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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORB THB 

JOINT COMMirrEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEARL HAEBOE ATTACK 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGEESS 

SECOND SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 20 

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 173 THROUGH 179 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

•'^r^^aomT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAEL HAEBOE ATTACK 
CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress) 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 20 
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 173 THROUGH 179 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
79716 WASHINGTON : 1946 



JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEAKL 

HAJRBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from MichI- tlve from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin ^_^^ 

Nortli Carolina "^lO 1 lo / 



COUNSEL 






(Through January 14, 1946) 

William D. Mitchbll, Qeneral Counsel J O /-/ (-, 

Gekhard a. Gesell, Chief Aasietant Counsel 
JuLE M. Hannafoed, Assistant Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 



^JzJr , ^-O 



(After January 14, 1946) A-:i%. a. 3l^ 

Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel / 

Samuel H. BLiufman, Associate General Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
Logan J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 

II 



HEARINGS OP JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 
Xo. 

1 
2 

3 
4 
o 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 



Pages 

1- 399 
401- 982 
983-1583 
1585-2063 
2065-2492 
2493-2920 
2921-3378 
3379-3927 
3929-4599 
4601-5151 
5153-5560 



Transcript 
pages 

1- 1058 

1059- 2586 

2587- 4194 

4195- 5460 

5461- 

6647- 

7889- 9107 

9108-10517 

10518-12277 

12278-13708 

13709-14765 



6646 

7888 



Hearings 

Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 
Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 
Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 
Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 
Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 
Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 
Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946. 
,Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 
Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 
Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 
Apr. 9 and 11, and Mav 23 and 31. 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 
Xo. 



12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 through 25 

26 

27 through 31 

32 through 33 

34 

35 

36 through 38 

39 



Exhibits Nos. 

1 through 6. 

7 and 8. 

9 through' 43. 

44 through 87. 

88 through 1 10. 

Ill through 128. 

129 through 156. 

157 through 172. 

173 through 179. 

180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 

Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 

Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



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a; 
+^ 
c 
o 
o 



J2 
S3 



4; 

a; 

02 



05 



5 



03.22 ^ 



3 
a: 

C 

c 

Si 
u 



'c 
u 

<i) 
w 

c 
o 

-^ 
S3 

CO ,jj 

^£ 

S3 oi 



OS 






w 

o: 

C 

a; 

bC 
S 

C 
t« 

o 

c 
o 

03 

w ->^ 

^s 

s3-^^ 

;5 



> 

o 



> 
o 

•a 
a; 

T3 



CO 

C 

_o 

'■5 
S3 

3 



S3 

C 

o 
3 

o 



a 

3 
02 



4i 



O 



0) 

c 
c - 



s3 u 
> <a 

s3Q 

o g 
O 



u 

01 

Q 



a 



2. 

01 
+J 

c3 
T3 

S3 

c 
o 

s 

OJ 

B 

c 

S3 

ge 
oi 
-»3 
S3 



O! 
01 



•a 
_o 

01 

a 

u 

c 

OJ 
bC 



S3 
> 
<A 

o 

dj 
u 

o 

o 

c 

|2 

o> 
02 



1—1 
I 

o 

3 

_o 

"x 
'> 

Q 

S 

c 

_bj3 

3 



•aS Q 



bC 

C 



u 

w 

c 
o 
u 

Oi 

c 
o 

1 



bC 
Pi 






3^ 

93 a 



3 

3 C 
- - OJ 

<; o 

^ OS 

+= - 
. <N aj 

Ph - 3 






'■5 ^ 



00 « c 

1— I O. jg 

iS>i^ o: 
w 0> 

O! "O 
r^ C O 

■^ o o 
1-1 «.s 

■^ +i *J 
. 0= . 

« 3*^ 
O) 

p 



.3 O 



03 

O 

B 



o 



V 01 

^ bcc: 

bc 2 a; 

V s3 .+^ 



O 

o 

H 



3 
O 
Hi 

u 

Oi 

a 



Id 

3 

3 
O 



3 
0> 



0> 
X 
0> 
3 
S3 

S3 

3 

o 



OS 



cc 



o 


Ci 


^^ 


n 


"S 


o 


w 


ja 


3 


0) 


n 


ij 


^ 


+j 


a 


h 


<u 


o 


0) 


s 






«-l 




c 


•c 


+J 


<a 




"3 


u 


u 


rr 




r. 


9 


S3 


^ 


i4 




H 





us 


1^ 


■* 


-* 


t>. 


CO 


O 


■* 


r^ 


■* 


to 


t^ 


ec 


•* 


■<** 


iO 


»o 


1© 


t^ 


r^ 


cc 


«o 


» 


CO 


1-1 


1-1 


1—1 


1-H 


1—1 


1-H 




1—1 


00 

1— ( 


00 

1-H 


GO 

1—1 


00 

1-H 


lO 


QO Y 

i-< 


»c 


iC 


lO 


lO 


kC 


lO 


lO 


lO 


id 


iC 


Tt* 


T' 


•«* 


•<*< 


"J* 


■* 


■* 


•* 


■<* 


■^ 


■* 


o»o 




o »c 


2^ 


-* 1 


■* 1 


■* 1 


"* 1 


00 1 


■* 1 


lO 1 


t*1-l 


!>'-' 


t*^ 


t^T' 


t^r-. 


t* — 


I>i-i 


l^'- 


t^ w 


t^--i 


t^-H 


•-c!, 


-^ci. 


^ 1 


-^c^ 


^c!, 


^c!, 


^ci, 


^c!, 


-^c!, 


-^ci. 


-^c!, 


I-H 


^H 


1— ) 


1—1 


1-H 


1— t 


1—1 


1—1 


r^ 


w^ 


I-H 



< 
4. 






I 



t* 
t* 



od 



OS 



o 

00 



00 



OO 



ec 

00 



I 
I 
I 

00 



XIV 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



C. 



JS 

o 

u 



o 
•c 



a 

it 

r- 

'u 

3 
-O 
cc 

C 

_o 
"S 

w 

o 
1) 

55 

O 
X 

c 
a 

"-s 
bti 

C 



a 

c 
o 

s 



u 

u 

Q 

C 
08 



05 






o 

Pl. 

.2 
c 

cc 

^« 

*^ c 

^^ 
a; « 

^C' « 

"Sec 

8 S 
^ 5 
.5^ 



■2£ 



< o 



= c 

bc o 

o « 

O «3 

CC 



S 



ai C -> 









u S 
03 3 

O.^ 
^ <- 

ao 
- "5 

2| 

10 03 

'- a 

go 

Q| 

^ c3 

c c 

3 03 

■^ 03 

o C 

go. 



cc 



-a 






O 

C5 



CC 






03 
O 

C 

O 

> 
5?: 



a; 
o 

O 
of? 

+- I 

^l 

•3 
03"-' 

91 
go 



c 


v: 


3 


C 





oj 





ft. 


■w 


u 





IS 


w 


^ 



.2" 
« o 



08 






o 



cc 



a 



bC 



t- :3 

&£) >. 

I.E 
(- 

o s 

i: CD 

03 — 

as 

S'S 
S^ 



1% 

.— 4) 

£'§■ 

« 3 



.2^ 

03 3 
SC o3 to 

<^ ao 



o 



X 

u 

a 



O 



^ 3 

o •- 

<J2 



•- o3 
3 (x 






c 



4) - 

^ 5 

•c 

■Is 

(/^ ~^ 

03 -- 
S co" 

So 

28 

L^ to 

CO >T-I 

So 



3 rff^ ^ X O 

-^3 ►- ^ -: 



0) 
03 



w S 3 

ac s 

a-2 
.2 

U t- 3 

-*^«c ^ 
- o a 

"" 3 O 

rt 3 bC 
■* S- 3 

" a; o 

08 



-U.SJ3 
^£3 

U O -3 



<& 



aS c 
2 o 03 



2.5 



-.2-;s 

^-v-t^ cc 
Sm 2 

Tf 3 O 

'"'.^03 



O 3 
. 03 



►J- CO 
K O 

Ox 

>iO 

■•-) CO 

3 3 
<y O 

SK 

ftn u 

(-, 
05 O 



OS 

en 

03 *j 



uf« 



W 3 - 

C 0) O 

C o3 ^ 

o3 iT to 



Q 



a© c 
.22 += 03 



SE.3 

^% 
«c.5 

> >. 
lO cc 

a- 

S-3 

oj 

>i3 

a o 



W3 -Sf^-p ^«r 
SJ3 »"o .2c 



03 



CO 

O 



C5 



u 
Q 



X 

3 

03 

O 



o 



0) 



3 
C 



a< 



u 
O 

u 

I 

o 

a 



o 
o 



^-3 
03 

X 

C 

-!.:> 
O 

Oh 



3- 
«^ . 

e *" 

5 o 

» o3 

<U X 

O «8 

o-i 

%< 

3 <S 



03 

•-5 



Oj 

a 

O o3 

O '2 

go 

St3 

O O 

S^ 

X 03 

^^ 

s « 

o:: 
- o 

:?^ 



CO o 

I? 






s ^ 

"3 



o2 






03 = 

13 o3 •*3 

u oS 

« o :3 
bC to 
03 ,, 3 
X O O 

£ Kr 3 

*j +s r> 

X C 

3 ^ 



.to 

3 



3 

c 
o 

X 






u 



1- 

^ 08 
08 ''^ 

■a .2 

4)>-> 



CO 




o 

05 



o 



CO 
05 









o 

OS 



o 

05 



05 



10 
o> 



00 

05 



H 



iC 


iC 


•f 


■<*< 


OiOC 


(N(» 


t-— < 


00—1 


— 1 


•-I 1 


(N 


(N 



U5 
00 



00 



10 

00 05 
00'-' 

— I 



00 



Cl '—I 

^ I 



00 
00 



CO o 
05 (M 

^ I 



OS 
00 



OfC 
(N I 



o 

05 



t^ I 

CD >— I 
OCO 



10 

00 |. 

to ^ 

(N I 



OS 



OS 



OfO 



CO 

OS 



00 I 

t^ —I 

occ 

<N 1 



9) 



»-< I 
OS I— I 
OCO 
M I 



0> 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



XV 



O 05 

GO 

03-:: 

•3.2 

O^ 

c 

C "^ 
O 03 



CO 









^^ 

2t3 

XI c 

_>> c 

s.-sJ 

CJOQCO 



JL «3 

= ^ 

•^ *i 
u _ 
1) G 
C O 

S^ 

on aj 

"I 

C Ml 

.-^ 
.2 ° 

S^, c «3 

005 
ffiS-S 

So o 



(N 



'^ C ■>, 



>. 

c 
> 

o 

CO 



03 



C 

(1) 
u 

C 



c 
o 



o 

CO 



a: 

CZ2 



c3 






•5 1^ 

? 03 



Q> « 



^o 






C 
oj 
Wi 

O 

s 



S ^ ■ 



^ 2 

^ 5 

c = 

"a; ^ 



5 !U 
S° 



go 

^ 33 

o 
bC 
03 
tc 
tc 
0) 






1-5 C I— I 

X! CI. 






Eo 



S c 
.SP - 

O «3 
^ bC 

C-- 
i-i a: 
— V 

ca > 

> c 

03 I— I 
^~ 

>. be 

-C C 
"^ I 

- c 

. «^ 
o H 

^ 

I- « 

^ S 



03 - . 

S-So 



„ o 






s 

u 



Sea; 

J- « 03 

o o 

s <», 



c 






PL, M 

? = 

si o3 



0) 

> 



c 



C5 



4; 



s^. "JS 



00 

a; c .s 
C ^.^ 

- S^ 

- o :: 

- "^ £ 

"^ ^^ 
^ ZZ m 

S;2^ 
^ o c 

1— I K "^ 

^ "^ o 
"i^ «= 

C -yj « 

« g 5 



(N 

> 



." 

C 






1^ 

(4-1 

o 

b£ 

o 



> 



-? I— I 



a~. 



oc 









o 



o 

s 



4) 

a. 



u 

o 
■c 

s 
s 

o 

O 

>■, 






c 

53 05 



lO 



OS a; 

Gils 

fc- ^ 
o . 

rv, t^ 
X be 

cc 

03 03 



.t; o 



H 


_ a: 


^ 


C 'i^ 


"-J 


o-c 






. 


-.J 


v; 


« -iS 




-< 0, 


C/J 


«~ 3 


, 





t3 


^0 










a.fc: 


bC 




1^ 



05 



d 

CJ 



OQ *" 



b 
O 



CJ 



03 



2 C 



03 



S 



C/2 






01 



to 
■ OJ 

c 

bC 
03 

Si 
CO 



(- 



S3 

03 _ 

-*^ 

c > 

a> o 

^ o 



a; 
Q 



cc 



•-s 



o 



s 

<; 

oj 



C . 



"Zt K 



1-5 SJ3 

«*- C 

o'C 
CO 3 
ajx) 



03 



Pi^ t- 



Si 

^ s 

.s ^ 

aj 



S3 
u 

5 

c 

< 



^o s 



CO -c 

So 



a; 



C.2 ^ 



O) 

CO 

OJ 

a) 



P o 



> c3 M w 
* fe 2 «* 

>.0» o 

X bC' 3 

-ki ^ ,••- HH 

bc_r o 

•:». G-' nr "^ 

- fc o o 
I— o £^ 

^ > 

Si g^ 
<^ S 2 



03 05 



ss 



o 

u 
03 

ffi. 



t-. 

03 

O 



03 



' -O 

5 ^- 
c; O o 

t;-:^ a 

c eS "^ 
3 , a a) 

> X ? 2 

a) ~r^ 

^.3 = ^ 
•- S-c >> 

^ o « ^ 





c 

5 

X 

a; 



o 



O C, • 



X3 fc, fc. c 



05 


t^ 


Tt< 


l-T 


«o 


CO 


t^ 


OC 


CM 





•* 


00 


00 





»-H 


T-H 


F-^ 


CM . 





^H 


CM 


rfi 


■<* 


u? 


a> 

















1— i 


1—* 


T-H 


r— ' 


!— 1 


CM 


»-H 


cs 


(N 


CO 


C^ 


CM 


CM 


CM 


CM 


c^ 


CM 


CM 


lO 





»« 


10 


10 


10 


iC 


10 


10 


10 


lO 




Tt< 


■<*' 


Tf 


-* 


Tf 


Tt< 


^ 


rh 


T}< 


■<*< 


■* 


CC 


^ 1 


r' 1 


CO 1 


2: 1 


IC 1 


i« 1 


iC 1 


10 1 


lO 1 


«o 1 


CD 1 


05 '* 


OSrH 


01 -« 


05.- 


Oi-H 


OSr-l 


OSr-^ 


05r-t 


Oi »— 1 


05rH 


O'-i 


OS — 


Tt* 1 


oco 


OfC 


OM 


OM 


OCO 


CO 


occ 


OCO 


OCC 


oco 


oeo 


CO-* 


"^ J, 


IN 1 


(N 1 


CM 1 


CM 1 


CM 1 


CM 1 


CM 1 


CM 1 


CM 1- 


<N 1 


CM 1 




CM 


(N 

v4 


CM 


CM 


CM 

1-H 


CM 

I— 1 


CM 


CM 

1— ( 


CM 

1—1 


CM 


T-H 



« 
o 






00 
05 



05 
OS 



o 
o 



8 



CO 

o 



o 



10 

o 



CO 

o 



o 



XVI 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



«<«. 



a; c s o 

°s; s = 

-05-0 

o o .-= 'e 

0)— * "C 
C <U O aj 

to Oj Q. !» 

5W c > 

-4-9 . o3 cO 

o § ^.2 
K "O *•-' JS 

"^ c o ^ 

^ -fj o 

00 



W 



•5 >>!2; 






S6 



;^ M Ol -^ 

^^ s 

^*^ 25 j= 
C^ 03 bC 

. - *= s^ 

k/ - t- ^. 

J o3 01 - 
■jr O o: S 

C^ C e 
5" != ^ 

So5(X.S 



.£• 

X 



C 

_o 

03 

_o 
u 

bC 

s 
o 

99 



0) 

c 



03 

E 

< 

X! 

•r 



a 

03 

S 



3| 



o.S 

XI 

>>o 

c 



S 4, 

5 '^ 
2 = 

-I 
o a 

O. o 

bC« 
CO 

Ox: 
S «- 

~XI 

^ OJ 

_ bC 
:5 o 

"^ ^- 

^2 

43 = 
^< 

^03 

at 



I5 

£:S 

2i 



X 

>' 

o 

/5 



o 

05 



xi 



O 



03 

d 
S 

T3 



u 
CC 



c8 






o 

a; 

0) 



_2 o a; 



r o 



03 






•<:f* O 
OS •'-I 

.•- 03 

-o c o 

0) 03 C 

03 ■:3 ^ 



0) 



Oes 






Ssg 



W 



08 

'c 

S3 

o 



01 

o 

GO 



bC 

C 



u 
o 



05 



W 

o 
O 

T3 

08 

T3 






■hi 



•2 ^ 



Is 

Si 



u ^ 




CM 

CO 






CI 



CM 



00 
CM 



CM 

o 

CM 



CO 
CM 



CO 
CM 



00 

eo 



50 


CD 


CC 


Tf< Tj< 


«OTf< 


t^rf< 


CO 1 


■* Js 


T}< Js 


CM 1 


CM 1 


CM 1 



CO 



CO 



loT CO 7 
cmV cmt 



CO 

oo7 
'2c6 



CO 



CM 



I 



i^ 



CO 



CO 



CM 



I 



CO 



CO 



o 



o 




<5 

e4 



pq 
I 

CO 



O 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



XVII 



« 


■J 




f^ 




>> 


"3 


> 


W 


S3 


>i 


5, 


3 




►-9 


> 




Em 


as 


> 


^^ 


o 


e<X! 




c 


>, 




-> 


^ 


'V 




B 


g 


S3 


Cu 




W) 


01 




TJ 


S3 


C 


^ 




^ 


F. 


o 


o 








CG 


^ 


^ 






U 


s 


(fl 




u 


,m^ 


sif 


1 


(^ 


E 


OD 



g.2 

c e o 
CS3.S 



CO 



"^ art 
S I 









= S3 V 



t « a; 
O -^ sjO 






C.2, 
bC S3 
3 S 



X 4j O 



OS 






SCO 
C 

<M bc 

ai * 

O S3 

S c 

08"" 

. 00 



as 

03^ 

K Q. 

u 

.h 03 
S bC 

"^£ 

<u 

c 
a— 

to .. 
gJW . 

U . CO 

« « « 



o 
u 



V 

X 

C 

<*- 
oi 

'3 

b£ 

.£ 
'c 
ti 
v 
w 
c 
o 
u 






o 

-(J 



c 

S3 



o 

u 
«-i 

a; 
u 

C 
0) 

c 
o 
a 

a; 

o 






> . 



^ 



< ■% 

«-i s3 

1*0 

o 
02 



o 



S3 

01 

C 

'3 

S3 



03 



cc 

02 

a;i 
C 

a;i 
rt 






•- 

D C 
W o3 

w S 

^ o 



cc ^ 



-ad 

a; a3 
a> 



CQ 

S3 



e 

c3 

H 

a; 
ja 

o 

A 
a; 

CO 



aj 



c 



S2 
So 

S o 

•oc 

a; 

-"^ 

X 

a; c 

02 

c ^ 

93 t, 

>■ a; 

^^ 

■^ c 

c a; 
S3 C 

aj o 



05 



a) 



3 
J5 

o 

c 
_o 

83 

o 

T3 
S3 

"5 

"a 
o 

m 

s 



bC 

o 






J, C-O bC 

- o <u c 

05 -(J •-" 

> CO s3-*^ 



■So 



g^|-3 

^ >> O 
b a 



w 



01 

fi o a c 

04 «■ "-e !? 
«- •" ti s3 

•--HO 

B SI D< « 
a; rv >-< > 

^^^ 9. 

5 CO 
-S bC^Pg 

ffl-c.S.2 

3 o3 



■3 C 
03 ^ 

"5 c 2i 






c 
_ S 

■«a 

a; a; 



a; 
03 

-^ 03X! &• 

•^ a> 



a) •— 
o3 V. O 
Cub 



•^ TI "08 
3Q W^ :S 

T3 — < 2!'3 
_. S3 pO 03 



a; 




•o 


xi 




c 


-«j 




03 


bf) 




^ 


C 




rf3 






w 


C 




o 


u 






aj 




« 


a 




• 


o 




U 


o 










O-^ 




li 




?=i 


Si 

T3 * 


<1) 


a5 


^^ 


S 


03 

a 


a; 

as 


ja-o 


fi:= 


3 


01 


.3 a 


CO 


% 


w& 


aj 




. o8 


c 


111 


HK 


a; 

c 


c 




n 






a 


-^ 


gs 


a; 


tJ 


— « <«-c 


a; 


a X 




a 


-o.S 


s 


■c 


<^.-S 



„ «3 

SO 

o > 

I" 

HH aj 



W 5 

U^ 



Kg 
"3.2 

a«*- 

^ aj 



c 
aj 

a 

aj 

03 
-t-s 
CO 



1— I «*H 

2 c 
^ is 

bC& 
^ 03 



X) 
3 
03 

a; 
c 
3 



■s c 



b 
U 

"5 

bC 
s 

'c 

l-t 

<a 

c 
o 



0) 

u 

c 
aj 

§^ 

aj • 



00 


1-H 


C<1 


t^ 


o 


t^ 


w 


■* 


CO 


1-H 


t» 


»C 


» 


o 


t^ 


•>. 


o 


o 


1— 1 


1-H 


1— 1 


N 


M 


n 


»c 


o 


« 


<o 


t>. 


t^ 


t^ 


t^ 


t^ 


t* 


t* 


t^ 


M 


(N 


W 


M 


N 


C<l 


(N 


(N 


N 


M 


M 


« 



oof 

1 



N 



50 



ooT 
si 






«o 



"5^ 



CC 



^7 



CO 



I 



ojT 



e<i 



lO' 



CO 



OS 



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osf 

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si 



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79716 O — 46— pt. 2C 



XVIII 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



a 
o 



c 
o . 

«- 1— I 

o . 
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0^ ^ 
CO C 

O -^ 

a 
2^ 



c 

C 






X 

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w 5 

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03 


03 


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a^ 

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got; 
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o,-r 
w • 

Ur-I 

CO 

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.2 

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13 

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C O c 

21-2 
tiC.2 tJ 

* 4) 03 
ra c CJ 

03 



c o 
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X 

+j eS X 

S<'-» 2 
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^^ g- 
S-2 a; 

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CD C C 

i^i 

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X O "* 

a; o OS 

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c 



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5 

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s- 03 

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03 "g 



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05 o3 1-H 
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eo 


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l^ 


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t>i 


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00 


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00 


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C<l 


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M 


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CD 


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rings, p 
date ini 
duced 


Si 




(n7 . 


ca7 


§1 


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cH 


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M 




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1— 1 


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eo 

•-4 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



XIX 



a 

o 
o 
of 

s 

3 
O" 
T3 
c9 
0) 



"in 



In 
< 

u 



o3 .2 



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c 
o 

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fe.s 

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■a "c 



e3 

o 

bC 

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a: 






=! ^ c> 

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S S 






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4) 

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u O s 

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b. 
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bl 

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a: 

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b. 



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03 •" y 
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o3 en 



03 
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03 -ti 

b< 

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03 o3 

03 

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00 tf '-ZS o 

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a; 



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XX 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



a 
o 



D 



C 

'-S 

OS 

s 

? 

3 



.5 g] 

"if 
OS 



s 


X 


^^ 






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J 


T3 


eS • 


pS 


a; 


O CO 




o 




u 
O 


5 
08 


c > 
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tf 


«:> 


X « 




"So 



m 



05 



c 

O* 
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5 "f 

■^ "0 .5 

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ap o 

CO S 

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c 



°-£ 



C - OS 

3 CO W)^ 

-^ 05 "5 « 

^ 85 • 




X 

c 



T3 

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u 
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o 

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S) 

■t-> 

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'c 

u 
c 
o 
u 

c 

_o 

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X 

s 

o 

o 

X 

a 
_o 

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'c 

3 



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00 

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83 
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'x 

xi 



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a 

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T3 3 
a; o 

pL, 



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If 



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a 

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3 ^ 

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OS Tf OS Tt< 

<N I <N I 

ost^ ost^ 

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eo 


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CO 


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ST 

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10 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



XXI 



■fcS 
0/-V 

taeo 
aw 

■^ QO 

♦s 

,x3 — 

^^ 

= > 



•T3 

a 



a 
an 



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2 

a. 




& 


>, 


r 


C 


bfi 


c 


C 

o 


HH 


J3 




3g 




t^ 


■e 




u 
3 


OS 


u 


CO 


U 






tf 


>t 08 


> 


HH 


03 




Z 


C' 
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3 
Oh 



o o 
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cc 


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2os 


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XXII 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS 



a 
o 



ox: 



^2 

T3T3 

■2 o 

«^ 



S 



o 



o -^ 



=3 
U 

o 



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'2 -t^ •'^ 



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>= «5 



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35 



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xfHS 

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tf.sg 

(V ic <a 

■fa 



6C ^ 



93 


1— ( 


00 


N 


00 


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CO 


O 


CO 


CO 


00 


■«t< 


00 


o 


o 


N 




eo 


•xf 


ICI 


Oi 


■* 


^ 


.a SZ 


■^ 


■^ 


U3 


lO 


lO 




lO 


IC 


ICI 


lO 


CO 


CO 




ec 


ec 


CO 


cc 


CO 




00 


CO 


CO 


CO 


CO 


CO 


be o 


to 


<r> 


CO 


CO 




CO 


CO 


CO 


CO 


CO 


CO 


CO 


°:.s^ 


"4 


-^T 


ot 


--T 


■^ 


1 


»T 


^T 


M"T 


n"1* 


n7 




earings 

ddate 

duce 


Si 

"^4 


"^3 




CO 


1 




CO A 


si 
"3 


si 
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3985 

EXHIBIT NO. 173 

MEMOIRS OF PRINCE KONOYE 

War Db3>artment, 
Washington, 1 May 1946. 
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson. 

In accordance with your oral request, there is forwarded herewith a copy of 
the Memoirs of Prince Konoye. It is a translation prepared by the Language 
Section G-2, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, of a document turned 
over to the United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Prince Konoye. He stated 
that he had prepared the document during the period between the resignation of 
his cabinet in October 1941 and March 1942. This translation was checked by 
T. Ushiba, Konoye's personal secretary, who verified all of the factual data, 
raising questions only as to the literary style of the translation. 

ROBE^JT M. DiGGS, 

Capt,. AUS. 

The Progress of Japanese-American Negotiations During the Time of the 

Second and Third Konoye Cabinets 



March 19^2 



ll\ I 

Beginning in December 1940, conversations for the readjustment of Japanese 
relations were conducted secretly between Bishop Walsh, president, and Mr. 
Draft, administrative secretary of MaryknoU (a high institution of American 
Catholicism), on the one hand, and Colonel IWAKURO of the Military Affairs 
Bureau of the Army Ministry and Mr. Tadao IKAWA on the other. 

By April 1941, the time had become ripe for the Governments of the two coun- 
tries to conduct the conversations themselves. It should be remembered that 
because of the personal connections of the participants in the conversations from 
the first, private contact was maintained between President Roosevelt himself 
and Mr. Hull on the American side, and between Ambassador NOMURA and the 
Japanese Military and Naval Attaches in Washington on the Japanese side. 
Thus, both the President and the Japanese Ambassador were kept informed of 
what was going on. 

On April 8th, the first tentative plan was presented by the American side, and 
after examining this, the Japanese side drew up a second tentative plan. On 
April 14th, and 16th, Mr. Hull held the first of the series of conversations on 
this problem with Ambassador NOMURA. At this time. Mr. Hull stated that the 
conversations theretofore conducted by private persons might be taken over 
by unoflJcial conversations between the Secretary of State and the Ambassador, 
and that the negotiations might be conducted with the second tentative plan as 
a basis. At the same time he expressed the wish that the Ambassador obtain 
official instructions from his Government. 

Ambassador NOMURA's dispatch containing these important representations 
by Mr. Hull and the contents of the plan (tentatively called the Proposal for 
Japanese-American Understanding), which was to provide the basis for the 
conversations, was received at the Tokyo Foreign Office between the afternoon 
of April 17th and the morning of the 18th. Since Foreign Minister Yosuke 
MATST'OKA was then in Siberia on his way home from his visit to Europe, Mr. 
OHASHI, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, at 11 A. M. cm the 18th, brought 
the first section of the dispatch to me while I was in a Cabinet conference. At 
4 :30 P. M. on the same day, after waiting for the cable to be decoded, he called 
on me at my official residence, accompanied by Mr. TERASAKI, Chief of the 
American Bureau. 

This Proposal for Understanding was to announce, in the form of a joint 
declaration, an agreement between the two Governments on several fundamental 
items necessary for breaking the deadlock between the two countries. Detailed 
agreements were to be arranged by a Japanese- American conference to follow 
the joint declaration 

[2] The following seven items are those concerning which the two Govern- 
ments were to establish nuitual understanding: 

1. International and national ideals embraced by America and Japan. 

2. The attitudes of the two countries toward the European War. 

3. The relationship of the two countries to the China Incident. 



3986 CONGRESSIONAL IN\T.STIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

4. Matters i>ei'tainii)g to the Naval strength, air strength and shipping of the 
two countries in the Pacific. 

5. Trade and monetary agreements between the two countries. 

6. Economic activity of the two countries in the Soutliwest Pacific. 

7. Policies of the two countries regarding political stability in the Pacific. 

From the Japanese point of view, the vital points of the Proposal for Under- 
standing were the prevention of the spread of the European War to the Pacific, 
the termination of the China Incident, and the promotion of economic co- 
operation between America and Japan. 

\-i] II 

In view of the importance of the matter, I .summone<l a joint conference of 
high government and military leaders for 8 o'clock that very night. 

The Government was represented by the Premier, the Home Minister, the 
War and Navy Ministers and also by Mr. OHASHI, Vice-Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. The Chiefs of the Army and Naval General Staffs represented the 
Supreme Command. Also present were the Directors of tVie Military Affairs 
Bureaus of the War and Navy Ministries, and the Chief Cabinet Secretary. 
Th^ concensus of opinion rejtrarding the American proposal was as follows: 

1. Acceptance of the American proposal would be the speediest way toward 
disposal of the China Incident. That is to say, no effective results had been 
obtained by the setting-up of the Wang Regime, direct negotiations with Chung- 
king were becoming more difficult, and Chugking was entirely dependent upon 
America; consequently negotiations with Chungking were possible only through 
the good offices of America. In view of these facts it was quite clear that 
acceptance of the American proposal would be the speediest way toward disposal 
of the China Incident. 

2. To accede to this proposal and to plan for a rapproachement between the 
two countries would not only provide the best means of avoiding a Japanese- 
American war, but would also be a prerequisite to preventing the European 
war from assuming the magnitude of a world war and to the creation of 
world peace. 

3. The considerable depletion of Japan's national strength made it desirable 
to restore and cultivate that strength by disposing of the China Incident as quickly 
as i)ossible. For the success of Japan's southward advance which was being 
advocated in certain quarters, the supreme command itself confessed to having 
neithei" the confidence of success nor the necessary preparation. The cultivation 
of national strength, moreover, necessitated the temporary restoration of amica- 
ble relations with America and planning for the replenishment of the supply of 
vital connnodities for the future. 

Thus, the participants were in favor of accepting the American proposal. 
However, the follrtwing items were brought forth as conditions of acceptance. 

1. It should be made clear that there would be no infringement of the Tri- 
partite Pact. This was considered axiomatic in view of Japan's keeping faith 
with Germany. 

[^/] 2. It should be made more clear that the obiect of Japanese American 
cooperation was the promotion of world peace. If the understanding between 
the two countries were to relieve America of her commitments in the Pacific and 
thus afford her an opiM)rtunity for increasing her support of Britain, Japan 
would be breaking faith with Germany, which would be improper, and it would 
constitute a lowering of the tone of the whole concept of the proposal. 

3. The contents of the proposal were too complex. 

4. Since the text gives the impression of a return to the old world order, 
clearer expression should be given to the constructive side of the proposal, 
namely, the idea of building a New Order. 

5. Speedy action was necessary to avoid the probable leakage of intelligence. 
For this reason the retunw)f the Foreign Minister to Japan must be u^ged. 

There were the following two opinions as to whether or not this affair should 
be reported to Germany. 

1. Fidelity demanded that Germany be informed of a matter of such impor- 
tance as this. She should be informed at least prior to Japan's answer being 
give nto America. 

2. If Germany were informed before the fact, she might express her opposition. 
Since this might vitiate the success of the desired conversations, they should 
be kei)t secret from Germany while negotiations were in progress. 



EXHIBITS OP JOINT COMMITTEE 3987 

[5] III 

After the joint conference on the 18th, the Army, Navy and Foreign Office im- 
mediately started examination of the proposal. In the meantime, TERASAKI, 
Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, wished to cable instructions 
to Ambassador NOMURA to transmit to America Japan's "acceptance in prin- 
ciple" of the proposal. Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs OHASHI, although 
in favor of the idea, vetoed it ; he insisted that the answer be dispatched after 
the Foreign Minister's return. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA finally reached 
Dairen on the 20th, and I got in touch with him by telephone. It was learned 
later that the Foreign Minister then said to persons close to him, "The American 
proposal has probably come as the fruit of what I said in Moscow to Mr. Stein- 
hart, the American Ambassador to Soviet Russia". In fact, the Foreign Minister 
on his way, both to and from Europe, had held conversations in Moscow with 
Mr. Steinhart, an old acquaintance, asking him to urge President Roosevelt, if the 
latter was really fond of gambling, to have faith in Japan and to lend a helping 
hand for the sake of Sino-Japanese peace. MATSUOKA had reported this to 
me by cable under the ^late of April 8th, and apparently had been secretly ex- 
pecting his move to bear fjint. 

Because of adverse weather, the Foreign Minister was delayed a day. returning 
to Tokyo on April 22nd. Since a joint conference had been scheduled for the 
very evening of his arrival, the examination of the American proposal, by the 
Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministries, had been roughly completed on the 2ist. In 
addition, the Army and Navy held a joint conference that same day at the Navy 
Club, the respective Ministers and Heads of Departments. Bureaus and Sections 
participating, and presented a memorandum to me which stated that "Japan must 
turn the American scheme to good advantage and by embracing the principles 
embodied in the proposal, attain the objectives of the China Incident, restore 
the national strength, and thereby attain a powerful voice in the establishment 
of world peace". 

I went to Tachikawa airfield to meet the Foreign Minister personally. Realiz- 
ing the significance of MATSUOKA's first glimpse of hte American proposal, 
since he is an extraordinarily sensitive man, I had intended to explain the pro- 
posal to him in the automobile on the way back to Tokyo. However, MATSUOKA 
had already planned to pay homage at the Imperial Palace at Niju Bashi, so 
Vice Foreign Minister OHASHI rode in MATSOUK Vs car in my place, and to 
OHASHI was entrusted the delicate task of discussing the American Proposal. 

I was told afterward, that as expected, the Foreign Minister was extremely 
annoyed and showed no interest whatever. At the joint conference held after 
his return, MATSOUKA talked endlessly about his European trip, and when the 
conversation turned to the American proposal, he showed signs of excitement 
and laid special emphasis upon the question of keeping faith with Germany. 

[6'] He said that he interpreted the American proposal as being 70% ill-will 
and 30% good-will. He recalled that America had entered the first World War 
after safeguarding her interests in the Pacific by concluding the Ishii-Lansing 
Agreement, and had scrapped the agreement after the war without regard for 
the difficult task which had been imposed upon Japan during the period of hostili- 
ties. M VTSUOKA asked for two weeks' time to ponder the question and left at 

II P. M. ahead of everyone else. The conference continued until 1 : 30 the next 
morning, the participants agreeing to proceed with the matter as far as i)OSSible, 
regardle.ss of MATSUOKA's opinion. 

When on the 23rd, I summoned the Foreign Minister alone for an informal 
conference at my official residence, he seemed to have regained a certain degree 
of calm as compared with the preceding day. The only thing that he said, how- 
ever, was "Let me pass judgment after my experiences in Europe have worn 
off". 

In the meantime, ill-feeling toward the Foreign Minister increased among 
Army and Navy leaders. Among these were some who in their anger demanded 
that resolute steps be taken, ev^n at the cost of changing the Foreign Minister. 
I, being familiar with MATSUOKA's complex nature, however, was aware that 
there was no other way than to let him ulone for the time b^ing. The next dav, 
I took to my bed with a cold and remained confined to my OGTKUBO home unt'il 
May 1st. The Foreign Minister, too, for about the same period, spent his (]ays 
in recuperating from an illness. During this time, the Directors of the Military 
Affairs Bureaus of the Army and Navy Ministries called on the Foreign Minister . 
jointly and separately, exerting their utmost efforts to soothe his feelings, so that 



3988 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Japan's answer might be sent to America as soon as possible. However, the 
Foreign Minister, either on the pretext of illness, or for the reason of his dispgree- 
ment with the contents of Japan's answer to the American proposal, was difficult 
to move from his position. 

[7] IV 

There was no denying, however, that despite his outward demeanor, the 
Foreign Minister was giving concentrated thought to the handling of the prob- 
lems then pending between America and Japan. It was learned later that on 
his sick-bed Matsuoka had b?en closely examining both the text of the American 
proposal and the revision of the same which had been drawn up by the appro- 
priate authorities of the Army, Navy and Foreign Ministries. In addition, he 
was also thoroughly revising the latter. A third joint conference was finally 
held on May 3rd. 

Tho.se participating in the conference approved, on the whole, of the revised 
proposal prepared by the Foreign Minister. . The main points of the revision 
were the elimination of Item IV, "Naval Strength, Air Strength and Shipping of 
the two countries in the Pacific" ; the insertion of a new clause under Item "2", 
"Attitudes of the two countries toward the European War", covering the 
mediation of Japan and America between Britain and Germanv ; and clear defi- 
nitions of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact. Other points were 
the withholding of the announcement of the China Incident peace terms, the 
deletion of Japan's declaration not to carry on a southward military advance, 
and the deletion of the agreement concerning Japanese-American conversations. 
(See Appendix II). 

Although the demand to submit the revised plan immediately to the Americans 
was overwhelming. Foreign Minister Matsuoka stubbornly maintained that the 
conclusion of a neutrality treaty should be propo.sed to the United States as a 
test. His point was finally approved. 

The next point was whether or not the Germans should be informed of the 
entire matter. Different points of view were expressed on this matter also. 
Nevertheless, the Foreign Minister demanded that the whole affair be entrusted 
to his own diplomatic ability, and so it was left entirely to his discretion. 

After the conference adjourned, the Foreign Minister di.spatched two tele- 
graphic instructions to Ambassador Nomura. The first was a tentative reply 
to the American proposal, and was in the form of an oral statement addressed 
to Secretary Hull by the Foreign Minister. The gi'>Jt of this statement was that 
the German and Italian leaders were absolutely confident about the outcome of 
the European War; that American participation in the war would serve only 
to prolong hostilities, and therebv bring about the downfall of world civilization ; 
and that Japan could never act in any way injurious to the position of her allies ; 
Germany and Italy. The other dispatch instructed Ambassador Nomura to 
propo.se as his personal idea a simple and clear-cut Japanese American neutrality 
treaty. 

Before the Foreign Minister left Tokvo on May 4th to visit the Ise Shrine, he 
instructed Sakamoto. Director of the European and Asiatic Bureau, to inform in 
strict confidence both the German and Italian Ambassadors that a secret pro- 
posal for the readjustment of Japanese-American relations [8] had been 
made by th^ American Government ; that the Japanese Government had made the 
above-mentioned tentative reply ; and that it had proposed a neutrality treaty. 
When the Foreign Minister returned to Tokyo on May 6th, he himself inquired 
whether "Foreign Minister Rihbentrop had any opinions", and he further 
stated that it would be ultimately profitable to Germany to turn to America's 
ill-intentioned proposal to good advantage and terminate the China incident. 

Meanwhile, in Washington. Ambassador Nomura and other members of the 
Embassy were growing impatient at the delay in Japan's submission of a reply 
to America. Having received the tentative instruction from Foreign Minister 
Matsuoka. the Ambassador iiad an interview with Secretary Hull on the 7th 
and sounded out his opinion regarding the conclusion of a neutrality treaty. 
However, Mr. Hull 'showed no interest whatever. Later, Ambassador Nomura 
discovered that the American Government authorities, although they might be 
interested after the conclusion of the Proposal for Understanding, were not at 
all interested in concluding a neutrality treaty at this stage of the ne,gotiations. 
As for the oral statement, the Ambassador refrained from transmitting the 
document to Mr. Hull, lest the feelings of the Americans be antagonized. He 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3989 

did not even read the document in its entirety to Mr. Hull. It was said that 
during the interview, Mr. Hull in a tone unusually strong for him, urged com- 
mencement of the negotiations themselves as speedily as possible. Thus, Foreign 
Minister Matsuoka's test plan failed to produce its desired effect. Also, Ameri- 
can domestic conditions were rapidly becoming more diflBcult, particularly in view 
of the National Defense Act and convoy problems. Ambassador Nomura repeat- 
edly urged the Japanese Government to reply. He also reported that he had 
held in check the American demands insisted upon from the beginning, namely, 
the establishment of four basic principles: 1) Preservation of territorial in- 
tegrity and respect for national sovereignty; 2) Non-interference with domestic 
issues; 3) Establishment of the equality principle, including equal commercial 
opportunity; and 4) Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific, with the 
exception of changes in present conditions through peaceful means, by proposing 
to keep at a minimum discussions involving principles, and to give precedence 
to a Japanese- American understanding which would be actual and effective. His 
report emphasized that an impatient demand by Japan at this time for recogni- 
tion of the New Order and for mediation in the European War would be more 
harmful than beneficial. The Japanese Military and Naval Attaches in Wash- 
ington, furthermore, sent to Japan a statement of their opposition to Matsuoka, 
terming his policy "gesture diplomacy". On the other hand, the Military Attache 
in Berlin sent a cable to the War Minister to the effect that it was known from 
reliable sources that the Japanese Government was conducting negotiations wiih 
America, that his office was completely opposed to such negotiations, and that, 
depending upon circumstances, his whole office might submit their resignations. 
This might be regarded as one repercussion to having informed German and 
Italy of the Japanese-American negotiations. 

[9] V 

AS the situation became more confused and complicated, the activity of the 
Cabinet members concerned grew more intense. On May 8th, the Foreign 
Minister was received in audience by the Emperor and informed him that in case 
America should enter the war, Japan must stand by Germany and Italy. In such 
an eventuality, the readjusmient of Japanese-Amer can relations woulti be broiight 
to nothing. In any case, if Japan were to break faith with Germany and Italy 
by inclining too much towai'd American problems, he, the Foreign Minister, 
Wiotild be obliged to resign. This the Foreign Minister himself reported to me 
on the 9th. 

On the same night, I secretly summoned the Army and Navy Ministers to my 
house at OGIKUBO, and we lield an informal discussion as to the best way of 
dealing with the Foreign Minister's attitude. We agreed that thereafter the 
Army and Navy should remain in close contact with me concerning the attitude 
to be taken by our country if America entered the war, and concerning what 
measures were to be used if Germany opposed or demanded revision of the 
Japanese-American negotiation. 

When on the following day. May 10th, I was received in audience by the Em- 
peror, he revealed to me, with the air of great concern, the substance of the Foreign 
Minister's report on the previous day. The Foreign Minister had informed the 
Emperor that if America were to enter the European War, Japan would have to 
attack Singapore ; and that since America's participation would result in a pro- 
longation of the war, there might be the danger of a German-Soviet collision. 
In such an eventuality Japan would have to abrogate the neutrality treaty, stand 
by Germany, and advance at least as far as Irkutsk. I advised the Emperor not 
to be concerned, since the Foreign Minister's utterances represented only one 
possible plan under the worst eventuality, and even if the Foreign Minister held 
such opinions, the military high command would have to take part in, and the 
Cabinet would have to be consulted about, any final decision. Taking advantage 
of the opportunity, I advised the Throne that for the settlement of the China 
Incident, which was proving to Ce the most urgent matter at present, making use 
of America was the only way, that the present American proposal was the best 
and only opportunity, and that I would exert all my efforts toward furthering it. 
I further explained in detail the difference of opinion among Cabinet members 
and the split in publiifopinion that might occur in the event of: (1) Germany's 
signifying her opposition; (2) America's further revising the Japanese revisions, 
and; (3) America's participation in the war after a Japanese-American under- 
standing had been reached. I assured the Emperor of my resolve to do my best 



3990 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to reach an amicable settlement, though if that were impossible, it might be neces- 
sary to use eiJiergenoy measures. Tlie Emperor acquiesced in all that I had said 
and ordered me to proceed according to the policies I had described. Upon con- 
sulting with Marquis Kido, Lord Keei^er of the Privy Seal, I learned that the 
[10] Foreign Minister's reasoning had become so flighty after his visit to 
Europe that he had lost the Emperor's confidence. In fact, on the 8th, after re- 
ceiving the Foreign Minister in audience, the Emperor had gone so far as to 
consider the advisability of changing the Foreign Minister. 

Ill] VI 

The German reply did not come. Meanwhile in spite of urging by both myself 
and fhe Army and Navy, the Foreign Minister postponed from day to day the 
presentation to America of the Japanese revised proposal decided upon on May 
3rd. Pressed by the necessity of being in time for the American President's 
speech sche(hiled for May 14th, however, the Foreign Minster, on May 12th, 
without waiting for the German reply, cabled instructions to Ambassador 
NOMUIIA, authorizing him to start negotiations according to the revised pro- 
posal cabled on the previous day. 

Ambassador NO^ilURA, in compliance with the belated instructions, called 
upon Secretary Hull on May 11th and 12th (May 12th and 13th) (Japane.se time), 
and f)ffered an explanation of the Japanese revised proposal. Foreign Minister 
MATSUOKA, on May 13th, again sent a message to Secretary Hull. He laid 
stres.s upon the point that the two premises motivating Japan's decision regarding 
the conversations with America were: (1) America's non-participation in the 
European War, and; (2) America's agreeing at an early date to advise Chiang 
Kai-shek to open peace negotiations with Japan. Secretary Hull called upon 
Ara'\)asf-'ador NOMURA to "tallv frankly about everything, since the Japanese- 
American conversations now in progress are not negotiations conducted upon a 
definite basis, but are unoflUcial and free talks". Concerning the Japanese revised 
proposal, which had been handed to him by the Ambassador, he expressed not 
a little doubt concerning the Japanese deletion of the clause insuring Japan's 
armed invasion of the Southern regions. He showed special concern over the 
<'lause covering the China Incident and asked various questions. He remarked 
significantly that concerning this matter America would have to consult with 
Britain. Further, his explanation that American domestic conditions were not 
at all such as to make conversations with Japan easy, showed that he was 
proceeding with the utmost caution. I\Tore than this, the President's speech 
which had been scheduled for the 14th was postponed until the 29th, and 
American public opinion was excited about the issue of convoy.s. It was apparent 
that, pressed by international and domestic is.?ues, America was finding it 
difficult to determine its attitude. At any rate, contrary to Japanese expecta- 
tions, the American answer was slow in coming. 

[12] VII 

It was because Foreign Minister MATSUOKA had wished to receive a German 
reply before submitting his reply to Washington that he had caused the delay 
in di.spatching the Japanese revised proposal. His efforts had been unavailing, 
and he had been able tV) wait no longer. Immediately after the instnictions 
had been sent to Ambassador NOMURA on May 12th, the German I'^ply arrived. 
The gist of the reply was that, since America's underlying motive in planning 
conciliarion with Japan apparently was that she wished to enter the war against 
Germany, it was desirable that the Japanese Government make it clear to the 
American Government that: (1) the patrolling and convoying being carried on 
by America was recongnized as an act deliberately provocative of war, and one 
which wouM inevitably cause Japan to enter the war, and that; (2) if America 
refrained from such actions, Japan would be ready to study the American 
proposal. Furthermore, the German reply ended with the request that, in view 
of the effect of the present negotiations upon the Tripartite Pact, Germany be 
consulted before a final answer is sent to America. The Italian Government 
.sent a communication to the effect that Italy's reply was the same as the German's. 

SubsequvMitly, on May lOth, as was more or less expected. Ambassador Ott 
made representations concerning the displeasure of his Government with Japan's 
having replied to America without waiting for the German reply. The German 
representations, by implication, expressed Germany's objection in principle to 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3991 

the Japanese-American negotiations, and pointed out that any treaty con- 
cluded by any one of the signatories of the Tripartite Pact with a third country 
would weaken the common front of the Tripartite Pact signatories. The reply 
requested that at least "The American Government's obligation not to interfere 
with the war between England and the Axis countries" and "Japan's obligations 
accruing from the Tripartite Pact" be clearly defined. Lastly, the representa- 
tions stated that "The German Government was obliged to express its desire 
for total participation by Germany in the Japanese-American negotiations and 
for an immediate report regarding the American reply. It constituted an 
infringement upon the articles of the Tripartite Pact for Japan to listen to 
American representations and to determine Japan's future policy without enter- 
ing into a previous understanding with the German Government regarding 
all the important problems included in the proposal." Such were the high- 
handed representations of the Germans. At the same time Ambassador OSHIMA 
repeatedly sent cables, reiwrting that German national leaders were harboring 
extreme antipathy toward the Japanese-American proposal. He also declared 
his own opposition in strong language. 

[13] VIII 

In Tokyo, joint conferences were held on May 15th and May 22nd. but they did 
not go beyond an exchange of information and opinions. It was evident that 
through the influence of the German representations and the repeated objections 
of Ambassador OSHIMA, the originally vague attitude of the Foreign Minister 
had become more and more vague : and it was more and more obvious that, in 
contrast with the other Cabinet members who were full of hopes, he was stand- 
ing alone in his opposition. For instance, following the conference on the 22nd, 
Chief Cabinet Secretary TOM ITA was asked by OKA, Director of the Military 
Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry to transmit to the Premier the request that 
he "take into consideration a possible split among Cabinet memtjers in the event 
of the establishment of an agreement, were the Foreign Minister to continue to 
hold such a contrary point of view." 

On the other hand, the Foreign Mini.ster had an interview with me on the 
23rd, in which he argued strongly that "although it appeared that Army and 
Navy leaders were trying to have the Japanese-American understanding put 
through, even at the cost, more or less of disloyalty to Germany and Italy, — 
what could -be accomplished by such a weak-kneed attitude?" 

Concerning the interpretation of Article III of the Tripartite Pact, the Foreign 
Minister yielded not an inch in his stand that even if American convoys were 
attacked by the Germans, Japan would be obliged to enter the war and help the 
Germans, convoying itself being regarded as attack. In fact, the Foreign Minister 
frequently, in a half-threatening manner, stressed this point upon Ambassador 
Grew, thinking that this might just possibly prevent America's entry into the 
war. However, the American President was apparently determined to enter 
the war, and if that should happen, the Japanese-American understanding would 
be useless. Under such circumstances the nation would never be satisfied with 
an attitude such as the Army and Navy's present one, and a national uprising 
might ensue. At all events, Japan would have to clarify its stand, and come 
out for England and America, or for Germany and Italy. He took the stand 
that as Foreign Minister he must insist on union with Germany and Italy to the 
very last. Later, by saying that "as a subject there was no other course than 
to obey the Emperor's wishes," he by implication Indicated the possibility of 
resignation. 

Although it was possible to suspect from the Foreign Minister's words and 
actions that he might have made some serious commitments while he was in 
Germany, there was no alternative to putting faith in his report. According to 
it, both Chancelor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbenthrop had urged that Japan 
attack Singapore, but he (MATSUOKA) had said nothing to commit himself. 
However, according to a cable from Ambassador OSHIMA, Foreign Minister 
Ribbenthrop had said "Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's personal view, at the 
time that he came to Germany, that Singapore would be attacked [4] seems 
to be entirely changed." The problem remained as to what was the truth. At 
any rate, it was extremely diflScult to comprehend the Foreign Minister's actual 
intentions, pressed as he was between the American question on one side and 
loyalty to Germany and Italy on the other. 



3992 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

At about this time the Foreign Minister began to express frankly his dis- 
pleasure and animosity toward Ambassador NOMURA. At an interview with 
me on May 23rd, he angrily declared that "'it was clear that the present proposal 
was not liiade by the Americans but was initiated by Ambassador NOMURA." 
In spite of my explanation that the Foreign Minister was mistaken in his surmise, 
he continued to censure the Ambassador's "going beyond his powers". When 
it became more and more clear that the proposal was not at least the fruit of the 
Foreign Minister's own labors with Steinhart, he seemed to be extremely dis- 
pleased. Further, according to a cable which Lord Halifax, British Ambassador 
to Washington, sent back to London, and which was intercepted by the Navy, 
Ambassador NOMURA had said to Secretary Hull that in Japan, the Emperor, 
and the governmental and Army and Navy authorities were all desirous of the 
success of hte present undertaking ; the Foreign Minister alone being opposed to 
it. When the Foreign Minister saw this, he became very angry, and sent a 
telegram rebuking Ambassador NOMURA for the above statement which he 
(MATSUOKA) had "received from a reliable source". He also ordered 
NOMURA to "correct the Secretary's misunderstanding immediately". Ambas- 
sador NOMURA immediately replied by cable, saying that he "was comp'etely 
surprised, and that the accusation was totally unfounded on fact". It also 
said that "the only thing he could have said bearing on the situation was in 
answer to Hull's question in which he had replied that in Japan, diplomatic 
policies cou'd not be decided by the Fore'gn Minister alone". In reply the P'oreign 
Minister cabled back, "that is good, but if there are any persons in America giving 
such an impression, take the proper steps." This reply clearly revealed the 
Foreign Minister's animosity towards persons who were not members of the 
Ambas-sador's staff but who were close to him. 

Though the issue was resolved for the time b*^ing, the opposition between the 
Foreign Minister on the one hand, and Ambassador NOMURA and his followers 
on the other, had already come out into the open. 

[IS] IX 

On May 14th, 16th, 20th, 21st and 28th, Ambassador Nomura held successive 
conversations with Secretary Hull "in an atmosphere of amity". They were 
"private conversations of from one to two hours, off the record," and did not 
appear to go further than to discuss back and forth the following subiects: 
the form of an agreement which was to cover the whole Pacific, the Tripartite 
Pact and the Chinese problem. From the Secretary of S*^ate's utterances and 
from inside information, the real facts seemed to be that America was suspicious 
of the sincerity of Japan's intention to bring negotiations to a successful con- 
clusion, and in particular was taking careful note of the uncompromising attitude 
of such people as Foreign Minister Matsuoka. Presi'^ent Roosevelt gave his 
fireside chat on May 27th, with the whole world listening attentively. He made 
no direct reference to Japan, and touched but lightly on Chinese affairs. There 
was also information that the President had given special attention to i-elations 
with Japan. These things together seemed to reflect a cautious attitude on the 
part of America and at the same time to offer material for hope concerning 
Japanese-American negotiations. However, on the 29th, the Washington Times- 
Herald printed an account bv Henning, the Chicago Tribune's Washington cor- 
respondent, exi^osing the inside story of the Japanese-American negotiations. 
According to this story, the President prior to his fireside chat, had summoned 
Congressional leaders, and had revealed that America's i)olicy was to concentrate 
upon entering the war with Germany, while pursuing a policy of appeasement 
toward Japan. The President was quoted as having said that "in Japan, the op- 
position of financial interests to the policy of the mi'itary wouM gather strength 
to the point where the Tripartite Pact wouM be virtually nullified". This story 
was immediately banned in Tokvo, but Foreip;n Minister Matsuoka, on the con- 
trary, insisted that it be published, and on the 30th made public his statement of 
"refutation" which emphasized the absolute unchangeableness of Japan's Axis 
diplomacy, and the existence of a limit to the peaceful southern advance policy. 

[m X 

I left on a trip westward on June 13th, and after fulflUinpt previous engage- 
ments at the Heian Shrine in Kvoto and at the Omi Shrine. I returned to Tokyo 
on the 16th. On the following day, the I7th, President Wang Ching-wei of the 
Nanking Government arrived on a visit to Tokyo. Until he left on the 25th, I 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3993 

"had to devote a good deal of time to his entertainment. Meanwhile, on the 
morning of the 22nd, to the utter consternation of the world, the Gorman-Soviet 
War broke out. To make matters worse, by co-incidence the American reply had 
been handed to Ambassador Nomura on the previous day, June 21st, and was 
transmitted to Tokyo on the 24th. The Cabinet was now forced to concentrate 
its entire attention upon the development of the serious matter of the German- 
Soviet War. 

As soon as Foreign Minister Matsuoka received word of the outbreak of the 
German-Soviet War, he immediately gained audience with the Emperor. He 
advised the Emperor that "now that the German-Soviet War had started Japan, 
too, must cooperate with Germany and attack Russia. To do this, it was better 
for the time being to refrain from action in the south. Sooner or later Japan 
would have to fight there. Ultimately Japan would be fighting the Soviets, 
America and England simultaneously. Of course, the Foreign Minister had not 
consulted with the Cabinet. This was his independent action. The Emperor 
was greatly astonished, and ordered him to "consult with the Premier imme- 
diately". At the same time, through Marquis Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy 
Seal, the Emperor informed me of the contents of the Foreign Minister's advice. 
In compliance with the Imperial order, the Foreign Minister called on me at my 
Ogikubo residence at ten o'clock the same night. What he said was not very 
clear, but in short it appeared that the Foreign Minister had conveyed to the 
Emperor his own personal forecast of the situation at its worst. Upon seeing the 
Emp. ror on the 23rd, I tried to relieve his concern by saying that such was the 
nature of the Foreign Minister's advice. It was not clear whether the Foreign 
Minister's "uncomprising attitude" was nothing more than his own personal 
forecast, or whethei* it was a conviction. Therefore, for fear of further com- 
plications, I telephoned from the Imperial Palace to the Chief Cabinet Secretary 
to postpone the joint conference to consider the German-Soviet question which 
was scheduled to begin that same afternoon. It was learned that in addition to 
his statement to the Emperor, the Foreign Minister had made not a few similar 
statements to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and to various private persons, 
and had caused quite a stir. A searching investigation by the Lord Keeper of 
the Privy Seal and myself disclosed that the Foreign Minister's claims appeared 
to be that "First, we must attack the Soviets. Although we must try to avoid 
war with America, in the event that America does enter the war, we must fight 
her too." Eren though that was the Foreign Minister's opinion, I held informal 
conversations with the Army and Navy Ministers to determine the Government's 
attitude. In addition, I summoned joint conferences in quick succession on June 
25th, 26th, 28th and 30th, and July 1st. Finally, I requested the convening 
of a council in the presence of the Emperor on July 2nd, where it was decided 
that for the time being Japan would not undertake action against the Soviets. 
(See Appendix III). 

[17] XI 

America showed a profound interest in Japan's attitude toward the German- 
Soviet War. On July 4th, the President had the Secretary of State send a mes- 
sage to me directly, which said that "We have information that Japan is start- 
ing military operations against the Soviets. We request assurance that this is 
contrary to fact." This message was delivered to me on July G'^h by Ambassador 
Grew. This procedure was unprecedented, and showed how seriously the Ameri- 
can Government held Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in disfavor. I conferred 
with the Foreign Minister, and on the 8th he submitted to Ambassador Grew, 
in place of an answer, a copy of the communication to the Soviet Government 
(handed to Soviet Ambassador Smetany on July 2nd). Turriing the occasion to 
advantage, I inquired whether "The American Government really intended to 
enter the European War." The American answer to this question arrived on 
July 16th, the day of the resignation of the Cabinet. This answer was bitterly 
ironical, saying that "it was quite proper to exercise the right of self-defense 
against Germany" and that "any country using force to keep America an indif- 
ferent bystander would be considered a partisan of the countries conducting 
armed invasion." Foreign Minister MATSUOKA at once disposed of this reply 
by expressing his opposition to unlimited abuse of the right of self-defense. Also, 
the Foreign Minister evinced consider^ible displeasure at the direct and secret 
transmission of the mes.sage to me. Whereupon Ambassador Grew could hardly 
hide his disappointment in having had a direct interview with me blocked. After 
this relationships between the Foreign Minister and Ambassador Grew, which 
had always been cool, grew increasingly worse. 

79716 O— 46 — pt. 20 3 



3994 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[18] XII 

With the German-Soviet question settled for the time being, the American 
question permitted of no more delay. Also, the Foreign Minister's ambiguous 
attitude could no longer be disregarded. Consequently, on July 4th, purposely 
using the form of a letter, I transmitted the following views to the Foreign 
Minister. 

1. Until the settlement of the Northern question, armed force should not be 
used against the Southern regions, and steps should be taken toward readjust- 
ment of diplomatic relations with America. Naval leaders clearly state that 
to fight America and the Soviets simultaneously offers almost insurmountable 
difficulties. From this point of view it is advisable that the invasion of French 
Indo-China should, if possible, be abandoned. 

2. As a result of the readjustment of diplomatic relations with America, it 
would be impossible to satisfy German demands. This might temporarily 
create an undercurrent of misunderstanding among the Axis countries, but 
this could not be avoided. 

3. Readjustment of American-Japanese relations was also necessary in view 
of these three points : 

a. Expansion of national, strength by acquisition of foreign goods. 

b. Prevention of American-Soviet reapproachment. 

c. Acceleration of peace negotiations with Chungking. 

4. Not only was it necessary to continue the present negotiations with America, 
from the above point of view — it was also necessary to bring them to a suc- 
cessful conclusion, in the light of high national policies. Lastly, I added that 
"even though from the Foreign Minister's point of view a compromise between 
Japan and America might seem impossible, I, who carried the responsibility of 
vital state affairs, was obliged to do my best. Moreover, the Emperor was 
seriously concerned about the situation. I, therefore was determined to do 
my utmost, and would work for the success of negotiations even at the cost of 
some concessions." 

The Foreign Minister said to me over the telephone that he was profoundly 
moved by my letter. When he saw me at my official residence the next day, the 
5th, the following points were established. 

"Fundamentally he was of the same mind as I. No matter what public opinion 
might be, he considered himself to be the most zealous person in respect to 
the American question. He was certainly not trying to please Germany. How- 
ever, he was opposed to do anything detrimental to the Tripartite Pact. From 
that very day he was going to give his entire attention to the American Ques- 
tion." At the same time, he made the significant statement that [19] "if 
at any time he became a stumbling-block, he would resign his post." 

XIII 

[20] Deliberations on the Japanese-American Proposal for Understanding 
thus began again. Joint conferences were held on July 10th and 12th, which 
considered the American proposal of June 21st. The special points of this June 
21st proposal were as follows : 

1. In the item covering the attitudes of the two countries toward the European 
War, the clause advocated by Japan, which proposed joint efforts of Japan and 
America for the restoration of peace, was deleted. This suggested by implica- 
tion a determination to work to the last for the overthrow of Germany. 

2. In relation to the Tripartite Pact, America proposed that "Japan . . . make 
clear her intention of preventiYig a spreading of the European War resulting 
from provocative acts. This seemed to reveal an effort to have Japan make 
a written promise not to take up arms in the event of America's participation 
in the war as the result of "provocation" by Germany. 

3. Concerning the China Incident, the distinction made in the first proposal 
between the Chiang Kai-shek Administration and the Nanking Government was 
omitted so as to make the recommendation of peace be to the "Chinese Govern- 
ment". Also, although the Konoye Principles were mentioned, only that part 
referring to amicable relations were included, and the matter of economic co- 
operation and a common front against commimism was omitted. On the whole 
htis marked a general reversion to a fear of American public opinion. 

4. The Sino-Japanese Peace Terms, which Japan had deleted were included 
In an Annex. The necessity for the establishment of perfect agreement con- 
cerning this was indicated. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3995 

5. Whereas Japan advocated limiting the economic cooperation of Japan and 
America to the "southwest" Pacific, this was revised to cover the entire Pacific. 
(See Appendix IV) 

Further, an oral statement was attached to the proposal. It attempted to 
sound out Japan's true intentions, saying that "America was ardently hoping for 
the realization of Japanese- American understanding, and would like to receive 
more clearly than it had up to this time assurances that the Japanese Gov- 
ernment too was desirous of this realization as a whole. In one section it was 
mentioned that intelligence had been received that "among Japanese leaders in 
Influential positions were tho.se who had pledged themselves to further the de- 
mands of National Socialist Germany and its subjugation policies". In saying 
that under these circumstances the understanding between the two countries, 
presently being deliberated, might end in "disillusionment", the oral statement 
by implication censured Foreign Minister MATSUOKA. It also expressed doubts 
eoncerning [21] the stationing of Japanese troops in China. 

This June 21st proposal was finally deliberated upon at the joint conference 
of July 10th. 

However, in spite of my efforts. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's attitude be- 
came increasingly uncooperative. It became clear that his attitude was one of 
opposition to the Japane.se-American negotiations. During the joint conference 
of July lOth, he especially requested the presence of Dr. Yoshie SAITO, Advisor 
to the Foreign Ministry and MATStJOKA's confidential friend, and through him 
opened up a general attack upon the Japanese-American negotiations. He even 
distributed to those who participated in the conference, previously prepared leaf- 
lets expressing his views. These leaflets contained points almost the same as 
those of his spoken agreement, and might briefly be summed up as follows : The 
American proposal, from beginning to end, was based upon ill-will, which wanted 
to subjugate Japan or throw her into utter confusion. The Foreign Minister was 
particularly incensed over the suspicion cast upon his attitude, by implication, 
In the oral statement attached to the American proposal. This was a demand for 
a Cabinet change which would change the Foreign Minister, and constituted an 
Interference in domestic affairs. Such a thing was unprecedented in diplomatic 
history since the time when the German Kaiser demanded the resignation of the 
French Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister's concluding statement was that, 
at the very least, the oral statement should be sent back at once, and that the 
Japanese-American negotiations should be broken off, the when and how of 
this being now the only questions. Troubled by the uncompromising attitude 
of the Foreign Minister, I held a secret conference that night with the Army, 
Navy and Home Ministers. 

At the joint conference on the 12th, the Army and Navy made a joint state- 
ment of their opinions. It differed from the Foreign Minister's in that it stated : 
(1) Japan's attitude toward the European War should be determined according 
to treaty obligations and the question of self-defense. (2) The three Konoye 
Principles should form the basis of dealing with the Chinese question. America 
might make recommendations as to an armistice and peace, but should not in- 
tervene in the peace terms. (3) Japan reserved her right to use armed forces 
in the Pacific in case of necessity. 

It was thought necessary to define these three points clearly for the sake of the 
future. In other respects the American proposal was all right. However, even 
In the eventuality of a breakdown in negotiations matters should be prolonged 
until after the entrance of Japanesp troops into French Tndo-China. 

Ultimately Foreign Minister MATSUOKA agreed to draw up the Japanese 
counter-proposal on the basis of the Armv and Navy views. On the 12th, [22] 
after the end of the conference, MUTA and OKA, Directors of the Military 
Affairs Bureaus of the Army and Navy Ministries, respectively; TERASAKI, 
Director of the American Bureau of the Foreign Oflice ; TOMITA, Chief Cabinet 
Secretary; and SAITO, Foreign Office Advisor, met in conference and drew up 
Japan's final draft proposal. 

There remained to obtain Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's agreement. In 
spite of strong Army and Navy pressure, the Foreign Minister, under pretext 
of illness, would not read the draft proposal. His seeing the German Ambassador 
and others in the meantime, however, angered the Army and Navy. Finally, on 
the 14th, the Foreign Minister listened to Dr SAITO's explanation, and the 
final proposal including the Foreign Minister's revised opinions was drawn up. 
This affair lasted only a day or two, but there was tense atmosphere in the 
government, and an added strain was felt in political circles. 



3996 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Japanese counter-proposal, which was drawn up according to the Foreign 
Minister's revision, differed from the American proposal of June 21st, chiefly in 
the following points: 

1. To facilitate American acceptance the phrase "when the proper occasion 
arises" was added to the clause covering a joint effort by Japan and America 
to be exerted for the speedy termination of the European War. 

2. The paragraph concerning the Tripartite Pact was revised to read "if by 
mischance the European War spreads, the Japanese Government shall execute 
its obligations under the Pact and determine Its attitude solely according to 
consideration of national welfare and saff'tv." 

3. In the section pertaining to the Chinese question, the Konoye Principles 
were set forth as a whole, and the term "Nanking Government", which was dis- 
like<l bv America, was avoided. However, it was clearlv stated that the Ameri- 
can Government was to advise Chiang Kai-shek to make peace. 

4. Sino-Japanese peace terms were again omitted. 

5. For the reason that it was in the Southwest Pacific that Japanese-American 
cooperation was particularly needed, the "whole Pacific area" was changed to 
"Southwest Pacific." 

When the Japanese counter-proposal was finally drawn up, everyone concerned 
was of the opinion that it should be sent to America immediately. However, the 
Foreign Minister clung to the opinion that "First of all, instructions rejecting 
the oral statement, and then two or three days later, the counter-proposal should 
be cabled. [23] The cabled instructions reiecting the oral statement termed 
it "an impolite and improper document", and indicated that "unless the American 
Government first withdrew it, Japan would be unable to proceed with deliberation 
on the Proposal for Understanding." 

I, and the Army and Navy, strongly urged that at least the Japanese counter- 
proi)osal should be despatched at the same time as the cabled instructions, since 
the latter by itself would only stir up ill feelings on the other side, and might 
lead to a rupture. However, late on the night of the 14th, the Foreign Minister, 
in disregard of an agreement with me and Dr SAITO. sent the cabled instruc- 
tions of rejection alone. (Actually, Secretary Hull, surprised at the interpreta- 
tion which had been given to it, withdrew it on July 17th, ini order to clear 
away the misunderstandir>g). On the following day, the 15th, the Foreign Min- 
ister ordered SAKAMOTO, the Director of the European and Asiatic Bureau, 
to inform the Germans secretly of Japan's last proposal which had not yet been 
presented even to America. 

[24] XIV 

Upon arriving at this state of affairs, the Cabinet was of one mind with me 
that it could no longer deal with important diplomatic matters. So, on the 
inth, after a Cabinet council from which the Foreign Minister was absent, I 
consulted with the Home, Army and Navy Ministers as to the best course 
available. The Army Minister declared that "realizing the various undesirable 
consequences which would ensue from the dismissal of the Foreign Minister, 
he had done his utmost to cooperate with him, but now it was no longer possible." 
At this point, there was nothirg else for it but the Foreign Minister's dismissal, 
or the resignation of the Cabinet en masse. Four Ministers were agreed upon 
this point. However, should the Foreign Minister alone be dismissed, extremely 
serious consequences might follow, in view of the fact that the Foreign Minister 
had emphatically stated that "the American oral statement was a demand for 
a Cabinet change". At this time, it was decided that,- quite apart from the 
Foreign Minister's attitude or the American question, and quite simply, from 
the viewpoint of the consolidation of the wartime structure, it would be better 
for the Cabinet to resign en masse. 

The council broke up with the decision to have a consultation again the 
next day. 

When I reported these circumstances to the Emperor at two o'clock that 
afternoon at his Hayama residence, the Emperor asked "whether or not it was 
possible to dismiss Matsuoka alone". I replied that I would do the best I 
could after careful deliberation, but that the Cabinet could not continue to exist 
like rhis. I then had an interview with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and 
explained the reasons why a general resignation was necessary. I suggested 
Home Minister Hiranunia as the best candidate for the next premiership. 
The I^rd Keeper of the Privy Seal, without saying whether he agreed or not, 
recommended that prompt action be taken. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3997 

On the following day, July 16th, in accordance with the previous day's 
agreement, I, the Home Minister, the Army Minister, the Navy Minister, and 
the President of the Cabinet Planning Board met at noon in a secret confer- 
ence at my Mejiro residence. As a result of the deliberations, we agreed 
upon a general resignation. Then, after all preparations had been made by 
the Chief Cabinet Secretary, who was standing by in readiness, at half-past 
six an extraordinary Cabinet council was convened, and the resignations were 
handed over. The Foreign Minister being at home in bed, the Chief Cabinet 
Secretary called upon him and obtained his resignation. The Foreign Minister 
was taken unawares, and showed great annoyance. However, he could do 
nothing in the face of the general decision, and entrusted his seal to the Chief 
Secretary. 

At 8 : 50 P. M. I tendered the resignations to the Emperor at his Hayama 
residence. At 11 P. M. I reported to the Cabinet Members. Thus the Second 
Konoye Cabinet came to an end. 

[25] XV 

On July 17th at 5 : 10 P. M. I was received in audience by the Elnperor at 
the Imperial Palace and ordered to organize the Cabinet again. Commencing 
the selection of Cabinet members at once, I completed the task at 5:30 P. M. 
on the 18th. I reported to the Palace at 7 : 00 P. M. and presented the names 
of the Cabinet members. At 8 : 50 P. M. the newly-organized third Konoye 
Cabinet came into existence. The first Cabinet council was held at 9:45 P. M. 
The special feature of the new Cabinet was the appointment of Admiral Toyoda 
as Foreign Minister. 

The previous Cabinet had done its utmost for the success of the Japanese- 
American negotiations. Particularly, the Army and Navy had maintained the 
closest cooperation. The opposition of the Foreign Minister alone had caused 
the Cabinet's collapse. Unexpectedly, only the Foreign Minister was changed, 
and actually the identical Cabinet had the opportunity of again taking the 
stage. (In addition to the Foreign Minister, four Ministers, Kanemitsu, Ogawa, 
Akita, and Kawada had resigned, but essentially it was a matter of Foreign 
Minister Matsuoka's being changed.) Thus, the mission assigned to the new 
Cabinet was clear to everyone. 

It should be noted particularly that the Army and Navy Ministers remained 
in office, and that the important post of Foreign Minister was occupied by a 
representative of the Navy, which was most concerned with the American 
question, and hence had a significant voice in the matter. The Cabinet was 
given the additional privilege of holding joint conferences with the Supreme 
Command in the Imperial Palace, and launched immediately upon the attain- 
ment of its objectives, the solution of Japanese-American problems. 

In the first part of July, the Imperial Headquarters was established in the 
Imperial Palace. The joint conferences between the Government and the Supreme 
Command were to take place in the Palace also. On July 23rd, the first meeting 
for exchange of information was held in the Palace. The Army, particularly 
Tojo, the Army Minister, was responsible for the establishment of the Imperial 
Headquarters and the joint conferences in the Imperial Palace. It was thought 
that by this maneuver orders issued by the joint conferences within the Palace 
would have more weight, and that such orders in themselves would completely 
obviate divisions within the Cabinet or a split in public opinion. That such 
a hope could be fully attained was inconceivable in the light of later developments. 

However, the significance of this very obvious political change was not clearly 
grasped by Ambassador Nomura in Washington. Because the Ambassador him- 
self failed to understand it, almost nothing was done to convey its significance 
to the Americans. To the Tokyo Government, which had expected that a good 
impression would be made by the establishment of the new Cabinet, and that 
negotiations would progress swifiHy now t^at the vague atmosphere had been 
dispelled, this situation was truly mortifying. 

[26] The previous Cabinet in its last days had drawn up with great pains 
a Japanese counter-proposal to the American proposal of June 21st, apd on July 
25th had dispatched it by cable. In spite of this, the Embassy at Washington had 
not yet presented it to the Americans, first because of the change in Cabinets, 
second, because of fear that its contents might not be acceptable to the Amer- 
icans. This was made clear in a cable from Ambassador Nomura on July 22nd. 



3998 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In addition to all that, Ambassador Nomura on July 23rd, requested that he be 
informed of the new Cabinet's policy toward America. 

While the Japanese Cabinet's strong desire to proceed with the Japanese- 
American negotiations had not yet even been conveyed to the Americans, the time 
set by the Cabinet council for dispatching troops to French Indo-China drew 
near, and movements of forces on the Pacific grew frequent. This could not fail 
to increase the doubt and anxiety of the American Government. According to 
a cable from Ambassador Nomura on the 24th, rumors were circulating to the 
effect that, 1) Future conversations would be "torpedoed" in Tokyo; 2) Japan 
had given our explanation to the Axis that the Japanese-American diplomatic 
adjustments were a strategem until preparations for a Southern invasion were 
completed. In Japan, too, the expression "Japanese encirclement" was increas- 
ingly used, and in Journalistic circles, for the most part, there was a strong 
anti-American tendency far removed from the attitude of the Cabinet. 

On July 21st, Under-Secretary Welles, representing Secretary Hull, who was 
ill. summoned Minister Wakasugi, Ambassador Nomura's representative, and 
warned him that "According to information, Japan appeared to be planning the 
occupation of French Indo-China, and that such an action would nullify pre- 
vious conversations. On the 23rd, Under-Secretary Welles had a conversation 
with Ambassador Nomura also, in which he made serious representations to the 
effect that "Up to now America had exercised all possible forbearance in holding 
conversations with Japan, but that because of recent events, the basis of the 
earliest conversations had been entirely lost." 

On the 24th Ambassador Nomura had a private interview with the President. 
At this time, the President, declaring that the question of French Indo-China 
constituted a fatal problem, made the following important proposals. 

1. Evacuation of Japanese troops from French Indo-China (if they have al- 
ready entered), and with that as a condition, 

2. A joint guarantee by Japan, America, England, Holland and China of the 
neutralization of French Indo-China 

3. Guaranteed access to goods from French Indo-China. 

[27] The Tokyo Government's announcement of the entry of troops into 
French Indo-China, and the American Government's announcement of the freezing 
of Japanese assets came simultaneously. In view of the sudden change in the 
situation, I ordered the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Board, that night, to 
station a special police guard at the American Embassy. 

[28] XVI 

During the period of approximately ten days between the political change and 
the occupation of French Indo-China, there were many happenings which were 
unfortunate for mutual understanding between Tokyo and Washington. It now 
seemed as if the Japaese-American conversations had failed utterly. However, 
the Cabinet, refusing to give up hope until the last, devoted its efforts to the 
resumption of conversations about the American President's July 24th proposal 
regarding French Indo-China. An elaborated form of this proposal, including the 
neutralization of Thailand as well as of French Indo-China, was transmitted 
through Under-Secretary Welles on July 31st. 

In Tokyo, successive joint conferences took place on July 29th and 30th, and 
on August 2nd and 4th. I exerted my utmost efforts, holding informal con- 
versations with the Navy and Foreign Ministers on the 31st. and with the Army 
Minister on August 1st. I also summoned Mr. Mitsuru TOYAMA and others 
as a move toward the conservatives. And so, at the joint conference of August 
4th, a single proposal to the United States was decided upon. Although in its 
form this was an answer to the President's proopsal, it was designed to be the 
key to reopening the Japanese- American conversations which had come to a 
standstill. The gist of the proposal was as follows : 

1. Japan has no intention of sending troops further than French Indo-China, 
and will withdraw them from French Indo-China after the settlement of the 
China Incident. 

2. Japan will guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines. 

3. America will remove her armaments in the Southwest Pacific. 

4. America will cooperate in Japan's obtaining resources in the Netherlands 
East Indies. 

5. America will act as intermediary in the direct negotiations betvp^en Japan 
and China, and will recognize Japan's special position in French Indo-China, even 
after the withdrawal of troops. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3999 

These cabled instructions were sent to Ambassador NOMURA on August 5th. 
On the 6th, the Ambassador conveyed them to Secretary Hull. The Americans 
showed no special interest, however, and made it clear that there was uo roMn 
for the continuation of conversations until Japan should abandon her saber- 
rattling policy. Ambassador NOMURA reported that America seemed to be ready 
to meet any situation. 

Two days later, on August 8th, Secretary Hull handed the American answer 
to Ambassador NOMURA. It contained no reference to the contents of the Jap- 
anese proposal. It merely pointed out that, as a reply to the President's pro- 
posal, the Japanese proposal was not to the point. It was a sharp document, 
repeating almost word for word the President's proposal. 

XVII 

[29] During this time, I was considering every means by which to surmount 
the Japanese-American crisis. Finally, I made up my mind to personally meet 
with the President, and on the evening of August 4th, I told both the Ministers of 
War and of Navy about this for the first time. My words were as follows : 

"1. The President of the United States has gone so far as to say that he 
'wishes to leave nothing undone,' and it is our duty, I believe, to do everything 
that can be done. Behind the conversations which have been held between Japan 
and America to date, there have been various misunderstandings and dif- 
ferences of sentiment, and it seems that the real intentions of each are not 
thoroughly understood by the other. For a statesman to allow matters to develop 
in this manner into war could not be justified when viewed in the light of world 
peace. He would not be fulfilling his duties to the Emperor, who views Japanese- 
American relations with particular anxiety, nor to the people. If all that could 
be done had been done and still there is war, there can be no help for it. In such 
an eventuality, our minds can be made up, and the people's will determined. 
Although outwardly Chamberlain of England appeared to have been deceived by 
Hitler on his several trips to the Continent prior to the European War, it is 
believed that they were effective from the standpoint of solidifying the determina- 
tion of the British people. 

"2. In this most critical period, it is feared that the opportune moment might 
be missed if negotiations are carried on through Ambassador Nomura. The 
Prime Minister should meet personally with the President and express straight- 
forwardly and boldly the true intentions of the Empire. If the President still 
does not understand, I shall, of course, be fully prepared to break off the talks 
and return home. It is, therefore, an undertaking which must be carried out 
while being fully prepared for war against America. If, after a direct meeting 
with the President, an understanding cannot be obtained, the people will know 
that a Japanese-American war could not be avoided. This would aid in con- 
solidating their determination. The world in general, also, would be made aware 
that the primary factor is not aggression and invasion. It will know that great 
efforts were made in behalf of maintaining peace in the Pacific. This would 
be advantageous to us in that the unfavorable trend of the world's public 
opinion would be somewhat eased. 

"3. Since the matter of the President's coming to Honolulu has already been 
brought up in the first Proposal for Understanding, I do not believe that having 
it materialize is an impossibility. It is not necessary to assume from the start 
that the conversations will fail. Japan will insist, of course, on the firm estab- 
lishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. American claims 
will be based on the provisions of the Nine-Power Pact. The contents of these 
are at odds with each other. However [30] America has stated that 'it 
is ready at any time to discuss making revisions to the Nine-Power Pact through 
legal means.' Japan's ideal, of course, is to bring about the firm establishment 
of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In view of the national poten- 
tial it is too much to expect this ideal to be fulfilled at once. Therefore, I do not 
believe that Japanese-American talks are an impossibility if they are carried out 
with broadmindedness. 

"4. This conference must be held soon. The outlook of the German-Soviet war 
Indicates that the peak will become apparent in about September. If, as people 
Ih some circles predict today, a stalemate is brought about, Germany's future 
cannot be viewed with optimism. If that does happen, the American attitude will 
stiffen and she will no longer entertain the thought of talking with Japan. On 
the other hand, even if the German-Soviet war develops favorably for Germany, 



4000 CONGRESSIONAL IN\*ESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

this conference would not necessarily bring about unfavorable results for Japan. 
Even if Germany's attitude toward Japan becomes cool, since there is no chance 
of a German conquest of the world or of a complete victory over Britain and 
America, there are many ways in which Japanese German relations can be 
altered. Therefore, we need not feel much anxiety because of favorable develop- 
ments for Germany in the G<irman-Soviet War. On the contrary, in considera- 
tion of possibly unfavorable developments for Germany, it is of the utmost 
urgency that we reach an accord with America without a day's delay. 

"5. But the problem is not merely to come to any agreement with America. 
The urgency, of course, must not force us to strike a submissive attitude. In 
other words, we shall do everything that can be done, and then if success is not 
attained, there is no help for it. It is my opinion that to do everything that should 
be done is absolutely essential from a diplomatic as well as from a domestic 
standpoint." 

Both the War and Navy Ministers listened to me intently. Neither could give 
me an immediate reply but before the day was over, the Navy expressed complete 
accord and, moreover, anticipated the success of the conference The War Min- 
ister's reply came in writing, as follows : 

"If the Prime Minister were to personally meet with the President of the 
United States, the existing diplomatic relations of the Empire, which are based 
on the Tripartite Pact, would unavioidably be weakened. At the same time, a 
considerable domestic stir would undoubtedly be created. For these reasons, the 
meeting is not considered a suitable move. The attempt to surmount the present 
critical situation by the Prime Minister's offering his personal services, is viewed 
with sincere respect and admiration. If, therefore, it is the Prime Minister's 
intention to attend such a meeting [31] with determination to firmly sup- 
port the basic principles embodied in the Empire's Revised Plan to the "N"-Plan 
and to carry out a war against America if the President of the United States 
still fails to comprehend the true intentions of the Empire even after this final 
effort is made, the army is not necessarily in disagreement. 

"However, (1) it is not in favor of the meeting if, after making preliminary 
investigations it is learned that the meeting will be with someone other than 
the President, such as Secretary Hull or one in a lesser capacity. (2) You shall 
not resign your post as a result of the meeting on the grounds that it was a 
failure ; rather, you shall be prepared to assume leadership in the war agamst 
America." 

The War Minister was of the opinion that "failure of this meeting is the greater 
likelihood." After considering the matter from all angles, the Foreign Minister 
concluded that "matters should be carried out expeditiou.sly." On the morning 
of the 6th, immediately after the joint conference, I was granted an audience, 
and I conveyed my intentions to the Emperor. During the afternoon of the 
7th, I was summoned to his presence and was advised: "I am in receipt of 
intelligence from the Navy pertaining to a general oil embargo against Japan 
by America. In view of this, the meeting with the President should take place 
as soon as possible." Instructions were despatched to Ambassador Nomura dur- 
ing the morning of the 7th. 

The first impression made on America by even this major proposal, was dl8- 
couraging. The President was absent from Washington at the time, having 
gone to meet with Prime Minister Churchill. Ambas.sador Nomura called on 
Secretary Hull on the 8th, and relaye<l the proposal to him. As stated before, 
however, this coincided with our receiving the American reply to Japan's pro- 
posal of August 4th. With regard to this most important new proposal, Hull's 
comment was: "As long as there is no change in Japan's policy, I lack confidence 
in relaying this proposal to the President." Ambassador Noiuura did not press 
the matter further but suggested by telegraph that the matter be taken up in 
Tokyo with Ambassador Grew. 

In America, the joint statement of the President and Churchill was publicly 
announced and subsequently the caustic Japanese press comments concerning it 
were reported. The attempt on Minister Hlranuma's Ife on the 14th was re- 
ported in a sensational manner. On the 13th, Secretary Hull handed Ambassador 
Nomura a note of protest enumerating the various instances in which Japan had 
disregarded American rights and interests in China, calmly explaining that all 
representations that should be made would continue to be made in the typical 
tradition of American diplomacy. Among American Cabinet officials with whom 
Ambassador Nomura came in contact, the matter was viewed with pessimism 
on the theory that there was no reason for [32] America to participate in 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4001 

a meeting of leaders which had no chance of succeeding. Realizing the very 
critical situation, Ambassador Nomura met once more with Hull on the 16th, 
Just prior to the President's return to Washington from his conference at sea. 
Ambassador Nomura made every effort to convey to Hull our true intentions, but 
as usual, Hall repeated his opposition to "military domination." At the same 
time, however, his attitude with regard to the meeting of the two leaders, softened 
somewhat and replied : "If the Ambassador is sufficiently confident, Japan's 
wishes may be conveyed to the White House." 

[33] XVIII 

As expected, President Roosevelt requested Ambassador Nomura to call on 
August 11 th — in spite of its being Sunday — which was almost immediately upon 
his return to Washington from the conference at sea. He brought up two 
subjects : One was a warning against any further southward advance by force 
of arms, and the other was his reply to the proposal foi" the meeting between 
the leaders of the two nations. First, he expressed the appreciation of the 
American Government to me and to the Japanese Government for making this 
proposal. Then he said, "If the Japanese Government halts Japan's expansion 
activities and readjusts its stand ; and if it desires to embark upon a program of 
peace in the Pacific along the lines proposed in the program and principles pro- 
posed by the United States ; and if, moreover, it is able to effect such a program, 
the United States is prepared to reopen the unrffl ial preparatory discussions 
which were broken off in July, and every effort will then be made to select a time 
and place to exchange views." * Thus he expressed agreement in principle. 
Finally : "For this purpose, it is requested that a statement concerning the 
present attitude and plans of the Japanese Governmei»t, with more clarity than 
heretofore, be submitted." Clarification of the term, "a peaceful program," 
showed that it included the application of the principle of equality of economic 
opportunity and treatment in the entire Pacific area ; the voluntary and peaceful 
cooperation of all the nationals in the said area ; the offering of assistance to any 
people who might be threatened ; the abolition of control through military or 
political pressure; and the abolition of monopolistic or preferential economic 
rights. 

The President was in high spirits throughout this Nomura -Roosevelt confer- 
ence. He even went so far as to say : "As for the locale of the meeting, Hawaii 
is impossible from a geographical standpoint. Juneau, Alaska, would be more 
suitable. As for time, how about around the middle of October?" 

That the President took up this matter personally without having it proceed 
through regular administration channels, because he was of the opinion that the 
matter could be settled more quickly through his personal intercession, was indi- 
cated by one Cabinet official (Walker?) who met with Ambissador Nomura. 
Ambassador Nomura wired Tokyo : "A reply should be made before this oppor- 
tunity is lost" and accompanied this with a draft of a reply to be used as 
reference. 

In Tokvo, after the instructions had been despatched on the 7th, aside from 
holding joint conferences on the 9th. 13th. 14t'\ nn-l the 16th, I remained in 
Constant touch with the War, Navy, and Foreign Ministers. On the 18th, Foreign 
Minister Toyoda invited Ambassador Grew to call and explain why the meeting 
between the leaders of the two nations was of the utmost importance, and 
requested his cooperation in having it materialize. 

[3.^] At about this time. Captain Iwakuro and Mr. Igawa, who had been 
aiding Ambassador Nomura in the talks with America, returned to Japan. Cap- 
tain Iwakuro was invited to attend the Joint conference of the 20th, at which he 
describ.'Kl in detail the developments up to then and explained conditions in 
America. My relationship with the army was explained to Mr. Igawa and his 
good offices in clarifying the situation were requested. Minister Wakatsuki also 
returned and described the Japanese-American negotiations as seen from a slightly 
different angle, principally to Foreign Office circles. 

[35] XIX 

At the Joint conference held on August 26th the Japanese Government de- 
cided upon Japan's reply to the American proposal, which was handed over to 
Ambassador Nomura by President Roosevelt on August 17th. In this reply, 
Japan pointed out that it was hard for Japan to accept the American Govern- 
ment's hitherto assumed attitude. In addition, Japan's attitude and intentions 



4002 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

toward the Southern Regions and the Soviet Union were clarified. Japan further 
de<'lared that the program which America claimed should be applied to the entire 
world should, by inference, be applied to the Pacific Area, which is a part of the 
world. In its reply Japan also expressed her view that it was reasonable to 
assume that any demand which was vitally necessary for the existence of a 
nation should be duly accepted. 

At this same joint conference held on August 26th, in addition to deciding upon 
her reply, the Japanese Government approved a message addressed directly from 
me to President Roosevelt. In this message I, freeing myself from the past 
business-like negotiations, discussed the Japanese-American problem from a 
broader point of view. I frankly stated my sincere intention of proposing an 
interview which would aim at tiding over the present crisis. I also expressed 
my hope that the interview would take place as early as possible. 

On August 2Sth these two documents were handed personally to the President 
of the United States by Ambassador Nomura. After reading my message, Pres- 
ident Roo.sevelt showed his appreciation by calling it a "splendid message" and 
expressing his hope for a three-day interview with me. Thus, although the 
President did not mention the date for the interview, he exhibited an unmistak- 
able desire for such an interview with me. Compared with the President's en- 
thusiasm, Secretary Hull, who was present at the time, took an extremely cautious 
attitude. On the same night Hull summoned Ambassador Nomura and empha- 
sized America's feeling that the interview between the two Governmental heads 
should take the form of a ratification of matters discussed in already completed 
conversations. He also made clear his basic disagreement with the Japanese 
feeling in this matter and stressed the fact that before the interview Japan's 
inteniions concerning the China Problem, especially that of the evacuation of 
Japanese troops and the right of self-defense, should be clarified more thoroughly 
than heretofore. 

Meanwhile, Ambassador Nomura sent two reports to Tokyo on August 29th 
and August 30th respectively. In one report Ambassador Nomura described the 
optimistic air surrounding his interview with the President, and in the other 
report he sent word concerning Mr. Hull's pessimistic opinion. These two reports 
contained important suggestions for a solution of the present crucial problems. 
Meanwhile, Japanese Governmental circles held two different opinions, one 
optimistic and the other pessimistic. However, in anticipation of the meeting 
b^'coming an actuality, the War, Navy and Foreign Miustries began selecting 
representatives. The Japanese Foreign OflBce [36] seems not to have 
viewed very seriously the State Department's "theoretical diplomacy" as rep- 
resented by Hull, and their faith in the President's "statesman-like" way of reso- 
lution seems to have grown stronger. In the joint conference held on August 
30th, Foreign Minister Toyoda inclined strongly toward the optimistic point of 
view. 

On September 3rd, President Roosevelt secretly summed Ambassador Nomura 
and personally handed him his reply to my message. Although the President 
addressed himself to me as being "very sincerely sympathetic," he showed none 
of his former enthusiasm. Even in his reply the President, while he used ex- 
tremely polite language, avoided any clear expression indicating his consent to 
the i))*oposed interview. Instead, he stated in his message that prior to the 
interview it would be necessary for Japan to agree upon certain basic principles. 
In the light of the President's message, it became clear that the State Depart- 
ment's opinion had become the dominant opinion. In his oral statement, Pres- 
ident Roosevelt clearly specified the Four Principles which he had up to that 
time avoided bringing up. He stated that these were the basic principles upon 
which the conversations had been conducted up to that point. Furthermore, he 
said that though the Japanese reply handed to him personally on August 28th (the 
reply accompanying my message) seemed to have made clear its agreement with 
these principles, there still remained various untouched-upon and unsolved prob- 
lems in respect to the June 21st American Proposal for T^nderstanding. He 
argued that it was necessary first to settle these problems and that he wished to 
learn the Japanese Government's stand in respect to them. In all this the 
Pre.sident's attitude was the same as that of the State Department. 

On the following day, the 8th, when Ambassador Nomura met with Hull, the 
letter's attitude hj^d become all the more firm. Hull stated that the Four 
Principles were the most important considerations, and that the Japanese Gov- 
ernment must show more clearly its intention to support them. In short, the 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4003 

United States strongly maintained the attitude that he basis for any conversa- 
tiouh boLWtjeii tiie Governmental Heads should be the same as the basis on which 
the earlier proposal for understanding was founded. 

[37] XX 

However, on September 3rd, at the same time that the interview was being 
helu becWven Ambassador Nomura and President Roosevelt, a joint conference 
was being held in Tokyo to discuss a new proposal to be sent to the United States. 
This proposal was drawn up by the Foreign Office. Based upon a difEerent 
principle from that of the Proposal for Understanding that was considered by 
Nomura and Hull in their previous informal conversation, it was in its essence 
a simplification of this proposal, and reads as follows : 

1. Japan will not send occupational troops further than French Indo-China. 

2. Japan will make an independent interpretation of the Tripartite Pact. 

3. In accordance with a Japanese-Chinese Agreement, Japan will withdraw 
her troops from China. 

4. Japan will not restrict American economic activities in China provided 
such activities are carried out along just lines. 

5. The principle of nondiscrimination in respect to trade will be established 
in the Southwest Pacific. 

6. The necessary steps will be taken to restore normal trade relations between 
Japan and America. 

The above proposals were to be offered to the United States, and the United 
States was to reciprocate. The Foreign Office set great store by the proposal, 
and on September 4th Foreign Minister Toyoda conveyed this proposal to 
Ambassador Grew in Tokyo at the same time that Ambassador Nomura was con- 
veying it to Secretary Hull. 

This proposal was not exactly a new; one, since Jai>an had done her utmost to 
make known her desires. However, it would be dinicult to say how long it 
would take to consider all of the important fundamental principles contained in 
the Proposal for Understanding which was used as the basis for negotiations in 
April. Since, in having to consider all of these, the present crisis might not be 
averted, Japan's purpose was to bring up only the immediate and concrete prob- 
lems and on these to base the conversations between the Governmental Heads. 

However, the American interpretation was that Japan found it difficult to 
adopt, in toto, the Proposal for Understanding and therefore, to avoid the issue, 
was offering new proposals based upon a new policy. Under these [38] 
circumstances, contrary to the sanguine expectations of Foreign Office, the Sep- 
tember 9th proposal merely invited misunderstanding and confusion. 

Nor was it unreasonable that America should have ^'allen into this misunder- 
standing, since America had presented the June 21st Proposal to Jaimn as the 
final American proposal. As stated above, Japan's reply was dispatched on 
July 15th. However, because of the cabinet change, etc.. Ambassador Nomura 
had failed to submit this reply to the American side. Thus, before the Japanese 
counter-proposal to the American proposal of June 21st had been received by 
Washington, another Japanese proposal dated September 4th had arrived. This 
seems to have been the principle reason for the American misunderstanding. 

[39] XXI 

While the" complicated and prolonged diplomatic negotiations were being con- 
ducted between Tokyo and Washington, in Tokyo itself a question of special 
significance was being deliberated upon by the cabinet. The question was 
whether to continue negotiations indefinitely with America, or whether to break 
them off abruptly. And more important still, they were considering whether war 
with America would follow upon the heels of the breaking off of negotiations. 

The diplomatic negotiations for establishing a better American-Japanese 
understanding were being participated in by only the highest leaders of the 
Government, Army, Navy and the Supreme Command. They were progressing 
to the absolute exclusion of lesser officials. With the sole exception of Foreign 
Minister Matsuoka, all the leading participants were hoping for the success of the 
negotiations, and for this very reason they were conducting it in absolute secrecy 
lest it encounter opposition. 

Nevertheless, news began to leak out, particularly as a result of Foreign 
Minister Matsuoka's secret reports to the German and Italian Ambassadors. 



4004 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

As they began to perceive the general outline of the negotiations, the lesser 
officials began to give evidence of their disapproval. The Army In particular 
stiffened in its opposition. Just at this moment, the German-Soviet war suddenly 
broke out. Though the governmental leaders were able to set aside the insistent 
demands for an immediate war against the Soviets, they were obliged to decide 
upon the armed occupation of French Ijido-China as a sort of consolation prize. 
At the same time, in order to be prepared for any emergency, they proceeded with 
full-scale preparations for a possible war against England and America. Though 
it was no easy task, the division between preparation for war and the war itself 
had to be firmly borne in mind. As preparations for war progressed, opposition 
to American-Japanese negotiations became more vociferous. 

Meanwhile, the effect of Japan's armed occupation of French Indo-China was 
immediate and powerful. America immediately effected a breaking off of 
economic relations painful to Japan and without hesitation made clear that her 
own country's traditional policy alone was the policy conducive to peace. This 
strong American retaliation created a proportionate reaction in the anti-Amer- 
ican camp in Japan. Opposition to American- Japanese negotiations came out 
into the open, and the course of action of the Cabinet, which had been created 
expressly for this purpose, became fraught with difficulties. Developments finally 
induced me to request a personal interview with the American President. How- 
ever, the fact of the existence of the so-called "Konoye Message" had leaked out 
as a consequence of the conversations between Nomura and the President, and, 
while the actual contents were not known, various vague conjectures began to 
circulate, making even more difficult the problems confronting negotiations. It 
would [40] seem that from about August 1941, the Army General Staff, 
even including the highest quarters, began advocating an immediate breaking 
off of negotiations and an opening of American-Japanese hostilities. Seeking in 
every possible way to contravene these policies, from the latter half of August 
I repeatedly held consultations with the Army and Navy Ministers and called 
together countless joint conferences. To a certain degree, the "National Policy" 
calling for the breaking off of negotiations and the immediate opening of hostili- 
ties against England and America was brought under discussion. 

Thus it came about that on September 6th, at a conference held in the 
Imperial presence, the "Outline for the Execution of the National Policy of the 
Imperial Government" was decided upon. (See Appendix 5.) 

On the day before the conference held in the Imperial presence, I had an 
audience with the Emperor in order to informally discuss the "Outline for 
the Execution of the National Policy of the Imperial Government." The Emperor, 
in examining the program, pointed out that it placed war preparations first 
and diplomatic negotiations second. This, he said, wou'd seem to give precedence 
to w.ir over diplomatic activities. He expressed the desire to question the chiefs 
of the Army and Navy General Staffs regarding this point at the meeting on 
the following day. In reply I explained f^at the order of business in the 
program did not indicate any differences in degree of importance. I also said 
that the Government intended to pursue diplomatic negotiations as long as 
possible and to commence preparations for war only when there seemed no 
prospect of successful negotiation. I also suggested that if he wishes to question 
the Chiefs of the Supreme Command on the subject, perhaps it would be more 
advisable to summon them privately rather than question them at the con- 
ference. The Emperor requested that they be summoned at once. They arrived 
promptly and in my presence were a.sked the same question and gave the same 
answer that I had given. In continuing, the Emperor asked the Army Chief of 
Staff General Sugiyama what was the Army's belief as to t»ie probable length 
of hostilities in case of a- Japanese-American war. The Chief of Staff replied 
that he believed operations in the South Pacific could be disposed of in about 
three months. Turning to the Chief of Staff, the Emperor recalled that the 
General had b^^n Minister of War at the time of the outbreak of the China 
Incident, and th^t he had then informed the Throne that the incident would 
be disposed of in about one month. He pointed out that despite the General's 
assurance, the incident was not yet concluded after four long years of fighting. 
In trepidation the Chief of Staff went to great lengths to explain that the 
extensive hinterland of China prevented the consummation of oi>erations accord- 
ing to the scheduled plan. At this the Emperor raised his voice and said that 
if the Chinese hinterland was extensive, the Pacific was boundless. He asked 
bow the General could be certain of his [.)/] three month calculation. 
The Chief of Staff hung his head, unable to answer. At this point the Navy 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4005 

Chief of General Staff lent a helping hand to Sugiyama by saying that to his 
mind Japan was like a patient suffering from a serious illness. He said the 
patient's case was so critical that the question of whether or not to operate 
had to be determined without delay. Should he be let alone without an operation, 
there was danger of a gradual decline. An operation, while it might be extremely 
dangerous, would still offer some hope of saving his life. The stage was now 
reached, he said, where a quick decision had to be made one way or the other. 
He felt that the Army General Staff was in favor of putting hope in diplomatic 
negotiations to the finish, but that in case of failure a decisive operation would 
have to be performed. To this extent, then, he was in favor of the negotiation 
proposals. The Emperor, pursuing the point, asked the Chiefs of the Supreme 
Command if it was not true that both of them were for giving precedence to 
diplomacy, and both answered in the affirmative. 

The Conference was held on September 6th at 10 AM in the Imperial presence. 
During the conference the President of the Privy Council Yoshimichi Hara 
spoke up and said the proposal before the conference gave the impression that 
the emphasis was being placed upon war rather than upon diplomacy. He 
wished a clarification of the views of the Government and the Supreme Com- 
mand on this point. The Navy Minister, representing the Government, answered 
Hara's question, but the Chiefs of the Supreme Command remained silent. 

The Emperor now spoke up suddenly and seconded the opinion put forth 
by the President of the Privy Council, Hara, and expressed his regret that the 
Supreme Command had not seen fit ,to answer. He then took from his pocket 
a piece of paper on which was written a poem by the Emperor Meiji : "Since 
all are brothers in this world, why is there such constant turmoil?" After 
reading this poem aloud, the Emperor stressed that he had read it over and 
over again and that he was striving to Introduce into the present the Emperor 
Meiji's ideal of international peace. Everyone prCi^ent was struck with awe, and 
there was silence throughout the hall. Soon the Chief of the Navy General 
Staff, Admiral Nagano, rose and said that he was filled with trepidation at the 
prospect of the Emperor's displeasure with the Supreme Command. The truth 
was, he said, that when the Navy Minister spoke, he had been under the 
impression that the Navy Minister was representing both the Government and 
the Supreme Command, and he had therefore remained silent. He assured the 
Emperor that the Chiefs of the Supreme Command most certainly concurred 
with the Navy Minister's answer; that they too were conscious of the importance 
of diplomacy, and advocated a resort to armed force only when there seemed 
no other way out. The meeting adjourned in an atmosphere of unprecedented 
tenseness. 

[42] XXII 

The American-Japanese negotiations gave the outward appearance of progress, 
and yet made no material headway. And while the proposal for an interview 
between the nation's leaders seemed perceptibly to move the President, no prog- 
ress was made toward a realization of this objective. This was partly due to the 
fact that Ambassador Nomura's actions were governed solely by official cables 
from Tokyo, and for this reason Japan's true intentions were not fully transmit- 
ted. Therefore, I made up my mind to meet rersonfTy with Ambassador Grew. 
On September 6th, the day that the above mentioned "National Policy Outline" was 
approved, with the full cognizance of the Army, Navy, and Foreign ^linisters, I 
dined in extreme secrecy with Ambassador Grew and the Councillor to the Ameri- 
can Embassy. Mr. Dooman, who acted as interpreter. I stressed the fact that the 
present cabinet, including the Army and Navy representatives, was unified in its 
wish for a successful conclusion of negotiations, and moreover that the present 
cabinet was the only one capable of carrying it through. I also made a most 
significant statement when I said that should we miss this one opportunity, an- 
other one might not arise in our lifetime. I also informed them that the jap.snese 
delegates to the propo.sed conference were all selected, including those of the 
Army, Navy, and Foreign Office. I laid emphasis upon the necessity of my meet- 
ing with the President at the earliest possible date in order that ideas could be 
exchanged concerning basic problems. 

Ambassador Grew asked for my views regarding Hull's Four Principles, and I 
said that they were splendid as principles but when it came down to actual appli- 
cation a variety of problems aros'^. It was in order to solve these very problems 
that I deemed it necessary to hold the meeting with the President. 



4006 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

After this informal talk which lasted about one hour and a half, Ambassador 
Grew, vvno appeared to be much impressed, promised to report inmaeuiateiy the 
contents of the conversation in the form ot a Uuect message trom me to the 
President. He stated in all sincerity that the report he was auout to despatch to 
iMe President was the most important cable to go from his hand since the start of 
his diplomatic career. 

[43] XXIII 

As far as Japan was concerned, since April, just about everything possible had 
been done to forward American-Japanese negotiations. I had taken the important 
step of proposing a personal interview wiih the President. I had sent him a 
message, and I had in addition explained by true feelings to Ambassador Grew. 
On the other hand, as a result of the important National Policy decided upon at 
the Imperial Conference on September 6th, as far as Japan was concerned, a point 
had been established beyond which negotiations could not proceed. We came more 
and more to feel that we were approaching a show-down. By this time we were 
largely aware of the difficulties confronting the negotiations, as well as the 
intentions of the United States. In other words, when it came to fundamentals, 
the difficulty was the "Four Principles," and when it came to more concrete ob- 
stacles, we were faced with the problems of the stationing of troops in China, 
the establishment of a principle of equal economic opportunity, and the problem of 
the Tripartite Pact. America seemed for the present to feel that Japan had no 
objections to the "Four Principles." And since I myself had told Ambassador 
Grew that they were "splendid as principles," it could well be imagined that this 
did not represent a real obstacle. Nevertheless, among certain elements of both 
the Army and the Foreign Ministries, there was undeniably powerful opposition 
even to agreeing upon these as principles. (The fact that the United States mis- 
interpreted the Japanese proposal of August 28th was due to a misunderstanding 
on the part of Ambassador Nomura. There was considerable discussion as to 
whether this proposal should be cancelled, or whether Ambassador Nomura should 
be recalled.) However, since it was evident that to reject the "Four Principles" 
would be to doom the American-Japanese negotiations to failure, I was hard put to 
know how best to handle this problem. 

In regard to the problem of a basic economic principle, Japan was prepared to 
acknowledge equal opporttmity in China, and was of the optimistic opinion that 
America would understand her peculiar geographical relationship with that coun- 
try. As for the problem of the Tripartite Pact — although the following cannot 
be considered as a record — the view had been ptit forward that it might be desir- 
able for America to enter the European War since she would then waste her 
national strength. Nevertheless, I was of the opinion that a way could he found 
to settle these things if an interview could be arranged between myself and the 
President. Lastly, in respect to the stationing of troops, there were times when 
the Army seemed to hold the moderate view that pretext and form were of no 
importance, but at the very next moment one would come up against a firm 
resolution not to give in on any account. Even within Japanese Government 
circles there was a strong tendency to feel that this constituted a real problem. 

[//Jf] Moreover Government circles were of one opinion in feeling that an 
official indication of peace terms would have to be made if we were to ask the 
United States to act as liaison between ourselves and China. It was in the light 
of recent negotiations and after careful consideration that these terms were to 
be decided upon. 

Thus at the Joint Conference of September 20th a proposal which adjusted and 
combined the views of the Japanese side was approved. (See Appendix VI.) 

[//5] XXIV 

Thus, on Japan's side, there was the feeling that she had finally settled upon 
everything that should be expressed on paper, and she assumed the position that 
she would, beyond this depend entirely on diplomatic sticcess. 

Foreign Minister Tovoda decided that he would first of all unofficially submit 
the conditions of Sino-Japanese peace to the American side. T'nis on September 
22nd he himself presented these conditions to Ambassador Grew, and on the 
23rd, presented them to Secretary of State Hull through Ambassador Nomura. 
At this time Ambassador Nomura brought up the problem of a meeting with 
leaders who in principle were supposed already to have received the approval of 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4007 

the President himself and requested Secretary Hull to grant him "agreement 
at least in principle," but this was a procedure which surely would be questioned. 
Since Secretary Hull had frequently gone so far as to disclose to other people 
the opinion of the State Department tuat the President had "gone too far," this 
proposal by Ambassador Nomura might have been something he was waiting 
for, but in any case he was completely hesitant about giving a definite answer. 
The feeling existed that the effect of thus unotTicially submitting the peace terms 
was to bring about a sharp turn-about in the attitude of the United States to the 
problem of our stationing armed forces in China. T*he Americans said, and 
they stated that Foreign Minister Toyoda so explained it, "Whereas we had under- 
stood that Japan would at once withdraw all of its forces from China, sign a new 
treaty, and through its terms station its armed forcas in fixed areas, according 
to the terms that were unofileially submitted, it would have a portion of the 
expeditionary forces then abroad remain just as they were, and would withdraw 
the rest ; if this is so, the stories differ." Though the actuality was the same, 
the attitude taken was that the forms differ in their real nature. 

On the 23rd, Foreign Minister Toyoda and Terasaki, Chief of the American 
Bureau, explain in detail to Councillor Dooman the reasons for the stationing 
of troops, and as to the substance itself of the stationing of troops (in China) 
the American side also had no objection. The pi-obiem restded in the forms to 
be followed. On this point the American side in the end did not yield. 

On September 27th, Foreign Minister Toyoda sub' litted to t le opposite side 
the comprehensive Proposal for Understanding that was determined upon on 
September 20th and that had been reserved lo the last. Thus, on that day, on 
the one hand, the Foreign Minister himself handed it over to and explained it to 
Ambassador Grew, and, on the other hand, at Washington, Ambassador Nomura 
and Matsudaira visit Valentine and present this plan. 

IJ/G] At the Foreign Office, they regarded this plan only about as follows: 
"It is our opinion, that as far as American desires are concerned, it is all 
right to use this plan as a basis and to proceed with negotiations." But they did 
not embark upon any principle that they would proceed with this plan alone, in 
complete disregard of the various plans of the past. This was a matter of 
diplomatic technique, but it was hard to believe that it was pi'oper. 

U7] XXV 

As expected, on October 2nd the United States submitted a memorandum (See 
Appendix 7). The point of this memorandum which drew attention was that 
the United States, just as before, regarded with utmost importance the plan of 
September 4th. This observation was based, for one thing, op the fact that the 
memorandum took the form of an answer to the plan of September 4th, but never- 
theless, since the Japanese side had on September 27th put forth a comprehensive 
final plan, the Americans, depending on the manner of handling, might have con- 
centrated their attention upon this latter plan. In actuality, as stated before, 
half of the responsibility for this state of affairs might have been due to the atti- 
tude of our Foreign OflSce authorities in laying stress ui)on the plan of Septem- 
ber 4th. Perhaps the Americans interpreted the complete plan as being simply 
an explanation of the plan of September 4th. But they did not mention this 
specifically. They stated that "It is regrettable that the negotiations that had 
almost reached a settlement have been split by the September 4th plan." They 
were concerned to the very end with the September 4th plan. And, as before, the 
Americans limited too much the applications of the peace policy made manifest 
by Japan, and the application of the principle aimed against economic discrimina- 
tion. They, also criticized the stationing of troops in China as a condition of 
peace between Japan and China. As for the Tripartite Pact, they expres.sed no 
opinion whatsoever. From its tone, one can understand that they still raised 
their greatest objections to the matter of stationing troops in China. Thus, in 
short, they said, "Japan agrees with the Four Principles, and gives wide guaran- 
tees for peace, but on concrete matters it contradicts them or insists upon de- 
limiting them unreasonably." It seemed that because of this memorandum pes- 
simistic arguments about the future of Japanese-American negotiations took on a 
darker color all at once. 

On October 7 the Foreign Minister invited Ambassador Grew to visit him and 
devoted himself to sounding out the real intentions of the United States. How- 
ever, the Ambassador, contrary to previous occasions, was extremely circumspect. 
He made almost no explanations, and gave no pledges whatsoever. In Washington, 



4008 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

too, Aml)assa(lor Nomura called upon Secretary Hull in accordance with instruc- 
tions and strove to arrive at a break in the deadlock, but he was similarly un- 
successful. Later, Hamilton,, in accordance with instructions from Hull, called 
upon the Ambassador, and said, "America's intentions are completely set forth in 
the memorandum of October 2nd, and in the plan of June 21st as more or less 
revised." He did no more than indicate that when the Japanese side had scruti- 
nized these carefully and would again revise its plan of September 4th, then the 
United States was prepared to give it (tiie revised version) careful consideration. 

[■i8\ About tills time, even though the Japanese alone were stating their 
(•pinions on all sorts of problems, the Americans merely criticized or attacked 
these and did not at all try to show what was in their minds. This was the 
point on which the Japanese felt dissatisfaction. The focal point of their diplo- 
macy was directed toward making the United States say something on its own 
side. At the same time, day by day, in the midst of anxiety, suspicion and fret- 
fulness, the argument gained strength that "Since the United States had already 
discovered the innermost mind of Japan, it will henceforth only drag out negotia- 
tions as long as possible. In contrast to Japan, it feels no need to bring negotia- 
tions to a swift conclusion.- Rather, if the negotiations were to extend themselves, 
the longer they did so the better it would be for the United States. Therefore it 
should be concluded that there is no sincerity on the part of the United States." 

On October IStli, Minister Wakasugi, who had returned from Tokyo to his 
post of duty, called upon Under-Secretary -Welles on receipt of telegraphic in- 
structions, and spoke intimately with him on the entire range of Japanese-Ameri- 
can negotiations. He tried somehow or other to draw out positive expressions 
of opinion from the American side, but although Welles did say that "There is 
no change at all on tlie point that the President and Hull desire a meeting with 
Premier Konoye, just as soon as the three problems that are outstanding are 
settled," as i-egards the question, "If that is so, what is the opinion of America 
on those problems?" there was only an insistence on the point, that, "This also 
is fully taken up in the memorandum of October 2nd, and a clarification beyond 
this is unnecespary." 

In the end the Japanese side insisted that ''It is now the United States' turn 
to say something," and to this the Americans continued to say stubbornly. "It 
is Japan's turn." The negotiations had now reached a complete deadlock. 

In the end. it was just as Ambassador Nomura's report had it, "The opposite 
side will not retreat at any point its former pos'tion. It will firmV adhere to its 
answer of October 2rid, and it takes the stand that it will consider at any time 
any Japanese proposal that agrees with it." On the Japanese side, we did indeed 
make up aii answer to this memorandum of October 2nd, but nothing was achieved 
by it that improved the situation, and in any case the urgency of the po'itical 
situation in Japan increased with oppressive force, and at last resulted in the 
resignation of the Cabinet en masse. 

[49] XXVI 

A^ter Japan's final comprehensive plan had been determined upon at the 
joint conference of September 20th, the activities of the Government frequently 
began to show an acute seriousness. This was by reason of the balance struck 
between the progress of Japanese-American negotiations on the one hand and on 
the outline of national policy determined upon in the conference that was held 
on September 6th in the presence of the Emperor. On September 2^1^h, and 25th, 
I held conferences for two days with the War Minister, the Navy Minister and 
the Foreign Minister and the President of the Cabinet Planning Board. From 
the 27th to October 1st, I took a rest at Kamakura, but during that time I called 
the Navy Minister, Oikawa. and a.sked in detail concerning the atmosphere in 
his circle. Unon the arrival of the Anierican memorandum of October 2nd, I 
went to the Imperial Palace on the 4th. Afterwards, driving away a group of 
bureau chiefs, I held a liaison confeernce with only the Cabinet Ministers and 
the leaders of the Supreme Command. On the evening of the 5th. I asked the 
War Minister to come to niv house in Ogikubo, and expressed my opinion that I 
would continue negotiations to the very end. 

Late on the night of the 7th, the War Minister visited me in my Japanese-style 
rooms, and declared, "As to the problem of withdrawing troops fnmi China, such 
a formality as to once withdraw — in principle — all troops and after that to sta- 
tion them there, as insisted upon by the United States, is something that is 
difficult for the Army to submit to". In view of the stiff attitude of the A''my, 
on both the f»th and 8th, I conferred separately with the Minister of the Navy 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4009 

and with the Foreign Minister, and deliberated with them on the methods of 
avoiding a crisis. The Foreign Minister further visited me twice on the 10th, 
and we spoke intimately on how we might somehow or other continue the nego- 
tiations. Ihe jjint conference also held a meeting on October 11th. During this 
time the movements of the three chokan (the President of the Cabinet Planning 
Board, the Director of the Bureau of Legislation, and the Chief Secretary of the 
Board) and especially of President Suzuki (of the Cabinet Planning Board) 
became objects of attention. 

October 12th. My fiftieth birthday. In spite of its being Sunday, early in 
the afternoon I gathered together the three ministers, the Minister of War, the 
Minister of the Navy, and the Foreign Minister, together with President Suzuki 
of the Cabinet Planning Board at Ogibuko, and held with them almost the last 
conference relative to peace or war. Before this meeting there was previous 
notification from the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Navy to the 
Chief Secretary of the Cabinet as follows : "The Navy does not desire a rupture 
in the negotiations. Thus it wishes as much as possible to avoid war. But 
as far as the Navy is concerned it can not of itself bring this openly to the surface 
and say so. At today's conference the Navy Minister is expected to say that 
the decision for peace or v^ar is entirely up to the Premier, so I beg you to keep 
this matter in your mind." 

[SO] Surely enough, at the very beginning there were the following opening 
remarks by the Minister of the Navy : "We have now indeed come to the cross- 
roads where we must determine either upon peace or war. I should like to 
leave this decision entirely up to the Premier, And, if we are to seek peace, 
we shall go all the way for peace. Thus, even if we make a few concessions, 
we ought to proceed all the way with the policy of bringing the negotiations to 
fruition. If in the midst of negotiations — after negotiations have gone on for 
two or three months, one says that "they won't do from any point of view, and 
"well, we've got to have war now, — the Navy will be put to inconvenience. If 
we are to have war, we must determine upon war here and now. Now is the 
time. We are now at the final moment of decision. If we decide that we are 
not to have war, I should like to have us proceed upon the policy that we will 
bring negotiations to fruition no matter what happens." To this I said, "If 
we were to say that we must determine on war or peace here, today, I myself 
would decide on continuing the negotiations." But the Minister of War said, 
"This decision of the Premier's is too hasty. Properly speaking, ought we not to 
determine here whether or not there is any possibility of bringing the negotia- 
tions to fruition? To carry on-negotiations for which there is no possibility of 
fruition, and in the end to let slip the time for fighting, would be a matter of 
the greatest consequence. In fact, does the Foreign Minister think that there 
is any possibility or not of bringing the negotiations to fruition?" Thus, turning 
to the Fo'^eign Minister, he asked this question, whereupon the Foreign Minister 
replied, "That depends entirely on the conditions. The most difficult point in 
the problem today, I believe, is the matter of stationing troops in China, but if 
in this regard the Army says that it will not retreat one step from its former 
assertions, then there is no hope in the negotiations. But if on this point the 
Army states that it would be all right to make concessions, however small they 
may be, then we can not say that there is no hope of bringing the negotiations to 
fruition." But the Minister of War said in answer to this, "The problem of the 
Stationing of troops, in itself means the life of the Army, and we shall not be 
able to make any concessions at all." I said, "At this time isn't it all right to 
forget about the glory but to take the fruits ; perform the formalities as America 
wants, and achieve a result that will in actuality be the same as 'stationing 
troops.' " To this, the Minister of War did not yield, and in the end, though 
the conference lasted from two o'clock till six o'clock, we did not arrive at any 
conclusion and adjourned. 

On the next day, the 13th, I went to the Palace and made a detailed report on 
the crisis which the Cabinet was facing. Then I spokp intimately with tbp Lird 
Keeper of the Privy Seal, Marquis Kido. On the following day, the 14th, at 
nine o'clock in the morning, prior to the meeting of the Cabinet, I asked the 
Minister of War to come to my official residence and once again asked his con- 
sidered opinion concerning the prob'em of the stationing of troops. I said, "I 
have a very great responsibility for the [51] China Incident, and today, 
when this Incident has lasted four years and still sees no settlement, I Aid it 
difficult to agree, no matter what is said, to enter upon a great war the future 
of which I can not at all foresee. On this occasion, we ought to give jn for a 
time, grant to them the United States the formality of withdrawing troops, and 

79716 O— 46 — pt. 20 4 



4010 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

save ourselves from the crisis of a Japanese-American war. Moreover, I believe 
that on this occasion both from the point of view of the nation's strength and from 
the point of view of the people's thinking it is necessary to end the China Inci- 
dent. The advancement and development of the nation are, of course, things 
that we should aspire to, but in order to develop greatly we need also at times 
to fall back and to cultivate the national strength." Thus did I declare my sin- 
cerest feelings and explain them to the Minister of War. To this, the Minister of 
War declared, "If at this time we yield to the United States, she will take steps 
that are more and more high-handed, and will probably find no place to stop. 
The problem of withdrawing troops is one, you say, of forgetting the honor and 
of seizing the fruits, but, to this, I find it difficult to agree from the point of view 
of maintaining the fighting spirit of the Army." Thus he insisted and did not 
move from his position. Therefore, my talk with the Minister of War ended at 
odds, and as soon as possible as the meeting of the Cabinet opened, the Minister 
of War strongly and excitedly set forth the reasons why the Japanese-.^merican 
negotiations should no longer be continued. 

These opening remarks of the Minister of War were so sudden that the other 
Cabinet Ministers were somewhat taken aback and there was no one who would 
open his mouth to answer. The Cabinet meeting, after settling other subjects 
for discussion, made no reference to this problem of continuing negotiations and 
adjourned. 

On the afternoon of the same day, Muto, the Chief of the Military Affairs 
Bureau, came to the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, and said, "Somehow or other 
it seems that the reason that the Premier can not make up his mind is due to 
the fact that the Navy can not make up its mind. Thus, if the Navy really 
does not wish war the Army also must think about it. But the Navy does not 
say anything openly to the Army and only says that 'it will leave it up entirely 
to the Premier'. Just to say that it will be up to the decision of the Premier 
will not be enough to control the inner circles of the Army. But if the Navy will 
openly come to the Army and say that 'The Navy at this time does not wish war', 
then the Army can easily control its command. I wonder if you can not manage 
it so that the Navy will come and say something along this line." Thereupon, 
the Chief Secretary spoke to Oka, the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, con- 
cerning this matter, but all that the latter could say was this: "As far as the 
Navy is concerned, no matter what anyone may think, for it to say that it does 
not wish war is something that it can not do in any formal manner. What the 
Navy can say is that 'it is entirely up to the decision of the Premier.' " 

[■52] Again that same night, Suzuki, the President of the Cabinet Planning 
Board, came to my home in Ogikubo as the messenger of the War Minister. The 
War Minister's message was as follows : "According to what we have been able 
to discover lately, it looks as if the Navy does not wish to have war. If this is 
so, why does not the Navy Minister clearly say so to me? If there were any 
clear statements to me from the Navy Minister, then I too would have to recon- 
sider matters once more. But it looks as if the Navy Minister is making the 
Premier shoulder the entire responsibility. This is indeed a matter of i-egret. 
If the Navy can not make up its mind, the conference on September 6th in the 
presence of the Emperor will have been fundamentally overturned. Hence, this 
would mean that, beginning with the Premier, the Ministers of War and the 
Navy and the President of the Supreme Command all did not sufficiently perform 
their responsibilities as advisors to the throne. H-^nce I believe that there is no 
other way but that at this time we all resign, declare insolvent everything that 
has happened up to now, and reconsider our plans once more. There is no one 
who is now a subj'^ct who has the power to keep control over the Army and the 
Navy and to refashion a plan. T>>erefore, I believe that at this time there is no 
other way hut to have an Imperial Prince come fortli as the leader of the next 
C'«binet. I believe, to begin with, that among the Imperial Princes, Prince Higa- 
shiknni is most suitable for the position. As far as myself am concerned, it is 
very hard for me to ask the Premier to resign, but as matters now have come to 
pass, I can not help but do so. I shouM like to beg that you kindly exert your 
efforts to having the Emperior ask Prince Higashikuni to become the next 
Premier." 

The next day, the inth, I went to the Palace and reported on developments 
since the last time that I had been there. At that time. I said. "Last niirht 
there w«s. indeed, a message from Trjo, and he says that he wonld, like to have 
Prince Higashikuni as the bead of the succeeding Cabinet." T»mis I inquired 
concerni"^ the inner feelings of the Emperor, whereupon the Emperior said, 
"Prince Higashikuni, I believe, is indeed most suited to his position as Chief 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4011 

of the General Staff. And I believe that to have a member of the Imperial 
Family stand in a Goveinmental position is something that requires coi.siuer- 
able thought. In time of peace, it wouid be all rigut, but in a siiuation in which 
we fear that there may be war, and when we also tliink further of the interests 
of the Imperial House, I question the advisability of a member of royalty standing 
forth", but it did not seem that he was completely out of favor with the idea. 
On the way home, I met Marquis Kido, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, and 
broached the matter of Prince Higashikuni, but the Lord Keeper seemed not at 
all to rise to the idea. 

The same night, I secretly visited the residence of Prince Higashikuni, reported 
to him the opinions of Tojo, the War Minister, and urged him to come forth. But 
the Prince said, "The matter is too important, so please let me think about it for 
two or three days." On the morning of the next day, the 16th, I spoke over the 
telephone with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal but [53] he said, "As 
to the matter of the Prince, there are great diflSjulties at the Imperial Court." 
But the situation was such that it did not allow for even a single day's delay. 
Thus from about ten o'clock in the morning, I had each Cabinet member come 
individually to the Japanese-style room of my oflBcial residence, stated the un- 
avoidable reasons for a resignation, obtained their understanding, and in the 
evening, alter gathering together all of their letters of resignation, went to the 
Palace. The letter of resignation of the Premier at that time was as follows (see 
Appendix 8). 

After presenting the resignations, I met the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, 
whereupon he said, "The Emperor will not appoint Prince Higashikuni as the 
next leader of the Cabinet. The leader of the next Cabinet will in any case 
become the subject of consultation at the meeting of the senior statesmen tomor- 
row, but as far as I myself am concerned, looking back on the chain of events 
up till today, I feel that it seems reasonable that the command to form the next 
Cabinet will fall on either the Navy or War Minister. As to which is better, 
the Navy or War Minister, we are now greatly racking our brains over it. What 
is your opinion?" Thus, I was asked by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, so I 
said, "From the point of view of politics, I feel that it is a post that is more 
suitable to the War Minister than to the Navy Minister. At the same time, the 
situation as it now stands is such that the War Minister is on the surface 
opposed to the continuation of negotiations between Japan and America ; but, 
just as we may understand from his talk of two or three days ago, he even states 
that as long as the opinion of the Navy is not clear, we ought to declare everything 
insolvent and revise our plans, so I think that even if the Minister of War were to 
receive the command to form the next Cabinet, he would not plunge us immedi- 
ately into war. Especially if there were a few words to this effect at the time 
of the command, I feel that the War Minister will take a prudent attitude all 
the more." It seemed that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal also was of the same 
opinion. The Lord Keeper, furthermore, asked if I would be present at the con- 
ference of the senior statesmen on the following day and explain the chain of 
events leading to »ur resignation. I decided that I myself would not be present 
but would explain everything by means of a letter. The letter that I submitted 
to that conference of senior statesmen was as follows (see Appendix 9). 

[541 SUPPLEMENT 

[55] StTPFLTING OF MILITARY STORES AND MATE:RIALS 

Pro and Con of the Theory of Gradual Exhaustion 

The motive behind the Government's persistent efforts to bring Japanese- 
American negotiations to a successful conclusion, which called for patience and 
more patience in view of world criticism, was the two great reasons described 
in a separate volume. Aside from these, an important consideration was the 
problem of economics, particularly the supplying of military stores and materials. 

Reliance on Britain and America for material, particularly for military stores, 
was our big weakness. The Planning Board was ordered on several occasions 
from the time of the first Konoye Cabinet to consider ways and means of over- 
coming this weakness, but each time their reply was that it was an "impossibility." 

The chief aim of the normalization of Japanese-American trade relations, 
which was one of the items of the Japanese-American negotiations as well as of 
the economic activities in the Southwest Pacific, was to obtain the materials 
mentioned above. During the negotiations, however, the order to fi-eeze assets 



4012 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

became effective, making it impossible to obtain or to be supplied with these goods, 
and causing this problem to be an even more critical one. If matters were per- 
mitted to rest as they were, our stock piles would gradually dwindle. The princi- 
pal advocates of war, therefore, proposed starting the war against America with- 
out delay. 

There were no means of avoiding this gradual impoverishment of military sup- 
plies other than to obtain goods through the successful conclusion of Japanese- 
American negotiations, or by increasing domestic production, at least to the extent 
of satisfying the requirements of the military. This was one of the main reasons 
for the extreme interest of the Government in the Japanese-American negotiations. 

When the Japanese-American negotiations reached the danger point, the Presi- 
dent of the Planning Board was again ordered to make a survey. This time, he 
reported that petroleum was the only item which posed a problem and that we 
could get along somehow as far as all other materials were concerned. Even 
where petroleum was concerned, it was reported that if two billion yen were sunk 
into expanding the synthetic oil industry, 500,000 tons could be produced by the 
end of 1943 and four million tons could be produced by the end of 1944. On the 
other hand, if the Netherland East [56] Indies were obtained through the 
force of arms, it is certain that the enemy would destroy all the oil field installa- 
tions. Moreover, there would be the transportation problem. When there were 
given consideration, not more than 300,000 tons during the first year, and not 
over a million and a half tons during the second year, could be expected. . It was 
believed that five or six years would be required before a five million ton figure 
could be reached. 

In other words, even by force of arms, we would be unable to obtain oil in 
necessary quantities in the immediate future. The report clearly established 
the fact that the gradual imnoverishment of military supplies could best be 
avoided by expanding the synthetic oil industry. 

According to the decision reached by the Council in the Imperial presence on 
September 6th, "we shall resolve to open hostilities against America (Britain, 
and the Netherlands) if, by early October, there is no probability of our demands 
in the Japanese-American ne«rotiations being met". There would therefore, 
be no objection to assuming that a resolution to open hostilities need not be 
made because a successful conc'usion of the negotiations "is probable". More- 
over, though the decisions s<^ates that we shall resolve to open hostilities, it 
does not state that "hostilities will be opened". It would, therefore, be pos- 
sible to proceed without war and with only the economic relations broken off, 
even if the Japanese-American negotiations end in failure. As a matter of fact, 
the Government did consider taking this step in the event that it could not be 
avoided, and then to consider secondarv stens without haste. 

The principal advocates of war, however, basing their arguments on the theory 
of the gradual impoverishment of military supplies and resources would not 
make any concessions. I, therefore, told the President of the Planning Board, 
Suzuki, that if this gradual impoverishment of oil and other military supplies 
and goods could b" avo'ded by increasing domestic produ'^ticns, then the domestic 
production facilities should be e-«^panded regardless of how many billions in 
capital would be required. It seems extremely foolish to make such a great 
sacrifice as a war against America and Britain for the sake of such goods. Presi- 
dent Suzuki concurred but added that opening hostilities was a matter of domestic 
politics. Shortly after this, the Cabinet resigned en masse and all came to an end. 

Althou'^h this was a later occurrence, at the Senior Statesmen''s Conference 
held on November 29th, which was lust before the Toio Cabinet plunged into 
the Greater East Asia [57] War, I asked whether it would not be pos- 
sible to prevent the gradual impoverishment of military supplies and goods 
by stepping up domestic production ; and that if it could be. was it not true that 
opening of hostilities against America. Britain, and the Netherlands, was not 
absolutely essential? Why could we not proceed as we were, with broken eco- 
nomic relations but without war. and at the same time consider subseouent 
plans, I asked. Prime Minister Tojo replied that from tl'e time his Cabinet 
had been formed until today he had been concentrating on that point and could 
only conclude that, if we were to proceed with broken e<'onomic relations, even 
without war, the final consequences would be gradual impoverishment. That 
was the reason for reaching the decision to open hostilities, he said. 

Prime Minister Tojo claimed that gradual impoverishment could not be avoided. 
President Suzuki claimed that gradual impoverishment could be avoided. One 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4013 

of the two had to be lying. It must be admitted that President Suzuki's state- 
ment that "opening hostilities is a matter of domestic policies", was indeed one 
with much meaning. 

[58] War With No Prospect of Success 

THE KUSSO- JAPANESE WAB AND PRINCE ITO 

On the occasion of an informal conversation with War Minister Tojo on the 
subject of the Japanese-American negotiations, the War Minister said : "Some- 
times it is necessary for a man to risk his life in one leap." I replied : "This 
might happen once or twice in the course of an individual's life ; however, a person 
in a responsible position, when he considers a 2600 year-old national polity and 
a hundred million subjects, cannot take such a <rtsk-." 

Although I did not speak of this to the War Minister, there are people who 
talk about "crossing the Rubicon," or "risking the fate of the nation". Foreign 
Minister Matsuoka frequently uttered such phrases, and every time I heard them 
I had an uncomfortable feeling. "Crossing the Rubicon" and "risking the fate 
of the nation" are exciting words, but starting a war without seeing the prospect 
of success is very different from the case of an individual. At least, when one 
thinks of the 2600-year-old faultless national polity, one cannot act so irresponsi- 
bly. Even when criticized as slow or old-fashioned, people like myself cannot 
act in such a way. 

However roundabout the way may seem, I firmly believe that war, unless it 
is a question of safety or 100% safety, must be avoided. 

At this time there are a number of military men who speak in this manner : 
"We did not have 100% confidence in our success when we entered the Sino- 
Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars. It is, in fact, impossible to have such 
a thing as 100% confidence in victory". 

At the time when War Minister Tojo and I dined together at my residence 
in Og kubo in the early part of October, we talked ovei* Japanese-American 
problems, and I referred to the above opinion as follows : 

"We believe that Ito and Yamagata had sufficient confidence in victory when 
they plunged into the Russo-Japanese war. If they plunged into the war with- 
out confidence in victory, they were being extremely irresponsible. Thus, even 
though the war ended in our favor, we should have to consider it as a pure bit 
of luck. 

"Previous to the declaration of the Russo-Japanese war. Emperor Meiji ex- 
perienced difficulty in making up his mind. Katsura, who was Premier at that 
Aime, decided one day that he would ask for the final words of the Emperor 
on that very [59] day. Prince Ito, however, held him back in order to 
allow the Emperor one more night in which to consider the problem. 

"The following morning. Emperor Meiji granted an audience to Prince Ito and 
questioned him as to whether he had confidence in success. To this Prince Ito 
replied : 'The Russian forces will certainly not be able to set foot inside Chosen, 
and it will be possible for us to hold the Russians for a year along the line of 
the Yalu River. At some time during the year in which such a condition ob- 
tains, we can expect the intervention of a third nation. When we speak of a 
third nation, since Britain is our ally, and France and Germany are on the 
Russian side, we can mean none other than the United States. Hence we can 
commence preparations at once and with confidence in our success.' 

"On hearing this, the Emperor was very much relieved, and at Council in the 
Imperial presence on the very same day he announced his final decision. 

"However, this time there will be no third nation, and there will be no country 
ready to intervene. Hence any prediction as to future prospects of success is 
quite impossible. If, in spite of this, our country is to be plunged into war, 
the decision will have to be made with extreme care and with consideration of 
the national polity." 

On the morning of October 14th I had a final consultation with War Minister 
Tojo in a Japanese-style room at my official residence. At that time, the War 
Minister stated : "I believe that the view of the Premier is rather overly pessimis- 
tic. This is because you are too well aware of the weak points of your own 
country. Is it not possible that the United States too has her weaknesses?" 

Our conversation at this time threatened to lead us into violent disagreement 
over the problem of the withdrawal of troops. However, the War Minister 
finally said, in a voice filled with emotion : "All this must be due to the difference 
in our characters." 



4014 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[60] The Independence of the St^preme Command and State Atfaibs 

From Each Other 

the anguish of cabinets from generation to generation 

The fact that the Supreme Command and State Affairs are independent of 
each other has been a matter of anguish for cabinets from generation to 
generation. 

During the present Japanese-American negotiations, too, the government on 
the one hand was conducting these negotiations with all its powers, but the 
military was vigorously making preparations in case the negotiations should be 
broken off : Moreover, as to what those preparations were, we did not know 
at all, and it was not possible to have them go along step by step with diplomacy. 
Since the military vigorously went about moving ships, mobilizing troops, etc., 
and these things were discovered by the United States, the United States would 
question the sincerity of our diplomacy, so that we were frequently embarrassed 
because the relationship between diplomacy and military matters was not smooth. 

In the pressing atmosphere since September last year, when we were either 
to have war with the United States or not. Prince Higashikuni, who was one 
of the supporters of prudence, used to say that in order to effect a break in this 
situation there was no other way but for the Emperor to stand firm. But it is 
said that the Emperor — and this is something that he also said to me — said a 
number of times to Prince Higashikuni too, that he was having a hard time of 
it because of the military. On such occasions the Prince said to the Emperor 
that it wouldn't do for him to say things that a critic might say, but if he were 
to feel that anything was improper he should say so. 

The fact that the Emperor practically never expressed his opinions, so rarely 
that one would think he was on the reserved side, was due, I think, to Prince 
Saionji, Count Makino, and others, who, thinking of the operations of a constitu- 
tion in the English style, said that the Emperor, as far as possible, ought not 
to take the initiative and interfere in matters aside from stating three items 
at the time of issuing a command to form a new Cabinet, namely, respect fo;* 
the constitution, not being unreasonable in diplomacy, and not bringing about 
sudden and great changes in the financial world. 

But the Japanese constitution is built on a framework of direct rule by the 
Emperor, and is fundamentally different from the English constitution. Espe- 
cially in reference to the problem of the authority of the Supreme Command, 
the [61] government has no power at all of raising its voice, and the only 
person who may restrain both the government and the Supreme Command is the 
Emperor. And yet, the fact that the Emperor is on the passive side, acting in the 
English style, gives rise to numerous difficulties in wartime, although it may 
be all right in peace. In the Japanese-American .negotiations, I bitterly felt 
the fact that it could not be settled simply by the urgings and suggestions given, 
in the English style, by the Emperor. 

To give one or two examples of our experience with the relationship between 
the Supreme Command and State Affairs, what was submittefl at the meeting 
of the Cabinet at the time of the start of the China Incident was as follows: 
the despatching of a division or so for the purpose of protecting Japanese resi- 
dents over there was first proposed by the Minister of War, Sugiyama, and this 
was decided upon ; but as to where those troops would go and as to what was 
to be done with them afterwards, the government did not know' these things 
at all. At the time of the outbreak of the China Incident too, the dispatching 
of troops solely under the pretext of protecting Japanese residents was pro- 
posed at the meeting of the Cabinet, but as to what would happen to them after- 
wards, and what the intentions were as to their use, the situation was such that 
we did not know these things at all. At the time of a special session of the Diet, 
Otani, the Minister of Overseas Affairs, received ray understanding, and after 
discussing the matter with the other Cabinet members too. directed his words to 
Sugiyama, the War Minister at a Cabinet meeting in the Diet Building and asked 
for an explanation of the following: that, in spite of the war situation expanding 
more and more ; the members of the Cabinet knew nothing at all of the future ; 
if nothing was done to keep it within certain bounds, then he was afraid that 
Japan would not be able to come out of it. But before Sugiyama, the War 
Minister, changed color and turning to Yonai, the Navy Minister, said fiercely, 
"What's the matter? Can't you see?" The Navy Minister Yonai. looked startled, 
and at this point, being the sort of person he is, said, "Is that so?" and withdrew 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4015 

from further talk. However, this was enough finally to get a hint of the general 
situation. That there were talks between the Army and Navy can be seen from 
this, but as a matter of course they said nothing about these matters to the 
members of the Cabinet nor to the Premier. Among the Cabinet members there 
were those who afterwards protested as follows, "To call a Cabinet meeting 
'this sort of place', what does he mean by that?" but there was nothing that 
could be done about it, and nothing further was said or done. 

After that Cabinet meeting, during an audience with the Emperor, I told 
him what the situation in the Cabinet meetings was, and expressed my belief 
that although there were [62] among the members of the Cabinet those 
who came from the various political parties, etc., the Premier, the Foreign 
Minister, and the Finance Minister at least ought to be given a general idea of 
things; but the Emperior said that he would like to have time to think about 
this matter. At the next audience I was told that there was an agreement 
between the Army and the Navy that the operations would stop between the 
Paoting and the Yingting Rivers, but that this information should go only to 
the Premier and the Foreign Minister. 

After this, although Paoting was taken, the war situation expanded more 
and more, and when I questioned the Emperor about this a second time he said 
something to the effect that they had thought that they would stop things at 
about that point, but it was the kind of situation which I would not understand. 

After the Cabinet meeting at which we determined to send to Shanghai, I 
asked Sugiyama, the War Minister, whether he was going as far as Nanking 
or thereabouts, and he said that he would not possibly go to Nanking. 

At the time of the departure of General Matsui, the Supreme Commander 
in -the Shanghai area, from Tokyo Station, he persistently told Sugiyama, the 
War Minister, to bring things about so that the Army would go as far as 
Nanking, and since the general had also told me the same thing, I asked the 
War Minister about it on the way home. He replied that although General 
Matsui spoke as he did, the Army would not possibly go as far as Nanking. 

However, it soon came to pass that the Army had gone as far as Hankow, 
not to mention Nanking. How to attack Nanking concerns the military opera- 
tions of the Army, and is not something that concerns the government, but 
unless the government knows in general about how far the Army is going, it 
stands to reason that it can make no move in diplomacy. Both in the case of 
the attacks on Nanking and Hankow, and in the spreading of the great military 
operations in North China, the China Incident has in all respects proceeded 
in this manner. If, from the beginning, the Army had had a far-reaching plan 
and had kept it a secret because of the demands of strategy, it would still have 
been embarrassing to the government, but there would have been something 
understandable about it. However, just as it had appeared in the conversation 
between Matsui and Sugiyama there was, as a matter of fact no great and firm 
plan. The situation was such that they were pushed on by developments and 
went on, gradually extending themselves. Herein lies the dangerous nature of 
[63] the China Incident. From the point of view of the relationship between 
State Affairs and the Supreme Command, among those matters that are dan- 
gerous is the point that things do not completely reach to the lower ranks of 
the Supreme Command. At the Five Ministers' Meeting that was convened after 
the great renovation of the first Konoye Cabinet, we took up, from the point 
of view of preserving international peace with Britain and America, each of 
300 hostile incidents occurring between Japanese and Americans and between 
Japanese and Englishmen during the one-year period after the outbreak of the 
China Incident. But when we informed the Army Headquarters on the spot 
concerning their disposition, they acknowledge<l it but did not bring anything 
into actuality. And although we told them again in September or thereabouts, 
it was the same. After that, when a year and a half had passed and I examined 
the matter during the time of the second Konoye Cabinet. I could not but be 
amaaed to find that just as before, not even one of the so-callod outstanding 
questions had been settled. If one were to speak of egregious cases, the one 
where the Army was to remove ropes hung at railroad stations to prohibit the 
entering of foreigners had not been settled. 

Recently Premier Tojo spoke to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Kido, 
and sympathetically that, now that he had become Premier, he understood for 
the first time how difficult it was for the previous Premiers to do things, and 
that he himself would to the very end proceed with a duplication of posts; to 
this I understand the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Kido, replied that that 



4016 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was not the first time that someone had said this, that it had been exactly the 
same from the time of the first Konoye Cabinet, and that, late though it may be, 
to have the Army realize this point was fine. 

Again, when General Abe came to see me to express his greetings on taking 
the office of president of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, he said that 
at first he declined Premier Tojo's invitation to accept office, whereupon Piemier 
Tojo said that if he would not take the office he himself (Tojo) would have 
to do so, but if this were done, he w<»uld have to resign from active service 
and thus would not be able to keep this added portfolio of War Minister. It 
was thus that Ganeral Abe finally accepted the position. 

Whether it be the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Kido, or General Abe, they 
know from long experience that unless the same man is both War Minister and 
Premier, there can be no adjustment between diplomacy and military affairs. 
So we may believe that both were of the same opinion as Premier Tojo, and 
sympathized with his words. Even if Premier Tojo were to quit, someone would 
have to become the Minister of War, and his adding the post of Premier is 
something that will probably continue for a time. 

[6^] AMERICA GIVES VP NKGOTIATIONS BECAUSE OF THE CHANGE OF CABINETS 

Ambassador Nomura returned to Japan in August. Soon afterward he visited 
me at my villa in Karuizawa with Ambassador Kurusu. I heard about the 
American situation from both Ambassadors. Because the Konoye Cabinet had 
resigned, and the Tojo Cabinet taken its place, America had concluded that 
there was no hope whatever for the success of the Japanese-American negotiations. 

When Ambassador Nomura met President Roosevelt at the beginning of No- 
vember, the President said that he had heard from reliable sources that Japan 
had finally decided upon war. The Ambassador denied this, but the President 
did not believe him. Also, Secretary Hull went so far as to say to Ambassador 
Nomura that he expected nothing whatever from Ambassador Kurusu's coming. 
It seemed that America had already given up hope for the negotiations. 

The resignation en masse of the Konoye Cabinet gave a considerable shock to 
America. Admiral Turner, Chief of Naval Operations, and a close friend of 
Ambassador Nomura — he was captain of the ship which brought back Ambas- 
sador Saito's remains to Japan — visited Ambassador Nomura. At that time 
he said that he supposed that the reason for that resignation of the Konoye 
Cabinet was due to the fact that Premier Konoye considered the success of the 
Japanese-American negotiations to be hopeless, inasmach as the President had 
refused the meeting which the Premier had proposed. However, the President 
had not refused flatly ; there were merely two or three points which he wished 
to clear up. If these points had been clarified, he would have been more than 
willing to see him. It had been decided to send a personal message to that effect 
from the President to His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Japan, and it was 
understood that steps already had been taken. Two or three days later, the 
Admiral again visited the Ambassador and told him that the decision referred 
and told him that the decision referred to on his previous visit had been can- 
celled, since opinions had arisen within the American Government that such a 
procedure would constitute an interference with internal affairs. 

[65] APPENDICES 

1. Proposal for Japanese-American Understanding — (American) (Omitted. 
Ensrlish original available) 

2. Proposal for J-ipanese-American Understanding — (Japanese) 

3. Outline of the Policy of the Imperial Government in View of Present Develop- 
ments 

4. American Counter Proposal 

5. Plans for the Prosecution of the Policy of the Imperial Government 

6. Proposal for Arriving at an Understanding for the Adjustment of Japanese- 
American Diplomatic Relations 

7. American Memorandum of October 2 (Omitted. English original available) 
8 Resir'nation of Premier Konoye at the Time of the Resignation of the Third 

Konoye Cabinet 

9. Details of the Cabinet Resignation and the Progress of Japanese-American 
Diplomatic Negotiations under the Direction of the Council of Senior Statesmen 
following the Resignation of the Third Konoye Cabinet 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4017 

[66] APPENDIX 1 

1. Proposal for Japanese-American Understanding — (American) (Omitted 
English Original Available) 

[67] APPENDIX II 

Proposal for Japanese-American Understanding 

(TN. OflScial English Translation available in the State Department. An In- 
formal Translation follows:) 

The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States of Ameri- 
ca accept joint responsibility in drafting a general agreement for the purpose 
of restoring the traditional friendly relations between the two countries. No 
attempt will be made to enter into a discussion of the reasons for the recent 
detrioration of diplomatic relations. The purpose of these negotiations is to pre- 
vent the recurrence of incidents which tend to destroy the friendly relations be- 
tween the peoples of the two countries or, in case unfortunate incidents do occur, 
to check the I'everberations of the same. 

It is the purpose of the two countries to work together for the establishment of 
peace in the Pacific based on the principles of morality and, by securing a deep 
and friendly understanding on mutual problems, to bring to an end to the sad 
turmoil which threatens to wipe out civilization. If this is impossible, it is the 
sincere purpose of the two countries to at least prevent the present struggle from 
spreading. 

In view of the fact that the above-mentioned ideals must be carried out reso- 
lutely and speedily, the two Nations propose to draw up a general agreement based 
on the principles of morality and embodying measures for the attainment of im- 
mediate ends. 

The present understanding covers only pressing problems and all related de- 
tailed considerations will be left for a later conference to work out. The two 
governments believe that a clarification of the attitudes and an adjustment of the 
matters covered in the following list will greatly contribute to improving rela- 
tions : 

1. International and national ideals embraced by America and Japan. 

2. The attitudes of the two countries toward the European War. 

3. The relutionsiiip of the two countries to the China Incident. 

4. Commerce between the two countries. 

5. Economic activities of the two countries in the Southwest Pacific. 

6. Policies of the two countries regarding political stability in the Pacific. 

[6'8] The following understandings have been reached on these above- 
mentioned matters. 

1. Internatlonul and National Ideals Embraced by America and Japan: The 
two countries agree to respect each other's positions as equal and independent 
neighboring Pacific powers and declare their intention to bring about a new era 
of trust and co-operation based on mutual respect and a determination to bring 
about a lasting i)eace. 

The two countries declare that all nations and all races form a universal family 
whose members should enjoy equality of opportunity, that their mutual interests 
and spiritual and material welfare should be furthered by peaceful means, and 
that the preservation of these blessings shall be the responsibility of all. They 
further declare that it has ever been their purpose to prevent the oppression of 
backward peoples. 

The two countries declare that they shall mutually assist each other in pre- 
serving their traditional ideals and the social orders and moral principles upon 
which the lives of their respective peoples are based. They are also determined 
to prevent the influx of foreign ideas that would break up the present order. 

2. The Attitudes of the Two Countries Touxtrd the European War: It is the 
purpose of the Japanese and American Governments to cooperate in bringing 
about a world peace, to prevent the spread of the European War and to restore 
peace to the warring countries. 

The Japanese Government declares that the Axis Pact is a defensive agree- 
ment and aims to prevent the entrance of any more nations into the European 
conflict. The Japanese Government further declares its intention to furnish 
military aid in pursuance of its responsibility under the Tri-Partite Pact, in 
case the situation outlined in Article 3 develoi)s. 



4018 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The American Government declares that it has no intention of taking sides in 
the European conflict either now or in the future. It also declares its antipathy 
toward war and states that it will take no part in the European conflict either 
now or in the future unless the welfare and saiety of the nation itself are at stake. 

3. The Relationship of the Two Countries to the China Incident: The American 
President understands the three principles of the Konoye Statement and those em- 
bodied in Japan's Treaty with Nanking and the Japan-Manchuria-China Joint 
Declaration which are based on those principles. He also has confidence in the 
good-neighbor policy of the Japanese Government and will immediately take 
steps to urge Chiang-Kai Shek's Government to make peace wtih Japan. 

[69] In the event that the Chiang Regime accepts the advice of the Ameri- 
can President, the Japanese Government will immediately take up peace negotia- 
tions with the United Government of China or with the various elements that 
will go to make up that Government. 

After this agreement has been drawn up and ratified, the Japanese and Ameri- 
can Governments will take mutual steps to guarantee the flow of necessary raw 
materials. Furthermore, both Governments will take suitable steps to restore the 
normal trade relations that existed while the Japanese-American Commercial Pact 
was in force. Whenever it is desired to make a new commercial agreement, con- 
versations will be opened and study will be given to drawing up such a treaty 
following the usual precedents. 

5. Economic Activities of the Two Countries in the Southwest Pacific: In view 
of the fact that Japan has declared that it is her policy to expand her interests 
In the Southwest Pacific by peaceful means, America will co-operate in making 
it possible for Japan to secure the raw materials which it needs from those 
areas such as oil, rubber, tin and nickel. 

6. Policies of the Two Countries regarding Political StahiUtp in the Pacific: 

A. Japan and America will jointlv guarantee the permanent neutrality of 
the Philippines with the understanding that Japanese nationals in the Islan(fe 
will not sulTer discriminatory treatment. 

B. Friendly consideration will be given to the matter of Japanese immigration 
to the United States and Japanese nationals shall be accorded treatment similar 
to that accorded to the nationals of other nations. 

Addendum: It is understood that this Agreement shall be embodied in secret 
memoranda. Mutual exchange of views shall precede any decision to announce 
the contents of this Agreement and the time of such announcement. 

[70] APPENDIX III 

An Outline of the Policy of the Imperial Government in View of Pbeseint 

De:velopments 

(Decision reached at the Conference held in the Imperial Presence on July 2) 

1. P<HJOY 

1. The Imperial Government is determined to follow a policy which will 
result in the establishment of the Greater Bast Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and 
world peace, no matter what international developments take place. 

2. The Imperial Government will continue its effort to effect a settlement 
of the China Incident and seek to establish a solid basis for the . security and 
preservation of the nation. This will involve an advance into the Southern 
Regions and, depending on future developments, a settlement of the Soviet 
Question as well. 

3. The Imperial Government will carry out the above program no matter 
what obstacles may be encountered. 

n. SUMMARY 

1. Steps will be taken to bring pressure on the Chiang Regime from the 
Southern approaches in order to bring about its surrender. Whenever de- 
manded by future developments the rights of a belligerent will be resorted to 
against Chungking and hostile concessions taken over. 

2. In order to guarantee national security and preservation, the Imperial 
Government will continue all necessary diplomatic negotiations with reference 
to the southern regions and also carry out various other plans as may be neces- 
sary. In case the diplomatic negotiations break down, preparations for a 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4019 

war with England and America will also be carried forward. First of all, 
the plans which have been laid with reference to French Indo-China and Thai 
will be prosecuted, with a view to consolidating our position in the southern 
territories. 

In carrying out the plans outlined in the foregoing article, we will not be 
deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war with England and 
America. 

3. Our attitude with reference to the German-Soviet War will be based on the 
spirit of the Tri-Partite Pact. However, we will not enter the contlict for 
some time but will steadily proceed with military preparations against the 
Soviet and decide our final attitude independently. At the same time, we will 
continue carefully correlated activities in the diplomatic field. 

[71] In case the German-Soviet War should develop to our advantage, 
we will make use of our military strength, settle the Soviet question and 
guarantee the safety of our northern borders. 

(Pencilled Note: On this occasion the Army and Foreign Minister Matsuoka 
took a strong attitude toward the Soviet Union, and the Army began concen- 
trating its armed forces in Manchoukuo. This resolution was drawn up to 
oft'-set the policies of the Army and the Foreign Minister.) 

4. In carrying out the preceding article all plans, especially the use of armed 
forces, will be carried out in such a way as to place no serious obstacles in 
the path of our basic military preparations for a war with England and 
America. 

5. In case all diplomatic means fail to prevent the entrance of America 
into the European War, we will proceed in harmony with our obligations under 
the Tri-Partite Pact. However, with reference to the time and method of 
employing our armed forces we will take independent action. 

6. We will immediately turn our attention to placing the nation on a war 
basis and will take special measures to strengthen the defenses of the nation. 

7. Concrete plans covering this program will be drawn up separately. 

[72] APPENDIX IV 

The Amebioan Counter Pboposal 

(TN: The original document is available in the State Department. An informal 
translation of the Japanese copy follows. ) 

The United States of America and the Japanese Government share respon- 
sibility in drawing up a joint declaration and a general agreement aiming at 
the restoration of their traditional friendly relations. 

No effort will be made to enter into a discussion of the special reasons for the 
recent deterioration of diplomatic relations, but it is the sincere desire of both 
countries to prevent the recurrence of anything which would cause a further 
deterioration in friendly relations or, in case unexi)ected and unfortunate events 
do occur, to check the reverberations of the same. It is the purpose of the United 
States and Japan to establish a lasting peace in the Pacific and, by effecting a 
friendly mutual understanding, to promote the interests of world peace. Fur- 
thermore, if it is impossible to bring to a speedy end the present war which could 
easily result in the destruction of civilization, the two countries will cooperate 
in preventing the spreading of that conflagration. 

It is felt that prolonged discussions would be fruitless and that they are out 
of place at a time which demands speedy and resolute action. Therefore, the 
two countries are resolved to effect a general understanding based on the prin- 
ciples of morality and to take certain measures to guide their actions in the 
future. 

The two governments are agreed that only important questions demanding 
emergency action should be included in the agreement, leaving related and minor 
matters to be settled by a future conference. 

The two governments acknowledge that a clarification of the attitudes and 
problems listed below will bring about a friendly reconciliation. 

1. American and Japanese ideals with reference to international relations 
and the nature of the state. 

2. The attitudes of the two countries toward the European War. 

3. Plans for the establishment of peace between Japan and China. 

4. Commerce between the two countries. 

6. The economic activities of the two countries in the Pacific area. 



4020 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

6. Policies of tlie two countries regarding the political stability of the Pacific 
area. 
[7^] 7. The neutrality of the Philippine Islands. 

Therefore, the Governments of the United States and Japan issue the following 
statements concerning their policies and mutual understandings : 

1. American and Japanese Ideals with Reference to International Rela- 
tions and the Nature of the State: 

The two countries aflBrm that it is iheir policy to work for the estab'ish- 
ment of permanent peace and to bring about a new era characterized by 
mutual trust between their two peoples. They declare that it is their present 
and traditional belief that all nations and all peoples form one great family 
characterized by the ideals of harmony, justice and equity. They acknowl- 
edge that the relations of nations and peoples should be built up and improved 
by peaceful means, that their spiritual and material welfare should be based 
on a consideration of mutual interests, and that the enjoyment of equal 
privileges should be based on a mutual sharing of responsibility. Each 
nation must take care not to endanger the welfare of others and this is the 
surest way of preserving its own welfare. Furthermore, the two Govern- 
ments will work together to prevent the oppression and exploitation of other 
peoples. 

The two Governments acknowledge their responsibility in safeguarding 
the traditional ideals, the social orders and the basic and moral principles 
underlying the national lives of each other's peoples and in preventing the 
infl X of any disturbing ideologies. 

2. The Attitudes of the Two Countries towards the European War : 

The Japanese Government declares that the purpose of the Tri-Partite 
Pact is and always has been a defensive one. The said Treaty aims to pre- 
vent the spreading of the European War by the unprovoked entrance of 
additional powers into the struggle. 

The United States Government declares that its present and future policy 
toward the European War is to avoid participating in it unless its own 
safety is endangered. 

Note: This article embodies a tentative proposal for a change in the 
corresponding article in the American proposal of May 31, 1941. 

3. Plans for the Establishment of Peace between Japan and China : 
Inasmuch as the Japanese Government has informed the American Govern- 
ment concerning the basic conditions of her proposal for a S'no-Japanese 
peace based on a good-neighbor policy and respect for [7^] each 
other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as embodied in the Konoye prin- 
ciples, the American President will propose to the Government of China that 
the latter enter into negotiations with Japan looking toward the cessation 
of hostilities and the restoration of a mutually advantageous peace. 

Note: The problem of joint action against the inroads of communism and 
t^e matter of Sino-Japanese economic coopera*^ion, which are covered in the 
preceding paragraph, can be changed, if desired, in later negotiations. The 
matter of stationing Japanese troops on Chinese territory is a part of the 
communist problem). Wf> believe that any proposals, for the revision of 
this paragraph and any additional proposals in regard to these matters should 
be embodied in one draft and that the entire resulting proposal should be 
given unified consideration to the satisfaction of all concerned. 

4 Commerce between the Two Countries : 

With the formal ratification of this undei-standing. America and Japan 
agree to furnish each other with needed raw materials. They also agree to 
restore the normal con)mercial relations wh'ch existed under the former 
Japanese-American Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. In case the two 
countries desire to draw up a new commercial treaty, n^otiations will be 
entered upon immediately to draw up the same in harmony with the usual 
precedents. 

5. The Economic Activities of the Two Countries in the Pacific Area : 

Japan and America's activities in the Pacific area shall be carried on by 
I)eaceful means, and all countries shall be guaranteed equal commercial oppor- 
tunities. Based on this agreement, the Japanese and American Governments 
will cooperate in assisting one another in securing the natural resources, such 
as oil. rubber, tin and nickel, which are necessary to guarantee the safety 
and development of their national economics. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4021 

6. Policies of the Two Countries Regarding the Political Stability of the 
Pacific Area : 

Both governments agree that the fundamental principle underlying this 
understanding is a guarantee of peace in the Pacific area. They will exert 
all possible efforts to cooperate in the preservation of that peace and declare 
that they have no territorial ambitions in the said area. 

7. The Neutrality of the Philippine Islands : 

The Japanese Government declares that it is prepared to enter into nego- 
tiations to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines [75] whenever 
the American Government decides to grant independence to that nation. 

The Oral Statement 

The Secretary of State appreciates the sincere efforts of the Japanese Am- 
bassador and his associates in working for a mutual understanding and the estab- 
lishment of peace in the Pacific. The Secretary also appreciates the straight- 
forward attitude of these officials in recent conversations. 

The American Government shares the earnest desire of the Japanse Ambassador 
that Japanese-American relations be speedily improved so that peace may be 
restored to the Pacific area. The Secretary of State himself shares the same 
spirit and has given careful consideration to the various viewpoints embodied 
in the Japanese proposal. The Secretary of Sl^ate has no reason to doubt that 
many of Japan's leaders share the viewpoint of the Ambassador and his asso- 
ciates and support them in pressing forward to the attainment of our high pur- 
poses. Unfortunately, however, among the powerful leaders of Japan are some 
who have committed themselves to follow the path of Nazi Germany and its 
policy of aggression. These people can think of no other possible understanding 
with America than that they must join on Hitler's side in the event that America's 
considerations of self-defense force her into the European War. Well-authenti- 
cated reports to this effect have been flowing to this Government from many dif- 
ferent countries and from the pens of many who for many years have been very 
friendly to Japan. 

The tone of many recent unnecessary declarations by Japanese spokesman 
concerning Japan's plans and promises under the Tri-Partite Pact unmistakably 
reveal this attitude. As long as those occupying responsible positions keep up 
this attitude and persist in directing Japan's public opinion in this direction, any 
hopes for the acceptance of the proposals now under consideration or the at- 
tainment of practical results from these discussions are inevitably doomed to 
disillusionment. 

Another source of suspicion in the Japanese proposals is the suggestion which 
calls for the stationing of troops in Inner Mongolia and North China for the osten- 
sible purpose of cooperating with China in the suppression of communism. 

Very careful consideration has been given this matter. While it is not desired 
to enter into a discussion of the actual nature of this problem, as has often 
been stated to the Japanese Ambasador and his associates, the United States 
cannot agree to any plan which runs counter to the principle's of freedom which 
have always been supported by the American Government. While it ife admitted 
that careful consideration would naturally have to [76] have to be given 

before agreeing to any concessions which might adversely affect this nation, in 
this case the freedom of a third power is involved and this government will, 
therefore, have to give very special consideration to the problem. Th'^refore, 
the Secretary of State has unfortunately been driven to the conclusion that the 
United States Government must ask the Japanese Government for a statement 
clearer than any heretofore ever delivered which will show that the said Gov- 
ernment is impelled by a desire to follow the ways of peace, as this forms the 
basic principle which should underlie the understanding we are attempting to 
arrive at. This government earnestly desires that the Japanese Government 
will make a clear statement clarifying its attitude on this point. 

Note: This is an informal, tentative and unbinding statement delivered to 
the Japanese Ambassador on May 31 in an endeavor to bring these negotiations 
in line with the present situation. On June 21 a revised proposal was handed 
to the Japanese Ambassador. 



4022 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

APPENDIX V 

[77] Plans fob the Pbosecution of the Policy of the Impebial 

Government 

(Agenda for a Council in the Imperial Presence) 

In view of the Increasingly critical situation, especially the aggressive plans 
being carrietl out by America, England, Holland and other countries, the situa- 
tion In Soviet Russia and the Empire's latent potentialities, the Japanese Gov- 
ernment will proceed as follows In carrying out its plans for the southern terri- 
tories as laid In "An Ojtline of the Policy of the Imperial Government in View 
of Present Developments". 

1. Determined not to be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war 
with America (and England and Holland) In order to secure our national exist- 
ence, we will proceed with war preparations so that they be completed approxi- 
mately toward the end of October. 

2. At the same time, we will endeavor by every possible diplomatic means to 
have our demands agreed to by America and England. Japan's minimum de- 
mands in these negotiations with America (and England), together with the 
Empire's maximum concessions are embodied in the attached document. 

3. If by the early part of O tober there Is no reasonable hope of having our 
demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations mentioned above, we will 
immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America (and 
England and Holland). 

Policies with reference to countries other than those in the southern terri- 
tories will be carried out in harmony with the plans already laid. Special effort 
will be made to prevent America and Soviet Russia from forming a united front 
against Japan. 

Annex Document 

.\ list of .iapan'8 minimum demands and her maximum concessions in her 

NFXJOTIATIDNS with AMEKICA and ENGLAND 

I. Japan's Minimum Demands in her Negotiations tenth America {and Eng- 
land). 

1. America and England shall not intervene in or obstruct a settlement by 
Japan of the China incident. 

(a) They will not Interfere with Japan's plan to settle the China Incident in 
harmony with the S'no-Japanese Basic Agreement and the Japan-Chlna-Man- 
choukuo Tri Partite Declaration. 

(b) America and England will close the Burma Route and offer the Chiang 
Regime neither military, jwlltlcal nor economic assistance. 

[78] Note: The above do not run counter to Japan's previous declarations 
in the "N" plan for the settlement of the China Incident. In particular, the plan 
embodied in the new Sino-Japanese Agreement for the stationing of Japanese 
troops In the specified areas will be rigidly adhered to. However, the withdrawal 
of troops other than those mentioned above may be guaranteed in principle upon 
the settlement of the China Incident. 

Commercial operations In China on the part of America and England may also 
be guaranteed, in so far as they are purely commercial. 

2. America and England will take no action in the Far East which offers a 
threat to the defense of the Empire. 

(a) America and England will not establish military bases in Thai, the Nether- 
lands East Indies, China or Far Eastern Soviet Russia. 

(b) Their Far Eastern military forces will not be Increased over their present 
strength. 

Note: Any demands for the liquidation of Japan's special relations with French 
Indo-Chlna based on the Japanese-French Agreement will not be considered. 

3. America and England will cooperate with Japan in her attempt to obtain 
needed raw materials. 

(a) America and England will restore trade relations with Japan and furnish 
her with the raw materials she needs from the British and American territories 
in the Southwest Pacific. 

(b) America and England will assist Japan to establish close economic rela- 
tions with Thai and the Netherlands East Indies. 

II. Maximum Concessions by Japan. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4023 

It is first understood that our minimum demands as listed under I above will 
be agreed to. 

1. Japan will not use French Indo-China as a base for operations against any 
neighboi-ing countries with the exception of China. 

Note: In case any questions are asked concerning Japan's attitude towards 
Soviet Russia, the answer is to be that as long as Soviet Russia fatihfully carries 
out the Neutrality Pact and does not violate the spirit of the agreement by, for 
instance, threatening Japan or Manchuria, Japan will not take any military 
action. 

2. Japan is prepared to withdraw her troops from French-Indo-China as soon 
as a just peace is established in the Far East. 

3. Japan is prepared to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippine Islands. 

[79] APPENDIX VI 

A Pboposai fob Areiving at an Undeestanding for the Adjustment of 
Japanese-American Diplomatic Relations 

(TN: Official translation available in State Department) 

The American and Japanese Governments accept joint responsibility for initiat- 
ing negotiations looking toward a general agreement embodying a joint state- 
ment on Japanese-American understanding aiming at the restoration of the tradi- 
tional friendship between the two nations. 

It is believed that it is unnecessary to enter into a discussion of the special 
reasons for the recent deterioration of Japanese-American diplomatic relations. 
It is the sincere desire of both countries to aim at the prevention of any further 
incidents tending to destroy friendly relations or, if any unexpected and unfor- 
tunate events do occur, to check the reverberations of the same. 

The two countries agree to cooperate in bringing about peace in the Pacific, to 
make an effective contribution to the preservation of that peace, to bring about 
friendly relations in order to promote world-wide peace and to bring to an end 
the tragic struggle which now threatens to destroy civilization or at least to pre- 
vent the same from spreading over a wider area. 

A decisive resolution of this kind precludes long and delaying negotiations 
which might only tend to vitiate the same. The two countries desire quickly to 
formulate an understanding and to determine the necessary measures for imple- 
menting the same. 

Only imi)ortant questions requiring emergency action will be covered in this 
agreement while minor related matters will be postponed to a future conference. 

The two countries believe that a clarification of the attitudes and other matters 
listed below will greatly improve their mutual relations. 

1. American and Japanese ideas on international relations and the nature of 
the state. 

2. The attitude of the two countries towards the European War. 

3. Plans for appeasement of the S' no- Japanese problem. 

4. Commerce between the two countries. 

[801 5- Economic questions in the Southwest Pacific Area. 
6. PoUcy for the political stability of the Pacific area. Therefore, the two 
countries have agreed to make the following declarations concerning their plans 
for mutual understandings. 

1. American and Japanese Ideas on International Relations and the 
Nature of the State : 

The two countries declare that it is their purpose to establish a lasting 
peace and to set up a new era characterized by cooperation and mutual trust 

The two countries further declare that it is and ever has been their firm 
conviction that all nations and all peoples should form one great family 
based on the ideals of justice, equity and harmonious living. Tbey acknowl- 
edge that this comity of nations and peoples should be built up by peaceful 
means, that their spiritual and material welfare should be based on a con- 
sideration of mutual interests, and that the enjoyment of equal privileges 
should be based on a sharing of responsibility. Each nation must take care 
not to endanger the welfare of others and this is the surest way of preserv- 
hlg its own welfare. Furthermore, the two governments acknowledge their 
responsibility to prevent the oppression and exploitation of other peoples. 

The two governments acknowledge their responsibility for safeguarding 
the traditional ideals, the social order, and the basic and moral principles 



4024 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

underlying the national lives of each other's i)eoples In preventing the influx 
of anv disturbing ideas or ideologies. 

2. The Attitude of the Two Sountries Towards the European War : 

The two countries declare that it is their purpose to bring about peace in 
the world and that they are determined to work together in bringing an end 
to the present conflict whenever a suitrble occasion arises. Until the resto- 
ration of world peace, the two countries are determined to act only in self- 
defense. With reference to her interpretation of and her obligations in the 
European War under the Tri-Partite Pact, Japan reserves freedom of action 
in case America should join that conflict. 

3. Plans for a Peaceful Settlement of the Sno-Japanese Problem: 

The two governments recognize that brining a peaceful end to the China 
Incident will prove to be a larpe contribution to the interests of world peace 
and they are therefore determined to bring an early end to that conflict. 

[81] America acknowledges Japan's efforts and her sincerity in en- 
deavoring to settle the China Incident and in bringing about an early cessa- 
tion of hostilities and the restoration of peace. America will urge China to 
open up peace negotiations with Japan and will place no obstacles in the way 
of any efforts which Japan may make to settle the China Incident. The 
Japanese Government declares that its basic conditions for the settlement 
of the China Incident are those embodied in the Konoye Statement sind in 
the Sino Japanese Agreement which is in harmony therewith. It further 
declares that Sino-Japanese economic cooperation shall be undertakiMi by 
peaceful means, that international trade shall be nondiscriminatory, that 
special rights inherent in geographical proximity will be respected, and that 
the economic activities of Third Powers will not be interfered with pro- 
vided they are ba.sed on the priciple of fairness. 

Note : The basic conditions upon which Slno-Japanese peace is to be based 
are as given in a separate document. These were decided upon at the joint 
conference. 

4. Commerce between the Two Countries : 

The two countries are agreed to take immediate steps for the restoration 
of normal trade relations between them. They guarantee that their mutual 
freezing orders will be cancelled and they they will assist each other in 
furnishing necessary raw materials. 

5. Economic Questions in the Southwest Pacific Area : The two countries 
covenant to carry on their economic activities in the Southwest Pacific by 
peaceful means alone. They further guarantee that the principle of non- 
discrimination shall characterize their international trade. The two coun- 
tries are agreed to cooperate in permitting all reasonable latitude in com- 
mercial intercourse and international investments in order to make it possible 
for each nation to secure those raw materials and those articles which are 
necessary for it to preserve and build up its economic life. 

They are agreed to cooperate in a distribution of oil, rubbber, nickel, tin 
and other special raw materials and special products without discriminating 
against anyone and to make the necessary agreements with the countries 
concerned in order to carry out this principle. 

6. Policy for the Political Stability of the Pacific Area : 

The two countries realize the vital importance of bringing about the im- 
mediate stabilization of the situation in the Pacific area and covenant to 
take no steps which would tend to threaten that stability. The Japanese 
Government agrees not to use its troops stationed in French-Indo China for 
military operations against neighboring countries ((^hina excluded) and, 
further, to withdraw its troops from French-Indo China as soon as peace is 
restored in the Pacific area. 

[82] The United States Government agrees to cut down its military 
establishments in the Southwest Pacific. The two countries agee to respect 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thai and the Netherlands East 
Indies. Furthermore, they declare their readiness to make an agreement 
guaranteeing the neutrality of the Philippines when independence is granted 
that nation. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4025 

[83 J ANNEXED DOCUMENT 

The Fundamental Conditions on Which Sino Japanese Peace Is To Be Based 

1. Good Neighbor Policy. 

2. Respect for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity. 

3. Sino-Japanese Defensive Cooperation. 

This Sino-Japanese cooperation includes action against communism and any 
other movements which tend to disrupt the present order and mutual efforts 
to preserve the peace. 

This envisages the stationing of Japanese troops and Japanese warships 
for a limited time in stated areas in harmony with past agreements and 
precedents. 

4. Withdrawal of Troops. 

All troops which have been sent to China in connection with the China Incident 
will be withdrawn except those mentioned in the preceding article. 

5. Economic Agreeement. 

a. A Sino-Japanese economic agreement will be drawn up covering the ex- 
ploitation and utilization of those raw materials necessary in the national defense 
program. 

b. It is understood that the preceding understanding shall not limit the 
economic activities of Third Powers providing they are carried out in harmony 
with the principle of fairness. 

6. A Unification of the Chiang Regime and the Wang Government. 

7. No annexation. 

8. No reparations. 

9. Recognition of Manchoukuo. 

[84] APPENDIX VII 

AMERICAN MEMORANDUM OF OCTOBER 2. (Omitted. English original 
available) 

[85] APPENDIX VIII 

The Resignation of Premier Konoye at the Time of the Resignation of the 

Third Konoye Cabinet 

By Your Majesty's Humble Servant. Fumimaro 

At the time when I was honored for the third time with the totally unexpected 
Imperial order to organize a Cabinet. I felt that it was very urgent for the sake 
of guaranteeing the future progress of the nation to put forth all possibile efforts 
to continue the negotiations with America and bring about a speedy settlement 
. to the China Affair. We have, therefore, exerted ourselves to the utmost in 
conducting successive conversations with the American Government and have 
endeavored to bring about a meeting between the President of the United States 
and myself. Tlie result of these efforts is still pending. Recently, however, 
War Minister Tojo has come to believe that there is absolutely no hope of reach- 
ing an agreement with America by the time we specified, (Namely, the middle or 
latter part of O tober), or, in other words, that we should now decide that "there 
is no reasonable hope to have our demands agreed to" as specified under Section 
III of the "Plans for the Prosecution of the Imperial Program" which was 
drawn up at a council in the Imperial Presence on September 6th. He f'.us 
concludes that the time has arrived for us to make ilp our minds to get ready 
for war against America. However, careful reconsideration of the situation 
leads me to the conclusion that, given time, the possibility of reaching an agree- 
ment with the United States is not hopeless. Tn particular. I believe that even 
the most diffimlt question involved, namely, that of the withdrawal of troops, 
can be settled if we are willing to sacrifice our honor to some extent and agree 
to the formula suggested by America. To plunge into a great war, the issue of 
which is most uncertain, at a time when the China Incident is still unsettled 
would be something which I could not possibly agree to, especially since I have 



79716 0—46 — pt. 20- 



4026 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

painfully felt my grave responsibility for the present state of affairs ever since 
the outbreak of the China Incident. It is vitally necessary now. not only to 
strengthen ourselves for the future but also to set the people's minds at ease, 
that the Cabinet and the Army and Navy cooperate in the closest possible manner 
in bringing to a successful conclusion the negotiations with America. Now is 
the time for us to sacrifice the present for the future and let our people con- 
centrate their entire efforts for the prosperity of the Emperor and the nation. 
Thus I have done my utmost in stating my earnest convictions in an endeavor 
to persuade War Minister Tojo to accept my viewpoint. In response to this, 
the War Minister insisted that although lie greatly appreciated my position 
and sincerity, it was impossible from the standpoint of preserving military morale 
for htm to agree to the withdrawal of troops ; that if we once gave in to America 
that country would become so arrogant that there would be no end of its depreda- 
tions; and that even if we should be able to settle the China Affair now, Sino- 
Japanese relations would again reach a deadlock in a mere two or three years. 
He pointed [86] out that while there are certain weak points in our posi- 
tion America also has its weak points and that we should therefore grasp the 
present opportunity and get ready for war at once. I have had four serious con- 
versations with him on this subject but was unable to change his position. It 
is therefore clear to me that my ideas will not prevail and that I shall be unable 
to carry out my responsibilities as an advisor to the Throne. I realize that this 
is entirely due to my insuflRciency and I feel very humble as I approach the 
Throne. It is with trepidation that I present my request, but I humbly and 
sincerely ask that you relieve me of my present responsibilities. 
October 16, 1941. 

Prince Fumimaro Konoye, 

Prime Minister. 

[87] APPENDIX IX 

The Details of the Cabinet Resignation and the Progress of Japan-American 
DiPi>0MATic Negotiations Under the Direction of the Council of Senior 
Statesmen Following the Resignation of the Third Konoye Cabinet 

I. Differences between the Viewpoint of the Government and the Army. 

1. Concerning the "Decisions Reached at the Council in the Imperial Presence: 
"Clau.'^e 3 of the Plans for the Prosecution of the Imperial Program", as decided 
upon at the Council in the Imperial Presence on Septembr 6th, states : "If by 
the early part of October, there is no reasonable hope to have our demands' 
agreed to — we will immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against 
America, England and Holland". The Army taHes the position that the progress 
of the negotiations with America in the early part of October impels us to decide 
that "there is no reasonable hope to have our demands agreed to", as referred 
to in the said article and that, therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that by the 
middle or end of October we "must make up our minds to ready for war". 

The Cabinet contends that not only have the diplomatic negotiations not 
reached a hopeless state, but that in the light of the diplomatic documents which 
we have received from America and many other reports, the American Gov- 
ernment also entertains considerable hope of arriving at a satisfactory agree- 
ment. However, that Government harbors certain misunderstandings and 
suspicious (for example, the Army's gradual intiltration into Northern Indo- 
China in the early part of October, though, of course, this was carried out in 
harmony with definite treaty stipulations) ; is intiueneed by the deliberate mis- 
repre.sentations of certain Third Powers, or is carefully watching the future of 
the international situation, especially of the European War. There are also 
activities on the part of strong anti-Japanese elements in the Far Eastern Sec- 
tions of the State Department, activities which have covered up the true feelings 
of the President and Secretary of State Hull. In view of these facts, we can 
not decide that there is no hope of successful negotiations even with the present 
conditions as suggested by us, if time is allowed for the conduct of the negotia- 
tions. Especially, if we could get our Army authorities to relax their position 
somewhat, namely, with reference to the withdrawal of troops, we believe that 
there is a good possibility of reaching an agreement. 

The Army feels that although the early part of October is the ideal time for 
us to decide on war in harmony with the demands of the Supreme Command, 
it can defer it till the middle of the month, but by all means not later than the 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4027 

latter part of the month. Otherwise, the Army feels itself seriously handicapped 
in the event of war. It, therefore, rigidly adheres to the middle of the month, 
the latter part of October, as the time to decide upon war, should war be de- 
cided upon, and this is a point that must ever be kept in mind. 

[88] 2. The obstacles in the negotiations with America (especially the 
problem of the withdrawal of troops) ; Efiplomatic negotiations are still pro- 
ceeding with America and while the true intentions of that country are not clear 
the following three points may be listed as the major unsolved problems : 

(1) The problem of stationing or withdrawal of troops from China. 

(2) Japan's attitude toward the Tri-Partite Pact. 

(3) The problem of non-discriminatory trade in the Pacific area. 

Among the three, it is clear to all that the outstanding problem is the with- 
drawal of troops. In other words, that problem is really the one problem, the 
negotiations with America. 

A summary of the Army's attitude concerning the withdrawal of troops is as 
follows : 

Our Government's terms for a Sino-Japanese peace, as indicated to America 
are very liberal, inasmuch as*they include the principles of no annexation and 
no reparations. They merely insist on the stationing of troops in certain areas 
for a stipulated period in order to facilitate cooperation with China in preventing 
the inroads of communism and any other movements tending to msrupt the pres- 
ent order. It is evident that these dangers are a threat to the safety of both 
Japan and China and to the welfare and prosperity of the peoples of both coun- 
tries. These measures are also vitally necessary for the economic development 
of the country. It is, of course, understood that all troops not necessary for 
the above purposes will be withdrawn as soon as the China Incident is brought 
to a close. In view of the above, the stationing of troops in China is an abso- 
lutely necessary stipulation. In other words, the Army insists that this point 
is a consideration of first importance and that the stationing of these troops in 
China is, after all, the one and only tangible result of the China Incident. It 
follows that the Army can not agree to any plan which envisages the giving 
up of the right to station troops in China. If our troops' withdrawal from China 
is carried out, the Army will be overcome by a spirit of defeatism and it will be 
impossible to preserve its morale. 

On the other hand, the final position of America on this matter of stationing 
troops is not yet clear. It may be possible if we give time for further negotia- 
tions to have our terms for the China problem agreed to by America. Up to the 
present, the American position in this matters seems to be as follows: 

[89] (1) Japan is to agree in principle to the withdrawal of troops. (The 

matter of stationing troops in China must be decided after this principle has 
been accepted.) It is not clear at the present moment whether America will 
agree to the stationing of troops in China but in the light of the negotiations so 
far conducted, America's position does not seem to be entirely negative in the 
matter. 

(2) America desires to be assured of Japan's sincerity in the matter of the 
withdrawal of troops. For instance, Under-Secretary Welles stated to Min- 
ister Wakasugi in Washington that if Japan was sincere in here decision to with- 
draw the troops, America was willing to give more consideration to the manner 
in which this should be done. 

In the light of the above, the Cabinet's position in regard to the withdrawal of 
troops is as follows : 

(1) Diplomatic negotiations should be continued for a longer period. 

(2) We understand, of course, that the stationing of troops in China is a very 
necessary consideration. However, if the success or failure of the present 
negotiations hangs on this one problem, the Cabinet holds the view that it would 
be better for us to agree to the American formula for the withdrawal of trooi)s 
and yet secure stationing of troops in China for a specified period. 

3. Views in Regard to War Against America: The Army points out that as a 
result of the British and American freezing orders, the import of necessary 
materials (especially oil) has become almost impossible and our shortages will 
become so severe that should America come upon us with impossible demands, we 
shall find ourselves unable to resist even for the sake of defending our very 
existence. Therefore, the Army insists that even though the situation is fraught 
with certain dangers, there is no cause for alarm and that now is the time for 
us to take decisive action if our people stand united in a determination to over- 
come all obstacles, remembering that America as well as Japan has certain 
weaknesses. 



4028 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Army claims that if we propose too liberal terms through American good 
offices and settle the China Incident, Ch^na would learn to despise Japan and we 
would have to punish her again within two or three years. 

I, as the Prime Minister, on the other hand, could not possibly entertain the 
idea of plunging into a great war with all its uncertainties at a time when the 
China Incident is still unsettled. Although, as the result of the freezing orders, 
we are faced with gradually shrinking stores of munitions of war, we believe 
that it is possible to take other means of replenishing our supplies, especially 
with reference to [90] oil. For even if we should capture the Nether- 
lands East Indies, tlie necessary amount of oil could not be obtained within a 
year or two because installations would be destroyed and transportation would 
be difficult. It would be far better for us, instead of going to war, to mobilize 
all our labor and material resources and begin the manufacture of synthetic 
oil. We think it would not be impossible to produce 500,000 tons by the end of 
1943 and 4,000,000 tons during 1944. As a result of our four years of struggle in 
China, our national strength has considerably deteriorated and the morale of 
our people has declined. Would it not be better at this time for us to eat the 
bitter, preserve our as yet undamaged Navy, settle the China Incident and grad- 
ually build up our national strength? 

4. The Attitude of the Navy: The following is a summary of the Navy's 
attitude : 

At the present time, we stand at the parting of the ways where we must make 
up our minds to either carry on diplomatic negotiations to the bitter end or 
declare war. If we decide to follow the path of diplomatic negotiations, we 
mtist make up our minds to give up the idea of declaring war. For us to carry 
on diplomatic negotiations for two or three months and then to declare war 
because we decide that further diplomatic negotiations would be fruitless is an 
impossibility. However the question as to w'^ ether we are going to declare war 
or choose the plan of diplomatic negotiation is one which the Government must 
decide. In other words, the Prime Minister must make the decision as to whet'ier 
we are going to turn to the left or to the right. There are some in Navy circles 
who hold that war should be avoided at all costs and that we should do our 
best to adjust our relations with America through diplomatic negotiations. 
II. The Progress of Diplomatie 'Negotiations with America. 

In the middle of April this year, Secretary of State Hull gave Ambassador 
Nomura a proposal for arriving at a Japanese-American understanding. Secre- 
tary rf S'^ate Hull stated that a clarification of the attitudes and a settlement of 
the problems listed below would greatly contribute to adjusting our relations. 

1. The attitude of both countries toward the European War. 

2. The relationship of the two countries with reference to the China Incident. 

3. Commerce between the two countries. 

4. The policy of both countries with reference to the stability of the Pacific 
area. 

The Secretary presented detailed observations on these matters. 

[91] In the middle of May the Government and the Supreme Command 
held a conference and decided on Japan's answer to the American proposal. 
(Foreign Minister Matsuoka was returning fiom Europe at the end of April 
and this circumstance greatly delaved our fnsw^rK 

In the latter part of June, America sent a further revised proposal. Just at 
that time, at the end of June, the German-Soviet War broke out- and the inter- 
national situation grew very complex. Furthermore, in order to prosecute the 
war on the. Continent, we carried out a peaceful occupation of Southern French 
Indo-China in harmony with our agreement. America, in return, retaliated with 
her freezing order. This resulted in very strained relations between the two 
countries. About the middle of June, but before Ambassador Nomura delivered 
the same, Japan s«^nt her answer to America's proposal of the latter part of 
June, the Second Konoye Cabinet resigned. In the early part of August, the 
Third Konoye Cabinet entered into earnest negotiations to bring about a meeting 
of the American President and Prime Minister Konoye in order to restore cordial 
relations, settle the China problem and discuss the question of world peace. 
Konoye sent a message to the American President the latter part of August. 
On the 6th of S^^ptember, there was held a Council in the Imperial Palace which 
drew up the "Outline of the Plan for the Execution of the Imperial Program". 
Judging by the events occurring just before and lust after that date, it was evi- 
dently the mind of the Council to carry on diplomatic negotiations with a view 
to settling all outstanding problems with America and England and bring an 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4029 

end to the China Incident, and not to resort to war unless there was absolutely 
no possibility of reaching an agreement by these negotiations. 

In the early part of September, we passed on our proposals for the problems 
to be discussed at the meeting of the President and the Prime Minister. On 
September 20th we sent a proposal to America embodying all the past proposals 
of both countries. On October 2nd the American authorities sent their answer 
in the form of a memo. The reception of this memorandum resulted in two 
schools of thought : One felt that America had no sincere intentions of conclud- 
ing an agreement and that it would be fruitless to continue negotiations further. 
The other disagreed, taking the position that the situation was not hopeless and 
that negotiations should be continued although it might be necessary for us to 
modify our demands. 



4030 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

EXHIBIT NO. 174 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. Three repurts from the roniniercial Attache, U. S. Embassy, Tokyo, for 
period September 1 to November 8, 1941. 

2. Four documents coiicerninj^ c-otirdi nation of connnunication facilities in case 
of Far East emergency: (a) Dispatch dated October IS. 1941 from Ambassador 
Winant, London, to State Department; (b) JNlemorandum from Secretary Knox 
for Secretary Hull dated November 8, 1941; (c) Memorandum from Chief of 
Staff for State Department Liaison Officer, dated November 2G, 1941; and (d) 
State Department dispatch #5603 to American Embassy, London, dated De- 
cember 2, 1941. 

3. Four memoranda of conversations between State Department officials and 
British Embassy officials concerning the Far Eastern Situation, dated November 
25, 1940; December 13. 1940; May 27. 1941; and September 23, 1941. 

4. (a) Memorandum dated September 16, 1941 concerning conversations be- 
tween Netherlands Minister Counselor and State Department officials; and (b) 
Dispatch dated November 18, 1941 from Ambassador Biddle through Ambassador 
Winant to State Department concerning Biddle's conversation with Nether- 
lands' official. Both documents refer to U. S. -Japanese conversations. 

5. Memorandum dated September 4, 1941 of conversation between Secretary 
Hull and the Chinese Ambassador concerning U. S. -Japanese relations. 

6. Dispatch dated December 4, 1941 from Ambassador Gauss, Chungking, to 
State Department on the general situation in the Far East. 

7. Dispatch dated December 2. 1941 from V. S. Consul General Foote, Batavia, 
to State Department concerning Japanese activities in Netherlands East Indies, 
and general situation there. 

8. Memorandum dated November 12, 1941 from Leo Pasvolsky to Mr. Ballan- 
tlne, both State Department officials, concerning a proposed economic policy 
which might be proposed to the Japanese. 

9. Memorandum dated December 6, 1941 concerning destruction of Japanese 
codes at their Embassy in Washington, D. C. 

10. Federal Bureau of Investigation letter to State Department concerning 
reported conversation of a Japanese Embassy official on December 1, 1941. 

11. Two memoranda dated November 15, 1941 concerning information reported 
by Mr. Kestwick, a British official, regarding reported scope of Ambassador 
Kurusu's mission to the U. S.. and four other doi'unients on the same subject. 

12. Documents relating to a rumor that the Australian Government had prior 
knowledge of the impending Japanese attack. 

13. Letter dated December 19, 1941 from Owen J. Roberts, Chairman, Roberts 
Connnission to the Secretary of State asking for a statement from him for the 
Roberts Commission record, and the reply of Secretary Hull. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4031 



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f«N9« the ®i&M«y at '?*?Tfeyo 




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mat Iaataro«tloB ^uii» 26, 1JI41, m« IffiB^SV*®^) ^J<!^ 

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FOR PIKIOP ra OM 3SPTB3t8R 1 > fs 



POLICY AKO ACrfiEEM N 
CL'C 9 1941 



mmfmmmmk 

DEC -8 1941 







ion of 

Pmi jL-v 



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Di^wtMrtafSM*^ 



€6' 



Pf»om Comaarolal Attaotie 



Frank 8. WilllAae 



Amerloan Smbae*y, fokyo Date of Completions Sept*. 17, 1941 

Date of Mailings Sept, 22, 1941 



F119 No. 850 «r-r f5"|- . 
Enclosure:- o s • \ ; 

1 - Copy of Letter to Amerloan Preeldent Lines 

2 Memorandua on Ford Motor Company 
Distributions 

Original and 1 copy to Department 
1 hectograph oopy 






4032 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAKL HAKBOR ATTACK 



;i^-:'\ 



While long antlolpatlag «oa9 aotloa *on th9 
pari; of ths United stpteei Alreoted aj^alnst «)^a|>«a*s 
ftnanolftl holdings, the scope <>f the Amerloan f reel- 
ing order of July 26th wae not only a ooaipXete sur~ 
prise, but a distlnot shook t^ the Japaneia./ Their 
oounter move haLd been preparafl several weekA prerloue 
and, in the typloal Japanese manner, was fa# broader 
and aore epeoifio and detailed than $itr oxrAer. V« 
had similar orders and estAbliehed woutiae regular 
tions as precedents and esqperienced personjael to 
fairly and efficiently iaplement our order, "filie is 
the first eaqperienoe Jf^an has had in f reeling asaeta 
of a foreign power, and like the huntsaan preparing 
a squixTPel stew, they tf*#if in all the available 
•sorap", the resultant oonooction being eztrfiR*ly 
indigestible to Amerioan residents of Japan, The 
sweeping regulations embraoe numerous foreign ex- 
change oontrol and other lavs foraerly In foiNse, thus 
crer.ting legal barriers against p'raotloally every 
liberty* American Individuals and oorpor|ition8 pre- • 
viously enjoyed. 

. Moreover the interpretation and enforce- 
ment of this array of regulations has been plaoed 
in the hands of Inexperienoed but super-consclentioas 
officials who, In their seal for detail and perfection, 
spioed with an Inherent dislike of foreigners - now 
particularly Americans - have in most finstanoes gone 

to 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4033 



4« tUt& U%kl- 



As a fflRtt«r of fact Amsrioaa® rsaidlmg iJR 
MamelmrlDi «aa oeoupled s>.r«a« of Ohiaa har* hm 
Jsctea to tmbttantiallr m<3j»« <ii«iigy«««bl© sua 
i;|;gr«Vftting treatsent tlmn ima b««ii m«t#d oat to 
Aaerioana living in Js^asi ««" the ■ f <a«»3f ar»a» ar« 
alt609t «joapl«t(*l^ eoatrolled and doaiaat»d by tli« 
or«-«ar«.r« ■■dlkp^MTj sxitliov } ^- ^ '=■ ^ ^ Suoh Rotisni.as the 
QXQ&'xntiOt A®«rioan flra^, piaoiag iUatrldana ajid 
their esBs>lo7«es sinde? strict surveillanoe; opeaiag 
and aetaining laail addreseed t6 Ajaer-ioanftj, prohibtW^ 
Ing Jkorerieana to travel within these areas or to 
d^art for the United States, refueal to allow taxia"^ 
t.o oanry Aaerlean paeeengere, in eosie inetanoes 
aotual oonfisoatlon of JUBerioaa properti", and eacy- 
2Morl}itant daaanda for rttireaent allovanoee hf e»» 
ployees of Amerlean finM» are all indloative of 
the prevailing aaimoeitr agaiftit the. United S|at«e. 
1%da feeling also exists agaiaat Srltish aationala 
but the attitude of the United States is held 
ohiafly reepoaeible for all of Japan's present ills, 

. It 



4034 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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^ enterprlssB froja ereaa Khich i c; controls - 




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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4035 



way «f fin optn break be-cwean Jap«B »ad ttee =;.\~.-., 

Stat®*, The trend f* •"-'♦• ---.-* »~;,^ between 

these tnro. loimtple-s, t;h«refore, depends ^'-.y 
upon ttoe strength these t*ro oppotlng Jspaa««e 
foreta will b© abl© to muster, 

Bererting to the frtesirig ordefs. The 
iB^jasft of the Japaness order on Aiaerieiina In Japam 
voaia haT« been vastly aifferent had %h@ toericaa 
aovsrnaent first presented ita plan fdr enforcing 
lt« cr'«°- ".galnat J&panfs® assets and infaiTldu&ls 
s Japanese ^ ■ -^ .-,gnt rr ~ ■•sotiflcatlon 
that auoh privileges ©abodied therein vcmlvl he ex- 
tended to Japanese nationals In the United States 
groTide^ . similar privilegeo were extended to 
Asseriosna residing; ' rant- 

ing in the United States of , -r&l' exeasptions 
to Japanese raiiSmntp. na«!« little if any Impreselon 
on tne authorities ±n Japan, particularly the sub- 
ordinate police officials la the interior dietrlote 
«»f Japan and In Manchuria and China. Furthersore, 
the Idea' behind the American order vas not p.n r-fuoh 
to .impose resT^rictiang on Individual ' 22s as 
to iaiplement the control of Jegjanese afsets in the 
United States, to prevent the uee of the financial 
facilities of the United States In w«t8 harmful 
to national defenat? enu other AmericaJi interests j 
and to curb i-ubversive activities in the United 

"stated. 



4036 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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or f lx« »»• *bl« to n(ieol;lat9 

Biutdt ftf Ntw tttrk «r any «t^«r jr«rt||;n o? J 

aitm adlf AliovtA btt»r®«n 4"«paR#8e fM ^mimett^- 
fdrelgnere without an official ost*snlt. |le 

trftdt and gtrlcmsly dtsturbtd business r»l«tloni 
betir«#tt loe&l foreign and Japaaei« ttm/t. Uwm 
these financial aad trade difficulties have been 
gr«atly lateuBlfUHl by the Irrit&tijun^ .^d ^etty 
regttlatlost enforced reiatlfe to travel aad the 
abeolute refueal of police offlclale.tj* all««r 
Amerioani to leave Japan when there vers nn vstli 
reaeons for their detaliunent. 

Another ^orlotte outorc^ of ti"i« freesi^i 
order It the attitude adopted by Japaneet eaployet*^ 
of Aaerieaa flrae. These e^lortea have taken 
advantage of the prevailing dlftarbed sl^atidA to 
make exhorbltant and nnreaeonable deaanda for 
retirement allowanoee. It baa alwaya been th# 

aooetsteft' 



m 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4037 






accepted praotlce in Japan for foreign firms and 
individuals to pay higher wages and salaries than 
H, the doaiestlo scale. Suoh wage and salary levels, 
however, were in liea of the bonus and rttireicent 
allowances proTlded for in the Japanese systea, 
Tht iiiferceaant of the freezing orders » other cor^ 
trol aeaaures, and the tense international situation 
Rfttur«lly have seriously Jeopardized the position of 

Aaerioan business concerns in Japan and have forced 

* * 

wkp. a aijaber to initiato plans for liquidating their 

Interests. Local ©aployees, sensing this dilemiaa, 

-lid iaspired by certain patriotic societies, and 

evidently with the ooanivance of the polio© autho- 

itles, h&vs presejited rld?*.culW8 dsiaands for retire- 
ment allowRaces- ??"«s*? li&ve usually called for • 
•"fc® one *: - "-- "'•'^-'- year of ser- 

vlee and an a4diti; .ount equal to two years* 
salary. ^© Aasrl^aa motlo ar% ooapaalea were 
presented vlth dsTA^ivAp. f ese ei^loyees 

whioh, '. " •ijp'&gc^ voujLu iiaye iieosssi«at«d tht 
payment of approatlMiftely tmi lsS00j,000» fhe isotlon 
picture ooKupanietf hr-^e nffer^td Cwit>. the asslstanoe 

* rv.A police '-•'-'^ • ^ttle with 

v£.8iy Staffs .<iath*3 salary for 

e&ch year of servio© up . '^l«rs, and ©ne and 
a half aoRthe for <?ach y- % fire y<^«r». 
^-- A-..-.^..... .^„ finally 

Zf. it* «ji^io>'*. 31s of oat 






4038 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




- 8 - 




month's salary for eaoh year ol aejrTio«, bul: this J 

I 
Inrolvid the pajmant of Yen 69,200,90 or ] 

0.8.116*237.71^ The original A««aoA» are set \ 



1/ forth In. the attec^fi'- Rftij'^ nf $i letter ^ad^tegsi 

to the Kobe ageat oi li^a .aasi'ioan President Lines 
under <JAte of Deoeraber IZ, 194Q, 

■ Several other Auierlcan conroanlea auoh a« 
Ford and Singer have received sltnilar demanfla. l^e: 

3/ ie attached hereto a oopy of a memoi'aRdua covering 
recent oonveraatlon with Mr. Benjamin Kbpf , General 
Manager of the Ford Company i» J^an, bearing on i 
thlp flubjeot, 

American tea ooapaniee in Japan have been 
particularly hard hit by these freening orde^^e. 
Detailed reports of their poeltlon have been B\xk 
~~^iBltted to the Department by oable and it is sincerely 
hoped that something oan be done to redoae thta 
from their extremely precarious eituaticn. 

fhe loBtancea cited' above clearly de»o»- 
Btrate the wide dieparlty between the treatment 
accorded Japanese In the United States and that 
meted out to Amerioane In Japan under the Japanese 
order. Here it was applied v/lth special eiaphaela 
to individuals although American busineea Intereat*- ^ 

naturally have been compelled to tensporarily ourtal^^ 

f 

their activities. However, the Ja-opnese are by far 

i 
the greater sufferers. | 

Perhaps the phase of our order whleli 

struok 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4039 



^ec 



?.>.• 



jsaj well be disturbed for t;h«jf Mve \ 
fesg«,ll«.bl8 proof tJi* ilnit.«?. 'it?'- 

Britain ca.n istiddle t 
fhnj aan see their prorit.ael., 
aw&y, t3::«ir mill lone of t. 

__»taxtding idle, thelf cotton alXl« .. „ - peratl-ree 

jy 50,^, their ray-- •^-- ''--^tSon e-^* ''■- +•-- '*•--" 
ttaelr Iron &n4 steal industr? 1*^ fa^fethijad ia 

output^ their traasportatlen systeis deter iomting 
tTon iaelt. of oil, rsplaoeaents t osixs, their 

agrloultttral output aioinlehliig, ar*- '■ ■ '■ ■ ^^-^sinolal 
strength deolinlog* In addition tiiey ai^e c»dgfii? 
of the antagonism prevailing against th.«. 
the United States and the British I^ire,, .'5or«r., 

I believe that a large percentage of t--- f-T-<v.v-<i« > 

'B,par*©f 



4040 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 






- 10 - 

J&paneat people realize that It would be national 
suicide for their oountry to become engaged in an 
all out war with the United States and Great Britain. 

The only ^lopsful derelopment is that thi's 
large percentage will finally muster sufficient in- 
fluence to tip the scales in Japan's favor. 



lnolo8urej~, 
1- C&pr of Let 
S« Keaoranc' 

Glstrllinztian: 

■"..•'igin.al an,(l 1 c^. 



Amerl<um Frtsldent Lines 
or Coajpany 



i^aeat 




• ^ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4041 



■■•locur* N«. I to 0«iqp«t«li He. 
^ MIS d«t«d 0«t«b*r 1S» 1941 

\ from thf Eabatey nt Tokyo 

ft ii. M.ftJ g , n_ -^ 

(Bur»«u of r«roign A P«M»tie CoMoroo - P«P»rt» ^ 
aont Inptroctlon JUno f.C, 1941, rilo 102.8V4W8) 




5J0 Strletly Confid«nti»l rprtnlgbtly 3ftokgrouaA 
^*^ Rsport No, 2 

IBTM to gftH 



freti CoiiHMi^lal Atittoho 

Pr«nk S. Wlili«M 

Aasrioan i^abftsty, Tokyo 0»t« of Ooa^lotloat «»«[^t. t9, IMIk 

S««o of MAlUsft Ottt. tt, 3UN3L 



origiiMl Mia s •otiofl to dvNHHMMit 
1 h«oto«)p«pli oo|»y 
Kn«l»cur»tt 

1» • M Uot«4i OR p«giM 




79716 O— 46 — pt. 20 6 



4042 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



- t • 



"^ 



ThM ooBplttt o«tt«%lon of tra4* vi%h «Im 
Unlt«d <)tat«t and th« mjor portion of th« British 
* Skplrt ai a ramilt of th« frtotlnff or4«r« hat 
notably Intontlflod tho mlrmAj ••rlout fltt*n«Ul 
•Ituation whloh has gradually but ttsadlly li#«i 
dOYaloplng during tho paat four jraart. Today Jt99M 
It praotloally itoUtad froa tli#MM^ w*^ aiiBadiltr 
aarkata of all nations. Har ooaan ffolmr ataaaart mm 
elthar tlad up In harbora o r balng utllitad by tha 
mi litary authorltlaa aa tra naporta. H«r aaqport wara- 
housaa ara flllad with atoeka of aarahafUllM wbiill 
oannot ba noTad and on vrhloh intaraat and ataz^mw 
ohargaa are aatlni^ away proflta. CorpmMk^ bealaviNI 
Itroaptlng munitlona la balng aavartly raatrlotad hf 
oontrol meaauraa and ahortaga of auppllaa - aifti 
proflta s.T« dvlndllng, Tha rata of Inaraaaa In 
banX depof.lta la shoving daflnlta algna of rsaadlag 
na a raault of hi har oparatlnp- and living eoats, 
fltagnatad foreign trnda, haavy ahlftlng of InduaturlaX 



output to i.unitlona nd allied aatarlalt, and da*> 

oraaalnp Toluma of domeatle bualnaaa. Tha rati 

of Inoreaae of nntlonal aavlnga la alao falling 

froa higher living aoata and dtillr bualnaaa oondltlonn. 

Tha aunply of it^onay appaara to ba thort and Infla* 

tlon oontlnuea upward daaplte tha atramioua afforta 

balng exerted to coabat Ita apraadlng. Tha Sank 

of Jap«n'fl no'e Ibbuc -iroulation on 3apteiri>ar SOtJi < 

reached a record hl<;^h for the year of 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4043 

tc t» •mmI t)^ ail. tiat l^igft iiiii% «f 
T«l 4,990.000,000 «k !»M«i^«r Tl, liW« 

TlMTt art f«HMrt t9 th« %trm% timM <^ 

R««M«M*y tmA* %» t%mB»— ^m war in (%i{ui mift 

ei*i tltitAtlois it tht AXttimltf mm %«i»ff •a^itB%«riA 
0«ii«i«l l»dit»ti*i*l i^r^aitotloii it ttiid«ii^t«4i)r A*«U»» 




laf «v«ry south b«e«it»« df laAk of ^pflioi, labor 



oa4 of f lolol rottrtotiono. J>9(»4te«tl«s ^0 vtf 



Mi%«pioli pi^lMdxljF i« boinf MnintAliiod Hi a f aifljr 
Hmtari rat.o. trBi,.IMi U iniat U<wio>Io on A ovw if 
grontod it oojmot long oontinuo undwr oxiating 
eoRditiona. Thoro it rtaaon to boliavo thoroforo 
that tho ro^otiona raeantXjr anaounooS in tho imvriitt 
festf** budgat allot»tftta wora i^da |iot«lMa prifi** 
eipally t^4rott|^ tha inability of iiilhuitpy %q p4P»-» 
4uea tha gooda ntoaaaary to ao^plato tha varioeo 
projaota eontoa^latod vhon tlio bu%ot allol^Ofita 
\frB approvad. Alas, an iaportant point to koap iA 
leind it that thaaa !»o4ttatiwia mn4 dofarsanta 
ladioAto tho growing urgonoy of avan tlia #o|>anoao 

vvf avuwaiii 



4044 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




4 



OoTtmacnt tightening Its belt In t e fact of the 
falling rate of national sr.vlnrj: « dtcllnlnp 

voluroe of ''vallfible funli. 

Then there uuet be a iaturatin^ point 
soQowhere 'along th« rinanoial theroofliettr for 
natlMial bonds* Aaeordlng t« fe latett Ministry 
of Flaanoe report, total national bond issues for the 
first nine son the of 1041 a{(» ragated Yen 5,662 Billion 
and rtdM9»tion Yen 8, U4 »llllr>n, plving r rate of 
abaarption of M«t^, this oos^ared vith 9&«7^ for the 
MrHNq^oading period of 1940. Bond issues for the 
Jttlf-I^tettbar qfuarter represwited Yen S,9dO sdlllon, 
a« iaorsasf of t«B l,09t ailllon eo«par«d vith ths 
eorr«spondinc period of last year. The rata of 
digaation for the Jaljf-$i^tesbar quarter was 91.9/ 
acainst 9S' for the praeading quarter and 99«5,^ for 
tha aarraapoiidiiig fuartir of 19d0» These figiiraa 
Indioata a rathar signifleant deelina in tha absorp« 
tion rata for the third quartar* The tatal asMwat 
of Clkiiia Xnold<mt bonds Issuad frwa the baglnaing of 
t^a (Siina Affair to Ootobar tad haa raaohad tha 
ananwva fl«aM af Tan X«,d04,B00,000« * Xa othar 
ira»4a this ficHro reprassats tha aaoont of aotual 
oaLik vfciah iMia b«a« aot aaida ao far to f ioanoe the 
war in Chlna« Of oootsa thl« ^oes not by any 
•tiAa ropresaot tha tatal expeadi taraa for thia puiw 
poaa, 

Thart 



t 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4045 



• 6 - 

Th«r« ar« aumy U^ns* J«p«ii#i« flrwi 

United 3UtM and th« 9rltl»h Ewplr*. SlilO* tl» 
fr««ting ordtrf w«nt lnt» «ff«et th««« bwinfih 
o<Mip«nl«i havt b«9n i«o!U%*di frim J^apan «»•& mmA Nf 
th«ir noraaX butlncts tr»nt«otlen« havt •ntil'tljr 
o«&s«A. ^ch lnt«r«ct» Muit r«pr««*nt hXjgA in* 
v«tt»«nt« In fros«n funds, earfo*** t<|ulp{a<mt, 
staff expsnesi, eto,, tsp.«oiaXly for ooncsims suSh 
as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, ^^urm, N.t.K., O.S.K,, and 
soas of ths largs lB«upnncs oonpanlss. A rwport 
of all ths hol'Unrs of fap^neas Intereets In ths 
Unltsd ft«t««, ths hlllppinss, and ths Hawaiian 
Islftn'^s ba«ed on ths results of <^ata aOonaiulstsd 
from our frsseln^ ordsr would bs most lllu»lnating». 

Another strain on fapRn's flnanoial 
eltuetlon arising from the frsstlne: ordsr and ths 
resultant utoo^aRS of forslgn triads in ?hs financing 
of KsrohandlR© which vas dsstlnert for export, 
Va«y isanufaoturers of catport goods ars operatlnf 
on s»all oapitaX struoturss rnd ars dspsndsnt 
upon rapid turnovers. There roust be millions of 
yen worth of goods Intsndsd for shlotaeht abroad 
which are no'-' stored In • arehounes vlth Interest 
and storage ohnrges rapidly mount Inis, 3oms ons 
has to flnsnoe the owf^ers, "'he ctovernasnt has bssn 
oalle<l on 'or ««« atftnot and has pr'>mi«sd something 
like Yen 70 million In subsld^uft this dsvlatlon 

of 



4046 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




fk* mmmtiim vt 919^^ «mI «iit ff § » ' 

•i l i Mf fiiig ant mH9mM tilMtiMi la r«t«»i %• 
ItM fttXrilaant of an^aiita atiilMiiia ia ff«a 
■ •iiayaaat i i Mi^MiaUr svtiyttli kMMn« Hmm la 
1/ atta^MA li«i«la ai|»r Af • a^MvaatfiM «aiaA ^^*^*'^ *' 

Ii4|, aitraftad fa tha AiiNiaaaim^ fflviiig a a a a ipt t a 
iMtaaaa af ^«i>aii*a lability ta 4la«luifffa a 
faral«a axahiima aHUfatlaa. «tet hai }mmmmMk 
la that <lapaa It now la aiHMtly tha aaaa aatoarraaalag 
IntamatloRal. flnaaolal. ^tltMi aa *4aalgaata4 
f oralgnara* ara In Jap«n« Batli ibva aa«a%a tout 
aaltliar oan aaa m«K« naturally Japan Ma aafea 
aa imrohataa fraa abraad tiadM* aaiii flaaaalal 
ra«trlatiotta» fei> a«tn ai^pllara af iiMintlai 
Swadlah ball ^aarlnta (aKf) will aat aitant any 



oradit to Japan until thalr aatvrad axahaafa 



traou Hava baan Il^i4ata4. 

"this flnanaiai "inolraloaant'' lo paflaataA 



In tha n«w trada pollojr now baUlg awalvad whair^lkf ' 
Japan 1« to ourtall hor aiqporta %a othar yon bloa 
araao and to Thailand, but at tha taaa tlaa oaaot 
prascura an tho«a oraaa f«r laifar ^antltlaa of 
all klndi of raw aatarlalo to ooapanoAto for tha 
lotaao in laportt from tha ihnitad statao, tba 
Brltlah Sap Ira nnd tho Nathorlaado fCaat Xadloo« 

Tha 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4047 

• 7 • 

T h» prtv iUngjt hoi'Utt pf yr»etl<«Xly wryj rlUl 
BMit«rl»I pr««ludtt tht ooatlmi«4 Xarf« toalt fupply- 
Int of aaiittf«ot«r«« pr^dMta U tht y«i bl»t ar«aa. 
ftl «» pthwr hand »fe« AutherltiM h«rt ateit that th« - 
mlf •miroat &r ittpply n«v avaiUblt art within tht ' 
••i*i>r««parlt/ aphara; tharafora, thaaa •auroaa mitt 
^ a^IaraA and Aafalapad U a aoit vlgoroaa aannar 
aaA tha raataiast Mtarlala tranapartad to Japan In 
tht ahertaat poaalbla tl«a. 8a aa« Ji^«i la faaad 
vlth tha i^tttlttta aaaataltf of attalBiM that aalf* 
•«ff lotastr «r w^i^ tha haa §9 oftaa aa4 loudljr 
baaataA. 

Tliaa va ttrs to JTi^aa'a ooi)|>lloata4 agri* 
aoltwral f InaAoiai pr»l>l«aa, Tha Oavtramiat raaaiit3kjr 
tMiraaaa* tha afflaM Hm j^u-ohaat prlaa la J»^m 
9m»99 h^r •mm fim ani j^iti ta, hiy w tii» tat jyt 
rUt, wh»»| aa4 »irUr a>a»a, aatj^tlur tMU 
«MiitiUaa aIUif«i |» u mUImA hy tHa f amara fm 
tteiy awa uta. Or mm 9Xm» tha aiiipMila« priaa 
mA§i^ ¥Ui •«Kr«^tt MMttOat atM" tm 400 alUiaii. 
At tha tUM^ 9^iMm 9^^M 1m« ii»t h*iii ahM^ai 
th« davaraaaat viU ¥a t«»«a ^Umt ta tha f araart ta 
^«t axtaat, fMPtlWP aiq^ttiitsraa «IU mm% i^rahaUjr 
h« aaAa tavArit tatlafrtac tte faratya of Taivaa a»A 
caiaaaa «i thal^ rla* i^r«*iaHaii« 

n» mm Ail tiiiaa^^» «til4ii i^rviiMtt 
iipMi*! imX mmm i» M far at f «wlpi tviAi la •§•» 

•«»«•§, it fMtat »«HaU 4a«ai4Mt» ?ha «««««» 

\ 

r 
i. 



4048 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

• 8 • 

. !••• of a oftsh butln«*t f«nnlnt iat« ih« n«i|^ 
borhbod of T«n 480 aiXXlon lunmialljr wi%h*a» 
protp«otiTt tubfttitiitt Murktt wottlA Ini a ttrioiM 
blow to Any InaMstry in any country. To Jmpvk 
tho lq>aot it partlottlarly •tocgoring bo«auM 
of IMNP inability to oonaumo Mm tufplMt ailk, 
tbo dltorganltatlon it baa oattaod in aKrio«ltwpt 
and tho total loiia of iROoaui la foroign ovrronoiot 
ftoroly naedod for tho puroh&ao of Tital ■attrlala 
and tquipmont if and' whon tho fMoting ord^ni art 
tornlnatod. 

iHiB^roua othor inataaooa oould bo oitoA 
ao indioativt of Ja aB*a inoroaalng fimutoial 
b«rdon» and dnoroaaing roaotorooa. Tho loaa of 
Inooae froa tha thouaanda of Japanaao nationals 
livSn^ abroad eauet roaoh qaito a aitablo figttM. 
The aama would a^'^ply to tho wholeaala avaouatiea 
of foroif!:nora froa Japan. Tho ineroaoing r«t« of 
taxation, tha addod proaauro baing oxortod on 
IndiTiduala and prlvato and oorporato bualnaat 
for largo aoalo purehaaoa of national bonda, tha 
s toady tighfoninK of reatriotiona on os|>andituroa 
of all kindo, tho oTor Mounting ▼oXuna of OeTomaant 
aigburaomonta, togtthor with othar faotora prorioualy 
nentloned In th4a raport, all point to a dof inif 
voreeninr of Jaran'a flnanoial poiitlon. 



raw/mp 
Dlntrlbutlonj 

Crlginal and 2 oopiaa to Dopartaont 

1 hectograph oopy 
Enoloauroi 

800 n«xt pago 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4049 



4050 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



mr^r -. r?" w-r r^s. 



l, ftrainaaM dMMPR&Ag fiMMmry ^tttturvt tor 
of nniPM t& Fo 






FesctttftlAlk at 



nwmtloM. 







^»a 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4051 




■i;*?;- :w 



■s COR injss n, 



EMBASSY OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 




No. 596y .Tokyo, Norember 13, 19 4 1 

SUBJECT: STRICTLY COJJFIBENTUL FOSTKIOHTLY BACKKIOOHB /<^ 

REPORT FHOK THE COJfflffiRCIAL ATTACHE FOR THE L , , 

PERIOD PROM 0CT0Bia-27TH TO JJOTEMBER aTH '/f 



STRICTLY COKFIDECTIAL 





7200^- 



The Secretary of State 
VaohlngtoB 



I have the l^aor to submit herewith Strictly 
Confidential Fortnightly Bacltgroiuid Report Ho. 3 
from the Commercial Attacfte for the period from 
October 27th to HoTember 8th, I entirely concur 
In Mr. tfilllaras' appraieal of the situation In 
Japan and In thie connection reference la 

respectfully 




to 
m 

01 



K> 




o 
o 



4052 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 







# 






file No. 850 

V Enclosure: 1 - an stated 
Distribution: 

Orlglr.al and 3 oopiea to Department 




5 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4053 



i^^i-ictly Confidential fortnightly 

Baclr^p-rousd Rftport No, S 



BSPOi-ii PEEIO0 FROM 



rclal Attache 



Prank S. Willies 



rioajR 



, Tofeyo Date of \#tion: H©v. 10, II 

Date of Hailing J 




<^ 

'>|.;b«tions 

and 2 cc- 
'fTTB.nh cop>' 



4054 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Japan* 8 eocmon ruoture cannot wlth- 

« present strain very mxch xo: . , For 
r.hTB9 fflonths no suoplte* of oil, copper. Iron, atari, 
aluaintta and other eeeentlal orocucts have been 
reoeired from auroad. Ko exact data is avaiiaoie 
on present atooJui of these commodltlee but from 
iinL-5ffiQiiil reports and personal studies of Japan 'f5 
eccNEMMBy over a period of several years It la fir 
belieYed that on the arerage the volume of these 
..t-^..i>^ -"*■■' the exception -'* **'*el oil for the Navy, 
is reiatifeiy eimll - probably adequate to maintain 
the- already unbalanced level of production and qqb-' 
sv.ssgtior. ' - zqj\ zo weive aioaths. The- ti&jj*». 

-■^ ■'(:_* vi!-- 

eu. f fuel oil is renerally estimated at suffi- 

oi«sftt for t'^-A rp-BTB* wsrtime consuKrption. 

To aesure anj substanti&l negree of 
B-'iOceB? In trie eite^utlon of declared wartime policies 
Japan's vast econocsic structure jcuet v-^ -^ -•-' Muously 
tsurtured. Her indue tries mist be e- m with 

.;. ,;«affierable Itinda of siaterlals, her people .« 

^-■"^ her national defenses mus-t be substantially 
extendsKl and strengthened, her transportation 
facilities taaet be Itaoroved and maintained, domestic 
;- :;: ;eae nausi De carried on and public utilities 
mist be operated at full ei«>ac All of these 

activit*ffi demand materials aftd euppllea, a:. — e 
materlale and ies, and these In an uninterrupted 

flow. Jajpkn has fiever even moderately ,||een eelf- 

stifflolent 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4055 



r 



sire«»ll -i.ltmvs leaned hf ,^H 

.■-■■•ritleh Saaplre. To4gty tiiese e- s t>e«n ^H 

on its ovn. .::.r':er4Sive flH 

een &to«d to Jap»n*s • |B| 

th;' npst ten jt-ra^e but these h: . . ;'Oven ver^ ^^H 
saaii <i0nor» of vital resources and km'we persalttel*^ 
only a 8lii':ht reduction In the nation's dependenc y J 
uxion t}-"^' -T-,ii:«,4 statee -<-"■"■* -rltaln. ^^ 

That; etrenuo /e been- and /x^HH 

being made to rei^edy tri«:( a&n«?ero«s situation i;^ | 
all too obTloua. *' ' r.^,nt that ^^ 

.lltbl- real progreea uas orowned tiiese efforts. mB 
Sivtn a period. of ?;n-. • ''-er ten years gome aeasure ofl 
sucofss might be ^-.v . . v: , . .. ,)ut unrortun<.;teiy for I 
Japan her prob ' e 8olve?r Hat©ly» | 

l\o nation can «rec ^nd its J 

r;jft.ti9rftal defense -"•- -ture. tr--: --■ •-*■ "™l 

np.tional ©cono c^ontrlbiate heavi ' *i 1 

d«velm>m»nt and ciRintenance. Jp,'^' :5resent 



' " Ic PtpSitXO,' 

repleniaraae; 
Guantltit. 
crcai.T; n. cefense 
self-lnfll 



imn vithout 
:ij0ption of large 

erinis In efforts to 
ithstsmd 
pressure fr 




fH="?FMyHWWff'^liWif^. 



4056 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



'ta t 



'■,if> 



r ..:■■ 






^S'./* Xi. 



ii;ri&i 



tto'ijt'aw tro^- 



1 

i 







■ne! of t-Jiree 



■Mrrent of intf^rn&tioyxsX 
■ ax\ ai.i."'Dut of fori- lo 

erity 
.ns. .Iff sir. or (/?) Rce.:--: 



The fiyst route vould mean that in 

would t>e u!mi>x« . re&lat any aesi^^as 

>8«fi by th© United States, The sec 

aaervatlan of her Etapire, the stecui'ity o 

r. enoc 



EXHIBITS -OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4057 




sars, thQi'^tart, that Jatsan'© 

"'"" '■■■-■ ^ tt*-i»lve .•;:ciii;^..v 



C4.:S&p«;. 



'USiSxi 



eoitomleslll' ^ 






« aei 




79716 O— 46 — pt. 20 7 



4058 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



^r 



m. 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



Division of far Eastern Affairs 



^.4. 



/yy^x 



ut^. 



Tokyo *s <i'^spMag|^f^T69 of 
November iBr^^ffi^^M^^^^iips^^ 



^}owI 



•k<>^ 



■*. « 



It is prAafc»l0Qteai tA||^rigi|al 

of this d%0^atcfi aid W&U 

never r@a<^fe,®HP^«pki 

cause of th#^^p|||i|yi%ttgj 

If the origin^Sm^^^rrirea, 

would you pi0as0 index and return 

to M©« 

iu^BQ please inform ms of the 
data of the last previous similar 
weekly repoi't of the Coiasiercial 
Attach^ in Tokyo which has 

reached the Department • 



K ; Sal Is' 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4059 



r 



-.mmgia. 



TELEGRAM RECEIVED 



-"^^ ~ ghifc teltgjpaffi HRiat be 

oJ»L *' • closely paraphraacd be 
"'W^* *rF»i*i fori being coHmunioat ' 

J2:™I!1^6.^tary of State 
ffaahington. 



-^ y'- —-"-••^ir •' ■,si|_-^---'--g-"«-M»^-. 

DtTisiaaof 
FaEUIBiAFFJM 

OCT 2 » 1941 

^MpcrtMK if vUui 



DRtEd-Ootc*Ci' 18, 1941 





.^, ilTif*/^ 1*-J-.»*>^ 



a-'i ^I^ '& M fe 



OCT ■- ' 

IfStePARXMElfl OF 5XAT1 1 



^^* 



4979, October 18, 4 p.m. 

MOST SECnET FOR THE SECaETARY AMD pUDER 
SECRETARY. 

A high official of the Foreign Office today 
handed an En&asay official the following mDnorand\m 
of a plan for quick ooiamunioatlon in the event of 
an emergency in the Par East, the need of \vhicli' ' 
was reallECd following the staff talks at Singa- 
pore. He expressed the hope that we would place a 
corresponding plan into effect without delay: 

"One. In tlie present situation in the Par m 

o 

East a threat from Japan mij^t easily develop vTith ^ 
very little warning and it is not possible to 
determine in advance \^at type of action by Japan 
would necessarily call for military counteraction. 
The British autaiorities concerned have *eeardingly 
been studying the problem of reducing to a ciiniraum 
the delay vSiicfa might be caused in such an eventu- 
ality by the nccesity of intcrgovErnrccntal consul- 
tation. A further problem has been to ensure that 

all British 



36 
* 

01 

o 



Q 



O . 

> 



4060 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



all BrJLtteh aaiborltiea oonesmtd «irc alwultanco^aly 
na^ incacdlfttcly warned ttficn a dsn^erotui altuatS<m 

Two» The procEdupt nhieb has bten devised 
is otitltned btlo*. It is intended to be brought 
into iBBBEdiatc effect should apy one of the author- 
ities canocmed receive infopiaation indicating that 
Japan is about to take or has ta&cn action v*iloh 
in hia view may ncceaaitatc laanedlate ailitary 
opuatcrmeasurcs. fhe authorities in question are 
the four oowaandcra in chief, i.e.. Par £as;;, 
China, Eaat Indies and India; the governors of 
Bunaa, Hong Kong, and Fiji; His Majesty's repre- 
sentatives at Tokyo, Chungking, Shanghai, Bangkok, 
and Washington, 

Three, In the eventuality oontemplated, any 
such authority would at once telegraph, by the 
qul.ckest possible method, a code word of warning 
to London. He would follow this preliminary 
".earning by a second telegram reporting the facts 
on which he •considered it neceaaary to base his 
warning. 

Pour. Any tclEgraw sent under the above 
procedure would be repeated by the sender to eil 

the authorities 






\-&,:y'5'Y^:!^"'.-S,'- 'f^v^ ^* *v'SSlS.*=^r-!?T^' 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4061 




-3- #<979, OcfcobET 13» 4 p,jn«, froic London. 

the authorities enuiaEPatcd ir paragraph tsro above 
and alfd to the CJovcmruEnts of Canada, iitw Ztc.land, 
the CoranonwEalth of Australia, and the Union of 
South Africa, , 

PivE. Special rj^rangEments have b-cen ciade 
in London for any tElejjram sent under this aystEM 
to bE iranEdiatEly dealt with by the hi^est polit- 
ical and military authorities. 

Six, His Hajeaty's GovEmaEnts in the domin- 
ions are being invitrd to IntroducE analogous 
orrangonents. 

SEVEn. On the receipt in London of tzlttivairts 
of thE natuTE oontEMplatEd in paragraph thr^E 
abovE, thE Foreign Office will notify both thE 
United StatEs Assbassador and the NEtherlands 
GovEmajEnt by the spesdiEat posaible means. 

Eight, It la hopEd that the United States 
and? Hctherlanda sJuthoritlEs will be willing to 
consider the introduction of corresponding arr-ant-E- 
iients whereby any infoitaatlCD of threatenine actioK 
by Japan which the'rrnited States or MEtherlands 
authorities In the Par East aay receive eiay be 

IwmEdiately 



."•yswwt . 



4062 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



-4- #4979, OctobET 13, 4 p.m., from London* 

ImmEdlatEly comraunicated not only to London but 
also on a basis of reciprocity to the British 
Commandop in Chief Par East through the most 
appropriate channel. 

Nine. It la emphasized that the procedurE 
proposed Is merely one of urgent rcpoirtlng. A 
decision as to action lauat, of course, lie with 
the Governments concerned," 

WINAMT. 

vvwc 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4063 



SaPABTMBS; 0? BTATB 



PARAFHHA6B 



STRIC7LX ccmmmrim,: 



Dated t Oetober 18, II 
Heo'd: October 18, 1941," 




9eltt|;r«a no. 49?9 
Tromt London 



S3ctr«m«ly 8«cr#t for th« 0nder Seoret&ry and Seeretary*^ 
fhe folloirlttg meaormidaa wae handed today to a» offlei 
of the &aiba08y )3y a hi^ offi«1Lal of the Foreign Office* 
It contains a plan proTldi^ for rapid eoisnanieatlon should 
an emergency artee In the Par,Ea«t, The necessity of such 
& plan becaiHc apparent after the staff talke which took 
place at Singapore^ The official in question stated thai 
he hoped that It would be possible for ue to put into effect 
immediately a siailar plan. 

1. Owing to present conditions in the Far Sast, 

Japan Bdg^t at rery short notice becose Bienacing, 
and it is imposBible to decide beforehand ftoat 
kind of action Japan might take whl.ch irould of 
necessity demand military counteraction, fhere^ 

■a 

fore the appropriate British officials have beel 
staking a study ef the question of reducing as much 
as possible the delay which in such an emererency 
sight be occasioned by the need of consultation 

between 



4064 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




-2- 

b«t«rsim sovtVQxents. An additional ptoblesi v^loh 
hau pi-«o?tMie4 iteetx iw ■-««,». of H«3(lsg it ««rt*iii 
that all i!it«rftotaS British offlelaXc lAioald r«-> 
eolTe tmzulng «it!umt 4«lay aiad at t'a« eaae sK>B«nt 
tih«!n«yer periloue eonditlona »l^t ayla«, 
'OutliaaH below le tfee jjlan that lia« beea woifeed oai;«. 
This plfcn i« to b« plaoed IsesAdlately in •tf&9t 
whrnnenrnr any of th© iat83;»«8t«d offleiale i^onald 
obtain information ehoidng that the J&panuse are 
aboat to talc^j or hare takaist, measaree that in 
hlB opinion alght require islHtary oountera»tlon 
withoat delay. The iaterested off Iclale ar«i the 
four chief oofflsandere, naaeisr, Ohiaa, East Zndlee, 
India, and the Far East; the flovemore of FIJI, 
Hotig Kong, and Bttreaaj and the British diplomatic 
repreeentatlves at CSixin^lng^ Shanghai, Washington, 
tokyo, and Bani^olt* 

If the eonteeiplated eventuality should take plaee, 
any of these offielals nould coqiaunlcate at onoe 
by telegraph and as quicKly as possible to London 
a code word indicating warning. This preliminary 
notioe would be followed by a second telegraphic 
aessage outlining the facts on vihich the official 
believed it essential to issue his warning, 

4. The 



1 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4065 




■/)S: 



-3- 

4, IRie Binder froiild rtpeat any tel«gr«pMc neseage 
sent In artoopdane* nitjbt th« fopegotag ppooeaore to 
all of th« officials Indicated in the second para~ 
OTaph as iwBill «mi to the GteTemaents of Hew Zealand 
and Qanada, the tTnlon of South Africa and the 
Coaeaomrealth of Australia, 

5, The authorities in London have coapleted epecial 
arrangeaeate so that any aeeeage transmitted accord- 
ing to this plan will receive the iamedl&te attention 
of the highest asthoritieSj, both aillltary and political* 

6, The Dominion Ctoverroests hare reoeiired invitations 
to put (»lr8il«r aTTStngements into effect, 

7, As soon as Itondon receive© telagraphle aeesaifes of 
the ItiM indicated in the third parag;ra|Jh, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs will transmit the 
information in as epeedy a aasner as pcesit^le to 
the Afflh&ssadoT of the United St*t;ee suid the 
Sovemaent of the Setherlande, 

S, the British authorities hope that the offleiaXa of 
the Hetherlaads and the tfslted States will be 
agreeable to considering the eetafeH«li»ent of 
siadlar arrangesents according to which any news 
of aeaaolng activity by StspKa whioh »ay be received 



by 



4066 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




by the Dutch or American authorities In the Far 
East may be transadtted without delay not only 
to London but equally, on a reciprocal basis and 
by the moat «^propriate meanei, to the British 
Commander in Chief la the Par East, 
9. Emphasis Is laid on the fact that the foregoing 
proposed method refers only to urgent reports. 
It is obvious that the Interested governments 
must detezniine ifhat action must be taken. 






i 






! 



Wlnant 



] 



U-LfOtt'BAB 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4067 





In r«ply to State D«partment Lialaon Officer 'a memo- 
randum U-L 740.0011 P.1N./570 of October S4, 1941, relative 
to the plan of British officials for coordination of urgent 
oommunlcatlona In case of emergency in the Par East, the 
following comments are submitted. 

Insofar ae the Havy is concerned, it is believed that 
the commiinlcation channels and procedures now existing are 
entirely adequate for the transmission of urgent and import- 
ant information and for insuring that information of this 
nature receives the prompt attention of appropriate authori- 
ties. -Adequate arrangements are in effect for fulJ iocal 
operation between United States Kaval and British Intelll- 
oe organization concerning Par Saatern matters. 

In brief the» situation is a« follows: 

(a) Suitable codes and oomMunication channels for the? 
ransfflisslon of information have been established between H 

the Commander-in-^'Mef, Asiatic Fleet and the Commander- inS 
Qilef of the British China Station and have pi^ved effeetl«» 
in use. ^ 

g 

(b) All United States naval intelligence personnel on* 
duty in the Par East, including those stationed in Australia, 
New Zealand and Colombo, have been instructed to cooperate 
fully with British Intelligence organs in their areas on a 11 
intelligence matters concerning Japan. British naval intelli- 
gence officers have received similar instructions. 

(c) The Commander-ln- Chief, Asiatic Fleet has estab- 
lished and la using effectively commiinlcation channels for 
the transmission of Information to and from United Sta.tes 
diplomatic arid consular officers In China. 



> 
O 



10 



a 

o 



(d) At important posts other than In China the United 
States Kaval Attache or United States Naval Observer is ava 
able to transmit important diplomatic and consular Infortnat 



llV>Hh 



4068 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




;*nd«i?*l)B-<Silef » Aalfctlo KLeet and tq th« Hary B»- 



>5r.t lBf<»««.tl<m 19 tawn*«itt9d dlrnot to the ©epartaMiit and 
oo'tiha apppopriata navai oojaaandara afloat and ashora and to 
api>roppl«t« niiTal IntalUgKHnoe offices. Local cooperation with 
the British Inaurea that Infoiwatlwo of thla nature la gl^en on 
the apot to ^propplata British offlciala for transmlsaion i:4)>* 
ttMir hlgbar authorities. 

(t) Standard t7nlted States a^val oonnunioatlon prooedura 
pro'videa awana for Insuring that Important despatches reoeive 
the prosapt attention of the" officer or officials who are re- 
sponsible for appropriate action. 

(g) Adei|uate and effective aseans of rapid Interoomniuni- 
eatlon have been established between the Commander-in-Chief, 
Ablatio Fleet and the Ooamander-in-Qilef of ^the Ketherlands 
Havy and Chief of the Bfetherlands Navy Department in the Nether- 
lands East Indies. 

In view of the foregolns It is believed that a special 
ajatem. Including special oodes, for the transmission of urgent 
Inforjaation la entirely unneoeaaary. 




Prank Knox 



The Honorable 

The Secretary of State, 



m, 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4069 



WAR DCPMtX^ 
OFFICE OF THE CHIEIOj 



WB 311 (10-24-41 )MC-3 




NOV 2 6 1941 



^^' 




r~:-yitmwm)k for the liaison officer, depaetment of stawi 

Subject! Plan of tiritish Officials for Coordination 
of Urgent CooMunications in Case of an 
Emergency in the Far East. . 

;^ 

Referring to the British proposal transaitted as an en- , 
closure to jrour letter of October Zlt, 19U1» on the above subject, the (^ 
War Departaent is of the opinion that existing methods of comaunieation q 
are, in general, adequate for a rapid interchange of urgent intelligence _ 
covering Japanese military activities in the Far East, _ 




With the exception of the Philippines, the War Department 
the Far East no rapid coamunication facilities oS its ownj its 
ireaentatives therefore use the United States Navy radio nets 
MTvi^T possible, and otherwise conaercial radio or cable* Conse- 
quentljr it is believed this is a matter of primary interest to the 
Navy Departaent. All ■ilitat7 intelligence officers are in constant 
touch with their British and Dutch colleagues and would thus receive 
urgent information aa quickly as under the proposed British seheoa. 



> 

O 

o 







o 



\ 



It^^' 



n 



3* With regard to details of the British proposal, paragraph 8 
Z^* of the asaorandua enclosed with your letter is interpreted to aeai that 
United States authorities in the Far East would report directly to 
London as wall as to the British Coviander in Chief of the Far East at 
Singapore* The United States should enter no agreement whereby its 
authorities in the Far East would report directly to London. The 
J "> exercise of proper control by the United States Govemaent in Washington 
'' \ would seem to demand that it retain sole authority to cowtunioate with "D 



5S 
> 

en 



the British Govemaent in London* 

It* There appears to be no objection to the adoption of a code 
warning to insure that the inf oraation which follows will receive the 
prompt attention of the proper authorities conc erned* The_ Uhited_ 
States representatives in the Far East should, iHdWeverJ ~~ 
eoaaminications to Washington, and, on a rociprdc^ baets,L^>j 
and Batavia. On receipt of these messages, the gUte Dei 
promptly inform the British Ambassador in Wash! aa*on,5 Thg 
with respect to reports from United States souitcs ii^ihe" 

1 CJ 



CO 



OOJNIlDENTLAii 



.x^ 




et thpir 
SlngS^or 
lent Mttld 

irooed^* 
Easg 



4070 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

•oonfidentiaIi 



would thus conform with the procedure proposed by the British for re- 
ports eaanatlng from British sources* 

^« The code word selected by the British to indicate warning 
should be lumedlately reported to the War Department to insure that 
the same word has not already been assigned by the United States as a 
code name for another purpose. 

For the Chief of Staff i 




Major,^i.S.C, 



xijaieii^-;'iii"- 



OQffJSTlSSNTlAL 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4071 




MHWAWM orviei 



MlwliOigrlittw 
. liitfitt Mt«r 

tM ratt. 

NIftit ttttw 
Ckirpt* 
$ 



Telegram Sent 






TO M TtlAHmiTTCa 
•^■^X MHrKWKrtAt. OOM' 

NewwNnticKriM. ooot 



-IWft — ' 



AMUtlOAV SNBASSI 






? 



.r 




^2tr:- 



Thil ciii* •iii#''i " e»nW*rt»»l Cod« 



bkk\| c«»iiumc««« u tnywfc 



■MMMMaHW 



4- 






SIORR. 

a* — — 

<^To«u» W^i 0««ab«r le, 4 p.a. 

V^" Bzistiag oouiunieatlon ohann«l» and pree*dur«« 

«r« eonald«r«d wholly aa*qu«t« for th« tranui*si«a of 

urgent and iaportant iaforaatloa aad for laauriaff tba% 

lafonuitloB of thla oharaotar raeolfair Vm proapt attcatlMi 

of tha approprlata hi^ authoritiaa in WaalU.iigt<»« "filata 

arrangaaaata proTida for oooMuniaatlon batvaaa tka 

Ooaaandar-ln-Chlaf, Aaiatla Flaat, and tha CoaaandiirHa- 

Chiaf , British China atatloa, tha Coaaandar-la-Ohlaf <rf 

tha Matherlaada Nary and the Chlaf of tha MatharlUBda 

KaTy Dapartaant la the Hatherlands Sast ladlaa, ■a a ' a w li- 

■ ■ f <l llill ll l H lll l llll H in >«?*««■" *<"« ■*■— i ^«fwn(Haj ■<! !>■■■ 

•wtherlUaat Arrangaaenta hara alao bean aada for looal 
oooparatlon on the apot batwaan Aaerlaan arajr and aaTX 
Intelllganea offloara and their Brltlah eeunterparta. 

In Tlaw of the foregoing It la not hall avad that any 
new arrangeaeata need be aade, U^ f^tlM rri 




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o 



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. , 19 



< 



4072 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




m of Conrtnathn 






DATE: loraKBIB 25, 1M4}. 



ASIOH 



PAnriCiPANTB: SMOKBOliaS HDU. ABD TBS EfilTISH AMBASSADOB, 
U)ja> LOTHIAX 



corasTOt 



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o 



.A» 



\-K 



Th* Br;^lah Aadt>«as*dor oam« Ir. mv nia request, having 
,9^ Ut/^ J^v^ retvunwd from London. He referred to the Far Eatatem 



; 

iM 



■■ 
i; 



aituatlon with epprehsnaion, Sft7lzig that he believed the 
Japaneae were likely aoon to attaok Sixxgapore. Ve dwelt 
briefly on the general aittiatlon in the Far Saat as it 
has developed thus far. I did not undertake to speoify 



juat what the future plans of this Ooveriment in that are^ 




would or might he from month to month and week to week, 
hut added that he knew the various steps in our progTaflC 
thua far, idiich oonteaplated a firm and resolute policy 
toward Japan, both diplomatically and allltairily, and aid 
to China at the same time. 

The main point the AmJbassador raised was that there 

should 



i 



I 

3J 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4073 



-2- 

shoiild l>« oonferonoos betwoen the naval experts of our 
tvo OoTeniBents with respect to niiat eadu woxtld or might 
do in case of allltary outbreaks on the part of Japan. 
Z said that, of course, there could be no agreements en- 
tered Into In this respect, but that there should un- 
doubtedly be collaboration with the view of making known 
to each other any and all Information practicable in re- 
gard to what both might have In mind to do, and when and 
wber^ In case of a military movement by Japan In the 
South or In some other direction. 

The Ambassador said that the InforiMtlon he had 
gathered In London was that, while our Haval Attaohi, 
Admiral (Hioraley, was a good man, he consistently declined 
to discuss possible future plans on the ground that he had 
absolutely no authority. This brought >^<«^ back again to the 
question of military consultation among appropriate of- 
ficials of our. two Governments In regard, for Instance, to 
the military situation that Singapore will present from all 
standpoints \mtll the oonoluslon of the war. He added that . 
some naval experts felt that the Amarloan Havy ali^t largely 
make Its base at Singapore, and that that would safeguarA 
the entire situation. He expressed the view tiiat irfii flMt 
at Singapore could reaoh Japan aash sooner than « J^aaea* 
fleet could reaoh the Paolflo OoMa, aad that, tharafoM, 

ttUMPe 



79716 O — 46 — pt. 20 8 



4074 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



-3- 

there would be no rlak Involved. I merely remarked that 
tliat was a matter for experts to pass on, and lie said 
he hoped there vould he dlsausslon between his and our 
h^gh naval officials with respect to all phases of the 
Pacific situation. 



C.H. 



3 CEtlU 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4075 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 




n 



Memorandum of Conversation 



DATE: December 13, 1940 



SUBJECT: BRITISH ATTITUDE R£»ARDINa JAPANESE AIMS IN SOUTH SEA 
AREA 



PAfmCIPANTS: 



COPIES TO: 



SEORETART OF SIAZS HULL AND THE BRITISH OHAROf 
D'ATFAIRJES, MR. NE71LLE BUTLER 




o 

o 
o 



^-"0' 



vQ^ 



fp' 



Mr. Hevllle Butler, Oiarg^ d» Affaires of the British 
Enbassy, oalled at hie request and said he desired to 
bring ttp a matter relating to one of the last statesents 
of Ambassador Lothian to the effect that if the Japanese 
should be made to feel reasonably certain that their 
iBTasion of the South Sea ooontries vould bring the 
United States into war vith them, they vould be fairly 
oertalQ not to undertake 8U<di invasion. He then said 
that he was under the iBpresBlon\l;fiigit ve baio. already 
tak«tx oertaib steps oaloulated to deter J«^an from suoh 
a ooorse. Z replied that ve hAd done so to;* certain 
MCtMit and in different ways. With all of lAiioh he is cr> 

I m 

familiar. I Mdd nstbing^ 4iior»« Rr, Butlijf then stated ^ 

that 



«S 



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I 

sr. 

50. 



31 



.•?■? rf.fi 



- ■«»• 




4076 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



.1. 









tbat ills (loT«nm«it was lnt*r*«t«A In tli« quettloa mt 
vh«t 80x*t of mllltarr ralatloas from a d«f»nsiT« staiid- 
polnt It might be poaslbla to d«T«lop In a autuallr 
fMislble and desirable way among the South Sea oountrlea. 
I replied that I bad heard some British or Oatoh official 
suggest what vas oonsldex*ed Terjr wise; that the British 
and the Dutoh dlsouss alL phases theoretloally and saoh 
would readily see what the view and the attitude of the 
other would be under given oondltlona In oase of a 
Japanese invasion and attack, and that this would In no 
sense InTolve any sort of a military or other alllanoe. 
I also added that sometime ago I had suggested to ' ' 
Ambassador Lothian that the British would logically dis- 
cuss these matters with the Dutoh and that irtiatever dle- 
busBlons the United States Gtovemment might have would 
be with the British only. 1 added that, of course, any 
such diaoueslons on our part would in no sense involve 
any depairturo from our past policies of non-involvement. 



C.H. 




S:CH:AR 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4077 




ARTMENT OF STATE 



andum of Convenation 



SUBJECT: FAR KASTEhN SITOATIOH 



Dc/e 



DATC: MAY 27, 1941 



PARTICIPANTS: SECRKTAHY OF STATE HULL AMD THE BRITISH AMBA.SaADOH, 
LORD HALIFAX 



COPIES TO: 



PERSONAL AND CONFIDENHAL 
FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE 



10 

K 
(D 



Tiie British Ambassador called at hla requeat. He 

referred to the casual and unofficial conversations 

c 

which I have recently had with the Japanese Amhassador r- 

r>» 

In regard to the possibility of instituting negotiations *" 

i3 

for a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area. He was — 

very much interested in the matter and desired to know 
how soon it might be before I woula knov/ whether there 
were any definite grounds for taking up such negotiations 
I replied tnat it might be very soon; that, of course, 
as I said to the Chinese Ambassador here some days ago, 
and as I Uave s£id to my associates in the Department 
from the beginninc, I would not think of entering into 

any 



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O 

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a 

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4078 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



M 



any discussions looking to an agreement without flrat 
having full and free conference with the Chinese repre- 
sentatives. I then added that the three basic points 
I am constantly keeping In mind relate to a aatlafaotory 
A' J. Cihlnese settlement, assurances that the Japanese will 



^ 



I ».. \ not go South for purposes of military conquest, and 

"i ;^- assurances that they will not fight for Germany In case 

the Japan e s e / v should be drawn Into the war. I concluded 
by saying that everything naturally revolved around 
these phases. The Ambassador seemed to be pleased with 
this view. 



C.H. 






S CH:MA 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4079 




DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



^cmoroiKAiin of GmvcrxrfkM ^***-— HL 




DATE: 

Septsmber 2Z, 1941 



Conversations botwoen Japan and 
Unltsd States 



PART1CIPANT8.- 



v' 



British Chargi, ^ir Ronald Campbell; 
Under Secretary, Mr. Welles 



COPIES TO: S, PA/H, FE, PA/D, Eu 



DIVISION OF 
EUROPEAN AFFAJPS 

SEP 2i m 



The British Charg* d' Affaires, Sir Ronald Campbell, 
called to see me this morning at his request. 

Sir Ronald first stated that he had received a tele- 
gram from Mr. Eden requesting that Secretary Hull be in- 
formed that the Secretary's wishes with regard to infoiroa- 
tion concerning the conversations proceeding between the 
United States and Japan had been scrupulously observed by 
the British Government. Va«. Eden stated that no reports 
concerning these conversations are being circulated to 
British missions and that the very small n\jmber of members 
of the British Government advised concerning the conversa- 
tions had been impressed as to the complete secrecy of 
these reports. 



U:3W:EMK 



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4080 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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AOVISER ON POUTICAL RBMSTKAi3 . 



:i-^ !4«i ''-^-f^^D 




DEPARTMENT OF STATf,^ 

} 

Saptember 16, 1941 



f iR EASTFIW Aff 4!Hy j 







vv^/ 



;r>erv;:- 



Baron van Boetzelaer, Mlnl8tBr"^unBelor of the 
Netherlands Legation, camp In to oee Mr. Atherton and 
myself today to say that the Minister of the Netherlands 
had asked hlni to come to the Department to Inquire whether 
there was any Information we could give the Legation with 
respect to the reported conversations between the Ameri- 
can and Japanese Governments. . The Minister Counselor 
said that the Netherlands Oovernment were, of course, 
very much In favor of the maintenance of peace In the 
Pacific and hoped that some arrangements would be eventu- 
ally arrived at which would avoid the extension of hos- 
tilities to the Far East. He went on to say, however, 
that the Netherlands Oovernment were extremely Interested 
In the economic aspects of the Far Eastern situation, that 
they were canrylng out certain measures now which had a 
bearlni; on such Important nuestlons aa petroleum andt/pther 




(0 

v. 
10 
W 
M 
01 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4081 



-2- 

productB, and they were very anxious to be Informed as 
soon as possible of any situation which might have an in- 
fluence on the economic measures now in effect or planned 
in the Netherlands Indies. 

Both Mr. Atherton and I informed Baron van Boetaelaer 
that for Information with regard to the Par East we would 
sue?fest that he speak to Mr. Hamilton or Dr. Hornbeok. 
Baron van Boetzelaer said that he had spoken with 
Mr. .Hamilton and Dr. Hornbeck from time to time but the 
Minister '.vlshed to have the desire of the Netherlands Qov- 
srnment for Information on the pr-jsent situation In the Par 
Sast olso laid before the offices concerned with European 
.Affairs as well. V'e further added that we realized fully 
the Interest of the Netherlands Government in developments 
In tlie Far East and thj\t if we ever had any information 
V(hic:-: V7ould be of Interest to that Government we would 
take Imr.ediate steps to communicate with him. 




Jame/ Clement Dunn 



PA/D:JCD:n-3 



4082 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



TELEGRAM RECEIVED 




fhi» ttlcgfem !3u»t be p*^^*. 
cloBcly p?iraphra«cfi bcJ **"*' 
fore being ooiMBuaiofltcd 

to anyone. (C) 



•ion 

liMiffUB 

.Llft41 
LonSon 

Date a WoWiSBc? 

Kre'd 12:02 p*m. 





vP 



•A 






^^ 



Scorttary of StetE, 

Novtrabcr 18, 4 p.m. 

NEHiCRLiiNDS SeRICS 46. FROM BIDOTE. 

Dr. Von: KleffEns yesterday spoke to sue 

with grcftt concern regarding the Netherlands 

Govemmentis Inek of knnvledgt of th? trend 

of convprBatinns with Adtilral Uomurn. Re 

said they were txtrcraely unhappy orer their 

conplete lgnor«ncc. The Netherlnnds Indies 

vfcre after all in the most exposed position 

and if the United State e bcoeuac involved 

in war with Japan the Netherlands Empire 

would likewise consider itself at wnr with 

that power. This being their position they 

felt that their natural desire for information 

vaa ooaprehcn Bible. • 

They Md had no Inf oi:w»tlon fr^m ua oon- 

cemlne these talks since August 17, On Oct- 

c 
obef 9 >f. Loudon was asked to inquire as to ^ 

the situ-'-tlon 



U 



I 



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O 

o 
o 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4083 




# 



-2- VtvmsitbtTtii.f irovtmber 18, 4 p«]BS». frcaa hfmioR, 

tb« situation «aa again cas . HoTtmber 10. Be 
was tolfi to stre«« that tm Kctherlanda So^tni- 
ment aid not crKisiacr it inaiocrect to caopresa 
the carncet hope that they nigjit he tept Inforw 
acd aincc their intcreata were noat ieu^diately 
at stake. Being ao long without Infoisaatlon 
they could not Judge how their IntcxTBttwErc 
being affected. Should the oc«Tcraatlon« 
break down they would h,«wc to rerlcw tte alt- 
uatlon with a view to making the neocsaary 
' aieposltlone. At ouch a tine. a matter of 46 
hours delay might pro re vital. 

Van Kleffttn said that thus far they had 
reoclTed no reoly to these instructions. Mean- 
while meeeages from Batavla Indiowted that 
Govcmncnt oiroles there despite their nonaal 
stolidity were highly nervous and indeed 
alamed, a situation attributable nalnly to 
thxir being left in. the dark. He therefore 
very earnestly hoped we might see ou? way clear 
to making available some Information. He felt 
thf.t in the circuiaetpjioes even a negative reoly 
wr.s preferable to no reoly. 

I should 




4084 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



• 



-S^TftuMcftiEredy Vorcrj^KJ^. IB, 4 p«b* fron London. 

1 8ho*aa nfla thnt nesteera of the Ifcthciw 
lands Gk)YEmmEnt turn not Infrequently rc- 
fsriTd to taiElr Inability to ol>t«ln Infor- 
aiiatl<ai »Egar4ing our oonwrantlono with 
jQI>an and bfive sated ac ifixttiiev 1 had any 
Information. I hnvE on thesK oooaeionB 
pointed out thE inherent dlf f loultie« In 
stating precisely what fix sltufttlon may be 
at tiny givEn.iBomEnt with oonditions bo fluid 
and dclioatc. I hnw fElt, howcwr, that I 
should ftccE'dE to Dr. Tan lElcffen's present . 
rf.ciuc8t to let you know their stste of mind. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4085 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



Po/C 



Memorandum of Conversation 

^ DATE: SBPTSMBSR 4, 1941 



SUaJECT: U.S. - JAPANKSE RELATIONS 



PARTICIPANTS: SiiCRETAnY OK STATE HOU. AND THE CHlNiiSE AMaASSADOR, 
ER, HU SHIH . ^ 



COPIES TO; 



■J 



The Chinese Ambassador called at his request and 
said that he had come to Inquire about the reported con- 



(0 

4^ 



,V versatlons between Japan and the United States. I said ^^ 

(X 
tnat I had hoped to be able within a week or two to send ^ 

for the Ambassaaor and irlve him somewhat definite infor- 

. aatlon as to the course of these conversations, meaning 

by this that I had hoped by that time they would have 

taken such a definite turn one way or the other that I 

could tell him something new in addition to what I said to C 

him some months ago on this same subject. I adde^^that I '.,' 

would be glad now, however, to make known to him ^jtything ,'' « 

I knev. tnat would be of interest in the foregoing -r-f ,'~- 



connection; 


hr^ 











4086 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



-2- 

• 

ooimftotion} that th» aaa* oaaual or •zploratorx convar- 
8et).9ns aftar an intarruption of aar'aral vaaka vara now 
going on; that thay hava not raaohad any ataga that 
would afford a haaia for nagotlatlons; that, aa I 
proailsed tha Chlnaaa Anbaaaador at oiir maating soma tlaa 
ago, thla aovanuaant would not think of any nagotlatlona 
that would affaot tha Chlnaaa altuatlon without first 
calling in tha Anbaaaador and talking tha antlra aattar 
ovar with him and his aovammant, aa I would talk it 
ovar with tha Brltiah,' tha Dutch and tha Auatraliana. 

I than gava tha Ambassador in vary strict oonfidanca 
the chief points which ara aet forth in tha racord of 
convaraations and axchangea of mamoranda batwean tha Japa- 
nese Ambasaador and myself and between the Anbaaaador 
and Preaidant Roosevelt. 1 made soma rafarance to tha 
military situation, as I had in my other conTaraationa, 
atating that we were continuing to treat it as a world 
military aaovement* I then reviewed the military posai- 
bilities, pro and con, both in the Weat and in the Kaat* 

The Aznb&^jsador made it rather clear that China did not 
.0^ desire any peace at this time* His theory seemed to be 
\^ that Japan was showing aigns of weakening - which did not 

n neceasarily mean an early collapae - and that within a 

reasonable 



A 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4087 



• reasonable time, she viould be obllt^ed to abandon, any 
aggressive milltai'y activities ana to seek peace. 

I brought out several possible developments that 
aii.xit occur in future, such as the possible collapse of 
Japan, referred to by the Ambassador; the possibility 
of Japan' s adopting all tne basic principles of peace- 
ful and normal International relations v.hlch this Gov- 
ernment has been preaching and practicing, as well as 
applying those principles in a satisfactory manner; 
the possibility of Japan's endeavoring to face both 
ways by entering into an agreement wnereby under an 
implied reservation which Japan would contend for she 
would have a right to exercise force against another 
country or coiontrlos in a given set of circumstances; 
and tne possibility that the governments opposed to .Japan, 
including the United States, might refuse to enter into 
a peace settlement at the present time. I said that any 
of these developments might arise and that it was a ques- 
tion of the attitude towards each other of the governments 
concerned, if and when any of the foregoing possibilities 
should arise. 

In conclusion X said that I would be only too glad 
to keep in close contact with the Ambassador in connec- 
tion with this entire matter. 



C.H. 



4088 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

TELEGRAM RECEIVED 



aV 



KD GRAY 



j JFROM Chungking via N.R 



^■r^- 



DatEd OccEmber 4, 1941 
Rcc'd. 3:18 a.m. ,6th 



Secretary' of State, '^aJJL' U 

Washington. 

470, DcccmbEr 4, 9a. m. 

The ChlnESE press has continued to give close — 

(j^ attention to the Aiaerlcan-Japanfse talks. The • 

^^ burdert of comment la that the talks are doomed to ^ 

failure largely because of the Intransigence of lU 

Ci 

Japan's leaders ns shown In To Jo' 3 recent bellicose ^ 

» 

stntenents, the reaffirmation of the Antl-Comlntern 

Pact, and warlike preparations In Southern Indochina* 

The only oossible solution of the situation is war 

and it la therefore vital for the democracies *-o £/" 

seize the Initiative which may best be carried out 5^ 

a D 

by a military alliance of the ABCD powers and Russia. o 3 

>-» P 
ConfidencE In thE United States has been maintained >-\ H 

r.nd foreign news reports of urgent Chinese re- 
presentations at V/ashlngton inferentially induce a 
proposed agreement have been excluded from the 
Chinese press. 

Sent to Departmeht; repeated to Peiplng. 

OAD33 
EPD 



% 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4089 



TELEGRAM REC 




,p-tr 




fEH Batavl 

ThlG telegram nuet be from . -> ^^"T nn„-i 
closely paraphpaoed be- '^""'Datcd Dcoembci-.g, 1941 
fore being oonmunlcntcd 

to anyone, (br) JfeT RCB*d 4:18 p.m. 

J^oilvlsion of X 

.1 FAHEiiraBUfr 
tary of Btote, 

shlngton. 







DeocmbET 2, 4 p, 
steetnshl 



APR -3 1942 ^y , 

DBPARTMENT OP STATE 



The JnpanEBE steaashlp HUai (FUJI- 
Surabaya November 29 for Xeelung with 1800 Japanese 
nsen, women and children evacuated from the Nethei*- 
lands Indies. This leaves only 400 to 600 Japs In 
this countiTT against about 7,000 on July 1. These 
evacuations have occurred since the beginning of 
the present American-Japanese discussions in Wash- 
ington, but chiefly during the past three weeks. 

A few days ago the Japanese Consul General 
warned all of his locnl nationals through various 
Japanese rrganizatlons that the HU8I would be the 
last evacuation ship to visit this country and 
that evacuation was desired by the Japanese Govern- ^ 
nent. Representatives of Japanese shipping compar.lEs, 
banks, retailers and other firms then met with the 
Japanese Consul General vho emphasized the desire of 
his Government that Evacuation proceed as quickly as 

possible. 



.-1 



o 

o 

o 



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> 
o 

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> 

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O) 



TJ 
7^ 



^^' 



79716 O — 46 — pt. 20- 



4090 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



-2- #217, DECEicbcr 2, 4 p.m., from Batavln. 

posBlblc. During this isectlng the following decisions 

vztz ondEt oil anall ahopkeepers to ti-rn their 

stocks over to r\ large retAllEr nnd then Evacunte, 

the largE flm to retain only a skeleton staff to 

liquidate the business; all small Inporters to 

follow the swae procedure; shipping conprjiles to 

clone branches In the Netherlands Indies and retain 

\ 

oh^i-y a saall staff at one main office; banks to ask 

for further* instiAJCtlons from Japan but Yokohana 
Specie^ Bank will probably be the only one to rennln; 
Jr.pnneae plantations and Borneo Oil Conpany to retain 
only nucleus staffs; consular officers to renaln 
except for women and children. 

The gineral opinion, both official and civil, 
is that hostilities are unavoidable and that the 
Netherlands Indies will be attacked in the near 
future. All ElEnenta of the Netherlands Indies amy 
were mobilizEd today In outer posseasions but not 
in Java. On the other hand, all air force reservists 
were nobllized today throughout the Netherlands Indies. 
They will not be concentrated, however, but will re- 
main nt their home bRBCe at least temporarily. 

LooaL 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4091 



\ 



-5- #217, DECEnbEr ?., 4 p.n. fran Batavla, 

Loonl rcr.ctlon to our discussions with Ambassadors 
Norurn and Kurusu Is that time is being lost; th.it 
J.ip.nn must bE fought and that It Is dangErous to 
dElr^y further; th.it Japan Is In a hopEless position, 
being unable to rEtreat from her announced policies 
and that she must continue her aggrEsslve policy 
unlEr.B stooped by force of ams. 

FOOTE 



NK 



4092 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



r Wbfi 



9 uxtA«r iHtfidMitiai olaaal^l* 

oat Ion, endors* sanding tia* 
and r«tam to U-L, Room 168. 

IROM 8TAT1 DKPARTmUIT TOR OPHAV: 

lollowlng rwelved 18-2-41, 4:18 p,«. 'fom 

Batana dated 18-9-41, 4 p.a., no. £17. t 

On RoTMibcr 89 tha RDSi (7UJI), a Japanese ateaasr olaarad 
Surabaya with 1800 Japan*** nan, ohlldran and vonan for laalung, 
Theaa paseeiisars ware withdrawn froa the Dutoh Indies, 



rooTi 



UL:iau 

Teletyped and oonflrnatlon sent NAVY 12-3-41, 

copy to SA/T 18-3-41. 






f. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4093 



M^ 



( fa:* tASTEF.lt *FFAIRSrt 
-?-*• DEPARTMENT OF STATE , ., , 3 

Sfkcial A8«i«taht to to« S«cr«ta«y \,^0«partmen» •f Slale^r 

IIoT«mbar 12,-*^1 
R 
Mr. Ballantln*: 

Attaebad Is agr suggastlon for a dociiaent on aeo- 
Doalo policy ableh aisht ba baodad to tha Japanaaa. — 
For tha aaka of eonranlanea, It la In tha form of a • 

Joint daelcuratlon on aeonoole policy. I think it covars .^ 

^^ 

all of tha points that should ba of intarast to us, (0 

01 

and it ought to ba accaptabla to tha Japanasa. ^ 

O 

Tha only quastion in connaetion with the draft is i 

A. CQ 

vhathar or not wa ara praparad to staSia, in tha fora >s. 

W 
r/ indieatad in paragraph 4 of saetion II, our intantions 01 

. ^ with ragard to Cuban prafaranea. As tha Saeratary 

^' A^ knows, wa hara discussad this mattar a graat daal but 

/• J^ haTa naTar raachad a dafinita decision. Ha may want 



1 






to (!▼• that point %tmm special eonsidaration* 

Mr. Hawkins haa read tha attached draft and con- 
curs fully. 



// 



lao PasTOlskjr 



8Ai(PtDai 



^f(ff 




4094 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

DRAFT 

United States Japanese L)eclaratio.\ on Economic Policy 
1. general poucy 

1. The Govenimeut (tf the United States um\ the Govenmient of Japan under- 
take to cooperate fully in urging all nations to reduce trade barriers, to eliminate 
all forms of discrimination in international connnercial relations, and in general 
to work toward the creation of conditions of international trade and inter- 
national investment under which all countries will luive a reasonable opportunity 
to secure, through peaceful trade processes, the means of acquiring those goods 
and commodities which each country needs for the safeguarding and develop- 
ment of its economy. 

2. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan under- 
take that each of them shall make its appropriate contribution toward the 
creation of the type of international economic relations envisaged above. 

3. As important steps in that direction, the Government of the United States 
and the Government of Japan shall establish between themselves and shall seek 
to establish in the Pacitic area the economic relationships indicated below. 

II. THE UNITED STATES-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP 

1. The United States and Japan undertake to inaugurate, as rapidly as pos- 
sible, all necessary measures for restoring the commercial, financial and other 
economic relationships between them to a normal basis. 

2. The United States undertakes to accord Japan as favorable commercial 
treatment as it accords any third country. 

3. Japan undertakes to accord the United States as favorable commercial 
treatment as it accords any third country. 

4. The United States re-affirms its policy of abandoning its present preferential 
arrang'ements with the Philippine Islands and intends to move in the direction 
of abandoning its present preferential arrangement with Cuba. As regards the 
latter, the United States is prepared to give up unilaterally the preferences 
which it receives in Cuba as the first step toward a complete abrogation of the 
existing preferential relationship. 

III. POLICY IN THE PACIFIC AREA 

1. Complete control over its economic, financial and monetary affairs shall 
be restored to China. 

2. It is the intention of the Japanese Government that, upon the inauguration 
of negotiations for a peaceful settlement between Japan and China, the sub- 
sidiaries of certain Japanese companies, such as the North China Development 
Company and the Central Promotion China Company, will be divested, so far 
as Japanese official support may be involved, of any monoix)listic or other pref- 
erential rights which they may exercise in fact or which may inure to them by 
virtue of the present circumstances in China under Japanese military occu- 
pation. It is likewise the intention of the Japanese Government to withdraw 
and to redeem the Japanese military notes which are being circulated in China 
and the notes of Japanese-sponsored regimes in China, the necessary measures 
to this end to be Initiated immediately upon the inauguration of negotiations 
with the Government of Chungking for a i>eaceful settlement and the process 
of withdrawal and i-edempfion to be concluded within a iMM'iod of two years 
after the conclusion of a peaceful settlement. 

3. The Government of the United States and the GovernmeiU of Japan under- 
take not to seek in Cliina any preferential or monopolistic connnercial or other 
economic rights for themselves or their nationals, but to use all their influence 
toward securing from China cf)nunei-cial treatment for themselves no less 
favorable than that accorded to any third country and full cooiieration in the 
promotion of the general policy stated in paragraph 1 of this Declaration. 

4. The Government of the United States and the (Tovernment of Japan under- 
take to urge upon China the inauguration, with foreign assistance where neces- 
sary, of a cfimprehensive program of economic development, a full opportunity 
to participate in which shall be accorded the United States and Japan on terms 
no less favorable than those accorded any third country. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4095 

5. The relations between the United States and Japan, respectively, and other 
countries of the Pacific area shall be governed by the same basic principles as 
those stated above in the case of China, and the Governments of the United 
States and of Japan undertake to ur^e these countries, wherever feasible, to 
undertake comprehensive programs of economic development with full oppor- 
tunity to participate in such programs accorded the United States and Japan 
on terras no less favorable than those accorded any third country. 

SA : LP : DBM v 

Nov. 12, 1941 



4096 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



'^o 



,.1 



4- 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
FOftEIGN^ACZUiUaLX^ORRELATION 




, 1941 




•r Davie of ONI called and said that he 
has received Information that the Japanese Embasey 
burned its secret codes and ciphers yesterday. 



mf 



C 






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to 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4097 



JOHN EOCAR HOQvER 
DIRtCTOR 




Ifthnal Surrau of 3ltmtet\g,ai 
linitrb li'tatra Drpartmrnt nf 3lui 
fflaatiington. 13. €. 

Dscember 5, 19^ 




vision of 
FAR EXTERN AFFAIRS 

C f. 194 

Oe^«rtm«rt»fSfjt« 




Honorable* Adolf A. Berle, Jr. 
Assistant Secretary of State 
Department of State 
Washington, D. C. 



My dear Mr. Berle: 



PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL 
SPECIAL MESSENGER 



'■^ A" r.^ 



P«r 




Information has come to the attention of this Bureau 
through a highly confidential source indicating that on 
December 1, 19^-, Shlgeo Kobata of the Japanese Embassy, 
Washington, D. C, contacted a woman named ?;inoshita in San 
FVancisco, California, and advised her that the efforts of the 
Embassy were failing and all of the staff were getting ready 
to leave within twenty-four hours, although all of the officials 
were not going back to Japan. Kobata allegedly asserted that he 
had been given the choice of staying in fne United States or 
going to either Mexico or Argentina and seemed unable to niake up 
his mind as to which he would accept, 

Kinoshita reportedly inquired that if American- 
Japanese relations were broken and the Embassy was closed how 
long the resultant condition would last. She commented that 
the opinion of people in San FVancisco was that the war would 
probably last two years. However, Kobata supposedly expressed 
the opinion that it would last longer. 

It has also been reported that Kobata mentioned sbme- 
thinsT about employees of the Embassy being placed in a concentra- 
tion camp in the event of war, although he ass^jred Kinosliita 
that "other people "nave nothing to worry about." 

This information is being submitted as a matter of 
interest to ve*^'*''-' '*^*^''"=- 



^ 



N, Sincerely yours, 



6 

O 



fO 



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lah^Uv^ 



::.^..-^^ 



4098 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



5i;-'-- 




■H^li^Ji'irml 



^\ 










ovem\)er 15, 1941 




Mr. Keswick called on me this afternoon. 
He told Be what Is set forth In the second 
paragraph of the attached memorandum. He 
said that his Information was based on com- 
ment made to him by an adviser to the Nether- 
lands East Indies Government whom Mr. Keswick 
met In Manila. The adviser to the Indies 
G-overnment said that the Dutch secret serv- *" 
Ice had seen a copy of the Japanese Prime 
Minister's instructions to Mr. Kurusu along ' 
the lines Indicated. 



The only other comment of special In- 
terest made by Mr. Keswick was that, speak- 
ing on a comparative basis, recent British 
official surveys had indicated that Malaya 
is overprepared, as contrasted with Burma, 
which is underprepared. Mr. Keewick said 
that no decision had been reached whether ; 
reinforcements for Burma would be sent 
from Malaya or from India. 1 



r 
c 

> 



FE;MMH:HES 



MOV 1 S ^94\ 




WSP':-.- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4099 

^^** ^ftOBf^^MEN-KoF STATE ^f]df^ 




KoTeB&»«r 1&,- 1941 



iifZ aan* War D*parta«at ims r«ceirea the following report 





,.!t^.!!i'?''.*,,.^'ipm the CcsMaiLndiag General at Honolulu: 



Mr. Keswick, secretary to Duff Cooper, who traveled 

w!!!^l!L!!!!/'^<>» ^* ^^^^ j^*»*> *<> '^''^* pacific Co&et with Kurusu, and 

xiha is continuiijkg oa to Weahlngton and London as e courier, 

states fehiat Kurustt'a mission to tikis oosntry is to con- 7 

firm repoi'ts that the 'Jnited States QoTemment is not ^ 

fluffing; tJaat if there Is any weakneos in our attitude "^ 

the Japanese Gov«m»ent will continue on its path of ag- ^ 

greeslon in a bigger and. 'better way; tout that if Kurwsa *^ 



-4 



and his 3oTenxKent are convinced of the strei^th and de- 
terminati«as of the American Oovenueent, there is « 
strong possibility that Idiere will be no further hostile 
actions on the part of the Japanese dovemsient. o 

The foregoing was telephoned to lae by Colonel ^ 
Bratton, who suggested the possible advisability of a ^ 
iii^ber of the Departaaent talking with Keswick while he 

is here In Washington and before he leaves for London. --^j^ 

'% 

Jolm F. Stone 



4100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 






A'^ 



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rti «*r , 



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•IxMlaa «B<r«3r« 3« ^liagias ]?mp«mmiI« «Hbd^;iis« «fak l!«UMdas 



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tgatamam ^ Vka vmitUu pagat^ Jgpta t» malkam mHimaia mgmmUia 
■be i&i» wMrta^ itol t« «i«ti» }a«r BdUtitNry miA pOiHMl » rwi w ii ttte ia ^Im* 

75 



(/) 




fci, l10Si«il 






Af «t««««t {|«i«f««ftrf ^ par i«^: 
CS«S4tif l^ ma ASr mrm 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4101 



TEUEGRAfWl JW&CSVil 



_ ;-iE. (SO) 



SEcrGtnry of 

348, ifovrmS'-.r n. 4 n. 








.... - , -jiiington; 
.2 V&Qti {tix'o) Ilar>- 



Kuru3u tRi--- • 

(one), Japan «,i>Si».,.„ 
cau;:uo for future dtc.,-. .>...„.,, vV-to-EE) distribution 
P&cii-ic sphETEs influcnoE; (foyr) Japan ceases loi- 
Itloal, Tnilitary but not eouthward expansion! itiv^) 
ChtriR returns to status nuo sAtt prior Gnine S"-" 

He stated JaoeiiEcE geiid«irmEs ^Eeir?: sebo- 
tfRchlngton agrEem-nt and he.ve plaoEfi above i nj.^. „■.-..- 
tion before German Embassy here. 

Foregoing obtained from SiffcrEnt fairly rcllablr 
loccJL contacts b;^ AP repre sentative t^bo has also in- 
foriaEd aeelBtant :'lli"'— - '--•' '■'-■•■■■• AttRchee'who 
trill doubtless inf-.' ,.!■ .;s vi 



TO 



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4102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4103 




^♦*- rtf IT .^ 



N0V2lt94^ 








rt Departmkmt 

THE CHIEF or NAV.U, CH^ESATIONS 
WASHING! 




^^ 



H.^iBber 13, 1941. 



i 



Jtoaorandum for State Departaent. 



■Hie Coamander South China Patrol reports that he has 
received the following inforoation froB the Assistant 
Military Attache ifho has obtained it froo a reliable source: 

THE JAPAHiSSE HCISSARY IS CARRYING TO WAEHINGTOH THE FOLLCfP/ISQ 
FIVB POIMTS: 

(1) RM)ISfEIBOTIOK OF THE SPHERES CF IHFLOEHOE I» PACU'IC. 

(2) JAPANESE WITHDRAV/Al PROM AXIS PACT. 

(3) JAPAN TO GIVE UP MILITARY AND POLITICAL ADVAHCE5 S0t3Tffi?ABD 
BUT NOT HER BCOHOHIC KXPAMSIOS IB THAT DIKECTIOB. 

(4) POR SAKE OF FACE MASCHOEUO MOT TO 3302 DXSaJBSEB FOR TIKE 
BBIHG. » 

(5) CHIHA. TO HETUM TO STATOS QDO EXISTING AT TIME OF MARCO POLO 
IKCIDENT. 

MILITARY FACTIOHS ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED- AHD HAVE CONVEYED TIS 
POINTS TO THE GEIiMAN EMBASSY PEIPING. 



B. B. Sohuinaann. ^ 



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4104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 












■ .^„^.^.^ 



^^^'/Inteluioence Division 
DEriiRTMEirr Gskeral Bvatf 



^'.■Ofc-. 



..(\*^ 



»«aii«ri 



0-2 R!aPORT._...i&«!B.„._. 



Smuw <Biul Dii«am «{ tUUdJaOHr: 






SantMmttmtlAn «l Rkpori 



U OMMWd* M> Ovvmt e*MN» M 




-4 



)tt% ««*la« M •!,«, ymUl Htm a% «^ iiil«Ml M.wDutm mtfim trnt, 



jb;,. If <Hifm tiMs ««% Hut «KtlMMI s«»to« la «»« WMtl^U! 
A» «lll buk —— 






o 



o 



s. A««w«iaa i« iaidl«»« «• ay •wkA«M«l«a t*l*»r«Mi 



t\ . - M*»I Jw 



O 

m ■ 
o 



A.-E. , . . 
Colonel, lathr.try 






0-2 Diatiibttition: 4. 



6. 



SIWW^^**^'*^ #f D«t- «r»w»»rt». t»tt 



*«; 



^ 



"«**>fe. 



J-'-^lT* I 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4105 



*|'^ ^ 



2la% fcpAwb^r, 19U. 



&«MKr Mr. B<Hir0bTft 

I httT« Just hmak iafwawd onr«r tii* %«l«pb«iM 
^ a r«irM«BtotiT« ef th« pirMs that Coti«rM«iwfi Onirah 1»- 
ftWMid ^« Soiic* ef S»sHr*c«fttatlv*s this •ftarnoom that ha 
kaM a mmm atataiMnt tJMt oa se«a i^vata o««aaic» I had 
aal4t that ia Attetralia, fortjr-aifht hour* bafora paarl 8arh«Kr, 
I iBMV «Im^ a JaiMnaaa taidc farea vac aboact to attaek 8<hw~ 
itfiara aad that a Uttia Utar I laansad that it aaa aboot ta 
«tta«dc imri—A t«rxltex7. I at oaaa iafaamad «ha israaa, aa tlM 
DMt la, that t had nmmr had «t^ lBfer»ati0B tluit tmy imjmmim 
faraa ma abai^ to attaak ai^r tarrltory af tha ttdtad ttataa «• 
mj iafamaUaa thaA aay aarlDca Maauraa v^ra likaly to ba 
takan av^ijMt tiM «aita« ttataa aad aarar mdA m, 

I hava aot jut had aa ofpoii»mll|r of aaalag tha 
Gaafraaalaual BaeeM er acgr ethar raport of a^t aataally ta«k 
plaoa l39i thta Mmm» tet I fait that X aheoM aot dai«r aa^uaiat* 

lotirs aiAearaXjr, 

(Iftf.) oaaa Mxem 

1km HoMwrahla ea»>iaU Mall, 

SaaralKrjr af atata of ttta iTaUad stataa, 
iashtagtaB« P.C. 



79716 O — 46 — pt. 20 10 



4106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



■!.'r In 



5? an n.'. 



le '.h* 



.- bo Oil SLinai&(m< V 
.^i »7idi»«o* !^/ »iv>« Wias ffi toouM before ttw 

.«wit a&Tlsse. Ttft«n Cf«vejpn*eat In ¥a«iiiagton 

-.c^.c ea Air- vrler ««•* ?or08 of tb» J»|?«ne«e 

..^«9A by Australian r«oonnftifl«tmc^ 

•.,- ■. MS bettve toafcy* th« attaok tix** tM.8 

■'i-\.i .* -.'o«aa was still La progr«ea tcjwspd 

?Ja.»a.ii, aa& tfie »«6* ootlfioftSion «aa aeat 24 hours 
•:.«fc>r# Pearl ParlMsr. Scrs of this iaforasatlcn •«»», 
■' ' - ;' -.©ral Sr.ort. 01 

iJie DepA): tanta's 7eotsi»«6 no ettch report froi.^ tit* 
AMSiTnll&xi GovemJBfent to tb«s Aaarlsajs OoTcwussnt. 

"■isaise fc: aah with tiw &ps»«prl»t# Au«tr«iian 

•'. «i«« at iiwcfc ana inoairs wii«t;li»r thty have any 
iuXoraiatJlya ocnoesming 'She report wijloh Repre8«nt«£t:iv8 
SamsES a\»t»a vhs made by U}« Auatralian OdTaruite&t to 
the Aaei-lcsn "OksveriMaent QUOTS tUftt an airoraf t carrier 
taek force ot the jr^piuaeas $;«T7 bad beec eigtited b? 
4a««rali«& reeonAa^seanos hesiAeA tovaj:^ I'earl Harbor t-OBQ'' 

Telegraph yo«r reply a« soon a« pesi«lble, 

U - .■» 
30ia»HtM>M 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4107 



m" 



mm # 

mis 
















SecEPstswif ef State 

OS \mma 

Soott ht^ mA» thfi sasks stftt4W«Bt^ VIM PviJm m^igt^or 
on t«^l«ffliber 7, in trntsmtr %o * (jusettos at hS.« i>x*%f« 
oonferenea, aal^; *$hl« I0 p«r« invention Oaf o4bi©« 
had no date r©ipM«dlnf tOt© J<^[>«s««a fl»Mf* (Refw^i^flr 
»«l?ar1a»ent»8 t«X«graa So, XOe, ajpt«8l>er i.8, ? ]>.»..) 



JOHHfSOU 



* J 
^'1 






1^ 



< 






% 


1 




< 




\ 




■he 



4108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



EXCERPT FROM REMARtS BY REPRE8EHTATIY1C 

|(oCOK MACK It? THE HOUoE. SEPTEMB^ 21. 1944 

*I ftm alFo RUthorlx0d by the State Dep&rtaent, 
having: discuesed this with AsFietant Secretary 
Breoklnbrldgc Long who cleared It with Secretary Hull, 
to nake the following etatetnent: 

•The Department of State did not reoelye 
prior to December 7, 1941, from the Auftrallan 
Government or from any other source Informa- 
tion an alleged to the effect that Japanese 
navel unite were heading tow^rci the Hawaiian 
Islande. There was no oral communication to 
the Department of State on that subject by 
anybody, either private oltlcen or official. 
There was no written communication received 
by the Department of State on that subject or 
to that effect. When the allegation was made 
th£<.t Information to thla effect had been re- 
ceived from Australia, the State Department 
Instructed the American Minister In Canberra 
to get In touch with the Australian euthorltlet 
at once and Inquire whether they had any Infor- 
mation concerning the report th^t the 
Australian Government had Informed the American 
Government "thot an aircraft carrier task 
force of the Japanese Navy had been sighted 
by Australian reconnaissance he<^ded toward 
Pearl Hnrbor,* The American Minister to 
Australia replied on September 14, 1944. that 
the Australian Prime Minister stated: 'This 
Is pure Invention. Our cables had no data 
ref rtrdlng the Japanese Fleet.* • • 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4109 



4110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




Deoember 30,. 1941 

ky <i«ar ^r. Ju«tio«) 

In your letter rtat©d i>»o»Hib«p 19, yoa p«ou«Bt that I 
wite to you, aa ChnlruvAn of the CommlRSion to lnT««tlfir»t# 
tne raota nni Cirountstanotts ooiin«ot*d with thtt Japan««« 
i.ttaok on iearl "nrbor on ^^eoAssbcr 7, 1941, otatlng 
vtiether i ''conTtysd to th» lj«partm®nt8 of '•«ar nnd Nnvy of 
the Unlttd atftte*, In tho p«i^iod intervening between Ne- 
▼ember 1 infl Deoemtser 7, 1941, warnings of the Ira-nediate 
danger or poseible nttick by the forces of the -■'•--• «9e 
ft^pire". iou add thnt for your -ourpose® It will be aiif- 
flolent li I '•will st-ite briefly ipproxi mutely the time* 
\&ien euoh warningfl were (^iven nnd, in outline ^nd y 

only, t.r.« ourport of the vnmin^B". 

i would sfly In reply thftt ^ if-ys fo*:3t<^ntl'^ v„,.t 
myself •»» fnrallipT p5? noeelble with «11 imT>ort'u t ae- 
velopm«ntB anfi oom'ltions arleinft in the relatione of 
the United states v?ith other oo«ntrle«. the 

cooperfttlve relntlonBbltJs which (sxiet betvR«»n - - .'-I 

partment of Hnxv wtw V <^ ,^^-.r.*-.»-t- -,•<• -^ ^t rhm 

. r. Justice ■k>berte, 

'• i^r'-in, •■^or.inlsei. .. - - .■- ^v ^ - -" 

nd Clrcumst' noee oonneoted with the 
J^w- ■' t.tf-ok Oil J e-^rl -if rbor. 



- « 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4111 



-E- 



had s2ur': :^«i»«<rj0#« with tJi» S#ar#tayy 




I 



of md tfc« B|ioT«tary of th« fi&vf «na «% iiit»rr*l» 

cor5f#i"«^-«»« '.'< ^'^ ♦■>'« «%l«-p ni^ 's.ta'ff «n4 t>!« Chi»f of 

oonf 0s:^no«« aouijht a full lnt«rohaj^» ®f inftrffiall^n 
fyn& '¥i»w« r«lattT« to oritloal »ituatloni» all ov»r th« 
'♦■-orl^, Including'— of oourse~-d«T«lo'3frients In tfe» Faeifle 

'?i:je89 exchange a o* i* ' ' tlon and vi«wg w»r« In 
rdditiort to thost which took pl&«e at CaMn«t' B#«tiage 

':lrigs during tht f-^ll of 194S. of tJh« W«r 
Council, ^3Pou6 otfc»r oonireraatloni. At th««e a 

conf«rer..c«B I kar ivlvtn the benefit of the knr,vl,eag«» "^^ 

meats poaaesaet of rail' .notore inTolv«Q. i« ths ^j^ 

world 0ituation and I in turn. took up political factors 
in ti. iituatlon i;her mettsrs of Mhich I hefi 

special kjiovled^cs. 

iii repl/ to >oar «-/ , i-iwwb iu-^iuiry, I r«yoall that at 
r meeting of ' • .n«t on Hovswber '?, 1941, 

t relations betw»«n *yapan s; 
and the United -it' tee w«r« 8Xtrem«ly oritloal and that 
taer«-' inent posaibility that «?apan raight at any 

• i - at--rt ■», ".»-•• ■ •'.litory mf^«-«»wi»n-«- f^* ,1.^ »,,-,,;«» St by foro« 

% in I 

I 



4112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




:J>>* 



1^ 



In aooordano0 with hsr many times announo»d purpose and 

policy. It thereupon beo^mo tLo ooaeeaeus of opinion 

t'.at ajfne iiiembers of the Cabinet iiiKht well emphaelze 

t.;i8 critical situation in speeouea in order that the 

country would, if possible, be better prepared for such 

a development. Aooordlngly, 'iecretary Knox, four days 

later on Armistice vay, delivered on address. In idiloh 

i^e 98peoi;!JLly emph-jslzed tills IntBtlnent and dangerous 

Bltuation. iie expressea th« following stron^j warning i 

* ■«9 ftre not only confronted with 

the neoessity of extreme measures of self-^efens* 

in the Atlwatlo, out we are likewise faced with 
iwrlm possibilities on th# other side of the world— 
on the far slue of the *'aolflo. Just what the 
morrow may hold for as in that quarter 0T the globe, 
no one may cfiy with certainty. The only thing we 
o«n be sure of is that the I'aolfio, no less than the 
"tlcintio, calls for Instant readiness for defenss. 
In the Paolfle area, no less than in Kurops, inter- 
ests vihloh arts vital to our national security are 
seriously threpteni^, " 

On the 8a»e day Under 8eoret»X7 of State Welles, amrrfXng 
out this Cabinet BugiJ^estlon in $un addresis, used th« fol- 
lowing lengu<»ge of ur^'ent w»«mings 

• tods»y the United Htaten finds itself 

In far Kre&ter peril than It dia in 1917, The waves 
of worl^ conquest nre brsnking hifii both in the Kaet 
ar.d in the "est. '■r.ey ».re thare.trtenlnij, more nearly 
eroh dfiy thft nnnses, to enf^lf our own ahorss. 



.... 



■In the TnT -•^st the sane forces of conquest 
under ji dlffere/it guise are menacing the safsty of 
ffll nations that border upon the i-^aeifio." 

", . .. . our 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4113 




*. . . . our ptopl* r««llt« th«t «t mnf aoMint 
w»r mmj b« fnro** u'-on u«, •nd if tt 1», th« Ilv»» 
of i»11 of u« will h»Tt to )>• d»<!lcat«(! to ort^wrv- 
Ing th« fr»#do« of tbo 'Jnlt«d Stst«», «nd to tsf*-. 

gusj^inn th« In^^-^nfltRW of th« A*8«rle«n p«er-l«, 
•-hSoh «r« Bor* ^©liir to u« th*n 11 r« tt««lf." 

It vii^ thm t>« ••«n th«t !tfiowl«dg» nf th« (fr#vlty 
of th« attuatlrsn In th» aolfio wa« not eonflntd to a«, 
but w»« mhmr»& by ««ny high offlo«r« of th« SN5V«rn«»»nt. 
I might adf*. th»t throuatiout thli D«rlod offloiala '^f th« 
Dtnsrtaont* of War anf^ of th« Mary ia«nlf«»t#d n spirit of 
vhoI»h«'Pt»d ooo'*r»tt"n mn& lndie»t«A in «tirt««»nt« «•<!• 
to »♦ froa tl»» to ti-m th«lr lt»«B oone«m r«*?iirdlng th« 
«itr1o\»«n«t«[ and orltl«»l n«tur« of th« danger. 

Cr NoT«ab«r S>8 »t«1 on »ov»ab«r 28, at »«9tln«« of thir"* 
v»r Counoll, «t *»hieh th» hlfh«»t offlo»r« of th« Army and 
th« Mavy of oouraa vara praaant, 1 aanhaalea^ tha orltleal 
Bptura of tha raletlona of tftla country with J«»>an: I 
»t»ta« to.' tha conf aranea that thara wsa orisctioally no 
non^lbi. Ilty of »n a#r»«»«nt b»in|; »oMava4l with isspan; 
that m «y o-3lnlon tha Japuneaa w»ra llkaly to braak out 
at any t^a vlth nav aetn of eonquaat by fifea; and that 
tha aattar of 0i*f$%tmr^in$ oui» national saowrlty waa.ln 
tha hftt*** of tha Ar«y mn6. tha Savy. At tha eonelualon 
1 vlth dua dafaranoa axrjraaaad »y Jud»r»«nt that any 0l»fti 
for --r -"'"tary (Safaris* -r— ■■"<« includa an »»«u»'>tlon that 

tha 



4114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



:i,ifl «'rM.::'is:sj.r-.\'>:^it/f -:•% ^fa-''T^~^4K»$1v:■«8!^iflp^afatxaMH^ 




th« Japanes* night mak* th« •l*m«nt of aurprit* a eantral 
point in th«ir strattg/ and also mig^t attaok «t Tarioua 
point! eiBultanaoualy with a Tltw to doaoralisiag afforta 
of dafanaa and of ooordination for purpoaaa tharaof . 
Sinoaraly yoBra* 




t4 



'fJbt 



/ 



■ ^^' 



^ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



EXHIBIT NO. 175 



4115 




IN 

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 




Jflsi^kr, ^£caa/^: 




a^^t^M^U^ 



U^ 



^Jm^JC" <yi»>w ^>-'^/ -i^Ct^ ^^^»0~7«.t. 








Di'Tlsion of 
FAS m\B% AffltlS 



Department tf State 




4116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



m 



m 




y 



fc..i*..i> m .» m 



















I 



ro 



1 Smvjt GmiMT 



I, futmftna 




&l aimtMtSat 4UUat« tMi 



^3k IteJiMM 



JOfOOO aNO «ud aoo ]4m)>». 
45,000 • • 151 • . 



'f 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4117 




41 18 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



CONFIDENTIAL 

WAR DEPARTMENT 

WAR UtPARIMENT GKNtHAl. STAFF 
MILITARY <NTnX)«KHi:V DIVItlOM ^t 

WASHINGTON 




D«c«9ob«r 6, 1941 



NJMOHAHBOM fOB THX CRZir 07 STAlTt 



Subjvott Ittlaat* of Japan««e Air 

and Oround forces in Indo^ 
China, Hainan and Toraona. 



1. In<k-Qhtai- 



J(^>an»«« troops in the thaatsr 
In tha Horth 26.000 

In tha South 82,000 

On ahipa in harbora 18.0QP 
Total 125,000 
(Othar troops, niabar unknown, ara in 
transit toward Zndo^China, south of 
Shan^phal) 

Planas (\»ulk in tha south) 



2. fillJUtt* 

Japanass troops 
Hanas 

3. Taiwan (foraosa ) . 

Japanasa troops 
Flanas 



126,000 



450 



50,000 

200 (approx. ) ^ 

1 



40.000 

400 (epprox,) 



4. Basis of tha fora<oin«t Reports hy M.I.D., O.fiT. I., Stata 
Sffpartiaant and British Intalli^anoa. 



l<^<^ 



SBSBMAV MUK, 
Bricadiar Oanerol, U. S. Amy, 
Acting Assistant Chiaf of Staff, Qm2. 
Distrihutiont 

t" Saoratary of War 

Aasistant Chiaf of Staff, WPD 



^ 




CONFIDENTML 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4119 



i 



OB««alMr i, I04X 




MSnuKAH&mi rem f^t pmBtmn 

In •«an>U«ao» wltfa your r*<|u<Mit ttor* le cBelMcA 

a K»aoi*aAdtai In r«f«jrS to th* mwb«r «f Jiip«ae8<> for*«c 
In IndoeMna aad tim r«ft*nt lnai<«ac« lij Jfti>aii#«« wllltsary 
m«t9rl«l HH& «<iaS.piM«t l3ro>««ht into that mlmf. 



O 



> 

o 

Tl 

o 

> 
3} 



JV) 

> 



retaAiMHp 




4120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Deckmcer (), 1941. 

Japanese Forces and Recent Incbease in Japanese Military Materiel and 

Equipment in Indochina 

According to information reported by our Consuls at Hanoi and Saigon, received 
by them from French military sources in Indochina and not confirmed, it is 
estimated tliat there are al present in northern Indochina (Tongkinjr) 25,()00 
Japanese troops and 8(),(MM) in southern Indochina, making a t(ttal of l<)r»,(KM), and 
that there are at the outside some 4'tO Japanese planes in Indochina. According 
to a statement made December 4 by tlie Govern<»r General of Indochina to our 
Consul at Hanoi, there are approximately 70,000 Japanese troops in Indochina, 
a little less than 30,000 being in Tongking and the balance in the south. The esti- 
mate of 105,000 is consideied to be approximately correct by the Military In- 
telligence Division of the War Department. 

According to the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department, 21 trans- 
ports were sighted in Camranh Bay on December 2 by an air patrol from Manila, 
12 submarines were sighted at sea nortlieast of Saigon proceeding south and nine 
of these submarines are now in Camranh Bay with other naval units including 
several destroyers. Our Consul at Hanoi reported on December f) information 
from [2] a reportedly reliable source that there were in Camranh Bay 30 
transports carrying an estimated division of troops. Our Consul at Tsingtao 
reported on December 1 that for the preceding ten days an average of about three 
transports had left Tsingtao daily loaded with troops in summer uniforms. 

An official of the French Foreign Office at Vichy stated to an officer of our Em- 
bassy on December 3 that the Japanese recently had been sending large amounts 
of military equipment and materiel into Indochina. According to our Consul 
at Hanoi Japanese military equipment recently landed in Indochina includes, as 
estimated by French military sources, 3,400 trucks and tractors, 6(X) automobiles, 
500 motorcycles, 260 tanks (categories unspecified), 300 cannon, 2,000 machine 
guns, 1,300 submachine guns, 2,100 pack horses and a large number of bicycles. 

The marked increase in Japanese troops in Indochina reportedly began Novem- 
ber 21 with tlie arrival of 21 troop and supply ships at Saigon, the landing of 
20,000 troops there, the transfer of 10,00<1 troops from northern Indochina south- 
ward and the subsequent landing of additional troops at both Saigon and 
Haiphong, those landed at the latter place proceeding southward by train. 

[3] At nearby Hainan Island there are estimated by the Military Intelli- 
gence Division of the War Department to be some 30,000 Japanese troops and an 
unknown number of planes. Pursuit planes as well as bombers can fiy from 
Hainan Island to northern Indochina, either direct or via Waichow Island off 
Pakhoi, Kwantung Province of China. 

FE:GA:MHP 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4121 



EXHIBIT NO. 176 




ux^sa^m 



ft Also 





i, Jkeml ForoM in tli* AtXaatlo ,., P««« 1 

V.1S. ttoml Fere4w ia tlw P»«lfle wod F«r SMrt ?•«• 2^3 

#lijplWHM« liKvm}. ForoM ia th» Far Sa«t ....• P«8* k-8 

Brltivh m-wl Forces in th* Far EMt Hgi^ »-9 

BctlMrlaiid* Kaval Foro«s in ttat Far East Pag* ^10 

Bcwalan Bafval Foroaa i» tha Far Sa«t Paga 20 



l^BBUaatiop of abbrrriaUoM w4t 

m BatUairtiip 

Cr .«. Alreraft Carrlar 

CC Araor«4 Crulaer 

CA Haarjr Cruiaar 

CL Light Cruiaar 

OL ........... D«8tix>jrar Laadar 

K> Dastroyar 

SS Sv^marina 

XCL .......... Coftvartad UarehantiMn 




79716 O— 46— pt. 20- 



-11 



4122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



North Csrolim 

viii»hin(ton 

X(ifeho 

Hmrn UaxlM 
ArtcftOMUi 
N*« Yoric 

T»XM 



■ ffK ATUMTIO 



H BattlMhlpa 



Rangar 

WMp 

Torktown 

Long Island 



k (Uurrtnt 



August* 

Quiney 

¥usoaloos« 

Vlneennss 

Mlchlt& 



$ Hmv^ CnilMr* 



U«nphia 

Kllmulca* 

Ctnolnnmtl 

Onaha 

PhlladsljF^tia 

BixMklTn 

Savannah 

Nashvilla 



8 Uijbt Cruiaai^ 




88 Oastroyara (approxlBataljr) 

6? Stdhaarlnes 

13 Patrol Squadrons 





EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



■>. ',:: vv>i.mf.f . 



I 



a.S. MAYAL P0HCE3 IN T?IS P ACIFIC AKD FAR Bta^ 



^} In Ptrl Harbor 



CalifomiA 

U&rjrlMHl 

H9v«4a 

Pwmtjrl-nuiia 

W«^71rginl» 

AxiwBim (overhma.) 

EbtMnprlM 

Chleago 

PortUnd 

Indlaaftpolls 

NorthM^n 

Salt Laktt City 

Ch«st«r 

MittMApoULs 

Vtmm OrXwtn* 

Astoria 

FhoAoix 
H«l«nft 
Detroit 

I Konolttlu {ov»rtuu&) 
St,. Louia (omiriMtal) 



6 Battldchipa 



2 Carrian 
10 Hmfij Cruiaan 



6 Liji^t Cruiaam 



43 Daatroyara (approxiaataljr, — 
including U undar ovarfaaul) 

U Sutaaarinaa (IneltMiijig 3 undar 
ovartuMl) 



4123 



•UKSKaKa 



2) fe?«tff#(^ 

Colorado {ovartiatil 



1 BatUaiMp 



4124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



U0L2 



U.S. NAVAL F0RCB3 Pi TtC PACIFIC AND FAR E^ST 
(eontlnuad) 



3) In Manll* 
BolM 



1 Light CrulMir 
5 D*atroy«r« 
30 isufaBArliM* 



4) In Balltc P«pan (Borooo) 
HouBton 



1 tiMvy CrulMr 
1 Light Cniltar 
8 D«stro7«ra 



5) ^f^ 3<in Frmdaco 



1 D««troy«r 

7 Sutxnarlnaa (InoXudlim 
3 undar oYwteui) 



6) In San Plato 

Concord (oTorhaul) 



1 Light Crulaar 
U Daatrojrara 
4 Sufaoiarlnaa 



7) V^m—ht at 3a* 

Saratoga 

Loulavllla 
Panaaoola 

Tranton 
Richmond 



1 Carrlar (San Diago to Paarl Hartoor) 

2 H—ry Crulaara (D«a Paarl Harbor 13 Dae.) 

(Dua UanllA 2 Jan.) 

2 Light Crulaara (In Balboa) 

(7-S. / 81-»l.) 



2 Sutaarlnaa 
X Subwkrina 



(an routa to 
(is Balboa) 



lOlago Cron C.Z.) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4125" 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4127 

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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4131 



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4132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR AITACK 

EXHIBIT NO. 177 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. Dispatch #234 dated May 18, 1939 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Slate 
Department, transmitting a proposal of .Japanese I'rime Minister Haron Hira- 
nunia, and attached memoranda dated Jnne 13 and \hiy 22, 1939. 

2. Dispatcli #242 dated May 23, 1939 from Counselor Dooraan, Tokyo, to State 
Department. 

3. Dispatch #24.") dated May 26, 1939 from Coun.selor Dooman, Tokyo, to State 
Department. 

4. Information Letter No. 393r» dated .June 7, 1939 from Eugene H. Dooman, 
Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Tokyo, to Secretary of State concerning ".Japan's 
Foreign Policy in Relation to the Situation in Europe". 

5. Dispatch #2(!.") dated June S, 1939 from Counselor Dooman to State De- 
partment. 

6. Memorandum dated .July 1, 1939 for the President from Secretary Hull, con- 
cerning the Hiranuma prt»posal. 

7. Dispatch #1S7 dated .July 7, 1939 from State Departnjent to American Em- 
bassy, Tokyo, concerning reply to Embassy's dispatch #234, above. 

8. Letter of Instruction #1767 dated July 8, 1939 from Secretary of State to 
American Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Tokyo, in reply to Hiranuma proposal. 

9. Di.spatch #319 dated .July 10, 1939 from Counselor Dooman, Tokyo, to State 
Department, in reply to dispatch #187, above. 

10. Dispatch #196 dated .July 13, 19.39 from State Department to American 
Embassy, Tokyo, in i-eply to Embas.sy's dispatch #319. 

11. Dispatch #194 dated July 12. 1939 tvom State I)e])artment to American 
Embassy, Tokyo, reporting conversation between Secretary Hull and Japanese 
Ambassador on July 10, 1939. 

12. Memorandum dated July 10, 1939 of conver.sation concerning "American 
rights and interests in China", between Secretary Hull and Japanese Ambassador 
Mr. Kensuke Horinouchi, at which time Secretary Hull protested the Japanese 
bombings of American nationals and property in Chungking, China, and made 
general reply to the Hiranuma proposal. 

13. Dispatch # 376 dated July 31. 1939 fnmi Counselor Dooman to State De- 
partment, ackn(iwdedging I'eceipt of Instruction Letter #1767. 

14. Dispatch #235 dated August 1, 1939 from State Department to American 
Embassy, Tokyo. 

15. Dispatch #239 dated August 2, 1939 from State Department to American 
Embassy, Tokyo. 

16. Dispatch #384 dated August. 3. 1939 from Counselor Dooman, Tokyo, to 
State Department (two parts). 

17. Dispatch #242 dated August 4, 1939 from State Department to American 
Embassy, Tokyo. 

18. Dispatch #389 dated August 5, 1939 from Counselor Dooman to State 
Department. 

19. Dispatch #390 dated August ."), 1939 from Counselor Dooman to State 
Department. 

20. Dispatch #393 dated August 8. 1939 from Counselor Dooman to State 
Department. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4133 



Dfpaktment uf State 

Division of Far Eastern Affairs 

June 12, 1939. 

On June 12 I.lr. Grew delivered 
to the Secretary in person tlie 
original of the nessag-e quoted in 
Tokyo's 234, Kay 18, 5 p.m. The 
message is not signed; is not 
dated; and is tj-ped on ilain, 
unheeded paper. 



FE:i^JI:R3K 



ftim^tiuiim^^iS^ 



Wsnw- 



4134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Department of State 

Division of Far Eastern Affairs 

May 22, 1939 



PA/H .:/ 

Mr. Hom'beck: / 

The Jepanese Prime Minister's message 
transmitted through the Foreign Office, and 
contained in the attached telegram from 
Tokyo (no. 234, ^:ay 18, 5 p.m.), is evi- 
dently inspired by his concern lest in the 
event of a European war the United States 
might align itself with the so-called "demo- 
cratic powers" with the result that the 
United States and Japan would confront each 
other from opposite camps. It is because 
of this concern that Japan would especially 
regard the eventuality of a European war to 
be detrimental to Japanese interests. 

In essence the message advances the 
thesis that conditions making for true world 
•peace can only be obtained through assuring 
to nations their "proper places in the world", 
and there is a scarcely disguised plea that 
the political thinking of this Government 
with regard to the so-called "have-not" 
nations be revised. Toward this end there 
is apparently an attempt to capitalize upon 
the known interest of the American Government 
and people in peace and the avoidance of a 
catastrophe such as a general world war. 

1 

/ 



FE:Bal{antine:EJL 
Sturgeon 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4135 




TELEGRAM RECEIVED 



EUflOP£AN • -^ 




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4136 c6ngressional investigation pearl harbor attack 



-2- #234» May 18, 5 p.m., from Tokyo, 

Then what are the causEs of this antagonism In 
Europe? ThEre may be contEntlons on both sldEs but on 
cool scrutiny of the European situations since the 
World War we come to the conclusion that, although 
Germany and Italy may be advised to be more patient. 
Great Britain and France also have a great deal to 
reconsider. 

Undoubtedly the intention of the United Sr.atcs 
Government Is to prevent the occurrencE of such 
catastrophe and thus to snvt Europe from the ;Ti5sEry of 
war. Similarly It is the 'irdent 'vl sh cf .Japan that 
I nations should hnve their own proper places in the 
/ world and thus the true v;orld pence might be EstablishLd 
and maintained. I ,for myself, an doing my utmost to 
realize this ideal, and on this point, I bclt-.^t will 
be found the posslblli ':;/ of much closer cooperation 
if "^ between Japan and America as well a? the founiatlon • f 

a deeper mutual understanclinp bLtwecn the tvo nations". 



m^^t 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4137 







,-^t present there Is a serious antafoaism oaonp, the 
nittions of iiurone and no one can assure that there v»lll 
te no clash in the near future. If, by mischance, war 
s to break out, its consequences would be practically 
eyond our inap.ination and the indescribable sufferin^rs 
p(>f hundreds of ni 11 ions of -jeople as well as the complete 
'destruction of civlliraticn would ensue. It is, there- 
'ore, H^srlutely necessary for us to exert our effort 
to prevent the occurrence of such catastrophe, and, I- 
b^iii^ve, that 1? the duty mainly incumbent on the United 
■tfcit<='; und Japan since these two Powers are situated 
outside th<» scope of European conflict. 

T:it^r. whf.t are the causer, of this antae~onism in 
Europe? The^i^ r.xy be contentions on both sides but on 
cool scrutiny of the European situations cince the V.orld 
..■.ir we conie to the conclusion that, nlthous-;! Oeraiany and 
Iti.y :."...• be advised to te nor^ patient, '".reat "ritain 
m; ■ 7 •'■•:. '."c 'iltv- hrive 'i ;;reat dt^al to r-.c j:i.- i ier. 

j' t-edly thti intrtntion of t,he 'Jnjtf>d wtat'^£ a?v- 
:t- - .' i t, T-revent the occuri'e'ce Tf euch c.t'ir.tror^he 
-;:.: * :.: ' sive .'.uy ■']•■•■ from the niaery of wnr. oi; li;" 
i" ■ ■■■ ^ ^- :-\ :\ 'f J •■• . '. :-it nati'vns Ptiould :\Mve 

t:.eir 



79716 ()— 46 — pt. 20 12 



4138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



2 - 



their own proper places in the world and thus the true 
world peace luight be established and maintained. I, for 
myself, am doing my utmost to realize this ideal, and on 
this point, I believe, will be found the possibility of 
much closer co-operation between Japan anl Arierica as well 
as the foundation of a deeper mutual xmderstanding between 
the two nations. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4139 

[This telegram must be closely paraphrased befin-e l)eing communicated to 

anyone (C)] 

TOKYO 

Dated May 23, 1939 
Rec'd 5 : 01 p. m. 
Secretary of State, 

Washington, 2If2, May 2S, 11 p. ni. 

(Strictly Confidential for the Secretary, Please Restrict Distribution) 

Our 234, May 18, 5 p. m. 

One. I dined this evening privately with the Prime Minister who had sent me 
word that he wished to explain his purpose in addressing the letter to you. 

Two. The first part of his discourse ran substantially along the lines of his 
letter. I pointed out that there would have to be the closest collaboration between 
the United States and Japan if they were to move jointly toward seeking a solu- 
tion of the troubles in Europe and I doubted whether such collaboration were 
possible so long as Japan adhered to its policies and actions in China. The Prime 
Minister said that public opinion in Japan would not permit of the settlement of 
the conflict with China being made a condition precedent to the American- 
Japanese move which he had in mind. The following is a summary of his state- 
ment explaining the Japanese position. 

Three. Japan had no legal obligation to enter the European war on the side of 
Great Britain but she believed that she had a moral responsibility. Her fleet 
and merchant marine were used in operations against the enemy she wrestled 
Shantung from Germany and later restored it to China and she cooperated in 
other ways toward bringing about the ultimate victory but the only thanks she 
got was the abrogation by Great Britain of their alliance. Further Great Britain 
along with the United States was complacent when China began to whittle down 
the fruits of Japan's victory over Russia. Finally the Washington and London 
naval treaties together with the Nine Power Treaty completely tied Japan's hands. 
There was bound to be a revulsion to these restrictions and that came with the 
Manchuria incident in 1931. The Prime Minister said that so strong was the 
sense of grievance of the Japanese people that the Japanese Government could 
not, even it if wished, make peace with China on terms which did not assure 
Japan economic security, and that under existing world conditions such security 
could not be provided by restoration of the status quo ante. He had already 
given careful thought to the question I had raised with regard to the need for 
making peace with China and he had come to the conclusion that it would be 
impossible to dissociate the Far Eastern problem from the conditions of unrest 
which prevailed in Europe and elsewhere and that this problem is capable of 
solution by negotiation only when the conditions which lie at the root of the 
European problem as well as of the Far Eastern problem can be considered. 

Four. I asked the Prime Minister whether he believed it likely that the 
American people would look with favor on American collaboration with Japan in 
approaching the difficulties in Europe when Japan herself was considered to be 
guilty of the same acts of which Germany and Italy stood condemned and when 
moreover the press is almost daily reporting acts of Japanese violations of 
American rights in China. The Prime Minister replied that in re.spect of the 
first point he hoped that the American Government at least realized that Japan 
had not intended or expected to engage in a war with China. In respect of the 
second point he admitted that there is justification for complaint but he said that 
Japan's first preoccupation nmst be the success of her military operations. Never- 
theless if the powers could come together to find by negotiation a solution of the 
world's troubles these issues involving American rights in China could be dis- 
posed of without difficulty. In the meantime the Government would continue its 
efforts to satisfy the American position with regard to the open door but one dif- 
ficulty was the sense of grievance to which he had previously referred. 

Five. In conclusion the Prime Minister said that this might prove to be the 
last opportunity to save the world from chaos. He was prepared to sound out 
Germany and Italy with regard to the holding of a conference such as he had 
suggested if the President were prepared at the same time to sound out Great 
Britain and France. 

Six. He ui'ged on me the supreme importance of secrecy with regard to his 
approach. 

DOOMAN. 

EMB : NK 



4140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 






J\A 



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I « . 



TELEGRAM RECETVI »BT^*" *"**^ 



EM 

Thia teltgrson wuflt ot 
olosEls paraphrased 
before bElng coBimunl^ 
catEd to anyone (C) 

Stcvzz9.rj of Stats 
Washing-ton 




From 






■9 



i 







> 24S, May 26, 8 p»«» 
STRICTLY COHFIC£»TIAI.» 
Oar 254, May 18, 5 p,«« 

One, Wir Atsbas-saclor immediat 
and 1 more rtotntij have tesd ociWEMat 
Jar-an^!'?, inciadiiiij meabera of th£ Cabin^'t^ ^ 

\t t -i-.itE Impresfiion that. In v: 

In wfc^3a^ events in Europet arc shaping, there is 
pi«6'fhErE an awclous st^i-oh for a position wM«ix v 
afford ^apan scetafttj, 

Two* In a com'ersatio'^ -^ *'«••,' 16 -' 

dor and ME one wt:'"" '- --^^ 'iTm.-^- .— • 

tlhces who tliiaJt s,s ru do £8, ■"■'"■"^ '■•'- -- 
to dcfeafc tfes -propoaal of »». •..■..-^ -'-'- ' 

j^, ow Id to iP£3i;os?s 

datsiporaclo states eapK^lallF ^^ 
, madE a at- 'S for »<Wi- 



8 







EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4141 



1^ 




S6, 8 &.-3J, Sv^» £o5qre 



States that ^..atoraticn or gooa relatione wj.tb J^pau 
«*s dE«ir.d, a atsp v*M.eh would g^^c.tly .wp^r* tho.. 
^ «crE opposing aHy nevr antl-oosiia^cm co«aitmtit. 
®-^ AJ^^H*^.. ^-<^ ^^ ^" -^^-^ ^'^ r.o.«ct^ to V, 

_^ *- -iw mij:^ IndicKtior unless rTapsK 

It offer evidiracc of infeention to tsate ^e<>. <- 

,.. .. pS3;\«« pc®.tt«: t«.;^? rtl^t "ijEt 
^^,. ■,■,-.- •.-■ Affair.'-. ^ «Du34 r 

^, ,., ,,^ , afi3 that h€ ir«»lft **'!^-' 

US'* an^l-ooKsSntuni r,OJ«slta«»t j'." 
haa tiine to ao«Kar.io«ts wit-ii 



fiEfer any 



n(i(^CT' 



lX''!iki: V^ 



4142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



EDA ~ 8 i* #235, May 26, 8 p.m. from Tokyo 



high offloJal mention.- 5 In my strictly confidential 242, 
May , - ..a one of his personal advisers, 

T -i-irt '-.''.- '=i , <ii,j not want to tie up with 

-^*v„ ^.. ...:_, ...ii there are In tJiose oountries 
„o,„F — -rents which gravely prejudice confidence 
..rrangcMEnt which Japan mi^t make with 
. - -'■.'■: subtly conveyed >-■■-*' **' •— - 

.o liUiintaln neu^i 

' to be ;■ ■ .-.ca on tt; 

ocratic states -; tb Gei^ 

,iance» I 
tht latter countries could deTc^i'. 



M 
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en ted 


cnt'a 








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ic United 




•••ent tc 










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cly 


by 


way 


of E'lropr 





EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4143 



€tik - 4 - #S35/ May S6, 8 p.m. trom Tokyo 




if It. ExistB Springs not frois any moi-al regeneration 
but fron Ttallztition that Japsm*3 sEourity can bE safc- 
Siuarded so long ao war ttorcatgna In Europe only by 
llquMating the conjflicfe trfth China, It la irapossiblE 
at thl3 tine to dEttrmine wMfchcr the more rational 
viev/6 herein reported are those which predoTslnatE within 
the .Japaneoe GovEPHKent but the standing of these \.'ho 
utter ihem entitles them to nsuch weight. 



DOOMK 



KLP !RR 



4144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



J^. 



Ko. ,■'.'.'■6 
St*? JKCT : 



\\U (-.'H AN EMBASSY 
Tokyo, June 7, 1900. 



J- 



/• ^ 



/" 



i- 

c 

O 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4145 



v.,irc elencrits li. Jw-.-an - not tc be confused with 
C'-T-t , but wllhi-.l ir.ef jact.'.^ . . -3 

esducated abroriC who hnve been telling us that re- 
action t'.:. Jaoan's ChiLa policy wh3 "just around thf? 

T" - who ; : that, ir; tie- event of a war 

;, , ;,:u, ct t . cf ueutrhlity 

betAetir. ihe ue;: rps would 

afford jHpun little .security, ftnc t.np.t r.etlur.ftl 
■jecurity could be as:-.ui-.ed ii. the lor,.-- run cr.ily by 
i; -a:., '!tln^ the oonillct viith Chli.'^. I abc ;.>- t 
uiifiv, ire c 1' t !'.p need i' or restinw- an obi.ervRtion of 
th-l3 nature cr •.- r«--;?rnably rim basis, ai.c it is 
my pTiTpofje in thi.-.; despRtch to i&y before the I«iart 
.•■ :.t the clrcunist-.i.cfes, so;r.e of perse:. 'il knov.lfcdj/e 
oti.era ■.'.hlch dorivfc by ceductior. , on -.vhieh 
• .■ V ; ■ V, ■ ■ - . or . .;. * .- ; ■ ijy «i ■;; in 

the press or in any other c forun; cf tne -lues- 

tion wJiether or ncit Janen should elif?n itself .-.ith 

It"ly - ii deed , any reference by the 
rrer-s tc thi ^ ■ .-. is offiei'^.Ily ii^terdicted - 

irforrr iticn with re^ird to tho\<-ht tr*^r;dL' hes c;j;T:e 
''■ Th'ely I ■' . 

the flri.t ation . .-eds to be 

:■ , .0, et a luiiChecn v.r.ich 

'■ of thf .. oscor and hrs. "rew 

by a Jrsr.nnene .•, . . .. , i le holci.-.p no officlul ro- 
:'. Ii''!., . ■ " J h ■-'^ friend rn.ri confident of iiirsi 

officials 



4146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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iTf- the t;- . - : \- '• ■ ■ •■ i.-v ".'r 
cire :.- • -oi:..- t:eir ^e.-t t.- .'-r-'t t; e 
"atrer.ct.-.er.i r:g . :' : . -' .-j:;! -Cc.v.i:;terc lact,", 
or at leasl tc -re vent it I'ror.. becocir..- a 
political lii.k Aith >rr.er.y ai.c Italj ; but 
it was ciii;'. uii lo xeet the ?.ri.:ument of 
those .vhc had af.voc.ted the allisrce ar.d 
are r.ov; fevcrli.;:- clo-.e assocl. -.ith 

Zfi.~nr.y <^.r.i It-ily, thfit rapiin car.not afford 

to 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4147 



-4- 




Lo be !.:Olnlec1. Gt-rmMiiy -Mid Icnly are 
urrliif. Jnwn''to cotre ovf r tc ttu^ir ;3ide", 

Ai.ll<» i\,e lie-, crutic nntiv-nr. iire turi.l-i;; tc 
Jarr.n a very cole shoulder. If, thfrel'ore, 
the deiiA:cr;iLic nn t i^.i.L'. , estecifllly t!ie t'l.iLec 
rtntes, could indcnto to >,f^j;^•^;. tJ:at rec- 
tor.", t ion 01" rood relMtioiitt .-i I ti. J'ii»«ii i» 
dt' 1: • ' . t. tl.e vi'-y 1 ;. t'Jr Jap'Ui 

to -il jf-n hor.-ioll' with •„;,(^ ric:..ocr»t t Ic 
nntU: :, "-'^r. r. jt n^-'iiLst t'.f tc t-. 1 i t> ri an 
st'ite.-, t !.i . e Jfli^ai.e St3 who Bl't- Acr-j.,^- 
J\ir pri.' c ijfl y t, :.■. c ^t^jecMver. •.■.cilf: r^-ve 
their hans" y-'ritiy 3t rer.yt!;--!:*^:-" . 



The X-'.i^apsndor said thit he fas very r.uch 'ii.ter- 
* i:. • • •■; ',."•> ;■ - , but that it must be 

^ ..;t t hi- r .' ■ :■ '.-I' r^'.cc -slid .-ooo relation? 

■ : ■; . ":.,.. ■, . I i.>j •) cv,,. iti.-n j'Tecedeut 

I- : '. ; : . i" .1 ; .. ;. t ■. v . r --l > • ; ,. \:jl:.rTei. Cb;-'!'. nhd 
y -^t, ■.. ■■ : , ; ' . :■ 'h'.. cr- ti- ;.Mt: :.-■'. !.e 
, :;•-:■:' : ■ , r<.-c.-.'r;i.:.ei.o ti't hi ■ ''Vt-rui-i.t 



irot 



tjiyt 



■':-.'-jX':2£2-.,.-a. 



■■^wi<i^~>«J»aiJA>r»ii&^iMT<iiii iS;i ii i>iia i^^ 



4148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Uiat o full stat'iir;^ .(iprineae paace ten:.ii laiglit 

hotter coine Vruh, ■ for Forei-'n Affairs. 

He unotJrt -; ' r«p^n-t tlu- cuiivorjatlon t' :r, Ari'a, 
. . A^i^,^i th-it he ,'iv« 'Aiti Ambasaa- 
■ exfla.-i^t-i Jn ■■f Japanojo objectives in 
China riiiriiuj ttie cj; :. .vhioh t'io /ur.basaador 

hud ar ■■■■ -^rLtu, wD !o.- 

{_;[•_; .v^.basiKi- 

dor and I.'.iv., C.rc* at luri' . i. on i.'.ay i'.', and I.'r. ''rs* 
prt;srran»?ea ■^; '»2<: '<i-ii«QVoi- curium' the 

lui.oh-on F»rty t ' r. Ar : ta .vhether 

our • • -.y lino consulted him. I 

QCi; iy took ■I'lV ;:.t'!. e ul' a favorable oppor- 

t;;.-v •- enj.'.Ui'e ,' r. .j'ltu i i. cnvBr-iatlor. . I found 

'' r ■■:/, '.-^ i'"i::iHar wltVi !■ . ■• • ; <: -jf the 

■irevl'Tus <iay. ;'e sal,! i\st tl.f.Te t.nQ been a auff'estlon 
tJiat V.e ^'ivfj '.:r. .'r" >ura;.ce ti.nt Japar would ..itli- 

iiold ai.y 'ict; " ■ Anti-ro:.>i!.tt'rii Tacf 

ur.til ;.r. Or''/; r -ton .niii hud an op- 

rortat.ity t<..';; .". •••tt,'. !.. ►•at th.^ possi- 

:n the country ui.' iv fit: ■ metssuiT ..hich 'and 

b-^on proposed to cc / -mi^itlo activities, and 

, if t:.o ti-n*' b-icame rip^ for the conclusion <. '.' 

• 'jria«!r discus:.' ion .'.Ith ".ertwsny and Italy,. 
:,,■ . •• : ';ed with :t. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4149 




. " ■ - 'i a c V 1 . . e r^ Ij G 1 , . - 

:ylv;t '■:-!(:v:.s.:':.- , '...■■ 
11 have to Ve ir?c:-=' s-2.:_ 



" .'.e 2 oe'j,. c r. i r .. r". t 



:^a :■ t 5 r. ; 



■; IIH ?'' i : ;:■ -.:t , its r o: 
brictje i>y .v. _ . ■ V';-!. -^ i: 



a3.3urar.c<5s ti.a- t,.e ',r:-ar.£;e.:.e :.* .;-■ r -:i3C'.:;.' :. 

the 3rlti ^h 'irx ^cv.. : '^ov^ru.. ■■-:■■... _ ■ ,.::C';Ily 

le „a^je ;-.-; plicable , but ^^e (!. r. .vritS) rerllec t;.at 

any ■irreu-er.'i.'.t AM:h :' . r^e^l t:.e Sasi^ for *!.•? ^il-se 

col lat i-r-iticn c ^i.t a:.-^'; tec by ':r-:..t Bv.t-j.'.:., rr:.i.-:^ 

/ 

Isr coll^borstU;. : - r ■■ ::,e . in tht o.n:;u'-t :t t-eir 
rolicie', ir. the ?•■ r ::.t. He ;r'liv-?rs2 hinself 3* 
ar-c i--..-t;-, ar.c .' '.- ■ :.~ i -"^r-bie ?boA of he«t over 
,:i" Robert Ct--- 1 -li^i ' 3 i;.-- ; 3 t^nce that toe assurances 
•iven«:r. Arita - oolvj any J-:-;.'-o<i g;jfi'-ty 

with 



4150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



-7- 

wlth regard to the offectlvj scope of the proposed 
arrar.,;;eraent. :-;r. Arlta concluded the conversation 
with me with the observation that decision over 
Japan's attitude vls-a-vis the situation developing 
in ^'urope would have to be withheld until results of 
the Ant'lo-Covi»t negotlatlona were known. 

A full account of the Ambaasador's conversation 
on Iv.ay 18 will be found in his tele^raa Ko. 235, Kay 18, 
7 p.n. 

The impressions which the AmUasjador and I had. 
formed of I.'r. Arita's views as expressed in the con- 
versations of I.'.ay 17 und 18 agreed in every respect. 
It seemed to us tint Tr. Arits, far fran Indioatirvg 
any e^igerness to find a v.ay to approach the demo- 
cratic nations, was preoccupied with the effects on 
the i'HT "i.-.t of the est-ibll ihmant of the "front 
against a-.'-reasion" ar.d was net in a coiioilintory 
mood. T - .vi.bassador can.e, therefore, to the con- 
clusior., as I did, tJwt there was no justification 
for be] .evlr.a th«t desire to bririf.- Japan into line 
Aith the dei-i.-'ornt ic nati >. us as n^-nii.jt the totali- 
tarian nationo SLlx'sted the Japp.r.-='se Jovernment 
as such. 
'" /.het'-.er by accident or by desi.'r^n, I was ap- 

proached on the 3&:l^ day, ;..8y Ih , by a Japanese 
hitherto unknown to De but aUo hid made the ac- 
s'oair.tance of trie .^Jnba2s•*.dor^;33 a fellow passenger 

d ur 1 r.g 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4151 



-e- 

, during a voyage across the Pacific, with the suggestion 
that I have a "chat", as h3 put it, with the Prime 
Minister. I asiced the gentleman . to call again, as 
I wished to consider the matter. I informed the Am- 
bassador of the call and cf the suggestion that I 
have a talk with the Prine t;irji3ter. Mr. Grew said 
ti^t he had foroed a favorable iaxpressiou of I'x. Fujil_ , 
^\ the person who had called on me, and that he saw no 

N reason why I should not return a favorable reply. Vhen 

Ijir. JPXiJii called ap:ain, I said that I vjould be glad 

' to have an opportunity to make the acquaintance of 
tte Prime i:ini3ter, but that 1 had heard rumors of 
the possibility of a chan^-e of .government and wonder- 
ed, therefore, whether a call at ttet time would be 
opportune. Ret'vrrjing on the folloi»/iag day, :.;r. ?ujli 

; brouf^ht an invitation from 3-':t jt. Hiranuma to r'inner 
on ;,;ay :'6, -.vh-=in he intended to explain his purpose in 
sending through iCr. Grew his aessage to the Secretary, 
and word to the effect that no chan'-e in the govern- 
ment was impending. I accepted the invitation. :.:r. 
Fujii then eihphasized the importance of keeping a 
profound secret the forthcoming talk. He said that 
Baron Hiranuraa's political po3iti;jn was reasonably 
secure, but that the alignment of factions *ithin 
the Oovern.-nent over Biiro'Dean policy was so delicate 
as to require that the Pri".e :.'.lnister set very 
cautiously . 

i.:r. 



Xv«tcaHr«H^>M$.M>iMi III •itibi««ni:n$t'3VwAMr uMaaEaea wuwS^TSX^iiV in»SE!«w'<«M!«!«k79^.u^««fran«°mc^^ 



'...js/S^^frtiiA'xim 



4152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



,V 



yr. ?ujii callad for ue un the evening of 
:..ay Hci. A3 we went in my car, which bears an 
Sinbassy license tag, :.;r. Fv,jli proposed that we 
alight some dista:.ce frore. t:£> Prine !.:inister's 
private residence ar.d go the rest of the way on 
foot; Ahich we did. At the gate of the residence 
there stood 9 number of policemen, ..l.o, although 
obviously surprised by seeing; a f&rei-'ner, stada 
no attetr.pt to stop me. The servants were prepared 
for my visit, but I have reason to believe t.'-.at 
they, as well as two female relations of the Prime 
Minister's who served us later at dinner, had no 
knowledge whatever of my Identity. It -niy.-.t be 
added that tne residence, which is situated in the 
suburbs, is small and quite unpretentious and would 
barely grace a small tradesman. These details, while 
inconsequential, may pertiaps reflect my impressions 
at the moment • 

Baron HlranvuiS received me very courteously. He 
said tt^^t lie unf ortur^ately had few opportunities to 
tieet forei-.-ners and thus to receive at first hand 
the impressions of foreigi.ers with regard to conditions 
in various parts of the world. The sit.iation in 
Europe was, in his view, a delicate one, and he felt 
confident that he could obtain from an American a 
more objective appraisal of that situation than 
he would be likely to procure from an European.- 

I 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4153 



-10- 

I expreajed regret that I was not in a position 
to •Ive hira any informotlon other than tint which 
was public k.nowlad(<e. There then ensued a colloquy on 
the situation in Europe, during which Baron liiranuraa 
displayed knowledge not only of a factual nature but 
of political trends -in Europe which surprised me. One 
of the points broutjht out which, in his viev.', made for 
dan»^er in Surore vvns t!i-st Chancellor Hitler - with 
the objectives which he tias in mind for Germany to 
achieve - provides an issue around which all elements 
in Great Britain can rally: the imperialists, who 
do not propose to tolerate a Gerr.any which can pre- 
tend to equality with G-reat Britain; the Industrial- 
ists, who fear Gerr.sn cooir.eroial compet ition; and, 
finally, the Jews, radicals and even the GerraahophiltJa, 
who vie with each ovher in their hatred of Hitler. 
Baron Hiranuma then said triat the possibility 
of a war arising in, Surope was or,e /.hi oh he couteiu- 
plated with horror. It would inevitably result in 
the totol destruction of civilizaticn, as no nation, 
however raiote from t'r.e -est of war, could hope to 
escape the aveatual cc:.3-- "uences even thourh .it aii*:ht 
be fortuMte to avoid direct involvexent . He had 
publicly st-Jted on several occasions that Japan 
could never be a de locracy or n tutalit'irian state, 
and that Japan could make its greatest contribution 
by bringing toi-ether in h8r,.jiilou3 and peaceful 
relations the two ~:roup3 of :.■-. ti -,-r.3. Ttere wore, 
he continued, elsruc>:.t3 in Japan which considered that 

Japan 



7971fi O— 46 — pt. 20 IH 



4154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




-11- 



Japan could not afford to maintain a condition of 
; isolation and that her security demanded that she 
; enter Into "special relations" with Germany and 
j Italy. He was insisting, however, that Japan 

follow what he termed "moral diplomacy". A nation's 
p existence was not to be measured by decades, and 
it was essential., therefore, that statesmen charged 
with the destinies of nations fix their attention 
, on long term objectives rather than on gaining 
favorable tactical positions, which were after all, 
ephenerul. The most l.T.portant of these objectives 
was a stabilized peace to replace interludes of 
preparation for the next war. Japan, like the* United 
States, was not directly involved in the troubles of 
Kurope; and it was his thought that these two nations, 
which were the oily Great Powers situated outside of 
Europe, were in a position to exerciae a moderating 
influence on Kurope. To exercise that influence was 
a duty which they owed their o.-,n oeoples, for the down- 
fall of Eui'ope would inevitably bring with it the 
downfall of the rest of the world. In his opinion, 
the first step which had to be taken was to check 
the tendency toward the division of Europe into two 
politically hostile camps. He wondered whether the 
views of the American Government were responsive to 
those which he had expressed in his message to the' 
Secretary. 

I 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4155 



I said that the American Government had taken 
a lead, in respect of both time and eiiivhasis, in 
aiaking known the fact that nations are to::aj' inter- 
dependent and that discord betAeen any nations Is a 
matter of concern to all others. His message to the 
Secretary cid not, I said, contain any definitive 
suggestion as to how the United States and Japan might 
proceed toward averting war in Surope. The principal 
difficulty, in zy opinion, in the way of the collabora- 
tion -Ahich he had suggested in talking to me was Japan's 
policies and actions in China. I felt certain that 
the ,\aerlcan Government would, in other more happy 
circumstances, have welcomed Japanese cooperation 
toward alleviating the tiireat to peace in 2urape 
which, the great majority of Americans believed, 
arises from the policies and actions of Gerxany and 
Italy, and I doubted <vhether the American people 
would favor collaboration /.it a a nation which it 
believed to be following in the Far Sast precisely 
those policies and actions that are considered to 
be the root of the trouble in Europe. I also said 
that the American people have laid before them nearly 
every day reports of bombings of American property 
and of other instances of violations of American 
rights and interests in China. The Foreign Office 
was trying to exculpate the Japanese military auth- 
orities by pleading military necessity or inadver- 
tence, but enough had happened to justify beli«f that 

the 



4156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




-13- 

the Japanese authorities, in China at least, were 
aystamatically and deliberately trying to expel 
American and other foreign interests from China. The 
views of the American people in these respects were, 
I an id, very definitely formed. I could not but 
feel, tiierefore, that the adjustment of the conflict 
in China on terms satisfactory to all concerned would 
have to be a condition precedent to that degree of 
collaboration between the United Stntes and Japan 
which could reasonably be expected to brine; about' 
the desired results in Europe. 

The Prime i:ini3ter observed that he was ^nell 
aware of the state of feeling; which prevailed in 
the United States Sr'ainst Japan. The American 
people hac assumed that Japan had deliberately 
provoked the conflict in China with u view to 
seizing the more populated and productive parts 
of that country, lut he felt confident that the 
American CJovernraent realized that it had not been 
the orifinnl intention or desire of Japan to do 
anyt-irif.- more than to protect Ito ric-'hts in North 
Oi.ina. It was also suppoeed by Americans that 
Jacan intended to close the C-^en loor in China; and 
to his regret the actions of the Japane^-je auth- 
orities in China were not entirely reconcilable 
•Aith the de.rlre of the ^nri-.r.Qse Government tc 
respect foreign riel.ta aiid interests i.. China. 

But 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4157 



-14- 

But he wondered whether the American Government 
realized that the Japanese people labored under a very- 
real feeling of grievance against the Cccidental 
Powers, especially Great Britain, .'/hen the Great 
.Ver brcrice out , Japan was an ally of Great Britain. 
There were no legal obligatiotis on Japan to support 
her ally, but she conceived that she had a moral ob- 
ligation to do so. Jhe accordingly declared war 
aj-'iinst Germany, her navy undertook operations 
against the German fleet in the Pacific, her 
merchant icarine cooperated in various ways, and 
finally her military forces eliminated OcT.aany 
froa Shantung. "The only thanks we got free. 
Great Britain", continued Baron Iliranuaa, "was 
the abrogation of that very alliance which inspired 
Japan to support Great Pritain." Again, the rights 
which Japan had ac'iuired in J'.anchuria as a result of 
her war .vith Russia and later by a^reeaient with 
China were essential to Japan; nevertheless, the 
efforts of China to prejudice those rights were 
regarded by Great Britain and the fnited States 
with complacence, if not with benevolence; China 
took courage to persist, with the result that Japan 
had to resort to force in 19^1 to protect those 
rii-hts. Finally, the Japanese people came to the 
conclusion that the liiae' Power Treaty and the Kaval 
Treaties operated, not to stabilize peace in the 
Far 2ast, but to bind Japan against safeguarding 
her interests in China. 3o long as the Japanese 

people 



4158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL- HARBOR ATTACK 



-15- 




people felt that it had just cause for grievance, 
it was politically impossible for hid (Sovernment or 
any governaient which would succeed hix to bring 
about conplete ejuality of opportunity in China for 
all nations. 

The Japanese people, Baron Hiranuma coutiuued, 
have considerable sympathy for Oero-any and Italy, 
as they conceive these cour.tries to be in cany im- 
portant respects in the same position as Japan. It 
was not to be expected that Geni.any would have por- 
Kitted herself to reaain under the restrictions 
of the Versailles Treaty, nor that Italy would have 
been content to be dependent on other nations for 
supplies of raw xaterials. At the saae tioie, the 
consequences of efforts on their part to redress 
their grievances by force, or of the stubborn 
r^iusal of the denr-ocratic nations tc offer to 
correct these grievances could not possibly be 
confined to the protagonists in t^e lurorean 
but would have tc be shared by other nations. He 
referred to my observation that the settlenent of 
the China conflict would probably have to be a 
condition precedent to joint ^uier lean- Japanese 
efforts, to moderate the situation in Surope. If 
that virere to be the view of the American Government, 
any hope of proceeding along the course which he - 
had in mind would have to te abandoned. The ob- 
jectives which Japan has had in China are essential 
for her security in a world of sanctions, embargoes, 

closing 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4159 



-16- 

clo.'iji; •■ •■..:• ft: to roroi^;n cor;j eti t lot., mid lack 
of free aoce.-; to i-Hv, materials, and 30 long as iiuct. 
onOitUns exist any moderation of her objectives in 
China and', therefcu-e, of her peace terms, cculC not be 
consirored. Nevertheless if coiiditions could be brc ufcht 
about wi.lci, would assure to nil np-tions market," for the 
world's ^ooiU^ on the basis of quality and price and 
..upulies of the Mterifels which ihey needed, the im- 
portasxe to Jaynn of securlt-e' Q market and acurces of 
raw naterials in China vwulc greatly aiminiah; and by 
ti,^ -n t; ere woulc not be the virre that there 

now is on .or . ..y iind Itnlo-' t^ e:<-^anc Rt th.e ex:e!.3e of 
•,e;il<"r and li-x'-Ufr i.at ic^n. . :• I'l ' i ■■ ^-uma stated th'it 
t;,^, .1 . ,, ; t i, I..-. 'a].U-\ hruui !.t ubuut the si turiti< n.j in the 
Far I'-ast and .furore are not. local ^ut universal in 
character, and t hn t n.'ith.r :ut..ati.-n could be r-ettled 
'in a mnm.e;- calculated to brinr about a stabilized 
peace unlrrss the conuiti.n.s which brought them about 

•.\ere co:-r-' . •. <- . , 

' . ; inr -.nu-.K sale t: ■•■t t. e belief was viideiy 
heir, abroad that Javan 'Aa;;, coi.si Cer In,- a aailit.^ry 
■•llir,:;oe ..ith ;pr:.-M.y :ui. IImI:.. ': .ndeavcred 

to exrlaii •-•nnkly the basis of Jarane^e sympathy 
f<ir ".erirva.y -.n-' Italy, ruui he coulc say iuite 
definitely th.-.t ti.e basis of Ai-it ars^'^'red to be a 
concerting of Japanese policy with t:.-.t of aeri!.any 
r^r.i ll-.]y lay in ti..- : ^ '.il t-hre.:- countries 

'ir>^ in the saj-.e oc - .,■ !■•/; c jlrf-ter-c i .> ili^n. ;■•-' 

personally 



■4iiSmiwmi- 



4160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



-17- 



personally was of the o.-.inion tJajt Japan, whose 
governmeiit would for al 3 time to coine rest on the 
sanctity of the hh'er\e) iixr.Aly, coul^ not tie 'tself 
by special relntl(iis tt. any foifflftn (••overna.ent 1^hoae 
stability depended on the continued existence and 
political prHMt l(.-e of one inilivicuul. There were 
both in Gerrjmy aiic iLhi.v poHtical cui'renta fio*ini~' 
bcr.t^ath tae surface which., in his view, wou]ci fcTHvely 
'>rejudlce conficJence in any political arrar^ ecent , 
Guch as a;, alliance, whicl. Jarnn ir.i.rj.t a^eke with tiioao 
co'./ntrl ^'.s. nic.den cissident eleirei.ts would be certain 
to make the:' sfl v«^s fe]t in time of vmr end thus ere 
'^o be rechi-ned as a tiireat to the i-uccesa of German 
nn(i Ttal iar. amit!. 

/.t tliis point we were lijterrupted hy notice 
that dinner wes served. The conv-Tsati i.n during 
dlni.er wns not ii; any way pertinent to the :;ubject 
of tldF. deoPdtch, bein^i confined to discussions of 
poi ts in Chinet^e phllnfOT>hy , personal ren.inif!eence3, 

ft 

■nd oc on, the Frine '.:ini£ter discour^ilne in a most 
Intwreytiw nHnner. 

Ret'.rnJ j.(j to his stucy, the Pria;t "..inlstfer said 
th(:L he wiiilied to draw together the various threads 
of our conversation, as follows: 

The 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4161 



-Ifc- 



Il;e UiiLtec btfites ar.o •^bzht, ..ere the only 
jC'Aers vir.icJ. o^.-,: :.• 1; t c. ;revt-:.t t.:.r j;.. it,Blli- 
zetioi. of the tre:.d ccAarc tl.e civicioa ^: ^.r---.t: 
i :.t& ar.i.eo can-- -, T.-.-^re car., ho'Aever, be r.o ccn- 
ficent Lora that a rerz^r.ei.t peace can be estallisr.- 
ed until the v.orl- -.-.Ice ec'.-i c2.ic ■ ,.^ ■ -litical ccn- 
ditions 'Ahict brli.fe- about unr'.-.t i:. ..^re;» t: - ii, 
tl.e Jsr Sast cei. re c^rrect-;-^ ; ar.d if ar. inter:. a- 
tioi;€!l ccnfere:'.ce can be c«.llec tc solve the protlfts 
Vihich create uiir«.=.t, Zf-.-p.i. .•■ . !•• be jrerared tc 
agree to the inclusion of t;.e :ut £e.?terr. ~it^".ti.,r. 
ST-cng the .rrotler.i tc be ci.-i-ussec. 3ef. re %:.y call 
fcr 3ucr. a cori'erence oculc be issued, Great ?rit = i:. 
^ and i"ra:.cft, and aerr.any ant" Itsly, -acuIc nave tc be 
sounded out. If the Pr*- I \.-z wtre pre-gred tc :La.<e 
a co.'.f i:?r. - :sl aprrcaci. tc ihe .:,urr-'-:;r:n cei.ccrscies; 
he -.icuic he ::-lad tc approach ■:'.e.r.,-:.y end Italy; and, 
if tnere /*ere returned ; ■=.-.■_ rf-.r >■ r-'plic? by these 
:.at:cr.3, he -acuIc be glac tc r.ave tlie fresident call 
the conference under zuct. conditions as night be 
s.-reec ..pen after cisoussion t.r ',,h ni.r..°l diplo- 
r-.atic channels. 

: •; : - :_'-: :'. Olrf:-, bef ;- . ■^*,;;.,j f rT.l cer- 
t<5in ccnclusi r.a Ahlch I dr-.-. f r; . these Cv: v-r:;3ti -ni> , 
th'- t I dc net put fc-.-^rc t^e v:e'.».3 cf t.. • 
even thcu^-h th-.:y be per. or- : .■■■--"- '. -..'.ce and 

:..;■ .-;.," - .■--.. :. . -" - '-' ■''- :-■'-'. :-.---'. i.S, 

>it!. 



4162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



_19- 

Ait.li i..f It. r ,,at.j-i. , '\:} be hifi i-tice:t;;arl ly the 

v!i>ws •■'■ ' ' •■ je Goverijii.*! * . These urt^, however, 

■ ' ■• , . .-. ri-i'.il olorr.m.t. i i, ihe ievoriiitinrit : they 

• ..ey n.'iv lUy'- , Vut Lhey cannot le i.iicred. 

J,, i .■■ i vvr '.v^? 1? In ?»ny way sensltiv-^ * •■"'r-^i 
■■'•■ wc'ul' , ? t' ■ •■ . vi-> lii Tokyo todiiy , L- c,.;... a.wti-.r 
■ ■■ ' ;. • : ■■.; ly ".Ti'.iii't the ^Mtherliic; ijtorii 

; ;. .'..i-i'... ] i.,..;. Hi-:.: ^i'''' iierai.tl.f* i f>l ly that the 
"•'uroj-'' t '••: •' ' ly h.Lj^. 11 iiihud t■ru.^-'X•y iropcrtlor.a , 
■nid tii'il iL .viiwi. ' •. ary Lo ;,uppotio that, the preaei.t 

- ■ -: ;. conccr;:: ■ j.u;-ae which •'-- ■ ■' - ' ^' "-IV^v 

uc tt- deafonc'.ei.ct' ever tho ni-firt. ' i .. i i.t-i f ro'^^ual 
■'.lilies 111 Chii.-t. TT.e An;.y iu.<i <. ! .,ei- eleK.ents Ai.ich 
I hvi;--. far cos.ti- lU^a CliiiiR policy h'tve asdunnd that 
■■ ".riL-tf-TJi coi.riiiH coulc be I enimiitji.tl;. and cuiu- 
: .■ • ; ■; . ■'.] .'.v' 4.-Mi!.. t, i>'ptircus.">i <.'ii 9 fi-oi.i .-.i tuMtii-nL^ 
flse/«hei'«- , u.'. they • look to .iT.r.-ricen aur. otl.i r 

^ocic. ■":•■• ;. in .thnt ccrfllct. Althoutl 

rofcrei.cr h;; ba-'j-iy's tele(_-rau.j t,i.' the 

■'ff.-cts ci" thf Tn:-'.:.' . ■' •' •> Ch!>r.c»«]]or latlm-, 

: CO tjct beV • , ctulc, rLhcr relt-rerxu* to 

tl.'.it. :■•• , • it ha<: tuwurn 

• . ■ :J i u.e thHt t!if>re 

• f -TJiVc i!>ii. •« - ..:j,oi.;. vi ; th the • • -tf-:^ 

•'not directly 's; ■ :.f iacii'.ic „urope", 



.licei.t, , 

be 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4163 



be resisted. But 11' war wei-e tohreHK out in iurope ■•.it;. 
the T'r.lr»c' :;tnt-L- { articipBti i,?: un the ..;lce of Gre>it ?-ritf-ii. 
nnd i-rt'i.co, t ht- outcome Iii the view of thuse Jij]-!,' • .■<.o 
think aloiu- rMtionn] linns vioulc edinit of no Uoubt. ..itli 
Geriaany and It'ily ciusi.oc , the prosoect of coiSvoulihc the 
victors wculc not bo a palEtuble one tc Japan. 

Thero aiv, therefore, it. tt.t: .-ii Lvjiit i..n which see!;.:; t- 
he developing- but tv/o courses for Jar>-a. lo fcillow - eithf^i' 
to i. o over urireaervedly to the totuli ti.rian .'j'...--, i^r to 
re.'-tore i"oo(i relf.tir.^ vnith these nn t.i', ns v.hici. , i:. the 
0"i}i'i-!j; of one oj-^i-ej.t of tiie J^)-!i:,eM« Ooveri . ' ;. ' , vvculc. 
be the vi'i:-:,. True, in rej-ctii.K Lho ;i% . to Join 

■Jer;.!'!,;/ -ii.t! itnly in an aliifinct;, vuv-in r^'O'^'-'^i I'^Hy choae 
a third coui'sc - nir^utr') 1 i t.. . 1 m;. 1 ;.•■ 1 iiit-o , Lav.'.vey , to 
doutf. whether th.ere :ire uint.y Jap»ine;:c .sh-. confideritly 
b^-l ievc th'it i.f-ulrality 'aouIc af!'t;rd Jieci.ri ty . Tlie lir.-- nip..M,ti! 
of tn . f A.'iO believe in the ju;h,tLiI' ;;o\v«;r of w.r.in;, -in^. 
It.-ily ■jr'=- i-bvious i:i.6 iiiir.^ie: Jm; ? n ii-is or.ly to arssociate 
herr.elf a'.:.:. thv;.;e count i' '■_ ;.; .-i-.u v»a it f v t. no u.-urtuj ,var 
to p'rk China like p. ripe r.lu;;. "ut , fur ti...-, '.- t'-;; 'u.-'.#e 
wi.o nave other vi>'V.r c. :.'-ern'i , tie ; ./.vei* of ;■ i'. .-: y and 
Itftly, th!-re it;' hut one way by A!ii.-'h Jupan'o Security can 
■-.>.■ : if''; -j'l ■■■ , ;:■■ ": .• i 10 brir,' the conflict Aith 
Cull.'. ' .. ' ..', '). ._^;:'.'-- r ■■■■,.:.. : .■• l^T .. 'lii:!':'':' nj-'iin I 

f.\r'. ' . . : ■- ■ t the ^<:.:\:'- for a .^ettleiT.fM.t of 

the ooi.f'ict '■'•. n-t lerive tro:. ;■■ 1 rV(.>^s.' : ■' . i but 

fron :■• •; ' rHtitt. c : . ' ; ■ ■:-t;-. 

In , 



4164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



-21- 



Ir. cciiCluc : : ^ 

ur.o^r.sclorifebly .1;;. ■, 1 - ; ::■. : . ; : . 

^- ...... ^-.z.^ .:. ::. cc;.v; r_i:i:,:. v.lL'. ::.• 

!-:ir.ister C :v .-::'•; i. k:' 1' ''■ '. r .■ , -Ahoie :;••=■ 

Is obvicus t;.«t t;.e .e = ^:t : ■ ' ;.:.:' 



I :-- <:;reac 



collebcT'-t; Icn t 



V r. I ,- ts V 



tj i. ^ - ■. ..C - . 



:r ! -T .'.;.- riC'tr 



aoou^ '---.ct; .:, -...:e S'ir.c m tr.e 



al.-cst an q&c-^-' " "' ^-' t;ie rcrei; :. i:ir.l..'ter t j 

of view reflect ccr.:2 ictir.K rclici--;s, 6i;c v..Mcr. ol" c.ese 
policies will ;i'«v^il :., ;-.. •' . ',f decided ty ever.ts of 



tr.e r.ext fe.s 



':" 'lly yours, 




IcCOr 



^/htf^^^^ 



.L ST., 



Cr^r,,e z' AV^'sLv^iS '^ i;.ier:: 



J^V 



.\! 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4165 




. fi 



SEGPCtary of State 
Iffashingtoa 



fokyo 
FRCSMitca June 6, 1939 
Reo'd 8:05 a.m. 

265. ,^. 8, 7 J. -^ ' \ ^'^^- 

STRICTLY Xl.PWEmUL. Our 246, May 26, 8 p.m. 
One, Th£ irlloh Aiabassador gave mz In strict «onfl- 

:■ ■:£ an aioounT^af 'aIs oonvErsatlon yesterday with the 
Minister for foreign .-.rfalrs as follows j (a) He told Vim 
Minister for Foreign Lrthlrs thrt hz ha-l heard that there 
had been rene-'J: urc on Japar. •;'j adhet*E to the Qt.tritmn 

Italian allian'^.L- .-uvl he inquired wbetl.Er there had hern 
any change In the ncis-itlve 'iecislorj taVcn In April >yy 
the Japanese Oovernnxnr. , The Poreigh MinlatEr replied 
that the.";- lkh no {repeat no) change but that iTapan'p 

position wo T to Vc rEExamir:E-3 UT!on ti;c coT'.oluslon 

of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations cor: an Rntl-.aggx>es- 

slon paot, (b) The Arabaaaador thEn usKCd for clurlfloa- 
tion of the Japanrsc attitude via n vis the -'iff 1 vul t lea 
rct'-vccn roland and Gerraany. Ths r. Minister sB.ld 



th'it hi 


3 


rr.pl.; t 


thtit 


quest 


ion 






'.: fov'nd in 


his 


prcsf.n.' 


•i' 


,ion of 


the four cardinal 


poi 


nta Japan's 


)!:ritudc 


|H|^H| tow'ird 


European 


probl' 






' I 


fSt 


point ia the 


t Japan 


^^^K mnlnta' 


V'- 


; friEnr 


llyrelr 


tiona 


witl 


1 


toth 


Germany and 
and 


Poland 
therefo|MB 



o 
o 



0) 





IS*, 



4166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



- 2 - #265, June 8, 7 pjn,, fro« ToVyo 



m 



and the rEfo •£ hopes that they will ptaocfully resolve 
thtlr present difficulties t Japan It prepared, without 
ooatmltment as to the mcrlta of the oauaes of their dis» 
putf , t lend its good offiOEs toward restoring good 
relatlona tetween the two oountrisa, fhe acoond Is that 
without prejudice to JfApan'a intention to anrold Involve- 
ment In the affairs of Europe, "Her relatlona with Oer- 
many extend beyond the framework of the Anti-Comlntem 
Paot". The third la that the results of the Anglo-3ovlEt 
negotiations will determine to a large extent whether or 
not Japan can avoid Involvement in Europe, The fourth 
la the possibility of Japan and the Wnltcd States colla- 
borating to /bring about a detente In Europe and th'us 
creating opportunity in Europe for laying do«n a basis 
of durable peace; the vlCwa of the Ainsricnn GovensBient 
In this respE'jt are being explored* (c) In the general 
dlsousalon which follC5w«-d the Foreign Minister again 



Enphasised Japan' 

t l!>,t 1 '<r.>;5 nr J ntlnr, 

to 

in -:iH., i< '^r t... Ti; , 

dcf--- - ■ 

«fitri:ir. i. u 

an Innovat i jn ui ■ 
Union fron '■"■■' ' -^p 



n t o 



rn over the Anglo-Sbvlct nego- 

rinot be Indifferent 
•.-.'o.Jld sx-rengthcn th£ position 
. ' " ■ , The Ambassador in 

Soviet t7niQn 
;■; i rorsr. j.n t.r.rnne referred to ■ 
"-"'■"'"^ ... -revEnt the Soviet 
' ■ -f . ThE Foreign 

Minlsttr 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4167 



3 - #265, June 8, 7 pi 



9M Tokyo 



Minlater rldioulEd that possibility whEr-capon the Ambaasa. 
dor made thE rejoinder that his GovErnraent has Indls- 
putablE EvidcnoE from both Ooman and Soviet sources that 
rappronhcmEnt between those two countries la now an 

&:■ ' ion. 

Two, The Ambassador gained the v ery definite Im- 
pression that the ao-called decision with regard to Jap- 
anese policy recently referred to hy the presv's is not a 
definitive decision but mereiy a conclusion reached by 
the Cabir; r. the result of the Anglo-Soviet 
negotiations. Ke belicvEs that the hardening of Ameri- 
aun sentiment apaln.!': Ocrmany Is largely responsible for 
the present confusion of the Japanese Government -with 
regard to lt.s European policy, his analysis of local 
trends following very closely that presented in our 
telegram iin:3-'r rcfcrenoe. 



JXjOMAK 



HPt> 



4168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



[ «Tl««T*ltV Of IT* 




c^^M 



f 



ff 




DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
WASHINGTON 



July 1, 1939 



Her^iAth, 



MHMORANDUM FOR TH£ PRESIDENT 



for approval: 



^ 



(1) Draft of proposed note to Jsipar.. Though 
It takes off from the Tientsin situation. It raises 
the whole Issue of the Japanese "now order" In China. 

(2) Proposed personal message from the Secretary 
of State to the Prime Minister of Japan. 

Also: 

(3) A personal message (Document No. 3, attached) 
sent me by the Prime Btlnlster through Ambassador O-rew, 
(to which No. (2) above Is the answer). Its drift Is 
that the United States and Japan, as the only two 
powers outside European conflict, might cooperate to 
"save Europe from the misery of war". 

(4) A long mall despatch from Dooman (Document 
No. 4 attached), explains the Prime Minister's mesaaga. 
It relates an amazing conversation between Dooman and 
Prime Minister Hlranuma. From page 9 on, It Is well 
worth reading. This Is, In effect, a private deaarefae 
of the Prime Minister to ue. On Its face, It suggests 
Japanese-Amer-ican cooperation In endeavoring to work 
out a peace agreement between Germany and Italy 
(through Japan) and France and Great Britain (through 
us). 

If you approve, I plan to send the Japanese note 
and the reply to the Prime Minister together. 



c )H 






•si 

I 



M 



S^9 

<*> 


1 




%» 




7^ 


r 


Z 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMIITEE 



4169 



wax INDIOATI vmCTMCK 



Telegram Sent 



MlMt 

Ckuf* 0«p«rtfflMit 



SL^of tm^ttt of i^iate 



TO M TKANMIITTCO 

X CONFIDCNTtXL OOOC X 

NONCONFIOCNTIAL OOOt 

PAATAIR 

PLAIN 



dMcfats 

S 



U-' 



^i./r- 



(959 JUL 8 AM 10 15 
AlOUBASSY, 



Wathinitalp 
July^, 1939. 










TOKYO (^AVK 

oonfidintul/ 




i.c; 



Your 234, May 18, 5 p.m.' 

/ / / / , 

■II The Department ie sending you by pouch the text of 

/ / / ' ^ 

a reply to the message quoted In your telegram under 

reference. 

/ / 

TheDepartment authorizes you. If you feel that a 

~7 / /■ ' I 

uiieful purpose would be served thereby, to Inform the 

/ ''' / / / 

Foreign Minister orally and In confidence that a reply 

is en route. If you feel that it would be advantageous 

/ / / ' / I .' 

to present the reply before t he text will have reached 

It / ' ' 

you by mail, please so inform the Deoartment by cable, 

/ / / / • 

giving a statement of your reasons, whereupon the 

Department will consider telegraphinp t he text to you. 




G» 



JV& 



l.«^»' 



FE::tiMH:HE8 

Enciphered ly . 

Sml by operator . M.. 

I>. O. R.-No. to 



n. u'- 



"-^^.(/-.^ 



19 



T^- 



>>> 



-J 
D 






Hi 
00 



79716 () — 46 — pt. 20- 



-14 



4170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



July 8 1939 



OOHflDKltTUL ~ ypR STlT r UBl OW.T 

■o. :' t- '■ 

tugeriA H. DooMua, Isqairo, 

American 0harg4 d'Affairaa ad interia, 
Tokyo, 

Sir: ■// • ' 

Raferonoe la mada to the Effltaasy's telegraa no. 234, 
May 18, 5 p.m.. In which thara la giran tha taxi of a 
raessag* from the Prime Mlnlatar vhloh «aa handed to 
Ambeftsador Ore* toy the Minister for Foreign Affalra with 

the request that Mr. Oraw deliver the massage personally 4w 

O 

to me. There la enclosed a reply to this maaaage. • 

O 
The Department desires to be consulted by telegraph O 

with regard to the question of the time when the reply — 

should be dellTored. Therefore, before arranging to 04 

call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the purpose 

of handlnp- the reply to him for transmlsBlon to the Prima 

Minister, oleaae telegraph your opinion whether an op- 

oortune time for presentation of the reply has arrWed, 

offerlnu- also such comments or aupgestions as may oocur 

to you with repard to the tart of the proposed reply. 

*Vhen you deliver the reply, the Departnent desires 

that you inform the Minister for Foreirn Affaire that It q 

is requested that the reply be regarded as strictly • f5 

confidential end not for )ublioation. 

Very truly yours, 



Enclos ire: 
Reply to Prime 
Minister. , \^ '^^ 




,.it 



FE:MMH:HES FE 
7-7 - ^ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4173 




0» hit t^tam %9 ffMhlttgiton AmbatMdor Or«« d*- 
llT«T«d to •• ptrsonnlly %h« ■•SMtg* whloh Tour Ixo«l- 
l«tt07 ««• so good Ml to plaoo in hit luuads through tho 
Japonooo Xlnlotor for 9»rolgA Affairs. I baro road 
with UBooual latoroot tfai ozproaaioao of Tour Iseol* 
10Bfi7*« ooBOom at tho oxlotonoo aaong tho natlono of 
luxopo of antagoaioa whloh aay load to ^on oonfllot, 
aad of Toor Ixoolloikoy't ooaMom aa to what tho oonso- 

quoaooa Might bo to alllloaa of pooplo and to olvlllsa- 

1 
ticn ahoiad ouoh aatagonlM load to aa oattooak of war. 

la thla altoat&oa Tour iseolloaoy oooa It aa tu.^ iatj 

of tho OoTermoata of wur two ooumtrlot, owing to tholr 

altoatloa * oat a Ida tho aoopo of Baropoaa oonfllot" to 

osort offorta to proront tba ooourronoo of tho oaaualty 

OBvlaagod. 

Z hOTO oarofolly aotod alao tho atatoaontt par- 

talalag to tho eaosoa of atralnod rolatlona In tha 

Ivropoaa altoatlon, tha Intoroat of ay Qovonaont la 

tho prooorvatloa of poaoo, aad finally tho "ardoat wlah 

of Japan* that tha rolatloaa of natloaa al^t ho so 

arrangtd that truo world poaoo would ho oatabllshed aad 

■alntalaod. 

Toor tsraollonoy will hawo no doubt, In tho light 

of tho pobliahod uttoranooa of tho Prosidont and ayaolf 

and of tho priaoiploa. wo havo adrooatad and aupportod, 

that tikO Ooreraaont of tho Oaitod Statoa wholohoartodly 

doalroa to aoo ootabliahod and aalntalnod upon tho ^ 

baaio 



4172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

-2- 




tesls of f&lr de&llng and fair play between and aaoag 
nations a oonditlon of true world paaoe. With ••p«cial 
refereno« to the aituation In Xuropa, Tour Exoellanoy ■ 
will be apprised of the reoent earnest efforts of this 
QoTernment: the President's identio messages sent oa 
Septefflber 26, 1938, to the head* of several luaropeaa 
goremments whioh had reaohed an alaraing oriels in 
their relations; identio messages addressed on April 14, 
1939, by the President and myself respeotlTely to the 
Ohanoellor of the Qerman RaIcL and to the Premier of 
Italy with regard to the possible r;<>aoTal of the 
pervading threat or fear of a European war. 

It would be most gratifying to me, and X may also 
speak for the President, if there oould be found vaye 
for the use of your Government's influence toward die» 
oouraglng among European governments, espeoially those 
governatents with whldti your Government may have epeoial 
relations, the talcing of any aotion, or the pureuanoe of 
any polioy, that might endanger the general peaoe. X asi 
oonfident that any suoh oontrlbution as this would oon^ 
stitute a hl^ servloe to thoee great sections of 
humanity which live ii^ fear of the devastation of war. 

In further referenoe to Tour Excellency's expressed 
desire to see a true world peaoe established and maia- 
tained, I venture to observe, in a spirit of frankness 
whioh I trust will not be misxmderstood, that this ob- 
jective ie made the more remote by the exletenoe and 
the continuanoe of armed oonfllot and ooneequent 
political disturbances in the far East today. Just aa 
the unfolding of evente in the European sphere have 

their 






EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4173 







th«ir T«p«rous8lon« la the Air l&tt, ao^ it app^urc, tb« 

prolongation cf abnoraal conditions in tlia Ikr last 

tontributo to oausea of unrest in luropo. Aaorioatn 

opinion it thoroforo porturtosd by tho trend of erents </ 

in the Far £ast» eepeoially with regard to tim aethods 

of Japan in relatione with China. 

If, therefore, it should prove iapraot ioahle or 
inexpedient to malce effeotire contribution at onoe to 
the settlement of problems arisinpr in the European 
area, there ne-vertheless would be urgent need for the 
exertion of efforts in oonneotion with disturbed condi- 
tions in other peograohioal areas, especially by tho^e 
nations which nay unhappily nam be en^ged in armed 
conflict. It is ay view that each peaceful settlement, 
in whatever peopraahioal sphere, constitutes a stabiliz- 
inp- element and an important step toward improvement in 
the general world situation. 

Tour Kxcellenoy may be assured of the genuine de- 
sire of the President and myself to do all ithln our 
power to convert into practical results those principles 
and hopes to which we have frequently given expression 
in connection with the foreign relations of the Govern- 
-aent of tJ^ United btates. ilille this Government does 
not perceive any practicable ste^s which it alpht use- 
fully take at this time in addition to those already 
taken, this GCTremment is sincerely Interested in the 
purrestion contained In Your ^xcellf^ncy's aessare, and 
in giving further consideration to tn-it suggestion 
would be pleased to have such further information as 

Your 



4174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR Al^TACK 





Tour Ixoell«noy way find it agMMible to offtr by «*y 
of aaplifying and oaking mor« definitiT* Tour Xxool- 
l«noy*B oonoept as to the etepa which might usafully 
be takan toward modtratinp the situation in Eur ops. 




FE:LDS/:aiH:HES 
7-7 






r-u 



X) 



Y> 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4175 




EG FROM 

This messajE must be 
oloarly paraphrasEd be- 
fore bcln--;; oommvmicatcd 
to anyonr, (Br) 



Tokyo 

Dated July IQ, 1939 

Rec'd 7:43 a, mi. 




n- 



-; ,C <. "'rh J " 



Secretary of State, t' 

^3h.in:ton. lA 

I, ."^uXy 10, nOon, 
.••.T\' CO:i?lDENTIAL. 

n;. ao ■• ' ,"*^Lr':i in cnr'-rct ' "re reply to 

the tnrsan.T /. \. ;. ^'fif initive, t:^^ ur .-.sv'.'cin,^ of It 

v. 

(•.'frpraV, not) a nal *, ^r of particular urgency, 
rfvrr,. I ivn bri-i:.; aalced every Xr»v days whether I 
av-: r' f.-ivro any reaction to the v xkms and dcfxnitivfc 
uj,,.rsf-,lon r^portru in. our 242, Ilay 2o, 11 p.n. Some 
i,tior of the Department's vic-'s thereon v^ould be 
I' aorrcciat-- ' . 





DOC'l.\Aii 



UK,' 



Ccllabor'ation by tbvC nni':ri 3 :.t. i; 1 J.iaan to 

cirtMe ;-.:V1 ' ical d i !'f l'-u1 M ;-.■ i t: ^'.'u-ope . 




O 

o 



O 




4176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



WIU. INOICATI WHCTHCa 



Telegram Sent 



Collect 

Chug* DsptrtmMt 



on 



Bepartm^nt of ^tate 



Ckirgcto 

% 



V 



<959 JUL 13 PV 5 35 



JulT 15, 1939. 



TO M THAMMIITTCO 

X ooMFiocHTiM. oooaK 

nONOOMFIOCNTIAL COOC 

nUTTAM 

MJklH 

•Br" 




AHDIBiSST, 

Torro (JAPAI). 

OOiriDDITIALr^ . ■ ---^^T 

The D«paxtaBat»« r«ply-fi«ntioned in-'our IBTf^July 8^ 
11 a.«.,/foilow«^ln part^tlMi line* of^iShe flr«t p*r«gxfliidi 
of xtlM Department »e/l94/^July 13^ p.a. r^eepeolally- the 
latter luilf 4 It ie 'Indicated in^he reply that if^lle thle ^ 
GtOTernmentxdoee not repeat not hara-any further etepe^a 
■lad at the preaent tlme'ihie OoTemaent^e interested 'la^ 
the euggeatlon vhloh haa been advanoedu^imd it is intisated- 
in the repl2;_that_ additional olarifying inforaation aight 
be helpful in our further study ^ the matter^ The reply' 
thus laoludes' indioation of our general reaoti<m t<rtbe 
▼lews reported in your'243^ May 33^ 11 p.au 

In Tiew of the faot that 'ihe indi oat i one ^bf the reply ^"^ 
as set forth above* are only in sununary form.'^be Department 
would prefer ..'tmlese you peroelTO substantial -bbjeotion, 
that you await -i;he receipt of ^he full text of^the reply 
before undertaking to aoquaint^the roreign Offioe^ with the 



nature of «ur reply cr t£> indioate our reaotion to the Tlews 
<p >ees e^ in yoiir 343. 






740.00/1890 

Enciphcral by 

Sent h\i operator . , 

D. C, R No. U 

ra:JlB:HE8 



7 



M.. 



joau J. 




.. 19 



I — 1*--J >^« -owi «■,- 



D 
O 



O 



15 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4177 



PKErARINO Orf ICC 
WiLC INDICATE WHETHER 

Collect 

Charge Department 



Telegram Sent 



Charge to 



y/ashinglon, 

July 12, 19 ••9.^ 



TO BE TNANtMITTED 

y. COMFIOCHTIAL C004( 

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE 

PARTACB 

Pt-AIN 



' i 



.1 i:^:^i 



mo.: " 

Co.-ifidential^. 

v.ne/ On ocoayion cf Jh --iitiu A.ibes36dor ' s ^cail'on 
July ir>' he ex:..rBCiSt-d^a dci.ir'j "t.^'^t i/coiuiaent or/taj ^ues- 
tii'.., .■..i.,.jJby^..r/^'lt,tiAvitiy'...r<^ Grew/ of 'action by^ur » 
tv/o .rovcrni'ients ''jirectcd/toward '^averting' war^in Europe, 
I toi'i hi::: thut' v;y re<cHra th<^ ]..reservation of paaca ''of 
sucf/ s-ij r-.-:..e^imj ortanoc 'to^^thd r .tui-e of/all natioiis'^that 
v/(y' :..a.-;-i ar' iiGtinotiou /^otween^] uuceful/countrl-^s^ "ithout 
refer inciB to'^ th^ir/ro:-:. of ;-;;overraaf^nt,'^ a;.d countries' 
v/M ;:i ar-s/t::r ;ateiiJ.na^rjiiltary -^onHaest'; ^that v/e Avill 
J <: la;'0;'atfa v, itr/--j v-.i-y. uacoful/nstioi/ and have/Cndicated-^ 
Oir leiir'j^to coopar'tt-i in isvery ''practicable '^ay '^toward ''''^ 
j.eoc'j una 'toward a 'reutoratlon'to/norriall ty'of international/ 
fir-'inca and co:,uii'jrcef and thut'^'.ve have made 4arnest/pleas / 
to the nations •'of iiurope^ looking- to /the adjustment/by 
ji&aceful iTieuna/of tii'sir/econoiuio and' other' relations. 1 
ir.tir;»at'id that, whilo Japan xuii:ht itself have i^ada or nay 
ta i;:ai4irig gimilar efforts, inasmuch as it might appear to 
otner nations that Japan is ongaged in military operations 

for 



EnclphtreJ iy 
Sent by operator 

J), r. I;, N'o. JO 



M.. 



19 



-J 

o 

o 
o 



•CO 
CD 

o 



m 



4178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



pRtPAHiNo orric« Telegram Sent to «e tranuhittio 

wilt. INDICATE WHETHEH 

CONFIDENTIAL COOC 

Collect 

NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE 

Ch.rR. 0«p.rtment jappartmpttt Of ^tatp """t*'" 

°" «J«N 

Ch.rg.to u/ i. . 



S -2- 



for purposes of -eon«iudat^ .J--jnn might< by -briiv^ing'^hls 
sltuatlcn-to un and^ exercise^ it smallest -±7lfluence "along 
with the United States and othtjr countries "In efforts' to 
discourap&''a.'Tgresslon In other f^arts of-^lia v/orld^ 

The Ambassador made no roj.eat no parti cular-tjomment 

othur than to refer to and deny-^eports that^apaji might--^' 
enter into a military jactAvith Germany -find 'Italy, 

Two,. The Ambassador, said -'also that -ha v.ould be^ 
interested in anything thatl .-aif^ht^have'^to say in regard 
to tills Government's concern Over the possible -<ietriiiient - 
to American interests arising from possible^- Japanese -poli- 
cies for permanent-' control over China -and in regard to the 
reported apprehension of this Government that^the Japanese 
occupation of Hainan ^1 3 1 art of -a plan of permanent^imili- 
^tary conquest^, subjects, which the Ambassador .^aid had 
been mentioned to.-Mr. Grew by ^he Japanese Foreign Linister^ 
shortly before-'Kr. Grevi> left^ t'okyo. 

In regard to the first point 1 referred to the fact 
that for six years I had been urging upon his *tovernnent 
the view that the world was large enough for all nations 
and that great progress of the whole world would flow 
from cooperation along progressive and mutually helpful lines. 

Enciphend iy Jq 

SciU bu operator . . M., . , /9 _, 

D. a H.-WO. w ._,.„ „ . ..„..., „„„ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4179 



ti^-. .^, „' .V iH^^yj I i I l 3 tt« 



rMMatMerrict TELEGRAM SENT - to m TKAMMiTTte 

m • 



WIU. IHOIOAt* WHCTMm 

MItct 



OOMFIQCNTIAl. OOM 
NQNOOMriOCNTIM. OOOK 



Ckwftt* 

s 



MJUN 

.3. lV<uhintlan, 




is. J^l^SfEi-Jta. the seoond point 1 said that whll© 
existlng'^Amerloan rights ana intereats In the Far East" 
are very Important a paramount oonslderatlon'^was whether 
all of 'bhlna" and the adjacent ''islands'^were to be disposed 
of by Japarf'as was Manohuria'J with the obaervanoe of treaties'' 
abolished, International law destroyed and the door shut 

/ ^ y f ^ y ■^ y' 

and looked exoept as to preference for Japanese subjects. 
I said that^'l need not^ speculate ''upon how JapaiTwDuld feel^ 
if it were announced thatf'the western hemisphere and a 
part of Jurope^'were to be foreclosed against Japan'' in a 
similar'way. 1 observed that the interference which was 
talcing place beyond all possible military requirements with 
the rights and interests of third power nationals all over 
China aroused resentment of the governments whose nationals 
are thus affected, that Japanese businessmen were being 
permitted to step in to the places of American and other 
businessmen who were being obliged to abandon tnelr busi- 
nesses, and that it v/es these circumstances and indications 
which gave rise to Aaerican aijrehension that, as the 
"I^nohuria-izing" of all China proceeded, American rights 
and interests might be permanently Jeopardized or helJ in 
abeyance by Japan. , 

Enciphmily ,. 1 

Smt h ofxrahr . .W.. 19. ... 

11.C.S ><■<>.» ,.,„. , .,.,..,,,.,,<. , 



4180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



■*fv^ 



Mt^MiM ofF.o. Telegram Sent 

«MU. INOtOATI WNCTNDI 
• OOI»l««IITIAt 

'^ HONOOHriMHTIAL 

"^ Mcnarinx^ttt at S>iait^ 

en 

.4_ Waghtttton, 



Ckargcte 



S 



I also iJolnted out .-^ speaking 'trom my Viewpoint, that 
afforts-^y any nation to domlnate'^a large part of the 



world oould 'result only in disaster ^o all and ihat I had' 
endearored^er six years to urge this general idea upon' 
Japanese statesmen^ 



Jl 



»«t»'ifc^ 



/ 

JUL h^^ 






^* 



w/ 



EndphtTtd hy 

Stnt hy opertxIoT . M., /o 



». o. B.-No. 19 



1— IWl u t oaviMHiitnT rtiNfina ofncf 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4181 



A^moitmibm of Om¥&*f^k>a 




isuancT: Anerlo&n rlghta and interests In China. 
PARTiciPANTfe SSGRCT4KSC OP STAra rJU. ASP fHg T-^^^'»^ 



COPHBBTO! 



->v 



Z^*" KSOmVBB ''1, 



■ 6%.,. *?"- , 




The Japanese Ambaasador came in at tsq raquftst. I 
than prooaedea, without particular preliminaries, to read 
hiffl the following: 

"Or two oooaaions between aldni(.dait and 2:00 a.a,, 
July 6, two equadrone of Japanese plans b raloled Ctomg- 
king» Bomba fell at random on both banks of tl» Xaagtse 
HiTfer and in the city. One bomb fell within 400 fo«l5 of K/ '| 
the residence of the Counssler of the American SobAsay. 
Other bombs fell in the eaae general nelghbortoAod, one 
landing about 300 yards froa the residence of the Amesis^n'^ 
Ambassador. The Lewis Memorial Institutional Churcn at 
Chungking, an Aaerioan institution, was badly damagrefi. 

"Another 



4182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



•Anothftr x«ld iMi« ubA* by jB.pw»«s« pltux** ea Otanog- 
kiii« on Joiy 7 eosBeaolsg aboot 3.i3i40 a.»^« mbA lastir^ 
until about S:iO a,»» On tMa eoea«loa brntbt f«H iU 
rarloua ar«a« of ^« elt7 «»& a3Lbo oa l^w •»uth bank of 
tho Yaagt«e, oaa bomb fallltsg mthia 60 jwe&» etf ^^ 
quarter* of the Oouneelor of the iasrloan jQubassy and 
oauftln^ about 30 QUne»e oiYiliaa oaso&Xtlo*. 

"Daring these ralda five boaba atrtick vlfbXn 200 
yarda of the U.S. 8, TUTUIIA. 

■The boiBbiag appears to have been oarxded out In 
an indlacrlalnate oaanair and the daoage and lose of 
life InfXloted to hare baea oonflaed alnoat ezoluai7«ly 
to clvlllarte. The Qovernaent of the tTnlted ftatee has 
repeatedly espreaaed thla oouati>7iB abhorrence of saoh 
lodl aertBlnate bombing. Mded to this general- humani- 
tarian ooncem is the consideration that the boablaga 
under dlecussion, which are but the noet recent of a 
loag 11 at of alallar bosblnga, have expoaed to grave 
hazard* the Aaerloan ambasaador, hla staff, an American 
naval veaeel and Aaeirloan naval peraonnel thereon, and 
all other Amerloana &t Ohtu>g]Eing. 

"The President in person haa asked that the Secretary 
of State protest to the tfapanese Ambaesador against a 
oonticuatlon of theae Indiaorlsilnate boBblags* the 

President 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4183 



- 3 - 

President woiild like to have an laraedlate atatement from 
the Japanese Oovernaent, without making the matter one of 
a formal exohsmge of notes." 

At the conclusion of the reading, I handed the Ambassador 
a copy of what I had read. He began to indicate his lack 
of belief In the facts, by saying that his Government had 
given speolea Instructions to the fflllltary authorities 
in China to be careful to avoid Injuries to persons and 
properties of other nations, etc., etc. I interrupted 
him and said that without takit^ up :he question of what 
kind of instructions the military authorities were under 
from Tokyo, the official facts speak for themaelvee and 
show clearly that the Japanese military authoj»ltlea are 
proceeding Indiscriminately and recklessly with bombings 
in and about Chungking; that I was speaking from the 
facts, ■trtiile the Ambassador was speaking froia hie under- 
standing that instructions to be oai-eful in bombing had 
been issued. He then abandoned this phase. I said that, 
of course, If this sort of reckless boabing went on some- 
thing serious in the way of injuries to oth«r nationals 
and their properties would inevitably oecur, and, that 
in the interest of both his country and mine, my ©overnment 
seeks to avoid such an unfortunate development. The 

, Ambassador 



.'imfliMPillBfliliBlWB^^ 



4184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



- 4 - 



n 



Ambassador then aald tie vould promptly tranaalt the 
written statement I had read to him to his (k>vernfflent. 

Re then refei*red to a oonversatlon between Ambassador 
Ckrev «md Foreign Klnlater Arlta, before the Ambaaeador 
recently left Tokyo for Aaerloa, in idiloh Mr, Arlta had 
brought up (1) the Idea of our two countries exercising 
their Influenoe toward avoiding war in Europe; (2) the 
reported apprehension of my Ctovemment that the Japanese 
oocupatloh of the Hainan islands is part of a plan of 
permanent military corfquest; and (3) ay OoTemaent'a 
concern about the extent of possible injury siid loss of 
Aaerio«m interests, including Amerlojui trade, in China, 
by reason of possible permanent Japanese poXloles of 
control. He said he would be intereetsd in anything I 
might have to say on these points. 

jPoint 3 . I said that, taJcing the last point first, 
I need not remind him that for six years I had been 
ecu*nestly pleading with and urging upon his aovernment 
the view that there Is enough room on this planet for 
fifteen or ei^teen great nations llJk:« his and sdne, and 
that by oooperating along progressive and mutually de- 
sirable llnes« great progress of the entire world popula- 
tion would gradually follow, etc., etc. 






EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4185 



5 - 



Point 2 . I eald tiiat, on the other hand, while 
present American Interests and rights In the fhur Xtest 
are highly important, the big eonaideratlon relates to 
the question whether all of China and the Faoiflo 
islands skirting it is to be Manohurla-lsed by Japan, 
with International law destroyed and treaty obeorratlon 
abolished and all other nations not allowed Into that 
one-half of the world - the door shut and locked by 
Japan except oyer preferences for her own citizens, 
I added that if some one nation is to do this in one-half 
of the world, some other nation In the other half of 
the world might imdertake to follow the same example, 
and nothing would be more absurdly lapoeslble for the 
future progress of the population of the world, including 
the countries assuming this species of domination, than 
such attempted course, I proceeded further to say that 
the Ambassador might suppose an announcement that thle 
hemisphere and a part of Europe would be foreclosed 
against his country In the sense of being Manchuria-ized, 
and added that I need not speculate on what his co\tntry 
would think and how it would feel, I said that such 
efforts at domination, with no facllitl>B Tor financ- 
ing and progressive development, and the going forward on 

such 



79716 O — 46 — pt. 20 15 



4186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



euoh a jxsigo «MdL«, oould «a3Ly r««ttlt la Als««1i«» ic 
aU o<>n«er&0{tt 8p«aJElfigf of ooit2»«e^ tvtm my Tlwupoin-^, 
and that «hl« g<««rftl ld«(t b&d been urged W si» on hl» 
Btat6«»eii for six y«&r-a> 

The Ambaeaa&ox> undertoolc to ftd7ano9 thja 14e& that 
.fnpan wai joet interf«ring tMjporarlly with otfcor p«>pl8»p 
intersats on aoootast of lallltary «xlg»ncl««, fa thl* 
I replied that fha faot that th« s^^te and latsreetS 
of other natlonaXn a3.X oTei* OMna air© balitg aarloualy 
interfared with, beyond all possible iailitary reqtdre- 
raeats or eT«n pretext, gives rise to the dlsappolatnent, 
not to say reeentaont, of tjs« governaents wbosa natlonaXs 
aro tJniB affected; that tb.«8e ezoesses have o»oarr«4 lu 
nortJa China and In South China and all vep and down the 
XaiJgtse Hirer; ttat i^serioans and other isatioaala are 
required to abandon their baslaeaseSj while the Janaaens 
buslneaemen are permitted to step In and take their 
places and car?y on huslness alooat aa usual - not 
twaporaniy, tsit apparently Indefinitely, X added that 
these eigne and olroiaastanese indicating the Manohuria- 
Islng of all China, or an attempt to do so at leasts 
givea rtse to the Ameriean appreheneion, to lAloh the 
Ambassador inferred, that Aaerioan tx«de and other 

interests 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4187 



7 - 




^' 



Interests mlgiit be permanently Jeopardized or held in 
abeyance by Japan. 

Point 1 . As to the question raised with Ambassa- 
dor Grew by Foreign Minister Arita about the possible 
■^, ■ cooperation of our two countries to compose the threatened 

dangers of Europe, I said that the single test of ray 
Sovernment in dealing with other Governments relates to 
the question of peace; that we consider the preservation 
of peace so supremely Important to the future of all 
nations tliat we draw the line between honest, law-abiding, 
peaceful countries and peoples, without reference to 
their form of ^voiTiment, on the one haM, and those who 
are flouting law and order and officially threatening 
military conquest without limit as to time or extent; 
that we will work in a friendly spirit with every peace- 
ful nation to promote and preserve peace, without serious 
thought as to who they are; that while we have not the 
slightest allianoe, or secret or other understandings 
with any nation on earth, and do not propose to have any, 
we will keep thoroughly armed and prepared to take oare 
of our intereste and rights; that we have, in the spirit 
1 was deaorlblng, made every kind and oharaoter of plea 
to the countries of Eua?ope to indicate a wlllingneee for 
the peaceful settlement and adjustment of their eoonomlo 

and 




4188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



And other relAtlons, aad we bavft IndiOAtftd oar reaAin^ne 
Co .ooop«rato m 0V«ry feaelUe plan to restore lnt«r- 
natlon&l trada and flminoe to a noi^sal basts; that, not- 
wlthfitanding theae earnaat pXeas^ (whloh the J'apaneee 
dovernaent Itself mlgSrit well hare been making, if it 
hae not l>e*n doinij bo, or might well make now and iver- 
eistently in the futare,) aatlons perhape ooold not fcu • 
take notice that, Japan heraelf v^e engaged in military 
operatiofls for purpoaee of oon<itiest,^ and that thie 
slstuition might well ©all for an ending, if Japan Kere 
to exerolee bar fullest Influenoe along with the United 
States and other countriea ia efforts to oompose threatened 
fflllltary ocnquest in other parte of the woi'ld, 

'Sh« AatMa«*ftdor tsside no js&rtioular eossaent, oxeept 
to state that th»re had been reports In thie oouatry to 
the effect that Japan might enter into a jailltat^- paot 
with Oeno&ny and Italy, whereas the truth la that his 
countiv has no idea of doing eo; that Japan, baca'ase tr 
ite prorlailty and Aif fio»;»ltle8 with Baasia, ha* be«n 
interested ia the antl-domlntem polifty of oertaiJ* 
European atatea and in working i«lth thea against Viianev: 
I -replied that J of course, this was prlsaarily the imctinetv 
of his country; that «y oourtry, of course, 6tron;>:i j 

oppoas 



I 



i 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4189 



satjv; 



tjj&t arm v^.» bsi' 

taabed pftsltlo. na*.-«r 

arid %flti} «««aaa®nt.- 

t«>uia present; mf •written gf.Ht<*&, 
ol" Aaericjji ns.tlorial£ 
S again eianhaaiasfl that;, 
vou_ 3 our ir. 

ehould . of -?' 

pri-«5.rliy from tills vl<»«poii. 
hlg: -Jae Uitsrsffl", »f botji G 

with €.anger-eui. csfc-r^ 

B«ridus natur«5 tJtet »y 0oV9Ti\j»' 
to waserve relations at i&i 
friendl.inees with p.ll nfitictia at aJ 




'oa}>l»_\; 



^ 



CSOUI'SSS,, 



4190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4191 



■-r,F 



TELEGRAM RECEIVED 



fore ■ 
to ^^ 



Secrtt 



tclE-rrj'. r.unt be 

-.nnlcated 




■a-:. 



: 1- at E 






TOKYO ^S^ 

Dated Jiay 31, 1939 
FfK)M 

Rcc'd 4:10 p»n» 






'•"'- -^,^;5^ 



f liG 


tc-t 


-4 


bt-s;: 


• 


.■) 



I;: .''■1, 11 p»ri» 

.V C-; ■•'irCNTIAL FOR 7}'£ SECRETARY. 

l3F nr-./RICT DISTRIBUTION, 

Jrnction Mc, 1767 of Ji-ily V -l-rirrv :ittli 

cf '-r- ri:nl'- t - l-.he Prime J.'inrist. cr'a ie;;il; .,;•£ ;. 

L" 1 '.".u nr, riircctEd I oubnit co^riEnt -^.n /'.~j1cv.'s 

<"irie, ""lE ;:[;xt of the proposed reply conbinec franknEas 

v.'lth renrrvred l'i*>3ii'.,i-,E and acEns to vx to I E pErfectly 

clEftr. As !■: -I'-JdrEnsEo itself specif icaJl;,- to thE PrlniE 

'■i-.^.i:;tEr't; fornal nesaagE dEllverEd tl-jnrAH;!! Mr. Gi»£w 

there occurn to r,iE no (repeat no) suciieatlon for change 

in the text, tc 

"•'o, "ith regard to thE question of opportuneneaa^S 

hivE no doubt whatevEr that the reply, if delivered nov;, 

would henvlly enphaslZE the Inpreasion In cffioinl oirclea ■ 

aa Elsewhere in Japan that the United States hna now 

Initiated a definitely positive attitude tov/ard Far Eastern 

problems. If that is the effect which the Departrient 

deairea to obtain the sooner the reply is delivered the 

r:ore effective it will bE» 

Three 



'"^ 



CO 
U3 



03 



■-^^;-*'.-yv "-*'-?s«?-.'s>**Vv 



^iis _: :i:^.i„V^4:^ 



4192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



liRE 2'4Z16 Frora Tokyo July 31, 11 p,n« 

Three, Although I have carefully studied the draft 
reply in tlie light of the Department's 196, July 15, 
6 p,r'.«, I desire the Department's further guidance as to 
whrit I should any to the Prime Minister concerning his 

« 

dcfiidtc proposal v/ith regard to the holding of an 
international conference to be called by the President to 
discuss problE'.r. causing v/orld unrest includinjr Far Eastern 
problcno, i" t haa been quite definitely "suggested to ne. that 
the r-Enc. .. r. '.vhi ,h was handed to iir, ':rew and wliich contained 
no- c^'icrete pi^oposal was inteni^'.cd as "n openinr for the 
nove v;hicr; the Prir>e '.'.inistcr :r.adE a few days later v/hen he 
auked thai- l oo riunicate his propor-al in the strictest 
confidence to you and the President, 

Four, I lay before the Department the follov/ing 
suggestion as to procedure on this last point (A) if 
notwithstanding the invitation in the draft reply for 
"further information" the Department does not desire to 
explore the proposal for an international conference that 
I invite the Prime Minister to read between the lines of 
the reply which I an to hand to the Foreign Minister; or 
(B) if the Department is in process of studying the proposal, 
that I so inform the Prime Minister and add that the reply 
which I am to hand to the Foreign Minister is addres'sed only 
to the message dEllTered to Mr, Grew and that a reply to 
his proposal will be forthcoming In due course, 
NPL:NK > DOOfiAN 




I Full ratf 
CollMt {d>} li>lti;r 
iNlght Ittler 

Ctkar|c« D«ptrtm«nt^ 

Full tttr 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4193 



w,L<. ,No,c.T,; w«c,H0« TELEGRAM SENT ,oi,r.oeNT.M. oooe, 

— NONOONFIOCNTIAL OOOK 



sr;:;;. ^ ^^^-^ ' p-' iS^. 1939. 



NlgM li'tt«r 
Ckirgf to 
S 



AUXUBilSSY, 

TOKYO (JAPAN), 

You/ 376, July 31", 11 p.m.' /0_-| 

STRICTLY CONFIDENT lAL.^ 

One. The Departaent has' re-«xainlned''the text of 
the proponed reply In the light of the oomaenta con- 
tained in your telegraa under xeferenoe. Although w«^ can' >• 

appreciate^ that some of the statements' contained In'the ^ 

* 

V reply, if taken by themselvea, mipht tend toward oreat- ^ 

ing an Impression somewhat along the lines suggested In ^ 



your paragraph numbered two, it does not repeat not ^. 

seem to us that the message viewed as a whole need give ~ 

or emphasize the impression whiah you estimate that it . 
would. We therefore would welcome further clarification 
of the thought suggested in the first sentence of your 
numbered paragraph two. 

Two. In the view of the Department our proposed 

(-. 
message answers both the Prime Uinlster's message handed _, 

to Mr. Grew and the Prime Minister's subsequent proposal CP 

co-anunlcated throuch you which we construe as an 

elaboration of the mesoa,-e. As stated in the DeiJartaent's 

EjicipficrtJ iy . 

Snd in optTiHm M., . 19.. , 



4194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



P»»AR.Noorric( TPI PnPAkil ^PMT to « TiiAM-imo 

WICL INDICATE WMCTHCA I C L. C Vji H M FVI X^CPt I COMriOCMTIAl. OOOC 

I Full r«t» HOHOOWIDCXTI/U. COM 

Chirge Department: 

f"" '••' _2_ tVatilnttan. 

Diji letter , -> ^ 

Night letter 

Charge i» 196, ' July 13, 'e p.m./ our reply Ahufl 'inoludds rndloatlon 

of/our/ general reaot Ion to the^vlews ieported-'ln your ' 
243< Uay 23/ 11 p.m. ' 

Three. ^As the'matter' appears to the Department, 
neither 'repeat "^neither of the alternatlve/prooedureft^ 
suggested In your^tiumbered^paragraph'^four^need ije / 
adopted! We believe that^the reply '^needs no'^reoeat 'no/ 
explanatory^ comment And that'when you'dellver T.t/you 
should make 4io 'repeat 'no' Interpretative ^comment' other 
thajnr to say,*^ If'^eipressly'aslced, that' the reply ''is/ 
meant to cover 'both the 'Prime Minister' a' wrltten'messagA/ 
and hie 'Statements reported'ln your telegram no.' 242,^/ "^ '^ 
May 23/11 p.m. 

Four. /The Department '^Is sending 'you by ''separate ; 
-,^M telegram the text of a change ^hloh the Deoartment ' Sz^ f 

desires /te made^ln the text of the reply.' '^^ 

Five. tJpon receipt from you of the clarification ^re- 
quested in paragraph' one ^above, the 'Department will-'expeot 
to send you definitive' Instructions with regard to the 
question of 'when the reply 'should be^dellveredt ^ 






Sent ii/ oprrator M.. .19 ^ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4195 



PREPARING OFFtCE 
WILL iNOtCATC WHETHCR 



/ 

Telegram Sent 



Collect 



Full ratf 
0«y letter 
Nigtit letter 

Charge Department: 

Full rate 
Oajr letter 
Nlgkt letter 

Cliarge to 

S 



^ 



Brparttttf ni of ^tat^ 

IVashtnglon, 

AiigUBt 2, 1939. 



TO BE TnANaMITTEO 

CONFIOENTtAL CODE 

NOrteONFIDCNTIAL CODE 

PARTAIR 



Special Gray 



AUEUBA8ST, 



TOKYO (JAPAN). 



/ J /■ ( 



Reference Department • s mall instruction no. 176?' 
of Jiily 8. On page 3 of the cnolosure, lines' 5 and 6,' 
please substitute for the words QUOTE especially with 
regard to the methods of Japan in relations with China' 
DNQUdTI the words QUOTE especially with regard to 
various declared Japanese alms and to various methods 
and Instrumentalities which various Japanese agencies 
employ in pursuit thereof UNQUOTE. 



\ 



lot 



V^^ 



O 

o 
o 












n:UUE:H£8 



Smith* 






PA/H 



M.. 



»_. 



I— l«tt •- •- ••nmatmt viiittM stvtsi 



4196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

TELEGRAM RECEIVED 

ML 

nils -MESsagE must be c lu :: t. l7 Tokyo 

invruf^iirancd bcforE bElur; conk* 

rn\-.nlcnt r.:! t c rinyoriE ♦ (C) from ^®^^"^ Au^xjot 3, 1939 

REc'd 10 :45 n,in, 

/ : . ^ ' 

SEcrc- rv of Stnt.E \^^' ^ J ""^'"^^^^ ^ '"^V^- 

■■.:■.., t Ion // •s^-. ' 

s-Rc • ■: c ;yiDE"n'rAL. ^ 

* -•* 

,• r ■. ■ y . '. rcptirt.ir.e-il:' u. M.lr i ;. .ncler rufErencE * 

O 

rorir.c'. !.. . K .".; ■ unc: J ; . U'- . : "(VE iii.'idvi: r':En lly ~^ 







■ Dcr-srt.'-cMi 




i ;ic I 




o 
o 


'rr "'" ! i: 




■ 1. I'l' ■. ■. 


* Tl ; . ' •: ! 


• ' . . • ' 


■' ■ 1 '' . ■ i re.-:' "'i • c- '-n 






■ • 


; o M i: •■t,;;"i: 
' ' ' > 


' ' ", ""^ r ,' 


:' i r.i. ; i 


in..,;; ■ ' '- ' , -.v. • -^wv \rt 
• r ?f:.;- ■ <• "i '.■ / .'.VTM 




orii ■■ 




• 






■?\vo. 





EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4197 



ML -8- from Tokyo Aug* 3, 10:45 a.m. #384 

Two. With regard to the point vihlch I am dEslred to 
clarify, I am strongly imprEsaed by the primary aigniflcnncE 
which is gEnerally attached in Japan to the fact that notice 
of tErmlnation of thE commErcial treaty was given by thE 
United States without prior intimation as there would have 
been liad tiie action been motivated in large part by economic 
considerations* The deduction that the motivating consideiN* 
ations v/erE politicil in character is confirned by noting 
Americm press and o'her popular reaction ro the notice of 
termin-. tiono 

(END SECTION ONE) 

DOOrJiN 
'JIC-.RR 



4198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAHL HAKBOK ATTACK 



TELEGRAM RECEIVED 



r xri.r'isr.r! fcrfrrc be in: r-on- 



r-\' r fl 



•ir.v'nr. (C) 



FRom 




.r.rttt 



K, 7C ■ f 1 . •' 



r.- Ki'hcr Ir. "he rrt;.: r .r • :: A-icilv3clunl. 

• -1 ,:■ ' ' • ■ , ■ -..'-. I'C^i.- ■ . ■■ 1 ;■ • ■ .- • ion 
VL :■ .'.r-i '-.:: :■''.■■'■'-, ■ , .vcvLr, 

■. : . • -'V.: ■■' : ... • ' : .:; ' ■ ••: : -■. "5 -.1, 

■ ' --iVi. c :''"'.n- ' • • ' ■ . '. ' • i • ■■'! ;; -y 
1 r'.nvr. rar.ly ail rut on flEl',; wiMiin 
; ■ • .\ ::•. Ij i-iE.; ■ • : "C.:- ' •■ ' : ■• 1 ;,' 

•\'\'.'-' : , ■ ■- r .;■' '•'.:'. ■^, i-Vit'.T'J .f'lon 

Chiric;;?: ••*'t;*-!ir: \ j, r.nv; br ' ri, r-T.^, ■,--,-•■ \ vm 



f n." , 



ii:'E ♦;-.'''. 'j.TT'i. irc f"' ns.ldcr-iMons lE-;clinr; '-O 
',h'c •ft lor. '■.•:/i', by out- Oovcrntnr.n^ lr..<jr- v/cek "..'hich f-ill en- 
■.'. r-i, 1;, .-'i'-irjL -i.i. field of my ob"crv;ilion md wliich jr.adE 
riE'-.-c:; . r y . r,\.i.r- obvJoualy r-^llin.' '.vit.hin the rcnlm of high 
polJ>-y. .' .'■ : feci '-h'it before th:l a corrcaponcJcncc is cloaed 
: r;hc/jld rxcord rr.y eo'lrK:'.t of the Effccti; vthlch v;.i 11 be 
prodMcrd by delivery of the reply in the form decided upon by 

the 



■-> I iii'iii'i"i8i!SSSuii»(iiiywjw^»i>r<,r 



.;?j»»j«MP*-»ilfeifa»sn 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4199 




t^p' 



ML •2-r from Tokyo, Atig^S* 10:35 a.m. #384 Sec, 2 

the pEnurtment, I believe th-it the reply would be lntG3>* 
preted (h) by the Japanese (/OVErnment as un Indication that 
the attitude now taken by the American Jovernment requiifES , 
the tt. rriirri * ion of the conflict with China as a condition 
precedcn'. to tht betterment by Japan of her relations with 
rhe i!ni'-.F.d States; »nd (b) by the Prime Minister as a closing 
of th"- door to insure peace In the Far East. (END MESSAC/E) - 

^ . DO OMAN 

HR :DDM 



stiaifer?"-. 



4200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



C- <:,:■ U. 



Telegram Sent 



Ucpartituntt of S^tatt 



lO l*f ItlANtMII Tl a 

»rc»Nr toi N1IAL coni - 

HONCUNF rl/LNTIAL Ct>«l. 

PAftTAIft 

n.AIN 



Washington. 

■ 1 -art ; , 



. : .-, .:rLY v:c:vF1De;;ilvL - . 

!•>=. ■.',''. tp i-f^f TfT'.c" to yiir e,ir(reeX.lor thr-t the 
Prlrie ;, Ir.l Rter' r, ufTFon^] r-no oonfldentlrl move nerlto p. 



r, reply BCppnMe froTi the written reply to hie written 
-if-sfip-e, ','• feci ti;flt r-s ;.lc -nove rae rr^'de ornlly/you 



/„ 4 — tf,_,-«.,j/hacl Informed 4h 



5wrf iv optrdor W.. W.. 



«..■ 



nirht. 3ubsPnuent to the 'delivery 'of our written reply, jyj 

IndJ^fte to lil-D ->r to some sporoprlate of f Iclal' In hie' c 

iTi-nedlnte' entourage t."f»t, In vler of the'^ntetement con- 

/ 
t.-ilned In your numbered p«r«p:raph one of your 242 of 

i.'iy ■?3, 11 p.m., r." conetrued his proposal as an elabora- 
tion of hie naeesage flnrt for this reason the written'' reply 

thuc Includes Indication of the reaction to the 'Prime 

G 
:.:in'i.gter' e confidential views. • S- 

/ "* 

Two. We find It difficult to'underatand your/state- 

ment rnnt kmvfledge of the Prime Mlnleter''8 proposal O 

Is probably confined to the Prime Minister^ e entoumge p 

In the llpht of the statement made tcyou by. the Polleh pj 

/ / / / ^3 

Ambeseador^s reported In^your 266, June 8, 7 p.m.,''^ p 



f 
►■•- 



that the Foreipn KlnlBterhad Informed ^the Polish ^^ 

Enctphmiht _ >-■ 



l~lMI K. *. •9n*mmwi r.i.*i*« •» nn 



CD 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4201 



PDCPARING OFFlCC Tpl PO R A kjl ^PKIT TO Bt TRANtMlTltO 

WILL IN01C»It- WHttHtR I tl.CV3n«IVI l£»Cn I COlWIOeNTlAL CODE 

(full r»t.' HONCONFIOCNTIAt. CODE 

Charge Detxrfnmt: 

full fit* -3- JfotAfrjj&n. 

D.y letter / 

'"^'"'•""AmljassadiTir that the Views of the "Imer lean Governoent in regard 

Charge to / ^ / ; 

$ to the possibility of Japan and the United States collaborat- 

ing- to bring about a'deten^'in lurope were being Explored. 
Also, 'the British Oovemment^oae time ago' approached'^be De- 
partment -^nd stated tbat^lt had heard/a report along'^hls 
line and inquired as to the attitude of 'this Oovemment. 

Three. It would appear from your comment that It is the 
reaction in Japan to the action of this Oovernment In giving 
notice of intention to terminate the commercial treaty, rather 
than! anything in the tone or contents of the proposed reply it- 
self, which, if the reply should be delivered now, would in 
your opinion be likely to emphasize , the impresalon that the 
Ifalted States has now initiated a definitely positive attitttdt 
toward far lastem problems. The reply was prepared a number 
of weeks ago and was addressed solely to the contents of the 
Prime lfinista]l*8 message as iamplif led i by his subsequent coa- 
■ent^ It i«|reali«ed, however^ that the reply, although it 
has no;repeat no reference to the question of treaty termina- 
tion, might,\ If delivered now, tend to cause the reactions you 
anticipate. In as much as; it has not repeat not beei^ and is not 
repeat not the Department's intention that the reply be Inter- 
preted as related to the question of treaty termination the 

Enctptmi h 



S§tm 9ff 0ip9fWtl^ .^^*.^'-~—~ •'-—•. Af*« .,..,. ...,.™„..„, /y„ 



79716 O — 46— pt. 20 16 



4202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



p«ci>AMiNo orricc Tn F^DAkJ QfMT to wm TmmmilM 

WILL IMOICATI WMtTMEII • CUC\jn^WI V9bri I 



Collrct 



Full rate 
Oiy letter 



eoNriourTiAL eooc 



Nlg«t letter ^tpattttWtlt Of ^tUt» 

Cltirge Oepirtmrrit: 

Full r.te IVnhlntbn. 

0«y letter — o— 

Night letter 

Charge to " ( > , \ 

s OepAxtment aathorlsaa you toj withhold it* dcllTerytfor 

\ ■ I I 1 

a short time \ If in your Judgaent suoh fdalay would be 

\ 1 ' I '. ' ' ' 

likely to render |the replyileaa {Suaoeptible toaaeh 

interpretation.' 

four. When delivering the repljt please bear la 

/ / / y / 

mind the Department's desire, as indicated in the laat 

• , ^ • / ^ y 

paragraph dt the Department's mail instruction no, 1767 

of July B'^that the reply Ij^ regarded as strictly 
confidential. 






FB: JTfB: HJN/HES FE 



Enciphered hy 

.■vrrf hy opfratOT . . . M.. . 19 



'J 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4203 

I _ 

TELEGRAM RECEIVED -^""^^ 

MA Tokyo 

Tills tKlE-ram must be 

0lo3Ely r-'raphrtiaEd bEfore DatEd August 5, 1939 

b«lnc ooniniunlcntEd to anyone. From 

(C) REc'd 12:45 p.m. 



% 



Ssoretary of Stnte ^ i-'" ■. \^^^^^ 

Waj-iln^ton \A 'I lf\!)^<i93g ' 

389, Avuauit fi, 9 p.mr*^'^^ ^, t ' _| 

STR:C?LV COKFlDtNTIAL. 

DErartniEr.t '.? ;M:', Auguat t, 3 p.m. 

Cnc. ^ r-r.".,- • rcatly apprEclate tv.s -'•'t-'""' "i.tlon 
grunted .-c b;, V-.e Tij ai^'tr.Ent to naki: .-r .. ..-:. , ^,, thE 
Prl-nE ;..i',:: b-.ti ! the Ex;-lanatory statt.:;f;:,': Indic .ttd by 
th£ DEr-i:'t:.E; ': . 

-v;:, '.Vlt:- rE.'.-U'd tc tl:E quEatioji vr-Jz-r^X ;, - thE 

DEp.-irfci'.Er.t XV. thE sEooi'-d ; .u-^^rapti cf itr t . '• ■ . 'indEr 

rEfEi'cr.oE l i:.c' r.ct" (rc-E'.t net) hnVE tl.c 5 . ,. .;i from 

anythlru' jaic to ;aE by t:ic Polish Ambass lh-t :■ r'-i.; o-;r 

ccr.VErs- *" 'i->-' on .7unE !'> cr l;-. an;: s'lbsEq:::. . c : .<vei'a..llo:i 

t'r.-i'- ti ■ , ■■•: •■-ir.istci' :-.;;d to]>-*. hlir. ar.ytlil'i- on t'lnt 

irx'jEct .■.\.lc . ...Ej net He wit}. in t!\E Tour c-riiEi'o '--f tiiE 

r-.Essi^:;*: ;i indEd to V.r. arEw or. V..ay in,' • that i",£s:i.-w'E was 

IndcGG m Effort tr Explore t:iE pccsibllity of an nrxricun- 

.'ap.-osEPE dEtE-itE in E'.'-ropE bnt doEsinot itciilf j^o so far 

fts tc tre-.^oiiE frr ocnsidEr-ition as thE rr'.-e "ir.istEr did 
lb 

subscq'JE-.tly "Wa ;!-E t: e c.:"ir,..- of an irtcr-', ♦■:■.■- •-/;1 ' 
confETEriCt: tc .i5sc ; :■ :,/r.'.: ,:.ntErE;;t;. ■..; v.Ei . ..• E';rc;iEan 

T-ri~blEn;3, 



-4 

C) 






4204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



'^Si 



M4 -2- tEl # 389, AugU3t 5, 9 p.m. from Tokyo 



problEmo. With rEgard to thE Inquiry at the Department of the 
British Ambaaoador, Cralglc asked me about two months aro 
whether 1 could clarify a report he had heard (presumably 
from the rolish Ambassador) to the effect that the Japanese 
Oovernmeiifc hid approached our Oovemincnt v/lth regard to the 
situation in Europe, and I replied that as the Department 
alone waa in a position to decide whether any inforr.iation 
on this Ditter should be given to the British Government, 
inquiry v/'-uT;3 "isut '.e rrAt In VJ^ahtnt'tTi , 

Thrr.u. '".'.iF Dtp-u't'ierit will note rni.i ovi"? Irr-edlatcly 
following telC'^iam th; t the titling yf the dEllv-.ry of the 
reply h.-ia beet-, further complic--tEd by re'^ortti ' -port-tnt 
devElopnent:; '..) Tokyo, Hy Incllnatlor. lo : ; >■ J'.'^ld action 

DOC^AA^■ 

' V) ' ill I ' ln r i '" niT- m ii i n v i 



<f>.- 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4205 



tex!egram received 



From 



(•'iA.--'' 



A(lC;U.t939 









4>. 

o 





tYX' 



\ confldEnce 1 



rrtree. 



4206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOIlSrT COMMITTEE 



4207 



T K L i:cm u am I x' I :( i : i \ i?: u 



,Uf .. 



. ( 



From 



r^ 



, • . 



, ':.C ' ■irrn 



t 



piviSiON or 




a;^^l'P^t■-l K': \ 


-'S 


l''^\ 2 '■ ' 


I'l 






lATf 



-J 

C) 



- f 



1 :int. 



o 

01 



i •. 5 = 



1 a 



;3'7fry 



1- \ ' '■ i-t: t o h -vi. 

^-^ ^ i: i V ; ' ■ "■ /Lr i- ■ f, 

•Am ^^: ■•int. I - >--i,iii \ ■ -■ v ■, --ii 

■MM'.- , [. ; i-,'^ ■•■ •.' ■■■:-]■, ^ - • . ,-. ■; 

'. r;r ;Vr! irr. t r, i;;.or; ":y 

■•';"1,:: Of: let . '.Jil c ]J: ^ - .In, I 



-0 



Li&_.iiis— >L_^„^ : ^.imi^lf,,-^„-^'^i^.. 



4208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 






^■■¥^ 



;f-^ 



■KVO, 




j^^avt him ■^. i^ri\v '.t. reply and said that it included, 
t'';r '.hi rcaaonc sptcifiEd in paragraph one c f the 

:•( P'lr* -Tn'- 's "42. A^anus^-. 4, 3 p.-^i., indication of the 

.,,,,, I . rLT-'\'-'n of ' hr. Fri^nr MnistEr's ccnf idEnt j,al 

'u.Ui'n crmntnt war '.hat the renly SEEPiEd 

.(■■ hi; 'iniirEr.se ; 'hi,, 'ri^'ic lUnicr.F.r' s written mEssagE 

^ ' .. 1 '" 11 rrYiX. , won ~ ^ ■; he "■: hou :-h ♦■. 

by 'ii - r-"i -r^ 1 /.■,! , ;'l, -•. ■. , 1,1: ■'. 

^Vi .c finioter nij- ' :l3 evtning after 

^ifcrEncL (c ' tc diricuss ■ the 

-uiv «nd Ii.:ily ) • 

IbL FM.pl;: strictly -:"''>". i'ldEni:ial 
.'u.Ui ' !•-' : : ■■ :• M-t 



•■UV: 



ht "•fr'.sJd DL' 

•HlliarK' r "'1 ' j ' -• 

Thr'. ■ . 'I m-w] 
an:) 5 ] ■> botb : . 



(repeat not) to be puhllshrd. 



"DOOr 'AN 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4209 

EXHIBIT NO. 178 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

1. Meiiioraiulnm dated May 9. 1946 from State Department Liaison Officer to 
Committee Counsel concerning date of receipt of letter from Ambassador Grew, 
Tokyo, dated September 22, 1941, addressed to President Roosevelt. 

2. Memorandum dated October .30. 1941 from Secretary of State for the Presi- 
dent enclosing a reply for the Presidejit to send to Ambassador Grew, pursuant 
to the Ambassador's letter of September 22, 1941. 

3. Memorandum from the President to the Secretary of State and attached 
letter dated September 22, 1941 from Ambassador Grew to the President. 

4. Copy of letter dated Sei)tember 1, 1941 from Ambassador Grew to a Japanese 
friend, in which he sun)marizes this government's policy concerning Japan, and 
which he enclosed with hi.s letter to the President dated September 22, 1941. 

5 . Memorandum dated November 8, 1941 and attached dispatch #1769 dated 
November 7, 1941 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to the State Department 
(two .sections). 

6. Dispatch #1893 dated December ."5. 1941 from Ambassador Grew. Tokyo, 
to the State Department. 

7. Dispatch #1910 dated December 8, 1941 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, 
to State Department relating the reply of the Japanese Emperor to the President's 
message of December 6. 1941. 



4210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

May 9. 1946. 
DEl'ARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON 

The Honorable Seth W. Richardson, 

Oeucrul Counxci, Joint Cointnittvc on the Investigation 

of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Confirexn of the United States. 

Dear Mr. Richardson : Reference is made to Mr. Masten's oral Inquiry regard- 
ing the date of receipt in Washington of Ambassador Grew's letter to President 
Roosevelt dated September 22, 1941. which was transmitted by the President to 
the State Department on October 29, 1941. A careful search has been made, 
but no information has been found in the Department's records relative to this 
question. However, for your information in this connection the Department's 
records sliow that several mail despatches from Tokyo bearing the dates Septem- 
ber 3, September l."> and September 20, 1941 were received in the Department's 
Division of Communications and Records on October 27, 1941. 
Sincerely yours, 

Herbert S. Marks, 
Assistant to the Under Secretary. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4211 




DEPARTMENT OF STATE 




f^^KORAN'DUK FOR Tiiil gn£o ID ^:r 

In Rooordance with your mo-aoraftduia of October S9, 
1941 treuiamlttlng a letter of SeptemVxsr Z'/. .jritirijHse'. 
yoa l>y Ambasaador (Jrsw at Tokyo, there la anclooeci foie 
your consideration a draft reply to Mr, <Jrav-. 

i«Bba8eador Oi-ew's letter ,-,r.d ItP snolcPMrn ;.rv 
returned hers-«lt-i. 



•"^^ ,/-'/ 






iioClOssLiT-SKi 

1. 3?c t-he Honorable 



j-5pK 



V, irrew> 



From ths Hono3?ab2'- 
Joseph C, C+rswj 
Septe-Tb'^ ■ ■-'' ""' '■ 
enoloau 



4212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



■•7»::.-isS'*at*« ^e% lil^-S:^ 


















«i ##«et %m im '^^41% w^ 







EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4213 



THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 




-,s- 1 V'> 



'vwrit*-*^'^'* 



* i- » 






m\^ 



^ ^ ^H? m^^ 




4214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The AMiiKicAN Embassy, 
Tokyo, September 22, 1941. 
The Pbesiuent, 

The White House, Washington. 

Dear Frank: I have not botheiviJ you with personal letters for some time for 
the good reason that letters are now subject to long delays owing to the infrequent 
sailings of ships carrying our diplomatic pouches, and because developments in 
American-Japanese relations are moving so comparatively rapidly that my com- 
ments would generally be too much out of date to be lielpful when they reached 
you. But I have tried and am constantly trying in my telegrams to the Secretary 
<)f State to paint an accurate picture of the moving scene from day to day. I hope 
that you see them regularly. 

As you know from my telegrams, I am in close touch with Prince Konoye who 
in the face of bitter antagonism from extremist and pro-Axis elements in the 
country is courageously working for an improvement in Japan's relations with the 
United'states. He bears the heavy responsibility for having allowed our relations 
to come to such a pass and he no doubt now sees the handwriting on the wall 
and realizes that Japan has nothing to hope for from the Tripartite Pact and 
must shift her orientation of policy if she is to avoid disaster; but whatever 
the incentive that has led to his present efforts, I am convinced that he now means 
business and will go as far as is possible, without incurring open rebellion in 
Japan, to reach a reasonable understanding with us. In spite of all the evidence 
of Japan's bad faith in times past in failing to live up to her commitments, I be- 
lieve that there is a better chance of the present Government implementing 
whatever commitments it may now undertake than has been the case in recent 
\ears. It seems to me highly unlikely that this chance will come again or that 
any Japanese statesman other than Prince Konoye could succeed in controlling the 
military extremists in cari-ying through a policy which they, in their ignorance 
of international affairs and economic laws, resent and oppose. The alternative to 
reaching a settlement now would be the greatly increased probability of 
war — Facilis descensus Averno est — and while we would undoubtedly win in the 
end, I question whether it is in our own interest to see an impoverished Japan 
i-educed to the position of a third-rate Power. I therefore most earnestly hope 
that we can come to terms, even if we nmst take on trust, at least to some degree, 
the continued good faith and ability of the present Government fully to implement 
those terms. 

I venture to enclose a copy of a letter which I recently wrote to a Japanese 
friend who had expressed the hope that the United States would ultimately come 
to sympathize and to cooperate with Japanese in pursuing her "legitimate inter- 
ests and a.spiration". The letter was sent by my friend, on his own initiative, to 
Prince Konoye. 

My admiration of the masterly way in which you have led and are leading our 
country in the present turmoil in world affairs steadily increases. 
Faithfully yours, 

Joseph G. Grew. 

Enclosure. 



EXHIBITS OF JOIXT COMMITTEE 



4215 





Copy of a letter from tb6 Ameiioen Ambaseador, lar. Grew, 
to a Japanaae frieafl ndio wrote ©apreaslng the hope tiiat 
the American Goiremfflieat would ultimately come to syasgpa- 
thlze and. If pooaible, to cooperate «itit ?€5>exi in pur« 
suing her "legittaate Intareots »ad afig^ls-a-fetoas". 



My dear •«»«,•»»♦«»••••« 



JStJBASSI OF TEE 
UIsTFED STATES 0? AMSEICA 

!!Po5cyo» September 1, 1941 



I tirall know hovf deeply the present situatioa in 
International affairs is paining you, Just as it is 
paining me* It is a dax'k and critical period that we 
are paesing through, Xnt during the past nine yeere I 
have eeen our two countries pass through several ortsae 
and gurmoiint them, and I firmly believe that we shall 
eventually aunaount the present one, I oazmot visuallz*^ 
the utter stupidity of war onsuin^s betweaa ^apan end th* 
United States, and If ever a break should oeour I feel 
cohtlnoed that it vd-ll not ocaae as a result of ai^ de* 
lib«rat«ft: »ct on the jpert of either of our Qo^svms&nte 
but rather through eo»e unfortmiete act wr-ouj:, -•■ ■""■'■' 

,»x^i?«BA«|t »l«ass.eata. X tocm vea?y imU. that i'n.a«e teiajCj^ 
and Admiral IDayodey and the Presldmit snd Mx* SuXX, 



4216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATl'ACK 



r 



aoiag their utmost to avoid war and. are dealing with 
the si-tuetion with tho highest stateaaacBhip, courage 
and far-sighted visioxi. Pray Ood that they nay he al- 
lowed to achieve miocess end that their aalightened 
efforts Will not be wrectoed by short-sighted and in- 
traneigeat elements in either country. 

But many things have been done over the ■ge.ht sev- 
lir&l years end are being don© today »fcloh are not per- 
loitted to cotae to the knowledge of the public in Jagpen, 
and therefoi^e it is very dif ft cults X should' say iJS- 
possible, for the Japanese people to view the situation 
sb^eetlvely ead to weigh all the factors **.loh have l»d 

the pres«s&t unhapry pass la our relations. Merely 
as an illustretion, I doubt if many ?apaa«e know of 
the aerioiig incidents wJiioh occurred only reoeatly, 
irhwa Japanese aviators attacked our Ssfeassy and our 
^navy ship the •I'D'rrrnJk, aister ablp of the ill-fated 
PAHAY, in Chungking on several occasions; oui" Embassy 
was damaged, fortunately without loss of AB»rioan lives, 
and a boajb Kissed the TUTUIU by only a few yards, but 
deaaaged her. Our Bta^esey m& our ship are in a seiP^ty 
zonPt rijv'^i'lzed by the Japanese Oovemaeat, sad no 
jaillt&i / vv;-"***""^ = ''^ "'"''• ♦•hem. fhreo jyserioaa of- 
ficers who wit^asssa ^ae aiitttck ma the WtUTLk from a 
oeer-b' hill have orriolelly expressed their og?lnlon 



■i 



4 



J 



^ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4217 





IHI 




tittat tbto ettaok w&s dellbarate or» at tbe X9tj laast, 
due to orlminal &eglig«aMo. Tbo Japaixese plaafts csae 
oyer in perfectly clear weatber; one piano loft tbe 
otbara and took a course directly over tfeo T^JWllA, 
droppixig its b<Mab as it passed orer the ship end aiss* 
ing her only by a q^lit-secoad of time. If the ship 
had been aink, or if our Asii>a&aador had been killed, 
as iBlght easily have occurred, I do not thick that the 
present status of our relations could have stood the 
strain because the entire American people would have 
become eaf lamed. I said this to Mr. Matsuoka early in 
Juno after the first attack on our Embassy, v&en the 
buildings had been actually hit; I said that never MX" 
ing my nine years in 3epan had 1 been more anxious over 
any situation than these obviously deliberate attacks 
on our Kiabassy and iShip, end that of all the difficult 
problems with which the Mnister was faced, I felt cer- 
tain that he was confronted with no more serious problsa 
than this one. Mr. iiEtsuoka rc5>lied "I agree with you", 
yet the attacks continued, three or fovar of them within 
a few weeks. By such hair-breadth escapes are America 
and Japan still hoping and working to avoid a break. 

You write of the desirability of our recognizing 
Japan's legitimate interests end aii>ir&tiong,> Ind&ed . 
our Government has time and tine again, and only re- 
cently, eacpressed its full appreciation of Japan's 




79716 0—46 — pt. 20- 



-17 



4218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



I 



3Wgitiiaat9 Interests 6n<l osplrations, realizing that 
leqpan, restricted rs she xa in her Islands., must tove 
aooesa to »ew naterisls, piarketa for tli© products of 
h#3r iaduBtries and u fretj flow cf trada and coBanerce, 
Nei?ertlxol«s0, unless Jap&n is willing to absoidon ag- 
grsssion by force t'tigrs can fc^ no nopa^ for an Improve- 
v:-ir in our rolatiouj?. Wa know ^y sad and bittor prac- 
tical osparlancc t\pan*3 so«oallod '•Naw' Ordor in 
Sast Asia* and "Go-Prosperity Sphars" visualize no* 
nolglBbo:. oaa on tfee basis of reciprocity and e 
frc'i «i'i.'Ci-.<sr(!l»tfik!- but rether «,n order In which Jfiqpenese 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4219 



I 



Interests, or what she conceives -to be her interests, i 
are to be predominant and to be exercised to the exclu- 
sion of the iegitimate interests of othar countrie.a, 
¥© have watched the gradual but inexorable ellaination 

of our own legitimate interests over these past several i 
years, our iong-standiug and p&tieatly-established busi- 

ness, conaaercial, industrial, banking and cultural in- i 

tereats, all legitimate and cooperative activities, pro- I 

gressively ousted first from Manchuria, and then, in 1 
'turn, frosi North China, the ports, the Yangtze, and now 

they are in process of being excluded from indochiae, la 1 

spite of the most categorical assurances and proiaisfes j 

[that the Open Door and »q.ual opportunity would ba sciti- -i 
Ipulously observed everywhere. Every Forei^^n MiBiater - - 

f-especially Hirota, Arita, Notaura -~ have given us sxich 1 

" " • 1 

promises but not one of those promises has been carried I 

out. Why? Ib-QB-Q promises were uaq^uestionabiy given in | 

good faith. But the military would aot permit their J 

ti55>lcaaent8tion, Japanese anied. force, has preventjed I 

their implementation. Is it surprising that when Amdx&X'i 

|.7oyoda assures me of Japan's peaceful intentions, is® | 

obliged to recount to him those pest bitter experiences'? 1 

rEow, in the light of those ©xpertehoes, can ny Oo^*^ | 

ment believe any such promise cr assursate ^zlxi&n \i-?f j 

any Japanese Government? I 

Highly placed Japanese are constantly tallcing ana j 

'ting about Antilo-iimeri can ia^erialla® in last Asle, 



4220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

f I 




4 

about Anglo-Aaerioan enoirelement. Ploasa look at tli* 
record. So far as the United States la coocemed, we 
have alwajni vrlahed Japan well, have proved our friend- 
ship by concrete acts, in the old days we protected 
Japan froot vuxequal treaties which other nations attao^ted 
to foist upon her. We oouoselsd and active y helped 
3ap&n in hsT i(?pl«idid efforts to beeooe « great fflod«rn 
Pot»er. At tlie time of the Great Sarthq,ual£e we did 
.everything in our power, spiritually mi materially, 
to show our frleMahlp for Japan end to support and aid 
her in hex hour of trial. J3p until the invasion of 
Itonohurla in 1931 we were negotiating with China for 
the abrogation of the unequal treaties, ready and will- 
ing to abandon our eactraterritorlal rights, including 
o\ir extrataixitorial judicial, ootsoercial end custons 
rights, and this wjuld unquestionabLy have cone to pass 
if Japan had not set out on her long course of aggression 
and the use of armed force as an instrument of national 
policy. The Szcluslon Clause of oxa Irmigration Act of 
1924 cast a dark shadow on our relations, but do you 
know that prior to 1931 our Oovermaant had been steadily 
woxicing to have that clause cancelled? In a few months 
that obnoxious clause, which naturally wo\mded your 
proud and sensitive people (evoa tihough it mM a domestie 
measure, taken for the aseie eooaonlc proteet&os that 
Japan has bena oontlQually invokiae i^d aoti&g upon durSAg 






EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4221 





receat years), wotild almost cortaiiay bare bean vXtttirmi 
Bat then cam® Japan's invasloa of J&nohurla, «aid wa then 
toew that further efforts et that timet to withdraw the 
exclueiOB oleuse were hopeXaos. 

I do aot believe that you, ay dear fr3.eRd, or ^mf 
of your friends, have sny detailed Icaowledge of th« 
?8tisnoe and forbearanoe exeroiaod toy the Anwiioaa 

rernraent end people in the face of the truly outragoous 
treatnant of our own logitiiaBto interests at the hands 
of Japsnesa authorities, both ailitexy and civil, dur- 
ing these past years* Our Mssioas throughout Chiaa, 
iaciuding ehurohaa, hospitals, uni varsities and sctooola, 
have been ruthlessly 'Doiidoad sad wrQoKed and Amaricas 
.ssionartes end their facdlies have beeaa killed or !»- 

•ad la spite of the feet that mth buildings were 
Learly marked by American flags both flying ead painted 
"on the i?oof a aad their precise locaticwQ marked on aaps 
subiaitted to the Japanese military authorities, efliowing 
that they were seldom if ever in the neighborhood of any 
oilitary objectives. There can be ao shadow of doubt 
that these cruel and brutal attacks were planned and 
jxecuted with careful intention, AccMents can happen, 
but not two or three hundred accidents of the seaae kin^. 
It is a saying among the Chines© that wlwn a Chinese 

iy or totm is bombed by Japanese aviators, the most 
dangerous spot and the one to get far away frcMa Is the 



I 



^ 



4222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




a 

ixa»xl09Ja fliieaioa^ It 1» p«rfeotly oleer tliat tbm 7apa« 
tt«8« bonbers vrairs followlog a ooiwerted pleat to drive 
Jttsenet&n Msslon&rr, oducatioaal, z&edioal attd cultural 

^ " aa p anaaneutly. Wo might ijar© 
brokea ralaticas vxx.ii Jt^&n qb thia Issua aXona, but 
we di.to*t; v/e r«Kei.aed patient "and, pemit ae to say, 
iODg-4Rif faring* Yftt you write: '♦Evaa an iaciA«tit 
aoe-teath as bed as that of the borabliig'of Iran will 
aarver talse ploce in this oiir part of the world,' 

Tii^ sgHT'-' ':'«rt0d drive agaizjst oxir businese flrae, 
■.:rxnke^ tn!5u: -.nterests, coacieroial and ahipping 

aotlvltles, ii^a stej&dlly and iaexorably prpgreceed, 
first la 14a- Men. in Korth China, tU^ porta, 

the Yaaet'<i6 valley, mA now la lndo.china where iiaerlcan<» 
ovmed cargce* hare heen ruthlessly eeizod and ahlpped 
Is tills the Cfipen Door end equal opportunity, of 
"orupxiloua safsgtsarding of which I so ofteii received 
ifis cost oatsgorioal aseuraacee from aueoessiTe Japaneae 
-.laentp? 

MoaJWdiiXe the aouthward advaaot progresaed stflp by 
one step at a time, first ooo^patioa, then oon- 
i<Jetiott, a pauae to watch Its result, end than another 
-,... i!tep» All wMa time many of your leading mmx., 

aa, Getterais, retired AaJbasaadors, prominent writers, 
*s and p^lltioiana, were contrlbutln« artioiea to 



EXHIBITS OF JOI]ST COMMITTEE 



4223 



:?i^®Jsm5Ss*Eaws<v 



the daily press end magaziaes advocating the rapid ^ 
pushing of the southward advance end the slinination 
of the Americans ajad Europetttao euid ail of their 1 
ests and activities frcra the »»ntire sphere cr '^n/^^;i.t?:T 
Sast Aijia iaoludiug the South Sear:" 'r-vs. -. ■.-...■ o-u v. t- 

las to be pursued first by hit^h-pressui-e ;i.^ ' y and 

jhen, i? aeoesaary, by force. Can you possibij bslieve 
that if Frenoe had ncsz been powerless she ^ould hav« 
alloweiS tfhe occupation of bases:, both nt. 
^tioii, ill ladoohir^? Or can yoxt. possibly believe that 
rest Britaia, coaisletely •->'- ■-"^•le*i as sh® is i«tth the 
|ar ta Europ«, where her o-.;ri j;«itloaal life and the s""'' 
|f xh* }^'itish Isles are at stake, wouic 
•prc-gr^a. of unprovoked egg 
idcchlna J3r Thailand, or that '■•■.-- T)ri 
"f>it3.d ever e?(>- 



r^-Tf^T-i-ir-: ■■ • i£ tOO 



r,.^. f^,rit to 



"Oi avec « £4: 



•sed by «ih«ia 



articl 



1© i-ifiv 



4224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



10 



b7 Japan In establishing and Qonsolidating the ao-ealled 
"Nev Order in Greater £ast Asia including the South 
Seas" and that defensive loeaaures had therefore to be 
taken? From all that baa paaseci and froa all that is 
being said and written and cone, the evidence ia clear 
for all to see that what ia eupheuiatioally called the 
•♦Ck) -Prosperity Sphere" means eventual Japanese hegemony 
over all the areas therein containea. Froa ell the 
evidence, is it not abunaantly clear that we in the 
United States must now and la future be guldod alone 
by facta and actions and that we can no longer rely on 

^words or assurances of peaceful intentions? t have 
stated this fact catef^orically to Admiral Toyoda, after 

Irecounting to hiia our past bitter experiences when we 
did rely on such assurcu&ces. 

To tui'n to the C ijjsa Affair, yew people icnow, but 
I kndW, that about ten days or a fortnifsht after the 
outbreak of hostilities in Jlily, 1937, Chiang Kai-shek 
sent a aiessage through the British Etabassy here to the 

Ijapanes© Governiaent. offeriiiii a:i iraaiediate anaistioe 
and the withdrawal of all Chinese troops if the Japanese 
troops would likevr? ae vrltharaw to a ijiven line pending 
uegotiatioas. m^. - uv^v.« "ns then the British Charg^ 
'"^kff aires, and irh«n he received that uessage from tbe 
h Ambassador in linking he oatte to asjc my adyica 



I 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4225 



ZaXTIFV^&a 



I 



11 



r 



t 



as to wh^tfaer hi^ ou^^t to deliver It to tb© ja|>aniR/i|» ^ * , 

Government vitliout ins true 1il<:m8 frcaa torn on because 

i 

bis own CSorernaent laiei^t Regard tbo step as iu the 
. neture of offer in^j aedlaticm, yet tlie messa^ v&a too 
urgent for him to wait for ins true ti ems. I toM Ijija" 
thet he oouXd not possibly take the responsibility cC 
not delivering the messuije liaaedlately, ao he did se 
and later London approved. The aes8a<|e was delivered ] 

to Mr. Horii»uchl who was then Vice ?orei<jn Mnister. 
But it died, alas> and nothing cajae of it. History 
will ao&t certainly take full cogaizaacs of that effort 
of Chiauti Kai-shek for pe%oe. "Rie Japanese forces 
didn»t Hunt an analstioe. 'Sx^ have now had war for 
over four lon«j years witli no end in sit^ht, Chiaati 
Kai-shek, a brave and far-sifted man, is still the 
legitixaate head of the Chinese Govermoent, is •till 
fi^jhtinii against ruthless a^^^jression agaifiet his soim~ 
try, and Wang Ghing-»ei could not live a da^' if Japan *» 
bayonets were withdrawn. How can ho therefore be re- 
garded as representative of Caina or, in fact, anything 
iLjre than a puppet? I know well Japan* s former troubles 
in China and with China, but thoae troubles oould have 
been snootiied out eventually by peaceful negotiation. 
They have not and never will be aiaoothed out by war 
' ch, unless terminated on terms acceptable to the 
aae — ^ also a proud and sensitive people -»• will 



4226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATl^ACK 



po.' 



a5>!X"'*W whtnar 



^K ^jiothsr &!■ 


^W 


i^ 1 


^^^tfels, Vki bisllc^-- 


■•h 5ba;od^.r4t 


T^n^Cui / thfi't (^.rxiasr . 1 


Hi 




-pe uTL-a Liw tir-i'^ia;-:> 


^^^^H^HB^i 






^^^pilter: 






^Ka^^^'i'- 






^B^ft-..; 






j^HEi-!^^ - 






^R^etfi ' 






^^HP^ At.. 






^^Hputt-ir^~ofr t 






^^K|£apc 




'■;-0 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4227 



. Japiirtasft 




X K. 



>ry, B:. 



4228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

f t 

" 14 

waleh proogpt«d her very wi»« oooupatlon of Syria ana 
Iran — tMhfore Hitler coula t^et there taiA oould tlireaton 
the Sues CeAal end the whole liedlterranean co'ea. But 
note the difference: Hitler elma to ccntrol all of 
3urope and hae so stated; Great Britaia baa piadged 
heraelf, and the wcerld by experience caff rely on her 
pledgea, to withdraw froa Iran eu»d to reatore tor com- 
plete aovereignty the moiaent the necessity for these 
&]«a8U£ea of aelf -defense haa parsed. I applaud her ac- 
tion, I oannot adnire the action of Japah** alllee. 

Xnoldentally »e now learn that ti» bombing cC iranlaa 
citiea by either the British or Soviet foi'cea has been 
offlQlally denied. I am inclined to believe that the 
|V bombing report was merely Nazi propaganda. 

tnteraational reiatioas, if they are to be stable 
ana secure, aust be based upon the oorupulous observance 
of international oo^ataitaants. Breakings of the pledged 
vord between nations can lead only to International 
anarchy. Wee it not the breaJsin^ of the Nine Power 
Zroaty tlb^it oonetltuted the first atop In thl» long 
line cf breaches of international cojanltaeata by certain 
jsationi? It is (se.ir.--' ' "r> Japea tShat Japan did not 
break the nine Powqt Yet look at the taxi and 

'hi f ;^rta^ irtiich spoe th«i)aa«lvea. It la held in 

. :\pan that \usder eht ina that treaty had be- 

.'.oss^ obeolete. "Q ."-ngMKn«:h4M>t stated i-. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4229 





f 

16 



sategorioal tewaa tfaet it iu ^t..*..,, ut all timirb ^ , 
sidor tbe effect of changed conditions upon interna' 
cocHaitiaeats- ajx4 to modify or aoacrr-i;;3 *:hcx. rt cci'alt- 
aenta by peaceful negotiations, f/e do art :.. 

never have, as charged, re^^'ardsd ths z'y^foB <^:i ls per^- 
Baoantly unalterable, our negotiations with Cnlna for 
abandoning our extraterritorial rit^hta proves the point, 
juat as does our willini;;ne33 to surrender our js rtauneat 
leases xn Japan and many other legitimate but outuodad 
rl^t«, ait once Japan resorted to force as an inst3ru~ 
aent of national policy in breaching an important int«r- 
xuaitjonol treaty^ frcwa which Japan had gained rauoh when it 
was concluded because it was a carefully balanced under- 
taking, entered into by Japan freaiy and, at; that tiiae, 
gladly, apracedenx was sat and an exaaple was created 
which were soon followed by other nat.-.rjns, beginning, as 
you will remember, by Italy ♦a action in Ethiopia, This 
was the begirjiing of international chaos of which we »ee 
the sad result today. 

Throuijji the process of publicity and propagand,a in 
Japan, largely stimulated frota Axis sources, the Japanese 
people are today told that the iOn^o-Saxon countries 
propose to "encircle" Japan by their iaperialiatL c am- 
bitions, to obtain con?>l©te hegeuony in East Asia, to 
control oonuaerce and trade and sources of raw sn&terials, 
to drive Japan to the wall, lio-a untrue is this pic- 





4230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



i!,A ' , ' J.f.iJ 



oftu ire 




^•9) 1.«V8 theSSt; 



?tor<iu 



r that 



J 



;app^iies;,, 



1 



nriied 



MOV'<;i 



la tiia 



xt of 



ch arid all oeT.ioas. 

Inolple c 

ira of o'i/iioi 

J of oq.u.a,iix 

' .':, ? jn-r- '•'*/•> r1"l M . 



:he 



ce 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4231 



4232 COT<fGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



ycAJTB, our relBticxns la&ve l»««a iikar]£«d by friondship, soo& 
vlXI, aoA r«fl]^«ct^ tb« oa« for the other. itM tr«di~ 
tie© of good oeighboriy relaWotts «u8t be restored, for 
If we fail la thttX taelc, there will be latroduoed into 
the Pacific the tradition of war which has oursed EUi .pi 
alooB the begljrml»g of history. t;e who are oharged with 
the a^ocas^lishaant of this taalc, who are worldsig for the 
welfare not only of this generation but of those yet 
vmhora, aee* your help ana the help of all other uaa of 

j^HSd wUU 

with axtsressloas of warn friendahip, I aaa a» alwiya. 

lay fif "•■■■ ..,,»., ^ .;, , » , 

Cordially yoira. 



JCBEPK G» (2^IW 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4233 



# 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



DIVISION OF Far Eastern Affairs 



C: 



November 8, 
1941 . 



t 



Comiaander Watte of OKI In- 
formed Mr. Schmidt of FE that 
the Navy Departnient had seen 
Tokyo's 1769, November ?, 
11 p.m. , and Commander Waists 
said that the Secretary of the 
Navy would like to be Informed 
of the contents of Tokyo* s 
1736, November 3, 3 p.m., to 
vhlch reference is made in the 
last sentence of Tokyo's 1769, 
November 7, 11 p»!n« Comjoander 
Watte was thereupon given a 
full paraphrase of Tokyo's 
1736, November 3, 3 p.m. 



>5f^ 



FE: Schmidt :HES 



79716 0—46 — pt. 20- 



-18 



4234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAKI. HARBOR ATTACK 





^^^ TELEGRAM RECEIVE 




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BAS Tokyo 
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^ — """Lng OonaiurilCHtcd ' 
; nc. (3C) 


bcr 7, 19*1 /^^^ 


>-^\ 




■'-•---* °ry of Sr-otf, , 




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-ahlftgton. 




\^¥»iir^rae«c»iS'»*/' 




1 1769,. Nov , il p.ni'r" 

■ STHlCTT.;x 




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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4235 



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4236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



W 



TELEGRAM SlECEiVED 



aMT from rjf^y^^ 

"Oils tEltgrojn Bust be 

closely paraphrasEd be~ Dated Sovcn*)cr 7, 1941 

fore being cona.iunicatEd 

*. ...... .,„r. (.=x:} Rcc'd 12jll p.m. 



Secretary of State, 
Washington, 



1769, NovEB*)Er 7, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO) 
Cfforta to bring ebout an adJustraEnt of 
relitlons aore and r-^^r rf^ffi^ult In ttxe face of 
.imcrioan public opx; .-ich naturally believed 

that theae Inflamatory articles, particularly the 
articles In the J^iP.iH TIMES AND aOVERTISER, which 
l3 knovnito be tiiE aouthpleoe. of the Foreign Office, 
correctly represented the attitude of the Japanese 
GovernEient, Informant said that he would repeat 
my reraarks to the Foreign Minister and would show 
htra the articles iHider reference. \ 

Four. Informant said that we lauat not pay too 
much attention to the Jftpaneac press. ^Vnhen doga 
arc frightened, they bark, ond the wore they ore 
frel^itened the louder they bark. At present the 
J.o.panedc nilltary are I'reightened at the future 
■outlook. Changing the tietcphor. Informant said 
tliat the United States makea the mistake of re- 
sardinft the J.-^pantae as Biature people whereas 

they are 



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I-'- 

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t— « 

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0) 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4237 



#1768, NovEHbcr 7. 11 p.r.. (SECTIOd I'./O) 

they art but children and should he treated as 
children, « friendly word or gesture inspires 
confidence. Itie Geniana have underst'iid tfcis 
psychology of the Japanese and have playsd 
upf«r~nr-«lth success. 

Five. Once agiltt^^i- ■: begged that 

vrhatEver might bnppen, the conv£raati'>n3 be 
not allowed tz- ccnc to a brcakdiwn because, 
if a cnripletc breikdifm should occur, -he feared 
the reaulta envisaged In i*iE final sentence 
ny 1735, Novenbcr 3, 3 p.m. 

iEltD OP JCSSui<« ) 



G8E« 



ED„ 



4238 COXGKESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEAHL HAKBOK ATTACK 



TELEGRAM RECEIVED 



HRL 

■ tElEgraa must bs: 
cly paraphraecij de- 
rort bEiriK cojamunicatct 
to anyone. (SC) 



FROM 



Toltyo 



HatEd December 5, 1341 



i'^cntr.ry of St-' 
Washington. 



/Vr: 



<i'^ 



1893, 0«:cc!3bcr 5. 
STRICTLY C0NF1I«!5?1AL 

'.'y British c'-llrnsrutr Inf- .. thr. 

AttaohE, who has 
lals of the JapancsE Nftvy 
:w3 of the arrival in Singapore 
ish nsv^r rtlnfcreoemntR Includlnp; capital 

"riov.B concern In ^'apantsE n&- '■ 
-^s anc, ,f Brltls^h cfl/:?ltal unite- 

f«t SirM;:ai-.oj'£, wh4ch vrae appaj-^eatl ,, .titicipatEd, 

zt Japyji's naVRl etr^lrglc plans. 




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a 



o 



-J 
o 



> 

CD 



O 

o 



<T5 



C- © 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4239 




4240 CONGRESSIONAL IN VESTICATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



-2- #1910, DcotmbEr 8» 1 p."*.',' from Tokyo 

wishes to th£ Foreign Mlnlatcr to convey the fol- 
lowing to'thE PrcBldent as » reply to the latter' a 
mt Bsagc : 

Some flayg ago, the President mede Inquiries 
regarding the clrcumetsncEs of the augmentation of 
Japanese forces In French Inddchlna to which Hie 
Msjcsty has dlirectcd the Govermnent to reply. With- 
drawal of Japanese forces from French Indochina oon- 
Btitutr.6 one of the subject matters of the Japanese- 
Amcrloan negotiations* . His Majesty has coauDanded 
the Govtrrntnent to state Its views to the Amerloan 
Govrrnni<-nt also on this question. It le, therefore, 
desired that the President will kindly refer to this 

t'Fply. 

Sstabllehnient of peace in the P$iclflo, and con- 
sequently of the world, has been the cherished desire 
of Rle Mnjf aty for the realization of which he has 
-ilthcrto made his Crcvernment to continue Its earnest 
endeavors. Hla Majesty trusts that the President Is 
fully aware of this fact". . 

GREW 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4241 



EXHIBIT NO. 179 

Tabt-e of Contents 

The following (l(lCUIlleIlt^s fnnii the files of former President F. D. Roosevelt 
have previously been placed in the Committee Record or Exhibits. 

1. Mcmoranauni entitled "Directive dated HO November 1941 from Foreign 
Minister Togo to Ambassador General Oshima in Berlin". This appears at pages 
204-206 of Exhibit 1, as messages Nos. 985 and 986 from Tokyo to Berlin. 

2. Joint memorandum dated November 27, 1941, from General Marshall and 
Admiral Stark to President Roosevelt — Exhibit 17. 

3. The following documents, all of which are included in Exhibit 18: 

a. Telegram dated November 24, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Min- 
ister Churchill. 

b. Memorandum of conversation dated November 24, 1941, of Secretary Hull, 
Lord Halifax. Dr. Hu Shih. Honorable Richard G. Casey, and Dr. A. Loudon, the 
Netherlands Minister. 

c. Memorandum of conversation dated November 25, 1941, between Secretary 
Hull and Dr. Hu Shih. 

d. Telegram dated November 25, 1941, from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek 
to Dr. T. V. Soong. 

e. Memorandum of conversation dated November 25, 1941, between Secretary 
Hull and Lord Halifax. 

4. Memorandum dated October 17, 1941, from Secretary Hull to President 
Roosevelt, enclosing proposed message from the President to the emperor of 
Japan— Exhibit 20. 

5. Memorandum entitled ''MOST KKCRET", unsigned, which was attached to 
inemoraiidiun <»f conversation dated November 30, 1941, between Secretary Hull 
and Lord Halifax— Exhibit 21. 

6. Two telegrams for Secretary Hull from President Roosevelt and draft of 
parallel communications to the Japanese Government — Exhibit 22. 

7. Telegram dated November 26, 1941. from Prime Minister Churchill to Presi- 
dent Roosevelt — Exhibit 23. 

8. Telegram dated November 30, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to Presi- 
dent Roosevelt — Exhibit 24. 

9. The following documents, which are pubUshed in Volume II, Foreign Rela- 
tions of the United States and Japan, 1931-1941— Exhibit 29: 

a. Memorandum of e<mversation dated February 14, 1941, between President 
Roosevelt and Ambassador Nomura, Vol. II, p. 387. 

b. Memorandum of conversation dated March 8, 1941, between Secretary Hull 
iind Ambassador Nomura, Vol. II, p. 389. 

c. Memorandum of conversation dated March 14, 1041, between President 
Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and Abassador Nomura — Vol. II, p. 396. 

d. Memorandum of conversation dated April 14, 1941, between Secretary Hull 
and Ambassador Nomura — Vol. II, p. 402. 

e. Memorandum of conversation dated April 16, 1941, between Secretary Hull 
and Ambassador Nxjmiu'a — Vol. II, p. 406. 

f. Memorandum of conversation dated July 24, 1941, between Acting Secretary 
Welles and Ambassador Nomura — Vol. II, p. 527. 

g. Memorandum entitled "PROPOSAL BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT", 
heariiig handwritten notation "File lockbox. This is reply to my proposal." and 
accompanying two-page "oral" memorandum, both documents bearing notation 
"Copy of a ('ocument handled by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary on 
August 6, 1941"— Vol. II, p. 549. 

h. Memorandum of conversation dated August 17, 1941, between President 
Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura — Vol. II, p. 554. 

i. Two-page memorandtun dated August 27, 19 tl entitle<l "TO THE PRESI- 
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE PRINCE PREMIER OF 



4242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

JAPAN", and accompanying six-page memorandum commencing, "The Japanese 
Government has received the communication . . . " — Vol. II, p. 572. 

j. Memorandum of conversation dated August 28. 1941, between Secretary Hull, 
Mr. Ballantine and Ambassador Nomura — Vol. II, p. 576. 

k. Memorandum of conversation date^l September 3, 1941, between President 
Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura, together with accompanying 
"oral statement" and message "T(> HIS EXCELLENCY, THE PRIME MIN- 
ISTER OF JAPAN, FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES"— 
Vol. II, p. 589. 

1. Memorandum of conversation dated November 15, 1941, between Secretary 
Hull, Mr. Ballantine, Ambassador Nomura and Minister Wakasugi — Vol. II, 
p. 722. 

m. Memorandum of conversation dated November 17, 1941, between President 
Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu— Vol. II, p. 740. 

n. Memorandum of conversation dated November 18. 1911, between Secretary 
Hull. Mr. Ballantine and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu — Vol. II, p. 744. 

o. Memorandum of conversation dated November 19, 1941, between Secretary 
Hull, Mr. Ballantine and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu — Vol. II, p. 751. 

p. Memorandum of conversation dated November 20, 1941, between Secretary 
Hull, Mr. Ballantine and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu — Vol. II, p. 753. 

q. Memorandum of conversation dated November 22, 1941, between Secretary 
Hull, Mr. Ballantine and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu — Vol. II, p. 757. 

r. Memorandum of conversation dated November 26, 1941, between Secretary 
Hull, Mr. Ballantine. and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu — Vol. II, p. 764. 

s. Memorandum of conversation dated November 27, 1941, between President 
Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and Ambassadors Nonmra and Kurusu — Vol. II, p. 770. 

t. Memorandum of conversation dated December 1, 1941, between Secretary 
Hull, Mr. Ballantine and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu — Vol. II, p. 772. 

u. Memorandum, of conversation dated December 5, 1941, between Secretary 
Hull, Mr. Ballantine and Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu — Vol. II, p. 778. 

V. Memorandum dated December 1, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Secretary 
HuM and Undersecretary Welles — Vol. II, p. 779. 

Note. — Except as indicated above, none of the foregoing copies of memoranda 
of conversations bear any handwritten notes ; several of the memoranda have 
attached notes from Secretary Hull to President Roosevelt which are not pub- 
lished in Vol. II, of which the following is an example: "Memorandum for the 
President. I believe you may be interested in reading the attached copy of my 
conversation with Admiral Nomura on April 14. C. H." 

10. G-2 Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, dated November 27. 1941, entitled 
"Recent Developments in the Far East" — included in Exhibit 33. 

11. Telegram dated November 2, 1941, from Generalissimo Chiank Kai-shek 
to President Roosevelt — included in Exhibit 47. There is attached to the tele- 
gram a copy of a memorandum dated November 11. 1941, from President Roose- 
velt to Secretary Hull, as follows: 

"This is the corrected telegram to me from Chiang Kai-shek. After reading 
it, let me know if I should make any change in the message I am to hand Hu Shih 
on Wednesday. F. D. R." Comparison of the "corrected telegram" with the 
telegram as appearing in Exhibit 47 discloses that the word "European" appear- 
ing in the next to the last line of the first incomplete paragraph on page 3 
should be changed to the word "whole" ; that the words omitted in the fourth 
line from the bottom of page 4 are the words "given a pretext" ; 'that the word 
"seriously" at the end of the eighth line on page 5 should be changed to 
"gravely" ; that the word "plea" in the twelfth line on page 5 should l>e 
c^hangefl to the word "help" ; and that the following words, "as I have sxig- 
gested to Mr. Churchill, I feel that success would be assured", should be inserted 
in the fourth line from the bottom of page 5 immediately following the words 
"combined operation". 

12. (Jeneral Marshall's Aide Memoire to the President re Defense of Hawaii — 
Exhibit 59. 

13. General Marshall's memorandum to the President re Ground Forces — 
Exhibit 60. 

14. Message dated August 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister 
Churchill— Exhibit 70. 

15. Memorandum dated February 11, 1941, from Admiral Stark to President 
Roosevelt — included in Exhibit 106. Attached to this memorandum is a brief 
memorandum to President Roosevelt from Admiral D. J. Callaghan, as follows: 
"Admiral Stark asked me to forward this to the President since he considered 
the matter of some urgency." 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4243 

16. Report dated December 14, IMl by the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox 
to the President after the Secretary's visit to Pearl Harbor subsequent to the 
attack. Printed in transcript at page 6221. 

17. Memorandum for the President from General Watson transmitting from 
Admiral H. R. Stark the letter dateil Feb. 9, 1941 from Capt. Ellis M. Zacharias 
to Admiral Stark. The letter concerned the interview Zacharias had with 
Admiral Nomura on Feb. 8. 1941. S?e Exhibit No. 141. 

18. Dinner guest list at White House for Dec. 6, 1941. See Exhibit No. 58. 

19. List of outside telephone calls through White House switchboard on Dec. 
6 and 7, 1941. See Exhibit No. 58. 

20. Letter dated Sept. 22, 1941 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to the President, 
memorandum for the Secretary of State, and the President's reply dated October 
30. 1941 to Ambassador Grew. See Exhibit No. 178. 

21. Letter dated Dec. 5, 1941 from the President to Mr. Wendell Willkie, con- 
cerned with a proposed visit to Australia by Mr. Willkie. Exhibit No. 111. 

22. Memorandum for the file and attached copy of the President's remarks on 
the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8 : 30 and continuing at 9 : 00 with 
legislative leaders on December 7, 1(M1. Exhibit No. 160. 

23. Message dated December 8, 1941 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State 
Department, reporting the reply of the Japanese Emperor to the President's 
message of December 6, 1941. 



In addition to the foregoing documents, items numbered 1, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 14 in 
Exhibit No. 158, and all documents appearing in Exhibit No. 159, were obtained 
from the files of former President F. D. Roosevelt. See tables of contents at- 
tached to those exhibits for descriptions of the individual documents. 



The following documents from the files of former President F. D. Roosevelt 
have not previously been placed in the Committee record or exhibits, and are in- 
cluded in this exhibit : 

24. Letter dated January 7, 1941 from President Roosevelt to Francis B. Sayre, 
High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands. 

25. Letter dated December 13, 1940 from Commissioner Sayre to the President, 
with attached memorandum dated December 26, 1940 enclosing copies of dispatch 
#966 dated Dec. 10, 1940 from Commisioner Sayre to the President, transmitted 
by Naval radio through the Interior Department, and comments to the Press by 
Sayre and President Quezon of the Philippines, and a newspaper clipping. 

26. Memorandum dated January 11, 1941 for the President attaching Naval 
message dated Jan. 6, 1941 from Alusna Tokyo to OpNav. 

27. Navy dispatch dated Jan. 11, 1941 from Alusna, Tokyo to OpNav. 

28. Memorandum dated January 19, 1941 from Secretary of War gtimson for 
the President concerning the Philippine Scouts. 

29. Letter dated Jan. 21, 1941 from the President to Ambassador Joseph C. 
Grew. 

30. Letter dated December 14, 1940 from Ambassador Grew to the President, 
and attached memoranda. 

31. Memorandum dated April 10, 1943 from the President for the Secretary of 
State. 

32. Letter dated Jan. 22, 1941 from Secretary of War Stimson to the President 
enclosing a memorandum entitled "Resume of Situation Relative to Bill 1776." 

33. Copy of memorandum dated Jan. 31, 1941 from the President for the Secre- 
tary of the Navy and attached letter dated Jan. 23, 1&41 from Evans Carlson to 
Miss LeHand, presidential secretary. 

34. Memorandum dated Feb. 5. 1941 from the President for the Acting Secretary 
of the Treasury. 

35. Memorandum dated Feb. 3 and 11, 1941 from the President and memoran- 
dum dated Feb. 5, 1941 from Secretary of State Hull for the President, and at- 
tached letter dated Jan. 27, 1941 from Father James E. Walsh to Postmaster 
General Frank C. Walker. 

36. Memorandum dated Feb. 5, 1941 from Secretary Hull for the President. 

37. Memorandum dated Feb. 5, 1941 for the President on proposal by Father 
Walsh. 

38. Memorandum dated Feb. 10, 1941 from the President for the Secretary of 
the Interior and the Director of the Bu^lget. 

39. Memorandum datwl Feb. 12, 1941 from Secretary Hull for the President 
with attached suggestions for interview with the Japanese Ambassador. 



4244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

40. Memorandum dated Feb. 15, 1941 from the President for Secretary Hull 
concerning the Spratley Islands. 

41. Memorandum dated Feb. 20, 1941 from the I'resident for Mr. Sumner Welles. 

42. Memoran<lum dated March 11, 1941 for the President, attaching a brief 
of Admiral Pratt's interview with Ambassador Nomura on March 4, 1941. 

43. Memorandum dated March 13, 1941 for the President attaching copy of 
report made by Rear Admiral R. K. Turner of his conversation with Ambassador 
Nomura on March 12, 1941. 

44. Letter dated March 13, 1941 from Joseph E. Davies to Stephen T. Early, 
and attached memorandum form Mr. Davies to the State Department. 

45. Memorandum dated Feb. 17, 1941 from Wilbur A. Nelson, University of 
Virfjinia, for the President, and attached memoranda, and a copy of a reply 
dated March 13, 1941 to Nelson on behalf of the President. 

46. Memorandum dated March 14, 1941 from Secretary Hull for the President 
concerning suggestions for an interview with the Japanese Ambassador. 

47. File memorandum concerning letter dated March 21, 1941 from General 
Dougla.s MacArthur to Mr. Stephen T. Early relating to the office of High Com- 
missioner of the Philippine Islands. 

48. Copy of a letter dated March 29, 1941 from Secretary Stimson to the Presi- 
dent concerning the Philippine defense. 

49. Memorandum dated April 3, 1941 from the Office of Naval Intelligence con- 
cerning the Japanese government and its obligation to the Axis. 

50. Letter dated April 4, 1941 from Resident Phillippine Commissioner J. M. 
Elizalde to Secretary of the Interior, memordum dated April 11, 1941 from Secre- 
tary Hull for the President, and attached memorandum. 

51. Memorandum dated April 10, 1941 from Secretary of the Interior for the 
President concerning Phillippine defense preparations. 

52. Memorandum dated April 15, 1941 from Stephen T. Early for the President 
and others concerning rumors of Japanese plans to delay American merchant 
shipping. 

53. File Memorandum concerning a letter from Admiral T. C. Hart dated April 
4, 1941 to Admiral H. R. Stark. 

54. Memorandum dated April 28, 1941 from Secretary Knox for the President, 
transmitting memorandum dated April 22, 1941 from Joseph B. Phillips for 
Admiral Pratt, and memorandum dated April 30, 1941 by Admiral Pratt con- 
cerning his interview with Admiral Nomura on April 28, 1941. 

55. Memorandum dated May 6, 1941 from the President for Secretary Hull 
concerning letter from Commisioner Sayre dated April 23, 1941. 

56. Letter dated May 7, 1941 from the Secretary of the Interior to the Pres- 
ident concerning the Philippines. 

57. Men'orandum dated May 6, 1941 from Gen. E. M. Watson, presidential 
aide, for the President concerning Japanese insurance firms in the U. S. 

58. Letter dated May 10, 1941 from Secretary Hull for the President and 
attached dispatch #120 dated April 1, 1941 from Commissioner Sayre to the 
State Department. 

59. Letter dated April 23, 1941 from Commissioner Sayre to the President 
and a cover letter to Brig. Gen. Watson, and memorandum dated May 15, 1941 
from Secretary Hull for the President suggesting a reply. 

60. Letter dated June 20, 1941 from Secretary Ickes to the President, and the 
President's memorandum dated June 23, 1941 to Secretary Ickes, concerning 
suggestion made by Edwin W. Pauley relating to the Japanese situation. 

61. Memoranda and letters dated June 6, 9, 13, 14 and 17, concel-ning sugar 
exports and political matters in the Philippines. 

62. Navy Department reports to the President dated June 17, 18 ; July 2, 3, 7, 8, 
16, 22. on the general intelligence available. 

63. Letter dated June 25, 1941 from Raynlond Haight to the President and 
reply dated July 11, 1941 on behalf of the President. 

64. Memorandum dated July 15, 1941 from Gen. G. C. Marshall for the Pres- 
ident concerning a Japanese intercept relating to an ultimatum planned for 
Indo-China from Japan. 

65. Dispatch proposed in July 1941 from Gen. G. C. Marshall for Gen. Douglas 
MacArthur setting up the U. S. Army Forces in the Far East, bearing approval 
of the President on July 26. 

66. Miscellaneous correspondence in July 1941, and letter dated Dec. 11, 1940 
from the Director of the Budget to the Secretary of War, between various govern- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4245 

ment offices concerning the "Calling into the Service of the Armed Forces of the 
U. S., the Organized Military Forces of the Government of the Commonwealth 
of the Philippines." 

67. Draft of dispatch dated July 26, 1941 from the President to Harry L. 
Hopkins in London, concerning trip to Moscow proposed by Hopkins. 

68. Memorandum dated July 26, 1941 from WDH for RF concerning Philippine 
military forces. 

69. Letter dated July 18, 1941 from Ambassador Josephus Daniels to the 
President enclosing a memorandum from E. Stanley Jones on the. Far East 
problem, which documents were transmitted to the President by Mr. Sumner 
Welles by memorandum dated July 28, 1941. 

70. Information Bulletin dated July 25, 1941. 

71. Letter dated July 25, 1941 from Harry Hopkins to the President. 

72. Memorandum dated July 29, 1941 from the President to Sumner Welles 
and his reply dated July 31, 1941 concerning reports of withdrawal of Japanese 
troops from sections of the China front. 

73. Dispatch #1131 dated July 30, 1941 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to the 
State Department concerning the Japanese advance on Indo-China. 

74. File Memorandum dated Aug. 9. 1941 concerning proposed executive order 
"Establishing Manila Bay Defensive Sea Area." 

75. File Memorandum dated Aug. 12, 1941 concerning proposed executive order 
"Transferring the U. S. Coast Guard for the District of Honolulu, Territory of 
Hawaii .... to ... . the Navy." 

76. File Memorandum dated Aug. 18, 1941, concerning proposed executive order 
"Suspension of Eight-Hour Law as to mechanics and laborers employed by 
the War Department in the construction of public works in the Territory of 
Hawaii necessary for the national defense." 

77. File Memorandum dated Aug. 20, 1941 concerning Navy request for author- 
ity to acquire four purse seiners to be converted into patrol vessels, for the 14th 
Naval District, stating Hawaii lacks adequate patrol ves.sels. 

78. Unsigned memorandum dated Aug. 16, 1941 addressed apparently to the 
Secretary of State by an employee in the Far East Division of the State Depart- 
ment. 

79. Letter dated July 31, 1941 from Commisioner Sayre to the President and 
the President's reply dated Aug. 23, 1941, and attached memoranda. 

80. Information Bulletins dated Aug. 6, 7, 8, 11, and 12, 1941. 

81. Memorandum dated August 28, 1941, from J. W. Ballantine for the 
Secretary of State. 

82. Memorandum of dates of three lunches with President Roosevelt, on 
July 8 and 11. and October 8, 1940, attended by Admiral J. O. Richardson. 

83. Memorandum for the President from W. R. Smedberg, III, concerning 
military forces in China. ( 

84. Dispatch No. 1384 dated Sept. 4, 1941 from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to 
the State Department (six sections) concerning Japanese offer of suggestion for 
meeting between Japanese Prime Minister and President F. D. Roosevelt. 

85. Memorandum dated Sept. 9, 1941 from Gen. G. C. Marshall for the Presi- 
dent, quoting from letter from Gen. MacArthur on the mobilizing of Philippine 
army units. 

86. Letter from the President dated Sept. 26, 1941 for President Quezon of 
the Philippines. 

87. Letter dated September 26, 1941 from the President to Commissioner 
Sayre, Manila, in reply to Sayre's letter of September 15, 1941. 

88. Letter dated Sept. 15, 1941 from Commissioner Sayre to the President 
reporting on the political situation in the Philippines. 

89. Memorandum from the President to the Director of the Budget, dated 
September 18, 1941. 

90. Memorandum dated Sept. 18, 1941 for the President from the Director of 
the Budget concerning purchase of a 6 mOnth food supply for Hawaii. 

91. Memorandum dated Sept. 28, 1941 from the President to the Secretary of 
State concerning negotiations with the Japanese. 

92. Letter dated Oct. 14, 1941 from the President to the Secretary of War, 
dictated by HLH referring to the Secretary's letter of Sept. 22, suggesting that 
subsequent to February 1942 more 4-engine bombers be allocated to the British. 

93. Memorandum for the President from Harry L. Hopkins dated October 14, 
1941 referring to the above letter to the Secretary of War. 



4246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

94. Letter dated Sept. 22, 1941 to the President from the Secretary of War 
In reply to the President's letter of Sept. 18, concerning production and distribu- 
tion of 4-engine bombers. 

95. Schedule of Presidential appointments txtr October 16, 1941. 

96. Schedule of Presidential appointments for November 25, 1941. 

97. Schedule of Presidential appointments for November 26, 1941. 

98. Schedule of Presidential appointments for November 27, 1941. 

99. Schedule of Presidential appointments for November 28, 1C41. 

100. Confidential Bulletin dated October 20, 1941. 

101. Memorandum dated December 9, 1941 from Harry Hopkins to Miss Tully," 
concerning letter dated October 21, 1941 from Secretai-y Stimson to the President, 
concerning the allocation of 4-motorcd bombers. 

102. Memorandum dated October 25, 1941 from the President to Commissioner 
Sayre. 

103. Memorandum dated October 22, 1941 from the Secretary of State to the 
President, concerning request of Commissioner Sayre to visit China. 

104. Memorandum dated October 22, 1941 from the President to the Secretary 
of State concerning a letter dated October 8, 1C41 to the President from Com- 
missioner Sayre, regarding an invitation for him to visit China. 

105. Proposed message from the President to Commissioner Sayre (not used). 

106. Letter dated October 8, 1041 from Commissioner Sayre to the President. 

107. File memorandum concerning message from President Quezon to President 
Roosevelt, dated October 23, 1941. 

108. L9tter dated October 31, 1941 from the President to President Quezon. 

109. Memorandum dated October 25, 1C41 from the President for Secretary of 
the Interior, and copy of message from President Quezon to Commissioner 
Elizalde, on October 22, 1941. 

110. Letter from Secretary of the Interior to the President dated October 23, 
1941, transmitting message from President Quezon to Commissioner Elizalde on 
October 22, 1941. 

111. Translation of radiogram dated October 22, 1941 from President Quezon 
to Commissioner Elizalde. 

112. Letter dated October 31, 1941 from President Quezon to President Roose- 
velt, replying to the President's letter of September 26, 1941. 

113. Letter dated November 1, 1941 from Commissioner Sayre to the President. 

114. Memorandum from Connnissioner Sayre to General Watson. 

115. Confidential Bulletin dated November 3. 1941. 

116. Confidential Bulletin dated November 4, 1941. 

117. Memorandum dated November 6, 1941 from the Secretary of State for the 
President. 

118. Letter datetl October 18, 1941 from President Quezon to the President. 

119. Memorandum dated November 6, 1941 from Secretary of State for the 
President, and draft of suggested reply to message from British Prime Minister 
concerning Chiang Kai-shek's appeal for aid. 

120. Message dated November 7. 1941 from the President to Prime Minister 
Churchill, in reply to Chiang Kai-shek's appeal for aid. 

121. Memorandum dated November 6, 1941 from the President for the Secre- 
tary of War. 

122. I-etter dated November 15, 1941 from the President to President Queaon. 

123. Letter dated October 18, 1941 from President Quezon to the P esident. 

124. Memorandum dated November 15, 1941 from the Secretary of State for 
the President. 

125 Memorandum dated November 15, 1941 from State Department for the 
President, concerning proposed remarks to Japanese Ambassadors. 

126. Letter dated November 17, 1941 from Stephen Early to David Sarnoflf. 

127. November 13, 1941 message from David Sarnoff to the President. 

128. File memorandum dated November 19, 1041 concerning legislation af- 
fecting martial law in Puerto Rico and Hawaii. 

129 Memorandum dated November 21, 19*1 from the Secretary of State for 
the President, and attached meniorandum dated November 13 from Colonel 
Donovan. 

130. November 15, 1941 memorandum from the President to the Secretary 
of State, transmitting memorandum from Colonel William J. Donovan dated 
November 13, 1941. concerning substance of remarks made by Hans Thomsen 
on November 6, 1941. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4247 

131. Memorandum dated November 22, 1941 concerning allocation of funds 
for calling up the military forces of the Philippines. 

132. Memorandum dated November 24, 1941 from Admiral Stark for the 
President. 

133. Memorandum dated November 25, 1941 from Owen Lattimore, Chung- 
king, to Lauchlin Currie, concerning Chinese reaction to the proposed modus 
Vivendi. 

134. Confidential Bulletin dated November 25, 1941. 

135. Confidential Bulletin dated November 26, 1941. 

136. Letter dated November 26, 1941 from Secretary Stimson to the President 
concerning Japanese movement to the south from Shanghai. 

137. Memorandum dated November 26, 1941 from Secretary Stimson to the 
President concerning Japanese convoy movements toward Indo-China. 

138. Memorandum from the State Department for the President dated Novem- 
ber 27, 1041 concerning proposed remarks during call of Japanese Ambassadors. 

139. Undated message from Commissioner Sayre to the President. 

140. Letter dated November 28, 1941 from Secretary Ickes to Mr. Mclntyre 
concerning suggestions of candidate for governor of the Hawaiian Islands. 

141. Memorandum for the President dated November 24, 1941, from Mr.- 
Mclntyre transmitting letter from Norman Littell, Assistant Attorney General, 
suggesting appointee for position of governor of the Hawaiian Islands. 

142. Memorandum dated November 25, 1941 from Mr. Mclntyre to Secretary 
Ickes transmitting the above letter of Mr. Littell. 

143. Letter dated December 18, 1941 from Normal Littell to Mr. Mclntyre 
enclosing an editorial from a Honolulu newspaper. 

144. Letter dated November 28. 1941 from Admiral Stark to the President, 
concerning Pacific bases. 

145. Letter dated November 24, 1941 from James Q. Newton to Admiral Stark. 

146. Letter dated December 1, 1941 to the President from Secretary Stimson 
concerning exchange of land in the Hawaiian Islands. 

147. Letter dated December 1, 1941 from Commissioner Sayre to the President. 

148. Confidential Bulletin dated December 3, 1941. 

149. Confidential Bulletin dated December 5, 1C41. 

150. Teletype sheet reflecting news bulletins on December 5, 1941. 

151. Memorandum dated December 5, 1941 from the Navy Department con- 
cerning Japanese forces in Indv)-China. 

152. Schedule of Presidential appointments for December 6, 1941. 

153. Schedule of Presidential appointments for December 7. 1941. 

154. Typewritten list of all Presidential appointments for December 7, 1941. 

155. Memorandum datetl December 7, 1941 from General G. C. Marshall for 
the President, concerning the Pearl Harbor attack. 

156. Memorandum dated De<'ember 3, 1941 from Secretary Morgenthau for 
the President concerning representatives of the Bank of Japan in New York. 

157. Memorandum dated December 8, 1C41 from Ferdinand Mayer and F. L. 
Belin. relating to conversations with Ambassador Kurusu on December 6 and 7, 
1941. 

158. List of outside telephone calls through White House switchboard on Nov. 
14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, 1941. 

159. Letter dated May 15, 1941 from the President to Lauchlin Currie, and 
attached memoranda relating to a tentative aircraft program for China. (See 
Exhibit No. 159 to which these documents were attached. ) 

160. Military reports dated July 25 and 27, October 12, December 2, 3 and 4, 
194] with transmittal letters to the President from the Briti.sh Ambassador. 



4248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




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4250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




Note — Reverse side of this memorandum not available. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4251 



THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER 

MANILA 



Personal and . ^. 

Strictly conridaotlal . 



December 13, ISHo., 



My dear Mr. President: 

With further reference to ay radio of Ceceaber tenlST 
a copy of which is enclosed herewith, concerning President 
Quezon's statements regarding the limitations of the powers 
of the President of the United States to approve or disap- 
proTe Philippine constitutional amendmente, I am enclosing 
herewith copies of (l) President Quezon's original press 
statement of December fourth, (2) ay press statement; of De- 
cember sixth, and (3) President Quezon's reported state- 
ment of December ninth at a press conference called specif- 
ically for the purpose. I think you will be particularly 
interested to glance at the latter statement of President 
Queson's. JH 

Up to now President Quezon has been entirely cordial 
and his attack came as a complete surprise to me. , Bils 
attack was obviously motivated by something deeper tbituk 
ay statement of December sixth, which he had to tdrtteor* 
out of its obvious meaning in order to find a vantage poia' 
for his assault. 



President Quezon seems to be growing more and more die-' 
tatorlal and arbitrary, and Impatient of any restradnt or 
of any criticism, no matter how well Justified. Perhaps 
hie basic attitude is best summed up in the remark which 
he made publicly a few months ago when, in speaking at the 
opening of a new bridge, he said: 

'An' American businessman had the nerve to 
oritiolze ae, so I told the president of the 
Rotjsiry Club to tell him to get out of the coun- 
try if he did not like- what I had done.* 



fhe President, 

The yihXte Bouse. 




4252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



2 - 

What make* the eltuation partlc\ilarl7 difficult Is that. 
In thsae oritloal times when international oomplicatione are ; 
menacing in thia quarter of the world, It is obviously of 
large importance to avoid unneoeeaary altercations. For thie 
reason I bare refrained from talcing issue with President 
Queion on innumerable occasions in spite of considerable pres- 
aure on the part of the American community who deeply resent 
President Quezon's attitude. On the other hand, when Presi- 
dent Quezon presumes to dictate what the President of the 
United States can or cannot do and deliberately misstates the 
law, 1 feel that I cannot remain silent. If American official 
representativee do not resolutely defend American sovereignty 
here until the date of independence, I am confident that our 
difficulties will be greatly multiplied. The very fact of 
the critical natiire of the international situation makes it 
all the more necessary to protect and uphold American sover- 
eignty here. 

Another complicating factor le the politicians who are 
constantly intriguing and plotting to secure additional 
Philippine powers and favors from the United States. One 
way of gaining their ends is to play off the American of- 
ficials concerned in Philippine matters, one against the 
other. 

For all these reasons it eeems to me of the largest im- 
portttioe, if American interests are to be protected, that more 
than ever all of ub stand firmly together, - particularly you 
and Secretary Ickea and myself. If the Filipino politicians 
are given any reason to believe that they can play one of us 
off against another there can be no resolute American policy 
here and we are In for trouble. 

It may be that at some time or other in the future, when 
President Queaon again Jumps the traces, you will desire your- 
self to make a public statement making clear to President 
Quezon that as long as America remains responsible for Phllip- 
pine defense and until independence is achieved you intend to 
back up the enforcement of American sovereignty in the Islands, 
I believe that some such statement, if luade public and coming 
from you, would have an exceedingly healthy effect throughout 
the Philippines. 

My effort out here is faithfully and loyally to interpret 
and carry out the policies you desire. It would be a great 
help to me, ae well as a tremendous encouragement, if I could 

*have 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4253 



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4254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Serial No. 966 
Radio Sent : Navy December 10, 1940. 

Code B 
No. 901 
Hampton, 

Department of Interior, Washington, D. C. 
Rnsli. Confidential for the President. 

QUOTE See attached radio No. 884 Dec-ember sixth from ine to Hampton. I 
made statement of December sixth quoted therein in order to defend po.sition and 
powers of President and because of the inappropriateness of President Quezon's 
undertaking to attempt to dictate the limits within which President of the 
United States may act. See my confidential letter to you of September 16, 1940. 

Presiden Quezon yesterday morning at a press conference called .specifically 
for the purpose bitterly and with unconcealed emotion criticized and attacked 
my statement of December sixth, reiterating the view previously expressed in his 
press statement of December fourth. The i.ssue of course is at present a purely 
academic one and I hope the incident will be closed with President Quezon's out- 
burst. In answer to requests from the press for a further statement I have 
told the press I have nothing to add to my original statement. 

Please refer to my radio No. 538 of August second to Department of Interior 
and my confidential letter to you of September twelfth in regard to emergency 
powers act. President Quezon is manifesting increasing irritation and im- 
patience whenever anything is said or done which tends to impair his full freedom 
of action and resents restraints resulting from American sovereignty. I am 
doing my best to avoid difficulties but I believe that unless American sovereignty 
is resolutely upheld until the date wh^n independence is granted we will be faced 
with increasing difliculties here. UNQUOTE 

To Hampton. Please send to President with this message copy of my radio 
to yoji No. 884. December sixth concerning press statements. S.\ybk. 

[Enclosure No. 1] 

In proclaiming President's approval of Philippine Constitutional Amendments 
President Quezon on December 4 issued following statement: 

"We should be, and in fact are, happy and grateful over the approval by 
President Roosevelt of the constitutional amendments. There should never 
have been any doubts in our minds as to what action the President would take. 
Under the independence act, the President of the United States may only dis- 
approve the proposed amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines if they 
do not conform with the provisions of the said independence act. On no other 
ground may the President disapprove amendments to the Philippine constitu- 
tion. Furthermore, President Roosevelt, being a progressive and a liberal, 
would naturally incline to let our people assume responsibility for our own 
government. 

"I have telegraphed the President our thanks." 



Enclosure No. 2 

At a press conference on December 6, when questioned in regard to President 
Quezon's statement of December 4, the High Commissioner read Section 7, 
paragraph 1 of the Tydings-McDuffie Act and said : 

"It is clear from that language that it is exclusively for the President of the 
United States to approve or disapprove such amendments as may be proposed 
to the Constitution of the Philippines, and I know of nothing in the Independence 
Act or in the Ordinance Appended to the Constitution restricting his right or 
power to do either." 

[Daily Rulletin— Manila, Dec. 10, 1940] 

Quezon Hits Back At Hicjh Commissionku 

When questioned last niglit, Woodbury Willoughby, executive 
assistant to High Commissioner Sayre, stated that the Commis- 
sioner had nothing to add to what he had said at the press 

conference last Friday. 

(By Cipriano Cid) 

President Quezon, at a press conference yesterday morning, openly and vigor- 
ously criticized a statement attributed to United States High Commissioner 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4255 

Francis B. Sayre that the President of the United States may veto any amend- 
ment to the Philippine constitution on any ground since his veto powers are not 
limited. 

President Quezon declared that the view expressed h.v the High Conunissioner 
at his press conference last Friday was a shock to him because, he intimated, 
it not only was not called for but it showed clearly that Mr. Sayre has failed 
to grasp the true philosophy of the Tydings-McDuffie independence law and the 
history of the progress of Philippine-American relations. 

He expressed surprise over the High Commlssicner s hearing on the constitu- 
tional amendments since in his opinion there was nothing in them which could 
have given cause for their disapproval by President Roosevelt. He reiterated 
his view that the American President may reject changes to the constitution of 
•the Commonwealth government only upon the grounds specified in the Tydings- 
McDuffie law and upon no others unless, he said, the President wants to be 
arbitrary and ignore altogether those moral and political restraints which have 
made ix)ssible the smooth progress in the relationship between the United States 
and the Philippines. 

For after all, the President confessed, the ultimate power in the relationship 
between any nations is that of physical force, and the United States, he stated, 
has all the power necessary to suppress every vestige of liberty in the Philippines. 

President Quezon was commenting on a statement of High Commissioner Sayre 
reported in the Bulletin last Friday. The High Commissioner was quoted as 
having said that he knew of "nothing in the Tydings-McDuffie act which restricts 
the power of tne President of the United States to approve or disapprove any 
amendments to the constitution as he sees fit." 

High Commissioner Sayre was then commenting directly on a statement of 
President Quezon issued in connection with the approval by President Roosevelt 
of the Philippine constitutional amendments which was the object of a trip to 
the United States by Speaker Jose Yulo. The Quezon statement, in part, said : 
"There should never have been any doubt in our minds as to what action the 
President would take. Under the independence act, the President of the United 
States may only disapprove the proposed amendments to the constitution of the 
Philippines if they do not conform with the provisions of the independence act. 
On no other ground may the President disapprove the amendments to the Philip- 
pine constitution." 

President Quezon told his press conference he objected to the construction by 
High Commissioner of the extent of the powers of the American President regard- 
ing the acts of the Commonwealth atTecting their internal government and to 
the High Commissioner's using his press conferences as a means of expressing 
his disagreement over acts of the National Assembly and the views of the of- 
ficials of the executive department of the Commonwealth. 

He frankly stated that he called the conference yesterday for the purpose of 
replying to the High Commissioner, explaining that if the Commissioner, in 
contrast with his precedessors, is going to continue utilizing his press conferences 
to disagree with Commonwealth officials, he would find him a willing "cooperator" 
because he would love to argue with the High Commissioner or with anybody. 

After stating the purpose of the conference and saying that he would not waste 
time by waiting for the reporters to ask him questions as usual, the President 
went on to say that although he has been aware for sometime of the position 
of the High Commissioner regarding the extent of the President's powers to veto 
or approve Philippine constitutional amendments, Mr. Sayre's public statement 
of them has been a painful surprise to him. "I have not recovered from the 
shock yet," he said. 

Mr. Sayre's views, he said, surprised him because the High Commissioner is 
apparently such a lover of democracy. He said he writes and talks of democracy 
to lead people to believe he not only preaches democracy but would practice it. 

But the views expressed by the High Commissioner regarding the legal and 
political aspects of Philippine-American relationship as reported in the press 
are wholly contrary and so at variance with the principles of a democratic 
government that to advocate them would be to advocate a reactionary policy. 

The President undertook to show the High Commissioner's error by stating 
that he cited only Section 7 of the constitution to bolster his position that the 
American President's powers over rejection or approval of the amendments are 



4256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

not restricted by law. He admitted that this section of the constitution placed 
no limitations upon the powers of the American President but asserted that it 
is not right to construe the scope and extent of the veto powers of the American 
President upon one section of the constitution. 

In order to fully understand the limitations placed upon those powers, he 
argued, one must look to other provisions of the constitution and the law which 
gave power and authority to the Filipino people to draft their own constitution. 
He said it is elementary in law, as not only the lowest member of the judiciary 
but even the student of law knows, to interpret laws in their entirety, and not 
only so but to look to the spirit behind its enactment. 

In the drafting of this constitution, congress, the President said, has placed 
only the following limitations upon the character of government that they would 
establish under it: (1) That it be republican in form; (2) that the constitution 
have a bill of rights, those same rights guarantee to American citizens, and (3) 
certain other limitations which must be appended to the constitution safeguarding 
the proper exercise of the sovereignty of the United States over the Islands. 

Only upon an infringement of any or all these limitations placed upon the 
nature and power of the Philipping government may the President of the United 
States veto the constitutional amendments, President Quezon stated. 

The Tydings-McDuflfie law is the consummation of a series of acts and pro- 
nouncements of the United States government dealing with the Filipino people, 
the President said, the redemption of the pledge duly made by the United States 
government that the Americans had come to the Philippines not to subjugate 
its people but to teach them the art and science of self-government and to secure 
for them the blessings of liberty. 

This law, he said, was enacted by congress in accordance with the promise 
made in the Jones Law that the Filipino would be granted their independence as 
soon as a stable government could be established by them. He added that con- 
gress found the Filipino people politically prepared for independence but due 
to economic policies which made the Philippines dependent upon the American 
market, the immediate severence of ties with the United States would result in 
serious consequences to the Philippines. 

He said that it was for this reason that the Congress of thellaited States 
instead of enacting a law granting immediate independencer^:=whtch should have 
been justified even then if the political ability of th6-^*iIipinos was to be con- 
sidered alone — approved the Tydings-McDuffie independence act which provides 
for the granting of independence after a transition period of ten years. 

Under this law, he said, the economic relations between the two countries would 
gradually change from Philippine dependence upon the United States market to 
that of ability to trade in the world market. 

Congress had two ways of bringing about such a change, the President went 
on to explain. Congress could merely have continued with the Jones Law or 
it could have enacted laws to enable the Filipino people to readjust their economy 
to meet the new situation. 

But congress wisely did not do so, he said, not only because there were minds 
in congress which were not reactionary but also because the sense of responsi- 
bility of congress counseled that the Filipino people be allowed to work out their 
own readjustment under a new law which vested in them the right to form a 
government of their own. 

"They decided that the Filipinos should create their own government with 
sufficient powers to meet and solve the problems that should be solved in prepara- 
tion for independence," he stated. "So ten years were gi\en us by the United 
States government with powers which would not infringe upon the sovereignty 
of the United States so that we may look after our own affairs and save our- 
selves from ruin. That is the political philosophy behind the enactment of 
that law." 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4257 








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THE mmwwn 

— — *MI»i*MW*i*'t i »II L a ' ii ■ J* iia i' l>iMiBlli i HH W H Mxt m UH I 

The attached despatch from mxr W^rml. 
Attach© at Toicyo i© forwarded as beJLiig of 
posaihl© Interest to the President, 

Bespecl 





« CMMQUm 



4258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4259 




4260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4261 




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t&oy «r« «^EM« (I r«r« <Mm%i»«%i«R of ftmit-lMai 
olMorvotioft, lone oxposrioavo with o«r fajMUUHM 
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vo?r aotioroi r»t»oo% f oir oa liUU>o«%li»i 

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ttt4o tewoafd #ovoi«pMiitto ia tM Far »io«-, Z ^ollovo 
tint tho fitftdoaoatol frotMltiea io m«t m wmm% y«t«c» 
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•},a. f«rt& of a aiatg^o «^2i, foafUtt. l» 
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la tlw ta»% of ««r*sAia$ oar mm mt lit o aaA - 
oar TitaX aatioaal tatoToata aliaravar %)mf aira a«rieaalr 
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miali tmm aooaaat af wwf twm% aai 
takaa a«va£t««e of avavr ^fortaailf ta o^HwiData %» 
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ai# mm Holy to mtaia ia Swe«»9 aa ta msm «m 
•MO to Britata ^ataaaa Tiatoify aaA ftafoat, Za tHia 
aM»Matiaa it aaoas t» m t^% «• aaat oeaaMar «^aMw»» 
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4262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 







%lM •bammmt f Iiiclaa4*a vlaaiAs la b*r atniMlc 
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•U« to •xiat aad t« d*f Mi %1mmhi1tm w»% only b*- 
•*a«« tlMiy hmrm prepared atroac loaal Aafanaaa b«t 
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tfea Britiah lag^&ra thaj teva Itaaa abla to draw upoa 
▼aat raaovraaa for thalr aoataoaaaa aad to tolac 
lAto ayaratloa agaloat thalr aaaadaa aaoMwia, adli* 
tary aa< aaTal pr*m»Vfm on a ««rXa««rl4a aaala. 
Iluqr lira bjr ia^artiag aoada fnm all parta of tlM 
worlA aaA hj vtillslac Isrsa vrwraaaa f laaaolal 
raaoaraaa* Thay ara dafaadad not oaljr Iqr aaaaaaNNi 
af 4«faaaa aarrlatt out looallf Imt alao by Aiataat 
aafl wl4aapraa4 aaMMmla, nilltaryt <uaiA aaval aatlvi* 
tlaa vhlah betk aoatytbttta to tba Halataaaaa* af 
thair auppllaa, A^tsf oartaia a««rta« of aiq^ly to 
tlialr aaaMlaa, «aA praf^aat tboaa aaaalaa fy»« aoa* 
•wMbratiac tba full foraa of tbair armMl poafar 
licalaat tlia lM»art aad tba awrra aaator af %hm Iqplra. 

Britlirtii aaaA aaaiataaea a2«ag %lm liaaa of oar 
(PMmndly aatablliriiaA poliaiaa at aaar paiata^ aaaiat- 

whiLtk la tlM» aaaa of tha Far Saat la acrtalalr 
wall «dLtbla tlia raalA of "poaalbilltjr'* ao far aa taa 
aapaaity of tlia XialtaA Stataa la aoaaaraad* 9balr 
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of imppliaa to teslana aaA kalpiag to pravMit a alaalac 
alMiaaala of aoaamaltta^oa ta aaA frMi Tariova parta 
Hw> tha tiK»rlA, m tlMt otiiaar ia»artaat aoinraa« af aappljr 
will aat ba aaala4 to tlia Brltlab aaA ba adtaA to tba 
aaaata «t tlui otbar alda* 

Tml alaa aas^Mt aa abiaf faatara la ttta arablaai 
Urn faattlwM vtetlMr aoA alKm Britala la lUcalr to 
via tba BaiaipaaiH «ar« m t bav« laAiaataA aba^a* tlM 
aoafliat la v»rli^ii«&4a9 aot aaraly a SaaropaMm «•»• 
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ibawl a faai'taijaibMit M vteik tanrltarlal 
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4263 



* jl • 



<«rlac tte •omm of tH* •Mf U«% tt f«»Mi it m« 
tpptat ft% tlw tottwi »f pti§» 4 aal At %)M tm «r 

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lag, dMito wtoa aaA «t«ra aaA tov «• taa mam% aft ••• 
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4264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



T^^BPI^B^WIK* ^W^WwJ ^W^^J^*' 



■'»mr Hmi 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4265 



OCFARTMCNT OF STATE 
WAOHINOTON 



January 21, 1941 



ISj dear Er. Presldoat! 

I iiava before me, by reference from you of 
January 5» Mr. (3rew*s letter to you of Deoember 14, 
1940. 

I find attached to Mr. Grew»s letter an envelope 
mtiich is inscribed "New stamps". la order to avoid 
obanoe of that envelope and its contents being lost, 
I retijrn tbe said envelops to you herewitSi, togetiier 
with a draft of a letter in acknowledgment thereof. 

I am sending to you separately a draft of a 
possible reply to Mr. arew»8 letter under reference 

Faithfully yours, 



^closures: 





1. Envelope containing 
four Japanese stamps. 

2. Draft of letter to 
Mr, Grew. 



The President, 

The White House. 



7971*) O — 46 — pt. 2(» 20 



4266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4267 



THE 0>,mmmcAH mmmj^u^f 

TOKYO 



itemh^T 



1 4. 



Bear frau.k? 



■'j,X^KS •'■& fcv^ !.:■ 



1 .V t^A^^9 



about Ja^an aii4 all i' 

tiiat skcmowji saoii«r or to iaav«j i 

fhe chiaf factors- in the problem would mn 



:: 'j'l e 



5 : :c intc 

-as to ma 

victory aa^ defeat; and, 

(3) to whet extoat oar owa policy i:a til's 

I'll® President, 

;dt# Hou 



iWi 



4268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




-V 



JJast amst be ttn^cL witii our proparedn^as p 
end. with respect to the relative stra»^.h of 
the Americom and the Japanese aavlos n<m aji4 
later. 

fhoee are questions wnxca, wx^xi ;-©!■&©>. 
information here, I asa. not qualified everi 
proxlKjateiy to aaswer. 

frmi tU» folcyo angle wre see 
roughly as follow©* 

After eight years of ei 
acmethinir p&rw^n&ntlr oon^t'- 
Japanese relatio&s, . 
beejQ defeate<l by" tr«Mc-. 
ita ooatro.; 
away as if 

and unaahasied 



i m& ■ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4269 



-3- 



pseMng the southward advance , with 80oa<mic oon- 
troi as a preliminary to political domioation in 
the areas isarked domi« Seonoitiio obstaclea, auoh 
as aay arise from American embargoes, will seriouslyl 
handioap d^apan in the long r\in» but meanwhile they 
tend to VMBh. the JSBanese ciwm.r& in a forlorn hope.^ 
of QStking themselvea economically self- stufrio lent. 
History has ahown that the pendulum in Japan 
is ali^ayn swinging between extraadst and moderate 
polioiea, but as things stand today we belieT© 
that the pendulum is more likely to swing still 

ther toward extremes tMa to reverse Its direct i<^« 
oye, and especially MatsuoiBft, will fall in due 

^^* -m^M. ISiii&i ^^^m^^mm ^«> Japanese^ 

'^'^-'^T group of leader® eould reverse the ex- 

fc»tt®i0alst program and hof# to eurviire, 

"'■"■• ''-'^■^ -^ but of inexorable 

^^ese step with' 
?irlse, and 
t } i&to.-J«i|tSL$ie»e, oonsoioua«' 



' 



1 



4270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




th« Sb. 




'. . llfT « ,(,.• 



a people aepI©l^© th© coutrsu which 
::''-"" .a^vi^ii^sj thos© ©len^nts are 

iieYertfe%i#ss ia&rtiCMlat© and powerless ais4l are 
llfee"'-" *■•"■* ^—'> •*':••* ao.. ^-'•.■'-"-''■■»T .- ^K^, .3,^3?;aaa0 her© 

■>:a -J&paa lato w&r with 
xm, 1 ha T© told Ifeitsuoka point blsjik that his 
country l9 heading for di^antai?. 1@ has at i®«»t 
s««2i thaf, ?>:ff'^,is»te ::,ffiidats iis haire fallen 

t a.'' ' ' '■"■'■ 

■f that intea'dfja ,v 



4 




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S«a«j-" '— '•■ 



aera. 



'h as 1-hs 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4271 





Aiseriean peop? - ■ '■-" •• a my opinion thos© risks 
&r© 1&&B la d0sr©« than tii« far greater future 
dangers whieli w© would f^ice it we wer© to follow 
a policy* of iaiss©r~t&ir«. 

In other words, ths risks of. not taking 
positive measures to jaaictaia oiir future security 
are likely to b$ much, greater than the risks of 
ts^;xag positive measurea as vw^ sauwajs's.ra, aavanc 
proceeds* So far as I am aware, t-iie great majority 
of tile Isioricaa people are in a asx>od for vigorous 
action. The principal point at issu8, as I see it, 
1,3 not vf^et.^lar ws must oail b hs^it t.r^ thp, TRnanes© 
program y when* 

It is important sonsteatly to ^®ar in jsi'nd th# 
:' .■^' ", . " -^m %& :■^isur$s '^s'hort ol war" witu 

.-:a to , 3€} measures to their 

flQal so.uc^uaion if r ">ar/, such lacK of ia~ 

teatloa will h© all tooobYious to ths Japanese :if 
who will proceed undeterred, and er&ii with greater 
inoentive, on their way. Onlj if they becoicp 
certain that «=■«• '^"an ..v. ...,;._.... if oalled upon to 



4272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



I 




do 80 will our preXiminaz'7 moasures 8taa4 aoaw 
Chanel of proTlng eff«ctlv© aM of rvaorine: 
the Jieeesaitj for war, - the old atory qS 
Sir Sdward Gray la 1914, 

If by «ueh aetioa w« can bring about tJi© 
aveatual discrediting of Japaii*a pr«s«at laadara, •: 
a ragaaaratioB of thou^t may ultlmataly take 
shape ia this oountry, permittiag the resua^tioa 
c>f noraial relatioas wltJi us and leading to a 
readjustoeat of the n^ole Paoirio problem. 

In a nut siiell that la about the wst I reajard 
e preseat aad future situatloa. Bo doubt you 
have, some of my telegram* which ha to tried to 
paint the picture as clearly as ims Q©©a possible 
at this post where we have to fumble and grope 
for accurate information, sii^ly beoauae among 
the Japanese themselves the right hand oftea 
doesn't know what the ?eft hand is doing. Their 
so-called "New Structure* is in an awful a«»» aad 
the bickering and controversy that go on within 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4273 



.^rf. 



Mv&r\^ 



i«m totalitarian step 



tbat we hftTe known and loured. 

If you are willing to gi're rie even a cue 
to your tijjoijgiita, «itii»r In a personal ultx^a- 
oonfidential letter or orally by so^ns trustwortliy| 
person oomin^ out here, it will be of tr«eiE»]idous 
help. 

I cabled you my entlmslaatio and affeetioiiate 
oongratulatlons on your r©*el©etion^ Toa are 
playing a iitasterly Mnd in o^^r Xorei^ affairs 
and I am profoundly thaO^^^i^ tMt the eoontry 
3»s not to be deprived of your olear vision, 

utermination and splendid oour&ge in piloting 
|ne old sxixp of state. 

Faithfully yours ^ 



(\^^ 





4274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




7^. 



tKsmaaBUKmmu' 



d^^stccti 



1 








(Mir 









EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4275 




^- '-. ■* :W5-?«S ■ -■%■>"■; i^ J^»- :jaiij/-.. ■; 



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Hi 






"WOODUCY 

3000 CATHKORAL AVEMUE 

WAaHIMOTON,O.C. 



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4276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




Jan.22/a 






RESUME OF SITUATION BH^ATTYE TO BIU. 1776 



I. 



The^ltuaUoD abroad. 



1. The ocsan supply altuatlcn of the Britlah Islea haa 
aot been aolred. It will probably grow vorae during the aprlng and 
aunoier. New supply of ahipe either from here or Britain cannot 
relieve it for at least another ten mntha. Britain's American 
simply of munitions is constantly ia^riled and her minlwiim food su;^ly 
guy be reached in a Tery few months. The strain on Britain for 
convoys is bearing harder and harder on her naval power elsewhere. 

2. Britain's air situation is probably being slightly 
in$>roved but she has yet no defense against a constant wearing 
attrition in the shape of sporadic bombardment which is diminishing 
her industrial capacity and strainii^ her morale. 

On the other hand, Qenaany undoubtedly has a large 
reseinre of air pcwrsr which she can draw up<») for a heavy blow In 
support of an invaaian. She la evidently planning such an attack 
possibly in the near future and pr<^ably by next summer. 

3. While Britain has temporarily saved ^ypt and the 
Canal and is probably knocking ^taly out of her African possessions, 
she has vat air control over the Central Uediterranean and her 
oonnunioations through the Mediten^jaean are likely to b« interrupted 
by the Oeraan reosuTorciBeot of Italy. Qeimany is evidently reenforc- 
ing Italy and may be also planning to stop the Greek sxiccess. If she 
decides not to invade the British Isles, it is possible that i^e may 
move south into Egypt and Spain in furtheraiMe of a plan to starve 
England, destroy her morale,and lower her prestige, 

4. <Iapan is stUl pressing slowly down towards ah attack 
oa the Nstherlands in which ahe wotild in all probability be successful 
as against the IM>cfa and British forces there. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4277 



-2. 



II. 






1. th» SKffiqsaratisflB power of our £L«et h«« pe<j«itly b««n 
presented by Secretary Knox. In caae of lo»« <^ the Britiah ileet, 
it would be far inferior to the conirfjied Germin, Italian and 
Japanese Jleete. Ttm oaaJn fleet is still in the Pacific, 

2. The Panama Canal is aubject to the hazard of 
sabotage and air attacks either by a svurpriae a^iproac^ fran the 
.sea or after land bases have been seissed in the Western Hetaisphore. 

3. In case of the fall of Great Britain and eUainatlcn 
of its fleet, our Atlantic ftot supported by protective land and 
air garris<»is would be oonfronted with the difficult task of 
Biamltaneously gtuirdlng against j 

a. The establiahaisnt of air bases in South toerica 
throi^h Fifth Coliam assistance, 

b. Surprise air raids upon the po}Hilous cities of 
our eastern seaboard or upon the Panaisa Canal 
fr«E ships operating in the Atlantic. 

c. The establislsaent of an airplane base in 
Newfoundland or Labrador. 



4. In any event the defense against ^ and £ above would 

have to be supported by e^cpeditionary forces of land troops. 

5. In the case of the eatabllshiiMmt of s« air base in 
either Newfoundland or Labrador, air attacJoi would fee j^asible upon 
American -cities on the eastern seaboard as far south as Wilmington, 
N.C., «id as far west as Detroit, arul Coluobua, Ohio. 

6. In case of the establishraBnt of hostile bases north 

of Dutch Guiana, similar attacks by Heinkel bonbers could be lUMle 
i^xxt the Panama Canal. 

7. Our attache reports to&t Gezmany will probably have 
1200 such bonbers equal to or better than our B-l? by next Septesfoer. 
We shall have nothing comparable to 8«ch a force by that time. 



4278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



W 



-3. 



8. Our ProtttctlY* Mobilization i'orces will not be 
trained or fully arwd until March 19A2. Prior to Novnber 1941 
«• DDuld have much difficulty in providing ^e essential expeditionary 
foroea for the defenae of Newfoundland, the Caribbean area, north- 
eastern Brazil and the suppoi-t of South American Republics without 
dangerously stripping our continental defense of materiel. 

9> Our i^eently acquired British naval and air bases 
will not be fully equipped or armed until the summer of 1942. 

10. Without resnforcements the permaaent garrison in 
Newfoundland would be entirely insufficient to defend northern 
Newfoundland from a foreign attack, and the establishment of an 
air base there. Similarly the psmanent gan-iaons in the 
Cartbbean area will require heavy reenf orcements in order to render 
them secure against a aajor attack. 

11. If Japan simultaneously became an enefcy, the 
hazards involved in rewtforclng the Atlantic fleet from the main 
Pacific fleet would be onicb increased. 

12. So long as the Panama Canal remained open, transfers 
to the Atlantic could be made lAilch in all probability would meet 
the various dangers in the Atlantic which are enumerated above, 
while still leaving American interests in the Pacific sufficiently 
secure. 

We must be prepared, however, against the possibility 
that the Canal may be blocked by a surprise operation for a period 
of a month or more, ocMapletely changing our defensive situation in 
the Atlantic until the arrival of the main fleet in those waters. 



III. 

X^e Hltl^te ffil^HaU<?B 



In case of the loss of the British fleet accompanied by 
hostile action against us by all three Axis powers, while our 
jmaadlate defensive positicn might be thus rendered teo;x>rarily 
secure by transfer of the main fleet to the Atlantic, this would 
probably not be true of our ultimate position. Not only would 
the aggret;ate present naval strength of the three Axis powers far 
exceed the present naval strength of this covuitry, but those' powers 
would be left in control of such superior facilities for shipbuilding 
as to make it probable that they could become and remain indefinitely 
a menace to this hemisphere — able to effect permanent hostile 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4279 



lodgments upon its continents. Certainly we would have no ground 
for expecting either of those powers to develop a* naval policy as 
compatible with owr interests as has been shown by the British 
Bnpire during the past 125 years. 



IV. 

1. The above described Iraciediate dangers to the 
United States arising from a defeat of Great Britain and a loss of 
the British fleet during the coming spring or sumner cannot be 
entirely eliainated by anything which it is possible for us to do in 
respect to selling munitions to Britain between now and next September. 

2. Whatever benefit Britain would derive during that 
period from the passage of Bill I776 would be aainly in the increased 
morale which such passage would undoubtedly give to the British 
people. The eiMCtment of the Bill would undoubtedly somewhat 
expedite the furnishing to her of American mmltions owing ti.the 
centralization of purchasing and the flexibility of operatiwis which 
it permits. But the immediate material advantages would, in my 
opinion, be far from sufficient to greatly increase her defensive 
power. For example, our production of the items of planes, guns 

< including aircraft guns, tank and anti-tank guns), and anmunition, 
will not be greatly increased until 1942. 

3. By far the chief naterial bmeflt to be derived by 
Britain from the passage of that Bill will not come tintil 1942. 

By that time she will derive immense benefit tram the law, and that 
benefit will continue through the period necessary for her recupera- 
tion after the war is over in case she wins a victory. 

The present shortage of Britain's supply of American 
exchange irtiich has resulted at present in all further orders for 
the purchase of munitions In this country being forbidden by the 
Presidait will be r«nedied by the Bill's passage. No really 
Important munitions, however, idiich nay then be ordered could possibly 
be finished and delivered until after the ccmiing 1941 emergency. 




.~a)-^d^-at - *w *^ -««^ fa^w i.«>v>.i^&C^ 



4280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



-5. 



V. 

Th« prompt passage of Bill I776 of J>3"A^robably *he last 
possible opportunity of, to any extent, contributingj^ta the defense 
of this country by aid to Britain «*iich is short of military action. 
That extent is mainlj' limited to the increase of British ""grfig- a^. 
which would be effected. In materiel the assistance rende?ec^^3uring 
the corain^' six months would be insignificant. And when a people 
are suffering frwr. such strain and shortage of supplies, including 
food, as will soon be the case with the British people, preservation , 
of morale is difficult. I therefore think that the President 
should consider whether the American j,'oveminent has not reached the 
time wh«i it must realize that the policy it has thus far followed 
of limiting its aid to measures which are short of military action 
will not probably secure a British victorj^. It is my belief that 
consideration should be given to measTjres which vdll at the same 
tine secure the life line of British supplies across the Atlantic 
and relieve their convoy duty units of her fleet irtiich ai>e sorely 
needed elsewhere. 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4281 








TE HOUSS 
-JTON 



•■) t 



% £!\)-'' 



'<:j't ar fm ^m%i 



^^^g^f^^-:^-:§W^j§t^i 






liptui 






79716 O — 46 — pt. 20 21 



4282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



-'■JK''—'— '■'-■•;■ 







Honolulu, 

23 January 1941. 



Dear Mies LeKand: 

I arrived here yesterday af.ternoon by tn© China 
Clipper. It hardly eeema poesihle that Z dined in Manila on 
Sunday night and arrived In Honolulu on Wedneeday. 

It was a tremendouely IntereEtlns trip for me. I 
have croseed the Pacific nine tlaos by ehlp, but thlB air voyage 
brought home In viitld aianxier how nodem coniniunlcatlAns have 8lirur>& 
dietanoee. 

I found Ouaa strugsllris to recover from the li^ 
devaetatlnji typhoon of Novoaber 3d. It certainly wrecked tne islaad.- ' 
Ihe Marine area was particularly hard hit. The Marines tax are 
working hard to put their place in or'^er again, but a cf tastrophe 
01 the magnitude whlon tuey experienced takee something out of 
buaan beings. At Wake Island I learned that the PanAir people had" 
changed their parsoawsl who went through a recent typhoon, putting 
in an entirely new crew. It struck ae tnst It woulto't be a bed 
idea to do the sees with tna Marines at Quan. A new outfit would « 
go in with frash enthuslasai ana witaout the terrifying ae ory of < 
the ordeal thr-oufeh whicn the:p»e8«ntP9B8tobente have pasred. 

Apparently I was wrong witn my gueee that the 
New ?ourtn Army problem would be solved without a resort to arae. 
Whan I was Iri Hongitong X wac Informed by the local Coin:?.uniBt repre- 
sentative tuat the order had been issued by fleneral Ho Ying-chln 
for the Central Oovernfnent troops to nove agalnet tne Kew Fourth. 
However, h:iVing only recently talked to Chow £rx-l&l and heard hie 
conBldsred opinion thj::t the Matter would be settled peacefully I 
was incxined to think that the Hongkong man was trying to propagan- 
diza me, or was unduly alar^tsd. But apparently he was tailing the 
truth, for when the news broke in tne preps at Hanila tne date of 
!;.<? aoveaent age ins t tne JJew Fourth was placed at Janusry I2tn. 

I oas Incllfiad to boiieve, tnough, that the affair 
Wili be loc-;li;;od. Chow £n-lai, Ir. his public (statement followinc 
t;ie clash, ssld &a much. II" the Corestunleta, who are being attacked, 
are willing to localize it, the Central GtovernEent oertair.ly snould 
make svery effort to do «o. It is noftt unfortunete, though, thtt it 
euuid have occurred, for it cannot help Ijut intensify the bitter- 
ness. Clarkf&err • ■ 'Titioh Aisbaei--ador, will, I aa sure, asake a 
strong protest, k ■>« that »r. Johnson will tk%io do so. It 
l« imparar^--- ' «■;. t,o ate, that c'vil war be avoided at all 
oo»i., Ch. tlnue to roeirt so ae to contain aa large a 
'-"-' — ■ '- ■• ,„,•;,. ,^„ ^ ,^ ,.„ „g poaeitls. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4283 



r 



//^-"^ 



>}.'>'* 





I have a DUj^eetlon to ofior i;. .oimo.'.ti 
situation. The president mai h,: ve co^sidared it ... .. .,, .,:>, ^ 

have been BUllln^ tne idea over In »y alnd since leaving Cbwnsklns 
and It esv-ae %o me to have come aerit. It secure to «« tn.at 
Adialr&l Yarr jgll would make an Ids; 1 Aabee'-ador to Chins at tRl| 
tiae. "T wlbh fn no way to csBt any reflection on tae work of 
'Ar. Johnson, but for aany rsi-eone it, ee«2«iB to me tnat Adtalpa.1 
Xarnell sight be het er eqaippsd to deal wltr. problf<"iB whicu will 
arise in tfce near future. In the ftret place, ha ia .admired and 
r-'Bpected by all politic--! groupe. Then, he h, s a «illtary-na. ya3.,ti 
background wnlch would be a distinct eeeet. Hig Ju5B--i:f!«nt la 
and sound. Ha .-cii be depended on to carry out InsiructionB to-^ 
letter, but he also nr s the coarage anJ judgeaent to act or: hie" 
own initiative when oco&fion deconde. In this rsrpTct he vouXd 
alily ,;osplosant the British Ambosrador, 

to>. J'a^meon i^cB hsd a long and diotinguiGhed record ^s 
cnlef of our diplomatic ralselon there, ana I do not eug^^eet ti»i 
he lecie ability. It le el.r.ply th.t i:. the present situation 
aope rs to me that Adsirel Y«riiell poseessoe certpin quJitfitatlos 
v..ich would enable him to ^et the dseired r«?8ults wltn {jreater 
ease. 



XhiB le ; , or .e-? to sut..ept and I 

so only ba -auflo - ,— ., , ^„..,.. -_ c^Dle tnjugbt &r>c{ feci 

r .-.'^ A a 3.,aild be eubr.itted for co.- sideration. I have neard 
S'Joweptio;! from noone exs.e, and I .io not know whether Malral 
Yarnell would wisb the ap volntsent. He le a tnorougii pj-triot, 
though, ana would serve Ir. any .;;apaclty tne President xlgfct vi)sh. 



I was glfifi to Bee that tno wors at Wake 
underway. Ky friends in the Fleet here tell me 
is In apple-pie order and ri-ady for any call. 
I think I snould say ta.it I have noied with pie 
tlor. of ofi'is;:er6, especially of senior offioere 
ideee. Apparently thora h&e been sonse recent 1 
tue top, for tnls hes not always been so ari.' tn 
ae. ferhape it is th t Britain's 8xp>Ti<3nc9 is 
Anywsiy It is a healthy ei^ for now is no time 



and Miaw&y is well 

tnat ths Fleet 
In tnie connection 
uure the l..cilna- 

f,o con slier new 
!■-•■: trlnation from 
f-ct h;s worried 
fearing fruit, 
for coiflplacency. 



I 15..V2 I'or 

DC (iood to be b.. jk. 



by tne Mateonia tomorrow, an--^ It will 



Wltfj kind re-^r-rds to all 1 ai. 



Sincerj^y, 



nSt>-Jh 






4284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The White House, 
Washington, February 5, 1941. 
Secret 
Memorandum for the Acting Secretary of the Treasury. 

Please let me have your recommendation on this secret recommendation of the 
Secretaries of War and Navy. 

F. D. R. 

Letter dated Jan. 30, 1941 to the President from Secretaries Stimson and Knox 
in re request of Pi-esident Quezon of the Philippine Commonwealth that funds 
not yet appropriated but already authorized to be paid the Commonwealth from 
sums derived from sugar excise taxes and currency devaluation be provided at 
this time in order to permit improvement of the defenses of the Islands. The 
sum in question amounts to $52,000,000. 



The White House, 
Washington, February 11, 1941. 
Memorandum for General Watson. 

Will you show this correspondence to the Postmaster General but don't give it to 
him? 

F. D. R. 



The White House, 
Washington, February 3, 1941. 
Private & Confidential 
Memorandum for the Secretary of State. 

What should I do next? 

F. D. R. 

Letter to Frank Walker from Father Walsh, Superior General at Maryknoll, 

dated January 27th, re cable sent stating that the Governments are 

now ready to send a trusted representative to discuss the terms of a projected 
agreement. 



Depaktment of State, 
Washington, February 5, 1941- 
Memorandum for the Pi'esident. 

Referring to your memorandum of February 3, covering a letter from Bishop 
Walsh to the Postmaster General, and to the memorandum which I am sending 
to you, separately, in comment upon possible procedure suggested by the Bishop 
in regard to relations with Japan, — 

In as much as the Japanese Government is sending a new Ambassador, who 
is due to arrive here shortly, would it not seem desirable to await arrival of 
and contact with that Ambassador before taking any action regarding any sug- 
gestions offered through indirect channels? 

The letter from Bishop Walsh to the Postmaster General is returned herewith. 
Enclosure : From Bishop Walsh, January 27, 1941. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4285 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4287 



papiMi'l I I J 



TMX MECMCTAHV CC ankTC 




;0N?ID^Ifl4li 




February 5, 1941, 




Referring to your memoraadoB of January 26, for~ 
warding the mcmorandua that was handed to you several 
days ago by Bishop Waleh on the subject of a possible 
procedure in relatioaa with Japaa, I have studied the 

matter carefully and I give detailed comasents in the 
isemorimduffl imtaediately hereunder, 

I doubt the praot ioability of proceeding on 

such line at thia tia®. It 8e««js to me. that there is.:" 

little or no IllEelthood that tM Japanese GtovenaBent 

end the Jai^ttiSfs -oeople would in good faith accept aay 

^wc>' ay5cat;»g.T;-;fji:;i^ — at this stage. It also seems to me 

through thfs good offices of this SOTemioent aa^ 

•^Rga^ftat were worked out which would extrioate Japwi; 

fsosa Its present i :,s«3t in Ohlina, the likelihood ' 

■>>^ t'ifit JmiSLt: -Toitl^ s^ft-ad and ?iOCfil@rate her lut— 







t,.,..;is, Jaijan would 




4288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



-S> 



Change h«r present oouree of aggreaslon to <me of 
peaceful prooeduree./jAt the eane time, 1 feel that «• 
should not dleoouxage those Japanese vbo may ise vozklng 
toward bringing about a ohange In the course which 
their country is following. Adairal Konura, Jfl^aness 
Ambaseador-dsslgnate to the United States, Is es^oted 
here soon. Upon his arriral he oay have soae proposals 
and suggestions to offer. We shall of oourse wish to 
listen carefully to what he has to say and we oaa try 
to convince hlJi that Japan's own best interests lie in 
the developaent of friendly relations with the United 
States and with other countries which believe in orderly 
and peaceful processes aaong nations. We should not, I 
think, resort to other agents and channels before we 
have even talked with the Ambassador and while we can 
work through Mr, Grew at Tokyo. 

■me memorandum left with you by the Bishop is re- 
turned herewith. I am also returning to you, separately, 
the letter sent by the Bishop to Mr. WaliDtr. 



\ 




closure: 

Uemorandum giving 
detailed ccRtunent 
and memorandum by 
Bishop Walsh. 



C 



lL 



M 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4289 

Department of State, 
Washington, February 5, 1941' 
Confidential 

Memorandum for the President. 

Referring to the strictly confidential memorandum relating to the Far Eastern 
situation which was left with you several days ago by Bishop Walsh, it seems 
to me that we can best approach the question presented in the memorandum 
by mentioning briefly certain facts fundamental in the Far Eastern situation 
and then examining the proposed plan of procedure in the light of those funda- 
mentals. 

The first fundamental is that since 1931 Japan has been dominated more and 
more by the military group — a group which finds adherents in all classes of 
Japanese society, the soldier, the sailor, the merchant, the industrialist, the 
farmer, et cetera, et cetera. This group sets a peculiarly high value on the use 
of force as an instrument both in national and in international [2] affairs. 
As Japan's military adventuring on the Asiatic mainland and southward has 
proceeded, the unmistakable trend in Japan has been toward an authoritarian 
control with the military group coming more and more to the front. During this 
process, there have been some elements in Japanese society which have felt that 
the course being followed by their country was a mistaken one. On the whole, 
these elements have had, up to the announcement on September 27, 1940, of the 
alignment by Japan with Germany and Italy in the tripartite alliance, less and 
less voice in Japan's affairs. The reaction of the United States to the three power 
alliance, the statements made by you in your fireside chat of December 29 and 
in your message of January 6 to Congress, the statements made by me on Janu- 
ary 15 before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and on January 27 before 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the increasing manifestations that 
this country is rearming at a steadily accelerating rate of speed .and that this 
Government and this country are determined to assist Great Britain and other 
countries which are protecting themselves against aggression, and the British 
and Greek successes against the Italians, — all these have probably caused many 
Japanese to feel that their course of [31 action may bring them into 

conflict with the United States and that their course is more fraught with 
serious risk to Japan than had previously been estimated. 

If events are permitted to take their course, it seems probable that Japan will 
for the time being become more and more authoritarian and more and more 
military-controlled. In view of the big strides already made by Japan in those 
directions, it would be extremely difficult to check or to change the dii'ection at 
this time. It seems clear that Japan's military leaders are bent on conquest — just 
as are Germany's. They demand that this country make concessions: that we 
give up principles, rights, interests : that we stand aside while Japan proceeds 
by force to subjugate neighboring areas and, working in partnership with Ger- 
many, contributes to the establishing of a new "world order" : even that we 
facilitate their efforts by promising to give them financial assistance for the 
exploitation of areas which they expect to conquer. Is there anything that can 
stop this aggressively moving force — other than the resistance of a stronger 
obstacle or the resistance of a greater force? 

Another fundamental fact is that the Chinese are fighting for their existence, 
against forces of [4] aggresion which, if successful, will probably increas- 
ingly menace the interests of the United States. 

Ever since Japan's military leaders embarked on their present course in 1931, 
various efforts have been made by Japanese leaders to persuade the Government 
of the United States to conclude some sort of new political arrangement with the 
Japanese Government. This effort has been motivated largely by a desire on 
Japan's part to make it appear to the world, and especially to their own people 
and to the Chinese, that the United States was prepared to acquiesce in — and 
even to assent to — the results of Japan's program of conquest. Japanese lead- 
ers have undoubtedly hoped by the conclusion of such an arrangement to dis- 
courage the Chinese and cause the Chinese leaders to make peace with Japan 
on Japan's terms. 

Many of Japan's leaders earnestly desire now to extricate Japan from its pres- 
ent involvement in China in order that Japan may be in better position than it is 
at this time to embark on conquest to the southward in areas which are richer in 
natural resources than is China and from which Japan might, if successful in 
conquering these areas, enrich herself more rapidly than she can in and from 
China. Any arrangement which would [5] help Japan to extricate herself 



4290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

temporarily from her involvement in China would be of doubtful soundness from 
point of view of the best interests of the United — and of the world — unless it also 
made effective provision that Japan desist from her program of conquest. 

Turning now to the plan suggested in the memorandum under reference: An 
effort has been made to consider the proposed plan in its broad aspet-ts, to evalu- 
ate the ideas which underlie the plan, and to appraise the plan in perspective. 
There are a number of statements in the proposed plan which, as they stand, 
are definitely not practicable. Comments in regard to some of these are con- 
tained in an annex to this memorandum. As indicated, the discussion in this 
memorandum is restricted to comment upon the plan as a whole. 

With regard to section "I. LEGAL", it might be feasible for the Japanese Gov- 
ernment to make, as a unilateral action, a declaration somewhat along the lines 
of Article III of the three power alliance to the effect that in view of the agree- 
ment between the United States and Japan relating to various aspects of the 
Far Eastern situation the Japanese Government would agree, should the United 
Stafes be attacked by a power at present involved in the European war, to as- 
sist the United States [61 with all political, economic, and military means. 
I doubt, however, that Japan would give such a unilateral commitment. I am 
sure that it would not be feasible for this Government to undertake to give Japan 
a reciprocal commitment. 

With regard to section "II. POLITIC", subsection A, this Government would, 
it is assumed, be prepared to cooperate toward bringing about a settlement of the 
Chinese-Japanese conflict — were Japan and China both to indicate willingness 
to negotiate on a basis reasonably fair and just to all concerned. 

Referring to the statement in this subsection that "China and Japan 
could . . . unite to fight Communism in China and in the Far East", it needs to 
be remembered that the Chinese have repeatedly rejected offers of the Japanese to 
assist in fighting communism in China and have declared such offers to be merely 
a mask for Japanese military operations of occupation. Experience shows that 
the working out of any arrangement on this matter which would be acceptable 
both to Japan and to China would be extremely difficult if not impossible under 
present circumstances. 

With regard to subsection B — in which it Is suggested that there be recognition 
of a Far Eastern "Monroe Doctrine" and that provision be made with regard to the 
[7] political status of the Philippine Islands, Hong Kong, Malaya, Indo- 
china, and the Dutch East Indies — it might be feasible to work out something 
along the lines indicated. However, a Far Eastern "Monroe Doctrine" would 
be diflicult to define either as to terms or as to area. As to terms, there would 
need be recognition of the legal equality of each of the areas (countries) in- 
cluded in the doctrine. As to area, the Far East is not readily delineated as a 
geographical area. For example, questions would arise whether countries such 
as India and Australia should or should not be included. There is also the 
question of Eastern Siberia. In one sense, such geographical questions are 
not important. In another sense, however, they raise further questions : whether 
the ties, historical, cultural, commercial, and racial, among the various regions 
of the Far Eastern area (Pacific area) are such as to make it feasible for there 
to be adopted with regard to the area any doctrine which is regional in character. 
We of course would not wish to be doctrinaire on this point, but at the same time 
it seems essential that thought be given to all important aspects of the matter. 

With regard to subsections C and D, no comment would seem to be needed. 

[8] With regard to section "III. ECONOMIC", we have long helieved that 
there are many constructive lines open to Japan and to the United States in 
the realm of economic and financial matters provided that Japan desists from 
the course of conquest on which she has been engaged since 1931. 

In general, I am skeptical whether the plan offered is a practicable one at this 
time. It seems to me that there is little or no likelihood that the Japanese 
Government and the Japanese people would in good faith accept any such 
arrangement at this stage. It also seems to me that, if through the good offices 
of this Government an arrangement were worked out which would extricate 
Japan from its present involvement in China, the likelihood would be that 
Japan would extend and accelerate her aggressions to the southward rather 
than that Japan would change her present course of aggression to one of peace- 
ful procedures. At the same time, I feel that we should not discourage those 
Japanese who may be working toward bringing about a change in the course 
which their country is following. As I said in my statement before the Foreign 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMIITEE 4291 

Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, this Government has, not- 
withstanding the course which Japan has followed during recent years, made 
\9] repeated efforts to persuade the Japanese Government that Japan's best 
interests lie in the development of friendly relations with the United States 
and with other countries which believe in orderly and peaceful processes among 
nations. You have worked hard at that. I have worked hard at it. Mr. Grew 
has worked hard at it. 

Admiral Nomura, Japanese Ambassador-designate to the United States, is 
expected here soon. Upon his arrival he may have some proposals and sug- 
gestions to offer. We shall of course wish to listen carefully to what he has to 
say and we can try to convince him that Japan's own best interest lie along 
lines other than that she is now pursuing. Should we succeed in convincing 
him, the next question will be can he convince his own Government and people? 

Annex : Comments on Subordinate Aspects of the Proposed Plan. 

Enclosure : Memorandum by Bishop Walsh returned. 

Annex 
comments on subordinate aspects of the pkoposed plan 

One. The plan itself is not new. Various of its aspects have been presented 
at one time or another, sometimes by American, sometimes by Japanese. 

Two. In section "II. POLITICAL", subsection B, there is a statement in 
regard to a "Japanese-American guarantee'. It would be contrary to long- 
standing policy of the United States to undertake to give such "guarantee". How- 
ever, in view of the fact that many Americans believe that this Government in 
the Washington Conference Nine Power Treaty gave a "guarantee" in regard 
to China's independence, whereas this Government in that treaty simply promised 
to respect China's independence, et cetera, it may be that the drafters of the 
phrase in question had in mind nothing more than some agreement whereby this 
Government and other governments would pledge themselves anew to respect the 
independence and the status of the areas mentioned. 

In this same subsection there is reference to the establishment of autonomous 
governments in Indochina and, in the Dutch East Indies, with the further 
statement that in the Dutch East Indies Queen Wilhelmina could be accepted 
as sovereign. The problem of working out arrangements in accordance with the 
statements made in the [2] proposed plan would present obvious difRcul- 

ties. However, both French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies are at the 
present time operating in many respects as at least semi-autonomous regions. 

Three. The Chinese, having in mind past Japanese failures to honor con- 
tractual obligations, have consistently insisted that they cannot and will not begin 
negotiations with Japan until, as evidence of Japan's good faith^-'Japanese troops 
have first been withdrawn from China. It may be assumed that this specification 
on the part of the Chinese need not be regarded as absolute : a complete with- 
drawal by Japan of her forces need not be regarded as the condition precedent ; 
but some clear indication of a change of heart and of intention on Japan's part 
would seem to be a sine qua non. 



Strictly Confidential Memo for President Roosevelt. 

The Japanese Government cannot admit, through official channels, that Amer- 
ican economic pressure and defense preparations under President Roosevelt 
have been so politically successful that the Japanese now would welcome an 
opiKjrtunity to change their international, and modify their China, positions. 

The domestic position of the present Japanese Government is like that of 
the Bruening Government in Germany in 1931. The Japanese would rather 
lose the war in China than lose the domestic war to their own Extremists. But, 
the loss of the China War and the imminence of an American War, would put 
the radical nationalists, civil and military, in complete control. If the Conserva- 
tive authorities, including Prince Konoye, Mr. Mqtsuoka, Count Arima, General 
Muto, etc. and the Emperor, can win, by diplomacy, a safe economic and inter- 
national position, public opinion in Japan would restore the Conservatives to 
complete control. 



4292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

For such a reversal, the Japanese majority needs, no less than China, the 
help of the United States. Failing this, they foresee the possibility of a union 
of their own Extremist elements with the Radical forces in China ; a union com- 
parable to, and an appendage of, the compact of Russia and Germany in Europe. 
They feel that if some constructive cooperation is not realized with the United 
States before March or April, the Fascist element will take control in both 
China and Japan, no matter whether England or Germany wins in the Spring 
offensive. 

Such an eventuality would surely close the door for the Allied cause in the 

Far East , in his own words, "is riding the horses until he can stop 

them." , in his own words, said that "to call the present war in 

China a Holy War is a blasphemy," and "to call the Treaty with Wang-Ching- 

Wei an equal Treaty is a lie." said he would probably be killed 

if we revealed his statements to certain Japanese. 

2. We found the Japanese oflBcials virtually despairing of any possibility 
of reestablishing cordial relations with the United States. President Roosevelt's 
policy, and the Italian losses in the Mediterranean have created a remarkable 
opportunity for solidifying the Far Eastern situation in our own favor, and the 
Japanese are apparently now following a plan of procedure for cooperation 
with the United States. Mr. Matsuoka designed his speech of December 19th 
as an indication of this intention. 

The Japanese feel that their alliance with the Axis will have to be nullified 
realistically before it can be broken legally and officially. The Japanese au- 
thorities are ready (though they dare not admit their readiness at the peril 
of their lives) to substitute the United States for Gernaany, by an agreement 
which would embrace the following aspects ; 

I. LEGAL (for Japanese public opinion) 

A. The Japanese Government could maintain that as they accepted the Axis 
Alliance to maintain world peace by restricting the European War vis-a-vis the 
United States (but much more Russia) they could apply the same principle 
to Germany and threaten Germany with Japanese involvement if she extends 
the War beyond its present confines. (Germany then would be doubly hesitant 
to declare war on the United States. ) 

II. POLITIC 

A. Acceptance of the cooperation of the United States in a settlement of the 
China War on the basis of the secret Truce Terms offered last October by 
Chiang Kal Chek. With some guarantee of politic-economic order in China, 
and the removal of China as an immediate military menace, or a political 
menace through a European 'sell-out', China and Japan could then unite to fight 
Communism in China and in the Far East. This would take Germany, now 
acting through Russia, out of China. 

[3] B. A recognition of a Far Eastern Monroe Doctrine based on the 
aforementioned China settlement, the Japanese- American guarantee to check 
any third power attempting to alter the political status of the Philippine Islands, 
Hong Kong, Singapore or Malaya, and the establishment of autonomous Govern- 
ments in Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies, in order to remove these areas 
as potential war spoils, and in order to forestall the demand of Japanese Extrem- 
ists for forcible action. (These autonomous Governments would agree to respect 
all existing investments, etc.) Actually, in the Dutch East Indies, Queen Wil- 
hemina could be accepted as a Sovereign. 

C. Just prior to our abrogation of the Commercial Treaty, the Japanese and 
British had virtually agreed upon a Treaty reopening trade in the Yangtze Valley. 
The British, therefore, would have no objection. 

D. No territorial aggrandizement in China proper. 

III. ECONOMIC 

A. Japan (and with her, the Far East) is drifting into a commodity economy 
which will produce a low standard of living which she does not like, but cannot 
avoid without American assistance. American assistance (cfr. additional memo- 
randa) could be so -given as to guarantee the political agreement and set up an 
economy in the Far East so totally variant from the German that the Germans 
could not do business with it. By ear-marking, but leaving in the United States, 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4293 

a heavy gold credit, with interest payments, for substantiating the currencies of 
Japan and China, the United States would put the Far East on a money economy 
like our own, and hold over both China and Japan the threat of withdrawal for 
any failure to comply with the political provisions of the joint agreements. 

[4] B. Japan would grant a complete Open Door provided she received 
similarly accepted and could actually be sought by both China and Japan under 
cal Trade Treaty with the United States allowing free entry of certain basic 
commodities, heavy machinery, etc. Cotton and agricultural surpluses would be 
similarly accepted and could actually be bought by both China and Japan under 
the monetary arrangement above mentioned. 

Because of the domestic situations, any such arrangement would have to be 
presented to the Japanese and Chinese people as a fait accumpli. Meantime, 
merely to indicate that such a settlement is possible is to put power in the hands 
of the Conservative element in Japan and give them confidence to proceed. 

A representative of President Roosevelt could be introduced, with the full 
knowledge of Mr. Drew, to work out, with the utmost speed and secrecy, in co- 
operation with the controlling elements in Japan, including the Emperor, such 
an agreement as would bring some order in the Far East, and put within the 
power of President Roosevelt the opportunity to immunize the Pacific for at 
least three years. 

The Japanese people who now despair of American friendship would welcome 
this as the greatest boon to their national life and security, for which the Jap- 
anese would sacrifice anything except their Far Eastern position. The repre- 
sentative of the President should be someone whom he knows and trusts inti- 
mately ; someone who will be apprised fully of American aims in the Far East ; 
someone who is keenly aware that the Germans will attempt ruthlessly to prevent 
any American-Japanese agreement ; and someone who will not attract attention 
as an official member of our State Department. 

If President Roosevelt acts to investigate this possibility, we would be willing 
to cooperate with his representatives for the safeguarding of the Japanese offi- 
cials, and the verification of their statements. 



The White House, 
Washington, February 10, 1941. 
Memorandum for. 

The Secretary of the Interior. 
The Director of the Budget. 

Please talk this matter over and let me have final recommendation. 
The whole matter should be treated as highly confidential. 

F. D. R. 

Letter of Feb. 7, 1941 from Acting Secretary Bell of the Treasury in re recom- 
mendation for the appropriation of certain moneys amounting to approximately 
$52,000,000 to the Philippine Islands to be used for defense purposes. 



Department of State, 

The Secbetabt, 
February 12, 1941. 

Memorandum fob the President 

There is attached a memorandum containing suggestions of statements which 
might be made orally to the Japanese Ambassador when he calls on you. 
Attachment ; Memorandum. 

Suggestion fob INTEB^^EW with the Japanese Ambassador 

There is offered for consideration the suggestion that in the initial conversa- 
tion with Admiral Nomura following presentation of his credentials the issues 
between the United States and Japan be not discussed in such a way as to cause 
Admiral Nomura to feel that this Government is closing the door to any diplomatic 



4294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

efforts which he may make as Ambassador. Reference might, however, be made 
to the assumption that he, as a seafaring man, would welCiOme frank speaking, 
and the following points might then be touched upon : 

1. There is no disguising the fact that relations between the United States 
and Japan are not good. The.se relation-^ have deteriorated for the reason, as 
we see it, that Japan has embarked upon a course of expansion by force. There 
is no need at this time to dwell upon the fact that Japan's course has been at- 
tended by more than 250 instances of the bombing by Japanese planes of American 
mission and other properties in China, by the sinking of the Panay and the 
burning or sinking of three other American vessels with loss of American life, 
and by the disruption of the normal and legitimate activities of thousands of 
Americans. 

2. With reference to the alliance entered into by Japan with Germany and Italy, 
some Japanese statesmen \2] say that Japan has retained freedom of 
action. Japan is aware of our policy of assisting those countries which are 
resisting aggression. In these circumstances, the question naturally arises 
whether Japan's actions will demonstrate that Japan in fact retains liberty of 
action or that Japan has pledged itself in alliance with Germany to oppose the 
things which this country is committed to support, things which it always has 
supported and which it forever will support. 

3. The Government of the United States has noted repeated statements by 
Japanese leaders to the effect that the United States is moving toward involve- 
ment in the European war and that such involvement would constitute a world 
calamity. Do not these statements, in view of happenings in the Far East, give 
rise to the warrantable and corollary question whether Japan itself, through 
its military activities toward the south and through its commitments to Germany 
and Italy, is not drifting toward involvement in the European war and whether 
such involvement would not be, in the words of Japan's leaders, a "world calam- 
ity"? There comes to mind in connection with this question Japan's military 
occupation of or military activities in north China, central China, south China, 
the Hainan Island, the Spratly Islands, and, thus far, parts of French Indochina. 
It appears to those on [3] this side of the Pacific that there is in 
the public utterances of Japanese leaders and in the Japanese press undue em- 
phasis upon the assei'ted responsibility of other nations and not sufficient 
consideration of the possible consequences of Japan's own presentation of con- 
stantly expanding aims at the expense of other countries. 

4. Our two countries have drifted apart from that friendly and reciprocally 
advantiigeous attitude which in general had previously characterized their 
relations with one another. Some very acute questions are now presented to 
each country. Without going into these at the moment, it is suggested that, if 
Japan has a desire to examine the points of divergence with a view to talking 
over the situation fully and frankly, the time has arisen when that should be 
done. If the Japanese Ambassador feels that he would like to discuss such 
questions, the appropriate officers of this Government are of course available 
for such discussion. This does not mean a negotiation ; it means a discussion 
attitudes, policies, objectives. 

5. These are some of the thoughts which honesty and candor require to be 
frankly expressed. In expressing them, we are not unmindful of the circum- 
stances attending the appointment of Admiral Nomura as Japanese Ambassador 
to the United States. The press has reported that he repeatedly declined this 
assignment. The fact that Admiral Nomura, [^1 with his high character 
his statesmanship, and his well-known friendship for the United States, finally 
accepted the responsibilities of the position of Japanese Ambassador to the United 
States, indicates to us that there is still desire on the part of Japan that progress 
toward improving relations l)etween the United States and Japan may be made. 

Note: With reference to the question of "tone" in the opening stages of our 
contracts with the new Japanese Ambassador, it is believed that it may be 
advisable— in the light of indications from the Far East — to "speak softly" 
(carefully avoiding any word that might to a wishful thinker imply that we 
would consider offers of "compromise"), while simultaneously giving by our 
acts in the Pacific new glimpses of diplomatic, economic, and naval "big sticks." 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4295 

FEBruaBY 12, 1941. 

Memorandum for the President 

There is attached a memorandum containing suggestions of statements which 
might be made orally to the Japanese Ambassador when he calls on you. 
Attachment : Memorandum. 
FE : MMH : HES 
[Hand written :] 

(Original in State Folder) 

(Copy in Japan Folder) 

Suggestions fob Interview With the Japanese Ambassador 

There is offered for consideration the suggestion that in the initial conversa- 
tion with Admiral Nomura following presentation of his credentials the Issues 
between the United States and Japan be not discussed in such a way as to cause 
Admiral Nomura to feel that this Government is closing the door to any diplo- 
matic efforts which he may make as Ambassador. Reference might, however 
be made to the assumption that he, as a seafaring man, would welcome frank 
speaking, and the following points might then be touched upon : 

1. There is no disguising the fact that relations between the United States and 
Japan are not good. These relations have deteriorated for the reason, as we 
see it, that Japan has embarked upon a course of expansion by force. There is 
no need at this time to dwell upon the fact that Japan's course has been attended 
by more than 250 instances of the bombing by Japanese planes of American mis- 
sion and other properties in China, by the sinking of the Panay and the burning 
or sinking of three other American vessels with loss of American life, and by the 
disruption of the normal and legitimate activities of thousands of Americans. 

2. With reference to the alliance entered into by Japan with Germany and 
Italy, some Japanese statesmen [2] say that Japan has retained freedom of 
action. Japan is aware of our policy of assisting those countries which are resist- 
ing aggression. In these circumstances, the question naturally arises whether 
Japan's actions will demonstrate that Japan in fact retains liberty of action or that 
Japan has pledged itself in alliance with Germany to oppose the things whicR this 
country is committed to support, things which it always has supported and which 
it forever will support. 

3. The Government of the United States has noted repeated statements by 
Japanese leaders to the effect that the United States is moving toward involve- 
ment in the European war and that such involvement would constitute a world 
calamity. Do not these statements, in view of happenings in the Far East, give 
rise to the warrantable and corollary question whether Japan itself, through 
its military activities toward the south and through its commitments to Germany 
and Italy, is not drifting toward involvement in the European war and whether 
such involvement would not be, in the words of Japan's leaders, a "world ca- 
lamity" ? There comes to mind in connection with this question Japan's military 
occupation of or military activities in north China central China, south China, 
the Hainan Island, the Spratly Islands, and, thus far, parts of French Indochina. 
It appears to those on [3] this side of the Pacific that there is in the public 
utterances of Japanese leaders and in the Japanese press undue emphasis upon the 
asserted responsibility of other nations and not sufficient consideration of the pos- 
sible consequences of Japan's own presentation of constantly expanding aims at 
the expense of other countries. 

4. Our two countries have drifted apart from that friendly and reciprocally ad- 
vantageous attitude which in general had previously characterized their relations 
with one another. Some very acute questions are now presented to each coun- 
try. Without going into these at the moment, it is suggested that, if Japan has 
a desire to examine the points of divergence with a view to talking over the situ- 
ation fully and frankly, the time has arisen when that should be done. If the 
Japanese Ambassador feels that he would like to discuss such questions, the ap- 

«propriate officers of this Government are of course available for such discussion. 
This does not mean a negotiation; it means a discussion of attitudes, policies, 
objectives. 

5. These are some of the thoughts which honesty and candor require to be 
frankly expressed. In expressing them, we are not unmindful of the circum- 
stances attending the appointment of Admiral Nomura as Japanese Ambassador 



4296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to the United States. The press has reported tTiat he repeatedly declined this 
assignment. The fact that Admiral Nomura, [Jf] with his high charac- 
ter, his statesmanship, and his well-known friendship for the United States, fin- 
ally accepted the responsibilities of the position of Japanese Ambassador to the 
United States, indicates to us that there is still desire on the part of Japan that 
progress toward improving relations between the United States and Japan may 
be made. 

Note: With reference to the question of "tone" in the opening stages of our 
contacts with the new Japanese Ambassador, it is believed that it may l>e advis- 
able — in the light of indications from the Far East — to "speak softly" (carefully 
avoiding any word that might to a wishful thinker imply that we would consider 
offers of "compromise"), while simultaneously giving by our acts in the Pacific 
new glimpses of diplomatic economic, and naval "big sticks". 

FE : WAA : HES FE PA/H 
2-12 



The. White House, 
Washington, February 15, 1941- 
Memorandum for the Secretary of State. 

In regard to the Spratley Islands, I thought it was perhaps better not to men- 
tion them in our talk with Nomura yesterday. 

I suggest, in view of your message, that we use the routine method of ask- 
ing Grew to question the Japanese claim to them by asking them how they 
justify their occupation. 

They may come back and say that like Canton Island and Enderberry Island, 
the Spratley group was uninhabited, but we have a perfectly good answer 
in the fact that both Great Britain and the United States each claimed those 
Islands by virtue of discovery and occasional guano use later, but also that 
the United States and Great Britain entered into a friendly agreement in re- 
gard to the future. 

F. D. B. 



The White House, 
Washington, February 14, 1941- 
Memorandum for the President. 

The Secretary of State called to say that he and his associates do not think 
it is a good idea for us to lay claim to the Spratly Islands but rather to ques- 
tion the Japanese claim instead. If we are going to make a formal representa- 
tion to the Japanese Government on this Spratly Island situation, my associates 
think it would be better to do it in a routine way through our Ambassador in 
Tokyo in a note. 

The Secretary thinks it is all right to mention the Japanese occupation of these 
Islands and question it without claiming it ourselves. 



The White House, 
Washington, February 20, 1941- 
Private & Confidential. 
Memorandum for Hon. Sumner Welles. 

I have Just read the purported instructions from Foreign Minister Matsuoka 
to Ambassador Nomura dated February 14. 
Please read them. 

These instructions seem to me to be the product of a mind which is deeply 
disturbed and unable to think quietly or logically. 

F. D. B. 



THE White House, 
Washington, March 11, 1941- 
Memorandum for the President. 

The attached is a brief of Admiral Pratt's interview with Ambassador No- 
mura. 

I thought the President would be interested. 
Respectfully, 

D. J. Caixaohax 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4297 

Memo — March-7-41 
Interview With Nomura on March 4 

At his own request, I met The Ambassador on March-4 — He gave me a lunch 
at the Plaza, and we had a three hours conversation alone in his private 
quarters — I am returning the compliment by giving him a small dinner at the 
St. Regis tonight March 7. 

My remarks followed, without my knowing it at the time, almost exactly the 
line indicated in the confidential report of the American Advisor for the Jap- 
anese Embassy, Mr. Moore. 

I told the Ambassador that Japan's best promise for the future lay along 
economic lines, and not through military conquest. 

That Japan being an island State, like Britain, her real interests, lay along the 
path of sea power, and not military power, and that her best promise for the 
future lay in connection with Britain and the United States, and not with the 
Axis. That sea power was not destructive as military power was — Sea power 
kept the trade lanes open — was liberal — and to succeed must be conciliatory 
and not aggressive. Military power was destructive — antagonized those it over- 
ran — was nonproductive — did not open trade lanes, but closed them — and ul- 
timately defeated its own purpose. 

I told him that joining the Axis was what turned American sentiment so 
definitely against Japan. I cited our Constitution, which puts no bars on naval 
strength, but definitely limits moneys to the Army for two years. This in itself 
showed the feeling at the time, that too great militai'y strength was a menace, 
and that fear of too great military power in unscrupulous hands had become 
an enduring part of American life and thought. 

I told him that we did not wish to see Japan destroyed — that her influence 
properly used could always be a strength in the Orient — that Russia is and 
always would be the main threat to Japan, as long as the present Communist 
influence lasted. 

[2] I told him we were definitely out to see Britain win, and would go 
the limit if necessary, because it was essential in an economic sense, and for 
the purposes of an enduring peace, that sea power prevail over aggressive military 
power. That 6 or 7 years ago, when visited by members of the Japanese 
General Naval Staff, in Los Angeles, and asked for an opinion, I had told them 
then that the military domination of China would be a failure. 

I told him that even if Japan won the first naval victory — we had the power 
to build and she had not — that she would be so weakened, that ultimately she 
would lose her influence in the Orient and be supplanted by Russia, and that 
her ideologies and not those of Japan would influence the Orient. 

That the best way to combat communism in China, their great fear, was 
along the economic road, and not along the aggressive military path — that given 
the chance to live, and become stabilized along economic and peaceful lines, 
there was no fear of China becoming communist in the sense Russia is to- 
day — that China's natural socialism centered around the family and the guild — as 
far apart from the Russian brand as the two poles, and if given the chance to 
work out her own salvation, Japan need never fear the Russian brand fully 
penetrating China. That military domination in China would never put down 
the brand of communism Japan feared, but on the contrary would drive China 
closer to Russia. 

I told him frankly that if a new war started in the Orient, it would be Japan's 
making — not ours — that the decision depended largely on the future course they 
adopted. 

'I advised him to exercise the Oriental talent for patience, and see if in the end 
the military conquests of Hitler in Europe, would not run the same course there 
that Japan's military venture in China did. That in effect it would be a failure. 

Nomura was more than frank, and agreed thoroughly with all I said. He told 
me of his interviews with Lord Halifax and The President — I gathered that 
my views were in entire accord with those of the President. 

[3.] I gathered that Japan does not wish w^r with us, and Britain, and 
that a southern drive against Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, will not be 
undertaken, certainly not for the present, if wiser counsels can prevail — that 
the leading military and naval men were against it — that the economic path 
was the one they wished to pursue — that the Elder Statesmen had strongly 
advised against the China invasion, but had been overthrown by the military 

79716 O — 46— pt. 20 22 



4298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



clique, but that the failure of the China venture, haf converted many of the 
leading military men. 

That since the China invasion had been such a failure, leading naval and 
military tliought had swung around, and was much more liberal now than it was 
then. He said Japan was full <»f German military men, and Gestapo agents, 
trying to induce Japan to act in conjunction with the Axis, but that after all 
Japan had a mind of her own, and the decision was hers and not Germany's — that 
there were few or no Nazi naval men in Japan. 

His own personal secretary has just come from England, and has had consider- 
able experience there — His naval and military attaches have much influence in 
the war office, and I gathered they were mostly in accord with his views. He 
admits he has a hard task, and only accepted the post from a sense of duty. He 
is exteremely liberal — his views on the liberal influence of sea power vs. aggres- 
sive military influence, coincide with mine — and I judge he is infinitely more sym- 
pathetic to the liberal policies of Britain and the United States, than he is to 
those of the Nazis. 

I gathered that if Japan were given a little chance to save face, so important 
to the Oriental, in Indo-China, along the economic path, it would do much to 
offset the smart of the China failure, and strengthen liberal influence in Japan 
itself, which though under a cloud was still fairly strong, and if I inferred cor- 
rectly, was more apt to grow than to weaken. 

I gatheretl that the main fear of military men were tye spread of Communism 
in China — that they frankly admitted that military domination would not solve the 
problem — and that they didn't know how to solve it — Hence I made the remarks 
I [4.] did, as what appeared to me to be the only way out for a solution. 
This covers the main points, and I trust I said nothing counter to the general 
trend of our own policies-yall I said was in the spirit of friendliness to Japan, 
and in the hope that she would do nothing rash which could only lead to her own 
ultimate defeat, which I did not wish. I wanted Japan to be strong, but a 
liberal generous Japan, not a militaristic Japan. In passing, I might add, that 
in the course of the years I have had many contacts with the Japanese, and 
contrary to the general opinion, I have never had one of the samuri class, delib- 
erately lie to me. 

W. V. Pratt. 



The White House, , 
Washington, March 13, 1941. 
Secret 
Memorandum for the President 

I thought the President would be interested in the attached copy of a report 
made by Rear Admiral Turner, re his conversation with Ambassador Nomura. 
As the President will recall. Admiral (then Captain) Turner was the skipper 
of the U. S. S. ASTORIA which, in April '39, carried to Japan the remains of 
the Japanese Ambassador who died in, Washington. Admiral Turner is very 
well known to, and very well liked by the Japanese. 
Respectfully, 

D. J. Callaghan 
D. J. Callaghan 

Mabch 13, 1941. 
From : Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U. S. N. 
To : The Chief of Naval Operations. 
Subject : Report of Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador- 

1. On March 12th I met the Japanese Ambassador at a cocktail party given 
In his honor by the Japanese Naval Attache. In the course of a five minute 
chat he said he would like to converse with me at greater length. On March 12th 
he telephoned me to ask me to see him at 5 p. ra., that day, either at the Embassy 
or at my home. I an-anged to call at the Embasssy at that hour. I shall here- 
after refer to him as "Nomura." The words of the conversation are my own; 
I merely try to give the gist and impressions of the talk. 

2. After an exchange of pleasantries, Nonuu'a stated that his mission here 
was to prevent war between Japan and the United States, that he had under- 
taken the mis.sion with a realization of the possibility of failure, and that he 
was even less hopeful of success after arrival here, but that he had undertaken 
the mission as a matter of duty to his government, and because of his conviction 
that the best interests of the two countries were to maintain peace. He referred 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4299 

to his friendship with Admiral Pratt and other United States naval oflBcers, and 
stated that he was exploring the ground, as best he could, in order to find a 
basis on which the two nations could agree. He said that he would value receiv- 
ing my views as to the future. 

3. I replied that naturally, as the War Plans Officer of the Navy, I could 
express no opinions as to military matters, and since military officers were not 
authorized to express the political views of the government, I could say nothing 
on that score. Therefore, I would confine my statements to the expression of 
my concept of the general attitude of the American people toward Japan, so 
far as I could determine it. [2] I had been to Japan four times, and had 
known Japanese there, in China, in Hawaii, and in California. I felt that I 
understood the Japanese better than the average American, and I admired 
their many excellent qualities. I would speak frankly, and he must assume 
that what I said was in no way to be construed as a criticism of the Japanese. 
Different peoples had different viewpoints ; all have good qualities, and also have 
qualities that are not so good ; and it is these inferior qualities, and the differences 
in culture, that often give rise to misunderstandings. 

4. I stated I believed that, underneath, the Japanese and the American people 
liked and respected each other. Minor differences and disagreements had 
naturally appeared, but I believed the events of the past ten years were more 
ominous, and that they were deeply disturbing to Americans. 

5. Nomura agreed that the feeling was worse than it had been in past years, 
but stated that the "New Order" in the Far East originally had not been in- 
tended as a military adventure, but was designed to be purely economic and 
cultural. Unfortunately, radicals had obtained a strong influence, and the execu- 
tion of the New Order had been initiated by the force of arms. He was impressed 
by the views that he had received in this country, and he agreed with them, that 
the victor and the defeated in a war received almost equal losses, and that both 
suffered severely. He gave France, Germany, and the United Kingdom as 
examples. 

6. He stated that he had talked, at various times, with high ranking Japanese 
army and naval officers as to whether Japan would be benefited by the war in 
China. Practically all of them were convinced that this adventure was a mistake. 
Certainly it had proved a terrible drain, and the task of controlling such a great 
territory by force seemed almost impossible to accomplish. When the project 
first came up, the high ranking army officers had opposed it, but the younger, 
radical element had been so strong that the older men had acquiesced. He 
believed now, on the contrary, that though the younger element was still in favor 
of strong measures, the older army officers in command would not give in to 
them. The Navy, on the contrary, had- been and still are in favor of peace with 
the United States. 

[3] 7. I replied that it was this use of force that had disturbed the United 
States. All thinking men recognized the necessity for outlets by an industrial 
country such as Japan had become, and recognized her need for sources of raw 
materials. Nevertheless, forceful expansion, such as Japan had undertaken, 
cuts across established national and personal interests, and naturally arouses 
antagonisms. The United States has difficulty in accommodating itself to the 
variations in Japanese policy which result in the shifts of power among the 
three quite different and antagonistic elements of Japanese political life. The 
question now was as to how much further Japanese Far Eastern conquests 
would extend. Japan never has had reason to fear a military expansion of the 
United States into the Far East ; when Commodore Perry in 1856 recommended 
that the United States should seize the Bonin and the Loo Choo Islands, the 
American people had rejected the idea. They accepted the temporary care of the 
Philippines reluctantly. In my opinion, they have no wish to extend permanent 
military power into the Far East. They wish to remain at home and at peace. 
They believe that gradual changes of status, and not sudden changes accompanied 
by force, will in the long run prove the best. The deterioration of American and 
Japanese relations, I believed, was chiefly due to the use of forceful measures by 
Japan, and in particular to the Japanese adherence to the Axis. This had come 
as a disappointment and a shock to Americans, who believed it a weapon aimed at 
themselves and the British. Nomura's appointment as Ambassador had slightly 
relieved this feeling, as it was construed as a desire on the part of Japan for im- 
proved relations. Nomura is respected by Americans, and is known for his desire 
to maintain peace with the United States. However, since the beginning of the 
affair in Indo-China, I felt that opinion here had become worse than before. 



4300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

8. Nomura recognized the value of a peaceful conquest. Relations of the 
United States with Mexico and Central America now under the Good Neighbor 
Policy were far better than when he was here in 1921, and the peaceful policy 
appeared very effective. Japan has not now, and never has had, any desire to ex- 
tend control over the Phillippines. With regard to adherence to the axis, it was 
his opinion that Matsuoka, whom lie knew well, had been sincere in his opinion 
that this action actually would be conducive to peace in the Pacific. 

[4] Nomura had not agreed to this, but Matsuoka had been much surprised 
by the severe reaction of the United States. As to the Indo-China affair: Japan 
is in need of rice and other supplies ; Indo-China had been even more uncoopera- 
tive than had the Netherlands East Indies; furthermore, Thailand is a friend. 
These influences had determined Japan's course. 

9. I stated that, of course, different peoples had difficulty in understanding the 
point of view of others. Their culture, habits of thought, and customs are dif- 
ferent, and they fail to allow for inevitable mistakes. That is doubtless one of 
the reasons that the United States and Japan began to fall apart. It is necessary 
to understand a people's background before its point of view can be appreciated. 
From my reading of translations from Japanese newspapers, and talking to Jap- 
anese, I feared that they might fail to appreciate the extremely close cultural 
and political relationship that exists between Great Britain and the United 
States. We both have the same origins, our economy is closely tied together, 
and though we have fought two wars and have had many quarrels, it should be 
understood that the United States would not stand aside and see Great Britain 
fall. The United States had intervened in her favor in the last war, and it must 
be clearly apparent that the Americja people are now deteimined to do all that 
lies within their power to save Great Britain now. This principle of common 
interest applies to British holdings in the Far East as well as in the Atlantic. I 
wished there were a way to make the Japanese understand this important 
relationship. 

10. Nomura said all Japanese naval oflScers understood this thoroughly, but, 
unfortunately, Japanese army officers did not. He tried to explain this to them, 
but they would not believe him. He emphasized this point by several repetitions. 

11. Nomura was convinced that the American i>eople were slow to make up 
their minds, but thereafter were very determined to carry out their decision to the 
full. He believed that they would help the British to the best of their ability, 
with material alone, if possible ; but that when the very severe German submarine 
and air attacks would nullify this help, the United States would enter the war 
against Germany. He did not believe German invasion plans were certain to 
succeed, but he believed it possible that in a few months the British people ml^t 
be starving beca.use of air and submarine action against the convoys. 

Secret 

[5] 12. Nomura is no longer active in the Navy, but, in his opinion, the 
presence of the United States Fleet in Hawaii, particularly in combination with 
the British, forms a stabilizing influence for affairs in the Pacific. This fleet would 
be less potent if many of the American destroyers and other light forces should 
move to the Atlantic to help the British. Battleships might be left in the Pacific, 
but their influence alone would not be great without other forces of adequate 
strength. (This was the only time he seemed to want to "pump" me). 

13. I agreed that the submarine and air menace placed Great Britain in a very 
bad position. Their danger is grave. We can not be sure how the matter will 
end. I intimated, however, that ways are available for defeating the German 
submarines and aircraft which have not been fully exploited. I had no idea 
whether the American people would make war in the Atlantic, the Pacific, or 
remain neutral. I pointed out that American warships are now being turned out 
rapidly, and that many of these would be available for the Atlantic without 
reducing our strength in the Pacific. In any case, it was my opinion that if war 
occurred in the Pacific, it would be because of events in the Far East, and not 
because of any decision by the United States to attack Japan, even though many 
persons were now advocating this step, and Gallup polls indicated strong sup- 
port for such a move. 

14. Nomura was very cordial. I believe he is fully sincere, and that he will 
use his influence against further aggressive moves by the military forces of 
Japan. He seemed desirous for support of the more liberal Japanese elements. 

R. K. TUBNEB. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4301 



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March 15, 1941 



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I an miitm sure th^% it fi.vfte 1r ghoi't c«np«8s <» baehcround 
that would be vflucTSie to "The Soes". 

Sfotily, 



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4302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Confidential Memorandum bt JosEapH E. Da vies foe the Depabtment of State 

Ffjbbuaby 18, 1941 

For the information of the Department, and for such value as it may have, I 
submit the following: 

Last week, at my law office, I was offered a retainer by a group representing 
Japanese interests who desired advice and counsel, in connection with the better- 
ment of relations between the United States and Japan. They submitted respon- 
sible references as to their reliability. 

I told them that if they wished to tell me about their problem, with the 
understanding that I incurred no fiduciary or other obligations by listening to 
them, that I would consider the facts and advise them as to my attitude there- 
after. To this they agreed. 

They stated that they represented certain big business groups in Japan, who 
were in close relationship with practically all of the Japanese Cabinet, except 
Matsuoka, the leaders of the Navy and many of the leaders of the Army. They 
also stated that the internal, political and economic situation in Japan had 
deteriorated so rapidly in the past four or five months, that the group which they 
represented had become convinced that there was no escape from complete in- 
ternal disaster, communism, and confiscation of all property rights, except thru 
ending the Sino-Japanese war, and by coming to a complete agreement with the 
United States. 

They confidently asserted that, if the President and Secretary of State would 
"take hold of" this situation vigorously, a rapprochement between the two coun- 
tries could be effected in which the United States could "write its own ticket". 

This they recognized involved a complete "volte face" on the part of the 
Japanese Government. In the face of that fact, they nevertheless confidently 
maintained that if negotiations were had, the following could be effected : 

(a) That Japan would get out of the Rome-Berlin axis. 

(b) That Japan would withdraw from China upon terms which the United 
States would determine. 

(c) That Japan would modify its policy with reference to the Orient; and 
would return to the "status quo ante" in accord with the concepts of the United 
States Government as to what constituted fairness in the Pacific and the Orient. 

(d) That even as to Manchukuo a settlement could be had satisfactory to the 
United States. 

The foregoing contained only one qualification and that was that it was ex- 
pected that the United States, while insisting upon the foregoing results, would 
exercise amelioration in the manner of doing the job ; so that the Japanese 
government responsible for the new policy could measurably "save face" before 
its own people. 

[2] The specific proposal suggested was; that the President and Secretary 
of State should send to Japan, by air and immediately, someone who could verify 
their representations by direct contact with their principals, and report the 
facts to the President. They suggested that if the Under Secretary of State or 
Mr. Hopkins were to go to Japan ; they could and would place themselves at 
their disposal to have them meet, unofficially, the leaders of these various groups, 
and see for themselves that their representations as to what could be done were 
well founded. 

They stated that they made this suggestion because they could secure greater 
frankness thru unofficial contacts which they could arrange, rattier than thru 
official contacts made thru the American Embassy ; and that in this suggestion 
there was no reflection upon the ability or effectiveness of Ambassador Grew. 

My reply to these gentlemen was that neither I nor my firm would accept any 
retainer or employment in this situation. I stated, however, that if they could 
make these representations with sufficient weight behind them to the Department 
of State; and could make good on their representations, that they would be ren- 
dering a great service not only to the Japanese interests they serve but to the 
cause of peace in the world. 

In connection with their suggestion that in my private capacity I go to Japan 
to verify their representations. I replied positively and unequivocally that under 
no circumstances would I do so. 

The foregoing is reported to the Department in the belief that it might be of 
some value in connection with the situation. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4303 

My own judgment, from what I gathered in these discussions, is that there is a 
"possibility"' that it might be well worth the Department's while to explore and 
consider the matter. There might be just a chance that this might be "the 
moment" for the "break" in the war situation, which the defection of Japan from 
the axis would undoubtedly afford. If there is nothing to it, still a valuable side 
light might be afforded in the situation and nothing would be lost. 

Joseph E. Davies 

The White House, 
Washington, D. C, March 13, 1941. 
Confidential 
Memorandum for the President. 

In accordance with the President's instructions, I have written a letter to 
Dr. Nelson, copy attached. 
Respectfully, 

D. J. Callaghan. 
D. J. Callaghan. 

Confidential MAech 13, 1941. 

Dr. Wilbur A. Nelson, 

Corcoran Professor of Geology, 
XJniversity of Virginia, 

Charlottesville, Virginia. 

Deae Dr. Nelson : The President has considered your memorandum written 
over date of February 17th, and has asked me to reply for him. 

The President is intensely interested in the area mentioned in your memo- 
randum, is fully aware of your study of the region — and remembers, of course, 
with regret, that your projected expedition had to be postponed because of the 
international situation. 

I have been asked to convey to you that the President appreciates your re- 
minder of our interest in that area, and the necessity of obtaining all possible 
information, hydrographic and geographic. To this end we have sought and 
are obtaining from certain friendly sources, information which is vital to our 
store of knowledge of particular regions in the area. 

In the present state of international relations, the President feels that, for 
many reasons, it would be unwise to disclose our particular interest in certain 
regions in the South Seas, by sending an expedition or a Presidential envoy 
for study in the area. It is certain that the presence of such an expedition or 
envoy would become known shortly, and, jwssibly, would have a deleterious effect 
on projected plans. 

The President has asked me to express his regret that, for the reasons given 
above, he feels that he cannot give favorable consideration to your suggestion at 
the present time. 

With my own personal good wishes, I remain, 
Sincerely yours, 

D. J. Callaghan, 
Captain, U. S. Navy, 
Naval Aide to the President. 

The White House, 
Washington, March 7, 19^1. 
Memorandum for Captain Callaghan. 

Will you break this news to Professor Nelson in your best manner? 

F. D. R. 



The White House, 
Washington, March 3, 1941. 
Confidential 
Memorandum for the President 

In re tlie proposal made by Dr. Nelson, the Navy Department feels as follows : 
(a) There is on hand a considerable amount of confidential information on 
the islands in question, contained in Pacific Airpilot, in confidential monographs, 
and in sailing directions. 



4304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(b) War Plans is in the process of obtaining additional needed information 
from Australia and New Zealand. 

(c) That sending an expedition to these islands now, would inevitably become 
known to ORANGl^:, would disclose our hand, and destroy the element of future 
surprise, in any contemplated use. 

While it is true that one can never have enough hydrographic and other perti- 
nent information on hand, re particular areas, it i.s felt that the thought con- 
tained in paragraph (c) above it of paramount importance, as indicating the 
uadesirability of undertaking such an expedition at the present time. 
Respectfully, 

D. J. Callaghan, 
D. J. Cuxaghan. 

Memorandum fob the President of the United States 

It is suggeste<l that a study be made of the little known island region of the 
South Pacific between Hawaii and New Zealand, much of which region is under 
mandate to New Zealand and Great Britain, to acquire comprehensive data on 
this region which will be of immediate benefit to the United States and to New 
Zealand in the present emergency. 

A number of these islands, which were first discovered and claimed for the 
United States by the captains of American clipper ships, are now uninhabited 
or have only a small remnant of their former population. 

As the leader of the temporarily postponed National Geographic Society- 
University of Virginia Pacific Islands Scientific Expedition, with the cooperation 
of the United States Coast Guard, and as one who has been studying this area 
rather intensively in preparation for this important Expedition, the necessity 
for such an immediate study by a special Presidential envoy is considered to be 
of utmost importance in this time of emergency. 

Wilbur A. Nelson, 
Wilbur A. Nelson, 
Corcoran Professor of Oeology, 

University of Virginia, 
Charlottesville, Virginia. 
Febbuabt 17, 1941. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



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•aTTABlOjr tafwtii •bcMt tt* ntr !»»«•» cltmtian 8«A» frwikSir, ttet li» «uta 
t)M» tiM fvMi4«i« iMliimai Vam* (Mb, llMiAyfefeMr** Manrlctt is mtA imnxf^mnA 1» 

1«» X«l«)MlM 



•M 4W »' M>Hl1 ( »< w w> - »«^ 8«MtS«i«IMr 






c^>--7^ 



'tU^^ 



u^ 



1 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4309 




WAR DEPARTIfflNT 
WASHINOTON 



March 29, 1341, 



The President 

The White House. 

Dear Mr, Presidents 

Our Military Adviser to th« Ooi«»«nw«altM of 
the Philippines, General Douglas MacArthur, ha« recently 
recommended the gtrengthenlng of the ieaoo«tt dlefenees of 

the Philippines against poaelble Invasion, 

He has requested that seven 8~lnoh railway 
guns (old model) and twenty- four 155 tm gun«, together 
with the neceaeary auxiliary equipment and amasunltlon, be 
placed at the disposal of the Philippine Oovernaont for 
this purpose. 

Title to equipment made available under tM^? 
proposed transfer would remain with the United States 
pending final adjudication of all acoounts between the 
two governments prior to 1946 as specified In the Tydlngs- 
McDuffie Act. 

The amount of equipment Invftlred is relatlYely| 
small. It does not affect our present oomraltiBents to the 
British Government and cannot materially affect future 
arrangements. 

The lar Department Is of the opinion that the 
proposed transfer w»uld both strengthen the defense of 
the Philippine Islands and improve the position of the 
United States in that area without impairment to more 
l»portant defense objectives. 

Your approve of this transfer Is reoomisendeA, 

Respectfully yours, 

(Signed) HENRY L. 3TIMS0N 

Secretary of War. 




8SCREt,« 



4310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 







NAVY DEPARTMENT 
Omcc OF Naval Intelugencs 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 



MO^IORAN£HiM FOR ...^l^LjdLtftffitolL. 



a^ft JIl^^pHU** 



■«^i r » W i »* » 





l»-HtMit WK» 



to ih^ Axis* 

• DXO 510 reported today that th« Mitsui Baiik 
of )lini Toric ^t boon inttniotod by its lioodoii 
o^ioo to eofidttot btitinoss on ^o promito 
that tlio Japasoao OorarisMiit is not seing to 
ftilfiXl its obllifitiotks to ths JhiU Fcwsrs. 
Sotareo of this inforsaitios is of doubtful 
roliabiXitii bo statod* 



B-t'-J 





EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4311 




4312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



\j 



THE SECRETARY 



April 11, 1941 



MEMSgUMDUM FOR TH8 TBSSHmST 

Vltb ref«r«no« to the attaohed letter frem 
Mr. J. M. tllsald*, the Philippine Resident Coau&le- 
fiioaer, to Seoretarjr lokes, vhioh you trancaltted to 
■e voBJLmf oover of a meaorandum dated April 7, 1941, 
it would ai^ear t33at thla letter »ae probably given 
to yoa tgr tt>e Seoretary of the Interior only for your 
inforaation and tha.t elnoe a r«^ly to the Biilipplne 
Resident Comaiaeioner will preattaably be siade by the 
Seeretery of i^e Interior, it doee not oall for any 
reply fro» yo«, fble irie» ie submitted f<«p your 
ooneideration. a^uld yom wiah a reply drafted for 
your signature, tibe fi«partiiient will be e^lad to 
aellAborate in it* preparation. 




Ao«oavNWftlaent{ 

T^ttKr fro« Ir. 3KLl»«lde 
to 89«r«t«ry Xekaa, Aati^ 
Jtoril 4. 1941. 




vVV##..|»»•wK^', 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4313 




The Honorable 

Harold L. I ekes 

Secretary of the Interior 



dear Mr. Secretary: 





I have today received a telegraia from. Presidsat 
Quezon with instniotions to submit it to you personal- 
ly. The radiogram reads as follows: 

"Commissioner Elizalde 

H|¥.'sshington DC 

"I 3r cuoting below text of letter which I have today 
sent to High CoEurd-Ssioner Francis B. Sayre with 
the request that you personally subinit copy 
thereof to Secretary of the Interioj", Harold L. 
Icices, 8 8 indicated in the last parsf^raph: 



B^ nio, April 3, 1941. 

♦My desr High Coranissioner Sayre: 

'Secretary Vargas has conveyed to roe your mess- 
age with reference to the promise made by me to Presid- 
ent Roosevelt not to exercise any of the powers vested 
in me by the TiEergency Power Act without first advising 
him of contemplated action. According to Secretary Yar- 
gas, this matter came up in connection rndth the lixecut- 
ive Order I have issued creatine the Civilian iji.er-^cncy 
Administrstton. The creation of this body through that 
Ixeoutlve Order has been done pursuant to the reoorrmienda- 
tions of the Civilian iiaergency Planning Board which you 
and I created after discussing the smtter with Admiral 
Smeallie snd Major General Gruixert. The recommendations 
of the Civilian Emergency Planning Board have not only 
received your complete approval but you have personally 
urged me to act promptly on them. The first of these 
recommendations is the creation of the Civilian Emergency 
Administration. 



♦Considering the broad and extraordinary powers to 
be exercised by the proposed organization if and when the 
emergency should arise, I assumed that you knew that I 




79716 O — 46 — pt. 20- 



-23 



4314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



-SA^^ 



MM*^ri-^. 



;viiv!'^t3;a'.ii 



,ioji3 or the 



ti\<; 



the 



of 



■ T^> t, 1 









m of ■ 



,he 



witbout maJciog use 
rgeaoy Power Adte 3 

-' repireaentatiYe of 
fi the Pbilippinea 

:© Sitjaauyes io accordanoe vd.tb'"' 

Civl llr.n RricrrToncy Plennlng 
f the United 

MSi"^'-|.>;!--i-'- vu t.-i:B -.ctlon sugit?;eated 
. ...,Slas' xay cosjznitments to Pr«^sid«nt 
osen-^ed thet until ? '■■urgency 

"^.nt by the 
oer o; the ref- 

vr- ot't" for the 



^V *I d 




■r -'G of 


'Ti popuifttlo. 


IPfcc, ^- ^•- 


. 'j3|>OTiS.1.bl?""* 


i>f tbc 


•i ie the mi-. 


Isloada* I/jde<5U 


af Liie 


tion ie by t'-^^^ " 


, \t\ rn-^r. • i: 



part of tjie 



ODlnion the 
' lippines 
luc; -;;jvenioment 
defonce of the 
civilian popula- 
rfare an essential 
mtry» 



eW 



"In i^l. Jiy . the respoasibllity as 

far 6,s the resoin monwealth p ^''^ <>f 

oarrying out "^ .ureci r'ioosmQnded by trie uxyilian 

FT^er^jency B^ .oard for the proteotion of the civil- 

j pulation^ tlie Goirsmoav^eelth GoTernifient B!«reiy de- 

foj-.v.;, tr, show by deeds our Icyaity end our determination 
to do all we can in support of the (Jnited States* But 
if toy action in this respect, instead of being presented 
In +><! rirr^nr-v 1 V;ht to the President of the United States 
is ted by you aa a violet ion of my ooimnit- 

ca to frcaiaent Rooaevelt, then I shall revoke my 
cutive Order and do nothing in connection with the 
reooiTJaendfttions of the Civilian Rieergency Planning Board. 



'1 ; -iry Sison not to call © 

meetini: of this Civil iiin iiaergoncy Administration, or 

fl r% an-j'b.'h^ rt,' iiy-. {-. IT T 'crr n-r* ■f'T'r^rr, YOU* 



'I tuii seiiding oopy of this letter to Secretary 
loices for his information nnd that of the President es 

1 as to the successor Irol Smeallie and to Gen 
ei-al Grunert, 

'Sincerely yours, 

•MANUKLL, ' UiZON*". 



•» '? 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4315 




There are one or two errors in the text end I am 
endeavoring to get a repetition from the esble companj* 
I will send you the corrected one at tixe e&rlieat possS 
ble mc«nent. T shall also be at your 41sr.Dsal at any 



time for whatever personal inquiry yo 
In this aatter. 



••'/ish to Fielcj 




Resident Cor'sai sal oner of the Philippines 
to th« tJnited States 



J 



i 



4316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 
^t4 WASHINGTON 



APR 1 1941 




f% '*^ *"* " ''Tf^'^*''*'*-'********^ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4317 



^Jwt. imr iiM«allAtl«wi womU mmAmXij 



la tlM «HI*«« 



la IMC 







IHMwif r U ** mttXmSaXm 



*Ba«lMiA*« Mil V* vrmgmnA im 
■»tJiK aai aa if profriattaa alXl to 



atHitto fto«- 






X M ta Maputo W W * «i«li tto dwihA tanw •/ tto r« 
tloMi Mftllawl la tb« jstat X«t««r «f Jkanarjr 90 te auto awllakXa 
tiMNW aattorlMNI ii yp roy rl atlaa* fSN' tto tii>wa>w,'it. (^ tim ilmfmm» a 9t 
tto IliilipplM lalaate. I «l«h t* paiat aak, to wi w , tiwk tim nal- 
ipplB* Twijf iiilwBii Aat •■tiibUiiMM t)M talto« Mato* KU;)i Ci— Xii- 
■ t — »r — yw I ■!■ ■■■ Bt atlta ia tto X«dMai« aai fwl jaa ttak to 
atoll to riM«pil.iito aa aadi by ^^a 11—111111111. af fta a r« af tto alUtorjr 
fturaaa af tta Qaito* ttoxaa ia Vm Xala»ft*. 1 tm mt thm aplaiaa. «tor»- 
fWra. tto* tto 8teh CaHdaslMwr ia tto lasiaal afrialal af tfeia tov> 
■fi—it to aovarvlaa tto aaqpaaditara af tfaaaa faaia ato ttot tto Xaf;ta-' 
Xattaa waHiin tto faato availakla AeaU mfmitiMktXf aa |«wvlto. 
Uck CMii&aa&«MHr la aa tto craaaft aad aaaU torn tto toaaflt af tto 
taatolaal a4vlaa af tto iftoaaniHiic; OawgaX, liaUyrlxw tofartMat. 
tolta4 Stataa ingr. aa< tto Cawwnitor la CU^, Aidatla Raat. A« 
r a ff aia a totAta 1m ttmiUL to la tto toat paaitlaa to «MH-^eiaato tha a«» 
tlvltlaa af tto CaMoaaaaltk aimanaiaat atth tto allltarr aa« aawl 
raftiraaaata at thia Oaaaraaaat. iMaaaar, tto atowa ■girmpeHr<t4 rmMm^ 
Craa 4mmm aat aa aaaaarlly aaaalt y«« to tiala yr»»aiara if it la 
teaad Xatar to to ia«NraatiaaX* 




Xte toltad Mataa W^gk eaaaiaalaaar «M a*rtaa< •• to tto 

wal paaitlaa titaa by tba saaratary af tor» tba Jaantary 9t tha 
■a<»y aa< tbla aapartaaat, mni %tor* toa aav baaa raa^'*a4 la tto to* 

partoaat a aaMaga fraa hla (ra^losna to. t7f}» toto« April •* aattlag 
farth hla furtfetar Tlaaw. A ma^f *^ **^* aaaaaga la attaatoA* 

Tto atora prap aaad aiij||ni aaa 4nfta4 aftar aaaaaltatlaa altk 
tto B!a>«a« af tto to4eat IniiprSar to tto raaalpt af tfela wmmmkfft fraa 
tto Qalta* ttotoa Kl|^ faawl »ai\ mmr$ hamnmr, 1 tmm aettkisg ia itla aaa- 
atlaa aklab aeal< aato tkla aaaaaga laapiraprlata. aa aaaaw to to 
iana« pritorlly ttot p aat ii ' to ialtlato aatlaa toe«14 to ratalaaA by 
toarloaa afftaiala. mU raaeawarola ttot aa nanwiloitlaa i<mw1« to aaat 
to tto Caaaaaaaalth aatoarltlaa ^toet aa«M to la fcatyotot aa aa aataal 
me la^pllad ataaltaaMk ^ yaa aa to tb* aattoA af asiq^aaAltara. aa* «r 
fttral af ttoaa foato. tto fr a y a a a d aaaaaca aagvi "faada waaM rasala 



4318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




nF«% fhamw SMsa mrrMUBttgr •!«•>> «1m* cwkMl «f IsImm t^mtm viU 

taw kMB ■»■<€■< wtdttUAmMkf y«k tt iMmj* t» wmM this Ui«iMm» mt* 

riMlilliiBW fa* • SMVi Bdli^ k* 4lMAr«lil*. tnrti «k f Irct cImm* It 
iMto tM^wl mA «M14 ct^ lOy wwrt— » fVtt«tfBti«i t» f|n «i «ta 

P«m4 awMiic* 19- vltelMittac tlM rtiftir— 11 t» futKra •pproprl«ti«iM, 
k«t s« ■iU»— it Mnmfttc ]«• in ■• wgr •■ ^Ih* f»lvt« 



I MB nnOy «■■•&■••« ttet it is «M&nl»l« t* rstiilJi sooftr*! 1b 
^mmtm, Iwt *• ttai faiiMt iwrndMl* «EtaBt pMnit pMrtl«lp«ti«a ty 
■iwwtmtiw af «w OMMMMsltli BiiiiiiMiitt b«t t» do tkls mM a»- 

tlM MorMrmtlM sf tlw Pi—iiTHlti> simaUULa «111 rs^ilr* dsLlMt* 

iMDMlitoC. 



Cw T«iiwiiMi«iitioa» iMT ttw Si|[^ fl—»liiA— r «ill tw Iwlrna la 
mrtdas <m* iMaai d«t»iU sf tlni* MBttwr, tat ia vOot sf tit* 1«b{ iMn>lMl 
•r tiiM «isMl IMM •liNP««l siw* litis ^usii^lsa km first r»lswl I b«ll«*» 
ttet ft—Kswt »w.ssm is vctitlMt aov ts • sAstssMut m ts viist hs asy 
rsssinshly saqw*t« i thiak tte ywy s s s d l a ss s g s olssriy ssts fsrth s 
sssMi ftsimi >0U«7 »Mt 4^<Mi IsAs •« BSirii Avteil as-Ib &(tv4««ble «t 
tliis «Uw« 



Zf >e« 9i»iwv* liwswIssiMB «»f this rsdlssrssk. it is sugf^stsd tiMt 
7<gm is<iiM» it ts'Ukis IsyMUftMat ts 1m awt in sipittsr. 



K.':o!o.:' B s sr s tar y «f ttw Intsrlsr* 

Jt^ttl)/, UM2. 

flilWTti. 




33SS«& .^ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4319 

Translation of Radiogram in Code Received April 4, 1941. deb 

(Manila, P. I.) 
EMERSON. 
Interior Department. 
Washington. 
April 3— No. 275. 

Your ordinary mail letter February 19 concerning sugar excise and dollar 
devaluation funds received March 29. Appreciate your informing me as to pro- 
posed action and your solicitude as to position of High Commissioner. 

With regard to substance of proposed action see my radio to you No. 548, 
August 6, 1940. If President decides to recommend to Congress that it appropriate 
funds covering sugar excise taxes under Sugar Act of 1937 and dollar devaluation 
under Act of June 19, 1934, to be devoted to the military defense of the Philip- 
pines, I should like to urge folloveing considerations : 

1. The Commonwealth Government is responsible for the "passive defense" 
of civilians in the Philippines, namely the organization of adequate measures 
for civilian welfare and protection such as insuring adequate supplies of food 
stuffs and fuel, preparing shelters and protection against air raids, strengthening 
and training the Constabulary, organizing a home guard and the like. The 
United States Government is responsible for the "active defense" of the Philij)- 
pines up to 1946. Therefore, since power should go with responsibility. United 
States Army and Navy should have full power to determine the ways and means 
of such active defense and to control expenditures therefore. 

2. It is clear that Philippine defense is not something separate and apart from 
general defense of the United States. Philippine defense is an intimate part of 
and should be closely coordinated with United States general defense. 

3. Therefore, the absolute control of expenditures for "active defense" of 
Philippines should be in the hands of those responsible for general defense of 
the United States, namely United States Army and Navy authorities. It is not 
sufficient that they have power merely to approve expenditures proposed or 
initiated by others. 

4. It would be particularly unfortunate to limit American control to approval 
of measures and of appropriations initiated by the Commonwealth Govern- 
ment, as this might easily prevent the United States military authorities from 
effectively planning in advance for defense of Commonwealth or from a neces- 
sary coordination of policy. While the phrase "under the supervision and control 
* * * " as used in proposed message from President Roosevelt to President 
Quezon seems less objectionable than the phrase "with the approval of * * * " 
the former phraseology seems not sufficiently exact and might give rise to 
argumentation and possible friction between United States Military and Naval 
authorities and Commonwealth Government to the possible detriment of a 
coherent plan for defense. It would [2] seem preferable to use some such 
phrase as "to be expected by the Military and Naval authorities of the United 
States in accordance with the approved recommendations of the Joint Board" 
mentioned below. 

5. However, I believe that the Commonwealth Government should have a part 
and be asked to collaborate in the formulation of plans for the expenditure of 
these funds as considered most beneficial to Philippine defense. Such collabora- 
tion might take the form of a Joint Board to recommend the purposes and 
projects in order of priority for the expenditure of funds, such Board to be com- 
posed of representatives of the United States Army, of the United States Navy, 
of the High Commissioner, and of the Commonwealth Government. It would 
seem a logical function of High Commissioner to attempt to reconcile opposing 
views and to coordinate action. It should be provided, however, that in case of 
possible disagreement in Board's conclusions, the representatives of the United 
States Army and Navy should have the power to cast the deciding vote. All 
procurement of materials and personal services and all disbursements should 
be effected by the United States Army or Navy. The recommendations of Joint 
Board in Manila when approved or acted upon by the Commanding General 
of Philippine Department and Commandant of Sixteenth Naval District to be 
referred to War and Navy Departments in Washington for final action. 

6. In order to avoid unnecessary friction or delay appropriations should be 
made directly to the United States Army and Navy with some such provision as 
above for collaboration by Commonwealth Government. 



4320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

7. Until legislation is actually passed I recommend that no communication 
to Commonwealth authorities and no release in Washington should be made that 
could be interpreted as an actual or implied commitment by the President of 
the United States as to the method of expenditure, use or control of these funds. 

8. If any communication is sent from the President of United States for 
President Quezon, it should be addressed to the United States High Commis- 
sioner as recommended specifically by the Secretary of the Interior. In com- 
munications between officials of the United States and Commonwealth Govern- 
ments it will avoid embarrassment and facilitate our efforts if the following 
opening form is used : 

"Please inform President Quezon (or even better. The Commonwealth Govern- 
ment)". 

9. The legislation making appropriations of sugar excise funds should pre- 
sumably not apply to future collections and should provide that the appropriations 
made do not imply any obligation to appropriate future collections or future dollar 
devaluation funds. (End tabulation.) 

Nothing in foregoing should be considered as disapproval on my part of 
desirable expenditures for training, equipment or extension of Philippine army 
or for improvement and extension of fixed fortifications which might eventually 
become the property of an independent Philippines, provided [3] that such 
expenditures are deemed desirable by military authorities of the United States. 

I have discussed whole problem with Commanding General of Philippine De- 
partment and with Commandant Sixteenth Naval District. The conclusions 
and recommendations here set forth are theirs as well as mine. 

I have as yet seen no text of proposed legislation. If and when this is formu- 
lated I should appreciate text being transmitted by radio and my being given 
opportunity to comment on it before its submission to Congress. 

Please furnish copies of this radio to the President and the Secretaries of 
War, Navy and State. 

Satbe. 



The White House, 
Washington, April 15, 194^ 
Memorandum for the President 

Honorable Cordell Hull 
Admiral Emory S. Land 
Honorable Harry Hopkins 
May I advise, as a matter of information, that Frank Kluckhohn of the New 
York Times Washington Staff, gives me the following statement: 

"The Domei official Japanese correspondent tells me that the Japanese intend 
to halt and delay for a month American merchant ships on their way to the 
Red Sea." 

S. T. E. 



4/15/41 

Memo for the files. 

Return to Admiral Stark his Secret memo to FDR 3/28/41 enclosing copy of 
let to him from Admiral Thomas Hart 4/4/41 re situation at Manila, P. I. 



The Under Secret aby of State, 

Washington, May 1, ISJ^t. 
The President, 

The White House. 
My Dear Mk. President : I am returning to you herewith the memorandum, with 
enclosures, transmitted to you under date of April 28 by the Secretary of the 
Navy which you were good enough to send me for my information with your 
memorandum of April 30. I have given it to Murphy to read. The latter should 
be in Casablanca Tuesday or Wednesday of next week. 

Admiral Pratt's memorandum in particular has been most helpful to me. 
Believe me 

Faithfully yours, 

Sumner Wells. 
Enc. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4321 



4322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The White Housb, 
Washington, April 30, 1941. 
Memorandum for the Under Secretary of State. 
Please read and return. You can show it to Bob Murphy. 

F. D. R. 

Memorandum from Admiral Pratt to the Secretary of the Navy and another 
memorandum from Joseph B. Phillips, the Foreign Editor of Newsweelt. 



The SECRBrABY of the Navy, 

Washington, April 28, 1941. 
Memorandum for the President. 

I am enclosing herewith a couple of papers which you might find interesting 
reading. One is by Admiral Pratt and the other by Joseph B. Phillips, the 
Foreign EMitor of Newsweek. I know in what high esteem you hold Admiral 
Pratt and I found them both very interesting. 

F. K. 
Enclosures — 2 

Memo for Admiral Pratt 

(1) — The need to protect our flank in the South Atlantic is pressing. Sierra 
Leone is the best base. In addition however there are numerous smaller islands 
in this region, which are worth consideration. Two weeks ago Newsweek had 
a story, based on a report by a French geographer, saying that Germany had es- 
tablished bases and stored fuel on some small islands off Bathurst. Nothing 
has been heard of this so far in the war. In addition I would like to point 
out that in my opinion, the French situation is deteriorating rapidly. The im- 
mediate German purpose may be to secure the French fleet and North Africa, 
but the influence will certainly extend to Dakar, and possibly to the Cameroons, 
and the present Free French Equitorial Africa. Contrary to the opinion often ex- 
pressed, I am doubtful that the policy of the Petain Government, will be 
guided by French public opinion. The hold of Germany is too strong. There 
are too many men ambitious of power around Petain, or such as Laval. Con- 
sequently I submit that your memorandum might include a suggestion that 
within the immediate future, every possible pressure should be brought on 
France, through such things as the food question, and publicizing our own 
armaments effort and our determination to prevent a British defeat, to fore- 
stall a German success in France. To this end propaganda for the French 
public will do some good, but not enough. The important thing is to impress 
a few individuals, such as Admiral Darlan and General Huntzinger. I have re- 
cently heard you express an opinion on General Weygand with which I con- 
cur, nevertheless he is important in Africa, and I think it would be well to be 
certain that someone in our consular or diplomatic service has access to him 
with the ability to exert the desired pressure. To express a purely personnal opin- 
ion, I believe that the next big break will come in France. Even such a thing 
as an American effort to secure the release of cer- [2] tain French war 
prisoners — say those needed for the Spring planting and harvest — while it would 
probably be fruitless, nevertheless would create a favorable impression. 

While Sierra Leone would serve us well and could be acquired from Britain, 
nevertheless I feel that the acquisition of Dakar would make a much greater 
impression upon Europe. I do not have enough military information on the 
situation there to know whether this is possible. If it is say, by a landing 
of marines, I would consider it an important step to convince both Europe 
and South America of our deterrainition. 

(2) — You and I have recently heard some interesting but uninformed dis- 
cussions of our possible Influence in the acquisition of Irish Bases. I have 
no special information on this subject, but would like to make the following 
suggestions — First that the influence we can exert on this problem must be sec- 
ondary to the English-Irish problem. Second that one definite contribution 
we can make is to analyize Irish-American opinion in this country and to 
influence it as much as possible. Although my contact with these' political 
groups is too slight to be of much use, it had been enough to give me the opin- 
ion that a serious study of such groups would be worth the while of the State 
Department or of the Navy Department. The divisions in Ireland are reflected 
here, and I have myself been present at meetings of persons who were con- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4323 

tributing to the Irish Republican Army. My impression is that most Irish- 
men in the United States, are anti-English, and I feel that many of them have 
been influenced by such organizations as the Silver Shirts and Father Coughlins 
followers. This nowever is only a suggestion that a, more serious study should 
be made of these groups, with the idea that they cannot be influenced unless 
they feel that the hnal peace settlement is to be determined more by the United 
States [3] than by Britain. 

(3) — As regards our position in the Far Blast, it definitely is not my opinion 
that we are doing enough if we merely leave Japan a way out from the Axis 
alliance by such devices as convoying ships defensively to the limit of the 
Neutrality zone. Japan is a nation on the prowl without resources and anxious 
for whatever she can get. Xhe keys here are primarily Russia, and secondarily 
a bold front on our part and that of the British. This is true because for 
several years Japan has feared Russia more than it has us or Britain. I am 
of the opinion that unless we act immediately — Russia will sell out China 
and force Chiang-Kai-shek to make a peace with Japan. Everything in Chiangs 
past record points to the probability that he will consent to this. You know 
there is a very serious division in the Japanese government over the Axis al- 
liance, and that it has been accented by the new neutrality treaty with Rus- 
sia, because there are a number of Japanese of influence who still think their 
main enemy is Russia. Consequently I have two suggestions to make. First 
that the State Department, and also Navy men, who often have more effective 
contacts with the Japanese should impress upon them that we are as determined 
to keep up our aid to China as we are to Britain, and second that we should 
make a very special effort to impress Russia. As you know I am of the opinion 
that this physically weak power is pursuing a policy designed to secure a 
compromise peace in Europe and in Asia, or a German or Japanese victory 
after an exhausting war. Nevertheless from first hand experience I am con- 
vinced that the primary objective of the Stalin regime is to survive among a 
growing host of enemies. I have what I consider to be reliable information 
that Germany has promised survival to this regime, which naturally has great 
influence in the Krenriin. It is within the bounds of possibility that [4] 
that Russia can force China to make peace with Japan, thereby freeing Japan 
for an attack on ourselves and British interests in the Far East — To offset 
this we can take three lines of action — 1 — as said above impress Russia that 
our aid to China will continue regardless of events in Europe — 2 — Make it 
clear to Russia that we are interested in the war in the Balkans and North 
Africa, and that we are anxious to prevent a German domination of the Straits 
of the Dardanelles which is a matter of old and vital interest to Russia, in 
spite of all the present talk about a possible substitute outlet through the 
Persian Gulf, and — 3 — to make every effort to impress Russia by our indus- 
trial war effort. This country for a variety of reasons, is more apt then any 
other to be impressed by the figures on the American war industrial effort. 
From two conferences which you and I have attended recently, I have the 
impression that the extent of this effort has not been fully publicized. More- 
over It is to the advantage of Russian policy at the moment to encourage this 
effort and to lessen sabotage. This war is a struggle for power, in which 
ideologies are only the instrument of power groups, and I see no reason why 
given our true position in the world we should not be capable'of playing upon 
the obvious weaknesses of both Russia and Japan to emasculate the danger 
to ourselves in the Pacific. 

(4) — As regards the specific recommendations in your memorandum, I have 
only two suggestions to make — fa)— that the headquarters of a joint American- 
British strategy board might better be in Canada than in Washington — (b) — 
that such a Board should have its own press relations bureau, quite separate 
from the notoriously inadequate Ministry of Information in London, and that 
in the selection of such an organization the British Dominions and ourselves 
should have more weight than the British. 

[5] Note — As an eddenda, I submit that all my information as a For- 
eign News Editor, is to the effect that in the case of defeat, the remnants of 
the British Fleet would be quite as apt to retreat to Singapore as to Canada. 

Joseph B. Phillips 



Memo on Siebra Leone 

We should have a base at Freetown on the south side of the Sierra Leone 
river. It is a British possession, having an excellent harbor, with an anchorage 



4324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

space over 9 miles long and 1 mile wide, for ships of the deepest drauglit. It is 
protected from the seas on the north, by shoals extending well to seeward, over 
which lieavy seas break, and by low flat land. There- are Government docks at 
which ships drawing 30 feet of water could berth, discharge, and take on cargo. 
There is a nice little town with churches, hospitals, barracks, and a sanitorium 
in the hills. It should be reasonably cool and healthy, for it is open to the 
breezes from the north and west, and some of the quarters and barracks are in 
the hills. 

It could not be attacked from the north, for the land on the north side is low 
and open to gunfire, and the flats extend well to seaward. The sea guards it on 
the west, and the river extends into the interior on the east. On the south it is 
protected by a series of hills and knolls, ranging from over 2,500 feet down, 
beginning about four and a half miles from the town and almost surrounding it. 
Any attack from the south would have to storm these hills and take them, before 
entry to the harbor could be made. It lies 450 miles south of Dakar, 2,760 miles 
from our base at Trinidad, and is 1590 miles from the nearest point in S ;uth 
America, approximately the same distance that Dakar is. It is a better spot 
for a base than Bathurst on the Cambia river, also a British holding, though 
Bathurst is nearer Dakar being 120 miles away. 

Irish Bases 

The best bases to secure and use in Ireland would probably be, if such a move 
is practicable — Cobh-Lough Swilly-Berehave in Bantry Bar. Berehaven was 
U8ed as a destroyer base in the last war. It covers the air and sea approaches 
from the west and south — Cobh is the natural port [2] for the discharge 
of cargo — Lougli Swilly is an extensive baf on the north coast of Ireland. It is 
the sea approach to Londonderry. A base in this vicinity would cover the 
northern and western approaches to Scotland and the Irish sea. 

POINTS SUGGESTED FOR CONSIDERATION 

Since the Lend Lease Bill has given the authority, and the $7,000,000.00 the 
power to start the wheels of production rolling, the most important factors to 
consider in the Aid to Britain program, are (a) — systematic and efficient planning 
between ourselves and Great Britain, and (b) — efficient and quick action in the 
matter of getting our production in the safest way to the localities where 
Britain can best use it. The need of speedy action in the case of — (b) — is evident 
since the successful solution of the Campaign of the Atlantic, is the most serious 
problem facing Britain now, and during the summer months, and transport across 
the sea is the weakest link in our aid to Britain scheme. In attacking this prob- 
lem of shipping, there are two points to consider — (c) — the replacement of ton- 
nage sunk, by the most rapid methods of constiniction, regardless of the size of the 
carriers — (d) — the safe transit of ships and their cargoes, with a minimum of loss, 
irrespective of any particular method by which ships cross the seas. In other 
words speed in transit and a reasonable degree of security are the key notes. 
If we attempt to safeguard shipping by escort, our own political position at home 
has to be considered, and the risk of involvement of a war in two oceans. Yet 
if we are not willing to assume some of the risks of defending the shipments 
regardless of what ships carry them, we might as well throw our money down 
the sink, and Britain may fall. If she does the logical spot for the British 
Government to move to is Canada, though the fleet might move to Singapore. 
Then we are in the war, for it has very definitely reached the Western Hemis- 
phere, for we have defense commitments with Canada which we cannot [,i] 
dodge. It would seem to be wi-ser policy to attempt to confine the fighting to 
Europe than have it come over here. A risk of our involvement in war, which 
is confined to sea and long range air activity, is a minimum risk, compared to 
what we would probably face if Britain fell. If the steps we take are in defense 
of our own rights as we view them, and we escort cargoes for the present no 
further than 30 degrees west hmgitude, which is within the limits of the western 
hemisphere, this might give .Japan an out, in that the real aggressor might be 
termed the one who firetl the first gun or torpedo, and Japan might be glad of 
an excuse not to go to war with us. 

In general, in the matter of our sea and air aid to Britain, there are three 
courses we may pursue — (e) — we may turn over to" Britain all the sea and air 
craft she needs, and which are at our disposal, with the promise of having 
them returned later. In the matter of aircraft, this presents no operational diffi- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4325 

culties, and the speed up in our own production should give us a good safety 
margin, in ease we had to look more closely to our own defense needs. The case 
of our war craft is different, though the difliculties attendant to turning over 
regu.ar men of war, does not apply to smaller craft, such as Coast Guard ships — 
yachts — patrol boats — tugs — mine sweepers. If we turn over too many men of 
war at one time, there is the problem for Britain to find trained crews to man 
them — there is a training period for British crews to learn how to run them 
without breakdowns — and there is the matter of additions and changes in material 
to make our ships fit to war specifications. Away from gunfire and air attack 
we should be able to make a better and quicker job of it — (f) — there is the 
course of conduct where we hold fast to all our sea and air craft, expecting to 
use them later. This is a negative effort, productive of no aid to Britain, and 
extremely wasteful of time — (g) — there is the com- [4] promise plan and 
this seems to me to be the one offering the most promise. This plan would be to 
turn over to Britain, all the sea and air craft she could use immediately, and which 
we could spare, having in mind our Pacific committment, and that we should start 
convoy immediately. 

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 

(1)— That* a Board be appointed, composed of comi)etent British and Ameri- 
can naval and military men, to study the war. plan a joint strategy and determine 
upon the proper tactics for its execution, if and when the time comes, that joint 
action is required. The seat of this Board would best be in Washington — (pos- 
sibly Canada) — removed from the center of strife, where quiet thinking is pos- 
sible, with all information given it. 

(2) — That steps be taken toward locating suitable bases in Labrador and Green- 
land, for the purpose of establishing across the narrow waters separating them, 
direct air flights for all types of planes, from the U. S. to Newfoundland — New- 
foundland to Labrador — Labrador to Greenland — Greenland to Iceland — Iceland 
to the British Isles. 

(3) — That steps toward the acquirement of temporary bases in Ireland and 
Sierra Leone be started. 

(4) — That direct sailings between our own ports and the Res sea be started. 
Turkey the key spot in the Eastern Mediterranean has not given in yet, and 
if she fights, air power — (the lack of which was one of the main reasons Greece 
fell) — in quantity will be needed. Our ships not to be convoyed on this route, 
by ourselves or the British. Nor should we endeavor to protect them yet on this 
route against raiders. The effort to do this would cause a dispersal of our 
naval force more urgently needed elsewhere now. If raiders sink or capture 
one this is an act of aggression. 

[5] (5) — Turn over to the British, exclusive of the needs of the Pacific fleet, 
all sea and air craft they can use immediately, and which we will not need in the 
convoys we escort. This is a practical measure since every war craft and 
aircraft we so turn over, goes into fuU war use immediately, while those w6 
retain will not get into full war use until we get into the war. 

(6)— Since British shipping is much tied up, if quick plane deliveries, are 
needed to West Coast African ports, in order to be flown to North Africa for imme- 
diate use, make the deliveries in our own fast ships, by direct sailings to West 
Coast African xwrts. 

(7) — Fit out immediately more ships of the C-type, similar to the one now being 
fitted out — that is the convoy, cargo aircraft carrier type. 

(8) — Since the rapid transit of cargo is more officient by direct sailings than 
by convoy, the principle should be established, that each individual cargo car- 
rier, as far as practicable should be made as immune to the submarine and air- 
craft as possible. In new construction this would put a limit on size, and the 
account on speed, both in construction and in transit. Older ships of slow speed 
must be escorted in convoy, and all means of defense used, even with the auto- 
gyro and blimp if it is found possible to use them. 

(9) — That ships of 1.5 knots and over should not go in convoy. 

(10) — That slow ships of 10 knots and under, should go in convoy. 

(11) — That between 10 and 15 knots discretion should be used whether to send 
ships in convoy or not. 

(12) — That convoys should be small. 

(13) — That the Neutrality Zone be extended to 30 degrees longitude west, 
which is within the limits of the western hemisphere. 



4326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(14) — That we start to escort convoys to longitude 30 degrees west, and then 
turn them over to the British. 

16] (13) — That as soon as practicable, we start an air patrol, by sea planes, 
conducted from those bases we have acquired or may acquire, which from their 
location in the Atlantic can give shipping important information. 

(1(5) — That the convoys we escort may be camposed of ships of all nationalities, 
and form in our ports. 

(17)— That when British war craft enter our ports for repair, the matter is 
taken under consideration, can we swap for the time being, an undamaged ship 
of the same type for the one damaged. If not then train the crews of the damaged 
ships, so that in time they can handle one of our own without much further 
training. 

(18) — That as our heavier battleships come along, they go to the Pacific, to 
relieve one or two of the older battleships, which may then be put in the Atlantic 
service as deemed advisable. 

(19) — Should it develop later that we become an active belligerent and found 
that In turning over too many of our warships and aircraft, while-as a non bellig- 
erent, we have stripped our.selves of the means to conduct a joint war eflBciently, 
we have an agreement with the British that such of our air craft as we had loaned, 
be returned, or that a new realignment of forces, their distribution and opera- 
tional tasks be assigned, in order to conduct efficiently the joint war, in whatever 
world areas war operations are conducted. 

(20) — That as soon as we decide to convoy, even to long. 30, a state of National 
Emergency be declared. 

(21) — That when a State of National Emergency is declared, or before steps 
be taken to insure the safety of our merchant ships against acts of sabotage, or 
those inimical to our interests. 

(22) — If the present political crisis in Australia, leads to a diminution of their 
active aid to Britain, for their own defence purposes [7] we may have 
to exert more pressure on Australia, to reassure them of our active support, in 
case their island is threatened by a southern Japanese move. 

W. V. Pratt 

Memo — April 30 — 41 

Report of a vei'y interesting conversation, I had with the Japanese Ambassador 
on April 28 — The interview was private — held in the Hotel Plaza — He and I were 
the only ones present during the entire interview — it wa^ held at his request, 
and lasted two and a half hours. In the main the conversation was general, but 
always stuck to the main theme — the war — However, there were certain definite 
statements, Non>ura made, to wit — that Japan definitely wanted a peace with 
China — would ask no indemnities — did not desire the military occupation of 
China — that now, though at first military occupation had been a purpose, this 
idea had been given up, by most of the influential leaders-including most of the 
higher military men — nearly all ot the naval men — and as I gathered by prac- 
tically all of the leading business and financial heads — What opposition existed 
rested entierly in the younger group — that Japan's aim vis-a-vis China was the 
rehabilitation along economic lines of China and Japan in order to create a 
stable economic situation through which both Countries would profit, along the 
lines of cooperation. 

With regard to the southward expansion — Japan's aims there-were in line 
with the policy adopted in China — that a military move directed at Singapore 
and the Dutch East Indies was not intended, but economic stability, and a free 
flow of trade in which Japan could participate — and I gathered on equal and 
not on preferential terms — He distinctly did not want war to creep into the 
Pacific — and I gathered this was the general sentiment in Japan — as it would 
tend to disturb Japan's policy of economic rehabilitation and stability in the 
Orient. In spite of the Russo-Japanese agreement, the great fear is and will 
C(mtinue to be Russia — not that they fear Russia in a military sense [2]- 
but that in a long war, with Britain and Germany exhausted — Stalin would be 
the only winner — then Communist influence would dominate the Orient, much 
to Japan's undoing — that he, and I judged most of .Japan's informed military 
authority regarded Russia as a weak country, with Stalin under the thumb of 
Berlin — that Russia was not sincere and could not be trusted. 

Nomura stated that of all foreigners in his country the Americans were the 
best liked. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4327 

He stated that the capitalist group in Japan were distinctly opposed to the 
Axis economic system — that Japan's system was the growth of one patterned 
after ours and that of Britain, and that the supremacy of the Nazi system would 
distinctly disrupt their own, and as I gathered would interfere much with Japan's 
economic policy in the Orient, as it was fundamentally different from the one 
Japan visualized. 

The immediate purpose of the discussion with me, was in connection with a 
visit he hoped Matsuoka would be able to make to this country in the near 
future — When Matsuoka went to Berlin — he, Nomura had cabled him, asking 
that he return via the United States — Matsuoka could not do it then, as he had 
to complete arrangements with Russia — I gathered that the feeling was, if an 
atmosphere was created in this country, which was not hostile to him, since 
Japan was an Axis partner, that he, Matsuoka, might be glad to come to this 
country to talk things over. 

I told Nomura then, if the suspicion was aroused in this country that Matsuoka 
came as an Axis agent prepared to spread the Nazi doctrine of a conqueror's peace, 
it would in my opinion be futile, and would only result in a greater antagonism 
in this country, for we would feel then that Japan had been sold lock, stock 
[3] and barrel to the Nazis — But that if Matsuoka came with the purpose 
of establishing friendly relations with this country on the basis of limiting the 
war to Europe — establishing a condition of peace in the Orient, not to be broken 
by further military conquests there, and keeping the peace so that war could 
not spread to the Orient, there might be a possibility — I was not a statesman, 
nor in ji position to make statement which carry any weight, but it was my 
opinion that the one successful approach to this country, and the only one giving 
any promise might be along the lines I suggested. 

I asked him about Matsuoka, stating that I heard he was in sentiment hostile 
to this country — The Ambassadors reply was to this effect — That Matsuoka must 
not be judged entirely by what he says — that he is a disciple of the American 
political method of saying a great many things to see their effect — but what he 
has in his heart may be quite another matter. 

I gathered, however, from the whole conversation, that there was a growing 
fear in Japan, that ultimately, if the Axis were the victors Japan might have 
to fear Hitler, about as much as they do Stalin — that he. Nomura, looks forward 
to a long war, and in the end he did not see how Hitler could prevail over 
Britain and the United States with their great reserve power. 

This represents the gist of the conversation. 

W. V. Peatt 



The White House, 
Washington, May 6, 19^1. 
Confidential 
Memorandum for the Secretary of State 

Will you speak to me about this? 

F. D. R. 

Letter from The United States High Commissioner giving a report on the 
Philippines, dated April 23, 1941. 



4328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 







THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 
WASHINGTON 



MAY - 7 I94t 



Th» fr»«id0iit, 

Th« IRilt* House. Ha 
l(^ doeu- Mr. Pr««id»nti 




•HNl 



In oosneotion with a answg* lAieh you M>thorls«d to b« B«nt ozt 
April 12, throiieh the Dnited Stftt«« High Congaisslonar to th» Pr«»id«irt 
oi" the Philippine Cojraaoinrealth, with regard to the appro privation of cer- 
tain fuade for defense purposes la the Fhllippiiiee, 1 enclose a copy of 
a radiograa whioh has boon reoeived froa the tmited States High Comls- 
sioner eoxitaining a further joessage for ymi tron Mr. «iaeson oa this 
subjoot. 

This oorrespondenoe and other Infonaation iBdleate a difference of 
opinion between Mr. S«orre and Mr. ()uesoa on this ^lestion. W» Sayre 
belle-res that all of this $52,000,000 should be us«id for dlreot sdll- 
tary and naral purposes and that exp«BUlltur«8 for olTillan welfare and 
protection should be borne by ttie Coaaaowrealth Oorermtent froa other 
funds, having is adnd the oooffput ail fflff^ae tsji: f«» d« now beiag oolleo- 
ted in the Bolted States and credited to ths ci»a|»iarealth Qttvnamat at 
the rate of approxiaately |17,000,000 annually. 

Mr. ^eson is on reoord as stating that he bsliereti that the pro- 
tection of Hut olrilian popttlation of the Biillpplnes Is as nush the pri<- 
mary reaponsiblllty of this Otf y o riB i tent as the sllitary defense of the 
Islands. He desires to use the ooeonut oil taxes for other purposes 
aad therefore reqfoests that |16,0C0,0C){J of than* additional funds be 
set aside for elrilia» defense. 

From 1934 to Uaroh 1, 1941, appro xiiaately #110,000,000 hmre aoorved 
''to the oredit of the Billii^lisMi QoTemanat as a result of th« oooocnt 
oil taxes. Vhse It is ooiuldered that the** «ctraordlaairy r«eeipt« «i- 
Bually approxinate oae-thlrd of the r*r«»t«« from ordinary eourees. It 
Is p«rhAp8 not unreasonable to feel 1^«t a pert at least of 8U«h rsnrei-* 
t adght be used la the present «i»ergeiley as «ugee«t«d bjr -Uw Hidi 
Bissloner. Be intliaatea that you sdght aaiae meh a aug$a«tioau Mem- 
erer, the CcnnoBwealth su-ttiorltiee have tmd»r «onalder«tl«a tiMt expendi- 
ture of a part of the oooonut oil tvmvy lor th» porpoe* of Ijoereaalnf 
the yfallippin* Constabulary and the oonstraation of wa alrpwrt. I 
(ibuM; the advisabiilty, until we kB»w how tKt they are pn-Mt.T'ii to 
ToluBtarlly, of ettauptlng to put wsr« preswurA «& th«» 







:A^- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4329 






Znacaooh »• X TaaderataM that aatlaatca for the &ppropri&tlo& 
ot tfel« »<m»7 «•• to te pr«p(ir«d by tJw *«r aad fery D»i)(«rtB.?nt«, 
I an •cadlBg 0opl«s of all this oorr88|>o&d«nc8 to tha S«or*t&rl«a 
of Var aad tha »»Ty for thalr iBfoxMatioa. Cntll their raeoiiKen- 
datloas ara raoalrad, tharafora, I 4o aot ballara that w»y farthar 
adtioB i« saeaaaary. 

Slaoaraljr yoorat 






laelo«ture«. 



Secretary of tha Interior. 



79716 O— 46— pt. 20 24 



4330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Oiudi** r. I.) 



Vuridacia 

Arm } - ■•. Ml, 



ttU maim tex f«i« U«m farnMlihilafy mi — »■ ti>"f>ft, . 

talM* »ut«« Aagr vpvid UK* to >drWlli ■ ff i fr i * aa aU to ««£«»•• «ir 
Civillaa laMrgMMT rianiSai ftM«4 tea abnn^ w iai iwi iii * UMi MUlfptea 
OHurtalniUi!f ■liiri.i b« aiMagyMaat aa a ■■■■»■ of aivlllM iar«wa« Saa 
•oygr af rapori «r tba OiviliHi iMaiaay Plaaalii« ItaH lanMNM fa« tm 
Harab a&, If^l V ftir aqpMM. llMiU apptratlato viaai af &ito«iMr aa to 
akatoar toMa ItoM mmtwm to rmq^ivmmtAa Saatlaa 4 PakUa aa» )Q0* fiHi 
Coaivaaa* Xa via* aP aifgairtiMi by OaaaMaaMltk to aaa mm m a tt •iX 
far stoaM'UMalj^ 0«aatakalai|r It U artiMk fli— iimilU «MiaUara 
4 toa«t awwMjH to ijMdato laU«aaI imtmm Uaaa« Ifela via* aaa 
Iqr SaMrataijr riaMMa latsM laa4 faar. ^r lapti Aifiatv &a af fialaw toaaa 
foada Mn ba aaad far la%i«aal Atfasaa itoaa iaala<iat alvUUa iaf aua 
Maauraa, WaUf hi* •plttSaa ayaa fctan^iitliiii «a*a HaA " «mA te a 4ia» 
jwaUTw amaa ia 8a«UMi 4 af la% Aagaal 7» 1«I9 ffaipliriag ftala to IM 
aM« for "aatlag Ma ar MMtttiwiT a a p i d ltoria ahUk aUl to 
ia alilaaUaf rMHyjiiaa iiiM^r' to a paiAtlia laiipialial af Umtc 
aMa« la ito Qteltoi Stoica aatf Sa iiiijufflH toa PiiUyflaaa far toa 

•Xaa fana 23 alaaegM^MHl aaialad irtwlalklir wflrtwitlwl SMavtaaiHa ail4.49ba4 

"Brafto af ywy o^^ a taflalaUaa to Iff aatowto tto l«iavi af Urn iuUA, Fta- 

pavatonr OaMltoaa va nrtllfylaa ItUUm" tiaaaaUtot Iqr latoar Saa«riNr |}« 

1934 frw M aa Aaalatoat taaratoxy •* Ma^ 4a Um C«Mi< 

Xa Tlaa af paaMkla wwriiy It la hMUy datliahla toa% waai aU 

to avaUaUa far totli aaltva allltoi^r 4af a^aa mA yaaatra lAvUlaa 

•aa ar ■•• V9, 19m 5, lf4I» Jtiwa Ito to to atiaaa af . 

■qr as, lfi4I* naaat layiittw Hffltjr* 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4331 



Translation of Badiograa in Code Raceivad April 23, 19U. deb 

(Itonila, P. I.) 

Interior Dapartdsieni. 

Waahixt|rton» 

April 22 - Ho. 3U. 

CwifidentiiLL for tba President, In letter dated April 21, 19U, 
President Quexon requeats we to forward folloKdng radio to you: 

"In reference to your contenplated action of aaklng OongresB 
to appropriate the funda collected from excise tax on 8ug&f as 
• well as the fuMs authorized from the gold devaduation for the 
defense of the Philippines as requested by me, I recorrmend that 
you include the setting aside of $I5,000,00C>.00 for the carryijig ^ 

out ot the civilian defwiee plans and $5,000,000.00 for the con- *^ 

etruction of a projwsed dry dock in Ifajsila harbor, p lans for 
i*!ich the Navy Department is familiar wltt;.^"™" •< 

In considering this recooiaendatlon you will doubtless wish to secure 
the opinion of War and N&vy Departments as to question of whether entire 
•ua derived fpoa both sugar excise tax and dollar devaluation funds of 
approjdjnateiy 152,000,000,00 is jaorc than auffioient for expenditures 
necessary for "active" mllltaty defense of Philippines, If entire mm 
of ♦52,000,000.00 is necessary for "active defense" you may wish to con- 
aider possibility of allowing CoBaDonwqalth Government to use coconut oil 
excise tax funds to suppl«»ent other Coasnonwealth funds available for 
financing cost of "passivs" civilian defwiae, as reco.Tsaar.ded in my rsdio 
No, 285 of April 5 to Interior, Also see ay confidential radio to Emerson 
Ko. 275 of April 3, 19U regarding responsibilities of United SUtes and 
CoBiaonwealth Qovemflsents with respect to defense and pointiixg out dis- 
tinction between "active" and "passive" defense. 

SAYRE. 



,__j; _t sssatssv. 



4332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



)*: 



THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 

May U, 1941. 




ISaCOIIAHITDlf FOR THE 

SECBETiM OF STATE: 

For yotir luforiB&tlon aM 



F. D. R, 






^ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4333 




THE WHITE HOUSE 

WASHINGTON 



May 6, 1941. 



MEMORAMDOIC FOB THE PRESIDENT: 

Clarence Dillon^ of Dllldn and Reld, (phoned 
the follcmings 

"The Japanese have in this country two 
insurance companies, <me of which is the 
Standai^ Insurance Coapany of Hew York, an 
excellent little company doing a good business, 
Mr. lioCain of ay office happens to be on the 
board of these companies, and has been for a 
good aany years. 

«The Japanese were over here last Decem- 
ber exploring the possibility of selling the 
coapanies, or s<Haething, and to see what the 
situation was. The other day we got a cable 
from the« asking if we could arrange for 
the sale of these companies in sixty days, 
IhMi, a few days later, their manager over 
here asked us if we could make them an imme- 
diate bids so we spoke to the Aetna in 
Bartford, and we cabled them on Friday, 
Baking them a bid, and a very low bid for imme- 
diate reply. We got a cable frcxn them this 
morning, accepting the offer, 

«I thought that this might be of real 
Interest to the President, as it looks like 
the Japanese are selling out their assets 
over here in a hurry. We had purposely 
cabled them a low offer for immediate 
acceptance, to see what would happen, 
and they accepted j^amedlately, 

•»If the President wants any details on 
this, McCain can be in WtslOngton today to 
give details to anybody d««l|^ted.". 



£?M.«. 



4334 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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4337 







120, April 1, 9 a.m. from Menila. 



purpose of attacking thE Hethcrlcnds Ir.aics in tht 
cvcnt of bclligErEncy involving them. In viEw of 
practlc£.l exigencies of the situation here T conciu' 
in Admiral Hart*s rccooKncndction f-nd consider it 
feasible laMer general principle of interna tlonsil la 
as applied, under present world conditions to swch I 
waters* Please immediately bring matter to the 
attention of the President, 



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4338 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Department of State, 

The Secretary, 

May 15, IQJfl. 

Memorandum for the President 

The attached letter from the High Commissioner, dated April 23, 1941, which 
you sent me with your memorandum of May 6, has been read with much interest 
and I appreciate the opportunity of reading it. For your consideration I sug- 
gest a reply somewhat along the following lines: 

"Your letter of April 23, J941 has just reached me and the several items of 
information given in it, as well as your comments, are found illuminating and 
useful. 

"It is gratifying to learn that you are working in such close harmony with 
General Grunert, Admiral Hart and Admiral Bemis; also, that the strengthening 
of our armed forces in the Philippines has resulted in a more satisfactory trend 
in Filipino public opinion. 

"Your comments upon the health of President Quezon and the consequent 
increase in his irascibility are very interesting. I am sure that in view of this 
tendency on his part you have kept [21 in mind the importance of exer- 
cising even more than usual tact in all of your relations with him. I am fully 
aware that in the tense atmosphere of the present situation it is not easy to 
collaborate without misunderstandings with a man of his proud and sensitive 
nature who is in a weakened condition consequent upon his illness, and tliat you 
will find it necessary to be more than ordinarily patient as well as wise. I am 
counting upon you to exercise just such wisdom, patience and tact, since the 
maintenance of harmonious relations is essential to obtaining the maximum 
degree of cooperation. 

"Your remarks as to your desire to continue in the High Commissionership 
for not more than another year, and in regard to the various riunors which 
have reached Manila as to your replacement, have been given my careful atten- 
tion. Since I have no ideas as to making any change at the present time, you 
should not permit yourself to be disturbed by rumors and press comments. I am 
carefully considering your suggestion that some statement be made in a press 
conference. Your desire to be relieved after another year will also be kept in 
mind." 



The United States High Commissioner, 

Manila, Baguin. April 23, 19^1. 
Via Airmail 

Personal and confidential 
Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson. 
The White House, 

Washington, D. C. 

My Dear General: Will you be good enough to see that the President is 
given personally the enclosed very confidential letter which is for his eyes 
alone? I shall greatly appreciate your kindness. 

What a tragic world this is becoming! I often wonder how the President and 
all of you in the White House can keep up the pace. I do hope that his health 
continues good. 

With warmest personal wishes, believe me. 
Ever sincerely yours, 

Francis B. Sayre. 

Enclosure. 



The United States High Commissioner. 

Manila, Bagnio, April 23, 194t. 
Via airmail 

Personal and confidential 
The President. 

The White House, 

Washington, D. C. 

My Dear Mr. President : I have not written you for some time because I 
realize the tremendous burdens which you are carrying and do not want to bother 
you with too frequent letters. However, the trend of affairs in the Far East 
at this time would seem to call for a brief report from the Phillipines. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4339 

President Quezon has recently recovered from what seemed at one time a very 
serious illness — a recurrence of lung trouble. There was a period when he 
saw almost no one. He is now in the summer capital at Baguio and still moves 
about in a wheel chair ; but when I talked with him a few days ago he seemed 
in good spirits and looked quite well. He told me that the spot on his lung had 
completely healed. 

His illness has not improved his irascibility. Fortunately this irascibility has 
not led to any further public utterances criticizing the High Commissioner, but I 
am more or less prepared for such an eventuality as President Quezon bitterely 
resents any opposition or difference of opinion and, in the natural course of 
.events, such differences are l)ound to arise unless the High Commissioner makes 
himself entirely .subservient to President Quezon's desires. 

We were delighted to see Mr. Currie who stopped over here on his way to 
Chungking and again on his way back. I found him keen and intelligent and I 
was glad of the chance to talk with him and give him a picture of our situation 
here. I hope that he has had an opportunity to discuss with you some of the 
diflaculties which confront us. 

Last month we had another interesting visitor, Mr. van Kleffens, the foreign 
Minister of the Netherlands, whom I had known some fifteen years before at 
The Hague, Mr. van [2] Kleffens spoke with delight of hs talk with you 
in Washington. It chanced that the British Air Marshal from Singapore, Sir 
Robert Brot ke-Popham, was passing through Manila at the same time. Naturally 
we all talked together although, as you know, there was nothing whatever ofHcial 
in our joint talks. The newspapers as usual made much of our conferences. 
Perhaps the news of our joint meeting, exaggerated as it was, had a not un- 
healthy effect upon opinion in the Far East. 

For the past several months I have been wrestling with defense problems. I 
have been working in the closest cooperation with General Grunert, Admiral 
Hirt and Admiral Bemis. Frequent ctniferences have established close co- 
ordination in our various fields of work. Our country is fortunate to have at this 
time men of such outstanding good judgmrent and ability in their field as they. All 
of us here feel glad that you have decided to recommend to Congress the appropri- 
ation of the sugar excise taxes and dollar devaluation funds for Philippine defense. 

I have been doing my best to urge and stimulate the Commonwealth Govern- 
ment to build up civilian defense. Last October, with President Quezon's co- 
operation, I organized a joint commitree composed of both Americans and Fili- 
pinos to study the problem of civilian defense and make concrete recommenda- 
tions. The committee rendered an excellent i'eiM>rt covering such matters as 
strengthening the Constabulary, building up home guard units, securing adequate 
supplies of food and fuel, building air-raid shelters, and the like. I urged Presi- 
dent Quezon and the Commonwealth authorities vigorously to push forward this 
work ; and they are now pushing it as best they can. The question of financing 
it is still an unsettled question. They are naturally eager to finance it with 
American money if they can. 

There is considerable uneasiness here over a possible Japanese invasion. Public 
opinion, at times jittery, was gratified as a result of the increased strength of the 
United States Army and Navy forces here. I believe that the steps taken were 
timely and necessary. Although the general trend of Filipino utterances is loyally 
to uphold America in her struggle for democracy, occasionally one runs into 
undercurrents of opinion among the Filipinos that their country is being dragged 
into an imperialistic war ai^d will be sacrificed like many other small countries. 
The strengthening of our armed forces here is the most effective reply. 

May I in closing speak of a matter wftich may appear [3] merely per- 
sonal but which because of the delicate situation in the Far East importantly 
affects the work of our Government at a most critical time. I refer to the rumors 
emanating from Washington which have appeared in the newspapers here as to 
the appointment of someone to succeed me as High Commissioner. I have tried 
to ignore such reports and when questioned as to them have of course disclaimed 
knowledge of any foundation for them. This morning headlines in the Manila 
papers blazoned the runjor afresh. It now has the appearance not of mere idle 
rumor but of forces actively at work to secure my return to Washington. The 
persistence of the rumor cannot but be detrimental to the morale of my staff and 
to the effectiveness of our work among the American and Filipino communities. 
I should warmly appreciate a confidential word- from you whether these reports 
have any foundation. My single desire is to uphold your hands in the great work 
which you are doing and to further the interests of our country. 



4340 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In any event, I think I should not remain here more than one year longer. After 
that. If events run their natural course, I hope I might he assigned to some other 
post, for I believe that from health considerations three years In the tropics are 
suthcient. 

If you do not desire to retain me here for another year, I am sure it would 
materially strengthen our Government's work and prestige in the Philippines 
if you or Secretary Early, perhaps in reply to a question planted in a press con- 
ference, could publicly exi)ress confidence in me and thus put a definite end to 
the persistent rumor of my recall to Washington. 

This letter has already become longer than I intended. But I believe you want 
to be kept informed in a personal way of the highlights of the situation in the 
Philippines. 

With admiration and affection, believe me. 
Ever sincerely yours, 

Fbank 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4341 




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^,, *,-^g action to prevent Jarmn 

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4342 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




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4344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4345 



TRANSLATIOiJ OF TELliaKAM REC^D IN CODE JUNE 6 



Commissioner Elizalae 
Washington, D. C. 



This is to conflnn what I told you ovf=>r th«» 
long-distance telephone. 

During the last two or three months ther*» 
have apoeared in the local pepera reports fron the 
United States, to the effect that the recall of Hi«th 
Commissioner, Francis d, Seyre, is bein« contemplated 
in Washington, D. C. because Hif:,h Coirnil'??? loner SRyr<=^ 
and the Commonwealth Jovemment cannot v.t>rk In h«r- 
money and cooperation. While, in a few occasion «, 
High Commissioner Sayre and I have held different views 
on certain public matters, as naturHllv hfwir.fmr b-*- 
ween persons of lndepend?;>nt r. ! , 

that r'lp-h Cor^ndr^ioncr Sayrr- pni: 1 are ebi«-. to ov-r- 
corre i-iCh difrerrnces of opinion and coopfrfit< with 
each other in the conanon tf^sk of promoting huc pro- 
tcctin^?; thf' best Int^-rcsts of t* e Unitoc r't»'i< > ^t ' 
the Philippinrr. There erlsts cotriplete haraop;- -• 
cooperf'tlon between hlf office and r.ine , end o^i 
sonol I'-lhtl re nooct friendly. Unl* 

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79716 O— 46— pt. 20 25 



4346 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



THB RESIOBNT CXJMMiaSlONBR OF THE PHIUPPIN^ 
TO THB UNITED STATB8 

WASHINGTON, O C. 

June 9, 1941 



itBOBVBD 

JUN 1 1941 

canoe or 

THBgEatETARV 



The Honorable 

Harold L. Ickes 

Secretary of the Interior 
Washington, D. C. 

My dear lir. Secretary: 

I desire to Inform you that, in my recent 
conferences with certain Members of the Maritime Commis- 
sion, I was advised that, In view of the withdrawal of 
approximately 45 per cent of American tonnage from commer- 
cial shipping and the increased demands In the United 
States for strategic commodities, the American ships re- 
maining in private operation, probably including ships of 
Philippine registry, will be required to curtail and In 
some instances completely eliminate Philippine sugar. 

Some of the lines which have been carrying siigar, 
such as Waterman, Lykes and Pioneer, have thus been prompted 
to discontinue calling their vessels at Philippine ports. 

As you well know, unless some relief can be 
secured, this will have a serious effect upon our finances 
and economy and it may precipitate a chaotic situation in 
the Philippines. 

I know you will do everything possible to protect 
our Interests and I assure you of our sincere appreciation 
for all the efforts you have exerted in our beh^^. 




Resident 



M 

Commissi- 
to tho u n 



ELI23tiJ3E_ 

_ he Philippines 
ed States 






EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4347 




Hy dear Mr. Secretajry: 

In connection with the movement of Philippine 
sugar to the United States, I desire to call your atten- 
tion to the following information which was cabled to me 
today from the Philippines: 

On June 6, 19iil, the Philippines had already 
shipped 567,328 long tons of sugar out of Its duty-free 
quota of 800,000 long tons. Another 35,iOO long tons 
was loaded and ready for clearance from Philippine ports — 
a total of 602,728 long tons definitely shipped or about 
to leave the Philippines. 

Of the remainder, 133,528 long tons was booked 
for shipment. American vessels have contracted for 
109,728 tonsj Japanese, 19,800j and Norwegian, ^^,000. 

This leaves only 63,7^-4 long tons still unbooked. 
However, ten vessels are due to arrive in the Philippines 
with 64,000 tons uncontracted for, sufficient space to take 
care of the balance of our 1941 Quota. 

Of our quota of 50,000 long tons of refined Sugar, 
22,000 tons had been shipped on J\me 6, and another 16,000 
tons was booked or loading. Thus, 38,000 long tons have 
left Philippine ports or are about to be cleared, leaving 
only 12,000 tons to be booked for shipment. 

It is believed In Manila that unless shipping in 
the Pacific is disrupted or more drastic requisitioning of 
vessels is aade, there will be no deficiency in our quota 
this year. . \ 



sines 





4348 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4349 

CONFIDENTIAL 

Nai^ Department, 11 June 19^1 
Repobt To The President 

Total Enlisted Strength, 14 June 239,387 

Fleet Reservists (enlisted) on active duty 8.596 

Other Reservists (enlisted) on , active duty 26,451 

Retired Men (enlisted) on active duty 766 

Total : -. 35, 813 

Aggregate Enlistments (last 24 hours) 234 

Aggregate Discharges (last 24 hours) 131 

Gain 303 

Admiral Towers stated today that Air Marshall Harris, R. A. F., has arrived in 
Washington for duty as direct representative of the Chief of Air Staff. The 
present Air Attache, Air Commodore G. C. Pirie, R. A. F., will serve under Air 
Marshall Harris as his Chief of Staff. Air Chief Marshall Bowhill until recently 
in command of aircraft of the Coastal Defense of the United Kingdom, is due to 
arrive in the United States this week to take direct charge of the problem of over- 
seas ferrying of aircraft built in the United States for Great Britain. It is be- 
lieved that these two details will be of great assistance to our part of aircraft 
aid to Great Britain. 

Admiral Kimmel today warned Naval families to be wary of anonymous tele- 
phone calls since they are used to obtain information about ship movements and to 
create suspicion and discord in families. 

[2.] Paymaster General of the Navy, to leave the 23rd of June for visit 
to the Fii-st and Third Naval Districts, making an address on June 26th at the 
new Navy Supply School at Harvard University where there are about 440 stu- 
dent Naval Reserve Officers of the Supply Corps. 

Bureau of Ships. The Carrier Ship Maintenance Desk has been consolidated 
with the Battleship Maintenance Desk. All minesweepers and all Bird Class 
minesweepers converted to other purposes, which had been under the Carrier 
Desk, were transferred to the Auxiliaries Ship Maintenance Desk. 

Captain Sheldon advises contractors are expected to complete work on the Beth- 
esda Medical Center in October. It is e.xpected the Center will be ready for oc- 
cupancy around January 1, 1942. Partial occupancy will begin as soon as possible. 

Hatcthorne, Nevada ammunition depot expected to be expanded to provide ad- 
ditional storage space. A contract involving $1,999,500.00 is under consideration 
as authorized in the 41-41 Building Program. 

UAW, (CIO), and A. F. of L., production workers of Electric Auto Lite Com- 
pany, Port Huron, Michigan, threaten to strike over a wage increase. This com- 
pany has a Navy contract [c] for electric cable and magnetic wire. 

Hipper and Scheer drydocked at Kiel on June 12 according to reliable reports. 

Admiral Leahy advised on June 13 that the CAPTAINE DAMIANI and AL- 
BERT (French tankers) were sent to CONSTANZA in order to test the possibility 
of supplying France (by sea) with some of the oil that the Rumanians agreed to 
deliver to France. This scheme may be given up since the CAPTAINE DAMIANI 
was torpedoed and badly damaged on June 14. 

Tirenty-one Japanese toarships and transports heading South from Wenchow 
at midnight. June 12 and 13. Effective midnight June 16 and 17 Japan closed 
waters in Swatow area to shipping according to reports. 

Dakar's inner harbor is protected by a submarine net according to reliable re- 
ports. One of the ships recently arrived at DAKAR from CASABLANCA brought 
ten light and ten medium tanks. The rains are now getting underway and most 
of the roads will be useless until October or November. 

Sun Shipbuilding Company employees, Chester, Pa., received twelve cents an 
hour pay increase and have accepted a pact banning strikes and lockouts for two 
years. 

[jf] Perkins advises German naval units, including some heavy types, have 
been concentrating in and around Copenhagen the last few days, perhaps because 
of desire to obtain better facilities and greater security or for possible naval 
demonstration in the Baltic. 

Germany pressing Russia to turn over warships to Japan according to uncon- 
firmed reports— 50 Soviet destroyers, 20 submarines, 14 minelayers, and 300 
military planes reported involved.. 



4350 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Inland Steel Comp<niy, East Chicago, 111., experiencing continuing series of 
minor slow-downs and department strikes. Possibility of major trouble indicated. 

Italian submarine believed to be shadowing convoy NE of Azores on June 14. 

London is full of conjections on the Russian-German situation. There was 
a tendency to believe Russia would give in to Hitler's demands, both economic 
and military, if they have not yielded already. 

French trucks and automative equipment in Algeria being taken over by 
the Germans will prove worthless when it arrives in Libya. 

Port of Lagos, Nigeria, was swept with magnetic gear on June 15 and it was 
expected to be oi)en on June 16th. 



confidential 

Report to the President 

Navy Department, 18 June JO.'/l 

Total Enlisted Strength, 16 June 239,722 

Fleet Reservists (enlisted) on active duty 8,596 

Other Reservists (enlisted) on active duty 26,635 

Retired men (enlisted) on active duty 766 

Total 35, 997 

Agregate Enlistments (last 24 hours) 204 

Aggregate Discharges (last 24 hours) 65 

Gain 139 

Admiral Moreell reports out of a total of 14,293 housing units completed by all 
Government housing agencies, 44 percent has been built by the Navy accord- 
ing to June 7 Weekly summary sheet of Defense Housing Coordinator. The first 
funds for the construction of low-cost defense housing became available to the 
Navy on August 12, 1940. The first contract was awarded October 2, 1940, the 
intervening 50 days being required to prepare plans and specifications as none 
were available. By February 7, 1941, all but 120 out of a total of 17,110 housing 
units for which funds were available were under contract. The remaining 120 
were placed under contract by Mi^y 4, 1941. The first houses were occupied 
March 1, 1941, and as of June 16th the total occupied is 6.325 in various localities. 
In addition to the 17,110 units previously mentioned, 548 more units are being 
built with savings made in the construction cost under the [2] $3500.00 

limit determined by Congress. 

Richard R. Adams, Ex. V-P, Grace Lines, advises confid«^ntialiy continually 
worried of sabotage by members of crews. Has asked Navy cooperation to 
prevent sabotage. This confirms concern by certain officers about possible trouble 
from seamen in merchant marine. 

Merchant Marine reserve officers may now be ordered to active duty without 
their consent. The Secretary of the Navy instructed in exercising this authority 
it is intended to confiict with the functions of the Merchant Marine to the 
minimum extent consistent with the urgent needs of the Navy. 

Naval censorship has been established for the Island of Guam through a notice 
sent to the Governor. 

A Nnval Air Station has been estab'ished at Kodiak, Alaska. 

Proposed bridge across the Columbia River from Port of Astoria Docks to 
Point Ellice, Washington is in most undesirable location since it would seriously 
jeopardize Navy patrol plane operations and approaches in bad weather when 
visibility is poor during routine operations from Naval Air Station at Tongue 
Point lour miles away. Army Engineer holding hearings at Portland during 
next 2 weeks. 

[5] General Vandergrift reports 2nd Defense Battalion USMC ready to 
move to Parris Island. Move will start on June 23rd. and will continue one 
train a day for approximately four days. 

Royal Norivegiun Navy is requesting cooperation, of British Admiralty and 
U. S. Navy in sending relief expedition of 2 small ships to the East Coast of 
Greenland the middle of July for party of 7 Norwegians and 22 Danes collecting 
meteorological data. Party needs supplies ; has radio station capable of reaching 
Copenhagen and probably would be in position to operate another in McKenzie 
Bay capable of supplying meteorological data to Iceland. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4351 

Suva {Fiji Island). — Hawaii radio link was discontinued on June 15th in order 
to prevent sliipping agents in Suva announcing arrivals and departures of allied 
shipping to West Coast — U. S. — Western Union has discontinued their arrival 
and departures services. 

Leaves have not been cancelled by general order in the Marine Corps as rumored. 
Some leaves may be curtailed from time to time due to special training operations 
it is reported. 

Acting Secretary of the Navy Forrestal announced on June 17 establishment of 
the U. S. Naval Reserve [.'/] Aviation Base at New Orleans, La., effective 
as of July 15, 1941 thereby completing the Navy's program for establishing 16 
Naval Reserve bases throughout the country. 

Temporary appointment of Naval Warrant Officers or enlisted, men as com- 
missioned officers required by the Naval expansion program is provided in the 
bill passed by the House and sent to the Senate yesterday. 

Japanese government has allotted seven million dollars for spreading propa- 
ganda in the U. S. during 1941, it is reliably reported. 

Axis submarine refueling in West African waters possible from mother ship 
designed as freighter, from Canary Islands, bases on uninhabited coasts, or from 
BISSAGOS ISLANDS. DAKAR not being used. WASSON wants permission 
from State Department to investigate. 

Japanese Naval Concentration reported still steaming South. 

Japanese homling of U. S. 8. TUTUILA either criminal carelessness or a delib- 
erate attempt to bomb the American Embassy and TUTUILA is indicated from 
military study. 

Axis seamen (460) reportedly leaving Tampico on June 19 for GUADALA- 
JARA. 

Schoenfield (Helsinki) advises German military circles reported to believe 
that Soviet army must be eliminated in 1941. Phillips reports Vatican believes 
Soviet will not compromise with Nazis. 



confidential 
Bulletin to the President 

Navy Department, 2 July 1941 

Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, chief of Bureau of Aeronautics stated : There are 
indications that the Germans have constructed, recently, a large number of air- 
planes designed specifically for sweeping for magnetic mines. Inasmuch as it 
is known that the British have sown a large number of such mines for protection 
against invasion, this program may have special significance. 

Admiral Molntire reports hospital dispensary plans for Bermuda. Argentia 
and Trinidad have been approved and sent to Yards and Docks and that Quantico 
Hospital went into Commission 1 July. 

Fort Schuyler taken over by Navy last week. 150 reserve college men arriving 
there 7 July for Navy Ordnance indoctrination. Fort Schuyler will now become 
receiving ship for all Ordnance Ensigns. From there they will be taken for 
instruction at gun factories. While there they will be shown all major indus- 
trial plants in New York Area. 

System of Battle Signal Lights being changed from horizontal to vertical. In- 
volves Emergency purchases of certain materials through the Bureau of Supplies 
and [2] Accounts for forwarding to Portsmouth. 

Traffic between Sweden and Germany now temporarily established through 
Denmark it is reported. 

Tioo Portuguese trawlers SANTA PRINCESA and SANTA JOANNA, a num- 
ber of two and three masted schooners all equipped with radio or radio telephone 
and 12 French Schooners of three or four masts but without radio are reported 
fishing on the BANK OF BANKS. Convoy data could be communicated by 
enemy vessels to ST. PIERRE for transmission to Germany but it is not known 
whether this is done, it is reported. Turks appear utterly amazed at Vichy request 
for right of transit to Syria and for war material it is reported from a reliable 
source. 

German Armistice Commission criticizes Weygand as impeding and sabotaging 
work of Commission in North Africa it is reliably reported. 

British and Chinese military staffs will meet in Burma during first week in 
July to conclude agreements on Mutual Co-operation in case Japanese attack 



4352 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

British. Plans are laid for use by British planes of Chinese airbases and British 
assistance to Chinese guerillas it is reported from a reliable source. 

Rufisians continue to suspect and mistrust the British and [S] are 
tolerating the British Military Mission instead of keeping it fully informed and 
making use of it according to impressions reported by Steinhardt. 

Admiral Nyes reports that consideration has been given to a request from the 
Radio Club of America asking if various Government Departments approve<l 
the use of this Organization's facilities and mailing lists to assist in securing 
technicians for the British Civilian Technical Corp. State, War and Navy saw no 
objection. 

French and Germans appear to be attaching great importance to LATAKIA, 
Syria it is reported. 

BORDEAUX and NOZIMA MARU each with a cargo of chrome ore (total 
9,600 tons) — from Philippines to United States, reported requisitioned by the 
Japanese Government. It is pointed out this is a method of blocking movement of 
the United States strategics without actual overt act. 

Japanese Extremists including the Army and Navy groups urging immediate 
action in support of Berlin it is reported. Grew reports Prince Konoye said 
Japan could reconcile U. S. S. R. neutrality treaty and Tripartite Pact, Germans 
expected to be successful and will control Western portion of U. S. S. R., but 
did not believe German influence would reach the East and that the So- [4] 
viet may not collapse. 

2 British Destroyers sunk 1 July, a third bardly damaged in Axis Air and 
Submarine Attack in East Mediterranean it is reported. 

13 German Ships in Orient ports reported loading wartime supplies prepara- 
tory to sailing halfway around the world in an effort to run the British blockade. 

Finland now has 13 divisions fully mobilized and three more are being mobilized 
it is reported. 

Portuguese Trawler believed to have been taken over by the Germans, found to 
have fuel oil concealed below salt when seiz'^d by Canadians at St. Johns. 

FORT de FRANCE departed from Martinique for Cayenne Ainder escort by 
Naval auxiliary cruiser BARFLEUR, carrying cargo of 1233 tons consisting mainly 
of flour of American origin. 

KOKVYU MARU a special service vessel under charter to the Japanese Navy, 
is reported to have sailed from the Naval Station at Kure to load oil and gaso- 
line at Los Angeles. 

Italian Vessels departed South American ports as follows : from Para towards 
open sea the MON BALDA 27 June, from Recipe 28 June "Twentyfour Maggio" 
for Hamburg it is reported. 



confidentiax, 

Bulletin to the President 

Navy Department, 3 July, 1941 

Japanese general opinion is that Nazis will gain quick victory ; if so Japan 
may occupy maritime provinces it is reported from a reliable source. American 
Officials at Mukden and Harbin have noted no indications that Japan is pre- 
paring to attack Russia. Reports from Third Naval District from a reliable 
informant close to Japanese Industrial interests states they expect Japan to 
move against Russia about 20 July. Japanese vessels of one Japanese steamship 
company have received orders to be west of Panama by 25 July regardless of 
passengers or cargo. The vessels of another Japanese company are ordered 
to discharge all cargoes on the Pacific coast for the present, it is reported from 
a reliable source. 5 Japanese vessels due New York first half of July. Axis 
shipping losses up to 17 June as follows: 102 freighters 469,000 tons taken or 
se'zed; 198 freighters 1,060,000 tons sunk by British or scuttled by own crews; 
345 ships 1,725,000 tons unidentified total 645 ships 3,254,000 tons— additional 47 
freighters 84,000 tons under Axis control or in their . service were sunk; 53 
vessels 320,000 tons seized in South American or [2] United States Har- 
bors it is reported from a reliable source in London. 

Ships reported sunk include: MALAYA II (British.) MAASDAM (Dutch) 
8812 tons. GRAYBURN (British) 6342 tons. AURIS (British Tanker) 8030 
tons. BARRHILL (British) 4972 tons. MONTFERLAND (British) 6790 tons. 
RABOUL (British) 5618 tons. TRAFALGAR (British) 5542 tons. 

Possible torpedo attack on Panama Canal between 1st and 15th of July is 
reported from a reliable source "in spite of the fact it sounds fantastic." 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4353 



Rumors are ciuTent in the Iberian peninsula which alleges that the United 
States is considering early action against the CANARIES the AZORES, CAPE 
VERDE and ICELAND. On the other hand the i:alians, Germans and French 
in Spain are very much afraid that the United States will inove against West 
Africa and Dakar while the Germans are busy with Russia : all West Africa is 
considered to be vulnerable by German High Command which considers that an 
American attack would prove disastrous to the future plans of the Reich accord- 
ing to reliable reports from Madrid. 

Russint} Ai7- Forces is reported from a reliable source as follows: 5552 first 
line planes in 346 squadrons divided as follows : 

[3.] 



Type 


Number of 
squadrons 


Number of 
aircraft 




Army 


Navy 


Army 


Navy 


Pursuit -. - 


100 

160 

20 

None 


16 

20 

None 

30 


2,000 

2,270 

320 

None 


292 


Liffht bombers* - - 


292 


Heavv bombers .. 


None 


Patrol 


378 








280 


66 


4,590 


962 



♦Includes reconnaissance and dive bombers. The above are first line planes — estimated reserves are 
30 percent. Personnel includes 10,000 oflBcer pilots, 10,000 nonflying oflBcers, 9,000 officer observers, 6,000 
cadets, 75,000 enlisted men from all ranks, 100,000 parachutists and airborne troops (reported.) Air force is 
poorly organized, trained, equipped and has poor morale. Planes copied from 1st class power's models 
3 or 4 years old. Relative Russian strength to German in ratio 2 : 3, Japan 5 :3 (in Far East). Twelve hun- 
dred aircraft in Far East cannot be withdrawn without yielding air superiority. Aircraft industry will not 
function in war time. Anticipate large numbers of Soviet planes to be shot down in combat or destroyed on 
ground. 

Oermans will reach Moscow in 5 days according to British informant it is 
reported from a reliable source. 

British AdmiraJty is printing ten thousand copies of a booklet on the identifi- 
cation of German, Japanese. Italian and French merchant ships. It is designed 
for use by [41 ships and planes and contains among other things scaled 
aerial silhouettes. Wide unrestricted distribution is intended and copies will be 
made available to U. S. N. 

General Weygand is reported to have earnestly requested that American radio 
broadcasts accord less prominence to his name because his relations with the 
Germans have been made far more difficult by this practice. 

Gun the r reports from a reliable source, a dummy city of Ploesti has been 
constructed a few miles from the real city. It is said to have been based on 
aerial photographs. It is possible that the fires which were reported to have 
been ignited, according to Russian communiques, were fires set in the dummy 
city to deceive the enemy. 

Barrage ballotis are proving effective in England and Germany for defense 
purposes. Army has about three thousand on order now. U. S. M. C. planning 
for their use in connection with outlying possessions it is reported. Balloon 
barrage defense against aircraft in Moscow indicated abandoned it is reported 
from a reliable source in Moscow. No coordinated planning of air raid pro- 
tection in Moscow. 

Nazi troops withdraw during the past week 15th, 52nd and 86th German 
divisions from France and official estimates place not over 35 divisions now in 
Holland, Belgium and France it is reported from a reliable source. 



confidentiai, 
Bulletin to the Pbesident 



Nary Department, 7 July, 1941 

Expansion of Axis commercial air activities in Natal region has seemingly 
opened a relatively safe steamship traffic between Europe and South America and 
possible domination of an invasion route from Africa to Brazil, inimical to 
United States interests. Italian and German commercial planes apparently 



4354 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

carry out air reconnaissance against British siiips and afford protection for 
sailings of own vessels it is reported from a reliable source. 

Shortaffcs are reported i)y the Director of the Navy Budget and Reports as 
follows: STEEL — The shortage of mild and alloy steel in the defense effort is 
acute and is becoming more so every day. All bureaus using steel report delays. 
These delays are occurring regardless of preference ratings and notwithstanding 
the fact that steel has l>een placed on the critical list; ALUMINUM and 
MAGNESIUM — Both Aluminum and Magnesium are now under mandatory 
priority. Even so and with numerous substitutions delays caused by lack of 
these materials are becoming worse each day. As an example, the .\dapti 
Company [2] a subcontractor for Dravo cannot get a promise of delivery 
from the Aluminum Company even though this item carried a priority of A-l-A 
it is reported; MACHINE TOOLS — All Bureaus report delays due to lack of 
machine tools. Estimated delays in vital machine tools vary from a few months 
to one year. Of the 5,723 machine tools of various descriptions due during the 
period January 1, 1941 to May 31, 1941, 3,414 or about 60% are overdue ; TIN— 
is causing delay in the delivery of tinned provisions ordered by the bureau of 
Supplies and Accounts; OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS— Shortage of Optical instru- 
ments in cameras, binoculars, tire control instruments, etc. continue due to lack 
of optical glass and personnel qualified to produce lenses; TNSTKUMENTS — 
At present the shortage in this category is being felt chiefly by the aircraft in- 
dustry and for certain anti-aircraft instruments. The shortage in this field 
will not be felt until the ships now being laid down approach completion ; 
FACILITIES — Many projects under the cognizince of Yards and Docks have 
no priority ratings, CLOSE-RANGE ANTI-AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT— the ob- 
taining of these guns, mounts, ammunition and fire control equipment remains 
critical. Progress is being made but the obtaining of machine tools, cartridge 
case brass, steel and powder remains very critical; OTHER [3] MATE- 

RIALS — Forged armor for Battleships is now running 8 to 15 months behind 
schedule. 

Japanese developments reported include: abrogation of Russian Neutrality 
Pact in the near future is predicted to be followed simultaneously or soon after- 
wards by an attack on Siberia ; consideration of an extension of the limits of 
Japan's territorial waters which would cut off Vladivostok from normal trade 
and hamper any shipments of United States materials to Russia is reported ; 
Japanese ships continue to expedite loading, unloading and departure direct to 
Japan from the East Coast ports of North and South America ; concern is re- 
ported over attempts made by the Japanese to extend their influence among 
various Moslem peoples in regions as distant as Iraq; Russians evacuating 
women and children from Japanese territory ; 2 air craft carriers at 
YOKOSUKA ; and the next Japanese move is to be complete occupation of 
French Indo-China to begin within one week according to German sources in 
Tokvo. 

B'smarck Svrvivors verifv the British smpicion that the vessel displaced over 
45.000 tons it is reported from a reliable source. Secret report on Bismarck 
sinking by Navy expert to be available by end of week. 

[4] Mail for United S'"ates ships now routed and sorted in New York and 
San Francisco. A plan is being considered to sort official mail in Navy Post 
Office for trans-shipment bv pouch thereby reducing the number of people know- 
ing where ships are located in the interest of security. 

Soviet Commissariats are busy moving their offices, presumably towax'd the 
Ea.st, Steinhardt reports. 

Nazis have 200 rigs ready to operate in Soviet oil fields a reliable source 
reports. 

Reliffiovs fervor among the mas.«*^s of T>nssi,a i« rf-awakeninsr on a large scale 
and the Army has been permeated by this sentiment is the interesting report 
of the Father G'^neral of the Society of Jesus who suggests re.iecting atheistic 
Communism in Russia and emphasizing the religious and nationalistic character 
of the defenses of Russia to have emerge something resembling the old "Holy 
Russia", Phillips reports. 

Leahy reports Mechin's Mission to Turkey to obtain transit of troops and w^ar 
material "a complete failure." 

Reinforcements for Dakar are reported from 3 French ships arriving from 
Morocco carrving several hundred native troops (to be demobilized), military 
trucks and 690 tons of rubber. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4355 

confidentiai- 

Bulletin to the President 
Navy Departmeni, 8 July, 19^1 

Leahy reports Henry (French Ambassador to Japan) indicates the Japanese 
Imperial Council probably reached a decision in favor of action against U.S.S.R. 
in the basis of the following motives (1) Obvious military reasons (2) The 
hopes of producing a collusion between Japan and United States and (3) Nazis 
have plans of their own for Dutch East Indies. 

Partial mobilization of all forces has been ordered in Japan it is reported 
reliably. 

Chiang Kai-shek predicted (5 July) that Japan would abrogate the Neutrality 
Pact with Russia and would attack Siberia it is reported from a reliable source. 

Assistant Secretary Bard is to inspect shore Naval activities at Boston and 
Newport and will open Naval Air station at Quonset Point on Saturday. Ad- 
mirals Towers, Hepburn and Mnreell will join him at Quonset Point. 

Appearance of United States Blue Jackets in United Kingdom causes many 
questions of number of Naval observers in London. Winant asks if there is 
any objection to releasing these figures. 

Bureau of Ordnance expe- f> h 'oiiverv of the first [21 American 
made 20 ram Anti Aircraft (AERLIKON) gun this week from the British Pro- 
duction Line at Providence, Rhode Island ; future production from this plant will 
be furnished the British and USN on percentage basis. This gun will be suc- 
cessor to the 50 calibre gun for anti air craft and probably in time will be used 
on Merchant ships as well as on battle ships. Ordinance has its own exclusive 
production of this gun from other sources including the Hudson Motor Car 
Company. 

Wholesale price index for all commodities for week ending 28 June 1941 : 87.7. 

For the purpose of cooperating in every way possible wih the spirit of the 
President's executive order 8802. Assistant Secretary Bard reports the forma- 
tion of a committee to investigate the (x e't fo whi -h thet enlisted personnel 
of the Navy and Marine Cori)s is representative of all American citizens. In 
case there should be evidence of discrimination because of race, creed, color 
or national origin, the committee is to suggost corrective measures. 

Oerman inMruotions apparently have been given to advise Berlin of all in- 
formation concerning shipping and cargo from the United States to the Red Sea. 

If United States enters the war all northern S<;uth American countries will 
follow suit according to opinion of important German Secret Agent "Greif" in 
South America. 

Marked departure in the past 36 hours from usual routine by Japanese Mer- 
chant Marine units in communications practice has been reported. 

French Government is negotiating with the Government of Brazil for purchase 
of 60,000 bales of Sao Paulo cotton it is reported. 

Cape Verde Islands now have 1,600 of troops on the Island it is reliably re- 
ported. 

Communistic strike activities in the United States being held in almost abso- 
lute abatement it is reliably reported. 

"/f is hoped" a new spirit will be injected into the personnel and that lack of 
direction, initiative, and cooi-dlnation will be replaced by accelerated action in 
the war effort in the Middle East with the appointments of Generals Haining 
and Auchinleck, it is reported. 

In YOKOHAMA BAY ships of the following classes are reported : Battleships: 
2 HYUGA, 1 FUSO; Cruisers: 3 KAKO, 1 CATORI, 1 JINTSU ; Destroyers: 8; 
Suhmarines: K VIGUN TYPE; Gunboats: 1 SAGA; Tenders: 3; Tankers: 2 
SHIRIYA and SARUTO. 

Miniature Mass X-Ray is being used by Navy Medical Corps [4] to 
detect early tuberculosis among recruits. This is a Navy development which 
already has demonstrated its value. It is an inexpensive method. 

Heavy armour niercing bombs again dropped on berths of German warships 
SCHARNHORST. GNEISENAU and PRINZ EUGEN at Brest, where bomb 
dropped from altitude of 50 feet also hit stem of 10,000 ton liner. 43 Welling- 
tons in air attack on Brest dropped 128,000 pounds of bombs. One stick pos- 
sibly straddled the SCHARNHORST it is reported. 

8. 8. ANTIN0U8 is the first American ship that has arrived at Suez, it is 
reported. 



4356 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

LARAMIE expects to arrive BAHIA, Brazil 22 July for duty, under Comtask 
force 3. 

Undertvater obstacles, probably antisubmarine nets have been placed in areas 
in Hiroshima Bay off Kure the Japanese have notified mariners. 

Ccminuinding General of Fort Richardson, Alaska, has sent a fine letter of 
commendation to Com Thirteen regarding the splendid cooperative spirit of the 
Army, Navy and Marine forces and their civilian assistants in Alaska. 

Italian Chin Cruiser (8 inch) thought to be the GORIZIA was sunk on 29 June 
by a submarine of the Mediterranean fleet. 



confidential 
Bulletin 

]6 July, 1941 

Facilities of More than 20 large corporations are not novp being used in Defense 
Production Mr. Batt has reported. Investigation in Navy shows there is con- 
siderable plant capacity not now being used and more is becoming available as 
priorities begin to take hold. The difficulty today is to find work tv these 
Companies to do. There is a marked increase in the desire to take part in 
Defense Production, probably resulting from necessity because of scarcity of 
material, etc. Navy is concentrating on this problem and is cooperating fully 
with 0PM, particularly with the Defense Contract Sei-vice and the Federal 
Reserve Board activities in both the country-wide and local efforts to utilize all 
productive capacity as fully and as quickly as possible. A Navy order of 14 July 
has been distributed to further the expedition and prosecution of work-subcon- 
tracting. Naval Liaison Ofl3cers will appraise the Defense Contract Service of 
(1) "so called bottlenecks" (2) necessities for "speed ups" of production (3) 
necessity for more sub-contracting (4) inefficient management or opera- \2] 
tion. (5) unsuccessful attempts to contact sub-contractors and (6) expansion 
needs. Every effort will be made to remedy these situations locally and reports 
will be sent to the Navy Department on each case. Mr. Mehornays Defense 
Contract Service may he being by-passed in OPM it is reported. 

Status of Section Bases is that all but two of the thirty are under construc- 
tion ; 17 are in use although the construction work has not been completed. The 
two bases not started are being held up pending the acquisition of the necessary 
land, and it is anticipated that they will be started in the near future. It is 
tentatively proposed to construct 16 additional Bases and add to the facilities 
of at least 5 of the existing Bases, it is reported. 

Entrance to Manila Bay and. the nearby Subic Bay area are being mined for 
"General defense purposes." The Navy Hydrographic Office reports that the 
areas "will be dangerous after daylight 17 July." The Hydrographic Office also 
reports a restricted Pilot Chart of the Northern North Atlantic Ocean embracing 
the waters surrounding Greenland and Iceland has been evolved and has ap- 
peared regularly since June 1941. 

The Sues Canal is closed to through traffic as a consequence [3] of 
recent air bombings it is reported from a reliable source. Increased air activity 
over Malta is reported. 

Invasion of England temporarily abandoned by Germans because of slowness 
of Russian campaign, effectiveness of RAF raids on Nazi war industry and severe 
losses in Russian War it is reported from a reliable source in Berlin. 

"Plans have been made and are being carried out for the evacuation of many 
Commissariats and institutions from Moscow" Steinhardt reports as of 13 ^uly 
5 P. M. This, in spite of official statement to the contrary reported 13 July. 
Kazan (Soviet Russia) might be seat of Government or at least for the Com- 
missariat for Foreign Affairs. 

Chinese G-2 is uncertain whether Japan will move North or South but believes 
the appointment of Okamura to connnand in North China and Itagaki in Korea 
is significant since they are Manchurian and Russian experts. A Chinese mem- 
ber of North China puppet regime states Japan will attack Siberia when Moscow 
falls it is reported. 

Complete disruption of Portugal banking and commercial system has resulted 
from sudden blocking of port accounts causing hardship, financial loss and cre- 
ation of ill will toward the U. S. at a most critical time it is reported. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4357 

Motris reporfs continued attention of German press to the [4] occupa- 
tion of Iceland may be to prepare the German Public for a possible "call" for 
help from Portugal in order to protect some of her outlying possessions from 
President Roosevelt's "aggression." 

Portuguese vessel CARVALHO ARAUJO (1,210 tons full load) arrived 13 July 
noon from Terceira where it is reported to have discharged a special cargo of 
military supplies and about 1,000 troops it is reported from Ponta Delgada 
(Azores on Sao M-iguel Island.) 

JOAO BELO (Portuguese SS 6,365 tons) carrying large quantities "of war 
materials" arrived from Lisbon on 13 July. One full infantry (1,200 men) 
battalion (fully equipped) was landed. The JOAO BELO was expected to 
depart for Fayal, Azores — chief town of Horta) ando Terceira (Azores) 15 July 
with about 1,000 troops for these islands it is reported from a reliable source. 

Spihikler systems are not relied on in London against incendiary bombs. 

The Secretary of the Navy has ordered that enlisted men of Naval Reserve on 
active duty be not discharged or reenlisted or their enlistements extended. This 
order is the result of a decision of the Comptroller General of the United States 
dated 9 July, 1941. 

confidentiai, 
Bulletin 

22 July, IHl 

Rumors, at variance with one another, in Japan makes reporting developments 
difficult, Greic reports. Many of these rumors have German origin. He believes 
"efforts by Japan to secure a privileged position in Indo-China should be taken 
with gravity ;" however, he thinks "the chief preoccupation for Japan' remains 
China." 

Japan will take military and economic control of Indo-China in the near future 
is the opinion of important Thai Government officials it is reported by a reliable 
source. 

Japanese Naval Units reported maneuvering in VAN DIEMEN Strait (Japan) 
south of KYUSHU ( Southermost of main islands of Japan ) on 16 July included : 
3 carriers, 7 battleships and between 52 and 57 destroyers and submarines it is 
reported from a reliable source. 

No decision has as yet been reached in connection with the Department's re- 
quest to send two American Naval Observers to Vladivostock and American Mili- 
tary Attaches are not to be granted permission to visit the Russian-German front 
it is reported from a reliable source. 

10 Nazis divisions are at present concentrated on the [2] Spanish border 
and the Hendaye-Irun Bridge has been reinforced to carry heavy traffic it is re- 
ported from a reliable source. Informant "apprehends" these developments 
presage a Nazis attempt to occupy the coasts of Portugal and Spain in order to 
obtain submarine and air bases lying beyond the range of the British bombers and 
simultaneously neutralize Gibralter as a naval base and close the straights. 

Sea and air landing equipment is i)eing assembled by the Nazis at Constanza 
(Rumania) and in the Danube Delta in preparation for a possible invasion of the 
southern U. S. S. R. it is reported. 

A Peruvian land and sea atack on 27 July is indicate<l by the latest alleged 
intercept, the sea attack to be at SALINAS and southward, with bombardment of 
SALINAS and GUAYQUIL (Ecuador) it is reported. 

Intercepted messages from German Secret Agents in Mexico and South America 
show the following has been reported to Berlin: (1) Plans of the Curtiss-Wright 
Model 22 Falcon All-Metal Bomber have been copied. (2) there is a Ferro Vana- 
dium shortage in connection with construction of submarines at Manitowoc, Wise. 
(3) German Agent OTIC has been offered a new bomb sight by an Argentine 
Officer. (4) 9 [S] Boeings have been flown, presumably to England with 
a British American crew, and that 20 more will follow in coming weeks. 

Mr. Batt has called attention to the difficulty involved in securing reliable 
statistical estimates on the future requirements of the War and Navy Depart- 
ments of aluminum and magnesium. Army, Navy and 0PM officials are consult- 
ing on the methods of estimating these requirements. This is most difficult to do 
with any degree of accuracy because of changing requirements and the decentrali- 
zation of purchasing. Apparently 0PM wants this information by the 20th of 



4358 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

each month by the pound for the various uses so as to allocate certain amounts 
to viirious groups. It is felt here by some, this cannot be (Ume and that it is not 
necessary because it would set up another priority system on top of the present one 
which will work if allowed to adjust needs either by increased production, real- 
location, substitutes, elimination or waitinj;. 

O. P. M. is reported to believe Army is giving better information than Navy; 
however a representative of Bethlehem Steel Company has advised Navy that this 
Company can get all the informati(m it wants from Navy but can get [4] 
nothing from the Army. This applied especially to heavy forgings 8" howitzers 
and 155 mm guns. This probaldy is due to the fact that Navy is oiJerating many 
things on a project basis while Army is on a tiscal year basis. 

Atyproximately ~>,000 man days are estimated to have been lost during the past 
week in strikes affecting Naval Defense contracts, making a total for this month 
of July to date of approximately 26,500 man days. Two million man days are 
estimated to have been lost in plants at which Naval Defense contracts have been 
involved, of which 90% have been lost since 1 January, 1941. Last week, in strike 
cases involving Naval Defense contracts 7 were settled, 21 are still open and 7 
strikes are pending in which information relative to Naval Defense contracts 
is not available. The slowdown technique is being used in the strikes at the 
Federal Mogul Corporation, Detroit, Michigan, and the Mitchell Metal Products 
Company Cleveland, it is reported. 

All neic Bases have been surveyed except Gi*eat Exuma (Bahama Islands) 
which survey will be completed in July. Arrangements will be made to have 
some survey made in Greenland. New charts will be made up as the information 
becomes available to the Hydrographic Office. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4359 





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a United StBt««i 


'a^^^^H 




1 


iuft 

."•8*;? ,7. 

;4tiCl as:: 

^ oitiEens willing Uiafc 
•*ar ' "■ '• ing thft - 

noU':, 'int plight- upoj- h®r»<)JLi , »" 
the>i- ^e ounsid"('r>li.'e d^batft (how 

•-h«t the { o/ Europ* 
^r«a<f!rit pi Prance »n 






1 


chat ■- - rai v*9«p^BJ 
was ,:«Mi ftft -jKO-powarjJI 
sigr.' ''-.a 


ii 




n 


■we Cfaanai. t^io^.^fci.; 


■ ■ '' ■- . fl 




B 


roe cure. 


ii 




t. 


huiCiSia geii3tit>.oii. Hac«i; 


■ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4361 




HA'dM?,T>*>»«f»in- « SW««T«ON 



that the reason we are falling to talce action In the Orient la 
not so much because It would alow down our all out n^lp to Britain 
as because Oroat Britain la looking keyond the war and does not 
oare tc have us establish a ooaimerclal and trading foot.; old in the 
Far East. 

Superimposed on all this Is the much graver real- 
ity of the moment, namely, that Japan will, if Russia begins tc 
collapse, drive into her rear. Within months, not years, Japan 
and Germany together inay have air bases scattered along north- 
eastern Siberia, perhaps within a two mile puddle ^ump of Alaska. 
Moreover, such a collapse will doubly assure Japan's proposed 
drive on the East Indies and strengthen her ability to conquer 
China . 

I need not tell you of your own ability to crys- 
tallize public sentiment; in fact sentiment will crystallize it- 
self if it Is correctly Informed. Should we miss the opportunity 
now of crystallizing and determining the Oriental picture we may 
later on find ourselves to be unable to give support to Great 
Britain at all because of joint Japanese-German operations in 
eastern Siberia, Alaska, and the Indies > - it may be our Munich. 

I do sincerely hope, Mr. President, that in ycpr 
conferences of the next few days while revamping the internation- 
al approach, you may give careful consideration to this rising 
national sentiment which, in spite of little being said of It and 
in spite of it being "pooh-poohed" by such hokum artists as Hugh 
Johnson, has caused a majority of our people to feel we hove a 
laore acute menace facing us in the Orient than we have facing us 
in Europe at this moment, serious though the latter is admitted 
to be. Japan alone is probably afraid to fight; Japan with the 
German Luftwaffe would be something else again. 



With personal regards, I remain 




Sincerely yours, 
Raymond Halght 




79716 O — 46— pt. 20- 



-26 



4362 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4363 




Ltaiu esMJ tha 'tfel ' 



9t«ite»s thtit on - 



»j!g^3Kwi®sw aiiips will hs resscnresl ffwB tli* run 1s©t!W««« 
1^» IMli.|^is?(»» «»d th» «*«t 13Blt«d S-fcates coasts. 

"Wm xwj to 1ib« «&8t ooEkStoir eo«tb Jufisrica Kill be 
e<a3tii^»diiaNm# August bat it Kill b« ijnqposnitle &ft@s* 
aftptesttdr lit* Bov«7er» ai»« ihips idXl aenrvi the m&% m'&»% 
ei Sovm AaMlcii -viA Gepe Boir»* (tbis liiy eigniiy tb«ir «ati~' 

eiffttl^ta o^ Ixt&bilitj to tt«« th« ^»3K»ft CKaal.) 

tbftly f{M|»ping aill »3Ktd.»u» to th« -flpsst coast adT 

& isSl eopgr of this *sv;igle" will %« 8«mt ytm as «oon 

ji» it c«i9 Ins pri|mr<sd« 






Chief 



4364 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Secretary, Oeneral Staff 



July 



1941 



. a::SE!UL DC'JOUS MAC ART I.-? 
Manila, v.l. 



effective this date there is hereby constituted a cosmand 
dosicnated as the United States fcnuy forces in the Par rJist STC" 
This oonmand irill include tne hSllppine Department coaaa forces of the Ooremii^nt 
of the Comitonwealth of the j-hilippines called and ordered into the 
service of the Army forces of the 0. S. for the period of the existing 
eaergency C0132A and nuoh othar forces as nay be aasited to it r;TOP 
Headquarter United States Army forces in the Far a*st will be established 
in lianila Philippine Islar.-'- "'"'" Toy are hereby designated as the 
Oocananding Seneral United rny forces in the ?ar I-^ast STOP 



you ar« also designated as .r: t-aeral Officer Unit^^ 
referred to in a liilitary »^rder calling into the so- 

focos of the Unit.id -^tat«f *-.- -.^nizoiJ m.-"'"--- ' 

of the CoFjr.onwealth of the :.e;; date 
calling you to active duty ' . ■^;^,iv►■ 

S?'.■T report cissuKption of 



Amy 
the arjued 
the covemaent 

Orders 
1941 



See(^e^~t 



liA.'^HAU, 5^7 




■u 



<kA- 



^ V*-v. 



/ i 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4365 




.^^ 



fb* lltits lease. ^ ' 

Mr <te» ^* 7ap«sid«Btt 

X a» )Mr««Lth txvBOBlttias * r«viMd dMft of a pvopoMd 
aUltMoT a«A«r forauted foor igr eouiAmwtioa ^ the A«Bl«tsat . 
&t2>««t«r of the Busvoi of %i» Bodget this tete. This lardsr is te 
mbstitudtiMi faar ths jiMpesad XssevtiTs caNter satitXsd "Oslliag 
iAt« ths Serrlfts of i&s l«M»d Tovom of ths Qkitsd StatM ths Or- 
{gmixaA auXitax^ JWoss of ths QoxnouMUt of. ths OoHUBinalth of 
t^ BklliSl^auts* tswuHittsi to 7ie« «ith my tgirsmnl Igr Isttsr of 

ths pgBa > ossd szOsr, itfUsh has hsoa zwvlssd in this &s~ 
lisxtgssat tut to fofm OBSy* has iv iqggoovBl as to ftoi sbA Iscslttr* 

5siq;w<itf«ai7, , 







4366 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



V 




WAR DEPARTMENT 

WASHINOTDN 

SECRET 

The Prssldsnt, -^^ 

The fihlt* Hou««. 

Dear Mr. Prasldentt 

Do* to the sittiatlea in the Far Eaat, all praetleal atepa 
ahould be taken to icoz>ea8e the defenalre streng^ of tlie FhilippliM 
lalaxula. To that end, you recently approved the subulsalon of leg- 
islation to Congress authorising the appropriati<m of approxloateljr 
$52,000,000 from sugar excise tax and currencj deTaluation ftinds for 
g«ieral defsensive purposes reeaciQeiided by the Amy, the Ncvjr, and the 
Gotrenuunt of the Co a e u mwealth of the niiliiq>ines. 

One of the more urgent measures recoanended to augtaent the 
present inadequate defenses of the Riilij^ine Islands is the e»lliBS 
into active sei^ce of the military forces of the CoonnMrealth of tte 
Philippines. The 75,000 of.ficers and men involved can be aobilised 
and trained over a period of about «ae year at an estimated cost of 
$32,000,000. Pending the anaetraent of enabling legislation and the 
i^ppropriation of moneys in accordance therewith, no funds in the haadm 
of the War Departoent are available for initiating the mobilisation 
and training of the Philippine Army. In view of the urgency^ it^ia 
suggested that approxiiaately #10,000,000 be allotted firom the Presi- 
dent's Emergency ?und for this purpose, with the understanding that 
repaynent of such asnunt will be Bade from any appropriations reoelT- 
ed from sugar excise ttaC and currency devaluation funds. 

Draft of an .'£bcecutl>eN Order calling into the service of tbs 
arsaed forces of the Itoited States the organised military forces of the 
Commonwealth of the Philippines is attached. This draft, now being 
processed through the Bureau of the Budget, differs froa one previott*- 
ly approved by you in that provision is made for flexibility ia its 
administration. 

I Strongly reoanmend that this Executive Order be now ptra- 
mulgated, and that you authorise the allocation of $10,000,000 from 
the Emergency Fund for the purpose of initiating the siobilisatiatt 
and training of the Philippine Amy. 

Respectfully yours. 



' «*^»^ A ,/^;«-*.*-^<:r»''%_ 



Secretary of War. 



Inclosure 



( 0' 



Draft of Executive; Order. 



SECRET 



EXHIBITS OF JOIXT COMMITTEE 



4367 



Vasiiingtioa, S. e. 



4 



Jfaly 



1941 



ymmmm tm ism mi^Tximis 



^r' 



tb«r« it trftiMslttcd h«r»«itb a proposal l«tt«r, pTtpixr^ 
tat jaar •igMturt , and •fi4r«M«dl to the Ssof etarr of tbo \ 

'irMHttrjr, allooatlBg titi!> earn of IKtO|OOC>,0(% fros tii« ^Jisatgemsr 
fnad for tiic {Voaldant," to ^ «3i>aaded t>2r tb* Saerotery of 
Var, in bia diaoratloo, for Iha oalllag iats aetiva e«me« of 
tba Amsd Yoroea cf tba Cttltad atataa, tba oxgaoSzed ailltary 
foreaa of tha OoversuMBt of tb« C^aatauMtmlila. of iiw HtilippiQea 
asd for tfae amarKaet aoblllzatlon and tT«tiil% of auctt fercea, 

Tharequaat for tJila ellooattoE by the S«arat«»y of Iter 
la eostalned Is bl« l«tt«r tc jrso dated Saly £5, I9ti., laeoaataad- 
iag tba iaauajsea \ij 70«t of a i4llta3:>? Ordar oallUtg Into the 
aarrlea of tha Axtsad 7oroas of ths Unltad dtataa the ojrgaaisad 
allitary £breaa of tba Oov«aRUBeat of tli« CamixmoaXtb of tba 
Pblllppiaaa. 

Helslnreaflwct of tba |10,0C0,Q0Q iiropoaed to ba aUottad 
fjcoa tba "Snargaaoy fund for tba ^3f»«ld«nt" la to be r«i?tt««t»d 
cf Qcaieem»» by ^M Hiur Oajmrtnafit in aoima«tioa witb lagia- 
latloa to ba awbelttad Tms^asmssAim «b« approiertatlott of 
««rt«lB sugar aiteia* tax md eurpaoBy dafaluwtlon fuisds. 

/S/ Jobfl B. Blaadford, Jr. 

Assistant Otraetor. 



SaoioaBre, 



4368 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Office of the Attorney General, 

Washington, D. C, July 21. 1941. 

through division of the federal register 
The President, 

The White House. 
My De^b Mr. President: I am herewith transmitting a proposed Executive 
order entitled "Calling into the Service of the Armed Forces of the United States 
the Organized Military Forces of the Government of the Otnimonwealth of the 
Philippines." 

The proposed order, presented by the Acting Secretary of War and forwarded 
for my consideration by the Assistant Director of the Bureau of the Budget this 
date, has my approval as to form and legality. 

Your attention is invited to the fact that this order is presented by the Acting 

Secretary of War as a substitute for a proposed order, bearing the same title, 

transmitted to you by the Attorney General under date of November 25, 1940, 

which you have held pending developments making issuance thereof advisable. 

Respectfully, 

Francis Biddle, 
Acting Attorney Oenerah 
[Stamped :] Received. Jul 25 10 26 AM '41, Bureau of the Budget. 



July 25, 1941. 

The Honorable, The Attorney General. 

My Dear Mb. Attorney General : This has reference to my letter of July 21, 
1941, transmitting draft of a proposed Executive Order entitled, "Calling into 
the Service of the Armed Forces of the United States the- Organized Military 
Forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines". 

Pursuant to suggestion of the President that the form thereof be a Military 
Order rather than an Executive Order, the War Department has prepared and 
there is transmitted herewith a revised draft, similar in substance and entitled 
"Military Order". 

The revised form of the Order has my approval. 

It has been requested that action upon the proposed order be expedited. 
Very truly yours. 



Assistant Director. 
Enclosures. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4369 



SOtSCVriVS ORDER 






I 



i 



CAUJHG mm) TS& SSHVICE (£r 1£1 ABftCED IY3SCES OF fHE 
tKITID STATES THE (HK3y«I22D MHimRX SOHCIS OF fHE 

GOTBSHitBar? OF m& oaaiamm/m of mg mojFPmm 



Ikk&mT and liy rLrta* of tliis autlioritjr in me rssted Isj tlt« 
CasfitittztioB of tl>« Iblted States, bjr seotiob 2(a) (12) of tlie 
PbiXipplae lBd«p«nd«aiO« Aot of mtnsk 24, 1934 lA$ Stat. 457}, 
eftd bjr tt» oonrraspondlsg prorialae of tba Ordinaaoe «gn?«ad^ to 



^ ^ $!• CflCBtitution of tlifi ConmoQwaalth of the Fbllippiaas, Z h«r«- 

tgr e«ll aad ordor into tlie aarrlce of the aiaad forces of tlia 
i IMlted States for tlw period of the exlstlag ta»jfs&acf, aM plaoe 

«ider tite eamKoA of a Oeueral Officer, Xhiited States Arvf, to be 
&»al0a«ted \ry Hbt Seoretary of War from tixte to tiaa, all of the 



-^ .r>^ 



"V M (a^wOsed Bllit«T7 foz>oes of tbe Gorezsuwnt of tlis CenaooKealtlt o£ 



A 



tlie PMliinpiaas: Frot^ded. tbat all lurval oca^onaats thereof slull 
he plaeed xmi^T tlM " fif«»"* of t&e ffwii,imdant of the Sizteeath 
nrnml Slctrlet, Dblted States V&rsf, 

this cfTdar lOutH tala» eft<f«t with relation to all mlts m& 
persQoasl <a «» organised Bili^oy faarees oaf the QoTemaeBt oT 
tike Oow«K*ealth of the Philiw?ia««, trm sad after the dates «ad 
htmrs, respeotlTely. indicated ia otrders to he isaiaed frosa tl»e 
to *i»e tsr the Oeaexal Officer, OMted State* Aray, deslgaated toy 
tile Seeretcry of War. 




s^u^A». 



*m&w3sa, BOOKS. 



%■ 



4370 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

War Department, 
WaJthinflton. July 18, 1941- 
Honorable Harold D. Smith, 

Director, Bureau of the Budget, 

Washingtoti, D. C. 
Dear Mr. Smith : Request that the inclosed draft of a proposed Executive 
Order to call into service all military forces organized by the Philippine Govern- 
ment, authorized by Secti<»n 2 (a) (12) Philippine Independence Act of March 
24, 1934, be processed in accordance with the procedure prescribed in paragraph 
2, Executive Order No. 7298. If approved, it is requested further that this draft 
be substituted for a similar proiwsed Executive Order which, as stated in your 
letter dated December 11, 1940, to the Secretary of War, was approved by the 
President as to form and is now being retained at the White House for signature 
if and when issuance shall be found advisable. 

The revision requested does not change basically the draft of the Executive 
Order previously approved. The purpose of the revision is to provide for latitude 
in calling units and persoimel into service and to vest command authority in a 
general officer to be designated by the Secretary of War, rather than in the 
Commanding General, Philippine Department, as stipulated in the original draft. 
It is requested that the processing of this revised draft be expedited so that 
prompt action can be initiated in the event of an emergency situation arising in 
the near future. 

Sincerely yours, 

Robeet p. Patterson, 
Acting Secretary of War. 



Secret 

Dec. 11, 1940. 
The Honorable, The Secretary of War. i^ 

My Dear Mr. Secretary: This has reference to letter of October 31, 1940 
signed jointly by yourself and the Secretary of the Navy, transmitting memo- 
randum dated September 27, 1940, (file J. B. No. 305 (Serial 655) secret) ad- 
dressed to the Joint Board by the Joint Planning Committee, and drafts 
of a proposed Executive Order and a proposed Executive Proclamation relat- 
ing to the Philippine Islands. 

The proposed Executive Order and proposed Executive Proclamation, as re- 
vised by this office and by the Attorney General, have been submitted to the 
President and have received his approval as to the form thereof. The unsigned 
originals are being retained at the White House for later signature if and 
when their issuance shall be found advisable. Meanwhile, there are enclosed 
herewith five copies of this form of the order and of the Proclamation for 
your information and for distribution confidentially to the Secretary of the 
Navy, the Secretary of the Interior (for transmittal to the High Commissioner 
of the Philippine Islands), and the Commanding General, Philippine Depart- 
ment. 

By direction of the President. 
Very truly yours, 

(Signed) Harold D. Smith, 

Director. 

EJhelosures. 



JtiL 21 1941. 

My Dear Mr. Attorney General : Reference is made to my letter of No- 
vember 16. 1040 transmitting drafts of a proposed Executive Order and of a 
proposed Executive Proclamation relating to the Philippine Islands, which 
were presente<l by .ioint letter of the Secretaries of War and Navy, for the 
puriwse of securing informal approval of the President as to the form thereof, 
and for the retention of the unsigned originals at the White House where 
they would be available for immediate issuance if necessary. 

The proposed Executive Order transmitted iinder that date, which was 
entitled "Calling Into the Service of the Armed Forces of the United States 
the Organized Military Forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4371 

the Philippines", provided, among other things, that Philippine military forces 
therein ordered into the service of the armed forces of the United States for 
the period of the existing emergency, should be placed imder the command of 
the Commanding General, Philippine Department, United States Army. 

There is transmitted herewith a revised draft of the proposed Executive 
Order, presented by the Acting Secretary of War under date of July 18, l&H, 
which the Department desires be substituted for the draft of order referred 
to above. The Acting Secretary points out that the revised draft of order does 
not change basically the draft previously acted upon, and that the purpose 
of the revision is to provide for latitude in calling units and i)ersonnel into 
service and to vest command authority in a general officer to be designated 
by the Secretary of War, rather than in the Commanding General, Philippine 
Department, as stipulated in the original draft. 

[2] While the original draft of the (unsigned) Executive Order was 
cleared with the State and Interior Departments, (who indicated a desire to be 
again consulted just prior to the formal issuance thereof) the revision presently 
proposed has not been referred to these Departments for comment since the 
proposed changes concern only certain military features rather than the basic 
policy involved. It is contemplated, however, that upon the informal approval 
by the President of the form of the proposed revised order, that copies thereof 
' will be forwarded, as in the case of the original drafts, to the Secretary of War 
for his confidential information and distribution to the Secretary of the Navy 
and the Secretary of the Interior (to be transmitted to the High Commissioner of 
the Philipine Islands). 

This order has my approval. 
Very truly yours, 

[Signed] John B. Blandford, Jb. 

Ansistant Director. 

The Honorable, The Attobney Genebai.. 

Enclosures. 



4372 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




Hipp ^tttm-W^^ i^^BWwiippp ■jr ^^^ 

9MVlili4|MI lif ilM OrmmMiICMI 4tf lilt MCUliAHINi S iMNIIIf 4rt3L Urt 

— BMwft tgftiw^ BMbfg aniw miK0 1» »» iiii upmi ir <ii» n i miM t' 

iMMMf JWTP tin liWUfl MWiftll' llli illliWill mf Tli 






hiA jMUMftnita HMttMii 4ifili> lit itelM wttkitu&B* 
\ ""7"" 






«ir«HN 



wlWl^w^^w^W l^^^^^^^W^^^^ ^^^^^^^KUwj ^^^•^^^^^^1^^^^'^^^^^^ ^^^F ^^^P^^ 



HBJ iWWIr ' ' #" ■raWlw*' 




WmKI^ 







EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4373 




Juiyse, iBm. 



$IK3tgf 

iHmitmmmimmmmmm 





mmm 
wmon 

m. Vell«8 aj^ 1 hl^iljr «^proir# Moisoow 
trip and aastsBid jroit w&ul^ go in a ftw 
Sajra* Fi»«aibl7 jr^at eotild get iNstek ta 

^r^ ilaerioa l»j Aiijpi»t $l^tli« I will 
•dud 701a toni^it a miaaage for Stalin. 




All veil liera. Tall Wmimmt Ha^ral 
l*«ott our o&ii0iirf*aiit aetien ia n^art 
to Japan is, I ^^ilnk^ I>«m^i^ fimi.t« 
I baar their iovaraaant imcii laiM^'^ ^^ 
no conolttaira future |K>lie|r |ia# batn 
detamlnad on* fall liln BXm in ^r#at 
oonfidanoa that X ha^a aii^ailNpi to 
Hofiura that Xndo^Ohlna b« i»m^mlisad 
by Britain, Boitoli^ Chinaaaf "^kns^mn and 
otirsaXires, plael^ Ii^^^^hina aoxatii&t 
in status of Svitaafaand* ^sptm %» 
gat noa and fartllisar bat idl on &m&^ 
dition that JaiMin nd^drav azmad f^re^ii 
tnm IMi>*0himL in toto* I te^a had 
no answer yat. Wumn it em»M it miil 
probably ba unfavorabla bat mt haira at 
laaait aada ona aora effort to aVold 
Japanese esqp^ansion to South Faoifio 

R006I?ELT 



m 




4374 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




IBm l^^MiMmm has sipwA leULttaty 

^l^^^^^p i^i^dp^^ ^^r-jj^jK^^^ '•^^F ^1^^^ ^^^^BI^P ^^PVlP'^I^RI^^'^V' ^*ww ^W^IFibBmW^W^P 

V* &• M« 






EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4375 



«■ 



7i^^^{vi9^£4^ 




4376 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



w-~ 



fe „' ;, ,'. r- : .^21l*;'.^4*?>5^^f * 




PERSONAL ^V„^^ wiH^BS^*^ Mexico, July 18, 19a 
Dear Traaklln: 

Dr. Staaley Jones, one of the greatest preach- 
ers In the world, has bees in Uexlco attending a 
religious gathering of niore than flTe hundred reli- 
gious leaders, mostly from Mezioo and the tJrdted 
States. You know his history. As a young Metho- 
dist preaaher he went as a missionary to India 
where he has made a place as t^e leader of ^erican 
missionaries. A few years age he declined t© a ocerpt 
the office of Bishap to which he had been elaeted, 
saying his call was to preach the gospel in India, 
He knows that country a s no other preaohar. B)i long 
resideaoe in Asia has made him familiar with condi- 
tions In China and Japan and he is deeply interes- 
ted in seeing the war between these two countries 
brought to a close, as all of ua are. 

Itelking with Br. Jones yesterday, he teld me 
of recent eonyeraations he had had with Dr. Miaa, 
Secretary of the Matioaal Council of China, and Dr. 
EJagjBwa, a well«kno«& author of Japan, regarding a 
possible basis for peaoe between China and Japan> 
he beoame convinoed that the situation may be ripe 
far the United States ta mediate between the two 
oountrias. He said that **it appears to be the one 
poaaibla door to peeee in the world situation," and 
added: "If it begins there it nay spread.** 

I know that your ]»art*s Aasire is to see an 
end of the tragic wars and would weloome an oppor- 
tunity ta bring about an honorable peace. Beoauaa 
at thla I am enclaai ng far your confidential readiae 
the mamoraadua idiioh Dr. Jonea prepared at ay ra» 
quest. , 

I on not familiar enough with the intersational 
Vituation, ea* the possible influenoa of the paraons 
quoted by Dr. Jonas, to give adTioa. I wish I knew 

a«ra 

Tka Eolwx«bXa Iranklia D.RooaaTelt, 
Tba Wklta Hauaa, Vashlngtan, D.c. 





EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4377 




-2- 



moM of th« inside •ituatlon in tluMf oa<iatrl«t« I 
am passing on this memorandtxn from • gr««t Bval, a 
friond of long standi n|§, for such Qeaaidaxtitlos aa 
OBnditiona in the Far Aaat may Justify. I prer dalXy 
that you may find a way to lead the unsrld to pe&oe 
and permanexxt ending of war* 

IB your, last letter you expreased tte hope that 
BQfr health wav s»od ead I was **not woerking toe hard.** 
AM to the firat, I was never ae well as new. As to 
t£ie second, though I give ityself freely to ay duties 
here, when X think «f this heavy burden you bear aad 
strain upon tiae and mind end heart, I f ael that la 
oeBtparlson I aa almost only a part-time workar. 

My wife joins in love te you and Sleanes. 



Affeotionataly y&meB, 




7971« O— 46 — pt. 20- 



-27 



4378 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

PRIVATE AND CONnDElCTIAL 

Memokandum of Conversations Regarding Possible Pe.\ce Between Japan 

AND China 

In informal conversations between Dr. Miao, Secretary of the National Christian 
Council of China, and Dr. Kagawa, well-know author of Japan, regarding a 
possible basis for peace between China and Japan, I fQund the following : 

1. They both agree that the time is ripe for a consideration of a possible peace 
if a basis could be found. They were both speaking individually, of course, and 
were not representing in any way anyone oflicially. But each thought that he 
was expressing the opinions of a large number in each country and possibly on 
some points the official attitude. 

2. Dr. Kagawa said that he thought Japan was prepai-ed to make peace on 
the basis of four points : 

a. The recognition of Manchukuo. 

b. The suppression of Communism in China. 

c. The elimination of anti-Japanese agitation in China. 

d. The recognition of the territorial and political integrity of China by Japan. 
He suggested that there might be other points raised by some, such as (a) a 

creation of a joint defense system in Mongolia against Russian Communism, 
(b) the port of Shanghai under Japanese control, (c) a concession between 
Hongkong and Indo-China for immigration. But these were subsidiary — the four 
points above were the main bases of peace from the Japanese viewpoint. 

Dr. Miao said that if the intention of the peace between China and Japan is 
that Japan's hands may be freed to carry out aggressive intentions elsewhere, 
then the peace would not be a real peace. China wants real peace. He said that 
if China could get two things nailed down she would be prepared to negotiate the 
rest: 

a. The territorial and political integrity and souvereignty of China. 

b. The recognition of Chang Kai Shek as the head of China. 

If these two things were agreed upon, China would feel that there is a basis 
on which peace could be considered, not that she recognizes that the other points 
raised are necessarily legitimate, but they might be made subjects for negotia- 
tion. Dr. Miao suggested, for instance, that some agreement might be worked 
out for joint control of Manchuria. 

[2] It will be noted that there is one area of agreement between the two 
suggestions, namely the territorial and political integrity of China. This is im- 
portant for this area of agreement is not a marginal matter, it is central. 

As to the recognition of Chang Kai Shek, Dr. Kagawa thought it might be 
brought about in time, but Japan's face would have to be saved i^i the matter, for 
Wang Ching Wei had been recognized. He thought it might be possible to solve the 
matter if Wang Ching Wei should agree to give away to Chang Kai Shek for the 
sake of peace and the unifying of China. Dr. Maio thought that Wa<<ig Ching 
Wei would have to give way entirely and that there could be no place for him 
in the government after what he had done. Dr. Kagawa said that the recognition 
of Chang Kai Shek is not impossible as many Japanese considered him as a great 
man. Both agreed that^eace could be scarcely hoped for if Chang Kai Shek were 
left out, for he represents China in a way that no one else does. 

It was suggested by Dr. Kagawa that if I want to get the official viewpoint it 
might be well for me to see the Japanese Ambassador. Accordingly, I endeavored 
to see both the Japanese Ambassador and the Chinese Ambassador during a short 
visit to Washington. The Chinese Ambassador was absent speaking at the Uni- 
versity of Michigan and the Japanese Ambassador was tied up with engagements 
and could not give me the time during the period at my disposal. But the Japa- 
nese Minister invited me to see him instead. Apparently the Japanese Minister 
is the diplomatic advisor to the Ambassador. 

I made it plain to the Minister that I did not represent anything official, that 
I was only there in the capacity of one who desires to see these two nations come 
together on a just basis, and that it was also clear that the opinions I was in- 
terpreting from Dr. Miao and Dr. Kagawa were entirely unofficial and were 
elicited by my own initiative. In other words, they did not raise the matter 
with me — I raised it with them. I also suggested that I knew the Minister's situ- 
ation as a diplomatic official and that he need not give anyrning on rne matters 
raised, but that I would put the matter before him and he could connnent on it or 
not, and I would understand. After I had placed the conversations I had before 
him, he replied that he would comment on the matter, but in an unofficial capacity. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4379 

He said that Dr. Kagawa left out one important point, namely, the economic 
cooperation of Japan and China. When I asked if the economic cooperation meant 
[3] the political dominance of the country by economic control, as many 
Chinese and others thought it would, he replied that it need not necessarily 
mean this. He further stated that although the territorial and political integ- 
rity of China was not specifically stated in the government statements regarding 
a basis of peace, it was implied in the other three points, because these points 
inferred a sovereign and independent China. He also added that the government 
of Japan had stated that there would be no indemnities and no territory de- 
manded of China. This, too, he said implied the political and territorial integrity 
of China. 

He suggested that Japan would desire a joint defense in Mongolia and North 
China against possible Russian aggression in these sections. When I pointed 
out that in the minds of the Chinese this planting of Japanese soldiers in North 
China and Mongolia would cancel the point about the territorial and political 
integrity of China, he replied that on the face of it it would, and that the demand 
might seem to be harsh, but in international law a nation might still be sovereign 
if she requested another nation to help her in the joint defense of territory. 

In regard to the recognition of Chang Kai Shek as the head of China, he stated 
that the Japanese government recognized Wang Ching Wei because he was 
willing to accept Japan's basis of cooperation and that if Chang Kai Shek would 
be willing to do so then Japan would not mind who it was at the head of the 
government. 

It seems to me that this left open the possibility of Japan's recognition of Chang 
Kai Shek if a new basis could be worked out which the latter could accept. 

At the close of my talk one thing seemed to be intact in both viewpoints, namely, 
the territorial and political integrity of China. Of course, there was the possi- 
bility of this being threatened by the proposal of joint action in North China 
and Mongolia. But on the whole it remained. There was also the possibility 
of the recognition of Chang Kai Shek under certan conditions — conditions held 
by both sides. It was not ruled out. 

When I came to the point of the possible mediation of the United States to 
bring peace in the Far East, I again urged on the Minister that he need not 
answer if he did not see fit. He replied that he would comment, not as giving 
an official but a personal view, that if my suggestions meant that America was to 
interefere in the Far East and try to impose her own terms, then the reply is. No. 
But if she should offer her good offices to help China and Japan to settle their 
own differences, then, Yes. 

[4] When I asked if I might express the substance of our conversations to 
anyone of my friends who might be in a position to pass it on to those who would 
be in a position to do something, he replied that I might, provided it was under- 
stood that all of these opinions were simply explorative and were personal and 
private and not official. He added that the world must have peace and that 
America is in a position to help toward peace. When I suggested if America 
offered her good offices to help bring peace between China and Japan it might 
means that she would thereby be led to straighten out her own differences with 
Japan, he agreed. 

It seems therefor that the situation may be ripe for America, to mediate be- 
tween China and Japan. It appears to be the one possible door to peace in the 
world situation. If it begins there it may spread. 

E. Stanley Jones. 



4380 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4381 



















iik Wm 



i 



4382 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

July 23, 1946. 
The Honorable John M. Vorys, 
House of Representatives. 

DcAs John : I referred your letters of July 11, 1941 to me and to the President 
and their enclosures in regard to the question of jwssible mediation by this 
Government in the conflict between China and Japan to the appropriate officers 
of the Department for study and comment. 

We have studied with care the contents of your letters and of Dr. Jones' 
memorandum, and we are very glad to have the benefit of your views and those 
of Dr. Jones who is well-known to the Department. The various points and con- 
siderations mentioned in Dr. Jones' memorandum have been brought to our at- 
tention from time to time from various quarters and we have been and are 
keeping them constantly in mind. In addition to the broad general factors 
mentioned in Dr. Jones' memorandum, the Department must take into account the 
fundamental national policies of the various nations concerned, especially as 
manifested in the acts of those nations and in the statements of responsible of- 
ficials thereof. 

In past public statements and utterances by Japanese oflBcials there has been 
considerable emphasis placed on terms similar to those referred to in Dr. Jones' 
memorandum. In this connection it may be observed that the contents of the 
agreements which the Japanese Grovernment has made with the regime of Wang 
Ching-wei at Nanking afford some concrete indication of the nature of the settle- 
ment with China which the Japanese Government has thus far had in mind. 

This Government has during recent years been making earnest efforts to per- 
suade the Japanese Government that the real interests of Japan lie in adopting 
policies in regard to international relations and conduct which are in line with 
the thought and procedures in which this country believes. 

[■S] Should you feel, in the light of the foregoing comment, that you would 
still like to discuss this subject with an appropriate oflBcer of the Department, 
such an officer will be glad at any time at your convenience to place himself 
at your disposal. 

If Dr. Jones should have occasion to visit Washington, officers of the Depart- 
ment would welcome an opportunity to see him and to obtain the benefits 
through personal conversation of his observations and views. 
Sincerely yours, 

Dean G. Acheson, 
Assistant Secretary. 



confidential 

Bulletin 
25 July 1941 

Japanese military preparation in Manchuria continues at accelerated rate is 
indicated by a report from a reliable source. This "seems to portend he (Japs) 
is preparing in North for Major efforts". On the other hand, Oretv reports "there 
has been a gradual weakening of the ties binding Japan to the Axis over a 
substantial period of time" and "the Government of Japan is expecting overtures 
from the Government of the U. S. S. R. designed to produce "a -general agree- 
ment.' " 

British Members of Parliament have invited some American Senators and 
Representatives to visit Britain shortly. Oermans are returning to their French 
owners, all small boats (less than 300 tons) seized at time of the occupation 
it is reported. 

German losses during first two weeks of Russo-German campaign were 640,000 
to 700,000 men ; 1100 to 1200 tanks ; a Navy source reports. 

The strike on oil tankers, Great Lakes Area, "is Communist influenced for 
the purpose of preventing production in the steel industry". 

[2] Admiral Toivers reports Navy's aviation training program for pilots, 
flight crews and maintenance personnel, is "ship-shape" and under way ahead of 
schedule. Today the Navy has four main pilot training stations with a combined 
student entry of 800 a month — Pensacola 300, Jacksonville 200, Corpus Christ! 
3(X)— The Naval Station «t Miami is providing the advanced carrier type train- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4383 

ing. The Navy including the Marine Corps had 40.521 aviators and 3,657 under 
training, 1 July, being 276 more aviators and 981 more students than the 1 
January 1941 estimates. The shortage of airplanes of the type required for 
advanced training is becoming critical. Training capacity now is available for 
9,095 aviation enlistetl men every four months ; by 1 January 1942 this will be 
increased to 12,000. 

Information from an Official source on the Statement by the Carnegie Insti- 
tution expert (in the 18 July Bulletin) shows that for some months weather 
reports to the fleet have been transmitted in confidential cipher ; that all reports 
of weather observations made by Naval vessels are confidential. Sabotage of a 
toi^pedo has been reported to Bureau of Ordnance. Considerable has been learned 
about Italian espionage activities in the United States during the past week. 

[3] Secretary Knox has appointed Dr. Jerome C. Hunsaker, of M. I. T. 
as Coordinator of Research and Development for the Navy Department, Chair- 
man of the Naval Research and Development Board and Member of the National 
Defense Research Committee. Dr. Hunsaker reports he is surveying Navy's 
research projects in order to determine the extent of the present program. 

Approximately 36 Public Relations Officers from the Naval Districts and the 
two Fleets will be in Washington Monday for a four-day conference and school 
on Public Relations. 

Secretc'ry Knox reports (expansion of facilities of the Naval Communications 
to meet the increased load placed on the system by demands of Navy Department 
operations under the National Emergency. 

The Senate has passed a bill authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to establish 
a secret detective force to investigate any existing or threatened espionage 
or sabotage in United States Naval establishments. USN makes a careful 
check of requests for the dismissal of aliens working in plants having defense 
production. Before any dismissal is requested, the Federal Bureau of Inves- 
tigation, Mill- [4] tary Intelligence and Naval Intelligence's central and 
field files are checked. 40% of the requests received are "washed out" because 
no cause for action is found. 

The Navy's program for supplying Diesel engines for small boats, together- 
with the special power-plant requirements for the newly develoi)ed landing boats, 
has resulted in the development of a more modern type of Diesel for these small 
craft. This engine is manufactured by the National Supply Company at the Su- 
perior Diesel Engine Plant and has been installed in both the 30-foot Bureau 
Type Steel and the 36-foot Higgins Type landing boats. 

Voluntary Spanish and Portuguese language instruction is progressing both 
in Washington and the Naval Air Stations at Pensacola, Florida, Jacksonville, 
Florida and Corpus Christi, Texas. Arrangements are being made to expand 
the language instruction during the coming year, by using the facilities of a WPA 
project. It is anticipated that over 5,000 officers and enlisted men of Navy- and 
USMC will undergo special instructions during the current fiscal year. Puget 
Sound Naval Hospital is expanding. It has almost reached its limit for the 
area it serves. For the present, however, it is adequate, the Bureau of Medicine 
and Surgery reports. 



4384 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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Ay/ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4385 




4386 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The White House, 
Washington, July 29, 1941. 
Memorandum for the Acting Secretary of State. 

I note in a number of dispatches during the past week or ten days that 
Japanese troop or plane withdrawals are reported from several sectors on the 
Chinese front. 

I think we should relay these reports to Gauss and the Military Attachl^ in 
Chungking for the information of the Chinese Government, with the suggestion 
that one or two powerful attacks on weakened Japanese position's might do real 
good at this time. Possibly you have done this already. 

F. D. R. 



DEa>ARTMENT OF STATE, 

Washington, JUly SI, 19^1. 
Meimoeandum fob the President 

Reference your memorandum of July 29, 1941 in regard to reports of with- 
drawals of Japanese troops and planes from certain occupied places in China. 

The messages to which you refer were repeated to the Embassy at Chungking 
via naval radio by the sending offices. We have brought these reports orally 
to the attention of the Chinese Ambassador here and are today conveying to 
Ambassador Gauss by telegraph the suggestion that he and the Naval and Mili- 
tary Attachl6s inform appropriate Chinese officials at Chungking of the reports 
in question. 

SuMNEE Welles. 



EXHIBITS or JOINT COMMITTEE 



4387 




Dated July 30, 19 
REo'd 7sl0 p»ia. 



Uila tElEgrnjn muat be 
oloscly parnphraeEd be- 
fore being coEBminioatcd 
to anyone* (SC}» 

■I 

soretary of State 
Vfasfeington 



1131, July 30, 10 p,ia» 

STRICTLr QOWimMTlM. FOE THE ACHKG S£CRET;iHy. 

YotBC 436, July 29, 3 p^n*, la greatly appreciated. 

_ThE eventual way out of the present situation 
appear to lie In the third provision of the 
Franco- Japaneae protocol of July 89 to the effeot 
that the validity of the atiptalations of the agrec- 
nent ahall ceaae when the altxmtion isotivatlng th£ir 
adoption no longer exists. The President* a piPopoBal, 
if accEpted and carried tibirou^, ^ould effectively 
renovE the illeged threat to the security of Indochina 
set forth in the preainblE of the protocol as the funda- 
mental pxirposE of the agreeraent. If Japan should 
reject the proposal or should avoid giving positive 
authorization to the President to ja-ocecd to carry out 
the proposal, Japan* a good faith would be brought 
into question, the honesty of her announced purpose 
and incentives would coae before the tribunal of public 

opinion. 



ms 




4388 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



^ 



* 



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i 



iaWUiJi^tiy 2K), XO p.©., from 'Tokyo. 

' '^•^ni^n, 'ana hrr position before tiit world and in the 
iS^t of history would becomE doubly tuiEnviable* 

■XMs, of oooxroE, aaaumee that the President's 
pyopoeal will eventually and inevitably be made known 
*"■ ^^'^- Bfubllc, a point «&ich tol^t discreetly but 
hclpJ^ly be conveyed to Adudral Nosrura in case the 
reply of the Japanese Government should be unduly de- 
I laycd OT should provt to be of a negative or evasive 

^h%»«.0t£r, JSo progress can be 8»de tcjward tdie adjust- 
^ jHSilt &r ia%€matioi»l relations without autual con- 
f. fidim«c« and were the Japatneai GovemiaEnt to withhoSd 



•eoofidjencE in the helpful efforts of the President 
to find a way out of the Impasae and in such eventual 
international assurances with regard to the sccxorlty 
of Indoohlna as the President might be in a position 
to j^resent, such an attitude on the part of Japan 
would oblige the United States completely to discount 
ajiy expressed desire on the part of Japan for a res- 
toration of good relations with the United States, 
I know of no other way of possibly preventing 
the Japanese forces frow "digging in" in Indochina 
than to bring the foregoing thoughts throu^ Admiral 
NwBura aquarcly to the attention of the Japanese 
Qovcraraent, 
\ . IX.P GBEV/ 

f'tS-'' .'N _^ ^ , _ ^^ , ' I I I V ^i Af.^ !^'' .'. \^...: ». ^.-!....... .L- " ,.. ■.■ipiiwM..-i.i.i] .i.i 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4389 



»-;g,->;.v>.;«.^.Wt.<!tJ.'-v.'A-... ' ....'ni;, .» 






vopiai for «m» jiwUmwHmi «# 

4C^ tin MkfM Wl^r Wv.* " A 




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jkmm •m'^'- ''V or ainto Mir st 



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4390 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4391 



IPt IPW* 



iimm 






ten* 



2ft 



•ffjMirwstoitoijM iwAtSpur *•• ?" ''"^ ^-"^'' 




«. 1714 




4392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 







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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4393 



u 




STfiXOTLY OOSFIDEHTUL 

Mr. Secretary: 

■me present Japanese yorelgn Minister is e-videntiy 
of the imt)re88lon, which earlier Japanese reports from 
Washinsrton undertook to give, that the initiative in 
regard to convereations came from the American Government. 

Apparently the Japanese Foreign Minister has heen 
holding bacjc as regards new conversations while awaiting 
(einoe Ai^uat 7) a report by Komora on the subject of 
•rumors of Hull's reeignation and of the imminence of a 
general embargo on all shipments of petroleisa products 
to Japan". 

In the Imperial conference of July 3, the Japanese 
Government apparently decided to adhere to its "ntv? order" 
policy "regardless of how the world situation may chanr-'e"; 
to "take measxiree with a view to advancing southward"; 
to Increase its pressure upon Chiang Kai-shek "froo various 
points In the south"; to continue diplomatic negoti-stlons; 
to carry out previous decisions regarding French Indochina 
end Thailand; to use "every means pvailable" in order "to 
prevent the United States from joinln' the war"; to act 
in accordance with the Three Power Pact, hut decidlnr 
for itself »when and how force will he employed". 




79716 O — 46— pt. 20- 



-28 



4394 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4395 




fk9 attaeh^d latt«r from tli# High 
i^mmlmiitomeTf 4at<»d July 31^ 1941^ 



••SIKH 




^nM.^ ^mi ^#iit m@ with jonr a^so^m 
of togust fl, hai» l50«n read with, iattr- 
#st «mt I ^pi*@0late the o^^rtunity of 

!8#«i!tfi* it^ I ©selese a sti^««tad 
toT yomr r#plr to Hr* Iknyr®. 




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4396 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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:j&. m^m^ ^j^mi %o talk eiF«fr :f«]?«dB«IlY vlt^ 
'^|pp |M|i«i^« Hm «&t^tl«ft la liit«U« sad 



Wmsi^mmhm ^ t^^^i^m'tmu xnin^^saeiajMu ' 'iBiiit "mux v»»»t 

'■■^ ^mm&i Wtm»m m^ asm nsetrnt ^f fmW^T §aflP9m» W» 

1^« #e^»SNmif«t9atl!i OovosmMHit 1mX&* ItJt oXootloM nojct 
|feov«fl^torv :t.«ffl»d« ^« ft3,««t&«« 9t « frooidoot ood . 

H«o IN^»4i^^,viv ^x^.i*ottM iM of oixtvoNto Sa^ortftaoo* « ox* 
•opt; tltsAt tUsto a^ofra^ti i& » toaro^oao ooaoXuoioA. tvorroMo 

TausmB 

^IM' 1S|li$« «Ott#«, 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4397 





kaov* that Qn«son vlll 1m •X««t«a Pr9«lA«at ^^ Osai^Hi 
Vlo« Proflld«nt. Bo oth«r ei^dldatft for tli9«« 
IMW th« fl^st of a ohftneo. Q»i«o& iteX&s •vei^'thifME ia 
tin* OMMMEWoaltb witHin M« gxwi^. Hat X I»»11«t« t^S«r« 
%§ no qtt««tloa of M« XoyaXty to ^i» li^t«A S%ii«9« sasiS.. 
his goiBftlno doolro to ooopoz«t« with tbs G^toA Stiit«« 
la dofooso aetlvltlof. I thlafc joe cmt emnt && tM#« i 

m.0 boalth i« fiot yot oatlrol./ r«»tor«d* B« t«n« »« 
l^t tiM dootors proiil«« tlaat ho viXX bo fit agola in 
IllVfliitoor. Bo has »aAo Pothor o rooaJPlK&feao rooovofj -Simt- 
p bod ottooli of ^i^oro«ulosl0» 

i^ AlMoot thft oaly ot^psisdsod polltioal «q^oitlo{i ist 
IteMMi ootMO f 70« tho ioolalioto hoadod 1^ ?«d2*o ikhftd 

Soiitoo, tho l»rothop of Joso {MmtoD, roooi^tlsr dtdvomood 
'Srem llAlotop of jrostioo to a il^istloo of tlio i^^sNMiw 
Wmatt* tho sola etroiiif^ of tho Soolollot pta^y i* %m 
'^&m proTlaoo of Pmi^m^f o rlm-^^i^ttsvdmt diotriot la 
#0»tr«3. I^xoa. X had a loag tnlk isith fodro Haatoo 
ijMit nook aad ho toXXo no that hit pis*^ aro tSmwm^kf 1 
'^jraX to tho l^stitod Statoo aad aro oppoood to «tfm%tt^ 
i^oiltioaX ohaacoo ^ foroe. 

H Oar off loo otoff havo hoea urorldla^ XUlo fm$m.» mi 

i^pt eoatroX aad oa *tt&*mt a«oota*» lo^ of tkmm 
iufto ooao to aaosoM Xa?fo m^rtaaoo oM to lairol^r « m 

Ihflalto a»oaat of vorh» 

.-. SttTli^ tho paot aoal^ $«ftoraX oeoaoaio 0^ f Ijyia^ 
ia^ ooadltloaa la tho Fhilli^plaoo hairo l^oa ^iKlto oatlo« 

i«^it«e7* I^nooo of »a|or os^n oi^^aMNIltloa hair® ijg^ 
af^fod aatonaXXj oiror Xao't ymr m^ foroliia tri^o haii 
i^ott 1^X1 aalatalttcd, ^o»«ld«ri^X« 3^»giin^io»«j|im» mm9fw» 
9«i»to a« to tho fatiaro ao a ^m^t of ^0 m»la« ao«s*«i^^' 

^ ohlpo aVRlXamo fo^ «&Uis»^ia»-*»«rloaa fi?«do* ,...,- 
Wmt* oltaatKm &«?o wm^ h»mm o^tio«^* iliNN^i^io «f i»^ 
iaBfOaoiaf ooa7«olt^ of Mttotto, thoi^o to ^i^or -lilH&t W» 

mmp oamtot ho oisoirtod frm. tho ByiXi»NMio« to ii3»ig.%i-> 
- Haitod ttatoo* If it ««Miot &o oi^HB^Iod %% ^mm»t 
^„j»tod« and ^s« ottgar o«»i«Pa:M» ma& jp^$w«^ h«ie«"4^e^ 
flaaaoo ooatlamcd oagay |kg^»dsot.ioa» fl»t wurnXd »«a& 
,.„»Jil Xahovara oat of worh, Xahor' mmm% m& oao of thr 
llMt la|»o»t«il» of 7hUlp!plx»i aotli^]^^ 'dimft«<i m& ^ 
'-^^ poamod^ Diat 'to ho do»ot X %^io#o tl»o mmm09^%h 
ponmoat ntl ahorti? ««^ t^r m h$9m:t^«if^ ^!^. 
Itod' ttatoO' -tt$ hoXi^ f laanoo tl» m^S0S^*mm». Mi 
Ltod Statoo oaiaiot oaj*3T m a ^j^^pPisi of liid«f$J^tal^ 



i9^ ttp i»f« a«3n;>X«« oafor otoola tn t^o^fhiXifflm 
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JyvohahM' ttrr«p ooaXi ho aa?ls«1^ot. 






4398 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




- 3 - 



>n«««Itli 9oT«nuient m»j not b« «bl« to avlng th« 
>t>l«i Alono auaid that If a ••rlout ahipping shortago 
laTaXopa tho Unitod 8tat«t will bavo to glvo ••rioua 
oonslAwratlon to affordlait fiB*noial aaaletanoo tmt 
shottld doubtloas oouplo vtiatoTar aatiataaeo it glvon 
witli a prograa of oarofol dirorfiea of aogar land to 
rieo and othor oropa noodod in tho Fhllli^liiot. 

Poiiiap* otlll Boro prooilng at tho aosoat io tho 
probloa of ■alftUlnlBg nuiipplno otooka of food •applio>i 
aftd otlior aoeostitloa. Zf th« ahortaso of bottoat bo-> 
o«Nua aottta vo mil bo oxtroKol/ llaitod la iduit sttpplloa 
w« oaB cot fro« tb« 0ftl««d Statoa« Zat thara la laKlnaat 
4Uiafor uiat iritet w« liaira will b« dralaad away by balng 
•iqportaA to aalig^liborlag Ito* SMitoni oosntrlaa wliara prloaa 
of av^ftllaa nay bo l&lAor. Va o;a|^t to eoatrol aaoh as- 
porta} bat hmn fb» import Ooatrol Aot i^parontlj la aet 
»ro«t aaoiiili to iMXtMto foodat«ffa and a ambar of othor 
aaoaiaarjr otMMdltloa* ^uat aow Vm wroatUag wltb tlila 
problo* aloo* It loolto aa If tbo only tiMroniiay aatla- 
f aotovgr loiiwor will bo aa Aot of tbo laltot ffatoa Ooa» 
trooc asMMUlBf tiao li^ort Ooatrol Aet ao aa to glvo oo»- 
irol oYor tba mcport froai tho IHlllpi^liioa of foodataffa 
asd artleloo of moooaolty tor ^dLllpplno doaoatlo aooda. 

It la hoartottlsf to aoo bow our eotntry laroopond- 
lag to yoar loadoraiii^ aad w« aro doleg our boat to ap» 
baiA ymtr ba&da la thla far oatpoat. 



Bvar alnoorol^yoara. 



•^^xM^ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4399 




1. <■-•!..; *!. w,-?' Li 



lOIUM^-, I^OI: :>. 



£ ^i'w £' 



^-■f 



tt®r trom asai* Fr&acis ^* Siss^'re, Ij»s» ii,Ag& 
€o9B«ia3l<3ii^r to tiid Fhiiljp^iBa liljasi^^ Ms 

aii^ aad his ^sssire al>€mi a^» Sa^J^t- 

i« llsmliii^'* Orlgift&i 'l#tt@r i®»t to t 
of Stats # Ccf^ of Pr«uJ4^at»s n^aora 
':«xp2jaiAtir ^mcioj«re s#at t® tll# Ife 

<jf State ♦ 



^ 



4400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

confidential 
Bulletin 

6 August 1941 

Matcriala are heitig accumulated and plans for a big German offensive against 
the Soviet or or about August 10, it is reported. 

Morris reports the German people are not "cheered" by the silence which 
covers German losses particularly in viev? of the slow progress on the Eastern 

Front. 

Precarious position of Axis forces in Libya has been confirmed by reports re- 
ceived by the Consul at Tunis. 

A large number of Nazi Marines are in Constanta and preparations are being 
made to recondition various Rumanian Ships which are to be used either as troop 
transports or as auxiliary cruisers in the Black Sea it is reported. 

The Japanese moUUzed 500,000 men during the period June and July it is re- 
ported. The majority of this force is believed to have been sent to Manchuria. 
(Russians reported to have 500,000 in Far East.) 

Troops defending Tobruk have 30 days food supply, 60 days ammunition sup- 
ply and very limited water supply. The fleet is unable to continue supplying this 
force. [2] 40 ships sunk in the port and 5 destroyers sunk outside the port 
show the extent of Axis air control over Tobruk. Relief must be effected by fall 
or Tobruk will have to surrender it is reported. 

British sources do not believe that the Russians will undertake an offensive on 
the Finnish Front. 

Stalin's Decree that civilian population be armed has been followed effective- 
ly. Irregulars also reported cooperating with OGPU in laying waste to the coun- 
try in the path of the invaders it is reported. 

Two Hundred Officers of the Colombian Army have been arrested and are be- 
ing held incommunicado on charge of conspiracy against the Government. 

Ecuador political situation is very delicate and an imminent change of Gov.- 
ernment is possible, it is reported. 

Recruiting activities for week ending 25 July, 1941. 

Accepted for first enlistment 228 

First enlistments 1423 

Reenlistments, continuous service 42 

Reenlistments, under broken service 17 

Tqtal 1482 

While violation of the regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Authority by Naval 
aircraft occurs at such infrequent intervals as to occasion an infinitesimal 
portion [3] of the total hazards to commercial operations, the importance 
of this problem is recognized. The Civil Aeronautics Authority has not approved 
the recommendations of the Navy (and Army?) to establish a permanent board 
to participate in planning to control violations of Civil Aeronautics Authority 
regulations which are caused by lack of segregation, zoning of airports, communi- 
cation facilities between aircraft and aircraft to ground, and of authority of any 
agency — Army, Navy or commercial — to ascertain its own priority in a given 
area. 

The Bureau of Ordnance appreciates the cooperation that is being given by 
the Army in furnishing machine gun ammunition. For the first half of the year, 
about 40% of the Navy's allotment was received and all special tasks were taken 
care of. At present, if necessary, the Bureau will be supplied with sufficient am- 
munition for any special task and up to 60% of its allotment. By September or 
October, the War Department will have sufficient small arms ammunition capac- 
ity available to take care of the Bureau 100%. 

Typhoon damage in Guam is $20,000 according to reported preliminary esti- 
mates. 

[4] Solicitation by Jehovah's ^Yitnesses in Independence, Kansas, effectively 
stopped by joint police and American Legion plan to send a policeman with the 
solicitor to open each interview by saying the canvasser represented "this organi- 
zation that does not believe in saluting the American Flag, and I am just along 
to help prevent riots such as this organization has precipitated in other com- 
munities", Navy Domestic Intelligence rejKjrts. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4401 

Permission for news correspondents to proceed from London to Iceland has 
been withheld and no stories on Iceland are to be released without Navy Depart- 
ment approval except press stories by approved correspondents when these stories 
are authorized by Comtaskfor nineteen and reference to following items has 
been deleted : Identification of units participating, strength of force, ships in- 
volved, defenses, names of individuals, future plans or movements, amount and 
type of equipment. 

Contract has been awarded the Naval Reserve Training School at Navy Pier, 
Chicago, Illinois, of $222,000.00 by Bureau of Yards and Docks. 

The Navy ration "shall" include canned, powdered, or concentrated 'fruit 
Juices under the terms of HR4757. 



CONFIDENTIAL 
BUIiETIN 

7 August, 1941 

Only a very determined attitude by the United States, Britain and the Nether- 
lands East Indies can now deter Japanese military from pushing things to ex- 
tremes, the British Ambassador at Tokyo reports. 

"An expected triumph over the Red Army by October and an invasion of the 
Persian Gulf Area and India by Spring are two events on Hitler's calendar" 
reports to the British indicate. 

Eden reports Turkish friendship still affords huge advantages to the British 
and "desires" the United States to aid Britain in supplying military supplies 
and equipment to Turkey as promptly as possible. ' 

MacMurray (Ankara, Turkey) reports "The opinion that there is no military 
threat to Turkey is shared by the British Military Officials here but they feel 
that it is not impossible or even unlikely that in time the situation may change 
abruptly." 

Ships laden icith Nazi soldiers reported transiting Swedish territorial waters. 

Port Said (Suez Canal) now handling a great volume of [2] tonnage 
with speed and dispatch and ships of United States Registry and British Troop 
transports are not using Suez at present a reliable source reports. 

Situation in Ecuador reported to be rapidly deteriorating: Anti-American sen- 
timent is increasing ; faith in Pan-Americanism is lost and Ecuadorans feel that 
the days of their country's life as an independent nation are numbered unless 
prompt action is taken by the United States. 

Canary Islands Oarrison increased from 12,000 to 53,050 in past three months. 
Because of topography, bad roads and fortifications built or to be built, an attack 
and seizure of {he Canary Islands would be a difficult task in the face of the 
Garrison as reinforced it is reported. 

Oermans continue to evince interest in the Sabana Bay and the Sabana del 
Guabatico Area, Dominica, a natural air landing area 50 miles from the Bay, 
it is reported. 

Nazi planes flying over Iceland 30 July made a detailed reconnaisance, a reli- 
able source reports. 

All future sailoings of Japanese ships for United States will be postponed 
indefinitely, the Japanese Foreign [3] Office "admitted", it is reported. 

Production of synthetic gasoline in Italy is at a minimum due to the lack of 
coal. Italians now using oil reserves and are having great difficulty in getting 
replenishments it is reported. German synthetic gasoline factories reported 
seriously damaged by the R. A. F. but new ones have been built are operating 
near Berlin. 

WPA Projects in the Navy program. Emergency Relief Act for the fi.scal year 
1942 was approved 1 July 1941. In contrast to the 1941 act, new bill does not 
ear-mark a sum of money for use on Federal Agency projects of the type ap- 
proved in previous years. Instead the $5,000,000 set aside for all federal agencies 
will be retained by WPA and allocated to specific projects, that cannot be oper- 
ated in the state program, when those projects are individually approved by the 
WPA. Therefore, with but few exceptions. Navy projects that are put in opera- 
tion will be in state programs under the direction of the State Administrators. 
The new act authorizes the operation of federal construction projects in the 
fiscal year 1942 approved under the act of the fiscal year 1941. 



4402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[.'/] Director of Pcrsotniel reports a survey of civilian supervisory positions 
ill the Navy Department looking toward obtaining higher grades is just being 
completed and a large number of new allocations have been secured. 

Price of red salmon is up 10 cents a pf)und over last year so the Bureau of 
Supplies and Accounts is ordering an increased amount of medium-reds which 
have advanced about 2 cents a pound for the same period. The demand for 
salmon from the Army and under lease-lend is heavy but 20% of this year's 
paclc will be used for these purposes without undue dislocation of the civilian 
market. 

Bureau of Ordnance reports 23,280,000 rounds of 40 mm Bofors and 57,200.000 
rounds of 20 mm Oerlikon Ammunition have been ordered. The present pro- 
gram contemplates increasing the orders to a total of 30,480,000 40 mm and 
72,200,000 20 mm all for production within the next twelve months. The steel 
brass, gilding metal and aluminum required presents a serious problem. This 
is .lust a start as the contemplated production of Oerlikon guns practically de- 
cided upon is 31,000 guns requiring 360,000,000 rounds of ararauntion. 

Eire Government reported considering seeking U. S. Protection of Ireland. 



confidential 

Bulletin 
8 August 1941 

Japanese Officers in civilian clothes are arriving in Thai accompanied by a 
flood of- "tourists" a reliable ^source reports. Thai oflBcials feel their nation is in 
serious immediate peril from' Japan. 

Japanese call up more retired Japanese personnel. 

Sevei-al large groups of transiwrts were observed off Kojo (Korea) heading 
North during the latter part of July. 

Japanese ships reported to be purchasing large amounts of petroleum products 
in Rio de Janeiro. 

The Japanese Naval Inspector's Office New York City was officially closed 7 
August. 

Fighting on the Eastern Front is characterized by an increased use of flame 
throwers and radio as a means of communication. Nightly bombing of Moscow 
reported "light but accurate". 

Occupied Thrace has been completely stripped, even to removal of windows 
and doors it is reported. 

.1// t^panish military leave in the Tangier (North Morocco) Zone was can- 
celled 4 August, it is reported. 

[2\ Aranha is "most indignant" over British demands concerning Ships 
Warrant Agreement and declares it will be necessary to close the ports of Brazil 
to British ships. 

Evidence that operations will he undertaken against Iran no matter what 
answer is given to the British ultimatum (in re: tourists) is reported. However, 
United States Minister at Bagdad reports British for the time being at least 
will not move into Iran since it is intimated that their forces there are inadequate. 

Oreek refugees fleeing into Turkey because of "onset of famine conditions" 
causing Turks to feel the democracies have left Greece to her fa'te after serving 
their purposes. Some are asking what the Turkish people might expect in 
similar circumstances it is reported. 

Threat against Egypt has been removed by Russian War and consequent 
change of Nazi plans a reliable source reports. IJelief of Tobruk (Libya) may 
l>e possible if 300 tanks above scheduled diliveries can.be attained by 15 Septem- 
ber. Australian Troops are in Tobruk. 

CKvde oil is Germany's real need it is reported. That's why they want Baku 
(City on Caspian Sea). They are reportetl to have enough oil refined and in 
production to carry them through until next year. 

[3] Acting Secretary Bard stated today it is hoped the strike at the Kearney, 
New Jersey, Shipbuilding plant can be settled at once, but if managment and 
labor cannot arrive at a settlement, steps must be taken which will in one way 
or another put this huge shipbuilding plant back into production at the earliest 
possible moment. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4403 

The Judge Advocate Oeneral is being asked to secure legislation to enable Navy 
personnel to use taxis on Official business between the Navy and other Govern- 
mental Departments. 

25 Officers and 72 Enlisted men have been ordered to a course of RADAR in- 
struction in Canada, beginning 16 August, 1941. 

Deliveries of propellers are not satisfactory to meet the needs of airplane pro- 
duction. At the present time, a quantity of completed fi^'hting airplanes are 
awaiting propeller deliveries. The Navy has on contract 100 training airplanes 
which are to be equipped with wooden propellers. In addition, tlie Navy contem- 
plated securing 100 additional wooden propellers from the Army, the Bureau 
of Aeronautics reports. 

The Bureau of Ordnance is making special efforts to con- [4] serve 
aluminum and other critical raw materials without interfering with the military 
efficiency of the product. 

The manufacture of torpedoes is being delayed by inability to obtain required 
quantities of steel as soon as needed. Practically all needed steel is under con- 
tract with various firms, and deliveries can only be improved by obtaining higher 
priority, which has been requested. Requisitions were originally made and pro- 
posals advertised for this steel late in 1940 in the usual form. Owing to the fact 
that most quantities required were small, ^no bids were received under then 
existing conditions. When necessity for the material was explained to various 
companies, bids were finally obtained, the Steel Section of 0PM being par- 
ticularly helpful in this matter, the Bureau of Ordnance reports. 

A meeting of a select committee to investigate air accidents, hi^aded by Mr. 
Nichols of the Office of Production Management, held on 7 August, was attended 
by Army, Navy, 0PM, CAA, and Commerce Officials, for a discussion of measures 
to be taken to insure the general health and prospects of the commercial air 
carriers of the United States. The subject will be gone into in greater detail 
later. 



CONFIDENTIAL 

BmXETIN 

11 August, 1941 

The Nazi ti/tne-tahle for defeating the Russian Army and occupying European 
Russia has been upset by stubborn Russian resistance. The new time-table of 
the German Army calls for breaking Russian resistance in the area the Germans 
expect to occupy during the coming winter, this includes territory west of the 
Volga River, it is reported. 

Considerable uneasiness is reported among tJie Qernian people. Attempts are 
being made to direct public opinion to the "West by an attack on the United States 
in the Press. 

Hitler and his henchmen greatly apprehend a British attack on their unpro- 
tected Norwegian flank and Western rear because they are unable at the present 
time to withdraw either material or men from the Eastern Frant, it is reported. 

Oerman high command is reported proposing to resume offensive operation in 
North Africa during the month of September, if the British don't attack before 
then. 

Combined Nazi and Spanish drive on Gibraltar "and else- [2] where!' is 
reported temporarily abandoned because of the situation on the Eastern Front. 

Clashes between German and Italian forces in Rusia are reported. 

Germans are said to be pleased with the 5 August Decree for Weygand to deal 
directly with Admiral Darlan since they suspect the motives of WeyganJ. 

Nazi Activities in Brazil are being intensified. "Something is brewing" in the 
Southern part of Brazil and it is believed Argentina is connected with, it, it is 
reported. 

Oermans are taking active steps to prevent Dakar from falling into the hands 
of the United States. Measures are under consideration to forestall an Anglo- 
United States attempt to get Portuguese Bases it is reported. 

The Japanese do not expect the Thais to resist occupation it is reported. It is 
reported Burma will be attacked by combined French and Japanese forces when 
enough Japanese forces arrive in Indo-China. 

Japanese ships are reported to have orders to avoid United States ports and to 
paint out their flags. 



4404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Wholesale Price Index for all Commodities for the week ending 2 August, 1941,— 
89.2. 



Naval strength of: 



Old battleships. 

Battleships 

Heavy cruisers. 
Light cruisers.. 

Destroyers 

Submarines 

Aircraft carriers 



Germany 


Italy 


France 


2 
. 2 




1 
1 


5 


4 


4 


4 


4 


12 


10 


56 


97 


49 


150 


76 


59 


1 




1 



Total 



3 

8 

12 

26 

202 

285 

2 



Approximately 100,000 man days were lost last week in strikes affecting 
Naval Defense contracts. 6 cases affecting 2810 workers were settled. 28 cases 
are still open and 16 strikes are pending in which Navy production may be 
involved. Conferences on the Kearney strike were held over the week end — no 
change has heen reported. An early settlement is hoped for. 

AA preference ratings ai'e being given material and machinery necessary for 
RADAR manufacture. 

Typical substitution and conservation of materials which may be necessary 
include: (1) 107c reduction in chlorine for bleaching paper; (2) palmetto fibre 
for palmyra fibre used in deck scrubbers; (3) paint cans of terne instead of tin 
plate; (4) various substitutes £or corrosion resisting steel; (5) fibre stock tags 
instead of zinc. 

Research is under way on plane-to-plane gun-fire. The problem is to secure 
effective fire control in order to take advantage of the full-range of the guns 
carried. [Jf] Complete coordination and cooperation is being secured from 

all Government, British and Private Agencies, it is reported. 

The obvious logical uses for lighter-than-air ships are in the detection of — and 
attack on — mines and submarines, and in the escort, when desirable, of convoys 
through the coastal shipping lanes. Steps are being taken to determine the 
value of under-water photography from airships ; this would appear to hold 
potentialities at least under some conditions. Another important project now 
underway is the development of sweeping equipment to be towed by airships for 
the destruction of magnetic mines. Corresponding equipment to be used against 
acoustic mines is also in the picture. This equipment tows on the surface and 
is energized from the airship. It has been necessary to start from scratch in 
the design and construction of this equipment but the project is considered to 
have good prospects for successful achievement. 

The average number of Naval Military personnel on the rolls during June 
1941 and the payments to retired and reserve personnel are estimated to have been 
as follows: 



Number 



Cost 



Personnel, regular— -active 

Personnel, regular— retired 

Personnel, reserve — all categories 

Total 



218,904 
17,581 
51,807 



288,292 



$18, 649, 680 
2, 520, 263 
6. 846, 131 



28, 016, 074 



CONFIDENTIAL 
BtTLLETIN 



12 Angust„19jil 

Comm^unist Party in the United States reported split with a militant group, 
believing Russia will be defeated, wanting to "headquarter" the party in United 
States or South America. 

Leahy reports Marshall Petain as saying "that Europe would suffer from 
famine and plague was already in evidence" and that the United States "was 
quick to criticize but slow to act." 

Leoft^l/ reports that the French do not believe Japan will attack Russia. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4405 

Reports of big Japanese troop concentrations on Siberian front coincide with a 
statement by Japanese military quarters that Japan expects a "decisive turn" 
in Russo-German war within the next two weeks. 

There is no clear evidence that the Russians intend to weaken their Far Eastern 
Forces by transfer of troops to the West, it is reported from Harbin (Manchuria). 

Between 18 and 2.'f Nazi submarines are reported to have recently reached 
Japan. 

Vndericater objects dangerous to navigation probably [3] mines have 
been placed in the Bako Harbor (Pescadores) area, Japan. 

Japanese 'Saval vessels reported at Cape St. Jacques, Saigon ( Cochin-China ) 
"or in the river between" are : 1 heavy cruiser, 1 light cruiser, 1 aircraft carrier, 
8 destroyers, 6 torpedo boats and 9 small minelayers or sweepers. 

Japanese aircraft factories in the Tokyo-Nagoya areas now working 24 hours 
per day, seven days a week, estimated total of 500 per month plane production. 

Nazis Circles are reported losing faith in ultimate victory. 

Finland will be rewarded by Germans with strips of Sweden and Norway, it is 
reported. 

100 light aj'mored scouting oars and about 2,000 Nazi "tourists" are reported 
near or in Algiers. 

The Vatican "apparently believes" that the tension between Ecuador and Peru 
is only temporarily relaxed and that hostilities "must" be expected to be resumed 
unless outside economic or military pressure is employed in order to enforce 
peace. 

British reported to have taken 10 or 12 Finnish ships (totaling about 30,000 
tons) detained in British ports. 

[3] Advanced progress is reported on a research project involving the use 
of properly colored lights on bridges and exposed gun-mounts which do not create 
"light-blindness" and which are not discernible from -a distance. 

In addition to contracts awarded for the Fiscal Year 1941, amounting to $2,196,- 
969,630.45, Letters of Intent have been issued to a total of $950,026,300.00 These 
letters of Intent ultimately will be superseded by contracts it is reported by the 
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. 

The raw material situation continues to become more critical and it may be 
that the problem may be more serious than has been the case with machine tools. 
The OflSce of Production Management is following the problem very closely and 
has been of considerable assistance to the Bureau of Ordnance in making distribu- 
tion to more important contractors, the Bureau of Ordnance reports. 

A survey of airplane plants covering the segregation of magnesium and alu- 
minum scrap, is reported under way. 

A special mission has been sent to London to study for the Navy and Maritime 
Commission, all matters relating to navigation, storage and distribution of 
petroleum products in the United Kingdom. 

Modern influence mines and degaussing are new. At one [-}] time dur- 
ing World War II until countermeasures were perfected, mines were accounting 
for more shipping losses than submarines or aircraft. Constant application to 
countermeasures is necessary to deal with existing types and new types as they 
appear. Studies now are under way on offensive and defensive operations in- 
cluding (1) various ship influences that can be used to Are a mine (2) surveying 
technique (3) mine recoverey (4) degaussing (5) mine, firing mechanism. A 
proving ground (Magic Carpet) will be completed shortly. Survey ranges, de- 
perming stations and wiping and flashing stations are in operation. Temporary 
degaussing now is giving way to permanent degaussing under instructions from 
the Bureaus of Ordnance and Ships and while the major studies of degaussing are 
expected to be completed by the end of this year, "degaussing will be with ns 
always". 

A Coordinator and Supervisor for all duplicating in the Navy Department is 
under consideration. Savings in cost and amount of space are excepted. 

Admiral Towers reports as far as the Navy is concerned there is no shortage of 
high octane gasoline. 

800,000 men are estimated to be in the Turkish Army. 



4406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




Mr. Secretary: 

In connection with your proposed call upon the 
President to discuss with him the proposal of the 
jSTtfpaneae Government which the Japanese Ambassador desires 
to present to him on August 28 In regard to a meeting 
of the heads of the American and Japamese Ckjvernments 
for the purpose of endeavoring to reach a peaceful 
settlement covering the Paoiflo area, observations are 
offered as follows: 

It seems apparent from the character of the docuaent 
which the Japanese Ambassador proposes to hand to the 
President, a copy of which he handed you last night, and 
various other indications that the Japanese Gbvernment 
will adopt a strategy designed to put through an agreement 
couched in general terms which will leave the apolicatlon 
of those terms wide«.open. The Japanese will probably 
argue that the situation calls for speedy action on the groQtnj 
that only in this way can there be averted the danger of 
control of the Japanese Gtovernment passing into the hani 
of the extremists, which woul»d result in the opportunity 
"ijeing lost for a peaceful adjustment of relations between 
the United States and Japan, (Our Embassy has reported 
that the Internal situation in Japan is serious and ther« 

may 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4407 




"D9 ft soimd basis for tide argument, 
prill protus^bly also argue that for this reason it ie (^s- 
mentlBl tjaat points of agreement be confined to broad 
Iquestlons leaving epeolflc details to be dealt with eub- 

faequently. 

f. 

I It will be recalled that these are the very tactics 
I 

fwhich the Japanese Ckjvernment has employed in connection 

|wlth the proposals for an understanding which were pre- 

■ eented to our Q-overnjBent last spring. It will be recalled 

i 

J too that our deliberate careful study of their nroposale 

i revealed inconeietenclee between their professions of ac- 

Iceotejice of the tDrlnclDles of respect for China's ter- 

! rltorlal integrity and of nondiscrimination in international 

i 

focwamerclaX relations on the one hand and their reluctance 




I 



on the other hand to agree to withdrawlnjr troops from 



I north China and Inner Mongolia and to relinquish in practice 

I 

t special economic principles which they have asserted in 

; China, 

Should we accede to Japan's desire to conclude an 

'. agreement first covering only broad principles, there is a 

I ganger thet we shall not have in fact reached a meeting of 

., minds on what is implied in the actual apollcatlon of 

r- 

r those principles to concrete cases. 

I We have consistently Informed the Japanese that, in 

the 



4408 CONGRi:SSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




th« llghl^f the manv pvideno«« whirth hav» com© t 

ttent^ei that the v^paneae CtoternoieKT: le pux>«iu.Xig ct 
iUaaotriofidXy opposed to the spirit vmder" the oc 

vareatlon* which you have held with tiie J*>pftne«e i^Wee 
, • ffiuet await eome clear Indication "? .r.crt.n, 

ernment'e Intenxion to pursue peacetui opoi'afts Msrore w^' 
could profitably ooutlnu© to puraue our oonY^matioas. 
It i« thought that the President may wish to re^^wnfeasl? 
to the Japanese Ambaesador ^^■^ rieiifs ^^ -• 

remain unohaneed. He ©ay wiaa xo recall to tii© AaiJ^»«&.v 
that in addition we found diu'ing tii^ 

vereationa difficultias srlBlnfr •' «ltic 

of the Japane 8 f» JJor-" '"■"--=• 
the Axis; (2) the ii.'ieritJLon or Iha •- 

to retain troops in ChJLneise territory afain^ 

ooanttunlatio act::^vitlear i^na (?) l*z^ 
tlon of '•'•'^ ..^-^1^ ,. 

dconoffilc ooop 



^nt m&. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4409 




>lftce. It would be helpful at this time If the *ir nnes© 

'flk)vernsjent could give eome practical evidence of 

intention to readjust ita position and to pursue 6oui's. 

of peace; the giving of such practical evidence would not 

-mly contribute toward convincing the American people 

the world at large of the earnestness of th« Jap€mese 

declared 
Governaient' 3/intentiong, but would also aerve, it is be~ 

llevedj, to aafce enfler the task of bringing about recon- 
ciliation between Japan and "'■•-•-< ^' accordance with 
Japan's earneetly professed aesire, ue might «ay that 

nese Ctovernment ie In a far better postitlon to 
toov than 1© the i^vermaent of the United States what 
^iiyo.^ .. ■-•'•""^ed to do byway of giving practioal 
evidenoe of ice inteatione, this Q«vernaent hesitates to" 
iuggeet oonoreta meaeurea wiiioh the Japaaese Sofernment 
might taic?.. 

'ii'.se r-tfjaid»nt aight then in oonolualon say thst hej 
to learn fr<»i %h» AialMuss&dor of the Japanese 9ov- 
e.i^aaient ' s de«lre to pursue peaceful .courses; th;y. he wil,l._ 

':>■; "■'; . ■' ■. f?lvff 3c.rt"^ft5l sti/rl'J- t -:. the tiar,ST» ■>:'',' • ■ " • ;-; 



., *^3?.S-S" 



oae .giV'^a 



-.iii a^ 



Tapajoeee So-ireraffient' 
iXt and ?rljice Koaca, 'Whi. 



aeet.tttg b*twt?0tl'' 



Freelci!? 



fr'" * 




79716 O — 46 — i)t. 20 29 



4410 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



r 



'-■■mff^m^-iissEi 




to try and arrange euoh « meeting, he feels that precedent 
*,o the taXinti place of such a meeting there should be a 
aeetini.; of minds "between the two Q-overnmentfi on fundamental 
principles, as It would he most unfortunate from the point 
of view of both G-overnments If when such a meeting taJcee 
place there should ensue a failure to arrive at a mutually 
satisfactory agreement. 



PE:Baliytfhe:MHP 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4411 

Admiral Richardson lunched with President Roosevelt 
on Jxily 8, 1940 at one o* clock. 

Admiral Richardson had an appointment with President 
Roosev-lt on July 11, 1940 at twelve o'clock noon. 

Admiral Richardson and Gov, Leahy lunched with President 
Roosevelt on October 8, 1940 at one o'clock. 



4412 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 







Ttk OoaBumdiog Offle«r of the 4th B«gliMnt of U.S. 
HarinaB bsllsves tb&t Japan vill soon aet toward tha re> 
aoTal of French and British foroes from Shanghai baaing 
their action on an enCorcement of neutrality. They are 
planning on seizing the French and British areas and 
specifically plan to prevent clsj eztexusion of our sector. 

The CinOAF suggests that a ooRplete rcTision of the 
SettleBeat defense plan is necessary between the Japanese 
and Americans and posaibly the Italians. He does not 
believe that we can entrust the safety of our Nationals, 
in the present British and French concessions to the 
Japanese protection » for several reasons: i.e. 

(1) the Japanese Oomaander at Shanghai has sub- 
ad tted a ooB^rehenslTe plan to Tolcyo for 
entering the French and British 'Settlaaents, 
taking over the defense areas by the Japanese 
Aray and Bavy and disaraiing the French and 
British^ troops* if not evacuated. 

(2) A siaiilar plan has been proposed for tJ» French 
Sett lamest at Bankow. 

(3) "^ese Japanese plana are to be wcecuted under 
the galso of nentrality enforocsMnt and the 
Japanese then plan on proposing a revised de> 
fense plan. 

(4) The Japanese are eng(MB«<i tn extensive hostilities 
on two frcaits iteleh «ight require the withdrawal > 
of their forees at any time; thereby leavijjg ttie • 
Settlea^ts unprotected. 

In view of theae reasona and to effect trae neutralitx 
the CittCAF intends to propose that the United States take 
over the defense of all evaonated sectors^ with possibly a ^ 

certain asAtsnt of acBall adjuslsseats on departtires <fro!& the 
^aropoeed. ^e OinOAF has talked this matter over wi.th the 

'■>\il cs^en*ra3-. 



fi^ UaI^vwa Jk-'fc^rv*. AJD 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4413 

MEV This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to 

anyone, (br) 

Tokyo 

Dated December 8, 1941. 
Rec'd 6 : 23 a. m., 10th 
Secretabt of State. Wasflitigton. 
1910, December 8, 1 p. m. 
Confidential 

Embassy's 1906 December 8, 1 a. m. 

One. The Foreign Minister at 7 o'clock this morning asked me to call on him 
at his oflScial residence. 

Two. He handed me a 13 page Memorandum, dated today, which he said had 
been transmitted to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to present to you 
this morning (evening of December 7th Washington time). He said that he had 
already been in touch with the Emperor who desired that the aforesaid Memo- 
randum be regarded as his reply to the President's message. 

Three. The Foreign Minister thereupon made to me the following oral state- 
ment : 

"His Majesty has expressed his gratefulness and appreciation for the cordial 
message of the President. He has graciously let known his [2] wishes to 
the Foreign Minister to convey the following to the President as a reply to the 
latter's message : 

Some days ago, the President made inquiries regarding the circumstances of 
the augmentation of Japanese forces in French Indochina to which His Majesty 
has directed the Government to reply. Withdrawal of Japanese forces from 
French Indochina constitutes one of the subject matters of the Japanese- American 
negotiations. His Majesty has commanded the Government to state its views to 
the American Government also on this question. It is. therefore desired that the 
President will kindly refer to this reply. 

Establishment' of peace in the Pacific, and consequently of the world, has been 
the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realization of which he has hitherto 
made his Government to continue its earnest endeavors. His Majesty trusts that 
the President is fully aware of this fact". 

GREW. 

HPD 



TRB This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to 
anyone. (SO 

Tokyo 

Dated September 4, 1941. 
Rec'd 12 : 17 p. m. 
Secketaey of State, 

Washington. 
Rush. 

1384. September 4, 9 p. m. (Section One). Strictly Confidential for the 
Secretary and Under-Secretary only. 
One. The Foreign Minister asked me to call this afternoon and in a long 
conversation he emphasized the desire of the Prime Minister and himself to 
make every efifort to bring about the proposed early meeting between the repre- 
sentative heads of the two governments and to make that meeting successful 
because if it should fail in achieving its fundamental object he feared that 
further efforts would be futile. With these ends in view the Japanese Govern- 
ment is prepared to place its cards face up on the table and provisionally to 
enter into certain commitments as well as provisionally to specify certain re- 
ciprocal commitments which it wouhl expect on the part of the United States, 
these points to serve as a basis for the proposed discussions [2] between 
the President and the Prime Minister. The Minister said that he had cabled 
these points this afternoon to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington but he 
asked me also to cable them to my Government because he feared the risk of 
inaccurate reporting through possible misunderstandings in the English language. 
Two. The Minister pointed out the readiness of the Japanese Government to 
concur in the points already tentatively. 

Gbew 
ALC 



4414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOft ATTACK 

TRB This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to 
anyone. ( SC) . 

Tokyo. 

Dated September 4, 1941. 
9ec'd 1 : 45 p. m. 
Secbetaet op State, 

Washington. 
Rush. 
1384, September 4, 9 p. m., (Section Two). 

agreed upon in the preliminary informal conversations which have taken place 
in Washington and furthermore that points C, D, and 3 below provide solution 
for three of the principal matters left unsolved in those conversations. He 
particularly emphasized the importance of point C because it envisages an 
interpretation of article three of the Tri-Partite Pact other than the interpreta- 
tion placed upon that article by Mr. Matsuoka. Admiral Toyoda spoke of this 
point several times in our conversation indicating the importance that he attaches 
to it. 

Three. While the Minister gave me the Japanese points in writing he urged me 
to cable them in our most secret code and I have therefore paraphrazed them 
without altering the sense, as follows. 

Four. The Japanese Government undertakes the [2] following pro- 
visional commitments : 

(A) Readiness to express concurrence in such matters as were already tenta- 
tively agreed upon in the informal preliminary conversations in Washington;) 
no (repeat no) military advance will be made by Japan from French Indochina 
against any areas adjoining Indochina and no military action will be undertaken 
by Japan against any regions lying north of Japan without justifiable reasons. 

Grew. 

RR 



NWN This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated 
to anyone. (SC) 

Tokyo 
" Dated September 4, 1941. 

Rec'd 3 : 30 p. m. 

Secbetaby of State, 

Washington. 

Rush . 

1384, September 4, 9 p. m. ( Section three) . 

C. The attitude of both the United States and Japan toward the war in Europe 
will be determined by concepts of self-defense and protection and in .iMe event 
that the United States should come to participate in that war, Japan will inde- 
pendently (repeat independently) determine the interpretation of the Tripartite 
Pact and its implementation of the pact by virtue of that independent interpre- 
tation 

D. It will be Japan's endeavor to bring Sino-Japanese relations to a normal 
and general rehabilitation, and once this rehabilitation is realized, Japan is 
prepared to withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as possible in ac- 
cordance with such agreements as may be reached between China arid Japan. 

E. So long as the economic activities of the United States in China are carried 
out on [2] an equitable basis, such activities will not be restricted. 

F. Activities by Japane in the region of the Southwestern Pacific will be 
pursued only by peaceful means and the principle fo nondiscrimination in inter- 
national commerce will be reserved ; furthermore the production and procure- 
ment by the United States of such natural resources as it may need in that 
region will be accorded Japanese cooperation ; 

Gbew 
LMS 



EXHIBITS OF JOIiSTT COMMITTEE 4415 

PM This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated 
to anyone. (SC) 

Tokyo 

Dated September 4, 1941. 
Rec'd 10:35 p. m. 
Secketaby of State, 

Washington. 

Rush. 

1384, September 4, 9 p. m. (Section Four). 

(G) Measures will be taken by Japan such as may become necessary for the 
resumption of normal trade relations between the United States and Japan, 
and on the basis of reciprocity Japan is prepared, as soon as a settlement is 
reached, to discontinue inmiediately application to the United States of the 
regulations applying to the control of transactions by foreigners. 

The American Government provisionally undertakes that : 

(A) In response to Japan's commitment set forth in point (D) above, no 
actions or measures will be taken by the United States which would prejudice 
Japan's efforts to settle the China affair; (the Minister said that this point 
referred to American aid to Chiang Kai-Shek) ; 

(B) Japan's commitment set forth in point (F) above will be reciprocated by 
the United States ; 

[2] (C) Any military measures by the United States in the area of the 
southwestern Pacific or the Far East will be suspended ; 

(D) As soon as a settlement is reached between the two countries, Japan's 
commitment set forth in point (D) above will immediately be reciprocated by the 
United States both by discontinuing application to Japan of the so-called freezing 
order and by withdrawing the prohibition against the use of the Panama Canal 
by Japanese ships. 

Gbew. 
KLP 



PM This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated 
to anyone. (SC) 

Tokyo 

Dated September 4. 1941. 

Rec'd 9 : 25 p. m. 

Secretary of State, 

Washington. 

RUSH. 

1384, September 4, 9 p.m. (SECTION FIVE). 

Five. After examining briefly the foregoing points, I expressed to the Min- 
ister the personal opinion that some of the points as set forth would appear to 
be open to very wide interpretation, to which he replied that the proposed com- 
mitments would of course be subject to discussion at the forthcoming confer- 
ence. I gather that they have been put forward by the Japanese Government at 
this time chiefly as a gauge of Japan's good faith in seeking a general settle- 
ment. The Minister suggested that the reciprocal commitments as finally 
adopted should be formulated in a secret agreement and that after the meeting 
of the representative heads of the two governments, a press release couched in 
general terms should be issued after mutual agreement. I pointed out the diflS- 
culty if not the impossibility under our democratic system of withholding from 
the [2] American public such concrete results as the proposed conference 
might achieve but the subject was not pursued. 

Six. In this connection, it seems to me that the specifications and stipula- 
tions which must be agreed upon with regard to each one of the points making 
up the provisional agreement put forward by the Japanese Government before 
any report of a concrete character could be laid before the American public 
could not be formulated in detail within the necessarily brief time available 
for the proposed conference of heads of governments. It occurs to me 

Grew. 
HTM 



4416 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

PM This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to 

anyone. (SC) 

Tokyo 

Dated September 4, 1941. 

Rec'd 10 : 50 p.m. 

Secketaey of State, 

Washington. 

RUSH. 

1384, September 4, 9 p.m. ( SECTION SIX ) . 

That the problem of publicity might be met for the time being, at the termi- 
nation of the conference, by an announcement that the Japanese Government had 
expressed concurrence with the principles of policy governing relations between 
nations which have been ennnciated by tlie Secretary of State and that a broad 
plan of adjustment of Pacific problems which would give effect to those prin- 
ciples of policy, was in process of formulation. The suggested announcement 
might further refer to the efforts of both Governments to contribute toward 
the establishment Of a world of freedom (as put forward by the President) and 
conclude with an expression of gratitication tliat progress toward such an end 
had been achieved without sacrifice by either nation of its just and legitimate 
aims and aspirations. 

Seven. The Minister said he understood that [2] Admiral Nomura 
had seen the President again yesterday but that the Ambassador's report of the 
conversation had not yet been received. I replied that I also was without infor- 
mation of that conversation. 

Eight. The difference in the tone and substance of the Foreign Minister's 
statement to me as conveyed by Mr. Terasaki on August 29, as reported in my 
1347, August 29, 9 p.m., and his statement today, is manifest and is significant 
of the earnest desire of the Japanese Government to reach a general settlement 
with our country. (END OF MESSAGE). 

Grew. 
KLP 



War Department, 
Office of the Chief of Staff, 
Washington, September 9, 19^. 
Memorandum for the President : 

The following extract from a personal letter from General MacArthur to me 
may be of interest to you : 

"The Philippine Army units that have been called are now (August 30) mobiliz- 
ing in a most satisfactory manner and the whole program is progressing by leaps 
and bounds. President Roosevelt's proclamation had a most momentous effect 
throughout the Far East. Locally it changed a feeling of defeatism to the highest 
state of morale I have ever seen. It was hailed with the utmost enthusiasm 
by all classes. You, Secretary Stimson, and the President may congratulate your- 
selves on the excellent timing of the action. 

"I wish to express my personal appreciation for the splendid support that you 
and the entire War Department have given me along every line since the forma- 
tion of this command. With such backing the development of a completely ade- 
quate defense force will be rapid." 

By commercial vessels from San Francisco on August 26th and September 8th, 
the following personnel and materiel have been shipped to Manila. 
One antiaircraft regiment 

One tank battalion (less one company) with 50 tanks 
Fifty latest model P-forty pursuit planes, along with ammunition, and 
some other items of materiel. 

The departure of the Flying Fortress squadron from Hawaii was delayed be- 
cause of the run-way at Wake Island. It is now en route and arrived at New 
Britain this morning. It should be in Manila tomorrow, or the next day. 

General MAcAnTHini, 

Chief of Staff. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4417 




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4418 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




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THE UNITED STATES HIQH COMMISSIONER 
MANILA 



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My dear Mr. President t 

I deeply appreciate your letter of Axigust twenty - 
third. To know that I hare your "fxtll oonftdenee* In 
these oritioal times means everything to ae and enable* 
us to go forward under full steam to oarry out your 
polloiee in this far part of the world, 

Xour epeach of September eleventh, atlrred our eouls. 
I pray that our country may be united 1<X)J5 behind you. . 
So other course aeeme to ae possible. America caimot 
surrender to lawless German aggression on the higheeae 
in l^hl any more than in 1917« **y profound admiration 
goes out to you aa the leader who hae forced American 
public opinion to face this issue and to face It before 
it is too late. 

In this part of the world I beliere our policy of 
firmness and fairness is bearing fruit, IVo» ail I can 
learn Japan's march Southward is halted at least for the 
present; and I believe that if an open break with us and 
with England can be avoided she will ultimately hang her- 
self. Her ill-chosen policies are placing her in a more 
and more impossible position. Indeed the danger Is that 
she hae left herself no face-saving way out. 

Here In the Philippines all at piresent Is going well. 
General MacArthur is progressively incorporating Filipino 
troope into the American Army. President Queson and other 
Commonwealth officiala are loyally cooperating. I think 
there is no question ae to the sincere loyalty of almost 
all elements of the Piliplno people to the American flag, 
fhe realization is being forced hone to them every day 
that without the protection of America thay have no chance 
either of independence or autonomy. 

President <)ueson has had another setback in hie long 
and slow recovery. He has to Halt hisaaelf strictly in 



hie 



The President, 

Tne White Bouse, 

Washington, D.G. 

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4420 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



<;ivltl9« and h&s lost the vigor and fire that 
with robust h«sXth. X foar that b« ■ay navar r*- 
ar them. -6 

Au^at twentf-elghth was tha daadline for noai* 
natloofl of oandidataft for tha alaotion on Novaabar 
alavanth of Prasidant, Tioa Praaidant, 84 Sanatora ' 
^nd 98 Rapravantativae. /Tha alaotion of Kr. Qua»on 
■'R I'raaidant and of Xr, Oii»ana aa Vica Pratidant ara 
foragona oonolualona. To all intants and piirpoaaa 
there la only a alngla political party hare and un- 
l«as M3>« (%u8>»on'e health ahoxtld fail hia alaotion 
will ba aliisost u»dl»j>utad, Tha ll«t of Zh Senators 
«o ba alacted tindar the new Conatltutiocal aaendaentB 
wae Tirtually «ad« up by Mr. Q^ai^on hiaaalf, with 
tha aid of his principal aeaoolataa, bafore tha oon- 
ventlon aat, tha ^00 dalegatea Beating in convention 
approved the list without a die^aentlng voice. Tha 
result will be a farther atrangthaning of Mr. Quaton'e 
polltioal power. 

During the pe^et two -sontha our office hae been 
working hard on asport control and foreign funde con- 
trol. Eaoh of these hae been functioning smoothly 
and wall and we have raoeivad full oooperation fron 
the OoBBaonwaaith (Jovernaant officials. Through them 
we have been enabled to build up effective aoonomie 
amaatent in this part of the world. 

With continuing admiration, believe me, 

Ever slncerel/ youre, 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4421 



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4422 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Sept. 18, 1941. 
Memorandum for the President : 

There has been submitted to this oflice by the Office of Price Administration 
and Civilian Supply, Office for Emergency Management, a proposal that $3,400,000 
be allocated by you to that agency, from the -Eniergency Fund for the President", 
for the purchase and maintenance (on a revolving basis) in the Island of Oahu, 
T. H., of a six months' re.serve (approximately 85,010 tons) of basic foodstuffs 
and feedstuffs for the civilian population, poultry, and livestock of that island. 
In brief, this proposal is based (1) upon the fact that the Island of Oahu, under 
existing conditions, imports approximately sixty percentum of all its food re- 
quirements, and (2) the fear that conditions may arise in the Pacific during the 
present emergency which would cut off or seriously curtail such imports. While 
losses tTirough deterioration is to be expected, it is the contention that the J[)ulk 
of the capital investment would be recovered at the end of the emergency. 

The question at issue has been investigated by this office and a conference held 
with representatives of the agencies concerned, as a result of which the following 
facts and opinions have been obtained : 

1. A representative of the War Department (Colonel Russell, War Plans 
Division, General Staff) advises that, while that Department would not be op- 
posed to the carrying out of the proposal in question, since it might relieve the 
Army of the possible' necessity of aiding in the feeding of citizens of the Island 
of Oahu, that the Department would not assign a very high priority to such a 
proposal, nor, if such funds were applicable, divert any part of its National 
Defense funds thereto. He was of the opinion that the probability of a situation 
arising which would seriously interrupt the flow of necessary food supplies from 
the West Coast of the Continental United States to the Island of Oahu was 
remote. 

2. A representative of the Navy Department (Captain Lowe, Office of Chief 
of Naval Operations) expressed the view that his Department did not look upon 
the building up of a six months' food reserve in the Island of Oahu as an emer- 
gency matter and had no fear that the importation of the necessary food supplies 
for that island would be cut off or curtailed by enemy action. 

[2] 3. A representative of the State Department (Mr. Stanley K. Horn- 
beck, Adviser on Political Relations) was of the opinion that action on the 
part of the United States Government in building up a reserve food supply in 
Hawaii would have a bad political effect, and give the impression that this 
Government was uneasy regarding the security of Hawaii and the further im- 
pression that it had in contemplation some offensive move, which might create 
a war situation in the Pacific; that creation of either or both of these impres- 
sions would be to our disadvantage; that he did not believe Hawaii was in 
any danger; that we are not contemplating a movement which would bring 
that region in danger ; and that even if a war situation developed in the Pacific 
it would be a long time, if ever, before the line of communication between our 
coast and Hawaii would be cut. 

4. As previously indicated, the proposal of the Office of Price Administration 
and Civilian Supply for the creation of a food reserve in the Island of Oahu, 
is deemed by that agency to be a necessary precautionary measure, which should 
be undertaken at this time by the Federal Government. It is stated that this 
proposal is considered by the Governor of Hawaii and his Emergency Commit- 
tee as the best and only sure method of preventing unnecessary hardships to 
the civilian population in that Territory. 

5. This question of a reserve food supply in Hawaii was submitted to j-ou 
in May 1941, by Mr. Wayne Coy, Liaison Officer, Office for Production Man- 
agement, and you advised him that he might speak to the Secretaries of War 
and Navy about it, but that your own feeling was that it would be a mistake to 
build up a food reserve in Hawaii at the- present time, especially because it 
would, in all probability, be possible to send food to Hawaii. 

6. In the fall of 1939 there was a shipping strike on the Pacific Coast. Being 
forewarned, the Importers of the Territory of Hawaii took steps to increase 
the volume of imports of foodstuffs. As an indication that the importers of 
Hawaii are presently looking ahead, because of existing world conditions, sta- 
tistics of the Department of Commerce show that for a five months' period, 
January-May, 1941, Hawaiian imports of only 8 basic food commodities for 
civilian consumption were increased over a similar period of 1940 by 8,130 tons. 



EXHIBITS OF JOIjSTT COMMITTEE 4423 

COMMKNT AND RECOilMENDATION 

1. A review of import statistics would indicate that the merchants of Hawaii 
are capable of building up a substantial reserve of basic food supplies. Coop- 
eration of the Governor and his Emergency Committee might reasonably be 
expected to insure the creation of a reasonable reserve. 

[3] 2. It would appear, from views expressed by representatives of the 
War, Navy, and State Departments, that it would not be a difficult task to pro- 
vide adequate food supplies for the civilian population and our armed forces 
in Hawaii in the event of an emergency in the Paci^c. 

3. In the opinion of the representative of the State Department the creation 
of a food reserve in Hawaii at this time by the Federal Government, under 
existing conditions in the Pacific, would be detrimental to the interests of the 
United States. 

4. If conditions should so change as to make it necessary for the Federal 
Government to provide for the food requirements of the civilian population of 
Hawaii, it is believed that, with funds immediately available from the "Emer- 
gency Fund for the President", no difficulty should be experienced. It does not 
appear that existing conditions warrant such action at this time. 

. 5. It is recommended that the request of the Office of Price Administration 
and Civilian Supplies for an allotment of $3,400,000 from the ''Emergency Fund 
for the President", for the purpose hereinbefore outlined, be disapproved, at 
least for the time being. 

(Signed) Hakold D. Smith, 

Director. 



The White Hquse, Washington 

Hyde Paek, N. Y., September 28, IHl. 
Confidential 

Memorandum for the Secretary of State 

I wholly agree with your pencilled note — to recite the more liberal original 
attitude of the Japanese when they first sought the meeting, point out their 
much narrowed position now, earnestly- ask if they cannot go back to their 
original attitude, start discussions again on agreement in principle, and .re- 
emphasize my hope for a meeting. 

F. D. R. 



4424 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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X tfelLaiE, iKWtt^r^ tJWit tlwi tot*! ^SiatribaUim of 
t^** »wr I»9«IMK>« &»tiMNm f«femary -^94^^ «wl <lttly I948ii 
•• «$M»(;ti<«ii'' e«v ewfe .»•«&» Mtd '"::,« i^iti«i»^ is aot & 
l^r<»9«r strat^io Siitril9Utios« Zt amma to mm tluit 
aftor 9»&riifti7 no?* of tdai«»« al«t»« ttum ^vo imw i>*«(i 
aUo«»t«« siMuU go t.o urn l^itiMu 

X b«U*v« It i« »or« iA^tarUat •tr«tocleftUjr to 
i^To Om »r&tljil» fSjf^Um tlMMHi |4«o»» in eowtet «MB it 
jU to atPMiMrt^ffiR ottr S^frfot^idliittd vsdX «itl» 4'»«a«ifMi 

Z »lab yoa sovOUS ozcsla* Agftla «itta |H»rtlettl«r 

joforMMMi to tSu* A-««iaU5» bo«iHir - cad X rofor no* 
mxXn^timkf to titi«r t«» »•» tjriwf' <af lK»id»«r ottb sufor- 

«)uirsota ^ *« to «lw«iaMir or aot tiMtro om w>t bo « 
«Utrl3tertlo» oWieli •£«« «itFO 100 to X50 aoro of tbo»o 
4*<io«l»* Mii*«ra to tlw IN^ti«ii »ft«ip rofermry aoatt Iw* 

S^rlor to <lialjr 1 tlemft jro« ficw r««ow»«»l* 

X t&m^ it i« l*porta«t to aeko tbi» 4««i»S.oa «t 
M o«ri7 « <SAto ti« s«»«lU« !>•«««»• of t&e R««««si^ 
of «(iul|H^ii« tiMW vltn l^rrr otalpnottt* 

Stoo ioMVftUo 

!iLa/i»b 

10/13/41 

VM^jir ./^ :>'^: 





EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4429 

THE WHITE HOUSL 
WASHINGT 



Lear dT» President: 




October i4^ ^^1 




' » 



There is attached a Euggested iette 
to i:>ecretary Stimson. 

There will foe a minimum of 675 of t 
new 4~ engine bombers made prior to July 
and the schedule provides for the British 
to receive only about I'Zu of the&e. 

You can readily see that we couJ-d 
handle the Philippine and Hawaii business; 
as well as other important strategic centers^ 
and still give the British 100 to 150 more 
than is now planned. I think the Philippines 
reqalre 101 more planes and, as I recall, 
fla'^aii about 50, 

The Army plans to use. the balari 
Panaxaa, the Caribbean, Newfoundland, 
land, Iceland, et cetera^ 

4 

I have no doubt that these hi.-,, •■■-'.••rs-. : 
are needed in all, of these places hau it 
simply a question of relative i.^sportances.. 

¥ery sincerely yours. 




HAREY L. HOPKIiiS ., 



Enclosure. 



The President, 

The IShite House, 



4 



4430 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



SECRET 



WAR OERARTMCNT 
WVASHINOTOM 



8«pt«ab*r 22, l^U 



lb* PrMldenty 

Thm Whit* HofOM. 

Dmut Mr. PrMtMcBti 

In «e4»ovdazie« with yaar l«tt«r of 8ept«ftb«r 18 an mtttimtim' 
but hami muLb to ladieata tb« total manber of AnerleMi boilt air- 
er&ft prodnoad Isatveen Ootobar I, IWL *oA July 1, 1942 aiiieh, la 
agr opiaioa, eould ba slv«i i^> for aaqport to othar natioDs vlthoat 
too ilUBji^roaaly radaeliaig tha dtf aiuilva atarangth of o«r Tital 
ou^poata and taak foreaa. that aatiaata la praaentad In tha fom 
of a taULa, and la att&elMd a« Tab A. It la baaad vpaa aljiiwaa 
allooatlooa to ttva Aragr ^uad Waery to fulfill thalr aoat urgwat 
noada. 

It will ba aa«i ft^m thla table tte.t tlia eaqwrUt grantad 
ia «aob tHjuu coceapt tbat of foGovanglaa bo«ibera» aa wall aa la 
tba total af all olaaaaa^ far aicctaada tha rola of thnab of 50 
paraaat MHttioBad ia jt>fir latt«r» Aftar aoat OKrefol ooasidara> 
tion, I haiva oaaeladad that X eaa aot approra of tha apptLioatlon 
of that rala to tha f o«GCMmgia» boabar elaaa oa idil^ aa hava 
alraady takaa aaah haa^jr dafsmaata* Tha foUoaljig tabla ahova 
tk*aa dafaraaata, laolaiiag tha forthar eoatribatloaa abicAi aa 
JTaal mt eaa aaka aoa. 

To go farthar aoiUSl]^ i^ ay opdai^aL, la|>oaa a riicA: aptm tha" 
dafasEusa of our Tital oa^posta fuSedAh aouM ba aaceaaaira. 



Vafnial Ito^ Btdaoad 



4 
3 
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1 
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AUotawat Statita )it%«t Biqporta 



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Hfawfoqndland, 

Alaaka 

Ioa3 

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South Aaorlea 
Maxlao 

ASG-X (laglnad) 




CuKI 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4431 



p?SfS:E'' 



EGRET 




lo alrplauda «r« ftT&ltaULs for toftlaiBg oi toMr~m0Mm 
pilota, for reMxrey for JkSC^l, otr for Poorto Bloo, vmdw th» 
propoMd Army AlXotMot. 

I_ fe:rlt» your p* *'*^<*"3j r ftttwatlon to Tab J * m^| Tl^ ^ 
i^ch ladi<grtgrr5apootiyoXy. j aa^bMla for t he AMy«» jriga ixg' 
tttota M>d the ^SSptrxnoa of prodoctlon wlttTg^qylrtaiii^ . 

The oajoril^ of tdl bcmbors, haavy kbA rnodlia, «vmiX~ 
aULe for export, o«imot be equipped with Sperrjr boffib si^ts or 
autonatie flight oontrol eq:i|i£»«sit« There are oe ord«r, for tihe 
Aragr> less than otae hundred and fifty sets of this aqtdpaMsit. 
Boabardaent airplanes ia addition to this anaber oast be deliranad 
without boab sights aad autoaatie fli^t eqoipMfit ubIsm the 
Hordea equipaimt, whioh is standsdrd m. aae plaiies, is released 
for export. 

Bespeotfolljr TOurs, 



*7l£^ 



A 

Secretary of lar 




tCHET 



4432 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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4434 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4435 



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BASIS OF COW^TinOH cs ism. 



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l^-risloB of InlU«l ttoit* tor iBC 1 



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U.3< Paiwavslotks Itt Mia 



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GroBjpe Airplanes vith re^erw 
23 1955 

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30 2550 



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4436 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4437 




4438 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4439 







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4440 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4441 



OONFIDENTIAI. 

BrnxETiN 

20 October 1941 

Ships in the North Atlantic are beginning to suffer the inevitable minor damage 
that operations in very severe weather brings. So far the trouble has been 
limited to minor items such as loss of bolts, damage to deck storage lockers and 
minor cracks in nonstrength structure. Steps are being taken to avoid over- 
loading ships which are to operate in that area during the winter" months. 
Winter North Atlantic is tough seagoing. It is the worst area — based on the 
International Load Line Convention, it is reported. 

Individual and personal attention is being given to requests from friends and 
I'elatives of men who may or may not have been aboard the KEARNY, it is 
reported. 

Quite a few calls are being received from. Oonfjressmen on the number of armed 
Merchant Ships sunk in World War I. The Library of Congress also has called 
a number of times for this information, it is reported. 

Newspapers are pressing for information about "Naval Control" of ship sail- 
ings from the West Coast, reports that all leaves have been canceled by the 
Navy and Army and for permission for reporters to board the KEARNY. 

[2] Scheduled deliveries reported by the Bureau of Ships : 



Ships 


Builder 


Date 


CoaFtal Minesweeper— AQRESSOR 

Coastal Minesweeper— STALWART- . . 

Coastal Minesweeper- ENERGY 

Coastal Minesweeper— CARACARA 


Oreenport Basin &i Construction Co 


10/20/41 


Snow Shipyards Incorporated.. 


10/20/41 


W \. Robinson, Incorporated 


10/24/41 


Bristol Yacht Building Company. 


10/25/41 


Submarine Tender— FULTON ... . 


Navy Yard, Mare Island 


10/25/41 


Aircraft Carrier — HORNET 


Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co 


10/20/41 


Destroyer — BRISTOL 


Federal Shipbuilding and Drv Dock Co 


10/21/41 


Submarine Chaser 


Defoe Boat and Motor Works.. 


10/20/41 


Submarine Chaser 


Westergard Boat Worksi Incorporated 


10/20/41 


Submarine Chaser 


Defoe Boat and Motor Works 


10/23/41 









Re-enlistment, under continuous service, for the year is running 76.67 per cent 
to 18 October, 1941; for the month of October, 1941, to 18 October, it is 74.62 
per cent, the Bureau of Navigation reports. 

Winter quarters being prepared Jor German Armies in N. W. Russia, indicating 
High Command reckons possibility of no great advance in that area but Ukraine 
and Caucasus armies are to fi'^ht on, it is reported. 

General Rommel again preparing Axis offensive in Libya. Scheduled for end 
of October, it is reported. 

5 submarines belonging to the Finns are reported still [3] at Helsinki 

in need of repair. Presumably, it is impossible to obtain spare parts from 
Germany. 

Russian Naval losses suffered from June 22 to 6 October in Baltic Sea reported ; 



Sunk or 
severely 
damaged 



Damaged 



Battleships 

Cruisers 

Flotilla Leaders 

Submarines 

Torpedo Boats 

Gunboats and Guard Boats. 

Destroyers 

Minesweepers 

Motor Torpedo boats 

Transports (ships) 

Barges 

Transport (boats) 

Tugs 

Sailing vessels. _. 

V.M. Boats 




3 
3 

27 
6 

31 

16 
3 
7 

96 
9 



79716 O— 46— pt. 20- 



-31 



4442 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In addition 16 destroyers, 7 motor torpedo boats, 3 mine sweepers, 3 tugs, 2 
transports (ships), 31 gunboats and guard boats and 6 torpedo boats are reported 
foundered. 34 guard boats and gun boats and 28 motor boats and small guard 
boats are reported lost on the Svir and Lake Ladoga. Likewise 1.5 barges, 14 
tugs and 28 transports of which 21 were motor boats also have been sunk. 73 
different Russian ships have been seized by the Finns "in the archipelago" and 
in ports along the coast of Finland. 

[4] \azi military chief tains "quite confident" campaign against Soviets "is 
finished" and that they will at an early date devote full attention to invading the 
British Isles, it is reported. 

Chinese reportedly expect Japan to launch an assault upon Siberia in the near 
future. Unconfirmed reports, indicate U. S. S. R. has reduced its Far Eastern 
forces to a substantial extent, the air arm is included in this reduction. 

Thailand, apprehensive "to the point of conviction", that an invasion is planned 
by Japan in the near future, is reported earnestly requesting twenty-four air- 
planes of the United States. This invasion may be launched, in 15 days, it was 
reported 15 October. 

Eight ships reported sunk by a submarine attack on a convoy niglit of 17-18 
October. Germans claim ten ships and two destroyers. 

S^jS warrior (United States 7,551 tons) reported overdue Capetown from 
Trinidad since 2 October. Believed Master may have proceeded direct without 
call at Capetown : if so, will have disobeyed routing instructions from Port 
Director Commandant Third Naval District. Ship is en route Rangoon, cargo 
China defense supplies. 

The White House, 
Washington, December 9, 1941- 
Memorandum for Miss Tully : 

In the light of what has happened in the last day or two this letter may be 
filed. It is not important for the President to take any further action" on this 
matter at this time. 

H. L. H. 



Wab Department, 
Washington, October 21, 1941. 
Strictly personal and Confidential. 

My dear Me. President : I have received your letter of October 14th in which 
you raise the question of the "proper strategic distribution" of our new four- 
engine bombers. In order to answer as carefully as possible the questions you 
raise, I have consulted the Chief of Staff, the head of the Air Forces and the 
head of the War Plans Division of the General Staff. I have also been assisted 
in forming my views by the conferences which I recently had with these gentle- 
men and their subordinates in which we hav^ gone over these same problems 
of strategy for the purpose of answering your inqury of last July as to the means 
necessary to bring this war to a successful conclusion. All of these labors have 
had a direct bearing upon the problem raised in your present letter. I hope that 
you will discuss this question fully with your military advisersbefore you make 
up your own mind upon this question. But pending such a conference I shall 
try to give you a brief epitome of my own views in answer to. your letter of 
October 14th. I do not think that they vary in any substantial particular from 
those of the gentlemen with whim I have consulted. 

1. Essentially, this question of the distribution of these planes is really not 
a static but a dynamic question. It is not to be solved by taking a map and 
computing how many planes shall be allocated to certain geographical positions. 
These new four-engine bombers now coming off the assembly line should con- 
stitute a great pool of American power applicable with speed and mobility to the 
respective spots where in the interests of our national strategy of defense it is 
important that such power should be applied. 

These planes themselves are not individually a finished element of such power. 
They must be manned with crews, trained first in individual operation and then 
in group operation, before they become the vital elements of this pool of power. 
The process of commissioning a plane is not unlike the process of commissioning 
a battle.ship, and you know how long that takes. The melancholy list of casual- 
ties which have recently occurred to our planes in the hands of British pilots is a 
reminder of the danger of trying to shorten this time and to use such planes with 
hastily trained crews. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4443 

[2] Again, the panorama of the theatres of action for our defense is con- 
stantly and rapidly changing. The relative importance of the different theatres 
of action varies greatly at different moments. This precludes static allocations 
or conceptions. The number of our planes at strategic points must be susceptible 
of rapid reenforcement and change. The ability thus to throw great massed 
power upon a given place at a given time is one of the essential elements of an 
effective use of air power. Germany in her use of air power has shown thus far 
supreme skill in her ability to mass her air force at different places at different 
times. The fate of the war conceivably may hang upon the length of time within 
which we can throw an overpowering force of these planes into a given theatre. 

The center of. all of these operations is the United States. There the planes 
are manufactured. There their combat crews are trained. There their group 
formations are organized and tactically instructed. From that as a center it 
should be possible in times of opportunity or necessity to send these trained com- 
bat units out as reserves to such theatres of action as need them. At present 
you will remember from my. letter of September 22nd that the minimum number 
of ten groups of these planes, to which we have been reduced by the exigencies 
of the demands of outside nations, does not jjei-mit the retention of any such pool 
as I have described above within the continental United States. Nor does it 
provide the absolute essential of enough equipment in the shape of four-engine 
bombers to train the large number of combat pilots and crews which will be 
needed to maintain our air forces in the various theatres of defense of the United 
States. This in itself shows the fundamental error of a static conception and 
the results which will follow from a merely geographic allotment of the planes. 

What is happening today in the Pacific exemplifies the importance of the fore- 
going principles. A strategic opportunity of the utmost importance has sud- 
denly arisen in the southwestern Pacific. Our whole strategic possibilities of 
the past twenty years have been revolutionized by the events in the world in the 
past six months. From being impotent to influence events in that area, we 
suddenly find ourselves vested with the possibility of great effective power. 
Indeed we hardly yet realize our opportunities in that respect. We are rushing 
planes and other prepai-ations to the Philippines from a base in the United States 
which has not yet in existence the number of the planes necessary for our im- 
mediate minimum requirements in that southwestern Pacific theatre. This is 
a result of our deferments to the British of last year. From nowhere but the 
United States can come the needed planes, the crews, the equipment, and the 
training. Yet even this imperfect threat, if not promptly called by the Japanese, 
bids fair to stop Japan's march to the south and secure the safety of Singapore, 
with all the revolutionary consequences of such action. As you well know, how- 
ever, the final success of the operation lies on the knees of the gods and we can- 
not tell what explosion may momentarily come from Japan. If we had the 
reserve necessai-y in the United States, we should not be in this present period of 
uncertainty. 

Simultaneously with this southwestern Pacific opportunity, another such chance 
is opening in the northwestern Pacific. Vladivostok is one of three gateways to 
Russia. The Archangel gate may be closed at any moment. The Persian Gulf 
gate is insignificant in capacity. The propinquity of Alaska to Siberia and the 
Kamchatka Peninsula and the facilities" which we believe (although we have 
not yet had opportunity for testing them) exist in that neighborhood, present us 
with the opportunity for another use of these bombers supplementary to the one 
I have just described in the south. That locality can possibly form the base of 
a northern pincer movement of American influence and power, this time not only 
to protect against aggression of Japan but to preserve the defensive power of 
Russia in Europe. Its opera^tion would fit into and supplement the operation 
from the south by permitting a circular sweep of these bombers which would 
greatly increase their safety by permitting those in the south, after passing over 
Japan and stopping at Vladivostok, to proceed to safety in the north in a way 
similar to the sweeps which Germany is now employing through the North Atlantic 
from Norway to France. The power of such a completed north and south opera- 
tion can hardly be over-estimated. The control over the Western Pacific which it 
would open could hardly fail to have immense iwwers of warning to Japan as 
well asof assurance to Russia. It might well remove Japan from the Axis powers. 
But it will require the existence of an adequate force of these bombers — even 
greater I believe than the minimum requirements stated in my letter to you of 
September 22nd. At present under the system of allocation we are planning but 
one group for Alaska. That 1 believe woul be quite inadequate. And my feel- 
ing is strongly reenforced by information which I have just received from General 



4444 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

DeWitt who is responsible for tlie Alaska station. Today there are not more 
than two four-engine bombers in the whole of Alaska. 

2. I have dwelt thus far on the Pacific front of our national peril because that 
is the one in which the threatened danger from Japan and the counter opportunity 
for us to take the initiative has first ripened. Our northeastern front in the 
northern Atlantic is, however, the main theatre of the present war. There we 
are already in iictual naval combat with Germany. The four-engine bombers 
which we have proposed to place- in Newfoundland are not designed to repose 
idly in the hangars of that outpost during the present emergency. They are to 
form the reserve component of a team of such four-engine bombers of, which the 
advance unit is to be in Iceland, only seven hours away by air. This takes on 
an added importance with the approach of the coming winter during which 
[.^J time the long range flying boats of the Navy now engaged in the North 
Atlantic and based on Iceland may be restricted by ice conditions in the harbors 
where they ordinarily land. In other words, we contemplate the possibility 
of sweeping operations by these long range bombing planes and have planned to 
place them in these separated bases to facilitate that purpose as well as to pro- 
tect against air attack on either base. Our past deferments to Great Britain 
of the B-24 bombers have contributed to the delay in the establishment of these 
two bases. Six of these four-engine bombers have just been sent to Newfound- 
land. None is yet at Iceland. 

The daily increasing peril of the northeastern Atlantic is evidenced only too 
clearly by the recent incident of the Kearny. As you know from our talk the other 
day when General Embick was present, I am much concerned that steps should 
be taken as promptly as possible to secure the defense of our principal bastion in 
the northeast, namely the British Islands. That safety will not be secured by a 
comparatively insignificant trickle of planes, unequipped, unmanned, and unor- 
ganized for battle formation. The situation requires far more radical treatment 
than that. It requires treatment which will make safe beyond peradventure, a 
favorable decision of the battle of the Atlantic as well as the defense against in- 
vasion of the British Isles. I have already stated my views to you on that subject 
and I shall not repeat them here, except to say that I think the time is coming 
rapidly when these radical steps should be taken. Otherwise I fear lest some 
morning we be caught napping by a surprise German attack. All that is germane 
for me to say in respect to my present letter is that I believe, in the light of this 
situation and of Britain's safety alone, that it is better for her to have in the 
world a potent, well-armed, friendly American air force than a few additional 
planes. 

Quite apart from that, there remains the question of the possible impairment of 
the defensive power of our own country which it is always our first duty to secure. 
Giving full tribute to the enormous service which has been rendered and will con- 
tinue to be rendered to our own defense by our furnishing weapons to hard-pressed 
nations already fighting in a cause common to us all, I believe that the moment 
has now come when we should' give our primary attention to the prompt develop- 
ment of a well-armed, well-rounded, and well-trained American air force. And I 
have, after using the most careful consideration and study, reached the conclusion 
that it would be unwise to divert further production from the Army air forces 
until such time as the minimum requirements stated in my letter of September 
22nd are fully completed. 
Faithfully yours, 

Henbt L.Stimson, 

Secretary of War. 

The President, 

The White House. 



The White House, 
Washington, October 25, lyjfl. 
Cable to Sayre 

(To go through Interior Dept. ) 
State Department feels Manila such focal point at this time it is preferable post- 
pone proposed visit. Al.so that when you make the trip you go to visit Gauss 
Instead of as guest. Sumner suggests we a.sk Gauss to make brief visit to you for 
consultation in order to establish closer liaison in defensive preparations. 

Furthermore I think you should be at Manila on account problems export and 
freezing controls in addition to general Far East activities. 

F. D. R. 
The original of this message sent to the Secretary of the Interior. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4445 

DiSPAETMENT OF STATE, 

Washington, October 22, 1941. 

MKMOKANDUM for the PilESlDENT 

In view of the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet and general develop- 
ments relating to the Far East, it is believed that Manila has at this time 
special signiiicance as a focal point. It is therefore suggested that it would 
be preferable that Mr. Sayre postpone his proposed visit to Chungking. It is 
suggested further that when he makes a trip to Chungking he go to visit Am- 
bassador Gauss rather than go as the guest of General Chiang Kai-shek. 

In the meanwhile, might it not be well for me to suggest to Ambassador 
Gauss that he make a brief visit to Manila for purposes of consultation with 
Mr. Sayre? Such a visit at this time would have, it seems to me, two advan- 
tages: (1) Such a visit would be generally interpreted as directed toward 
establishing closer liaison between American defensive preparations in the 
Philippine Islands and this country's interest in [2] China's defensive 
activities, and (2) Mr. Gauss has been going through a specially ti'ying pe- 
riod at Chungking and would doubtless be considerably benefited by a brief 
change. 

As you know, we now have a number of important problems relating to the 
Philippine Islands connected with our export and freezing controls. Also, 
there is the constant problem relating to coordination of our activities in the 
Far East and the activities of the British and the Dutch in that area. In ref- 
erence to these problems the presence of Mr. Sayre at Manila seems advisable 
and, in view of their importance, there does not seem to be available a suitable 
replacement for Mr. Sayre at this particular, juncture. 

A proposed radio message to Mr. Sayre is attached for your consideration. 

C. H. 

Enclosure : 

Proposed radio 
message to 
Mr. Sayre. 



The White House, 
Washington, October 22, 1941- 

Memorandum for the Secretary of State 

For recommendation this afternoon or evening, if possible. 

F. D. R. 

Letter to the President, dated October 8, 1941, from United States High 
Commissioner Sayre, asking permission to accept invitation of Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek to visit China sometime in December, if a"pproved by the 
President. 



October 22, 1941. 

Radio message from the President to Mr. Sayre. 

Referring to your personal and confidential letter of October 8. 

In view of the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet and of developments 
in general in and relating to the Far East, I believe that Manila has at this 
time unusual significance as a focal point and your work there is especially im- 
portant. I therefore believe that it would be inadvisable for you to be absent 
at this time. I am considering suggesting that Ambassador Gauss make a visit 
to you. 



4446 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



THE UNITED STATES HIQH COMMISSIONER 

MANILA 

▼la aira»ll October «, 19»H. 

feraonal and confidential 

Uy dear Mr. Presidents 



I have Just reoeived a letter froa Mr. Owen Lattlaore 
in Chungking dated Septeaber 2X, 19*H, saylngt 

"Mow that the really bad bwsblng season in 
Chungking Is over, and t1 el tors need not feel 
that most of their time Is likely to be spent in 
dugouts, the Qenerallsslao and Xadane Chiang 
Kai-shek would like very auch to have you and 
lire* Sayre oome to China for a Tlsit. 

"Before sending a formal iniritatlon, the 
OeneralisslBo has asked ae to find out lAiat tlae 
would suit you best. ♦♦♦ If I aay add a word for 
myself, I should like to say how eagerly I hops 
that you will be able to ooae. Tour visit would 
have the very greatest construotlve value in 
Chinese«*AffierlcaDi relations," ' 

Such a visit would have so dlreot a bearing vtpon 
Chinese-Aaerican relations that I do not feel that I ou^t 
to aot in the aatter without the advice of yourself and 
perhaps the State Department. I, myself, believe that 
such a visit would be useful in marking still closer cor- 
diality and cooperation between China and the 0nited Statei 
and might have a very wholesome and happy effect. On the 
other hand, you may feel that the international situation 
in the Pacific is so tense that you do not want ae to leave 
Manila even for a short visit. What is your deslret If 
you approve of ay going, would it be preferable. to accept 
the invitation of the Oeneralissimo and go as his guest, 
or to go perhaps as the guest of Ambassador Gauss on a 
private visit to hiat M shall greatly appreciate a radio 
from you letting ae know what answer you would like ae to 
give to the invitation of the Generallssiao, 



If 



The President, 

The White House, 

Washington, P. C. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4447 




. 2 «. 




If I go, the timing sight b« of soma Isportanc© 
from the lnt<»matioaaX etandpolnt. I should tjuggest 
the month ofDecemher uaXets you prefer eome different 
time. 

Such a visit would moan ay being -mmj from Manila 
preeuaably about two weeks* In this eveot, do you de- 
sire the appointment of an Acting Bi^ Cktmmieeionert 
If 80« I should suggest the appointment of Mr. Woodbury 
Wlllou^by, my Plnanolal Adviser, or, if he Is here by 
that time, Mr. Stewart McDonald, about whoa I have 
written you and who, I hope, will be appointed as sQr 
Legal Adviser. 

Everything la- going smoothly here and the ship le 
sailing on even keel. Manila is becoming a crossroads 
In this part of the world and wo have a continual stream 
of important visitors with whoa I am gl€id to have the 
chance of making contacts. Sir Robert Brooke-Pophaa, 
Air Marshal in command of the British Forces in the Far 
Xast, was here over Sunday and day before yesterday Sir 
Xarle Page, Minister In the Australian Cabinet, stopped J 
over on his way from Australia via the United States to 1 
London. Each of them came to dine with me and 1 much | 
enjoyed the chance of talking with th«B. This after- 
noon Mr. Merle Cochran, Special Assistant in the freasviry 
Department, arrives by plane on his way to China and In 
a few more days I expect to see Henry Grady, representa- 
tive of the Federal Loan Agency, who is now in Hong Kong 
bo^a»d back for America, M 

With w&rmeBt wishes, believe ase, 

Kver elRoereiz/yours, 



■K^'^SU^I 



-%--^f 



4448 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 





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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



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4450 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4451 




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4452 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 






'l^rj^a^Atlott of Codfld HadiejoPMi Btfl'd Oq%. 22 






Infera hl» ihjit or th* occftslon of the «iBkiss of tbs Xftamy. 
end tJMi fill], of th» K«so7» Oabin«t, and considtrlAg th«»« 
«if«ttttt oidwmjs, I wrotie io tbei Pn>«ld«nt a l«lt«r ieSLlian; 
htn that iw ftTS raady te follov hl» rc£Bjrdl«»tt of tbo ooa- 
«ect«wiioes> Please reiterate to Secretary Ickee, at the head 
of the jyepartxe&t trhloh is In charge of Phllipplse iJTfaire, 
that ia thaee eritieal soawate, I want his to feel that v« 
are at hie eosoiand. 



Cltr Jg ZO IS 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4453 

OCTOBEE 31, 1941 

Peesident Franklin D. Roosevelt 
The White House, 

Washington, D. C. , 

My Deab Mb. President : I was deeply moved by your letter of September 26, 
1941, and all I can say is that, if elected, you can continue to depend upon my 
loyalty and support, both officially and personally. 

Your information that there is a growing confidence that the Philippines can 
be adequately defended is particularly gratifying and encouraging. As I have 
assured you in my last letter, we, on our part, are doing everything within our 
resources to meet whatever situation may arise, especially after the news of the 
bombing of the "Kearny" and the fall of the Konoye Cabinet. From time to time, 
I shall take the liberty of writing you as to the progress that we are making 
here. 

After that slight setback, I am regaining very rapidly my old health and 
strength. 

Mrs. Quezon joins me in sending you and Mrs. Roosevelt highest regards and 
best wishes. 

Devotedly yours, 

(Sgd) Manuel L. Quezon. 

MLQ/sc 



The United States High Commissioner, 

Manila, November 1, 1941. 
Via airmail 
The President, 

The White House, 

Washington, D. C. 

My Deab Mb. President : Thank you for your letter of September twenty-sixth 
enclosing a copy of the letter you wrote to President Quezon. I am so glad 
you wrote to President Quezon as you did. It flattered him greatly to receive 
your warm expressions of good will and he was as pleased as a child with what 
you said. I know that your note served a genuinely useful purpose in deepening 
his sense of loyalty to the United States and to yourself. 

Out here on the firing line I feel distressed that you are being so hamstrung 
and impeded by a divided Congress and by refractory labor groups.. The Neu- 
trality Law should have been repealed weeks and months ago and the United 
States should today be forging armaments at a pace which would make the out- 
come of the war clear to everyone. As long as Germany pursues her civilization- 
wrecking policy a fight to the death between her and the United States is as 
inevitable as the rising of the sun, for Americans will not take the defeat of 
their most precious heritages lying down. This being true, the sooner America 
can whole-heartedly devote one hundred percent of her energies to the supreme 
effort necessary to crush Naziism, the sooner the present wrecking of civilization 
can be stopped. The way you have led the American people step by step to 
understand and realize this fact has been one of the outstanding achievements 
of democracy during this time. 

We feel much more reassured out here that Americans back home under your 
leadership have come to realize the importance of building up a strong Philippine 
defense. How greatly our defenses here have been strengthened Japan also 
knows ; and that is the surest way of avoiding trouble in the Far East. 

I have been building up a fine staff of workers in the High Commissioner's 
office. They are an outstanding group; and as the work has rapidly increased 
with export control functions, foreign funds control, priority problems and a 
[2] host of additional duties due to war conditions, they have jumped into 
the breach gallantly and have carried on with great ability and loyalty. I am 
hoping that my new Legal Adviser, Stewart McDonald, whom you appointed two 
weeks ago, will arrive by the end of this month. 
Ever sincerely yours, 

Frank. 



4454 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The United States High Commissioner, 

Manila, Novemher 1, 1941. 
Via airmail 

Major General Edwin M. Watson, 
The White House, 

Washington, D. C. 
Mt Deae General Watson : Will you be kind enough to give the enclosed letter 
to the President personally? I shall appreciate your kindness. 



Ever sincei-ely yours, 
Enclosure. 



Francis B. Sayre. 



contidential 

Bulletin 

3 November 1941 

Combined Japanese Fleet reported now in Kuresaeki area, near Yokohama ac- 
cording to fairly reliable information. Same source reports elaborate plans 
joint Army-Navy occupation of Thailand complete. Invasion will follow lines 
of German Blitzkrieg in Belgium and Holland. 250 transport planes said assem- 
bled Taiwan (Formosa, Japan) Hainan (China) ready to begin move when 
ordered. Forces in Indo-China being strengthened to estimate total 100,000. 

Japanese repatri<ition ship for Lisbon has been postponed. This ship will, 
however, leave Yokohama direct from Singapore on November 7 to bring back 
about 300 Japanese subjects in Malaya. It is expected to sail from Singapore 
on November 17 and to arrive in Manila about November 21, on its way to Japan. 
Severest Oas Attack of China War reported occurred in Ichang fighting Octo- 
ber 8, 9 and 10 in which total of 340 gas shells were fired into the city. About 
1,350 gas casualties, of whom 750 died, are reported. (Unconfirmed as to use 
of gas. ) 

[2] Soviet A^'^ny and Navy Officers believe that the Russians will under- 
take intensive training behind the Ural Mountains throughout the winter, mean- 
while holding Moscow and the Donets Basin at whatever cost. On the whole 
the morale of the Russian people is first rate and no despair is being shown as to 
Russia's position, it is reported by an observer recently arrived at Kiubyshev 
after a tour to Archangel and back. 

Seven unidentified units Red Baltic Fleet reported broke through the minefields 
in the Gulf of Finland and are now either operating in the Eastern Baltic or 
heading for Sweden to intern. 

Oermans reported to have warned Spanish Qovemment that any ship sent to 
the United Kingdom will be torpedoed. 

British Empire GUILLEMOT (INDEPENDENT) on Government Service at- 
tacked and sunk by torpedo plane on October 24 off Bona Algeria. A convoy was 
attacked thrice by planes off Southwold last night (November l-October 31) 
when Greek NICOLAUS PIANGOS bombed, abandoned and wrecked and BRIT- 
ISH FORTUNE sank, it is reported from London. 

Australian Naval Board reports the shuttle service [3] by air between 
Thursday Island and Port Moresby has been established for Torres Strait pilots. 
House flag of American Scantic Line reported washed ashore Pernambuco and 
fourth raft of similar type lately come ashore Pedras Point, South of Cabed-ello. 
Senator Truman is reported pleased with the arrangements made by the Navy 
Clearing Office in connection with the activities of The Senate Committee to 
Investigate Contracts under the National Defense Program. 

Rear Admiral Lgster, Royal Navy, Fifth Sea Ivord, has made arrangement to 
return to England. As a result oi his visit to this country the Bureau of Aero- 
nautics has a more complete and up-to-date amount of information regarding 
the British naval aviation requirements for aircraft and for British pilot train- 
ing in this country, the Bureau of Aeronautics reports. 

The Bureau of the Budget held hearings on October 30 on the subject of early 
approval of the accelerated naval program of the production of 2020 airplanes, 
the most important items of which were recently set up in the regular 1943 esti- 
mate, the Bureau of Aeronautics reports. 

5 strike cases affecting Naval Defense Contracts were [4] settled dur- 
ing the week ending November 1. 18 strike cases affecting Naval Defense Con- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4455 

ff 

tracts were still open and 9 strikes were continuing on which information rela- 
tive to Naval Defense Contracts was not yet available as of Notember 1. 

Pennants han-e been airarded to the foUoic'mg stations for outstanding perform- 
ances in Public Works Construction Program dnting July, August and Septem- 
ber. This is the 2nd quarterly award by Bureau of Yards and Docks. 
Group 1 — Over $600,000 monthly expenditures : 

First— Naval Fuel Depot, Pearl Harbor, T. H. 

Second — Roosevelt Base, Terminal Island, Calif. 

Third — Naval Air Station, Bermuda. 
Group 2— From $300,000 to $600,000 monthly expenditures : 

First — Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Fla. 

Second— Floating Drydock ARD-2. 12th Naval Dist. 

Third — Destroyer Base San Diego, Calif. 
Group 3— Less than $300,000 monthly expenditures : 

First — Naval Air Station, Cavite, P. I. 

Second — Naval Air Station, Cape May, N. J. 

Third — Naval Ammunition Depot, Fallbrook, Calif. 
As of 28 October 247 reconditioned 3"/50 caliber low-angle broadside guns and 
mounts and 150 4"/50 caliber low-angle guns and mounts were transferred to the 
British, the Bureau of Ordnance reports. 

confidential 
Bulletin 

Jf November 1941 

Thailand's reaction to Japanese attack reported would depend on the assistance 
received from the United States and Great Britain. Thailand would have to have 
air support the moment invasion began ; delay would be fatal. This air assist- 
ance should protect Bangkok (Siam) and Thai air bases and provide for bombing 
of Japanese communications. Thais then would employ their own air force until 
it no longer existed, is the reported opinion of Thai Intelligence Officer. If 
help was not immediately forthcoming and Japanese bombed cities and troops, 
he thought Thai leaders would capitulate although this action would be dangerous 
in view of anti-Japanese attitude of the army. Thai Government would hope to 
be set up again by the Democratic powers after the war. 

Japanese invasion of China from Indo-China reported now a possibility. It 
would be most difficult in view of Japan's existing military over-extension. One 
to three months would be required to make the necessary concentrations of five 
to ten divisions. Successful Japanese expedition would be a serious blow to 
China's [2] power and will to resist. 

Losses to date in. Russian campaign estimated by ONI and MID as follows:- 
German (1) Personnel. 800,000 to 1,000,000 killed, wounded or missing; (2) Ma- 
terial, 25% to 30% ; Russian (1) Personnel, over 1,000,000 prisoners. Killed and 
wounded unknown but probably proportionately heavy; (2) Material, up to 
80% of equipment on hand at start of campaign. German relative strength 
vis-a-vis the Russians is growing constantly. Since Germans have or are about 
to capture 75% of Russia's war industries, this ti'end will be accelerated in next 
six months unless Russian losses are made good by outside assistance. 

Russian Black Sea Fleet reported to have left Sevastopol for Novorossisk 
(N. E. Shore of Black Sea). Fleet consisted of one old battleship, three heavy 
cruisers, two light cruisers, two destroyer leaders, twenty-one destroyers, six 
old destroyers and thirty-eight submarines. 

About 20,000 Russian soldiers reported to have gone through Kuibyshev from 
Siberia prior to October 20. These men were in good spirits but Soviet reserve 
outfits being activated have low morale. Spirit of the civilians in the Saratov 
region (E. Soviet Russia) is very low, much lower than that of the civilians 
east of there. It [3] is reported. 

British figures for October show 103 enemy ships sunk or damaged in the 
Mediterranean. 25% of Axis convoys estimated to have been sunk. Press Asso- 
citation figures show about four hundred Axis ships sunk or damaged in Mediter- 
ranean in past four months. 

Troops numbering 700,000 "judged" now in active service in Turkish Army. 
Twenty regiments reported not equipped with machine guns, either heavy or light, 
it is reported from a reliable source. 



4456 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HM shipii HMS DEVON f<ni RE, EMS COLOMBO and EMS CARTHAGE re- 
ported to have intercepted November 3, 450 miles south of Durban French convoy 
of five ships believe<l totaling 39,000 tons which left Tamatave (Miidagascar) 
October 24 for France. 

i'-Bout Hituation Novetuher 3 rriiort iiicludot: (1) four or tive in area 300 miles 
south or southeast Cape Race (Newfoundland) (2) one off Freetown ( W. Africa) 
or southeast Cape Verde Islands (3) one south of St. Helena, (Island, South 

Atlantic Ocean). ^ - rr,^. 

A new Ordnance Plant is to be opened in Macon, Georgia on November 15. This 
plant will manufacture shell fuses. It is one of th? six plants now being estab- 
lished in the [-)] current expansion program of the Bureau of Ordnance. 
Admiral Blandy, Representative Vincent and representatives of the Naval Gun 
Factory, Washington Navy Yard, will open the plant, the Bureau of Ordnance 

reports. 

During an inspection trip which Admiral MoreeU made to Norfolk, Virginia; 
November 2, to confer with the Commandant, Fifth Naval District, and the Com- 
manding General, Fortress Monroe, with regard to taking over the Chamberlin 
Hotel, for the use of members of service families, it was brought out that it is a 
not infrequent occurrence for service families to spend the night sitting in chairs 
in the hotel lobbies of Norfolk and Portsmouth, Virginia. One of the hotels is 
reported to be making a practice of renting chairs at 25<t per night, the Bureau 
of Yards and Docks reiwrts. 

Scheduled Keel Layings reported by the Bureau of Ships: 



Ships 



Ocean-Going Tug APACHE. 
Destroyer CONWAY 



Builder 



Charleston Shipbuilding and Drydock Company. 
Bath Iron Works Corp. Bath, Maine. 



Date 



n/8/41 
11/5/41 



The White House, 
Washington, November 6, 19^1 . 
Memorandum for the Secretary of State: 
To prepare a very nice personal letter for my signature. 

F. D. R. 
Letter from Hon. Manuel L. Quezon, 10/18/41, to the President, a copy of which 
has been retained for our files. In re defense of the Philippines. 

October 18, 1941. 

My Dear Mr. Pre81i>ent: Today's press reports seem to point strongly to the 
possibility of actual involvement of the United States in the war on account of 
the torpedoing of the destroyer ''Kearny". On the other hand, the course of 
recent event? in Japan is far from encouraging to those who would hope that 
there may not be armed conflict between the United States and .Japan. Should 
this unfortunate situation arise, it is but natural to expect that the Philippines 
will be the scene of such a conflict. I am, therefore, hastening to reiterate to you 
what on former occasions I have asserted, namely, that our government and 
people are absolutely and wholeheartedly for you and your policies, and that we 
are casting our lot with America no matter what sacrifices such determination 
may entail. 

Mr. President, since at a time such as this it is of the utmost importance that 
the Government of the Philippines should have complete understanding and co- 
operation with the military and naval authorities of the United States. I believe 
you will be pleased to know that General MacArthur and I are in perfect accord, 
and that the government and people of the Philippines are placing at his disposal 
everything that he needs to accomplish the great task of defending the Philip- 
pines. I could almost say as much regarding my relations with Admiral Hart, 
although, owing to the nature of the Navy's work, our connections are not so 
close and our contacts so frequent as those I have with General MacArthur. 

Mr. President, it is, of course, a dreadful thing to contemplate the horrors of 
war, but there is this consideration in which I almost find cause for rejoicing 
that such an awful situation should arise before the severance of the political 
ties now existing between the United States and the Philippines; and that is, 
because the Filipino people are thereby afforded the opportunity to prove in 
supreme efforts and sacrifices not only our deep appreciation of the great things 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4457 

which America has contributed in the upbuilding of this new nation of ours, but 
also the fact that the democratic ideals, of the United States have become our 
saci'ed heritage, and that to preserve such a precious gift we are willing to pay 
the price in blood and treasure. 

[2] With assurances of my deepest respect and highest regard, I beg to 
remain 

Faithfully yours, 

(Sgd) Manuel L. Quezon. 
President Franklin D. Roosevflt, 

The White Hmise, Washiyigton D. C. 

MLQ/sc 



Department of State, 
Washington, November 6, 1941. 

Strictly confidential 

Memorandum for the President 

Herewith, as requested, the draft of a suggested reply to the message from 
the British Prime Minister in regard to Chiang Kai-shek's appeal. 

C. H. 
Enclosure : 

Draft of a suggested reply to the British Prime Minister. 

"SC" 
novembeb 7, 1941. 
American Embassy, 
London. 

Your 5257, November 5, 5 p. m. 

Personal and strictly confidential from the President to the former naval 
per.son. 

QUOTE We have very much in mind the situation to which Chiang Kai-shek's 
appeal is addressed. While we feel that it would be a serious error to under- 
estimate the gravity of the threat inherent in that situation, we doubt whether 
preparations for a Japanese land campaign against Kunming have advanced to 
a point which would warrant an advance by the Japanese against Yunnan in 
the immediate future. In the meantime we shall do what we can to increase 
and expedite lend-lease aid to China and to facilitate the building up of the 
Ameiican volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We have 
noted that .v«u would be prepared to send pilots and some planes to China. 

We feel that measures such as the foregoing and those which you have in mind 
along the lines we are [^1 talking, together with continuing efforts to 
strengthen our defenses in the Philippine Islands, paralleled by similar efforts 
by you in the Singapore area, will tend to increase Japan's hesitation, whereas 
in Japan's present mood new formalized verbal warning or remonstrances might 
have, with at least even chance, an opposite effect. 

This whole problem will have our continuing and earnest attention, study and 
effort. 

I shall probably not repeat not make express reply to Chiang Kai-shek before 
the first of next week. Please keep within the confidence of your close oflScial 
circle what I have said above. UNQUOTE. 
FE:JWB:HES FE PA/H 



The White House, 
Washington, November 6, 19.^1. 
Memorandum for the Secretary of War. 

For preparation of a personal reply to Francis Sayre for my signature. 

F. D. R. 

Note from Hon. Francis B. Sayre, U. S. High Commissioner to the Philippine 
Islands, Manila, 10/20/41, to the President, enclosing copies of his letter to Lt. 
Gen. Douglas MacArthur, dated 9/30/41, with its enclosures (Marron reports), 
together with a copy of General MacArthur's reply to Mr. Sayre of 10/10/41, 
dealing with the organizing and stimulating of effective civilian defense prepa- 
ration in the Philippines. 



79716 O — 46— pt. 20 32 



4458 CONGRESSIONAL ixvestigatiox pearl harbor attack 



15* I'MX 



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«9bl«2i 70«, Oottwrol ll«oAr«t»a> loeift Aaatlrol I«rt 
aro oolXalwrfttlatiE In Kticiftg fO'siMM^tiOAf for tho 
Aofonso of ^M ndXtppi»9M, 

Xt i« ^r ooTttoet liopo i^M* tho oeatiftsoaor 
for idHoh pr«i»«rfttioa« «ro Itoifii **^ ^^^t-^Ll mvm- 
lariso. Sooovor, la tlio Ui^t of rooant Hiotery 



r- 



EXHIBITS OF JOIXT COMMITTEE 



4459 




4460 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




Today's press reports seem to point strongly to the 
-poOBibility of actual InvolTeoflat of the United States in 
the war on Account of the torpedoing of the destroyer 
•Kearny". On the other hand, the course of recent events 
in Japan ie far from encouraging to those who would hope 
that there Etay not be armed conflict between the United 
States and Japan. Should this unfortunate situation arise, 
it is but natural to expect that the Philippines will be 
the scene of such a conflict. I am, therefore, hastening 
to reiterate to you what on former occasions I have assert- 
ed, namely, that our government wxd people are absolutely 
and wholeheartedly for you end your policies, and that we 
are easting our lot with America no matter what sacrifices 
such determination may entail. 

Mr* President, since at a time such as this it Is of 
the utBJOSt importance that the Government of the Philippines 
should have complete understanding and cooperation with the 
military and naval authorities of the Unj^ted States, X be- 
lieve you will be pleased to know that General MaeArthur 
and I are in perfect accord, and that the gcvernaeat and 
people of the Philippines are placing at his disposal every- 
thing that he needs to accomplish the great task of defend- 
ing the Philippines. I could almost say as much regairding 
my relations with Admiral Hart, although, owing to the 
natiure of the Navy's work, our connections are not so close 
axui our contacts so fr6q.uent as those I have with General 
IteoArthur. 

Mr. President f it is, of course, a dreadful thing to 
contemplate the horrors of war, but there is this consider- 
ation in which I almost find cause for rejoicing that such 
an awful situation should arise before the severance of the 
political ties now existing between the United States and 
the Philippines; and that is, because the Pilipino people 
are thereby afforded the opportunity to prove in supreme 
efforts and sacrifices not only our deep appreciation of 
the g}^«ftt things which Ansrica has contributed in the up- 
feuilding of this n«w nation of ours , but also the fact 
;^^t the democratic ideals at the United States have be- 1 
(fiiCfBM our sacred heritage, and that to preserve such a 
reoiotts gift we are willita? to pay the price in blood 
treasure * 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4461 




With assureaoes of ms 4««post r©sr*«''t. aas 
klghest regard, I b#g to raEaalD 



• Faitlif ully your' 



AJ^o^xM^i^^ '^('^-^^ 




Proaident Fraakllii D* Booaevelt 
The IRiit© Hous« 

Washiagtos, D.O. 



4462 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



;> 



'* 



DEPARTMENT OF OTATE 
WAeHINOTON 





My dear Mr. President: 

In coi^llanc© with the request contained in the 
meaorandum whloh you attached to the ©icloeed letter, 
dated October 18, 1041, from the Honorable Manuel L. 
Quezon, President of the Comsionwealth of the Philippines 
aesiiring you of the loyalty and support of the Cioromon-*^ 
wealth, I a® enclosing a suggested reply to President 
Quezon. 

Faithfully yours. 




EnoloBurea* 



1. From the Honorable 
Manuel h, Queeon, 
October 18, 1941. 

2. Suggested reply to 
Prealdenvi Queton. 



The president. 

The White House. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4463 



■■■^«ri-!,--*SL«»Bv3;r.&^".v--''i'>'^*i.-*'PKi 










¥2ri3Sf-rir,. 



DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

WASHINGTON 

* November 15, 1941 



STRICTLY COK^IDENTIAL 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 



.iigj(/*7VO 



Vlth reference to the call which Mr./KuruBU is to 
oaJce upon you In company with the "Japanese Ambaesador on 
November 17, Mr. Kurusu may regard this first call as 
purely ceremonial ajid may not wish to initiate any dis- 
cussion. Should the occasion appear opportune, however, 
you may wish to offer comments along lines as follows: 



(1) We cannot afford to make light of the tremendous 
seriousness of the present world situation confronting us, 
I want to repeat and to emphasize what I said to Ad- 
miral Nomura on November 10. The entire world has been 
placed in a precarious position as e result of the havoc 
which has been wivjught by the forces of aggression. Our 
common sense tells us of the extreme need that the world 
come back to ways of peace. It Is the purpose of this (Jov- 
ernment to do its best in thff'splrit of fair play to oon- 
trlbute to establishing a basis for peace, stability, and 
order In the Pacific area. As a means of achieving these 
objectives it Is essential that emphasis be laid upon 
giving practical effect to a soundj, philosophy of human 

welfare. 




4464 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

-2- 

welfare. We have often and quite recently made olear 
publicly irtiat we have in mind In'thle regard. 

(2) We are fully aware that it may require time for 
Japan to turn to coursee of peace. The American people 
and Qovernment, eepeolally the President and the Secretary 
of State, have been very patient. We are ready as>1 willing 
to continue to be patient, to endeavor to work out a broad- 
gauge peaceful settlement, and to afford every practicable 
opportunity to Japan to turn to coureee of peace. 

(3) It is tremendously impoirtant that no statesman 
and no country miscalculate the attitude and the position 
of the American people and Government. The American people 
and Government are fully alive to the sinister menace \rtiioh 
all peace-loving countries are facing from Hitlerism and 
courses of aggression. This country has been slow in 
arousing itself to the dangers of Hitlerism. Today we are 
fully av^are of those dangers and are thoroughly aroused. 
Our national effort is primarily and in ever-increasing 
measure being devoted toward defeat of Hitlerism. We are 
determined to protect and preserve our national security 
against Hitlerism. 

(4) A victorious Hitler would constitute a menace to 
all other nations, including Japan. Our opposition to 
courses of aggression and to the program of Hitlerism 
stands firm. We are entirely convinced that Hitlerism 

will 



\ 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4465 



-3- 

i 

will be defeated. 

(5) We hope that our exploratory conversations will 
achieve favorable results in the way of providing a basis 
for riegotlatlona. We shall continue to do our best to 
expedite the conversations Just as we understand that the 
Japanese Government is anxious to do. We hope that the 
Japanese Government will maJte it clear that it Intends 
to pursue peaceful courses Instead of opposite courses, 
as such clarification should afford a way for arriving 
at the results which we seek. 



In view of the general character of these suggested 
comments no need is perceived of giving the Ambassador 
a written record of iidiat you say to him. 



4466 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4467 




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4468 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4469 







4470 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



DOARTMOfT or STATE 



E SECPIETARY 



lioir«ab®r 21, 19 41 



MMOMSDM FOR THE PRK8IDIOT 



I ba¥@ read the attaehtd 
ooajninieatlofi to you froa 
Ooloii®! Boaoirmn and return 
It witH tImnMs* 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4471 

The White House, 
Washinffton, November 15, 1941. 
Meniorandiim for the Secretary of State. 
To i-ead and return for my files. 

F. D. R. 

Coordinator of Information, 
Washington, D. C, November 13, 1941. 
My Dear Mr. President : The following is the substance of statements made 
l)y Dr. Hans Thomsen on Thursday afternoon, November 6, to Mr. Malcolm R. 
Lovell : 

If Japan goes to war with the United States, Germany will immediately 
follow suit. The United States has no effective way to wage war in the 
Pacific. It c(mld not denude the Atlantic to place full fleet power in the 
Pacific. 

If Tokio and Yokohama should be bombed, the Japanese would [2] 
surely bomb Manila. 

When Russia collapses, the Japanese will occupy northern Sakhilin. 
This will alleviate the oil situation in Japan, as the oil supply in Sakhalin 
is substantial and can be more fully developed. 

Japan is trying to gain time with the United States. In a way this effort 
works both ways, for the United States seems to be trying to gain time 
with Japan. In the last analysis, Japan knows that unless the United States 
agrees to some reasonable terms in the Far East, Japan must face the 
threat of [3] strangulation, now or later. Should Japan wait until 
later to prevent this strangulation by the United States, she will be less 
able to free herself than now, for Germany is now occ-upying the major 
attention of both the British Empire and the United States. If Japan waits, 
it will be comparatively easy for the United States to strangle Japan. 
Japan is therefore forced to strike now, whether she wishes to or not. 

If the United States breaks diplomatic relations with Germany, most, if 
not all, of the South American countries will do the same. 

[4] The new United States Charge d'Affaires is going to Berlin by boat, 
via Lisbon. Evidently the United States is in no hui'ry to get him to Berlin. 
This probably means that no immediate diplomatic rupture is planned. It 
is, of course, always ix)ssible that a diplomatic break may be postponed 
indefinitely. Japan and China so continued for two full years. Of course 
there is always the iwssibility that my government may tire of the un- 
declared war, and may itself break diplomatic relations. I think this is 
improbable, however. 

I was amnsed at Stalin's [.5] radio address. We have definitely 
taken prisoner, over 3,COD,000 Russian soldiers, and these men are now 
actually working for Germany, building roads, winter barracks, for our 
soldiers, and other constructive work. We are sure that at least an equal 
number of Russian soldiers have been killed. 

I am vei-y tired. I need a vacation very much. For thi-ee years I have 
had no rest. I wish we two and our wives could go to Florida for a month 
to sit on the beach in the sunshine. 

Respectfully, 

W1U.1AM J. Donovan. 



4472 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4473 



SECRET 

In reply refer to Initials and No. HRS/Hu 

Navy Department, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, 2// November 19-'fl 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 

As I told you yesterday, we are constantly studying the situation in the 
Atlantic with a view to reduction of sinkings. We have certain thoughts now 
involving possible radical rerouting which to carry through would require our 
merchant ships going all the way into British ports, as well as our naval escort 
vessels. Involved in this would be the use of United States ports for the assem- 
bly of convoys, and the use of mixed escorts consisting of United States destroyers 
and Canadian corvettes. If this scheme were adopted. United States and Cana- 
dian escorts would be refuelled each trip in the United Kingdom, and British 
escort groups would probably have to come into United Sates ports for refuelling. 

Of course we will put nothing of this sort into effect without your approval 
in principle. 

Betty. 

P. S. The movement you spoke about for 10 December is shaping up and should 
be ready to sail on time. Here's hoping we can get it through before any open 
break with Japan. 

Regarding escort from the Philippines to Hongkong, the matter is under study 

and I will give you a report later but my initial reaction is that it would too 

greatly comolicate Tommy's Hart's problem, some of which I mentioned to you 

yesterday. 

HRS. 



Chungking, November 25, 19 41. 
Lauchijn Currie 

After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's conference 
with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the 
Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated 
before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase 
Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while 
Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any "Modus Vivendi" 
now arrived at with China would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America 
and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed 
British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the result- 
ing disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery. It 
is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for 
the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence 
in the President's fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even 
the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese 
national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan's escaping military 
defeat by diplomatic victory. 

Lattimoeb. 



confidential 

Bulletin 

25 Novem ber, 1941 

General Anders, Cormnander-in-Chief of Polish forces in Russia-, is reported 
to have expressed doubt of Moscow's ability to hold out and Russian officials in 
general are reported for the first time indicating worry over the situation. 

Supplies for Russid are reported to have moved over a new Iran trucking route 
linking Persian Gulf port of Bushire with Tehran. A fleet of 250 trucks is 
available at Bushire. Other trucks, including some 15-tonners capable of carry- 
ing tanks, are expected soon from America. 



79716 O — 46 — pt. 20 33 



4474 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Several U-hoats are continitinff their movement M^estipard. Operations close 
off American ports may be expected. Submarines have reappeared off the Cape 
Verde Islands and there are indications that oi)erations are to be extended to the 
Southward as far as the Cape of Good Hope. The total number of U-boats at sea 
is gradually rising (27). There have been no attacks in the Western Atlantic 
for about fitrcc iveeks. 

A Uir(jc part of Cervmn Nnral Personnel now enroute to Italy wearing civilian 
clothing, it is rumored in Berlin. 

[4] It is indkated that Axis forces in Libya are running dangerously 
short of airplane fuel, according to British reports. 

The foUouHng estimate represents consensus of all British Intelligence services 
as to Japan on the basis of all information available up to November 18. The 
estimate concludes that: (1) In the event of failure of her last attempt to get 
America to come to a general agreement, Japan will have to make up her mind 
as to whether she should chance the war which would likely follow further 
aggressive action on her part (2) Japan will probably not attack Siberia at 
present; she will wait until Soviet strength is decreased (3) Japan will con- 
tinue the war with China except in the event of a general agreement with the 
United States (4) Japan's movement of troops from Tongking to the south 
indicates that she does not intend at present to try cutting the Burma Road 
(5) From tlie Japanese viewpoint her best move, the one with least chance of 
bringing on a general war, would probably be occupation of Thailand. Se- 
curing bases in Siam would also pave the way for later movement against Malaya 
or the Netherlands East Indies. Furthermore, a Japanese drive into Thai- 
[3] land is indicated by her recent movements. 

Five Japanese motor vessels, formerly merchantmen-, armed with 10 to 16 
anti-aircraft guns each arrived Shanghai to-day. Those with a lesser number 
bf guns have mountings in place for 6 additional machine guns. Average seven 
3" dual purpose, remainder are automatic which appear about 50 caliber. It 
concludetl that the large number of anti-aircraft guns mounted on Japanese 
merchantmen taken over by the Navy makes of them virtual anti-aircraft ships 
and that this arming can have been made only with the air opposition of such 
powers as the United States and Britain in mind. Arrangements have been 
made to supply the SS. PRESIDENT MONROE with the necessary armmient to 
make her the first United States Merchant Ship to be armed if present plans are 
put into effect. The President Monroe is owned by the BetMeheni Steel Atlantic 
Works and is loaned to the Maritime Commission, the Bureau of Ordnance 
reports. 

The British are reported pleased with the expeditious repair of the EMS 
INDOMITABLE, which was placed in commission twelve hours in advance of the 
scheduled completion time. Officers of the Bureau of Ships and [4] the 
Norfolk Navy Yard met the vessel to determine the extent of damage and ev 
I)edite repair. Knowing of the anxiety of the British to have the ship in 
action, the Yard was able to proceed upon word of the grounding, with the 
fabricaMon of a section of the bow, due to the presence of the sister ship the 
HMS FORMIDABLE in the Yard. This coupled with the availability of the 
dock being used by the HMS FORMIDABLE expedited clearance in a few days. 

Repairs for the ODENWALD are expected to be completed Novembei- 26. 
The ODENWALD is in the custody of the United States District Court of Puerto 
Rico and the Mirshall. Investigati<m shows the ODENWALD was 4aunched in 
Gernianv in 1923 over the name ODENWALD. About 1035' her name was 
clianged'to ASSUAN and in 1938 it was changed back to ODENWALD th^ Office 
of the Judge Advocate General reports. 

Scheduled Completions reported by the Bureau of Ships: 



Ships 



1 Coastal Minesweeper: INDUSTRY. 

2 Destroyers r 

ELLYSON 

EMMONS 



Builder 



F. L. Fulton 

Federal S. B. & D. D. Co 
Bath Iron Works.. 



Date 



11/25/41 

11/27/41 
11/26/41 



EXHIBITS or JOINT COMMITTEE 



4475 



confidential 

Bulletin 

26 November, 1941 

Approximately 24,000 troops sailed from Woosung from the 15th to 23rd with 
large quantity luilitai'y equipment, including 184 landing boats plus others on 
5 vessels, (accurate check could not be obtained). A number of outgoing trucks 
were ob.served newly camouflaged, predominantly green which is unusual in this 
area. Shipping at Shanghai now normal. Along coast either north or south, to 
date no large movements seen, it is reported by the Naval Attache at Shanghai. 
Although the destination of the 24,000 troops is not given, the green camouflagetl 
trucks indicate a southern destination. The i»resence of the landing boats also 
indicate a destination from which an attack may be planned on United States. 
British or Netherlands territory, ONI states. 

British islands irestern Pacific being photographed by Japanese planes, partic- 
ularly the Gilberts. Observer is sending a detailed report. Joint photography is 
being proposed by British of all Japanese Mandates, French Indo-China coast- 
line and Japanese occupied China and mutual exchange of this information by 
the United States, Dutch and British aviation. 

[2] British Air Ministry reports 108 Japanese fighters recently transferred 
to Mandated Islands of which 18 are at Truk and 6 at Saipan. A new type of 
fighter is reported now in complement of KAGA (Japanese aircraft carrier. 
26,900 tons), HIRYU (Japanese aircraft carrier 10,050 tons) and SORYU (Japa- 
nese Aircraft carrier, 10,050 tons). 

.4^ Latitude 2A° South, Lonaitvde 111° East Naval ratings from German 
raider rescued. The R. A. N. SIDNEY (Light Cruiser) was in that area but no 
copuuunications from her, it is reported by Naval Attache at Melbourne. 

Russian Ambassador to England, Ivan Maisky emphasized at a luncheon meet- 
ing of the Anglo-Soviet Association in London that no naval or air operations 
will defeat the Germans, for, being a land power, they can only be beaten on 
land by an armed force that is capable of destroying the German army. MID re- 
ports. Maisky also asserted that the Russian losses, including killed, wounded 
and missing, number 1,750,000 (press states 2,120,000). Russian industry has 
been uprooted to such an extent that % of it is now inoperative. 

Unconfirmed reports from a Naval Observer state it is suspected that German 
submarines are now operating in [.?] the Capetown area. 

Turkey is reported to have forbidden her ships to go from Istanbul to Bulgarian 
Black Sea ports on account of "repeated torpedoings by Soviet submarines". 

The RAF has been in control of the air from the start of the Libya campaign, 
MID reports from Cairo. The Observer's personal opinion is tbat the maior 
portion of the Axis forces (consisting of some 35,000 Germans and 60,000 
Italians) will be destroyed or captured. 

Status of Naval Aircraft, 31 October, 19/(1, as reported by the Bureau of Aero- 
nautics : 



Naval Aircraft on hand 


Combat 


Training 


Utility 


Total 


(Service, obsolete, obsolescent and experimental) 

Naval Aircraft on Order and undelivered 


2,734 
5, .385 


2.184 
224 


273 
626 


1 5. 191 
6.235 







1 Of this number, 238 are assigned to the Marine Corps. 

The KITTY HAWK, one of the ex-Sea Trains now being converted into an air- 
plane transport has been fit te<l out, the Bureau of Ships reports. The second 
ex-Sea Train, the HAMMONDSPORT is being completed at Teaching and Lang. 
It will go to the Yard to be fitted out next week. This is a two-week's job the 
Bureau of Ships reports. 

[4] The "America First" Committee ran a large "ad" in the Roanoke Times 
recently which might have been equivalent to an anti-recruiting measure. Upon 
study, the OflSce of the Judge Advocate General decided that no action could be 
taken with respect to this "ad". 



4476 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A filing system has been started in the Office of the Co-ordinator of Research 
that will protect the Government and save it millions of .dollars in subsequent 
patent claims, the Offi'e of the Judge Advocate General reports. 

Scheduled Keel Layinffs reported by the Bureau of Ships: 



Ships 


Builder 


Date 


4 Destroyers: 

.Icnkifis . 


Federal S. B. & D. D. Co 


11/27/41 


LaVallette. . . . 


Federal S. B. & D. D. Co.... 

N. Y. Puget Sound 


11/27/41 


Ho worth - - 


11/24/41 


Killen 




N. Y. Puget Sound 


11/24/41 


1 Submarine Chaser 


Peterson Boat Woiks _. 


11/25/41 









Scheduled Launchings reported by the Bureau of Ships: 



Ships 


Builder 


Date 


1 Destroyer: Woodworth 


Bethlehem Steel Company, San Fran- 
cisco. 
Defoe Boat & Motor Works 


11/29/41 


1 Submarine Chaser. . 


11/27/41 









WaE DEaPARTMBNT, 

Personal and confidential Washington, November 26, 1941- 

The Pbes dent, 

The White House. 

Deab Me. President : I am sending herewith 

1. Another memo about the Japanese movement to the south from Shanghai. 
This is highly abbreviated from the verbal information given me but it will 
give you the substance. 

2. The British estimate as to Japanese intentions of which I spoke to you and 
of which you asked me to send you a copy. 

Will you kindly return this last paper when you have read it? 

Faithfully yours, Henry L. Stimson, 

Secretary of War. 

War Department, 
Washington, November 26, 1941. 
Memorandum for the President : 
Subject : Japanese Convoy Movement towards Indo-China. 

About a month and a half ago we learned through Magic that the Japanese 
Government informed the Vichy Government that tliey proposed to move approxi- 
mately 50,000 troops into Indo-China in addition to the 40,000 already there by 
previous agreement. 

Today Information has accumulated to the effect that a convoy of from ten to 
thirty ships, some of 10,(J()0 tons displacement, has lx>en assembled near the 
mouth of the Yangtse River below Shanghai. This could mean a force as great 
as 50,000, but more probably a smaller number. Included in this ship concen- 
tration was at least one landing-boat carrier. The deck-load of one vessel con- 
tained heavy bridge equipilient. Later i-eports indicate that this movement is 
already under way and ships have been seen south of Formosa. 

The officers concerned, in the Military Intelligence Division, feel that unless 
we receive other information, this is more or' less a normal movement, that is, a 
logical foUow-up of their previous notification to the Vichy Government. 

I will keep you informed of any other information in this particular field. 

Henky L. Stimson, 

Secretary of War. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4477 




4478 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




s*d beyond 
ultinate 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4479 

t 



mm 

e.R. 074S. 



YOUX MESSAGE OF HOVEMBER 26TH IS GREATLY 
APPKieiATES. 

( HAVE BEEN ASKED BY PflESiOENT QUEZON TO INFOfOI 
YOU THAT YOU MAY BE ABSOLUTELY ASSURED THAT TO TIC LAST MAK 
TNE aOVERMIENT OF TIC PHtLIPPtNE 00MM0N9EALTH, AND THE 
f^aiPINO PEOPLE, WIU STAND BEHIND THE UNITED STATES OF 

^*^"'^^- SEiilT ■'" 

A<rr»ON: fHITE HOUSE.... 

•B FILE...... yf^^- '2isisA^ /O 




4480 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 





-^u 



,y 



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 
WASHINGTON 



to 7^ ia iM«h h* *tiB(*«l)a Jadf> >t« <«^lj|; ffl^ %b» 0»it*d SialM 
Dlstrtet Oonrt t« mee—A. 9ot«rn«r ksiriunctwr la BMKail. I don't 
•IMT* Littoll'a ToltraiM«*t «ttliwlam stoat JSai«« StAialMek, tat 
X Adult that tb0 difflflnltjr 1b olitalalBe tte rl«^t kind of a mu 
for Oovoraor of Hamkll, tf w hav* to rootriet oorMlToo to a 
rooidaat daaoomt. Is a sajor on*. Oovaraor ]folad*xtor has navor 
tMMNi aa/thiag to oboo* a)»out« >ut at loaat bo has baoa aae^Joettoa- 
ekU and. on th* wtwia, dnriac aoraal tlnNia, satlafsietory. Bomvar, 
9pata r«cardlaM of bio toaaltb, «• do naed a otroac aaa tbaro aev. 
Bad wharo to find th* richt «en I do not krnw* ?ho ?r«old*at, ea 
oaa eooaotoa, maetgfUA that w* aiiebt aoir Ooa«s««» to aatmd tho 
fwidaawatal law «o aa to jMOVlt %bm ajrpotntwmt of a aaialaador. 
Imt tbio did aot «••» polltia at tbe tioa, aad I doa*t know tbat 
it wecOd now. altbou^ tbaro vonld probiibly b* looo ebjoetloa sew 
than ia aoraal tiaoa. 

SiBoeroly jrwtro. 



.^^^^^...r^^'f^^-^- 



Saorotary of tbo latorlor. 



Xi» 



Mr, Marrin 0. Mclntjro, 
Saqrotary %o ?tao ?ro«id«at. 
Tta* Vbit* Booaa. 
Vaobincton, 9. 0. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4481 




4482 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




MORMAN M. urmx 



21»t and .4j»t;'n«.re, 
West V«n<>ofu*«r, B.C., 



Mr. lUrvin 0, tfelxci^rft, 
?«.or«t«ry to tho Prejdd'Wit, 
v<hlt« Bou0*« 

D««r Mros 

IBttl* ooaoltidiiig « p«rlod )»f o«nraI«sto«aca irttti 
frl«n4c to Britl** Colusbin, ItLTonafttiaa rwicked »« ths.t 
Governor PoiBd«xti«r in ^onclulu h&s \mtwiitiaiit«Xy jT&lli 
rc«oy«r fron hie op«r«itlcas -Miille Izt %^iisf1:0iri, D.C., « r«$«F 

MWiti^s *|^, a^td Ij&at hi» r«td4puKtl<m i« expoeted b«fc>r« the 
ex|>lj«tion of h^« t«n» iMSct Hl»r«h> This n9<»«XIfl ts^ "si sit to 
Hotto^U^u 3»rt Au^«t in ecnnsotioei vitli t.h» hoftvy Toliaw of 
eoBdHOBfttioQ vork ^or« for xutionftl dufciiUfo pi2rpo3««, tiR& 
p»rtl«ul.&rly ««rt«irt is^r«Asicns of iilw F»-i»rtl G«Tism«««t's 
r«pr»8«Rtatl03 la *«rlo«« official p««t« la th« Islaasdv, a«d 
T tun eoa>trAixM»4 to xwke c*rtai» «4jB«nw.t:5,<«is to the Pr«sid«at 

App?>l»*aiasB.t« is pwM* ttsw tc- th« *Bfcysi<Ji»9 of thw> 
Bkclfic" ftr» a«M tiiizii;, bwt with tW lB):«adK b^eaaisjc a> fcr^'1 

point of coB«iB«aieftti«sMs , su}»pli»», aB<J iwwftl op&r&ti\;i\», is- 
t&o icartMsinf; t«»8loas of t^aa P*oifis"j, t.i>er« nanst b» afcl* «bU 
f««vrl9&8 n»» in soaBssaana, cApuble of xs&kiz^. dft«iissi,-»ri» aitd f:-"*-'- 
tlilJOCB dsm»w 1 Kiiia«d tBqsr»»ai<m9 «f ^waJaweBSi >.-«i «X1 ai.d«». 
0<rw»naoy Poisfeiteefe^r* *!ho is »*4,l a^'»i»«!.*ti>, tn jfloa^? a to b©*riA t,-i.tji^ 
h&B Vmmr w«tfck«at«d by ill hJ8«lt4t wfiitfc is .r«ri»ex«d *51 th»> v'ay 

e^3M»r «rga»»iB»*^»i'- s-^wwi''*( r«ri<»e'j;B *J» ■*p»si}ii»»i»i8 of . . 

an<l wi4«ly ».»;j::;-ris;i,«'-5« eld g«»afcJ«iBiiM:: jiA«' 

*f ««♦ ©f ti>« »-?>»•»; (KSfcflittZig Sk'KVBkl pOlftH 



^.R 



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. i&t»^'leRtiX» sat,-. 














the X«S8S!'^-. 


•^;-;' f'9>M'!-'.T« tfi rs"' 







|3nsp«ieftis<J(t ffea^Mirti 



Vci-Sr 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4483 




4484 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 









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vty- ■ciji. ■ 



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■rie «lsn».«l5 S*»*««#«w* 4th or 
'w, and' 



;.i?ife«r«ly yotsrSs 



;«y vs«a»- 



.Y?AT.xffr'St 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4485 



"^^^j^^-^^i^^'"'- "'. ^^"''liiP^t^ 




-wsm^M'svm rm 




SIHBiSilig 1% aip 



«■ 




4486 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Depabtment of Justice, 
HoNORABLK Marvin H. McIntyre, Washinffton, December 18, 19J^. 

Secretary to the President, 

The White House, Wushitiffton, D. C. 
Dear Mac: My letter of November 14 to you from Vancouver. B. C, referred 
to three gentlemen In primary positions of command for the Federal Govern- 
ment at Honolulu — Governor I'oindexter, Admiral Bloch, in command at Pearl 
Harbor, and General Short, in conunand for the Uidted States Army of the 
Hawaiian Department. 

Enclosed is an editorial in regard to the Governor, published on December 4 
in the Star Bulletin and, in my opinion, correctly representing the general atti- 
tude in Honolulu. This was three days before the Japanese attack, and I am 
afraid the sentiment may have precipitated to more bitter levels since then. 
Kindest personal regards. Norman M. Littell, 

Sincerely yours. Assistant Attorney Oeneral. 

Enclosure 
By Messenger 

delay at the top Dec. 4, 1941. 

Inaction on the Oahu food storage project, like inaction on the new M-Day 
law, is directly traceable to lethargy at lolani palace. 

In the face of a war emergency that has already arrived in Hawaii, urgent 
steps for full preparedness are intolerably slow and hesitating. 

The territorial administration, to put it plaiidy, is keei)ing pace in defense 
preparation neither with the aggressive speed of the federal branches of govern- 
ment nor with the ready and willing spirit and energy of the civilian community. 
******* 

Governor Poindexter has been, it is true, in the hospital for two weeks for a 
period of rest. There is no occasion or-desire to impose upon him any unneces- 
sary physical demands. But the governor has ample authority and scope to 
delegate some or nearly all of the immediately pressing duties of preparedness 
to others. 

He can, for instance, give full authority to the emergency food commission to 
go ahead full speed on the Oahu food storage depot. 

He can order the M-Day committee to move into action with something like 
real speed and scope on its own important lines of preparation. 

He can instruct them to step up or step out — and the community will back him 
to the limit. 

******* 

The delays daily revealed in civilian preparation for what at any terrible mo- 
ment may become actual war in the Pacific are due to no lack of readiness to 
serve by the civilians of Hawaii. 

At every call, Honolulu and other communities have responded. 

Everywhere there is the keen desire, by men and women of every race who 
make lip this American territory, to do whatever is necessary and requested of 
them individuallv and collectively. 

This has been the spirit and this has been the determination for many months. 

It has been concretely demonstrated by such organizations as the mayor's 
disaster council, the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross, by the emer- 
gency food commission itself, and by many others. 

It has been proved by the willingness and enthusiasm with which thousands 
of Hawaii's young men have met the call to active duty in the army, the navy or 
the marine corps. 

It has been expressed in the proud bearing of the parents of those sons sent 
into service — the pride that conies with the realization that these youths of the 
islands ai*e relied on to help in island defense. 

******* 

Yes, the civilian community has resp<mded promptly and loyally to the many 
and varied demands and i-equests made upon it — and properly nuule — in the name 
of national .service. 

******* 

TRe delays which it is a painful necessity to record are attributable to lack of 
aggressive leadership by the territorial administration at this critical time. 

There seems slight realization that the necessary steps for preparedness 
MUST be taken (juickly and decisively. 

There seems scant realization that war on the Pacific is daily coming nearer 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4487 

to a fact, and that many things which will havt> to be done in the event of war 
are not yet done or even well started. 

:^ ill « ^ if * * 

Iiuuiediately the two most important tasks before the administration are 
action on the Oahu food storage reserve, and action on the M-Day law. 

If these require night-and-day work — and we believe they do — then let the 
governor insist on night-and-day work and he will find no lack of support for 
such a policy. 

Nor is there lack of competent citizens to do the big job ahead, and if he will call 
on them in the n.inie of patriotic service, and give them authority to act on their 
own judgment and experience, he will not fail to find plenty of able helpers. 

In reply refer to initials and No. HRS/Hu 

Navy Depaetment, 
Office of the Chikf of N vval Operations, 
The Pkesident, W<i.shin(/ton, 28 November 19Jfl. 

The White House. 

Dear Mr. President : Just to follow up on the Madagascar scare. The British 
have called up and told us to disregard theii' message, that they had completely 
discredited it. 

I won't bother you with anytliing else and hope that it is possible you can free 
your mind of most everything here. We will be on the job. 

We are doing everything possible towards strengthening and making ready 
the "bases in the Pacific, and I believe you will approve of the measures we are 
taking without much, if any, change. 

Was glad you found such general concurrence with the paper Marshall and 
I .sent to you. One of the holes we had plugged with the message I read you for 
Hart andKimmel. The other with regard to specifically defining an area we will 
work on in connection with the messages you requested be prepared. 

Am enclosing copy of a letter from Jim Newton who is from Denver, a great 
friend of Justice Douglas, and a member of a very well known family. You can 
guess he is quite a character and an independent thinker himself. I thought it 
might be of a little interest and you probably would not get a chance to read it 
except on a vacation. 

I hope you have a fine vacation and that you can see it through. 

All good wishes. Sincerely, Betty. 

James Q. Newton, 
Denver, November 2k, 19^1. 

Dear Harold: Bill Douglas' dinner and y(mr luncheon were a real treat to your 
counti-y cousin. I do feel very often, as I told you, that my world is drifting 
away from me, but when I have a chance to talk to both of you and realize that 
after all we are thinking about the same thing, it is quite consoling to say the 
least . 

I am more firmly convinced than ever that the middle income group is getting 
excited and should have leadership from the group that you and I think should 
be the leaders in America. 

The multiplicity of government agencies and their intense desire to prove their 
worth and perpetuate their organizations has created a public feeling of confusion 
and maybe resentment against what is commonly called propaganda. 

Organized minorities take advantage of that confusion and foster laws which 
seem to the middle group discriminatory and selfish. It is that feeling of con- 
fusion which will eventually turn our actions into a rout and some Hitler, under 
the guise of his orotective government, will appear and be leader of the ex- 
ploited middle group. It is a known fact that knowledge cannot be spoon fed 
and the objectives of these various so-called social advancements cannot be ad- 
vanced by the propaganda methods of the various government agencies. Only 
resentment and confusion and a feeling of being "taken in" has been the result. 
The growing resentment against English propaganda should be proof enough. 

It is immediately necessary for us to try and create unity in our nation and to 
do so it is necessary to help the people become dynamic in their action and thoughts 
and change their feeling of being "taken in" to their disadvantage. There is no 
such force as class consciousness in the United States. No person thinks any 
other person in the sense of class is better. All of us feel many other citizens are 
lower than we, but none of us believe any other person is better. But there is 
a class feeling based on money. We always seem to feel that the very low income 
group, meaning the subsidized underprivileged, and the very rich receive the 
good things in material life. Somehow the middle income group have lulled 



4488 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

themselves to sleep and it is only through a sudden change, such as [2] our 
present international policy that consciousne s comes into that group. They have 
little and need little comparatively, and are docile to the extreme, but when 
aroused by fear are apt to be piinicky and turn tliemselves over body and soul to 
any fearless leader. This group is composed of at least 60% to 70% of the able 
United States citizens and can be turned from their present trend of confusion 
and fears if we can some way, .munehow restore to them their right and duty to 
think for themselves. 

The first prol)lem for them is that of pliysical preparedness, such as providing 
a place to meet and to talk to each other. 

The second is leadership among themselves; the third cohesion and correlation 
of their groups; and the fourth form an organization competent to furnish their 
groups with honest, truthful data which they deem necesary to help their think- 
ing and self expression. 

My plan would be to divide the United States into regional districts. In each 
regional district, employ about three professional organizers who would appoint 
a general coumiittee consisting of twelve extremely prominent citizens from the 
following groups: Three from religious organizations, three from public school 
system, three from university or higher education group and three from business. 
' These groups while essentially a symbol of honesty and community solidarity 
should be forced to become interested in filtering information which is to be 
presented by various specialized agencies to the community self interest groups 
formed under our plan. 

I am never clear about explaining my objective nor my methods, but I believe 
that through this plan I am creating meeting places where the middle income 
group can express themselves when, as, and if they are seriously and mentally 
upset as to their government relationships and understandings. 

Adult educational groups and all other university extension groups have at- 
tempted to serve education on a platter to the middle group. I am sure they do 
not want to be educated because our public school system has explained to almost 
each and every one of us that when we are through school, we are educated. A 
serious defect, in niy opinion, in the system. The dullest man in the United 
States today is the I*hi Beta Kappa at 21, who is the sedate citizen at 45. He 
never cracks a book after he leaves college because he feels he is educated and 
can prove it by his degree. 

[3] To define what I mean by this middle income group. I am sure I mean 
almost all of the 'oi polloi in America. When you say middle income group you 
mean those individuals who presently earn their costs of living or use income 
derived from the investment of their savings. The people I exclude from this 
group are the so-called under-privileged and the so-called hereditary rich. In 
other words the dregs and the frotli of society. 

I propose that a connnittee be organized in each separate economic region 
of the United States, compo.sed of the representatives of the church, the public 
school system, university system, and business. I firmly believe that President 
Roosevelt can get the leadership of this group through this method and I finnly 
believe he should make the attempt to regain the confidence of that group. 

I am presenting this plan to you and Bill Douglas simply because I admire 
you both personally. T want you to understand that I have no ambition to be 
anything. Thank God, my philosophy has taught me that to try to be a some- 
body in the estimation of somebody else is futile and empty. I firiply believe my 
philosophy has told me that while there are very few values in t.hi» action of 
life, the one real value that counts is to have such control- over yourself that 
you can enjoy life through the happiness of others. Maybe you think I have 
gone Pollyanna, but to live as I have just expressed is a thousand times harder 
than to stand out on the street corner and be a tub thumper and court public 
acclaim. 

I am sending this letter to you and Bill Douglas and in case you care to sug- 
gest any future action by me to further these plans. I shall appreciate it, or in 
the event you think the idea should be dropped, let me know. 

The costs of actually compiling the information and correlating necessary 
facts of the various agencies involved would be considei-able but could be ac- 
complished by the Social Security set up. 
Sincerely, 

James Q. Newton. 

Admiral Hakot.d Stark, 

Chief of II. S. Naval Operations, Waahinffton, D. C. 



EXHIBITS or JOINT COMMITTEE 



4489 




79716 O — 46 — i>t. 20- 



-34 



4490 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



4491 




THE UNITED STATES HIQH COMMISSIONER,, 
MANILA '■'' 




Tl« airaail 



/ « 






(k»mp Kt, PrasldcDtt 



VlUi r*f«r«a9« to ay t«l«griw8 to you of HoT«ib«r 29 
and RoYonber 30 oonoeralag Freeldent <}u«ison* • addroc* b*~ 
for* tiw PhiXl|jplB« mirmvtXtj of KovMbor 2«, (««• Ka- 
olOBur* Ho« 1>. th« ex«fg*r«t*d «ll«g«tloa« ia M* 8p««eh 
0Blig« M «t tbl« tiao to sttbalt to you tU* roport oa 
oinilaa •acrgoaoy def «a«« noaaurec in tbo Phlllppino 
Islaiidt «a4 rooognondatioBs a« to your olarlfleatlon of 
tho probl«» of roi^onsiblllty for tbo oontlauanco of tixlo 
woPk* 



w«p«s 



?r«*ld«nt ^osen** dbdof •liogatloaf la M* tpoooh 



1. 



8. 



Of to* FlLiiippiBos wetad b« oflpvotootod; 

fhi laadaqtaaoy of pr(^«ratioB« was duo to 
FToaidiot Quoten's bolag bleokod in hi* ef- 
fort* to proTiOs for oiTiiian daf enso by tha 
rrecldaat of tho Siiitad iStatas atoppiag bia 
trem oxarolalag p9w»T» vmSLw tha lBarg«aey 
Fovox^ Aet; 

3* fraaidaat Roo8aTolt*a aotiea ma dtta to a 
aai^aifl^ baaad oa i^oraaoa and bad faith 
iiidttl««4 l» by oi-ril llbartlaa unieaa, paaa*. 
f%^»syprU* »©siatl««, «&«erlat*, wrltara, 
H??f*^f **** AaaiMoaB li^>orl«llata in «m 

]^*?if?f***'l *^ raapoaaibHity for tba InMoquaoy today 
£^?ii^ -!^?****Sf^** ^ **^ «illlppl»««. Praaidant 
£?t^*th! SfSfi! ?®A^* ST r^"^**" •»* f«N.*lgiitadaaaa for 
Aot ©f Aagaat if, x$kQ »sA iia asaortad ^at «Ii«b you atoppad 

bsmlXiatioja ««d tafaat bt Imd. raaaivad la bi« pubSo lifa 



lo 



frf^Bidant, 
".>« fhita 8asaa*, 

taaMafttm, 8, 0, 



nmfff 




4492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




»V»'.i,'».??f?"i'-^'-V 



Hd said tki* prMMt mi9r«3p«r«4Bea« ms An* to hie •nf^rotd 
iBAotlYity dariQ£ a ft«v« > ■w n tlm period «h«a ki« teMs war* 
ti»d. This period oaa rmSve only to ttw tisa priar ta 




ipril X| If^Jt- «^«n ^7 •zaotitlr* «r4Lar h* •*% m %h» OiTiliao 
SiicrMaey Adaiaiatratioa. (••« Bulaaar* H«. 8). As I 
poiottd out ia lay t«l«gr«a of lov«Bbi»r 3Q, 19^^!, dnr^ac «bi« 
porioA it waa alvaya op»a to Mai to aaour* aaeh lafialitioa 
aa Bigtit ba naoaaaarjr, and alae h» algiJit hav* proaaodad aadar 
the ordiaaxT^ polioo pewara of tba Ooaaoawaalth Ooraroaaat. 

During that period X aada oaoaaaing affert ta initiate 
and atiaulate aotivity in eiTiliim dafenae woi^. On Sm>t«a« 
bar 9, 19*10 Oaneral Oronert, Ooaaandiag Oanarai of the PhiXip> 
pine Departaent, in ajr offioe and at ay raquaat explained in 
detail to Preeident QwiaMa the argent need for Joint eollalMr- 
atioa in preparing for eirilian 4ef«ta«. ?reaid«D.t ^e«on 
thereupon appointed a ooanittao inoladiag Oaaeral KaoArthor, 
then hia ailitary adviaer, \,i repraaeat hia in oenf erring 
with Oaneral Oruaert. On 8ep>te»b«r> l6, Saneral (3raa«rt pre- 
eented to the ooaaittee a det d** .. eeeorandnsf eatliniag the 
need for oiTiliaa defenee pi? tu^. After a nonth'a atndjr, 
on October 15, the ooaaittee i'eported tit xt proteotiTO ■eaauras 
ahould not be preaattlrely praotiead her< i»t in aatieipatian 
of any eaergenoy, the f^ergenoy Poir«r« A^; gave to Preaid^ht 
Quezon ooapxets oontrol of oivio foaotioaa, and that in tiae 
of esergeney by oonvertiag land to food prodaetian t&e Philip- 
pinee could be eaaily aelf-auatained. (See aaeloaara lo. 3). 
On Ootober l6, Preaident Qaeson etated to the praaa that war 
wae not iaainent in the Orient and that he did not believe it 
was the duty of the Philippine Ctoiremaent to provide air-raid 
ahelters bat even if it were he was of the%opiniea they ware 
not necaseary. 

On Ootober SS, at »y raqueat, Oeneral Onwert aubaittad M 
to ae a pltm for a General Planning Board; asnd en the next t^ 
day Preaident Queton, Oaneral Orunert and Adairel iauiallia, .] 
then Coaaandant of the l6th Karal Ciatriot, conferred with 'S 
ae and agreed to create euch a Board to f emulate oonorete 
plana for oiviiian proteotion in the event of audften xaergaaey. 
On Ootober 28, the Planning Board, with Preaident Qae»on hi»- 
aelf in attendance, held its first aeeting in ay offiee aadar 
the ohaiivanahip of ay then llaiaen officer. Lieutenant Colonel 
Robert K. Oarawell, who is now in the United States. The 
Board aade exhauetive turvBja of reeoureea and needa and anb- 
aitted ita report Jointly to President ^eaon and ae en 
March 11, 19^^!. Oaneral Orunert stated the Boaz4 did an az- 
oellent iot and that the future suoeeae or failure of thia 
civil planning and its results appeared to depend upon what 
the Cooaonwealth goveraaent, particularly its l^ealdent, 
oould and would do in furtherance of the Baard* a re^maaan- 
datione. 

President 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE ' 4493 






, 3 • 

hif; f.:.d Jj® wo«.ld go feiiwira m& »a llopafe 2« h.« Joiawd «» in 
i««aij!i|; ». -preae v^l**** (««« £aol«0ure lfo» ' ' •••i'^;\:;. ...; ©at 
«oaAil!£«Be to 1^ r>»is«Al«ft cBd atiitlsg tlMit »st >?.-g«u'iisi&tioo 
WHild b« »«t up «d funotion dlr«etl]r a»d«r tue ?l'£>««id«Bt of 

dcat S^Kfia thefi ectAbli^sd oa April 1, 1S>43. th« Civilian 
Btt^Tgcse; AdniultitriitloQ 1»7 an Sz««utlv« Order vmAvt %h« 
tn«rg«ao3r Vovsrs Aot* {8*e fiaolotttr* le. 2) 

tt ««4m« el«Rr, tharefors, ti&at during th* scTtta-aoQth*' 
period prtQf t© jd^rll 1, if«^l, da« to Xh» iaitl««iT« of the 
JuKsrieazt aat{s#riti«« m& with th« knowledge amd oeoper8tiie& 
«f Freeideat ^eeeit, tbe gretutdwezic ««« is teot pr«]p«red for 
tiM Olfiiiea fiiergenoy MBiBletration. 

After Hb* oreAtioB ef the OXA en i^rll 1, 19^1, actual 
fsregreee in QlviliBa defense prejtaratioBe hae l»8en aleir iMt 
eealiaie^as.. It baa been liiuadloapped, hevever, by vealBWseee 
In «H[^«ais«tien and adalMstratien, inadeq[tt«63r of fnnda, 
7«QilXMien m objeetlves, diffleultlee In w^ntaining oloee 
ooerdi&ation witH the silitar; and ordinary inertia. I hmr9 
;ffs eeaeiatestlf endeavored to etlnulate the Old l»r plaoiE^ at 

■}p it« dlapoeal all the faellltlee of m offiee and eeMins to 

W it* neetinga i^ adlltarjr lialaon offleer. On S(Q>t«aber 7, 

^ X9^X t »«ml Kajor Marron, «gr nilitar? llalaen of fleer, te 

Britieh Malagra and the Metherlanda Sast Indiee to rspert en 
elvlllan defence preparatione there. Hie eaasellent reporte, 
oepies of whioh are In Vaehiagton, dlaeloeed glaring defi- 
eiwseiee here hjr eeaparleen and althou^^ they enoaed nuoh 
prees oonent and effielal efforte towards self~Ju»tifloa» 
tion, th^ resulted in the aooeleratien In elTllian defenee 
iiia«8H2>«« t«r «iiieh t have sonstantlr striven. Obeervatiene 
&n th» CKA BT9 oontained in the s^nthlf reports Iqr Mr* 
taurenee 1. ftallalmrr, my for»«r adrleer on pelitioal af- 
fairs, who i» now en <fe»ty at the State iep«r1»ent, and are 
•n file in Va^hiii^ea. 

fka ren>4nsibilit|r for the adeqaaey or inadequao; of 
the work of the CIA reete ttinarely upon President ({aeson. 
Ihe tzeeati-re Order oreating it states tluit the direoting 
oeaMieeiott of the CCA shall, subjeet to «he aipproTal of the 
President of the Philippines, fennaate and exeoute polloies 
and plans for the proteotion of the olTllisfi population of 
the Philippines in extr«»rdinary ^d oaergenoy eonditlens. 

President Queeen, hsmmttr, has not been always oonsia» 
tent in reoognising his responsibilii^. On Kay 5, 19%, in 
an address to tifte iaVional Aesssibly, he stated that the duty 
of eafefoarding inhabitante, both eitlsens and aHene, against 
hanger, pestilMioe. lawlessness uvd ether dangers whloh the 
nature of »odem wa2>far« <mtails, rests aalnXy with ths 

■" ^Temnent 



4494 C0XGRESSION>NL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



k - 



gOTernment of the Commonwealth and that oonaequently ha 
created the CKA to advise and aealat the government In the 
adoption and execution of ouch meaeuree as may be necessary 
to protect Its civilian population In oase of emergency. 
(See Enclosure No. ^). 

In a letter to me dated April 3, IS'^l, he saldt 

*I desire to make It olear that. In my 
opinion, the protection of the olvlllan popu- 
lation of the Philippines Is as muoh the primary 
reeponelblllty of the Oovernment of the United 
States as la the military defense of the Islands." 

Four days later, he wrote to met 

■the obligation which the Oovemment of the Com- 
■onwealth attempted to assume by the approval of 
the Emergency Powers Act - that of protecting the 
fillplno people from the ravages of war - was, 
after all, primarily the obligation of the United 
States and not of the Oomaonwealth. * 

Because of these fluctuations in hie attitude and the 
dire need for effective oiviii&n defense preparations, I 
reoommend that you clarify the problem of raeponsibility 
for the continuance of this work. Responsibility might 
oonoelTably rest upon either (1) the High Coomlssioner's 
office, (2) the United States Amy, or 1,3) *^« Commonwealth 
government. To this problon for over a year I have given 
intensive study. 

My oonoluslons and reoommendAtlons follow: 

It is olear that the High Oommlssloner* a of flee ma at 
present constituted lacks both the funds and the neoessary 
personnel which would warrant its being designated to as- 
sume responsibility for civilian defense. It al*9 laoks 
Jurisdiotion due to the doaestio autonomy granted the 
Philippines by the Independenoe Aot. 

Throwing upon the United States military foroaa re- 
sponsibility for the work of oivilian defense is « posal- 
blllty. This matter has already been brought to the atten- 
tion of the Commanding Seneral of the United States Army 
in the rar East and he h&a taken the position that civilian 
defense should lie with the Commonwealth. As late as Rovem- 
ber 27, 19*H when President Q»eton and Oeneral KaoArthur 
eonferred with me at my request to oonsider the effMts of 




EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4495 



- 5 - 

a letter dated October 7. 19*^1 afldreseed to me by Mr. 
LaOuardia ae United States Director of ClTilLan Defense, 
eppointlng se Dlreotor of Civilian Defense for th6 Philip- 
pine Islandfi, it was again agreed by the three of ue that 
the existing Civilian Bsergency AdBicietration should oon~ 
tlnue to operate under the direct control of the President 
of the Coanonwealth, but of course with the constant obser- 
vation and advice of the United States ailitary authorities. 
(See Snolosuree Noe. 6 and 7)« ^ enclose hereirlth a copy 
of Mr. LaOuardia's letter to ae and of ay reply, eiqplain- 
ing the reasons idiy I did not feel free to accept this ap- 
polntasnt. (See Enclosures Moe. 6 and $), 

In view of the above it seeas that responalbillty for 
the vork of civilian dsfenee should rest squarely upon the 
CoBiaonvealth Qovernaent. Two fundaaental reasons fora the 
basis for ay opinion: first, the disturbance which I fear 
a shift at this tiae al^t cause and which alght be con- 
strued both here and abroad as a disruption of Pilipino- 
Aatarloan relations; second, your announced policy, as given 
m your lett«r of March 1, 1937 *o "y predecessor, which 1 
have continually borne In Bind, not only to avoid unneces- 
sary Interfercsnce with the large measure of autonoay In the 
adalnistratloQ of doaeetic affairs entrusted to the Coaaon- 
wealth Gtoveznoaent, but also to give helpful encoiiregeaent to 
the new govenment. 



Very sincerely yours « 





Saolo surest 

1. Spesoh of Free. Queson, Sot. 28, 194l; 

2. &ceeutlTe-~Ord«r by ?r«e. ^eson, Ke. 3](5, 

April 1, 19^1 J 

3. I<ett«r froa Sec. Targes to Q«&. Grunert, 

Oct. 15, 19H0; 
^. Joint p^ess release bjr H.C. and Pre*. 

Quesea, Maroh ^, 19^1; 
3. Pres. Qiueeon's aeesaee to Batioaal 

AsseabXy, X«y 5, ^9^1; 

6. Letter f?os I.e. to (!h)n. MaoArthar, 

Hot. 27, IJ^l; 

7. Letter froa <l«a. XaoArthur to H.C, 

Sov. 2g, 19kl', 
0. Letter f?09 Hmf@T LaOuardla. to H.C, 

Oct. 7, 19*^ij 
9. Heply to Kft?or LaSosirdia by H.C, 

Bee. 1, X3*i, 




4496 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Enclosure No. 1 

Speech of His Excellkncy, the Pkksident at the University of the Philip- 
pines ON THE Occasion of the Celebration of National Heroes Day, 
November 28, 1941. 

President Gonzales, Members of the Faculty, Distinguished Guests, Students 
of the University of the Philippines, Ladies and Gentlemen : 

Every time that I witness a parade of the UOTC, my heart beats fast for 
I am filled with almost unbounded pride and pleasure. Today, however, as I 
saw you pass before me, officers and men of the ROTC of the University of the 
Philippines, I felt that my heart was heavy and thoughts came to my mind 
that perhaps some of you may soon have to give your lives in defense of your 
country. Should such an occasion arise, I want you, young men, to remember 
that there is no death more glorious and more desirable than death in defense of 
the fatherland. 

We are gathered here this afternoon to do honor, to pay homage, to the 
heroes of our race. You are celebrating National Heroes Day. Should you 
have to give your lives in defense of your country, those coming after you will 
revere you in their hearts just as we are revering today those who have gone 
before us. That should be the thought you must bear constantly in mind in 
these days that you may be ready to face any danger that may confront us. 

A little while ago, at the Luneta, after that mammoth parade during the cele- 
bration of the sixth anniversary of the Commoi^ wealth, I stated, with I think 
justifiable pride, that it was due to my vision, to my far-sightedness and to my 
determination that we have today a forc*e capable of putting up a good fight 
should tlie occasion arise. In the course of my remarks, I stated that this 
achievement of my administration as accomplished despite the oppostion of the 
so-called civil liberties unions, both here and in the United States, and the 
peace-at-any-price societies. I might have added that that was accomplished 
despite the opi)osition of liberty-loving theorists. 

I come now to tell you of something of which I am not proud. I want to 
confess to you the greatest defeat and humiliation that I have received in my 
public life. And this defeat was caused by these theorists — these "defenders of 
liberty", these civU liberties unions here and in the United States. 

Perhaps I might have gone to my grave without making a public statement 
of this secret. No one likes to speak of his defeat. But soon after I made 
that statement at the Luneta the so-called Civil Liberties Union of the Philippines 
gave out a statement denying that they have ever opposed the national defense 
program of my administration, but asserting with evident satisfaction that what 
they have opposed is the emergency povpers act. And the evidence that our 
stand was justitied is the fact that for seven months, the powers granted to 
the President in that act have not been exercised. 

[2] It is true — unfortunately true — and I hope it may not prove to be 
the most tragic truth In the history of the Philippines. Today if the war were 
to start and bombs fall on the University campus — don't laugh they may fall — 
thousands or hundreds of you will be killed for you have no air raid shelters 
here. If there was to be war our people may find themselves starving. Cer- 
tainly, if there had been war two months ago, there would have been starvation 
in the Philippines. 

If there was to be war now, we may find ourselves to be without fuel, with- 
out gasoline, — in one word, if there were to be war now, we would find ourselves 
unprepared. The civilian population of the Philippines unprotected. We are 
just beginning to practice blackouts — we are just starting to show our people 
how to evacuate crowded places. 

And who is responsible for this neglect? Not the President of the Philippines, 
not the National Assembly — but the "liberty loving" people of the Philippines, 
the so-called "liberty loving" people of the Philippines. 

No sooner did the war in Europe break and especially after the debacle of 
France, I asked the National Assembly to give the President emergency powers 
so that he might be able to take the measures necessary for the protection of our 
people. At that time nobody in the Philippines thought that war may ever 
come to our shores. These people who know so much, who are all the time 
felling us what to do — they never imagined, they could not imagine — a bunch 
of fools that they are — they could not imagine a war between Germany and 
England and France will ever reach our shores. But I did. I saw it coming. 
I saw it because I am spending my days and nights studying what is going on in 
the world, because it is my duty to you to be always alert so that I may be 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4497 

in a position to render to you the service that is my duty to render that you 
may be protected. 

As soon as I sent that message to the National Assembly asking for these 
powers, all these young writers of the Philippines with the Civil Liberties Union 
and all these so-called liberals — who have never done anything in their lives to 
fight for freedom and liiierty — all these come out and denounced me as a would- 
be dictator and attacked the National Assembly, denouncing its men as weak 
and incompetent for granting me those powers. Seven months, the Civil Liberties 
Union said, had to elapse before I made use of those powers. Precisely the 
seven months that I needed to be ready at this time. If I had been able to 
do what we had to do during thosie seven months, I would not be afraid now that 
something, some cataclysm may happen here in the University campus. I will 
be certain that these students of the University of the Philippines for whose 
care I am responsible — I assert that no matter what happens nothing would 
occur to you. But I am humiliated and grieved to say that I am in no position to 
give that assurance now. 

[S] How did this happen? Did these writers, these liberals, this Civil 
Liberties Union — did they ever succeed in stopping my hand? Never. Never 
by themselves alone. But at this time they found powerful allies — the American 
imperialists in the Philippines, as represented by the Bulletin. Now I am call- 
ing everything by its name. These imperialists who have never accepted defeat, 
who still believe that they can stop the Philippines from becoming independent, 
who all the time have been placing, obstacles in our way in the hope that and 
perhaps in the belief that they may defeat our cause — these people have been all 
the time charging the Government of the Commonwealth of being incompetent 
or of being a dictatorship. They are the ones who started to oppose the national 
defense program. And they opposed the national defense program not because 
they did not believe that we could make a success out of it but because they 
wanted to make an argument when independence was to come, to say to the 
United States, "Are you going to let the Philippines alone when they are abso- 
lutely defenseless?" So when I was trying to arm the country they denounced 
me as a would-be military dictator with the idea of stopping that program. For- 
tunately I had occasion to go to the United States then and I fought them right 
before American public opinion and I had occasion to convince the President of 
the United States that what we are doing here was not only the right thing to do 
but the essential thing, to do if we were going to become independent. And I 
defeated them, when, however, the flght against the Emergency Powers Act in 
the United States came, I was tied up in the Philippines. The war was going on ; 
I could not leave the country for something might happen while I was away. It 
was my duty to be here. And so the cry that came to America coming from these 
American imperialists and these Filipinos (what shall I say about ttjem?) made 
an impression in the United States. That had the effect of creating an opinion 
there unfavorable to the exercise of those powers by me. It was no strange. 
At that time nobody in America — no, I won't say nobody because President Roose- 
velt knew it — but very few in America knew that the war in Europe was going 
to aflfect them seriously. And these peace-at-any-price fellows — they could not 
understand why if America was not getting ready then — why .should the Philip- 
pines get ready. Why? There is no doubt that this Quezon is getting to be a 
dictator. I had to flght both ignorance and bad faith. The campaign was so 
eflr-ctive that I received a message from no less a personage than the Prasident 
of the United States himself telling me that the enactment of this law had created 
great concern in the United States and a.sking me to give a public statement to 
the effect that I would not use those powers. 

Lndies and Gentlemen, under the Tydings-McDuffie law, the President of 
the United States has the right to intervene in the Philippines if in his judgment 
the government here established has ceased to be democratic. And the matter, 
as presented to the President, seems to prove this has ceased to be a democracy. 
It was impossible for me to argue with the President over the phone or through 
rad'o, I could not send him a telegram so I simply bowed my head in deep sorrow. 
I gave the President of the [-}] United States the assurance that I would 
not exei*cise these powers unless his representative in the Philippines himself 
asked me to do it. I was so certain that the day would come when I would be 
asked to exercise these powers that I preferred to bide my time. But seven 
months had gone by. During that time I had my hands tied. I don't know how. 



4498 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

but the fact that the Philippines might be involved in war before I was ready to 
protect my people haunted nie day and night, and for several months I could not 
go to sleep until finally I broke down with another attack of tuberculosis. I could 
not stand it anymore. Finally, the commanding general of the United States 
Army wrote me a letter asking what thi.s government was doing for the protec- 
tion of the civilian population. My answer was, "I don't know. You ask the 
High Commissioner." And finally I was asked by the High Commissioner him- 
self to constitute the Civilian Emergency Administration, to which body I gave 
all the powers that the Emergency Powers Act gave me. This is the reason why 
for seven months the powers of that Act were not exercised, not because they 
were not necessary but because thanks to the wisdom of the far-sightedness of 
these liberty-loving Filipinos, in conjunction with the American imperialists, 
the President stopped me from exercising these powers. 

I am going to say something terrible — but that is what I feel. If war breaks 
out soon and our people die here unprotected by the bombs, those men who have 
stopped me from doing, what I should have done ought to be hanged — everyone 
of them on the lamp post. And now I am addressing you — the youth of the 
land — and with you I am addressing your rectors, and your professors — for you 
are not alone responsible; they are primarily responsible too for what you are 
doing or failing to do. 

Under the Constitution of the Philippines, the Government of the Common- 
wealth has supervision and control over all schools and colleges and universities. 
Even before the Commonwealth was inaugurated, we had laws here that gave 
the government the effective control over our educational institutions. 

I have been President of the Philippines for six years now. The worst criticism 
against me and my administration has come either from professors or from 
university students. If there is anybody here who dares say publicly — be he a pro- 
fessor, a pi'esident of a university, a rector or student — is there anyone here 
who dares say in my presence that because he has taken the liberty to criticize 
me, even in denouncing me falsely, that I have done anything against him? 

Nobody can say that. And yet if we were to read what you are writing and 
saying almost every day in public speeches and newspapers, you seem to be living 
in a country where you cannot move without someone hitting you in the head ; 
that you cannot speak your mind ; that this is a dictatorship. 

[5] Fortunately the Filipino people do not agree with you for they have 
once more elected me to this high office with still greater majority than Ihe first 
time I was elected. They know that I am not a dictator. They know it is 
beautiful oratory to accuse somebody of dictatorship. They know that it is 
easy for you to get applause from the public if you are brave and attack the pres- 
ent government from the President down to the policeman. 

That is why every time you have an oratorical contest there the speeches are 
full of denunciation. My goodness, I don't know my own country. I don't know 
my own people when I read these .speeches. I do not care what you say about that. 
It amuses me. I have no hesitancy in saying that since the first day that democ- 
racy has come to this earth there has never been a case of the chief of state whose 
position is elective, that he has been elected by his people without his asking for 
his election. I am the only one in history. And I want you to know that I did not 
want to be elected. I want you to know that the only thing that at last induced me 
to adopt a passive attitude about my reelection is that war in Europe, that I saw- 
that the Philippines may sooner or later be involved. 

And I, saw that while the immense majority of our ijeople were living in a fool's 
paradise, I was one of the few who was watching what was going on and knew 
what was coming. That was why as one of the reasons I permitted myself to be 
reelected once more. 

But I have no hesitancy in saying that that provision in the Constitution which 
limits my reelection to two more years has been my own work, for I did not want 
to go beyond that. Is that the dictator? I am resigning my position at ray own 
volition. There is nobody in this country who could have defeated me if I had 
wanted to continue for another four years. 

Now, I am speaking to you with my heart in my hand because of what I am go- 
ing to tell you how. This is no time for us to be engaged in foolish debates. 
This is the time when your mind — the mind of everyone of you, men and women, 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4499 

old and young — should be devoted to but one problem : the problem that is con- 
fronting us and which may mean a terrible destruction and unbearable hardship. 
Talk of freedom and liberty. You have plenty of that. What you do not have 
enough of is duty. As least, you do not talk of duty. You need not learn from 
my lips. See what has happened to France. To France. Where is France to- 
day? At the feet of the conqueror, paying 8 million dollars — 16 million pesos a 
day for the support of the German army, five billion and a half a year of pesos. 

If France had spent that money in airplanes and tanks, France would not be 
giving that money now to her master. The Frenchman is working day and night, 
when he is told to work, with or without compensation. He is working for his 
master, Germany. He would not be doing that now if he had not been all the time 
wanting more [6] hours of rest, less hours of work and more salary and 
more good time. Strike upon strike. In every corner of the streets in Paris, you 
could hear nothing but freedom, liberty, while the Germans were getting ready 
to take that freedom and liberty from them. 

I wonder. I wonder if my countrymen desire to have the same fate that befell 
France. T'hat is the work of the Fronte Popular of Blum ; the work of so many 
parties of the opposition, that whenever they wanted to have a government they 
had to get together five or six opi)osition parties. They never had a majority 
party ; they never had a policy, a constant policy of government that had a ma- 
jority and the confidence of the people. That is the fruit of doing nothing but 
singing the song of liberty without remembering that liberty without order is 
chaos. 

I think that our universities and colleges ought to, occasionally at least, tell 
their students that men do not live on liberty alone. There is also duty. And 
that the man who knows how to do his duty knows how to fight for his right. 
There is no man in this country — I challenge every Filipino of the 16 million Fili- 
pinos — there is no man in this country, not even a woman, there is no man in this 
country who loves liberty more than I do. I have fought for liberty since I was 
a boy, and now that I am an old man I am still fighting for the liberty of our coun- 
try. No man who is willing to give his life for that liberty is going to deny that 
liberty. 

I am an old man, even though I do not want to confess it, especially when there 
are girls around — but I am an old man. At least in the Philippines very few men 
live more than 70 years. In another six years or seven I will be 70, and before I 
am 70 I know I will be' dead. Why should I who have been raised to the position 
I am occupying today by my people, only because I have been their servant in the 
fight for their liberty and freedom — pow that I am old about to die, deprive you 
of that freedom? Why should I deprive you, the men of tomorrow, of the oppor- 
tunity to be free when my whole life has been dedicated to the cause of liberty so 
that you may live free. I am about to die but I want my country to live and I 
want my country to live eternally and to live with the blessings of liberty. But 
liberty can only be a blessing if it is accompanied with order. I am about to die 
but I am leaving children, children that are as young if not younger than you are. 
I could not face those pieces of my own soul and flesh if I were not devoting every 
day of my life for their happiness and freedom and security ; and I cannot do 
that for them without doing it for you. They cannot be free if the rest of you are 
slaves. 

My friends — for you are my friends regardless of whether you like me or not — 
please listen to me. I am talking to you on a very solemn occasion, on a very 
dangerous situation. You have been reading only of the dearth and de.struction in 
Europe. You have seen it in the movies. You do not realize that you may see 
[7] it right here and you are not getting ready for it. Nobody is getting ready 
for it. I am not telling you that war will come. It may never come. I hope it will 
not come. But if it should come, it will be a good thing for all of us for we will 
learn to suffer and we will learn to die. I know i)eop]e are not worthy unless they 
know how to suffer and how to die. I wish these educators of ours here will start 
telling you to write poems or speeches speaking of your duty to lay down your 
lives, your duty to work and your duty to suffer. That is life. 



4500 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Enclosure No. 2 

Malacaiian Palace 
Manila 

By the PteKSlDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 
• EXECUTIVE 0RDE3t NO, 335 

Creating a civilian emof/cnc)/ administration, defining its potrcrs and duties 
and providing for coordination and control of civilian organizations for the 
protection, of the civil population in extraordinary and emergency conditions. 

Whereas, the Civilian Emergency Planning Board has reconunended immediate 
adoption cf measures to control and coilrdlnate civilian participation in meeting 
grave emergencies ; and 

Whereas, it appears necessary and desirable that comprehensive rules and 
regulations be issued to safeguard the integrity of the Philippines and to insure 
the tranquility of its inhabitants ; 

Now, therefore, I, Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Philippines, by virtue of 
the powers in me vested by Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred, do hereby 
create and constitute a Civilian Emergency Administration, which shall function 
through and be administered by the following officials and organizations and 
those that may hereafter be designated ; 

1. The National Emergency Commission, composed of the Secretary of Na- 
tional Defense as Chairman and a representative of each Executive Department 
as members. This Commission shall, subject to the approval of the President, 
formulate and execute policies and plans for the protection and welfare of the 
civil population of the Philippines in extraordinary and emergency conditions. 
It shall have general supervision and control over the officials and organizations 
as authorized herein, in so far as their duties pertain to said Administration, 
and shall function through (1) The Manager, Philippine Red Cross; (2) a Di- 
rector of Publicity and Propaganda; (8) a Food Administrator; (4) an Indus- 
trial Production Administrator; (5) a Fuel and Transportation Administrator; 
(6) a National Air Raid Warden: (7) a Directo"r of Communications and such 
other officials as may be appointed by the President from time to time. 

2. A Provincial Emergency Connnittee in each province, composed of the 
Provincial Governor, as Chairman, and the Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial 
Fiscal, the District Engineer, the Division Superintendent of Schools, the Pro- 
vincial Inspector of Constabulary, the District Health Officer, and the Provincial 
Agricultural Supervisor, as members. This commitee shall have general super- 
vision and control over the Municipal FJmergency Committees. 

3. A Municipal Emergency Committee in each municipality or municipal dis- 
trict, composed of the Mmiicipal Mayor, as Chairman, and the Municipal Treas- 
urer, the ranking or Principal Teacher, the Chief of Police, the Sanitary Officer, 
the Municipal Agricultural Inspector, and a representative of the Municipal 
Council, as members. This Committee shall organize local units for emergency 
purposes in accordance with and subject to the rules and regulations to be pre- 
scribed by the National Emergency Commission. Such local units shall consist 
of (1) a Volunteer Guard, (2) Air Raid Protection. (3) protection of utilities 
and industries, (4) food administration, (5) evacuation, (6) public welfare and 
morale, (7) transportation and fuel administration, (8) medical and sanitary, 
(9) publicity and propaganda and sii -h other services as may be authorized from 
time to time. 

4. A City Emergency Committee in each chartered city, composed of the City 
Mayor, as Chairman, and the City Treasurer, the City Fiscal or Attorney, the 
City Engineer, the City Superintendent of Schools, the Chief of Police, the City 
Health Officer, the Chief of the Fire Department, and a representative of the 
Municipal Board, as members. This Committee shall organize local units for 
emergency purposes as prescribed for municipaliti*>s under paragraph (3) here- 
of. 

5. For the purpose of carrying out die oltjectives of this Order, the co<")peration 
of all departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Gov- 
ernment is hereby enjoined and the whole-hearted support of the inhabitants 
of the Philippines earnestly requested. 



EXHIBITS OF OINT COMMITTEE 4501 

Done at the City of Baguio, this 1st day of April, in the year of our Lora. 
nineteen hundred and forty-one, and of the Coniiuonwealth of the Philippines, 
the sixth. 

(Sgd.) Manuet. L. Quezon, 
President of the Philippines. 
By the President : 

(Sgd.) Jorge B. Vargas, 

Secretary to the President. 



EInclosure No. 3 

Office of the President of the Philippines, 

Manila, Octoher 15, WJfO. 
Confidential 

Deab Genebal Gbunert : The Committee appointed hy His Excellency, the Presi- 
dent, has carefully considered the statements contained in your memorandum of 
September 16th, presented in our recent conference, and I beg to submit the follow- 
ing comment and information, reference being made seriatim to subheadings of 
paragraph 4 thereof: 

a. Additional soldiers. 

The Philippine Army is prepared to mobilize immediately its twelve divisions 
of approximately 120,()C0 men. The Department Commander has complete data 
as to the location, equipment, and training of these troops. As for their replace- 
ment in civil pur.suits, the unemployed in the islands, including those that would 
be thrown out of employment by the war processes, would fill the vacancies in 
productive fields resulting from a mobilization. 

b. Food supplies. 

The Commonwealth at present imports a certain amount of its food require- 
ment. In time of emergency, however, by converting to food production some i)or- 
tion of the agricultural land now devoted to cash exports it could easily be self- 
contained. The federal forces here, as you know, are supplied largely by imports ; 
however, they could readily be supplied from local sources in time of war. The 
National Rice and Corn Corporation, a Commonwealth entity, imports those 
cereals and could, in emergency, increase its present supply. The continued 
importation of food supplies is an insignificant problem compared with the im- 
portation of military supplies. All ammunition, ordnance, gasoline, aviation sup- 
plies and what might be classed as munitions of war must be imported and the 
channels of communication constantly kept clear. This is a naval problem, not an 
interior one. 

c. Other essential military supplies — transportation, medical, construction 
materials, utilities. 

All transportation in the islands would be available to the military on demand. 
The supply would be far in excess of military needs. Complete studies have been 
made as to such facilities. Repair and maintenance facilities and oi)erating 
personnel are available. Such demands as the military might make could readily 
be accommodated by the civil population. Gasoline stocks are very limited and 
the supply depends upon the maintenance of sea communications. 

[2] Medical installations and facilities are limited and no funds are avail- 
able to do more than is now being planned by the Commonwealth in its progressive 
program for improving conditions within its fiscal limitations. 

Construction materials exist only in limited quantities. Timber and cement are 
available, buf steel products and appurtenances are supplied from the United 
States or foreign countries, largely upon indivhlual order. The road system 
hardly needs discussion, as it is shown on oflScial road maps of the Bureau of 
Public Works. 

Utilities, now adequately manned and administered, could be insured only by 
a proper military defense. 

d. Communications. 

All communications would naturally be at the disposal of the military. The 
present oi)erating agencies could continue to function under such direction and 
supervision as the military might impose. No preparatory instructions are neces- 
sary to accomplish these ends. 

e. Labor. 

The demands of the military could be more than met by civil potentialities in 
this regard provided the United States Government pays the prevailing wage. 



4502 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The operation and administration of labor gangs engaged on military measures 
present problems that do not materially differ from similar operations in civil 
life. 

f. Welfare. 

This is a subject that receives the constant attention of Government. Its tran- 
sition from a civil to a war-time basis will depend entirely upon the policies of the 
military as determined by the nature and course of military operations. 

g. Publicity. 

The dissemination of military propaganda is a problem that appertains not to 
the civil, but to the military headquarters. The usual publicity methods would 
continue subject to such restrictions as the military might impose. The applica- 
tion of such restrictions would be a simple matter in so far as civil authority is 
concerned. 

h. Protection. 

The protective features of municipalities and provinces would continue to func- 
tion except as might be modified by military commanders. Any attempt to reor- 
ganize the.se civil agencies based not upon local civic needs but upon xwssible needs 
in time of war would be impracticable. The present organization repre.sents a 
standard development which would have to await local necessity in order to be 
intelligently modified. 

[3] Anti-sabotage measures are already in operation. 

Blackouts, gas proof shelters, and all the many ramifications of a nation at war 
are of doubtful application to the local situation until a much more critical phase 
of the international situation develops. Such steps cannot be imposed without 
causing the gravest anxiety and concern on the part of the populace and great 
expense and effort on the part of Government. Such steps are not as yet current 
in the United States itself, and it is not believed that they should be prematurely 
practiced here. 

The present police control of aliens in so far as is known, has proven entirely 
satisfactory. The efficiency of the current system unquestionably compares favor- 
ably with that of other parts of the United States. 

In anticipation of any emergency the Commonwealth Government has recently 
enactefl Commonwealth Act No. 600 authorizing its President to take the most 
comprehensive action with reference to complete control of its civic functions. 
The comprehensiveness of this law which was enacted as a measure of pre- 
paredness, exceeds anything of the kind as yet provided by the United States 
Government or any of its other integral parts. 

Most of the data on the subject you have outlined are available from published 
annual reports of the different cffi':'es of the Comonwealth Government. If any 
further data are desired along any special line, I shall be very glad indeed to 
furnish such information as soon as it can be made made available. 

With expressions of cordial regard, I am 
Sincerely yours, 

Jorge B. Vargas, 
Secretary to the President. 

Major General George Grunert, 

Commanding General, U. 8. Army, Philippine Department, Manila. 



Enclosure No. 4 

Office of the United States High Commissioner, 

Manila, March 20, 1941. 
Press Release 

The report submitted to the United States High Commissioner and the Presi- 
dent of the Philippines by the Civilian Emergency Planning Board on March 11th 
contains a resume of conditions as they exist at this time, as determined by 
surreys conducted by the Committees on Supply, Transportation, Medicine, Com- 
munications, Welfare, and Personnel and Labor. In addition to setting forth 
conditions as they exist, the report of each Committee p<^)ints out specific condi- 
tions that need to be remedies] and contains the reoominendations of the com- 
mittees as to the action to be taken by the Coinnumwealth authorities to remedy 
such defective conditi<ms. For instance, definite shortages are known to exist 
in certain articles of food and other supply items. The Committee on Supply 
has recommended that the Commonwealth authorities immediately develop and 
put into effect a plan to increase the production of essential foodstuffs through- 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4503 

out the Philippines, and that special attention be paid to the development of 
self-si^fficieney of food supply in each locality. It also recommended that the 
growing of short-time crops, and the raising of livestock and poultry to meet the 
requirements for meat, dairy and poultry products, be encouraged in every 
practicable manner. The acquisition of suitable and adequate reserve stocks 
of all imported iten)s considered as essential, including fuels and foodstuffs, by 
the Commonwealth Government itself, or by suppliers of such items under an 
agreement with the Conmionwealth Government, was reconnuended. 

Concerning transportation, certain recommendations were made for the con- 
trol of the operation of motor vehicles during an emergency in order that existing 
supplies of gasoline, lubricating oil, tires and spare parts might be conserved. 
Among other recommendations made by the Board were those concerned with 
the estab ishment of adequate stocks of surgical instruments, X-ray apparatus 
and supplies, biological serums and apparatus for blood transfusions; the expan- 
sion of existing telephone and telegraph lines to meet emergency conditions ; and 
the control and use of radio stations during an emei-gency. 

During any emergency many organizations will be active in behalf of the 
civil population. In order to avoid duplication of effort, prevent waste and 
reduce expense, the work of these oi-ganizations should be controlled and co- 
ordinated by a central organization. To secure such coordination and control 
the Board has recommended that a Civilian Emergency Administration be created 
by the President of the Philippine composed of [2] one representative of 
each of the following Departments of the Commonwealth Government. 

Department of the Interior 

Department of Public Works and Communications 

Department of Agriculture and Commerce 

Department of Health and Pub'ic Welfare 

Department of Public Instruction 

Department of Finance 

Department of National Defense. 
This organization would function directly under the President of the Philip- 
pines and be charged with the duty of formulating and executing policies and 
plans for the organization of certain units in all the provinces and chartered 
cities. Functioning directly under this national body would be the Philippine 
Red Cross, a Director of Publicity and Propaganda, a Fuel Administrator, a Food 
Administrator, a National Air Raid Warden, and a Director of Communications. 
Among the units that would be organized and trained under the supervision 
of the National CEA if this plan is adopted are those belonging to the Air Raid 
Protective Service and Volunteer Guard Units. 

The Board has prepared a complete and comprehensive Air Raid Protective 
Plan which contemplates the organization of : 

A Warning Service 

An Air Raid Wardens Service 

Auxiliary Fire Fighting Units 

First-Aid Units 

Rescue Units 

Demolition and Repair Units 

Decontamination Units. 
This plan contains the necessary information to be given to the public as to 
what to do before, during and after an air raid. It contains information re- 
garding air raid shelters and several designs of inexpensive shelters for family 
use. It even contains directions for making a cheap improvised type of gas 
mask which would afford temporary protection from poison gas. 

Manuel L. Quezon, 
President of the Philippines. 
Fr.\ncis B. Sayre, 
United States High Conimissiover 
to the Philippine Islands. 



4504 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Enclosure No. 5 



MALACANAN PALACE 

MANILA 



Bagulo, May 5, 1941 



Gentlemen of the National Assemblyt 

The trend of events seems to point strongly 
to the possibility of America's entiry into the pre- 
sent world war. If such a situation should arise, 
it feoea without saying that the Philippines would 
also be Involved directly in the war* 

Willie the protection of the Philippines against 
external ae,iiression is priirarily the responsibility 
of the United iitates, the duty of safeguarding the 
inhabitants of our country, both citizens and aliens, 
at^alnat hunger, pestilence, lawlessness and otter 
dan^jers which the nature of modern warfare entails, 
rests mainly with the Oovemment of the Gommon wealth. 
Consequently, and by virtue of the powers vested in 
me h^ Coninonwealth Act No. 600, I have constituted a 
Civilian Emergency Administration to advise and assist 
the ^^ovemment in the adoption and execution of such 
measures as may be necessary to protect otir civilian 
population in case of an emergency. This Administra- 
tion la functioning through the following organizational 

1. The National Emergency Commission, oomposed 
of the Honorable Teofilo Slaon, Secretary of National 
Defense, as Chainoan, and a representative of each 
Executive Department, as members. This Commission, 
subject to the approval of the President, formula tea 
and executes plans for the protection and welfare of 
the civil population of the Philippines in extraordinary 
and emergency conditions. It operates through (1) The 
Manager, Philippine Red Cross; (2) a Director of Publi- 
city and Propaganda; (3) a Pood AdminiBtrator; (4) an 
Industrial Production Administrator; (5) a Fuel and 
Tz'ansportation Administrator; (6) a National Air Raid 
Warden; and (7) a Director of Coranvuiications. 

2, A Provincial aaiergency Committee In each 
province, composed of the Provincial Governor, as 
Chairman, and the Provincial Treasurer, the Prevln- 
cial Fiscal, the District fiiglneer, the Division 
Superintendent of Schools, the Provincial Inspector 

of 



PA/ 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4505 



- 2 - 

of Constabulary, the District Health Officer, and 
the Provincial A^icultilral Supervisor, as members. 
This Committee has ^^eneral supervision and control 
over the municipal emergency coint.itteos« 

3« A Municipal Elaergency Committee "in each 
municipality or municipal district, composed of tiie 
Municipal Mayor, as Chairman, and the Municipal 
Treasurer, the ranking or Principal Teacher, the 
Chief of police, the Sanitary Officer, the Liuniclpal 
A^lcultural inspector, end a i^epresentative of the 
Municipal Council, as members. This Conaaittee or- 
ganizes local units for emergency purposes, in accord- 
ance with the rules and rejiulatlons prescribed by the 
National Emergency Comrdssion* 

4» A City ianergenoy Committee in each chartered 
city, cornpoaod of the City Mayor, as Chairman, and the 
City Treasurer, the City Fiscal or Attorney, the City 
Brioineer, the City Superintendent of Schools, the Chief 
of police, the City Health Officer, the Chief of the 
Fii'e Department, ai:id a representative of the Muxiicipal 
Board, as members. This Comciittee organizes local 
units for emargency purposes, in accoruance with the 
rules and regulations prescribed by th© National iimer- 
gency Commission. 

The Civilian Etaergency Administration has been 
functioning for some time, and has already formulated 
comprehensive plana designed to effectuate the objec- 
tives of the Government in the event that our country 
la drawn into the conflict. Some of these plans are 
now in process of execution; others are being carefully 
studied by the Government with a view to final action. 

In order to avert shortages in certain articles 
of food and other supply Items, definite steps have 
been taken to increase the production of essential 
foodstuffs throughout the Philippines, particular 
attention being given to the development of aelf- 
'aufflolency of food supply in each locality. The 
growing of short-term crops has been encouraged. Ne- 
gotiations are under way for the acquisition of suit- 
able and adequate reserve stocks of all Imported items 
consid0x*ed as essential — including fuels, construction 
materials, and foodstuffs — either by the Govemment ^ 
Itself or by the importers of such items under an agree- 
ment 



79716 O — 4«— pt. 20 35 



4506 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 




•» o - 

ment. wit|i the fllovemraent. In this connection, I have 
Issued an executive order ji'equirlnti all tpvemnent en- 
titles to establish and maintain at leaat u four-month 
reserve Bui>ply of jasoline, lubrlcatin^s oil, dleael oil, 
and other oil products. Public utility enterprises are 
beln^ requested to take similar precautions. 

To safeguard the health of the civilian popula- 
tion, negotiations are bein^i made for the acquisition 
of an emergency reserve supply of medicines, and surgi- 
cal instruments, includln^^ bacteriological serums and 
vaccines. These supplies will be distributed and 
stored throughout the country in eleven strategic loc- 
ations. Artesian wells will be drilled in evacuation 
centers in order to Insure adequate supply of drinking 
water. 

The Civilian Emergency Administration has found 
that the construction of public alr-rald aheltera In 
Manila and in moat other coaotaJL cities and towns would 
be very expensive and impractloable on account of tho 

low terrain. B^irthermore, the supply of materials for 
the construction of suitable shelters is totally Inade- 
quate. • ?or these reasons, the Commission has recommend- 
ed the evacuation of children and uneBsentlal men and 
women from the> danger areas In such cities and towns, 
as well us the transfer of some government offices from 
the City of Manila and surrounuiiio municipalities to the 
provinces. There are, however, certain offices 
\#iich, by the nature of their functions, must remain 
In Manila, and to afford protection, as far as possible, 
to the officers and. employees whose duties require them 
to remaiii in such offices, air-raid shelters will be 
constructod in the buildings where those offices are 
located. 

To enable private persona or entities to build 
their own air-raid shelters, plans for the construction 
of such shelters In privately owned conceete buildings 
will soon be ready for distribution. Because of the 
lack of sufficient supply in the local market, the Na- 
tional Coconut Corporation has been requested to have 
1,000,000 sacks manufactured from coconut coir for use 
In building alr-rald shelters. 

Flans are being completed for the evacuation of '™^ 

such portions of the civilian popvilation of Manila as ^ 

may be found In danger areas which tho proper author- "| 

Ities of the United States Array will specify in due J 
time. These plana include the designation of places 

in 





EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4507 




*- 4 - 

In lUnlla where people will be expected to gather for 
their transportation to the different evacuation 
centers* A survey has been made of nearby towns in 
the provinoes of Rizal and Laguna to determine their 
availability as evacviation centers from the standpoint 
of food and water supply, sanitation, construction 
laaterials, etc. A siiHilar survey is bein^; laade for 
the purpose of taking care of the populations of 
other danger areas outside of the City of Manila, 
suoh as the cities of Gavlte, Cebu, and Hollo, and 
tiM towns of Batangns, Llngayen, and others. 

In case of an emergency, our electrical conununi- 
oatlons are inadequate. Therefore, plains have bean 
adopted for their Improvement and for supplementing 
thevBual facilities with mobile and portable radio 
sets. To carry out these plans, the amount of 1^250,000 
has for the prescmt been allotted. The sum of is-lOO^OOO 
has also been made available for Imiaediata use by the 
Bureau of Posts for the purpose of malntainine^ 24-hour 
telegraphic service in all provincial cfipitals, for the 
employment of the necessary additional personnel, the 
training, of operators, and the purchase of additional 
equipment and supplies . 

With a view to avoiding coi.fuaion resulting from 
laok of organization and to provide orj^anized emergency 
groups ready to function at any moment for the purpose" 
of ministering to the needs of the population, the or- 
ganization of Volunteer Guard units in all chartered 
cities, municipalities and municipal districts, is being 
undertaken by the provincial governors under the direc- 
tion of the Chief of Constabulary. Rules and regulations 
for the organization and training of the Volunteer Guards 
and for the estatalisliment of an Air Raid Warden Service 
have been issued and sent to all officials concerned. 
Theao rules and regulations, including directions for air- 
raid precaution, have been printed in pamphlet form for 
ipttoteral distribution. 

During great emergencies, the matter of police 
protection for the civil population assumes a vital 
importance. It is the primary duty of the Government 
to provide adequate police protection in such cases. 
The present strength of the Philippine Constabulary, 
irtiile adequate in noraal times, is insufficient to meet 

emergency 



4508 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



- 5 - 

8nier,5«ncy condltlona. It is, therefore, necessary to 
provide tho force with additional personnel In order to 
enable It to cope with the altxu&tlon when an emeroency 
occurs • 

The execution of the plans and the effectuation 

of the objectives I have mentioned require the expendi- 
ture of considerable sums of money. I, therefore, 
recoiicviend that the amount of ^10, 000,000 be appropriated 
for such purposes. 1 also recorajnend that the life of 
CoKcionwealth Act No. 600, commonly known as the Etaergency 
Powers Act, be extondod to the date of adjournment of the 
first regular session of the Congress of the Philippines, 
with such modifications and under such conditions as the 
National Assembly may deera proper to provide. 

Respectfully, 



(SGD) MANUEL L, QUEZON 
President of the Philippines 



The National Assembly 
Manila 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4509 

Enclosure No. 6 

NOVEMBKR 27, 1941. 
Lieutenant Genesal Douglas MacAbthub, 

Commanding U. S. Army Forces in the Far East, 1 Calle Victoria, Manila. 
My Dear General MacArthur: In accordance with our conversation of this 
morning, I am enclosing a copy of a letter of October 7, 1941 from Mayor La- 
Guardia, the United States Director of Civilian Defense, in which he says: 

' Confirming our recent conversation, I hereby appoint you Director of 
Civilian Defense for the Philippine Islands." 
As I told you this morning, there must be some mistake, since I have had 
neither recent conversation nor corresptmdence with Mayor LaGuardia. It is 
apparent that he has not taken into consideration special circumstances obtaining 
in the Philippine Islands and the progress already achieved in emergency de- 
fense measures under the primary responsibility of the Commonwealth Gov- 
ernment in conjunction with the advice and cooperation of the military au- 
thorities. 

I shall appreciate having your views as to what reply should be made to 
Washington. So that Mayor LaGuardia and President Roosevelt may obtain 
a clear understanding of the situation here, I should appreciate your setting 
forth in [2] your letter the present status of civilian defense and plans 
for future activities. 

Very sincerely yours. 



Enclosure. 
CAB: 
FBS : abn 



4510 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Enclosure No. 7 

[copy compared rap] 

Headquarters, 
United States Army Forces in thk, 1''ar East, 

Office of the Commanding General, 

Manila, P. 1., November 28, 1941. 

The United States High Commissioner to the Philippines, 

Manila, P. I. 

Dear Mr. High Commissioner: I have received your cordial note of November 
27th and I concur fully with your thought that the communication from Mr. 
LaGuardia was sent through mistake. The executive power in the Philippine 
Islands for peacetime execution of measures involving extraordinary controls 
of the civil population are vested in the Commonwealth Government. With the 
Tydings-McDuffie Act as a basis it enacted emergency laws placing such authority 
in the hands of its Chief Executive. Accordingly local measures for civilian 
defense were initiated several months ago after coordinated discussion between 
the High Commissioner, the President of the Commonwealth, and the military 
authorities. A Civilian Emergency Administration for this purpose was con- 
stituted operating under the direct control of the President of the Commonwealth. 
This agency, while a responsibility of the Commonwealth Government, functions 
with the constant advice and observation of both the High Commissioner's office 
and the military authorities. It has operated successfully within the natural 
limitations imposed by local conditions. It would be most unfortunate if any 
attempt were made to change the present arrangement. The cooperation and 
complete understanding which now exists between all agencies involved should 
not be disturbed especially at this critical time. 
Most sincerely, 

Douglas MacArthub. 



Enclosure No. 8 



[copy compared rap] 



Office op Civilian Defense, 
Washington, D. C. October 7, 1941. 



Hon. Francis B. Sayre, 

United States High Commissioner, 

Manila, Philippine Islands. 

My Dear Commissioner : Confirming our recent conversation, I hereby appoint 
you Director of Civilian Defense for the Philippine Islands. 

Instructional material has been sent to you, and you will receive from time 

to time such additional information as it becomes available. If there Is any 

assistance this office can render you at any time, we will be only too glad to do so. 

As Director of Civilian Defense for the Philippine Islands, it is understood 

that you will serve without remuneration. 

Sincerely yours, 

F. H. LaGxtardia, 
TJ. 8. Director of Civilian Defense. 



Enclosure No. 9 
Via airmail 

December 1, 1941. 

The Honorable F. H. LaGuardia. 

United Btates Director of Civilian Defense, 

Washington, D. C. 

My Dear Mr. LaGuardia : I have your letter of October 7, 1941, sent by ordinary 
mail and not received here until late in November, informing me that you have 
appointed me Director of Civilian Defense for the Philippine Islands. Inasmuch 
as I have had no previous conversations with you with regard to this matter as 
stated in your letter, I wonder whether the letter could have been sent possibly 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4511 

under some misapprehension. As you know, the executive power in the Philippine 
Islands with certain exceptions has been placed by the Tydings-McDuffie Act 
in the hands of the President of the Commonwealth Government. Acting in 
accordance with that power, nearly eight months ago he set up the Civilian 
Emergency Administration, of which he is the directing head. In view of the 
delicacy of the existing international situation and of the political and juris- 
dictional complexities of the local situation, the problem of civilian defense in 
the Philippines has now been referred to President Roosevelt and it would be 
most unfortunate at this time to disturb the present arrangement without his 
specific instructions. I therefore do not feel free to accept the appointment 
tendered in your letter unless directed otherwise by the President, to whom I 
am today sending a full report on the situation. 
Sincerely yours, 

Feancis B. Saybe. 
FBS : abn 



confidential 

Bulletin 

3 December 19^1 

Note: Heavy Japanene troop movements from Central China continue, probably 
to the South, ONI reports and a Naval Observer in Shanghai reports from 
November 26 to November 29, 14,000 Japanese troops plus others (accurate check 
not available), arrived there by rail. Equipment with arrivals included field 
artillery and tanks. 

Vichy officials stated, December J, that the French Oovernment in case of war 
in the Far East would take all means in its power to defend Indo-China against 
any aggression, regardless of whence it comes. Should a Japanese attack on 
Thailand occur, the French Government would "examine the situation and deter- 
mine its positron in accordance with a realistic policy," it is reported from Vichy. 

Through November 1, Germans killed and missing in Russian campaign are 
estimated to total 2.250,000, MID reports from Bern. Note: This figure con- 
sidered excessive although Germans recently admitted 2,125,000 killed, wounded 
and missing. 

[2] «S NI8HMAHA (United States) picked up November 27, 72 men on 
rafts from the British cruiser DUNEDIN (4,850 tons), torpedoed and sunk on 
the 24th. Five died and buried informally. Proceeding Trinidad from S. E. ONI 
reports. 

To date, the RAF has avoided night missions icith fighters and light bombers 
due to the necessity that all take-offs be made during daylight, MID reports 
from Cairo. The reason for this is claimed to be the lack of experienced flyers, 
but in so doing much of the air attacks' effectiveness is lost. Most of the RAF 
losses during the early days of attack resulted from crashes by RAF planes land- 
ing on their own grounds. American-built aircraft are considered excellent. 
Adequate direct-support planes, to be used in conjunction with tank operations, 
are not available. RAF performance — except for the conduct of close-support 
missions — has been rated highly effective. The RAF transport shuttle, taking 
into account its lack of equipment, is considered good. 

Japanese and Germans are meeting in Lima, Peru, to plan sabotage and em- 
barrass the United States. Peru plans against, a Naval Observer, in Lima reports. 

[3] Future operation of the Federal Shipbuilding plant at Keurny, New 
Jersey, it reaching a showdoicn in view of the fact the Mediation Board is about 
to make its recommendations on the cases of union maintenance referred to 
them. It is hoped that the company and the union may reach an agreement. 

In reply to a request from the British Admiralty for nine additional converted 
aircraft carriers the Navy Department has asked the British to advise the locality 
in which the operations of such carriers would be anticipated. The thought 
behind this is that if the plan is to operate them In the North Atlantic it would 
be better for the United States to acquire them, man them, and operate them, 
the Bureau of Aeronautics reports. 

Mr. Frederick Remtschler, Chairman of the Board, and Mr. Eugene Wilson, 
President of United Aircraft Corp>oration, conferred on the morning of December 3 
with Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air Artemus L. Gates and the Chief 



4512 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of the Bureau of Aeronautics Admiral Tpwers concerning their corporation's plan 
of general refinancing, the Bureau of Aeronautics reports. Special conferences 
are still beinff held in regard to [//] the control of allocation of steel re- 
quired for National Defense, the Bureau of Ordnance reports. In thi.s connection, 
it is probable that special inventories of all Ordnance plants will be required to 
check any possible excessive inventory being kept on hand. Efforts are being 
made to Jivoid additional questionnaires being sent to Inspectors and contractors 
for information that appears to the Bureau to be unnecessary or that might be 
obtained direct from steel pr<»ducers. Reports have been furnished to the Qflace 
of Budget and Reports as to the steel requirements for 1942 to produce all classes 
of projectiles. 

Scheduled deliveries reported hy the Bureau of Ships: 



Ships 


Builder 


Date 


2 Coastal Minesweepers: 

Paramount . . 


Delaware Bay S. B. Co 

Anderson* (I'ristofani 


12/ 1/41 


Proerress 


11/30/41 


*^ submarine chasers _ - 


Peterson Boat Works 


12/1/41 




do 


12/ 5/41 









Representation's have been made that there is a conspiracy in Philadelphia to 
gouge the Navy on the purchase of land. The Judge Advocate General has an 
attorney looking into this matter very carefully. 



CONFIDENTIAL 

Bulletin 
5 December 1941 

Hitler not shot, Naval Attache in Rome reports. German Embassy interpreted 
telephone message "Big Chief shot down" to mean Hitler. Later when inter- 
rupted communications were restored it was learned that General Von Paul ; 
Major Bruning, Assistant Chief Luftwaffe, Rome ; two colonels ; two aides ; two 
pilots and possibly others crashed and killed in Sicily en route Africa. Von Paul 
was to be Chief entire Axis Air F'orce Africa and was carrying complete plans for 
African campaign. Germans in Rome feared plane shot down. 

Nazis have started a major offensive in the Kharkov region of the Donets river 
basin, 250 miles N.W. of Rostov, in order to ease pressure on retreating Germans 
to the South. The Russians are said to be resisting successfully, it is reported 
from London. 

MID reports from Rome: (1) Defenses in South Italy and Sicily are to be set 
up under the control of the Germans from now on (2) Naples' defenses against air 
attack are much improved, however, industrial sections were severely damaged 
by recent bombing (3) The [2] central and southern portions of Italy are 
preparing to receive a large addition to the Luftwaffe forces already there. 

Three Oerman steamships were reported as sunk recently IN THE W. Mediter- 
ranean in the vicinity of the Straits of Gibraltar, MID reports from Gibraltar. 

Admiralty appreciates that one raider is still in Pacific and possibly another in 
Indian Ocean. Supply ship also possibly at sea, the Admiralty reports. 

The Saigoti radio announced December 3 that Tokyo had given a pledge to Oov- 
ernor General DeCoux to send no more troops into French Indo-China and to 
refrain from using Indo-(^hina bases for attacks on Thailand or China's Burma 
Road, it is reported from Vichy. (Note : "Scrap of Paper V") 

Naval Attache, Singapore reports British and allied merchant ships in that area 
advised by Commander-in-Cliief, China (1) All ships north of Hongkong "beat it 
South thereof" (2) Crown Colonys and all ocean going ships to Singapore and 
bring such shipyard equipment as possible (3) Except for Coast of Malaya 
and West Borneo no vessels leave Singapore north-bound without permission (4) 
No Dutch ships shall go North their islands without authority orders issued by the 
Dutch. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4513 

[3] Naval Observer in Mexico City reports: Japanese Minister here has ap- 
plied for United States visa for self and family to cross border about December 
13 to depart from United States for Japan on TATUTA MAUU. Two other lega- 
tion officials have also requested United States visas for families and will leave 
for Japan from United States. Reported Japanese Legation Mexico City has re- 
quested TATUTA MARU call at Manzanillo (Cuba) and Canal Zone after leav- 
ing United States presumably to evacuate families. Such evacuations believed 
indicative of Japanese officials expectation of trouble. 

The Army and Navy Munition.s Board has granted the Navy Department the 
right to assign A-l-a priorities for all of its combatant ships which will be fin- 
ished in 1943, the Secretary's Office reports. The Board has been requested to 
grant permission to establish the same priorities for airplane carriers to be com- 
pleted in 1944. 

U8S SALINAS (5,375 tons) torpedoed oil tanker, now at Robins Dry Dock, 
Brooklyn, New York, will be placed in Dry Dock December 8 for examination and 
repairs, the Bureau of Ships reports. 

[4] Navy is taking steps to establish a branch of the Norfolk Navy Supply 
Depot, in Baltimore. Commercial terminal space will be used. This is for the 
purpose of serving British Repair, conversions and other USN supply needs, the 
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts reports. 

Ordnance reports progress on the delivery of guns, including ammunition sup- 
plies, for Russia under Defense Ai^ with Russian ships currently being armed 
and armament for ice-breakers delivered or waiting to be picked u