plane crashed flaming 2 mi. 
SW Ft. Barrette. 

1 plane shot down near Wahiawa 

1 plane crashed in Ord shops at 
Ft. Kam. 

Observed 1 plane crash in sea 
SW Barbers Pt. 

Observed 1 plane crash in cane 
field nr Aiea. 

1 plane shot dowh over Bellows 
Fid. fell in sea. 

1 plane down at Brody Camp 
#4:1 nr Kaawa. 

1 plane at Ft Weaver 1 at Wheel- 
er Field, 1 at Hickam Field, 
1 at Pearl Harbor, 1 at Ft Bar- 
rette, 1 at Ewa. Witnessed 1 
shot down back of Naval Hos- 
pital. 

1 plane by AA at Beckoning Pt, 
1 on deck of a ship. 




1020 






0855 
0830 

1100 


Verified " 

Verified 

Verified 






Not verf 






298th Inf 


Verified... 

Verified 






24th Division 


2 




Haw. Air Force 

Navy 

Total 


2 doubtful 


7 




Verified 


2 




38 













The Navy reports are not available. 



T. H. Davies, 
Lt. Col, Inf, Asst. A. C. of S., G-2. 



3020 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

REMARKS: While some of the planes enumerated are undoubtedly duplica- 
tions it is believed that a minimum of at least 29 enemy planes were shot down. 

Kendall J. Fielder, 
Ll. Col., G. S. C, A. C. of S., G-2. 

[Exhibit V] 

[SECRET] 

A true copy 

Edward Von Geldern 
Edward Von Geldern 
2nd Lt. F. A. 

[1] Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

' Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 19 February 1941 
In replv refer to 
Engr. 660 
General George C. Marshall, 

Chief of Staff of the Army, War Department, Washington, D. C. 

Dear General Marshall: I was very glad indeed to have your letter of Feb- 
ruary 7th as it gave us some very definite information on aircraft we did not have. 

Since assuming command I have had two conferences with Admiral Kimmel 
and two with Admiral Bloch. I have found them both most approachable and 
cooperative in every way. I have told them that from my point of view there 
will be no hair splitting, but that the one thing that would affect any decision 
where there is an apparent conflict between the Army and the Navy in the use 
of facilities would be the question of what could produce the greatest combined 
effort of the two forces. They have assured me that they will take exactly the 
same view. From my brief intercourse with them I feel that our relations should 
be extremely cordial. 

As a result of my short study of conditions here I believe that the following 
are of great importance and I am taking steps to carry out the necessary changes: 

(1) Cooperation with the Navy. 

(2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance 

and servicing of aircraft. 

(3) Improvement of the Antiaircraft defense. 

(4) Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery. 

(5) Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights. 

(6) Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improve- 

ment in roads and trails. 

(7) Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and com- 

munication centers. 

(8) Increase in the number of Engineer troops. 

Cooperation with the Navy. A series of joint committees consisting of Army 
and Navy officers has been appointed with a view to the study of cooperation of 
the Army and Navy especially with reference to employment of air and Aircraft. 
These committees have been directed to report on March 1st. Copy of the 

letter creating these committees is, attached hereto as well as copy of 
[2] instructions to the echelon comm'anders concerning cooperation with 

the Navy. 
Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and servicing 
of aircraft. Provision has been made for a number of emergency fields upon the 
various islands but no provision has been made for dispersion of the planes in the 
vicinity of fields and other protection by either camouflage or by bunkers. The 
emergency fields on other islands will be valueless for pursuit aviation except 
possibly on the Island of Molokai. The pursuit aviation is capable of only 
approximately one hour's flying with the throttle wide open. This means that 
the dispersion of pursuit aviation must take place upon the Island of Oahu if it 
is to be able to meet an attack from any direction. The dispersion and bunkers 
for the greater part of the pursuit aviation can be made in the immediate vicinity 
of Wheeler Field by the use of ravines and bunkers. The maintenance and repair 
facilities can be placed in ravines under ground without an exhorbitant cost in 
time or money. Tanks are now available for the distribution of gas and we are 
asking for money to install tanks. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3021 

The bombers can make use of the landing fields on other islands but it will be 
necessary to make provisions for their dispersion in the vicinity of those fields 
and also on the Island of Oahu. Their dispersion is more difficult than that of the 
pursuit. The repair and maintenance facilities require so much space that it 
will be necessary, at least temporarily, to place them above ground protected by 
hills. At present the only repair facilities for the bombers are in buildings on 
Hickam Field which would undoubtedly be attacked by any surprise raid. Up to 
the time that we make runways for dispersion of planes on all the fields surprise 
enemy raids would be extremely serious. 

Improvernent of the Antiaircraft Defense. The major shortages in Antiaircraft 
artillery armament are sixteen 3-inch or 90 m.m. antiaircraft guns (six enroute) 
135 37-mm antiaircraft guns, 236 .50 caliber machine guns and 30 sound locators. 
The locators are expected in June. The shortage of personnel, however, is much 
more serious than the shortage in materiel. Practically all the coast artillery 
units have dual roles. If they man antiaircraft artillery the Harbor Defense 
Artillery will not be manned, and vice versa. To man the entire antiaircraft 
artillery defense project avoiding dual assignments to all but four Harbor Defense 
batteries requires an increase in the existing antiaircraft personnel as follows: 
Two regiments of Coast Artillery Antiaircraft (Mobile) T-0 4-11. 
One Battalion Gun Coast Artillery Antiaircraft (Mobile (less searchlight 
battery) T. O. 4-15. 

[S] Approximately 90 officers and 2,000 enlisted replacements to activate 
three gun batteries and three 37-mm batteries of the 64th Coast Artillery Anti- 
aircraft, now inactive. With the increasing critical international situation at 
this time it is urgently recommended that all reinforcements of Antiaircraft 
Artillery personnel, both unit and individual reinforcements mentioned above, 
together with the shortage in antiaircraft artillery materiel, be furnished to this 
department with the least practicable delay. 

These reinforcements to the antiaircraft artillery garrison, as well as those for 
the Harbor Defense Artillery listed below, are required to complete the approved 
defense project. No provision of the defense of the Kaneohe Naval Air 
Station has been made in the defense project. This problem has been made the 
subject of a separate letter, copy attached as Inclosure No. 4. 

Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery. There are no major shortages 
of equipment for Harbor Defense Artillery. However, about 150 oflficers and 
2,700 enlisted men as individual reinforcements and one regiment. Coast Artil- 
lery (T. D.) T. O. 4-31 W are required to fully man the Harbor Defense Artillery, 
not including the three obsolescent seacoast mortar batteries. It is urgently 
requested that these replacements and reinforcements be furnished at the earliest 
practicable moment. 

As an accessory to the Harbor Defense Artillery, the north shore Railroad 
connection is extremely important to give access to railway gun positions on the 
north shore. 

Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights. The only serious 
shortage is in beach defense searchlights. A 24-inch carbon-arc light is under 
development; but the receipt of these lights here may be unduly delayed. This 
shortage can be overcome immediately by supplying power units for 42 Mack 
36-inch projectors which are now on hand. The trucks and power units for 
these lights are unserviceable but the projectors are in fair to good shape. 

There is a shortage throughout of spare parts for 60-inch searchlights, which 
were requisitioned some months ago. These would be required for any pro- 
longed action. Information from the Chief of Engineers indicates that they will 
probably be furnished in the near future. 

Provision for more rapid movements of supplies and reserves by improvement in 
roads and trails. With the increase in the number of motors available in the 
department it is most necessary that roads be provided to make the maximum 
possible use of the motors in the movement of reserves and supplies. The Engi- 
neers have made a very careful study of the roads and trails which are necessary 
or the defense of the island. 

[4] There are numerous bottlenecks in the islands where it is not practicable 
to construct alternate roads. If these roads are damaged by shelling or bombing 
it is most important that they be repaired in the minimum of time. To provide 
for this stores of repair material should be placed in close proximity to the vital 
points. It is believed that the Territorial government will cooperate with the 
Army in this matter, thus reducing expenses to be charged to National Defense. 



3022 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communication 
centers. Command Posts, communication centers and items of critical supply 
should be bombproofed. This protection of Command Posts particularly should 
be done immediately in order that these installations can be trained to function 
in these locations before hostilities start. 

Increase in the number of Engineer Troops. The protection of aircraft and the 
construction of air fields will keep one regiment of engineers employed constantly. 
The work on roads and trails would be such as to employ one General Service 
Regiment constantly. The combat Engineer regiment of the Hawaiian Division 
should be left available for bombproofing of Headquarters and communication 
centers and other tactical work. 

Previous recommendations for a regiment of Aviation Engineers, less 1 battal- 
ion, and an increase in enlisted strength of Third Engineers were based on 
assumption that some civilian labor would be available. The situation on 
civilian labor has become acute, and while it has been necessary to import skilled 
labor, the recent increase in defense work is going to necessitate importing un- 
skilled labor as well. The only alternative would be to curtail activities of the planta- 
tions and much of our defense work should not be postponed until that is done. 

Communications covering all the above recommendations are being or have 
been submitted to The Adjutant General. The following are the titles and 
dates of letters covering these subjects : 

Cooperation with the Navy. 

Joint letter, HHD 14th Naval District, 14 February 1941, subject: "Army 
and Navy Aircraft in Hawaiian Area", copy attached, Inclosure No. 1 
AG 354.2/JAX-(pencil) 

Letter, HHD to major echelon commanders, 17 February 1941, subject: 
"Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," file 354.2/JAX, 
copy attached, Inclosure No. 2. 

[5] Dispersion and protection of aircraft. Letter Engr. 452, 19 February 1941, 
subject: "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft," Copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 3. 

Improvement of Antiaircraft defense and of Harbor Defense Artillery. Letter, 
HHD to TAG, 19 February 1941, subject: "Reinforcements for Coast Artillery 
Garrison, Hawaiian Department," file 320.2/55 copy attached, Inclosure No. 4. 

Letter, HHD to TAG, 18 February 1941, subject: "Defense of Naval Air 
Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file 381, copy attached, Inclosure No. 5. 

North Shore Railroad Connection. Letter, HHD Engr. 662.7, 19 February 1941, 
copy attached, Inclosure No. 6. 

Improvement of situation with reference to searchlights, a. Beach defense Lights: 
Letter, Engr. 470.3/6 x 470.3/10, 29 January 1940 with 11 Indorsements, 11th 
Indorsement AG 470.3 (1-29-40) M-D, 26 August 1940. 12th Indorsement, 
HHD dated 18 February 1941, to TAG being transmitted, copy inclosed, In- 
closure No. 7. 

b. Searchlight Parts. Letter, Engr. 470.3/8, 2 November 1940, to the Chief of 
Engineers, subject: "Priority Items, Engineer Status Report, Revision 1940." 
1st Indorsement, O., C. of E., (381.4) (Hawaii) 101, 28 January 1941, states: 
"Reference Par 1 c, the requisition for spare parts for searchlights was concurred 
in by this office. The requisition now is undergoing review by G-4 and action 
. is expected shortly. You will be promptly informed of the action taken." Copy 
of 1st Indorsement inclosed, Inclosure No. 8. 

Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in 
Roads and Trails. 

Letter, Engr. 611, 19 February 1941, subject: "Military Roads and Trails 
Program, Hawaiian Department." Copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 9. 

Bombproofing of vital installations. Letters, Engr. 800.96, following subjects 
and dates. (Copies attached) 

1. Bombproof Command Posts, Hawaiian Air Force, 4 February 1941. 

Inclosure No. 10. 

2. Bombproof Protection, Command Posts, Hawaiian Division, 4 February 

1941, Inclosure No. 11. 

3. Bombproof Const /uction for Magazines at Fort Barrette and Fort 

Weaver, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 12. 

4. Splinterproof Protection for Antiaircraft and Mobile Seacoast Batteries, 

4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 13. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3023 

[6] 5. Bombproof Command Post, Antiaircraft Groupment, 4 February 
1941, Inclosure No. 14. 

6. Bombproof Gasoline Storage, Hawaiian Department, 5 February 
1941, Inclosure No. 15. 

7. Bombproof Protection for Signal Installations, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, 6 February 1941, Inclosure No. 16. 

8. Storage of Defense Reserves, Aviation Gasoline, Hawaiian Air 
Force, 6 February 1941, Inclosure No. 17. 

9. Department Command Post, Aliamanu Crater, last correspondence 
660.9 (S), copy attached, Inclosure No. 18. 

Increase in number of Engineer Troops. — Letter Engr. 322.03, 19 February 1941, 
subject "Additional Engineer Troops", copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 19. 
Enclosures herewith are made for your ready reference and information. 
Sincerely yours, 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, Commanding. 
19 Incls. 

[Exhibit W] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 
Office of the Dep.\rtment Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 19 February 1941. 
In reply refer to: 
Engineer 452. 
SECRET 

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft. 
To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C. 

1. With the present set-up of existing facilities in this Department the pursuit 
ships are forced to operate to a large extent from Wheeler Field and similarly the 
bombardment ships are forced to operate from Hickam Field. In times of actual 
operation some of the bombardment ships will be operating from bases on the out- 
lying islands, but to a large extent the pursuit ships will continue to operate 
from Oahu due to the limited time and radious of operation without refueling. 

2. The concentration of these airplanes at Wheeler Field and at Hickam Field 
presents a very serious problem in their protection against hostile aviation. 
Wheeler Field is too small for the operation of the number of pursuit ships to be 
furnished to this Department and it will be necessary to develop another base 
for at least one group of pursuit aviation. A site in the vicinity of Barbers Point 
has been tentatively selected and is now being discussed with the Navy Depart- 
ment in connection with that Departments activities on its new air base in the 
Ewa Plain Area. The new Army air base will be the subject of a subsequent 
letter. 

3. While this new base will provide some opportunity for dispersion of the pur- 
suit ships this dispersion cannot be counted upon to give adequate protection and 
it will be necessary to provide protection bv means of bunkers in the vicinity of 
existing fields for both pursuit and bombardment aviation. I have asked the 
District Engineer of Honolulu to study this problem and to sbbmit cost esti- 
mates on the most economical satisfactory means of providing this protection. The 
District Engineer has recommended that the protection be provided by a rolled 
fill embankment of dirt and has estimated the cost at $1,200.00 each for pursuit 
planes, $8,000.00 each for two engine bombardment planes and $15,000.00 each 
for four engine bombardment planes. In arriving at these figures he has given 
consideration not only to present unit costs, but has included funds to cover 
increasing cost of both labor and non-labor items in this Department; the figures 
shown include both direct and indirect costs. This bunkering protection will 
cost about the same regardless of its location; the unit price includes cost of taxi 
strips and accessories. 

4. This protection should be provided for 142 single engine pursuit ships and 
121 double engine pursuit ships and for 25 two engine bombers and 70 four 
engine bombers. Using the unit costs quoted above the total for pursuit planes 
is $315,600.00 and the total for bombing planes is $1,250,000.00. The total for 



3024 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the two types is $1,565,600.00. It is recommended that funds in this amount 
be allotted to this Department as soon as possible to initiate the installation of 
this protection. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding. 
A true copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 

£nd Lieut. F. A. 

[secret] 

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft. 

AG 600.12 (2-19-41) M 1st Ind ACW/mme 

War Department, A. G. O., March 3, 1941. To the Chief of the Air Corps 
and Chief of Engineers, IN TLRN. 

For remark and recommendation. 

B3' order of the Secretary of War: 

Adjutant General. 
Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft. 

2nd Ind (12) 

War Department, 
Office, Chief of Air Corps, 

Washington, D. C, March 5, 1941. 
To Chief of Engineers. 

This office concurs in the recommendations as contained in basic communication. 
It is recommended that action be taken to provide funds for this project in the 
next supplemental bill. 



For the Chief of the Air Corps: 



Walter J. Reed, 
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps, 
Executive, Building, & Grounds Dio. 



A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

3nd Lieut. F. A. 

600.1 (Haw. Dept. Airfields)— 38 

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft. 

3rd Ind. 3-N 

Office, C. of E., April 1, 1942. 
To the Adjutant General. 

1. Attention is invited to paragraph 3 of basis letter which gives unit prices 
for rolled fill bunkers for pursuit planes, two-engine and four-engine bombard- 
ment planes. It is noted that the unit prices given include funds to cover in- 
creasing cost of both labor and non-labor items and direct and indirect costs. 
It is also noted that the unit prices include the cost of taxi strips and accessories. 

2. For the reason that the basic letter gave no basis on which this office could 
check the estimate of cost, a radiogram was sent to the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department, March 25, 1941, requesting detailed information sufficient 
for checking. A copy of this radiogram is inclosed. A reply was received 
thereto by radiogram from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 
dated March 29, 1941, copy of which is inclosed. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3025 

3. It is recommended that approval in principle of the proposed protective 
arrangements be granted and that an initial allotment of $1,000,000 be made at 
this time, authorizing the preparation of complete plans and initiation of con- 
struction with a view to providing necessary balances when costs are more 
fully determined. 

For the Chief of Engineers: 

William F. Tompkins, 
Lieut Col., Corps of Engineers, 

Executive Assistant. 
2 Incls: 

Copy of Radiogram dated 3/25/41; 
Copy of Radiogram dated 3/29/41. 
A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern 

2nd lieut F. A. 

Via Air Mail 

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft. 

AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-E 4th Ind. ESA 

War Department, A. G. O., May SI, 1941. 
To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

1. Authority is granted for the construction of revetments in the Hawaiian 
Department for 70 four-engine bombardment, 13 light bombardment and 170 
pursuit planes. This is the total number of airplanes which at present are visual- 
ized as an obtainable objective in Hawaii within a reasonable time. 

2. In locating these revetments, "battle stations" of airplanes should be visual- 
ized in view of present and projected airdromes in the Hawaiian Islands. Revet- 
ments should be dispersed over the widest practicable area around and adjacent 
to airdromes. 

3. In the designs of revetments for use in the present war in the British Isles, 
provision is made for a splinter-proof shelter for airplanes crews and maintenance 
personnel who may be caught in the revetments during an air attack. In the 
British design, this splinter-proof, shelter is placed in the rear wall or back of the 
revetment. In the construction of the revetments proposed for the Hawaiian 
Department, it is believed that this feature should be incorporated. 

4. It is desired that you submit revised estimates covering the construction of 
the revetments approved in paragraph 1 above incorporating splinter-proof shelters 
for plane crews. 

5. Funds, in the amount of $1,358,000 for the completion of this project as 
finally approved after receipt of your revised estimates, are being included in 
estimates for funds now being prepared. 

By order of the Secretary of War: 



Major General, The Adjutant General. 
Incls. w/d 
A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lieut., F. A. 

Engr. 452 5th Ind 

Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Fort Sha/ter, T. H., 31 July 1941. 
The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. Provisions in plans have been made for splinter-proof shelters for airplane 
screws and maintenance personnel. 

2. Revised estimates based on obtainable objectives are as follows: 
a. Personnel shelters 5' x 9' @ $635.00 each for 85 pursuit planes, 

bunkers having already been built on Wheeler Field by troop 

labor $53, 975. 00 



3026 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

h. 85 Pursuit Bunkers @ $1,200.00 and 85 personnel shelters, 
5' X 9' @ $635.00 to be constructed at locations other than 

Wheeler $155, 975. GO 

13 Lt. Bombardme'^t bunkers @ $8,000 and 8 personnel shelters 

5' X 13' @ $800.00 $114, 400. 00 

./. 70 four-enpine bombardment bunkers @ $15,000 and 70 per- 
sonnel shelters 5' x 17' @ $925.00 . - $1,050,000.00 



Total $1, 374. 350. 00 

3. The bunkers for pursuit planes will be built at the new pursuit field and at 
Bellows Field. These for A-20-A planes will be at Bellows Field and for the 
4-engine bombardment planes will be started at Hickam Field. It is not planned 
at this time to construct any bunker for these 4-engine planes on the outlying 
airports, but it is possible that when these airports are completed, the installation 
of some bunkers at these airports with the majority at Hickam may be desirable. 
This question has been discussed with the District Engineer, Honolulu, who states 
that the costs at these field will be about the same as his estimate for Hickam. 

4. Since the figure of $1,374,350.00 is so close to the figure of «l,35S,000.00 
mentioned in 4th Indorsement, it is recommended that the latter figure included 
in the estimates be adopted and that funds in this amount be nllotted to the Dis- 
trict P^ngineer, Honolulu, for this purpose. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commandino- 
A T^ue Cipv: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von GelderN: 

2nd Lieut. F. A. 

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department. 

A-G 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-G 6th Ind. ESA 

War Department, A. G. O., September 22, 1RA1 . 

To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

1. Plans for revetments proposed in tl^e preceding correspondence are approved. 

2. F inds in the amount of $1,358,000 for X>q completion of revetments in the 
Hawa ian Department have been included in Project C-21, preliminary estimates 
1943. It is expected that they will become available about January 1, 1942. 

3. Final design of the revetments is being prepared by the Fortification Divi- 
sion, Corps of P^ngineers, and will be coordinated with the Chief of the Army 
Air Forces, upon completion. 

4. When available, funds will be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, 
for the construction of the required revetments. 

Bv order of the Secretarv of War: 



.\ True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern 

2nd Lieut., F. A. 



Major General, The Adjutant General. 



[Exhibit X] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 
Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., Sept. 10, 19J,1. . 
In replv refer to: 
Engr. 600.96 SECRET 

Subject: Underground Repair Facilities, Hawaiian Air Depot. 
To: The .\djutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. The provision of bombproof faciHties for the repair of aircraft by the Ha- 
waiian Air Depot is vital to the continued functioning of the Hawaiian Air Force 
during an attack on Oahu. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3027 

2. At present all shop and repair facilities of the Hawaiian Air Depot are 
crowded into a small area at Hickham Field. This area is located close to the 
entrance channel of Pearl Harbor which is a perfect landmark even during black- 
outs. Concealment or confusion as to the purpose of this installation by camou- 
flage is impracticable by any means known to this headquarters. In any attack 
or raid on this island, it is not only probable, but almost unavoidable that the 
Depot would be put of of action. 

3. Considerable study has been made of the problem of insuring continued main- 
tenance facilities for the A'w Force and the only logical solution is to provide bomb- 
proof shelter for part of the existing maintenance facilities. Provision of bomb- 
proofed protection for all of these facilities is manifestly impracticable due to the 
tremendous cost. It is believed that bombproofed space for one complete B-17 
type airplane and for two B-17's without wing and tail assemblies, together with 
required space for all subassembly overhaul an repair represents the minimum space 
required. The District Engineer, Honolulu, has prepared a preliminary design of this 
structure and estimates its cost at $3,480,650.00. Copies of the design drawings and 
his estimate are inclosed as Inclosures 1 and 2. Proposed location of this repair 
depot is shown on print, inclosure No. 3. This location has been selected because 
it is at a considerable distance from any other probable target, because the terrain 
is adapted to camouflage and because the soil will ofifer no construction difficulties. 
Location adjacent to the present facilities of the Hawaiian Air Depot at Hickam 
Field is impracticable; rock and ground water are reached only a few feet under- 
ground and this location is close to other primary targets of an air attack. 

4. It is recommended that one imderground repair depot of the type shown on 
inclosed plans be approved for construction at Wheeler Field and that funds in 
the amount of $3,480,650.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, for 
this construction. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding. 

3 Incls: #1 Design Dwgs. (3 sheets) 

2 Estimate 

3 Location Drawing 
A True Copy: 

Edward von Geldern 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lieut., F. A. 

Subject: Underground Repair Facilities, Hawaiian Air Depot. 

AG 600.12 (9-10-41) NC-G 1st Ind. ESA 

War Department, A. G. O., October 27, 1941. 
To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

1. The cost of providing bombproof underground repair facilities compared 
with the advantages to be gained is so great, that it is a policy that such facilities 
will not be provided. 

2. Although the advantages of greater security which could be achieved by the 
provision of bombproof underground repair facilities must be recognized, the 
additional cost involved makes it necessary for air base installations exposed to 
possible bombardment attacks to assume this risk. 

3. One hangar being built for our Atlantic base is to provide sidewalls of bomb- 
splinter proof construction. If you desire installations of this type, due consid- 
eration will be given your request, considering funds are available, and the needs 
of other bases similarly exposed to danger of air attack. 

By order of the Secretary of War: 

E. S. Adams, 
Major General, The Adjutant General. 
3 Incls n/c 
A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lieut., F. A. 



79716 0—46 — pt. 18 12 



3028 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Exhibit Y] 

U] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., October 28, 1941. 
In reply refer to: 
Engr. 400.312 
Via "Clipper" Air Mail 

Subject: Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Materials. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. Reference is made to the following project letters from this headquarters: 

a. Letter to The Adjutant General, Engr. 600.94, 4 February 1941, subject: 
"Splinterproof Protection for Antiaircraft and Mobile Seacoast Batteries," recom- 
mending that $306,000 be allotted to initiate protective shelters for personnel and 
propellants at antiaircraft and mobile seacoast batteries. In 4th Indorsement, 
AG 662.1 (2-4-41) M-WPD, 31 March 1941, this headquarters was advised that 
the recommendation was not favorably considered, and that "protective instal- 
lations of this type should be improvised by ordinary field fortification methods." 

b. Letter to The Adjutant General, Engr. 000.91, 7 July 1941, subject: "Re- 
quest for funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field," recommending that an allot- 
ment of $56,210.00 be made for the purpose of camouflaging bunkers, landing 
field, hangers and warming apron at Wheeler Field. 

c. Letter to the Adjutant General, Engr. 000.91, 27 February 1941, subject: 
"Camouflage of Defense Installations," recommending that $29,000 be allotted 
for camouflage of batteries at Fort DeRussy, Fort Kamehameha, Fort Ruger, and 
Fort Barrette. 4th Indorsement, AG 007.5 (2-27-41) MC-E, 27 June 1941, 
approved the project and stated that funds for this purpose would be included in 
the next estimates and would be made available at the earliest practicable date. 
Radio from the Chief of Engineer 10 October 1941 advises that $29,000 for 
camouflage of coast artillery batteries had been disapproved by the Budget Ad- 
visory Committee. 

[2] d. Letter of The Adjutant General, Engr. 452, 19 February 1941, 
subject: "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft," recommending that an initial 
allotment of $1,565,600 be made for the construction of bunkers for the dispersion 
and protection of aircraft. 4th Indorsement AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-E, 
31 May 1941, granted authority for the construction of revetments for 70 four- 
engine bombardment, 13 light bombardment and 170 pursuit planes, and stated 
that funds in the amount of $1,358,000 for the completion of the project after 
receipt of revised estimates would be included in estimates for funds being pre- 
pared. 5th Indorsement Engr. 452, 31 July 1941, submitted a revised figure of 
$1,374,350, and recommended that it be adopted instead of the $1,358,000. 6th 
Indorsement, AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-G, 22 September 1941, approved plans 
for revetments, and advised funds in amount of $1,358,000 for completion of 
revetments in department were included in Project C-21, preliminary estimates 
1943, funds expected to become available about Januarv 1, 1942. 

€. Letter from the Adjutant General, AG 353 (7-28-41) MC-D, 13 August 
1941, subject: "Reallocation of Special Field Exercise Funds for Field Fortifica- 
tion and Camouflage Projects," and 1st Indorsement thereon, AG 121/1, 14 
September 1941, recommending the immediate allotment of $125,000 for neces- 
sary materials and tools for the construction of field fortifications. This indorse- 
ment was followed up by radio 25 September 1941, recommending immediate 
favorable action on allotment of $125,000 for execution of field fortifications and 
camouflage projects. War Department radio, 29 September 1941, advised re- 
quest was not favorably considered, confirmed by 1st Indorsement War Depart- 
ment 14 September 1941. 

/. Letter to the Chief of Engineers, Engr. 121.2, 17 May 1941, subject: 
"Annual Estimates, Fiscal Years 1942 and 1943," and supporting data under 
Project 5, which requested $50,000 each for fiscal year 1942 and 1943 for local 
purchase of supplies for units of the Hawaiian Garrison other than Engineer 
troops, these supplies to be used in the construction of fortified works other than 
command posts for major echelons and camouflage measures, letter, Office, 
Chief of Engineers, to Department Engineer, 1 July 1941, subject: "Allotment 
of Engineer Service, Army Funds, Fiscal Year 1942," advised that only $5,000 
was being allotted. It further stated "It is believed the amount of $50,000 re- 
quested for this purpose is greatly excessive. Field fortifications or camouflage 
to this extent goes beyond the training stage and reaches the status of a construe- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3029 

tion project. It is suggested that such requirements for the defenses of Hawaii 
be obtained from construction funds, which should be estimated and appropriated 
for this purpose." 

[3] 2. The field fortification and camouflage works that will be required to 
insure the adequate defense of this island are of such magnitude that their ac- 
complishment after the outbreak of hostilities is entirely out of the question. 
All installations located on Government owned or leased land should be con- 
structed at the present time eliminating those tasks from the work that cannot 
be done until after complete mobilization when it will be possible to enter on 
and organize private land. 

3. The program for immediate construction contemplates semi-permanent 
emplacements for all coast artillery weapons in the present defense project. 
These weapons are sited in their most advantageous positions covering all ap- 
proaches to the island and fixed Naval installations and their movement is not 
contemplated under any change of situation. Protection for infantry units is 
based on lightly held beach positions with a strong and highly mobile reserve in 
accordance with latest tactical principles. Dispersed and camouflaged Bunker 
protection must be provided for aircraft and airfield installations must be pro- 
tected by machine gun emplacements and fencing. 

4. The peculiar topographic and geologic conditions and the nature of the 
vegetation of the Hawaiian Islands require a greater expenditure of materials 
for field fortification than would normally be anticipated. In their maneuvers 
and field training, troops have constructed many field fortification works. Sal- 
vage and local materials have been used to the utmost and many methods have 
been improvised to take into consideration the coral and lava rock, sand, and 
peculiar volcanic soil of the islands. This effort has been largely wasted because 
of the rapid deterioration of the local materials used. Sand bags and local tim- 
bers have a maximum life of about six months in this locality. 

5. The War Department has repeatedly directed this Headquarters to con- 
struct certain works by Field Fortification methods but neither materials nor 
funds have been supplied. This letter presents a new computation of all material 
requirements for field fortification works and camouflage which should be con- 
structed at once. This tabulation does not include those materials which must 
be used to complete the field fortification works after the outbreak of hostilities. 
These requirements may be divided into three groups as follows: 

a. The Air Corps requirements. The airfields in the Hawaiian Islands are 
limited in number and there are very few places aside from regular airfields where 
enemy planes might land.. Consequently, it is expected that determined efforts 
would be made to capture existing airfi-elds. To prevent this, protected machine 
gun positic)ns must be placed to guard the sensitive points, on each airfield, aRd 
[4] mobile forces provided for counter-attacks on enemy air-borne or sea- 
borne troops who are attempting a landing or who have landed. Airplanes on 
the ground must also be hidden and dispersed, to prevent their loss in surprise 
air attacks, hence camouflage is needed to conceal them. For this purpose, the 
local vegetation must be augmented by additional planting. In case an airfield 
on the outlying islands must be abandoned, its runways and other essential 
features should be destroyed, hence demolition chambers should be installed in 
advance. These matters cannot be deferred because of the time required for 
vegetation to grow and the time required to install protection and demolition 
works. 

b. Coast Artillery requirements. The Coast Artillery includes permanent fixed 
defenses, mobile guns in positions prepared in time of peace, and antiaircraft 
guns piotecting fixed Naval or military installations. The Coast Artillery can- 
not maneuver; the mobile elements, including antiaircraft, are held in fixed 
positions to defend fixed installations or to cover intervals in the permanent 
defenses, and the best positions have been prepared. Since these positions are 
known to the general public, the enemy also knows them. The operating per- 
sonnel must have shelters to protect them and their ammunition during air attack, 
and the positions must be camouflaged to prevent accurate aim by enemy bombers. 
Coast Artillery troops must be constantly on the alert during active operations, 
and can then spare no men for fortification work after hostilities have begun. 

c. Infantry requirements. The Infantry divisions will occupy beaoh positions 
very lightly held, and will have highly mobile motorized reserves. The beach 
positions have additional weapons, beyond table of organization allowances. 
Emplacements, trench shelters, observation and command posts for the beach 
positions must be ready when the enemy appears offshore, and field works should 



3030 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

be used to develop the maximum efficiency of automatic and heavy weapons and 
release as many men as possible to the reserve. There will be neither time nor 
men available to construct beach positions after the enemy arrives; fields of fire 
must be cleared, barbed wire, road blocks, anti-tank mines, and other obstacles 
must be installed at that time because these defenses will be placfed on private 
property or will unduly interfere with civilian enterprise if set up in advance. 

6. Inclosed are tabulations showing the material requirements of the Air Force, 
the Coast Artillery Command and the two Infantry divisions. 

\5] 7. It is recommended that an allotment of $1,455,542 be made immedi- 
ately available for the purchase of fortification and camouflage materials so that 
the work can be initiated and carried along concurrently with normal training 
activities. 

8. The only alternative for having these positions prepared in advance is to 
have a large increase in the garrison authorized for the defense of the islands. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding. 
1 Incl: in six sheets (in dupl.) ^ 

A True Copy: 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Gbldern, 

2nd. Lt.,F. A. 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department 
fort shafter, t. h. 

Memorandum for Department Adjutant General: 
10 WAR TG 61 WD 

WASHN, D. C, 252P Aug. 12, 1941. 
CG 

Haw Dept, Ft. Shafter, T. H. 
31 12th 

AGjMC reurlet July twenty eighth AG one two one point two subject realloca- 
tion of special field exercise funds for field fortification and camouflage projects 
stop special field exercise funds are not available for purpose requested further 
information follows by mail 

Adams 

1017A 
A True Copy 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

[Exhibit Zl 

[1] Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Office of The Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., July 15, 1941. 
In replv refer to: 
Engr. 000.91 

Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. There is definite need for camouflage treatment of Air Fields in the Hawaiian 
Department. Up to this time no camouflage treatment has been undertaken at 
any air field in this department. 

2. Attached is a plan for camouflage of Wheeler Field prepared by the 804th 
Engineer Company Aviation (Separate). The plan includes photographs of the 
type of camouflage to be applied to the bunkers, together with itemized estimates 
of costs and recommendations. 

3. In reporting on this propo.sed plan, Major J. F. Ohmer, Jr., Corps of Engi- 
neers, Camouflage Officer, has commented as follows: 

"The place for camouflage of Wheeler Field as prepared by the 804th Engineer 
Company Aviation (separate) is a good treatment for the field and the bunkers. 
The plan generalh' calls for 'blending' the buildings of Wheeler Field into the 
Schofield Barracks building area and endeavoring to restore the air field proper 
to the original condition as shown by the present earth scars, such as the old 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3031 

Kamehameha Road, the gully through the field and the pineapple fields, roads 
and irrigation ditches." 

"The plan is practicable and can be readily accomplished by the 804th Engineer 
Company Aviation." 

"The Commanding General, Wheeler Field, has approved the plan and urged 
that the work be expedited." 

" While the air photographs of the two planes in the camouflaged bunkers show 
the wing tips and the harsh straight shadows of the deciding line between the 
upper and lower nets, this can be blended by additional garnishing and small 
nets tying the lower nets under the upper terrace. This work is now being 
completed." 

"It is recommended that the camouflage plans for Wheeler Field be approved." 

[S] 4. It is recommended that an allotment of funds be made to this office 
in the amount of $56,210.00 for the purpose of camouflaging bunkers, landing 
field, hangars, and warning apion at Wheeler Field, the work to be done by the 
804th Engineer Company Aviation (Separate). An itemized estimate is incor- 
porated as a part of the plan substantiating the amount requested. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding. 

1 Incl: Plan 

A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

[3] Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field. 

AG 007.5 (7-12-41) MC 1st Ind. RPM/gt-1712. 

War Department, A. G. C, July 29, 1941. 
To Chief of Engineers and Chief of the Army Air Force, IN TURN. 

For remark and recommendation. 
By order of the Secretary of War: 

/s/ Carl Robinson. 

Adjutant General. 
1 Incl. n/c. 
A true copy 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

[4] Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field. 

600.1 (Wheeler Fid) 71 2nd Ind. 6-C 

War Department, 
Office, Chief of Engineers, 
Washington, D. C, September 16, 1941. 
To: The Chief, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C. 

1. The proposed plan for the camouflage of Wheeler Field, Hawaii, has received 
careful con.sideration by The Engineer Board. As camouflage is essentially a 
local problem long range criticism may be entirely in error. Consequently, the 
following comments are off'ered only to supplement and should not invalidate 
decisions made on the spot by officers with initimate knowledge of local conditions. 

2. Specific comments on Part I: 

a. Bunkers. — The bunkeY-s do not appear in the best arrangement to give maxi- 
mum protection and to afford natural concealment. Their regular curving align- 
ment throws a great burden on the artificial camouflage measures. The outer 
berm of the bunkers should be more irregular at the toe of the slope and should not 
be permitted to appear as a series of parallel lines as seen in photograph (V- 
112.101). Portions of the light colored pattern which show on the photograph 
could be continued over the revetment by sand or the native soil and over the net 
by weaving in appropriately colored garnishing. Extensive planting in native 
patterns will assist in this blending, and it is suggested that vines could be planted 
in the bunker tops and trained to grow into the nets to aid in defeating disclosure 
by means of infra-red photography. If additional dispersal pens are constructed, 
they should be spaced further apart, be more irregularly arranged, and the outer 
surface of the earth walls should be more irregular, especially at the toe of the 
slope. 



3032 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

b. Landing Field. — The division of the field boldly into three sections by natural 
boundaries as described is excellent, and, if carried out as indicated, should be 
very successful. The following detail criticisms may aid in the execution, but are 
not arbitrary. The field roads might be made a little more con.spicuous by 
sprinkling a light colored earth, gravel or lava on the stripped surface as noted by 
contrast in the field roads in lower left corner of photograph (V-109-9I6-N-18). 
The same technique may be u.seful in the reproduction of the old Kamohameha 
road. If the fertilizer method does not produce dark enough contrasts it may be 
necessary to use black emulsified asphalts or a mixture of iron sulphate and tannin. 
The dark areas of the reproduced gully should not be used for taxiing and warming 
up any more than absolutely necessary, as this will destroy the desired effect. 

[5] c. Hangar Line. 

(1) The effort to make the buildings of Wheeler Field appear as a more homo- 
geneous portion of Schofield Barracks might be more effective if more roads, 
dummy or real, were built between the two areas. 

(2) The athletic track is a dangerous subterfuge, because of its characteristic 
outline and east-west orientation, and is not generally recommended as it becomes 
a reference point when detected. 

(3) The painting of buildings on the aprons appears satisfactor}-; maintenance 
■will be required and should not be neglected. 

(4) The hangar painting presents a fine appearance. More disruption might be 
achieved by a larger and bolder plan of painting. The roads which terminate at 
hangars might be carried over the building successfully and the buildings painted 
on the roof tops might be connected with painted walks and service roads to help 
create the illusion of a reduced scale of construction. The general trace of the shad- 
ow s of buildings should be studied and wherever possible, there should be painted, 
or preferably planted, trees and shrubs to break up their characteristic outline. 
Planting, which may appear relatively ineffective in vertical views, may help 
materially against the bombers' approach. 

(5) Inasmuch as the concrete hangar line apron is of brighter material and more 
reflective than other roadways in the area, it should be generally toned down 
w ith a thin solution of tar or asphalt in kerosene, in addition to the other treatment 
suggested. 

3. Specific comments on Part II. 

a. It is suggested an asphalt emulsion for roofs would be cheaper and more 
suitable. In general, the type of paint should be selected with regard to the mate- 
rial to be coated, instead of the classification by roofs, walls, etc. Under "Con- 
crete" it is assumed that aprons are included. The American Betumuls Company, 
which maintains a branch in Hawaii, should be able to furnish asphalt emulsion 
paints and adhesives more advantageously than Rejuvo. The matter of granules 
to cover surfaces should be investigated carefully to see whether local materials of 
indigenous colors or of a nature which will absorb bituminous colors, such as lava, 
are not more easily procurable. 

[6] 4. It is recommended that: 

a. That the plan of camouflage be approved. 

b. That the camouflage office, Hawaiian Department, or the Commanding 
Officer of the 804th Engineer Battalion (Avn.) (Sep.) be granted permission to 
communicate directly with the Engineer Board on matters of materials and 
technical details to expedite the work. 

c. That the Engineer Board be furnished a report to be made upon completion 
of the work, including photographs of intermidiate the final stages. It is sug- 
gested that oblique photographs be furnished as well as vertical. The oblique 
photographs should be taken at 10,000 feet and three to four miles from Wheeler 
Field from four directions. 

d. That the amount of $56,210.00 be alloted to the Department Commander, 
Hawaiian Department, for the purpose of camouflaging bunkers, landing field, 
hangars and warming aprons at Wheeler Field, the work to be done by the 804th 
Engineer Company. 

For the Acting Chief of Engineers: 

[s] Homer Saint-Gaudens, 

Lt. Co., Corps of Engineer, 
Acting Chief, Operations and Training Section. 
1 Incl 
Sub. 1. 
A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 

Snd Lt., F. A. 



"EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3033 



[7] Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field. 

AG 007.5 (7-12-41) MC-G. 3rd Ind. WR-1712. 

War Department, A. G. O., October 28, 1941. 

To Chief of P^ngineers. 

1. The camouflage treatment of Wheeler Field as outlined in basic corres- 
pondence is authorized when funds become available for this construction. 

2. It is desired that you take the necessary action to include the sum of $56,210 
in the next available budget estimate for camouflage treatment of Wheeler Field. 

By order of the Secretary of War: 

D. R. Van Sickler, 

Adjutant General. 
1 Incl. n/c/ . 

Copy to: 

Chief of Air Corps w/cy of basic com., 1st Ind., 2nd Ind. 
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department ref. his basic Itr. 7-12-41, 
together w/cy of 1st Ind., and 2nd Ind. 
A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 



27 Feb 1941. 
Engr. 000.91 

Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations. ^ 

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. Investigations conducted by this headquarters have demonstrated that 
effective measures can and should be taken to reduce the visibility of exposed 
defense installations to hostile aerial observation. Admittedly these installa- 
tions cannot be concealed to such an extent that they will be invisible on aerial 
photographs; at the same time, however, any camouflage which will render visual 
observation more difficult and will decrease the effectiveness of enemy bombard- 
ment is of the utmost importance. 

2. Time has not permitted the submission of a comprehensive program for the 
camouflage of all defense installations in this department which require some 
degree of concealment; this matter is undergoing continuous study. Fixed sea- 
coast batteries have received first attention and plans of procedure and cost esti- 
mates have been prepared. The following table shows the various installations 
on which camouflage work should be undertaken immediately with the tentative 
costs: 



Installation 


Armament 


Inclosure No. 


Co,st 


Ft. DERUSSY: 

Battery Randolph 


1 
2-14" CDi'sappparing).. 


Incl. No. 1. 

Incl. No. 1 

Incl. No. 2 __ 

Incl. No. 3 

Incl.No.3 

Incl. No. 4. .- 

Incl. No. 5 


1 .$6,000.00 
6.000.00 


Battery Dudley .. 

Ft. KAMEHAMf:iIA: 

Battery Closson _ _ 


2-6" (Disappearing) _ 

2-12" (Barbette) 

2-12" (Disappearing) . 


Battery Selfridge 


5,000.00 






1,500.00 


Ft. RUOER: 

Battery Adam.s 


2-8" (Barbette) 


2,000.00 


Ft. BARRETTE: 

Battery Hatch 


2-16" (Barbette) 


8, 500. 00 








Total cost 


$29, 000. 00 











The measures contemplated include construction of various types of overhead 
cover, dummy positions, extension of roads, painting and the transplantation of 
trees and shrubbery. 

3. Experience in the present World War has shown the very considerable 
success of the Germans in concealing by camouflage, their long range guns on the 
channel coasts. The several millions of dollars invested in the installations 
enumerated in paragraph 2 above and their general value in the defense of this 
island justify expenditure which will render them less vulnerable to enemy 



3034 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

attack. It is therefore recommended that the sum of $29,000.00 be allotted this 
department as soon as practicable to permit initiation of this camouflage work. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, Commanding. 
Incls. 1-5: Aerial Photos 
A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations. 

AG 007.5 (2-27-41) M - 1st Ind. ACW/lfi 



To: The Chief of Engineers. 

For remark and recommendation. 
By order of the Secretary of War: 



War Department, A. G. O., 

March 13, 1941. 



Adjutant General. 



S Tncls n/c 

C. of E. 618.33 (Oahu) 3 2nd Ind. 6-E 

Office, C. of E., May 28, 1941. 
To: The Adjutant General, THROUGH THE CHIEF OF COAST ARTILLERY. 

1. This paper was held in this office to permit direct inspection of the installa- 
tions by a representative of this office who visited Hawaii on this and other 
fortification matters. Reference is made to Hawaii on this and other fortification 
matters. Reference is made to memorandum of March 22, 1941, to The Adju- 
tant General, in this connection. 

2. The importance of protective concealment for existing seacoast batteries is 
recognized by this office and a directive bulletin is now being prepared for issue 
to the field showing methods of such concealment for different type batteries. 

3. The estimate submitted is considered an absolute minimum that will be 
required even omitting from consideration at this time Batteries Hatch and 
Closson which are to be casemated and more funds will probably be required at 
a later date. It is recommended that the project be approved and funds be 
made available at the earliest practicable date. 

For the Chief of Engineers: 

George Mayo, 
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers, 

Chief, Fortification Section. 
5 Incls. — n/c 
A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations. 

618.3/45-B 3rd Ind. 5 

War Department, Office, Chief of Coast Artillery, 

June 12, 1941. 
To: The Adjutant General. 

1. The need for camouflaging the seacoast Batteries listed in paragraph 2 of the 
basic letter is evident from inspection of the inclosures, Nos. 1 to 5, inclusive. 
The program as outlined in paragraph 2 of the basic letter, is concurred in, subject 
to the proviso that the protective concealment of Batteries Hatch and Closson 
will be coordinated, both in time and character, with the casemathig of these 
batteries. 

2. No Seacoast Defense funds are available, at this time, for application to 
camouflage projects and none are included in current estimates. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3035 

3. It is recommended that the camouflage project, described in paragraph 2 of 
the basic letter, be approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Department Defense 
Project. 

For the Chief of Coast Artillery: 

Joe D. Moss, 
Major, C. A. C, 

Acting Executive. 
5 Incls — No change. 
A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edwakd Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations, Hawaiian Department. 
AG 007.5 (2-27-41) MC-E BSA 

4th Ind. 

War Department, A. G. O., 

June 27,1941. 
To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

1. The program for the camouflaging of Batteries Randolph, Dudley, Closson, 
Selfridge, Jackson, Adams and Hatch, as proposed in paragraph 2 of the basic 
letter, is approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Defense Project. 

2. Funds to the amount of $29,000 for this purpose will be included in the next 
estimates to be submitted and will be made available at the earliest practicable 
date. 

By order of the Secretary of War: 

E, S. Adams, 

Major General, 
The Adjutant General. 
5 Incls. w/d. 

5th Ind. 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Ft. Shafter, T. H., 

July 24, 1941. 
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, Ft. 
DeRussey, T. H. 

1. To note and return to this headquarters. 

2. The Department Engineer will be directed to include this project in the 
next revision of the Hawaiian Defense Project and to prepare plans for the ex- 
ecution of this work when funds are received. 

By command of Lieutenant General Short: 

O. M. McDoLE, 
Major, A. G. G., 
Assistant Adjutant General. 
A true copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

(Basic: Ltr., HHD, Engr. 000.91, 27 February 1941, subject: "Camouflage of 
Defense Installations.") 

000.91 6th Ind. 

HQ. H. S. C. A. BRIGADE, Pt. DeRussy, T. H., July 29, 1941— To CG Haw. 
Dept. 



Noted. 



A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd LL, F. A. 



Fulton Q. C. Gardner, 
Major General, L. S. Army, 

Commanding. 



3036 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(Exhibit lAi 

[ / 1 • [secret] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 
Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shatter, T. H., 19 February, 1941. 
Engr. 611 

Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. Reference is made to letter, Engr. 611, this headquarters, 8 November 1940, 
covering the recommendations for the revision of the military Roads atid Trails 
Program. As indicated in paragraphs 5 and 8 of that letter, the revised program 
was not complete and additional roads and trails were vmder consideration. 

2. A detailed study made by this headquarters indicates that the following 
additional improvements are necessary: 

a. Wiliwilinui road and trail improvement, estimated cost $33,550.00. Con- 
struction covering improvement of the existing 15,000 lineal feet of road at Wili- 
wilinui Ridge, eliminating sharp curves and providing adequate turnouts. It 
also covers construction of a 6-foot pack trail extending from the end of the exist- 
ing road to the main crest of Koolaupoko Ridge area. 

b. Improvement of Pupukea-Kahuku trail estimated at $12,720.00. This 
project consists of the general widening of the existing trail from 3 to 6 feet along 
its 13,000-foot alignment. This improvement will provide desirable communica- 
tion between the northeasterly section of the Island and northern end of Wahiawa- 
Pupukea trail. 

r. Coincidental with the improvement of the Koolau Ridge trail, feeder trails 
to the ridge should be developed and improved. As a part of its reforestation 
program, the CCC has constructed several trails from forest reserve boundaries 
to the main ridge of the Koolaua along the lateral ridges. These trails, shown in 
the following list, should be partially relocated and improved as 6-foot pack trails: 

(1) Poamono trail, 22,800 feet, estimated cost $35, 100. 00 

(2) Kawailoa trail, 24,000 feet 22, 750. 00 

(3) Schofield-Waikane, 33,000 feet 45, 750. 00 

(4) Waiawa trail, 30,000 feet : 28, 650. 00 

d. A road to Fuu Palailai. This project (copy illegible) of a 10' 

class "B" supply road extending from the main government road to Fuu Falai- 
lai. This road is desired to improve access to a group of fire c ntrol stations 
manned by a detail of from 50 to 100 men. The approximate length of this road 
is 8,700 feet and estimated cost $10,000.00. 

e. lunia-Palehua road. This project will connect an existing plantation road 
with the Palehua spur via the Mauna Kapu and the Honouliuli trails. The need 
for an alternate route to the Manauahua Defense Area is extremely important, 
particularly in view of the exposed condition of the Falehua road to hostile 
observation. This project calls for the construction of 24,000 lineal feet of a 
10-foot class "B" road at an estimated cost of $136,500.00. 

/. Radial Ridge roads, Manauahua area. This project calls for the construc- 
tionof three roads along the ridges, south and west of Fuu Nanauahua as shown 
on the attached map. These roads serve vital defense areas which must be made 
accessible to truck transportation. The total length of these ten-foot roads is 
approximately 20,000 feet and the estimated cost of construction is $84,900.00. 

3. These additional roads and trails have been combined with the 19 items 
listed in paragraph 7 of letter, this headquarters, file Engr. 611, 8 November 
1940, and are shown in the table below in order of their relative priority. The 
location of each item is shown on the map, scale 1/125,000, Inclosure No. 1 
hereto. 

1. Fort Weaver 155-mm position Road 10' Class B $8,900 

2. P'ort Roger Roads lO'ClassB. 4,000 

3. Rarbors Point East 3L Pos. Trail 3L Trail.... l.OOn 

4. Maili Marker 3L Position Trail 3L Trail. 6,000 

5. Mailiilii 3L Position Trail 3L Trail 1,400 

6. Eaena Point 3L Position Trail 3L Trail... 1,000 

7. Wailoa Point 3L Position Trpil 3L Trail. l.f'OO 

8. Completion of Barbors Point Road Net Class .A... 13:<,000 

9. North Shore RR Connection R. R •. 250,000 

10. Improvement Wakiaua Pupukea Road 10' Class A & B 216,000 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3037 

11. Waimoa-Pupukca Roarl 10' Class B . $35,000 

12. Alternate RK Schofield-Wahiuau Bypass R. R _ 70,000 

13. Conneotion-Leilohua Spur to Oahu Sugar Co. tracks ^rail only) R. R 48,600 

14. Ordnance Magazine Area, Sohofleld ?5' Class .\._ 33,000 

15. Feeder Roads Wahiaua Pupukea Road, Improvement. 111,800 

16. Eahuku 155-mni Position Road, 10' Class B._. 9.500 

17. Rahuku CP Trail, CP Trail 2,100 

18. Kepuhi CP Trail, CP Trail g.OOC 

19. Koolau Ridge Trail, 6' Pack Trail _ 20,000 

20. Wiliwilinioa Road, Improvement 17,900 

21. Wiliwilimi Trail, 6' Pack Trail 15,650 

22. Poamoho Tiail, 6' Pack Trail... 35, 100 

23. Pupukoa-Mahuhu Trail, 6' Pack Trail _. 12,720 

24. Hawaiian Trail, R' Pack Trail 22.750 

25. Schofield-Wahiwan Trail. 6' Pack Trail.. 45,750 

20. Waiwan Trail, 6' Pack Trail 28,650 

27. Pau Palailai CP Road, 10' Class B.. 10,000 

28. Kunia-Palahua Road, 10' Class B 136.500 

29. Ridge Roads, Maniamam Area, 10' Class B.. 34,900 

1, 370, 020 

4. It is recommended that the roads and trails program shown in the table 
above be approved in lieu of the present program approved in 4th Indorsement 
(AG 611 Hawaii (3-31-38 (Misc.) (X) dated 23 May 1939, on War Department 
letter (AG 611 Hawaii (3-28-38) Misc. WPD) dated 31 March 1938, subject: 
"Military Priority Highways in the Hawaiian Department". It is further rec- 
ommended that the sum of $1,370,020.00 be allotted to this department as soon 
as possible to permit early completion of this program. 

Walter C. Short, 

Lieutenant General, 

Commanding. 
1 Inch Map 
A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
. Edward Von Gelde-in, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 



Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department. 
AG 611 Hawaii (2-19-41) M 1st Ind. AGW/ric 

War Department, A. G. O., 

February 27, 1941. 
To: Chief of Engineers and Chief of Coast Artillery, IN TURN. 

For remark and recommendation, reference being made to files C. of E. 611 
(Haw) 10 and OCGA 611/45 A 7. 
By order of the Secretary of War: 



Adjutant General. 
1 Incl. a/c 

C. of E., March 12, 1941.— 
To: The Chief of Coast Artillery. 

1. Items 1 to 19, inclusive, in this program were approved tor inclusion in the 
Hawaiian Defense Project in 3rd Indorsement dated February 18, 1941, AG 611 
Hawaiian Department (1 1-8-40) M-WPD; OCGA 611/45 A 7; C. of E. 611 
(Hawaii) 10. It was further directed that the Commanding General confer with 
Mr. Moskowitz, the representative of the Commissioner of Public Roads in 
Hawaii, with a view to securing the maximum aid permissible from the Public 
Roads Administration for the accomplishment of the construction authorized 
Federal Highwav Act of 1940. It was also directed that a revised estimate be 
submitted covering Items 9, 12 and 13. The above action was not available to 
the Commanding General at the time of preparation of basic paper. 

2. Items 20 to 29, inclusive, are new items of work. The estimated cost ap- 
pears reasonable, and their inclusion in the program is recommended. 

3. Attention is invited to letter from the Commanding General Hawaiian 
Department dated February 19, 1941, subject: "Construction of North Shore 
Railroad Connection" file Engr. 611; AG 112.05 (2-19-41) M; C. of E. 611 
(Hawaii) 11 in which it was recommended that funds in the amount of $230,000 



3038 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

be allotted as soon as possible to initiate construction. The itrm referred to is 
included in this paper as item 9. 
For the Chief of Engineers: 

[S] George Mayo, 
George Mayo, 
Lt. Col. Corps of Engineers, 

Chief, Fortification Section. 
1 Inclosure n/c. 

611/45A-10 3rd Ind. 5. 

Office, Chief of Coast Artillery, 
War Deiartment, 

March 15, 1941. 
To: The Adjutant General. 

1. The remarks and recommendations of the Chief of Engineers appearing in 
the 2nd indorsement are concurred in. 

2. In addition to the funds referred to in paragraph 1, 2nd indorsement, $300,- 
000 is included in current Seacoast Defense estimates for application on items 
Nos. 9, 12 and 13 (railroad construction projects). 

For the Chief of Coast Artillery: 

[S] E. T. Blood, 
Colonel, C. A. C, Executive. 
1 Incl. n/c 
A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt. F. A. 

Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department. 

AG 611 Hawaii (2-19-41) M-WPD 4th Ind. ESA 

War Department, A.G.C, 

April 1, 1941. 
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

1. Attention is invited to the preceding 2d and 3d Indorsements. 

2. The program for road, trail and railroad construction contained in para- 
graph 3, basic communication, is approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Defense 
Project in place of the road, trail and railroad program approved by 3d Indorse- 
ment, February 18, 1941, to the letter, subject: "Military Road and Trail 
Program, Hawaiian Department", AG 611 Haw. Dept. (11-8-40) H-WPD. 

3. It is desired that you submit a breakdown of the items contained in the 
road and trail program approved herein to show the expenditures contemplated 
for augmentation and for maintenance. In this connection, attention is invited 
to your 1st Indorsement, January 16, 1941, to the letter, subject: "Maintenance 
and repairs of Fortifications, Estimate of Funds for FY 1943" (Engr. 121.2, 
Forts), in which you request funds for the maintenance of roads. The break- 
down requested is necessary to insure that no duplication will be encountered in 
the defense of estimates to be submitted for the completion of this program. 

Bv order of the Secretarv of War: 



Incl. w/d 

A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt. F. A. 



Major General, The Adjutant General. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 
Proposed prouram, tactical items 



3039 



Priority 




Type 


Esti- 
mated 


Old 


Rec. 


Present 


Rec. 


cost by 
troop 
constr. 


25 


la.. 
6... 

c 

d.... 

e 

/.... 
2a .. 

6.... 

c 

d.. 

e 

3a.. 
ft.... 

c 

rf.... 

e 

4«.. 
4... 

5a . 

6-... 

c 

d.... 

e 

6a.. 
6.... 

c 

d... 
7a.. 
6.... 


Schofield-Walkana 

Kunia-Palehua 

Pupukea-Black Junction 


Pack Trail 

Motor Trail 

Pack Trail 

Foot Trail 

Dirt Road 

Foot Trail 

None 


Motor Trail . . . 


$170,000 


28 

23 


10' WB Macadam 

Improve.. 


75,000 
12, 720 


32 


Poanoho Trail. 


Improve 


10.000 


20 -.- 


Wiliwilinui Road 

Wiliwilinui Trail 

Fort Weaver-155mm Oun Posi- 
tions. 
Fort Rupor Roads 


10' Class B 


1 7, 900 


21 


Pack Trail 


10,000 


1 


10' Class B 


8,900 


2 . . 


None 

None 

None 

None 

Coral Roads 

Motor Trail 

Nore 

None 


10' Class B 


4.000 


3 


Barbers Point East SL Route 

Maili Marker SL Route 


SL Trail 


1,000 


4 


SL Trail 


6,000 


5 


Mailiilii SL Route 


SL Trail . 


6,600 


8 

10 

6 


Barbers Point Road Net Paving.. 

Wahiawa-Pupukea Paving. 

Koera Point SL Route 


Paved Motor Roads 

10' Class A & B 

SL Trail 


75,000 

200,000 

1,000 


7 


Wailea Point SL Route 


SL Trail 


1,000 


17 


Fahuhu OP Route 


None 


OP Trail 


2, 100 


11 


Wainea Pupukea 

Alternate Crossing S. Faloraun 

Gulch. 
Ordnance Magazine Area, Scho- 

field Barracks. 
Manauahua Ridge Route 


Foot Trail 

Raised Ford. 


10' Class B 


45,000 


None 


Bridge.. 


6,000 


14 


22' Class A 


33,000 


20 


Motor Trail 

Foot Trail 

Foot Trail 

Foot Trail 

Dirt Road 

Dirt Road 

Dirt Road 

Foot Trail 

Dirt Road 

Foot Trail 


Water Bound Macad- 
am. 

Improve 

Improve.. 

Improve 

Improve 


74,900 


19 


Koolau Ridge Trail... 




24 


Kaiwailon Trail.. 




26 


Waiawa Route. 




15a 


Haleiwa-Opaeula Approach Road . 
Fawalloe-.\nahulu " " 
Ashley Station " " 
Kopuhi OP Route. 


1 


156.... 
ISc. . 


Improve 

Improve.. .. 


[ 111,800 


l8 .... 


Improve 

10' Class A 




16 .. 


Kahuhu-155mm Oun Positions 

Fua Palailai OP Route 


9,300 


27 


10' Class B.... 


10,000 




Total 




$901,020 













A True Copy: 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt. F. A. 

[7\ Engr. 611 5th Ind. 

He.^dquarters, Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 26 May 1941. 
To: The adjustant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. Reference is made to the following correspondence: 

a. AG 611, Haw. Dept. (11-8-40) M-WPD; Military Road and Trail Program, 
Hawaiin Department. 

b. AG 660 (,4-19-41) M; Expenditure Program, Seacoast Defense Fund, 
Fiscal Year 1942 

c. Eng. 121.2 (Forts); Maintenance and Repair of Fortifications, Estimate of 
Funds for Fiscal Year 1943, (cited in Paragraph 3, 3rd Indorsement above). 

2. a. Road, trail and railroad program submitted in reference a was approved 
by War Department 3rd Indorsement, February 18, 1941, subject to the following: 

CI) That Mr. Moskowitz be contacted to secure a maximum of the unobligated 
portion of $446,000.00, previously allotted the PRA for Hawaii, for the con- 
struction of the road and trail items in the approved program. 

(2) That revised estimates be submitted for the railroad items in the approved 
program. 



3040 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

b. 4th Indorsement, this headquarters, April 4, 1941, submitted the following: 

(1) Recommendation that $446,000.00 available to the PRA be not diverted 
from the purpose for which originally allotted, namely, construction of the 
Wahiama cut-off and the Kolokolo-Waiamoa Road. 

(2) Revised estimates for the rpilroad items and reduced estimates for the road 
and trails portions of the program by the $70,400.00 made available on December 
7, 1940. 

(3) Cross-referenced the originally approved program, items 1-19 inclusive, 
with the additional items, 20-29 inclusive, approved herein and submitted re- 
vised estimates in the amount of $951,020.00 for the road and trail items and 
$298,000.00 for the railroad items. The total cost, $1,249,620.00 supersedes 
estimate of $1,370,020.00 reported in basic letter herewith. 

[8] 3. Reference b informed this headquarters that regular estimates for 
Seacoast Defense funds, FY 1942 include $300,000.00 for the construction of the 
railroad items and $50,000.00 for road and trail items. Release of these funds 
will cover the construction of the railroads $298,600.00) and will reduce the 
required funds for the completion of the roads and trails to $901,020.00. 

4. a. Reference c submitted estimates in the amount of $286,000.00 for the 
upkeep of military roads and trails during FY 1943. These estimates were based 
upon the maintenance of these roads and trails already constructed in this depart- 
ment, since at the time of submission, the augmentation program did not have 
War Department approval. The great increase in FY 1943 estimates over those 
of previous years has been due primarily first, to the necessity of procuring new 
plant and equipment as replacements for outworn units and second, to the neces- 
sity supplanting WPA employees with hired labor as a result of the increasing 
non-availability of the former. 

b. The breakdown of the $286,000.00 estimate showed the proportional amounts 
of the total which would be expended on existing roads and trails. In view of the 
approval by 4th Indorsement of the revised road, railroad, and trail program, 
which contains funds for the improvement of certain existing roads, the original 
breakdown of FY 1943 maintenance estimates is no longer applicable. Specifically, 
maintenance funds for the Wahiana-Purukea Road and Barbers Point Road net 
can be reduced considerably; at the same time, however, the construction of new 
roads and trails during FY 1943 and ensuing years. Attached as inclosure No. 1 
is a revised tabulation of maintenance funds required during FY 1943 for all 
existing roads and trails and those to be constructed under the approved program. 
This breakdown shows specifically the purposes for which these funds will be 
expended. Revised estimates decrease the funds originally requested by 
$34,000.00. 

c. 1st Indorsement, January 16, 1941, which forwarded the estimates cited in 
paragraph 5a, recommended immediate release of $100,000.00 of the $286,000.00. 
This $100,000.00 is necessary for the purchase of materials and additional plant 
and the hiring of labor for the maintenance of long neglected existing roads and 
trails, funds for the improvement of which have not been included in the approved 
augmentation program. 

[9] 5. As explained in the foregoing paragraphs, there is no duplication in 
the funds still required for the constiuction of the approved augmentation pro- 
gram, $1,249,620.00 or $901,020.00 if the $350,000.00 in FY 1942 estimates is 
made available and the funds, totaling $252,000.00, required for maintenance: 
the $1,249,620.00 construction estimate includes no funds for maintenance and 
the $252,000.00 maintenance estimate includes no funds for new construction. 

6. It is recommended: 

a. That in accordance with the revised estimates cited in paragraphs 3b (3) 
and 4, above, funds in the amount of $901,020.00 for the completion of the. 
approved road, trail and railroad program be included in FY 1942 estimates 
to supplement the $350,000 expected to be released. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3041 

(6) That the revised estimates in the amount of $252,000.00 be substituted 
for the $236,000.00 now inckided in FY 1943 estimates for the maintenance and 
repair of military roads and trails and that $100,000.00 of this amount be released 
to this department during FY 1942. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
1 Inch Revised estimate. 
A true copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

[10] Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department. 
AG 611 Hawaii (2-19-41) MC 6th Ind. 21-H/agb-1712 

War Department, A. G. O., June 9, 1941- 
To: Chief of Coast Artillery and Chief of Engineers, In Turn: 
For remark and recommendation. 
By order of the Secretary of War: 

1 Inch n/o , 

Adjutant General. 
611/45-A-lO 7th Ind. 3. 

War Department, 
Office, Chief of Coast Artillery, 

June 12, 1941. 
To: Chief of Engmeers. 

1. The records of this office indicate that the necessary action has been takeu 
with a view to accomplishing the recommendations appearing in paragraph 6 a 
of 5th Indorsement, assuming that that portion of the recommendation reading 
"FY 1942" was intended to read "Fy 1943" 

2. With respect to the recommendation appearing in paragraph 6 6 of 5th 
indorsement, preliminary estimates for FY 1943 do not now include a specific 
item for maintenance and repair of military roads and trails. The total sum 
now appearing in the preliminary estimates FY 1943 under Project 11 — Alter- 
ation, maintenance and repair of fortifications — is $225,000. Fy 1942 estimates 
for Project 11 total $173,710. The portion of these funds to be applied to mainte- 
nance of roads and to strictly fortification works appears to be discretionary with 
the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. However, the basis for esti- 
mating these funds for FY 1941 Included specifically $59,000 as applicable to 
road maintenance. 

For the Chief of Coast Artillery: 

Leonard L. Davis, 

Lt. Col, C. A. C, 

Assistani. 
1 Inclosure 
(Dup. w/d). 
A true copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geidern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

[11] C. of E. 611 (Hawaii) 12. 

Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department. 

8th Ind. 6-E 

Office C. of E., 

July 1, 1941. 
To: The Adjutant General. 

1. Reference paragraph 6 a of 5th Indorsement and paragraph 1 of preceding 
Indorsement, it is recommended that authority be granted to include the $901,000 
required for the completion of the approved road, trail and railroad program in 
the supplemental estimates for Fiscal Year 1943 at the first opportunity. 



3042 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. The remarks of the Chief of Coast Artillery in paragraph 2 of 7th Indorse- 
ment are concurred in. 

For the Chief of Engineers: 

George Mayo, 
Lt. Col., Corps oj Erigineers, 

Chief, Fortification Section. 
1 Inclosure n/c. 
CG of OCCA 
A True Copy: 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

[12] Subject: Militarv Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department. 
AG 611 (2-10-41) MC-K EGA 

9th Ind. 

War Department, A. G. O., July 18, 1941. 

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

1. Funds in the amount of $300,000 for railroads and $50,000 for roads and 
trails are now available from FY 1942 appropriations for construction contained 
in the approved Road, Trail, and Railroad Program. These funds will soon be 
released to the District Engineer. Additional funds in the amount of $900,000 
have been included in tentative estimates, FY 1943 for the completion of the 
approved Road and Trail Program. This latter amount will be requested at an 
earlier time in the event that further supplemental FY 1942 estimates are prepared. 

2. General maintenance funds to the amount of $173,710 are now available 
from FY 1942 appropriations and a substantial amount thereof has been released 
to the District Engineer, Honolulu. The portion of these funds to be applied 
to the maintenance of roads is discretionary with you. Additional general 
maintenance funds to the amount of $223,000 "have been included in preliminary 
estimates, FY 1943. 

3. An additional amount of $140,000 will be included at the first opportunity 
in estimates to be submitted to provide further funds for maintenance of roads 
and trails in your department. 

By order of the Secretary of War: 

r 

Major General, 
The Adjutant General. 
Inch w/d 
A true copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

[Exhibit IB] 
Vi& "Clipper" 
Air Mail 
Engr. 600.12 

Commander, 
Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 April 'U 
[extract] 

Subject: Construction at Bellows Field, T. H. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. Reference is made to 1st Indorsement. The Adjutant General's office, file 
AG 370.5 (2-15-41) M-D, dated 5 March 1941 which authorized the permanent 
assignment of the 86th Observation Squadron and the 58th Bombardment 
Squadron at Bellows Field. 

******* 

5. The improvement of the runways consist in lengthening the present runway 
from about 2800' to 3400' and widening from 150' to 300'. The new runway is 
5000' long and 300' wide. Cross-connection the existing and the new runway is a 
paved taxi strip and parking .strip 300' wide and 2200' long with a servicing niat 
300' X 600' adjacent to the taxi strip. Ail runways, servicing mats and taxi strips 
will be asphaltic concrete. Other installations required are an airdrome control 
tower and an aqua-gasoline system of 600.000 gallon capacity. The necessary 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3043 

tanks for this gasoline system are on hand. A complete system of airport lighting 
and sewer, water, and power utilities will be necessary. Miscellaneous installa- 
tions include man-proof fences around vital installations, improvement of the 
drainage of the camp area, pistol and 1000" machine gun ranges, and roads and 
sidewalks. 

7. The improvements recommended are all necessary. Funds for improving 
the runways in particular should be e.xpedited. The District Elngineer has in- 
formed me that it is possible at this time to secure on the mainland the necessary 
plant and equipment for this paving but that unless contracted for in the very 
near future, it will not be much longer available. 

******* 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
3 Incls: 

No. 1 Tabulation of Housing Needs 

2 Layout Map* 

3 Tabulation of Cost Estimates 
*(Filed in Drafting Room; Bellows Field #1) 

No R/S was prepared. Verbal approval of C/S and signature secured by Major 
Fleming, 5 April 1941. 

Copy to Hawaiian Air Corps 4/8/41 
Copy to District Engineer 4/17/41 
A true copy : 

Edward von Geldern 
Edward von Geldern 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

Subject: Additional funds for Completion of Authorized Mobilization Housing 
Project, Hawaiian Department 

2nd Ind. (12-P3) 

War Department, 
Office, Chief of the Air Corps, 

Washington, D. C, June 26, 1941 
To: The Quartermaster General. 

1. Reference is made to Paragraph I.e. of basic communication which indicates 
that funds in the amount of $990,769 will be included in future estimates for the 
projects at \\ heeler, Hickam, and Bellows Fields, as requested in Paragraph 
2.0,6, and c of basic communication. 
For the Chief of the Air Corps 

Frank M. Kennedy 

Colonel, Air Corps 
Chief, Buildings and Grounds Division 
Copied from Project Letter B-1 
A true copy: 

Edward von Geldern 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F.A. 

[1] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 
Office of the Department Commander. 

Fort Shafter. T. H., 2 May 1941. 
Engr. 600.12 

Subject: C'onstruction at Barking Sands Field, Kauai, T. H. 
To: The Adjutant General, \A'ashington, D. C. 

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's Office, file AG 580 
(3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." 
At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded 
with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently 
needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of 
training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more 
fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The 

79716 O — 46— pt. 18 13 



3044 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing 
need. 

2. It is recommended that Barking Sands Field on Kauai be developed into an 
outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 6 
officers and 107 men, and 1 National Guard company to provide local security 
of 4 officers and 116 men. total 10 officers and 223 men. In addition to this 
permanent garrison, two heavy bombardment squadrons of 37 officers and 206 
men each from Hickam Field will be sent to Barking Sands for training. While 
these bombardment squadrons will change, two will be temporarily stationed at 
all times at this field. The total garrison at Barking Sands including temporary 
and permanent troops will be 84 ofl^icers and 635 men. 

3. Some buildings have been and are being erected at this field by the WPA. 
Additional buildings will be necessary and the WPA Administrator lias informed 
me that neither his material funds nor his available labor will be sufficient to 
complete the required program. There is inclosed as Inclosure Xo. 1 a tabula- 
tion showing the buildings, built and building by the WPA and the additional 
buildings required which include administration buildings, shops, warehouses, 
recreation buildings, mess halls, officers' quarters and other structures. Complete 
utility system should be provided for this camp. All buildings to be mobilization 
type. 

' 4. Other construction recommended consists in improvement of flying condi- 
tions by the grading of two runways 5000' by 500' and the paving of a 200- 
strip on each runway for a length of 5000', the construction of a servicing mat 
and the installation of a complete airport lighting system. Storage for 450,000 
gallons of gasoline will soon be installed by the District Engineer with funds 
now available to him; in this storage nine of the eighty [2] 50,000-gallon 

tanks now on hand will be utilized. These tanks are now designed for the aqua 
system; at this time, however, the tanks are being installed for storage only and 
if at a later date the necessity develops, this storage system can be readily con- 
verted into the aqua system. Also included in the cost estimates are miscellaneous 
items such as an airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000" ranges and man-proof 
fencing around vital installations. Roads within the camp area have also been 
included in the cost estimates; an improvement to the access road to this military 
reservation from the nearest point on the Kauai belt road has been the subject 
of discussion with the local public roads administration under the provision of 
Section 18 of the Federal Highway Act of 1940. Surveys of this road are now 
being made by the Territorial Highway Department; these surveys have not 
been completed. The local Public Roads Administration officials, based on a 
reconnaissance, estimate that this access road will cost about $150,000. As it 
is doubtful whether either territorial or Federal Highway funds will be available 
for construction on this amount has also been included in the estimates. Tele- 
phone costs have been estimated at 2^% of building costs as directed in Chief 
Signal officer's radio of 11 March 1941. In determining the building costs a 
constructive evaluation of the work already done by the WPA based upon costs 
of the new buildings recommended in this letter was used to ar.rive at the total 
costs. 

5. There are inclosed as Inclosures Nos. 2 and 3, a layout drawing of this 
field and a tabulation of cost estimates of the buildings and other improvements 
required. These cost estimates were prepared by the District Engineer, Honolulu, 
and include not only direct but also the indirect costs of the job. The total 
required to complete the installation is $1,772,220. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3045 

6. It is recommended that the improvement of Barking Sands be authorized 
and that funds in amount of $1,772,220.00 be released to the District Engineer, 
Honolulu, to initiate this construction. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
3 Incls: #1 — Bldg tabulation 
#2 — Layout drawing 
#3 — Cost Estimate 
A true copy: 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

{1\ Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941. 
In replv refer to: 
Via "Clipper" Air Mail 
Engr. 600.12 

Subject: Construction at Hilo Airport. 

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. Reference is made to letter. The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 
(3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objec- 
tive." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are over- 
crowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are 
urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons 
of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need 
more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. 
The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this exist- 
ing need. 

2. It is recommended that Hilo airport be developed into an outlying field 
with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men, 
and 2 National Guard companies to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 
men each, total 12 officers and 382 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, 
one heavy bombardment squadron of 37 officers and 206 men from Hickam 
Field will be sent to this field for training. While this squadron will change, at 
least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The 
total garrison at Hilo therefore will be 49 officers and 588 men. 

3. Some buildings are now being erected at this field by the WPA. Additional 
buildings are needed and the WPA Administrator has informed me that neither 
his material funds nor his available labor will be sufficient to complete the required 
program. The buildings now being built and the additional ones required are 
tabulated in the cost estimates. A complete utility system is recommended. 
Buildings. will be mobilization type. 

4. The runways at the Hilo airport will be improved, through a CAA contract 
under supervision of the District Engineer, Honolulu. Additional improvements 
needed are the installation of storage for 450,000 gallons of gasoline; for this 9 of 
the 80 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized. These tanks were 
designed for the aqua system, but simple storage only is recommended at this 
time. If the need later develops, this storage can readily be converted to the 
aqua system as all fittings will be available on the tanks. 

[2] 5. There are inclosed as Inclosure No. 1 a tabulation of cost estimates, 
and as Inclosure No. 2 a layout map of the field. In addition to the items already 
mentioned, these estimates include miscellaneous items such as roads, airdrome 
control tower, pistol and 1000 inch ranges and telephone installations. These 
telephone costs have been estimated at 2}^ per cent of the building costs as directed 
in Chief Signal Officer's radio of 11 March 1941. In determining the total build- 
ing costs a constructive evaluation of the work now being done by the WPA was 
combined with the estimated costs of construction recommended in this letter. 
The estimates in the tabulation were prepared by the District Engineer, Honolulu, 
and include indirect as well as direct costs of the job. 



3046 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTICATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

6. It is recommended that this construction on the present military reservation 
at the Hilo airport be authorized and that funds in the amount of $670,140 be 
allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation. 
2 Incls: #1 Cost Estimates 
#2 Layout map 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
A true copy: 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

headqrar,ters hawaiian department, 
Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941 
In reply refer to: 
Via "Clipper" Air Mail 

Subject: Construction at Homestead Field, Molokai. T. H. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1., Reference is made to letter. The Adjutant General's Office, file AG 560 
(3-7-4 l)M-G-i\I, 14 March 1941, Subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objec- 
tive." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are 
overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports 
are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for 
reasons of training and operations in time of peace: in addition to this peacetime 
need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. 
The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this 
existing need. 

2. It is recommended that Homestead Field, Molokai, T. H., be developed 
into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment 
of 4 officers and 50 men, and 1 National Guard Company to provide local security 
of 4 officers and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 men. In addition to this perma- 
nent garrison, one pursuit squadron of 33 officers aiid 157 men from Wheeler 
Field will be sent to this field for training. While this squadron will change, at 
least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The 
total garrison at Homestead Field therefore will be 41 officers and 323 men. 

3. Some buildings have been and are being built at this field by the WPA. 
Additional buildings are needed and the WPA Administrator has informed me 
that neither his material funds nor his available labor will be sufficient to com- 
plete the required program. The buildings now being built and the additional 
ones required are tabulated in the cost estimates. A complete utility system is 
recommended. Buildings will be mobilization type. 

4. The runways at the Homestead Field will be improved through a CAA 
contract under supervision of the District Fhigineer, Honolulu, .\dditional im- 
provements needed are the installation of storage for 350,000 gallons of gasoline; 
for this 7 of the 30 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized. These 
tanks were designed for the aqua system, but simple storage onlv is recommended 
at this time. If the need later develops, this storage can readily be converted to 
the aqua system as all fittings will be available on the tanks. 

A true copy: 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2tid Lt. F. A. 

[2\ 5. There is inclosed a tabulation of cost estimates. In addition to the 
items already mentioned, these estimates include miscellaneous items such as 
roads, airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000 inch ranges and telephone installa- 
tions. The.se tele'phone costs have been estimated at 2^2 per cent of the building 
costs as directed in Chief Signal Officer's radio of 1 1 March 1941. In determining 
the total building costs a constructive evaluation of the work now being done by 
the WPA was combined with the estimated costs of const r\ict ion recommended 
in this letter. The estimates in the tabulation were prepared by the District 
P.ngineer, Honohilu, and include indirect as well as direct costs of the job. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3047 

6. It is reconiiuendec) that this construction on the prcscMit military reservation 
at Homestead Field be authorized and that funds in the amount of $407,600.00 be 
allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation. 
1 Tnd: Cost Estimates. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, V. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
A true copy: 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt. F. A. 
[1] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department 
Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., May 2, 1941. 
Engr. 600.12 
Via "Clipper" Air Mail 

Subject: Construction at Morse Field, Hawaii 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. Reference is made to letter. The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 
(3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Array's Second Aviation Objective." 
At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded 
with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently 
needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of 
training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more 
fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating condition. The 
Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing 
need. 

2. It is recommended that Morse Field on Hawaii be developed into an outlying 
field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 6 officers and 
107 men, and 1 National Guard company to provide local security of 4 officers 
and 116 men, total 10 officers and 223 men. In addition to this permanent 
garrison, two heavy bombardment squadrons of 37 officers and 206 men each from 
Hickam Field will be sent to Morse Field for training. While these bombardment 
squadrons will change, two will be temporarily stationed a large part of the time 
at this field. The total garrison at Morse Field including temporary and per- 
manent troops will be 84 officers and 635 men. 

3. Some buildings have been built at this station by troop labor. Other 
buildings have been and are being built by the W^PA. Additional buildings and 
improvements are necessary; I_believe that the requirements of training preclude 
any extensive use of troop labor and the WPA Administrator has informed me 
that neither his material money nor his available labor will be sufficient to com- 
plete the required program. These additional buildings' will all be of mobilization 
type construction for use as operations buildings, shops, administrative and supply 
buildings, barracks, mess halls, magazines, etc. A complete system of utilities 
should be provided. 

4. Other construction recommended consists in improvement of flying facilities 
by the paving of a main runway 3400 feet long and 300 feet wide, and its extension 
by grading, leveling and light paving to a length of 4150 feet and width of 400 feet. 
Because of prevailing wind conditions, only one paved runway is considered 
necessary by the Commanding General, [2] Hawaiian Air Force. Neces- 
sary taxi mats, service mats and warming up aprons will be graded and paved. 
A complete airport lighting system will be installed. Gasoline storage for 450,000 
gallons utilizing nine of the eighty 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be in- 
stalled; because of the shortage of water at this field, this will be plain storage 
and not the aqua system. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 1, a layout map of 
this field. It will be noted that considerable areas in the vicinity of the runway 
are shown for light paving. This is necessary; the soil at this field is very fine 
and with the prevailing high velocity wind there is a serious dust problem as this 
dast aff"ects the engines of the planes. The shortage of water makes stabilization 
by sodding or vegetation impracticable, and the most practical way that this 
problem can be solved is to stabilize by light paving. 



3048 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

5. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 2 a tabulation of cost estimates of the 
buildings and other improvements required. In addition to the items already 
mentioned, miscellaneous items such as roads, pistol and 1,000 inch ranges, an 
Airdrome Control tower, and telephone installations have been included. These 
telephone costs have been estimated at 2^2 percent of building costs as directed 
in Chief Signal Officer's radio of II March 1941. In determining the building 
costs a constructive evaluation of the work already done by troop labor and the 
WPA based upon costs of the new buildings recommended in this letter was 
used to arrive at the total costs. The estimates in the tabulation were prepared 
by the District Engineer, Honolulu, and include the indirect as well as the direct 
costs of the job. . , 

6. It is recommended that the improvement of Morse Field be authorized and 
that funds in the amount of $1,687,530 be allotted to the District Engineer, 
Honolulu, to complete the installation. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
2. Incls: #1 — Layout Map 

#2 — Cost Estimates 
A true copy 

Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt. F. A. 

[confidential] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 
Office of the Department Commander, 

Ft. Shafter, T. H. 
Engr. 600.12 

Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. Reference is made to letter. The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 
(3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." 
At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded 
with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently 
needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of 
training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more 
fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The 
Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing 
need. 

2. At present the Hawaiian Air Force has under lease an unimproved landing 
field located at Haleiwa, on the north shore of Oahu, about ten miles airline dis- 
tance from Wheeler Field. There are no paved runways, and no installations 
other than boundary marking lights. No permanent detachment is quartered 
there. The field is used for practice landings, etc. by the pursuit aviation at 
Wheeler Field. 

3. It is proposed that this field be improved by the grading and paving of one 
runway 4000' by 300' and by the installation of other facilities for flying operations. 
These w^ill include an operations building and airdrome control tower and storage 
for 100,000 gallons of gasoline using two of the eighty 50,000 gallon tanks now on 
hand. This storage will utilize the aqua system. A small galvanized warehouse 
for oil storage will be provided. 

4. The only garrison at this field will consist of a small permanent detachment 
to refuel and handle planes on the ground and to operate radio and control installa- 
tions. For this detachment a combined barracks and mess hall will be provided. 

5. It is recommended that the improvement of Haleiwa Airport be authorized 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3049 

as outlined above and that funds in the amount of $450,000 be allotted to the 
District Engineer, Honoluhi for this construction. 
1 Incl: Cost Estimate 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, V . S. Army, Commanding. 
A true copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2d Lt. F. A. 

Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H. 

AG 580 (5-22-41) MC RPM/agb-1712 

1st Ind. 

War Department, A. G. O., May 27, 1941. 

To: Chief of the Air Corps and Chief of Engineers, IN TURN: 

For remark and recommendation. 

By order of the Secretary of War: 



Adjutant General. 
1 Incl. n/c 

2nd Ind. (9) 

War Department, 
Office, Chief of the Air Corps, 

Washington, D. C, May 31, 1941. 
To: Chief of Engineers. 
Approval recommended. 
For the Chief of the Air Corps: 

[S] Edward P. Curtis, 
Edward P. Curtis, 
Major, Air Corps, Executive, Plans Division. 
1 Incl. n/c 
A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

600.1 (Haleiwa Airfield, T. H.) 1 

Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H. (Let. from Hawaiian 
Dept. H", to AGO, 5/22/41) 

3rd Ind. 3-N 

Office, C. of E., June 10, 1941. 
To the Adjutant General. 

1. Approval recommended. 

2. It is assumed that the District Engineer at Honolulu collaborated with the 
Hawaiian Department Commander in preparation of the estimate inclosed with 
the basic communication. Further delay in verification of this estimate is not 
considered advisable inasmuch as the funds required can be rectified if necessary 
in the future. 

3. Funds for this construction at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H. are available in this 
office under the Miscellaneous Construction Reserve provided this construction 
is of a high priority, the urgency for which is not known in this office. 



3050 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

4. If authorized it is requested that the amount of $460,000 be approved for 
allotment from funds reserved under the Miscellaneous Construction Reserve for 
construction of the buildings, gasoline storage and runways as specified in the 
inclosed estimate. 

For the Chief of Engineers: 

John R. Hardin, 
Major, Corps of Engineers, 

Chief, Construction Section. 
Inclosure: Sub 1 
A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H. 

AG 580 (5-22-41) MC-D 4th Ind. RPM/agb-1712 

War Department, A. G. O., June 25, 1941. 
To: Chief of Air Corps. 

1. You are authorized to proceed with plans for construction of an airfield at 
Haleiwa, on the island of Oahu, as indicated in basic communication. 

2. You are authorized to include in the next available estimates, funds for the 
accomplishment of this project, in the amount of $450,000, as recommended in 
basic communication. 

3. The allotment of Miscellaneous Construction Reserve Funds for this 
project, as recommended in paragraph 3, 3rd Indorsement, is not favorably con- 
sidered as these funds are required for other purposes. 

By order of the Secretary of War: 

D. R. Van Sickler, 

Adjutant General. 
1 Incl. — n/c 
Copies to: 

Chief of Engrs. Ref. his 3rd Ind., 600.1 (Haleiwa Airfield, T. H.) 1. 
6-10-41, to TAG. 

Commanding General, Haw. Dept. Ref. his basic Itr., Engr. 600.12, 
5-22-41, to TAG, w/cys. of 1, 2, & 3 Inds. 
A true copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

[1\ [confidential] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 
Office of the Department Commander, 
In reply refer to: 22 May 1941. 

Via "Clipper" Air Mail 
Engr. 600.12 

Subject: Construction at Burns Field, Kauai, T. H. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. Reference is made to letter. The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 
(3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." 
At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded 
with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently 
needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of 
training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more 
fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The 
Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing 
need. 

2. It is lecommended that Burns Field be developed into an outlying field with 
a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men, 1 
National Guard company to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men, 
total 8 officers and 166 enlisted men. In addition to this garrison, one heavy 
reconnaissance squadron of 43 officers and 233 men will be sent to this field for 
training. Either this squadron or a heavy bombardment squadron will be sta- 
tioned at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison at the field will 
therefore consist of 51 officers and 399 men. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3051 

3. Some buildings have been erected at this field by soldier labor. Other 
buildings are necessary and soldier labor is not available for their construction. 
These buildings have been tabluated in the cost estimates, Inclosure No. 1. All 
buildings will be of mobilization type construction. The installation of a com- 
plete system of utilities is recommended. 

4. The runways at Burns Field are authorized for improvement by a CAA 
project. Additional improvements needed are the installation of storage for 
200,000 gallons of gasoline; for this four of the eighty 50,000-gallon tanks now on 
hand will be utilized. These tanks were designed for the aqua system, but simple 
storage only is recommended at this time. If the need later develops, this storage 
can be readily converted to the aqua system as all fittings will be available on the 
tanks. 

[3] 5. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 1 a tabulation of cost estimates. 
In addition to the items already mentioned, these estimates include miscellaneous 
items such as roads, airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000-inch range and 
telephone installations. These telephone costs have been estimated at 2}2% of 
the building costs as directed by the Chief Signal Officer's radio of 11 March 
1941. The estimates include direct as well as indirect co.sts of the job. 

6. It is recommended that this construction be authorized on the present 
military reservation at Burns Field and that funds in the amount of $636,163.00 
be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S Army, Commanding. 
1 Incl: Cost Estimates 
A true copy: 

Edward vgn Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt. F. A. 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Office of the Department Commander. 

Fort Shafter, T. H. 
Via "Clipper" Air Mail 
Engr. 600.12 

Subject: Proposed Airfield on the Island of Lanai. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. Reference is made to letter, the Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 
(3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." 
At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded 
with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently 
needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of 
training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more 
fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The 
Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing 
need. 

2. Included in the plan for dispersion of facilities is a proposed airport on the 
Island of Lania. A location has been selected and preliminary negotiations for 
leasing have been made. The land is owned by the Hawaiian Pineapple Company 
which is willing to lease it to the government on a twenty-five (25) year lease in 
return for one dollar a year rental and the use of the flying field. The location 
of the field, barracks area, and a proposed bombing range are shown on map, 
scale 1/62,500 inclosed as Inclosure No. 1. Project letter for the bombing range 
has already been submitted by letter to The Adjutant General, subject: "Con- 
struction of Night Bombing Range, Island of Lanai" file Engr. 686 dated 16 Mav 
1941. 

3. It is propo.sed to improve this field by the grading and paving of two 5,000' 
runways 300' wide and by the installation of facilities for flying operations. These 
will include the necessary operations buildings and shops, airdrome control tower 
and storage for 200,000 gallons of gasoline using four of the eighty 50,000 gallon 
tanks now on hand. Although these tanks were designed for the aqua system, 
only simple storage is proposed, although all the necessary fittings for later con- 
version to the aqua system will be installed. 

4. The rotating garrison at this field will consist of an air base detachment of 
4 officers and 50 men and a National Guard companj' for local security of 4 officers 
and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 men. In addition to this garrison, a pur- 



3052 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

suit squadron of 33 officers and 157 men will be temporarily stationed at this 
field for training. While this squadron will change at least one will be tempo- 
rarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison, there- 
fore, will be 41 officers and 323 men. 

5. There is attached as Inclosure Xo. 2 a tabulation showing in detail the 
buildings and other construction proposed with estimated costs. These costs 
include not only direct but also indirect costs of the job. The total cost shown 
on this tabulation is $1,990,000.00. 

6. The following is recommended: 

a. That this headquarters be authorized to proceed with negotiations for the 
lease of this site. 

b. That construction and improvements outlined in Inclosure Xo. 2 be 
authorized. 

c. That funds in the amount of $1,990,000.00 be alloted to the District Engineer, 
Honolulu, to complete this installation. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
2 Incls: #1 Map; #2 Cost Estimates. 
A True Copy. 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lieut. F. A . 

Subject: Proposed Airfield on the Island of Lanai. 

AG 580 (5-22-41) MC 1st Ind. RPM/agb-1712 

War Department, A. G. O., May 27, 1941. 
To: Chief of the Air Corps and Chief of Engineers, IN TURN: 
For remark and recommendation. 
Bv order of the Secretary of W'ar: 



2 Incls. n/c Adjutant General. 

2nd Ind. 

War Department, 
Office, Chief of the Air Corps, 

Washington, D. C. June 2, 1941. 
To: Chief of Engineers. 

Approval recommended. Attention is invited to the Memorandum for the 
Chief of Staff, (WPD 2550-22), 6-10-41, Subject: Estimates for the Construc- 
tion of Airports for Hav, aiian Air Force. 
For the Chief of the Air Corps: 

Edward P. Curtis, 
Major, Air Corps, Executive, Plans Division. 
2 Incls. n/c 
A true copy. 

Edward von Geldern 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lieut. F. A. 

600.1 (Hawaiian Dept. Airfields) 83 

Subject: Proposed Airfield on the Island of Lanai. 

3d Ind. 3-N 

Office, C. of E., June 16, 1941. 
To the Adjutant General. 

1. Approval recommended. 

2. The estimate of cost as given in the basic communication was prepared by 
the District Engineer at Honolulu, T. H. 

3. If authorized, it is requested that the amount of $1,990,000 be approved for 
allotment to the District Engineer at Honolulu for the construction of buildings, 
utilities, runways, and other installations on the Island of Lanai, as recommended 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3053 

in the basic communication and inclosure thereto, from funds reserved under the 
Fifth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act (Pilot Training Schools 
Reserve), approved April 5, 1941. 
For the Chief of Engineers: 

John R. Hardin, 
Major, Corps of Engineers, 

Chief, Construction Section. 
Inclosures: Subs 1-2 
A true C"py: 

Edward Von Geldern 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lieut. F. A. 

Subject: Construction of Airfield at Lanai, T. H. 

AG 580 (5-22-41) MC-G ESA 

4th Ind. 

War Department, A. G. O., August 8, 1941. 
To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

1. You are authorized to pioceed with negotiations for the lease of the site 
referred to in basic communication. 

2. The construction as recommended by you is authorized except that "Theatre 
Operations Type of Construction" be substituted for the "mobilization type" 
requested. 

3. It is desired that funds required be included in the next budget estimates. 
Bv order of the Secietarv of War: 



Major General, 
The Adjutant General. 
2 Incls. n/c 
A true copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lieut F. A. 

[1] [confidential] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 
Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941. 
Via "Clipper" Air Mall 
Engr. 600.12 

Subject: Construction at Proposed Airport, Parker Ranch Area, Hawaii, T. H. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. Reference is made to letter. The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 
(3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Obje(itive." 
At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded 
with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently 
needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of 
training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more 
fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The 
Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing 
need. 

2. There has been for some time a realization that an additional field was 
necessary on the Island of Hawaii, and extensive studies have been made on its 
location. The best location found was about four miles from the town of Waimea 
on land owned by the Territory of Hawaii, and at present under lease to private 
cattle interests. The site consists of about 1,360 acres, and it is believed that 
the land can be transferred to the Federal government under Section 91 of the 
Organic Act. Preliminary negotiations to this end have been opened with the 
Territory. The location of the field is shown on map, scale 1/62,500, inclosed 
as Inclosure No. 1. 

3. It is proposed that this field be improved by the grading and paving of 
three 5000-foot runways and by the installation of facilities for flying operations. 



3054 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

These will include the necessary operations buildings, and shops, airdrome control 
tower, and storage for 300,000 gallons of gasoli'.ic, using 6 of the eighty 50,000- 
gallon tanks now on hand. Although these tanks were designed for the aqua 
system, only simple storage is proposed, as the shortage of water will preclude 
use of the aqua system. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 2 a print of Depart- 
ment Engineer Map No. 11-1-25D41 which shows the boundary of the land 
and the location of the three 5000-foot runways. 

4. The rotating garrison at this field will consist of an air base detachment of 
4 officers and 50 men and a National Guard company for local security of 4 officers 
and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 men. In addition to this permanent gar- 
rison, a heavy bombardment squadron of 37 officers and [3] 206 men will 
be temporarily stationed at this field for training. While these squadrons will 
change at least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the 
time. The total garrison therefore will be 45 officers and 372 men. 

5. There is attached as Inclosure No. 3 a tabulation showing in detail the 
buildings and other construction proposed with estimated costs. These costs 
include not only direct but also indirect costs of the job. The total cost shown on 
this tabulation is $1,992,600.00. 

6. The following is recommended: 

a. That this headquarters be authorized to proceed with negotiations for the 
acquisition of this site. 

b. That construction and improvements outlined in Inclosure No. 3 be author- 
ized. 

c. That funds in amount of $1,992,600.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, 
Honolulu, to complete this installation. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
3 Incls: 

#1 Map 

#2 Print, Map No. 11-1-25D41 
#3 Estimated Costs 
A True Copy 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lieut. F. A. 

[1\ Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., April 14, 19U. 
In reply refer to: 
Via "Clipper" Air Mail 
Engr. 600.12 

Subject: Additional Airdrome, Hawaiian Department 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. The recent and anticipated increases in the Pursuit Wing of the Hawaiian 
Air Force have emphasized the need of an airdrome to supplement the existing 
facilities at Wheeler Field. The latter field is now badly overcrowded with the 
planes stationed there. 

2. A very thorough study has been made of the location of this additional air 
field by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Department Engineer and 
the District Engineer. At least five separate locations were given serious con- 
sideration; one of these in the Barbers Point area was discarded first because of 
its proximity to the beach and second, because of objections by the Navy to in- 
terference with the new carrier aviation base in the Ewa plane area. Another 
location at Kahuku was discarded because of i:s proximity to the beach. A third 
on the flat ground about three miles north of Wahiawa was discarded by the Ha- 
waiian Air Force l)ecause of bad flying conditions from turbulent air conditions. 
A fourth location in the general area to the east of the crossing over Kipapa Gulch 
by the Kamehameha Highway was discarded for similar flying reasons. The area 
finally selected between the Kipapa and Waikakalua Gulches and west of the 
Kamehameha Highway is believed to be the best possible location of this airdrome 
on the island of Oahu.' There is inclosed a map on the scale of 1/20,000 showing 
the location of this field. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3055 

3. The garrison to be stationed at this field will consist of the loth Pursuit 
Group of 84 officers and 729 enlisted men, an air base group (single) 28 officers 
and 490 men, and miscellaneous detachments of 5 officers and 75 men. Total 
strength 117 officers and 1,294 men. Complete construction with, mobilization 
type facilities must be provided for the housing of this garrison. The present 
construction authorized for Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields is insufficient 
or the needs of those three stations and it will be impo.ssible to transfer any of 
the existing authorization to this new field. 

4. It is estimated that at least 75% or 88 of the officers will be married and of this 
number 10% or 9 will be senior officers. Since there are no locations in this 
vicinity where these officers can be placed upon commutation and live in private 
quarters and also becatise of the tremendous, housing shortage on Oahu, it is 
believed that Government quarters should be provided for these married officers. 
Recognizing that this [2] field must be constructed under emergency 
appropriations, it is proposed that these quarters not be as elaborate as usually 
constructed on Army Posts. With the unit costs estimated, houses similar in 
construction to the average in Honolulu can be provided. In addition it is also 
estimated that there will be 135 married noncommissioned officers in this garrison. 
Adequate quarters will also be provided for these married enlisted men and it is 
recommended that the War Department .secure from the Federal Building Ad- 
ministration authorization for the construction of 135 low cost housing units at 
this field. 

5. The improvement for flying operations consists of the installation of three 
runways each 5,000 feet long with a graded width of 400 feet and a paved width 
of 200 feet; the paving of taxy strip 200' x 5,000' and a servicing apron 300' x 600'. 
A complete installation of airport lighting is proposed. Bunkers for the protection 
of airplanes against hostile bomVjardment will be installed as part of the airport 
and the cost of these bunkers and necessary approaches are included in the cost 
estimates. It is also proposed to install storage for 900,000 gallons of gasoline 
with the aqua system. ' In this storage 18 of the 80 50,000 gallon tanks now on 
hand will be utilized. 

6. The housing proposed will be mobilization type construction. It will 
include barracks, mess halls, and recreation facilities for the men, buildings for 
flying operations such as an airdrome control tower, Air Corps technical schools, 
supply rooms, and housing for maintenance facilities. In addition mobilization 
type construction is proposed for the necessary post overhead, buildings such as 
a fire station, a guard house and an infirmary and warehouses for commissaries, 
etc. A complete system of utilities is covered in the estimates. In designing the 
water supply and sewage disposal systems provision has been made for the 
eventual expansion of the garrison to 4,000 men. This increase in capacity is 
proposed to take care of the possibility of assigning an antiaircraft regiment as 
part of this garrison. Shown on the map accompanying this letter are two areas 
shaded in blue. The area near the runway will be used for the construction of the 
service buildings incidental to flying operations. The 40 acre tract shown to the 
north of the runways will be utilized for construction of housing facilities for both 
officers, married noncoms, and enlisted men. The land where the runways and 
the adjacent blue area are located is now cultivated cane land. The area of the 
40 acre tract is cultivated pineapple land; the cane land involved is about 250 
acres minimum. If these sites are secured by lease it is estimated that the cane 
land will cost $30.00 per acre per year and the pineapple land $25.00 per acre per 
year, or a total annual rental of $8,500. If this land is purchased the cane land 
will cost about $1,000 and the pineapple land about $500.00 per acre; a total cost 
of about $270,000. 

7. There is inclosed a tabulation showing the buildings which should be con- 
structed with cost figures^and cost estimates on runways and other flying facilities 
and on utility systems. These estimates show a total estimated cost of $4,668,950 
not including cost of land. As stated shows if the land is leased there will be a 
vearlv rental of $8,500. If the land is purchased the total cost is estimated at 
$4,938,950. 



3056 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[3] 8. It is recommended that the proposed location of this new field be 
approved and that funds in the amount of $4,668,950 be allotted for construction 
if the War Department decides that securing the land on a lease basis is satis- 
factory. It is further recommended that if the War Department decides that 
this land should be purchased, additional funds in the amount of $270,000 be 
made available. 

(s) Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
2 Incls: 
#1 Map 
#2 Tabulation 
A true copy. 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

^nd Lt., F. A. 

[confidential] 

Paraphrase of Radio From TAG: 

Fifteenth Pursuit airbase at Kipapa is disapproved Stop Base is to be located 
at Kahuku Stop Personal letter twenty one July (?) from General Marshall to 
General Short covers this subject. 

Ulio. 
True copy. 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

[Exhibit IC] 

[1] [secret] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 
Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., April 14, 1941. 
In reply refer to: Engr. 600.96 
Subject: Protection of Seacoast Defense Batteries. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. Reference is made to your secret radiogram No. 708, 4 April 1941, which 
was on the subject of protection for the seacoast defense batteries in this depart- 
ment and which suggested a conference with Mr. J. C. Letts of the Office of the 
Chief of Engineers during his recent visit in this department. 

2. This radiogram stated that a letter covering this construction was being 
forwarded by mail. This letter has not as yet been received in this department 
In order to save time, however, we're submitting recommendations without 
waiting for the arrival of this letter as its subject matter was explained in general 
by Mr. Letts. 

3. There are three batteries involved in this protection; these are the two 
16-inch gun batteries. Battery Hatch at Fort Barrette and Battery Williston at 
Fort Weaver and a 12-inch barbette gun battery. Battery C'osson at Fort Kame- 
hameha. A study of this problem has been made jointly by the Commanding 
General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, the District Engineer sand 
Mr. Letts. They recommend the casemating of Battery Hatch and Battery 
Closson and provision of a tunnel type shield for Battery Williston. There is 
inclosed a chart showing the fields of tire of these batteries after the protection is 
installed. From this chart it will be seen that Battery Hatch has a field of fire 
from azimuth 295 to azimuth 80; and Battery Williston, a 360° field of fire. The 
red shading on this chart indicates the area in which the fire of four 16-inch guns 
can be placed. The yellow shading shows the additional area which can be 
covered by the fire of two 16-inch guns at Fort Weaver. The existing range circle 
of Battery Hatch is shown by the red line and Battery Williston by the black line. 
The chart indicates that there is an area about 5,000 yards in range west of Oahu 
which is now covered by the fire of Battery Hatch and which is not covered by the 
fire of Battery Williston. On the east side of the island the area now covered by 
fire from Battery Hatch, which is sacrified by the casemating is well in the field 
covered by Battery Williston. The only loss in coverage is in the 5,000 yards to 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3057 

the west of the island and in the fact that the general area is now covered by the 
fire of only two 16-inch guns while under present arran^ment this area is in part 
covered by the fire of four 16-inch guns. 

[2] 4. I do not believe that this loss in coverage is at all important when 
compared to the necessity of providing protection for Battery Hatch in par- 
ticular, and therefore concur in the recommendations of the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade. 

5. Your radio also referred to our letter, subject: "Bombproof Construction 
for Magazines at Fort Barrette and Fort Weaver," dated 4 February 1941. 
The recommendations contained in this letter are reiterated. Since the recom- 
mendation is made that Battery Williston should have tunnel type shield pro- 
tection which does not provide any protection for ammunition, a bombproof 
magazine for at least one-half of the propelling charges should be provided at 
that battery. Also due to the exposed position of Battery Hatch and the im- 
possibility of camouflaging the existing magazines, it is believed that a bombproof 
magazine for one-half of the propelling charges should be provided at that battery 
in addition to the bombproof storage for 50 complete rounds in each casemate. 

6. Reference is now made to letter, this headquarters, subject: "Defense of 
Naval Air Station, Kaneche Bay, Oahu, T. H." dated 18 February 1941, file 381, 
in which the War Department was advised that this department was assuming 
responsibility for the defense of the Kaneche Bay Area. It is believed that the 
growing military and naval importance of Kaneche Bay aera makes it essential 
that a major calibre seacoast battery be installed for its protection. The need 
for this battery is urgent and its installation should not wait upon the manufac- 
ture of the armament. It is understood that there are some 12-inch long range 
gun batteries similar to Battery Clo.sson on the mainland where the need for 
them no longer exists and it is recommended that the armament of one of these 
batteries be shipped to this department and funds provided for its emplacement 
in the Kaneche Bay area. 

7. The following is therefore recommended: 

a. That protection be provided for Battery Hatch by the construction of 
casemates and overhead cover, at Battery Closson by the construction of over- 
head cover, and at Battery Williston by the installation of tunnel type shields. 

b. That a bombproof magazine for one-half of the propelling charges be author- 
ized for Battery Williston and a similar magazine be authorized for Battery 
Hatch in addition to the storage of 50 rounds in each of the casemates. 

r. That the armament of a 12-inch gun battery similar to Battery [3] 
Closson to be obtained from a location on the mainland where it is no longer 
needed and shipped to this department and installed to cover the Kaneohe Bay 
area. 

(s) Walter C. Short 
Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
1 Inch Chart (Orig of Incl No. 1 is on file at H S C A B) 
A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, ' 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

[1] Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 31 July 1941. 
In reply refer to: 
AG 381/20 

Kaneohe Bay Project. 
Secret 

Subject: Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. References: — 

A Secret letter HHD to TAG, 14 April 1941, subject: "Protection of Seacoast 
Defense Batteries" file AG 662.1 (4-14-41) MC-E, HD Engr 600. 96, with 4 
indorsements. 

B Secret letter TAG to HHD, 8 April 1941, Subject: "Defense of Naval Air 
Station, Kaneohe Bav, Oahu, T. H." file AG 381 (3-13-41) M-WPD, with 1st 
Indorsement HHD to TAG dated 16 June 1941. 



3058 CONtJRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEAHL HARBOK ATTACK 

2. The attached study was prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian 
Separate Coast Artillery Brigade in accordance with the directive contained in 
the 4th indorsement, to reference A. In considering this study, reference should 
be made to a similar study which was submitted as on enclosure to 1st indorse- 
ment, reference B. 

3. The recommendations contained in paragraph 6 of the attached study of the 
seacoast and antiaircraft defenses required for the protection of the Kaneohe 
Bay Naval Base (Incl. #1) are approved with the following exceptions: 

a. It is believed a large proportion of the 15 A A searchlights recommended in 
paragraph 6a. should be equipped with SCR 268 sets instead of the M2 sound 
locators. The severe 'limitations imposed by the terrain and normal atmos- 
pheric conditions present in this area make mandatory the early detection of 
hostile aerial targets. 

b. In order that personnel may be available to establish a headquarters for the 
Harbor Defenses of Kaneohe Bay, it is believed that instead of augmenting the 
seacoast personnel,' as recommended in paragraph 6d. (2) by one battalion 
(TD) and three separate batteries (HD), that the increase should consist of one 
Coast Artillery regiment (HD), type B, (T/0 4-71, Nov 1/40), less band and one 
battalion. This organization will provide the necessary command and staff and 
attached medical personnel to permit the proper tactical organization of the de- 
fenses. The 155mm battalion can take the place of the second battalion of the 
Harbor Defense Regiment. 

\2] 4. It is recommended: 

a. That the eventual project for defense of the Kaneohe Bay Naval .Vir Station 
and Bellows Field, based on the installation of fixed armament, be as follows: 

(1) Armament: 

(a) Seacoast: 

2 155 mm Cun Batteries (latest type"). 

2 6" Fixed Cun Batteries (2 guns each). 

1 16" Long Range Casemated Cun Battery of 2 guns on 
Barbette Carriages. 

(b) Antiaircraft: 

3 90 mm AA Gun Batteries. 

3 37 mm AA Gun Batteries to consist of 10 guns each. 
48 Caliber .50 AA Machine Guns. 

15 AA searchlights together w-ith a minimiuii of 6 SCR 268 
sets and Al2 sound locators. 

(2) Personnel: 

(a) Seacoast Artillerv: 

1 Battalion Coast Artillerv (TD), 155 mm trims, (T/0 4-35, 

Nov 1/40). 
1 Regiment Coast Artillerv (HD). tvpe B, less hand and one 
battalion, (T/0 4-71, Nov 1/40). 
(h) .\ntiaircraft .Artillery: 

1 Reeiment Coast Artillery (AA), semi-mobile, less one gun 
battalion, (T/0 1-111," Nov 1/40). 
}). That initially based on armament now available in the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, the defense be constituted as shown below. The seacoast armament and 
personnel to be used in this defense must be moved from previously assigned 
positions in other parts of tha island, thereby weakening the defense in othc'r areas. 

(1) Considering only personnel now present and available: 

] 155 mm Gun Battery. 

1 155 mm Gun Batterv with additional assignment of five antiaircraft 
searchlights. 

1 S" Railway Gun Battery. 

2 3" .\ntiaircraft Gun Batteries. 

1 Seacoast Searclilight Battery. 

(2) .\ssuming that personnel under paragraph 4 a (2) (a) above will be made 
available at an earlv date and using armament now availabk' in \\ ar Reserve, 
the defense can be organized as sliown below. Under this plan no movement of 
armament from pn>sent assigned ixtsition^i i« required: 

2 155 mm (Jun Batteries 

1 155 nnn Cun Battery with, additional assignment of five antiaircraft 
searchlights. 

1 8" Railway (Jiin liattery. 

2 3" .\ntiaircraft Gun Baiteries. 
1 Seacoast Searchlight Battery. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3059 

[3] e. That the increaso in personnel and in major items of armament 
recommended in paragraphs fi a and t>, reference H, insofar as they relate to the 
(■oast Artillery be amended to conform to paragraph 4 a. above. 

Walter ('. Shokt, 
LieiHenant General, U. S. Army, 

Com mantling. 

1-lncl: Revised Study on Seacoast and Antiaircraft Artillery Defense of the 
Kaneohe Naval Air Station (Secret) in trip. 
A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern. 
Edward Vo\ Geldurn, 

,?w/ LL, F. A. 

[secret] 

[1] 

Subject: Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Ha- 
waiian Department. 
AG 381 (7-31-41) MC-E 3rd Ind. 

Wa.r Department, A. G. O., Ociober SO, 1941. 
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

1. Reference is made to: 

a. Letter, this office, April 8, 1941, AG 381 (3-13-41) N-WPD, subject: 
Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H. 

b. Radio No. 320, your headquarters, September 13, 1941. 

c. Letter, your headquarters, September 18, 1941, Engr. 662/4 x 662/7, subject: 
Provision of three (3) Panama mount 155-mm Battery Positions and one (1) 
8-inch Railwiay Gun Batterv Position for the defense of Kaneohe Bav, Oahu, 
T. H. 

2. The following temporary measures for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay 
area are approved : 

a. Movement of one battery of 8" railway guns now in storage at Fort Kame- 
hameha to Alokapu Peninsula and temporary installation at site designated by 
you in reference c subject to local coordination of site with the Navy. 

b. Installation of tw^o batteries 155-mm guns on Panama mounts at sites to 
be selected by you. 

3. Immediate personnel and armament requirements will be set: 

a. By the transfer to the Hawaiian Department of the following units at their 
allotted strengths: 

(1) One battalion, 57th Coast Artillery, TD, with battalion section, 
supply platoon (T/0 4-32) and battalion section, Medical detachment (T/0 
4-31), attached, less guns and fire control equipment. 

(2) 95th Coast Artillery (AA), Semimobile (less one gun battalion), with 
armament and equipment on hand. Authority is granted for the reorganiza- 
tion of the 37-mm gun battalion of this regiment into three [2] 37 
mm gun batteries (8 guns each) and one (1) Caliber .50 MO battery (A A) 
(12 guns). 

b. By the local activation of one 8" railway battery (R/0 4-47) from personnel 
available in the Hawaiian Department. 

4. Guns and fire control equipment fo/ the battalion of 155 mm guns and the 
8" railway battery will be furnished from defense reserves on hand in the Hawaiian 
Department. Shortages will be filled in accordance with approved War Depart- 
ment priorities. 

5. Personnel and equipment mentioned in Paragraph 3 a. above will be dis- 
patched to the Hawaiian Department by first available shipping. It is estimated 
that troops will begin to arrive in your department about December 1, 1941. 
The shipment of the major items of organizational equipment and armament for 
reinforcing units is dependent upon the availability of bottoms of which no accurate 
forecast can be made at this time. 

6. Theater of operations type housing is authorized for the personnel listed in 
paragraph 3 above. It is desired that estimates covering housing for this increased 
garri.son be made the subject of separate correspondence. 

7. Ultimate approval of one 8" .seacoast battery (fixed) in lieu of the 16" 
battery recommended by you, and of two 6" seacoast batteries (fixed) to replace 
the two batteries of 155 mm guns authorized for temporary defense is probable. 



79716 O— 46 — pt. 18 14 



3060 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The 8" seacoast guns will not be available before July, 1942, and the 6" seacoast 
guns not before December, 1942. 

8. In view of the expected approval of fixed armament for the Kaneohe Bay 
Area the plan submitted by reference c for the installation of the 8"railway 
battery on Mokapu Peninsula and for the construction of 155 mm gun positions 
is considered too elaborate. Plans should be revised to provide for temporary 
installation of the 8" railway battery, and for construction of Panama mounts 
for two 155 mm gun batteries. Provision should be made for splinterproofing 
magazines and plotting room only and should be confined to that which can be 
constructed by field fortification methods and materials. 

9. A revised project, to include detailed estimates of cost, is desired for the 
defense of Kaneohe Bay based on two batteries of two 6" BC guns, and one 
battery of two 8" BC guns, all shielded type. 

[3] 10. No change in the eventual project for the antiaircraft defense of 
Kaneohe Bay over that prescribed for the temporary defense Paragraph 3 a (2) 
above, is contemplated. 

11. Reinforcement of either the peace or war garrisons of the Hawaiian De- 
partment by additional troops for the beach and land defense of Kaneohe Bay is 
not contemplated at this time. 

By order of the Secretary of War: 

(s) E. S. Adams, 

Major General, 
The Adjutant General. 
2 Incls' 

#1 Memor from Ch. of Eng. to Ch. of Coast Artillery, C.' of E. 662B 

(Oahu), August 26, 1941. 
#2 1st Ind. frm Ch. of Coast Artillerv, to A. C. of S, WPD 663/45-F-l, 
July 23, 1941. (added) 
Original Inch #1 w/d) 
A true copy. 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

[SECRET] 

Paraphrase 

Radio 320— 13th 

September 13, 1941 
The Adjutant General. 

Washington, D. C. 
Additional funds needed to complete railway gun position project also funds 
needed to erect positions in Kanoehe Bay area as para four B paren two paren 
letter this headquarters thirty one July nineteen forty one subject coast artillery 
armament for naval air station Kaneohe Bay paragraph due added costs of 
materials and labor in this area railway gun positions in approved project could 
not be built with funds allotted last fiscal year Stop Estimates prepared by 
district engineer Honolulu aver that one hundred seventeen thousand two hundred 
fifty six dollars required to add to funds received last fiscal year for railway gun 
positions Stop Building of positions for one four gun eight inch railway battery 
and three four gun one fifty five batteries in Kaneohe Bay area estimated to cost 
two hundred fifteen thousand two hundred sixty five dollars Stop Above 
amounts include direct and indirect costs and are for sites recommended as first, 
priority by commanding general Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command in which I 
agree for immediate construction paragraph project will follow Stop District 
engine Honolulu is submitting cost estimates to chief of engineers by radio 
Stop Pending the receipt of this letter strongly recommend that money in 
amount of three hundred thirty two thousand five hundred twenty one dollars 
be contained in penditig appropriation bill. 

Short. 
A true copy: 

Edward von Geldern 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3061 

[SECRET] 

[1] Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 18 September 1941. 
In reply refer to: 
Engr. 662/4 x 662/7 
Via "Clipper" Air Mail 
Subject: Provision of three (3) Panama Mount 155-mm Battery Positions and 

one (1) 8-inch Railway Gun Battery Position for the Defense of 

Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. References: 

a. Secret letter TAG to HHD, 8 April 1941, Subject: "Defense of Naval Air 
Station, Kaneohe Bav, Oahu, T. H." file AG 381 (3-13-41) M-WPD, with 1st 
Indorsement HHD to TAG dated 18 June 1941. 

h Secret letter HHD to TAG, 5 June 1941, Subject: "War Garrison for Initial 
War Operation", file AG 320.3/37b, with 1st Indorsement TAG to HHD, dated 
22 Julv 1941. 

c. Secret letter HHD to TAG 31 July 1941, Subject: "Coast Artillery Arma- 
ment for Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay", file AG 381/20. 

2. Reference a. directs that the Army assumes the responsibility for the defence 
of the Kaneohe Bay area. A study by this headquarters of the armament require- 
ments for the defense of Kanoche Bay and submitted by my 1st Indorsement to 
reference a. requested the inclusion of the following items of Seacoast Defense 
Armament in the Hawaiian Defense Project for this purpose: 

3 Batteries of 155-mm guns. 

1 Battery of two 12-inch barbette guns with related equipment 

3. A restudy of the project for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay area submitted 
by reference h. recommended that the following armament be provided: 

Two 155-mm gun batteries 

Two 6-inch fixed gun batteries of two guns each 

One 16-inch long range casemated gun battery of two guns on barbette 
carriages. 
[2] 4. A realization of the fact that it will be at least two years before these 
items of fixed armament, namely, the two 6-inch batteries and the one 16-inch 
battery, can be installed, makes it necessary that some provision be made im- 
mediately for the employment of mobile artillery to defend this area. The 1st 
Indorsement from The Adjutant General's Office to reference h. authorized the 
following additional units for the defense of Kaneohe Bay: 

One battalion of Coast Artillery, 155-mm guns with one additional gun 

battery. 
One Harbor Defense Battery. 
Pending the installation of the fixed batteries, it is recommended that the 
Seacoast Defenses of the Kaneohe area consist of the following items of mobile 
artillery : 

Three 155-mm gun batteries. 
One 8-inch railway gun battery. 
The proposed locations and fields of fire of these batteries are shown on map, 
Inclosure No. 1. 

5. Since there is no railroad running from Honolulu to Kaneohe Bay, it will be 
necessary to move this railway battery to Kaneohe Bay by truck trailer, and it is 
proposed to install this battery on fixed mounts similar to those of Battery Granger 
Adams on Black Point. 

6. Each of the 155-mm battery positions should include the following- 

(1) 4 Panama mounts. 

(2) 4 splinterproof ammunition shelters for 25 rounds at each gun position. 

(3) 4 gun bunkers. 

(4) 4 splinterproof personnel shelters. 

(5) 2 splinterproof propellent shelters for 150 charges each. 

(6) 2 splinterproof projectile shelters for 150 projectiles each. 

(7) 1 splinterproof plotting room. 

(8) The roads and ramps necessary for the occupation of the position. 

(9) Camouflage treatment of all the above listed installations. 
Considering the urgent need for combat training and the large amount of labor 

required to complete field works now being constructed by the troops of this com- 
mand, it is believed advisable to construct these positions by contract. 



3062 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[S] 7. The cost of installation of the three batteries of 155-mm guns includ- 
ing the acquisition of land has been estimated at $93,630.00. The co.st of the 
transportation and installation of the 8-inch railway battery in an emplacement 
similar to that- of Battery Granger Adams has been estimated at $121,635. These 
estimated costs include both direct costs and indirect costs. Inclosure No. 2 is 
a tabular breakdown of these cost figures. 

8. It is recommended that the installation of these three batteries of 155-mm 
guns with the necessary field fortifications and the construction of one 8-inch gun 
battery position be approved, and that funds in the amount of $215,265.00 be 
allotted to the U. S. District Engineer, Honolulu, f©r construction. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
2 Incls: 

(1) Map 

(2) Breakdown 
A True copy. 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

[Exhibit ID] 

[SECRET] 

27 August 1941. 

Deslege Brown 

1st Lieutenant, Corps of Engrs. 
Assistant Department Engineer. 
To: The Adjutant General, 

Washington, D. C. 
Beurad anno fifteen July district engineer estimates cost of forty five hundred 
foot runway at three hundred thirty thousand dollars due to railroad relocation 
and heavy fill Stop Thirty five hundred foot runway is longest that can be pro- 
vided without railway relocation Stop Reduction from thirty seven hundred 
feet due to bunker construction and new housing Stop Strongly recommend 
construction of thirty five hundred foot runway as auxiliary landing strip comma 
forty five hundred feet economically unfeasible Stop main runway can be 
used by planes requiring longer run Stop Auxiliary also needed for use while 
main runway is being leveled recommend immediate allotment of twenty five 
thousand dollars for levelling of main runway and thirty thousand seven hun- 
dred for thirty five hundred foot auxiliary runway. 

Short. 
A true copy. 

Edward von Gildern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lieutenant, F. A. 

Subject: Improvement of Landing Facilities at Wheeler Field, T. H. 

2nd Ind. (12-ElO) 

War Department, 
Office, Chief of the Air Corps, 

Washington, D. C, August 25, 1941. 

To The Adjutant General THRU Chief of Engineers. 

1. Attached hereto is a copy of the radiogram transmitted to the Commanding 
General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H. on July 15, 1941. 

2. In explanation thereof, you are advised that this office concurs with the 
opinion that the uneven areas in the runways, referred to in the basic communica- 
tion, should be eliminated in the interests of safe operation. 

3. This office considers runways of 4,500 feet in length to be an absolute mini- 
mum for military airports at sea level, with an additional 500 feet of length for 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3063 

each 1,000 feet of elevation or fraction thereof. This minimum likewise meets 
the requirements for the future installation of an instrument landing facility, 
if there is provided that the same time forty to one clear angles of approach at 
both ends of the runway in question. 

4. If such clearances are not available at the north end of the present N-8 
runway, or of the proposed new N-8 runway, becau.se of quarters built at that 
end of the field, then the runway lengths should be extended on the southerly 
ends sufficiently to in£,ure that a 4,500 foot length of runway will exist south 
of a point where a forty to one clearance angle may be realized. 

5. There is no objection to the runway crossing the railroad spur, if necessary, 
providing the runway pavement is kept flush with the top of the rails and there 
is; no break in the runway grade, and providing, of course, rail traffic is controlled. 
If a difference in grade exists, the rail grade should be brought to that of the 
runway, or the spur relocated. 

6. It is requested that the District Engineer be advised of these considerations, 
and that his new estimates be made accordingly. 

7. No funds are available at this time for the construction and improvements 
recommended in the basic communications. The recommendation, however, 
will be placed in our "Suspense File" for further consideration upon receipt of 
a revised estimate, and when funds therefore become available. 

For the Chief of the Air Corps: 

Walter J. Reed, 
Colonel, Air Corps, 
Asst. Chief, Bldgs. & Grounds Div. 
Incl. Cy, Radio 8/21/41 

cc: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

For information only 
This is not an authorization 
A true copy. 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt. F. A. 

Signal Corps, United States Army 

War Department Message Center, 

Room 3441, Munitions Building, 

Washington, D. C. 
56 WTJ 125 WD 

Ft Shafter TH 1057 A Aug 27 
THE AG 

Washington DC. 

Keurad Agmo fifteen July district engineer estimates cost of forty five 
hundred foot runway as three hundred thirty thousand dollars due to railroad 
relocation and heavy fill stop thirty five hundred foot runway is longest that can 
be provided without railway relocation stop reduction ffom thirty seven hundred 
feet due to bunker construction and new housing sto]) strongly recommend con- 
struction of thirty five hundred feet runway as auxiliary landing strip comma 
forty five hundred feet economically unfeasible stop main runway can be used 
by planes requiring longer run stop auxiliary also needed for use while main runway 
is being levelled . . Recommend immediate allotment of twenty five thousand 
dollars for levelling of main runway and thirty thousand seven hundred for thirty 
five hundred foot auxiliary runway. 

Short. 
305 AM 
A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 



3064 CON(iRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Immediate Action 

War Department, 
The Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington. 
1st Ind. 
AG 580.82- Wheeler 
Field (8-27-41) NO JJF Ir 

Wai Department, AGO, August 28, 1941— -To the Chief of the Air Corps. 
In connection with letter your office dated July 11, 1941, file 611. 
By order of the Secretary of War: 

[S] John B. Cooley, 

Adjutant General. 
A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

Subject: Improvement of Landing facilities at Wheeler Field, T. H. 

2nd Ind. 

(12-ElO) 
War Department, 
Office, Chief of the Air Corps, 
Washington, D. C, September 2, 1941. 
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shaffer, T. H. 

1. With reference to your radiogram dated August 27, 1941, attention is invited 
to 2nd Indorsement of basic letter dated June 21st, subject as noted above, a 
copy of which is attached hereto. 

2. A request has been made this date that $25,000;t00 be included in the funds 
estimated to be required for use in future airfield development. This sum is to be 
used for the leveUng of the main runway at Wheeler Field. 

3. No request will be made for the inclusion of funds for the construction of the 
auxiliary runway, pending receipt of the revised estimate as requested in the 
2nd Indorsement referred to above. 

By order of the Chief of the Air Corps. 

Frank M. Kennedy, 



Inch Cy 2nd Ind. 8/25/41 

A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern. 

2nd Li., F. 



Colonel, Air Corps, 
Chief, Building & Grounds Division. 



[Exhibit IE] 



Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 10 June 1941. 

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL: 

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message 
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear 
or having a different security classification. 
This message is routine. 

Robert J. Fleming, Jr., 

Major, Corps of Engineers, 
Assistant Department Engineer. 
A true copy: 

Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

To THE Adjutant General 

Washington, D. C 

Division engineer San Francisco has informed me that the priority covering 
contract W dash four one four ENGR seven eight four with Interstate Equip- 
ment Corporation Elizabeth New Jersey is now a dash one dash G stop This 
contract is the one for furnishing all materias for cable way to Kaala aircraft 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3065 

Warning station Stop Motor and all electrical equipment sub contracted to 
General Electric Stop Division engineer states that with this priority there is 
strong probaiaility that delivery this electrical material to contractor will be 
delayed about fifteen weeks Stop This Kaala station is the most important in 
aircraft warning system and early completion of this cableway is essential Stop 
I consider this aircraft warning service as the most important single project in 
this Department Stop Strongly recommended that the War Department give 
all possible assistance to Chief of Engineers to have priority on this contract 
changed to a dash one dash B 

[SJ Short. 
ENC-SEC by Capt. C. J. Harrison SC— 715P June 10 1941 



Headquarters Hawaiian Department 

FORT SHAFTER, T. H. 

Washn DC. 740P June 26 1941. 



75 War EiM 61 WD 

C C 

Hawn Dept Ft Shafter T. H. 
904 26th 

Agmc reurad three zero zero nine priority contract W dash four one four 
Engr seven eight four kaala AWS Station advanced to A dash one dash C Chief of 
Engineers will instruct Division Engineer on procedure should results under this 
prioritv be unsatisfactory 

Ad.\ms. 

616P 
True Copy 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

[secret] 

[1] 

29 September 1941. 

SIG 676.3 

Subjecl : Aircraft Warning Service Installation Hawaiian Department. 

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. Reference is made to letter, file AG 660.2 A. A. (7-5-41) MC-E, 8 July 
1941, subject: "Aircraft Warning Service Philippine and Hawaiian Departments." 
A report of a Board of Officers convened at this headquarters to restudy the 
AWs project is being transmitted to the War Department by Clipper mail under 
separate cover. This board has considered the employment of the six fixed and 
six mobile stations allocated to this Department by the War Department. The 
increased number of stations now available has necessitated some adjustments in 
both type and location of the stations in the previously approved project of three 
fixed and five mobile units, as well as new locations. The results of this restudy 
are covered fully in the report being submitted, and are summarized in the follow- 
ing paragraphs. 

Locations a. Kauai. There have been no changes in the fixed station now 
approved at Kokee. In the former project the mobile station on Kauai was 
planned for operation on the Waimea Kokee road. This mobile station is now 
recommended for operation on the coast north of Kilauea Village at latitude 
22°13'50", longitude 159°23'54". There is no change in the base camp at Kauai 
which is now under construction at Kokee for the personnel of both the fixed 
and mobile stations. 

b. Maui. No change has been made in the previously approved fixed station 
which is now under construction at Red Hill on Haleakala. Formerly approved 
project contained a mobile station to operate along the road up Haleakala. The 
project now being submitted makes no change in this mobile unit. 

c. Hawaii. The former project contained a mobile station for the Island of 
Hawaii, which was to be operated from the upper terminus of the Mauna Loa 
truck trail, with a base camp for personnel at the Kilauea Military Camp. This 
station has been eliminated in the restudy and has been replaced by a fixed 
station ih che vicinity of Pa^'oa at latitude"^ 19°26'50" and longitude 154°57'5", 
and bv a mobile station to operate from an initial position near Kahuku Ranch at 
latitude 19°30'30", longitude 155°41'40". A base camp similar to that on 
Kauai will be constructed near the fixed station for the personnel of both that 
station and the mobile unit. 



3066 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

d. Oahu (1) There is no change in the previously approved fixed station for 
Mt. Kaala. 

(2) The formerly approved mobile station at Manavvahua is to be replaced by 
a fixed station. 

(3) Opana. Under the former project, there were not sufficient \2\ sta- 
tions to emplace one on the north shore of Oahu. With the increa.se in the num- 
ber of stations allowed, this is now possible and it is recommended that a fixed 
station be installed at the Opana Triangulation station at coordinates (98.655- 
19.182). 

(4) The increase in the number of stations has also made advisable the con- 
sideration of other locations for mobile units on Oahu. This reconsideration 
indicated that a location at Makapuu Point had many advantages over the former 
approved Pali location, and it is accordingly recommended that the Makapuu 
Point Station be considered as an initial operating position in lieu of the former 
Pali location. 

(5) The increase in the number of stations allowed has also made possible the 
provision of units in reserve against the possibility of, failure of one of the primary 
stations. Since Oahu is the central point in the islands for which protection 
must be secured, it has been decided to concentrate the reserve units on this 
island. For this purpose two mobile units are recommended as a mobile reserve 
and for general operations on Oahu and on other islands if necessary. These 
stations will be utilized as needed to either replace the other Oahu stations or 
reinforce the coverage in certain sectors. Locations on Oahu which have been 
considered for their employment are the Pali location discus.sed above, on the high 
ground along Tantalus Road, at Fort Shafter, and at various points along the 
coast. 

(6) Information center. There has been no change in the previous location for 
the Information Center which is now under construction at Fort Shafter. In 
compliance with other directives, this installation has been combined with various 
command posts into an air defense command post. 

(7) No base camps are being provided for the stations on Oahu as the personnel 
will be housed in construction already approved for the Signal Area, Fort Shafter. 
The same construction, however, will be built at the Manawahua and Opana 
fixed stations as is now approved for Kaala. 

2. Reference is made to 2d Ind, Hq Haw Dept, OSigO, 31 Mav 1941, to the 
letter Sig. 676.3 (AWS) dated 17 October 40 in which Signal funds totalling 
$75,281.84 were requested for the installation of radio and wire facilities for the 
original three fixed and five mobile stations. Due to the abandonment of the 
mobile station at the Nuuanu Pali on Oahu and the Moana Loa Station on Hawaii, 
this sum can be reduced by $2,296.00 to $72,985.84. The allocation of additional 
stations has necessitated increased demands for Signal communications. These 
additional communication facilities are summarized as follows: 

a. Radio facilities for the control from the Information Center of pursuit task 
forces. This includes a station at the control airdrome with four .satellite stations 
at the principal pursuit fields on Oahu. 

Total cost : . $55, 000 

b. Emergency power for pursuit radio control transmitters. This power is 
to allow the operation of pursuit control during commercial power failure. 
Total cost $12, 000 

c. Commercial power extensions to include provision of adequate commercial 
power for the base camps and the principal alert stations at locations where this 
is economically feasible. 

Total cost $39, 000 

[3] d. AWS radio communication facilities to include additional transmitters 
and receivers at the new fixed stations, receivers at the Information Center and 
allied antenna and control equipment as established by standard practice. 

Total cost $18, 000 

e. AWS wire and cable facilities to include additional cable extensions for the 
added stations- on Oahu, together with additional telephone and teletype equip- 
ment. This item also includes a cable installation from the Hawaii base camp to 
the detector unit at Pahoa. 

Total cost $10, 900 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3067 



f. Commercial wire facilities to include leased lines from all base camps to the 
nearest commercial exchange, leased lines from the principal alert stations to the 
nearest exchanges, together with the yearly rental charge. 

Total cost-- $10, 463. 67 

Total Sig funds 145,400. 00 

3. Estimates for the internal wire facilities of the Information Center and the 
allied Air Defense wire facilities are being held in abeyance pending more reliable 
information upon which to estimate the necessary funds. It is believed, however, 
that estimates for the Information Center should be included in the next available 
appropriation bill. Information Center layouts and schematic diagrams of the 
Information Center Wire Net have been forwarded to the Chief Signal Officer for 
review. This data is being transmitted as an inclosure to the aforementioned 
board proceedings. 

4. Funds in the amount of $890,804 have been made available to the Dist. 
Engr. Honolulu, to complete the previously approved project of three fixed and 
five mobile stations. Some of these funds were for stations which are being 
superseded by other stations in the revised program. The tabulation below shows 
cost estimates on the new stations, less the amounts available from the superseded 
stations, and the total of engineer funds supplementing those now on hand re- 
quired to complete the revised projects. 



Item 
No. 



Description 



Oahu 
Mana- 
wahua 



Opana 



Makapuu 



Kauai 
Kilauea 



Hawaii 
Pahoa 



Kahuku 



[41] 



Cost of Site -.-. 

Clearing 

Grading . 

Right of Way-Access Road 

Road Constr...- 

Bldg. Constr 

Fuel Storage , 

Water Supply... 

Sewage Disposal 

Man Proof Fence 



$2,000 

300 

2,700 

500 

58, 470 

26,260 

1.900 

2,970 

900 

2,000 



$2,000 

200 

800 

500 

28,000 

29, 250 

1,900 

4,400 

1,000 

2,000 



$2, 000 



$500 



5,700 
11,965 



500 

500 

24,800 

12, 300 



200 
1,000 



2,000 
5C0 



$7, 500 

300 

700 

1,800 

9,000 

74,720 
2,700 
9,000 
2,97C 
3,000 



$500 



200 

200 

3,000 

12,070 



1,000 
500 



98, 000 



70, 050 



42, 600 



111,690 



Subtotals by Islands 

Funds now available from superseded sites. 
Supplemental funds required 



Oahu 



$187,415 
76, 735 
110,680 



Kauai 



$42,600 
12,600 
30,000 



Hawaii 



$129, 160 
36,217 
98, 943 



Total $233,623 

Mobilization of Personnel and Plant at 3%.-_ , $7,010 

Total direct costs 240,633 

Contingencies, Contractors Fee, Social Security, Workmen's Compensation and Insurance at 15%. 36, 100 

Engineering, Surveys, Inspection and Auditing at 18% 19,250 

Oeneral Office Overhead at 8% .' - 19,250 

Grand Total Engineer funds 315,233 

5. Secret radiogram Xo 321, this hq, 13 September 41, submitted for advance 
consideration the above cost estimates with the exception of those which had 
been previously submitted as stated in par 2 above. Since no information has 
been received concerning the previous recommendation, those estimates are being 
added to the figures submitted by the radiogram cited. 

6. I strongly recommend that funds in the amount of $315,233 for engineer 
construction, and $218,400 for signal communications and one year's rent of 
leased wire facilities, total $533,633, to be included in pending appropriation 
bills, and made available as soon as possible for the completion of the revised 
project. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding. 
True Copj'. 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt. F. A. 



3068 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Exhibit IF] 

[1] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Office of the Department Engineer, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., July 3, 1941. 
Via Clipper Airmail 
Engr. 523.07 

Subject: Priorities and Preference Ratings. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. On 4 June 1941 I wrote a letter, file Engr. 523.07, subject: "Priority in 
Shipping Space for the Hawaiian Electric Company", in which the question of 
securing shipping space priorities for this comuany was discussed. A copy of 
this letter is inclosed for ready reference. At that time the main problem was 
the securing of shipping space; since then it has developed that difficulties are 
also arising concerning the procurement of materials. I have directed that an 
investigation be made of this priority question, and the results of this investi- 
gation indicate that some clarification and coordination is highly desirable. 

2. At the present time priorities and preference ratings for Army activities 
are assigned by the various procurement agencies and contracting officers. There 
is now no coordination in the Department between these various agencies, each 
of which is dealing direct on priorities questions with its Chief in the War De- 
partment. This is satisfactory as long as only one procurement agency or con- 
tracting officer is involved. There are cases, however, in which more than one 
agency is involved, and the number of these will undoubtedly increase in the 
future; I believe it is advisable to have a coordinating agency in the Department 
to not only coordinate these cases locally, but also to bring to the attention of 
the War Department the advisability of similar coordination between the Chiefs 
of the respective agencies. Also there are many procurement problems on which 
the establishment of priorities and preference ratings is necessary which no agency 
is now handling. The 14th Naval District has already established a central 
priority office in the local bureau of supplies and accounts where priorities infor- 
mation is kept available, and where preference ratings on all Navy orders are 
issued. 

3. The following outlines in greater detail some of the problems on which diffi- 
culty has already been encountered: 

a. We have some projects in which more than one supply or construction 
"branch is interested. While there is no complaint with the present system by 
which each agency handles priority matters with its Chief in the War Department 
there is a probability that desirable action by one agency may be overlooked with 
the result that the second agency might be held up in its work even though it 
had taken all action necessary. 

[2] b. Hawaii presents a special problem in procurement as do the other 
overseas departments, due to the shipping situation. The present priorities in- 
structions are concerned with procurement; in this Department, however, prior- 
ities on shipping space are important. There are large quantities of essential 
materials transported on commercial shipping. These shipments involve not 
only government shipments but also shipments by private concerns of materials 
which are to be incorporated in defense installations. 

c. Practically all construction materials must be imported into the island. The 
various constructing agencies are, of course, anticipating their needs and are 
having materials procured on the mainland and shipped to the department. It 
is impossible to anticipate every item needed, and in the past the various supply 
houses in the department, such as the Honolulu Iron Works, the Hawaiian 
Electric Company, and others, have maintained local stocks from which small 
items could be procured as they were needed. These local stocks are now be- 
coming a matter of concern. For example, the mainland agents of the Hawaiian 
Electric Company have advised the company that it can not expect to obtain 
replacements for its ordinary warehouse and operations stocks unless a preference 
rating is placed on this procurement. Practically all of our defense contracts 
demand electric power and unless the company's local stocks are maintained it 
will be impossible to install power connections without waiting for the arrival of 
necessary materials for each connection from the mainland. A specific example 
of this occurred recently where a sub-contractor on the Hickam Field low-cost 
housing had to import by Clipper air express at an expense of $1,000.00, some 
plumbing items which under normal conditions could have been obtained from 
local stocks. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3069 

d. As stated above shipping priorities are also important. To our knowledge 
there is now no coordinated shipping priorities, although the Matson Navigation 
Company, which handles the bulk of the shipments, is granting unofficial priority 
to items on which a procurement priority has been obtained. As far as govern- 
ment bought and shipped materials are concerned there has been no great diffi- 
culty although considerable detail work has been involved in radioing about 
specific shipments. There are large quantities of materials, however, which are 
being ordered by private firms either for direct supply to government agencies 
or for incorporation in defense works directly or indirectly, and these private 
concerns are encountering great difficulties in securing shipping space for this 
material. 

4. To meet this increasing problem I propose to pet up an office in this depart- 
ment to be responsible for coordinating all priorities matters, and I have selected 
the Department Engineer's office as the section in w^ich this control can best 
be established. Additional officers, not necessarily engineers, will be placed on 
duty in that office to furnish needed assistance. [3] The following is a 
preliminary outline of the duties of this section : 

a. To establish an information bureau where request for information on 
priorities can be promptly filled. 

h. To keep me informed of the priorities and preference ratings assigned by 
regular supply branches to their own procurement in order to insure that these 
are coordinated. In this work with the regular supply branches and construction 
agencies it is not intended that the coordinating office will assume any control 
over these agencies; it is intended, however, that the coordinating office keep 
informed of what action these agencies are taking in priority matters. 

c. We assign preference ratings covering procurements which are essential to 
defense work and which are not now covered by existing instructions. 

5. In the directive of the Priorities Committee of the Army and Navy Munitions 
Board, 27 November 1940, it is noted that all Panama Canal defense projects 
are placed in priority classification A-l-b. There is no similar blanket coverage 
for devents projects in this department; and the rating which can be assigned 
to any project in this department depends upon its classification as a general 
project under the other entries in this directive. The aircraft Warning Service 
project is the most important single project in the department, and under the 
general classification in this directive the highest priority which could be assigned 
to it would be A 1-f. It is believed that the conditions facing this department 
are similar to those in Panama and that a similar blanket priority classification 
for our defense projects should be authorized, and that this rating should be high. 
If this is done it would not be necessary to assign this high a rating to all projects, 
and this department could reserve the high rating for the exceptional projects 
which were considered absolutely essential. 

6. As stated above, the maintenance of adequate local stocks by local supply 
firms is essential. Existing instructions on the issuance of preference ratings 
are predicated on the fact that the firm to whom the rating is issued is a govern- 
ment contractor. The local supply firms who must obtain preference ratings 
to maintain stocks are not actually government contractors at the time they 
place their mainland orders. These firms become contractors, however, when a 
government agency orders materials from their stocks. The question involved 
here is one of time; and obviously we should not wait until the specific need for 
a stock item arises to issue a preference rating then delay the job while the item 
is being procured and shipped. It is believed that some authority should exist 
for us to give preference ratings for the procurement of any items which we, 
through experience and knowledge of future projects, select as essential. 

[4] 7. The following is therefore recommended: 

a. The establishment of a blanket prioritv for Hawaiian defense projects as has 
been done for Panama Canal defense projects, and authorization to this head- 
quarters to apply this high rating to cases of exceptional importance. 

h. Waiving of the requirement that preference ratings can be issued only to 
government contractors and authorization to this Headquarters to issue these 
ratings for the procurement of those items which we anticipate will be essential 
to the defense program. 

c. Consideration of the establishment of a liaison with shipping agencies on the 
West Coast to insure that defense materials ordered by private firms receive 
proper priorities in shipping space. 



3070 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

It is further recommended that prompt consideration be given to subparagraphs 
o and b above and this headquarters advised by ladio of the War Department's 
attitude. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding. 

1 incl: C/Ltr. Engr 523.07 4 Jun 1941 
Record copy Engineers 
A true copy. 

Edward Von Geldern, 

Edward Von Geldefn, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

114.14-18-C-32 RGC/amw 
(8-18-41 

1st Indorsement 

Priorities Committee, 
Army & Xavy Munitions Board, 

War Department Building, 
Washington, D. C, August 18, 1941. 
To Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Office of the 
Department Engineer, Fort Shafter, T. H. (THRU: The Adjutant General, 
Washington, D. C.) 

1. The following information is submitted in answer to the recommendations 
on page 4 of letter from Lieutenant General Walter C. Short: 

2. The establishment of a blanket priority specifically to Hawaiian Defense 
Projects is not considered necessary inasmuch as the Directive, Priorities Com- 
mittee, Army and Xavy Munitions Board, established the preference rating 
A-l-c for "Construction, equipment, defense and development of outlying bases, 
not included in the Continental United States". This Directive is the cumulative 
result of an exhaustive study of the military importance of the various items 
required by the military and naval forces of the United States, and has received 
the approval of the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Xavy. 

3. Attention is invited to a copy of communication of July 31, 1941, from the 
Army and X'avy Munitions Board to "Supply Arms and Services of the Army 
and Bureaus and Offices of the Xavy", which explains the procedure covering the 
issuance of project rating orders to Army and X'avy construction projects outside 
of the Continental United States. It will be noted that the project rating orders 
issued in accordance with these instructions will not be confined to items on the 
Critical List, but will include all items necessary to complete the construction of 
a particular project. These ratings may be extended in the usual way, and it is 
believed should cover the recommendation as made in paragf-aph 7 b. 

4. Attention is invited to the "Defense Supply Rating Plan" recently inaugu- 
rated by the Office of Production Management. This is a plan developed whereby 
the manufacturers who supply so-called "Off the shelf" items to defense industries 
are permitted to get material with which to manufacture additional stock so as 
to make a supply available to defense customers. This plan mav be of value to 
some of the concerns in the Hawaiian District and is mentioned for your 
consideration. 

5. The establishment of a liaison with shipping agencies of the West Coast has 
been referred to the Division of Emergency Shipping, Maritime Commission. 
That Commission has a record of the situation as it exists and as it has been for 
some time. They are further checking into the situation, but definite decision 
to establish a liaison agency has not been made. 

For the Priorities Committee: 

RoBT. G. Cook, 
Major, Ordnance, USA. 
1 Incl. no change. 
A True Copy: 

Edward Von Geldern 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3071 



[immediate action] 

War Department 

The Adjutant General's Office 

washington 

Via Air Mail 

AG 523 Priority 

(7-7-41) MB 2nd Ind. 

War Department, A. G. O., Augusl 26, 1941. 

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

Attention is invited to preceding Indorsement. 
By order of the Secretary of War: 



JAU 



Brigadier General, 
Acting The Adjutant General. 
1 Incl. n/c. 
A True Copy. 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

14 August 1941. 
The Adjutant General, 

Washington, D. C. 

Relet this headquarters third July file engr five two three point zero seven 
subject priorities and preference ratings stop. This question of priorities becom- 
ing more pressing and many local supply houses are now advised by mainland 
agents that no shipment can be made until priority is secured stop. Request 
radio advice as to action on recommendations paragraph seven of letter cited. 

Short. 
A True Copy: 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 
Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., Oct. 23, 1941. 
In replv refer to: 

Engr. 523.07 
Subject: Office of Production Management Field Service. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. Reference is made to letter dated 13 August 1941 from the Army and Navy 
Munitions Board, a copy of which is inclosed. Reference is also made to letter 
from his headquarters, file Engr. 523.07, subject "Priorities and Preference 
Ratings," and 1st Indorsement from Priorities Committee, Army and Navy 
Munitions Board, 18 August 1941, file 114. 14-1 8-C-32-RGC-amw (8-18-41). 

2. The conditions as to securing priorities for materials needed in the Hawaiian 
Islands are growing worse steadily, and a large part of the difficulties encountered 
can be traced to lack of information and to failure of field offices, whose region in- 
cludes this Territory, to malce themselves known to local Federal officials and 
business men. The long distances involved in travel, the difference in time, and 
the high cost of telephonic communication, all make contact with any regional 
office difficult. 



3072 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3. Governor Poindexter has already submitted a request to Washington for the 
establishment of a local office of tne Priorities Division, OPM, and at his request 

1 concurred in his suggested action. A copy of my letter of September 13, 1941 
to the Governor is inclosed for your information. 

4. It is therefore requested that the War Department propose the establish- 
ment in Honolulu of a field office of the Office of Production Management, to 
include the Priorities Division, initially, w ith provision for adding representatives 
of other divisions later, if required. 

[s] Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
2 Incls: (1) Cy of Itr Army & Navy Munitions Board, 8/13/41; (2) Cy of Itr 
to Gov. Poindexter, 13 Sept 41. 
A true copy: 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

m 2nd Lt., F. A. 

AG 334.8 Production Management Board 

(10-23-41) MB 1st Ind IG/mm-1713 

War Department, A. G. O., 

October 31, 1941. 
To: The Under Secretary of War. 

2 Incls. No change. 
A true copy. 

Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

2d Indorsement 
18-C-32 RGC/amw 
(11-13-41) 

Priorities Committee 
army & navy munitions board 

War Department Building, 
Washington, D. C, November IS, 1941. 

To Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Office of the 
Department Commander, Fort Shaffer, T. H. (THRU: The Adjutant General, 
War Dept., Washington, D. C.) 

1. Recommendation has been made to the Office of Production Management 
and a field office of the Office of Production Management be established in Hawaii 
at an early date. They have requested to advise this Committee as to the 
action contemplated or already accomplished in this direction. Such information 
will be forwarded when received. 
For the Priorities Committee: 

(/s/) RoBT. G. Cook, 
Major, Ordnance, USA. 
2 Incls. No change. 

3rd Ind. 
AG 334.8 Production Management Board (li)-23-41) MB 

IG:wc-1713 
War Department, A. G. O., 

November 17, 1941. 
To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 
Attention is invited to preceding Indorsement. 
By order of the Secretary of War: 

(/s/) E. L. Adams, 



Incls. n/c. 
A true copy. 

Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 



Major General, 
The Adjutant General. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3073 

[Exhibit 1 G] 



Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 
Office of the Department Commander, 

Fori Shafter, T. //., July 28, 1941. 
VIA "CLIPPER" AIR MAIL 
Engr. 600.12 (Gen.) 

Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. The delay in securing necessary maierials for our construction program has 
become a matter of serious concern. Experience indicates that from three to 
four months are necessary to procure construction materials from the United 
States after funds for projects are allotted, and increasing transportation difficulties 
may lengthen this time. 

2. The following is the situation of the two constructing agencies: 

a. The District {Engineer has no revolving fund for advance procurement of 
materials. Among the first Engineer projects approved, however, were two large 
projects; ohe the additional ammunition storage facilities, and the other the Air 
Corps mobilization housing. As soon as these allotments were received, the 
District Engineer immediately ordered all or a large part of the necessary materials 
to complete the entire project. With his construction crews now well organized, 
the rate of using these materials has greatly accelerated and the stock is being 
depleted because the rate of use is greater than the rate of arrival from the 
mainland. 

b. The Constructing Quartermaster is in somewhat the same situation. While 
the Quartermaster General has authorized the establishment of a stock pile of 
lumber, no funds have been advanced for the procurement of other materials. 
These other materials are not available for local purchase in any appreciable 
quantities, and as a result, there will undoubtedly be delays. 

3. I understand that the Division Engineer, San Francisco, has recommended 
to the Chief of Engineers that a revolving working fund of $1,000,000,000 be 
allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to permit that officer to procure 
materials in advance. This fund would be a revolving fund. All expenditures 
from it for materials would be reimbursed from other projects funds as these 
projects were approved and utilize the materials. 

4. I think that this materials situation may become critical. As stated in 
previous communications, a large part of our construction forces have been 
imported from the mainland on contracts which require either their continued 
employment or return to the mainland at Government expense. It is obvious 
that if there is anv lack of materials not only will the jobs be delayed, but also the 
cost to the Government will be increased,. I therefore strongly recommend that 
the suggestion of the Division Engineer, San Francisco, be adopted, that the 
District Engineer, Honolulu, be allotted a revolving fund of $1,000,000.00, and 
that similar arrangements be made for the Constructing Quartermaster to permit 
him to stock materials in addition to lumber. 

(s) Walter C. Short, 
Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 

Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials. 

AG 600.12 Hawaiian Dept Istlnd. ET/rm 

(7-28-41) MO ^^^ 

War Department, AGO, 

August 1, 1941- 

To: Chief of Engineers AND The Quartermaster General, IN TURN. 
For remark and recommendation. 

By order of the Secretary of War: 

. . , 

Adjutant General. 

A true cop}'. 

Edward von Geldern, 

Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

400.31 (Honolulu) 335. 

Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials. 



3074 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2nd Ind. 3-N 

Office, C. of E., 

August 7, 1941. 

To The Adjutant General (Through The Quartermaster General.) 

It is recommended that a revolving fund of $1,000,000.00 he authorized for the 
purposes indicated in the basic letter. If the necessary funds are not available 
to the War Department from any other source, it is believed that this amount 
could be advanced from the Fifth Supplemental, 1941, Deferred Storage Program, 
(Air Corps), Items a & h, Parking Storage Areas, Reserve Airplanes. As a final 
resort, the sum of $1,000,000.00 now reserved for construction at the Mobile Air 
Depot, (Brooklev Field) could be advanced for this purpose. In either case, 
reimbursement should be effected upon the appropriation of funds for construc- 
tion in Hawaii under the 1943 Construction Program. 
For the Chief of Engineers: 

(s) John R. Hardin, 

John R. Hardin, 
Major, Corps of Engineers, 

Chief, Construction Section. 
A true copy. 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

20 August 1941. 
Fred W. Herman, 
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers, 
Assistant Dept. Engineer. 
The Adjutant General, 
Washington, D. C. 
Reference clipper letter this headquarters July twenty eighth file Engr six 
hundred point one two parenthesis gen period parenthesis subject revolving fund 
for purchase of materials Stop Information has been received from district 
engineer Honolulu that allotment of one million one hundred thousand dollars 
has been received wh[ch can be utilized for advanced purchases of materials as 
recommended in letter cited Stop Constructing quartermaster has not repeat 
not received similar allotment as revolving fund to permit advance purchases of 
materials nor any information thereof Stop Strongly recommend revolving 
fund allotment similar to that established for district engineer be made to con- 
structing quartermaster to permit advanced ordering of materials for defense 
contracts 

Short 
A true copy. 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

Snd Lt., F. A. 
OM 411.1 C-P 
(Hawaiian Dept.) 

3rd Ind. 

War Department. 
Office of The Quartermaster General, 

Washington, D. C, August 21, 1941. 
■ To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 
1. The Quartermaster Torps has established a stock-pile reserve of lumber in 
Hawaii in the amount of $600,000.00. It is therefore recommended that a 
revolving fund in an amount not to exceed $500,000.00 be authorized. If the 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3075 

necessary funds arc not available to the War Department from any other source, 
funds in allotted status to the Quartermaster C^orps can be made available. 
For the Quartermaster General: 

(s) L. R. Groves. 
L. R. Groves, 
Colonel, Q. M. C, 

Assistant. 
A true copy. 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

3nd Lt., F. A. 

Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials — Hawaiian Department 

AG 600.12 Haw. Dept. 

(7-28-41) i\IO-D 4th Ind. ESA 

War Department, AGO, September 27, 1941- 

To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shaffer, T. H. 

The establishment of revolving funds as requested in basic communication is not 
favorably considered. The Quartermaster General will, however, augment the 
lumber stock pile now maintained in the Hawaiian Department sufficiently to 
meet requirements for ^A ar Department approved projects for both Engineer and 
Quartermaster construction. A similar stock pile of other classes of construction 
materials will also be established by The Quartermaster General without delay. 
The materials u.sed from these stock piles will be replaced from applicable funds 
of projects for which used as soon as suclf funds become available to local con- 
structing agencies. 

Bv order of the Secretarv of War: 



Major General, 
The Adjutant General. 
A true copy. 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

Headqi'arters Hawaiian Department, 
Offu e of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., September 13, 1941. 
In reply refer to: Engr. 600.12 (Gen.) 
Major General R. C'. Moore 

Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department, 

Washington, D. C. 
Dear Dick: 

The situation surrounding the obtaining of materials for defense contracts is 
becoming more and more critical. On many items a dejay of between three and 
four months occurs between the time an allotment of funds for a project is received 
and the materials necessary are obtained from the mainland. We have recently 
received word on some electrical equipment which indicates that delivery cannot 
be made for six months. 

In a conference with Colonel Hamium, Division Engineer is San Francisco, 
when he was here sometime ago, he mentioned that he had recommended to The 
Chief of Engineers that a revolving fund of $1,000,000.00 be set up to permit the 
District Engineer to make advance purchases of materials and plant. I followed 
up Hannum's recommendation to the Chief of f^igineers with a strong letter to 
the War Department urging that this revolving fund be set up for the District 



79710 0—40 — pt. 18 15 



3076 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Engineer and that similar arrangements be made for the Constructing Quarter- 
master. The District Engineer informed me today that he had received an allot- 
ment of $1,100,000.00 from the Chief of Engineers which could be utilized for the 
advance purchase of materials. The Constructing Quartermaster, however, has 
not yet received similar information, and while he is authorized to stock lumber 
locally, he has no revolving fund for which to make advance purchases of materials 
other than lumber. 

1 am following up my previous recommendation by radio to The Adjutant 
General today. I think that the matter is sufficiently important to bring it to 
your attention, and I will appreciate it if you would have someone look into this 
matter. A copy of my letter of July 28th and of the radio follow up of September 
13 are inclosed for ready reference. 

Very sincerely. 

Walter C. Shokt, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding. 

2 Incls: Cy. Itr. Engr. 600.12 (Gen.) 28 Jul 41, Cy. rad. 20 Aug 41. 
A true copy: 

Edward Von Geldern, 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

War Department, 
Office of the Chief of Staff, 

Washington, September 29, 1941- 
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, 

Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, T. H. 
Dear Walter: 

I have your letter of the thirteenth relative to the establishment of revolving 
funds in connection with construction in Hawaii. 

Owing to legal restrictions we cannot approve your request for revolving funds. 
However, it appears that the wording of the appropriation fiom which the Quarter- 
master General maintains the lumber pile you mention is such that those funds 
may be used to make advance purchases of other materials required for con- 
struction. 

The Quartermaster General will take immediate measures to establish a stock 
pile of construction materials other than lumber, sufficient to meet requirements 
for both Engineer and Quartermaster construction. The conditions under which 
these stock piles will be reimbursed will be covered in the reply of the War 
Department to your official request of July 28, 1941. 

The Chief of Engineers advises that the allotment of $1,100,000 made to your 
District Engineer, to which you refer, is from funds now available for approved 
projects. This allotment should not be construed as making these fund^ available 
to you as a revolving fund, nor for advance purchase of mateiials, except for the 
projects to which the funds apply. 

I believe that when these stock piles have become established the situation you 
outline will be greatly relieved. 
Sincerelv vours. 

■ ' [S] R. C. Moore, 

R. C. Moore, 
Major General, Deputy Chief of Staff. 
A true copy. 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. . 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3077 

[Exhibit 1 H] 

[secret] 

War Department, 
Office of the Chief of Staff, 

Washington, November 27, 1941- 
Air Mail via Clipper 

Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, U. S. A., 
Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Office of the Department Commander, Fort Shafter, T. H. 
Dear Short: The copy of your report on the additional air routes has been 
received. The quantity of details requiring coordination, and the distances 
involved in the projects make the short time consumed in getting rolling almost 
unbelievably short. 

I extend you my personal thanks for the effort you have expended on this job 
and the results you are getting. 

The way things are working out now, it looks as if we will be using trans- Pacific 
airways almost continuously from now on. Our plans are O. K. for 4-engine 
bombers, but what are the prospects for medium bombers? Do you think we 
should even study that phase of trans-Pacific operations? 
Best regards. 
Sincerely. 

[S] H. H. Arnold, 
Major General, V. S. A., 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air. 
A true copy: 

Edward Von Geldern 
Edward Von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

[Exhibit II] 

Subject: Increase in the Strength of the Third Engineers. 

AG320.2 (11-1-40) M-C 3rd Ind. ESA 

War Department. A. G. O., February 10, 1941. 
To Commanding Genera!, Hawaiian Department. 

1. Action is being taken to increase the allotment of Regular Army enlisted 
men for the Corps of Engineers, Hawaiian Department by 107. This allotment 
will permit the organization of the 3rd Engineers in accordance with Table of 
Organization 5-11, November 1, 1940. Regular Army personnel are not available 
to increase further the strength of this regiment. 

2. Since War Department policy forbids sending trainees to the Overseas 
Departments it will not be practicable to aid you in creating an Engineer Bat- 
talion (Separate) as recommended in your radio of January 23, 1941. 

3. As previouslj' advised, plans provide for the activation of a separate Engineer 
Company (Avn) for your Department. 

By order of the Secretary of War: 

A True Copy: [sgd] E.S.Adams. 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

[secret] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 
Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., February 19, 1941. 
In replv refer to: 
Engr. 322.03 

Subject: Additional Engineer Troops. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, Engr. 322.03, 23 August 1940, 
which recommended the assignment to the Department of an Engineer regiment 



3078 COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(Aviation) less one battalion, and to letter. P^ngr. 210 x220.03, 1 November 1940, 
which recommended an increase in the strength of the Third Engineer-^, and to 
letter. Ensjr. 322.03. 5 February 1941. recommending a redesignation in the Third 
Engineers from a combat regiment. Division, to a combat regiment. Corps. 

2. These previous recommendations for an increase in the Engineer component, 
in the Department were based upon the assumption that some civilian labor 
would be available. It has been necessary with the various agencies involved 
in defense construction to import skilled labor from the mainland. A recent 
increase in the defense contracts of the Xavy will now necessitate the importation 
of unskilled labor as well. This development now makes it impossible to assume 
that any appreciable local labor will be available and requires that previou.s 
estimates of the minimum force of P^ngineers necessary be revi.sed upward.s. 

3. I consider it essential that a regiment of Engineers (.\viation) be furnished 
this Department as an integral part of tlie Hawaiian Air Force and that a regi- 
ment of Engineers, General Service, be furnished this department as Department 
Engineer troops. There is sufficient work immediately on hand in connection 
with Air Corps activities on the outlying islands and on Oahu to keep a regiment 
of Engineers continuously occupi'^d. There is also sufficient work in connection 
with military roads and trails in department units to keep a regiment of General 
Service Engineers continuously occupied. There i.s also sufficient work in con- 
nection with the Hawaiian Division such as bombproofing of Division command. 
l)osts and comnumication centers, road blocks and other tactical employment 
to keep the Third Engineers continuously occupied. 

4. It is therefore recommended that one regiment of F^ngineers (Aviation) (T. O. 
5-411) and one regiment of Engineers, GeneralService, (T. O. 5-21) be authorized 
for this Department and that these units complete with personnel and equipment 
be furnished as soon as possible.. 

W.ALTKR C. Short, 

Lieutenant General, 

Commanding. 
Record copy: Engineers. 
.\ True Copv: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41. 

Subject: Additional Engineer Troops. Hawaiian Department. 

AG 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M 1st Ind. ESA 

War Department, A. G. O., 

May 15, 1941. 
To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

1. a. The 34th Engineers (Combat), will be activated in your department with 
an allotted strength of 1127 enlisted men under T/0 5-171, November 1, 1940, 
less band and basic privates, on June 1, 1941 (AG 320.2 (4-8-41) M-C, radio 
April 9, 1941). 

b. The regiment will be organized with cadres to be furnished by units now in 
your department, as directed by you, and with selectees to be dispatched from 
the Continental United States. 

c. Every effort will be made to send inaividuals who have completed their basic 
training; however, in order to make maximum use of the available shipping, some 
curtailment in their basic training mav be required. If this is done, you will be 
informed so that thev can complete their training in Hawaii. Under the present 
tentative schedule, it is proposed to dispatch the full quota except thirty-six 
attached medical, in June. The Medical Department personnel Will be dis- 
patched in November. 

d. The actual date of activation of the regiment will conform to the arrival of 
personnel in your department. 

2. While your recent request for additional medical enlisted men was dis- 
approved because of non-availabilitv of personnel, the 34th Engineers (and the 
97th and 98th Coast Artillerv Regiments whose activation is covered in separate 
correspondence) is allotted a full (luota of attached medical personnel, less basics. 
You are authorized to make a redistribution of this attached medical personnel, 
reporting such readju.stment to this office. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3079 



3. It is desired that you submit a report on the following: 

a. The actual date of activation of the 34th Engineers. 

b. Changes in the distribution of three-vear men in engineer units in connec- 
tion with the organization of the 34th Engineers. 

4. Attention is invited to letter, this office, April 21, 1941, AG 381.4 (1-27-41) 
M-D-M, subject: Reports of change in status reports — Defense Reserves, 
Overseas Departments. 

5. Your request for aviation engineers is being considered separately. 

6. The allotment of commissioned personnel and the grades and ratings of 
enlisted personnel will be made separately. 



By order of the Secretary of War: 



3 Inclosures- 



[S] E. S. Adams, 

Major General, 
The Adjutant General. 



Incl. 1.— Copv of Itr., 5-15-41, to C. G., Third Corps Area. 

Incl. 2.— Copy of Itr., 5-15-41, to C. G., New York Port of Embarkation. 

Incl. 3. — Copy of Itr., 5-15-41, to The Quartermaster General. 

A True Copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

[confidkntial] 

War Department, 
The Adjutant Generai/s Office, 

Washington, June 18, 1941- 
AG 320.2 
(6-5-41) MR-M-C 

Subject: Constitution and Activation of Certain Engineer Units (804th Engineer 
Battalion, Aviation (Separate), and Personnel for Engineer Head- 
quarters, Hawaiian Department Air Force). 

To: The Commanding Generals, Fourth Army, Hawaiian Department, Ninth 
Corps Area, and San Francisco Port of Embarkation. 

Extract 



1. The 804th Engineer Company, Aviation (Separate), now in Hawaii, will be 
disbanded at the earliest practicable date and concurrently therewith the 804th 
Engineer Battalion, Aviation (Separate), will be constituted and activated with 
an authorized strength of 21 officers and 625 enlisted men, including 10 attached 
medical. The personnel, unit funds, and equipment of the 804th Engineer 
Battalion, Aviation (Separate). 



By order of the Secretary of War: 



[S] E. S. ADAMS, 

Major General, 
The Adjutant General. 



A True Copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

War Department, 
The Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, May 28, 1941. 
AG 320.2 (5-28-41) MC-C-M 
Subject: Additional Engineer Troops and Reinforcements for Coast Artillery 

Garrison, Hawaiian Department. 
To: The Commanding General, Third Corps Area. 

The Sailings of USATs Manhattan, Washington, and Wood for Hawaii have 
been indefinitely postponed. So much of letters, this office, May 15, 1941, AG 



3080 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

320 2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M, subject: Additional P^ngineer Troops, Hawaiian 
Department, and iMay 10, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-18-41) MC-C-M, subject: Rein- 
forcements for Coast Artillery Garrison Hawaiian Department, as pertains to 
movement of trainees to Ports of Embarkation and overseas movement is re- 
scinded. Instructions covering final disposition of trainees earmarked by the 
two letters mentioned above will follow this communication. 
By order of the Secretary of War: 

Adjutant General. 
Copies furnished: 

The Commanding Generals, First Army, GHQ Air Force, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment, San Francisco and New York Ports of Embarkation; 
The Chief of Staff, GHQ 
The Chief of Chaplains 
The Chief of Coast Artillery 
The Chief of the Air Corps 
The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service 
The Chief of Engineers 
The Chief of Ordnance 
The Chief Signal Officer 
The Quartermaster General; and 
The Chief of Finance. 

A true copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

War Department, 
The Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, June 23, 1941- 
AG 320.2 (6-16-41) MC-C-M 

Subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian Department. 
To: The Commanding Generals, Hawaiian Department, Third Corps Area and 
the New York Port of Embarkation; 
The Quartermaster General. 
Letter this office, May 15, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M, subject: 
Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian Department, to the Commanding Genral, 
Third Corps Area, the Commanding General, New York Port of Embarkation, 
and The Quartermaster General, respectively; and 1st Indorsement this office, 
May 15, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M, same subject, to the Commanding 
General, Hawaiian Department, are rescinded. Letters, this office May 23, 1941, 
AG 320.2 (5-23-41) MC-M, May 24, 1941, AG 320.2 (5-24-41) MC, and May 27, 
1941, AG 320.2 (5-26-41) MC, subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian 
Department, to the Commanding General, Third Corps Area are also rescinded. 
By order of the Secretary of War: 

[sgd] E. S. Adams, 

Major General, 
The Adjutant General. 
Copies Furnished: 

Chief of Staff, GHQ 

The Commanding Generals, First Army, and S. F. P. of E 
The Chief of Chaplains 
The Chief of Coast Artillery 
The Chief of the Air Corps 
The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service 
The Chief of Engineers 
The Chief of Ordnance 
The Chief Signal Officer 
The Chief of Finance 
The Surgeon General 
A True Copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

Subject: Additional Selective Service Trainees for the Hawaiian Department. 
AG 320.2 (4-21-41) MC-C 1st Ind. ESA 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3081 

War Department, A. G. O., 

May 21, 1941. 
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

1. Radio No. 721, this office, April 9, 1941, requested your views on the prac- 
.tical)ility of securing additional selectees locally, and it was not intended that an 
appeal be made to the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii to secure 1,127 addi- 
tional selectees in excess of the oxistins: quota. 

2. In connection with your remarks on labor shortage in Hawaii, a resolution 
recently passed by the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of Honolulu, 
copies of which were sent to the Secretary of War and other governmental heads, 
protested the organization of a port company in Hawaii on the grounds that the 
supply of labor was ample and that needs of National Defense projects could be 
met without importation of additional personnel from the United States. This 
matter is brought to your attention for information only. No further action 
appears •ic'essary (n desirable at this time. 

3. Personnel for the 34th Engineers will be provided from the Continental 
United States in two increments. Details have been communicated to you in 
separate correspondence. 

By order of the Secretary' of War: 

[sgd] E. S. Adams, 



A true copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 



Major General, 
The Adjutant General. 



Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 
Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 21 April 1941. 
In replv refer to: 
AG 381 

Subject: Additional Selective Service Trainees for the Hawaiian Department. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. War Department radio No. 721, of 9 April 1941, proposes activation in this 
Department of the 34th Engineer Regiment (C) in June with a strength of 1127, 
including 36 attached medical personnel. It further proposes that the 3d Engi- 
neers (C) will furnish the cadre; the balance to be local selectees. 

2. As the existing Territorial quota of 1400 Selectees has already been exceeded 
by approximately 500, and those now inducted assigned to organizations, an appeal 
was made to the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii to secure the additional 
personnel required to activate this new unit. The Governor's reply, attached, 
states that he is without authority to call additional quotas of trainees, and even 
if such authority existed, he is oppo.sed to providing additional manpower at the 
expense of National Defense projects and local industry which have already 
absorbed all available labor. 

3. The labor shortage in Hawaii is acute. Skilled labor for work on National 
Defense projects is now being imported and it is quite likely that the importation 
of unskilled labor will become necessary to maintain defense work schedules. 

4. In view of these circumstances it is urged that the War Department provide 
personnel from the Mainland U. S. for the activation of new or expansion of ex- 
isting units in the Hawaiian Department. 

[sgd] Walter C. Short, 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
2 Incls. 

1. Letter to Governor, T. H. 

2. Letter from Governor, T. H. 
A True Copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 



3082 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Exhibit IJ] 
W 

[Secret] 

18 February 1941. 
AG 320.2/55 

Subject: Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department. 
To: The Adj-ntant General, Washint^ton, D. C. 

1. Reference is invited to: 

A. Letter the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated 24 January 
1941. with reference to the defense of the Pearl Harbor Xaval Base against a 
surprise attack, copy forwarded to this headquarters as inclosure to letter TAG 
to HHD. 7 Februarv 1941, subject: "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii," 
file AG 381 (1-24-41) M. 

B. Letter HHD to TAG, 5 September 1940, subject: "Additional Antiaircraft 
Troops for the Hawaiian Department", file 320.2/49. 

C. Letter TAG to HHD, 27 September 1940, subject: War Reinforcements, 
Hawaiian Department", file 320.2 (9/27/40) M-WPD, with 1st and 2nd Indorse- 
ments thereon. 

2. The increasingly critical international situation, together with the vital need, 
as expressed in Reference A, for adequate provision for the best defense which 
can be provided for the security of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base |and the Fleet 
against surprise attacks makes it essential that the antiaircraft artillery garrison 
of Oahu he placed upon a war footing without delay. While not specifically 
mentioned in Reference ^4, there is a similar requirement for a sound defense of 
the Fleet and its base against raids by surface ships. This would have special 
importance if the fleet should be withdrawn from Pearl Harbor. An adequate 
defense, ready for prompt action, can not be provided with the present garrison 
because of the necessity for dual assignments of Coast Artillery batteries to anti- 
aircraft and harbor defense missions. The reinforcements required for the anti- 
aircraft artillery and harbor defense garrisons to provide the degree of defense 
considered essential are discussed below. 

3. Antiaircraft Artillery. 

a. The approved defense project provides for twenty-five (25) gun batteries, 
five (5) searchlight batteries, and sixteen (16) automatic weapons batteries 
manning a total of seventy-two (72) mobile and twenty-six (26) fixed AA guns, 
seventy-five (75) searchlights, one hundred and twenty (120) 37 mm AA guns, 
and two hundred (200) cal. .50 A A machine guns. (NOTE: Three hundred and 

13\ forty five (345) cal. .50 AA machine guns are provided in the defense 
project, of which two hundred (200) are manned by antiaircraft artillery and 
the remainder by other troops.) With the present garrison, including the 
assignment of all but two (2) harbor defense artillery batteries to antiaircraft 
assignments, only nineteen (19) gun batteries, three (3) searchlight batteries, 
no 37mm batteries and six (6) machine gun batteries can be manned because of 
the shortage of both personnel and equipment. The major shortages in anti- 
aircraft artillery armament are sixteen (16) three inch AA guns and associated 
equipment (of which six (6) guns are understood to be enroute'to this Depart- 
ment), all one hundred and thirty-five (135) 37 mm AA guns, two hundred and 
thirty-six (236) cal. .50 machine guns, and thirty (30) sound locators. 

b. To man the entire antiaircraft artillery defense project, avoiding dual 
assignments to all but four harbor defense batteries, requires an increase in the 
existing garrison of the following antiaircraft artillery personnel: 

2 Regiments Coast Artillerv AA (Mobile) T/0 4-11. 

1 Battalion Gun Coast Artillerv AA (Mobile) (less searchlight batterj-) 
T/0 4-15. 

Approximately ninety (90) officers and two thousand (2000) enlisted men as 
individual filler replacements to activate three (3) gun batteries and three (3) 
37 mm batteries of the 64th CA (AA), now in active, and to bring to war strength 
the active elements of this regiment. 

c. In paragraph 10 a of 2nd Indorsement of Reference C, the War Depratment 
provided for only one half of the reinforcements of the peacetime garrison of 
antiaircraft artillery which, at that time, were considered essential to provide a 
reasonably effective antiaircraft defense prior to the date unit reinforcements 
from the mainland could affect the situation. With the increasingly critical 
international situation at this time, it is urgentl}' recommended that all war 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 30<S3 

reinforcements of antiaircraft artillery personnel, both unit and filler reinforce- 
ments described above, together with the existing shortages in antiaircraft 
artillery material be sent from the mainland with the least practicable delay. 

4. Harbor Defense Artillery. 

The status of the defense which can be established with existing personnel of 
the peace garrison of harbor defense artillery is described in detail in par 6/, of 
the basic document, Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision of 1940. Briefly, only 
one 16-incli battery and the seacoast searchlights of the Ulupau Group can be 
manned by batteries with harbor defense as their only mission. By employing 
the undesirable expedient of dual assignments to harbor defense and antiaircraft 
missions, and of harbor defense and Field Artillery missions, both 16-inch gun 
batteries, the one 14-inch battery, o'ne of the two 12-inch gun batteries, none of the 
three mortar t:)atteries, three of the five 8-inch batteries (fixed and railway), six 
of the twelve 155 mm batteries (two manned by Field Artillery personnel) and 
none of the two 6-inch and two 3-inch [3] batteries can be manned upon 
initial deployment. As shown in Table I, par. 7 to HDP-40, an increase of 
approximately 165 officers and 3400 enlisted men as individual filler reinforcements 
and One Regiment Coast Artillery (TD, T/0 4-31 W) is required to fully man 
the harbor defense artillery. By not manning the three fixed seacoast mortar 
batteries, which are not essential to a defense against raids, the total number of 
individual filler reinforcements may be reduced to approximately 150 officers 
and 2700 enlisted men. This increase in the garrison will be sufficient to provide 
only one relief as manning details for harbor defense guns, but will be adequate so 
that key observation stations, air guards and similar details can be maintained 
continuously. 

5. Summarizing, it is urgently recommended that: 

(a) The Coast Artillery garrison of this Department be brought to substantially 
war strenght bv the dispatch from the mainland of the following reinforcements: 

(1) Two Regiments CA (A A) Mobile, T/0 4-11. 

(2) One Battalion CA fAA) gun, xMobile (less searchlight battery), T/0 

4-15. 

(3) One Regiment CA (TD), 155mm gun, T/O 4-31 W. 

(4) Individual antiaircraft artillery filler reinforcements to include 91 

officers and 2064 enlisted men. 

(5) Individual harbor defense artillery reinforcements to include approxi- 

mately 150 officers and 2700 enlisted men. 
b. Existing major shortages in the armament of the approved antiaircraft 
artillery projects, as .set forth in par. 3 above, be filled as soon as practicable. 

Walter C Short, 

Lieutenant General, 

Commanding. 
A True Copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41. 
\1] 

[SECRET] 

Subject: Reinforcements for Coast Artillerv Garrison, Hawaiian Department. 
AG 320.2 (2-18-41) MC-C-M 1st Ind." ESA 

War Department, A. G. O., 

May 10, 1941. 
To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

1. The Coast Artillery garrison, Hawaiian Department, will be augmented by 
approximately 276 officers and 5,734 enlisted men between June, 1941, and March, 
1942, in three increments paralleling the estimated delivery of material, as follows: 
a. June, 1941 : 

(1) AA filler replacements, 60 officers and 1,337 enlisted men. 

(2) 62 officers and 1.329 enlisted men required to activate the following 
units in the Department: 



3084 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

98th Coast Artillery (A A) (Semi-mobile), less band, 3d Battalion (37-mm 
Gun), Battery E (Searchlight), basic privates and attached medical, under 
T/0 4-111, November 1, 1940, and component tables. 

(3) 17 officers and 359 enlisted men to activate the 2d Battalion, 97th 
Coast Artillery (A A) (Semi-mobile), less Battery H (Gun), Battery E 
(Searchlight) and basic privates, under T/0 4-115, November 1, 1940 and 
component tables. 

b. November, 1941 : 

(1) 48 officers and 885 enlisted men to activate the 97th Coast Artillery 
(AA) (Semi-mobile), less band, 2d Battalion (Gun), 3d Battalion (37-mm 
gun), and basic privates, under T/0 4-111, November 1, 1940, and compo- 
nent tables. 

(2) 4 officers and 134 enlisted men to activate Battery H (Gun), 97th 
Coast Artillery, less basic privates, under T/0 4-17, November 1, 1940. 

(3) Attached Medical personnel, 98th Coast Artillery, 7 officers and 49 
enlisted men. 

[2] c. March, 1942: 

(1) AA filler replacements, 24 officers and 661 enlisted men. 

(2) 54 officers and 980 enlisted men to activate the 3d Battalion (37-mm 
Gun), 97th Coast Artillery and 3d Battalion (37-mm gun), 98th Coast Ar- 
tillery, each less Battery M (Gun) and basic privates, under T/0 4-125, 
November 1, 1940 and component tables. 

2. Cadres for the new imits will be furnished from existing units in the Hawaiian 
Department; their source, strength and composition will be determined by you. 

3. Every effort will be made to send individuals who have completed their basic 
training; however, in order to make maximum use of available shipping, some cur- 
tailment in their basic training may be required. If this is done, you will be in- 
formed so the individuals can complete their basic training in Hawaii. 

4. The actual activation of the various units will conform to the arrival of per- 
sonnel in the Department. 

5. While your recent request for additional medical enlisted men was dis-* 
approved because of non-availability of personnel, the 97th and 98th Coast Ar- 
tillery Regiments (and the 34th Engineers whose activation is covered in separate 
correspondence) are allotted full quotas of attached medical personnel, less basics. 
You are authorized to make a redistribution of this personnel, reporting such re- 
adjustment to this office. 

6. It is desired that you submit a report on the following: 
a. The actual dates on which various units are activated. 

6. Changes in the distribution of three-year men in Coast Artillery units in 
connection with activation of new units. 

c. List of all Coast Artillery units and installations in the "Department includ- 
ing allotted strengths and tables of organization under which organized; this re- 
port to be submitted upon completion of the activation of all new units and dis- 
tribution of. the last increment of A A filler replacements. 

[3] 7. Attention is invited to letter, this office, April 21, 1941, AG 381.4 
(1-27-41) M-D-M, subject: Reports of Change in Status Reports^Defense 
Reserves, Overseas Departments. 

8. The allotments of commissioned personnel and the grades and ratings for 
enlisted personnel will be made separately. 

9. Recommendation for augmentation of harbor defense artillery is not favor- 
ably considered at this time because the additional personnel is not available. 
The antiaii craft reinforcements will strengthen the seacoast defenses by the 
relief of all but four harbor defense batteries from dual antiaircraft missions. 

By order of the Secretary of War: 

(sgd) E. S. Adams, 

Major General, 
The Adjutant General. 
3 inclosures — Added. 

Incl. 1— Copy of Ltr., 5/10/41. 

AG 320.2 (2/18/41) MC-C-N, to C. G., Third Corps Area. 
Incl. 2— Copy of ltr., 5/10/41, AG 320.2 (2/18/41) MC-C-M, to C. G.s, 

N. Y. & San Fran. Ports of Emb. 
Incl. 3— Copy of ltr., 5/10/41, AG 320.2 (2/18/41) MC-C-M, to The 
Quartermaster General. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3085 

Copies furnished: 

The Commanding Generals, Third Corps Area and New York & San 

Francisco Ports of Embarkation: 
The Chief of Staff, GHQ; 
The Chief of Chaplains; 
The Chief of Coast Artillery; 
The Chief of the Air Corps; 
The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service; 
The Chief of Engineers; 
The Chief of Ordnance; 
The Chief Signal Officer; 
The Quartermaster General; 
The Surgeon General; and 
The Chief of Finance. 

A true copy: 

L. W. Trukan, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

[secrkt] 

I/] 

A.G 320.2/57 25 February 1941 

Subject: Increase of onlisted strength, 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National 

Guard (California). 
To: The Adjutant General. 

1. On January 9, 1941, the then Department Commander, Lieutenant General 
Herron, radioed for authority to increase the enlisted strength of the 25 1st Coast 
Artillery (AA), National Guard, from present allotted strength to a peace strength 
of 1450 by assignment of selectees from Ninth Corps Area. On January 17, 1941, 
the War Department replied by radiogram to the effect that the recommendation 
made in Janurary 9, 1941 radiogram was not favorably considered and that the 
policy of the War Department is that selective service personnel in overseas gar- 
risons will be limit(!d to those procured within the overseas department itself and 
that no additional selective service personnel will in time of peace be sent from the 
continental United States to overseas departments. 

2. I am again submitting this request as I am of the firm opinion that the 
situation hero is different than in the United States, and that this is a special case 
which deserves further consideration. The facts are: 

The 251st National Guard is the only National Guard organization on duty 
outside of the continental limits of the United States; 

This regiment is composed of white officers and enlisted mun; 

The selective service trainees now in being in this Department are composed of 
469 Japanese out of the quota 700. The next draft quota of 700 which is to b' 
inducted in March will undoubtedlv be composed of approximately the same 
ratio of Japanese; namely, about 67%; 

The selective service trainees are of varied nnxture. such as Japanese, Hawaiian, 
Part Hawaiian, Filipinos, Chinese, Korean, and other mixtures; 

.Any assignment of the selective servi(;e traine;»s to the 251st Coast Artillery 
(AA) would r^'sult in a mixture of races, largely Japanese, being. assigned to a white 
organization, which is contrarv to War Department policv, as stated in War 
Department Letter AG 291.21 (10,9/40) -ISI-A-M, October 16, 1940, Subject: 
"War De[)artment Policy in regard to Negroes", paragraph g; 

The Colonel, Conunanding the 251st Coast .\rtillery (AA), states that because 
of the feeling in California against orientals, any asjsignment of selective service 
trainees from this Department to his command would cause dissension, and 
lessen the efficiencv of his command fuUv 50 percent. 

[2] All replacements now coming from the mainland are required for the 
Regular Armv troops here. 

All the selective service trainees in this Department will be needed to fill the 
Hawaii National Guard units which are composed of races of the same type as in 
the selective service draft. 



3086 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3. In view of the above, the only justifiable solution of this problem is to assign 
selective service trainees from the mainland, and preferably from the 9th Corps 
Area, to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard. It is my opinion that 
it will be contrarv to the best interests of all concerned to assign selective service 
trainees in this Department to the 251st Coast Artillery (A A) to increase its 
strength. 

4. Since this is a special situation incident to this Department. I do not be- 
lieve the present War Department policv, as stated in WD Radiogram, January 
17, 1941; i. e., of not sending any additional selective service personnel from the 
continental United States to overseas departments, should apply to this Depart- 
ment. 

5. I therefore again request that the 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National 
Guard, be increased from present allotted strength to a peace strength of 1450 by 
assignment of selective service trainees from the 9th Crops Area. 

(sgd) Walter C. Short, 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, V. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
A true copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

[SECRET] 

Subject: Increase of Enlisted Strength, 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National 

Guard (California). 
AG 320.2 (2-25-41) M-C 1st Ind. ESA 

War Department, A. G. O., 

March 8, 1941. 
To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

1. Your recommendation that the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) be increased from 
its present allotted strength of 1181 to a strength of 1450 by assignment of se- 
lectees from the Ninth Corps Area is not favorably considered. 

2. As stated in radiogram from this office, January 17, 1941, all selective service 
personnel to be procured in the current fiscal year have already been allotted to 
units and activities. Additional personnel could be allotted to the 251st Coast 
Artillery (AA) only at the expense of other units or activities. 

3. If "trainees were sent to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) at the present time, 
it is not considered that they could be of great value to the regiment or to the 
defense of the Hawaiian Islands due to the short period of time they would be 
available after completing their basic training. Selectees inducted now would 
probably reach the Hawaiian Department some time in April 1941. Their basic 
training would require approximately three months making them fully available 
about July 1941. As the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) is scheduled to be returned 
to the United States for return to an inactive status of September 16, 1941, it 
appears that any selective service personnel sent at this late date would be avail- 
able to the regiment for a maximum of two months. 

By order of the Secretary of War: 

(sgd) E. S. Adams, 

Major General, 
^ The Adjutant General. 

A true copy. 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

[secret] 

[1] 

AG 320.2/58 25 February 1941. 

Subject: Reinforcements for Hawaiian Department. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. Reference is invited to: 

A. Letter, TAG to HHD, 4 Februarv 1941, subject: "Tables of Organization, 
Overseas Departments" file AG 320.2 ( 1-17-4 1) P(C) : 

B. Letter, TAG to HHD, 27 December 1940, Subject: "Equipment for Field 
Artillery Units", file AG 320.2 (12/20/40) P. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3087 

C Letter, HHD to TAG, 18 February 1941, subject: "Reinforcements for 
Coast AitiUerv Garrison, Hawaiian Department", file AG 320.2/55. 

D. Letter, HHD to TAG, 19 February 1941, subject: "Additional Engineer 
Troops", file Engr. 322.03. 

2. The requests for troop reinforcements as stated in Reference C ana D, hold 
priority over the requests given herein. The following reinforcements are re- 
quested for this Department at the earliest possible date and in the priority in 
which they are listed. 

a. In accordance with Reference A, authority is requested to organize the 11th 
Field Artillery under WD T/0 6-41, dated November 1, 1940. The 11th Field 
Artillery (less 3d Battalion) is now organized under Standard War Departmeat, 
Tables of Organization with units organizea and maintained at war strength, as 
follows: 

(1) nth Fiela Artillery (less 3d Bn), T/0 6-41, January 3, 1939. 

(2) Hq & Hq Btry, 11th Field Artillery, T/0 6-42, January 3, 1939. 

(3) 1st ana 2a Bn, 11th Field Artillerv, T/0 6-45, December 7, 1938. 

(4) Hq & Hq Btry, 1st and 2d Bn, 11th Field Artillery, T/0 6-46. January 
7, 1938. 

(5) Four (4) batteries, 11th Field Artillery, T/0 6-47, December 7, 1938. 

b. That one Infantry Battalion, Light Tanks, be authorized for and the neces- 
sary personnel and material to organize same, be furnished this Department. 
The number of possible localities for hostile beach landings make the availability 
of a mobile reserve having the characteristics of light tanks of [2] great tactical 
importance for counterattacks. The 11th Tank Company (Light Tanks) or- 
ganized under Standard WD, T/0 7-8, dated March 17, 1938, is the only tank 
unit in this Department and could be the nucleus for the Infantry Battalion of 
Light Tanks, requested herein. 

c. That the organization of two (2) Military Police Companies, under WD, 
T/0 7-55, dated November 1, 1940, (Military Police Battalion) be authorized 
and that the necessary personnel be furnished from the Mainland for organization 
of the two (2) companies in this Department. The technical duties required of 
Air Corps enlisted personnel are retarded due to the required training for and 
actual performance of interior guard duty at both Hickam and Wheeler Fields. 
It is believed that an organized Military Police Company stationed at each of these 
fields would release Air Corps personnel for necessary air activities and also render 
more efficient interior guard and military police duty. The Military Police per- 
sonnel could be efficiently trained in anti-sabotage work and also in close-in 
defense without disrupting scheduled training. It is the intention to use the 
Military Police personnel to perform similar work at outlying air fields under the 
control of the Commanding Officers of Hickam and Wheeler Fields and also to 
accompany Air Corps Units to those outlying fields when either Wing is operating 
under its Dispersion Plan. 

d. That the necessary reinforcements be furnished so that the Infantry Regi- 
ments of the Hawaiian Division, be organized under WD, T/0 No. 7, dated No- 
vember 1, 1940: Infantry Division (Square). These regiments are now organized 
under Standard WD, T/0 7-11, dated December 6, 1938, as modified to fall within 
the "Allotment of Grades and Ratings for Enlisted Men, and authorized Recruit- 
ing Strength" as published in mimeograph letter, TAG, August 7, 1940, file AG 
221 (8-7-40) E. Approval of this request would permit compliance with Refer- 
ence A, above, and also make available the necessary personnel and material au- 
thorized by current standard War Department Tables of Organization. 

e. That "the 11th Field Artillery Brigade (less Uth Field Artillery) be organized 
under WD, T/Os dated November 1, 1940 and that the necessary reinforcements 
be furnished this Department. That War Department, Tables of Basic Allow- 
ances for Field Artillery, No. 6-1, dated November 1, 1940, be made applicable 
to the nth Field Artillery Brigade (less 11th Field Artillery). 

3. A Study is now being made of all Special Tables of Organization at present in 
use by units in this Department, with a view of submitting recommendations for 
changes that will permit organization and functioning under current Standard 
WD, Tables of Organization. 

[sgd] Walter C. Short, 

Walter C. Short, 

Lieutenant General, 

Commanding. 
A true copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41. 



3088 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[secret] 

SUBJECT: Reinforcements for Hawaiian Department. 

1st Ind. 
AG 320.2 '(2-25-41) M-C WVC 

War Department, A. G. O., 

April It, 1941. 

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

1. The augmentation of Coast Artillery and Engineer components of the 
Hawaiian Department is being considered separately, and you will be advised 
in the near future of the action taken thereon. 

2. The augmentation of the Field Artillery and Infantry components of the 
Hawaiian Division, and the addition of a Tank Battalion and two Military Police 
Companies to* the peace garrison are not considered urgent, nor is it practicable 
to provide the personnel at this time. It is believed the necessary guard duties 
can and should be performed by troops in the Department without organizing 
Military Police Companies for this purpose. 

3. The reorganization of Infantry and Field Artillery elements of the Hawaiian 
Division under latest War Department tables of organization is approved. This 
can be accomplished without additional personnel. The majority of the units 
in other foreign garrisons and in the Continental United States are below table 
of organization strengths yet conform to standard tables. As stated in letter, 
February 4, 1941, AG 320.2 (1-17-41) P (C), subject: "Tables of Organization, 
Overseas Departments", this can be accomplished by reducing the size of com- 
ponent elements of a unit or by carrying certain elements inactive. 

Bv order of the Secretary of War: 

(sgd) W. V. Carter, 
W. V. Carter, 
Brigadier General, 
Acting The Adjutant General. 
.\ true copy : 

L, W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41. 

[Exhibit IK] 

[SECRET] 

AG 320.2 (3-5-41) M-WPD ACW/lfi 

April 9, 1941. 
Subject: Aircraft Warning Service and Air Defense. 

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

1. Reference is made to letter, this office, December 15, 1939, AG 676.3 (12- 
15-39) M-WPD, subject: "Aircraft Warning Service, Hawaiian Department", 
to subsequent communications on the same subject; to letter G-2/183-316, 
February 12, 1941, subject: "Final Report of Commanding General, Air Defense 
Command"; and to letter, this office, March 17, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-28-41) M- 
WPD-M, subject: "Defense Plans, Continental United States". 

2. It is suggested that you consider the advisability of organizing your depart- 
ment for air defense, along lines similar to those described in letter, this office, 
March 17, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-28-41) M-WPD-M, i. e., charging your senior 
air officer with functions corresponding to those of the Commanding General^ 
GHQ Air Force in the United States. These functions would include the peace- 
time organization and training of both fixed and mobile Aircraft Warning Services 
and of Interceptor pursuit aviation. 

By order of the Secretary of War: 

D. R. Van Sickler, 

Adjutant General. 
A true copy: 

U. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-23-41. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3089 

ISECRET] 

AG 320.2/61 1st Ind. 

.Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., S May, 1941. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

Considerable study has been given to the organization of a Hawaiian Air 
Defense Ccmmand and the proposed plan was presented in paragraph 7, secret 
letter, this headouarters to TAG, dated 25 April 1941, subject: "Reorganization 
of the Forces of the Havaiian Department." 
For the Commanding General: 

Carl Grosse, 
Major, A.G.D., 
Assistant Adjutant General. 
\ true copv: 

L. W. Truman, 
L. W. Truman, 

Ca-pl. Inj'. 
12-22-41. 

[SECRETl 

(IG-24) 
Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 
^ Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 2U April 1941. 

In reply refer to: 320.2 
Subject: Air Base Group. 

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C, (thru: Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.). 

1. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, recently requested the 
War Department to designate Bellows Field, T. H., a permanent Air Corps 
station under the jurisdiction of Headquarters Hawaiian Department. 

2. A further request is being prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian 
Department, to have the Mar Department authorized the creation of a separate 
.\ir Corps station for the 15th Pursuit Group on Oahu, T. H. 

3. Subject to the approval of the above mentioned recommendations, a redis- 
tribution of Air Base Group units will be necessary and the following is recom- 
mended: 

a. The 18th Air base Group (R) (tentative T/0 1-411) Wheeler Field, T. H., 
be redesignated an "Air Base Group, Air Base" (Single). 

b. An "Air Base Group, Air Base" (Single) (tentative T/0 1-411) be authorized 
for Bellows Field, T. H. 

c. An "Air Base Group, Air Base" (Single) (tentative T/0 1-411) be authorized 
for the new station of the 15th Pursuit Group. 

F. L. Martin, 
Major General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
A true copy: 

li. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

[confidential] 
SUBJECT: Air Base Group 

AG 320.2 (4-24-41) MC-C 2nd Ind. RPM/ihw-1217 

War Department, a. G. O., 

June 26, 1941. 
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

1. The Troop I^nit Basis FY 1942, provides for two additional materiel squad- 
rons for the Hawaiian Department Air Force. It is believed that this provides 
sufficient air base units to care for Bellows Field. 

2. Action on your recommendation for the organization of an additional air 
base group for station with the 15th Pursuit Group is held in abeyance pending 
decision on the new station. 



3090 CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3. It i?; desired that you submit without delay your recommendations for station 
and construction for the two additional materiel squadrons. 
Bv order of the Secretary of War: 

D. B. Van Sickle, 

Adjutant General. 
\ true copy: 

L. W. Truman, 
I,. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-4] 

[secret] 

AG 320.2/94 3rd Ind. OMM/ajk 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shaffer, T. H., 22 July 1941. 

To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C. 

Reference paragraph 3, 2nd Indorsement, it is recommended that the two 
additional material squadrons be stationed at Bello\\s Field. Construction to 
care for these squadrons has been included in letter this Headquarters to the 
War Department dated 5 April 1941, Engineer file 600.12, subject: "Construction 
at Bellows Field, T. H." 

For the Commanding General: 

O. M. McDole, 

Major, A. G. D., 
Assistant Adjutant General. 
A true copy : 

L. W. Truman 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

7 August 1941. 
Chenney L. Bertholf, 
Lt. Co., A. G. D., 
Adjutant General 
Chief of the Air Corps, 

Washington, D. C. 
. Request authority be obtained for the activation of Bellows Field of a head- 
quarters detachment to provide officer and enlisted staff for the post commander 
Stop Absence of an air-base group in the Bellows Field set-up necessitates the 
above Stop Minimum personnel for Hq Bellows Field now being furnished on 
DS from Hickam and Wheeler Fields Stop First two grade personnel available 
locally Stop Request for allotment of grades and ratings for the above follows 
by airmail Stop Request radio reply signed Martin. 

Short. 
A True Copy: 

L. W. Truman, 
Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

Confidential 
380-22 

Chief of Army Air Forces, 
Washington, D. C. 
Request information as to status of air base group for Bellows Field Stop 
Seven hundred troops now station thereat and the administrative situation is 
becoming difficult Stop Refer thirty nine August fifteen Signed Martin 

Short. 
A True Copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 



EXHIBITS OF JOIJfT COMMITTEE 3091 

Confidential 

From 

6 War WD 

Washington, D. C, Sept. 27, 1941. 
C G, Hawaiian Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H. 
172— 27th 

The activation of the air base group for Bellows Field reurad three eighty was 
not favorably considered by Secretary War because this would exceed the garrison 
strength now allotted Hawaii Stop The Adjutant General has been requested 
to activate a headquarters detachment in accordance with your letter August 
fifteen same subject A one dash seven. 

Arnold. 

316P/27. 
Decoded by Lt Jos Engelbertz SC 10:00A, 29 Sept. 41. 
A True Copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

SECRET 

War Department, 
The Adjutant General's Office, 

Washington, September 27, 1941- 
AG 320.2 i8 15 41) 
MR-M-AAF 

Subject: Activation of Air Corps Units. 
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

1. The Headquarters Detachment, Bellows Field, T. H., is constituted and 
will be activated by you at the earliest practicable date. 

2. Grades and ratings for this detachment will be as indicated on the attached 
inclosure. 

3. Personnel for this detachment will be furnished from personnel now avail- 
able in the Hawaiian Department with no increase in strength of the Hawaiian 
Air Force. 

By order of the Secretary of War: 

(S) Otto Thuson, 

Adjutant General. 
1 Incl. Copies furnished: 

Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force 

Chief of Staff, GHQ. 

Chief of the Army Air Forces 

Chief of thf Air Corps 

Divisions of the War Department General Staff. 

A true copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

. Cavt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

secret 
56 WAR RC WD 

Washington, D. C, 554P, AGU 30, 1941. 
C G Hawn Dept. Ft. Shafter, T. H. 

Seven Nine Thirtieth Air base group at Bellows Field and URAD August 
Seven reference hdqrs Bellows Field reulst April Twenty-four Stop Desired 
that following information be furnished by most expeditious means to this office 
Stop One what are total Air Corps personnel requirements for Hawaiian Dept 
quy rtewo what are total personnel requirements for arms and services with 
Air Corps query three number of air base groups and location that will be required 
for Hawaiian Dept. 

Ulio. 

352P. 
Decoded by: Capt. C. J. Harrison, SC. 1030A, Aug. 31, 1941. 
A true copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

79716 O — 46— pt. 18 — —16 



3092 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

9 September 1941. 
[S] Chemey L. Bertholf, 
Lt. Col. AGD 
Adjutant General. 
272-9 

The Adjutant General, 
Washington, D. C. 
Following Air Force requirements submitted re your seven nine thirtieth 
Stop Following units and personnel required at present two air base groups 
paren single paren comma one for Bellows Field and one for Kahuru Point semicolon 
Air Corps enlisted personnel now in department sufficient to organize these units 
Stop One heavy bombardment squadron consisting of twenty seven officers and 
two hundred twenty enlisted men required to replace Fourteenth Bombardment 
Squadron transferred to Philippine Department Stop Other services required 
as follows Bellows Field colon Medical Corps one officer seven enlisted Dental 
Corps one officer semicolon Quartermaster Corps one officer thirty enlisted 
comma Ordnance Department one air base company of four officers and sixty 
men Stop For Kahuru Point colon Medical Corps three officers twelve en- 
listed one Dental Corps comma /Quartermaster Corps one officer thirty enlisted 
comma Signal Corps ten enlisted specialists Stop In order that the Hawaiian 
Air Force may be brought to the strength necessary to enable that force to provide 
the air defense of Oahu it is necessary that the following additional personnel 
be provided as soon as possible colon Air Corps three thousand eight hundred 
seventy one enlisted comma Medical Corps six officers thirty six enlisted one 
Dental Corps comma Quartermaster four officers seventy enlisted Stop Also 
three air base squadrons one each at Barking Sands Kauai comma MORSE Field 
and Hilo Hawaii Stop In the near future two additional air base squadrons 
will be required one at Lanay paren under construction paren one at Parker Ranch 
paren Project to be submitted paren Stop This need covered in full detail in 
confidential letter commanding General Hawaiian Air Force to Chief Army 
Air Forces dated twenty August forty one forwarded from this headquarters 
twenty-fifth August Stop The above increased personnel both Air Corps, 
arms and services was not repeat not included in my letter ag three twenty zero 
point three slant thirty seven 2 dated June fifth forty one 

Short. 
EMC secret by Lt. G. Lennox S. C, 1146A Sept. 9, 1941. 
A true copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

secret 
126 WAR EM WD 

Washington, D. C. 731 P Oct 17, 1941. 
C. G., HAWN DEPT Ft. Shafter T. H. 

17th Fourteenth Bombardment Squadron H is relieved from assignment to 
Eleventh Bombardment Group H and from permanent station at Hickam Field 
and assigned to Commanding General U S Army Forces in the Far East Manila 
P I for permanent station to be designated by him 

Adams, 

IIOIP. 
Decoded by Capt. C. J. Harrison, 1138P Oct 17 1941. 
A True Copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

8 November 1941. 
Cheney L. Bertholf, 
Lt. Col., A. G. D., Adjutant General. 
786-eth 

Chief of Army Air Forces, 
Washington, D. C. 
Request immediate consideration be given to the assignment of three repeat 
three air depot groups to the Hawaiian Air Force Stop Procurement of sufficient 
civilian employees for the Hawaiian Air Depot is impossible St/op Discharge 
of enlisted men at the convenience of the Government for the purpose of accepting 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3093 

employment in the Hawaiian Air Depot fails to remedy the shortage in personnel 
Stop At present our depot maintenance is far behind schedule Comma result- 
ing in the grounding of thirty percent of our tactical planes Stop Lack of 
both personnel and material is becoming increasingly acute Stop From a stand- 
point of second and third echelon maintenance we are poorly prepared for any 
augmentation in airplane strength Stop We must have maintenance personnel 
and material at once Stop No no personnel is available here for the activation 
of these groups signed Martin 

Short. 
ENC secret by LTCR Tiemah SC 310PM Nov. 8, 1941. 
A True Copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

SECRET 

59 WAR MC WD 

Washington, D. C, 748 P Nov. 15, 1941. 
C G Hawn Dept. Ft. Shafter, T. H. 

Four zero two fifteenth. Reference your radiogram number seven eight six of 
Nov eighth for additional air depot groups period This matter is now under ad- 
visement period Answer will be made in the immediate future period At the 
present time the air depot groups are not available for transfer to your depart- 
ment period When depot groups can be made available to your dept will \ his 
increase in Air Force personnel co«ie within the authorized war garrison strength 
now approved for the Hawaiian Dept period From Arnold. 

Adams, 
120A/15/16. 
Decoded by: Capt C. J Harrison SC 435P Nov. 16, 1941. 
A True Copy: 

L. W. Truman. 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

18 November 1941. 
Wm E Donegan, 
Lt. Col. G. S. C. 
889— 19th A. C. of S., G-3 

The Adjutant General, 
Washington, D. C. 
Reference your four zero two fifteenth of November fifteenth increase of Air 
Depot groups will not repeat not come within authorized war garrison strength 
now approved for Hawaiian Department Stop Request that personnel for 
Air Depot groups be furnished as soon as possible Stop Air groups urgently 
needed due to difficulty in procuring civilian employees Stop Hawaiian Air 
Force will be severely handicapped in proposed augmentation in airplane strength 
Stop Demands for depot maintenance will be unlimited Stop Authorized 
war garrison strength must be increased to accommodate air depot groups End 

Short. 
Enc sec by Lt J H Babcock, 137P Nov. 19, 1941. 
A True Copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22^41 

secret 

War Department, 
The Adjutant General's Office, 
• AG 320.2 (11-1-41) Washington, November 18, 1941. 

MR-M-AAF 

Subject: Activation and Redesignation of Air Corps Units. 
To: Commanding Generals, 

Caribbean Defense Command, Panama Canal, 
Hawaiian and Philippine Departments, 
Newfoundland Base Command and 
U. S. Forces in Far East 
Chief of Army Air Forces. 
1. The following units are constituted and will be activated at the earliest 
practicable date by the Department commanders concerned: 



3094 CONGRESSIONAL INVfeSTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Unit 


Source of Personnel 


Station of 
Activation 


Permanent Station 


5th Air Corps Squadron, 


Existing I'nits in 


Phil. Dept.... 


Sq. Hq. Nichols Field, P. I., Airways 


Communications, (Re- 


Phil. Dept. 




detachments as directed by Dept. 


gional Control). 






Commander. 


5th Airways Squadron 


Existing Units in 


Phil. Dept.... 


Sq. Hq. Nichols Field, P. I., Airways 




Phil. Dept. 




detachments as directed by Dept. 
Commander. 


6th Airways Squadron 


Existing Units in 


P. C. Dept:... 


Sq. Hq. Albrook Field, Panama, Air- 




Caribbean De- 




ways detachments as directed by 




fense Com- 




Dept. Commander. 




mand. 






7th Airways Squadron 


Existing Units in 


Haw. Dept 


Sq. Hq. Hickam Field, Haw., Air- 




Haw. Dept. 




ways detachments as directed by 
Dept. Commander. 



2. The initial strength of the 5th and 7th Airways Squadrons will be 19 officers 
and 110 men. Grades and ratings will be issued in a separate communication. 

3. The 5th and 7th Airways Squadrons will furnish the servicing detachments 
for Airways stations in the Pacific Area. Weather and Communications person- 
nel for the Airways stations will be furnished by the Chief of the .\rmy Air Forces 
upon receipt of a requisition from the appropriate Department commander. 

4. These units will be activated from personnel now available to the respective 
Department commanders. 

5. Further replacements for the 5th Airways Squadron and 5th Air Corps 
Squadron, Communications, will be furnished by the Chief of the Army Air Forces 
upon receipt of a requisition from the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in Far 
East. 

6. Attached is a Manning table for an Airways station. 

7. The following units are redesignated as indicated: 



OLD DESIGNATION 

Air Corps Detachment, Weather, Philip- 
pine Islands. 

Air Corps Squadron, Communications, 
Caribbean. 

Air Corps Detachment, Weather, Pan- 
ama. 

Air Corps Detachment, Communica- 
tions, Hawaii. 

/iir Corps Detachment, Weather, Ha- 
waii. 

Air Corps Detachment, Communica- 
tions, Newfoundland Base Command. 

Air Corps Detachment, Weather, New- 
foundland Base Command. 



NEW DESIGNATION 

5th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Re- 
gional control). 

6th Air Corps Squadron, Communica- 
tions (Regional Control). 

6th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Re- 
gional control). 

7th Air Corps Squadron, Communica- 
tions (Regional Control). 

7th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Re- 
gional control). 

8th Air Corps Squadron, Communica- 
tions (regional control). 

8th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Re- 
gional Control). 



8. Assignment of units: 
Caribbean Air Forces: 

6th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron 
headquarters at Albrook Field. 

All Communications detachments in the Caribbean Area including Puerto 
Rico and the Communications detachments at all Airways stations in the 
Caribbean Area. 

6th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control) with squadron head- 
quarters at Albrook Field. 

All Weather detachments in the Caribbean Area including Puerto Rico and 
the Weather detachments at all Airways stations in the Caribbean Area. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3095 

Far East Air Force: 

5th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron 
headquarters at Nichols Field. 

All Communications detachments in the Far East Area. 5th Air Corps 
s{|uardon, Weather (Regional Control) with squadron headquarters at 
Nichols Field. 

All V\ eather detachments in the Far East Area. 
Hawaiian Department Air Force: 

7th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron 
headquarters in the Hawaiian Department Area. 

7th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control) with squadron head- 
quarters in the Hawaiian Department Area. 
Newfoundland Base Command: 

8th Air Corps Squadron, Conuiiunications (Regional control) with squadron 
headtiuarters at Newfoundland Airport. 

All comnmnications detachments at the British Bases in the Northeast, and 
Bermuda. 

8th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control) with squadron head- 
quarters at Newfoundland Airport. 

All W eather detachments at the British Bases in the Northeast, and Ber- 
muda. 

9. Weather Sections and Communications Sections now assigned as a part of 
Airways detachments are removed from assignment thereto and reassigned as a 
Weather or Communications detachment to the appropriate Weather or Com- 
munications s(]uadron of that area. The detachments will remain at their Air- 
ways stations. 

10. Weather and Communications personnel for the Airways stations will be 
furnished by the Chief of the Army Air Forces on receipt of a requisition from the 
Department commander concerned. 

By order of the Secretary of War: 

[S] Otto Johnson, 

Adjutant General. 
Copies furnished: Chief of Staff GHQ, Commanding General, Air Force Com- 
bat Command, Chief of Air Corps, Divisions of the War Department, General 
Staff. 1 Incl. 
A true copv: 

L. W. Truman, 
L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41. 

[confidential] 
873-18 
Chief of Army Air Forces, 

Washington, D. C. 
Request that authority be obtained to activate station complements of a 
strength in grades and ratings equal to those at present organized on the mainland 
at the following Air Corps Fields within this department colon Hickam Field 
Wheeler Field Morse Field Barking Sands Stop No provision has been made 
for personnel for Base and Post functions with the result that the wings at Hickam 
Field and Wheeler Field are forced to provide administrative personnel for the 
posts in addition personnel from the Eighteenth Wing Hickam Field and from 
the Air Base Group Hickam Field are required to man Barking Sands and Morse 
Field comma both major outlying fields. Personnel for post administration 
must be obtained somewhere and it is now being obtained at the expense of our 
tactical organizations Stop If the tactical organizations should be moved 
into the field post administration would collapse Stop It is urgently recom- 
mended that the authority requested above be obtained immediately signed 
Martin 

A True Copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 



3096 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[confidential] 
144 WAR WE 

Washington, D. C, S19A, Nov. 36 1941. 
Commanding General, 

Hawaiian Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H. 
455-25th 

Until such time as present initial war garrison limitations imposed upon Hawai- 
ian Department have been lifted additional personnel can not repeat not be sent 
to thSt department Stop With view to securing an increase in the air strength 
for that station action has been initiated and you will be advised when final action 
is taken Stop Referring to your eight seven three 

Adams, 
730AI25I26I1PM. 
Decoded by Lt. Jos Engelbertz SC, 3:15 P, 26 Nov 41. 
A True Copv: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

[Exhibit IL] 

[SECRET] 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 
Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 25 April 1941. 
In replv refer -to: 
AG 230.3/37 

Subject: Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1 . Reference is invited to : 

A. Secret letter, HHD to TAG, 25 Februarv 1941, subject: "Reinforcements 
for Hawaiian Department", file AG 320.2/58. 

B. Secret radio, TAG to HHD, 19 April 1941, 744-18th and reply thereto, 
HHD to TAG, 22 April 1941. AG 325/18-18a. 

C. Secret letter, HHD to TAG, number 2645-18, dated 18 April 1941, in 
connection with Medical Department Enlisted Reinforcements. On file in 
Department Surgeon Office. 

2. It is recommended that authority be given this headquarters to organize the 
present Hawaiian (Square) Division into two (2) separate and independent Tri- 
angular Divisions. Under War Department, tables of Organization, No. 70, 
dated November 1, 1940, current shortages exist in both personnel and material 
but it is believed that a desirable reorganization can be accomplished without 
increases in present strength other than the expansion of certain units as requested 
in my References A, C, and D, and requested reinforcements to organize a Recon- 
naissance Troop in each of the proposed Triangular Divisions. In paragraph d, 
Reference A, I requested the necessary reinforcements to organize the Infantry 
Regiments of the Hawaiian (Square) Division under current War Department, 
Tables of Organizations, No. 7, dates November 1940, and assuming favorable 
action on the recommendation, the reinforcements requested herein for the 
expansion of existing units are in accordance with Reference A. A summary of 
the proposed reorganization with tables showing personnel shortages hereto as 
Inclosure No. 1. 

3. Primary reasons for this request are as follows : 

a. For tactical purposes the Defense of Oahu is conducted in two sectors, they 
are, the North Sector and the South Sector. Two (2) Triangular Divisions are 
considered more flexible to accomplish defensive operations in the two separate 
sectors. 

b. The proposed reorganizations presents no serious problems as to organiza- 
tion, command, staff and tactical unity. 

c. The Hawaiian (Square) Division, as now organized and employed, consti- 
tutes a separate channel of command. Due to present organization it is less 
flexible than the proposed two (2) Triangular Divisions and also retards the prompt 
execution of missions requiring the employment of one or more units of the Divi- 
sion in coordination with units of the other echelons under the control of the 
Department Commander. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3097 

d. As now constituted the land defense is assigned to the Division Commander 
as the Beach and Land Defense Officer, with the result that it permits the De- 
partment Commander to play no part in the defensive action, if and when, the 
air and coast defenses are knocked out. 

4. National Guard and Selectee Units. 

a. It is proposed to assign one of the two National Guard Infantry regiments 
now in Federal Service to each of the Triangular Divisions. 

b. If the two National Guard Infantry regiments now in Federal Service are 
demobilized upon completion of one year's training and the Department's full 
yearly quota of three thousand (3,000) selectees are authorized, then it is planned 
to form two Infantry regiments from the selectees and assign one selectee Infantry 
regiment to each of the Triangular Divisions. See Reference B. 

c. Should the two (2) National Guard regiments now in Federal Service and 
two (2) tentatively planned selectee regiments be in Federal Service at the same 
time then, it is planned to assign one selectee Infantry regiment to each of the 
Triangular Divisions and one or both of the National Guard regiments to defense 
missions on -the Outlying Islands or retain one National Guard regiment as a 
Department reserve unit on Oahu. 

d. By employing one National Guard regiment with each of the Triangular 
Divisions it will forstall an expected request for a Brigade organization of the 
two Hawaiian National Guard Regiments. 

5. Station Compliments. 

a. Schofield Barracks, 

(1) It is recommended that a Brigadier General be assigned to Schofield 
Barracks for duty as an administrative Post Commander and that he be provided 
with a staff and commissioned assistants, warrant officer, nurses, enlisted men and 
civilian employees as shown in Inclosure No. 2, attached hereto, which lists the 
net mininuim requirements desired in addition to permanent personnel now on 
duty at Schofield Barracks and not assigned to units of the present Hawaiian 
(Square) Division. 

b. Fort Shafter. 

(1) It is recommended that a Lieutenant Colonel be assigned to Fort Shafter 
as the Administrative Post Commander and that he be provided with the officer 
and enlisted Station Complement personnel as shown in Inclosure No. 3, attached 
hereto. The necessity for a station complement for the post of Fort Shafter is 
predicted upon operational missions of its garrison, the 64th Coast Artillery 
(Antiaircraft) regiment. When thus employed the regiment is absent from its 
station and because of post and administrative requirements is deprived of its 
maximum fighting strength. It is believed this serious handicap could be elimi- 
nated by employment of a Station Complement at Fort Shafter. 

c. Station Complements are not requested for stations under control of the 
Hawaiian Air Force and the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade for the 
following reasons: 

(1) Hawaiian Air Force: The duties of units of the 18th Bombardment Wing 
(Hickam Field) and the 14th Pursuit Wing (Wheeler Field) necessitate maximum 
operation, maintenance and control from Air Fields under the control of the 
Wing Commanders and from which the Post Administrative Staff and enlisted 
assistants will not be moved. With full consideration of the anticipated comple- 
ment of three hundred (300) airplanes, no need for Station Complements exists. 

(2) Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade: Practically all of the field 
operational functions will be performed in the vicinity of the permanent station 
and no necessity for Station complements is considered except for Fort Shafter, 
as noted above. 

6. After preparation of this letter, your 1st. Indorsement to our reference A 
was received. This request is being forwarded with a view of having it available 
for reference in the War Department, under the follow'ing conditions: 

a. That this communication with its request for reinforcements as listed in 
Inclosure #1, be given reconsideration at the earliest date it is practicable to 
provide the reinforcements requested. 

b. That authority be granted me to reorganize the present Hawaiian (Square) 
Division into two (2) Triangular Divisions by using the present available per- 
sonnel and material. This can be accomplished in accordance with the last of 
your paragraph 3, 1st Indorsement, dated April 11, 1941, to my Reference A. 

7. Organization of Air Defense Command. 

a. In order that maximum coordination in all activities pertaining to the Air 
Defense of Oahu may be accomplished, I propose to create an Air Defense Com- 



3098 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

mand to be commanded by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, who 
will continue control of the 18th Bombardment Wing. I propose to constitute 
the Air Defense Command as follows: 

(1) Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. 

(a) Headquarters and Staff, Hawaiian Air Force. 

(6) 18th Bombardment Wing. 

(f) Air Defense Command. 

1. Aircraft Warning Service. 

2. 14th Pursuit Wing. 

3. Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade. 

b. In the organization of an Air Defense Command no interference with normal 
antiaircraft training is contemplated. Only while actually performing operational 
missions is it planned to place the antiaircraft Artillarv under the control of the 
Air Defense Commander. Furthermore, no increase in the numbers of the Staff 
of the Hawaiian Air Force is believed necessary in order to create an air defense 
Command for this Department. It is planned to have the Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Air Force, and his staff also perform the duties of the Commander and 
the Staff of the Air Defense Command. In order to avoid divided responsibilities 
due to the dual missions now required of some beach defense batteries, no action 
will be taken to form an Air Defense Command until the first increment of the 
antiaircraft artillary reinforcements, described in secret radiograms War Depart- 
ment, 25 and 26 April, 1941, have been received. 

c. An Air Defense Command for the Hawaiian Department is believed peculiarly 
adaptable to .this theater and will best meet the needs for defen.se against attacks 
from the air. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
3 Incl. 

#1 — Summary of Propo.sed Reorganization 
#2 — Station Complement, Schofield Barracks. 
#3^ — Station Complement, Fort Shafter. 
A true copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

ISECRET] 

Subject: Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department. 

AG 320.2 (4-25-41 MC-C 1st Ind. ESA 

War Department, A. G. O., 

July 29, 1941. 
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

1. Reference is made to 1st Indorsement, this office, July 22, 1941, AG 320.2 
(6-5-41) MC-E, subject: War Garrison for Initial War Operations, Hawaiian 
Department. 

2. In view of the action taken on the correspondence referred to above, basic 
communication is being returned without action. 

By order of the Secretary of War: 

Major General. 
The Adjutant General. 
3 incls. n/c 
A True Copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3099 

[SECRET] 

17 WVY MX 109 

WahJi D. C. 610A May 29 41 . 
CG 

Hawn Dept. Ft. Shaftrr T. II. 

Eight three seven twenty ninth Secretary of War has decided that in connec- 
tion with other vital needs total war repeat war garrison of your department for 
initial war operations must be reduced to approximately fifty eight thousand 
officers and men stop It is not believed advisable to reduce Air Corps combat 
comma antiaircraft and AWS units now set up stop Therefore a reduction 
must be made with respect to other troops stop Recommendations desired as 
expeditiously as possible as to manner of effecting required reduction 

Adams. 
657A 
A True Copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

AG 320.37/37B 

5 June 1941. 
Subject: War Garrison for Initial War Operations. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. Reference is invited to: 

A. Secret Radio, TAG to HHD, 29 Mav 1941, 837-29th. 

B. Secret letter HHD to TAG, 25 April, 1941, subject: "Reorganization of 
the Forces of the Hawaiian Departniient", file AG 320.37/37. 

2. In compliance with instructions contained in Reference A, the composition 
of the war garrison for initial war operations has been studied. Table I herewith, 
shows the forces recommended, totaling 59,425 officers, warrant officers, nurses, 
and enlisted men, but not including the civilian employees now shown in Table I, 
par. 7, HDP-40. 

3. The proposed war garrison consists of the following major units: 

a. Two Triangular Divisions, less reconnaissance troops, with the Infantry 
and Signal Corps personnel at reduced strength. 

b. Corps troops consisting of a light tank battalion, the existing 11th Ordnance 
Company, Division Pack Train, and Co. A, 1st Separate Chemical Battalion, 
and the recently authorized 34^h Engineers, Combat, and the 804th Engineer 
Battalion (Avn.). 

c. The Hawaiian Air Force with service elements at present strenths. 

d. Harbor Defense Coast Artillery as now provided in the approved defense 
project reduced by the personnel required to man three fixed seacoast mortar 
batteries and three 155-mm GPF batteries. 

e. Antiaircraft Artillery with no reduction from the approved defense project. 
/. Service, elements, with reductions in the mobilization strengths as shown 

in par. 7 HDP-40, and with many units entirely eliminated. 

4. (a) The necessity for the defense of existing military air fields on the outlying 
islands of the Hawaiian group, together with the recently assumed responsibility 
for the defense of the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe, Oahu, directed by secret 
letter WD to HHd, 8 April 1941, Subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe 
Bay, Oahu, T. H.", file AG 381 (3-13-41) M-NPD, and provision of a suitable 
mobile reserve for the beach and land defense of Oahu are three vital missions 
which can not be performed with any degree of success with an initial war garrison 
of approximately 59,000 troops. 

b. The 299th Infantry recently has been transferred from Oahu to the islands 
of Hawaii, Kauai, Molokai, and Maui for the defense of air fields, thus leaving the 
proposed North Sector division short one Infantry Regiment. 



3100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

c. Plans for the defense of the Xaval Air Station at Kaneohe, now in preparation 
in this headquarters, indicate the minimum increase in the war garrison for this 
mission will include the following: 

1 Regiment Infantry. 

1 Regiment Field Artillery, 155mm How., truck drawn. 

1 Battalion C. A., 155mm guns plus one additional battery. 

1 Regiment C. A., (AA), (semi-mobile) (less one gun battalion). 

1 Battery C. A., 12-inch barbette guns. 

d. Assuming that two Infantry regiments wiU be furnished, one to replace the 
299th Infantry and one for the defense of Kaneohe Bay, it is believed that the 
mobile reserve for the beach and land defense should be comprised of the light 
tank battalion now included in Table I herewith, and Infantry units detached 
from one or both of the triangular divisions recommended in Table I herewith. 

e. It is therefore urgently recommended that the strength of the war garrison 
for this department be increased from approximately 58,000 to approximately 
70,600 men so as to provide the following unit reinforcements from the mainland 
not now shown in Table I herewith: 

2 Infantry Regiments, T/0 7-11 Nov. 1, 1940 6,898 

1 Regiment F. A. 155mm How T/0 6-41 Nov. 1, 1940 1,733 

1 Regiment C. A. (AA) Semi-mobile (less 1 gun bn) T/0 4-111 

Nov. 1, 1940 1,797 

1 Bn C. A. 155mm guns, w/1 additional gun btry, T/0 4-35 Nov. 

1, 1940 694 

1 Btry C. A. 12-inch barbette guns, T/0 4-67 Nov. 1, 1940 157 

Total 11,279 

5. Reference is invited to par. 5 and inclosures 1 and 2 of reference B in which 
it was recommended that station complements be provided for Schofield Barracks 
and Fort Shafter. Table I herewith includes provisions for the Quartermaster 
Corps, Finance Dept., Medical Corps, Signal Corps, and Ordnance personnel 
required for these station complements. It is highly desirable that the war 
garrison be increased sufficiently to provide the complete station complements 
for these two stations, an increase of 731 officers and men for Schofield Barracks 
and 131 officers and men for Fort Shafter. 

6. Summarizing, in Table I herewith the war garrison for this Department has 
been reduced to a strength of 59,425. To provide a mobile reserve for the beach 
and land defense of Oahu, and to defend the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe and 
military air fields on outlying islands, an increase to approximately 70,600 officers 
and men is essential. A further increase of about 860 officers and men is highly 
desirable to furnish station complements for Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter. 
I therefore recommend that the war strength of this command for initial war 
operations be fixed at approximately 71,500 officers and men. 

7. Recent operations in Europe, particularly the failure of the British to hold 
the island of Crete, indicate the vital importance to the defense of Oahu of the 
nearby air fields on the other islands of the Hawaiian group. Hostile use of any 
of these air fields, considering modern methods of air warfare, would be extremely 
hazardous to the defense of Oahu. While not yet included in the war garrison 
recommended for this Department, it is probable that in the near future, plans 
will be submitted for the garrisoning of each of the outlying islands by a force 
consisting of approximately one regiment of Infantry and a composite battalion 
of Field Artillery. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
1-Incl.— Table I. 
A true copy: 

L. W. Trtjman, 
Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

Subject: War Garrison for Initial War Operations, Hawaiian Department. 

AG 320.2 (8-5-41) MC-E 1st Ind. ESA 

War Department, A. G. O., July 22, 1941. 
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

1. The war garrison recommended in paragraph 2 of the basic communication, 
totalling 59,425 officers, warrant officers, nurses and enlisted men, reduced to 



EIXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3101 



*67,249 as shown in inclosure 2, and augmented by the following units for the de- 
fense of Kaneohe Bay: 

1 Regt CA (AA), semi-mobile (less one gun 

Bn, band and basies) . T/04-111 11-1-40 1,590 

I Bn CA 155 MM Guns with 1 addit. gun 

btry T/04^35 11-1-40 694 

1 Btry CA T/0 4^67 11-1-40 157 

Total 2,441 

is approved. Paragraph 7, HDP-40 will be amended accordingly. 

2. The recommendation contained in paragraph 6 of the basic communication 
to establish a war garrison of 71,500 officers and men for initial war operations in 
your department is not favorable considered. Troops in excess of the 59,690 
authorized in paragraph 1, above, will be sent to Hawaii only in case the situation 
develops a need therefor and provided such additional troops can be made available 
in connection with other requirements. 
By order of the Secretary of War: 

(Signed) E. S. Adams, 

Major General, 
The Adjutant General. 
2 Incls; 
#1— N/c. 
#2 — Initial War Garrison, Haw. Dept. (Added) 

A true copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

Initial war garrison — Hawaiian Department 



Organization 


T/0 


Date 


Mobilization strength 


Off 


WO 


ANC 


E. M. 


Total 


a. Department Headquarters: 

Gen & Spec Staff Sections 






144 
7 
3 
5 
2 


30 




152 
41 
59 

170 
70 


326 


Hq Sp Troops 






48 


Hq Company 










62 


MP Co Haw Dept 


7-7... 


11- 1-40 
11- 1-40 






175 


QM Co (Car) 


10-87P 






72 










Total Dept HQ 


161 


30 




492 


683 




70 


11- 1-40 

10- 1-40 
10- 1-40 




6. North Sector Division (Triangu- 












lar). 

Div Hq 


70-1 


26 

7 

4 
206 

65 
121 
18 
38 
16 


2 




74 
123 


102 


Hq & MP Co 


70-2 


130 


Reconn Troop 






Omitte 


d 




Div Sig Co 


Sp 






114 
4,660 

1,577 

2,563 

616 

482 

296 


116 


19th & 21st Inf 


7-11 


10- 1-40 
10-12-40 
5-11-41 
10- 1-40 
10- 1-40 
10- 1-40 
10- 1-40 


2 




4,868 


299th Inf WD Ltr AQ 221E 








6-80 


1,642 


Div Arty 


1 




2,685 


Engr Bn 


5-75 


634 


Med Bn 


8-65 . 






620 


QM Bn 


10-15.. 






312 










Total Div... 


601 
43 
11 


5 




10,505 
380 


11,011 


Attached Med 






423 


Attached Chap 










11 
















Aggregate ...... 


556 


6 




10,886 


11,446 




70 

70-1 


11- 1-40 

10- 1-40 
10- 1-40 




e. South Sector Division (Triangu- 












lar). 
Div Hq 


26 

7 

4 
206 

60 


2 




74 
123 


102 


Hq & MP Co 


70-2 


130 


Recon Troop 






Omitte 


d 




Div Sig Co 


Sp 






114 
4,660 

1,308 


118 


27th & 35th Inf 


7-11 


10- 1-40 
10-12-40 
6-11-41 


2 




4,868 


298th Inf WD Ltr AG 221E & 




Radio. 




1,358 



3102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
Initial war garrison — Hawaiian Department — Continued 



Organization 


, T/0 


Date 


Mobilization strength 


Off 


WO 


ANC 


E. M. 


Total 


c. SouMi Sector Division— Cm. 
Div Arty 


6-80 


10- 1-40 
10- 1-40 
10- WO 
10- 1^0 


121 
18 
38 
16 


1 




2,563 
616 
482 
296 


2,685 
634 


Engr Bn. 


5-78 


Med Bn 


8-65 






520 


QM Bn -... 


10-15 






312 










Total Div 


486 
43 
11 


5 




10,236 
380 


10,727 
423 


Attached Med 






Attached Chap 










11 












"" 




A ggregatc 


540 


5 




10, 616 


11 161 




1-10-1 


8- 1 39 




d. Headquarters Hawaiian Air 
Force: 
Hq A Hq Sq HAF 


70 






336 


406 


18th Bomb Wing 








Hq <t Hq Sq 18th Bomb Wing. 


1-10-1 

1-112 

1-115 

1-115 

1-115 

1-215. .- 

1-112 

1-115 

1-115 

1-115 

1-215 

1-355 _ 

1-411 


6- 1-41 
6- 1-41 

6- 1 41 
6- 1-41 
6- 1 41 
6- 1-41 
6- 1^1 

6- 1-41 
6- 1-41 
6- 1-41 
6- 1-41 
8- 1-39 
6- 7^0 


13 
21 

37 
37 
37 
43 
21 

37 
37 
37 
43 
40 
40 
18 

531 






122 
232 

217 
217 
217 
229 
232 

217 
217 
217 
229 

182 
682 


135 


Hq & Hq Sq 5th Bomb Orp 






253 


(Hv). 
23d BombSq (Hv). 






254 


3Ist Bomb Sq (Hv) 






254 


72d Bomb Sq (Hv) 






254 


4th Recon Sq (Hv) 






272 


Hq & Hq Sq 11th Bomb Op 






253 


(Hv). 
14th Bomb Sq (Hv).. 






254 


16th Bomb Sq (Hv) 






254 


42d Bomb Sq (Hv)... 






254 


50th Recon Sq (Hv) 






272 


19th Transport Sq 






222 


17th Air Base 






722 


Haw Air Depot _ 






18 
















Total 






3,546 


4,077 














Attached Med . ... 


17 
1 

3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
1 
3 
3 
5 
5 






95 


112 


Attached Chap 










1 


Service Units: 

53d Sig Maint Co 


11-227 

11-247 

11-217 


12- 1-40 
12- 1^0 
12- 1-40 






44 

71 

71 

7 

2 

21 

10 

38 

125 

123 

4 

70 
102 
60 


47 


324th Sig Co (Air Wg) 






74 


328th Sig Co (Avn).. . 






74 


Sig Sections (H A F) 






9 


Sig Sections 18th Wing 










4 


12th Sig Plat (Air Base).... 


11-237 


3-19-40 






22 


Ord Sect Hq HAF 






13 


740th Ord Co A vn (AB) . . . 
481st Ord Co Amm (Bomb) 


9-167 

9-157. 

9-157 


12-16^0 
12-16-40 
12-16-40 






41 
128 


482nd Ord Co Avn (Bomb). 






128 


QM Sec Hq HAF & 18th 






4 


Wing. 
13th QM Co (Truck) 


10-57 

10-357 

10-27 


11- 1-40 
4-18-40 
11- 1^0 


3 
3 
2 






73 


259th QM Co(AB) 






157 


39th QM Co(LM) 






62 










Total attached 


56 






841 


897 




1-10-1. 

1-12 


6- 1-41 
6- 1-41 
6- 1-41 
6- 1-41 
6- 1-41 
6- 1-41 
6- 1-41 
6- 1-41 
6- 1-41 
6- 1-41 
1- 1-41 
8- 1-39 
6- 7-40 








e. 14th Pursuit Wing & Attached 
Units: 
Hq & Hq Sq 14th Pur Wing... 


13 
23 
35 
35 
35 
35 
13 
33 
33 
33 
21 
25 
30 






122 
209 
201 
201 
201 
201 
122 
279 
279 
279 
137 
196 
499 


135 


Hq & Hq Sq 18th Pur Orp (1) 






232 


6th Pur Sq (1) 


1-15. 






236 


19th Pur Sq (1) 


1-15 






236 


78th Pur Sq (1) 


1-15 .. 






236 


44th Pur Sq (1) 


1-15 . . 






236 


Hq & Hq Sq 15th Pur Grp (F) 


1-12 . 






135 


45th Pur Sq (F).. 


1-12 






312 


46th Pur Sq (F) 


1-15 






312 


47th Pur Sq (F) . . 


1-15 






312 


86th Obs Sq 


o-255._ 

1-135.. 

(Tentative 
1-441) 






158 


58th Bomb Sq.. 






221 


18th Air Base Grp._.. 






529 










Total 


364 






2,926 


3,290 




■^ 










Attached Med 


17 
1 






84 


101 


Attached Chap... 










1 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 
Initial war garrison — Hawaiian Department — Continued 



3103 



Organization 


T/O 


Date 


Mobilization strength 


Off 


WO 


ANC 


E. M. 


Total 


e. 14th Pursuit Winp <fe Attached 
Units—Continupd 
Service Units: 

Sig Sed 14th Wing 






2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
3 
4 
4 






2 
71 
21 
102 
70 
38 
50 
50 


4 


307th Sig Co (Air Wing)... 


ii-2i7.. 

11-237 

10-357 

10-57 

9-167 

9-157 

9-157 


12- 1-40 
3-19-40 
4-18-40 
10- 1-40 
12-16-40 
12-16-40 
12-16-40 






74 


4rth Sig Plat (AB) 






22 


258th QM Bn (AB) 






118 


14th QM Co (Truck) 






73 


741st Ord Co (AB) (Avn).. 






41 


„ fi74th Ord Co AVxN (Pur).. 






54 


(•>%th Ord Co AVN (Pur).. 






54 










Total Attached 


40 






498 


538 














Total Hawaiian Air Force 


895 






6,472 


7,367 


(Air Units). 












Total Hawaiian Air Force 


991 






7,811 


8,802 


& Attachejl Units. 


4-10-1 

4-41 


11- 1-JO 
11- 1^0 

11- 1-40 

11- 1-40 

11- 1-40 
11- 1-40 








/. Harbor Defense Troops: 

Hfi & Hq Btrv HSCAB 


10 
46 

42 

49 

67 
37 






75 
1,122 

969 

1,108 

1,678 
800 


85 


16th CA (HD) (Less 1 gun 


1 
1 




1,169 


btry). 
16th CA (HD) (Less 2 gun 

btry). 
41st CA (RY) (Less 1 gun bn) 


*-71- 

4-41 


1,012 
1,157 


(LessBd). 
55th CA (TD) (Less bd) 


4-31 

4-31 






1,745 


NthCA (TD) (LessHq& CTn 






837 


2d & 3d Bus & Btrys D, E, 
& F, SL Btry & Band). 








Total Harbor Defense 


251 


2 




5,752 


6,005 










Attached Med: 

16th CA 


6 
6 
6 
7 
4 
5 






37 
37 
35 
46 
26 


43 


15th CA - 










43 


41st CA 










41 


55th CA 










53 


Nth CA 










30 


Attached Chaplains 










5 
















Total Attached.. 


34 






181 


215 














Total Harbor Defense & 


285 


2 




5,933 


6,220 


Attached Troops. 


4-10-1 

4-08 


11- 1-40 
1- 1-39 

11- 1-40 
W Date— 
12-12-38 
11- 1-40 
11- 1-40 

11- 1-40 




g. Anti-p.ircraft Artillery: 

Hq <t Hq Btrv AA Brig 


10 
4 

97 

69 

87 

87 






75 
134 

2,451 

1.807 
1.979 

1,979 


85 


Intelligence Brty A-\ Brig 






138 


Spec. 
64tb CA (A A) (Rein) 

251st CA (AA) 


4-11 & 4-13.. 
4-11 


1 


- ----- 


2,549 

1,877 


97th CA A A (less Band SL 
and one fl) 37mm Btry and 
basics in part plus 1 A A M(i 
Btry). 

98th CA. AA (Less Band SL 


*-lll -- 

4-111 


2,066 
2,066 


and one (1) 37mm Btry and 
basics in part phis 1 A A 
MG Btry). 








Total AA Coast Anillery. . 


354 


2 




8,42.5 


8,781 




4-11... 

4-11 

4-111 

4-111 

4-11 


11- 1-40 
11- 1-40 
11- 1-40 
11- 1-40 
11- 1-10 




Attached Medical: 
64th C.\ (AA).... 


b 
6 

7 
7 
6 






41 
41 

48 
49 


47 


251st CA (AA) 






47 


Xth CA (A A) 






56 


Yth CA (AA) 

Attached Chaplains. 






56 






6 










Tot:il Attached 


32 






180 


212 














Total kA & Attached . 


386 


2 




8,005 


8,993 











3104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
Initial war garrison — Hawaiian Department — Continued 





T/0 


Date - 


Mobilization strength 


Organization 


Off 


WO 


ANC 


E. M. 


Total 


A. DeDBitment Troops: 


17-57 

17-55 

9-7 


11-15^0 
11-15-40 
11- I74O 


5 

26 
6 
3 
2 






106 
.406 
140 
82 
168 


111 


Xth Tank Bn (Less 1 Co) 






432 






146 




Sd 






85 


Co A 1st SepChem Bn 


3-17 


11- 1-40 






170 








Total 




42 






902 


944 






- 


3 




. 


32 


~^5 


Chemical Depot & filling Plant 

j. Engineer Corps: 

34th Engrs (Less Band & 

Basics). 
Attached Med & Chap 


^r> 










5-171 --- 

5-171 -- 

5-435 

Spec - 


11- 1-40 

11- 1-40 
4-22-40 


39 

7 

21 

5 

65 






1,090 

35 

625 

51 


1,129 
43 






646 


Engr Depot - - — 






56 


Total Engrs - 










1,766 


1,831 


Total Engrs plus attached 
Med & Chap - 






72 

12 
2 
6 
6 
6 

6 






1,802 


1,874 


k. Ordnance Department: 










92 
50 
140 
140 
180 


104 




9-17 

9-7 --- 

9-7 


11- 1-tO 
11- 1-40 
11- 1-4C 
11- 1-40 






52 








146 








146 




9-18 






186 


Ordnance Personnel Attached 
to Units - - - 








6 


Total Ordnance Department- 






38 







602 


640 


/. Finance Department: 






3 

8 






10 
38 


3 


Mis Fin Est 










46 


Total Finance Department . 






11 






48 


59 


m. Quartermaster Department: 


24 
15 
15 
3 
4 
4 
3 
3 
5 
4 
1 

81 


2 
2 
1 




212 
227 
300 
224 
185 
185 
110 
110 
158 
196 
121 


236 
















316 


Co B 90th QM Bn (HY M)--- 

32nd Sep QM Co (LM) 

33rd Sep QM Co (LM) 


10-47 

10-27 

10-27- - 

10-57 

10-57 

10-147 


11- 1-40 
11- 1-40 
11- 1-40 
10- 1-40 

10- 1-40 

11- 1-40 


227 






189 
189 






113 








113 








163 


72nd QM Co (Bakery) 






200 


School Bakers & Cooks -- --- 










22 


Total QM 






5 




1,928 


2,014 


Attached Med QM Depot- . - 






1 
82 






15 


16 


Total QMC and Attached- - - 






5 




1,943 


2,028 


n. Signal Corps: 

Signal Co (Depot) (Less Dets) 


• 

11 107 




2 

3 

1 

20 

12 






60 
230 

30 
542 
357 


62 










233 












31 




11-15 

11-157 


11- 1-40 
11- 1-40 






562 


Aircraft Warning Co 






369 




■ 38 
3 






1,219 
11 


1,257 


\ttached Medical 










14 


Total Sig Corps & Attached 
Units 






41 






1,230 


1,271 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 
Initial war garrison — Hatvaiian Department — Continued 



3105 





T/0 


Date 




Mobilization strength 




Organization 


Off 


WO 


ANC 


E. M. 


Total 


0. Hospitalization Forces: 

Tripler Qen Hosp 


(SP) 8-507.. 
(SP) 8-507. . 


7-25-40 
7-25-40 


73 

73 

2 

4 




120 
120 


500 

500 

8 

31 

6 

1,000 

90 

90 


693 


Scho Bks Oen Ho?P-- 


693 
10 












35 












6 


2 Qen Hosps _. 


S-507 

8-118. 

8-118 


7-25-40 
2- 1-40 
2- 1-40 


146 
3 
3 




240 


1,386 
93 


9th Amb Co . .. 






93 










Total Med Corps 


304 




480 


2,225 


3,009 










p. Districts Hawaiian Department: 
OAHU District Hn (Dept Ser 


25 

12 
12 
5 


1 




2 

19 
5 
2 


28 


Comd). 
HAW MI District Hq 






31 


MAUI District Hq 










17 


K \UAI District Hq 










7 














Total (Less Dets 299th Inf) 


54 


1 




28 


83 










Recapitulation: 


Ifil 
1,137 
991 
285 
386 
247 
304 
54 


30 
10 




492 
22, 403 
7,811 
5.933 
2,605 
5,657 
2,225 
28 


683 


Beach & Land Defense - 






23.550 
8,802 


Harbor Defenses. 






2 
2 

5 


""m 


6,220 
8.993 








5.911 








3,009 








83 










Total . ... 


3,565 


50 


480 


53, 114 


5, 7241 











A True Copy: 

I,. W. Tbuman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 



[Exhibit IM] 



2 May 1941 



AG 320.3/38 

Subject: Organization of Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington D. C. 
1 Rcf Gr6ncGs i 

A. War Dept. Secret Radio No. 739, 24 April 1941. 

B. War Dept. Secret Radio No. 760, 26 April 1941. 

C. Letter CO, RECAB to CG, Reun. Dept, dated 16 April 1941, subject: 
"Constitution and Activation of Antiaircraft Intelligence Battery," forwarded 
to the War Department by 1st. Indorsement dated 21 April 1941, file RECAB 
320.3, IHD 320.3/36. 

D. Letter FED to TMG, subject " Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian 
Department", dated 25 April 1941, file 320.3/37. 

E. Letter VD to FED dated 2 April 1941, subject: "Coast Artillery units for 
Hawaiian Department", file AG 3GC.2 3G26-41 M (Ret) M-C. WD 320.2 
straight Misc. 

2. Upon the arrival of the first increment (Ref. A) of the war reinforcements of 
the Antiaircraft Artillerv Garrison of this Department in June 1941, the organi- 
zation of the Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade will be required. This brigade will 
be composed of all Antiaircraft Artillery Units in the Department except the one 
or two batteries of harbor defense artillery regiments which still have dual assign- 
ments to harbor defense and Antiaircraft Artillery missions. The organization 
of this brigade is mandatory not only because of the strength of the units involved 
but also because of the organization of the Air Defense Command (Reference D) 
this brigade will be required to function independently of the Hawaiian Separate 
Coast Artillery Brigade for tactical operations and in training therefore. 



3106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3. It is proposed that the Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade. Hawaiian Department, 
will be organized as follows: 

53rd C. A. Brigade (AA) (RRF.N.). 

Hq. and Hq. Btrv, 53rd CA Brigade (RefH.). 

Intel. Btrv, 53d CA Brigade (T/0 4-08 (a) HAD) (Ref. C & R). 

64th C. A. (AA) 

251st C A (AA) 

"Teh'' CA (AA) easi-mobile (less 3d Ea) (Ref. A) 

"Eth" Rs, AA gun, semi mobile (less searchlight battery and one gnn Bat- 
tery) (Ref . A) ; to be expanded into the "8th" Regt. upon arrival of the 
remainder of the reinforcements (Ref. B) 

4. Accordingly it is recommended that: 

a. Authoritv be granted to activate the Hq. and Hq. Btrv, 53d CA Brigade 
(T/0 4-10-1. 'l. Nov. 40) and the Intel. Btry. 53d. CA Brigade (T/0 4-06 (c) 
New), on or about 1 June 1941. 

b. A brigadier General be assigned to this Department to command the 53d 
CA Brigade. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
A True Copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

[SECRET] 

Subject: Organization of Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade. 

AC 340.2 (5-2-41) 

MR-0 

1st. Ind. 
War Department, A. 0. O., June 12, 1941. 
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

1. You are authorized to activate the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 
and Intelligence Battery, 53rd. Coast .Vrtillery Brigade, within the recently 
authorized organization of Coast Artillery garrison, Hawaiian Department, by 
1998 filler replacements. No additional personnel can be made available at this 
time. 

2. It is desired that the date of activation of these units and report showing 
the reallotment to units of grades and rating;.'- of your present allotment, Coast 
Artillery Corps, to include these units be furnished this office. 

3. Separate action will be taken on the allotment of additional grades and 
ratings and on the recommendation to assign a brigadier general to the Depart- 
ment. 

4. Table of Organization 4-06 (S) (HAD) is approved as submitted, and is 
being reproduced and distributed. 

By order of Secretary of War: 



Major General, 
The Adjutant General. 
A true copy : 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

[Exhibit IX] 

DOO 320.2/141 

W A GARRON COL ORD DEPT 

759— 6th 

Chief of Ordnance, 

Washington, D C 
Attention invited to fact that there are six each activiatet thirty seven MM AA 
btrys at present in Haw Dept comma that present olans contemplate six addi- 
tional of this type battery by March nineteen forty two comma and that only 
twenty guns are on hand Period Radio information therefore requested as to 
which and in what quantities we may expect the one hundred each thirty seven 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3107 

MM A A guns listed as under procurement fronn by nineteen forty one funds in 
00 secret file six six zero point two slant eleven capron. 

Short. 
ENC TIEMAN 
Nov. 6, 1941 
A True Copy: 

L. W. Truman, 

Capt. Inf. 
12-22-41 

[Exhibit 1 O] 

Talk Givkn by General Short to Chamber of Commerce on Army Day 

Gentlemen: 

I am especially pleased to be able to come before this representative gathering 
of Honolulu business men on the occasion of the celebration of Army Day. 
Today our military establishment is being brought closer to the view of the 
general public throughout the entire United States by exhibits and various 
demonstrations, in order that the people may become better acquainted with some 
of our equipment, methods and procedures, and now I am afforded the oppor- 
tunity of discussing some of our plans which Aill demand close and active coopera- 
tion on the part of the civil community and by various departments of your civil 
government. 

You are all aware of the tremendous effort being expended by industry, labor 
and all departments of the government toward the accomplishment of a gigantic 
program of national defense. While there are many evidences of this activity 
here in Hawaii, through defense projects being carried on both by the Army and by 
the Navy, the tempo of action has not reached as deeply into the private life of the 
average citizen as has been the case in many cities on the Mainland. Conditions 
are changing overnight and procedures and practices of today may be changed by 
the plans and activities of tomorrow. None of these matters are being handled, 
or even considered, in the light of actual warlike moves nor with any feeling of 
hysteria, but simply as carefully considered plans which are to be effected for the 
future security of each and every individual, including the youngest child and the 
oldest adult, of our nation. 

I have been asked many times what the community can do to assist National 
Defense. The following items are of prime importance: 

(a) Production and storage of food. 

(b) Organization of doctors and nurses for care of injured and wounded. 

(c) Organization of an auxiliary to the police force to guard utilities and prevent 
sabotage. 

(d) Preparation of plans and making of provisions for evacuation of women and 
children and preparation of shelters for workers in vicinity of essential industries. 

These islands are in no way self sustaining in the matter of food. This is due 
not to lack of fertility of your soil but to your specialized agriculture. 

All of you are vitally interested in the food supply of these islands. In any 
emergency, which might include the possibility of a disruption of communications 
with the Mainland, a most important safety measure would be to begin at once 
the planting of basic food crops which are known by actual practice to be the most 
easily grown in this soil and cHmate. Such produce might include sweet potatoes, 
string beans, lima beans, Chinese cabbage, peanuts and some other local varieties 
of vegetables. The plantations have done important development work and are 
prepared to produce these articles in quantity should the necessity arise. An 
immediate increase in the stocks of such items as rice, flour, canned milk, fats and 
oils would be a great safety factor and with rising prices is sound economy. Short- 
age of storage for the food shipped in is now a problem. This condition can be 
materially alleviated if housewives will well stock their cupboards with non-perish- 
able items. This action would operate to clear needed space on retail and whole- 
sale merchant's shelves for further storage of additional foods. This plan is good 
present day economy because of steadily rising food prices. There is at present 
a plan on foot for the construction of large warehouse storage by government 
subsidy and I believe that this plan should have the support of us all as a defense 
measure. In the pursuit of this project speed is all important. 

Along this same thought I read with much interest in the local press of March 
19, 1941, an item which referred to the possible repeal of the personal property 
tax which so greatly affects the merchant or importer who desires to cooperate 



79718 O — 46 — pt. 18 17 



8108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

in holding large stocks of food available in his warehouse or store. I would like 
to voice my approval to such an Act, or other similar legislation which would 
freeze the tax for any corporation or individual at an amount not to exceed that 
paid in the past year. This would make it possible for more adequate and plenti- 
ful stores of food stuff to be maintained without imposing a hardship on any 
individual or organization. 

It is further important that the local fishing fleet be kept in operation, as it 
supplies a very large proportion of our daily subsistence. Increased cold storage 
for meats should be provided. Existing dairy herds on Oahu should be conserved 
am feed stored. 

In the ganeial defense measures for these islands there is no civilian efl'ort of 
higher importance than preparedness now for an adequate food supoly for all 
the people in time of emergency. 

The preparation of your emergency medical service in the case of an extreme 
emergency such as an air attack or actual assault upon the city is of vital import- 
ance. The functions of the military forces under such conditions or control, 
would be to take measures to insure fhat civilian agencies, expanded as required, 
continued to function and not to displace them by a military operating agency. 
It is therefore definitely necessary that prompt action be taken to organize your 
medical service into the maximum possible number of teams with mobile equip- 
ment capable of being rapidly moved from place to place and set up in existing 
buildings. Staff's of doctors, nurses, technicians, and others required for the 
stations should be selected and trained and be ready at any time for immediate 
duty. 

Adequate initial medical supplies for these stations should be obtained, classi- 
fied, packed, and stored in a manner making them readily available. Necessary 
vehicles must be on hand by loan or otherwise. Suitable trucks, of the delivery 
type, for rapid conversion to use as ambulances should be listed and obtainable at 
once. Necessary personnel for the immediate expansion of hospitals properly 
located to the extent at least of the porches, day rooms, etc., should be listed by 
each. All of these preparations should be accompanied by the preparation of 
shelters, from air attack, of the best types available. Suitable buildings should 
be selected to replace hospitals in the zones of probable bombardment. Prepara- 
tions of this nature should be made in cooperation with the Red Cross. 

The organization of a force of ex-service men to supplement the police force in 
guarding utilities and preventing sabotage I understand is under way. This move 
will release troops for defense purposes. Consideration should be given to the 
employment of the R. O. T. C. of the University of Hawaii for the same purpose. 

Here in Hawaii we all live in a citadel or gigantically fortified Island. Many 
residents have their homes well within the limits of actual military fortifications, 
docks, arsenals or many other types of legitimate military targets. Should we 
ever be faced with a military operation by any enemy against this island (which 
we fervently hope may never come true), the residents in these areas must be 
cared for and protected. Plans for such care and protection quite properly come 
under the jurisdiction of your civil governmental agencies, and I believe these 
should now receive careful, detailed and mature consideration. I repeat that 
these matters are not to be viewed with alarm or hysteria, but simply as defense 
projects and exactly in the same classification as any of the present housing 
activities which you see around you every day. If you, as civilian organizations, 
are making plans for adequate warehouse and pier space for the handling of 
defense materials should you not give some degree of the same effort toward the 
security and protection of your families from any possible contingency? I believe 
that you already have a Defense Committee, under the leadership of the Governor 
of the Territory and the Mayor of Honolulu which has given, or is about to give, 
some consideration to these matters, and I advance, for the consideration of this 
committee, some of my ideas on this subject. 

There has been considerable information in the New York newspapers as to the 
plans which are being formulated and discussed oy the Mayor of that city for 
the protection of its inhabitants from any possible air raids. Elaborate measures 
have been suggested for shelters, fire protection, and other phases of which you 
are well aware. It is my suggestion that some such plans be initiated for the city 
of Honolulu. My belief is that any such proposals should be considered not only 
from a possible wartime condition but also with a view of fitting into the plans 
for the expansion, betterment and improvement in the civil facilities. In other 
words, why should we not make plans which will not only form the nucleus for 
protective measures and which will, at the same time, furnish additional recrea- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3109 

tion centers for our civil and military population. My plans envision a recrea- 
tional center for each precinct, or perhaps smaller section of the city, which would 
be located somewhere in the highlands away from military targets. There might 
properly be selected by the Forestry Service, the City Planning Commission or 
other appropriate body. These camps would be located where a .source of fresh 
water is available, some degree of natural shelter and with a view of accessibility. 
Here would be installed, in the following order of importance, water, sanitary 
facilities, outdoor grills and other cooking installations, and mess halls. The 
Forestry Service, National Parks Administration, and the CCC have already had 
considerable e.xperience in the construction and laying out of such installations 
as many such recreational camps already exi.st on the Mainland. You yourselves 
have seen some of the results of these activities in your National Park on Hawaii. 
Thousands of you people spend your hours of leisure and recreation at the 
beaches. Why would it not be feasible as well as healthful to divert a portion 
of such time to comfortable and attractive camps in the hills? Forming the 
habit of such excursions to adequate and well plaimed camps would accomplish 
a dual purpose in establishing not only additional recreation features but at 
once establishing the basis for evacuation camps should they ever be required 
in the future. 

In case of actual hostilities, which involved this community, all able-bodied 
males would be utilized by industry or by the military services in one manner 
or another. Normal business routine would be continued to the greatest extent 
possible. Any evacuation camps would thus be dedicated to the use of women, 
children, and male citizens who would not be qualified for other duties. The 
Army has definite plans to go ahead immediately on the construction of similar 
camps for the use of the faimiiies of Army personnel should such an occasion ever 
demand that drastic action. In the meantime the camps will be utilized as recrea- 
tion centers by all of our personnel. 

I take this opportunity of laying before you the foregoing plan as deserving 
your consideration. I believe the evacuation of the women and children from 
the area of probable bombardment the most essential and difficult problem con- 
fronting the community. Without advance planning the greatest confusion and 
loss of life might result. 

I again repeat that the foregoing suggested plans are to be considered as im- 
portant defense measures with the same priority as given other defense plans. 
They are not to be thought of as indications of any immediate pending threat, 
but rather as carefully considered measures to safeguard our homes and families 
in case of any future dangers. The bill now before the Legislature creating a 
major Disaster Relief Department, if enacted, will put you in a position to com- 
plete these plans and preparations. The Army is ready to do all within its 
power to help you and you must feel free to call upon us for advice at any time. 
My thoughts have been expressed to you quite frankly, as I believe we must 
understand each other on all questions and work out our common plans together. 
Army Day was inaugurated with such an ideal as its basis and I am pleased to 
have had this opportunity of bringing before you some ideas and suggestions 
which may have material work to you now and in the uncertain days of the 
future. 

I thank you. 

[Exhibit IP] 
[1] 

Chronological Narrative of Actions Taken by Lieutenant General 
Walter C. Short in Connection With Preparedness of the Civil Popu- 
lation TO Meet a Food Emergency in Hawaii. 
Item No. 1 Letter from General Short to Governor Poindexter, re storage facili- 
21 Mar 41 ties for Food Supply. General Short states that after a conference 

with a civilian committee on food supply and facilities for storage, 
he is in hearty accord with action taken to date. He feels strongly 
that the problem is of vital interest to both the civil population 
and the military. The civil authorities should take the initiative 
for their own supplies, and their actions will receive his utmost 
support. (See Inclosure No. 1). 
Item No. 2 Letter from General Short to War Dept. asking authority to issue 
4 Apr 41 invitations for purchase of Irish potatoes grown in Hawaii, 

stating serious problem of food supply under emergency condi- 
tions, and stating his objective is to stimulate continuous Irish 
potato production in Hawaii. (See Inclosure No. 2). 



3110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Item No. 3 Radio from Gen. Short to War Dept. referring to his letter of 4 

12 May 41 April 41, and asking priority radio advice as soon as decision has 

been reached. (See Inclosure No. 3). 
Item No. 4 1st Indorsement to Gen. Short's letter of 4 April 41, from War 
2 May 41 Dept., granting authority to contract for Hawaiian-grown pota- 

toes, providing price does not exceed 23^^^ per pound. (See In- 
closure No. 4). 

Item No. 6 Memo to Board of Directors, Honolulu Chamber of Commerce from 
5 May 41 the Executive Secretary, John A. Hamilton: 

1. Prior to April 7, 1941, there was very little buying of food 
supplies for emergency use. However, on April 7, Lt. General 
Walter C. Short, Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department, 
United States Army, suggested the desirability of purchasing addi- 
tional food supplies for use during a possible emergency. 

2. Beginning with April 7, the consumer began to purchase addi- 
tional food supplies in quantities ranging from an extra can of milk 
to as much as $800.00 per family as reported by one retailer. Retail 
merchants report that 20 to 30 per cent of their customers have pur- 
chased additional food supplies in the last 30 days. This means 
that the retailers' stocks on hand would be depleted rapidly. 

3. It would be expected that the retailer, when food stocks are 
moved rapidly from the shelves as a result of heavy consumer pur- 
chases, would reorder quickly from the wholesaler or the manu- 
facturer. This has been done. In fact it would appear that 
retailers have increased their purchases by 20 to 25 per cent above 
normal. 

4. Wholesalers generallv support the report of the retailers with 
' regard to the increase of consumer buying as reflected in the increase 

in the buying done by the retailer from the wholesaler.'*. 

5. Of the three wholesale firms visited, two reported large stocks 
of foodstuffs on hand as a result of additional warehousing space 
secured to care for the additional demand and the prospective needs 
in the event of an emergency. Also these firms report a satisfac- 
tory replenishment of stocks although additional time is required 
to get merchandise from the manufacturers to the docks in Honolulu. 

^ote. The direct result of Gen. Short's public address of 7 
. April 1941 was to increase the supplv of food in storage in Hawaii 
from 20 to 35%. 

\S] 

Item So. 7 In a published statement prior to a general n eeting of agriculturists 
thru-out the islands at the University of Hawaii, Gen. Short 

16 June 41 said, ".All efforts to increase local food production are steps to- 

ward increased security for Hawaii". 

Item No. 8 At an address to the L niversity Assembly on Aug. 13th Gen. Short 
stated : 

13 Aug 41 "Among defense projects which I have publicly emphasized has 

been that of the home production of food to sustain the civilian 
population during an emergency. I regard this project of local 
food production as of primary importance to the defense of Hawaii." 

"So far as food supply is concerned, the military organization 
here is self-sufficient as to its reserves of essentia! items. It w ill ^ook 
after itself in time of war, and it is now projecting food production 
on military reservations to supply its needs — so far as is practicable. 

"I have also supported shipping priorities for all foods — cattle, 
dairy and poultry feeds, as well as food for human consumption. 
This support includes farm machinery which is important for large- 
scale crop productioii." — (From the Honolulu Advertiser, 14 Aug 
41) 
Item No. 9 Copy of radiogram from Delegate King to Gov. Poindexter stating 

the War, Navy and State Department.s and the Budget Bureau 
16 Sept 41 were lukewarm in their interest in procuring food reserve stocks 

for Hawaii. (See Inclosure No. 5 attached). 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3111 

For reply to Delegate King, stating Gen. Short's continued sup- 
port, see Inclosure No. 6. 

U\ 

Item No. 10 The Food Production Plan for Hawaii was formally presented in 
23 Oct 41 complete form to the Directors of the Hawaiian Sugar Planter's 

Association and accepted by them as the basic operating plan for 
local production of food crops, cattle and dairy products. This 
plan covers production not only of Oahu but of all the out-islands 
as well, setting up acreage and <;rops allocations to plantations, 
both sugar and pineapple, which were accepted by them as 
defense requirements. Small farmers were included in the plan 
as well. Seed requirements were set up; as well as insecticide, 
fertilizer and machinery requirements for producing crops suffi- 
cient to sustain the entire population for six months. 
This plan was based on the Army plan and was supported and urged 
thru-out by Gen. Short. It is now in operation in its initial 
phases as planned. Gen. Short arranged for the procurement 
of all seed, insecticides, fertilizer and machinery for harvesting 
this crop, as well as arrangements for procuring the necessary 
priority allocations of shipping spaice required. (See Incl. No. 7.) 
Item N.o. 11 Letter from Gen. Short to War Dept., stating that the project of 
3 Dec 41 the Emergency Food Reserve for Hawaii which failed of approval 

by the Bureau of the Budget should be brought up for recon- 
sideration, and asking the support of the War Dept. when it comes 
up. (See Inclosure No. 8.) 
Item No. 12 Letter from Gen. Short to Gov. Poindexter, stating that he has 
3 Dec 41 always regarded a reserve food supply as of primary importance 

in defense plans, giving supporting data, and asking the Governor 
to obtain an inventory of food on hand in the Territory, in order 
to support his request for an emergency reserve food supply. 
(See Inclosure No. 9.) 
Item No. 13 Radiogram from General Short to War Dept. stating in detail the 
14 Dec 41 immediate requirements of food, seed, livestock feed, farm ma- 

chinery, insecticides and fertilizers, including shipping space 
required, for current civilian needs. (See Inclosure No. 10.) 

Item No. 14 WD Radio #685, 17 Dec. 41 "Shipment of Food for Civilian Popu- 
17 Dec 41 lation". 

In reply to Haw'n Dept. radio #1182, the War Dept. states food 
will be procured and delivered to civil authorities in Hawaii, 
first shipment to leave within one week, second shipment follow- 
ing week; every effort to be made to provide critical items indi- 
cated by the radio? of Gen. Short and of the Governor. 
(See Inclosure No. 11.) 

As a direct result of Gen. Short's letter to the War Department 
of December 3, 1941, the attached radiogram (Inclosure No. 11) 
from the War Department, dated December 17, 1941, was re- 
ceived, indicating the immediate shipment of the Food Reserve 
Supply to Hawaii. 

While Gen. Short was not asked for letters of support for certificates 
of necessity for the construction of storage for the Emergency 
Food Supply because this was not needed, he has consistently 
supported such construction, both by the Hawaiian Pineapple 
Co. for the dry storage, and by the Oahu Ice and Cold Storage 
Co. for the refrigerated storage. 

When the Emergency Food Reserve was turned down by the 
Bureau of the Budget Gen. Short stated publicly that storage 
completed, or under construction for the Emergency Food Supply 
would be specifically reserved for the purpose for which the 
certificate of necessity was granted by the War Dept. 

At present the warehouse space of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. is 
ready, and that of the Oahu Ice and Cold Storage Co. will be 
ready in the very near future. 

The Ci\ ilian Food Administration, as planned by Gen. Short, is 
now in full operation under Governor Poindexter's Council of 
Civilian Defense, which in turn is affiliated with the National 
Office of Civilian Defense. 



3112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Civilian authorities of the Food Administration freely acknowledge 
the impetus of Gon. Short's consistent urging of plans to imple- 
ment the Food Administration for an emergency, so that it has 
been able to get into operation without delay on the basis of 
plans set up by the Army. 

Enclosure No. 1. 

Headquarteks Hawaiian Department, 
Office of the Department Commander. 

Fort Shafter, T. H., March 21, 1941. 
Honorable Joseph B. Poindexter, 

Governor, Territory of Hawaii, Honolulu, T. H. 
My Dear Goverjstor Poindexter: Mr. H. H. Warner and Mr. Richard Kim- 
ball, acting as your committee on emergency food storage, conferred with me 
March 19th relative to storage facilities and food supply, and the adequacy in 
general of the supply of food stuffs during any emergency in which incoming 
shipments might be curtailed. The conference included the action taken to date 
to obtain storage facilities, including their meeting with local importers and 
bankers, the action taken by Delegate King, and your radiogram of March 18th 
to Delegate King. I assure you that I am in hearty accord with the action taken 
to date and am in full concurrence therewith. 

I strongly feel that the problem of assuring the civil population an adequate 
supply of food stuff during any emergency in which incoming shipments might 
be curtailed or cut off is of vital interest both to the civilian community and the 
military. I believe that the civilian community should take the initiative as this 
problem is primarily and initially the concern of the civil authorities. However, 
the military cannot be divorced of its concern in this p'iroblem as it is relatively 
of equal vital interest to the military. Any action which you may take to insure 
such an adequate supply of food for the civil population will be concurred in by 
me and have my utmost support. 
With kindest personal regards, 
Sincerely, 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 

Enclosure No. 2 

[1] Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 4 April 1941. 

Subject: Authority to Issue Invitations for Purchase of Irish Potatoes Grown in 

Hawaii. 
To: The Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. 

1. In view of the present military situation it is of high importance to increase 
the local production of food within these islands so that they may become self- 
supporting. 

Hawaii at present imports 85% of its food supplies from the mainland. In 
the event of an interruption of communications the sustenance of the civil popu- 
lation would become a serious problem. Under certain conditions the solution 
of this problem becomes a mission of this Department. 

In view of these conditions it is believed that the subsidizing of local food 
production by governmental agencies is entirely justified as an emergency defense 
measure provided that the increase in cost to the government is not unreasonable. 

In this connection attention is invited to Radiograms (381) this Headquarters, 
to the Quartermaster General, 22 and 23 August 1940, and to his reply thereto 
of 26 Augu.^it 1940, authorizing this Department to contract for Irish potatoes 
under conditions as set forth in 1st Indorsement, W.D. -OQMG, July 5, 1938; 
and to related correspondence over the past four years. 

2. Under the authority above quoted 1,929,000 pounds of Hawaiian-grown 
Irish potatoes have been contracted for delivery during February, March and 
April of this year at an average cost of $.025 per pound. Mainland-grown 
potatoes w-ere delivered to the Navy during this period at an average of $.018 
per pound. Therefore, the project of Irish-potato growing in Hawaii for the 
purpose of increasing local food production as an emergency defense measure 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3113 

was carried out in this case at an increased cost to the Army of $.007 per pound, 
or approximately $13,500 for the total project in terms of money. It is believed 
that this difTerential would hold good as an average throughout any year until 
growers have established a year-around crop when the spread would become less. 
Actually, the wastage on Island-grown potatoes is nil for shrinkage, loss of weight 
or spoilage such as occurs with mainland potatoes in their shipment to Hawaii. 
This fact materially reduces the differential cost to the government as above 
indicated. The increase in cost is considered justified as a safety defense measure 
to assure the future expansion of the local crop. This can be accomplished 
[2] only by this assurance to the grower of the return of his cost of produc- 
tion. Sugar planters — who provide the bulk of the production, are entirely 
willing to go along on this project and break even. 

3. The efforts of this Department during the past year have directly resulted in 
the increase in production of 1,242,086 lbs of locally grown Irish potatoes over 
1940. 

4. It is believed that for a part of the first year Island production will not be 
able to meet the requirements of the Army for Irish potatoes, but the project is 
still considered well worth the added cost to the government during the period 
that the reqdirements can be met. Local producers feel that they can quickly 
build up the industry to a point where Hawaii can meet the demand throughout 
the entire year. 

5. It is now proposed to stimulate continuous Irish potato production in 
Hawaii. For this purpose authority is requested to contract for Hawaii-grown 
Irish potatoes for the fiscal year 1942, for monthly or quarterly periods, or for 
periods of six-months, or for one year as seem most likely to accomplish the 
nurpose at the time of the offering. 

(Sgd) Walter C. Short, 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
Enclosure No. 3. 

R. S. Bamberger, 
Colonel, A.G.D., Adjutant General, 

12 May 1941. 
The Adjutant General, 

Washington D. C. 
Remylet four April subject authority to issue invitations for purchase of Irish 
potatoes grown in Hawaii Stop As soon as decision has been reached relative 
to request contained in paragraph five thereof request priority radio advice 

Short 
Enclosure No. 4 
AG 432 Hawaiian 
Dept. (4-4-41) M-D 1st Ind. ESA 

War Department, A. G. O., May 2, 1941- 
To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

Authority is granted to contract for Hawaiian-grown Irish potatoes for the 
fiscal year of 1942 on the basis proposed in Paragraph 5, basic letter, provided 
the contract price strait not exceed 2}^^ per pound. 
By order of the Secretary of War: 

(Sgd) E. S. Adams, 

Major General, 
The Adjutant General. 
Enclosure No. 5 
Poindexter 
Warner 

September 16, 1941. 
Further reference my wire September 15th regarding food storage at recent 
meeting attended by Maverick Ashby and representatives War Navy Interior 
State and Budget Bureau spokesman for service departments indicated rather 
hike warm interest in program for producing surplus food stocks for Hawaii 
Period Would appreciate your asking commanding general and commandant if 
their letters dated last March endorsing this project still represent their views 
and wire me this information. 

Delegate King. 



3114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Enclosure No. 6 

September 17, 1941. 
Honorable Samuel Wilder King, 
Delegate to Congress, 

604 House Office Building, 
Washington, D. C. 

In opinion of local well informed persons recent international developments only 
increase the likelihood of demand exceeding the supply of cargo space available 
for carrying civilian food requirements from mainland to the territory which 
formed the basis for the original surplus food program Period Commanding 
geneial endorses his previously expressed view for the needs of this project 
as stated in his letter to Governor Poindexter March twenty first Period 
Admiral Bloch presently on off island vacation and unavailable Period Opinion 
of governors food commission made plain in radiogram to you of August twenty 
second Period Regardless of current situation in Pacific personally feel that 
as we approach shooting operations with accelerated local defense construction 
projects the shipping facilities for civilian supplies to the islands are more likely 
to be restricted than when plan was originally drawn Period Your suggestion 
that Maverick appraise local problem himself as soon as possible is receiving 
hearty support of interested parties and strongly urge you to persuade him 
make such a trip to obtain first hand information on this matter 

Warner (Poindexter). 
H. H. Warner, 

Director Agricultural Extension Service 
^Iniversity of Hawaii and 

U. S. Department of Agriculture Cooperating 

Enclosure No. 8 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department. 
Office of the Department CoMMANnER, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., 3 December 1941. 
In reply refer to: 
AO430 

Subject: Emergency Reserve Food Supply for the Civilian Population of Hawaii. 
To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D.C. 

1. The present military situation in this area has engendered a strong feeling 
among the civil authorities that the project of the Emergency Food Reserve for 
Hawaii which has lately failed of approval by the Bureau of the Budget, should 
be brought up again at this time for reconsideration based on new data to be 
presented. 

2. It is my feeling that this project should be progressed as a sure way to meet 
any food shortage with which the Territory may be confronted in emergency, 
and for this reason I have written a letter to the Governor of Hawaii in support 
of this project. A copy of this communication is enclosed. 

3. In view of the necessity of a reserve food supply as indicated above, and in 
the enclosure herewith, I request the support of the War Department for this 
project when it comes up for reconsideration by the Bureau of the Budget. 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
1 Incl— 

Let. Gov. of Hawaii re 
food storage dated 
12-3-41. 

Enclosure No. 9 

December 3, 1941. 
AG-430 
Honorable Joseph B. Poindexter, 

Governor of Hawaii, Honolulu, T. H. 
My Dear Governor: The present military situation in the Pacific indicates 
the necessity of advancing certain plans foi the care and protection of the civil 
population of Hawaii in the event of an interruption of normal shipping between 
the Islands and the mainland. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3115 

I have always regarded the accumulation of a reserve food supply for Hawaii 
as of primary importance in our defense plans, and I have publicly announced 
this view on appropriate occasions. 

I feel strongly that the project for the reserve food storage which has lately 
been refused approval by the Bureau of the Budget, might well be again ad- 
vanced at this time. 

In support of this view I should like to quote from the annual report of the 
Diversified Crops Committee of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association trans- 
mitting the final Food Production Plan for Hawaii to the Trustees of that or- 
ganization: 

"We think that our year of work on these plans has given us a sufficiently 
clear understanding of the various phases of the problems of emergency food 
supply to enable us to express an opinion. And that opinion is, that no stone 
should be left unturned in the effort to have adequate supplies of essential basic 
foods stored here against an emergency." 

Additionally I should like to quote in part from a radiogram from Delegate 
King of October 24, 1941, addressed to yourself and to Mr. H. H. Warner of 
your Emergency Food Commission, on the subject of the refusal of the Bureau 
of the Budget to approve the Food Storage Plan. This communication was 
submitted at the time as information to the members of the commission, including 
the Army re;^resentr,tive present. 

"Perhaps appeal by Governor addressed to President through Interior Depart- 
ment supported by inventory of specified food commodities and length of time 
such supplies could meet local needs would help bring about further consideration 
this program. 

' ' Direct appeal from local administration based on factual data would bring 
quicker action." 

It is apparent from the above that the surety of a food supply during the initial 
phases of a war situation and prior to any supplementary local food production, 
can be safely predicated only upon the presence of a reserve of food stored here, 
and that the chance of getting the approval of the Bureau of the Budget for this 
project rests largely upon the ability of local authority to submit factual data as 
to amounts of food currently in Hawaii. 

This requirement cannot be met with any degree of accuracy except by data 
obtained through a physical inventory of food on hand. 

It is my feeling that as a matter of safeguarding the public welfare against the 
coming emergency, the project of a defense reserve of food for Hawaii should be 
again advanced at this time, and that it should be supported in this case by a 
factual statement of the amount of food currently on hand in the Islands. 

For this purpose it is believed that the local importers and others concerned 
would voluntarily take an inventory to supply the required data in response to a 
request from you. It would seem that an appropriate date for this inventory 
might well be the end of this calendar year to tie in with other legal inventory 
requirements of the territory, or even sooner in view of the tiir.e element involved 
in assembling the figures. 

May I take this opportunity to assure you of my continued wish to be of any 
assistance in the present emergency. 
Very sincerely yours, 

Walter C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 

Copy of this let. furnished War Department 

Enclosure No. 10 

[Radiogram] 

14 December 1941. 
The Adjutant General, 
War Department, 

Washington, D. C. 
Oahu food inventory of December ninth shows thirty seven days of essential 
foods on hand for tw o hundred fifty five thousand civilian population Stop This 
reserve must be constantly maintained by immediate shipments to supply current 
consumption ^top Thirteen days rice comma eighteen days potatoes and onions 
are most serious deficiencies fetop One hundred thirteen thousand head of cattle 
equal to one hundred fifty tw o days reserve supply for all civilians in Territory 
comma and twelve thousand head swine equal to ten days reserve supply for ail 



3116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

civilians in Territory are on hand Stop Important that this reserve be main- 
tained by no more than normal slaughter Stop Food store inventories on outlj ing 
islands being taken Stop Sugar and pineapples on hand ample for Territory Stop 
Shipment of twenty thousand net tons of food for civilians in Territory per month 
for current needs requiring one million two hundred and fifty thousand cubic feet 
of shipping space per month Stop It is expected that commercial firms will place 
orders on mainland for necessary subsistence for current needs of civilian popula- 
tion providing there is an allocation of shipping made available Stop It is essen- 
tial that allocation for this shipping space be made immediately Stop In addition 
shipmsnts of ssven thousand two hundred net tons of food for Army personnel 
per month requiring four hundred fifteen thousand cubic feet of shipping space 
per month comma first shipment immediately comma are urgently needed Stop ■ 
Shipment of emergency food reserve for storage to value of two million five hundred 
thousand dollars for human food and nine hundred thousand dollars value of 
animal and poultry feed comma total three million four hundred thousand dollars 
eqviel to forty eight thousand net tons requiring two million seven hundred fifty 
thousand cubic feet of shipping space is urgently needed Stop Letter will follow 
showing items for purchase for this emergency food reserve for storage Stop 
Requisition has been alreadv communicated by Governor Poindexter to Swope 
Department of Interior and Delegate King Stop Orders have been placed for 
seed comma, insecticides comma fertilizer comma and agricultural implements 
through Division Engineer South Pacific Division San Francisco Stop Forty 
thousand v eight tons and fifty five thousand ship tons of shipping required for 
these items Stop This must be shipped immediately Stop Request War De- 
partment obtain shipping spaces or Government shipping for all shipments covered 
in this communication both for immediate shipment and future monthly ship- 
ments. 

Short. 
Enclosure No. 11. 

[Radiogram] 

Washn D. C. 4OS A Dec 17 1941. 
C G- 

Hawn Dept, Ft. Shafter, T. H. 
685 16th Department of Agriculture will procure and deliver to civil authorities 
in Hawaii food for civilian population comma URAD one one eight two period 
First shipment planned to leave within one week followed by second shipment 
following week period Every effort will be made to provide critical items indi- 
cated in URAD and that of Governor. 

Adams. 
346A 

[Exhibit 1 Q] 

[1] Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 

Office of the Department Commander, 

Fort Shafter, T. H., July 11, 1941. 
In reply refer to: 
Via "Clipper" Air Mail 
Engr. 383 

Subject: Protection of the Civilian Population against Air and Other Attack. 
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C. 

1. Reference is made to radiogram from Delegate Sam King to me, a copy of 
which is inclosed for ready reference. This radiogram raised questions concerning 
funds to be allotted to Hawaii under the Lanham Act for the protection of the 
civilian population against air and other forms of attack. These questions are 
answered in this letter which is submitted to the War Department in accordance 
with request in the radiogram. A copy of this letter and all inclosures is being 
forwarded direct to Dr. C. E. Fronk, in care of Division of Territories and Island 
Possessions, Department of the Interior. Dr. Fronk is now in Washington as 
the Governor's representative in this matter. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3117 

2. Evacuation camps will be built in units designed to care for 240 people. This 
size is determined by the capacity of the standard mess hall (Fig. 74, FM 5-35) 
which will serve 120 people at one sitting. The ideal unit would be built in a 
quadrangle 100 yards wide by 120 yards long. This arrangement will facilitate 
guarding against prowlers, contribute to privacy, and shorten average distances 
between shelters and latrines, mess ball, baths, and wash rooms. See typical 
layout plan inclosed herewith (Inch No. 1). 

a. This typical layout will be modified as necessary to adapt it to ground forms, 
streets, etc.; but the general principle of using shelters to form a partially inclosed 
communal area will be observed. 

b. The design has been made extremely simple to permit erection by unskilled 
labor, and the use of any type of building material. Materials available in local 
stocks will be used to the utmost to conserve shipping space. Windows and doors 
are omitted. Occupants will devise curtains to secure such privacy as they wish. 
It is proposed to construct all units except bath houses and water served latrines 
without floors initially. If lumber is available, wooden floors will eventually be 
laid on wooden sleepers. If lumber is not available, floors will be finished with 
volcanic cinders, crushed rock, or sand stabilized with portland cement if available. 
If floors cannot be provided, occupants will have to provide themselves with 
something to stand on. 

[2] c. Canec, a locally available product, will be used to the fullest extent 
practicable. Studding, rafters, flooring, and piobably sleepers supporting flooring 
will have to be imported if not in stock. Roofs will be made from galvanized 
iron, if obtainable. 

d. All structures have been designed to utilize standard sheets of canec, ply- 
board, and standard lengths of lumber. 

e. The mess hall is an adaptation of the standard mess hall shown in Fig. 74, 
FM 5-35. Construction is greatly simplified by omitting doors and windows 
which permits spacing all studs uniformly 24" on centers (See Incl. No. 6). 

/. All other buildings are simple shed construction. See inclosed sketches of 
shelters, latrines, bath houses, and wash houses. (Incls. 2 to 5). 

(1) 960 lineal feet of living room shelters will be provided for each camp. They 
will be built in lengths which are multiples of 8'. Standard double bunks (Fig. 
71, FM-5-35) will be placed 8' apart. (Incl. No. 2). Partitions will be of canec 
so nailed that they may be easily removed. Occupants will remove and shift 
canec partitions to give any length room desired. 

(2) The same type construction will be used for latrines, bath houses, and wash 
rooms as in living quarters. Details of interior arrangements are indicated on 
inclosed sketches. Latrines will be equipped with water closets when a sewer 
system is available and the necessary plumbing supplies can be secured. Other- 
wise pit latrines will be used. Running water will be available at all camps. 
Plumbing will be installed in mess halls, bath houses, and wash houses in the 
order named as far as available materials will permit. 

g. Protection against bombardment will be provided by slit trenches as indi- 
cated in the typical layout sheet (Incl. No. 1) when camps are on flat ground. 
Camps in gulches will be provided with conveniently located alcoves dug into 
deep slopes. 

h. Dispensary buildings and administration buildings will not normally be 
built. In the general instance sufficient space in permanent residences or other 
buildings will be available for those purposes. 

i. Protection of funds and valuables may be made a function of a central 
administration service. No provision will be made for that in construction plans. 

[3] 1. Evacuees will be encouraged to bring small artif'les of furniture such 
as mirrors, chairs, hammocks, mattresses, curtains, etc. They will also be en- 
couraged to bring simple hand tools. It is presumed that sub.sequent to evacua- 
tion a systematic collection will be made of abandoned articles required for camp 
comfort. 

3. a. Camp locations have been selected with a view to the following. For 
locations see Incl. 7. 

(1) Utilizing existing roads, utilities installations, and community service units 
such as .stores, post offices, churches, etc. 

(2) Avoiding ground at present under cultivation. 



3118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(3) Placing a large percentage o: ev&cuees near areas suitable for growing 
vegetables. 

(4) Securing dispersion. 

b. The equivalent of 42 units (240 persons each) with a capacity for 10,080 
people will be constructed as extensions of existing permanent plantation villages. 
In addition to this extension many villages will be increased by one mess hall, 
latrine, bath house, and wash house to psrmit increasing the number of occupants 
in the permanent buildings which will be utilized solely as dormitories. Planta- 
tion villages in the higher f.ltitudes are usually built on the edges of gulches. 
The camp extensions will, in the general instance, be sited in these gulches and 
will vary greatly in size and layout, depending on terrain conditions. These 
camps will be spread throughout the central valley in areas least subject to 
probable enemy activity. Distances from Honolulu will vary from 8 to 26 miles. 
The estimated average distance is about 20 miles. Locations are shown on Incl. 
7. These camps will have running water, but will not have sewer connections. 
The following advantages are characteristic of these units: 

(1) provide a high degree of dispersion. 

(2) Sited in excellent locations for protection. 

(3) Well located for utilization of occupants in food production. 

(4) Adaptable to race segregation which will be desirable to present communal 
discord. 

(5) Can readily be amalgamated with existing village administrations which 
will facilitate government. 

(6) Utilize existing installations. 

[4] c. 42 units (240 persons each) with a capacity for 10,080 people will be 
located at \A ahiswa, north of the Schofield Barracks East Range boundary and 
south of the North Fork of W ahiawa Reservoir. The distance from Honolulu is 
about 21 miles by Kamehameha Highway. This location offers the following 
advantages: 

(1) W ill be an extension of an existing city in areas fairly well supplied with 
roads. 

(2) Can readily be supplied with sewer facilities if materials are available. 

(3) Will be included in anti-aircraft defense of Schofield Barracks and \A heeler 
Field. 

(4) Is in an area of rich soil adaptable to utilization of evacuees in food pro- 
duction. 

d. 21 units (240 persons each) with capacity for 5,040 people will be located in 
four valleys leading into the Koolau Range from the evacuated areas. For 
location see Incl. 7. They will be between 2 and 3 miles of the evacuated area. 

e. 21 units (240 persons each) with a capacity for 5,040 people will be located 
in gulches west of Aiea. For location see Incl. 7. They will be an average of 
about 13 miles from Honolulu. 

4. The projected air-raid shelters are intended to protect 6,000 persons other 
than military personnel whose continued presence in the danger area is essential 
to the defense of Oahu. The number is based upon reports submitted by essential 
governmental agencies, public utilities, and commercial firms. 

6. The proposed locations of shelters is shown on the inclosed map of Honolulu 
(Incl. No. 8). These locations have been determined from reports of probable 
distribution of personnel submitted by the organization affected. 

c. It is proposed to construct the shelters of reinforced concrete and to limit 
the normal capacity of each shelter to from 10 to 15 persons which o^n shelter 
from 16 to 25 people for short periods. However, other materials will be sub- 
stituted for reinforced concrete if cement and steel are not available in sufficient 
quantities. \\ hen practicable existing structures will be utilized by increasing 
protective characteristics. Tunneling will be practicable in some locations. 
Inclosures 9 to 12 show details of the various types to be used, depending on 
conditions. 

[6] d. The cost of reinforced concrete shelters has been estimated at $100.00 
per person to be sheltered. That is each shelter will cost from $1,000 to $1,500. 
No estimate of unit cost can be made for shelters built of substitute materials. 
Should shortage of materials limit the number of concrete shelters built, the avail- 
able funds will be applied to building as many shelters of substitute materials as 
possible. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3119 

e. It is presumed that the shelters provided for personnel essential to defense 
will be supplemented by private individual shelters and by shelters erected by 
commercial interests not essential to defense. The costs of these shelters should 
be borne by the individual. 

W.\LTER C. Short, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, 

Commanding. 
13 Incls: 

Incl. #1 Layout plan 
#2-5 Sketches 
#6 Fig. 74 
#7 Map 

#8 Map of Hono 
#9-12 Drawings 
#13 Radio, 4 July 41 
A True Copy: 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

2nd Lt., F. A. 

[secret] 
5 ND DJ 243 Govt REP 

ZPN 1 Radio, Washington, D. C, July 4 0128 1941. 

Govt Rep Lt General Walter C. Short, 

Fort Shafter, TH Oahu 

Following from Doctor C. E. Fronk quote Reurletter June twenty reference 
number three eight one War Department considering whether problam lies 
purely within military jurisdiction or should be responsibility of civilian agency 
period In latter case Office of Civilian Defense may be made responsible for pro- 
gram of Federal Works Agency with funds from Lanham Act period In confer- 
ence with General Lorenzo D. Gasser Army representative on LaGuardias 
committee I was requested obtain as soon as possible full details proposed evac- 
uation period Am advised allocation of funds according to estimate submitted 
by Colonel Lyman in memorandum dated June nineteenth reference number 
three eight three would not be made on basis data so far available here period 
More explicit information regarding number and exact location of camps comma 
number of persons at each camp comma together with areas to be evacuated and 
distances from city to proposed camp sites will be required substantiated with 
maps period Recommend provision for shelters be included in which case char- 
acter and material of shelters should be incorporated in your estimates period 
Referring to splinter shelters exact location and number also necessary together 
with any other data that may be pertinent period Would greatly appreciate your 
forwarding this material by fastest mail through War Department with compy 
direct to me addressed care Division of Territories and Island Possessions Depart- 
ment of Interior period Outlook encouraging letter follows unquote Delegate 
Sam King. 

Tod, 

1628 
610A/4 
A true copy: 

Edward von Geldern, 
Edward von Geldern, 

£nd Lt.. F. A. 



3120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[Exhibit IR] 

December 22, 1941. 
My dear General Short: I have the honor to present an entirely unsolicited 
expression of interest from many leading men of Honolulu. 

There are a hundred more who I am sure would have felt honored to sign this, 
if time had been available. I wished to place a copy of this letter in your hands 
without further delay. 

Yours very truly, 

Frank E. Midriff. 
A true copy: 

Robert J. Fleming, Jr., 
Robert J. Fleming, Jr., 

Major, G. S. C, 

Asst. to G-4. 

Honolulu, T. H., December 22, 1941. 
The President, 

The White House, Washington, D. C. 

Sir: We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social organi- 
zations in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest 
in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere 
appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by 
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short. 

We have found him at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he has 
exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an 
emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for 
this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such plan. 

General Short's thofough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas 
to our Territorial Legislature, to our local officials, and to our community in 
general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound 
"M-Day" Bill; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard; (c) for the decision 
to increase stored food and to produce food; and (d) for the prevention of sabo- 
t^ige. He has shown a correct and a sympathetic attitude toward the problems 
of the civil community in assuring cooperation of civilians. 

He has maintained a high morale in his Command and has conducted "alerts" 
from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing the troops and with plans, 
now looking for financing from federal funds, for adequate and safe storage of 
sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a probable emergency. 

We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go into 
various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have 
selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned. 

Meanwhile, we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high esteem 
and our full confidence in the character and ability of General Walter C. Short 
as a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be. This letter is 
prepared without the knowledge or con.sent of General Short or any other officials, 
merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may accrue to the record of 
such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse publicity or other wise. 
This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest in the adequate defense 
of Hawaii and our Nation. • 

With very best respects and wishes, we are 
Yours very truly, 

Lester Petrie, City of Honolulu, Mayor; C. R. Hemenway, President, 
Hawaiian Trust Co., Ltd.; A. L. Dean, Vice-President, Alexander 
& Baldwin, Ltd.; Walter F. Dillingham, President, Oahu Railway 
& Land Co.; F. D. Lowrey, Pre.sident, Lowers & Cook, Ltd.; 
H. H. Warner, Asst. Food Administrator, O. C. D.; J. B. Poin- 
dexter, Governor of Hawaii; S. B. Kemp, Chief Justice, Supreme 
Court; T. G. S. Walker, Director, Civilian Defen.se for Oahu; 
John E. Rus.sell, President, Theo H. Davies & Co., Ltd.; George 
S. Waterhouse, Ex. Vice-President, Bishop National of Hawaii 
and Honolulu; Cyril F. Damon, Ex. Vice-President, Bishop 
Trust Co., Ltd.; Briant H. Wells, Executive Vice President, 
Hawaiian Sugar Planters Assn.; H. A. Walker, President, Amer- 
ican Factors, Ltd.; S. M. Lowrey, Treasurer, American Factors, 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEF 3121 

Ltd.; P. E. Spalding, President C. Brewer & Co., Ltd.; Frank 
E. Midkiff, Trustee, Bernice P. Bishop Estate; Edouard R. L. 
Doty, Terr. Director of Civilian Defense; James Winne, Mgr. 
Mdi^e Dept., Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd.; (now acting as Food 
Administrator and Supply Officer). 

c. c. to General Walter C. Short. 
A true copy: 

Robert J. Fleming, Jr., 
Robert J. Fleming, Jr., 

Major, G. S. C. 

Asst. to G-4. 

Major Disaster Council 
^ City and County of Honolulu. 

Office of the Director, Island of Oahu, 

Honolulu, Hawaii, December 20, 1941- 
Lt. General Walter C. Short, 

Fort Shafter 
Dear General Short. 

Please allow ms express my sincere regret that our contact through Civilian 
Defense Plans has terminated. 

It was greatly due to your help and backing that our Civilian Organizations 
were so far advanced that they were able to function so splendidly during the 
attack. 

You will always be able to recollect that your determination to have our Civilian 
Groups Prepared saved many lives of our Sailors and soldiers through the organized 
effort of our Civilian Defense Medical Committee and the many trucks that we 
had ready to be turned into ambulances at a minutes notice. 

Please be assured that you will carry the sincere thanks and Aloha of your 
many friends here who realizes the distress you saved by urging and helping us to 
be Prepared. 

Yours very sincerely, 

(s) T. G. S. Walker 

T. G. S. Walker, Director, 

Civilian Defense, 

Island of Oahu. 
True Copv 

O. M'. Cutler 
O. M. Cutler 
Lt. Col. Infantry 

[1] . [SEAL OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII] 

TERRITORY OF HAWAII, 

Executive Chambers, 
Honolulu, 23 December 1941. 
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, 

Fori Shafter, T. H. 

My Dear General Short: Having noted in the public press that an investi- 
gation is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in 
Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a state- 
ment as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands for 
war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked on December 7, 
1941. 

The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these 
Islands were important to National Defense from a military standpoint, but it 
has been only since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941 that it has 
been brought home to the civil population the importance of the part it would 
play in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens of these 
Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud to be the 
Chief Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging the population to 
prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of the Army 
and civil population in planning and preparing for this emergency was mag- 
nificently rewarded. 



3122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations 
which bore fruit on December 7, 1941: 

(1) The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act by a special session of Legislation 
called for that purpose. This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire 
civil economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in the event of 
disaster. By virtue of this act, civilian defense was planned and many of its 
phases were brought to such a point of preparation that they were able to go into 
action immediately and to function effectively on December 7, 1941. 

(2) The production and conservation of food: Householders were persistently 
urged to stock their shelves in canned food. It is estimated that this resulted 
in increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than 
twenty percent. Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and 
storage for food reserve. This appropriation has, since [S] December 7, 
1941, been authorized. By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made 
for the procurement and storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas 
with quick growing food crops. Agreements were also made for the growinK, 
in normal times, of those crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In 
furtherance of this plan, the War Department was induced to permit the purchase 
of Island grown potatoes for the use of the Army although the price was above 
that of mainland potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies of 
food asked for in the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity 
for building an adequate warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is 
now available for the storage of food supply when it arrives. 

(3) The medical facilities for the care of the injured and wounded during any 
disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these Islands 
for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical profession of 
the Islands with all its medical facilities. Approximately three thousand persons 
were given training and instruction in First-Aid as required by the Red Cross. 
The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous tasks of evacuation. 
Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit consisting of personnel of 
about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps of one hundred and forty 
improvised ambulances were organized. The performance of their tasks by 
these groups was one of the highlights of the civil defense efforts on December 7, 
1941. 

(4) Plans for the evacuation of women and children and the prsparation of shelters 
for workers in essential industries had reached a high state of perfection on 
December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas attacked 
was accomplished in a most admirable manner. 

(5) An auxiliary police force to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was 
organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly 
when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. Their work of 
this force was exceptional and excellent. 

(6) Legislation authorizing a home guard was enacted at the special session of 
the Territorial Legislature. It was well planned and so organized that 1400 of 
such home guardsmen could and were placed on duty thereby relieving members 
of the Army for other military duty. 

(7) There were many other matters too numerous to detail here which were 
planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the 
bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public 
service in times of emergency. 

All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local authori- 
ties, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded 
since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases 
of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly as 
a direct result of prior planning and training. 

It is my beliet that the public has confidence in the military and civil authorities 
The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a treacherous attack 
has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in your demonstrated 
abilities. I wish to state that the magnificent way in which the Territory of 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3123 

Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large measure due to your 
foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf of the Territory. 
You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit. 
Very sincerely yours, 

■^ (S) J. W. POINDEXTER, 

Governor of Hawaii. 
This is a True Copy. 
L. W. Truman 
L. W. Truman, 
Captain, Infantry. 

Headquarters Hawaiian Department 

OFFICE OF A. C. OF 8., G-4 
FORT 8HAFTER, T. H. 



79716 O — 46— pt. 18 18 



3124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

EXHIBIT NO. 134 



STANDARD rORM NO 1' 



StCRET 



TELEGRAM 

OFFICIAL BUSINESS— GOVERNMENT RATES 



CABI-gHUm 



r«oM V.Ai; Department 
A. 0. 0. 



AT ' . (ll-29-a)liC-E 



aiB/cdm - 1712 
N0V3iBEK 29 1941 



COliiiUlDING OENERAL 

HAWAIIAN DEPARTVSBNT 

PORT SHAJ^aH T H 



II 



CONSULT C IN C PACIFIC FLKET R.'iFERSNGE HIS DxSPATCK t.maaR T-:0 
SIGHT Z'EHO SLX TWO SEVai TO CHIEF OF NAVAL OPSUTICNS PSaiCD Itl VIEW OF 
INFOaaTIOf) CONTAINED IN ABOVE DISPATCH COaiA THS MCVSISMT OF THS TWC) Afaff 
•• PURSUIT S-JUADROHS AS IKDICATED IN WAR DEPARTUSJT CABLE NUMBER FOUR SIX SIX 
CCaau NCV3HBER WD SIX COiaiA ONE NIH3 FOUR 0^fE COiOlA WILL BS SliSPSNDSD PERIOD 
THSSE SQUADRONS SHOULD HOfmm. BE PREPARED TO MOVE ON SHOOT NOTICE PSSIOD 
; PASACaAHi WAR DEPARTsfflHT HAS OFFHRED TO TAKE OVER DtFEEBS OF PACIFIC ADVANCE 
" BASES FROM THSSAVT EXCEPT FOR RJHNISHING /iNTIAIRCRAFT SJ^JIPMSNT PERIOD 
; CONSULT C IN C rACIFTC FLEBT R3FERIKCE RESJIREliSlJTS AND AREAS TO HE DEFSNDED 
' PERIOD WAR DKPASTliEKT HAS ALSO ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEfgJJSE OF GHRISIVA3 
I AND CANTON PERIOD IT IS CONTEWPUTSD THAT YOU 'A1LL FORM BASE DSFEKSS UNITS 
J FROM THE HAWAIIAN GARRISON SPECIALLY CSOANIZSD AS TASK FORCES FOR PARTICULAR ' 
AREAS PEKIOD IF THESE UNITS ARE !iOVSD FROM OAHU CaaU N3CE^ARY RSPLACaffiHTS 
raCK THE OOTTED STATES HILL BE FURNISiED PERIOD R3PC«T YOUR CONCLUSIONS AND 
RaCOiaiENDATIONS TO THE WAR DEPARTUE^^' AT THE liARUEST PRACTICABLE .DATE 

AOAUS 



SECFiC. I 



ADJUTANT GENERAL. J^"* 



vi 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3125 



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3130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

6 8 £ A F T H E C £ M S U S 

t6TH CENSUS 

OF THE OttlfES STATES 
1940 




Population 




■*■■*••*****■ -.1 



Second Series 
Characteristics of the Population 



H 



awaii 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3131 



BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 

J. C CAJPT. MnKBr {Appmli* Mt It, U4i) 

miUkU LANS AtmriK, IMnulT(atUndJtmmt»t, IHt) 

Abut U. ELkmam, A ni t i m l Dktor 

r »t<ih « i«ii Um Ik thwwu,, t»kt aiotiiuttiM. 

Hnuw O. Btmwua, AmiMm OnkftulUMm. 

OtoifUat BtiuMte~A»i> M. Bdmnli. 

Omctnt fofa-UMoB SutlMa*— H«aqr & ftryMk, ft. 

RmcOBM tH«tlMi»— WHBam H. tfailMi. 

BooateS WjOMlat— gdmnl P. Btudt. 

MMhamtUad Advinr-W. BdwiRb Dmli(. 

Taolinlcil OpnstioBi— Ib«li W. HaliatMt(. 

IVputMloa AnalyM— Joel WBUuh. 

BtBpAoyniMit AnAlyet^-Jolm D. Dunod. 

TlboiUfcio Eipnt^Kul U Bounii. 

TMkniMl BittUiiir- Brora L. JmUnMs. 

TeohDlod lutnu>iloii>— Jamas L. MoFkanQii. 
A<tau*JatnUra 8«rtfc»-P. B. Prmui, AM»t Oi^. 
A|^«l<ara— Zhixheb R. P»itxt, (M^SmiKiclm». 
»»»I «M« J oi<» AuiiiKWT, CSkt,/ e^'lMiettto. 
GMtrafiop— CuiuNom E. B»i»c»«vFr, Ctprarlm: 
lalMwiUMi •Bd PnbHolInu— A. W. tok !<t«ov«, AMks Ckitf. 
MmUb* Tifciil«*>»— lUunt E. 0»Li^»Ai, Cku/. 
MmmattMmtm—TnoutB J. fmotluu>, C3Htf SUHitlKicm. 
State u4 UinU 0<ntaB«i<— EsViU R. Qui, OU^ AaliMMaa. 
Vital Stadatka—H.LBEitT h. Doni., CW<f SlalMhaan. 



SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1940 



REPORTS ON HAWAII 

Fopaladoa; 

Number of lobabitac^ii — Hawaii 

Ghanctarutles of th« Fopulatioa — HamiL 
■naiat: 

Oeaetal Chanetwutic* — HawalL 
AgifealtBra: 

FaraiB, Fajm Property, LlTestoek, and Crop* — Bawait 
Baalaeaa; 

CeiMUi of Builoen, ll)3«— Alaaka, Bavaii, and Ptterio Sloo. 
Xanafaetnrea: 

Ceoaiu of Manufacture*." Outlying Ama. 



3132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

reSSE H. lONES, Secretary 

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS 

J. C. CAPT. DinctoT (Appointed Mar 22. 1941) 

WILLIAM LAN£ AUSTIN. Diiacloi (Ralixd lonuory 31. 1941) 

PHILIP M. HAUSER. Ainalonl Dinclor 




SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES : 1940 

POPULATION 

Second Series 
Characteristics of the Population 



HAWAII 



Prepared under the supervision of 

Dr. LEON E. TRUESDELL 

Chief Statisticicji for Population 



UNITED STATES 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON : 1943 



■nta. U. 8. Oovwmznant Printing Offlc* 
• Pries IS c«nts 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3133 



CONTENTS 



Pag« 

Map. — Hawaii by counties, islands, and census tracts iii, iv 

Introduction 1 

Arrangement of tables 1 

Availability of unpublished data_ .- 1 

EXPLANATIONS AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS 

Sex and race _ 1 

Nativity 1 

Place of birth 1 



Age 

Citizenship 

Marital status _ _. 

School attendance 

Highest grade of school completed 

Employment status J- 

Employed (except on public emergency work) _ 

On public emergency work 

Seeking work 



EXPLANATIONS AND DEFINITIONS OF 

TERMS— Continued 

Number of unemployed 

Comparison of 1940 data for the labor force with previous 

data for gainful workers 

Class of worker 

Wage or salary workers 

Employers and own-account workers 

Unpaid family workers 

Occupation and industry statistics 

Occupation classification ._ 

Industry classification 

Coverage of industry classifications "Government" and 

"Domestic service" 

Comparison of occupation and industry statistics for 1940 

with data from earlier censuses 

Wage or salary income and receipt of other income 

Months worked in 1939-.- 



TABLES 



Table Page 

1. — Race, by nativity and sex, for the Territory and for 

Honolulu city: 1910 to 1940 5 

2. — Age, by race and sex, for the Territory and for 

Honolulu city: 1940 and 1930 6 

3. — Foreign-bom population by citizenship, race, and 
sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu city: 1940 
and 1930 7 

4. — Marital status of the population 15 years old and 
over, by sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu 
city : 1920 to 1 940 8 

6.^ — School attendance, by age, race, and sex, for the 

Territory and for Honolulu city: 1940 and 1930-. 9 

6. — Persons 25 years old and over, by years of school 
completed, race, and sex, for the Territory and for 
Honolulu city: 1940 _ 10 

7.— Place of birth, by sex, for the'Territory: 1940 and 

1930 11 

8. — Employment status of persons 14 years old and over, 
by race and sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu 
city: 1940- .- 12 

9.— Employment status of persons 14 years old and 
over, by age and sex, for the Territory and for 

Honolulu city: 1940 13 

10.- — Persons in the labor force, 1940, and gainful workers, 
1930 and 1920, by age and sex, for the Territory 

and for Honolulu city 14 

11. — Age of persons in the labor force, by race and sex, 

for the Territory and for Honolulu city: 1940 15 

12. — CIass of worker of employed persons (except on 
public emergency work), by race and sex, for the 
Territory and for Honolulu city: 1040 16 



Table Page 

13. — Detailed occupation of employed persons (except 
on public emergency work), by sex, for the Terri- 
tory and for Honolulu city : 1 940 16 

14. — Major occupation gfoup of employed persons (ex- 
cept those on public emergency work), by race 
and sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu city: 
1940 19 

15, — Detailed industry of employed persons (except on 
pubhc emergency work), by sex, for the Territory 
and for Honolulu city: 1940 21 

16. — Wage or salary income and receipt of other income 
in 1939 for experienced persons in the labor force 
in 1940, by class of worker and sex, for the Territory 
and for Honolulu city 22 

17. — Wage or salary income and receipt of other income 
in 1939 for persons who were wage or salary work- 
ers (except public emergency workers) in 1940, by 
months worked in 1939 and sex, for the Territory 
and for H onolulu city 25 

18. — Composition of the population, by counties: 1940 

and 1930 27 

19. — Age, race, and sex, by countiesi 1940 and 1930 28 

20. — Persons 14 years old and over, by employment 
status, major occupation group, industry group, 
and sex, by counties: 1940 30 

21. — Race and age, by sex, for judicial districts and 

census tracts, by counties: 1940 i_ 31 

22. — Composition of the population, for cities of 6,000 to 

100,000: 1940 34 

23. — Persons 14 years old and over, by employment 
status, major occupation group, industry group, 
and sex, for cities of 5,000 to 100,000: 1940 36 



3134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HAWAII BY COUNTIES, ISLANDS, AND CENSUS TRACTS 

Part 1.— TRACTS IN HONOLULU COUNTY AND KAUAI COUNTY 
KAUAI CO. 










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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3135 



HAWAII BY COUNTIES, ISLANDS, AND CENSUS TRACTS 

Part J— TRACTS IN HAWAII COUNTY AND MAUI COUNTY 



MOLOKAI I. 

M-19 (KALAWAO) 




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HAWAII CO. 



3136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION 



INTRODUCTION 

This second Population bulletin for the Territory of Hawaii 
presents data on the characteristics of the population, including 
sex, age, race, nativity, place of birth, citizenship, marital status, 
school attendance, highest grade of school completed, employ- 
ment status, class of worker, occupation, industry, wage or 
salary income, and months worked in 1939. In the first Popula- 
tion bulletin, entitled "Number of Inhabitants," the total popu- 
lation of the Territory on April 1, 1940, was given for all of its 
political subdivisions, including counties, judicial districts, 
representative districts, census tracts, cities, towns, and villages. 
There remain to be presented for the Territory and for Honolulu 
city statistics on age by marital status, relationship to head of 
household, and education, data on occupation by age, wage or 
salary income, and class of worker, and on industry by race. 

Arrangement of tables. — The tables in the present bulletin 
are arranged on the basis of the areas for which figures are pre- 
sented. Tables 1 to 17 present statistics for the Territory as a 
whole and for Honolulu city. Tables 18 to 20 contain the figures 
for counties. Table 21 gives data by judicial districts and census 
tracts. Figures for cities of .'1,000 to 100,000 are shown in tables 
22 and 23. The amount of detail presented in this bulletin is 
generally greater for the larger places than for the smaller ones, 
and data from earlier censuses are presented for the larger areas 
only. 

Availability of unpublished data. — The statistics in this bulle- 
tin presented for the Territory as a whole and for Honolulu city 
represent practically all of the data tab\ilated in this phase of 
the 1940 program, .\lthough similar statistics have been 
tabulated for Hilo and Wailuku cities, and almost as much detail 
has been tabulated for counties and for Honolulu census tracts, 
it is not possible, because of space limitations, to publish the data 
in full detail. 

These unpublished statistics, however, can be made available 
upon request, for the cost of transcribing or reproducing them. 
Requests for such statistics, addressed to the Director of the 
Census, Washington, D. C, will receive a prompt reply which 
will include an estimate of the cost Of preparing the data. 

EXPLANATIONS AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS 

Sex and race. — Because of the importance of the classification 
of the population by sex, practically all of the data in this bulletin 
are presented separately for males and females. Moreover, as 
fat* as feasible, the data'are also piesented by race. Seven major 
race classifications are distinguished in the tabulations; namely. 
Hawaiian, part Hawaiian, Caucasian, Chinese, Filipino, Jap- 
anese, and "other races," the latter comprising mainly Koreans 
and Puerto Ricans. In the 1940 census, several revisions were 
made in the race classification. Portuguese, Spanish, and "other 
Caucasian" were combined into one group, "Caucasian"; 
persons from Puerto Rico were classified as a separate group 
because of special interest in their number; and all persons of 
mixed Hawaiian and other blood were classified as part Hawaiian. 
All statistics in this bulletin classifying the population by race 
are in accordance with the 1940 definition. The complete 
classification by race, sex, and nativity is shown in the following 
table: 



POPDLATION OF THE 


Territory by Race, Nativity, 
Sex: 1940 


AND 




>L.C.*»« 


K.T.V, 


rOBUON BORN 




Total 


Male 


Female 


Male 


Female 


Male 


Female 


^AU races 


423. 330 


243. 135 


178, 195 


214, 646 


196. 072 


30,490 


99.123 


Hawaiian 


14. 375 

49,935 

103.791 

28.774 

51669 

157, 905 

6,851 

255 

8.296 

679 


7.413 
24,660 
64.473 
16, 131 
40,791 
82.820 

3,965 
172 

4.407 
313 


6.962 
25,286 
39,318 
12.643 
11,771 
76,085 

2,886 
83 

3,889 
266 


7:413 
24,636 
60,034 
12.738 
40, 791 
61.910 

2,267 
165 

4.407 
284 


6.962 
25.272 
35.806 
11.192 
11,778 
58.642 

2.194 
83 

3.889 
254 






Part HawaiiaD 


14 

4,439 
3.393 


13 
3,512 
1.451 




Filipino 




20,910 

1.698 

7 


1&443 

em 












29 


12 





Nativity. — In the classification by nativity, a person born in 
continental United States or in any of its terdtories or posses- 
sions is counted, as native. Likewise included as native are 
the small number of persons who, although born in a foreign 
country or at sea, are American citizens by birth because their 
parents were American citizens. 

Place of birth. — The native population is classified, with respect 
to place of birth, into five groups: Those born in the Territory 
of Hawaii, those bom in the Philippine Islands, those bom in 
Puerto Rico, those born in other United States territories or 
possessions (including American citizens born abroad or at sea), 
and those born in continental United States. 

The foreign-born population is classified according to country 
of birth. All classifications of the 1940 population according 
to country of birth are based on the political boundaries of 
January 1, 1937, which were practically the same as in 1930. 

Age. — The age classification is based on the age of the person 
at his last birthday before the date of the census, that is, the 
age of the person in completed years. 

Age data for the Territory, Honolulu city, and counties are 
presented by 5-year periods up to 54 years and by 10-year 
periods to 74 years. For cities of 5,000 to 100,000 figures are 
presented by 5-year periods up to 34 years and 10-year periods 
from 35 to 74 years. Data are also available in various tables 
for additional age groups having some special significance, i. e., 
21 years and over and the various groups shown in connection 
with school attendance and employment statue. 

Citizenship. — The classification of the foreign born by citizen- 
ship comprises two main groups, naturalized and alien; the 
second group is further subdivided into those having first 
papers (that is, those who have raade formal declaration of 
intention to become citizens of the United States) and those 
having no papers. In addition, there is a third group made up 
of foreign-born persons for whom no report on citizenship was 
obtained. Since it is likely that most of these persons are aliens, 
they are often included with the aliens in summary figures for 
citizens and noncitizens. 

Marital status. — In the classification by marital status four 
major groups. are shown: Single, married, widowed, and divorced. 
In aU censuses there were a few persons-for whom the enumerators 
failed to report marital status. All these persons are here classi- 
fied as single. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3137 



HAWAH 



School attendance. — The school attendance tabulation for 1940 
U baaed on the replies to the enumerator's inquiry as to whether 
the person had atlended, or been enrolled in, any regular school 
or college between March 1 and April 1, 1940. Night schools or 
vocational schools were not included unless they were a part of 
the regular school system; and no correspondence schools were 
included. The school attendance question in the Census of 1930 
applied to a somewhat longer period, namely, the seven months 
between September 1, 1929, and April 1, 1930. Furthermore, 
in the earlier censuses the question was not restricted as to type 
of school. 

Highest grade of school completed. — In 1940 the census, for 
the first time, included a question on the formal educational at- 
tainment of each person. The question on the schedule asked 
for fjie last full grade that the person had completed in the regu- 
lar school system — public, private, or parochial school, college, or 
university. This question replaced the inquiry on illiteracy in- 
cluded in previous censuses and provides data on educational 
status, a characteristic which is significant for every population 
group, especially in combination with other characteristics. 

The tabulations on last year of school completed which are 
presented in this bulletin, are restricted to persons 25 years old 
and over, practically all of whom have comj leted their formal 
education. All tables presenting data on education include the 
median year of school completed. The median j'ear of school 
completed may be defined as that year which divides the popula- 
tion group into equal parts, one-half having completed more 
schooling, and one-half having completed less schooling than the 
median. These medians are expressed in terms of a continuous 
series of numbers representing years of school completed. For 
example, the completion of the first year of high school is indi- 
cated by 9 and of the last year of college by 16. 

Employment status. — In the classification by employment 
status in the 1940 Census of Population, all persons 14 years old 
and over are classified on the basis of their activity during the 
week of March 24 to 30, 1940, into two principal groups: (1) Per- 
sons in the labor force, including those employed for pay or profit 
or at unpaid family work, those on public emergency work, and 
those seeking work; and (2) persons not in the labor force. The 
latter group includes persons reported as-engaged in their own 
home housework; those in school; those unable to work; all in- 
mates of penal and mental institutions and homes for the aged, 
infirm, and needy, regardless of their acti^ ity during the census 
week; others not employed, not on public emergency work, and 
not seeking work; and persons for whom employment status was 
not reported. 

The various categories of persons in the labor force are defined 
below: 

Employed {except on public emergency work).- — The 
group classified as employed includes: (a) Persons who worked 
for pay or profit at any time during the week of March 24 to 30 
1940, m private work or nonemergency Federal. Territorial, or 
local government work, or assisted without pay on a familv 
farm or in a family business; and (i) persons not actually at work 
and not seeking work during the week of March 24 to"30 1940 
but with jobs, businesses, or professional enterprises from whicli 
they were temporarily absent because of vacation, illnea*. indua- 
trial dispute, bad weather, or lay-off not exceeding 4 weeks with 
definite instructions to return to work on a specific date. The 
group "Employed (except on public emergency work)" includes 
not only employees but also proprietors, farmers, other self- 
employed persons, and unpaid family workers. 

On public emergency work. — This category includes persons 
who, during the week of March 24 to 30. 1940.' were at work on 
or aKiigned to, public emergency work projects conducted bv 
the Work Projects Administration (WPA), the National Youth 
A^nistraUon (NYA), or the CivUian Conservation Corps 

In the interpretation of the data for persons on public emer- 
gency work, allowance must be made for the misclassification 
of considerable numbers of public_emergency workers. The 



number of persons reported in the census as on public emergency 
work in Hawaii was 2,326, whereas the number recorded on the 
pay rolls of the Federal emergency work agencies at the time of 
the census was 3,568. 

Seeking work. — This category represents persons without 
work of any sort in the week of March 24 to 30, 1940, who were 
actively seeking work during that week. The group seeking 
work was subdivided into experienced workers and new workers, 
the latter being persons who had not previously worked full 
time for 1 month or more. Persons seeking work for whom a 
report on work experience was lacking were classified as experi- 
enced workers. 

Persons with a job but not at work were classified as employed 
because the strict definition of this group and the fact that these 
persons were reported as not seeking work, tended to eliminate 
all except those who would shortly return to the employment 
from which they were temporarily absent. 

Number of unemployed. — The total number of unemployed, 
as usually defined, includes (1) persons seeking work and with- 
out any form of pubUc or private employment and (2) those on 
public emergency work programs estabUshed to provide jobs 
for the unemployed. Because of the misclassification of public 
emergency w orkers, the census total of these two groups under- 
states the amount of unemployment. More satisfactory figures 
can be obtained by adding to the census figures for persons seek- 
ing work, the number of persons on pay rolls of the Federal 
emergency woik agencies at the time of the census. This pro- 
cedure yields a total of 8,678 unemployed persons. 

Comparison of 1940 data for the labor force with previous 
data for gainful workers. — The 1940 data for the labor force 
are not directly comparable with the census statistics for gainful 
workers in 1930 and earlier years because of differences in 
definition. "Gainful workers" were persons reported as having 
a gainful occupation, that is, an occupation in which they earned 
money or a money equivalent, or in which they assisted in the 
production of marketable goods, regardless of whether they were 
working oi seeking work at the time of the census. The labor 
force is defined in the 1940 census on the basis of activity during 
the week of March 24 to 30, and includes only persons who were 
employed, seeking work, or on public emergency work in that 
week. Thus seasonal workers who were neither working nor 
seeking work during the census week were excluded from the labor 
force in 1940; such persons Kcre classified for the most part as 
gainful workers in 1930. In addition certain classes of persons, 
such as retired workers, some inmates of institutions, and 
recently incapacitated workers were frequently included among- 
gainful workers in 1930. but in general, such persons are not in 
the 1940 labor force. On the other hand, the 1940 labor force 
includes persons seeking work without previous work experience, 
that is, new workers, and persons reported as in the labor force 
for whom neither occupation nor industry was entered on the 
schedule. Most of the relatively few new workers at the time 
of the 1930 and earlier censuses were probably not counted as 
gainful workers. Likewise, some persons who were actually 
gainful workers, but for whom neither occupation nor industry 
was reported, were not included in the gainful worker figures for 
1Q30 and earlier years. 

Tlie 1940 labor force figures are restricted to persons 14 years 
old and over, whereas the number of gainful workers shown in 
earlier censuses included persons 10 years old and over. The 
number of workers 10 to 13 years old has become relatively small 
and no longer justifies the additional burden of enumeration and 
tabulation necessary to retain the 10-year age limit. In making 
comparisons between the 1940 labor foice data and the gainful 
worker statistics in earlier census reports, the slight difference 
in age limits should be taken into consideration. The gainful 
worker statistics shown in this bulletin for earUer censuses exclude 
those 10 to 13 years old. 

Class of worker. — Class-of-worker statistics for employed 
workers (eicluding persons on public emergency work) are given 



3138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION 



3 



in table 12, which shows the numbers of wage or salary workers, 
employers and own-account workers, unpaid family workers, 
and workers who failed to report class of worker. The com- 
position of the various categories is described below: 

Wmi0 or gmlmry workers. — This class consists of persons who 
worked as employees for wages or salary (in cash or kind). 
It includes not only factory operatives, laborers, clerks, etc., 
who worked for wages, but also persons working for tips or for 
room and board, salesmen and other employees working for 
commissions, and salaried business managers, corporation execu- 
tives, and government officials. 

Bmptoyera and own-account werAers. — This group con- 
sists of persons who operated their own business enterprises. 
It includes not only the owner-operators of large stores and 
manufacturing establishments, but also small merchants, inde- 
pendent craftsmen, farmers, professional men, peddlers, and 
other persons conducting enterprises of their own. It does not 
include managers paid to operate businesses owned by other 
persons or by corporations; such workers are classified as wage 
or salary workers. 

Unptdd {amity workers. — This class is composed of persons 
who assisted without pay on farms or in stores or other enter- 
prises operated by other members of their families. The great 
majority of unpaid family workers are farm laborers. 

Occupation and industry statistics. — In the 1940 Population 
Census of Hawaii, inquiries relating to occupation and industry 
were made for all experienced persons 14 years old and over in 
the labor force during the census week (March 24 to 30, 1940). 
The occupation and industry data presented in this bulletin, 
however, are limited to employed persons (except those on public 
emergency work), and relate to their jobs during the census 
week. 

Ocoupatiou olaMiflcation. — The detailed occupation classifi- 
cation used in the 1940 Population Census for Hawaii contains 
378 titles.' In this bulletin, the detailed occupation classifica- 
tion is used only for the presentation of occupation statistics 
for employed workers (except those on public emergency work), 
by sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu city (table 13). In 
other tables, occupation data are shown in terms of \2 major 
octupation groups, representing major groupings of the detailed 
clantflcation. 

Industry olaiiiflcation. — The industry classification used in 
the 1940 Census for Hawaii contains 131 titles.' The detailed 
industry classification is used here only for the presentation of 
industry statistics for employed workers (except those on public 
emergency work), by sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu 
city (table 15). In other tables, a condensed list of 44 industries 
1b used. This abbreviated list represents selections and com- 
binations of the titles in the complete classification. 

CoTerage of industry classifications "Qovernment" and 
"Domestic seryice." — The industry classification "Government 
(not elsewhere classified)" does not include all persons employed 
by governmental agencies. Persons are included in this clas- 
sification only if they were engaged in activities that are peculi- 
arly governmental functions. Government employees who were 
engaged in activities that are commonly performed by employees 
of private enterprises are included in the industry classification 
in which their activities fell. For example, a tax collector is 
included in the industry classification "Government." but a 
carpenter employed on a Federal building project is classified 
in the category "Construction." The total number of persons 
employed by governmental agencies, therefore, cannot be ob- 
tained from the industry classification. 

» with some excoptloos. this cliaslflcatlon Is coavertthle to the 327 -item Convertl- 
bflJty Lilt of Occupfttfons. which was prp pwtd by the Joint Comislttee on OocupA- 
tlonaJ CUMlflctttion (sponsored by the Cflmral Stttlstic*] Bo«rd and the American 
fltatlatloal Association) to Increaso comparability among occupational statistics 
compiled by various fcovenuDeotal and private sourtcs. 

I Thli daaslQcatlcn Is a condensation o( the Standard Industrial ClaaslflcaUon of 
1,411 titlea, which wae prepared lor uao Id classilylog industry returns Irom workers 
ornMnbenoltbelr hunllles. by th« Joint Commlttoeon Oocupatlonal CUHlAcation, 
In eooparatloD with the Conuulttee on Industrial ClaalflcaUon spoosond by tbe 
Connl ButMlal B«b4. 



The industry group "Domestic service" ia somewhat more 
inclusive than the major occupation group "Domestic service 
workers," which is limited to "Housekeepers, private family," 
"Laundresses, private family," and "Servants, private family." 
The industry classification "Domestic service" includes not only 
these workers but also persons in occupations such as practical 
nurse, chauffeur, and gardener, if they were employed by private 
families. 

Comparison of occupation and industry statistics for 1940 
with data from earlier censuses.— No comparisons of the 1940 
census data on occupation and industry with similar data from 
previous censuses are included in this bulletin. Such compari- 
sons are complicated by three import.ant considerations. 

First, gainful workers, the group for which occupation and 
industry statistics were presented in previous censusee, are not 
strictly comparable with the 1940 labor force. 

Second, the occupation and industry data shown here do not 
cover the entire labor force, being limited to employed persons. 
Third, the 1940 classifications of occupation and industry 
differ from those used in earlier censuses, with respect to arrange- 
ment and content of titles. For example, in 1930, most of the 
occupation titles were grouped under a few major industrial 
headings ("Agriculture," "Forestry and fishing," "Extraction of 
minerals," etc.), based upon the industry in which the occupa^ 
tiou was most commonly followed. In 1940, however, the 
occupation titles are grouped into 12 major occupation groups 
("Professional and semiprofessional workers," "Craftsmen, 
foremen, and kindred workers," "Operatives and kindred work- 
ers," etc.), regardless of industrial attachment. 

Wage or salary income and receipt of other income. — In 
the 1940 census, all persons 14 years old and over (except in- 
mates of specified institutions) were asked to report the amount 
of money wage or salary income received in 1939. (Those who 
received over $5,000 were required only to report that they had 
received more than that amount.) Pereons 14 years old and 
over were also asked to report whether they had received <50 
or more from sources other than money wages or salaries in 1989. 
This comparatively small amount was chosen in order to identify 
those persons whose incomes, for all practical purposea, were 
limited to receipts from wages or salaries. A question regarding 
the exact amount of nonwage income was not included because 
of the very considerable additional burden of enumeration that 
such a question would have entailed. 

Wage or salary income, as defined for the purposes of the 1940 
census, includes all money received by persons as compensation 
for work or services performed as employees, including commis- 
sions, tips, piece-rate payments, bonuses, etc., as well as 
receipts commonly referred to as wages or salaries. Enumera- 
tors were instructed not to consider as wage or salary income 
receipts from business profits, fees, travel reimbursements, sale 
of crops, unemployment compensation, etc., nor compensation 
in forms other than money, such as meals, lodging, clothing, fuel, 
etc. 

"Other income" includes all income other than money wages 
or salaries, such as income from roomers or boarders, buaineea 
profits, professional fees, income in kind, receipts from the sale 
of farm products, rents, interest, dividends, unemployment com- 
pensation, direct relief, old-age assistance, pensions, annuitiea, 
royalties, and regular contributions from persons other than 
members of the immediate family. Other itcome does not in- 
clude receipts in the form of lump-sum insurance settlements, 
occasional gifts of goods or money, inheritances, receipts or 
profits from the sale of properties (unless the person earned his 
living by buying and selling such properties) or reimbursements 
for travel expenses. 

In this bulletin, tbe group of persons for whom the reoeipt or 
noniecaipt of oUier income was not reported is combined with the 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3139 



HAWAII. 



group without other income of $50 or more, since the majority 
of the persons failing to report probably had no other income. 

Data on wage or salary income and other income in 1939 are 
presented in table 16 for the experienced lalor force, which com- 
prises employed persons, those on public emergency work, and 
persons other than new workers seeking work, during the week 
of March 24 to 30, 1940. In this table sUtistics >re presented 
separately for wage or salary workers and for other experienced 
workers (that is, for the combination of employers, own-account 
workers, unpaid family workers, and persons for whom class of 
worker was not reported). The group of wage or salary workers 
is subdivided into (a) private and nonemergency goverDmenl 
workers, and (b) public emergency workers. The category 
"public emergency workers" includes both persons who were on 
public emergency work during the census week and persons 
seeking work during that week who had last worked on public 
emergency projects. This category is therefore somewhat larger 
than the employment status group "on public emergency work." 

The statistics on wage or salary income and receipt of other 
income refer to the calendar year 1939, while the class ideations 
by employment status and class of worker refer to the week of 
March 24 to 30, 1940. Because of the rapid turn-over of emer- 
gency project employment, the difference in time reference is 
probably most important in connection with the wage or salary 
income distribution of public emergency workers. A consider- 
able proportion of the wage or salary income reported by public 
emergency workers was derived from private employment. Like- 
wise, some persons who were employers, own-account workers, 
and unpaid family workers at the time of the census had been 
employed as wage or salary workers during a part or all of the 
year 1939, and reported themselves aa having received various 
amounts of wage or salary income. 

Two important factors may have made for inaccurate report- 
ng of wage or salary Income. First, perwns who raceived their 
compensation in many installments of irregular amounts may 
not hare been able to determine accurately the total amount 
received. Second, some informants who replied to the eensui 
Icquiriea for the whole family undoubtedly did not know the 
precise amount of wage or salary inoome raoeived by eaefa mem- 



ber. Nevertheless, the statistics present a reasonably accurate 
picture of the amount and distribution of wage or salary income 
received in 1930. 

Months worked in 1939. — In order to show the relationship 
between income and amount of employment during the year, 
statistics on wage or salary income and receipt of othei income 
are presented for wage or salary workers classified according to 
number of months worked in 1939. The classification by num- 
ber of months worked was obtained from a question regarding 
the number of weeks worked for pay or profit, including public 
emergency work, or at unpaid family work, which was asked for 
all persons 14 years old and over except inmates of certain 
institutions. For persons with periods of part-time work, the 
report was to be made in terms of equivalent full-time weeks, A 
full-time week being defined as the number of hours loc^y 
regarded as full time for the given occupation and industry. 
Paid vacations or other absences with pay were included in the 
number of weeks worked. 

The returns for weeks worked in 1939 have been converted 
into months in the tables in this bulletin, because a large pro- 
portion of the reports were only approximate, and did not repre- 
sent valid statements of the precise number of weeks of work. 
The groupings of months worked that are used in this bulletin 
are listed below, with their equivalents in terms of the original 
reports of weeks worked. 

Number of months worked KumDer of weeka worked 

Less than 6 months, or not to 23 weeks, or not reported. 
reported. 

6 to 8 months 24 to 35 weeks. 

9 to II months __. 36 to 49 weeks. 

12 months 50 to 52 weeks. 

Data on months worked in 1939 were not tabulated for 
employers, own-account workers, and unpaid family workers. 
For such workers, the data on months worked are less slg- 
oiflcaDt and lees reliable than for wage or salary workers. 
Moreover, for workers in these groups, the amount of emfdoy- 
ment in 1039 boa Utile relation to the amount of wage or salary 
incone retafved. 



79716 O— 4«— pt. 18- 



19 



3140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION 



Tabls 1.— race, by nativity AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1910 TO 1940 

[Percent not ahovn where less than 0.1} 



THinunOBT 
Totel 

1940 

Native 

Foreign bora .. 

USD . 

NaUve . 

Foreign bom ... 

laao 

Native 

Foreign born 

mo 

Native 

Foreign born... 

Kale 

ItW 

Native... 

Foreign born... 

Il»0 

Native 

Foreign bora 

1040 

Native.. 

Foreign born 

1030 . 

Native 

Foreign born 

Kale* per 100 

females 

1040 

Native 

Foreign born 

1900 

Nallve 

Foreign born 

HONOLULO CITY 

Total 

1040 



9U.0U 

168.871' 
87.2411 



94.734 
82.071 
12.663. 

74. 46S; 
5S. 808 
lS.«48i 



84.693 
74.537 
10.0S5| 



119.0 

iiai 

125.0 



54. 742 23. 507 21. 031 



44. 048:31. 074 
28,930 7.195 
15.118 14.1 



31.M7 1 

27. 715 
3.952 



153.8 : 
155.5 

141.9 : 



33. 948 10. 141 

21. 734 I 
2.214 



131.3 
115. 1 
167.2 



76.0CB 
46.759 
28.249 



33.515 
15.230 
7.285 



113.0 

IM. 8 
174.4 



PKaCKNT BT KACB 



15.1 


9. 


91.9 


: 


■a.i 


6 


13.9 


10. 


9L4 


0. 


m. 5 


7 


13.5 


12. 


3.10 


11 


29.5 


7 


16.1 


15. 



100.0 
67.7 
42.3 



loo 

22.0 
78.0 



100 100 100 



100. Ol 100.0 100. c 
78.6 10aO 65. ( 
21.4 34.0 



100. 100. 100. 0' 



lOo' o! 75- 7 



100.01 100. 100. 0' 100. 0| 100.0 
100.0 87.3, 74.3 100.01 62 6 
12.71 25.71 



100. 0! 100.0' 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 



10)0 99.9 



100 100. 100. 100. 100. 

Or 100.0 86.4 84.6100.0| 67.0 
13.61 15. 



10O.O 
72.1 
37.0 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3141 



HAWAII 

-AGE, BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940 AND 1930 

[PorceDt Dot ahowD ubere loss than 0.1] 



Male Female 



THB TUIBITOKT 



TjDder syears- 
5to6years — 
10 to H years. - 



21,961 
24.110 
26,359 



7.419 6.963 



23,3.S4 
21, 979 
19.033 



94, 660 3S, 2Bt 



16, 131 13, 643 



2,238 
2,296 
2.040 
1, 2116 



83. 830 79. 089 

7.327 

9.067 
11.329 
11. 36.) 

9.192 



30 to 34 years.. 
38 to 39 years.. 
40 to 44 years . . 



3 64 years,. 
74 years- 



21,571 
17,969 
12,963 
9,648 

9,422 
12.911 

6, 767 
1,792 



6.694 
7.607 
3,345 
1,010 



2,019 
2,337 
1,043 



2,777 
1,212 



2,667 
3,669 
1,396 



1 years and over . . 
AU aies, 1930 



145.046 

222. 640 

24.630 
23.894 
10.235 
19.324 



87.603 
145. 696 



4.708 
11.911 



13. 481 
48. 706 



26, 528 
31.687 



9,645 

le.sei 



1.547 
1..354 
1.078 



6.432 
10. 618 



53. 568 

2.864 



35.346 
64.623 



4.723 
4.446 



3.066 
3,796 



65 to 59 years-. 



3,627 
3,132 
2,388 
1,979 
1,472 



1,757 
1,515 
1.072 



2,208 
5,570 
4,417 
4.720 



21 years and over. 
Percent, 1940 



129,292 
100.0 



03.510 
100.0 



6.361 
100.0 



6,390 
100.0 



4,142 
100 



4,466 
100.0 



17. 169 
100.0 



9.854 
100.0 



40.860 
ICO.O 



66 to 64 years 

65 to 74 years 

Not reported 

21 years and over.. 

Percent, 1890.. 

Under 6 years 



66.0 
100.0 



49.2 
100.0 



32.4 
100.0 



43,0 
tD0.0 



3142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION 7 

Tabu «.— AGE, BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1040 AND 1830— Continued 

(PeroKit not ibovn wban km tb*D 0.1) 



AUA. aOB, AHD 


AlXCLABSBS 


Hawaiuk 


PUT 
Hawaiun 


Cauuham 


c™- 


PTl^O 


Japamui 


Othkbeacu 




Total 


Mala 


Fanula 


Mile 


Tf- 


Male 


Po- 
mala 


Male 


Pe- 
male 


Male 


Pe- 
mala 


«"• iJi 


Mali 


IS. 


Mala 


Pe 

male 


HOaOKTTlD CJTY 
AUtfM, INO 


ITS, IN 


M.m 


M.6M 


!,7T» 


•.•T9 


19,<1> 


11, Itl 


It, 944 


21,946 


11.304 


10, 141 


6,101 1.TI6 


31. at 


tt. tn 


S,9« 


3,607 




16. M7 

17, m> 
10. «U 
30.298 
31,343 

IS, 166 
14.000 

13.380 
9.671 
7.6M 
6,546 

9.077 
4.353 

100,114 
100.0 


8.IM0 
9.00] 
B.9M 
10i429 
11,J07 

9,713 
7,630 
ftTJO 
5,083 
3,930 
3, 804 

6^291 

2,696 

717 

49 

64,242 

loao 


8,296 
8,967 
9,eTi 
9,864 
10,136 

8,462 
6,539 
6,660 
4,488 
3,745 
2,741 

3.786 

1,767 

674 

24 

45,972 

100.0 


184 
214 
239 
236 
209 

568 
231 
304 
222 
206 
166 

196 

116 

32 

5 

1,839 

100.0 


166 
198 
239 
236 
237 

361 
226 
231 
202 
196 
149 

179 
113 

46 

1 

1.794 
100.0 


2.228 
2.0.14 
1,867 
1,497 
1,194 

1,036 
753 
689 
347 
348 
193 

233 

79 
19 
6 

4,627 

100.0 


2.261 
2,004 

1,868 
1,676 
1.447 

1,046 
816 
637 

380 
249 

315 
119 
61 

6,144 
100.0 


1,949 
1,7«) 
1,736 
2423 
3,972 

3,206 
2,669 
2,366 
1,822 
1,489 
1,308 

'663 
228 

17 

19,279 
100.0 


1.721 
1,745 
1,721 
1,786 
2.444 

2,926 
2.751 
2.182 
1.713 
1,377 
1.057 

1,444 
734 
336 
13 

16.681 

100. 


908 
1.096 
1,446 
1,471 
1,266 

1,011 
794 
890 
871 
616 
280 

770 

. 604 

228 

6 

7,099 

100.0 


819 

1,099 
1,384 
1,420 
1.248 

900 
722 
77? 
630 
305 

376 
217 
60 

4 

6,179 
100.0 


390 
346 
273 
236 
236 

1.018 
874 
686 
432 

130 

100 
18 

4 
4 

3.828 

lOO.O 


m 

310 
388 

217 
170 

128 
77 

07 

.■a 

23 

22 
2 

1 

617 
100.0 


2.680 

3.172 
3.906 
4.120 
3,8M 

2,908 
1,952 
1,865 
1,264 
781 
1,673 

2,068 
864 
139 
12 

10,646 

loot 


2.688 
3.088 
3. 681 
4.133 
4.160 

2.8B4 
1,73" 

i:39« 

1,327 

9)9 

1.323 
!02 
61 

5 

14,945 
lOO.O 


300 
422 
606 
466 
4Z1 

286 
257 
131 
136 
113 
164 

477 
302 

47 

1 

2,124 
100.0 




















































75 y««rs uid over 


30 


21 yean and over 

P«roeiit.l»U 


1,612 
100.0 


Under 6 years 

StoSyears- 


9.6 
10.0 
10. B 
11.3 
11.9 

lai 

7.« 

a.* 

«.> 

4.3 
3.6 

S.1 
2.4 
0.7 


9.1 
9.6 

10 5 

11 
11.8 

10.3 

7.9 
7.1 
6.4 

th 

6.0 
2.7 
0.8 
0.J 

67.3 


9 8 
10.6 
II 4 
11.7 
12.0 

10.0 
7.7 
6.7 
6.3 
4.4 
3.2 

' 4.6 
2.1 
0.7 


6.6 
7.7 
86 
86 
9.7 

9.3 
&3 
7.8 
80 

7.4 
6.0 

7.1 
4.J 
1.2 
0.2 

66.2 


6.2 
7.4 
89 
88 
88 

0.7 
84 

86 
7.6 
7.3 
6.6 

6.7 
4.2 
L7 


17.9 
16.5 
14 9 
12 1 
9.6 

8.3 
6.1 
4.7 
2.8 
2.8 

i.g 

1.9 
0.6 
0.1 


17.1 
16.2 
14 1 
12 
11.0 

7.0 
6.2 
4.8 

ai 

19 
1.9 

2.4 
0.9 

a4 


7.2 
6.6 
6.4 
9.0 
14.7 

11.9 
9.9 
87 
6.8 
6.6 
4.6 

1.4 

^6 

0.8 

ai 

67.8 


7.2 
7.3 
7.2 
7 5 

10 2 

12 2 

11 5 
9.1 
7.2 
6.7 
4.4 

6.0 
3.1 
1.4 
0.1 

69.3 


7.4 
89 
11.8 
12 
10.2 

82 
6.6 
7.2 
7.1 
6.0 
13 

6.3 
6.4 
L9 


81 
10.8 
13.6 
14.0 
12 3 

89 
7.1 
7.2 
(.2 
3.9 
16 

8.7 
11 

a5 


7.6 
88 
6.4 
4.4 
4.6 

20.0 
17.1 
13.4 
86 
7.2 
16 

10 
0.4 
0.1 
01 

76.0 


18 8 
17.4 
16.0 
12 2 
9.6 

7.2 
4.3 
6.2 
3.8 
8.0 
1.3 

1.3 
0.1 

ai 


84 
10.2 
12.6 
13.2 
114 

9.3 
6.3 
6.0 
4.0 
16 
6.4 

0.6 
17 

a6 


9.0 
10.6 
115 

14.1 

9.9 
5.9 
6.4 
4.8 
4.2 
3.2 

4.6 
1.7 

a3 


9.1 
10.7 
12 8 
11 6 
10.7 

7.2 
6.6 
3.3 
3.2 
19 
3.9 

110 
6,1 
L2 


10.5 
11.8 










































75 yean and over 


ao 


21 years and over 


(5.8 


S4.2 


67.0 


36.4 


39.1 


67.7 


91.1 


34.6 


SS.0 


60.9 


63.6 


4*0 



Tablb 3.— FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION BY CITIZENSHIP, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR 

HONOLULU CITY: 1940 AND 1930 

rPercent not shown where less than 0.1 or where base is less than lOO] 







«,...0N 


.OBNPOP 


,la™n-. 


HA0.S 




,OB„OK.BOB 


,W,Ot.AT.O»2.T.A«.OU.A»nO™ 


ABBA, BACK, AND SBZ 


Total 


Natural lied 


First 


papers 


No papers 
and not 
reported 


Total 


Naturalized 


Pirst papers 


No papers 
and not 
reported 




Number 


Percent 


Number 


Percent 


Number 


Percent 


Number 


Percent 


THE TEKBITORY: 1040 
IHaL 


62, lis 


6,668 


10.6 


397 


0.8 


46.663 


63,041 


6,419 


10,4 


391 


0.1 


ti.lM 




30,490 
22,123 


3,645 
2,008 


11.6 
0.1 


277 
120 


0.9 
0.6 


26.668 
10, 996 


30,146 
21,896 


3,432 
1,987 


11.4 
9.1 


273 
120 


0.9 

0.6 


26,441 
19^780 








27 

14 

13 

7,951 

4,439 

3,512 

4,844 
3,393 
1,451 
37,353 
20,910 
16,443 
2,438 
1,734 
704 


14 
6 

8 
6,141 
3.292 
1.849 

199 
116 
84 
148 
87 
61 
61 
46 
6 








13 
8 

5 
1422 

878 
1,644 

4,644 

3,277 
1,367 
37,201 
20,820 
16,381 
1383 
1,685 
606 


24 
12 
12 

7,774 
4,303 
3.471 

4,730 
3,320 
1,410 
37.089 
20,784 
16,305 
1424 
1,736 
696 


14 

s 

6,015 
3,185 
1,830 

193 
110 
83 
147 
86 
61 
60 
45 
6 












































64.7 

74.2 
62 6 

4.1 
3.4 
5.8 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
11 
16 
0.9 


388 

269 
119 

1 
1 


4.9 
6 1 
3.4 


64.6 
74.0 
617 

13 
6.9 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
11 
26 
7 


383 
364 

119 


4.9 
6.1 
8 4 
















Male 












1,327 




4 
3 

I 
4 
4 




""^Sto 


















0.2 

0.2 


0.2 

a2 








Pemale 


698 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3143 



HAWAII 



TiBLE 8.— FOREIQN-BORN POPULATION BY CITIZENSHIP, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR 
HONOLULU CITY: 1940 AND 1»30— Continued 





(Peroeot Dot ahowii where leM tbkn 0.1 or wfaer« bue Is lee 


1 Ifaui 100) 














rOtllOII-BOfeH POFOLATIOH— AU. AGKS 




..,o»..o. 


.rort^r 


0»„Y„ 


Ifl OLD AND OT» 


AHA, ftACI, AMD UX 


Total 


N&tiumlited 


FInt 


Fnpera 


Nopapen 
and not 
reported 


Total 


Natuxallied 


First papers 


No papers 
isilllM 
npond 




Namber 


Peroeot 


Ntunb«r 


Porceot 


NumtMT 


Peroeot 


Number 


Percent 


THE TERRITORY: IMO 


U.HT 

42, OU 
AIM 


i.m 


7.7 


•IB 


1.9 


ai,tt9 


•7,«8B 


i.094 


7.1 


791 


I.I 










3,262 
1,971 


7.8 
7.8 


120 


1.7 
0.9 


38,023 
34.426 


4i,an 

lt,09> 


3.180 
1,914 


7.7 
7.3 


679 
116 


1.6 
0.4 






M.W 
































9.M8 

t,eo6 

7.M8 












0,211 
9,384 
3.827 

7.304 
5.777 
1.627 


4,779 
3.074 
1.706 

179 
67 
112 


91.9 
97 1 
44.6 

2.9 
1.2 
7.3 


773 
660 
113 

3 
2 

1 


8.4 
13.3 
3.0 


I.M9 










































mS* 














%1» 
1,414 














0.1 


















<8.44e 

a>.»« 

».1»7 

a. MS 

2.274 
791 

SS,718 












47, HO 
27.970 
19.060 
3.040 
2.299 
781 

».37> 


103 
18 
89 
33 

12 
3.348 


0.2 
0.1 
0.4 

o!9 

1.9 
It.O 


6 

1 

1 
963 


















































0.3 
0.3 
0.1 

1.9 




























19.066 




HONOLDLIT CITY: IMO 

Totol 


9.389 


14.9 


889 


11 


U,T« 




iz.naa 
10, ow 


1.968 
1,420 


19.9 
14.1 


166 
99 


13 
1.0 


10,929 
8,936 


9!908 


1.937 
1,409 


15 6 
14.2 


164 
99 


1.3 
1.0 






81400 






ao 
11 
« 

4.544 

2,330 
3,214 

3.228 
2.020 
1.20S 


11 

9 

< 

3,112 

1.792 

1.320 

173 

a> 

74 








9 
6 
3 

:,i7i 

375 
796 

3,054 

1.920 
1,134 


IB 
9 
9 

4.471 
2.282 
2,189 

3.123 
1,953 
1,170 


11 

3.079 
1.769 
1,310 

168 
99 
73 










































''•"SS": - 


68. 9 

76.9 
99.6 

9.4 
4.9 
8.1 


361 
163 

96 

1 

1 


9 7 
7.0 
4.4 


68.8 
77.3 
99.8 

9.4 
4.9 
6.3 


299 
191 
98 

1 
1 


6.8 
7.1 
4.6 


1,137 


"."li 












0.1 
























13.790 
7.«0 
6.210 
1,138 

414 


60 
42 

18 
32 
30 
2 


0.4 
0.6 
0.3 
2.8 

4.2 
0.9 


2 

I 
1 
1 
1 




13. 728 
7.937 
6.191 
1.103 

691. 

412 


13.634 
7.503 
6.131 
1.126 

409 


60 
42 

18 
32 
30 
2 


0.4 
0.3 

0.3 
2.8 
4.2 
0.9 


2 

1 
1 
1 
> 




















6,113 

i,on 




0.1 
0.1 


0.1 
9.1 





















Table 4.— MARITAL STATUS OF THE POPULATION 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY 
AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1920 TO 1940 





(For each year a small number of persons for whom marital status 


was not 


reported a 


re Included In the figures (or "sln(Ie"| 








KALIS 15 TIAKS OLD AND OYII 


FBHALBS IS TEABS OLD AND OVBK 




Total 


Single 


Married 


Widowed 


Dl- 
voroed 


Total 


Single 


Married 


Widowed 


Di- 




Number 


Percent 


Number 


Percent 


Number 


Percent 


Number 


Percent 


Number 


Percent 


Number 


Percent 


vorced 


THE TERRITORY 


178,663 
194.981 
104,910 

67.059 
48,224 


98,128 
79. 142 
45,966 

31.061 
20.331 


94.9 
91.1 
43.8 

46.3 
42.2 


71,715 
68.187 
92,977 

32,446 
29,179 


40,1 
44.0 
50.5 

48.4 
92 2 


6,211 
6.030 
6.011 

2,249 
2,038 


3.5 
3.9 
4.8 

3.4 
4.2 


2.609 

1.622 

956 

1.303 
67f, 


113.667 
B0..DI4 
60.197 

57. 765 
17.698 


36,152 
19,609 
10. 752 

18.451 
10. 216 


31.8 
34.6 

17 9 

31.9 
27.2 


66,669 
93,948 

49,990 

32.812 
23.666 


68.6 
67.4 

79.7 

96.8 
62.9 


8.819 
9.623 
3,479 

4.893 
3,042 


7.8 
6.9 
9.8 

8.9 
8.1 


3,117 








HONOLULU CITY 


1.600 









3144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION 9 

Table 5.— SCHOOL ATTENDANCE BY AGE, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU 

CITY: 1940 AND 1930 











(Pprceat not shown where base Is less than 100 






















lUWAlUN 


PiBT aiWiniN 


CAtlClSIAM 


cHm«. 


nupiNO 


lAPAKlSI 


OTHKB RACU 


«.A,AO..«X^.KDC.Ka.S 


ToUU 
□umber 


Altrnding 
school 


Attend- 
ing 
school 


Per- 
cent 


Attend- 
ing 
school 


Per- 
cent 


Attend- 
ing 
school 


Pcr- 


Attend- 
ing 
school 


Per- 
cent 


Attend- 

Ing 
school 


Per- 


Attend- 
ing 
school 


Per- 


At- 
tend- 
ing 
school 


Per- 




Number 


Per- 


cent 


THE TERRITOBY: 19<0 
TM*1, e u M run 


1M.M0 


110.459 


58.0 


8.767 


58.7 


17.849 


64 4 


16.696 


U.1 


9,148 


70.9 


9.571 


•5 7 


58.881 


•4.9 


4.777 


n.T 




8.575 
8,069 
«!,-87 
38,128 
9,366 

9,774 
18,111 
20,453 
11,333 
39,744 

tot. 464 


2.562 
6.016 
26.372 
37.722 
9.091 

8.802 
12. 152 
5.267 
1,025 
1.450 

56.707 


29.9 
74.6 
98.5 
98.9 
97.1 

90.1 
67.1 
25.8 
9.0 
3,6 

54.3 


to 

140 

716 

1,103 

274 

215 

187 
58 
8 
6 

1,370 


16,6 
58.6 
97.2 
97.5 
90.7 

73.9 
38.8 
11.6 
2.8 
0.6 

61.3 


457 
1.184 
4.821 
5.999 
1.374 

1.176 
1,488 

561 
87 

112 

6.696 


25.2 

73.1 
98 
98,6 
94.9 

87.0 
58.8 
24.3 
8 
3.1 

65.! 


338 
888 

4.016 
5.169 
1.261 

1.242 

1,540 
829 
174 
240 

S.015 


27.6 
74.5 
9S.I 
98.5 
97.0 

86.4 
68.6 
12.8 
3.9 
1.6 

S6.6 


250 

430 

1.735 

2.818 

733 

739 
1.320 
706 
173 
255 

4.998 


47.7 
83.5 
98.7 
99.3 
90.5 

98.0 
88.9 
63.8 
27.9 
10.6 

71.6 


130 

677 

2.686 

3.276 

683 

552 
499 

21 
4.S47 


12 7 
61 1 
97.7 
98.5 
96 4 

83 3 
60-3 
16 8 
4 6 
1.2 

•4 1 


1.258 
i557 
11.235 
17.597 
4.383 

4..W7 

6.644 

2.803 

604 

762 

87. 173 


37.6 
79.7 
99.0 
99.3 
98.5 

93.4 
72.8 
33 5 
12,2 
5.4 

••.4 


79 

250 

1.166 

1.760 

383 

371 

100 
58 
58 

2.414 


21.1 


















15 Mini 


81.7 


















Male, fttoMyMn 


•0.1 


Byeare 


4,367 
4,124 
13.459 
19.325 
4.785 

4.972 
9.113 

12,274 
7,258 

24,786 

88,876 


1.236 
3.056 
13.242 
19.129 
4.672 

4,581 

6.406 

2. 943 

575 

867 

53.752 


28,3 
74.1 
98.4 
99.0 
97.6 

92.1 
70.3 
24.0 
7.9 
3.5 

68,6 


29 
73 
358 
544 
136 

107 
89 
86 

4 
4 

1.3S7 


21,6 
58.4 

96.2 
97.8 
91 3 

79.3 
38.2 
9.3 
2.4 
0.8 

64.9 


221 

586 

2.399 

3.095 

672 

598 
735 
290 
44 

66 

8.553 


23 5 
71,8 
97,8 
98 9 
95.9 

89.3 
59,0 
25.1 
8.0 
3.2 

63 6 


168 

448 

2.006 

2.691 

647 

661 
812 
440 
90 
152 

7.681 


27.2 
71.9 
98.3 
98.6 
97.9 

88.8 
61.1 
8.6 
24 
1.2 

65.7 


124 

856 

'380 

364 
687 
372 
100 
139 

4.456 


47.3 

85.8 
99 
99 2 
90,5 

98,4 
88,9 
55,9 
30.0 
11.7 

69.6 


42 

297 

1.341 

1.634 

326 

295 
287 
77 
18 
10 

4.884 


9.6 
60 4 
97 
98.6 
96.2 

87.5 
55.0 
20.8 
8.5 
11 

67.5 


600 
1.307 
5.696 
8.920 
2.317 

2.364 

3.666 

1.639 

292 

471 

8i. 0B8 


34 6 
80.1 
99.1 
99.3 
98.7 

94.9 
77.7 
38.2 
13.9 
66 

M 4 


42 
121 
674 
899 
194 

193 
231 
99 
27 
35 

8.S6S 


21.1 






7 to fl years — i. 


98.3 








85.3 


















Faioale, fl to 84 yean 


•l.i 


6 years 


4,208 
3,944 
13.328 
18.803 
4.58. 

t:^ 

8,179 
4,075 
14,958 

197. 3M 


1,326 
2,960 
13.130 
18,593 
4,419 

4,221 

6,74« 

2,324 

450 

683 

82, 429 


31,6 
76,1 
98,5 
98,9 
96.5 

87.9 
63.9 
28,4 
11,0 
3.9 

«4.7 


21 
67 
368 
559 
138 

108 
98 
32 
4 
2 

4.471 


16 6 

58.8 
98.1 
97.2 
90.2 

69.2 
39.4 
14.2 
3.2 
0.4 

eo.s 


236 

598 

2.422 

2.904 

702 

678 
763 
261 
43 
56 

0.411 


27.0 

ki 

94! 

84.9 
68.6 
23.4 
7.3 
2.9 

70.9 


170 

440 

2.009 

2. .W8 

614 

581 

728 
389 
84 
88 

14. 510 


28.0 
77.3 
98.0 
98.4 
96.1 

83.8 
56.1 
28.7 
12.2 
2.7 

57.7 


126 
196 
879 
1.372 
353 

375 
633 
333 
73 
116 

7.338 


48.1 
81.0 
98.4 
99.5 
99.4 

97.7 
88.9 
51.6 
25.4 
9.3 

75.8 


78 

2S0 

1,334 

1,642 

357 

2.W 
212 

54 
3 

7 

3.989 


16.0 
61.8 
98.5 
93.4 
94.7 

78 8 
45.1 
13.2 
1.7 
1,3 

32,6 


658 
1.250 
6.537 
8.677 
2,066 

2,143 
3.090 

291 

40,717 


39.7 
79.3 
98.9 
99.3 
98.3 

91.9 
67.8 
28.6 
10.6 
4.2 

71.6 


37 
129 

861 
189 

179 
232 
91 
31 
31 

1.998 


80.3 


« years ^ 


99.3 










16 ears 


78.1 


















THE TERRITORY: 1930 
Total. S to SO years 


7H 


Svears 


10, 3U 
9.847 
26.881 
31.255 
6,787 

6,383 
12.239 
14.869 

8,702 

68. SIS 


966 
6,362 
24.884 
30.J29 
6.fc89 

4,801 

6.2» 

3,172 

739 

48. 55i 


9.2 
54.5 
92.6 
06.7 
88.2 

75 2 

2L3 
8.5 

61. S 


34 

224 
1.233 

1. 812 
379 

280 
331 
148 
30 

2.181 


6.3 

46.7 
87.6 
94.5 
81.5 

65.0 
37.0 
17.0 
7.5 

59.8 


113 

676 

2.830 

3.383 

646 

617 
765 
407 
85 

4,750 


9,6 
60.8 
92.7 
97.2 
88.9 

74.7 
65.7 
34.8 
16 5 

71.4 


146 

856 

4.320 

5.438 

803 

1.120 

611 

136 

7.425 


9.4 
55.9 
93.1 
90.2 
83.1 

67.0 
43.2 
14.5 
5.6 

51.8 


151 

485 

1.865 

2,329 

547 

483 
815 
523 

a.77J 


18.8 
64.4 
92.3 
93.1 
90.0 

85.4 
76.7 
65.4 
32.2 

76 3 


39 

304 

1.630 

1.608 

229 

174 
146 
49 
10 

8. 18S 


3,9 
34 1 
86,8 
94 3 
74 6 

57 2 
24.2 
1.7 
0.3 

84.0 


434 

2.668 
12,444 
15024 

2,987 

2.437 

3.012 

1.374 

327 

81. 8M 


8.6 
64.4 

93.6 
97.9 
91.9 

79.7 
54.3 
30.2 
17.0 

713 


39 
150 
652 
735 
121. 

107 
117 
•0 
11 

1,096 


15.1 










10 tol3year« 

14 years 


91.0 
70.9 














Kale, 6 to 80 year* 


77.4 


6 years -, — 


5,257 

■l3!726 
15.835 
3,400 

3,268 
6,320 
9,736 
6.365 

58,636 


476 
2,705 
12,711 
15, 321 
3,074 

2.585 

3, 452 

1.816 

415 

39. 873 


9.1 
55.1 
92.6 
96.8 
90.4 

79.1 
54.6 
18.7 
6 5 

68.1 


11 
104 
627 
886 
173 

144 

160 
73 
13 

8.280 


4.1 
45.0 
86. 1 
03.9 
79.7 

64.0 
35.0 
16.4 
7.0 

61 6 


52 

331 

1.465 

1.694 

329 

272 
380 
188 
39 

4.981 


9.1 
60.6 
93.4 
96.8 
90.6 

75.3 
64.7 
33.6 
16 6 

70.3 


73 

451 

2.206 

2.772 

653 

410 
562 
325 
73 

7.084 


9,0 
57.7 
93,5 
96,6 
84.6 

67.5 
42.1 
10.8 
3.8 

65.6 


77 
246 
061 
1.155 
266 

248 
442 
294 
69 

3.558 


18.6 
68.9 
92.9 
93.3 
89.3 

87.2 
80.1 
58.3 
28.2 

75 3 


15 
168 

785 
784 
121 

107 

101 

39 

8 

1.961 


3.1 
38.0 
87 
96.8 
82.9 

66.9 
25.6 

o!3 

54.1 


228 
1.334 

6.J30 
7.640 
1.577 

1.333 

1.746 

869 

208 

19. 461 


8 9 
54.4 

93.5 
97.8 
94.6 

86.a 

62.4 
36.2 
30.8 

«9.6 


80 
70 
337 
380 
55 

61 
61 
37 
5 

••• 


163 
70.0 














16 eara 
















Female, StoSOyeara 


Ta.1 


ears 


5,134 
4,936 
13.165 
15,420 
3,387 

3,115 
5.919 
6.133 
2,337 

79.190 


480 
2.657 
12, 173 
14,908 
2.915 

2.216 

2,844 

1,356 

324 

48.396 


9.3 
63.8 
92.6 
96 7 
86,1 

71,1 
48.0 
26.4 
13.9 

ai.i 


23 
120 

606 
926 
206 

136 
171 
75 
17 

963 


8.5 
46.2 
89.0 
96.1 
83.1 

66.0 
39.1 
17.5 
8.0 

61.8 


61 
344 

1,366 

1,689 

317 

245 

.376 

219 

46 

8,888 


10.1 
60,9 

07:5 
87.1 

74.0 
56.7 
36.1 
16 4 

15.5 


73 

405 

2.114 

2,666 

527 

393 
558 
286 
63 

8.750 


9.8 
54.1 
92.8 
94 9 

sa? 

66.5 
44.3 
23.8 
1L5 

49.8 


74 
239 
904 
1,164 
281 

225 
873 
228 
71 

7.303 


19 1 
62.1 
91.7 
92.9 
90.6 

83.6 
73.0 
62.1 
37.4 

71.0 


24 

136 
744 
724 
108 

67 
45 
10 
2 

1.961 


4.7 
32.2 
86.6 
03.7 
68,8 

•46.5 
31 5 
4.7 
1.4 

• 1.7 


106 

1.333 
6,124 
7,384 
1,410 

1.104 

1,206 

616 

119 

18.911 


8.3 
54 4 

93.7 
98.1 
39.1 

73.0 
46.0 
23.6 
12.8 

•8.8 


19 
80 
315 
355 
66 

40 
6« 

a 
• 

8.890 


14.8 


6 years 
































HONOLULU CITY: 1040 
Total, A 10 84 yean 


•9.1 


ft years 


3,419 

3,377 
11.123 
15.805 

8,831 

4,071 
7,945 
8.277 
4.417 
16.925 


1.447 
2.765 
10,056 
15,629 
8,757 

3,781 

5,790 

2,776 

611 

884 


42.3 
81.9 
98.5 
98.0 
98.1 

92.9 
72.9 
33.6 
13,8 
5,2 


27 
54 

229 
373 
84 

91 
73 
16 

3 


'"97^4" 
96.0 

75.2 
43.2 
14.3 
1.6 

as 


300 

631 

2,372 

2.985 

665 

609 
815 
314 
68 
7« 


35.3 
79.3 
98.3 
98.7 
96 4 

90.6 
63.8 
27. 9 
9.9 

9.8 


221 

512 

2,160 

2.707 

692 

6«2 
946 
630 
116 
176 


34.1 
74 9 
98.2 
98.5 
97.7 

90.5 
68.6 
26.7 
9.6 
1.4 


228 

342 

1,355 

2; 235 

580 

592 
1.099 
692 
162 
218 


54.5 
85.1 
986 
99.4 
99.7 

98.3 

9ao 

56.4 

89.0 
U.0 


36 
101 
368 
431 

95 

78 
101 
80 
t 



26.6 
70.6 
97.9 
98.2 
93.1 

"664" 
23.3 

"IT 


684 
1. 000 
3,964 
6.062 
1,461 

1,531 

%520 

1,177 

346 

M4 


62.0 
89.1 
98.8 
99.3 
99.0 

96 5 
76.4 
85.6 
14.3 
6.8 


60 
125 
S«7 
836 
180 

188 
136 
08 
SO 
40 


3a9 


















8 Ttm 


86.8 












i-i 


1 to 24 rears. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3145 



10 



HAWAII 



Tablb 5.— school attendance BY AGE, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU 
CITY: 1940 AND 1930— Continued 

[percent not shown wbrre base is less than 100] 



HONOLULU CITY: IWO- 
Contlnued 

tfiJe, 5 to M yean 

5 Tears 

e years 

7 to 9 years , 

10 to 18 years 

Ufean 

16 years 

16 and 17 years , 

IRand 19 years 

20 years 

21 to 24 years 

Fsmala, B to S4 jeua 

6 years 

years 

7 ti 9 years 

10 to 13 years 

14 years 

15 years 

16 and 17 years 

18 and 19 years , 

20 years 

21 to 24 years 



3,972 
3.918 
2.029 
8.106 



30 




63 




253 


08.4 


412 


98.6 


. 88 




92 


91.1 


113 


61.9 


60 


28.7 


14 




26 


7.6 


1.161 


ei.6 


20 




Ha 




254 


98.8 


424 


99.3 


92 




96 


81.4 


124 


63.3 


48 


26.1 


16 





Tablb 6.— PERSONS 25 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE 
TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940 



"^"----°' 


*..».«, 


B»W.n.N 


PARTDAWAUAN 


CAUCASIAN 


CHINESE 


nuPmo 


lAPANKS, 


OTHKREACKe 


Num- 
ber 


Per- 


Num- 
ber 


Per- 
cent 


Num- 
ber 


Per- 
cent 


Num- 
ber 


Per- 
cent 


Num- 
ber 


Per- 
cent 


Num- 
ber 


Per- 
cent 


Num- 
ber 


Per- 
cent 


Num- 
ber 


Per- 
cent 


THE TERRITORY 
Total, 86 years old and oyer 


192.906 


100.0 


8.087 


lOOO 


13, 770 


100.0 


53. 070 


106 


13.640 


100.0 


34.860 


100.0 


62. 979 


100,0 


6.611 


100.0 


No school years completed 

Grade school: 1 to 4 years 

5and6yrars 

7 andSyears 

High school: 1 to 3 years 


35 
35 
25 
36 
19 
21 
7 
10 


643 
607 
978 
0T7 
543 
519 
683 
252 


is! 6 

13.6 
18.7 

1L2 
4.0 
6.3 
0.3 

100.0 


517 

2; 114 

1,937 

741 

375 

36 
4,186 


27I8 
26 2 

4^6 
9 

100.0 


271 
1,537 

3! 661 

2. 514 

2,484 

649 

444 

8-6 
8,623 


2 
11 2 
16 7 
20.6 
18 3 
18.0 

3 2 
0.3 


1,865 
4,115 
4, 561 

10,965 
7,981 

10, S17 

5, 307 

7,303 

156 

10.9 

30,823 


7; .8 
8-6 
20 7 
1.5 
20 4 
10 
13 8 
3 

100-0 


3, 695 

2,243 

1,321 

1,800 

1,346 

2,040 

431 

840 

33 

6-6 

9.458 


26-3 

16 4 
9 7 

13-2 
9.9 

14 9 
3,2 
6-2 
2 

100.0 


16. 445 

12.546 

3.295 

2.111 

&34 

378 

80 

54 

117 

1.6 

31.680 


44 3 
36.0 
9-6 
6-1 
2 4 
1-1 
2 
2 
0.3 

100.0 


11.437 
11,482 
11,630 
14.018 
6,717 
5,092 
1,055 
1,448 
200 

6.5 

34,641 


18,2 
18,2 
18 5 
23,7 
9-1 
8-1 
1.7 
2 3 
0.3 

100.0 


2.613 
1,439 
894 
686 
410 
333 
89 
IZ! 
21 

3.0 

4,049 


38.6 
22.1 
13.7 
10.6 
6.3 


College: l to 3 yean: 


1.4 
2.0 




6.9 
120. 260 




Male, 20 years old and orer 


100.0 


loao 


No school years completed _ 

Grade sctool: 1 to 4 years 

Sand A years 

7 and Syears 

High school: 1 to 3 years 


23.869 
23,769 
14,988 
22,252 
12.706 
12,414 
3.511 
6,297 

6.6 

72.645 


19.8 
19.8 

100 
10,3 
2.9 
5.2 
4 

100.0 


240 
1,221 
1,092 
921) 
399 
231 
33 
21 
20 

3,881 


29^2 
26.1 
22.2 
9.6 
5.6 
0.8 
0.5 
0.5 

100.0 


126 

800 

1.067 

1,642 

1.236 

1,285 

226 

210 

32 

8.6 
7.147 


1 9 
12.1 
16 1 
24.8 
18.6 
19-4 
3.4 
3.2 
5 


780 
2,048 
2.508 
7,502 
6.470 
6.6,56 
2,343 
4.404 

113 

10 4 


2-5 
6-6 
8 1 
24-3 
17-7 
18-3 
7-6 
14-3 
0-4 

100-0 


2,152 
1,445 

8.13 
1.118 

901 
1,3.18 

200 

444 
27 

6-6 
5.191 


25.4 
17.1 
9.8 
13-2 
10 7 
15-8 
2-4 
6-2 
0-3 

100,0 


13,808 

11.541 

3, 046 

1,803 

745 

331 

62 

46 

109 

1-7 
3,879 


43,7 
36,5 
9,6 
6,0 
2 4 
1,0 
0,2 
1 
0.3 

100,0 


6,166 
6,870 
5,903 
8,732 
3.671 
3.383 

691 
1,087 

139 

7.1 
28. 43B 


16-0 
17 
17 1 
26 3 
10 6 
9-8 
1-7 
3-1 
4 

100-0 


1,598 
844 
640 
436 
285 
191 
66 
86 
. 14 

3 
2.462 


39. S 
30.8 
13.3 
10.8 
7.0 


(College: 1 to 3 years 


1.4 
2.1 






Female, 2b years old and 


100-0 


100.0 




No school years completed 

Grade school: l to 4 years 

Sand 6 years 

7 and 8 years 

High school: 1 to 3 yews. _ 


11 

13 
6 
9 

4 
3 


774 
838 
990 
825 
837 
105 
172 
9.56 


16.2 
16.3 
15,1 
19.0 
9.4 
12.6 
5.7 
6.4 
0.2 


277 

1,025 

1,022 

1,018 

342 

144 

39 

16 

9 

6.2 


7.1 

26 4 
26.3 
200 
8.8 
3.7 
1.0 
4 
2 


737 

1,096 

2,019 

1,279 

1.199 

423 

234 

15 

8.6 


2 
10 
It 

f 
3 


3 

2 

8 
9 
3 


1,085 
2,067 

3:463 

S. 162 

2,964 

2,899 

43 

11 9 


9; 3 
9 2 
16-6 
U-3 
23 2 
13-3 
13-0 
0-2 


1.443 
798 
4S8 
682 
445 
702 
231 
396 
6 

6.4 


27-8 

13 1 
8.6 

13.6 
4.6 
7.6 
0.1 


1,637 

1,004 

2.50 

218 

47 

8' 
1.0 


49 9 
30 6 
7 6 
6,6 
2.7 

O.i 
0.2 
2 


6.272 
5,012 
5.727 
6,186 

l!709 
464 
361 
61 

6.8 


22-1 
19.7 
20-1 
21-8 
7-2 
6-0 
1-6 
1.3 
0.2 


916 

354 
349 
125 
142 
33 
42 
7 

3.1 


37.2 
24.a 
14.4 
10.1 
S.1 


College: 1 to 3 years 

4 years or more... 


1.3 
1.7 


Median school yeara completed.. 


7.2 









3146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION 



11 



-PERSONS 25 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE 
TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940— Continiwd 



ABBA, ax. AVD TBABfl or 
•CaoOLOOMnBTSV 


AUBACZa 


HAwanAK 


FAIT BAWAIUM 


CAVCAaUK 


CBIKUX 


nuriK. 


jAPAKxan 


OfBBmBACIa 


Num- 
ber 


Por- 
eant 


Num- 
ber 


Per- 
cent 


Num- 
ber 


Per- 
cent 


Num- 
ber 


Per- 
cant 


Num- 
ber 


Per- 
cent 


Nnm- 
bar 


Per- 
cent 


Num- 
ber 


Per- 
cent 


Nnm- 


Per- 
nnt 


HONOLULU CITY 
Tetol, u TMn old ud 


ai.iM 


10l>.0 


!,«•» 


too.o 


7.11T 


itao 


••.or 


10ft 


10,100 


100.9 


4.118 


108.0 


15,118 


108 


1,081 


IOOlO 


Ko Mbool VMrs completed 

Ond« nhooli 1 to 4 yean 

6 and 6 years 

7aDd8yMt3 

Bl(hiobool: ltd 3 yean 


ia427 
10.414 
10.31B 
16, H2 
10,404 
13.683 
4,668 
6,687 
370 

8.3 
41. 08 


12.5 
12 5 
12 4 
19.9 
1Z6 
16.4 
6.S 
7.9 
0.3 

100.0 


189 
766 
8M 

884 
828 
211 
20 
16 
19 

6.6 
1.198 


58 
33.3 
26.8 

36l7 
10.1 
6 6 
6 
6 
6 

100.0 


148 

608 

1,047 

1,984 

1,496 

1,6M 

986 

370 

30 

8.9 
i.MI 


1.9 
0.1 
13.7 
380 
10 6 
21 3 
4.4 
3.8 
0.3 

loeo 


837 
1,021 

3,339 

4,769 

82 

lil 
16, 106 


18 
6.9 
7.1 
18 1 
14.0 
38.9 
11.3 
18 1 
03 

100.0 


,636 
1,601 
1,001 
1,40 

1,093 
315 
698 
31 

7.0 
*ll» 


34.5 
16.4 
9.7 
13.8 
10-6 
I&4 
3.1 
6.2 
02 

uao 


1,388 
1,396 
689 
607 
251 
123 
39 
39 
33 

8.9 
9.8« 


91.3 
31.6 
13.8 
13.3 
6.1 
3.0 
9 
06 
06 

100.0 


3,850 

3; 710 

463 

756 

86 

7,1 
19.188 


17.4 
14.3 
17,3 
34.0 
11 8 
10 8 
1.8 
3,0 
03 

100.0 


1,076 
508 
417 
344 
348 
336 
64 
88 
19 

4.0 
1,789 


98.1 
1916 
18.6 

11.1 

8.1 


CoUem: ItoSyeara 

4 years or more .. 


1.8 
18 
0.4 


Median iobool yeara oompletad. 
Male. M ;ean old aad 






No aohoQ] yeara completed 

Onda school: 1 toAyean- 

6 and Qyaars 

7and>yean 

Hlghaohool: lto3yeara 


^504 
6,«22 
6.488 
9.281 
5,970 
7.198 
1,974 
3.997 
189 

8.9 
87.766 


12.1 
12 8 
12 1 
204 
13.1 
15 8 
4.3 
88 
4 

100.0 


86 
980 
431 
303 
167 
138 
6 
12 
16 

86 
l.Nl 


6.3 
2S 8 
36 3 
24.0 
10 2 
84 
4 
7 
9 

100.0 


60 
S46 
606 

874 
706 
880 
116 
136 
18 

9.0 
«,H5 


1.7 
9.7 
14.1 
34.9 
19-7 
23.1 
3.3 
3.8 
6 

loot 


336 

900 
1,076 

3,iea 

2,265 
3,133 
1,361 
2.812 
86 

11.7 

am 


22 
8 
7.1 
21.0 
16.0 
20.7 
9.0 
18 6 
4 

100.1 


1.339 
944 
816 
879 
714 

1.101 
167 
360 
17 

7.4 
i>71 


21.8 
15 4 
101 
14.3 
11 6 
18 
26 
6.9 
3 

108. 


1,106 
1,167 
531 
46> 
318 
108 
32 
17 
21 

3 4 
484 


30.4 
31.9 
14.3 
13.6 
80 
9 
9 
6 
6 

110.0 


1,047 
1,767 
3,096 
3,302 
1.739 
1,766 
i71 

etn 

64 

7,6 

11.118 


14,4 
13,0 
15 5 
34.4 
12 8 
13.0 
2 
4,6 
4 

100.0 


613 
334 
341 
319 
181 
134 
93 
68 
8 

4.3 
1,M8 


85.2 
181 
19.4 
11.0 
0.0 


CoUafa: ItoSyeara 

4 year* or more... 


1.8 
9.3 


Median school years completed. 
Famala, U yaaia old and 








No school years completed 

Grade sobool: 1 to 4 yean 

Band ftyean 

7and8yean 

High school: 1 to 3 yean 


4,923 
4.613 
4,827 
7,261 
4,484 
6.484 
2.684 
,560 

i.2 


13.0 
12.2 
12.8 
19 2 
11.7 
17.2 
6.8 
6.8 
0.2 


104 

>6« 
406 
472 
161 
73 

6.6 


6.6 
22.9 
36.3 
29 4 
10 
4 6 
9 
0.2 
2 


83 
346 
541 
1,110 
780 
704 
220 
135 
3 

8.9 


21 
86 
13.4 
27.6 
19.6 
19.7 
5.5 
3.4 
0.3 


491 
1,021 
1,034 
2.309 
1.876 
3.986 
1,072 
1,057 
26 

13.3 


3.4 
7,0 
TO 
15 2 
12 9 
27.2 
13,6 
13,6 
0.3 




1,187 
645 
387 
644 

377 
691 
168 
278 

6.3 


28.6 

15 6 
9,3 

19,0 
9 

14,2 
3.8 
6.7 
0.1 




181 
139 
48 
64 
33 
14 
7 
6 
3 

Z7 


37,4 
38.7 
9.9 
11.2 
6.8 
29 
1.4 
1.2 
0.4 


2,433 

1,839 

3,348 

3,741 

1,111 

954 

191 

152 

32 

8.4 


30.8 
15.8 
19 3 
33,5 
0.6 
8 3 
1.6 
1.3 
0.3 


444 

374 
176 
191 
87 
103 
22 
28 
5 

9.7 


86.0 
31.6 
13.9 

laa 

6.0 


CoUage; lto3years 

4 years or more... 


1.7 
12 


Median school yean completed. 





Table 7.— PLACE OF BIRTH, BY SEX, 


FOR THE TERRITORY: 1940 AND 1930 






To.AL»™..a 


PEBCENT 


HA.E 


PE«A« 




1940 


1930 


1940 


1930 


1940 


1930 


1940 


1930 




433,990 


988, 998 


100.0 


100. 


346. 196 


983.840 


178, 188 


149.891 








970. 717 


899,799 


87.8 


81,4 


814, 948 


180,837 


161.073 










278.506 
35,778 
1,848 
361 
64,224 
52,613 

53, 813 


214.51- 
52,672 
2,181 
238 
30,191 
68,637 

88,987 


65.9 
8.6 
4 
0.1 
12.8 
12.4 

100.0 


68,2 
14,3 
06 
0.1 
82 
18.6 

100.0 


141.871 
32,153 
1,207 
209 
39,206 
30,490 

80,410 


109,246 
47.369 
1,374 

23, SM 
42,013 

U,013 


136.63.'. 

3,626 

641 

152 

15,019 

33,123 

18, 139 


























98,184 








1,619 
165 
116 
127 
105 

67 
67 
121 
614 
113 
03 

266 
167 
343 
2,397 
246 

4,868 
37,362 
2,454 

793 
89 
191 
118 
169 
64 


1,782 
162 
150 
133 
110 

63 


2.9 
0.3 
2 
0,2 
2 

0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
1.2 
0.2 
0.3 

0.5 
0.3 
7 
4.6 
5 

9,3 
71.0 
4.7 

1.6 
3 
04 
0.2 
0.8 
0.1 


2 6 
2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 

1 


910 
97 
79 
82 
74 

41 
44 

37 
490 
90 
71 

156 
146 

162 

1,155 

183 

3,400 
30,929 
1,743 

377 
43 
76 
63 
81 
33 


1,121 
106 
110 
104 

81 

46 


609 
68 
87 
46 
31 

16 
39 
84 
184 
39 
23 

109 
31 
181 
1,343 
69 

1,488 

16,433 

712 

416 
48 

116 
65 
88 
83 






















IS 






Fnaoe 


116 
676 
134 
100 

250 
134 
413 
3,713 
129 

7,477 
48,125 

2,977 

606 
83 

116 


0.2 
1.0 
2 
01 

0.4 
0,2 
0.6 
6 4 
0.2 

10 9 
70.7 
4.3 

1.0 
Ol 
0.3 


44 

503 
112 

74 

• IJS 

125 

206 

1,903 

101 

6,890 
28,238 
2,208 

369 
54 

81 


72 














EiustaCU S S R) 


93 
9 




308 




1,810 




38 




1,687 




301187 


xSm) 


760 




S27 




39 




117 








207 
420 


0.3 

0.6 


109 

278 


104 




143 







I iBotodflB peraona bora at iM under Uw United 8utee 0ac u>d American dtiteni bern ebrotd. 



» Inolndea (for 1040 only) a few penona from "Other Aala." 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3147 



12 



HAWAII 

-EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF PERSONS 14 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE 
TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940 





Population 
14 years old 
and over 




NOT 


■,.„0K,0«. 




Total 


Employed (oxc. on 
emerg. work) 


On public 

cmerRcney 

worlc 


Seelling work 


Total 


In Institu- 
tlona 






Number 


Percent 
of popu- 
lation 


Number 


Percent 
of labor 
force 


Total 


Experi- 
enced 
workers 


New 
workers 


Otber and 
not re- 
ported 


TBE TERRITORY 
Tout 


301. asa 


1S8.S32 


•3.4 


180. 799 


MO 


9.926 


6.110 


4.198 


072 


119. 464 


9.909 


109. 951 




10.921 
26.115 
66.281 
20,984 
39.854 
107.867 
10.6S4 

1SS.44B 


6.230 
12.574 
58.071 
11.306 
32.939 

161,(48 


47.9 
48.1 
68 1 
63.9 
82 6 
68,0 
51.8 

BS.7 


4.539 
11.131 
56.419 
10.688 
32.132 
60.973 

4.914 

14B.<e9 


86 8 
88,6 
97,2 
94,5 
07,6 
97,4 
8«,9 

99,1 


367 
549 
502 
127 
194 
2H 
333 

2.348 


324 

804 
1.160 

491 

613 
1.356 

282 

3.741 


260 
684 
030 
393 
570 
1.064 
237 

3.133 


64 

220 

43 
292 
45 

•08 


6.691 
13.641 
27. 190 

9.678 

6.915 
46.284 

6.166 

91.800 


526 
545 
639 
406 
390 
629 
368 

9,481 


5.165 


Put Hawaiian 


I109« 
26.651 




9.272 




&625 




44.666 




4.787 


Mala 


••.9>9 




&670 
12.624 
65^061 
12.169 
34,279 
67,446 

6.200 

118.236 


4,212 

9,183 
49,098 

8,305 
32,254 
43,204 

4,492 

96.584 


74.3 
72.7 
90,8 
68,2 
94,1 
76 2 
72.6 

90,9 


3.578 

7.991 
48.772 

7.853 
31.470 
42.046 

3.960 

35. 197 


84,0 
87.0 
97,6 
94,6 
97,6 
07,3 
87.0 

96 


362 
634 
483 
111 
103 
243 
322 

78 


272 
658 
743 
341 
591 
916 
220 

1.369 


232 
510 
625 
281 
667 
733 
186 

1.005 


40 
130. 
118 

60 

34 
183 

34 

314 

24 

71 
102 

38 

9 

1119 

11 

•57 


1.458 
3.441 
5.063 
3.864 
1025 
14.241 
1.708 

81.654 

4.233 
10.100 
22.127 

5.814 

4.690 
31.043 

3,447 

54,870 


325 
300 

415 
340 
341 
426 
286 

1.078 




Part Hawaiian 


3.141 
4.648 




3.524 




1.684 




13. 816 




1.423 


Female 


80.989 




6.251 
13.491 

30.200 
8.815 
^675 

60.422 
4. 484 

lis. 687 


1.018 
3.391 
8.073 
3.001 
685 
19.379 
1.037 

79,817 


19,4 
26 1 
26.7 
31.0 
12.3 
38.4 
23,1 

97.4 


061 
3.140 
7.647 
2,836 

602 
18,928 

964 

•9,209 


94 4 
02 6 
1*4,7 
94,5 
96.6 
07.7 
93 

09.7 


5 
16 
19 
16 

11 
II 

1. 187 


52 
236 
407 
150 

22 
440 

62 

9.487 


28 
165 
306 
112 

13 
331 

51 

S.770 


224 
66 
49 

204 
83 

1.960 


4.032 


Part Hawaiian 


9.«66 




5.748 














HONOLULU CITY 


••.•10 








4.311 
14.034 
40.9S2 
16. 2n 

6>0«7 
42.994 

i062 

••.Oil 


2.066 
6.864 

24.522 
8,803 
3,767 

25.313 
1603 

63. Ml 


47,7 
48,9 
60 8 
64, 1 
74.1 
68.9 
49 4 

77,9 


1,748 
6.067 

23.334 
8,267 
1.305 

24.303 
1089 

M.STO 


86 1 
88.4 
06 P 
03.9 
90 4 
96.0 
83.6 

N.4 


123 
215 
207 
92 
122 
126 
213 

I.1S4 


184 
582 
801 
444 

240 
886 
201 

>.tn 


144 
443 
731 
366 
222 
706 
!«• 

1.010 


40 
130 
160 

89 

18 
170 

32 

419 


1266 
7.170 

1&460 
7.474 
1.310 

17.641 
1860 

13. »8 


187 
212 
103 
312 
167 
149 
130 

1.055 


1060 


Part Hawaiian 


0.088 






ywpiM-- 


1.143 
















2,m 
e,«>8 
n.m 

9.140 
4.139 
2^295 
S.7«2 

w.nt 


l.«16 
4.818 
18.801 
6.418 
3.6I0 

1.907 

It. ••4 


73,8 

717 
869 
70.1 
87.2 
74.7 
60,0 

39,6 


1.346 
4,204 

17.918 
6.028 
3.261 

16,917 
1.547 

IS. on 


81.2 

87,3 
96.6 
94 
90,3 
06 6 
81,1 

. 94.7 


111 
109 
1J» 

78 
123 

lie 

304 
69 


180 
411 
S«t 
300 

217 
612 
156 

998 


114 
323 
475 
264 
211 
491 
132 

7(0 


26 
88 
89 
55 
16 
121 
24 


676 
1.810 
3.086 
1786 

629 
5,637 

866 

39,14! 


164 

163 
169 

I9« 
153 
138 
116 

lot 




Put Hawaiian 


1.668 




























2.129 

7.406 
19.095 

7.128 

028 

20.669 

2,300 


439 

2.046 
6.721 
2.300 

147 
8.665 

606 


20,7 
27,6 
30,0 
33.6 
16 8 
41,9 
26.0 


403 

1.863 
6 376 
1230 

134 
8.376 

642 


01 8 
91.1 
94,0 
93,7 
91 2 
96 8 
90,9 


2 
12 
18 
16 

9 


34 
171 
327 
136 

13 
273 


20 
120 

256 
101 

215 
37 


14 
51 
71 
34 

2 
68 

8 


1,681 

8,360 
13,374 

4,738 

781 

11004 

1,704 


33 
60 
60 
16 
15 
16 
16 




Part Hawaiian 


^aoo 

18^334 








■m 


jSmei::;:;:::;;::: 




(SE^racei 









3148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPT7LATION 



13 



-EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF PERSONS U YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY AGE AND SEX, FOR THE 
TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940 
(Percent not shown wbere hase Is less than 1001 





Popula- 

14 yeais 
old and 


„>U..0.,O^ 


Not in 
labor 
lore* 


nsctm 07 LABOB towm 




Total 


Employed 

(exwpt on 

emergency 

work) 


On pub- 

gency 
work 


Seeking work 


Employed 
(except on 

public 
emergency 

work) 


On pub- 

geney 
work 






Number 


Percent 
of popu. 
laticn 


Tout 


Experi- 
enced 
workers 


New 

workers 


Beeklng 
work 


THE TERRITORY 


901,686 


188, 232 


82.4 


160. 796 


9.926 


6.110 


4,138 


972 


113,454 


96 


l.> 










Id, 140 
18.111 
20,453 
51.077 
75,716 

60.999 
32.603 
20.618 
10. 112 
2,802 
156 

183,448 

0.757 
9.113 
12.274 
32.044 
4S,68S 

30.932 
19. 070 
12.911 
6,707 
1,792 
103 

118, ras 


1,118 
4, .MS 
12,330 
38,081 
66,511 

37, 169 
22.315 
12.100 
3,652 
350 
91 

161, «48 


6.8 
24.9 
60.3 
74.6 
74.6 

72.9 
68.4 
69.0 
36.1 
12.6 
68.7 

88.7 


3^898 
11.309 
36.369 
64.957 

36.111 
21. 495 
11, CIO 
3.573 
343 
84 

145. 669 


8 
215 
294 
336 
428 

393 
389 
239 
19 
2 
3 

9,248 


63 

402 

727 

1.376 

1.126 

665 
431 
2S1 
60 
5 

9.741 


24 

186 

462 

1.046 

1.039 

642 
423 
248 
60 
6 
3 

3,193 


39 
216 
265 
330 

87 

23 
8 
3 


18,022 
13,696 
8.123 
12.996 
19.205 

13.830 
10.288 
8.418 
6.460 
2.452 
64 

91.800 


93 6 
86.3 
91.7 
95.6 
97.3 

97.2 
96.3 
96.0 
07.8 
98.0 


0.7 
4.8 
2.4 
0.9 
0.8 

l.I 
1.7 
2.0 
0.5 
0.6 












































1 
608 






Ml 


L9 










765 
2.761 
9.102 
29,809 
47, 313 

29.898 
17.744 
10.499 
3.352 
326 
70 

36,584 


7.8 
30.3 
74.2 
03.0 
97.2 

96.7 
93.0 
81.3 
49.6 
18.2 
76.7 

30. B 


717 
2,302 
8,3.10 
28,543 
46,086 

28,991 
16.991 
10.032 
3.276 
319 

86, 197 


6 
201 
280 
326 
409 

382 
383 
237 

2 
3 

7! 


42 

268 
492 
940 
818 

626 
370 
230 
67 
6 

1.368 


16 
123 
315 
740 
764 

616 
367 
227 
67 
5 
3 

1.0O6 


26 
135 
177 

9 
3 
3 


8.992 
6.352 
3,172 
2,235 
1,372 

1,034 
1,326 
2.412 
3.415 
1,466 
24 

31,854 


93.7 
83,4 
91.5 
95.8 
97.4 

97.0 
96.8 
95.6 
97.7 
97.9 


0.8 
7.3 
3.1 

1.1 
0.9 

1.3 
2.2 
2.3 
0.6 
0.6 












































9(4 






oeo 













9,383 
8.998 
8.179 
19.033 
•27,031 

20.067 
13.633 
7.607 
3.346 
1,010 
52 

198,187 


353 
1,754 
3,229 
8,272 
9,198 

7.271 

4,571 

1.601 

300 

24 

12 

78.817 


3.8 
19.5 

43^5 
34.0 

36.2 
33.8 
2L0 
9.0 
2.4 


330 
1,596 
2,979 
7.828 
8,871 

7,120 

4.501 

1.678 

287 

34 

12 

69,203 


2 
14 

19 

11 
6 
2 


21 
144 
236 
436 
308 

140 
61 
21 
3 


8 
63 

306 
275 

126 
6« 
21 
3 


13 
81 

88 
130 
33 

5 


9,030 
7,244 
4, 951 
10, 761 
17,833 

12,796 
8,962 
6,006 
3,045 
986 
40 

64,870 


93.6 
91.0 
92.3 
94.6 
96.4 

97.9 
98.6 
98. S 
99.0 


0.6 
0.8 
0.4 
0.1 
0.2 

2 
0.1 
0.1 
































































HONOLULU CITY 


17.4 


1,187 


3,427 


2,770 


687 


93.7 

~^I17.6 
V6.4 
86. 7 
92.4 
95.7 

95.9 
64.7 
93.3 
96.0 
93.5 


L« 

L4 

6,2 
Z7 
1.1 
1.0 

2!6 

2.9 
0.9 
1.9 










7,902 
7,945 
8.277 
21.349 
32,249 

21,968 
14,213 
9,077 
4,363 
1.291 
73 

69,051 


282 
1,601 
4.316 
14,729 
22,190 

16,297 
9,318 
4,767 
1,172 
107 
39 

69,829 


3.6 
20.2 
62,1 
69.0 
68. S 

69.7 
66.6 
62.5 
28,0 
8.3 


247 
1.223 
3.698 
13.606 
21,226 

14,671 
8,824 
4,447 
L125 
100 
36 

B0,»70 


4 
100 
115 
16S 
217 

213 

229 
137 
U 

2 

1 

1,124 


31 
278 
■602 
965 
747 

413 
266 
183 
36 
6 
2 

S,41< 

21 
189 
338 
654 

605 

303 
217 
162 
33 
6 
2 

B>8 


11 
137 
328 
741 
681 

393 
2.'i7 
180 
36 
5 
1 

1,010 


20 
141 
171 
224 

66 

20 
8 
3 


7,620 
6.34t 
3,962 
6.620 
10.059 

6.661 
4.895 
4.310 
3.181 
1,184 
34 

It, 998 


























2.8 


















419 






77. « 


M.4 


S.1 


4.1 








4.057 
3,973 
4.359 
11,214 
17,268 

11,810 
7.727 
6.291 
2,596 
717 
49 

>»,>3t 


198 

918 

2,704 

9,916 

16,661 

11,306 
7,063 
4.004 
1,028 

m 

33 

i>,gM 


4.9 
23.1 
62.0 
88.4 
9«.0 

95.7 
91.4 
75.7 
39,6 
12.8 


175 

641 

21261 

9,112 

16,862 

10,801 

6,623 

3,706 

984 

85 

30 

18.933 


2 
.88 
106 
160 
204 

202 
223 
136 
11 
2 

<3 


6 
96 
222 
616 
462 

297 
214 
150 
33 
5 

760 


16 
94 
116 
138 
43 

6 
3 
3 


3,869 
3,055 
L656 
1,298 
607 

504 

664 

1,287 

1.568 

626 

16 

>>,t4> 


88.4 
69.8 
83.6 
91.9 
95.7 

95.6 
93.8 
92.6 
95.7 


1.0 
9.6 
3.9 
1.6 
1.2 

L8 
3.2 
3.4 
LI 












20 to 24 years., 


6.6 




















" i 














38.6 


M.7 


0-1 


IlO 








3.845 
3.972 
3,918 
10.136 
14; 991 

10, 148 
6,486 
3,786 
1,767 
674 
24 


84 

683 

L611 

4,813 

6,629 

3,991 

2.256 

763 

144 

15 

6 


12 
17.2 

47! 5 
37.6 

39.3 
34.8 
20.2 
8.2 
2.6 


72 

• 582 

1,437 

6I374 

3.870 

2,201 

741 

141 

16 
6 


2 
12 
10 

8 
13 

11 

6 


10 
89 
164 
311 
242 

110 
48 
21 
3 


6 
42 
106 
226 
319 

96 
43 
31 
8 


6 
47 
68 
86 
23 

14 

6 


3.761 
3.289 
2.307 
4 322 
9.362 

6,157 
4,231 
3.023 
1.613 
659 
18 










•85.2 
89.2 
93.4 
96.6 

97.0 
97.6 
97.1 
07.9 


L8 
0.6 
0.2 
0.2 

0.3 
0.3 
0.1 


13.0 




iO.2 








4.3 




3.8 




3.1 




3.8 






3:1 















































EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3149 



14 



HAWAII 



Table 10.— PERSONS IN THE LABOR FORCE, 1940, AND GAINFUL WORKERS, 1930 AND 1920, BY AGE AND SEX, 
FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY 

[Percent not shown where less than 0.1 or where base is less than 100] 



AREA, CENSV9 



THE TERRITORY" 



Total, 14«&dov«r.. 



18 and 19 years. 



14 and 15years_ 
16 and 17 years. 



45to H years.- 
55toM years.. 
66 to 74 years.. 
76 years and o^ 



14 and 16 years,. 
16 and 17 years. 
18 and 19 years.. 



HONOLULU CITY 



16 and 17 years 
18 and 19 yeai 
20 to 24 years 



and 15 years., 
d 17years_. 
d 19 years. - 

24 years 

34 years 

8 to 44 years__. 

5 to 54 years 

S to 64 years--. 
S to 74 years. -- 



1 Figures for 1920 and 1930 represent gHinful workers. 



POPULAHON 



Male Female 



30,932 
19, 070 
12, 9U 
6.767 



48,30S 
26,806 
3.351 



4.057 
3. 973 
4.359 
11,214 
17.258 



22,315 
12,100 
3,652 



54.682 
27.231 
2,270 



4.316 
14.729 
22,190 



Male Female 



17.744 
10,499 
3,352 



2,704 
9.916 
16, 561 



POPULATION 



Male Female 



DISTBIBUTIOK ( 



100.0 


100.0 


?1 

so 

18.4 
30.8 


0.4 
3.4 
&I 
M.l 
28.2 


21.0 
13.1 


.20.0 
11.3 


l.B 
0.2 
0.1 


0.7 
0.1 



3150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION 



15 



-AGE OF PERB0N8 IN THE LABOR FORCE. BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR 
HONOLULU CITY: lft40 
[Pareutt dm tbowa wbaa \»u tbu O.I| 



ARU, at, AMD A'*! 



THE TERRrrORY 
TrtaL 14 Aid »rw . 



l4»Dd lA yran 

le ADd 17 y«u% 

U AOd 19 jfn 

30 to 24 jrran 

2B to 34 T9*n 

S5to44y«An 

46toMreAn 

55 to 64 yean 

U t« 74 y««n 

75'y*Ari« and ov*r 

Not reported 

MaU, 14 aod OT«r 

14 and 16 yts\n 
10 And 17 years 



6»u>My(«n 

W to 74 yf ATS 

75 yean and ovrr . 

Not reijbrted 

VAAala, 14 aad ovar. 

14 and IR yuttrt 

lA And 17 yean 

Maiid 10 yean 

ao to 14 year* 

as to 34 yean 

SS to 44 yoan 

«S to M yean 

OS to M yean 

65 to 74 7ean - - ■ 
7S yean and over - — 
Not raported 

HONOLULU riTY 

Total, 14 and orar 

14 Aod IIV yoan 
16 and 17 yean 

18 and 10 yean 

3010 24 yean 

SAtoMyaara 

U to 44 yean 

46 toMyenn 

66 to 64 years 

W to 74 yean 

75 yean and over 

Not reported 

Mala, 14 ABd«far .. 

14 and 16 yean 



Uto44 yeAn . . 

45 to 64 yeart 
56 to M ycAn . 
66 to 74 yeAn 

76 yeAn and over 
Not reported . 

TefluU, 14 a 

14 and 15 yean 
16aod 17 jrean 
18 and IV yean 
3n to 24 yean. .. 
36 to 34 yean 

tfi to 44 yean. . . . 

46 to 61 years ... 
85 to 64 yean 

65 to 74 yeara 
75 yean and over. 
Not rtpOftAd 



11,306 
7.0M 
4.004 




2.378 

4,506 

n.2i9 

14,367 



1,K40 
6.98K 
6,672 



3.033 
2,263 
1,606 



Total ''JJ'*' HawbI- ^^ 



ff"-!- ^S^' Chin-- rUlplBO ^SS ^ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3151 



16 



HAWAII 



Ta»l» la.— class of worker or RMPLOYED PERSONB (except on public emergency WORK), BY RACE 
AND BEX, FOR THE -TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1640 





Total 


Hawal- 
laa 


Part 

Hawal- 
laa 


Oanoa- 


Chl- 


nil- 


If- 


Other 
races 


nitCBlfT DMTBUimOII 


AM*, aum or wouik, urn nz 


Total 


Ha- 
wai- 
ian 


Part 
Ha- 
waiian 


Ceil- 
eaalan 


Okl- 


fui- 

ploo 


Japa- 
nean 


Otkar 
mm 


TBI TXRBITORY 


IN.nt 

lit. at 

s,nt 
tn 


_«.m 

3.«7a 

<73 

» 

3,171 


11,131 
10.146 

en 

173 

n 

7, Ml 

^a»4 

363 

87 
3S 

3.140 

33 

47 

t.on 


it. 762 

a. 300 

334 

114 

48.775 

4(.t7< 

1.643 

101 

11 

7.647 

667 
183 
63 

•3.334 


10.«t« 

3.738 

1.W4 

>4> 

4« 

7,888 

~6!m8 

1,316 

111 

21 

3,838 

348 
318 
10 

8,367 


33.113 

ao.vso 

088 
148 
40 

31.470 

"so. IB 
810 

31 

002 


•0.OT3 


4.314 


100.0 


100. • 


180.0 

03.0 
1.6 
16 

7 

100.0 

03.8 

4.6 
11 
4 

100.0 


108. 8 

01.1 
4.1 
0.4 
0.3 

100.0 


108.8 

• 1.7 
14.6 
3.3 
0.4 

10O.0 


188.0 

06.3 
3 1 
0« 
2 

100 


100. • 


186.0 






46.862 

8.8U 

4,62« 

337 

43,041 


4,202 
418 

Ul 
38 

Lou 


87.7 
8.8 
3.2 
3 

100.0 

00 4 
8 

76.3 
12 3 
10.7 
0.8 

100.0 


io!4 

13 
0.6 

loao 
"mT 

8,6 

o.» 

0.2 

100.0 

66.0 
28.6 
3 2 
3.2 

lOO.O 


76.4 

18.7 
7 6 
4 

100.0 


•3.3 
•.> 

3.7 
8 

two 


Ch»1o7«b ud own-Moouit irori[«n . . 


Mkl*employ«l <eio, uncrt.) 


Wase or m1m7 workan 


131, 791 
1.H1 

an 
at. 137 

3«.7M 

4.m 

3.7« 
»l 

«.>M 

M.aso 

7,«I3 
1.1173 

a7 

80,»70 
43.XIS 

t.en 

626 
113 

1B.«I3 

19. MS 

i.ai< 

1,347 
12< 


3.344 

28 
3 

Ml 


33.417 

7,608 

1,U8 

118 

1«,»2« 


3,810 
833 
M 
23 

W4 

742 
180 
77 
11 

1.060 


•6 3 
3 4 

3 
1 

100.0 

88.7 
8.7 
1,7 
0.8 

106.0 


81.3 
18.8 

1.7 
0.3 

100 

83 8 

8.7 

7.7 

a7 

100.6 

83.8 
13 6 
2.6 

100.0 

82.7 
18.8 
1.3 
0.3 

100.0 

7.8 
St 
0.7 


07 1 
3 6 

0.2 
0. 1 

100 

60 
38.4 

11.8 
2.1 

160.0 

«4.3 

8.4 
2 
1 

100.0 


78.1 
16.7 
3 8 
0.3 

100 

^OfT 
IS 8 
16.1 
0.8 

100.0 

78.7 
18.8 
6.3 
«.S 

100.0 

77.8 
18.0 
SO 
2 

100.0 

74,7 
13.3 


8.3 


ClHiatwakiriiainiiorud. 

ramale onployMl («ic. «■>«(.) 


0.6 

Kn.8 


Ww« or Balary workMi 

Bmploy«n and owii-iieoouDt workon . . 

UdiiaM funOy worken 

CiMi or worts Dot nportwl 

HONOLCLU CITY 

IWSI Mpl^rX (aU. ODHCf ) 


«S4 

373 
31 
SI 

1,748 

i.m 

«7 

J 


3»7 
171 
?« 
14 

3.3M 


13, 148 

2,880 

3.121 

113 

34.303 


87. 8 
8 4 
2.8 
11 

100.0 


77.0 

Its 

a.0 
i.e 

M8.0 


Waffo at watoty workora 

Kinp4oT«n and owD-acoouot worken 


8.706 
273 
38 

47 

4.204 


31.111 
1,617 

m 

64 
17. Me 


6, Ml 

1.124 

211 

31 

6.028 


3.20O 

183 

8 

4 

3.261 


18.648 
4.041 
1.830 

77 

11.027 


1.762 
248 
71 
11 

1.847 

1.336 

174 

31 

6 

143 

426 
71 
40 

8 


88.8 
11 
2.0 
0.3 

100.(1 


04 4 
8.0 
0.8 
0.2 

100. 

07.3 
2.6 
1 

100 

84.6 
12 
1.7 
7 


04 
4 1 
6 
0.8 

100.0 

01.0 
4.2 
4 
4 

100.0 

"«1.8 
1.3 

i.7 


02 2 
7 1 

4 
0.3 

100 

03.2 
6.1 
0.1 
2 

100.0 


•ts 

II.T 


ClMa of worker not reportod 

Mkle employod (f ic. omen.) 


0.1 
lOO.O 




i.am 

36 
403 

mT 

33 
7 
3 


3,m 

m 

16 
16 

1.863 


16.738 

1.172 

20 

31 

8.376 


4.M3 
080 
7» 
16 

3,230 


3.087 

107 

3 

134 


12.30(1 

3.023 

476 

30 

8.376 

6. 216 

1.010 

1,063 

38 


87.2 
11.3 
1.2 
0.3 

100 


oil 

1 

100.0 

84.3 
11 • 

8.7 




Empioyen and own-acoount workers 


11.3 
3 




Fomale employed (eic. emers.) 


100.0 




1,711 

m 

2] 
31 


4.780 
481 
78 
S3 


1.018 
174 
133 
18 


113 
16 
8 


82.1 
101 
7.1 
0.7 


88 
0.0 
11 
0.0 




Emplonn and own-account worken 


U.I 













-DETAILED OCCUPATION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK). BY 
SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940 

{"N. •. 0." meuu not ekewtMra olavifled) 



oocorAnoH 



Tnt»MiovH ftod MmlpnlM^n*! work«rt 

Prod w etooal workers _ . 

Aathor*. edlton, and r«porUn . 

Aolhon 

■dltorn aod reporters _ _ . . 

Obemltta. uuyera, and metallurs<tls 

OkntynMn 

Colleve pTMldeoLi. proressora, nid Initructors. _ 

Dentists 

rivll fMlDoers 

MsrhanlcKl «DKlnMrB. _ ._ 

Othor technical enfclriMrs 

OtMinloalcnfiUiMn ..- 

llMtilcalaitfliiMrt- 

ladoiMftl «iiciiMWB 

Lvrnn and JudgM 

Moprimt wo moito tetchwi 

PbyiUftas mm) luravoDS 

TimIiiii (o. a. c.) nnrludlnR county ueoti) - - 

G«aiiK7 •f«aU ftnd rarm demonstrators - - 

Otb« pnMewonB) workon _ _ 

Actors wid actreaaw - 

Atobttfctii 

Artl*ttuid Aft tMctiare - 

Llbr»iiMu __ 

O««*0pt*»i. __ 

PtuniiArist^ 

BoeUland wdlfftre work«p»_ 

Trained nursM and atudeot nuTMi 

VvtirluarlftQa - 

Protoadoaal workm (d e. o.) 



THK TIKRITORY 

M«l« F«malc| Male 



18, MS 

s.nv 

3.001; 



OOCUTAnOH 



8«TntprofM5loniil worken 

Drtlfnierx and draftAin«n 

DflslRneri 1 

[>ritftim«n 

Other sAm'profca^lonul workers.. 

Athletw 

Dancers, danclcv teachers, find chorus (rlrls 

Funeral direvtom and embalmcrti 

Healers and niedlcnl nervlce workers (n, e. c.) 

Optometrists 

Pnototrraphers 

Radio and wireless operators 

Rrllrlous workerH 

Showmco 

Sportfl Instructors aod ofllrinlfl 

Technicians and osslntauts, laboratory 

Tflohnlclans. except laboratory , 

Renilproresslonal workers (n, e. c.) 

Farmeraaad hrm maBAcere 

Ffirmera (owners and tenaotn). .' 

Farm managers. . . 

Proprietora, managera, and offldala, esoept 
turn.. 

Postmasters and mlscellaQeoua ftovernmeot 

ufflclalN 

InnrtectorH. irnitod States 

Inspectffn, TttnltCirUJ 

Inapeetora. dtjf 

InilMotoni, oooDty and loctl.. 



Male Female 



8. Ml 


1,818 


3.000 


126 


m 




38 




•2 




16 





■OKOtm-D OTT 



Male Female 



1.8U 


I.IM 


l.OOS 


81 


•1 


1 


» 




m 




I 





3152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION 



17 



-DETAILED OCCUPATION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK) BY 
SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940~Continued 



OCCUPATION 



Male Femali 



Male Female 



THS TBBRITOBY HONOLDLD OTT 



Mnle Femali 



fcjm— CoDttbued . 

Postmasters and misc«Uaoeous goveinmeDt 
offlcUls— Continued. 

Officials. United States- 

Officials, Territorial 

Officials, city. - 

Officials, county and locak-. - 

Postmasters .-- -.- - 

Other spectfled manaiiers and officials - - 

Buyers and department beads, store 

Conductors, railroad 

Country buyers and shippers ot livestock and 

other (arm products 

Credit men_ _ 

Floormen and floor managers, store 

Maaacers sod superintendents, buildine 

Officer?!, pilots, pursers, and engineers, ship 

Officlflls, lodge, society, union, etc 

PurchaslnR agonts and buyers (n. e. c) 

Proprietors, managers, and officials (n. e. c), by 
industry 

Sugar indaitry 

Construction. 

Manufacturing Tfexc. sugar) 

Food and kindred products (ozc. sugar) 

Bakery products 

Beverage industries. 

Canning and preserving iruits. vegetables, 
and seafood 

MLsoeUaneou.<i food products (exc. sugar)... 
Miscellaneous manuiacturing industries 

Lumber, (urniture, and lumber products... 

Printing, publishing, and allied industries.. 

Chemicals and allied products 

Other manufacturing industries 

Transportation. communJcation, and other 

public utilities ^ 

Railroads (incl. railroad repair shops) 

Street railways and bus lines 

Taxicab service .■ 

Trucking service 

Water transportation. __ 

Miscellaneous transportation 

Communication 

XJtilitles _ 

Wbokeale and retail trade _ 

Wholesale trade _ 

Food and dairy products stores, and miUc re- 
tailing.. _ 

General merchandise and variety stores 

Apparel and accessories stores. 

Motor vehicleis and accessories retailing, and 

filling stations 

Motor vehicles and accessories retailing,.. 

Filling stations 

Eat&iE and drinking places 

Miscellaneous retail trade 

Furniture, home furnishings, and cquip- 

Drugstores 

Hardware, farm implement, and building 

material retailing 

Liquor stores 

Retail florists 

Jewelry stores 

Other retail trade 

Finance, insurance, and real estate 

Banking and other finance 

Insurance and real estate 

Insurance 

Real estate. 

Business and repair services 

Automobile storage, rental, and repair services. 

Business and miscellaneous repair services 

Business services 

Miscellaneous repair servloea and band 

Personal services. 

Hotels and lodging places — 

Laundering, cleaning, and dyeing services 

Miscellaneous personal services 

Amusement, recreation, and related services 

Theaters and motion pictures 

Miscellaneous amusement and recreation 

Miscellaneous Industries and services 

Agriculture (exc. sugar) 

Fishery 

Mining 

Proreftsional and related serTloes 

Industry not reported 

Most Inspectors In manufacturing industries are classified as operatives. 



Clerical, sales, and kicdred worken.. 
Clerical and kindred workers 



Bookkeepers, accountants, cashiers, and ticket 

agents 

Bookkeepers, accountants, and cashiers 

Ticket, station, and express agents 



Messengers, errand, and office boys and girb.. 

Telegraph messengers 

Sliipplng and receiving clerks 

Stenographer^, typists, and secretaries 



Telegraph operators . . 

Telephone operators 

Clerical and kindred workers (n. i 



3 and saleswomen.. 



? agents and brokers... 
Other sales agents and brokers.. 



Real estate agents and brokers. . . 

Salesmeq, finance, brokerage, and commission 

Traveling salesmen and sales agents 



"Clerks" in stores 

Demonstrators. 

Salesmen and saleswomen (n 



Craftsmea, (breman, and kindred workers. 

Blacksmiths, forgemen, and hammermen. 

Carpenters , 

Compositors and typesetters 

Cranemen. hoistmen, and construction machin- 
ery operators 

Electricians . 

Foremen (n e. c), by industry 

Sugar industry 

Construction.-- 

Manufacturing (exc. sugar). , 

Canning and preserving fruits, vegetables, 

and sea food 

Miscellaneous food products (exc. sugar) 

Tin cans, tinware, and miscellaneous iron and 

steel industries 

Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 

Transportation, communication, and other 

public utilities 

Railroads (incl. railroad repair shops) 

Water transpjrtstlon 

Miscellaneous transportation 

Communication - 

Utilities 

MisoellaAous Industries and services 

Agriculture (exc. sugar), forestry, and fishery 

Mining 

Wholesale trade 

Retail trade 

Business and repair services , 

Personal services... 

Ajnusement, recreation, and related services. 

Professional and related services 

Government 

Industry not reported 

Inspectois (n. e. c), by Industry 

Construction 

Transportation, communication, and other 

public utmties..-. 

Miscellaneous industries and services > , 

Locomotive engineers 

Machinists, millwrlgbts, and tool makers 

Machinists 

Millwrights - 

Tool makers, and die makers and setters 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3153 



18 



HAWAII 



Table 18.— DETAILED OCCUPATION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK), BY 
SEX. FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940— Continued 







BONO...„aTT 


OCCUPATION 




BONOLULO CTTT 




Male Female 


Male 


Female 


Male 


Female 


Male 


Female 


CrftftimeB. for«m«D. ksd kindred 

worker!— Continued. 


633 
<>13 
30 
932 

1.402 

III 

43 

1.3(8 

1.183 

1.180 

3 

736 

3116 

290 

1.032 
118 
34 
42 
43 

a 

1 

79 

wa 

38 
13 
77 
32 
12 
86 
48 
30 
6 
66 
69 

109 

27 

.14,428 


1 

i 

2 

2 

2 
2 

2 

1 
162 

27 
14 

1 

i' 

2" 

3" 

6' 

4.699 


333 
319 
14 
274 

099 
93 
20 

886 

777 
774 
3 
479 
136 
144 

704 
46 
22 
34 
38 

8 

1 

«0 

26 
13 
73 
31 
10 
82 
37 
29 
3 
40 
46 

86 
26 

7.0S3 


1 

2 

2 

2 

2 

2 

67 

23 

12 

i 

i 

3 

9 

S,010 


OperatiTeiaDd kindred worker* — Contlnoed 

Other Bpeclfled operatives and kindred work- 
era— Continued. 


34 
91 

4,912 

1,H7 

266 

1,828 

1,228 

42 

88 

966 
28 
32 
S2 

248 

352 
8 
9 
66 
29 
46 
26 
22 

75 
81 

273 
25 
31 
32 
68 
12 
60 
23 
22 

261 
47 

63 
32 
119 
189 

124 

65 
319 
1 
120 
149 

43 

240 
60 
2 

106 
23 

18 
22 
19 

3,002 


10 

6 

2,739 
66 

1 

2,163 

1,778 

48 

19 

1,638 
11 
1 
63 
6 

369 
148 
97 
15 

43 

11 

1 

23 
28 

20 

7" 

2 
10 

1 

31 

24 
119 
47 
11 

1 
10 
12 

3 

7 

266 
16 

■"" 187' 
33 

11 

15 

4 

0,518 


31 
20 

2,546 

160 

1.439 
966 
38 

764 
24 
26 

5r 

222 
261 

9 

49 

38 
9 
19 

69 
63 

222 
9 
31 
31 
57 

49 
20 

212 
46 

34 
25 
107 
116 

77 
39 
259 
1 
114 
124 
20 

133 

2 
69 
16 

13 
14 
14 

1.090 
















Operatives and kindred workers (n, e. cj, by 
tnduBtry _ _ 






1.948 








MechBnJcs and repairmen, railroad and car shop. 




1 649 


Painters (construction and maintenance) and 


Food and k Indred products (exc- sugar) 


1.349 










Carming and preserving truJts, vegetables. 






















Miscellaneous food products (exc. sugar).. . 


27 




Miscellaneous manufarturing Industries 














Apparel and other fabricated textiles 

Lumber, furniture, and lumber products___ 














Printing, publishing, and allied industries^ 
















Iron and steel and not specified metal in- 














Pattern and model makere, except paper 


Transport ation. communication, and other 








Plasterers __ _ 


Railroads find- railroad repair shops) 






















































Food and dairy products stores, and milk 






12 




325 
61 
24 
41 
17 
39 
20 

124 
9 

623 
273 
260 
13 

4.263 

1.236 

457 

328 

307 

190 
287 
216 
366 

•760 
9 
18 
66 

102 

20 
2 

2 

164 
96 

36 
96 


102 

i 

3 

98 

26 

1 

i 

20 
8 
3 

763 

1 

3 

997 

i 

962" 
6 

a 

2 

i 


204 
27 
18 
17 
12 
22 
16 
86 
7 

303 
25 
21 

4 

1.760 
711 
166 

181 

209 

UO 
95 

^A 

405 
7 
7 
23 
3 
35 
11 
14 
1 

2 
3 

1 

m" 

47 


49 

i 

3 

45 



9 

1 

i 

1 

416 

2 

1 

676 
f 

539 

6 

W 


Apparel and accessories stores, except shoes... 














Automobile storage, rental, and repair 








Building and hand trade apprentices (n. e. c.).. 


Business and miscellaneous repair services...- 


6 














Attendants, filling station, parking lot, garage, 


Federal Qovemment (n. e. c.) 

Territorial and local government (n. e. c.) 


7 
























Laundering, cleaning, and dyeln? services.... 
Hotels and miscellaneous personal services ... 
Amusement, recreation, and related serv- 








Firemen, except locomotive and fire department.. 
I-aundry operatives and laundresses, except p'ri- 






















9.446 








30 

32 

1,940 

37,869 


1,186 

978 
4,356 

14 


12 

17 

1.061 

6.441 














2.686 








Firemen, fire department 






183 
916 
893 

23 
637 
405 
104 
3 

26 
26,233 

4,815 

321 

352 

1,354 

13 

1.333 

8 


8" 

8 

6 

1 

3,762 


124 

611 

607 

4 

223 

190 

24 

3 

« 

4,6^ 

!.117 














Cbainmen, rodmen. and axmen. surveying 


Watchmen (crossing) and bridge tenders 












Policemen and detectives, except government.. 
















Soldiers, sailors, marines, and coastguards* 

Service workera, except domestic and pro- 


















Attendants, hospital and other institution. 






218 

eoe 

213 
10 
194 


162 
17? 
758 

749 
6 


46 








30 ....... 

1 

69 


















Painters, except construction and matntenaoce- 







3154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION 



19 



Tabu 13.— detailed OCCUPATION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK) 
BY SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940— Continued 



OCCOTAtlOM 



IM0T*— Continued. 

Cooks, ezoapt private hmlly 

BiTTMits. «ioept privtt« hmUy 

Waltcnand bartenders 

BarteotWa - 

WaJten and v&itresses. except private tkoUy. . 

Other arrloe workers, except domeetio and pro- 
teetlTe 

Atteodaots, professional and personal service 
(n.ec.).. - 

Attendants, refreatloD and amusement 

Boer4lDf houee and lodgloKboiise keepers 

Bootblacks - 

Elevator operators _ 

Bouwkeepera. stewards, and hostesses, exoept 
private family . - - - - 

Practical oursee and mid wives 

Usbers, amusement place or assembly 

Farm laboren and (oremen _. 

Farm foremen, sugar Industry 

Farm (oremen. except sugar industry 

Farm laborers (wage workers), sugar Industry . . 

Farm laborers (wage workers), except sugar in- 
dustry -- 

Pum laborers (unpait^ family workers), socar 
Industry - - . - - 

Fann laborers (unpaid family workers), exoept 
sugar Industry 

Laborers, except farm and mine 

Flshenrenand oystermen 

Gardeners, except farm, and groundkeepers 

Loi^sboremen and stevedores 

Other specified laborers 

Qar^e laborers and car washers and greasers.. 

Lumbermen, raftsmen, and woodchoppers 

Teamsters 

Laborers {n. e, c), by Industry... 

Sugar industry.- - 

A^ctilture (exc. sugar), forestry, and fishery.. 

Agriculture (exc. sugar) 

Fcwestry, except Joking- 

Fishery 

Construction - 

Manufacturing (exc. sugar) 

Food and kindred products (exc. sugar) 

Beverage industnes 

Canning and preserving fruits, vegetables, 

and seafood 

Dairy products 

Miscellaneous food products (exc. sugar) . . . 

Ship and boat building and repairing 

Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 

Lumber, furniture, and lumber products.. 
Paper and allied products 





=oKot.,.„cm 


Mile 


Female 


Male 


Femtla 


Ul 


311 


564 




ei3 


421 


436 


195 


987 


1,»6 


748 


946 


IM 


27 


116 


21 


«a 


1,268 


632 


926 


tsi 


OW 


357 


434 


21 

74 


46 
5 


It 
48 


34 


a 


25 


> 


16 


41 




39 




«4 


a 


63 


6 


87 


236 


43 


leg 


2 


298 


1 


168 


82 


82 


54 


62 


U,096 


8,897 


710 


448 


1.315 
tl5 


2 
12 






21 


6 


25,750 


1,927 


26 




7,424 


287 


508 


27 


38 
1,052 


35 
1.634 






236 


416 


M,<55 


1,934 


9.778 


670 


1,147 


14 


448 


7 


495 


22 


238 




1,280 




765 




les 




62 




46 


1 


34 


1 


101 


3 


10 


I 


19 




8 




11,168 


1,194 


6,270 


665 


4411 


58 


14 




212 


16 


52 


8 


163 


9 


27 


3 


18 




7 




31 


7 


18 


5 


3,195 


14 


1,749 


4 


1,661 


635 


1,070 


283 


1,119 


504 


664 


256 


111 


14 


64 


7 


840 


438 


627 


236 


55 


8 


10 


3 


113 


44 


63 


2li 


234 




199 




318 


31 


207 


27 


60 


1 


,38 




49 


* 


7 


4 



lAb ar e r i, exoept ktra and mine — Con. 

Lat>orers (n. e. c), by Industry — Continued. 
Miscellaneous maDutacturlog 
industries — Continued. 
Paints and miscellaneous chemical Indaa- 

Iries 

Stone, clay, and ftlaaa prodocts 

Iron and steel and not spedfled metal in- 
dustries 

Other manufacturing Industries 

Transportation, commanlcation, and other 

pubUo utUlties 

Transportation _ 

Air transportation. . 

Railroad (incl. railroad repair shops) 

Trucking service 

Warehousing and storage 

Water transportation 

Mlsoellaneoas transportation 

Ccftmunicatlon _._ 

millUes - 

Electric light and power 

Gasworks and steam plants 

Water and sanitary services 

Wholesale end retail trade 

Wholesale trade 

Food and dairy products stores, and milk 

retailing _._ 

Hardware, farm implement, and building 
material retailing 

Miscellaneous retail trade 

General merchandise and variety stores 

Furniture, home furnishings, and equlp- 

FUling sUtlons \'.S..\.... 

Eating and drinking places 

Other retail trade ^:.. 

Government , 

Postal service 

National defense 

Federal Government (n. e, c.) 

Territorial and local government (n. e. c.) 

Miscellaneous industries and services 

Finance, insurance, and real estate 

Automobile storage, rental, and repair serv- 

Bnslness and miscellaneous repair services 

Laundering, cleaning, and dyeing services 

Hotels and mlseellaneons personal services-. . 

Amusement, recreAtloq, and related services.. 

Educational services _ _ _ 

Medical and other health services.- 

Legal, engineering, and miscellaneous profes- 
sional services. . 

Charitable, religious, and membership 
organ itations 

Industry not reported 

OccnpatioD not reported 



TBI rmsiTORj 



Female Male 



HONOLriC CITT 



Table 14.— MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT THOSE ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY 
WORK), BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940 





Total 


hawai' 
Ian 


Part 
Hawai- 
ian 


Cauca- 
sian 


Chinese 


Filipino 


Japa- 
nese 


Other 


P.RC.H,mSTR,RUT,01. 


AREA, MAIOB OCCUPATION GROUP, 
ANDSEI 


Total 


Ha- 
wai- 
ian 


Part 
Ha- 
wai- 
ian 


Cau- 
casian 


Chi- 


Fill- 

piDO 


Japa- 
nese 


Other 
races 


THE TERRITORY 


180,786 


1.619 


11, 181 


56.418 


19.888 


99,132 


90,973 


4,914 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 


100.0 










9.492 
1.411 
3.564 

11.522 
18.711 
15.991 
19.081 
8.520 
36.460 

37.232 

2.760 

15.489 

573 


149 
21 
118 

142 
177 
447 
943 
117 
419 

691 

33 

1.369 

24 


971 
161 
136 

639 
1,499 
1,411 
3.261 

400 
1,101 

803 

. 74 

1,723 

62 


4.714 

529 
306 

4.739 
6.823 
3.999 


967 
147 
140 

1,346 
3,094 


123 
67 
189 

290 
583 
767 

2,614 
467 

1,696 

22,101 

n 

3.306 
63 


2.396 

463 

2.^ 

4.186 
7.272 
8.097 
7.288 
6.342 
4.112 

10.212 

2.413 

6,376 

343 


173 
33 
78 

280 
263 

422 
780 
285 
416 

1,267 
34 
832 
62 


6.3 
0.8 
2.0 

6.4 
10.3 

88 
10.6 

4.7 
20 2 

20 6 
1.5 
16 
0.8 


3 3 

0.6 
Z6 

3.1 
3.9 
9.8 
20 8 
i6 
9.2 

13.0 
0.7 

39.9 
0.5 


8.7 
1.4 
1.2 

4.8 
13.5 
12.7 
20 2 
3.6 
9.9 

7. J 
0.7 
16.6 
0.6 


8!4 
0.9 
0.5 

8.4 
10.3 

7.1 
6,7 
1.3 
49.0 

3.3 

0.1 
3.8 

a3 


9.0 

L3 

12.6 
28.9 

7.9 
13.2 

2.2 
11.2 

3.7 
4 
8.0 
0.1 


0.4. 
0.2 
0.6 

0.9 
1.8 
2.4 
8.1 
1.5 
6 

68.8 
0.2 

10.0 
0.3 


3.9 
0.7 
4.3 

6.9 
11.9 
13.3 
12.0 
10.4 

67 

16.7 
4.0 
&8 

0.4 




eemiprofessicnal workers - 


0.7 


Proprietors, managers, and officials, ex- 




Clerlcal. sales, and kindred workers..,-.. 
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers. 


5.4 
8.6 










27.623 

1,860 

83 

2,145 

131 


898 

48 

860 

9 




Farm laborers (wage workers) and farm 




Farm laborers (unpaid family workers).. 


0.7 


Occupation not reported 


1.1 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3155 



20 



HAWAII 



Tablb 14.— major occupation GROUP OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT THOSE ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY 
WORK), BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940— Continued 



AMBA, UAiOB OOCVPATTOM fl 



THE TERRITORY— ContlDned 

Male 

ftoCesalonal wockwi 

BtinlpcotMrional worken 

VtlUHiB and form momven 

FtOfirteton, maoBgen, and offlclalB, ex- 

ooptfarm -? .- 

Ctancal, sal«0, and kindred workers 

Cnttsmeo, foremec. aod kindred workers 

Operatives and kirvdred workers. 

Domestic service workprs 

SflTTlce workers, except dumeatic 

Ftnn laborers (wage workers) and Tann 

foramen _ 

Farm laborers (unpMd fomlly workers)... 

L^wrer?, except farm aod mice 

OoeapeClon not reported 

Female 

Pro lWBlonal worken 

SamlprofesBlonal workers 

FarmeraaQd farm manacera 

Proprletora, roaoagers, and officials, ex- 

oebt farm.- 

Clerical, sales, and kiodred workers 

Craftsmoo. foremen, and kindred workers 

Operatives and kindred workers 

Domestic service workers 

Sarvloe workers, except domestic. - 

Farm laborers (wage workers) and farm 

foremen 

Farm laborers (unpaid family workers).. 

Laborers, except farm and mine 

Occupation not reported 

HONOLULU CITY 

Total 

Professional workers. 

8emiprofes^ional workers 

Fanners and farm managers 

Proprietors, managers, and officials, ex- 
cept farm 

Clerical, sales, and kindred worbexs 

Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers. 

Operat Ives and kindred workers 

Domeatic service workers 

Service workers, except domestic 

Farm laborers (wage workers) aod fann 
foremen 

Form laborer? (unpaid family workers) . . 

Laborers, except farm and mine 

Occapatlon not reported. 

Male 

Professional workers 

Semiprofesslonal 

Farmers and farm managers 

Proprletont, managers, and officials, ex- 
cept farm 

Clerical, sales, and kindred workers. 

Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers 

Operatives and kindred workers 

Domestic service workers 

Service workers, except domestic 

Farm laborers (wage workers) and farm 
foremen 

Farm laborers (unpaid family workers).. 

Laborers, except farm and mine 

Occapatlon not reported.. 

Profesaionai workem 

8emiprofoasion.ll workers 

Farmers and farm managers 

Proprietors, managers, and officials, ex> 
cept farm. 

Clerical, sales, and kindred workers 

Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred work- 
ers 

Operatives and kindred workers 

Domestic service workers 

Service workers, except domestic 

Farm laborers (wage workers) and farm 
foremen 

Farm laborers (unpaid family workera)— 

LAboreiv, except farm and mine 

Occapatlon not reported 



60.270 

2.461 



0,773 
120 


-521 


ia,S33 


409 


3,005 
234 
MO 


34 
i 


I.IOl 

4.272 


11 
43 


273 
3,010 
3.445 
2,286 


16 
178 
40 
69 


33 

416 





23.334 

3,060 



79716 0—46 — pt. 18- 



-20 



3156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CHARACTERISTICS OF THE fOPULATTON 



21 



Tablb 16.— detailed INDUSTRY OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT ON PUBLIC ENiERGENCY WORK), BY 
SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940 





T„.«»»,ro»v 


HoKouaumr 


.Kn,.S7». 


TH.T.a.,ro.r 


HONOLDi-ucrrr 




Male 


Female 


Mule 


Female 


Male 


Female 


Male 


Female 




MS, atg 


S8. 1S7 


50,270 


18,993 


Mannlactiirini (ezc. lagar)— Continued 


141 

40 

101 

7 

11 

83 

1.159 

10 

24 

1. 114 

11 

162 

38 

25 
65 
34 

9,028 


14 

7 
7 

2 

5 
18 

43 
2 

8 
8 
24 

487 


117 

37 

80 

6 

11 

63 

1.055 

9 

19 

1.018 

9 

126 

28 

23 
66 
19 

6,093 










3a,3a9 


9,491 
9.586 


!45 
2.029 


62 
631 


ElectrtSl machYnerv and ' m t 








r 


AcnciUtQre(exc.ingftr).for««r7. A flihery. 








Office an^ store machines, e<]uip., & suppllee. 




Agriculture (exc. sugar) . . _ _ _ _ _ _ 


13.110 

1.216 

57 

1.1(11 

UD 

54 

195 
5 

178 
2 
10 

10, ess 

8.969 


2,493 
33 

33 

t 


1,574 
455 
16 
439 

166 


612 
19 

i9 

t 








17 




Aircrall and parts __ _ 

Automobiles and automobile equipment 








U 




Railroad and misc. transportation equipment. . 






Crude petroleum and DBtural gas productioD 


3 


44 


2 




Not specifled metal industries 






3 

1 

i' 

1 

94 

S,474 

2.704 
133 

57 

2.512 
2,358 
18 
37 
2 
97 

■"iM 

5 

164 
1 

14 

62 
1 

76 

135 

127 

8 

32 
1 
5 

19 
7 

10 
5 
4 

260 
31 

31" 

si 

2 
2 

14' 

13 

1 

i" 

i 

44 

28 
16 
3 

2' 

1 


121 
2 

107 
2 
10 

6,700 

6,876 


3 

1 

77 
9.989 


SdentiQc and photopiapbic equipment & sup- 










Mlscelianecus manufacturing industries 










Traiupart., commnn., A other public uHl- 
itioa , 






806 




Transportation 


5,741 
267 
898 
875 
23 
499 
747 
526 
221 

2,120 
1.213 
16 
762 
62 
383 

547 
446 
363 
83 
101 
1.737 
1,071 
235 
431 

14,784 


157 

6 
3 

10 
32 
15 
17 

48 
52 

26 

10 

243 
226 
224 
2 
17 
87 
61 
10 
16 

7,092 


3,513 
152 
338 
317 
21 
315 
493 
333 
160 

1,546 

669 

8 

461 

159 

351 

296 
249 
47 
55 
1.229 
739 
213 
277 

9.694 






Air transportation.. 






4.805 
4S3 
414 
58 
3. 850 
3.301 
39 
209 
32 
269 

24 
6 
2 
4 

12 
2 

1 


3,409 
356 
279 
45 
2,729 
2,432 
24 
119 
22 
132 

11 

2 
2 

4 
2 


1.906 

99 

37 

3 

1.768 

1,690 

42 

i2 

3 
1 
2 
6 

1 


Railroads and railway express 






Railroads (including railroad repair sfaops) . . . 
Railway express service.. 


6 








Street railways and bus lines 






Trucking service and warehousing 


24 


CanniDg and preserv'g fruits, veg., & sea food 






Warehousing and storage 






Water transportation 








Miscellaneous food industries (exc. sugarT 














17 




Services incidental to transportation 




6 








119 
106 




Telephone and telegraph (wire and radio) 












1 

i' 

32 

22 

10 

215 

7 

98 

70 

40 

33 

6 

7 

21 

060 

146 

146 

138 

40 
32 

8 
15 
24 
21 

3 

3 

78 

4 

15 

50 

47 

7 

3 

2 

387 

11 

376 

111 

285 

27 

2 

18 

7 


1 
3 
108' 
104 
4 
28 
1 
4 
17 
6 

3 

1 
104 
17 

i? 

17 

2 
2 

14 

13 

1 
1 

i 

i 

i 

39 

39 

24 

15 
2 

i 




13 
68 
47 








8 
33 
23 
10 
311 
35 

60 
124 
96 

21 

1.200 

248 

1 

247 

8 

239 

6« 

53 

16 

16 

28 

22 

6 




Apparel and other fabricated textile products 




Water and sanitary services 




Miscellaneous fabricated textile products 


Wholeaale and retail trade 


4.40J 




Wholesale trade-- 


2,285 
14499 

3.462 
3.175 
287 
1.365 
1.356 
9 

869 
716 
153 

680 
239 

720 

811 

347 

1.719 

837 

257 

580 

1.689 

80 
179 
110 
691 
475 

1,611 


317 
6,716 

1,489 
1,470 
29 
988 
975 
13 

1,035 

1,013 

22 

156 
108 
48 
67 
66 
136 
1,869 

60 
43 

839 
46 

180 
42 

'336 
235 

toi 

220 
281 
141 
140 


1.826 
7,868 

1,927 

1.744 

183 

561 

566 

5 

550 
417 
143 

648 
305 
343 
461 
498 
281 
1,295 

622 
215 
407 
1.136 
91 
72 
120 
79 
642 
223 

1.229 

573 
656 
386 
270 










Retail trade - 






Food and dairy products stores, & milk retail- 
ing 










Food stores, except dairy products - 


757 




Dairy products stores and milk retailing ,. 
General merchandise and variety stores 


24 


Miscellaneous paper and puJp products 

Printing, publishing, and allied industries 




Limited price variety stores 






Apparel and accessories stores- 










Apparel and acceasories stores, except shoes. - 


666 








Furniture, home ftu'nishings, A equipment 








Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 


Furniture and bouse furnishings stores 

Household appliance and radio stores 


63 

37 






45 








Leather and leather products, escept footwear.. 










Hardware, farm impl., and bidg. material retail- 






109 

4 

17 

88 

69 

13 

4 

2 

496 

17 

479 

152 

327 

35 

2 

26 

7 




Stone, clay, and glass products 


50 




Hardware and farm implement stores. 

Lumber and building material retailing 


34 
16 
563 




Other stone and clay products 


Cement. & concrete, gypsum, & plaster prod. 
















Miswilaneous nonmetalllc mineral pr*" 'acts.. 






Iron and steel and their products 






Blast furnaces, steel works, and rolling mills.... 






Other iron and st«l products 


Finance, inanranee. and real estate 


4U 






765 
846 
615 
331 


177 


Nonferrous metal primary products 






Clocks, watches, jewelry, and silverware ' 






Miscellaneous nonferrous metal products 


Real estate 


137 



> Includes metal engraving (eicept for printing purposes), plating, and po'lshiog. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3157 



22 



HAWAII 



-DETAILED INDUSTRY OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK), BT 
SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940— Continued 



IKDUffTRT 


THE TXBRITOBT 




™.cs™. 


TB>TB>.,TO>T 


HONOLULU CUT 


Male 


Female 


Male 


Female 


Male 


Female 


Male 


Female 


BgiinwM and repftir Mrrioea 


1,713 


IBS 


1.507 


lot 


Profeuloiul uid rslkted aervloM 


4, HI 


<,709 


S,(M 


9.8M 


Automobile storage, renul. and repair servioes. .. 
Biuloess and repair sorvloas. exc. automobile 


1,878 

su 

38 
235 

eu2 

5,918 

2,533 

1.253 

786 

MS 

i.oir 


45 

108 
14 
70 
24 

e,e4s 


023 
584 
36 
176 
373 
3,40« 


23 
80 
11 
54 
21 
5,457 




1,818 

1,478 

448 

867 

99,911 


4,198 

1,872 

166 

468 

898 


994 

879 
366 

433 

0.799 


i289 
1,116 






Legal, engineering, and mlso. protesslonal services. 
Charitable, religious, & membership orgaolzo- 






Miscellaneous repair services and hand trades- - 






Oofernmeirt 










4 697 

617 

1.030 

1.506 

470 


1,373 

1,009 

490 

634 

too 


3,683 
374 
647 
863 

873 




Hotels and lodtrtog places-- 




281 
28,882 
4.748 
2,304 
2,444 

t5S 


60 

663 
353 
310 

459 


160 
6,396 
3,237 
1,983 
1.264 

471 


10 


Laundering, cleaning, and dyeing services- 


National defense 








Amnaemeot, recreatioD, ft related lervlces. . 


Federa) government (n. e. o.) 

Territorial and local government (n. e. c.) 


310 
200 




442 

575 


296 


256 
344 


178 













t e]sewher« classified. 



Table 16.— WAGE OR SALARY INCOME AND RECEIPT OF OTHER INCOME IN 1939 FOR EXPERIENCED PER- 
SONS IN THE LABOR FORCE IN 1940, BY CLASS OF WORKER AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR 
HONOLULU CITY 

{Percent not shown where less than 0.1; median or percent not shown where base Is less than 1001 





TOTAL 


WnHOUTOTHXatKCOMKlHl^.. 


w,r 




939 




Total 


Wage or salary 
workers 


Other 
eiperi- 
enc»d 
persons 
In labor 
force 


Total 


Wageo 


r salary 
kers 


Other 
experi- 
enced 
persons 
fa labor 
force 


Total 


Wage or salary 
workers 




ARIA, WAOl OR SALARY INCOMB IN 


Private 
and non- 

gency 
govern- 
ment 
workers 


Public 

gency 
workers 


Private 
and non- 

gency 
govem- 

workers 


Public 

gency 
workers 


Private 
and non- 

genoy 
govern- 
ment 
workers 


Public 

gency 
workers 


experi- 
enced 
persons 
hT labor 
foroe 


THE TERRITORY 
lUle -. 


161,040 


134,061 


2,439 


14,659 


78,139 


73,169 


8.108 


9, 885 


78,901 


10,885 


985 


11,991 




16.378 
3.299 
6.526 
11.667 
14.461 
15.701 
14,104 
22,246 

13,201 
15,690 
7,445 
6,236 
2,136 
943 
1,338 
1,671 

S620 
38,230 


2,861 
2,991 
6,129 
11,324 
13,906 
16.244 
13.720 
21,929 

13.001 
15. 521 
7.352 
.6,182 
2,106 
930 
1,281 
676 

1627 
27.58« 


166 
145 
236 
230 
467 
384 
321 
204 

117 
72 
42 
20 
6 
2 
1 
31 

»413 
83 


12,351 
163 
162 
113 

ge 

73 
63 
112 

83 

51 
33 
25 
11 
56 
1.065 

»447 
e.<13 


3,926 
1.74! 
3.118 
3.925 
6.569 
8.566 
6.852 
11.783 

8.246 
11.028 
6,334 
4.267 

480 
667 

(702 
!6,7M 


1,845 
1,532 
2,806 
3,686 
6,124 
8,202 
6.518 
11.528 

8.093 

10.913 

5.276 

4.231 

1.187 

446 

462 

322 

»716 
81,788 


124 
126 
208 
195 
401 
322 
300 
192 

100 
65 
34 

11 
3 

1 
1 
26 

J416 
76 


1,867 
83 
105 
44 
44 
41 
36 
66 

62 
48 
24 
15 
11 
4 
26 
310 

$466 

8,(88 


11.452 
1.558 
2.408 
7.742 
7.892 
7.136 
7.252 

10,463 

4.956 

4.664 

2.111 

1.978 

936 

492 

849 

1,014 

•648 

10.434 


1,016 
1,459 
2.324 
7.638 
7.782 
7.042 
7.204 
10,403 

4,908 

4.608 

2.076 

1.951 

918 

484 

819 

253 

tS49 
6,749 


42 
19 
27 
36 
66 
62 
21 
12 

17 
7 
8 
9 
3 
1 






























































6 

$402 
7 




Median wage or salary Income for persons 
















1.991 
2.016 
3.203 
2,857 
3,527 
2,977 
1,668 
2,313 


12 
19 
9 
1 
2 
3 
6 
6 


7,474 
138 
110 
62 
29 
23 
17 
32 


4.774 
1,831 
2; 764 
2,363 
2,801 
2,339 
1,366 
1,909 


1.467 
1.699 
2.667 
2.314 
2.779 
2,318 
1.337 
1.886 


11 

18 
9 


3.306 
114 
78 
39 
20 
18 
12 
17 


4.703 
343 
668 
667 
767 
664 
326 
442 


634 

317 
636 
643 
748 
669 
321 
437 


1 
1 






2 

3 
2 
3 
3 


173 
322 
910 
558 
0O3 


M 








1 






2 
3 
6 
6 
















$600 to $799 


2,351 




IS 



^ Includes statistics for persons for whom the receipt or nonrecelpt of other i 



9 in 1939 was not reported 



3158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION 



28 



Ta»l» 1«.— wage or salary income and receipt of other income in 1939 FOR EXPERIENCED PBR- 
80N8 IN THE LABOR FORCE IN 1940, BY CLASS OF .WORKER AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR 
HONOLULU CITY— Continued 

(Percent Dot sbown where less than 0.1; iDediBii or porceot oot Bhowo wbere bue Is less than 100] 







TO,.. 




w,r,00T„r«a 


«co«n. 


..K. 


wiTB vrun Hcom nt 


SM 




ToUI 


Wace or salary 
workers 


Other 
eiperi- 
enced 
persona 
In labor 
foroB 


Total 


Wa«e or salary 
workers 


Other 
esperl- 

meed 
persons 
in labor 

force 


Total 


Wa«e or salary 
workers 




ABBA. WAOB OB SAUBT IMCOMB Of 

lHB,Ain> BX 


Private 
aadrion. 
emer- 
fBDoy 

gonm- 
imnt 

workers 


Public 

genoy 
workers 


Private 
and non- 

rency 
govern. 

mant 
workers 


Public 

eency 
workers 


Private 
andnon- 
enwr- 
frency 

nxnt 
workers 


Pnbllo 

lenoy 
workers 


enoed 

ffffil 
km 


THE TERRITORY— Continued 
V*BAl»-C0DtbllWd. 


1,M1 

*s 

10* 
17 
U 

781 

MM 
100.0 


1,217 
1,»S8 
3,716 
863 
102 
17 
10 
102 

•437 
100.0 


9 


16 
18 
14 

7 
3 


1,000 

1,686 

1179 

662 

83 

4 

2 

294 

3427 
100.0 


984 

1.666 

1186 

649 

62 

6 

3430 

loao 


6 

8 
6 


10 
13 
8 
3 

1 


341 
399 
666 
317 
61 
13 

487 
•460 

100.0 


231 
393 
•50 

313 
SO 
13 
9 
97 

•463 
100.0 


3 

1 












































3 

877 

3184 
100.0 


i 

100.0 


1 
288 

•168 
lOO.O 




»' 




2 


1 


Medton wage or lalBry InoonM tor pentmi 


MOiO 




100.0 


100.0 






10.2 
2.3 
3 7 
7.7 
0.6 

10 « 
0.3 

14.7 

8.7 
10.4 
4.0 
4.1 
1.4 

o.e 

0.9 
1.1 

U0.0 


2.1 
i2 
3 8 
8.4 
10.4 
11.4 
10.2 
16.4 

0.7 
11.6 
8.5 
4.6 
1.6 
0.7 
1.0 
0.4 

tn.0 




84.9 

i!i 

8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.4 
0.8 

0.6 
0.7 
0.4 
0.2 
0.2 
0.1 
0.4 
7,3 

100.0 


6 
2.2 
40 
60 
8 4 

11.0 
8 8 

16.1 

10.6 
14.1 
6.8 
6 4 
18 
0.6 
0.6 
0.8 

100.0 


2.6 
2.1 
3.8 
6.0 
8.4 

11.2 
8 9 

18.8 

11.1 
14.9 
7.2 

8.8 
1.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.4 

100.0 


6.9 
6.0 
9.9 
9 3 
19.0 
16.3 
14.2 
9.1 

4.7 
3.1 
1.6 
0.6 
0.1 


68.3 
29 
3.7 
1.8 
1.5 
1.4 
1.3 
13 

1.8 
1.7 
0.8 
0.5 
0.4 
0.1 
0.9 
10.8 

100.0 


16.7 
11 
3.3 

10.6 

10.8 
0.8 
9.9 

14.4 

6.8 
6.4 
19 
17 
1.3 
0.7 
1.2 

100.0 


1.7 
14 
3.8 
116 

lis 

11.6 
11.8 
17.1 

8.1 
7.6 
3.4 
3.3 
1.6 

a8 

1.3 
0.4 

100.0 


119 

6.8 
8.3 
10 8 
17 2 
19.1 
6.6 
3.7 

6.3 
12 
16 

18 
0.9 
0.3 


K.9 




6 
1 

IS 
16 
13 




6 
8 
8 
2 






















0.J 






4.8 
3.0 
1.7 
0.8 
0.2 


































1.3 


1.2 


1.8 




















K.2 
•.0 
0.3 
8.0 

a.& 

8.2 

4.6 
».S 

2.4 

6.1 
7.6 
3.4 
0.3 


7.2 
7.3 
11. « 
10.4 
12.8 
10.8 
0.0 
8.4 

4.4 

7.1 
0.0 
3.1 
0.4 
0.1 




86.8 
1.6 
1.3 
0.6 

as 

0.3 
0.2 
0.4 

0.2 
0.2 
0.2 

ai 


18.8 
7-1 

10.7 
0.1 

10.9 
9.1 
6.3 
7.4 

3.0 
6.2 
8.6 
2.1 
0.2 


6.7 
7.8 
12 2 
10.6 
12.8 
10.6 
6.1 
8.7 

4.8 
7.2 
9.9 
IS 
0.2 




84.2 
2.9 
10 
1.0 
0.5 
0.6 
0.3 
0.4 

0.3 
11.3 
0.2 
0.1 


45.1 
3.8 
5.4 
6.3 
7.3 
6.4 
3.1 
4.2 

13 
3.8 
6.3 
3.0 
0.6 
0.1 
0.1 
4.7 

16,869 


9.3 
5.5 
9.3 
9.6 
13.0 
11.6 
5.6 
7.4 

4.1 
6.8 
9.6 
6.6 
0.9 

a2 

0.2 

1.7 

11,130 
































































































































































12 
U.4M 


a4 

48, 4a 




7.9 
t,7U 


1.1 
3«,S«8 






7.3 
1,1« 




1^1 


HONOLULU CITY 
■nte. — 


i,m 


34,319 


1.184 


U 


t.m 




7,943 
StU) 
1,706 
^678 
2,800 
%M3 
SlBS 
\7«1 

t,tn 

608 

063 

1.083 

tssi 


1,602 
869 

i,m» 

2,636 
3.309 
1381 
1032 
6,682 

^384 
9,061 
4.738 

*.m 

1,443 
804 

904 

481 

«071 


lOO 
79 
131 
102 
168 
IM 
220 
111 

72 
36 
14 

8 
> 

1 
1 
16 

8440 


8,641 
81 
76 
41 
32 
28 
33 
69 

60 
68 

34 

23 

16 
8 

47 
636 

•676 


1,616 
666 
1,213 
1,166 
1.486 
1,774 
1,739 
4.661 

4.714 

7. WO 

3,987 

3,326 

967 

3M 

417 

637 

•091 


962 
644 

1,043 
1,040 
1,305 
1,610 
1,499 
4,506 

4,613 

7,861 

3, OS 

3,309 

946 

361 

302 

388 

31,021 


77 
70 
112 
96 
169 
146 
216 
108 

67 
35 
13 

7 
3 

1 

14 
•466 


617 
41 

% 
32 
19 

a 

46 

34 
34 

17 
10 
9 
3 
34 
136 

•584 


6.807 
334 
492 

1,622 

1,023 
789 
546 

I,U)1 

692 
1,222 
799 
961 
604 
349 
636 
406 

•733 


660 

316 

460 

1.408 

1,004 

771 

683 

1,074 

•71 
1,190 
780 
937 
406 
343 
613 

as 

•723 


33 
9 
9 

e 

9 

3 
3 

S 

1 
3 

1 
1 






u 


























































I 




unnii with II or num 


•aat 



> lDolod«6 BtetlvUa fcHT peaoDi for vbom the raoelpt or Donrwetpt of otber liuxmifi Id 1039 was not nported. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3150 



24 



HAWAII 



Tablb 16.— wage or salary INCOME AND RECEIPT OF OTHER INCOME IN 1939 FOR EXPERIENCED PER- 
SONS IN THE LABOR FORCE IN 1940, BY CLASS OF WORKER AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR 
HONOLULU CITY— Continued 



tPeroent not sbowu where Ism than 0.1; medlui 


or perMDt not sbown wbere base Is less than 100] 










ror^ 


WTTBOOT OTHBB 


INCOMB IN 


l.„. 


w.r.0T«.mc0M.„..» 




Total 


WBgeorulary 
workeR 


Otber 
experl- 

eooed 
persoDfl 
b labor 

tOTCt 


Total 


Wage or salary 
worken 


Otber 
experi- 
enced 
persons 
In labor 
force 


Total 


Wig« or salary 
wvrkera 


Otber 
experi- 
enced 
persons 
in labor 
force 


ABSA, WAOE OB 8AL1RT mCO« W 
W». IND BIX 


Private 
and noD- 

tenoy 
goTerO' 

lD«Dt 

workers 


Publlo 

gency 
workers 


Prfvate 
and non- 

gency 
govem- 


Public 
emer- 
genoy 
workers 


Private 
and nop- 

gMcy 
govern- 
ment 
workers 


Public 

genoy 
workers 


HONOLCLD CITY— Continued 
F«mal» 


U,rM 


11. in 


6T 


9, NO 


14,388 


11,840 


(1 


1,388 


5,470 


8,141 


1 


8,11! 




1.083 
i,aao 

1,301 
1.833 
1.771 
I.IOS 
1.71» 

837 

i.3ra 

1.750 
042 
71 
14 

a 

S£! 
1808 

100.0 


1,381 
1,008 
1.811 
1,274 
1,617 
1.763 
1,003 

i.eiB 

016 

1,S37 

1,744 

638 

89 

14 

6 

157 

(511 
100.0 


11 

13 
9 
1 
2 
3 
3 
6 

8 

8 

4 


,857 

40 
36 
IS 
18 
13 
33 

13 
14 
11 

4 
3 


1,922 
872 
1,391 
1,079 
1,348 
1,406 
888 
1,405 

749 

1,131 

1,430 

409 

36 

2 

3 

339 

1408 
IW.O 


866 
1.366 

ilsso 

1,391 

876 

1.389 

738 

1,108 

1,409 

407 

35 

2 

80 
8601 

100.0 


11 

12 
9 


1,056 
56 
27 
23 
5 
12 
9 
11 

7 
11 
7 
2 

1 


1317 
211 
369 
223 
386 
366 
320 
314 

188 
338 
339 
333 
35 
13 
7 
313 

8553 

100.0 


405 
304 
266 
217 
278 
363 
316 
303 

lat 

234 
335 

331 
34 

13 
5 

77 

•684 

ltt.t 




1,813 




• 






13 




1 






3 
2 
3 

6 

6 
7 
























? 


8 




3 




































3 
394 

8367 
100.0 




1 
159 

»21l 
I0t.t 








I 




1 


335 


Median wage or salary Income fbr per- 






Pemnt dlitribntloB 


ioe.0 


MO 














13.8 
1.9 

3.2 
6,0 
4.7 
4.8 
4.3 
10 8 

JOl 
17.1 

to 

8,0 
17 
1,1 
1,8 
1,0 

IMO 


3.3 

1.9 

a3 

6.6 
6.1 
5.3 
4.6 
13.3 

11.6 
19.0 
10.4 
9.3 
3.2 
1.3 
30 
1.1 

IM.0 


8.3 

6.6 
10.0 

8,6 
13,0 
12,8 
18,3 

0,2 

6.0 
3,0 
1,2 
0,7 
0.2 
0.1 
0.1 
1.3 


83.6 
8 
1.1 
0.6 
0.6 
0.4 
5 
1.0 

0.7 
1.0 
0.5 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0.7 
7,9 

lN.t 


4.8 
IS 
8,3 

VI 
4.9 
4,8 
12.8 

13 9 
31 7 
10,9 
9.1 
2.6 
1.0 

108.0 


2.8 
1.6 
8.0 
3,0 
3.8 
4.7 
4.4 
13.1 

13.4 
219 
11.6 
9.6 
28 
1.0 

LI 

itoo 


6.0 

8.2 
10 

8.6 
14.1 
lit 
19.4 

9.6 

6 
3.1 
1.1 
0.6 
0.3 
0.1 
0.1 
1.3 


65.8 
3.7 
6.2 
1.8 
2,0 
1.7 
10 
4.1 

1.1 
3.1 
1.5 
0.9 
0.8 
0.3 
12 
112 

108.0 


33.2 
10 
19 

to 

&I 
4.7 
3.2 
6,5 

4.1 
7.3 
4.7 
6.6 
3.0 
15 
3.3 
10 

loot 


4.9 
18 
4.3 
13.4 
9 
6.9 
4.8 
9.6 

6.0 
10.7 
7.0 
8.4 
4.5 
11 
4.6 
0.8 

1«.0 




81.1 






0.3 
















































t.I 




































7.1 






ltl.t 














31,0 

5,5 
8,4 
6,6 
&3 
»,0 
6.8 
8.7 

4.7 
8.0 
8.0 
3.2 
0.4 
0.1 


7.8 

6.3 
10.0 

7.9 
10.0 
10.8 

6.7 
10. S 

6.7 
8.3 
10.8 
3.9 
0.4 
0.1 




81.9 
1.8 
1.1 
7 
4 
5 
0.4 
6 

4 

0:3 
0.1 
0.1 


13.6 
6.1 
9.7 
7.6 
9.4 
• 8 
8.3 
9.8 

5.3 
7.8 
9.9 
3.9 
0.8 


6.7 
8.J 

10.8 

8.2 

ia4 

10.8 
8.8 
10.8 

5.7 
8.6 
11.0 
3.3 
3 




76 3 
4.0 
1.9 
It 
0.4 
O.t 
0.6 
t.8 

t.l 
t 8 
0.5 
0.1 
t.l 


40.6 
3.9 
4.9 
4.1 
5.2 
6.7 
4.t 
6.7 

3.4 
4.4 

6.3 
4.3 
0.8 
0.2 
t.l 
6.7 


111 
6 1 
7.6 
6.8 
8.3 

It. 8 
8.4 
tit 

6.4 

7.0 
10.0 
8.9 
1.0 
0.4 
t.l 
It 














0.8 






































































0.8 
























































01 
11.3 








6.1 
11. t 








Z8 


1.0 




1.7 


0.8 










' 









1 Inctadn statlstlca for iienont for wbom the receipt or nonreoeipt ot other li 



I ItSt was not reported . 



3160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION 



25 



Tablb 17.— wage or salary INCOME AND RECEIPT OF OTHER INCOME IN 1939 FOR PERSONS WHO WERE 
WAGE OR SALARY WORKERS (EXCEPT PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORKERS) IN 1940, BY MONTHS WORKED 
IN 1939 AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY 









[Percent 


Qot Shown where less than 


0,1) 


















«,». 


WITBOUT OTHBR INCOHK IN 1939 1 


w„aoTH„n.c<,«n,.». 


"'*' "■*''lMrAN*D'*i\ "■'"'*'" ™ 


Tolal 


Less 
thane 
months 

and 
not re- 
ported 


6 to 8 
months 


9 ton 

months 


13 
months 


Total 


Less 
thane 
months 

and 
not re- 
ported 


eto8 
months 


9toll 

months 


12 

months 


Total 


Less 

thane 
months 

ported 


etos 
months 


9toll 
months 


12 
months 


THE TERRITORY 

VAlfl 


1M.U1 


11, CM 


9,111 


16,378 


97,928 


73,eo< 


7,276 


5,944 


10,056 


10,330 


«,98B 


•3,788 


3,177 


e,s»j 


«T,gie 






2.882 
3.040 
S. 168 
11.330 
13.908 

)!,. ua 

13.720 
2I.I)2» 

13.001 
16. 521 
7.352 
6,182 
2,105 
930 
1.281 
916 

$527 
ST, 870 


2.361 

2.715 

2,737 

1,368 

680 

339 

188 

166 

95 
77 
39 
35 
19 
5 
10 
227 

$156 
6,075 


37 

142 

1.484 

1.963 

1.977 

1,187 

669 

825 

.160 
251 
91 
34 
11 
3 
6 
51 

$347 
3, DOS 

23 
152 
907 
805 
4C0 
149 

88 

lie 

74 
60 
26 

5 

1 


85 
42 
4.'4 
1.0S4 
2.466 
3.3.19 
2,320 
2.408 

1.4-6 

1.318 

596 

467 

135 

56 
89 

$531 

4.999 


370 
141 
493 
6.915 
S.786 
10,381 
in. .M3 
18.530 

11,040 
13. 875 
6.626 
.5.646 
1.940 
878 
1,209 
649 

$721 
18,908 


1.846 
1,581 
2.844 
3.692 
6,128 
8.201 
6.516 
11,. 526 

8.01)3 
10,913 
5.276 
4.231 
1,187 
446 
. 462 
663 

$714 

«,i:7 


1.759 
l,37<i 
1.788 
962 
524 
263 
143 
125 

65 
51 
24 
IS 
6 

160 

$172 
5,225 


12 
107 
617 
1,217 
1.289 
830 
528 
656 

333 
205 
72 
28 
6 
1 
2 
41 

$.178 
8,425 


8 

168 
544 

1..W7 
1,883 
1.229 
1,530 

1,117 
1.042 

342 
79 
22 
18 
66 

$570 
5,927 


71 
261 
969 
2,806 
6,22s 
4,616 
9,215 

6,578 

9.615 

4.706 

3.843 

1.090 

423 

440 

396 

$854 

10,550 


l.i)16 
1.459 
2.324 
7,618 
7,782 
7,042 
7.204 
10.403 

4,908 

4.608 

2.076 

1.051 

918 

4IM 

819 

263 

$549 
6,743 


1,339 
939 
406 
1.56 
76 

41 

30 
26 
15 
17 
13 
5 

67 

$123 
850 


25 

36 
867 
746 
088 
367 

169 

57 
46 
19 
6 
5 
2 

10 

$290 
480 


77 

286 
540 
958 
1.466 
1.091 
878 

3.59 
276 
122 
125 
56 
22 
38 
23 

$490 
1.061 














6,»4e 

6,980 
5.153 
5,927 
9,315 

4,402 
4,260 
1,920 




JWOto J4W 












$3,000 to W.999 


844 










Median waso or salary income for per- 


$m 
>,au 






None 


1.9M 
2.112 
3,249 
2.868 
3.530 
2.979 

I.e.™ 

2,311 

1,217 
1.958 
2.716 
862 
102 
17 
10 
284 

•435 

100.0 


1.6.56 
1.7^>3 
1,567 
462 
176 
123 
78 
73 

24 
23 
8 
5 


37 

249 
- 5."^ 
650 
458 
2!0 
252 

221 
423 

'389 
41 
8 

1 
26 

$816 

lOOO 


278 
126 
526 

1214 
2,240 
1.252 
1,873 

80S 

1,452 

1,289 

463 

60 

8 

9 

163 

$646 

100.0 


1:795 

2,' 325 

1320 
1.337 
1.887 

984 

1.666 

2,160 

649 

52 

4 

1 

187 

$427 

100,0 


1,417 

■ 1, 573 

1.341 

.395 

151 

63 

19 

19 
5 

1 


7 
IZ'. 
765 
684 
416 
131 

89 

ei 

15 

1 


6 
31 
203 
439 
516 
360 
210 
199 

195 
336 
1,134 
260 
18 
2 


30 

66 

404 

807 

1,6<« 

1,72s 

994 

1,543 

709 

1,169 

1,012 

287 

33 

2 

1 

76 

$552 

100.0 


.534 
317 
536 

669 

• 32! 

427 

233 

393 
660 
313 
50 
13 
9 
07 

$163 

100.0 




134 

98 
30 
63 

26 
87 
260 
120 
23 
6 
1 
7 

$981 

'.00.0 






220 
226 
67 
25 
22 
15 
17 

5 

3 


27 
142 
121 
74 
18 
18 
27 

13 
9 
10 




















































1 














87 
$121 
100.0 


9 
$247 
100.0 


84 
$122 
100.0 


9 

$246 
100.0 


18 
$793 
100.0 


3 
$137 
100.0 


$252 
100.0 




Medfan wage or salary income for per- 




Percent distribution 








None 


2.1 
2 3 
3.8 
8.4 
10.3 
II. 3 
10.2 
18. J^ 

9.7 
11.5 
5.5 
4.6 
l.G 
7 
1.0 
0.7 

100.0 


2U4 
24,5 
24 7 
12.4 
6,1 
3.1 
1.7 
1.5 

9 
7 
0.4 
3 
2 

■" o.i 

2.1 
100.0 


4 
1.6 
16.3 
21.5 
21.7 
13.0 
7.3 
9.0 

4.3 
2.8 
1,0 
4 
0.1 

' d'i' 

0.6 
100.0 


5 
0.3 
2.8 
6,6 
15.1 
20.4 
14.2 
14.7 

9,0 
8,0 
3.6 
2,9 
8 
0,3 
3 
5 

100.0 


4 
1 
5 
7.1 
9.0 
10 6 
10.8 
18.9 

11.3 
14 2 
6,8 
6 8 
2,0 
0,9 
1,2 
0,6 

100,0 


2,5 
2,1 
3.9 
5,0 
8.3 

11 1 
8.9 

15.7 

11,0 
14.8 
7,2 
5.7 
1,6 
0.6 
0,6 
9 

100.0 


24,2 
18,9 
24,7 
13.2 
7.2 
a. 6 
ZO 
1.7 

0.9 
7 
3 
0,2 
1 


2 
1,8 

10 4 
20.5 
21.7 
14 
8,9 
11.0 

6,6 
3,4 

1 2 
0,6 
01 


1 
3 

6 4 

18 7 
12.2 
15,2 

10:4 
4,7 
3.4 
8 
0.2 
0.2 
7 

100.0 


1 
1 
5 
1,9 
6 6 

10.4 
9 2 

18.3 

13 1 
19,1 
9,4 
7,0 
2,2 
0,8 
9 
0,8 

100.0 


1.7 
2.4 
3.8 
12,6 
12.8 
11,6 
11,8 
17.1 

8,1 
7,6 
3,4 
3.2 
1,5 
8 
1.3 
4 

100.0 


16,0 
3,5,3 
24,8 
10 7 
4.1 

io 

1,2 
1.1 

0.8 
7 
4 
0,4 
3 
0,1 
2 
1,8 

100.0 


8 

27^1 
23,6 
21.7 
11.2 

6:3 

1.8 

o!6 

2 
2 

li 
100.0 


1.2 
2 
4.5 

8.6 
15.2 
23,0 
17,3 
13.9 

5,7 

1:9 
2.0 
8 
3 

oe 

4 
100.0 




$lto$99.--.- 

$100to»190__ 

t200tO$299 .; 

«00to$390.-- 

J400to$4M--- 


0.1 
0.5 

12.5 
12.6 
10.8 
































2.2 
100.0 


"0.7 
1W.I1 


















7.2 
7.6 
11.7 
10 3 
12.7 
10- 
5.9 
8.3 

4.4 

7.0 
».7 
3.1 
0.4 
01 


27,3 
29, S 
25, S 
7,6 
2,9 
2.0 
1,3 
1.2 

0.4 
4 
0.1 
0.1 


0,8 
5,2 
31,2 
27.7 
16,9 
5.1 
3.0 
4.0 

2,5 
2.1 
0.9 
0.2 


7 
8 
6.0 
111 
13.0 
0,2 
4.8 
5.1 

4 4 

8.6 
28,0 
7.8 
8 
02 


2,0 
9 
3,8 
7 5 
1.S.9 
16.2 
9.0 
13.5 

6,6 
10 4 
9,3 
3.3 
0,4 
0,1 
0,1 
1.2 


6,6 
8.1 
12,3 
10 5 
12,6 
10 6 
6.0 
8.6 

4.4 

7.1 
9,8 
2.6 
2 


27. r 

301 
25.7 
7.6 
2.9 
1.9 
1.2 
1.1 

4 

0,4 
0.1 


3 

5.2 
, 31.6 
28.2 
17,2 
6,4 
2.9 
3.7 

2.5 
2.1 
0.6 


2 
8 
6 2 
11.2 
13,1 
9.2 
5,3 
6.1 

6 
8-6 
28.9 
6.6 
5 
0.1 


3 
0.6 
3.8 

16.1 
16,4 
9.4 
14.6 

6.7 
11.0 

2:7 
0.3 


9,3 
5.5 
9,3 
9.6 
13 
11,5 
6 6 
7.4 

4.1 

6.8 

9.e 

6.5 
0.9 
2 
0.2 
1.7 


28.1 
2.5.9 
26 e 

2^9 

lis 

2.0 

6 
5 
4 
6 


29,6 
25,2 
15 4 
3,7 
3.7 
5.8 

2,7 
1.9 
2.1 
8 


0:9 
4.4 
10 8 
12.7 
9.3 
2.8 
6.0 

2,6 
82 
24 6 
12.2 
2.2 
0.6 
0,1 
7 


7.4 










$200 to $29(1 


7.2 


















































2 


















Not reported » 


1.0 


1.4 


0.3 


0.5 


6.8 


1.6 


4 


5 


0.7 


04. 




2.6 



< Includes statistics for persons for whom tbe receipt or uonreceipt of other Income in 1939 was not reported. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



3161 



26 



HAWAII 



Tablm 17.— wage or salary INCOME AND RECEIPT OF OTHER INCOME IN 1939 FOR PERSONS WHO WERE 
WAGE OR SALARY WORKERS (EXCEPT PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORKERS) IN 1940, BY MONTHS WORKED 
IN 1939 AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY— Continued 
[Percent o