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Given By
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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 18
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 129 THROUGH 1S6
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
i^, JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAEL HAEBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
;,. (As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 18
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 129 THROUGH 156
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79716 WASHINGTON : 1946
\'l<f^ '■ Pi If ,9^
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL /
HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS. Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Mlchl- tive from California
gan FRANK B. KEEFB, Representative from
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin
North Carolina
COUNSEL
(Throagh January 14, 1946)
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel
JULE M. Hannafoed, Assistant Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel
Samdel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel
JOHN E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Pari
Pages
Transcript
Xo.
pages
1
1- 399
1- 1058
2
401- 982
1059- 2586
3
983-1583
2587- 4194
4
1585-2063
4195- 5460
0
2065-2492
5461- 6646
6
2493-2920
6647- 7888
7
2921-3378
7889- 9107
8
3379-3927
9108-10517
9
3929-4599
10518-12277
10
4601-5151
12278-13708
11
5153-5560
13709-14765
Hearings
Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19
Nov. 23, 24, 26 to
Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10,
Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18
Dec. 31, 1945, and
Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18,
Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25,
Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1
Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12
Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19,
Apr. 9 and 11, and
, 20, and 21, 1945.
30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
11, 12, and 13, 1945.
19, 20, and 21, 1945.
Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
19, and 21, 1946.
26, 28, and 29, 1946.
, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
, 13, and 14, 1946.
and 20, 1946.
May 23 and 31. 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
Xo. Exhibits Nos.
12 1 through 6.
13 7 and 8.
14 9 through 43.
15 44 through 87.
16 88 through 1 10.
17 111 through 128.
18 129 through 156.
19 157 through 172.
20 173 through 179.
21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
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J: '^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2875
EXHIBIT NO. 129
2876 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2877
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, May 26, 1941.
Op-12B-5-McC
(SC)A16(R-5)
Serial 060512
From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Distribution List for WPL-46.
Subject: Promulgation of Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46).
Enclosures:
(A) Pages for WPL-46, Registered No. 92, including List of Effective Pages.
(B) Receipt form in duplicate.
1. Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46) is promulgated herewith.
2. Report receipt, and check of contents, on the form provided as enclosure (B).
3. The highest priority in the preparation of war plans is assigned to plans
required by WPL-46.
4. It is desired that the preparation and distribution of these plans be accom-
plished with the least possible delav. To this end, all planning based upon the
directives of WPL-13, WPL-14. WPL-42, and WPL-44 will be discontinued
until plans based upon WPL-46 are completed.
5. Appendix II, Chapter IX, prescribing the coinposition of the Naval Trans-
portation Service will be issued as a change to this plan. If this plan is executed
prior to the issue of Chapter IX, specific directives will be issued to provide for
the initial .sea transportation requirements of the plan.
6. The extreme importance of the security of this Navy Basic War Plan —
Rainbow No. 5, cannot be over-emphasized. In this respect, attention is invited
to the instructions contained in "The System of War Planning", and in the
"Registered Publication Manual'^
7. Plans and estimates of requirements for the preparation for war service of
vessels to be taken over from private sources, as indicated in the tables of Appendix
II, will be classified as confidential. Attention is invited to paragraph 1105 of
WPL-8.
[ii] 8. This plan shall not be carried in aircraft except by authority of the
Chief of Naval Operations, and when not in u.se shall be kept in Class "A"
stowage as prescribed in the "Registered Publication Manual".
9. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY POR-
TIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY
FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, EXCEPT IN SUBORDI-
NATE PLANS BASED UPON THIS PUBLICATION.
H. R. Stark.
[ill]
Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5.
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES
Subject Matter
Letter of Promulgation, CNO Secret Serial 060512, (SC)A16(R-5)
of May 26, 1941.
List of Effective Pages _
Table of Corrections .
Distribution List
Title Page
Table of Contents _
Introduction
Part I _...
V, VK
1
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' I'aj;es referred to are inilieated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent i)ages
of original exhibit.
Chart
Part I (Cont'd).
Part II
Part III
Part IV
Part V
Appendix I
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in Effect
2878 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Navy Basic War Plan — Rainboic No. 5 — Continued
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAiGlES— Continued
Subject Matter
Appendix II:
Title Page
Chapter I
Chapter II
Table ATF-1...
Chapter III
Table PAF-1...
Table PAF-2..
Chapter IV:
Table SEP-1_
Chapter V:
Table ASF-1
Chapter VI___-
Table NE-1
Table NE-2
Chapter VII:
Table CNO-1 ,
Chapter VIII ..
Table NACF.
Table SCF _
Table CACF
Table PACF.
Table PSCF
Table PNCF....
Table HCF ..
Table PhCF
Chapter IX.-.
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• Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages
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Uv] TABLE OF CORRECTIONS
R. P. M. or Change No.
Date of
entry
Signature and rank of officer entering change.
1
26-7-14
Marion L. Monsen Ens. U. S. N. R.
Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, June 3, 1941-
Op-12B-5-McC
(SC)A16(R-5)
Serial 064112 ^
Secret
From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Distribution List for WPI^46.
Subject: Change No. 1, WPL-46.
1. Make the following pen and ink corrections to WPL-46:
(a) On Page 45
Paragraph 3511.a.2.(f), first line— Change 13,400 to 6,400.
Paragraph 3511.a.2(g), first line — Change 23,600 to 12,600.
Paragrat)h 3511.a.2.(i), first line— Change 44,000 to 23,000.
(b) On Page 80
Paragraph 4601, first line, — after "will be" insert "prepared as".
(c) On Page SO of Appendix I
Paragraph 51. a. (13), first line — Change 13,400 to 6,400.
Paragraph 51. a. (14), first line— Change 23,600 to 12,600.
(d) On Page 31 of Appendix I
Paragraph 51. a. (16), first line — (Change 44,000 to 23,000.
2. Insert this letter in the front of WPL-46.
3. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the
addressees in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore
authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the
continental limits of the United States.
R. E. Ingersoll, Acting.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2879
[VI DISTRIBUTION LIST
Official to whom issued Registered Nos
Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. - 1
Commander, Battle Force 2
Commander, Battleships, Battle Force.. - - - 3
Commander, Battleship Division One (issue withheld) - 4
Commander, Battleship Division Two (issue withheld) - 5
Commander, Battleship Division Three 6
Commander, Battleship Division Five - - - 7
Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force.. - 8
Commander, Cruiser Division Three, Battle Force - 9
Commander, Destroyers, Battle Force 10
Commander, Aircraft, Battle Force. - - - 11
Commander, Minecraft. Battle Force -- --- --- 12
Commander, Scouting Force - 13
Commander, Cruisers, Scouting Force - - 14
Commander, Aircraft, Scouting Force - 15
Commander, Submarines, Scouting Force — - - 16
Commander, Base Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet 17
Commander in Chief, U. S. Atlantic Fleet. 18
Commander, Cruisers, Atlantic Fleet. - 19
Commander, Cruiser Division Two, Atlantic Fleet - 20
Commander, Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet - - - 21
Commander, Aircraft, Atlantic Fleet 22
Commander, Submannes, Atlantic Fleet - 23
Commander, Support Force, Atlantic Fleet - - --- 24
Commander, Train, Atlantic Fleet -- 25
Commander in Chief. U. S. Asiatic Fleet --- 26
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Division --- 27
Commanding General, Second Marine Division - - 28
Operations— Director, War Plans Division. - 29,30,31
— Director, Naval Intelligence Division - 32
—Director, Naval Communications Division --- 33
— Director. Fleet Maintenance Division.. -- 34
— Director, Ship Movements Division... - 35
— Director, Naval Districts Division 36
—Director, Naval Transportation Service (Issued to Director, Ship Movements
D i vision) - - - 37
Chief of Bureau of Navigation -.- 38,39
Chief of Bureau of Ordnance. 40
Chief of Bureau of Ships - - - 41
Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks -- 42
Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics. - -- -- 43
Chief of Bureau of Supplies and Accounts ' 44,45
Chief of Bureau of Medicine and Surgery ■ . 46
[VI] Judge Advocate General, U. S. Navy 47
Major General Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps. -. 48
Director, Shore Establishment Division (Oificeof Assistant Secretary of the Navy) 49
War Plans Division, General Staff, War Department 50
President, Naval War College. 51
Commandant, First Naval District... - 52,53
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland 54
Commandant, Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N. H 55
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Newport, R. I. 56
Commandant, Third Naval District. - 57,58
Commandant, Fourth Naval District— 59,60
Commandant, Fifth Naval District 61,62
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Bermuda 63
Commandant, Sixth Naval District - 64,65
Commandant, Seventh Naval District .-.' - 66
Commandant, Eighth Naval District—. .-. 67,68
Commandant, Ninth Naval District 69
Commandant, Tenth Naval District 70
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba 71
Commandant, Naval Operating Base, Trinidad .-. 72
Commandant, Eleventh Naval District - -- 73,74
Commandant, Twelfth Naval District 75,76
Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District. 77,78
Commandant. Fourteenth Naval District 79
Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District 80
Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District .-. 81
Commanding General. Department of Pacific, U. S. Marine Corps, San Francisco, California.— 82
Commanding General, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va.. 83
Commanding General, Marine Corps Base, San Diego, Calif 84
Commandant, Naval Station, Tutuila, Samoa— - 85
United States Military Mission in London 86,87
United States Naval Attache, Ottawa, Canada... 88
British Military Mission in Washington 89
U. S. Naval Attache, Melbourne, Australia - 90
Registered Publication Section, — Working Copy 91
Registered Publication Section, —Library Copy .-. - 92
Registered Publication Section, —Reserve Copies -.. 93,
94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107
2880 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Op-12B-McC Navy Dkpahtment,
(SC)A16(R-5) Officer of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Serial 071912 Washington, July 1, 1941.
Secret
From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Distribution List for WPL-46.
Subject: The establishment of Naval Coastal Frontiers.
Reference :
(a) GO No. 142.
(b> GO No. 143.
(c) WPL-46.
1. The Naval Coastal Frontiers prescribed in paragraphs 3122, 3232 and 3312
of WPL-46 are hereby established.
2. The boundaries of the Naval Coastal Frontiers are as prescribed in Annex I,
Appendix I, WPL-46.
3. The command relations prescribed in Part III, Chapter I, Section 3, and
Part III, Chapter II, Section 4, of WPL-46, are hereby made effective and, in
accordance with the provisions of these sections, the conflicting provisions of
General Order No. 142 are suspended.
4. For the present, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces as prescribed in General
Order No. 143 will not be formed. Vessels assigned to Naval Districts and Naval
Stations will continue in these assignments, and, until further orders, new assign-
ments of vessels will be made to Naval Districts or Naval Stations, rather than to
Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, Naval Coastal Forces, or Naval Local Defense
Forces.
5. The Bureau of Navigation will issue orders assigning officers to additional
duties as Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers as indicated:
Commandant, 3rd Naval District — Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal
Frontier;
Commandant, 6th Naval District — Commander, Southern Naval Coastal
Frontier;
Commandant, 10th Naval District — Commander, Caribbean Naval Coastal
Frontier;
Commandant, 15th Naval District — Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Fron-
tier;
Commandant, 12th Naval District — Commander, Pacific Southern Naval
Frontier;
Commandant, 13th Naval District — Commander, Pacific Northern Naval
Frontier;
Commandant, 14th Naval District — Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal
Frontier;
Commandant, 16th Naval District — Commander, Philippine Naval Coastal
Frontier.
6. The establishment of the Naval Coastal Frontiers, and the orders to the
commanders thereof, is assigned a RESTRICTED classification. The limits of
the Naval Coastal Frontiers remains in a SECRET classification. Correspond-
ence relating to Naval Coastal Frontiers will be classified according to its nature.
7. Transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental
limits of the United States is authorized.
/s/ H. R. Stark.
[1] W. P. L.— 46
NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN— RAINBOW NO. 5, UNITED STATES
NAVY
[S] TABLE OF CONTENTS
Subject Page '
Introduction:
Chapter I. Origin, Basis, and Scope of this Plan - 5
Chapter II. Execution of this Plan 6
Section 1. Execution of the Entire Plan - 6
Section 2. Execution of a part of this Plan - 7
Chapter III. Aprcements with Associated Powers other than the British Commonwealth 8
Part I. Task Organization, Information and Assumptions:
Chapter I. Task Organization. .. 9
Chart Areas of Responsibility of the Associated Powers — 11
Chapter II. Information and .\ssumptions -- 12
' Pa^es referred to are indicated by italic fl^ures enclosed by brackets and represent pages
of original exhibit.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2881
TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued
Subject Page'
Part II. Outline of Tasks:
Ciiapter I. Concept of tiie War. , - - 13
Ciiapter II. The General Task - 14
Part III. Assignment of Tasks:
Chapter I. Forces in the Western Atlantic Area - - 15
Section 1. The U. S. Atlantic Fleet - - 15
Section 2. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces - 21
Sections. Command Relations - - - -- 25
Chapter II. Forces in the Pacific Area -- 27
Section 1. The U. S. Pacific Fleet _ - -.. 27
Section 2. The Southeast Pacific Force... - - 31
Section 3. The Naval Coastal Frontier Forces 33
Section 4. Command Relations 36
Chapter III. Forces in the Far East Area 38
Section 1. The U. S. Asiatic Fleet and the Philippine Naval Coastal Frontier 38
Chapter IV. Forces in the United Kingdom and British Home Waters Area, 42
Section 1. The U. S. Naval Forces, North Europe.. 42
Chapter V. The Services _ -- 44
Section 1. The Naval Transportation Service 44
Section 2. The Naval Communication Service .-- 47
Section 3. The Naval Intelligence Service - - --. 48
Chapter VI. The Shore Establishment --- 49
Chapter VII. Instructions lointly Applicable to Task Forces 50
Section 1. Forming the Task Forces. 50
Section 2. Mobilizat ion ^.. 51
[.'?] Sections. The Routing and Protection of Shipping .-. 53
Section 4. Rules of Warfare 58
Section ,5. Intelligence Liaison between Commanders of Associated Forces in the Field - 60
Pnri IV. Logistics:
Chapter I. The Shore Establishment 61
Chapter II. Oeneral Directives. . 62
Section 1. Personnel --- 62
Section 2. Material - 63
Section 3. Transportation 64
Section 4. Legal Services -- 66
Section !>. Augmentation and Maintenance of the Shore Establishment 67
Section 6. Priorities _ 68
Chapter III. The Operating Forces and Services - - 69
Section 1. Preparation for War Service ^ 69
Section 2. Maintenance - 73
Section 3. Augmentation 77
Chapter I V . Ad vanced Bases 78
Chapter V. Salvage . 79
Chapter VI. Plans to be prepared by the Shore Establishment 80
Part V. Special Provisions:
Chapter I. Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure 81
Chapter II. .loint Plans Covering Intelligence Service, Censorship and Publicity, and Mobiliza-
tion of Resources 82
APPENDICES
Appendix I. The Joint .\rmy and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 1-36
Annex I. Coastal Frontiers 37-51
[4] Appendix II. The Composition of Forces
Title Page 1
C hapter I . Introduction . 2
Chapter II. The U. S. Atlantic Fleet 4
Table ATF-1 --- --- - - Sheets 1 to 3
Chapter III. The U. S. Pacific Fleet -- 6
Table PAF-l Sheets 1 to 3
Table PAF-2- - Sheet 1
Chapter IV. The Southeast Pacific Force
Table SEP-1 - _•- Sheet 1
Chapter V. The U. S. Asiatic Fleet
Table ASF-1 - ---- - -- -- Sheets 1,2
Chapter VI. U. S. Naval Forces, North Europe - 7
Table NE-1 Sheet 1
Table NE-2 - Sheet 1
Chapter VII. Vessels Operating under the Chief of Naval Operations
Table CNO-l... - - --- - Sheet 1
Chapter VIII. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces - 8
Table NACF - -- ..-- Sheets 1 to 5
Table SCF Sheets 1 to 4
Table CACF - Sheet 1
Table PACE ---- - Sheet 1
Table PSCF - Sheets 1 to 3
Table PNCF ..-. Sheet 1
Table IICF -- Sheet 1
Table PhCF - Sheet 1
Chapter IX. Naval Transportation Service _. H
' Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages
of original exhibit.
2882 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[6] Introduction
chapter i. origin, basis, and scope ov this plan
0101. This Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5 was prepared under the
direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.
0102. It is based upon the Report of the United States-British Staflf Conver-
sations (Short Title ABC-1), the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan
(Short Title ABC-22), and the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan— Rainbow
No. 5.
0103. The United States-British Staflf Conversations (ABC-1) and the Joint
Canada-United States Defense Plan (ABC-22) will be given only a limited dis-
tribution to holders of this plan. These documents are referred to in this plan
by their short titles. Their essential features, so far as concerns war operations,
are incorporated in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5,
which is included in this plan as Appendix I.
0104. This plan provides for the initial organization, composition of forces and
tasks for the Naval Establishment in a Rainbow No. 5 War.
0105. After the execution of this plan has been directed, no attempt will be
made to maintain the tables of Appendix II corrected up to date. Changes in
the composition of forces will be made by direction of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions and shown subsequently in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization
of the Seagoing Forces of the U. S. Navy," and in the "Assignment of Units to
Naval Districts and Naval Stations."
[6] CHAPTER n. EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN
Section 1. EXECUTION OF THE ENTIRE PLAN
0211. a. Upon the receipt of the following ALNAV despatch, the Naval
Establishment will proceed with the execution of this plan in its entirety, includ-
ing acts of war: "EXECUTE NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN RAINBOW No. 5".
b. The date of the above despatch will be M-day unless it has been otherwise
designated.
[7] Section 2. EXECUTION OF A PART OF THIS PLAN
0221. A preliminary period of strained relations of uncertain duration is antici-
pated, during which time certain preliminary steps provided for in this plan may
be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.
0222. Mobilization may be directed prior to directing the execution of this plan
or any part, thereof. The order to mobilize does not authorize acts of war.
0223. This plan may be executed in part by a despatch indicating the nations
to be considered enemy, the tasks to be executed, or excepted, and the preliminary
measures to be taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan or addi-
tional tasks thereof.
[8] CHAPTER III. AGREEMENTS WITH ASSOCIATED POWERS OTHER THAN THE
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH
0301. The substance of agreements reached with Associated Powers other than
those with the British Commonwealth, including Canada, insofar as they relate
to the operation of naval forces, will be made available to the holders of this plan,
as soon as made, by revision of this Chapter III of the Introduction.
0302. Brazil, for the purposes of defense of the Western Hemisphere, has
agreed to permit United States naval forces to use the ports of RECIFE and
BAHIA.
a. There is at present no time limit on the duration of stay in these ports.
b. They are available for refreshment and upkeep, and for the purchase and
delivery of fuel, consumable supplies and fresh provisions within the limited
cap>acities of the ports.
c. A United States Naval Observer is stationed at eac)i port.
d. On first entry, two days confidential advance notice of arrival should be
given to the United States Naval Observer at the port via the United States
Naval Attache, Rio de Janeiro. This notice should include information in regard
to communicable diseases and last port visited. Pratique and customs clearance
are not required.
e. For repeated entry, incident to extended op>eration8 in the vicinity, local
arrangemeints as to notice may be made with the Brazilian Captain of the Port,
through the United States Naval Observer.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2883
[9] Part I. Task Organization. Information and Assumptions
CHAPTER I. TASK ORGANIZATION
1101. The task organization, by which this Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow
No. 5 will be executed, under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, is
prescribed below:
a. THE OPERATING FORCES, under command of the Chief of Naval
Operations,
1. THE UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET, under command of
the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.
2. THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, under command of the
Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
3. THE UNITED STATES SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, under
command of the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE.
4. THE UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET, under command of the
Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.
5. THE UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE,
under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES,
NORTH EUROPE.
6. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, under the command
of the Commanders, NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, consisting of:
(a) THE NAVAL COASTAL FORCES;
(b) THE NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES.
b. THE SERVICES, under command of the Chief of Naval Operations.
1. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE.
2. THE NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE.
3. THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.
c. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT, under the direction of the appropriate
Chiefs of Bureaus, and Heads of Offices of the Navy Department.
[10] 1102. Major areas of command and instructions concerning responsi-
bility for the strategic direction of military forces therein are set forth in Appendix
I, "Section V". In paragraph 3222 of this plan is defined an additional subarea,
designated as the "SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA." In Annex I, of Ap-
pendix I, are the sub-areas which are included in the Naval Coastal Frontiers.
1103. Command over naval forces in the areas and sub-areas for which the
United States has accepted responsibility for the strategic direction of operations
will be exercised by the appropriate United States naval commanders listed in
paragraph 1101 a. of this plan, subject to the special conditions set forth in
Appendix I, "Section V."
79716 O— 46 — pt. 18-
2884 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(-1
Ui
liJ
'Si
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2885
[12] CHAPTER II. INFORMATION AND ASSUMPTIONS
1201. Assumptions are as stated in Appendix I, "Section III."
[13] Part II. Outline of Tasks
CHAPTER I. concept OF THE WAR
2101. The Concept of the War is as stated in Appendix I, "Section IV."
[14] CHAPTER II. THE GENERAL TASK
2201. The Joint Army and Navy General Task is set forth in paragraph 24 of
Appendix I.
2202. The Navy General Task is as follows:
a. The Naval Establishment, in cooperation with the Army and the forces of
the other Associated Powers, will:
1. Destroy Axis sea communications in the WESTERN ATLANTIC
AREA, in the PACIFIC AREA east of 180°, and through the MALAY
BARRIER in the FAR EAST AREA;
2. Raid Axis forces and sea communications in the PACIFIC and FAR
EAST AREAS, and in the EASTERN ATLANTIC and the WESTERN
MEDITERRANEAN;
3. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers in United
States Areas, and support the defense of sea communications in the UNITED
KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, in the FAR EAST
AREA, and to the eastward of AUSTRALIA;
4. Prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or
Asiatic military p>ower, and support the defense of the territory of the Asso-
ciated Powers in the FAR EAST AREA; and
5. Prepare to capture the AZORES, CAPE VERDE, MARSHALL, and
CAROLINE ISLANDS.
[15] Part III. Assignment of Tasks
CHAPTER I. forces IN THE WESTERN ATLANTIC AR£A
Section 1. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET
3111. The U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET (Chapter II, Appendix II) will initially
be organized into task forces as follows:
a. OCEAN ESCORT;
b. STRIKING FORCE;
c. SOUTHERN PATROL FORCE;
• d. SUBMARINE FORCE ONE;
e. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO;
f. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE;
g. NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE;
h. U. S. NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA;
i. ADDITIONAL TASK FORCES AS DIRECTED BY THE COM-
MANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.
3112. The U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within
the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA:
a. TASK
PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED
POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING, AS
REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY
RAIDING FORCES (see Part III, Chapter V, Section 1) ;
b. TASK
DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR
DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY
WITH THE ENEMY;
[16] c. TASK
PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS
AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY MILITARY POWER
INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, BY DESTROYING HOSTILE
EXPEDITIONARY FORCES AND BY SUPPORTING LAND AND
2886 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE OF LAND
POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE;
d. TASK
IN COOPERATION WITH BRITISH FORCES AND THE U. S.
ARMY, DEFEND BERMUDA IN CATEGORY "C":
e. TASK
COVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE U. S. NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER FORCES;
f. TASK
PREPARE TO OCCUPY THE AZORES AND THE CAPE VERDE
ISLANDS.
3113. a. So far as practicable, the naval forces in the WESTERN ATLANTIC
AREA will be covered and supported against attack by superior enemy surface
forces, by the naval forces of the Associated Powers which are operating from
bases in the UNITED KINGDOM and the EASTERN ATLANTIC.
b. Forces operating normally in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH
HOME WATERS AREA, the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, and the SOUTH
ATLANTIC AREA, which move temporarily into the WESTERN ATLANTIC
AREA in pursuance of their assigned tasks, will remain under the strategic direc-
tion of the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff. They will be supported bv the
naval forces in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA as necessary and practicable.
3114. a. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will operate under the strategic direc-
tion of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until its arrival in
the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.
[17] b. This force will be assigned the following task by the Commander in
Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET:
L TASK
PROCEED FROM BASES IN THE UNITED STATES TO
GIBRALTAR, WHEN SO DIRECTED BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS.
c. After arrival of SUBMARINE FORCE TWO in the NORTH ATLANTIC
AREA this force will execute the following task:
1. TASK
RAID ENEMY SHIPPING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, MEDITERRANEAN, ACTING
THROUGH THE BRITISH (OR UNITED STATES) FLAG OFFI-
CER COMMANDING NORTH ATLANTIC.
d. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will remain a part of the U. S. ATLANTIC
FLEET for administrative purposes.
3115. a. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUBMARINE FORCE
THREE will operate under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief,
U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM
AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA.
b. These forces will each be assigned the following task by the Commander
in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET:
1. TASK
PROCEED FROM BASES IN THE UNITED STATES TO
BASES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME
WATERS AREA, WHEN SO DIRECTED BY THE CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS.
[18] c. Upon arrival in UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME
WATERS AREA, the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUBMARINE
FORCE THREE will be detached from the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and be
assigned to U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE. Their tasks thereafter
are to be found in Part III, Chapter IV, Section 1.
3116. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, wiU arrange
for the logistic support for the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET (see Part IV, Chapter
III, Section 2) operating in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA from sources
designated by the Shore Establishment in the continental United States and
outlying possessions and bases in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, and from
United States and foreign (outside the British Isles) commercial sources. For
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2887
this purpose he will employ the transportation facilities of the U. S. ATLANTIC
FLEET, which will be supplemented, as required, by those of the Naval Trans-
portation Service.
b. Logistic support for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, and other United States
forces operating in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, will be arranged as indicated
herein. Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service.
1. Fuel and subsistence stores from United States naval auxiliaries, supple-
mented as mav be practicable from British sources available in the NORTH
ATLANTIC AREA.
2. Personnel, technical supplies, and ammunition from United States
sources.
3. Repair and upkeep facilities from tender and cargo vessels, and tem-
porary shore facilities erected by the United States, supplemented by use of
available British facilities.
4. Replacement of British fuel and subsistence stores from United States
sources.
[19] c. In emergency circumstances where the transportation facilities of
the Naval Transportation Service are inadequate for the logistic support of
SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, or of other U. S. Naval forces operating in the
NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, the Senior U. S. Naval Officer of forces based in
that area is authorized to charter, on a time charter basis, vessels immediately
obtainable by him for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic
deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be emploved, if available.
d. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET," will establish in the
office of the Chief of Naval Operations an officer of the staff of the Commander,
TRAIN, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, who will have liaison duties with respect
to the quantities and the transportation of logistic requirements, including per-
sonnel, for the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.
e. Logistic support for the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUB-
MARINE FORCE THREE, after transfer to the U. S. NAVAL FORCES,
NORTH EUROPE, will be provided as directed in Part III, Chapter IV, Section 1.
3117. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will require the
preparation of the following plans:
1. U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW No.
5 (Navy Plan 0-3, RAINBOW No. 5);
2. NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE MOVEMENT PLAN— RAINBOW
No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-3-A, RAINBOW No. 5), covering the movement of
this force and the first movement of Army troops to ENGLAND, SCOT-
LAND, and NORTH IRELAND (See paragraph 3511 a. 2. (b)) ;
3. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE MOVEMENT PLAN— RAINBOW
No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-3-B, RAINBOW No. 5) covering the movement of
this force to the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS
AREA;
4. Such other subordinate task force operating [20] plans as the
Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, may direct, including the
movement plan for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO. No operating plan for
SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, for operations after arrival in the NORTH
ATLANTIC AREA, need be prepared.
b. 1. Plans listed under a. 1, 2, 3, and 4, will be reviewed by the Chief of
Naval Operations.
2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.
[21] Section 2. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES
3121. a. The organization of NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES is
prescribed in General Order No. 143.
b. The boundaries of Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frontiers, Coastal
Zones, Sectors, and Subsectors, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and the
Navy, 1935", as modified by Annex I of Appendix I.
3122. The Naval Coastal Frontiers in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA
are:
a. THE NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;
b. THE SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;
c. THE CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;
d. THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.
1. All tasks assigned to the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
are contained in this Section, including those for the PACIFIC SECTOR.
2888 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3123. The NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES (Chapter VIII, Appen-
dix II) in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA are assigned the following tasks:
a. TASK
DEFEND THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER IN CATEGORIES
INDICATED BELOW:
CATEGORY B— THE NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER.
—THE SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.
CATEGORY D— TEE CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRON-
TIER.
—THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.
[22] b. TASK
PROTECT AND ROUTE SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH
INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PART III, CHAPTER VIL SEC-
TION 3;
e. TASK
SUPPORT THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET;
d. TASK
SUPPORT ARMY AND ASSOCIATED FORCES WITHIN THE
COASTAL FRONTIER.
e. In addition, the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES of the PAN-
AMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER are assigned the following task:
1. TASK
SUPPORT THE U. S. SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE.
3124. a. The following plans will be prepared:
1. Local Joint Plans as prescribed in Appendix I, paragraph 48, of this
plan;
2. By the Commanders, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER, and SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER:
(a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plans — RAINBOW No. 6, including
an annex covering the operating plans of the Naval Coastal Force. (Naval
Coastal Frontier Plans 0-4, RAINBOW No. 5);
3. Bv Commanders, CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER,
and PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and by Commandants,
FIRST, THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, SIXTH, SEVENTH, AND EIGHTH
NAVAL DISTRICTS:
[23] (a) Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans — RAINBOW
No. 5 (Naval District Plans 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5);
(b) Joint Embarkation Plans as required in Appendix I, paragraph 48;
4. Additional subordinate task force operating plans as directed by Com-
manders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, and Commandants of Naval Districts.
b. 1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans, and other plans prepared by the
Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, will be reviewed by the Chief of
Naval Operations.
2. Operating Plans prepared by the Commandants of Naval Districts will
be reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers.
3. Subordinate Task Force Operating Plans will be reviewed by the respec-
tive Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, or Commandants of Naval
Districts.
4. (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Force Operating Plans for the NORTH
ATLANTIC and SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, -and
Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans for the CARIBBEAN and
PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS will be forwarded to the
Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for comment, prior to their
review bv the Chief of Naval Operations, with a view to their coordination
with the' Operating Plans of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.
(b) Such portions of Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans and
Naval District Contributory Plans, as relate to the protection of fleet anchor-
ages and to services to the U. S. [24] ATLANTIC FLEET, will be
referred to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for com-
ment, if he so requests.
5. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.
[26] Section 3. COMMAND RELATIONS
3131. In order to provide for unity of command of task groups of the U. S.
ATLANTIC FLEET and the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, in
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2889
the execution of tasks requiring mutual support, the following provisions shall
apply :
a. On M-dav, or sooner if directed bv the Chief of Naval Operations, the
Commander, NORTH ATLANTIC XXVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, the
SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, the CARIBBEAN NAVAL
COASTAL FRONTIER, and the Commander, PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER so far as regards operations in the ATLANTIC SECTOR, are
assigned a dual status as follows:
1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces
operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations;
2. As officers of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, operating under the orders
of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, in command of
task groups of that fleet, when and as directed by the Commander in Chief
thereof.
b. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, may thereafter require
the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his command, tempo-
rarily and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval Coastal Frontier
Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will, when taking
temporary command of such task forces, have due regard to the tasks assigned
in this plan to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers.
1. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will not require
task groups of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces to leave the limits of their
respective Coastal Zones, except in emergency, or upon the authority of the
Chief of Naval Operations.
[36] c. Conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended while
the provisions of this paragraph are in effect.
S132. The NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA, by this plan is as-
sigtved as a unit of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, both for administrative and
tasVi purposes.
3133. In addition to having general authority over the operation of the Naval
Local Defense Forces, the Commander, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER and the Commander, SOUTHERNNAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
have authority to coordinate the activities of the Commandants of the Naval
Districts within their respective Naval Coastal Frontiers, in matters that concern
the Naval Communication Service, the Naval Intelligence Service, and the Naval
Transportation Service. Due consideration will be given to the requirements of
the tasks assigned to these services by the Chief of Naval Operations.
3134. a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign temporarily to
the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft as-
signed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force.
b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, Commanders of
Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by the
Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense
Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.
3135. Command relations between United States and Canadian Forces will be
set forth in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5, Appen-
dix I, after ABC-22 has been approved.
[27] CHAPTER II. FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AREA
Section 1. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
3211. The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET (Chapter III, Appendix II) will be organ-
ized into task forces as follows:
a. Task forces as directed bv the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET;
b. NAVAL STATION, SAMOA;
c. NAVAL STATION, GUAM.
3212. The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within the
PACIFIC AREA:
a. TASK
SUPPORT THE FORCES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE
FAR EAST BY DIVERTING ENEMY STRENGTH AWAY FROM
THE MALAY BARRIER, THROUGH THE DENIAL AND CAPTURE
OF POSITIONS IN THE MARSHALLS, AND THROUGH RAIDS ON
ENEMY SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND POSITIONS;
2890 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
b. TASK
PREPARE TO CAPTURE AND ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER
THE CAROLINE AND MARSHALL ISLAND AREA, AND TO ES-
TABLISH AN ADVANCED FLEET BASE IN TRUK;
c. TASK
DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR
DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY
WITH THE ENEMY;
d. TASK
SUPPORT BRITISH NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA SOUTH OF
THE EQUATOR AS FAR WEST AS LONGITUDE 155° EAST:
[28] e. TASK
DEFEND SAMOA IN CATAGORY "D";
f. TASK
DEFEND GUAM IN CATAGORY "F";
g. TASK
PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED
POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING AS
REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY
RAIDING FORCES (See Part III, Chapter V, Section 1);
h. TASK
PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS
IN THE PACIFIC AREA AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF
ENEMY MILITARY POWER INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
BY DESTROYING HOSTILE EXPEDITIONS AND BY SUPPORTING
LAND AND AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE
OF LAND POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE;
i. TASK
COVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
FORCES;
j. TASK
ESTABLISH FLEET CONTROL ZONES, DEFINING THEIR LIMITS
FROM TIME TO TIME AS CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE;
k. TASK
ROUTE SHIPPING OF ASSOCIATED POWERS WITHIN THE
FLEET CONTROL ZONES.
[29] 3213. a. Units assigned to the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT in
Chapter III, Appendix II, will be transferred from the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET,
to the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, when directed bv the Chief of Naval Operations.
b. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE (Chapter IV, Appendix II), will be
established under the immediate command of the Chief of Naval Operations,
when so directed by that officer.
c. Until detached, the units assigned to the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT
and the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE will be under the command of the
Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and may be employed as desired
by him, so long as they remain in the PACIFIC AREA. They shall not be sent
to such distances from PEARL HARBOR as would prevent their arrival in the
CANAL ZONE twenty-one davs after the Chief of Naval Operations directs their
transfer from the PACIFIC AREA.
3214. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will arrange for
the logistic support of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET from sources in continental
United States and in the FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT designated by
the Shore Establishment, and from United States and foreign commercial sources.
(See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.) For this purpose he will employ the
transportation facilities of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, which will be supple-
mented as required by those of the Naval Transportation Service.
b. To the extent practicable, the services of the Naval Transportation Service
will be restricted to supplementing the movement of logistic supplies, including
personnel, between the continental United States and OAHU.
c. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will establish in the
Office of the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRON-
TIER, an officer of the staff of the Commander, BASE FORCE, U. S. PACIFIC
FLEET, who will have liaison duties with respect to the quantities and trans-
portation of logistic requirements, including personnel, to be delivered into the
Fleet Control Zones. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2891
at his discretion, establish similar liaison officers in the offices of the Commanders
of other Naval Coastal Frontiers.
[SO] 3215. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will
require the following plans to be prepared:
1. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW
No. 5 (Navy Plan ai, RAINBOW No. 5);
2. A plan for the execution of TASK b. of paragraph 3212, assuming the
availability of approximately 30,000 Army troops in addition to forces of the
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and assuming that the task will be executed on
180M;
3. NAVAL STATION, SAMOA, NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE
OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW No. 5 (Naval Station Samoa Plan 0-5,
RAINBOW No. 5);
4. Such other subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander In
Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may direct.
b. 1. Plans listed under a. 1. and 2, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval
Operations.
2. The NAVAL STATION GUAM Naval Local Defense Force Operating
Plan — RAINBOW No. 3 will be applicable, and no additional plan need be
prepared.
NOTE: The Commandant, Naval Station, GUAM, is not included in the
distribution of this Navy Basic War Plan— RAINBOW No. 5.
[SI] Section 2. THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE
3221. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE (Chapter IV, Appendix II) will
be established under the immediate command of the Chief of Naval Operations
upon its arrival in the CANAL ZONE.
3222. This force will base on the Naval Operating Base, BALBOA, or in
SOUTH AMERICAN ports as mav later be directed, and will operate in the
SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA, delimited as that part of the PACIFIC
AREA south of the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and between
the west coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West.
3223. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE is assigned the following tasks:
a. TASK
DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING
OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY
WITH THE ENEMY;
b. TASK
PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED
POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, OR PATROLLING AS
REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY
RAIDING FORCES;
c. TASK
SUPPORT THE OPERATIONS OF THE PANAMA NAVAL
COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES IN THE PACIFIC SECTOR;
d. TASK
PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS
IN THE NATIONS ON THE WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA.
[S2] 3224. a. The Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, wiU
arrange for the logistic support of the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE from
Shore Establishment sources in the FIFTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and from
foreign commercial sources (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2). Transporta-
tion will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service.
b. In circumstances where transportation facilities provided by the NAVAL
TRANSPORTATION SERVICE are inadequate, the Commander, SOUTH-
EAST PACIFIC FORCE, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis, vessels
immediately obtainable by him, for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent
logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if
available.
3225. a. The Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, will require
the preparation of the following plans:
\. U. S. SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE OPERATING PLAN-
RAINBOW No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-3-C, RAINBOW No. 5);
2892 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. Such subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander,
SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, may direct,
b. 1. The plan listed under a. 1. will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval
Operations.
2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.
[33] Section 3. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES
3231. a. The organization of the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES
is prescribed in General Order No. 143.
b. The boundaries of Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frontiers, Coastal
Zones, Sectors, and Subsectors, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and the
Navv, 1935," as modified bv Annex I of Appendix I.
3232. The Naval Coastaf Frontiers in the PACIFIC AREA are:
a. PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;
b. PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;
c. HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.
3233. The NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES (Chapter VIII, Ap-
pendix II) in the PACIFIC AREA are assigned the following tasks:
a. TASK
DEFEND THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS IN CATEGORIES
INDICATED BELOW:
CATEGORY B— THE PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER.
— THE PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER, EXCEPT THE ALASKAN SECTOR.
CATEGORY C— THE ALASKAN SECTOR OF THE PACIFIC
NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER,
EXCEPT UNALASKA.
CATEGORY /)— UNALASKA.— THE HAWAIIAN NAVAL COAST-
AL FRONTIER;
[34] b. TASK
PROTECT AND ROUTE SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH
INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PART III, CHAPTER VII, SEC-
TION 3;
c. TASK
SUPPORT THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET;
d. TASK
SUPPORT THE ARMY AND ASSOCIATED FORCES WITHIN
THE COAST A,L FRONTIERS.
3234. a. The following plans will be prepared:
1. Local Joint Plans as prescribed in Appendix I, paragraph 48:
2. By the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER:
(a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plan — RAINBOW No. 5,
including an annex covering the operating plan of the Naval Coastal
Force (Naval Coastal Frontier Plan 0-4, RAINBOW No. 5);
3. Bv Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and by
the Commandant, ELEVENTH and TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICTS:
(a) Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans — RAINBOW No. 5
(Naval District Plans 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5);
(b) Joint Embarkation Plans as required in Appendix I, paragraph
48;
[35] 4. Additional subordinate task force operating plans as directed
by Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, and Commandants of Naval
Districts.
b. 1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans and other plans prepared by Com-
manders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval
Operations.
2. Operating plans prepared by Commandants of Naval Districts will be
reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2893
3. (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plans for the PACIFIC
SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and Naval Local
Defense Force Operating Plans for the HAWAIIAN NAVAL
COASTAL FRONTIER will be forwarded to the Commander in Chief,
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET for comment, prior to their review by the Chief
of Naval Operations, with a view to their coordination with the Operat-
ing Plans of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
(b) Such portions of Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans and
Naval District Contributory Plans as relate to the protection of fleet
anchorages and to services to the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will be
referred to the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET for
comment, if he so requests.
4. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.
[36] Section 4. COMMAND RELATIONS
3241. In order to provide for unity of command of task groups of the U. S.
PACIFIC FLEET and of the PACIFIC NORTHERN and PACIFIC SOUTH-
ERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, in the execution of tasks requiring
mutual support, the following provisions shall apply (see paragraph 3242) :
a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the
Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
and PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will be
assigned a dual status as follows:
1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces
operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations.
2. As officers of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET operating under the
orders of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, in com-
mand of task groups of that fleet when and as directed by the Com-
mander in Chief thereof.
b. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may thereafter
require the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his com-
mand, temporarily and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval
Coastal Frontier Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET,
when taking temporary command of such task forces, will have due regard
for the tasks assigned in this plan to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers
by the Chief of Naval Operations.
1. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will not
require task groups of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces to leave the
limits of their respective Coastal Zones, except in emergency, or upon
authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.
c. Conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended while
the provisions of this paragraph are in effect.
[S7] 3242. The provisions of paragraph 3241 above, apply to the command
relations of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and the Com-
mander, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, except that the circum-
stances under which its provisions are applicable are not restricted to the execu-
tion of tasks requiring mutual support, but apply in all circumstances.
3243. The Chief of Naval Operations will direct the Commander, SOUTH-
EAST PACIFIC FORCE, to operate under the strategic direction of the Com-
mander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, if coordinated action of that force
and the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET becomes necessary. The Chief of Naval Opera-
tions will be informed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, if
this situation arises.
3244. In addition to having general authority over the operation of the Naval
Local Defense Forces, the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL
COASTAL FRONTIER, has authority to coordinate the activities of the Com-
mandants of the Naval Districts within his respective Naval Coastal Frontier in
matters that concern the Naval Communication Service, the Naval Intelligence
Service, and the Naval Transportation Service. Due consideration will be given
to the requirements of the tasks assigned to these services by the Chief of Naval
Operations.
3245. a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign, temporarily,
to the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft
assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force.
2894 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, Commanders of
Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by the
Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense
Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions.
3246. Command relations between United States and Canadian Forces will be
set forth in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — Rainbow No. 5, Appendix
I, after ABC-22 has been approved.
[S8] CHAPTER III. FORCES IN THE FAR EAST AREA
Section 1. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET AND THE PHILIPPINE NAVAL
COASTAL FRONTIER
3311. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 16.b.:
"Far East Area
"Coordination in the planning and execution of operations by Military
forces of the United States, British Commonwealth, and Netherlands East
Indies, in the FAR EAST AREA will, subject to the approval nf the Dutch
authorities, be effected as follows:
"(1) The commanders of the Military forces of the Associated Powers
will collaborate in the formulation of strategic plans for operations in
that area.
"(2) The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers will be
the responsibility of the respective commanders of the Military forces
concerned. These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual
support as may be practicable and appropriate.
"(3) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces
of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting
the defense of the PHILIPPINES, will be assumed bv the British Naval
Commander in Chief, CHINA. The Commander in Chief, UNITED
STATES ASIATIC FLEET, will be responsible for the direction of
naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the PHILIPPINES."
3312. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, is the immediate
superior in command of the Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT,
who is also designated as the Commander, PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER (see Chapter V, Appendix II). *
b. The organization of Naval Coastal Frontiers is prescribed in General Order
No. 143.
[S9] c. The boundaries of the PHILIPPINE COASTAL FRONTIER,
and the extent of the PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, are
defined in "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935", as modified by Annex I
of Appendix I.
d. The Commander, PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL- FRONTIER will
employ the Naval Local Defense Force in the execution of tasks assigned by the
Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, and will arrange for its joint
tactical and strategical erAployment in cooperation with the Army, under the
direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.
3313. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET is assigned the
following tasks:
a. TASK
RAID JAPANESE SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND DESTROY
AXIS FORCES;
b. TASK
SUPPORT THE LAND AND AIR FORCES IN THE DEFENSE OF
THE TERRITORIES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS. (THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED
STATES ASIATIC FLEET, FOR SUPPORTING THE DEFENSE OF
THE PHILIPPINES REMAINS SO LONG AS THAT DEFENSE
CONTINUES.) ;
c. TASK
DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING
OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY
WITH THE ENEMY;
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2895
d. TASK
PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED
POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING, AS
REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY
RAIDING FORCES;
[40] e. TASK
IN COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY DEFEND THE PHILIP-
PINE COASTAL FRONTIER— CATEGORY OF DEFENSE "E";
f. TASK
ROUTE UNITED STATES FLAG SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE
WITH AGREEMENTS REACHED WITH THE OTHER ASSOCIATED
POWERS IN THE FAR EAST AREA.
3314. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will shift base to
BRITISH or DUTCH ports at discretion.
3315. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will arrange for
the logistic support of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET from sources in the SIX-
TEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and in continental United States; from com-
mercial sources in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; and from British and Dutch
governmental and commercial sources (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.).
b. Logistic requirements other than personnel, ammunition, and technical
materials, will be obtained from sources in the FAR EAST AREA or from sources
in the adjacent BRITISH AREAS.
c. Personnel, ammunition, and technical materials will be obtained from sources
in the United States.
d. Transportation facilities available to the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET will be
employed so far as practicable for the movement of logistic supplies. The Naval
Transportation Service will provide transportation for shipments from the United
States. The first two of these vessels to arrive in the FAR EAST AREA may be
retained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, for use in that
[41] e. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, mav acquire
through the Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and in accordance
with the provisions of existing law, any vessels of United States' or Philippine
registry by requisition, time charter, or bare boat charter, to supplement the
transportation facilities of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.
f. In circumstances where the transportation facilities of the U. S. ASIATIC
FLEET, supplemented as provided for in paragraphs d. and e., are inadequate,
the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, is authorized to charter on a
time charter basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of
providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States
registry will be employed if available.
3316. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will require the
following plans to be prepared:
1. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW
No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-2, RAINBOW No. 5);
2. Local Joint Plans required by Appendix T, Paragraph 48;
3. SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE
FORCE OPERATING PLAN— RAINBOW No. 5. (Sixteenth Naval
District Plan 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5);
4. Such subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander in
Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, may direct.
b. 1. The plan listed under a. 1, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval
Operations.
2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.
[42] CHAPTER IV. FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS
AREA
Section 1. THE U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE
3411. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH
EUROPE, is also the naval member of the United States Military Mission in
London.
2896 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
b. The U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will come under the
administrative command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES
NORTH EUROPE, upon the arrival of these forces in the UNITED KINGDOM
AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA.
3412. a. The U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE (Chapter VI,
Appendix II) will be organized into task forces as follows:
1. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE;
2. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE.
b. These task forces will operate under the command of the Commander in
Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM
AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA.
3413. After their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME
WATERS AREA, the task forces of the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH
EUROPE, are assigned the following tasks:
a. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE
1. TASK
ESCORT CONVOYS IN THE NORTHWEST APPROACHES,
ACTING UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE
BRITISH COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE WESTERN AP-
PROACHES;
b. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE
1. TASK
RAID ENEMY SHIPPING IN AN AREA TO BE DESIGNATED,
UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH VICE
ADMIRAL, SUBMARINES.
[43] 3414. Logistic support for the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH
EUROPE, will be arranged as indicated herein (see Part IV, Chapter III, Sec-
tion 2). Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service,
or from vessels assigned to the task forces.
a. Fuel from United States and British sources.
b. Personnel, technical supplies, ammunition, and subsistence supplies from
United States sources.
c. Repair and upkeep facilities from tender and cargo vessels and shore facili-
ties assigned to this force, supplemented by a limited use of British facilities.
d. Replacement of fuel to British storage from United States sources.
e. In circumstances where the transportation facilities of the U. S. NAVAL
FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, and those provided by the NAVAL TRANS-
PORTATION SERVICE are inadequate, the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL
FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis,
or a bare boat basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of
providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States
registry will be employed, if available.
3415. a. Outline operating plans for the employment of the U. S. NAVAL
FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will be prepared bv the prospective Commander
of the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE, and submitted to the prospective
Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, for review
by the British Commander in Chief, WESTERN APPROACHES. After
review and acceptance, copies of this plan will be furnished the Chief of Naval
Operations.
[44] CHAPTER V. THE SERVICES
Section 1. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE
3511. The NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE (Chapter IX, Appendix
II) is assigned the following task:
a. TASK
PROVIDE SEA TRANSPORTATION FOR THE INITIAL MOVE-
MENT AND THE CONTINUED SUPPORT OF ARMY AND NAVY
FORCES OVERSEAS, OTHER THAN THOSE WHICH ARE TO BE
TRANSPORTED BY THE OPERATING FORCES. MAN AND
OPERATE THE ARMY TRANSPORT SERVICE.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2897
1. Deliveries may be made by commercial transportation or by vessels
of the Naval Transportation Service as circumstances require.
2. The initial movements of U. S. Army troops under this task are as
indicated in this paragraph. Larger movements may be made eventually,
as indicated in Appendix I, paragraph 51, but the Navy will make no plans
for these later movements until so directed bv the Chief of Naval Operations.
(a) NEW YORK to ICELAND, 26>00 troops, 73 aircraft. First
contingent — 10,500 troops embark on 24M. Second contingent —
16,000 troops embark on 57M. These two movements will be made by
British transports if arrangements can be effected. If not, this plan
contemplates use of United States transports.
(b) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 7,000 troops embark on lOM.
NEW YORK to IRELAND, 8,000 troops embark on lOM.
(1) These two forces will move in one convov.
(c) NEW YORK to BERMUDA, 3,700 troops, 38 aircraft, embark
on 18M. Eight aircraft will fly to destination, 30 aircraft will be [45]
transported. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.
(d) GALVESTON to CURACAO-ARUBA, 6,000 troops, embark on
15xM.
(e) GALVESTON to TRINIDAD, 12,500 troops embark on 15M.
(f) GALVESTON to PANAMA, 6,400 troops, of which 3,300 embark
on 20M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships
become available. Part of this force mav be moved before M-day.
(g) GALVESTON to PUERTO RICO, 12,600 troops, of 4,000 em-
bark 20 M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships
become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-dav.
(h) SEATTLE to ALASKA, 23,000 troops, of which 1,100 embark
on lOM. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships
become available. Part or all of these troops may be moved before
M-day.
(i) SAN FRANCISCO to HAWAII, 23,000 troops, of which 15,000
embark on lOM. The remainder will be transported progressively as
ships become available. Part of these troops may be moved before
M-day.
3. The supply levels for the support of overseas forces which are to be
transported by the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, are indi-
cated in Appendix I, paragraph 57.
3512. Shipping will be routed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Coin-
manders of the Operating Forces in accordance with instructions contained in
Part III, Chapter VII, Section 3.
[46] 3513. The Director, Naval Transportation Service, will prepare the
Principal Naval Transportation Service Operating Plan — Rainbow No. 5, and
will prescribe therein, the Naval Transportation Service Operating Plans — Rain-
bow No. 5, which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval
Stations, and Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Com-
mandants of Naval Districts.
U7) Section 2. THE NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
3521. The NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE is assigned the following
tasks:
a TA ^K
INSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF COMMUNICATION FACILITIES
AND A SYSTEM FOR THEIR EMPLOYMENT ADEQUATE TO THE
NEEDS OF THE NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT IN THE EXECUTION
OF THIS PLAN;
b. TASK
IN COOPERATION, WHERE NECESSARY, WITH OTHER GOV-
ERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND INDEPENDENT OFFICES, AND
SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PERTINENT LEGISLATION,
PROCLAMATIONS, AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS, PROVIDE FOR
THE OPERATION OR SUPPRESSION, CONTROL, OR SUPERVI-
SION, AS NECESSARY, OF NON-MILITARY COMMUNICATION
STATIONS IN AREAS UNDER UNITED STATES' CONTROL.
2898 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3522. This Service, operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations
(Director of Naval Communications) comprises the following:
a. Office of the Director, Naval Communications, Navy Department;
b. The Communication Organization under the command of the Commandants
of Naval Districts and Outlying Naval Stations; and under command of com-
manders of forces afloat, including aircraft.
3523. The Director, Naval Communication Service, will prepare the Principal
Naval Communication Service Operating Plan — Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe
therein, the Naval Communication Service Operating Plans — Rainbow No. 5
which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and
Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of
Naval Districts.
[48] Sectwn 3. THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
3531. The NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE is assigned the following
aska:
a. TASK
IN COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY AND ASSOCIATED
POWERS. SECURE, AND DISSEMINATE AS ADVISABLE, SUCH
INFORMATION, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING THE ENEMY,
ENEMY AGENTS AND SYMPATHIZERS. AS WILL ASSIST AND
FACILITATE THE EXECUTION OF NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN-
RAINBOW No. 5 AND THE PROTECTION OF THE NAVAL ESTAB-
LISHMENT;
h TA Si/f
IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPART-
MENTS, PREVENT THE TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION OF
MILITARY OR ECONOMIC VALUE TO THE ENEMY.
3532. This Service, operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations
(Director of Naval Intelligence), comprises the following:
a. Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, including
naval attaches, naval observers, and other personnel directly under the Director
of Naval Intelligence;
b. The Naval Intelligence organization under the command of the Comman-
dants of Naval Districts, the Navy Yard, Washington, D. C, and Outlving Naval
Stations, including the field units of the respective subordinate activities.
3533. The Director, Naval Intelligence Service, will prepare the Principal
Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plan — Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe
therein the Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plans — Rainbow No. 5, which
are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and Activi-
ties or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of Naval
Districts.
[49] CHAPTER VI. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT
3601. The task of the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT is prescribed in Part IV
[60] CHAPTER VII. INSTRUCTIONS JOINTLY APPLICABLE TO TASK FORCES
Section 1. FORMING THE TASK FORCES
3711. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will be formed on M-day or sooner if
directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.
a. Units of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and
U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, designated for assignment to NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER FORCES, when directed by the respective Commanders in Chief
of the Fleets, will report to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, to
which assigned.
b. Vessels of NAVAL DISTRICT CRAFT (See General Order No. 143),
designated for assignment to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, when directed
by the Commandants of the Naval Districts, will report to the commanders of
task organizations to which assigned.
c. Vessels to be mobilized, upon completion of mobilization, and when directed
by the Commandants of Naval Districts in which they mobilize, will report to the
commanders of task organizations to which assigned.
3712. The Chief of Naval Operations will issue special instructions to vessels
of the Naval Transportation Service and to vessels operating directly under the
Chief of Naval Operations as circumstances require.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2899
3713. a. Coast Guard Districts, including vessels, aircraft and shore establish-
ments within the Districts, upon M-day or sooner if directed by the President,
will automatically come under the control of Naval Districts in the manner set
forth in the "United States Coast Guard District Manual, 1940."
b. The Commandants of Naval Districts will direct the Coast Guard units
coming under their command to report to the commanders of the task organiza-
tions as indicated in Appendix II of this plan.
[51] Section 2. MOBILIZATION
3721. a. Mobilization comprises two steps, vi?:
1. Timely assembly at assigned Mobilization Districts of the forces to be
mobilized preparatory to 2;
2. Preparation for war service. This is a function of the Shore Establish-
ment assisted to the extent practicable by the forces being mobilized, and is
provided for in Part IV of thig plan.
b. Under this plan the term "mobilization" is applied only to the Operating
Forces and the Services, including their units ashore. The Shore Establishment
does not mobilize, but, as stipulated in Part IV, increases its personnel and
facilities as required to perform its assigned task.
c. Mobilization is thus not a process confined exclusively to the initial days of
the war but continues as long as there are additional forces to be mobilized.
During and subsequent to mobilization, vessels and units are supported through
the operation of the maintenance provisions of Part IV.
3722. Most of the Naval Forces listed in the current Operating Force Plan
have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan. Vessels so listed,
even if not completely mobilized on M-day, will be considered available for
immediate war service within the limits of their capabilities. They will complete
their mobilization progressively as opportunity permits, and as directed by their
superiors in command. Exceptions may be made by direction of the Chief of
Naval Operations.
3723. In view of the provisions of paragraph 3722, mobilization in this plan
applies principally to vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service, to
the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, and to Naval District Craft which are to be
taken over from private sources or other government departments.
[52] 3724. Instructions for the assembly at Mobilization Districts of
.vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service will be issued by the Chief
of Naval Operations.
3725. Instructions for the assembly at Mobilization Districts of vessels assigned
to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces are contained in Chapter VIII, Appendix II.
[53] Section 3. THE ROUTING AND PROTECTION OF SHIPPING
3731. The following is quoted from Appendix I, "Section V";
a. "20. The British authorities will issue directions for the control and protec-
tion of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which British author-
ities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military Forces. United
States authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping
of the Associated Powers within the areas in which the United States authorities
assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces.
"21. United States and British shipping scheduled to pass from an area assigned
to one Power into an area assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and pro-
tected by agreement between the respective naval authorities. The British
Admiralty is the supreme authority in the control of shipping in the North
Atlantic bound to and from the United Kingdom.
"22. The British Naval Control Service Organization will continue in the
exercise of its present functions and methods in all regions pending establishment
of effective United States Agencies in United States areas. The Chief of Naval
Operations, immediately on entry of the United States into the war, will arrange
for the control and protection of shipping of United States registry or charter
within United States areas. Requests from the British Naval Control Service
Organization for protection by United States forces within United States areas
will be made to the Chief of Naval Operations."
b. The term "control of shipping" as used in Appendix I, "Section V", includes
all matters relating to the movement of non-combatant vessels on the high seas,
except protection.
79716 O — 46 — pt.
2900 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Definitions
3732. a. ROUTING. The term "routing of shipping" as employed in this
plan relates to the sea routes to be followed; [54] the time of departure
from port; whether or not ships will move singly or in convoy; the timing at meet-
ing points (rendezvous) and along the sea route; and the delivery of instructions
for routing. Instructions in regard to the assembly of vessels for convoys, the
scheduling of ports of call or destination, and loading are not considered as a
part of routing.
b. INTRA-DISTRICT SHIPPING. That shipping of the Associated Powers
proceeding from one port to another within the limits of a Naval District.
c. INTRA-FRONTIER SHIPPING. That shipping of the Associated
Powers proceeding from one Naval District to another within the same Naval
Coastal Frontier.
d. INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING. That shipping of the Associated Powers,
not overseas shipping, proceeding from a port in one Naval Coastal Frontier to,
or through the waters of, another Naval Coastal Frontier.
e. FLEET CONTROL ZONE SHIPPING. All shipping of the Associated
Powers while within the Fleet Control Zone.
f. OVERSEAS SHIPPING is that shipping of the Associated Powers whose
route, in whole or in part, lies outside the coastal zone of a Naval Coastal Frontier;
except that shipping passing between the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL
FRONTIER and the ATLANTIC COAST ports of the United States or Canada
is considered INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING.
Instructions for routing shipping
3733. INTRA-DISTRICT INTRA-FRONTIER, and INTER-FRONTIER
SHIPPING.
a. The Chief of Naval Operations will issue general instructions to Naval
Coastal Frontier Commanders for the routing of Intra-District, Intra-Frontier,
and Inter-Frontier Shipping. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers and
Commandants of Naval Districts will keep the Chief of Naval Operations and
interested Commanders in Chief informed as to routing instructions issued by
them.
[55] h. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will route Intra-Frontier
and Inter-Frontier Shipping.
c. Intra-District shipping will be routed by the Commandant of the Naval
District under the general direction of the Commander, Naval Coastal Frontier.
3734. OVERSEAS SHIPPING.
a. Overseas shipping is divided into two categories, referred to hereafter as
Class A and Class B Overseas Shipping:
1. CLASS A. Overseas shipping between two points in the areas of
strategic responsibility of the United States;
2. CLASS B. Overseas shipping between one point in the areas of strategic
responsibility of the United States, and one point in the areas of strategic
responsibility of the United Kingdom.
b. WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA.
1. The Chief of Naval Operations, in consultation with the United Kingdom
Chief of Naval Staff, will arrange the routing details of Class B Overseas
Shipping which passes between the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA and
UNITED KINGDOM AREAS to the east or south.
2. The Chief of Naval Operations will route all Class A and Class B Over-
seas Shipping while it is within the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA. In
the case of overseas shipping moving in convoy, he will issue the routing
instructions to the convoy commanders, via the Commandants of the Dis-
tricts in which are the ports of assembly of the convovs, with copies to the
Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, appropriate Naval Coastal
Frontier Commanders, and Commandants of other Naval Districts affected.
In the case of overseas shipping moving singly, the [56] Chief of
Naval Operations will issue general routing instructions to the Naval Coastal
Frontier Commanders, with copies to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLAN-
TIC FLEET, and to Commandants of Naval Districts affected. Under the
general supervision of the Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers, Com-
mandants of Naval Districts will issue routing instructions to commanders
of vessels.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2901
c. PACIFIC AREA.
1. Under the general direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, the
Commander of the PACIFIC SOUTHPJRN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
wiU perform, in the PACIFIC AREA, all the routing duties performed by
the Chief of Naval Operations in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA,
with the following exceptions:
(a) The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will route
shipping in the PACIFIC FLEET CONTROL ZONES;
(b) The Commander, PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER,
will route shipping in the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA;
(c) Routing details of overseas shipping bound to or from the
AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND AREA will be arranged
directly between the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL
COASTAL FRONTIER, and the Chief of the Australian Naval Staff.
The Chief of Naval Operations will make arrangements with the United
Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff in case action is required by that officer.
Instructions for the protection of shipping
3735. a. Tasks providing for the protection of shipping are assigned to the
Operating Forces.
[57] b. Protection of shipping may be provided by sea or air escort, by
covering operations, by patrol, by dispersal, by shifting of routes, or by a combina-
tion of these methods.
c. The shipping of the Associated Powers operating in the areas of strategic
responsibility of the United States will be protected by the responsible Com-
manders in Chief, Commanders of Sub-Areas, and Naval Coastal Frontiers, and
by the Commandants of Naval Districts, to the extent required by the existing
situation, and as may be practicable by the use of available forces. These officers
will keep each other informed, as may be appropriate, as to the strength of naval
forces, and the methods being employed, in the protection of shipping.
d. The protection of embarked military personnel and valuable cargoes will be
viewed as having an especial importance.
[58] Section 4. RULES OF WARFARE
3741. In the conduct of the war the Naval Establishment will be guided by
the current "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime
Warfare".
3742. Except under extroardinary circumstances (as when no prize crews are
available or great distances are involved, and it is impracticable for the capturing
ship to leave her station), prizes should be sent promptly to a port within the
jurisdiction of the United States, or to an allied port in which a United States
prize court is sitting, or to an allied port where arrangements have previously
been made by the commander in the Area for prizes captured by the United
States to be received into custody of local officials until an opportunity presents
itself of sending them to United States prize courts. When the State Department
shall have made arrangements with other Associated Powers to permit United
States prize courts within their jurisdiction, the forces afloat will be promptly
notified.
3743. Do not use poison gas except in retaliation for similar use by the enemy.
3744. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, within the
WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC
FLEET, within the PACIFIC AREA, are authorized to declare such "Strategi-
cal Areas" as in their opinion are vital. They must give wide publicity to the
exact boundaries of the areas involved and, at the earliest opportunity, notify the
Chief of Naval Operations of these actions. A "Strategical Area", as here used,
means an area from which it is necessary to exclude merchant ships and merchant
aircraft to prevent damage to such ships or aircraft, or to prevent such ships or
aircraft from obtaining information, which, if transmitted to the enemy, would
be detrimental to our own forces.
[59] 3745. Should the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET,
or the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, desire to lay mines outside
the territorial waters of the enemy, or of the United States or other Associated
Powers, or outside of proclaimed Strategical Areas, they should make recom-
2902 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
mendations to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the areas proposed to
be mined and the time when the mines are to be laid. The Chief of Naval
Operations will take the necessary steps to declare the mined areas and to notify
shipping and foreign governments. In an emergency, mines may be so laid,
before communicating with the Chief of Naval Operations, but in such cases
appropriate local notification should be made by the Commander in Chief con-
cerned, and the Chief of Naval Operations should be informed.
[60] Section 5. INTELLIGENCE LIAISON BETWEEN COMMANDERS
OF ASSOCIATED FORCES IN THE FIELD
3751. The commanders of the Operating Forces and their subordinate task
force commanders will, on their own initiative, exchange liaison officers with task
force commanders of the Associated Powers for the purpose of coordinating mat-
ters which directly affect their operations. (See Appendix I, paragraph 17. f.).
[61] Part IV. Logistics
CHAPTER I. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT
4101. The SHORE ESTABLISHMENT is assigned the following tasks:
a. TASK
PREPARE FOR WAR SERVICE, MAINTAIN, AND AUGMENT
THE OPERATING FORCES AND THE SERVICES;
b. TASK
PROVIDE PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL REQUIRED FOR ES-
TABLISHING AND MAINTAINING ADVANCED BASES;
c. TASK
PROVIDE SALVAGE SERVICE IN THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC
OCEANS, THE GULF OF MEXICO, AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA,
WITHIN APPROXIMATELY 500 MILES OF CONTINENTAL UNITED
STATES, ALASKA, PANAMA CANAL ZONE, AND OF OUTLYING
UNITED STATES POSSESSIONS AND LEASED TERRITORY IN
THE ATLANTIC OCEAN AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA.
4102. Each Chief of Bureau or Head of an Office of the Navy Department, and
each Commandant of a Naval District or an Outlying Naval Station will execute
such parts of the tasks assigned to the Shore Establishment as fall under his
cognizance by law or regulation, unless otherwise stipulated in Part IV.
[6^] CHAPTER II. GENERAL DIRECTIVES
Section 1. PERSONNEL
4211. The Shore Establishment will supply the trained personnel required for:
a. Preparing for war service, maintaining, and augmenting the Operating
Forces and the Services;
b. Augmenting and maintaining the Shore Establishment Activities;
c. Establishing and maintaining Advanced Bases;
d. Augmenting and maintaining Salvage Service.
4212. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 54.
"The Army and Navy requirements for increased personnel \Vill be met
by the operation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940".
4213. a. Personnel will be supplied in accordance with the Basic Priorities
established in Section 6 (paragraph 4261).
b. Where the requirements for personnel for the Operating Forces and the
Services cannot be supplied from other sources, naval personnel assigned to Naval
District Craft (see General Order No. 143) will be replaced with civilian personnel
for such period of time as found to be necessary.
[63] Section 2. MATERIAL
4221. The Shore Establishment will supply material required for:
a. Preparing for war service, maintaining, and augmenting the Operating Forces
and the Services;
b. Augmenting and maintaining the Shore Establishment Activities;
c. Establishing and maintaining Advanced Bases;
d. Augmenting and maintaining Salvage Service.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2903
4222. The material to support this Plan will come from existing reserves of the
Navy and from production sources developed under the approved Industrial
Mobilization Plan, and Navy Procurement Plans. The procurement of material
will be regulated and controlled by existing laws and regulations, Executive
Orders, and in accordance with the instructions contained in the Joint Army and
Navy Basic War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5 (Appendix I, paragraphs 56 and 58).
4223. Bureaus having technical cognizance of material being procured for the
Navy will take appropriate measures to insure that contractors safeguard such
material from exposure to sabotage and from damage by sabotage or other means.
4224. Material will be supplied in accordance with the Basic Priorities estab-
lished in Section 6 (paragraph 4261).
[64] Section S. TRANSPORTATION
4231. a. Sea transportation will be provided by:
1. THE OPERATING FORCES;
2. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE.
b. The Naval Transportation Service will arrange for delivery of personnel and
material by commercial transportation facilities wherever practicable.
4232. a. Bureaus will provide material at loading ports ready for loading.
b. The Shore Establishment will furnish the Chief of Naval Operation? and
the District Commandants concerned with the necessary information regarding
material and personnel to be loaded at loading ports in order that sea transporta-
tion may be provided.
c. The Shore Establishment will load material and embark personnel in vessels
designated by the Chief of Naval Operations.
4233. a. The Army will furnish to the Chief of Naval Operations, or the Dis-
trict Commandants, information regarding the numbers of troops and quantities
of material to be transported overseas (see Appendix I, paragraphs 51 and 57).
b. The Army will move Army material and troops to ports of embarkation,
and load Army material and embark Army troops in vessels designated by the
Chief of Naval Operations, subject to supervision by the Navy in matters regard-
ing the safety of vessels.
c. The Navy will furnish subsistence and medical supplies for Army personnel
while embarked on transports operated by the Navy (including time-chartered
vessels) ; the Army will provide subsistence and medical supplies for all animals
embarked on such transports. Army medical and Army commissary personnel
embarked will be available to perform their normal duties in relation to Army
personnel.
(65) 4234. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will
establish in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in
Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will establish in the Office of the Commander,
PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, officers having liaison
duties in regard to coordinating the transportation of material and personnel by
fleet transportation facilities and the Naval Transpbrtation Service.
[66] Section 4- LEGAL SERVICES
4241. The Shore Establishment (Office of the Judge Advocate General of the
Navy) will provide the legal services, charged to it by law and regulation, neces-
sary for the execution of this plan by the Naval Establishment.
4242. These services will include:
a. The supervision of the administration of law throughout the Naval Estab-
lishment;
b. Securing the enactment of such legislation and the promulgation of such
Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders as may be required by the
Naval Establishment in the execution of this plan;
c. In conjunction with the War Department, securing the enactment of legisla-
tion and the promulgation of such Presidential Proclamations and Executive
Orders affecting both the Army and the Navy as are deemed necessary for the
execution of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5
(Appendix I, paragraph 59).
[67] Section 5. AUGMENTATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE
SHORE ESTABLISHMENT
4251. The Shore Establishment will augment and maintain its activities by
providing personnel and material necessary for the accomplishment of its assigned
tasks.
2904 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4252. Requirements for Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) in
excess of those provided for in the current Operating Force Plan, will be met
locally by the Commandants of Naval Districts. This may be done by taking
over suitable craft from private owners, or by contracting with private owners
for the operation of such craft in a pool under navy control, to meet both govern-
ment and private requirements.
[68] Section 6. PRIORITIES
4261. Priority in matters of supply, delivery, and services will be in accordance
with the basic priorities stipulated below. AH supporting efforts of the SERV-
ICES and the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT will fall respectively under the pri-
orities established by this general formula. For planning purposes, the several
items listed under the same basic priority shall be considered of equal importance.
a. PRIORITY ONE
1. The transportation of Army troops and material in the initial move-
ments to the UNITED KINGDOM, BERMUDA, CURACAO-ARUBA.
TRINIDAD, PANAMA, PUERTO RICO, ALASKA, and HAWAII.
2. The requirements of the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE, U. S.
NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, and SUBMARINE FORCE
THREE, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE.
3. The requirements of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.
b. PRIORITY TWO
1. Initial movements to ICELAND.
2. The requirements of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and the U. S.
PACIFIC FLEET.
3. The requirements of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE
not specified under PRIORITY ONE.
c. PRIORITY THREE
1. The requirements of the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES.
2. The transportation of Army troops and material not specified under
PRIORITIES ONE and TWO.
d. PRIORITY FOUR
1. New Construction.
[69] CHAPTER III. THE OPERATING FORCES AND SERVICES
Section 1. PREPARATION FOR ^^' AR SERVICE
4311. Commencing on M-day. and before if directed, the SHORE ESTAB-
LISHMENT will prepare for war services those vessels and units of the OPER-
ATING FORCES and SERVICES listed in Appendix II, which are not then in
condition of readiness for war service, by placing them in material condition and
providing personnel to perform their war tasks.
4312. The desired condition of readiness for war service as regards personnel,
repairs and alterations, and supplies, is the STANDARD CONDITION pre-
scribed by the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department concerned and
approved by the Chief of Naval Operations.
4313. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services listed in the
current Operating Force Plan.
a. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services, appearing in the
current Operating Force Plan are not assigned to Mobilization Districts, as most
of those vessels have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan.
Vessels not completely mobilized on M-day will be considered available for imme-
diate war service within the limitations of their capabilities. They will complete
their mobilization progressively as opportunity permits, and as directed by their
superiors in command. Exceptions may be made by direction of the Chief of
Naval Operations.
4314. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services NOT listed in
the current Operating Force Plan.
a. Vessels not appearing in the current Operating Force Plan, assigned in
Appendix II to the Operating Forces and the Services, are assigned to Mobiliza-
tion Districts for preparation for war service (mobilization). Commandants are
responsible for preparing for war service all vessels assigned to their districts for
mobilization.
b. In cases where Appendix II indicates the day of arrival at the Mobilization
District and the day required to be ready for service, the Commandant will
employ the intervening period in the preparation of the vessel for war service.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2905
[70] If essential items of conversion can not be completed by the "Day
Ready" indicated in Appendix II, the Commandant will inform the Chief of
Naval Operations and the Commander of the Operating Force concerned, as far
in advance as practicable.
c. In cases where the day of arrival at the Mobilization District and the "Day
Ready" are not indicated in Appendix II, the Commandant will complete the
mobilization as promptly as possible in accordance with the priorities established
and other related instructions.
d. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces, other than those assigned to the
Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, will be degaussed, armed, and manned with
navy personnel before being considered ready for war service.
e. Vessels assigned to Naval C'oastal Frontier Forces will be placed in STAND-
ARD CONDITION before being considered ready for war service, unless the
Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, direct otherwise, in which case placing
them in STANDARD CONDITION will be deferred until opportunity permits.
f. Vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service will be placed in
STANDARD CONDITION before being considered ready for war service, except
as follows:
1. Transports to be commissioned in the Navy will be considered ready for
war service when degaussed, provided with fresh water, commissary, sani-
tary, medical, berthing, and other facilities essential for the initial scheduled
voyage;
2. Transports to be operated on a time charter basis will be considered
ready for war service when provided with fresh water, commissary, sanitary,
medical, berthing, and other facilities essential for the initial scheduled
voyage, and provided with a liaison group consisting of a communication
group and such additional personnel (supply and medical) as may be required;
[71] 3. All other classes commissioned in the Navy scheduled for
voyages outside of the WESTERN HEMISPHERE will be considered ready
for war service when degaussed and prepared for the particular service for
which scheduled;
4. All other clas.ses operated on a time charter basis will be considered
ready for war service when degaussed and prepared for the particular service
for which scheduled, and provided with a liaison group consisting of a com-
munication group and such additional personnel (supply and medical) as
may be required;
5. Vessels of the Naval Transportation Service will not be delayed for
the installation of batteries and magazines.
g. Time chartered merchant vessels of the Naval Transportation Service to
be taken over and commissioned will be placed in STANDARD CONDITION
after their initial voyage, and when opportunity permits.
h. Instructions for the mobilization of vessels assigned to the Naval Coastal
Frontier Forces are contained in Chapter VIII, Appendix II.
4315. a. The crews of all combat loaded transports and other vessels scheduled
to unload at a destination having no stevedores available, will include competent
stevedore personnel. These may be supplied from trained naval personnel, or
by contract if suitable naval personnel is not available. This provision applies
to vessels commissioned in the Navy and to time chartered vessels.
b. Provision will be made for furnishing prize crews consisting of a suitable
number of officers and men as follows:
1. To the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET 6;
[72] 2. To the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET 8;
3. To the SOUTHEAST PACJIFIC FORCE 8;
4. To the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET 6.
[73] Section 2. MAINTENANCE
4321. The Shore I']stablishment will maintain the Operating Forces and the
Services in condition of readiness for war by:
a. Replacement of personnel and material;
b. Repairs to units made available at Shore Establishment activities;
c. Hospitalization of personnel;
d. Provisions of facilities at Shore Establishment activities for recreation and
welfare of personnel.
2906 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Replacements
4322. a. In order to provide for replacements of personnel and material for the
Operating Forces and the Services, the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Depart-
ment concerned will establish standard monthly replacement rates based upon
estimated expenditures, plus a small excess for building up a reserve. These
rates will be used by the. Shore Establishment as a basis for procuring personnel
and material to>meet the replacement requirements of the Operating Forces and
the Services. The estimates should be based on probable operations of each
type of the Task Organization in each of the Areas and Sub-Areas listed in para-
graph 1102 of this plan.
b. These standard monthly replacement rates will be revised from time to
time so as to accord with the requirements of the Operating Forces and the
Services, as determined by war experience.
c. In procuring personnel and material at the standard monthly replacement
rates, no deduction will be made for probable losses in the forces to be supplied.
A 10% surplus over the standard monthly replacements will be maintained
available for shipment to provide for probable losses during sea transportation
to destination.
d. Should the established monthly replacement rates prove to be inadequate
to supply the requirements, personnel [74] and material allotted to low
priority units will be reassigned to higher priority units, as required, until defi-
ciencies can be replaced under revised replacement rates.
e. The Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department who provide replace-
ments of personnel and material will designate the activities of the Shore Estab-
lishment to which the Operating Forces and the Units of the Naval Transporta-
tion Service will submit their requests for replacements.
f. The rate of flow of replacements will be controlled by the timely submission
of requests for replacements, stating the desired time and place of delivery.
g. Requests for replacements will be submitted as follows :
1. For the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, U. S.
ASIATIC FLEET, and SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, and U. S. NAVAL
FORCES, NORTH EUROPE by the commanders thereof, or by oflScers
designated by them;
2. For the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, by the Com-
mandants of Naval Districts upon which the forces are based;
3. For units of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE by the
commanders thereof, through the appropriate local naval authorities where
delivery is desired;
4. For units ashore by the commanders thereof, through the Commandants
of Naval Districts or Commanders of Outlying Naval Stations in which these
units are established.
h. Where Shore Establishment facilities are not readily available, units of the
Operating Forces and of the Naval Transportation Service will obtain material
replacements from local sources. (See par. 3116, 3214, 3224, 3315, 3414.) Replace-
ments obtained in this manner will not be included in requests for replacements
made to Shore Establishment activities.
[75] 4323. Delivery of replacements to the Operating Forces the the Services
will be effected, insofar as practicable, at the times and places requested.
Repairs
4324. a. The Shore Establishment will repair such units of the Operating
Forces and Services as may be made available therefor at Shore Establishment
activities.
b. The assignment of availability of such units to an activity of the Shore
Establishment for overhaul and repairs will be governed by the following:
1. The geographic disposition of the various forces;
2. The facilities available at certain activities for accomplishing the work
required;
3. The degree of urgency of the work required;
4. The distribution of the work load among the various activities;
5. The needs for repairs by units of the Associated Powers.
4325. The Chief of Naval Operations will designate the shore activity to which
a vessel will be assigned for overhaul and repairs and will fix the availability dates.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2907
Hospitalization and evacuation
4326. a. The Operating Forces will provide hospitalization for sick and wounded
personnel within the capacity of the hospital facilities available in hospital ships,
in Advanced Base Hospitals, and in Mobile Medical Units.
[76] b. The Shore Establishment will provide hospitalization for sick or
wounded naval and marine corps personnel which may be evacuated to Shore
Establishment activities.
4327. The sick and wounded personnel evacuated to Shore Establishment activ-
ities will be transported in evacuation transports, hospital ships, and other
available vessels having adequate medical facilities.
4328. a. Army forces overseas will provide their own hospitalization, but will
be evacuated to home territory in the same manner as naval personnel.
b. Army forces embarked on naval vessels will be provided hospitalization by
the Navy until such time as the sick and wounded can be evacuated to Army
hospitals or field medical units.
Recreation and welfare
4329. a. The Shore Establishment will provide and maintain recreation and
welfare facilities at Shore Establishment activities for naval and marine corps
personnel.
b. Provisions for these activities will include:
1. Augmentation and maintenance of recreational facilities at Shore Estab-
lishment activities where units of the Operating Forces and Services are
concentrated, and at Training Stations;
2. Augmentation and maintenance of religious and welfare facilities at the
above activities, including cooperation with national and local welfare agencies
and religious groups, operating for the welfare of naval personnel.
[77] Sections. AUGMENTATION
4331. The Shore Establishment will augment the Operating Forces and the
Services by;
a. New construction of vessels and aircraft;
b. Acquisition from the Maritime Commission and from private owners of
vessels and aircraft designated by the Chief of Naval Operations (Naval Supply
and Transportation Service Section), and by their preparation for war service;
c. Preparation for war service of vessels and aircraft transferred to the Navy
from other Government Departments;
d. Acquisition of material.
4332. In preparing plans for the acquisition of small vessels, Commandants of
Naval Districts will provide for consultation and cooperation between local
representatives of the Army, Navy, and Maritime Commission.
[78] CHAPTER IV. ADVANCED BASES
4401. The Shore Establishment will provide personnel and material required
for establishing and maintaining ADVANCED BASES in accordance with in-
structions issued in separate directives.
[79] CHAPTER V. SALVAGE
4501. a. The Shore Establishment will provide salvage units and render sal-
vage service to vessels, both private and public, of all nationalities, in the areas
prescribed in paragraph 4101. c.
b. The Operating Forces, assisted by such facilities as can be made available
by the Shore Establishment, will render salvage service to vessels of their own
forces and to other vessels where practicable, in the waters of the outlying United
States possessions in the Pacific Ocean, of the Philippine Islands and of Advanced
Bases, and in the open sea outside of the areas mentioned in paragraph 4101. c.
4502. The Shore Establishment will cooperate with and assist the Army or
other agencies responsible for clearing harbor channels of stranded vessels within
the waters of the United States.
2908 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4503. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the President, the Navy will
acquire the following vessels to be converted and equipped as salvage vessels:
1. From the COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY
PIONEER,
GUIDE,
DISCOVER;
2. From the COAST GUARD
REDWING,
b. These vessels will be manned and operated as directed by the Bureau of
Ships, and two will be stationed on the Atlantic Coast of the United States and
two on the Pacific Coast of the United States.
[80] CHAPTER VI. PLANS TO BE PREPARED BY THE SHORE ESTABLI.^HMENT
4601. Contributory Plans, Rainbow No. 5, will be prepared as prescribed in
Part V, WPL-8, with particular reference to paragraphs 5126, 5127, and 5128.
4602. The Principal Contributory Plans, Rainbow No. 5, will prescribe the
estimates of requirements, if any, to be made by the subordinate planning agencies.
[81] Part V. Special Provisions
CHAPTER I. exertion OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE
5101. The following is quoted froin Appendix I, paragraph 60:
"The Administrator of Export Control, jointly with the War and Navy
Departments, is to prepare plans and programs for the application of economic
pressure such as may be obtained through control of commodities, trans-
portation, communication, financial relationships, and all related means."
5102. The Chief of Naval Operations will cooperate in the preparation of joint
plans for the Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure.
[82] chapter II. joint plans covering INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, CEN-
SORSHIP AND PUBLICITY, AND MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES
5201. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 61:
"Cooperation of Other Departments of the Government
"The War and Navy Departments, jointly with other departments of the
Government, shall have prepared plans or programs covering the following
subjects:
a. Intelligence Service;
b. Censorship and Publicity;
c. Mobilization of Resources."
5202. a. The Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence) will
act for the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for
the Intelligence Service.
b. The Secretary of the Navy (Director of the Office of Public Relations) and
the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence) will jointly act
for the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for Censor-
ship and Publicity.
c. The Under Secretary of the Navy, acting through the Navy Members of the
Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board, will represent the Navy Department in
the preparation of joint plans or programs for the Mobilization of Resources.
[/] Appendix I. To WPL-46, The Joint Army and 'Navy Basic War
Plan — Rainbow No. 5
[2] SECTION I. DIRECTIVE
1. The directive for Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5,
contained in J. P. 325 (Serial 642-1), Section 1, paragraph 3e, approved October
14, 1939, and revised April 10, 1940, is superseded by the directive contained in
paragraph 2 of this paper.
2. The Joint Board directs The Joint Planning Committee to submit Joint
Army and Navy Basic War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5 based upon the Report of
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2909
United States-British Staff Conversations, dated March 27, 1941 (ABC-1), and
upon Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC-22), now in process of
drafting.
[3] SECTION II. DEFINITIONS
3. The term "Associated Powers" means the United States and the British
Commonwealth, and, when appropriate, includes the Associates and Allies of
either Power.
4. The term "Axis Powers" means Germany and Italy, and, if Japan and
other Powers are at war against the Associated Powers, is to be understood as
including all such Powers.
5. "Malaysia" includes the Philippines, the Malay States, the Straits Settle-
ments, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies. The "Malay Barrier" includes
the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and the chain of islands extending in an
easterly direction from Java to Bathurst Island, Australia,
6. The term "United States naval forces" as used herein will be construed as
including United States naval aviation. The term "air forces" will be construed
as including only the United States Army Air Corps and the Royal Air Force.
[4] SECTION III. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS
7. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the
British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, Greece, Yugo-
slavia, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war
against the Axis Powers, comprising either:
a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.
8. That the Associated Powers will conduct the war in accord with ABC-1
and ABC-22.
9. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility
of their intervention must be taken into account.
10. That United States forces which might base in the Far East Area will be
able to fill logistic requirements, other than personnel, ammunition, and technical
materials, from sources in that general region.
11. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive
elements, but will remain in a nonbelligerent status unless subjected to direct
attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will be
available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense.
[5] SECTION IV. CONCEPT OF THE WAR
12. The Concept of the War as sot forth in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of
ABC-1 is quoted below, except that paragraph 13 (h) is quoted as modified by
the Chief of Naval Operations' and the Chief of Staff's secret letter Serial 039412
of April 5, 1941.
"10. The broad strategic objectives of the Associated Powers will be the
defeat of Germany and her Allies.
"11. The principles of United States and British national strategic de-
fense policies of which the Military forces of the Associated Powers must
take account are:
(a) United States
The paramount territorial interests of the United States are in the Western
Hemisphere. The United States must, in all eventualities, maintain such
dispositions as will prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of
European or Asiatic political or Military power.
(b) British Commonwealth
The security of the United Kingdom must be maintained in all circum-
stances. Similarly, the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India must
maintain dispositions wliich, in all eventualities, will provide for the ultimate
security of the British Commonwealth of Nations. A cardinal feature of
British strategic policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as
will ensure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the
maintenance of its war effort.
(c) Sea Communications
The security of the sea communications of the Associated Powers is essential
to the continuance of their war effort.
2910 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[6] "12. The strategic concept includes the following as the principal
offensive policies against the Axis Powers:
(a) Application of economic pressure by naval, land, and air forces and all
other means, including the control of commodities at their source by diplo-
matic and financial measures.
(b) A sustained air offensive against German Military power, supple-
mented by air offensives against other regions under enemy control which
contribute to that power.
(c) The early elimination of Italy as an active partner in the Axis.
(d) The employment of the air, land, and naval forces of the Associated
Powers, at every opportunity, in raids and minor offensives against Axis
Military strength.
(e) The support of neutrals, and of Allies of the United Kingdom, Asso-
ciates of the United States, and populations in Axis-occupied territory in
resistance to the Axis Powers.
(f ) The building up of the necessary forces for an eventual offensive against
Germany.
(g) The capture of positions from which to launch the eventual offensive.
"13. Plans for the Military operations of the Associated Powers will
likewise be governed by the following:
[7] (a) Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers,
the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre.
The principal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre,
and operations of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted
in such a manner as to facilitate that effort.
(b) Owing to the threat to the sea communications of the United Kingdom,
the principal task of the United States anval forces in the Atlantic will be
the protection of shipping of the Associated Powers, the center of gravity of
the United States effort being concentrated in the Northwestern approaches
to the United Kingdom. Under this conception, the United States naval
effort in the Mediterranean will initially be considered of secondary im-
portance.
(c) It will be of great importance to maintain the present British and
Allied Military position in and near the Mediterranean basings, and to
prevent the spread of Axis control in North Africa.
(d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the
Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy
their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan
does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive.
The United States does not intend to add to its present Military strength
in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively
. in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to
support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength
away from Malaysia. The United States intends so to augment its forces
in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth
will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.
[8] (e) The details of the deployment of the forces of the Associated
Powers at any one time will be decided with regard to the Military situation
in all theatres.
(f) The principal defensive roles of the land forces of the Associated
Powers will be to hold the British Isles against invasion; to defend the
Western Hemisphere; and to protect outlying Military base areas and islands
of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack.
(g) United States land forces will support United States naval and air
forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in
the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability of trained
and equipped organizations. United States land forces will, as a general rule,
provide ground and anti-aircraft defenses of naval and air bases used pri-
marily by United States forces.
(h) Subject to the requirements of the security of the United States, the
British Isles and their sea communications, the air policy of the Associated
Powers will require that associated effort in the air will be directed toward
providing the necessary naval and land air components for the accomplish-
ment of naval tasks, for the support of land operations, and for independent
air operations against the sources of Axis military power.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2911
(i) United States Army Air Forces will support the United States land
and naval forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or
operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability
of trained and equipped organizations, they will undertake the air defense
of those general areas in which naval bases used primarily by United States
forces are located, and subsequently, [9] of such other areas as may
be agreed upon. United States Army air bombardment units will operate
offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force,^ primarily against
German Military power at its source.
(j) United States forces will, so far as practicable, draw their logistic
support (supply and maintenance) from sources outside the British Isles.
Subject to this principle, however, the military bases, repair facilities, and
supplies of either nation will be at the disposal of the Military forces of the
other as required for the successful prosecution of the war."
13. In addition, plans for the Military operations of United States forces will
be governed by the following:
(a) Under this War Plan the scale of hostile attack to be expected within the
Western Atlantic Area is limited to raids by air forces and naval surface and
submarine forces.
(b) The building up of large land and air forces for major offensive operations
against the Axis Powers will be the primary immediate effort of the United States
Army. The initial tasks of United States land and air forces will be limited to
such operations as will not materially delay this effort.
[10] SECTION V. TERMS OF AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM
RELATING TO WAR OPERATIONS
14. Agreements have been reached between the United States and the United
Kingdom relating to war operations.
In this Section certain of these agreements are set forth (See ABC-1 and
ABC-22).
15. Principles of Command of the Forces of the United States and the United
Kingdom, a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the
United Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of
responsibility of their own Power.
b. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting
the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations
into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.
c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic
direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their
type, be employed as task (organized) forces charged with the execution of specific
strategic tasks. These task (organized) forces will operate under their own
commanders and will not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces
of the other Power. Only exceptional Military circumstances will justify the
temporary suspension of the normal strategic tasks.
d. When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised
by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of
time in grade.
e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate
under United States naval command, and will remain an integral part of United
States naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their
operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups.
/. Special command relationships pertaining to particular areas are set forth
in paragraph 16.
[11] 16. Responsibility for the Strategic Direction of Military Forces, a.
United States Areas. Upon entering the war, the United States will assume
responsibility for the strategic direction of its own and British Military forces
in the following areas:
(1) The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous con-
tinental land areas, north of Latitude 25° South and west of Longitude 30°
West, except:
(a) The area between Latitude 20° North and Latitude 43° North which
lies east of Longitude 40° West.
(b) The waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility
for the strategic direction of Military forces, as may be defined in United
States-Canada Joint Agreements.
2912 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(2) The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous con-
tinental land areas, as follows:
(a) North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East;
(b) North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East;
(c) South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South Ameri-
can coast and Longitude 74° West; except for the waters and territories in
which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of Military
forces, as may be defined in United States-Canada Joint Agreements. The
L^nited States will afford support to British naval forces in the regions south
of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.
[13] b. The Far East Area Coordination in the planning and execution of
operations by Military forces of the United States, British Commonwealth, and
Netherlands East Indies in the Far East Area will, subject to the approval of the
Dutch authorities, be effected as follows:
(1) The commanders of the Military forces of the Associated Powers will
collaborate in the formulation of strategic plans for operations in that area.
(2) The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers will be the
responsibility of the respective commanders of the Military forces concerned.
These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual support as may
be practicable and appropriate.
(3) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the
Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense
of the Philippines will be assumed by the British naval Commander-in-Chief,
China. . The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be
responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense
of the Philippines.
(4) For the above purposes, the Far East Area is defined as the area from
the coast of China in Latitude 30° North, east to Longitude 140° East,
thence south to the equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence
south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence
westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, thence south to Lati-
tude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence north to Latitude
20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.
[13] c. Joint Land Offensives. Responsibility for the strategic direction of
the Military forces engaged in joint offensive action on land will be in accordance
with joint agreements to be entered upon at the proper time. In these circum-
stances unity of command in the theatre of operations should be established.
d. British Commonwealth Areas. The British Commonwealth will assume
responsibility for the strategic direction of associated Military forces in all other
areas not described in sub-paragraphs a, b, and c next above. These areas as
initiallv delimited are:
'(1) The AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AREA comprises the
Australian and New Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180°
and south of the equator. The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China,
is responsible for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated
Powers operating in the Australian and New Zealand Area.
(2) The UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA
comprises the waters to the eastward of Longitude 30° West and to the
Northward of Latitude 43° North and the land areas bordering on, and the
islands in, the above ocean area. Administrative command of all United
States land and air forces stationed in the British Isles and Iceland will be
exercised by the Commander, United States Army Forces in Great Britain.
This officer will have authority to arrange details concerning the organization
and location of task forces (organization of units in appropriate formation)
and operational control with the War Office and the Air Ministrv.
(3) The NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.
(a) Northern boundary. Latitude 43° North,
(b) Southern boundary, Latitude 20° North,
[14] (c) Western boundary. Longitude 40° West,
(d) Eastern boundary, the coasts of Spain, Portugal, and Africa, and
Longitude 5° West, together with the islands and land areas contiguous
thereto.
(e) Strategic direction of a United Sfates naval force basing on Gibraltar
will be exercised by the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff except when
he specifically delegates it for a stated period as follows:
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2913
To the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for operations
in the Western Mediterranean.
To the Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, for operations
in the Central Atlantic.
(/) The Commander of United States naval forces basing in Gibraltar will
be r^ponsible for administrative matters to the Commander-in-Chief, United
States Atlantic Fleet.
(4) The SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA comprises:
(a) The area between Latitudes 20° North and 25° South, bqunded on the
west by Longitude 30° West and on the east by the African Coast.
(b) The South Atlantic Ocean, south of Latitude 25° South, between
Longitudes 74° West and 33° East, together with the islands and land areas
contiguous thereto.
(5) The MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST AREAS comprise
the Mediterranean Sea east of Longitude 5° West, the Suez Canal, and the
islands and countries adjoining them, including the present theatres of opera-
tions in North and East Africa. The Black Sea, Iraq, and Aden are also
included in this area.
[15] (6) The INDIA AND EAST INDIES AREA comprises:
(a) India.
(b) Indian Ocean, including the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, bounded on the
West by the coasts of Africa and Longitude 33° East, and on the East by
the western boundaries of the Far East Area and the Australian Station.
(c) The islands in the above ocean area.
17. Collaboration in Planning, a. The High Commands of the United States
and United Kingdom will collaborate continuously in the formulation and execu-
tion of strategical policies and plans which shall govern the conduct of the war.
They and their respective commanders in the field, as may be appropriate, will
similarly collaborate in the planning and execution of such operations as may be
undertaken jointly by United States and British forces. This arrangement will
apply also to such plans and operations as may be undertaken separately, the
extent of collaboration required in each particular plan or operation being agreed
mutually when the general policy has been decided.
b. To effect the collaboration outlined in the preceding sub-paragraph, and to
ensure the coordination of administrative action and command between the United
States and British Military Services, the United States and United Kingdom will
exchange Military Missions. These Missions will comprise one senior officer
of each of the Military Services, with their appropriate staffs. The functions of
these Missions will be as follows:
(1) To represent jointly, as a corporate body, their own Chiefs of Staff
(the Chief of Naval Operations being considered as such), vis-a-vis the group
of Chiefs of Staff of the Power to which they are accredited, for the purpose of
collaboration in the [16] formulation of Military policies and plans
governing the conduct of the war in areas in which that Power assumes
responsibility for strategic direction.
(2) In their individual capacity to represent their own individual Military
Services vis-a-vis the appropriate Military Services of the Power to which
they are accredited, in matters of mutual concern in the areas in which that
Power assumes responsibility for strategic direction.
c. The personnel of either Mission shall not become members of any regularly
constituted body of the government of the Power to which they are accredited.
Their staffs will, however, work in direct cooperation with the appropriate branches
and committees of the staff of the Power to which they are accredited.
d. The United States, as may be necessary, will exchange Liaison officers with
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand for effectuating direct cooperation between
United States and Dominion forces.
e. To promote adequate collaboration and prompt decision, a military trans-
portation service will be established between England and the United States.
Ships and airplanes will be assigned to this service by the United States and the
United Kingdom as may be found necessary.
/. Existing Military intelligence organizations of the two powers will operate
as independent intelligence agencies, but will maintain close liaison with each
other in order to ensure the full and prompt exchange of pertinent information
2914 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
concerning war operations. Intelligence liaison will be established not only
through the Military Missions but also between all echelons of command in the
field with respect to matters which affect their operations.
[ / 7] Communications
18. The United States and the United Kingdom will establish in London the
"Associated Communication Committee" which is to be constituted as follows:
a. A representative of the United States Army and a representative of the
United States Navy, who are members of the staff of the United States Military
Mission in London.
b. Representatives of the British Combined Signals Board in the United
Kingdom.
19. The Associated Communications Committee will be the supreme controlling
body with relation to intercommunications by radio (W/T), wire, visual, and sourid
affecting the armed services and the merchant marines of the two nations.
Control and Protection of Shipping
20. The British authorities will issue directions for the control and protection
of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which British authorities
assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces. United States
authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the
Associated Powers within the areas in which the United States authorities assume
responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces.
21. United States and British shipping scheduled to pass from an area assigned
to one Power into an area assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and
protected by agreement between the respective naval authorities. The British
Admiralty is the supreme authority in the control of shipping in the North Atlantic
bound to and from the United Kingdom.
22. The British Naval Control Service Organization will continue in the
exercise of its present functions and methods in all regions pending establishment
of effective United States Agencies in United States areas. The Chief of Naval
Operations, immediately on entry of the United States into the war, will arrange
for the control and protection of shipping of United [18] States registry or
charter within United States Areas. Requests from the British Naval Control
Service Organization for protection by United States forces within United States
areas will be made to the Chief of Naval Operations.
23. Special Relationship between Canada and the United States. Joint Agree-
ments are being drawn up by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United
States-Canada, regarding the cooperation of the Armed forces of the United
States and Canada in the areas in which the United States has strategic direction.
When completed, the substance of these agreements, (Short Title ABC-22), will
be incorporated in this plan.
[19] SECTION VI. GENERAL TASKS
24. Joint General Task. In cooperation with the other Associated Powers,
defeat the Axis Powers, and guard United States national interests, by:
a. Reducing Axis economic power to wage war, by blockade, raids, and a
sustained air offensive;
b. Destroying Axis military power by raids and an eventual land, naval, and
air offensive;
c. Protecting the sea communications of the Associated Powers;
d. Preventing the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic
military power; and by
e. Protecting outlying Military base areas and islands of strategic importance
against land, air, or sea-borne attack.
[W] SECTION VII. TASKS
25. The tasks of the Army and Navy, as set forth in this section, are those
listed in, or derived from, the tasks of ABC-1, Annex III.
26. These tasks as stated do not include the assistance which may be furnished
by the Armed Forces of Latin-American Republics. Such assistance may reduce
the total of forces required but will not change the character of the operations.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2915
The Western Atlantic Area
27. Definition. The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with Islands and contiguous
continental land areas north of latitude 25° South, and west of Longitude 30° West
except the area between Latitudes 20° North and 43° North which lies east of
Longitude 40° West.
28. Army Tasks, a. In conjunction with Naval forces, protect the territory
of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of Axis military power into
the Western Hemisphere by destroying enemy expeditionary forces and by
denying use to the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and Naval bases in that
Hemisphere.
6. In conjunction with naval forces, support Latin American Republics against
invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling
enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere.
c. Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of
the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications bj-
offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating
radius of occupied air bases.
d. Relieve British forces in Curacao and Aruba.
e. Provide defensive garrisons for Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, Trinidad,
St. Lucia, Antigua, and British Guiana.
[£1] f. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense
Command Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in
paragraph 47.
g. Build up forces in the United States for eventual offensive action against
Germany.
h. Prepare to relieve Marine Forces in the Azores and Cape Verde Islands if
such garrisons have been established.
29. Army Forces, a. 1941 Troop basis plus all augmentations, less detach-
ments.
b. Local defense forces.
c. One reinforced Corps of three divisions, including appropriate Air forces
maintained in the L'nited States as a reserve for the support of overseas garrisons
and Latin American Republics.
Note: For overseas movements see paragraph 51.
30. Navy Tasks, a. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers
by escorting, covenng, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.
b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading
directly or indirectly with the enemy.
c. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of
enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying hostile expe-
ditionary forces and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the
use of land positions in that hemisphere.
d. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified
localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.
[22] e. Protect and route shipping in the Coastal Zones.
/. Prepare to occupy the .Azores and the Cape Verde Islands.
31. Navy Forces, a. The Atlantic Fleet, less detachments.
b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.
The Pacific Area.
325 Definition. The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous
contin*ental land areas, is as follows:
a. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East.
b. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East.
c. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to South American coast
and Longitude 74° West.
33. Army Tasks, a. In conjunction with naval forces, protect the territory
of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of Axis military power into
the Western Hemisphere by destroying enemy expeditionary forces and by
denying use to the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and naval bases in
that Hemisphere.
b. In conjunction with naval forces, support Latin American Republics against
invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling
enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere.
79716 O— 46 — pt. 18-
2916 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[SS] c. Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications
of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by
offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating
radius of occupied air bases.
d. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense Command
Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.
34. Army Forces, a. Local defense forces.
h. One reinforced Division, including appropriate air forces maintained in the
United States as a reserve for the support of Latin American Republics on the
West Coast of South America.
Note: For overseas movements see paragraph 51.
35. Navy Tasks, a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far
East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the
denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy
sea communications and positions.
b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading
directly or indirectly with the enemy.
c. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific
Area.
d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west as
Longitude 155° East.
e. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific area, and
prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by
destroying [24] hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces
in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Hemisphere.
/. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall
Island area.
g. Defend Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa and Guam.
h. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and sf>ecified locali-
ties in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.
i. Route shipping in the Pacific Area.
36. Navy Forces, a. The Pacific Fleet, less detachments.
b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.
The Far East Area *
37. Army Tasks. In cooperation with the Navy defend the Philippine Coastal
Frontier — Category of Defense "E".
38. Army Forces. Local Defense Forces, augmented only by such personnel
and facilities as are available locally. ,
39. Navy Tasks, a. Raid Japanese sea communications and destroy Axis
forces.
b. Support the land and air forces in the defense of the territories of the Asso-
ciated Powers. (The responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United States
Asiatic Fleet, for supporting the defense of the Philippines remains so long as that
defense continues.)
[26] c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels
trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.
d. Protect sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering,
and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.
e. In cooperation with the Army defend the Philippine Coastal Frontier —
Category of Defense "E".
40. Navy Forces, a. The Asiatic Fleet.
United Kingdom and British Home Waters
41. Definition, a. Waters to the eastward of Longitude 30° West and to the
Northward of Latitude 43° North.
b. Land areas bordering on, and islands in the above ocean area.
42. Army Tasks, a. In cooperation with the Royal Air Force conduct offen-
sive air operations primarily against objectives in Germany, and against attempted
invasion or blockade as demanded by the situation.
b. Provide for the ground defense of occupied ba.ses and air defense of those
general areas in the British Isles in which bases used primarily by United States
Naval forces are located, and subsequently of such other areas as may be agreed
upon.
c. Provide a token force for the defense of the British Isles.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2917
[26] d. Relieve, as soon as practicable, the British garrison in Iceland and
in cooperation with the Navy defend that island — Category of Defense "D".
43. Army Forces. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped forces:
a. British Isles.
3 Heavy Bombardment Groups
2 Medium Bombardment Groups
3 Pursuit Groups
Approximately 10 Anti-aircraft Regiments
Approximately 10 Infantry Battalions (Bases)
One reinforced Regiment (Tok«n Force)
h. Iceland.
One reinforced Division.
Note: For overseas movements see paragraphs 51.
44. Navy Tasks and Forces, a. Northwest Escort Force.
Task. Escort Convoys in the Northwest Approaches, acting under the strategic
direction of the British Commander-in-Chief of the Western Approaches.
b. Submarine Force Three.
Task. Raid enemy shipping in an area to be designated later, acting under the
strategic direction of the British Vice Admiral, Submarines.
North Atlantic Area
[27] 45. Definition. The North Atlantic Area is defined as follows:
a. Northern boundary, Latitude .43° North.
h. Southern boundary. Latitude 20° North.
c. Western boundary. Longitude 40° West.
d. Eastern boundary, the Coasts of Spain, Portugal, and Africa, and Longitude
5° West.
46. Navy Tasks and Forces, a. Submarine Force Two.
Task. Raid enemy shipping in the Mediterranean under the strategic direction
of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, acting through the Flag Officer
Commanding North Atlantic.
Note: As soon as the situation in the Pacific permits their transfer to the
Atlantic, United States naval forces may be assigned the following tasks in this
area, unless the strategic situation in the Atlantic at that time dictates a different
decision.
b. Protect the sea commuinlcations of the Associated Powers by escorting,
covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.
c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading
directly or indirectly with the enemy.
d.' Raid Axis sea communications, territories and forces in the Western Medi-
terranean.
[28] 47. Categories of Defense. The Categories of Defense listed in this
paragraph apply to all Defense Command Areas, Coastal Frontiers, Naval
Coastal Frontiers and isolated positions.
Northeast Defense Command and North Atlantic Coastal Frontier,
except United States Bases in Newfoundland -< Category B
United States Bases in Newfoundland ,_., Category C
Southern Defense Command and Southern Coastal Frontier Category B
Caribbean Defense Command and Panama and Caribbean Coastal
Frontiers Category D
Western Defense Command and Pacific Coastal Frontier, except
Alaska Category B
Alaska, Less Unalaska Category C
Unalaska . Category D
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Category D
Philippine Coastal Frontier . Category E
Note: No Army reinforcements will be sent to the Philippine
Coastal Frontier.
Bermuda Category C
Iceland Category D
Midway, Johnston, Palmyra Category D
Guam ^ : Category F
2918 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
48. Joint Plans to be prepared. The provisions of paragraph 42 e. "Joint Action
of the Ami}' and the Navy" in conflict with the provisions of this paragraph will
be disregarded.
a. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans.
b. Joint Sector Defense Plans, except that the Sector Defense Plans for New-
foundland, Nova Scotia, and the British Columbia Sectors will be made as
required by ABC-22.
c. Joint Subsector Defense Plans and Defensive Coastal Area Plans as directed
by the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans.
d. Joint P^mbarkation Plans for the embarkation of the Army units, specified
in paragraph 51 a, to be prepared by the Commanding Generals, Army Ports of
Embarkation and the Commandants of the Naval Districts in which these ports
are located.
[S9] SECTION VIII. OVERSEAS MOVEMENTS
49. Army Tasks. Move troops to ports of embarkation as required.
50. Navy Tasks. Provide sea transportation for the initial movement and the
continued support of Army and Navy forces overseas. Man and operate the
Army Transport Service.
51. Overseas Movements of Army Troops. The plan in this paragraph 51 is
based on the assumption that M-day will occur prior to September 1, 1941.
Movements on the dates given in certain sub-paragraphs will not be made unless
M-day has occurred before such date.
a. The Navy will assemble material and make specific plans for the troop
movements specified in this subparagraph a.
(1) NEW YORK to ICELAND, 26,500 troops, 73 aircraft.
First contingent — 10,500 troops embark on 24-M.
Second contingent — 16,000 troops embark on 57-M.
These two movements will be made by British transports if arrangements
can be effected. If not, this plan contemplates use of United States trans-
ports.
(2) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 7,000 troops, embark on 10-M.
(3) NEW YORK to IRELAND, 8,000 troops, embark on 10-M.
These two forces, sub-paragraphs (2) and (3), will move in one convoy.
The Northwest Escort Force will move with this convoy.
(4) NEW YORK to BERMUDA, 3,700 troops, 41 aircraft, embark on
18-M. Eight aircraft will fly to destination, 33 aircraft will be transported.
Part of this force may be moved before M-day.
[30] (5) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 8,000 troops, 73 aircraft, embark
September 1, 1941. 16 aircraft will be transported, 57 aircraft will fly' to
destination.
(6) NEW YORK to IRELAND, 7,000 troops, 105 aircraft, embark October
1, 1941. Aircraft will be transported.
(7) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 6,600 troops, 60 aircraft, embark October
1, 1941. 57 aircraft will fly to destination, three aircraft will be transported.
These two forces, sub-paragraphs (6) and (7), will move in one convoy.
(8) NEW YORK to IRELAND, 11,600 troops, 200 aircraft embark
November 1, 1941. Aircraft will be transported.
(9) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 7,000 troops, 38 aircraft, embark January
1, 1942. 35 aircraft will flv to destination, 3 aircraft will be transported.
. (10) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 13,000 troops, 76 aircraft, embark on
February 1, 1942. 70 Aircraft will fly to destination, six aircraft will be
(11) GALVESTON to CURACAO-ARUBA, 6,000 troops, embark on
15-M.
(12) GALVESTON to TRINIDAD, 12,500 troops embark on 15-M.
(13) GALVESTON to PANAMA, 6,400 troops, of which 3,300 embark on
20- M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become
available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2919
(14) GALVESTON to PUERTO RICO, 12,600 troops, of which 4,000
embark 20-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships
, become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.
[31] (15) SEATTLE to ALASKA, 23,000 troops, of which 1,100 embark
on 10-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become
available. Part or all of these troops may be moved before M-day.
(16) SAN FRANCISCO to HAWAII, 23,000 troops, of which 15,000
embark on 10-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ship^
become available. Part of these troops may be moved before M-day.
b. The movements of the troops in this sub-paragraph b are contingent upon
unpredictable eventualities. The Navy will not prepare material nor make
specific plans for these movements in advance of M-day.
(1) GALVESTON to WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA, 24,000
troops, 80 aircraft will prepare to embark at Galveston on 45-M. If the
Panama Canal is not open, these troops will embark at San Francisco.
(2) NEW YORK and GALVESTON to EAST COAST of LATIN
AMERICA, 86,000 troops, 56 aircraft, will prepare to embark 90-M. The
56 aircraft may be flown to destination.
(3) NEW YORK and GALVESTON to TRANSATLANTIC DESTINA-
TIONS, 83,000 troops wUl be prepared to embark 20-M; desired minimum
rate of movement 60,000 troops per month.
(4) EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, One Army, two Corps, ten Divisions,
will be prepared to embark at East Coast and Gulf ports beginning 180-M.
SECTION IX. SUPPORTING MEASURES
[32] 52. Theaters of Operation. The designation and delimitation of addi-
tional land and sea theaters of operations to meet the developments of the situation
covered by this Plan will be announced when the Plan is put into effect.
53. Time of Execution. M-Day is the time origin for the execution of this
Plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war or the occurrence of hostile
acts. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate
or put into effect certain features of this Plan prior to M-Day.
54. Personnel. The Army and Navy requirements for increased personnel will
be met by the operation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.
55. Ports of Embarkation. The Army will establish, when required, additional
ports of embarkation at:
New Orleans, La. >
Galveston, Texas
Boston, Mass.
Charleston, S. C.
56. Material. The United States will continue to furnish material aid to the
United Kingdom, but for the use of itself and its other associates, will retain
material in such quantities as to provide for security and best to effectuate
United States-British joint plans for defeating Germany and her Allies. Subject
to the foregoing, the material to fill ihe requirements of the Army and Navy under
this plan will come from existing reserves of the respective services and from pro-
duction sources developed under Army and Navy Procurement Plans. In all
cases where surveys indicate that reserves and existing production will not meet
requirements, the War and Navy Departments will [33] each be responsible
for providing the additional production necessary to meet deficiencies of their
respective services, except in cases where one Department furnishes the other
with the material involved.
57. Supply Levels. Supply levels will be maintained for forces operating in
the areas or positions as indicated by the tentative figures given in this para-
graph. Final figures pertaining to building up initial levels will be established
after a detailed joint e.xamination of the problems involved.
2920 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
a. Supplies other than ammunition.
(1) Iceland 30 days, build up to 60 days within six
months.
(2) British Isles Except pursuit aircraft, 30 days, build up to
60 days within six months.
Pursuit Aircraft
60 days, build up to 120 days within six
months.
(3) Panama and Caribbean 30 days, build up to 45 days within six
Coastal Frontiers. months.
(4) Newfoundland and Alaska 30 days, build up to 60 diays within six
(Less Unalaska). months.
(5) Unalaska 60 days, build up to 90 days within six
months.
(6) Bermuda Maintain at 30 days.
(7) Hawaii Maintain at 70 days.
[SJf] (8) Philippines As the situation may permit, the desirable
standard being the maintenance of stocks
at 90 days' supply.
h. Am.munition for places listed under 57 a:
(1) For all troops included in a project; complete the project and then
maintain at that level.
(2) For ground troops not included in a project; establish and then main-
tain five times the mobilization allowance.
(3) For Air Corps troops not included in a project (less pursuit aviation
in British Isles): Ammunition for 30 days' operation; build up to 60 days
within six months.
(4) Pursuit aviation in the British Isles: Ammunition for 60 days' opera-
tions; build up to 120 days within six months.
58. Industrial Planning. For Industrial planning purposes, and with due
regard to decisions that may be made with respect to supplies to other Associated
Powers, the industrial capacity of the nation will be allocated in conformity with
the following general policy:
a. The Army and the Navy shall each continue to plan for maximum industrial
needs.
h. When the available capacity of the nation to produce does not meet the
requirements of the Army, Navy, and Associated Powers, such priorities as neces-
sary to support the strategic situation will be established by The Joint Board
and administered by the Army and Navy Munitions Board, in keeping with
national policy.
\S5] c. When plans contemplate that one Service procure for and deliver
material to the other Service, the manufacturing facilities needed to produce such
material shall be taken into consideration when a division of. capacity is made.
Under this provision, all ship-building plants will be allocated to the Navy, and
the Navy will furnish the Army with such overseas transportation as the Army
may require, consistent with national strategic needs as a whole.
59. Supporting Legiclative Program. The War and Navy Departments jointly
shall have prepared by appropriate agencies, such drafts of legislation. Presidential
Proclamations, and Executive Orders affecting both the Army and the Navy as
are deemed necessary for the execution of this Joint Plan.
60. Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure. The Administrator of Export
Control, jointly with the War and Navy Departments is to prepare plans jand
programs for the application of economic pressure such as may be obtained
through control of commodities, transportation, communication, financial rela-
tionships and all related means.
61. Cooperation with Other Departments of the Government. The War and Navy
Departments, jointly with other departments or agencies of the Government,
shall have prepared plans or programs covering the fojlowing subjects:
a. Intelligence Service.
b. Censorship and Publicity.
c. Mobilization of Resources.
SECTION X. DIPLOMATIC MEASURES
[36] 62. With respect to Latin American Republics, copfirmation should
be sought that each State will make available to the armed forces of the United
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2921
States, immediately as the necessity arises in carrying out operations for Hemi-
sphere Defense, or in behalf of any State, the use of its available sea, air, and land
bases.
63. A special agreement should be sought with Brazil to the effect that the
defense of the Western Hemisphere and the protection of its sea communications
may require use by the United States of Brazilian sea, air and land bases and
commercial port facilities for the projection of naval, land or air operations to the
African continent. The most important areas in this respect are the coastal
zones and territorial waters extending from Belem to Bahia and including the
Island of Ferando do Noronha.
64. Diplomatic and economic pressure should be directed towards securing
the acquiescence of the powers concerned for the protective occupation when
necessary of Eire, the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, and French North Africa.
65. Diplomatic and economic support should be given to Governments in exile,
to China, to neutrals and to populations in occupied territory in order to encourage
opposition to the Axis Powers.
66. Acquiescence of the Netherlands Government in London for protective
occupation of Curacao and Aruba will be secured by the British Government.
[37] ANNEX I. COASTAL FRONTIERS
Reference: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.
1. For purposes of this Plan, this ANNEX I to Joint Army and Navy Basic
War Plan — RAINBOW No. 5 temporarily amends Section IV of reference (a),
as indicated herein.
2. Change paragraph 33 of reference (a) to read:
"33. Joint organization and command.
"a. Coastal divisions with geographical coterminous boundaries within which
an Army officer and a Naval officer will exercise command over the Army forces
and the Navy forces, respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions, have
been established in order to provide a joint organization and to ensure the effective
coordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense.
These coastal divisions comprise coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors. The
system of coastal frontiers includes certain outlying land, island and sea areas,
as well as the coasts of continental United States. The joint organization, together
with the commanders responsible for the execution of security measures on and
after M-day and the necessary peacetime planning therefor, are as stated below.
NOTE: The preceding sub-paragraph, for purposes of this plan, modifies
Chapter V, paragraph 26 a, Section I, of reference (a).
"b. A Defense Command is a geographical area within which an Army officer is
responsible for the coordination or preparation, and for the execution of all plans
for the emplovment of Army forces and installations Iving within the command
boundaries; where pertinent, a Defense Command includes one or more coastal
frontiers and may include isolated localities. (See map attached showing defense
commands in contihental United (States.)
"c. Normally a naval coastal frontier includes the coastal zone adjacent to
the coastal frontier. In certain cases, two naval coastal frontiers may be included
in a coastal frontier; in other cases the naval coastal frontier includes waters
which extend bevond the limit(S of the coastal frontier.
[38] "d. The provisions of ABC-22 may prescribe the extension of the
North Atlantic coastal frontier and the Pacific coastal frontier to include part of
the territory and coastal waters of Canada.
"e. Coordination between Army and Navy forces in coastal frontier operations
shall be by the method of mutual cooperation, subject to the provisions of para-
graph 9 h."
3. Change paragraph 34 of reference (a) to read as follows:
"34. North Atlantic coastal frontier.
"a. Boundaries.
Northern. — Northern boundary of the United States, but including United
States bases in Newfoundland. This may later be modified by ABC-22.
Southern. — Diamond Shoals Lightship, Hatteras Inlet inclusive, southern
and western boundary of Dare County (N. C), Albemarle Sound, Chowan
River, Virginia — North Carolina boundary to the west, all inclusive.
2922 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"b. Commanders.
Army. — The Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command, or an
officer, designated by him.
Navy. — The Cornmandant, Third Naval District, who is designated as
the Commander North Atlantic naval coastal frontier. This officer also
commands the naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal
force under his immediate command, and the naval local defense forces of the
First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Naval Districts under the command of the
commandants of the naval districts concerned. The officers named will
arrange for the joint tactical employment in cooperation with the Army, of
the naval forces assigned to their respective commands.
[39] "c. Sectors. — The North Atlantic coastal frontier is divided into the
following defense sectors:
(1) Newfoundland sector.
(a) Boundaries: These may later be established by ABC-22.
The sector now consists of the United States bases in Newfoundland.
(b) Commanders.
Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast
Defense Command.
Navy. — Commander, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland.
(2) New England sector.
(a) Boundaries.
Northern. — Northern boundary of the United States.
Southern. — Nantucket Shoals Lightship, exclusive; Block Island,
inclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary.
(b) Commanders.
Army. — As designated by Commanding General, Northeast
Defense Command.
Navy. — The Commandant, First Naval District.
(c) This sector is subdivided into the Portland, Boston, and Newport
subsectors, with boundaries as follows:
[40] 1. Between the Portland and the Boston subsectors:
Northern boundary of Massachusetts.
2. Between the Boston and the Newport subsectors: Pollock Rip
Slue Lightship, Monomy Light, Bishop and Clerk's Light, Cotuit
Bay, Bourne, Taunton, northern boundary of Rhode Island, all to
Boston subsector.
(3) New York sector.
(a) Boundaries.
Northern. — Nantucket Shoals Lightship, inclusive; Block Island,
exclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary.
Southern. — Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both exclusive; Trenton,
inclusive.
(b) Commanders.
Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast
Defense Command.
Navy. — Commandant, Third Naval District.
(c) This "sector is subdivided into the Long Island and New Jersey
subsectors with boundary as follows:
Between subsectors: The Sandy Hook Peninsula and lower New York
Bay to the Long Island subsector.
(4) Delaware-Chesapeake sector.
(a) Boundaries.
Northern. — Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both inclusive; Trenton
exclusive.
[41] Southern. — Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet,
inclusive; southern and western ^boundary of Dare County (N. C),
Albemarle Sound, Chowan River; Virginia-North Carolina bound-
ary to the west, all inclusive. This sector will be subdivided into
the Delaware and the Chesapeake subsectors, with the boundary as
Winter Quarter Shoal Lightship (to Delaware subsector), southern
and western boundary of Delaware.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2923
(b) Commanders.
Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast
Defense Command.
Navy. — There is no naval commander of this sector. The
Commandant, Fourth Naval District, commands the naval local
d'ifense force in the Delaware subsector, and the Commandant,
Fifth Naval District, commands the naval local defense force in
the Chesapeake subsector. The Commandant, Fifth Naval Dis-
trict, coordinates operations and war planning of the naval local
defense forces of the Fourth and Fifth Naval Districts."
4. Change paragraph 35 of reference (a) to read as follows:
"35. Southern coastal frontier.
"a. Boundaries.
Northern. — Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, exclusive; southern
and western boundary of Dare County (N. C); Albemarle Sound, Chowan
River; Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all exclusive.
[42] Southern. — The Rio Grande. The coastal zone extends south-
eastward and southward to the northwestern boundary of the Caribbean
naval coastal frontier, so as to include the Gulf of Mexico and such parts of
Bahaman waters and the Caribbean Sea as to lie to the northward of that
boundary.
"b. Commanders.
Army. — The Commanding General, Southern Defense Command, or an
officer designated by him.
Navy. — The Commandant, Sixth Naval District, who is designated as the
Commander Southern naval coastal frontier. This officer exercises command
over the naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal force
under his immediate command, and the naval local defense forces of the
Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Naval Districts under the immediate command
of the commandants of the naval districts concerned. The officers named
will arrange for the joint tactical employment, in cooperation with the Army,
of the naval forces assigned to their respective commands.
"c. Sectors. — This frontier will be subdivided into defense sectors of Carolina,
Florida, and Gulf, corresponding territorially to the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth
Naval Districts, respectively."
5. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraphs:
"35A. Caribbean coastal frontier.
"a. Boundaries.
All United States territories and possessions, and United States military
and naval reservations and activities on shore located within an area bounded
as follows:
[43] Beginning at latitude 18°05' North, longitude 87°32' West
thence by a line bearing 63° true to the 25th parallel of latitude, thence by
the 25th parallel of latitude to the 65th meridian of longitude, thence
by a line direct to latitude 2° North, longitude 49° West, thence by a
line direct to the place beginning. The coastal zone includes all of the
waters within these boundaries, as well as the sea lanes and focal points
beyond, but near, the eastern boundary.
"b. Commanders.
Army. — The Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, or
an officer designated by him.
Navy. — The Commandant, Tenth Naval District, who is designated
as the Commander, Caribbean naval coastal frontier. This officer also
commands the naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint
tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army.
"c. Sectors. — The Caribbean coastal frontier is divided into the following
defense sectors:
(1) Guantanamo sector.
(a) Boundaries. — The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier lying
westward of a line passing through Cape Isabela and Beata Point, His-
paniola, extended to cut the northern and the southwestern coastal
frontier boundaries.
2924 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(b) Commanders.
Army.^ — As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean
Defense Command.
[44] Navy. — Commander, Naval Operating Base, Guan-
tanamo, Cuba.
(2) Puerto Rico sector.
(a) Boundaries. — The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier
lying eastward of the eastern boundary of the Guantanamo sector, and
' northward of the 15th parallel of north latitude.
(6) Commanders.
Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean
Defense Command.
Navy. — The Commandant, Tenth Naval District.
(3) Trinidad sector.
(a) Boundaries. — The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier
lying eastward of the eastern boundary of the Guantanamo sector, and
southward of the 15th parallel of north latitude.
(b) Commanders.
Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean
Defense Command.
Navy. — The Commander, Naval Operating Base, Trinidad."
6, Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraph:
"35B. Panama coastal frontier.
[45] "a. Boundaries.
All United States territories and possessions, and United States
military and naval reservations and activities on shore located within
the following area: British Honduras, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, and Ecuador; all land
areas between the southwestern boundary of the Caribbean coastal
frontier and the coasts of Central and South America; and all land areas
between the coasts of Central and South America and a broken line drawn
from the Mexico-Guatemala border to a point in latitude 5° South,
longitude 95° West, and thence to Peru-Ecuador border. The coastal
zone includes all the waters within these boundaries, as well as the sea
lanes beyond, but near, the western and southern boundaries.
"6. Commanders.
Army. — The Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command,
or an officer designated by him.
Navy. — The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District, who is desig-
nated as the Commander, Panama naval coastal frontier. This officer
also commands the naval local defense force, and will arrange for its
joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army.
"c. Sectors.
The Panama coastal frontier is divided into the following defense
sectors:
(1) Atlantic sector.
(a) Boundaries. — The area within the Panama coastal fron-
tier lying between the northeastern boundary and the continen-
tal divide.
(b) Commanders.
Army. — As designated by Commanding General Caribbean
Defense Command.
Navy. — The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.
(2) Pacific sector.
(a) Boundaries. — The area within the Panama coastal frontier lying
between the contiental divide and the western and southern boundaries.
(b) Commanders.
Army. — As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean
Defense Command.
Navy. — The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District."
7. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraph:
"35C. The Caribbean defense command includes all the land and water areas
lying within the boundaries of the Caribbean coastal frontier and the Panama
coastal frontier."
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2925
8, Change paragraph 36 of reference (a) to read:
"36. Pacific coastal frontier.
"a. Boundaries.
Northern. — Northern boundary of Washington except that Alaska is part
of the Pacific coastal frontier. This frontier mav later be changed as required
by ABC-22.
[47] Southern. — Southern boundary of the United States. The coastal
zone extends southeastward to abreast the southern boundary of Mexico.
(1) Pacific naval coastal frontiers.— The Pacific coastal frontier is
divided into two naval coastal frontiers, i. e., the Pacific Southern naval
coastal frontier, and the Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier. The
boundary between the two naval coastal frontiers is the northern
boundary of California,
"b. Commanders.
Army. — The Commanding General, Western Defense Command, or an
oflRcer designated by him.
Navy. —
(1) The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District, who is also desig-
nated as the Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier.
(2) The Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, also
commands the Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier force, composed
of the naval coastal force under his immediate command and the naval
local defense forces of the Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts under
the command of the commandants of the naval districts concerned.
(3) The Commander, Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier, is the
Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District. This officer also commands
the naval local defense force assigned to his district.
(4) The Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, and
the Commander, Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier, will arrange
for the joint tactical employment, in cooperation with the Army, of the
naval forces assigned to their respective commands.
[48] "c. Sectors. — This frontier is subdivided into the Southern California,
Northern California, Northwestern, and Alaskan sectors, as follows:
(1) Boundary between the Southern California and Northern California
sectors, Santa Maria River.
(2) Boundary between the Northern California and the Northwestern
sector is the northern boundary of California.
(3) Northern boundary of the Northwestern sector is the northern bound-
ary of Washington.
(4) The boundaries of Alaska define the Alaskan sector.
"d. Sectors of this frontier are further subdivided into subsectors with bound-
aries as follows:
(1) San Diego subsector: Mexican boundary to San Mateo Point, inclusive.
(2) San Pedro subsector: San Mateo Point, exclusive, to Santa Maria
River, exclusive.
(3) Monterey subsectors: Santa Maria River, inclusive, to Pigeon Point,
inclusive.
(4) San Francisco subsector: Pigeon Point, exclusive, to northern bound-
ary of California.
(5) Columbia River subsector: Northern boundary of California to
Moclips, Wash., inclusive.
(6) Seattle subsector: Moclips, Wash., exclusive, to northern boundary
of Washington.
[49] (7) Sitka naval subsector: Alaska east of longitude 141° West.
(8) Kodiak naval subsector: Alaska west of longitude 141° West.
9. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraphs:
"36A. Hawaiian coastal frontier.
"a. Boundaries.
The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all of the land and sea
areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a dis-
tance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and
Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.
2926 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"b. Commanders.
Army. — The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Navy. — The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who is designated
as the Commander, Hawaiian naval coastal frontier. This officer also
commands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its
joint tactical and strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army.
"36B. Philippine coastal frontier.
"a. Boundaries.
The Philippine coastal frontier consists of Luzon, and all of the land and
sea areas required for the defense of Luzon. The coastal zone includes all of
the sea approaches to the coastal frontier.
[50] "b. Commanders.
Army. — The Commanding General, Philippine Department.
Navy. — The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, who is designated as
the Commander, Philippine naval coastal frontier. This officer also com-
mands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint
tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2927
©
7vas""^'
h
a..
t4
2928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[1] Appendix II to WPLf-46, Composition of Forces
[3] chapter i. INTRODUCTION
2-101. APPENDIX II prescribes the initial composition of the Operating
Forces and of the Naval Transportation Service.
2-102. a. Naval vessels and aircraft are listed by organization unit or number.
b. Coast Guard vessels are listed by name.
c. Units not listed in the current Operating Force Plan which are to be taken
over by the Navy either temporarily or permanently are, for war planning pur-
poses, designated in this Appendix II as "X" vessels in accordance with the
system defined in WPL-10 (XAR 5, XAK 17, XPYc 20, etc.).
2-103. a. When the Coast Guard becomes a part of the Navy, Coast Guard
vessels will continue to be designated by their Coast Guard names.
b. When vessels listed in the tables as "X" vessels come under Navy control,
the Chief of Naval Operations (Director, Ship Movements Division) will assign
to them names, symbols, and numbers in accordance with standard nomenclature
(AP 60, AK 90, FY 50, etc.). The names will be recommended by the Chief of
the Bureau of Navigation, and the symbols and numbers by the Chief of the
Bureau of Ships.
2-104. Units appearing in the current Operating Force Plan are not assigned
to Mobilization Districts, as most of these vessels have already been mobilized
at the time of issue of this plan.
2-105. In the Tables of Appendix II, where capital letters appear under the
heading "Sub-Group", these letters indicate the categories to which vessels and
aircraft belong, as follows:
A — Navy vessels and aircraft in commission on M-day;
B — Navy vessels not in commission on M-day, including those under
construction ;
C — Vessels and aircraft belonging to other Departments of the Government
to be commissioned in the Navy;
[3] D — Merchant vessels to be commissioned in the Navy, either
Navy-owned or on a bare-boat charter basis;
E — Merchant vessels to be chartered on a time charter basis;
CG — Coast Guard vessels.
[4] chapter II. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET
2-201. Table ATF-1 shows the initial composition of the U. S. ATLANTIC
FLEET as of Julv 1, 1941.
2-202. a. SUBMARINE FORCE ONE will be composed of submarines, sub-
marine tenders and submarine bases, not assigned to SUBMARINE FORCE
TWO. Not less than five submarines must remain based on the SUBMARINE
BASE, COCO SOLO.
b. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will be composed of submarines destined for
the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.
2-203. When the units included in the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT,
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, arrive in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, the
Chief of Naval Operations will assign them to such existing or new task forces as
may then be dictated by the existing strategic situation.
2-204. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations,
the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will assign for task duty,
patrol planes, and patrol plane tenders required for their support, to the Task
Forces indicated herein:
1. To the NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE.
18 VPB and necessary tenders;
2. To the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE
12 VPB and necessary tenders;
3. To the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE
12 VPB and necessary tenders.
b. The aircraft units assigned as prescribed in the preceding sub-paragraph
will remain under the administration of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLAN-
TIC FLEET. Rotation of units may be made periodically at the discretion of
the Commander in Chief.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2929
[6] 2-205. TRANSPORT DIVISION ONE wiU be assigned temporarily to
the Naval Transportation Service, as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations,
for the transportation of Army troops.
2-206. Destroyers assigned to experimental work and sound school, and sub-
marines assigned to submarine school and sound school wiU normally continue in
these assignments and will be withdrawn for other duties only under exceptional
circumstances.
TABLE ATF-1
Unit— Vessel
Symbol
No.
Notes
BATTLESHIPS
Batdiv 3. -
BB
BB
CA
CA
CL
CL
AD
ODD
ODD
DD
DD
DD
DD
DD
CV
CV
VPB
VPB
AVD
AVP
VPB
VPB
AVD
AVP
PG
ASR
OSS
OSS
AO
OSS
SS
ASR
OSS
OSS
AS
OSS
OSS
AF
AG
AKS
AO
AT
AE
DMS
AM
AP
APD
3
3
1
4
4
4
2
3
4
4
9
9
8
8
2
1
12
12
2
2
12
12
1
2
1
1
8
7
1
2
1
1
6
6
2
3
7
2
1
1
8
2
1
4
7
4
2
Batdiv 5
CRUISERS
CA 31
Crudiv 7.
Crudiv 8 .- -.
Cradiv 2 , -
DESTROYERS
AD 2, 12 -
DD 141, 187, 343
Desdlv 54
Desdiv 22 --.
Desron 2
Desron 8 .--
Desron 9
1,850 tons.
Desron 13.. . .. .. .... .....
AIRCRAFT
Cardiv3
CV5
Patwing S
VP 31..
VP32...
AVD4, 9
AVP 1,9
Patwing 6
VP61..
VP52
AVD 13
AVP 3, 8 -
SUBMARINES
PO 53 -
Svbron 1
S/M Base, New London
ASR2._
Subdiv 11
Eidiv 1
KQ 24
SS 20, 48
SS 204
S« 67-07! 3
S/M Base, Coco Solo
A&R4
Subdiv 31 -
Subdlv32 -.
Subrov 7
ASS, 21 . -..
Subdiv 71
Subdiv 72. ---
Mobile Submarine Repair Unit No. 2
S/M Base, St. Thomas
TRAIN VESSELS
AF1.9 ._ -.- - ---
AF 1 to be assigned in August, 1941
AO 17 -
AKS3 -
AKS 3 to be assigned in July, 1941
AO 9, 11. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26 -.
AT 37, 66 - -
AE 2
To be assigned in August, 1941.
MINECRAFT
Minron 7
Mindiv 13 i.---
Mindiv 14 •
TRANSPORTS
Transdiv 11
2930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TABLE AT F-1— Continued
Unit— Vessel
Symbol
No.
Notes
PATROL CRAFT
Subch aserd i v 31 - -
PC
XPG
XPG
XPG
XPG
XPG
XPG
XPG
XPG
AG
IX
5
1
niJANE (CG)
INGHAM (CO) ---
CAMPBELL (CO) -..
SPENCER (CO)
HAMILTON (CO) - - .-
BIBB (CO) -
NORTH STAR (CG) _
NORTHLAND (CO) _._ .-
AG 29
UNCLASSIFIED
IX 20
NAVAL OPERATING ^ASF. BERMUDA
MOBILE BASK HOSPITAL NO. 1
MARINE CORPS FORCES
Fifth Defense Battalion
[6] CHAPTER III. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET
2-301. a. Table PAF-1 shows the initial composition of the U. S. PACIFIC
FLEET as of July 1, 1941.
b. Table PAF-2 shows the initial composition of the ATLANTIC REIN-
FORCEMENT, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
2-3o2. a. On M-dav, or sooner if directed bv the Chief of Naval Operations,
the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET will assign for task duty,
patrol planes and submarines, and tenders required for their support, to the Task
Forces indicated herein:
1. To the PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
FORCE
12 VPB and necessary tenders,
2 SS and necessary tenders (for ALASKAN SECTOR) ;
2. To the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
FORCE
12 VPB and necessary tenders.
b. The units assigned as prescribed in the preceding sub-paragraph will remain
under the administration of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
Rotation of units may be made periodically at the discretion of the Commander
in Chief.
2-303. Destroyers and submarines assigned to sound school will normally
continue in these assignments and will be withdrawn for other duties only under
exceptional circumstances.
TABLE PAF-1
Unit — Vessel
BATTLESHIPS
Batdiv 1-.
Batdiv 2 ^..
Batdiv 4
CRUISERS
Crudiv4...,
Crudiv 6
Crudiv 9....
DESTROYERS
Desflot I
CL7
ADS, 4
Desron 1 (less one Desdiv)
Dcsron 3, 5
Desflot i
CL8...
AD 11, 14
Desron 4, 6.
Desdiv 50
Sym-
bol
BB
BB
BB
CA
CA
CL
CL
AD
DD
DD
CL
AD
DD
ODD
No.
Notes
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
TABLE PA F-1— Continued
2931
Unit— Vessel
MINECRAFT
CM4- --.-
Mindiv 1, 2- -
AIRCRAFT
Cardiv 1
Cardiv 2 (less CV 5) - -
Patwing 1
VP 11 ----
VP 12 -
VP 13.—
VP 14 -
AVI— -
AVD 6, 10
AVP4
Patwing 2
VP21
VP22
VP23....
VP24
AV4
AVD 11, 14..__ _.
AVP7..
Patwing 4
VP41 -
VP42
VP43
VP44
AVD 2. 12..
AVP5, 6
SUBMARINES
CL9
Subron i
AS 3 -
ASR5..
Subdiv 21
Subdiv 22„
Subron 4
S/M Base, Pearl Harbor
DD336
AM 30
ASR 1. _
Subdiv 41
Subdiv 42....
Subdiv 43
Subron 6
Subdiv 61
Subdiv 62
BASE FORCE
TRAIN VESSELS
AE 1
AF 7,8, 11
AG 16, 31
AH 1
AKS 1, 2
AM 3, 13, 10, 20, 24, 25, 26, 31, 43. 52
A O 1, 3, 4, 5, 12, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29
AR 1,4
ARb 1....
ARD 1
AT 12, 23, 33, 34, 64, 65
TRANSPORTS
Transdiv 2_.
, Transdiv 4
Transdiv 12
MINE SQUADRON 3
DMS 13
Mindiv 4
Mindiv 5 _ _
Mindiv 6
NAVAL STATION, OUAM
NAVAL STATION. SAMOA
Seventh Defense Battalion
MARINE CORPS FORCES
Second Marine Division
Second Marine Aircraft Group..
Second Defense Battalion
Sixth Defense Battalion
Sym-
bol
No.
CM
1
DM
8
CV
2
CV
1
VPB
12
VPB
6
VPB
5
VPB
12
AV
1
AVD
2
AVP
1
VPB
12
VPB
12
VPB
12
VPB
12
AV
1
AVD
2
AVP
1
VPB
6
VPB
6
VPB
6
VPB
6
AVD
2
AVP
2
CL
1
AS
1
ASR
1
ss
6
ss
6
ODD
1
AM
1
ASR
1
OSS
6
ss
4
ss
5
ss
3
ss
3
AE
1
AF
3
AG
2
AH
1
AKS
2
AM
10
AO
14
AR
2
ARb
1
ARD
1
AT
6
AP
2
AP
2
APD
4
DMS
1
DMS
4
DMS
4
DMS
4
Notes
To be formed about October 1, 1941.
Includes SM 1.
To be assigned in August, 1941.
EXAD 13.
79716 O— 46 — pt. 18-
2932 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TABLE PAF-2. THE ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT
Unit— Vessel
Symbol
No.
Notes
CRUISERS
Crudiv 5
CA
4
CHAPTER IV. THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE
2-401. Table SEP-1 shows the initial composition of the SOUTHEAST
PACIFIC FORCE as of July 1, 1941.
TABLE
3EP-1
Unit— Vessel
Symbol
No.
Notes
CRUISERS
Crudiv 3 . . . -
CL
DD
2
4
DESTROYERS
As assigned by CinCpac.
CHAPTER V. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET
2-501. The Table ASF-1 shows the composition of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.
2-502. One stores ship (AF) and one cargo ship (AK) of the NAVAL TRANS-
PORTATION SERVICE, upon arrival in the FAR EAST AREA mav be re-
tained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.
TABLE ASF-1
Unit— Vessel
Symbol
No.
CA
1
CL
1
AD
1
ODD
13
VPB
12
VPB
12
AV
1
AVD
2
AVP
1
AS
2
ASR
1
OSS
6
ss
4
ss
7
PQ
2
PR
5
PY
1
AO
2
AT
1
AM
2
AM
4
Notes
CRUISERS
CA 30.- - ----
CL 12
DESTROYERS
AD 9 -
Desron 29 -.
AIRCRAFT
Pat wing 10
VP 101 ---.
VP 102
AV 3
AVD 1,7 ---
AVP 2
SUBMARINES
Subron SO
AS 9,20 --- --.
ASR 6
Subdiv 201—-
Subdiv 202—
Subdiv 203 - ---
PATROL CRAFT
PO 21,22
PR3,4,6,7,8
PYIO
TRAIN
AO 6, 13 - -
AT 32.-
Mindiv 3
Mindiv 9
MARINE CORPS FORCES
Marine Detachments
Fourth Marines (Shanghai)
Marine Detachments
(North China)
Marine Detachments
(PhiUppines) ..
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2933
[7]
CHAPTER VI. U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE
2-601. The Tables for the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE,
show the initial composition as of Julv 1, 1941.
a. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE— TABLE NE-1.
1. Units of this table not prepared for overseas service will be temporarily
assigned to the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for training and material prep-
aration.
b. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE— TABLE NE-2.
TABLE NE-1. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE
Unit— Vessel
Symbol
No.
Notes
DESTROYERS
AD 15- _
AD
DD
ODD
ODD
DD
VPB
VPB
VPB
VPB
AV
AVD
VPB
VPB
VPB
VPB
AVD
VPB
VPB
VPB
VPB
AM
AMc
1
9
18
5
4
12
12
9
9
1
2
12
12
12
12
1
12
12
12
12
4
6
Desron 7 _ _
Desrons 30. 31
DD 341, Desdiv 53 _
Desdiv 21...
Mobile Destoyer Repair Units 1, 2
AIRCRAFT
Patwing 7
VP 71
VP 72 .
VP73... . ,.
VP74 ...
AV5._
AVD 3,8
Patwing 8
VP81_.
VP82__
VP83
VP84__.. _
AVD 5..
Palwinq 9
VP91..
1
VP92
iThis wing will be formed following
completion of Patwing 8.
VP93
VP 94
Mobile Aircraft Repair Units 1, g..
A IN VESSELS
AM 73, 74, 75, 77.
^ AMc 3fi, 42, 43. 46, 47. 50
SlARINE CORPS FORCES
Eleventh Provisional Marine Company..
TABLE NE-2. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE
Unit— Vessel
Sym-
bol
No.
Notes
SUBMARINES
Subron 6
AS 13
AS
ASR
OSS
OSS
OSS
1
1
7
4
6
•
ASR3. ...
Subdiv 51
Subdiv52
Subdiv 53
Mobile Submarine Repair Unit No. 3
CHAPTER VII. VESSELS OPERATING UNDER THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2-701. The Table CNO-1 shows the vessels assigned to special duty under the
Chief of Naval Operations.
2934 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TABLE CNO-1.
Unit— Vessel
AG 1
AG 23
AG 25,26...
AG 30, 32
AM 40
P052
MTB Squadron 1
MTB Squadron 2.
Subchaser Squadron 1.
COMANCHE (CG)..
ALGONQUIN (CO)..
M6D0C iCQ)..
RARITAN (CG)
IX 50--..
SS 206 to 211 incl
Sym-
bol
No.
AG
1
AG
1
AG
2
AG
2
AM
1
PG
1
FT
6
PT
7
PTC
4
XPY
1
XPY
1
XPG
1
XYT
1
IX
1
SS
6
Notes
SecNav Yacht.
President's Yacht and tender.
Survey vessels.
BuOrd duty.
Tender for PT's and PTC's.
Greenland Patrol.
Greenland Patrol.
Greenland Patrol.
Greenland Patrol.
Greenland Patrol.
In commission or to be commis-
sioned and to operate either un-
der the CNO or CinClant for
temporary duty. To be assigned
to U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
CHAPTER VIII. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES
[8]
2-801. The tables in this Chapter VIII show the assignments to the NAVAL
COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES.
2-802. Units that are not listed in these tables but which have otherwise been
assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Districts, outlying Naval
Stations, or to activities excluded from Naval Districts, will continue in such
commands. Commandants of Naval Districts and outlying Naval Stations will
assign such units under their commands to Naval Local Defense Forces or to
Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) in accordance with the following
general rules:
a. TO THE NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES
1. Units other than auxiliary type (see "Standard Nomenclature, Ships'
Data, U. S. Naval Vessels").
2. Units of the Auxiliary Type required for execution of the tasks of Naval
Local Defense Forces.
3. District Craft (see " Standard Nomenclature, Ships' Data, U. S. Naval
Vessels"), as follows: YN, YNg, VMS, YP; those YT assigned for net and
boom services; and other classes at the discretion of the Commandant.
b. TO NAVAL DISTRICT CRAFT
1. Units not assigned to the Naval Local Defense Force.
c. 1. Units of the Naval Local Defense Force and of the Naval District Craft
will be placed in the status "in service not in commission", or- in the status "in
commission" as prescribed by article 636 (1), (2), U. S. Navy Regulations, in
accordance with the current Operating Force Plan in effect, or in specific cases as
directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.
2. Units taken over from private sources will be placed "in service not in
commission", or "in commission", depending upon the status in which units of
the same classification appearing in the current Operating Force Plan^. are oper-
ating.
[9] 2-803. a. Units of the Coast Guard not otherwise assigned in succeeding
paragraphs or in the tables of Appendix II, will be employed in the Naval Local
Defense Forces of the Naval Districts in which they are based at the time the
Coast Guard is transferred to the Navy, in the manner prescribed in the "United
States Coast Guard District Manual, 1940." Commandants of Naval Districts
will understand that, on assuming command of Coast Guard units, they also
assume responsibility for the discharge of essential Coast Guard functions. Prior
to M-day, Commandants of Naval Districts, in cooperation with local Coast
Guard commanders, will plan the war operations of the Coast Guard.
b. Lighthouse tenders will normally be employed in their peace-time duties, as
modified by war requirements of the Army and Navy.
2-804. a. The tables show the assignments to the Naval Coastal Frontier
Forces in tabular form.
1. Unit (vessel, aircraft, or organization unit) Column (1) .
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2935
2. Sub-group Column (2) .
3. From (indicating the fleet from which the unit is to be
detached, the Naval District in which a private vessel is to
be taken over, or that the assignment will be made by the
Chief of Naval Operations) Column (3) .
4. Mobilization District (indicating the Naval District in which
the vessel is to be mobilized) Column (4).
b. The symbol XAGs indicates a station ship.
2-805. Units to be taken over will be manned by Navy crews in the Naval
Districts indicated in Column (3) of the tables, and moved under the direction of
the Commandant of that Naval District to the Mobilization District indicated in
Column (4) , where mobilization will take place.
[10] 2-806. It is undesirable to take over for use in Naval Coastal Frontier
Forces vessels that will remain idle for a long period on account of inability to
convert, equip, or man them. Commandants of Naval Districts in which units
are taken over (Column (3)) will, therefore, arrange to do so after consideration
of the following:
a. Personnel available to take over and man the unit for mo\ement to the
Mobilization;
b. Conversion yards available and readiness to start conversion;
c. Equipment available;
d. Personnel available to man the unit upon completion of conversion;
e. The desirability of placing the unit in immediate service with little or no
conversion.
2-807. Commandants charged with taking over and mobilizing Naval Coastal
Frontier Forces will give the same priority to units assigned to the Naval Coastal
Frontier Forces of other Districts as they give to units assigned to the Naval
Coastal Frontier Forces within their own Districts.
TABLE NACF.— NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
Unit— Vessel
(1)
NAVAL COASTAL FORCE
Navy Vessels
PE 19, 27, 48,55, 56 5 PE
PY 12, 13, 15, 16 4PY
PO 17, 18, 54 3PO
VPB 18VPB
AV or AVD or AVP number as required..
ZNP 6ZNP
Coast Guard Aircraft based at:
Air Station, Salem, Mass. _
Air Station, New York, N. Y
Air Station, Elizabeth City, N. C
Vessels from Other Sources
XPQ 1.- IXPQ
XPQ 2,3 2XPO
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— FIRST
NAVAL DISTRICT
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may
be assigned by the Commander, North At-
lantic Naval Coastal Frontier.
Coast Guard Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
Vessels from Other Sources
XYP 1 to30incl 30 XYP
XAGsl, 2 2 XAGs
XAM 1 to4incl 4 XAM
XAMb 1 to9incl. 9 XAMb
XAMcl, 2 2XAMC
Units Ashore
As indicated in I ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW
No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.
Sub-
group
(2)
From
(3)
USAF
USAF
IV ND
CNO
CNO
I ND
I NJJ
I ND
I ND
I ND
Mob.
Dist.
(4)
I
III
Notes
(5)
{Administration in
U. S. ATLAN-
TIC FLEET.
2936 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TABLE NACF— NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER— Continued
Unit-Vessel
Sub-
group
From
Mob.
Dist.
Notes
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE-THIRD
NAVAL DISTRICT
Nary Vestels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may
bo assigned by the Commander, North Atlan-
tic Naval Coastal Frontier.
Coast Guard V^essels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
Vessels from Other Sources
XYP31 1 XYP
D
III ND
III
XAM 5 to 13 incl - 9 XAM
D
D
D
I ND
IND
IND
I
I
I
XAMb 10 to 14 incl 5 XAMb
XAMc 3 to 16 incl 14 XAMc
UnH» Ashore
As indicated in III ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW
No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No 5
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— FOURTH
NAVAL DISTRICT
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be
assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic
Naval Coastal Frontier.
Coast Guard Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
Vessels from Other Sources
XCMcl... IXCMc
D
IND
I
XPYcl, 2 2XPYC
D
HIND
III
XPYcS, 4 2XPYC
D
IV ND
IV
.—
XAQs3 1 XAOs
D
IV ND
IV
XAM 14 to 21 incl 8 XAM
D
D
D
D
IND
IND
IV ND
IND
I
I
IV
I
XAMb 15 to 24 incl 10 XAMb
XAMcl7 to 19 incl 3 XAMc
XAMc 20 IXAMc
Units Ashore
As indicated in IV ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW
No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE-FIFTH
NAVAL DISTRICT
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be
assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic
Naval Coastal Frontier.
Coast Guard Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
Vessels from Other Sources
XCMc2 1 XCMc
D
VND
V
XYP 32 to 38 incl 7 XYP
D
D
VND
VND
V
V
XAGs4. 1 XAGs
XAM 22,23 2 XAM
D
IND
I
XAMc 21 to 31 incl 11 XAMc
D
VND
V
Units Ashore
As indicated in V ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW
No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2937
TABLE SCF— SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
Unit— Vessel
(1)
NAVAL COASTAL FORCE
Navy Vessels
None .-
Coast Ouard Vessels
MOJAVE, TAMPA 240' 2XPQ
TALLAPOOSA Misc. 1 XPY
MOHAWK 165' 1 XPY
Coast Ouard Aircraft based at :
Air Station, Charleston, S. C
Air Station, Miami, Fla.-
Air Station, St. Petersburg, Fla..
Air Station, Biloxi, Miss -
Vessels from Other Sources
XP0 4 - IXPO
XPY 1 to4incl 4XPY
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE-SIXTH
NAVAL DISTRICT
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be
assigned by the Commander, Southern Naval
Coastal Frontier.
Coast Ouard Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
Vessels from Other Sources
XCMc3 - IXCMc
XPYc5. 6 2XPYC
XYP 39to44incl.... 6XYP
XAQs5, 6 2XAQs
XAM 24to27incl 4XAM
XAMb 25 to 31 incl 7 XAMb
XAMb32to34incl 3 XAMb
As indicated in VI ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW
No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.
NA VAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— SEVENTH
NAVAL DISTRICT
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may
be assigned by the Commander, Southern
Naval Coastal Frontier.
Coast Guard Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
Vessels from Other Sources
. XPYc7,8 2XPYc
XPYcO, 10 2XPYc
XAGs 7, 8._ -.-- 2 XAQs
XAM 28, 29 2 XAM
XAMb 35, 36 2 XAMb
XAMc 32 to 35 incl 4 XAMc
Units Ashore
As indicated in VII ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW
No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— EIGHTH
NAVAL DISTRICT
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may
be assigned by the Commander, Southern
Naval Coastal Frontier.
Coast Guard Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
Sub-
group
(2)
CO
CO
CO
From
(3)
VI ND
VI ND
IV ND
CNO
III ND
III ND
III ND
VI ND
VI ND
I ND
TND
VI ND
IND
HIND
VII ND
IND
IND
IND
Mob.
Dist.
(4)
VI
VI
VI
VI
III
III
III
VI
VI
I
I
VI
I
III
VII
I
I
I
Notes
(5)
2938 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TABLE SCF.— SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER— Continued
Unit— Vessel
(1)
From
Mob.
Dist.
(3)
(4)
III ND
III
IX ND
VIII
VIII ND
VIII
V ND
V
VIII ND
VIII
VIII ND
VIII
I ND
I
VI ND
VI
Notes
(5)
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— EIGHTH
NAVAL DISTRICT-Continued
Vessels from Other Sources
XCMc4 1 XCMc
XPYcll to ISineL.. 8 XPYc
XYP 45to50incl fi XYP
XYP 51 to 55incl 5 XYP
XAOsQto 11 incl 3 XAQs
XAMb37to40incl.-. 4 XAMb
XAMc36to40incl - 5 XAMc
XAMc41 to 43 inch. 3 XAMc
Units Ashore
As indicated in VIII ND Plan O-S, RAIN-
BOW No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.
TABLE CACF.-CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
ODD Desron 33 less Desdiv 67 5 ODD
PY 18 1 PY
VPB 12 VPB
A V or A VP or A VD number as required
Coast Guard Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
Vessels from Other Sources
XPQ 6,7_ 2 XPO
XPC 2,3,4 3 XPC
XPY 8 1 XPY
A
A
A
A
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
USAF
USAF
CNO
III ND
V ND
III ND
III ND
I ND
IV ND
I ND
V ND
I ND
I ND
X
III
V
III
III
I
IV
I
V
I
I
(Administration in
\ U. S. ATLAN-
l TIC FLEET.
XPY 9, 10. ._ 2 XPY
XPYc 24 to 27 incl 4 XPYc
XPYc28 to31 incl ... 4 XPYc
XYP 128 to 131 incl ... 4 XYP
X AM 42 to 47 incl 6 XAM
XAMb 61 to 66 incl . 6 XAMb
XAMb 67 to 70 incl 4 XAMb
XAMc 93 to 102 incl 10 XAMc
Units Ashore
As indicated in X ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW
No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.
Fourth Defense Battalion, Naval Operating
Base, Guantanamo, Cuba.
•
TABLE PACF.— PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
ODD Desdiv 67... 4 ODD
PG50 1 PO
VPB... 12 VPB
AV or AVP or AVD number as required
Coast Guard Vessels:
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
Vessels from Cfther Sources:
XCMc6 IXCMc
XPC 5,6 - 2XPC
XPY 11 to 14 incl 4 XPY
XPYc 32 to 43 Incl 12 XPYc
XPYc 44 to 46 incl 3 XPYc
USAF
USAF
V ND
III ND
IX ND
III ND
V ND
V
III
VIII
III
V
(Administration in
\ U. S. ATLAN-
I TIC FLEET.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2939
TABLE PACF— PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER— Continued
Unit— Vessel
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— Continued
Vessels from Other Sowrces- Continued
XPYc47 - 1 XPYc
XYP 132 to HI-- lOXYP
XAOs 16, 17.-- 2XAQS
XAM 48 to 50 incl -.- 3 XAM
XAMb71, 72 - 2 XAMb
XAMclOSto 116 incl--- 14 XAMc
Units Ashore
As indicated in XV ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW
No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.
Sub-
group
(2)
From
Mob.
Dist.
(3)
(4)
VI ND
VI
IV ND
IV
VIII ND
VIII
I ND
I
V ND
V
V ND
V
Notes
(5)
TABLE PSCF.— PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
NAVAL COASTAL FORCE
Navy Vessels
ODD Desdiv 70,83 8 ODD
PE 32, 38 . 2 PE
PY14 - 1 PY
VPB 12 VPB
AV or AVD or AVP number as required
Coast Guard Vessels
TANEY. 327' 1 XPG
SHAWNEE Misc. 1 XPY
Coast Guard Aircraft based at:
Air Station, San Francisco, Calif
Air Station, San Diego, Calif
Vessels from Other Sources
XPG 5 IXPG
XPY 5, 6,7 3XPY
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— ELEV-
ENTH NAVAL DISTRICT:
Navy Vessels:
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be
assigned by the Commander, Pacific South-
ern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Coast Guard Vessels:
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
Vessels from Other Sources:
XCMc5 1 XCMc
XPC 1 1 XPC
XYP 93 to 97 incl 5 XYP
XAGs 14 1 XAGs
XAM 39 to 41 incl 3 XAM
XAMb 51 to 60 inch- 10 XAMb
XAMc 65 to 86 incl 1 -. 2? XAMc
As indicated in XI ND Plan 0-5, RAI.NBOW
No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces:
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.
NA VAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— TWELFTH
NAVAL DISTRICT
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may
be assigned by the Commander, Pacific
Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.
Coast Guard Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
Vessels from Other Sources
XYP 98 to 127 incl 30 XYP
XAGs 15 - 1 XAGs
XAMc 87 to 92 incl 6 XAMc
CG
CG
USPF
USPF
IX V ND
XII ND
CNO
XI ND
HIND
XI ND
XI ND
XI ND
XI ND
XI ND
XI ND
XII ND
XII ND
XIIND
XI
XII
XII
XI
(Administration in
\ U. S. PACIFIC
I FLEET.
Ill
XI
XI
XI
XI
XI
XI
XII
XII
XII
2940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
TABLE NACF.-NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER— Continued
Unit— Vessel
(1)
Sub-
group
(2)
From
(3)
Mob.
Dist.
(4)
Notes
(6)
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— TWELFTH
NAVAL DISTRICT— Continued
Units Ashore
As indicated in XII ND Plan 0-5, RAIN-
BOW No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2. RAINBOW No. 5.
TABLE PNCF.— PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE— THIR-
TEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802, Appendix II.
ODD Desdiv 82 -. 5 ODD
P0 51. 1 PQ
PE 57 1 PE
SS 2SS
ASR 1 ASR
VPB.. 12VPB
AV or AVD or AVP number as required
Coast Ouard Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
AURORA 165' B 1 XPC
Coast Guard Aircraft based at:
Air Station, Port Angeles, Wash.
Vessels from Other Sources
XPYc 19 to 23 incl 5 XPYc
XYP56to92incl.- 37 XYP
XAOs 12, 13.-. 2XAOs
XAM 30 to 38 incl 9 XAM
XAMb41 to 50 incl 10 XAMb
XAMc 44 to 64 incl 21 XAMc
XAOb 1, 2 2XA0b
Units Ashore
As indicated in XIII ND Plan 0-5, RAIN-
BOW No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No.
CO
USPF
USPF
USPF
USPF
XI ND
XIII
XI ND
XIII
XIII ND .
XIII
XIII ND
XIII
XI ND
XIII
XIII ND
XIII
XIII ND
XIII
CNO
XIII
Administration in
} U. S. PACIFIC
FLEET.
TABLE HCF.— HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE
Navy Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-802. Appendix II.
ODD Desdiv 80 4 ODD
PO 19 1 PG
Coast Ouard Vessels
Units assigned in accordance with paragraph
2-803, Appendix II.
DAPHNE. 165'B 1 XPC
Vesseis from Other Sources
XCMc7 1 XCMc
XYP 142 to 167 incl _ 26 XYP
XAM 51 to 55 incl... .-.. 5 XAM
XAM66 - 1 XAM
XAMc 117 to 119 incl 3 XAMc
XAOb3,4.-.. 2 XAOb
XYF 1 to5incl 5 XYF
Units Ashore
As indicated in XIV ND Plan 0-5, RAIN-
BOW No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2, RAINBOW No. 5
First Defense Battalion
Third Defense Battalion
CO
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
XII !nd
XII
V ND
V
XIV ND
XIV
I ND
I
XII ND
XII
XIV ND
XIV
CNO
XIV
XIV ND
XIV
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2941
TABLE PhCF.— PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
Unit— Vessel
(1)
Sub-
group
(2)
From
(3)
Mob.
Dist.
(4)
Notes
(5)
NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE-SIX-
TEENTH NA VAL DISTRICT
Such suitable vessels as are locally available and
additional vessels and aircraft as assigned by
Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC
FLEET.
Units Ashore
As indicated in XVI ND Plan 0-5, RAIN-
BOW No. 5.
Marine Corps Forces
Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan
C-2. RAINBOW No. 5.
[11] CHAPTER IX. NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE
2-901. The Sections and Tables prescribing the composition of forces of the
Naval Transportation Service will be issued as a change to this plan.
EXHIBIT NO. 130
Confidential
Paraphrase of Code Radiogram Received at the War Department at 22 : 55,
OOTOBEB 27, 1941
M/nila, October 27, 1941.
British sources report 2 Japanese aircraft carriers, one of which is the Kage,
operating In Mandated islands. Following planes reported there :
Wotje — 8 flying boats
Jaluit — 8 flying boats, 12 fighters
Truk — 6 fighters, 6 heavy bombers
Saipan — 8 fighters, 6 heavy bombers
Palau — 8 flying boats
General southward movement of Japanese shipping in Western Pacific re-
ported by British.
BRINK
IB #2 10/28/4],.
Distribution :
Mr. Lauchlin Currie
Assistant Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War for Air
Chief of the Army Air Forces
Chief of the Air Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD
Q. H. Q.
State Department.
Director of Naval Intelligence
Situation Section
Far Elastern Section
Department of State. Received Nov. 29, 1941. Division of Communications
and Records.
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
Paraphrase
November 21, 1941.
The following was received from the Naval Observer at Wellington November
19, 1941 :
"Source New 25ealand Naval Intelligence: On November 16 and 17 planes,
apparently Japanese, were sighted over Gilberts. One day twin engined mono-
plane next flying boat, course generally north and south with speed 125. Indi-
2942 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
cates daily patrol from Jaluit over Gilberts to area south near shipping routes.
Several unknown ships reported last 10 days near Gilbert apd Ellice Jap liners
reported carrying troops or laborers to Mandates, Truk and Saigon each recently
reinforced by V^ squadron fighters and 1/2 squadron bombers."
Department of State. Received Nov. 30, 1941. Division of Communications
and Records.
Strictly confidential
Paraphrase
November 24, 1941.
The following was received from the Naval Attache Singapore November 23
1941:
"DEPENDABLE REPORTS HERE OF RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER
GILBERT ISLANDS ON NOVEJVIBER 15 BY MONOPLANE WITH TAPERED
WINGS, SINGLE TAILFIN, TWIN ENGINES. NEXT DAY REPEATED BY
MONOPLANE FLYING BOAT SILVER COLOR NUMBER OF ENGINES UN-
OBSERVED."
CC: Mr. Hamilton
Mr. Hornbeck.
Telegram received
HRL Geay
From: Tokyo
Dated : November 29, 1941
Rec'd 3 : 11 p. m.
Secbetabt of State,
Washington.
1868, November 29, 6 p. m.
The Embassy has received Foreign Office note no. 129 American 1 dated
November 27 which is translated as follows.
"Excellency: I have the honor to state that according to a report from the
Japanese Naval authorities, an American airplane flew over Garanbi on the
southernmost tip of Taiwan Island at 12 : 30 p. m. November 20, 1941 and after
circling at an altitude of 2,000 meters flew away southward at 12 : 45 p. m. the
same day.
"It is believed that the Japanese Government cannot overlook such a violation
of Japanese territoi-y by an airplane and it is therefore requested that the mat-
ter be brought to the attention of the United States authorities concerned. Also
I particularly bespeak Your Excellency's solicitude particularly the recurrence
of such incidents at this time when the international situation is tense and the
untoward events to which they might give rise are unpredictable. I avail my-
self of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance's of my high-
est consideration. Shigenori Togo, Minister for Foreign Affairs." Sent to the
Department only.
Grew.
JRL
Secret Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, December 2, 19^1.
The following information has been received from the Commander in Chief
Asiatic Fleet.
"At a bearing from Saigon of 070 and a distance of 180 miles three type 1-61
submarines were observed on December 2nd in cruising formation headed south
at a speed of 15 knots. Also at Camaranah six planes patrolled overhead while
21 transports anchored.
"In Lat. 13- ION. Long 110-00 at 0230 Greenwich December 2nd a patrol plane
observed 9 submarines headed south at a speed of 10 knots, [apparently headed
for Camranh Bay.]"
/S/ R. E. SCHUIRMANN.
EXHIBITS OF JOINl COMMITTEE 2943
Strictly confidential Paraphrase
December 4, 1941.
The following message was received from the Governor of Guam November
24, 1941 :
"At 1217 local time today unidentified two-engined plane sighted, circling
southern end of island. Altitude approximately 15,000 feet. At 1226 local time
plane passed out of sight to southwest."
Telegram sent
Depabtment o\ State,
December 6, 1941.
AMEMBASSY
Tokyo (Japan).
Your 1868, November 29, 6 p. m.
The Foreign Office note has been brought to the attention of the appropriate
authorities of this Government.
In connection with this question, you may be interested to know that the Navy
Department has been informed by the Governor of Guam that about noon on
November 24 an unidentified two-motored airplane circled the southern extremity
of Guam' for about ten minutes flying at an altitude of approximtaely 15,000
feet.
/S/ HXJLU
/s/ S W
FE:RLS:NHS FE
EXHIBIT NO. 131
(This exhibit was originally designed to incorporate the prior testimony of Rear
Admiral H. E. Kimmel before (1) the Roberts Commission, (2) the Navy Court
of Inquiry and (3) the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Inasmuch as the entire tran-
script of testimony taken incident to each of these proceedings has been set forth
as exhibits to the Joint Committee record, the prior testimony of Admiral Kimmel
is not being printed at this point pursuant to direction of the Committee. For
reference thereto, see index. )
EXHIBIT NO. 132
Report on Confekence Befwejen Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the
AMERICAN Ambassador 7 : 30 A. M. Dec 8, 1941
1. I stated, "After my conference with you last night I succeeded in obtaining
an answer from the Emperor to the personal telegram from President Roosevelt
to the Emperor which you presented at that conference. Thus, His Imperial
Majesty orders me to convey the following message to President Roosevelt
through you :
" We have heretofore commanded the Japanese Government to reply to the
query of the President of the United States respecting the assembling of Japanese
troops in French Indo China. Further, the withdrawal from French Indo China
was one of the matters discussed in the Japanese-American negotiations and we
have already had the Japanese Government state its opinions on the matter.
Therefore, please consult these statements to understand our position. We be-
lieve the President must be fully aware of the fact that the object of our wishes
is the establishment of peace in the Pacific and throusrhout the world, and that,
in accordance with our desires, the Japanese Government has up to the present
time striven to attain that goal.' "
The Ambassador listened to the Emperor's note with respectful attention and
replied that he would transmit it to the President immediately. He then said
that he had been instructed to request an audience of the Emperor to present
2944 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the President's telegram personally, and since the relations between our two
nations were now facing a grave crisis he requested that I take special pains
to arrange for an audience. I answered that if his sole object in requesting an
audience was to present the President's telegram, I doubted, considering the
nature of the Emperor's note, that an audience was necessary. I pointed out,
however, that I had no intention of standing in his way and if he had any further
satement to make, in addition to the telegram, I would of course do everything I
could to arrange for one. The Ambassador seemed very pleased and expressed
his gratitude. (At his request, I have submitted a provisional translation of
the English text of his application [for an audience] (as Supplement A)).
2. Next I banded the Ambassador a copy of the note to the United States and
said that, as he knew, the Imperial Government had done everything in its xwwer
to bring the Japanese- American negotiations to a successful conclusion and that
I myself had worked earnestly to that end.
"However,"
I continued,
"we have come to the conclusion that the attitude of the American Government
unfortunately precludes any prospect of reaching an agreement even though the
negotiations should be further continued, and we have therefore ordered this ntoe
to be presented to the Government of the United States on the afternoon of
December 7, Washington time. I am very sorry that things have worked out this
way."
[2] The Ambassador said that he would return to the Embassy to read the
document and would refrain from making any statement at this time, whereupon
he withdrew.
3.' The conference lasted about half an hour, but at that time Ambassador Grew
stated that President Roosevelt had sent a personal telegram to the Emperor and
that he had been instructed to present it to the Emperor himself, and therefore
he requested the Foreign Minister's help in arranging for an audience. The
Foreign Minister answered that it was now late at night and steps for arranging
an audience could not be taken before the next morning. He suggested that the
Ambassador's chances for getting an audience would probably depend on the con-
tents of the President's telegram. Ambassador Grew informally handed the
Foreign Minister a copy of the telegram which he had with him (Supplement A),
again requested that the Foreign Minister do everything possible to arrange for
an audience in view of the gravity of the situation, and withdrew after arranging
for another interview.
4. The Foreign Minister proceeded to the Premier's official residence with a
summary translation of the President's telegram, and there, at an emergency
conference with the Pi'emier and the rest of the cabinet, determined in general
the line of action to be taken on this matter. [Two lines illegible.]
5. At about 3 A. M. the Foreign Minister returned to his residence. He waited
as directed, until 6 o'clock on the morning of the 8th to notify the English and
American Ambassadors of the rupture of Anglo-American negotiations. At this
time he handed the following statement to Ambassador Grew as the Emperor's
answer to President Roosevelt's wire :
[Here follows the text of the Emperor's note as given above.]
Gist of Confebence Between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the Bbitish
Ambassador 8 :(X) A. M. Dec. 8, 1941
Following my interview with the American Ambassador. I called the British
Ambassador to an interview. I told him directly as I had the American Am-
bassador that it had become unavoidably necessary to break off Japanese- American
negotiations, and handed him a copy of the note addressed to the United States.
At the same time I said "Although this is only the copy of a note to the United
States, please understand that the Imperial Government, realizing Great Britain's
great interest in these negotiations and that the interests of Great Britain and
the United States are inseparably connected, has included in the note its opinions
on all problems currently pending between Japan and Great Britain." The
Ambassador thereupon remarked that he regreted the rupture of negotiations
as deeply as I did. He went on to say that there were reports to the effect that
Japanese vessels with a large number of troops aboard were proceeding westward
• From this point on this would seem to be a totally different document, referring to
what preceded the conference of the morning of the 8th.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2945
through the Gulf of Siam and that it would seem that possibly part of them
were headed for Thailand and part for the Malay Peninsula. The invasion of
these areas by the Japanese Army would produce a most serious situation. As
he had stated a little while ago ( here he referred to the interview with me on the
6th) , Great Britain had no intention of violating Thai independence and territorial
integrity provided that other nations respected them. Therefore he hoped that
the Japaiiese Government would restrain its Military.
1 answered that I was by no means certain of the situation since last evening.
However, just this morning I had heard a report to the effec-t that the English
had assembled Indian troops on the Thai border. I thought it probable that our
vessels were cruising the waters adjacent to that area to be ready for anything
that might come up in a situation which was plainly not normal. I had just
ordered our ambassador to Thailand to report on the situation, and as sixm as that
report arrived, would consider this mater in a general study of the situation.
Whereupon the British Ambassador advised me to be wary of reports fabricated
by elements seeking to disturb the peace, and withdrew.
On the Declaration of War Against the Uniti<:d States and Great Britain
Meeting of Privy Council Dec. 8, 1941
Written by Matsumoto — Head of Treaty Bureau
In the 11th item of Article 6 of the Internal Orders decided upon at the time
of the Reorganization of the Privy Council in December 1938, was included a sec-
tion on "The Declaration of War." It was unclear whether this gave the Privy
Council the right to advise the decision to engage in war, or just the authority
for advising the formal declaration of war. However, when war was declared
against the United States and Great Britain, the decision to engage in war had
already been made at the previous conference of Dec. 1, 1941, so the Privy
Council was only to consider an address to the throne stating "We declare war
against the United States and Great Britain." A draft of an Imperial Rescript
declaring war was attached to the Address to the Throne for advisement. (The
Address to the Throne and the draft of the Imperial Rescript were drawn up
by the Cabinet.)
Meeting of Committee of Advisement
Dec. 8—7 : 40 A. M.
In the Imperial Palace
Tozo Room
Those Present
All members of the Advisory Council [Komonkan]
All Cabinet ministers (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Togo, was absent, because
he was holding interviews with the United States and British Ambassadors).
Head of the Legal Bureau — Moriyama
Foreign Affairs Officials :
Yamamoto, Head of the American Bureau
Sakamoto, Head of the Europe-Asia Bureau
Matsumoto, Head of the Treaty Bureau
Army Officials:
Muto, Head of Military Affairs Bureau
Navy Officials :
Muto, Head of Military Affairs Bureau
First, the Navy Minister reported on the military action against American
and British Troops which had been in progress since this morning in the Malayan,
Hongkong, and Hawaiian areas.
1st President of the Council — I propose that a Committee of Advisement headed
by the Vice-President of the Council, and constituted of all the members of the
Advisory Council, meet immediately and consider this matter.
Premier Tojo — explained the reasons for declaring war.
Advisor Ishii — At what time will war be declared? It is necessary to make
sure that America and Britain don't saddle us with the responsibility.
Primier — We hope for an immediate declaration.
[2] Advisor Kubota — A state of war already exists, but what is the view-
point of the Imperial Headquarters,
2946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Premier — At the conference of Dec. 1 they determined to commence hostilities
against England, America, and the Netherlands.
Advisor Shimizu — What is the attitude of Thailand?
Premier — It is not yet clear, but negotiations are in prograss for a policy of
Mutual Defense.
Advisor Shimizu — Aren't we going to declare war on Holland?
Premier — We are not declaring war against Holland because of military ex-
pediency.
Advisor Minami — What is Germany's attitude?
Premier — German entrance into the war in our support is almost certain,
and negotiations to that effect are now in progress.
Advisor Nara — What is the attitude of the Soviet Union?
Premier — The attitude of the Soviet Union is one of circumspection.
Advisors Sugawara and Fukai submitted questions on the expenditure of war
funds, matters of material, etc., which were answered by the Minister of Finance
and the Premier.
Advisor Sutakarai — Is it the question of whether or not we should declare war
that you want us to consider? I mean, has an Imperial Rcesript already been
issued on the beginning of the war?
Premier — Yes.
(Foreign Minister Togo enters and takes his place.)
Advisors Futakami and (?Ikeda?) pointed out that the use of the word
"America," [BEIKOKU] in the sugge.sted draft of the Imperial Rescript which
had been appended for advisement, might be misunderstood to apply to all the
Americas, and recommended a revision, but the Premier and the Head of the
Treaty Bureau explained that no such misunderstanding was possible.
Last of all, Foreign Affairs Minister Togo reported on the diplomatic situation
which had preceded the commencement of war.
[3] The documents under discussion were approved by a unanimous vote.
Full session, 10 A. M. Dec 8, Imperial Palace, Higashidame Room
His Imperial Majesty was present.
The rest of the attendance was the same as at the meeting of the Committee
of Advisement.
Committee President Suzuki presented his advisement report which was unani-
mously approved.
EXHIBIT NO. 132A
From : Wa.shington ( Nomura )
To: Tokyo
30 September 1941
Msg. #881
Part 2(") — (conclusion of the message)
Said Admiral is a man who thinks that war between Japan and America would
bring about no advantageous results for either country and that it is impossible
to solve economic problems by means of arms. He was cordial in his attitude
toward me from beginning to end. So I told him how much I regretted that, since
my arrival to take up my post. I had not been able to accomplish anything at all,
to which he said, "All the people who know your Excellency deeply appreciate
your efforts", and pointing out the apprehensions expres.sed in the Business Con-
ditions Weekly (") regarding Far-Eastern problems (the gist of the article is to
the effect that, while a showdown ('*) between Japan and America is imminent,
war between these two comitries is unnecessary and that if Japan is able to change
and readjust her policy, America will be mindful of her prosperity), he urged me
to read the article and said that he would put forth due efforts in the matter.
I would request that the above information be convej'ed to the Navy Minister.
(Finis)
• Part 1 appears under SIS-22987.
* Expressed by the English words.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2947
From : Tokyo
To : Germany, Brazil, Canada, England, Australia, Russia
Date : 8 November 11)41
Msg No. Circular 2288
With regard to the present stage in the Japanese-American negotiations: (Of-
fice Ciiief's Code)
1. Tiie government, since the formation of the labinet, has held daily conferences
with Imi)erial Headquarters and lias given consideration to the fundamental aim
in our national policy so as to meet the present grave crisis. We came to a de-
cision on the matter at the conference held in the Emperor's presence on the 5th
inst. together with a determination of fundamental plans relating to diplomatic
adjustments between Japan and America.
2. With regard to Japanese-American negotiations we decided to continue nego-
tiating for diplomatic adjustments and Ambassador NOMURA has already begitn
conversations in compliance with our new policy. However, although we on our
part still have the same strong desire to come to an agreement in the negotia-
tions, we are also determined to persist in our demands in so far as they pertain
to the existence and authority of our Empire. However, in view of the way in
which these negotiations have progressed in the past, there will be a great deal
of divergency of opinion between us and them. On the other hand, since the situa-
tion indicates imminent tension, the outlook does not permit optimism. In cas^
of a rupture in the negotiations, the situation throughout our Empire may be ex-
pected to undergo a sudden change.
3. At present the government will endeavor to save the situation by peaceful
means. It expects to expedite the negotiations by urging the American govern-
ment to reconsider its attitude. So exhausting every possible method to accom-
plish this, and because we think it appropriate, we have decided with this in view
to despatch Ambassador KURUSU to America (he is scheduled to arrive in Wash-
ington about the 13th), so that he might himself inform Ambassador NOMURA
of our decision, and aiding said ambassador in the final stages of the negotiations,
bring about a new turn in the critical situation.
4. In this way our government, while persistently adhering to our position, is
trying in every possible way to prevent a break in Japanese-American relations,
and by devoting its utmost efforts, is endeavoring to bring about a rapid and new
turn in the critical situation. The above is for vour information alone.
This messj^ge is addre.ssed to GERMANY, BRAZIL, CANADA. AUSTRALIA.
ENGLAND and RUSSIA. Will you plea.se relay it to ITALY from GERMANY,
and to the ambassadors and ministers in South America and MEXICO from
BRAZIL.
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To : Peking, Nanking, Manchuria, Shanghai, Hongkong, Hanoi, Batavla, Thailand,
San Francisco, Manila.
Date : 12 November 1941
Circular 2313
With regard to the present stage in the Japanese-American negotiations :
( Office Chief's Code. Urgent ) .
1. The government, since the formation of the Cabinet, has held daily confer-
ences with Imperial Headquarters and has given consideration to the fundamental
aim of our national policy so as to meet the present grave crisis. We came to a
decision on this matter on the 5th inst. together with a determination of our
fundamental plans relating to diplomatic adjustments between Japan and America.
2. With regard to Japanese-American negotiations we decided to continue
negotiations on diplomatic adjustments on an etiuitable basis. And no sooner had
conversations begun on the 7th than considerable divergence of opinion appeared.
In view of the way in which the negotiations have moved in the past, it is doubtful
whether an agreement will be reached in the negotiations, and while on our part
we will try to put forth our utmost efforts to bring about an agreement, the
situation is such that we shall not be able to make any further concessions, so
that the outlook does not permit any optimism. In case of a rupture in the
negotiations it is expected that the situation throughout our Empire will undergo
a sudden change.
This message is sent to : Peking, Nanking, Manchuria, Shanghai, Hongkong,
Hanoi, Batavia, Thailand, Manila and San Francisco. Will Hongkong please
79716 O — 46— pt. 18 7
2948 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
relay it to Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, and will San Francisco relay
it to the various Consuls in America, to Chicago, Honolulu and Vancouver.
From: Tokyo
To : Canada and Brazil
Date : 10 November 1941
Msg No. Circular 2193
(Very Urgent. Office Chief's Code).
The reason for the resignation of the entire Cabinet, as the Information
Bureau ' has already announced, was that recently no unanimity of opinion within
the Cabinet could be found. However, no matter what kind of a Cabinet will
henceforth be formed, the intention is to give very careful thought to meeting
the present crisis, and to continue the negotiations between Japan and America
as well. This is for your information alone.
This wire is addressed to Canada and Central and South American countries.
Will Brazil please relay it to Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and
Colombia.
Minutes of an Interview H^ld on 19 August 1941 Between Vice-minister
Amau and Ambassador Ott
On the 19th August the German Ambassador Ott called upon the Vice-Minister
and, after a"n exchange of courtesies and after a presentation of the war situation
in Europe, advanced the idea (1) that it would be to the advantage of Japan
also if at this time she attacked Russia from the east, and (2) stating that
intelligence had been received to the effect that America was going to provide oil
to Vladivostok by means of transport vessels, that the first of these ships had
already sailed, and that after that they would sail in rapid succession, he remarked
that this oil would doubtless be used for an attack upon .Japan too, and this
would have a very important bearing on .Japan. Thus, he tried to find out what
Japan's attitude was regarding these matters. (3) He also tried to sound out
Japan's attitude on the problem of American vessels stopping at Japanese ports
(the problem of the Pre.sident Coolidge). And (4) referring to Japan's attitude
toward Thailand, he asked whether Japan was planning merely for the economic
development of that country or whether she was thinking of a political or military
penetration. He asked various questions in order to obtain intelligence of
this kind.
To this the Vice-Mlnister replied : '-For Japan to do a thing like attacking
Russia would be a very serious question and would require profound reflection.
As for the problem of American oil we are giving the matter very careful attention.
And while we do not consider such a matter as American vessels stopping at our
ports to be of such importance as to cause the world to get excited, we have not
yet had time to investigate the facts in the case. (At this point Ambassador Ott
interjected the remark that at the interview with the news reporters held today at
the Information Bureau there were many questions and answers relating to the
matter). Then with regard to Thailand, Great JJritain, in view of the fact that
Thailand ( ?bears such a close relation?) to the defense of the British Empire,
attaches very great importance to that country and Japan's attitude will therefore
have to be decided by giving consideration also to the attitude of England and
America."
In the course of the above interchange of questions and answers Ambassador
Ott stated that the Russo-German war was at present making progress in the
southern sectors, that southern Russia would soon fall into the hands of Germany,
that Moscow would fall perhaps during the first part of September, but in that,
case wbether or not the Stalin regime would fall or not could not be affirmed.
[1] Gist op a Consultation Held Bptween the Gekman Ambassador Ott
AND VlCE>MlNI8TBR AMAir ON 29tH AUGUST, 1941
At 6 p. m. on 29th August Ambassador Ott called and had the following inter-
view with Vice-Minister Amau :
The Ambassador: "According to a communique issued by the Japanese gov-
ernment this afternoon. Ambassador Nomura handed a message from Premier
" Joho Kyoku.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2949
Konoye to President Roosevelt. Is tlmt correct V In fact, I had requested an
interview with the Foreign Minister about this problem, but I have now come to
you because I consider it my duty to get a detailed explanation on the question
as to whether there would be any objection for us to understand that today's
message does not depart from the policy which was determined at a conference
held in the Imperial presence on 2nd July, at which time confidential informa-
tion relating to the policy of the Japanese government in regard to the Axis
was given to us, as well as on the question as to whether the present Cabinet
is contemplating any change with regard to this point."
The VicE-MiNisTEB : "I regret that the Foreign Minister could not see you be-
cause of a previous engagement, but I will reply to your questions to the limit
of my knowledge. It is true that Ambassador Nomura conveyed a message
from Premier Konoye to President Roosevelt. But that does not mean that
there has been a change in Japan's policy, nor that we are contemplating
any change in our relations with the Axis. As you know, when Matsuoka was
Foreign Minister, negotiations were carried on between Japan and America
with regard to various problems, and at that time we sent confidential reports
regarding the negotiations to your country. However, because of the Japanese
Army's advance into French Indo-China a temporary rupture in these negotia-
tions took place. And meanwhile in China, as well as in Japan and America,
various questions arose between Japan and America, causing Japanese-American
relations, contrary to our wishes, to become strained, so that in fact communi-
cations between Japan and America have at present come to a standstill, and the
situation is such that even economic relations have been broken off. It is natill-
ral that no country would desire such a situation to persist for any length of
time. I seems that America too desires a break in the deadlock, and the same
thing is true of Japan. I understand that the reason for sending the message
was to clarify the atmosphere in the Pacific."
The Ambassador : "Although I am aware that negotiations had previously
been carried on between Japan and America, that these negotiations had been
discontinued, and that since then various incidents have come up, do the pro-
posed negotiations between Japan and America involve only matters that have
fallen into abeyance, or do they concern entirely new problems?"
[2] The Vice-minister: "As I have just said, the idea back of the mes-
sage which was sent from Premier Konoye to President Roosevelt was merely
an attempt to start conversations between the two parties. It was not concerned
with any concrete problem such as to what questions would be talked about.
Furthermore we have not yet received any reply to the message from the
President."
The Ambassador : "How you received any notification from the American author-
ities that they are prepared to consent to negotiations?"
The Vice-Mini STER : "We have not received any such particular notification from
the American authorities, but as I have just said, we have received the impres-
sion that the American authorities are prepared to enter into negotiations in
order to break the deadlock."
The Ambassador : "As usual, America will try to gain time by beginning nego-
tiations with Japan, and meanwhile will put forth still greater efforts to carry
out her objectives. Therefore, I think that precautions must be taken against
America's scheme to prolong these negotiations, so that this might work to her
advantage."
The Vice-Mini STER : "We have given those points full consideration. And we
have also given the matter careful thought so that the carrying on of negotiations
by Japan with Amer/ca might not have any disadvantageous consequences upon
Germany and Italy. As you are aware from the Imperial edict and other proc-
lamations issued by government authorities at the time, the original purpose of
the Tripartite Alliance was the quelling of disturbances and the restoration of
I)eace. So even if we begin negotiations between Japan and America, the objec-
tive will always be to maintain peace, and therefore this will not conflict with
the spirit of Axis diplomacy.
"Moreover, if next I may express my own personal opinions, our aim at the
time when Matsuoka was Foreign Minister was to keep America from partici-
pating in the war, and for this reason we took a firm attitude toward America.
In order to prevent her from joining in the war, we considered it necessary to get
her to reflect upon her attitude, and, judging from the situation at the time, it was
no mistake at all for us to think that it was quite proper for us to take a firm
attitude toward her. Nevertheless the results proved to be just the opposite, and
2950 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
we can not deny that American public opinion has grown stronger and stronger,
speeding up American preparations for war. Meanwhile Germany took a very
mild attitude toward America. That is, America in all kinds of ways gave aid
to England, instituted a system of convoy, and invaded Iceland, on the other hand
freezing German funds in America and even closing German Consulates, while
Germany took a very gentle [3] attitude. Even at present Japan's policy
of preventing America from participating In the war remains unchanged, and our
aim is to keep her from joining in the war. Even now there is no change whatever
in that objective. However it will be necessary for us to consider a policy that
is adequate for the attainment of said objective, depending upon the time and
occasion. In the present situation, America being a country of wide expanse
and plentiful raw materials, we might possibly think it preferable, just at this
time when the hostile feeling of the people toward the situation is on the point of
becoming violent, to appease them and bring about a domestic disintegration,
rather than to excite and unify them."
The Ambassador : "Negotiations between Japan and America may prove to be
quite troublesome. For instance, when we think of the China problem, since
the sending of aid to Chiang Kaishek is one of the fundamental policies of Amer-
ica, she will not readily give this up. And I think that it may be very difficult
to come to an agreement with regard to various other problems. At any rate,
since the contents of this message is considered to be of tremendously great
importance to Germany also, even though I have not received any instructions
from my government, would it not be possible for me to receive a secret report
of Its contents since I will have to send a report about it to the government?"
The ViCE-MiNiSTEB : "As I have just said, the message conveys a statement
from Premier Konoye to the American President, and we have not received a
reply from the President as yet, but I will convey the substance of your desire
to the Foreign Minister."
The Ambassador : "If that is the case, then will it be all right for the present
for me to send a report to my government to the effect that the content of the
message signifies that for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, negotiations
are to be carried on between Japan and America on the basis of the Tripartite
Alliance?"
The ViCE-MiNisTEB : "As I have just said, the object of beginning parleys be-
tween Japan and America is to clarify the atmosphere In the Pacific. And while
there is no objection to the use of the words 'for the maintenance of peace', we
think that it would be permissible to suppose that nothing like a concrete prob-
lem, such as, for instance, the concluding of a non-aggression pact, is mentioned
In the message."
The Ambassador : "If so, do you have any idea of sending a special mission to
America to carry on these negotiations?"
[4] The VicE-MiNiSTEai : "As I have just said, it has not yet been settled
as to whether or not negotiations will be begun, and preliminary arrangements
regarding concrete problems have not yet been completed. So L understand that
no decision has yet been reached as to such a problem as sending a mission."
The Ambassador: "Is this problem to be worked out through Ambassador
Grew?"
The Vice-minister: (Hesitated to say anything for a moment).
The Ambassador : "Is Ambassador Nomura to do it?"
The VicE-MiNiSTER : (Nodded assent).
The Ambassador: "Again may I ask you to tell the Foreign Minister that I
wou!d like to have a confidential report of the contents of the message. In fact,
it has also some bearing upon instructions which I recently received from my
home government regarding the Russo-German war. Will you please make
arrangements so that I might by all means have an interview with the Foreign
Minister tomorrow."
The ViCE-MiNiSTER : "I will tell the Minister."
The Gist of an Interview Held Between Foreign Minister Toyoda and
Ambassador Ott on 30th August 1941, at 3 : 00 p. m. in the Official Resi-
dence (Administrative Official Yoshiuchi Acting as Interpreter)
After Anibassadot- Ott made a statement relating to the situation in the Russo-
German War, the conversation proceeded as follows: (Ambassador Ott is to be
designated by "O" and the Minister by "Toyo" in the following account) .
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2951
"O" : "In the notice sent to the German government on the 2nd July, the state-
ment is made that Japan is making preparations for every possible eventuality
in her relations with Russia and America, but are the intentions of the Japanese
government still the same today? Is there any possibility that Japan may par-
ticipate in the Russo-German vpar?
"ToYo" : "Japan's preparations are now making headway, and it will take
more time for their completion."
"O" : "Are the intentions of Japan as given in the notice of 2nd July still the
same?"
"ToYo" : "There is no change in our intentions, which are, to make preparations
in order to avail ourselves of any new development that may take place in the
situation henceforth."
"O" : "I learned of the message which Premier Konoye sent to President Roose-
velt for the first time through the newspapers, and later according to Domi (in re-
sponse to a question from the Minister Ott replied that this Domei dispatch was
one that was "carried" by DNB on the evening of the 29th as Domei report). I
learned that this message mentions the disposal of the China problem and the
establishment of a Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere as the ultimate aims of
Japan's national policy, and refers to the fact that as a result of the Russo-
German War Japanese-American relations have become delicate. So far as the
problems referred to in the message are concerned, from the viewpoint of the
Tripartite Pact Germany has very grave apprehensions, and since a detailed report
will have to be sent to my government, in disregard of propriety I must once more
make inquiry about this matter. Yesterday Vice-Minister Amau gave me an
explanation as to the contents of this message, but if you have anything beyond
that to add, will you please state it."
[2] "TOYO" : "The situation being what it is, all kinds of reports are bound
to arise, but what I would like to tell you explicitly is that the report about prob-
lems concerning which I have just now heard for the first time, is absolutely
false. Vice-Minister Amau gave you the right explanation of the message."
"O" : "If so, then the message does not concern any concrete matters?"
"ToYO" : "It is just as Vice-Minister Amau explained."
"O" : "I would like to inquire what your impression is as to how the message
was received by them [the Americans]. Even if it does not deal with any con-
crete matters, I would like to ask whether it was received in a friendly spirit,
or whether their attitude was one of disapproval."^
"ToYO" : "I can't tell you, because I have as yet received no report whatsoever
about the matter."
"O" : "In Foreign Minister* Matsuoka's time the Japanese government author-
ities thought that what America was planning to do was to get Japan to take an
attitude in conflict with the Tripartie Pact, that is, to give up taking any posi-
tive action in the Pacific area no matter what occasion might arise, and Germany
is very grateful that at the time the Japanese government resolutely resisted
these American designs, and we hope that it will continue to take that 'line'. I
would like to ask what Your Excellency's views are concerning this point."
"ToYO" : "In a word I may say that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact is to
prevent American participation in the war, and that this view is the same as
in the past ; nor will it change in the future."
Basic Conditions for a Peace Settlement Between Japan and China
(Agenda for a conference with the Army and Navy Military Affairs Bureau
Chiefs held at the Foreign Minister's Official Residence at 2 : 00 p . m. on the 6th
September, 1941).
The Chungking regime accepts the basic treaty concluded between Japan and
the Nanking government together with the agreements attached thereto, as well as
the fact that the joint declaration issued by Japan, Manchoukuo, and China is
based upon the following principles, and will join up with the Nanking govern-
ment.
1. The merging of the Chungking and Nanking regimes.
2. Neighborly friendliness.
3. Respect for sovereignty and territory.
4. Joint defense (the maintenance of public order, the protection of rights
and interests, and cooperation in defence of things jeopardizing the same). The
2952 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
stationing of Japanese army units particularly in prescribed areas in Meng-
chiang and North Cbina as well as in Aiuoy and Hainan Island for this purpose.
5. Withdraway of troops. The Japanese army units which have been sent
to China because of the incident are to be withdrawn attendant upon the settle-
ment of the incident in accordance with a Sino-Japanese agreement.
6. Economic coalition. Not : economic activities of third powers in China
are not to be restricted so long as they are conducted on an equitable basis.
7. Non-annexation."
8. No indemnities.
9. Recognition of Manchoukuo.
Basic Conditions fob a Sino-Japanese Peace
Decisions reached at a liaison conference held on the 13th September, 1941.
1. Neighborly friendliness.
2. Respect for sovereignty and territory.
3. Sino-Japanese joint defense.
Sino-Japanese cooperation to preserve public order and to checli communistic
and other movements of a subversive natui'e which threaten the security of
Japan and China.
The stationing of Japanese army units for a necessary period in prescribed
areas in Inner Mongolia and North China for the above purpose, as well as the
placing of Japanese warships and units for a necessary period in Hainan
Island, Amoy, and other localities on the basis of previous agreements and
practices.
4. Withdrawal of troops. The Army units which have been sent to China for
the prosecution of the China Incident shall, with the exception of those men-
tioned in the preceding item, be withdrawn attendant upon the settlement of the
incident.
5. Economic Coalition.
(a) A Sino-Japanese economic coalition shall be put in operation, the main
object of which shall be the development and use of important raw materials
for national defense in China.
(b) The economic activities of third powers in China shall not be restricted if
conducted on an equitable basis.
6. The merging of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the Wang government.
7. Non-annexation. •
8. No indeminities.
9. Recognition of Manchoukuo.
26 November, 1941.
The last time I gave you the details up to the 18th November, but I will now
inform you of developments since then.
Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu called upon Secretary Hull on the 20th and
presented our new proposal, stating that they were making this proposal with a
view to bringing about a speedy settlement. But Secretary Hull without saying
anything in particular about it, manifested great disapproval of that clause in
the proposal which states that "America shall cease any activities that might
interfere with the peace efforts between Japan and China", and replied that,
unless Japan clarifies the meaning of the Tripartite Pact and positively asserts
that she will pur.sue a peaceful policy, it will be difficult to cut off aid to Chiang
Kaishek, and that the statement too to the effect that the President was to act
as intermediary in a Sino-Japanese peace would necessarily be conditioned by
Japan's adoption of a peaceful policy. But he did promise that after a study of
the new proposal, he would have further consultations.
On the next day, the 21st, when Ambassador Kurusu had a private interview
with Secretary Hull, the latter stated that he had no objection to Japan and
America holding leading positions through peaceful measures in East Asia and
in the Western Hemisphere respectively, and that he hoped that both countries
could conclude a Pacific agreement in a friendly spirit, the Japanese authorities to
• Doubtless refers to non-annexation of China by Japan.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
2953
see to it that the Tripartite Pact did not interfere with the execution of such
a treaty. . . ..^ . v.
On the 22iKl Secretary Hull, before he had an interview with Ambassadors
Nomura and Kuriisu, held a conference with the Ambassadors and Ministers of
England, Holland and Australia with regard to those parts of the proposal for a
Japanese-American understanding wliich deal with matters in which these coun-
tries are concerned, and these Ambassadors and Ministers said that they would
send in a i-equest to their home governments and would be able to reply to the
American government by Monday (the 24th).
On the same day at the interview held between Ambassadors Nomura and
Kurusu and Secretary Hull, the former asked for America's own reply to our
proposal, but the Secretary avoided a definite reply to this. However, he said
that what England, Holland and Australia desired was that the serious situation
in the South Pacific areas might be alleviated at once, that the movement of the
Japanese army units stationed in southern French Indo-China to the northern part
of the country was not deemed sufficient, and further, that, while gradual progress
in the restoration of trade conditions was desirable, when Japan once made clear
her peaceful intentions, we could look for a sudden change within a few days.
He also made the remark with regard to the cutting off of aid to Chiang Kai-shek
by America, that he would like to have us acknowledge the fact that in such a
matter America could not be an impartial intermediary.
[2] With regard to the cutting off of American aid to Chiang Kai-shek, we
issued orders to Ambassador Nomura on the 22nd to the effect that, since our
Empire simultaneously with the conclusion of a treaty, in accord with our new
proposal, would like through the good offices of America to get China to express
her friendship toward Japan in line with a suggestion made by America on the
12th inst., and to begin direct peace negotiations between Japan and China, he
should make a representation to the American authorities to the effect that it
would be natural to expect the American authorities to stop any activities that
might obstruct these negotiations.
Furthermore, in Tokyo I, the Foreign Minister ", asked the American Ambassa-
dor in Tokyo to call on the 23rd, and I made it clear to him that, while it seems
that England, Holland and Australia as well as America are not satisfied with
merely the movement of the Jai)anese forces stationed in Southern French Indo-
China to the northern part of that country, neither do we consider it sufficient
merely to restore conditions as they were previous to the putting into effect of the
freezing order, a thing which we with reluctance dared to propose and which we
anticipate, and that it will be impossible to reach a settlement so long as no
understanding with America is reached also with regard to the cessation of aid
to Chiang Kai-shek and with regard to the securing of raw materials from the
Dutch East Indies.
» The word here used is Hondaijin, indicating that this message is a report sent out by
Tokyo and made up in the main of information received from Washington.
EXHIBIT NO. 133
[secret]
[a] STATEMENT BY MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT OF EVENTS
AND CONDITIONS LEADING UP TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK,
DECEMBER 7, 1941
[a] Table of Contents
Statement Major General Walter C. Short. Pp. 1-50 incl. Exhibits A-lR (incl.)
Page
Exhibit
1. Paraphrased Radio, 16 Oct. 41 from Chief Naval Operations,
2. W. D. Radio 472, 27 Nov. 41, from General Marshall..-
3. Hawaiian Department Alerted 27 Nov. 41
4. Alerts (Extracts from Standing Operating Procedure)
5. Reasons for Calling Alert No. 1
6. Extract from "Joiat Coastal Frontier Defense Plan".
7. Annex #7 from "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan"
1
1
2
2-10 incl..
10-13 incl.
11-12 incl.
12
^ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent
pages of original exhibit.
2954 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[a] Table of Contents — Continued
8. 28 Nov. 41 Radio Reply to W. D. Radio 472 (Qen. Marshall 27 Nov. 41)
9. W. D. Radio 482. 28 Nov. 41, "Sabotage"
10. E.xtract from MID-SC30-45 "Subversive Activities"
11. 29 Nov. 41 Radio to W. D. (Steps Taken to Prevent Sabotage)..
12. Events Transpiring from 27 Nov. 41 to 6 Dec. 41.
a. Order for Detector Operation
6. Conferences With Navy ,
c. Certificate "No Navy Request for Long Range Reconnaissance"
d. Certificate "Statement Made by Naval Staff Officers"
e. Arrival B-24 (Photo Mission) from U. S
/. W. D. Radio 465, 26 Nov. 41 (Re B-24 Photo .Mission)
g. 5 Dec. 41 Radio to Chief Air Corps (Re B-24 Photo Mission)...
A. Unarmed B-17 Flight from U. S. Arrive Oahu During 7 Dec.
Attack.
i. RCA Radio (Commercial) from General Marshall "Japanese
Ultimatum".
;. \V. D. Radio 549, 9 Dec. 41, Requesting Time RCA Radio Re-
ceived.
k. Radio Reply to \V. D. Radio 549, 9 Dec. 41 "Time Received"..
/. Japanese Submarine Sunk Pearl Harbor 7:15 A. M. 7 Dec
m. Aircraft Warning Service Operation 7 Dec. 41
13. Action at Time of Attack, 7 Dec. 41
a. Alert of .\11 Units.
b. An t i- A ircraft Art illery .
[6] <;. Hawaiin Air Force
d. 24th Division
e. 25th Division
/. Medical Teams and Civilian Relief Committees
14. Martial Law Declared 8 Dec. 41
15. Efforts to Improve Defenses of Hawaiin Islands
a. Letter to Gen. Marshall Outlining Deficiencies Found
6. Request for Funds for Dispersion Aircraft
c. Request for Underground Maintenance Hawn. Air Depot
d. Request for Fortification and Camouflage Funds
e. Request for Funds for Camouffeging Air Fields
/. Request for Funds for Roads, Trails
g. Request for Additional Air Ports
ft. Request for Kaneoho Bay Defenses
i. Request for Funds for Improvement Landing Strips Wheeler
Field.
j. Request for Priorities on Aircraft AVarning Stations
k. Request for Honolulu Office Production Manager
I. Request for $1,000,000 Fund for Stocking Reserve Supplies
m. Letter from C'hief Air Corps "Ferrying Operation Airfiedls"...
n. Request for Increase in Engineer Strength
0. Request for Increase in Coast Artillery Strength
p. Request for Increase in Infantry and Artillery Strength
q. Request for Increase in Air Corps Strength
r. Request for Reorganization Hawn. Division and an Increase in
Initial War Garrison.
s. Request Activation of A. A. Artillery Brigade
t. Request Information 37 MM Guns
u. Standing Operating Procedure
16. Efforts to Better Prepare Civilian Community for Defense
a. Army Day Speech, 6 April 41 to Honolulu Chamber of Com-
merce.
6. Production and Storage of Food
c. Organization of Doctors and Nurses
d. Organization of Auxiliary Police and Fire Force..
[c] e. Evacuation Camps and Air Raid Shelters
/. M-Day Bill _
17. Letters from Civilian Reference Efforts to Improvement of Civilian
Defense.
a. Unsolicited Letter to President. United States
6. Unsolicited Letter from Major Disaster Council, Honolulu
c. Unsolicited Letter from Gov. Poindexter '.
18. Conclusions
11
13-14 incl
14
14-15 incl..
15-24 incl
15-16 incl
16-17incl.-..
17
17
18.
18
18-19 incl..
19
20-21 incl
20 :...
20-21
21..
21-24 incl
24-26 incl
24
25
25
25
25-26 incl
26...
26-27 incL...
27-42 inch.
28 par. 1
28-29 par. 2
29 par. 3
29 par. 4.
30 par. 5...
30 par. 6
30-32 incl. par. 7..
32-33 incl. par. 8..
33 par. 9.
33 par. 10
34 par. 11
34-36 incl. par. 12
35 par. 13
36 par. 14
36-37 incl. par. 15
36-37 incl. par. 15
38-40 incl. par. 16.
40-41 incl. par. 17.
41 par*. 18
42 par. 19..
42 par. 20
43-45 incl
43..:
43-44 incl....
44.
44
45
45 .,
45-47 incl.
45-46 incl-
47
47a
48-50 incl
' Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent
pages of original exhibit.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2955
[1] STATEMENT BY MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT OF
EVENTS AND CONDITIONS LEADING UP TO THE JAPANESE
ATTACK, DECEMBER 7, 1941
The following radiogram from the Chief of Staff was received October 16, 1941 —
Exhibit "A":
Note for commanding general Hawaiian department :
The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval
Operations which I have been directed to pass to you quote:
Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave situation x if a new
cabinet is formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly na-
tionalistic X if the Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new
mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States
X either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible
X since Britain and the US are held responsible by Japan for her present
situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two
powers X view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including
siich preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor
constitute provocative actions against Japan x.
The following radiogram from the Chief of Staff was received 2:22 P. M.,
November 27th— Exhibit "B":
"Hawn Dept, Ft. Shafter, TH:
472 27th negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical
purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government
might come back and offer to continue stop Japanese future action un-
predictable but hostile action possible at any moment stop If hostilities
cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States
desires that Japan commit the first overt act stop This policy should not
comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course
of action that might jeopardize your defense stop Prior to hostile Japanese
action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures
as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not
comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent
stop Report measures taken stop Should hostilities occur you will carry
out the tasks assigned the Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan
Stop Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum
essential officers.
Marshall,
116P/27.
[2] Upon receipt of the above radiogram, I gave consideration to the type
of an alert which I should order, and, after talking the matter over with the
Chief of Staff , Alert #1 was ordered by telephone , and put into effect at once.
Standing Operation Procedure, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 5 Novem-
ber 1941.— Exhibit "C":
"section II — ALERTS
13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as
indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department
order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph / (8) below.
14. ALERT NO. 1. a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and up-
risings within the islands, with no threat from without.
b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, all General and Special Staff
Sections will continue with their usual duties at their present stations, pending
further orders.
c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending
instructions from this Headquarters.
d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:
(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.
(2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient
to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.
2956 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(3) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS reservation and all vital instal-
lations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations), in its assigned
sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among
the important ones:
Police District No. 1, see paragraph 14 h (2) below.
Command and Fire Control Cable System.
Railwav and Highwav Bridges.
Water supplv for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA.
WAIAU Generating Plant.
Telephone Exchanges at WAIPAHU, WAHIAWA, WAIALUA (in HALE-
IWA), LAIE and KANEOHE.
Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAIALUA, KAHUKU KAILUA,
WAIPIO AND EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO, WAHIAWA,
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive,
from KOOLAU switch station BELLOWS FIELD.
[3] Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA.
Pumping Stations at MO AN ALU A and KAPAHULU.
(4) the 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping
stations at AIEA and HALAWA.
e. The HA'WAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND will:
(1) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation
and fire control installatigns, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft
defense,
(2) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command.
(3^ Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.
(4) Provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and
Tripler General Hospital.
/. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:
(1) Protect all vital installations on posts of OAHU garrisoned by air forces.
(2) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base
detachments with District Commanders.
g. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the Air Corps detachments
within the districts, will:
Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage,
and maintain order in the civil community.
h. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, in addition to his normal
duties, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will:
(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.
(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.
(3) Esta'blish liaison with the local police force.
i. The STATION COMPLEMENTS OF HICKAM, WHEELER and BEL-
LOWS FIELDS, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the
protection of all vital installations on their respective posts.
;. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD. Upon the formation of the Territorial
Home Guard, recently authorized by the TERRITORIAL Legislature, it is
anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the
District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations,
except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installons ation
Army and Navy Re.servations.
[4] 15. ALERT NO. 2. a. This alert is applicable to a more serious con-
dition than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, sur-
face, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings,
is provided.
b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, only the G-2 and G-3 Sections
will be required to operate on a 24-hour basis. All other sections of the General
and Special Staffs will continue with their normal schedule.
c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending
instructions from this Headquarters.
d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:
(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.
(2) Maintain available all units at fifty percent (50%) of their present strength,
except those required under (3), (4) and (5) below.
(3) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient
to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2957
(4) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation and all vital installa-
tions (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned
sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among
the important ones:
Police District No. 1.
Command and Fire Control Cable System.
Railway and Highwav Bridges.
Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA.
WAIAU Generating Plant.
Telephone exchanges at WAIPAHU, WAHIAWA, WAIALUA (in HALE-
IWA), LAIE and KANEOHE.
Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAIALUA, KAHUKU. KAILUA,
WAIPIO and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO, WAHIAWA,
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive,
from KOOLAU switch station BELLOWS FIELD.
Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA.
Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPAHULU.
(5) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the Pumping
Stations at AIEA and HALAWA.
[6] (6) Place 240 mm howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards
and; when directed, place ammunition at positions.
(7) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155 mm guns)
to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command.
(8) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 15 I below.
e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attached Field
Artillery, will:
(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that rail-
way batteries will remain at FORT KAMEHAMEHA or where emplaced.
(2) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational
control.
(3) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation
and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft
defense.
(4) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command,
except FORT SH AFTER, For FORT SH AFTER, see paragraph 15 k (1) below.
(5) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.
(6) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.
(7) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.
(8) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol,
(9) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.
(10) Provide Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.
/. The Hawaiian Air Force will:
(1) Maintain aircraft and creWs in condition of readiness as directed by this
headquarters.
(2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.
(3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival
thereat, disperse on fields.
(4) Disperse bombers with crews.
(5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.
(6) Protect all vital installations on posts on OAHU garrisoned by air forces.
(7) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base
detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 15 g below.
(8) In case of surprise hostile attack:
[6] (a) Release to Navy for operational control all bombers in condition
of readiness "A". The bomber commander will report to the Commander of
Patrol Wing X TWO.
(b) Receive all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighter planes in
appropriate condition of readiness and release them to the Interceptor Command
for operational control.
g. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the air corps detachments
within the districts, will:
Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage,
hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.
2958 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
h. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division
Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will:
(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.
(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.
(3) Establish liaison with the local police force.
(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions includ-
ing blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.
(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.
(6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 15 k (1).
i. The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:
(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service
and then release it to the Interceptor Command.
(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for im-
mediate employment.
j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will:
Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery
(including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the Aircraft Warning
Service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft
measures of units not under military control, to include:
(1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.
(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/
or HONOLULU HARBORS.
(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.
k. STATION COMPLEMENTS:
(1) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, undert the supervision of the Depart-
ment Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER
and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department
Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.
(2) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS Complements,
under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their
respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.
I. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD. Upon the formation of the Territorial
Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated
that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Com-
manders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the
Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and
Navy Reservations. See paragraph 15 d (4) and g above.
16. ALERT NO. 3. a. This alert requires the occupation of all field positions
by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations
on outlying islands.
b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS:
(1) All sections of the forward echelon will occupy their stations at forward
command post, prepared to operate on a 24-hour basis.
(2) All sections of the rear echelon will continue their usual duties at their
present stations. Blackout instructions will be complied with.
c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will remain in condition of mobile readiness at
their permanent stations, pending instructions from this headquarters.
d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:
(1) Defend its assigned sector on OAHU.
(2) Protect all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy
Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.
(3) Release all available Bands to the Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD
BARRACKS.
(4) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping
stations at AIEA and HALAWA.
(5) Place 240 mm howitzers in position.
(6) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155 mm guns)
to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 16 e below.
(7) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 16 to below.
e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attacked
Detachment Field [8] Artillery, will:
(1) Occup3' initial seacoast and antiaircraft positions.
(2) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.
(3) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.
(4) Support the Infantry Divisions.
(5) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.
(6) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2959
(7) Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.
(8) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational
control.
(9) Protect all vital installations on post and reservations of the command,
except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 16 I (2)
below.
(10) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation
and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft
defense
/. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:
(1) Destroy enemy aircraft.
(2) Carry out bombing missions as directed.
(3) Cooperate with Naval air forces.
(4) On OAHU, defend all posts garrisoned by air forces against sabotage, air
and ground attacks.
(5) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local
base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 16 h below.
(6) Arm all planes, except that normally bombs will not be loaded on ships
dispatched to outlying islands.
(7) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival
thereat, disperse on fields.
(8) Disperse bombers with crews.
(9) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.
(10) Perform observation, command and photographic missions.
(11) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.
g. G-5 will be prepared to establish the following:
(1) Food administration.
[9] (2) A Labor Procurement Service.
h. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS OF HAWAII, MAUI (includes MOLO-
KAI) and KAUAI Districts, assisted by the air corps detachments present
within the districts, will:
Defend the air fields against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain
order in the civil communitv.
i. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division
Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will:
(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.
(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.
(3) Establish liaison with the local police force.
(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in f 11 .\ir Raid Precautions includ-
ing blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.
(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.
(6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 16 I (2) below.
j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will coordinate and control the opera-
tions of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including availaole Naval and
Marine Corps AA Artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and
will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under
military control to include:
(1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.
(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or
HONOLULU HARBORS.
(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.
k. The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:
(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service
and then release it to the Interceptor Command.
(2) Insure the joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate
employment.
(3) Be prepared to assume control over essential civilian communications.
/. STATION COMPLEMENTS:
(1) The SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Complement will protect all vital installa-
tions on the SCHOFIELD Reservation.
(2) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Depart-
ment Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER
and. in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department
Headquarters and [10] Tripler General Hospital.
(3) The HICKAM, ^^'HEELER and BELLOWS FIELD Complements,
under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their
respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.
2960 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
m. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.— Upon the formation of the Terri-
torial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is
anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the
District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations,
except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on
Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 16 d (2) and h above."
Alert #1 is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprising within the islands
with no threat from without. In addition to the duties prescribed in Alert #1,
the Aircraft Warning Service was directed to operate all mobile aircraft warning
stations from two hours before dawn to one hour after dawn.
My reasons for ordering Alert #1 rather than Alert #2, which is applicable to a
condition more serious than Alert #1, security against attacks from hostile sub-
surface, surface and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and
uprising, were as follows:
1. There was a strong probability of sabotage by the Japanese population in
Hawaii.
2. I had no information to indicate the probability of an attack.
3. Alert #2 or Alert #3, which provides for the maximum defense of OAHU and
of army installations on outlying islands, interfere very seriously with training.
These three reasons will be discussed in detail:
1. Defense against sabotage can be carried out better where there is not too,
much dispel sion of the command. Where the defense is against sabotage only
the planes are grouped on the landing mats and the apron, while in a defense
against air attack the pursuit planes would be dispersed in their bunkers and the
bombardment planes would be sent to landing fields on outlying islands or placed
in the air if time were available. If time were not available, they would remain
in their bunkers. From this can be seen that the action for the two diflFerent
types of defense is quite different. Since sabotage was considered far more prob-
able [11] than air attack, the planes were dispersed to all of the landing
fields on the island of OAHU, but were not placed in bunkers. This was especially
desirable as man-proof fencing and fiood-lights had not as yet been provided for
the fields. $240,000.00 for this purpose was requested on May 15, 1941, and the
authorization of $102,000.00 was made on July Uth and $91,975.00 on August
12, 1941. Orders for the material had to be placed in the mainland as it was not
available in the Hawaiian Islands. Owing to the difficulties of obtaining priori-
ties, both for material and for shipping, the District Engineer has not yet received
the material. The Constructing Quartermaster was allotted funds for fencing of
other than air fields, and a small amount of the material had been received and
installed prior to December 7th.
2. The Hawaiian Department is provided with no means of collecting informa-
tion as to the location of Japanese or other ships throughout the world and is not
responsible for distant reconnaissance. The "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval
District" — Section I, par. 3, 18 and 21, definitely place the responsibility for such
reconnaissance upon the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. The
following quotation makes this evident:
EXTRACT from "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan"— Exhibit "D":
"3. METHOD OF COORDINATION. The Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District
have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by
mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein tne
Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of
command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935,
Chapter 2, paragraph 9 b.
H: H: :i: t * * ^
18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall
piovide for:
*******
i. Distant reconnaissance.
*******
21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice
in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until dis-
approved in part or in whole by either the War or the Naw Department. This
HCF-41 (JCD-42) supercedes ■HCF-39 (JCD-13) except that the annexes, Nos.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2961
1 to VII of latter remain eflFective and constitute annexes 1 to VII inclusive, of
this plan."
[12] Annex #7 to the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" provides as
follows— Exhibit "E":
"When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval
Base Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat
of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each
commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available
without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his
disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be con-
ducted in accordance with the following plans:
1. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the
tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine
the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due con-
sideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes
released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain
available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the
mission, when it will revert to Army control.
2. Defensive Air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be
executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense
Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions.
With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter
aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force
will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for mainte-
nance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation,
it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control.
3. When Naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search opera-
tions, and army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical
control of the naval commander directing the search operations.
4. In the special instance in which army pursuit protection is requested for the
protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this situation will pass
to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission".
These documents make it clearly evident that the Hawaiian Department had
no responsibility for distant reconnaissance, and that when army bombardment
planes are actually placed under the command of the Navy whenever they
operate upon distant reconnaissance missions, they receive their mission and all
instructions from the [13] Naval Commander, and report to him upon
the completion of their mission. This method of procedure has been followed
strictly since March 21, 1941, including the period since December 7th.
3. If upon consideration of the available facts the calling of Alert No. 1 would
be sufficient to handle the situation Alert No. 2 or No. 3 should not be called
because to do so would seriously interfere with the training of the command.
When the troops are in battle positions it is practically impossible to carry on
any orderly training. With the number of new man in the command it is highly
important to conduct their training regularly. This was particularly true of
the Hawaiian Air Force on Noveinber 27th due to the fact that they had been
given the mission of training combat crews and ferrying B-17 planes from the
mainland to the Philippine Islands. September 8th the Hawaiian Air Force sent
nine (9) trained combat teams to the Philippine Islands. Previous to November
27th eighteen (18) trained combat teams had been sent to the mainland, and
seventeen (17) more combat teams were ready to go to the mainland for ferrying
purposes. In addition, twelve (12) combat crews had to be trained for planes
that were expected at ^n early date in this Department. With only six (6)
B — 17 planes available for training combat teams, it was imperative that the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force mak'e the maximum use of these
planes for training, and any order that would take them out of training for any
considerable period would prevent him from carrying out the ferrying mission
that had been assigned to him.
2962 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I replied as follows to the radiogram from the Chief of Stafif of November 27th —
Exhibit "F":
"Chief of Staff,
War Department,
Washington, D. C:
Reurad four seven two twenty seventh report department alerted to prevent
sabotage period liaison with navy
Short".
Upon receipt of my radiogram of November 28th, I received the following
replv from The Adjutant General — Exhibit "G":
"Hawn Dept., Ft. Shafter, TH:
482 28th critical situation demands that all })recautions be taken immediately
against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of [^-41
War Department Paren See paragraph three IVIID SC thirty dash forty five
End paren Stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional meas-
ures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma prop-
erty comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your
personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against
espionage Stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are
authorized Stop Protective meanures should be confined to those essential to
security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm Stop To insure
speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but
this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions.
AOAMS".
This par. of MID SC 30-45 referred to in the above mentioned radiogram is
attached as Exhibit "H", and this paragraph refers wholly to subversive
activities.
Careful consideration of the radiograms of October 16th, November 27th and
November 28th discloses that the War Department emphasizes that action taken
would not alarm the civil population, would not disclose strategic intention,
constitute provocative actions against Japan, and would avoid unnecessary pub-
licity. Alert #2 or #3 would have disclosed tactical positions and given more
pubiicity to preparations and might have alarmed the civil population.
If the War Department at that time had considered it necessary to alert the
Hawaiian Department against air and ground attack, it undoubtedly would have
so directed instead of sending a long radiogram outlining the various steps that
should be taken in connection with sabotage and subversive activities.
In my radiogram of November 29th 1 replied to the radiogram of the War
Department of November 28th, and explained in detail the steps I wa.s taking to
prevent sabotage and subversive activities, and of the authority that T had ob-
tained from the Governor of Hawaii and of the Mayor of the City and County of
Honolulu to legalize all the steps which I had taken — Exhibit "1":
"The Adjutant General,
War Department,
Washington, D. C:
Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth Comma Full precautions
are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative re-
sponsibility of War Department Paren Paragraph three MID SC thirty dash
forty five End paren And military establishments including personnel and
equipment Stop As regards protection [15] of vital installations out-
side of military reservations such as power plants Comma Telephone ex-
changes and highway bridges Comma This headquarters by confidential letter
dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory
to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act
which provides Comma In effect Comma That the Governor may call upon
the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the Territory
of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence Comma Invasion Comma
Insurrection etc Stop Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June
twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand of this headquarters to
furni.sh and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to
prevent sabotage -Comma And lawless violence in connection therewith
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2963
Comma Being committed against vital installations and structures in the Terri-
tory Stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection
is now being afforded vital civilian installations Stop In this Connection Comma
At the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June
thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordnance which permits the commanding
general Hawaiian Department Comma to close Comma Or restrict the use
of and travel upon Comma Any highway within the city and county of Hono-
lulu Comma whenever the commanding general deems such action necessary in
the interest of national defense Stop The authority thus given has not yet
been exercised Stop Relations with FBI and all other Federal and Territorial
officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all
pertinent matters.
Short"
events transpiring from november 27th to december 6th
From November 27th to December 6th the troops remained on the Alert for
sabotage, and carried on routine training with the men not required to be on
duty dviring this Alert. The Aircraft Warning Service operated daily from two
hours before daylight until one hour after daylight. It also carried out this
usual practice, closing the information center at 7:00 A. M., December 7th.
Routine training was also carried out by this Detachment from 7:00 to 11 :00 A. M.
except on Sunday. Memorandum of the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department,
states as follows — Exhibit "J":
Subject: Detector Operation.
To: Department Signal Officer.
1. On November 27, 1941, after conference with Assistant Chief of Staff G-3,
and receiving instructions to operate all mobile detectors from two hours before
dawn until one hour after dawn, I, as Acting Department Signal Officer, gave
immediate instructions [16] to Captain TETLEY, Commanding Officer
of the Aircraft Warning Company, to initiate the above detector operation so
long Alert No. 1 was in force.
2. The detectors in question operated daily thereafter during the prescribed
period except when having occasional operational trouble. In addition, the six
detector stations operated daily except Sundays from 7:00 A. M. to 11:00 A. M.
for routine training. Daily except Saturday and Sunday, to hours 12:00 noon
until 4:00 P. M. were devoted to training and maintenance work.
(Signed) W. H. Murphy,
W. H. Murphy,
Lt. Col., Sig. C.
During the period November 27th to December 6th I had conferences with the
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and the Commandant of the
Fourteenth Naval District as follows:
November 27th: Conference on the reinforcement of the marine garrisons at
Midway and Wake Islands by squadrons of army pursuit planes. I was accom-
panied on this conference by Major General Frederick L. Martin, Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Air Force, and Lt. Colonel James A. MoUison, Chief of
Staff of the Hawaiian Air Force.
December 1st: Conference relative to the relief of the marine garrisons on the
islands of Midway and W^ake, and the taking over of the defense of Canton Island
by the army.
December 2nd: Conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States
Fleet with reference to a letter that he was sending to the Chief of Naval Operations
relative to the relief of the marines at Midway and Wake by the army.
December 3rd: Conference with reference to a radiogram I was sending to the
War Department relative to the relief of the marines at Midway and Wake by
the army.
December 4th: Major Fleming, of my staff, conferred with Col. Pfeiffer, Fleet.
Marine Officer on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet
relative to the use of marine 5" guns at Canton Island.
At these conferences the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and
the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District had ample opportunity to
acquaint me with information of the location of Japanese carriers, which would
79T16 O— 46 — pt. 18-
2964 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
render possible an attack on the island of OAHU. If they believed carriers
so located, they unquestionably [17] would have discussed the possible
danger to any troops attempting to effect a relief at Midway and Wake. There
is at least a strong inference that they had no such knowledge of the location of the
Japanese carriers which would have rendered an attack possible. The fact that
the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District did not request the em-
ployment under naval command of army bombardment planes for distant recon-
naissance, as provided for by the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" indicates
that they were satisfied with their information with reference to Japanese car-
reers, and there was nothing new in the situation to cause me to change from an
Alert for sabotage to an Alert for defense against an air attack. The following
certificate shows that no request was made by the Commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District to the Hawaiian Air Force for long range aerial reconnaissance —
Exhibit "K":
HicKAM Field, T. H., 20 December 1941.
I, JAMES A. MOLLISON, certify that during the period of 27 November 1941
to 7 December 1941 the Navy made no requests to the Hawaiian Air Force for in
shore or long range aerial reconnaissances.
(Signed) Jas. A. MoUison,
Jas. a. Mollison,
Lt. Col, A. a,
H.'A. F. C/S.
To what extent such reconnaissance was made by the Navy planes is not
known.
At the conference on November 27th, a staff officer of the Commander-in-Chief
of the United States Fleet made a statement about the improbability of a Japanese
air attack in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief. This statement is covered
by certificate of Lt. Col. James A. Mollison, as follows — Exhibit "L":
"I certify that on November 27, 1941, I accompanied General Short and
General Martin to Admiral Kimmel's office for conference relative to sending
Army pursuits planes to Midway and Wake. As this would unquestionably
weaken the defenses of Oahu, Admiral Kimmel asked a question of Captain
McMorris, his War Plans Officer, which was substantially as follows:
Admiral Kimmel: McMorris, what is your idea of the chances of a surprise
raid on Oahu?
Captain McMorris: I should say none Admiral .
(Signed) James A. Mollison,
Lt. Col., A. a
[18] December 5th one B-24 plane arrived at Hickam Field from the
mainland. This plane had insufficient armament for combat, only one .30 caliber
and two .50 caliber guns in the tail, and was without ammunition for the guns
that were installed. In spite of the fact that this plane arrived without being
in condition to fire, the following radiogram was received from the War Depart-
ment— Exhibit "M":
"Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Ft. SJiafter, TH.:
Four six five twenty sixth.
Reference two B dash twenty four airplanes for special photo mission Stop
It is desired that the pilots be instructed to photographic Truk Island in the
Caroline group Jaluit in the Marshall group Stop Visual reconnaissance should
be made simultaneously Stop Information desired as to the number and loca-
tion of naval vessels including submarines comma airfields comma aircraft comma
guns comma barracks and camps Stop Pilots should be warned islands strongly
fortified and manned Stop Photography and reconnaissance must be accom-
plished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity
Stop AvoTd orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed Stop
Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self pres-
ervation Stop The two pilots and copilots should be instructed to confer
with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advice Stop If
distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great comma suggest one B*dash
twenty four proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake comma then Philip-
pines by usual route photographing Ponape while enroute Moresby Stop Advise
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2965
pilots best time of day for photographic Truk and Jaluit Stop Upon arrival
in Philippines two copies each of an.y photographs taken will be sent to General
MacArthur comma Admiral Hart comma Admiral Kimmel comma the Chief
of Naval Operations comma and the War Department Stop Insure that both
B dash twenty four airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure
from Honolulu.
Adams.
The combination of the arrival of the plane in this condition and of the instruc-
tions for it to be placed in instant readiness for firing during the remainder of
the journey plainly indicates that the War Department considered Honolulu not
the subject of a probably attack, and that flying from the mainland to Honolulu
the hazard of carrying the extra weight of ammunition was greater than the
possibihty of being attacked by the Japanese.
After the receipt of radiogram 46526, quoted above, the following radiogram
was sent — -Exhibit "N":
Chief of the Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C:
Reference secret photographic mission of two B twenty fours Stop One of B
twenty fours [19] Lieutenant Faulkner which landed Hickam this date
short following equipment considered essential to safety and success of mission
colon fifty caliber machine guns comma mounts comma adapters and accessories
for upper hemisphere semicolon fifty caliber tunnel gun comma adapter and
accessories semicolon fifty caliber guns comma adapters comma mounts and
accessories for starboard and port sides semicolon second thirty caliber nose gun
comma adapter and accessories Stop Guns can be removed from our equip-
ment and ammunition is available Stop Strongly recommend that second B
twenty four bring necessary equipment from mainland for installation on both
planes prior their departure from Hickam field Stop Plane being held here
until satisfactorily armed Stop Subject plane has no armor plate installation
Stop Except for removal of passenger seats plane equipped as for ferry service
North Atlantic Signed Martin HAF 141.
Short
In spite of radiogram quoted above, airplanes continued to be dispatched from
the mainland without ammunition and with guns not in condition to fire. Twelve
B- 17 airplanes, under orders from the War Department, left the mainland in two
squadrons at 9:30 P. M., Dec. 6th, Pacific time (12:30 A. M., Dec. 7th, Eastern
time) and 10:30 P. M., Dec. 6th, Pacific time (1:30 A. M., Dec. 7th, Eastern time).
None of these guns were equipped with ammunition for the defensive armament.
Machine guns were still cosmolined and had not been bore-sighted. Ferry crews
were skeletonized, consisting of pilot, co-pilot, navigator, engineer and radio
operator. Such crews were incapable of manning gun positions, even if the guns
had been properly prepared for combat and supplied with ammunition. (Exhibit
"O"). The inference is plain that up to 1:30 A. M., December 7th, the War
Department felt that the hazard of carrying the extra weight in ammunition was
greater than the danger of an attack by the Japanese. These planes actually
arrived at Hickam Field in the midst of the first attack. Four of the twelve
planes were destroyed by the Japanese without being able to fight. Had the War
Department considered an attack by the Japanese probable, these planes would
not have been permitted to leave the mainland without ammunition, and without
guns in condition to be fired. Up to that moment the War Department had given
me no indication of a crisis in the American-Japanese relations.
Later in the^ morning of December 7th apparently alarming news was received
and the Chief of Staff sent the following message to me by commercial radio —
Exhibit "P":
[W\ "Hawn Dept.,
Ft. Shaffer, T. H.:
529 7th Japanese are presenting at one PM eastern standard time today what
amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine
immediately Stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not
know but be on alert accordingly Stop Inform naval authorities of this
communication
Marshall".
2966 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The message was filed at 12:18 P. M., December 7th, Eastern time (6:48 A. M.,
December 7th, Honohilu time). It was received by the R. C. A. in Honolulu at
7:33 A. M., December 7th, and delivered to the Signal Office, Fort Shafter, at
11:45 A. M. (Delivery probably delayed by the Japanese attack). The deci-
phered message was delivered to the Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department,
at 2:58 P. M., December 7th. Thus this important message was received seven
hours after the attack. If the message had been telephoned by secret telephone
direct to me as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time for encoding
there would have been time to warm up the planes and put them in the air, thus,
in all probability, avoiding a large loss of planes in the initial attack at 8:00 A. M.
The fact that the War Department sent this message by radio in code instead of
telephoning it in the clear and putting it through in the minimum amount of
time indicates that the War Department, even as late as 6:48 A. M., December
7th, Honolulu time, did not consider an attack on Honolulu as very probable.
When the Chief of Staff, War Department, was informed by the Chief of Staff,
Hawaiian Department, by secret commercial telephone of the first attack, he
inquired if the message with regard to the Japanese ultimatum had been received
prior to the attack. He was informed that it had not been received up to the
time of that conversation.
On December 9th the following radiogram was received from the War Depart-
ment— Exhibit "Q":
"Hawn Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.:
Five four nine ninth please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our
number five two nine repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact
time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to staff and by what
staff officer received.
Cotton, Acting".
The following reply was made by this Headquarters — Exhibit "R".
[21] "Re your five four nine radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via
RCA seven thirty three morning .seventh Stop Received signal office Fort
Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh paren this time approximate but within
five minutes paren Stop Deciphered message received bj- adjutant general HQ
Hawn Dept two fifty eight afternoon seventh
Short.
Two instances occurred early on the morning of December 7th, which, if inter-
preted differently at the time, might have had a very great result upon the action
that followed.
About 7:15 A. M. a two-man submarine entered Pearl Harbor and was destroyed
by ships on duty. Had the Naval authorities foreseen this as a possible forerunner
of an air attack and notified the army, time would have been available for the dis-
persion of the planes. However, the naval authorities did not connect this sub-
marine attack with a possible general attack. The army was not notified until
after the attack at 8:00.
After the Air Craft Warning Service Information Center was clo.sed at 7:00
A. M., December 7th, the OPANA station remained in operation for further prac-
tice. At 7:20 A. M. a very significant event occurred, as shown by the following
affidavits —
Exhibit "8":
"Fort Shafter, T. H.
Territory of Hawaii, ss:
Personally appeared Ijefore me, the undersigned, authority for administering
oaths of this nature, one Grover C. White, Jr. 0-396182, 2nd Lieut., Signal Corps.
Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly sworn according
to law deposes and .sayeth:
1. At the request of the Control Officer and Naval Liaison Officer the AWS
agreed to operate its detectors beyond the daily period of two hours before until
one hour after dawn. The first schedule required operation of all stations from
4 A. M. to 6 P. M. This schedule was modified to the hours of 4 A. M. to 4 P. M.
A temporary schedule was next devised which required all stations to operate from
4 A. M. to 11 A. M. and to have "staggered" operation, i. e., 3 stations from 11
A. M. to 1 P. M., the remaining 3 stations from 1 P. M. to 4 P. M. On Saturday.
December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to request authority to have all
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2967
stations operate from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941; this
was agreed to by the Control Officer.
2. Staff Sergeant Stanley J. Wichas, SCAWH, acting RDF Officer, reports
that he saw nothing that could be construed as suspicious in the information
received [2S] by the AWS Information Center from 4 A. M. to Sunday,
December 7, 1941. This is verified by Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, who was
the only officer in the Information Center from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M.
3. At approximately 7:20 A. M. a report was received from a Detector station
at Opena that a large luunber of planes was approaching Oahu on a course North
3 degrees E^ast at a distance of approximately 192 miles. This information was
immediately transmitted by the switchboard operator, Pfc. Joseph McDonald
to Lt. Tyler, who talked to Opana about the flight. The statement of Pfc. Joseph
McDonald, SCAWH, the switchboard operator is attached.
4. The Navy Liaison Officer's position within the Information Center was not
manned when I reached the Information Center at about 8:30 A. M. This position
was manned shortly thereafter by Technical Sergeant Merle E. StoufTer, SCAWH,
who remained on the position until approximately 4:30 P. M. when the position
was taken over by Naval Officers.
Further the deponent sayeth not.
(Signed) Grover C. White, Jr.
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps, Signal
Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of Dec. AD 1941, at Fort
Shafter, T. H.
(Signed) Adam R. Huggins,
2nd Lt., Signal Corps,
Summary Court.
"Fort Shafter, T. H.,
ss:
Territory of Hawaii,
Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority for administering
oaths of this nature, one Joseph P. McDonald, 13006145, Pvt. Icl, Signal Company
Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly svVorn according to law deposes
and sayeth:
I was on duty as telephone operator at the AWS Information Center on Sunday
morning, December 7, 1941. I received a telephone call from Opana at 7:20
A. M. stating that a large number of planes were heading towards Oahu from
North 3 points east. I gave the information to Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps,
78th Pursuit Squadron, Wheeler Field, T. H. and the Lieutenant talked with
private Lockhard at the Opana station. Lt. Tyler said that it wasn't anything
of importance. At that time the planes were 132 miles out. I asked if we
shouldn't advise Corporal Beatty and have the plotters come back. The Opana
Unit stressed the fact that it was a very large number of planes and they seemed
excited. Lt. Tyler [23] said that it was not necessary to call the plotters
or get in touch with anyone. Further the deponent sayeth not.
(Signed) Joseph P. McDonald,
Joseph P. McDonald,
Stg. Co., Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of December A. D. 1941 at
Fort Shafter, T. H.
(Signed) Adam R. Huggins,
Adam R. Huggins,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Summary Court.
statement of lieut. kermit a. tyler
20 December 1941.
On Wednesday, 3 December 1941, I was first detailed to learn the operation
of the plotting board in the Interception Control Center. I reported for duty
at 1210, just as the crew on duty was leaving. I spoke with Lt. White, Signal
Corps, a few minutes and he showed me the operating positions for Navy, Bom-
bardment, Antiaircraft, Controller's position and Aircraft Warning Service. I
remained on duty until 1600. Only a telephone operator was on duty with me.
On Sunday, 7 December 1941, I was on duty from 0400 to 0800 as Pursuit
Officer at the Interceptor Control Center. From 0400 until approximately 0610
2968 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
there were no plots indicated on the interception board. From that time until
0700 a number of plots appeared on the control board at various points sur-
rounding the Island of Oahu. I particularly remember at least one plot South
of Kauai and I believe there was- one South of Molokai. There were two plots
at some distance north of Oahu and which I remember seeing on the historical
record. At the time, I questioned the plotter of the historical record who stated
that he makes a record of all plots as they come in. There were a number of
plots over and around the Island of Oahu. Having seen the plotters work once
before with about the same general layout, this did not seem irregular to me. At
0700 all of the men except the telephone operator folded up their equipment and
left. At about 0700 the operator at the OPANA RDF Station called me and
said that the instrument indicated a large number of planes at 132 miles to the
North. Thinking it must be a returning naval patrol, a flight of Hickam bombing
planes, or possibly a flight of B-17 planes from the coast, I dismissed it as nothing
unusual. (It is common knowledge that when Honolulu radio stations are
testing by playing Hawaiian music throughout the night that coincidentally
B-17s are apt to come in using the station [24\ for radio direction finding.
The radio station was testing on the morning of 7 December, 0230-0400) . At about
0750 I heard some airplanes outside and looking toward Pearl Harbor saw what I
thought to be the navy practicing dive bombing runs. At a little after 0800,
Sergeant Eugene Starry, A. C, Wheeler Field, called me to tell me that Wheeler
Field had been attacked. I immediately had the telephone operator call all men
back to duty. Most of the men had returned to duty by 0820 when Major L. N.
Tindal arrived and took charge of the Control Center. I remained on duty
assisting Major K. P. Bergquist and Major L. N. Tindal as Pursuit Control
Officer until about 1615, 8 December 1941, with the exception of rest periods
from 2000 to 2400, 7 December, and 0600 to 1000, 8 December.
(Signed) Kermit A. Tyler,
Kermit A. Tyler,
1st Lieut., Air Corps.
Had Lieut. Tyler alerted the Hawaiian Air Force instead of deciding that the
planes were friendly, there would have been time to disperse the planes but not
to get them in the air as they were not warmed up. Dispersion, in all probabil-
ity, would have decreased the loss in planes, but would not have prevented the
attack on Pearl Harbor.
ACTION AT TIME OF ATTACK
At 7:55 A. M., December 7th, the enemy planes attacked Hickam Field, Pearl
Harbor and Wheeler Field. At 9: 00 a second attack was made, and a third about
11:00 A. M., each lasting approximately fifteen minutes. At 8:03 A. M. the
Chief of Staff reported the attack, and by 8:10 order had been given to all units
(major echelons) by telephone to put Alert #3 in effect.
Antiaircraft Artillery: All antiaircraft batteries had skeleton crews guarding
them. All units had in their possession ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic
rifles and machine guns. 3" ammunition had been placed in positions accessible
to all batteries except four batteries of the 64th C. A. C. (AA). The first of
these batteries began drawing ammunition at the Aliamanu Crater at 8:15 A. M.
At 10:15 all these batteries had drawn the initial unit of fire.
The automatic weapon batteries at Fort Kamehameha, Pearl Harbor and Camp
Malakole took the enemy planes under firing during the eight o'clock raid. The
first 3" gun fire was opened at 8:30, and all batteries of the south group were in
action by 10:00 A. M. East group opened fire between 11:00 A. M. and 12:00
noon. (For detailed firing of batteries, see Exhibit "S").
[S5] Hawaiian Air Force: During the first attack men started pulling planes
out of the fire, and at 8:50 the serviceable pursuit planes took off. At 11:40 A. M.
the serviceable bombers took off' on a mission under naval control.
Before the attack December 7th status of planes in Hawaiian Department was
as follows:
Pursuit planes in commission 80
Pursuit planes out of commission 69
Reconnaissance planes in commission 6
Reconnaissance planes out of commission 7
Bombers in commission 39
Bombers out of commission 33
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2969
Damaged in Raid:
Pursuit planes 88
Reconnaissance planes 6
Bombers • 34
Status as of December 20th, 1941: m commission Reparable locally
Pursuit planes 61 22
Reconnaissance 6 2
Bombersi 50 13
' Includes 29 bombers from mainland.
Exhibit "T"
A comprehensive study of the losses inflicted on the enemy by the army places
the number of enemy planes brought down by aviation and antiaircraft fire at
twenty-nine (29).
Exhibit "U"
24th Division: Troops of the 24th Division at Schofield were attacked at 8:10
A. M. Men with automatic rifles returned the enemy's fire. At 8:30 A. M. the
Division started moving to its battle positions, and all units were in position by
5:00 P. M. and had one unit of ammunition on the position. The second unit of
fire was issued during the night.
26th Division: The 25th Division opened antiaircraft fire at 8:30 A. M. It also
started to move to battle positions at 8:30 A. M., and completed movement to
position by 4:00 P. M. and had issued one unit of fire. The second unit of fire
was issued during the night.
All movement and action of troops was carried out as prescribed in [26]
standing operating procedure (See Exhibit "B") without confusion. The value
of planning and training with everyone made familiar with the plans was
brought out very clearly.
At 9:00 A. M. the first civilian surgical teams began reporting at Tripler Gen-
eral Hospital.
At 12:00 noon the Civilian Relief Committee began the evacuation of Hickam
Field, Wheeler Field and Schofield, and continued throughout the afternoon and
part of the evening. Most of the women and children were moved to school
buildings, although a few from these posts and all of the women and children
from Shafter, Tripler, Ordnance Depot and Signal Depot were sheltered in the
incompleted underground Interceptor Command Post.
During December 7th the foreign agents previously listed by F. B. I. and G-2
were arrested and confined at the Immigration and Quarantine Stations as follows:
Japanese 370
Germans 98
Italians 14
Total 482
The 804th Engineers began clearing the runways at Hickam Field and Wheeler
Field as soon as the first attack was over. The fire fighters, while still fighting
fire, assisted in moving the debris. During the evening of the 7th the District
Engineer began repairing broken water pipes and other utilities at Hickam
Field.
Governor Poindexter put the M-Day Bill in effect on December 7th, and on
December 8th declared martial law and requested the Department Commander
to assume the responsibility as Military Governor.
December 8th the District Engineer took over all building materials, supplies
and equipment, called all construction companies into service and started the
construction of bunkers and the extension of runways at the air fields. On the
9th he started construction of evacuation camps for army dependents and ci-
vilians. December 8th the Department Engineer distributed material to the
troops and got field fortifications under way. December 9th he started construc-
tion of slit trenches on posts and in the vicinity of school buildings and parks in
the city, and started plans for construction of shelters throughout the city.
Martial law was placed in effect on December 8th, and the following action
was taken:
1. Courts were closed.
2. All civilian officials were asked to remain in their positions and carry on the
work of their offices.
2970 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[27] 3. An Advisory Committee headed by Governor Poindexter was
appointed.
4. A Military Commission and Provost Court were appointed.
5. The sale of intoxicating liquors, beer and wine was prohibited.
[S8] EFFORTS TO IMPROVE DEFENSES OF HAWAIIAN 1SLAND8
My efforts to improve the defenses of the Hawaiian Islands has a bearing upon
all work under me since assuming command of the Hawaiian Department, Febru-
ary 7, 1941. The following are some of the most important items taken up and
the action taken by the War Department. P^ach item is supported by exhibits.
1. The need for additional facilities and troops in this Department became
evident very soon after arrival. On February 19th a letter was transmitted to
the Cheif of Staff of the Army outlining some of the deficiencies discovered and
recommending action which should be taken to correct them. Among these
points were:
(1) Cooperation with the Navy,
(2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and repair, maintenance and
servicing of aircraft,
(3) Improvement of anti-aircraft defense,
(4) Improvement of the harbor defense artillery,
(5) Improvement of the situation regarding searchlights,
(6) Roads and trails,
(7) Necessary bombproof construction,
(8) Increase in the number of engineer troops.
A copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit "V".
2. On "February 19, 1941, a secret letter was submitted to the War Depart-
ment, subject: "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft", file Engr. 452. This
letter explains the urgent necessity of providing protective bunkers for bombard-
ment and pursuit aviation in this Department and recommended that funds in
the amount of $1,565,600.00 be allotted for this purpose. This cost included
the costs of the necessary taxiways and hard standings to permit the dispersion
of planes at Hickam Field. A large part of the ground surrounding the landing
mat at Hickam Field is made up of a soft fill and it is not possible to disperse
planes onto this ground without the provision of taxiways and hard standings.
This correspondence was indorsed back to this Department by the 6th Ind.,
AG 600.12 (2^19-41) MC-G, September 12, 1941, which stated that the plans
for revetments had been approved and that funds in the amount of $1,358,000.00
[29] would be available about January 1, 1942. At the time of the
attack on December 7th, no money had been received for this project and it was
impossible to adequately disperse the planes at Hickam Field. Construction
of these bunkers was initiated immediately after the attack under the Emergency
Authority granted. — Exhibit "W".
3. It was apparent that the facilities of the Hawaiian Air Depot which had
been constructed in a very concentrated area at Hickam Fie'ld would be ex-
tremely vulnerable to an attack. As a result, a letter was submitted to the War
Department on September 10, 1941, file Engr. 600.96, subject: "Underground
Repair Facilities Hawaiian Air Depot", which strongly recommended the ap-
proval of bombproof facilities for the repair of aircraft in this Department, and
requested funds in the amount of $3,480,650.00. This correspondence was
indorsed back by 1st Ind., file AG 600.12 (9-10-41) MC-G, Adjutant General's
Office, October 27, 1941, stating that due to the cost of providing bombproof
facilities that it was the War Department's policy not to provide them, and
suggesting that splinterproof installations be provided. During the attack of
December 7th, the Air Depot was one of the main targets and suffered tremendous
damage. Construction of an underground bombproof facility was started under
the Emergency Authority subsequent to the attack. Steps have also been taken
to decentralize the Hawaiian Air Depot to several smaller shops around the
island.— Exhibit "X".
4. Fortifications and Camouflage Funds. — A letter was submitted to the War
Department on July 28th, file AG 121.2, subject: "Reallocation of Special Field
Exercise Funds", requesting that these funds be made available for purchase of
fortification and camouflage equipment. This letter was answered by confiden-
tial radiogram No. 31, August 12, 1941, stating these special field exercise funds
could not be made available for this purpose. This radiogram was followed by
letter dated August 13, 1941, file AG 353 (7-28-41) MC-D, subject: "Realloca-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2971
tion of Special Field Exercise Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage
Projects", in which it was stated that the interest of the Hawaiian Department
in providing field fortifications was appreciated by the War Department, but
that funds could not be allotted for this purpose. This letter was returned by
1st Ind. this headquarters, file AG 353 (7-28-41) MC-D, September 14, 1941,
again recommending an immediate allotment of $125,000.00 for field fortification
and camouflage purposes. In 2nd Ind. to [30] the same correspondence
September 26, 1941, the Adjutant General stated that the allotment could not
be made. Also on this same subject, this headquarters submitted to the War
Department a clipper letter on October 28, 1941, file Engr. 400.312, subject:
"Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Material", which recapitulated
the previous correspondence on this subject, and requested an allotment of
$1,445,542.00 be made available immediately for the purpose of fortification and
camouflage materials. No funds had been received for this purpose at the time
of the attack.— Exhibit "Y".
5. Camouflage: The necessity of camouflaging treatment of all airfields in this
Department was brought to the War Department's attention in letter File Engr.
000.91, July 15, 1941, subject: "Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler
Field". This letter stated, "There is definite need for camouflage treatment on
all airfields in the Hawaiian Department. Up to this time no camouflage treat-
ment had been undertaken at anv airfield in this Department." This proposal
was finally approved in 3rd Ind.. file AG 007.5 (7-12-41) MC-G from the Adjutant
General's Office to the Chief of Engineers which directed that funds in the amount
of $56,210.00 be included in the next budget estimate for Wheeler Field. At the
time of the attack on December 7th, no funds had been received for this purpose.
The question of camouflage was also submitted to the War Department by letter
this headquarters February 27, 1941, file Engr. 000.91, subjects "Camouflage of
Defense Installations". This project was approved by 4th Ind., AG 007.5
(2-27-41) MC-E, Adjutant General's Office June 27, 1941. At the time of the
attack, no funds for this purpose had been received, and although considerable
work had been done by troop labor to camouflage these installations, its eff'ective-
ness was limited by our inability to buy the necessary materials. — Exhibit "Z".
6. The revised Roads and Trails Project was submitted by letter this head-
quarters, file Engr. 611, February 19, 1941, which recommended that funds in
the amount of $1,370,000.00 be allotted for construction of the military roads,
railroads and trails in this Department. At the time of the attack, only $350,-
000.00 had been allotted for this purpose. — Exhibit "lA".
7. The need for additional airports was brought to the War Department's
attention in letters file Engr. 600.12, according to the following [31] sched-
ule:
(1) Bellows Field April 5,1941
(2) Barking Sands May 2,1941
(3) Hilo Airport . May 2,1941
(4) Homestead Field May 2,1941
(5) Morse Field May 2,1941
(6) Haleiwa May 22, 1941
(7) Burns Field May 22, 1941
(8) Lanai May 22, 1941
(9) Parker Ranch June 2, 1941
(10) Kipapa : May 14.1941
At the time of the attack no funds had been allotted specifically for construction
at these airfields. The War Department disapproved the proposed site at Kipapa
and directed construction at Kahuku. This relocation required protracted
negotiations with the Fourteenth Naval District which had a bombing range on
the Kahuku site. These negotiations were completed only a short time before
the attack, but as no funds had been received, no construction had been started.
In this connection, several expedients had to be adopted due to the non-availability
of funds. Construction work at Molokai, Burns, Morse and Barking Sands was
actually done by troop labor using materials provided by the WPA. The need
of an additional airdrome on Oahu was recognized as acute. The only possibility
for immediate development was in improving the field at Bellows, and the only
funds which had been made available for construction work at Bellows Field
applied to housing only. The project letter on Bellows Field included a request
for funds for improvement of runways, installation of gasoline storage and other
facilities to make this a first class operating base. As stated, no funds had been
allotted for these improvements. Since the need for these vital facilities was
2972 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
acute, this Department authorized the District Engineer to proceed with their
construction, utilizing any funds which might be available to his office. At the
time of the attack, provision had been made for gasoline storage at Bellows and a
5000' runway was about half done, and the District Engineer was able to com-
plete this ruuway by Thursday night following the attack. Bellows Field is now
a useable base, but all construction which [32] has been done to make
this an operating base has been done without any funds being allotted by the War
Department. The improvement of other airdromes on Oahu at either the Kipapa
or Kahuku area or at Haleiwa had not been undertaken at the time of the attack
because no funds had ever been allotted for this purpose. — Exhibit "IB".
8. Kaneohe Bay Defenses: It was recognized that the preceding arrangement
under which the Army disclaimed any responsibility for the defense of the new
Naval Air Station at Kaneohe Bay was a mistake. A letter was prepared and
transmitted to the War Department on the 18th of February 1941, subject:
"Defense of Naval Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file 381. This letter
informed the War Department that this Department had assumed responsibility
for the defense of this area. This subject was again covered in letter this head-
quarters, file Engr. 600.96, dated April 14. 1941, subject: "Protection of Seacoast
Defense Batteries" to the Adjutant General, and recommendation was made that
a 12-inch gun battery sunilar to Battery Closson be obtained and shipped to this
Department for installation in the Kaneohe Bay area. The War Department
recognized the need of this protection for Kaneohe Bay, but was unable to supply
a 12-inch gun battery for this. The project for the permanent defenses at Kaneohe
Bay was submitted by letter of this headquarters 31 July 1941, file AG 381/20
Kaneohe Bay project, subject: "Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station
Kaneohe Bay", which recommended both additional^ personnel and additional
armament required. This was answered by 3rd Ind. Adjutant General's Office,
file AG 381 (7-31-41) MC-D, October 30, 1941, which approved the temporary
utilization of armament now on hand in this Department. This indorsement
also stated that the reinforcements of peace or war garrison of the Hawaiian
Department for the beach and land defense of this area was not contemplated.
The project for the utilization of temporary armament was submitted on the 18th
of September 1941, file Engr 662/4 x 662/7 which recommended the provision of
funds for the construction of Panama mounts for three 155-mm batteries and a
railroad gun emplacement, and requested that funds in the amount of $215,265.00
be alloted for the construction of these positions. This matter was also followed
up in radiogram No. 320 this headquarters, September 18, 1941, which recom-
mended that funds in the amount of $215,265.00 be made available for the con-
struction at Kaneohe Bay and also that $117,256.00 be made available for the
completion of the project for [33] construction of railroad gun positions. At the
time of the attack no funds had been allotted for this construction. Exhibit "IC".
9. The necessity of improvement of the landing strips at Wheeler Field was
brought to the War Department's attention by letter this headquarters, file
Engr. 686/d, 21 June, 1941. In 2nd Ind. on this correspondence, from the Office
of the Chief of the Air Corps, August 25, 1941, question was raised as to the ade-
quacy of the second proposed north-south runway, and the statement was made
that no funds were available at that time for the construction and improvements
recommended. In 2nd Ind. Chief of the Air Corps, Washington, D. C, September
2, 1941, to this Department, statement was made that $25, 00b. 00 had been
requested for the leveling of the main runway at Wheeler Field. At ttie time of
the attack, however, no funds had been received for the improvement of this
landing strip. Some improvements had been made utiUzing troop labor of the
804th Engineers; however, due to tne lack of funds these improvements were
limited and did not adequately solve the problem. — Exhibit "ID".
10. The Aircraft Warning Service is probably the most important single
project for the defense of Oahu. At the time of the attack, however, none of the
three fixed stations in the original project had been completed due to the impos-
sibility of securing materials under the priorities system. The Kaala station,
for example, depended for its construction on construction of the cableway
approach. In radiogram 3009 on June 10th, this headquarters reported to the
War Department that this cableway material could not be delivered unless a
higher priority rating was received, and in War Department radio 904, June
26th, the Adjutant General reported that this priority rating had been advanced
to an A-l-c rating. With this rating it was not possible to secure the material
to install this installation and the others expeditiously. Revised estimates for
engineer construction of the superseding project of six fixed stations and six mobile
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2973
stations and preliminary estimates for the cost of the signal communications
involved in this revised project, were submitted by letter this headquarters 29
September, 1941, file Sig 676.3. Pending tne allotment of these additional
funds, this Departme it authorized the District Engineer to proceed with con-
struction of AWS stations with any funds available to his office. At the time
of the attack, however, due to this priority difficulty, none of the three original
fixed stations were in operation. — Exhibit "IE".
[34] 11. The entire construction program in this Department has been
delayed due to the situation regarding priorities. It was extremely difficult to
secure materials for the construction program, not only those which were ordered
specifically for a defense project, but particularly those materials which are
ordinarily purchased as an "over the counter" transaction. From a study of the
the priorities situation, and also of the shipping situation, it became evident in
June that the local dealers who ordinarily maintain stocks and materials necessary
for defense projects would not be able to secure delivery from the mainland until
after a purchase order from a Government agency had been placed. This meant
that after the priority was placed, if the item was not available in local stock
that there would be a delay of from six weeks to two months even under the most
favorable conditions before mainland delivery could be effected. To remedy
this situation a letter was sent to the War Department by clipper airmail, file
Engr. 523.07, subject: "Priorities and Preference Ratings," July 3, 1941. This
letter presented the problem in detail and recommended to the War Department
that action be taken to correct this situation. The letter was followed up by
radio on the 14th of August, and was answered by 1st and 2nd Inds. from the
Priorities Committee dated August 18, 1941, and the Adjutant General dated
August 26, 1941. The problem was again presented to the War Department by
letter dated October 23, 1941, file Engr. 523.07, which recommended that the
Office of Production Management be opened in Honolulu. In 2nd Ind. on this
correspondence, the Priorities Committee advised that the Office of Production
Management had been requested to establish a field office in Hawaii. This
field office had not been established at the time of the attack and due to this diffi-
culty in securing materials, many of our projects were not completed at the
time of the attack.— Exhibit "IF".
12. Another effort was made to solve this supply problem by securing funds for
the advance procurement of certain essential materials. It was originally re-
quested in clipper airmail letter this headquarters July 28, 1941, file Engr. 600.12,
which recommended that a revolving fund of $1,000,000.00 be set up to permit
the advance procurement of essential materials before the specific allotments had
been made for individual projects. This letter had not [35] been answered
on the 13th of September when a follow-up radiogram was sent to the War Depart-
ment, and on the same day the matter was brought to the personal attention of the
Deputy Chief of Staff in the War Department, who very quickly secured a solution
of the problem by the allotment of $500,000.00 for the advance purchase of essen-
tial materials. Before these materials could be secured, however, the $500,000.00
was diverted by the War Department for the construction of housing at Kaneohe
Bay, with the result that on the day of the attack, no reserve supplies of materials
other than lumber had been accumulated. — Exhibit "1G'\
13. The following letter shows appreciation by the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Air of the difficulties in the carrying out of the project for the creation of air
fields to permit ferrying of planes to the Philippine Islands, and of the rapidity
with which the arrangements were completed. — Exhibit "IH".
November 27, 1941
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, U. S. A.,
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H.
Dear Short: The copy of your report on the additional air routes has been
received. The quantity of details requiring coordination, and the distances in-
volved in the projects make the short time consumed in getting rolling almost
unbelievably short.
I extend you my personal thanks for the effort you have expended on this job
and the results you are getting.
The way things are working out now, it looks as if we will be using trans- Pacific
airways almost continuously from now on. Our plans are O. K. for 4-engine
2974 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
bombers, but what are the prospects for medium bombers? Do you think we
should even study that phase of trans-Pacific operations?
Best regards.
Sincerely,
/s/ H. H. Arnold,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.
[36\ 14. Increase in Engineer Troops:
February 10, 1941.— TAG sent 3d Ind., file AG 320.2 (11-1-40) M-C saying
that 3d Engineer Regiment was to be increased. Regular Army personnel not
available to further increase Engineer Regiment. Selectees prohibited from being
sent and it was not possible to i id in creating Engineer Battalion here as requested.
On 19 Feb. 1941, letter to TAG file Engr. 322.03 requested that War Department
send an Eng. Regiment (Aviation) and an Eng. Regiment (General Service) here.
1st Ind., May 15th, A. G. 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M; TAG, stated that 34th Eng.
Regiment (C) would be activated and that the personnel would probably arrive
in June. This Regiment was to take the place of the Regiment (General Service)
requested. On June 18th, letter AG 320.2 (6-5-41) MR-MC, the War Depart-
ment issued orders expanding 804 Eng. Company to the 804th Eng. Battalion.
The troops for the 304th Eng. Battalion arrived in this Department 21 July 1941.
Previous instructions concerning the activation of the 34th Eng. Battalion had
been rescinded with the result that the unit was not activated u.itil 17 October
1941. It hart not been completely trained and lacked many items of equipment
at the time of the attack. See Exhibit "1 I".
15. Increase in Coast A.rtillery Troops:
February 18, 754/.— Letter written to TAG urgently requesting two (2) Regi-
ments C A Mobile; 1 Battalion CA (AA) gun, Mobile (less searchlight battery);
one Regiment CA (TD) 155 mm. gun; AA filler replacements (90 officers and 2064
enlisted men); Harbor Defense Artillery reinforcements (150 officers and 2700
enlisted men). TAG replied by first indorsement May 10, 1941, file AG 320.2
(2-18-41) (56) that the Hawaiian Department CA Garrison would be augmented
with a total of 276 oflScers and 5734 enlisted men between June 1941 and March
1942, as follows: (See Exhibit "IJ").
June 1941:
(1) A A fillers, 60 officers, 1337 enlisted men,
(2) 98 CA 62 officers, 1329 enlisted men
(3) Second Battalion, 97 CA less Battery H (Gun) Battery E (SL) (17
officers, 359 enlisted men)
[37] November 1941:
(1) 97 CA less 2 Battalion, 3 Battalion— (48 officers, 885 enlisted men).
(2) Battery H, 97 CA (4 oflScers, 134 enlisted men).
(3) Medical Personnel, 98 CA (7 officers, 49 enlisted men).
March 1941:
(1) A A fillers (24 officers, 661 enlisted men).
(2) 3 Battalion, 97 CA (37 mm. gun) less Battery H, 3 Battalion, 98 CA
(37 mm. gun) less Battery M (54 officers, 980 enlisted men).
February 25th, 1941.— Letter written to TAG, file AG 320.2/57 (Exhibit re-
questing increase in enlisted men in 251st C. A. Regiment NG from 1181 to
1450. Disapproved by TAG March 8, 1941 (Exhibit IJ) 1st indorsement,
file 320.2/57.
February 25th, 1941.— Letter written to TAG, file 320.2/58 (Exhibit IJ) re-
questing following reinforcements of Hawaiian Department:
(1) That CAC requested February 18th (Exhibit IJ) be given priority.
(2) That nth F. A. be organized under T/0 dated November 1, 1940.
(3) One Tank Battalion.
(4) Two (2) M. P. Companies for guarding air fields.
(5) Reinforcements of Inf. Regiments so as to be organized under T/0
November 1, 1940.
(6; That 11th F. A. Brig, {less 11 F. A.) be reinforced and organized under
T/0 November 1, 1940.
TAG replied by first indorsement, file 320.2 (2-25-41) (58) (Exhibit IJ) that
CAC and Engineering increases would be considered separately; that reinforce-
ments for F. A. and Inf. Regiments were not considered urgent; that Tank
Battalion and 2 M. P. Companies for Hawaiian Department were disapproved;
and that any reorganization of units was to be accomplished by reducing size
EXHIBITS OF JOITSTT COMMITTEE 2975
of existing units and by carrying others as inactive. On May 28th, orders for
the shipment of CAC increases were rescinded file 320.2/70. On July 15, letter
from TAG, file 320.2/82m (Exhibit IJ) activated the following units:
[38] 97th CA Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2 Battalions,
and Batteries F and G.
98th CA Regimental Headquarters Battery (less band), Headquarters and
Headquarters Battery 1st and 2nd Battalions, and Batteries A, B, C,
D, F, G and H.
16. Increase in Air Corps Strength:
April 9th, 1941.— Letter from TAG, file 320.2 (3-5-41) (61) (Exhibit IK)
directing that Air Defense Command be set up. First indorsement, May 3,
1941 (Exhibit IK) to TAG called attention to the fact that the plan was presented
to War Department in letter of April 25th, 1941, Paragraph 7 "Reorganization
of Forces in Hawaiian Department" (Exhibit IK).
April 24th, 1941.— Letter written to TAG from COHAF (thru channels) file
320.2/94 (Exhibit IK) subject "Air Base Group" requesting:
(1) Bellows Field as permanent Air Corps Station
(2) Permanent Station 15 Pursuit Group
(3) A redistribution of Air Base Groups
(4) That two Air Base Groups be authorized.
Bv second indorsement TAG to COHD dated June 26th, 1941, file 320.2
(4-24-41) (94) (Exhibit IK):
(1) War Department stated that Troop Unit Basis FY 1942 provided
for two additional material squadrons for HAF. This is believed to provide
sufficient air base units to care for Bellows Field.
(2) Organization of Air Base Unit for 15th Pursuit Group held in obeyance
pending decision on new station. By third indorsement CGHD to TAG,
file 320.2/94 (Exhibit IK) request was made for two additional material
squadrons to be stationed at Bellows Field. On August 7th, 1941, radio,
file 320.2/100 (Exhibit IK) was sent to Chief of Air Corps requesting Head-
quarters Detachment in absence of Air Base Group. On August 15th Radio
No. 380 (Exhibit IK) was sent to TAG requesting information of status of
Air Base Groups for Bellows Field. Administrative situation there very
difficult. In answer. Chief of Air Corps sent radio no. 172, file 320.2/108c
(Exhibit IK) stating [39] not favorably considered because it would
exceed the 59,000 allotted and also that TAG had been requested to activate
Headquarters Detachment. On September 27th, 1941, by letter (exhibit IK)
from TAG, file 320.2/108d, subject "Activation of Air Corps Unit" a Head-
quarters Detachment was authorized at Bellows Field but personnel had to
be furnished bv the Department.
On August 30, 1941, Radio No. 779, file 320.2/108 (Exhibit IK) was received
asking:
(1) What are total AC personnel requirements.
(2) Total requirements for personnel for arms and services with AC.
(3) Number AB groups needed and their locations.
On September 9, 1941, Radio No. 272 to TAG, file 320.2/108a (Exhibit IK)
answering Radio No. 779 requesting the following:
(1) Two AB Groups (one for Bellows, one for Kahuku)
(2) Air Corps enlisted men now in Department sufficient to organize
these groups.
(3) One Squadron (HB) (Exhibit IK) consisting of 27 officers, 220 en-
listed men to replace 14th Bombardment Squadron transferred to Phillipine
Islands.
(4) Personnel for Bellows. Medical Department (1 officer, 7 enlisted
men) Dental Corps (1 officer) Quartermaster (1 officer, 30 men) Ordnance
Dept. (1 A. B. Co. of 4 officers and 60 enlisted men).
(5) Personnel for Kahuku Point. Medical Department (3 officers, 12
enlisted men) Dental Corps (1 officer) Quartermaster (1 officer, 30 enlisted
men) Signal Corps (10 enlisted men specialists)
(6) Following personnel needed: Air Corps (3871 enlisted men) Medical
Corps (6 officers, 36 enlisted men); Dental Corps (1); Quartermaster (4
officers, 70 enlisted men). 3 AB Squadrons one each at Barking Sands,
Kauai; Morse Field; Hilo, Hawaii.
(7) Near Future. Two (2) additional AB Squadrons — (1) Lanai (under
construction) (2) Parker Ranch (project to be submitted).
On November 8th Radio no. 786 was sent to TAG, file 320.2/126 (exhibit IK)
requesting immediate assignment.
2976 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(1) Three airdepot Groups to HAF
(2) Procurement of civilian employees impossible and discharge of en-
listed men for employment does not help.
[40] (3) 30% tactical planes grounded due to shortage in depot
maintenance. Becoming acute.
(4) Must have personnel and material at. once. No personnel
available here for activation of units.
On November 15th Radio no. 402, file 320.2/126a, (exhibit IK) from TAG
stating that three Air Depot Groups were under advisement but that groups
not available now. If and when available, will it come within strength of war
garrison?
On November 19th Radio no. 889, file 320.2/126b (exhibit IK) to TAG—
Increase of three Air Depot Groups will not come within authorized war garrison
but should be furnished as soon as possible due to shortage in personnel. War
garrison must be increased to accommodate Air Base Groups.
On November 18th the War Department activated Seventh Airways Squadron
from existing personnel in Department, file 320.2/127 (exhibit IK). On Novem-
ber 18th Radio no. 873, file 320.2/128 (exhibit no. IK) was sent to TAG requesting
Station Complements at Hickam, Wheeler, Morse Field and Barking Sands.
Urgently requested. On November 25th 1941 Radio no. 455, file 320.2/128a
(exhibit IK) from TAG stated that until war garrison limitation was lifted, no
additional personnel could be sent to the Hawaiian Department.
17. Reorganization Hawaiian Division & Increase in War Garrison April 25th,
1941. Letter written to TAG, file 220.3/37, (exhibit IL) requesting that two
triangular divisions be organized from the Hawaiian Division (Square) and the
organization of station complements be made at Schofield Barracks and Fort
Shafter; also Air Defense Command is to be created. By first indorsement
dated July 29, 1941, file 320.3 (4-25-41) (37) (exhibit IL). TAG returned this
letter without action.
May 29th, 1941. TAG sent radio no. 837, file 320.3/37a (exhibit IL) stating
that the initial war garrison would be reduced to 58,000. Reductions would
come from troops other than Air Corps, Anti aircraft, and Aircraft Warning
Service.
[41] June 6th, 1941.— 'Letter was written to TAG. file 320.3/37b (Exhibit
IL) subject "War Garrison for Initial War Operations" stating
(1) That Table I, (Exhibit IL) shows forces recommending totaling 59,425.
(2) Statement that proper defense of Kaneohe Bay, Airfields, beaches and
provisions for mobile reserve cannot be successful with only 59,000 troops.
(3) Statement of minimum increase for Kaneohe Bay as follows: 1 Regi-
ment Inf; 1 Regiment Field Artillery, 155 How (T. D.) ; 1 Battalion C. A. 155
guns plus one additional battery; 1 Regiment C. A. (AA); 1 Battery C. A.
12" Barbette guns.
(4) Urgently requested that strength be increased from 58,000 to approxi-
mately 71,500 as follows: 2 Inf. Regiments; 1 Regiment Field Artillery, 155
How 1 Regiment CA (AA) SM; 1 Battalion CA 155 guns; 1 Battery CA 12"
Barbette guns . . . total 11,279.
(5) Again recommended that station complements for Schofield Barracks
and Fort Shafter be organized. This would give an increase of 731 officers
and men for Schofield Barracks and 131 officers and men for Fort Shafter.
(6) Plans are to be submitted in the near future for garrisoqg each of
otitlying islands with a force consisting of approximately 1 regiment of
Infantry and a composite battalion of Field Artillery, all of which will not be
within war garrison strength.
On July 22, 1941, 1st indorsement to exhibit IL file 320.3/37b (Exhibit IL)
TAG said
(1) War Garrison of 59,425 recommended by CGHD is reduced to 57,429
and augmented by following units: 1 Regiment CA (AA) SM (less 1 gun
battalion, band, basics), 1 Battalion CA 155 M guns with 1 additional
Battery, 1 Battery CA.
(2) Recommendation of war garrison for 71,500 officers and men is dis-
approved.
(3) Troops in excess of 59,690 authorized will be sent to Hawaii only in
case the situation develops a need and if such troops are available.
18. May 2nd, 1941.— Letter written to TAG, file 320.3/38 (Exhibit IM) subject
"Organization of Anti Aircraft Artillery Brigade" requesting authority to activate
the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 53 CA Brig, and the Intelligence
Battery, 53rd CA Brig, about June 1, 1941.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2977
June 12, 1941.— First indorsement from TAG to CGHD, file 320.2 (5/2/41)
(38) (exhibit IM) gives authority to activate.
[42] 19. November 6, 1941.— R&dio No. 759 to Chief Ordnance, file 320.2/121
(exhibit IN) stated that 6-37 mm. batteries now in Hawaiian Department. Plans
made for six more by March, 1942, but only twenty (20) guns on hand. When
and in what quantities will the one hundred (100) 37 mm. guns listed under 1941
funds be sent? Replv not vet received.
20. STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE. Before February 7, 1941,
Field Orders No. 1 (Landing Operations) No. IW (Sabotage) and 1 NS (Naval
Security) had been prepared. It was found during Maneuvers, May 1941, that
these field orders were too cumbersome. On July 14th, 1941, a tentative Standing
Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department was issued to each officer in the
Department with instructions that any suggested changes were to be reported to
Department Headquarters by August 15, 1941. During the preparation of the
final form of the Standing Operating Procedure, the tentative S. O. P. was in
effect. The final form was issued on November 5, 1941. Each unit knew its
mission in the event Alert No. 1, 2 or 3 was put into effect. Due to this planning
(the S. O. P.) each unit was able to act quickly and promptly when the air raid
took place on December 7, 1941.
EFFORTS TO BETTER PREPARE THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY FOR DEFENSE
[43] Soon after taking command of the Hawaiian Department I made a
survey with reference to possible defense measures to enable the civilian popula-
tion to meet any emergency which might arise. I had been asked to speak to the
Chamber of Commerce on Army Day, April 6th, and decided that this day was
the best opportunity to obtain publicity, as practically all the important business
men of Oahu were present on this occasion. I proposed the following items of
prime importance:
1. Production and storage of food.
2. Organization of doctors and nurses for care of injured and wounded.
3. Organization of an auxiliary to the police force to guard utilities and prevent
sabotage.
4. Preparation of plans and provision for evacuation of women and children
and preparation of shelters for workers in the vicinity of central industries.
(For complete remarks on this occasion, see Exhibit "10".
Production and storage of food: As a result of my talk and support by the papers
and certain men of importance in the community, the storage of food in the pantry
of the home was put into effect at once, and the purchases from the retailers
increased about 20% during the first month.
For some years a study had been made of food production required and possible
in the islands. A committee completed this work, and made definite assignment
of acreage and crops to all plantations on the Islands. Plantation managers
and the five big companies which act as factors for the various plantations all
agreed to this plan. Necessary implements for changing from cane and pine-
apples to truck gardening were listed for each plantation. Orders for seed for
planting the first crop were placed with firms in the mainland, orders to be filled
upon telegraphic advice. — Exhibit "IP".
On December 10th, after completion of the inventory of food on hand, a meet-
ing was held with the Presidents of the five big companies and of the Governor's
Food Committee. The District Engineer was directed to purchase the seed and
equipment at once, as it was believed the matter could be handled in less time in
this [44] manner instead of having each plantation make purchases.
The committee on storage of food determined the articles and tonnage of the
essential elements of diet necessary to provide for the civil population for six
months. The cost of these items was estimated to be $2,500,000 for human con-
sumption and $900,000 for feed for dairy cattle and poultry. This matter was
taken up with the War Department.
Governor Poindexter and Delegate Sam King gave the storage of food their
full support. However, the item was eliminated by the Bureau of the Budget
and no action was gotten through Congress. The purchase of this emergency
food reserve by the Department of Agriculture and the allocation of shipping
therefor was authorized December 17th. Recent press dispatches indicate that
the President has made an allotment for food production.
Organization of Doctors and Nurses for care of injured and wounded: The Medical
Society of Honolulu got squarely behind my effort to prepare the doctors and
2978 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
nurses for an emergency. Twenty (20) civilian-aid station groups were organ-
ized and have had considerable practice in setting up their stations. They actu-
ally functioned efficiently on December 7th. Sixteen (16) surgical teams were
organised. They started reporting at 9:00 A. M. December 7th, and by 9:30
all were employed. They are representative of the leading surgeons, anesthetists,
etc., in the city. The regular operating staff at Tripler General Hospital was
operating at 8: 45 A. M.
After several conferences the Red Cross agreed to purchase and store in Hono-
lulu $200,000.00 worth of medicines and surgical supplies and equipment. Much
of the equipment and supplies had been received prior to December 7th.
Buildings suitable for hospitals were surveyed, and many of the.se have actually
been equipped and operated since December 7th.
Organization of auxiliary police force: The organization of an auxiliary police
force was effected and placed under the command of Major Douglas King by the
Mayor of Honolulu. This force was given some training in taking over leading
utilities and the use of firearms. It proved to be a very efficient force immedi-
ately after the raid.
Auxiliary fire fighters and fire wardens have been organized. Requests for
fire-fighting equipment have been made to the Office of Civilian Defense, and
also sent direct by the Governor to the same organization.
[45] Evacuation and shelters: Detailed plans were drawn for evacuation camps,
for trenches in parks, schools, etc., and for splinter-proof shelters in the vicinity of
public utilities. A request for $2,800,000 for construction of these camps and
shelters was made through the War Department and also direct by Governor
Poindextcr. The funds were not provided until after the attack December 7th.
Since that date the President has made funds available to the Governor of the
Territory of Hawaii for this purpose. — Exhibit "IQ"
M-DAY BILL
At the request of the Senate of the Territory of Hawaii I appeared before that
body and explained the value and the necessity for the passage of the M-Day bill.
The passage was effected in the next few days and the measure was signed by the
Governor. The bill enabled the Governor to organize emergency committees and
carry out many things of great benefit in the medical work, evacuation and police
work immediately following the attack on December 7th.
LETTERS FROM CIVILIANS WITH REFERENCE TO MY EFFORTS TO IMPROVE CIVILIAN
DEFENSE
The following copies of letters have been received: Exhibit "IR"
Honolulu, T. H., December 22, 1941.
The President, The White House, Washington, D. C.
Sir: We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social organi-
zations in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest
in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere
appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.
We have found him at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he has
exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an emer-
gency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for this
purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such plan.
General Short's thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas to
our "Territorial Legislature, to our local officials, and to our community in gen-
eral have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound "M-Day"
Bill; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard; (c) for the de- [46] cision
to increase stored food and to produce food; and (d) for the prevention ot sabotage.
He has shown a correct and sympathetic attitude toward the problems of the civil
community in assuring cooperation of civilians.
He has maintained a high morale in his Command and has conducted "alerts"
from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing the troops and with plans,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2979
now looking for financing fi^om federal funds, for adequate and safe storage of
sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a probable emergency.
We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go into
various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have
selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned.
Meanwhile, we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high esteem
and our full confiden< e in the character and ability of General Walter C. Short
as a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be.
This letter is prepared without the knowledge or consent of General Short or
any other officials, merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may accrue
to the record of such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse publicity
or otherwise. This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest in the
adequate defense of Hawaii and our Nation.
With ver> best respects and wishes, we are
Yours very truly,
Lester Petrie, City of Honolulu, Mayor; C. R. Hemenway, President,
Hawaiian Trust Co., Ltd., A. L. Dean, Vice-President, Alex-
ander & Baldwin, Ltd., Walter F. Dillingham, President, Oahu
Railway & Land Co.; F. D. Lowrey, President, Lewers & Cook,
Ltd.; H. H. Warner, Asst. Food Administrator, O. C. D.; J. B.
Poindexter, Governor of Hawaii; S. B. Kemp, Chief Justice,
Supreme Court; T. G. S. Walker, Director, Civilian Defense for
Oahu; John E. Russell, President, Theo H. Davies & Co., Ltd.:
George S. Waterhouse, Ex. Vice-President, Bishop National of
Hawaii and Honolulu; Cyril F. Damon, Ex. Vice-President,
Bishop Trust Co., Ltd.: Briant H. Wells, Executive Vice-Presi-
dent, Hawaiian Sugar Plants Association; H. A. Walker, Presi-
dent, American Factors, Ltd.; S. M. Lowrey, Treasurer, American
Factors, Ltd.; P. E. Spalding, President C. Brewer & Co., Ltd.;
Frank E. Midkiff, Trustee, Bernice P. Bishop Estate; Edouard
R. L. Doty; Terr. Director of Civilian Defense; James Winne,
Mgr. Mdse. Dept., Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd. (now acting as
Food Administrator and Supply Officer).
C. C. to General Walter C. Short.
[47] Major Disaster Council
city and county of honolulu
Office of the Director, Island of Oahu
Honolulu, Hawaii, December 20, 1941.
Lt. General Walter C. Short,
Fort Shafler.
Dear General Short: Please allow me to express my sincere regret that our
contact through Civilian Defense Plans has terminated.
It was greatly due to your help and backing that our Civilian Organizations
were so far advanced that they were able to function so splendidly during the
attack.
You will always be able to recollect that your determination to have our Civilian
Groups Prepared saved many lives of our Sailors and Soldiers through the organ-
ized effort of our Civilian Defense Medical committee and the many trucks that
we had ready to be turned into ambulances at a minute's notice.
Please be assured that you will carry the sincere thanks and Aloha of your many
friends here who realize the distress you saved by urging and helping us to be
prepared.
Yours very sincerely,
(s) T. G. S. Walker,
T. G. S. Walker,
Director, Civilian Defense, Island of Oahu.
79716 O— 46 — pt. 18-
2980 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[47a] seal of the territory of hawaii
Territory op Hawaii
Executive Chambers
honolulu
23 December 1941.
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short,
Fort Shafter, T. H.
My Dear General Short:. Having noted in the public press that an investiga-
tion is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in
Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a state-
ment as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands for
war when thev were so insidiouslv and treacherously attacked on December 7,
1941.
The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these Islands
were important to National Defense from a military standpoint, but it has been
only since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941 that it has been
brought home to the civil population the importance of the part it would play
in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens of these Islands
met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud to be the Chief
Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging the population to prepare to
meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of the Army and civil
population in planning and preparing for this emergency was magnificently re-
warded.
It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations
whdch bore fruit on December 7, 1941:
(1) The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act by a special session of Legislation
called for that purpose. This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire civil
economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in the event of
disaster. By virtue of this act, civilian [4^b] defense was planned and
many of its phases were brought to such a point of preparation that they were
able to go into action immediately and to function effectively on December 7, 1941,
(2) The production and conservation of food: Householders were persistently
urged to stock their shelves in canned food. It is e.stimated that this resulted in
increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than twenty
percent. Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and storage for
food reserve. This appropriation has, since December 7, 1941, been authorized.
By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made for the procurement and
storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas with quick growing food
crops. Agreements were also made for the growing, in normal times, of these
crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In furtherance of this plan,
the War Department was induced to permit the purchase of Island grown pota-
toes for the use of the Army although the price was above that of mainland
potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies 6f food asked for in
the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity for building an
adequate warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is now available for
the storage of food supply when it arrives.
(3) The medical facilities for the care of the injured and wounded during any
disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these Islands
for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical profession of
the Islands with all its medical facilities. Approximately three thousand persons
were given training and instruction in First-Aid as required by the Red Cross.
The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous tasks of evacuation.
Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit consisting of personnel of about
one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps of one hundred and forty im-
provised ambulances were organized. The performance of their tasks by these
groups was one of the highlights of the civil defense efforts on December 7, 1941.
(4) Flans for the evacuation of women and children and the [47c] prepa-
ration of shelters for workers in essential industries had reached a high state of
perfection on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from
areas attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner.
(5) An auxiliary police force to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was
organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly
when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. Their work of this
force was exceptional and excellent.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2981
(6) Legislation authorizing a home guard was enacted at the special session of
the Territorial Legislature. It was well planned and so organized that 1400 of
such home guardsmen could and were placed on duty thereby relieving members
of the Army for other military duty.
(7) There were many other matters too numerous to detail here which weie
planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the
bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public
bervice in times of emergency.
All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local authori-
ties, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded
since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases
of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly as
a direct result of prior planning and training.
It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil authori-
ties. The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a treacherous
attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in your demon-
strated abilities. I wish to state that the magnificent way in which the Territory
of Hawaii met its pioblem in its crucial hour was in a large measure due to your
foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf of the Territory.
You aie at liber tv to use this letter in any way which you see fit. THIS IS
A TRUE COPY.
Very sincerely yours,
(S) J. B. POINDEXTER,
Governor of Hawaii.
L. W. Truman,
Captain, Infantry.
[48] I have presented many of my actions, both with reference to the military
defense of the islands and the preparations of the civil community for defense, to
show that I have taken both a very active and an intelligent part in this work from
the time of my arrival in the Hawaiian Department.
I should be very glad if this Committee would see fit to call before it a number
of officers of my command, preferably from officers of high enough rank to know
what I have accomplished, and from staff officers who are familiar with the work
that has been carried out during the past ten months. I would also like very
much to have the Governor and some of the leading business men called before
the Commission to tell what the civil community thinks of the work that I have
done over l^e past ten months.
CONCLUSIONS
1. The radiogram from the War Department thu CINCUS fleet UCS of October
16th emphasized that measures taken by me during the grave situation of the
Japanese negotiations should not disclose strategic intention nor constitute
provocative actions against Japan.
The radiogram of November 27th reiterated that action should be carried out
so as "not repeat not to disclose intent", not alarm civil population, and avoid
unnecessary publicity.
When the War Department was notified that the Hawaiian Department was
alerted against sabotage it not only did not indicate that the command should be
alerted against a hostile surface, sub-surface, ground or air attack, but replied
emphasizing the necessity for protection against sabotage and subversive meas-
ures. This, taken in connection with the two previous radiograms mentioned,
indicated to me a tacit consent to the alert against sabotage ordered by the
Hawaiian Department.
2. The Hawaiian Department is not provided with an agency for locating enemy
ships in various parts of the world. Such information as it may acquire on this
subject must be obtained from the Fourteenth" Naval District or from the War
Department.
The "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" places
upon the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District the responsibility for
distant reconnaissance. Annex # 7 to the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan"
provides that when naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search
operations and army aircraft are made available, these will be under the tactical
control of the naval command during search operations. That means that the
army planes receive their missions and all instructions from the naval commander
and carry out the search as he deems necessary in order to carry out his respon-
sibility for distant reconnaissance.
2982 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[49] During the period November 27th to December 6th, the Navy made
no request for army planes to participate in distance reconnaissance. To me
this meant that they had definite information of the location of enemy carriers
or that the number unaccounted for was such that naval planes could make the
necessary reconnaissance without the assistance from the army. During this
period I was in frequent conferences with the Commander in Chief of the United
States Fleet and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and at no
time was anything said to indicate that they feared the possibility of an attack
by the Japanese by air. In fact, the sentiment was expressed by a naval staff
officer that there was no probability of such an attack. With a large part of the
United States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with their sources of information, I
was convinced that the Navy would be able either to intercept any carrier
attempting to approach Oahu or at least to obtain such information from task
forces or by reconnaissance as to make them aware of the presence of carriers
in the Hawaiian waters and of the possibility of an air attack.
3. Action of the War Department on December 5th and as late as 1:30 A. M.,
Eastern standard time, December 7th, in dispatching planes from the mainland
to Honolulu without ammunition indicated that the War Department did not
believe in the probability of an early Japanese attack upon Honolulu.
I felt that I had a right to expect the War Department to furnish me by the
most rapid means possible information should a real crisis arise in Japanese
relations. I did not expect that when the crisis arose the desire for secrecy would
be considered more important than the element of time. Had the message in
regard to the Japanese ultimatum and the burning of their code machines
been given me by telephone as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time
for encoding and decoding, etc., I, in all probability, would have had approximately
two hours in which to make detailed preparations to meet an immediate attack.
4. I feel that my work in the Hawaiian Department should be judged by my
activities throughout the complete period from the assumption of command on
February 7, until my relief upon December 16th. I believe that any careful
examination of my work during that period will prove that I have worked very
seriously at the job and have accomplished measures of very considerable im-
portance. I do not see how I could better have carried out what appeared to be
the desires of the War Department unless I was supposed to know more than the
War Department about the danger of Japanese attack and more than the Navy
Department about the location of the Japanese carriers. To have taken more
steps in preparation against a Japanese attack than I did would have alarmed the
civil population and caused publicity contrary [50] to W^ar Department
instructions. I do not believe that I should be found guilty even of an error in
judgment because I did not have the vision to foresee that the War Department
would not notify me of a crisis in the least possible time and that the Navy
with its large fleet in Hawaiian waters would not be able to carry out its
mission of intercepting Japanese carriers, or at least detecting their presence in
Hawaiian waters and informing me of the fact.
[57a] [Exhibit A]
[57] copy
[SECRET]
U. S. Naval Communication Service
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, V. S. PACIFIC FLEET
[Paraphrase]
NOTE FOR COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT:
THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF A DISPATCH FROM THE
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WHICH I HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO
PASS TO YOU QUOTE:
Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave situation x if a new cabinet is
formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic x if the
Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not
include rapprochement with the United States x either' way hostilities between
Japan and Russia are strongly possible x since Britain and the US are held respon-
sible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility Japan
may attack these two powers x view of these possibilities you will take due pre-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2983
cautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic
intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan x
CBO CRJ DATE 16 OCT 41 SERIAL NO. 10-340
ORIGINATOR ACTION
OPNAV CINCLANT INFORMATION
CINCPAC
CINCAF
A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldeun,
2nd Lt., F. A.
- [Exhibit B]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
fort shafter, t. h.
PI WAR PRTY
Wash DC 611 PM Nov 27 1941
C G
Hawn Dept Ft Shafter T. H.
472 27th negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical
purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might
come back and offer to continue stop Japanese future action unpredictible but
hostile action possible at any moment stop if hostilities cannot comma repeat
cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first
overt act stop this policy should not comma repeat not comrna be construed as
restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense stop prior
to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and
other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out
so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent
stop report measures taken stop should hostilities occur you will carry out the
tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan stop limit dissemi-
nation of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers
True copy Marshall
O. M. Cutler
O M Cutler 116P/27
Lt Col Infantry
Note: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablegrams. One copy only to be submitted-
The making of an exact copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such extracts as are
absolutely necessary will be made and marked secret or confidential as the case may be. This copy will
be safeguarded with the greatest care and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division.
Adjutant General's OflBce, without delay. (AR 3S0-5)
Form H. D. No. 1173 (Revised)— 1664 Honolulu 10-10-40 5M.
[Exhibit C]
[restricted]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 November 1941.
Subject: Standing Operating Procedure
To: Distribution "B", "L", and "G" less 1, 2, 3 and 5
1. Attention is directed to attached Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian
Department, which supersedes Tentative Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaii-
an Department, 14 July 1941.
2. Issuing headquarters will collect and destroy all copies of Tentative Standing
Operating Procedure in the possession of units and officers.
3. Department General and Special Staff Sections and Commanders of major
echelons, districts, department troops and station complements directly under
this headquarters will submit, for approval of this headquarters, Standing Operat-
ing Procedures, Movement and Loading Tables. Chiefs of Special Staff Sections,
HHD, will include in their SOP HD all installations under their supervision.
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:
Robert H. Dunlop
Robert H. Dunlop,
Qolonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.
1 Inclosure: SOP HD
2984 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[bestricted]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafler, T. H., 5 November 1941.
Subject- Standing Operating Procedure
To: Distribution "B", "L", and "G" less 1, 2, 3 and 5
1. Attention is directed to attached Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian
Department, which supersedes Tentative Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian
Department, 14 July 1941. ^
2. Issuing headquarters will colled and destroy all copies of Tentative Standing
Operating Procedure in the possession of units and officers.
3. Department General and Special Staff Sections and Commanders of major
echelons, districts, department troops and station complements directly under
this headquarters will submit, for approval of this headquarters. Standing Oper-
ating Procedures, Movement and Loading Tables. Chiefs of Special Staff
Sections, HHD, will include in their SOP HD all installations under their super-
'vjsion.
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:
Robert H. Dunlop,
Robert H. Dunlop,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.
I Inclosure: SOP HD
RESTRICTED
[a] [restricted]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H. 5 November 1941.
Standing Operating Procedure
Hawaiian Department »
Section I— General
Par Subject Page^
1 Purpose
• 2 Unit Procedures
3 Short Title 1
4 Department Headquarters ; _
5 Tactical Principles
6 Security
7 Liaison
8 Orders-- - ^ 2
9 Movement ^- 2
10 Antiaircraft Defense 3
I I Installations and Alarm System 3
12 Guides 3
Section II— Alerts
13 Alerts - 3
14 Alert No. 1 3
15 Alert No. 2 5
16 Alert No. 3 8
Section III— Condition of Re.\diness for Aircraft
1 7 Condition of Readiness 10
Section IV— Intelligence
18 Intelligence Standing Operating Procedure 11
19 Essential Elements of Enemy Information 11
20 Measures to Obtain Information 11
21 Measures for Handling 15
22 Reports and Distribution - 15
23 Department G-2 15
24 G-2 Forms--^ 16
■ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent
pages of original exhibit.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2985
Section V— Administration Page '
25 Supply 16
26 Evacuation . 18
27 Traffic .' 19
28 Motor Transportation 19
\1] SECTION I GENERAL
1. PURPOSE. — The purpose of a "Standing Operating Procedure" is stated
in paragraph 159, FINI 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, and paragraph
56, FM 101-5, Staff Officers' Field Manual.
2. UNIT PROCEDURES.— Conforming to the Department Procedure, sub-
ordinate units and staff sections will develop appropriate Standing Operating
Procedures.
3. SHORT TITLE.— "SOP HD" will signify this Standing Operating Pro-
cedure.
4. DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS.— Department Headquarters may
operate either as a whole or in two groups. When divided, the headquarters will
consist of a forward and a rear echelon, the composition of which ordinarily will
be as follows:
a. FORWARD ECHELON.—
Commanding General and Aides
General Staff (less G-1 and G-5)
• Secretary to General Staff
Engineer Officer
Signal Officer
Chemical Officer
Ordnance Officer
Surgeon
Headquarters Commandant
Provost Marshal.
b. REAR ECHELON.—
G-1
G-5
Special Staff (less those in forward echelon) .
5. TACTICAL PRINCIPLES.— See FM 31-10, Coast Defense. The chief
tactical principles applicable to the problem of the defense of OAHU and the air
fields on the outlying islands are as follows;
a. Complete organization of the ground
h. Position to be held lightly
c. Large reserves, held mobile, with motor transportation sufficient to transport
them
d. Automatic counter-attack.
6. SECURITY. — Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from
hostile ground or air forces. See paragraphs 233 to 273, inclusive, FM 100-5.
7. LIAISON. — a. OFFICERS. — During all operations and alerts, a li aison
officer with motor transportation will be sent from each of. the following un-' ts to
Department Headquarters and will remain thereat except when on a mission to
their own headquarters:
24th Infantry Division
25th Infantry Division
[2\ Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command
Hawaiian Air Force
86th Observation Squadron
Each Department Reserve Unit.
b. UNITS. — Both lateral and vertical liaison are mandatory. The responsi-
bility therefor is from right to left and from front to rear. Combat teams operat-
ing in areas where coast artillery group stations are in operation will establish
liaison with those stations.
8. ORDERS. — a. The Department Commander will issue orders covering the
action of the Infantry Divisions, the Hawaiian Air Force, the Hawaiian Coast
Artillery Command, Department Reserve units and all attached troops.
b. Orders issued by the Department (except as in c below) will be brief written
field orders with an operation map. Circumstances may require the issuance of
an oral order, but this will be confirmed later in writing.
^ I'ages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent
pases of oriainal exhibit.
2986 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
c. Fragmentary orders, oral or written, may be issued when appropriate.
Copies of the Department Commander's decision or directives, together with a
roughly sketched operation map, will be sent by staff officers to lower units as
soon as issued in order that plans may be initiated prior to receipt of the field
order from the Department.
d. To e.xpedite issue and to conserve time, unit commanders and staff officers
will dictate their decisions, directives, plans and orders. All commanders and
staff officers will perfect themselves in the dictation of orders. Competent
stenographer-clerks and draftsmen will be trained within each headquarters.
9. MOVEMENT. — a. In general, all troops will be moved by motor. The
maximum space in trucks will be utilized for the troops (standing if necessary)
since all movements are necessarily for short distances.
6. Trucks will not close up and every effort will be made to avoid halting in the
open. Maximum use will be taken of overhead cover, and vehicles either in
bivouac or assembly areas will always be dispersed when in the open, and will be
dispersed to the maximum extent practicable when in concealed positions.
c. In tactical movements, vehicles will be maintained at maximum speed
authorized by law, consistent with safety. (This may be satisfactorily accom-
plished by restricting the leading vehicle to 10 miles per hour less than the maxi-
mum authorized; the others, not exceeding the maximum authorized speed).
d. All tactical movements in daylight will be by infiltration, FM 25-10, the
distance between vehicles being not less than 300 yards. Administrative marches
will be made with not less than safe driving distance between vehicles, or
any distance greater than safe driving distance which will facilitate the movement
(paragraph .31, FM 25-10). When necessary, officers' control points and route
markers (paragraph 94, FM 25-10) will be utilized.
e. All movements under Alert No. 1 will be administrative.
/. Motor vehicles operating at night, at the discretion of local commanders,
will be (1) in convoy with standard blackout or blue lights with a shielded tail
light on all vehicles, or (2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard
blackout or blue lights on leading vehicle and a shielded tail light on the rear
vehicle, and no lights on the others, or (3) no lights when operating on one-way
secondarj- roads, and cross-country, on military reservations and leased lands.
On two-way roads the distance between vehicles and/or serials will be sufficient
to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic.
fjf] g. Trucks attached to a unit for a specific mission will revert to control
of the parent unit when the specific mission has been accomplished.
10. ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE.— a. Antiaircraft defense is a responsibility
of every unit. See paragraphs 261-273, FM 100-5.
b. All Infantry units not occupying front line positions will have their automatic
weapons habitually in readiness for antiaircraft defense, and all other units will
be prepared likewise to engage hostile aircraft.
c. On marches, all small arms suitable for use against aircraft will be in readiness
for action. When enemy air action is imminent trucks normally will halt, troops
will detruck, disperse and fire on enemy planes.
d. All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following:
(1). Maintenance of air guards to give timely warning of the approach of hostile
aviation.
(2) Adoption of necessary measures to prevent hostile observation and aerial
photography through advantageous use of terrain, utilization of cover, and use
of camouflage.
(3) Reduction of vulnerability to air attack and observation by dispersion of
personnel and materiel when in bivouac or in position and by increased speed
during movement.
11. INSTALLATIONS AND ALARM SYSTEM.— AW important installa-
tions not protected by the Territorial Home Guard will be guarded by troops.
An adequate alarm system will be established in connection therewith.
12. GUIDES. — a. In ca.se of a relief, guides from the relieved organization will
meet the incoming unit and remain with it until ordered back to their organization
by the commander of the incoming unit.
b. Whenever units are ordered to another sector for support or attachment,
the sector commander will provide the necessary guides to assist the supporting
or attached units.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2987
SECTION II — ALERTS
13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as
indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department
order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15/ (8) below.
14. ALERT NO. l.—a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and
uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.
h. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, all General and Special Staff
Sections will continue with their usual duties at their present stations, pending
further orders.
c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending
instructions from this Headquarters.
d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:
(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.
(4] (2) Maintain one (I) infantry battalion with motor transportation suffi-
cient to transport it, prepared to move on one (I) hour's notice.
(3) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation and all vital installa-
tions (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned
sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among
the important ones:
Police District No. 1, see paragraph 14 h (2) below
Command and Fire Control Cable System, see inclosure No. 1
Railwav and Highwav Bridges, see inclosure No. 2
Water supplv for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS
Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA
WAIAU Generating Plant
Telephone Exchanges at WAIPAHU, WAHIAWA, WAIALUA (in HALEIWA),
LAIE and KANEOHE
Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAIALUA, KAHUKU, KAILUA,
W^AIPIO and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO-WAHIAWA-
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive,
from KOOLAU switch station— BELLOWS FIELD, see inclosure No. 3.
Cold Storage Plant in W^AHIAWA
Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPAHULU.
(4) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping
stations at AIEA and HALAWA.
(5) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 14 j below.*
e. The HAW^AIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND will:
(1) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation
and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft
defense.
(2) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command.
(3) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.
(4) Provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and
Tripler General Hospital.
/. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:
(1) Protect all vital installations on posts on OAHU garrisoned by air forces
(2) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying i.slands by cooperation of local
base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 14 ^ below.'
g. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the air corps^ detachments
within the districts, will:
Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage,
and maintain order in the civil communitv.
h. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, in addition to his normal
duties, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, w^ill:
(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.
(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.
[5] (3) Establish liaison with the local police force.
i. The STATION COMPLEMENTS of HICKAM, WHEELER and BEL-
LOWS FIELDS, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the
protection of all vital installations on their respective posts.
j. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.— Upon the formation of the Territorial
Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated
that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Com-
2988 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
manders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the
Command and Fire Control ('able System and those installations on Army and
Navy Reservations. See paragraph 14 d (3) and g above. Instructions will be
issued.
15. ALERT NO. 2. — a. This alert is applicable to a condition more serious
than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface,
and air-craft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is
provided.
h. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, only the G-2 and G-3 Sections
will be required to operate on a 24-hour basis. All other sections of the General
and Special Staffs will continue with their normal schedule.
c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending
instructions from this Headquarters.
d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:
(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.
(2) Maintain available all units at fifty percent (50%) of their present strength,
except thosa required under (3), (4) and (5) below..
(3) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to
transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.
(4) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Re.servation and all vital installa-
tions (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned
sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among
the important ones:
Police District No. 1, see paragraph 15 /i (2) below
Command and Fire Control Cable System, see inclosure No. 1
Railway and Highway Bridges, see inclosure No. 2
Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS
Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA
WAIAU Generating Plant
Telephone exchanges at WAIPAHU, WAHIAWA, WAIALUA(in HALEIWA),
LAIE and KANEOHE
Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAIALUA, KAHUKU, KAILUA,
WAIPIO and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO-WAHIAWA—
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive,
from KOOLAU switch station— BELLOWS FIELD, see inclosure No. 3
Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA
Pumping Stations 'at MOANALUA and KAPAHULU. .
(5) The 25th Infantry Diision will assist the Navv in guarding the pumping
stations at AIEA and HALAWA.
[6\ (6) Place 240mm howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards
and, when directed, place ammunition at positions.
(7) Release Field Artilleiy units manning seacoast armament (155mm guns)
to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 15 e below.
(8) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 15 / below.
e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, a-nd attached Field
Artillery, will:
(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that rail-
way batteries will remain at FORT KAMEHAMEHA or where emplaced.
(2) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational
control.
(3) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation
and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft
defense.
(4) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command,
except FORT SH AFTER.- For FORT SH AFTER, sec paragraph 15 k (1)
below.
(5) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.
(6) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.
(7) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.
(8) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.
(9) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.
(10) Provide Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.
/. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:
(1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this
headquarters. See paragraph 17.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2989
(2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.
(3) Prepare aircraft foi dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival
thereat, disperse on fields.
(4) Disperse bombers with crews.
(5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.
(6) Protect all vital installations on posts on OAHU garrisoned by air forces.
(7) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local
base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 15 g below.
(8) In case of surprise hostile attack:
(a) Release to Navy for operational control all bombers in condition of readi-
ness "A". The bomber commander will report to the Commander of Patrol
Wing TWO.
[7] (b) Receive all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighte
planes in appropriate condition of readiness and release them to the Intercepto'"
Command for operational control.
g. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the air corps detachments
within the districts, will:
Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage,
hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.
h. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division
Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will:
(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.
(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.
(3) Establish liaison with the local police force.
(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions includ-
ing blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.
(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.
(6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 15 A; (1).
i. The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:
(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service
and then release it to the Interceptor Command.
(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for imme-
diate employment.
j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will:
Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery
(including available Naval and Marine Corps A A Artillery), the Aircraft Warning
Service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft
iiieiasures of units not under military control, to include:
(1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.
(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or
HONOLULU HARBORS.
(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.
k. STATION COMPLEMENTS:
(1) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Depart-
ment Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FOPfr SHAFTER
and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelonof Department
Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.
(2) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS Complements,
under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their
respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.
[8] 1. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.— Upon the formation of the
Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is
anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the
District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations,
except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on
Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 15 d (4) and g above. Instruc-
tions will be issued.
16. ALERT NO. 3. — a. This alert requires the occupation of all field positions
by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations
on outlying islands.
h. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS:
(1) All sections of the forward echelon (see paragraph 4 a) will occupy their
stations at forward command post, prepared to operate on a 24-hour basis.
(2) All sections of the rear echelon (see paragraph 4 h) will continue their usual
duties at their present stations. Blackout instructions will be complied with.
2990 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION FEARL HARBOR ATTACK
c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will reiuain ir. condition of mobile readiness at
their permanent stations, pending instructions from this headquarters.
d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:
(1) Defend its assigned sector on OAHU.
(2) Protect all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy
Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home
Guard.
(3) Release all available Bands to the Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD
BARRACKS.
(4) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping
stations at AIEA and HALAWA.
(5) Place 240mm howitzers in position.
(6) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155mm guns)
to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 16 e below.
(7) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 16 m below.
e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attached De-
tachment Field Artillery, will:
(1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft positions.
(2) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.
(3) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.
(4) Support the Infantry Divisions.
(5) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.
(6) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.
(7) Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.
[9] (8) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for oper-
ational control.
(9) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command,
except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 16 1 (2) below.
(10) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation
and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiair-
craft defense.
/. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:
(1) Destory enemy aircraft.
(2) Carry out bombing missions as directed.
(3) Cooperate with Naval air forces.
(4) On OAHU, defend all posts garrisoned by air forces against sabotage, air
and ground attacks.
(5) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base
detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 16 h below.
(6) Arm all planes, except that normally bombs will not be loaded on ships dis-
patched to outlying islands. See paragraph 25 e (8).
(7) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival
thereat, disperse on fields.
(8) Disper^ bombers with crews.
(9) Dispersfe pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.
(10) Perform observation, command and photographic missions.
(11) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.
g. G-5 will be prepared to establish the following:
(1) A Food Administration.
(2) A Labor Procurement Service.
h. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS of HAWAII, MAUI (includes MOLO-
KAI) and KAUAI Districts, assisted by the air corps detachments present within
the districts, will:
Defend the air fields against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain
order in the civil community.
i. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division
Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will:
(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.
(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.
(3) Establish liasion with the local police force.
(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions includ-
ing blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.
(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.
[10] (6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 16 I (2) below.
j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will coordinate and control the opera-
tions of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2991
Marine Corps A A Artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units,
and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under
military control to include:
(1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.
(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or
HONOLULU HARBORS.
(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.
A;. The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:
(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service
and then release it to the Interceptor Command.
(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for im-
mediate employment.
(3) Be prepared to assume control over essential civilian communications.
/. STATION COMPLEMENTS.—
(1) The SOHOFIELD BARRACKS Complement will protect all vital in-
stallations on the Schofield Reservation.
(2) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Depart-
ment Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER
and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department
Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.
(3) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS Complements,
under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their
respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.
m. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.— Upon the formation of the Territorial
Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated
that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Com-
manders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the
Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and
Navy Reservations. See paragraph 16 d (2) and h above. Instructions will be
issued.
SECTION III — CONDITION OF READINESS FOR AIRCRAFT
17. Condition of readiness for aircraft will be prescribed by a combination of
a letter and a number as indicated in paragraphs a and b below. The letter
indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned
task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed
for that part.
a. MATERIAL READINESS.—
A — All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
[11] B — One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready
for a task.
C — Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available
and ready for a task.
D — Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available
and ready for a task.
E — All aircraft conducting routine operations, none jeady for the purposes
of this plan.
b. DEGREE OF OPERATIONAL READINESS.—
All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of
a unit to be in the air armed and prepared to carry out the assigned task.
1 — For pursuit and VF types: Four minutes. Types other than fighters:
Fifteen minutes.
2 — All types: 30 minutes.
3 — All types: One hour.
4 — All types: Two hours.
5 — All types: Four hours.
SECTION IV- — INTELLIGENCE
18. The Intelligence Standing Operating Procedure indicated below will be
followed generally where applicable.
19. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ENEMY INFORMATION.—
a. Will the enemy attempt to destrov or neutralize NAVAL BASES at PEARL
HARBOR, at KANEOHE BAY, and air fields on OAHU with the object of
denying their use to the UNITED STATES without occupation? If so, will
2992 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
his air attacks be accompanied by Naval bombardment and blockading operations?
b. Will the enemv attempt to capture OAHU by expeditionary forces with the
object of utilizing "the NAVAL BASES at PEARL HARBOR,' at KANEOHE
BAY, and air fields thereon? If so, when, where, and with what strength will
he make his main attack?
c. Will the enemy attempt to capture any other of the principal islands of the
Hawaiian Group with the object of utilizing the air fields and establish bases
thereon?
d. Will the enemy military operations be accompanied by acts of sabotage
and terrorism on the part of resident sympathizers?
e. Will the enemy utilize local foreign population, local aliens or nationals of
foreign origin for sabotage operations, raids to assist landing operations, or
other acts of assistance?
20. MEASURES TO OBTAIN INFORMATION.—
a. NAVY.—
(1) Transmit, through the Joint Intelligence Loop, information received from
the OflFshore and Inshore Patrols, from any escort or attack forces formed, and
from any other Naval Ships relative to:
(a) Location, composition, course, and speed of enemy units encountered, with
particular reference to location of aircraft carriers and transports.
[12\ (b) Indications of landings on any island of the main Hawaiian Group,
with particular attention to the number and type of landing boats, and the
composition of supporting Naval units.
(c) Indications of attempts to block HONOLULU and/or PEARL HARBORS.
(d) Indications of any hostile aerial activity in strength.
(e) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops and installations. Dam-
age to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage
immediately.
(f) Report damage by hostile Naval and air bombardment, incurred or ob-
served. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of
chemicals, immediately.
(g) See paragraph 20 c below.
i. ARMY.—
(1) Hawaiian Air Force. —
(a) Observe all waters within an area bounded as follows:
Bv arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at OP AN A POINT, MAUI;
KAtJIKI HEAD LIGHT, MAUI; LAUPAHOEHOE LIGHT, HAWAII;
CAPE KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAWAII: KALAE LIGHT, HAWAII; SOUTH-
WEST HEADLAND, KAHOOLAWE; LEAHI POINT, NIIHAU; LEHUA
ISLAND, NIIHAU; KAILIU POINT, KAUAI; and arc of thirty (30) miles
radius with its center at KAHUKU POINT, OAHU, and the tangents connecting
these arcs in the order named.
Report location, composition, course and speed of enemy units encountered.
Maintain continuous contact with major subdivisions of enemy units. Particular
attention to location of aircraft carriers and transports. First contact, material
changes of direction, and definite location of aircraft carriers to be reported
immeoiately by Joint Intelligence liOop; thereafter on the hour by department
Intelligence Loop.
(b) Report indications of landing on any island, giving location, number, type
and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting Naval group.
Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.
(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations.
Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important
damage immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop.
(d) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment, incurred or ob-
served by their operations. Important damage, including damage to landing
fields, and use of chemicals, immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop; other
damage at 1815 by Department Intelligence Loop.
(e) Report any hostile aerial activity in strength, including number, type,
direction and area of attack or observation, by Joint Intelligence Loop.
(2) S6th OhHeruation Squadron. —
(a) Same as for "HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE"— see 20 b (1) above.
[IS] (b) Be prepared to provide, on call, observation for the control of
long-range artillery fire.
(3) Interceptor Command. —
i,a) Report immediately any and all information of hostile air force or surface
vessel.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2993
(b) Report, upon completion of action by or with enemy air force, composition
of enemy foices, diiection of approach, time of action, area attacked, and damage
to enemy airplanes.
(4) Each Infantry Division. —
(a) Report location, number, type and formation of transports and landing
boats and composition of supporting naval group. Report when observed there-
after hourly, on the hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.
(b) Report enemy front lines and boundaries between units. Report immedi-
ately any significant change. Otherwise report every two hours, on the even hour,
by Department Intelligence Loop.
(c) Report location of own Jront lines. Report every two hours, on the even
hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.
(d) Report all identifications. Infantry identifications are most important.
Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.
(e) Report indications of landing of artillery, including caliber of same, and
tanks. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.
(f) Repoit damage by hostile naval and air bombardment. Important damage
immediately; other damage at 1830, by Department Intelligence Loop.
(g) Report time, place, kinds and method of employment of chemicals. Report,
when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.
(h) Report weather and surf conditions on all favorable landing beaches.
Report at 0300, 0700, 1200 and 1700 and 2200, by Department Intelligence Loop.
(i) The 25th Division will assign G-2 personnel to assist the Provost Marshal
in the examination and questioning of enemy documents and personnel in South
Sector.
(5) Hawaiian Coast Aitillcry Command. —
(a) Report immediately, by Department Intelligence Loop, initial contact with
enemy Units, giving location, composition and course of formation.
(b) Report immediately, by Department Intelligence Loop, when an action is
begun by hostile vessels or by the seacoast artillery, giving location of naval
vessels, locality being attacked, and units engaged.
(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations.
Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage
immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop.
(d) Report upon completion of any action, by Department Intelligence Loop,
important damage from hostile naval and air [14] bombardment, and
report the use of chemicals immediately. Other damage at 1900 by Department
Intelligence Loop.
(e) Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop, location, num-
ber, type, and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting naval
force.
(f) Report, when observed, bv Joint Intelligence Loop, indications of attempts
to block HONOLULU HARBOR, PEARL HARBOR, or KANEOHE BAY.
(g) Report as soon as practicable important damage to ground installations,
including damage to use of chemical agents.
(h) Report visibility at 0400, 0700, 1200, 1700 and. 2200, by Department
Intelligence Loop.
(i) Any of the above reports may be transmitted by telephone when necessary
to avoid delay.
(6) District Commanders of HAWAII, MAUI and KAUAI Districts. — Report
when observed, by radio to Hawaiian Air Force, thence by Department Intelli-
gence Loop:
(a) Nature of hostile activity, including number, type, direction and area of
attack or observation.
(b) Damage by hostile naval and air bombardment.
(c) Location, number, type and formation of landing boats and composition
of supporting naval group.
(d) Enemy front lines and boundaries between units.
(e) All identifications. Infantry identifications are most important.
(f) Time, place, kinds and method of employment of chemicals.
(7) Department Signal Office. —
Radio intercept and goniometric service. Report when obtained.
c. ALL ELEMENTS OF HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT.—
(1) Report presence of parachute troops and assemblies of enemy nationals or
sympathizers and overt acts of sabotage or terrorism, giving location, time, num-
bers involved, and probable intentions or damage accomplished.
2994 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(2) Report of location of floating or stranded mines, in order that this infor-
mation may be relayed to the Navy. No other action, i. e., attempts at destruc-
tion, than to report location immediately, should be taken.
d. MISCELLANEOUS.—
(1) Transmission of G-2 Information. —
In the absence of specific instructions as to transmission, or in the event of
failure or overload of specified channels, G-2 information will be transmitted by
direct line, where available, or by the most expeditious routing over the circuits
set forth in current Signal Operations Instructions. [15] If wire and radio
signal communication are out, important intelligence information will be sent
back by any means at hand: Wire circuits of near-by units, motor messenger,
commandeered vehicle, any means necessary commensurate with the value of
the information.
21. MEASURES FOR HANDLING.—
a. PRISONERS: Examination stations will be located at all Prisoner of War
collection points.
b. DOCUMENTS AND CAPTURED MATERIAL.—
(1) Documents will be sent to G-2's of Department or Divisions, with the
minimum of delay, by regularly scheduled messenger service.
(2) Reports of captured material will be sent to the same stations by the
same means.
(3) Documents and material identifying organizations or indicating the use of
chemicals are of major importance. They will be given special priority in ship-
ment to examination stations and will be reported to Department G-2 by the
most expeditious means.
(4) Liaison officers from the office of G-2, H. H. D., will be assigned to all
Examination Stations, and will assist the Provost Marshal in examining enemy
personnel, materiel and documents, and in determining destination of reports.
c. MAPS. — Maps will be supplied initially by the Department Engineer.
22. REPORTS AND distribution:—
Distribution of reports from Department Headquarters: Summaries of In-
telligence at 0800, 1300, 1800 and 2300.
23. THE DEPARTMENT G-2 will:
a. Keep the Commanding General and all interested staff officers informed
regarding the enemy situation and of his deductions concerning it.
b. Insure that counterintelligence measures are adequately provided for and
adhered to.
c. .Establish a counter-espionage service that will not only guard against the
subversive activities of the external enemy, but will also enable the Department
G-2 to keep the Department Commander constantly advised aS to the attitude,
trend of thought, and probable course of action of the civil population, particu-
larly that of alien extraction. This service will maintain close liaison with the
Department Provost Marshal, with a view to:
(1) Furnishing the Department Provost Marshal with all information gained,
through the counter-espionage service of value in the prevention .of civil disorders,
sabotage and incipient uprisings.
(2) Receiving and evaluating information relative to the internal situation
collected by the Department Provost Marshal through his agencies set up for
the actual control of the civil population.
d. Collect, evaluate, and disseminate information relative to assemblies of
enemy nationals or sympathizers, and overt acts of sabotage and terrorisrn.
[16] e. Prepare propaganda and publicity for the encouragement of the
loyaltv and support of the civil population, particularly that of aliea extraction.
24. 'G-2 FORMS.—
a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation, see Inclosure No. 4.
b. Periodic Reports, see page 1, Inclosure No. 5. For combat Air Force see
page 2, Inclosure No. 5.
SECTION V ADMINISTRATION
25. SUPPLY (See paragraphs 75-80, FM 100-10).—
a. SUPPLY AREAS.—
(1) Schofield Supply area includes the area of OAHU north and west of a gen-
eral line extending LAE O KAOIO— PUU KAAUMAKUA— KIPAPA STREAM
— KAMEHAMEHA HIGHWAY at (97.9— 91.0)— KAMEHAMEHA HIGH-
WAY—PEARL CITY JUNCTION— PEARL HARBOR ENTRANCE.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2995
(2) The Honolulu Supply area includes the remainder of OAHU and outlying
islands.
b. CLASS I SUPPLIES (rations) ; including QMC class II and IVS.:
Schofield Supply Area— Quartermaster, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
Honolulu Supply Area — Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, HONULOLU.
(1) Supplies, for a small unit of an organization, when moved nearby into a
different supply area from the parent organization, may be continued thru the
parent organization or may be obtained separately from the D. P. for the new
supply area as warranted by the situation.
(2) Distribution will be based on consolidated daily strength reports submitted
by organizations to the Depot or Quartermaster supplying the area in which the
organization is stationed (copy to Dept. QM) by 0800 daily.
(3) Schedules of distribution will be arranged by issuing quartermasters by
direct agreement with unit commanders supplied. Distribution schedules will be
set up and copies furnished Dept. QM and 0-4, H. H. D.
(4) A standard menu ration is established for Alert No. 3.
f. CLASS III SUPPLIES.—
(1; All units leaving their normal posts under any alert will take with them the
authorized allowance of gasoline containers filled. Replenishment will be made
in the following manner:
(a) Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS will establish DPs at
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS for all units operating in the SCHOFIELD BAR-
RACKS area.
(b) Commanding officers of each post in the Honolulu Supplv Area, except
MALAKOLE, BELLOWS FIELD and KANEOHE, will establish DPs at their
posts for the supply of all units operating in this area. MALAKOLE, BELLOWS
FIELD and KANIOOHE will establish a DP at their respective posts for the
supply [/7] of their own units operating in the immediate vicinity of
their own post.
(c) In the event units are moved, placing them in another supply area, gasoline
will be supplied from the DP nearest the unit, regardless of supply area.
(d) Normally, the supply of gasoline from DPs will be by 5 and 10 gallon
drums, rather than filling individual trucks.
(e) Units will furnish personnel for refilling of their containers at the DP.
Post Commanders will provide suitable equipment for refilling containers.
(f) 11th Tank Company will draw aviation gasoline from the nearest Air
Corps Station.
(g) Replenishment of stocks at posts will be accomplished in the normal manner.
Following the period of the maneuvers, necessary monetary adjustments will be
made through Department Headquarters.
(h) Class III supplies on outlying islands will be the responsibility of the
District Commanders.
d. CLASS II & IV SUPPLIES (except Quartermaster Corps).—
(1) Medical Supply:
Schofield Supply Area — Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Medical Depot, SCHO-
FIELD BARRACKS.
Honolulu Supply Area— Hawaiian Medical Depot, FORT SHAFTER.
(2) Signal Supply (except Signal Corps aircraft radio):
Schofield and Honolulu Supplv areas — Hawaiian Signal Depot, FORT SHAF-
TER.
(3) Signal Supply — aircraft radio only:
Schofield and Honolulu Supply areas — Hawaiian Air Depot, HICKAM FIELD.
(4^ Chemical Supplies — all supplv areas — Hawaiian Chemical Depot, SCHO-
FIELD BARRACKS.
(5) Engineer Supplies — all supplv areas — Hawaiian Engineer Depot, SCHO-
FIELD BARRACKS, T. H. Distributing points for class IV supplies will include
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT RUGER, FORT KAMEHAMEHA, FORT
BARRETTE and North Shore in vicinity of (86.9-04.2). Credits at DP's to
major echelon commanders will be announced separately to commanders con-
cerned.
(6) Water Supply: Will be secured locally and will be inspected by a medical
officer before use except from post and CITY of HONOLULU water systems.
(7) Air Corps Supply: All supply areas — Hawaiian Air Depot, HICKAM
FIELD and WHEP^LER FIELD Branch, when so designated, for types of serv-
ices announced by Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.
79716 O — 46 — pt. 18 10
2996 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(8) Ordnance Supply (other than ammunition Class V). —
Schofield Supplv area — Schofieid Branch, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, SCHO-
FIELD BARRACKS.
Honoluhi Supplv area — (General Storage and Shop) Hawaiian Ordnance
Depot, HONOLULU.
[18] e. CLASS V SUPPLIES:
(1) Schofield Supplv Area — all types — Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Ordnance
Depot, SCHOFIELD 'BARRACKS (See (3) below).
(2) Honolulu Supply Area — all types — Ammunition Storage Area, Hawaiian
Ordnance Depot. (See (3) below.)
(3) Aircraft pyrotechnics and bombs, 8-inch railway and 240mm ammunition
and chemical ammunition (other than grenades) — Ammunition Storage Area,
Hawaiian Ordnance Depot — all supply areas.
(4) Credits of an "initial issue" and of one "unit of fire" are automatically
placed at the disposal- and under the control of all major echelon commanders
whenever an Alert is ordered. Quantities of various types of ammunition in-
cluded in the "initial issue" and in a "unit of fire" are shown in Inclosures Nos.
6 and 7 herewith. Load of Aircraft Ammunition per airplane is indicated in
Inclosure No. 8.
(5) At the time Alert No. 2 or No. 3 is ordered, all units will draw such of
their "initial issue" as has not already been drawn, except that for Alert No. 2
the Infantry Divisions will draw initially only 1/5 of the "initial issue" and the
balance thereof will be drawn after occupation of positions with their organic
and/or sector weapons. Whenever issues cannot be made simultaneously, they
will be made according to the following order of priority and according to a
schedule to be mutually arranged between the Unit Supply Officer and the
Supply Point concerned.
Aircraft bombs and ammunition for aircraft weapons.
Antiaircraft 3", 37mm and Machine Gun ammunition.
Ground machine gun ammunition — all types.
Other small arms ammunition.
All artillery ammunition, less antiaircraft.
(6) At the time Alert No. 1 is ordered, only small arms ammunition included
in the "initial issue" will be drawn.
(7) Aircraft bombs will not be issued in "initial issue" but will be held avail-
able in bomb storage areas.
(8) Two "units of fire" of bombs and machine gun ammunition will be main-
tained on outlying islands for each airplane operating therefrom.
/. Dumps and Ammunition Distributing Points will be established as directed
by this headquarters.
26. EVACUATION.—
a. PERSONNEL:
(1) North Sector Division by 24 Medical Bn. to Station Hospital, SCHO-
FIELD BARRACKS.
(2) South Sector Division by 25 Medical Bn. to Tripler General Hospital ex-
cept for troops in the area west of the Une: PEARL HARBOR CHANNEL —
EWA JUNCTION. The latter will be evacuated to Station Hospital, SCHO-
FIELD BARRACKS.
(3) Hawaiian Air Force. —
(a) HICKAM FIELD, by the Surgeon, HICKAM FIELD to Station Hos-
pital, HICKAM FIELD or Tripler General Hospital. [19] Additional
ambulances, with drivers and orderlies, will be attached as needed.
(b) WHEELER FIELD and HALEIWA Landing Field, by Surgeon
WHEELER FIELD to Station Hospital Schofield. Additional ambulances,
with drivers and orderlies will be attached as needed.
(c) BELLOWS FIELD, by Surgeon, BELLOW^S FIELD to Tripler General
Hospital. Additional ambulances, with drivers and orderlies, as needed.
(d) Air fields on outlying islands, bv vehicle to local hospital or by air to
Tripler General Hospital or Station 'Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
Collection by respective medical detachment. Details of evacuation to be ar-
ranged by the responsible commanders for each field.
(e) HCAC, by the Surgeon, HCAC (collection by respective medical detach-
ments, reinforced if necessary). One ambulance eompany to be attached to the
command prior to combat. Evacuation from the area north and west of the line:
PEARL HARBOR Channel— EWA Junction— LAE O KAOIO Point to Station
Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. Evacuation from the area south and
east of this line to Tripler General Hospital.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2997
(f) KAUAI District, MAUI District and HAWAII District to local hospitals
as directed by District Commanders under provisions of letter, this headquar-
ters to each Distiict Commander, dated 31 July 1941, subject: "Medical Service."
(g) Elements not included elsewhere: North Sector by 24th Medical Bn., on
call; South Sector by 25th Medical Bn., on call.
b. ANIMALS:
(1) North Sector to Veterinary Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS,
by provisional Veterinary Detachment attached to Hawaiian Pack Train.
(2) South Sector to Veterinary General Hospital, FORT SHAFTER, by
provisional Veterinary Detachment, attached to units having animals.
c. SALVAGE: To supply points designated in paragraph 25 above for services
indicated.
d. PRISONERS OF WAR.—
(1) Collecting Points— SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT SHAFTER,
FORT RUGER, KANEOHE BAY. To be established and operated by De-
partment Provost Marshal, assisted by Provost Marshals,^ Infantry Divisions.
(2) Prisoner of War Inolosures — Establishment and operation by Department
Provost Maishal, as directed by this headquarters.
27. TRAFFIC—
The Department Provost Marshal, Assisted by the Division Provost Marshals,
will regulate traffic on OAHU.
28. MOTOR TRANSPORTATION.—
a. Motor pools will be established by the Infantry Divisions and the Hawaiian
Coast Artillery Command. These pools will [ko] consist of all available
tactical vehicles and administrative vehicles, the latter obtained by reducing to
a minimum administrative requirements.
b. The assignment of motor vehicles for one specific purpose will be the excep-
tion. All motors will be used to the maximum for all purposes.
c. Current movement and loading tables will be maintained by the Infantry
Divisions and the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command as follows:
(1) Number of vehicles, tactical and administrative in the pool, showing the
number of men and amount of impedimenta that can be moved initially into
position. See paragraph 9 above.
(2) Number of vehicles, tactical and administrative, subsequent to move into
position which are available for movement of reserves, and the number of men
which can be moved.
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:
Walter C. Phillips,
Walter C. Phillips,
Lt. Col., G. S. C, Chief of Staff.
Official:
Wm. E. Donegan,
Wm. E. Donegan,
Lt. Col., G. S. C, Asst. Chief of Staff. G-3.
Inclosures:
No. 1 — Map, Communications Installations.
No. 2 — Map, Bridges and Police Districts.
No. 3 — Map, Electric Installations.
No. 4 — Estimate of Enemy Situation.
No. 6 — Periodic Intelligence Report Forms.
No. 6 — Allowances of Ammunition.
No. 7— Unit of Fire.
No. 8 — Load of Aircraft Ammunition.
Inclosure No. 1
(Inclosure No. 1 is a map of Communications Installations on the
Island of Oahu, T. H. as of 7 July 1941. This map is reproduced as
Item No. 34 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of
Joint Committee.)
Inclosure No. 2
(Inclosure No. 2 is a map of the Island of Oahu, T. H., showing
Police Districts, Railroad Bridges and Highway Bridges. This map
is reproduced as Item No. 35 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to
Proceedings of Joint Committee.)
2998 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
RAILROAD BRIDGES
Num-
ber
90
92
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
Location
0.9 mi. \V of Honolulu..
1.0 mi. \V. of Honolulu.
1.9 mi. W of Honolulu..
2.4 mi. W of Honolulu..
2.6 mi. W of Honolulu..
2.6 mi. W of Honolulu..
0.7 mi. E of Aiea
0.2 mi. W of Aiea
0.3 mi. E of Kalauao
t).2 mi. E of Kalauao
0.4 mi. W of Kalauao...
Waiau Station
0.2 mi. W of Waiau
0.3 mi. W of Waiau
0.4 mi. W of Waiau
0.3 mi. W of Pearl City.
0.8 mi. W of Pearl City.
Waipahu.
1.3 m "
2.2 m
0.6 m
1.0 m
2.5 m
1.1 m
0.5 m
3.3 m
3.4 m
0.2 m
0.1 m
0.7 m
0.5 m
0.6 m
Hale
2.1 m
0.7 m
0.7 m
1.0 m
2.2 ip
2.9 m
4.0 m
0.6 m
2.0 m
4.1 m
3.4 m
3.3 m
2.7 m
0.6 m
0.4 m
2.0 m
2.3 m
0.2 m
W of Gilbert.-
S of Nanakuli
S of Nanakuli.
N of Nanakuli
S of Waianae
Sof Waianae
N of Waianae
N of Waianae
N of Waianae
S of Makua —
S of Makua. _.
W of Mokuleia
W of Mokuleia
W of Waialua.
wa --
N of Haleiwa
S of Waimea.
N of Waimea
N of Waimea.
N of Waimea.
N of Waimea _ .
N of Waimea.
N of Waipahu
N of Waipahu
N of Waipahu
S of Wahiawa
S of Wahiawa
S of Wahiawa
S of Wahiawa
N of Wahiawa
N of Wahiawa.
N of Wahiawa
N of Brodie Junction.
Type
Bents
Concrete pile...
Concrete pile...
Concrete pile...
Concrete pile...
ConcretP pile. ..
Concrete pile...
Concrete pile...
Concrete pile...
Concrete pile...
Concrete pile...
Concrete pile...
Timber pile
Timber pile
Concrete pile...
Concrete pile...
Concrete pile...
Concrete pile...
Timber Trestle
Timber Trestle
Timber Trestle
Timber Trestle
Timber Trestle
Timber Trestle
Timber Trestle
Timber pile
Timber pile
Timber Trestle
Timber Trestle
Timber Trestle
Concrete pile...
Concrete pile...
Concrete pile...
Timber Trestle
Timber Trestle
Concrete pile...
Timber Trestle
Timber Trestle
Timber Trestle
Timber Trestle
Timber Trestle
Concrete arch..
Wood Trestle. .
Wood Trestle..
Wood Trestle..
Wood Trestle..
Wood Trestle..
Wood Trestle..
Wood Trestle..
Wood Trestle..
Wood Trestle. .
Wood Trestle..
Girders
Timber.
Concrete
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber -
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber-
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber -
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Timber.
Height
14
20.
15,
13.
20.
14.
10.
23.
22.
11.
22.
20
30
75
115.
107.
55.
13.
Span
100'
32'
160'
160'
ZV
12'
208'
48'
96'
28'
112'
27'
32'
32'
32*
160'
16'
63'
64'
64'
96'
64'
64'
96'
96'
64'
80'
62'
114'
80'
112'
448'
224'
96'
272'
60'
90'
96'
75'
128'
98'
144'
64'
224'
160'
320'
272*
608'
448'
272'
112'
HIGHWAY BRIDGES— PRIORITY
Number
52
49
17
16
9
74
15
45
13
127
5
6
61
99
IGO
161
57
109
Location
Kam Highway over Waiawa Stream.. _
Kam Highway over Kipapa Stream
Kam Highway over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir
Kam Highway over N. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir
Kam Highway over Anahulu R. Haleiwa
Kam Highway over Waimea R., Waimea..
Kam Highway over Poamoho Gulch
Old Kam Highway over Kaukonahua Gulch, Schofield Barracks
Kam Highway over Opaeula (Twin Bridges) at Waialua...
Kam Highway at Kuapa Pond (Koko Head)..
Between Waialua Mill and Thompson Corner..
Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa
Between Waialua Mill and Haleiwa
Dillingham Blvd. at Keehi Lagoon..
Kam Highway at Kahana Bay
East Range Road over S. Fork Wahiawa Reservoir....'...
Waipahu cut-off over O. R. & L. RR at Waipahu
New Kam Highway o\er Halawa Stream S. of .\iea
Kmti Highway at Heeia fish pond
Coordinates
95-84. 12
4 -87. 8
46-95. 68
37-96. 75
98-07. 98
82-13. 52
27-98. 92
72-96. 96
78-06. 33
45-70. 22
06-04.57
12-05.76
52-06. 20
76-76. 55
34-03. 25
7f>-95. 34
56-82. 46
82-80.30
04-89.11
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 2999
Inclosure No. 3
(Inclosure No. 3 is a map of the Island of Oalm, T. H., showing
Electric Installations and Generating Plants. This map is reproduced
as Item No. 36 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of
Joint Connnittee.)
Inclosure No. 4
Title
Place
Date and hour
ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION
1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.
a. P^nemy Naval Operations. — Movements (by fleet or groups).
h. Enemy land operations.
(1) Enemy activities in forward areas and nevf identifications.
(2) Movements, concentrations and establishments in rear areas.
(3) Sabotage.
(4) Terrain, weather, visibility and surf as thev affect the enemy.
2. CONCLUSIONS.
a. Enemy capabilities. — An enumeration of lines of action open to the
enemy which may affect accomplishment of the mission of the command.
(6) (1) A statement of the relative probability of adoption of the fore-
going lines of action when such statement can be justified.
(2) Reasons justifying any statement made in (1) above.
Inclosure No. 5
Chief of section.
From: (Date and hour)
To: (Date and hour)
Issuing unit
Place
Date and hour of issue
PERIODIC REPORTS
No.
Maps. (Those needed for an understanding of the report.)
1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
a. Enemy front line (or nearest elements). — Location and nature.
h. Defensive organization.- — ^Trenches, emplacements, observation posts, com-
mand posts, obstacles, etc.
c. Units in contact. — Composition of units-, with identifications if known;
location of their flanks, estimated combat efficiency (strength, training, physical
condition, morale, and other pertinent factors).
d. Artillery. — Location and calibers.
e. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention. — Location, strength,
composition, dispositions, estimated combat efficiency, and where and when
they probably can be employed.
/. Supplv and evacuation establishments. — Location and nature.
2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
a. General summary — action of enemy forces as a whole.
h. Operations of component elements.
(1) Enemy Naval Operations. — Movements (by fleet or groups).
(2) Enemy Land Operations.
(a) Landings. (By areas. Each entry to show, for that area, the front lines
and identifications).
(6) Operations of Land Components.
/. Antiaircraft artillery.
2. Antitank units.
3. Armored forces.
Jf. Artillery.
5. Aviation, combat.
6. Aviation, observation.
7. Parachute Troops.
8. Cavalry.
9. Chemical warfare.
3000 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
10. Engineers.
11. Infantry.
12. Tanks.
13. Administrative elements.
c. Sabotage.
d. Miscellaneous. — Such enemy activities, movements or changes since last re-
port as are not conveniently included in h above.
3. MISCELLANEOUS.'
0. Estimated enemy casualties, including prisoners.
h. Morale.
c. Supply and equipment.
d. Terrain not under our control.
e. Enemy's probable knowledge of our situation — observation, reconnaissance,
prisoners and documents lost by us, inhabitants, etc.
/. Weather, visibility and surf, by areas.
g. Any enemy intelligence not specifically covered by headings of this report.
4. ENEMY Capabilities. — a discussion of each of the lines of action open
to the enemy which may affect the accomplishment of our mission, in the order
of their possible imminence. For each capability, the effect of time, space, terrain,
present known dispositions, and other factors in the situation should be evaluated.
The earliest estimated time at which the enemy can put each into effect should be
stated. When applicable, the possible fesult of the adoption by the enemy of
any capability should be included.
AC of S, G-2.
INTELLIGENCE PROCEDURE IN AVIATION UNITS
Form G
A form for
Periodic Intelligence Report
for
Air Combat Units
(Adapted to telegraph printer transmission)
Periodic Intelligence Report
From: (Date and hour)
To: (Date and hour)
Issuing unit
Place of issue
Date and hour of issue
1. ENEMY ACTIVITIES AIR.— (Appropriate resume.)
2. ENEMY ACTIVITIES GROUND.— (Appropriate resume.)
3. ENEMY ACTIVITIES NAVAL.— (Appropriate resume.)
4. OBJECTIVE FOLDERS DATA.— (Additions or changes giving serial
number of folder in each case.)
5. IDENTIFICATIONS. — (Additions or changes in enemy units.)
6. ENEMY KNOWLEDGE OF OUR SITUATION.— (Brief estimate.)
7. ENEMY CAPABILITIES. — (list in priority of their probable adoption or,
if no priority, so state.)
8. MISCELLANEOUS.— (Any items not covered by above.)
Note. — Information contained in previous intelligence reports will not be
repeated; only changes or additions thereto. If no change has occurred under a
given heading, the number of the paragraph only will be transmitted.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3001
Inclosure No. 6.
ALLOWANCES OF ORDNANCE AMMUNITION PER WEAPON (OTHER THAN
AIRCRAFT) FOR INITIAL ISSUE HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Weapon
Arm or service
N
0. of rds
per weapon
AP
Ball
Tracer
Total
Rifle, cal. .30, M1903 _.
CA..
25
140
40
32
112
28
40
25
105
80
162
28
64
40
48
105
460
560
""'"992
240
30
525
1,500
3,500
""i,'506"
4, 725
2,100
28
21
340
250
440
240
20
185
Eng-.
40
FA
8
32
8
40
Inf
16
160
(Rifle Plat.) Inf. (except Rifle
Plat.)
4
40
QM
40
Sig
"15"
24
46
8
16
25
Others
30
48
24
4
150
Rifle, US, cal. .30, Ml
Eng.
152
Inf
232
(Rifle Plat.) Inf. (except Rifle
Plat.).
40
Ord
80
Sig
40
MP
48
Others
30
15
120
60
240
120
60
20
75
250
1,000
1,200
1,800
900
250
1,350
300
150
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30
CWS..
08O
CA .
60
960
60
6S0
FA . _
1200
Inf
1,172
Ord
300
QM
30
150
250
500
4.800
7,200
3.600
250
675
600
80
Others .
750
Machine sun, cal. .30, HB
Eng .
2,000
(M1919A4)
Inf
5,000
Tanks or Armd. Cars ...
6.000
Machine pun, cal. .30, WC
CA
9,000
(M1917A1)
(AW Bn.) CA (except AW Bn.).
Eng
4,500
2,000
Inf
6,750
Others
3,000
Pistol cal. .45
CWS, CA, Eng., Inf
28
FA, Ord., QM, Sig., MP, others.
21
Submachine gun, cal. .45
340
Sig. (other than motorcycles)
MP.
250
110
60
1.440
550
Others . .
300
Machine gun, cal. .50, WC (AA)
CA...
5,760
7,200
(AW Bn.)
CA (except AW Bn.) .
2,880
2,880
600
960
1,568
720
720
150
240
392
3,600
Others
3,600
Machine gun, cal. .50, HB
FA.... .
750
Inf
1,200
9
Tanks or Armd. Cars..
1,900
All -
25K
Grenades, hand, frag, (per Rifle
Co.).
Inf
150K
Inf
25
Sig (Avn or Wg Co )
5
Sig (Opn or Tri Div.
30
Lights, Very signal (assorted) _.
37mm gun, M1916
Co.).
All
24
240
240
37mm gun, Antitanlf (M3)
FA
200
180
180
200
Inf
20
1,620
120
132
18
200
CA
1,800
60mm Mortar
Inf •
120
Inf .
Light.
Heavy
1
75mm gun Truck-D
All
""""#459
75mm gun. Antitank... __
FA
iK144
FA
#205
FA
#117
3" AA mobile
90mm A A mobile
CA
CA . -
15
12
285
238
300
100
60
300
250
3" AA fl.xed . -
CA ..--
300
155mm gun, M1918M1
All
100
240mm How M1918
FA
60
8" Ry. Gun
CA
85
85
3002 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Inclosure No. 6 — Continued
Weapon
Arm or service
N
0. of rds. per weapon
AP
Ball
Tracer
Total
FIXED SEACOAST ARTILLERY
3"gun, M1903
505
505
6" gun
i,666
350
335
275
300
280
250
1 000
8" gun -
200
550
12" gun (Barbette Carriage). -.
335
12" gun (Disappearing Carriage) .
275
12" Mortar
*
300
14" gun
280
16" gun
250
Notes: Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not avialable in Haw. Dept.
Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution
of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.
# Proportions of types (Shrapnel, reduced charge HE, and normal charge HE) will be shown on requisi-
tions kept on file at the designated supply points.
Inclosure No. 7.
UNIT OF FIRE (OTHER THAN AIRCRAFT)— HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Weapon
No.
rds. for one (1) unit of fire
AP
Ball
Tracer
HE
Total
Rifle, cal. .30, Ml or M1903
30
150
150
600
600
105
525
525
2,100
20
160
15
150
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30
75
750
Machine gun, cal. .30, HE (M1919A4) (other than
75
750
combat vehicle).
Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A2or A4) (com-
150
750
bat vehicle).
Machine gun, cal. .30 (M1917-17A1)
300
3,000
20
Pistol, cal. .45
40
200
720
1,920
960
180
900
Machine gun, cal. .50, AA, WC (except in Gun
480
2,400
Batteries).
Machine gun, cal. .50, A A, WC (in Gun Batteries) .
240
1,200
Grenades, hand, frag, (per Rifle Co.)
150
25
Pistol, Very, Mklll
24
37mm gun, M19I6
120
36
540
400
234
66
120
84
60
120
600
400
Light
SOU
Heavy
3" Trench Mortar
300
SupQT .-
36
150
114
39
225
150
285
238
300
38
60
300
Normal. _. ,
Reduced .
75mm gun, antitank . ,.
111
150
105mm How .
225
155mm How. M1918
150
15
12
300
90mm A A gun, mobile . '.
250
3" A A gun, fixed
300
155mm gun, M1918 MI .
112
150
240mm How. M 1918
60
8" Ry Gun
85
85
4" Chemical Mortar
200
4.2" Chemical Mortar . .
200
Notes: Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept.
Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in suflBcient quantities, substitution
of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3003
Inclosure No. 8
LOAD OF AIRCRAFT AMMUNITION PER AIRPLANE
Type airplane
Bombers
Pursuit
OBS.
(C&D)
Item..
Hv.
(B17D)
Med.
(B-18)
Lt.
(A20A)
(P-40)
(P36A)
(P-26)
1-engine
(0-J7)
Ctg APCaiaO --
Ctp. Ball Cal30 -
480
120
600
60
900
240
1,200
1,280
320
1,600
1,920
480
2,400
1,600
400
2,000
20
300
80
400
400
100
500
10
150
40
200
800
200
1,000
640
Cte. tr Cal30.._
Total Cal 30#
160
800
Ctg. AP Cal 50 -
Ctg ball Cal 50
Cte tr Cal 50
Total Cal 50#
BOMBS
Bomb frag. 30# and
40
12
4
2
1
10
Bomb Demo. 100# or
20
14
8
6
4
'4
3
6
20
10
32
14
6
4
2
'4
3
6
20
7
Bomb Demo. 300# or
Bomb Demo. 500-600# or
Bomb Demo. 1,000#1.100# or
Bomb Demo. 2.000# --
PYROTECHNICS
Bomb Photoflash
14
Flare M26 2
1
6
20
1
Flare M9 --
5
Sig. AC Asstd
20
Sig. Drift -
' For Reconnaissance squadrons only.
2 Flare M8A1 used as temporary substitute on the basis of 2-M8 or M8A1 flares per M26 flare.
[corrected copy]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 10 December 1941
Subject: Coordination of Traffic Control. (Paragraph 9h (TENTATIVE)
added to SOP HD.)
To: Distribution: Special, and Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H.
1. The attention of all commanders is directed to provisions of Paragraphs 27
and 9/, SOP HD, 5 November 1941, repeated below:
"27. Traffic: The Department Provost Marshal, assisted by the Division
Provost Marshals, will regulate traffic on OAHU.
"9. /. Motor vehicles operating at night, at the discretion of local commanders,
will be (1) in convoy with standard blackout or blue lights with a shielded tail
light on all vehicles, or (2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard
blackout or blue lights on leading vehicle and a shielded tail light on the rear
vehicle, and no lights on the others. Standard blackout light or approved modifica-
tions are authorized for use at all times and all places during hours of darkness on
vehicles carrying military personnel on a military mission. On two-way roads the
distance between vehicles and/or serials will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded
flow of traffic."
2. The following additional instructions are published for the strict compliance
of all troops in this Department:
Paragraph 9h (TENTATIVE), SOP HD.
(1) The civil police (special and regular) and the Military Police will have
COMPLETE and EXCLUSIVE control of traffic on the island of OAHU with
the following exceptions:
a. Guards on entrances to vital installations operating under special instructions.
b. In case of accidents or other emergencies.
3004 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(2) Route markers are ai'thorized for tactical or convoy movements.
(3) Except in case of military necessity and except as otherwise hereinafter
provided, the present civil regulations relating to traffic shall remain in force.
(4) Only such nilitary and civilian personnel as are actually needed on defense
work, public vtilities, and conducting emergency work or on a military mission
will be authorized to operate motor vehicles on the highways between 1800 and
0600 (6:00 P. M. and 6:00 A. M.), tactical movements excepted. In this connec-
tion, contractors' trucks working on 24 hour basis on approved defense projects
will not be delayed. All cars authorized to operate between the above hours
(6:00 P. M. to 6:00 A. M.) shall have standard blackout, or blue lights using Mos&
Blackout Blue Paint (quick-drying) or its equivalent.
(5) All modified lights must conform to a standard pattern and be visible for a
distance of not to exceed 100 feet.
(6) The Military Police assisted by the civil police, will approve and check
modified blackout lights and will not permit modified lights to be used that do not
conform to the standard of blackout lighting equipment, as pertains to visibility
from the air. Special instructions and detailed specifications will be issued later
by the Provost Marshal.
(7) Persons operating vehicles at night without approved blackout lights will
be arrested promptly.
(8) Parking is prohibited on the following streets in Honoluhi:
School Street Nuuanu Avenue
Lusitania Street Alapai Street between Lusitania and
Beretania Street Beretania
King Street Iwilei Road between King and railroad
Waialae Street tracks
Dillingham Boulevard Queen Street on mauka side between
Middle Street Iwilei Road and Fort Street
(9) During air raids all vehicles are prohibited from operating, except the follow-
ing:
a. Military vehicles on a military mission.
b. Civilian police cars.
c. Certain civilian vehicles specifically authorized by the Provost Marshal.
All other operators will halt their vehicles off the main roads or streets where
they will remain until authorized to be moved by the police (civil or military)
or until ALL CLEAR is given.
(10) Immediate action will be taken by all commanders to insure that their
personnel are informed of the above contents.
(11) The cooperation of all personnel, civil and military, is directed.
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:
Walter C. Phillips,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.
Official:
William E. Donegan,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.
Distribution: Special, plus 100 to Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H., plus 500
for file w/SOP.
[CORRECTED COPYJ
(Please destroy all previous copies)
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Forward Echelon,
0500 17 December 1941.
Subject: Coordination of Traffic Control (Corrections to Par 9 / and 9 h (tenta-
tive) SOP-HD)
To: Distribution, Special, plus one to each holder of SOP-HD and Chief of Police,
Honolulu, T. H.
1. Reference letter, HHD, Corrected copy, subject "Coordination of traffic
control", dated 10 December 1941, SOP-HD is further corrected as follows:
o. "9 /. Motor vehicles operating at night at the discretion of local commanders,
will be:
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3005
"(1) in convoy with Standard Blackout lights or approved modifications with
tail light shielded or painted all blue, on all vehicles, or,
"(2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard blackout lights
or approved modifications on the leading vehicle and a tail light shielded or painted
all blue on the rear vehicle, and no lights on the others.
"(3) Standard blackout lights or approved modifications are authorized for lise
at all times and all places during hours of darkness on vehicles carrying military
personnel on a military mission.
"(4) On two-way roads the distance between vehicles and/or serials will be
sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic.
"(5) All motor vehicles not having standard blackout lighting equipment shall
have modified lights conforming to the following specifications:
"Headlights to be painted all black with the exception of a two and one-half
inch circle, slightly below the center of the headlight lens. This circle will be
painted with Moss Blackout Blue paint (quick-drying) or equivalent. Tail lights
will be shielded or painted all blue. Sufficient coats of the Blackout Blue paint
will be used to insure that the "modified lights" conform to the standard of
blackout lighting equipment, as pertains to visibility from the air."
b. Par 9 h (tentative), sup-par 4, changed to read as follows:
"(4) only such military and civilian personnel as are actually needed on defense
work, public utilities, and conducting emergency .work or on a military mission
will be authorized to operate motor vehicles on the highways between 1800 and
0600 (6:00 PM and 6:00 AM), tactical movements except. In this connection,
contractors' trucks working on 24 hour basis on approved defense projects will not
be delayed. All cars authorized to operate between the above hours (6:00 PM
to 6:00 AM) shall have standard blackout lights or "approved modifications"
using Moss Blackout Blue paint (quick-drying) or its equivalent and with tail
light shielded or painted all blue."
c. Par 9 h (tentative) sub-paragraph (.5) deleted.
d. Par 9 h (tentative) sub-paragraph (6) delete the last sentence which reads as
follows: "Special instruction and detailed specifications will be issued later by the
Provost Marshal."
2. The above corrections will be made on all copies of the corrected SOP-HD
(see corrected copy of letter, same subject, HHD, dated 10 Dec 1941).
By command of Lieutenant General EMMONS:
J. Lawton Collins,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.
Official:
Wm. Donegan
William E. Donegan,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shaffer, T. H., 10 December 1941.
Subject: Air Raid Alarm Instructions. (Paragraph II b, r, d, e and f (TENTA-
TIVE) added to SOP HD.)
To: Distribution Special, Plus 90 to Navv and 100 to Chief of Police, Honolulu,
T. H.
1. Paragraph 11, SOP HD, is repeated below and changed by inserting para-
graph a and adding paragraphs b, r, d, e and /.
"11. Installations and Alarm System. — a. All important installations not
protected by the Territorial Home Guard will be guarded by troops. An adequate
alarm system will be established in connection therewith."
h. (ij A general Air Raid Alarm will be started bv sounding a long blast on the
siren in the Aloha Tower. Orders for such Air Raid Alarm will be given only by
the Air Corps Warning Service Information Center by direct communication
with the Navy Detail at the .\loha Tower.
(2) This alarm will immediately be taken up by units, small groups, patrols
and individuals who will immediately sound the alarm by a continuous blast on
their alarm equipment until it is picked up and relayed by adjacent groups.
Usually one (1) minute duration should be sufficient.
3006 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(3) Alarm equipment is listed below and will be used for no other purpose ex-
cept in connection with Air Raid Alarm and recall therefrom or All Clear Signals.
(a) Siren on Aloha Tower.
(b) Stewart type Klaxon Horn.
(c) Ambulance sirens.
(d) Fire truck sirens.
(e) Police sirens.
(/) All other sirens not covered above.
c. The "Recall from Air Raid Alarm" or "All Clear Signal" will be relayed by
the alarm equipment indicated above, starting with the siren on the Aloha Tower,
on instructions from the Air Corps Warning Service Information Center. The
signal will be "broken short blasts" repeated until relayed by adjacent units.
d. In addition to the above signals, Air Raid Alarms and "All Clear" instruc-
tions will be announced over teletype networks, relayed over tactical communi-
cation nets, and announced over KGNB and KGU.
e. The above Air Raid Alarm signals will not be given except as indicated above
unless units are actually attacked by enemy aircraft.
/. The above Air Raid Alarms and All Clear Signals will be relayed to the Dis-
trict Commanders of the outlying islands by the Department Signal Officer.
By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:
Walter C. Phillips,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.
Official:
Wm. Donegan,
William E. Donegan,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.
Distribution: Special, plus 90 to Navy and 100 to Chief of Police, Honolulu,
T. H., 500 for file w/SOP.
HEADQUARTERS HEADQUARTERS
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
Fort Shafter, T. H. Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, T. H.
11 April 1941 11 April 1941
[Exhibit D]
[secret]
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier,
Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District
SECTION I — directives
[Extract]
* * * * * * • *
3. Method of coordination. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined
that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation
and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy
operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked,
as prescribed in Joint Action of the .\rmy and the Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, para-
graph 96.
* * * * * :i>f *
18. Navy. The Commandant. FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall
provide for:
* * * * 4: 4c t
i.^ Distant reconnaissance.
*******
21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice
in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until dis-
approved in part or in whole bv either the War or the Navv Department. This
HCF-41 (JCD-42) supercedes HCE-39 (JCD-13) except that the Annexes Nos.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3007
I to VIT of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of
this plan.
(Signed) Walter Q. Short (Signed) C. C. Bloch
Walter C. Short C. C. Bloch
Lieut. General, U. S. Army, Rear- Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commanding, Commandant,
Hawaiiant Department. Fourteenth Naval District
True Extract Copy:
O. M. Cutler
O. M. Cutler
l.t. Col., Infantry
[Exhibit E]
confidential
Headquarters Hawaiian Department;
Fort Shafter, T. H:, 20 March 1941.
JOINT AIR OPERATIONS:— To be included as a part of Annex No. VII,
HCF-39, (14-ND-JCD 13) RCT, Joint Security Measures for the protection
of the PACIFIC FLEET and PEARL HARBOR BASE, (now in preparation).
When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval
Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14rth Naval District), agree that
the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such
action each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make
available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces
at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be
conducted in accordance with the following plans:
1. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the
tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the
Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due con-
sideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment air-
planes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force
will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until com-
pletion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.
2. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be
executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense
Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these mis.sions.
With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter
aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force
will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for main-
tenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation,
it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control.
3. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search opera-
tions, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the
tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.
4. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for
the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will
pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.
Approved: 21 March, 1941
(sgd) C. C. Bloch
C. C. Block
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commandant
Fourteenth Naval District
True Copy: O. M. Cutler
O. M. Cutler
Lt. Col., Infantry
(sgd) Walter C. Short
Walter C. Short
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding
Hawaiian Department
3008 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[Exhibit F]
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
fort shafter, t, h.
Chief of Staff
War Department, Washington DC
Reurad four seven two tv/enty seventh report department alerted to prevent
sabotage period liaison with Navy
Short
Enc sec by
Lt Jos Engelbertz SC
5:40 P 27 Nov 41
True copy
O. M. Cutler
O M Cutler,
Lt Col Infantry
[Exhibit G]
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
fort SHAFTER, T. H.
Signature and Title
114 War Kr 189 WD PRTY
C G Washn, D. C, 842 Nov 28, 1941.
Hawn Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.
482 28th critical situation demands that all precaution be taken immediately
against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War
Department paren see paragraph three mid sc thirty dash forty five end paren
stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessar}'
to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and
equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subver-
sive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This
does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop Protective
measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding un-
necessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical
telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect
your responsibility under existing instructions
Adams
True copy
O. M. Cutler
O. M. Cutler
Lt col Infantry
[Exhibit H]
[CONFIDENTIAL]
[Extract— UID-SR 30-45]
3. DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITY, a. (1) By direction of the
President, investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters
are controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Depart-
ment of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and
the Office of the Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. In accordance
with this directive, the War Department assumes responsibility for the investiga-
tion of officers, enlisted men, and civilians employed on military reservations or
under military control. Similar personnel of the naval establishment is covered
by Naval Intelligence. The investigation of other civilians suspected of sub-
versive activities, except in certain overseas possessions, is the responsibility of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, hereinafter referred
to as the F. B. I.
(2) Cooperation with the agencies of Naval Intelligence and the F. B. I. will be
effected by appropriate echelons of our CS system, to the end that full protection
may be obtained without duplication of effort.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3009
b. Corps Area and Department Commanders are charged with the supervision
of countersubversive operations, in accordance commands, including those of
exempted stations and tactical units temporarily present, except the activities
coordinated by the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General
Staff.
True Extract Copy
O. M. Cutler
O. M. Cutler,
Lt. Col., Infantry
[Exhibit I]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
fort shafter, t. h.
Memorandum For Department Adjutant General:
(date)
Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or
having a different security classification.
This message is Priority
/sgd/Thomas H. Green,
Thomas H. Green,
Lt. Col. J. A. G. D.,
Department Judge Advocate.
The Adjutant General,
War Department, Washington, D. C.
Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth comma full precautions are
being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative respon-
sibility of war department paren paragraph three mid SC thirty dash forty five
end paren and military establishments including personnel and equipment stop
as regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as
power plants comma telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma this
headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one
requested the Governor of the territory to use the broad powers vested in him by
section sixty seven of the organic act which provides comma in effect comma that
the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the
United States in the territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence
comma invasion comma insurrection etc stop pursuant to the authority stated
the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on
this headquarters to furnish and continued to furnish such adequate protection
as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connec-
tion therewith comma being committed against vital installations and structures
in the territory stop pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protec-
tion is no w being afforded vital civilian installations stop in this connection
comma at the instigation of this Headquarters the City and County of Honolulu
on June T hirtieth Nineteen Forty One enacted an ordnance which permits The
Command ing General Hawaiian Department comma to close comma or restrict
the use of and travel upon comma any highway within the city and County of
Honolulu comma whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary
in the int erest of National Defense stop the authority thus given has not yet
been exer cised stop relations with FBI and all other Federal and Territorial of-
ficials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all
pertinent matters
Short
Enc Sec by
LT JOS ENGELBERTZ SC
Lt Jos Engelbertz SC
2:45 P 29 Nov 41
True copy ^
O. M. Cutler,
O. M. Cutler,
Lt Col Infantry
3010 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[Exhibit J]
SECRET
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
office of the signal officer
Fori Shafter, T. H., 20 December, 1941.
In reply refer to:
Sig.
Subject: Detector Operation.
To: Department Signal Officer.
1. On November 27, 1941, after conference with Assistant Chief of Staff G-3.
and receiving instructions to operate all mobile detectors from two hours before
dawn until one hour after dawn, I, as Acting Department Signal Officer, gave
immediate instructions to Captain TETLEY, Commanding Officer of the Air-
craft Warning Company, to initiate the above detector operation so long as
Alert No. 1 was in force.
2. The detectors in question operated daily thereafter during the prescribed
period except when having occasional operational trouble. In addition, the six
detector stations operated daily except Sundays from 7:00 A. M. until 11:00 A. M.
for routine training. Daily except Saturday and Sunday, the hours 12:00 noon
until 4:00 P. M. were devoted to training and maintenance work.
W. H. Murphy,
Lt. Col, Sig C.
True Copv:
O. M. Cutler
O. M. Cutler,
Lt. Col., Infantry.
[Exhibit K]
SECRET
AFFIDAVIT
HicKAM Field, T. H.
20 December 1941.
I, JAMES A MOLLISON, certify that during the period 27 November 1941
to 7 December 1941 the Navy made no requests to the Hawaiian Air Force for
in shore or long range aerial reconnaissances.
JaS. A. MOLLISON,
Lt. Col, A. C,
H. A. F. C/S.
True Copy:
O. M. Cutler
O. M. Cutler,
Lt. Col., Infantry.
[Exhibit L]
CERTIFICATE
I certify that on November 27, 1941, I accompanied General Short and Greneral
Martin to Admiral Kimmel's office for conference relative to sending Army pur-
suit planes to Midway and Wake. As this would unquestionably weaken the
defenses of Oahu, Admiral Kimmel asked a question of Captain Mc Morris, his
War Plans Officer, which was substantially as follows:
Admiral Kimmel: Mc Morris what is your idea of the chances of a surprise raid
on Oahu.
Captain McMorris: I should say none Admiral.
James A. Mollison, •
Lieut. Colonel, A. C.
True Copv:
O. M. Cutler,
O. M. Cutler,
Lt. Col., Infantry
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3011
[Exhibit M]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
fort shafter, t. h.
November 26, 1941.
RCA 831 US GOVT
Washington, DC Nov 26 1941 L149P
Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, Th.
Four six five twenty sixth
Reference two B Dash Twenty four airplanes for special photo mission Stop
It is desired that the pilots be instructed to photographic Truk Island in the
Caroline Group Jaluit in the Marshall Group Stop Visual reconnaissance
should be made simultaneously Stop Information desired as to the number
and location of naval vessels including submarines Comma airfields Comma
aircraft Comma guns Comma barracks and camps Stop Pilots should
be warned islands strongly fortified and manned Stop Photography and
reconnaissance must be accomplished at high altitude and there must be no
circling or remaining in the vicinity Stop Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing
maximum altitude and speed Stop Instruct crews if attacked by planes to
use all means in their power for self preservation Stop The two pilots and
copilots should be instructed to confer with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at
Honolulu to obtain his advice Stop If distance from Wake and Jaluit to
Moresby is too great Comma suggest one B dash twenty four proceed from Wake
to Jaluit and back to Wake Comma Then Philippines by usual route photo-
graphing Ponape while enroute Moresby Stop Advise pilots best time of day
for photographic Truk and Jaluit Stop Upon arrival in Philippines two copies
each of any photographs taken will be sent to General MacArthur Comma
Admiral Hart Comma Admiral Kimmel Comma the chief of naval opera-
tions Comma and the War Department Stop Insure that both Bdash twenty
four airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from
Honolulu.
Adams
Decoded by: Lt. G E Haven SC, 147A November 27, 1941.
True copy:
O. M. Cutler
O. M. Cutler,
Lt. Col., Infantry.
Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 465 — 26th
[Exhibit N]
(Copy)
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
FORT shafter, T. H.
Memorandum for Department Adjutant General:
Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear
or having a different security classification.
This message is Priority.
/s/ Cheney L. Bertholf,
Lt. Col., A. G. D.
Approved for Transmission: " Adjutant General
/s/ O. M. McDole,
Major A. G. D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.
Chief of the Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C.
Reference secret photographic mission of two B twenty fours stop One of
B twenty fours Lieutenant Faulkner which landed Hickam Field this date short
following equipment considered essential to safety and success of mission colon
79716 O — 46 — pt. 18 11
3012 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fifty caliber machine guns comma mounts comma adapters and accessories for
upper hemisphere semicolon fifty caliber tunnel gun comma adapter and acces-
sories semicolon for starboard and port sides semicolon second thirty caliber
nose gun comma adapter and accessories stop Guns can be removed from our
equipment and ammuntion is available stop Strongly recommend that second
B twenty four bring necessary equipment from mainland for installation on both
planes prior their departure from Hickam Field stop Plane being held here
until satisfactorily armed subject plane has no armor plate installation stop
Except for removal of passenger seats plane equipped as for ferry service North
Atlantic signed Martin HAF 141 C
Short.
Enc sec by Lt. G. E. Haven, S. C. 225P 5 Dec/41
A True Copy
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2d Lt. F. A.
[Exhibit O]
20 December 1941.
certificate
On the morning of 7 December, 1941, the 18th Wing had 6 B-17s in commission,
with 6 B-17s out of commission for maintenance. Of the 8 B-17s destroyed dur-
ing the attack, 4 were from those stationed at Hickam Field, 2 from those in
commission and 2 from those out of commission. The other 4 were lost while
attempting to land upon arrival from the Mainland. These B-17s arrived at
Hickam Field between 8:00 A. M. and 8:20 A. M., 7 December, 1941. These
planes took off from Hamilton Field, California in two squadrons, one at 9:30
P. M. December 6, Pacific time (12:30 A. M. December 7, Eastern time) and the
other at 10:30 P. M. December 6, Pacific time (1:30 A. M. Eastern time).
Of the 8 B-17s which arrived safely from the mainland, none had sufficient gaso-
line to permit dispatching them on missions, nor were they equipped with ammu-
nition for these defensive armament. Machine guns were still cosmolined and
had not been bore sighted. Ferry crews were skeletonized, consisting of pilot, co-
pilot, navigator, engineer and radio operator. Such crews were incapable of
manning all gun positions even if the guns had been properly prepared for combat
and supplied with ammunition.
The B-24 which arrived at Hickam Field on 5th December, 1941, previous to
the attack, had insufficient armament for combat, only 1 .30 cal. and twin .50
cal. guns in the tail, and was without ammunition for the guns that were installed.
James A. Mollison,
Lieut. Colonel, A. C.
True Copy
O. M. Cutler,
0. M. Culter,
Lt. Col. Infantry.
[Exhibit P]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
fort shafter, t. h.
1549WS Washington D C 74/73 RCA USG ETAT 7 1218P
C C
Hawn Dept Ft Shafter TH
529 7th Japanese are presenting at one pm eastern standard time today what
amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine
immediately stop just what significance the hour set may have we do not know
but be on alert accordingly stop inform naval authorities of this communication
Marshall.
Decoded by: Lt. J. H. Babcock 251P Dec. 7, 1941
Code Message No. 529 7th
True Copy
O. M. Cutler,
O. M. Cutler,
Lt. Col. Infantry.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3013
[Exhibit Q]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.
P 4 war L 54 WD 1 Extra Urgent
Washington DC 219P Dec 9 1941.
CG
Hawn Dept Ft Shafter TH
Five four nine ninth Please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our
number five two nine repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact time
deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to staff and by what staff oflBce
received
Colton
Acting.
Decoded by: Lt L G Forbes SC 910AM Dec 9 1941
True Copy
O M Cutler
O M Cutler
Lt Col Infantry.
[Exhibit R]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
fort shafter, t. h.
Chief Signal Officer,
Washington, D. C.
Re your five four nine radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via RCA seven
thirty three morning seventh stop Received signal office Fort Shafter eleven
forty five morning seventh paren this time approximate but within five minutes
paren stop Deciphered message received by Adjutant General HQ HAW dept
two fifty eight afternoon seventh
Short
A true copy :
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
NoTK : This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablegrams. One copy only to
be submitted. The making of an exact copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is for-
bidden. Only such e.\tracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked secret
or confidential as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care
and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General's
Office, without delay. (AR 380-5).
Form H. D. No. 1173 (Revised)— 2892 Honolulu 10-31-41 lOM.
[Exhibit S]
Copy SECRET
Fort Shafter, T. H.
Territory of Hawaii, ss:
Personally appeared before me, the undersigned, authority for administering
oaths of this nature, one Grover C. White, Jr. 0-396182, 2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii who after being duly sworn according
to law deposes and sayeth:
1. At the request of the Control Officer and Naval Liaison OflRcer the AWS
agreed to operate its detectors beyond the daily period of two hours before until
one hour after dawn. The first schedule required operation of all stations from
4 A. M. to 6 P. M. This schedule was modified to the hours of 4 A. M. to 4 P. M.
A temporary schedule was next devised which required all stations to operate
from 4 A. M. to 11 A. M. and to have "staggered" operation, i. e., 3 stations from
11 A. M. to 1 P. M., the remaining 3 stations from 1 P. M. to 4 P. M. On Satur-
day, December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to request authority to
have all stations operate from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941 ;
this was agreed to by the Control Officer.
2. Staff Sergeant Stanley J. Wichas, SCAWH, acting RDF Officer, reports
that he saw nothing that could be construed as suspicious in the information
3014 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
received by the AWS Information Center from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M. Sunday, Decem-
ber 7, 1941. This is verified by Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, who was the only
officer in the Information Center from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M.
3. At approximately 7:20 A. M. a report was received from a Detector station
at Opana that a large number of planes was approaching Oahu on a course North
3 degrees East at a distance of approximately 132 miles. This information was
mmediatxly transmitted by the switchboard operator, Pfc. Joseph McDonald to
Lt. Tyler, who talked to Opana about the flight. The statement of Pfc. Joseph
McDonald, SCAWH, the switchboard operator is attached.
4. The Navy Liaison Officer's position within the Information Center was not
manned when I reached the Information Center at about 8:20 A. M. This posi-
tion was manned shortly thereafter by Technical Sergeant Merle E. Stouffer,
SCAWH, who remained on the position until approximately 4:30 P. M. when the
position was taken over by Naval Officers.
Further the deponent sayeth not.
/s/ Grover C. White, Jr.,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of Dec. A. D. 1941 at Fort
Shafter, T. H.
/s/ Adam R. Huggins,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Summary Court.
A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
Fort Shafter, T. H.
Territory of Hawaii, ss:
Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority for administering
oaths of this nature, one Joseph P. McDonald, 13006145, Pvt Icl, Signal Com-
pany, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly sworn according to law
deposes and sayeth:
I was on duty as telephone operator at the AWS Information Center on Sunday
morning, December 7, 1941. I received a telephone call from Opana at 7:20
A. M. stating that a large number of planes were heading towards Oahu from
North 3 points east. I gave the information to Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps,
78th Pursuit Squadron, Wheeler Field, T. H. and the Lieutenant talked with
private Lockard at the Opana Station. Lt Tyler said that it wasn't anything
of importance. At that time the planes were 132 miles out. I asked if we
shouldn't advise Corporal Beatty and have the plotters come back. The Opana
Unit stressed the fact that it was a very large number of planes and they seemed
excited. Lt. Tyler said that it was not necessary to call the plotters or get in
touch with anyone.
Further the deponent sayeth not.
Joseph P. McDonald,
Sig. Co., Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of December A. D. 1941 at
Fort Shafter, T. H.
Adam R. Huggins,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps.
Summary Court.
True copy:
O. M. Cutler,
O. M. Cutler,
Lt. Col., Infantry.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3015
Statement of Lieut. Kermit A. Tyler
20 December 1941.
On Wednesday, 3 December 1941, I was first detailed to learn the operation of
the plotting board in the Interception Control Center. I reported for duty at
1210, just as the crew on duty was leaving. I spoke with Lt. White, Signal
Corps, a few minutes and he showed me the operating positions for Navy, Bom-
bardment, Antiaircraft, Controller's position and Aircraft W'arning Service. I
remained on duty until 1600. Only o telephone operator was on duty with me.
On Sunday, 7 December 1941, t was on duty from 0400 to 0800 as Pursuit
Officer at the Interception Control Center. From 0400 until approximately 0610
there were no plots indicated on the interception board. From that time until
0700 a number of plots appeared on the control board at various points surround-
ing the Island of Oahu. I particularly remember at least one plot South of
Kauai and I believe there was on South of Molokai. There were two plots at
some distance North of Oahu and which I remember seeing on the historical
record. At the time, I questioned the plotter of the historical record who stated
that he makes a record of all plots as they come in. There were a number of
plots over and around the Island of Oahu. Having seen the plotters work once
before with about the same general layout, this did not seem irregular to me.
At 0700 all of the men except the telephone operator folded up their equipment
and left. At about 0720 the operator at the Opana RDF Station called me and
said that the instrument indicated a large number of planes at 132 miles to the
North. Thinking it must be a returning naval patrol, a flight of Hickam Field
Bombing planes, or possibly a flight of B-17 planes from the coast, I dismissed it
as nothing unusual. (It is common knowledge that when Honolulu radio stations
are testing by playing Hawaiian Music throughout the night that coincidentally
B-17s are apt to come in using the station for radio-direction finding. The radio
station was testing on the morning of 7 December, 0230-0400). At about 0750
I heard some airplanes outside and looking toward Pearl Harbor saw what I
thought to be a navy practicing dive bombing runs. At a little after 0800,
Sergeant Eugene Starry, A. C. Wheeler Field, called me to tell me that Wheeler
Field had been attacked. I immediately had the telephone operator call all men
back to duty. Most of the men had returned to duty by 0820 when Major L. N.
TindaJ arrived and took charge of the Control Center. I remained on duty
assisting Major K. P. Bergquist and Major L. N. Tindal as Pursuit Control
Officer until about 1615, 8 December 1941, with the exception of rest periods
from 2000 to 2400, 7 December, and 0600 to 1000, 8 December.
(s) Kermit A. Tyler,
Kermit A. Tyler,
1st Lieut., Air Corps.
True copy:
O. M. Cutler,
O. M. Cutler,
Lt. Col. Infantry.
Headquarters 53rd Coast Artillery Brigade (AA),
Office of the Brigade Commander,
Fort Shafler, T. H., 20 December 1941.
Subject: Report on action bv 53d C. A. Brigade (AA) from 0755 to 2400, 7 Decem-
ber 1941.
To: General Short.
]. At the beginning of the attack on Oahu 7 December 1941, the 53d Coast
Artillerv Brigade (A A) was operating under the conditions of Alert No. 1, S. O.
P., N. C. A. C, 26 November 1941. The 97th C. A. and the AA Detachments of
the East Group had anti-sabotage guards at their fixed 3-inch gun Batteries. All
anti-aircraft equipment was being guarded.
3016 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. a. Fort Weaver. Headquarters 2nd Battalion 97th C. A. (\A).
\lerted 0810
Ready to fire 0813
Engaged enemy at 0814
Amnu fired: 407— .30 Cal. hall.
117— .30 Cal. A. P.
53- .30 Cal. Tracer.
12— Pistol.
South Group Command Post detail at stations at 0810. NO repeat XO inter-
ruption in communications in South Group during this period. There was rifle
and automatic rifle fire on low flying enemy planes by officers and men.
Battery G 97th, were in camp at Fort Weaver. Its battle position is at fixed
batterv at Fort Weaver.
'Alerted at 0810
Ready to fire 0830
Engaged enemv 0830
Fired 30 rds— 3" A. A. Shrapnel. Approximately 200 rds of .30 Cal. ball
Amm. One .50 Cal. Machine Gun was in action at approximately 8:40
A. M. During this firing Private YORK gunner was wounded while
engaging the enemy, he stayed at his post although ordered to take cover.
Lieutenant KING states that the battery fire broke up and definitely
turned back one formation of 15 enemy pianos. Casualties — -One (1)
Officer dead - Killed while proceeding through Hickam J^ield to his battle
position. Four (4) enlisted men woimded.
(Basic: Ltr., HO. 53d C. A. Brigade (AA). dated 20 December 1941. Subject: "Report on action by 53d
r. A. Brigade (AA) from 0755 to 2400, 7 Dec. 1941".)
Battery F 97th, was camped at Fort Weaver. Its battle position at Fixed
Battery Closson, Fort Kamehameha, T. H.
Alerted 0755, and moved to Batterv position across Pearl Harbor Entrance.
Ready to fire 0855
Engaged Enemy 0900 to 0920
Amm. fired: 27—3" A. A., H. E., M. K. fuse M3.
Approximately 400 rds .30 Cal. ball.
Approximately 150 rds .30 Cal. A. P.
Battery G 64th, was in barracks at Fort Shafter, battle position at Ahua Point.
Alerted approximately 0815, and moved to battery position at Fort
Kamehameha.
R^ady to fire 1030
Engaged Enemy with .30 Cal. M. G. at 1030
Amm. Fired: Approximately 50 rds of .30 Cal. ball.
Battery H 64th, was in barracks at Fort Shafter. Its battle position is at Fort
Weaver.
Alerted 0830
Ready to fire 1145
Engaged Enemy 2100
Amm. fired: 40 rds— .50 Cal. ball.
40 rds— .50 Cal. A. P.
30 rds— .50 Cal. Tracer
Marine detachment: The Fleet Machine Gun School at Fort Weaver. Opera-
tions were in cooperation with South Group although not tactically assigned.
Alerted 0800
R^ady to fire 0810
Engaged Enemy 0810
Amm. fired: Approximately 8000 rds of .50 Cal. A. P. ball and tracer.
Approximatelv 450 rds of 20 mm A. A.
This Detachment shot down 4 enemy planes and saved a 4 engined bomber by
causing enemy plane firing on it's tail to pull out and cease it's attack. Much
shrapnel and some small arms bullets fell about Fleet M. G. School. There was
excellent cooperation from Fort Weaver personnel in the liaison, phone, etc.
b. 98th Coast Artillery, Schofield Barracks.
Alerted at 0800
The communications section at the Command Post, Wahiawa, shot down one
enemy plane flying at less than 100 feet, with their automatic rifles at 0855.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3017
1st Baiialion 98th C. A. (AA), was in position and ready for action at the
following time:
B— 98: 0955
D— 98: lOOli
C— 98: 1030
Battery M 64th, stationed at Fort Shaffer, was alerted at 0815, moved to Wheeler
Field, and was ready for action at 1155.
2nd Battalion 98th C. A. {AA). This Battalion has two batteries at Kaneohe
and one at Waipahu School. They were in position and ready for action at the
following times:
F— 98: 1315
G— 98: 1315
H— 98: 1330
c. Cattip Malakole 251st C. A. (AA). All units were alerted at 0805 when fired
upon by a single enemy plane. All units returned the fire with small arms and
the plane was shot down.
1st Battalion 251st C.A. {AA), was in position and ready for action as follows:
B— 251: at West Loch, 1145
C— 251: Ewa Beach, 1145
D— 251: South of Ewa, 1145
2nd Battalion 251st C. A. {AA), was in position as follows:
E— 251: Navy Yard
F — 251: Navy Recreation Area
G— 251: Tank Farm
H— 251: Navy Yard
At 1120 and again at 1122, E, 251st fired on enemy planes, shooting down one
plane. 100 rds of .50 Cal. were fired on the first plane and 200 rds of .50 Cal.
were fired on the second plane.
d. Fort Kamehameha. Battery A, 97th C. A. (AA) fired 1500 rds of .30 Cal.
at one enemy plane offshore at 0835.
c. Sand Island. The A A Detachment of Battery F, 55th C. A., present at Sand
Island when the attack started was ready for action at 0815. This battery fired
89 rds of 3" A A and shot down two (2) enemy planes at 0815.
/. Fort Shafter.
(1) Three (3) enemy dive bombers were fired on by the Headquarters Battery
and the Intelligence Battery of this Brigade and by Battery E, 64th C. A. (AA).
Ammunition Expended — 3,000 .30 Cal.
(2) Enemv planes were fired on at 0900 and 1000 by Batterv A, 64th C. A.
(AA). Ammunition Expended— 1000 .30 Cal.
(3) All 3" gun batteries and Automatic Weapons batteries of the 64th C. A.
(AA) were alerted at 0815 and were in position as follows:
B— 64: at Aiea, 1000
C— 64: at Aliamanu, 1030
D— 64: South of Aliamanu, 1100
F— 64: at Pearl City, 1105
G — 64: See Par. 2 a, above.
H — 64: See Par. 2 a, above.
I — 64: at Aliamanu
K — 64: at Hickam Field
L — 64: at Hickam Field.
M— 64: See Par. 2 b, above.
All of these units except ]\I, 64th fired during the second attack from 1000 to
1145. Ammunition expended as follows:
3", 23 rds.
.50 Cal, 2361 rds.
.30 Cal., 2821 rds.
g. Fort Barrette. Battery H, 97 C. A. (AA), was stationed at Fort Weaver.
The battery was alerted at 0755, moved out of Fort Weaver at 0830, and arrived
at Fort Barrette at 0910. Enemy planes were engaged by small arms fire at Fort
Weaver, while enroute, and at Fort Barrette. The detachment on guard at Fort
Barrette shot down one enemy plane at 0910 by small arms fire.
3. Three (3) Marine AA Batteries were attached to the Brigade at 2245.
4. Ammunition. Status at 0730, 7 December 1941. All units of the Brigade
had in their possession, the initial issue of small arms ammunition. This included
ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles and machine guns. In addition,
3018 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the 3-inch ammunition was so positioned that it was readily accessible to all units
of the Brigade except four (4) batteries for which ammunition was at Aliamanu
Crater. These batteries completed drawing their initial allowance, 1200 rounds
per battery, bv 1015.
' ■ C. K. Wing
C. K. Wing,
Colonel, 53d C. A. Brigade (AA), Commanding.
[Exhibit T]
Status of aircraft of 7 December 1941 before a/^ar/:— Continued
HICKAM FIELD
Name
Total
Out
In
A-20A -
13
12
32
2
1
2
1
2
3
2
1
1
7
6
12
2
1
0
0
0
1
2
1
1
6
B-17 D -
6
B-18 :
20
B-12 A._ _
0
0-47 B . .
0
BT2BR
0
BT-2CR.-.
1
C-33 - -.1 -
2
A-12 _- .- -
2
P-26 A .....
0
P-26B
0
B-24 ^- - - -
0
72
33
39
BELLOWS FIELD
0-47 B
10
3
6
1
4
0-49 - _
2
WHEELER FIELD
P40 C . . . .
87} 100
44
8—14
6
1
3
4
3
1
2
1
2
{ 32
24
1-4
3
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
2
M
55/
P40 B
P3f) A
20
P26A
7—10
P26B
3
B 18.- ... " . . ....
1
B 12.
1
AT6
3
0A9 _ _
3
0 47B
1
Pi. 12A
2
OA 8
1
VT2--
0
Type
Damaged
in raid
Percent of
damage
HICKAM field:
A-20.
2
10
21
1
67
21
4
2
18
B-17
40
B-18
65
B-24
100
WHEELER field:
P-40 .
65
P-36
55
BELLOWS field:
0-47
40
0-49 ' - . - -
66
A true copy
Edward von Geldern
Edward von Geldern
2nd Lt. F.
James A. Mollison
Lt. Col. A.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3019
Aircraft stalus an of ISOO, 20 Decemhcr 1941
B-17
n-18
A -20
P-40
P-36
0-47
In Comrnission -
31
6
9
5
10
40
2
3
8
21
3
5
2
2nd Fclielon ..
3rd Echelon . .
2
0
TotHl . .
■39
14
10
53
30
.
12 B-17 on hand Hickam 0000-7 Dec.
1 29 B-17s arrived from the Mainland from 7 Dec. to 20 Dee. inclusive.
J.AMKS A. A!oLLTSON,
Lt. Col. A. C.
A true coj^v
Edward von Geldern
Edw.^rd vun Geldern
2nd LI. F. A.
[Exhibit i:]
Headquarter.s Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shatter, T. H.,
Forward Echelon, 21 December 1941.
Memorandum to Lieut Col. Kendall J. Fielder.
The following report of planes shot down, crashing or otherwise destroyed in
the attack on Oahu, 7 December 1941, is submitted for your information. All of
these losses have as yet not been verified, and it is very likely that some of the
reports from different sources will be in reference to the same plane. Verifications
are being received daily:
Time
Source
Details
Remarks
Total
0800-1000
6 officers from emergency
landing field at Haleiwa.
CO Mil District of Kauai.
Civilian report
Accounted for 10 planes .
Some of these may
appear in other re-
ports.
Verified
10
1 plane crashed off North shore,
1 wrecked on Niihau.
1 plane crashed in Qulch, rear
Aiea Hgts.
3 planes crashing in Honolulu
Harbor.
2 planes destroyed by machine-
gun fire.
2 planes
2
Verified
1
Group of officers on fish-
ing trip.
Capt. Ebby, "B" Btry
55th C. A. C.
Btry "F", 55 CAC
251st C. A. C
Btry "H"97th CAC
98th C. A.C
Hq. Btry 15th CAC
35th Infantry.--.
27th Infantry
Verified .
3
0940
Verified
2
0922-1130
0922 report not veri-
fied. llSOrpt verfd.
Verified
2
0805
1 plane, 200 yds. off Malikoli
1 plane crashed flaming 2 mi.
SW Ft. Barrette.
1 plane shot down near Wahiawa
1 plane crashed in Ord shops at
Ft. Kam.
Observed 1 plane crash in sea
SW Barbers Pt.
Observed 1 plane crash in cane
field nr Aiea.
1 plane shot dowh over Bellows
Fid. fell in sea.
1 plane down at Brody Camp
#4:1 nr Kaawa.
1 plane at Ft Weaver 1 at Wheel-
er Field, 1 at Hickam Field,
1 at Pearl Harbor, 1 at Ft Bar-
rette, 1 at Ewa. Witnessed 1
shot down back of Naval Hos-
pital.
1 plane by AA at Beckoning Pt,
1 on deck of a ship.
1020
0855
0830
1100
Verified "
Verified
Verified
Not verf
298th Inf
Verified...
Verified
24th Division
2
Haw. Air Force
Navy
Total
2 doubtful
7
Verified
2
38
The Navy reports are not available.
T. H. Davies,
Lt. Col, Inf, Asst. A. C. of S., G-2.
3020 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
REMARKS: While some of the planes enumerated are undoubtedly duplica-
tions it is believed that a minimum of at least 29 enemy planes were shot down.
Kendall J. Fielder,
Ll. Col., G. S. C, A. C. of S., G-2.
[Exhibit V]
[SECRET]
A true copy
Edward Von Geldern
Edward Von Geldern
2nd Lt. F. A.
[1] Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
' Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 19 February 1941
In replv refer to
Engr. 660
General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff of the Army, War Department, Washington, D. C.
Dear General Marshall: I was very glad indeed to have your letter of Feb-
ruary 7th as it gave us some very definite information on aircraft we did not have.
Since assuming command I have had two conferences with Admiral Kimmel
and two with Admiral Bloch. I have found them both most approachable and
cooperative in every way. I have told them that from my point of view there
will be no hair splitting, but that the one thing that would affect any decision
where there is an apparent conflict between the Army and the Navy in the use
of facilities would be the question of what could produce the greatest combined
effort of the two forces. They have assured me that they will take exactly the
same view. From my brief intercourse with them I feel that our relations should
be extremely cordial.
As a result of my short study of conditions here I believe that the following
are of great importance and I am taking steps to carry out the necessary changes:
(1) Cooperation with the Navy.
(2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance
and servicing of aircraft.
(3) Improvement of the Antiaircraft defense.
(4) Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery.
(5) Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights.
(6) Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improve-
ment in roads and trails.
(7) Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and com-
munication centers.
(8) Increase in the number of Engineer troops.
Cooperation with the Navy. A series of joint committees consisting of Army
and Navy officers has been appointed with a view to the study of cooperation of
the Army and Navy especially with reference to employment of air and Aircraft.
These committees have been directed to report on March 1st. Copy of the
letter creating these committees is, attached hereto as well as copy of
[2] instructions to the echelon comm'anders concerning cooperation with
the Navy.
Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and servicing
of aircraft. Provision has been made for a number of emergency fields upon the
various islands but no provision has been made for dispersion of the planes in the
vicinity of fields and other protection by either camouflage or by bunkers. The
emergency fields on other islands will be valueless for pursuit aviation except
possibly on the Island of Molokai. The pursuit aviation is capable of only
approximately one hour's flying with the throttle wide open. This means that
the dispersion of pursuit aviation must take place upon the Island of Oahu if it
is to be able to meet an attack from any direction. The dispersion and bunkers
for the greater part of the pursuit aviation can be made in the immediate vicinity
of Wheeler Field by the use of ravines and bunkers. The maintenance and repair
facilities can be placed in ravines under ground without an exhorbitant cost in
time or money. Tanks are now available for the distribution of gas and we are
asking for money to install tanks.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3021
The bombers can make use of the landing fields on other islands but it will be
necessary to make provisions for their dispersion in the vicinity of those fields
and also on the Island of Oahu. Their dispersion is more difficult than that of the
pursuit. The repair and maintenance facilities require so much space that it
will be necessary, at least temporarily, to place them above ground protected by
hills. At present the only repair facilities for the bombers are in buildings on
Hickam Field which would undoubtedly be attacked by any surprise raid. Up to
the time that we make runways for dispersion of planes on all the fields surprise
enemy raids would be extremely serious.
Improvernent of the Antiaircraft Defense. The major shortages in Antiaircraft
artillery armament are sixteen 3-inch or 90 m.m. antiaircraft guns (six enroute)
135 37-mm antiaircraft guns, 236 .50 caliber machine guns and 30 sound locators.
The locators are expected in June. The shortage of personnel, however, is much
more serious than the shortage in materiel. Practically all the coast artillery
units have dual roles. If they man antiaircraft artillery the Harbor Defense
Artillery will not be manned, and vice versa. To man the entire antiaircraft
artillery defense project avoiding dual assignments to all but four Harbor Defense
batteries requires an increase in the existing antiaircraft personnel as follows:
Two regiments of Coast Artillery Antiaircraft (Mobile) T-0 4-11.
One Battalion Gun Coast Artillery Antiaircraft (Mobile (less searchlight
battery) T. O. 4-15.
[S] Approximately 90 officers and 2,000 enlisted replacements to activate
three gun batteries and three 37-mm batteries of the 64th Coast Artillery Anti-
aircraft, now inactive. With the increasing critical international situation at
this time it is urgently recommended that all reinforcements of Antiaircraft
Artillery personnel, both unit and individual reinforcements mentioned above,
together with the shortage in antiaircraft artillery materiel, be furnished to this
department with the least practicable delay.
These reinforcements to the antiaircraft artillery garrison, as well as those for
the Harbor Defense Artillery listed below, are required to complete the approved
defense project. No provision of the defense of the Kaneohe Naval Air
Station has been made in the defense project. This problem has been made the
subject of a separate letter, copy attached as Inclosure No. 4.
Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery. There are no major shortages
of equipment for Harbor Defense Artillery. However, about 150 oflficers and
2,700 enlisted men as individual reinforcements and one regiment. Coast Artil-
lery (T. D.) T. O. 4-31 W are required to fully man the Harbor Defense Artillery,
not including the three obsolescent seacoast mortar batteries. It is urgently
requested that these replacements and reinforcements be furnished at the earliest
practicable moment.
As an accessory to the Harbor Defense Artillery, the north shore Railroad
connection is extremely important to give access to railway gun positions on the
north shore.
Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights. The only serious
shortage is in beach defense searchlights. A 24-inch carbon-arc light is under
development; but the receipt of these lights here may be unduly delayed. This
shortage can be overcome immediately by supplying power units for 42 Mack
36-inch projectors which are now on hand. The trucks and power units for
these lights are unserviceable but the projectors are in fair to good shape.
There is a shortage throughout of spare parts for 60-inch searchlights, which
were requisitioned some months ago. These would be required for any pro-
longed action. Information from the Chief of Engineers indicates that they will
probably be furnished in the near future.
Provision for more rapid movements of supplies and reserves by improvement in
roads and trails. With the increase in the number of motors available in the
department it is most necessary that roads be provided to make the maximum
possible use of the motors in the movement of reserves and supplies. The Engi-
neers have made a very careful study of the roads and trails which are necessary
or the defense of the island.
[4] There are numerous bottlenecks in the islands where it is not practicable
to construct alternate roads. If these roads are damaged by shelling or bombing
it is most important that they be repaired in the minimum of time. To provide
for this stores of repair material should be placed in close proximity to the vital
points. It is believed that the Territorial government will cooperate with the
Army in this matter, thus reducing expenses to be charged to National Defense.
3022 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communication
centers. Command Posts, communication centers and items of critical supply
should be bombproofed. This protection of Command Posts particularly should
be done immediately in order that these installations can be trained to function
in these locations before hostilities start.
Increase in the number of Engineer Troops. The protection of aircraft and the
construction of air fields will keep one regiment of engineers employed constantly.
The work on roads and trails would be such as to employ one General Service
Regiment constantly. The combat Engineer regiment of the Hawaiian Division
should be left available for bombproofing of Headquarters and communication
centers and other tactical work.
Previous recommendations for a regiment of Aviation Engineers, less 1 battal-
ion, and an increase in enlisted strength of Third Engineers were based on
assumption that some civilian labor would be available. The situation on
civilian labor has become acute, and while it has been necessary to import skilled
labor, the recent increase in defense work is going to necessitate importing un-
skilled labor as well. The only alternative would be to curtail activities of the planta-
tions and much of our defense work should not be postponed until that is done.
Communications covering all the above recommendations are being or have
been submitted to The Adjutant General. The following are the titles and
dates of letters covering these subjects :
Cooperation with the Navy.
Joint letter, HHD 14th Naval District, 14 February 1941, subject: "Army
and Navy Aircraft in Hawaiian Area", copy attached, Inclosure No. 1
AG 354.2/JAX-(pencil)
Letter, HHD to major echelon commanders, 17 February 1941, subject:
"Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," file 354.2/JAX,
copy attached, Inclosure No. 2.
[5] Dispersion and protection of aircraft. Letter Engr. 452, 19 February 1941,
subject: "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft," Copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 3.
Improvement of Antiaircraft defense and of Harbor Defense Artillery. Letter,
HHD to TAG, 19 February 1941, subject: "Reinforcements for Coast Artillery
Garrison, Hawaiian Department," file 320.2/55 copy attached, Inclosure No. 4.
Letter, HHD to TAG, 18 February 1941, subject: "Defense of Naval Air
Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file 381, copy attached, Inclosure No. 5.
North Shore Railroad Connection. Letter, HHD Engr. 662.7, 19 February 1941,
copy attached, Inclosure No. 6.
Improvement of situation with reference to searchlights, a. Beach defense Lights:
Letter, Engr. 470.3/6 x 470.3/10, 29 January 1940 with 11 Indorsements, 11th
Indorsement AG 470.3 (1-29-40) M-D, 26 August 1940. 12th Indorsement,
HHD dated 18 February 1941, to TAG being transmitted, copy inclosed, In-
closure No. 7.
b. Searchlight Parts. Letter, Engr. 470.3/8, 2 November 1940, to the Chief of
Engineers, subject: "Priority Items, Engineer Status Report, Revision 1940."
1st Indorsement, O., C. of E., (381.4) (Hawaii) 101, 28 January 1941, states:
"Reference Par 1 c, the requisition for spare parts for searchlights was concurred
in by this office. The requisition now is undergoing review by G-4 and action
. is expected shortly. You will be promptly informed of the action taken." Copy
of 1st Indorsement inclosed, Inclosure No. 8.
Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in
Roads and Trails.
Letter, Engr. 611, 19 February 1941, subject: "Military Roads and Trails
Program, Hawaiian Department." Copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 9.
Bombproofing of vital installations. Letters, Engr. 800.96, following subjects
and dates. (Copies attached)
1. Bombproof Command Posts, Hawaiian Air Force, 4 February 1941.
Inclosure No. 10.
2. Bombproof Protection, Command Posts, Hawaiian Division, 4 February
1941, Inclosure No. 11.
3. Bombproof Const /uction for Magazines at Fort Barrette and Fort
Weaver, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 12.
4. Splinterproof Protection for Antiaircraft and Mobile Seacoast Batteries,
4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 13.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3023
[6] 5. Bombproof Command Post, Antiaircraft Groupment, 4 February
1941, Inclosure No. 14.
6. Bombproof Gasoline Storage, Hawaiian Department, 5 February
1941, Inclosure No. 15.
7. Bombproof Protection for Signal Installations, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, 6 February 1941, Inclosure No. 16.
8. Storage of Defense Reserves, Aviation Gasoline, Hawaiian Air
Force, 6 February 1941, Inclosure No. 17.
9. Department Command Post, Aliamanu Crater, last correspondence
660.9 (S), copy attached, Inclosure No. 18.
Increase in number of Engineer Troops. — Letter Engr. 322.03, 19 February 1941,
subject "Additional Engineer Troops", copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 19.
Enclosures herewith are made for your ready reference and information.
Sincerely yours,
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, Commanding.
19 Incls.
[Exhibit W]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Dep.\rtment Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 19 February 1941.
In reply refer to:
Engineer 452.
SECRET
Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.
To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.
1. With the present set-up of existing facilities in this Department the pursuit
ships are forced to operate to a large extent from Wheeler Field and similarly the
bombardment ships are forced to operate from Hickam Field. In times of actual
operation some of the bombardment ships will be operating from bases on the out-
lying islands, but to a large extent the pursuit ships will continue to operate
from Oahu due to the limited time and radious of operation without refueling.
2. The concentration of these airplanes at Wheeler Field and at Hickam Field
presents a very serious problem in their protection against hostile aviation.
Wheeler Field is too small for the operation of the number of pursuit ships to be
furnished to this Department and it will be necessary to develop another base
for at least one group of pursuit aviation. A site in the vicinity of Barbers Point
has been tentatively selected and is now being discussed with the Navy Depart-
ment in connection with that Departments activities on its new air base in the
Ewa Plain Area. The new Army air base will be the subject of a subsequent
letter.
3. While this new base will provide some opportunity for dispersion of the pur-
suit ships this dispersion cannot be counted upon to give adequate protection and
it will be necessary to provide protection bv means of bunkers in the vicinity of
existing fields for both pursuit and bombardment aviation. I have asked the
District Engineer of Honolulu to study this problem and to sbbmit cost esti-
mates on the most economical satisfactory means of providing this protection. The
District Engineer has recommended that the protection be provided by a rolled
fill embankment of dirt and has estimated the cost at $1,200.00 each for pursuit
planes, $8,000.00 each for two engine bombardment planes and $15,000.00 each
for four engine bombardment planes. In arriving at these figures he has given
consideration not only to present unit costs, but has included funds to cover
increasing cost of both labor and non-labor items in this Department; the figures
shown include both direct and indirect costs. This bunkering protection will
cost about the same regardless of its location; the unit price includes cost of taxi
strips and accessories.
4. This protection should be provided for 142 single engine pursuit ships and
121 double engine pursuit ships and for 25 two engine bombers and 70 four
engine bombers. Using the unit costs quoted above the total for pursuit planes
is $315,600.00 and the total for bombing planes is $1,250,000.00. The total for
3024 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the two types is $1,565,600.00. It is recommended that funds in this amount
be allotted to this Department as soon as possible to initiate the installation of
this protection.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.
A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
£nd Lieut. F. A.
[secret]
Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.
AG 600.12 (2-19-41) M 1st Ind ACW/mme
War Department, A. G. O., March 3, 1941. To the Chief of the Air Corps
and Chief of Engineers, IN TLRN.
For remark and recommendation.
B3' order of the Secretary of War:
Adjutant General.
Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.
2nd Ind (12)
War Department,
Office, Chief of Air Corps,
Washington, D. C, March 5, 1941.
To Chief of Engineers.
This office concurs in the recommendations as contained in basic communication.
It is recommended that action be taken to provide funds for this project in the
next supplemental bill.
For the Chief of the Air Corps:
Walter J. Reed,
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps,
Executive, Building, & Grounds Dio.
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
3nd Lieut. F. A.
600.1 (Haw. Dept. Airfields)— 38
Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.
3rd Ind. 3-N
Office, C. of E., April 1, 1942.
To the Adjutant General.
1. Attention is invited to paragraph 3 of basis letter which gives unit prices
for rolled fill bunkers for pursuit planes, two-engine and four-engine bombard-
ment planes. It is noted that the unit prices given include funds to cover in-
creasing cost of both labor and non-labor items and direct and indirect costs.
It is also noted that the unit prices include the cost of taxi strips and accessories.
2. For the reason that the basic letter gave no basis on which this office could
check the estimate of cost, a radiogram was sent to the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, March 25, 1941, requesting detailed information sufficient
for checking. A copy of this radiogram is inclosed. A reply was received
thereto by radiogram from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
dated March 29, 1941, copy of which is inclosed.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3025
3. It is recommended that approval in principle of the proposed protective
arrangements be granted and that an initial allotment of $1,000,000 be made at
this time, authorizing the preparation of complete plans and initiation of con-
struction with a view to providing necessary balances when costs are more
fully determined.
For the Chief of Engineers:
William F. Tompkins,
Lieut Col., Corps of Engineers,
Executive Assistant.
2 Incls:
Copy of Radiogram dated 3/25/41;
Copy of Radiogram dated 3/29/41.
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern
2nd lieut F. A.
Via Air Mail
Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.
AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-E 4th Ind. ESA
War Department, A. G. O., May SI, 1941.
To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. Authority is granted for the construction of revetments in the Hawaiian
Department for 70 four-engine bombardment, 13 light bombardment and 170
pursuit planes. This is the total number of airplanes which at present are visual-
ized as an obtainable objective in Hawaii within a reasonable time.
2. In locating these revetments, "battle stations" of airplanes should be visual-
ized in view of present and projected airdromes in the Hawaiian Islands. Revet-
ments should be dispersed over the widest practicable area around and adjacent
to airdromes.
3. In the designs of revetments for use in the present war in the British Isles,
provision is made for a splinter-proof shelter for airplanes crews and maintenance
personnel who may be caught in the revetments during an air attack. In the
British design, this splinter-proof, shelter is placed in the rear wall or back of the
revetment. In the construction of the revetments proposed for the Hawaiian
Department, it is believed that this feature should be incorporated.
4. It is desired that you submit revised estimates covering the construction of
the revetments approved in paragraph 1 above incorporating splinter-proof shelters
for plane crews.
5. Funds, in the amount of $1,358,000 for the completion of this project as
finally approved after receipt of your revised estimates, are being included in
estimates for funds now being prepared.
By order of the Secretary of War:
Major General, The Adjutant General.
Incls. w/d
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lieut., F. A.
Engr. 452 5th Ind
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Fort Sha/ter, T. H., 31 July 1941.
The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. Provisions in plans have been made for splinter-proof shelters for airplane
screws and maintenance personnel.
2. Revised estimates based on obtainable objectives are as follows:
a. Personnel shelters 5' x 9' @ $635.00 each for 85 pursuit planes,
bunkers having already been built on Wheeler Field by troop
labor $53, 975. 00
3026 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
h. 85 Pursuit Bunkers @ $1,200.00 and 85 personnel shelters,
5' X 9' @ $635.00 to be constructed at locations other than
Wheeler $155, 975. GO
13 Lt. Bombardme'^t bunkers @ $8,000 and 8 personnel shelters
5' X 13' @ $800.00 $114, 400. 00
./. 70 four-enpine bombardment bunkers @ $15,000 and 70 per-
sonnel shelters 5' x 17' @ $925.00 . - $1,050,000.00
Total $1, 374. 350. 00
3. The bunkers for pursuit planes will be built at the new pursuit field and at
Bellows Field. These for A-20-A planes will be at Bellows Field and for the
4-engine bombardment planes will be started at Hickam Field. It is not planned
at this time to construct any bunker for these 4-engine planes on the outlying
airports, but it is possible that when these airports are completed, the installation
of some bunkers at these airports with the majority at Hickam may be desirable.
This question has been discussed with the District Engineer, Honolulu, who states
that the costs at these field will be about the same as his estimate for Hickam.
4. Since the figure of $1,374,350.00 is so close to the figure of «l,35S,000.00
mentioned in 4th Indorsement, it is recommended that the latter figure included
in the estimates be adopted and that funds in this amount be nllotted to the Dis-
trict P^ngineer, Honolulu, for this purpose.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commandino-
A T^ue Cipv:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von GelderN:
2nd Lieut. F. A.
Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department.
A-G 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-G 6th Ind. ESA
War Department, A. G. O., September 22, 1RA1 .
To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. Plans for revetments proposed in tl^e preceding correspondence are approved.
2. F inds in the amount of $1,358,000 for X>q completion of revetments in the
Hawa ian Department have been included in Project C-21, preliminary estimates
1943. It is expected that they will become available about January 1, 1942.
3. Final design of the revetments is being prepared by the Fortification Divi-
sion, Corps of P^ngineers, and will be coordinated with the Chief of the Army
Air Forces, upon completion.
4. When available, funds will be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu,
for the construction of the required revetments.
Bv order of the Secretarv of War:
.\ True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern
2nd Lieut., F. A.
Major General, The Adjutant General.
[Exhibit X]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., Sept. 10, 19J,1. .
In replv refer to:
Engr. 600.96 SECRET
Subject: Underground Repair Facilities, Hawaiian Air Depot.
To: The .\djutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. The provision of bombproof faciHties for the repair of aircraft by the Ha-
waiian Air Depot is vital to the continued functioning of the Hawaiian Air Force
during an attack on Oahu.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3027
2. At present all shop and repair facilities of the Hawaiian Air Depot are
crowded into a small area at Hickham Field. This area is located close to the
entrance channel of Pearl Harbor which is a perfect landmark even during black-
outs. Concealment or confusion as to the purpose of this installation by camou-
flage is impracticable by any means known to this headquarters. In any attack
or raid on this island, it is not only probable, but almost unavoidable that the
Depot would be put of of action.
3. Considerable study has been made of the problem of insuring continued main-
tenance facilities for the A'w Force and the only logical solution is to provide bomb-
proof shelter for part of the existing maintenance facilities. Provision of bomb-
proofed protection for all of these facilities is manifestly impracticable due to the
tremendous cost. It is believed that bombproofed space for one complete B-17
type airplane and for two B-17's without wing and tail assemblies, together with
required space for all subassembly overhaul an repair represents the minimum space
required. The District Engineer, Honolulu, has prepared a preliminary design of this
structure and estimates its cost at $3,480,650.00. Copies of the design drawings and
his estimate are inclosed as Inclosures 1 and 2. Proposed location of this repair
depot is shown on print, inclosure No. 3. This location has been selected because
it is at a considerable distance from any other probable target, because the terrain
is adapted to camouflage and because the soil will ofifer no construction difficulties.
Location adjacent to the present facilities of the Hawaiian Air Depot at Hickam
Field is impracticable; rock and ground water are reached only a few feet under-
ground and this location is close to other primary targets of an air attack.
4. It is recommended that one imderground repair depot of the type shown on
inclosed plans be approved for construction at Wheeler Field and that funds in
the amount of $3,480,650.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, for
this construction.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.
3 Incls: #1 Design Dwgs. (3 sheets)
2 Estimate
3 Location Drawing
A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lieut., F. A.
Subject: Underground Repair Facilities, Hawaiian Air Depot.
AG 600.12 (9-10-41) NC-G 1st Ind. ESA
War Department, A. G. O., October 27, 1941.
To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. The cost of providing bombproof underground repair facilities compared
with the advantages to be gained is so great, that it is a policy that such facilities
will not be provided.
2. Although the advantages of greater security which could be achieved by the
provision of bombproof underground repair facilities must be recognized, the
additional cost involved makes it necessary for air base installations exposed to
possible bombardment attacks to assume this risk.
3. One hangar being built for our Atlantic base is to provide sidewalls of bomb-
splinter proof construction. If you desire installations of this type, due consid-
eration will be given your request, considering funds are available, and the needs
of other bases similarly exposed to danger of air attack.
By order of the Secretary of War:
E. S. Adams,
Major General, The Adjutant General.
3 Incls n/c
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lieut., F. A.
79716 0—46 — pt. 18 12
3028 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[Exhibit Y]
U]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., October 28, 1941.
In reply refer to:
Engr. 400.312
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Subject: Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Materials.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. Reference is made to the following project letters from this headquarters:
a. Letter to The Adjutant General, Engr. 600.94, 4 February 1941, subject:
"Splinterproof Protection for Antiaircraft and Mobile Seacoast Batteries," recom-
mending that $306,000 be allotted to initiate protective shelters for personnel and
propellants at antiaircraft and mobile seacoast batteries. In 4th Indorsement,
AG 662.1 (2-4-41) M-WPD, 31 March 1941, this headquarters was advised that
the recommendation was not favorably considered, and that "protective instal-
lations of this type should be improvised by ordinary field fortification methods."
b. Letter to The Adjutant General, Engr. 000.91, 7 July 1941, subject: "Re-
quest for funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field," recommending that an allot-
ment of $56,210.00 be made for the purpose of camouflaging bunkers, landing
field, hangers and warming apron at Wheeler Field.
c. Letter to the Adjutant General, Engr. 000.91, 27 February 1941, subject:
"Camouflage of Defense Installations," recommending that $29,000 be allotted
for camouflage of batteries at Fort DeRussy, Fort Kamehameha, Fort Ruger, and
Fort Barrette. 4th Indorsement, AG 007.5 (2-27-41) MC-E, 27 June 1941,
approved the project and stated that funds for this purpose would be included in
the next estimates and would be made available at the earliest practicable date.
Radio from the Chief of Engineer 10 October 1941 advises that $29,000 for
camouflage of coast artillery batteries had been disapproved by the Budget Ad-
visory Committee.
[2] d. Letter of The Adjutant General, Engr. 452, 19 February 1941,
subject: "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft," recommending that an initial
allotment of $1,565,600 be made for the construction of bunkers for the dispersion
and protection of aircraft. 4th Indorsement AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-E,
31 May 1941, granted authority for the construction of revetments for 70 four-
engine bombardment, 13 light bombardment and 170 pursuit planes, and stated
that funds in the amount of $1,358,000 for the completion of the project after
receipt of revised estimates would be included in estimates for funds being pre-
pared. 5th Indorsement Engr. 452, 31 July 1941, submitted a revised figure of
$1,374,350, and recommended that it be adopted instead of the $1,358,000. 6th
Indorsement, AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-G, 22 September 1941, approved plans
for revetments, and advised funds in amount of $1,358,000 for completion of
revetments in department were included in Project C-21, preliminary estimates
1943, funds expected to become available about Januarv 1, 1942.
€. Letter from the Adjutant General, AG 353 (7-28-41) MC-D, 13 August
1941, subject: "Reallocation of Special Field Exercise Funds for Field Fortifica-
tion and Camouflage Projects," and 1st Indorsement thereon, AG 121/1, 14
September 1941, recommending the immediate allotment of $125,000 for neces-
sary materials and tools for the construction of field fortifications. This indorse-
ment was followed up by radio 25 September 1941, recommending immediate
favorable action on allotment of $125,000 for execution of field fortifications and
camouflage projects. War Department radio, 29 September 1941, advised re-
quest was not favorably considered, confirmed by 1st Indorsement War Depart-
ment 14 September 1941.
/. Letter to the Chief of Engineers, Engr. 121.2, 17 May 1941, subject:
"Annual Estimates, Fiscal Years 1942 and 1943," and supporting data under
Project 5, which requested $50,000 each for fiscal year 1942 and 1943 for local
purchase of supplies for units of the Hawaiian Garrison other than Engineer
troops, these supplies to be used in the construction of fortified works other than
command posts for major echelons and camouflage measures, letter, Office,
Chief of Engineers, to Department Engineer, 1 July 1941, subject: "Allotment
of Engineer Service, Army Funds, Fiscal Year 1942," advised that only $5,000
was being allotted. It further stated "It is believed the amount of $50,000 re-
quested for this purpose is greatly excessive. Field fortifications or camouflage
to this extent goes beyond the training stage and reaches the status of a construe-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3029
tion project. It is suggested that such requirements for the defenses of Hawaii
be obtained from construction funds, which should be estimated and appropriated
for this purpose."
[3] 2. The field fortification and camouflage works that will be required to
insure the adequate defense of this island are of such magnitude that their ac-
complishment after the outbreak of hostilities is entirely out of the question.
All installations located on Government owned or leased land should be con-
structed at the present time eliminating those tasks from the work that cannot
be done until after complete mobilization when it will be possible to enter on
and organize private land.
3. The program for immediate construction contemplates semi-permanent
emplacements for all coast artillery weapons in the present defense project.
These weapons are sited in their most advantageous positions covering all ap-
proaches to the island and fixed Naval installations and their movement is not
contemplated under any change of situation. Protection for infantry units is
based on lightly held beach positions with a strong and highly mobile reserve in
accordance with latest tactical principles. Dispersed and camouflaged Bunker
protection must be provided for aircraft and airfield installations must be pro-
tected by machine gun emplacements and fencing.
4. The peculiar topographic and geologic conditions and the nature of the
vegetation of the Hawaiian Islands require a greater expenditure of materials
for field fortification than would normally be anticipated. In their maneuvers
and field training, troops have constructed many field fortification works. Sal-
vage and local materials have been used to the utmost and many methods have
been improvised to take into consideration the coral and lava rock, sand, and
peculiar volcanic soil of the islands. This effort has been largely wasted because
of the rapid deterioration of the local materials used. Sand bags and local tim-
bers have a maximum life of about six months in this locality.
5. The War Department has repeatedly directed this Headquarters to con-
struct certain works by Field Fortification methods but neither materials nor
funds have been supplied. This letter presents a new computation of all material
requirements for field fortification works and camouflage which should be con-
structed at once. This tabulation does not include those materials which must
be used to complete the field fortification works after the outbreak of hostilities.
These requirements may be divided into three groups as follows:
a. The Air Corps requirements. The airfields in the Hawaiian Islands are
limited in number and there are very few places aside from regular airfields where
enemy planes might land.. Consequently, it is expected that determined efforts
would be made to capture existing airfi-elds. To prevent this, protected machine
gun positic)ns must be placed to guard the sensitive points, on each airfield, aRd
[4] mobile forces provided for counter-attacks on enemy air-borne or sea-
borne troops who are attempting a landing or who have landed. Airplanes on
the ground must also be hidden and dispersed, to prevent their loss in surprise
air attacks, hence camouflage is needed to conceal them. For this purpose, the
local vegetation must be augmented by additional planting. In case an airfield
on the outlying islands must be abandoned, its runways and other essential
features should be destroyed, hence demolition chambers should be installed in
advance. These matters cannot be deferred because of the time required for
vegetation to grow and the time required to install protection and demolition
works.
b. Coast Artillery requirements. The Coast Artillery includes permanent fixed
defenses, mobile guns in positions prepared in time of peace, and antiaircraft
guns piotecting fixed Naval or military installations. The Coast Artillery can-
not maneuver; the mobile elements, including antiaircraft, are held in fixed
positions to defend fixed installations or to cover intervals in the permanent
defenses, and the best positions have been prepared. Since these positions are
known to the general public, the enemy also knows them. The operating per-
sonnel must have shelters to protect them and their ammunition during air attack,
and the positions must be camouflaged to prevent accurate aim by enemy bombers.
Coast Artillery troops must be constantly on the alert during active operations,
and can then spare no men for fortification work after hostilities have begun.
c. Infantry requirements. The Infantry divisions will occupy beaoh positions
very lightly held, and will have highly mobile motorized reserves. The beach
positions have additional weapons, beyond table of organization allowances.
Emplacements, trench shelters, observation and command posts for the beach
positions must be ready when the enemy appears offshore, and field works should
3030 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
be used to develop the maximum efficiency of automatic and heavy weapons and
release as many men as possible to the reserve. There will be neither time nor
men available to construct beach positions after the enemy arrives; fields of fire
must be cleared, barbed wire, road blocks, anti-tank mines, and other obstacles
must be installed at that time because these defenses will be placfed on private
property or will unduly interfere with civilian enterprise if set up in advance.
6. Inclosed are tabulations showing the material requirements of the Air Force,
the Coast Artillery Command and the two Infantry divisions.
\5] 7. It is recommended that an allotment of $1,455,542 be made immedi-
ately available for the purchase of fortification and camouflage materials so that
the work can be initiated and carried along concurrently with normal training
activities.
8. The only alternative for having these positions prepared in advance is to
have a large increase in the garrison authorized for the defense of the islands.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.
1 Incl: in six sheets (in dupl.) ^
A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Gbldern,
2nd. Lt.,F. A.
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
fort shafter, t. h.
Memorandum for Department Adjutant General:
10 WAR TG 61 WD
WASHN, D. C, 252P Aug. 12, 1941.
CG
Haw Dept, Ft. Shafter, T. H.
31 12th
AGjMC reurlet July twenty eighth AG one two one point two subject realloca-
tion of special field exercise funds for field fortification and camouflage projects
stop special field exercise funds are not available for purpose requested further
information follows by mail
Adams
1017A
A True Copy
Edward von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
[Exhibit Zl
[1] Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of The Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., July 15, 1941.
In replv refer to:
Engr. 000.91
Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. There is definite need for camouflage treatment of Air Fields in the Hawaiian
Department. Up to this time no camouflage treatment has been undertaken at
any air field in this department.
2. Attached is a plan for camouflage of Wheeler Field prepared by the 804th
Engineer Company Aviation (Separate). The plan includes photographs of the
type of camouflage to be applied to the bunkers, together with itemized estimates
of costs and recommendations.
3. In reporting on this propo.sed plan, Major J. F. Ohmer, Jr., Corps of Engi-
neers, Camouflage Officer, has commented as follows:
"The place for camouflage of Wheeler Field as prepared by the 804th Engineer
Company Aviation (separate) is a good treatment for the field and the bunkers.
The plan generalh' calls for 'blending' the buildings of Wheeler Field into the
Schofield Barracks building area and endeavoring to restore the air field proper
to the original condition as shown by the present earth scars, such as the old
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3031
Kamehameha Road, the gully through the field and the pineapple fields, roads
and irrigation ditches."
"The plan is practicable and can be readily accomplished by the 804th Engineer
Company Aviation."
"The Commanding General, Wheeler Field, has approved the plan and urged
that the work be expedited."
" While the air photographs of the two planes in the camouflaged bunkers show
the wing tips and the harsh straight shadows of the deciding line between the
upper and lower nets, this can be blended by additional garnishing and small
nets tying the lower nets under the upper terrace. This work is now being
completed."
"It is recommended that the camouflage plans for Wheeler Field be approved."
[S] 4. It is recommended that an allotment of funds be made to this office
in the amount of $56,210.00 for the purpose of camouflaging bunkers, landing
field, hangars, and warning apion at Wheeler Field, the work to be done by the
804th Engineer Company Aviation (Separate). An itemized estimate is incor-
porated as a part of the plan substantiating the amount requested.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.
1 Incl: Plan
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
[3] Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field.
AG 007.5 (7-12-41) MC 1st Ind. RPM/gt-1712.
War Department, A. G. C, July 29, 1941.
To Chief of Engineers and Chief of the Army Air Force, IN TURN.
For remark and recommendation.
By order of the Secretary of War:
/s/ Carl Robinson.
Adjutant General.
1 Incl. n/c.
A true copy
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern
2nd Lt., F. A.
[4] Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field.
600.1 (Wheeler Fid) 71 2nd Ind. 6-C
War Department,
Office, Chief of Engineers,
Washington, D. C, September 16, 1941.
To: The Chief, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.
1. The proposed plan for the camouflage of Wheeler Field, Hawaii, has received
careful con.sideration by The Engineer Board. As camouflage is essentially a
local problem long range criticism may be entirely in error. Consequently, the
following comments are off'ered only to supplement and should not invalidate
decisions made on the spot by officers with initimate knowledge of local conditions.
2. Specific comments on Part I:
a. Bunkers. — The bunkeY-s do not appear in the best arrangement to give maxi-
mum protection and to afford natural concealment. Their regular curving align-
ment throws a great burden on the artificial camouflage measures. The outer
berm of the bunkers should be more irregular at the toe of the slope and should not
be permitted to appear as a series of parallel lines as seen in photograph (V-
112.101). Portions of the light colored pattern which show on the photograph
could be continued over the revetment by sand or the native soil and over the net
by weaving in appropriately colored garnishing. Extensive planting in native
patterns will assist in this blending, and it is suggested that vines could be planted
in the bunker tops and trained to grow into the nets to aid in defeating disclosure
by means of infra-red photography. If additional dispersal pens are constructed,
they should be spaced further apart, be more irregularly arranged, and the outer
surface of the earth walls should be more irregular, especially at the toe of the
slope.
3032 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
b. Landing Field. — The division of the field boldly into three sections by natural
boundaries as described is excellent, and, if carried out as indicated, should be
very successful. The following detail criticisms may aid in the execution, but are
not arbitrary. The field roads might be made a little more con.spicuous by
sprinkling a light colored earth, gravel or lava on the stripped surface as noted by
contrast in the field roads in lower left corner of photograph (V-109-9I6-N-18).
The same technique may be u.seful in the reproduction of the old Kamohameha
road. If the fertilizer method does not produce dark enough contrasts it may be
necessary to use black emulsified asphalts or a mixture of iron sulphate and tannin.
The dark areas of the reproduced gully should not be used for taxiing and warming
up any more than absolutely necessary, as this will destroy the desired effect.
[5] c. Hangar Line.
(1) The effort to make the buildings of Wheeler Field appear as a more homo-
geneous portion of Schofield Barracks might be more effective if more roads,
dummy or real, were built between the two areas.
(2) The athletic track is a dangerous subterfuge, because of its characteristic
outline and east-west orientation, and is not generally recommended as it becomes
a reference point when detected.
(3) The painting of buildings on the aprons appears satisfactor}-; maintenance
■will be required and should not be neglected.
(4) The hangar painting presents a fine appearance. More disruption might be
achieved by a larger and bolder plan of painting. The roads which terminate at
hangars might be carried over the building successfully and the buildings painted
on the roof tops might be connected with painted walks and service roads to help
create the illusion of a reduced scale of construction. The general trace of the shad-
ow s of buildings should be studied and wherever possible, there should be painted,
or preferably planted, trees and shrubs to break up their characteristic outline.
Planting, which may appear relatively ineffective in vertical views, may help
materially against the bombers' approach.
(5) Inasmuch as the concrete hangar line apron is of brighter material and more
reflective than other roadways in the area, it should be generally toned down
w ith a thin solution of tar or asphalt in kerosene, in addition to the other treatment
suggested.
3. Specific comments on Part II.
a. It is suggested an asphalt emulsion for roofs would be cheaper and more
suitable. In general, the type of paint should be selected with regard to the mate-
rial to be coated, instead of the classification by roofs, walls, etc. Under "Con-
crete" it is assumed that aprons are included. The American Betumuls Company,
which maintains a branch in Hawaii, should be able to furnish asphalt emulsion
paints and adhesives more advantageously than Rejuvo. The matter of granules
to cover surfaces should be investigated carefully to see whether local materials of
indigenous colors or of a nature which will absorb bituminous colors, such as lava,
are not more easily procurable.
[6] 4. It is recommended that:
a. That the plan of camouflage be approved.
b. That the camouflage office, Hawaiian Department, or the Commanding
Officer of the 804th Engineer Battalion (Avn.) (Sep.) be granted permission to
communicate directly with the Engineer Board on matters of materials and
technical details to expedite the work.
c. That the Engineer Board be furnished a report to be made upon completion
of the work, including photographs of intermidiate the final stages. It is sug-
gested that oblique photographs be furnished as well as vertical. The oblique
photographs should be taken at 10,000 feet and three to four miles from Wheeler
Field from four directions.
d. That the amount of $56,210.00 be alloted to the Department Commander,
Hawaiian Department, for the purpose of camouflaging bunkers, landing field,
hangars and warming aprons at Wheeler Field, the work to be done by the 804th
Engineer Company.
For the Acting Chief of Engineers:
[s] Homer Saint-Gaudens,
Lt. Co., Corps of Engineer,
Acting Chief, Operations and Training Section.
1 Incl
Sub. 1.
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Snd Lt., F. A.
"EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3033
[7] Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field.
AG 007.5 (7-12-41) MC-G. 3rd Ind. WR-1712.
War Department, A. G. O., October 28, 1941.
To Chief of P^ngineers.
1. The camouflage treatment of Wheeler Field as outlined in basic corres-
pondence is authorized when funds become available for this construction.
2. It is desired that you take the necessary action to include the sum of $56,210
in the next available budget estimate for camouflage treatment of Wheeler Field.
By order of the Secretary of War:
D. R. Van Sickler,
Adjutant General.
1 Incl. n/c/ .
Copy to:
Chief of Air Corps w/cy of basic com., 1st Ind., 2nd Ind.
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department ref. his basic Itr. 7-12-41,
together w/cy of 1st Ind., and 2nd Ind.
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
27 Feb 1941.
Engr. 000.91
Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations. ^
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. Investigations conducted by this headquarters have demonstrated that
effective measures can and should be taken to reduce the visibility of exposed
defense installations to hostile aerial observation. Admittedly these installa-
tions cannot be concealed to such an extent that they will be invisible on aerial
photographs; at the same time, however, any camouflage which will render visual
observation more difficult and will decrease the effectiveness of enemy bombard-
ment is of the utmost importance.
2. Time has not permitted the submission of a comprehensive program for the
camouflage of all defense installations in this department which require some
degree of concealment; this matter is undergoing continuous study. Fixed sea-
coast batteries have received first attention and plans of procedure and cost esti-
mates have been prepared. The following table shows the various installations
on which camouflage work should be undertaken immediately with the tentative
costs:
Installation
Armament
Inclosure No.
Co,st
Ft. DERUSSY:
Battery Randolph
1
2-14" CDi'sappparing)..
Incl. No. 1.
Incl. No. 1
Incl. No. 2 __
Incl. No. 3
Incl.No.3
Incl. No. 4. .-
Incl. No. 5
1 .$6,000.00
6.000.00
Battery Dudley ..
Ft. KAMEHAMf:iIA:
Battery Closson _ _
2-6" (Disappearing) _
2-12" (Barbette)
2-12" (Disappearing) .
Battery Selfridge
5,000.00
1,500.00
Ft. RUOER:
Battery Adam.s
2-8" (Barbette)
2,000.00
Ft. BARRETTE:
Battery Hatch
2-16" (Barbette)
8, 500. 00
Total cost
$29, 000. 00
The measures contemplated include construction of various types of overhead
cover, dummy positions, extension of roads, painting and the transplantation of
trees and shrubbery.
3. Experience in the present World War has shown the very considerable
success of the Germans in concealing by camouflage, their long range guns on the
channel coasts. The several millions of dollars invested in the installations
enumerated in paragraph 2 above and their general value in the defense of this
island justify expenditure which will render them less vulnerable to enemy
3034 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
attack. It is therefore recommended that the sum of $29,000.00 be allotted this
department as soon as practicable to permit initiation of this camouflage work.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, Commanding.
Incls. 1-5: Aerial Photos
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations.
AG 007.5 (2-27-41) M - 1st Ind. ACW/lfi
To: The Chief of Engineers.
For remark and recommendation.
By order of the Secretary of War:
War Department, A. G. O.,
March 13, 1941.
Adjutant General.
S Tncls n/c
C. of E. 618.33 (Oahu) 3 2nd Ind. 6-E
Office, C. of E., May 28, 1941.
To: The Adjutant General, THROUGH THE CHIEF OF COAST ARTILLERY.
1. This paper was held in this office to permit direct inspection of the installa-
tions by a representative of this office who visited Hawaii on this and other
fortification matters. Reference is made to Hawaii on this and other fortification
matters. Reference is made to memorandum of March 22, 1941, to The Adju-
tant General, in this connection.
2. The importance of protective concealment for existing seacoast batteries is
recognized by this office and a directive bulletin is now being prepared for issue
to the field showing methods of such concealment for different type batteries.
3. The estimate submitted is considered an absolute minimum that will be
required even omitting from consideration at this time Batteries Hatch and
Closson which are to be casemated and more funds will probably be required at
a later date. It is recommended that the project be approved and funds be
made available at the earliest practicable date.
For the Chief of Engineers:
George Mayo,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Fortification Section.
5 Incls. — n/c
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations.
618.3/45-B 3rd Ind. 5
War Department, Office, Chief of Coast Artillery,
June 12, 1941.
To: The Adjutant General.
1. The need for camouflaging the seacoast Batteries listed in paragraph 2 of the
basic letter is evident from inspection of the inclosures, Nos. 1 to 5, inclusive.
The program as outlined in paragraph 2 of the basic letter, is concurred in, subject
to the proviso that the protective concealment of Batteries Hatch and Closson
will be coordinated, both in time and character, with the casemathig of these
batteries.
2. No Seacoast Defense funds are available, at this time, for application to
camouflage projects and none are included in current estimates.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3035
3. It is recommended that the camouflage project, described in paragraph 2 of
the basic letter, be approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Department Defense
Project.
For the Chief of Coast Artillery:
Joe D. Moss,
Major, C. A. C,
Acting Executive.
5 Incls — No change.
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edwakd Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations, Hawaiian Department.
AG 007.5 (2-27-41) MC-E BSA
4th Ind.
War Department, A. G. O.,
June 27,1941.
To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. The program for the camouflaging of Batteries Randolph, Dudley, Closson,
Selfridge, Jackson, Adams and Hatch, as proposed in paragraph 2 of the basic
letter, is approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Defense Project.
2. Funds to the amount of $29,000 for this purpose will be included in the next
estimates to be submitted and will be made available at the earliest practicable
date.
By order of the Secretary of War:
E, S. Adams,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
5 Incls. w/d.
5th Ind.
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Ft. Shafter, T. H.,
July 24, 1941.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, Ft.
DeRussey, T. H.
1. To note and return to this headquarters.
2. The Department Engineer will be directed to include this project in the
next revision of the Hawaiian Defense Project and to prepare plans for the ex-
ecution of this work when funds are received.
By command of Lieutenant General Short:
O. M. McDoLE,
Major, A. G. G.,
Assistant Adjutant General.
A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
(Basic: Ltr., HHD, Engr. 000.91, 27 February 1941, subject: "Camouflage of
Defense Installations.")
000.91 6th Ind.
HQ. H. S. C. A. BRIGADE, Pt. DeRussy, T. H., July 29, 1941— To CG Haw.
Dept.
Noted.
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd LL, F. A.
Fulton Q. C. Gardner,
Major General, L. S. Army,
Commanding.
3036 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(Exhibit lAi
[ / 1 • [secret]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shatter, T. H., 19 February, 1941.
Engr. 611
Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. Reference is made to letter, Engr. 611, this headquarters, 8 November 1940,
covering the recommendations for the revision of the military Roads atid Trails
Program. As indicated in paragraphs 5 and 8 of that letter, the revised program
was not complete and additional roads and trails were vmder consideration.
2. A detailed study made by this headquarters indicates that the following
additional improvements are necessary:
a. Wiliwilinui road and trail improvement, estimated cost $33,550.00. Con-
struction covering improvement of the existing 15,000 lineal feet of road at Wili-
wilinui Ridge, eliminating sharp curves and providing adequate turnouts. It
also covers construction of a 6-foot pack trail extending from the end of the exist-
ing road to the main crest of Koolaupoko Ridge area.
b. Improvement of Pupukea-Kahuku trail estimated at $12,720.00. This
project consists of the general widening of the existing trail from 3 to 6 feet along
its 13,000-foot alignment. This improvement will provide desirable communica-
tion between the northeasterly section of the Island and northern end of Wahiawa-
Pupukea trail.
r. Coincidental with the improvement of the Koolau Ridge trail, feeder trails
to the ridge should be developed and improved. As a part of its reforestation
program, the CCC has constructed several trails from forest reserve boundaries
to the main ridge of the Koolaua along the lateral ridges. These trails, shown in
the following list, should be partially relocated and improved as 6-foot pack trails:
(1) Poamono trail, 22,800 feet, estimated cost $35, 100. 00
(2) Kawailoa trail, 24,000 feet 22, 750. 00
(3) Schofield-Waikane, 33,000 feet 45, 750. 00
(4) Waiawa trail, 30,000 feet : 28, 650. 00
d. A road to Fuu Palailai. This project (copy illegible) of a 10'
class "B" supply road extending from the main government road to Fuu Falai-
lai. This road is desired to improve access to a group of fire c ntrol stations
manned by a detail of from 50 to 100 men. The approximate length of this road
is 8,700 feet and estimated cost $10,000.00.
e. lunia-Palehua road. This project will connect an existing plantation road
with the Palehua spur via the Mauna Kapu and the Honouliuli trails. The need
for an alternate route to the Manauahua Defense Area is extremely important,
particularly in view of the exposed condition of the Falehua road to hostile
observation. This project calls for the construction of 24,000 lineal feet of a
10-foot class "B" road at an estimated cost of $136,500.00.
/. Radial Ridge roads, Manauahua area. This project calls for the construc-
tionof three roads along the ridges, south and west of Fuu Nanauahua as shown
on the attached map. These roads serve vital defense areas which must be made
accessible to truck transportation. The total length of these ten-foot roads is
approximately 20,000 feet and the estimated cost of construction is $84,900.00.
3. These additional roads and trails have been combined with the 19 items
listed in paragraph 7 of letter, this headquarters, file Engr. 611, 8 November
1940, and are shown in the table below in order of their relative priority. The
location of each item is shown on the map, scale 1/125,000, Inclosure No. 1
hereto.
1. Fort Weaver 155-mm position Road 10' Class B $8,900
2. P'ort Roger Roads lO'ClassB. 4,000
3. Rarbors Point East 3L Pos. Trail 3L Trail.... l.OOn
4. Maili Marker 3L Position Trail 3L Trail. 6,000
5. Mailiilii 3L Position Trail 3L Trail 1,400
6. Eaena Point 3L Position Trail 3L Trail... 1,000
7. Wailoa Point 3L Position Trpil 3L Trail. l.f'OO
8. Completion of Barbors Point Road Net Class .A... 13:<,000
9. North Shore RR Connection R. R •. 250,000
10. Improvement Wakiaua Pupukea Road 10' Class A & B 216,000
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3037
11. Waimoa-Pupukca Roarl 10' Class B . $35,000
12. Alternate RK Schofield-Wahiuau Bypass R. R _ 70,000
13. Conneotion-Leilohua Spur to Oahu Sugar Co. tracks ^rail only) R. R 48,600
14. Ordnance Magazine Area, Sohofleld ?5' Class .\._ 33,000
15. Feeder Roads Wahiaua Pupukea Road, Improvement. 111,800
16. Eahuku 155-mni Position Road, 10' Class B._. 9.500
17. Rahuku CP Trail, CP Trail 2,100
18. Kepuhi CP Trail, CP Trail g.OOC
19. Koolau Ridge Trail, 6' Pack Trail _ 20,000
20. Wiliwilinioa Road, Improvement 17,900
21. Wiliwilimi Trail, 6' Pack Trail 15,650
22. Poamoho Tiail, 6' Pack Trail... 35, 100
23. Pupukoa-Mahuhu Trail, 6' Pack Trail _. 12,720
24. Hawaiian Trail, R' Pack Trail 22.750
25. Schofield-Wahiwan Trail. 6' Pack Trail.. 45,750
20. Waiwan Trail, 6' Pack Trail 28,650
27. Pau Palailai CP Road, 10' Class B.. 10,000
28. Kunia-Palahua Road, 10' Class B 136.500
29. Ridge Roads, Maniamam Area, 10' Class B.. 34,900
1, 370, 020
4. It is recommended that the roads and trails program shown in the table
above be approved in lieu of the present program approved in 4th Indorsement
(AG 611 Hawaii (3-31-38 (Misc.) (X) dated 23 May 1939, on War Department
letter (AG 611 Hawaii (3-28-38) Misc. WPD) dated 31 March 1938, subject:
"Military Priority Highways in the Hawaiian Department". It is further rec-
ommended that the sum of $1,370,020.00 be allotted to this department as soon
as possible to permit early completion of this program.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.
1 Inch Map
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
. Edward Von Gelde-in,
2nd Lt., F. A.
Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.
AG 611 Hawaii (2-19-41) M 1st Ind. AGW/ric
War Department, A. G. O.,
February 27, 1941.
To: Chief of Engineers and Chief of Coast Artillery, IN TURN.
For remark and recommendation, reference being made to files C. of E. 611
(Haw) 10 and OCGA 611/45 A 7.
By order of the Secretary of War:
Adjutant General.
1 Incl. a/c
C. of E., March 12, 1941.—
To: The Chief of Coast Artillery.
1. Items 1 to 19, inclusive, in this program were approved tor inclusion in the
Hawaiian Defense Project in 3rd Indorsement dated February 18, 1941, AG 611
Hawaiian Department (1 1-8-40) M-WPD; OCGA 611/45 A 7; C. of E. 611
(Hawaii) 10. It was further directed that the Commanding General confer with
Mr. Moskowitz, the representative of the Commissioner of Public Roads in
Hawaii, with a view to securing the maximum aid permissible from the Public
Roads Administration for the accomplishment of the construction authorized
Federal Highwav Act of 1940. It was also directed that a revised estimate be
submitted covering Items 9, 12 and 13. The above action was not available to
the Commanding General at the time of preparation of basic paper.
2. Items 20 to 29, inclusive, are new items of work. The estimated cost ap-
pears reasonable, and their inclusion in the program is recommended.
3. Attention is invited to letter from the Commanding General Hawaiian
Department dated February 19, 1941, subject: "Construction of North Shore
Railroad Connection" file Engr. 611; AG 112.05 (2-19-41) M; C. of E. 611
(Hawaii) 11 in which it was recommended that funds in the amount of $230,000
3038 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
be allotted as soon as possible to initiate construction. The itrm referred to is
included in this paper as item 9.
For the Chief of Engineers:
[S] George Mayo,
George Mayo,
Lt. Col. Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Fortification Section.
1 Inclosure n/c.
611/45A-10 3rd Ind. 5.
Office, Chief of Coast Artillery,
War Deiartment,
March 15, 1941.
To: The Adjutant General.
1. The remarks and recommendations of the Chief of Engineers appearing in
the 2nd indorsement are concurred in.
2. In addition to the funds referred to in paragraph 1, 2nd indorsement, $300,-
000 is included in current Seacoast Defense estimates for application on items
Nos. 9, 12 and 13 (railroad construction projects).
For the Chief of Coast Artillery:
[S] E. T. Blood,
Colonel, C. A. C, Executive.
1 Incl. n/c
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt. F. A.
Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.
AG 611 Hawaii (2-19-41) M-WPD 4th Ind. ESA
War Department, A.G.C,
April 1, 1941.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. Attention is invited to the preceding 2d and 3d Indorsements.
2. The program for road, trail and railroad construction contained in para-
graph 3, basic communication, is approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Defense
Project in place of the road, trail and railroad program approved by 3d Indorse-
ment, February 18, 1941, to the letter, subject: "Military Road and Trail
Program, Hawaiian Department", AG 611 Haw. Dept. (11-8-40) H-WPD.
3. It is desired that you submit a breakdown of the items contained in the
road and trail program approved herein to show the expenditures contemplated
for augmentation and for maintenance. In this connection, attention is invited
to your 1st Indorsement, January 16, 1941, to the letter, subject: "Maintenance
and repairs of Fortifications, Estimate of Funds for FY 1943" (Engr. 121.2,
Forts), in which you request funds for the maintenance of roads. The break-
down requested is necessary to insure that no duplication will be encountered in
the defense of estimates to be submitted for the completion of this program.
Bv order of the Secretarv of War:
Incl. w/d
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt. F. A.
Major General, The Adjutant General.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Proposed prouram, tactical items
3039
Priority
Type
Esti-
mated
Old
Rec.
Present
Rec.
cost by
troop
constr.
25
la..
6...
c
d....
e
/....
2a ..
6....
c
d..
e
3a..
ft....
c
rf....
e
4«..
4...
5a .
6-...
c
d....
e
6a..
6....
c
d...
7a..
6....
Schofield-Walkana
Kunia-Palehua
Pupukea-Black Junction
Pack Trail
Motor Trail
Pack Trail
Foot Trail
Dirt Road
Foot Trail
None
Motor Trail . . .
$170,000
28
23
10' WB Macadam
Improve..
75,000
12, 720
32
Poanoho Trail.
Improve
10.000
20 -.-
Wiliwilinui Road
Wiliwilinui Trail
Fort Weaver-155mm Oun Posi-
tions.
Fort Rupor Roads
10' Class B
1 7, 900
21
Pack Trail
10,000
1
10' Class B
8,900
2 . .
None
None
None
None
Coral Roads
Motor Trail
Nore
None
10' Class B
4.000
3
Barbers Point East SL Route
Maili Marker SL Route
SL Trail
1,000
4
SL Trail
6,000
5
Mailiilii SL Route
SL Trail .
6,600
8
10
6
Barbers Point Road Net Paving..
Wahiawa-Pupukea Paving.
Koera Point SL Route
Paved Motor Roads
10' Class A & B
SL Trail
75,000
200,000
1,000
7
Wailea Point SL Route
SL Trail
1,000
17
Fahuhu OP Route
None
OP Trail
2, 100
11
Wainea Pupukea
Alternate Crossing S. Faloraun
Gulch.
Ordnance Magazine Area, Scho-
field Barracks.
Manauahua Ridge Route
Foot Trail
Raised Ford.
10' Class B
45,000
None
Bridge..
6,000
14
22' Class A
33,000
20
Motor Trail
Foot Trail
Foot Trail
Foot Trail
Dirt Road
Dirt Road
Dirt Road
Foot Trail
Dirt Road
Foot Trail
Water Bound Macad-
am.
Improve
Improve..
Improve
Improve
74,900
19
Koolau Ridge Trail...
24
Kaiwailon Trail..
26
Waiawa Route.
15a
Haleiwa-Opaeula Approach Road .
Fawalloe-.\nahulu " "
Ashley Station " "
Kopuhi OP Route.
1
156....
ISc. .
Improve
Improve.. ..
[ 111,800
l8 ....
Improve
10' Class A
16 ..
Kahuhu-155mm Oun Positions
Fua Palailai OP Route
9,300
27
10' Class B....
10,000
Total
$901,020
A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt. F. A.
[7\ Engr. 611 5th Ind.
He.^dquarters, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 26 May 1941.
To: The adjustant General, Washington, D. C.
1. Reference is made to the following correspondence:
a. AG 611, Haw. Dept. (11-8-40) M-WPD; Military Road and Trail Program,
Hawaiin Department.
b. AG 660 (,4-19-41) M; Expenditure Program, Seacoast Defense Fund,
Fiscal Year 1942
c. Eng. 121.2 (Forts); Maintenance and Repair of Fortifications, Estimate of
Funds for Fiscal Year 1943, (cited in Paragraph 3, 3rd Indorsement above).
2. a. Road, trail and railroad program submitted in reference a was approved
by War Department 3rd Indorsement, February 18, 1941, subject to the following:
CI) That Mr. Moskowitz be contacted to secure a maximum of the unobligated
portion of $446,000.00, previously allotted the PRA for Hawaii, for the con-
struction of the road and trail items in the approved program.
(2) That revised estimates be submitted for the railroad items in the approved
program.
3040 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
b. 4th Indorsement, this headquarters, April 4, 1941, submitted the following:
(1) Recommendation that $446,000.00 available to the PRA be not diverted
from the purpose for which originally allotted, namely, construction of the
Wahiama cut-off and the Kolokolo-Waiamoa Road.
(2) Revised estimates for the rpilroad items and reduced estimates for the road
and trails portions of the program by the $70,400.00 made available on December
7, 1940.
(3) Cross-referenced the originally approved program, items 1-19 inclusive,
with the additional items, 20-29 inclusive, approved herein and submitted re-
vised estimates in the amount of $951,020.00 for the road and trail items and
$298,000.00 for the railroad items. The total cost, $1,249,620.00 supersedes
estimate of $1,370,020.00 reported in basic letter herewith.
[8] 3. Reference b informed this headquarters that regular estimates for
Seacoast Defense funds, FY 1942 include $300,000.00 for the construction of the
railroad items and $50,000.00 for road and trail items. Release of these funds
will cover the construction of the railroads $298,600.00) and will reduce the
required funds for the completion of the roads and trails to $901,020.00.
4. a. Reference c submitted estimates in the amount of $286,000.00 for the
upkeep of military roads and trails during FY 1943. These estimates were based
upon the maintenance of these roads and trails already constructed in this depart-
ment, since at the time of submission, the augmentation program did not have
War Department approval. The great increase in FY 1943 estimates over those
of previous years has been due primarily first, to the necessity of procuring new
plant and equipment as replacements for outworn units and second, to the neces-
sity supplanting WPA employees with hired labor as a result of the increasing
non-availability of the former.
b. The breakdown of the $286,000.00 estimate showed the proportional amounts
of the total which would be expended on existing roads and trails. In view of the
approval by 4th Indorsement of the revised road, railroad, and trail program,
which contains funds for the improvement of certain existing roads, the original
breakdown of FY 1943 maintenance estimates is no longer applicable. Specifically,
maintenance funds for the Wahiana-Purukea Road and Barbers Point Road net
can be reduced considerably; at the same time, however, the construction of new
roads and trails during FY 1943 and ensuing years. Attached as inclosure No. 1
is a revised tabulation of maintenance funds required during FY 1943 for all
existing roads and trails and those to be constructed under the approved program.
This breakdown shows specifically the purposes for which these funds will be
expended. Revised estimates decrease the funds originally requested by
$34,000.00.
c. 1st Indorsement, January 16, 1941, which forwarded the estimates cited in
paragraph 5a, recommended immediate release of $100,000.00 of the $286,000.00.
This $100,000.00 is necessary for the purchase of materials and additional plant
and the hiring of labor for the maintenance of long neglected existing roads and
trails, funds for the improvement of which have not been included in the approved
augmentation program.
[9] 5. As explained in the foregoing paragraphs, there is no duplication in
the funds still required for the constiuction of the approved augmentation pro-
gram, $1,249,620.00 or $901,020.00 if the $350,000.00 in FY 1942 estimates is
made available and the funds, totaling $252,000.00, required for maintenance:
the $1,249,620.00 construction estimate includes no funds for maintenance and
the $252,000.00 maintenance estimate includes no funds for new construction.
6. It is recommended:
a. That in accordance with the revised estimates cited in paragraphs 3b (3)
and 4, above, funds in the amount of $901,020.00 for the completion of the.
approved road, trail and railroad program be included in FY 1942 estimates
to supplement the $350,000 expected to be released.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3041
(6) That the revised estimates in the amount of $252,000.00 be substituted
for the $236,000.00 now inckided in FY 1943 estimates for the maintenance and
repair of military roads and trails and that $100,000.00 of this amount be released
to this department during FY 1942.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
1 Inch Revised estimate.
A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
[10] Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.
AG 611 Hawaii (2-19-41) MC 6th Ind. 21-H/agb-1712
War Department, A. G. O., June 9, 1941-
To: Chief of Coast Artillery and Chief of Engineers, In Turn:
For remark and recommendation.
By order of the Secretary of War:
1 Inch n/o ,
Adjutant General.
611/45-A-lO 7th Ind. 3.
War Department,
Office, Chief of Coast Artillery,
June 12, 1941.
To: Chief of Engmeers.
1. The records of this office indicate that the necessary action has been takeu
with a view to accomplishing the recommendations appearing in paragraph 6 a
of 5th Indorsement, assuming that that portion of the recommendation reading
"FY 1942" was intended to read "Fy 1943"
2. With respect to the recommendation appearing in paragraph 6 6 of 5th
indorsement, preliminary estimates for FY 1943 do not now include a specific
item for maintenance and repair of military roads and trails. The total sum
now appearing in the preliminary estimates FY 1943 under Project 11 — Alter-
ation, maintenance and repair of fortifications — is $225,000. Fy 1942 estimates
for Project 11 total $173,710. The portion of these funds to be applied to mainte-
nance of roads and to strictly fortification works appears to be discretionary with
the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. However, the basis for esti-
mating these funds for FY 1941 Included specifically $59,000 as applicable to
road maintenance.
For the Chief of Coast Artillery:
Leonard L. Davis,
Lt. Col, C. A. C,
Assistani.
1 Inclosure
(Dup. w/d).
A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geidern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
[11] C. of E. 611 (Hawaii) 12.
Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.
8th Ind. 6-E
Office C. of E.,
July 1, 1941.
To: The Adjutant General.
1. Reference paragraph 6 a of 5th Indorsement and paragraph 1 of preceding
Indorsement, it is recommended that authority be granted to include the $901,000
required for the completion of the approved road, trail and railroad program in
the supplemental estimates for Fiscal Year 1943 at the first opportunity.
3042 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2. The remarks of the Chief of Coast Artillery in paragraph 2 of 7th Indorse-
ment are concurred in.
For the Chief of Engineers:
George Mayo,
Lt. Col., Corps oj Erigineers,
Chief, Fortification Section.
1 Inclosure n/c.
CG of OCCA
A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
[12] Subject: Militarv Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.
AG 611 (2-10-41) MC-K EGA
9th Ind.
War Department, A. G. O., July 18, 1941.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. Funds in the amount of $300,000 for railroads and $50,000 for roads and
trails are now available from FY 1942 appropriations for construction contained
in the approved Road, Trail, and Railroad Program. These funds will soon be
released to the District Engineer. Additional funds in the amount of $900,000
have been included in tentative estimates, FY 1943 for the completion of the
approved Road and Trail Program. This latter amount will be requested at an
earlier time in the event that further supplemental FY 1942 estimates are prepared.
2. General maintenance funds to the amount of $173,710 are now available
from FY 1942 appropriations and a substantial amount thereof has been released
to the District Engineer, Honolulu. The portion of these funds to be applied
to the maintenance of roads is discretionary with you. Additional general
maintenance funds to the amount of $223,000 "have been included in preliminary
estimates, FY 1943.
3. An additional amount of $140,000 will be included at the first opportunity
in estimates to be submitted to provide further funds for maintenance of roads
and trails in your department.
By order of the Secretary of War:
r
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
Inch w/d
A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
[Exhibit IB]
Vi& "Clipper"
Air Mail
Engr. 600.12
Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 April 'U
[extract]
Subject: Construction at Bellows Field, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. Reference is made to 1st Indorsement. The Adjutant General's office, file
AG 370.5 (2-15-41) M-D, dated 5 March 1941 which authorized the permanent
assignment of the 86th Observation Squadron and the 58th Bombardment
Squadron at Bellows Field.
*******
5. The improvement of the runways consist in lengthening the present runway
from about 2800' to 3400' and widening from 150' to 300'. The new runway is
5000' long and 300' wide. Cross-connection the existing and the new runway is a
paved taxi strip and parking .strip 300' wide and 2200' long with a servicing niat
300' X 600' adjacent to the taxi strip. Ail runways, servicing mats and taxi strips
will be asphaltic concrete. Other installations required are an airdrome control
tower and an aqua-gasoline system of 600.000 gallon capacity. The necessary
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3043
tanks for this gasoline system are on hand. A complete system of airport lighting
and sewer, water, and power utilities will be necessary. Miscellaneous installa-
tions include man-proof fences around vital installations, improvement of the
drainage of the camp area, pistol and 1000" machine gun ranges, and roads and
sidewalks.
7. The improvements recommended are all necessary. Funds for improving
the runways in particular should be e.xpedited. The District Elngineer has in-
formed me that it is possible at this time to secure on the mainland the necessary
plant and equipment for this paving but that unless contracted for in the very
near future, it will not be much longer available.
*******
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
3 Incls:
No. 1 Tabulation of Housing Needs
2 Layout Map*
3 Tabulation of Cost Estimates
*(Filed in Drafting Room; Bellows Field #1)
No R/S was prepared. Verbal approval of C/S and signature secured by Major
Fleming, 5 April 1941.
Copy to Hawaiian Air Corps 4/8/41
Copy to District Engineer 4/17/41
A true copy :
Edward von Geldern
Edward von Geldern
2nd Lt., F. A.
Subject: Additional funds for Completion of Authorized Mobilization Housing
Project, Hawaiian Department
2nd Ind. (12-P3)
War Department,
Office, Chief of the Air Corps,
Washington, D. C, June 26, 1941
To: The Quartermaster General.
1. Reference is made to Paragraph I.e. of basic communication which indicates
that funds in the amount of $990,769 will be included in future estimates for the
projects at \\ heeler, Hickam, and Bellows Fields, as requested in Paragraph
2.0,6, and c of basic communication.
For the Chief of the Air Corps
Frank M. Kennedy
Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Buildings and Grounds Division
Copied from Project Letter B-1
A true copy:
Edward von Geldern
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F.A.
[1]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander.
Fort Shafter. T. H., 2 May 1941.
Engr. 600.12
Subject: C'onstruction at Barking Sands Field, Kauai, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, \A'ashington, D. C.
1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's Office, file AG 580
(3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective."
At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded
with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently
needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of
training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more
fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The
79716 O — 46— pt. 18 13
3044 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing
need.
2. It is recommended that Barking Sands Field on Kauai be developed into an
outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 6
officers and 107 men, and 1 National Guard company to provide local security
of 4 officers and 116 men. total 10 officers and 223 men. In addition to this
permanent garrison, two heavy bombardment squadrons of 37 officers and 206
men each from Hickam Field will be sent to Barking Sands for training. While
these bombardment squadrons will change, two will be temporarily stationed at
all times at this field. The total garrison at Barking Sands including temporary
and permanent troops will be 84 ofl^icers and 635 men.
3. Some buildings have been and are being erected at this field by the WPA.
Additional buildings will be necessary and the WPA Administrator lias informed
me that neither his material funds nor his available labor will be sufficient to
complete the required program. There is inclosed as Inclosure Xo. 1 a tabula-
tion showing the buildings, built and building by the WPA and the additional
buildings required which include administration buildings, shops, warehouses,
recreation buildings, mess halls, officers' quarters and other structures. Complete
utility system should be provided for this camp. All buildings to be mobilization
type.
' 4. Other construction recommended consists in improvement of flying condi-
tions by the grading of two runways 5000' by 500' and the paving of a 200-
strip on each runway for a length of 5000', the construction of a servicing mat
and the installation of a complete airport lighting system. Storage for 450,000
gallons of gasoline will soon be installed by the District Engineer with funds
now available to him; in this storage nine of the eighty [2] 50,000-gallon
tanks now on hand will be utilized. These tanks are now designed for the aqua
system; at this time, however, the tanks are being installed for storage only and
if at a later date the necessity develops, this storage system can be readily con-
verted into the aqua system. Also included in the cost estimates are miscellaneous
items such as an airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000" ranges and man-proof
fencing around vital installations. Roads within the camp area have also been
included in the cost estimates; an improvement to the access road to this military
reservation from the nearest point on the Kauai belt road has been the subject
of discussion with the local public roads administration under the provision of
Section 18 of the Federal Highway Act of 1940. Surveys of this road are now
being made by the Territorial Highway Department; these surveys have not
been completed. The local Public Roads Administration officials, based on a
reconnaissance, estimate that this access road will cost about $150,000. As it
is doubtful whether either territorial or Federal Highway funds will be available
for construction on this amount has also been included in the estimates. Tele-
phone costs have been estimated at 2^% of building costs as directed in Chief
Signal officer's radio of 11 March 1941. In determining the building costs a
constructive evaluation of the work already done by the WPA based upon costs
of the new buildings recommended in this letter was used to ar.rive at the total
costs.
5. There are inclosed as Inclosures Nos. 2 and 3, a layout drawing of this
field and a tabulation of cost estimates of the buildings and other improvements
required. These cost estimates were prepared by the District Engineer, Honolulu,
and include not only direct but also the indirect costs of the job. The total
required to complete the installation is $1,772,220.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3045
6. It is recommended that the improvement of Barking Sands be authorized
and that funds in amount of $1,772,220.00 be released to the District Engineer,
Honolulu, to initiate this construction.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
3 Incls: #1 — Bldg tabulation
#2 — Layout drawing
#3 — Cost Estimate
A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
{1\ Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941.
In replv refer to:
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Engr. 600.12
Subject: Construction at Hilo Airport.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. Reference is made to letter. The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580
(3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objec-
tive." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are over-
crowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are
urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons
of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need
more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions.
The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this exist-
ing need.
2. It is recommended that Hilo airport be developed into an outlying field
with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men,
and 2 National Guard companies to provide local security of 4 officers and 116
men each, total 12 officers and 382 men. In addition to this permanent garrison,
one heavy bombardment squadron of 37 officers and 206 men from Hickam
Field will be sent to this field for training. While this squadron will change, at
least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The
total garrison at Hilo therefore will be 49 officers and 588 men.
3. Some buildings are now being erected at this field by the WPA. Additional
buildings are needed and the WPA Administrator has informed me that neither
his material funds nor his available labor will be sufficient to complete the required
program. The buildings now being built and the additional ones required are
tabulated in the cost estimates. A complete utility system is recommended.
Buildings. will be mobilization type.
4. The runways at the Hilo airport will be improved, through a CAA contract
under supervision of the District Engineer, Honolulu. Additional improvements
needed are the installation of storage for 450,000 gallons of gasoline; for this 9 of
the 80 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized. These tanks were
designed for the aqua system, but simple storage only is recommended at this
time. If the need later develops, this storage can readily be converted to the
aqua system as all fittings will be available on the tanks.
[2] 5. There are inclosed as Inclosure No. 1 a tabulation of cost estimates,
and as Inclosure No. 2 a layout map of the field. In addition to the items already
mentioned, these estimates include miscellaneous items such as roads, airdrome
control tower, pistol and 1000 inch ranges and telephone installations. These
telephone costs have been estimated at 2}^ per cent of the building costs as directed
in Chief Signal Officer's radio of 11 March 1941. In determining the total build-
ing costs a constructive evaluation of the work now being done by the WPA was
combined with the estimated costs of construction recommended in this letter.
The estimates in the tabulation were prepared by the District Engineer, Honolulu,
and include indirect as well as direct costs of the job.
3046 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTICATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6. It is recommended that this construction on the present military reservation
at the Hilo airport be authorized and that funds in the amount of $670,140 be
allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation.
2 Incls: #1 Cost Estimates
#2 Layout map
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
headqrar,ters hawaiian department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941
In reply refer to:
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Subject: Construction at Homestead Field, Molokai. T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1., Reference is made to letter. The Adjutant General's Office, file AG 560
(3-7-4 l)M-G-i\I, 14 March 1941, Subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objec-
tive." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are
overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports
are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for
reasons of training and operations in time of peace: in addition to this peacetime
need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions.
The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this
existing need.
2. It is recommended that Homestead Field, Molokai, T. H., be developed
into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment
of 4 officers and 50 men, and 1 National Guard Company to provide local security
of 4 officers and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 men. In addition to this perma-
nent garrison, one pursuit squadron of 33 officers aiid 157 men from Wheeler
Field will be sent to this field for training. While this squadron will change, at
least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The
total garrison at Homestead Field therefore will be 41 officers and 323 men.
3. Some buildings have been and are being built at this field by the WPA.
Additional buildings are needed and the WPA Administrator has informed me
that neither his material funds nor his available labor will be sufficient to com-
plete the required program. The buildings now being built and the additional
ones required are tabulated in the cost estimates. A complete utility system is
recommended. Buildings will be mobilization type.
4. The runways at the Homestead Field will be improved through a CAA
contract under supervision of the District Fhigineer, Honolulu, .\dditional im-
provements needed are the installation of storage for 350,000 gallons of gasoline;
for this 7 of the 30 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized. These
tanks were designed for the aqua system, but simple storage onlv is recommended
at this time. If the need later develops, this storage can readily be converted to
the aqua system as all fittings will be available on the tanks.
A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2tid Lt. F. A.
[2\ 5. There is inclosed a tabulation of cost estimates. In addition to the
items already mentioned, these estimates include miscellaneous items such as
roads, airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000 inch ranges and telephone installa-
tions. The.se tele'phone costs have been estimated at 2^2 per cent of the building
costs as directed in Chief Signal Officer's radio of 1 1 March 1941. In determining
the total building costs a constructive evaluation of the work now being done by
the WPA was combined with the estimated costs of const r\ict ion recommended
in this letter. The estimates in the tabulation were prepared by the District
P.ngineer, Honohilu, and include indirect as well as direct costs of the job.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3047
6. It is reconiiuendec) that this construction on the prcscMit military reservation
at Homestead Field be authorized and that funds in the amount of $407,600.00 be
allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation.
1 Tnd: Cost Estimates.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, V. S. Army,
Commanding.
A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt. F. A.
[1]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., May 2, 1941.
Engr. 600.12
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Subject: Construction at Morse Field, Hawaii
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. Reference is made to letter. The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580
(3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Array's Second Aviation Objective."
At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded
with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently
needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of
training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more
fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating condition. The
Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing
need.
2. It is recommended that Morse Field on Hawaii be developed into an outlying
field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 6 officers and
107 men, and 1 National Guard company to provide local security of 4 officers
and 116 men, total 10 officers and 223 men. In addition to this permanent
garrison, two heavy bombardment squadrons of 37 officers and 206 men each from
Hickam Field will be sent to Morse Field for training. While these bombardment
squadrons will change, two will be temporarily stationed a large part of the time
at this field. The total garrison at Morse Field including temporary and per-
manent troops will be 84 officers and 635 men.
3. Some buildings have been built at this station by troop labor. Other
buildings have been and are being built by the W^PA. Additional buildings and
improvements are necessary; I_believe that the requirements of training preclude
any extensive use of troop labor and the WPA Administrator has informed me
that neither his material money nor his available labor will be sufficient to com-
plete the required program. These additional buildings' will all be of mobilization
type construction for use as operations buildings, shops, administrative and supply
buildings, barracks, mess halls, magazines, etc. A complete system of utilities
should be provided.
4. Other construction recommended consists in improvement of flying facilities
by the paving of a main runway 3400 feet long and 300 feet wide, and its extension
by grading, leveling and light paving to a length of 4150 feet and width of 400 feet.
Because of prevailing wind conditions, only one paved runway is considered
necessary by the Commanding General, [2] Hawaiian Air Force. Neces-
sary taxi mats, service mats and warming up aprons will be graded and paved.
A complete airport lighting system will be installed. Gasoline storage for 450,000
gallons utilizing nine of the eighty 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be in-
stalled; because of the shortage of water at this field, this will be plain storage
and not the aqua system. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 1, a layout map of
this field. It will be noted that considerable areas in the vicinity of the runway
are shown for light paving. This is necessary; the soil at this field is very fine
and with the prevailing high velocity wind there is a serious dust problem as this
dast aff"ects the engines of the planes. The shortage of water makes stabilization
by sodding or vegetation impracticable, and the most practical way that this
problem can be solved is to stabilize by light paving.
3048 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
5. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 2 a tabulation of cost estimates of the
buildings and other improvements required. In addition to the items already
mentioned, miscellaneous items such as roads, pistol and 1,000 inch ranges, an
Airdrome Control tower, and telephone installations have been included. These
telephone costs have been estimated at 2^2 percent of building costs as directed
in Chief Signal Officer's radio of II March 1941. In determining the building
costs a constructive evaluation of the work already done by troop labor and the
WPA based upon costs of the new buildings recommended in this letter was
used to arrive at the total costs. The estimates in the tabulation were prepared
by the District Engineer, Honolulu, and include the indirect as well as the direct
costs of the job. . ,
6. It is recommended that the improvement of Morse Field be authorized and
that funds in the amount of $1,687,530 be allotted to the District Engineer,
Honolulu, to complete the installation.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
2. Incls: #1 — Layout Map
#2 — Cost Estimates
A true copy
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt. F. A.
[confidential]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Ft. Shafter, T. H.
Engr. 600.12
Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. Reference is made to letter. The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580
(3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective."
At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded
with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently
needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of
training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more
fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The
Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing
need.
2. At present the Hawaiian Air Force has under lease an unimproved landing
field located at Haleiwa, on the north shore of Oahu, about ten miles airline dis-
tance from Wheeler Field. There are no paved runways, and no installations
other than boundary marking lights. No permanent detachment is quartered
there. The field is used for practice landings, etc. by the pursuit aviation at
Wheeler Field.
3. It is proposed that this field be improved by the grading and paving of one
runway 4000' by 300' and by the installation of other facilities for flying operations.
These w^ill include an operations building and airdrome control tower and storage
for 100,000 gallons of gasoline using two of the eighty 50,000 gallon tanks now on
hand. This storage will utilize the aqua system. A small galvanized warehouse
for oil storage will be provided.
4. The only garrison at this field will consist of a small permanent detachment
to refuel and handle planes on the ground and to operate radio and control installa-
tions. For this detachment a combined barracks and mess hall will be provided.
5. It is recommended that the improvement of Haleiwa Airport be authorized
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3049
as outlined above and that funds in the amount of $450,000 be allotted to the
District Engineer, Honoluhi for this construction.
1 Incl: Cost Estimate
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, V . S. Army, Commanding.
A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2d Lt. F. A.
Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H.
AG 580 (5-22-41) MC RPM/agb-1712
1st Ind.
War Department, A. G. O., May 27, 1941.
To: Chief of the Air Corps and Chief of Engineers, IN TURN:
For remark and recommendation.
By order of the Secretary of War:
Adjutant General.
1 Incl. n/c
2nd Ind. (9)
War Department,
Office, Chief of the Air Corps,
Washington, D. C, May 31, 1941.
To: Chief of Engineers.
Approval recommended.
For the Chief of the Air Corps:
[S] Edward P. Curtis,
Edward P. Curtis,
Major, Air Corps, Executive, Plans Division.
1 Incl. n/c
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
600.1 (Haleiwa Airfield, T. H.) 1
Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H. (Let. from Hawaiian
Dept. H", to AGO, 5/22/41)
3rd Ind. 3-N
Office, C. of E., June 10, 1941.
To the Adjutant General.
1. Approval recommended.
2. It is assumed that the District Engineer at Honolulu collaborated with the
Hawaiian Department Commander in preparation of the estimate inclosed with
the basic communication. Further delay in verification of this estimate is not
considered advisable inasmuch as the funds required can be rectified if necessary
in the future.
3. Funds for this construction at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H. are available in this
office under the Miscellaneous Construction Reserve provided this construction
is of a high priority, the urgency for which is not known in this office.
3050 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. If authorized it is requested that the amount of $460,000 be approved for
allotment from funds reserved under the Miscellaneous Construction Reserve for
construction of the buildings, gasoline storage and runways as specified in the
inclosed estimate.
For the Chief of Engineers:
John R. Hardin,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Construction Section.
Inclosure: Sub 1
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H.
AG 580 (5-22-41) MC-D 4th Ind. RPM/agb-1712
War Department, A. G. O., June 25, 1941.
To: Chief of Air Corps.
1. You are authorized to proceed with plans for construction of an airfield at
Haleiwa, on the island of Oahu, as indicated in basic communication.
2. You are authorized to include in the next available estimates, funds for the
accomplishment of this project, in the amount of $450,000, as recommended in
basic communication.
3. The allotment of Miscellaneous Construction Reserve Funds for this
project, as recommended in paragraph 3, 3rd Indorsement, is not favorably con-
sidered as these funds are required for other purposes.
By order of the Secretary of War:
D. R. Van Sickler,
Adjutant General.
1 Incl. — n/c
Copies to:
Chief of Engrs. Ref. his 3rd Ind., 600.1 (Haleiwa Airfield, T. H.) 1.
6-10-41, to TAG.
Commanding General, Haw. Dept. Ref. his basic Itr., Engr. 600.12,
5-22-41, to TAG, w/cys. of 1, 2, & 3 Inds.
A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
[1\ [confidential]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
In reply refer to: 22 May 1941.
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Engr. 600.12
Subject: Construction at Burns Field, Kauai, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. Reference is made to letter. The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580
(3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective."
At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded
with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently
needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of
training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more
fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The
Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing
need.
2. It is lecommended that Burns Field be developed into an outlying field with
a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men, 1
National Guard company to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men,
total 8 officers and 166 enlisted men. In addition to this garrison, one heavy
reconnaissance squadron of 43 officers and 233 men will be sent to this field for
training. Either this squadron or a heavy bombardment squadron will be sta-
tioned at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison at the field will
therefore consist of 51 officers and 399 men.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3051
3. Some buildings have been erected at this field by soldier labor. Other
buildings are necessary and soldier labor is not available for their construction.
These buildings have been tabluated in the cost estimates, Inclosure No. 1. All
buildings will be of mobilization type construction. The installation of a com-
plete system of utilities is recommended.
4. The runways at Burns Field are authorized for improvement by a CAA
project. Additional improvements needed are the installation of storage for
200,000 gallons of gasoline; for this four of the eighty 50,000-gallon tanks now on
hand will be utilized. These tanks were designed for the aqua system, but simple
storage only is recommended at this time. If the need later develops, this storage
can be readily converted to the aqua system as all fittings will be available on the
tanks.
[3] 5. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 1 a tabulation of cost estimates.
In addition to the items already mentioned, these estimates include miscellaneous
items such as roads, airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000-inch range and
telephone installations. These telephone costs have been estimated at 2}2% of
the building costs as directed by the Chief Signal Officer's radio of 11 March
1941. The estimates include direct as well as indirect co.sts of the job.
6. It is recommended that this construction be authorized on the present
military reservation at Burns Field and that funds in the amount of $636,163.00
be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S Army, Commanding.
1 Incl: Cost Estimates
A true copy:
Edward vgn Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt. F. A.
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander.
Fort Shafter, T. H.
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Engr. 600.12
Subject: Proposed Airfield on the Island of Lanai.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. Reference is made to letter, the Adjutant General's office, file AG 580
(3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective."
At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded
with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently
needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of
training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more
fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The
Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing
need.
2. Included in the plan for dispersion of facilities is a proposed airport on the
Island of Lania. A location has been selected and preliminary negotiations for
leasing have been made. The land is owned by the Hawaiian Pineapple Company
which is willing to lease it to the government on a twenty-five (25) year lease in
return for one dollar a year rental and the use of the flying field. The location
of the field, barracks area, and a proposed bombing range are shown on map,
scale 1/62,500 inclosed as Inclosure No. 1. Project letter for the bombing range
has already been submitted by letter to The Adjutant General, subject: "Con-
struction of Night Bombing Range, Island of Lanai" file Engr. 686 dated 16 Mav
1941.
3. It is propo.sed to improve this field by the grading and paving of two 5,000'
runways 300' wide and by the installation of facilities for flying operations. These
will include the necessary operations buildings and shops, airdrome control tower
and storage for 200,000 gallons of gasoline using four of the eighty 50,000 gallon
tanks now on hand. Although these tanks were designed for the aqua system,
only simple storage is proposed, although all the necessary fittings for later con-
version to the aqua system will be installed.
4. The rotating garrison at this field will consist of an air base detachment of
4 officers and 50 men and a National Guard companj' for local security of 4 officers
and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 men. In addition to this garrison, a pur-
3052 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
suit squadron of 33 officers and 157 men will be temporarily stationed at this
field for training. While this squadron will change at least one will be tempo-
rarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison, there-
fore, will be 41 officers and 323 men.
5. There is attached as Inclosure Xo. 2 a tabulation showing in detail the
buildings and other construction proposed with estimated costs. These costs
include not only direct but also indirect costs of the job. The total cost shown
on this tabulation is $1,990,000.00.
6. The following is recommended:
a. That this headquarters be authorized to proceed with negotiations for the
lease of this site.
b. That construction and improvements outlined in Inclosure Xo. 2 be
authorized.
c. That funds in the amount of $1,990,000.00 be alloted to the District Engineer,
Honolulu, to complete this installation.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
2 Incls: #1 Map; #2 Cost Estimates.
A True Copy.
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lieut. F. A .
Subject: Proposed Airfield on the Island of Lanai.
AG 580 (5-22-41) MC 1st Ind. RPM/agb-1712
War Department, A. G. O., May 27, 1941.
To: Chief of the Air Corps and Chief of Engineers, IN TURN:
For remark and recommendation.
Bv order of the Secretary of W'ar:
2 Incls. n/c Adjutant General.
2nd Ind.
War Department,
Office, Chief of the Air Corps,
Washington, D. C. June 2, 1941.
To: Chief of Engineers.
Approval recommended. Attention is invited to the Memorandum for the
Chief of Staff, (WPD 2550-22), 6-10-41, Subject: Estimates for the Construc-
tion of Airports for Hav, aiian Air Force.
For the Chief of the Air Corps:
Edward P. Curtis,
Major, Air Corps, Executive, Plans Division.
2 Incls. n/c
A true copy.
Edward von Geldern
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lieut. F. A.
600.1 (Hawaiian Dept. Airfields) 83
Subject: Proposed Airfield on the Island of Lanai.
3d Ind. 3-N
Office, C. of E., June 16, 1941.
To the Adjutant General.
1. Approval recommended.
2. The estimate of cost as given in the basic communication was prepared by
the District Engineer at Honolulu, T. H.
3. If authorized, it is requested that the amount of $1,990,000 be approved for
allotment to the District Engineer at Honolulu for the construction of buildings,
utilities, runways, and other installations on the Island of Lanai, as recommended
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3053
in the basic communication and inclosure thereto, from funds reserved under the
Fifth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act (Pilot Training Schools
Reserve), approved April 5, 1941.
For the Chief of Engineers:
John R. Hardin,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Construction Section.
Inclosures: Subs 1-2
A true C"py:
Edward Von Geldern
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lieut. F. A.
Subject: Construction of Airfield at Lanai, T. H.
AG 580 (5-22-41) MC-G ESA
4th Ind.
War Department, A. G. O., August 8, 1941.
To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. You are authorized to pioceed with negotiations for the lease of the site
referred to in basic communication.
2. The construction as recommended by you is authorized except that "Theatre
Operations Type of Construction" be substituted for the "mobilization type"
requested.
3. It is desired that funds required be included in the next budget estimates.
Bv order of the Secietarv of War:
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
2 Incls. n/c
A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lieut F. A.
[1] [confidential]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941.
Via "Clipper" Air Mall
Engr. 600.12
Subject: Construction at Proposed Airport, Parker Ranch Area, Hawaii, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. Reference is made to letter. The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580
(3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Obje(itive."
At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded
with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently
needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of
training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more
fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The
Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing
need.
2. There has been for some time a realization that an additional field was
necessary on the Island of Hawaii, and extensive studies have been made on its
location. The best location found was about four miles from the town of Waimea
on land owned by the Territory of Hawaii, and at present under lease to private
cattle interests. The site consists of about 1,360 acres, and it is believed that
the land can be transferred to the Federal government under Section 91 of the
Organic Act. Preliminary negotiations to this end have been opened with the
Territory. The location of the field is shown on map, scale 1/62,500, inclosed
as Inclosure No. 1.
3. It is proposed that this field be improved by the grading and paving of
three 5000-foot runways and by the installation of facilities for flying operations.
3054 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
These will include the necessary operations buildings, and shops, airdrome control
tower, and storage for 300,000 gallons of gasoli'.ic, using 6 of the eighty 50,000-
gallon tanks now on hand. Although these tanks were designed for the aqua
system, only simple storage is proposed, as the shortage of water will preclude
use of the aqua system. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 2 a print of Depart-
ment Engineer Map No. 11-1-25D41 which shows the boundary of the land
and the location of the three 5000-foot runways.
4. The rotating garrison at this field will consist of an air base detachment of
4 officers and 50 men and a National Guard company for local security of 4 officers
and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 men. In addition to this permanent gar-
rison, a heavy bombardment squadron of 37 officers and [3] 206 men will
be temporarily stationed at this field for training. While these squadrons will
change at least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the
time. The total garrison therefore will be 45 officers and 372 men.
5. There is attached as Inclosure No. 3 a tabulation showing in detail the
buildings and other construction proposed with estimated costs. These costs
include not only direct but also indirect costs of the job. The total cost shown on
this tabulation is $1,992,600.00.
6. The following is recommended:
a. That this headquarters be authorized to proceed with negotiations for the
acquisition of this site.
b. That construction and improvements outlined in Inclosure No. 3 be author-
ized.
c. That funds in amount of $1,992,600.00 be allotted to the District Engineer,
Honolulu, to complete this installation.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
3 Incls:
#1 Map
#2 Print, Map No. 11-1-25D41
#3 Estimated Costs
A True Copy
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lieut. F. A.
[1\ Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., April 14, 19U.
In reply refer to:
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Engr. 600.12
Subject: Additional Airdrome, Hawaiian Department
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. The recent and anticipated increases in the Pursuit Wing of the Hawaiian
Air Force have emphasized the need of an airdrome to supplement the existing
facilities at Wheeler Field. The latter field is now badly overcrowded with the
planes stationed there.
2. A very thorough study has been made of the location of this additional air
field by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Department Engineer and
the District Engineer. At least five separate locations were given serious con-
sideration; one of these in the Barbers Point area was discarded first because of
its proximity to the beach and second, because of objections by the Navy to in-
terference with the new carrier aviation base in the Ewa plane area. Another
location at Kahuku was discarded because of i:s proximity to the beach. A third
on the flat ground about three miles north of Wahiawa was discarded by the Ha-
waiian Air Force l)ecause of bad flying conditions from turbulent air conditions.
A fourth location in the general area to the east of the crossing over Kipapa Gulch
by the Kamehameha Highway was discarded for similar flying reasons. The area
finally selected between the Kipapa and Waikakalua Gulches and west of the
Kamehameha Highway is believed to be the best possible location of this airdrome
on the island of Oahu.' There is inclosed a map on the scale of 1/20,000 showing
the location of this field.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3055
3. The garrison to be stationed at this field will consist of the loth Pursuit
Group of 84 officers and 729 enlisted men, an air base group (single) 28 officers
and 490 men, and miscellaneous detachments of 5 officers and 75 men. Total
strength 117 officers and 1,294 men. Complete construction with, mobilization
type facilities must be provided for the housing of this garrison. The present
construction authorized for Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields is insufficient
or the needs of those three stations and it will be impo.ssible to transfer any of
the existing authorization to this new field.
4. It is estimated that at least 75% or 88 of the officers will be married and of this
number 10% or 9 will be senior officers. Since there are no locations in this
vicinity where these officers can be placed upon commutation and live in private
quarters and also becatise of the tremendous, housing shortage on Oahu, it is
believed that Government quarters should be provided for these married officers.
Recognizing that this [2] field must be constructed under emergency
appropriations, it is proposed that these quarters not be as elaborate as usually
constructed on Army Posts. With the unit costs estimated, houses similar in
construction to the average in Honolulu can be provided. In addition it is also
estimated that there will be 135 married noncommissioned officers in this garrison.
Adequate quarters will also be provided for these married enlisted men and it is
recommended that the War Department .secure from the Federal Building Ad-
ministration authorization for the construction of 135 low cost housing units at
this field.
5. The improvement for flying operations consists of the installation of three
runways each 5,000 feet long with a graded width of 400 feet and a paved width
of 200 feet; the paving of taxy strip 200' x 5,000' and a servicing apron 300' x 600'.
A complete installation of airport lighting is proposed. Bunkers for the protection
of airplanes against hostile bomVjardment will be installed as part of the airport
and the cost of these bunkers and necessary approaches are included in the cost
estimates. It is also proposed to install storage for 900,000 gallons of gasoline
with the aqua system. ' In this storage 18 of the 80 50,000 gallon tanks now on
hand will be utilized.
6. The housing proposed will be mobilization type construction. It will
include barracks, mess halls, and recreation facilities for the men, buildings for
flying operations such as an airdrome control tower, Air Corps technical schools,
supply rooms, and housing for maintenance facilities. In addition mobilization
type construction is proposed for the necessary post overhead, buildings such as
a fire station, a guard house and an infirmary and warehouses for commissaries,
etc. A complete system of utilities is covered in the estimates. In designing the
water supply and sewage disposal systems provision has been made for the
eventual expansion of the garrison to 4,000 men. This increase in capacity is
proposed to take care of the possibility of assigning an antiaircraft regiment as
part of this garrison. Shown on the map accompanying this letter are two areas
shaded in blue. The area near the runway will be used for the construction of the
service buildings incidental to flying operations. The 40 acre tract shown to the
north of the runways will be utilized for construction of housing facilities for both
officers, married noncoms, and enlisted men. The land where the runways and
the adjacent blue area are located is now cultivated cane land. The area of the
40 acre tract is cultivated pineapple land; the cane land involved is about 250
acres minimum. If these sites are secured by lease it is estimated that the cane
land will cost $30.00 per acre per year and the pineapple land $25.00 per acre per
year, or a total annual rental of $8,500. If this land is purchased the cane land
will cost about $1,000 and the pineapple land about $500.00 per acre; a total cost
of about $270,000.
7. There is inclosed a tabulation showing the buildings which should be con-
structed with cost figures^and cost estimates on runways and other flying facilities
and on utility systems. These estimates show a total estimated cost of $4,668,950
not including cost of land. As stated shows if the land is leased there will be a
vearlv rental of $8,500. If the land is purchased the total cost is estimated at
$4,938,950.
3056 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[3] 8. It is recommended that the proposed location of this new field be
approved and that funds in the amount of $4,668,950 be allotted for construction
if the War Department decides that securing the land on a lease basis is satis-
factory. It is further recommended that if the War Department decides that
this land should be purchased, additional funds in the amount of $270,000 be
made available.
(s) Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
2 Incls:
#1 Map
#2 Tabulation
A true copy.
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
^nd Lt., F. A.
[confidential]
Paraphrase of Radio From TAG:
Fifteenth Pursuit airbase at Kipapa is disapproved Stop Base is to be located
at Kahuku Stop Personal letter twenty one July (?) from General Marshall to
General Short covers this subject.
Ulio.
True copy.
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
[Exhibit IC]
[1] [secret]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., April 14, 1941.
In reply refer to: Engr. 600.96
Subject: Protection of Seacoast Defense Batteries.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. Reference is made to your secret radiogram No. 708, 4 April 1941, which
was on the subject of protection for the seacoast defense batteries in this depart-
ment and which suggested a conference with Mr. J. C. Letts of the Office of the
Chief of Engineers during his recent visit in this department.
2. This radiogram stated that a letter covering this construction was being
forwarded by mail. This letter has not as yet been received in this department
In order to save time, however, we're submitting recommendations without
waiting for the arrival of this letter as its subject matter was explained in general
by Mr. Letts.
3. There are three batteries involved in this protection; these are the two
16-inch gun batteries. Battery Hatch at Fort Barrette and Battery Williston at
Fort Weaver and a 12-inch barbette gun battery. Battery C'osson at Fort Kame-
hameha. A study of this problem has been made jointly by the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, the District Engineer sand
Mr. Letts. They recommend the casemating of Battery Hatch and Battery
Closson and provision of a tunnel type shield for Battery Williston. There is
inclosed a chart showing the fields of tire of these batteries after the protection is
installed. From this chart it will be seen that Battery Hatch has a field of fire
from azimuth 295 to azimuth 80; and Battery Williston, a 360° field of fire. The
red shading on this chart indicates the area in which the fire of four 16-inch guns
can be placed. The yellow shading shows the additional area which can be
covered by the fire of two 16-inch guns at Fort Weaver. The existing range circle
of Battery Hatch is shown by the red line and Battery Williston by the black line.
The chart indicates that there is an area about 5,000 yards in range west of Oahu
which is now covered by the fire of Battery Hatch and which is not covered by the
fire of Battery Williston. On the east side of the island the area now covered by
fire from Battery Hatch, which is sacrified by the casemating is well in the field
covered by Battery Williston. The only loss in coverage is in the 5,000 yards to
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3057
the west of the island and in the fact that the general area is now covered by the
fire of only two 16-inch guns while under present arran^ment this area is in part
covered by the fire of four 16-inch guns.
[2] 4. I do not believe that this loss in coverage is at all important when
compared to the necessity of providing protection for Battery Hatch in par-
ticular, and therefore concur in the recommendations of the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.
5. Your radio also referred to our letter, subject: "Bombproof Construction
for Magazines at Fort Barrette and Fort Weaver," dated 4 February 1941.
The recommendations contained in this letter are reiterated. Since the recom-
mendation is made that Battery Williston should have tunnel type shield pro-
tection which does not provide any protection for ammunition, a bombproof
magazine for at least one-half of the propelling charges should be provided at
that battery. Also due to the exposed position of Battery Hatch and the im-
possibility of camouflaging the existing magazines, it is believed that a bombproof
magazine for one-half of the propelling charges should be provided at that battery
in addition to the bombproof storage for 50 complete rounds in each casemate.
6. Reference is now made to letter, this headquarters, subject: "Defense of
Naval Air Station, Kaneche Bay, Oahu, T. H." dated 18 February 1941, file 381,
in which the War Department was advised that this department was assuming
responsibility for the defense of the Kaneche Bay Area. It is believed that the
growing military and naval importance of Kaneche Bay aera makes it essential
that a major calibre seacoast battery be installed for its protection. The need
for this battery is urgent and its installation should not wait upon the manufac-
ture of the armament. It is understood that there are some 12-inch long range
gun batteries similar to Battery Clo.sson on the mainland where the need for
them no longer exists and it is recommended that the armament of one of these
batteries be shipped to this department and funds provided for its emplacement
in the Kaneche Bay area.
7. The following is therefore recommended:
a. That protection be provided for Battery Hatch by the construction of
casemates and overhead cover, at Battery Closson by the construction of over-
head cover, and at Battery Williston by the installation of tunnel type shields.
b. That a bombproof magazine for one-half of the propelling charges be author-
ized for Battery Williston and a similar magazine be authorized for Battery
Hatch in addition to the storage of 50 rounds in each of the casemates.
r. That the armament of a 12-inch gun battery similar to Battery [3]
Closson to be obtained from a location on the mainland where it is no longer
needed and shipped to this department and installed to cover the Kaneohe Bay
area.
(s) Walter C. Short
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
1 Inch Chart (Orig of Incl No. 1 is on file at H S C A B)
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern, '
2nd Lt., F. A.
[1] Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 31 July 1941.
In reply refer to:
AG 381/20
Kaneohe Bay Project.
Secret
Subject: Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. References: —
A Secret letter HHD to TAG, 14 April 1941, subject: "Protection of Seacoast
Defense Batteries" file AG 662.1 (4-14-41) MC-E, HD Engr 600. 96, with 4
indorsements.
B Secret letter TAG to HHD, 8 April 1941, Subject: "Defense of Naval Air
Station, Kaneohe Bav, Oahu, T. H." file AG 381 (3-13-41) M-WPD, with 1st
Indorsement HHD to TAG dated 16 June 1941.
3058 CONtJRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEAHL HARBOK ATTACK
2. The attached study was prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Separate Coast Artillery Brigade in accordance with the directive contained in
the 4th indorsement, to reference A. In considering this study, reference should
be made to a similar study which was submitted as on enclosure to 1st indorse-
ment, reference B.
3. The recommendations contained in paragraph 6 of the attached study of the
seacoast and antiaircraft defenses required for the protection of the Kaneohe
Bay Naval Base (Incl. #1) are approved with the following exceptions:
a. It is believed a large proportion of the 15 A A searchlights recommended in
paragraph 6a. should be equipped with SCR 268 sets instead of the M2 sound
locators. The severe 'limitations imposed by the terrain and normal atmos-
pheric conditions present in this area make mandatory the early detection of
hostile aerial targets.
b. In order that personnel may be available to establish a headquarters for the
Harbor Defenses of Kaneohe Bay, it is believed that instead of augmenting the
seacoast personnel,' as recommended in paragraph 6d. (2) by one battalion
(TD) and three separate batteries (HD), that the increase should consist of one
Coast Artillery regiment (HD), type B, (T/0 4-71, Nov 1/40), less band and one
battalion. This organization will provide the necessary command and staff and
attached medical personnel to permit the proper tactical organization of the de-
fenses. The 155mm battalion can take the place of the second battalion of the
Harbor Defense Regiment.
\2] 4. It is recommended:
a. That the eventual project for defense of the Kaneohe Bay Naval .Vir Station
and Bellows Field, based on the installation of fixed armament, be as follows:
(1) Armament:
(a) Seacoast:
2 155 mm Cun Batteries (latest type").
2 6" Fixed Cun Batteries (2 guns each).
1 16" Long Range Casemated Cun Battery of 2 guns on
Barbette Carriages.
(b) Antiaircraft:
3 90 mm AA Gun Batteries.
3 37 mm AA Gun Batteries to consist of 10 guns each.
48 Caliber .50 AA Machine Guns.
15 AA searchlights together w-ith a minimiuii of 6 SCR 268
sets and 0 Al2 sound locators.
(2) Personnel:
(a) Seacoast Artillerv:
1 Battalion Coast Artillerv (TD), 155 mm trims, (T/0 4-35,
Nov 1/40).
1 Regiment Coast Artillerv (HD). tvpe B, less hand and one
battalion, (T/0 4-71, Nov 1/40).
(h) .\ntiaircraft .Artillery:
1 Reeiment Coast Artillery (AA), semi-mobile, less one gun
battalion, (T/0 1-111," Nov 1/40).
}). That initially based on armament now available in the Hawaiian Depart-
ment, the defense be constituted as shown below. The seacoast armament and
personnel to be used in this defense must be moved from previously assigned
positions in other parts of tha island, thereby weakening the defense in othc'r areas.
(1) Considering only personnel now present and available:
] 155 mm Gun Battery.
1 155 mm Gun Batterv with additional assignment of five antiaircraft
searchlights.
1 S" Railway Gun Battery.
2 3" .\ntiaircraft Gun Batteries.
1 Seacoast Searclilight Battery.
(2) .\ssuming that personnel under paragraph 4 a (2) (a) above will be made
available at an earlv date and using armament now availabk' in \\ ar Reserve,
the defense can be organized as sliown below. Under this plan no movement of
armament from pn>sent assigned ixtsition^i i« required:
2 155 mm (Jun Batteries
1 155 nnn Cun Battery with, additional assignment of five antiaircraft
searchlights.
1 8" Railway (Jiin liattery.
2 3" .\ntiaircraft Gun Baiteries.
1 Seacoast Searchlight Battery.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3059
[3] e. That the increaso in personnel and in major items of armament
recommended in paragraphs fi a and t>, reference H, insofar as they relate to the
(■oast Artillery be amended to conform to paragraph 4 a. above.
Walter ('. Shokt,
LieiHenant General, U. S. Army,
Com mantling.
1-lncl: Revised Study on Seacoast and Antiaircraft Artillery Defense of the
Kaneohe Naval Air Station (Secret) in trip.
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern.
Edward Vo\ Geldurn,
,?w/ LL, F. A.
[secret]
[1]
Subject: Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Ha-
waiian Department.
AG 381 (7-31-41) MC-E 3rd Ind.
Wa.r Department, A. G. O., Ociober SO, 1941.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. Reference is made to:
a. Letter, this office, April 8, 1941, AG 381 (3-13-41) N-WPD, subject:
Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H.
b. Radio No. 320, your headquarters, September 13, 1941.
c. Letter, your headquarters, September 18, 1941, Engr. 662/4 x 662/7, subject:
Provision of three (3) Panama mount 155-mm Battery Positions and one (1)
8-inch Railwiay Gun Batterv Position for the defense of Kaneohe Bav, Oahu,
T. H.
2. The following temporary measures for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay
area are approved :
a. Movement of one battery of 8" railway guns now in storage at Fort Kame-
hameha to Alokapu Peninsula and temporary installation at site designated by
you in reference c subject to local coordination of site with the Navy.
b. Installation of tw^o batteries 155-mm guns on Panama mounts at sites to
be selected by you.
3. Immediate personnel and armament requirements will be set:
a. By the transfer to the Hawaiian Department of the following units at their
allotted strengths:
(1) One battalion, 57th Coast Artillery, TD, with battalion section,
supply platoon (T/0 4-32) and battalion section, Medical detachment (T/0
4-31), attached, less guns and fire control equipment.
(2) 95th Coast Artillery (AA), Semimobile (less one gun battalion), with
armament and equipment on hand. Authority is granted for the reorganiza-
tion of the 37-mm gun battalion of this regiment into three [2] 37
mm gun batteries (8 guns each) and one (1) Caliber .50 MO battery (A A)
(12 guns).
b. By the local activation of one 8" railway battery (R/0 4-47) from personnel
available in the Hawaiian Department.
4. Guns and fire control equipment fo/ the battalion of 155 mm guns and the
8" railway battery will be furnished from defense reserves on hand in the Hawaiian
Department. Shortages will be filled in accordance with approved War Depart-
ment priorities.
5. Personnel and equipment mentioned in Paragraph 3 a. above will be dis-
patched to the Hawaiian Department by first available shipping. It is estimated
that troops will begin to arrive in your department about December 1, 1941.
The shipment of the major items of organizational equipment and armament for
reinforcing units is dependent upon the availability of bottoms of which no accurate
forecast can be made at this time.
6. Theater of operations type housing is authorized for the personnel listed in
paragraph 3 above. It is desired that estimates covering housing for this increased
garri.son be made the subject of separate correspondence.
7. Ultimate approval of one 8" .seacoast battery (fixed) in lieu of the 16"
battery recommended by you, and of two 6" seacoast batteries (fixed) to replace
the two batteries of 155 mm guns authorized for temporary defense is probable.
79716 O— 46 — pt. 18 14
3060 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The 8" seacoast guns will not be available before July, 1942, and the 6" seacoast
guns not before December, 1942.
8. In view of the expected approval of fixed armament for the Kaneohe Bay
Area the plan submitted by reference c for the installation of the 8"railway
battery on Mokapu Peninsula and for the construction of 155 mm gun positions
is considered too elaborate. Plans should be revised to provide for temporary
installation of the 8" railway battery, and for construction of Panama mounts
for two 155 mm gun batteries. Provision should be made for splinterproofing
magazines and plotting room only and should be confined to that which can be
constructed by field fortification methods and materials.
9. A revised project, to include detailed estimates of cost, is desired for the
defense of Kaneohe Bay based on two batteries of two 6" BC guns, and one
battery of two 8" BC guns, all shielded type.
[3] 10. No change in the eventual project for the antiaircraft defense of
Kaneohe Bay over that prescribed for the temporary defense Paragraph 3 a (2)
above, is contemplated.
11. Reinforcement of either the peace or war garrisons of the Hawaiian De-
partment by additional troops for the beach and land defense of Kaneohe Bay is
not contemplated at this time.
By order of the Secretary of War:
(s) E. S. Adams,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
2 Incls'
#1 Memor from Ch. of Eng. to Ch. of Coast Artillery, C.' of E. 662B
(Oahu), August 26, 1941.
#2 1st Ind. frm Ch. of Coast Artillerv, to A. C. of S, WPD 663/45-F-l,
July 23, 1941. (added)
Original Inch #1 w/d)
A true copy.
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
[SECRET]
Paraphrase
Radio 320— 13th
September 13, 1941
The Adjutant General.
Washington, D. C.
Additional funds needed to complete railway gun position project also funds
needed to erect positions in Kanoehe Bay area as para four B paren two paren
letter this headquarters thirty one July nineteen forty one subject coast artillery
armament for naval air station Kaneohe Bay paragraph due added costs of
materials and labor in this area railway gun positions in approved project could
not be built with funds allotted last fiscal year Stop Estimates prepared by
district engineer Honolulu aver that one hundred seventeen thousand two hundred
fifty six dollars required to add to funds received last fiscal year for railway gun
positions Stop Building of positions for one four gun eight inch railway battery
and three four gun one fifty five batteries in Kaneohe Bay area estimated to cost
two hundred fifteen thousand two hundred sixty five dollars Stop Above
amounts include direct and indirect costs and are for sites recommended as first,
priority by commanding general Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command in which I
agree for immediate construction paragraph project will follow Stop District
engine Honolulu is submitting cost estimates to chief of engineers by radio
Stop Pending the receipt of this letter strongly recommend that money in
amount of three hundred thirty two thousand five hundred twenty one dollars
be contained in penditig appropriation bill.
Short.
A true copy:
Edward von Geldern
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3061
[SECRET]
[1] Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 18 September 1941.
In reply refer to:
Engr. 662/4 x 662/7
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Subject: Provision of three (3) Panama Mount 155-mm Battery Positions and
one (1) 8-inch Railway Gun Battery Position for the Defense of
Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. References:
a. Secret letter TAG to HHD, 8 April 1941, Subject: "Defense of Naval Air
Station, Kaneohe Bav, Oahu, T. H." file AG 381 (3-13-41) M-WPD, with 1st
Indorsement HHD to TAG dated 18 June 1941.
h Secret letter HHD to TAG, 5 June 1941, Subject: "War Garrison for Initial
War Operation", file AG 320.3/37b, with 1st Indorsement TAG to HHD, dated
22 Julv 1941.
c. Secret letter HHD to TAG 31 July 1941, Subject: "Coast Artillery Arma-
ment for Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay", file AG 381/20.
2. Reference a. directs that the Army assumes the responsibility for the defence
of the Kaneohe Bay area. A study by this headquarters of the armament require-
ments for the defense of Kanoche Bay and submitted by my 1st Indorsement to
reference a. requested the inclusion of the following items of Seacoast Defense
Armament in the Hawaiian Defense Project for this purpose:
3 Batteries of 155-mm guns.
1 Battery of two 12-inch barbette guns with related equipment
3. A restudy of the project for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay area submitted
by reference h. recommended that the following armament be provided:
Two 155-mm gun batteries
Two 6-inch fixed gun batteries of two guns each
One 16-inch long range casemated gun battery of two guns on barbette
carriages.
[2] 4. A realization of the fact that it will be at least two years before these
items of fixed armament, namely, the two 6-inch batteries and the one 16-inch
battery, can be installed, makes it necessary that some provision be made im-
mediately for the employment of mobile artillery to defend this area. The 1st
Indorsement from The Adjutant General's Office to reference h. authorized the
following additional units for the defense of Kaneohe Bay:
One battalion of Coast Artillery, 155-mm guns with one additional gun
battery.
One Harbor Defense Battery.
Pending the installation of the fixed batteries, it is recommended that the
Seacoast Defenses of the Kaneohe area consist of the following items of mobile
artillery :
Three 155-mm gun batteries.
One 8-inch railway gun battery.
The proposed locations and fields of fire of these batteries are shown on map,
Inclosure No. 1.
5. Since there is no railroad running from Honolulu to Kaneohe Bay, it will be
necessary to move this railway battery to Kaneohe Bay by truck trailer, and it is
proposed to install this battery on fixed mounts similar to those of Battery Granger
Adams on Black Point.
6. Each of the 155-mm battery positions should include the following-
(1) 4 Panama mounts.
(2) 4 splinterproof ammunition shelters for 25 rounds at each gun position.
(3) 4 gun bunkers.
(4) 4 splinterproof personnel shelters.
(5) 2 splinterproof propellent shelters for 150 charges each.
(6) 2 splinterproof projectile shelters for 150 projectiles each.
(7) 1 splinterproof plotting room.
(8) The roads and ramps necessary for the occupation of the position.
(9) Camouflage treatment of all the above listed installations.
Considering the urgent need for combat training and the large amount of labor
required to complete field works now being constructed by the troops of this com-
mand, it is believed advisable to construct these positions by contract.
3062 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[S] 7. The cost of installation of the three batteries of 155-mm guns includ-
ing the acquisition of land has been estimated at $93,630.00. The co.st of the
transportation and installation of the 8-inch railway battery in an emplacement
similar to that- of Battery Granger Adams has been estimated at $121,635. These
estimated costs include both direct costs and indirect costs. Inclosure No. 2 is
a tabular breakdown of these cost figures.
8. It is recommended that the installation of these three batteries of 155-mm
guns with the necessary field fortifications and the construction of one 8-inch gun
battery position be approved, and that funds in the amount of $215,265.00 be
allotted to the U. S. District Engineer, Honolulu, f©r construction.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
2 Incls:
(1) Map
(2) Breakdown
A True copy.
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
[Exhibit ID]
[SECRET]
27 August 1941.
Deslege Brown
1st Lieutenant, Corps of Engrs.
Assistant Department Engineer.
To: The Adjutant General,
Washington, D. C.
Beurad anno fifteen July district engineer estimates cost of forty five hundred
foot runway at three hundred thirty thousand dollars due to railroad relocation
and heavy fill Stop Thirty five hundred foot runway is longest that can be pro-
vided without railway relocation Stop Reduction from thirty seven hundred
feet due to bunker construction and new housing Stop Strongly recommend
construction of thirty five hundred foot runway as auxiliary landing strip comma
forty five hundred feet economically unfeasible Stop main runway can be
used by planes requiring longer run Stop Auxiliary also needed for use while
main runway is being leveled recommend immediate allotment of twenty five
thousand dollars for levelling of main runway and thirty thousand seven hun-
dred for thirty five hundred foot auxiliary runway.
Short.
A true copy.
Edward von Gildern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lieutenant, F. A.
Subject: Improvement of Landing Facilities at Wheeler Field, T. H.
2nd Ind. (12-ElO)
War Department,
Office, Chief of the Air Corps,
Washington, D. C, August 25, 1941.
To The Adjutant General THRU Chief of Engineers.
1. Attached hereto is a copy of the radiogram transmitted to the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H. on July 15, 1941.
2. In explanation thereof, you are advised that this office concurs with the
opinion that the uneven areas in the runways, referred to in the basic communica-
tion, should be eliminated in the interests of safe operation.
3. This office considers runways of 4,500 feet in length to be an absolute mini-
mum for military airports at sea level, with an additional 500 feet of length for
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3063
each 1,000 feet of elevation or fraction thereof. This minimum likewise meets
the requirements for the future installation of an instrument landing facility,
if there is provided that the same time forty to one clear angles of approach at
both ends of the runway in question.
4. If such clearances are not available at the north end of the present N-8
runway, or of the proposed new N-8 runway, becau.se of quarters built at that
end of the field, then the runway lengths should be extended on the southerly
ends sufficiently to in£,ure that a 4,500 foot length of runway will exist south
of a point where a forty to one clearance angle may be realized.
5. There is no objection to the runway crossing the railroad spur, if necessary,
providing the runway pavement is kept flush with the top of the rails and there
is; no break in the runway grade, and providing, of course, rail traffic is controlled.
If a difference in grade exists, the rail grade should be brought to that of the
runway, or the spur relocated.
6. It is requested that the District Engineer be advised of these considerations,
and that his new estimates be made accordingly.
7. No funds are available at this time for the construction and improvements
recommended in the basic communications. The recommendation, however,
will be placed in our "Suspense File" for further consideration upon receipt of
a revised estimate, and when funds therefore become available.
For the Chief of the Air Corps:
Walter J. Reed,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Asst. Chief, Bldgs. & Grounds Div.
Incl. Cy, Radio 8/21/41
cc: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
For information only
This is not an authorization
A true copy.
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt. F. A.
Signal Corps, United States Army
War Department Message Center,
Room 3441, Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.
56 WTJ 125 WD
Ft Shafter TH 1057 A Aug 27
THE AG
Washington DC.
Keurad Agmo fifteen July district engineer estimates cost of forty five
hundred foot runway as three hundred thirty thousand dollars due to railroad
relocation and heavy fill stop thirty five hundred foot runway is longest that can
be provided without railway relocation stop reduction ffom thirty seven hundred
feet due to bunker construction and new housing sto]) strongly recommend con-
struction of thirty five hundred feet runway as auxiliary landing strip comma
forty five hundred feet economically unfeasible stop main runway can be used
by planes requiring longer run stop auxiliary also needed for use while main runway
is being levelled . . Recommend immediate allotment of twenty five thousand
dollars for levelling of main runway and thirty thousand seven hundred for thirty
five hundred foot auxiliary runway.
Short.
305 AM
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
3064 CON(iRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Immediate Action
War Department,
The Adjutant General's Office,
Washington.
1st Ind.
AG 580.82- Wheeler
Field (8-27-41) NO JJF Ir
Wai Department, AGO, August 28, 1941— -To the Chief of the Air Corps.
In connection with letter your office dated July 11, 1941, file 611.
By order of the Secretary of War:
[S] John B. Cooley,
Adjutant General.
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
Subject: Improvement of Landing facilities at Wheeler Field, T. H.
2nd Ind.
(12-ElO)
War Department,
Office, Chief of the Air Corps,
Washington, D. C, September 2, 1941.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shaffer, T. H.
1. With reference to your radiogram dated August 27, 1941, attention is invited
to 2nd Indorsement of basic letter dated June 21st, subject as noted above, a
copy of which is attached hereto.
2. A request has been made this date that $25,000;t00 be included in the funds
estimated to be required for use in future airfield development. This sum is to be
used for the leveUng of the main runway at Wheeler Field.
3. No request will be made for the inclusion of funds for the construction of the
auxiliary runway, pending receipt of the revised estimate as requested in the
2nd Indorsement referred to above.
By order of the Chief of the Air Corps.
Frank M. Kennedy,
Inch Cy 2nd Ind. 8/25/41
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern.
2nd Li., F.
Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief, Building & Grounds Division.
[Exhibit IE]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 10 June 1941.
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:
Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message
does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear
or having a different security classification.
This message is routine.
Robert J. Fleming, Jr.,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Department Engineer.
A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
To THE Adjutant General
Washington, D. C
Division engineer San Francisco has informed me that the priority covering
contract W dash four one four ENGR seven eight four with Interstate Equip-
ment Corporation Elizabeth New Jersey is now a dash one dash G stop This
contract is the one for furnishing all materias for cable way to Kaala aircraft
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3065
Warning station Stop Motor and all electrical equipment sub contracted to
General Electric Stop Division engineer states that with this priority there is
strong probaiaility that delivery this electrical material to contractor will be
delayed about fifteen weeks Stop This Kaala station is the most important in
aircraft warning system and early completion of this cableway is essential Stop
I consider this aircraft warning service as the most important single project in
this Department Stop Strongly recommended that the War Department give
all possible assistance to Chief of Engineers to have priority on this contract
changed to a dash one dash B
[SJ Short.
ENC-SEC by Capt. C. J. Harrison SC— 715P June 10 1941
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.
Washn DC. 740P June 26 1941.
75 War EiM 61 WD
C C
Hawn Dept Ft Shafter T. H.
904 26th
Agmc reurad three zero zero nine priority contract W dash four one four
Engr seven eight four kaala AWS Station advanced to A dash one dash C Chief of
Engineers will instruct Division Engineer on procedure should results under this
prioritv be unsatisfactory
Ad.\ms.
616P
True Copy
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
[secret]
[1]
29 September 1941.
SIG 676.3
Subjecl : Aircraft Warning Service Installation Hawaiian Department.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. Reference is made to letter, file AG 660.2 A. A. (7-5-41) MC-E, 8 July
1941, subject: "Aircraft Warning Service Philippine and Hawaiian Departments."
A report of a Board of Officers convened at this headquarters to restudy the
AWs project is being transmitted to the War Department by Clipper mail under
separate cover. This board has considered the employment of the six fixed and
six mobile stations allocated to this Department by the War Department. The
increased number of stations now available has necessitated some adjustments in
both type and location of the stations in the previously approved project of three
fixed and five mobile units, as well as new locations. The results of this restudy
are covered fully in the report being submitted, and are summarized in the follow-
ing paragraphs.
Locations a. Kauai. There have been no changes in the fixed station now
approved at Kokee. In the former project the mobile station on Kauai was
planned for operation on the Waimea Kokee road. This mobile station is now
recommended for operation on the coast north of Kilauea Village at latitude
22°13'50", longitude 159°23'54". There is no change in the base camp at Kauai
which is now under construction at Kokee for the personnel of both the fixed
and mobile stations.
b. Maui. No change has been made in the previously approved fixed station
which is now under construction at Red Hill on Haleakala. Formerly approved
project contained a mobile station to operate along the road up Haleakala. The
project now being submitted makes no change in this mobile unit.
c. Hawaii. The former project contained a mobile station for the Island of
Hawaii, which was to be operated from the upper terminus of the Mauna Loa
truck trail, with a base camp for personnel at the Kilauea Military Camp. This
station has been eliminated in the restudy and has been replaced by a fixed
station ih che vicinity of Pa^'oa at latitude"^ 19°26'50" and longitude 154°57'5",
and bv a mobile station to operate from an initial position near Kahuku Ranch at
latitude 19°30'30", longitude 155°41'40". A base camp similar to that on
Kauai will be constructed near the fixed station for the personnel of both that
station and the mobile unit.
3066 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
d. Oahu (1) There is no change in the previously approved fixed station for
Mt. Kaala.
(2) The formerly approved mobile station at Manavvahua is to be replaced by
a fixed station.
(3) Opana. Under the former project, there were not sufficient \2\ sta-
tions to emplace one on the north shore of Oahu. With the increa.se in the num-
ber of stations allowed, this is now possible and it is recommended that a fixed
station be installed at the Opana Triangulation station at coordinates (98.655-
19.182).
(4) The increase in the number of stations has also made advisable the con-
sideration of other locations for mobile units on Oahu. This reconsideration
indicated that a location at Makapuu Point had many advantages over the former
approved Pali location, and it is accordingly recommended that the Makapuu
Point Station be considered as an initial operating position in lieu of the former
Pali location.
(5) The increase in the number of stations allowed has also made possible the
provision of units in reserve against the possibility of, failure of one of the primary
stations. Since Oahu is the central point in the islands for which protection
must be secured, it has been decided to concentrate the reserve units on this
island. For this purpose two mobile units are recommended as a mobile reserve
and for general operations on Oahu and on other islands if necessary. These
stations will be utilized as needed to either replace the other Oahu stations or
reinforce the coverage in certain sectors. Locations on Oahu which have been
considered for their employment are the Pali location discus.sed above, on the high
ground along Tantalus Road, at Fort Shafter, and at various points along the
coast.
(6) Information center. There has been no change in the previous location for
the Information Center which is now under construction at Fort Shafter. In
compliance with other directives, this installation has been combined with various
command posts into an air defense command post.
(7) No base camps are being provided for the stations on Oahu as the personnel
will be housed in construction already approved for the Signal Area, Fort Shafter.
The same construction, however, will be built at the Manawahua and Opana
fixed stations as is now approved for Kaala.
2. Reference is made to 2d Ind, Hq Haw Dept, OSigO, 31 Mav 1941, to the
letter Sig. 676.3 (AWS) dated 17 October 40 in which Signal funds totalling
$75,281.84 were requested for the installation of radio and wire facilities for the
original three fixed and five mobile stations. Due to the abandonment of the
mobile station at the Nuuanu Pali on Oahu and the Moana Loa Station on Hawaii,
this sum can be reduced by $2,296.00 to $72,985.84. The allocation of additional
stations has necessitated increased demands for Signal communications. These
additional communication facilities are summarized as follows:
a. Radio facilities for the control from the Information Center of pursuit task
forces. This includes a station at the control airdrome with four .satellite stations
at the principal pursuit fields on Oahu.
Total cost : . $55, 000
b. Emergency power for pursuit radio control transmitters. This power is
to allow the operation of pursuit control during commercial power failure.
Total cost $12, 000
c. Commercial power extensions to include provision of adequate commercial
power for the base camps and the principal alert stations at locations where this
is economically feasible.
Total cost $39, 000
[3] d. AWS radio communication facilities to include additional transmitters
and receivers at the new fixed stations, receivers at the Information Center and
allied antenna and control equipment as established by standard practice.
Total cost $18, 000
e. AWS wire and cable facilities to include additional cable extensions for the
added stations- on Oahu, together with additional telephone and teletype equip-
ment. This item also includes a cable installation from the Hawaii base camp to
the detector unit at Pahoa.
Total cost $10, 900
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3067
f. Commercial wire facilities to include leased lines from all base camps to the
nearest commercial exchange, leased lines from the principal alert stations to the
nearest exchanges, together with the yearly rental charge.
Total cost-- $10, 463. 67
Total Sig funds 145,400. 00
3. Estimates for the internal wire facilities of the Information Center and the
allied Air Defense wire facilities are being held in abeyance pending more reliable
information upon which to estimate the necessary funds. It is believed, however,
that estimates for the Information Center should be included in the next available
appropriation bill. Information Center layouts and schematic diagrams of the
Information Center Wire Net have been forwarded to the Chief Signal Officer for
review. This data is being transmitted as an inclosure to the aforementioned
board proceedings.
4. Funds in the amount of $890,804 have been made available to the Dist.
Engr. Honolulu, to complete the previously approved project of three fixed and
five mobile stations. Some of these funds were for stations which are being
superseded by other stations in the revised program. The tabulation below shows
cost estimates on the new stations, less the amounts available from the superseded
stations, and the total of engineer funds supplementing those now on hand re-
quired to complete the revised projects.
Item
No.
Description
Oahu
Mana-
wahua
Opana
Makapuu
Kauai
Kilauea
Hawaii
Pahoa
Kahuku
[41]
Cost of Site -.-.
Clearing
Grading .
Right of Way-Access Road
Road Constr...-
Bldg. Constr
Fuel Storage ,
Water Supply...
Sewage Disposal
Man Proof Fence
$2,000
300
2,700
500
58, 470
26,260
1.900
2,970
900
2,000
$2,000
200
800
500
28,000
29, 250
1,900
4,400
1,000
2,000
$2, 000
$500
5,700
11,965
500
500
24,800
12, 300
200
1,000
2,000
5C0
$7, 500
300
700
1,800
9,000
74,720
2,700
9,000
2,97C
3,000
$500
200
200
3,000
12,070
1,000
500
98, 000
70, 050
42, 600
111,690
Subtotals by Islands
Funds now available from superseded sites.
Supplemental funds required
Oahu
$187,415
76, 735
110,680
Kauai
$42,600
12,600
30,000
Hawaii
$129, 160
36,217
98, 943
Total $233,623
Mobilization of Personnel and Plant at 3%.-_ , $7,010
Total direct costs 240,633
Contingencies, Contractors Fee, Social Security, Workmen's Compensation and Insurance at 15%. 36, 100
Engineering, Surveys, Inspection and Auditing at 18% 19,250
Oeneral Office Overhead at 8% .' - 19,250
Grand Total Engineer funds 315,233
5. Secret radiogram Xo 321, this hq, 13 September 41, submitted for advance
consideration the above cost estimates with the exception of those which had
been previously submitted as stated in par 2 above. Since no information has
been received concerning the previous recommendation, those estimates are being
added to the figures submitted by the radiogram cited.
6. I strongly recommend that funds in the amount of $315,233 for engineer
construction, and $218,400 for signal communications and one year's rent of
leased wire facilities, total $533,633, to be included in pending appropriation
bills, and made available as soon as possible for the completion of the revised
project.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.
True Copj'.
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt. F. A.
3068 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[Exhibit IF]
[1]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Engineer,
Fort Shafter, T. H., July 3, 1941.
Via Clipper Airmail
Engr. 523.07
Subject: Priorities and Preference Ratings.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. On 4 June 1941 I wrote a letter, file Engr. 523.07, subject: "Priority in
Shipping Space for the Hawaiian Electric Company", in which the question of
securing shipping space priorities for this comuany was discussed. A copy of
this letter is inclosed for ready reference. At that time the main problem was
the securing of shipping space; since then it has developed that difficulties are
also arising concerning the procurement of materials. I have directed that an
investigation be made of this priority question, and the results of this investi-
gation indicate that some clarification and coordination is highly desirable.
2. At the present time priorities and preference ratings for Army activities
are assigned by the various procurement agencies and contracting officers. There
is now no coordination in the Department between these various agencies, each
of which is dealing direct on priorities questions with its Chief in the War De-
partment. This is satisfactory as long as only one procurement agency or con-
tracting officer is involved. There are cases, however, in which more than one
agency is involved, and the number of these will undoubtedly increase in the
future; I believe it is advisable to have a coordinating agency in the Department
to not only coordinate these cases locally, but also to bring to the attention of
the War Department the advisability of similar coordination between the Chiefs
of the respective agencies. Also there are many procurement problems on which
the establishment of priorities and preference ratings is necessary which no agency
is now handling. The 14th Naval District has already established a central
priority office in the local bureau of supplies and accounts where priorities infor-
mation is kept available, and where preference ratings on all Navy orders are
issued.
3. The following outlines in greater detail some of the problems on which diffi-
culty has already been encountered:
a. We have some projects in which more than one supply or construction
"branch is interested. While there is no complaint with the present system by
which each agency handles priority matters with its Chief in the War Department
there is a probability that desirable action by one agency may be overlooked with
the result that the second agency might be held up in its work even though it
had taken all action necessary.
[2] b. Hawaii presents a special problem in procurement as do the other
overseas departments, due to the shipping situation. The present priorities in-
structions are concerned with procurement; in this Department, however, prior-
ities on shipping space are important. There are large quantities of essential
materials transported on commercial shipping. These shipments involve not
only government shipments but also shipments by private concerns of materials
which are to be incorporated in defense installations.
c. Practically all construction materials must be imported into the island. The
various constructing agencies are, of course, anticipating their needs and are
having materials procured on the mainland and shipped to the department. It
is impossible to anticipate every item needed, and in the past the various supply
houses in the department, such as the Honolulu Iron Works, the Hawaiian
Electric Company, and others, have maintained local stocks from which small
items could be procured as they were needed. These local stocks are now be-
coming a matter of concern. For example, the mainland agents of the Hawaiian
Electric Company have advised the company that it can not expect to obtain
replacements for its ordinary warehouse and operations stocks unless a preference
rating is placed on this procurement. Practically all of our defense contracts
demand electric power and unless the company's local stocks are maintained it
will be impossible to install power connections without waiting for the arrival of
necessary materials for each connection from the mainland. A specific example
of this occurred recently where a sub-contractor on the Hickam Field low-cost
housing had to import by Clipper air express at an expense of $1,000.00, some
plumbing items which under normal conditions could have been obtained from
local stocks.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3069
d. As stated above shipping priorities are also important. To our knowledge
there is now no coordinated shipping priorities, although the Matson Navigation
Company, which handles the bulk of the shipments, is granting unofficial priority
to items on which a procurement priority has been obtained. As far as govern-
ment bought and shipped materials are concerned there has been no great diffi-
culty although considerable detail work has been involved in radioing about
specific shipments. There are large quantities of materials, however, which are
being ordered by private firms either for direct supply to government agencies
or for incorporation in defense works directly or indirectly, and these private
concerns are encountering great difficulties in securing shipping space for this
material.
4. To meet this increasing problem I propose to pet up an office in this depart-
ment to be responsible for coordinating all priorities matters, and I have selected
the Department Engineer's office as the section in w^ich this control can best
be established. Additional officers, not necessarily engineers, will be placed on
duty in that office to furnish needed assistance. [3] The following is a
preliminary outline of the duties of this section :
a. To establish an information bureau where request for information on
priorities can be promptly filled.
h. To keep me informed of the priorities and preference ratings assigned by
regular supply branches to their own procurement in order to insure that these
are coordinated. In this work with the regular supply branches and construction
agencies it is not intended that the coordinating office will assume any control
over these agencies; it is intended, however, that the coordinating office keep
informed of what action these agencies are taking in priority matters.
c. We assign preference ratings covering procurements which are essential to
defense work and which are not now covered by existing instructions.
5. In the directive of the Priorities Committee of the Army and Navy Munitions
Board, 27 November 1940, it is noted that all Panama Canal defense projects
are placed in priority classification A-l-b. There is no similar blanket coverage
for devents projects in this department; and the rating which can be assigned
to any project in this department depends upon its classification as a general
project under the other entries in this directive. The aircraft Warning Service
project is the most important single project in the department, and under the
general classification in this directive the highest priority which could be assigned
to it would be A 1-f. It is believed that the conditions facing this department
are similar to those in Panama and that a similar blanket priority classification
for our defense projects should be authorized, and that this rating should be high.
If this is done it would not be necessary to assign this high a rating to all projects,
and this department could reserve the high rating for the exceptional projects
which were considered absolutely essential.
6. As stated above, the maintenance of adequate local stocks by local supply
firms is essential. Existing instructions on the issuance of preference ratings
are predicated on the fact that the firm to whom the rating is issued is a govern-
ment contractor. The local supply firms who must obtain preference ratings
to maintain stocks are not actually government contractors at the time they
place their mainland orders. These firms become contractors, however, when a
government agency orders materials from their stocks. The question involved
here is one of time; and obviously we should not wait until the specific need for
a stock item arises to issue a preference rating then delay the job while the item
is being procured and shipped. It is believed that some authority should exist
for us to give preference ratings for the procurement of any items which we,
through experience and knowledge of future projects, select as essential.
[4] 7. The following is therefore recommended:
a. The establishment of a blanket prioritv for Hawaiian defense projects as has
been done for Panama Canal defense projects, and authorization to this head-
quarters to apply this high rating to cases of exceptional importance.
h. Waiving of the requirement that preference ratings can be issued only to
government contractors and authorization to this Headquarters to issue these
ratings for the procurement of those items which we anticipate will be essential
to the defense program.
c. Consideration of the establishment of a liaison with shipping agencies on the
West Coast to insure that defense materials ordered by private firms receive
proper priorities in shipping space.
3070 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
It is further recommended that prompt consideration be given to subparagraphs
o and b above and this headquarters advised by ladio of the War Department's
attitude.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.
1 incl: C/Ltr. Engr 523.07 4 Jun 1941
Record copy Engineers
A true copy.
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldefn,
2nd Lt., F. A.
114.14-18-C-32 RGC/amw
(8-18-41
1st Indorsement
Priorities Committee,
Army & Xavy Munitions Board,
War Department Building,
Washington, D. C, August 18, 1941.
To Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Office of the
Department Engineer, Fort Shafter, T. H. (THRU: The Adjutant General,
Washington, D. C.)
1. The following information is submitted in answer to the recommendations
on page 4 of letter from Lieutenant General Walter C. Short:
2. The establishment of a blanket priority specifically to Hawaiian Defense
Projects is not considered necessary inasmuch as the Directive, Priorities Com-
mittee, Army and Xavy Munitions Board, established the preference rating
A-l-c for "Construction, equipment, defense and development of outlying bases,
not included in the Continental United States". This Directive is the cumulative
result of an exhaustive study of the military importance of the various items
required by the military and naval forces of the United States, and has received
the approval of the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Xavy.
3. Attention is invited to a copy of communication of July 31, 1941, from the
Army and X'avy Munitions Board to "Supply Arms and Services of the Army
and Bureaus and Offices of the Xavy", which explains the procedure covering the
issuance of project rating orders to Army and X'avy construction projects outside
of the Continental United States. It will be noted that the project rating orders
issued in accordance with these instructions will not be confined to items on the
Critical List, but will include all items necessary to complete the construction of
a particular project. These ratings may be extended in the usual way, and it is
believed should cover the recommendation as made in paragf-aph 7 b.
4. Attention is invited to the "Defense Supply Rating Plan" recently inaugu-
rated by the Office of Production Management. This is a plan developed whereby
the manufacturers who supply so-called "Off the shelf" items to defense industries
are permitted to get material with which to manufacture additional stock so as
to make a supply available to defense customers. This plan mav be of value to
some of the concerns in the Hawaiian District and is mentioned for your
consideration.
5. The establishment of a liaison with shipping agencies of the West Coast has
been referred to the Division of Emergency Shipping, Maritime Commission.
That Commission has a record of the situation as it exists and as it has been for
some time. They are further checking into the situation, but definite decision
to establish a liaison agency has not been made.
For the Priorities Committee:
RoBT. G. Cook,
Major, Ordnance, USA.
1 Incl. no change.
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3071
[immediate action]
War Department
The Adjutant General's Office
washington
Via Air Mail
AG 523 Priority
(7-7-41) MB 2nd Ind.
War Department, A. G. O., Augusl 26, 1941.
To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Attention is invited to preceding Indorsement.
By order of the Secretary of War:
JAU
Brigadier General,
Acting The Adjutant General.
1 Incl. n/c.
A True Copy.
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
14 August 1941.
The Adjutant General,
Washington, D. C.
Relet this headquarters third July file engr five two three point zero seven
subject priorities and preference ratings stop. This question of priorities becom-
ing more pressing and many local supply houses are now advised by mainland
agents that no shipment can be made until priority is secured stop. Request
radio advice as to action on recommendations paragraph seven of letter cited.
Short.
A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., Oct. 23, 1941.
In replv refer to:
Engr. 523.07
Subject: Office of Production Management Field Service.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. Reference is made to letter dated 13 August 1941 from the Army and Navy
Munitions Board, a copy of which is inclosed. Reference is also made to letter
from his headquarters, file Engr. 523.07, subject "Priorities and Preference
Ratings," and 1st Indorsement from Priorities Committee, Army and Navy
Munitions Board, 18 August 1941, file 114. 14-1 8-C-32-RGC-amw (8-18-41).
2. The conditions as to securing priorities for materials needed in the Hawaiian
Islands are growing worse steadily, and a large part of the difficulties encountered
can be traced to lack of information and to failure of field offices, whose region in-
cludes this Territory, to malce themselves known to local Federal officials and
business men. The long distances involved in travel, the difference in time, and
the high cost of telephonic communication, all make contact with any regional
office difficult.
3072 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. Governor Poindexter has already submitted a request to Washington for the
establishment of a local office of tne Priorities Division, OPM, and at his request
1 concurred in his suggested action. A copy of my letter of September 13, 1941
to the Governor is inclosed for your information.
4. It is therefore requested that the War Department propose the establish-
ment in Honolulu of a field office of the Office of Production Management, to
include the Priorities Division, initially, w ith provision for adding representatives
of other divisions later, if required.
[s] Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
2 Incls: (1) Cy of Itr Army & Navy Munitions Board, 8/13/41; (2) Cy of Itr
to Gov. Poindexter, 13 Sept 41.
A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
m 2nd Lt., F. A.
AG 334.8 Production Management Board
(10-23-41) MB 1st Ind IG/mm-1713
War Department, A. G. O.,
October 31, 1941.
To: The Under Secretary of War.
2 Incls. No change.
A true copy.
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
2d Indorsement
18-C-32 RGC/amw
(11-13-41)
Priorities Committee
army & navy munitions board
War Department Building,
Washington, D. C, November IS, 1941.
To Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Office of the
Department Commander, Fort Shaffer, T. H. (THRU: The Adjutant General,
War Dept., Washington, D. C.)
1. Recommendation has been made to the Office of Production Management
and a field office of the Office of Production Management be established in Hawaii
at an early date. They have requested to advise this Committee as to the
action contemplated or already accomplished in this direction. Such information
will be forwarded when received.
For the Priorities Committee:
(/s/) RoBT. G. Cook,
Major, Ordnance, USA.
2 Incls. No change.
3rd Ind.
AG 334.8 Production Management Board (li)-23-41) MB
IG:wc-1713
War Department, A. G. O.,
November 17, 1941.
To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Attention is invited to preceding Indorsement.
By order of the Secretary of War:
(/s/) E. L. Adams,
Incls. n/c.
A true copy.
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3073
[Exhibit 1 G]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fori Shafter, T. //., July 28, 1941.
VIA "CLIPPER" AIR MAIL
Engr. 600.12 (Gen.)
Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. The delay in securing necessary maierials for our construction program has
become a matter of serious concern. Experience indicates that from three to
four months are necessary to procure construction materials from the United
States after funds for projects are allotted, and increasing transportation difficulties
may lengthen this time.
2. The following is the situation of the two constructing agencies:
a. The District {Engineer has no revolving fund for advance procurement of
materials. Among the first Engineer projects approved, however, were two large
projects; ohe the additional ammunition storage facilities, and the other the Air
Corps mobilization housing. As soon as these allotments were received, the
District Engineer immediately ordered all or a large part of the necessary materials
to complete the entire project. With his construction crews now well organized,
the rate of using these materials has greatly accelerated and the stock is being
depleted because the rate of use is greater than the rate of arrival from the
mainland.
b. The Constructing Quartermaster is in somewhat the same situation. While
the Quartermaster General has authorized the establishment of a stock pile of
lumber, no funds have been advanced for the procurement of other materials.
These other materials are not available for local purchase in any appreciable
quantities, and as a result, there will undoubtedly be delays.
3. I understand that the Division Engineer, San Francisco, has recommended
to the Chief of Engineers that a revolving working fund of $1,000,000,000 be
allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to permit that officer to procure
materials in advance. This fund would be a revolving fund. All expenditures
from it for materials would be reimbursed from other projects funds as these
projects were approved and utilize the materials.
4. I think that this materials situation may become critical. As stated in
previous communications, a large part of our construction forces have been
imported from the mainland on contracts which require either their continued
employment or return to the mainland at Government expense. It is obvious
that if there is anv lack of materials not only will the jobs be delayed, but also the
cost to the Government will be increased,. I therefore strongly recommend that
the suggestion of the Division Engineer, San Francisco, be adopted, that the
District Engineer, Honolulu, be allotted a revolving fund of $1,000,000.00, and
that similar arrangements be made for the Constructing Quartermaster to permit
him to stock materials in addition to lumber.
(s) Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials.
AG 600.12 Hawaiian Dept Istlnd. ET/rm
(7-28-41) MO ^^^
War Department, AGO,
August 1, 1941-
To: Chief of Engineers AND The Quartermaster General, IN TURN.
For remark and recommendation.
By order of the Secretary of War:
. . ,
Adjutant General.
A true cop}'.
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
400.31 (Honolulu) 335.
Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials.
3074 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2nd Ind. 3-N
Office, C. of E.,
August 7, 1941.
To The Adjutant General (Through The Quartermaster General.)
It is recommended that a revolving fund of $1,000,000.00 he authorized for the
purposes indicated in the basic letter. If the necessary funds are not available
to the War Department from any other source, it is believed that this amount
could be advanced from the Fifth Supplemental, 1941, Deferred Storage Program,
(Air Corps), Items a & h, Parking Storage Areas, Reserve Airplanes. As a final
resort, the sum of $1,000,000.00 now reserved for construction at the Mobile Air
Depot, (Brooklev Field) could be advanced for this purpose. In either case,
reimbursement should be effected upon the appropriation of funds for construc-
tion in Hawaii under the 1943 Construction Program.
For the Chief of Engineers:
(s) John R. Hardin,
John R. Hardin,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Construction Section.
A true copy.
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
20 August 1941.
Fred W. Herman,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Dept. Engineer.
The Adjutant General,
Washington, D. C.
Reference clipper letter this headquarters July twenty eighth file Engr six
hundred point one two parenthesis gen period parenthesis subject revolving fund
for purchase of materials Stop Information has been received from district
engineer Honolulu that allotment of one million one hundred thousand dollars
has been received wh[ch can be utilized for advanced purchases of materials as
recommended in letter cited Stop Constructing quartermaster has not repeat
not received similar allotment as revolving fund to permit advance purchases of
materials nor any information thereof Stop Strongly recommend revolving
fund allotment similar to that established for district engineer be made to con-
structing quartermaster to permit advanced ordering of materials for defense
contracts
Short
A true copy.
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
Snd Lt., F. A.
OM 411.1 C-P
(Hawaiian Dept.)
3rd Ind.
War Department.
Office of The Quartermaster General,
Washington, D. C, August 21, 1941.
■ To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. The Quartermaster Torps has established a stock-pile reserve of lumber in
Hawaii in the amount of $600,000.00. It is therefore recommended that a
revolving fund in an amount not to exceed $500,000.00 be authorized. If the
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3075
necessary funds arc not available to the War Department from any other source,
funds in allotted status to the Quartermaster C^orps can be made available.
For the Quartermaster General:
(s) L. R. Groves.
L. R. Groves,
Colonel, Q. M. C,
Assistant.
A true copy.
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
3nd Lt., F. A.
Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials — Hawaiian Department
AG 600.12 Haw. Dept.
(7-28-41) i\IO-D 4th Ind. ESA
War Department, AGO, September 27, 1941-
To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shaffer, T. H.
The establishment of revolving funds as requested in basic communication is not
favorably considered. The Quartermaster General will, however, augment the
lumber stock pile now maintained in the Hawaiian Department sufficiently to
meet requirements for ^A ar Department approved projects for both Engineer and
Quartermaster construction. A similar stock pile of other classes of construction
materials will also be established by The Quartermaster General without delay.
The materials u.sed from these stock piles will be replaced from applicable funds
of projects for which used as soon as suclf funds become available to local con-
structing agencies.
Bv order of the Secretarv of War:
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
A true copy.
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
Headqi'arters Hawaiian Department,
Offu e of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., September 13, 1941.
In reply refer to: Engr. 600.12 (Gen.)
Major General R. C'. Moore
Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Dick:
The situation surrounding the obtaining of materials for defense contracts is
becoming more and more critical. On many items a dejay of between three and
four months occurs between the time an allotment of funds for a project is received
and the materials necessary are obtained from the mainland. We have recently
received word on some electrical equipment which indicates that delivery cannot
be made for six months.
In a conference with Colonel Hamium, Division Engineer is San Francisco,
when he was here sometime ago, he mentioned that he had recommended to The
Chief of Engineers that a revolving fund of $1,000,000.00 be set up to permit the
District Engineer to make advance purchases of materials and plant. I followed
up Hannum's recommendation to the Chief of f^igineers with a strong letter to
the War Department urging that this revolving fund be set up for the District
79710 0—40 — pt. 18 15
3076 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Engineer and that similar arrangements be made for the Constructing Quarter-
master. The District Engineer informed me today that he had received an allot-
ment of $1,100,000.00 from the Chief of Engineers which could be utilized for the
advance purchase of materials. The Constructing Quartermaster, however, has
not yet received similar information, and while he is authorized to stock lumber
locally, he has no revolving fund for which to make advance purchases of materials
other than lumber.
1 am following up my previous recommendation by radio to The Adjutant
General today. I think that the matter is sufficiently important to bring it to
your attention, and I will appreciate it if you would have someone look into this
matter. A copy of my letter of July 28th and of the radio follow up of September
13 are inclosed for ready reference.
Very sincerely.
Walter C. Shokt,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.
2 Incls: Cy. Itr. Engr. 600.12 (Gen.) 28 Jul 41, Cy. rad. 20 Aug 41.
A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
War Department,
Office of the Chief of Staff,
Washington, September 29, 1941-
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short,
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, T. H.
Dear Walter:
I have your letter of the thirteenth relative to the establishment of revolving
funds in connection with construction in Hawaii.
Owing to legal restrictions we cannot approve your request for revolving funds.
However, it appears that the wording of the appropriation fiom which the Quarter-
master General maintains the lumber pile you mention is such that those funds
may be used to make advance purchases of other materials required for con-
struction.
The Quartermaster General will take immediate measures to establish a stock
pile of construction materials other than lumber, sufficient to meet requirements
for both Engineer and Quartermaster construction. The conditions under which
these stock piles will be reimbursed will be covered in the reply of the War
Department to your official request of July 28, 1941.
The Chief of Engineers advises that the allotment of $1,100,000 made to your
District Engineer, to which you refer, is from funds now available for approved
projects. This allotment should not be construed as making these fund^ available
to you as a revolving fund, nor for advance purchase of mateiials, except for the
projects to which the funds apply.
I believe that when these stock piles have become established the situation you
outline will be greatly relieved.
Sincerelv vours.
■ ' [S] R. C. Moore,
R. C. Moore,
Major General, Deputy Chief of Staff.
A true copy.
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A. .
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3077
[Exhibit 1 H]
[secret]
War Department,
Office of the Chief of Staff,
Washington, November 27, 1941-
Air Mail via Clipper
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, U. S. A.,
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander, Fort Shafter, T. H.
Dear Short: The copy of your report on the additional air routes has been
received. The quantity of details requiring coordination, and the distances
involved in the projects make the short time consumed in getting rolling almost
unbelievably short.
I extend you my personal thanks for the effort you have expended on this job
and the results you are getting.
The way things are working out now, it looks as if we will be using trans- Pacific
airways almost continuously from now on. Our plans are O. K. for 4-engine
bombers, but what are the prospects for medium bombers? Do you think we
should even study that phase of trans-Pacific operations?
Best regards.
Sincerely.
[S] H. H. Arnold,
Major General, V. S. A.,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.
A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
[Exhibit II]
Subject: Increase in the Strength of the Third Engineers.
AG320.2 (11-1-40) M-C 3rd Ind. ESA
War Department. A. G. O., February 10, 1941.
To Commanding Genera!, Hawaiian Department.
1. Action is being taken to increase the allotment of Regular Army enlisted
men for the Corps of Engineers, Hawaiian Department by 107. This allotment
will permit the organization of the 3rd Engineers in accordance with Table of
Organization 5-11, November 1, 1940. Regular Army personnel are not available
to increase further the strength of this regiment.
2. Since War Department policy forbids sending trainees to the Overseas
Departments it will not be practicable to aid you in creating an Engineer Bat-
talion (Separate) as recommended in your radio of January 23, 1941.
3. As previouslj' advised, plans provide for the activation of a separate Engineer
Company (Avn) for your Department.
By order of the Secretary of War:
A True Copy: [sgd] E.S.Adams.
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
[secret]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., February 19, 1941.
In replv refer to:
Engr. 322.03
Subject: Additional Engineer Troops.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, Engr. 322.03, 23 August 1940,
which recommended the assignment to the Department of an Engineer regiment
3078 COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(Aviation) less one battalion, and to letter. P^ngr. 210 x220.03, 1 November 1940,
which recommended an increase in the strength of the Third Engineer-^, and to
letter. Ensjr. 322.03. 5 February 1941. recommending a redesignation in the Third
Engineers from a combat regiment. Division, to a combat regiment. Corps.
2. These previous recommendations for an increase in the Engineer component,
in the Department were based upon the assumption that some civilian labor
would be available. It has been necessary with the various agencies involved
in defense construction to import skilled labor from the mainland. A recent
increase in the defense contracts of the Xavy will now necessitate the importation
of unskilled labor as well. This development now makes it impossible to assume
that any appreciable local labor will be available and requires that previou.s
estimates of the minimum force of P^ngineers necessary be revi.sed upward.s.
3. I consider it essential that a regiment of Engineers (.\viation) be furnished
this Department as an integral part of tlie Hawaiian Air Force and that a regi-
ment of Engineers, General Service, be furnished this department as Department
Engineer troops. There is sufficient work immediately on hand in connection
with Air Corps activities on the outlying islands and on Oahu to keep a regiment
of Engineers continuously occupi'^d. There is also sufficient work in connection
with military roads and trails in department units to keep a regiment of General
Service Engineers continuously occupied. There i.s also sufficient work in con-
nection with the Hawaiian Division such as bombproofing of Division command.
l)osts and comnumication centers, road blocks and other tactical employment
to keep the Third Engineers continuously occupied.
4. It is therefore recommended that one regiment of F^ngineers (Aviation) (T. O.
5-411) and one regiment of Engineers, GeneralService, (T. O. 5-21) be authorized
for this Department and that these units complete with personnel and equipment
be furnished as soon as possible..
W.ALTKR C. Short,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.
Record copy: Engineers.
.\ True Copv:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.
Subject: Additional Engineer Troops. Hawaiian Department.
AG 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M 1st Ind. ESA
War Department, A. G. O.,
May 15, 1941.
To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. a. The 34th Engineers (Combat), will be activated in your department with
an allotted strength of 1127 enlisted men under T/0 5-171, November 1, 1940,
less band and basic privates, on June 1, 1941 (AG 320.2 (4-8-41) M-C, radio
April 9, 1941).
b. The regiment will be organized with cadres to be furnished by units now in
your department, as directed by you, and with selectees to be dispatched from
the Continental United States.
c. Every effort will be made to send inaividuals who have completed their basic
training; however, in order to make maximum use of the available shipping, some
curtailment in their basic training mav be required. If this is done, you will be
informed so that thev can complete their training in Hawaii. Under the present
tentative schedule, it is proposed to dispatch the full quota except thirty-six
attached medical, in June. The Medical Department personnel Will be dis-
patched in November.
d. The actual date of activation of the regiment will conform to the arrival of
personnel in your department.
2. While your recent request for additional medical enlisted men was dis-
approved because of non-availabilitv of personnel, the 34th Engineers (and the
97th and 98th Coast Artillerv Regiments whose activation is covered in separate
correspondence) is allotted a full (luota of attached medical personnel, less basics.
You are authorized to make a redistribution of this attached medical personnel,
reporting such readju.stment to this office.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3079
3. It is desired that you submit a report on the following:
a. The actual date of activation of the 34th Engineers.
b. Changes in the distribution of three-vear men in engineer units in connec-
tion with the organization of the 34th Engineers.
4. Attention is invited to letter, this office, April 21, 1941, AG 381.4 (1-27-41)
M-D-M, subject: Reports of change in status reports — Defense Reserves,
Overseas Departments.
5. Your request for aviation engineers is being considered separately.
6. The allotment of commissioned personnel and the grades and ratings of
enlisted personnel will be made separately.
By order of the Secretary of War:
3 Inclosures-
[S] E. S. Adams,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
Incl. 1.— Copv of Itr., 5-15-41, to C. G., Third Corps Area.
Incl. 2.— Copy of Itr., 5-15-41, to C. G., New York Port of Embarkation.
Incl. 3. — Copy of Itr., 5-15-41, to The Quartermaster General.
A True Copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
[confidkntial]
War Department,
The Adjutant Generai/s Office,
Washington, June 18, 1941-
AG 320.2
(6-5-41) MR-M-C
Subject: Constitution and Activation of Certain Engineer Units (804th Engineer
Battalion, Aviation (Separate), and Personnel for Engineer Head-
quarters, Hawaiian Department Air Force).
To: The Commanding Generals, Fourth Army, Hawaiian Department, Ninth
Corps Area, and San Francisco Port of Embarkation.
Extract
1. The 804th Engineer Company, Aviation (Separate), now in Hawaii, will be
disbanded at the earliest practicable date and concurrently therewith the 804th
Engineer Battalion, Aviation (Separate), will be constituted and activated with
an authorized strength of 21 officers and 625 enlisted men, including 10 attached
medical. The personnel, unit funds, and equipment of the 804th Engineer
Battalion, Aviation (Separate).
By order of the Secretary of War:
[S] E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
A True Copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
War Department,
The Adjutant General's Office,
Washington, May 28, 1941.
AG 320.2 (5-28-41) MC-C-M
Subject: Additional Engineer Troops and Reinforcements for Coast Artillery
Garrison, Hawaiian Department.
To: The Commanding General, Third Corps Area.
The Sailings of USATs Manhattan, Washington, and Wood for Hawaii have
been indefinitely postponed. So much of letters, this office, May 15, 1941, AG
3080 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
320 2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M, subject: Additional P^ngineer Troops, Hawaiian
Department, and iMay 10, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-18-41) MC-C-M, subject: Rein-
forcements for Coast Artillery Garrison Hawaiian Department, as pertains to
movement of trainees to Ports of Embarkation and overseas movement is re-
scinded. Instructions covering final disposition of trainees earmarked by the
two letters mentioned above will follow this communication.
By order of the Secretary of War:
Adjutant General.
Copies furnished:
The Commanding Generals, First Army, GHQ Air Force, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, San Francisco and New York Ports of Embarkation;
The Chief of Staff, GHQ
The Chief of Chaplains
The Chief of Coast Artillery
The Chief of the Air Corps
The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service
The Chief of Engineers
The Chief of Ordnance
The Chief Signal Officer
The Quartermaster General; and
The Chief of Finance.
A true copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
War Department,
The Adjutant General's Office,
Washington, June 23, 1941-
AG 320.2 (6-16-41) MC-C-M
Subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian Department.
To: The Commanding Generals, Hawaiian Department, Third Corps Area and
the New York Port of Embarkation;
The Quartermaster General.
Letter this office, May 15, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M, subject:
Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian Department, to the Commanding Genral,
Third Corps Area, the Commanding General, New York Port of Embarkation,
and The Quartermaster General, respectively; and 1st Indorsement this office,
May 15, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M, same subject, to the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, are rescinded. Letters, this office May 23, 1941,
AG 320.2 (5-23-41) MC-M, May 24, 1941, AG 320.2 (5-24-41) MC, and May 27,
1941, AG 320.2 (5-26-41) MC, subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian
Department, to the Commanding General, Third Corps Area are also rescinded.
By order of the Secretary of War:
[sgd] E. S. Adams,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
Copies Furnished:
Chief of Staff, GHQ
The Commanding Generals, First Army, and S. F. P. of E
The Chief of Chaplains
The Chief of Coast Artillery
The Chief of the Air Corps
The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service
The Chief of Engineers
The Chief of Ordnance
The Chief Signal Officer
The Chief of Finance
The Surgeon General
A True Copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
Subject: Additional Selective Service Trainees for the Hawaiian Department.
AG 320.2 (4-21-41) MC-C 1st Ind. ESA
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3081
War Department, A. G. O.,
May 21, 1941.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. Radio No. 721, this office, April 9, 1941, requested your views on the prac-
.tical)ility of securing additional selectees locally, and it was not intended that an
appeal be made to the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii to secure 1,127 addi-
tional selectees in excess of the oxistins: quota.
2. In connection with your remarks on labor shortage in Hawaii, a resolution
recently passed by the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of Honolulu,
copies of which were sent to the Secretary of War and other governmental heads,
protested the organization of a port company in Hawaii on the grounds that the
supply of labor was ample and that needs of National Defense projects could be
met without importation of additional personnel from the United States. This
matter is brought to your attention for information only. No further action
appears •ic'essary (n desirable at this time.
3. Personnel for the 34th Engineers will be provided from the Continental
United States in two increments. Details have been communicated to you in
separate correspondence.
By order of the Secretary' of War:
[sgd] E. S. Adams,
A true copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 21 April 1941.
In replv refer to:
AG 381
Subject: Additional Selective Service Trainees for the Hawaiian Department.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. War Department radio No. 721, of 9 April 1941, proposes activation in this
Department of the 34th Engineer Regiment (C) in June with a strength of 1127,
including 36 attached medical personnel. It further proposes that the 3d Engi-
neers (C) will furnish the cadre; the balance to be local selectees.
2. As the existing Territorial quota of 1400 Selectees has already been exceeded
by approximately 500, and those now inducted assigned to organizations, an appeal
was made to the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii to secure the additional
personnel required to activate this new unit. The Governor's reply, attached,
states that he is without authority to call additional quotas of trainees, and even
if such authority existed, he is oppo.sed to providing additional manpower at the
expense of National Defense projects and local industry which have already
absorbed all available labor.
3. The labor shortage in Hawaii is acute. Skilled labor for work on National
Defense projects is now being imported and it is quite likely that the importation
of unskilled labor will become necessary to maintain defense work schedules.
4. In view of these circumstances it is urged that the War Department provide
personnel from the Mainland U. S. for the activation of new or expansion of ex-
isting units in the Hawaiian Department.
[sgd] Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
2 Incls.
1. Letter to Governor, T. H.
2. Letter from Governor, T. H.
A True Copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
3082 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[Exhibit IJ]
W
[Secret]
18 February 1941.
AG 320.2/55
Subject: Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department.
To: The Adj-ntant General, Washint^ton, D. C.
1. Reference is invited to:
A. Letter the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated 24 January
1941. with reference to the defense of the Pearl Harbor Xaval Base against a
surprise attack, copy forwarded to this headquarters as inclosure to letter TAG
to HHD. 7 Februarv 1941, subject: "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii,"
file AG 381 (1-24-41) M.
B. Letter HHD to TAG, 5 September 1940, subject: "Additional Antiaircraft
Troops for the Hawaiian Department", file 320.2/49.
C. Letter TAG to HHD, 27 September 1940, subject: War Reinforcements,
Hawaiian Department", file 320.2 (9/27/40) M-WPD, with 1st and 2nd Indorse-
ments thereon.
2. The increasingly critical international situation, together with the vital need,
as expressed in Reference A, for adequate provision for the best defense which
can be provided for the security of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base |and the Fleet
against surprise attacks makes it essential that the antiaircraft artillery garrison
of Oahu he placed upon a war footing without delay. While not specifically
mentioned in Reference ^4, there is a similar requirement for a sound defense of
the Fleet and its base against raids by surface ships. This would have special
importance if the fleet should be withdrawn from Pearl Harbor. An adequate
defense, ready for prompt action, can not be provided with the present garrison
because of the necessity for dual assignments of Coast Artillery batteries to anti-
aircraft and harbor defense missions. The reinforcements required for the anti-
aircraft artillery and harbor defense garrisons to provide the degree of defense
considered essential are discussed below.
3. Antiaircraft Artillery.
a. The approved defense project provides for twenty-five (25) gun batteries,
five (5) searchlight batteries, and sixteen (16) automatic weapons batteries
manning a total of seventy-two (72) mobile and twenty-six (26) fixed AA guns,
seventy-five (75) searchlights, one hundred and twenty (120) 37 mm AA guns,
and two hundred (200) cal. .50 A A machine guns. (NOTE: Three hundred and
13\ forty five (345) cal. .50 AA machine guns are provided in the defense
project, of which two hundred (200) are manned by antiaircraft artillery and
the remainder by other troops.) With the present garrison, including the
assignment of all but two (2) harbor defense artillery batteries to antiaircraft
assignments, only nineteen (19) gun batteries, three (3) searchlight batteries,
no 37mm batteries and six (6) machine gun batteries can be manned because of
the shortage of both personnel and equipment. The major shortages in anti-
aircraft artillery armament are sixteen (16) three inch AA guns and associated
equipment (of which six (6) guns are understood to be enroute'to this Depart-
ment), all one hundred and thirty-five (135) 37 mm AA guns, two hundred and
thirty-six (236) cal. .50 machine guns, and thirty (30) sound locators.
b. To man the entire antiaircraft artillery defense project, avoiding dual
assignments to all but four harbor defense batteries, requires an increase in the
existing garrison of the following antiaircraft artillery personnel:
2 Regiments Coast Artillerv AA (Mobile) T/0 4-11.
1 Battalion Gun Coast Artillerv AA (Mobile) (less searchlight batterj-)
T/0 4-15.
Approximately ninety (90) officers and two thousand (2000) enlisted men as
individual filler replacements to activate three (3) gun batteries and three (3)
37 mm batteries of the 64th CA (AA), now in active, and to bring to war strength
the active elements of this regiment.
c. In paragraph 10 a of 2nd Indorsement of Reference C, the War Depratment
provided for only one half of the reinforcements of the peacetime garrison of
antiaircraft artillery which, at that time, were considered essential to provide a
reasonably effective antiaircraft defense prior to the date unit reinforcements
from the mainland could affect the situation. With the increasingly critical
international situation at this time, it is urgentl}' recommended that all war
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 30<S3
reinforcements of antiaircraft artillery personnel, both unit and filler reinforce-
ments described above, together with the existing shortages in antiaircraft
artillery material be sent from the mainland with the least practicable delay.
4. Harbor Defense Artillery.
The status of the defense which can be established with existing personnel of
the peace garrison of harbor defense artillery is described in detail in par 6/, of
the basic document, Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision of 1940. Briefly, only
one 16-incli battery and the seacoast searchlights of the Ulupau Group can be
manned by batteries with harbor defense as their only mission. By employing
the undesirable expedient of dual assignments to harbor defense and antiaircraft
missions, and of harbor defense and Field Artillery missions, both 16-inch gun
batteries, the one 14-inch battery, o'ne of the two 12-inch gun batteries, none of the
three mortar t:)atteries, three of the five 8-inch batteries (fixed and railway), six
of the twelve 155 mm batteries (two manned by Field Artillery personnel) and
none of the two 6-inch and two 3-inch [3] batteries can be manned upon
initial deployment. As shown in Table I, par. 7 to HDP-40, an increase of
approximately 165 officers and 3400 enlisted men as individual filler reinforcements
and One Regiment Coast Artillery (TD, T/0 4-31 W) is required to fully man
the harbor defense artillery. By not manning the three fixed seacoast mortar
batteries, which are not essential to a defense against raids, the total number of
individual filler reinforcements may be reduced to approximately 150 officers
and 2700 enlisted men. This increase in the garrison will be sufficient to provide
only one relief as manning details for harbor defense guns, but will be adequate so
that key observation stations, air guards and similar details can be maintained
continuously.
5. Summarizing, it is urgently recommended that:
(a) The Coast Artillery garrison of this Department be brought to substantially
war strenght bv the dispatch from the mainland of the following reinforcements:
(1) Two Regiments CA (A A) Mobile, T/0 4-11.
(2) One Battalion CA fAA) gun, xMobile (less searchlight battery), T/0
4-15.
(3) One Regiment CA (TD), 155mm gun, T/O 4-31 W.
(4) Individual antiaircraft artillery filler reinforcements to include 91
officers and 2064 enlisted men.
(5) Individual harbor defense artillery reinforcements to include approxi-
mately 150 officers and 2700 enlisted men.
b. Existing major shortages in the armament of the approved antiaircraft
artillery projects, as .set forth in par. 3 above, be filled as soon as practicable.
Walter C Short,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.
A True Copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.
\1]
[SECRET]
Subject: Reinforcements for Coast Artillerv Garrison, Hawaiian Department.
AG 320.2 (2-18-41) MC-C-M 1st Ind." ESA
War Department, A. G. O.,
May 10, 1941.
To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. The Coast Artillery garrison, Hawaiian Department, will be augmented by
approximately 276 officers and 5,734 enlisted men between June, 1941, and March,
1942, in three increments paralleling the estimated delivery of material, as follows:
a. June, 1941 :
(1) AA filler replacements, 60 officers and 1,337 enlisted men.
(2) 62 officers and 1.329 enlisted men required to activate the following
units in the Department:
3084 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
98th Coast Artillery (A A) (Semi-mobile), less band, 3d Battalion (37-mm
Gun), Battery E (Searchlight), basic privates and attached medical, under
T/0 4-111, November 1, 1940, and component tables.
(3) 17 officers and 359 enlisted men to activate the 2d Battalion, 97th
Coast Artillery (A A) (Semi-mobile), less Battery H (Gun), Battery E
(Searchlight) and basic privates, under T/0 4-115, November 1, 1940 and
component tables.
b. November, 1941 :
(1) 48 officers and 885 enlisted men to activate the 97th Coast Artillery
(AA) (Semi-mobile), less band, 2d Battalion (Gun), 3d Battalion (37-mm
gun), and basic privates, under T/0 4-111, November 1, 1940, and compo-
nent tables.
(2) 4 officers and 134 enlisted men to activate Battery H (Gun), 97th
Coast Artillery, less basic privates, under T/0 4-17, November 1, 1940.
(3) Attached Medical personnel, 98th Coast Artillery, 7 officers and 49
enlisted men.
[2] c. March, 1942:
(1) AA filler replacements, 24 officers and 661 enlisted men.
(2) 54 officers and 980 enlisted men to activate the 3d Battalion (37-mm
Gun), 97th Coast Artillery and 3d Battalion (37-mm gun), 98th Coast Ar-
tillery, each less Battery M (Gun) and basic privates, under T/0 4-125,
November 1, 1940 and component tables.
2. Cadres for the new imits will be furnished from existing units in the Hawaiian
Department; their source, strength and composition will be determined by you.
3. Every effort will be made to send individuals who have completed their basic
training; however, in order to make maximum use of available shipping, some cur-
tailment in their basic training may be required. If this is done, you will be in-
formed so the individuals can complete their basic training in Hawaii.
4. The actual activation of the various units will conform to the arrival of per-
sonnel in the Department.
5. While your recent request for additional medical enlisted men was dis-*
approved because of non-availability of personnel, the 97th and 98th Coast Ar-
tillery Regiments (and the 34th Engineers whose activation is covered in separate
correspondence) are allotted full quotas of attached medical personnel, less basics.
You are authorized to make a redistribution of this personnel, reporting such re-
adjustment to this office.
6. It is desired that you submit a report on the following:
a. The actual dates on which various units are activated.
6. Changes in the distribution of three-year men in Coast Artillery units in
connection with activation of new units.
c. List of all Coast Artillery units and installations in the "Department includ-
ing allotted strengths and tables of organization under which organized; this re-
port to be submitted upon completion of the activation of all new units and dis-
tribution of. the last increment of A A filler replacements.
[3] 7. Attention is invited to letter, this office, April 21, 1941, AG 381.4
(1-27-41) M-D-M, subject: Reports of Change in Status Reports^Defense
Reserves, Overseas Departments.
8. The allotments of commissioned personnel and the grades and ratings for
enlisted personnel will be made separately.
9. Recommendation for augmentation of harbor defense artillery is not favor-
ably considered at this time because the additional personnel is not available.
The antiaii craft reinforcements will strengthen the seacoast defenses by the
relief of all but four harbor defense batteries from dual antiaircraft missions.
By order of the Secretary of War:
(sgd) E. S. Adams,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
3 inclosures — Added.
Incl. 1— Copy of Ltr., 5/10/41.
AG 320.2 (2/18/41) MC-C-N, to C. G., Third Corps Area.
Incl. 2— Copy of ltr., 5/10/41, AG 320.2 (2/18/41) MC-C-M, to C. G.s,
N. Y. & San Fran. Ports of Emb.
Incl. 3— Copy of ltr., 5/10/41, AG 320.2 (2/18/41) MC-C-M, to The
Quartermaster General.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3085
Copies furnished:
The Commanding Generals, Third Corps Area and New York & San
Francisco Ports of Embarkation:
The Chief of Staff, GHQ;
The Chief of Chaplains;
The Chief of Coast Artillery;
The Chief of the Air Corps;
The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service;
The Chief of Engineers;
The Chief of Ordnance;
The Chief Signal Officer;
The Quartermaster General;
The Surgeon General; and
The Chief of Finance.
A true copy:
L. W. Trukan,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
[secrkt]
I/]
A.G 320.2/57 25 February 1941
Subject: Increase of onlisted strength, 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National
Guard (California).
To: The Adjutant General.
1. On January 9, 1941, the then Department Commander, Lieutenant General
Herron, radioed for authority to increase the enlisted strength of the 25 1st Coast
Artillery (AA), National Guard, from present allotted strength to a peace strength
of 1450 by assignment of selectees from Ninth Corps Area. On January 17, 1941,
the War Department replied by radiogram to the effect that the recommendation
made in Janurary 9, 1941 radiogram was not favorably considered and that the
policy of the War Department is that selective service personnel in overseas gar-
risons will be limit(!d to those procured within the overseas department itself and
that no additional selective service personnel will in time of peace be sent from the
continental United States to overseas departments.
2. I am again submitting this request as I am of the firm opinion that the
situation hero is different than in the United States, and that this is a special case
which deserves further consideration. The facts are:
The 251st National Guard is the only National Guard organization on duty
outside of the continental limits of the United States;
This regiment is composed of white officers and enlisted mun;
The selective service trainees now in being in this Department are composed of
469 Japanese out of the quota 700. The next draft quota of 700 which is to b'
inducted in March will undoubtedlv be composed of approximately the same
ratio of Japanese; namely, about 67%;
The selective service trainees are of varied nnxture. such as Japanese, Hawaiian,
Part Hawaiian, Filipinos, Chinese, Korean, and other mixtures;
.Any assignment of the selective servi(;e traine;»s to the 251st Coast Artillery
(AA) would r^'sult in a mixture of races, largely Japanese, being. assigned to a white
organization, which is contrarv to War Department policv, as stated in War
Department Letter AG 291.21 (10,9/40) -ISI-A-M, October 16, 1940, Subject:
"War De[)artment Policy in regard to Negroes", paragraph g;
The Colonel, Conunanding the 251st Coast .\rtillery (AA), states that because
of the feeling in California against orientals, any asjsignment of selective service
trainees from this Department to his command would cause dissension, and
lessen the efficiencv of his command fuUv 50 percent.
[2] All replacements now coming from the mainland are required for the
Regular Armv troops here.
All the selective service trainees in this Department will be needed to fill the
Hawaii National Guard units which are composed of races of the same type as in
the selective service draft.
3086 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. In view of the above, the only justifiable solution of this problem is to assign
selective service trainees from the mainland, and preferably from the 9th Corps
Area, to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard. It is my opinion that
it will be contrarv to the best interests of all concerned to assign selective service
trainees in this Department to the 251st Coast Artillery (A A) to increase its
strength.
4. Since this is a special situation incident to this Department. I do not be-
lieve the present War Department policv, as stated in WD Radiogram, January
17, 1941; i. e., of not sending any additional selective service personnel from the
continental United States to overseas departments, should apply to this Depart-
ment.
5. I therefore again request that the 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National
Guard, be increased from present allotted strength to a peace strength of 1450 by
assignment of selective service trainees from the 9th Crops Area.
(sgd) Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, V. S. Army,
Commanding.
A true copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
[SECRET]
Subject: Increase of Enlisted Strength, 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National
Guard (California).
AG 320.2 (2-25-41) M-C 1st Ind. ESA
War Department, A. G. O.,
March 8, 1941.
To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. Your recommendation that the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) be increased from
its present allotted strength of 1181 to a strength of 1450 by assignment of se-
lectees from the Ninth Corps Area is not favorably considered.
2. As stated in radiogram from this office, January 17, 1941, all selective service
personnel to be procured in the current fiscal year have already been allotted to
units and activities. Additional personnel could be allotted to the 251st Coast
Artillery (AA) only at the expense of other units or activities.
3. If "trainees were sent to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) at the present time,
it is not considered that they could be of great value to the regiment or to the
defense of the Hawaiian Islands due to the short period of time they would be
available after completing their basic training. Selectees inducted now would
probably reach the Hawaiian Department some time in April 1941. Their basic
training would require approximately three months making them fully available
about July 1941. As the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) is scheduled to be returned
to the United States for return to an inactive status of September 16, 1941, it
appears that any selective service personnel sent at this late date would be avail-
able to the regiment for a maximum of two months.
By order of the Secretary of War:
(sgd) E. S. Adams,
Major General,
^ The Adjutant General.
A true copy.
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
[secret]
[1]
AG 320.2/58 25 February 1941.
Subject: Reinforcements for Hawaiian Department.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. Reference is invited to:
A. Letter, TAG to HHD, 4 Februarv 1941, subject: "Tables of Organization,
Overseas Departments" file AG 320.2 ( 1-17-4 1) P(C) :
B. Letter, TAG to HHD, 27 December 1940, Subject: "Equipment for Field
Artillery Units", file AG 320.2 (12/20/40) P.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3087
C Letter, HHD to TAG, 18 February 1941, subject: "Reinforcements for
Coast AitiUerv Garrison, Hawaiian Department", file AG 320.2/55.
D. Letter, HHD to TAG, 19 February 1941, subject: "Additional Engineer
Troops", file Engr. 322.03.
2. The requests for troop reinforcements as stated in Reference C ana D, hold
priority over the requests given herein. The following reinforcements are re-
quested for this Department at the earliest possible date and in the priority in
which they are listed.
a. In accordance with Reference A, authority is requested to organize the 11th
Field Artillery under WD T/0 6-41, dated November 1, 1940. The 11th Field
Artillery (less 3d Battalion) is now organized under Standard War Departmeat,
Tables of Organization with units organizea and maintained at war strength, as
follows:
(1) nth Fiela Artillery (less 3d Bn), T/0 6-41, January 3, 1939.
(2) Hq & Hq Btry, 11th Field Artillery, T/0 6-42, January 3, 1939.
(3) 1st ana 2a Bn, 11th Field Artillerv, T/0 6-45, December 7, 1938.
(4) Hq & Hq Btry, 1st and 2d Bn, 11th Field Artillery, T/0 6-46. January
7, 1938.
(5) Four (4) batteries, 11th Field Artillery, T/0 6-47, December 7, 1938.
b. That one Infantry Battalion, Light Tanks, be authorized for and the neces-
sary personnel and material to organize same, be furnished this Department.
The number of possible localities for hostile beach landings make the availability
of a mobile reserve having the characteristics of light tanks of [2] great tactical
importance for counterattacks. The 11th Tank Company (Light Tanks) or-
ganized under Standard WD, T/0 7-8, dated March 17, 1938, is the only tank
unit in this Department and could be the nucleus for the Infantry Battalion of
Light Tanks, requested herein.
c. That the organization of two (2) Military Police Companies, under WD,
T/0 7-55, dated November 1, 1940, (Military Police Battalion) be authorized
and that the necessary personnel be furnished from the Mainland for organization
of the two (2) companies in this Department. The technical duties required of
Air Corps enlisted personnel are retarded due to the required training for and
actual performance of interior guard duty at both Hickam and Wheeler Fields.
It is believed that an organized Military Police Company stationed at each of these
fields would release Air Corps personnel for necessary air activities and also render
more efficient interior guard and military police duty. The Military Police per-
sonnel could be efficiently trained in anti-sabotage work and also in close-in
defense without disrupting scheduled training. It is the intention to use the
Military Police personnel to perform similar work at outlying air fields under the
control of the Commanding Officers of Hickam and Wheeler Fields and also to
accompany Air Corps Units to those outlying fields when either Wing is operating
under its Dispersion Plan.
d. That the necessary reinforcements be furnished so that the Infantry Regi-
ments of the Hawaiian Division, be organized under WD, T/0 No. 7, dated No-
vember 1, 1940: Infantry Division (Square). These regiments are now organized
under Standard WD, T/0 7-11, dated December 6, 1938, as modified to fall within
the "Allotment of Grades and Ratings for Enlisted Men, and authorized Recruit-
ing Strength" as published in mimeograph letter, TAG, August 7, 1940, file AG
221 (8-7-40) E. Approval of this request would permit compliance with Refer-
ence A, above, and also make available the necessary personnel and material au-
thorized by current standard War Department Tables of Organization.
e. That "the 11th Field Artillery Brigade (less Uth Field Artillery) be organized
under WD, T/Os dated November 1, 1940 and that the necessary reinforcements
be furnished this Department. That War Department, Tables of Basic Allow-
ances for Field Artillery, No. 6-1, dated November 1, 1940, be made applicable
to the nth Field Artillery Brigade (less 11th Field Artillery).
3. A Study is now being made of all Special Tables of Organization at present in
use by units in this Department, with a view of submitting recommendations for
changes that will permit organization and functioning under current Standard
WD, Tables of Organization.
[sgd] Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.
A true copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.
3088 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[secret]
SUBJECT: Reinforcements for Hawaiian Department.
1st Ind.
AG 320.2 '(2-25-41) M-C WVC
War Department, A. G. O.,
April It, 1941.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. The augmentation of Coast Artillery and Engineer components of the
Hawaiian Department is being considered separately, and you will be advised
in the near future of the action taken thereon.
2. The augmentation of the Field Artillery and Infantry components of the
Hawaiian Division, and the addition of a Tank Battalion and two Military Police
Companies to* the peace garrison are not considered urgent, nor is it practicable
to provide the personnel at this time. It is believed the necessary guard duties
can and should be performed by troops in the Department without organizing
Military Police Companies for this purpose.
3. The reorganization of Infantry and Field Artillery elements of the Hawaiian
Division under latest War Department tables of organization is approved. This
can be accomplished without additional personnel. The majority of the units
in other foreign garrisons and in the Continental United States are below table
of organization strengths yet conform to standard tables. As stated in letter,
February 4, 1941, AG 320.2 (1-17-41) P (C), subject: "Tables of Organization,
Overseas Departments", this can be accomplished by reducing the size of com-
ponent elements of a unit or by carrying certain elements inactive.
Bv order of the Secretary of War:
(sgd) W. V. Carter,
W. V. Carter,
Brigadier General,
Acting The Adjutant General.
.\ true copy :
L, W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.
[Exhibit IK]
[SECRET]
AG 320.2 (3-5-41) M-WPD ACW/lfi
April 9, 1941.
Subject: Aircraft Warning Service and Air Defense.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. Reference is made to letter, this office, December 15, 1939, AG 676.3 (12-
15-39) M-WPD, subject: "Aircraft Warning Service, Hawaiian Department",
to subsequent communications on the same subject; to letter G-2/183-316,
February 12, 1941, subject: "Final Report of Commanding General, Air Defense
Command"; and to letter, this office, March 17, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-28-41) M-
WPD-M, subject: "Defense Plans, Continental United States".
2. It is suggested that you consider the advisability of organizing your depart-
ment for air defense, along lines similar to those described in letter, this office,
March 17, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-28-41) M-WPD-M, i. e., charging your senior
air officer with functions corresponding to those of the Commanding General^
GHQ Air Force in the United States. These functions would include the peace-
time organization and training of both fixed and mobile Aircraft Warning Services
and of Interceptor pursuit aviation.
By order of the Secretary of War:
D. R. Van Sickler,
Adjutant General.
A true copy:
U. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-23-41.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3089
ISECRET]
AG 320.2/61 1st Ind.
.Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H., S May, 1941.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
Considerable study has been given to the organization of a Hawaiian Air
Defense Ccmmand and the proposed plan was presented in paragraph 7, secret
letter, this headouarters to TAG, dated 25 April 1941, subject: "Reorganization
of the Forces of the Havaiian Department."
For the Commanding General:
Carl Grosse,
Major, A.G.D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.
\ true copv:
L. W. Truman,
L. W. Truman,
Ca-pl. Inj'.
12-22-41.
[SECRETl
(IG-24)
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
^ Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2U April 1941.
In reply refer to: 320.2
Subject: Air Base Group.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C, (thru: Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.).
1. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, recently requested the
War Department to designate Bellows Field, T. H., a permanent Air Corps
station under the jurisdiction of Headquarters Hawaiian Department.
2. A further request is being prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, to have the Mar Department authorized the creation of a separate
.\ir Corps station for the 15th Pursuit Group on Oahu, T. H.
3. Subject to the approval of the above mentioned recommendations, a redis-
tribution of Air Base Group units will be necessary and the following is recom-
mended:
a. The 18th Air base Group (R) (tentative T/0 1-411) Wheeler Field, T. H.,
be redesignated an "Air Base Group, Air Base" (Single).
b. An "Air Base Group, Air Base" (Single) (tentative T/0 1-411) be authorized
for Bellows Field, T. H.
c. An "Air Base Group, Air Base" (Single) (tentative T/0 1-411) be authorized
for the new station of the 15th Pursuit Group.
F. L. Martin,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
A true copy:
li. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
[confidential]
SUBJECT: Air Base Group
AG 320.2 (4-24-41) MC-C 2nd Ind. RPM/ihw-1217
War Department, a. G. O.,
June 26, 1941.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. The Troop I^nit Basis FY 1942, provides for two additional materiel squad-
rons for the Hawaiian Department Air Force. It is believed that this provides
sufficient air base units to care for Bellows Field.
2. Action on your recommendation for the organization of an additional air
base group for station with the 15th Pursuit Group is held in abeyance pending
decision on the new station.
3090 CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. It i?; desired that you submit without delay your recommendations for station
and construction for the two additional materiel squadrons.
Bv order of the Secretary of War:
D. B. Van Sickle,
Adjutant General.
\ true copy:
L. W. Truman,
I,. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-4]
[secret]
AG 320.2/94 3rd Ind. OMM/ajk
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shaffer, T. H., 22 July 1941.
To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.
Reference paragraph 3, 2nd Indorsement, it is recommended that the two
additional material squadrons be stationed at Bello\\s Field. Construction to
care for these squadrons has been included in letter this Headquarters to the
War Department dated 5 April 1941, Engineer file 600.12, subject: "Construction
at Bellows Field, T. H."
For the Commanding General:
O. M. McDole,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.
A true copy :
L. W. Truman
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
7 August 1941.
Chenney L. Bertholf,
Lt. Co., A. G. D.,
Adjutant General
Chief of the Air Corps,
Washington, D. C.
. Request authority be obtained for the activation of Bellows Field of a head-
quarters detachment to provide officer and enlisted staff for the post commander
Stop Absence of an air-base group in the Bellows Field set-up necessitates the
above Stop Minimum personnel for Hq Bellows Field now being furnished on
DS from Hickam and Wheeler Fields Stop First two grade personnel available
locally Stop Request for allotment of grades and ratings for the above follows
by airmail Stop Request radio reply signed Martin.
Short.
A True Copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
Confidential
380-22
Chief of Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C.
Request information as to status of air base group for Bellows Field Stop
Seven hundred troops now station thereat and the administrative situation is
becoming difficult Stop Refer thirty nine August fifteen Signed Martin
Short.
A True Copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
EXHIBITS OF JOIJfT COMMITTEE 3091
Confidential
From
6 War WD
Washington, D. C, Sept. 27, 1941.
C G, Hawaiian Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.
172— 27th
The activation of the air base group for Bellows Field reurad three eighty was
not favorably considered by Secretary War because this would exceed the garrison
strength now allotted Hawaii Stop The Adjutant General has been requested
to activate a headquarters detachment in accordance with your letter August
fifteen same subject A one dash seven.
Arnold.
316P/27.
Decoded by Lt Jos Engelbertz SC 10:00A, 29 Sept. 41.
A True Copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
SECRET
War Department,
The Adjutant General's Office,
Washington, September 27, 1941-
AG 320.2 i8 15 41)
MR-M-AAF
Subject: Activation of Air Corps Units.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. The Headquarters Detachment, Bellows Field, T. H., is constituted and
will be activated by you at the earliest practicable date.
2. Grades and ratings for this detachment will be as indicated on the attached
inclosure.
3. Personnel for this detachment will be furnished from personnel now avail-
able in the Hawaiian Department with no increase in strength of the Hawaiian
Air Force.
By order of the Secretary of War:
(S) Otto Thuson,
Adjutant General.
1 Incl. Copies furnished:
Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force
Chief of Staff, GHQ.
Chief of the Army Air Forces
Chief of thf Air Corps
Divisions of the War Department General Staff.
A true copy:
L. W. Truman,
. Cavt. Inf.
12-22-41
secret
56 WAR RC WD
Washington, D. C, 554P, AGU 30, 1941.
C G Hawn Dept. Ft. Shafter, T. H.
Seven Nine Thirtieth Air base group at Bellows Field and URAD August
Seven reference hdqrs Bellows Field reulst April Twenty-four Stop Desired
that following information be furnished by most expeditious means to this office
Stop One what are total Air Corps personnel requirements for Hawaiian Dept
quy rtewo what are total personnel requirements for arms and services with
Air Corps query three number of air base groups and location that will be required
for Hawaiian Dept.
Ulio.
352P.
Decoded by: Capt. C. J. Harrison, SC. 1030A, Aug. 31, 1941.
A true copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
79716 O — 46— pt. 18 — —16
3092 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
9 September 1941.
[S] Chemey L. Bertholf,
Lt. Col. AGD
Adjutant General.
272-9
The Adjutant General,
Washington, D. C.
Following Air Force requirements submitted re your seven nine thirtieth
Stop Following units and personnel required at present two air base groups
paren single paren comma one for Bellows Field and one for Kahuru Point semicolon
Air Corps enlisted personnel now in department sufficient to organize these units
Stop One heavy bombardment squadron consisting of twenty seven officers and
two hundred twenty enlisted men required to replace Fourteenth Bombardment
Squadron transferred to Philippine Department Stop Other services required
as follows Bellows Field colon Medical Corps one officer seven enlisted Dental
Corps one officer semicolon Quartermaster Corps one officer thirty enlisted
comma Ordnance Department one air base company of four officers and sixty
men Stop For Kahuru Point colon Medical Corps three officers twelve en-
listed one Dental Corps comma /Quartermaster Corps one officer thirty enlisted
comma Signal Corps ten enlisted specialists Stop In order that the Hawaiian
Air Force may be brought to the strength necessary to enable that force to provide
the air defense of Oahu it is necessary that the following additional personnel
be provided as soon as possible colon Air Corps three thousand eight hundred
seventy one enlisted comma Medical Corps six officers thirty six enlisted one
Dental Corps comma Quartermaster four officers seventy enlisted Stop Also
three air base squadrons one each at Barking Sands Kauai comma MORSE Field
and Hilo Hawaii Stop In the near future two additional air base squadrons
will be required one at Lanay paren under construction paren one at Parker Ranch
paren Project to be submitted paren Stop This need covered in full detail in
confidential letter commanding General Hawaiian Air Force to Chief Army
Air Forces dated twenty August forty one forwarded from this headquarters
twenty-fifth August Stop The above increased personnel both Air Corps,
arms and services was not repeat not included in my letter ag three twenty zero
point three slant thirty seven 2 dated June fifth forty one
Short.
EMC secret by Lt. G. Lennox S. C, 1146A Sept. 9, 1941.
A true copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
secret
126 WAR EM WD
Washington, D. C. 731 P Oct 17, 1941.
C. G., HAWN DEPT Ft. Shafter T. H.
17th Fourteenth Bombardment Squadron H is relieved from assignment to
Eleventh Bombardment Group H and from permanent station at Hickam Field
and assigned to Commanding General U S Army Forces in the Far East Manila
P I for permanent station to be designated by him
Adams,
IIOIP.
Decoded by Capt. C. J. Harrison, 1138P Oct 17 1941.
A True Copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
8 November 1941.
Cheney L. Bertholf,
Lt. Col., A. G. D., Adjutant General.
786-eth
Chief of Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C.
Request immediate consideration be given to the assignment of three repeat
three air depot groups to the Hawaiian Air Force Stop Procurement of sufficient
civilian employees for the Hawaiian Air Depot is impossible St/op Discharge
of enlisted men at the convenience of the Government for the purpose of accepting
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3093
employment in the Hawaiian Air Depot fails to remedy the shortage in personnel
Stop At present our depot maintenance is far behind schedule Comma result-
ing in the grounding of thirty percent of our tactical planes Stop Lack of
both personnel and material is becoming increasingly acute Stop From a stand-
point of second and third echelon maintenance we are poorly prepared for any
augmentation in airplane strength Stop We must have maintenance personnel
and material at once Stop No no personnel is available here for the activation
of these groups signed Martin
Short.
ENC secret by LTCR Tiemah SC 310PM Nov. 8, 1941.
A True Copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
SECRET
59 WAR MC WD
Washington, D. C, 748 P Nov. 15, 1941.
C G Hawn Dept. Ft. Shafter, T. H.
Four zero two fifteenth. Reference your radiogram number seven eight six of
Nov eighth for additional air depot groups period This matter is now under ad-
visement period Answer will be made in the immediate future period At the
present time the air depot groups are not available for transfer to your depart-
ment period When depot groups can be made available to your dept will \ his
increase in Air Force personnel co«ie within the authorized war garrison strength
now approved for the Hawaiian Dept period From Arnold.
Adams,
120A/15/16.
Decoded by: Capt C. J Harrison SC 435P Nov. 16, 1941.
A True Copy:
L. W. Truman.
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
18 November 1941.
Wm E Donegan,
Lt. Col. G. S. C.
889— 19th A. C. of S., G-3
The Adjutant General,
Washington, D. C.
Reference your four zero two fifteenth of November fifteenth increase of Air
Depot groups will not repeat not come within authorized war garrison strength
now approved for Hawaiian Department Stop Request that personnel for
Air Depot groups be furnished as soon as possible Stop Air groups urgently
needed due to difficulty in procuring civilian employees Stop Hawaiian Air
Force will be severely handicapped in proposed augmentation in airplane strength
Stop Demands for depot maintenance will be unlimited Stop Authorized
war garrison strength must be increased to accommodate air depot groups End
Short.
Enc sec by Lt J H Babcock, 137P Nov. 19, 1941.
A True Copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22^41
secret
War Department,
The Adjutant General's Office,
• AG 320.2 (11-1-41) Washington, November 18, 1941.
MR-M-AAF
Subject: Activation and Redesignation of Air Corps Units.
To: Commanding Generals,
Caribbean Defense Command, Panama Canal,
Hawaiian and Philippine Departments,
Newfoundland Base Command and
U. S. Forces in Far East
Chief of Army Air Forces.
1. The following units are constituted and will be activated at the earliest
practicable date by the Department commanders concerned:
3094 CONGRESSIONAL INVfeSTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Unit
Source of Personnel
Station of
Activation
Permanent Station
5th Air Corps Squadron,
Existing I'nits in
Phil. Dept....
Sq. Hq. Nichols Field, P. I., Airways
Communications, (Re-
Phil. Dept.
detachments as directed by Dept.
gional Control).
Commander.
5th Airways Squadron
Existing Units in
Phil. Dept....
Sq. Hq. Nichols Field, P. I., Airways
Phil. Dept.
detachments as directed by Dept.
Commander.
6th Airways Squadron
Existing Units in
P. C. Dept:...
Sq. Hq. Albrook Field, Panama, Air-
Caribbean De-
ways detachments as directed by
fense Com-
Dept. Commander.
mand.
7th Airways Squadron
Existing Units in
Haw. Dept
Sq. Hq. Hickam Field, Haw., Air-
Haw. Dept.
ways detachments as directed by
Dept. Commander.
2. The initial strength of the 5th and 7th Airways Squadrons will be 19 officers
and 110 men. Grades and ratings will be issued in a separate communication.
3. The 5th and 7th Airways Squadrons will furnish the servicing detachments
for Airways stations in the Pacific Area. Weather and Communications person-
nel for the Airways stations will be furnished by the Chief of the .\rmy Air Forces
upon receipt of a requisition from the appropriate Department commander.
4. These units will be activated from personnel now available to the respective
Department commanders.
5. Further replacements for the 5th Airways Squadron and 5th Air Corps
Squadron, Communications, will be furnished by the Chief of the Army Air Forces
upon receipt of a requisition from the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in Far
East.
6. Attached is a Manning table for an Airways station.
7. The following units are redesignated as indicated:
OLD DESIGNATION
Air Corps Detachment, Weather, Philip-
pine Islands.
Air Corps Squadron, Communications,
Caribbean.
Air Corps Detachment, Weather, Pan-
ama.
Air Corps Detachment, Communica-
tions, Hawaii.
/iir Corps Detachment, Weather, Ha-
waii.
Air Corps Detachment, Communica-
tions, Newfoundland Base Command.
Air Corps Detachment, Weather, New-
foundland Base Command.
NEW DESIGNATION
5th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Re-
gional control).
6th Air Corps Squadron, Communica-
tions (Regional Control).
6th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Re-
gional control).
7th Air Corps Squadron, Communica-
tions (Regional Control).
7th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Re-
gional control).
8th Air Corps Squadron, Communica-
tions (regional control).
8th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Re-
gional Control).
8. Assignment of units:
Caribbean Air Forces:
6th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron
headquarters at Albrook Field.
All Communications detachments in the Caribbean Area including Puerto
Rico and the Communications detachments at all Airways stations in the
Caribbean Area.
6th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control) with squadron head-
quarters at Albrook Field.
All Weather detachments in the Caribbean Area including Puerto Rico and
the Weather detachments at all Airways stations in the Caribbean Area.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3095
Far East Air Force:
5th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron
headquarters at Nichols Field.
All Communications detachments in the Far East Area. 5th Air Corps
s{|uardon, Weather (Regional Control) with squadron headquarters at
Nichols Field.
All V\ eather detachments in the Far East Area.
Hawaiian Department Air Force:
7th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron
headquarters in the Hawaiian Department Area.
7th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control) with squadron head-
quarters in the Hawaiian Department Area.
Newfoundland Base Command:
8th Air Corps Squadron, Conuiiunications (Regional control) with squadron
headtiuarters at Newfoundland Airport.
All comnmnications detachments at the British Bases in the Northeast, and
Bermuda.
8th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control) with squadron head-
quarters at Newfoundland Airport.
All W eather detachments at the British Bases in the Northeast, and Ber-
muda.
9. Weather Sections and Communications Sections now assigned as a part of
Airways detachments are removed from assignment thereto and reassigned as a
Weather or Communications detachment to the appropriate Weather or Com-
munications s(]uadron of that area. The detachments will remain at their Air-
ways stations.
10. Weather and Communications personnel for the Airways stations will be
furnished by the Chief of the Army Air Forces on receipt of a requisition from the
Department commander concerned.
By order of the Secretary of War:
[S] Otto Johnson,
Adjutant General.
Copies furnished: Chief of Staff GHQ, Commanding General, Air Force Com-
bat Command, Chief of Air Corps, Divisions of the War Department, General
Staff. 1 Incl.
A true copv:
L. W. Truman,
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.
[confidential]
873-18
Chief of Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C.
Request that authority be obtained to activate station complements of a
strength in grades and ratings equal to those at present organized on the mainland
at the following Air Corps Fields within this department colon Hickam Field
Wheeler Field Morse Field Barking Sands Stop No provision has been made
for personnel for Base and Post functions with the result that the wings at Hickam
Field and Wheeler Field are forced to provide administrative personnel for the
posts in addition personnel from the Eighteenth Wing Hickam Field and from
the Air Base Group Hickam Field are required to man Barking Sands and Morse
Field comma both major outlying fields. Personnel for post administration
must be obtained somewhere and it is now being obtained at the expense of our
tactical organizations Stop If the tactical organizations should be moved
into the field post administration would collapse Stop It is urgently recom-
mended that the authority requested above be obtained immediately signed
Martin
A True Copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
3096 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[confidential]
144 WAR WE
Washington, D. C, S19A, Nov. 36 1941.
Commanding General,
Hawaiian Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.
455-25th
Until such time as present initial war garrison limitations imposed upon Hawai-
ian Department have been lifted additional personnel can not repeat not be sent
to thSt department Stop With view to securing an increase in the air strength
for that station action has been initiated and you will be advised when final action
is taken Stop Referring to your eight seven three
Adams,
730AI25I26I1PM.
Decoded by Lt. Jos Engelbertz SC, 3:15 P, 26 Nov 41.
A True Copv:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
[Exhibit IL]
[SECRET]
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 25 April 1941.
In replv refer -to:
AG 230.3/37
Subject: Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1 . Reference is invited to :
A. Secret letter, HHD to TAG, 25 Februarv 1941, subject: "Reinforcements
for Hawaiian Department", file AG 320.2/58.
B. Secret radio, TAG to HHD, 19 April 1941, 744-18th and reply thereto,
HHD to TAG, 22 April 1941. AG 325/18-18a.
C. Secret letter, HHD to TAG, number 2645-18, dated 18 April 1941, in
connection with Medical Department Enlisted Reinforcements. On file in
Department Surgeon Office.
2. It is recommended that authority be given this headquarters to organize the
present Hawaiian (Square) Division into two (2) separate and independent Tri-
angular Divisions. Under War Department, tables of Organization, No. 70,
dated November 1, 1940, current shortages exist in both personnel and material
but it is believed that a desirable reorganization can be accomplished without
increases in present strength other than the expansion of certain units as requested
in my References A, C, and D, and requested reinforcements to organize a Recon-
naissance Troop in each of the proposed Triangular Divisions. In paragraph d,
Reference A, I requested the necessary reinforcements to organize the Infantry
Regiments of the Hawaiian (Square) Division under current War Department,
Tables of Organizations, No. 7, dates November 1940, and assuming favorable
action on the recommendation, the reinforcements requested herein for the
expansion of existing units are in accordance with Reference A. A summary of
the proposed reorganization with tables showing personnel shortages hereto as
Inclosure No. 1.
3. Primary reasons for this request are as follows :
a. For tactical purposes the Defense of Oahu is conducted in two sectors, they
are, the North Sector and the South Sector. Two (2) Triangular Divisions are
considered more flexible to accomplish defensive operations in the two separate
sectors.
b. The proposed reorganizations presents no serious problems as to organiza-
tion, command, staff and tactical unity.
c. The Hawaiian (Square) Division, as now organized and employed, consti-
tutes a separate channel of command. Due to present organization it is less
flexible than the proposed two (2) Triangular Divisions and also retards the prompt
execution of missions requiring the employment of one or more units of the Divi-
sion in coordination with units of the other echelons under the control of the
Department Commander.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3097
d. As now constituted the land defense is assigned to the Division Commander
as the Beach and Land Defense Officer, with the result that it permits the De-
partment Commander to play no part in the defensive action, if and when, the
air and coast defenses are knocked out.
4. National Guard and Selectee Units.
a. It is proposed to assign one of the two National Guard Infantry regiments
now in Federal Service to each of the Triangular Divisions.
b. If the two National Guard Infantry regiments now in Federal Service are
demobilized upon completion of one year's training and the Department's full
yearly quota of three thousand (3,000) selectees are authorized, then it is planned
to form two Infantry regiments from the selectees and assign one selectee Infantry
regiment to each of the Triangular Divisions. See Reference B.
c. Should the two (2) National Guard regiments now in Federal Service and
two (2) tentatively planned selectee regiments be in Federal Service at the same
time then, it is planned to assign one selectee Infantry regiment to each of the
Triangular Divisions and one or both of the National Guard regiments to defense
missions on -the Outlying Islands or retain one National Guard regiment as a
Department reserve unit on Oahu.
d. By employing one National Guard regiment with each of the Triangular
Divisions it will forstall an expected request for a Brigade organization of the
two Hawaiian National Guard Regiments.
5. Station Compliments.
a. Schofield Barracks,
(1) It is recommended that a Brigadier General be assigned to Schofield
Barracks for duty as an administrative Post Commander and that he be provided
with a staff and commissioned assistants, warrant officer, nurses, enlisted men and
civilian employees as shown in Inclosure No. 2, attached hereto, which lists the
net mininuim requirements desired in addition to permanent personnel now on
duty at Schofield Barracks and not assigned to units of the present Hawaiian
(Square) Division.
b. Fort Shafter.
(1) It is recommended that a Lieutenant Colonel be assigned to Fort Shafter
as the Administrative Post Commander and that he be provided with the officer
and enlisted Station Complement personnel as shown in Inclosure No. 3, attached
hereto. The necessity for a station complement for the post of Fort Shafter is
predicted upon operational missions of its garrison, the 64th Coast Artillery
(Antiaircraft) regiment. When thus employed the regiment is absent from its
station and because of post and administrative requirements is deprived of its
maximum fighting strength. It is believed this serious handicap could be elimi-
nated by employment of a Station Complement at Fort Shafter.
c. Station Complements are not requested for stations under control of the
Hawaiian Air Force and the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade for the
following reasons:
(1) Hawaiian Air Force: The duties of units of the 18th Bombardment Wing
(Hickam Field) and the 14th Pursuit Wing (Wheeler Field) necessitate maximum
operation, maintenance and control from Air Fields under the control of the
Wing Commanders and from which the Post Administrative Staff and enlisted
assistants will not be moved. With full consideration of the anticipated comple-
ment of three hundred (300) airplanes, no need for Station Complements exists.
(2) Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade: Practically all of the field
operational functions will be performed in the vicinity of the permanent station
and no necessity for Station complements is considered except for Fort Shafter,
as noted above.
6. After preparation of this letter, your 1st. Indorsement to our reference A
was received. This request is being forwarded with a view of having it available
for reference in the War Department, under the follow'ing conditions:
a. That this communication with its request for reinforcements as listed in
Inclosure #1, be given reconsideration at the earliest date it is practicable to
provide the reinforcements requested.
b. That authority be granted me to reorganize the present Hawaiian (Square)
Division into two (2) Triangular Divisions by using the present available per-
sonnel and material. This can be accomplished in accordance with the last of
your paragraph 3, 1st Indorsement, dated April 11, 1941, to my Reference A.
7. Organization of Air Defense Command.
a. In order that maximum coordination in all activities pertaining to the Air
Defense of Oahu may be accomplished, I propose to create an Air Defense Com-
3098 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
mand to be commanded by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, who
will continue control of the 18th Bombardment Wing. I propose to constitute
the Air Defense Command as follows:
(1) Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.
(a) Headquarters and Staff, Hawaiian Air Force.
(6) 18th Bombardment Wing.
(f) Air Defense Command.
1. Aircraft Warning Service.
2. 14th Pursuit Wing.
3. Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.
b. In the organization of an Air Defense Command no interference with normal
antiaircraft training is contemplated. Only while actually performing operational
missions is it planned to place the antiaircraft Artillarv under the control of the
Air Defense Commander. Furthermore, no increase in the numbers of the Staff
of the Hawaiian Air Force is believed necessary in order to create an air defense
Command for this Department. It is planned to have the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Air Force, and his staff also perform the duties of the Commander and
the Staff of the Air Defense Command. In order to avoid divided responsibilities
due to the dual missions now required of some beach defense batteries, no action
will be taken to form an Air Defense Command until the first increment of the
antiaircraft artillary reinforcements, described in secret radiograms War Depart-
ment, 25 and 26 April, 1941, have been received.
c. An Air Defense Command for the Hawaiian Department is believed peculiarly
adaptable to .this theater and will best meet the needs for defen.se against attacks
from the air.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
3 Incl.
#1 — Summary of Propo.sed Reorganization
#2 — Station Complement, Schofield Barracks.
#3^ — Station Complement, Fort Shafter.
A true copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
ISECRET]
Subject: Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department.
AG 320.2 (4-25-41 MC-C 1st Ind. ESA
War Department, A. G. O.,
July 29, 1941.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. Reference is made to 1st Indorsement, this office, July 22, 1941, AG 320.2
(6-5-41) MC-E, subject: War Garrison for Initial War Operations, Hawaiian
Department.
2. In view of the action taken on the correspondence referred to above, basic
communication is being returned without action.
By order of the Secretary of War:
Major General.
The Adjutant General.
3 incls. n/c
A True Copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3099
[SECRET]
17 WVY MX 109
WahJi D. C. 610A May 29 41 .
CG
Hawn Dept. Ft. Shaftrr T. II.
Eight three seven twenty ninth Secretary of War has decided that in connec-
tion with other vital needs total war repeat war garrison of your department for
initial war operations must be reduced to approximately fifty eight thousand
officers and men stop It is not believed advisable to reduce Air Corps combat
comma antiaircraft and AWS units now set up stop Therefore a reduction
must be made with respect to other troops stop Recommendations desired as
expeditiously as possible as to manner of effecting required reduction
Adams.
657A
A True Copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
AG 320.37/37B
5 June 1941.
Subject: War Garrison for Initial War Operations.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. Reference is invited to:
A. Secret Radio, TAG to HHD, 29 Mav 1941, 837-29th.
B. Secret letter HHD to TAG, 25 April, 1941, subject: "Reorganization of
the Forces of the Hawaiian Departniient", file AG 320.37/37.
2. In compliance with instructions contained in Reference A, the composition
of the war garrison for initial war operations has been studied. Table I herewith,
shows the forces recommended, totaling 59,425 officers, warrant officers, nurses,
and enlisted men, but not including the civilian employees now shown in Table I,
par. 7, HDP-40.
3. The proposed war garrison consists of the following major units:
a. Two Triangular Divisions, less reconnaissance troops, with the Infantry
and Signal Corps personnel at reduced strength.
b. Corps troops consisting of a light tank battalion, the existing 11th Ordnance
Company, Division Pack Train, and Co. A, 1st Separate Chemical Battalion,
and the recently authorized 34^h Engineers, Combat, and the 804th Engineer
Battalion (Avn.).
c. The Hawaiian Air Force with service elements at present strenths.
d. Harbor Defense Coast Artillery as now provided in the approved defense
project reduced by the personnel required to man three fixed seacoast mortar
batteries and three 155-mm GPF batteries.
e. Antiaircraft Artillery with no reduction from the approved defense project.
/. Service, elements, with reductions in the mobilization strengths as shown
in par. 7 HDP-40, and with many units entirely eliminated.
4. (a) The necessity for the defense of existing military air fields on the outlying
islands of the Hawaiian group, together with the recently assumed responsibility
for the defense of the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe, Oahu, directed by secret
letter WD to HHd, 8 April 1941, Subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe
Bay, Oahu, T. H.", file AG 381 (3-13-41) M-NPD, and provision of a suitable
mobile reserve for the beach and land defense of Oahu are three vital missions
which can not be performed with any degree of success with an initial war garrison
of approximately 59,000 troops.
b. The 299th Infantry recently has been transferred from Oahu to the islands
of Hawaii, Kauai, Molokai, and Maui for the defense of air fields, thus leaving the
proposed North Sector division short one Infantry Regiment.
3100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
c. Plans for the defense of the Xaval Air Station at Kaneohe, now in preparation
in this headquarters, indicate the minimum increase in the war garrison for this
mission will include the following:
1 Regiment Infantry.
1 Regiment Field Artillery, 155mm How., truck drawn.
1 Battalion C. A., 155mm guns plus one additional battery.
1 Regiment C. A., (AA), (semi-mobile) (less one gun battalion).
1 Battery C. A., 12-inch barbette guns.
d. Assuming that two Infantry regiments wiU be furnished, one to replace the
299th Infantry and one for the defense of Kaneohe Bay, it is believed that the
mobile reserve for the beach and land defense should be comprised of the light
tank battalion now included in Table I herewith, and Infantry units detached
from one or both of the triangular divisions recommended in Table I herewith.
e. It is therefore urgently recommended that the strength of the war garrison
for this department be increased from approximately 58,000 to approximately
70,600 men so as to provide the following unit reinforcements from the mainland
not now shown in Table I herewith:
2 Infantry Regiments, T/0 7-11 Nov. 1, 1940 6,898
1 Regiment F. A. 155mm How T/0 6-41 Nov. 1, 1940 1,733
1 Regiment C. A. (AA) Semi-mobile (less 1 gun bn) T/0 4-111
Nov. 1, 1940 1,797
1 Bn C. A. 155mm guns, w/1 additional gun btry, T/0 4-35 Nov.
1, 1940 694
1 Btry C. A. 12-inch barbette guns, T/0 4-67 Nov. 1, 1940 157
Total 11,279
5. Reference is invited to par. 5 and inclosures 1 and 2 of reference B in which
it was recommended that station complements be provided for Schofield Barracks
and Fort Shafter. Table I herewith includes provisions for the Quartermaster
Corps, Finance Dept., Medical Corps, Signal Corps, and Ordnance personnel
required for these station complements. It is highly desirable that the war
garrison be increased sufficiently to provide the complete station complements
for these two stations, an increase of 731 officers and men for Schofield Barracks
and 131 officers and men for Fort Shafter.
6. Summarizing, in Table I herewith the war garrison for this Department has
been reduced to a strength of 59,425. To provide a mobile reserve for the beach
and land defense of Oahu, and to defend the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe and
military air fields on outlying islands, an increase to approximately 70,600 officers
and men is essential. A further increase of about 860 officers and men is highly
desirable to furnish station complements for Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter.
I therefore recommend that the war strength of this command for initial war
operations be fixed at approximately 71,500 officers and men.
7. Recent operations in Europe, particularly the failure of the British to hold
the island of Crete, indicate the vital importance to the defense of Oahu of the
nearby air fields on the other islands of the Hawaiian group. Hostile use of any
of these air fields, considering modern methods of air warfare, would be extremely
hazardous to the defense of Oahu. While not yet included in the war garrison
recommended for this Department, it is probable that in the near future, plans
will be submitted for the garrisoning of each of the outlying islands by a force
consisting of approximately one regiment of Infantry and a composite battalion
of Field Artillery.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
1-Incl.— Table I.
A true copy:
L. W. Trtjman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
Subject: War Garrison for Initial War Operations, Hawaiian Department.
AG 320.2 (8-5-41) MC-E 1st Ind. ESA
War Department, A. G. O., July 22, 1941.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. The war garrison recommended in paragraph 2 of the basic communication,
totalling 59,425 officers, warrant officers, nurses and enlisted men, reduced to
EIXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3101
*67,249 as shown in inclosure 2, and augmented by the following units for the de-
fense of Kaneohe Bay:
1 Regt CA (AA), semi-mobile (less one gun
Bn, band and basies) . T/04-111 11-1-40 1,590
I Bn CA 155 MM Guns with 1 addit. gun
btry T/04^35 11-1-40 694
1 Btry CA T/0 4^67 11-1-40 157
Total 2,441
is approved. Paragraph 7, HDP-40 will be amended accordingly.
2. The recommendation contained in paragraph 6 of the basic communication
to establish a war garrison of 71,500 officers and men for initial war operations in
your department is not favorable considered. Troops in excess of the 59,690
authorized in paragraph 1, above, will be sent to Hawaii only in case the situation
develops a need therefor and provided such additional troops can be made available
in connection with other requirements.
By order of the Secretary of War:
(Signed) E. S. Adams,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
2 Incls;
#1— N/c.
#2 — Initial War Garrison, Haw. Dept. (Added)
A true copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
Initial war garrison — Hawaiian Department
Organization
T/0
Date
Mobilization strength
Off
WO
ANC
E. M.
Total
a. Department Headquarters:
Gen & Spec Staff Sections
144
7
3
5
2
30
152
41
59
170
70
326
Hq Sp Troops
48
Hq Company
62
MP Co Haw Dept
7-7...
11- 1-40
11- 1-40
175
QM Co (Car)
10-87P
72
Total Dept HQ
161
30
492
683
70
11- 1-40
10- 1-40
10- 1-40
6. North Sector Division (Triangu-
lar).
Div Hq
70-1
26
7
4
206
65
121
18
38
16
2
74
123
102
Hq & MP Co
70-2
130
Reconn Troop
Omitte
d
Div Sig Co
Sp
114
4,660
1,577
2,563
616
482
296
116
19th & 21st Inf
7-11
10- 1-40
10-12-40
5-11-41
10- 1-40
10- 1-40
10- 1-40
10- 1-40
2
4,868
299th Inf WD Ltr AQ 221E
6-80
1,642
Div Arty
1
2,685
Engr Bn
5-75
634
Med Bn
8-65 .
620
QM Bn
10-15..
312
Total Div...
601
43
11
5
10,505
380
11,011
Attached Med
423
Attached Chap
11
Aggregate ......
556
6
10,886
11,446
70
70-1
11- 1-40
10- 1-40
10- 1-40
e. South Sector Division (Triangu-
lar).
Div Hq
26
7
4
206
60
2
74
123
102
Hq & MP Co
70-2
130
Recon Troop
Omitte
d
Div Sig Co
Sp
114
4,660
1,308
118
27th & 35th Inf
7-11
10- 1-40
10-12-40
6-11-41
2
4,868
298th Inf WD Ltr AG 221E &
Radio.
1,358
3102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Initial war garrison — Hawaiian Department — Continued
Organization
, T/0
Date
Mobilization strength
Off
WO
ANC
E. M.
Total
c. SouMi Sector Division— Cm.
Div Arty
6-80
10- 1-40
10- 1-40
10- WO
10- 1^0
121
18
38
16
1
2,563
616
482
296
2,685
634
Engr Bn.
5-78
Med Bn
8-65
520
QM Bn -...
10-15
312
Total Div
486
43
11
5
10,236
380
10,727
423
Attached Med
Attached Chap
11
""
A ggregatc
540
5
10, 616
11 161
1-10-1
8- 1 39
d. Headquarters Hawaiian Air
Force:
Hq A Hq Sq HAF
70
336
406
18th Bomb Wing
Hq <t Hq Sq 18th Bomb Wing.
1-10-1
1-112
1-115
1-115
1-115
1-215. .-
1-112
1-115
1-115
1-115
1-215
1-355 _
1-411
6- 1-41
6- 1-41
6- 1 41
6- 1-41
6- 1 41
6- 1-41
6- 1^1
6- 1-41
6- 1-41
6- 1-41
6- 1-41
8- 1-39
6- 7^0
13
21
37
37
37
43
21
37
37
37
43
40
40
18
531
122
232
217
217
217
229
232
217
217
217
229
182
682
135
Hq & Hq Sq 5th Bomb Orp
253
(Hv).
23d BombSq (Hv).
254
3Ist Bomb Sq (Hv)
254
72d Bomb Sq (Hv)
254
4th Recon Sq (Hv)
272
Hq & Hq Sq 11th Bomb Op
253
(Hv).
14th Bomb Sq (Hv)..
254
16th Bomb Sq (Hv)
254
42d Bomb Sq (Hv)...
254
50th Recon Sq (Hv)
272
19th Transport Sq
222
17th Air Base
722
Haw Air Depot _
18
Total
3,546
4,077
Attached Med . ...
17
1
3
3
3
2
2
1
3
3
5
5
95
112
Attached Chap
1
Service Units:
53d Sig Maint Co
11-227
11-247
11-217
12- 1-40
12- 1^0
12- 1-40
44
71
71
7
2
21
10
38
125
123
4
70
102
60
47
324th Sig Co (Air Wg)
74
328th Sig Co (Avn).. .
74
Sig Sections (H A F)
9
Sig Sections 18th Wing
4
12th Sig Plat (Air Base)....
11-237
3-19-40
22
Ord Sect Hq HAF
13
740th Ord Co A vn (AB) . . .
481st Ord Co Amm (Bomb)
9-167
9-157.
9-157
12-16^0
12-16-40
12-16-40
41
128
482nd Ord Co Avn (Bomb).
128
QM Sec Hq HAF & 18th
4
Wing.
13th QM Co (Truck)
10-57
10-357
10-27
11- 1-40
4-18-40
11- 1^0
3
3
2
73
259th QM Co(AB)
157
39th QM Co(LM)
62
Total attached
56
841
897
1-10-1.
1-12
6- 1-41
6- 1-41
6- 1-41
6- 1-41
6- 1-41
6- 1-41
6- 1-41
6- 1-41
6- 1-41
6- 1-41
1- 1-41
8- 1-39
6- 7-40
e. 14th Pursuit Wing & Attached
Units:
Hq & Hq Sq 14th Pur Wing...
13
23
35
35
35
35
13
33
33
33
21
25
30
122
209
201
201
201
201
122
279
279
279
137
196
499
135
Hq & Hq Sq 18th Pur Orp (1)
232
6th Pur Sq (1)
1-15.
236
19th Pur Sq (1)
1-15
236
78th Pur Sq (1)
1-15 ..
236
44th Pur Sq (1)
1-15 . .
236
Hq & Hq Sq 15th Pur Grp (F)
1-12 .
135
45th Pur Sq (F)..
1-12
312
46th Pur Sq (F)
1-15
312
47th Pur Sq (F) . .
1-15
312
86th Obs Sq
o-255._
1-135..
(Tentative
1-441)
158
58th Bomb Sq..
221
18th Air Base Grp._..
529
Total
364
2,926
3,290
■^
Attached Med
17
1
84
101
Attached Chap...
1
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Initial war garrison — Hawaiian Department — Continued
3103
Organization
T/O
Date
Mobilization strength
Off
WO
ANC
E. M.
Total
e. 14th Pursuit Winp <fe Attached
Units—Continupd
Service Units:
Sig Sed 14th Wing
2
3
1
2
3
3
4
4
2
71
21
102
70
38
50
50
4
307th Sig Co (Air Wing)...
ii-2i7..
11-237
10-357
10-57
9-167
9-157
9-157
12- 1-40
3-19-40
4-18-40
10- 1-40
12-16-40
12-16-40
12-16-40
74
4rth Sig Plat (AB)
22
258th QM Bn (AB)
118
14th QM Co (Truck)
73
741st Ord Co (AB) (Avn)..
41
„ fi74th Ord Co AVxN (Pur)..
54
(•>%th Ord Co AVN (Pur)..
54
Total Attached
40
498
538
Total Hawaiian Air Force
895
6,472
7,367
(Air Units).
Total Hawaiian Air Force
991
7,811
8,802
& Attachejl Units.
4-10-1
4-41
11- 1-JO
11- 1^0
11- 1-40
11- 1-40
11- 1-40
11- 1-40
/. Harbor Defense Troops:
Hfi & Hq Btrv HSCAB
10
46
42
49
67
37
75
1,122
969
1,108
1,678
800
85
16th CA (HD) (Less 1 gun
1
1
1,169
btry).
16th CA (HD) (Less 2 gun
btry).
41st CA (RY) (Less 1 gun bn)
*-71-
4-41
1,012
1,157
(LessBd).
55th CA (TD) (Less bd)
4-31
4-31
1,745
NthCA (TD) (LessHq& CTn
837
2d & 3d Bus & Btrys D, E,
& F, SL Btry & Band).
Total Harbor Defense
251
2
5,752
6,005
Attached Med:
16th CA
6
6
6
7
4
5
37
37
35
46
26
43
15th CA -
43
41st CA
41
55th CA
53
Nth CA
30
Attached Chaplains
5
Total Attached..
34
181
215
Total Harbor Defense &
285
2
5,933
6,220
Attached Troops.
4-10-1
4-08
11- 1-40
1- 1-39
11- 1-40
W Date—
12-12-38
11- 1-40
11- 1-40
11- 1-40
g. Anti-p.ircraft Artillery:
Hq <t Hq Btrv AA Brig
10
4
97
69
87
87
75
134
2,451
1.807
1.979
1,979
85
Intelligence Brty A-\ Brig
138
Spec.
64tb CA (A A) (Rein)
251st CA (AA)
4-11 & 4-13..
4-11
1
- -----
2,549
1,877
97th CA A A (less Band SL
and one fl) 37mm Btry and
basics in part plus 1 A A M(i
Btry).
98th CA. AA (Less Band SL
*-lll --
4-111
2,066
2,066
and one (1) 37mm Btry and
basics in part phis 1 A A
MG Btry).
Total AA Coast Anillery. .
354
2
8,42.5
8,781
4-11...
4-11
4-111
4-111
4-11
11- 1-40
11- 1-40
11- 1-40
11- 1-40
11- 1-10
Attached Medical:
64th C.\ (AA)....
b
6
7
7
6
41
41
48
49
47
251st CA (AA)
47
Xth CA (A A)
56
Yth CA (AA)
Attached Chaplains.
56
6
Tot:il Attached
32
180
212
Total kA & Attached .
386
2
8,005
8,993
3104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Initial war garrison — Hawaiian Department — Continued
T/0
Date -
Mobilization strength
Organization
Off
WO
ANC
E. M.
Total
A. DeDBitment Troops:
17-57
17-55
9-7
11-15^0
11-15-40
11- I74O
5
26
6
3
2
106
.406
140
82
168
111
Xth Tank Bn (Less 1 Co)
432
146
Sd
85
Co A 1st SepChem Bn
3-17
11- 1-40
170
Total
42
902
944
-
3
.
32
~^5
Chemical Depot & filling Plant
j. Engineer Corps:
34th Engrs (Less Band &
Basics).
Attached Med & Chap
^r>
5-171 ---
5-171 --
5-435
Spec -
11- 1-40
11- 1-40
4-22-40
39
7
21
5
65
1,090
35
625
51
1,129
43
646
Engr Depot - - —
56
Total Engrs -
1,766
1,831
Total Engrs plus attached
Med & Chap -
72
12
2
6
6
6
6
1,802
1,874
k. Ordnance Department:
92
50
140
140
180
104
9-17
9-7 ---
9-7
11- 1-tO
11- 1-40
11- 1-4C
11- 1-40
52
146
146
9-18
186
Ordnance Personnel Attached
to Units - - -
6
Total Ordnance Department-
38
602
640
/. Finance Department:
3
8
10
38
3
Mis Fin Est
46
Total Finance Department .
11
48
59
m. Quartermaster Department:
24
15
15
3
4
4
3
3
5
4
1
81
2
2
1
212
227
300
224
185
185
110
110
158
196
121
236
316
Co B 90th QM Bn (HY M)---
32nd Sep QM Co (LM)
33rd Sep QM Co (LM)
10-47
10-27
10-27- -
10-57
10-57
10-147
11- 1-40
11- 1-40
11- 1-40
10- 1-40
10- 1-40
11- 1-40
227
189
189
113
113
163
72nd QM Co (Bakery)
200
School Bakers & Cooks -- ---
22
Total QM
5
1,928
2,014
Attached Med QM Depot- . -
1
82
15
16
Total QMC and Attached- - -
5
1,943
2,028
n. Signal Corps:
Signal Co (Depot) (Less Dets)
•
11 107
2
3
1
20
12
60
230
30
542
357
62
233
31
11-15
11-157
11- 1-40
11- 1-40
562
Aircraft Warning Co
369
■ 38
3
1,219
11
1,257
\ttached Medical
14
Total Sig Corps & Attached
Units
41
1,230
1,271
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Initial war garrison — Hatvaiian Department — Continued
3105
T/0
Date
Mobilization strength
Organization
Off
WO
ANC
E. M.
Total
0. Hospitalization Forces:
Tripler Qen Hosp
(SP) 8-507..
(SP) 8-507. .
7-25-40
7-25-40
73
73
2
4
120
120
500
500
8
31
6
1,000
90
90
693
Scho Bks Oen Ho?P--
693
10
35
6
2 Qen Hosps _.
S-507
8-118.
8-118
7-25-40
2- 1-40
2- 1-40
146
3
3
240
1,386
93
9th Amb Co . ..
93
Total Med Corps
304
480
2,225
3,009
p. Districts Hawaiian Department:
OAHU District Hn (Dept Ser
25
12
12
5
1
2
19
5
2
28
Comd).
HAW MI District Hq
31
MAUI District Hq
17
K \UAI District Hq
7
Total (Less Dets 299th Inf)
54
1
28
83
Recapitulation:
Ifil
1,137
991
285
386
247
304
54
30
10
492
22, 403
7,811
5.933
2,605
5,657
2,225
28
683
Beach & Land Defense -
23.550
8,802
Harbor Defenses.
2
2
5
""m
6,220
8.993
5.911
3,009
83
Total . ...
3,565
50
480
53, 114
5, 7241
A True Copy:
I,. W. Tbuman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
[Exhibit IM]
2 May 1941
AG 320.3/38
Subject: Organization of Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington D. C.
1 Rcf Gr6ncGs i
A. War Dept. Secret Radio No. 739, 24 April 1941.
B. War Dept. Secret Radio No. 760, 26 April 1941.
C. Letter CO, RECAB to CG, Reun. Dept, dated 16 April 1941, subject:
"Constitution and Activation of Antiaircraft Intelligence Battery," forwarded
to the War Department by 1st. Indorsement dated 21 April 1941, file RECAB
320.3, IHD 320.3/36.
D. Letter FED to TMG, subject " Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian
Department", dated 25 April 1941, file 320.3/37.
E. Letter VD to FED dated 2 April 1941, subject: "Coast Artillery units for
Hawaiian Department", file AG 3GC.2 3G26-41 M (Ret) M-C. WD 320.2
straight Misc.
2. Upon the arrival of the first increment (Ref. A) of the war reinforcements of
the Antiaircraft Artillerv Garrison of this Department in June 1941, the organi-
zation of the Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade will be required. This brigade will
be composed of all Antiaircraft Artillery Units in the Department except the one
or two batteries of harbor defense artillery regiments which still have dual assign-
ments to harbor defense and Antiaircraft Artillery missions. The organization
of this brigade is mandatory not only because of the strength of the units involved
but also because of the organization of the Air Defense Command (Reference D)
this brigade will be required to function independently of the Hawaiian Separate
Coast Artillery Brigade for tactical operations and in training therefore.
3106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. It is proposed that the Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade. Hawaiian Department,
will be organized as follows:
53rd C. A. Brigade (AA) (RRF.N.).
Hq. and Hq. Btrv, 53rd CA Brigade (RefH.).
Intel. Btrv, 53d CA Brigade (T/0 4-08 (a) HAD) (Ref. C & R).
64th C. A. (AA)
251st C A (AA)
"Teh'' CA (AA) easi-mobile (less 3d Ea) (Ref. A)
"Eth" Rs, AA gun, semi mobile (less searchlight battery and one gnn Bat-
tery) (Ref . A) ; to be expanded into the "8th" Regt. upon arrival of the
remainder of the reinforcements (Ref. B)
4. Accordingly it is recommended that:
a. Authoritv be granted to activate the Hq. and Hq. Btrv, 53d CA Brigade
(T/0 4-10-1. 'l. Nov. 40) and the Intel. Btry. 53d. CA Brigade (T/0 4-06 (c)
New), on or about 1 June 1941.
b. A brigadier General be assigned to this Department to command the 53d
CA Brigade.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
A True Copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
[SECRET]
Subject: Organization of Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.
AC 340.2 (5-2-41)
MR-0
1st. Ind.
War Department, A. 0. O., June 12, 1941.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. You are authorized to activate the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
and Intelligence Battery, 53rd. Coast .Vrtillery Brigade, within the recently
authorized organization of Coast Artillery garrison, Hawaiian Department, by
1998 filler replacements. No additional personnel can be made available at this
time.
2. It is desired that the date of activation of these units and report showing
the reallotment to units of grades and rating;.'- of your present allotment, Coast
Artillery Corps, to include these units be furnished this office.
3. Separate action will be taken on the allotment of additional grades and
ratings and on the recommendation to assign a brigadier general to the Depart-
ment.
4. Table of Organization 4-06 (S) (HAD) is approved as submitted, and is
being reproduced and distributed.
By order of Secretary of War:
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
A true copy :
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
[Exhibit IX]
DOO 320.2/141
W A GARRON COL ORD DEPT
759— 6th
Chief of Ordnance,
Washington, D C
Attention invited to fact that there are six each activiatet thirty seven MM AA
btrys at present in Haw Dept comma that present olans contemplate six addi-
tional of this type battery by March nineteen forty two comma and that only
twenty guns are on hand Period Radio information therefore requested as to
which and in what quantities we may expect the one hundred each thirty seven
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3107
MM A A guns listed as under procurement fronn by nineteen forty one funds in
00 secret file six six zero point two slant eleven capron.
Short.
ENC TIEMAN
Nov. 6, 1941
A True Copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
[Exhibit 1 O]
Talk Givkn by General Short to Chamber of Commerce on Army Day
Gentlemen:
I am especially pleased to be able to come before this representative gathering
of Honolulu business men on the occasion of the celebration of Army Day.
Today our military establishment is being brought closer to the view of the
general public throughout the entire United States by exhibits and various
demonstrations, in order that the people may become better acquainted with some
of our equipment, methods and procedures, and now I am afforded the oppor-
tunity of discussing some of our plans which Aill demand close and active coopera-
tion on the part of the civil community and by various departments of your civil
government.
You are all aware of the tremendous effort being expended by industry, labor
and all departments of the government toward the accomplishment of a gigantic
program of national defense. While there are many evidences of this activity
here in Hawaii, through defense projects being carried on both by the Army and by
the Navy, the tempo of action has not reached as deeply into the private life of the
average citizen as has been the case in many cities on the Mainland. Conditions
are changing overnight and procedures and practices of today may be changed by
the plans and activities of tomorrow. None of these matters are being handled,
or even considered, in the light of actual warlike moves nor with any feeling of
hysteria, but simply as carefully considered plans which are to be effected for the
future security of each and every individual, including the youngest child and the
oldest adult, of our nation.
I have been asked many times what the community can do to assist National
Defense. The following items are of prime importance:
(a) Production and storage of food.
(b) Organization of doctors and nurses for care of injured and wounded.
(c) Organization of an auxiliary to the police force to guard utilities and prevent
sabotage.
(d) Preparation of plans and making of provisions for evacuation of women and
children and preparation of shelters for workers in vicinity of essential industries.
These islands are in no way self sustaining in the matter of food. This is due
not to lack of fertility of your soil but to your specialized agriculture.
All of you are vitally interested in the food supply of these islands. In any
emergency, which might include the possibility of a disruption of communications
with the Mainland, a most important safety measure would be to begin at once
the planting of basic food crops which are known by actual practice to be the most
easily grown in this soil and cHmate. Such produce might include sweet potatoes,
string beans, lima beans, Chinese cabbage, peanuts and some other local varieties
of vegetables. The plantations have done important development work and are
prepared to produce these articles in quantity should the necessity arise. An
immediate increase in the stocks of such items as rice, flour, canned milk, fats and
oils would be a great safety factor and with rising prices is sound economy. Short-
age of storage for the food shipped in is now a problem. This condition can be
materially alleviated if housewives will well stock their cupboards with non-perish-
able items. This action would operate to clear needed space on retail and whole-
sale merchant's shelves for further storage of additional foods. This plan is good
present day economy because of steadily rising food prices. There is at present
a plan on foot for the construction of large warehouse storage by government
subsidy and I believe that this plan should have the support of us all as a defense
measure. In the pursuit of this project speed is all important.
Along this same thought I read with much interest in the local press of March
19, 1941, an item which referred to the possible repeal of the personal property
tax which so greatly affects the merchant or importer who desires to cooperate
79718 O — 46 — pt. 18 17
8108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in holding large stocks of food available in his warehouse or store. I would like
to voice my approval to such an Act, or other similar legislation which would
freeze the tax for any corporation or individual at an amount not to exceed that
paid in the past year. This would make it possible for more adequate and plenti-
ful stores of food stuff to be maintained without imposing a hardship on any
individual or organization.
It is further important that the local fishing fleet be kept in operation, as it
supplies a very large proportion of our daily subsistence. Increased cold storage
for meats should be provided. Existing dairy herds on Oahu should be conserved
am feed stored.
In the ganeial defense measures for these islands there is no civilian efl'ort of
higher importance than preparedness now for an adequate food supoly for all
the people in time of emergency.
The preparation of your emergency medical service in the case of an extreme
emergency such as an air attack or actual assault upon the city is of vital import-
ance. The functions of the military forces under such conditions or control,
would be to take measures to insure fhat civilian agencies, expanded as required,
continued to function and not to displace them by a military operating agency.
It is therefore definitely necessary that prompt action be taken to organize your
medical service into the maximum possible number of teams with mobile equip-
ment capable of being rapidly moved from place to place and set up in existing
buildings. Staff's of doctors, nurses, technicians, and others required for the
stations should be selected and trained and be ready at any time for immediate
duty.
Adequate initial medical supplies for these stations should be obtained, classi-
fied, packed, and stored in a manner making them readily available. Necessary
vehicles must be on hand by loan or otherwise. Suitable trucks, of the delivery
type, for rapid conversion to use as ambulances should be listed and obtainable at
once. Necessary personnel for the immediate expansion of hospitals properly
located to the extent at least of the porches, day rooms, etc., should be listed by
each. All of these preparations should be accompanied by the preparation of
shelters, from air attack, of the best types available. Suitable buildings should
be selected to replace hospitals in the zones of probable bombardment. Prepara-
tions of this nature should be made in cooperation with the Red Cross.
The organization of a force of ex-service men to supplement the police force in
guarding utilities and preventing sabotage I understand is under way. This move
will release troops for defense purposes. Consideration should be given to the
employment of the R. O. T. C. of the University of Hawaii for the same purpose.
Here in Hawaii we all live in a citadel or gigantically fortified Island. Many
residents have their homes well within the limits of actual military fortifications,
docks, arsenals or many other types of legitimate military targets. Should we
ever be faced with a military operation by any enemy against this island (which
we fervently hope may never come true), the residents in these areas must be
cared for and protected. Plans for such care and protection quite properly come
under the jurisdiction of your civil governmental agencies, and I believe these
should now receive careful, detailed and mature consideration. I repeat that
these matters are not to be viewed with alarm or hysteria, but simply as defense
projects and exactly in the same classification as any of the present housing
activities which you see around you every day. If you, as civilian organizations,
are making plans for adequate warehouse and pier space for the handling of
defense materials should you not give some degree of the same effort toward the
security and protection of your families from any possible contingency? I believe
that you already have a Defense Committee, under the leadership of the Governor
of the Territory and the Mayor of Honolulu which has given, or is about to give,
some consideration to these matters, and I advance, for the consideration of this
committee, some of my ideas on this subject.
There has been considerable information in the New York newspapers as to the
plans which are being formulated and discussed oy the Mayor of that city for
the protection of its inhabitants from any possible air raids. Elaborate measures
have been suggested for shelters, fire protection, and other phases of which you
are well aware. It is my suggestion that some such plans be initiated for the city
of Honolulu. My belief is that any such proposals should be considered not only
from a possible wartime condition but also with a view of fitting into the plans
for the expansion, betterment and improvement in the civil facilities. In other
words, why should we not make plans which will not only form the nucleus for
protective measures and which will, at the same time, furnish additional recrea-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3109
tion centers for our civil and military population. My plans envision a recrea-
tional center for each precinct, or perhaps smaller section of the city, which would
be located somewhere in the highlands away from military targets. There might
properly be selected by the Forestry Service, the City Planning Commission or
other appropriate body. These camps would be located where a .source of fresh
water is available, some degree of natural shelter and with a view of accessibility.
Here would be installed, in the following order of importance, water, sanitary
facilities, outdoor grills and other cooking installations, and mess halls. The
Forestry Service, National Parks Administration, and the CCC have already had
considerable e.xperience in the construction and laying out of such installations
as many such recreational camps already exi.st on the Mainland. You yourselves
have seen some of the results of these activities in your National Park on Hawaii.
Thousands of you people spend your hours of leisure and recreation at the
beaches. Why would it not be feasible as well as healthful to divert a portion
of such time to comfortable and attractive camps in the hills? Forming the
habit of such excursions to adequate and well plaimed camps would accomplish
a dual purpose in establishing not only additional recreation features but at
once establishing the basis for evacuation camps should they ever be required
in the future.
In case of actual hostilities, which involved this community, all able-bodied
males would be utilized by industry or by the military services in one manner
or another. Normal business routine would be continued to the greatest extent
possible. Any evacuation camps would thus be dedicated to the use of women,
children, and male citizens who would not be qualified for other duties. The
Army has definite plans to go ahead immediately on the construction of similar
camps for the use of the faimiiies of Army personnel should such an occasion ever
demand that drastic action. In the meantime the camps will be utilized as recrea-
tion centers by all of our personnel.
I take this opportunity of laying before you the foregoing plan as deserving
your consideration. I believe the evacuation of the women and children from
the area of probable bombardment the most essential and difficult problem con-
fronting the community. Without advance planning the greatest confusion and
loss of life might result.
I again repeat that the foregoing suggested plans are to be considered as im-
portant defense measures with the same priority as given other defense plans.
They are not to be thought of as indications of any immediate pending threat,
but rather as carefully considered measures to safeguard our homes and families
in case of any future dangers. The bill now before the Legislature creating a
major Disaster Relief Department, if enacted, will put you in a position to com-
plete these plans and preparations. The Army is ready to do all within its
power to help you and you must feel free to call upon us for advice at any time.
My thoughts have been expressed to you quite frankly, as I believe we must
understand each other on all questions and work out our common plans together.
Army Day was inaugurated with such an ideal as its basis and I am pleased to
have had this opportunity of bringing before you some ideas and suggestions
which may have material work to you now and in the uncertain days of the
future.
I thank you.
[Exhibit IP]
[1]
Chronological Narrative of Actions Taken by Lieutenant General
Walter C. Short in Connection With Preparedness of the Civil Popu-
lation TO Meet a Food Emergency in Hawaii.
Item No. 1 Letter from General Short to Governor Poindexter, re storage facili-
21 Mar 41 ties for Food Supply. General Short states that after a conference
with a civilian committee on food supply and facilities for storage,
he is in hearty accord with action taken to date. He feels strongly
that the problem is of vital interest to both the civil population
and the military. The civil authorities should take the initiative
for their own supplies, and their actions will receive his utmost
support. (See Inclosure No. 1).
Item No. 2 Letter from General Short to War Dept. asking authority to issue
4 Apr 41 invitations for purchase of Irish potatoes grown in Hawaii,
stating serious problem of food supply under emergency condi-
tions, and stating his objective is to stimulate continuous Irish
potato production in Hawaii. (See Inclosure No. 2).
3110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Item No. 3 Radio from Gen. Short to War Dept. referring to his letter of 4
12 May 41 April 41, and asking priority radio advice as soon as decision has
been reached. (See Inclosure No. 3).
Item No. 4 1st Indorsement to Gen. Short's letter of 4 April 41, from War
2 May 41 Dept., granting authority to contract for Hawaiian-grown pota-
toes, providing price does not exceed 23^^^ per pound. (See In-
closure No. 4).
Item No. 6 Memo to Board of Directors, Honolulu Chamber of Commerce from
5 May 41 the Executive Secretary, John A. Hamilton:
1. Prior to April 7, 1941, there was very little buying of food
supplies for emergency use. However, on April 7, Lt. General
Walter C. Short, Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department,
United States Army, suggested the desirability of purchasing addi-
tional food supplies for use during a possible emergency.
2. Beginning with April 7, the consumer began to purchase addi-
tional food supplies in quantities ranging from an extra can of milk
to as much as $800.00 per family as reported by one retailer. Retail
merchants report that 20 to 30 per cent of their customers have pur-
chased additional food supplies in the last 30 days. This means
that the retailers' stocks on hand would be depleted rapidly.
3. It would be expected that the retailer, when food stocks are
moved rapidly from the shelves as a result of heavy consumer pur-
chases, would reorder quickly from the wholesaler or the manu-
facturer. This has been done. In fact it would appear that
retailers have increased their purchases by 20 to 25 per cent above
normal.
4. Wholesalers generallv support the report of the retailers with
' regard to the increase of consumer buying as reflected in the increase
in the buying done by the retailer from the wholesaler.'*.
5. Of the three wholesale firms visited, two reported large stocks
of foodstuffs on hand as a result of additional warehousing space
secured to care for the additional demand and the prospective needs
in the event of an emergency. Also these firms report a satisfac-
tory replenishment of stocks although additional time is required
to get merchandise from the manufacturers to the docks in Honolulu.
^ote. The direct result of Gen. Short's public address of 7
. April 1941 was to increase the supplv of food in storage in Hawaii
from 20 to 35%.
\S]
Item So. 7 In a published statement prior to a general n eeting of agriculturists
thru-out the islands at the University of Hawaii, Gen. Short
16 June 41 said, ".All efforts to increase local food production are steps to-
ward increased security for Hawaii".
Item No. 8 At an address to the L niversity Assembly on Aug. 13th Gen. Short
stated :
13 Aug 41 "Among defense projects which I have publicly emphasized has
been that of the home production of food to sustain the civilian
population during an emergency. I regard this project of local
food production as of primary importance to the defense of Hawaii."
"So far as food supply is concerned, the military organization
here is self-sufficient as to its reserves of essentia! items. It w ill ^ook
after itself in time of war, and it is now projecting food production
on military reservations to supply its needs — so far as is practicable.
"I have also supported shipping priorities for all foods — cattle,
dairy and poultry feeds, as well as food for human consumption.
This support includes farm machinery which is important for large-
scale crop productioii." — (From the Honolulu Advertiser, 14 Aug
41)
Item No. 9 Copy of radiogram from Delegate King to Gov. Poindexter stating
the War, Navy and State Department.s and the Budget Bureau
16 Sept 41 were lukewarm in their interest in procuring food reserve stocks
for Hawaii. (See Inclosure No. 5 attached).
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3111
For reply to Delegate King, stating Gen. Short's continued sup-
port, see Inclosure No. 6.
U\
Item No. 10 The Food Production Plan for Hawaii was formally presented in
23 Oct 41 complete form to the Directors of the Hawaiian Sugar Planter's
Association and accepted by them as the basic operating plan for
local production of food crops, cattle and dairy products. This
plan covers production not only of Oahu but of all the out-islands
as well, setting up acreage and <;rops allocations to plantations,
both sugar and pineapple, which were accepted by them as
defense requirements. Small farmers were included in the plan
as well. Seed requirements were set up; as well as insecticide,
fertilizer and machinery requirements for producing crops suffi-
cient to sustain the entire population for six months.
This plan was based on the Army plan and was supported and urged
thru-out by Gen. Short. It is now in operation in its initial
phases as planned. Gen. Short arranged for the procurement
of all seed, insecticides, fertilizer and machinery for harvesting
this crop, as well as arrangements for procuring the necessary
priority allocations of shipping spaice required. (See Incl. No. 7.)
Item N.o. 11 Letter from Gen. Short to War Dept., stating that the project of
3 Dec 41 the Emergency Food Reserve for Hawaii which failed of approval
by the Bureau of the Budget should be brought up for recon-
sideration, and asking the support of the War Dept. when it comes
up. (See Inclosure No. 8.)
Item No. 12 Letter from Gen. Short to Gov. Poindexter, stating that he has
3 Dec 41 always regarded a reserve food supply as of primary importance
in defense plans, giving supporting data, and asking the Governor
to obtain an inventory of food on hand in the Territory, in order
to support his request for an emergency reserve food supply.
(See Inclosure No. 9.)
Item No. 13 Radiogram from General Short to War Dept. stating in detail the
14 Dec 41 immediate requirements of food, seed, livestock feed, farm ma-
chinery, insecticides and fertilizers, including shipping space
required, for current civilian needs. (See Inclosure No. 10.)
Item No. 14 WD Radio #685, 17 Dec. 41 "Shipment of Food for Civilian Popu-
17 Dec 41 lation".
In reply to Haw'n Dept. radio #1182, the War Dept. states food
will be procured and delivered to civil authorities in Hawaii,
first shipment to leave within one week, second shipment follow-
ing week; every effort to be made to provide critical items indi-
cated by the radio? of Gen. Short and of the Governor.
(See Inclosure No. 11.)
As a direct result of Gen. Short's letter to the War Department
of December 3, 1941, the attached radiogram (Inclosure No. 11)
from the War Department, dated December 17, 1941, was re-
ceived, indicating the immediate shipment of the Food Reserve
Supply to Hawaii.
While Gen. Short was not asked for letters of support for certificates
of necessity for the construction of storage for the Emergency
Food Supply because this was not needed, he has consistently
supported such construction, both by the Hawaiian Pineapple
Co. for the dry storage, and by the Oahu Ice and Cold Storage
Co. for the refrigerated storage.
When the Emergency Food Reserve was turned down by the
Bureau of the Budget Gen. Short stated publicly that storage
completed, or under construction for the Emergency Food Supply
would be specifically reserved for the purpose for which the
certificate of necessity was granted by the War Dept.
At present the warehouse space of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. is
ready, and that of the Oahu Ice and Cold Storage Co. will be
ready in the very near future.
The Ci\ ilian Food Administration, as planned by Gen. Short, is
now in full operation under Governor Poindexter's Council of
Civilian Defense, which in turn is affiliated with the National
Office of Civilian Defense.
3112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Civilian authorities of the Food Administration freely acknowledge
the impetus of Gon. Short's consistent urging of plans to imple-
ment the Food Administration for an emergency, so that it has
been able to get into operation without delay on the basis of
plans set up by the Army.
Enclosure No. 1.
Headquarteks Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander.
Fort Shafter, T. H., March 21, 1941.
Honorable Joseph B. Poindexter,
Governor, Territory of Hawaii, Honolulu, T. H.
My Dear Goverjstor Poindexter: Mr. H. H. Warner and Mr. Richard Kim-
ball, acting as your committee on emergency food storage, conferred with me
March 19th relative to storage facilities and food supply, and the adequacy in
general of the supply of food stuffs during any emergency in which incoming
shipments might be curtailed. The conference included the action taken to date
to obtain storage facilities, including their meeting with local importers and
bankers, the action taken by Delegate King, and your radiogram of March 18th
to Delegate King. I assure you that I am in hearty accord with the action taken
to date and am in full concurrence therewith.
I strongly feel that the problem of assuring the civil population an adequate
supply of food stuff during any emergency in which incoming shipments might
be curtailed or cut off is of vital interest both to the civilian community and the
military. I believe that the civilian community should take the initiative as this
problem is primarily and initially the concern of the civil authorities. However,
the military cannot be divorced of its concern in this p'iroblem as it is relatively
of equal vital interest to the military. Any action which you may take to insure
such an adequate supply of food for the civil population will be concurred in by
me and have my utmost support.
With kindest personal regards,
Sincerely,
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
Enclosure No. 2
[1] Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 4 April 1941.
Subject: Authority to Issue Invitations for Purchase of Irish Potatoes Grown in
Hawaii.
To: The Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.
1. In view of the present military situation it is of high importance to increase
the local production of food within these islands so that they may become self-
supporting.
Hawaii at present imports 85% of its food supplies from the mainland. In
the event of an interruption of communications the sustenance of the civil popu-
lation would become a serious problem. Under certain conditions the solution
of this problem becomes a mission of this Department.
In view of these conditions it is believed that the subsidizing of local food
production by governmental agencies is entirely justified as an emergency defense
measure provided that the increase in cost to the government is not unreasonable.
In this connection attention is invited to Radiograms (381) this Headquarters,
to the Quartermaster General, 22 and 23 August 1940, and to his reply thereto
of 26 Augu.^it 1940, authorizing this Department to contract for Irish potatoes
under conditions as set forth in 1st Indorsement, W.D. -OQMG, July 5, 1938;
and to related correspondence over the past four years.
2. Under the authority above quoted 1,929,000 pounds of Hawaiian-grown
Irish potatoes have been contracted for delivery during February, March and
April of this year at an average cost of $.025 per pound. Mainland-grown
potatoes w-ere delivered to the Navy during this period at an average of $.018
per pound. Therefore, the project of Irish-potato growing in Hawaii for the
purpose of increasing local food production as an emergency defense measure
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3113
was carried out in this case at an increased cost to the Army of $.007 per pound,
or approximately $13,500 for the total project in terms of money. It is believed
that this difTerential would hold good as an average throughout any year until
growers have established a year-around crop when the spread would become less.
Actually, the wastage on Island-grown potatoes is nil for shrinkage, loss of weight
or spoilage such as occurs with mainland potatoes in their shipment to Hawaii.
This fact materially reduces the differential cost to the government as above
indicated. The increase in cost is considered justified as a safety defense measure
to assure the future expansion of the local crop. This can be accomplished
[2] only by this assurance to the grower of the return of his cost of produc-
tion. Sugar planters — who provide the bulk of the production, are entirely
willing to go along on this project and break even.
3. The efforts of this Department during the past year have directly resulted in
the increase in production of 1,242,086 lbs of locally grown Irish potatoes over
1940.
4. It is believed that for a part of the first year Island production will not be
able to meet the requirements of the Army for Irish potatoes, but the project is
still considered well worth the added cost to the government during the period
that the reqdirements can be met. Local producers feel that they can quickly
build up the industry to a point where Hawaii can meet the demand throughout
the entire year.
5. It is now proposed to stimulate continuous Irish potato production in
Hawaii. For this purpose authority is requested to contract for Hawaii-grown
Irish potatoes for the fiscal year 1942, for monthly or quarterly periods, or for
periods of six-months, or for one year as seem most likely to accomplish the
nurpose at the time of the offering.
(Sgd) Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
Enclosure No. 3.
R. S. Bamberger,
Colonel, A.G.D., Adjutant General,
12 May 1941.
The Adjutant General,
Washington D. C.
Remylet four April subject authority to issue invitations for purchase of Irish
potatoes grown in Hawaii Stop As soon as decision has been reached relative
to request contained in paragraph five thereof request priority radio advice
Short
Enclosure No. 4
AG 432 Hawaiian
Dept. (4-4-41) M-D 1st Ind. ESA
War Department, A. G. O., May 2, 1941-
To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Authority is granted to contract for Hawaiian-grown Irish potatoes for the
fiscal year of 1942 on the basis proposed in Paragraph 5, basic letter, provided
the contract price strait not exceed 2}^^ per pound.
By order of the Secretary of War:
(Sgd) E. S. Adams,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
Enclosure No. 5
Poindexter
Warner
September 16, 1941.
Further reference my wire September 15th regarding food storage at recent
meeting attended by Maverick Ashby and representatives War Navy Interior
State and Budget Bureau spokesman for service departments indicated rather
hike warm interest in program for producing surplus food stocks for Hawaii
Period Would appreciate your asking commanding general and commandant if
their letters dated last March endorsing this project still represent their views
and wire me this information.
Delegate King.
3114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Enclosure No. 6
September 17, 1941.
Honorable Samuel Wilder King,
Delegate to Congress,
604 House Office Building,
Washington, D. C.
In opinion of local well informed persons recent international developments only
increase the likelihood of demand exceeding the supply of cargo space available
for carrying civilian food requirements from mainland to the territory which
formed the basis for the original surplus food program Period Commanding
geneial endorses his previously expressed view for the needs of this project
as stated in his letter to Governor Poindexter March twenty first Period
Admiral Bloch presently on off island vacation and unavailable Period Opinion
of governors food commission made plain in radiogram to you of August twenty
second Period Regardless of current situation in Pacific personally feel that
as we approach shooting operations with accelerated local defense construction
projects the shipping facilities for civilian supplies to the islands are more likely
to be restricted than when plan was originally drawn Period Your suggestion
that Maverick appraise local problem himself as soon as possible is receiving
hearty support of interested parties and strongly urge you to persuade him
make such a trip to obtain first hand information on this matter
Warner (Poindexter).
H. H. Warner,
Director Agricultural Extension Service
^Iniversity of Hawaii and
U. S. Department of Agriculture Cooperating
Enclosure No. 8
Headquarters Hawaiian Department.
Office of the Department CoMMANnER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 3 December 1941.
In reply refer to:
AO430
Subject: Emergency Reserve Food Supply for the Civilian Population of Hawaii.
To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D.C.
1. The present military situation in this area has engendered a strong feeling
among the civil authorities that the project of the Emergency Food Reserve for
Hawaii which has lately failed of approval by the Bureau of the Budget, should
be brought up again at this time for reconsideration based on new data to be
presented.
2. It is my feeling that this project should be progressed as a sure way to meet
any food shortage with which the Territory may be confronted in emergency,
and for this reason I have written a letter to the Governor of Hawaii in support
of this project. A copy of this communication is enclosed.
3. In view of the necessity of a reserve food supply as indicated above, and in
the enclosure herewith, I request the support of the War Department for this
project when it comes up for reconsideration by the Bureau of the Budget.
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
1 Incl—
Let. Gov. of Hawaii re
food storage dated
12-3-41.
Enclosure No. 9
December 3, 1941.
AG-430
Honorable Joseph B. Poindexter,
Governor of Hawaii, Honolulu, T. H.
My Dear Governor: The present military situation in the Pacific indicates
the necessity of advancing certain plans foi the care and protection of the civil
population of Hawaii in the event of an interruption of normal shipping between
the Islands and the mainland.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3115
I have always regarded the accumulation of a reserve food supply for Hawaii
as of primary importance in our defense plans, and I have publicly announced
this view on appropriate occasions.
I feel strongly that the project for the reserve food storage which has lately
been refused approval by the Bureau of the Budget, might well be again ad-
vanced at this time.
In support of this view I should like to quote from the annual report of the
Diversified Crops Committee of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association trans-
mitting the final Food Production Plan for Hawaii to the Trustees of that or-
ganization:
"We think that our year of work on these plans has given us a sufficiently
clear understanding of the various phases of the problems of emergency food
supply to enable us to express an opinion. And that opinion is, that no stone
should be left unturned in the effort to have adequate supplies of essential basic
foods stored here against an emergency."
Additionally I should like to quote in part from a radiogram from Delegate
King of October 24, 1941, addressed to yourself and to Mr. H. H. Warner of
your Emergency Food Commission, on the subject of the refusal of the Bureau
of the Budget to approve the Food Storage Plan. This communication was
submitted at the time as information to the members of the commission, including
the Army re;^resentr,tive present.
"Perhaps appeal by Governor addressed to President through Interior Depart-
ment supported by inventory of specified food commodities and length of time
such supplies could meet local needs would help bring about further consideration
this program.
' ' Direct appeal from local administration based on factual data would bring
quicker action."
It is apparent from the above that the surety of a food supply during the initial
phases of a war situation and prior to any supplementary local food production,
can be safely predicated only upon the presence of a reserve of food stored here,
and that the chance of getting the approval of the Bureau of the Budget for this
project rests largely upon the ability of local authority to submit factual data as
to amounts of food currently in Hawaii.
This requirement cannot be met with any degree of accuracy except by data
obtained through a physical inventory of food on hand.
It is my feeling that as a matter of safeguarding the public welfare against the
coming emergency, the project of a defense reserve of food for Hawaii should be
again advanced at this time, and that it should be supported in this case by a
factual statement of the amount of food currently on hand in the Islands.
For this purpose it is believed that the local importers and others concerned
would voluntarily take an inventory to supply the required data in response to a
request from you. It would seem that an appropriate date for this inventory
might well be the end of this calendar year to tie in with other legal inventory
requirements of the territory, or even sooner in view of the tiir.e element involved
in assembling the figures.
May I take this opportunity to assure you of my continued wish to be of any
assistance in the present emergency.
Very sincerely yours,
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
Copy of this let. furnished War Department
Enclosure No. 10
[Radiogram]
14 December 1941.
The Adjutant General,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.
Oahu food inventory of December ninth shows thirty seven days of essential
foods on hand for tw o hundred fifty five thousand civilian population Stop This
reserve must be constantly maintained by immediate shipments to supply current
consumption ^top Thirteen days rice comma eighteen days potatoes and onions
are most serious deficiencies fetop One hundred thirteen thousand head of cattle
equal to one hundred fifty tw o days reserve supply for all civilians in Territory
comma and twelve thousand head swine equal to ten days reserve supply for ail
3116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
civilians in Territory are on hand Stop Important that this reserve be main-
tained by no more than normal slaughter Stop Food store inventories on outlj ing
islands being taken Stop Sugar and pineapples on hand ample for Territory Stop
Shipment of twenty thousand net tons of food for civilians in Territory per month
for current needs requiring one million two hundred and fifty thousand cubic feet
of shipping space per month Stop It is expected that commercial firms will place
orders on mainland for necessary subsistence for current needs of civilian popula-
tion providing there is an allocation of shipping made available Stop It is essen-
tial that allocation for this shipping space be made immediately Stop In addition
shipmsnts of ssven thousand two hundred net tons of food for Army personnel
per month requiring four hundred fifteen thousand cubic feet of shipping space
per month comma first shipment immediately comma are urgently needed Stop ■
Shipment of emergency food reserve for storage to value of two million five hundred
thousand dollars for human food and nine hundred thousand dollars value of
animal and poultry feed comma total three million four hundred thousand dollars
eqviel to forty eight thousand net tons requiring two million seven hundred fifty
thousand cubic feet of shipping space is urgently needed Stop Letter will follow
showing items for purchase for this emergency food reserve for storage Stop
Requisition has been alreadv communicated by Governor Poindexter to Swope
Department of Interior and Delegate King Stop Orders have been placed for
seed comma, insecticides comma fertilizer comma and agricultural implements
through Division Engineer South Pacific Division San Francisco Stop Forty
thousand v eight tons and fifty five thousand ship tons of shipping required for
these items Stop This must be shipped immediately Stop Request War De-
partment obtain shipping spaces or Government shipping for all shipments covered
in this communication both for immediate shipment and future monthly ship-
ments.
Short.
Enclosure No. 11.
[Radiogram]
Washn D. C. 4OS A Dec 17 1941.
C G-
Hawn Dept, Ft. Shafter, T. H.
685 16th Department of Agriculture will procure and deliver to civil authorities
in Hawaii food for civilian population comma URAD one one eight two period
First shipment planned to leave within one week followed by second shipment
following week period Every effort will be made to provide critical items indi-
cated in URAD and that of Governor.
Adams.
346A
[Exhibit 1 Q]
[1] Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., July 11, 1941.
In reply refer to:
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Engr. 383
Subject: Protection of the Civilian Population against Air and Other Attack.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. Reference is made to radiogram from Delegate Sam King to me, a copy of
which is inclosed for ready reference. This radiogram raised questions concerning
funds to be allotted to Hawaii under the Lanham Act for the protection of the
civilian population against air and other forms of attack. These questions are
answered in this letter which is submitted to the War Department in accordance
with request in the radiogram. A copy of this letter and all inclosures is being
forwarded direct to Dr. C. E. Fronk, in care of Division of Territories and Island
Possessions, Department of the Interior. Dr. Fronk is now in Washington as
the Governor's representative in this matter.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3117
2. Evacuation camps will be built in units designed to care for 240 people. This
size is determined by the capacity of the standard mess hall (Fig. 74, FM 5-35)
which will serve 120 people at one sitting. The ideal unit would be built in a
quadrangle 100 yards wide by 120 yards long. This arrangement will facilitate
guarding against prowlers, contribute to privacy, and shorten average distances
between shelters and latrines, mess ball, baths, and wash rooms. See typical
layout plan inclosed herewith (Inch No. 1).
a. This typical layout will be modified as necessary to adapt it to ground forms,
streets, etc.; but the general principle of using shelters to form a partially inclosed
communal area will be observed.
b. The design has been made extremely simple to permit erection by unskilled
labor, and the use of any type of building material. Materials available in local
stocks will be used to the utmost to conserve shipping space. Windows and doors
are omitted. Occupants will devise curtains to secure such privacy as they wish.
It is proposed to construct all units except bath houses and water served latrines
without floors initially. If lumber is available, wooden floors will eventually be
laid on wooden sleepers. If lumber is not available, floors will be finished with
volcanic cinders, crushed rock, or sand stabilized with portland cement if available.
If floors cannot be provided, occupants will have to provide themselves with
something to stand on.
[2] c. Canec, a locally available product, will be used to the fullest extent
practicable. Studding, rafters, flooring, and piobably sleepers supporting flooring
will have to be imported if not in stock. Roofs will be made from galvanized
iron, if obtainable.
d. All structures have been designed to utilize standard sheets of canec, ply-
board, and standard lengths of lumber.
e. The mess hall is an adaptation of the standard mess hall shown in Fig. 74,
FM 5-35. Construction is greatly simplified by omitting doors and windows
which permits spacing all studs uniformly 24" on centers (See Incl. No. 6).
/. All other buildings are simple shed construction. See inclosed sketches of
shelters, latrines, bath houses, and wash houses. (Incls. 2 to 5).
(1) 960 lineal feet of living room shelters will be provided for each camp. They
will be built in lengths which are multiples of 8'. Standard double bunks (Fig.
71, FM-5-35) will be placed 8' apart. (Incl. No. 2). Partitions will be of canec
so nailed that they may be easily removed. Occupants will remove and shift
canec partitions to give any length room desired.
(2) The same type construction will be used for latrines, bath houses, and wash
rooms as in living quarters. Details of interior arrangements are indicated on
inclosed sketches. Latrines will be equipped with water closets when a sewer
system is available and the necessary plumbing supplies can be secured. Other-
wise pit latrines will be used. Running water will be available at all camps.
Plumbing will be installed in mess halls, bath houses, and wash houses in the
order named as far as available materials will permit.
g. Protection against bombardment will be provided by slit trenches as indi-
cated in the typical layout sheet (Incl. No. 1) when camps are on flat ground.
Camps in gulches will be provided with conveniently located alcoves dug into
deep slopes.
h. Dispensary buildings and administration buildings will not normally be
built. In the general instance sufficient space in permanent residences or other
buildings will be available for those purposes.
i. Protection of funds and valuables may be made a function of a central
administration service. No provision will be made for that in construction plans.
[3] 1. Evacuees will be encouraged to bring small artif'les of furniture such
as mirrors, chairs, hammocks, mattresses, curtains, etc. They will also be en-
couraged to bring simple hand tools. It is presumed that sub.sequent to evacua-
tion a systematic collection will be made of abandoned articles required for camp
comfort.
3. a. Camp locations have been selected with a view to the following. For
locations see Incl. 7.
(1) Utilizing existing roads, utilities installations, and community service units
such as .stores, post offices, churches, etc.
(2) Avoiding ground at present under cultivation.
3118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(3) Placing a large percentage o: ev&cuees near areas suitable for growing
vegetables.
(4) Securing dispersion.
b. The equivalent of 42 units (240 persons each) with a capacity for 10,080
people will be constructed as extensions of existing permanent plantation villages.
In addition to this extension many villages will be increased by one mess hall,
latrine, bath house, and wash house to psrmit increasing the number of occupants
in the permanent buildings which will be utilized solely as dormitories. Planta-
tion villages in the higher f.ltitudes are usually built on the edges of gulches.
The camp extensions will, in the general instance, be sited in these gulches and
will vary greatly in size and layout, depending on terrain conditions. These
camps will be spread throughout the central valley in areas least subject to
probable enemy activity. Distances from Honolulu will vary from 8 to 26 miles.
The estimated average distance is about 20 miles. Locations are shown on Incl.
7. These camps will have running water, but will not have sewer connections.
The following advantages are characteristic of these units:
(1) provide a high degree of dispersion.
(2) Sited in excellent locations for protection.
(3) Well located for utilization of occupants in food production.
(4) Adaptable to race segregation which will be desirable to present communal
discord.
(5) Can readily be amalgamated with existing village administrations which
will facilitate government.
(6) Utilize existing installations.
[4] c. 42 units (240 persons each) with a capacity for 10,080 people will be
located at \A ahiswa, north of the Schofield Barracks East Range boundary and
south of the North Fork of W ahiawa Reservoir. The distance from Honolulu is
about 21 miles by Kamehameha Highway. This location offers the following
advantages:
(1) W ill be an extension of an existing city in areas fairly well supplied with
roads.
(2) Can readily be supplied with sewer facilities if materials are available.
(3) Will be included in anti-aircraft defense of Schofield Barracks and \A heeler
Field.
(4) Is in an area of rich soil adaptable to utilization of evacuees in food pro-
duction.
d. 21 units (240 persons each) with capacity for 5,040 people will be located in
four valleys leading into the Koolau Range from the evacuated areas. For
location see Incl. 7. They will be between 2 and 3 miles of the evacuated area.
e. 21 units (240 persons each) with a capacity for 5,040 people will be located
in gulches west of Aiea. For location see Incl. 7. They will be an average of
about 13 miles from Honolulu.
4. The projected air-raid shelters are intended to protect 6,000 persons other
than military personnel whose continued presence in the danger area is essential
to the defense of Oahu. The number is based upon reports submitted by essential
governmental agencies, public utilities, and commercial firms.
6. The proposed locations of shelters is shown on the inclosed map of Honolulu
(Incl. No. 8). These locations have been determined from reports of probable
distribution of personnel submitted by the organization affected.
c. It is proposed to construct the shelters of reinforced concrete and to limit
the normal capacity of each shelter to from 10 to 15 persons which o^n shelter
from 16 to 25 people for short periods. However, other materials will be sub-
stituted for reinforced concrete if cement and steel are not available in sufficient
quantities. \\ hen practicable existing structures will be utilized by increasing
protective characteristics. Tunneling will be practicable in some locations.
Inclosures 9 to 12 show details of the various types to be used, depending on
conditions.
[6] d. The cost of reinforced concrete shelters has been estimated at $100.00
per person to be sheltered. That is each shelter will cost from $1,000 to $1,500.
No estimate of unit cost can be made for shelters built of substitute materials.
Should shortage of materials limit the number of concrete shelters built, the avail-
able funds will be applied to building as many shelters of substitute materials as
possible.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3119
e. It is presumed that the shelters provided for personnel essential to defense
will be supplemented by private individual shelters and by shelters erected by
commercial interests not essential to defense. The costs of these shelters should
be borne by the individual.
W.\LTER C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
13 Incls:
Incl. #1 Layout plan
#2-5 Sketches
#6 Fig. 74
#7 Map
#8 Map of Hono
#9-12 Drawings
#13 Radio, 4 July 41
A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
[secret]
5 ND DJ 243 Govt REP
ZPN 1 Radio, Washington, D. C, July 4 0128 1941.
Govt Rep Lt General Walter C. Short,
Fort Shafter, TH Oahu
Following from Doctor C. E. Fronk quote Reurletter June twenty reference
number three eight one War Department considering whether problam lies
purely within military jurisdiction or should be responsibility of civilian agency
period In latter case Office of Civilian Defense may be made responsible for pro-
gram of Federal Works Agency with funds from Lanham Act period In confer-
ence with General Lorenzo D. Gasser Army representative on LaGuardias
committee I was requested obtain as soon as possible full details proposed evac-
uation period Am advised allocation of funds according to estimate submitted
by Colonel Lyman in memorandum dated June nineteenth reference number
three eight three would not be made on basis data so far available here period
More explicit information regarding number and exact location of camps comma
number of persons at each camp comma together with areas to be evacuated and
distances from city to proposed camp sites will be required substantiated with
maps period Recommend provision for shelters be included in which case char-
acter and material of shelters should be incorporated in your estimates period
Referring to splinter shelters exact location and number also necessary together
with any other data that may be pertinent period Would greatly appreciate your
forwarding this material by fastest mail through War Department with compy
direct to me addressed care Division of Territories and Island Possessions Depart-
ment of Interior period Outlook encouraging letter follows unquote Delegate
Sam King.
Tod,
1628
610A/4
A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
£nd Lt.. F. A.
3120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[Exhibit IR]
December 22, 1941.
My dear General Short: I have the honor to present an entirely unsolicited
expression of interest from many leading men of Honolulu.
There are a hundred more who I am sure would have felt honored to sign this,
if time had been available. I wished to place a copy of this letter in your hands
without further delay.
Yours very truly,
Frank E. Midriff.
A true copy:
Robert J. Fleming, Jr.,
Robert J. Fleming, Jr.,
Major, G. S. C,
Asst. to G-4.
Honolulu, T. H., December 22, 1941.
The President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.
Sir: We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social organi-
zations in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest
in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere
appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.
We have found him at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he has
exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an
emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for
this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such plan.
General Short's thofough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas
to our Territorial Legislature, to our local officials, and to our community in
general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound
"M-Day" Bill; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard; (c) for the decision
to increase stored food and to produce food; and (d) for the prevention of sabo-
t^ige. He has shown a correct and a sympathetic attitude toward the problems
of the civil community in assuring cooperation of civilians.
He has maintained a high morale in his Command and has conducted "alerts"
from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing the troops and with plans,
now looking for financing from federal funds, for adequate and safe storage of
sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a probable emergency.
We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go into
various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have
selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned.
Meanwhile, we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high esteem
and our full confidence in the character and ability of General Walter C. Short
as a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be. This letter is
prepared without the knowledge or con.sent of General Short or any other officials,
merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may accrue to the record of
such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse publicity or other wise.
This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest in the adequate defense
of Hawaii and our Nation. •
With very best respects and wishes, we are
Yours very truly,
Lester Petrie, City of Honolulu, Mayor; C. R. Hemenway, President,
Hawaiian Trust Co., Ltd.; A. L. Dean, Vice-President, Alexander
& Baldwin, Ltd.; Walter F. Dillingham, President, Oahu Railway
& Land Co.; F. D. Lowrey, Pre.sident, Lowers & Cook, Ltd.;
H. H. Warner, Asst. Food Administrator, O. C. D.; J. B. Poin-
dexter, Governor of Hawaii; S. B. Kemp, Chief Justice, Supreme
Court; T. G. S. Walker, Director, Civilian Defen.se for Oahu;
John E. Rus.sell, President, Theo H. Davies & Co., Ltd.; George
S. Waterhouse, Ex. Vice-President, Bishop National of Hawaii
and Honolulu; Cyril F. Damon, Ex. Vice-President, Bishop
Trust Co., Ltd.; Briant H. Wells, Executive Vice President,
Hawaiian Sugar Planters Assn.; H. A. Walker, President, Amer-
ican Factors, Ltd.; S. M. Lowrey, Treasurer, American Factors,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEF 3121
Ltd.; P. E. Spalding, President C. Brewer & Co., Ltd.; Frank
E. Midkiff, Trustee, Bernice P. Bishop Estate; Edouard R. L.
Doty, Terr. Director of Civilian Defense; James Winne, Mgr.
Mdi^e Dept., Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd.; (now acting as Food
Administrator and Supply Officer).
c. c. to General Walter C. Short.
A true copy:
Robert J. Fleming, Jr.,
Robert J. Fleming, Jr.,
Major, G. S. C.
Asst. to G-4.
Major Disaster Council
^ City and County of Honolulu.
Office of the Director, Island of Oahu,
Honolulu, Hawaii, December 20, 1941-
Lt. General Walter C. Short,
Fort Shafter
Dear General Short.
Please allow ms express my sincere regret that our contact through Civilian
Defense Plans has terminated.
It was greatly due to your help and backing that our Civilian Organizations
were so far advanced that they were able to function so splendidly during the
attack.
You will always be able to recollect that your determination to have our Civilian
Groups Prepared saved many lives of our Sailors and soldiers through the organized
effort of our Civilian Defense Medical Committee and the many trucks that we
had ready to be turned into ambulances at a minutes notice.
Please be assured that you will carry the sincere thanks and Aloha of your
many friends here who realizes the distress you saved by urging and helping us to
be Prepared.
Yours very sincerely,
(s) T. G. S. Walker
T. G. S. Walker, Director,
Civilian Defense,
Island of Oahu.
True Copv
O. M'. Cutler
O. M. Cutler
Lt. Col. Infantry
[1] . [SEAL OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII]
TERRITORY OF HAWAII,
Executive Chambers,
Honolulu, 23 December 1941.
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short,
Fori Shafter, T. H.
My Dear General Short: Having noted in the public press that an investi-
gation is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in
Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a state-
ment as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands for
war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked on December 7,
1941.
The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these
Islands were important to National Defense from a military standpoint, but it
has been only since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941 that it has
been brought home to the civil population the importance of the part it would
play in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens of these
Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud to be the
Chief Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging the population to
prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of the Army
and civil population in planning and preparing for this emergency was mag-
nificently rewarded.
3122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations
which bore fruit on December 7, 1941:
(1) The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act by a special session of Legislation
called for that purpose. This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire
civil economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in the event of
disaster. By virtue of this act, civilian defense was planned and many of its
phases were brought to such a point of preparation that they were able to go into
action immediately and to function effectively on December 7, 1941.
(2) The production and conservation of food: Householders were persistently
urged to stock their shelves in canned food. It is estimated that this resulted
in increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than
twenty percent. Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and
storage for food reserve. This appropriation has, since [S] December 7,
1941, been authorized. By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made
for the procurement and storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas
with quick growing food crops. Agreements were also made for the growinK,
in normal times, of those crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In
furtherance of this plan, the War Department was induced to permit the purchase
of Island grown potatoes for the use of the Army although the price was above
that of mainland potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies of
food asked for in the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity
for building an adequate warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is
now available for the storage of food supply when it arrives.
(3) The medical facilities for the care of the injured and wounded during any
disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these Islands
for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical profession of
the Islands with all its medical facilities. Approximately three thousand persons
were given training and instruction in First-Aid as required by the Red Cross.
The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous tasks of evacuation.
Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit consisting of personnel of
about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps of one hundred and forty
improvised ambulances were organized. The performance of their tasks by
these groups was one of the highlights of the civil defense efforts on December 7,
1941.
(4) Plans for the evacuation of women and children and the prsparation of shelters
for workers in essential industries had reached a high state of perfection on
December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas attacked
was accomplished in a most admirable manner.
(5) An auxiliary police force to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was
organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly
when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. Their work of
this force was exceptional and excellent.
(6) Legislation authorizing a home guard was enacted at the special session of
the Territorial Legislature. It was well planned and so organized that 1400 of
such home guardsmen could and were placed on duty thereby relieving members
of the Army for other military duty.
(7) There were many other matters too numerous to detail here which were
planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the
bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public
service in times of emergency.
All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local authori-
ties, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded
since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases
of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly as
a direct result of prior planning and training.
It is my beliet that the public has confidence in the military and civil authorities
The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a treacherous attack
has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in your demonstrated
abilities. I wish to state that the magnificent way in which the Territory of
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3123
Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large measure due to your
foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf of the Territory.
You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit.
Very sincerely yours,
■^ (S) J. W. POINDEXTER,
Governor of Hawaii.
This is a True Copy.
L. W. Truman
L. W. Truman,
Captain, Infantry.
Headquarters Hawaiian Department
OFFICE OF A. C. OF 8., G-4
FORT 8HAFTER, T. H.
79716 O — 46— pt. 18 18
3124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 134
STANDARD rORM NO 1'
StCRET
TELEGRAM
OFFICIAL BUSINESS— GOVERNMENT RATES
CABI-gHUm
r«oM V.Ai; Department
A. 0. 0.
AT ' . (ll-29-a)liC-E
aiB/cdm - 1712
N0V3iBEK 29 1941
COliiiUlDING OENERAL
HAWAIIAN DEPARTVSBNT
PORT SHAJ^aH T H
II
CONSULT C IN C PACIFIC FLKET R.'iFERSNGE HIS DxSPATCK t.maaR T-:0
SIGHT Z'EHO SLX TWO SEVai TO CHIEF OF NAVAL OPSUTICNS PSaiCD Itl VIEW OF
INFOaaTIOf) CONTAINED IN ABOVE DISPATCH COaiA THS MCVSISMT OF THS TWC) Afaff
•• PURSUIT S-JUADROHS AS IKDICATED IN WAR DEPARTUSJT CABLE NUMBER FOUR SIX SIX
CCaau NCV3HBER WD SIX COiaiA ONE NIH3 FOUR 0^fE COiOlA WILL BS SliSPSNDSD PERIOD
THSSE SQUADRONS SHOULD HOfmm. BE PREPARED TO MOVE ON SHOOT NOTICE PSSIOD
; PASACaAHi WAR DEPARTsfflHT HAS OFFHRED TO TAKE OVER DtFEEBS OF PACIFIC ADVANCE
" BASES FROM THSSAVT EXCEPT FOR RJHNISHING /iNTIAIRCRAFT SJ^JIPMSNT PERIOD
; CONSULT C IN C rACIFTC FLEBT R3FERIKCE RESJIREliSlJTS AND AREAS TO HE DEFSNDED
' PERIOD WAR DKPASTliEKT HAS ALSO ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEfgJJSE OF GHRISIVA3
I AND CANTON PERIOD IT IS CONTEWPUTSD THAT YOU 'A1LL FORM BASE DSFEKSS UNITS
J FROM THE HAWAIIAN GARRISON SPECIALLY CSOANIZSD AS TASK FORCES FOR PARTICULAR '
AREAS PEKIOD IF THESE UNITS ARE !iOVSD FROM OAHU CaaU N3CE^ARY RSPLACaffiHTS
raCK THE OOTTED STATES HILL BE FURNISiED PERIOD R3PC«T YOUR CONCLUSIONS AND
RaCOiaiENDATIONS TO THE WAR DEPARTUE^^' AT THE liARUEST PRACTICABLE .DATE
AOAUS
SECFiC. I
ADJUTANT GENERAL. J^"*
vi
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3125
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3130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
6 0 8 £ A 0 0 F T H E C £ M S U S
t6TH CENSUS
OF THE OttlfES STATES
1940
Population
■*■■*••*****■ -.1
Second Series
Characteristics of the Population
H
awaii
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3131
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS
J. C CAJPT. MnKBr {Appmli* Mt It, U4i)
miUkU LANS AtmriK, IMnulT(atUndJtmmt»t, IHt)
Abut U. ELkmam, Anitiml Dktor
r»t<ih«i«ii Um Ik thwwu,, t»kt aiotiiuttiM.
Hnuw O. Btmwua, AmiMm OnkftulUMm.
OtoifUat BtiuMte~A»i> M. Bdmnli.
Omctnt fofa-UMoB SutlMa*— H«aqr & ftryMk, ft.
RmcOBM tH«tlMi»— WHBam H. tfailMi.
BooateS WjOMlat— gdmnl P. Btudt.
MMhamtUad Advinr-W. BdwiRb Dmli(.
Taolinlcil OpnstioBi— Ib«li W. HaliatMt(.
IVputMloa AnalyM— Joel WBUuh.
BtBpAoyniMit AnAlyet^-Jolm D. Dunod.
TlboiUfcio Eipnt^Kul U Bounii.
TMkniMl BittUiiir- Brora L. JmUnMs.
TeohDlod lutnu>iloii>— Jamas L. MoFkanQii.
A<tau*JatnUra 8«rtfc»-P. B. Prmui, AM»t Oi^.
A|^«l<ara— Zhixheb R. P»itxt, (M^SmiKiclm».
»»»I«M« Joi<» AuiiiKWT, CSkt,/ e^'lMiettto.
GMtrafiop— CuiuNom E. B»i»c»«vFr, Ctprarlm:
lalMwiUMi •Bd PnbHolInu— A. W. tok !<t«ov«, AMks Ckitf.
MmUb* Tifciil«*>»— lUunt E. 0»Li^»Ai, Cku/.
MmmattMmtm—TnoutB J. fmotluu>, C3Htf SUHitlKicm.
State u4 UinU 0<ntaB«i<— EsViU R. Qui, OU^ AaliMMaa.
Vital Stadatka—H.LBEitT h. Doni., CW<f SlalMhaan.
SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1940
REPORTS ON HAWAII
Fopaladoa;
Number of lobabitac^ii — Hawaii
Ghanctarutles of th« Fopulatioa — HamiL
■naiat:
Oeaetal Chanetwutic* — HawalL
AgifealtBra:
FaraiB, Fajm Property, LlTestoek, and Crop* — Bawait
Baalaeaa;
CeiMUi of Builoen, ll)3«— Alaaka, Bavaii, and Ptterio Sloo.
Xanafaetnrea:
Ceoaiu of Manufacture*." Outlying Ama.
3132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
reSSE H. lONES, Secretary
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS
J. C. CAPT. DinctoT (Appointed Mar 22. 1941)
WILLIAM LAN£ AUSTIN. Diiacloi (Ralixd lonuory 31. 1941)
PHILIP M. HAUSER. Ainalonl Dinclor
SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES : 1940
POPULATION
Second Series
Characteristics of the Population
HAWAII
Prepared under the supervision of
Dr. LEON E. TRUESDELL
Chief Statisticicji for Population
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1943
■nta. U. 8. Oovwmznant Printing Offlc*
• Pries IS c«nts
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3133
CONTENTS
Pag«
Map. — Hawaii by counties, islands, and census tracts iii, iv
Introduction 1
Arrangement of tables 1
Availability of unpublished data_ .- 1
EXPLANATIONS AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS
Sex and race _ 1
Nativity 1
Place of birth 1
Age
Citizenship
Marital status _ _.
School attendance
Highest grade of school completed
Employment status J-
Employed (except on public emergency work) _
On public emergency work
Seeking work
EXPLANATIONS AND DEFINITIONS OF
TERMS— Continued
Number of unemployed
Comparison of 1940 data for the labor force with previous
data for gainful workers
Class of worker
Wage or salary workers
Employers and own-account workers
Unpaid family workers
Occupation and industry statistics
Occupation classification ._
Industry classification
Coverage of industry classifications "Government" and
"Domestic service"
Comparison of occupation and industry statistics for 1940
with data from earlier censuses
Wage or salary income and receipt of other income
Months worked in 1939-.-
TABLES
Table Page
1. — Race, by nativity and sex, for the Territory and for
Honolulu city: 1910 to 1940 5
2. — Age, by race and sex, for the Territory and for
Honolulu city: 1940 and 1930 6
3. — Foreign-bom population by citizenship, race, and
sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu city: 1940
and 1930 7
4. — Marital status of the population 15 years old and
over, by sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu
city : 1920 to 1 940 8
6.^ — School attendance, by age, race, and sex, for the
Territory and for Honolulu city: 1940 and 1930-. 9
6. — Persons 25 years old and over, by years of school
completed, race, and sex, for the Territory and for
Honolulu city: 1940 _ 10
7.— Place of birth, by sex, for the'Territory: 1940 and
1930 11
8. — Employment status of persons 14 years old and over,
by race and sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu
city: 1940- .- 12
9.— Employment status of persons 14 years old and
over, by age and sex, for the Territory and for
Honolulu city: 1940 13
10.- — Persons in the labor force, 1940, and gainful workers,
1930 and 1920, by age and sex, for the Territory
and for Honolulu city 14
11. — Age of persons in the labor force, by race and sex,
for the Territory and for Honolulu city: 1940 15
12. — CIass of worker of employed persons (except on
public emergency work), by race and sex, for the
Territory and for Honolulu city: 1040 16
Table Page
13. — Detailed occupation of employed persons (except
on public emergency work), by sex, for the Terri-
tory and for Honolulu city : 1 940 16
14. — Major occupation gfoup of employed persons (ex-
cept those on public emergency work), by race
and sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu city:
1940 19
15, — Detailed industry of employed persons (except on
pubhc emergency work), by sex, for the Territory
and for Honolulu city: 1940 21
16. — Wage or salary income and receipt of other income
in 1939 for experienced persons in the labor force
in 1940, by class of worker and sex, for the Territory
and for Honolulu city 22
17. — Wage or salary income and receipt of other income
in 1939 for persons who were wage or salary work-
ers (except public emergency workers) in 1940, by
months worked in 1939 and sex, for the Territory
and for H onolulu city 25
18. — Composition of the population, by counties: 1940
and 1930 27
19. — Age, race, and sex, by countiesi 1940 and 1930 28
20. — Persons 14 years old and over, by employment
status, major occupation group, industry group,
and sex, by counties: 1940 30
21. — Race and age, by sex, for judicial districts and
census tracts, by counties: 1940 i_ 31
22. — Composition of the population, for cities of 6,000 to
100,000: 1940 34
23. — Persons 14 years old and over, by employment
status, major occupation group, industry group,
and sex, for cities of 5,000 to 100,000: 1940 36
3134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HAWAII BY COUNTIES, ISLANDS, AND CENSUS TRACTS
Part 1.— TRACTS IN HONOLULU COUNTY AND KAUAI COUNTY
KAUAI CO.
>■
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3135
HAWAII BY COUNTIES, ISLANDS, AND CENSUS TRACTS
Part J— TRACTS IN HAWAII COUNTY AND MAUI COUNTY
MOLOKAI I.
M-19 (KALAWAO)
MAUI CO.
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HAWAII I.
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HAWAII CO.
3136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION
INTRODUCTION
This second Population bulletin for the Territory of Hawaii
presents data on the characteristics of the population, including
sex, age, race, nativity, place of birth, citizenship, marital status,
school attendance, highest grade of school completed, employ-
ment status, class of worker, occupation, industry, wage or
salary income, and months worked in 1939. In the first Popula-
tion bulletin, entitled "Number of Inhabitants," the total popu-
lation of the Territory on April 1, 1940, was given for all of its
political subdivisions, including counties, judicial districts,
representative districts, census tracts, cities, towns, and villages.
There remain to be presented for the Territory and for Honolulu
city statistics on age by marital status, relationship to head of
household, and education, data on occupation by age, wage or
salary income, and class of worker, and on industry by race.
Arrangement of tables. — The tables in the present bulletin
are arranged on the basis of the areas for which figures are pre-
sented. Tables 1 to 17 present statistics for the Territory as a
whole and for Honolulu city. Tables 18 to 20 contain the figures
for counties. Table 21 gives data by judicial districts and census
tracts. Figures for cities of .'1,000 to 100,000 are shown in tables
22 and 23. The amount of detail presented in this bulletin is
generally greater for the larger places than for the smaller ones,
and data from earlier censuses are presented for the larger areas
only.
Availability of unpublished data. — The statistics in this bulle-
tin presented for the Territory as a whole and for Honolulu city
represent practically all of the data tab\ilated in this phase of
the 1940 program, .\lthough similar statistics have been
tabulated for Hilo and Wailuku cities, and almost as much detail
has been tabulated for counties and for Honolulu census tracts,
it is not possible, because of space limitations, to publish the data
in full detail.
These unpublished statistics, however, can be made available
upon request, for the cost of transcribing or reproducing them.
Requests for such statistics, addressed to the Director of the
Census, Washington, D. C, will receive a prompt reply which
will include an estimate of the cost Of preparing the data.
EXPLANATIONS AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS
Sex and race. — Because of the importance of the classification
of the population by sex, practically all of the data in this bulletin
are presented separately for males and females. Moreover, as
fat* as feasible, the data'are also piesented by race. Seven major
race classifications are distinguished in the tabulations; namely.
Hawaiian, part Hawaiian, Caucasian, Chinese, Filipino, Jap-
anese, and "other races," the latter comprising mainly Koreans
and Puerto Ricans. In the 1940 census, several revisions were
made in the race classification. Portuguese, Spanish, and "other
Caucasian" were combined into one group, "Caucasian";
persons from Puerto Rico were classified as a separate group
because of special interest in their number; and all persons of
mixed Hawaiian and other blood were classified as part Hawaiian.
All statistics in this bulletin classifying the population by race
are in accordance with the 1940 definition. The complete
classification by race, sex, and nativity is shown in the following
table:
POPDLATION OF THE
Territory by Race, Nativity,
Sex: 1940
AND
>L.C.*»«
K.T.V,
rOBUON BORN
Total
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
^AU races
423. 330
243. 135
178, 195
214, 646
196. 072
30,490
99.123
Hawaiian
14. 375
49,935
103.791
28.774
51669
157, 905
6,851
255
8.296
679
7.413
24,660
64.473
16, 131
40,791
82.820
3,965
172
4.407
313
6.962
25,286
39,318
12.643
11,771
76,085
2,886
83
3,889
266
7:413
24,636
60,034
12.738
40, 791
61.910
2,267
165
4.407
284
6.962
25.272
35.806
11.192
11,778
58.642
2.194
83
3.889
254
Part HawaiiaD
14
4,439
3.393
13
3,512
1.451
Filipino
20,910
1.698
7
1&443
em
29
12
Nativity. — In the classification by nativity, a person born in
continental United States or in any of its terdtories or posses-
sions is counted, as native. Likewise included as native are
the small number of persons who, although born in a foreign
country or at sea, are American citizens by birth because their
parents were American citizens.
Place of birth. — The native population is classified, with respect
to place of birth, into five groups: Those born in the Territory
of Hawaii, those bom in the Philippine Islands, those bom in
Puerto Rico, those born in other United States territories or
possessions (including American citizens born abroad or at sea),
and those born in continental United States.
The foreign-born population is classified according to country
of birth. All classifications of the 1940 population according
to country of birth are based on the political boundaries of
January 1, 1937, which were practically the same as in 1930.
Age. — The age classification is based on the age of the person
at his last birthday before the date of the census, that is, the
age of the person in completed years.
Age data for the Territory, Honolulu city, and counties are
presented by 5-year periods up to 54 years and by 10-year
periods to 74 years. For cities of 5,000 to 100,000 figures are
presented by 5-year periods up to 34 years and 10-year periods
from 35 to 74 years. Data are also available in various tables
for additional age groups having some special significance, i. e.,
21 years and over and the various groups shown in connection
with school attendance and employment statue.
Citizenship. — The classification of the foreign born by citizen-
ship comprises two main groups, naturalized and alien; the
second group is further subdivided into those having first
papers (that is, those who have raade formal declaration of
intention to become citizens of the United States) and those
having no papers. In addition, there is a third group made up
of foreign-born persons for whom no report on citizenship was
obtained. Since it is likely that most of these persons are aliens,
they are often included with the aliens in summary figures for
citizens and noncitizens.
Marital status. — In the classification by marital status four
major groups. are shown: Single, married, widowed, and divorced.
In aU censuses there were a few persons-for whom the enumerators
failed to report marital status. All these persons are here classi-
fied as single.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3137
HAWAH
School attendance. — The school attendance tabulation for 1940
U baaed on the replies to the enumerator's inquiry as to whether
the person had atlended, or been enrolled in, any regular school
or college between March 1 and April 1, 1940. Night schools or
vocational schools were not included unless they were a part of
the regular school system; and no correspondence schools were
included. The school attendance question in the Census of 1930
applied to a somewhat longer period, namely, the seven months
between September 1, 1929, and April 1, 1930. Furthermore,
in the earlier censuses the question was not restricted as to type
of school.
Highest grade of school completed. — In 1940 the census, for
the first time, included a question on the formal educational at-
tainment of each person. The question on the schedule asked
for fjie last full grade that the person had completed in the regu-
lar school system — public, private, or parochial school, college, or
university. This question replaced the inquiry on illiteracy in-
cluded in previous censuses and provides data on educational
status, a characteristic which is significant for every population
group, especially in combination with other characteristics.
The tabulations on last year of school completed which are
presented in this bulletin, are restricted to persons 25 years old
and over, practically all of whom have comj leted their formal
education. All tables presenting data on education include the
median year of school completed. The median j'ear of school
completed may be defined as that year which divides the popula-
tion group into equal parts, one-half having completed more
schooling, and one-half having completed less schooling than the
median. These medians are expressed in terms of a continuous
series of numbers representing years of school completed. For
example, the completion of the first year of high school is indi-
cated by 9 and of the last year of college by 16.
Employment status. — In the classification by employment
status in the 1940 Census of Population, all persons 14 years old
and over are classified on the basis of their activity during the
week of March 24 to 30, 1940, into two principal groups: (1) Per-
sons in the labor force, including those employed for pay or profit
or at unpaid family work, those on public emergency work, and
those seeking work; and (2) persons not in the labor force. The
latter group includes persons reported as-engaged in their own
home housework; those in school; those unable to work; all in-
mates of penal and mental institutions and homes for the aged,
infirm, and needy, regardless of their acti^ ity during the census
week; others not employed, not on public emergency work, and
not seeking work; and persons for whom employment status was
not reported.
The various categories of persons in the labor force are defined
below:
Employed {except on public emergency work).- — The
group classified as employed includes: (a) Persons who worked
for pay or profit at any time during the week of March 24 to 30
1940, m private work or nonemergency Federal. Territorial, or
local government work, or assisted without pay on a familv
farm or in a family business; and (i) persons not actually at work
and not seeking work during the week of March 24 to"30 1940
but with jobs, businesses, or professional enterprises from whicli
they were temporarily absent because of vacation, illnea*. indua-
trial dispute, bad weather, or lay-off not exceeding 4 weeks with
definite instructions to return to work on a specific date. The
group "Employed (except on public emergency work)" includes
not only employees but also proprietors, farmers, other self-
employed persons, and unpaid family workers.
On public emergency work. — This category includes persons
who, during the week of March 24 to 30. 1940.' were at work on
or aKiigned to, public emergency work projects conducted bv
the Work Projects Administration (WPA), the National Youth
A^nistraUon (NYA), or the CivUian Conservation Corps
In the interpretation of the data for persons on public emer-
gency work, allowance must be made for the misclassification
of considerable numbers of public_emergency workers. The
number of persons reported in the census as on public emergency
work in Hawaii was 2,326, whereas the number recorded on the
pay rolls of the Federal emergency work agencies at the time of
the census was 3,568.
Seeking work. — This category represents persons without
work of any sort in the week of March 24 to 30, 1940, who were
actively seeking work during that week. The group seeking
work was subdivided into experienced workers and new workers,
the latter being persons who had not previously worked full
time for 1 month or more. Persons seeking work for whom a
report on work experience was lacking were classified as experi-
enced workers.
Persons with a job but not at work were classified as employed
because the strict definition of this group and the fact that these
persons were reported as not seeking work, tended to eliminate
all except those who would shortly return to the employment
from which they were temporarily absent.
Number of unemployed. — The total number of unemployed,
as usually defined, includes (1) persons seeking work and with-
out any form of pubUc or private employment and (2) those on
public emergency work programs estabUshed to provide jobs
for the unemployed. Because of the misclassification of public
emergency w orkers, the census total of these two groups under-
states the amount of unemployment. More satisfactory figures
can be obtained by adding to the census figures for persons seek-
ing work, the number of persons on pay rolls of the Federal
emergency woik agencies at the time of the census. This pro-
cedure yields a total of 8,678 unemployed persons.
Comparison of 1940 data for the labor force with previous
data for gainful workers. — The 1940 data for the labor force
are not directly comparable with the census statistics for gainful
workers in 1930 and earlier years because of differences in
definition. "Gainful workers" were persons reported as having
a gainful occupation, that is, an occupation in which they earned
money or a money equivalent, or in which they assisted in the
production of marketable goods, regardless of whether they were
working oi seeking work at the time of the census. The labor
force is defined in the 1940 census on the basis of activity during
the week of March 24 to 30, and includes only persons who were
employed, seeking work, or on public emergency work in that
week. Thus seasonal workers who were neither working nor
seeking work during the census week were excluded from the labor
force in 1940; such persons Kcre classified for the most part as
gainful workers in 1930. In addition certain classes of persons,
such as retired workers, some inmates of institutions, and
recently incapacitated workers were frequently included among-
gainful workers in 1930. but in general, such persons are not in
the 1940 labor force. On the other hand, the 1940 labor force
includes persons seeking work without previous work experience,
that is, new workers, and persons reported as in the labor force
for whom neither occupation nor industry was entered on the
schedule. Most of the relatively few new workers at the time
of the 1930 and earlier censuses were probably not counted as
gainful workers. Likewise, some persons who were actually
gainful workers, but for whom neither occupation nor industry
was reported, were not included in the gainful worker figures for
1Q30 and earlier years.
Tlie 1940 labor force figures are restricted to persons 14 years
old and over, whereas the number of gainful workers shown in
earlier censuses included persons 10 years old and over. The
number of workers 10 to 13 years old has become relatively small
and no longer justifies the additional burden of enumeration and
tabulation necessary to retain the 10-year age limit. In making
comparisons between the 1940 labor foice data and the gainful
worker statistics in earlier census reports, the slight difference
in age limits should be taken into consideration. The gainful
worker statistics shown in this bulletin for earUer censuses exclude
those 10 to 13 years old.
Class of worker. — Class-of-worker statistics for employed
workers (eicluding persons on public emergency work) are given
3138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION
3
in table 12, which shows the numbers of wage or salary workers,
employers and own-account workers, unpaid family workers,
and workers who failed to report class of worker. The com-
position of the various categories is described below:
Wmi0 or gmlmry workers. — This class consists of persons who
worked as employees for wages or salary (in cash or kind).
It includes not only factory operatives, laborers, clerks, etc.,
who worked for wages, but also persons working for tips or for
room and board, salesmen and other employees working for
commissions, and salaried business managers, corporation execu-
tives, and government officials.
Bmptoyera and own-account werAers. — This group con-
sists of persons who operated their own business enterprises.
It includes not only the owner-operators of large stores and
manufacturing establishments, but also small merchants, inde-
pendent craftsmen, farmers, professional men, peddlers, and
other persons conducting enterprises of their own. It does not
include managers paid to operate businesses owned by other
persons or by corporations; such workers are classified as wage
or salary workers.
Unptdd {amity workers. — This class is composed of persons
who assisted without pay on farms or in stores or other enter-
prises operated by other members of their families. The great
majority of unpaid family workers are farm laborers.
Occupation and industry statistics. — In the 1940 Population
Census of Hawaii, inquiries relating to occupation and industry
were made for all experienced persons 14 years old and over in
the labor force during the census week (March 24 to 30, 1940).
The occupation and industry data presented in this bulletin,
however, are limited to employed persons (except those on public
emergency work), and relate to their jobs during the census
week.
Ocoupatiou olaMiflcation. — The detailed occupation classifi-
cation used in the 1940 Population Census for Hawaii contains
378 titles.' In this bulletin, the detailed occupation classifica-
tion is used only for the presentation of occupation statistics
for employed workers (except those on public emergency work),
by sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu city (table 13). In
other tables, occupation data are shown in terms of \2 major
octupation groups, representing major groupings of the detailed
clantflcation.
Industry olaiiiflcation. — The industry classification used in
the 1940 Census for Hawaii contains 131 titles.' The detailed
industry classification is used here only for the presentation of
industry statistics for employed workers (except those on public
emergency work), by sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu
city (table 15). In other tables, a condensed list of 44 industries
1b used. This abbreviated list represents selections and com-
binations of the titles in the complete classification.
CoTerage of industry classifications "Qovernment" and
"Domestic seryice." — The industry classification "Government
(not elsewhere classified)" does not include all persons employed
by governmental agencies. Persons are included in this clas-
sification only if they were engaged in activities that are peculi-
arly governmental functions. Government employees who were
engaged in activities that are commonly performed by employees
of private enterprises are included in the industry classification
in which their activities fell. For example, a tax collector is
included in the industry classification "Government." but a
carpenter employed on a Federal building project is classified
in the category "Construction." The total number of persons
employed by governmental agencies, therefore, cannot be ob-
tained from the industry classification.
» with some excoptloos. this cliaslflcatlon Is coavertthle to the 327 -item Convertl-
bflJty Lilt of Occupfttfons. which was prp pwtd by the Joint Comislttee on OocupA-
tlonaJ CUMlflctttion (sponsored by the Cflmral Stttlstic*] Bo«rd and the American
fltatlatloal Association) to Increaso comparability among occupational statistics
compiled by various fcovenuDeotal and private sourtcs.
I Thli daaslQcatlcn Is a condensation o( the Standard Industrial ClaaslflcaUon of
1,411 titlea, which wae prepared lor uao Id classilylog industry returns Irom workers
ornMnbenoltbelr hunllles. by th« Joint Commlttoeon Oocupatlonal CUHlAcation,
In eooparatloD with the Conuulttee on Industrial ClaalflcaUon spoosond by tbe
Connl ButMlal B«b4.
The industry group "Domestic service" ia somewhat more
inclusive than the major occupation group "Domestic service
workers," which is limited to "Housekeepers, private family,"
"Laundresses, private family," and "Servants, private family."
The industry classification "Domestic service" includes not only
these workers but also persons in occupations such as practical
nurse, chauffeur, and gardener, if they were employed by private
families.
Comparison of occupation and industry statistics for 1940
with data from earlier censuses.— No comparisons of the 1940
census data on occupation and industry with similar data from
previous censuses are included in this bulletin. Such compari-
sons are complicated by three import.ant considerations.
First, gainful workers, the group for which occupation and
industry statistics were presented in previous censusee, are not
strictly comparable with the 1940 labor force.
Second, the occupation and industry data shown here do not
cover the entire labor force, being limited to employed persons.
Third, the 1940 classifications of occupation and industry
differ from those used in earlier censuses, with respect to arrange-
ment and content of titles. For example, in 1930, most of the
occupation titles were grouped under a few major industrial
headings ("Agriculture," "Forestry and fishing," "Extraction of
minerals," etc.), based upon the industry in which the occupa^
tiou was most commonly followed. In 1940, however, the
occupation titles are grouped into 12 major occupation groups
("Professional and semiprofessional workers," "Craftsmen,
foremen, and kindred workers," "Operatives and kindred work-
ers," etc.), regardless of industrial attachment.
Wage or salary income and receipt of other income. — In
the 1940 census, all persons 14 years old and over (except in-
mates of specified institutions) were asked to report the amount
of money wage or salary income received in 1939. (Those who
received over $5,000 were required only to report that they had
received more than that amount.) Pereons 14 years old and
over were also asked to report whether they had received <50
or more from sources other than money wages or salaries in 1989.
This comparatively small amount was chosen in order to identify
those persons whose incomes, for all practical purposea, were
limited to receipts from wages or salaries. A question regarding
the exact amount of nonwage income was not included because
of the very considerable additional burden of enumeration that
such a question would have entailed.
Wage or salary income, as defined for the purposes of the 1940
census, includes all money received by persons as compensation
for work or services performed as employees, including commis-
sions, tips, piece-rate payments, bonuses, etc., as well as
receipts commonly referred to as wages or salaries. Enumera-
tors were instructed not to consider as wage or salary income
receipts from business profits, fees, travel reimbursements, sale
of crops, unemployment compensation, etc., nor compensation
in forms other than money, such as meals, lodging, clothing, fuel,
etc.
"Other income" includes all income other than money wages
or salaries, such as income from roomers or boarders, buaineea
profits, professional fees, income in kind, receipts from the sale
of farm products, rents, interest, dividends, unemployment com-
pensation, direct relief, old-age assistance, pensions, annuitiea,
royalties, and regular contributions from persons other than
members of the immediate family. Other itcome does not in-
clude receipts in the form of lump-sum insurance settlements,
occasional gifts of goods or money, inheritances, receipts or
profits from the sale of properties (unless the person earned his
living by buying and selling such properties) or reimbursements
for travel expenses.
In this bulletin, tbe group of persons for whom the reoeipt or
noniecaipt of oUier income was not reported is combined with the
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3139
HAWAII.
group without other income of $50 or more, since the majority
of the persons failing to report probably had no other income.
Data on wage or salary income and other income in 1939 are
presented in table 16 for the experienced lalor force, which com-
prises employed persons, those on public emergency work, and
persons other than new workers seeking work, during the week
of March 24 to 30, 1940. In this table sUtistics >re presented
separately for wage or salary workers and for other experienced
workers (that is, for the combination of employers, own-account
workers, unpaid family workers, and persons for whom class of
worker was not reported). The group of wage or salary workers
is subdivided into (a) private and nonemergency goverDmenl
workers, and (b) public emergency workers. The category
"public emergency workers" includes both persons who were on
public emergency work during the census week and persons
seeking work during that week who had last worked on public
emergency projects. This category is therefore somewhat larger
than the employment status group "on public emergency work."
The statistics on wage or salary income and receipt of other
income refer to the calendar year 1939, while the class ideations
by employment status and class of worker refer to the week of
March 24 to 30, 1940. Because of the rapid turn-over of emer-
gency project employment, the difference in time reference is
probably most important in connection with the wage or salary
income distribution of public emergency workers. A consider-
able proportion of the wage or salary income reported by public
emergency workers was derived from private employment. Like-
wise, some persons who were employers, own-account workers,
and unpaid family workers at the time of the census had been
employed as wage or salary workers during a part or all of the
year 1939, and reported themselves aa having received various
amounts of wage or salary income.
Two important factors may have made for inaccurate report-
ng of wage or salary Income. First, perwns who raceived their
compensation in many installments of irregular amounts may
not hare been able to determine accurately the total amount
received. Second, some informants who replied to the eensui
Icquiriea for the whole family undoubtedly did not know the
precise amount of wage or salary inoome raoeived by eaefa mem-
ber. Nevertheless, the statistics present a reasonably accurate
picture of the amount and distribution of wage or salary income
received in 1930.
Months worked in 1939. — In order to show the relationship
between income and amount of employment during the year,
statistics on wage or salary income and receipt of othei income
are presented for wage or salary workers classified according to
number of months worked in 1939. The classification by num-
ber of months worked was obtained from a question regarding
the number of weeks worked for pay or profit, including public
emergency work, or at unpaid family work, which was asked for
all persons 14 years old and over except inmates of certain
institutions. For persons with periods of part-time work, the
report was to be made in terms of equivalent full-time weeks, A
full-time week being defined as the number of hours loc^y
regarded as full time for the given occupation and industry.
Paid vacations or other absences with pay were included in the
number of weeks worked.
The returns for weeks worked in 1939 have been converted
into months in the tables in this bulletin, because a large pro-
portion of the reports were only approximate, and did not repre-
sent valid statements of the precise number of weeks of work.
The groupings of months worked that are used in this bulletin
are listed below, with their equivalents in terms of the original
reports of weeks worked.
Number of months worked KumDer of weeka worked
Less than 6 months, or not 0 to 23 weeks, or not reported.
reported.
6 to 8 months 24 to 35 weeks.
9 to II months __. 36 to 49 weeks.
12 months 50 to 52 weeks.
Data on months worked in 1939 were not tabulated for
employers, own-account workers, and unpaid family workers.
For such workers, the data on months worked are less slg-
oiflcaDt and lees reliable than for wage or salary workers.
Moreover, for workers in these groups, the amount of emfdoy-
ment in 1039 boa Utile relation to the amount of wage or salary
incone retafved.
79716 O— 4«— pt. 18-
19
3140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION
Tabls 1.— race, by nativity AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1910 TO 1940
[Percent not ahovn where less than 0.1}
THinunOBT
Totel
1940
Native
Foreign bora ..
USD .
NaUve .
Foreign bom ...
laao
Native
Foreign born
mo
Native
Foreign born...
Kale
ItW
Native...
Foreign born...
Il»0
Native
Foreign bora
1040
Native..
Foreign born
1030 .
Native
Foreign born
Kale* per 100
females
1040
Native
Foreign born
1900
Nallve
Foreign born
HONOLULO CITY
Total
1040
9U.0U
168.871'
87.2411
94.734
82.071
12.663.
74. 46S;
5S. 808
lS.«48i
84.693
74.537
10.0S5|
119.0
iiai
125.0
54. 742 23. 507 21. 031
44. 048:31. 074
28,930 7.195
15.118 14.1
31.M7 1
27. 715
3.952
153.8 :
155.5
141.9 :
33. 948 10. 141
21. 734 I
2.214
131.3
115. 1
167.2
76.0CB
46.759
28.249
33.515
15.230
7.285
113.0
IM. 8
174.4
PKaCKNT BT KACB
15.1
9.
91.9
:
■a.i
6
13.9
10.
9L4
0.
m. 5
7
13.5
12.
3.10
11
29.5
7
16.1
15.
100.0
67.7
42.3
loo 0
22.0
78.0
100 0 100 0 100 0
100. Ol 100.0 100. c
78.6 10aO 65. (
21.4 34.0
100. 0 100. 0 100. 0'
lOo' o! 75- 7
100.01 100. 0 100. 0' 100. 0| 100.0
100.0 87.3, 74.3 100.01 62 6
12.71 25.71
100. 0! 100.0' 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
10)0 99.9
100 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100.
Or 100.0 86.4 84.6100.0| 67.0
13.61 15.
10O.O
72.1
37.0
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3141
HAWAII
-AGE, BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940 AND 1930
[PorceDt Dot ahowD ubere loss than 0.1]
Male Female
THB TUIBITOKT
TjDder syears-
5to6years —
10 to H years. -
21,961
24.110
26,359
7.419 6.963
23,3.S4
21, 979
19.033
94, 660 3S, 2Bt
16, 131 13, 643
2,238
2,296
2.040
1, 2116
83. 830 79. 089
7.327
9.067
11.329
11. 36.)
9.192
30 to 34 years..
38 to 39 years..
40 to 44 years . .
3 64 years,.
0 74 years-
21,571
17,969
12,963
9,648
9,422
12.911
6, 767
1,792
6.694
7.607
3,345
1,010
2,019
2,337
1,043
2,777
1,212
2,667
3,669
1,396
1 years and over . .
AU aies, 1930
145.046
222. 640
24.630
23.894
10.235
19.324
87.603
145. 696
4.708
11.911
13. 481
48. 706
26, 528
31.687
9,645
le.sei
1.547
1..354
1.078
6.432
10. 618
53. 568
2.864
35.346
64.623
4.723
4.446
3.066
3,796
65 to 59 years-.
3,627
3,132
2,388
1,979
1,472
1,757
1,515
1.072
2,208
5,570
4,417
4.720
21 years and over.
Percent, 1940
129,292
100.0
03.510
100.0
6.361
100.0
6,390
100.0
4,142
100 0
4,466
100.0
17. 169
100.0
9.854
100.0
40.860
ICO.O
66 to 64 years
65 to 74 years
Not reported
21 years and over..
Percent, 1890..
Under 6 years
66.0
100.0
49.2
100.0
32.4
100.0
43,0
tD0.0
3142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION 7
Tabu «.— AGE, BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1040 AND 1830— Continued
(PeroKit not ibovn wban km tb*D 0.1)
AUA. aOB, AHD
AlXCLABSBS
Hawaiuk
PUT
Hawaiun
Cauuham
c™-
PTl^O
Japamui
Othkbeacu
Total
Mala
Fanula
Mile
Tf-
Male
Po-
mala
Male
Pe-
male
Male
Pe-
mala
«"• iJi
Mali
IS.
Mala
Pe
male
HOaOKTTlD CJTY
AUtfM, INO
ITS, IN
M.m
M.6M
!,7T»
•.•T9
19,<1>
11, Itl
It, 944
21,946
11.304
10, 141
6,101 1.TI6
31. at
tt. tn
S,9«
3,607
16. M7
17, m>
10. «U
30.298
31,343
IS, 166
14.000
13.380
9.671
7.6M
6,546
9.077
4.353
100,114
100.0
8.IM0
9.00]
B.9M
10i429
11,J07
9,713
7,630
ftTJO
5,083
3,930
3, 804
6^291
2,696
717
49
64,242
loao
8,296
8,967
9,eTi
9,864
10,136
8,462
6,539
6,660
4,488
3,745
2,741
3.786
1,767
674
24
45,972
100.0
184
214
239
236
209
568
231
304
222
206
166
196
116
32
5
1,839
100.0
166
198
239
236
237
361
226
231
202
196
149
179
113
46
1
1.794
100.0
2.228
2.0.14
1,867
1,497
1,194
1,036
753
689
347
348
193
233
79
19
6
4,627
100.0
2.261
2,004
1,868
1,676
1.447
1,046
816
637
380
249
315
119
61
6,144
100.0
1,949
1,7«)
1,736
2423
3,972
3,206
2,669
2,366
1,822
1,489
1,308
'663
228
17
19,279
100.0
1.721
1,745
1,721
1,786
2.444
2,926
2.751
2.182
1.713
1,377
1.057
1,444
734
336
13
16.681
100. 0
908
1.096
1,446
1,471
1,266
1,011
794
890
871
616
280
770
. 604
228
6
7,099
100.0
819
1,099
1,384
1,420
1.248
900
722
77?
630
305
376
217
60
4
6,179
100.0
390
346
273
236
236
1.018
874
686
432
130
100
18
4
4
3.828
lOO.O
m
310
388
217
170
128
77
07
.■a
23
22
2
1
617
100.0
2.680
3.172
3.906
4.120
3,8M
2,908
1,952
1,865
1,264
781
1,673
2,068
864
139
12
10,646
loot
2.688
3.088
3. 681
4.133
4.160
2.8B4
1,73"
i:39«
1,327
9)9
1.323
!02
61
5
14,945
lOO.O
300
422
606
466
4Z1
286
257
131
136
113
164
477
302
47
1
2,124
100.0
75 y««rs uid over
30
21 yean and over
P«roeiit.l»U
1,612
100.0
Under 6 years
StoSyears-
9.6
10.0
10. B
11.3
11.9
lai
7.«
a.*
«.>
4.3
3.6
S.1
2.4
0.7
9.1
9.6
10 5
11 0
11.8
10.3
7.9
7.1
6.4
th
6.0
2.7
0.8
0.J
67.3
9 8
10.6
II 4
11.7
12.0
10.0
7.7
6.7
6.3
4.4
3.2
' 4.6
2.1
0.7
6.6
7.7
86
86
9.7
9.3
&3
7.8
80
7.4
6.0
7.1
4.J
1.2
0.2
66.2
6.2
7.4
89
88
88
0.7
84
86
7.6
7.3
6.6
6.7
4.2
L7
17.9
16.5
14 9
12 1
9.6
8.3
6.1
4.7
2.8
2.8
i.g
1.9
0.6
0.1
17.1
16.2
14 1
12 0
11.0
7.0
6.2
4.8
ai
19
1.9
2.4
0.9
a4
7.2
6.6
6.4
9.0
14.7
11.9
9.9
87
6.8
6.6
4.6
1.4
^6
0.8
ai
67.8
7.2
7.3
7.2
7 5
10 2
12 2
11 5
9.1
7.2
6.7
4.4
6.0
3.1
1.4
0.1
69.3
7.4
89
11.8
12 0
10.2
82
6.6
7.2
7.1
6.0
13
6.3
6.4
L9
81
10.8
13.6
14.0
12 3
89
7.1
7.2
(.2
3.9
16
8.7
11
a5
7.6
88
6.4
4.4
4.6
20.0
17.1
13.4
86
7.2
16
10
0.4
0.1
01
76.0
18 8
17.4
16.0
12 2
9.6
7.2
4.3
6.2
3.8
8.0
1.3
1.3
0.1
ai
84
10.2
12.6
13.2
114
9.3
6.3
6.0
4.0
16
6.4
0.6
17
a6
9.0
10.6
115
14.1
9.9
5.9
6.4
4.8
4.2
3.2
4.6
1.7
a3
9.1
10.7
12 8
11 6
10.7
7.2
6.6
3.3
3.2
19
3.9
110
6,1
L2
10.5
11.8
75 yean and over
ao
21 years and over
(5.8
S4.2
67.0
36.4
39.1
67.7
91.1
34.6
SS.0
60.9
63.6
4*0
Tablb 3.— FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION BY CITIZENSHIP, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR
HONOLULU CITY: 1940 AND 1930
rPercent not shown where less than 0.1 or where base is less than lOO]
«,...0N
.OBNPOP
,la™n-.
HA0.S
,OB„OK.BOB
,W,Ot.AT.O»2.T.A«.OU.A»nO™
ABBA, BACK, AND SBZ
Total
Natural lied
First
papers
No papers
and not
reported
Total
Naturalized
Pirst papers
No papers
and not
reported
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
THE TEKBITORY: 1040
IHaL
62, lis
6,668
10.6
397
0.8
46.663
63,041
6,419
10,4
391
0.1
ti.lM
30,490
22,123
3,645
2,008
11.6
0.1
277
120
0.9
0.6
26.668
10, 996
30,146
21,896
3,432
1,987
11.4
9.1
273
120
0.9
0.6
26,441
19^780
27
14
13
7,951
4,439
3,512
4,844
3,393
1,451
37,353
20,910
16,443
2,438
1,734
704
14
6
8
6,141
3.292
1.849
199
116
84
148
87
61
61
46
6
13
8
5
1422
878
1,644
4,644
3,277
1,367
37,201
20,820
16,381
1383
1,685
606
24
12
12
7,774
4,303
3.471
4,730
3,320
1,410
37.089
20,784
16,305
1424
1,736
696
14
s
6,015
3,185
1,830
193
110
83
147
86
61
60
45
6
64.7
74.2
62 6
4.1
3.4
5.8
0.4
0.4
0.4
11
16
0.9
388
269
119
1
1
4.9
6 1
3.4
64.6
74.0
617
13
6.9
0.4
0.4
0.4
11
26
0 7
383
364
119
4.9
6.1
8 4
Male
1,327
4
3
I
4
4
""^Sto
0.2
0.2
0.2
a2
Pemale
698
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3143
HAWAII
TiBLE 8.— FOREIQN-BORN POPULATION BY CITIZENSHIP, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR
HONOLULU CITY: 1940 AND 1»30— Continued
(Peroeot Dot ahowii where leM tbkn 0.1 or wfaer« bue Is lee
1 Ifaui 100)
rOtllOII-BOfeH POFOLATIOH— AU. AGKS
..,o»..o.
.rort^r
0»„Y„
Ifl OLD AND OT»
AHA, ftACI, AMD UX
Total
N&tiumlited
FInt
Fnpera
Nopapen
and not
reported
Total
Natuxallied
First papers
No papers
isilllM
npond
Namber
Peroeot
Ntunb«r
Porceot
NumtMT
Peroeot
Number
Percent
THE TERRITORY: IMO
U.HT
42, OU
AIM
i.m
7.7
•IB
1.9
ai,tt9
•7,«8B
i.094
7.1
791
I.I
3,262
1,971
7.8
7.8
120
1.7
0.9
38,023
34.426
4i,an
lt,09>
3.180
1,914
7.7
7.3
679
116
1.6
0.4
M.W
9.M8
t,eo6
7.M8
0,211
9,384
3.827
7.304
5.777
1.627
4,779
3.074
1.706
179
67
112
91.9
97 1
44.6
2.9
1.2
7.3
773
660
113
3
2
1
8.4
13.3
3.0
I.M9
mS*
%1»
1,414
0.1
<8.44e
a>.»«
».1»7
a. MS
2.274
791
SS,718
47, HO
27.970
19.060
3.040
2.299
781
».37>
103
18
89
33
12
3.348
0.2
0.1
0.4
o!9
1.9
It.O
6
1
1
963
0.3
0.3
0.1
1.9
19.066
HONOLDLIT CITY: IMO
Totol
9.389
14.9
889
11
U,T«
iz.naa
10, ow
1.968
1,420
19.9
14.1
166
99
13
1.0
10,929
8,936
9!908
1.937
1,409
15 6
14.2
164
99
1.3
1.0
81400
ao
11
«
4.544
2,330
3,214
3.228
2.020
1.20S
11
9
<
3,112
1.792
1.320
173
a>
74
9
6
3
:,i7i
375
796
3,054
1.920
1,134
IB
9
9
4.471
2.282
2,189
3.123
1,953
1,170
11
3.079
1.769
1,310
168
99
73
''•"SS": -
68. 9
76.9
99.6
9.4
4.9
8.1
361
163
96
1
1
9 7
7.0
4.4
68.8
77.3
99.8
9.4
4.9
6.3
299
191
98
1
1
6.8
7.1
4.6
1,137
"."li
0.1
13.790
7.«0
6.210
1,138
414
60
42
18
32
30
2
0.4
0.6
0.3
2.8
4.2
0.9
2
I
1
1
1
13. 728
7.937
6.191
1.103
691.
412
13.634
7.503
6.131
1.126
409
60
42
18
32
30
2
0.4
0.3
0.3
2.8
4.2
0.9
2
1
1
1
>
6,113
i,on
0.1
0.1
0.1
9.1
Table 4.— MARITAL STATUS OF THE POPULATION 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY
AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1920 TO 1940
(For each year a small number of persons for whom marital status
was not
reported a
re Included In the figures (or "sln(Ie"|
KALIS 15 TIAKS OLD AND OYII
FBHALBS IS TEABS OLD AND OVBK
Total
Single
Married
Widowed
Dl-
voroed
Total
Single
Married
Widowed
Di-
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
vorced
THE TERRITORY
178,663
194.981
104,910
67.059
48,224
98,128
79. 142
45,966
31.061
20.331
94.9
91.1
43.8
46.3
42.2
71,715
68.187
92,977
32,446
29,179
40,1
44.0
50.5
48.4
92 2
6,211
6.030
6.011
2,249
2,038
3.5
3.9
4.8
3.4
4.2
2.609
1.622
956
1.303
67f,
113.667
B0..DI4
60.197
57. 765
17.698
36,152
19,609
10. 752
18.451
10. 216
31.8
34.6
17 9
31.9
27.2
66,669
93,948
49,990
32.812
23.666
68.6
67.4
79.7
96.8
62.9
8.819
9.623
3,479
4.893
3,042
7.8
6.9
9.8
8.9
8.1
3,117
HONOLULU CITY
1.600
3144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION 9
Table 5.— SCHOOL ATTENDANCE BY AGE, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU
CITY: 1940 AND 1930
(Pprceat not shown where base Is less than 100
lUWAlUN
PiBT aiWiniN
CAtlClSIAM
cHm«.
nupiNO
lAPAKlSI
OTHKB RACU
«.A,AO..«X^.KDC.Ka.S
ToUU
□umber
Altrnding
school
Attend-
ing
school
Per-
cent
Attend-
ing
school
Per-
cent
Attend-
ing
school
Pcr-
Attend-
ing
school
Per-
cent
Attend-
Ing
school
Per-
Attend-
ing
school
Per-
At-
tend-
ing
school
Per-
Number
Per-
cent
THE TERRITOBY: 19<0
TM*1, e u M run
1M.M0
110.459
58.0
8.767
58.7
17.849
64 4
16.696
U.1
9,148
70.9
9.571
•5 7
58.881
•4.9
4.777
n.T
8.575
8,069
«!,-87
38,128
9,366
9,774
18,111
20,453
11,333
39,744
tot. 464
2.562
6.016
26.372
37.722
9.091
8.802
12. 152
5.267
1,025
1.450
56.707
29.9
74.6
98.5
98.9
97.1
90.1
67.1
25.8
9.0
3,6
54.3
to
140
716
1,103
274
215
187
58
8
6
1,370
16,6
58.6
97.2
97.5
90.7
73.9
38.8
11.6
2.8
0.6
61.3
457
1.184
4.821
5.999
1.374
1.176
1,488
561
87
112
6.696
25.2
73.1
98 0
98,6
94.9
87.0
58.8
24.3
8 0
3.1
65.!
338
888
4.016
5.169
1.261
1.242
1,540
829
174
240
S.015
27.6
74.5
9S.I
98.5
97.0
86.4
68.6
12.8
3.9
1.6
S6.6
250
430
1.735
2.818
733
739
1.320
706
173
255
4.998
47.7
83.5
98.7
99.3
90.5
98.0
88.9
63.8
27.9
10.6
71.6
130
677
2.686
3.276
683
552
499
21
4.S47
12 7
61 1
97.7
98.5
96 4
83 3
60-3
16 8
4 6
1.2
•4 1
1.258
i557
11.235
17.597
4.383
4..W7
6.644
2.803
604
762
87. 173
37.6
79.7
99.0
99.3
98.5
93.4
72.8
33 5
12,2
5.4
••.4
79
250
1.166
1.760
383
371
100
58
58
2.414
21.1
15 Mini
81.7
Male, fttoMyMn
•0.1
Byeare
4,367
4,124
13.459
19.325
4.785
4.972
9.113
12,274
7,258
24,786
88,876
1.236
3.056
13.242
19.129
4.672
4,581
6.406
2. 943
575
867
53.752
28,3
74.1
98.4
99.0
97.6
92.1
70.3
24.0
7.9
3.5
68,6
29
73
358
544
136
107
89
86
4
4
1.3S7
21,6
58.4
96.2
97.8
91 3
79.3
38.2
9.3
2.4
0.8
64.9
221
586
2.399
3.095
672
598
735
290
44
66
8.553
23 5
71,8
97,8
98 9
95.9
89.3
59,0
25.1
8.0
3.2
63 6
168
448
2.006
2.691
647
661
812
440
90
152
7.681
27.2
71.9
98.3
98.6
97.9
88.8
61.1
8.6
24
1.2
65.7
124
856
'380
364
687
372
100
139
4.456
47.3
85.8
99 0
99 2
90,5
98,4
88,9
55,9
30.0
11.7
69.6
42
297
1.341
1.634
326
295
287
77
18
10
4.884
9.6
60 4
97 0
98.6
96.2
87.5
55.0
20.8
8.5
11
67.5
600
1.307
5.696
8.920
2.317
2.364
3.666
1.639
292
471
8i. 0B8
34 6
80.1
99.1
99.3
98.7
94.9
77.7
38.2
13.9
66
M 4
42
121
674
899
194
193
231
99
27
35
8.S6S
21.1
7 to fl years — i.
98.3
85.3
Faioale, fl to 84 yean
•l.i
6 years
4,208
3,944
13.328
18.803
4.58.
t:^
8,179
4,075
14,958
197. 3M
1,326
2,960
13.130
18,593
4,419
4,221
6,74«
2,324
450
683
82, 429
31,6
76,1
98,5
98,9
96.5
87.9
63.9
28,4
11,0
3.9
«4.7
21
67
368
559
138
108
98
32
4
2
4.471
16 6
58.8
98.1
97.2
90.2
69.2
39.4
14.2
3.2
0.4
eo.s
236
598
2.422
2.904
702
678
763
261
43
56
0.411
27.0
ki
94! 0
84.9
68.6
23.4
7.3
2.9
70.9
170
440
2.009
2. .W8
614
581
728
389
84
88
14. 510
28.0
77.3
98.0
98.4
96.1
83.8
56.1
28.7
12.2
2.7
57.7
126
196
879
1.372
353
375
633
333
73
116
7.338
48.1
81.0
98.4
99.5
99.4
97.7
88.9
51.6
25.4
9.3
75.8
78
2S0
1,334
1,642
357
2.W
212
54
3
7
3.989
16.0
61.8
98.5
93.4
94.7
78 8
45.1
13.2
1.7
1,3
32,6
658
1.250
6.537
8.677
2,066
2,143
3.090
291
40,717
39.7
79.3
98.9
99.3
98.3
91.9
67.8
28.6
10.6
4.2
71.6
37
129
861
189
179
232
91
31
31
1.998
80.3
« years ^
99.3
16 ears
78.1
THE TERRITORY: 1930
Total. S to SO years
7H
Svears
10, 3U
9.847
26.881
31.255
6,787
6,383
12.239
14.869
8,702
68. SIS
966
6,362
24.884
30.J29
6.fc89
4,801
6.2»
3,172
739
48. 55i
9.2
54.5
92.6
06.7
88.2
75 2
2L3
8.5
61. S
34
224
1.233
1. 812
379
280
331
148
30
2.181
6.3
46.7
87.6
94.5
81.5
65.0
37.0
17.0
7.5
59.8
113
676
2.830
3.383
646
617
765
407
85
4,750
9,6
60.8
92.7
97.2
88.9
74.7
65.7
34.8
16 5
71.4
146
856
4.320
5.438
803
1.120
611
136
7.425
9.4
55.9
93.1
90.2
83.1
67.0
43.2
14.5
5.6
51.8
151
485
1.865
2,329
547
483
815
523
a.77J
18.8
64.4
92.3
93.1
90.0
85.4
76.7
65.4
32.2
76 3
39
304
1.630
1.608
229
174
146
49
10
8. 18S
3,9
34 1
86,8
94 3
74 6
57 2
24.2
1.7
0.3
84.0
434
2.668
12,444
15024
2,987
2.437
3.012
1.374
327
81. 8M
8.6
64.4
93.6
97.9
91.9
79.7
54.3
30.2
17.0
713
39
150
652
735
121.
107
117
•0
11
1,096
15.1
10 tol3year«
14 years
91.0
70.9
Kale, 6 to 80 year*
77.4
6 years -, —
5,257
■l3!726
15.835
3,400
3,268
6,320
9,736
6.365
58,636
476
2,705
12,711
15, 321
3,074
2.585
3, 452
1.816
415
39. 873
9.1
55.1
92.6
96.8
90.4
79.1
54.6
18.7
6 5
68.1
11
104
627
886
173
144
160
73
13
8.280
4.1
45.0
86. 1
03.9
79.7
64.0
35.0
16.4
7.0
61 6
52
331
1.465
1.694
329
272
380
188
39
4.981
9.1
60.6
93.4
96.8
90.6
75.3
64.7
33.6
16 6
70.3
73
451
2.206
2.772
653
410
562
325
73
7.084
9,0
57.7
93,5
96,6
84.6
67.5
42.1
10.8
3.8
65.6
77
246
061
1.155
266
248
442
294
69
3.558
18.6
68.9
92.9
93.3
89.3
87.2
80.1
58.3
28.2
75 3
15
168
785
784
121
107
101
39
8
1.961
3.1
38.0
87 0
96.8
82.9
66.9
25.6
o!3
54.1
228
1.334
6.J30
7.640
1.577
1.333
1.746
869
208
19. 461
8 9
54.4
93.5
97.8
94.6
86.a
62.4
36.2
30.8
«9.6
80
70
337
380
55
61
61
37
5
•••
163
70.0
16 eara
Female, StoSOyeara
Ta.1
ears
5,134
4,936
13.165
15,420
3,387
3,115
5.919
6.133
2,337
79.190
480
2.657
12, 173
14,908
2.915
2.216
2,844
1,356
324
48.396
9.3
63.8
92.6
96 7
86,1
71,1
48.0
26.4
13.9
ai.i
23
120
606
926
206
136
171
75
17
963
8.5
46.2
89.0
96.1
83.1
66.0
39.1
17.5
8.0
61.8
61
344
1,366
1,689
317
245
.376
219
46
8,888
10.1
60,9
07:5
87.1
74.0
56.7
36.1
16 4
15.5
73
405
2.114
2,666
527
393
558
286
63
8.750
9.8
54.1
92.8
94 9
sa?
66.5
44.3
23.8
1L5
49.8
74
239
904
1,164
281
225
873
228
71
7.303
19 1
62.1
91.7
92.9
90.6
83.6
73.0
62.1
37.4
71.0
24
136
744
724
108
67
45
10
2
1.961
4.7
32.2
86.6
03.7
68,8
•46.5
31 5
4.7
1.4
• 1.7
106
1.333
6,124
7,384
1,410
1.104
1,206
616
119
18.911
8.3
54 4
93.7
98.1
39.1
73.0
46.0
23.6
12.8
•8.8
19
80
315
355
66
40
6«
a
•
8.890
14.8
6 years
HONOLULU CITY: 1040
Total, A 10 84 yean
•9.1
ft years
3,419
3,377
11.123
15.805
8,831
4,071
7,945
8.277
4.417
16.925
1.447
2.765
10,056
15,629
8,757
3,781
5,790
2,776
611
884
42.3
81.9
98.5
98.0
98.1
92.9
72.9
33.6
13,8
5,2
27
54
229
373
84
91
73
16
3
'"97^4"
96.0
75.2
43.2
14.3
1.6
as
300
631
2,372
2.985
665
609
815
314
68
7«
35.3
79.3
98.3
98.7
96 4
90.6
63.8
27. 9
9.9
9.8
221
512
2,160
2.707
692
6«2
946
630
116
176
34.1
74 9
98.2
98.5
97.7
90.5
68.6
26.7
9.6
1.4
228
342
1,355
2; 235
580
592
1.099
692
162
218
54.5
85.1
986
99.4
99.7
98.3
9ao
56.4
89.0
U.0
36
101
368
431
95
78
101
80
t
0
26.6
70.6
97.9
98.2
93.1
"664"
23.3
"IT
684
1. 000
3,964
6.062
1,461
1,531
%520
1,177
346
M4
62.0
89.1
98.8
99.3
99.0
96 5
76.4
85.6
14.3
6.8
60
125
S«7
836
180
188
136
08
SO
40
3a9
8 Ttm
86.8
i-i
1 to 24 rears.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3145
10
HAWAII
Tablb 5.— school attendance BY AGE, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU
CITY: 1940 AND 1930— Continued
[percent not shown wbrre base is less than 100]
HONOLULU CITY: IWO-
Contlnued
tfiJe, 5 to M yean
5 Tears
e years
7 to 9 years ,
10 to 18 years
Ufean
16 years
16 and 17 years ,
IRand 19 years
20 years
21 to 24 years
Fsmala, B to S4 jeua
6 years
0 years
7 ti 9 years
10 to 13 years
14 years
15 years
16 and 17 years
18 and 19 years ,
20 years
21 to 24 years
3,972
3.918
2.029
8.106
30
63
253
08.4
412
98.6
. 88
92
91.1
113
61.9
60
28.7
14
26
7.6
1.161
ei.6
20
Ha
254
98.8
424
99.3
92
96
81.4
124
63.3
48
26.1
16
Tablb 6.— PERSONS 25 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE
TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940
"^"----°'
*..».«,
B»W.n.N
PARTDAWAUAN
CAUCASIAN
CHINESE
nuPmo
lAPANKS,
OTHKREACKe
Num-
ber
Per-
Num-
ber
Per-
cent
Num-
ber
Per-
cent
Num-
ber
Per-
cent
Num-
ber
Per-
cent
Num-
ber
Per-
cent
Num-
ber
Per-
cent
Num-
ber
Per-
cent
THE TERRITORY
Total, 86 years old and oyer
192.906
100.0
8.087
lOOO
13, 770
100.0
53. 070
106 0
13.640
100.0
34.860
100.0
62. 979
100,0
6.611
100.0
No school years completed
Grade school: 1 to 4 years
5and6yrars
7 andSyears
High school: 1 to 3 years
35
35
25
36
19
21
7
10
643
607
978
0T7
543
519
683
252
is! 6
13.6
18.7
1L2
4.0
6.3
0.3
100.0
517
2; 114
1,937
741
375
36
4,186
27I8
26 2
4^6
0 9
100.0
271
1,537
3! 661
2. 514
2,484
649
444
8-6
8,623
2 0
11 2
16 7
20.6
18 3
18.0
3 2
0.3
1,865
4,115
4, 561
10,965
7,981
10, S17
5, 307
7,303
156
10.9
30,823
7; .8
8-6
20 7
1.5 0
20 4
10 0
13 8
0 3
100-0
3, 695
2,243
1,321
1,800
1,346
2,040
431
840
33
6-6
9.458
26-3
16 4
9 7
13-2
9.9
14 9
3,2
6-2
0 2
100.0
16. 445
12.546
3.295
2.111
&34
378
80
54
117
1.6
31.680
44 3
36.0
9-6
6-1
2 4
1-1
0 2
0 2
0.3
100.0
11.437
11,482
11,630
14.018
6,717
5,092
1,055
1,448
200
6.5
34,641
18,2
18,2
18 5
23,7
9-1
8-1
1.7
2 3
0.3
100.0
2.613
1,439
894
686
410
333
89
IZ!
21
3.0
4,049
38.6
22.1
13.7
10.6
6.3
College: l to 3 yean:
1.4
2.0
6.9
120. 260
Male, 20 years old and orer
100.0
loao
No school years completed _
Grade sctool: 1 to 4 years
Sand A years
7 and Syears
High school: 1 to 3 years
23.869
23,769
14,988
22,252
12.706
12,414
3.511
6,297
6.6
72.645
19.8
19.8
100
10,3
2.9
5.2
0 4
100.0
240
1,221
1,092
921)
399
231
33
21
20
3,881
29^2
26.1
22.2
9.6
5.6
0.8
0.5
0.5
100.0
126
800
1.067
1,642
1.236
1,285
226
210
32
8.6
7.147
1 9
12.1
16 1
24.8
18.6
19-4
3.4
3.2
0 5
780
2,048
2.508
7,502
6.470
6.6,56
2,343
4.404
113
10 4
2-5
6-6
8 1
24-3
17-7
18-3
7-6
14-3
0-4
100-0
2,152
1,445
8.13
1.118
901
1,3.18
200
444
27
6-6
5.191
25.4
17.1
9.8
13-2
10 7
15-8
2-4
6-2
0-3
100,0
13,808
11.541
3, 046
1,803
745
331
62
46
109
1-7
3,879
43,7
36,5
9,6
6,0
2 4
1,0
0,2
0 1
0.3
100,0
6,166
6,870
5,903
8,732
3.671
3.383
691
1,087
139
7.1
28. 43B
16-0
17 0
17 1
26 3
10 6
9-8
1-7
3-1
0 4
100-0
1,598
844
640
436
285
191
66
86
. 14
3 0
2.462
39. S
30.8
13.3
10.8
7.0
(College: 1 to 3 years
1.4
2.1
Female, 2b years old and
100-0
100.0
No school years completed
Grade school: l to 4 years
Sand 6 years
7 and 8 years
High school: 1 to 3 yews. _
11
13
6
9
4
3
774
838
990
825
837
105
172
9.56
16.2
16.3
15,1
19.0
9.4
12.6
5.7
6.4
0.2
277
1,025
1,022
1,018
342
144
39
16
9
6.2
7.1
26 4
26.3
200
8.8
3.7
1.0
0 4
0 2
737
1,096
2,019
1,279
1.199
423
234
15
8.6
2
10
It
f
3
3
2
8
9
3
1,085
2,067
3:463
S. 162
2,964
2,899
43
11 9
9; 3
9 2
16-6
U-3
23 2
13-3
13-0
0-2
1.443
798
4S8
682
445
702
231
396
6
6.4
27-8
13 1
8.6
13.6
4.6
7.6
0.1
1,637
1,004
2.50
218
47
8'
1.0
49 9
30 6
7 6
6,6
2.7
O.i
0.2
0 2
6.272
5,012
5.727
6,186
l!709
464
361
61
6.8
22-1
19.7
20-1
21-8
7-2
6-0
1-6
1.3
0.2
916
354
349
125
142
33
42
7
3.1
37.2
24.a
14.4
10.1
S.1
College: 1 to 3 years
4 years or more...
1.3
1.7
Median school yeara completed..
7.2
3146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION
11
-PERSONS 25 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE
TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940— Continiwd
ABBA, ax. AVD TBABfl or
•CaoOLOOMnBTSV
AUBACZa
HAwanAK
FAIT BAWAIUM
CAVCAaUK
CBIKUX
nuriK.
jAPAKxan
OfBBmBACIa
Num-
ber
Por-
eant
Num-
ber
Per-
cent
Num-
ber
Per-
cent
Num-
ber
Per-
cant
Num-
ber
Per-
cent
Nnm-
bar
Per-
cent
Num-
ber
Per-
cent
Nnm-
Per-
nnt
HONOLULU CITY
Tetol, u TMn old ud
ai.iM
10l>.0
!,«•»
too.o
7.11T
itao
••.or
10ft 0
10,100
100.9
4.118
108.0
15,118
108 0
1,081
IOOlO
Ko Mbool VMrs completed
Ond« nhooli 1 to 4 yean
6 and 6 years
7aDd8yMt3
Bl(hiobool: ltd 3 yean
ia427
10.414
10.31B
16, H2
10,404
13.683
4,668
6,687
370
8.3
41. 08
12.5
12 5
12 4
19.9
1Z6
16.4
6.S
7.9
0.3
100.0
189
766
8M
884
828
211
20
16
19
6.6
1.198
58
33.3
26.8
36l7
10.1
6 6
0 6
0 6
0 6
100.0
148
608
1,047
1,984
1,496
1,6M
986
370
30
8.9
i.MI
1.9
0.1
13.7
380
10 6
21 3
4.4
3.8
0.3
loeo
837
1,021
3,339
4,769
82
lil
16, 106
18
6.9
7.1
18 1
14.0
38.9
11.3
18 1
03
100.0
,636
1,601
1,001
1,40
1,093
315
698
31
7.0
*ll»
34.5
16.4
9.7
13.8
10-6
I&4
3.1
6.2
02
uao
1,388
1,396
689
607
251
123
39
39
33
8.9
9.8«
91.3
31.6
13.8
13.3
6.1
3.0
0 9
06
06
100.0
3,850
3; 710
463
756
86
7,1
19.188
17.4
14.3
17,3
34.0
11 8
10 8
1.8
3,0
03
100.0
1,076
508
417
344
348
336
64
88
19
4.0
1,789
98.1
1916
18.6
11.1
8.1
CoUem: ItoSyeara
4 years or more ..
1.8
18
0.4
Median iobool yeara oompletad.
Male. M ;ean old aad
No aohoQ] yeara completed
Onda school: 1 toAyean-
6 and Qyaars
7and>yean
Hlghaohool: lto3yeara
^504
6,«22
6.488
9.281
5,970
7.198
1,974
3.997
189
8.9
87.766
12.1
12 8
12 1
204
13.1
15 8
4.3
88
0 4
100.0
86
980
431
303
167
138
6
12
16
86
l.Nl
6.3
2S 8
36 3
24.0
10 2
84
0 4
0 7
0 9
100.0
60
S46
606
874
706
880
116
136
18
9.0
«,H5
1.7
9.7
14.1
34.9
19-7
23.1
3.3
3.8
0 6
loot
336
900
1,076
3,iea
2,265
3,133
1,361
2.812
86
11.7
am
22
8 0
7.1
21.0
16.0
20.7
9.0
18 6
0 4
100.1
1.339
944
816
879
714
1.101
167
360
17
7.4
i>71
21.8
15 4
101
14.3
11 6
18 0
26
6.9
0 3
108. 0
1,106
1,167
531
46>
318
108
32
17
21
3 4
484
30.4
31.9
14.3
13.6
80
9 0
0 9
0 6
0 6
110.0
1,047
1,767
3,096
3,302
1.739
1,766
i71
etn
64
7,6
11.118
14,4
13,0
15 5
34.4
12 8
13.0
2 0
4,6
0 4
100.0
613
334
341
319
181
134
93
68
8
4.3
1,M8
85.2
181
19.4
11.0
0.0
CoUafa: ItoSyeara
4 year* or more...
1.8
9.3
Median school years completed.
Famala, U yaaia old and
No school years completed
Grade sobool: 1 to 4 yean
Band ftyean
7and8yean
High school: 1 to 3 yean
4,923
4.613
4,827
7,261
4,484
6.484
2.684
,560
i.2
13.0
12.2
12.8
19 2
11.7
17.2
6.8
6.8
0.2
104
>6«
406
472
161
73
6.6
6.6
22.9
36.3
29 4
10 0
4 6
0 9
0.2
0 2
83
346
541
1,110
780
704
220
135
3
8.9
21
86
13.4
27.6
19.6
19.7
5.5
3.4
0.3
491
1,021
1,034
2.309
1.876
3.986
1,072
1,057
26
13.3
3.4
7,0
TO
15 2
12 9
27.2
13,6
13,6
0.3
1,187
645
387
644
377
691
168
278
6.3
28.6
15 6
9,3
19,0
9 0
14,2
3.8
6.7
0.1
181
139
48
64
33
14
7
6
3
Z7
37,4
38.7
9.9
11.2
6.8
29
1.4
1.2
0.4
2,433
1,839
3,348
3,741
1,111
954
191
152
32
8.4
30.8
15.8
19 3
33,5
0.6
8 3
1.6
1.3
0.3
444
374
176
191
87
103
22
28
5
9.7
86.0
31.6
13.9
laa
6.0
CoUage; lto3years
4 years or more...
1.7
12
Median school yean completed.
Table 7.— PLACE OF BIRTH, BY SEX,
FOR THE TERRITORY: 1940 AND 1930
To.AL»™..a
PEBCENT
HA.E
PE«A«
1940
1930
1940
1930
1940
1930
1940
1930
433,990
988, 998
100.0
100. 0
346. 196
983.840
178, 188
149.891
970. 717
899,799
87.8
81,4
814, 948
180,837
161.073
278.506
35,778
1,848
361
64,224
52,613
53, 813
214.51-
52,672
2,181
238
30,191
68,637
88,987
65.9
8.6
0 4
0.1
12.8
12.4
100.0
68,2
14,3
06
0.1
82
18.6
100.0
141.871
32,153
1,207
209
39,206
30,490
80,410
109,246
47.369
1,374
23, SM
42,013
U,013
136.63.'.
3,626
641
152
15,019
33,123
18, 139
98,184
1,619
165
116
127
105
67
67
121
614
113
03
266
167
343
2,397
246
4,868
37,362
2,454
793
89
191
118
169
64
1,782
162
150
133
110
63
2.9
0.3
0 2
0,2
0 2
0.1
0.1
0.2
1.2
0.2
0.3
0.5
0.3
0 7
4.6
0 5
9,3
71.0
4.7
1.6
0 3
04
0.2
0.8
0.1
2 6
0 2
0.2
0.2
0.2
0 1
910
97
79
82
74
41
44
37
490
90
71
156
146
162
1,155
183
3,400
30,929
1,743
377
43
76
63
81
33
1,121
106
110
104
81
46
609
68
87
46
31
16
39
84
184
39
23
109
31
181
1,343
69
1,488
16,433
712
416
48
116
65
88
83
IS
Fnaoe
116
676
134
100
250
134
413
3,713
129
7,477
48,125
2,977
606
83
116
0.2
1.0
0 2
01
0.4
0,2
0.6
6 4
0.2
10 9
70.7
4.3
1.0
Ol
0.3
44
503
112
74
• IJS
125
206
1,903
101
6,890
28,238
2,208
369
54
81
72
EiustaCU S S R)
93
9
308
1,810
38
1,687
301187
xSm)
760
S27
39
117
207
420
0.3
0.6
109
278
104
143
I iBotodflB peraona bora at iM under Uw United 8utee 0ac u>d American dtiteni bern ebrotd.
» Inolndea (for 1040 only) a few penona from "Other Aala."
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3147
12
HAWAII
-EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF PERSONS 14 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE
TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940
Population
14 years old
and over
NOT
■,.„0K,0«.
Total
Employed (oxc. on
emerg. work)
On public
cmerRcney
worlc
Seelling work
Total
In Institu-
tlona
Number
Percent
of popu-
lation
Number
Percent
of labor
force
Total
Experi-
enced
workers
New
workers
Otber and
not re-
ported
TBE TERRITORY
Tout
301. asa
1S8.S32
•3.4
180. 799
MO
9.926
6.110
4.198
072
119. 464
9.909
109. 951
10.921
26.115
66.281
20,984
39.854
107.867
10.6S4
1SS.44B
6.230
12.574
58.071
11.306
32.939
161,(48
47.9
48.1
68 1
63.9
82 6
68,0
51.8
BS.7
4.539
11.131
56.419
10.688
32.132
60.973
4.914
14B.<e9
86 8
88,6
97,2
94,5
07,6
97,4
8«,9
99,1
367
549
502
127
194
2H
333
2.348
324
804
1.160
491
613
1.356
282
3.741
260
684
030
393
570
1.064
237
3.133
64
220
43
292
45
•08
6.691
13.641
27. 190
9.678
6.915
46.284
6.166
91.800
526
545
639
406
390
629
368
9,481
5.165
Put Hawaiian
I109«
26.651
9.272
&625
44.666
4.787
Mala
••.9>9
&670
12.624
65^061
12.169
34,279
67,446
6.200
118.236
4,212
9,183
49,098
8,305
32,254
43,204
4,492
96.584
74.3
72.7
90,8
68,2
94,1
76 2
72.6
90,9
3.578
7.991
48.772
7.853
31.470
42.046
3.960
35. 197
84,0
87.0
97,6
94,6
97,6
07,3
87.0
96 0
362
634
483
111
103
243
322
78
272
658
743
341
591
916
220
1.369
232
510
625
281
667
733
186
1.005
40
130.
118
60
34
183
34
314
24
71
102
38
9
1119
11
•57
1.458
3.441
5.063
3.864
1025
14.241
1.708
81.654
4.233
10.100
22.127
5.814
4.690
31.043
3,447
54,870
325
300
415
340
341
426
286
1.078
Part Hawaiian
3.141
4.648
3.524
1.684
13. 816
1.423
Female
80.989
6.251
13.491
30.200
8.815
^675
60.422
4. 484
lis. 687
1.018
3.391
8.073
3.001
685
19.379
1.037
79,817
19,4
26 1
26.7
31.0
12.3
38.4
23,1
97.4
061
3.140
7.647
2,836
602
18,928
964
•9,209
94 4
02 6
1*4,7
94,5
96.6
07.7
93 0
09.7
5
16
19
16
11
II
1. 187
52
236
407
150
22
440
62
9.487
28
165
306
112
13
331
51
S.770
224
66
49
204
83
1.960
4.032
Part Hawaiian
9.«66
5.748
HONOLULU CITY
••.•10
4.311
14.034
40.9S2
16. 2n
6>0«7
42.994
i062
••.Oil
2.066
6.864
24.522
8,803
3,767
25.313
1603
63. Ml
47,7
48,9
60 8
64, 1
74.1
68.9
49 4
77,9
1,748
6.067
23.334
8,267
1.305
24.303
1089
M.STO
86 1
88.4
06 P
03.9
90 4
96.0
83.6
N.4
123
215
207
92
122
126
213
I.1S4
184
582
801
444
240
886
201
>.tn
144
443
731
366
222
706
!«•
1.010
40
130
160
89
18
170
32
419
1266
7.170
1&460
7.474
1.310
17.641
1860
13. »8
187
212
103
312
167
149
130
1.055
1060
Part Hawaiian
0.088
ywpiM--
1.143
2,m
e,«>8
n.m
9.140
4.139
2^295
S.7«2
w.nt
l.«16
4.818
18.801
6.418
3.6I0
1.907
It. ••4
73,8
717
869
70.1
87.2
74.7
60,0
39,6
1.346
4,204
17.918
6.028
3.261
16,917
1.547
IS. on
81.2
87,3
96.6
94 0
90,3
06 6
81,1
. 94.7
111
109
1J»
78
123
lie
304
69
180
411
S«t
300
217
612
156
998
114
323
475
264
211
491
132
7(0
26
88
89
55
16
121
24
676
1.810
3.086
1786
629
5,637
866
39,14!
164
163
169
I9«
153
138
116
lot
Put Hawaiian
1.668
2.129
7.406
19.095
7.128
028
20.669
2,300
439
2.046
6.721
2.300
147
8.665
606
20,7
27,6
30,0
33.6
16 8
41,9
26.0
403
1.863
6 376
1230
134
8.376
642
01 8
91.1
94,0
93,7
91 2
96 8
90,9
2
12
18
16
9
34
171
327
136
13
273
20
120
256
101
215
37
14
51
71
34
2
68
8
1,681
8,360
13,374
4,738
781
11004
1,704
33
60
60
16
15
16
16
Part Hawaiian
^aoo
18^334
■m
jSmei::;:;:::;;:::
(SE^racei
3148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPT7LATION
13
-EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF PERSONS U YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY AGE AND SEX, FOR THE
TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940
(Percent not shown wbere hase Is less than 1001
Popula-
14 yeais
old and
„>U..0.,O^
Not in
labor
lore*
nsctm 07 LABOB towm
Total
Employed
(exwpt on
emergency
work)
On pub-
gency
work
Seeking work
Employed
(except on
public
emergency
work)
On pub-
geney
work
Number
Percent
of popu.
laticn
Tout
Experi-
enced
workers
New
workers
Beeklng
work
THE TERRITORY
901,686
188, 232
82.4
160. 796
9.926
6.110
4,138
972
113,454
96 0
l.>
Id, 140
18.111
20,453
51.077
75,716
60.999
32.603
20.618
10. 112
2,802
156
183,448
0.757
9.113
12.274
32.044
4S,68S
30.932
19. 070
12.911
6,707
1,792
103
118, ras
1,118
4, .MS
12,330
38,081
66,511
37, 169
22.315
12.100
3,652
350
91
161, «48
6.8
24.9
60.3
74.6
74.6
72.9
68.4
69.0
36.1
12.6
68.7
88.7
3^898
11.309
36.369
64.957
36.111
21. 495
11, CIO
3.573
343
84
145. 669
8
215
294
336
428
393
389
239
19
2
3
9,248
63
402
727
1.376
1.126
665
431
2S1
60
5
9.741
24
186
462
1.046
1.039
642
423
248
60
6
3
3,193
39
216
265
330
87
23
8
3
18,022
13,696
8.123
12.996
19.205
13.830
10.288
8.418
6.460
2.452
64
91.800
93 6
86.3
91.7
95.6
97.3
97.2
96.3
96.0
07.8
98.0
0.7
4.8
2.4
0.9
0.8
l.I
1.7
2.0
0.5
0.6
1
608
Ml
L9
765
2.761
9.102
29,809
47, 313
29.898
17.744
10.499
3.352
326
70
36,584
7.8
30.3
74.2
03.0
97.2
96.7
93.0
81.3
49.6
18.2
76.7
30. B
717
2,302
8,3.10
28,543
46,086
28,991
16.991
10.032
3.276
319
86, 197
6
201
280
326
409
382
383
237
2
3
7!
42
268
492
940
818
626
370
230
67
6
1.368
16
123
315
740
764
616
367
227
67
5
3
1.0O6
26
135
177
9
3
3
8.992
6.352
3,172
2,235
1,372
1,034
1,326
2.412
3.415
1,466
24
31,854
93.7
83,4
91.5
95.8
97.4
97.0
96.8
95.6
97.7
97.9
0.8
7.3
3.1
1.1
0.9
1.3
2.2
2.3
0.6
0.6
9(4
oeo
0
9,383
8.998
8.179
19.033
•27,031
20.067
13.633
7.607
3.346
1,010
52
198,187
353
1,754
3,229
8,272
9,198
7.271
4,571
1.601
300
24
12
78.817
3.8
19.5
43^5
34.0
36.2
33.8
2L0
9.0
2.4
330
1,596
2,979
7.828
8,871
7,120
4.501
1.678
287
34
12
69,203
2
14
19
11
6
2
21
144
236
436
308
140
61
21
3
8
63
306
275
126
6«
21
3
13
81
88
130
33
5
9,030
7,244
4, 951
10, 761
17,833
12,796
8,962
6,006
3,045
986
40
64,870
93.6
91.0
92.3
94.6
96.4
97.9
98.6
98. S
99.0
0.6
0.8
0.4
0.1
0.2
0 2
0.1
0.1
HONOLULU CITY
17.4
1,187
3,427
2,770
687
93.7
~^I17.6
V6.4
86. 7
92.4
95.7
95.9
64.7
93.3
96.0
93.5
L«
L4
6,2
Z7
1.1
1.0
2!6
2.9
0.9
1.9
7,902
7,945
8.277
21.349
32,249
21,968
14,213
9,077
4,363
1.291
73
69,051
282
1,601
4.316
14,729
22,190
16,297
9,318
4,767
1,172
107
39
69,829
3.6
20.2
62,1
69.0
68. S
69.7
66.6
62.5
28,0
8.3
247
1.223
3.698
13.606
21,226
14,671
8,824
4,447
L125
100
36
B0,»70
4
100
115
16S
217
213
229
137
U
2
1
1,124
31
278
■602
965
747
413
266
183
36
6
2
S,41<
21
189
338
654
605
303
217
162
33
6
2
B>8
11
137
328
741
681
393
2.'i7
180
36
5
1
1,010
20
141
171
224
66
20
8
3
7,620
6.34t
3,962
6.620
10.059
6.661
4.895
4.310
3.181
1,184
34
It, 998
2.8
419
77. «
M.4
S.1
4.1
4.057
3,973
4.359
11,214
17,268
11,810
7.727
6.291
2,596
717
49
>»,>3t
198
918
2,704
9,916
16,661
11,306
7,063
4.004
1,028
m
33
i>,gM
4.9
23.1
62.0
88.4
9«.0
95.7
91.4
75.7
39,6
12.8
175
641
21261
9,112
16,862
10,801
6,623
3,706
984
85
30
18.933
2
.88
106
160
204
202
223
136
11
2
<3
6
96
222
616
462
297
214
150
33
5
760
16
94
116
138
43
6
3
3
3,869
3,055
L656
1,298
607
504
664
1,287
1.568
626
16
>>,t4>
88.4
69.8
83.6
91.9
95.7
95.6
93.8
92.6
95.7
1.0
9.6
3.9
1.6
1.2
L8
3.2
3.4
LI
20 to 24 years.,
6.6
" i
38.6
M.7
0-1
IlO
3.845
3.972
3,918
10.136
14; 991
10, 148
6,486
3,786
1,767
674
24
84
683
L611
4,813
6,629
3,991
2.256
763
144
15
6
12
17.2
47! 5
37.6
39.3
34.8
20.2
8.2
2.6
72
• 582
1,437
6I374
3.870
2,201
741
141
16
6
2
12
10
8
13
11
6
10
89
164
311
242
110
48
21
3
6
42
106
226
319
96
43
31
8
6
47
68
86
23
14
6
3.761
3.289
2.307
4 322
9.362
6,157
4,231
3.023
1.613
659
18
•85.2
89.2
93.4
96.6
97.0
97.6
97.1
07.9
L8
0.6
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.1
13.0
iO.2
4.3
3.8
3.1
3.8
3:1
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3149
14
HAWAII
Table 10.— PERSONS IN THE LABOR FORCE, 1940, AND GAINFUL WORKERS, 1930 AND 1920, BY AGE AND SEX,
FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY
[Percent not shown where less than 0.1 or where base is less than 100]
AREA, CENSV9
THE TERRITORY"
Total, 14«&dov«r..
18 and 19 years.
14 and 15years_
16 and 17 years.
45to H years.-
55toM years..
66 to 74 years..
76 years and o^
14 and 16 years,.
16 and 17 years.
18 and 19 years..
HONOLULU CITY
16 and 17 years
18 and 19 yeai
20 to 24 years
and 15 years.,
d 17years_.
d 19 years. -
24 years
34 years
8 to 44 years__.
5 to 54 years
S to 64 years--.
S to 74 years. --
1 Figures for 1920 and 1930 represent gHinful workers.
POPULAHON
Male Female
30,932
19, 070
12, 9U
6.767
48,30S
26,806
3.351
4.057
3. 973
4.359
11,214
17.258
22,315
12,100
3,652
54.682
27.231
2,270
4.316
14.729
22,190
Male Female
17.744
10,499
3,352
2,704
9.916
16, 561
POPULATION
Male Female
DISTBIBUTIOK (
100.0
100.0
?1
so
18.4
30.8
0.4
3.4
&I
M.l
28.2
21.0
13.1
.20.0
11.3
l.B
0.2
0.1
0.7
0.1
3150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION
15
-AGE OF PERB0N8 IN THE LABOR FORCE. BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR
HONOLULU CITY: lft40
[Pareutt dm tbowa wbaa \»u tbu O.I|
ARU, at, AMD A'*!
THE TERRrrORY
TrtaL 14 Aid »rw .
l4»Dd lA yran
le ADd 17 y«u%
U AOd 19 jfn
30 to 24 jrran
2B to 34 T9*n
S5to44y«An
46toMreAn
55 to 64 yean
U t« 74 y««n
75'y*Ari« and ov*r
Not reported
MaU, 14 aod OT«r
14 and 16 yts\n
10 And 17 years
6»u>My(«n
W to 74 yf ATS
75 yean and ovrr .
Not reijbrted
VAAala, 14 aad ovar.
14 and IR yuttrt
lA And 17 yean
Maiid 10 yean
ao to 14 year*
as to 34 yean
SS to 44 yoan
«S to M yean
OS to M yean
65 to 74 7ean - - ■
7S yean and over - —
Not raported
HONOLULU riTY
Total, 14 and orar
14 Aod IIV yoan
16 and 17 yean
18 and 10 yean
3010 24 yean
SAtoMyaara
U to 44 yean
46 toMyenn
66 to 64 years
W to 74 yean
75 yean and over
Not reported
Mala, 14 ABd«far ..
14 and 16 yean
Uto44 yeAn . .
45 to 64 yeart
56 to M ycAn .
66 to 74 yeAn
76 yeAn and over
Not reported .
TefluU, 14 a
14 and 15 yean
16aod 17 jrean
18 and IV yean
3n to 24 yean. ..
36 to 34 yean
tfi to 44 yean. . . .
46 to 61 years ...
85 to 64 yean
65 to 74 yeara
75 yean and over.
Not rtpOftAd
11,306
7.0M
4.004
2.378
4,506
n.2i9
14,367
1,K40
6.98K
6,672
3.033
2,263
1,606
Total ''JJ'*' HawbI- ^^
ff"-!- ^S^' Chin-- rUlplBO ^SS ^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3151
16
HAWAII
Ta»l» la.— class of worker or RMPLOYED PERSONB (except on public emergency WORK), BY RACE
AND BEX, FOR THE -TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1640
Total
Hawal-
laa
Part
Hawal-
laa
Oanoa-
Chl-
nil-
If-
Other
races
nitCBlfT DMTBUimOII
AM*, aum or wouik, urn nz
Total
Ha-
wai-
ian
Part
Ha-
waiian
Ceil-
eaalan
Okl-
fui-
ploo
Japa-
nean
Otkar
mm
TBI TXRBITORY
IN.nt
lit. at
s,nt
tn
_«.m
3.«7a
<73
»
3,171
11,131
10.146
en
173
n
7, Ml
^a»4
363
87
3S
3.140
33
47
t.on
it. 762
a. 300
334
114
48.775
4(.t7<
1.643
101
11
7.647
667
183
63
•3.334
10.«t«
3.738
1.W4
>4>
4«
7,888
~6!m8
1,316
111
21
3,838
348
318
10
8,367
33.113
ao.vso
088
148
40
31.470
"so. IB
810
31
002
•0.OT3
4.314
100.0
100. •
180.0
03.0
1.6
16
0 7
100.0
03.8
4.6
11
0 4
100.0
108. 8
01.1
4.1
0.4
0.3
100.0
108.8
• 1.7
14.6
3.3
0.4
10O.0
188.0
06.3
3 1
0«
0 2
100 0
100. •
186.0
46.862
8.8U
4,62«
337
43,041
4,202
418
Ul
38
Lou
87.7
8.8
3.2
0 3
100.0
00 4
8 0
76.3
12 3
10.7
0.8
100.0
io!4
13
0.6
loao
"mT
8,6
o.»
0.2
100.0
66.0
28.6
3 2
3.2
lOO.O
76.4
18.7
7 6
0 4
100.0
•3.3
•.>
3.7
0 8
two
Ch»1o7«b ud own-Moouit irori[«n . .
Mkl*employ«l <eio, uncrt.)
Wase or m1m7 workan
131, 791
1.H1
an
at. 137
3«.7M
4.m
3.7«
»l
«.>M
M.aso
7,«I3
1.1173
a7
80,»70
43.XIS
t.en
626
113
1B.«I3
19. MS
i.ai<
1,347
12<
3.344
28
3
Ml
33.417
7,608
1,U8
118
1«,»2«
3,810
833
M
23
W4
742
180
77
11
1.060
•6 3
3 4
0 3
0 1
100.0
88.7
8.7
1,7
0.8
106.0
81.3
18.8
1.7
0.3
100 0
83 8
8.7
7.7
a7
100.6
83.8
13 6
2.6
100.0
82.7
18.8
1.3
0.3
100.0
7.8
St
0.7
07 1
3 6
0.2
0. 1
100 0
60 0
38.4
11.8
2.1
160.0
«4.3
8.4
0 2
0 1
100.0
78.1
16.7
3 8
0.3
100 0
^OfT
IS 8
16.1
0.8
100.0
78.7
18.8
6.3
«.S
100.0
77.8
18.0
SO
0 2
100.0
74,7
13.3
8.3
ClHiatwakiriiainiiorud.
ramale onployMl («ic. «■>«(.)
0.6
Kn.8
Ww« or Balary workMi
Bmploy«n and owii-iieoouDt workon . .
UdiiaM funOy worken
CiMi or worts Dot nportwl
HONOLCLU CITY
IWSI Mpl^rX (aU. ODHCf )
«S4
373
31
SI
1,748
i.m
«7
J
3»7
171
?«
14
3.3M
13, 148
2,880
3.121
113
34.303
87. 8
8 4
2.8
11
100.0
77.0
Its
a.0
i.e
M8.0
Waffo at watoty workora
Kinp4oT«n and owD-acoouot worken
8.706
273
38
47
4.204
31.111
1,617
m
64
17. Me
6, Ml
1.124
211
31
6.028
3.20O
183
8
4
3.261
18.648
4.041
1.830
77
11.027
1.762
248
71
11
1.847
1.336
174
31
6
143
426
71
40
8
88.8
11 0
2.0
0.3
100.(1
04 4
8.0
0.8
0.2
100. 0
07.3
2.6
0 1
100 0
84.6
12 0
1.7
0 7
04 0
4 1
0 6
0.8
100.0
01.0
4.2
0 4
0 4
100.0
"«1.8
1.3
i.7
02 2
7 1
0 4
0.3
100 0
03.2
6.1
0.1
0 2
100.0
•ts
II.T
ClMa of worker not reportod
Mkle employod (f ic. omen.)
0.1
lOO.O
i.am
36
403
mT
33
7
3
3,m
m
16
16
1.863
16.738
1.172
20
31
8.376
4.M3
080
7»
16
3,230
3.087
107
3
134
12.30(1
3.023
476
30
8.376
6. 216
1.010
1,063
38
87.2
11.3
1.2
0.3
100 0
oil
0 1
100.0
84.3
11 •
8.7
Empioyen and own-acoount workers
11.3
3 0
Fomale employed (eic. emers.)
100.0
1,711
m
2]
31
4.780
481
78
S3
1.018
174
133
18
113
16
8
82.1
101
7.1
0.7
88 0
0.0
11
0.0
Emplonn and own-account worken
U.I
-DETAILED OCCUPATION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK). BY
SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940
{"N. •. 0." meuu not ekewtMra olavifled)
oocorAnoH
Tnt»MiovH ftod MmlpnlM^n*! work«rt
Prodwetooal workers _ .
Aathor*. edlton, and r«porUn .
Aolhon
■dltorn aod reporters _ _ . .
Obemltta. uuyera, and metallurs<tls
OkntynMn
Colleve pTMldeoLi. proressora, nid Initructors. _
Dentists
rivll fMlDoers
MsrhanlcKl «DKlnMrB. _ ._
Othor technical enfclriMrs
OtMinloalcnfiUiMn ..-
llMtilcalaitfliiMrt-
ladoiMftl «iiciiMWB
Lvrnn and JudgM
Moprimt wo moito tetchwi
PbyiUftas mm) luravoDS
TimIiiii (o. a. c.) nnrludlnR county ueoti) - -
G«aiiK7 •f«aU ftnd rarm demonstrators - -
Otb« pnMewonB) workon _ _
Actors wid actreaaw -
Atobttfctii
Artl*ttuid Aft tMctiare -
Llbr»iiMu __
O««*0pt*»i. __
PtuniiArist^
BoeUland wdlfftre work«p»_
Trained nursM and atudeot nuTMi
VvtirluarlftQa -
Protoadoaal workm (d e. o.)
THK TIKRITORY
M«l« F«malc| Male
18, MS
s.nv
3.001;
OOCUTAnOH
8«TntprofM5loniil worken
Drtlfnierx and draftAin«n
DflslRneri 1
[>ritftim«n
Other sAm'profca^lonul workers..
Athletw
Dancers, danclcv teachers, find chorus (rlrls
Funeral direvtom and embalmcrti
Healers and niedlcnl nervlce workers (n, e. c.)
Optometrists
Pnototrraphers
Radio and wireless operators
Rrllrlous workerH
Showmco
Sportfl Instructors aod ofllrinlfl
Technicians and osslntauts, laboratory
Tflohnlclans. except laboratory ,
Renilproresslonal workers (n, e. c.)
Farmeraaad hrm maBAcere
Ffirmera (owners and tenaotn). .'
Farm managers. . .
Proprietora, managera, and offldala, esoept
turn..
Postmasters and mlscellaQeoua ftovernmeot
ufflclalN
InnrtectorH. irnitod States
Inspectffn, TttnltCirUJ
Inapeetora. dtjf
InilMotoni, oooDty and loctl..
Male Female
8. Ml
1,818
3.000
126
m
38
•2
16
■OKOtm-D OTT
Male Female
1.8U
I.IM
l.OOS
81
•1
1
»
m
I
3152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION
17
-DETAILED OCCUPATION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK) BY
SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940~Continued
OCCUPATION
Male Femali
Male Female
THS TBBRITOBY HONOLDLD OTT
Mnle Femali
fcjm— CoDttbued .
Postmasters and misc«Uaoeous goveinmeDt
offlcUls— Continued.
Officials. United States-
Officials, Territorial
Officials, city. -
Officials, county and locak-. -
Postmasters .-- -.- -
Other spectfled manaiiers and officials - -
Buyers and department beads, store
Conductors, railroad
Country buyers and shippers ot livestock and
other (arm products
Credit men_ _
Floormen and floor managers, store
Maaacers sod superintendents, buildine
Officer?!, pilots, pursers, and engineers, ship
Officlflls, lodge, society, union, etc
PurchaslnR agonts and buyers (n. e. c)
Proprietors, managers, and officials (n. e. c), by
industry
Sugar indaitry
Construction.
Manufacturing Tfexc. sugar)
Food and kindred products (ozc. sugar)
Bakery products
Beverage industries.
Canning and preserving iruits. vegetables,
and seafood
MLsoeUaneou.<i food products (exc. sugar)...
Miscellaneous manuiacturing industries
Lumber, (urniture, and lumber products...
Printing, publishing, and allied industries..
Chemicals and allied products
Other manufacturing industries
Transportation. communJcation, and other
public utilities ^
Railroads (incl. railroad repair shops)
Street railways and bus lines
Taxicab service .■
Trucking service
Water transportation. __
Miscellaneous transportation
Communication
XJtilitles _
Wbokeale and retail trade _
Wholesale trade _
Food and dairy products stores, and miUc re-
tailing.._
General merchandise and variety stores
Apparel and accessories stores.
Motor vehicleis and accessories retailing, and
filling stations
Motor vehicles and accessories retailing,..
Filling stations
Eat&iE and drinking places
Miscellaneous retail trade
Furniture, home furnishings, and cquip-
Drugstores
Hardware, farm implement, and building
material retailing
Liquor stores
Retail florists
Jewelry stores
Other retail trade
Finance, insurance, and real estate
Banking and other finance
Insurance and real estate
Insurance
Real estate.
Business and repair services
Automobile storage, rental, and repair services.
Business and miscellaneous repair services
Business services
Miscellaneous repair servloea and band
Personal services.
Hotels and lodging places —
Laundering, cleaning, and dyeing services
Miscellaneous personal services
Amusement, recreation, and related services
Theaters and motion pictures
Miscellaneous amusement and recreation
Miscellaneous Industries and services
Agriculture (exc. sugar)
Fishery
Mining
Proreftsional and related serTloes
Industry not reported
Most Inspectors In manufacturing industries are classified as operatives.
Clerical, sales, and kicdred worken..
Clerical and kindred workers
Bookkeepers, accountants, cashiers, and ticket
agents
Bookkeepers, accountants, and cashiers
Ticket, station, and express agents
Messengers, errand, and office boys and girb..
Telegraph messengers
Sliipplng and receiving clerks
Stenographer^, typists, and secretaries
Telegraph operators . .
Telephone operators
Clerical and kindred workers (n. i
3 and saleswomen..
? agents and brokers...
Other sales agents and brokers..
Real estate agents and brokers. . .
Salesmeq, finance, brokerage, and commission
Traveling salesmen and sales agents
"Clerks" in stores
Demonstrators.
Salesmen and saleswomen (n
Craftsmea, (breman, and kindred workers.
Blacksmiths, forgemen, and hammermen.
Carpenters ,
Compositors and typesetters
Cranemen. hoistmen, and construction machin-
ery operators
Electricians .
Foremen (n e. c), by industry
Sugar industry
Construction.--
Manufacturing (exc. sugar). ,
Canning and preserving fruits, vegetables,
and sea food
Miscellaneous food products (exc. sugar)
Tin cans, tinware, and miscellaneous iron and
steel industries
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries
Transportation, communication, and other
public utilities
Railroads (incl. railroad repair shops)
Water transpjrtstlon
Miscellaneous transportation
Communication -
Utilities
MisoellaAous Industries and services
Agriculture (exc. sugar), forestry, and fishery
Mining
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Business and repair services ,
Personal services...
Ajnusement, recreation, and related services.
Professional and related services
Government
Industry not reported
Inspectois (n. e. c), by Industry
Construction
Transportation, communication, and other
public utmties..-.
Miscellaneous industries and services > ,
Locomotive engineers
Machinists, millwrlgbts, and tool makers
Machinists
Millwrights -
Tool makers, and die makers and setters
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3153
18
HAWAII
Table 18.— DETAILED OCCUPATION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK), BY
SEX. FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940— Continued
BONO...„aTT
OCCUPATION
BONOLULO CTTT
Male Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
CrftftimeB. for«m«D. ksd kindred
worker!— Continued.
633
<>13
30
932
1.402
III
43
1.3(8
1.183
1.180
3
736
3116
290
1.032
118
34
42
43
a
1
79
wa
38
13
77
32
12
86
48
30
6
66
69
109
27
.14,428
1
i
2
2
2
2
2
1
162
27
14
1
i'
2"
3"
6'
4.699
333
319
14
274
099
93
20
886
777
774
3
479
136
144
704
46
22
34
38
8
1
«0
26
13
73
31
10
82
37
29
3
40
46
86
26
7.0S3
1
2
2
2
2
2
67
23
12
i
i
3
9
S,010
OperatiTeiaDd kindred worker* — Contlnoed
Other Bpeclfled operatives and kindred work-
era— Continued.
34
91
4,912
1,H7
266
1,828
1,228
42
88
966
28
32
S2
248
352
8
9
66
29
46
26
22
75
81
273
25
31
32
68
12
60
23
22
261
47
63
32
119
189
124
65
319
1
120
149
43
240
60
2
106
23
18
22
19
3,002
10
6
2,739
66
1
2,163
1,778
48
19
1,638
11
1
63
6
369
148
97
15
43
11
1
23
28
20
7"
2
10
1
31
24
119
47
11
1
10
12
3
7
266
16
■"" 187'
33
11
15
4
0,518
31
20
2,546
160
1.439
966
38
764
24
26
5r
222
261
9
49
38
9
19
69
63
222
9
31
31
57
0
49
20
212
46
34
25
107
116
77
39
259
1
114
124
20
133
2
69
16
13
14
14
1.090
Operatives and kindred workers (n, e. cj, by
tnduBtry _ _
1.948
MechBnJcs and repairmen, railroad and car shop.
1 649
Painters (construction and maintenance) and
Food and k Indred products (exc- sugar)
1.349
Carming and preserving truJts, vegetables.
Miscellaneous food products (exc. sugar).. .
27
Miscellaneous manufarturing Industries
Apparel and other fabricated textiles
Lumber, furniture, and lumber products___
Printing, publishing, and allied industries^
Iron and steel and not specified metal in-
Pattern and model makere, except paper
Transport ation. communication, and other
Plasterers __ _
Railroads find- railroad repair shops)
Food and dairy products stores, and milk
12
325
61
24
41
17
39
20
124
9
623
273
260
13
4.263
1.236
457
328
307
190
287
216
366
•760
9
18
66
102
20
2
2
164
96
36
96
102
i
3
98
26
1
i
20
8
3
763
1
3
997
i
962"
6
a
2
i
204
27
18
17
12
22
16
86
7
303
25
21
4
1.760
711
166
181
209
UO
95
^A
405
7
7
23
3
35
11
14
1
2
3
1
m"
47
49
i
3
45
9
1
i
1
416
2
1
676
f
539
6
W
Apparel and accessories stores, except shoes...
Automobile storage, rental, and repair
Building and hand trade apprentices (n. e. c.)..
Business and miscellaneous repair services...-
6
Attendants, filling station, parking lot, garage,
Federal Qovemment (n. e. c.)
Territorial and local government (n. e. c.)
7
Laundering, cleaning, and dyeln? services....
Hotels and miscellaneous personal services ...
Amusement, recreation, and related serv-
Firemen, except locomotive and fire department..
I-aundry operatives and laundresses, except p'ri-
9.446
30
32
1,940
37,869
1,186
978
4,356
14
12
17
1.061
6.441
2.686
Firemen, fire department
183
916
893
23
637
405
104
3
26
26,233
4,815
321
352
1,354
13
1.333
8
8"
8
6
1
3,762
124
611
607
4
223
190
24
3
«
4,6^
!.117
Cbainmen, rodmen. and axmen. surveying
Watchmen (crossing) and bridge tenders
Policemen and detectives, except government..
Soldiers, sailors, marines, and coastguards*
Service workera, except domestic and pro-
Attendants, hospital and other institution.
218
eoe
213
10
194
162
17?
758
749
6
46
30 .......
1
69
Painters, except construction and matntenaoce-
3154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION
19
Tabu 13.— detailed OCCUPATION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK)
BY SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940— Continued
OCCOTAtlOM
IM0T*— Continued.
Cooks, ezoapt private hmlly
BiTTMits. «ioept privtt« hmUy
Waltcnand bartenders
BarteotWa -
WaJten and v&itresses. except private tkoUy. .
Other arrloe workers, except domeetio and pro-
teetlTe
Atteodaots, professional and personal service
(n.ec.).. -
Attendants, refreatloD and amusement
Boer4lDf houee and lodgloKboiise keepers
Bootblacks -
Elevator operators _
Bouwkeepera. stewards, and hostesses, exoept
private family . - - - -
Practical oursee and mid wives
Usbers, amusement place or assembly
Farm laboren and (oremen _.
Farm foremen, sugar Industry
Farm (oremen. except sugar industry
Farm laborers (wage workers), sugar Industry . .
Farm laborers (wage workers), except sugar in-
dustry --
Pum laborers (unpait^ family workers), socar
Industry - - . - -
Fann laborers (unpaid family workers), exoept
sugar Industry
Laborers, except farm and mine
Flshenrenand oystermen
Gardeners, except farm, and groundkeepers
Loi^sboremen and stevedores
Other specified laborers
Qar^e laborers and car washers and greasers..
Lumbermen, raftsmen, and woodchoppers
Teamsters
Laborers {n. e, c), by Industry...
Sugar industry.- -
A^ctilture (exc. sugar), forestry, and fishery..
Agriculture (exc. sugar)
Fcwestry, except Joking-
Fishery
Construction -
Manufacturing (exc. sugar)
Food and kindred products (exc. sugar)
Beverage industnes
Canning and preserving fruits, vegetables,
and seafood
Dairy products
Miscellaneous food products (exc. sugar) . . .
Ship and boat building and repairing
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries
Lumber, furniture, and lumber products..
Paper and allied products
=oKot.,.„cm
Mile
Female
Male
Femtla
Ul
311
564
ei3
421
436
195
987
1,»6
748
946
IM
27
116
21
«a
1,268
632
926
tsi
OW
357
434
21
74
46
5
It
48
34
a
25
>
16
41
39
«4
a
63
6
87
236
43
leg
2
298
1
168
82
82
54
62
U,096
8,897
710
448
1.315
tl5
2
12
21
6
25,750
1,927
26
7,424
287
508
27
38
1,052
35
1.634
236
416
M,<55
1,934
9.778
670
1,147
14
448
7
495
22
238
1,280
765
les
62
46
1
34
1
101
3
10
I
19
8
11,168
1,194
6,270
665
4411
58
14
212
16
52
8
163
9
27
3
18
7
31
7
18
5
3,195
14
1,749
4
1,661
635
1,070
283
1,119
504
664
256
111
14
64
7
840
438
627
236
55
8
10
3
113
44
63
2li
234
199
318
31
207
27
60
1
,38
49
*
7
4
lAbareri, exoept ktra and mine — Con.
Lat>orers (n. e. c), by Industry — Continued.
Miscellaneous maDutacturlog
industries — Continued.
Paints and miscellaneous chemical Indaa-
Iries
Stone, clay, and ftlaaa prodocts
Iron and steel and not spedfled metal in-
dustries
Other manufacturing Industries
Transportation, commanlcation, and other
pubUo utUlties
Transportation _
Air transportation. .
Railroad (incl. railroad repair shops)
Trucking service
Warehousing and storage
Water transportation
Mlsoellaneoas transportation
Ccftmunicatlon _._
millUes -
Electric light and power
Gasworks and steam plants
Water and sanitary services
Wholesale end retail trade
Wholesale trade
Food and dairy products stores, and milk
retailing _._
Hardware, farm implement, and building
material retailing
Miscellaneous retail trade
General merchandise and variety stores
Furniture, home furnishings, and equlp-
FUling sUtlons \'.S..\....
Eating and drinking places
Other retail trade ^:..
Government ,
Postal service
National defense
Federal Government (n. e, c.)
Territorial and local government (n. e. c.)
Miscellaneous industries and services
Finance, insurance, and real estate
Automobile storage, rental, and repair serv-
Bnslness and miscellaneous repair services
Laundering, cleaning, and dyeing services
Hotels and mlseellaneons personal services-. .
Amusement, recreAtloq, and related services..
Educational services _ _ _
Medical and other health services.-
Legal, engineering, and miscellaneous profes-
sional services. .
Charitable, religious, and membership
organ itations
Industry not reported
OccnpatioD not reported
TBI rmsiTORj
Female Male
HONOLriC CITT
Table 14.— MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT THOSE ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY
WORK), BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940
Total
hawai'
Ian
Part
Hawai-
ian
Cauca-
sian
Chinese
Filipino
Japa-
nese
Other
P.RC.H,mSTR,RUT,01.
AREA, MAIOB OCCUPATION GROUP,
ANDSEI
Total
Ha-
wai-
ian
Part
Ha-
wai-
ian
Cau-
casian
Chi-
Fill-
piDO
Japa-
nese
Other
races
THE TERRITORY
180,786
1.619
11, 181
56.418
19.888
99,132
90,973
4,914
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
9.492
1.411
3.564
11.522
18.711
15.991
19.081
8.520
36.460
37.232
2.760
15.489
573
149
21
118
142
177
447
943
117
419
691
33
1.369
24
971
161
136
639
1,499
1,411
3.261
400
1,101
803
. 74
1,723
62
4.714
529
306
4.739
6.823
3.999
967
147
140
1,346
3,094
123
67
189
290
583
767
2,614
467
1,696
22,101
n
3.306
63
2.396
463
2.^
4.186
7.272
8.097
7.288
6.342
4.112
10.212
2.413
6,376
343
173
33
78
280
263
422
780
285
416
1,267
34
832
62
6.3
0.8
2.0
6.4
10.3
88
10.6
4.7
20 2
20 6
1.5
16
0.8
3 3
0.6
Z6
3.1
3.9
9.8
20 8
i6
9.2
13.0
0.7
39.9
0.5
8.7
1.4
1.2
4.8
13.5
12.7
20 2
3.6
9.9
7. J
0.7
16.6
0.6
8!4
0.9
0.5
8.4
10.3
7.1
6,7
1.3
49.0
3.3
0.1
3.8
a3
9.0
L3
12.6
28.9
7.9
13.2
2.2
11.2
3.7
0 4
8.0
0.1
0.4.
0.2
0.6
0.9
1.8
2.4
8.1
1.5
6 0
68.8
0.2
10.0
0.3
3.9
0.7
4.3
6.9
11.9
13.3
12.0
10.4
67
16.7
4.0
&8
0.4
eemiprofessicnal workers -
0.7
Proprietors, managers, and officials, ex-
Clerlcal. sales, and kindred workers..,-..
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers.
5.4
8.6
27.623
1,860
83
2,145
131
898
48
860
9
Farm laborers (wage workers) and farm
Farm laborers (unpaid family workers)..
0.7
Occupation not reported
1.1
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3155
20
HAWAII
Tablb 14.— major occupation GROUP OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT THOSE ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY
WORK), BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940— Continued
AMBA, UAiOB OOCVPATTOM fl
THE TERRITORY— ContlDned
Male
ftoCesalonal wockwi
BtinlpcotMrional worken
VtlUHiB and form momven
FtOfirteton, maoBgen, and offlclalB, ex-
ooptfarm -? .-
Ctancal, sal«0, and kindred workers
Cnttsmeo, foremec. aod kindred workers
Operatives and kirvdred workers.
Domestic service workprs
SflTTlce workers, except dumeatic
Ftnn laborers (wage workers) and Tann
foramen _
Farm laborers (unpMd fomlly workers)...
L^wrer?, except farm aod mice
OoeapeClon not reported
Female
ProlWBlonal worken
SamlprofesBlonal workers
FarmeraaQd farm manacera
Proprletora, roaoagers, and officials, ex-
oebt farm.-
Clerical, sales, and kiodred workers
Craftsmoo. foremen, and kindred workers
Operatives and kindred workers
Domestic service workers
Sarvloe workers, except domestic. -
Farm laborers (wage workers) and farm
foremen
Farm laborers (unpaid family workers)..
Laborers, except farm and mine
Occupation not reported
HONOLULU CITY
Total
Professional workers.
8emiprofes^ional workers
Fanners and farm managers
Proprietors, managers, and officials, ex-
cept farm
Clerical, sales, and kindred worbexs
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers.
Operat Ives and kindred workers
Domeatic service workers
Service workers, except domestic
Farm laborers (wage workers) aod fann
foremen
Form laborer? (unpaid family workers) . .
Laborers, except farm and mine
Occapatlon not reported.
Male
Professional workers
Semiprofesslonal
Farmers and farm managers
Proprletont, managers, and officials, ex-
cept farm
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers.
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers
Operatives and kindred workers
Domestic service workers
Service workers, except domestic
Farm laborers (wage workers) and farm
foremen
Farm laborers (unpaid family workers)..
Laborers, except farm and mine
Occapatlon not reported..
Profesaionai workem
8emiprofoasion.ll workers
Farmers and farm managers
Proprietors, managers, and officials, ex>
cept farm.
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred work-
ers
Operatives and kindred workers
Domestic service workers
Service workers, except domestic
Farm laborers (wage workers) and farm
foremen
Farm laborers (unpaid family workera)—
LAboreiv, except farm and mine
Occapatlon not reported
60.270
2.461
0,773
120
-521
ia,S33
409
3,005
234
MO
34
i
I.IOl
4.272
11
43
273
3,010
3.445
2,286
16
178
40
69
33
416
23.334
3,060
79716 0—46 — pt. 18-
-20
3156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE fOPULATTON
21
Tablb 16.— detailed INDUSTRY OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT ON PUBLIC ENiERGENCY WORK), BY
SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940
T„.«»»,ro»v
HoKouaumr
.Kn,.S7».
TH.T.a.,ro.r
HONOLDi-ucrrr
Male
Female
Mule
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
MS, atg
S8. 1S7
50,270
18,993
Mannlactiirini (ezc. lagar)— Continued
141
40
101
7
11
83
1.159
10
24
1. 114
11
162
38
25
65
34
9,028
14
7
7
2
5
18
43
2
8
8
24
487
117
37
80
6
11
63
1.055
9
19
1.018
9
126
28
23
66
19
6,093
3a,3a9
9,491
9.586
!45
2.029
62
631
ElectrtSl machYnerv and ' m t
r
AcnciUtQre(exc.ingftr).for««r7. A flihery.
Office an^ store machines, e<]uip., & suppllee.
Agriculture (exc. sugar) . . _ _ _ _ _ _
13.110
1.216
57
1.1(11
UD
54
195
5
178
2
10
10, ess
8.969
2,493
33
33
t
1,574
455
16
439
166
612
19
i9
t
17
Aircrall and parts __ _
Automobiles and automobile equipment
U
Railroad and misc. transportation equipment. .
Crude petroleum and DBtural gas productioD
3
44
2
Not specifled metal industries
3
1
i'
1
94
S,474
2.704
133
57
2.512
2,358
18
37
2
97
■"iM
5
164
1
14
62
1
76
135
127
8
32
1
5
19
7
10
5
4
260
31
31"
si
2
2
14'
13
1
i"
i
44
28
16
3
2'
1
121
2
107
2
10
6,700
6,876
3
1
77
9.989
SdentiQc and photopiapbic equipment & sup-
Mlscelianecus manufacturing industries
Traiupart., commnn., A other public uHl-
itioa ,
806
Transportation
5,741
267
898
875
23
499
747
526
221
2,120
1.213
16
762
62
383
547
446
363
83
101
1.737
1,071
235
431
14,784
157
6
3
10
32
15
17
48
52
26
10
243
226
224
2
17
87
61
10
16
7,092
3,513
152
338
317
21
315
493
333
160
1,546
669
8
461
159
351
296
249
47
55
1.229
739
213
277
9.694
Air transportation..
4.805
4S3
414
58
3. 850
3.301
39
209
32
269
24
6
2
4
12
2
1
3,409
356
279
45
2,729
2,432
24
119
22
132
11
2
2
4
2
1.906
99
37
3
1.768
1,690
42
i2
3
1
2
6
1
Railroads and railway express
Railroads (including railroad repair sfaops) . . .
Railway express service..
6
Street railways and bus lines
Trucking service and warehousing
24
CanniDg and preserv'g fruits, veg., & sea food
Warehousing and storage
Water transportation
Miscellaneous food industries (exc. sugarT
17
Services incidental to transportation
6
119
106
Telephone and telegraph (wire and radio)
1
i'
32
22
10
215
7
98
70
40
33
6
7
21
060
146
146
138
40
32
8
15
24
21
3
3
78
4
15
50
47
7
3
2
387
11
376
111
285
27
2
18
7
1
3
108'
104
4
28
1
4
17
6
3
1
104
17
i?
17
2
2
14
13
1
1
i
i
i
39
39
24
15
2
i
13
68
47
8
33
23
10
311
35
60
124
96
21
1.200
248
1
247
8
239
6«
53
16
16
28
22
6
Apparel and other fabricated textile products
Water and sanitary services
Miscellaneous fabricated textile products
Wholeaale and retail trade
4.40J
Wholesale trade--
2,285
14499
3.462
3.175
287
1.365
1.356
9
869
716
153
680
239
720
811
347
1.719
837
257
580
1.689
80
179
110
691
475
1,611
317
6,716
1,489
1,470
29
988
975
13
1,035
1,013
22
156
108
48
67
66
136
1,869
60
43
839
46
180
42
'336
235
toi
220
281
141
140
1.826
7,868
1,927
1.744
183
561
566
5
550
417
143
648
305
343
461
498
281
1,295
622
215
407
1.136
91
72
120
79
642
223
1.229
573
656
386
270
Retail trade -
Food and dairy products stores, & milk retail-
ing
Food stores, except dairy products -
757
Dairy products stores and milk retailing ,.
General merchandise and variety stores
24
Miscellaneous paper and puJp products
Printing, publishing, and allied industries
Limited price variety stores
Apparel and accessories stores-
Apparel and acceasories stores, except shoes. -
666
Furniture, home ftu'nishings, A equipment
Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products
Furniture and bouse furnishings stores
Household appliance and radio stores
63
37
45
Leather and leather products, escept footwear..
Hardware, farm impl., and bidg. material retail-
109
4
17
88
69
13
4
2
496
17
479
152
327
35
2
26
7
Stone, clay, and glass products
50
Hardware and farm implement stores.
Lumber and building material retailing
34
16
563
Other stone and clay products
Cement. & concrete, gypsum, & plaster prod.
Miswilaneous nonmetalllc mineral pr*" 'acts..
Iron and steel and their products
Blast furnaces, steel works, and rolling mills....
Other iron and st«l products
Finance, inanranee. and real estate
4U
765
846
615
331
177
Nonferrous metal primary products
Clocks, watches, jewelry, and silverware '
Miscellaneous nonferrous metal products
Real estate
137
> Includes metal engraving (eicept for printing purposes), plating, and po'lshiog.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3157
22
HAWAII
-DETAILED INDUSTRY OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK), BT
SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940— Continued
IKDUffTRT
THE TXBRITOBT
™.cs™.
TB>TB>.,TO>T
HONOLULU CUT
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
BgiinwM and repftir Mrrioea
1,713
IBS
1.507
lot
Profeuloiul uid rslkted aervloM
4, HI
<,709
S,(M
9.8M
Automobile storage, renul. and repair servioes. ..
Biuloess and repair sorvloas. exc. automobile
1,878
su
38
235
eu2
5,918
2,533
1.253
786
MS
i.oir
45
108
14
70
24
e,e4s
023
584
36
176
373
3,40«
23
80
11
54
21
5,457
1,818
1,478
448
867
99,911
4,198
1,872
166
468
898
994
879
366
433
0.799
i289
1,116
Legal, engineering, and mlso. protesslonal services.
Charitable, religious, & membership orgaolzo-
Miscellaneous repair services and hand trades- -
Oofernmeirt
4 697
617
1.030
1.506
470
1,373
1,009
490
634
too
3,683
374
647
863
873
Hotels and lodtrtog places--
281
28,882
4.748
2,304
2,444
t5S
60
663
353
310
459
160
6,396
3,237
1,983
1.264
471
10
Laundering, cleaning, and dyeing services-
National defense
Amnaemeot, recreatioD, ft related lervlces. .
Federa) government (n. e. o.)
Territorial and local government (n. e. c.)
310
200
442
575
296
256
344
178
t e]sewher« classified.
Table 16.— WAGE OR SALARY INCOME AND RECEIPT OF OTHER INCOME IN 1939 FOR EXPERIENCED PER-
SONS IN THE LABOR FORCE IN 1940, BY CLASS OF WORKER AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR
HONOLULU CITY
{Percent not shown where less than 0.1; median or percent not shown where base Is less than 1001
TOTAL
WnHOUTOTHXatKCOMKlHl^..
w,r
939
Total
Wage or salary
workers
Other
eiperi-
enc»d
persons
In labor
force
Total
Wageo
r salary
kers
Other
experi-
enced
persons
fa labor
force
Total
Wage or salary
workers
ARIA, WAOl OR SALARY INCOMB IN
Private
and non-
gency
govern-
ment
workers
Public
gency
workers
Private
and non-
gency
govem-
workers
Public
gency
workers
Private
and non-
genoy
govern-
ment
workers
Public
gency
workers
experi-
enced
persons
hT labor
foroe
THE TERRITORY
lUle -.
161,040
134,061
2,439
14,659
78,139
73,169
8.108
9, 885
78,901
10,885
985
11,991
16.378
3.299
6.526
11.667
14.461
15.701
14,104
22,246
13,201
15,690
7,445
6,236
2,136
943
1,338
1,671
S620
38,230
2,861
2,991
6,129
11,324
13,906
16.244
13.720
21,929
13.001
15. 521
7.352
.6,182
2,106
930
1,281
676
1627
27.58«
166
145
236
230
467
384
321
204
117
72
42
20
6
2
1
31
»413
83
12,351
163
162
113
ge
73
63
112
83
51
33
25
11
56
1.065
»447
e.<13
3,926
1.74!
3.118
3.925
6.569
8.566
6.852
11.783
8.246
11.028
6,334
4.267
480
667
(702
!6,7M
1,845
1,532
2,806
3,686
6,124
8,202
6.518
11.528
8.093
10.913
5.276
4.231
1.187
446
462
322
»716
81,788
124
126
208
195
401
322
300
192
100
65
34
11
3
1
1
26
J416
76
1,867
83
105
44
44
41
36
66
62
48
24
15
11
4
26
310
$466
8,(88
11.452
1.558
2.408
7.742
7.892
7.136
7.252
10,463
4.956
4.664
2.111
1.978
936
492
849
1,014
•648
10.434
1,016
1,459
2.324
7.638
7.782
7.042
7.204
10,403
4,908
4.608
2.076
1.951
918
484
819
253
tS49
6,749
42
19
27
36
66
62
21
12
17
7
8
9
3
1
6
$402
7
Median wage or salary Income for persons
1.991
2.016
3.203
2,857
3,527
2,977
1,668
2,313
12
19
9
1
2
3
6
6
7,474
138
110
62
29
23
17
32
4.774
1,831
2; 764
2,363
2,801
2,339
1,366
1,909
1.467
1.699
2.667
2.314
2.779
2,318
1.337
1.886
11
18
9
3.306
114
78
39
20
18
12
17
4.703
343
668
667
767
664
326
442
634
317
636
643
748
669
321
437
1
1
2
3
2
3
3
173
322
910
558
0O3
M
1
2
3
6
6
$600 to $799
2,351
IS
^ Includes statistics for persons for whom the receipt or nonrecelpt of other i
9 in 1939 was not reported
3158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION
28
Ta»l» 1«.— wage or salary income and receipt of other income in 1939 FOR EXPERIENCED PBR-
80N8 IN THE LABOR FORCE IN 1940, BY CLASS OF .WORKER AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR
HONOLULU CITY— Continued
(Percent Dot sbown where less than 0.1; iDediBii or porceot oot Bhowo wbere bue Is less than 100]
TO,..
w,r,00T„r«a
«co«n.
..K.
wiTB vrun Hcom nt
SM
ToUI
Wace or salary
workers
Other
eiperi-
enced
persona
In labor
foroB
Total
Wa«e or salary
workers
Other
esperl-
meed
persons
in labor
force
Total
Wa«e or salary
workers
ABBA. WAOB OB SAUBT IMCOMB Of
lHB,Ain> BX
Private
aadrion.
emer-
fBDoy
gonm-
imnt
workers
Public
genoy
workers
Private
and non-
rency
govern.
mant
workers
Public
eency
workers
Private
andnon-
enwr-
frency
nxnt
workers
Pnbllo
lenoy
workers
enoed
ffffil
km
THE TERRITORY— Continued
V*BAl»-C0DtbllWd.
1,M1
*s
10*
17
U
781
MM
100.0
1,217
1,»S8
3,716
863
102
17
10
102
•437
100.0
9
16
18
14
7
3
1,000
1,686
1179
662
83
4
2
294
3427
100.0
984
1.666
1186
649
62
6
3430
loao
6
8
6
10
13
8
3
1
341
399
666
317
61
13
487
•460
100.0
231
393
•50
313
SO
13
9
97
•463
100.0
3
1
3
877
3184
100.0
i
100.0
1
288
•168
lOO.O
»'
2
1
Medton wage or lalBry InoonM tor pentmi
MOiO
100.0
100.0
10.2
2.3
3 7
7.7
0.6
10 «
0.3
14.7
8.7
10.4
4.0
4.1
1.4
o.e
0.9
1.1
U0.0
2.1
i2
3 8
8.4
10.4
11.4
10.2
16.4
0.7
11.6
8.5
4.6
1.6
0.7
1.0
0.4
tn.0
84.9
i!i
0 8
0.7
0.6
0.4
0.8
0.6
0.7
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.4
7,3
100.0
6 0
2.2
40
60
8 4
11.0
8 8
16.1
10.6
14.1
6.8
6 4
18
0.6
0.6
0.8
100.0
2.6
2.1
3.8
6.0
8.4
11.2
8 9
18.8
11.1
14.9
7.2
8.8
1.6
0.6
0.6
0.4
100.0
6.9
6.0
9.9
9 3
19.0
16.3
14.2
9.1
4.7
3.1
1.6
0.6
0.1
68.3
29
3.7
1.8
1.5
1.4
1.3
13
1.8
1.7
0.8
0.5
0.4
0.1
0.9
10.8
100.0
16.7
11
3.3
10.6
10.8
0.8
9.9
14.4
6.8
6.4
19
17
1.3
0.7
1.2
100.0
1.7
14
3.8
116
lis
11.6
11.8
17.1
8.1
7.6
3.4
3.3
1.6
a8
1.3
0.4
100.0
119
6.8
8.3
10 8
17 2
19.1
6.6
3.7
6.3
12
16
18
0.9
0.3
K.9
6
1
IS
16
13
0
6
8
8
2
0.J
4.8
3.0
1.7
0.8
0.2
1.3
1.2
1.8
K.2
•.0
0.3
8.0
a.&
8.2
4.6
».S
2.4
6.1
7.6
3.4
0.3
7.2
7.3
11. «
10.4
12.8
10.8
0.0
8.4
4.4
7.1
0.0
3.1
0.4
0.1
86.8
1.6
1.3
0.6
as
0.3
0.2
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.2
ai
18.8
7-1
10.7
0.1
10.9
9.1
6.3
7.4
3.0
6.2
8.6
2.1
0.2
6.7
7.8
12 2
10.6
12.8
10.6
6.1
8.7
4.8
7.2
9.9
IS
0.2
84.2
2.9
10
1.0
0.5
0.6
0.3
0.4
0.3
11.3
0.2
0.1
45.1
3.8
5.4
6.3
7.3
6.4
3.1
4.2
13
3.8
6.3
3.0
0.6
0.1
0.1
4.7
16,869
9.3
5.5
9.3
9.6
13.0
11.6
5.6
7.4
4.1
6.8
9.6
6.6
0.9
a2
0.2
1.7
11,130
12
U.4M
a4
48, 4a
7.9
t,7U
1.1
3«,S«8
7.3
1,1«
1^1
HONOLULU CITY
■nte. —
i,m
34,319
1.184
U
t.m
7,943
StU)
1,706
^678
2,800
%M3
SlBS
\7«1
t,tn
608
063
1.083
tssi
1,602
869
i,m»
2,636
3.309
1381
1032
6,682
^384
9,061
4.738
*.m
1,443
804
904
481
«071
lOO
79
131
102
168
IM
220
111
72
36
14
8
>
1
1
16
8440
8,641
81
76
41
32
28
33
69
60
68
34
23
16
8
47
636
•676
1,616
666
1,213
1,166
1.486
1,774
1,739
4.661
4.714
7. WO
3,987
3,326
967
3M
417
637
•091
962
644
1,043
1,040
1,305
1,610
1,499
4,506
4,613
7,861
3, OS
3,309
946
361
302
388
31,021
77
70
112
96
169
146
216
108
67
35
13
7
3
1
14
•466
617
41
%
32
19
a
46
34
34
17
10
9
3
34
136
•584
6.807
334
492
1,622
1,023
789
546
I,U)1
692
1,222
799
961
604
349
636
406
•733
660
316
460
1.408
1,004
771
683
1,074
•71
1,190
780
937
406
343
613
as
•723
33
9
9
e
9
3
3
S
1
3
1
1
u
I
unnii with II or num
•aat
> lDolod«6 BtetlvUa fcHT peaoDi for vbom the raoelpt or Donrwetpt of otber liuxmifi Id 1039 was not nported.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3150
24
HAWAII
Tablb 16.— wage or salary INCOME AND RECEIPT OF OTHER INCOME IN 1939 FOR EXPERIENCED PER-
SONS IN THE LABOR FORCE IN 1940, BY CLASS OF WORKER AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR
HONOLULU CITY— Continued
tPeroent not sbowu where Ism than 0.1; medlui
or perMDt not sbown wbere base Is less than 100]
ror^
WTTBOOT OTHBB
INCOMB IN
l.„.
w.r.0T«.mc0M.„..»
Total
WBgeorulary
workeR
Otber
experl-
eooed
persoDfl
b labor
tOTCt
Total
Wage or salary
worken
Otber
experi-
enced
persons
In labor
force
Total
Wig« or salary
wvrkera
Otber
experi-
enced
persons
in labor
force
ABSA, WAOE OB 8AL1RT mCO« W
W». IND BIX
Private
and noD-
tenoy
goTerO'
lD«Dt
workers
Publlo
gency
workers
Prfvate
and non-
gency
govem-
Public
emer-
genoy
workers
Private
and nop-
gMcy
govern-
ment
workers
Public
genoy
workers
HONOLCLD CITY— Continued
F«mal»
U,rM
11. in
6T
9, NO
14,388
11,840
(1
1,388
5,470
8,141
1
8,11!
1.083
i,aao
1,301
1.833
1.771
I.IOS
1.71»
837
i.3ra
1.750
042
71
14
a
S£!
1808
100.0
1,381
1,008
1.811
1,274
1,617
1.763
1,003
i.eiB
016
1,S37
1,744
638
89
14
6
157
(511
100.0
11
13
9
1
2
3
3
6
8
8
4
,857
40
36
IS
18
13
33
13
14
11
4
3
1,922
872
1,391
1,079
1,348
1,406
888
1,405
749
1,131
1,430
409
36
2
3
339
1408
IW.O
866
1.366
ilsso
1,391
876
1.389
738
1,108
1,409
407
35
2
80
8601
100.0
11
12
9
1,056
56
27
23
5
12
9
11
7
11
7
2
1
1317
211
369
223
386
366
320
314
188
338
339
333
35
13
7
313
8553
100.0
405
304
266
217
278
363
316
303
lat
234
335
331
34
13
5
77
•684
ltt.t
1,813
•
13
1
3
2
3
6
6
7
?
8
3
3
394
8367
100.0
1
159
»21l
I0t.t
I
1
335
Median wage or salary Income fbr per-
Pemnt dlitribntloB
ioe.0
MO
13.8
1.9
3.2
6,0
4.7
4.8
4.3
10 8
JOl
17.1
to
8,0
17
1,1
1,8
1,0
IMO
3.3
1.9
a3
6.6
6.1
5.3
4.6
13.3
11.6
19.0
10.4
9.3
3.2
1.3
30
1.1
IM.0
8.3
6.6
10.0
8,6
13,0
12,8
18,3
0,2
6.0
3,0
1,2
0,7
0.2
0.1
0.1
1.3
83.6
0 8
1.1
0.6
0.6
0.4
0 5
1.0
0.7
1.0
0.5
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.7
7,9
lN.t
4.8
IS
8,3
VI
4.9
4,8
12.8
13 9
31 7
10,9
9.1
2.6
1.0
108.0
2.8
1.6
8.0
3,0
3.8
4.7
4.4
13.1
13.4
219
11.6
9.6
28
1.0
LI
itoo
6.0
8.2
10 0
8.6
14.1
lit
19.4
9.6
6 0
3.1
1.1
0.6
0.3
0.1
0.1
1.3
65.8
3.7
6.2
1.8
2,0
1.7
10
4.1
1.1
3.1
1.5
0.9
0.8
0.3
12
112
108.0
33.2
10
19
to
&I
4.7
3.2
6,5
4.1
7.3
4.7
6.6
3.0
15
3.3
10
loot
4.9
18
4.3
13.4
9 0
6.9
4.8
9.6
6.0
10.7
7.0
8.4
4.5
11
4.6
0.8
1«.0
81.1
0.3
t.I
7.1
ltl.t
31,0
5,5
8,4
6,6
&3
»,0
6.8
8.7
4.7
8.0
8.0
3.2
0.4
0.1
7.8
6.3
10.0
7.9
10.0
10.8
6.7
10. S
6.7
8.3
10.8
3.9
0.4
0.1
81.9
1.8
1.1
0 7
0 4
0 5
0.4
0 6
0 4
0:3
0.1
0.1
13.6
6.1
9.7
7.6
9.4
• 8
8.3
9.8
5.3
7.8
9.9
3.9
0.8
6.7
8.J
10.8
8.2
ia4
10.8
8.8
10.8
5.7
8.6
11.0
3.3
0 3
76 3
4.0
1.9
It
0.4
O.t
0.6
t.8
t.l
t 8
0.5
0.1
t.l
40.6
3.9
4.9
4.1
5.2
6.7
4.t
6.7
3.4
4.4
6.3
4.3
0.8
0.2
t.l
6.7
111
6 1
7.6
6.8
8.3
It. 8
8.4
tit
6.4
7.0
10.0
8.9
1.0
0.4
t.l
It
0.8
0.8
01
11.3
6.1
11. t
Z8
1.0
1.7
0.8
'
1 Inctadn statlstlca for iienont for wbom the receipt or nonreoeipt ot other li
I ItSt was not reported .
3160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION
25
Tablb 17.— wage or salary INCOME AND RECEIPT OF OTHER INCOME IN 1939 FOR PERSONS WHO WERE
WAGE OR SALARY WORKERS (EXCEPT PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORKERS) IN 1940, BY MONTHS WORKED
IN 1939 AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY
[Percent
Qot Shown where less than
0,1)
«,».
WITBOUT OTHBR INCOHK IN 1939 1
w„aoTH„n.c<,«n,.».
"'*' "■*''lMrAN*D'*i\ "■'"'*'" ™
Tolal
Less
thane
months
and
not re-
ported
6 to 8
months
9 ton
months
13
months
Total
Less
thane
months
and
not re-
ported
eto8
months
9toll
months
12
months
Total
Less
thane
months
ported
etos
months
9toll
months
12
months
THE TERRITORY
VAlfl
1M.U1
11, CM
9,111
16,378
97,928
73,eo<
7,276
5,944
10,056
10,330
«,98B
•3,788
3,177
e,s»j
«T,gie
2.882
3.040
S. 168
11.330
13.908
)!,. ua
13.720
2I.I)2»
13.001
16. 521
7.352
6,182
2,105
930
1.281
916
$527
ST, 870
2.361
2.715
2,737
1,368
680
339
188
166
95
77
39
35
19
5
10
227
$156
6,075
37
142
1.484
1.963
1.977
1,187
669
825
.160
251
91
34
11
3
6
51
$347
3, DOS
23
152
907
805
4C0
149
88
lie
74
60
26
5
1
85
42
4.'4
1.0S4
2.466
3.3.19
2,320
2.408
1.4-6
1.318
596
467
135
56
89
$531
4.999
370
141
493
6.915
S.786
10,381
in. .M3
18.530
11,040
13. 875
6.626
.5.646
1.940
878
1,209
649
$721
18,908
1.846
1,581
2.844
3.692
6,128
8.201
6.516
11,. 526
8.01)3
10,913
5.276
4.231
1,187
446
. 462
663
$714
«,i:7
1.759
l,37<i
1.788
962
524
263
143
125
65
51
24
IS
6
160
$172
5,225
12
107
617
1,217
1.289
830
528
656
333
205
72
28
6
1
2
41
$.178
8,425
8
168
544
1..W7
1,883
1.229
1,530
1,117
1.042
342
79
22
18
66
$570
5,927
71
261
969
2,806
6,22s
4,616
9,215
6,578
9.615
4.706
3.843
1.090
423
440
396
$854
10,550
l.i)16
1.459
2.324
7,618
7,782
7,042
7.204
10.403
4,908
4.608
2.076
1.051
918
4IM
819
263
$549
6,743
1,339
939
406
1.56
76
41
30
26
15
17
13
5
67
$123
850
25
36
867
746
088
367
169
57
46
19
6
5
2
10
$290
480
77
286
540
958
1.466
1.091
878
3.59
276
122
125
56
22
38
23
$490
1.061
6,»4e
6,980
5.153
5,927
9,315
4,402
4,260
1,920
JWOto J4W
$3,000 to W.999
844
Median waso or salary income for per-
$m
>,au
None
1.9M
2.112
3,249
2.868
3.530
2.979
I.e.™
2,311
1,217
1.958
2.716
862
102
17
10
284
•435
100.0
1.6.56
1.7^>3
1,567
462
176
123
78
73
24
23
8
5
37
249
- 5."^
650
458
2!0
252
221
423
'389
41
8
1
26
$816
lOOO
278
126
526
1214
2,240
1.252
1,873
80S
1,452
1,289
463
60
8
9
163
$646
100.0
1:795
2,' 325
1320
1.337
1.887
984
1.666
2,160
649
52
4
1
187
$427
100,0
1,417
■ 1, 573
1.341
.395
151
63
19
19
5
1
7
IZ'.
765
684
416
131
89
ei
15
1
6
31
203
439
516
360
210
199
195
336
1,134
260
18
2
30
66
404
807
1,6<«
1,72s
994
1,543
709
1,169
1,012
287
33
2
1
76
$552
100.0
.534
317
536
669
• 32!
427
233
393
660
313
50
13
9
07
$163
100.0
134
98
30
63
26
87
260
120
23
6
1
7
$981
'.00.0
220
226
67
25
22
15
17
5
3
27
142
121
74
18
18
27
13
9
10
1
87
$121
100.0
9
$247
100.0
84
$122
100.0
9
$246
100.0
18
$793
100.0
3
$137
100.0
$252
100.0
Medfan wage or salary income for per-
Percent distribution
None
2.1
2 3
3.8
8.4
10.3
II. 3
10.2
18. J^
9.7
11.5
5.5
4.6
l.G
0 7
1.0
0.7
100.0
2U4
24,5
24 7
12.4
6,1
3.1
1.7
1.5
0 9
0 7
0.4
0 3
0 2
■" o.i
2.1
100.0
0 4
1.6
16.3
21.5
21.7
13.0
7.3
9.0
4.3
2.8
1,0
0 4
0.1
' d'i'
0.6
100.0
0 5
0.3
2.8
6,6
15.1
20.4
14.2
14.7
9,0
8,0
3.6
2,9
0 8
0,3
0 3
0 5
100.0
0 4
0 1
0 5
7.1
9.0
10 6
10.8
18.9
11.3
14 2
6,8
6 8
2,0
0,9
1,2
0,6
100,0
2,5
2,1
3.9
5,0
8.3
11 1
8.9
15.7
11,0
14.8
7,2
5.7
1,6
0.6
0,6
0 9
100.0
24,2
18,9
24,7
13.2
7.2
a. 6
ZO
1.7
0.9
0 7
0 3
0,2
0 1
0 2
1,8
10 4
20.5
21.7
14 0
8,9
11.0
6,6
3,4
1 2
0,6
01
0 1
0 3
6 4
18 7
12.2
15,2
10:4
4,7
3.4
0 8
0.2
0.2
0 7
100.0
0 1
0 1
0 5
1,9
6 6
10.4
9 2
18.3
13 1
19,1
9,4
7,0
2,2
0,8
0 9
0,8
100.0
1.7
2.4
3.8
12,6
12.8
11,6
11,8
17.1
8,1
7,6
3,4
3.2
1,5
0 8
1.3
0 4
100.0
16,0
3,5,3
24,8
10 7
4.1
io
1,2
1.1
0.8
0 7
0 4
0,4
0 3
0,1
0 2
1,8
100.0
0 8
27^1
23,6
21.7
11.2
6:3
1.8
o!6
0 2
0 2
li
100.0
1.2
0 2
4.5
8.6
15.2
23,0
17,3
13.9
5,7
1:9
2.0
0 8
0 3
oe
0 4
100.0
$lto$99.--.-
$100to»190__
t200tO$299 .;
«00to$390.--
J400to$4M---
0.1
0.5
12.5
12.6
10.8
2.2
100.0
"0.7
1W.I1
7.2
7.6
11.7
10 3
12.7
10-
5.9
8.3
4.4
7.0
».7
3.1
0.4
01
27,3
29, S
25, S
7,6
2,9
2.0
1,3
1.2
0.4
0 4
0.1
0.1
0,8
5,2
31,2
27.7
16,9
5.1
3.0
4.0
2,5
2.1
0.9
0.2
0 7
0 8
6.0
111
13.0
0,2
4.8
5.1
4 4
8.6
28,0
7.8
0 8
02
2,0
0 9
3,8
7 5
1.S.9
16.2
9.0
13.5
6,6
10 4
9,3
3.3
0,4
0,1
0,1
1.2
6,6
8.1
12,3
10 5
12,6
10 6
6.0
8.6
4.4
7.1
9,8
2.6
0 2
27. r
301
25.7
7.6
2.9
1.9
1.2
1.1
0 4
0,4
0.1
0 3
5.2
, 31.6
28.2
17,2
6,4
2.9
3.7
2.5
2.1
0.6
0 2
0 8
6 2
11.2
13,1
9.2
5,3
6.1
6 0
8-6
28.9
6.6
0 5
0.1
0 3
0.6
3.8
16.1
16,4
9.4
14.6
6.7
11.0
2:7
0.3
9,3
5.5
9,3
9.6
13 0
11,5
6 6
7.4
4.1
6.8
9.e
6.5
0.9
0 2
0.2
1.7
28.1
2.5.9
26 e
2^9
lis
2.0
0 6
0 5
0 4
0 6
29,6
25,2
15 4
3,7
3.7
5.8
2,7
1.9
2.1
0 8
0:9
4.4
10 8
12.7
9.3
2.8
6.0
2,6
82
24 6
12.2
2.2
0.6
0,1
0 7
7.4
$200 to $29(1
7.2
0 2
Not reported »
1.0
1.4
0.3
0.5
6.8
1.6
0 4
0 5
0.7
04.
2.6
< Includes statistics for persons for whom tbe receipt or uonreceipt of other Income in 1939 was not reported.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3161
26
HAWAII
Tablm 17.— wage or salary INCOME AND RECEIPT OF OTHER INCOME IN 1939 FOR PERSONS WHO WERE
WAGE OR SALARY WORKERS (EXCEPT PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORKERS) IN 1940, BY MONTHS WORKED
IN 1939 AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY— Continued
[Percent oot shown where less than 0.1]
KONOIUIU CITY
11.000 1« 11,499 .
II .900 to tl. WO..
t4,000 to t4.999 .
r salary income for t
il.OOO to Sl,499
r salary income for per-
Fercent distribntion
tlto$09
tl00to>199..
i2notat»9..
S300toS399..
S400 to (499. .
tS00to(599..
ia00tot799..
$3,00010(3,999..
$4,000 to $4,999..
> Includes statistics for persons for whom the receipt or nonrcceipt of other h
1.509
2.63.';
2.309
2,381
2,032
6.582
$462
1,787
1.284
1. 128
4.138
than 6
months! 9
and months
months months
1.043
1^306
$1,021
18. 973
$200
8,776
$870
2,136
100.0
30-0
1.2 0.6 0.6
WITH OTHKB I
nontbs 6 tog
and months c
$864
i.jtr
3162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION
27
Tabus 18.— COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION, BY COUNTIES: 1940 AND 1930
..««,
Tb»
Terri-
tory
Hawaii
County
Hono-
lulu
County
Kauai
County
Maul
County
.„s,^
Tb6
Terri-
tory
Hawaii
County
Hono-
lulu
County
Eauai
County
Maul
County
SEX, RACE, AND NATIVITY
«U.S90
73.976
IU,>M
149,042
109, 214
227.612
131.621
95.991
30.644
17. 421
13,223
7,090
31.463
82.516
24.667
19.066
83.387
10,177
100.0
It. SIB
56, 9U
MARITAL STATUS
Male, 16 yeari old and Of or
Single
171, U9
98.128
71.715
6.211
2,609
111,667
36,162
66,669
8,819
2,117
16,644
8,678
61.6
64.916
64.094
98.7
19. 140
17.893
93.5
18.111
12.162
67.1
31.786
6.292
19.8
39.744
1.450
3.6
190, 260
23,869
23,769
14.068
22,252
12,706
12,414
3,611
6,207
454
6.6
7J.141
M,I7I
15.648
12.197
1,455
376
18,6(6
6.126
10.793
1,494
153
3,221
1,368
12, 526
12.408
99 1
3,780
3.610
92.9
3.401
2.145
63.1
4.383
988
22.6
4,757
185
3.9
92,169
111,115
61489
43,852
3,097
1,777
72,718
22.899
42.288
6.769
1,782
9.373
5.364
67.2
36.790
36.262
98.6
10.750
10. 121
94.1
10,646
7.406
70,2
21.813
4.089
18.7
28.842
1.019
3.6
69,741
10,194
9.040
7.804
14.689
9,636
9.768
2,790
M05
277
80
47, «a
It, Bit
8.642
6,385
706
185
6,614
345.135
178,195
370, 717
21<.ftl5
1S6.072
62.613
30.490
22.123
H. 375
49.935
103.791
28.774
52.(69
157. 905
15.961
IM.O
42,369
31,007
62,761
36,003
26.758
10.515
6.266
4,249
3,451
7.901
9.821
1.832
12,846
34,865
2,.W1
100.0
21.626
14,192
31.472
19.017
12.465
4.346
2 04)9
1,737
888
2.666
4.465
862
10. 140
15. 470
1.318
100.0
32,198
23,782
48.372
28.004
20.868
7.108
4. 194
2,914
2,946
7,915
6.989
1,513
10,609
24.183
1.926
100.0
11,449
9^381
Female, 15 yean old and of or
2,793
5,098
580
53
1,454
722
49.7
6.725
5.667
99.0
1.732
1.607
92.8
1,568
985
62 8
2,116
604
23.8
2,297
97
4.2
11,983
3,444
3.881
1.637
1.869
567
541
IK
311
38
3.8
6, in
8,900
■jrue:
SCHOOL ATTENDANCE
2.878
3.4
11.8
24.5
6.8
12.4
37.3
9ea,su
4.7
10.8
13.4
2.5
17.5
47.6
73,195
2.7
12.2
32.0
9.6
7.4
32.3
101.993
2.6
7.4
12.5
24
28.3
43.2
35,049
5.3
14.1
12.8
2.7
18 8
43.2
51.140
n&nMliAn
22,636
28.224
80.373
27.179
63.052
139.631
7.341
100. <
4,864
5,071
10,358
2,098
15,956
33,748
1,230
100.0
12,103
16,359
67.702
22,068
20,390
69.586
4,716
100 0
1,363
1,758
4,770
1.201
12.662
13,905
383
100.0
4.306
6.036
7,643
1.812
14,144
22,399
912
100.0
YEARS OF SCHOOL
COMPLETED
Male, 36 yean old and o>er
lt,0TT
5,669
6.245
3.429
3.139
1.526
1.261
340
964
86
4.5
11, Ul
6.1
7.7
21.8
7.4
17.1
n.»
1U,0U
114. «01
>,4S3
272
a»,441
iT,m
6.6
6.0
U. 1
3.9
11.8
««.0
M.TH
18,616
4X
M
6,7S7
1».TM
6.0
81
38.4
10 9
10.0
tt.9
U,70>
3.8
4.9
13.3
1.3
36.0
11.7
11,615
7.7
9.0
13.4
3.2
35.3
at!
11, OU
11,883
M3
14
9,937
2.218
OVER
Median sobool yean eompletod
faaala,85y«araoldaBdafef
71, at
l«J7
XM
14,287
tT,MI
10. 9U
ir
»
^440
(.tM
11,774
11,888
10,900
13,825
6,837
9.105
4.173
3.096
149
7.3
1010
2,601
2,436
1.999
8D3
807
466
412
18
5.9
7,B33
6.283
6.118
8.966
6,296
7.468
3.167
9,060
103
7.9
1.079
1,301
789
1,108
264
316
238
169
9
A8
VocHsB bora- No i»|Mn ud not r»>
e$.m
i.gn
i»
o,im
1«2
i
tt,m
l.iW
loa
11, w
4.128
91
S
1.639
7,936
124
7
3.7»7
TmHga born— No vipin nnd not It-
Median sobool yean completed
0.0
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3163
28
HAWAII
Ta>u 19.— AOE, race, and SEX, BY COUNTIES: 1940 AND 1980
Oauatyudwe
Total M»le Ptmats
Part Hawatlas
Mftl* Fflmala
Male Famale
Mala Pemala
Mala Famala
Male Female
Male Female
Male Female
iMraUOouatr..-
UatotTwn
(•••TMn
WtoUMMi
UtDlSlMn
stoMnwi
xttUymn
lOtoMmn
tttomr—n
«ls44n>rs
«ito«rnn
lOtaMymn. ..:....
UloMfwra
aeioMnan
Notraported
21 T«anaod over —
laHlala Ooutr.
Dadarlr**"
Slotywn -
10tol4 7<«n -
1& to 10 yean -..
Xlto 14 rears
astoMyean
ao to 94 yean
agio to yean
40 to 41 yean
46 to 40 years
SO to M yean.-
M to 64 yean
66 to 74 yean.--
76 yean and over —
Not reported
21 yean and over
Eaaal Gennty
Uoder6yaan
StoOyeara
10 to 14 yeai3
16 to 19 yean
aotoMyears
26tonyean
30 to 34 yean
36 to 3S yean
40 to 44 yean
46 to 40 yean
60 to 64 yean
66 to 84 yean
65 to 74 yeara
76 yean aod over —
Not reported
21 yean and over —
Hani County
Under 6 yean
6to0yean
10 to 14 yean
16 to 16 yean
20 to 34 yean
25 to 29 yean
30 to 34 yean
36 to 39 yean
40 to 44 yean
46 to 40 yean
60 to 64 yean
56 to 64 yean
6510 74 yean
75 yean and over —
Not reported
31 yean aod over
7.418
1.343
9.274
a, ate
4.124
4.M3
26.794
29.763
S6.996
27.374
20.267
17.663
13.371
10.630
11.7TO
12.437
13.620
13.134
13. 174
12.861
10.339
8,069
7.217
6.846
9.273
9.877
7.246
6.360
13, 616
99.198
3.246
2.907
2,489
6.252
99,789
2,312
1,626
2,781
2.612
2.283
2146
2 200
2 913
3.649
3.343
2.618
19.704
3.126
6,686
8,199
1.707
1,194
1.M1
2146
2.680
3164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION
Tablb 19.— age, race, AND SEX, BY COUNTIES: 1940 AND 193ft— Continued
29
County and b^e
Total Male Female
Part Hawallao
Male Female
Male Female
Male Female
5S4y(iara..
jMyesrj..
HoDolnla CoQuly..
Coder S years
6 to 9years
10 to 14 years
2.221
2,211
2,046
13,0<3
1,493
6,505
5,711
4.539
68 toMyeais..
65 to 74 years , .
76 ye^n and o\
10,324
6,008
2,039
6. 288
9,672
5,941
1.961!
3.056
1,866
1,706
4,090
4,399
2,429
Under 6 years
li, 270
2. 124
10 to 14 years.,
15 to 19 years..
20 to 24 years..
35 to 2S years..
30 to 3i years..
2.948
1.958
1.632
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3165
30 fiAWAIl
TiBi* 80.— PERSO'NS U YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS, MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP,
INDUSTRY GROUP, AND SEX, BY COUNTIES: 1340
«.T.EE,TO,y
a^W.,, COU»TY
HONOLULU COUNrT
M.O,CO0..T,
OBODP
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
i4e,iu
1U,4«S
171,196
lis, 936
43, MB
90,664
31,007
19,467
149,043
113,867
lOB, 314
76,Bt«
31, (36
16,389
14,193
«,B!4
«3,1B8
33.878
M,78l
EMPLOYMENT STATUS
t4,tB«
Id labor force
151. M8
82.7
146. U»
1348
S.741
31, MD
l«t,tM
36.584
30.0
36. 137
7S
1.369
SI, 654
U,l9r
26,420
82.9
24.670
.464
496
6.234
KM
8.924
30-4
6.t4|
13.633
6.748
93,878
82.5
^;r4
i^JS
89,844
23.789
31.8
22,649
M
1.074
61.609
99,649
13.880
35.4
13.68B
160
142
2,379
19,688
2..VI2
28.7
2.532
3
27
6.362
3,893
IB 470
81 4
17.657
403
4.208
17,667
^'"li
4.208
.4
97
10.260
EMPLOYED WORKERS BY MAJOR OCCUPATION
QROUP
4. Ml
4.2»
l.DM
S.D4«
9,»«4
12.371
15.526
14.422
2.002
32.684
35.004
1.091
14. 2.^
370
145, tl9
506
1.958
6,340
465
4.659
6.518
3 776
2.228
1,6«9
1.231
203
36, 137
644
119
1.217
1.162
1.543
2,244
2,084
236
889
'601
2.00S
91
94,670
793
35
147
347
777
58
!m
882
495
8.',7
708
36
6,748
2.841
801
1.174
7.2S19
8.927
10. 250
9.191
1.364
30 904
7.748
348
8.825
184
89,644
3.440
247
228
i.s.-a
4.762
311
3.461
4.367
309
642
765
125
33,649
287
74
189
432
779
1.413
1.319
164
317
6.976
28
1,585
35
18,688
390
IS
29
87
316
46
187
573
223
396
89
176
7
3,693
466
100
468
681
1.122
1.619
1.82S
248
674
8,638
116
1.747
60
17,667
641
20
102
171
496
61
602
696
409
607
2H0
189
3<
EMPI.OYED WORKERS BY INDUSTRY OROUP
4,101
a««» 1,1.1,1 atrv
!8,M9
14,93a
3.491
3,626
19,812
3,996
1,016
811
8,079
6,693
407
1,063
8,884
1,084
431
166
7,604
4734
497
13.110
1.216
ISO
io,es3
8,M>
2.493
33
1
94
3,474
2.749
246
17
l.!7t
693
807
4.887
636
301
8,053
7,100
1.040
23
6
81
3,603
1,016
68
7
880
448
164
4.468
266
16
788
716
492
6
1
10
387
1
191
KanofMivuic («M- «af«r)
4M
4.805
2
24
33
35
142
134
124
1.200
248
16
28
109
496
35
141
1.159
231
t.o:8
2.704
238
1
9
73
3.617
1
12
32
8
103
112
33
998
175
15
25
81
394
30
122
1,146
202
6,731
1.988
390
178
660
466
164
136
1
5
28
10
260
31
142
13
.14
117
1
23
9
203
21
1
1
3
1
7
4
25
24
13
91
119
42
2
12
1
1
2
35
7
3
8
1
27
2
11
66
29
1
3
B
33
11
1
14
1
44
3
14
18
44
487
1.
IS
62
3
10
8
28
1,069
14
40
2
18
35
867
7
2
1
2
1
447
1
I
2
1
8
3
0
63
Transportation. commnnlcatioD, and other pnblio ntilitiea.
37
781
49
898
626
4.320
547
1,737
14,784
9
16
133
243
87
T,053
191
67
664
56
191
1,836
1
476
360
3,124
438
1.333
10,913
7
13
109
167
71
6,058
71
38
270
25
34
800
160
61
363
28
179
1,337
2
13
37
12
988
4
20
3
410
7
29
I
Wholettle and retail trade
676
2.285
3.462
1.719
1.531
6.787
1,(11
«,T«
317
i:869
133
3,214
601
163
249
630
129
208
719
m
976
20
295
202
IB
452
30
10
1.904
2.282
1.400
1.081
4.166
1.J38
1.930
289
940
1,436
• 93
2,300
44T
134
37
217
6?
110
381
89
316
89
91
211
9
to
95
433
48
132
529
83
833
4
175
140
Mntor vehicles and accessories retalllnf, and fllling stations
6
251
16
Bndneaa and repair aarriccs
9
1,878
865
6,816
45
108
9,843
305
70
678
283
109
66
120
149
676
Tit
S49
4
6
1,319
904
112
S.'i
218
76
1,023
74
43
1,173
647
4,176
. 30
94
8,829
166
50
363
8
2
749
235
98
400
3
6
Peraonal t«r*lcea..„
tea
2.632
1,253
786
945
1,017
4,611
Si. til
tn
6.697
61-
1.030
1,606
470
eiT03
>W
463
1.818
1.051
649
658
686
3,079
33,889
863
4.605
416
898
1,010
330
4,431
730
308
217
29
32
75
73
396
373
n
582
32
20
114
80
46S
IB
83
214
64
39
92
lU
Ml
831
81
706
57
27
163
48
101
88
Indaatrj not reported
78
3166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION 31
r*Bi» Bl.— RACE AND AGE, BY SEX, FOR JUDICIAL DISTRICTS AND CENSUS TRACTS, BY COUNTIES: IMO
T«U1
AOI (TIAUB
«t t< U to tit
Foil* dMftH..
TtmI R-1...
TiMt B-L..
3.«7> :
I.9M :
8<ioth BDo dbtrlot.
Hflodtr. laul...
Tra*tH-l
Ttk(H-«
TnxtB-t
TraalB-U
Tim«a-aB
TlMtB-7
Tract H-e
82,988
>,«8t
1Z437
10. ne
1.U3
1,411
s.a>
3.IM
2.361
2.876
2.176
2,078
North BSo dbtrlot..
Tr««tH-»
Tract H-10
Tra«tH-ll
4,468
l,43t
2,278
Uamakua district . .
Tract H-U
TiMCB-U
8,244
3,891
4,293
Tract B-14. .
Tract B-U..
3.226
%136
2.M2
1.926
Nonb KoDadlstrtBt..
Tract H-17
Tract B-18
Soatb Kona district.
Tract H-19
TlMtB-30
KnldbtrM
Tract B-21
Tract B-2>
4,024 ]
3,294 1
730 1
6,681 1
2,ffiU 1
3,496 1
1.837
1.789
1,606
■andnltt Oeiatr-
HoDokila dKrlct>.
53.467
29.046
26.944
23.948
13,984 43.4T7
5,062 39.910
5. 102 31. 222
1.786 29.371
4.877
5. 50r
II. 168
8.649
8.208
26.057
25.308
19.026
18.929
881 (T.Ml
3.463
2.091
2.598
1.757
2,l»l
1 Booohiln County adiulTO 9t Ttimjn lilaod.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3167
32 UAWAn
Tam* «1.— race and age, by sex, for judicial districts and census tracts, by COUNTIES: 1940— Con.
"'
Total
Bei
duM
«iCI
Aoa (Tiias)
eooKiY, JUDlCUl
bimm, km at»-
Minuet
waf-
Ian
Ba-
val-
Ian
Cau-
■Ian
Chl-
Fili-
pino
Japa-
Other
Under
6
5to
14
15 to
24
2610
84
35 to
44
45 to
64
56 to
64
65 to
74
75 and
°an'd
not re-
ported
21
and
BoDolnhi dUtrlct^
CoDtlna«d.
Baoololadty-Coo.
8.436
t.OM
».m
S.(BI
«,S78
\m
3,6M
4,SI0
6.M7
4.864
8.349
1.846
7.222
i388
4.471
t,sse
7,U0
B.MO
S.OM
M
t
M
F
M
t
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
T
M
F
M
F
M
F
}■'.
r
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
¥
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
¥
M
f
4,439
3,987
3.314
2,670
5.509
3.714
2.904
2.027
3,169
3,209
1.702
1.931
2.43.1
1,229
2,697
1,913
2,757
2,310
2,329
2,535
4,26.1
'St
8,762
8,470
2.086
2,303
2,109
2,370
2.747
3,192
>.m
3,688
3.119
3.H71
3.973
4.051
6.247
4.485
3.4W
3.m
3.803
2.370
4.707
4.685
3.400
3.840
32
185
191
136
117
283
204
112
91
82
84
30
20
112
ll«
US
95
147
1.54
26
62
189
167
16
17
69
72
23
22
37
33
36
60
44
63
1!
26
162
146
6!
54
37
35
75
7(
*>
i
687
700
882
352
401
413
2SS
243
422
474
278
353
179
209
32'l
393
32?
370
707
732
73
71
Kl
293
102
246
240
257
156
213
286
299
258
259
477
1.081
1.04J
633
712
mit
423
72i
788
317
385
IS
495
4n
62
63
100
64
83
193
.150
416
844
940
1.27S
237
276
123
362
313
98?
1.233
1.043
1,029
504
J.10
287
270
768
1:1
1,522
1,734
2.6.30
2.730
216
190
i.ooe
1.204
2.194
1.540
1.398
1.446
993
1.060
1.9«3
1.96.1
1.038
tot
13
751
683
588
913
1,294
806
1.049
413
759
691
162
175
72
63
6S«
496
63
47
169
171
1.076
seo
62
48
303
269
401
224
212
76
00
65
62
286
280
826
801
618
477
656
304
303
6W
404
81
1
1»7
(M
610
181
883
244
211
26
43
28
25
10
138
96
108
13
214
9?
207
26
39
16
4
4
60
24
86
12
21
66
20
143
6
57
17
6"
28
33
16
8
117
0
68
18
108
84
1.514
1,368
1.101
1.063
2.047
1,760
1.184
1.014
1.331
1.350
346
407
511
475
974
783
1.6*2
1.303
469
1.0.6
1.019
201
279
2,710
2.496
590
603
171
Z)5
882
1.058
518
604
3.216
2.040
1.618
1.459
1.042
1,049
597
580
394
372
1,123
1,138
1,870
1.769
610
650
801
391
282
224
97
48
182
166
18
36
48
3.1
163
121
8
lit
180
136
141
15
12
42
46
84
62
65
21
10
13
24
19
48
60
152
148
96
103
73
80
142
117
61
27
455
474
316
298
430
419
213
196
80.1
327
167
192
136
205
17R
284
276
216
199
401
419
64
61
361
327
100
181
160
1?7
221
181
>16
J73
354
325
347
326
627
458
832
305
202
196
451
445
330
167
1.060
1,013
743
669
1,026
016
422
442
696
746
295
203
275
287
413
401
•46
Si?
380
924
922
145
140
831
814
344
404
390
340
488
606
400
397
728
702
810
796
1,143
1,046
752
729
447
471
1,074
990
720
672
970
925
753
6'%
1.044
OM
579
636
727
829
311
428
806
299
690
569
668
S49
478
674
1.029
1,011
160
210
818
882
448
860
384
504
623
701
314
678
678
634
863
963
1,298
997
754
734
440
454
866
1.068
707
780
7
734
628
611
878
930
804
806
384
611
402
313
378
543
193
625
318
428
337
872
618
771
710
145
187
709
831
418
480
897
472
450
488
1,004
1,029
5.10
563
696
744
971
886
568
708
418
466
810
000
484
«»
16
606
400
351
273
6S8
Ji?
221
323
330
258
266
342
130
312
222
307
2S1
292
236
476
410
124
142
421
376
301
389
395
363
387
462
601
680
350
292
602
483
629
643
405
515
3.17
314
686
689
468
411
7
322
280
294
184
430
279
306
142
233
234
•189
190
183
91
201
137
187
160
173
203
312
312
123
129
261
214
176
184
243
356
342
384
356
371
210
177
349
330
362
232
288
268
227
190
302
324
334
274
3
246
171
211
122
383
134
286
82
196
164
101
101
100
165
85
160
94
130
104
215
179
79
67
230
173
127
113
160
173
226
226
219
207
151
106
236
2S1
195
172
162
170
125
207
161
218
lie
.107
74
04
45
243
190
130
73
48
60
25
51
26
67
36
61
44
113
89
28
33
102
72
64
73
60
82
82
107
63
OS
81
56
128
133
103
74
76
88
49
51
152
72
109
64
41
25
18
6
61
16
28
9
49
26
20
8
6
35
8
10
8
23
27
26
U
7
22
18
n
18
19
21
43
28
47
19
25
17
16
43
35
19
27
33
36
18
21
90
27
30
23
2.322
1.835
1.2)0
3.091
2.027
1,706
1.040
1. 6,15
1.626
1.394
1,462
2,313
561
2,039
11286
1,315
1.705
JJ22
1.612
TrMtM.
2.296
2.366
2.861
7,01.'
4.67J
t.»i
^44«
»,Q06
8.610
6.887
4.a«8
1.8W
>,0M
8,397
8.684
4,868
22.417
6,086
16,381
8,948
l,94(
1.870
1.300
TiMtSB -.-
2.635
2.487
1.878
PdmjmlsfaiBd....
33
Eoolaapoko dlstrirt..
4.979
4.027
1,944
1,675
l.^
3,008
1 060
1,085
784
1.923
1.176
5.0»
3.368
2. 288
1.346
2.741
2.122
18.146
4.271
8.284
2.802
14.862
1.469
i.m
1.349
170
106
85
229
an
184
IM
4<
41
76
60
an
15
56
45
46
68
46
66
2
172
161
m
1(1
878
998
215
344
663
654
462
387
314
801
148
at
830
309
80
74
;40
211
179
223
173
203
6
2a
470
41!
480
411
1.081
880
63;
500
369
252
1S2
74
46
178
136
445
420
127
98
318
331
15.144
1.680
457
440
14.087
1.240
2.17
148
187
m
363
27;
6(
319
217
64
51
43
37
21
14
105
41
33
82
42
194
164
187
157
7
7
II
11
769
261
610
156
349
105
'421
138
10
896
412
1.920
66
1.2IS
374
705
287
628
243
610
192
101
61
275
no
175
UO
1.634
1.378
561
517
1.066
861
774
694
241
521
417
1.965
1.725
749
648
1.206
1,077
1,642
1.484
1.491
1.366
61
118
472
401
471
«1
144
82
11
21
133
61
194
124
84
54
110
70
199
142
65
37
134
108
418
407
411
378
7
39
ao
4
10
4
460
410
184
306
266
388
307
290
125
103
182
106
479
433
20
27!
272
465
443
310
300
168
153
181
191
181
m
1,084
1,0M
363
396
661
630
069
271
236
391
366
052
1,014
377
381
875
63
1.051
98
808
73
248
250
411
364
411
M4
754
853
168
439
486
as
573
370
171
136
402
234
870
704
322
266
6U
438
0.971
955
696
687
9,275
•218
189
208
289
X8
781
511
414
143
370
268
614
334
158
85
456
140
1.179
30S
«4«
139
639
186
4. '268
771
6O0
386
3.67S
389
259
156
118
166
746
80S
114
175
411
3S
381
191
115
75
166
116
719
364
386
140
331
114
1.374
500
364
346
1.010
263
216
134
316
U4
564
489
310
144
354
395
232
142
94
76
138
66
301
240
201
83
190
166
606
320
256
216
440
IPS
18«
loa
i»
lot
381
166
105
59
276
107
120
82
67
47
03
35
287
144
107
SO
180
94
242
134
193
103
49
31
11!
5«
113
M
206
66
45
15
161
61
80
3;
Z
20
11
126
5
32
20
04
3
50
53
57
3t
3
17
6
V
5
Z
60
25
11
8
40
17
23
S
17
4
2«
14
1
1(
2(
1
1
1
1
2.068
1.971
1.301
1,767
1.691
817
663
1.038
WBWudiBtrlct
3.039
1,466
1,406
1.543
W»htowa district
12. 8U
1.711
'"•S??
WalHMdWrlot
^mttm..-
931
551
911
561
3168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION 33
Tablb 21.— race and AGE, BY SEX, FOR JUDICIAL DISTRICTS AND CENSUS TRACTS, BY COUNTIES: 1940— Con.
t
Tota)
F.X,;
Bex
All
classes
«*«
COnWTT, JUDICIAL
Dtft-ntlCT, AKD CKH-
8U8 TRACT
Ha-
WBl-
lan
Part
Ha-
wai-
ian
Cau-
siao
Chl-
Fili-
pino
Japa-
Other
Under
6
5 10
14
16 to
24
25 10
34
35 to
44
45 10
64
65 to
64
65 to
74
76 and
and
not re-
ported
31
and
HonolalD Coaoty—
Continued.
30.002
6.389
9.495
V806
10.912
S60
39,818
10. U2
182
3.M«
s.82e
I.29S
8.493
5,2»
3.237
7.806
2,360
t.536
6,512
1.284
3.219
2.009
2.065
1.160
905
55,980
2,663
387
2,006
270
li91S
2,772
8,460
2,448
1,235
21.051
2.947
5,567
2,193
7,319
1.076
l.OSO
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
K
P
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
-F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
M
F
20. (US
0.744
3. 338
2.051
6,614
3.881
3.046
1.760
8.860
2.062
557
3
>i.e2e
14. 192
137
147
27
16
29
28
62
86
19
18
21
675
660
87
107
138
96
185
207
165
140
73
8.973
1.776
262
230
340
324
1,732
661
6,630
661
411
3
9.340
2.125
600
303
80
50
2.18
87
60
22
12
4.272
1.600
1.405
410
1.860
810
184
73
823
307
6.877
4.057
1.3M
1,125
2W3
2,311
690
688
1,030
903
1
524
411
123
113
177
13S
81
59
143
101
39
1.239
'252
231
506
429
23;
250
2.914
2.793
649
629
1.2,13
l,22f.
423
401
589
635
7.212
2.186
668
465
1.096
848
963
429
4.585
444
162
1
9.635
9.937
4.646
1.3(6
838
211
995
431
787
402
2.025
302
217
6.104
1,842
2.452
1.122
610
241
716
4.14
3.15
188
861
259
114
1
3.883
1.468
1.082
416
12
6
368
136
.193
245
109
61
687
3.12
360
214
318
13S
738
311
209
10(
629
209
585
278
113
62
249
114
223
82
191
89
122
6t
35
4,869
2,467
1,228
726
284
165
472
322
152
93
320
146
63
769
367
163
70
353
144
98
63
165
100
11
344
108
64
30
169
39
10
64
20
65
33
10
9
24
8
10
6
11
11
4,416
2,075
876
1.625
923
Outlying Islands ' —
093
1
1.722
1.794
4.086
9.934
1.192
1.145
30
22
405
410
6.14
677
123
136
1.034
1.012
674
657
360
355
842
789
296
273
646
616
770
767
154
139
301
384
225
234
248
231
131
lOS
98
7.097
6.836
Eaufti Coaotr
467
431
1.362
1.314
688
874
9.086
2 184
2.767
699
8.198
7.538
722
696
197
149
■"is"
lOO
25
24
16
288
2.11
103
182
95
69
112
106
47
62
60
64
90
68
25
19
51
42
7
35
22
27
20
8
1.088
897
1,881
968
.112
258
3
3
161
73
320
149
68
33
377
219
222
165
91
392
. 196
126
61
266
135
379
196
69
37
207
100
103
59
131
69
79
U
52
35
8,696
1,787
1.167
688
707
860
111
n
19,616
<.861
Walmcn dlstrlet
6.679
4.174
01
01
2.187
3 667
2.1. TO
7^3
665
4.970
3.523
2.900
2.257
1.971
1.266
4.801
3.095
1.405
956
3.396
2.140
3.901
2,611
787
497
1.S29
1.390
1.285
724
1,276
789
731
429
616
360
33.198
23.782
187
185
77
39
40
48
21
20
62
44
25
17
27
27
78
65
24
21
54
61
46
4
6
28
26
19
16
99
81
14
17
85
04
1,568
1.378
425
360
10
160
If!
84
183
197
06
108
87
89
286
299
151
145
134
154
340
338
63
47
184
187
103
104
119
120
33
27
86
93
9,993
9,923
483
440
1
"263
190
253
220
26
24
797
744
627
580
170
164
682
519
121
90
-461
420
417
360
66
64
201
188
146
118
61
62
49
51
12
11
9.518
9.471
171
T7
2.448
2,264
3
3
712
609
1.348
1,2IH
385
388
2. 117
1.861
1.338
1.167
809
094
1.665
1.548
499
475
1.166
1.073
1.469
1.32!
337
298
731
706
401
320
403
341
224
201
179
140
12.940
11.243
f.20
521
ir
25
186
inn
211
228
66
72
418
432
292
285
147
371
379
111
121
264
258
309
302
61
51
150
171
98
80
100
100
68
9. 167
9.116
1.088
1,030
14
16
359
317
574
5.16
141
ISO
866
7.85
616
325
269
7.19
249
224
615
535
625
696
126
113
312
334
187
140
192
. 158
lie
82
61
8.977
6.969
1.653
538
9
17
536
191
966
2.18
142
82
1.106
454
625
288
166
1.311
309
114
1.002
326
. 821
323
343
188
318
73
214
87
163
43
61
6,153
2.917
331
156
3
1
103
31
191
94
36
30
285
147
170
80
67
237
160
67
35
170
125
221
89
5?
104
45
67
27
81
30
35
15
46
IS
1,764
913
209
C4
1
2
53
11
116
42
39
9
16.1
70
83
41
70
27
106
48
27
18
79
30
142
50
38
11
59
22
45
17
97
18
19
7I
10
803
346
60
17
2
16
6
22
10
IP
2
46
22
23
18
22
4
36
11
11
6
26
6
49
20
16
6
14
12
19
3
22
7
8
i
<
894
96
4.275
1,792
65
21
64
24
62
32
44
36
19
20
25
16
35
42
21
49
14
166
84
66
28
2e
12
116
43
9
1
107
42
903
eio
■'876
2.'iO
1.748
431
149
IS
1.460
301
70'
181
7.W
208
1,988
523
621
142
1,467
381
1.368
391
236
46
566
197
576
148
443
120
375
112
68
8
8.188
2.981
35
rartK-^.
635
2.414
968
Koloa di'itrlr't
264
Z946
1.544
071
LDiue district
675
3.096
1.417
831
396
2.205
Kawaihan district ...
Tract K-9-
Track K-10
1,021
3.403
487
226
1,074
614
843
Hanalei district
804
795
363
186
329
■avlConntr
167
18,006
10,884
Bona district
I.6S3
1.080
214
173
1,228
778
141
129
8.286
6.629
1,666
1,206
i717
3.743
1.347
1.101
666
679
11.713
9.338
1.738
1,209
3,189
2.378
1.206
987
3.811
3.508
650
425
1.119
831
297
273
U
17:
172
66
67
248
221
61
46
76
63
75
83
36
29
368
357
23
11
35
30
31
19
126
162
7
1
14(
421
424
126
119
239
248
67
67
691
686
166
149
279
268
178
187
69
82
1.227
1,292
30
K
18:
168
602
689
lil
63
109
167
67
67
8
6!
55
1.439
1.454
221
271
876
883
229
20!
i.
1.464
1.475
173
195
463
436
108
95
643
676
45
61
132
123
29
(
6
17
4
3
4
266
212
116
104
63
46
26
17
61
46
376
271
16
8
42
28
40
31
250
188
3
6
26
11
468
76
6
1
457
75
5
1.646
688
221
12
1.212
499
168
64
45
13
2.436
762
655
186
835
303
117
28
360
133
217
67
262
60
217
186
6
2
203
174
8
0
3. 589
3.096
765
613
1,879
1.68t
628
499
317
302
6.499
4.900
808
748
1.513
1.300
726
641
1.8f.4
1,726
298
233
200
263
84
61
6
77
60
1
1
418
373
17
11
333
304
44
43
24
15
341
281
34
20
118
113
2
5
60
44
19
11
104
88
162
164
i!
108
113
15
18
811
762
163
139
437
434
147
118
04
71
1.189
1.233
154
161
311
322
133
130
425
461
41
112
116
329
329
57
47
228
231
44
61
2.031
1.972
366
362
1.134
1.122
374
356
167
132
2.682
2.612
355
381
728
695
304
258
909
871
13
269
288
249
243
27
35
198
186
24
22
1,676
1.523
304
264
964
889
260
218
148
152
2.249
2.191
295
263
664
668
252
257
724
834
123
98
191
171
306
115
26
24
264
79
16
12
1.319
744
237
122
843
415
128
108
111
99
2.176
1.205
418
141
579
282
193
132
639
641
130
36
217
03
239
91
25
14
199
66
IS
11
950
670
186
136
665
366
129
US
70
63
1,429
951
232
108
363
232
143
114
4.14
374
99
42
138
81
132
68
14
12
109
49
9
7
705
644
134
103
386
296
,143
102
43
44
893
646
129
104
256
176
89
58
273
208
s;
01
C6
01
48
14
6
63
89
14
3
463
280
114
67
223
147
87
66
39
30
640
325
104
46
188
86
64
26
191
121
46
16
47
33
63
14
8
2
42
10
3
2
339
09
61
16
120
66
64
22
14
6
345
141
44
13
83
36
21
12
140
60
17
8
40
u
23
(
4
17
t
1
9
n
36
11
7
46
20
26
6
10
I
110
34
7
3
17
2
7
67
2S
7
2
IS
a
032
413
100
64
768
107
(M
Mateweo district....
43
1300
3,846
830
633
3.496
1.670
640
463
341
Waflulra district
383
6.386
4,061
1.030
601
1,733
Tract M-10
Tract M-11*
Tract M-12
Tract M-13
086
614
427
2,010
1,641
390
173
600
834
'Baker, Canton, Enderbory, Howland, Jarrla, Johnston, and Midway Islands.
> Coextensive with Walloku dty.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3169
U HAWAU
Tablb 31.— race and AGE, BY SEX, FOR JUDICIAL DISTRICTS AND CENSUS TRACTS. BY COUNTIES: 1940— Con.
Total
latloD
Sei
All
BAO
AOS (VIARai
COCNTT. IDD1CI41
DISTRICT, AND CKN-
Ha-
wai-
ian
Part
Qa-
Cau-
Chi-
Fill.
Japa-
Other
Under
6 10
15 10
25 to
36 to
45 to
55 to
66 to
78 and
o^'er
and
21
and
wal-
laD
slan
nese
plno
nese
races
5
14
24
34
44
64
64
74
ported
Ibai Coomr-
CooUnucd.
,«.
M
4.783
177
649
33.1
99
1.28S
2.208
2!
467
1.0.17
887
910
650
374
F
3..™
162
617
298
4«
334
1,964
2.'
467
1,011
78f
407
365
1.063
M
2t
142
22
12
m
244
75
144
103
lie
32
53
h-
3J
I3C
in
.It
223
6(1
147
91
48
43
2«
Tract M-IS
7,22S
M
HS
60!
3i;
87
1,122
1,964
2?
392
893
784
80C
668
321
241
133
3C
2.370
129
487
282
47
1,741
2."
401
864
697
3.M)
322
212
140
68
1,332
3,720
M
2.S62
6S
144
75
53
1.313
738
164
198
365
421
748
476
166
140
F
«
HI
63
1!
251
572
ISl
33.1
247
172
13C
61
3,720
M
2.W2
65
144
75
6.1
1,313
738
16--
19«
365
421
748
475
165
14t
F
1. 168
50
119
63
18
251
672
9:
181
333
247
172
130
61
41
2
1
490
Molokal district
4,804
M
3.(115
314
808
1%
79
1,008
659
41
330
641
450
616
468
286
136
63
26
1.762
.W8
v.
309
67B
344
217
218
137
53
3.828
M
2.367
196
81
62
899
536
25
244
484
361
55B
380
220
80
F
151
511
72
37
219
427
11
244
450
279
168
171
90
36
i,oe6
M
618
118
240
26
17
109
123
If
86
157
89
60
88
65
56
F
418
102
186
16
5
27
81
1
65
129
65
49
47
38
18
7
178
Kalawao district ■. ..
446
M
266
99
53
34
12
29
30
9
2
45
77
68
4,
24
14
6
446
M
266
99
53
34
12
29
30
(
2
45
77
68
24
F
180
59
57
36
6
1
19
3
30
67
42
30
U
10
167
■ Coextensive with Kalawao County but Included wilb Maul County for purposes of legislative representation.
Table 22.— CJOMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION, FOR CITIES OF 5,000 TO 100,000: 1940
aUB,.OT
Bllo
La-
halna
Wa-
hiawa
Wal-
luku
Wal-
pabu
SCB,.CT
HUo
La-
halna
Wa-
hlawa
Wal-
luku
Wal-
pahu
SEX, RACE, AND NATIVITY
93,363
6.217
6,491
2 854
2566
4.5«
2.196
2.167
857
458
399
109
363
897
337
444
2.497
773
S.B64
7.S19
«.8oe
"3^918
2,088
5.795
3.283
2 612
1,111
635
476
61
192
649
262
1.723
3.774
255
3.918
AQE— Continued
606
124
6
10.926
111
25
64
12
139
63
4
3,609
124
22
1Z428
10,925
20,083
10.534
9 549
3.270
1.B94
1.376
919
3.226
4,2.W
911
2 1.18
11.207
696
12,428
2960
2,257
4.435
2..W5
1.930
782
455
327
220
829
474
130
795
2,742
27
S.960
3.810
3.509
6.3«9
3.261
3,128
930
649
381
277
1.291
1.119
438
493
3,591
110
3,810
8.267
2,666
!,B8«
1.140
1.349
1.468
1,445
1.206
934
674
633
607
437
328
476
234
84
10
8,418
288
299
304
297
246
162
128
116
112
91
68
105
50
12
265
296
344
349
296
208
156
170
145
116
83
97
33
8
466
460
381
288
254
214
160
US
90
121
60
25
329
425
15 to 19 y.ars
266
B;rac«:
130
65 to 74 veara
MARITAL STATUS
2.023
I,8J0
8,477
1.207
1,295
1.508
1.345
1,118
1.153
976
820
6M
462
636
757
285
314
338
297
253
321
247
236
144
104
117
168
285
332
407
346
263
282
185
166
126
102
137
177
424
454
455
402
322
322
318
273
181
122
ISO
191
386
433
478
447
356
3.^7
278
246
217
163
159
252
9. Ml
3.901
4,035
386
96
e.9<8
942
957
I0«
18
1.3««
845
914
47
24
i,aei
1.055
1,282
104
36
S.1S4
X
Female, 16 yeara old and orer
1,7M
2468
3,814
604
82
429
812
109
16
674
940
111
36
723
1,254
163
23
Married
1,033
3170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION
35
Tablb 28.— persons 14 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS, MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP,
INDUSTRY GROUP. AND SEX, FOR CITIES OF 8,000 TO 100,000: 1940
HOo
city
LabalDB city
WahUwt city
Wanakii city
Walpahn city
Male
Femato
Male
FeiDale
Mala
Female
Male
Feoiale
Male
Female
8.7M
10, (U
7,M<
I.OH
«,«»7
l,4M
t.U4
1.907
1.7M
l,»10
t.W4
>,1N
J.J6I
8,918
8,701
i;8M
EMPLOYMENT STATUS
6.71^
77.0
6.259
l.W
' 297
2,007
6,258
2,324
32.0
J. 196
3
' 125
4,9a
1.701
81.4
1,054
. II
I3«
388
1,(54
4TS
33.1
469
► i
1.449
76.0
1.370
24
56
468
1.970
667
38.1
631
1.910
74.6
1.801
66
53
655
i.ni
749
83.2
734
3.136
79 0
3,083
32
31
560
1,061
26
1.067
191
15
1. 600
784
EMPLOYED WORKERS BY MAJOR OCCUPATION
GROUP
268
64
128
£91
946
942
780
49
406
1,028
98
997
24
6.869
367
lA
24
139
475
45
ita
442
278
M
65
m
0
>,1M
13
!
82
102
303
105
5
63
720
70
2
18
67
>
74
63
64
78
3
35
1
4W
54
10
43
250
172
201
229
14
188
SI
8
160
66
S
9
74
115
18
142
89
86
6
16
4
2
HI
108
34
30
231
309
391
227
19
132
140
7
157
16
1,N1
169
4
6
31
164
16
04
121
70
4
18
43
37
7M
37
11
26
87
143
249
311
6
76
873
3
2H
6
8,061
30>
3
1,«S«
EMPLOYED WORKERS BY INDUSTRY GROUP
1,870
1,SS9
427
u
100
1,17J
01
101
4
1
17<
HO
H
U
M
1,588
74
Agricoltore («zc lafu), forec^. utd flshvry....
88
u
2SS
143
It
Ml
AM
so
1
40
31
4
177
1
•
UI
38
60
11
i
IM
Ml
M
71
1
1
«
IT
«
IN
M
H
1
•
1
M
n
m
1«
1
1
»"
t
n
i»
a
M
i'
11
i"
1
n
•
n
H
M
1
IH
i'
M
i'
>■
•
17
i"
1
1
*
Paper Kod illied nroducU
Pftoling pablKhlng. hu<\ tilted bidiutrles
Chemicals and allied producta,
i'
M
1
M
'I
1
1
M
*■
1
I
1
i'
i'
i'
■" i"
Sloae, clay, and glass products
Iron and slec! and their products
ii
«
s
9
7
ae
7«T
i'
1
>
J"
IT
I
1
1
1
i
MaetatD^ry -
Transportation fqaiom^Dt
1
i"
111
1
1
M
4
«
lU
u
4r
t
RaOroxU <iiic. railroad repair sbop<i) aod ry. expres Mrriaa
IK
M
Ml
M
m
1,171
1
14
141
t
7
N
7
M
IN
n
3
41
14
H
Ml
1
1
IT
i
4
IM
0
18
>
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3171
EXHIBIT NO. 135
Summary of Evidknce Concekning Timk of 27 and 28 Nov 41 War Department
Warning Messages to Hawaii and Replies Thereto
1. 27 Nov Marshall warning message (Exhibit 32. p. 7)
received in War Dept code rooiu — 6:00 P. M. Washington tinle; 12:30
P. M. Hawaii time
filed in War Dept signal center — 6:11 P. M. Washington time; 12:41
P. M. Hawaii time
received in Hawaii signal center — 6:46 P. M. Washington time; 1:16
P. M. Hawaii time
decoded in Hawaii — 7:52 P. 'M. Washington time; 2:22 P. M. Hawaii
time
Received in Hawaii 1 : 16 P. M. 117 Nov— Short (APHB Tr. 420) ; Phillips
(Roberts Tr. 220)
Phillips took to Short abcmt 2 : 30 P. M. 27 Nov— Dunlop (Clausen Rep. 65)
Short immediately talked it over with Phillips and made alert decision — Short
(APHB Tr. 282)
Decided on alert in "a very few minutes" — Short (APHB Tr. 520)
Put Alert No. 1 into etTect within 30 minutes — Sliort (Navy Court Tr. 241)
2. 27 Nov G-2 tvarning message (Exhibit 32, p. 10)
received in War Dept code room — 6:06 P. M. Washington time; 12:36
P. M. Hawaii time
received in Hawaii signal center — 7:14 P. M. Washington time; 1:44
Hawaii time
decoded in Hawaii — 9:30 P. IVI. Washington time; 4:00 P. M. Hawaii
time
Fielder doesn't recall whether he showed G-2 message to Phillips and Short
before or after Alert No. 1 was ordered — I'Melder (Roberts Tr. 311)
Fielder had already taken action under Alert No. 1 before 4 : 00 P. M. staff
conference ; G-2 message was decoded at 4 : 00 P. M., was not presented
to staff conference but only to Phillips and Short — Fielder (Roberts
Tr. 312-12)
Alert decision based on Marshall message, without G-2 message — Phillips
(APHB Tr. 1116, 1131)
"Subsequent" message from G-2 seemed to confirm action — Phillips (APHB
Tr. 1128 )
"Subsequent" G-2 message taken by Short as tacit approval of alert against
sabotage— Phillips (APHB Tr. 1131, 1142)
3. 27 Nov Short reply to Marshall warning (Exhibit 32, p. 12)
encoded in Hawaii — 11 : 10 P. M. 27 Nov. Washington time; 5: 40 P. M.
27 Nov Hawaii time
filed in Hawaii signal center — 11:35 P. M. 27 Nov Washington time;
6: a"> P. M. 27 Nov Hawaii time
received in War Dept code room — 5: r>7 A. M. 28 Nov Washington time;
12: 27 A. M. 28 Nov Hawaii time
Short answered within 30 minutes— Short (APHB Tr. .395, 420)
4. 28 Nov Adjutant General sabotage trarning (Exhibit 32, p. 13)
filed in War Dept signal center — 8:42 1'. M. 28 Nov Washington time;
3 : 12 P. M. 28 Nov Hawaii time
decoded in Hawaii — 4:1:5 A. M. 29 Nov Washington time; 10:55 P. M.
28 Nov Hawaii time*
Short considered as reply to his report of 27 Nov, felt it indicated tacit consent
to alert against sabotage— Short (APHB Tr. Ill, 3^5, 422; Roberts Tr. 48, 50)
No doubt that War Dept was fully cognizant of Short's 27 Nov report when
Adj Gen me.^.sage was sent — Short (APHB Tr. 296)
War Dept came back (miy with more sabotage, so Short thought they approved
what he was doing— Short (APHB Tr. 421 ; Navy Court Tr. 244-46)
Sabotage messages caused Short to fee! War Dept agreed with his own judg-
ment that greatest danger was internal — Short (APHB Tr. 430)
Alert ordered prior to receipt of Ad.i (Jen sabotage message — Phillips (Roberts
Tr. 220-21)
•Not shown on available document; data taken from testimony of Hain (APHB Tr.
3.310-11).
79716 O — 46 — pt. 18 21
3172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
5. 2S Nov Arnold sabotage warning (Exhibit 32, p. 14)
received in War Dept code room — 8:15 P. M. Washington time; 2:45
P. M. Hawaii time
Short saw before Martin did— Martin (Roberts Tr. 346-47)
6. 29 Nov Short reply to Adjutant (leneral sabotage warning (Exhibit 32, p. 17)
encoded in Hawaii — 8:15 P. M. 29 Nov Washington time; 2:45 P. M.
29 Nov Hawaii time
filed in Hawaii signal center — 8: 47 P. M. 29 Nov Washington time; 3: 17
P. M. 29 Nov Hawaii time
received in War Dept code room — 12: 57 A. M. 30 Nov Washington time;
7 : 27 P. M. 29 Nov Hawaii time
7. J^ Dec Martin-Short reply to Arnold, sabotage warning (Exhibit 32, p. 19)
filed in Hawaii signal center — 6: 21 P. M. 4 Dec Washington time; 12: 51
P. M. 4 Dec Hawaii time
received in War Dept code room — 1 : 24 P. M. 10 Dec Washington time;
7 : 54 A. M. 10 Dec Hawaii time
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3173
OmCIAL BUStNOM— OOVCNNMCNT KATKS
rm>m M.^ OBPANTMENT
•hb - 1712
mmmm 27, 19U.
^
oofMAiviNa anoBUJL, hamjiaii ocpAimatMr,
' - row sNArm, t.h.
£fifiBSX
TWJIBLUJSfi.
NBOOTIATIONS WHM JAPAN APPBAX TO K TBHaNATES TO AU
PRACTICAL PURPOSaS WITH OULT TO» BARBT FOSSIBIUrPtS WAT 1H« JAPAMBS
oonamaifr taoHT oous back and amn to ooNnim pouod japaxess ptmntE
AenoN OMPiuDiDouaj; but Hosnxic action possiblx at ami vaam pkriod
/,
IP HOSnUTUB CAMaOT OOMU fOEPSAT CAMNOT COMHA Bt AVOZINH) WI OIOTD
STATSS nBUOB WAT JAPAN OOMaT TKS POtST OTKRT ACT POUOD WIS FOUCT
MOUU) NDT eOMKA RVIAT K)T OOMU BB COWtBlflR) AS RSSntlCTXltO TOO TO A
ootmsx cr actiok tmat moKT jkopaxdxzb xd« dbvbi pnzoD prioh 10 Hosnue
JAMMBI ACTION SX; AB OZIOBTBD TO UNODtnuat SOCK ntOONHAISSANCS AMD 01HR
wuaaaa as tou obm moessart bot nocss mASUioES should b cairib} on ao
AS NOT comma RVIAT NOT OOWA TO AtANM CIVIL FOinnATION OR DISCLOSS HR^porr
PKRIOO ltB>Oltr KIASanS TAKIN pouod SHOOLD HQBTILITIKS OCCUR TOU NXU. CARRX
OUT IMS TASKS A8SI0NB) IN RAINBOW PIVB 30 PAX AS 1HKT PBtTAIK TO JAPAX PBRXQO
LXMiT DissaamTioN or mis hiqhlt sscket inpooution to ionzmum bsbrial
OPflCDIS
MARSKAU
WAR DVARTHBirr ICBS3AGE CDfTHRi PLSI^E SXTO SAMB RAOIOCRAll lOt
COMMANDING GEMBIAL
QUARBX HXII
, CARIBfiBAN DBPBtBE COMiAMD, y7>^^ / ^^ j
^S^XL\jfT^\L I ^ADJUTANT r.BNKRAL.
[stamped] CODE SECTION
W.D.M.C.
1941 NOV 27 PM 6:00
[handwritten]
ready to send
at this time
DRV
3174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
^y<?
TIATIOMS "ITH JAPAN AOPEAH TO 8t TCWMINATtD
DURPOSES >'ITM OW.V THE BAREST 00S« I BIH Tl ES
GOVERNMENT WIQMT OOME BAvIC AND OFFER TO
AHCSt FUTURE AvSTION UNf»RED(CTI BLE BUT HORTIUE
ACTION t>OS-|HUE%lT ANY yOMEMT <?T0«> IF MOf!T»UtTIES 0«NNOT COMMA
RCPfAT CA:N0T OtjtUA SE AVOIDCD THE UNITED STAT S DESIRES THAT
JAOAN COM'MT THE F I R<T OVERT ACT STOP THIS «»OC«Ct rtiXlUD MOT
(■CV.WA RrPEAT NOT Or.W BE CON«!TPUL0 AS RESTw|rtTlNO VOO TO A
SOUrSE OF ACTION THAT miOHT JE0<»AR'^I 2E v/>UR rEFPHRE STOP PRIOW
T «^C^TILt JAPANESE Ai'TION VOU ARC niRECTKT TO UNDERTAKE
SUCH ReC••>N.^AIS>A■4^JE AND OTHER IJEAUnC; AS V'>U DECH f*ECE8PARV
BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD 6K OARI.IfD OUT SO AS NOT COMMA
«Ei»CAT NviT U..«MA To ALARM CIVIL PO»iJLAT« )N 0« ?l Si^OSE INTENT
STOo REPORT VEA?UPE? TAKEN JTOP SHOULD HOSTILITirs o' UH iV
WILL CARRY OUT TH, rASKS A?8I0NED \H RAIWJQW FIVE SO FAR A.H
VJ»^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3175
■aMAL OOnrt. imnVD STATU ARMY
TiM tdtmmlmt ■iiifi ««• nmtt^m* M iU4ie StaikM WTJ ia CODE
SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED
TMCY PEKTaIN to japan ST0'> Ll«n Dl <EMINAT|i-, Of TnlS -IGHLV
SCCHET INrORMATION TO MIMMOM ES ENTIAL OTFICERR
MARSMALU
116P/?r
cs^
(SF.CRKT )
(HESTRKneo ) LT J H ■■- .
(S<rtk« out two) C^.'' '.-'. .'.7 !j4 1
Ai»»>-r i*m.M b* m«fk«<i ANSWER lo C«l« Mmmi* No AT^ ^7T 1
3176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
itdiAL ctmn, owns irATV army
* jl^;- VAMIMfOf Be NTlWn Z I'' '■
*0 ,? fTT"
SAfmrnm lenofunms juv« cow to ni*eT:cii ita.i>*at«
it wxnenb swt iMrmn cowMxtao ocwi*;. .^^ cHiir or
sr«rr e«ur
War Dept G«-2 file coT)y
stanped on "back:
"CODE SECTION
W. D. M. C.
1941 UOV 27 PM 6:06"
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3177
t]
Mk -JMKMItnM HAWABAM OSPAItlV JIT
pcMflr MATnw. T. a
Km OCPARTMKNT ADJUTANT G£NERAL<
{•SmM 1 aflMal nkiieanun Im MMt. Thtt m m* *•*» NOT ««r«« w
Tin*
•Pri«*y.
,At.';,t
MCMIi
%^^<^^-2.^vt
N»
We PUarf'
■r-.>dKannx..i .J
AMn«v«4 (at TmMRtMMaai
A<l|«i<«i n«Mr*i
tim.tJi roc ( 4.S.VS1 ixo r. .-uTot/vtn ., ^ •,• -.
HOtvoiT ^Mn-at i-».<loi. 1.1 a^K r.ira :, ..r
L.
nmmn^
Bso an
i« JOS mfiiimn ae
5«*<» a? HOT *i
Ue r.
•My M IM iKKimlWl* Th* anMitnt •*
••••'•I'* OWm. wMKvwt «*l*r. <AII MMI
fm«A •» Ita It i«i«i iini I
y
3178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
P 9 J lUDlOQHAM
0-U-C
KMviv^ *t tiM W*r DapartBwnt Manat* Cwiiar
Room )44l MunitioM BM«.. Wathinclon. D. C.
NOVaOER 20, I9UI
Fron
i. t^p*ttfurmikt4 tfj B«iW.'
P H 1 0 a I T Y
FO!{T SHAFTE!^ TH
_55IJL_jtf.
7-e g'iOJ' OF STAFF
NO. 959 NOViWittiH 27TH
!a';POHT UEPARTK^V.NT AIJr.-KTl-.D TO PRT.VENT SABOTAOE PVTUOD .
' LIAISON 'iMTH NAVY RKURAD FOUR SKVU^ TOU TWiJJTY SEVKNTH
'' SHOiiT
(^ -x^^i^, wPbii /w'^
46 A 00
DEC 8 M\
VT
Action Copr
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3179
HEAL.JARTER3 HAWAIIAN DtrAtCnOi
FORT SHATTER, T. H.
MtMORANDUM FOR DtPARTMtNT ADJUTANT GiNtRAl
(data)
bo ••nl ThU mMM«« do«« NOT cov.i aub-
•rnl m ■ innMi(«, sithcr in th* cl**r or
havinK a diffrieni •ecurll)' ckwlftcatlon.
R>^u
rSlVfl 1 oH^ci.1 tadiogtain b* M
th.l thr lulluwmi | *«hMwUMF } |«I m.ltci ptav.ou.ly
ThH
• KC M
•Stnki out word» not applicable
Ml.n.lur. »urt TUl..
J
Srnt •• Radiogram Maaaagc Cantei
No No
Tim
• Filed
Ch«ck Cod. Clerk
1
114 «AR KR Ids HO prnr
«JlSKi DC 84 2 F »cT tS J Ml
c a
Approved for Tranamieeion ;
Aitluiaot Uaiiara
iun DOT rr snAmu t h
482 tars CRiriCAi siroArica ddujids that all PiucAirriovs as Tuta nofKDt*i«,T
AOAiasr suBVfeHsiVK ACTiYiTiKs niTuiii HSU) Of itvis»natnvK RMPoisiaiiTTT or
.AM OU-ABnUiHr rAatjJi «&• i-AiUaitAMl THMUb HU) 8C TUm DAIB TJITTT KIVK OR) FARJCi
gTor ikUK) otsiaio tuat tuj lairuri roRrwani all aooitiuial MusuRr^ kechssaxt
TO FHOTiDs ro» noTBorto* or Tons uTABUsmiarrs oomia psd) nirr couu aid
•Qtanoarr aoaimt tABOtmtt com a Pitorwrioa or roux ymootasL aoaikst aoBnotsivs
nOMQAimA A«D PW.'TSCn01l OF ALL AOTiriTIES A£)AIMST SSriCIAOS tTgC THIS DOES KOT
RIU'£Ar lOT MUM THAT ATT ILLBOAL UUSUKU! AU AUTHORIZED STor TSOT XTIVE VBASURa
uouu) 3K coarxiKO to trom sssurriAL to SKCURITT COMUA AVUIDINO JIHEXUUART
rOa.ICITT AID ALAMM stop to IMWHi SfOD ur TIAIMXSBIO* lOCaTICAL rSJEORAMi
ARK ftnm BWn to AU, air fTAtlOM BUT Ti!I8 DOSS »0T HKJ-iWr BUT AmKT TOOR
RoiPoiisiBiLiry unsR ntSTUo imtmdctiobb
tlBJE COFT f
Tl y'c^Tua
LT OOL TKfM fkl , _ _ ^, __, p.iii..,.i«^ Ona aeav am» W »« awkmltte*. The makln« •« a«
•lOTl: TM. farm W M «aa<l «.!» for n.«la«rai..« .«« Ca»l«irama. o»a aor an.)- w ~ V^^,„^,, ----_I„ _,|| a.
I!^ mart*, aacr., .. ..«W.MI.I a. «K. «i.. ~.r •-• TKki «», win »« "'••-"^.^^^.r'^ Tm^
wlt«n
r«r« ■!.•»• IIT
3180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
■TAMOAM0 rOKM WO. 14«
■ MIMI
~ ■' '•'M "'
fCLCGRAM
omciAL. BUSiNnw— oownNMcrrr hatoi
COMKANDINC r,KN>;RAl.
HAWAIIAN DF,rARTMV;NT
IfVKt 3H'>FTER T H
ATTSXTION ojvj ■•: :■
Af. RiLLOW Pt Isr'V
DESIHKD XU>K AO/.I'
RE3J0NSIBIUTY OjK
PUUP FIVbJ »P=T! TH
ONCE JSHIOD IT !C I ,' !' . : :.
y(v rv^rKVWTZVt V i '.■ vinr T^-
r.'TVSHSlvE i^r-K-.;M>x - '-'^ ; ■' T,
PHOTKCTTON ACAINTT
THIS DC-S NCT ".rJ .- ' :
AND rCPUCITY '"'^r-
! A'',f, IT !G AL"
Tlih Crilhr '-.' ^ • ;
PESIOD "T' '.. •;: ...
rm.M »VAR Dei'ARTMtNT
Uo_44i^-4ii_a»-4A^r
/^^r^' lUiiUi
Sl
witi. r
Official - Secr«rt
AdJut»At 0«r»r»l . \
47
R. B. LtmsDn
Sad i.ieut-. Air Corpa
> ■•it..- .:,:,i: l.r.' .>r
^o/
fc V
[stsinped] CODE SECTION
W. D. M. C.
' 1941 NOV 28 PM 8:15
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3181
'■4'
roKT aMAmti.T. m.
mMK».Ai&m TO« DWARTMKNT ADJUTANT GINBIUL.
■JMUMHWIftWi tf^.—
RxhMM ifcM iIm l«IWwl.t,
Tkl»i
"Pittinr.
::>
*S(rik« MM wmnU net «ppllii«hl».
THQMM B.
Lt. 0«X. . /.A.O.O..
tM^Jk
ttaw PIM'
y
«.''jt:
tSl *DJOT.',CT OKMOUL
WAR DEPfirmmT
WASHINtWON D C
A»W!il^..'l"»rX'^'
JuMHtMOT ttMMWMl
m TOOT StCRi.T RABIO TOOR OOHr TiO
Rju. fR«cu.tmojs Atu akUB
^
TAxsi AQAiKST suBTLHsivs ACTIV1T1J0 nnDi nu Fuut w urmarxaAnvik EiiiwiwiaiirBr
cr «AR DEPADmomr mjum paxaomph tuitu kxs sc murt o«ai vocrr nn i» msm im
Vk
laLTTAHT iaTABUsaiEiTs imcuidik: putsoNOL AMD lonMisHr asoiP A» UQAKM nwuniOB ^
cr TITAI IKSTAULATIOKS OPOTSIOS OT KIUTAXT njoatatom 8008 AS POUK PLAMBI MMA ^
TCLEPHo;;! exceJaicxs a» biobxat bridgis ccmu mis siAfiaiAirnEBs nr ootanoMinia >|^
LFnra OATiD JTSk nncnn nxisiBi fOBTf on BaopnorAD tn ooDdBioB or rtu minarx
TO T»I m BBOAO POfSSS TXSTB) IN Rill BT SHCTICa SIXST SBVOI Or Ttfik OaOAXXC AOT VBOB
PRovnuEs ztsma. in cmcr cmka tbat tsx cM>vmN» lur ciaxx opw tn wteuMnam <ar
BILITART AKD RATAL fOBOlO OF TKl OKTtt STATIBS X» tBB TEBMltanr Of HMUII tO PBBWW^
OR SOTTRJOSS LAWUBS VlOUWa; OOBU HWASIOB OOMHA IBSauaBOTIoa do aBWMP fOMBMUR tP
TUB AtmioBtrr srtATS) trx oovibho* ob jxaa nansM coKnoomAixr maok a fOMUL
TOTni' DBVrS OR THIS BBA&^JARTBM TC ftSHiaB AMD OOHnMBS 90 POBCaB BDOB APWKTB
■•MMk Mtil
"""^
3182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
f
POR OtPARTMOfr ADJt/rAMrrcifCRALi
<
ApiHvvarf far Tn
A4)lilul O ■■■»»»
MOITCO
ncrnnOK as mat BK mtOBBJjnr to FWTe»t SABOTmOJi. COWU;^ AIC LA*IJ:.SS VIOU^'Cc. II.'
coNHnmon ■naauotiiB iioiatA ,b»iko ocMVtrrto AaAiicrr vitw, iKr:AU--~ioi:c /iKj
9WwroMB IK Tnt TwacTonr otop pcrsuaj/t to tiu. «»<inciNc lo^vtr". >,rrac*'Ki;.Ti.
KIUTAHT PROTiarirK IS !W« BilNO AffCRDiO VITAL ClVIUfcN ltwTAiX».nCi;i/ STOP i:. TLl .
CCWRKCTICm CCMIU, AT TW IKJTIOATIOJ; OK THir H*Ai>V,UAHTtiC TIU. CITY «;iU Ct-U.-Df CT
HOWOUnjD OH ratlK TiaRTliETH NIKiTiAN FCrfTY olw i-VCTt-C .:. i.,u.:j,t*.t. *hlCrt i'l.**^;-.-
TKE OOMUI-Oll.-O OU.-ERAl HAMAIUt.' DtP. .Cl-W: ^U-k.. TC CU,3x. sJv^iA* <..< u— ihiJl TIU VZt.
(Sr ATD TRAVnL UPCK COHKA AKY HICH*/.Y -ZTJU:. THt ;ITY A..U JO^^.'.Y Of bOl.wtJi..: JUJm.
wuwtvw TH« co)aL»:iiMC ss.-tSAi, Oiii;.-. jucm ac-.u:. i.iOk-^-riY :;. Zh^. ;KT^tii;T ok
B/,TIOf(AL DEnBJSS STTOP THE A-.THCKITY THUS OIVUJ KA3 I.C: Yj.1 hit!* iXiunClSea JTO?
UKUTIONS WITH f B 1 AMD ,.iX CTIU^ KtDAR/,1. Atil> TtW<:TOhI>.L OKICL.U; AH*, a;.^ i...V_
SEEK CO<«lAl. Arc yTT"Al :r^"nA-.T10!; 1U.3 a«i!. ^:v„, ^t. ,..^ j'.-itTU.juVr ^TTthS
ENC ::.x: BY
LT J j^ r:NOHU>:SaE so
MOTI: TW. ((mt «• M km* iwlr «•' «««l»tf«"« an* C«»l«tr*<M. Oo* m«|> Mlf I* to iMtlHw*. Til* iMMllilt •« «t a
•••r >< tMrvl f C»>rtM»Mlal (••4i*|r«mt li f*rk««A. Onir M**i artrMU n ai^ alMwIwtaly nmialri •rtll k* a
•M markM aaarat ar aaxAaanttal aa ma aaaa mar »a. Thia aa»r <>><l> ka aafotMraiMI with <ha |raa«a«l aam a*al a
L JX^ "♦ l*"»«' '••ulr»« will •a fatu"(.a ta Iha llaaar«a OWIalaai. A4>itaM Ckanaral'a 0«la«, wllKaaM Aaiay. (AH M*
ranaaa. a< iiti a ■<«. laaa >.<>..•. i.. m ta aaa
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3183
o-U-o
ui
PRiotmr
>M4I
■KY
,D.C
"i57A u.
J?3H»PTO.
r. THBAflO.
tfO TWBNTT
■■KIUUUJ 110,^966. NOVBOn 29M.' * ^
IBB YOUR SBIBT NUDZO FOQR JSlWa
XIGHTH. FVU. FRBCAOTI0N3 ARE miM TAXn AQAIN9T 8UBVIRSIVI
ACTIVITZBS WITHIN THE TISLD OT INVKSTICUtlVB fOSPONSlB-^^
iLmr OP 1AR ntPT parw pmuuhufh threb urn 9C wrarY j^
BASH PCnTY nvX WD PARBi AND UILITARY ISTAH.ISIi(ENT3 «^
INCUIDXNa URSONNBL AND SQUinam. AS lOXURra FROtKTICMOgk
.OP VltAL mSTALLAf IONS OUTSIDK OF MILITARY RSSHRVAXX0N8 .^^
sum AS POKBR PLANTS* TBXFHONB BCUANOBS AMD HXaBUX
BRIDGM, THIS WPS BY CONFIOTMTIAL UOTTBt DATBl) JWW ^^^
NIMEtBM NSamW FORTY ONE RBqUBSBED TOt OOVSMOR »
THE TBniTQIir.TO l»B THE BtOAD POICRS VBaOD IN KM BY
aaoncM sxxty. sevw or the oromnic act mam iwvugbs
Ol BViKT, THAT THK OOVBRMOR MAY CAUL UPON THE
or MILITARY AMD NAVAL FORCES QT T« IMIZED SBAKS 3lf
amaTOHi or bamah to prevent or supnvss itaoMm ..
Viai»CE. SfVASUM,. atSORnBTIGM ETC. WRSUXt fO «t
AOTBOBITY 8TASBI T« OOVBWOR OM JOW TWRTBBI
OQMFXDMTXAIUr MASK A FOHIAL Wrtl* MMAW) OH flOS
mm «► wuafgf^m oownw to4ww« sua
1
.1*^,-
3184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
RtMivad M tlM War Oip«ft«Mst Mimgi CwMw
Hmm 3441 Mw^tiMi BUg.. WadMactmi. D. C.
FnML.
To.
sHspT ^ 9r nwww H9. 99^e?IH.
^fjpr?rfl«t--
IT
i
Ifiii
8 S • • S
x*IT
PROTECTION AS UAY BE NECESSAJTlf TO PREVENT SA'K)TAGE, AND
LAWLESS VIOUKCE IN CONNECTION THEREWITH, BEir.'G CCIC.:ITTED
AGAINST VITAL INSTALLATIONS AND STFOJCTURES IN THE TEft^IT-
OEff. PURSUANT TO THE F0REC5OING fEEQJUEST APPROPRIATE
MILITARY PROTECTIC»< IS NOW BEINO AFFORDED VITAL CIVILIAN
INSTALLATIGNS. IN THIS CONNECTION, AT THE INSTIGATION
OF THIS HEADQUARTERS THE CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU
ON JUNE THIRTIETH NINETEEN FORTY ONE ENACTED AN ORDNANCE
WICH PEHMITS THE CC»A<ANDING GHIERAL HAHAIIAN DEPT, TO
CLOSE, OR RESTRICT TOE USE OF AND TRAVEL UPON, ANY
HIGHIAY WITHIN THE CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, WHENEVER
THE COMMANDINO OWERAL DSaiS SUCH ACTION riECESSAHY IN
THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. THE AUTHCa^ITY THUS
GIVEN HAS NOT YET BEEN EXERCISED. RELATIONS KITH FBI
AND ALL OTHER FEDERAL AND TERRITORIAL OFFICIALS ARE AND
HAVE BEW CORDIAL AND UUTUAL COOPERATIOB HAS BK8N GIVKH
ON ALL FBRTINiKT UATTKRS. ' .^
SHORT.
I, 19U,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3185
' KMwvsd at lh« War Department Mcaaaga Crater
Roon 3441 MumtMM BUg.. Waahiacton. D. C.
DBCEMBER 10, 1941
M.
From.
rt sKAjrrtR th
To.
CHISr JMtt AIR CORPS
C«fw</arauJM «i aMW;
BFrnJiiPii
f?tufc..VED
»U Artr;. AIR A. G.
/'
■Q. XOajICSjtCgMBm 4TH^
rOLLOWIlK} RBPORT M COHPLUICB miTH IISTBOCT lOSS CONTAIHED III
AswAP POUR siaB^£ggR oash mCTr ki-.ht culob cihstkuctioks
co»7aihko m sobjbct radiogram issued to ALiu ESTABLismearrs ajid.
OTIITS UHDES COKTRQL Of UAWAIIAX AIR POPCS Oil TWUTT NIKE HOVBMBSS
STOH MTIR8 SUajSCT OP P80T8CTI01I ReCEOTLr REC«I\'EO COMMA ATO
cownnnss to RBcgrvs comma detailed kko comprihehsivb attwtiow ^
'AS SJISULT 0? THRKE REPORTS RJEPASED BT SPECIAL INSPECTOR DORISO i|
At
JOTB AMD JVLX PORT OW STOP PAHA ADDITIOKAL STEPS IHITIATEB §
SPICinCALLT TO COMPLT WITH SDBJECT RADIOGRAM SOBSTASTIALLY A2 S
rOLLO»rilJC01;01l ASStlBLT Of IllTKLLiaEllCS OfPICERS OF MAJOR StTBDIVlSIOK
Of BIWAIIAW AIR PORCE TITErPr KIRB HOVSMBBR STOpJ PERSOHAL
IHSPtCTlOt OF STATTOBS AID ACTIVXTIKS BY AIR KORCB COMMAJIDER
OK AID TVO DBCSMBIR 3T0|j IHCRXA8B I* SUE OP WARD MHSKX
OmXABUI STQ^BSTRDCTIOVS ISStHSD TO SXPBDITE OVXSHAHLim OF
PASS StSTBM COI«tt[CIVIi.lAl AJD MILITAJ^T COMMA »(* l» PROGRESS STOP
TBI8 EWTIRt DBPARTMWT IS KM OPERATIJIO AITO WILL CORTIWm TO
OPHUTI OK>BB AM AUBT FOR PREVESTIOB OF 8AB0TA0E ACTIVITIBS STOP ft
PARA 8KCFECT OISCIPLHIE BSrWO OIVB» ALL EMPHASIS PRACTICABLE
TBROOOH OFFICIAL AXD QUASI OFFICIAL AOEBCrES STOP WORK HAS
ACTTJALLT BKUI BBOOll OH BSSElfTIAL PROTECTIVE FEIICIN'5 aKD FLOOD
3186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Recti v»d at th« W»r Department MMMfc Center
Room 3441 Munition! BIdf.. WMh<tt|ton. D. C.
hrum _
<..p...!»f.„k^„^^: P*6» t»o No. 105S D«o«i»t«r 4th
LH--HTTNG I'ROJTCTS ST>P/P>U<A V,ITH REFERENCE TJ COUNTER PPOPAGAOTA
/
C^MMA THE PROBLKH IE EDUCATl .''NAL FATHER THAN RKTJiJVT.'H Y ANn AT
PRESENT IS BSINO DEALT WITH THROUGH THE MKDI'JM OF SQUADRON TALKS ^
'stop NEED IS FELT FOR A *AR DSPAHT»ENT ITJBLICATION PARKN POSSIBLY
]ilN FORM OF DEVELOPMENT AND EXPANSION OF FOREWORD TO SOLDIERS
iHATOB.)OK COIW^KU T.'.FNTY ONE DASH ONE HUNDRED PA»E« STIITABLY
AARANr.ED AN1) rtOK'JED F.^5 U3r, OF PE^^TIVELY IHEXPERJEKCED PVRSONTJEL
'COWAA DKA1.1NG ^.ITH - TABUS OF SOLDIER AS CITIZEN COMkA IDEALS AND
'dOCTRINKS INFLUSNCINT. F'VIK)""?S OF AMBRICAB r.O\'ERN;JEKT CMMA
I STROCTUT'E OF C.OVERNUENT C 1MMA PLACE OF !IIl.ITAi<Y SSTA3LISh!ffNT
} 1% THJ' STRUCTURE COMMA NATI.jKAL OBJECTIVES COjSJiA HUTH >JMEJTIC AND
; INTEfNATIOHAL COIOiA TuOETHER WITH DISCUSlIuN OF TH.>SE KORICi OF
lOW.PK.'.ffirKT INIMICAL TO lEkWCRX"' i; F..>;.M T:" SnNr',1 MAi_7IK END
:! SHORT
Action Copy
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3187
EXHIBIT NO. 136
M-3
War Department,
Office of the Chief Signal Officer.
Washington, November 19, 19^1.
Memorandum to Mr. Harvey H. Bnntly, Special Assistant to tlie Secretary of War
Subject: Performance of SCR-270
1. Tliere is attaclied a copy of a memorandum from the Department Signal
Officer, Hawaiian Department, relative to the operation of Radio Set SCR-270
in the Hawaiian Islands, which is forwarded for your information.
/S/ Eugene V. Elder
Eugene V. Elder,
Lt. Col. Signal Corps.
November 14, 1941.
Memorandum for Colonel Col ton. Chief, Materiel Branch.
In recent exercises held in the Hawaiian Department, the operation of the
radio set SCR-270 was found to be very satisfactory. This exercise was started
approximately 4 : 30 in the morning and with three radio sets in operation. We
noted when the planes took off from the airplane carrier in the oscilloscope.
We determined this distance to be approximately 80 miles, due to the fact
that the planes wotild circle around waiting the assemblage of the remainder
from the carrier.
As soon as the planes were assembled, they proceeded towards Hawaii. This
was very easily determined and within six minutes, the pursuit aircraft were
notified and they took off and intercepted the incoming bombers at approximately
30 miles from Pearl Harbor.
It was a very interesting exercise. All the general officers present were highly
pleased with the proceedings of the radio direction finding sets and the personnel
associated with the information centers.
We have had very little trouble with the operations of these sets. When
the fixed stations are installed in the higher mountains surrounding Hawaii, we
expect to have as good an air warning system available for use as is now operat-
ing for the British on their tight little island, as their situation is approximately
the same as ours is on Hawaii.
C. A. POWEXL,
Lt. Col. Signal Corps,
Department Signdl Officer, Hawaiian Department.
EXHIBIT NO. 137
War Department
Classified Message Center Outgoing Clear Message
OPD 381 Haw (19 Nov 45)
Operations Div WDGS Current
Group WDOPD 74676
19 November 1945.
COMGENAFMIDPAC Ft Shafter T H
Information :
CINCAFPAC Admin Manila P I
Number : WCL 22214
From : WARSEG
Congressional Pearl Harbor Committee desires all orders and memoranda
pertaining to time .schedule for operation of and training at radar stations
in Hawaiian Department during the period 27 November 41 to 7 December
41. Some evidence here indicates that schedule was initiated by verbal order
on 27 November 41. In that case confirmatory written order or memorandum
is requested.
End.
ORIGINATOR : OPD
MC-OUT-22214 (Nov 45) DTG 201810Z Is
Unclassified
79716 O — 46 — pt. 18 22
3188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Radio Mes.sauk Datkd 21 NovEAtBER 1945 From CG AFMIDPAC, Ft. Shafter,
TH TO War Department
[Paraphrase]
Will forward by air mail on 21 November four orijiinal papers relating to time
schedule for radar stations' operation and training in Hawaiian Department from
27 November to 7 December 1941.
[Description of the four papers is omitted.]
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3189
( BUY
SECRET
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
MIDDLE PACIFIC
Ai\?R/rrm
In npt7 reter to:
:jpqct AG 413.684 (
Classified SECRET
Auth: ™»S
Date: 21 Jan k€,
Initials: OPp
SUBJECT: Operating Time Schedule for Radar Stations on Cahu from
27 November 1941 to 7 December 1941.
TO : The Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington 25, D. C.
ATTiUTION: AC of S, Operations Division.
References: (a) Radio, Nr: WCL-ZiSH, DTG: 201834Z Not 45, from the
Secretary of War to the Commanding General, TJ. S. Army
Forces, Middle Pacific,
(b) Radio, Nr: RJ-73J81, DTG: 212004Z Nov 45, from the
Coraiuandlng General, U. S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific,
to the War Depart.nent, Operations Division.
1. Inolosures are forwarded to furnish information requested by ref-
erence (a) and referred to in reference (b) , both above.
2. nn exhaustive search through the files designated under Headquarters
Hawaiian Department has not disclosed the publication of Official Orders of
any kind tn connection with the time schedule of training at, or the opera-
tion of radar stations on Oahu during the period prior to 7 December 1941.
3. The inclosures consistently show that the time schedule, effec-
tive 27 November 1941, placed the aircraft warning radar stations on Oahu
in tactical operation from 4:U0 A. M. to 7:00 A. M. each day. Except for
Sunday, operation was continued for training from 1x00 A. M. to 11:00 A. M.,
while the afternoon period, fro-n 12:00 noon to 4:00 P. V., , was set aside
for routine maintenance duties.
TOR THE CCSaLiMDING GENERAL:
4 Incls:
^1 - Affidavit of Lt Grover C,
White, Jr., Signal Corps.
jj«2 - Memorandum to the Depart-
ment Signal Officer, Sign-
ed by W. H. Tetley, Cap-
tain, Signal Corps.
iX^KX^l'l-^
SECRET
3190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
(Basic: Ltr, HAIMIDPiiC, file tiPCXJT AG 413.684, 3Ub: "Operating Tima
Schedule for Radar Stations on Oahu froia 2? November 1941 to 7 December 1941.
^} - Memorandum to General Short,
dated 19 December 1941, sign-
ed by C. A. Powell, Lt Colonel,
Signal Corps.
jfA - Letter, Hq Hawaiian Department,
subject: "Detector Operation",
dated 20 December 1941, signed
by Lt Colonel W. H. Murphy,
Signal Corps.
SECRET
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3191
SECRET
Fort Shafter, T, H.) i'crsonally a;.i:'cared before rie, the undersij.ned,
I SB authority for adj.iuisteriiig oaths of tliis nature, one
Territory of liavmii) Grovur C. ..liite. Jr. 0-396182, 2nd Lieut., signal
Corps, "ignal Ccr.pany, Aircraft V/ornin^, -%waii who '
after being duly sworn aooordinc to law deposes and sayethj
1. At the request of the Control ^Jffioer and i'aval Liaison Officer
the AVra agreed to operate its detectors beyond the daily period of two
hours before until one hour after dawn. The first schedule required opera-
tion of all static, IS fron 4 k,'.'.. to 6 P.I,. This schedule was nodified to
the hoMrs of 4 A.;', to 4 P.V., A teriporary schedule was next devised which
required all statio. s to operate from 4 A.!!, to 11 A.:!, and to liave
"staggered" operation. I.e., 3 stations from 11 A.;', to 1 P.i;., the rer.iain-
ing 3 stations fron 1 P.V.. to 4 P.I., On Saturday, Deoenber 6, 1941, I con-
tacted the Control Officer to request autliority to have all stations oper-
ate from 4 A.i'. to 7 A.L;. only on Sunday, Docenber 7, 1941j this \ie.B agreed
to by the Control Officer.
2. Staff Gert;eant Stanley J. V/ichas, SC/^.VH, acting 3DF Officer, re-
ports t)iat he saw nothing that could be construed as suspicious in the in- ,
formation received by the -'li'fS Information Center froa 4 A.;;, to 7 A.j;.
Sunday, December 7, 1941. This is verified by Lt. Kernit A. Tyler, Air
Cores, who was the only officer in the Infortiation Center from 4 A.;', to
7 a'.LI.
3. At approximf'tely 7:20 A.;', a report was received from a Detector
station at Opana that a lurge nuiaber of planes was approaching Oahu on a
course "..orth 3 degrees East at a dir.tance of apiiroximately 132 miles. This
information was imnediately transmitted by the svnti;hboard operator, Pfc.
Joseph i-.cDonald to Lt. Tyler, vfho talked to Opajia about the flight. The
statement of Pfc. Joseph l.;cL)onald, SCW'ill, the switchboard operator is
attached,
4. Tlie i'avy Liaison Officer's position within the Inforr.ation Center
was not uanned when I reached the Infomntion Center at about 8:20 A.]!,
This .'osition i/as manned sliortly thereafter by Technical Sergeant Uerle E.
Stouffer, GC-'.ViII, vmo remained on the position until approximately 4:30
P.Li, v/hen tlie position \/as taken over by ilaval Officers.
Further the deponent saycth not, / / - ^
GROVER C. .:■■',"■.. JR., ^/
2nd Lieut., .jl^iinl Corps,
Signal Company, Aircraft Vi'arninr.. '^waii.
t^tfe^3lIei3-1^yPforil»gepr~Wl5Q^
Subscribed and sworn to before r.e this y'fnJ day oiAkc-^ A.D. 1941
at Fort Shafter, T. U.
ADAli R. aUGGlRg/ *
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Sunmary Court
^
>1 #1 to Ltr HAFiaOPAC, Flla MPGCT AG415.684(21 Hot 45), ..... „ - . „
dtd 21 Not 45, iutjj Oparating Time Sehedule for Radar Stationa on Oahu
27 Horaaber 1941 to 7 Daoamber 1941 .
from
3192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
MHilO: To Department Signal Officer.
The instructions given me verbally by Colonel Murphy were to
operate from Dawn-2 to Dawn^, which at that time was from Oii;00
to 07:00. This schedule was supplemented by a training schedule from
07:00 to 11:00 everyday except Sunday. The afternoon period was devoted
to routine maintenance.
W. H. TETLEY,;
Captain, Signal Corps.
SECRET
Inol #8 to HAFIODPAC Ltr. file BPGCT AG 415.684 (21 Hot 45), dtd 21 Hot' 45
2'7''HJ,2^r,^Sfil^"",^^'"*"^'' ^'"' ^^"- "^"°°'' °° 0»h" fro.
27 Hovtaber 1941 to 7 D«oember 1941.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3193
SECRET
Inreolyreterto: HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Office of the Signal Officer
Fort Shafter, T. H.
Slg.
19 December 1941.
Memorandum to General SHORT:
1. Instructions were issued by U Col W. H, MURPHY Acting Depart-
ment Signal Officer to Capt W. H. TBrLEY,C. 0. S±g Co A.W.H. on November
27 to start immediately operating the radio locators from two hours
before davm to one hour after davm which order was complied with to
include December ?•
»
2. This schedule was supplemented by a training schedule from 7:00 A
to 11:00 A every day except Sunday. The afternoon period was devoted to
routine maintanence.
C. A. PO'.VELL
Lt Col, Signal Corps
Dept Signal Officer
SECRET
lael #8 to HAFUDPAC Ltr,
file MPGCT AO 413.684 (21 Nov 45), dtd 21 Nov 45,
subji Operating Time Schedule for Radar Stations
on Oahu from 27 NoTamber 1941 to 7 Deoember 1941.
3194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET 4^
In reply refer to: HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Office of the Signal Officer
Sig. Fort Shatter, T. H.
20 December, 1941.
SUBJECT: Detector Operation.
TO : Department Signal Officer.
1. On November 27, 1941, after conference with Assistant Chief
of Staff G-3, and receiving instructions to operate all mobile detectors
from two hours before before dawn until one hour after dawn, I, as Acting
Department Signal Officer, gave immediate instructions to Captain TETLEY,
(Jommandlng Officer of the Aircraft Weiming Company, to initiate the above
detector operation so long as Alert No. 1 was In force.
2. The detectors in question operated dally thereafter during the
prescribed period except when having occasional operational trouble.
In addition, the six detector stations operated daily except Sundays from
7:00 A. M. iintil 11:00 A. M. for routine training. Dally except Saturday
and Sunday, the hours 12:00 noon until A: 00 P. M. were devoted to training
and maintenance work.
^rsf-i
W. H.
Lt Col, Sig C.
laol #4 to EAfiaOPAC Ltr. file HPOCT AG 41S.684 (21 Nov 45) SECRFT
dtd 21 Hov 45, lubj: Operating Tlmo flohodule for Radar ««.wnLI
Station! on Oahu from 27 Kovanbar 1941 to 7 D«o«ib«r 1941.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
EXHIBIT NO. 138
3195
*oNri!)rr
>
ij .
/^^t. c, .^^Lr^
►*«"-
3196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 139
COiirl^.ir.U.L
Ti«.ilr\- Ofticei C-Z, i. .:..,..
Army Contact f f f io«
llonol .1 .. T.! .
Dulej 17 October 1941.- 1200
r-2 bSTIKATL ''K INTlJ'.NATT AL ( JAJAIft-U.-.j l;ITOATI')"
1» SuBB'mry of Situation
a. Kith thH fall of th« Third Konoyw Cabinet, the ICth Inatact,
tanaion In th« l^oiflc reaohed a new h\-}\. The fall ol' aald cabinet la
apparently primarily t^ua to a breakdown of the rapproohcment nerotlatlons
between Amerlea and Japar., uru' alao <iua to extrene preasure fron the
rle^tltt elamenta in Japan aa a reiult of Oormac succeaa a^alnit Ruasla, and
alao for faar of conplete encirclement of Japan by the ABCD group.
b. Th« situation It n«n*>^Hy *dnitt«d aa balni; •xtremaly oritlctkl,
an4 la atlll aaeaatarlly unoartaln, due to the fact that the formation of
tho new eablaet haa not been oonpletad and, eonaequently, little or no
definite lAfonnatlon le available aa to the attitude of indlTidual meubera,
aad nothing aa to what the attitude of the cabinet as a whole will be.
e* Based upon contemporary opinlona froei varlona aeuroea, however,
it la fairly eertain that Japan's baale polloy, as heretofore fre<iuently
stated, will rsaain unehancedi and It Is expected that Japan will shortly
annoiinoe her decision to ehallenfie militarily may nation or eonbinatlon of
nations irtileh alf^bt oppose the exsoution of said policies - Irrespectivs
of #iat Meaas she aay ehoese to adopt or eourse she aay deelde to take in
their aehiSTnent.
t* CaaaluaJqaa
Aaeordlng to present indiaatlons, it is highly probable that Japan
will, ia tiie near ftature, take allitary aetien in new areas of the Far
Bast* The priaary reaseaa for tuoh a aore or aeres are believed to be
aa ftollowai
^ Oapahilitiea
1. Daaparata •aaaaala eaadittaaa lateraalXy-
■akiac it partaapa preferable to rlak a aaj^r fareica aar
rather than iatoraal rrrelntiea*
t. Tialeat oppasitioa bgr the "rlfhtiat" eleaaata
ih» ara appased to aagr apfssi— — t af the issusraalaa
aa4 iaairi asra aotlvs saafagatloa with Hia Asia • for
Hm tlaa baiac.
t« That aajar tn—BmB af «» Axis la
tlSB pStaatlal aallapaa af laaaiaa raaiatanas, affard m
•naittlUlad appartoaltgr tw •■paaaisa with ahaaaaa af
,1,1— f««Utmaa - that la« i^aa the atraacttt •t Iha
Aals ia at ita aaalMB. aad tha atrw^th af tha iwnsrasiaa
aat yet faUjr aabiUM*.
umillMillAL
(h
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3197
OOVXDUTIAI,
4. A tealr* to braftk th« •«-«»ll«4 «i«lr«l*>
m«Bt of th* ABCD blook.
^« Pro>»*bl» lloT»«. Tha aoat llkaly aeraa lAloh Jm^mn aay
■•k* li) this iM«r futtir*. and tha ••qu«ne« th»r«of « ftr* aa foll««ai
1^. Attaok Suaala froa tha a^at.
t* Praaaura Franab Ind..'Chla* and Thailand f«r
aoaea'aaioaa In tha «ay of mlXltary, aaTal, and air
baaaa, and (piarantaaa of aooaoatle oooparation.
£. Attaok Brltiah poaaasalena In tha Tv laat.
4> Dafand agaiaat an inarleaa attaak la aupport
of tha Brltiah.
^. Attaok ainmltanaousXy the A3CD blook at ahloh
arar polnta nlf^t pronlaa har eraataat t«otioal, atratagla,
and aooneado advantanoa*
£• Kaaaona Juatifylng Thaaa Hovaa. tha baala for aaah of
the aho^a postlbls noTaa ara eonsidarad to ba aa followai
1. Attack on Ru««la.
(a) Japan's dealra to axtand har tlrat Una of
dafanca aa far to tha waat aa poaalbla aa a primary da-
fenaa agalnat potantlal aarlal attaeka on tha teart of
Japan proper by a contiaantal power.
(b) To aat up a buffer atato bataaan haraalf
and Oaraany (aasuHlnr; that Oamany will aTcntually
attflBipt to extend har Infltianee and control aaataard t«
the Paeifie.)
(e) To aaeure luneaae quantities of mueh-aaadad
rail material* kno-wn to be In Slbsrla.
(d) To aaeure affeetlTe control over, or perhapa
atanp out, comnunisii In the Far bast by 8trlkln<; at tha
root or source of tho doctrine.
(e) A possibility' that an attack on Rusaia at
t)>is time oun be undertaken with a reaaonable rhance of
non-^illtary intervention '• tha United Statasj and t)iat
eTsn the Lirltioh mi :'.it not roaort to active mllltar^r
aetion in su,>port of Russia In the I'aoirio, due to tha
fact that both the ABorlcajis and Crltlsh are preooeupiad in
E<jropa. and that nelthor power has ai^' renuine dealre to
OTar see the state of the U3SR seierca auf ♦'lolently strong
to ar:aln pla(:ue the dsBiooratio states with tha sinister
IJeals of QOmi-xiniMn.
CONFIDiJiITIAL
•2-
3198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
oomivmrus.
(f ) T» oy«i •■■BBiMitloii* with 0«r— wy f*r tto
f«rp«B« cf alascr •oor41a«tiaa Ui4 rapply, la oft«« it b«*
Ma«« iM««aaMry ta •ontlBu* th« ww ac^^Bat ethar htaifla
pcwra*
(s) Ta ftahlar* a apaatAaulur vlatarjr vhiah la
aa« VPMttly aaadad to rmrXy tha BArmla af tha 9«apl« aB4
prapara thtm tor fntura afforta tavfaird tha aeuth*
t. hraeaara franah Intfo-CMn* and Thailand.
Pracaura ob Trmxoh Xndo-China aad Th&iland far a«B-
aaaaioaa 9t military, aftv«l, or air b*aaa, aad cumraataaa
of aooaoMla oooparation, i antirely to ba aj[paotad, aad
thia may althar praoada or follow, or oaour aiaultanaoualy
with aa attaak on Ruaala, ia ordar to iaaura aaourlty in tha
aouth lAtlla har prlnary objoetiva In tha north la bclag
aahlaTadi and to afford har aora and battar atmtaeio baaaa
froB which aha oan oparata afraina ChiiBi;]ciaf; ■ a llaaa of ao»>
■nmlaatieti, aad/oi' Aaarlakn aad Britiah liaaa of ooHauaiaa-
tlbaa In oaiaa It baeonaa naoaaaary to dafand haraalf agaiaat
althar or both of thaaa p«wara« Alao, to aaauro additional
raw natarlala, food, ate«
8. Attaok on Brltiah Poaaaaaiona in tha Tar »aat.
Pollowln.-* tha prlnoiple of dafaatlnr, one oppoaaat at
a tlna - fasiout with har Axla partnar, Jiitlar - it la balioTad
that Jftiar. , If faced vlth eertein British T.liitarj- raaiataace
to her plana, will unheal tat inrly attaok the Britiahi aad do
ao wlthio-it a airultaneoua attacV on ir.arlean poaser:slon,
because of no Icnovn bindin* t.r.rcrn^r.': botwser the Brit! ah and
Americuna for Joint nllltar^- action a-^ainat Japan, an«} that
the Anarloan publlo ia not j'et fully prepared ce aupport auoh
aotlon. HowBTar, it oust be arident to the Japaaaaa that in
eaae of auoh an attaoV 09 tha Brltiah, they would most ow- •
talnly hare to fl.-^ht the nitad jtatea within a relatlyely
short tine.
4. -Sinultaneoua AttaoV on thq A.BCD r'owara
■hlla a siiirultaneoua attaotr on the ^BCI. powars would
Tlolato tha principle mentioned a^ove. It oaiinot be ruled
out aa a poas 'ability for the roaaon that U Japan oonaidara
war with the I'nited State* to be ine-vl table as a result of
her actiona aralnst f^uuiila. It 1« rcajonablw to bellcTe
that she trny doolde to strlkf h^lort our naTal orofirarri la
eomilcted.
An attaoV on the '.'nitad State* eonti* net bo under-
taken without almost oertal r Irvolvonont of the entire
ABCf block, hoTioe there rmnalns the posslMllty that Japan
n*;- itrJifc at the most oppor'une tine, one' at whateTar
yioiats ni -ht "jalr for hor thr r-oit stratr -Ic, tactical, or
ecinorlc<»l 6d;)gLntk>'ns OTer hnr o-';'or»'nt!!.
C>VI!iJ.:i/a-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3199
9. iB oosMltiaioa, barrinc UBf»rMm and aat«««r4 iMld«B«a, i*i«h
mXffkt mt off • Mnfliot In ny qiMrter and inrlW aMnrcs antf — »wr'
BMsur** BTVvr •aBt«ipUt*4, it !• b*ll«T»<l ttet tlw ftb««« r«»r»Mato
th> MOtt lorloal aajer Mv*t that Japan may taka aatf tha probabla
acquanaa tharMf. TM« la aaatMinr that tha nmrn aablaat will ba, M
i;«Mrallx pradlatad, "atrondy ■illtary" and id 11 aupp«rt tha |inaa«»
dMajic>a of tha 'rlch^lata' ali—nta i«iieh «ara Urtaljr raapenalbla ftr
tha fUl 6f tha Thirtt Xoneya aabln«t.
OlOMk V, •ICKIBU.
Lt. Calaoal, O.S.C.
^at. A.C. of S., 0-t
CoBtMt Ufftaor.
PlatributioB
c/s r.H.D,
C-l, I[..1.D. »/
c-a. ;uA.r.
0-1, 6«lu>flal4 i^rroako (S aopiaa)
5-3. H.H.O.
K.3.I.. Haaolulu >2 o : i'»r.)
O.-.I., ' oaalultt It aopiaa)
3200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
C/S HID
CONFIDENTIAL
iBBuihg Officei G-2, H .H.D,,
Army Contact Office,
Honolulu, T.H.
Time and date: 1200 25 Oct. 1941.
G-2 ESTIMATE OF INTERNATIONAL (JAPANESE) SITUATION
1. Sximmary of Sltuationo Reference par« ■ .^^h 1, G-2 Estimate of the
International (JAPANESE) Situation, 120C uct. 17, 19^1, there have been no
fundamental chani^es in the international situation, cantering on Japan,
since the time mentioned; and the estimate iz still in almost complete
accord nith conten^sorary opinions of most high officials and reputable
observers who aro knovm to be in close touch with the various phases of
the present fast moving situation. However, the following generally auB-
mary is considered appropriate at this time:
a. A crisio of the first magnitvide was created in the Pacific by the
fall of the Third Konove Cabinet on the I6th instant. The fall of said
cabinet was cllej.-edly precipitated by unsatisfactory progress of the rap-
prochement rjgotiations between America and Japan, and by extreme pnressure
fic'n "rightist" elements who have been clamoring fpr stronger ties with the
Axis and more foiceful opposition to the ABCD block, including Russia.
b. An apparently imminent collapse of the Russian foccsa in the west,
together with the loudly proclaimed German successes everyiiiere, tended to
accentuate the cry for action on the side of the Axis to such a degree that
the Konoye cabinet could no longer resist, hence resigned en block, and waa
almost immediately replaced by a new cabinet headed by ex -War Minister,
General To Jo.
c. Ministers of the new cabinet, as well as Premier Tojo, have
openly declared their intentions of stronger ties with the Axis - which
automatically underscores Japan's policies with "intensified aggression";
definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States and other
democracies; makes all protestations of peacefiil intentions a sham or
objective of suspicion; and forces America into a state of constant vigi-
lance - but at least clarifies the situation to such an extent that we do
know where we stand, what to expect, and what should be done.
2. Conclusions. No change in paragraph 2 of G-2 Estimate of 17 Oct. 1941.
However, several important incidents have transpired, or are
scheduled to take place, which are certain to have a profound bearing on
the probable course of events in question in the near future. These are:
a. The formation of a new Japanese "War Cabinet", headed by ex-Weu-
Ulnlster, General Tojo.
b. The decision of Premier to continue his predecessor's order to
permit three Japanese vessels to visit American ports for the purpose of
transporting stranied Americans and Japanese natiohals to their respective
homalaads.
c. Premier Tojo's expressed desire to continue rapprochement nego-
tiations with the United States.
d. The order by the navy department to American vessels to avoid
Asiatic ports in the north Pacific, including Shanghai.
e. The annoimced decision of the American government to abandon
Vladivostok as a port of entry for war supplies to Russia, and to adopt
the port of Archangel as the sole point of entry for such shipments.
-1-
CONFIDENTIAL ^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3201
j[. Announcement of Ajobassador Nomura 'a return to Japan for conault-
ation with the new cabinet.
3, Jufltificatlons for conclviaionB. The following is a brief analyalB and
evaluation of the above, based on limited reports, ajad is not bo be regarded
as conclxisive, but rather to assist in making accurate conclusions on the
general situation as subsequent events and special situations are presented:
a. New Cabinet. Paragraph 1 fi above *-• the general answer. The only
other noteworthy viewpoint received, and n i:idered to be worth mentioning,
is that General To Jo waw selected to head the new cabinet because he was
the only man considered capable of controlling the "ejctremlst" arny elements,
and thus stave off tmy precipitate action unt'JL such time as the situation
in Europe has become definitely clear, and until at least a decisive stage
has been reached in rapprochement negotiations with the United States.
b. Japanese vessels to America. The Japanese government's decision
to permit three ships to visit America for the purpose of repatriating
stranded nationals of both countries, may be regarded either as a peaceful
gesture or as a measure to "clear the decks" in the Pacific with a view to
future naval and military moves. It will be recalled that the Japanese
were careful to remove Japanese nationals from the interior of south China
before spreading military operations to that section. It is considered
impracticable to reiiove all Japanese (nationals from America and American
territories.
c. Rapprochement Negotiations. Inasmuch as the new Japanese cabinet
has openly declared its intentions of stronger ties with the Axis - definite-
ly our enenp - we can only expect Japan to. make a similar uae of peace
negotiationr^ as her partner, Hitler, i.e., as a means to delude and disarm
her potential enemAos. From a military point of view such peaceful overture*
shoxild be preci*ded by concrete evidence of sincerity before they can be
serlo\ialy considered.
d. Haw Order to Clear American Ships from North Pacific. This
action on the part of the navy seems to have been largely "precautionary",
which also appears fully Justified - realizing that we are now^efinltely
dealing with an exponent and ally of Hitler.
e. Abandonment of Vladivostok as a Port of Entry for Russian Suppliea.
Two issues are here involved:
(1) Military. Die crucial point as to whether wo will be able to
continue 9o face Hitler across the English Channel, across the Atlantic, or
ru American shores, caaters in the British Isles. Convoys must cross the
Atlantic in order to hold the British Isles at all cost, irrespective of
irtiat happens in the Pacific. Convoys to Archangel, for the greater part of
the distance, could be carried on incidental to convoys going to the British
Isles. Requirements of armed escorts for the remaining distance to Archangal,
would probably be less than what would be required over any Pacific route.
In fact, with a hostile Japanese fleet in the Pacific, any prcctioable
route across the Pacific to Russia may have been entirely ruled out.
Assuming this to be the case, the most logical step would be not to undertake
a thing that would certainly have to be abandoned later.
(2) Diplomatic. Inasmuch as the shipping of supplies to Russia
▼ia Vladivostok has been one of the major issues between America and Japin
recently, the abandonment of said route may serve to keep the door of
diplomacy open for a longer period; and, in ease of an unforeseen major
reverse for the Axis in Europe, might provide an open door for successful
negotiations at a time ;rtien Japan desired to change her mind, seeing that
further ties with the Axis are useless, and that a compromise with the
deBocracies has become inevitcble.
-2.
CONFIDL'MTIAL
3202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Goi>
•AL-
f . nonura'B report to Hwr Cabihet. BUs 1b floasidfrad a TWjr aoraia,
prooaclur« with the Japanese goveriaaent. Mr. Noaura will be •«paot«d to
give a revle* of his efforts in Waahlagton and pmrbapa tlM last «ard oo
the Anerlcan attitude. If hla prsTloua work is still In huwoar *lth
Japan's new policy, he jbbj return to Washington. If not. It •••■■ a flidr
a8suii9>tlon that he my not even be replaced. In case tha ataaerMl preQ«dar«
is fonowod, of dispatching a subordinate to Tokyo, It mtf be taken M ma
attanpt to conceal the real gravity of the situation. lULa is aot>
a prediction.
RBHMUCS. Bveryons is interested in the aamrar to tbo qiMStioB, WbMk
will Japan Bove? - a fuestlon wfaloh no one daves predict with eartalBt^.
However, the following points are considered to be worthy of ■sntianlnct
§. Things whloh tend to iadloate that a aajor aova will not tate
plaoa for approzlBately another aoath aret
(1) The dispatch of Japanese vessels to the United States for
return of stranded nationals of both oountries to their respoetlve hoaalaadr.
(2) Ambassador Hosura's return to Japan for purpose of reportiag
to thii her; cabinet.
(3; Ropcatoc declf rations b^- Japanese officials that Japan desires
to continue rapprocheTront riagotiations.
iU) Extreme cold over Bastam Siberia wakes allltary op«i«tiona
against Russia vory risky before spring.
(?) A protractf.'d Rucso-Gersan war seems nuch more Ukaly now
than it did iimrsd .lately ..rior to the assumption of office bgr the new eablnet*
and that the "r5.s'itiatc" iiAio rera crying for action against a "collapalag*
Russia, nay again hcaitito to take the final plunge on the side of Hitler.
If the intense cold plvr. a tirod Russian anfQr Is able to stop the javiaoiblo
legions of Hitler bcfoie Moscow (7), wisdom nay dictate not to risk the
matohlese legions of I/ippon ai^ainst a rested Russian army under tsapaiatUi —
still lower than arou:id Moseoii,
(6) Aimounccicent that Cabinet leaders have requested ^pwor
Hlrohlto to convoke a special five-day session of the £q>«rlal TUmt, toaglii-
nlng Mov. 15, at trtiioli tine, It Is predicted, the government wHl %• aaksd
to clarify Its stand on iaternatlonul polioies, particularly with Mfaranea
to former Preniler Koroye^s mtssaga to President Rooaavelt aid the pregraaa
of the Waslilngton negotiations*
^ In other wordi. It seems logical to believe that no ^ J or mov*
will be made beforB tb<) latter part of Movamber - in any direction * with
a chance that the gi^eat break, if It comes, will not occur before apriag*
Distribution t
Q-2 Sd^ofiold 3arrac!-s **"*^i;f;t*LJliJ^
0-2 24th Dlv. ConUot Offiear
0-2 25th Oiv.
P.B.I. (2)
O.M.I. (2)
Capt. Bryan, Srans. Sect.
-3-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3203
EXHIBIT NO. 140
WAR DEPARTI 4T
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
MEMORANDUM
i^hnJL^ UiiJFh rtJI^iL — <:^
1^ tJU^ l^fvuf^aj ^L^^
79716 O — 46— pt. 18 23
3204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
WAR DEPARl. .£NT
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON
/
4 EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3205
CONFIDENr.!/ '.
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
WAaMINOTON
January 27, 1942.
IffiMORANDDM for the Chief of Staff.
Subject: Course of action with respect to General Walter
Campbell Short.
1. Furauant to your instructions I submit the following
ooiaaAnts with respect to possible courses of action against the
above-named officer on account of the derelictions disclosed in
the report of the President's Comnission to investigate the
Japanese attack on Hawaii on Decenber 7, 1941. These comments
are based solely upon the text of the report of the Coanlsslon.
I have not seen or examined the 1867 typewritten pages of testi-
mony taken by the Conmlssion nor the 3000 printed pages of records
and documents examined by it.
2. General Short may be tried by a general oourt-aartial
or he may be summarily discharged from the Amy by the President
pursuant to the provisions of Article of War 118.
3. With reference to trial by general court-martial, it is
assumed that the evidence taken by the Commission sustains its
findings of fact and conclusions and would warrant such procedure
•hould it be deemed advisable. However, it is iiq>08sible to predict
with certainty the result of aiiy trial or the sentence iriildi the
court might i]q>ose. In this case should a court acquit or Impose
a sentence less than dismissal I can see no advimtage resulting
from such a trial. It will be noted that the offenses charged
against General Short are offenses of omission or nonfeasanoe which
re<|ulre a muoh stronger showing to justify a trial than those
involving misfeasanoe or malfeasance. General Short's nonfeaaanoe
or omissions were based on an estimate of the situation which,
although proved faulty by subsequent events, was,. In so far an
I am able to ascertain from the report of the Commission, mde
or concurred in by all those officers in Hawaii best qualified to
form a sound military opinion. That estimate was that an attack
by air was in the highest degree iaqprobable.
4. There are. In my opinion, serious questions of polioy
lAloh should be considered in connection with a posslbl» trial of
thla officer by gsneral oowt-martial.
CONFIDiiMTi.-- L
3206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
con; ... - .s ■
a. If a oourt should find him guilty and santano* hia
to anytiiinf leas than diainissal, the Army would be acouaad of «hit««
washing Ganeral Short. This aoousatlon wjuld be muoh mora atrongly
made ahould th« trial result in his aoquittal.
b. Such trial would have to be in open court, otherwiaa
the y/ar Departanent would be subject to critiolsai of whitawaahlng
General Snort if acquitted, or of persecuting him if oonrlotad.
o. The ramifications of this case are such that is a
trial by court-martial it would be necessary to introduce in
evidence numerous secret plans, orders and other peters which do
not appear in the Commission's report. Both the prosecution and
the defense would need these documents in order properly to prasant
their casea. It certainly would be against the publio Intaraat
to disclose soma, at least, of these various war plana and doouaaats.
Such being ths case, it would be in^oaaible to prevent the publica-
tion of these plans and documents except by closing tha oourt
during those sessions in which these saorat ps^ra ware read and
disoussad. The result of a trial by a court partly in open saaaion
and partly in secret session might be that tha War DapartSMDt would
be subjaot to the same charges of whitewashing or peraaoutioa aa
referred to in subparagraph b^ above.
d. A general court-martial would require tha tijM aid
energy for~a conaiderable period of a large number of ganarala and
other offioara of high rank as oiambera of the oourt-martlal, and
for peraonnel of the proaeoution and dafanaa. It would oonaii—
such time and effort of the numerous offioara of tiia Arsy and
Kavy whoaa sarvloes would be required in order properly to praaaot
tha oaae tor trial, or iriiose attendance would be raquirad aa
wltneaaas. The rmifioations of such a trial would ba so great
and it would require the time of so many offioara ftrom tlia lowart
to tha hl^est rank that it would interfere aarioualy in tha main
Job now before the ilTar Departmsnt, naxwly tha proaaoution of th*
war.
a. Tha oareer of General Short aa an aotiv* Amy offloar
ia f iniaha? and oloaed. Beoauaa of tha laok of oonfidanoa wfaloh
tha publio now has in him, whioh laok of oonfidanoa would no doubt
be shared by hi a future aubordinataa, it is unthinkable that any
oosBMnd should again be entrusted to him. Ganaral Short knowa
thla. That in itaelf la a very severe punlahaant. Furtharmora,
Oanaral Short has been relieved of hia ooiaiand wfaloh radueoa hljB
from a llautanant general to a major general. Aa addition to ttaaffe
punlahxMnt of any punlahaant other than dlamiaaal* suoh aa a
raprlMuad, loaa of fllaa, forfaltura of pay or au^anaioB tnm
CONFIDh.Xvl : ; .
y
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3207
CONFlDEiMlL..
, would b« Inapproprlat*.
6. For tha Pr«ald«at to dlaohars* 0«n«ral Short aunaiwrlly
undor tho provlslona of Artlbl* of War 118 would toad OT«n aor*
■troncly thai a dlinlosal by a aontanoa of a ganaral oourt-nartlal
to oaoabla hla aftarward to olala paraaoutlon. Eo'vlaad Btatutoa,
Motion 1244, proTidaa that whan an offloar ia 62 yaara old ha aay
ba ratirad froa aotlTo aarrloa at tha diaoration of tha Praatdaat.
Oanaral Short will ba 62 yaara old on Uaroh SO, 1942. UomTor, it
ia unaooaaaary to dlaouaa thla aouraa of aotion for tha raaaon that
you haTa Infozaad ma that Oanaral Short haa offarad to apply for
ratlraawit at any tlaa you nay daaira to aooapt it. Ha may lawfully
ba ratirad upon auoh ^pplleation.
6. Oanaral Short oitarad tha Army aa a aaoond liautanant
of Infantry on Pabruary Z, 1901, and had, up to Daoaobar 7, 1941,
naarly 41 yaara of honorabla and moat oraditabla aarrioa. Ha «
raaohad tha naxt to tha hlghaat rank that an Army offloar oan
raaoh, namaly that of a llautanaat ganaral.
/. I raaliaa that tha quaation of iriiat ought to ba dona in
tiiia mattar haa baan tha aubjaot of haatad diaouaaion in tha praaa
and alaandiara and whatarar may ba dona will probably aubjaot tha
War Daparbaant to oritioian. HowoTar, in viaw of all tha oonaidara^
tiona karalnaboTo diaouaaad, I raapaotfully auggaat tha adviaabili^
and tha daairability of aooopting tha applioation of Oanaral Short
for rrtlriant HowoTar, in thia oonnootion I would furthor auggaat
that it would ba both politio and Juat to ooordinata tha aotion
takan by tiia War Daparteant with that takmn by tha Navy Dapartmant
in tta« oaaa of Admiral Eiaial.
Myron C. Cra
Major Oanaral,
Tha Jndga Advooata Oanaral.
CONFlD£.iNlii
-8-
3208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
( 'ON Pi L J NT ? A . , .y^^-C^ U . <^
WAR DEPARTMENT
OmCI OP TW JUDGI APVOCATI OiMIIML
WAaMINaTON
5>/^ //^-^
jaMCBAl^DUlI for the Secretary of War.
Subjeott Course of action with respect to J.!aJor General ll/altar
Campbell Short.
1. After considering my memorandun for the Chief of Staff of
January 27, 1942, on the above subject, you have asked me a further
question, as follomi
"If General Short's proposed application for voluntary
* retirement were accepted, with the announced understanding
that such action would not preclude a future court martial
for the alleged offenses in re Pearl Harbor, would that be
' valid - Could a subsaquent court martial be validly brought,
should it be found advisable?"
2. A retired officer is as a matter of law still an officer of
the Army and still subject to court-martial as much as though he were
still on the active list (A.W. 2a; Nat'l Defense Act, sec. 2; 10 U.S.
C. 4). Neither does his retirement emount to a break in the continuity
of his service which would prevent his trial after retirement for an
offense committed before retirement (Dig. Op. JAG 1912, p. 992, par
I G 2b). The real question involved is whether the retirement of an
offioer on his own application constitutes a condonation of his offense,
barring trial for it.
3. There are opinions of this office to the effect that under
certain circumstances release from sirrest or oonfineasnt or promotion
may constitute such a condonation. I find no precedent holding either
way with respect to retirement. Retirement after thirty years' service
upon the officer's own application under section 1243, Revised Statutes
UO U.S.C. 943i liil. Laws, sec. 326), is "in the discretion of the
President". The foregoing is one of the two statutes under which
General Short may be retired at once on his own application. If he be
retired under that statute, there may be sane plausibility in a con-
•nn c**''^ °P ,^'^* the President's exercise of discretion in terminating
™" C>th«/» ^fHwer ' s active service on his own application constitutes a
bargain between him and the offioer to the effect that he will not
jTurtbar be prosecuted for known offenses occurring prior to retire-
^nt. There is no statutory or Judicial authority for such a view,
«pd I regard it as unsound as a strict matter of law. Therefore I
/i^'
R E C i. I
F. S. SEC '•
a r, ■
^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3209
CONFIDENTIAL
•namr your inquiry by a«ying that u a laattar of law th* retiroMat
cf 0«aiaral Short undar tha abora ttatuta upon his own applioatioa in
tha di«oration of the Praaidant doae not inTolre tha paaaing of Judg-
nant by tha Praaidant upon tha offloar'a paat aarrloaa or a oondouation
by him of prior of fenaaa whioh would praTant aubaaquant trial by oourt-
martial .
4. Narartheleaa, aa a nattar of faimeaa rathar than law, thara
ia foroa in tha aupposed oontantlon abova atatad. Ganaral Short haa
voluntaarad to autxoit an application for ratiramant. . Ha may raaaon-
ably aupposa that a raquaat to him from an offioial aouroa, in anawar
to hia 'voluntary auggaation, to aubnit his application for retiromsnt,
involTea a taoit agreament that the isaua of hia offioial oonduot of
tha defenaa of Hawaii prior to and on Daoamber 7 will ba closad by hia
retiremant. and that no ohargea will ba preferred against him growing
out of suoh conduct.
5. Anothar atatuta imdar whioh Ganaral Short might ba retired
ismediataly upon hia own application, ia the aeoond proviao of aaetion
S of the act of June 13, 1940 (54 Stat. 380), readingi
"Provided further. That any officer on the aotiTe list of th*
Reguleu* Army or Philippine Soouta Who aerred in any capacity
aa a meinber of the military or naval forcea of the Qnitadt
Stataa prior to November 12, 1918, shall upon hia own appli-
oation be retired with annual pay equal to 7S per oentum of
his aotiva>duty annual pay at the time of his retirement unleaa
entitled to retired pay of a higher grade aa hereinafter pro-
vided, except tnat of floors with leaa than twenty yeara'
aervioa and officara who are under inveatigation or who are
awaiting trial by courta martial or the result of auoh trial,
or whose oaaea are pending before courts of inquiry shall be
retired only when the applioation for retirement in each case
haa been approved by the Secretary of Wart * * *"
It ia manifeat that War Department approval of an applioation of General
Short for retirement under the above atatuta, would amount in affect to
a finding that he is not tinder investigation or awaiting trial by court-
martial, and would thus tend even more strongly to support a conten-
tion that any offensea chargeable against him were condoned by the
acti(}n.
6. If Ganaral Short ahould be retired on hia own applioatior
under the above oiroumstanoes and if afterward he ahould be brought
. 2 .
3210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
V. v^ _ 1 ^ i JLv ,. , J. j.i ..X.J
to trial for his oonduot oi' the defense of Hsmii, it may be antioi-
pated that charges of bad faith would be aiade against the War Depart-
ment by him or by others in his behalf. I think it most desirable
that no opportunity be afforded for suoh acousations. I assume that
General Short's offer of retirement as made was not subject to any
oorklitions. Therefore, I suggest that before his offer be accepted
he be given to understand, preferably in writing for the purpose of
the record, the.t suoh retirement will not constitute a condonation of
his offenses, if any, on the part of the War DopajrtF.ent, or be con-
sidered a bar to any future trial by general court-martial in oaoe
suoh trial should be deemed advisable.
7. Should General Short refuse to submit his application for
voluntary retirement with suoh a condition attached, the President
ray, without any application by General Short, retire him upon his
reaching the age of 62 years on lArch 30, 1942, pursuant to the pro-
visions of Revised Statutes, section 1244 (10 U.S.C. 944» Mil. Laws,
sec. 323), and may oeiko announcement to that effect at the present
time.
lyron C. Cramer,
: ajor General,.
The Judge Advocate General.
Inol.
Let. to C. of S.
1/27/42.
r
EXHIBITS OF JOIXT COMMITTEE 3211
Chabge — Violatio:t of 96th Article; of Wab
Spe^'ififation 1 : Failure to provide an adequate inshore .nerial patrol.
Specification 2: Failure to provide adequate anti-aircraft defenses.
Specification 3 : Failure to ."iet up an Interceptor ("ominnnd.
Specification 4 : Failure to provide a proper aircraft v.arnin^r service.
Specification '>: Failure to provide for tl.e transmission of appropriate warn-
ings to interested aKencie.s.
Specification 6: Failnre to estaldi.sh a proper system of defense by cooperation
and coordination witli the Navy.
Specification 7 : Failure to is.sue adequate orders to his subordinates as to their
duties in case of sudden attack.
Specification s : Failure to take ade<iuate measures to protect the Fleet and
Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.
Specification 9: Failure to have hi.s airplanes dispersed in anticipation of a
hostile attack, after having been warned of the danger rhereof .
Specification 10 : Failure to have his airplanes in a state of readiness for an
attack.
Specification 11 : Failure to provide for the protection of military personnel,
their families, etc., and of civilian employees on various reservations.
[ 1 ] Wak Dep-^btmest.
Sebuces of Sltply,
Office of the Judge ahvocate Gexekal.
Washington. April 20. 19-i2.
Memorandum for The Judge Advocate General.
Subject : Preparation of charges against Major General Walter C. Short, United
States Army, Retired.
1. Pursuant to the oral direction of The Adjutant General to report to you
for duty in connection with the preparation of charges agatn.st the above-named
officer, in addition to my regular duties in his offic-e, and having so reporte<l and
been directed to prepare tentative charges as aforesaid, the following comments
are submitted with the tentative charges prepared.
2. Possiblr Line-f of Prorffliuf . An examination of the record of the board
which investigated the attack by the Japanese on the Island of Oahu. on Decem-
ber 7, 1941, (hereinafter referred to as the Roberts Board), led to the conclusion
that, at the present tinie. there were only three courses open :
(a) To prepare charges and specifications again.st General Short, not based
entirely on the evidence adduced before the Roberts Board, but on that evidence
and on evidence which it was believed may be further adduc-ed, either (1) by
recalling witnesses already exandned for further questioning, or (2) by calling
new witnesses from whom pertinent testimony may be expected.
• bj To prepare charges and specifications at this present time but based only
on such evidence as was adduced before the Roberts Board which appears legally
sufficient to support such charges and specifications.
(c) To refrain from drawing charges and spec-ifications at this time, and to
await a period when additional evidence may be adduced before a second board,
and then to draw such charges and specifications as the accumulated evidence
appears to warrant.
We have followed the first course, (a), because it not only appears to be in
conformity with the direction that charges be now prepared, but becaa«e it is
certain that the formal investigation of the charges which must prec-ede arraign-
ment will bring out additional evidence. For example, we believe that knowledge
of the Navy r)ep:irtment radio of Xovember 27. 1941. ("This is a war warning"),
can be brought home to General Short, but from the Roberts record there would
be difficulty in establishing that as a fact. General Short states categorically.
"I didn't .see it". Record, paire 143. Only almost inuuediately to admit that he
"did not know whether I saw it or not. I am not sure". Record, page 144. The
Roberts record does not establish the fact, one way or another, for Admiral
Kimmel's .subordinates admit they did not carry out the Admiral's explicit direc-
tion that the radiogram was "for pers<^)nal delivery to General Short*', but, so
far as they are conc-erned. it only reached G-3. (Record, page 662). Whether
G-3 ever got the message to General Short was not brought out.
3212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[2]
Again, Admiral Kinimel testified that the Navy Department informed him on
December 3, 1941, that based upon information from reliable sources that Japa-
nese diplitniatic and consular officers in AVashington, London, Hong Kong, Singa-
pore and BataAia were directed to destroy most of tlieir codes and ciphers and
to burn secret dijcuments. (Record, page 583). But, while General Short testi-
fies to conferences with Admii'al Kimmel from November 27, 1941, to December
6, 1941, and, in fact, to a conference on that very date, December 3, 1941, there is
nothing in the record to indicate whether or not this information was given him
by Admiral Kimmel.
Further, we have noted newspaper statements by possible witnesses who did
not appear before the Roberts Board on iioints covered by our charges. Tlius,
Mrs. Mary Kogan, wife of First Lieutenant Milton M. Kogan, D. C, a reserve
officer, is quoted in the press as stating that they had never received any instruc-
tions at Schofield Barracks as to what to do in case of an air raid, and further
that a Hawaiian newspaper had predicted an attack by the Japane.se "that week
end". (See clipping in Brief and Resume submitted herewith.) Also, Mr. Ray-
mond Coll, a Hawaiian newspaper editor is quoted by a Washington newspaper,
shortly after the submission of the report of the Roberts Board, as stating, in
substance, that General Short and Admiral Kimmel had made clear by their
utterances before December 7, 1941, the possibility and imminence of a Japanese
attack at an easly date. (We have not been able to examine the Hawaiian news-
papers at the Library of Congress because we were informed that they are now
at the bindery, but this is another "lead" which should be followed in pi'eparing
the case.) Staff Sergeant Joseph Lockard, the enlisted man who was operating
the Opana radar on the northern tip of the Island of Oahu, and who irave warning
of the approach of the Japanese airplanes on this morning of December 7, 1941,
was not questioned.
It is not necessary to multiply other instances. The Roberts Board, of neces-
sity, could not go into many matters which would properly concern a court-
martial.
3. Theory upon ichich Chatf/r and Sped ficat ions were framed. The theoi'y
on which we have prepared the charjie and specifications is tiiat of nonfeasance.
We have endeavored in each specification to show a duty and then to allege
a neglect or failure to perform that duty. The line which General Short's
defense will take is obvious from his statements before and to the Roberts Board.
He will contend that there was no neglect of duty, but simply errors of judg-
ment: that he had reported the measures he had taken to the War Department,
and if he was in error in not going beyond "Alert No. 1" (protection against
sabotage only), the War Department was etpially in error in not inviting his
attenti<m to the supposed neglect; that from the nature of his instructions many
of the neglects or failures with which we may charge him concerned defensive
measures which he could not take without "causing unnecessary publicity and
alarm", contrary to the instructions in the Chief of Staff's radio'xram of Novem-
ber 27, 1941; [3] that it was the duty of the W^ar Department to warn
him more specifically if it had thought hostilities imminent, and that it did not
do so until the radiogram of December 7, 1941, which he did not receive until after
the attack. The obvious answer to this line of denfense is that he had been
warned, not once but repeatedly, both by the War Department and Navy De-
partment messages, of the imminent dangers, well before December 7. 1941; that
. he had been placed in a position that every school-boy knows was one of ex-
posure to sudden attack ; that his own battle plans referred to it as "frontier" ;
that what the War Department may or may not have thought of the possibility
of a sudden attack could not relieve him of his responsibility ; that his failure
to take effective and vigorous measures of defense against outside attack can
not be condoned as mei-e errors of judgment. In short, the case will come down
to thi.s — Has the Government shown clearly and uneciuivocally neglect of duty
01- has it merely pointed out errors of judgment, excusable under the circum-
stances. We think that we can show such neglect, and that General Short will
not be able to escape its consequences by any "Tu quoque'' ai-gument.
-'/. The Proposed Char(je and i^pecifieations. It will bo noted that there is only
one Charge, viz., violation of the 9(;th. Article of War. There are several reasons
wh,v it is not reconnnended that any otiier ai'ticle be invoked. In the first place,
no precedent has been found for employing the 9r>th. Article of War in a case of
this nature — in fact, the ca.se appears to be unique — and if it be conceded that
the 95th. Article of War could be used, there would immediately be an outcry
'EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3213
that the War Department was practically informing the court-martial that it
desired the oflScer dismissed the service. Then, to use the 96th. Article of War
avoids anytliing in the nature of a personal attack on General Short. A court-
martial, whose members of necessity must, in most instances, know him per-
sonally, would hesitate to find him guilty of conduct unbecoming an oflScer and
a gentleman unless it was very firmly convinced that he had deliberately falsified.
However, while General Short did not, in my opinion, deliberately falsify in his
testimony before the Roberts Board, he certainly made statements without a
sufficient background on which to base them, and actually the statements were
contrary to the facts. A statement made "with disregard of a knowledge of the
facts" may be a false official statement equally with one made with full knowl-
edge of its falsity. (See, for example, specifications 119 and 141, Appendix 4,
Manual for Courts-Martial, 1928.) Examples of such statements are, in sub-
stance, as follows :
(a) That the Interceptor Command was fully working from November 27, 1941,
to December 6, 1941. (Record, page 51.) But General Davidson, who was sup-
posed to be in charge of it, states that the Interceptor Command was not set up
or functioning on or before December 7, 1941, and, in fact, that it was not acti-
vated until December 17, 1941. (Record, pages 170, 179, 196. See also Lt. Col.
Powell, S. C Department Signal Officer, Record, page 353.)
[4] (b) There were Navy liaison officers at the Interceptor Command
Station — General Short thinks that three naval officers may have been detailed
there to relay information to the Navy, but none were there on the morning
of December 7, 1941. (Record, pages 68-70.) But no Navy liaison officers had
as yet been detailed for this duty or had made their appearance at the Station.
(Lt. Comdr. Taylor, Record, page 1230; Major Bergquist, Record, page 381;
Admiral Kimmel, Record, page 632.)
(c) "The inshore reconnaissance was a daily thing. We had planes all
around the Island constantly." (Record, page 107.) But General Davidson
states, in answer to a question whether there were less planes in the air early
Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, than usual, "Well, we don't generally have
any planes in the air on Sundays." (Record, page 181.) And General Martin,
Commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, states that up to December 7, 1941, there
were no inshore aerial patrols for a possible enemy. (Record, page 1648.)
(d) First Lieutenant Tyler, Air Corps, was the control officer for the Inter-
ceptor Command (on December 7, 1941). (Record, page 66.) But Lieutenant
Tyler was simply an observer who had only seen the "board" once before and
had never operated it. He had no instructions whatever beyond observing for
training purpo.ses, and was at the Station after all the others but one had de-
parted at 7 : 00 o'clock a. m. on December 7, 1941, only because he had been
tttld to stay there until 8: 00 o'clock a. m. (Record, page 368.) Major Bergquist
had taken upon himself to have officers like Lieutenant Tyler assigned so that
he could train them in the system. There was no assignment of this officer,
Lieutenant Tyler, by order from General Short's headquarters or the head-
quarters of General Martin, commanding the Air Forces. (Record, page 379.)
If higher authority should reside speciiications based on statements of Gen-
eral Short, such as are above mentioned, it would be easy to prepare them.
But it is submitted that all such inconsistencies can best be developed by testi-
mony relating to alleged acts of negligence, rather than by specifications charg-
ing false official statements. Thus, the proposed specification (number 3)
as to the lack of an Interceptor Command, in effect contradicts flatly the alle-
gation made by General Short that there was such a command functioning on
December 7, 1941. The court-martial can determine whether he made the
statement truthfully, deliberately, falsely, or with disregard of its truth or
falsity. It should be kept in mind that a sentence of dismissal can be adjudged
under A. W. 96 as well as under A. W. 95.
The specifications, all laid under the 96th Article of War and alleging a
neglect or omission which was continuous down to and Including December 7,
1941, are eleven in number, and, in substance, cover the following alleged offenses:
[5] (1) Failure to provide an adequate inshore aerial patrol.
(2) Failure to provide adequate anti-aircraft defenses.
(3) Failure to set up an Interceptor Command.
(4) Failure to provide a proper aircraft warning service.
(5) Failure to provide for the transmission of appropriate warnings to
all interested agencies.
3214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(6) Failure to establish a proper system of defense by cooperation and
coordination with the Navy.
(7) Failure to issue adequate orders to his subordinates as to their re-
spec'tive duties in case of sudden attack.
(8) Failure to take adequate measures to protect the Fleet and Naval
Base at Pearl Harbor.
(9) Failure to have his airplanes dispersed in anticipation of a hostile
attack, after having been warned of the danger thereof.
(10) Failure to have his airplanes in a state of readiness for an attack.
(11) Failure to provide for protection of military personnel, their families,
et cetera, on various reservations.
Some, if not, all, of these specifications may be expanded into several speci-
fications. Thus, the failure to provide adequate anti-aircraft defense (speci-
fication 2) may be subdivided as follows, to-wit:
(a) Failure to have the available anti-aircraft guns in readiness.
(b) Failure to have the available ground machine guns in readiness.
(c) Failure to have adequate ammunition at hand for the anti-aircraft
and the ground machine guns.
But it is believed that it will be much wiser to limit the specifications to a com-
paratively small number of distinct heads. When one begins to divide and sub-
divide he almost invariably ends by pleading evidence and unnecessarily ham-
pering the prosecution by too great particularity. All three of the subdivisions set
forth above are comprehended in failure to provide adequate antiaircraft defense.
If, of a large number of specifications, the accused is found guilty but of a few,
there is always an attempt to show persecution. Thus, in the wel Iknown case of
Oberlin M. Carter, the accused was tried on 37 specifications and found guilty
of but four, and his defenders have constantly referretl to that fact (overlook-
ing that these four specifications were the most serious of the entire thirty-
seven). Specifications of large and general import focus attention on the larger
issues, and, in a ease of this nature, that is highly desirable. General Short
is not to be tried for some obscure military offense, but for neglect of duty
in matters of the greatest moment to the whole country.
[6] Nor can General Short plead ignorance of the nature of the accusations
against him on the ground that the specifications lack particularity, because in
these specifications we have used language taken from battle plans and agree-
ments to which either he was a subscribing party or of which he cannot deny
knowledge without admitting gross ignorance. Certainly General Short cannot
ask us to be more specific in our charges tlian he was in the written plans ayd
agreements to which he was a party. If he knew what the plans and agree-
ments meants, he cannot be deceived or misled by the same language in the
charges.
It will be noted also that these specifications cover the specific matters in
which General Short was found negligent by the Roberts Board. (See Report
of Board under "Conclusions", pages 9, 10, 12, 13, 16 and 17. )
5. Statute of Limitations. From the nature of the offenses charged, it seems
clear that it is proper to treat them as continuing down to and including the date
of the attack, December 7, 1941. The failure to take adequate measures is
not a single failure on a specific date but a failure on every day it continues.
Hence, the statute of limitations, set forth in the 39th Article of War, for the
offenses charged is two years and arraignment before a duly constituted court-
martial must be had on or before December 6, 1943, if these charges are to be
brought to trial. In order to give the investigating officer and the trial judge
advocate ample time to perform their respective duties, it would seem that
formal charges would have to be served not much later than January 1, 1943,
for months would be required to secure depositions of absent witnesses and
documentary evidence, not to speak of the difficulty of assembling a court of
general officers. It is not unlikely, also, that the investigating officer or the
trial judge advocate, or both, might find it necessary to visit the situs of the
alleged derelictions.
6. Liaison with the Navp Department. As divers allegations of negligence are
based on failure to cooperate with the Navy or to act on information received
through the Navy, it will no doubt be necessary to call on the Secretary of the
Navy for permission to examine the Navy officers who testified before the
Roberts Board. The statute of limitations for any naval court-martial also
appears to be two years. (See Section 1624, Revised Statutes, Art. 61.)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3215
7. Verification of Charges. If desired, the charges can be verified, as on
information and belief, by Major Steuart or myself, since from our examination
of the Roberts record we believe that there is legal justification for trial.
[7] 8. Assistance rendered by Major Dell King Steuart, J. A. O. D. In the
review of the voluminous record made by the Roberts Board, the examination
of divers maps and other documents submitted, and in the analysis of and search-
ing out of the evidence on which to base these charges and the intial ground-work
in the preparation of the charges, I cannot speak too highly of the work done
by my assistant, Major Dell King Steuart, J. A. G. D. Major Steuart was
unknown to me when, with your approval, I selected him for this task, and,
in my opinion, he has done a thorough piece of work in a highly eflBcient manner
which has not only materially lightened my own review of the record, but which
will be of the greatest assistance to anyone who is assigned to try this case. I
desire to take this opportunity to express my appreciation of his loyal cooperation,
F. Granville Munson
F. Granville Mvnson,
Colonel, J. A. G. D.
4 Incls
Incl a — Charge and Specifications.
Incl 6 — Brief and Resume of Record of Roberts Commission.
Incl c — Pertinent notes — Roberts Commission (typewritten).
Incl d — Pertinent notes — Roberts Commission (longhand).
3216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(WKITt NOTHINO ABOVE TBI3 LINE)
OHARQE SHEET
, , 1«
(PIstM (DxUj
Name, etc , of «ccuso<l 5hflrt,..lIaltar.i:...iQrJi»21X^.J*^Qr.-ijeimr*l^.JUnit«l.at«U
(01v« lut um«, Ont DiUTw, ao'l uilddto InJUAl la (bal order followed br Mrlal nuabar, (fftdo. oompunj, t
— aet.lrwd.
otbrr B|ipf uprLiUi doocrlpilou of occiMOd. AlUs BW&e.-i, etc, to follow In mom maoner)
Age Pay, % per month. AllotmonU to dependents, I per moath.
(Beae par plua paj fur laocto of aeivloc)
Government Insurance deduction, $ per month.
Data Rs to service:
(Ar to Kuch irrmlDaUd cnlinioaol. five lodudloc datea ol acrrke and criinltallwi ta vkkk ienrfi( at t
aaiinineni, (Ire the laitiai data and tlia icim IbenoL Olre dmUar daU aa to aar% loe not under an anlntmanl)
Data as to witnesses, etc.
(Give namaa, addittMfla. and note If for nccuaad. UatdocunantarrarldanflaaadnocawhMoaadhltaMtkMMlaagrtofe
ha the question of the wltoessea wbo ■■/ be eallad dapanda
on the direction of higher authority as to the manner in which
the case shall be tried (viz., on the testlaony of only thoe*
wltoesses who appeared before the Roberts Board, on the test!-
fflony of those witnesses plus that of additional witnesses, etCe)
these data are- left for future action. A list of the witnesses
before the Roberts Board may be found in "Brief and Resnae of
Record of Roberts Conmisslon" or "Notes Taken from Transcript
of Ro"erta Conrndssion to Investigate Attack on Pearl Harbor*.
Data aa to natraiut of aocuaed:
(Om data, vbeaw and kBIal «iia a(a« ralnJBt « ■eooaO
(1)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3217
Charge : Violation of the 98th Article of War.
Specification 1: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army,
Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian
Department, i>eing then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of pro-
viding for, and the execution of, defensive air operations over and in the immedi-
ate vicinity of the Island of Oahu, in his command, and of the establishment of an
inshore aerial patrol of the waters of Oahu defensive coastal area, did, on the
7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and
fail in his said duty and responsibility, by failing to establish and provide for an
adequate inshore aerial patrol of said area commensurate with the critical rela-
tions between the United States and Japan which he then knew to exist, same
being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to
bring discredit upon the military service.
Specification 2: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army,
Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian
Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of
providing for, and the execution of, defensive air operations over and in,' the
immediate vicinity of the Island of Oahu, in his command, and of providing
for the beach and land, sea-coast, and anti-aircraft defense of said Island of
Oahu, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto,
utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing to provide
adequate anti-aircraft defenses for such area commensurate with the critical
relations between the United States and Japan which he then knew to exist,
same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a
nature to bring discredit upon the military service.
Specification S: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army,
Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian
Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of
providing for, and the execution of, defensive air operations over and in the
immediate vicinity of the Island of Oahu, in his command, and of providing for
an interceptor command to coordinate and control the operations of pursuit air-
craft, anti-aircraft artillery (including Naval and Marine Corps anti-aircraft
artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, did, on the 7th day of
December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said
duty and responsibility by failing to establish and provide for such interceptor
command, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and con-
duct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.
Specification 4: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army,
Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian
Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of
providing for, an dthe execution of, defensive air operations over and in the
immediate vicinity of the Island of Oahu, in his command, and of providing an
aircraft warning service for the Hawaiian Island, in his command, did, on the
7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and
fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing to establish and provide for an
adequate aircraft warning service commensurate with the critical relations be-
tween the United States and Japan which he then knew to exist, same being a
neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring
discredit upon the military service.
Specification 5: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army,
Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian
Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of
providing for, and the execution of, defensive air operations over and in the
immediate vicinity of the Island of Oahu, in his command, and of establishing
ain aircraft warning service for the Hawaiian Islands, with provision for the
transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies, did, on the 7th
day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail
in his said duty and responsibility by failing to provide for the transmission of
appropriate warnings to all interested agencies of the approach or movement of
possible hostile aircraft received through any aircraft warning service for said
Hawaiian Islands, or otherwise, same being a neglect to the prejudice of mili-
tary discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military
service.
Specification 6: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army,
Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian
Department, being then *and there charged with the duty and responsibility of
3218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
acting jointly and in coordination with the United States Naval Forces in hold-
ing the Island of Oahu, in his command, as a main outlying naval base, and of
coordinating joint defensive measures of the military and naval forces for the
security of the United States Fleet in and near Pearl Harbor, and the Pearl
Harbor Naval Base, Island of Oahu, from hostile raids and air attacks deliv-
ered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war,
did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at aH times prior thereto, utterly
neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing adequately to
collaborate and cooperate with the said United States Naval Forces in their
aforesaid joint defensive measures in a manner commensurate with the critical
relations between the United States which he then knew to exist, same being
a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to
bring discredit upon the military service.
Specification 7; In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army,
Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian
Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of
holding the Island of Oahu, in his command, against attacks by land, sea and
air forces, and in providing for the beach and land, sea coast, and anti-aircraft
defense of said Island of Oahu, with particular attention to Pearl Harbor Naval
Base on said Island of Oahu and the naval forces there present, did, on the 7th
day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail
in his said duty and responsibility by failing to issue to his subordinates ade-
quate orders and instructions commensurate with the critical relations between
the United States and Japan which he then knew to exist, as to their various
duties in the event of sudden hostile attack against said Island of Oahu, same
being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature
to bring discredit upon the military service.
Specification 8: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army,
Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian
Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of
coordinating the joint defensive measures of the military and naval forces for
the security of the United States Fleet in Pearl Harbor and for the Pearl Har-
bor Naval Base, Island of Oahu, in his command, and for the defense against
hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war, and of pro-
viding for the beach and land, sea coast, and anti-aircraft defense of said Island
of Oahu, with particular attention to Pearl Harbor Naval Base and the naval
forces there present, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times
prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by
tailing to take and provide for adequate and proper defense measures, com-
mensurate with the critical relations between the United States and Japan
which he then knew to exist, for the security of the said Pearl Harbor Naval
Base and the naval forces there present, same being a neglect to the prejudice
of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the mili-
tary service.
Specification 9: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army,
Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian
Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of
holding the Island of Oahu, in his command, against attacks by land, sea and air
forces, and of providing for the beach and land, sea coast, and anti-aircraft
defense of said Island of Oahu, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all
times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by
failing to make proper ground disposition, commensurate with the critical rela-
tions which he then, knew to exist between the United States and Japan, of air-
craft under his command, in that the said aircraft were not properly dispersed
in anticipation of hostile air attacks which niight be delivered prior to a declara-
tion of war, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.
Specification 10: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army,
Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian
Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of
holding the Island of Oahu, in his command, against attacks by land, sea and air
forces, and of providing for, and the execution of, all defensive air operations over
and in the immediate vicinity of said Island of Oahu, did, on the 7th day of De-
cember, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said
duty and responsibility by failing to have the aircraft under his command in a
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3219
proper state of readiness, commensurate with the critical relations between
the Untied States and Japan which he then knew to exist, for the defense of
the Island of Oahu, as aforesaid, same being neglect to the prejudice of military
discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.
Specification 11: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army,
Retired, then Lieutenant General. United States Army, commanding Hawaiian
Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of
providing for the defense of the Island of Oaliu, in his command, against attacks
by land, sea and air forces, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times
prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing
to provide adequate measures and means, commensurate with the critical relations
between the United States and Japan which he then knew to exist, for the pro-
tection of military personnel and fheir families, and of civilian employees of the
Army, at and in the immediate vicinity of the various military reservations on
sad Island of Oahu from air raid attacks, same being a neglect to the prejudice
of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military
service.
79716 O— 46 — pt. 18 24
3220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(WIIITE NOTUINO AUOVE TUI9 LINI)
(Signature of accuser)
(Omde, orgBolStttlon, «r brmneb)
ArFIDAVIT
Before me, the undersigned, authorized by law to administer oaths in cases of this character, personally
appeared the above-named accuser this _ doy of , 19 , and
made oath that he is a person subject to military law and that he personally signed the foregoing charge*
and specifications, and further that he* has personal knowledge of the matters set forth in specifications
_ ; and 'has investigated the matters set
(iDdlcut* by tpeclflcatloo and ctauiss numbora}
forth in specifications , and that the i
(Indlcttl« by speciflcstfon and chars* Dumban)
are true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief
(Signature) —
(Orada asd orgaaUatlos)
(OlSclal cbaractar, aa auismary oourt. natary pnUtc^ ate)
Notes. — At (•) Ktrikc out worda not applicable.
If the accuser has personal knowledge of the facts stated in one or more apecificatlons or parts thereof, and bia
knowledge aa to other specifications or parts thereof U derived from Investigation of the facts, the form of tba
oath will be varied accordingly. In no case will ho bo permitted to state alternatively, aa to aoy partieular
charge or specification, that he either has personal knowledge or has investigated.
If the oath is administered by a civil officer having a seal, his official seal should be affixed.
Headquarters , , , 18
(PUoi) CData)
Referred for trial to
(Orude, naSM, and ortanjaatloil ai tamoMij oouft, or trial Jud^B advocata)
court-martial appointed by paragraph , Special Orders No
(SuBsmary) (TrialJudtaadvocatAafipadalcirseDaral)
Headquarters _ 1 !•-
By of -.
(ComjDand nr order) (Oimda aad numo oT Gonimandiac offlov)
., Adjutant.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3221
I have serred • copy heraof on (e«ch oO the aboVft-oftined acouaed, thia day
of- , 18
(iSignatun) , 3W«l J^tig* AiaoMU.
(OradjMiJ iljiliillnl
(■TAOS VOB VSB WHSBB TXIAI. El BT (UMMUIT OOUBI)
OAae No.
■FECIFIOATIONS AND OBAEQIS
PLBAB VINDINaS IBNTKNOB OB XOVnTttOt AMD BBMAmWi
Plttc6 _ t Date , II
_ Sdininaiy Coorl:
(Slgnatun, inde, ftnd orgaulauioo)
Headquarters , 19
(Place ud dxe)
(AcUoa of nTtowiBf ftutharlty)
(Sltroatun. li*d«, knd crtsnlutloii)
Entered on service record in cases of conviction
(iDlUAb ol pfrnmnol adJuUBt)
(4)
(wwTt Nornma below tBffl iiAft)
., OtymmmMng.
3222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Secret
Brief and Rksume of Testimony and Exhibits Taken Before Roberts Commis-
sion Investigating Attack on Pe^vrl Harbor Dexembek 7, 1941 With List of
Possible Specifications. Based THiaiEON
[Note : This Brief and Resum^ is based upon, and a further condensation of,
approximately 100 pages of notes taken from the Report of the Roberts Commis-
sion. For a pore complete statement of the testimony of each witness reference
may be had to the aforesaid 100 pages of notes.]
[1] INDEX
Page.
1. Index.
2. Reference note.
3. Explanatory note.
4. Witnesses examined by the Roberts Board and their functions.
5. Basic Documents and pertinent data.
5a. Newspaper Clippings.
6. Documentary Evidence.
21. Specification 1 : Failure to provide an adequate inshore aerial patrol.
23. Specification 2 : Failure to provide adequate anti-aircraft defenses.
27. Specification 3 : Failure to set up an Interceptor Command.
29. Specification 4 : Failure to provide a proper aircraft warning service.
31. Specification 5 : Failure to provide for the transmission of appropriate warnings to
interested agencies.
32. Specification 6 : Failure to establish a proper system of defense by cooperation and
coordination with the Navy.
36. Specification 7 : Failure to issue adequate orders to his subordinates as to their duties
in case of sudden attack.
39. Specification 8 : Failure to take adequate measures to protect the Fleet and Naval
Base at Pearl Harbor.
43. Specification 9 : Failure to have his airplanes dispersed in anticipation of a hostile
attack, after having been warned of the danger thereof.
44. Specification 10 : Failure to have his airplanes in a state of readiness for an attack.
46. Specification 11 : Failure to provide for the protection of military personnel, their
families, etc., on various reservations.
[2] In re Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired
Note: The specifications on the charge sheet number 1 to 11, inclusive. The
evidence relied upon to sustain each specification will be found in this Brief and
Resume under the headings of Documentary Evidence and "Possible Specifica-
tions", each bearing a number that corresponds to that of the specification as
drawn. In addition to the evidence shown under each particular specification,
evidence set out under other specifications may also be relevant. Hence, it is
advisable to first read all the Documentary Evidence, then the evidence contained
in said Brief and Resume under all the specifications with this fact in mind.
Dell King Steuart,
Major, J. A. G. D.
[S] explanatory note
This concise resume of pertinent evidence with suggestions of possible specifi-
cations that' might be based thereon, is a concentration and evaluation of over
4,900 typewritten pages of testimony and exhibits.
From this vast fund of material it was found that certain evidence therein
tended in a degree to establish certain specifications herein enumerated under
the heading of "Possible Specifications", and each item of such evidence has
herein been listed, together with page in the record where it may be found, under
the appropriate "Possible Specification".
It will be found that certain evidence is lacking, in whole or in part necessary
to sustain some specifications, but it is thouglit that from all of the other pertinent
evidence that such deficiency might readily be supplied by a further search and
the .securing of such additional evidence as may be necessary to sustain the
specification to which it pertains. In some instances, it will be found that from
the evidence in the record it appears that any deficiencies might be supplied by
an examination in greater detail of the same or other witness.
The "Possible Specifications" are but tentative suggestions, and may be divided,
sub-divided or combined in various ways when put in final form.
It has been the purpose of this resume to set forth each scintilla of evidence
that either proves or tends to prove a certain possible specification, as set out in
the record that has been examined, and, as stated above, in any instance where
the evidence is either lacking, insuflBcient or unsatisfactory to sustain such speci-
fication, it will have to be supplied by further investigation or other appropriate
measures.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3223
There are sixteen volumes of the Roberts Record and thirty-six exhibits. The
method used herein for reference thereto is that R6-780 means volume number 6,
page 780. Ex. 15, means exhibit number 15.
Dell. King Steuabt,
Major, J. A. O. D.
[4 J Officers Examined and Their Official Capacities
1. Lt. Col. W. E. Donegan, GSC, T. H.
2. Major Win. S. Lawton, GSC, T. H.
3. Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, CG Dept. of Hawaii
4. Brig. Ken. Howard C. Davidson, CG 14th. Pursuit Wing
5. Brig. Gen. Jacob H. Rudolph, CG 18th. Bombardment Wing
6. Major Brooke E. Allen, AC Hickman Field
7. Col. Walter C. Phillips, C of S, Hawaiian Dept.
8. Biig. Gen. Durward S. Wilson, CG 24th. Div.
9. Major Gen. Maxwell Murray, CG 25th. Div.
10. Major Gen. Henry T. Burgin, CG CA (sea coast and antiaircraft artillery)
11. Lt. Col. Kendall F. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Dept.
12. Lt. Col. Melvin L. Craig, Provost Marshall
13. Lt. Col. Bicknell, Ass't to G-2.
14. Major Gen. Frederick L. Martin, CG Hawaiian Air Force
15. Lt. Col. Carrol A. Powell, Dept. Signal Officer
16. Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, AC
17. Major Kenneth P. Bergquist, AC
18. Major Lorry Norrls Tindall, AC
19. Lt. Kenneth M. Taylor, AC— cited
20. Lt. Geo. S. Welch, AC— cited
21. Sergeant Mobley L. Hall, Wheeler Field
22. Capt. Frank AV. Ebey, CAC
23. Col. Wm. J. McCarthy, CAC
24. Pvt. Creed Short, ambulance driver
25. Lt. Stephen Saltzman, CA
26. Pvt. Raymond F. McBriarty, Bellows Field
27. Sgt. Lowell Vincent Klatt, 98 CA '
28. Lt. Col. Jack W. Howard, QMC
29. Lt. Howard Frederick Cooper, Hickam Field
30. Capt. Melbourne H. West, Camp Malakole
31. Lt. Willis T. Lyman, CA— Malakole
32. Civilian Chas. Utterbach
33. Rear Adni. Husband E. Kimmel, USN, Cincpf
34. Rear Adni. Claude Chas. Bloch, Conimarulaiit 14tli. Naval District
35. Walter Stanley Delany, Ass't C of S, and Operations Officer of the CinC
36. Capt. Chas. H. McMorris, USN, War Plans Office
37. Vice Adm. Wm. Satterlee Pye, USN
38. Rear Adm. Patrick X. L. Bellinger, CO Naval Planes when on shore.
39. Lt. Com. Edwin T. Lay ton, Fleet Intelligence Officer
40. Comdr. Joseph J. Rochefort. Combat Intelligence
41 Lt. Col. Claude A. Larkin, USMC. CO Ewa Field, Marine Planes
42. Capt. James M. Shoemaker, CO US Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay
43. Lt. Col. Leonard Weddington, CO Bellows Field
44. Lt. Comdr. Wm. E. G. Taylor ( helping.army set up AWS).
3224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
BASIC DOCUJOUTS AND PERTINEUT DATA
D*ta
Deacriptlon
(nown to Ganli
Raaaries
1935
Joint Army 4 Navy Def ,
Plan. -Rainbow 5
Yes.
This was the basic plan.
Jan. 24, 'U
Letter Secy, of Navy
to Secy, of War
Yes.
Sets forth in detail ejqpected attack
on Fleet in P.H.
Peb.l.l9U
Ada.Klinmel takes com.
Feb.7,19U
Secy of War answers
Secy of Navy letter
Yes.
Secy War states both sent to Gen. S.
and in his statement admits letter
2/7/U received from W.D.. 2/19/U.
Feb.7.19U
Sen. Short takes com.
This corresponds to Amy, SOP, and based
on this CG and Adm.Bloeh drew "Joint
Air Operations Agreement".
Feb.l5,'41
Pac.Pt.Con.Letter 2CL-
U- (Security Ueasures)
Yes.
Joint Air Operations
Ajp-eement.
)Ur.21,'Ul
When part of Amy or Navy Air Forces
will come under conmand of other.
Mar.31,'a
Addendum I to 2CL-41
and Annex
Signed ^ CG, This is a Joint estimate of the air
Hawn Air Forci action each would take in case attacked
&Adm.Belllnge:'. (Sunniariges situation in detail).
Apr.ll,'U
Joint Coastal Hawaiian
Frontier Defense Plan
Yes.
Signed Gen. Short & Adm.Bloeh. (See pgs.
1 4 2 in Brief and Resume for details.)
;^r.ll,'41 Addendum II to 2CL-41
This is naval instruction as to degrees
of readiness of plans based on Addend. I.
June, 1941 See letter Secy.Tfar to
Navy dated Feb.?. 1941
Radar equipment supposed to be deliver-
ed jtoCGinOahu^
June 19, '41 Letter Gen. Short to
Adm. Klnpel
Yes.
Stating AWS "will be in operation Ih
the near future".
Aug.5,19U
Letter Gen.Short to
Adm. KlEsnel
Yes.
Stating AWS is "rapidly nearing coa-
pletion.
Aug. 20, 'U Ex.35-Plan Gen. Martin
for Aviation Defense
Yes.
Sent thru Gen.Short to WD. Covers in
detail exactly what happened in attack.
None given
In effect
Joint Action of ArnQr
and Navy. R5-553.
It appears so
2CL-41 (Revised)
Plan of Joint Board stating specific
functions of Amy in re AWS and trans-
mission of info to Navy. Page 8 of Brief.
Oct.l5.19a
No particular import this matter.
Oct.16.1941
CNO despatch to Cincpf
Yes. R2-40
"Japan may attack US and Britain.
Nov. 5,19a
Standing Operating
Procedure. Hawn Dept.
Yes.
Ex.32. Duties AW and Interceptor
CoBimand.
"Suprise aggressive move of Japs in
any direction a possibility."
Nov.24,1941
CNO to Cincpf. Direct-
ed to inform Arny
Thinks may
have.R2-39.
Nov.27,19a
CNO to Cine directed
to inform Ang
Adm. Kimmel
says yes. ?
"This is a war warning.
Nov.27,19U
C of S to CG, Hawn
Dept.
Yes.
"Hostile action possible at any
moment. Negotiations teralnated.
Nov. 27. ,'41
G-2 to G-2.Hawn Dept.
Yes.
"Possible that hostilities may begin.
None given
Hawn Dept., Field Order
No. 1.
Yes.
Lawton says this created Interceptor
Cos»aand.
"Critical situation^ denands" watch for
subversive activities".
Nov.28, '41
G-2 to C. Areas & Over<-
seas Depte.
Uust have. 7
Nov.28,' a
CG to WD
Yes.
"Alerted to prevent sabotage.
with Navy.
Liaisoo
Dec. 1,2, 3,
19U
Gen.Short says in con-
ference with Navy.
Doesn't remember anything they dis-
cussed.
This is message Japs to destroy ciphers,
codes, bum papers.
Dec. 3, '41
CNO to Cincpf
Dec. 6, '41
Japs burning papers
Yes ?
Reported to C of S Powell night before.
He reported at Staff aeetihg this date.
Dec.7.'U
Note:
f-p
Wp warning toCg
M *\ Mm,
plans and messages ire set
out t\
fuily
This WM message that name too Late.
Ijr in Bx. 36 by CUn. Gerow.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3225
3226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
berlanc'-av, Somerset, Md.
al
ict
he
ag
May Urges Death
"" for Kimmel & Short
At
At
W
Er Unlltd PreM
PIKEVILLB; Ky., April 7 — Rep.
May (D.. Ky.) chairman or .the
House Military A/falrs Committee,
recommends a "shooting match",
court mMttU or Lieut. Oen. Walter
C. ShorMPid Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel, commanders of Army •«Jid
N8%-y installations at Pearl Harbor
during the Japanese assault.
May made the recommendation at
an Army Day celebration In this
little cour.ty seat In the Cumberland
Mountains.
Tom Holland, editor of The Pike-
■\'i]le County News, defined "shooting
match" as •Kentuclcy language lor
a lawful execution."
May placed complete blame for the
."success of the Japanese attack on
the two commanders He said they
ivere given sufficient warning of at-
tack.
"It waa probably the morning after
Saturday night," May said. "You
know Honolulu Is noted for its night
, „v.». - clubs."
^* street NW. whfch sheneftimmedi:-] '^ar
ately after her marriage last April ,^i^
All acro.3s the continent she found ' "^
the .same li^tlessness. In the Middle
"West particular: she noticed there
were no signs that a war was in
4>rogr€ss.
She left Hawaii February 28, flew
by clipper to San Francisco and
completed the trip by train. In Cal-
ifornia she .saw the first lights at
night she hxd seen in three months
and here at iiome she experienced
one of the greatest letdowns of her
Ufe
The citv is just like it was when
fapBiMp^g, I Harbor
Navy Cross
A 29'
Witness
and ra
of Jar
safety
Washir
"The;
Washin
Mrs. M
ton Ka
"I'm
calm,
there !:
donp a;
ters?"
Mrs.
repeatei
week
JACKSOXVILUE. Pla., April 4
(U.P.).— A 31-year-old naval flyer
who took his unarnjored Sikor^Jjj
amphibian aloft as Japanese wbp
planes were attacking Pearl Har-
bor on I>ecernber 7 in order to
obtain • inf onaayon of the
enemy." today received the Navy
Cross for bravery. ,,
Tht flyer, lieut. Gordon K. Bol-
ser, of. Los Angeles, .was carrying
only two Springfield rifles In his
plane wlien two Japanese planes
atcacked him at an altitude of
!| about l,50e feet. Unable to fight
Oick. he broke away from the Jap
f'gl-ters by slipping Into a cloud
bank and gaining altitude.
Bolser who was transferred to
-le Jacksonville Naval Air SUtion
.ist week as an instructor In ob-
servation and scout training, was
1 reticent to discuss his exploit but
jiauded Uie conduct of his com-
rades at Pearl Harbor under fire.
"Talk about suicide ^uadrona,"
he said, "we really had them. Men
from disabled ships were eager to
get at the enemy and begged for
MRS MUTOW KOCll^'.'":'' .'° «« "P' ^^'-^^ ^ ^'
Sia' bfo^ armed traaiing planes.
: 1 1 left it. although America ^s facing j " ] „v,hln% ^Lr^^Tm^''?'^^,,"''^? **
■ tvio cr,.<.^n>«t -vir in her historv " »»»«■ I newsoappr.s 3 ,MSl £iil.*™*i I Started my takeoff. Our
1 aid' es^dal""No o^e'h'^r^'ls'atfe^^ two stranger^ne
„T. „„• )..rf^.;hll. lifp in Hawaii l.s tha^. incgFendhao ..ui.ie ..from a battleship and one from
e ' l*ke Uv"n" ir a fortreL. I ^leel [ Mri. Kogan remcmbe.r a patrol squadron. We had nff
1 1 like saviiig" -Wake up, people, and do husbands reaction to thei arms until two sentries hMdg;
■- 1 something' Unfortunately it may | escape. gv5? ineir tspringtields." '—
i take a bombing to make them do j Nightmare for 24 H<> A native of Boston, Bolser la
5* this, but there will be no laxity after | -i think 111 go shave," sthe son of Mrs. Charles C. Allen
^ I that. I can never forget the feeling j him. ot Los Angeles. .
'- j you have during an air raid— you j And then she a.sserteii h< He was decorated today by Capt.
""want only one thing, and that is i ity as a bride. "I think yt Charles P. Mason, commandant a'
•°s I your life." I she said. "This is war." the Naval Air Station, on behali
Saw Bisinr Sun Insignia. \ strong in her memory that of President Roosevelt.
,..„ «■„„,« <,r,H hor hiKshand were Things were a nightmaio xu» v.itrr
Mrs. Kogan and her husband were i ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^.^ ^^^^ ^^^.p^ ^^^^
lis
I *■': ^I°ViK»i-K,^«,o at «;rhnfiplri r»t" 24 nouis. ane neipea mane
kwakened at then hOBS^/J^gy'" , surgical dressings ail mo.nmg'and
'^^^T^^F^^^^T^. «w tLv t.hen she was huddl.:Kl in a quad-
by loud noi-ses ^"'I^^Viri'^/,'^!^ 1 rangle to await evacuation. It was
threw on wiaps and walkea out into „„„^„,<., ^„,^ „,v,„„ ,i,„ ^„^ ^,y,„
ti
vard, thinking it was something
diflevent in the way of maneuvers.
They commented to each other that
j if war was like this it must be ter-
! rible. Smoke was rising in all dl-
, ; rectic;is The gigantic explosion of
' ! bombs, the heavy roar of coast ar-
' tlllery fire and the rattle of machine
well after dark when she and other I j;
women were taken away by bus. 1 li
Thev passed by the burning ruins 1 n
of Pearl Harbor, tluough a black- }
ne.s-s broken !rcq-jei;iiy by tracer ; w
buUel^s, Along the roadside they | 8
could hear the excited talk of many I tl
people, all going tow ard Honolulu. | B
Eventually the bus drew up at
guns seemed to be shaking the entire I ^^j^^^j building in K.alihi Valley, i tl
island. i There the evacuees lay down on the i ti:
Out of the dogfight overhead a \ floor on a thin layer of blankets ■ bi
plane peeled olT and came toward and tried to bleep j m
them, flying low Tliey watched it "Before December 7, ' spt; rrrally!, ca
until, they saw the rising sun in- |' we hadn't even been told what to i^
.signta on its side, saw its machine '"30 IB Cttse B! ^n air raid ,
guns spouting, saw bullets klckiiig i "Hawaii has had her bombing ex-
up soil at their feet. It '^''" ttittfii perlence and Hawaii is prepared."
they knew the thing wat.-ieal-fLQd. she saxi. "But I'm afrgid ioj Wash-
ffiat Ih* timing ot' a Hawaiian I ingjj
"1 5a -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3227
[6] Documentary Evidence
PLANS
1. Joint Army and Navy Defense Tlan of 193;"). See Ex. 36 and Rl-5.
Based on above War Plans Division prepared Army Strategical Plan which
consists of Operations Plan — Ruinbow 5, and Concentration Plan — Kainbow 5.
Mission assigned Hawaiian Coastal Frontier under Army Strategical Plan are:
a. Joint. — Hold Oahu as main outlying naval base and control and protect
shipping in coastal zone.
6. Aitny. — Hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea and air forces and
against hostile sympathizers. Support naval forces in protection of the sea
communications of the Associated Powers, * * *.
c. Navy. — Patrol the coastal zone; control and protect shipping therein;
support the Army.
Based on above plan General Short and Admiral Bloch appeared and signed on
April 11, 1941 the—
2. Joint Hawaiian Coastal Fontier Defense Plan, Ex. #36, states in part —
"I. Oeneral:
1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the
fleet and for Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air
attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobiliza-
tion for war. the following agreements, * * *, are adopted.
"II. Joint Air Operations:
2 * * *
a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels * * *.
&. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will
be executed under the tactical conunand of the Army. * * *."
In addition to foregoing. Major Lawton states (Rl-5) that [7] this
plan says —
3228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, shall provide for tMe
beach and land, sea-coast, and anti-airrraft defence of Oahu, with particular
attention to Pearl Harbor Naval Base and naval forces present, etc., etc."
"The Army to provide for anti-aircraft and gas defense, intelligence and
warning services, protection of landing tields and naval installations and out-
lying islands consistent with available forces, defense of installations on
Oahu vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light,
water, power, and for interior guard and sabotage * * * within Ha-
waiian Island * * ♦, cstuhlishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the
waters of Oahu defensive coastal area in cooijeration with the naval inshore
patrol, * * *, and an aircraft teaming service for the Hawaiian
Islands, * * *."
Under this Plan the Navy was to be responsible for "distant reconnaissance" .
Hased upon above there was issued Field Order #1 which was a secret opera-
tions order for Hawaiian Department (Rl-17). Major Lawton states that this
document creates the interceptor command and the aircraft warning service.
Then to further amplify Field Order #1 which was secret, the Standing Oper-
ating Procedure (SOP) of 5 November 1941 was issued (Ex. 32).
Section II, paragraph 15; provides :
''The interceptor Command will :
Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft ar-
tillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA artillery), the
aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will provide for the coor-
dination of anti-aircraft measures of units not under military control, to
include :
(1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.
[8] (2) The coordination of the anti-aircraift fire of Naval ships in Pearl
and/or Honolulu Harbors.
(3) Transmission of appropriate learnings to all interested agencies."
Rl-34 states where these three documents were examined and briefly their
contents.
Based upon the Joint Army and Navy Plan-Rainbow 5, Admiral Kimmel on
February 15, 1941, issued his security measures in a letter Icnown as "Letter
2CL-41", which was later revised on October 15, 1941, and known as Pacific Fleet
Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised). R5-following page 549. Paragraph
(G) of this letter provided that Commandant 14th. ND would be the Naval Base
Defense OflBcer, known as N. B. D. O., and as such should cooperate with the
Army for "defense against air attack".
In furtherance of this proposed cooperation Admiral Bloch and General Short
on March 20, 1941, drew up an agreement which was signed and approved by them
March 21, 1941 (R5-.554-556). This was known as their Joint Air Operations
Agreement. This provided in brief that Defensive air operations over and in
the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under tactical command of the
Army, and that under certain situations Army planes would go to the Navy to
assist them with their "distance patrol" and other times Navy planes on shore
would operate under Army control.
April 9, 1941, the N. B. D. O. issued an Annex for the Naval Forces to this Joint
Air Operations agreement based upon this agreement. Letter 2CL-41, 15 Febru-
ary 1941, and Addendum I to the Plan.
[9] Addendum I is a joint estimate of the air action necessary, date<l 31
March 1941, signed by Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force (General Mar-
tin) and Admiral Bellinger (R5-556C). This states, in pertinent part, as follows :
I. Nummary of the Situation:
(a) Relations between US and Orange are strained, uncertain and varying.
(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile action by a declaration
of war.
(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations
on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the western
Pacific for a long period.
(d) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or fast raiding force
might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelli-
gence service.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3229
II. Survey of Opposing Strengths:
(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or
one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruis-
ers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers. * ♦ *
III. Possible Enemy Action:
(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by :
1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations at Pearl
Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.
(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu
would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would
most likely be launched from one or more carriers which icould probably
approach inside of 300 miles.
(c) A single attack might indicate or not indicate the presence of more
submarines or more planes awaiting to attack * * *
(d) * * *.
(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be deliv-
ered as a complete surj>rise in spite of any patrols we might be using
* * *. (Here discusses dawn and dusk carrier borne plane air attacks in
detail.) (See this document as it completely covers and provides for just
what happened.)
IV. Action Open to United States:
[10] (4) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until
an attack is knowm to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand,
when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must
start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should
be organised note, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and
detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken
promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises.
* * *.
V. Decisions:
* * * * * * «
2. Air Combat Group. (To) Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Iden-
tify and report types of attacking aircraft. Trail attacking carrier type
planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group.
* * *
(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this
plan when :
(a) An air attack occurs on Oahu.
(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is
probable.
Addendum II to this Plan follows on R5-556K, see also R5-556M, N, and this
briefly describes the various states of readiness of the planes necessary to per-
form their duties under this plan. The two lowest degrees or states of readi-
ness are :
Material Readiness, E — All aircraft conducting routine operations, none
ready for the purposes of this plan; and under Operational Readiness #5.
All types — four hours.
On January 24, 1941, Secretary of the Navy Knox wrote to the Secretary of
War Stimson, which letter reads in pertinent part, as follows ( R16-1823-1827 ) :
My Dear Mr. Secretary : The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in
Pearl Harbor and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under re-
newed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several
weeks. This re-examination has been, in part, prompted by the increased
gravity of the situation with respect [11] to Japan, and by reports
3230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
from abroad of successful bombing antl torpedo plane attacks on ships while
in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that
hostilities would be initiated by a surprise .attack upon the Fleet or the Naval
Base at Pearl Harbor.
In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major distaster to the fleet
or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that
will Increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand
a raid of the character mentioned above.
The dangers envisaged in their order of iniiM)rtance and probability are
considered to be :
(1) Air bombing attack.
(2) Air torpedo plane attack.
(3) Sabotage.
(4) Submarine attack.
(5) Mining.
(6) Bombardment by gun tire.
Defense for all but the first two appears to have been provided for satis-
factorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion
of the problems encompas.sed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which
I consider to be of primary importance.
Both types of air atack are possible. They may he carried out successively,
simultaneously, or in combination with other operations enumerated.
* * * Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and
their supporting vessels.
The counter measures to be considered are :
(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels
before air attack can be launched ;
(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they can reach
their objectives;
(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;
:tc * * * * * *
To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals :
(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit
aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warn-
ing net in Hawaii.
(2) * * *.
(3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval
and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire,
against surprise aircraft raids.
(4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees
of joint readiness for immediate action [12] in defense against sur-
prise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.
(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in
Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once
weekly so long as the present uncertainty exists.
» • ♦ * * « «
Sincerely yours,
Frank Knox.
On the 7th day of February, 1941, the Secretary of War answered this letter,
in brief, as follows :
Subject : Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
1. In replying to your letter of Jaiuiary 24. 1941, regarding the possibility
of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to
express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the
urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile
effort.
2. (Here the Secretary outlines the Hawaiian Project for defense. Says
all material for aircraft warning service will be there not later than June,
1941, etc.)
6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense. I am
forwarding a copy of your' letter and this reply to the Commanding General,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3231
Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local
naval authorities in making those measures effective.
Henry Stimson.
This last letter from War to Navy is Ex. 22, and reported on page R16-1827
of transcribed testimony. In General Short's statement he admits receipt on
February 19, 1941, "of your letter of February 7, 1941", and refers to much
information on aircraft he didn't have. (It is inferred that this is the letter to
wliich he refers, but it .should be checked.)
On the 20th day of August, 1941, the Commanding General. Hawaiian Air
Force (General Martin), submitted to the War Department, [IS] through
the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (General Short), a plan for
the Air Defense of Oahu (E.\. 35). It states, in pertinent part, as follows:
I. General:
1. The key to this plan is found in the provision for first, a complete and
thorough search of the Hawaiian area daily during daylight ; secondly, an
attack force available on call to hit a known objective located as a result of
the seai'ch, and, thirdly, if the objective is a carrier, to hit it the day before
it could steam to a jjosition offshore of Oahu where it could launch its
planes for attack.
* * « « , * * *
III. Facts Bearing on the Case:
1. Facts:
«. The Army mission is : "To defend the naval base of Oahu. * * *"
d. To perform its missions, the Fleet must have freedom of acti(m without
responsbility for the defense of its base.
2. Assumptions :
m ***** *
e. The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of
hostile carriers in this vicinity before they approach within range of Oahu
where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or attack on
Oahu.
*******
e. Our most likely enemy. Orange, can probably employ a maximum of six
carriers against Oahu.
IV. Discussion:
Part 1. The Search:
1. The only manner in which the Hawaiian area can be thoroughly
searched for enemy surface craft, particularly aircraft carriers, in the event
of a situation requiring such action, is to provide a sufficient number of air-
craft to conduct a daily search of a desired area during daylight hours with
10076 coverage through 360 degrees. * • *
Part 2.
1. Section 1 :
a. An enemy should be primarily interested in obtaining the maximum
cover of darkness for his carrier approach. This section illustrates four
possible uses of darkness by an enemy to cover his approach. * * *
*******
c. * * * The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of
action open to the enemy.
v. Conclusion:
■^ * * *
2 a. The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the action
upon which we should huse our plans of operation [I4] is the early
morning attack in which the enemy must make good the following time
schedule :
(1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before
attack.
(2) * * *.
(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of
the attack.
VI. Recommendations:
3232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. * * * The sole purpose of the existence of the military establish-
ment on Oahu, ground and air, is for the defense of Oahu as an outlying
naval base. * ♦ *.
It has been said, and it is a popular belief, that Hawaii is the strongest
outlying naval base in the world and could, therefore, withstand indefinitely
attacks and attempted invasions. Plans based on such convictions are in-
herently weak and tend to create a false sense of security with the consequent
unpreparedness for offensive action.
Just prior to December 7, 1941, there were several communications that are
mentioned throughout the testimony and should be borne in mind, as follows:
1. General Short on R2-40 admits receivinjj the following from the Navy 16
Oct. 41:
The following is a paraphrase t>f a despatch from the CNO which I have
been directed to pass to you. Quote : "Japanese cabinet resignation creates
a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be anti-
American and extremely nationalistic. If the Konoye cabinet remains it
will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapproachment
with the United States. Either way hostilities between Japan and Russia
are strongly possible. Since Britain and United States are held responsible
by Japan for her present situation there is also a possibility that Japan
may attack those two powers. View of these possibilities you will take due
precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose
strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan."
2. R9-1094: On November 24, 1941 CNO to Cincpf— General Short thinks
(R2-39) he probably saw it:
There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of [15] ne-
gotiations with Japan. This situation, coupled with statements of Nippon
Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in
our opinion that n surprise aggressive movement in any direction including
an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff
has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action addressed (* * *)
inform senior Army ofHcers their respective areas. Utmost secrecy is neces-
sary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipiate Jap
action. * * *. (These communications are all found Ex. 36)
3. War Department to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Novem-
ber 26. 1941. in re two olanes to photograph islands to locate Jap guns, ships, etc.
4. CNO to Cincpf dated November 27, 1941 (there is considerable discussion
about whether this was delivered to General Short or not, but Admiral Kimmel
tells just how it was delivered by a Lieutenant Burr to G-3, either Donegan or
Lawton, on November 27, 1941, in R6-622,3, it reads in part (See R9-1095) :
This is a paraphase of a classified dispatch.
3|E >•: * « « * *
"Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan
in an efifort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is
expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An
amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula
or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese
troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a
defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in
WPL 46 only. Guam Samoa and 'Continental Districts have been directed
to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being
sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and army authorities.
British to be informed by Spenavo." * * *
5. Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 27 November
1941:
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all [16] prac-
tical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Govern-
ment might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action un-
predictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot,
repeat cannot, be avoided, the US desires that Japan commit the first overt
act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a
course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japa-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3233
nese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other
measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out
so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report
measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out tasks assigned
in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this
highly secret information to minimum essential oflBcers.
6. G-2, War Department, to G-2, Hawaiian Department, dated November 27,
1941:
Advise only the CO and the C of S that it appears that the conference with
the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and
espionage probable. Also possiblo that liostilitics may begin.
7. G-2, War Department, to all Corps Areas and Overseas Departments, dated
November 28, 1941 :
Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately
against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility
of the War Department * * * (then discusses sabotage. See Ex. 36).
8. Commanding General to Chief of Staff, November 28, 1941 :
Report department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy.
9. Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, December 7,
1941 (this message never delivered prior to attack) :
Japanese are presenting at 1 : 00 P. M., EST, today what amounts to an
ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine imme-
diately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but
be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication.
[17] On R5-553, Admiral Kimmel testifies in regard to a publication known
as "Joint Action of the Army and Navy." He says, "This publication was pre-
pared by the Joint Board and promulgated to the two services by a joint order
signed by the Secretaries of War and Navy. Under a heading "The Specific
Functions of the Army in Coastal Frontier Defense" — {the Army will provide
(I have added the Italicized words for clarity — DKS) ) :
A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning
service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt
exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.
On R5-554 Admiral Kimmel reads a statement from this "Joint Action of the
Army and Navy", page 32 thereof, which states :
An aircraft warning service is a communication and intelligence service
which forms part of the communication and intelligence service of the
frontier defense. The purpose is to warn centers of population, industrial
plants, public utilities, and military and naval establishments of the approach
of hostile aircraft, and to alert Air Corps units and antiaircraft artillery
units. It consists essentially of observers, of information centers for plotting
the courses and distributing information of approaching hostile planes, and
of the necessary communications.
(Note: This above document is discussed but no date thereof given, although
Adm.TCimmel says it was in force December 7, 1941, and prior thereto. Check it.)
Ex. 7 : On page 11, General Short in his statement cites an extract from the
Joint Coastal Frontier Plan which is also his Ex. D attached thereto, and it
reads :
"Method of Coordination. The CG, Hawn Dept, and the Commandant
14th Naval Dist. have determined that in this joint plan the method of co-
ordination will be by mutual cooperation [18] and that this method
will apply to all activities wherein the Army and Navy operate in coordina-
tion, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed
in Joint Army and Navy Defense Plan, 1935, Chap. 2, par. 9&."
On R5-583, Admiral Kimmel reads a Naval Dispatch dated December 3, 1941,
which states:
"OpNav informs CinC Asiatic, CincPac, Combat 14-15 that highly reliable
information has been received that instructions were sent Japanese diplo-
matic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Washington,
3234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn
secret documents."
Ex. 16: This is account of action and orders taken since December 7th at
Wheeler Field. This document is extremely illuminating in that it indirectly
shows what was necessary and not done prior to the attack — such as information
for conduct of families during air raids; blackouts, what to do in gas attacks,
orders for gas masks. (No provision for these things prior thereto.) It in-
cludes :
Special Orders for chemical air attack dated December 9, 1941.
Air raid instructions, dated December 7, 1941.
Statement that they distributed Stewart Klaxons for air raid warning sys-
tem after attack. (Conseqeuntly, must have had them prior thereto.)
December 9, 1941, sets up a practice air raid for Honolulu. This signed by
General Short.
December 9, 1941, had them exchange their old gas masks for new ones as
old oties were unserviceable.
Submitted Col. Wm. Flood, Commanding Wheeler.
Ex. 17 : From General Rudolph at Hickam Field. Gives his new arrangements
and instructions since December 7, 1941. Blackout instructions, issued gas masks,
and sirens for air raid alarms. Cooperation with Navy on patrols.
Ex. 18: From General Tinker, Air Force Commander, Hickam [19] Field.
About same as above.
Ex. 20: This is a communication from General Martin to Commanding General
dated September 20, 1941, arranging for Joint Army and Navy practice drill for
17-22 November, 1941. (This was a plan for the drill.) States they want to
test "ability of carrier aviation to attack defenses of Oahu" — "eflBciency of
Interceptor Command". "* * * defense of Oahu will be directed by the
Interceptor Commander using recently installed equipment and controlling oi)er-
ations from his control board."
Ex. 31: SOP, CAC— 53rd CA Brigade (AA) November 26, 1941. CO— Harbor
Defense — Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, Kaneohe Bay.
"Sec. 1, para. 6— Every unit is responsible for its security at all times
from hostile ground or air forces."
See pars. 233-273, incl., FM 10-5 (particularly applicable to "close in"
defense by all sea coast artillery and AA units.) "Sec. 1, para. 10-a. AA
defense is a responsibility of every unit. See Paras. 261-273, FM 100-5."
"All units will have their automatic weapons habitually in readiness for
AA defense.
d. All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following :
(1) Maintenance of air guards to give timely warning of the approach
of hostile aviation ; * * *
(3) Reduction of vulnerability to air attacks and observation by disper-
sion of personnel and material when in bivouac or in position, * • *
Sec. 1, para. 11 * * * an adequate alarm system will be provided.
(Alarms for air attacks, close-in defense and blackouts indicated.)"
Ex. 32: SOP, Hawaiian Department, 5 November 1941. This is practically
same content as preceding Ex. 31 in re all things mentioned above.
Ex. 27: This is telephone conversation on December 3, 1941, [20] be-
tween a Japanese in Honolulu by name of Mori and a Military or Naval oflacer
in Tokio, translated and available to Military Intelligence, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, December 5, 1941. (This does not seem to show very much of importance
except that Tokio inquired about the number of air planes flying about daily and
if Mori knew "anything about United States Fleet".)
Ex. 28: SOP, 25th Division — See Section I, para. 10, "Alarm system" and
Sec. I, para. 6 a, b (1) (2) — relative to having AA guns and ammunition.
Ex. 29 : SOP, 24th Division. See in re AA defense and Sec. 1, para. 13 — "alarm
system".
\21] Possible Specifications
1. failub*: to provide an adequate inshore aerial patrol
Rl-5: Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan — provides amongst other things
for Army the "* ♦ * establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters
of Oahu defensive coastal area."
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3235
Rl-14: Major Lawton states that Army fliers were to patrol inshore area off
Oahu (about 20 miles) and Navy to operate a surface patrol In same iirea.
R2-127 : Gen. Short states there were no planes in the air this Sunday morn-
ing of attack, and that it was "Most unusual". Would have to ask Davidson why
not. But had they been in the air "they would have had no ammunition. They
were only training."
R2-107 : Gen. Short states, "Inshore reconnaissance was a daily thing. We
had planes around the Island just constantly."
R2-162: Pursuit planes not armed at time of the attack, Gen. Short admits.
Says, "They were not on a war footing." (There was no "in.shoi-e" patrol estab-
lished. He means that training planes were just flying around for the training.
They had no ammunition while In the air.)
R2-172 : Gen. Davidson had charge of the pursuit planes on the Island and says
that none of his planes ever flew before 7 : 30 A. M. and then just for training and
never flew on Sundays.
R2-181 : General Davidson says there were no planes in the air this Sunday
morning just the same as any other Sunday morning. They were resting.
R6-738 : Adm. Bloch says that he and Gen. Short signed the Joint Coastal
Hawaiian Frontier Defense Plan, April 11, 1941. By this Navy undertook the
distant reconnaissance and the Army to provide an "inshore aerial patrol" to
run out 25 to 50 miles at sea. Prior to December 7th he don't think Anny ever
did this.
R14-1648 : Gen. Martin was Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and
admits that prior to December 7, 1941, there was no inshore patrol.
[22] R2-200: Gen. Rudolph, Commanding General, bombers, says that he
was only training crews to bring over the bombers from the mainland. That when
his ships were up they would have no ammunition unless they were doing some
target practice in connection with their training. None of his planes were in the
air at time of attack December 7, 1941, at 7 : 55 A. M. and that none got in the
air until after the attack.
R2-127 : General Short, after stating that "planes were in the air constantly",
was asked, "Well, they were the planes of your inshore pati'ol?" He replied,
"Well, they were planes that were in training, but they would see just as much
as — yes, they would have only been inshore patrol ; they wouldn't have gone over
15 miles ; they wouldn't have seen anything that those training planes wouldn't
have seen constantly".
R2-107 : General Short states, "My reconnaissance under the plan with the
Navy is limited to just the immediate offshore of the island, ordinarily limited
to 15 miles. * * *" (See statement of Admiral Bloch, R&-738, supra.)
[23] 2. FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES
Rl-o: Joint Coastal Frontier Plan makes Army responsible for aircraft de-
fenses.
R2-80: General Short admits that all anti-aircraft batteries didn't have am-
munition. Admits four batteries had to go some distance to get it, and some
had to go to the crater after it, and those who had it had to unbox it.
R2-88. 25th Division had to draw ammunition for their artillery and was
not in battle position until 4 P. M.
R2-128: Alert #1 didn't provide for air attack at all, but only for upris-
ings " * * * where there was no threat from without."
R2-189-90: General Davidson says the biggest difficulty was that plane guns
were not loaded and the ammunition was in a hangar that was afire.
R2-190 : General Davidson states that had he been in position with his ships
he could have shot down Jap planes before they reached their objective.
R3-257: General Wilson says that by the time he got to the field the men
themselves had gotten the machine guns out and "had gotten busy".
R3-284: Colonel Phillips states that AA guns had no ammunition. Thinks
they should have under FM 100-5. (This he speaks of would be mobile units.)
R3-252 : General Wilson, 24th Division says his troops had to draw am-
munition.
R3-262 : General Murray, 25th Division, says that he had violated regula-
tions and had previously drawn ammunition. He says he knew the area for
drawing ammunition (small) at Schofield and as it was congested he knew that
it would be a regular slaughter if Japs attacked with bombs. He thought there
might be a surprise raid, so he did this. Says it took about six hours to draw
ammunition owing to th^congestion in the area.
79716 O — 46— pt. 18 25 \
3236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
R3-274 : General Burgin says some of his AA guns were in position "in 15 or
20 minutes and others had to go to the other side of the Island and were not
in position until afternoon. A great many did get into position." (This latter
remark implying that they all did not. Negative.)
R3-27r) : General Burgin says that all of his guns did not have ammunition.
Men had to go to the crater for it, and even that that was near guns was still
in boxes and had to be unboxed before could be used.
R3-280. There were 60 mobile and 26 fixed AA guns.
R3-270: General Burgin says that when he got Alert #1 he expected Alert #2
right away. Alert #2 "is where we take ammunition."
R3-345 : General Martin said that had Alerts 2 or 3 been in effect their planes
would have had fuel and ammunition.
R4X434: Sergeant Mobley Hall tells of having to get machine guns [24]
for anti-aircraft shooting out of the supply room at Wheeler Field and set them
up and then go for "supplies". (Presumably ammunition.)
R4— 137, 8: Captain Ebey, CAC, says his CA guns were not in position at Bar-
bers Point at time of attack. Had to get 4 guns down there under fire. Got some
machine guns out of supply room and set them up in a tennis court and fired,
then set them on a barge and tired back at attacking Japs. They had no ma-
chine guns or ammunition at time of attack.
R4-458, 9: Lieutenant Stephen Saltzman, 98th CA, had no guns and their
machine guns were in storeroom.
R4-459: Lieutenant Saltzman says they had ammunition pits and gun pits,
but had to dig in ground for barracks for the men (7). They had no automatic
weapons except .30 Calibre Brownings with infantry adapter mounts for anti-
aircraft fire. Had no AA guns and the machine guns they had were in the store-
rooms.
R4-473 : Lieutenant Cooper — came to Hickman Field — men were getting ma-
chine guns out, trying to put them together — they lacked water cans.
R4-469: Lieutenant Colonel Jack Howard, QMC, has charge of depot — many
supplies — and on R4-471, says depot an easy target and had no machine guns for
anti-aircraft at time of attack.
R4^73: Lieutenant Cooper, above, states that men were desperately and
bravely bringing machine guns out and trying to shoot them.
R4-497: Captain West, CAC, had some machine guns (ground) at Camp
Malakole, but had to get AA guns out of storage and set them up.
R4-498 : West says no equipment in place and ready to fire. Says not ready
at Pearl Harbor for 1 or 2 hours after attack.
R4-500: Lieutenant Lyman, CA, his was a machine gun battalion — had no AA
guns and their machine guns were in storage about 50 yardS away.
RlO-1166: Lieutenant Colonel Larkin, UMSC, CO of Ewa Field, had planes
for Army use December 7, 1941, but Army never called nor was he called that
entire day (Army controlled these land planes by the plans in effect.) Says for
their anti-aircraft they had only some .30 calibre machine guns that they took
out of some destroyed planes.
RlO-1191: Captain Shoemaker, Commanding Otficer Ford Island, (1193-1197).
Army were supposed to install AA guns and ammunition and, supposed to man
them. This is an Army battery. They had been there before on some tests, but
December 7th they never showed up at all all day long. They got out some
machine guns but the ammunition was in storage.
R10-1210: Commander Martin, Kaneohe Bay, had no anti-aircraft except
ground machine guns and rifles. All planes here were put out of commission.
[25] RlO-1217: Lieutenant Colonel Weddington, Commanding Officer, Bel-
lows Field, had planes but no ammunition. No anti-aircraft whatever. Got out
their machine guns but had to go to the crater for ammunition. Post wasn't
authorized any ammunition he says.
R13-1590: Colonel Pickett, USMC, was at Navy Yard Barracks— they were
not supposed to handle the anti-aircraft defenses but no one called them so
they of their own accord got machine guns out of the shed and ammunition
and set them up. They were not set up or ready in any way and they had to do
this under fire. Took them about 20 minutes.
R14^1648 : General Martin says they did not set up machine guns at fields for
the pi-otection of planes.
Rl(>-1830: Lieutenant C!olouel Whaling saw one of our AA's shoot at our
own plane.
R5-553: Admiral Kimmel testifies in regard to a publication known as the
"Joint Action of the Army and Navy." He states, "This^ublication was prepared
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3237
by the Joint Board and promulgated to the two services by a joint order signed
by the Secretaries of War and Navy." He says Army was to provide —
"A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning
service, among the elements of the land defense with provision for the prompt
exchange of Information or instructions with the Navy."
R5-554 : Admiral Kimmel purports to read from page 32 of this document
wherein it defines the functions of an aircraft warning service. (This is fully
set out on page 17 this Brief and Resume under Documentary Evidence.)
No date of this is given but the Admiral says it was in force and effect December
7, 1941, and prior thereto.
Ex. 9: Statement of Captain Edward Kent tlmt he was ground defense officer
at Bellows P'ield. They had some ground machine guns but no amnmnition.
Had asked for some ammunition about December 1, but it hadn't arrived.
Ex. 13 : Captain Edward Kent makes another statement that at Bellows Field
they had no rifles or ammunition issued, so they issued some rifles to use for
their anti-aircraft. Their machine guns were not set up until after the attack.
Had only rifles and a few machine guns from the grounded planes to ward
off the attack.
Ex. 28 : SOP 25th Division.
Ex. 29: SOP 24th Division (These sop's all provide for each unit responsible
for its own air attack defense.)
Ex. 31 : SOP, CAC — "Section 1, par. G — Every unit is responsible for its security
at all times from hostile ground and air forces." See paragraphs 233-273, FM
100-5. (Particularly applicable [26] to "close-in" defense by all sea
coast artillei*y and antiaircraft units.)
Ex. 32 : SOP, Hawaiian Department, November 5, 1941.
R4-427: Lieutenant Welsh says that pits were dug for installing AA guns
in some places but the guns were not ready.
R4-471 : Colonel J. Howard, QMC, had many supplies in his QM depot which
was an easy target but had no machine or other guns for anti-aircraft defense.
Ex. 7 : Statement by General Short — page 24 : "All anti-aircraft batteries had
skeleton crews guarding them. All units hud in their possession ammunition
for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles and machine guns."
Ex. 7, p. 23: Here appears a written statement by Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler
wherein he says at time of attack he was "Pursuit Officer at the Interceptor
Control Center." (But see statements of his superior officer. Major Bergquist,
(R3-379), Tyler merely sent there to watch it and familiarize himself with its
operation.)
Ex. 7, p. 22: Appears an affidavit of Private Joseph P. McDonald who was
the telephone operator at the AWS information center at time of attack.
(Merely verifies that Lockard called in. Private McDonald wanted Lieutenant
Tyler to call back the men at the Board, but Lieutenant Tyler said it was not
necessary.)
R2-80: General Short here, and also in his statement (Ex. 7, p. 24), said
that all anti-aircraft batteries had .30 caliber, .50 caliber, and small arms
amnmnition, "in their immediate possession." Then he says, "All but four bat-
teries had their ammunition for the 3-inch guns immediately accessible. For
instance, down at DeRussy the ammunition was in the casemate. They had to
carry it probably 75 yards, but their men were right there, and the guns were
all set up and in position, but the ammunition was not right along side of the guns.
There were four batteries that had to go further for their ammunition. * * *.
(B. C. D, and F, 64th Infantry). The first one of those batteries started draw-
ing its ammunition at the * * * Crater, where we had our ammunition in
caves, at 8: 15, * * *. And by 10: 15 they had all drawn what we call a day
of fire, which for that particular battery is 300 rounds per gun. * * . They
moved out, and they had about a thousand yards to go, and by 8: 15 were actually
drawing ammunition, * * *."
Q : "And the batteries you say all had the ammunition at the- "
A: Immediately accessible. They were not right along side of the gun. I say
they had to step into the casemate and probably carry the ammunition 75 yards.
Down at Fort Kamehameha they probably didn't have to carry it that far, and
they were in action very quickly as a result of that. The casemate was closer
to the position."
R2-81 : General Short says under Alert #2 the ammunition would have been
along side of the guns.
3238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[27] 3. FAILUBE TO SET UP AN INTERCEPTOR COMMAND
Rl-5 : Joint Coastal Frontier Plan — Army to provide against air attack.
Rl-16 : F. O. #1, dated November 28, 1941, sets up duties and responsibilities
of Interceptor Command.
Rl-18 : SOP, Hawaiian Department states in pertinent part : "The interceptor
command will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, anti-
aircraft artillery, including available Naval and Marine Coi-i)s anti-aircraft
artillery, aircraft warning service and attached units, and will provide for the
coordination of anti-aircraft measures of units not under military control, to in-
clude (1) arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft, (2) the coordination of
the anti-aircraft fire from naval ships in Pearl and Honolulu Harbors, (3) traus-
mission of appropriate warnings to all intei'ested agencies.
R2-51 : General Short here explains the workings of the Interceptor Command,
just as though it was all set up and definitely states that General Davidson was
in command thereof December 7th.
R2-68, 9: General Short states that ordinarily a Naval Oflacer was at the Board
in the information center to relay any information on to the Navy in compliance
with (3) above — and that he thinks three Naval Officers were detailed there.
Says they were not there December 7th.
R2-178: General Davidson states definitely that on December 7th this com-
mand was not set up, that it was not activated.
R2-170 : General Davidson states that he was not in charge of interceptor com-
mand December 7th because there was no interceptor command on that date.
(Gen. Davidson had been in US from about Oct. 15, 1941 until Dec. 3, 1941, and
after the 3rd he took the 4th and 5th in writing up his findings from the main-
land where he had been studying the workings of interceptor commands, so he
knew very little that was going on.)
R2-179: Davidson says interceptor command was not activated until "a few
days ago" (Dec. 24, 1941.)
R2-196 : Interceptor Command activated December 17, 1941.
R3-232 : Colonel Phillips, Chief of Staff, admits interceptor command activated
December 17, 1941.
R3-274: General Burgin, Command General CA, (sea coast and anti-aircraft
artillery), when they are ready to fire turns his anti-aircraft over to the inter-
ceptor command, as' had been doing in drills, and did this December 7th., and
says "they were just shooting at everything * * * i don't think they had much
contx'ol."
R3-339 : General Martin in speaking of AWS was asked, "Who had it if you
didn't?" Answer "It was under the Signal Officer who [28] was in charge
of the installation of the equipment."
R3-353: Lieutenant Colonel Powell, Department Signal Officer, had been set-
ting up this command and that it had not been organized on December 7th. That
he had been in U. S. with General Davidson. Interceptor Command had not been
organized in accqrdance with SOP.
R3-356: Colonel Powell says that on morning of December 7th he was at his
home in Honolulu at time of attack. Was not at AWS. (This is where interceptor
commander would be.)
[29] 4. FAILURE TO PROVIDE A PROPER AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE
Rl-5: Joint Coastal Plan — Army to provide for aircraft warning service.
Rl-16: F. O. #1 provides army's responsibility for AWS.
Rl-18: SOP, Hawaiian Department, Army to supply and "provide for trans-
mission of information to all interested agencies". (Navy?)
R2-178 : Although General Short had stated that this under General Davidson,
General Davidson here states that it was not under his command as the Signal
Corps were just setting it up and they were operating it a little.
R3-232 : Colonel Phillips states that the "radars are still not installed", (ap-
parently meaning the fixed ones).
R3-233 : Had only three mobile units in use, and two of these not operating at
time of attack. (They were only ordered to operate between 4 and 7 a. m., after
that they could use them to train if they wanted to, but not required, and as no
training on Sunday, they all quit at 7 a. m., December 7th, except the one boy,
Lockard.) (Navy did not know that this was only time they were operating.
Were not told.)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3239
R3^253: When Colonel Powell, Signal Officer, got back from U. S., G-3 told
him to operate it from 4 to 7 a. m., and this he did, but it was not set up yet
in accordance with SOP for Interceptor ("omniand.
R3-329 : General Martin, Conimandinj-; General, Air Force, says December 7th
the AWS was under the Signal Officer (Col. Powell) who was installing the
equipment, never under Martin's command. (Which it would have had to be
to be under Gen. Davidson. )
R3-337 : General Martin says that AWS was never under his command.
R3-339: General Martin in speaking of AWS was asked, "Who had it if you
didn't", answer, "it was under the Signal Officer who was in charge of the
installation of the equipment."
R3-353: Colonel Powell, Signal Officer, says that on December 7th the detector
instruments were under his direction, and it was planned that when he got the
AWS working satisfactorily that he would turn it over to the Interceptor
Command.
R3-3n4, n : Colonel Powell says that at time of attack he had seven listening
posts (AW stations) set up and could have enough men to operate them 24 hours,
but there were not enough stations as they wear out under strain.
R3-368: Lieutenant Tyler, AC, was told by Major Bergquist to go over to
the information center this morning from 4 to 8 a. m. — didn't know what to do —
had no instructions — had only seen "board" once before and had never operated
it. Says at 7 a. m. all those who had been there sitting [30] around the
board with earphones on, took them off and all went home, except the switch-
board operator, who is always there', and himself because he had been told to
stay there until 8:00 o'clock. This officer had no instructions whatever as to
his duties there. At about 7: 20 a. m. the radar station at Opana (northern tip
of Island) called in all excited and said a large number of planes were coming
in from about 132 miles north. This was Lockard and he told this to Lt. Tyler,
who told him not to worry about it. In about ten minutes Lockard, called in
again, very excited, the operator asked the Lt. if he shouldn't call the men back
to tlie board. Lt. Tyler said not to. Very soon the attack came.
R3-377 : Major Bergquist had been helping voluntarily to set up the informa-
tion center and he states that it was not finished. He had voluntarily and with-
out instructions, had officers under him go over to the board to act as watch
officers, just to see it operate and learn what it was about, and this is why he had
Lt. Tyler go over there this morning from 4 : 00 to 8 : 00 o'clock. The Board only
operated until 7 : 00 a. m. but he had told Tyler until 8 : 00 and that is why he
wa^ there.
R3-380 : He states that he knew that Lt. Tyler knew nothing about the Board
and didn't expect him to as it was not necessary to have any air officer there at
that time at all.
R3-383: Major Bergquist states that the Aircraft Warning Service Company,
operating under the Signal Corps, were the ones ordered to operate the AWS
from 4 : 00 to 7 : 00 a. m. The Air Force merely cooperated on its own initiative.
Major Tindall, Commander Taylor and himself were all Controllers and could
have operated it.
R3-382: Major Bergquist says that they could have operated the mobile units
24 hours a day at the time and that the setg could have stood it. The difficulty
was with the gas engines operating the sets rather than the sets themselves, but
even then could have operated them.
R3-390: Major Tindall says that altho not detailed or instructed to go over
to the Information Center, he knew that it would probably be undermanned at
the time of the attack on December 7, 1941, so he voluntarily went over there to
help out if he could. Major Bergquist, Comdr. Taylor and himself w'ere the
only three who might be qualified to act as control officers and none of them were
detailed there at that time as it had not been finished and was not ready, and
even then it was only ordered to operate between 4 : 00 and 7 : 00 a. m. There
was no naval officers there as there never had been any assigned. So there were
none there this morning "the same as any other morning".
RlO-1229 : Lt. Comdr. Taylor says the AWS was "not ready by any means",
and there was no naval liaison officers detailed there.
R3-356 : Colonel Powell, Signal Officer, under whose direction the AWS was
at the time of the attack, states that at that time he was at his home in Honolulu,
not at the AWS center.
R5-553 : Admiral Kimmel testifies in regard to a publication known as the "Joint
Action of the Army and the Navy", saying, "This publication was prepared by
3240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the joint board and promulgated to the two services by a joint order of the Sec-
retaries of War and Navy. "He says that it provides under a lieading "The
specific functions of the Army in Coastal Frontier Defense" that the Army shall
provide — "A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warn-
ing service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt
exchange of information or instructions with the Navy."
R5-554 : Adm. Kimmel reads from this document on page 32 thereof where it
defines functions of AWS. (This will be found in Documentary Evidence.)
[30a] Ex. 7, p. 23 : Here appears a written statement by Lieutenant Kermit
A. Tyler wherein he says at time of attack he was "Pursuit Oflicer at the Inter-
ceptor Control Center." (But see statements of his superior oflaoer. Major Berg-
quist (R3-379), Tyler merely sent there to watch it and familiarize himself with
its operation.)
Ex. 7, p. 22 : Appears an affidavit of Private Joseph P. McDonald who was the
telephone operator at the AWS information center at time of attack. (Merely
verifies that Lockard called in. Private McDonald wanted Lieutenant Tyler to
call back the men at the Board, but Lieutenant Tyler said it was not necessary.)
[31] -). FAILURE TO PROVIDE FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF APPROPRIATE
WARNINGS TO ALL INTERESTED AGENCIES
Exhibit 32 : Standing Operating Procedure — Nov. 5, 1941 : Section II, para-
graph 15j provides : "The Interceptor Command will : Coordinate and control the
operations of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery (* * *), the aircraft
warning service, and attaclied units, and will provide for the coordination of
anti-aircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:
(1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.
(2) * * *
(3) Transmission of appropriate learnings to all interested agencies."
R5-553 : Admiral Kimmel testifies in regard to a publication known as "Joint
Action of the Army and the Navy", saying "This publication was prepared by the
Joint Board and promulgated to the two services by a joint order signed by the
Secretaries of War and Navy." Under a heading therein 'The specific functions
of the Army in Coastal Frontier Defense' it says the Army will provide :
"A communications and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning
service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the
prompt exchange of information or instructions icith the Navy."
(Altho in the record it does not appear that the date of this document was.
Admiral Kimmel says it was in effect Dec. 7, 1941.)
R5-554: Admiral Kimmel reads from page 32 of above stated document, viz:
"An aircraft warning service is a communication and intelligence service which
forms part of the communication and intelligence service of the frontier defense.
The purpose is to warn centers of population, industrial plants, public utilities,
and military and naval establishments of the approach of hostile aircraft, and to
alert Air Corps units and anti-aircraft artillery units. It consists essentially of
observers, of information centers for plotting the courses and distributing infor-
mation of approaching hostile planes, and of the necessary communications."
R2-68-70 : General Short testifies that there were Naval Officers at the Infor-
mation Center at all times to get this information and relay it to the Navy. That
they were liaison officers detailed there for that purpose — and he thinks that
three naval officers had been so detailed to act in "transmitting" any warnings
to the Navy. But, altho they had always been there on previous mornings, there
were none there this morning of the attack.
R3-380: Major Bergquist says that Lt. Tyler at the Board this morning would
not know that fhe planes heard were not Navy planes because the Navy liaison
position at the Board had not been filled yet.
R3-381 : Major Bergquist says that there had never been any navy liaison
officers at the Board prior to Det^ember 7, 1941, and that Comdr. Taylor had
contacted the navy in regard to sending some such officers over for that purpose,
but none had as yet been sent.
R3-3S9: Major Bergquist also states that there was no bomber liaison at the
Center until in afternoon, December 7, 1941.
R5-632: Admiral Kimmel states that no naval officer had ever been detailed
to the AWS center to keep navy advised.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3241
[32] 6. FAILURE TO ESTABLISH A PROPER SYSTEM OF DEFENSE BY
COOPERATION AND COORDINATION WITH THE NAVY
Rl-5: Major Lawton sets out the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Plan.
, Therein the Navy is to provide for a "distant reconnaissance".
Rl-14 : Under this Plan the Army was to conduct an inshore aerial patrol and
the Navy a surface patrol of the same area. Major Lawton thought this distance
would be about 20 miles out.
R6-738: Admiral Bloch says that he and General Short signed this Plan and
under that the Army were to conduct an inshore aerial patrol to a distance of
25 to 50 miles.
Exhibit 7, page 11 : In his exhibit D General Short sets out the following
extract from the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan :
'•Method of Coordination. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Dept.,
and the Commandant, 14th. Naval District, have determined that in their
joint plan the method of coordination wil be by mutual cooperation and that
this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and Navy operate
in coordination, until and if the method of unity of conmiand is invoked, as
prescribed in Joint Action of Army and Navy, 1985, Chapter 2."
Rl-18: Standing Operating Procedure, 5 Nov., 1941, states that the Interceptor
Command shall control the AWS and "provide for transmission of appi-opriate-
warnings to all interested agencies."
R2-42 : After War Dept. radiogram of Nov. 27. 1941, Gen. Short states that he
only ordered Alert #1, and operation of AWS 4 : 00 to 7 : 00 A. M., but it doesn't
appear that he notified the Navy of these steps.
R2-108: Gen. Short states that he didn't ask Navy about the "distant
reconnaissance".
R2-127 : Gen. Short doesn't know why the planes were not in the air this
Sunday morning of the attack. Says there were planes all around the Island
constantly. "Most unusual" that they were not up this morning. However, it
would have made no difference as if they had been up they had no ammunition
as they were only training up to that time.
R2-164: Gen. Short says that he did not discuss with the Navy whether they
con.sidered Alert #1 suflScient ; says they, "Never talked it over."
R2-167 : The General says that with all his guns and materiel he couldn't
have guaranteed that the Fleet would be safe. (But never talked it over.)
R2-53 : Gen. Short tells of the many meetings with Admirals Kimmel and Bloch
just prior to the time of attack, but nothing to show that the Navy were ever
informed that interceptor command had not been activated ; that AWS was only
working from 4 : 00 to 7 : 00 A. M. ; that there was no inshore aerial patrol, or that
only Alert #1 as to sabotage was in effect.
R2-68, 9: Gen. Short states that ordinarily a naval officer was at the Board
at the Information Center — that he thinks that three officers were detailed there
from the Navy. (This was not true so it shows they were not mutually
cooperating.)
R2-108: Gen. Short says he never asked the Navy what distance reconnais-
sance they were making as, "It tt?«.s their full responsibility. I didn't know just
where they went, and I don't know just tvhat they did when they were out.
That was a naval res^ponsihility. * * *^ and I did not feel that it was my
business to try to tell Adm. Kimmel how he would conduct his reconnaissance'".
R2-119: Gen. Short says that Alert #1 doesn't call for the operation of the
AWS at all, but were doing it anyhow.
[33] R2-128 : Gen. Short states that Alert #1 didn't cover air attack at all.
And that no particular precautions tvere taken whether the Fleet was in or out of
the Harbor.
R2-186: Gen. Davidson states that a Navy Officer (Comdr. Taylor) had been
around helping them set up the AWS, but not there every morning and that he
was not detailed there as a liaison officer.
R2-222: Col. Phillips, Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Dept., was the senior Army
member of the Local Joint Planning Committee (Army and Navy security meas-
ures), but that they had never met since he became Chief of Staff and was a
member, November 6, 1941. Also, that they never met even after the communi-
cations of Nov. 27, 1941.
R3-223 : Col. Phillips never consulted with the Navy Fleet or Dept. heads at
any time between Nov. 27, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941.
3242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
R3-227: Ck)l. Phillips says that after the War Dept. radio of Nov. 27, 1941, he
and Gen. Short talked it over and decided on Alert #1. He thought that the Navy
would make ''veconnaisance," but never asked them or consulted tfiem in any way.
R3-227, 8: Col. Phillips never did know when the fleet were in or out of the
Harbor, and he says knowing this fact would have made a difference in their
plans of defense. "* * * but as Chief of Staff, I never knew."
R3-229: Col. Phillips states that he was never present at any conferences be-
tween Commanding General and the Navy Commanders. That the General always
took his aide along with him to these conferences. Says that the General was per-
sonally handling the protection and/or cooperation with the Navy. "Short was
handling all that himself."
R3-2fe, 6 : Col. Phillips says that "they" depended on the Navy to warn them.
(I presume that he means by the distant reconnaisance.)
R3-245: Col. Phillips states again that there were no meetings of the Joint
Planning Committee.
R3-270: General Burgin says that Gen. Short expressed himself "very force-
fully" along the line that with the Navy scouting, etc., no ships could get close
enough to land a plane. He got the impression that Gen. Short got this from the
Navy.
RS-273 : Gen Burgin, Commanding General sea coast artillery and anti-aircraft
artillery, says he never knew when the Fleet was coming in, altho it would
have helped him with his defenses had he known this.
R3-283 : Gen. Burgin says that the Navy never gave any information as to when
they were coming in except when they were practicing.
R3-293 : Lt. Col. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Dept., states that at the Staff meeting
on the morning of Dec. 6, 1941, he reiwrted that the Japs were burning papers
at the Consulate. That he knew of this a short time before this. That the FBI
had reported it to one of his men and he in turn told meeting of the Staff. (Gen.
Short says that he did not know of this, and Col Fielder does not state specifically
whether Gen. Short was at this Staff meeting. ) Says nobody paid any attention
to this burning of papers.
R3-381 : Major Berquist says that there had never been any Naval liaison
officers at the Information Center, prior to Dec. 7, 1941.
R5-538: Admiral Kimmel says that he inspected the Pearl Harbor defenses
and was astounded at their weakness.
R5-554: Adm. Kimmel says that my Army and Navy Joint Agreement signed
March 20, 1941, "defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of
the Island of Oahu" would be under the tactical control of the Army. Signed by
Adm. Bloch and Gen. (This is true. See under Documentary Evidence.)
[34] R5-556C : Here Admiral Kimmel sets out the Joint Agreement and the
Joint Estimate of the Situation (Addendum I). (These are set forth in the
preceding pages under Documentary Evidence.)
R5-569: Adm. Kimmel says, that the Navy were not informed until about Dec.
9, 1941, that the radar operated by Sgt. Lockard at Opana had picked up the
approaching Jap planes the morning of the attack. Had they been they might
have trailed them back to carriers.
R5-581, 2 : Adm. Theobald states that the "war warning message" of Nov. 27,
1941, from CNO to the Navy "was given by a Naval Officer to an Army Officer."
R5-583 : On December 3, 1941, the CNO sent Adm. Kimmel a message that they
had reliable information that the Jap consulates at Hong Kong,* Singapore,
Batavia, London and Washington were to destroy most of their codes and ciphers
and burn secret papers at once. (Gen. Short admits he was in conference with
Adm. Kimmel this day, but it is not brought out whether he was informed of
this message.)
R5-608, 9 : Adm. Kimmel states that there were no Navy morning or -evening
patrols except over the route to Honolulu (?), and to the south where a task
force was out — nothing to the north. He says no evening patrols anywhere at
anytime.
R12-1481 : Adm. Kimmel says that the Army was furnished with a schedule that
did show what ships were in or out of the Harbor at a given time and this had
been so for months.
R5-630-7 : Adm. Kimmel states that he thought the AWS was working, and that
radar sets were in good shape, had never been informed otherwise. He knows
that no naval officer was detailed at the Information Center as a liaison officer.
He had the SOP, 5 Nov., 1941, Hawaiian Dept., and from that thought the Inter-
ceptor Command and the AWS was working as provided therein. Just learned at
time of hearing that the permanent radar sets were not even then installed.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3243
R6-G62, 3 : Here Adin. Kimmel states just how he understands the "war warn-
ing" message was given to Gen. Short. Says (.'onidr. Layton gave it to Lt. Burr
(Navy liaison at Army Hq.) who gave it to G-3 (Col. Donegan or Major Lawton)
on Nov. 27, 1941.
R6-667: Gen. Short wrote Adm. Kimmel June 19, 1941, saying that the AWS
"will he in operation in the near future." Aug. 5, 1941, Gen. Short wrote him
again that AWS (aircraft warning service) is "rapidly nearing completion."
R6-669, 670: Tentative SOP (Standing Operating Procedure) of Interceptor
Command was never given Adm. Kimmel he states.
R(}-676 : Adm. Kimmel knew there was no distant patrol of Dec. 7, 1941.
R&-730, 1 : Admiral says that Gen. Short never told him at any time what he
proposed to do after the messages of Nov. 27, 1941.
R&-733-738 : Adm. Bloch didn't know the radars were not working all the time,
didn't know anything ahout the inshore aerial patrol.
R7-771 : Adm. Bloch states that the conversations between Adm. Kimmel and
Gen. Short were very general.
R7-804, 5 : Adm. Bloch says that he and Gen. Short talked many times after
Nov. 27, 1941, and that Gen. Short never told him at any time prior to Dec. 7, 1941,
that he was only alerted to prevent sabotage. After attack he went to the Gen-
eral's office and said, "Weren't you on alert?" and the Gen. replied, "Only against
sabotage." Navy Condition 1 is their highest form of Alert while Army,Alert #1
is their lowest. He thought the Army was on a "high" alert. Didn't know about
the various types of alerts.
R7-806 : Adm. Block thought Gen. Short was given the "war warning" despatch
because he was given one by Adm. Kimmel.
[35] R7-831: Capt. DeLany, USN, knew that the AWS was very unsat-
isfactory, and "couldn't get information out of it."
R7-859: Admiral Pye says that he would depend for warning upon scouting
by aircraft, "and it would seem reasonable to suppose that with all of the Army
observation posts it would be impractical for enemy aircraft to arrive in this
position in such a fashion that we could not fully man our guns." He assumed
that Army's AWS was in full operation — "* * * because on these drills they
had given adequate warning."
R7-865: Adm. Pye says that Navy had its guns manned and ammunition at
them at all times after Nov. 27, 1941.
R9-1094 : Here Lt. Comdr. Layton introduces several Naval despatches right
up until December 3, 1941, showing the inmiinence of war. (However, these are
not brought home to Gen. Short in the record, but this might be checked. If they
were cooperating they should have been made known to him.)
R9-119 : Rochefort knew that Jan Consulate was burning papers the Wednesday
before Dec. 7, 1941.
R14-1624: Gen. Short here says that the SOP, Nov. 5, 1941, was issued as an
accomplished procedure. This sets out the functions of the Interceptor Command
and provides that the Army will transmit warnings to "interested agencies".
(Ten copies of this were given the Navy. T
R14-1626: Gen. Short upon being recalled admits that at time of attack the
Interceptor Command had not a "definite organization". "We were working it in-
formally". Doesn't know for sure whether the Navy knew this or not. (He
didn't say this before.)
R14-1655: Gen. Martin, Com. Gen. Haw. Air Force, did not know the Navy
had no daily off-shore reconnaissance.
R14-l(>48 : G«n. Martin admits that prior to Dec. 7, 1941, there was no inshore
aerial patrol by the Army Air Force.
R16-1823-1827 : Here are set out the two letters. One from Secretary of Navy,
Jan. 24, 1941. setting out the matter of protection of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor,
and the answer thereto by Secretary of War, Feb. 7. 1941, which were sent to Gen-
eral Short and received by him. He admits receipt thereof in his statement as
of Feb. 19, 1941. (See Documentary Evidence this Brief and Resume.)
R2-164: General Short was asked, "You didn't actually coordinate with the
Navy as to whether they considered Alert #1 sufficient?" He replied, "I didn't go
down and ask the Navy, no, sir, whether they considered it sufficient. I am sure
from all of our talk that everybody understood just what was being done."
Question to General Short, "♦ * *. Was it intended that the same alert
would be ordered by the Navy or by the Army in each case?" He replied, "I
hadn't — yes."
R2-38 : General Short was asked if he got the "war warning" message to Navy.
He replied, "I don't remember. I perhaps saw it in that I was in conference
3244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
with Admiral Kiinmel and Admiral Bloch on the 27th for 2 or 3 hours. I was in
conference with him on December 1 — Admiral Kinimel on December 1, and with
both of them on December 3 ; so in all probability I did see the one to which
you refer. I am not sure whether it was sent to me oflScially."
[S5a] R2-39: General Short states the same answer would apply to the
Naval Communication of November 24, 1941. (See documentary Evidence in this
Brief and Resume. )
R2-46 : General Short says, "Now, to take up the question of having no infor-
mation to indicate an attack, as I say, I was in constant communication with the
14th Naval District. / had nothing in the way of alarming news. In our
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan we coordinate the work of the Anny and Navy
hy mutual cooperation. ♦ * *
R2-A6: General Short here discusses the Joint Air Operations Agreement of
March 21, 1941, and says what they each agreed to do, and then, after stating
the Navy was responsible for distant reconnaissance, says ''The qniestion of just
how the total reconnaissance loas carried out was never known to me. * * *
I assumed that the Navy planes were searching all the other critical areas, and
they probably were. / saij. that loas a matter that was not under my control."
R2-107: General Short states, "My reconnaissance under the plan with the
Navy is limited to just the immediate offshore of the Island, ordinarily limited
to 15 miles. * * *" (See statement of Admiral Bloch, R6-738, supra.)
R2-70: General Shbrt in speaking of the operation of the Interceptor Com-
mand station said there would under battle conditions "be a total group of
about 30 oflScers there. * * * Including the naval officer. I think three naval
officers is the normal quota that they have there."
[36] 7. FAILURE TO ISSUE ADEQUATE ORDERS TO HIS SUBORDINATES AS TO THEIB
RESPECTIVE DUTIES IN CASE OF SUDDEN ATTACK
R2-66: Gen. Short here tells about Lt. Tyler being at the Board on this morn-
ing of the attack and getting the call regardinir the approaching planes from
Lockard. (But he had no instructions whatsoever regarding any duties there
or what he was to do in case anything happened. )
R2-162 : Gen. Short says that no planes had any ammunition. Were only train-
ing.
R2-163 : Gen. states that no troops under his command were on a war footing.
R2-177 : Gen. Davidson here sets out two telegrams whereby he is instructed
not to disperse the planes.
R2-178 : Gen. Davidson was never instructed to operate the AWS— it was just
being set up, by Signal Corps.
R2-172 : Gen. Davidson had charge of the pursuit planes but had never been
instructed to have any in the air prior to 7 : 30 A. M. when they started the day's
training — never told to operate an aerial inshore patrol — never told or instructed
to have his planes in the air on Sunday mornings.
R2-186 : Gen. Davidson states that he was never informed as to the serious
international situation between U. S. and Japan. Hence, his subordinates, in-
eluding Lt. Tyler, did not.
R2-2(X): Gen. Rudolph, Commanding General 18th. Bombardment Wing, has
charge of the bombers, states he positively had no information of critical i"ela-
tions between U. S. and Japan.
R2-201, 2: Gen. Rudolph states that as an instructor that had he ever seen a
radiogram stating "this is a war warning" he would never have had his planes
concentrated, and especially on a Sunday morning.
R2-203: Major Allen, AC, says at attack he rushed out — got into a plane —
it wouldn't start — he didn't know what to do — asked instructions — finally got
into the air at Hickam Field about 11 : 30 A. M.
R2-205 : Major Allen never heard a discussion, even informally, that there
might be an attack by Japan.
R2-206 : Major Allen, AC, didn't know that there was a flight of 12 of our own
bombers coming in from the mainland at the time of the attack — saw some of
our own men fire on these pilots as they were trying to land.
R3-226 : There were no restrictions on social functions. All liberties and
leaves of the men were normal.
R3-3r)3: Col. Powell, Signal Corps, who had been getting the AWS together
had been in the U. S. with Gen. Davidson from about Oct. 15, 1041, to Dec. 3,
1941, and when he got back G-3 had already told Col. Muri)hy, whom he had left
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3245
in charge, to operate the AWS between 4 : 00 and 7 : 00 A. M. He was told noth-
ing else to do than just this. Says there was no way of gettiny any infomuition
to the Navy.
R3-237: Col. Phillips, C of S, states that no one ever reported to him that any
ammunition was insecure in a hangar at Hickam Field. He says that no one
ever reported to him that Lockard had picked up the i)lanes that morning until
a few days later when the Signal Officer just mentioned it informally.
R3-245 : Col. Phillips didn't know whether Navy had been given SOP, Nov. 5,
1941, or not, or whether they would know what Alert #1 meant or not, or whether
they had a similar procedure. (Navy were given 10 copies.)
[S7] R3-249, 250: Brig. Gen. Durwold Wilson, CG 24th. Division, was
verbally told by Col. Haynes, G-2 25th. Division, on Nov. 27th. that he had seen a
telegram that Jap Negotiations were off, but no mention was made that hostilities
might ensue. Never called into conference or consulted.
R3-251 : Gen. Wilson says that he felt safe from attack on account of the
patrol system ( ?), altho he says he knew nothing about it except by hearsay. He
thought the Navy had an inshore and off-shore patrol.
R3-254 : Gen. Wilson was at the "Ann Etzler's Cabaret" the prec<!ding Satur-
day night at Schofield Barracks.
Col. Phillips was there -R2-216.
Gen Short was there.
Gen. Murray was there -R3-264.
Gen. Burgin at "a little party at Ft. Ruger."
Major and Mrs. Dupree had rather "large party at Schofield"-R3-226.
Gen. Martin was at Dinner Party at Hickam Field -R3-332.
R3-299 : Col. Fielder, G-2, says that he and Gen. Short discussed the possibility
of an attack in a "purely academic way."
R3-260, 1 : Gen. Murray, CG 25th. Div., "planned to take a horseback ride that
morning. Was pei"plexed * * *".
R3-264: On Nov. 27th. when Gen. Murray got Alert #1 he was not informed in
any way as to the seriousness of the situation. No intimation — nothing.
R3-265 : On Nov. 27th when Gen. Murray got Alert #1
R3-265: He says that he talked with Gen. Short several times between Nov.
27, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941, but the Gen. had never intimated any serious or critical
situation. He had only mentioned that he couldn't get all the funds he wanted
for various things. Nothing in re international situation.
R3-273: Gen. Bui-gin thought the Interceptor Command was working and
thought that Gen. Davidson was in charge of it.
R3-274 : Gen. Burgin states how on this morning of the attack he got his anti-
aircraft ready and turned it over to the Interceptor Command as he had done
on the drills, and says, "They didn't have good control". (There wasn't any
Interceptor Command and this Gen. didn't know it, altho he turned over his guns
to it. It was just then being run by Majors Tindall and Bergquist who volun-
tarily went over there thinking that it would be undermanned.)
R3-316: Lt. Col. Bicknell, Ass't G-2, got the information that the Japs were
burning papers on December 5, 1941, and informed Staff meeting next morning.
Says that it meant that war was imminent to him.
R3-337 : Gen. Martin says that Gen. Davidson was the Interceptor Commander,
then on page 338 he didn't even seem to know that it was not activated until Dec.
17, 1941.
R3-368: Lt. Kermit Tyler was told by Major Bergquist to go over to the In-
formation Center of the AWS tliis morning but didn't know why. He had no
instructions only to be there between 4 : 00 and 8 : 00 A. M. He had never oper-
ated a Board and had only seen one once before.
R3-377 : Major Bergquist had been helping the Signal Corps set up the AWS,
and knew it was operating between 4 : 00 and 7 : 00 A. M. so he thought it would
be a good idea to acquaint the officers under him with it hy having them take turns
going over there and watching the Board. So without being told to do so he sent
over Lt. Tyler. Says that no Air Corps officer was required to be there as it was
not under the Air Corps as yet. Page 380 — he states that he knew that Lt. Tyler
knew very little about it, didn't expect him to. Says there were no naval officers
ever there as they had been assigned there as yet.
R3-383 : Major Bergquist says that the Air Corps were merely cooperating on
their own hook. Page 384 — he states that there was no bomber liaison [38]
there at the Center until afternoon of that day.
3246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
R3-386 : Major Bergquist states that he came ih^re about 10 : 00 A. M. as he was
not detailed or assi{?ne<l there, but merely came to help out.
R3-390: Major Tindal says that he was not detailed or assigned to the Infor-
mation Center of the AWS, but knew it would probably be undermanned so he
went over there to help out. He iv<is the first officer there and the men toere
trying to man it theninelics.
R-JMllS : Lts. Taylor and Welsh rushed to Maleiwa Field — no one told them to
go up or to do anything — no squadron commander present. (He was hunting
deer on another Lsland.) So on thair own initiative they both took to the air
after loading ammunition. They brought down several planes.
R4— 427 : Lt. Welsh says the guards there had no instructions as to what to do
if enemy planes came over.
R4-447 : Col. McCarthy says that on Dec. 7, 1941, he never did receive instruc-
tions to put in Alert #3 so he just did it himself and did what he could.
R4-448 : Col. McCarthy says that from about Nov. 22, 1941, until Dec. 2nd or
3rd. that Alert #2 had been in effect. Says that Post Commander called in
several Battalion Commanders and verbally gave them orders to put Alert #2
in effect.
R4-476 : Lt. Cooper says that they had been on Alert #3 for about two weeks.
(I don't understand these two oflSeers and it should be checked.)
R4-4:j4 : Pvt. Shortt, ambulance driver, rushed to the hospital — three or four
doctor officers there — had no 'nstructions or orders — knew that men were injured
so without any instructions he went out and picked up wounded by himself — no
litter service or assistance at all.
R4-461 : Lt. Saltzman stated that he couldn't conceive of this attack "in my
wildest dreams". Says that this is what the Junior Officers thought : — "Knowing
that the Signal Corps, the AWS has outposts all over the Islands and that they
are manned almost continually and that Navy patrols these waters, I never felt
that we would be completely surprised the way we were." (This last word is
"did" in record.)
R4-491 : Pvt. McBriarty at Bellows Field says that about 8 :30 A. M. a plane
flew over shooting its machine guns, but as no one was hit they thought nothing
of it and he went on to Church.
R14-1654: Gen. Martin says that no search was made for carriers on this
morning.
R14-1659 : Gen. Davidson says that the Interceptor Command did not direct
that a search for planes from carriers be made this morning. (How could it?)
Exhibit 16 : This document gives in detail the things they have done since the
attack such as practice air raids, drills for gas attacks, practice air raid on
Honolulu, distributed the Klaxons fo rair warning system. This at Wheeler
Field. (See con^^ents of this Exhibit more fully set out under specification 11.)
(While this is all negative evidence, nevertheless it does show what was not done
prior to the attack and what could have been done to alleviate the severity of
said attack and the loss sustained.)
Exhibit 17 : This sets forth what was done by Gen. Rudolph subsequently at
Hickam Field. (See this under specification 11.)
Exhibit 15: Blackout instructions for Hickam Field, issuance of gas masks;
air raid drills; plans for evacuation of women and children, etc..) Klaxons for
air warning service had not been issued.
[39] 8. FAILUEE TO TAKE ADEQUATE MEASURES TO PROTECT THE FLEET
AND N.WAL BASE AT PEIARL HARBOB
Rl-f> : Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Plan (See Documentary Evidence in
this Brief and Resume) — "Army to provide for land, sea coast and anti-aircraft
defense of the Island of Oahu, with particular attention to Pearl Harbor and the
naval forces there present. See also Exhibit 25, Plan for Air Defense of
Oahu, * * *
"III. Facts Bearing on the Case.
1. Facts:
a. The Army mission is : 'To defend the naval base of Oahu'. * * *
d. To perform its missions, the Fleet must have freedom of action with-
out responsibility for the defense of its base."
A1.SO, Joint Army and Navy Defense Plan, 1935, Rainbow 5:
a. Joint — Hold Oahu as main outlying naval base and control and protect
shipping in coastal zone.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3247
Rl-14: By above Plans Army was to conduct an inshore aerial patrol. (The
distance of this is in debate.)
R2-42: After warning of November 27, the only measures General Short took
were to order Alert #1 (sabotage and uprisings) and radar operation 4-7 a. m.
R2-80: General Short states that all anti-aircraft batteries, and these included
PH, did not have ammunition. Says that by 10:15 a. m., they were already,
though.
R2-51 : General Short states what measures he took after November 277 — See
page 42 above.
R2-53 : General Short states that he met with Kimmel and Bloch several times
just prior to December 7, but nothing to show that they were informed that
interceptor command was not organized ; AWS was not working only 4-7 a. m. ;
that there was no inshore patrol or that only Alert #1 was in eifect. (There is
much to show otherwise, however.)
R2-l()8 : General Short says he never asked the Navy what distance reconnais-
sance they were making as "It was their full responsibility". "I didn't know
just where they went, and I don't know just what they did when they were out.
That was a naval responsibility. * * * and I did not feel that it was my
business to try to tell Admiral Kimmel how he would conduct his reconnaissance."
R2-119: General Short states that Alert #1 is not for air attack and under
this it was not necessary to operate AWS at all.
R2-127 : General Short states no planes in air at time of attack this Sunday
morning, he didn't know why, says it was "most unusual".
R2-157: General ««//s that no special precautions are taken whether Fleet is
in or out of the harbor.
R2-162 : General admits his planes were not on a war footing at time of attack
and had no annnunition.
R2-178: General Davidson says the AWS not under his command at this time —
that Signal Corps were just setting it up. ( Materials had been there since June,
according to Secretary of War's letter of February 7, 1941.)
R2-186: General Davidson says a naval officer was helping set up the AWS
but none were detailed to serve there for liaison. (Hence, there was no provision
for transmitting information to interested agencies.)
[40] R2-172: General Davidson states no planes of his (pursuit) were ever
in the air prior to 7 : 30 a. m., and never any on Sundays.
R2-190: General Davidson had 80 planes in commission and 69 not, this
morning.
R2-389, 190: General Davidson states that the biggest difficulty was that the
plane guns were not loaded and the ammunition was in the hangar that was
on fire.
R3-222, 3 : Colonel Phillips, Chief of Staff, was senior army member of Local
Joint Planning Committee, but it never met since he was a member. Never con-
sulted with Navy Fleet or District heads from November 27 to December 7.
R3-227, 8: Colonel Phillips says he never consulted Navy. He never knew
when Fleet was in or out of the Harbor and this would affect the plan for de-
fense. Never present at any conference of Commanding General with Navy.
"General Short was handling all that himself."
R3-234: Colonel Phillips states that anti-aircraft guns, mobile units, had no
ammunition. Thinks that under FM 100-5 they should have had some.
R.3-245 : As Chief of Staff he never knew what forces the Navy had. Depended
on Navy to warn them. (?)
R3-273: General Burgin says although he had the sea coast artillery and the
anti-aircraft artillery he never knew when tleet was coming in although it would
have helped him a lot to know this.
R3-298: Lieutenant Colonel Fielder reported at Staff meeting morning of
December 6, that Japs were burning papers.
R3-316 : Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, Assistant Chief of Staff, got information
that Japs were burning papers at 5 p. m., Friday, gave to Staff next morning.
Also brought the Mori message to Commanding General the night before, but
they could make nothing of it. (Ex. 27.)
R3-825: General Martin states that Japs seemed to know everything about
them. "Unfortunately we were in Alert #1, that was the most unfortunate thing
of all."
R3-368: Lieutenant Tyler detailed to Board with no experience, no instruc-
tion, wasn't even supposed to be there, Opana called and reported planes but
3248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Tyler not told what to do, didn't know so he did nothing, and planes, although
they had been detected, came on and surprised tliem all.
R3-380, 1 : Major Bergquist says AWS not organized or set up ; no interceptor
command activated ; no naval liaison or other means for getting information to
Navy. On his own responsibility sent Tyler up there to get acquainted with it.
Says had suflScient personnel to operate 24 hours. Bergquist was not detailed
there, but did voluntarily go there and help take charge of it when the attack
came.
RSr-SOO: Major Tindall voluntarily went over there during attack as he knew
it was not set up and would be undermanned.
R4-437, 8: Captain Ebey says his truck drawn coast artillery was not in posi-
tion at Barbers Point. They were machine gunned on the way. They had to get
machine guns out, set them up and fire back.
R4-468: Sergeant Klatt: C. A., says the switchboard and telephones for bis
battle post were in the barracks supply room — not installed.
[J/1] R-1-497. 8: Captain West says that at Malakole they had some ma-
chine guns but the anti-aircraft had to be gotten from the storage and set up.
No equipment in place and ready for fire.
R5-538: Admiral Kimmel says he inspected defenses at Pearl Harbor and
was astounded at their weakness.
R5-549: (See two letters (2CL-41) of Navy's— SOP, Hawn. Dept. in Docu-
mentary Evidence. Also Ex. 35 "Air Defense of Oahu".)
R5-556C : On March 31, 1941, Bloch and Martin signed ji)int estimate of situ-
ation covering joint Army and Navy Air Action in event of hostile surprise
attack. (See this in Documentary Evidence it covers the exact thing that hap-
pened.)
R5-581, 2: Admiral Theobald says that November 27, "war Warning" message
given by "a naval officer to an army officer".
R6-7.80, 1 : Admiral Kimmel says that Short at no time ever told him what
measures he was going to take as a result of the messages of November 27.
R7-804: Bloch didn't know Army not on a "high" alert — never knew different
kinds of alerts.
RlO-1191 : Captain Shoemaker, Commanding Officer, Ford Island, says Army
was to set up an anti-aircraft defense of the island and man it, but that on
this day they didn't even show up so they got out some machine guns but had to
get ammunition from storage.
R14-1624 : Short says hat SOP, 5 November 1941, was issued as "accomplished
' prncodure". (This wns ?iven the Navy.)
R14-1622: General Short says, "Frankly, * * * i was more serious about
the training rather than expecting anything to happen at that time".
R14-ll>L!4, 3: Geueial Short admits reconnaissance and radar working haphaz-
ardly up until December -7, because "I didn't think the situation demanded it."
1^14-1641, 2 : General Short states that if he had had all the material he needed
it wouldn't have made any ditTerence in his plans.
R3-383: The AWS Company, operating under the Signal Corps were the ones
ordered to operate the AWS from 4 to 7 a. m. The Air Force merely cooperated
on its own hook. Operating on a war footing there would be a controller and a
pursuit officer present at the Information Center. Major Tindall, Commander
Taylor and himself (Major Bergquist) were all controllers and could have
operated it.
R3-339 : General Martin in speaking of AWS was asked, "Who had it if you
didn't?" Answer, "It was under the Signal Officer who was in charge of the
installation of the equipment."
R3-337 : General Martin says that AWS was never under his commnnd.
R3-353; Colonel Carroll Powell says that at time of attack the Interceptor
Command had not been organized in accordance with SOP. On this day AWS
was under his direction.
[42] R3-356: At attack he was at his home in Honolulu. Was not at the
AWS station.
R8-389: Major Bergquist says there was no bomber liaison at Information
Center until in afternoon, December 7.
Ex. 20 : .Joint drill to test efficiency of interceptor command. ( See) .
R12-1481 : Admiral Kimmel says Army was furnished with schedule showing
when ships in and out and had been getting this several months.
R5-553 : Admiral Kimmel testifies in regard to a publication known as the
"Joint Action of the Army and the Navy." He states, "This publication was pre-
pared by the Joint Board and promulgated the two services by the Secretaries of
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3249
War and Navy by a .ioint order signed by them respectively". It states what the
Army shall provide for under a heading "The specific functions of the Army in
Coastal Frontier Defense''' —
"A communication system and an intelligence system to include an aircraft
warning service, aniong the elements of the land defense, with provision for
the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy."
R5-554 : Admiral Kimmel then reads from page 32 of this Joint Action plan
and it defines and describes the duties of an aircraft warning service. (This is
copied verbatim on page 8, Documentary Evidence, in this brief and l^esume.)
Admiral Kimmel says this was in effect December 7, 1941, and prior thereto.
R2-168: General Short was asked:
Q : "Well, your basic plans state specifically that that is the responsibility
of the forces (Army) here, to protect that base."
A : "That is correct."
Q : "All right. Now, if you had those ideas have you discussed them with
Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch along those lines? Have you ever dis-
cussed with them the situation, or rather, whether or not they should bring
their fleet in, or how many? Has that ever been discussed?"
A : ^ don't think that I have discussed that pax'ticular point as to how
many ships they would bring in."
[43] 9. FAILTJKE TO HAVE HIS AIRPLANES DISPERSED IN ANTICIPATION OF A
HOSTILE ATTACK, AFTER HA\7NG BB^EN WARNED OF THE DANGER THEREOF
Ex. 36: See communications of both the Army and Navy dated October 16,
1941 ; November 24, 1941 ; November 27, 1941 (one to Army direct from War De-
partment, and the "war warning" dispatch to Cincpf), and November 28, "J941,
and the Navy dispatch of December 3, 1941 (although it is not shown that Gen-
eral Short saw this latter, he says he was in conference with both Admiral Kimmel
and Bloch on December 3, 1941), all bearing upon the warnings of danger given
to General Short. These various documents also appear in this Brief and Resume
under Documentary Evidence.
R2-84 : General Short admits purposely grouping the planes as they were then
easier to guard against sabotage.
R2-177: General Davidson set out two telegrams from Hawaiian ^Air Force
not to disperse planes.
"Nov. 27, 1941. * * * HAF Four two C place Alert number one in
effect immediately. Anti-sabotage only. This is an actual repeat actual
alert not a drill."
Followed by :
"Under alert #1 aircraft will not be dispersed. All units continue train-
ing under condition easy five."
Easy five meant E5 which was ready in four hours. So just continued to train
normally under conditionEo. Nothing ready.
R2-200 : General Rudolph states alert #1 "did not include airplane raids ; it
included sabotage. Therefore, we bunched the planes because we could have
much better protection against sabotage."
Ex. 6: This map shows the bunched arrangement of planes at Hickam Field.
m] 10. FAILURE TO HAVE HIS AIRPLANES IN A STATE OF READINESS FOR AN
ATTACK
R2-162 : General Short admits that pursuit planes were not on a war footing at
time of attack and were not supplied with ammunition.
R2-127 : General admits no planes in the air this fateful Sunday morning.
R2-128: General states that Alert #1 doesn't cover air attack at all.
R3-345 : General Martin states that had Alerts 2 or 3 been in effect the planes
would have had fuel and ammunition, would have been better.
R3-331 : Martin states that he had 140 pursuit planes at time and about one-half
of them out of commission.
R2-190: Davidson says that he had 80 ships (pursuit) in commission at time and
69 out of commission.
3250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
R2-189, 90 : General Davidson state that the biggest difficulty at the time was
that the planes guns were not loaded and the ammunition was in a hangar that
was on fire.
R2-177 : General Davidson shows two telegrams from Commanding General,
Hawn Air Force, not to disperse planes under Alert #1. —
"Nov. 27, 1941. * * * HAF Four two C place Alert number one in effect
immediately. Anti-sabotage only. This is an actual repeat actual alert not
a drill."
"Under alert #1 aircraft will not be disi>ersed. All units continue train-
ing under condition easy five."
R5-556K, M, N : Addenda I an'd II to the plan of Army and Navy made in ac-
cordance with the Joint Air Operations Agreement of March 21, 1941 (R5-556A)
provide conditions of aircraft readiness, in pertinent part, as follows :
"Material Readiness, E — All aircraft conducting routine operations, none
ready for the purposes of this plan ; and under Operational Readiness #5.
All types — four hours."
R3-383 : Major Bergquist says that if there had been Alert #2 the planes would
have been dispersed ; a pilot there at all times and a man sitting in the cockpit at
all times to warm it up, and could be up in 1 to 3 minutes.
R3-389: Bergquist says there was no bomber liaison at information center
December 7th until in the afternoon.
R4— 415-423.: Lieutenant Taylor and Welsh rushed to Maltewa Field and the
men were just loading ammunition (30 cal.) into the planes — there was no Squad-
ron Commander there (he was bear hunting on Molokai Island) — had no instru-
tions at all so just jumped in to the planes and brought down six Japs and were
cited for this by the Government.
R8-893 : Amdiral Bellinger says that all Navy planes were armed with machine
guns and had ammunition. (Also, somewhere in there that Navy planes were
all dispersed.)
[^5] R14^1658 : General Martin states that he did not set up machine guns
at Fields for protection of planes. (What about the SOP's and FM 100-5 — Every
unit will be responsible for its own defense from air attack.)
Ex. 25 : In statement by Assistant Chief of Staff, Gr-3, states that there were no
airplanes ready for immediate use at time of attack.
R2-200 : General Rudolph, Commanding General bombers, says that he was only
training crews to bring over the bombers from the mainland. That when his
ships were up they would have no ammunition unless they were doing some target
practice in connection with their training. None of his planes were in the
air at time of attack December 7, 1941, at 7 :55 a. m., and that none got in the
air until after the attack.
R2-201, 2 : General Rudolph, Commanding General bombers, says that if he had
had any intimation of pending trouble he would never have had his planes bunched
or concentrated, but would have had them ready for the air, "Especially on a
Sunday morning."
R5-561 : Here General McNarney reads a statement submitted by General Short
in re condition of Reconnaissance and Bomber planes on December 7, 1941 :
Reconnaissance planes in commission — 6.
Reconnaissance planes out of commission — 7.
Bomber planes in commission — 39.
Bomber plane out of commission — 33.
R2-128 : General Short after saying it was "most unusual" for planes not to be
in the air this Sunday morning, was asked how he would explain that. He re-
plied, "I wouldn't be able to explain it without asking General Davidson why;
bjut if thcj/ had been up and training they icouldnH have had wnvmunition, for
normally in training they did vot earry ammunition.^'
R2-128: General Short says further "♦ * ♦. There is no question, if we
had had pursuit in the air fully armed and expected this attack at 8 o'clock, why,
we probably would have — we might have been able to stop it to a considerable
extent, at any rate."
R2-162: General Short was asked, "Were the pursuit planes armed and sup-
plied with amnninition at all?" He replied, "They were not."
R2-163 : General Short was asked, "Were the bombers in the same state of un-
preparedness as the fighting planes?" He replied, "Yes, sir."
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3251
[46] 11. FAILUBE TO PROVIDE FOR PROTECTION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, THEIR
FAMILIES ET CETERA, ON VARIOUS REKERVATIONS
R3-232 : Colonel Phillips states that the Hawaiian Home Guard was not in
existence December 7th — "It was just being organized." Says there was no
aerial warning service "with sirens in tower downtown" at that time. Have
been established since.
R3-233: Colonel Phillips states again that there was no system of air raid warn-
ings.
Rl-5 : Under the Joint Coastal Plan the Army mission was to provide against
air and gas attack.
R4-^12, 13: Colonel Phillips again states there were no sirens or warnings
at various fields of any kind prior to attack. No warning devices of any kind.
Also, again no air raid warning for "tower" prior to December 7th.
R4-514: Civilian Chas. ITtterbach states that civilian comment was, "They
caught them asleep, by God."
Ex. 15: This contains a group of orders and instructions issued issued sub-
sequent to attack at Hickam Field. (While tliis evidence is of subsequent meas-
ures it does show what security measures were lacking prior to the attack.) It
shows : gas masks issued ; a gas alarm system established ; blackout regulations
promulgated : one communication dated December 20, 1941, states, ''The Ha-
woAian Air Depot is dependent upon the inverted sections of gasoline tanks
for shelter and protection of our personnel in the event of an air raid. * * *
It is requested that wc be permitted the use of these sections until such time as
adequate air raid shelters are built for mir personnel, * * *." (Permis-
sion was granted by 1st Indorsement.) ; and a system of ait raid wardens estab-
lished.
Ex. 16: By order General Short gives orders for a practice air rail alarm
on December 10 for Honolulu. Issued December 9, 1941. Also states that Mem-
bers of the Military Police, Honolulu City Police, Home Guard and Honolulu
Fire Dept. have been issued a supply of Stewart Hand Klaxon sirens for distri-
bution throughout the City of Honolulu.
December 9, 1941 — Standing orders first issued for defense against gas attack.
December 7, 1941 — Bulletin "Information for Conduct of Families in Air
Raids."
Ex. 17 : This contains subsequent instructions by General Rudolph, Command-
ing General ISth Bombardment Wing. This states gas masks issued to all
personnel. Sirens issued for use in giving air raid alarms. Construction for
additional facilities underneath barracks floor initiated, to protect men occu-
pying barracks. Continuous daily patrols have been flown in cooperation with
the Navy. Evacuation plans [^7] for icmnen and children initiated. Com-
plete blackout instructions put into effect.
(These exhibits are all negative evidence, but show (1) that these obvious
safety measures they call for were not done prior to the attack, and (2) that
the facilities were there and all of these things could have been done prior
to the attack hadanyone even suspected there might be trouble.)
(An article appears in the Washington Star for week of March 23, 1942, of
an interview of Mrs. Mary Kogan, 1340 Taylor Street, N. W., wife of Lieutenant
Milton Kogan, wherein she states that she and her husband were at Schofleld
Barracks at time of attack. She states therein, in pertinent part, "It was then
they knew the thing (the attack) was i-eal and that the warning of a Hawaiian
Newspaper a week earlier that Japan could be expected to attack that week end
had come true. * * * Before December 7, we hadn't even been told what to
do in case of an air raid".) {Underscoring supplied.]
(As showing that General Short must have known of imminence of attack,
a Mr. Raymond Coll, a Hawaiian newspaper editor is quoted by p. Washington
Newspaper, shortly after the submission of the report of the Roberts Board,
January 24, 1942, as stating, in substance, that General Short and Admiral
Kimmel had made clear by their utterances before December 7, 1941, the proba-
bility and immence of a Japanese attack at an early date.) (We have not been
able to examine these Hawaiian papers at the Congressional Library as the
papers were at the bindery at the time of this report.)
79716 O— 46— pt. l8 26
3252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SECRET
June 12, 1942.
UZUCRANDDU for the Files.
I today saw General Hilldring and Colonel Donald Viil son,
the officer who is to succeed him on July 1, about the general
court-martial charges we have drawn up in the natter of General
Short. General Hilldring explained the background of the situation
to Colonel Wilson. General Hilldring advised me that there was
nothing to do at the present time but hold the papers but suggested
that I should at some time tell the Secretary of .lar and the Chief
of Staff that we had prepared a draft of specifications and were
awaiting any further instructions.
"VtTV.^-^ y...^wv^IX^ /S*""—^
3t\*> ^
;ECB^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3253
27 November 1944.
Memorandum for Mr. Bundy :
Subject : Secretary's Press Release of 28 February 1942 Re General Short.
1. Attached hereto are two copies of the Secretary's press release of 28
February 1942.
2. Pursuant to his direction the Judge Advocate General's Office on 4 March
undertook preparation of charges against General Short, utilizing all available
data including the Roberts Report and transcript. This work was completed 20
April 1942 and resulte<l in preparation of charges alleging violation of the 96th
Article of War, with eleven specifications as follows :
Specification 1 : Failure to provide an adequate inshore aerial patrol.
Specification 2 : Failure to provide adequate anti-aircraft defense.
Specification 3: Failure to set up an Interceptor Command.
Specification 4 : Failure to provide a proper aircraft warning service.
Specification 5 : Failure to provide for the transmission of appropriate warn-
ings to interested agencies.
Specification 6 : Failure to establish a proper system of defense by cooperation
and coordination with the Navy.
Specification 7: Failure to i.ssue adequate orders to his subordinates as to their
duties in case of sudden attack.
Specification S: Failure to take adequate measures to protect the Fleet and
Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.
Specification 9: Failure to have his airplanes dispersed in anticipation of a
hostile attack, after having been warned of the danger thereof.
Specification 10: Failure to have his airplanes in a state of readiness for an
attack.
Specification 11 : Failure to provide for the protection of military personnel,
their families, etc., and of civilian employees on various reservations.
3. The above charges were merely tentative and possible chai'ges and were
never approved by The Judge Advocate Genei'al or transmitted to the Secretary
of War. Of course, they were never made public.
WiLJJAM J. Hughes, Jr.,
Colonel, JAQD.
1 Incl. Cy Pre.ss Release (dup)
3254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 141
VoUa, Correspondunca.and Rtporta Relating to P»«rl Harbori and ETwnto Lcadlna m>
to It. '^ "• -r
JL^ ■Og'tf^^l' Ji?40t Received report fro* Japeoeae aources in fexico of IntenUoni) to
boab four (A) Battleshlpe on 17 October 19^. Thia report conveyed in peraon by
ne to CIBCUS (Adadisl Riohardaon) then at Sen Pedro, Cellf., with three (3)
Battleahipe and one(l) Heavy Crulaer. Official report »ad« to C.».0. (D.N.I.)
by CoBdt Uth. Jferal rdatrlot, San.Weeo. (See O.K.,1. files for copy,)
12 Itova^Var 3,9i4Q. Aaeiated In InraetlgatioB a»d recoBBwndatloBB regarding iBtelllgeaee
facilities In Hawaii. Thia being conducted by Capt. W.K.Kilpe trick D.S.K. on o»tter»
of CIBCUS (Ada. Richardaon).
JA, B?r«lNr IW.' W.«cuaaed with Adairal Block the vuDaarability of fleet at Pearl Harbor
and reoMnanded oerUin aaeeurea for sectirity. Obtained hia persdrfioa to krre seat
to Honolulu certain key sen to build up the IntelUgenoe organl»tioD.
9 Fabruarv MZ^. Letter to Adalral H.R.Stark USN regarding ay eoaveraationa with Aikdrel
ffCmmx at Sen Kranciaco on 8 Feb. (Copy attached).
11 Fabnary 19^. Letter to Admiral K.i;.Kiaiael OSN regarding SOJTJRA conversationa and
the axiatlBg aituatlon. (Copy attached).
17 Febrmrv 19A1. Reply of Ad». Stark to agr letter of 9 Febnary. (Copy Attached).
Ifarch 19/m. Con^ereatioB with Aduttal Kijwel (CINCPAC) and hia Chief of Staff
(Capt. IB. SBith XBS) regarding Scmm intersriew, and SURPRISE ATTACK on our Fleet
by Japanese in oaee hoatilltios eventuate. .Detslla of this conversation are
covered in a Personal and Confidential lieso to Ch4ef of Staff to Ciacpeo, laar-
Adalrsl Kilo Dapseaal, XSSH, for preaentatlon to CISCPAC (Adairal Nisdtz) and dated
March 17, 1942. (Copy Attached).
1^ Septeai)er V^J^. Letter to Admiral Stark tirgli^ <»trtioB, and other Batters. (Copy attaobed}*
Qetcb^;: 1941, Japanese diacuaaicm of chances of aucceaa of air attack on Pearl Htartor,
Ccpj of thia presented to Capt. CH.IfcMorria USB (Planning Officer on staff Ciaeua) :.
a tranalation of "When Japan Fights", by 8oasaku Rlrata. (Copy attached).
20-25 October 19^. Extensive ooBversatioaa with an Inveatigator froo Washington, Ifcr Cvartia
B, Mtmaon, (beliered to be frcai high levels) carrying a letter frosi Admiral Stark (CJIO)
to "open everything to hlis". He was give* an accurate picture of the ait-uatio/i existiag
aad how it would develop. He was told to"forget about uprialngs and aabotage" about which
he WB8 wjat concerned because the Japsnoae would start the war "With an air attack on our
fleet for the purpoae of disabling four Battleahipa.'-Soaie detalla are included in ay aaao
to Ada. BraeiBel, ■sBtioned abova aad copy attached. (See Hunaon authentication attached.)
l") Bpva.-B^r 19A1^ Converaatlon with Lieut, C.H.CogglB8,(iK!) OSS, (Attached to Intelligence
organiiatlon), regardiag exiating Officer ISorale and lack of readinese for war. Detaila
IncIttdAd In report to Fleet Intelligence Officer, aame date. (Copy attached),
;^Q-25 tJoWMber 19^. Converaationa with Lieut. Coggina regarding exiating low an^r ■erala.
DeUila in Confidential aeao to Dlatrict lateillgeuce Officer , l4th Maval Diatrict,
Hcrrolulu dated 5 Deceaber 1941. (Copy attached).
f^*y- 'l±i CoHversatlona rwfiftilng failure to apprehend Seven (7) Japanese ag«nt> found
photogrephing Kanaohe Haval Air atatioa on all aldea, on 4 Soveaber 1941. ( fhie one of
firat apota hit by attacking aircraft). Detaila available in O.H.I. Fllea, including
Teletype report to F.B.I. Office la Honolulu. For whole Intelligence altuatlon , this
known only to Officer in Charge of Inveatigatlons, Lt-Coawir. R.B.Stevenson, tBSR, now at
Honolulu. ;.»<-<- Iv't-r' irv>^ I>...-r.r ya-rH T-vh Jl.^.*£ s. 4^hi. H .*'<>»•<»•« - a«».«^ foyH <n.»» J
^7 Movenbay 1941. BetaUed diacuaaiona with Jh-.Lorrln B. Thurston, Head of Radio StaUon
KGU, Honolulu and Editor of Honolulu Advertlaer regarding preaent serious situation and
pfceparation of his Htdlo station for neceaaary broedoasta at tijae of air attack.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3255
2,B Novtwr 19^ S«il«d with Task Fore* 8 [kdx. Kalsay) for W«lc« Island.
;? ^-ecggb^r 494J,. News report of arriral tn Washington of Jspenss* irbassador to
Pern. This was li5dicat«d by bo as one of the cwidltiona which would bring a "^raak*
ons way or another, Ir ny convarsetiona with Ifansoc and others.
j l^oewbay 19^4 . Rspert fron C.TKCUS that unidentified siibwsrine had been reported
In the operating areas on night on 4 lieoember.
This w»8 the condition on whioh I had sdviaed all In my ooirrersatlone,
including AdBlrsl Il«»ei, that the Japanese would be ready to strike.
rro» 1800 to 2400 endeavored to intercept Japanese conversation on Ssdio short
wave. There wee nothir^ that would have Justified any report to eqr Task Force
CcBiaBnder or CLNClfi.
7 Pepeaber 194)1, (C;600) '•hen Cotonuniostion Officer reported tJie attack on Oshu, switched
on Hadio and BCti Honolnlu was seisJins out the words we had discussed on the
erening of 27 Norember.
At night we Joined the tJSS Etatrolt and Destroyers and Seowted to the Southward
for the Eneg^f. Sothlng sighted. Entered Pearl Harbor at daylight, 8 December.
ch
V /v' X {>.... ltd,
t+1 '^»!
, , ; n-^i , > I; h )
3256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In r«Fly refer to Sio, C 0 P I
Op-16-B
42-8 -■- • '■ -■ ■ .•■>•• -.-..Qn,
SwUl So. 0325C16
CMirEMSlfTUl, iOTeKb
D»ar Zaciiarl»»i
TJaLr.k8 for j-our letter o:' Nc^»nb«r 5th. Tou ar«
quite rignt \hat elarifiostlon i» hijjoljr desirable. Encloued
lo « ©opy of an official iett«r »t«tir.g that such action i»
now uM)«r way.
been apparent
Uowever, that . . -^: .
Armj' and Kavy ware ooncer-
not^nt in •bif^h to obta.i'
8tat«;is«Tit. ■ ' ■ .
enforc«a:r
foraatic;, , , .
Bijoiald also iiixrt stitei *.-.jI iulject r
of diroct Intarsst to th« Army or Ks -t«»d
to th« iiro;x-r o:.-'icJui, ^3 o:. ;..^.,e in. , , ,
th*re 9o- J ae.Tii>er3 of all
tiure* iii vhia particiilar
aaittor.
Sit), beet <!j3iij5s.
Sincerely yours,
QOmxm^tUL M.S. tx>d«t aon.
Rear tciniral, I), 3. liavy,
Dii'eetor of i«aTal inte) li^-.encs.
Captaia E. M. Zaoi..".:
KlBV^nth Naval Wstr
Jiaval Cp*;ratl". ■ ■>
San Di«eo, Oa
^ncloeure
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3257
In repiy refer to Kc.
3«rtal Nc. 032i;9l6
COKFJDEKTIAi
COPT
Office of th»> Oiiof of »6V»a Opwation*
Offic* of Kavia Intelligence
llilSrfIHGTOK
Mov. 19, 1940
.; District
-aarai Bure»w of
: .livun KonrldentlR : ■ ■ ...
.'• of Novwjiber 6, -
' TfrMe (s^ Is aeW!0«le<Jg;«d.
■" :-<::.c«.jr» «it;. Uis d«8lrablllty of
leareti up jritii re3i*ct to Uia Presi-
■^ ,'!me 1^'^9 &nd tne federal Burwm
.:>jtii:j) l."tlfr of r.«pt«»ber e, 1939 ^luotirit; »
y statesant, 3t»r>s are rob tinderwai' to pre-
1nt directivo nhieh will clear up tiw aatter.
By direction.
3258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
If
Ln n convwrrstion
lartart few r£tr«
oarsatio:
bot>
to -J'
.• to
. Tndo-
o f oll'T- la{*'
^r
{!)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3259
(n) m t 1^
then th» r r j.tx
ft t^-x->- i - 1 .
to
upcwi tlna 0«rnn .
{4> Thfit the ;.ltialrc
eJatrp clvL-'lon of opinion
loTlnouco in itr fuvor*
1» a ""nit oc.'onpll" ■-.
It ■•-Eirt ."'.e c. ru * .rr.l
etc"
rsd rtiRCo-.
7 flniill;'
\ti\ only "
«ttied
otailn or
After Via uruolei clji „ e af p-o
ooo'vwrE tion iCr' indlo tiic to tita vfinircC
lbe«Ei rl'^ron a rao- 1 dlf rlcult tani; ( "d .-.r'.:-
hajj&le it. r.o fcii:'. ""^ .\o. c Ir to rov^
B«ttltnr the dirflcultler oai^ntlnr bet-r
replied f "Of couz- e -'x. m^s' thtit ^t I«e
P«ojs1b aj* recjcc* 7 ctlon ee r:.r u.
concaraieCf i-rX 7<'> "icyo otUsrx -.u'.c t
»3oul<I be {Ur&i'ti. * v'aj^an '".r'jd '•'- '^ -
'ft bsv« no <!l8r.lre to .0-3 Japan iefw.
her in ISOft, yo-. rrlll {irrea?" He at
I oontlntied, •• eH, ■«« •■ould li'<o to fvc .y r
very ;.!ttr» reascsu! C3lrt tortf.7, Tba .'.norloen
Elr.fle le»m«d tlv.t r, tf?,:^ TitAtinla or i\ -tro-
«na of Je.pBa, In
stO'-kTOdB, 1 hayr
if our Cff"7Terco •-
of evmrf mir in -
to all roroLcn. ti>
TBPt of ".cle""'
gald , ".'j&xtlr. .
is tifiy Japsin, a c
Cteportuaity* ooxiT
<,.ith all opi^rtun.
.tione?" He repll
• iTohlerm for
■ the Japans* '
off, 'IjOCf. '
.chiirlQ,
"^fi the
t ho'hrX
-r-tr" to
confliot
iTOrt
!.!«
lr.l:fn la
it)
"■£•
3260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
V,
Japan as to tha ajlvlsfetllity or : l,-.ntni.' the -^<xt sx^(^. ti-^at onlj'
a rtfTl' .-11. M U\l:.:.v.i - r '.rSZ:(i'.\c:, •v.i*« 1'. o.-. I'l.-. ::,t -Im-
practicf-.Il;,
to >•'-' n:
you reallj' -J
as am,' «xJUl
It. itie.e©
r«
■ t. I- :. no t ) t . . r
d
u,
70U XD the
Chiari _,o.
re ^rt -^.o
^^. V . to "vXS
r^ then iis'-ji ''*,
I 'jouia say I*r .
&n£, rroach lado-
thou,:htfUl for ^i u.^-.. rt)Clc-„l^ U'.uurrul.m
C3)
L 1^ 4
itr.t
'*'
0 r
ICl.
»Jtj
<m u
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3261
3262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3263
3264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
\
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3265
it ii. .• to eae t::.A, :>os8lbill'-, ■
or reaolvlat: t > sitaatlon, t not r«l;ii
u: ;;ii 'or '..v.. ....«-- 1..- -<-ccrlty.
,r ;' ' '-•T. to
:r Attas; • -ts do not
■ ie
lea and
-1-
3266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
'.it.QJi t^-.eir T^-T«st 'tetlon
., advised m w« ijoyld
".eaa *»^lo^' I
-3 you
9« to t>^»
Or:
i?.'.«! dav If 1 would b«
.-<.iil'«fC«, I r«pll»d,
; v*-e dor't t' Inic ahot.'t
't \>» an:' to saoiPlfice".
Ip ant. vdll aoon huT» la
'■ ard y'^en t?* situation
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3267
79716 O— 46 — pt. 18 27
3268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3269
\
3270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
■A
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3271
pl-ai-es -J-lBi-.'
par' l?'-.! srlr
3272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3273
3274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3275
3276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(») ft** »pja'o;>3?i«t« aetio# tp»f4Ut<^:^ an aay l«trt»nsl«»at
or oontisaaXljr akcptioal k.tjr offlMr «$to la unirllllag to
iiS8tua» r*«pt}>uilbilitjr for poaltlr* «otlon er r*ocfBm«Mla-
tioas.
(4} OoatinM aM sswwd Hp tmlalac i^ «^^ tbe atio^ apaolal*
i«*«'J«lMi. inkiM mjf Is fBlng to r»qQir« maar r«pl&9«»
mamtB »M v» haTC too f«« already).
is) aiw <««tt*y3dia« Off-ioara afloat dl^ast of ;«rtla«Bfc
iat«iil««ao« m%i-^lti»m wltM whlob thajr might b« acafw»a*-
ed or wbl«fe Kight «ad t« gaaaral plm {%hi» s&csaia Iut«
1»aim a «c«apjf«li9a«'lT« pea«a-tl«» aotlTity bet it la its*
*»© l*t« *9 oorraoif).
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3277
ICa»oraadtm for tha Gae»:'iEi5ex«'lR-«hJ m", .-ualflo flmet.
;ilti»ry :-3©v«.pja>r |Oia«P»l
*tst&<sh»«Kt; of S*pmmm
*al» I» E«
^ -!*«- upom 0«s»rai
-.a em tfe« /«paa»®e
at timm
r,s: til, or- . *: c... . .^^r-iw^hlef*
I V-.. ^Ifl si ei' n.y btiS<Q-/ouKd of iwwafey F»«r»
•■ ?■:« WldftJ
■rfra lis »^aer«t« miMm*
tte» Witi ,. ft 5ftp«M»8» !>*?«•« i«
&Qnm fey C<a«e«i»iaisi« , tb«7 o«a audi wlU i>« w«« IW fcs»Rafflsl»«ia»
of i»for?' '.M nnmsr"*
.,•„ th.<5c. <vak<3«i hmt msii laferwittoa is tr«saad.tt«MI,
a*T«rtl«a8nt«, «to, a» t^m mlM tUt ttels w5«a« b« 6J3«alE*ft
-A
3278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
abl-
Z th*a •xplin
afiuwift^ji 'iwJ »r««m»r«« that haA b#(iB
«i:#rt»il om •■.!»<,» naopi* foi
■8 falHl Vtid't with *11 tb*
ML o<; i :h »f» kKaw tlieus. to h»Y« eutd ^itet aajr r««l
■r«v©ma«iifc, (I f«r««t t<f
! ejct.Bi\<lf to Xlquidtttion j.r<4 Is &n
• - ' '- - rlflj:' «fc(B« «)• fc»»»
jotila In lli»i), X
■A «*•
-?-^ tli.46 i>»o*.uB* of Vim l«f«« awa^«r of
-■•■'*^"h» Mionrht th«t tt weald b« *
-tioa If th*-!' (jotiW <5«t B«w» la tlwlr
ffiml* be t ta th«si
-ra «8(i» 0& t.h« Tokyo l>ro«d»*«$«. I
'•'-^' , „„.,.,„ bs ton*» Jttst «« wfii In th« ^^agiialt
'•rtAia tJjst ths ii«o»nti i!!;«i«r«*ticiaKWtti.d ioiaip
«fe«uli vns tis £0 aolioltou:: ..'jcmt tii- alltoi Jtt3;>*si«»»? TIms* iir«
th« azM>* who kt* our »jD.<>t iacigtti-ouji s«ap«ets* <im )sa)»m tbat for
7*v^r8 tbe»« paopI« iAT» Aud %h«lr Asslffatd dvtaile*
•ff-
for
big norttis fuotor
aatl-^e ton.'"" 9. 1
fiX «o«M i^liiSi in t&« 0onY«r»iitt.Mi tit* o«BH»fsi ante tlMi
«£•
V
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3279
Ww^
m
Mpin* Mo«j>ta»e« of aa latoI»x«bl« «OA«ltl<m Is m»t •mzioB).
1 r«pXi««t •"«• afeottid step •!! of tb»M «o«rfi«e un« If w« don't
•**rt s«n*«itf«r« «• axs not elan; to bm&Ic* *»y h»*«i»«r-. H« said,
"m Iwv* jM o«n»oriaii|i> ear wdl t(«tiM«s tjaa i;»l«afia tm« that la
«a •*•? aethod f«* th« agfasts", I tJ>«» ml& that If tfels Is
a«e*«i»«J7> It ahotdd b« don* «l8«, R« tft*a rasTfcsd that tan
MKtJL wM pllliNg ii3> tMMWftdottBly aow, whloh I advisftd wa* a ^od
fos» of ••nsors^i^ la li«u of th« othwr, la-oTldasd tt 1« btld long
l^y;, Th» OwMHPal t!i«n qu«»tlon»d th« STallablllty of 3r»|>an«»« agsnts
|P|w wvd I had to Bay tMt h» wtmld Had that th«ra ar* at l«a«* aJLx
liiiQdr*d and la^obaftly sbot* lc«y »« •till *t largo, ?h« 9onv»r5.it Ion
tbost turnod to tlm mttiods of pieklag thmt up liiidh. I ftiisur«d Ma
C ooald and flhcRild bo don«, tipoaa a«Jdlii« how, I lold hla by a gen«p«l
^^ rottBdotti» of «ai first ^onorKtlcm (oilOB 3&ptkn9a*\f %11 soeos.d
\ gonoratloB wbo )»t« bo<Mi in ;ap«ui fron oarly childhood, b«o%t)ae
i tlsojr Itho Tory daagoroao group ksowa a« KIBBt} Imvo beon In totjoh
>• _ _ with tho youagor «lo««at» la Impm irtjo sr« tlao ultra «haavlnlsto
WSm ^P^OB *'^<>" ^^* I^iuito httTO workod a&d it Is thoy «^k> hEtvo brought
^ about tho proooat oltmitloa; and flaaily ail th» seoond g«n»ratioB
tOm havo booa stmtlnually la ooataot with vialtlni; S&p&n»s«
4 aigBlt*rio«» Sacral Offloaro, «to,» all of «!»«« shouia h««T« b««i
I llstod IB tho flloo, Ht thio ho (acproaood goa«ral laablllty to
' do ouoh a Job far ooToral roasoaoi flrsrt, " ?o naod thoao
/apaaooo for l^b07» It la n dlffaront sltoatioa fron tbo ooaat "^
3280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
vhav t.bm-c9 ie « labor .k.rk«i. f}i«A ttmr* l» tl* probl«.-; of
a roup If taiaBji in , t-nC *•
efin't vpam Wi» lu-b-T oad "iBterl»l«r anrt tlia« to do thi*
•xtstuilT* lork, if vr« i %o prepare I'or ujx >t!i«r nt.tock.
Our first Jo\» la to ^o- ,a istd-i: ;Ut o; the- :ifir-ir b/»ff>r«
ASothAr fittuok oo-Jtta",
3 Jupiuaeso .i l«t titel
hi.Vi rra^om of a«rrs ^n*. tn »; li-.ror-i.tlor. o-. ■
«111 hiit* BUf_floi«iit axaet finte jMomsaor-f to ' la
}s«ror». 4m nhouid or»at« the iapMcslon oi" V. d
.•: t^tUTK, "Cita 0#nersl, perturbed rsnliad, "Oh
no, »« wouidja't twloon* a retura",
ITxa i^nercl then snifi Un.t h» wus n.ot ■worrlod atoufe
lBff«jina»tioa fi«ttia.r out but --.^s mors coaoernecl wliih th.3 aMibotas*
that nj..ht t» Aft — r. attattk ie %o \>e a»49»
I than •xplaijMd t :(£* t,trBs.t aid aot oxigt in Hawtili
l)*CRtt«<* thev r-ld -Tcses to in.' '• •.■■SI <-c:iv'i I««,
Sitillti«», 8", L:: sm tto .aet :>n«
poii»r piaat Iwire wt.tct *«« sot iritiil, ;.lttlo»,
1 th«a otttliaed tL.» vulaarRlSlllty of tr>e .«»t ■.o.-/.t ;,«;, the stop*
t h&'i XKimn i» 3W.7, 1940 in rtiBhlsv.ton to ;ut Ir.to afreet eori-
oimt* plaaii utZli'
£:«&9rel rottad-up b«rer« th«ir si'iort.. ^o'xld ba succ«8:.'.
tlMiB iBi!i«t«4 tfatit tl8 lio". ■' " - ■— --f.-^o
altluragti 8trat«£ia jwints '^
- 4 -
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3281
m r»»rflafta«d »^^tu th« momamitr tor tis* -i?>«r pr«j>*rlag
to T9pml *tt»ck, to *%Uh I i»pll»4 tl»t tb« first rt^p LB «tt«b
a uoT* is to dimy laforaotien to tbo «bm7 <uid If «• Doi>* to
ic««9 tb«n froB ooftlag t>aek w* b«4 b«tt«r taks la aU of tiwiJr
ai;«rts. m aacprossoa l>*ll«f tik.t 7BZ and MS «WN) telM all
tboy ooulti ttad I hstd to wiy it la o&viou» that n^t fe&d booa
dons is Bot onottgh. iBoiawnt&lIy, I was th« <8m iAu» trl*4 over
& period of tiN> ?«<im to )»▼• M.I.D. Sxi^lawmtad hj givlnc
CoXoBOl OXdflald (CM^9tli Oorpa ^^rm) tjmmdtim tm lottsrs t«
.*aJil!i«toi!„ Hotbiae would b« doea osttl M day, X was tha en*
wlio ««-r» ?.S.l. its atart fjf«« tfea jaaranth Nayal Diatriet. I
kaunr axaotly ■^x^x botH agwaoioa liMW «waa t&olr aapabllltloa. Ba
titaa asiOBd 4^tiat skara ootad ba dotta. 1 vi^i*& It la a.hmV^*lw
a*9—ury to rouud aip oTarr ^apauaaa of *»y ganeratiwa to riicm aajr
•uaplaioa attaeljae, Thoaa f«w »i-r«««y ta auatody ara <»ly tlia oaaa
coi wboB oooerata arldanea is in t ha fliaa. Tl» cfcfeor aaa l>a
appraikandad a'bA miat ba»
va than m^&p marmu to bra«.k off th» o©airar8atl<» at whlah
tlflw tha QmxMT^l istoda tha gtataeeant, "1 aa aot golsg to atop tbt
aawapttpars unlsss It oun ba prored to b» tliat thay ara baiag «9a4
for aaplomga jwirpoaaa. 1 heva t»» dual raapoMib lllty bera ct
^mp^Tlm f&a dafaaaaa and of k»api»cc »q> tha Mor^a of tha p«»pla*
1 rapliod, "-nia aorala will ba of llttla aoaaldarati** If wa allow
tbaai to origiBt.ta a b«ii«f that wa ara diaplayin^: aWm of
wa&knaaa, ^^^ trm g£ JeaoyladJta ai; tbaa 2 oan aay 4an.)Aitaly that
pajmbils&tlea^ of thaaa aawapapara wtll ba so rlawaA. Aa* if i»»
3282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
lm% thm lemow t^*t *• !»•▼• "ay f»»r«. «»• ^r* r«l»xlag 1b •«•
rlell«no» ana &6 aot t*i» tb* pvoptr t«9« *• •<»* **• •«*lrltl«»
of tlMir fcgtnt*, we ar« eaaaarNSlii* tlwB te ••«• bMlr.
H* r*lt8r«t«4 hi* a*«lA«» to l«t islMi p*p«r« go to to****,
WBttl It o*n t« p'"or»a f««h»r ttJ«t tt*»y nr* *«li««: «*•« '«?■
•«9iftae.g« ■gfcarpotf**
1 atatoft that wo mtviXi mif thut *tt«B|j«, This, » li*«loaMd»
ho KWiia &« gla4 to hoYo tai te« It l» tl»r«foro acmoHA th«» tmt
I»,t«illg«se«' »«XTrla« It »«tl*erl»od to obtwla trtm tbo ajbv «11
data rogttrdiae tb» mtltedo of hasAliac tlioe* p«kll«s«io(i« m€ ft«
•OTOF iai ladtTiAtMao oo*ui»«t»a thorowitli.
^^
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3283
t% l» my »osMiI<l«r«« «q?lni««-U5at fclsn «s©l« ««Rat4«r^tlea of '.!•«
.iOTSDT i» Amrstltm to th» ttfort «f b«U4Jj« th«ir ^mtmnamn m ttmt
tbmy will b« «b,i« to d«f«rsa OAlm teem aa attaak In faro* W tfm
mm»r n—t winh mtmmr air wappon trcm ©«• of th» r»feb«r ial*is««
tipe« Wtlloll tl» WIi«l^ will b« abl« to «9t«t>ll8ll « t»MMI.
It i* tarthmr 9«mmli«rm& tJy^fc In frnimlatliSR tfc»lr plans,
tb«r« IWB b««tt ao fleR«id«m«i<m wi»t«Ter ©f th* :»»ytsfco3.»«l««l
f»«t«ra »b4 «b»ra9t«rt«tlo» of tht 3m^*x»m»
li«i«e «<»el««»liloa la Xmiag. ^irm t« t^ oe«fllbtlity ©f
pr«v«ctl£« suok an «tta«k bf d«n7li3#; lKfoi»&tlo» to tht •rMir, whlelt
f»«t taio««a t •« Ut mxt wUiH «ttoh 9«^1«*« «8oi«ra«y la th* jjr«Pirlaw»
tmt ti» mhm* sltu£tt>l«a li> an mAnmnly &maKwrm.» om for fbm
mtrr »M tbKt liMB»41iu%9 &«tiasi siMmlii )>• t&ists to rmmv mnaj
^brnmsSi oX aii«b Siuae^r*' Zt eata b« Aom mnA toast h« <iem,
thmm l» «l«flnit«ly a laoJt of my thmgi^ of tht n»«t ftnS lt»
protiMtlon. Xh»r *^>« %talaKln« oaXr la t«xsui of «fi«a>at d«f«aM.
- ? -
T9716 O — 46 — pt. 18 28
3284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
It U rMCMMnd«d th«t ih« 0<wMnd«iv.lf>-Chi«f m »mi«r Of riser
rwMwnl pr«T(m to pjvhi' " ihmm* <{«^n«*e a***-' ■"
pmfmrti, anC If.-.t \m taM. .«....»-..,. .^«^... .- ^.. sin e«»«:Vir.at«!! and
«oop«r»i.tv« •xropt oi! th« part sf til gevsmaaniai Agarioie* to ih«
•ar*«L, lit 9r<imr t« rmuiv9 th» aetMOva aotad abov«.
B«rp««tftll;-,
Cftptain,
e -
7
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3285
txmnc&nrud.
facta oono«mlnc ^« r«0T>«»lai; of tho Jaf«uMi«e Lant'tiAfi* *w«f«|>«n».
If it !■ proposad to r*mmii the pttbllcatlisri« Bentionad, Vlpp« ii 3i,
*ad Htttn.ll Hoekl, it It aost iaporti^t t« kncm.tho vill nrrite, *&ii and
»up«jnrl«e th« aaitariAl whioh wlU »pp»iur ti«r»la. If it 1* pCUaaod to ium
th» •dltorlil ■taff» which Mimgwi the p*p«r« p<r«vlou«ly, tm »hoi« propoaftl
■ay b« r«ipB.rded uliiply as a rtry daagerott* (Mtperiswnt. Both of tbe»c |»p«r*
have al»fs.y» h«,«n atronglj jhi»-J«i>»im»««, and JVaqtumtly anti-Asiarltakn.
The »«ntl»«nts of the stiffa oasaot btr «xpaetod to chang* oirerttlght, or by
r«que«t. Having for winy ywar* htmn ahsorbad In th« furthering of Jap«n«a«
aabitiona, we -nay exjvect these paople to 9«iJ5e everj spportimlty to tarn the
a«» pablicatlOTsa to the sdvaat&g« cf .Tapan. Tisis cam best be 4cm» by ijatng
the ne*«p«p«j* as ■« seoret neana of lerftorning loaal riTts oolmmletjt of intended
plans. iwiounc«e«rits of thl» sort are new iiepoesible, except by telephone.
The roeiwptlon of n-wspRpep pablieJ^ftg will r;lv» the mtwmy ft m»um of wide-
spread signal Inj;. thie will be aJjwwrt i«poaeible to detect — " the whole
■toiy MAj he told in a aieplaced ccmmt. or a Bieepelled word.
Any parson who acoffe at the above ld«a a* fimtauti-, cbriously kZKMt*
nothing whateTor about either 'jsnsm.n «■ Japanes* esplo!! -b».
The ia«s i« beinc w>aA at the pp<«»ent nowent in every > -r**}
U. 1« w.rs old and is Btandard pereotlce In every Intel, ,-t.- — ^rjjajilsation.
IS t'onsi-ier for a KooMtttt who are the persons >^ow in charge of the
-Ko n»-»9rvapere tmrter oonsii1er»tiai) — whc htve not been plAced in detentitaii
Cti the Hipjw Ji Jl, w« ha -ye the eon of the owner. The owner himself,
laeutaro So'^t, is imrfer det««ti«j because of both eeplonara and prcpmgaada.
activltleis. . The elder Soji. was a iR«wber of the advisory council of five
which met with the Japanese ConsxU. in affairs of tSie Japauese 3tate.
Hie newspaper has for aany yiairs beee violently fwo-4apaiiese and frequently
openly anti-Aweriaajs ,
The son, aiigeo 3oga, was b — - "-•r%il, eduoatisd on the Bs.inla«d,
"traveled* In Japnui. He fias t... r.'iy la iAs C&%lmr's cor.fidenoe
in »«tt.s»r8 concerning Japan, an'' ntc;; Kl» fathsr'it newspaper ifl
Ijaportaat aatters '"or several 7. f:r i^for««&ntB, ho has
rsTealed hla real pro-JapRtiase : ;;-,». To eotniat this
Man with the resuaptlon of puhli sly danjjerous.
However, Buch the saste situation exiate »ith regard ic the rest of the staff.
None of tha« caus hf. trustod, in tht. li*:ht of past experience.
I0 an Sur&si&n »a»ed Kaklno.
, itid & lokohaaa tirl naaed
.. nis roo-aer' s n&jEc, rxnc 13 no* KTjOwn as Fred Maklno. Jlore
v ;; fi-fyP this a«n lad the Japanese people in a court aotion instituted
s,;a . Introduced In the Territorial l<et;t»latiu'8 for trxe control of
fort5i„Ti lanjimie schools. Uakino is known as a violent and previously out-
spoken pro-Japaaeee , forraerly a leader In Territorial Labor aovesents.
3286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
COir?l£UITUL
Ho tftd hla Kgmt* bar* iAaaX-itUtA anit •hB4cp««d otir own o<Rn>i«r-««plo(Mm:* A^fMi*
on floMe oi;««s:l«ns. It is hon«() that naithar ba nor any »«Bb«r of hi* *ts.fr
1« a«riou«ljr oon«ia«r«4 %» ' -ri. of a Jap«B«M pap«r la ■»r-tl««.
It i« fraaljr a4«'.tt«d . 4.->Xe tc ;rj'lnt lnfon«tlon for dl«-
a«slnati<ai ttmong tha loeaJ Jupuc^fl** irf;:^ : will aoMntaract tha Japanaaa
propaganda — but tu.ch a pro^aot oannft b* safaly aalxiad «>ut ual»«« tt»»
publioatiOB ?*•(■)• top to bottoai la ataiffad by dapmidabla paraozut, »tn> ■u»t b«
cftusaslaaa.
Thare
Japan oartr
which !Ur«
: i»,ov«r why the refutation of auch propupinito ftroB
;.ngll9h newapapera aasj broa4leaata ail of
^•.rstloi5, who ar* tha onaa wa ar« trylag ta rMielt.
thay, t)eJ'
te be -y.;!-
ar« ',
oajuj
oonf i
»o\ir---
iat is t,w fafilinc of tha
•:e ,'s;.«n(rse ntmn^nxyi-rti aft' printed and .-iidtrlbutad,
-uad and Judge ff»^ th«»aiB«I'»»a tha son tan ta, ara bouBd
'. ^'.■xr'^)m^ about It. H* know -viarjr definlt«5jr that th«y
t.rt<J ftd it can bit aaid without bealtatlos that ••
a p«iai!p and harmon/, afford to furtiiar dlaturb thalx
^. iUce r<nts are a definite poaalbllity ffOB tM*
rdod.
kr, Hvyn
We preauae that thsse two Japanaae nawapapera will r«ciaw pttblloation
UBdar the .t~'-t -~.~-«-«^ <., -.- *i.. m^-.,..,^ aoY«m«mt, but we Kuat consider
of aoBft d& 5,tlon In the Japaneae language.
1. I
to the older Japanese
vpr the war aituation
".o bwild the -iiorale i'or Japanese Tietory
■? or the youBi.-ar J<ip«r;f!se (or Anerlcan oltli
Absolute ct: ,t,ij- paj^ats.
0
actlrltleB Ir
enewy (Jap«ne»e) amenta
'hfir l^ea* of secret
ill : slaj^g, prorerbe and poaaa}.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3287
i
( 1
tf JTmamLxr, 194a,
(VO-vaq)
ttio3.o«iar*t {a) toteUtfljwjs* JJaWLloggro^y for mmvml Offlo^w,
1. Or* of tb* prl2»ip&l aifn««l«tea «fneotmt«r«fi in
•irt*bll«itnit a wMdly •ff««tlT« ••«urlt|' pemxm ta tfen Karr
arlMs ftwa « tNMiio la«le of &5??3n»ol««laB sy maf oiwai affiewr*
of tl» vital n««MMi«ltj tl3*r«foy. ^ma la the M|i*»y ipeafes,
4««g?l6« ««<wt8iilat«a «(Kp«ri«&<i* of 3r«Kir«, ttmrt) !aw»
i»*t«a<»Mi of »ttrprlai»e dbtnmm»» tuA v«i0r«fttft^l« la«i: of
«pp<r««ti^t ion of thB aoopw and ia^)arti«io« of lRt«lll|E«sa«» wo
iR mm0 txmtasi&tm offio«rs haT« ft«m« ae fwr &« astlraly to
t/p'ooim n«o«fl»axy s^cjarlfcy a««MRSP«« eppareRtly f«eltnR th&t «u«to
nwaRTM r»flwt both apoii tli» int^ssrUy of thair mo ms4
80ttatltnt« Wiwarmntsd vtstr* otl<m» ^xscm. th«ly omi fr««a<» of
■watiwafc ssA vxpressioa* I& otbttxw ta» tlspXaet «mS iio«rt!
•XanKtmr? •ffort* t« i^fs«aaM tlw •»tsblta}sMRt m0».tnm
pmMtmtim bjr f«««ia& a«s«nt« m& •etmrslT* •l«BMet« !»^ tMNm
las^r ia»3.1itl«4 W ti» upattoitla or stesptidsl attlt>aa» of
X«»9C»8lbl« Qrffi6«r»«
2, Tit« roraeolBf l« «a«»8isaiy tft» of 8iw»»« •«t&Mi»h-
wutts i«d 7«t» 111 ffonsTttlt tiMso at<fttlatt« offsr smat«r
opoortB&itr for osplsiUM!* «id 8aDQ«««« with 1s<m shsinoo of
«»t«etii» tla«a anr eJthsr i>ortioa of tim mv&l •»t*tellghwmt.
th» toolttio*! mcmllmtai of oor antort&l, ear pT<isf9tmir9 imiga
pallejr vaA mr ««)aie»l«««^ mria l^adorship Sm !f«v«l .iViati«a.
All ofCwr jrtoh jnawaxds to tito fcsroigit «sptoiia|^ i»>efmt, ikusr or
««ur nhoxm «at;AbllBtea«Ettfl 1^ r«a«en of eoRstraotioB Wk& gxec^isg
of boUdlags «.»3 oti)«r oiiuipniiafe offer rloh orlsot to %)m Mbotmr.
9, Ite.vl2i« bowi « B«^ticn aore or !«•« imml^^ted Is the
'ttm the intrlfu* imsl aeplouage of taarope end the orlerst,
to ls«T« a«Telop«a a r»th«r wiaeaprowa belief that tbe «py
p««» fjwn the intrlfue imsl aeplouage of taarope end the orlerst, *•
•pseer to ls«T* aerelopea a r»th«r wiaeaprowa belief that tbe «ji-~
«^ the eftbctettT are oroaturos oofiflisefl la^Bely to thoee areajs
ere wlaterit in thle oottntjra* afeiefly cai the_ silver sewHm or
aoe«'aot.~'lJi'fa.«t-, ««i»t 1« beooatr^ iaepeaelngly appsrent aa ta
In the secuMtiasua siaffR%iiie« 1%at this taiesfBl atato of affaire
al«o the ftwt tStot tl» Uany as a wtsole 8oa Its offioers* la
l»arfcl9Bl»r mmt be twftootrlni^tedl wltli a eocind a'rnr«oi..tltm of tlse
3288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I
»7 9«tmitr, 194S.
3a)>jMti dMrnrl^jr laao9triiu«l«a» XM9*a»Xt7 for.
▼Itftl Sflkirar^ftBe* at Xfit*lll<«ii«« im& •n iaXttllismA m«p of Its
••oM «&4l Mitlieds* Xft "H.** of tlw nafartvnat* l«.«k: «f aajr ««h
9Z««nai of t&AcMtirlaBtUtt at tb* »mX A«Mwfqr, tb» l»o««.gsr<ultt«t«
3Bte«l. or ts tiNi marrim, aooli isi4»«trtjw.tlim «nd ts^iaiftg anat.
la « lAXff* MluMgr** «m» througji weotMtt iat«r«st, r*Mlt&« *a4r BCttar
fcff- tte tadivl*Ka afrtwups ti!imM3LT«».
•Smt tMs iittUiitlfiR «a:lat« •aime« 1m» '1e»1»t«a ^7 aayaaMi
toldi Sa %\»
^ .^ - .- -, ^if it
i«K» ls«« talen mrt Is the laforana ®p»«|> «l«e«««l«i8 Iseldi
■ - ,|lr ' '" ' ' ' ' - - --
n«id of ftetlvity fioar t&« «ei«Mr &«mt. It is Ioomk
oTfttra M» (Nwr n«ia of ftotlvtty gtxt tfe« «a«iqr a«Kit, it la xmemn
%!»» tM« ie tla» w^?«ft«tt<» wMiA w9 «ttJ«F t-prtmi. It ts ad aaay
te obt«ia Isfomntlen ten tbat 1I& 4e «o »w h&rdly Im yvpurtca «•
9, 7k« AMMl for 7r9p«r laAootri&stloB ^ pcrscHOMiI i«
MnsidMrwd *<Rit*. It is Will Mslisod th&t tlwy aaast a«<tair« t&la
lAftcMttrlaatlaai wtO*? tiMir ow p«m«3f. To ftttsaat te 'Wtv* or
fonw tluM %9 mmofitw •ftortt viu obI/ metxawl i» dleiiatiAg tb«a
•aA tiMMi gJUwiag tlM wamtrltjr 9ve«x«a fttrttor ttea 9T«r fvea
•Mrii a BMUMr tbut tlwy «m aot >>« miara «t for««s t«ii^ti« to
AlTMlt «ad ftiiMMia tiM^ «>pi&i«Mu
«• It la MLi«7«d tit«t «b« iMMt ««r to MaoMffilUli tkia «bA
1» to &irwt tlMiir tbcantljta I to tto !>nw«r «ti>ai»«ls l»y aaaaa of
vmAim »Att«r ?!»««& at ttelr Alapowl, Zf tha ?»J<arltr of
«^fl««m ««B IMI i&«»««a to raa* «f •a5»t«B««« aattara. timrm
ta&Mtvtoata t&aMMtl-Ms «ad tlw$j> foxmr ilX-fo«taa«l eocrrlvt
f, A« a aaaaa of aroualsg latwraat la tbla <rt.t«l Htbjoat
«B tha p«rt of t>M *vt»u|^ 6ffi««r, th« apponaa* lia* of 1»ok»
r«lutla« tbarato )»» ba«a s?ri^r«4. fbaao *ra •nttraly of tba aoa
flattoB wnatf «M laoluda tho liairti la tha flaU. Ttoay fcr*^
(U9«a««« ipearally la tba or*«T of rtwamaa^aA priority, mrimm
of tlw Mr* i^portaat onaa ara iBolaAoA.
i, Jfc la balioraA theittfeia 11 a* pro»i4aa tim teaaU for
wrata em& la«i«»a •mnf of raaalai!; ani rtuay |a *M*a. «. w-
riaat «al4, Xfc la tbarafcra arltaiftlr raooaaaaiad tba* it ba
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3289
\
9f fmamvf, 194M»
Stil}J««tt ^MRxritr X&doetrtaatiaB, mmmmttT for,
priMtmti or «dbMMss«i]>li»d m& 0.rm trite j!i»$rltaiefel«K MAior« kA
to ttw i^Eti>oii«laM oAtlirltlM. If m^mmBTy to dbt&iA T^piata ««
tteM BOW mt or ^rlx«, thla lOMsItl !« dee* at tim ««.x1!.4m*
«^l>act«alty «»ft ia sRim«JU»t faaatltr t© jawia* r — ~' -
toT (MMOn dbip «M altoTo atatiMU £f wmmamrr$ t«
and aav* tlM, thmm teotai tlxMld %« M^ro^HiMdi S» 9<^<k
rm )»r «B7 «w ef tlw war smbHjBtOas hmmm i*» *» •aaii
•svwr form t»r «B7 on* ef
$. Hm «a»«l©»ure «»« j»p«p««id W m ©fflawr of tlw Wmy
««)(» b&« ^«(»rk*a eflntlsmXljr laA £a oosJiewtiaB trltli tfc« «Ti««r, %ai
f@r ««rt«iJ!i itMkscHM hi* tm» !• wltMMli &% %hU ftia*. ¥ii» it la
XiMrst&r tiizoue^ m« «tffiavt« tte« tMs •xmUm* ««i9il«ti«K tea
bMM aMMta* Fn»«r tmomitim tea «bA «£U te mm tme Mm mm.
B, M, ZAmAXlM,
3290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
»f immtmrw* 1MS<
Ottpcttia Alls K* SEMtMurttta. 9.3. Uurf,
ttut Qhl*r of Sd'Tsd Op4rrati<]ie»»
3«l»o«ieQ o3t Off lc«rs for i:nt«lUL4i«Re« Diatr*
X. ttm fojllawlai; l^ttMr, pr«pftr*<l nor* timn * srour «4ft
wlttah«a<l AWkitlng iimr* fH7<ur«%l« strckwwtMMM ii^l«Si vewli
^r* a«t«a«ioit. tftktor thu pr— mt «lnMnMiitaa8»« It 1* fait
th&t it (i)i<mid »• t&vwtrt»A iMn»AU««i|rio ^
TIM {qr«K««8t a!^^« ■wm3m.«m» of oar Ittmil In««lliMi«»«
lies Is th» fact timt imr fltffio»n «r« MilMrtMl fer smuKOM
theoR a;>««taii f Itixasa for %hiM Irtnd of woi^. For aMiy ywn
ria«r8 tterwtf^tiwt th* Ra»y b«Y« b««b m«il«»»4 to to6«lli««oo«
* far trlTlal or ijnfmlvram rmttoam m& wit* llttJMi i!'i<pi>iX ftit
tim ekff^lt'oA* or -ysrsooRl q««I lfi««t%i«BS of th* offisc? tmmmrmA,
Ttmy littv* 'itmtm r,itmi. ]DB;t«lllir«ae9 worlc &• •ellat«x«l dsty k(M«as«
tb«)r hUT* ba£ 31%tl« aleo to do* %ttil fnits r*««Bti7 tli*7 b«T«
i» tnduatod &a KaT&l AttAoIWK l«yg»jl]r )nmmk!W» timf ««*• MAUlly
[lBellB*e. 3«xM baim l>WHt ' x«ev«ilt»fl iMMmtMi th«7 ir«r« of fvfim
i««tlee ca* ooeld myi»k, mmmtimm lMU.tinfl7, in & f««im8»
,0Bgwi« 3oBw ott» tliflir &i»sis»wai to feertttitetts (riLmmiiiilliiw—
•r tiKilr «Mm onriositr aed iBt«mt»t»
Zft eoBMN|iHrao« of t&ls i»olie.|r, SsTttl Ist«lli4r<n«« » ftLrMAy
lAfarior is amftors aet flnanal&l svpport. «bte oca^strkA witli
slMIar organizAtioRO Abroad, tum )»•«»• ittforior u (jaality ••
well.
A. t»rl«f soMidaratlMi «f (Ater ;&!t«Ilis«ia« ••rrl««e ii«v«al«
to «ocpl«in tin omuHtB andorlrln^ «mr iafttrierlty,
Sm la««ill4i«Ei«« •orvieiNi ia .othor oemtarl** i« n^^vAaA
gcnmnOly m & Muroor wbiaH dMWBds tte hl«b*st iadiTl4u«l VMkLiftM*
tiMiSt aad «boM n«alMire de««rr* uUl nwvlv* «&• ««8rt MMtfVl ui
iBlMKclTO t7«iM)m. tlw forftl^i •«ui«ptiaa of t-lio IHI«lllMBWtt
iKSttaeb is thftt it soma «« tb« •]••«. Mrs a&d tmmmj ot to*
flg;htlB« foroMi, and th^t, for thla ta««r6«at tetr» tta Iwst 9MMi
«r«, see* toe good*
Bi Dolsotlng A^MtB^ forolga gat«'«Maat» oeato ttelr «n.tljp«
M»r7l9«« for o«mdid&t«8 who oan iw«t tho bi|^»l stssdurd* 'wt
••J/w
Ml* Ab,
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3291
ti. s. s . '
tf imtm.rr, 19U»
T^^TV^ . f^****** ®*' Offl»«PB for lBfe«m««io« Uafty,
•»»»«•&«• *»4aptu«aj «a« wiie iriv* pgtmlm sf P3roritl»i fs«« •
£*?*"•.«£ •*'««^» »*«lftia#r. a» a% l«*«t silt foir«l#ii asuntsri**
T^f!*^!^**?"*^**^ «sp«4tMit»» •*• y«ttirr.«« fee thiwi* moimelB
at tatvrvttlit tJupou«b6tjt th«Dr »»»«•». 4» a «taa«mt} !»• ;'« trato**
to otNMMT*, to r«a»!5»,«r- to el«»alfy «QBa t© •mln»t«, m mtmimn
iiHJ^* •fttil»MMit» uaifiNBM, cf»8«l)s«tl«B, history, g«««r*|>i&3r,
l«n«tt»«», pi*n« *na-}»ii«y of %h0 9mmrU» with s*.llb bt i» t«
aatali wlt«, AM h», te t«3m, is «t«&l«Ml !>y el««r l»t«iii««nffl«
offio^ra to «»t»Twin« bla spoaiAl ^t«lifl9«.tlms bsA how fcl»y aMty
b«»t %• tttlllsM. .vft«r fiaisiji»e hia «cw»«8 la f«s«yal
Iet«JU^«« th« ofn««r t»««|iMi to ap»«l*lls;«. «d» la tm of tlj«
worlft»« flr«t 9iA»m pomKttt toa«y, tit*" si^elallsstlati itna TN>«a
*?f^** *® !^ 5^*»* "^^^P* ^ »*3f !>• a««i«jaii<} to m9plem.g« or
o«lBt«r>-«spi«B*«« *«^lact «Mi »ot«atl«l •aaHcr mXr, Tb« offisor
xmmlaa la tM« a»8ti«B for * Iffiog i>«rto« of ysasfs or for HI*
«8tlir« »w««r, «RM»t«Btly ?«r?«otln« Isl* fc«so«l*««» of th«
It 1« saiiy to rwfelia*. ^sib»n ♦* *3fi^Ar» »«r aw» teolMiaarfi as«
oa*wil ««l»«tloB of iat»lXli3Bia« offloara with tU« w»«Ii»tl« «afi
•fflelwa* r!i«tli64» «iploy»il al«roa«, that, ia U>im «e4l1lc»ii *«t*l«
at •t«.t whioh w« «r« flgjittag la p««i>« aa«i tm wir, im fln« owr
|!»«etlo«aiy l»ipi«8» aufcjjMt th« oy^nifeoliiiaa sdtji lapc
•apwrier »M^ni aa« ti^ialag «t met oppm»-^a», mum f
« XBt8ll$ii«Do« offio«r, s«l9e«*d alno«t at maSm>f mi
by ttM
wltlMwt trataiii^ «Rjrt!iy of tls« mia*, pits bJjH»»lf a^KlMt t&»-
•life* of otbftjr aomoo* b« ts lM«ly aotiaatelMd, aai t&» r«a(tiltiB||
•taruasio HBist &e otaiod, ia m»r laatauaees -^o <»<mt«st.»
*li8t Is to bl8ua» fey tl» prmmmt Blisu.«ttaat PrelMitely asay
•flBtrifcatW f*«ta«i «ur« limii'»»4, Mii« «e«at3fy, •»Joyta«
e*o«r«i^*«l iMl^^tloM frcK athmr getu.% powbtb awS z><ia.ativ«ly
Iwag pwlodm of i»«ao«, Mw !MMm XvaXmA 3jy oar wwiatb was gemiim.
ptnme iBfco « fal»« a«&s« of swmurlty bo l0B««r jtjstlflea ia tfeo
li#it of worlA *T«nta. Thl* "Fool's Pa-jmaiso" la »has«« b/ l«irg«
pxepoirttoiaa of ow s«akjja« offift«»», f*w, if any, or Msa« hav«
vnae 3r»o«lT*i l«teail««»o« traialng In tboir low, ri«tt»«fttl
•wraczn. Tot noVf trhao worldi tWDusfan iBortHume &n& mptmm0t is
•&rrl«« oa wliol.«s«.l«, •« sEiat a«|i®M e?e» timso orfi»«r» t«
ialtl«t« a poliey of r««aiiaa for whi«h thmir «xperi«io» »(»
la«4«q[U«t«ay pp«|»r«« ttmm* mskim;-; otftamm bsllttlo tiai t}«y«ght
of api^m or tho sBfv^otion of <lMie*ro«« wabofe*^ fS"oai witii|&, fclboy
i ■
3292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(lO-r««)
aki»j»«tt
»f iVKmrTf IMS.
3«I«otlae of Offi«*rs f«r Iat«lll(tena« Quty.
i|-^ 1»Q|^ ftt tb« p«««i)>llltr of «iiibv«r«lT« thTMta to OQr ooraa*,
M' nearA Iiii«Ul6«B«« orflaer* mm «•» oBb«lll»t»»«tB of th»
'^^' •«nrl«*, aad Tiumt and «v«n o<»ib«t effort t al»«d at •ff»«tl&is
M««irlt7. UMitwhll* for«i«» AfpntB thirmig to our Aor«s, tba
a;>7*« £to^|»r ■a&tiag c^miad, and sta^X &nd. btt? ailitttrf a&d iiav«3.
■wratB oat tvom tialor th« aos«« of tbos* sum offiocrs. Two
of owr lAtvst sraisari bad aplsa woirkla^; aboard (torlag eonstruetiaa
iX «BS darUe trial r«n« witho«t b«lix« *pi>r«i»n4»a. Th»y ««rc •i*!
allo««& to tiOm \iSLam'8rist» boM «itk tlsMt at oli^t. liot • vlssla
»pr baa b««n oaa^t Is tM« eoaBtry in tho Xast flft*«& ymra aa
a rosalt e^ foT^ivl«kt aad •ffl«l«Rt oo«&t«ro««(piac«g« work, Tte
f«v wbo b«v* %a«R appr«ts%ma«d f*Il v^totia to imzvly »«eiA«ntal
mtt& u&twnmm.f oir««»st^an0«s asd bluRdara*
TlMMmfora, tlaa writar regards our flr.-t grtxt a*«d aa propar
imdoatrlawticst of all offle«r», t»euptl««larlr th«w« la aflaoawaA.
flfca ••eoed gratt E»«d la f<ar tralmlng of 3!rt«lll'^tto«
offlwara, THia aliould l»« IwieBB kjr « saaaral oowsa glra* la tb»
llsa ?.&, MlHMl. It Kho«ad eonprlsa no lass tha& on* toimdr«d
Ikoura of ijutr<-!«tl(«. fMa ((oaraa wsttid «sbieTa t^ra wortbtc^lla
p«rpoe«8. ?t»it, it wo«Id iadootriiiat* all offleara la • 8«1i|««ffc
•earaalr 1*m la^^ortaat tbaa a«7 etbar taNi^mloal Mbjaat, vbA
WMMnd, It wovld Mum a« a 1mukI.« •oars* froB «9ileli to aalaet
rBg off lean t^to art Qiaallflall for atvaaaai stQdjr «ad oftr««n
wtilah asai^BHMot as Iia[1»«lli«ana« offioaara woold plar ••
iaportaat parfc.
"Sbm pmamat fatila gaaturaa la tb« dir«9tlUm of traialag f«r
t^alligwwa mmt ba eomrarta* l»to a r«a affort. a Umg llat
of oottrvM «tf laatruattao wdlatfl »t prasaajt isaraly sa papw. «»*
•crvwa anXy to ndalxad tt-x>6« aonoamad with oor affiaiaBajr la tbia
temaak. Tlia "TKtUdlae* of aa afflolaat latalllswMta offiaaar
raqalraa «or« tiiM tbaa tba eenstruetioa of » battlaship and, aa a
9»m>m 'Mmsa prcaaatloit, oaimot b« d«l«.r«d tmtll fXa«li*a of gasfira
ara 8««a on tha karlzoa.
^'A
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3293
Subjueit
27 ;MaU7, 194Z,
B«lmtim of omawa for Int «1X1k«js«» Dutr.
Tb« offi«»«r s«Xe«ti^ for Ii!t6lll,-«y.oe «'-'ty ssuft hsT« bihwIaI
p»ra<aua *ini *«a8p«rs»nt«a i^tsullfioattonif to b* istjoa«Mful la that
duty, H« tmmt poasmsn a 8»at«JL al«rtn«>8« whliih -sdll •i»W« ld»
tn oosxi H-itfe a«ii<» Mkd olerer o|>po«it5oB» fertiflea by Mt^l*
flBa».«t«a r^mtmr^m, m me* be iaftstRvtlr* mough te Ti«ra«iis*
th» poesibl* pUm of wseajr «««Rts and ^t th« wm* tlM Im
8Ufflol«nUr MMilytisaa to protmrlf <mils»t» the liiforM.tt0B w&i«b
oo?s<js to kis, nmre awat b« Ijs hl» natn?*! or aeqtilrM ««1»-e9 «
o«3rt>il« siaowt of »ii«pieic« ««(1 aiji»l»«ll«f . H* wist b« i»«tstsl3jf
a?,gr8aaiT» «ii4 poseiUHt tl» Initintiva t*(^irm€ to plan •ff»ett'*»
otMMtloas. m ttmXA h* <li««r»«t asd bM fa73fiiI<M«» aM ahoold
WGiarataiid lB«»«a aatcqN), It a str«B«tfa mi its w»a1m«Ba<Mi,
<^dillti(maXX7« ha 9lumi<t b« willla^ %o imma& Ma mm ■pmetmtX
atdadfltrOa of ^mO^sfi in tha mQctasUtHmmBA ot m tmporttmi <^|»««iv»
acHitrllMictiss t.9 «^ iMitl«»al wOtim ia tia» of wajr.
» r»%.lt»tlo. Ha rnurt hara tfe» sibillty to aea tfela«»
a« sfaay «m» aiid to tw,y# tM c&aya,ii» tn» Srlm* th*® to tlta Mrtjit*
of Mia ««|MKPi«3r» "^"^ "^
Tba ortto4&x <tad aoiis«nratlir« typa of »ai«l off tear is <bMli»ti
by tr»iiiijag ajfi4 ia<So<strtouti0a jot to ba «a IDstalligimaa offi««p.
?a-thiB raaasm tha aalaetitm ofjSnotm^i. trmt tb» Sairr tvr tkim
typ« of tatr gJsmid ba s&i&a a&ply la tJje offiear'a ea«<Mr ao tba* 1B»
aar ^ tzulBM 1» U^a $ftr«.tu^flmB of tkls ia^x^rtrnt ftraasli of %ha
41»tl«t5mtl6»
It is
wide
raacaKsendad th-t tMa lettar b«
&«»« tha offlaeys of tha Jlaat^a
0<maiuximf»iSf-^hi*t t i» orday to laroaota a g9R«y«l iaftaraat is tlila
a^ibjaot aad aiM8«tiri4ee raiding mS si^udy of boeScs j?alat«rfl «ii«r«t««
A s^laatad list of auoh bd«i^ has Imms ft»r«ai««d this d&ta te %h»
Cisiaf of lla-ml Opayatlona*
I, M. SACE-UIIAS.
i4)
^- '-■fi f. .ft
3294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
n
mmiX9xt$.vm for Ateir«l DvmmO.
ItaroJb; 17, 19U.
Xb aoAor^ttsAc* wi%b TO»r nnnmat «rt«r our «<»nv*z-Bctioa
fehia aoralsg, th« fdllo«iti£ mmaa is suuBattwds-
iSf vswtmrsuttan wivh r^tt i» ijip«Il«d' froa a s*as« of aus,f
MMsitt* of vhet X a»aLsi<l«r • awriouc Bituatlon •xlstJLag iu Hmnalt.
C^M* Iwfor*, la aufih a «ltu»tio&, I •vav* oooerata Oj/iaioua aa<:i
aAvlea whlab app^rantljr oould not bx^ak throu{six praooaoalvad
idaaa. HleUtr/ waa about to T9p*m% Itsalt aoA ao ooa would
iMliara it. J. Itava no paraonaJl aablUo^a or daairaa ragardliie
^a aubjaat oattar other thtm aaa^u-loc t&at wa h»v9 « safa aad
•all protaatad baa* for smr riaat, wbioh la tiia aoXe raascm for
ttaa. axl«t«Doa of ilawail. It baa baaa agr atfcXtuda tltat it mwcaa
ao dlfYajpouoa atxo fioas a Jab a« loae aa It la don* affiolaatl/
aad tboxouebly.
iuiqr «rltiai«B diraot or tai^llad la offarad tfolmLf fran a
aoaatruotiTo Ti««p«iBt aaa la for thm purjioaa of pr«:vaatixie la
tha futur« » raevuranaa of a diaaatar auah aa that of 7 "ytKamsLUmr,
OaXj a fa« paopla kaow t:tMt I had oautloned .vdalral Ximall
aad Cs taia Stoltli, durlnc %hm oouraa of au hoar uad a half ooo-
rmttv^LuB, vlih tbaii, of tha axaet avauta to taka plaoa on
7 Dmomtmr, aot 0BX7 ** ^o «*hat would happm, but adao taow uid
vtUMft* Iff onljr ^vor waa that tha Jajtansaa vara after f&ur battla-
■lil^ and tbay cat fiva. I fdao gara th«& tha raasoaa for agr
aeaolaalMM aad i^vlaad thes of tha atapa aaoasaarr to praraat
•uoit an attaak. Txob tliM> tro tljaa, in aontaot with turn r>taff, I
weald TOloa poaBiblXitl as a&d only two -aonthe hfifora tha sttaok
aaaaad at unraaliatie attitudaa I said, mum. ara wa goliie '*^
•top til* aa surpriaa IfiiQ^watiOQa and 'pra^ara Tot aurjiriaa attaok".
Atout'th&t aaae tlsia Mr. Iftmaon, a rapr- sautatlra froa Kaahloeto*,
(iMllaTae to ba a > raaidantlal agactj aarrjrlsg a lattar fvo« Opoav
to "op«a oTarj-thlag to hi*"', aout^ht m Tot an axpraaalon of Tlfwa
OB ayobabilltlaa and vy o^slnloa as to what aotl'on should ba taJican
vita tha S«^mi3mB9 imx* ax>d on t^ Bast Soaat. Aftar outlining to
Mai aqr flm oeirrlotioo that If rTaj»aa daoldiad to go to war with ua
It would oj>aa by an %iT attd .it on : *url :fju*bor, on a waakand and
pxohmtaf Sunday aoruiae* «^^t* aii '^« r®«aon» thwrofefr, and J than
at«t«A, Ton BOW havo two anvoys la Waahls^ton. «haa tha third
MM arrivas you s«t look for It to br«alc lakodiatalyj, on* way or
tha othar". Hiia aa-ray %rriv«d in teaaiitngton about 2 Daoisafcar I9U.
-1-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3295
On %t» rd ht of 27 mvemimT, »ft«r ''inamv wltli l^rrltt
t&umtoa, !-«a<J or t..'j» iajnolx.lM .Ulir»r«l»er «bs« SOT, I i^atM
tn« laB>«aitr>4' |;^^»»ibUlt:«» a» «W-r» wad ba ««ie, "H*** I as
« a«? -N«"-<,. . ....^ - '.v«n't »*«£. J»«8 »&rieM wte«* to mbS «m*
OT«r r *a sttaoje". I m&vim>^ lii* gr»s4«sJLy
to »« . svoridio air «tt&»JE, «v«i7oa« shouW
wllX ;r«T«5t. .tie ailitHry frox a,«ttiat-, t« tij®i? stations,,
Th«ro is »-tV~- t« worry a!»uf„ ia 2« ««*«ab«r I 8*U»4 wltk
Tasit ?orc5"- \» lalbUMi. Upoa rtMseipt tf «Ji«u"«o'«
<ies?«'3h :Hsr, "TU* Isl-jxA» axte &«!%.; ftt,t»,«K»d tiiia 1»
n*) irl.l ofl as? raAlo nn« KSW WR» »<Ksdl)a» out ay
•xsc^ aat BOJMKm* is«ll«^«S It. *at» wsm i^rabKtOj
M«i6 v r-~*sji aiinouno««nnt «i3out 3 ^N»««!s»a«r timt XJbm
/at>«u.-.,.:w. ,-.. -^/„ bad ^rrlvad In <■ aaaia^toa «* « t Ird mrej.
Sseirjc t*sls, ?^r8 'Jliuratoa r«ai»4«d ."li^r huaNkcd «ad tlx«y w«r«
&l«rt««.
cm JTldJiy, 5 n>»o«Bb«r, ls«*la^ p»e«lvi»d & r«port of •
8ubaM9rin« off -^aisu - on* of th« tUlr*e« I sev* Mairsd KiiaBsU
a» • ponttiYB liidiaatioB of latwattoB to «tt«ek • I lUfiMtA all
•T«alajr, oa sbor^ wbtb for Jss»«»««» oem-»«r««tieii. Ail »«»
g«rU«a «omr«r»«ti€.8 Out th« Ijstaiwltry af tfe» 8«|too«l»4s»«Bt«
Ttn>ic»5-1? ^-a^fts****) lB!il«s»t«« to tm tA«t »«»»tM.Be **•
is«la«nt. 1 trl«<i to obtala a stael* word whiah wo«ia justify
8« la r«i:iue8tlafi ^BTTRRkFor « to wlYtii* Oiae?*©, but aoWJiac
oaul4 b« eaeile out. 1 lm«* »h»t the rweotioa iwuld b« to a
reoo3ffl«ditloe from tbin i»lr iind I a«»uia#4 timt proper w&rainsii
would b« oosijSf' fr - ' " '-oa.
I hare aw«« ." *3«n «float to glvs agr Bdnio* to '
Intelli'-«na« !ict.:rlt',<>s . .jta a.-viSore mv& afloat «aa »-h«n n«o«»»«ry
•T»a to -...'ie ,,al,'*., ^f ■♦Sjiittlajj is". I 'm<i ta"i«d for y«»Mi to
ha-rs aetallsd a rlmt ratalll«:«i»e affiasar wfeo was not tltKl aj>
AS ri«^ 3«or«t«7 or oc otnstr Jote«. naally two 3f«ar« age
OonemoAtr Dy«r adflaad ai« thst 31naus wa» ^otat to hanr« « flm^t
laflli&tm.c« Ofrioar. T, reooawKtntSsd Lt-c;oMiJ«a«jp I«yt««, Kb©
h«e 30fisi«it*»tly done e «pl«adi4 Job la aa offla* i»)a»r« tli«r«
sliiould hav« b««a twuity dffU»r» l»iit*»S of t«o* Surly 1a
WoTBrnb^r I waia about to »«e 'Jsytala 3»ith aad adlvis« that h«
S<t sotttt i:i«a.|> for l.sii3%sm mnA Hudsoa as tb«y wvf bsth. «om 4o
•ad as>p9aT«A r«»dy to oraok xsp. But : he«ltfit<»fi, woaAerlag »asy
»liould I Daira to «d^ls« Clai©a« oa th» «id«<|ua3y. of hlB tsro:
It aliould lk»-»« 'immx obvious to aey Jo-i»,V,«r thtt lftt«lli§«a«»
at «uoh 8 tia* wu» 5ii» ao»t vital imvm. Z €««id»« jg(t to
npproMh assit^, b«oa«s« I found that Iat«lll««tia« w»» ast r«Ki«iiidae
it« prop«T raoogaitloiia
^^
3296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
JM^Mi^ JiD ^.Q^^IPgrriAL
Oa» o;" thti cofitributinj faotor* to 7 j^omx^y^r m&» tJi*
JWlluotAQoe of ..dnirai rd^Ksil to assuKie hla pr««»t«tii>r«« smd
t«ll th* CSowBwnSant to on'rry out -llrwotlyBB or aoi-io oae slea
would t>« obt«ia»<! to 10 tJi® jo!». Thm 9om»Xhili%lnm ot »in
uaplaasant nltuf^tlan ehould i. r» ^«n rsutUiy api/ureiit to Xitm
u«l>«rtiMat wiiea i foiiusr uoi-tflnu«r-la-Jui«f 1* put uadar «,
ytjuagwr «aa. i-«tty JfliaiouaieB ar« bound' to !>• prwawnt aad
tU«s« «»ii» into apposiUon. A tvpios! Inilcntlor. was am
ItXQi'umtit ifclah I ob»«nro4 <slo»«ly. "niu
in KoToaber, 1<>U) to taxe oosf.<ia(I oi .a«
tmkmi. ta sf.siut la « surrey of ttxm :.._--...- _.__... „ riot
wiilah W4UI iaiti«t«d by tb« aoawteaaer-ia-viilftX. It wn» i<iiira«a
%&ma that r»ocwjMMjaAtloR« fa«rfJ b«4ija blcMsfcwi tod that tiio offiam
waa or iittie iralu*.
?M» aurr»y iaoiu«l»d iiTsamfiiato .-iad »x%<mmlv» i-«aoMsaBa<latloa«.
iaaludlaiE trained i>ar»oito«i to b* ta«.«a /roa siy ola ll%h Biotriet
to build up t&« 14tb *• quiokly aa j^oaaiiaia,
%• next day, aft«r t«liia« AOi&iral Biaah tb« 8»ourity m
mioymA la tl»« Utii aad lndUatin<; lbs ooajpUt* i«o«: a«r» h«
approvad all staps to r«a»dF tis« sltaatioa. Aooordiagly, tiM
p»r»oaa»l arrlT»d Mad cspwoalon, plamiiaa «uid trminla^- w«r«
smpld. Durl»*j the <»uxo« of s »\il>«»ciU«iit mrrwy to outllna
fault« la th« Dintrict, %Sb» frnport or di«««t. mut brou.-M to the
atteatioa of Adadral Slooli. ttU.« survey wa« mde by an offloer
mm vmm wortetag for the '2oss3«uTder-iB~<,Jbi.8i' aiid iulso heipia.' the
liletrict. At th« alfifet of thU oriticfO. aurvsy ooadati f«»» i^»
Co«B«adep-la-«;hl«f , .-^tairia Bloah gave Teat to his wrath aM
latelllseaoe aatlirltlfts aui'ferred for ^uite a tlae. «.,
The steeptlolem of %:>» Corakandaat r«e«a^iJio aeaeesity fcr -11111
■eourlty waa also typlo&l rroM a yeawtrtt oaoe oode duiliu.' '^-^
eeeurtty efforte, "Brisi^ &« a Jep&aese apy. I've never 'aeea oae
«&d i«ttld lUCe to see oae". Hie yard wui full of then.
Oa 16 ".epteafeer, 1941, in a letter to -aiadral iStortE, I
stated. "It la smtiryiflc to »«« thet there Is a j>o»«l«»illty of
jwwolirinc the Japaneee situation, but vfo aaiat cjt reiai until
tlwqr *«'»» iiivea ooaaret* immi»%T&%iom of ftlaaerity.".
Ail of the foreeolne ie slaply to icnioate the poeeibiilty
of qualified pereonnel ftoourately »fttlia.ntiAC tJis situ«Uo&, wad
^e diatressliV' feot that aothblo^j wms dona «tbout it.
X na aow oo&cezioed t>eeauee of another sltuatioa «^ioh i« «^
gsowiae in ewrlouaaeBS and proportions. :jusiors are Inoreaalog \,V
moA I fiad not wily the aorale of eiviliaiui falling lower end ^
lower but aleo theft of K«V|^ ^jrfioor*. Thia is a typical
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3297
fifth ooluaii tftoiinifjua wiA It mxat b« »topr«d. It aot only
»ort«as up our owe r-<soile Gut It Is throwla^j Xh* ts«ooa4
e«n«ratloa J'(ip(tn»se lato tli« 1 ps c' mammj »^«ats, isarsf of
whoa c: stlil cot in gu^toay, i us^d to t>a )ao»t optialatio
about tK« J&^aaesft aevar r^Vareia- iisra ft)r anouisr r«14, but
th« r'^'X»i»ter ■■ •• ' - - ' tloc, «tiio}ii Uiey will l««ra
abotut aooa .. tlon to tfa«a to return. Tlii*
»1«. « tfor ', b7 •trcag *3ff«c3l¥«* pro-
. I fouad on« wsttKH frantloidly «r.jSAgJjB6
.^ Twn tela tier J3*.*» te.-rilsle fie sa» «tt»«»ic
*«■- . Iv .!-,aa. 3o--a»OBc is epr^afilt..; a rimar lA&t t^y«
i» ^smeee flfewt »tt«ok on .^pi-it I4tli, I ta now ■wytag
to . . .... source o? -=- •^« ^. >»,.-. --»ors wr« sori'StlsieB •t«rt«4
t« eiiasiuo* tii® poeiti -sr orraiiJ /-atloa.
Aii^txrmntly^ oc ti«? . er-^ om.\ L..i«y sir* uadeoiaehfi how to li«ntfl«
Uj» ^as'im«»« BituatSoii, H«r«, wh«r« it Is Kuah sore dlffloult, I
find tiit-t ilttlc or wjtLla^ la Iwiu^ doa,«. Make ao adttalta oteut
it, tha yropmr haadiiag of this aituatioa x^^uires two auallfioao
tloas: tivm, hishly profos«ioj:Ai Int«ilij«ac« aetlrltlM, ma&
ueao.ivl. <» ;,h«>3?ou-aJti k2»*?l®as« of the Jnpeiaeae peopI«. TJft« atkot
in .! ao oaa 'iualificd to hdJ%<Jl9 sl-Wiar. I teKW what thajr
b*,'. ^ tliay &r« oap&bla of dolae* 2* rmKew no airf«r«ai3«
w%,., w. . . .» Job es lone a» it is done affisl«ntly aM t&farougjUijr.
5^t, X v-.v.-^rc tc- .uak-s tha flat statei-iiit tiint it-.tl« or BO r««uXt»
ha»* b««ai r»oeiT»d on »*«•« tamod over to tiJasa &y t?i« i4th R«fmi
Diatrijt, 1 riua th.st t&e nuaiayous Jap ansa* attstwir oj*«r«itopa
have oaiy b«ea atooal«&«(S Jjy lotter oaly Jjot V> op<?rat«. Ad«qu«t«
a«8ro;i«s ii^c'j Liwt -/^^jn a;-, '.«•• Sao« ««»p90t3 aav« not SxM»a t«Jc«ft
Into o» ins ".ro r-tlll nn'^*n-',«T»d 'ry the
pr«&«ai. . yoblsK o«»n rse ©olif&a la forty-fir*
witb his i.»i«v«a«>i«!v»*. »«. •.» '. , J "oiT!''. -.J .i.'5»> i^a \.'!o«, . ..a Of ills iMni<
ti» gev« as tim reason for oontlaulac th« S&p&B,«a» a«w»pa^ar» tbat
th«y wer« c.-aaasary fa. tise iiorale or t\fe <ans*jy aliens. At th*
Jagfliiafo into a^foat^ ido o)^ tE« Territorial OuIm ssaa mrn
dflWaced It. The aeleoieea K"CTf> ^»seB fiisirsssKS sad put into labor
battaaioca. I^i* aatlos will Ua-ra tha effect of .saodLic tiiaaa
^
A
3298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
let ln3<«pi«t«f
m>, 22mjp'^mfk
■f^.tir
of hi;'
ln4uc
quo ■ •
3to tjM l»p« of immv nijwit*. It 1«
»«n9tbl« solutt^as to *ll ti»««« p»«W.«i
Mft^rJcswi out, »«* 1% i«i loMvisttbi© W
J.S on rr»-;ir«jUfJlo«»d «ol<»t4oa».
>«.1.5 o TialmL, or oo« o-
•«9 ar« 3tiH 'afviftt««^ .
in
I ,.a« i>i-*»«3t ila« tii« Aiwy is •itacfi'vorlaii. to talw «»^«r •aa%v*l
o* tii« lat»lil^.enr« ar,i[«ai»«ti»a in a«»»»il. aa4«r tao»« •oa&itlMNi
til* 3o/a?*<ur'«r-iii~-;h.i«f *«ui<S »» tyia^ feU jgja ja^m^O JSiMSMlil'
T5i»ir -si. -V. ureeant, trntnlon ^iS psrfonwmoftir la no v%j <tualin** tibi
Ui*ja ■ r!t. I know ta«ijr o«|?«feillfci»a »a<J '^ant t!i»7 haT«
b«o«'.. ■ 1 w!» for nuas' y««r«, trlwJ to hsT® th«» ljipl«a*at.«A
oa tfc* i^-, .->&t, ii'i;* th« .'»r '^■♦p«rtJa«st Iji-v&rlafely r»pile4, "HO
action win t,« i-nxma u&tll ** dfcy". Aa » r««ult tik«y "8i«4 liet *
»iael» tri»ln«^ Inteiiigeoc* aan *lth iHtJois 50 st&rt mi orgAsdzatlMi".
"Pius quotations ar« rxtMB G«iMiral illlea, tixm h««6 of 0-2.
Th« N-aT«l Intellig»ao« orsisaiewtiios o? tiJ« l4tJi !>l«trtat hiMI
b««n built wp sn<?. tr«lae4 throiM^h t-fe<? iat*B»iT« •ffort oX two -i
•xo*lI»£it ofrlaere with years of «2|i«rien<}« b«bi&4 tbMU ThfOUij^
thotr ic»owl»dK« «*-.-!«!! »r.t r«r»eauel heve ?>«en •nroXled oOi; tradUM^
«ad 1 Rp. a?ii'« ! in splt« -.^f ob»tt*uatSon8 *M<jh n^uld
^«T« b®ar. Help, tlon is so fsr suparlnr to •:.?>• Mi«y
aad ;?.3.3. for :m.w --" *'- ■• ".h*r« is no ooap. *i»oft.
Hawaii, ae
T«luf »0l»ly &» I ^.„.^...,- _ - . - , .
profi4»« tr* aal> tncWaw for ta« eii«t»nc«
defenB* outroe*- or tfe 'Aitea St«st«». is of
••£• *>•»• for t>i:« W«*t. 'Ki« p]\>t*ctioa of it
iffsnslvft ■t-t5tua« is* 8 r«\al«it« te t?aj», t 6ef«iii««. Tiiis «ff«(a»i»»
•ttitu^le does n-jl «xl»t. I'nd^r tii« ri^t^^^t tiCst« of a&BiniEtr*'tiMM' .
th« ia:*Xu«Qc«e fit uark, mu:: th« d»£,«3;«ir>^tljQ^ ffior&le, I o£ax!K>t MMMJW
th« f««ii:i,: \.te.t xmlmat firsi ootioc la tftkss «• &r* a^i>ro«ohiji« •
•Itaatloa ^ftiisi; al.;,nt result te 6o-;*thla£; wor»« tliaa that of
7 D»oi»ab«r. (It tiaa aiwaya bean ssy o»iisi«i«r«.-3 opinion Tor * loac
ti»« thttt because cf th« 7«el«X aitufttiaa %h» Hmr«li«a Islnndii «UL1
«r«ntuall7 reeui:^ k mlllt.fr^ gov*>nm»at« it* pu:'po»«ii diotttt* tbi<t
It «l»o«»id bo « SaTJil adlitary i5or»jnaa»iA , %&0vmtoT» now in tb« >
tlae to vtart it.) tvV\
-5-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3299
1
That the ••ein'^a; er-ln-Jhlef , ne '"''■ " •'
•x«rci»« 111* f-jjiotlesR «» ylll*.<vry o.-
a^l aotlTlti«s ttmt %hm Bdalnlnta- 1 * ■«
1S"S » ;>#tsuty, «» «t pr«ee.it, If ' >*.» -«*«".
•atitfaotory, sin! th»t t.i;« lr.i» ■»« b» c«tit»r««
or t*.e ?l»«»t «n<t 15, « fl«spt ,;«««,
(
■ 1h«t, pow«r «f «rr«st '^^ "'-*.-» t, « - of t^e
«^;«aoy but tii» osiiy f-o^*ir^ vmr. }
offla«r, ."ictor lieus-tcB, Mas r-fssd^.ilj . ►*», v <• -* ".■ci.v '. .•< 'o'.io«
CoaalsaiOB sad it in isjonoei'vafei* thst U* ^-s^ui.' Ue in »
po»1tl9n to .-viapsr Mavnl »«ourlty.
79716 O — 46— pt. 18 29
3300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
plajw bnt Uw thr»« point* «»a#l» h» !• th« w>st con0«m«3 »r«!
(1) »1U » J»p«w>«» f*»t STRIKUIO rows «»d« op of eroi»«r« •«!
•Iroimft c«rri«r« skmib on « awiouting or rtrilting stMldn?
;Z) Will Jmptimam mbmHrmn homr tmmr the Islwnd* to atUch or
V
(3) mU a ApauwM KapsHJltlomrr foroa b« ma% 0TOr»e*8t
lb* fSx*t of th«M la th« aiost fa»rsoM». Sup^xMW Jkpain «*ni t« font
« f«»t strlklag fore« coMpoacd of attch apoa^r tott:i«idilpe (abose apaad
AMarliO* eaanot mtoh) »a th* RIKDIU, KONOO aad QHXaKIMi., th* aircraft
OMYlars iiuai aad tCTOJO, utf th* IUCMIoUm of lM*rr crulaersi Ihla
vonOd ba * f**t-«t*p{>lJ)g foro* tbat vould b* truly aatchOaaa and ioTlnclblalt
'fcr* tb«f oppo*e<l to a'«<an th* Xarg* gutM of AMsrloan battlaahips, th*7 eouM
utlllM thslr anp*rlor ap»*d*, tfaua laa^lac ^^^^^ *^<'<' attvaraarlea bahlad.
If oppo»*d to a orulaor faro* tb*7 eould eXoa« In and with tc^llln^ hlxms cruah
tba oppoaitlon. Truly, thla would b* a psarlaaa fero#! «bl« to cloa* to
battle, or opaa o«t, if out (uniwdl If thla Past Striking f&ro« ebould aeat
• aiaf ortnne , loaing one or two faat l«ttl««hi|» or aircraft oarrlara, thaj-
■aoiild auraly be a aaTsra blow to Japan aitd wa would l*w to grit oar t««th,
aantiwring o«r rage until the imy ot a (itteial-rs K&ixt Ka^gawnt to obtalo
tmr rarengal .
Mtyba each a bold vactura wooldi. ba too great a rlak, who can aay? Oa
the other hand, warfara la a rlak and he who haaitatea, or faara the riaka
of bold tantura, oannot wag* war! llor»«»ar, an atlMiek off Hawaii would ba
the flrat battl* of the Wiolfie lar and if ia the ^mtf flrat engageaent one
ean wrest Um courage away froa the en*^ brjr oriaa own daring, it would put
hl« In a funk or glvw hia the Jitt*ra."
SKowrpt frwi nfma JAPAS rwns* by Mr. Kaaaatat Hlmta.
.\\
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3301
^ ?i ss«SKS.-&Kis2!^ far ^.i^id-i'-ai Vttits^i
17
-■.«««HkI «««l«l,liag
tht t'-^,.r>'-^ c*?"*« ''■'■^' if*® ^-s« }. /m '"^''-0ii «..>*3?#la i» a36*K.
H«(RS
tt w««iM opir.
Itfcer". thS,!:
3302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 142
Material Rexating to "Winds" Code
TABLE OF CONTEXTS
1. Data lewived c-onceruing establishment and nature of Winds Code.
Intercept, Circular #2353, Tokyo to Washington (use of Code in Japanese Short
Wave News Broadcast), page 154, Couiniittee Exhibit 1.
b. Intercept, Circular #2354, Tokyo to Washington (use of Code in .Japanese Gen-
eral Intelligence Broadcasts), page 155, Committee Exhibit 1.
c. Dispatch from Cincaf to OPNAV info. Cinpac, et al, dated 11/28/41, (Committee
I'ranscript, page 7314).
d. Dispatch from B'oote (Batavia) to Secretary of State Hull dated 12/4/41.
e. Dispatch from Thorpe (Batavia) for General Miles, received War Dept. 12/5/41
(per log of incoming cables. Committee Exhibit 93).
2. Dispatches and Data Relating to Monitoring for Winds "execute".
a. OPXAV to Cincaf, Cincpac dated 11/2S/41 (Committee Transcript, page 7316).
b. Comsixteen action Cincaf, info. Cincpac, OPXAV, Comfourteen, dated 12/1/41,
(Committee Transcript, page 7315).
c. General Miles dispatch to G-2, Honolulu, dated 12/5/41, Committee Exhibit 32.
3. Certification of Secretary FCC, dated 8/18/44, with attachments as follows:
a. Messages FCC requested to monitor (Doc. Xo. 1)
b. Message intercepted by FCC 12/4/41 (Doc. Xo. 2.)
c. Message intercepted by FCC 12/5/41 (Doc. Xo. 3.)
d. Two messages intercepted by FCC 12/8/41. (Doc. No. 4)
4. Material relating to whether winds "execute" message sent or received.
a. Communication from Army liaison officer to Committee dated 12/3/45 and en-
■ closed cables between War Deut. and General MacArthur.
b. Summary of interview of SHINROKU TANOMOGI dated 11/30/45 (enclosure
3 of report to Chief of Staff, War Dept., from General Mac.^rthur dated
12/13/45— Exhibit 8D, page 6606 of Record).
c. Communication dated 12/6/45 from State Dept. to Committee Counsel, with
enclosed paraphrase of State Dept. cable dated 11/6/45, relative to moni-
toring for winds execute message by British, Australia and Dutch East
Indies.
d. Same dated 11/20/45. with enclosed paraphrase of cable dated 11/16/45 from
Canberra to State Dept.
e. Same dated 12/5/45 with enclosed paraphrase of cable dated 12/4/45 from
London to State Dept.
5. List of messages appearing in Committee Exhibit 1 dealing with instructions to .Tai)anese
representatives to destroy codes, sent through ordinary channels of communication.
6. Material relating to Navy intercept JD-l : 7<i01, marked "cancelled."
a. Navy memorandum dated 11/8/45 re sjiecial studies concerning JD-l : 7001, with
enclosure.
8. Examples of JD-l #'s cancelled and JD-l : 6998-7004.
From: Tokyo 1 (a)
To : Washington
19 November 1941
Circular #2353
Regai'ding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the
cutting off of international communications, the following warning will he added
in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news bi'oadcast.
(1) In case of a Jai)an-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.^
(2) Japaii-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORF
(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.'-
' East wind rain.
' North wind cloudy.
» West wind clear.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3303
This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and
each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is iieard please destroy all code
papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement .
Forward as urgent intelligence.
(Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT)
25432 JD-1 : 6875
I (b)
SECRET
From: Tokyo
To : Washington
19 November 1941
Circular #2354
When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the fol-
lowing at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:
(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI".
(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".
(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. I.) ; "NISHI".
The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.
Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.
(Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S)
25392 JD-1 : 6850
U] ' 1 (c)
Top Secret
28 November 1941
From : CINCAF
Action : OPNAV
Info: COMSIXTEEN CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN 281430
Following Tokyo to net intercept transhitlon received from Signapore X If
diplomatic i-elations are on verge of being severed following words repeated live
times at beginning and end of ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts will have signifi-
cance as follows X Higashi Higashl Japanese American X Kita Kita Russia X
Nishi Nishi England including occupation of Thai or invasiim of Malaya and Nei
XX on Japanese language foreign news broadcasts the following sentences re-
peated twice in the middle and twice at the end of broadcasts will be used XX
America Higashi no Kaze Kumori XX England X Nishi no Kaze hare X Unquote
X British and COMSIXTEEN monitoring above broadcasts
1 (d)
Telegram Received
BF. This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated
to anyone. (SC).
Batavia
From : Dated December 4, 1941
Rec'd. 9 : 19 a. m.
Secretary of State,
Washinffton.
220, December 4, 10 a. m.
War Department at Bandoeng claims intercepted and decoded following from
Ministry Foreign Affairs Tokyo :
"When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end
weather reports: <me east wind rain war with United States, two north wind
cloudy war with Russia, three west wind clear war with Britain including
attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies. If spoken twice burn codes and
secret papers."
Same re following from Japanese Ambassador Bangkok to Consul General
Batavia :
"When threat of crises exists following will he used five times in texts
of general reports and radio broadcasts: one Higashi east America, two Kita
North Russia, three Nishi west Britain with advance into Thailand and attack on
Malaya and Dutch Indies."
3304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Thorj)e and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attach little or
no importance to it and' view it with some suspicion. Such have been common
since 1936.
FOOTE.
HSM
1 (e)
From: ALUSNA BATAVIA OPNAV RRRRR
Date: 5 DEC IJMl
Decoded by: KALAIDJIAN
Paraphrased by : PURDY
mWS0 CR^222
From Thorpe for miles War Dept. Code intercept: — Japan will notify her
consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end.
East wind rain XXXXXX United States: north wind cloudy Russia: west
wind clear England with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will
be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be
introduced five times in general text.
(Signature illegible)
Distribution :
War. Dept. Action Files: CNO 20()P 2^A Record Copy: 2^C X Show
OPDO Top Secret
Secret
Com 14
Com 16
2 (a)
Naval Message Navy Department
Message Precedence : Priority XXXX
From OPNAV
Released by : L. F. SalTord
Date
TOR CODE ROOM : 2548
CINCAF
CINCPAC
282301
Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred
precedence.
New Tokyo broadcast schedules as follows X Jig victor jig one two two seven
five ke six pm and seven pm to Pacific Coast six thirty pm to Western Hemisphere
X Jig hypo love five one six zero kc eight pm nine pm and ten pm to China coast X
Jig unit option nine four three zero kc six thirty pm to Western Hemisphere X
Jig hypo prep' one one nine eight zero kc ten thirty pm to Europe X Probably
Tokyo time.
Top Secret— Ultra
Secret
2 (b)
1 December 1941 Top secret
From :
Action : CINCAF
Info: CINCPAC, OPNAV, COMFOURTEEN
011422
Jig victor jig press tonight in closing seventeen hundred .schedule stated quote
"All listeners he sure and listen in at zero seven zero zero and zero seven thirty
ttmiorrow morning, since thehe may be important news" unquote XX Suggest
frequencies seven three two seven X rtine four three zero X and one two two
seven five X times Tokyo let.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3305
2(c)
Sent No. 519, 12/5 ^ Secret
Dbcembeb 5, 1941.
Assistant Chief ok STAtT Headquabtebs,
(t2 HitwaiUin Drpurtment,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii :
Coiitat-t ('oiiiuiander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval
District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo ret'erence weather.
Miles.
Top Secret Secret
United States of Amekica,
Feujeral Communications Commission,
Washington, D. C, Auyust 18, 19U.
I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as
follows :
Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather messages which Major Wesley
T. Guest (now Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Corps, requested the CommLs-
sion's monitors to be on the loolcout for in Tokyo broadca.sts and to advise
Colonel Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such message was inter-
cepted. This request was made on November 28, 1941 at approximately 2140
GMT.
Document No. 2 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station
JVW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at approximately 2200 GMT,
December 4. 1941, which at 9 : 05 p. m. EST, December 4, 1941, having been
unable to c<mtact Colonel Bratton's office, was telephoned to Lieutenant
Brotherhood, 2()-G, Watch Officer, Navy Department, who stated that he was
authorized to accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office.
Document No. 3 is a true copy of a weather nies.sage from Tokyo station
JVW3, intercepted by Commission monitors at 2130 GMT, December 5, 1941,
which was telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7: 50 p. m. EST,
December 5, 1941.
Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by
Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG 4 and JZJ between 0002 and
0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. C. Dusenbury,
U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at approxi-
mately 8 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the
Romaji version of tliese messages.
on file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the
Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of August,
1944.
[seal] T. J. Slowie,
Secretary.
Top Secret •
3 (a)
Docttment No. 1
GROUP ONE IS EAST WIND RAIN
GROUP TWO IS NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND
GROUP THREE IS WEST WIND CLEAR STOP
GROUPS REPEATED TWICE IN MIDDLE AND AT END OF BROADCAST
The above are the weather messages Major Wesley T. (iuest requested the Com-
mission to monitor on November 28, 1941.
3306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3 (b)
Secret
Document No. 2
TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLtOHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME
CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLKiHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE WEATHER
KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM
AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS
CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH AVIND CLEAR MAY BECOME
SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM
Weather message from station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GMT,
December 4, 1941.
3(c)
Secret
Document No. 3
TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR BEGIN
CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM
SOUTH, (repeated 3 tim^s)
Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately
2180 gmt December 5, 1941.
3 (d)
Seci'et
Document No. 4
English
Romaji
This is in the middle of the news but
today, specially at this point I will give
the weather forecast :
WEST WIND, CLEAR
WEST WIND, CLEAR
This is in the middle of the news but
today, at this point specially I will give
the weather forecast :
WEST WIND, CLEAR
WEST WIND, CLEAR
Nyusu no tochu de goztiimasu ga
honjltsu wa toku ni koko de tenki yoho
wo moshiage masu
NISHI NO KAZE HARE
NISHI NO KAZE HARE
Nyusu no tochu de gozaimasu ga
kyo wa koko de toku ni tenki yoho wo
moshiage masu
NISHI NO KAZE HARE
NISHI NO KAZE I|ARE
Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ trans-
mitted by them between (X)02 and 0035 GMT December 8, 1941.
4(a)
War Department,
Washwgton, D. C, Room ^Dl/Gl, the Pentafffm, 3 December IdJfO.
Memorandum for Mr. Mitchell :
Pursuant to your request the War Department directed (ieneral MacArthur'e
Headquarters to make inquiries in Japan concerning the Winds Code.
Attached are uniiaraphrased copies of the cables exchanged between the War
Department and General MacArthur.
Harmon Duncombe,
Lt. Colonel, 08C.
Inel.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3307
4 (C)
Departmknt of State,
Wa.HhiDgton, Drccuibcr 6, UiJff).
DE1A.R Mr. MiTCHEix : In coiupliaiife with your i-equest of December 3, 1945,
I enclose a paraphrase of our cable of November 6, 1945 to London, the Hague
and Canberra inquiring alxmt the "winds" message.
My letter of yesterday advised y<'.u of the answers we have received from
London and the Hague.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Herbert S. Marks,
/t/ Hekbekt S. Marks,
Assistant to the Under Secretary.
Enclosure :
Paraphrased cable.
The Honorable Wiu.iam D. Mitchfxt., General Counsel,
Joint Committee on the Jnrestif/ation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States.
30 October 1945.
GSB 168
From : War Department
To: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo
On 19 Nov 1941 Japanese Foreign Office advised its representatives abroad that
in case diplomatic relations with United States, Great Britain or Russia were
about to be .severed a certain signal in form of false weather report would be
broadcast in news message and that all code papers were then to be destroyed.
Signal was to be "Higashi No Kaze Ame" (east wind rain) in case of break
between Japan and United States, "Kitano Kaze Kumori" (north wind cloudy)
in case of break between Japan and Russia and "Nishi No Kaze Hare" (west
wind clear) in case of break between Japan and Great Britain. Congressional
committee investigating Pearl Harbor attack has requested that Japanese rec-
ords and authorities be examined to ascertain whether any signal implementing
this or any similar code was in fact transmitted on or prior to 7 Dee and if so
exact time and manner or transmittal. Inconclusive evidence available here
suggests such signal may have been transmitted on or about 4 Dec. Request that
all reasonable steps be taken to obtain such information and that this request
and resulting information receive no publicity.
3 November 1945.
BSG 187
From: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. ITS Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo
To: War Department
GSB 168 dated 31 Oct investigation has been initiated and results thereof will
be communicated at the earliest practicable date. Progress in work of this kind is
of necessity somewhat slow. However, every effort will be made to expedite it.
Necessary steps have been taken to avoid publicity.
GSB 180 6 November 1941.
From : War Department.
To: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo.
Supplementing GSB 168 there follows full Japanese text of two circulars from
Tokyo Foreign Office dated 19 Nov 1941 :
Circular 2353. Kanchoo fugoo atsukai kokusai jigyoo no hippaku no
kekka itsu .saiaku no jitai ni tachi itaru kamo hakararezaru tokom kakaru
baai wagahoo to aitekoku tono tsuushin wa tadachi ni teishi serarubeki wo
motte wagahoo no gaikoo kankei kiken ni hinsuru baai ni wa waga kaigai
3308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
hoosoo no kakuchi niuke nihohoo news no chuukan oyobi saigo ni oite tenki
yohoo to shite. 1. Nichibei kankei no baai ni wa "higashi no kaze aiue". 2.
Nichiso kankei no baai ni wa "kita no kaze kumori". 3. Nichiei kankei no
baai ("tai" shinchuu "niaree" Netherlands E. I. kooryoku oboe fukumu
("nishi no kaze hare". 02 do zutsu kiirikaeshi hoosoo seshiineru koto to
seru wo motte iiiigi ni yori angoo, shorui too tekitoo shobun aritashi. Nao
migi wa gen ni gokuhi atsiikai to seraretashi.
Circular 2304: Gokuhi. Wagahoo no gailioo kankai kiken ni hinsen to
suru baai ni wa ippah joohoo hoosoo no bootoo oyobi niatsubi ni : 1. Nichibei
kankei hippaku no baai ni wa "higashi". 2. Nichiso kankei no baai niwa
"kita". 3. Nichei kankei ("tai" shin chuu "maree" Netherlands E. I. koory-
oku oboe fukumu (no baai mi wa "nisiii". Narugo 05 do ate soonyuu
subekl ni tsuki goryoochi aritashi.
Both messages sent in ^ Believe broadcasts mentioned
for signalling in circular 2353 were voice broadcasts and those in 2354 were
Morse code.
Code designation omitted.
BSG 196 13 November 1945.
From: Conunander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo.
To : War Department.
Reference message 1 November requiring search of Jap records and interroga-
tion of authorities to ascertain whether an implementing signal to circulars 2353
and 2354 (see GSB 180) Tokyo Foreign Office 19 November 1941 was ever trans-
mitted. Investigation discloses that all pertinent records were burned prior to
emperor's rescript of 14 August 1945. Interrogation of authorities so far has
resulted in absolute denial of transmission of such an implementing message and
existence of any prearranged instructions which would permit transmission of
such an implementing signal. It would help the investigation if pertinent author-
ities could be confronted with circulars 2353 and 2354. This has not been done
before in order to avoid disclosing to the Japanese the fact that we had this info.
Investigation will be continued but without much prospect of success unless appro-
priate authorities can be confronted with circulars mentioned.
GSB 186 13 NovEMBEK 1945.
From : War Department.
To : Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo.
Reference BSG 196 you are authorized to confront Japanese officials with copies
of circulars 2353 and 2354 but without disclosing when or by what means they
were obtained.
21 NovEMBEai 1945.
BSG 210
From : Conimander-inChief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo.
To : War Department
In reply to radiogram 31 October 1945, GSB-168, the results of interrogation
of number of employees have indicated that signal iniplententing circular 2353
and 2354, was probably not transmitted prior to 8 December, Tokyo time, but
was transmitted by radio voice broadcast at some hour after 0230, 8 December,
Tokyo time. Exact hoar unknown. No evidence can be obtained that imple-
menting signal was transmitted by radio telegraph. 1 employee, now in Tokyo,
states that he received radio voice broadcast signal in Rangoon at 0930, g De-
cember, Tokyo time (0630 Rangoon time). No info has been obtained that any
signal implementing similar code was transmitted.
As stated in my message numl>er BSG-196, the burning of i)ertinent records
prior to Emperor's rescript of 14 August 1945 precluded obtaining info on this
subject from that source.
Furthermore, individuals who were in authority at time under consideration
admitted nothing luitil they were confronted with circulars 2353 and 2354 of Tokyo
Foreign Office, 19 November 1941, pursuant to authority contained in your
GSB-186.
These employees did not learn when or by what means these circulars were ob-
tained.
Further investigation here appears unprofitable. Request authority to discon-
tinue it.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3309
24 November 1945.
GSB 196
From: War Department
To : Coniinaiuler-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo
Reference BSG 210. Only use of Winds code (either voice or radio telegraph)
shown here by available contemporaneous records is voice broadcast from Tokyo
between 0002 and 0E35 on 8 December Tokyo time using code words referring to
British Japanese relations. In order to assist in evaluating information given in
your BSG 210, Joint Congressional Peiirl Harbor Committee desires to know
first whether persons who conducted interrogation or those who were interro-
gated had any knowledge that prior to the interrogation of the United States
had information establishing use of Winds code on 8 December Tokyo time, and,
secondly, if such persons did have such knowledge, whether they knew that
the United States had no definite information establishing use of Winds code
at any time prior to 8 December Tokyo time. Prompt reply will be appreciated.
27 November 1945.
BSG 214
From : Commander-in-Chief Advance PIq. US Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo
To : War Department
Reur GSB-196 persons who conducted interrogation had no knowledge that
prior to interrogation T'nited States had info establishing use of Winds code
on 8 Dec Tokyo time. Persons ^who were interrogated were not asked whether
they knew that United States had info establishing use of Winds code on 8 Dec
Tokyo time. Also, interrogated persons were not asked whether they knew
that United States had no info establishing use of the Winds code at any time
prior to 8 Dec Tokyo time. Tliey will be questioned on these points at once
and answers provided. Employee referred to in my BSG-210 who stated that
he received voice broadcast signaling Rangoon at 0930, 8 Dec Tokyo time (0630
Rangoon time) may have meant that he received code words referring to British-
Jap relations. He will be questioned again. This partial reply is made now and
full reply will be forwarded as promptly as employees can again be found for
questioning.
27 November 1945.
GSB 197
From : War Department
To: Commander-in-Chief. Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific. Tokyo.
Information supplied in BSG 214 is believed sufficient answer to Committee's
question, which was dii'ected towards prior knowledge of interrogators and
whether anything had developed in the interrogation which would indicate such
prior knowledge on the part of Japanese. It seems clear from your BSG 214
that there was no such indication. Please confirm this.
It is requested that no further interrogation on this point be conducted unless
Congressional Committee indicates desire to press inquiry further, in which
event you will be advised.
Further interrogation of employee referred to in BSG 210 to ascertain whether
broadcast heard in Rangoon used code words referring only to British-Japanese
relations would be helpful. Other wise you may consider interrogation com-
pleted.
30 November 1945.
BSG 219
From : Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo
To : War Department
Reur GSB 197 nothing developed during interrogation which indicated on part
of Japanese prior knowledge of character stated in your GSB 197.
Employee who heard Rangoon broadcast states he does not recall code words
heard but believes they referred to severance of British-Jap relations. This re-
sulted from further questioning of this employee and without prompting as to
character of answer given.
3310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4b
U. S. Naval Technical AIission to Japan
Interrogation No. 11.
Place: FLTLOSCAP
Date : 30 November 1945
Subject : Radio Tokyo Broadcast December 8.
Personnel Interrogated: Mr. Shinroku Tanoniogi, Head of Overseas Department
of Japan Radio Broadcastinj; Corporation in December 19-41 ; presently mem-
ber of the Diet and secretary to the Minister of Transportation.
Interrogator: Captain Peyton Harrison, USNR.
Interpreter: Lt. (jg) Stanley E. Sprague, USNR.
Summary :
Mr. Tanoniogi, as head of the Overseas Department, was in charge of pro-
grams, including news programs, beamed to foreign countries. All news re-
leases were controlled or "censored" by the Information Bureau of the Cabinet,
the Communications Bureau of the Communications Ministry, and the General
Staff.
Mr. Tanoniogi was usually on duty at Radio Tokyo every other night. He was
on duty the night of December 7 (Tokyo Time) and stated that the regular
schedule of pi'ograms was broadcast. At about 0400 on December 8, he received
a telephone call from the Information Bureau informing him that Japan was
at war and that scheduled programs would have to be rearranged and prepara-
tions made for broadcasting important government communiques. An official
of the Information Bureau arrived at Radio Tokyo early on the morning of De-
cember 8 to work out details with Tanomogi's staff. Tanomogi remained at
Radio Tokyo until about 1800 of December 8. He stated that they broadcast
only what was given them by Domei News or by the Information Bureau. "All
news was official government news".
Mr. Tanomogi was asked if he remembered the "east wind rain" weather
report broadcast about 1500 on December 8. He replied that he was not listen-
ing to the broadcasts at that particular hour, but that he had a vague recollec-
tion of some such announcement being broadcast among the releases abruptly
ordered for transmission that day by the Information Bureau.
Mr. Tanoniogi was handed a copy of Drew Pearson's article in the Honolulu
Star-Bulletin of November 9, 194.'i. He stated that he would have known of it
if a message such as that described as being broadcast December 4 had been trans-
mitted and that he had no recollection at all of any "east wind rain" report or
any similar phrase being broadcast prior to December 8.
Pabaphrase of Incoming Texegram
To : London, the Hague and Canberra, November 6, 1945.
From : Secretary Byrnes
The Congressional Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor
attack has sent to the Department a communication of which the essential por-
tion is quoted below :
"Under date of November 19, 1941, Japan advised its representatives abroad
that if danger arose of a breach of diplomatic relations with the United States,
or Russia or the British, and the cutting off of other means of international com-
munications, an emergency system for warning Japanese diplomatic representa-
tives of impending break in diplomatic relations would be used, by adding in the
middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast the following :
"(1) In case Japan-United States relations were in danger, the words
Higashi No Kazeanie (East Wind Rain).
"(2) In case of Japan-Russian relations in danger, the words Kitanokaze
Kumori (North Wind Cloudy).
"(3) In case Japan-British relations in danger, the words Nishi No Kaze
Hare (West Wind Clear).
this signal to be given in the middle and at the end of the broadcast as a weather
forecast, 'each sentence to be repeated twice'. This arrangement also said, 'When
this is heaid, please destroy all code papers, etc'
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3311
"At the same time, on November 19. 1941, the Japanese sent further notice to
its representatives that when their diplomatic rehitions with the United States,
Russia or the British were in danger, there would be added at the beginning and
at the end of Japanese general intelligence broadcasts words as follows :
"(1) If it were Japan-United States relations, the word 'Higashi'.
"(2) If it were Japan-Iiussla relations, the word 'Kita'.
"(3) If it were Japan-British relations (including Thai, Malaya, and
Nei), the word 'Nishi'.
these words to be repeated live times at the beginning and end of the broadcast.
"The Joint Congressional Committee Investigating the Attack on Pearl Harbor
of December 7, 1941 are tryinv to ascertain whether any broadcast undier this
system were monitored and overheard, either by the United States or by Austra-
lia, the Dutch East Indies or the British, and, if so, on what day and at what
time such a broadcast was overheard, and if so the text of the broadcast, and
whether either of the three nations mentioned, having overheard the broadcast,
advised the United States of the fact. We are particularly interested in the
period from November 27th to December 7th inclusive, and suggest that the
inquirv first cover that period and then, if time permits, work back to November
19, 1941."
You are requested urgently to inquire of the government to which you are
accredited concerning the above and at the earliest possible moment to telegraph
a report of the results.
4 (d)
Department of State,
Washington, November 29, 19^5.
My Dear Mr. Mitchell: I am enclosing as requested by your office a para-
phrase of the cable from Canberra which was referred to in my letter of November
26.
Sincerely yours,
(S) Herbert S. Marks
(T) Herbert S. Marks,
Assistant to the Under Seeretary.
Enclosure: Paraphrase of cable friom Canberra.
The Honorable William D. Mitchell, General Counsel,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attaek,
Congress of the United States.
Paraphrased copy
Canberra, November 16, 19Ji5.
Secketaey of State, Washington,
16S, Novem ber 16, 3 p. m.
Nothing has been revealed by an exhaustive search of the records of the
monitoring service according to the Department of External Affairs. It is stated
however that they may have missed certain messages in code as at that time
trends only were followed and Japanese broadcasts were not taken down verbatim
by the monitoring service.
Minter.
4 (e)
Department of State,
Washington. Deeember 5, 19^5.
My Dkak Mr. Mitchell : I enclose a paraphrased cable dated December 4, 1945,
just received from London in reply to our inquiry of November 6 as to whether
the British had monitored and overheard any Japanese broadcasts using the
so-called "winds" code between November 19 and December 7, 1941.
3312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
As to the Netherlands, the Counsekn- of the American Embassy at The Hague
advised us by telephone this morning that the Dutch Foreign Office has now
stated in reply to our inquiry of November 6, that the most careful search has had
negative results.
Sincerely yours,
(S) Herbert S. Marks
(T) Herbert S. Marks,
Assistmit to the Under Secretary.
Enclosure : Paraphrased cable.
The Honorable William D. MiTCHEa.L, General Counsel,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States.
I'ARAPHRASING OF INCOMING TeI-EGRAM
To : Secretary of State, December 4. 1945
From : American Ambassador, London
The Foreign OffiL-e has just informed us that while their inquiries are not yet
finished, up to the present no evidence has been found that any "wind" message
was received before the morning of December 8, 1941, the day following the
attack on Pearl Harbor. The Foreign Office says that there was relayed to
Singapore from Hongkong a broadcast by the Japanese which contained messages
in code and which was received in Singapore six hours following the attack on
Pearl Harbor. The text of the Japanese code is not available yet but if desired
we will ask the Foreign Office for more particulars.
The following messages appearing on the indicated pages of Committee Exhibit
1 deal with instructions sent in code via ordinary commercial channels of com-
munication, to Japanese representatives to. destroy their codes :
Committee
Exhibit 1
Circular 2436 Of Dec. 1, 1941 p. 208
Circular 2443 of Dec. 1, 1941 p. 209
Circular 2444 of Dec. 1, 1941 p. 209
Circular 2445 of Dec. 1, 1941 p. 215
Tokyo to Wa.shington. No. 867, of Dec. 2, 1941 p. 215
Circular 2447 of Dec. 2, 1941 p. 216
Tokyo to Washington, No. 881, of Dec. 4, 1941___ p. 231
Washington to Tokyo, No. 1268 of Dec. 5, 1941 i p. 236
Panama to Tokyo, No. 367, of Dae. 5, 1941 p. 237
Tokyo to Washington, No. 897 of Dec. 6. 1941 p. 237
Bangkok to Tokyo, No. 919, of Dec. 6, 1941 p. 247
Tokyo to Washington, No. 910, of Dec. 7, 1941 p. 249
Enclosure (A)
6 (A)
Top Secret — Ultra
8 November 1945.
Subj : JD-1 : 7001, special studies concerning
1. In an effort to locate JD-1 : 7001 the following sources have been exhaus-
tively studied :
a. numerical file of JD-l #'s.
b. chronological tile of Japanese Diplomatic translations.
c. the "Japanese diplomatic traffic log" for 1941.
d. old GZ card index of Japanese diplomatic traffic, under Tokyo circulars
and Tokyo-Washington circuit.
2. A special study of Jd-1 #'s was made to determine the relationship between
the date of the message, the date of translation of the message, and the JD-1 #.
The results of this study are attached to this memo.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3313
3. From thi-s study it would appear that JD-1 : 7001, if siu-h number was
assigned to a translation, was for a message dated 28 November 1941, translated
on either 12-2-41 or 12-3-41 by the Army. As all of the JD-1 #'s on both sides
of JD-1 : 7001 were translated on either 2 December 1941 it seems reasonably
certain that the message was dated on or prior to 3 December 1941.
4. Throughout the JD-1 numerical tile there are incidents of cancelled num-
bers. The reasons for some of these cancellations are not given : other.s are given
as follows: "duplicate of message previously numbered", "additional part of
message already assigned a number", and "number skipped by mistake".
5. In October 1044 and on 14 May 1045 Lieut. Comdr. G. E. Boone called Col.
Uowlett at Arlington Hall and secured from him the following information
concerning the Army luunbering system in 1941 : Occasionally numbers were
cancelled, biit there was no indication given of the reason for the cancellation,
by whom it was made, nor by whom it was authorized. He stated that there were
other ca.ses of numbei's cancelled in the 1941 file.
/s/ Sally T. Lightle,
/t/ Sally T. Lightle,
Lieut., USNR.
Enclosure with Op-20-G Top Secret— Ultra Serial 00036(20
Study of JD-1 #'h to (leteniiine relationship betiveen date of message, date of
t rati si at ion, and JD-1 #
JD-i#
6975.
6976.
6977.
6978.
6979.
6980.
6981
6982.
6983.
6984.
6990.
6991.
6992-
6993.
6994
699.5.
6996.
6997.
6998
6999.
7000.
7001..
7002.
7003.
7004.
7005.
7006.
7007.
7008
7009
7010.
7011.
7012.
7013.
7014.
7015.
7016.
7017.
7018.
7019.
7020.
7021.
Date of
message
29 Nov 1941
29 Nov 1941
29 Nov 1941
29 Nov 1941
29 Nov 1941
29 Nov 1941
29 Nov 1941
30 Nov 1941
1 Dec 1941
1 Dec 1941
27 Nov 1941
9 Oct 1941
Oct 1941
Oct 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Nov 1941
Dec 1941
Dec 1941
Dec 1941
Dec 1941
Dec 1941
Dec 1941
3 Dec 1941
3 Dec 1941
3 Dec 1941
2 Dec 1941
Date of
transla-
tion
12-2-41
12-2-41
12-1-41
12-2-41
12-2-41
12-2-41
12-2-41
12 2-41
12-1-41
12-1-41
12-2-41
12-3-41
12-2-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12-2-41
12-2-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12-2-41
12-2-41
12-2-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12 2-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12-2-41
12-2-41
12-2-41
12-2-41
12-2-41
12-.3-41
12-2-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12-3^1
12-3^1
12-3-41
Army
or
Navy
trans.
A
A
A
A
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
A
A
N
A
1 N
N
N
N
A
JD-1#
III 7022
7023
7024
7025
7026
7027
7028
7029
7030
7031
7032
7033
7034
7035
7036
7037
7038
7039
7040
7041
7042
7043
7044
7045
7046
7047
7048
7049
7050
7051
7052
7053
7054
7055
7056
7057
7058
7059
IV 7060
7061
7062
7063
7064
7065
1 Revision.
Date of
message
2 Oct 1941
2 Oct 1941
20 Oct 1941
25 Oct 1941
7 Nov 1941
10 Nov 1941
15 Nov 1941
20 Nov 1941
21 Nov 1941
21 Nov 1941
24 Nov 1941
24 Nov 1941
25 Nov 1941
25 Nov 1941
25 Nov 1941
29 Nov 1941
29 Nov 1941
29 Nov 1941
1 Dec 1941
1 Dec 1941
1 Dec 1941
1 Dec 1941
1 Dec 1941
1 Dec 1941
2 Dec 1941
2 Dec 1941
3 Dec 1941
3 Dec 1941
3 Dec 1941
3 Dec 1941
3 Dec 1941
3 Dec 1941
1 Dec 1941
1 Dec 1941
1 Dec 1941
3 Dec 1941
2 Dec 1941
2 Dec 1941
Date of
transla-
tion
12-4-41
12-4^1
12-4-41
12-3-41
12-4-41
12-4-41
12-3-41
12-4-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12-4-41
12-4-41
12-4-41
12-4-41
12-4-41
12-4-41
12-3-41
12-3-41
12-4-41
12-4-41
Pt. 1.3
12-5-41
Pt. 2
12-4-41
12-3-41
12-3^1
12-3-41
12-4-41
12-4-41
12-3-41
12-4-41
12-4-41
12^-41
12-4-41
12-4-41
12-4-41
12-4-41
12^-41
12-4-41
12-5-41
12-4-41
18 Oct 1941
10 Nov 1941
15 Nov 1941
18 Nov 1941
18 Nov 1941
18 Nov 1941
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-4-41
12-.5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
Army
Navy
trans.
3314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Stud)/ of JD-I #'.v to (Ictefmine relntion.ship between date of message, date of
translation, and JD-l # — Continued
JD-1#
Date of
message
Date of
transla-
tion
Army
or
Navy
trans.
JD-1#
7099...
7100.
Date of
message
Date of
transla-
tion
Army
or
Navy
trans.
7066
7067
18 Nov 1941
20 Nov 1941
20 Nov 1941
22 Nov 1941
24 Nov 1941
25 Nov 1941
25 Nov 1941
25 Nov 1941
25 Nov 1941
25 Nov 1941
26 Nov 1941
26 Nov 1941
26 Nov 1941
27 Nov 1941
27 Nov 1941
27 Nov 1941
27 Nov 1941
28 Nov 1941
28 Nov 1941
28 Nov 1941
29 Nov 1941
29 Nov 1941
30 Nov 1941
30 Nov 1941
1 Dec 1941
1 Dec 1941
1 Dec 1941
1 Dec 1941
2 Dec 1941
3 Dec 1941
3 Dec 1941
3 Dec 1941
3 Dec 1941
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-4-41
12-4-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-4-41
12-5-41
12-4-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-t-41
12-5-41
A
A
A
A
A
N
N
N
N
N
A
A
N
N
N
N
N
A
A
A
N
N
A
A
N
N
N
N
A
N
N
N
N
3 Dec 1941
3 Dec 1941
4 Dec 1941
4 Dec 1941
4 Dec 1941
4 Dec 1941
4 l>c 1941
4 Dec 1941
4 Dec 1941
4 Dec 1941
27 Nov 1941
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-4-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
12-4-41
12-5-41
12-5-41
(no date
given)
12-5-41
N
N
7068...
7069
7101
7102
7103
7104...
7105
7106
7107
7108 ....
7109
A
A
A
-A.
A
7070
7071.
7072
7073
7074
7075
A
A
N
7076
7077
7078..
V 7110
7111
7112
IS Nov 1941
18 Nov 1941
18 Nov 1941
20 Nov 1941
20 Nov 1941
26 Nov 1941
26 Nov 1941
26 Nov 1941
26 .Nov 1941
27 Nov 1941
28 .Nov 1941
28 Nov 1941
2 Dec 1941
3 Dec 1941
2 Dec 1941
2 Dec 1941
3 Dec 1941
12-6-41
12-6-41
12-6-41
12-5-41
12-6-41
12-5-41
12-6-41
12-6-41
12-5-41
12-6-41
12-6-41
12-6-41
12-5-41
12-6-41
12-7-41
12-6-41
12-7-41
7080...-
7081
7082
A
A
A
7083
7084..
7085
7086
7087
7088 -
7113
7114..
7115
7116
7117
7118
7119 .. ..
A
A
A
A
A
A
N
7089
7090
7091.
7092 _.
7093
7094
7095
7096...
7097..
7098
7120
7121
7122 ....
7123
7124
7125
7126
A
A
N
.N
A
A
A
Top Secret-Ultra
Examples of JD-1 #'s Cancelled and JD-1: 6998-7004
INDEX
6(b)
JD-1 #
Date
Circuit
911
Cancelled . .
985..
Cancelled
1094.
2074
Cancelled. --
Cancelled
-
46 17
6998
22 Nov 1941
Batavia-Tokyo.
6999... ...,
27 Nov 1941
28 Nov 1941
Rome-Tokyo.
7000
Tokyo-Hsinking.
7001 .
Cancelled
28 Nov 1941...
28 Nov 1941..
28 Nov 1941
7002
Buenos Aires-Washington.
7003..
Rome-Tokyo.
7004
Hsinking-Peking, Nanking and Shanghai.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3315
Top Secret— Ultra
(All handwritten:)
Cancelled
Dupl. of 957
911 Cancelled HSH 2/20/41
(All handwritten:)
Top Secret— Ultra
Number Cancelled
Part 3 of 3
Bangk(.k-T()k.v()=8 Feb. 1941 #92
(See JD-1: 971)
985
Top Secret— Ultra
(All handwritten:)
Cancel led =
Part 2 of 957
1004= HSH 2/20/41
(All handwritten)
Top Secret — Ultra
Number skipped in error (Cancel)
2074 HSH
(All handwritten)
Top Secret — Ultra
Cancelled
Cancelled by Army after being numbered. HSH
4647
Secret
Top Secret — Ultra
From: Batavia (Isizawa)
To: Tokyo
November 22, 1941
Purple.
#1253.
To be handled in Government Code.
Departmental secret.
The activities of KOO CHOO SUI, backed up by the CHI GOO KAI and the
KOO HOO (an intelligence society and a publication), is working bard in our
behalf to stamp out anti-Japanism. Several incidents have occurred lately and
his opponents are rather belligerent. Conse<iuently, Governmental surveillance
over KOO is rather close. From April to September of this year wie afforded
KOO a subsidy for the KOO HOO and a fund for collecting intelligence, amount-
ing to from 2,000 to 3,000 guilders. KOO is so familiar with the Chinese and
natives here that in case of emergency he can do much to help us. That is why
I have employed him so far. He is ready at our direction to start the distribu-
tion of pamphlets designed to win over as many of his oonsanguinaries and the
natives as possible. I think that we should continue to avail ourselves of his
services. He lias a family of eight. Therefore, 1 think we should let him have
3,000 guilders for operating expenses; 15,000 guilders for living expenses, and
12,000 guilders as a subsidy for the KOO HOO as of from October 1st to the end
of the year. Will you please, therefore, arrange to appropriate and remit that
amount, namely 30,000 guilders.
Army 25<J33 6998 Trans. 12-2-41 (6)
79716 O— 46 — pt. 18 30
3316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Top Set-ret — Ultru
f'rom : Rome.
To : Tokyo.
27 November 1041
(Purple)
# ?
( lut xectiot) — nndecodeable )
{2nd tirction)
Although supply movements are beset with ditticulties, including occasional
sinkings of convoys, these supplies are continuing and they are optimistic of the
Mnal outcome.' Furthermore * * * (Remainder of section 2 undecodeable)
( Srd section )
As regards Italian-French relations, up to now independent conver.sati(ms be-
tween the French and Italians have not taken place. However, with the elimi-
nation of Weygand it is being said in various quarters that a great increa.se in
use of Tunis army transportation facilities is contemplated.
JD-1: 69)!) Secret (M) Navy Trans. 12-2-41 (<i-TT)
[J] Secret
Top Secret— Ultra
From : Tokyo
To : Hsihking
Ntivember 28, 1941.
Purple.
#782 (corrected to #882).
Re your #751.''
1. We have been communicating with the German representatives here, giving
them much of the Manchukucan opinions and, as a result of a talk between
OTAKI and WCHLTHAT. the final draft for a new German-Manchukuan pact
is proposed by (Jermany as follows :
(a) The title of the pact is "A provisiomal agreement for extending Gerraan-
Manchukuoan economic Relations."
(b) This pact is effective until the' last day of March next year.
(c) The balance of 85,000 tons of soy beans shall be delivered before the end of
March at the old price although the agreement expires the end of January.
(d) 4,500 tons of soy bean oil, including the undelivered balance on the con-
tract for jimson, shall al.so be delivered by the end of March.
(e) Exchange permits shall be given for the unused balance of German con-
tingent goods specified in the pact of May 31, 1941. (Minister WAGNER must
have a list of about one million marks' worth of goods in Japan, Manchukuo,
Shanghai and other Far Eastern p<tints. )
(f ) Exix>rt permits shall be gine for German goods which are now held or may
in the future be held in Manchukuo at the convenience of the holdei'S. If a
state of emergency should ari.se. this goods shall not be confiscated nor seized.
The above should be administered on a rational basis.
[2] (g) The application of this contract will be acted on by specified
conferences of local tradesmen.
(h) The term for repayment of the "W" account shall bo extended to May 31,
1942. However, this understanding shall be ni.-idc directly with the bank at the
.same time the pact is set up; it will not be mentioned in the pact.
(i) 1,000.000 marks shall be appropiiated at the end of November and Decem-
ber respectively and 1,.")(M),0(;0 marks at the enrtof January and P\'brnary re-s^jec-
tively from the "B" account for repa.\ment of the "X" account. (Although their
representatives have already expressed their, wishes to WAGNP]R. when I talked
with WAGNER on the 21st I ditl not mention tliis. As he believes it should be
handled from special funds, I think it is best for Manchukua to negotiate for
necessary funds on short term credit under this measure).
(j) Germany will offer credit to a maximum of 10,000.0(M) marks, because of
the rcdu<'tion in amount of shipments of Maruhukuoan prcKlucts (soy beans and
soy bean oill. For this credit a new account, "V," will be set up. Thus, the
' In IJhya.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3317
"X" account should be li(iui(late<l duriiis the term of the new pact through the
5,(K)0,000 marks from account "li" and soy bean jjaynients, and account "W"
should be reduced by at least l,Ol)€r,(HX> marks from soy bean payments.
(k) The balance of account "B" shall be used for payments to Germany.
Manchukuo is at liberty to make payments under heading (c) from any account
whatsoeveV.
[3] (1) The second section and the second paragraph of the third section of
the imct of May 31, IJMl (means f(»r conversion of obligations not yet settled at
the expiration of the pact) shall be left unchange<l.
2. Although Manchukuo will probably want to pay Germany through regular
channels, because of the obstacles to transportation I think it would be better to
deduct German payments from (a) together with a suitable rate of interest.
Moreover, believing that the terms of this pact are reasonable since Manchukuo's
credit responsibilities are greatly increased, as soon as they get Manchukuo's
approval Germany will send it to Berlin. As they wish to have it returned to
Tokyo with the signatures of WCHLTHAT, SPINDLER and the Manchnkuoan
representatives not later than Christmas, they demand speedy consideration by
Manchukuo.
Please press the Manchukuo government for prompt adoption of the above pact
and please wire a reply. Since Japan and Germany are virtually in agreement on
the (^hiTiese text, please urge them again to let us know at once their opinion of
the (Jerman-Manchukuoan understanding mentioned in our secret message #474 "
dated September 27th (German edition: German text).
This telegram has been discussed with military authorities and Vice Minister
MIURA.
Arniv 2r)081 Trans. 12-3-41 (5)
a Not available.
Top Secret-Ultra
(Typed)
JD-1 : 7001
JJumber cancelled.
7001
Top Secret-Ultra
Secret
From : Buenos Aires (Tomii)
To : Washington
November 28, 1941
Purple
#17
We have received the consignment from your office. Plesase advise us the
call letters and general news.
Army 7002 Trans. 12/3/41 (8)
Secret
Top Secret-Ultha
From : Rome
To : Tokyo
November 28, 1941. <
Purple.
#706. (Primary importance)
According to reports received from the Vatican through CICOGNANI, the
Papal representative in Washington, many indications are evident that Japan
forms a great obstacle to the United States' early termination of the present
anti-Axis war. Public opinion in the United States is that America would be
able to achieve victory for Great Britain simply by large-scale production of
military supplies if it were not for this obstacle. In the event of a Japanese-
American cla.sh, assistance to England and the Soviet would decrease, making
necessary American military intervention by means of forces on the European
continent. Moreover, there are a great many who believe that during American-
Japanese negotiations Japan init forth stipulations encroaching upon American
interests and lionor and so causing c()nditions to bec<»me extremely delicate.
3318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
There were also reports to the effect that the difficulties of Japaiiese-Ainerican
nesotiatioiis constrained the Interventionist faction headed by the President and
strengthened the position of he Isolationists.
Army 7003 25630 Trans. 12-2-41 (MR)
[;] Secret
Top Secret-Ultra
From : Hsinking
To : Peking, Nanking and Shanghai
November 28, 1941
Purple
Cir. 231 (Message to Tokyo #779)
Local military intelligences are as follows. For you information.
1. At the military review in celebration of the anniversay of the revolution,
47 airplanes of an unrecognizable type flew over the city of Kuibyshev. They
were definitely of American design and construction. It seems that large num-
bers have recently been arriving.
(The above is a report of the Japanese Military Attache in the Soviet.)
2. Large bodies of anti-Communist mobile forces are fighting in the vicinity
of Mininsk (Russe) and Barugujin " (south of Krasnoyarsk), destroying lines
of conmiunication and attacking the Kolhoz and Sofhoz. (The above is a spy
report. )
3. The 39th Sharpshooters Division (in the neighborhood of Kogaiko") has
executed before the tiring squad 20 unsuccessful deserters' who tried to get
into Manchukuo between May and November. To date, 4(J Soviet troops have
deserted. The Soviet, in order to prevent desertion, has moved certain detach-
ments away from the border or have strung charged barbed wire fences along
the border. Another means which they are utilizing is making the regiment
responsible for detachments from which there have been deserters. (The above
is intelligence of primary importance.)
[2] 4. Recently to the Ude Front, the surveillance troops of the outer
Mongolian area have within the last few days deliberately trespassed on Mon-
golian territory several times, even to the extent of 10 to 20 kilos. They are
taking a strong, hostile attitude toward Japanese surveillance troops. (The
above is intelligence of primary importance.
I have transmitted this to Peitai, Shanghai, and Nandai.
Army 25632 Trans. 12/3/41 (5)
« Kana spelling.
EXHIBIT NO. 142A
Dec. 5, 1941.
Mr. Steeling : At 7 :45 p. m. Mr. Carter called in from Portland with the fol-
lowing information ;
JVW3 2130G
TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR BEGIN
CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM
SOUTH, (the above was repeated three times)
JVW3 sent a time signal at 2200G and then :
I WILL NOW GIVE YOU THE WEATHER REPORT (nothing further,
carrier on but no modulation — evidently cutoff in Tokyo).
Remai-ks by Carter; They are getting a more complete picture of the operations
now and it is evident that at 21.S0G the Tokyo weather is transmitted and at
2200G the Tokyo weather and weather for other prefectures. Reception is
getting better and estimate efficiency on this assigment has increased approxi-
mately twenty-five percent.
Foned Col. Bratton and gave him the me.ssnge at 7 : 50 jj^ m.
Remarks by Col. Bratton : Results still negative but am pleased to receive the
negative results as it means that we have that nnich more time. The informa-
ti(m desired will occur in the middle of a progi-ani and possibly will be repeated
at frecjuent intervals. (Asked Col. Bi-atton if I should communicate the in-
formation to Portlanrl — concerning the fact that the desired data will be in the
middle of a program.) No. I will have a conference with Lt. Col Dusenberg
in the morning and will contact Mr. Sterling in that regard.
DB
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3319
Federal Communications Commission Section of Mail and Files From to Radio
Intelligence Division
(The following handwritten)
Night Watch Log— Nov. 24th to Dec. 8th 1941
Return this file promptly. DE
Papers are not to be removed from the file.
Secret
Nov. 24, 1941
1. At 6: r>5 PM the Supervisor of the Coast Guard Radio Station at Alexandria,
Va. telephoned to report that W9WGI was causing serious interference to their
circuit on 40.")() kcs. Requested Supervisor to inform this office immediately if
the interference was again heard. (No further reports from CG up to midnight)
Nov. 25, 1941
At 9 : 10 the Supervisor of SA-P telephoned in from Jackson, Miss., requesting
information relative to the resignation of Henry Gantt, an operator at SA-10.
(Memo, re : conversation placed on Mr. Sterling's desk.)
Nov. 26, 1941
Handled" routine correspondence and traflSc.
Nov. 27, 1941
At 6 : 20 pm Monitoring Officer Cave of NA-9 (.'ailed in regard to Wash. Case
4001 and 4002. Mr. Mcintosh gave Cave the information requested.
Nov. 28, 1941
At 7:55, the Major Guest telephoned in requesting Mr. Sterling's home phone
luimber. Gave him the requested information. At 8:00 pm long distance operator
called on Na. 2995 stating that Portland, Oregon was calling and desired to con-
tact Mr. Sterling. Informed operator that Mr. Sterling was not here, but that
he could be reachi?d at his home Evergreen 278. At 10:20 Mr. Sterling called
giving instructions he wished passed on to Mr. Norman, Mr. North and Miss
Perry.
Nov. 29, 1941
Handled routine correspondence and traflic.
Dec. 1
1. 5:05 P. M. Monitoring Officer CA-8 (Bairiey) telephone to report that
Ferguson (Wash. 3423) original informant, has moved out of neighborhood
where original key clicks had been heard and requested further instructions.
Told Bairiey to contact Officer House of Auburn Police for further information.
Also contact Ferguson at his new address for detailed description of signals he
had heard previously.
2. At 5 : 45 P. M. telephoned Col. Bratton. Gave him a message per Mr.
Sterling's instructions.
3. 9 : 05 P. M. telephoned Mr. Sterling re verification of frequencies for Portland.
4. 9:30 P. M. Monitoring Officer Duncan SA-5 telephoned from Tallahassee,
Fla. stating he had heard unlicensed station JUMP (Wash. 3930) and probably
could have complete evidence of unlicensed operation within two days. He stated
that the subject was undoubtedly using a phonograph oscillator. Duncan re-
quested Information as to whether he should remain in Tallahassee or return to
St. Augustine and work on some in-active alleged subversive cases. Informed
Duncan to remain in Tallahassee two more days and endeavor to complete his
evidence on Wash. 3930.
5. 9 : 45 P. M. sent TWX to Portland confirming frequencies.
3320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Dec. 2
1. 7:35 I'. M. long distaiu-e operator called on Na 25>S)r) asking for Mr.
Stei'ling. Operator stated that Portland. Ore. was calling. Informed her that
Mr. Sterling was not here but that he could be contacted at his home in Balti-
more, Evergreen 278.
Dec. 3
1. 6 : 15 P. U. received TWX from GS-P relative to NDA cases.
2. 6:25 P. M. telephoned Mr. Peterson for information concerning NDA cases.
3. 6: 43 TWX to GS-P containing instructions relative to NDA cases.
4. 7:15 P. M. long distance operator of Portland. Ore. called on NA 2995 for
Mr. Sterling. Informed her that Mr. Sterling was not in office at present but
that I would try to contact him.
5. 7: 20 called Lafayette Bowling Alley and had them page Mr. Sterling. They
reported that Mr. Sterling had already departed.
6. 7 : 45 P. M. Mr. Sterling called this office and directed me to take message
from Mr. Carter at Portland, Ore.
7. 7 : 52 I'. M. contacted Mr. Carter at Portland, Ore. and obtained message for
Mr. Sterling.
8. 7 : 55 P. M. telephoned Col. Bratton at his home and delivered a mesage in
accordance with Mr. Sterling's instructions.
9. 8:37 P. M. Mr. Sterling called this office and contents of message from
Portland, Ore. was read to him.
Dec. 4
1. 6:55 P. M. called Mr. Norman at his home in reference to message from
GS-P concerning Mr. McKinney. Mr. Norman advised that no further action
was necessary.
2. 8: 12 P. M. received a message from Mr. Carter at Portland, Ore.
3. 8:25 P. M. unable to contact Lt. Col. Dusenburg either at the War Dept.
or at his home.
4. 8 : 40 P. M. telephoned Mr. Sterling requesting instructions relative to a
message from Mr. Carter.
5. 8 : 45 P. M. called ONI watch officer at Navy Dept. to ascertain if he was
permitted to accept messages of interest to Col. Bratton's office. The officer
in charge stated that he was not certain but that he would inquire and call
me back.
6. 9 : 05 P. M. Lt. Brotherhood 20-G Watch Officer Navy Dept. telephoned to
state that he was authorized to accept message in question. Gave Lt. Brothei'-
hood the message from Mr. Carter.
7. 9:32 P. M. Lt. Brotherhood called to inquire if any other reference to
weather was made previously in program intercepted by Portland. Informed
him that no other reference was made.
Dec. 5
1. 7:45 P. M. Mr. Carter called in from Portland, Ore. with a message.
2. 7:50 P. M. telephoned Col. Bratton at his residence and repeated the
message from Mr. Carter.
3. 11 : 05 P. M. Monitoring Officer Dunphey of CA-6 telephoned in requesting
information on Wash. Case 3259. Informed Dunphey would try to get the
information for him in the morning.
Dec. 6
1. Handled routine correspondence and traffic.
Dec. 8
1. 6:15 A. M. Mr. Dunphey called in, no results. Told him take six hours
off, then assume duties for six hours, then eight hours off, alternating with
Baltimore Unit.
2. 8:00 A. M. Mr. Meriwether called in. no results. Told him to remain on
job until noon when CA-6 unit wotild take over. Informed him to take over
watch again at 6: 00 P. M.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3321
3. 8:50 A. M. NA-3 called re Washington case 3722, off air. Mac gave him
some important bearing and/or intercei)t assignment.
4. 12:00 Noon. Mr. Meriwether and Mr. Blum at office. One will take 6:00
P. M. to Mid., the other 0:00 A. M. to Noon, sandwiched with Falls Church.
5. 12:10 P. M. Mr. Berle of State Department called— Wanted Mr. Fly,
finally got Mr. Fly.
EXHIBIT NO. 142B
From : Tokyo
To: (Circular telegram)
7 December 1941
(Plain Japanese language using code names)
Circular #2494
Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.
Note: The above is the translation furni.shed the President and other high
officials at 1100 (EST) on Dec. 7, 1941. In the rush to get it out, owe code
word was overlooked. The correct translation reads as follows :
"Relations between Japan and the following countries are not in accord-
ance with expectation : England, United States."
This omission, which was not discovered until January^ 1944, does not ap-
preciably change the information that was available at IKX) (EST) on Dec.
7, 1941.
Note: The Army translation of Circular #2494 (supplied in March, 1944)
is as follows :
"Relations between Japan and are approaching a crisis (on the
verge of danger) : England, United States."
Note: See JD #6985.
JD-1:7148 Secret (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)
Tokyo Circular #2494
Original
S 7 Dec 41.
SF DE JAH
621 S Tokyo 19 7 850S JG
Koshi, PANAMA
Urgent 92494 Koyanagi rijiyori seirinotugoo arunituki Hnttori Minami kinen-
bunko seturitu kiklno kyokaingaku sikyuu denpoo aritass stop — Togo
1208 S JP
S 387/7 850S GR23 7630
Obese ovals rpwno rfnmo rtjmo rwfmo gnome.
JD-1:7148 Secret (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)
Distribution
Tokyo Circular #2494 5652
S 7 Dec. 41
SF DE JAH
622 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG KOSHI HAVANA
623 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI HONOLULU
624 S TOKYO 19 7 850 JG RIYOJI NEW YORK
625 S TOKYO 22 7 850S JG JAPANESE CONSUL VANCOUVER
626 S TOKYO 22 7 850S JG JAPANESE MINISTER OTTAWA ONT
(Same text and sign as our NR5651)
1220 JP
7630
JD-1:7148 SP:CRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)
3322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Distribution
Tokyo Circular #2494 5653
S 7 Dec 41,
SF DE JAH
627 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI SAN FRANCISCO
628 S TOKYO 19 7 SoiiS JG RIYOJI PORTLAND ORE
629 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI SEATTLE
630 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI NEW ORLEANS LA
631 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI CHICAGO ILL
632 S TOKYO 19 7 850S JG RIYOJI LOS ANGELES CALIF
(Same text and sign as our NR565)
1243 JP
7630
JD-1:7148 SECRET (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)
EXHIBIT NO. 142C
Depabtment of State,
Washington, February 4, 1946.
The Honorable Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel
« Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
Congress of the United States.
Dear Mr. Richardson : Enclosed are paraphrases of three telegrams received
regarding the "winds" message, supplementing previous correspondence on this
subject.
Sincerely yours,
Herbert S. Marks,
Assistant to the Under Secretary.
Enclosures :
1. Telegram from London, December 15, 1945 ;
2. Telegram from The Hague, January 26, 1946 ;
3. Telegram from London, January 31, 1946.
Tbxegbam Received From The American Embassy at London, Dated December
15, 1945 (Paraphrase)
This morning we had a conversation regarding the "winds" messages with a
Foreign Office Japanese expert who was in the Foreign OflBce immediately pre-
ceding and at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. He declares that, so far
as he knows, prior to December 8, 1941 no such messages were received. Investi-
gation is still being carried on but the Foreign Office has as yet no information
which would change the statement contained in the Embassy's telegram of De-
cember 4, 1945 on this subject.
Telegram Received From The American Embassy at The Hague, Dated
January 26, 1946 (Paraphrase)
We have been informed by the Foreign Office in a note dated January 24 that
all reports of monitored Japanese broadcasts were desti'oyed before the invasion
of the Netherlands East Indies by the Japanese. The same is trne of the archives
of the Netherlands Indies Government. For this reason the Foreign Office regrets
that it is unable to supply the information which has been requested by the
Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack.
Telegram Received From The American Embassy at London, Dated January
31, 1946 (Paraphrase)
The Foreign Office states that the investigation requested in the Department's
telegram 9745 of November 6, 1945 has drawn a complete blank and that it does
not seem worthwhile to make any further investigation.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
EXHIBIT NO. 142D
3323
3324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
C
0
rtOtSJd. XtO-.USICATlOHS OOMMISSIOH P
Bn^lnter'.n^ Department T
Radio lnt»l M/5;ence Divlf^ion
lorember 7. I9U5
AddretB reply to :
609 Stan/?;«nw»ld Building
Honc.l-:lu 1. T. H.
PCtSOKAI AKJ
coyriDBffriAL ' nx oiippbh AjgMAii
Mr. Oeor^e S Sterllnr
Chief. "Radio Intelilf<'
federal C'^m'^mlcatlonti 4
Wa«hlr.e;t-.n ^> , 0, :
Dear Mr Ster. '. -. -
-■HHi; \,if. .;.ti :? ' ' ' . ^-^ . . . t- - -' " ^'»1rI
Karbcr - a<ecree wltr. y^-
that, *'.- H nn-'ttT _ . : ■ '. c
radio Drerst 10 ".t. -f r a Army " Is t^e rep!..! of ignoranc* and lack- of xinder-
• tandlap on t e >_ t, i" Arr\y ptreon <> . •■ -ip' T gj^' i.M ilk* to (enow the
exact basis for t*-e statenpnt. I ass-ii;:;* that something sore than the g«n«»ral
alle^tloR was made
there hava been nu-nero'-e references In the newepaper* latel? to the
ioded Javanese weather me»ti&-'« w^ *. -r wa» t.- roveal their '^- '-'i* In reading
through the trajislatio:.- ' ic-ists r-. RA- P and
translated by the O.H.I,. ,•: ,- , r^sg t-.« f with whlcn
you are pr-^b.-ibiy f.uil-lar. d..,*ave-, sl;,v-e .t -".Iffers --,■.<?■ 1*- :■-»;,. ..■ fro- --«
current news st'Tles and nay be in addition t^^ ts- e "Wf.«t^f..r eBBi;-*" re^'erred
to , T . •-Jitln..- i *. ' • ■ ■ ~ - ' ■■ was r.ade fros
Ttt: t e J2I for December 8,
19-- ■ ■= " : ,- ,-o»^ attacks
fo - and .
th^' . : . .»ari
•"•a!" T r ^ foilowiriK In •:.arenthesi»8
bPtv t«- p: ' •ade--i« fir '18 I .-ar
re* » .•>i! berr: -lade hpfore K'.b exact
Vor q weat »»i- fcr^cnft at ' '■ ' f t'.'-e--
'"pt ■■ -•.,'■!> ^ -,---. .- -p«i-^ h" the Jar>aj".i»Be
Sav • f - > «- "^ O.K I trH-?
lat- - .iivAi-'- • B';c' a forecast T'.e
sa.'ne weat er - —f • ;■ ' -rradcaet.
■ - :ftj.er8. *.;.at thP Senate
Ho .: attack wil: n^-it visit
Hawa. - ;,,...,< ■- . ^
Slhcerely y-urg.
/s-' Lee H. Qawso".
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3325
:t .ti.;n J^I ?ro';r'jn
3326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
- ■..-.rtod
;. tr..^ 2C'0
i :.J :ir:ce
c--;Ti-d
I : ci'co
a. try
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3327
to respond to your will. On b^hfilf of the government and the Army and
Navy, ..'G, Illdoki and S'..i;otaro, your subjecta, rcopectfully moke this re-
ply. DecoKber 8, I94I.
(:-,i::ned) Ifideki Tojo, I.iii.ister of '.tar.
£ailsotaro Shin.ruiu, liluiatcr of
Navy.
Sir.co our ,jri.i-y and IJav/ .rted Q vmr . - -l-nd and
yc.crici in t:^e iesterr. .'^oit'lc at . . xy , our )■ . '_ 7 ■-■J-\ to-
day held un oiner'Tei.. ■ ..n of'tae catinet at tiic .- r- i ■' . re .: Isrice.
Outsiue or Forei;,!. Togo, ill the cabinet nl:.i. '„ , • -c ■. ■.■■--■r.\t,
riratly, Kir.iatcr ci '-.j..j oaimada reported the develo;. ■- l mst
Sn^land aiid .j-erica and based on this report , the oourj- tc :
the .^overnTiei-t wt,,; decided, -.vhereupon i'rcr.ier Tojo calltJ on t . -or
and reported the decision.
ACGoidi t nti di
Togo ri-i^rted by rler E \v. I^^ltuo
Stcte jiall at 1-OC .\. on t lu 7th,
present our ovcri-Lrt'^ i. ''i^ial "
rtt the siiro ti c, c n n init>tc"
Japan, jrc, ^ a . i^iil le ^xri
an offi"i^^ . T X ^ t t
r ',,'ashi-
jn jra to -
L"2:;eiiit 1.
if
"1 .. 7 45 -
Japan, ^r-
It,
" cla. j*v,h^
It-
liitul, 0 t
of v;ai ' ^
-
off ditil r
I
Consc qv e
1
Iriid
1
df;ys s V
'. , -nd
26th.
■ to
.J /.in
:11,
•-0
: tv;o
:-r.C7
.tod
-3-
3328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to America, and v;ithin it,
son for declarin,: the v.":-.
aihored to in the Japari!
propos:;! , fcr fA-Y.ple, :
Asi- .
arr...
. '^hur.'jki;.
\..r.\. .....^x>iiij olid rtTioriCu, .■■
Intensifyir^g their action t(
our country is
fairness v/as :iade clear
:d the rea-
. J ,',> principles
i iatic and her
. ;US3 Of Kast
;33ion 13 more nean tr.an
Lt':tlon of Sa^lar.d and
!•
Kent . Frf
thus ccint:
tiations .
ri"r,v.,-.- 1
' oTinoiiiice-
.lly und
■:am„a on nego-
. «.L firjt, a
joint defense
n-lca, coopcrat-
■r.ic oppression.
.■ ■. n ,.i-U3t to
:lt,
mrtir.ju^t
SCI
Steele s -i
c<^ot
hv
,000
■ 311'iod
rd
ur
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3329
Pr-cil'ic h-.s bee:; br<...ir,i.L .:^ .-
for t,.i, i .;...: ^
ly :.nd ri.A- t;.
cl«. .r". ;
3330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tier, cur.-' 'i
, I will ;-vr
the
. iG
■6-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3331
79716 O — 46— pt. 18 31
3332 COXGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 143
(This exhibit is the proceedings of the Roberts Commission ap-
pointed December 18, 1941 by the President and will be found printed
separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index of Exhibits.)
EXHIBIT NO. 144
(This exhibit is the proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Ad-
miral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Xavy, Retired, pursuant to precept dated
February 12, 1944 of the Secretary of the Navy and will be found
printed separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index of
Exhibits.)
EXHIBIT NO. 145
(This exhibit is the proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor
Board, convened by the Secretary of War pursuant to the provisions
of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and will
be found printed separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index
of Exhibits.)
EXHIBIT NO. 146
(This exhibit is the proceedings of the Xaval Court of Inquiry con-
vened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the provisions of
Public Law 339, T8th Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and will be
fotind printed separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index
of Exhibits.)
EXHIBIT NO. 147
(This exhibit is the. proceedings of the investigation conducted by
Colonel Carter W. Clarke, September 14, 15, ancl 1.6, 1944, and con-
tinued from July 13 to August 4, 1945. and will be found printed
separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index of Exhibits.)
EXHIBIT NO. 148
(This exhibit is the report of investigation during the period
November 23, 1944, to September 12, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Henry
C. Clausen, AUS, for the Secretary of War, and supplementary to the
proceedings of the Army Pearl ^Harbor Board, and will be found
printed separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index of
Exhibits.)
EXHIBIT NO. 149
(This exhibit is the proceedings of the inquiry conducted by
Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pui-suant to precept dated
May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the
proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, and will be found printed
separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index of Exhibits.)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3333
EXHIBIT NO. 150
280 BronxTllle Road
BroniTille New York
18 Uarob 1944
Admltal William F Halsey U.S. Navy
Commeuider Scath Pacific Fleet
c/o Fteet Tost Office
San Frsmcisco, California
Dear Bill,
You have on your staff Commander A.D.K ramer, U.3.N.,
who W8 3 on duty in the Communications Office in the Navy Depa»tDien
at the time of the attack on Pearl harbor and for some time' priot
to that date. I believe he has knowledge of facts and incidents whlo^.
occured in the navy Department hwich are of interest and value to me*
Will you please obtain from him an affidavit and ask him if he will
supply me with a copy. I will assure him that I will make no use of
the arfidavit without hia permission so long as he is alive. If he
does not wish to supply me with a copy of the affidavit, 1 would
appreciate it very nuch if he will make the affidavit, put It in a
secure place and inform me when I can obtain it.
There was a message received in the Navy Department on
December 4th or 5tb, 1941, wJilch came to be called the "^inds
Messiige". I should like to know:
What station first received the Winds Message ?
What date was it received in Washington ?
When was it deciphered translated, decoded and delivered
to responsible officials in Washington ?
What officials in Washington saw the translation of tb«
Winds message and when ?
What was the substance of the information contained in
the Winds Message ?
What Action towards notification of Field Confflenders
of contents of message and implications thereM was
taken ?
Mr
There was a note delivered by the Japanese Ambassador to
. Hull on 7 December 1941 •
When were the first 13 parts of this message reoeived,
decoded, and delivered to responsible officials in
WashingtcQ ?
What officials In Washington received translations of tlB
first 13 parts of this message and when did each
reoei ve them ?
3334 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral William F. Halsey, USIAVT 18 March 1944
When was tbe 14th part of the message received, decoded and
delivered ?
What officials in Washington received treaslations of the 1
I4th part of tiis message and when did each received it ?
What action was recommended \>y you or anyone else of
which you have knowledge ?
There w^s a message directing the Jupanese Ambassador to
deliver a note to Secretary Hull in person at 1;00 P.M.
Sasteren Standard Tine on 7 Decaaber 1941.
When was this message received in the Navy Department ?
Whit agency decoded the message and when was decoding
coo9>leted ?
What agency translated the message and when was the
tranftlation delivered to the Navy Department.?
What officials in Washii^^on received translations of this
message and when did each received it ?
What acti (XI was taken as a result of tkls message ?
When Commander Kramer delivered this messege to Mr. Knox
a memorandum pointing out tnat 1:00 P.M. Eastern Stadard
Time was sunrise in Honolulu and midnight in Manila and
that the whole thing meant sunrise air raid in Pearl
Harbor within a few minutes after the dellv ery of the
Japanese note.
Will you please have I'ommander Kramer answer all of the
fore-going questions of which he has knowledge and put them in the
form of an affidavit and also request him to include in his affidavit
any other matters of which he may have first-hand knowledge. I
shall be very grateful to him for this matter will be of considerable
Interest and value to me.
My kindest regards to' you always Bill.
Most STnoerely yours,
/s/ H.is. KiBoiei;
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3335
EXHIBIT NO. 151
Memoranda Prepared by Captain Saffobd
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page '
1. Memorandum dated 17 May 1945 for Lieut. Commander John F. Sonnett, U. S.
N. R. regarding Evaluation of Messages of November 26, 1941 1
2. Memorandum dated 19 May 1945 for Lieut. Commander John F. Sonnett, U. S.
N. K. regarding Evaluation of "UTU' Broadcasts 7
3. Memorandum dated 21 May 1945 for Lieut. Coanmander John F. Sonnett, U. S.
N. R. regarding Information concerning the Japanese passenger ship TATUTA
MARU and American passenger ship PRESIDENT MADISON 15
4. Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Walter Foote at the State Department on
Wednesday, 30 May 1945 17
5. Memorandum dated 22 June 1945 for Admiral Hewitt regarding Pearl Harbor
Investigation ^ 19
6. Memorandum dated 14 July 1945 of Conversations in connection with Admiral
Hewitt's Investigation of the Pearl Ha 'bor Disaster 20
^ I'ages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent
pages of original exhibit.
[1] Secret
17 May 1945.
Memorandum for Lieut. Commander John F. Sonnett, U. S. N. R.
Subj : Evaluation of Messages of 26 November 1941.
Ref:
(a) Opnav— 242239 (Nov. 1941).
(b) Com 14—260110 (Nov. 1941).
(c) Com 16—261331 (Nov. 1941).
(d) Com 14 Communication Intelligence Bulletins (1 Nov.-6 Dec. 1941).
(e) Station "H" Chronology (1 Dec.-6 Dee. 1941).
(f) Roberts Report (Senate Document 159) dated 23 Jan. 1942.
(g) CINCPOA "Weekly Intelligence" Vol. 1, No. 22, 8 Dec. 1944— P. O. W.
Account of Raid on Pearl Harbor,
(h) Op-16-F2 Weekly Memorandum dated 1 Dec. 1941.
(i) Jane's Fighting Ships — 1941 edition.
End :
(A) Op-2(>-3 GL Memo dated 14 May 1945.
(B) "Japanese Naval Vessels" (ONI — December 194?).
1. Reference (a) advised that Com 16 intercepts were considered most reliable
and requested Com 16 to evaluate reports on Japanese naval movements and
send despatch to Opnav, info Cincpac. Com 16's estimates were more reliable
than Com 14's, not only because of better radio interception, but because Com
16 was currently reading messages in the Japanese Fleet Cryptographic System
("5-number code" or "JN2o") and was exchanging technical information and
translations with the British C. I. Unit at Singapore. McCollum knew this and
gave it due consideration when he drafted reference ( a ) .
2. Reference (b) summarized Japanese naval activities for the current month
and advised that some large scale movement involving most if not all of the
Japanese Navy was about to take place. The message itself was summarized
in its last sentence, as follows :
Evaluate above to Indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in
Southeastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and
Marshalls.
This information was reliable, timely, and accurate on the whole. It must
be realized, moreover, that this estimate was based entirely on "radio intelli-
gence," the Com 14 C. I. Unit being unable to read anything except the Weather
Ciphers and other minor systems of the Japanese Navy at that particular time.
Tliis fact was known in the Navy Department, and the Director of Naval Com-
munications and the Director of Naval Intelligence were so informed by me.
[21 3. The major project of the 14th District C. I. Unit in November 1941
was attack on the Jrflianese Flag OflBcers Cryptographic System (Transposition
Cipher superposed on a "4-character code" — think we called it "AD") — in which
they were being backed up( by similar attack in the Navy Department. This
system (its earlier editions) had been our main source of information on the
Japanese Navy from 192G or 1927 up until about November 1940. It was the
most diflScult as well as most important system the Japanese Navy was using
and our most skilled and most experienced oflBcers and men were attempting its
solution. If we could have solved the Flag Officers System, Admiral Kimmel
3336 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
would probably have known of the Japanese plans and the Pacific Fleet would
not have been surprised on December 7, 1941. Unfortunatelj', neither the U. S.
Navy nor the British cryptanalysts ever succeeded in cracking this system. The
"5-numeral" system yielded no information which would arouse even a suspicion
of the Pearl Harbor Raid, either before the attack or afterwards. The Japanese
abandoned the "AD {?)" system in 1942 or 1943, apparently because of excessive
delays and unreadable messages. As regards the "JN25" or "o-numeral" sys-
tem, the current code ( JN25B) had been in effect since 1 December 1940, remained
in effect until 27-31 Mfiy, 1942. and was partially readable in November 1941.
A new system of keys was introduced on 4 December 1941 and reported by Com
16-041502, but the carry over of the old code made their solution quite simple,
and we were reading messages again by Christmas, Corregidor getting the
"initial break" on 8 December 1941. The Hawaiian- C. I. Unit did not com-
mence work on the Japanese Navy's "5-number" system until 10 December 1941,
at which date it discontinued attack on the "Flag GflBcers System." (The Navy
Department continued its attack on the "Flag OflScers System" as long as it
remained in use.)
4. Reference (c) contained Com 16's evaluation of reference (b) plus ex-
tensive observations and comments of his own, and in general agreed with Com-
14's estimate. Com 16 had the benefit of his own translations plus "tips" from
Singapore. Com 16 also had much better direction finder service as distances
were much less, differences of longitude much less, and the bearings lines gen-
erally cut. at more favorable angles for reliable plotting. This advantage was
lost with the capture of Guam a few days after the Pearl Harbor Raid.
5. The discrepancies between references (b) and (c) are mostly artificial, the
only important difference being in the following sentences, which are quoted
below:
Ref. (b). Com 14-260110:
There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air group
in the Marshalls which comprise airron twenty four at least one carrier divi-
sion unit plus probably one third of the submarine fleet.
[3] Ref. (c), Com 16-261331:
"Second section (expected to oijerate in mandates) crudiv five X Cardiv
three Ryujo and one Maru ''
"Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in
mandates X. Our best indications are that all known first and second fleet
carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area X
It is apparent that everyone has jumped to the conclus+ion that "carrier division
unit" meant "carrier division." but such was not tiie case. Commander Williams
used the term "unit" rather loosely: in this instance it was later identified, on
November 30, 1941, as "a unit of plane guard destroyers" (i. .e.. two or more de-
stroyers attached to CarDiv 5). Another source of confusion was in the loose
use of the term "Mandates." To Com 14 it meant Jaluit, Marshalls, and Eastern
Japanese Mandated Islands, but to Com 16 it meant Palao or Halmahera. The
Japanese Mandated Islands stretched over an East-West belt 2,100 miles long,
so the distinction is important.
6. A study of reference (d) reveals the following:
(a) Call "SI TI 4" (previously identified as Cardiv 4) was located at Jaluit
on November 19, but on November 21 was identified as a Submarine Squadron.
(b) The November 25th statement. "One or m(»re of the Carrier Divisions are
present in the Mandates," was retracted on November 27 by the statements :
"No further information of Carrier Division Five in Mandates."
"Carriers are still locatetl in home waters."
(Note: According to reference (j) the Pearl Harbor Attack Force sailed
from the Kurile Islands on 27 November 1941.)
(c) On November 30, the above discrepancies were reconciled by the statement :
"The presence of a unit of plane (iiiard dcstrojiera indicates the presence
of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this has not been confirmed."
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3337
(d) Another interestinp bit of information apimared on November 3():
"The only taotical circuit iieard today was one with Akagi and several
Marus."
14] (e) The December 2nd Summary comes clean :
"Almost a complete blank of information on carriers today. Lack of iden-
tification has somewhat prompted this lack of information."
(f ) The last specific mention of carriers was on December 3rd :
"No information on submarines or carriers."
(g) The record as to carriers is closed with the December nth entry :
"No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been
seen either."
(h) The earlier estimate of submarine concentration in the Marshalls is re-
affirmed on November 30 as follows :
"This unit cannot agree with Com K! that there is not a submarine con-
centration in that area (the Marshalls). Every evidence points to a concen-
tration of not only the small (R()-class) Fourth Fleet submarines there but
also a good piirtion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force."
(Note: See enclosure (A) and reference (g).
7. In view- of the foregoing, and after consideration of all other information
available to me at this time, I evaluate Com 16"s statement "All known First and
Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure Area," to refer specifically to the fol-
lowing carriers:
CarDiv 1 CarDiv 2 CarDiv 5
Kaga (F) Soryu (F) Shokaku
Akagi Hiryu Zuikaku
These carriers were in the vicinity of the Japkanese main islands on that date,
and participated in the Pearl Harbor Raid on 7 December 1941.
(^arDiv 3, Ryujo and (Kasuga) Maru, were stated by reference (c) as ear-
marked for operations under Vmi) Second Fleet in the forthcoming offensive in
Southeastern Asia and were not specifically located, although it was implied that
they were at Palao. They did not represent an offensive threat against U. S.
possessions other than Guam and the Philippines. Reference (h) and enclosure
(A) list the Kasuga (Maru) ; reference (i) and enclosure (B) do not; she might
have been the Shoho.
CarDiv 4 (Hosho and Zuiho), second line and escort carriers used for training
pilots in flight deck operations, may have been assigned to the Fifth Fleet, or to
the First Fleet (see enclosure (A) ), or directly under the CinC Combined Fleet.
These ships did not represent an offensive threat against U. S. possessions at
that time.
[5] The Koryu was listed in reference (h) as being in the Sasebo-Kure Area.
Reference (i) describes the Koryu as a sister ship of the Soryu and Hiryu. En-
closure (B) and later information indicate the Koryu was nonexistent. She was
undoubtedly confused with one of the four auxiliary carriers.
8 Reference (e), prepared by the Chief Radioman in Charge of Radio Heeia,
supports and amplifies reference (d), but introduces one element of confusion.
Extracts are quoted below.
/ Decemher IB.'il
(Nothing of particular interest.)
2 Decemher lOJfl
"CinC Second Fleet has shifted to Sasebo and is probably going to South China
to direct operations of units sent to this area from the Empire."
"No signs of movement of the Third Fleet or Cari'iers were given in today's
traffic. It is believed that they remain in the vicinity of Kyushu. CarDiv 4 is
believed to still be at Sasebo. CarDiv 3 has not shown any activity during the
last few days, and it is possible that this unit has gone South."
3338 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
S December 1941
"It is believed that the Carriers are still based at or near Sasebo."
4 December 19.'il
"Very little activity was observed in the Sasebo or Kiire areas. The Carriei-s
are believed to have remained in the vicinity of Kyushu."
"The large number of high precedence messages and general distribution might
indicate that the entire Navy is being instructed to be prepared for drastic action."
, 5 December 1941
"No indication as to locations of the Carriers was noted in today's traflSc,
although it is believed they remain in the vicinity of Kyushu."
[6] 6' December 19J,1
"At 0430, Tokyo was heard using 32 kcs, dual with 12330 kcs for UTU broadcast
of traffic. This broadcast was discontinued at 1800, but 7285 kcs (M) was imme-
diately brought up and used until 1900, when it was secured. This broadcast
was in addition to Tokyo's I'egular UTU. Tokyo also broadcasted traffic on 6665
kcs (A) during the evening."
"Saipan, Takao and Ominato were also heard broadcasting traffic to units in
their vicinities. The use of this method of delivering messages tends to keep
unknown the positions of vessels afloat, and is probably one of the first steps
toward placing the operation of the Navy on a wartime basis."
9. Reference (f ) states on page 9:
"The Naval Intelligence Service in Hawaii, due to lack of information indi-
cating that the bulk of Japanese carriers were at sea, concluded they were
in home ports."
The Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer (Lt Comdr. E. T. Layton U S N) and
the Hawaiian Communication Intelligence Officer (Comdr. J. J. Rochefort,
U.S.N.) deny ever making such a statement to the Roberts Commission. This
information must have come from the District Intelligency Officer (Capt. I. H.
Mayfield, U.S.N.) or one of the members of Admiral Kimmel's staff, who were
completely outside of the picture as regards Conmiunication Intelligence or loca-
tions and movements of Japanese Naval Forces. The statement can find some
support in reference (e) but none in reference (d), which was the last word in
this matter.
10. Reference (d) was examined by a member of the Roberts Commission —
but was not submitted as evidence. Reference (d) was not available to Admiral
Hart because it was not submitted to him at Pearl Harbor and could not be
located at the Navy Department. Reference (e) was not located until the day
before I gave my "on-the-record" testimony to Admiral Hart. • It did not quite
fit the description of Com 14's Daily C. I. Summaries that Rochefort had told me
about in the spring of 1943, but I figured my memory or his had been at fault. So
reference (e) was submitted to the "Hart Investigation" to substantiate my testi-
mony as well as refresh my memory. It is apparent that reference (e) has been
the source of confusion and misleading evidence in the two earliest investigations
of the Pearl Harbor Disaster.
L. F. Safford,
Captain, U.S. Navy.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3339
[7] Secret
19 May 1945.
Memorandum for Lieut. Commander John F. Sonnett, U. S. N. R.
Sub : Evaluation of "UTU" Broadcasts.
Ref:
(a) Com 14— Routine 052200 (Dec. 1941).
(b) Com 14 Communication Intelligence Bulletins (1 Nov.-6 Dec. 1941).
(c) Station "H" Chronology (1 Dec.-6 Dec. 1941).
(d) CinCAF— Priority 020345 (Dec. 1941).
(e) CinCAF— Priority 020730 (Dec. 1941).
(f) CinCAF— Routine 021636 (Dec. 1941).
(g) CinCAF— Priority 061255 (Dec. 1941).
End: (A) Copies of references (d), (e), (f) and (g).
1. Reference (a) reported to Com. 16 and to Chief of Naval Operations;
"UTU's are being sent by HA FU 6 (Tokyo Radio) on 32 kilocycles instead
of 39 kcs as before."
This message was sent with ROUTINE precedence was handled by the Navy
Department Code Room, and was delivered to Op-20-G at 1943 GCT on 6 Decem-
ber 1941 according to notation on the mes.sage.
2. Reference (a) is, to a large extent, evahiated by references (b) and (c),
relevant portions of which are quoted below :
2 December 19^1 {Ref. (ft))
"The most prominent factor in today's traffic is the apparent confusion in
the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were
instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it appeared
on the Tokyo broadcast, and also where Takao Radio received the same dis-
patch that it previously sent. ComSixteen reported Second and Third Fleets
in Takao area and that Takao was broadcasting traffic to those fleets. This
broadcast was not uncovered here and contrary to location reports, there was
one indication that the.se two flleets were not close to Takao. In several in-
stances, Takao Radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. Summing up
all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second,
Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters but is either not close enough
to Takao for good communication or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao.'"
[8] 3 December J 941 {Ref. (ft))
"Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good."
"It is the impression that both Second and Third Fleets are underway but
are not verified by Radio Intelligence means."
3 December 1941 {Ref. (0))
"Takao, using call NUKU, was heard broadcasting traffic on 7155A kcs (night)
and 14310A kcs (day). This broadcast was similar to the Tokyo UTU broad-
cast. Traffic wa» broadcast to CinC's combined. Second and Third Fleets, Comdr.
Combined Air Force, Comdr. Indo-China Force and several unidentified afloat
calls."
// December 19^1 {Ref. (ft))
"Traffic volume normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao Radio (in
Formosa) today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in
heading so that there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation."
"It is now believed that CinC Sceond Flet is in the vicinity of Takao and that
apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broad-
cast which CinC Second Fleet is still copying."
3340 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
.'t December 1941 {Ref. (e) )
"Takao continued to broadcast traffic on 71n5A kcs (night) and 14310A kcs
(day) to ships in that vicinity. A reguhir series of UTU numbers are being
used by Takao and the broadcast is similar to Tokyo's. Takao uses the call
MIKU, and calls RIKU (All ships in my vicinity?)."
5 December 1941 (Ref. (b))
"Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo broadcast going
over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit is duplex operation. There were
several new intercept schedules heard. Ominat Radio working Sama and Bako
sending fleet traffic. The Takao broadcast handling traffic to Seconni and Third
Fleets while the Tokyo broadcast is still handling traffic for these units also.
It is noted that some traffic being broadcast several days old which indicates
THE UNCERTAINTY OF DEXIVERY EXISTING IN THE RADIO ORGANIZATION."
[9] "Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have originated any
traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving their traffic
over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther South since the
Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic."
5 December 1941 {Ref. (c) )
"Takao continues the u.se of the UTU broadcast on 7155 kcs to units in that
area. From all indications, CinC's Second and Third Fleets are in the Takao
area or have moved even farther South from Takao."
"Saipan, Ominato and Takao were heard bi-oadcasting traffic to vessels in their
vicinity. Tokyo broadcasted traffic on 12330 kcs in addition to his regular UTU
broadcast. At 0430/Oth Tokyo was observed using 32 kcs for an UTU broadcast.
This frequency was used dual with 12330 kcs. Signals were very strong during
the day. The use of this low frequency indicates traffic sent on this broadcast
is for ships at a great distance from Tokyo."
6 December I94I {Ref. (6) )
"Traffic volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being transmitted.
Messages as far back as 1 December were seen in the traffic. This is not believed
an attempt to maintain a high traffic level, but is the result of confusion in traffic
routing with uncertainty of delivery. The stations now holding broadcasts are:
Tokyo (with 3 distinct and separate broadcasts), Saipan, Ominato, and Takao."
'Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders. These units
are .sending their traffic via the Takao and Tokyo broadcasts."
"Fifth Fleet appears dispersed about the Japan Sea with Ominato broadcasting
traffic for this unit."
6 December 1941 {Ref. (c))
"Takao continues to broadcast traffic for ships in that vicinity on 7155 kcs (A)
(night) and on 14310 kcs (A) (day)."
"At 0430, Tokyo was heard using 32 kcs, dual with 12330 kcs, for UTU broadcast
of traffic. This broadca.st was discontinued at 1800, but 7285 kcs (M) was im-
mediately brought up and used until 1900, when it was secured. This broadcast
was used in addition to Tokyo's regular UTU. Tokyo also broadcast traffic on
6665 kcs (A) during the evening."
[10] 3. It was a matter of official record in Op-20-G, and common knowl-
edge among our intercept operators, that the Naval Radio Station Tokj'o had,
on several occasions during the period 1936-1941, keyed other transmitters for
test or during Grand Maneuvers of the Combined Fleet. The transmitters that
are specifically remembered are:
Haranomachi (250 miles north of Tokyo)
(Commercial) 19. (j kcs 400 kw (reported)
Fukuoka (near Sasebo) (Commercial) 32 kcs 100 kw (estimated)
Kure (Navy) 57 kcs 50 kw (estimated)
Yokosuka (Navy) 63 kcs 50 kw (estimated)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3341
By way of comparison, corresponding characteristics are listed for the trans-
mitter used for regular Tokyo UTU broadcasts :
Tokyo (Navy) 39 kcs 100 kw (estimated)
It was also a matter of general knowledge and official record that Tokyo Radio
normally operated at reduced power but did not hesitate to go to full power when
anything important occurred. Broadcasts on 19.6 kcs from Haranomachi
(JAA), the most powerful station in Japan, would have implied submerged re-
ception by submarines or transmission to a far-distant surface force.
4. References (d), (e), (f) and (g) report actual sighting of the Japanese
Naval Forces referred to in paragraph 2 above. Reference (g), reporting the
Japanese Amphibious Force which landed at Kota Bharu a day or two later, was
deciphered in the Navy Department Code Room at 1557 GCT on 6 December 1941.
This was approximately two hours before reference (a) was received by Oi)-20-G.
In view of the actual sighting of the Japanese Invasion Force heading for the
Kra Peninsula, reference (a) came as an anticlimax.
L. F. Saffoed,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
[11] Enclosure (A)
From: CINCAF For Action: OPNAV PP
Date : Dec, 2, 1941 Information : CINCPAC PP
Decoded by : Laresen
Paraphrased by : Purdy
020345. CR0759
Patrol plane sighted 9 submarines speed 10 course south at 0230 GMT LAT
13-10 north long 110 degrees.
Shown DOO 0900
Shown OPDO 0850
Shown 38\V 0850
CNOL
Dist : 38W Action 20 OP
Record Copies 38S DOO 38 12 13 16
Navaide JRB
[12] From: CINCAF For Action : OPNAV PPPP
Date : 2 Dec 1941 Information : CINCPAC PPPP
Tor Code Room 1048
Decoded by : Weinstock
Paraphrased by: Purdy
020730 CR0778
Bear 070 from Saigon distant 180 M miles 3 type 1-61 submarines in cruising
formation headed south 15 knots. 21 transports anchored Camranah Bay with
six planes patrolling overhead.
Distribution :
38W Action. Shown OPDO by W. Bell
Record Copy: 38S. 12 38 16 021120
Files: CNO 200P General SHOW OPDO
GBM : No action copy
requested
NavAide JRB H
[13] Todays reconnaissance no results of significance other than as pre-
viously reported X the nine submarines were line abreast five mile spacing X
ships in Cararanh are mostly large several probably cargo only X our planes
having been sighted on Indo China coast three successive days have discontinued
search that locality for the present XX action addees are C X M and cine csina
via numeral cypher XX goodnight.
3342 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
38W— Action CNO
Record copy 38S— 12— 38— IG 20 Op
13 — Navaide Secret
Routine
From : CINCAP Refer : 021636
To : OPNAV Tox : 2017 Indicator : GUPID
By : HUTCHINSON Date : Dec. 2 1940
Exact Translation NAVCOM-14 0896
[IJf] GOLF BALLSDXX Cine China reports quote two five ship convoy with
escort six cruisers and ten destroyers lat eight north one zero six east at zero
three one six Greenwich today X convoy ten ships with two cruisers and ten
destroyers seven dash forty north one zero six dash twenty east two hours later
X all on course west X three additional ships seven dash five one north one
zero five east at zero four four two course three ten X this Indicates all forces
will make for Kohtron repeat Kohtron unquote X my scouting force sighted
thirty ships and one large cruiser anchored Camranh Bay ^^ NIBLIC-K
Priority Secret
From : CINCAF Refer : 061255 CR 0151
To : OPNAV Tox : 1557 Indicator : CETYH
By : CURTI S Date : 6 Dec 41
Exact Translation
[15] Secret 21 May 1945.
^Memorandum for Lieut. Commander John F. Sonnett U. S. N. R.
Subj : Information concerning the Japanese passenger ship TATUTA MARU
and American passenger ship PRESIDENT MADISON.
Ref:
(a) CinCAF 010300 (Dec. 1941).
(b) OpNav 071722 (Dec. 1941).
(c) "Where Away" (1944) by Perry & Leighton.
(d) AmCon Batavia #263 dated Dec. 31, 1041.
(e) AmCon Singapore #391 dated Dec. 29. 1941.
(f) Minister Vichy #1191 dated Aug. 14, 1942.
1. Reference (a) requested authority for CinCAF to use the PRESIDENT
MADISON for evacuation of American Marines plus about 615 American
Nationals in North China area, and advised that the MADISON could arrive at
Chingwangtao (seaport for Peiping) on 10 December 1941.
2. Reference (b) advised CinCAF six days later that the State Department was
Informing the Japanese Government of the MADISON'S movements and request-
ing that she be allowed to proceed "freely and without hindrance" in return for
similar arrangements "made for TATUTA MARU now enroute Los Angeles lo
evacuate Japanese Citizens." It is apparent from the tone of reference (b) that
war in Eastern Asia is anticipated but that this war does not include the United
States. Reference (b) was prepared by the Central Division of Naval Operations
(Oi>-l3) and the records of that Division may contain additional information
on this subject.
3. Reference (c) states on pages 39-48 that the USS MARBLEHEAD joined
the PRESIDENT MADISON on 9 December 1941 in Balikpapan (Borneo) and
escorted her to Surabaja (Java). It mentions the "frightened passengers" on
the MADISON. References (d) and (e) report the departure of the MADISON
(with evacuees) for Colombo on 29 December 1941.
4. Reference (f) is the State Department's only readily available reference
to the TATUTA MARU. It reports that the TATUTA MARU will be used as an
"exchange ship" for civlian internees. However, it is believed that additional
information could be located in the files of the State Department, of Op-13, and
of Op-20-G.
5. An interesting story appeared in reference (c) on page 28. as follows :
"Back in the States it was still December 6th. A minute or two after
three that morning a plain-language message came over the radio. ♦ * *
By 3 : 15 the general alarm began hammering the MARBLEHEAD's people
into wakefulness. * * * Over the loudspeaker system were coming the
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3343
relentless words: 'Man your battle stations.' When all stations had been
manned, an announcement was made over the public address system:
'We have just received an otiicial plain-language message which says. "The
Japanese have commenced hostilities. Act accordingly." ' "
L. F. Safford,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
Note : The Memorandum bear the following handwritten notes :
"The authors were a bit ambiguous at this point."
"Dick Lern, Navigator of the 'MARBLEHEAD says this was just after the
attack on Pearl Harbor, Monday Dec. 8th, Tarapan Time. A check with the
book shows that 'still Dec. (Jth referred to the quiet evening' the day before 0300/
8th (Tarapan Time) =2100/7th GCT=1030/7th (Pearl Harbor Time)"
"This could have been bajed on CincPac 071542 or NSS 071930 ([illegible] 142).
[17] Secret
[Handwritten note:] Note: Not given to Adm. Hewitt or Lt. Cdr. Sonnett.
Memorandum of conversation with Mr. Walter Foote at the State Department on
Wednesday, 30 May 1945.
1. Mr. Walter Foote was the American Consul General at Batavia, Java, from
1927 until the capture of Java by the Japanese in 1942, except for a short tour
of duty in Australia. At the present time he is attached to the State Depart-
ment and is standing-by to return to Java as diplomatic representative of the
United States Government. Mr, Foote knew all the NEI officials intimately and
was taken into their confidence in all official matters in their relations with
Japan. Mr. Foote may be reached on Branch 420 at the State Department,
in care of Miss Jane Wilson.
2. Mr. Foote got his information about the Winds "Set-Up" meSoage from
"Tony" Lovink, Advisor to the Governor General for East Asiatic Affairs.
Mr. Lovink is now Netherlands Ambassador at Chungking, being one of the few
high Dutch officials to escape from Java. Mr. Lovink was head of the NEI
Intelligence Service and was well Jnformed as to Japanese plans and inten-
tions. As early as July, 1941, Mr. Lovink informed the Governor General
that Japan was planning the conquest of East Asia and the only thing in doubt
was just when the Japanese would commence their advance. Mr. Lovink said
the Winds "Set-Up" was the first tangible thing that he had to show his Govern-
ment to prove his predictions. As he expressed it, "It was the first thing I could
sink my teeth into." Mr. Lovink kept warning the NEI Government as to the
Japanese plans and preparations for war, and was regarded as an alarmist.
Subsequent events proved him 100% correct throughout.
3. Mr. Lovink informed Mr. Foote of the Winds "Set-Up", and Mr. Foote
sent Batavia confidential message #220, dated 4 December 1941, addressed to the
State Department, after thinking the matter over for about two hours. This
message was largely at Mr. Lovink's behest. Lieut. Colonel Thorpe, USA, and
Lieut. Commander Slawson, USNR, got their translations of the Winds "Set-
Up" directly from the NEI War Department at Bandoeng. (Lt. Comdr. Slawson
was killed in action off the coast of New Guinea.) (Lt. Col. Thorpe is believed
to be still alive.)
4. The Dutch listened for the Winds "Execute" message but did not hear
it. Mr. Foote is positive that he would have been notified if any Winds "Execute"
had been heard in Java. The Dutch were convinced that Japan was going to
make war on them on December 6, 1941, when the big convoy of 35 transports
(Mr. Foote's ^collection), guarded by about six cruisers and several destroyers,
was sighted heading straight for Kota Bharu (Malaya). The Dutch did not
think that Japan was going to attack the United States and Pearl Harbor
came as a complete surprise to them.
5. Vice Admiral Helfrich. NEI Commander in Chief, ordered his subs to sea on
December 6, possibly earlier, and stationed them to defend the Netherlands East
Indies. Submarines had orders not to commence hostilities [18] without
positive orders. When the news of the Jap attack on Pearl Harbor reached Java,
the Governor immediately broadcast the following message to all NEI armed
forces :
"We are now at war with Japan which has just attacked Pearl Harbor,"
or words to that effect. The Dutch Navy commenced hostilities immediately
after this broadcast but took no hostile action before. (Vice Admiral Hel-
3344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
frich attended the San Francisco Conference in 1945 as one of the Dutch dele-
gates.) The story that NEI Fleet put to sea on December 6, 1941, with orders
to sink anything flying the Japanese flag seems to be a somewhat garbled ver-
sion of what actually happened.
6. The NEI Intelligence were very alert. They had all the leading Japanese
under constant surveillance throughout November and December, 1941, and had
most of them under arrest within fifteen minutes of the time the news of the
attack on Pearl Harbor was broadcast by the Governor General. Mr. Foote per-
sonally saw one whole block of Japanese run down the street in their under-
clothes in the custody of NEI policemen.
7. Mr. Foote lived next door to the Japanese Consul General and saw his arrest
a few minutes after the previously-mentioned incident. Mr. Foote saw the
Japanese Consul General burn his codes and secret papers in his back yard a
day or so before Pearl Harbor. He could see servants bringing papers from
the consulate and could see the smoke flame up each time a new batch was
thrown on. (Mr. Foote was burning his own secret papers at the same time
in his own back yai'd.)
8. When Mr. Foote came to Washington about a year ago, prior to going to
duty at Curacao, NWI, he looked up all his telegrams and reports on file in
the State Department to refresh his memory. Mr. Foote recalled the #220
as soon as he saw it. He stated that there was no record in the State Depart-
ment of any further reference to the Winds Message or anything in the nature
of a war vvarning, and that he did not recall ever having sent one. He is
thoroughly convinced that the Dutch did not hear the Winds "Execute" message
but that they would have believed it if they had heard it. Mr. Foote was one
of the very last white men to leave Java. He escaped on a small steamer from
a small port down the coast with nothing but the clothes on his back. He
received the warning to get out from Captain J. M. Creighton, U. S. Navy,
who escaped through some other route, believed by plane.
9. "Tony" Lovink was thoroughly convinced that the Winds "Execute" message
would contain the Japanese Government's decision as to peace or war with
Russia, the United States, and England (including NEI), respectively, and
impressed this fact on Mr. Foote.
10. The above memorandum is prepared from notes made at the time and is a
reasonably accurate summary of Mr. Foote's statements.
22 June 1945.
[19] Secret
Memorandum for Admiral Hewitt.
Subj : Pearl Harbor Investigation.
Ref : (a) My testimony given this date.
1. I now recall that Lieut. Commander Brotherhood told me that he did not
receive a written copy of the "False" Winds Message from the F. C. C, but merely
received the information by telephone. The only written version of the "False"
Winds Message we ever had prior to 1944 was a memorandum of the phone call
in Brotherhood's handwriting. Only one significant word (North) appeared and
it was in English. It was this memorandum that Kramer threw in the "burn
bag" after telling Brotherhood that this was not what we were looking for.
2. The Winds "Execute" Message which passed through my hands on the morn-
ing of 4 December 1941 was a teletype copy (typed on yellow teletype paper) of
the entire Japanese broadcast about 200 or 300 words long. Three significant
words (Kita, Higashi, and Nishi) appeared and they were in Japanese. Kramer's
translation appeared in pencil, or colored crayon, at the bottc^ of the sheet.
There was very little chance of confusion.
3. I would like to make one correction in the testimony I gave today :
"Mr. Phillip Cate, Japanese translator, employed by the Navy Department is
still alive. It was his brother, employed as a .lapanese translator by the War
Department, who died a few weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor."
Respectfully,
L. F. Saffobd,
Captain, U. 8. Navy.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3345
[20]
Confidential
14 July 1945.
Memorandum of Conversations in Connection With Admiral Hewitt's
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Disaster.
1. This meiuorandum is prepared, while events are still fresh in my mind, for
possible use in connection with future Investigations of the Pearl Harbor Disaster
or Court-martials in connection with Pearl Harbor. It includes certain acts
which strike me as irregular or unusual and probably illegal.
2. On or about Friday, 11 May 1945, I was called to an unofficial conference
(or meeting) conducted by Lieut. Comdr. John Sonnett, USNR, in Room 1083A,
Navy Building. He was in civilian clothes, as he has been on every occasion on
which I have seen him. Sonnett told me that he had been assigned as a legal
assistant to Admiral Hewitt in an investigation of the responsibility for the Pearl
Harbor Disaster, that he was also a special representative for Secretary Forrestal
in this investigation, and that he was authorized to handle Top-Secret and Secret
information and documents. He showed me papers signed by Secretary Forrestal
and Fleet Admiral King verifying these statements. At my request, he let me
read the Precept which directed Admiral Hewitt to conduct the investigation. It
was my understanding that Admiral Hewitt had not yet returned to Washington
and that Sonnett was getting things lined up to expedite matters after the
Admiral's arrival.
3. I answered many questions pertaining to my testimony before previous inves-
tigations and discussed discrepancies between my testimony and the testimony
of other witnesses. Sonnett requested that I give him, by the end of the next
week, written memoranda to be used as a basis of study and examination (under
oath) on the subjects listed below. This was done, and the memoranda submitted
as follows :
Subject
Date sub-
mitted
Remarks
* Winds Message" (6 pages) .
Evaluation of Messages of 26 Novem-
ber 1941 (6 pages).
Evaluation of "UTU" Broadcasts (8
pages).
Tatuta Maru and the President Madi-
son (1 page).
15 May 1945
17 May 1945
19 May 1945
21 May 1945
Withdrawn on 18 May 1945 at the suggestion of
Lt. Cdr. Sonnett. Original retained for pos-
sible future use.
Also lists the 6 carriers described by Com 16 as
"all known First and Second Fleet Carriers."
No action was taken because Jap invasion fleet
had been sighted by RAF planes off Kota
Bharu.
Indicates that on 7 Dec. 1941 the CNO refused to
believe that the U.S. would be involved in the
war that was imnjinent in East Asia.
[21] On Sonnett's request, I prepared and furnished him copies of certain
U. S. Naval messages, the Station "H" Chronology for 1-6 Dec. 1941, and Com 14
Daily CI Summaries for 1 Nov.-6 Dec. 1941.
4. It was apparent to me on my very first meeting with Lieut. Comdr. Sonnett
that he was acting as a "counsel for the defense" for the late Secretary Knox
and Admiral Stark rather than as the legal assistant to the investigating officer.
His purpose seemed to be to re'ute testimony (before earlier investigations) that
was unfavorable to anyone ir. Washington, to beguile "hostile" witnesses Into
changing their stories, and t( itroduce an element of doubt where he could
not effect a reversal of testimony. Above all, he attempted to make me reverse
my testimony regarding the "Winds Execute" Message and to make me believe
I was suffering from hallucinations.
5. I talked to Sonnett the second time on 18 May 1945, and the third time a
day or two later. On these latter occasions, like the first, Sonnett tried to per-
suade me that there had been no "Winds Execute" Message, that my memory
had been playing me tricks, that I had confused the "False Winds Message" with
what I had been expecting, and that I ought to change my testimony to permit
reconciling all previous discrepancies and thereby wind up the affair. In
some eases the idea was stated outright, in some cases it was implied, and in other
cases it was unexpressed but obviously the end in view.
3346 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6. I distinctly recall Lieut. Conidr. John Sonnett, USNR, making the following
statements to me during the course of the above-mentioned conferences:
"You are the only one who seems to have ever seen the 'Winds Execute'
Message."
"How could the 'Winds Execute' be heard on the East Coast of the U. S. and
not at any of the places nearer Japan?"
"It is very doubtful that there ever was a 'Winds Execute' Message."
"It is no reflection on your veracity to change your testimony."
"It is no reflection on your mentality to have your memory play you tricks —
after such a long period."
"Numerous witnesses that you have named have denied all knowledge of a
'Winds Execute' Message."
"You do not have to carry the torch for AJmiral Kimmel."
[22] 7. I testified before Admiral Hewitt the first time on or about 24 May
1945, before he went to Pearl Harbor. I testified before Admiral Hewitt a second
time on 22 June 1945, after his return from examining witnesses at Pearl Harbor.
Upon completion of my testimony (in which the "Winds Execute" Message had
figured), I asked him, "off-the-record." if there was still any doubts in his mind
as to the "Winds Message" having been sent by Japan and disseminated in the
War and Navy Departments. The Admiral looked startled, and before he could
reply Sonnett said :
"Of course, I am not conducting the case and I do not know what Admiral
Hewitt has decided, but to me it is very doubtful that the so-called 'Winds
Execute' Message was ever sent."
Admiral Hewitt thought a minute or two more and then said :
"You are not entitled to my opinion, but I will answer your question. There is
no evidence of a 'Winds Execute' Message beyond your unsupported testimony.
I do not doubt your sincerity, but I believe that you have confused one of the
other messages containing the name of a wind with the message you were expect-
ing to receive."
8. For my part, I do not doubt Admiral Hewitt's integrity, but I do believe
that Sonnett has succeeded in pulling the wool over his eyes.
9. I also believe that Sonnett employed similar tactics on other witnesses whose
testimony had favored Admiral Kimmel, particularly Rochefort and Kramer.
10. Copies of the memoranda described in paragraph 3 are appended hereto.
Also appended is a memorandum to Admiral Hewitt, dated 22 June 1945, clarifying
my testimony regarding the "Winds Execute" Message and indicating that
Sonnett had attempted to trick me into stating the opposite of what I intended
to say.
/s/ L. F. Safford,
/t/ L. F. Saffx)rd,
Captain, U. 8. N.
[23] [Following Memorandum bears this handwritten note:]
18 May 1945.
Delivered to Lt. Cdr. Sonnett by Lt. Cdr. Linn about 1009 on 15 May 1945.
Withdrawn on May 18, 1945 at the suggestion of Lt. Cdr. Sonnett.
Retained for possible use at the Next ( ?) investigation of Pearl Harbor.
L. F. Saffx>r».
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3347
Secret 14 May 1945.
Memorandum for Lieut. Commander John F. Sonnett? U. S. N. R.
Subj : Winds Message.
1. To the best of my knowledge and belief the following officers knew, in
December 1941, that the Winds "Execute" message had been broadcast from
Tokyo on (or about) 4 December 1941 (and prior to 7 December 1941), although
some of them did not learn about it until after the attack on Pearl Harbor :
ARMY
Name
George C. Marshall.
Iveonard T. Gerow . .
Dawson Olmstead ..
Sherman Miles
Clayton Bissell.
Otis K. Sadtler.
Rufus S. Bratton
Rex W. Minckler
Harold Doud..
im
Robert E. Schukraft
Frank B. Rowlett...
Present rank
General of the
Lt. Gen. U. S.
Maj. Gen. U.
Maj. Gen. U.
Army
. A
S. A. (Ret.).
S. A.
S. A,
Maj. Gen. U.
Col. U. S. A
Brig. Gen., U. S. A .
Col., U. S. A..
Col., U. S. A.
Col., U. S. A..
I>t. Col. (Signal Corps Re-
serve), U. S. Army.
Station and duty on 7 December 1941
Chief of StaflE. U. S. Army.
Director, War Plans Division.
Chief Signal Officer.
Director of Military Intellieence. War Plans
(Handwritten note) Military Intelligence Di-
vision (WDGS) ' (Corrected after return.
LFS).
-\rmy Communications, Office of Chief Signal
Officer.
In charge. Far Eastern Section, Military Intelli-
gence.
Chief of Signal Intelligence Service, Office of
Chief Signal Officer.
In charge, Japanese Section, SIS, Office of Chief
Signal Officer.
In charge. Intercept Section, SIS, Office of Chief
Signal Officer.
Principal Cryptanalyst, Japanese Section, SIS,
Office of Chief Signal Officer.
NAVY
H. R. Stark
R. E. Ingersoll
R. K. Turner
t: S. Wilkinson...
Leigh Noves
Admiral, U. S. Navy
Admiral, U. S. Navy
Vice Adm., U. S. N..
Vice Adm., U. S.N
Rear Adm., U. S. N
Rear Adm., U. S. N
Rear Adm., U. S.N.
Rear Adm.. U.S. N..
Capt., U. S.N
Capt., U.S.N
Capt., U. S. N
Capt.,U. S. N
Comdr., U. S. N
Lt. Comdr., U. S. N. R
Chief Ship's Clerk, U. S. N.
Chief of Naval Operations.
Asst., Chief of Naval Operations.
Director, War Plans Division.
Director of Naval Intelligence.
Director of Naval Communications.
J. R. Beardall
J. R. Redman
F. E. Beatty.
L. F. SafTord
Naval Aide to the President.
Asst. Director of Naval Communications.
Aide to the Secretary of the Navy.
Op-20-G. In charge. Security Section, Naval
A. H. McCollum.
G. W. Welker
Communications.
Op-16-F2. In charge. Far Eastern Sect., Naval
Intelligence.
Op-20-GX. In charge. Intercept and Direction
A. D. Kramer...
L. W. Parke.....
A. A. Murray.
H. L. Bryant
-Finding Section.
Op-20-GZ. In charge, Translation and Dissem-
ination section. (Actually attached to Far
Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence.)
Op-20-GY. In charge Cryptanalytical Section.
Watch Officer in Op-20-OY.
Confidential Yeoman in Op-20-GZ.
' [Handwritten note:] Corrected after return. LFS.
[26] 2. An element of confusion was caused by the Tokyo Weather Fore-
cast or "False" Winds Message intercepted b.v the F. C. C. at 2200 OCT, 4
December 1941, and phoned to Lt. Comdr. Brotherhood during the evening of
4 December 1941. It is believed that certain officers attached to Op-20-G In
December 1941 had in mind the "False" Winds Message when they informed me
that they knew of the "Winds Message." Their names are as follows :
Lt. Comdr. G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R.
Lt. Comdr. F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R.
Lt. Comdr. A. V. Bering, U. S. N. R.
Lieut. F. L. Freeman, U. S. N.
Ensign Wilmer Fox, U. S. N.
The F. C. C. interception of another Winds Execute Message between 0002 and
0035 (GCT), 8 December 1941, proves that the Japanese Government did use this
system for broadcasting loar tvarnings.
79716 O— 46 — pt. 18-
-32
3348 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
3. There never has been any doubt in my mind that the Winds "Execute"
Message was broadcast from Tokyo two or three days prior to the attack on
Pearl Harbor and forwarded to the Navy Department. The points in doubt,
which I sought to clarify by sighting the incoming Japanese message (or its
translation), were.:
(a) Exact date [i. e. December 4 (Thursday) or December 5 (Friday) 1941].
(b) Exact wording of the original Japanese broadcast.
(c) Station call, time and frequency of the Japanese Radio Station which
broadcast it. (This would reconcile "skip" phenomena.)
(d) Whether received in voice or Morse code.
(e) Station which intercepted the message.
4. After receiving the Winds "Execute" Message I discussed with Lt. Comdr.
Welker (Op-20-GX) the advisability of di.scontinuing the special intercept
watches being maintained to pick up the Winds "Execute." However, only two
days previously we had translated Tokyo Circular #2409 (JD #6985) dated
27 November 1941— setting up a system for sending out "Hidden Word Messages"
(INGO DENPO) in event of strained relations. Although we expected these
would come over regular commercial circuits (as proved the case on the morning
of 7 December 1941), we could not be sure, and it seemed advisable to continue
the existing set-up which covered all possibilities (even though it meant the
operators continuing their doubled-up watches), and required no further orders
and no possibility of misunderstanding and confusion. It is my impression that
Welker discussed the matter with Capt. Schukraft, and the Army made a similar
decision. I have not discussed this with Welker since September 1942 and I
have no idea how well he remembers this incident.
[^7] 5. Somebody must have notified the War Department about the Winds
"Execute" Message because Colonel Bratton telephoned to Admiral Noyes and
requested a copy of the original Japanese broadcast so that he could verify the
translation. (This was customary in highly important intercepts.) Admiral
Noyes got quite indignant and told Colonel Bratton that the Navy's translation
was correct and that the War Department would not be furnished a copy of the
original message. The foregoing incident, if verified by Colonel Bratton will
prove that the Winds "Execute" got as far as Rear Admiral Noyes and G-2.
6. There is one possible source of information on the Winds Message which
has not been checked, namel.v— the Australian C. I. Organization. The Australi-
ans had a small G. I. Organization and in December 1941 they were intercepting
Japanese Diplomatic radio traflSc and reading messages in the J-19 system.
(The Dutch in Java were also reading J-19, as well as the British in Singapore
and London and the U. S. Army and Navy in Corregidor and Washington.) The
Australian C. I. Unit had liaison with the Singajiore C. I. Unit, including ex-
change of translations and keys, except for the Purple and Red machines. The
Winds "Set-up" message (Tokyo Circulars #2353 (JD #6875) and #2354 (JD
#6850), dated 19 November 1941) were in J-19. Singapore sent translations to
Corregidor (CinCAF 281430 (COPEK) to OpNav) and undoubtedly sent these
same translations to Australia. The Australians may have intercepted the Winds
"Execute" Message on 4 December 1941. If so, this was the basis of Senator
Ferguson's "Australian War Warning" which received much publicity in Decem-
ber 1943. This hypothesis could be easily proved or disproved. The following
secret message to the Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne, is suggested :
Secret
"From: SECNAV.
"To: FRUMEL.
"Referring CINCAF twentyeight fourteen thirty November nineteen fortyone
and Tokyo circulars twentythree fiftythree and twentythree flftyfour dated
nineteen November same year in jig nineteen did Australians intercept or know
of such a warning broadcast from Tokyo on or about four December nineteen
fortyone X If affirmative forward by airmail certified. Transcript of broadcast
as received with notation as to date X time X frequency X voice or Morse X
call letters of transmitting station X location of intercepting station and other
relevant data."
[Handwritten note :. Australia knew of the Winds "execute" but did not inter-
cept this message locally.
[Note: This message was never sent. LPS.]
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3349
[28] 7. Lieut. Colonel Rowlett heard of the Winds "Execute" by office
gossip a day or two before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. A few days
after the attack Colonel Sadtler came to him and said, "I would like to see the
Winds Message," or words to that effect. Rowlett referred him to Major Doud,
in charge of the section, who in turn referred him to Colonel Minckler, the Chief
of S. I. S. The rest of the story belongs to the Army Investigation rather than
the Navy Investigation except for the fact that it furnishes further proof of the
authenticity of the Winds "Execute" Message and that some written record of it
did exist in the War Department in December 1941.
8. A complete exposition of Radio Wave Propagation would be very lengthy
and out of place. It is sufficiertt to say that the radio frequencies used between
Japan and the United States were quite erratic in performance, and that long
distance radio communications in an East-West direction are more difficult and
less reliable than those in a North-South direction. A few pertinent examples
can be given, namely :
(a) The long fourteen (14) part Tokyo Serial #902 (JD-1 #7143) was
intercepted solid at Bainbridge Island, Washington. Part Two (of Tokyo Serial
#902) and Tokyo Serial #904 (JD-1 #7144) were also copied at Cheltenham,
Maryland, and forwarded to the Navy Department and used for the actual
decryption. (This is verified in the GY Log for 6 December 1941.) The rest
of Tokyo Serial #902 was "uncopyable" at Cheltenham.
(b) Part Two of the very important three-part Tokyo to Berlin #985 (JD-1
#6943) was missed but the first and third parts were copied solid.
(c) We finally had to call on Corregidor to cover the Berlin-Tokyo circuits
as the combined efforts of Intercept Stations in the East Coast, West Coast,
Hawaii and England could not provide better than fifty (50) percent coverage.
During the period 1 Deceniber-7 December 1941, the Navy Department received
seventy (70) Japanese Diplomatic intercepts from Corregidor as compared with
Seventy-three (73) from Bainbridge Island, Twenty (20) for all other U. S. Navy
Stations, and ninety-three (93) for all U. S. Army Stations. The Japanese were
trying to reach Rio and Buenos Aires as well as San Francisco, Mexico City, and
Washington. (See distribution of Tokyo Serial #2354.) It is not at all sur-
prising that the frequency used to reach Washington, Rio, and Buenos Aires
skipped over the West Coast and Hawaii. There is a possibility that this fre-
quency was heard in Australia even though it skipped over Manila, Singapore,
and Java.
9. There is one final place where written confirmation of the Winds "Execute"
Message may exist — the Record of Proceedings of the Roberts Commission. I
cannot believe that they could cover up so completely that some mention of the
Winds "Execute" did not slip into the record. First they said I didn't know
what was going on around me ; now they claim I am suffering from hallucina-
tions. Under the circumstances it is only fair that I be permitted to search
through the record for such evidence in order to prove my sanity, as well as my
intelligence and my veracity.
[Handwritten note:] See testimony of Col. Fielder and Col. Bicknell — Dec.
24, 1941.
[29] 10. In conclusion the following quotation from my secret memoran-
dum to Colonel West, dated 2 October 1944, is submitted for consideration :
"The reason for my stressing the 'Winds Message'' so much in my testimony
(in all three cases) is because we could afford to talk about it, even print it in
the newspaper, without detriment to the war effort. Even the Dutch know of
the Code and the FCC listened for the message. We had the same information —
at the same time — from more secret but less dramatic sources. Also the 'Winds
Set-up' was the nearest thing to a warning CINCPAC ever got. If the 'Winds
Execute' had been heard at Pearl Harbor, the fleet would not have been sur-
prised. And because sCINCP AC was given no information that the 'Winds Exe-
cute' had been sent, everybody at Pearl Harbor believed it had not been sent and
that the Japs were still making up their minds as to the next step."
/s/ L. F. Safford,
L. F. Safford,
Captain, U. 8. Navy.
3350 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[30] From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J19) .
Circular #2354
When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following
at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts :
(1) If it is Japan U. S. relations "Higashi"
(2) Japan Russia relations "Kita"
(3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI) "Nishi"
The above will be repeated five times and rei)eated five times at beginning and
end.
Relay to Rio de Janeiro, B. A., Mexico City, and San Francisco.
[Handwritten note] J-19 Key for this message passed to Washington (Navy
Dept) by London (Admiralty) on Nov. 24, 1941.
JD-1:6850 Secret Navy Trans. 11-26-41. S(TT) Intercepted Nov. 19, 1941.
[31]
Batavia
Dated December 4, 1941
Rec'd 9 : 19 a. m.
Secbetary of State,
Washington.
220, December 4, 10 a. m.
War Department at Bandoeng claims intercepted and decoded following from
Ministry Foreign Affairs Tokyo :
"When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end weather
reports : One east wind rain war with United States, two north wind cloudy war
with Russia, three west wind clear war with Britain including attack on Thailand
or Malaya and Dutch Indies. If spoken twice burn codes and secret papers."
Same re following from Japanese Ambassador Bangkok to Consul General
Batavia :
"When threat of crises exists following will be used five times in texts of general
reports and radio broadcasts : one Higashi east America, two Kita north Russia,
three Nishi west British with advance into Thiland and attack on Malaya and
Dutch Indies."
Thorpe and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attach little
or no importance to it and view it with some suspicion. Such have been common
since 1936.
FOOTE.
Secret
[32] Secret
From: Alusna Batavia For Action: OPNAV RRRRR
Date : 5 Dec. 1941
Decoded by : Kalaidjian
Paraphrased by : Purdy
031030 CR0222
From Thorpe for Miles War Dept. Code Intercept : Japan will notify her
consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East
wind rain United States : north wind cloudy Russia : west wind clear England
with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice
or may use compass directions only. In this case words *vill be introduced five
times in general text.
Distribution :
War Dept. Action Files : CNO 20P 20A
Record Copy : 20G X Show OPDO
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3351
[33] From: Tokyo .
To : Washington
19 November 1941
(J19)
Circular #2353
Regarding tiie broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the
cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added
in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.
(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:
HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations:
KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
(3) Japan-British relations:
NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)
This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast
and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy all
code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
Forward as urgent intelligence.
[Handwritten note:] J-19 Key for this message passed to Washington (Navy
Dept) by London (Admiralty) on Nov. 24, 1941.
JD-1:6875 (Y) Navy Trans 11-28-41 S (TT) Intercepted Nov 19, 1941.
[34] From: CINCAF
For Action : OPNAV
Date : 28 NOVEMBER 1941
Information-COMSIXTEEN
Decoded by : P R White
CINCPAC
COMFOURTEEN
[Handwritten:] COPEK.
281430
Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Singapore X
if diplomatic relations are on verge of being severe<l following words repeated
tive times at beginning and end of ORDINARY TOKYO NEWS BROADCASTS
will have significance as follows X Higashi Higashi Japanese American X Kita
Kita Russia X Nishi Nishi England including occupation of Thai or Invasion
of Malaya and Nei XX on Japanese language foreign news broadcasts the
following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end of
broadcasts will be used XX America Higashi no kaze kumori XX England
X Nishi no kase hare X unquote X British and oomsixteen monitoring above
broadcasts.
Secret
EXHIBIT NO. 152
Board of Wateb Supply, Honolulu, Hawaii
general obsebvations on damage by projectiles in the city of honolulu on
DECEMBEJt 7, 1941
Immediately following the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, and after
several water main breaks and interruptions of water service had been reported,
the writer was delegated by Mr. Frederick Ohrt, Manager and Chief Engineer,
Board of Water Supply, to visit the various points in the city where damage had
been done and to take notes on the damage and get photographs where practical.
This was desired in order that the water depai-tment, as a vital agency, would
be better qualified in the event of renewed attacks to operate effectively in pro-
tecting water mains and other installations and repairing any that were damaged.
3352 -CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Accordingly, on December 8, and several days following, some forty to fifty
places were visited and available information collected. The chief i)oints are
listed below :
A Partial List of Points in Honolulu Reported as Struck by Projectiles on
December 7, 1941.
(Not all these points were visited; some are probably duplicates due to
confusion in reporting.)
Washington Place
South and Queen Streets
2840 Kalihi Street
2683 Pacific Heights Road
625 Ala Moana
758 Kaaloa Street
1807 Liliha Street
2653 Rooke Street
Alewa Heights
Fort and School Streets
Kuhio and Kalakau Streets
610 E Street, Damon Tract
North School Street
2160 Numana Road
lolani Palace
Judd and Liliha Streets
Nisei Club, 44 South School
Lewers and Cooke Company
Hauoli and McCully Streets
Kalihi Pump Station
Fort Armstrong
Nuuanu and Kukui Streets
734 McCully
3122 Duval Street
2113 Bingham Street
lolani School & Judd Street
Henry Street, upper end
1838 Puowaina Street
56 Wyllie Street
Lewers and Kuhio Streets
Kamehameha Heights
44 Dowsett Avenue
May Damon residence, Moanalua
2522 Kalihi Road
Moanalua Garden
Police Shooting Range, water front
2640 Kamanaiki Road
Waipa Lane
1443 Nuuanu Avenue
956 Spencer Street
1630 Leilehua Street
Robello Lane
Hawaiian Gas Products, Kuwili St.
467 Judd Street
Judd and Iholena Streets
Dowsett Ave. and Alika Drive
Kamamalu Park
Kukui Street
Principal sources of information were the daily papers, the Territorial and
City-County offices of Public Works the City-County Road and Garbage De-
partments, the Board of Water Supply Maintenance and other divisions, the
Honolulu Police Department daily log, and finally persons at the various sites
of damage. The writer is not an expert in thej field of ballistics, or high ex-
plosive projectiles, and to avoid error has recorded only what was actually seen,
as to damage and explosion effects, without attempting to say what sort of
projectilr was responsible.
Many observers have testified to the immediate commencement of fire after the
striking of projectiles at Lunalilo School and at McCully and King Streets,
suggesting that these projectiles may have been of the incendiary type. At
many other points the projectiles landed either inside or near houses and then
exploded to produce two marked effects, (1) blast damage, and (2) splinter
damage. The combinati<m of these two was suflBeient to totally wreck a small
two- or three-room house when landing in it, or one side and a room or two
of a larger house. In such case the damage as the far side of the house or two or
three partitions away was not great.
The blast damage was very severe on an adjacent wall, fioor, or windows,
or on furniture in the room struck, blowing them out, and generally wrecking
furniture. In .some cases wood splinte^rs or fragments of bric-a-brac were
driven through plaster board in the manner of tornado damage. However, it
was noticeable that blast damage fell off very rapidly and unbroken windows
would be found in the second or third wall removed from the focus of explosion.
Splinter damage was similar in its falling off characteristics. Prentiss says
splinter velocities may be 5,000 to 7,000 ft. /sec, or 3 to 4 times that of a rifle
bullet, but that because of small size and irregular shapes the velocity falls
off very rapidly. Observations in Honolulu confirm this strongly. Splinters
often went through wooden partitions or the first web of concrete hollow tile
but connnonly did not go through a second 1" board, and in no case seen by
the writer did they go through both sides of an 8" hollow tile wall. In the)
near vicinity of the focus there was nnich tearing and rending of wood due
chiefly to blast, or to displacement of tlie structure. In cases where the projec-
tile landed in the street a few feet from buildings, the outer walls were well spat-
tered by splinters, many of which did not pass through even the wooden wall.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3353
A few passed through one or two wooden walls, or broke off corners of wood
or masoni-y. Many windows were broken. It is the the writer's impression that
except for larjie glass windows, by far the most damage was blast damage.
(This applies to the particular projectiles involved chiefly on December 7, 1941,
but is no prediction.)
Some projectiles landing in gardens and out of doors apparently did not
explode at all. but merely made a one- or two-foot hole in wet ground and passed
several feet downward. General advice to persons in air raids is well borne out
by observations. At any point seen by the writer, a person lying in a two-foot
trench or behind a two-foot embankment 20 feet away would have been safe.
Of course some persons not over 20 feet away were unharmed without protection
but that was good luck. Injury and death were due to being tossed about by
blast effect, to being struck by objects actuated by blast, and to splinters or
fragments of pavement or pavement thrown by explosion.
Damage in one store was exceedingly slight by direct hit, blast or explosion,
but came chiefly by water from the breaking of one sprinkler head. The corner
of one small garage annex was struck by a projectile which knocked off one or
two cubic feet of the concrete foundation and splintered the corner of the
woodwork but did not explode and did no injury to two people eight or ten
feet away. All the observations of the writer indicate that on hearing a raid
alarm it is imperative to get under the best cover that is nearby, and that side
cover is most important, and roof cover next. If roof cover is not available, an
open trench or the corner of a walled garage even if open to one side offer a
large proportional safety.
Prepared by :
/s/ Chester K. Wentworth,
CHESTEai K. Wentwoeth,
Principal Geologist.
Approved by :
/s/ Frederick Ohrt,
Frederick Ohrt,
Manager and Chief Engineer,
December 23, 1941
(The remaining portion of Exhibit IM is a map of the City t)f Honolulu,
reflecting points struck by projectiles, December 7, 1941, and is reproduced as
Item No. 37 In Exhibits — Illustrations to Proceedings of Joint Committee)
EXHIBIT NO. 153
STATEMENT TO THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO INVES-
TIGATE THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A Record op Civiijan and Industrial Preparedness in the Tebbitoey of Hawaii
Price to December 7, 1941
Introduced by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, Territory of Hawaii
[/] To the Joint Congressional Committee to Investigate the Pearl Harbor
attack
I. Purpose of this statement
It is the understanding of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association that your
Honorable Congressional Committee has as its objective an exhaustive investiga-
tion intended to present to the public a full report on all activities leading up
to the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, and that in carrying out this
investigation all persons have been invited to present to the Committee any
material, documents or other relevant information pertaining thereto.
It is the further understanding of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association
that your Committee, in addition to its primary objective of bringing before the
public any relevant informaticm having any bearing or significance relative to a
final determination of responsibility for that disaster, is also interested in cor-
recting any deficiencies, ommissions, misimpressions or incorrect conclusions or
3354 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
inferences resulting from the reports of previous investigating committees
or boards.
Tile Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, on belialf of its member planta-
tions, plantation agents, and the officials and individuals associated with these
organizations, and on behalf of. the Territory of Hawaii generally has therefore
prepared this statement for the consideration of your Committee, with the re-
quest that it be entered into, and made a part of, the record of the CJommittee's
investigation for three primary reasons:
First, it is believed that the information presented herewith, duly supported
by records and documents or true copies thereof has direct bearing upon the
activities of the armed forces in this area prior to December 7, 1&41 ; and
Second, it is conclusive proof of an outstanding record of cooperation with the
armed forces in the fulfillment of their mission prior to the l)eginning of the war
in the Pacific, as well as subsequent thereto, on the part of the Hawaiian Sugar
Planters' Association, its member plantations, their agents, and individuals
associated therewith and the Territoi-y of Hawaii generally ; and
Third, it is believed that the information presented herewith duly supported
by records and documents or true copies thereof, is conclusive proof of the error
contained in certain testimony given before the Army Pearl Harbor Board,
appointed by the Secretary of War, pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339,
78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, to Ascertain and Report the Facts Re-
lating to the Attack made by the Japanese Arr.ied Forces upon the Territory of
Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and is also conclusive proof of the falsity of the
inferences and conclusions which could be drawn from the reading of the Report
of said Board as released to the public on August 29, 1945, in that said Report
incorporated excerpts of the testimony herewith objected to in a manner indi-
cating that the statements contained in said testimony were accepted by the
Army Pearl Harbor Board, [2] which thereby were capable of false and
misleading impressions, and which in fact did result in false and misleading
impressions in the public mind in that said testimony and the presentation in
paid Report intimated a lack of cooperation with the Army and the Army Com-
manders in Hawaii, which conclusion is erroneous, is entirely lacking in founda-
tion, and has resulted in a grave injustice to the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Asso-
ciation, its member plantations, their plantation agents, oflBcials and individuals
associated therewith and the people of Hawaii generally.
The testimony specifically objected to as presented before the Army Board to
Investigate Pearl Harbor are those portions of the testimony of Major General
Henry T. Burgin, U. S .A., Commanding General of Artillery, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, said excerpts of testimony being set forth on pages 174-177, inclusive
of the report of said Board as released on Wednesday, 29 August 1945, by the
Secretary to the President of the United States. The statements in said testi-
mony were that (1) one of the great handicaps to development of field artillery
positions was resistance from land owners to letting the artillery go on the land
or lease it for the placing of battery positions; (2) that if General Short had gone
to Alert #3 there would have been great opposition from important and in-
fluential civilians on the island and particularly those who compose what is
known as the Big Five; (3) that among those influential citizens whom he
thought might have voiced their objection were, among otliers, Mr. Walker, a
sugar man. General Wells, and the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, and
those having the land and crop interest^ in sugar and other crops. The testimony
to which objection is taken is set forth verbatim as Exhibit "A", appended
herewith.
It is contended that the statements in this testimony before the Army Board
to Investigate Pearl Harbor are in error, that the statements are entirely lack-
ing in foundation, and that the inferences of lack of civilian cooperation in
Hawaii with the Army and Array Commanders which inferences resulted from
the inclusion of said testimony in the Report of the Army Board are likewise in
error and lacking in foundation, and that the weight of the evidence supported
by the records prove conclusively an outstanding record of cooperation in Hawaii
on the part of the people generally, an<l in particular on the part of the Hawaiian
Sugar Planters' A.ssociation, its member plantations, their plantation agents,
officials and individuals associated. therewith.
Summary
The following statement presents to your Committee a record of cooperation
with the armed forces prior to December 7, 1941, and thereafter on the part of
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3355
the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations, their agents,
and officials and individuals connected or associated therewith, and on the part
of the Territory of Hawaii, which, it is submitted, is an outstanding record of
cooperation and assistance.
On the part of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and its member
plantations, this record of cooperation is one of established policy extending
over a period of many years, built upon close relationship with the armed forces,
and mutual recognition of the needs and requirements of the military and the
contributions that could and liave been made by the plantations in the defense
plans of Hawaii. This policy of cooperation was further engendered and de-
veloped through the close liaison always maintained between the sugar industry
and the military authorities by Major General Briant H. Wells (Ret.) a former
Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army, who in 1934 was made Vice-Presi-
dent and Executive Secretary of the Hawaiian [,i] Sugar Planters' Asso-
ciation following his retirement from the Army on completion of his tour! of
duty as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. This established policy
of cooperation is proven by the fact that sugar plantation lands were made
available for Army use prior to Pearl Harbor on each and every occasion that
the Army requested the use of such lands. It is demonstrated by the estab-
lishment as early as 1940 of an extensive plantation provisional police organi-
zation with the purpose of providing police organization for the primary purpose
of providing aid and assistance in the defense of Hawaii and the fulfillment of
the mission of the armed forces in Hawaii. It is demonstrated by the compre-
hensive emergency food subsistence program for Hawaii developed by the
Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association long prior to the war, and the organiza-
tion prior to the war of comprehensive civilian defense committees engaging in
extensive preparedness activities under plantation auspices in close coordination
with civilian and military authorities. All of these instances of close coopera-
tion and coordination are further emphasized by the war record of the sugar
plantations of Hawaii and of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association in the
aid and assistance given the armed forces on December 7, 1941 and thereafter,
making available all plantation facilities, machinery, equipment, and manpower,
in a period of critical emergency.
On the part of the people of the Territory of Hawaii it is, submitted that the
record of civilian preparedne.ss activities prior to the war is outstanding for
its appreciation of the emergency conditions existing in the Pacific long prior
to Pearl Harbor. . The readiness of the people of Hawaii to do whatever the
military and naval commands might advise or desire and in many instances to
undertake these preparedness activities on their own initiative, at considerable
expense, with the firm conviction long prior to December seventh of the necessity
for developing extensive defense preparations reflects to the lasting credit of
the people of Hawaii.
This record of cooperation is presented hereafter in full. The preparedness
activities of the civilian community of Hawaii is presented in the statements of
persons in the community participating in the organization of these activities. It
is submitted that these statements provide a complete refutation of the testimony
referred to in the report of the Army Board to Investigate Pearl Harbor and
any inferences therefrom resulting from the inclusion of said testimony in the
report of said Board. This record of cooperation with the military by the
Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations, their plantation
agents, and the officials and individuals connected therewith, and the record ef
civilian preparedness activities on the part of the people of Hawaii generally is
submitted to your Committee with the request that it be made a part of the
record of your Honorable Committee.
U]
II. — Certain Inferences of Lack of Civilian Cooperation in Hawaii as Contained
in, and Resulting front, the Report of the Army Board to Investigate Pearl
Harbor are in Fact Conclusively Refuted Elsewhere in the Same Report.
Certain inferences contained in said testimony are refuted elsewhere in the
same report of said Army Board, although not specifically referred to in that
portion of the report incorporating this testimony. For example, at page 59
of said report it is stated (italics added) :
■ 3356 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"General Herron, who preceded General Short, had been directed on June 17,
1940, by Washington, to institute an alert. (R. 213) This alert lasted six weeks.
(R. 214-215). After it was sn.speiided at the end of six weeks it was reinstated
for a period. The alert was an all-out alert, with complete dispersion of forces
into combat positions and with full ecpiipment and ammunition.
"General Herron. testified that there iras no diaturhanee of the eivilian popula-
tion bj/ the use of this all-out alert whieh teas instituted under conditions similar
to those H^iich later prevailed for General Short's alert.
'When asked as to the Alerts 1, 2, and 3 of Short, he disposed of these alerts
with the following language:
" 'General Herron. That was a refinement that the training men put over on
General Short when he came out there. I told him I would not do any sucfh
thing. There was only one kind of alert, and that was a total alert, and then I
would do it in accordance with the situation. But the training men liked refine-
ments, and they recommended three kinds because the Navy had three kinds.
But they did not get to the real point of the thing. . The Navy has three kinds, but
the all-out alert is number one, always. Now they ease up into two and three;
but these young men did not know that, and when Short came out they put over
the three and got them rever.sed, so that Short went into the Number 1, which
was sabotage. It did not seem to him a very important change, I don't suppose,
and it turned out to be vital. It was too much of a refinement,' (R. 226-227)"
And at page '('8 (italics added) :
"As the ejitire attack up^m Pearl Harbor did not extend beyond approximately
three hours, it is obvious that the selection of the correct alert was vital. His-
torically, and by way of precedent, Short had before him the action of General
Herron in the preceding year of an all-out alert under Field Order No. 1 of
Herroii by which complete dispersal of planes and troops and guns was affected,
with ammunition at the guns. The record sfwws (Colonel Capron and other
witnesses— R. 1298, 2025, 2720, 2728, 2772-2773, 3096^3097) that there was no
disturbance of the civilian population as a result of the action by Herron. This
is significant, in view of the fact, as will later appear, that General Short gives
that explanation as one of his primary reasons for the selection [5] of
Alert Number 1, because he might alarm the population. (R. 427-428, 532-533).
"It should be kept in mind that the civilian population was accustometl to the
continued movements of the Army and Navy in their frequent inaneuvers and
practice operations. Much of the civilian population in this instance was living
practically in the midst of one of the greatest military and naval installations
anywhere, so that their state of mind would be far different, from that of people
on the mainland unaccustomed to such sights. Then, too, the newspapers oft-
times contained much more exciting news, threats and disturbing events, than
anything that an alert could stir up, either by the Army or Navy or both. The
explanation therefore lacks both substance and credibility."
And further on page 79 (italics added) :
'At this point the question of sabotage which led to the selection and imple-
mentation of Alert No. 1 should be examined. No single instance of sabotage
occurred while Short ivas in command up to December 7. It was true that there
were 35,000 aliens of Japanese origin and there was a total of 160,000 or about
37% of the population of Japanese origin or affiliations (R. 289), but in no case
was there any instance of misbehavior, despite a very exhaustive investigation
being made constantly by the F. B. I. and by G-2, as well as by Naval Intelligence.
"We have investigated the state of mind and the information as to the actions
of the Japanese population in an endeavor to understand why it was that General
Short adopted his anti-sabotage alert on November 27 in the face of the increasing
international tension, and of his own estimate and that of the Navy that an air
attack was the most dangercms form of attack likely to be encountered. We
therefore resorted to the testimony of a great variety of witnesses in all walks
of life in Honolulu, resident there during 1941, and inquired of their feelings
and views and the whole situation as to the Japanese population.
"We could find no substantial evidence of any fear by these witnesses, including
some of the best-informed leaders in the civil life of the Islands, that the Japanese
would commit acts of sabotage. Their knowledge was based upon long residence
in the Islands and experience with the Japanese. Governor Poindexter, news-
paper editors like Raymond S. Coll, of the Honolulu Advertiser, United States
District Attorney Angus Taylor, Shivers, head of the F. B. I., General Wells,
executive vice-president of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, and
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3357
Walter Francis Dillingham, president of tlie Oahu Railway and Land Company
and owner or director of many other enterprises in the Islands, concurred with
many other witnesses such as ranch owners, government officials, leaders in busi-
ness, that the risk of sabotage, so long as the Army and Navy were in a predom-
inant position, before an actual landing and show of success by the Japanese,
was a relatively minor matter. However, the Army was sabotage-minded. There
appeared to be no substantial basis for this fear other than [6] specula-
tion as to what a large body of citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry might do
in case of stress."
On pages 130-131 it is further stated (underlining added) :
"The third portion of the message (from the Chief of Staff's Message dated
November 27, 1941, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department) is this:
'Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnais-
sance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be
carried out so as not connna repeat not comma alarm the civilian population or
disclose intent. Report measures taken.'
"Comment : This was an order. Short could take such measures, including
reconnaissance, as he deemed necessary. What was available to Short for
reconnaissance and defensive action and the measures taken by him are fully
discussed elsewhere.
"Here again we find the limitation that he must act cautiously. However, the
weight of evidence indicated that a higher form of alert then that taken would
not have alarmed the public."
These statements indicate that that portion of the testimony pertaining to
objection on the part of influential citizens to an Alert #3, is itself refuted by
the record and conclusions of the Army Board. The factual record supports this
conclusion that the sugar plantations, and the Territory of Hawaii generally
have at all times supported, assisted, and cooperated fully in all maneuvers,
alerts, and other activities, training or otherwise, of the military authorities in
Hawaii.
///. — The Haimiian Suffar Planters' Association, its Member Plantations, the
Plantation Agents and Officials and Individuals Associated Thereivith Have as
a Matter of Established Policy Cooperated in Every Way with the Army and
Army Authorities
As to that portion of this testimony which was placed in the record, and there-
after the report of the Army Board, the statements to the effect that there was
opposition from land owners to letting the artillery go on the land or lease it
for the placing of battery positions, the record of cooperation with the military
on the part of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations
and their plantation agents is to the exact contrary, said record of cooperation
being an outstanding one over a period of many years, reflecting in the written
record thereof, cooperation which has presented no opposition to the military at
any time in matters pertaining to requests connected with any defense prepara-
tion, plans and training, or other measures taken by the military. This record of
cooperation is one commonly recognized, appreciated and accepted by former and
present Army Commanders in this area.
To refute such statements and to'acquaint your Committee with the record of
cooperation of the sugar industry of the Territory of Hawaii with the Army and
with Army authorities as a matter of policy, the flies of all plantations and of the
[7] Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association have been reviewed thoroughly.
Endeavor has been made in the material presented hereafter to present a factual,
complete picture of this record of cooperation, resulting from the established
policy of the plantations to assist the armed foi-ces in their needs and require-
ments. Supporting documents and records are included as exhibits. Brief state-
ments of other connnunity preparedness activities have been included to the extent
that a true and accurate presentation can be made with brevity covering very
extensive activities, where supporting documents would be voluminous.
Should the Committee desire additional material, records or other documents,
the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association is prepared to present such additional
material at the convenience of the Committee.
3358 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
/F. — Sugar Plantation Lands Were Made Available for Army Use Prior to Pearl
Harbor Whenever The Army Requested The Use of Such Lands
The record of the sugar plantations in making lands available to the uses
and requirements of the Army is an exceptional record extending over a period
of many years. Since the major military activities in Hawaii prior to Pearl
Harbor'centered on Oahu, the location of Pearl Harbor, a study has been made
of the requests made by the Army to Oahu sugar plantations during the period
commencing in 1939 and extending up to December 7, 1941. This study involved
a careful comprehensive review of all plantation records during this period.
Review of all records of plantations and the records of the plantation agents
discloses not a single instance in which anif plantation denied entry to the
Army. On the contrary every request, regardless of its nature, whether mere
permission to use lands for a certain period or purpose without formal docu-
ments, or lease or license to enter, or entry prior to condemnation, was granted
with promptness and complete cooperation, reflecting a mutual appreciation
of the problems facing the military authorities which is illustrative of a high
degree of coordination between civilian interests and the military which, it is
contended, would not have been duplicated in any other part of the country.
The requests received by the plantations from the Army during the period
mentioned totalled one hundred seventy-nine (179). Approval was given in
every case. These requests were of various natures. For example, permission
to carry out maneuvers on plantation roads and lands, to establish gun posi-
tions, either temporary or i)ermanent, to install cable, radio and telephone com-
numications lines, construct extension spurs to railroads, enter upon planta-
tion lands for surveys for airfields and other installations, and a variety of other
related military uses such as camouflage tests in cane lands.
These requests as granted by the seven plantations located on the Island of
Oahu are graphically presented on the map attached herewith as Exhibit "B",
made a part hereof.
The plantation boundary lines are approximate only, and encompass lands
owned or under the control of the sugar plantations. Each black circle repre-
sents one request granted. All sugar plantations at one time or another granted
blanket permission to the Army for maneuvers of infantry units. Artillery units,
or the entire Hawaiian Department. Blanket permission so granted is re-
flected in shading the various plantations.
[8] Grouping of the circles in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor and Haleiwa
reflect the greater concern of the military authorities with these areas. The
fewer circles shown on the more remote plantations are indicative of lesser
utilization by the military authorities of the lands of those plantations. It
shouUl be remembered that verbal authorizations granted, of which there were
many, are not shown. Only retiuests supported by documents have been counted.
This visual presentation reflects the full cooperation at all times of all sugar
plantations, regardless of the nature of the requests received by the plantations
for the use of their lands. Without discussing each and every request, illustra-
tive examples of the requests received, together with the authorization granted
to the Army indicate how closely integrated the Army activities and plantation
activities have been on Oahu and conclusively prove the high degree of coopera-
tion. Without burdening down this statement with an exhaustive presentation,
a few examples have been selected at random and are supported herewith by
true copies of the substantiating doc-uments.
Requests for permission to enter upon plantation lands were in many cases
so common that blanket permission for the use of all plantation lands was often
grantefl. In a letter dated November 8, 1940, Mr. James N. Orrick, the Manager
of Kahuku I'lantation Company, located on the North shore of Oahu, volunteered
to Lieutenant General Herron, Commanding General. Hawaiian Department,
to grant a blanket authorization covering the iise of all the roads and lands
under the control of the plantation for maneuver purposes, and including the
use of plantation water and any other facilities deemed necessary to carry out
maneuvers. In replying to this letter on November 13, 1940, Lieutenant General
Herron stated :
"I am; In receipt of your exceedingly gratifying letter of November 8th in
regard to the u.se of plantation lands by the troops of this command. What you
say in regard to the good conduct of troops on your lands and your most generous
offer of a blanket permission give pie the greiitest pleasure. Please accept my
sincere thanks for any my appreciation of your very helpful offer."
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3359
Copies of this exchange of correspondence are set forth herewith in full in
Exhibit "C".
Similarly by indorsement on February 17, 1941, blanket permission was
granted by Oahu Sugar Company to the 64th Coast Artillery (Anti-Aircraft) to
occupy positions from time to time on the property owned and controlled by
the plantation. Copies of the exchange of correspondence between the Army
Colonel Commanding the 64th Coast Artillery (AA) and the plantation manager
are included in Exhibit "C". A similar authorization had previously been given
on November 21, 1939, on an unlimited time basis by Honolulu Plantation
Company to the same Coast Artillery unit. This correspondence is also included
in Exhibit "C."
Similar blanket permissions were also granted by other plantations, and are
recorded on the attached map.
Contrary to any of the statements concerning opposition from land owners
relative to leases of land for gun positions, the records of the sugar plantations
indicate that prompt and comprehensive authorization was at all times given
whenever request was made by the Army authorities. Immediate entry was
granted as a matter of established policy without requiring execution of the
formal documents.
[.91 For example, in June, 1941, the Real Estate Officer, Headquarters
Hawaiian Department, was in the process of leasing three sites of approximately
three acres each from Ewa plantation Company, two of whicli were required for
anti-aircraft guFf sites, the remaining one for a Sub-Sector Command Post. In a
letter dated June 4, 1941, Mr. A. S. Davis, Vice-President of Ewa Plantation
Company, pointed out that the plantation was prepared to discuss the terms and
conditions of the lease and further added :
"If, however, the importance of this matter to the National Defense Program
is such as to require immediate occupancy by the War Department of the areas
proposed to be taken, Ewa will be agreeable to such a plan, upon the under-
standing that, at a later date, maps delineating the specific areas wall be fur-
nished by you, together with a formal document."
Copy of this letter is set forth In full in Exhibit ''D''.
A similar letter dated May 29, 1941, was sent by Mr. John H. Mldklff, Manager
of Waialua Agricultural Company, Limited to the same Real Estate Officer,
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, authorizing entry on plantation lands to
permit immediate construction of eight gun emplacements, two mortar positions,
and permanent trenches and fortifications, it being understood that maps delineat-
ing the specific areas would be furnished with a formal instrument covering
same at a later date. This authority was granted less than one week from the
date of receipt of the request. Copy of this letter is included in Exhibit "D"
Similarly, when on April 25, 1941, Lieutenant General Short, Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, addressed a letter to Mr. H. A. Walker as Presi-
dent of Waianae Company, requesting that the Army be permitted to initiate
construction of certain railway spurs across the plantation lands, pending final
acceptance by the War Department of the license already granted to the Army
to enter and use the plantation lands involved, the plantation through its agents,
American Factors, Limited, of which Mr. Walker was President, authorized im-
mediate entry. This authority for immediate entry was transmitted within three
days of the time that General Short made his letter request. Exchange of this
correspondence is set forth in Exhibit "D".
Other examples can be selected at random. It should be pointed out, more-
over, that many of these requests involving troop maneuvers meant many hun-
dreds or even a few thousand men and many vehicles using plantation roads and
lands during maneuvers of individual units, as part of division maneuvers, or
the entire Hawaiian Department, such maneuvers being scheduled in many in-
stances as surprise alerts. Tliere are attached herewith copies of three letters
to Waialua Agricultural Company, Ltd. and to Ewa Plantation Company with
reply indorsement thereon authorizing use of lands for planned maneuvers dur-
ing 1941. and reflecting the constant use of plantation lands by Army units.
(Exhibit "E".)
A variety of other requests have been made in the past to the plantations by
the Army and promptlv granted in a spirit of complete cooperation. For example,
in Janufiry 1941, the Commanding General of troops at Schofield Barracks desired
to perform experiments with the possibilities of camouflaging gun positions in
3360 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
canefields. This assistance was immediatelj' given by Waialua Agricultural
Company, Limited. Exchange of correspondence is attached hereto in Ex-
hibit "F".
At anotlier time a request was addressed to Oahu Sugar Company requesting
that new plantings of cane be started about live yards from the fence line at the
Waipio Sub-Station (electric power station) in order that defense of the Sub-
Station [10] against sabotage might be facilitated and at the same time
be made more effective. This request was inmied lately recognized as set forth
in the correspondence included in Exhibit "F".
Further evidence of the willingness of the plantations to cooperate in all mat-
ters pertaining to the defense potential of plantation facilities is reflected in a
letter of Waialua Agricultural Company, Limited dated July 21, 1939, furnished to
various Army authorities including the Department Service Command at. Fort
Shafter which supplied the authorities with information relative to total em-
ployees, the racial groups, engineer and motor equipment available, railroad
equipment, etc. Copy of this letter, included in Exhibit "F", is illustrative of the
information whictt has been furnished by all plantations in i*esponse to Army
requests.
Commanding officers have always been appreciative of this established policy
of cooperation as evidenced by this active assistance promptly granted.
When Lieutenant General Herron relinquished his command of the Hawaiian
Department to Major General Short in February, 1941, he addressed letters of
appreciation to the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association expressing appreciation
for the continued and substantial contributions of tlie Association to National
Defense. This letter concluded :
"Please believe that the liberal and helpful attitude of the A^ociation is not
lost upon the Army and that we are grateful. For my successor. General Short,
I bespeak your good oflices and a continuance of the generous assistance you have
always given to the Army in Hawaii."
Copy of this letter is set forth in full as Exhibit "G".
Letters of appreciation were addressed by General Herron to the various
plantations recognizing the cooperation given. Similarly, letters have been re-
ceived from other commanding oflicers reflecting their appreciation for consistent
cooperation. On June 3, 1940, the Commanding General, Schofleld Barracks
and Hawaiiian Division, Major General Wm. H. Wilson, U. S. A., addressed
letters to the plantations expressing appreciation for the cooperation given
during the maneuvers in May 1940. Illustrative of these letters is that addressed
to Oahu Sugar Company, Limited, included in Exhibit "G". This letter states:
"The success of the maneuvers, completed May 25, 1940, has in a great measure
been facilitated by the cooperation of private land owners in allowing Hawaiian
Division to u.se land during this period."
Other phases of this continuous cooperation have been recognized, as for exam-
ple in a letter from Lieutenant General Short, dated November 29, 1941, thanking
Mr. Hans L'Orange, Manager of Oahu Sugar Company, for the assistance rendered
in surveys, layouts and location of the airport in the vicinity of Kipapa, although
the original plans to locate an additional airport at that location was changed
in favor of construction at Kahuku Point. This letter is set forth verbatim in
Exhibit "G".
With such evidence of cooperation it is believed that the record of the planta-
tions in making their lands available whenever requested by the Army and to
whatever extent required is a record of complete cooperation. It is difllcult
therefore to understand for what purpose or on what basis the testimony pro-
tested herein, amounting as it did to a grave injustice to the Territory generally,
could have been introduced in the record without factual support or to under-
stand how the Army Board could therefore proceed to indicate [11] ac-
ceptance of this testimony without ascertaining the true factual record of
cooperation.
V. — Organization of Sugar Plantation Provisional Police Ouard in July, 1940
An outstanding example of a record of cooperation between the Hawaiian
Sugar Planters' Association and its member plantations with the Army is
demonstrated in the early organization of the Plantation Provisional Police
throughout the plantations on Oahu, commencing at the early date of July 30,
1940. Undertaking this program of organization of groups of employees trained
in police work under leadership and guidance of trained police of the police
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3361
force of the City and County of Honolulu, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Associa-
tion and the plantations through the Oahu Sugar Managers' Association pro-
ceeded to develop an effective police organization vv^hose objective was complete
training to meet any emergency which might arise.
At a special meeting of the Oahu Plantation Managers' Association held at
Waipahu on July 19, 1940, in conjunction with the Army and City and County
Police authorities, Mr. T. G. S. Walker' was appointed Coordinator of Plans for
any emergency which might arise. In a confidential memorandum dated July 30,
1940, to all Sugar Plantation Managers on Oahu, the newly appointed Coordinator
outlined the various alerts which the organization of the Provisional Police was
intended to meet. Plan No. 1 envisioned an alert. Plan No. 2 envisioned "sud-
den and unpredicted overt acts by disloyal inhabitants, whether accompanied or
not by hostile 'Blitzkrieg' from air or sea." This confidential memorandum is
set forth in full as Exhibit "H".
No publicity was given to these initial plans nor to their purposes. Nor was
any publicity given to the fact that the sugar plantations were undertaking this
program in cooperation with Army authorities. In the confidential memorandum
dated July 30, 1940, issued by the Coordinator, it was requested that this work
be kept as confidential as possible and the police be mentioned as the instigators
rather than the Army. This was at the request of the Army authorities.
This organization contemplated, in addition to the actual organization and
training of police, the procurement of any information bearing upon any phase
of internal security. This is reflected by the transmission of Memorandums to
the Coordinator and to the Chief of Police as early as Jlily 31, 1940, setting
forth lists of local Japanese on the plantations as well as pointing out incidents
of rumors and their source, and the names and locations of any questionable
characters.
At a meeting held at the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association Boai-d room
on Tuesday, August 6, 1940, at which Major Melvin L. Craig, Department Provost
Marshal, Major W. O. Poindexter, Provost Marshal's Oflice and the Chief of
Police, Mr. W. A. Gabrielson, and the Managers of all Oahu plantations were
present, the Chief of Police presided requesting details as to number of per-
sonnel, trucks and living quarters to be supplied by each organization. Districts
and each beat boundaries were explained. A program of lectures at each of the
plantations was outlined covering the next two weeks. A Memorandum of the
Coordinator states relative to this meeting that
"Major Craig expressed General Charles D. Herron's thanks for the splendid
cooperation being shown by the Plantation Managers." (See Exhibit "I".)
Although it was never publicly expressed, the salary of the Coordinator, who
was employee! on a fulltime basis for the organiza- [12] tion of these provi-
sional police, was paid entirely by the seven Oahu plantations, through the Oahu
Plantation Managers' Association, on a pro rata basis.
The close coordination which was maintained by this voluntary organization
with the Army forces of the Hawaiian Department and with the Police Forces,
City and County of Honolulu, is shown by the provisional p>olice plan for emer-
gency guard divisions prepared by the Oflice of the Chief of Police on August 12,
1940, and issued over the signature of the Chief of Police, Mr. W. A. Gabrielson.
This plan issued as a confidential memorandum states that "the provisional
police plan is to provide the persoimel and other means necessary to protect from
overt acts all agencies and establishments, both civil and military, which are
essential to the defense of the Island of Oahu, the defense of which is not charged
to combat elements nor located on military reservations. In the performance of
this mission the City and County of Honolulu Police Department will take over
when directed by the Department Commander." This plan is set forth in full
as Exhibit "J". The plan divided the Island of Oahu into four police districts.
Police District No. 1 embracing the City of Honolulu and the remaining three
districts comprising the rural districts.
Dividing the rural districts into beats correspondng to the plantations and one
beat comprising the three pineapple plantations, the plan then contemplated the
selection of guards after careful scrutiny of their record.s, estimating that a
grand total of 836 guards would be required for this plan. Prior to the date
that the plan was to become effective, it was stated that the Army would furnish
the Police Department a detailed map of installations to be guarded. Sugar
plantation managers agreed to provide messing and housing facilities for the
personnel furnished from their respective plantations. Until proper arrange-
ments were made otherwise, th sugar plantations agreed to furnish the necessary
3362 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
trucks, including one riot truck equipped with armor plates or sand bags and
armed with machine guns and sufficient personnel, located at every police district
headquarters. Tour of duty on each installation would be based up<m the deci-
sion of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department prior to the ef-
fective date of the plan. The plan also contemplated that ai*ms, ammunition
and equipment sufficient for the proper discharge of these duties would be fur-
nished by the Army. This organizational plan was distributed to the Com-
manding General, Hawaiian Divi.sion, the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, the Chief of Police, the Provost Marshal,
Hawaiian Department and the I'rovost Marshal, Hawaiian r>ivision.
On the basis of this provisional plan, and proceeding in cooperation with the
plantation managers, the Coordinator proceeded to organize the necessary
guards on each i)lantation. It should be pointed out that this organization was
entirely separate from the units of regular plantation police.
Actual organization embraced much more than that of police guard. A
memorandum of the Coordinator indicated that interest was being worked up in
local food production, storage of food, establishing a fire alarm system and also
emergency facilities and hospitals. Rep<jrts relative to Nazi or Japanese activity
and rumors pertaining thereto were checked carefully at all times. Commencing
in December, 1940, arrangements were made to give men from each plantation
instruction in shooting on the police range.
The complete coordination between the Coordinator of Provisional Police
plans, the. plantation managers and the provisional police on the plantations and
the Army authorities is reflected in a letter to the plantation managers from the
Coordinator dated December 17, 1940, pointing out that the [13] Coordina-
tor had been requested by the Army authorities to sit in on the Headquarters Staff
exercises covering war conditions. The coordinator stated :
"During these exercises Col. Craig took me around and introduced me to the
various Headquarters Staffs who would be especially cooperating with the planta-
tion managers and civic authorities.
"Col. Hayes, the Chief of Staff, tentatively suggested that the plantation
managers and some of their executive staffs might care to have a similar exercise
worked out for them with regard to the i)ossible conditions which might face them
in time of emergency. It was suggested that Col. Poin dexter might work out
such a plan with the Chief and me, and at some mutually agreed on date suitable
to all plantations, the plantation managers and their executive staffs might go
through an exercise with Poindexter, the Chief, and possibly myself actnig as
neutral judges."
This letter is set forth in full as Exhibit "K".
In December, 1940. it was arranged that General Herron visit Governor Poin-
dexter to explain the urgency of finding some means, if possible, under the
home guard defense laws by which funds could be drawn to uniform, equip, and
give armed training to the provisional police guard. Apparently no action de-
veloped from this since the plantations continued to financ'e the arrangements
whereby the continuation of this training was possible.
In February, 1941, during one of the frequent Army alerts, a meeting was held
between Army authorities, the Chief of Police, and executives of the civilian
personnel of District #1. Each was asked to give a short summary of their
actions regarding their anti-sabotage precautions, etc. On the basis of this
alert and this coordination with the civilian personnel comprising the police
guard of District #1, the Coordinator made arrangements whereby the other
districts were trained for immediate response to any alert. Although the meet-
ing with the civilian defense group during the Army alert was called at one
hour's notice by the Army authorities, every company notified was represented
liy its chief executive.
On March 8, 1941, the Coordinator, Provisional Police Plan furnished to all
plantation managers and to the pineapple plantation representative, Wahiawa,
the complete mobilization plan for the provisional police. At this time the
sketches showing the "^•ltal points" in the various districts which the Army
wished the provisional police force to guard were not furnished but were with-
held to be forwarded as soon as released by the Department Provost Marshal.
In May, 1941, the Army planned and carried through Hawaiian Department
maneuvers. The provisional police were invited to participate in these maneu-
vers. Five hundred eighty-two {a82) members of the Provisional Police Guard
did so participate. Officers and non-commissioned officers of the Army were
designated to supervise and instruct the guard in the use of riot shotgims, as
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3363
reflected in the copy of letters of instructions dated May 5, 1941, from General
Short to the Commanding General, Schofield Barracks, set forth in full as Ex-
hibit "L." Five rounds of ammunition per man were furnished by the Army.
Silhouette type targets were provided. Instructions for guard's at bridges and
other installations to [14] guard against sabotage by persons apt)roaching
on the ground or descending from the air by parachutes were spelled out spe-
cifically. Reports indicated all guards ptn-formed satisfactorily, keen and alert
in the performance of their duty.
Soon after this alert, T. (i. S. Walker, Coordinator. Provisional Police Plan,
was selected by the Mayor, City and County of Honolulu, to act as Coordinator
of the Emergency Disaster Council commencing June 17, 1941. Major Douglas
King, Assistant to the Chief of l\»lice, was designated by Chief of Police Gabriel-
son to continue the work of Coordinator in matters pertaining to this police guard
organization. Throughout the remaining months until December 7, 1941, instruc-
tion continued unabatedly. The Army was requested and did furnish the non-
commissioned officers to give instruction in the use of firearms. Instruction talks
by the Chief of Police, the Chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Department Provost Marshal were arranged at the various provisional guard
units. Courses of instruction in First Aid which the Army authorities considered
most necessary were also undertaken.
Immediately prior to December 7, 1941, this provisional guard detail totalled
between 1500 and 1800 plantation emnloyees. This unit swung into action on
December 7th assuming guard duties immediately according to prearranged
plan, thereby relieving Army personnel for duty elsewhere. They stood at
their posts for many hours during the early days of the war iiending final ar-
rangements whereby many of these men became air raid wardens, or assumed
other active defense duties.
VI. The Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association Developed a Comprehensive
Emergency Food Subsistence Program Long Prior to the War
For a long period prior to the war, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association
had been directing attention to problems of local food subsistence. In 1935 the
Association had created and established a Diversified Crops Committee composed
of men representing all phases of agricultural activity in the Territory. Orig-
inally concerned primarily with study and research directed towards ascertaining
what food crops could be grown in the tropical Hawaiian climate with profit to
the growers and also as a phase of plantation activities, the Committee devoted
considerable attention and effort to plans for producing locally crops in such
quantities and of such a nature as would provide the entire population with
adequate subsistence if any emergency stopped the flow of foodstuffs into the
Territory from outside sources.
Successive Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department had been em-
phasizing subsistence food production as a major defense problem of the Terri-
tory, as a phase of the mission of the military forces. For a period of at least
eight years before the emergency x-esulting from war in Europe, plans were being
formulated, developed and revised by the Dej)artment Service Command and
by the Civil Affairs Section, G-5, Headquarters Hawaiian Department.
Being fully cognizant of the activities of the Army in emergency food subsist-
ence planning, Major General Briant H. Wells (Ret.), former Commanding Gen-
eral of the Hawaiian Department, and Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters'
Association following his retirement from the Army, had Invited the Army to
designate a representative to attend meetings of the Diversified [15] Crops
Committee and work with the Committee in coordinated planning. Lt. Col. James
A. Ulio had been designated in 1937 by the Conunanding General, Hawaiian De-
partment and thereafter an Army representative was appointed each year.
The close relationship between the Diversified Crops Committee and the Army
authorities is reflected in a memorandum of Lt. Col. Ulio in 1937, explaining the
objectives of the Diversified Crops Committee. Copy of this Memorandum is set
forth in full as Exhibit "M".
In the latter part of 1940 the plans developed by the G-5 Section were officially
made known to various civilian groups. With these expressions of mutual
recognition by the military and civilian groups of the necessity for adequate
planning to meet any emergency, new impetus was given to the activities of the
('ommittee. The Pineapple Producers Cooperative Association also appointed
a special food production committee which immediately undertook to determine
79716 O— 46 — pt. 18 — —-33
3364 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the extent to which pineapple lands on Oahu could be used to supplement cane
and small farmers' lands in food production.
The close coordination between the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and
the Army is reflected in the letter dated February 1, 1941, of Lieutenant General
Herron to the Association previously referred t«) and set forth in full as Exhibit
"G". In this letter General Herron stated in part :
"The attitude of all of your personnel is beyond praise, but I feel that I should
especially express appreciation of the invaluable aid of your Secretary, General
Wells, and of the vital and highly intelligent work done by your Diversified Crops
Committee and its members."
In this connection, it should be kept in mind that every effort was made by
the Trustees, President and Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Associa-
tion to include on the Committee expert agriculturists although they might not
be directly employed by the sugar plantations or the Association. For example,
the Standing Committee appointed by Mr. H. A. Walker as President for 1941
included Dr. H. L. Lyon, Chairman, Director of Experiment Station, Hawaiian
Sugar Planters' Association ; Mr. H. P. Agee, Agricultural Consultant for Castle
& Cooke, Limited, sugar factors, and Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Ltd ; Dr.
J. H. Beaumont, Director of the Experiment Station, U. S. Department of Agri-
culture ; Dr. D. L. Crawford, President, University of Hawaii ; Dr. A. L. Dean,
Vice President, Alexander & Baldwin, sugar factors ; Col. Casey Hayes, G-5 Sec-
tion, Hawaiian Department ; Mr. L. D. Larsen, Director Plantation Activities, and
Vice President, C. Brewer & Co., Ltd., sugar factors ; Mr. W. W. G. Moir, Agricul-
turist, American Factors, Ltd., sugar factors; and Mr. H. H. Warner, Director,
Agricultural Extension Service, University of Hawaii. This representative group
of agriculturists therefore included experts whose services the Army could not
have obtained otherwise.
On January 30, 1941, sub-committees were appointed as active operating com-
mittees. These included an Animal Husbandry Sub-Committee, to promote pro-
duction of meat, milk and eggs; a Chemical Supplies Sub-Committee, to ascertain
requii'ements in fertilizers, fungicides, insecticides, weed killers, etc., and take
steps to insure an adequate supply of each ; a Field Operations Sub-Committee,
to plan appropriate food crops on requisitioned land in suflScient quantities to
assure an adequate diet for every person on Oahu ; an Inventories and Disburse-
ments Sub-Committee, to keep track of the fluctuating food supply and advise as
to its equitable distribution, with particular [16] attention to inventories
and the promotion of food conservation and food storage; a new crops Sub-
Committee, to locate and demonstrate new food crops that might be grown to
advantage ; the Pineapple Producers Cooperative Association Relations Sub-Com-
mittee to coordinate the efforts in food production of the two respective organiza-
tions; and a Truck Gardens Sub-Committee, to stimulate production of truck
crops on plantations, on small farms and in home gardens by independent growers.
On February 7, 1941, an additional Army representative, Major A. R. Lamb, Sani-
tary Corps, was appointed to the Diversified Crops Committee as alternate for
Colonel Hayes.
Indicative of the seriousness with which the Diversified Crops Committee
undertook to develop comprehensive plans for emergency subsistence is the dis-
tinction made by it between plans developed for "Emergency A" and those devel-
oped for "Emergency B". "Emergency A" was defined as a condition of total
blockade and complete isolation of Oahu from the mainland and off-islands.
"Emergency B" contemplated a condition of total blockade and isolation of the
Territory of Hawaii from the mainland or other sources of food and feetls.
Starting out in January, 1941, to develop intensively a plan of emergency sub-
sistence for Oahu, the Field Operations Committee enlarged its personnel in May,
1941, by the addition of representatives on the islands of Maui, Hawaii and
Kauai, with the additional responsibility of developing, with the assistance of
the representatives of the Planters' Associations of the several islands, a Terri-
torial emergency subsistence plan in which each of the islands might contribute
to the subsistence of the civilian and military population of Oahu to an extent
most consistent with their own and general Territorial interests. The enlarge-
ment of the Committee contemplated also the development of emergency subsist-
ence plans for each of the islands with the assistance of the Planters' Associations
of the several islands.
These efforts, directed as they were to the extreme emergency. Emergency "A",
were entirely of a cooperative nature, to be coordinated with the military and
government authorities. Final plans as submitted contemplated the requisition-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3365
ing of lands, that good land would be taken out of cane production by authority
of a food administrator, the withdrawal of such lands to be planted and managed
in accordance with the plans developed.
Further indication of the close coordination between the committee of the
HSPA and the Army is found in listing of appropriate food crops in the final
plan as submitted on October 23, 1941, evolved to meet the extreme situation,
Emergency A. The crops listed in the Army plan in September 1&40, with two
deletions and one addition were alone considered to be "appropriate food crops."
That the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and the Diversified Crops Com-
mittee and its sub-committees were at all times proceeding under clear recogni-
tion of the importance of the development of comprehensive emergency planning
is clearly illustrated by the tone of a letter addressed to the then Territorial Gov-
ernor, the Honorable Joseph B. Poindexter, on June 19, 1941, signed by Harold
L. Lyon. Chairman of the Diversified Crops Conmiittee and Director of the Experi-
ment Station of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, following a conference
of General Wells, Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, and Dr.
Lyon with the Territorial Governor. He pointed out that the Committee had
available at that date feasible plans for food and feed production in the Terri-
tory with the intention of placing these plans at the disposal of a food Adminis-
tration if, and when such Administration [17] was created. He also made
clear the extremes which the Committee assumed for purposes of the planning :
"If the extreme situation develops — That is, complete isolation of Oahu — the
conditions which make this possible will render such exposed sections of the Island
as Waianae, Kahuku, and Waimanalo unfit and unreliable for farming operations ;
therefore, plantings for the extreme emergency should be confined to the four
major and centrally located plantations."
This letter is set out in full as Exhibit "N".
In the first few months of 1941, the Diversified Crops Committee had already
evolved extensive plans of such a complete nature that Walter C. Short, Lieu-
tenant General, United States Army, Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, accepted the plans as submitted as the basis for all planning for Oahu. In
a letter dated May 15, 1941, addressed to the Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar
Planters' Association, General Short stated :
"Please express my thanks to the Trustees of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters'
Association for the Report of the 'Field Operations Committee' and for the
'Emergency Planting Plan' of the Diversified Crops Committee.
"I feel that the Report, together with the Plan, is the best and most complete
study on the subject of local emergency food production yet accomplished, and
that this work will constitute the basis for all planning on this subject for Oahu.
"In this connection I have directed that the Planting Plan with such minor
changes as may be necessary from a military standpoint, be incorporated in our
current Food Production Plan for application' to Army use should this ever be
required.
Copy of this letter is set forth in Exhibit "O".
Efforts of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations,
and the various food specialists who had joined in the comprehensive emergency
subsistence planning did not cease, however, with this approval, but continued
throughout the rest of the year. On October 23, 1941, the Field Operations Com-
mittee submitted to the Diversified Crops Committee of the HSPA a complete
"Emergency Food Production Plan," its comprehensiveness being indicated by the
fact that it consisted of over one hundred and twenty-five pages of estimates,
charts, graphs and compilations, representing a complete plan for any emergency.
Commencing with careful estimates of the requirements for emergency subsistence
rations for all the people in the Territory, the plan then specified the kinds of vege-
tables that should be grown, how many acres should be planted, how many pounds
of seed obtained, what the initial seed orders should be, with computations of aver-
age yields per acre, and determination of the number of acres of sugar cane land,
and pineapple lands to be planted and harvested each month and day. Fertilizer
requirements were estimated for the various crops, and amounts determined on
the basis of acreage requirements. Insect control requirements were also com-
puted. Equipment, tools and machinery requirements were [18] also
determined, and the number of the various kinds specified, with a listing of the
priority of procurement. Tentative allotments of acreages of emergency crops
among the various plantations were attempted with guidance from the military
authorities in allotting subsistence food crops on Oahu to the four central planta-
tions, Oahu Sugar Company Ltd., Waialua Agricultural Company, Ltd., Ewa
3366 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Plantation Company, Ltd., and Hoholulu Plantation Company, Ltd., assigning
forage and feed crops to Kahuku, VVaianae and Waimanalo, located outside the
pocket of Honolulu, Pearl Harbor and Schofleld Barracks.
Assuming the necessary seeds and equipment were procured, and planting
undertaken, it was still recognized that it would require considerable time for
the crops to mature for harvesting. The Committee therefore compiled a list
of staple foods and the amounts needed of each which the Committee recom-
mended for storage and considered necessary to carry over an estimated six
months period from the beginning of the emergency to the initial production
of food crops. This list was later the basis for the imports and storage by
the Federal Surplus Coiumodity Corporation acting in conjunction with the
military authorities and the Food Control Section. of the Office of the Military
Governor.
The number of animals required, the number needed to be imported, the number
that should be culled for economy of feed, the requirements of feeds and forage,
and the acreages needed to be planted and harvested were computed carefully.
The seed requirements for this feed were also tabulated, and the fertilizer
needs for feed production, and the machinery required for feed crops. Con-
siderations relative to increasing banana and papaya production and increasing
the consumption of pineapples were explored carefully. Culture of yeast from
sugar was explored as a means of supplying protein needs.
It was this plan which represented the culmination of years of attention
and active experiments. It was this plan which .the Army adopted as a basis for
all emergency food subsistence planning.
As early as 1937, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association had appropriated
money for food crop experiments and continued these experiments at some ex-
pense over a period of years. Money was also appropriated for the purchase of
agricultural equipment required for cultivation of these emergency food crops
and some equipment was purchased and delivered prior to the outbreak of war.
Considerable optimism has always been expressed by the uninitiated over the
possibilities of growing temperate climate food crops in Hawaii, and consider-
able effort has been directed to this. The Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Associa-
tion spent time and money, with all of the technical assistance of the extensive
facilities of the experiment stations in experiments directed towards selectivity
of suitable crops. The experiments conducted were without question worth
many more times their cost, for they included the lessons gained from the experi-
ments of expert talent familiar with climate and soil.
While these developments proceeded, in full coordination between the Ha-
waiian Sugar Planters' Association and the Army, other committees were es-
tablished such as the Food Committee appointed by the Mayor, City and County
of Honolulu, in 1940, the Governor's Committee on Food Storage in March
1941, and the Governor's Emergency Food Commission in June 1941. Member-
ship of these committees was closely integrated [19] with that of the
membership of the Diversified Crops Committee.
Subsequent to December 7, 1941, an Advisory Committee for Food Crop Pro-
duction was established by the Military Governor. However, the experiments
and plans of the Diversified Crops Committee, Hawaiian Sugar Planters' As-
sociation, provided the basis for subsequent efforts directed towards local emer-
gency food subsistence.
Any additional information desired relative to the extensive plans prepared
for emergency food subsistence can be furnished promptly by the Hawaiian Sugar
Planters' Association.
Vll.-^Oahu Siif/nr Plantations Provided the Basis for the Development of an
Efficient Civilian Defense Organization Thrmighout Rural Oahu Priar to the
War
Having organized an extensive provisional police organization throughout
all of the plantations as early as 1940, and participated in blackout practices
as eiarly as 1939, the plantations were prompt in undertaking the development
of civilian defense organizations in 1941, so that by December 7, 1941, each
plantation had trained its personnel to swing quickly into action when the
emergency arose.
Early in August, 1941, the Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu apiwinted
Mr. Stafford L. Austin, Manager of Honlulu Plantation Company, as a member
of the Major Disaster Ouncil. Mr. Austin proceeded immediately to organize
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3367
a Rural Oahu Committee, with districts corresponding to the areas occupied
by the plantations exce;pt for the Wahiawa area composing the town of Wahiawa
and the pineapple plantations, and the Kaneohe area on the windward side
of Oahu. Each of these divisions was in turn in charge of the plantation man-
ager, ho in turn supervised various defense committees which prepared plans
and mobilized all available plantation facilities for defense emergencies.
An appreciation of the extensivei and efficient preparedness organization
possible under this proce/dure requires appreciation of the facilities which the
plantations were able to make available. In addition to the executive talent,
and the existing organization of superintendents, supervisors, and all planta-
tion workers, there were all of the physical plant facilities of each plantation,
including power and light, fii-e fighting equipment, tmcks, cranes, and fully
equipped, completely staffed hospitals. Accustomed to working as units, the
plantations provided eflScient organizations to develop promptly elaborate civilian
defense preparations. The assistance which the plantations were able to pro-
vide on the morning of December 7, 1941, not only to civilians in the vicinity
of plantations but also to Army and Navy personnel and installations is ample
proof in itself of the close coordination of the plantations and the military
authorities, the integration of the plantation facilities with the military require-
ments, and the effectiveness of the defense preparations made by all plnta-
tions.
"Without burdening your Committee with an exhaustive presentation of the
activities of each plantation in the development of civilian defense organiza-
tions, the organization developed by Honolulu Plantation Company provides ah
example of similar organizations developed by all plantations, closely coordi-
nated through the Chairman of the Rural Oahu [20] Committee of the
Major Disaster Council.
Throughout August and September, each plantation designated committees
which proceeded to hold regular meetings, engage in training, and organize plan-
tation facilities. Committees were established for the following: Transporta-
tion-Evacuation, Police, Medical, Fire and Air Raid Warning, Communication
and Intelligence, Food Administration, Electric Power and Light, Rural Water,
and Engineering. There is attached herewith as Exhibit "P", an outline of the
Major Disaster Organization developed at Honolulu Plantation Company and
distributed on October 3, 1941, by the Chairman of the Rural Oahu Committee
to all Plantation districts.
The Fire and Air Raid Warning Conunittee proceeded to train its personnel,
already trained in fire fighting, in the methods of handling incendiary bombs and
fires resulting from other enemy action. This Committee distributed instructions,
and conducted lectures and demonstrations for the education of the public in ac-
cordance with the procedure that became common throughout the mainland after
the outbreak of the war.
The Medical Committee prepared plans to supply medical aid during the time
of disaster, designating collecting points, conducting first aid training for all
plantation personnel, and encouraging training of nurses. Since each plantation
as a matter of policy had complete hospital and me<lical facilities engaged in the
treatment of injuries and sickness of plantation personnel, and had long experi-
ence in the maintenance of public health, these additional preparations were
able to be completed promptly and in manner hardly to be duplicated in any
other mainland locality. Moreover, the location of the plantation hospitals
throughout the island, and in many cases in close proximity to Army airfields and
posts, and as in the case of Honolulu Plantation Company, within a few miles
pf Pearl Harbor, naturally resulted in attention beign given to possible need of
the plantation facilities for military personnel. Close liaison existed between
the plantation doctors and Army and Navy Medical officers.
The Police Committee prepared plans for the protection of transportation
routes, and the guarding of installations, the directing of traffic, maintenance
of order in time of disaster, instruction of behavior in ease of air raid alarm
and of blackout, and the prevention of looting. The existing plantation provi-
sional police provided personnel already trained for these functions and
responsibilities.
The Food Administration Committee prepared plans for extensive company
food production, coordinating these plans with the Diversified Crops Committee
of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association. Educational campaigns were com-
menced for the development of home gardens.
3368 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The Transportation and Evacuation Committee prepared listings of all avail-
able transportation, and compiled organization charts for motor and rail trans-
portation personnel. Maintenance of all equipment was a responsibility of this
comniitree. In effect, the work of this committee was a pooling of all existing
transportation facilities of the plantation to direct their utilization for emergency
purposes when required, for operation and maintenance of equipment was of
course part of the daily plantation operation.
The Communication and Intelligence Ccmimittee, in addition to communication
liaison between the various headquarters of the Major Disaster Organization, also
engaged in intelli- [21] gence activities to ascertain any subversive activi-
ties, false rumors, unrest or other developments which might be of value to the
military intelligence agencies and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or which
might l)e of assistance to the plantation provisional guard in maintaining order.
The Electric Power and Light Committee was organized for the purpose of
proper maintenance of the plantation electric system which all persons, civilian
and military, recognized as an important source of power for standby senice in
case of damage to the Hawaiian Electric Company plant, the island's main source
of electric power.
The Rural Water Committee outlined alternate sources of water in case of
destruction or obstruction of the existing system, and planned emergency trans-
portation of drinking water if required.
The Engineering Committee was established to plan for construction of air
raid shelters, and formation of damage repair crews.
These connnittees met regularly and were not mere paper committees. The
plans developed by these committees at Honolulu Plantation Company were the
basis for action on December 7, 1941, just as each plantation on Oahu was engaged
in identical activities. First aid classes were well attended in close coordination
between the plantation hospital staffs and the Medical Prepai-edness Committee
of the Honolulu County Medical Society. Equipment needed in fighting fires
resulting from enemy air raids was obtainetl and individual householders had
been instructed to obtain necessary fire fighting equipment as early as September
27, 1941. This equipment was specified to include bags of sand, ladders, re-
ceptacles for spare water supply, and a fire extinguisher if possible.
Householders were encouraged to store additional food, and for this purpose
basic subsistence items were imported in qiwntity by plantation stores. Special
precautions were taken to keep careful account of all explosives, and in addition
to the customary precautions additional inspections were made daily of all ex-
plosives stores. Close coordination was at all times maintained with the other
plantations and the respective districts, and with the various committees of the
Major Disaster Council.
The plantations, and plantation perscmnel, were proud of the civilian defense
organization they developed and they are proud of the immediate response they
were able to make on the morning of December 7, 1941. It is submitted that the
civilian defense preparedness achieved by the sugar plantations through the or-
ganization of the various committees on each plantation, and coordinated through
the Rural Oahu Committee of plantation managers, represents one of the best
examples of such organizations then in existence.
There is attached herewith as Exhibit "Q" a report of the Chairman of the
Rural Oahu Committee which presents in summary from the activites of the rural
civilian defense divisions on the morning of December 7, 1941 and immediately
thereafter.
[22] VIII. — The Personnel and Facilities of Hawaii's Sugar Plantations
Provided Immediate and Valuable Assistance to the Army and Navy in Meet-
ing the Emergency Resulting from the Attack on Pearl Harbor
The preparedness of the plantation provisional police units has been discussed,
as has the preparation of the Civilian Defense of Major Disaster Committees.
These organizations undertook their assignments immediately. The planning
of the Diversified Crops Committee of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Associa-
tion, for emergency food subsistence, was utilized thereafter.
In a<ldition to these pre-Pearl Harbor defense preparations by all of the sugar
plantations, there was the further direct participation of the plantations with
the Army and Navy in rallying to meet the sudden emergency. The material
and in many ways almost indispensable aids provided to the Army and Navy
by the sugar plantations on December 7, 1941 and thereafter was iu»t alone the
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3369
uniting of forces to meet a common enemy. It was also organized assistance,
reflecting tlie appreciation of tlie sugar industry over a long perioti of years of
the integrated relationship existing between the sugar industry and the mili-
tary authorities and tlie essential part of the plantations in the plans of the
military for the defense of Hawaii.
At the request of Army authorities all sugar plantations had at various times
prior to the war submitted information concerning the defense potential of
the sugar plantations. There was every indication in the manner by which
this information was requested and compiled that the Army considered the
plantation facilities as an integral part of the plans of defense of Hawaii. The
sugar plantations, and the Hawaiian Sugar Planters" Association had proceeded
accordingly. As has been previously pointed out, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters'
Association, particularly under the guidance of the Vice-President and Execu-
tive Secretary, Major General Briant H. Wells (Ret.), former Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department, proceeded on established policy of close
coordination and cooperation with the military forces.
On the morning of December 7, 1941, every plantation mobilized to aid the
military forces in whatever way or manner assistance might be given. The
war record of the sugar industry, particularly on that fateful day and for
months thereafter is a record which would require volumes to record. It covers
much more than civilian preparedness. It includes direct assistance to the
armed forces themselves, in a manner that can be appreciated fully only as the
location of the plantations in close proximity to Peai'l Harbor, Army, Navy
and Marine airfields and other installations is recognized with the extensive
facilities of each plantation in machinery, equipment and manpower and the
close relationship that has at all times existed between the plantation per-
sonnel and the personnel of the military forces, and the practical liaison with
the military commanders which Major General Wells continued. It can truly
be said that the sugar plantations were in the war immediately alongside the
Army and Navy.
It is submitted that the part played by the sugar plantations in meeting, this
emergency has no parallel in any part of our country. A few examples serve
to illustrate this.
[23] Plantation Hospitala Received Many of the Wounded Service Personnel
Some plantations were subjected to enemy strafing fire the morning of attack
and suffered casualties. Plantation hospitals were immediately receiving vic-
tims of the attack. These casualties received at plantation hospitals on Oahu
included Army, Navy and Marine personnel as well as civilians.
Plantation Equipment was Dispatched to Installations Attacked by the Enemy
Plantation trucks and cranes with plantation personnel to man the equipment
were dispatched to Peaid Harbor, Ewa Marine Air Station, Hickam Field,
Wheeler Field and other Army and Navy installations as requested or required.
Equipment dispatched by Ewa Plantation Company on the Seventh is illus-
trative of this aid and assistance. At the request of the Ewa Marine Aviation
Group, three cranes and two caterpillar tractors with twelve equipment oper-
ators were engaged in aiding the Marine Air Station in the removal of aerial
bombs from magazines and loading them on bomb carts and distributing the
loaded bombs as directed. This crew stood by at the air station throughout
the night of the Seventh. Another crane and two additional tractors were dis-
patched on December 8th to expedite this work. From that time until De-
cember 21, 1941, some Ewa Plantation men and equipment remained at the
Marine Air Station. The men were even trained in fusing aerial bombs and
placing them in the bomb racks of planes.
Shortly after the attack the Navy requested all possible assistance in supply-
ing pumps, welding units, and cranes for use at Pearl Harbor. This equipment
was dispatched promptly, remaining in use in some instances for many months.
Construction equipment from the plantations was made available throughout
Oahu and all other islands for emergency construction of airfields and other
installations. In many cases this equipment was of primary importance in
making possible the rapid development and completion of airfields at a time
when the utmost speed was essential to insure airfield facilities on Oahu, and
the other islands.
3370 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Plantation Labor Provided a Large Construction Force for the. Army
The pool of plantation manpower with many men traine<l in equipment opera-
tion was also available for emergency construction. Army recognition of the
aid and assistance which the plantations could provide is reflected in the final
lK)oling of these available resources for dispatch at the call of the military
through a central Coordinator for the plantations. Through this central co-
ordinator's office, foremen and skilled and unskilled laborers were dispatched
to a great variety of projects. Coordinajtion of this plantation labor was not
limited to Oahu but included the other islands of Hawaii also, where the plan-
tation labor supplied for Army construction was of extreme importance since
the plantations were virtually the only source of labor on these islands and
virtually no defense construction had been undertaken prior to the war, thereby
emphasizing the urgency of construction which the plantations were able to
expedite.
Stevedores and dock working crews were obtained from plantation labor,
tractor and crane operators, carpenters, [2^] welders, electricians, garage
and machine shop mechanics, truck drivers, blacksmiths, painters, plumbers,
sheetmetal workers, power plant operators, locomotive operators and trainmen,
accountants — these categories of labor supplied by the plantations to the Army
and reporting where directed, are illustrative of the type of labor furnished,
well trained in their respective skills. Man-hours of labor supplied under this
procedure to the Army during the time of emergency until the Army was able to
recruit the necessary workers, both locally and from the mainland, illustrates tiie
importance of this labor to the Army :
Man-Days of
Plantation Labor
Supplied to Army
Year : Engineer
1941 (December) 66,034
1942 390, 178
1943 . 54, 394
1944 3, 524
Total - 514, 130
Power was Supplied from Plantation Electric Power Plants
On December seventh, all plantations immediately undertook standby service
at their electric power plants as units in the island-wide coordination of gen-
erating plants. On a number of occasions subsequent to the Seventh, various
plantations were called upon to carry the electrical load in their localities when-
ever emergencies arose such as those resulting from accidents, from major re-
pairs, or emergency demands for additional power at the shops at Pearl Harbor
and elsewhere. In these cases the coordination of the available sources of power
through the central control of Hawaiian Electric Company i)roved of inestimable
value to the armed forces in meeting the unprecedented demands for power that
followed the enemy attack with the development of the defenses of Hawaii, and
the expansion of the fleet repair shops at Pearl Harbor. Recognition by the mili-
tary authorities of the value and importance of the plantation power facilities is
demonstrated by the construction of a 300,000 gallon concrete fuel oil storage
tank at Ewa Plantation to serve the plantation power plant. This construction
was undertaken at the direction of the Corps of Engineers;
Plantation Repair Shops icere Utilized Constanthi hu the Army and Navy
Following the attack, plantation machine shops were utilized for a wide variety
of repairs as well as for the fabricating of substantial armament units. The
machine shops of Ewa Plantation Company, for example, fabricated tank barriers,
30-caliber gun mounts, 37-, 7.")-, and 155-millimeter gun mounts, tank repair stands,
and fuel storage tanks. Equipment was repaired and rebuilt. At this one planta-
tion, 37 percent of the total man-hours worked by the machine .sliop crews during
the period from January 1st to September 30th, 1942, was for the account of the
Army.
Other plantation shops such as plumbing, carpenter, and blacksmith shops
were similarly engaged in repair, fabrication and constJ'uction work for the
armed forces.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3371
[25] Plantation Water and Inventories of Suppliex were Availahle to the
Armed Forces
Plantation water supply systems proved of great aid to the armed forces at this
time of emergency. An example of this is the furnishing of water to Barber's
Point Naval Air Station and to Ewa Marine Air Station by Ewa Plantation
Company. The scarcity of water on the arid Ewa plain presented a serious prob-
lem in normal times. Had the Navy been required to develop new sources of
potable water before construction work could have started, valuable time would
have been lost. Although furnishing of tliis water created a substantial drain
<m the plantation system, the plantation was able to maintain fairly constant
pressure while meeting the Navy's requirements. From December 7, 1941 through
September 1942, Ewa supplied the Navy a total of 77,260,000 gallons of water.
Miscellaneous materials were obtained from the plantations for a multitude
of requirements particularly during the very early days of the war. The supply
of sugar bags was immediately siezed upon for the use of the armed forces and
the civilian defense authorities to be filled with sand for protection of vital instal-
lations and gun positions.
Volunteer Units Were Formed Witli Plantation Personnel
Plantation Personnel was trained to form organized volunteer units to aid in
guarding essential installations and in the active defense of Hawaii. These
volunteer units, organized as regiments In rural Oahu and on the other islands
were trained in the use of weapons and in combat methods, thereby providing
assistance to the military through i-elease of troops for other combat assignments.
(Organization of these units, with the organization of businessmen in Honolulu
was accomplished in close coordination with the military authorities. These
volunteer units, important as they were on Oahu, were of even greater importance
on the other islands as troops were moved to forward areas for offensive
operations.
These examples of the participation of the plantations in the defense of Hawaii
can be no more than illustrative of the many activities in which the plantations
engaged in active support of the military during the war. All plantations of
Hawaii participated In this close coordination with the military forces. The
role played by the plantations located on the Islands of Hawaii other than Oahu
was demonstrably of primary importance to the Army in the emergency of
defense preparations.
It is submitted that here in the war record of Hawaii's sugar plantations there
Is more than response to a common emergency ; that in this record there has been
a degree of organized assistance which could have been achieved only after care-
ful consideration and planning on the part that the plantations could play in an
emergency as a natural phase of the close coordination and cooperation with the
military forces which the management of the sugar industry and the officials of
the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association had developed as a matter of estab-
lished policy long prior to the war.
[26] IX. — Under War Conditions and in Spite of Serious Limitations in Man-
power, Hawaii's Sugar Plantations Continued to Maintain Sugar Production
at Nearly Peacetime Levels During the War Years
Sugar and its byproduct, molasses, have been basic agricultural commodities
required In the prosecution of the war to a successful conclusion. It has long
been recognized how essential it is that sugar production be maintained at the
highest possible level. Hawaii's sugar plantations did not fail therefore to direct
the utmost effort to continue the production of sugar in accordance with direc-
tives from Washington to exert every effort to this end.
Problems of decreasing manpower, as a result of the attraction of employment
with the Army, Navy, and their Contractors, presented great difficulties. Equip-
ment required for Army and Navy construction involved delays in planting and
harvesting. Scarcity of materials affected maintenance and impeded operations.
Blackout restrictions and other military regulations reduced the hours of work
and resulted in problems of working conditions requiring constant adaptation.
In spite of these considerations, however, Hawaii's .sugar plantations exerted
additional effort towards meeting the multitude of problems presented, directing
more intensive effort to achieving exceptional total tonnage production for these
war years.
3372 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
There is attached herewith as Exhibit "R" a chart comiiaring sugar cane acre-
age, sugar production, average number of male adult employees (unskilled) and
total men days of all employees (unskilled) on Hawaiian Sugar Plantations
from the period 19:16 through 1944. This chart shows a production of 870,109 tons
in 1942, 885,640 tons in 1943, and 874.947 tons in 1944. Hawaii's sugar industry
is proud of this record, and the great contribution that this represents to the
nation's successful prosecution of the war.
This record has not gone unacknowledged. By letter dated November 2, 1945,
addressed to the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, the Secretary of Agricul-
ture acknowledged this i)ro(luction record in observing:
"The work of your institution, I am told, proved especially signiticant in the
recent war ijeriod. Notwithstanding rigid military regulations and a very trying
manpower situation, the Hawaiian Islands maintained their sugar production at
near ijeacetime levels. For this accomplishment the Nation can be grateful."
This letter is set forth in full as Exhibit "R".
fc X. — Conclusion
It is submitted that this record of the sugar industry in Hawaii in its coopera-
tion with the military authorities in preparedness activities prior to the war, and
in coordination of activities with the military throughout the war is an outstanding
record, representing a complete refutation of any of the inferences and statements
contained in the report [^7] of the Ai'my Board to Investigate Pearl Har-
bor which might reflect upon this record.
Hereafter there are attached the statements of persons in the civilian com-
munity of Hawaii who participated in the preparedness activities of the civilian
community of Hawaii prior to the war. These illustrative statements are pre-
sented so that your Committee may be cognizant of the part played by the people
of Hawaii to prepare for any emergency which might arise. It is submitted
that the degree of civilian preparation thereby achieved reflects to the lasting
credit of Hawaii.
It is respectfully requested that this .statement of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters'
Association with the statements of civilian preparedness in Hawaii set forth
hereafter be made a part of the record of your Committee to the end that the
grave injustice to the Territory of Hawaii resulting from the incorrect and mis-
leading statements and inferences in the report of the Army Board to Investigate
Pearl Harbor relative to Hawaii's cooperation with the Army during the critical
period prior to the war may thereby be corrected in the manner which the excel-
lent war record and preparedness activities of the sugar industry and Hawaii
prior to the war so amply justifies.
Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association,
P. E. Spalding, President.
DECEMBER 1, 1945.
I, Chauncey B. Wightman, of the City and County of Honolulu, Territory of
Hawaii, and Secretary of the Hawaiian Surgar Planters' Association, having
seen the original documents from which copies were made and are attached as
exhibits in the statement submitted herewith to the Joint Congressional Commit-
tee to Investigate Pearl Harbor, .submitted to the committee on behalf of the
Hawaiian Sufiar Planters' Association and their member plantations and the
copies contained in the statements submitted by Mr. Alfred L. Castle, relative
to the preparedness activities of the Hawaii Chapter, American Red Cross ;
Mr. T. G. S. Walker, relative to the preparedness activities of the Major Disaster
Council, City and County of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii ; Dr. H. L. Arnold,
relative to the preparedness activities of the Medical Preparedness Committee,
Honolulu County Medical Society; Dr. F. J. Pinkerton, relative to the prepared-
ness activities of the Honolulu Blood Plasma Bank; Addison E. Kirk, relative to
the preparedness activities of the Transportation Committee, Major Disaster
Council. City and County of Honolulu ; and Mr. Heaton L. Wrenn, relative to
the preparedness activities of the Honolulu Police Reserve, do hereby certify
that said copies as contained in this statement submitted herewith to the Joint
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3373
Congressional c;ominittee to Investigate Pearl Harbor are true and exact copies
of the original ciocunients thereof.
Chauncey B. Wightnian
Chauncey B. Wightman.
Territory of Hawaii,
City and County of Honolulu, ss:
Subscribed and sworn to before rue this 15th day of January, 1946.
[seal] Alberta Van Brockun,
Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit, Territory of Hawaii.
My Commission expires 6-30-1949.
[28] Exhibit "A"— Excekpt of Testimony of Major General Henry T.
BuRCiiN Before Army Board to Investigate Pearl Harbor (Army Board Re-
port, pp. 173-177 Inclusive)
3. Antiaircraft Artillery and Coast Defennes. General Burgin commanded
the Coast Artillery Command consisting of seacoast artillery plus all antiaircraft
artillery in the Hawaiian Department. He commanded the 53rd Coast Artillery
Brigade composed of the 64th Regiment, 251st Regiment, and the 98th Regiment.
He testified that the Interceptor Command was being organized on a temporary
basis saying:
"We had constant training and maneuvers, practice, where that particular
thing was stressed, and the antiaircraft was turned over to interceptor Command
* ♦ * For at least six weeks or two months prior to December 7, we had, every
Sunday morning, one of these exercises with the Navy. Our AA would go out
in the field and take their field positions, they would know that the Navy was
coming in, with carrier-based planes, and they would simulate an attack on the
island, and we put our guns out mainly along the roadways, somtimes in position,
and practiced simulating fire against this simulated attack made by the Navy.
And we were out just one week prior to December 7. * * * On Sunday ; but,
by some stroke, we did not go out on December 7. The fleet was in the harbor."
And again he said, as to the Interceptor Command :
"It worked, yes, because we would get the information of the planes coming
in, and immediately the interceptor command would take over. All that !s, so
far as turning it over to the interceptor command, is that the interceptor com-
mand tells you when to hold fire and when to resume fire." (R. 2602-2604).
This brought him to his opinion expressed in the record that if the Interceptor
Command had worked during the drills and exercises on the morning of December
7, then it could have worked for the attack. He said in his opinion it would not
have made any difference anyway, "because we didn't have ammunition with our
mobile antiaircraft. If they had been out in the field without any ammunition,
they would have been worse off than they actually were." (R. 2604)
He said of his antiaircraft batteries :
•'They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that
the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition." (R. 2604)
A reference to the next section will show that it was General Short who
supported the Ordnance Department in refusing to issue this ammunition to
troops when they went out for exercises in the field.
Additionally, General Burgin found that he could not [29] even put
his guns into final position because of the conditions now described.
General Burgin pointed out one of the great handicaps to development of field
artillery positions was resistance from land owners to letting the artillery
go on the land or lease it for the placing of battery positions. He described
the situation as follows :
"General Russell. Is it true, therefore. General, that prior to December 7,
1941. so far as you can recall, you had never had all of your mobile batteries
in the positions which they were to occupy in the event of hostilities?
"General Burgin. That is correct ; they had not all been in the actual position
they were to go in.
"General Frank. Was that because of this opposition to the people who owned
the land?
"General Burgin. Yes, and the fact that we had not yet gotten the leases all
fixed up, .so that we could move into those positions for practice." (R. 2628)
3374 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
He also pointed out that if General Short had gone to Alert No. 3 there would
have been great opposition from important and influential civilians on the
island and particularly those who compose what is known as the Big Five.
As to this he said :
"General Russeix. Is there in your mind some thought that there would
have been developed a considerable opposition among the influential civilian
population here on the island toward the results of Alert Number 3?
"General Bubgin. I think there is no doubt about it, in the world.
"General Russeix. In other words, if General Short had ordered Alert Num-
ber 3 — and I am asking this question in the interest of clarity — if General Short
had ordered Alert No. 3 and thrown all of his people into readiness for imme-
diate combat, including the issuing of ammunition, it might, or, in your opinion,
it would have provoked opposition on the part of some of the responsible and
influential civilian population here on the island?
"General Burgin. I feel positive it would.
"General Gbunert. Even though he might have explained that to the influential
citizens, there would still have been opposition?
"General Btjrgin. I don't believe you could have explained it, at that time.
"General Gbunert. Who are some of those influential citizens that you think
might have voiced their objection?
[30] "General Bubgin. Oh, my!
"General Gbunest. Is Dillingham one of them?
"General BtrBGiN. Mr. Dillingham, Mr. Walker.
"General Frank. Which Walker?
"General Bubgin. I don't know. He is a sugar man. General Wells." (R.
2629)
He said amongst those people were the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association,
and those having the land and crop interests in sugar, pineapples, etc.
In this connection it should be noted that there is proof in this record that
one of the things that may have influenced Short in Selecting Alert Number 1
and not stirring up the Japanese population was the opposition that developed
then and later from the large commercial interests on the island using Japanese
labor, that they did not want it disturbed and that they would be shut down in
their business if a substantial portion of it was either- deported or interned.
(R. 2654)
As General Burgin testified, if the tables had been reversed and Americans
had been situated in Japan like the Japanese were in Hawaii they would have
been locked up before the war started and not afterwards. (R. 2649)
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3375
3376 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[32] Exhibit "C"
November 8. 1940.
Lieutenant General C. D. Herron.
Commanding, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.
Dear General Herron : During tlie past 17 years the Army has at times used
our roails and lands for maneuvers and each time your staff has requested our
permission before carrying out these exercises. During this period we have never
had an occasion to complain about the condition in which our roads and lands
were left by the Officers and men under your command. With this in mind I
wonder if. during these strenuous times, it would be of any help to you and your
staff to have for maneuvering purposes, a blanket okeh covering the use of the
roads and lands under our control. If so, I will be glad to have it forwarded
immediately.
This will also cover the use of plantation water and any other facilities that
you might deem necessary to successfully carry out maneuvers.
If there is any other way in which we can cooperate please do not hesitate to
call on us.
Yours very sincerely,
/s/ James N. Orrick,
Manager, Kahuku Plantation Company.
JNO : L
[33] Commanding General
War Department.
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii, November 13, 1940.
To : Mr. James N. Orrick,
Manager, Kahuku Plantation Company, Kahuku, Hawaii.
My Dear Mr. Orrick : I am in receipt of your exceedingly gratifying letter of
November 8th in regard to the use of the plantation lands by the troops of this
command. What you say in regard to the good conduct of troops on your lands
and your most generous offer of a blanket permission give me the greatest
pleasure. Please accept my sincere thanks for and my appreciation of your
very helpful offer.
We shall be delighted to have the blanket permission and I trust that should
any transgression occur, as it must in time, you will immediately notify us in
order that we may make prompt restitution and take the necessary preventive
measures against repetition.
Yours sincerely,
/s/ C. D. Herron
C. D. Herron,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.
[34] November 18, 1940.
The Commanding General
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, Oahu, T. H.
DEiAR Sir: Until further notice you and your command are hereby permitted
for maneuvering purposes the free use at any time of all roads and lands under
our control at Kahuku.
Permission is also granted for the withdrawal of domestic water from the
pipeline situate on the Kamehameha Highway near our Main Store at Kakuku.
Yours very truly,
Kahuku Plantation Company.
/s/ James N. Orrick, Manager.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3377
[3,5] Headquakteiss 64'rH Coast Artillery (AA)
Office of the Regimental Commandeb
Fort Shatter, T. H., February 11, 19^1.
In reply refer to : 680
Oahu Sugab Co.,
Waipahu, Oahu, T. H.
Gentlemen: In carrying out training in various missions for the defense of
Oahu this regiment must use positions, usually on the sides of roads, for search-
light units. Each of these units consists of about ten men and the searchlight
equipment. The units arrive at the positions just before dark, occupy them for
three or four hours and then depart. Four of these positions are located on your
property.
1. lOlX) yards southeast of pump camp #5 at first locked gate on the road to
Manawahua.
2. At a railroad crossing 0 6 miles north of the road which begins just west
of the Waipahu Grade School.
3. On a cane field road at the east end of the stables which are just off Kunia
Road near Kunia Camp #1.
4. On cane field road at the southwest edge of a reservoir by the camp 1%
miles north of Ewa Junction and about i/4 luil^ east of Kam Highway.
As the various missions and plans change from time to time, new positions
have to be occupied, and as each position requires permission it is readily seen
that freedom of movement to meet each situation is hampered. It is therefore
requested that this regiment be granted blanket authority to occupy positions
from time to time on the property owned and controlled by you.
This of course would be granted with positive assurance that every care will
be exercised to preivent damage to the property.
Very truly yours,
(Signed) C. K. Wing
C. K. WING,
Colonel, 64th CA (AA) Commanding.
Waipahu, Oahu, T. H., Fehruary 11, 19^1.
To: Colonel C. K. Wing, Commanding 64th C. A. (AA), Fort Shafter, T. H.
Permission to use specific positions as described in the [36] above letter
is hereby granted.
Your request for blanket authority to move to other positions not specifically
described herein is also granted.
Yours very truly,
Oahu Sugar Company, Limited,
(Signed) H. L'Obange, Manager.
HL'O : W
[57] Headquarters 64th Coast Artillery (AA),
Fort Shafter, T. H., November 16, 1939.
In reply refer to: 680 (P&T)
Honolulu Plantation Co.,
Aiea, Oahu, T. H.
Gentlemen : In carrying out training in various missions for the defense of
Oahu this regiment is in need of positions usually along side of roads to place
small groups of men with equipment such as searchlight units with a crew of
about § to 10 men. Some of the desired positions are located on property belong-
ing to or controlled by your company. It is requested that permission be granted
this regiment to place these groups of men with their equipment of the following
locations :
A position on Aiea Heights
A position on Red Hill
The men arrive at these positions with their equipment just before dark, occupy
them for three or four hours and then depart.
3378 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
As these various missions and plans change from time to time, new positions
have to be occupied and as each position requires permission, it is readily seen
that freedom of movement to meet each situation is hampered. It is therefor
requested that this regiment be granted blanket authority to occupy positions on
the property owned or controlled by you from time to time. This of course would
be granted with positive assertion that every care will be exercised to prevent
damage to the property and interference with traflSc on roads.
Very truly yours,
/s/ C. K. Wing
C. K. Wing,
Colonel, 64th CA (AA),
Commanding.
[38] November 21st, 1939.
Colonel C. W. Wing,
Commanding, 64th C. A. {AA), Fort Shaffer, Oahu.
Deiar Sir : We will be pleased to grant you i)ermission to occupy any position
you wish, on the plantation, so you may carry out your various missions and
plans, as requested in the last paragraph of your letter of November 16th, 1939.
Yours truly,
HouoLtTLU Plantation Company,
Stafford L. Austin, Manager,
SLA : ESB
[39] Exhibit "D"
June 4, 1941.
Captain J. E. Young, Q. M. C,
Real Estate Officer, Fort Shaffer, T. H.
land matters
Deab Sib:
In connection with Ewa Plantation Company's leasing to the Army of three
sites of approximately three acres each (not referred to in our letter to you
of May 29, 1941) the locations of which were tentatively agreed upon between
Acting Manager Slater Miller and your Lieutenant Colonels Lynd and Taliaferro,
we wish to say in this respect that Ewa Plantation Company is prepared to dis-
cuss with you the terms and conditions to be embodied in such a lease, and for
this purpose we accordingly ask that you telephone or write us to arrange a place
and date of meeting.
As we understand, the site proposed by Lieutenant Colonel R. F. Lynd for
the Sub-Sector Command Post lies in the vicinity of Ewa Field 20.1 crossed by
the 200-foot contour ditch. Of the other two sites selected by Lieutenant Colonel
E. H. Taliaferro for anti-aircraft gun sites, one lies in the reclaimed area ad-
jacent to Ewa Field 64 and the other on the North slopes of Honouliuli Valley
in the neighborhood of Ewa Field 32.
For your information, before any lease can be entered into with the Army
covering these three sites, we believe it will be necessary for you to locate
same on the ground and prepare maps and descriptions. Further, if you in-
tend to record the lease, it will require the subdivision, for land court purposes,
of certain lots on which these sites are located, all such work to be undertaken
at your expense.
If, however, the importance of this matter to the National Defense Program is
such as to require immediate occupancy by the War Department of the areas
proposed to be taken, Ewa will be agi'eeable to such a plan, ui)on the under-
standing that, at a later date, maps delineating the specific areas will be fur-
nished by you, together with a formal document. If, in the immediate taking
of such areas, cane crops are thereby demaged, you will reimburse or compen-
sate Ewa Plantation Company for all such crop damages and all other damages
incidental to such taking.
Very truly yours,
/s/ A. S. D.
A. S. Davis,
• Vice-President, Ewa Plantation Company.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3379
[^0] Mat 29, 1941.
QM 660. C-RE (Gen.)
Captain J. E. Yoitng. "
Q. M. Corps. Real Estate Officer,
Headquarters, Hawmian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.
Dear Sik: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of 22 May, 1941,
requesting confirmation of verbal permission for the use of certain small areas
of land by the War Department for military purposes.
Permission is hereby granted the War Department for military use, as re-
quested, of the small areas of land desired. It is understood that maps delineat-
ing the specific areas will be furnished with a formal instrument covering same
at a later date. This permission covers the following approximate sites :
Seven gun emplacements and three bomb-proof shelters to be constructed at
various locations along Puujki Beach, all located on Lot A of Land Court Appli-
cation 1089.
One gun emplacement at Kaiaka Bay, located on Grant 1976, Apana 3, under
lease to Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd., from Dorthea Emerson.
Two mortar positions, located on land leased from the Bishop Estate by
Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd., near the City of County Reservoir at Haleiwa.
Permanent trenches and fortifications, located .iust above the Wahiawa Ditch
and below the road leading across Helemano 6 Reservoir on Land Commission
Award 7713, Apana 34.
The permission to use these various sites for military purposes is granted
subject to the following provisions :
1. No growing crops are to be disturbed.
2. No plantation facilities, such as irrigation ditches, pipe lines, etc., are to be
disturbed without making prior arrangements.
3. All fences or gates leading to the various sites will be closed at all times.
4. That the use of these various sites by the government will not in any way
constitute a release of title to the land by Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd.
5. The permission granted for the use of lands which are leased by Waialua
Agricultural Co., Ltd., from other parties only extends until the expiration of the
leases involved.
6. Permission to use the above sites is granted for the extent of the present
National Emergency, and in the event that the use of sites is desired beyond said
emergency, [4n then it is felt that same should be covered by a formal
document properly executed by all parties and interests.
I hope this fulfills your immediate request and that it will serve until the
necessary formal instruments can be prepared for approval.
Very truly yours,
Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd.,
/s/ John H. Midkiff, Manager.
JM : mhs
[42] May 1, 1941.
The Commanding General,
Hauaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.
Dear Sir:
license for railway on waianae co. land
Referring to your letter of April 28th, Engr. 662/7, requesting permission to
enter at once upon the land of Waianae Company at Maili, Laulaulei, Oahu, for
the purpo.se of constructing railway spurs authorized under license, the execution
of which by the War Department is now pending, please be advised that on
behalf of said Company, you are hereby authorized to make immediate entry
upon said land for the purpose specified.
Your very truly,
Ame:eican Factors. Limited,
/s/ C. T. B.
C. T. Bailey,
Manager. Land Department.
CTB : LL
79716 O — 46 — pt. 18 34
3380 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
US]
Headquartkks Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shaffer, T. H., Apr. 28, 1941.
In reply refer to : Engr. 662/7
Mr. H. A. Walker,
President, Waianae Company,
% American Factors, Limited, Honolulu, T. H.
Dear Mr. Walker: This is to acknowledge receipt of Mr. Bailey's letter dated
17 April 1941 transmitting to me a document" and three duplicate copies of a
license for the railway to be located on the land owned by your company at Mail,
lAialualei, Oahu.
Pending final acceptance of this document by the Secretary of War, it is re-
quested that the Army be permitted to initiate the construction of these spurs.
I desire to express my sincere thanks for your prompt and helpful attitude that
you and other oflScers of your Company have adopted toward the furtherance of
this military project. Your hearty cooperation exemplified fine support of the
national defense of your country.
Very truly yours,
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. 8. Army,
Commanding.
[44] Exhibit "E"
Headquarters 24th Division Artillery,
Schofield Barracks, T. H., Nnvemher 6, 1941-
WAIALUA AORICULTrRAL Co.,
Waialua, T. H.
Mr. J. H. Midkiff, Mngr.
Dear Sir : Request is made for use of certain portions of your land as described
below :
Area
Men
Vehicles
Purpose
Date
Time
Unit
164
164 .
60
400
400
400
140
60
140
60
60
12
50
50
50
20
10
20
10
10
ROOP-K...
ROOP-K...
ROOP-K...
ROOP-K. -
ROOP-K...
ROOP-K...
ROOP-K...
ROOP-K...
ROOP-K...
Nov 25-26...
Nov 25-26...
Nov 25-26...
Nov 25-26...
Nov 24
Nov?4......
Nov. 27
Nov 25
Nov 26
AM-PM
AM-PM
AM-PM
AM-PM.
AM-PM
AM-PM
AM-PM
.A.M-PM
AM-PM
Hq 24 Div Arty .
13th FA.
180
322
13th FA.
13th FA.
123
13th FA.
161 ..
161
180
180.
Hq Btry 52 FA.
HQ & B, 13 FA.
Btry B, 52 FA.
Hq Btry, 52 FA .
The usual precautions to safeguard your property will be observed. Cultivated
or plowed land will not be entered upon. Your workers and machinery will not
be interfered with. Every effort will be made not to damage roads.
Reply by endor.sement hereon will suflSce. The enclosed envelope requires no
postage.
Very truly yours,
/s/ Rox. H. Donaldson
Rox. H. Donaldson,
Major, 24th Division Artillery,
Land Officer.
I^'irst Endorsement
November 7, 1941.
To Major Rox. H. Donaldson
24t'h Division Artillery,
Land Officer, Schofield Barracks, T. H.
1. Approved.
/«/
.JM : mbs
Joseph Matson, Jr.
JosEa>H Matson, Jr.,
Civil Engineer, Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3381
[-'/5]
Headqt'ahters Eleventh P'ikld Artiijlery Bkigade.
Schofleld Barracks, Territory of Hawaii, March 25, 1941.
Mr. H. R. Sh.vw,
Waialua Agricultural Co., Waiahia, Oahu.
De.ab Sie : Request is made for use of certain portions of your land as described
below :
Area
Men
Vehicles
Purpose
Date
Time
Unit
Johanna
70
10
RSOP
April?
A. M
13th FA.
Johanna
100
12
Reconnaissance .
April 11
A. -M,
13th FA.
Johanna.
300
40
Camp-K.
April 14-17....
Day & Night..
13th FA.
Anahulu
350
50
RSOP-K
April 7-8
Day & Night..
13th FA.
Anahulu
350
50
Camp-K
April 14-17....
Day & Night..
ll-8th FA.
Euc. Forest
350
50
RSOP-K
April 7-8
Day & Night..
13th FA.
Euc. Forest
100
12
Reconnaissance .
April 21
A. M
13th FA.
Euc. Forest
350
50
Camp-K
April 14-17....
Day & Night..
13-8th FA.
Brig. Woods
150
15
Camp-K
Aprill4-17_-.-
Day & Night.
13th FA.
ERA Camp
150
15
Camp-K
April 14-17....
Day & Night-.
13th-8th FA.
Kaiaka Point...
10
2
Camp-K
April 14-17....
Day & Night..
13th FA.
Puiki Woods...
50
5 Camp-K
April 14-17....
Day & Night..
13th-8th FA.
The usual precautions to safeguard your property will be observed. Culti-
vated or plowed lands will not be entered upon. Your workers and machinery
will not be interfered with. Every effort will be made not to damage roads.
Reply by endorsement hereon will suffice. The enclosed envelope requires no
postage.
Very truly yours,
/s/ K. W. van de Velde,
R. W. VAN DE Velde,
Captain, 11th F. A. Brigade.
Note: Areas for April 14-17 are for North Shore maneuver, we do not know
definitely which will be used, but may, at one time or other, have to use all.
Permission granted. No exceptions.
Waialua, T. H., March 28, 19 J,!.
/s/ Harold R. Shaw,
Harold R. Shaw,
Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd.
[46] Headquarters,
Eleventh Field Artillery Beigade,
Schofield Barracks, Territory of Hawaii, Sept. 5, 1941.
Ewa Plantation Co..
Ewa, Oahu, T. H.
(Att. Mr. S. M. Miller, Field Supertd.)
Dear Sir : Request is made for use of certain portions of your land as de-
scribed below :
Area
Men
Vehicles
Purpose
Date
Time
Unit
260
260 .
70
70
70
70
10
10
10
10
RSOP-K...
RSOP-K...
RSOP-K...
RSOP-K ..
Sept. 22, 1941
Sept. 25, 1941
Oct. 3, 1941
Oct. 3, 1941
All Day...
All Day...
All Day...
All Day...
Hq. 1st Bn 13th FA.
Btry. C 13th FA.
Btry. A 13th FA.
Btry. B 13th FA.
262
277
The usual precautions to safeguard your property will be observed. Culti-
vated or plowed lands will not be entered upon. Your workers and machinery
will not be interfered with. Every effort will be made not to damage roads.
3382 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Reply by endorsement hereon will snflSee. The enclosed envelope requires no
postage.
Very truly yours.
/s/ R. B. Hood,
Major, 11th F. A. Brigade.
September 10, 1941.
EwA Plantaiion Company,
Approved.
/s/ S. M. MrrxEB.
"Restricted"
[^7] Exhibit "F"
ScHOFiKLD Barbacks. T. H.. January 13, 1941.
Mr. H. R. Shaw,
Waialua Affricultural Co., Waialua, T. H.
Dear Mr. Shaw : There follows a very peculiar request. General Murray
is very anxious to make some experiments with the possibilities of camouflaging
gun iMjsitions in cane fields. In order to accomplish this we have to have the
cooperation of some plantation. You and the Waialua Co. have been most
cooperative and for that reason I feel that I may be "working a willing horse
to death." Please feel free to refuse if you so desire.
Here is the proposition : We would like two plots of cane approximately
40' X 40', one side of which to be directly on a road with no irrigation ditch
to cross. Some, of the cane will be cut out of these plots and we will run
a gun into each, stretch a camouflage net over it and experiment with various
methods of placing the cut cane on the nets until we find the methodl which
shows least change in an air photo. This experiment to be made during February
25-27. We need a full growth of cane to get as much height as possible and
thought if you were planning to burn a field about that time, the cane cut for
the experiment would not be wasted.
I realize that you are in business and that your concern is not set up be an
auxiliary to the Army, so please be frank in your reaction to this request.
Cane, covering so much of the lowlands, as you know, is one of our problems
and we can think of no other way to solve it.
Verv truly yours,
/s/ R. W. van de Velde
R. W. VAN DE Velde,
Captain, 11th F. A. Brigade.
OK
M
[1,8] January 14, 1941.
Captain R. W. van de Vei.de,
11th Field Artillery Brigade.
Behofield Barracks, T. H.
Dear Capt.\in van de Velde : Your request of January 13th for cane areas in
which to make tests on camouflaged gun positions has been received, and I believe
we can make the necessary arrangements.
As you anticipated, it would be necessary to arrange the test in an area which
would' be harvested within three days of the date of the experiment. Whether an
area which would suit your puriwse from the viewpoint of road.set and topog-
raphy would be available between the exact dates of February 25-27 cannot be
predicted this far in advance.
My suggestion would be that about February 15-20 we make an inspection
together of the areas which will be harvested between that time and March 1st.
By choosing several alternate positions, I could notify you several days in advance
of the date each area is to be cut, and you could make final arrangements as
Influenced by availability of a gun battery or of Air Corps participation.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3383
As always, we shall be happy to cooperate with the Army in this experiment,
and are sure that you will cooperate to minimize disturbance of our normal pro-
duction operations.
Very truly yours,
Harold R. Shaw,
Waialva Agricultural Co., Ltd.
[Jf9\ Headquartkks Twenty-seventh Infantry,
Office of the Regimental Commander,
Schofield Barracks. T. H.. Septemher 23. IdJ^l.
Superintendent,
Oahu Sugar Plantation Co.
Dear Sir : It has been brought to my attention recently that the property ad-
jacent to the Waipio Sub Station has been cleared of cane.
If it would be convenient to you I would like to request that new plantings
be started about five (5) yards from the fence line in order that defense of the
Sub Station against sabotage may be facilitated and at the same time be made
more effective.
Sincerely yours,
/sgd/ Wm. A. McCulloch,
Wm. a. MoC'ulloch,
Colonel, 27th Infantry,
Commanding.
[50]
September 29, 1941.
41/1041
Wm. a. McCutxoch
Colonel, 27th Infantry
Commanding Schofield Barracks, T. H.
Deab Sir : In reply to your letter of September 23, 1941 please be advised that
new plantings of cane in the area adjacent to the Waipio Sub Station will be
started five (5) yards from the fence line.
Yours very truly.
Oahu Sugar Company, Limited
(Signed) H. L'Oranoe. Manager.
HL'O :M
July 21, 1939.
[51] .
Lieut. Clyde R. McBride,
2nd En., 13th Field Artillery,
Schofield Barracks, T. H.
Dear Sie: In reference to your letter of July 17, 1939 requesting data on the
Waialua Plantation of possible military interest and value, we are glad to supply
the following information :
(A) Personnel data as of June 30, 1939:
(1) .\dult Male Personnel Employed
(2) Total Plantation Population
Ancestry
Citizen
Non-
Citizen
Total
Men
Women
Children
Total
Japanese _ _
Filipino
Chinese
275
17
5
14
12
no
24
57
17
176
808
5
20
10
9
..
451
825
10
34
22
119
24
58
17
536
804
14
46
27
137
26
62
18
425
152
6
34
18
119
14
60
10
833
501
17
68
45
171
23
51
25
1,794
1.457
37
Korean
Port o-Riean
148
50
Portuguese
Hawaiian.
Anglo-Saxon..
All Others
447
63
173
53
Total
531
1,029
1,.560
1,670
838
1,764
4,262
3384 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Estimated total population of Haleiwa Village (Non-Plantation) 4.000
(B) Engineer find Motor Equipment Available:
(1) Truc-ks and Trailers, 19.
Total Cargo Capacity, 65 Tons.
Passenger Capacity, 1105 persons.
(2) Tractors rated by horsepower:
HP 22 30 35 40 65 70 75 95 Total
No. 13 2 1 5 2 2 2 2 29
(3) Miscellaneous Engineer Material:
Mobile Cane Loaders, 7.
Excavator Bucket, 1.
Drag Line Bucket, 2.
Road Grader, 10', 1.
Bull-dozers, 2.
Tractor-trailers, 3.
Heavy Breaking Plows, 2.
Heavy Disc Plows, 2.
Portable Air Compressors, 2.
Portable Welding Machines, 2.
Portable Concrete Mixers, 2.
Detailed list of hand tools and normal warehouse supply submitted to Depart-
ment Service Command in August, 1938.
(C) Railroad Equipment :
(1) Length Permanent Narrow-Gage Main Line, 55^4 miles.
(2) Length Portable Track (12-foot section), 10 miles.
(3) Number of Locomotives, 7.
(4) Number of Cane Cars (3 to 4 tons cargo capacity), 736.
(5) Number of Labor Cars (Beating Capacity — 25 men), 25.
(6) Number of Flat Cars, 36.
(7) Number of Oil Cars, 2.
[52] CD) Time required to lay one mile narrow gage portable track ap-
proximately 20 mandays of 8 hours. Our average figure to date for 16-man crews
in each harvest field is 3.83 man-days for 1,000 feet of portable track.
(E) Time necessary to burn and clear one acre of cane land highly variable,
depending on weather conditions and yield of cane, and whether for commercial
or military purposes. A working approximation would be 8 man days to burn
and cut one acre of cane, plus 7 man-days with proper equipment to load and
clear the area.
(F) Possibility of cutting off water supply of Haleiwa and Waialua not
feasible at individual sources of supply, as we maintain 19 pumps supplying
108 million gallons per 24 hours from 114 wells. Destruction of power plant
at (1) Waialua Mill and (2) Hawaiian Electric Transformer station, and of
concrete reservoir at Haleiwa would probably accomplish purpose.
(G) Plantation roads and ditches are semi-permanent in the sense that they
are placed on key terrain features, and are seldom moved.
(H) The legend that plantation water supply is poisoned is entirely mythical.
Practically all pump water is potable but subject to contamination in open
channels ; gravity mountain water is usually very turbid as well. During a
few months of the year, fertilizer is applied in the irrigation water within the
field but not in main supply canals. Arsenic berbizides are applied directly to
vegetation along roads and ditches and Vithin cane fields — never in the irriga-
tion water.
(I) Other Features of Possible Interest :
(1) The plantation maintains complete shops for railroad, electrical and
mechanical repairs. Detailed list of power tools available submitted to Depart-
ment Service Command, August. 1938.
(2) Electric Power — Mill Power Plant, 3,000 KWH ; Hydroelectric plant near
Brigade Woods, 385 KWH.
(3) Billeting — total number of dwellings. 1.087; average floor area per
dwelling. 900 square feet.
(4) Livestock — 65 mules, 15 pack-mules, 14 horses.
(5) Wahiawa Tunnel — four miles long, 4 feet by 6 feet cross section, gives
completely covered and concealed route for foot troops from Kaukonahua Bridge
near Artillery Gate, Schofield, to Brigade Woods.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3385
A similar tunnel on east side of Kawailoa Gulch gives covered approach from
Wahiawa-Pupukea Road to Eucalyptus Forest.
Very truly yours,
H. P. Shaw,
Irrigation Overseer.
HPS: es.
cc : Department Service
Command, Fort Shaftei, T. H.
A. C. of S., Gr-3 Hawaiian Division, Schofield Barracks
S-3, 21st Infantry Brisade, Schofield Barracks
S-3, 27th Infantry, Schofield Barracks
Mr. C. R. Sischoff
[53] Exhibit "G"
War Department,
Headquabters Hawn. Department,
Fort Shafter, Territoni of Haimii, February 1, 1941.
Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association,
Honolulu, Hawaii.
Gentlemen : It would be unseemly and ungrateful to qi\it my command of the
Hawaiian Department without expressing the appreciation of the Army for the
continued and substantial contributions of your Association to National Defense.
The attitude of all of your personnel is beyond praise, but I feel that I should
especially express appreciation of the invaluable aid of your Secretary, General
Wells, and of the vital and highly intelligent work done by your Diversified
Crop Committee and its members.
Your Forester, Mr. George A. McEldowney, has for many years in his own time
advised and assisted the Schofield Barracks authorities in their reforestation
program and the very substantial progress made in the last two years is largely
due to him.
Please believe that the liberal and helpful attitude of the Association is not
lost upon the Army and we are grateful. For my successor. General Short, I
bespeak your good oflSces and a continuance of the generous assistance you have
always given to the Army in Hawaii.
With all good wishes and sincere thanks, I am.
Sincerely,
C. D. Herbon,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.
[54] Heiadqxjartebs Schofield Barracks
and Hawaiian Division,
Office of The Commanding General,
Schofield Barracks, T. H., June 3, 19^0.
In reply refer to: 354.2 (6-3-40) 4
Mr. Hans L'Orange,
Manager, Oahu Sugar Company,
Waipahu, T. H.
Dear Mb. L'Orange : The success of the maneuvers, completed May 25, 1940,
has in a great measure been facilitated by the cooperation of private land
owners in allowing the Hawaiian Division to use land during this period.
Every eflort was made to prevent damage to propei;ty and inconvenience to
land owners. A survey is being made to insure the repair of any damages caused
by troops during maneuvers. If property, under your control, has been damaged,
incident to its use by troops, a report fnmi you giving details will be appreciated.
Please accept my appreciation for your cooperation and generosity in allowing
the army to use your lands during this maneuver, and for all past favors.
Very truly yours,
(Signed) Wm. H. Wilson
Wm. H. Wilson,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
3386 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
155] Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
F(yrt Shatter, T. H., Nov. 29, 1941.
In reply refer to : Engr. 600.12 (Kipapa)
Mr. Hans L'Orange,
Manager, Waipahu Plantation,
Waipahu, T. H.
Dear Mr. L'Orange: After considerable study and investigation, the War
Department has decided that the additional airport to be constructed on this
Island should be located in the vicinity of Kahuku Point rather than in the
vicinity of Kipapa Gulch where I originally recommended its construction.
I wish to thank you for your efforts in assisting members of my Staff with
the location, surveys and layouts of the airport in the vicinity of Kipapa. Your
knowledge of local conditions was of great value in this study. Since there
is still a possibility of future expansion of the air forces in this department,
Kipapa may re-enter the picture at some later date. However, all action upon
that site has been stopped at the present time.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Walter C. Short
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
[56] Exhibit "H"
Police Headquarters.
Honolulu, Hawaii, July 30, 1940.
Contidential Memorandum
To All Sugar Plantation Managers Oahu, T. H.
Owing to current events, the Oahu Sugar Managers Association at a special
meeting held at Waipahu July 19th, in conjunction with the Army and Police
Authorities, appointed the writer as co-ordinator of plans for any Emergency
which might arise. It was, however, carefully pointed out that this is purely
a precautionary measure and does not necessarily denote a belief that such an
Emergency is near or even bound to come.
However, the Plantation Managers are faced with the necessity of having
plans for two phases.
I. The Alert— Plan No. 1.
II. Sudden and unpredicted overt acts by disloyal inhabitants whether ac-
companied or not by hostile "Blitzkreig" from air or sea — Plan No. 2
Plan No. 1 :
This will come in force the instant that information received or other in-
dications denote the advisability of putting in precautionary measures. This plan
is taking shape rapidly, and I hope to report to you more fully on this in the
next week or so.
However, it might be well for you to remember that the Alert will probably
mean that :
(a) As far as possible Plantation work should proceed as normally as possible.
(b) Previous plans to keep people calm should be put in force.
(c) All personnel for guard duty, transportation, housing facilities, etc., prom-
ised under this plan would probably be immediately required by the Police.
(d) Further guards for your own private property and buildings would be
required. Cane fire preventive patrols might be advisable.
(e) Arrangements for putting plan No. 2 into effect would have to be made.
Plan No. 2:
I will discuss this in a future memorandum and also verbally with individual
managers.
[57] It is requested that this work be kept as confidential as possible and
the Police be mentioned as the instigators rather than the Army.
Yours very truly,
/s/ T. G. S. Walkeb,
Co-ordinator Emergency Plan.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3387
[58] Exhibit "I"
Police He:ai>quaeters,
Honolulu, T. H.
Confidential
Memorandum : Provisional Police Plan
A meeting was lield at the H. S. P. A. Board Room 10 A. M. Tuesday, August
6th, 1940.
The following were present : Major Melvin L. Craig, Major W. O. Poindexter,
Chief of Police W. A. Gabrielson, Mr. George Y. Bennett, Waimanalo Sugar Co. ;
Mr. J. N. Orriek, Kahuku Plantation Co. ; Mr. J .H. Midkiff, Waialua Agricul-
tural Co. ; Mr. Hans L'Orange, Oahu Sugar Co. ; Mr. J. D. Bond, Ewa Plantation
Co.; Mr. Robert Fricke, Waianae Plantation Co.; Mr. S. L. Austin, Honolulu
Plantation Co. ; Mr. T. G. S. Walker.
Chief of Police Gabrielson presided. Details as to number of personnel, trucks
and living quarters to be supplied by each organization were discussed. Dis-
trict and Beat Boundaries were explained.
Dates for lectures by Police to Provisional Police were fixed to start as follows:
Kahuku Plantation Co., 5 P. M., Monday August 19.
Waimanalo Plantation Co., 7 : 15 P. M., Monday August 19.
Waianae Plantation Co., 5 P. M., Tuesday Aug. 20.
Ewa Plantation Co., 7 P. M., Tuesday Aug. 20.
Waialua Plantation Co., 5 P. M., Wed. August 21.
Waipahu Plantation Co., 7 P. M., Wed., August 21.
Honolulu Plantation Co., 4 ; 30 P. M., Thurs. August 22.
Subsequent meetings will be announced later, though it was thought if possible
lectures and instructions should be given weeklv at same time and place until
course is finished.
Major Craig expressed General Charles D. Herron's thanks for the splendid
co-operation being shown by the Plantation Managers.
Meeting adjourned 11 : 20 A. M.
/s/ T. G. S. Walker,
Co-Ordinator Provisional Police Plan.
[59] Exhibit "'J"
Confidential
Office of the Chief of Police,
Honolulu, T. H., August 12, 1940.
Pbovisional Police Plan fob Emekgenoy Guard Division
PLAN for the organization BY THK CHItF OF POLICE OF THE VOLUNTARY GUABO
division
Maps : Island of Oahu 1/62.500 w/4 overlays attached hereto ; Island of Oahu,
1/62,500 (SECRET) showing Signal Corps installations to be distributed by
Army when emergency occurs.
1. The Provisional Police Plant is to provide the personnel and other means
necessary to protect from overt acts all agencies and establishments, both civil
and military, which are essential to the defense of the Island of Oahu, the
defense of which is not charged to combat elements nor located on military res-
ervations. In the performance of this mission, the City and County of Honolulu
Police Department will take over when directed by the Department Commander.
2. The Island of Oahu is divided into four (4) police districts, namely. Police
District No. 1, City of Honolulu ; and Police Districts Nos. 2, 3, and 4, comprising
the rural districts.
3. a. There will be a Captain of Police in charge of the Provisional Guard
Division, who will have two assistants, namely,
(1) The Captain of Police in Charge of Police District No. 1; and
(2) The Captain of Police in charge of rural Oahu Districts Nos. 2, 3, and 4.
h. There will be a lieutenant of Police in charge of each Police District No.
2, 3, and 4; and to assist these lieutenants of Police will be three (3) Sergeants
of Police for eacli Police Beat.
c. The personnel required within Police Districts will be supplied from the
following sources :
(1) DISTRICT NO. 1 — Police officers on pension, the American Legion, Vet-
erans of Foreign Wars, Public Utilities, Pineapple Companies, and other citizens
of the City of Honolulu.
3388 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
(2) DISTRICT NO. 2
Beat 1: Waiiuea Bridge to Brigade Woods (Inclusive). Waialua Agricultural
Co., Ltd. Mr. John Midkiff.
(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols —
79 men.
(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.
[6'0] (c) One (1) truck for shift changes.
Beat 2: Brigade Woods to Kipapa Gulch (Inclusive). Three Pineapple Plan-
tations :
(a) California Packing Corporation
(i) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols —
55 men.
(2) One (1) truck (riot).
(b) Hawaiian Pineapple Company.
{!) List of men required for Provisional Police Guax'ds and Patrols —
55 men.
(c) Libby, McNeill & Libby.
(1) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols —
32 men.
(2) One (1) truck tor shift changes.
(3) DISTRICT NO. 3
Beat 1: Pearl Harbor Junction to Pearl City Junction (Inclusive). Honolulu
Plantation Company — Mr. Stafford Austin.
(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols — 58
men.
(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.
(c) One (1) truck for shift changes.
Beat 2 : Pearl City Junction to Kunia Road. Oahu Sugar Company — Mr. Hans
L'Orange.
(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols — 66
men.
(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.
(c) Two (2) trucks ; 1 riot and 1 for shift changes.
Beat 3: Kunia Road to Nanakuli (Inclusive). Ewa Plantation — Mr. Douglas
Bond.
(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols — 63
men.
(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.
(c) Two (2) trucks for shift changes.
Beat 4: Nanakuli to Kaena Point (Inclusive). Waianae Plantation — Mr. Rob-
ert Fricke.
(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols — 112
men.
[61] (b) One (1) truck for shift changes.
(4) DISTRICT NO. J,
Beat 1: Makapuu Point to Kokokahi Road, Waimanalo Plantation— Mr. George
Bennett.
(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols — 40
men.
(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.
(c) One (1) truck for shift changes.
Beat 2: Kokokahi Road to Kahana Bridge. (Not inclusive). Mr. George
Bennett.
(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols — 30
men.
(b) One (1) truck for shift changes.
Beat S: Kahana Bridge to Waimea Bridge (both inclusive). Kahuku Planta-
tion— Mr. J. W. Orrick.
(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols — 102
men.
(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.
(c) Two (2) trucks: 1 riot and 1 for shift changes.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3389
d. Each police district commander will be responsible for the guarding and
protecting of all vital installations, both civil and military; and within his re-
spective district.
e. Training.
(1) Guards will be selected, after their records have been carefully scrutinized,
from lists supplied by organizations detailed to do so in the Provisional Police
Plan. Information as to details of training will be published in a separate Po-
lice Memorandum. . '
/. Divisional strength :
District Patrols & Guards
Shift
Total
I. Channel Street to Awa Street (Patrol) _.
Awa St. to Pier 37, via RR (Patrol) --
Main Plant, Hawaiian Electric
Mutual Telephone:
Main Plant --.
Kaimuki -
Wailupe - - —
Nuuanu - - - -
Kalihi... ---- --
Punahou - -
5 Railroad Bridges, Kalihi -
Sewer Disposal, Nuuanu Plant - -
Sewer Disposal, Date St
Sewer Disposal, Ala Moana & Fort Armstrong.
leg]
Water Supply, Beretania St
Water.SuppIy, Houghtailing & King
Water Supply, Kapahulu & Harding
Water Shaft, Kamehameha IV Road
Water Shaft, 16th & Claudine Aves. (Kaimuki)
2 Radio Stations
Headquarters' Clerks & Timekeepers
Fire and Police Alarm (City Hall)
8
24
6
18
2
6
2
6
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
5
15
2
6
1
3
1
3
2
6
2
6
2
6
2
6
2
6
4
12
46
138
1
3
47
141
1
3
g. Prior to the date that this plan is to be effective, the Army will furnish
the Police Departxuent with a detailed map of installations that are to be guarded.
4. o. Campsites — Locations of :
(1) Police District No. 2:
Wahiawa — CCC Camp
Waialua — Waialua Agricultural Co.
(2) Police District No. 3:
Aiea — Honolulu Plantation Co.
Waipahu — Oahu Sugar Co.
Ewa — Ewa Plantation Co.
Waianae — Army Military Reservation.
(3) Police District No. 4:
Kaneohe (to be erected)
Kahuku — Kahuku Plantation Co.
Waimanalo — Waimanalo Sugar Co.
b. All sugar plantation managers, excepting Waianae Company, which is not
supplying housing, have agreed to provide the messing and housing facilities
for the personnel furnished from their respective plantations.
c. One (1) riot truck, equipped with armor plate or sandbags and armed with
machine gun and sufficient personnel, will be located at every police district head-
quarters. One (1) pick-up truck will be located at each police beat headquarters.
(Until proper arrangements can be made, the sugar plantations will furnish
the above named trucks. )
d. The tour of duty on each installation by the various guards, pay, etc., will
be published in a later Police Bulletin. The same will be based upon the decision
of the Commanding fJeneral of the Hawaiian Departi^ent prior to the effective
date of this plan.
3390 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
e. There will be designated a Lieutenant of Police as Supply OflBcer, who will
be in charge of all supplies for all police districts. He will function directly
under the Chief of Police.
f. All guards will he furnished with distinctive markings, insignias, uniform,
etc.. which will readily designate them as special police guards. (Suggested
uniform for these guards would be the Army fatigue clothing, plus fabricated
sun helmet of proper design ) .
g. Arms (service riot guns), ammunitions and equipment, suflBcient for the
proper discharge of these duties will be furni.shed by the U. S. Army.
o. a. Each riot truck, patrol car, and sub-district headquarters will be equipped
with radio. (It is recommended that [63] the Territory of Hawaii ex-
tend the use of its voting booths for headquarters in the several sub-police
districts. )
b. Command Posts :
Chief of Police, Honolulu Police Station.
Captain of Police-ln-charge Division, Honolulu Police Station.
Captain of Police. District 1, Honolulu Police Station.
Captain of Police, Districts 2, 3, 4, at Wahiawa.
Lieutenant of Police. District 4, at Kaneohe.
Lieutenant of Police. District 2. at Wahiawa.
Lieutenant of Police, District 3, at Pearl City.
W. A. Gabrielson,
Chief of Police,
City and County of Honolulu.
1 Enclosure : Chart — Organization, Voluntary Guard Division.
Distribution :
Commanding General, Hawaiian Division — 1.
Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade — 1.
Chief of Police— 1.
Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department— 1.
Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Division — 1.
District, Beat Description
IV. 1. Makapuu Point to Ko-
kokahi Road (inclu-
sive)
2. Hokokahi Road to Ka-
hana Bay Bridge
(not inclusive)
3. Kahana Bay Bridge
to Waimea Bridge
(both inclusive)
III. 1. Peari Harbor Junction
to Peari City Junc-
tion (inc)
2. Peari City Junction to
Kunia Road
3. Kunia Road to Nana-
kuli (inc)
4. Nanakuli to Kaena
Point (inc)
II. 1. Waimea Bridge to
Brigade Woods (in-
clusive)
2. Brigade Woods to Ki-
papa Qulch (inclu-
sive).. --
Huts
Sta-
tions
R. R.
Bridges
Hiway
Bridges
Trucks
Beat
33
21
90
45
54
99
69
123
Men Required
Patrols
& hqrs.
Res.
Total
40
30
102
58
66
63
112
79
142
District I
RECAPITULATIONS
144
District II
221
District III
299
District IV
172
Grand Total
836
' Waiau Power Plant, 6.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3391
165] Exhibit "K" Confidential
Police Department,
City and County of Honolulu,
Territory of Hawaii, December 17, 1940.
Subject : Suggested Exercise for Plantations.
To : All Plantation Managers and Mr. Leo Rodby.
The Army authorities very kindly asked me as your representative to sit in
on their Headquarters Staff exercises to cover war conditions.
In these exercises, only the staffs of the various units work, being told that
theoretically they have so many men and such and such equipment under their
control. Each officer affected is given a bunch of sealed envelopes with instruc-
tions to open them up at the different specific times stated on each envelope.
Inside these sealed envelopes are messages stating that such and such an event
has taken place; the officer then has to state in writing whom he contacted and
what action he would take with the theoretical force at his command to handle
the situation.
During these exercises, Colonel Craig took me around and introduced me to
the various Headquarters Staffs who would be especially cooperating with the
Plantation Managers and civic authorities.
Colonel Hayes, the Chief of Staff, tentatively suggested that the Plantation
Managers and some of their executive staffs might care to have a similar
exercise worked out for them with regards to the possible conditions which
might face them in time of emergency. It was suggested that Colonel Foin-
dexter might work out such a plan with the Chief and me, and at some mutually
agreed on date suitable to all the Plantations, the Plantation Managers and
their executive staffs might go through an exercise with Poindexter, the Chief
and possibly myself, acting as neutral judges.
Would you please let me know what you think of the above plan, and if you
wish me to go further into the matter with the Army and Police authorities.
Please keep this confidential until a final decision is made on the matter.
/.s/ T. G. S. Walker,
T. G. S. Walker,
Co-ordinator, Provisional Police Plans.
TGSW : DL
[66] Exhibit "L"
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shatter, T. H., 5 May 1941.
Subject : Participation of Provisional Police Guards in Department Maneuvers
during i>eriod 17 May to 18 May 1941.
To : Commanding General, Schofield Barrack.s, T. H.
1. In connection with Department Maneuvers to be held in May, five hundred
eighty -two (582) members of the Provisional Police Guard will participate
during the period 12 : 00 noon, 17 May to 12 : 00 noon, 18 May 1941, inclusive.
The contemplated plan calls for the employment of one hundred ninety-four
(194) of those men for each relief while guarding installations located within
Police Districts II, III and IV.
2. It is desired you designate nine (9) officers (junior grade) and nine (9)
non-commissioned officers to supervise and instruct these guards in the use of
the Riot Shot Gun. and nine (9) Medical Corps enlisted men who are capable
of administering first aid. This personnel to report to the office of the Depart-
ment Provost Marshal at 10 : 00 am, 10 May 1941. It is further resired that a
total of 235 Riot Shot Guns and a total of 2,910 rounds (5 rounds per man)
of ammunition for same be made available for target practice, and a total of
235 targets — E. Silhouette type.
3. The personnel mentioned above will be stationed as indicated and the Riot
Shot Guns and ammunition for same distributed as shown below :
3392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Police District II
Beat 1 :
Place: Haleiwa Couit House
Officer : 1 Comiuissloned Officer as Supervisor
NCO : 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid : 1 Em to administer 1st Aid
Guns : 31 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 31
Beat 2 :
Place: Wahiawa Court House
Officer : 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO : 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid : 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns : 31 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 31
Police District III
Beat 1 :
Place : Pearl City Court House
Officer : 1 Commissionetl Officer as Supervisor
NCO : 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid : 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns : 19 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 19
Beat 2 :
Place: Waipahu Athletic Field
Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO : 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid : 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns : 24 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 24
[67] Beat 3 :
Place: Administration Building, Ewa
OflBcer : 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO : 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid : I EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns : 24 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 24
Beat 4 :
Place: Wainae Courthouse
Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO : I NCO as Instructor
1st Aid : 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns : 24 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 24
Police District IV
Beat 1 :
Place: Waimanalo Plantation Gymnasium
Officer : 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid : 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns : 14 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 14
Beat 2 :
Place : Kaneohe Court House
Officer : 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO : 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid : I EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns : 11 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 11
Beat 3 :
Place: Kahuku Plantation Co. Police Station (near Picture House)
Officer : 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid : 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns : 37 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 37
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3393
Totals
Commissioned Officers — 9
Non-Comraissioned Officers 9
Enlisted Men capable of administering 1st Aid 9
Riot Shot Guns 235
Rounds of Am^iunition for Riot Siiot Guns 2910
Targets 235
By command of Lieutenant General Short :
[68] Exhibit "M"
Subject : Objectives of the Diversified Crop Committee of H. S. P. A.
1. Basic Considerations.
a. The purpose of crop diversification should be dual, namely, to make the
local community more self-sufficient in time of peace and to develop local facilities
so that Oahu may be made entirely self-supporting in time of war.
b. A broadened agricultural base to include a greater diversification of food
crops will be of great value in a depression, will be an influence to improve the
well-being of local labor at all times and may well be the determining influence
in the defense of these islands in time of war. The cost of the development
of diversified agriculture may be considered as a very reasonable insurance
premium protecting an investment of many millions.
c. The local climate and other conditions make it economically sound to put
the major agricultural effort of the islands into sugar and pineapple production.
The major emphasis on these two products should not be altered.
d. Present trade relations with the West coast in food commodities provide a
valuable mainland tie which should not be severed.
e. A reasonable objective should be to accomplish a 50% self-sufficiency in
time of peace accomplished by putting major emphasis on those things which
are niost suited to local production.
f. Crop diversification in the Hawaiian Islands, to be effective must be within
the plantation system. This is apparent in view of the fact that plantations
control all suitable land, control most of the labor and are financially the only
agencies capable of undertaking any such activity.
g. Crop diversification should be given "infant industry" assistance and pro-
tection. This is necesssary in view of the fact that the local agricultural field
is completely occupied.
h. Diversified agriculture should be developed under conditions such that a
relatively small amount of land in the mo.st suitable location will be devoted to
it. This will require land in an area outside the heavy rain belt and where
irrigation is easily feasible.
i. Food production must be so organized as to provide for a continuous flow
of produce to the market. Retailers will patronize the agency which can promise
continuity of supply. This will require control by the plantations, the H. S. P. A.
or a growers associations such as the Maui Association.
/s/ J. A. UiJO,
[69] Exhibit "N"
ExPEBiMENT Station of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association
APPENDIX SEC. Ill-B- ( 1 )
June 19, 1941.
The Honorable .Ioseph B. Poindexter,
Oovernor of Hawaii, lolani Palace, Honolulu, T. H.
My Dear Governor Poindexter: In compliance with your request, I submit
the following brief statement regarding what has been done and what should
be done to insure an adequate food supply for Hawaii in case of an emergency.
The Diversified Crops Committee.
In 193.0, the H. S. P. A. called together, as a Diversified Crops Committee, a
group of men representing all phases of agricultural endeavor in the Territory.
3394 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Ever since its inauguration, this Committee has functioned continuously and at
the present time its membership is as follows :
J. H. Beaumont Col. Casey Hayes
H. P. Agee L. D. Larsen
F. W. Broadbent H. L. Lyon
D. L. Drawford W. W. G. Moir
A. L. Dean H. H. Warner
A. D. Ednie Neil Webster
While the primary function of the Diversified Crops Committee was to find
new crops that could be grown in the Territory with profit to the growers, it has
from the very first given much attention to plans for producing, locally, crops
in such quantities and of such a nature as would provide the entire population
with adequate subsistence in case some emergency stopped the fiow into the
Territory of foodstuffs from outside sources. During the past year, all the efforts
of this Committee have been focussed on this one objective.
A Food Administration with Authority an Obvious Necessity
The Diversified Crops Committee has at all times held the opinion that when-
ever an emergency develops necessitating the local production of a large part
or all of the food required to feed the people in this Territory, a Food Admin-
istration would be set up and financed by the Federal Government, and given
unlimited powers to requisition land, water, labor, machinery, fuel and all seeds
and cuttings of food plants.
The Diversified Crops Committee has, through long continued efforts on the
part of its members and their associates, worked up feasible plans for food and
feed production in this Territory with the intention of placing these plans at
the disposal of a Food Administration if, and when, such [70] an Admin-
istration was created.
On request, the Diversified Crops Committee can supply inventories of stocks
of essential foods, feeds, fuels, etc. present at the time in the Territory and can
also provide an estimate of the cost of any operation which it recommends.
If Prepared for the Worst, any lesser Emergency can be Easily Handled.
It is quite probable that if an emergency develops, the Territory will experience
a gradual curtailment of transportation facilities but we should be prepared
to promptly meet the worst possible situation. As the bulk of the Territory's
population resides on the Island of Oahu, the most serious situation that can
arise is the complete isolation of Oahu, not only from the mainland but from
the other Islands in the group as well. The Diversified Crops Committee has
prepared a food production plan to meet this critical situation should it ever
arise. If some agency is authorized and financed to carry out this plan to
meet the worst possible situation, it will be able to cope rattier easily with any
situation of lesser severity which may be inflicted upon us. The Diversified
Crops Committee has, therefore, drawn up a Basic Plan to meet the extreme
situation ; this plan being so drawn that it can be put into effect by increments,
the entire plan becoming effective only when the extreme situation is about to
be realized.
Adequate Funds should be made Immediately Available.
If the extreme situation develops — that is, complete isolation of Oahu — the
conditions which make this possible will render such exposed sections of the
Island as Waianae, Kahuku and Waimanalo unfit and unreliable for farming
operations ; therefore, plantings for the extreme emergency should be confined
to the four major and centrally located plantations. The lands of these planta-
tions are among the most highly productive in the Territory and their use for
growing diversified crops will represent a heavy financial investment. The
minimum area of irrigated lands required for planting under the Basic Plan is
8,700 acres. These sugar cane lands, when requisitioned, will all be carrying
heavy crops of cane and it will require much energy, labor and expense to get
this cane out of the ground, put the land in shape and plant other crops. Seeds
and propagating material for the crops to be planted must be grown or purchased.
Seeds for some crops can be purchased from outside sources but that for
others, such as pigeon pea, must be grown locally. The sweet potato should be
our most extensively planted foo<J crop as it is our most reliable, but we shall
have to have much more propagating material than is now available in the
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3395
Territory. Steps should be taken at once to secure appropriate land and grow
thereon the propagating material of the essential crops which will be required
for the initial plantings under the. Basic Plan.
The planting, cultivating and harvesting of the food crops that must be grown
will require special machinery not now to be found on sugar plantations or
elsewhere in the Territory. The procuring of this machinery should be attended
to at once as it will take time to. get it here from the mainland. Following
recommendations of the Diversitied Crops Committee, the H. S. P. A. has al-
ready invested several thousand dollars in [71] emergency machinery,
but this will only serve to demonstrate what is needed. The H. S. P. A. has
also spent many thousands of dollars on the promotion of diversified crops
through field and feeding experiments carried on under the supervision of the
Diversified Crops Committee.
We Must Grow Crops for Feed.
In addition to growing food crops for human consumption, we must grow
crops to feed beef cattle, dairy cattle, hogs and and poultry, for we must have
meat, milk and eggs. The by-products of the sugar and pineapple industries
will be employed to advantage as feed, but these will not go vei*y far towards
fulfilling requirements. We must grow forage crops for cattle, root crops for
hogs and seed crops for poultry.
Protein Foods and Feeds.
A life sustaining diet for all animals including man must provide a consid-
erable amount of protein, that is, organic compounds containing nitrogen.
Hawaii's standard crops are notoriously rich in carbohydrates but very low in
protein. As a consequence, the Territory imports, under normal conditions, large
amounts of foods and feeds which supply protein. To provide adequate protein
for human consumption and for stock feed will be one of the most serious
problems to be solved in an extreme emergency.
All plants can make protein out of carbohydrates and inorganic nitrogen, but
animals do not possess this ability, so must derive all their proteins from plants.
The sugar cane, pineapple and banana make protein for their own bodies, but
place very little of it in the products whicli we recover, so, in an emergency, we
must gi'ow plants that put protein in that portion of their bodies which we, as
humans, use for food. Bean plants deposit a lot of protein in their seeds and,
as we can grow many varieties of beans successfully in Hawaii, they constitute
one crop on which we can rely for a considerable part of our protein in an
emergency.
Another crop rich in protein, the cultivation of which is being advocated by
the Diversified Crops Committee, is yeast. This lowly organism can be grown
easily in a weak sugar solution to which has been added ordinary fertilizer
salts. It feeds on the sugar and, picking up the nitrogen and mineral elements,
builds up protein, growing at a prodigious rate. The yeast organism does not
construct a complicated body but merely clothes its living substance with a thin
membrane. A mass of dry yeast, therefore, is largely protein. Under favorable
conditions, which are easily maintained in any climate, a crop of yeast grows
to maturity in less than 24 hours, so it is quite possible to harvest a crop every
day in the year.
At a pilot plant in Honolulu, financed by the H. S. P. A., all the details of
yeast production as a commercial crop has been worked out. The dry product
is 50 per cent protein ancl very rich in the vitamins of the "B" complex. It is
quite palatable and a number of people have, for some time, been eating it
regularly to determine its value as a source of protein in the human diet. Their
reactions are all very favorable. Up to the present time, most of the output
of this pilot plant has been used in feeding experiments at the University with
cattle, hogs and poultry. The results of these experiments dlearly indicate that
yeast is an excellent source of protein for these food-yielding animals. How-
ever, since this yeast has proven to be a good protein food for humans, it would
be poor economy to feed it to beef cattle in an emergency, for it will [72]
be necessary to feed at least 10 pounds of yeast protein for every pound of
protein recovered in beef.
Since an abundance of sugar will always be available on Oahu, the Diversified
Crops Committee recommends that adequate facilities be provided so that in an
emergency yeast may be produced in large quantities for food and feed. Under
our conditions, the culture of yeast affords the surest and quickest method of
producing the essential protein.
79716 O — 46— pt. 18 35
3396 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Stores and Storage Most Essential.
It will be at least 6 months after operations under the Basic Plan have been
started before its returns will fully meet the needs of the population, so it is
essential that we have on hand supplies of food and feed to carry us through
this critical period.
We have learned by experience that crops cannot be successfully grown on our
lands unless they are supplied with adequate fertilizers and as all fertilizers
used in Hawaii are brought in from outside sources, it is essential that an ade-
quate supply of these materials be imported and held in reserve for use in case
an emergency develops.
In order to combat the diseases and insect pests which are certain to attack the
divers crops which we must grow in an emergency, we should have on hand an
adequate supply of appropriate insecticides and fungicides. These materials
should be brought into the Territory while transportation facilities are still
available.
Most of the energy consumed in the Territory outside of sugar factories is
derived from fuel oil, diesel oil and gasoline brought from the mainland. We
cannot have electric lights and electric power if the flow of these fuels from the
mainland is stopped. Most of the water used for domestic purposes and irriga-
tion on Oahu is pumped from wells with power derived from fuel oil. Deprive
Oabir of fuel oil, and the water supply of Honolulu would fail completely, while
most of the can fields on the Island would have to go without water and the crops
which they carry would be ruined. Deprive Oahu of Diesel oil and gasoline and
it would be impossible to operate the machinery necessary to the cultivation of
field crops. It is most essential, therefore, that if an extreme emergency is im-
pending, large supplies of fuel oil, Diesel oil and gasoline be held in storage on
Oahu for, if our power supply fails, we will be unable to long survive.
Cultivation of Truck Crops in Hawaii Not Profitable under Normal Conditions
The chief aim of agriculture is to capture radiant energy by means of crops
which store it in products which can be utilized by man. Of all known crops,
sugar cane is the most efficient producer of such products and^ consequently,
its cultivation adds more to our national resources in a given time than can the
cultivation of any other crop. So long as normal transportation between Hawaii
and the mainland can be maintained, Hawaii can contribute most to our national
resources by growing sugar for shipment to the mainland, and most to our na-
tional prosperity by buying from the mainland products produced more efficiently
there than they can be produced in Hawaii.
[73] Hawaii is tropical and its fields are not suitable to the cultivation of
temperate zone crops. If such crops are grown, the yields are not comparable to
those obtained in temi)erate climes.
It should be obvious to any student making a careful examination of the situa-
tion that anyone undertaking the production of truck crops in Hawaii on a
scale sufficient to satisfy the local demand for these crops is embarking on a
course that will lead to financial disaster if mainland produce has continued
access to our market. If Hawaii must undertake the production of food crops
to tide her through a national emergency, the Federal Government should
underwrite the enterprise, as it cannot survive when the emergency is passed
and will be liquidated at a considerable loss to its promoters.
Tours respectfully,
(Signed) Harold L. Lyon, Director.
lH] Exhibit "O"
Headquabtees Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shatter, T. H., May 15. 1941.
Major General Briant H. Wexls (Ret.)
Hatoaiian Sugar Planters' Association,
Honolulu, T. H.
Dear General Wells : Please express my thanks to the Trustees of the Ha-
waiian Sugar Planters' Association for the Report of the "Field Operations
Committee", and for the "Emergency Planting Plan" of the Diversified Crops
Committee.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3397
I feel that the Report, together with the Plan, is the best and most com-
plete study on the subject of local emergency food production yet accompl'shed,
and that this work will constitute a basis for all planning on this subject for
Oahu.
In this connection, I have directed that the Planting Plan with such minor
changes as may be necessary from a military standpoint, be incorporated in
our current Food Production Plan for application to Army use should this ever
be required.
Very truly yours,
/s/ Walter C. Short
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, V. S. Army,
Commanding.
[75] Exhibit "P"
Rural Oahu Committee,
Major Disaster Council,
October 3rd, I94I.
To All District Chairmen
Gentlemen : For information and guidance, I am enclosing herewith the
Outline of Organization as used by Mr. Penhallow of District "8". The functions
under such sub-committee may be changed to suit local conditions in each dis-
trict. Further information regarding the function of each committee, will be
found in the "Outline of Plan for Protective Measures for Civilian Population
of Oahu in case of Hombardment,'' recently delivered to you.
We have also received a letter from Dr. R. B. Fans, In Charge of Detail Plans
and Training, which we give you herewith : —
"At the request of Mr. Walker, I am pleased to inform you that one unit of
the Emergency Medical and Ambulance Service has been formed at Kailua under
the direction of Dr. Chinn. I know one is being formed at Kaneohe under the
direction of Dr. Ching and a third at Wahlawa under Dr. Mack.
"First Aid classes have been conducted at Kahuku and Waialua under Drs.
Rothwell and Davis. (Classes have been and are being held at Aiea under Dr.
Thompson). Dr. Garton Wall informs me th:it he is all set at Ewa Plantation.
I have not been informed as to what further assistance they may need in the way
of equipment and man-power to develop their units."
From the foregoing, it is evident that any information and assistance needed
for the formation of Medical units in the various districts, will be gladly given
by Dr. Fans and his committee Please address all communications to Dr. Faus
thru these headquarters.
Yours truly,
/s/ S. L. Austin
Stafford L. Austin,
Chairman, Rural Oahu Committee,
Major Disaster Council.
SLA : FSB
End,
[76] Major Disaster Committee — District 8
Chairman : Richard Penhallow
Vice Chairman : Robert Johnston
Transportation : Alfred Muller
Police : George W. Groves
Medical : P. H. Liljestrand
Fire : T. B. Goskirk
Communication : Intelligence, S. K. Toomey
Food Administration : Jaul I. Fagan, Jr.
Electric Power-Light : Syl. Sonognini
3398 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Transportation-Evacuation : A Mnller
List of available transportation (less Police. Fire, Medical and communica-
tion requirements)
Organization chart for transportation personnel, motor & R. R.
Maintenance of equipment
Co-operation — Police. Medical, Fire, Communication, Food Administration
and Electric committees.
Police : G. W. Groves
Provisional Police and company guards
Protection of Transportation Routes
Utility installations
Prevention of Looting
Direction of TraflSc
Maintenance of order in time of disaster
Instruction in behavior when alarm sounds (Schools, etc.)
Training of Police personnel
Black-out committee (.7. K. Evans)
Education of Public
Co-operation — All other committees.
Medical : P. H. Liljestrand
Outline of plan to supply medical aid during time of disaster :
Location of Hospital and Aid Stations
Location of Collecting points
Organization of Personnel
Training of Personnel
Education of Public
Maintenance of Public Health, Prevention of Epidemic :
Immunization
Sanitation
Go-operation — All other committees.
Fire: T. B. Goslcirk
Organization of Fire brigades
Maintenance of equipment
Training of Personnel
Education of Public, Incendiary bombs, etc.
CJo-operation — All other committees.
Communication and Intelligence : S. K. Toomey
District Headquarters :
Communication Liaison between Rural Headquarters and district or-
ganization
Commimication Liaison between units of district organization and
between units and headquarters
Organization chart of personnel including messengers and radio and
telephone pei-sonnel (2 Radio Patrol Cars).
[77] Intelligence:
Keep in constant touch with the grape vine, to learn in advance of
subversive activity to enable Police to maintain order. (Camp Police
personnel)
Co-operation — All other committees.
Food Administration : P. I. Fagan, Jr.
Company food production. (Prepared plan)
Home gardens. (Educational campaign)
Store inventories. (Maintain periodical check)
Household inventories. (Encourage Increase)
Make an outline of your organization's arm's and personnel
Co-operation — All other committees.
Electric Power and Light : Syl. Sonogriini
Organization chart of maintenance Crews
Maintain Plantation electric system by repairing breaks as soon as they
occur
Co-operation — All other committees.
Rural Water : A. M. DaVico
Organization Chart of Maintenance & Repair Crews
Description of System
Outline of Alternate sources in case of destruction or obstruction of present
system
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3399
Plan for transporting drinking water if impossible to pipe
Cooperation witli Rural Water Department, City & County
Cooperation with all other committees.
Engineering: J. M. Nakano
Organization Chart 'of administrative personnel & necessary crews for
damage repair
Plan for air raid protection by clocks In villages :
Suitable plans for Air tlaid Shelters
Recommendation for location of Air Raid Shelters
Cooperation with Engineer, Rural Chairman's Advisory Staff
Cooperation with all other committees,
[78] Exhibit ''Q"
Rural Oahu Committee,
Civilian Defense Corps,
December 21st, 1941.
Mr. T. G. S. Walkee,
Director, Civilian Defense Council, Honolulu, Hawaii.
Dear Sir : With reference to your memorandum of December 30th, 1941, on
the subject of Civilian Defense, I give you the following. I am enclosing here-
with the Organization Chart of the Rural Oahu Committee of the Civilian De-
fense Council, so that you may get a clear picture of the set-up in Rural Oahu.
Within an hour of the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Forces of the Rising
Sun, this whole rural organization was functioning 100% in all capacities. The
various committees were standing by at their designated Stations for immediate
action.
From then on everything moved along smoothly and the civilian activities
were taken care of in all the districts without delay. All vital public utilities
Installations were placed under guai'd and plantation power plants were standing
by to come onto the main lines at the moment's notice of a power failure.
In the weeks following the "Blitz", all defense requirements of labor, equip-
ment and supplies for both the Army and Navy were handled through this
office for the Rural Districts, which turned out to be a tremendous job. How-
ever, we believe that the wants of the Army and Navy were well taken care of.
In fact, all labor, equipment and supplies were pooled for their immediate use.
One special article of which they were in dire need, was sand bags and their
wants in this line were quickly made available to them from the stocks of sugar
bags on hand at the plantations. Approximately 1,000.000 bags were requi-
sitioned for this purpose.
All food inventories were taken care of with dispatch by the Committee of
Food Administration which was ably handled by the Chairman, Mr. W. W.
Morrell. This licensing of stores was also done by the same group of men in
the Rural Areas.
Our Rural Engineering Committee is busy at this time, gathering all infor-
mation on utilities in the Rural Districts to make it available to the U. S. E. D.
Department of Utilities, who has asked that this be done by our Rural Civilian
Defense Committee.
The rationing of gasoline in the Rural Districts is being well taken care of
by the nine district chairmen. This is a big job in itself and the chairmen are
to be congratulated on the fine manner in which they handled all the various
and sundry items that were asked of them to do. All this work being done
on their own time and everyone has given freely of their time.
[79] We want to take this opportunity to express our appreciation for the
fine work done by your office and the excellent and efficient manner in which
all our problems were handled by your organization. I do believe that the Oahu
Defense Organization really put their hearts into the job at hand, and made it
go with a mininmm of delay. The chairman of the Rural Committees did a
swell job and as Chairman of the Rural Oahu Committee, I have nothing but
praises for the fine work these gentlemen have done and are still doing.
Sincerely,
/s/ Stafford L. Austin,
SxArFOKD L. Austin,
Chairman, Rural Oahu Committee, Civilian Defense Corps.
SLA : ESB
3400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
.1
t^HIAIT ■ Jt' ■
CHAItT COMPAItINO SUOAK. CANEACKeAOCSUGAJtFUODUCTION
AnitA9l NllklbmorMALE- A DOLT [UnoY[ES'(lfNSiniUD)AND
• TOTAL MENOAYSAUlMPLOriESdlNSKILLTO)'
• ONHAWAUAN506AI PLANTATIOfiS
YtAK /9t4 I9ir /»!# /»J» f*4» 1941 1941 /94i 1944
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3401
[81] Exhibit "S"
Department of Agriculture,
Washington, November 2, 1945.
Hawahan Sugar Planters' Association,
Honolulu, Hawaii.
Gentlemen : I regret very much that previous cominitnients have made it
impossible for me to accept the kind invitation extended by your President,
Mr. P. E. Spalding, to attend the 50th Anniversary dinner of the Hawaiian
Sugar Planters' Association.
Please extend my congratulations to the oflScials of your association's experi-
mental station in their observance of its 50th year of operation. Your association
has earned recognition as a research organization through the persistent efforts
of its scientific personnel. It is only necessary to compare the per-acre production
of sugar cane in your area with the similar results of any area in the world
to realize the outstanding scientific progress made by the Hawaiian Sugar
Planters' Association. The work of your institution, I am told, proved especially
significant in the recent war period. Notwithstanding rigid military regulations
and a very trying manpower situation, the Hawaiian Islands maintained their
sugar production at near peacetime levels. For this accomplishment the Nation
can be grateful.
The scientific knowledge your association has acquired through the years
provides the best kind of basis for further important research. Knowledge is
one thing which can never be surplus. In building the kind of free world for
which we have fought, we shall have use for all the knowledge we possess and
can acquire. One way or another, we must build a world of plenty for all people.
That is the only way the world can survive. Let us work together, using all
fivailable knowledge, to expand the world's economy and meet the needs of
^pankind.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Clinton P. Anderson, Secretary.
[82] dviLiAN Preparedness Activities and Establishment of Major
Disaster Council, City and County of Honolulu
T. G. S. Walker, Honolulu, Hawaii
[83] Probably no community in the United States has been more closely
geared to the activities of the Army and Navy throughout its entire history
than has the community of the Territory of Hawaii and more particularly the
Island of Oahu and the City and County of Honolulu.
It is believed that the Territory of Hawaii was among the very first, if not
the first, integral part of the United States of America, to realize that war with
Japan was becoming inevitable and that the civilian population would not only
be vitally affected by the war but should organize to take care of as many of
the civilian public as possible without calling on the military authorities and
Army troops for help.
blackout practices
As early as 1939, the City and County government of Honolulu, with the
cooperation of Army authorities, organized and carried out a comprehensive total
blackout for the Island of Oahu. The cooperation of the public was outstanding
and the mechanics of blacking out for the island in ca^ of a sudden attack pi-oven
satisfactory. Similar blackout practices territorial-wide were carried out in 1940
and 1941 with equally favorable response from Army authorities. A copy of
the radio statement of General Short following the blackout test of Hawaii on
May 20, 1941, is attached herewith in full as Exhibit "A".
3402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ORGANIZATION OF EMERGENCY RELIEF COMMITTEE
In July 1940, one of the Supervisors of the Board of Supervisors, City and
County of Honolulu, Mr. A. S. Cleghorn Robertson, tad proposed the formation
of a committee to prepare a major emergency disaster plan and to draft a bill
to effectuate the same for submission to the Board of Supervisors. At a meeting
of a general committee of businessmen and leaders of the community held at the
Mayor's office on July 8, 1940, a motion had been made by Mr. Cain which was
duly passed reading in part "to determine how much money, if any, would be
neetled and how much work would be involved in the establishment of such a
committee."
By letter dated July 16, 1940, Mayor Crane, the Mayor of the City and County
of Honolulu, appointed a subcommittee with instructions "to study more fully
the Emergency Disaster Plan." This subcommittee, at this early date of July,
1940, proceeded to consider a broad Emei-gency Disaster Plan contemplating
"sabotage during the period of strained relations ; war with its attendant possi-
bilities of partial blockade ; blockade ; bombardment ; bombing, landing para-
chute troops ; landing of major boats, or troops." The agenda states that by
"strained relations", the subcommittee envisaged conditions to exist in which it
seems possible that a foreign power will attempt sabotage and preparations for
an attack on this Territory and that during such a period government of the
city would be conducted as in normal times up until the time [84] That
the Governor declared martial law. At such time the subcommittee envisaged
that the Governor would take charge of the administration with the aid of the
National Guard and the Emergency Disaster Plan could therefore provide for the
cooperation of our citizenship with the Governor and the National Guard. At
the discretion of the Governor, assistance of Federal troops. Army and Navy,
could be obtained at this time and cooperation with those forces should be
foreseen and provided for. The agenda also conceived the possibilities that
upon the inception of war the government of the Territory would presumably
be taken over by the military authorities. Therefore, any proposed emergency
disaster plan could provide for cooperating with the military force "so that as
little burden as possible falls on the shoulders of troops who will be necessary
in the field."
Following this expression of community interest in preparedness activities,
the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and the Oahu Plantation Mangers
Association had initiated at their own expense the training of a Provisional
Guard Unit at their own expense. This development is discussed in the state-
ment of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.
On April 3, 1941, Mayor Lester Petrie who succeeded Charles S. Crane as
Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu called a meeting of the Board of
Supervisors with various department heads to "consider the formulation of and
participation by the City and County government in a major disaster plan for
this community." The undersigned, as Coordinator for the Plantation Pro-
visional Police Unit was present at this meeting. Mayor Petrie explained that
"the object is really to coordinate our plan§ and schedules with the military
service so that in the time of extreme emergency, the military service will not
be hampered unnecessarily by civilian problems which we can well take care of
ourselves." He explained that he had discussed these proposals with General
Herron and with General Short. General Short was then expected to discuss
these civilian activities at the Army Day luncheon, which he did on April 7, 1941.
At this time, also, the Honolulu Medical Society was proceeding with its
organization of an Emergency Preparedness Committee. At the meeting of the
Mayor, Dr. Clarence E. Fronk and Dr. Thomas Mossman of the Medical Pre-
paredness Committee pointed out that the Committee was then working on
some twelve aid stations possibly increasing that to twenty to be located through-
out the city, operating on a twenty-four hour basis in time of emergency. Dif-
ferent concerns in town had already volunteered about one hundred commercial
trucks for ambulances. About sixty drivers had volunteered for training and
a first aid unit was being set up for display and training.
The Chief of Police explained that at that time a force of between 2,000 and
2,500 men had been organized to guard public utility companies, plantations,
both sugar and pineapple, the City and County, the oil companies, and other
installations. This plan contemplated complete tie-up with the Army and the
civilian police.
I
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3403
The Mayor explained that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss organi-
zational activities possible on the part of the City and Ck)unty of Honolulu in
view of the existing defense activities being carried forward by individual
groups and organizations and the discussions in the Territorial Legislature.
[85] As a result of this meeting a temporary committee of five was ap-
pointed by the Mayor which in turn called' upon the undersigned to assist in
studying emergency disaster plans. This committee recommended to the Mayor
the appointment of a Major Disaster Council composed of City and County
department heads with certain representatives of the utility companies. Ap-
pointment of a full-time Coordinator was also recommended, and a proposed
resolution was submitted urging the Territorial Legislature to allocate suffi-
cient funds for a major emergency. Representativeg^ of the Army, Navy and
Territorial Government were to be appointed to the Council.
In the meantime, on April 8, 1941, an ordinance was proposed before the Board
of Supervisors of the City and County of Honolulu, to create a Major Disaster
Council. This ordinance was approved on April 26, 1941. The Major Disaster
Council so created was to consist of the Mayor, a City and County department
head as Vice-Chairman, and such other persons as the Mayor might appoint with
the approval of the Board of Supervisors. This Council was charged with the
coordination of all community resources and by means of mutual cooperation
and effort to create a plan for utilizing all resources for relief and general
welfare of the people in the event of some major disaster. The Mayor was
empowered to declare when an emergency disaster existed. The divisions of
the Council were set forth to include, among others, transportation, communica-
tions, power and light, law and order, fire protection, water and water supply,
medical, Red Cross, rescue demolition and gas protection, air raid warning,
mortuary work, finance and supplies, and rural Oahu. The Ordinance author-
ized a coordinator to be responsible for the entire plan.
The Mayor proceeded, therefore, with the appointment of the Council and the
undersigned Coordinator. The first meeting of the Major Disaster Council was
held on June 24, 1941. Copy of the Minutes of this first meeting is attached
herewith ^s Exhibit "B." Also attached as part of the same exhibit is an
organizational chart of the Council as originally established.
Close coordination was maintained with the Army through the designation
by General Short of Lt. Colonel Casey Hayes, F. A., U. S. Army, of G-5 Section,
Hawaiian Department, and Col. H. K. B. Lyman, CE, U. S. A., Department
Engineer, as advisors of the Council. Capt. C. C. Baughman, IJSN, Captain
of the Yard, Pearl Harbor, was designated by the Commandant, Fourteenth
Naval District, as Navy Advisor. By October, 1941, the Department Surgeon,
Colonel Edgar King, USA, had been designated an advisor.
The undersigned as Coordinator, with the Executive Committee of the Council,
proceeded to set up suitable headquarters, organized and trained volunteers,
tabulated available transportation and evacuation facilities, designated emer-
gency reporting points for all personnel equipment, and took all other possible
steps to cushion the shock to civilians in any emergency that might arise. The
necessity for relief of trained Army personnel for actual combat by having
civilians handle as many of their own problems as possible was a paramount
consideration in all of the above plans and activities.
The provisional police organization as developed subsequent to June, 1940,
was merged with the Major Disaster Council. All plantation managers and
other chairman of the various districts were appointed Major Disaster Council
chairmen with the fullest possible power to act for the Council in their own
districts in case of an attack.
[86] On July 1, 1941. the Emergency Medical and Ambulance Committee
of the Honolulu Medical Society which had been training volunteers several
months with funds supplied by the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce and some
considerable assistance from the Hawaii Chapter, American Red Cross, was
made a Major Disaster Committee with Dr. H. L. Arnold as Chairman and
Dr. Robert Fans as Vice Chairman. The Mayor and Board of Supervisors al-
located $6,000 to cover this Committee's exi)enses for the period from July 1-
December 31, 1941. The above sum was augmented by $5,000 from proceeds
of a benefit football game. A full report of the activities and medical pre-
paredness by Dr. H. L. Arnold is set forth hereafter. Private individuals,,
the Chamber of Commerce, and Committee Members themselves made contribu-
tions to the activities of the Major Disaster Council. The contributions were
3404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
not limited to any racial group but included all nationalities — Caucasian, Hawai-
ian, Filipino, Chinese, and Japanese.
The Coordinator for the Major Disaster Council from the time of appoint-
ment to December 7, 1941, delivered approximately 150 talks to business and
fraternal organizations, parent-teachers association groups, etc., emphasizing
the need for preparedness and the need for volunteers. The response of the
community to these talks, and the response of the publicity given to the activities
of the Major Disaster Council in the formulation and preparation of plans was
considerable.
Mayor Lester Petrie and the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of
Honolulu approved the purchase on City and County funds of medical equip-
ment totalling $50,000; medical supplies $10,000; fire fighting equipment worth
$72,500 and two-way radio equipment $7,500. Most of this equipment arrived
in November, 1941, and was of inestimable value on December 7, 1941. In the
purchase of fire equipment, able assistance provided by Mr. Charles W. Schruth,
Federal Works Engineer, was of great value in permitting procurement through
the Lanham Act. This equipment started arriving in Honolulu in February,
1942. Close liaison was maintained with Army and Navy Intelligence as well as
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In its coordinating activities, the
Major Disaster Council joined with Army, Navy and FBI representatives in estab-
lishing a committee with prominent representatives of each racial group resi-
dent in Hawaii for the purposes of formulating plans for meeting the problems
attendant upon any war emergency with the variety of racial groups present
in the Territory.
In conjunction with the Army authorities and parallel with the public appeal
of Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commanding general, Hawaiian De-
partment, a campaign was initiated to get householders to purchase canned
goods for storage up to the limit of their cupboard .space. In this manner large
spaces in warehouses and store shelves were cleared permitting merchants to
make large purchases in shipments from the Coast in October and November, 1941.
The amount of shipping space thus released for war materials was appreciable.
COOPERATION WITH TBaiRlTOBIAL OFFICIALS — M-DAY LAW
During this period it was becoming more and more apparent that the situation
called for wider authority and more financial backing than that possible under
City and County financing. The Major Disaster Council urged Governor Joseph
Poindexter to call a special session of the Legislature to [S7J enact an
M-Day law, giving the Governor unusual emergency powers. This session was
called by the Governor on September 15, 1941. And at the request of the Gov-
ernor and President of the Territorial Senate, a special committee of the Major
Disaster Council under the chairmanship of Mr. Fred Ohrt, compiled a financial
report showing what "M-Day funds" in their opinion should be set aside for pre-
paredness activities and in case of an attack. This recorrimendation was for
$1,500,000 the first year and a total of $8,000,000 in case of a war of three years.
Also at the request of the Territorial Senate, the Coordinator and members of
the Major Disaster Council attended this session and gave advice regarding the
M-Day Bill.
It was at this session that Lt. General Walter C. Short appeared at the request
of the Territorial Government and gave a strong talk on the danger of the situa-
tion and the urgent needs. The Territorial Legislature passed the M-Day Bill
allocating $500,000 to this Administration and setting up a reserve fund of
$1,000,000.
The work of the City and County Major Disaster Council had undoubtedly
alerted large numbers of the population to the dangers involved in the Pacific and
the necessity for serious, intensive defense preparedness. It is impossible to
present briefly any complete picture of the extensive preparations that were
made and the training and preparations carried through. In any event, however,
the rapidity with which the personnel of the Major Disaster Council organization
reported for duty immediately after the attack on December 7, 1941, and pro-
ceeded to discharge their pre-assigned duties efficiently and effectively is ample
proof of the excellent organization that had been developed. There is attached
herewith as Exhibit "C" a copy of a summary prepared by the undersigned of the
activities of the Council following the attack. This report was prepared on
January 2, 1942, following the activities of that fateful time. Additional reports
of the various sub-committees are available if desired.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3405
CONCLUSION
By this summary of defense activities, the undersigned has attempted to pre-
sent in summary form only the extensive preparedness activities undertaken by
the civilian community prior to the war. Additional brief statements of the
chairmen of the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross, the Medical Pre-
paredness Committee, the Transportation Committee, the Blood Bank, and the
Reserve Police follow this statement.
It is believed that after a review of these statements it will be evident that the
civilian community had succeeded, long prior to Pearl Harbor, in developing
elaborate preparations for any major disaster and demonstrated complete co-
operation with the Army and the Navy with active response to any of the de-
sires or suggestions of the military authorities for civilian preparedness. It is
believed that this is certainly a matter to i)e entered into the record of the
Honorable Investigating Committee to counteract any inferences or impressions
in the testimony and report of the Pearl Harbor Army Board which might be
construed to the contrary.
Additional information and material is available relative to the activities
of the Major Disaster Council should the Committee so desire.
T. G. S. Walker
T. G. S. Watkeb.
[88] Exhibit "A"
General Short's Blackout Broadcast Talk, 20 Mat 1941
General Short (Following introduction by announcer) : I am speaking to
you from the command post of the Hawaiian Department somewhere on the
Island of Oahu. Into this command post tonight have streamed the messages
from the many vantage points both on this island of Oahu as well as from Ha-
waii, Maui, Lanai, Molokai and Kauai, telling the story of the great job the
Territory of Hawaii has done in blacking out the Islands.
Far underground in the command post are located the vital nerve centers of
command and communications of the Hawaiian Department. Staff officers have
been receiving these reports both from Army airplanes and observation posts.
In an actual emergency it is into these C. P.s that the story of the blackout would
stream.
From a vantage point in an observation post nearby I have with my own eyes
witnessed the complete blackout of Honolulu, the great Pearl Harbor naval t»ase,
Schofleld Barracks, and the Army's Hickam Field.
H have watched the swift and expeditious manner in which this job was done.
From the reports pouring into the command post and handed to me here, I
have been apprised of the success of the exercise throughout the entire Terri-
tory.
Hawaii has had, probably, more practice in blackout than any other major
American community. But she has out-done her previous efforts tonight. Loy-
alty and cooperation with your Territorial Blackout Committee has spelled suc-
cess in a job which would have made the task of enemy bombers a difficult one.
With such a spirit activating all Americans in this time of national trial I
think we can meet with confidence all threats of enemy encroachment even that
of bombardment from the air.
Governor Poindexter, Mr. Sinclair and members of the Territorial Blackout
Committee, and to the people of the Territory of Hawaii, I extend my praise and
congratulations, and giving you my aloha, I say Good Night.
[89] Exhibit "B"
Minutes — Major Disaster Council, City and County of Honolulu
The first meeting of the Major Disaster Council of the City and County of
Honolulu was called to order by Mayor Lester Petrie, at 1 : 30 P. M. on Tuesday,
June 24th, 1941, in the Assembly Room of Honolulu Hale.
3406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mayor Petrie opened the meeting by announcing that while a Council such as
tliis had been under consideration for some time, it was necessary to get official
iKicking before anything of importance could be done. The Board of Super-
visors of the City and County of Honolulu had, therefore, on April 8th, 1941,
passed Ordnance No. 891, Bill No. 24, creating the Major Disaster Council of the
(Jity and County of Honolulu, outlining its duties and functions, and providing
for its maintenance. Mayor Petrie explained that the work had been delayed
while the "M" day bill was under consideration in the Territorial Legislature,
but now that it seems advisable, the organization of the Council would proceed
immediately.
The Mayor expressed his appreciation for the response given by the down-
town business men to his invitation to serve on the Council, and their indication
of willingness to serve on this committee.
Mayor Petrie announced that he had appointed Mr. T. G. S. Walker as Co-
ordinator of the Major Disaster Council, and that Mr. Walker had his staff or-
ganized and was at the service of the members.
A call of the roll showed all members of the Couneii present or officially repre-
sented.
Mr. T. '^ S. Walker, Co-ordinator, gave a resume of what has been done by,
and what could be expected of, the co-ordinator*s office. He said that the prin-
cipal ai^ was to try and stop the overlapping of individual organizations, and
to get all civilian defense workers under the authority of the Mayor and Board
of Supervisors. Mr. Walker said that in the main the committees would be run
by City and County executives, but that no defense plan would be complete
without the cooperation of the industrial and business leaders, and for this
reason the splendid response of these leaders was greatly appreciated.
The Co-ordinator announced that the policy would be that the Co-ordinator will
simply be the liaison man, who will work with the Army and Navy authorities
so that our efforts will coordinate with their defense plans. He stated that both
the Army and the Navy had been asked to serve on the Major Disaster Council
in an advisory capacity, and that General Short had delegated, as representatives
of the Army, Col. A. K. B. Lyman and Col. Casey Hayes; while Admiral Block
had sent as the representatives of the Navy, Captain C. C. Baughman.
Mr. Walker stressed the fact that the work of the Council would of necessity
be ^one by the chairmen of the various conimittees which the Mayor would
appoint later in the meeting, and by their assistants, but that his office and staff
would at all times be available for information or assistance. [90] He
suggested that in order to facilitate the handling of major problems, and to save
the members of the Council from having to meet too frequently, an Executive
Committee be appointed, and that it be comprised of the chairmen of the main
committees of the Council.
Mayor Petrie said that he considered this the best procedure. He then asked
the approval of the Council on the following appointments to the chairmanships
of the various committees set up by Ordinance 891 :
1. Co-ordination— T. G. S. Walker
2. Transportation — ^Addison E. Kirk
3. Communications — Alvah A. Scott
6. Law and Order — W. A. Gabrielson
8. Fire Protection— W W. Blaisdell
9. Water and Water Supply — Frederick Ohrt
10. Streets and Highways — Joseph F. Kunesh
11-12. Medical : Health & Sanitation— T. M. Mossman, M. D.
13-14. Red Cross : Rescue etc. — John F. Gray.
20. Finance — George Waterhouse
The Mayor added that he had requested the Board of Supervisors to approve
the name of W. W. Beers as a member of the Council, and that this action would
be taken at the Board meeting today. Mr. Beers would then be appointed in
charge of a new committee to handle thq Food problem.
It was moved, seconded and unanimously carried that the list of chairmen
submitted by Mayor Petrie be approved.
Mayor Petrie then asked tliat each member of the Council submit in writing
to the Co-ordinator, the name, address and telephone number of an alternate
who could represent him in case of enforced absence from a meeting of the
Council.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3407
The Mayor then suggested that the Executive Committee be comprised of the
following :
Mayor Lester Petrie, Chairman
Joseph F. Kunesh, Vice-Chairman
W. A. Gabrielson
Frederi. k Ohrt
W W. Blaisdell
T. M Mossraan, M. D.
John F. Gray
Alvah A. Scott
Addison E. Kirk
Supervisor John M. Asing
G ^orge Waterhouse
W. W. Beers
Col. A. K. B. Lyman
Col. Casey Hayes
Captain C C. Baughman
T. G. S. Walker, Coordinator
The list was accepted as presented.
The suggestion was made, however, that the Council be kept advised at all
times of the action taken by the Executive Committee, and this was agreed to be
a necessary procedure.
The Mayor then presented for discussion the subject of finances. He pointed
out that all phases of the work were handicapped by the lack of funds, and he
stated that the City and County had reached its limit in supplying money to
carry on the work. He then asked for suggestions as to a solution of the
problem.
[91] A long discussion followed as to ways and means of financing the
work of the Disaster Council.
Mr. Dillingham suggested that at least part of the cost should be borne by the
Federal Government, and suggested that immediate contact be made with the
OflB'-e For Emergency Management at Washington. Major G?neral Wells con-
curred in this view. The Co-ordinator explained that this had already been
done; and Mayor Petrie pointed out that the Governor and Dr. Fronk were now
on their way to Washington to present the territorial situation to the Chairman
of the Emergency OflBce. It was agreed that no direct action could be taken by
this group that would in anyway interfere with the Governor's program.
Mayor Petrie announced that just prior to his departure for the mainland,
Governor Poindexter had appointed the following Territorial Advisory Defense
Council :
Honorable Lester Petrie, Chairman
Dr. H L Arnold
Honorable William Ellis
Col. Perry M. Smoot
Honorable A. S. Spencer
Honorable S. M. Spencer
General Briant H. Wells
The Mayor read to the Council a letter from Admiral Block, in which he
stated his willingness to cooperate with the Major Disaster Council ; and he
greeted the representatives of the Army and Navy who were present, thanking
them for the wonderful cooperation they had given and were giving.
Mayor Petrie then stressed the necessity for the various committee chairmen
keeping the Co-ordinator informed on all activities within their committees,
furnishing him with copies of all pertinent correspondence, and also with a list
of the personnel of the committees, together with office and home addresses
and telephone numbers.
it was suggested and agreed that all publicity should be released through the
office of the Co-ordinator.
After some discussion it was agreed that afternoon meetings were most con-
venient for the majority of the members, and the ^rst meeting of the Executive
Committee was called for 2 P. M. on Thursday, May 26th, 1941, in the office of the
Mayor.
3408 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Mayor Petrie announced that all members of the Major Disaster Council
must sign the Oath of Loyalty, and stated that notaries would be present in
the Assembly Hall at the close of the meeting to administer the oath.
The meeting adjourned at 2 :30 P. M. to meet again at the call of the Chair.
[92] Key to Organization Chart
Major Disastbs Council, City and County
of Honolulu
1. Co-ordination & Intelligence T. G. S. Walker
2. Transportation Addison E Kirk
3. Communications Alvah A. Scott
4. Power and Light LesUe A. Hicks
5. Personnel D. Ransom Sherretz
6. Law and Order W. A. Gabrielson
6A. Provisional Police Major Douglas C. King (Ret.)
7. Law Enforcement W. A. Gnbrielson
8. Fire Protection W. W. Blaisdell
8A. Fire Wardens Paul Carter, Director
9. Water and Water Supply Frederick Ohrt
10. Streets and Highways Jos. F. Kunesh
11. Medical Thos. M Mossman, M. D.
12. Health and Sanitation F. M. Haralson, M. D.
13. Red Cross John F. Gray
ISA. Housing & Shelter-Evacuation
13B. Necessities of Life Frank E. Midkifl
13C. R2habilitation Lyman H. Bigelow
14. Rescue, Demolition, Gas Prot W. A. Gabrielson
15. Air Raid Warning Federated Churches
16. Religious Worship A. K. Powlison
17. Recreation Duke Kahanamoku
18. Mortuary Work Jon Wiig
19. Law George Waterhouse
20. Finance and Supplies Oren E. Long
21. Education Stafford L. Austin
22. Rural W. W. Beers
23. Food Production
A. Zone 1— District 5 Sam Damon
B. Zone 2 — District 4 Cleghorn Robertson
C. Zone 3 — District 4 Tom Wnddoups
D. Waterfront Warden___ J. L. Friel
Not Shown : Sub-committees reporting direct to Co-ordinator's Committee :
Engineering H. A. R. Austin
Publicity Walter Macfarlane
Camouflage Robt. O. Thompson
Protection of Art Edgar C. Schenck
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
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3410 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[941 Exhibit "C"
Summary of the Functions of the Major Disaster Council, City and Counts
OF Honolulu, Fuom DECEiiBER 7th to 31st, 1941, Inclusive
The Co-ordinator of the Majoi- Disaster Council of the City and County of
Honolulu notified the Mayor promptly upon receipt by him of word that the Island
of Oahu was being bombed, by enemy Japanese planes. He then proceeded
immediately to his headquarters at the City Hall.
All Committee Chairmen and members of the Council were notified by telephone
and radio to report immediately to the City Hall for duty. Within an amazingly
sliort time all Chairmen and sub-chairmen of the twenty-six committees under
the Major Disaster Council, liad reported, and organizations composed of com-
mittee members and volunteers proceeded according to previously laid plans.
Mayor Petrie, who is also Chairman of the Major Disaster Council, authorized
the Co-ordinator to use the facilities of the City Hall for headquarters, as he
saw fit, thus making it possible to concentrate the majority of the work near
the office of the Co-ordinator.
The Co-ordinator was then appointed Director of Civilian Defense for the
Island of Oahu by the Territorial Director.
A clerical staff, composed of City and County employees, court workers, and
volunteers from private industry, and others, was organized to handle the dis-
semination of information and instructions from the Co-ordinator to his Chair-
men. This staff worked steadily all day Sunday and through the night. On
Monday an arrangement was made to divide the staff into three groups, each
working an eight hour period, viz : 8 A. M. to 4 P. M. ; 4 P. M. to 12 midnight ;
and 12 midnight to 8 A. M. A competent person was appointed to direct the
work of each group. These volunteers continued in full force for the first week —
there being several hundred of them — after which the government employees
returned to their departments, where they were needed as many department
heads are also chairmen of Major Disaster Council committees. From that time
on a strictly volunteer staff has carried on. In the past week it has been possible
to cut this group down to approximately thirty-five persons during the day, and
a smaller number of volunteers at night, but a crew has been maintained on
twenty-four hour duty in the Co-ordinator's office since the commencement of the
war on December 7th, 1941. ,
In accordance with arrangements which had been made during the preparatory
period, the American Legion delegated twelve men for use by the Co-ordinator
in his office. These Legionnaires served as assistants to the Co-ordinator, and
as guards and aides, i)erforming any service asked of them willingly and effi-
ciently. Two of these Legionnaires were appointed as Shift Directors in the oflSce
of the Co-ordinator. One other Shift Director and three Liaison Officers were
also appointed by the Coordinator to assist him in the handling of the tremen-
dous volume of work which centered in his oflace during the first three days
following the attack. With these Shift Directors and Liaison Officers there
were stenographers, typists and clerks on duty day and night.
[95] Attached to this resume are copies of the reports of activity by the
various individual committees during the period from December 7th to December
31st, 1941. These reports speak for themselves, and I can add nothing but the
highest praise of the manner in which directions and instructions forwarded
from the Co-ordinator's office to the Coumiittee Chairmen, were followed out by
the Chairmen and their workers.
As martial law was declared immediately after the disaster, and all civilians
ordered off the streets, it was necessary that some means of identification for
civilian defense workers be devised.
The Military Governor ruled that only Major Disaster Council identification
cards would be recognized, and for several days this office issued identification
cards, each bearing a number; arm bands (white with a large, red "CD" printed
on them) ; and red, white and blue "CD" stickers for automobiles to all persons
presenting proof that they were engaged in civilian defense operations. A record
was kept of all cards, bands and stickers issued.
The number and type of volunteers was amazing, and most gratifying. They
ranged from Army and Navy wives, resident civilians etc., to mainland salesmen
whose work was interrupted and tourists who were stranded in Hawaii and
anxious to do their bit. All came forward and offered their services, then served
faithfully in whatever task was assigned them. One City and County official
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3411
stepped into a job of manual labor in order to j^et lielp quickly to people in dis-
tress. Many volunteers gave up any possibility of income to serve in civilian
defense as long as they were needed ; others found themselves without employ-
ment for one reason or another, when they returned to their businesses at the
end of the first few strenuous days. Many of these latter have continued to
work long hours without remuneration and without complaint.
During the first two or three days practically all questions regarding all
phases of the problems facing the City and County of Honolulu came to this
oflice. Clerks were on duty twenty-four hours a day to answer these calls and
aid persons in need of information and assistance. Queries ranging from an
inquiry from a Navy wife'asking if her husband had been killed at Pearl Harbor,
and service men attempting to locate their evacuated families, to simple ques-
tions of whether or not we were still being bombed, passed over the desks of these
clerks, were disposed of, and a record kept of them. In the first two nights of
the Blackout hundreds of calls were received. Some reported suspicious lights
and signalling which warranted the investigation they received ; others proved
to be very bright stars twinkling in our blue Hawaiian sky. One woman threat-
ened to go through the Governor to the President of the United States if guards
were not placed on a downtown hotel, which was at the moment heavily guarded.
Others reported incidents which were passed on to the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation.
To sum up the activities of the Co-ordinator's office, for the first three days
all placing of evacuees, taking over of schools for first aid stations,' directing and
instructing fire wardens, securing guards for buildings, utilities, etc., were
directed and supervised by the Co-ordinator, and the work was carried out by
the Committees of the Major Disaster Council as the Civilian Defense for the
Island of Oahu.
[96] For the last two weeks the office has continued to function, carrying
out the instructions and orders of the Military Governor, and Civilian Governor
and the Territorial Director of Civilian Defense, and generally carrying on
civilian defense operations. For the third week of the War there has been
maintained in the City Hall a skeleton crew on twenty-four hour duty — all
committee's having returned to their own headquarters. There is, however, a
large staflf on call which can be rounded up and ready to work within an hour
from the receipt of any announcement of an alert.
/s/ T. G. S. W.
T. G. S. Walker,
Director, Ciwlian Defense for the Island of Oahu.
Jantjaby 2nd, 1942.
1^7] Hawaii Chapter, American Red Cross — Its Part in the Civilian
Pbeparedness Progeam
Alfred L. Castle, Honolulu, Hawaii.
[98] The Hawaiian Chapter, American Red Cross, was set up in World
War I on a Territory wide basis. It maintained a certain amount of service
on Oahu after the war, and a skeleton organization throughout the Territory.
There was no difficulty therefore for the Chapter to swing into any preparedness
program for World War II.
preliminary
In June of 1940 the Hawaii Chapter decided that it should prepare itself and
likewise take active part in the production and shipment of needed articles to
our probable Allies, particularly Britain. At the Executive Committee meeting
of June 13, 1940 a Production Committee was set up with Mrs. H. V. Von Holt,
Chairman ; Mrs. S. R. Damon, vice-chairman ; and Mrs. Arthur Molyneux, chair-
man of Production. Mrs. H. S. Turner, was chairman of Surgical Dressings;
Mrs. David Akana, chairman of Supplies, Instruction and Supervision ; Mrs.
Heaton L. Wrenn, chairman of Knitting; and Mrs. Peter K. McLean, chairman
of Volunteer Special Services funds. After this same meeting contact was made
with supply houses in Honolulu to the end that raw materials and supplies would
always be on hand. It was iwinted out that Hawaii might be the object of
attack. Groups on Oahu, Molokai, Kauai, and at three localities on Hawaii
were already at work on surgical dressings. From then on, for a period of
9-10 months, the majority of dressings and garments of various sorts produced
79716 O— 46— pt. 18 — —36
3412 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
were sent to the British Red Cross. Contact was, however, maintained with
the Army here, for at the meeting on November 28, 1940 Mrs. von Holt reported
that the Army had recommended that one quota of surgical dressings be kept
here for local use, a quota being approximately 17,0(X) dressings. At that meet-
ing, however, it was felt that about 50,000 dressings should be kept here, which
was done for those early stages.
EXPANDED WORK
By March of 1941 the Chapter had materially increased its work, and was
more definitely pointing to the need for local preparedness. It was reported
that from our local production 145,000 surgical dressings, and over 6000 knitted
garments had been made and shipped to the British Red Cross, but from then
on policy changed and production was held here. At the meeting of March 21,
1941 the pending M-day bill in the Hawaiian legislature was discussed. The
First-Aid Committee reported some 1000 women had completed courses. Mrs.
Moir reported that two Motor Corps classes had been completed, one at Schofleld
Barracks totalling 30 women and one in Honolulu with 28. Further steps were
taken at that meeting to set up again the formal Branch organizations on the
outside islands.
MAJOB DISASTKK COUNCIL
In April of 1941 the Supervisors of Honolulu created a Major Disaster Council
to coordinate the resources of the City, with residents, firms, agencies and
organizations to meet any major disaster or emergency. The Red Cross, acting
under National charter, could not surrender in any way either its direct pre-
rogatives or obligations, but the Hawaii Chapter immediately cooperated with
such Council and throughout did its agreed-upon part. Because of their long
experience, Mr. John Gray, for nearly 20 years with the Red Cross in Hawaii
and executive secretary of the Chapter, and Alfred L. Castle, [99] Chapter
vice-chairman, were at once assigned to the prepardness work, both acting as
members of the Major Disaster Council and liaison between the Army and Red
Cross. Mr. Castle had organized the Hawaii Chapter in World War I, was
the first Field Director herei. was a deputy commissioner and executive secre-
tary for the Red Cross in Siberia, and special reepresentative to Japan, China,
and the Philippines in World War I. The relations between the Hawaii Chapter
and the Major Disaster Council were of the best throughout.
WAK PREPARKa»NESS
The plans of the Red Cross were laid primarily with a view to air attack
by Japan, an attack which might be directed not only against military and
naval objects but also against the city, whether deliberate or not. The pos-
sibility of bombardment was considered, and, to a small degree, invasion and
its effect on the civilian population. Besides repeated conferences with the
Major Disaster Council (hereafter called the Disaster Council), conferences
were had by Messrs. Gray and Castle, individually or together, with the Com-
manding General Walter G. Short, and the Department Surgeon, Col. Edgar
King and members of his staff. As a result of the conferences with the Army,
General Short on May 10, 1941 wrote Mr. Castle a letter which stated in part :
<i»> * * In the first priority and requiring immediate action are:
"1. The organization and training of aid station groups and the provision of
initial equipment for not less than twelve such stations.
"2. The provision of an adequate reserve of medical supplies for the civilian
population.
"It is understood that the training of personenl for the aid station groups
has been well begun and that a primary objective is to provide funds for com-
pletion of the training and for the purchase of initial equipment for twelve
stations. The time element is very important as the supplies, both initial and
reserve, must. I am informed, be secured on the maiidand. not being locally
available.
"* * * It also is my understanding that the arrangements for carrying on
this work, as contemplated by your organization, are fully concurre^l in by other
local groups now concerned with the same problem."
General Short's letter is attached hereto in full and marked Exihibit "A".
Relationships between the Army and Red Cro.ss throughout the entire period
to December 7 were of the best.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3413
Under this general title of War Preparedness the work will be grouped under
appropriate subheadings.
(a) First Aid Training and Aid Slations.
By the end of March 1941 and as a part of the intensive Red Cross program
nearly 1,000 persons had received first aid training.
In April of 1941 the Preparedness Committee of the [100 \ Honolulu
County Medical Society, headed by Dr. Harry L. Arnold with Dr. Robert B.
Faus as executive officer undertook, in cooperation with the Red Cross, a very
intensive first aid training program. Red Cross instruction books were used, and
Red Cross certificates awarded for those who passed. Strictly Red Cross classes
were also continued separately. While the larger part of this operation was
conducted by the Preparedness Conmiittee, and the history will appear in the
reports of Dr. Harry L. Arnold, Chairman of that Committee, the net result
was that many thousand persons were trained and qualified prior to December 7.
On April 25, 1941 a joint statement on the training plan was issued by the
Preparedness Committee and the Red Cross and published in the Honolulu Press.
Such statement is hereto attached and marked Exhibit "B".
In September of 1941 the National Red Cross in Washington sent to Hawaii
two expert instructors in first aid and water safety to assist in the intensified
program.
As a part of the general program it was essential that aid statiott equipment
be obtained so that on an attack there would not only be available trained
personnel but aid stations fully equipped, with trained personnel, so that cas-
ualties could be effectively handled. It was contemplated that much of the
funds necessary would come from the M-Day bill being considered by the Ter-
ritorial Legislature in April. The bill apparently was loSt the last night of the
session in the first days of May, and no relief was forthcoming. The Red Cross
then at once stepped in and supplied emergency funds, until after June 30 the
Board of Supervisors of the City was able to make further appropriations. Had
not the Red Cross stepped in at that time the entire program might have been
seriously jeopardized. (See letter of Mr. Castle to Dr. Arnold, dated May 13,
1941, marked Exhibit "C", enclosing copy of the letter of General Short (Exhibit
"A"), and Dr. Arnold's reply thereto, marked Exhibit "D".)
It was likewise necessary to obtain the actual equipment for first aid stations,
which are referred to in the correspondence attached variously as "units,"
"medical units," "aid stations" and "emergency units," and physically to set
these up for operation at carefully selected sites. The Army, in the first instance,
came to the rescue, agreeing to loan 20 units to the Red Cross. In early June,
sixteen units had been received from the Army, which wei-e immediately put
to use. (See excerpt from letter Mr. Gray to Mr. Castle, dated June 10, 1941,
marked Exhibit E.)
Meanwhile, to hasten matters and to get further aid from the National Red
Cross in Washington, John Gray, executive secretary of the Hawaii Chapter,
left here on April 15 for Washington armed with letters from Colonel King, the
department surgeon, specifying medical supplies and emergency units necessary
for use for the civilian population in case of an attack, and not purchasable
locally. The medical supplies will be referred to later. Later in May and June
Mr. Castle was in Washington also discussing both subjects with National Red
Cross headquarters. Tentative agreements were reached and \ry the end of
July twelve complete medical station units, costing some $25,000, were ordered
for shipment to the Hawaii Chapter. (See excerpt from letter Mr. Mitchell to
Mr. Castle, dated July 22, 1941, marked Exhibit F.)
These units all arrived in Hawaii prior to December 7, and were held in
accord with a letter from Colonel King, [101] dated July 29, 1941, marked
Exhibit "G."
On the Japanese attack. Honolulu had adequately trained personnel and
properly equipped first aid stations at 20 separated points, sufficient to meet
any emergency existing on that day and for the entire war as it developed.
Each station had been adequately supplied far in advance by the Hawaii Chapter,
Red Cross, with surgical dressings and other production equipment.
The matter of expansion of hospital facilities referred to in General Short's
letter was handled by the Preparedness Committee.
(b) Medical Supplies.
The Department Surgeon, Colonel King, felt that emergency supplies of drugs
and medicines, not procurable locally, should be on hand for civilian use, with
3414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
which we agreed. This list, prepared by Colonel King, was taken on April 15
to the National Red Cross by Mr. Gray and under date of May 16, 1941, the
Red Cross here was advised that National would send such supplies. In June
the City decided to make certain purchases of medical supplies, but Mr. Castle
then in Washington was able to explain that such purchases did not conflict or
in any way overlap the articles desired of the Red Cross. The medical supplies
requested of the Red Cross were delivered in Honolulu beginning in August, in
various batches, up to December 4, 1911, at a cost of about $40,000.
(c) Proctuction Department — Surgical Dressings.
Beginning in April 1941, all production was held in Hawaii, and tlie character
of the production was molded to meet an anticipated attack. The number of
workers, all volunteers, who came to the work rooms at the Castle Kindergarten
and elsewhere steadily increased. Work done was on surgical dre.^sings, hospital
garn'ents, operating robes, convalescent robss, pajamas, knitted goods and other
necessary articles. In July the Department Surgeon was given a statement,
marked Exhibit "H," showing the disjxtsition of locally produced Red Cross
surgical dressings in the Territory, in addition to actually finished goods held
in Honolulu. The statement also showed that material had been ordei-ed for
approximately 240,000 more surigal dressings.
In August a quota of surgical dressings, about 17,000 di'essings, was divided
among the 20 aid stations operated by the Preparedness Committee (Drs. Arnold
and Fans).. Certain hospital garments and other emergency robes or garments
were likewise distributed.
Long before December 7 the Red Cross used certain homes, with proper base-
ments, and two school buildings, at widely separated parts of the City, for the
storage of .such articles that would be used at once in case of an attack. There
were more of such storage centers, away from headquarters at Castle Kinder-
garten, and in them were stored surgical dressings, hospital garments and robes,
convale.scent robes, and such, women's and children's clothing, and canned goods.
All centers were selected with a view to both geographical distribution and quick
accessibility.
In October and November the Hawaii Chapter in its surgical dressings produc-
tion centered on special Army dressings, and between November 25 and December
4 delivered to the Army Medical Department here a total of 58.121 dressings.
[102] On December 7 the parties assigned to headquarters and to the
storage centers reported on a prearranged schedule. From one center over
19,600 dressings were released for the Pearl Harbor hospital, together with certain
garments, and one quota, about 17,000, was sent to Tripler Hospital from another
center, deliveries in each instance being made by the Red Cross Motor Coi-ps.
The foundation laid and the experience gained during the entire year of 1941
made possible the enormous and specialized production for the services. Army,
Navy and Marine, which steadily increased throughout the War, in the latter
months averaging well over 1,000,000 surgical dressings per "month.
(d) Motor Corps.
Motor Corps was organized in April and May of 1941, its first work being the
collection, sorting and distribution of hooks and magazines to our armed forces.
In order to qualify, membei-s had to take prescribed courses. Regular duty was
started on July 21, 1941. with 28 Army wives, 17 Navy and 49 civilian women,
married or single. Due to the evacuation policy of service personnel, by Decem-
ber 7 there were only three in Motor Corps directly connected with the Army or
Navy, their places being largely filled by local women. In order that the Army
and Navy should be fully acquainted with Motor Corps uniform, cars, and in-
signia, as well as for humanitarian reasons. Motor Corps from July on took con-
valescents from Military and Naval hospitals for drives and excursions. During
the fall months additional training was given in first aid. emergency delivery of
babies, military drill, gas and chemical warfare lectures and demonstration,
and blackout driving. A complete list of assignments, subiect of course for change,
wa.s made for attack day, so on December 7 certain Corps members reported at
once to assigned posts, and the balance at headquarter.';.
On December 7. atul for the immediate days thereafter, not a single prepara-
tion proved to be futile. Motor Corps carried supplies to Hickam. Pearl Hai-bor.
Schotield and other posts, assisted evacuees, and hurried back and forth from all
Army and Navy pf)sts on innumerable assignments. Naturally, such posts were
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3415
closed to the public on the attack.-but the fact that Motor Corps and the Red
Cross uniform had been previously well known made it possible to go right
through to complete vital assignments, whereas others were turned back. Ail
this was not an accident — it had been carefully thought out and prepared for
months in advance ; and on that particular day, a Sunday, proved a Godsend.
(e) Evacuation and Disastc?- Relief.
It had been agreed in advance that evacuation, housing and feeding of civilians
caused by an enemy attack was primarily a governmontal function. Neverthe-
less, the Red Cross stood by to assist and cooperate. On December 7 Motor
Corps assisted in transporting evacuees. The Red Cross took charge, and as-
sumed responsibility for the large group of evacuees housed at the University
of Hawaii. Movements of evacuees were quickly coordinated without the slight-
est friction between the Disaster Council and the Red Cross.
In accordance with prearranged plans the heads of the large supply houses in
Honolulu, together with adequate staff and all available trucks and drivers, re-
ported at once on December 7 for duty. Telephone orders from the Red Cross for
clothing, mattresses, blankets, canned goods and innumerable items were promptly
filled and delivered by the Red Cross \iO,i] Motor Corps or properly au-
thorized civilian trucks, as the case might be. The Red Cross did not have to go
through any red tape but orders were taken over the phone and the charges
made later. December 7 and the following few days cost the Red Cross some
$50,000.
(f) Canteen Servioe.
This corps was organized in August 1941. It had training in serving con-
valescents from Navy hospitals on picnics, and certain Allied contingents passing
through Honolulu, both in conjunction with Motor Corps. The Navy had loaned
the original equipment.
At 10 a. m. on December 7 the Canteen Corps was called to duty and set up
service at once in the loiani Palace grounds, feeding medical unit workers,
oflBcials, truck drivers, guards, emergency police, civilians, or any one who needeil
food in such grounds. Canteen Corps remained on 24-hour duty until December 17
when gradually its work in the Palace was taken over by the O. C. D. Service to
evacuees, located and living in other parts of Honolulu was, as stated above,
handled by the Relief Council and the Red Cross. By the time O. C. D. took over,
the evacuee problem had largely woiked itse'f out.
It is interesting to note that the acting chairman of this unit passed the en-
trance at Pearl Harbor that morning at 6:30 on an Inter-Island steamer on her
return to Honolulu, receiving her call for service at her home shortly thereafter.
(g) Home Service Department.
This department, trained to assist service men and their families, was or-
ganized in September 1941 but not specifically as a war measure. On December 7,
because of its trained personnel, it was at once of value in assisting evacuees to
look up separated members of families, render temporary assistance and advice,
to assist in new living arrangements, and to answer inquiries from the maiidand.
CONCLUSION
The fact that civilian affairs ran so well on December 7 is definitely due to the
intensive preparation of the Disaster Council, with all its ramifications, and the
Red Cross. There was no panic or any semblance of one. It is remarkable that
throughout all the training period there was no friction, but only a "pull-together"
and "get-ready" spirit. The c'osest cooperation prevailed between the Disaster
Council, its able director, T. G. S. Walker, Drs. Arnold and Fans, the Army medi-
cal department acting under authority of the Commanding General, and the Red
Cross. On December 7 the Disaster Ccmncil's headquarters were at the City Hall,
and the Red Cross at the Castle Kindergarten, both in the same'block. The pre-
paredness work as a whole stimulated the Red Cross workers in that period, and
certainly assisted as a- starting point for the amazing record of the Hawaii Chai>-
ter, all of which, except for "military secrets", appears in the printed Chapter
reports issued subsequently for each year.
Alfred L. Castle.
Alfred L. Castle.
3416 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[104] Exhibit "A"
(Letterhead of
Headquarters Hawaiian
Department, Fort
Sliafter. T. II. )
Refer: (MED) 080
Mr. A. L. Castle,
Acting Director, American Red Cross, Honolulu, T. H.
My Dear Mr. Castle : It has been brought to my attention that the local chapter
of the American Red Cross has offered to take such action as may be needed, to
continue the program of preparation for emergency relief for the civilian popula-
tion, to become effective in event of disaster particularly such as might eventuate
from an enemy air attack on the city. It is understood that the leadership thus
assumed will be available until superseded by an appropriate Government agency
or until for other reasons it is no longer needed.
That leadership, under those conditions as offered by the American Red Cross,
is a source of the greatest satisfaction to me. May I again bring to your attention
what seem to be the most urgent local needs. In the first priority and requiring
immediate action are :
1. The organization and training of aid station groups and the provision of
initial equipment for not less than twelve such stations.
2. The provision of an adequate reserve of medical supplies for the civilian
population.
It is understood that the training of personnel for the aid station groups has
been well begun and that a primary objective is to provide funds for completion
of the training and for the purchase of initial equipment for twelve stations.
The time element is very important as the supplies, both initial and reserve,
must, I am informed, be secured on the mainland, not being locally available
Closely linked with the items in the first priority but not of such extreme
urgency in point of time are :
1. The expansion of hospital facilities for the civilian population.
2. The provision of an adequate number of vehicles for ambulance service
on call.
It also is my understanding that the arrangements for carrying on this work,
as contemplated by your organization, are fully concurred in by other local
groups now concerned with the same problem.
[105] I consider your proposed action to be both adequate and timely and
should like to see it be put into effect in the shortest practicable time in order to
meet any disaster or emergency situation.
Yours very truly,
(S) Walter C. Short
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. 8. Army, Commanding.
[106] Exhibit "B"
JOINT statement OF PREPAREDNESS COMMITTEE AND THE RED CROSS
While the United States is not actually at war, and there is no occasion for
war hysteria, the international situation is so critical that the civilian popula-
tion of Honolulu must realize that the time has come now — not tomorrow for
intelligent, adequate, civilian defense preparedness. No sane person can think
otherwise.The Army and Navy is not here to protect the population of Honolulu ;
their duty is to defend Hawaii as one of the most vital parts of the Ameican
Defense system. In case of emergency the civilian population must be prepared
to care for itself.
As one of the first and most constructive steps in this program the Prepared-
ness Committee of the Metlical Associatioti has undertaken the task of recruit-
ing, training and getting ready for instant mobilization a large group of civilians
who will be so organized that they can quickly render first aid. collect, sort, and
transport to hospitals injured civilians with proficiency.
At least 50 doctors are now freely giving their time for this training period.
This program needs men and women who can become thoroughly trained in
this work. As a part of the enlistment in this training and work, those taking
the course are required to respond to their posts of duty at any call in an emer-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3417
gency. Honolulu must be able to mobilize quickly and efficiently, and its volun-
teers must be competent to perform tasks assigned.
No program can be carried through without cost. The instruction books
and supplies involved cost in excess of $1.00, but the booklet received is a valu-
able one for anyone to own. The majority of people taking the course will
undoubtedly gladly pay this $1.00, but certain firms and individuals have con-
tributed enough so that if anyone cannot afford this sum the booklet and supplies
will be furnished them free.
At the end of the course examinations will be given in cooperation with the
Red Cross, and those passing will receive proper certificates. To qualify for
such certificate, the person must have attended instruction classes for at least
20 hours, must pass a written examination and certain demonstration tests in
artificial respiration, digital pressure, etc., and practical problems.
The Rew Cross, for a long time here in Honolulu and throughout the Terri-
tory, has been making up surgical dressings and materials of all types which
would be imperatively needed in case of an emergency. The call on the Red
Cross is and has been heavy, and will be for some time to come — how long no
one knows.
The instruction courses being given by the Preparedness Committee do not
overlap or confiict with the First Aid classes of the Red Cross. These latter
classe sare educational — vitally so now — and will continue as formerly, with the
granting of the certificates to those who pass successfully. In less than a year
now, 897 persons have successfully passed [107] the work prescribed in
the Red Cross courses, providing a most valuable nucleus for any defense work.
(Honolulu, Hawaii, April 25, 1941)
Robert B. Faus,
Executive Officer in Charge of Plans and Training
for Preparedness Committee.
Alfred L. Castle,
Vice Chairman Hawaiian Chapter, American Red Cross.
[108] * Exhibit "C"
May 13, 1941.
Dr. Harry L. Arnold,
Chairman, Preparedness Committee of the Honolulu Medical Association,
Honolulu, T. H.
Dear Dr. Arnold : Confirming our conversation of recent date, I wish to define
the relationship of the Red Cross with your committee in connection with the
point of first aid training, the equipment of first aid stations, etc., as originally
worked out by your committee.
The program originally proposed by your committee was a very vital part of the
plans already prepared for M-Day. It had been assumed that the legislature
would pass the M-Day bill, which in turn carried with it an appropriation of
$50,000 for what I may term the "training period," and a further $250,000 after
an emergency should be declared. This bill failed under circumstances not
necessary here to relate, and left the entire program somewhat in chaos. Unless
something was done for civilian defense, the attitude of Hawaii towards such
defense seemed a disgrace.
The work of your committee, and the training in first aid for emergency
purpose, were already under way. It seemed criminal to drop this for lack of
funds. Accordingly, a tentative arrangement was worked out by which your
executive officer, Dr. R. B. Faus, became Chairman of the Disaster Relief Com-
mittee of the Red Cross. You are also a member and you are familiar with the
personnel of that committee, which consists of six. If you want to suggest
another doctor or someone else on the committee please let me know, but, as
pointed out below, the work will in practice function through your own committee.
The program so splendidly outlined and started by your committee is not
technically a Red Cross function. Your own program is more properly a
Government function which would have been carried out through funds provided
by the M-Day bill. The Red Cross would in the usual situation function as
a relief organization after a disaster has occurred. However, the Red Cross
cooperates with other agencies, and in this particular instance it is obvious that
work started by you must not stop; it is vital to defense, and is the first step
in preparing against a disaster which might be much worse except for adequate
preparedness.
3418 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
It will not be the policy of the Red Cross to endeavor in any way to direct
or control your work. For that reason we apopinted Dr. Fans chairman of our
committee, as the work he is heading up seems the most vital to be carried on.
However, we will have to supply the funds, budget the same, and have the same
properly audited ; the same would be true whether you worked with Government
funds or Red Cross. There are other matters in connection with disaster relief
which we ourselves will have to work out and which were contemplated by
the M-Day setup.
If and when GovertmK'iit funds are available the work of your committee will
undoubtedly come under the Gov- [109] ernment setup, where it should
properly come. There is no thought on the part of the Red Cress to retain any
function properly belonging to another group, or in any way to take any credit
for the work of the Medical Association. We are only trying to carry on as a
stopgap until an M-Day program with Government funds can be perfected for
I am convinced this must come sooner or later.
The big problem now is of course finance. I am informed that the minimum
requirement of your present program is $20,000, with more to come if the work
is expanded to complete the setup. The Red Cross has not that amount avail-
able. It will therefore be our problem to consider ways and means of raising
funds and of carrying on the work being done by you, until such time as Govern-
mental funds are available. Please understand that the amount of assistance
we can give is limited by the financial problem. I believe the present arrange-
ment, as soon as this is approved by your committee, can be covered by temporary
budget allotment.
I feel, also, that the present arrangement is a happy one, as the work of
the Production Department of the Red Cross, and its own First Aid classes, very
closely dovetails in with your work.
I enclose a copy of a letter from General Short which sets forth this entire
matter far better than I can. He is very definite in his statement that this work
should continue, and certainly the Red Cross will endeaver to cooperate to the
best of its ability. Let me repeat again our assurance that we are not trying
to dictate policies to you, or interfere with or control your work, but are merely
trying to make possible the continuation of this work until our assistance is
superseded by the appropriate Government agency.
Very truly yours,
/S/ Alfred L. Castle,
Vice Chairman, Hawaiian Chapter
of the American Red Cross.
ALC : GB
ENCL.
[110] Exhibit "D"
Honolulu, Hawaii, May 13, 19Ifl.
Mr. Alfred L. Castle,
Vice-Chairman, Haxcaikin Chapter of the American Red Cross.
Honolulu, T. H.
Dear Mr. Castle: We are deeply appreciative of your letter of even date,
offering the financial assistance of the American Red Cross in making prepara-
tions for disaster relief of the civilian population of Honolulu.
It is the unanimous opinion of this committee that we should accept your
offer and proceed as rapidly as possible to secure the necessary funds and
supplies as outlined in General Short's letter. The amount mentioned in your
letter ($20,000) would not be adequate for the full program, but would provide
for the initial training period.
Yours very truly.
Honolulu County Medical Society.
By (s) H. L. Abnoid, Chairman.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3419
[111] Exhibit "E"
Excerpt — letter from John F. Gray, Secretary Hawaii Chapter, to Mr. Alfred L.
Castle, dated June lU, 1941.
"Under date of June 7th I wired you to let you know something of what had
been happening here. I am now enclosing a clipping from the Advertiser June
5, 1941, outlining in more detail the action taken by City-County othcials with
regard to providing medical supplies and fire equipment. Bids have been let
for the supplies and apparently these will be available in the near future.
In the meantime Mr. Evans, Special Representative from National Head-
quarters whom you did not meet, has contacted the military and civilian authori-
ties during a brief stay of four or five days and he is to return on June 16th
for a ten days' or two weeks stay at which time civilian activities will be
coordinated with official agencies. Until then it was deemed advisable that
the training of the medical units continue without interruption and the Army
agreed to loan us up to twenty units, authority for this having been received
from the War Department in Washington.
To date I have signed for sixteen of these units which have been delivered
to the Armory in the custody of Dr. Fans and Mr. Fitkin who are assigning
units to their various commanders. Mr. Evans also thought it advisable and
wired for Wasiiington to ship us twelve complete units for our own use here.
Undoubtedly we shall have to set up at least one unit on each of the larger
outside islands if for no other than psychological reasons.
Just this morning Mr. Davis of Consolidated Amusement authorized me to
give publicity to the donation of the ambulance and that will be I'eleased within
a day or two.
Production work is progressing very nicely under the leadership of Mrs.
Molyneux. Mrs. von Holt was ill going up to the coast, as you may know, and
she stayed in Los Angeles only a week before returning. She is not on duty
yet but hopes to be very soon."
[112] Exhibit "F"
Excerpt — letter from L. M. Mitchell, Assistant to the Vice Chairman, American
Red Cross, to Mr. Alfred L. Castle, Vice Chairman, Hawaii Chapter, dated
July 22, 1941.
"Meantime, we are proceeding with the matter of medical supplies and have
authorized the purchase of equipment for the twelve stations in accordance with
the request transmitted by the Chapter and the letters prepai'ed by the Army
authorities. As soon as medical station equipment can be purchased, it will
be shipped to your Chapter for assembly in the twelve station units, since it
is not feasible at this end to break up the purchases and assemble the units
prior to shipping. It is understood that these medical station units will be held
for the emergency and that in the event an emergency need does not develop
and there is later need for them elsewhere, they will be available for such use.
With this understanding, the cost of this equipment is being met by the National
organization.
"As indicated in our cable of yesterday to Mr. Gray, we have already ordered
the revolving stock of medical supplies requested some time ago as a reserve to
be held in Honolulu for immediate use in case of emergency. These supplies
have actually been purchased for China and are shipped to Honolulu to protect
your ability to meet any emergency that may arise. They should be held intact
so that, if necessary, they may be forwarded to China at a later date, or 'shipped
elsewhere as the need arises. It may be advisable with some items to forward
the stock on hand in Honolulu to China and replace with fresh supplies in the
interest of keeping the stock currently fresh.- From time to time, the situation
will be reviewed and appropriate action to keep the stock in current condition
for immediate use will be made."
3420 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[113] Exhibit "G"
(Letterhead of
Headquarters Hawaiian
Department, Fort
Shafter, T. H.)
29 July 1941.
Mr. John F. Gbay, Field Director,
American Red Cross,
426 Dillingham Building,
Honolulu. T. H.
My Dear Mr. Gray: Ttie following plan for the storage and issue of certain
amounts of American Red ('ross medical supplies, designated as "Reserve" and
"Aid Station Equipment (12)", has been approved':
1. Both the Reserve and the Aid Station Equipment will be held in storage
for actual use and not issued for training purposes. If items for training pur-
poses cannot be secured from any other source, minimal quantities as approved
by this oflBce to be issued for this purpose.
2. All items to be stored under the control of the Commanding OflScer, Hawai-
ian Medical Depot, properly dispersed. Storage to be at the risk of the American
Red Ci'oss.
3. Method of Storage:
a. Reserve Supplies. According to usually accepted rules.
b. Aid Station Equipment. Each to be earmarked for a particular local
civilian Aid Station group. To be so marked and the proper civilian officials
notified.
4. Issue. By order of the Department Surgeon, subject to approval of the
Department Commander.
Please notify Captain Paul Nixon, Hawaiian Medical Depot, Fort Shafter,
as far in advance of arrival of supplies as your information pennits. Include
approximate cubic footage space required and list of items.
Reference transportation, request delivery by you at points to be specified by
Captain Nixon.
Yours very truly,
Edgar King,
Colonel, Medical Corps,
Department Surgeon.
Information Copy :
Mr. A. L. Castle,
312 Castle d Cooke, Ltd.
Honolulu, T. H.
[lUf] Exhibit "H"
SXJBGICAL DRESSINGS
HAWAII (1 quota) # — Hilo has material and is making a quota to be stored in
Hilo : Mrs. R. M. Lindsay, Hilo, Phone 2006.
KOHALA (1 quota) — Has completed quota, five boxes, stoi-ed. Mrs. James M.
Beck, Mahukona, Phone, Kohala 368.
KEALAKEKUA (2 boxes) — 2 boxes shipped from Oahu. Assorted. To be
stored by Mrs. William J. Paris, Kaihaliu, Hawaii, Phone, 2 W 716.
LANAI (1 quota) — Ship from Oahu 5 boxes completed by Oahu. To be stored by
Mrs. H. B. Caldwell, Lanai City, Lanai, No phone, must wire.
MOLOKAI (1 quota) — Material for 1 quota is being made up on Molokai and
will be stored by Mrs. George P. Cooke, Kaunakakai, Molokai, Phone, 7 W 29.
MAUI (2 quotas) — Has material to make one quota Will ship from Oahu quota
now bein? completed by Kahuku. To be stored by Mrs. Stanley Elmore,
Spreckelsville, Maui, Phone, 4 W 576.
KAUAI ( 1 quota) — Has material and is making quota to be stored by Mrs. J. C.
Plews, Lihue, Kauai, Phono, Lihue 326.
OAHU (3 quotas) — Will make and store 3 quotas here in three separate places.
Material on hand for 3 quotas plus. Material for 14 extra quotas ordered
from the mainland.
# One quota contains approximately 17,000 dressings.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3421
[115] MEDICAL PREPAREDNESS IN THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII
PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941
H. L. Arnold, M. D., Honolulu, Hawaii
[116] MEDICAL PEIEPAREDNESS
The first organized eflort of the medical profession of Honolulu to prepare for
the medical aspects of war, began in June of 1940. Dr. Clarence Froiik was
appointed by the oflBcers of the Territorial Medical Association to represent them
on the National Committee on Medical Preparedness. During the following
year, Doctors Fronk, Faus, Wallis, Keay and Burden were appointed as a
Territorial Committee on Preparedness. The County Medical Society also
appointed a Committee in 1940, consisting of Doctors Fronk, Palma, Fred Lam
and James Kuninobu. This Committee met, made plans, and endeavored to
interest the profession, but in general, their efforts did not meet with much
success. However, on April 11. 1941, following discussions with the Surgeon,
Hawaiian Department, Colonel — now Brigadier General — Edgar King, the Hono-
lulu County Medical Society elected a committee, consisting of seven members.
Doctors Larsen, Judd, Strode, Pinkerton, Withington, Faus and the writer.
These men were called the Preparedness Committee, and were given power to act
for the Society in making the necessary arrangements to prepare for the care
of civilian casualties in the event of war.
Offfanization
The first meeting of this committee was heUl on April 15, 1941. The conviction
of every member of the committee that war was imminent and that it was
urgently necessary for preparations to be made to care for a potentially large
number of injured civilians is reflected in tlie following excerpts from the min-
utes of this initial meeting.
•' * * * The following specific actions were taken :
Dr. Robert Faus was reappointed to the position which he held under the previ-
ous preparedness committee. It was decided that his work was to be facilitated
by the Committee in any way which Dr. Faus might suggest.
• * •*« * * •
The actual listing of medical personnel on this Island for duties during war
conditions was decided to be an absolutely necessary factor and this work will
go forward as rapidly as possible.
• ••••••
Dr. Fronk stated that the Army would be able to furnish beds and linen for
the potentially expanded hospitals. Dr. Fronk also stated that it was unlikely
that subsidiary hospitals anywhere near the business districts would be useful.
The potential local manufacture of typhoid vaccines was discussed and
approved.
The offer of Dr. James Kuninobu of supplying medical personnel from the
Japanese Medical Society for service in the event that it is needed was accepted
gladly and he will be so notified.
Dr. Pinkerton reiwrted that the blood and [Hf] plasma bank situation
was satisfactory and well under way.
Dr. Fans was given charge of the arranging for supplies of orthopedic appara-
tus such as Thomas splints and Kirschner stirrups."
The minutes of this first meeting of the Preparedness Committee are attached
hereto in full and marked Exhibit "A".
Dr. Robert Faus (now Colonel, M. C. A. U. S.) was made executive oflBcer
in charge of plans and training and functioned as such until after December 7,
1941. Subcommittees were formed and additional advisers called in from time
to time. Liaison was established with the Army, the Hawaii Chapter, American
Red Cross, the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, the City and County government,
the Major Disaster Council under Mr. Walker, the Nursing Association, and in-
numerable other less important organizations. The close liaison maintained
with the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross is reflected in the exchange
of correspondence with that organization (See the following letters in the presen-
tation of the Hawaii Chapter, American Red Cross : Letter of Mr. Castle to Dr.
Arnold dated May 13, 1941, marked Exhibit "C" enclosing copy of letter from
Lt. General Walter C. Short, and Dr. Arnold's reply thereto marked Exhibit 'D").
3422 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Training
The physicians of the city were divided into groups and assigned to specific
duties in tl^.e event of wjir. One group of surgeons, with their volunteer nurses,
was assigned to go to military hospitals and assist military surgeons in caring
for their casualties, since it was obvious that the medical staffs of these hospitals
foi" normal times would not be able to deal with a sudden influx of casualties
resulting from enemy action. Other groups were assigned to do the same thing
for the local civilian hospitals. Still others were assigned to First Aid Stations
to care for minor casualties, and to prepare for transportation to the hospital
those casualties too badly injured to be taken there without prior treatment.
Twenty First Aid Stations were set up throughout the City in schools and public
buildings, and in some instances in private buildings through the generosity of
the owners, and to each of these a staff was attached. It was obvious that it
would be necessary to train large numbers of lay personnel in the primary care
of casualties, and there were not enough teachers to do this. Thereiore. a course
was instituted for "teaching teachers." A large class of teachers was trained by
Dr. Fans and given diplomas by the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross,
and the work of training the workers themselves then began. In all nearly 3,000
individuals representing all nationalities were given courses and certificates of
graduation in the principles of First Aid, Ambulance Training, etc.
All of these training activities included extensive publicity throughout the
entire community. Records of the Preparedness Committee show that from the
time of its inception to November 30, 1941, members of the committee had de-
livered a total of 18 public speeches while newspaper publicity had totalled 3,775
inches in the columns of the local newspapers.
Finances were a problem from the beginning. Obviously, it was necessary to
have some sort of an office and to have at least a skeleton personnel to do typing,
mimeographing, mailing and so forth. The funds for this purpose came very
largely from the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross, although the Hono-
lulu Chamber of Commerce, the Committee \118] members themselves, and
many other persons of all nationalities contributed liberally of their funds for
the purpose. The Army detailed a medical oflBcer to the sole duty of assisting in
the work. The large mercantile firms of Honolulu, such as American Factors,
T. H. Davies, and many others, were contacted for permission to make arrange-
ments to convert their fieets of trucks into ambulances by the addition of frames
to hold stretchers. Two hundred and fifty such trucks were thus fitted and the
drivers trained before December 7, 1941.
ynrsing Services
A survey of the nursing facilties of the Territory, under Miss Matthews, was
instituted and carried out and the nurses available for emergency duty in every
community were listed, with their telephone numbers and capabilities.
Hospitals
The hospitals of the City were studied critically, with a view to discovering how
their capacities to care for patients could be increased, and how they could be
evacuated of the less seriously ill to jtermit the entrance of large numbers of
casualties, should the occasion arise.
Supplies and Equipment
The supplies and equipment of the Aid Stations were in part loaned by the
Army, and in part purchased by funds donated by the Hawaii Chapter of the
American Red Cross, the Chamber of Commerce, and the City and County of
Honolulu. Each Aid Station had at least two doctors assigned to it, two dentists,
at least three nurses, a group of nurses' aides, ambulance drivers, and many
other types of specialized personnel. These volunteers attended regular weekly
meetings from June, 1941. until long after the war had begun.
Ambulances
Three ambulances were donated — one by the Wholesale Liquor Dealers' Associ-
ation, one by the Consolidated Amusement Company, and one by the Schuman
Carriage Company. These vehicles were almost indispensable during the training
period for transportation of supplies, equipment and personnel to the various
stations. The ambulances which would be depended upon if war came, however,
were the converted trucks volunteered by Honolulu business firms. Mass rallies
were held on several occasions in the Armory, and in the auditorium of McKinley
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3423
High School for the purpose of stimulating interest and furthering the course
of training.
On each of the "outside" islands, a chairman was selected by the local County
Medical Society and put in charge of the work, as had been done in Honolulu.
The preparations were, of necessity, less elaborate and extensive than were in
Honolulu, but every island, including Lanai, had made, long before December
7th, Definite and detailed plans for what they would do in the event of enemy
action.
Evacuation
Evacuation sites were provided for the various hospitals, to serve for a place
to put less seriously sick patients, to make room for more seriously injured and
to increase their possible capacity. It was also assumed that it was likely that a
hospital might well be destroyed by fire or bombing and that the entire organiza-
tion might find it neces- [119] sary to move to new quarters. These
were selected and arrangements made for transportation to them. The Major
Disaster Council's transportation division, under Mr. Kirk, was responsible for
these arrangements. In spite of the serious objection of the Bureau of Narcotics
of the International Revenue Department, arrangements were made with the
Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross to have on hand a generous supply
of morphine. This was stored in a safety deposit vault, pending the need for
its distribution. Typhoid vaccine was arranged for, from the Territorial Board
of Health, it being felt that in the event that the people in the community, or
any considerable number of them, were evacuated to the mountains, typhoid
fever would promptly become a problem.
Blood Bank
The blood plasma bank, which had been established some time before, con-
tinued under the management of Dr. Pinkerton, also a member of the Committee,
and strenuous efforts were made by him to increase the supply of stored plasma
to be ready for an emergency. Due to general lack of public understanding of
the blood donation idea, however, the quantity, while large in comparison with
most cities was, of course, far from adequate. The work of the Honolulu blood
plasma bank is discussed more fully in a separate presentation by Dr. F. J.
Pinkerton.
Did the Plan workf •
On the morning of December 7th, the Headquarters diary of the Emergency
Medical and Ambulance Service at Kaahumanu School shows that the chain
telephone^ystem which had been set up in preparation for such an event began
to function at 8:20 A. M., when Mrs. Nash called her office staff to duty. At
8 : 35 A. M., the ambulance trucks from Davies and Company and American
Factors, Ltd. were ordered to fit their frames and be ready for call. Other
companies were alerted later by Mr. Paul Meyer, officer in charge of the ambulance
pool.
At 9 : 00 A. M., Colonel King, then Department Surgeon, telephoned in a re-
quest for twenty-six doctors and twenty nurses to report to Tripler Hospital.
These nurses and doctors were called immediately ; fortunately, most of the
doctors of the City were attending a postgraduate lecture on wound surgery at
that hour. At 9 : 10 A. M., Colonel King requested that as many trucks as possible,
fitted as ambulances report to Hickam Field to carry wounded from Hickam to
Tripler Hospital. Twelve trucks left immediately and others left as rapidly
as they drove in to report. By 9 : 20 A. M.. forty-five trucks were on their way
to Hickam Field. Most of the wounded from Hickam Field were transported by
these ambulances, and most of the treatment of the wounded was done by civilian
physicians, nurses and volunteer helpers.
The Aid Stations were all manned promptly and reported in from time to time
as shown on the attached blotter. In all, 2,344 persons were treated for illness
or injury on December 7, 1941, by these organizations. Distribution of these
treatments and, to some extent, the nature of them, is listed on the enclosed
sheet. Lunalilo Station was actually struck by a Japanese bomb, set on fire, and
compelled to move to an adjacent building.
Distribution of cases treated at the Medical Unit is shown on the tabulation
attached herewith as Exhibit "B."
3424 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[120] The recognition of the Army for the services rendered on December 7,
1941, is reflected in the following memorandum from the Oflice of the Surgeon,
Hawaiian Department, dated January 19, 1942 :
"Memo to : Dr. H. L. Arnold, Office of Civilian Defense.
"From : Headquarters Hawaiian Department — January 19, 1942.
"Request that the following statement, which has the approval of the Depart-
ment Commander, be publislied in the Honolulu County Medical Journal :
" 'The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, wishes to take this op-
portunity to thank the physicians and their assistants for the splendid aid and
cooperation rendered on December 7 and the period following in the cai'e of the
wounded. All did a superior job.'
"For the Department Surgeon.
"(Signed) Sidney Posneb,
"Captain, Medical Corps."
Miscellaneous Activities
The balance of the day's activities was devoted to innumerable details of
rendering assistance to sick and injured persons, to hospitals and doctors and to
moving supplies and equipment to places where they were needed.
The wisdom and adequacy of the plans and training schedule were, it is sub-
mitted, demonstrated by the relatively prompt and smooth functioning of the
organization when war came. The devoted service of the volunteer trainees and
trainers, who spent hours and hours of time in preparing for war can never be
adequately praised.
Major General Norman Kirk, the Surgeon General of the United States Army,
in addressing a large group of physicians from the Service and the civilian
community on January 26, 1945, at Kamehameha Hospital said, "Before begin-
ning my talk, I want to express the thanks of the Army to the civilian physicians
of Honolulu for the magnificent job they did on December 7th, when they were
ready for it and we weren't."
H. L. Aenold.
[121] Exhibit "A"
Minutes of Fibst Meeting of Prepabedness Committee of the Honolulu County
Medical Society — ^April 15, 1941
All members present, and by invitation Dr. Clarence Fronk and Dr. Thomas
Mossman. It was decided that the President of the County Medical Society
should ex officio be invited to all meetings of the Committee in future, and that
these meetings would be held weekly on Tuesday at noon at the Pacific Club when
there were matters to be discussed and that notification would be sent out in
plenty of time in advance. A quorum will consist of four members and the re-
porting will be done by the Chairman of the Committee.
The division of the committee into the following categories was approved :
Dr. Robert Faus — Executive, in charge of all phases of the Committee's work.
Dr. N. P. Larsen — In charge of plans for hospital expansion and evacuation.
Dr. Joseph Strode — In charge of hospital teams for civilian casualty care.
Dr. J. R. Judd — In charge of hospital teams for military casualty care.
Dr. Paul Withington — In charge of the collection and primary care of casualties.
Dr. F. J. Pinkerton — In charge of liaison with Chamber of Commerce, the Red
Cross, other branches of the County disaster organizations, and Supplies and
Publicity.
Dr. H. L. Arnold — In charge of administration, hygiene and sanitation.
It was agreed and considered of vital importance that all medical personnel
be under the control of this committee and assignments of such personnel be
made only under its sanction.
The following specific actions were taken :
Dr. Robert Faus was reappointed to the position which he held under the
previous preparedness committee. It was decided that his work was to be facili-
tated by the Committee in any way which Dr. Faus might suggest.
Dr. Mossman stated that he was in the process of preparing a master list of
the available medical supplies on Oahu and he is to continue this work.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
3425
[122] The actual listing of medical personnel on this Island for duties
during war conditions was decided to be an absolutely necessary factor and this
work will go forward as rapidly as possible.
When and if the Disaster Board of the City and County lays plans for the
construction of evacuation camps or shelters, recommendations for the hygiene
and sanitation of these camps will be offered. Dr. Enright and Dr. Haralson
were to be approached regarding the desirability of publicity concerning the need
for typhoid and smallpox vaccination on a voluntary basis as soon as this can
be done.
Dr. Fronk stated that the Army would be able to furnish beds and linen for
the potentially expanded hospitals. Dr. Fronk also stated that it was unlikely
that subsidiary ho.spitals anywhere near. the business district would be useful.
The potential local manufacture of typhoid vaccines was discussed and
approved.
The offer of Dr. James Kuninobu of supplying medical personnel from the
Japanese Medical Society for service in the event that it is needed was accepted
gladly and he will be so notified.
Dr. Pinkerton x'eported that the blood and plasma bank situation was satis-
factory and well under way.
Dr. Faus was given charge of the arranging for supplies of orthopedic apparatus
such as Thomas splints and Kirschner stirrups.
A comluittee consisting of Drs. Fronk. Judd and Strode will confer upon two
matters : one, the appointment of hospital teams for the care of hospitalized
patients in both military and civilian hospitals and also upon the standardiza-
tion of the treatment for burns and the acquisition of necessary supplies for
this work. It was suggested that the physicians of the city be circularized as
to what good and serviceable instruments they have which would be available
for the use of the general disaster committee in the event of serious need for
such instruments.
The principle was laid down that doctors who are asked to teach in the evacua-
tion units now being organized will not of necessity be expected to serve in these
units in the actual emergency but all doctors who are asked to do this work of
teaching are urged to cooperate to the fullest extent.
Captain Gay is caring for the coordination of medical services during potential
disaster with the other functions of the general disaster committee.
It was decided that all actions taken by the Committee should be given publicity
by posting them in the office of the Honolulu County Medical Society.
There being no other business, the meeting was adjourned.
/s/ H. L. Arnold,
Chairman, Preparedness Committee,
Honolulu County Medical Society.
HLA:H
Exhibit "B"
[123] Cases treated
at the medical unit, December 7-31
, mi
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3
0
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3
.c
0
0
s
0
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s:
0!
2
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5
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Deaths.. ..
0
0
0
39
0
116
4
46
11
24
6
3
120
0
0
.?
0
157
13
50
37
10
6
3
170
0
0
0
72
0
70
2
5
33
5
16
0
72
0
0
0
2
0
49
1
13
46
4
0
0
50
0
1
0
19
3
67
5
15
24
1
4
0
72
0
0
0
19
0
37
4
11
6
0
0
0
41
0
0
0
15
0
82
4^
34
4
0
1
86
0
0
0
0
0
42
0
30
41
0
1
0
42
0
0
0
3
0
15
0
1
10
0
0
0
15
3
0
0
29
0
119
2
20
68
0
3
18
121
0
0
0
13
0
13
0
0
13
0
0
0
13
0
0
0
0
0
10
1
2
2
4
1
0
11
4
0
0
27
0
48
6
27
11
0
8
15
,'54
1
0
0
50
0
285
5
188
15
0
1
0
290
0
0
0
4
0
50
1
16
34
0
1
0
51
0
0
0
19
0
58
0
2
15
1
1
1
58
0
0
0
9
0
40
1
7
12
11
2
0
41
0
0
0
1
0
12
0
0
9
0
0
0
12
0
0
11
99
0
957
4
666
165
0
0
0
971
0
0
0
33
0
52
2
16
27
4
4
1
54
S
Deliveries
1
Dental treatment..
11
Dressings.
520
Doctors called
3
Home
2,289
Hospitalized .
55
Medical treatments
1,158
613
Miscellaneous
68
Ri
War casualties
42
Total
?.. 344
Total number of patients treated in the 20 medical units: 2,344.
3426 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[124] Preparedness of the Honolulu Blood Plasma Bank pride to
DCEMBER 7, 1941
F. J. Pinkerton, M. D., Honolulu, Hawaii
[125] During tlie year 1940 many informal discussions were had by the
physicians in Honolulu concerning the merits of a Blood Bank and the impor-
tance of such in the event that war developed between the United States and
Japan. , Ways and means were discussed pro and con by a few of the more
interested and far-thinking physicians. Finally, at the suggestion of the Public
Health Committee of the Chamber of Commerce, a letter was written to the
chairman of the committee putting the general thoughts of the various discus-
sions in letter form and suggesting that the Public Health Committee might be
interested in financing and operating such a Blood Bank.
Since such a project involved the voluntary donations of blood from a favor-
able group, the matter was discussed with representatives of the Junior Cham-
ber of Commerce and their interest and support solicited with the thought in mind
that the membership, composed of young men, would be the best group to call
upon for voluntary blood donations.
In February, 1941, an outline of the proposed blood and plasma bank was
presented to the Public Health Committee of the Honolulu Chamber of Com-
merce and a committee was appointed by the chairman to supervise and inaugu-
rate and begin operations of the blood bank. This committee was composed
of the following:
Chairman of Public Health Committee, Chamber of Commerce, as chairman.
A representative of the Health Committee fi'om the Jr. Chamber of
Commerce.
A Pathologist.
A representative of the Surgeon of the Hawaiian Department, U. S. Army.
The Territorial Commisisoner of Health.
The Medical Director of the Queen's Hospital.
The City and County Physician.
Principal provisions of the plan were :
1. A central bank was to be established in the City and County Emergency
Hospital to draw blood and prepare plasma.
2. The Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross was asked to assume
charge of publicizing tlie project and securing donors.
3. The supply of plasma and its production for the Blood Bank was to be
under the direction and control of the Public Health Committee of the Chamber
of Commerce of Honolulu.
4. No blood or plasma was ta be offered for sale.
5. As a beginning the central supply was to consist of 100 flasks of plasma,
250 cc. each.
6. Certain equipment was to be purchased for hospitals on Oahu desiring to
prepare plasma in addition to that of the central bank. (In order to decen-
tralize and to encourage widespread interest in the technical preparation of
plasma and the operation of a blood bank it was decided to offer to all the
hospitals minimum equipment which could be brought into [126] oper-
ation when an emergency arose and to train the technicians of those hospitals
in the technic.
Budget: A budget of $2,000, later increased to $3,000 was appropriated by the
Public Health Conuhittee of the Senior Chamber to convert space at the City and
County Emergency Hospital into a laboratory, and to purchase equipment and
pay .salaries. A physician, a medical technologist and a bacteriologist were
employed to supervise the laboratory. Eight hospitals on Oahu, (six in Hono-
lulu and two in rural Oahu) agreed to participate in the program. Equipment
was purchased for all of them and their own technicians were trained in plasma
tedinic by the Blood Bank technologist.
Openhig of hank: After four months of preparation and securing equipment
fr<tm the mainland, the first blood was drawn on June 2, 1941. A schedule of
bleeding nine to twelve donors' a week was maintained. At the end of three
months, 96 men and women had given blood and 77 flasks of plasma were on
hand.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3427
Additional oijproijriatiou: $1,000 additional was appropriated by the Cham-
ber of Commerce and a plan approved for doubling the s^'Jil to 200 flasks and to
speed operations to care for about SO donors a weeli. Under the new schedule,
within Ave weelis 158 donors had siven blood and the goal of 200 flasks had
been passed.
Cost: The cost of the last 138 flasks came to $7.25 per 250 cc, as compared to
the cost of $19.50 to $27.50 per 250 cc, for commercial plasma.
Red Cross: In October of 1941 the Blood Hank jjroject was offered to the
American Red Cross but this organization did not accept the offer because of lack
of approval from Washington.
Closing of bank: In November of 1941 the Chamber of Commerce feeling that
the demonstration had been .successful and that enough experience had been had
to insure protection to the community in the event of war, closed its doors. Sev-
eral weeks were required to draw and culture the plasma then in the process of
production and to take inventory of the equipment.
Storage: On December 1, 1941, 203 flasks of plasma were placed in the cold
storage warehouse at the Hawaiian Electric Company and plans were made to
turn the central laboratory over to the City and County Hospital for an indefinite
period (to carry on the functions of a central blood bank for emergency needs
if required).
Sneak attaK-k on December 7, lO^fl: On December 7, 1941, our Army and Navy
bases were attacked and an urgent appeal by Service hospitals went out for
plasma. The chairman of the Public Health Committee of the Chamber of Com-
merce delivered 75 flasks to the Tripler General Hospital. 80 flasks to the
Queen's Hospital for civilian use and 45 flasks to the Pearl Harbor Naval Hos-
pital. Within six hours the total supply, the product of months of effort, was
exhausted. The doctors w'ho attended the wounded that day tell of men who were
carried in, very evidently marked for death, and they also tell how many of
these men still live because of the life-giving plasma being on hand and ready
for instant use to be poured back into their veins.
[127] Immediate expansion of blood bank: Now- the value of those months
of preparation, of standardizing technic, of training technicians, was felt. A call
for donors was broadcast over local radio stations and the response was over-
whelming. A schedule of 50 donors iter hour, 10 hours a day, 7 days a week was
maintained for two weeks. Every available doctor and nurse was enlisted to
assist. Between 20 and 30 doctors worked on a volunteer basis from 3 to 5 hours
daily in taking the donors, many of them in addition to their First Aid Station
duties. Men and women from all walks of life and all economic levels stood in
line for hours. War workers came after their long shift of duty, as did dock
workers and workers in the sugar and pineapple fields. The original blood bank
laboratory was placed on 24 hour duty, the personnel working in three eight-hour
shifts, sterilizing equipment, preparing sodium citrate, culturing plasma and
dispensing it.
The laboratory at the Queen's Hospital typed the donors, ran serological tests
on the blood, prepared plasma and dispensed blood and plasma.
Units were instituted at the Experiment Stations of the Hawaiian Sugar
Planters' Association and the Pineapple Producers' Cooperative Association.
Equipment and technical assistance were borrowed from the University of Hawaii.
The other seven hospitals absorbed part of the load of plasma preparation
with equipment provided by the Public Health Committee in advance of the
attack. Personnel of all these hospitals had been trained during 1941 for just
such an emergency.
The Blood Bank was again offered to the American Red Cross but this offer
was not accepted ; it was then taken over by the Office of Civilian Defense
who assumed responsibility for expenses Incurred as of December 7, 1941.
F. J. Pinkerton
F. J. PiNKEETON. M. D.
79716 O — 46 — pt. 18 37
3428 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[128] Prkparedness Activities of the Transportation Committee, Major
Disaster Council City and County oy Honolulu. Territory of Haw An, Pbiob
to December 7. 1941
Addison E. Kirk, Honolulu, Hawaii
[129] The Congressional Committee Investigating Pearl Harbor
The following is a brief summary of the activities of the Transportation Com-
mittee, Major Disaster Council, City and County of Honolulu, prior to the
attaclv on Pearl Harbor. Unfortunately, the records of tliis Conunittee have
been forwarded to Washington, ^D. C., with the files of the local OflSce of Defense
Transportation.
The Major Disaster Council was formed on June 24, 1941, with oach member
assigned as chairman of a conunittee. The Transportation Committee was
formed immediately thereafter with members heading some committee, each of
which dealt with a particular type of transportation with the exception of the
Engineering Committee. Various meetings were held, including joint meetings,
with the representatives of the Evacuation Committee and other committees
affected by transportation.
In the beginning: the Committee's activities consisted of a complete survey
of all types of transportation including railroad, highway, ships, barges, tugs
and airplanes. The Engineering Committee made a survey and an analysis
of each garage, service station and repair shop on the island. The information
secured was tabulated and cross indexed. Prior to December 7th, roughly
5,000 trucks, buses and vehicles of all types were listed. This listing included
the individual responsilile for the unit, key personnel in larger companies with
telephone numbers and addresses for out of hour calls.
The list of vehicles ranged from heavy duty trucks to small pick-up trucks
and included refrigerated units which might be used for the temporary storage
of food at evacuation centers.
The Enjrineering Committee, in its survey of trarages, had a complete list of
the macliines. tools and otiier equipment available for emergency repairs as well
as major overhauls. Per.sonne) of each garage was listed and special training
noted. Compilation of the capacity of all gasoline storage was included, both
for the purpose of refueling during an emergency and for the dispersion of this
highly neces.sary fuel.
The "danger zone" which had been established by the military authorities
was divided into four zones witii a committee member in charge of each.
In classifying transportation vehicles, including buses, the listing was divided
with those available in the city of Honolulu in one and those in the country
districts in the other. As stated before, by December 7th. there were approxi-
mately 5,000 of these vehicles listed. These did not include certain trucks which
had been turned over to the Medical Committee for use as- ambulances. Prior
to December 7th these vehicles had been outfitted as ambulances with removable
equipment which could be installed in a very few minutes.
With the attack on December 7th. all committee members reported to rheir
posts and calls for transportation equipment began to come in shortly after the
attack.
I am pleased to report that the cooperation of tho.se people volunteering their
equipment was 1007<. The volunteer drivers exceeded the requirements. I am
happy to report that all requests for trnnsportation received after [130]
9 a. m. Decemher 7. 1941, were filled satisfactorily and In ?ach instance, the
vehicles were dispatched not later than twenty miiuites after the call came in.
The larjrest single job done that day was the evacuation of the women and
children from Scliofield Barracks and'fnmi Hickani Field to various cafeteria
equipped schools in Honolulu. The movement from these posts was done in total
blackout without serious incident.
Respectfully submitted.
A. E. Kirk.
A. E. Kn^K.
Chairman, 'Iransiiortation Committee,
Major Disaster Council.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3429
[131] Organization of the Civilian Police Resbibve in the Citt and County
OF Honolulu Pbiob to DECE:MBEat 1, 1941
Heaton L. Wrenn, Honolulu, Hawaii
[132] On July 28, 1941, with the approval and under the authority of the
Honolulu Police Department and Chief of Police W. A. Gabrielson, the Honolulu
Police Reserve was organized under the leadership of Major Douglas G. King
a former officer in the British Army! The purpose of the Police Reserve was to
provide a trained body of citizens who could assist and augment the regular Hon-
olulu Police force in time of emergency. 144 men enrolled in the first group and
these men were given a course in police training. This training consisted of 14
lectures by police instructors. The subjects included the apprehension of crim-
inals, search and seizure, judo, the law of arrest, criminal law, criminal investi-
gation, traffic work, identification work, first aid and other pertinent subjects.
The lectures were held once a week on Monday evenings at the Central Inter-
mediate School from 7 : 30 to 9 : 00 P. M. The final evening lecture was con-
cluded on October 27, 1941. Thereafter the men were given training during the
daytime in drilling, judo, riot guns and pistol shooting. 24 of those enrolled in
the first class dropped out during the course of instruction. 120 of the first class
were commissioned as officers of the Honolulu Police Department on November
3, 1941.
Beginning on September 9, 1941 the members of the class started accompanying
regular police officers on their beats on every eighth day. On the graduation of
the class it was decided that the group would meet once a month for further in-
structions. The first meeting of the group was held on December 1, 1941 at
the Central Intermediate School.
A second class of 38 men was started on November 25, 1941. This course of
instruction was interrupted by the events of December 7, 1941.
On December 7, 1941, 114 of the first class and 28 of the second class went on
active police duty.
On December 7, 1941 the 142 members of the Police Reserve did regular police
duty guarding important installations, working with the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation in picking up enemy aliens and persons suspected of being dangerous
to the security of the community, guarding the oflBce of the Japanese consulate,
evacuation work in bombed areas, traffic duty, and in fact doing the same type
of work as the regular police officers. Following December 7, 1941 the members
of the Reserve for a time did duty every day and night for several weeks then
the group was divided so that they did duty every other day. Subsequently the
Reserves were divided into six groups, each of which did regular beat work,
during the third watch for one night a week and on two nights a week every
seventh week.
The members of the first class who went on duty on December 7, 1941 repre-
sented the several racial groups comprising our population and were largely
business men. For example, the group numbered among its members an under-
taker, a physician and surgeon, an interior decorator, bank tellers, a dentist, trust
company officials, salesmen, accountants, lawyers, an instructor in physical cul-
ture, steamship executives, ne\\spaper executives, contractors, an industrial re-
lations director, radio executives, chemists, clerks, architects, dairymen, invest-
ment brokers, bankers, merchants, hotel executives, insurance salesmen, securi-
ties salesmen, theater executives, a veterinarian, florists, bookkeepers, scientists,
mechanical engineers and agriculturists.
[133] Following December 7, 1941 additional groups of Reserves were given
intensive police training, commissioned as officers and did active police duty.
The Reserves for a substantial portion of the time they were on active police
duty numbere<l approximately 300 men at one time on active status.
The Honolulu Police Reserve was the first organization of its kind organized
in the United States and probably the only group whose members went on reg-
ular duty as commissioned uniformed police officers performing all the functions
of regular police.
The Police Reserve continued on an active status until October 13, 1945.
Heaton L. Weenn.
Heaton L. Wrenn
3430 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 154
COKRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENBaiAL AKNOLD AND GENERAL MaRTIN
Correspondence between General Arnold and General Martin (lOJ/l)
Date
From—
To—
Subject
Page'
15 Aug...
20 Aug...
25 Sept...
3 Nov
Martin
Martin
Arnold
Martin
Arnold
Arnold
Arnold
Martin
Arnold
Martin
Notice of study of Hawaiian air situation being sent
Inclosing study of Hawaiian air situation
1
2
Comment on Short's Tentative SOP._ __ .-._
Same _ --
6
7
27 Nov
Same - -
11
1 Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent
pages of original exhibit.
[1] 15 August 1941.
Major General H. H. Arnold, U. S. A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C.
My Dear General Arnold : There has been mailed under separate cover a
secret study which was being made at the time the memorandum from the Secre-
tary of the General Staff was received requesting that " a study be made of the
air situation in Hawaii."
This study was originally made by Colonel Farthing as Commanding OflBcer of
the 5th Bombardment Group (Heavy) assisted by Major Rose and Captain Cod-
dington. It has been prepared as a staff s'udy and cavefnlly checked as to its
contents with certain additions being made by the G-3 Section of the Hawaiian
Air Force. It represents to me the complete possibility of the Hawaiian Islands
being defended from attack by carrier-based aircraft. It is not making a state-
ment which can not be fully realized upon to say that, "The defense of the
Hawaiian Islands can be accomplished with the 180 heavy bombardment air-
planes which are setup for this mission by this study." That being true, then,
by occupying outlying fields on this island group and with the requisite number
of airplanes and the combat crews as called for by this study, the defense of the
Hawaiian Islands has been accomplished and need cause the War Department
nor the Army Air Force further ccmcern.
The original of this report is being forwarded through the Department Com-
mander of the Hawaiian Department but I am sending you a copy direct so that
you may have an opportunity to consider this study prior to the original arriving
in the War Department.
Most sincerely,
(S) E. L. Martin,
F. L. Martin,
Major General, U. S. Army.
[2] 20 August 1941.
Subject : Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii.
To : Commanding General, Army Air Forces. Washington, D. C.
Thru : Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shatter, T. H.
1. In compliance with copy of corrected memorandum for the Commanding
General. Army Air Forces, OCS 17234-25, from the Secretary, (Jeneral Staff, dated
July 17, 1941, "that a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii", there is at-
tached for consideration of the War Department a plan for the employment of
long-range bombardment aviation in the defen.se of Oahu. This i»lan clearly pre-
sents the air defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Attention is called to the recom-
mendations therein.
2. No increase in personnel of the permanent air garrison of Hawaii is neces-
sary to bring the actual heavy bombanlment strength to one group. Under pro-
visions of Table of Basic Allowances No. 1, War Department, dated December 1,
1940, fourteen additional heavy bombardment air|)lanes will be required to pro-
vide a total strength of one group of thirty-five B-17D type airplanes. This force
is so small for the mission to be performed that it is considered entirely
inadequate.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3431
3. When the RDF installation is completed and the 15th Pursuit Group has its
full complement of 80 fighters no further increase for pursuit aviation is con-
sidered necessary. Provision should be made to maintain at all times the 14th
Pursuit Wing at" full combat sti-ength of 80 fighters and lOo interceptors. It is
contemplated that pursuit aviation will perform its normal mission in the de-
fense of these islands by intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft in the
vicinity of or over the Island of Oahu. This is considered an adequate force to
perform the pursuit mission in the defense of these islands.
4. A combination medium bombardment-torpedo force is considered highly de-
sirable in order that attack can be made under conditions of low visibility when
horizontal bombing is not feasible and is tlierePore recommended as a component
part of the Hawaiian Aii- Fofce. ( S;>e Study No. 2 in attached plan).
5. On the assumption that there is a possibility of enemy surface craft reaching
the shores of Oahu, one squadron of dive bombers is [3] considered neces-
sary to assist the ground forces in withstanding an invasion effort by concentrat-
ing on denying the enemy any opportunity to establish beach heads. The quick
and accurate striking power of dive bombers makes them particularly effective
for close-in support of the ground forces and this premise is borne out by informa-
tion contained in intelligence reports received on the war in Europe. Dive bomb-
ers would also be employed against hostile surface craft and submarines which
had i)enet rated close to the shores of Oahu.
6. With the addition of the force of medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes
and one squadron of dive bombers no further increase in the number of light
bombardment airplanes is required.
7. One additional observation squadron should be assigned the Hawaiian Air
Force to supplement the new ground organization of the Hawaiian Department
which is being re-organized into two triangular divisions. The groimd forces of
the Hawaiian Department should be provided with three observation squadrons.
At present there is assigned one observation squadron (C&D) and one light
bombardment squadron which could be diverted to observation duty.
8. To increase the number of aircraft in the Hawaiian Air Force as outlined
in this letter and in the attached plan it is estimated that approximately 3,871
additional men should be assigned. A minimum of 216 combat crews and 180
maintenance crews are necessary to operate 180 B-17D type airplanes. Sufficient
persoimel are now present in the Hawaiian Air Force to man 70 combat crews
and 70 maintenance crews for heavy bombardment aircraft. Additional per-
sonnel equal to the differences above should be assigned to the Hawaiian Air
Force to meet these requirements. Further personnel increases should be made
to activate two medium combination bombardment-torpedo squadrons, one dive
bomber squadron, one additional observation squadron and five air base squad-
rons. The five air base squadrons will be used to maintain the outlying fields
tabulated below which will house heavy bombardment squadrons as indicated.
The two Air Base Groups (S) are to be used to maintain Bellows Field and the
site selected for the station of the 15th Pursuit Group.
Barking Sands : 2
Morse Field 2
Hilo 1
Lanai 1
Parker Ranch 1
9. The dive bomber squadron and three observation squadrons with allied
services will become, in effect, an air support command and will be stationed at
Bellows Field.
[4] 10. Tables of Organization prescribe five enlisted men for each heavy
bombardment combat crew. For continuous daily operation a minimum of four-
teen men will be necessary for each heavy maintenance crew. Using these figures
as a basis, personnel requirements have been computed as shown in Inclosure
No. 2.
11. There is at present available, under construction and awaiting approval
of the War Department, housing for 12,288 enlisted men. This study will require
housing for a total of 12,813 men to provide for all Air Corps and associated
personnel. This leaves but 52.5 men to be cared for in a future project which
will be submitted when this study has been approved. For detailed analysis of
housing see Inclosure No. 3.
3432 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
12. It is my conviction that by increasing the present strength of the Hawaiian
Air Force by one observation squadron, a minimum of one dive bomber squadron,
two squadrons of combination medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes and by
increasing the strength of long-range bombardment to a total of 180 airplanes
a positive defense of the Hawaiian Islands can be assured without any assistance
whatever from the naval forces giving the Navy complete freedom of action.
(S) F. L. Martin,
F. L. Martin,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
3 Incls—
Incl #1 — Plan for the Employment of Long-Range Bombardment Aviation
in the Defense of Oahu. (In triplicate).
Incl #2 — Personnel Requirement Recapitulation. (In triplicate).
Incl #3 — Air Force Housing Facilities. (In triplicate). '
[Note. — For inclosures see Army Exhibit 35, Roberts Record.!
15] Basic : ( Ltr. HAF, 20 August 1941, "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii." )
AG 381/264 HDP
1st Ind.
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shaffer, T. H., August 19^1.
To Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.
I concur in this study.
/S/ Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
3 Incls. (dup). /
[6'] September 25, 1941.
Major General F. L. Martin.
Hawaiian Air Force.
Honolulu, T. H.
Dear Martin : There has just been brought to my attention the Hawaiian
Department Tentative Standing Operative Procedure publication July 14, 1941.
I note under Section 2 that the Hawaiian Air Force is charged with being pre-
pared to release a provisional battalion totaling 500 men to assist the auxiliary
police force. It is further observed that the Hawaiian Air Force is charged with
defending Schofield Barracks against ground and sabotage "attacks.
The combat units, together with the auxiliary and service units set up for the
Hawaiian Department, have been designed primarily to insure the full effective-
ness of air force operations during that critical time indicated under the Ha-»
waiian Department Alert No. 1. It would appear, however, that we have over-
estimated the requirements for the Hawaiian Air Force. Obviously, it would be
impossible for the Hawaiian Air Force to carry out the mission above noted, in
addition to its Air Force combat mission, unless there were a surplus of Air Corps
and related troops.
As we are so short of trained oflScers and personnel in the Air Force, it is most
undesirable to employ such personnel for other than Air Corps duties, except
under most unusual circumstances.
It would seem that the proper step to be taken would be a request made on
the War Department to increase the Hawaiian Department by the number of
personnel required to assist the auxiliary police force and to defend Schofield
Barracks. Our action would then be to reduce the numbers of Air Corps and
auxiliary personnel by that number.
However, before any official steps are taken, I would appreciate your unofficial
and informal comment.
Sincerely,
H. H. Arnold,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Chief of the Army Air Forces.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3433
[7] 3 NOVEMBEE 1941.
Major General H. H. Arnold,
Chief of the Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C.
Dear Happy : In reply to your request for unofficial and informal comment
upon tlie use of Air Corps troops as ordered by "Hawaiian Department Tentative
Standing Operating Procedure," dated July 14, 1941, the following information is
submittetl.
During the department maneuvers, which lasted from the 12-24 May of this
year, the Department Commander, General Short, became very much interested
in the proper employment of all military jjersonnel in a last stand defense of
Oahu. At that time he mentioned the fact that the Air Force had approximately
4,000 enlisted men at Hickam Field and nearly 3,000 at Wheeler Field ; he saw
no reason why these men should not receive some training as Infantry so that
after the Air Force was destroyed they could assist the ground forces in the
defense of the island. I told him it was not possible to give such training at this
time as the Air Force's first mission, that of training combat crews, was in a
most unsatisfactory state. In order to obtain these combat crews the men must
be processed through our technical schools and in addition thereto gain ex-
perience in the actual performance of these duties under proper supervision.
As no further conmient was made at the time, I thought the matter was a
closed issue. Without further warning a letter was received from the Hawaiian
Department, dated 5 June 1941 on the subject of training Air Corps personnel
for ground defense missions. This letter directed that- —
a. At Hickam Field : The training of two battalions of 500 men each to perform
the following missions :
(1) One battalion to provide ground close-in defense for Hickam Field.
(2) One battalion to be prepared to take over initially under the direction of
the Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department, the anti-sabotage mission within
Police District No. 1, City and County of Honolulu, now assigned to the 1st
Battalion. 27th Infantry, under the provisions of FO #1, OHD 38.
[8] ft. At Wheeler Field: The ti-aining of one battalion of 500 men to per-
form the following missions:
Tl) Provide ground close-in defense of Wheeler Field.
(2) Be prepared to take over initially under the direction of the Headquarters
Commandant, Hawaiian Division, the protection of the Schofleld Area now as-
signed to the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, under the provisions of FO #1, OD 40.
The training of these 1,500 men was conducted under the supervision of Infantry
instructiors, after three o'clock in the afternoon, four afternoons per week.
The men who were placed in these battalions were the most recent arrivals
in the islands, plus a certain number of noncommissioned officers required in the
organization. The officers for these battalions were reserve officers regularly
assigned to these two stations but from other arms of the service. As the Air
Corps training for the enlisted men in these battalions progressed they received
assignments with the Air Corps commensurate with their ability and training.
The Infantry drill in the afternoon, which usually lasted from 3 : 00 p. m. to
4 : 30 p. m. interferred a great deal with the performance of their normal duties
and when an alert was called these men were required to take their defensive
positions which took them away from their Air Corps assignments. This left
the organizations to which these men belonged extremely short of the necessary
personnel for carrying-on the functions required of the Air Corps organizations.
In other words, there was imposed upon these men the performance of a duty
assigned to them for the last defense of this island when the Air Force was
still carrying-on its primary mission in the defense of the island. As soon as
sufficient reliable data could be collected as to the inroad this was making on
Air Force activities, a letter dated August 25. 1941, was prepared on this sub-
ject and taken to the Department Commander, General Short, in person showing
that it was inconsistent with the Air Force mission to require its men to train
as Infantry and to take their Infanry positions when an alert was called, leav-
ing vacant their proper assignment with the Air Force. The only relief from
the performance of these duties General Short would give at the time was that
those assigned to such duties and properly trained for the performance of these
duties need not receive more training than was necessary to insure that they
would be properly prepared to assume these duties when called upon.
3434 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A new "Standing Operating Procedure" is being prepared but has not yet
been published. A copy of this procedure wliicli was submitted to this head-
quarters for comment made no mention of the assignment of Air Corps troops
for Infantry missions, other than that Air Corps troops will be trained for the
close-in defense of Army airdrt>mes on the Island of Oahu. I have delayed an-
swering your letter awaiting the publication of this "Standing Operating Pro-
cedure", that I might be sure that the provisions of the existing "Standing
Operating Procedure" had been changed as indicated above.
[9] It is my belief that the letter which I mentioned above, pointing out
the unnecessary handicaps placed upon the Air Force in training as Infantry
at a time when they were unable to conduct sufficient training to meet their
primary mission as Air Force troops, has received consideration. In this letter
I asked the Department Commander to rescind his instructions requiring Air
Corps troops to train as Infantry at least until such time as we had developed
sufficient combat and maintenance crews to meet the Manning Tables for the
number of airplanes allotted to the Hawaiian Air Force. I am attaching hereto
a copy of the letter on the subject of diversion from Air Force training, dated
August 25. 1941.
It is my firm belief that no attempt would be made by an enemy force to
make a hostile landing on these islands until the Hawaiian Air Force has been
destroyed or reduced in effectiveness to the point where they could offer little
if any resistance. When the present allotment of airplanes has been received
and these airplanes are properly manned by competent combat crews, there is
no enemy in these waters strong enqugh to destroy the Hawaiian Air Force or
effect a landing on these shores.
I can well understand how one charged with the defense of these islands,
assuming that the Hawaiian Air Force had been destroyed, would wish to utilize
to the fullest extent the military man power available to him in can-ying out
his mission of the defense of Oahu. For Air Corps troops to be effective under
such circumstances they should be properly ti-ained for the parts they are required
to play in such defensive action but I just do not wish my Air Force troops to
receive training for this "last ditch fight" until they have been properly trained
for their primary mission with the Air Force.
General Short is a very reasonable man of keen perception. It is now my
belief that he sees more clearly the training problems confronting the Air Force
and realized its enormous proportions. I do expect that the training of Air
Force troops as Infantry will not be permitted to seriously interfere with their
proper training for their normal mission.
I feel very strongly that a War Department policy should be established or
orders issued which will prescribe that troops from the ground forces have the
responsibility of the defense of airdromes and performance of interior guard
duty. If the interior guard duty is to be performed by Air Force troops, then
a special table of organization should be issued for a Military Policy Company
to be established at each post for the performance of interior guard duty. Due
to the importance and value of property on Air Corps stations, troops performing
interior guard duty should be especially well trained for this service. These
services can never be efficiently performed except by those \\ho are regularly and
permanently assigned to such duty. The duties to be performed by troops for
the close-in defense of an airdrome are quite similar and require tlie same train-
ing as that given to all ground troops for a similar mission. As to [10]
the number of men required, it makes no difference whatever whether the defense
of airdromes and interior guard duty are performed by Air Force troops or
troops from other arms. In either case troops performing these duties must
have this as their sole responsibility and assignment.
I am happy to say that this problem of training Air Force troops with In-
fantry, which has caused me such deep concern, seems now on its way to a
satisfactory solution. Having given me this opportunity to unofficially and
informally bring this matter to your attention I shall, if in the future this
burden becomes imbearable, bring it to your personal attention.
I am forwarding under separate cover a study which has been made of our
personnel requirements to meet the allocation of airplanes for the Hawaiian
Air Force. As you will observe tables of organizations for the respective units
have been adhered to as far as possible. Our experiences indicates the num-
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3435
ber of men in these organizations barely meets the demands on this personnel
for our operations.
Expressing to you my high esteem I beg to remain,
Most sincerely,
F. L. Martin,
Major General, U. S. Army.
1 Incl.
Cy. Itr. fr. HAF, to CG HD,
8/25/41
HI] Nov. 27, 1941.
Major General F. L. Martin,
Commanding Oenera^!, Hauaiian Air Force,
Hickum Field, T. H.
Dear Fred: Your letter of November 3, 1941, was very enlightening on the
use of Air Force troops in Hawaii. I am happy to learn that in your opinion
a satisfactory solution to the problem will be arrived at shortly.
When the new "Standing Operating Procedure" of the Hawaiian Department
is published. I would be interested in knowing the policy which it expresses to-
ward air troops and their employment in local defense of air bases. These
matters are of vital interest and the decisions reached in Hawaii may aid in
the solutions of similar situations in the United States or in other theaters.
In your letter you urged that a War Department policy be issued which
will prescribe that ground forces assume the responsibility of airdrome defense.
The broad policy governing local ground defense of air bases has been published
in War Departnient Training Circular No. 47, "dated July 18, 1941. Paragraph
16 of this circular states the order of availability of troops for defense, and
Air Corps troops are listed in the 4th priority with a notation that their primary
mission is operation, maintenance and repair of aircraft. I believe that this is a
plain statement of current War Department policy on this matter.
I am appreciative of your efforts to keep me abreast of developments affecting
your command.
Yours very truly,
H. H. Arnold,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Chief of the Army Air Forces.
EXHIBIT NO. 155
(Exhibit 155 is the original Radar Plot of Station OPANA, Decem-
ber 7, 1941 and will be found reproduced as Item No. 38 in Exhibits —
Illustrations to Proceedings of Joint Committee)
3436 CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBIT NO. 156
JlJB* 'til, l^ul
t<n ASSiSTAJiT Qi'.ISP -)F SIAyf, 0-2,
Swb>«ii rinmX MMnaeitetiana r%r Zntttmra ^
I Imrrm tbm folIoalaK r— nn Mmfction* %o mu\ati%t
1» »«k th» iaUuur/ *tt»ob«, rhai^jttjd «adi tt* ^UtMry
jaMMBBk iite«r««r, Sij)e»pwr« b* rmavmA trmi j»rUiAiMtUm of tfaa
MBt. M thlB0i zMNT ctAndf «• ham •» bMctaalvMnt sl^uttlilaB
la that tbM« t&«t> «r» oDdor tha t»idU|>nla» Dvputnant, «itl]« omt
of fi«e* la Ja)p«a •■< Chlaa «>■ ef Miara* untor ttw Mar D»p«r^Mnt«
Te •orrMt iim altuvtian a rwtlonrw* ^muM ba aant ^ tha CaaMMn*> ^ i
ias OMMval, ^aupplna DawrtaaMit aitbatauitiaUy a« foUaaai
lororni JaaiMOB anA wtk thut affavtl^M this teta ttoay v,
art plaaad noOmr ittr Oasiarfenaab JuriadlanioRt^Ttta nar Pataiiwit
daaLraa tiwt thay oamfeirMa te aani a aapy of aXX raparta dlraat
ta ntiIlir,>lJ3a Da{»rtMank* ^
2* tiMit MTM* mlaya* i*m Sutah aaat mdlaa aaA rraMh Oi4a>
China ba tranafarrad to ttia Par Baabam Baotl«a. In aui^iort of thia
it ia olKrlnui Uiat iMTHa ahaold ba roajiad with China, prlMmrtXy (m
aaoouBt of tha »tfa» Raad, mad ■imBirtly, baoauaa of tha nwiawl-
aafcloB nat* ftiapaattoe tha tafia Pai of tha cAhar tltraa ptoiii
nanail, all ot gwiUMMtaim, Mia aboaU la ^ apinloK ba oomidarad -^
am mm larga oparatlaoaJ. araa, ywry aloaaly mlaita^ to Chlaa* Apaa
and JttilXppftjtm laltaida* ghatOd thta tramfar ba afniru<>a4 thara
a^miM «€ •mtrw ba tneia/arrad to tha Far Ua«t«m saatlon %ha alar- "i^
laal paraaawX taotatiwly aat t^ f or thalr hMdliae in tha BriUah '
aai Wi >tarn lOiropaaB flaatlaa*.
9« tisattt iaatruatJ.4aB ba Ummi ttarti tfaa Qiaiirilne ommt^t,
fiail|>piM Daparlawak, tha KlUtary c^munmt, tioeiM^a**, tha lOlltarjr \.
AMaalia. TtilHarf^ «Imi mUAary Attaaba, OhlJM« Mi« tha ulUtMry v
A«ii ihi» *«a» iitotawtHTly aa fmlliwit '
b* full and
■ ■Hiliti aauii— tit with srit&ah mtallV:— a jtemmUm im mm ana >
«aiter yaar JartaAiatim. s^ioh eaaparatiaB %a taalMia aiihwua aT ^
laAwHBbiMi flB tha atraniith aotf Aiapaaitlan aT aia* mm faraaa* aa
aaU aa af otter aooHbrlaa ia yttLA as aay ba wbHUUgr ti*awgtt<« ^
<.!(
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3437
« 2 -
la thla oonneotion it is further reoo::njended that the Lireotor
031' »k-««,i Xa-bvlIlt^AOM b« *»,:od rso oonaXowr *»3UjlH0 elaiiju- i.-«-i-u»-
•^^•nolM. Aooordln.r U> Ommn^X l0* la l«nd(n« th« Brltiah hsr>
»lrMdy iaiatru(Tt«d tiM y«tr SMrt«rn paopl* «o this mum moA •oA
r»rtS.9J.\»r\ / <to«lr« tlmt N«-»«a Inforsagktioo b» looXiadad.
ii, T«it w* I'orw • S««r«t S«rvio« arg»»i«*iitia» to op«r«t« ia
(Iiitinij_«if iij Burwku MBd alao -Uw ;!il«i ^1 Mint .ir Itish S««rr<;
l»rfciaalMrly m rvfturda curaw) uad«r JapMMUMi ooutjroii Mui atiiw
rwaoFts vewmM, aan a soo i'^-i (»»i..' •-)j'>u,.;i ti-c .oparat ^..sas oi" •uah k
•ywtan* Siwb «i »y«..«u ubvloualy lauai. 1» iosirti soj^ikrfct* trim oar
eanmX aitellij-wio* irf^aaiSftiiofj, and fm sitould, 1 Viuak, l»«n
li*«vlly upaw ii'itieh advioa and exiJ«ri*iio« In orgaaisinr,. ;'>i«
Chiaf si" fch» nrlfclsit 88r-/ioo In 3in;-«i?oro Ini'onaor! job '-i*'- la a»W»
WB should <!««lr« •^■■. or -,tir\iis« u siisu-lBr eysvea, :.ti tfiia ^-..-e^fej-wd to
assist, ua ir. av:.rj wviy, -iwlu-taj, tiw rooi-uit «u^. o. iMkui'/e o^jorstlf**.
m «• iau«>h «4> it. ie hxihlj Asstrabls lor oovioua rm^sw* r.oiU t'> hai»s
s rsfuliu* •Jre^y afriaaf di;i»«4inf: sash arj-ytfiisiit '.oii, i reooBnead that
iiy«S- >*«>r«R aiwBkC & i'wi-irwl ',)i;io»r j»'w on ..iu-^y Ji the Publia
iis)jiitlacu> »«oti(»i EUtd » J»i»iJ»s« X«rii;uik£& gimoiuat*, 'js ««itto Siagst-
pors -to oai%e4l^ '«';-.a tUrt '.n-s^' >.'■ t:;«j U--i-E-. ;,t!ora . :^rv'.3S t!)«rs
r»..;;»rdlJL;-, ti* d»t*-lsui" arg*ai*a.ti.on aati >,i»> s«i»OvJ.g«i jf »ji opeimti-
HoBgicaas.
A. Abrati
(1) I r»o««!»a«id -uhsit ths Ai- Corj* b.j r«K,\ie»t«d t*
fvurnish a issll qualified «uadl wol". rmci«le«! offlowp Car d«t^' In Siu^ia-
;->a(re ■sdtiej'® y!i*re Is k i-rsai ?«»a ojT 'nfortititi ■■:«'. ac ■&!■!© »ir .'aross
iund tin* «dtr fislJa jf "yi* ei,t'r« .51.;- ..jn.j*'., :* ;ih.->u^ ; *- o.>an»« bs
a«or»t51t«d U) r.ia.ja.fiaj'^. —
[2) I i-ajiSK-i, ay fMiasr j-oocHanada-tioix that «• ssnd
to SlBcuporw on* of cHtr twrjr bast Jaimn bmq. '^ ^jrsssnt itiXitary
Ob««rTsr« fit. Ool« jiriivic, is »«11 tiua,!:."!*^ -« jovyr liiiaro., Uis
Dut<»(i East S:kdils« and tntxittii mdo-chiafe. AdAltiswaH/, h_t,cTc;-,
sine* laaaJi of fchs m>r!c of r«ve rar Ea«t*r.i Jacnblaed Bur«a . ■■.iv'.. .aost
oT fci» work of ths r?ritis:« Ssor*'. iiwrrtos Is oriant)«4 oi Japcn, i
MOaiAMT it MMHstiail tbat «• te^m la 8ln£:a.por« a Jkpan oas '■ho la
thoraw^^ly fia«lllar witii »-»is' pi»»««iTit .LnTon'sstism <« Jcpaa. Jlnjor
Jtot>ta ?B>|>i», at pssoBrt Asst. »Q.ilt«ir5' AttaoJw ia Tskyo, «u2«w»rs Ihs
rtJ^IJhKsita** i'uiv «jv? wo-.»l.t, -.'ji ».»*it-tm, be of ralae to ti»e }r-lti»h
In rvalaatlisf. lafarraatitsa on Oapaji, arid would tlaw (Kiabls us *o £-,!•»•
sacMthljtc bask to ths tJarltlsii in nvtt^m for th« Lnfomfttiaii l^tat ■<m
3438 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
-J.
•ictraat Aran th»lr fU*«« go litiXo iaf<xcmtAUn i» 9M*tmb]« •%
pwwsRt in Oftp«n that I f»«l ■»» «»hc»uM at oao* fcr«n»f«r .*i*, to
Slnc»poF«. mp* •hou34 lUondM Iw aoariklitoii &> g5.a6«ip©ni»
(3) !iv^ orif^in^l nuMo rooac»miUitk.iihMm (MuoMmli^
lite nujio r«oQaj0ad»tj,oai imtumlly rMohad >ia.«hla,':tan la adwaaa
of ^r Wtter «ac{>l«ULi«c *ihe nMMsity tor t2« iMarcoiBi*!, Mad ia
r«p2^ t« the raiillo osHy one otork toid a ia»6£er««)* 'wwrw Aathorli*d»
7h« oHMvn^r 1« of oourv* :«>i»MsAr:! ftnd «>l»-uld h<iv» iMMa 'laoltito^
In B^ arikCixwiX r^oor^MKufefctioau* At loMtt oob AddltioBftl aX*rk>
vtitto^PRptwr, hanwer, will ^ n»o»mmry, waA I mwmmoA tfaat Brtok
b« tutharisad 'by r«.Uo to Mre an» ROdiUoMfci »1»A at » wJary «rf
(I4) StoM t)w 3ritUh 3rMedU Iat«Uig«a(M Ofi'io* la
IkmgiiXBe la Urr*!;^' orl^ntvd om A^ho, I fW«il falant tai aiiould lite*
wise bsv* ft Jfex«a aeu .a ^cna^cnf; (In addition to our g^>,; rj> swb
et*ti,a!a»4 ttwrv). ^or JowsjJi J, Tsftttav t« i*t a Atpaj^sa A»£i|-:u»e»
greawta, u qi«iUni^(ikn4 ii>sIrM {^"^MiilU, xt is rwawuMtdod tl»t
}« bti ordMr«<} to ivd^Mai^toa iixr * short p«n*iod oi ort«Ht*.tian And
thsa s«ctt to lion.^keRi:. I!« el'^ould »:' 9o:tf»« "la »jar«dlt«4 to BnwglWlg
M «a off Wlal obaarrarr-
C*;^) tlxe trwottfsr of mp* to sln^por* wtll of ooutm
t-A'VQ aaas »fr««t <apat4 th« ?c^-o oX;Uoe« aIb mum sty r««aa:ieaaa.ti«t»
etsnoAmln^ tfitci e9tal>lla}«Mnt of * S4Mr*t s«i*«lo« oremlMttioti la
pumemipb, h ftbov* •!*• BO't fanrerably «aaii4«r«4« I rwMMMndt ttefe
Chmr 'bw sAnt tn rcdqro mi Asalatant Hllitai^r At^utb*. Ot>unndae,
Tok;^ «iia stUl oury on t^ utilltlsij; ti« Mn-rloiw oiC Ji^im" 3* stantoB
atlXMKtkj cannk^r, jtiho bu Juat oovlsted hia fon^l IssiguMea «tarl]r«
vlto ia alraad^ aos. A* la B«sia« and xixo ia« lu futt* st prwMst
MrttuOUy «0HcL ^ in tha ?ok^ oiT^oa as Fcipo's MtaJlataut*
(6) Slaoa tmip<atary prorastion for <air aXmcrmv «Bd
a»d attaaaiiai abraw! Is aj^arentl;^ out of t))« (^uestlon^ I raea»iiaaMl
that «a do atfiat im oaxi ta toiraaaa thalr pivatif^ ligr aw^ciaf; audb of
than aa ten mA «t fBNMMrat, •tt^Mr <M0 f» tatiac 'MS* Dhll* thia
M17 Men aocMlhKt liaaoem»<$Mm:M»X hmn ia. maWngtoa, la ay oytalaa
It vUl 4«flnit«l3r anhaaaa thmir pawatl^ *iff<ead«
3» mthln tha^ ?*r ^aatwm 3a«tijaa
Tjhile the tontatiire aUotmsnt of t^miry maA OiriUim pMnacnoal
la la aftmrni aKtiafikcriMry, l oamiter it MaaBtiia that w at eaoa
jlUmom a ia»n gualifiad oam bcjcuago ^^rsduRta (r%,ulAr Ara;/) la. ^«l
-IKT «&• CSKtt* «««J:, 60 that as «» Beaervv and CtvUiaa pannifBial nor
\miiir aelftotod 'acooiaew armUUbio w i»iU :»v« aoiaBooe «.lraesi;r ftoUlar
with tha OilM. altMatlon to dlra«rt thalr ft«tliritl*«* uhlia UiHra ai»
a »a*ar of (SOaa gr»d«at«» aa our ?»oaai, I feel that, partioularly in
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3439
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