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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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Given By 
U. S. SUPT. OF DOCl'MENTS 



PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BDFORB THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEARL HAEBOB ATTACK 
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES ^'Jyjl;^ 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGEESS ^ () ^ ' 

FIRST SESSION ' ; 

M , • 

PURSUANT TO i ^' ' '' 



S. Con. Res. 27 '^^ 



A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



j^-^:^ 



PART 22 

PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Inyestlgation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




.•\ V 









PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFOKE THE 

JOIJsT COMMITTEE 0?J THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAEL HAEBOE ATTACK 

CONGKESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 



S. Con. Res. 27 ^^"^^ 



A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1041, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PtA%l 



PART 22 
PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




UNITED STATES 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON : 1946 



Of OOCUMWl* 

SEP 20\V» 






JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 
(Through January 14, 1946) 
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
GERHARD A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JULE M. Hanxaford, Assistajit Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samcel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
LOGAN J. Lane, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Hearings 

Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19. 20, and 21, 1945. 
Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 
Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 
Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 
Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 
Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 
Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946., 
Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 
Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 
Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 
Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 


Pages 


Transcript 


No. 




pages 


1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


2 


401- 982 


1059- 2586 


3 


983-1583 


2587- 4194 


4 


1585-2063 


4195- 5460 


5 


2065-2492 


5461- 6646 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


7 


2921-3378 


7889- 9107 


8 


3379-3927 


9108-10517 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


11 


5153-5560 


13709-14765 



Part 






No. 




Exhibits Nos. 


12 


1 through 6. 




13 


7 and 8. 




14 


9 through 43. 




15 


44 through 87. 




16 


88 through 110. 




17 


Ill through 128. 




18 


129 through 156. 




19 


157 through 172. 




20 


173 through 179. 




21 


180 through 183, 


and Exhibits-Illustrations. 



22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

26 Hart Inquirj' Proceedings. 

27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 

Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



IV 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



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Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

■""5269-5291 

"""3814-3826 
3450-3519 

"""5089-5122 


Joint 

Committee 
Exhibit No. 

149 .; 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lo 1 1 1 1 1 1 : 

|M 1 M M M M M iM! M i M i i 

ft. 1 1 1 , . 1 , , , .r- , 1 1 , I 1 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investia;ation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 
64" 

""""]"" 

59-63 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Au?. 

4, 1945) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 i i 1 ' ''*^ 

3 M 1 1 i 1 1 1 M M 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 r 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

140 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 !gc 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ao' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

« 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CO 

^ i N N N N n N N |s i N N i 1 


Joint 
Committee 
E.xhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pases 

3105-3120" 

2479-2491" 

4022-4027" 
148-186 

2567-2580" 
3972-3988 
2492-2515 

1575-1643 

3720-3749" 
1186-1220 

1413-1442' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

""391-398" 
115-134 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
203-209 

1127-1138" 
1033-1038 

1719-1721 

12 19-1224" 

886-951 
1382-1399 

"".377-389' 
1224-1229 

""314-320" 


s 


Allen, Brooke E., Maj 

Allen, Riley H 

Anderson, Edward B., Maj 

Anderson, Ray 

Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Anstey, Alice 

Arnold, H. H., Gen 

Asher, N. F., Ens 

Ball, N. F., Ens 

Ballard, Emma Jane 

Barber, Bruce G 

Bartlett, George Francis 

Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr 

Beardall, John R., Rear Adm 

Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens 

Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm 

Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm 

Benny, Chris J 

Benson, Henry P 

Berquist, Kenneth P., Col 

Berry, Frank M., S 1/c 

Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen 

Bicknell. George W., Col 

Bissell, John T., Col 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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VI 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


I o- 

1 i 2 






















oc 
c<- 

oc 
c<- 

1 

i 














Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


1 














1 1 s 


















CO ITt< 

(N itO 

■* ITj< 

Sis 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 
















w§ 1 
00 ; 










B22S-224 

B65-66 

B229-231 

49-51 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


2 : 


































Joint 

Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 














I 1 

1 1 Tt< 




















Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


l| 










1 


N i 

: ! s 
1 1 2 


in CO 


11 

CO — 








Ico I 

iCO 1 

ic^ 1 

.ITf* 1 

IS : 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry. 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


1 


2 

7 


1 

o 




7 i i 4< 

§ 1 : ^ 


















I loo 

i i^ 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 






00 
1 


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77i 

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1 ICO — Oi 

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INDEX OF WITNESSES 



VII 



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VIII 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


; i ii ; : i I i i ; ; ; i i i ibis's : Hm 
= : i ll i i i i : i i i i i i i il^^^ i i's^s^ 

111 1 ! ! I 1 1 ! 1 ! ! 1 1 1 1 1 '^^'^ 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11. 1945) 


Pages 


428-432 
414-417 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


iililiiCOi^C^tiiiiii-ii iiii 
llliiii^'OGOiiiiiOi IIII 

E 1 ! : I 1 I 17 i-r^ : 1 1 : M 1 i i : i 
^ i I ; : 1 1 12 ;§ i i i ; i§ i i i i i 

1 1 1 1 1 j 1(N IrH 1 1 1 I 1^ 1 111' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


i i i i i 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ill 

^ I M M 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 M 1 1 MM 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 M 1 1 1 1111 


Joint . 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

;Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
1070-1076 

""461-469" 

"763-772" 

""816-851" 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


lo— ii-^ii'oiMiiii-^t^iii, iCCii 

1 ill 17 i i^i i i i 1^2 i i i i^ i i 

.e 1 1 1 1 -H 1 1 1> 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 ^1 lO 1 1 

ft, lOt- i-"^ 1 iOtJ< I 1 1 iOrt< III 1 ti 1 1 

iCOiO i(M 1 iiMfO 1 1 1 lO^ III ilr^ 1 1 

<0 CTi 1 ii05iiii(M05lli 1 II 

i(N CO 1 1 1 (M 1 1 1 1 (M —1 1 1 1 1 II 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 



""417-436" 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 

1571-1574' 

1664-1676" 
"469-473' 


i 


Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept 

Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen 

Harrington, Cyril J 

Hart, Tliomas Charles, Senator 

Rayes, Philip, Maj. Gen 

Heard, William A., Capt., USN 

Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA 

Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen 

Hill, WiUiam H., Senator 

Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN 

Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr 

Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col 

Hornbeck, Stanley K 

Home, Walter Wilton 

Howard, Jack W., Col 

Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr 

Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN 

Hull, Cordell 

Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c 

Hunt, John A., Col 

Ingersoll, Royal E., Adm 

Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



IX 



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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



.Joint 

Congressional 

Conunittee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


o,iO 1 1 1 1 1 

^g : 1 1 1 1 

lO 1 1 1 1 1 


Oi 00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i ^- -0 1 1 

l7 i ifsi : i 

i' i 1 li 1 i i i 1 1 liSS 1 1 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

Mav 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 
'"541-553' 


182-292 
"140^142 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


1 1 ico ; : 

1 1 lO 1 1 

If 


107-112 

186 
219-222 

102 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^ ' 1 1 1 1 




Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 i i i i i i 


00 1 1 1 1 ICO 1 1 1 lO iio II 

^lllll-^IIIITfHiQO II 

OililiCDiliit^iCC II 

4 1 ; I 1 ;<i 1 ! 1 u ;c^ ; i 

c^i 1 1 1 ico lid II 

C3 Oiiiit^iOO 11 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit ^0. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

26(35-2695" 
3028-3067 

1161-1185" 

2787-2802 
1014-1034 
1678-1694 
3226-3250 

2362-2374" 

2-54 

T. S. 2-52, 

192-226 

3126-3152 

1816-1913 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


1 uo It-- 1 1 ! 

1 1 1 1 1 1 i(M 1 1 II 

g C;l iCO . 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 ; i i ; i i ii: is : i 1 : i i ; ; i ; : i i 

1 1 1 1 1 1 i(N iCO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan.23, 1942) 


I'oi^KNiOiiiiOiiii-tiiiiiO ic^'lOS 

J i iS ;3 i S i ; iS i i i i^ i i !^ 'i^" 

1 irf< iio 1 1 1 1 t^ 1 1 1 iiO 1 1 1 C3 leo 
iiT-(i,-Hi OiiilMiiii iiit^ 1 


s 


Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN 

Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen 

Landreth, J. L., Ens 

Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0 

Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col 

Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC 

T;awtnn. William S. Col 


Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN 

Leahy, William D., Adm 

Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm 

Lewis, Fulton, Jr 

Litell, S. H 

Locev, Frank H 

Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA 

Lorence, Walter E., Col 

Lumsden, George, Klaj 

Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN 

Lynch, Paul J 

Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr 

Mac Arthur, Douglas, Gen 

Marshall, George C, Gen 

Marston, Morrill W., Col 

Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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XII 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5210 
4933-5009 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 
"387-388' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

14S 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


oil ill 1 1 T-i 1 IM 1 1 1 t^ 1 1 

ili It ; "ii iSii 

t^-* ;;;;;; |oj 1 1 1 1*" 1 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investisation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


Vol. 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


i is i i i i i i -'ffffs's^'s i i^ i i§§ 

1 1 17 111 III 7^f^2::;: 1 17 I 1?;^ 

1 i ij: ill i i i "i^I3I i ii i iil 

11^ 111 III c^^§2:2 1 1^ 1 i^g 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

1107-1160,' 
1240-1252 

3636^3640' 

2375-2398, 

3990-3996 

3153-3165 

2923-2933 

388^3915 

1968^1988' 
1035-1070 

778-789 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
"147-169' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


1 1 ,j-t>. Tt< 1 1 o 1 ,^,f.roo 1 1 1 co"^ 1 1 1 1 
1 li^oooi 1 1 lO iH?2c<' I " loooo 1 1 1 1 

1 1 i^<7t2 1 1 2 i«^^ ! : \^f 1111 
(^ 1 :o^i^ 1 ! ci 1^^ 1 1 icis 1 1 1 1 


1 


Pettigrew, Moses W., Col 

Phelan, John, Ens 

PhUUps, Walter C, Col 

Pickett, Harry K., Col 

Pierson, Millard, Col 

Pine, Willard B 

Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov 

PoweU, BoUing R., Jr., Mai 

PoweU, C. A., Col 

Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr 

Pmther, Louise 

Pratt, John S., Col 

Pye, WUliam S., Vice Adm 

Rafter, Case B 

Ralev, Edward W., Col 1 

Ram.sey, Logan C, Capt., USN 

Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



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XIV CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


i§ i i i i i^s i ii i ;?^^^§S i iii i i i 

1 :! i i i :^! ! ^^^^f f f 

1 1 M 1 i" 1 1 i 1°-^"" 1 ;^- 1 1 1 


.Joint 

Conrmittee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


i i i i? i IK iiiiii iii is i 

gll IITfHllCO llllll 111 ITJHI 

? ; i i i i is i i : i i ; i i i i= i 

11 II 1 ICO llllll 111 |T}< 1 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 



69 
195-197 

203-204 

185" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarko 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aus. 

4, 1945) 


Vol. 

2" 
2" 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


ilf NNIf iNNfif IN IN 

^ IS 1 1 1 1 i rl 1 1 1 '^gi III 111 
1^ 1 1 1 1 I"' fe 1 1 1 1 ^^ 111 111 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
3644-3650 
276-541, 
4411-4445 

3265-3286' 

1539^1575' 

4037-4094 

C 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 
32-65 

323-334 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

to Jan. 23, 1942) 


loTb-ic iiiil I<n1Iooo 111 111 

itO^iO -i** 1 lOO 111 111 

.o ItJ-Tci) 1 1 I 1 1 It 1 177 III III 

(i. icot^LO 1 1 1 1 1 lOb 1 no lO 111 111 

I'-i-^illll iCOiiQOO 111 111 

12 1 1 I I ' 'C: ' '1=12 'II ' ' ' 


1 


Short, Arthur T 

Short, Walter C, Maj. Gen 

Shortt, Creed, Pvt 

Sisson, George A 

Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN.- 

Smith, Ralph C, Maj. Gen 

Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen 

Smith, "William W., Rear Adm 

Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN 

Smoot, Perry M., Col 

Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr 

Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen 

Staff, W. F, CH/CM 

Stark, Harold R., Adm _ ... 

Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR 

Stilphen, Benjamin L 

Stimson, Henry L 

Stone, John F 

Street, George 

Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XV 



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XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


1 i 










C3 

CO 
















fi| 

cOq 1 
co^ 1 

co^ ', 


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Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


; 








- 


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•>* 






376-386 
541-553 
5'9Z-602 

442-450 




Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


1 1 










Il i 

'III 




i 








Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


:s ] 
























Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 














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§ 
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Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


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134.5-1381 

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Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


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Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 

1311-1329 

496-499 

1830-1842 




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Dodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR 

Dodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN. 

aolley, Ralph E 

right, Weslev A., Comdr 


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PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 143 



EGBERTS COMMISSION PROCEEDINGS 

[o] Note. — The following are brief transcripts of statements made by 
officers to the Commission during their meetings in the Munitions Building iu 
Washington on December 18 and 19, 1941. The Commission's expressed purpose 
in consulting these ofScers before leaving for Honolulu was to get a preliminary- 
outline of the questions involved in the inquiry, and to learn to what extent data 
on this subject would be available in Hawaii. 

December 18, 1941. 

General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, was invited to make a 
statement. 

General Marshall outlined a number of informative or warning 
messages sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment. These were habitually sent after conferences between the Chief 
of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. Sometimes only one 
message was sent to reach both the military and naval commanders 
in Hawaii. This was principally to protect the code. The des- 
patches referred to coincided closely with critical developments in 
the course of negotiations with Japan. General Marshall mentioned 
such a message shortly before sanctions were imposed on Japan by 
the United States in July, 1941, and again on October 16, 1941, Novem- 
ber 24 and November 27, 1941, The last two messages were warnings 
in connection with a forecast of the breakdown of [&] negotia- 
tions. 

General Marshall said that copies of paraphrases of these despatches 
would be found by the Commission in Hawaii. General Marshall 
spoke at some length about a message sent by him to the Command- 
ing General, Hawaiian Department, on the morning of December 7. 
It was not delivered and decoded until after the attack. 

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, was present while 
General Marshall was making his statement. He concurred in Gen- 
eral Marshall's description of the close liaison between these two offi- 
cers, and commented on the despatches sent to the Commander in 
Chief of the Pacific Fleet on the same or nearby dates as the messages 
sent by General Marshall. Both General Marshall and Admiral Stark 
referred to the situation in the eastern Pacific before December 7, 
and both mentioned the titles of certain key plans and joint plans in 
effect on and before December 7 and obligatory upon the officers in 
command in Hawaii in both services. 

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director of War Plans Division in 
the office of Naval Operations, Avas present with Admiral Stark, and 
when called upon supplemented Admiral Stark's statement with par- 
ticulars concerning the joint plans and subsicliar}^ orders and agree- 
ments. 

Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, Assistant Chief of Staff, War 
Plans Division, was present, and mentioned the Basic War Plan 
Rainbow No. 5, the Joint Coastal Frontier [c] Defense Plan 

79716 — 46— Ex. 143, vol. 1 2 



2 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

prepared by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department 
and the Commandant 14th Naval District, and General Gerow said this 
was in course of revision on December 7. It appeared also that con- 
sistent with these plans and joint plans the commanding officers of both 
services in Hawaii had by agreement drawn joint operating plans of 
their own. The Commission was assured that copies of these and 
similar documents would be available to the Commission in Hawaii. 
None of the officers who appeared was sworn. 



December 19, 1941. 

General Sherman Miles, Chief of the Military Intelligence, made a 
statement to the Commission. He was not sworn. 

General Miles described the function of the intelligence service, 
which is to inform the high command of the War Department of the 
existing situation and furnish it with estimates of the situation. He 
spoke in some detail of the several messages sent July to December, 
1941, which were mentioned in the statements of officers yesterday. 
General Miles also spoke of methods and means of obtaining intelli- 
gence of Japanese plans and movements. By direction of the Com- 
mission, however, no notation was made of General Miles' statements 
under this head. 

Captain Theodore Wilkinson, U. S. N., Chief of the [d] Office 
of Naval Intelligence, supplemented the statement of General Miles. 
Captain Wilkinson was asked to describe the extent of liaison between 
the Navy Department and the State Department and did so, but by 
direction this was not noted. Captain Wilkinson was asked about 
information received in his office from Hawaii. He stated that in- 
formation received by the Army and the Navy intelligence services 
were as a matter of course exchanged between them. 

Colonel Bratton, U. S. A., and Lieutenant Colonel French, U. S. A., 
made unsworn statements having to do with the sending and method 
of sending of the despatch mentioned yesterday by General Marshall 
as having been sent by him on the morning of December 7 to General 
Short, to be imparted also to Admiral Kimmel. This was the message 
which was not received until after the attack. Colonel French's state- 
ment went into the details of sending from Washington via San Fran- 
cisco and covered such information as the War Department has of 
the circumstances surrounding the receipt and delivery of the message 
in Hawaii. 

Major General Charles D. Herron, retired, was invited to appear. 
He was not sworn. General Herron preceded General Short in com- 
mand of the Hawaiian Department. He was interrogated on the sub- 
ject of maneuvers, training, and joint maneuvers. He stated among 
other things that the cooperation between Army and Navj^ was close 
in Hawaii, and the interchange of information and views was in- 
creasingly complete during the time of his command. He also men- 
tioned cooperation with the [e] civil authorities there. He 
spoke of his special interest in intercepting devices to detect the ap- 
proach of airplanes and surface craft, and mentioned his reliance upon 
frequent personal inspections. He was questioned as to his views- of 
the possibility of attack by Japan without warning and of such an 
attack by air. He said this subject was a matter of constant thought 
and frequent consultation with the Navy. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 6 

Owing to the tentative and preliminary nature of the hearings on 
December 18 and 19, 1941, the Commission decided that it was un- 
necessary to have the statements of the above mentioned officers noted 
stenographically and verbatim. The foregoing condensed statements 
have been prepared by the Recorder and the Secretary to the Com- 
mission from stenographic notes taken by him at the time, showing 
mainly topics taken up in the several statements. 

[/] Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, having examined the 
transcript of his testimony given before this Commission on December 
27. 1941, and December 29, 1941, and having on January 5, 1942, by 
letter to the Commission (See transcript page 1470 et seq.) recom- 
mended certain revisions of that transcript, the Commission approved 
each of those reconnnendations and incorporated each of them in the 
transcript by interleaving tlie text of each suggested revision on a 
page immediately following each page referred to in the said letter. 
The Commission directed that the transcript thus revised is the trans- 
script of Rear Admiral Kinmiel's testimony on the dates above men- 
tioned. Nevertheless, in compliance with Rear Admiral Kiramel's 
further request, it directed that his testimony of December 27, 1941, 
and December 29. 1941, be copied with each of the revisions incorpo- 
rated in the copied text to effect a clean copy without interleaved 
errata. That copy has been made in one volume, in duplicate, pages 
S-1 to S-226. inclusive, and on January 24, 1942, verified by the 
Recorder to the Commission as to the correctness of each revision, 
and it is annexed to each of the two sets of 16 volumes each of the 
transcript, to be deposited respectively in the secret archives of the 
Departments of War and Navy, but by direction of the Commission 
not made a part of said transcript. The said annexed volume accom- 
panies the 16 volumes of the transcripts and is marked "Annex to 
transcript and not a part thereof : A copy of the transcribed testimony 
of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel given before the Commission 
to Investigate the Attack on the Territory of Hawaii, and revised 
by authority of the Commission in compliance with Rear Admiral 
Kimmel's request." 

Walter Bruce Howe. 
Recorder to the Commission. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



[1] CONTENTS 



MONDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1941. 

Statement of— Page > 

Lieutenant Colonel William E. Donegan 2 

Major William S. Lawton 4 

^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transscript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDIXGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSIOX 



m COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE 
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII 



MONDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1941 

Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, 

Fort jSh-after, Temtory of Hawaii. 
The Commission met at 10 : 45 o'clock a. m., Associate Justice Owen. 
J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding. 



Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, 
Chairman ; 

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired; 

Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired, 

Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired ; 

Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army; 

Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission ; 

Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal 
Advisor to the Commission; 

Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission. 

There was a brief informal discussion outside the record, following 
which Lieutenant Colonel William E. Donegan was called into the 
hearing room.) 

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM E. DONEGAN 

The Chairman. What have you there, Colonel? 

Colonel Donegan. I have here 

General McCoy. Let us get the colonel's name, rank, and position. 

The Chairman. Your name? 

Colonel Donegan. William B. Donegan, Lieutenant Colonel, Gen- 
eral Staff Corps. 

General McCoy. May I ask. Colonel, before you begin, how long 
you have been in this position ? 

Colonel Donegan. To give the background. General, I was detailed 
down here as an infantry officer in April, 1940. From September, 
1940, to July, 1941, I was on detached service, infantry, in G-3. In 
July, 1941, 1 was placed on general staff as assistant, G-3. On Novem- 
ber 5, [J] 1941, I was detailed as G-3 Hawaiian Department. 

The Chairman. And you were about to say, "I have here " 

General McCoy. May I ask if there is any specific section of G-3 
charged with the war plans? 

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. I would like to stress strongly, to save 
the time of the Commission, that Major Lawton, General Staff Corps, 



8 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

is directly in charge of joint Army-Navy activities and is the Army 
liaison officer with the Navy. He has the background of this study. 
He is present outside. 

General McCoy. Could we have him in with the Colonel ? and that 
would save time. 

The Chairman. You may have him in, sir. 

General McCoy. And we can request them both then together. 

(At this point Major William S. Lawton entered the hearing room.) 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Gentlemen, this is Major Lawton. 

The Chairman. Major, glad to see you. What is the full name, 
Major? 

Major Lam-ton. William S. Lawton, sir. 

The Chairman. Sit down, if you will, sir. We have asked you to 
come in with the Colonel so that we may ask you indifferently ques- 
tions ; that will save time, enlighten us. 

Major Lax^ton. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, Colonel, what is the first paper you have 
produced ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I hadn't planned any jDresentation. 

The Chairman. No; I understand that. 

Colonel DoNEGAN. First, I have the joint coastal frontier defense 
plan. 

General McCoy. That is the one that Major Lawton is in charge of ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes, sir. It is signed by General Short and 
Admiral Block, I believe. 

The Chairman. How had we better go through this? 

Admiral Standley. Well, I personally want to look at those plans. 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I have the official record I can get. 

General McNarney. If you have two or three copies we can glance 
through them. 

Admiral Eeea'es. He can give you a list of what he has. 

[4] The Chairman. Yes. 

Now, what have jon there in addition to that document? 

Colonel Donegan. I brought in field order No. 1, which is the opera- 
tions order for the Hawaiian Department. 

The Chairman. What is it dated ? 

Colonel Donegan. Dated the 28th of November, 1941. And stand- 
ing operating procedure of the Hawaiian Department, dated 5- Novem- 
ber, 1941. 

The Chairman. Anything further? 

Colonel Donegan. No, sir. I have notes, resume of the activities 
of the major echelons of the Department as of December 7. 

The Chairman. That is only as of the day in question ? 

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. It is a periodic report of G-3 and activi- 
ties for that day. 

General McCoy. Those were all in effect on the day of December 7, 
were they ? 

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. And the latest ? 

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You are familiar with the joint plan, Colonel ? 

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Could you undertake to tell us briefly what the 
Army's responsibilities were under that joint plan ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 9 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I would prefer to have Major Lawton do it, sir. 
The Chairmais-. Very well. Let Major Lawton do it. 

STATEMENT OF MAJOR WILLIAM S. LAWTON 

Major Lawton. These are very definitely stated in the plan, sir. 

The Chairman. Would you think it unwise to attempt to sum- 
marize? Would it be better for us to study the plan ourselves? 

Major Lawton. Well, the}'^ are listed here in the plan very briefl}', 
sir. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Major Lawton. I think I could read them, and right from the plan 
would be very exact, sir, and brief. 

[5] The Chairman. All right, sir. 

Major Lawton. First, the method of coordination. The command- 
ing general of the Hawaiian Department and the commandant of the 
14 Naval District have determined that in this joint plan the method 
of coordination wnll be by mutual cooperation and that this method 
will apply to all activities w^herein the Army and Navy operate in 
coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked. 
That is the basis of operation of the plan. 

As to tasks, the joint task is to hold Oahu and the main outlying 
naval base and to control and protect shipping in the coastal zone. 
The Army task is to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air 
forces and against hostile sympathizers, to support the naval forces ; 
Navy task, to patrol the coastal zone and to control and protect ship- 
ping therein and to support the Army forces. 

Under the Army there are definite missions assigned. The com- 
manding general. Hawaiian Department, shall provide for the beach 
and land, seacoast, and anti-aircraft defense of Oahu, with particular 
attention to the Pearl Harbor naval base and naval forces present, 
and at Honolulu Harbor, City of Honolulu, and the Schofield Bar- 
racks, Wheeler Field, Lualualei. Lualualei is the munition depot. 
The increasing importance of Kanoche area is recognized. 

General McCoy. Of the what? 

Major Lawton. Kanoche. That is the naval air station at Ulupau 
Peninsula. 

The next mission of the Army provides for an anti-aircraft and gas 
defense, intelligence and warning services, protection of landing field 
and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available 
forces, defense of installations on Oahu vital to the Army and Navy 
and to the civilian community for light, water, power, and for interior 
guard and sabotage except within naval establishments, defense 
against sabotage within the Hawaiian Islands except within naval 
shore establishments, establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the 
waters of Oahu defensive coastal area in cooperation with the naval 
inshore patrol, and an aerial [^] observation system on outly- 
ing islands, and an aircraft warning service for the Hawaiian Islands, 
support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea 
conducted within range of Army bombers, provide personnel for and 
Army communications facilities to harbor patrol posts provided for 
in paragraph 18. 

[7] ^ The next paragraph, briefly: to provide a system of land 
communications by teletype, telegraph loops, and also radio intercepts; 



10 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

an intelligence service which in addition to normal function will 
gather, evaluate, and distribute, both to the Army and the Navy, 
information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within 
the Hawaiian Islands, counterespionage within the Islands, control 
of dangerous aliens within the Islands, Army measures to assure 
eifective supervision, control, and censorship over communications 
system, supply of all Army and civil population in the Hawaiian 
Islands, hospitalization of the same, reception and distribution of 
personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civilian 
population. 

Colonel Brown. Let me suggest, sir, he is just reading; this is all 
in writing, and he could just get a note of the page read and get it 
that way. 

Admiral Keeves. We do not want to take them. 

The Chairman. We do not want to take these papers. 

Colonel Brown. But you are taking the full data there. 

The Chairman. We would rather not take the papers, and leave 
it in the hands of the stenographer and copy them ; do you not think 
so? 

Admiral Reeves. Yes. 

Major Lawton. That completes the provisions for the Army. 

Admiral Reeves. Those are the tasks of the Army ? 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, I think you read one that said warning de- 
vices, operation of warning devices on the Islands ? 

Major Lawton. Yes. 

The Chairman. Did that include the operation and responsibility 
for the use of these detectors that had been set up on the Islands ? 

Major Lawton. The radio detectors of the aircraft warning serv- 
ice, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. In other words, it was the Army's task to operate 
these detecting stations? 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. That is including antiaircraft warning 
[5] services for the Hawaiian Islands. 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Probably the Navy. 

Major LA^vTON. The Navy's responsibility is as follows: 

(a) An inshore patrol ; 

(b) An offshore patrol; 

(c) An escort force; 

(d) An attack force ; 

(e) To provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint de- 
fense of Pearl and Honolulu Harbors ; 

(f) Installation and operation of underwater defense for Pearl 
and Honolulu Harbors ; 

(g) Support of Army forces in the Oahu defensive coastal area 
and installation of submarine mine fields in the defense of Oaliu de- 
fensive coastal area, as may be deemed necessary and practicable ; 

(h) Sweeping channels and mine fields ; 
(i) Distant reconnaissance; 
(j) Attacking enemy naval forces; 

(k) Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage 
within all naval shore establishments; 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 11 

(1) In conjunction with the Army and local communications serv- 
ice — I will brief some of these here instead of reading them complete, 
as they are not sufficiently pertinent ; 

(m) Navy measures to assure etfective supervision, control, and 
censorship over communications systems, in conformity with joint 
Action Army and Navy 1935 ; 

(n) Operation of a naval intelligence system, including counter- 
espionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile 
information ; 

(o) Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces; 
and 

(p) Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facili- 
ties pertaining thereto. 

[9] As pertinent to the discussion, I would like to emphasize in 
that particular paragraph, paragraph (i), the responsibility for dis- 
tant reconnaissance, which was made a responsibility of the Navy, 
sir. 

Colonel Do]srEGA]sr. We have a letter I would like to present to the 
Commission. 

General McCoy. Before you get off of that I would like to ask, Mr. 
Justice, a question or two in regard to these plans. 

The Chairman. Certainly. Go ahead, sir. 

General McCoy. Colonel, these joint plans were plans agreed to 
by the commanding general and the commandant of the district? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. What responsibility, if any, did the connnander- 
in-chief U. S. Fleet have in this connection ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. He was not included in this joint plan. 

General McCoy. In the joint plan. 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Which is a plan signed by Admiral Block and 
General Short. Admiral Block is the base defense commander. 

General McCoy. In other words, it was necessary 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Did not pertain to the fleet. 

General McCoy. That was on the general idea, I imagine, that the 
fleet itself had freedom of action? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. And that the. particular plan here was that the 
fleet could go and come without being concerned about the safety 

Colonel DoNEGAN (interposing). Yes, sir; exactly, sir. 

General McCoy. Of the defense excepting the broader strategy of 
operations? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Complete operations. 

That is all. 

Admiral Standley. Now, these plans, joint plans: Were thev ap- 
proved by the Chief of Staff? 

Colonel DoNEGAX. Yes, sir. 

[10] Admiral Standley. And the Chief of Naval Operations ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes, sir, they were. I have the data. 

Admiral Standley. They were approved before being put into ef- 
fect? 

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. 



12 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Standley. And do you know : are they based on the gen- 
eral or are they based on the basic Army-Navy basic joint plans for 
national defense? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Based on the Joint Action Army and Navy 
1935, which is the basic document. 

Admiral Standley. Yes. 

The Chairman. The basic document was presented to us. 

Admiral Standley. That is the one that assigns the task. 

The Chairman. Exactly. 

Admiral Standley. This is based on that. 

The Chairman. On that. 

Admiral Standley. And then it is approved by the Chief of Staff. 

The Chairman. By the Chief of Staff. 

General McNarney. Was a copy of Rainbow No. 5 operations order 
of the Army, of the War Department, available when this plan was 
drawn ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. No, sir. 

Major Lawton. No, sir. This plan is dated 11 April, 1911, sir. 

The Chairman. 1941? 

Major Lawton. 11 April, 1911. 

The Chairsian. 11 April, 1941? 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I think it was dated March. We got it sometime 
around July. We can check it. 

The Chairman. I think the Colonel's statement ought to be taken on 
that. 

Colonel DoNEGAN. I can check outside, sir. 

The Chairman. Just hold that answer open until he checks. 

Admiral Standley. On those basic plans dated April, had there 
been any changes up to December 7 in those plans ? 

[11] Major Lawton. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Those were the plans as of that day? 

Major Lawton. Yes. 

General McCoy. There were no changes made after the warning 
orders came, then? 

Major Lawton. No, sir. 

The Chairman. I presume the files produced here. Major, do not 
include the warning orders from the Chief of Staff's office ? 

Major Lawton. Between November 27 and December 7, no, sir. 

Admiral Standley. You have those, have you not, your office? 
They are under your cognizance, are they not? 

Major Lawton. I haven't them, no, sir. I believe the Chief of 
Staff has them. 

Admiral Standley. Who is the officer that Avould have cognizance 
of operations as a result of those orders? 

Major Lawton. That would be G-3, sir. 

Admiral Standley. G-3. Is that the Chief of Staff ? 

Major Lawton. No. Operations. 

The Chairman. We shall have to wait until he comes back. Had 
you any questions? 

General McNarney. Off the record. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

The Chairman. You have before you and you have produced here 
a chart definino; the sea areas and the coastal areas, and that chart indi- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 13 

cates that the coastal area is a belt 20 miles out to sea from the outer- 
most point of any island, roughly drawn 20 miles outside the shore 
line: is that right? , 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. That's right, sir. 

The Chairman. The Army had functions in connection with the 
20-mile belt, as I understand you : first, to use its artillery for the 
protection of that zone? 

Major Lawtojst. Around Oahu the area is covered. 

The Chairman. Around Oahu? 

[121 Major Lawton. We have an Oahu defensive coastal area. 

The Chairman. And does that extend more than 20 miles to sea ? 

Major Lawton. No, sir. There are a number of various areas that 
are described. They are quite confusing in description. 

The Chairman. Well, we are interested particularly in Oahu. 

Major Lawton. Oahu. 

The Chairman. And you have a 20-mile zone or belt outside of Oahu 
for which the Army has some task, has some responsibility, is that 
right or not ? 

Major Lawton. No, sir. 

The Chairman. All right. Now tell me what is the fact. 

Major Lawton. We have an Oahu defensive coastal area. 

The .Chairman. All right. 

Major Lawton. Which is described in this document as comprising 
all water areas within the areas of circles and the connecting tangents 
drawn with points as centers and respective radii as follows. I think 
mavbe I had better read them into the record : 

Keahu Point, 49,000 yards ; 

Puu Kapolei, 45,000 yards ; 

Puuiki Station and Kahuku Point, each 23,000 yards. 

Those are the limits to which our gunfire can reach on the Island of 
Oahu. The 49,000-yard and 45,000-yard arcs are those bounded by 
swing of arc of the 16-inch gun position. The Puuiki Station and the 
Kahuku arcs are determined by ranges of 8-inch railway guns in the 
vicinity of those localities. 

Admiral Standley. May I interrupt you there a moment. Major? 
You say that is a defensive sea area. 

Major Lawton. What? 

Admiral Standley. I say, you have the defensive sea area. Is that 
in accordance with the definition of "defensive sea area" as prescribed 
in the basic plans, and has it the same significance? 

Major Lawton. The defensive sea area. I believe I read this de- 
fensive sea area as being this 20-mile limit. The defensive sea area 
[IS] has been recently changed to a limit within three miles of the 
shores, to come within the sea area controlled by the Government of 
the United States, I think it is. I believe that is why it was changed. 
But the defensive sea area is now three miles from the shores of the 
various points. 

Admiral Standley. In our basic plans we have a defensive sea area. 

Major Cawton. That is right, sir. 

Admiral Standley. And the definition of it. 

Major Lawton. That is right, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Now, is that the same as the sea area that has 
been prescribed by the Navy Department as the defensive sea area for 
the Hawaiian Islands ? 



14 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Major Lawton. This area that I described was, sir. 

Admiral Standley. That is described by the Navy Department ? 

Major LM.WTON. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Now, recently that has been changed ? 

Major Lawton. It has recently been changed. 

Admiral Standley. By the Navy Department ? 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Isn't that the definition of " defensive sea area" ? 

Major Lawton. Yes. The Joint Action Army-Navy 1935, that 
was changed. 

Admiral Standley. That means that area in which all shipping 
must be controlled by the Navy ? 

Major Lawton. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Isn't that the only significance that the defen- 
sive sea area has ? 

Major Lawton. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. And the fact that you have defensive artillery 
for shore batteries has nothing to do with it ? 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. That is what I intended to bring out. 

The Chairman. Now, with respect to the coastal area, [i^] 
did the aircraft of the Army have any task ? 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir, under this Oahu defensive coastal area, 
which is the area I am speaking of now within gun range of our 
batteries. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Major Lawton. And one of the items I read under the responsi- 
bilities of the Army was: establishment of an inshore patrol of the 
waters of the Oahu defensive coastal area in cooperation with the 
naval inshore patrol. 

The Chairman. Well, now, what do you mean by an inshore patrol? 

Major Lawton. That is the patrol by the Navy of the waters — of 
the approaches to the harbors. 

The Chairman. So there was a joint task for Army and Navy fliers 
in that area ? 

Major Lawton. Well, Army fliers to do the flying in that area in 
conjunction with the Navy inshore patrol, which is a surface patrol. 

The Chairman. Yes. Oh, the naval patrol is a surface patrol? 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And the Army's was an air patrol jointly with it? 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That was the farthest to sea the Army fliers were 
to go except in emergency where they were to aid Navy fliers in an 
actual fight ; is that right ? 

Major Lawton. Well, I have a letter here in that regard, sir, that 
I intend to bring up next, sir. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Major Lawton. I think that will explain that. 

The Chairman. All right, sir. 

Major Lawton. This is an agreement between Admiral Block, as 
commandant of the 14 Naval District, and General [16] Short, 
as commanding the Hawaiian Department (reading) : 

Subject : Joint air operations. Dated 20 Marcli, 1041. With respect to distant 
reconnaissance, paragraph 3 : When naval forces are insuflacient for long-distance 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 15 

patrol and search operation and Army aircrafts are made available these air- 
crafts will be under the tactical control of the Navy commander directing the 
operation. 

In other words, on call the commandant 14 Naval District could re- 
quest assistance from the Army, in which case, if they did, these air- 
planes were turned over to the Navy and are operated directly under 
their command and control. They were completely out of the hands 
of the commandant of the Hawaiian Department and became part of 
the Navy's system of long-range or distant reconnaissance. The fact 
that we might give them planes would in no way interfere with the 
responsibility laid down in this document. 

The Chairman. How is that? 

Major Lawton. The fact that we might give the Navy or loan the 
Navy planes would in no way change the responsibilities as laid down 
in this document. 

The Chairman. I understand. 

General McCoy. Was that in effect on the 7th of November? 

Major La's^'ton. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Seventh of December. 

Major Lawton. It was in effect. This document was in effect — 
it is elated the 20th of March, 1941, but between the 27th of November 
and the Gth of December or prior to the 7th, including the 6th of 
December, no request was made upon the Army for airplanes for this 
purpose. 

The Chairman. Off the record. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

General McCoy. Is there anything in those appendices resulting 
from the installation by the Army of the detector [16] service 
and the method by which that warning should be quickly relayed to 
the Navy ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. In the separate command. 

Major Lawton. No, sir. That is generally covered in this docu- 
ment on the interchange of information, but no definite system estab- 
lished in these agreements. 

General McCoy. There is nothing there definitely referring in any 
of the appendices to the new method of dete(^tion by this system 
that was established when ? 

Major Lawton. No, sir, not in detail ; merely the fact that the Army 
is responsible for the aircraft warning service. 

General McCoy. Yes, but how did they get the result of that service 
to the Navy? 

Major Lawton. As it has been established, as it has been built up, 
as material and equipment have become available, we have established 
an information center to which this information from the aircraft 
warning service comes. In there there is a representative of the Com- 
mandant 14 Naval District, who is an officer from Patrol Wing 2 to 
give them the information regarding any airplanes, ships, and so 
forth, that may be picked up on the board, and relay it directly and 
immediately to the Na\^. 

General McCoy. That is the responsibility, then, of the naval officer 
in the information service, is it? 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir; he is given the information right there, 
and it is his responsibility to relay it. 



16 CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Standlet. May I continue the questions ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. And what is the status of that order, sir, of 
the officer's duties ? Is he ordered to report to the commanding general 
or whoever is in charge of the post as liaison officer? What are his 
orders ; do you know ? 

Major Lawton. I have never seen his orders. 

The Chairman. Where w ould those be found ? 

[17] Admiral Standley. The commandant. 

The CHAHiMAN. The commandant. 

Major Laavton. I would believe at the 14 Naval District, sir. 

The Chairman. The orders with respect to your representative in 
the information post are available, I take it, here? 

Major Lawton. Just in the establishment of the aircraft warning 
service information center; it is a general order establishing that 
service, which includes all the elements that go to make it up, sir. 

General McCoy. I think that might be furnished us. 

The Chairman. Well, I would like to see the order, please. 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Will you make a note of that, Mr. Recorder, that 
we want the general order establishing the aircraft Avarning service 
of the Army. 

Major Lawton. Well, that is, I think its primary establishment is 
in our standing operating procedure in this document, sir. 

The Chairman. Will you look and see? 

Major Lawton. There are two documents here. One is Field Order 
No. 1 and the other the standing operating procedure. Under Field 
Order No. 1, the interceptor command will coordinate and control 
the operations of pursuit aircraft, 53 Coast Artillery Brigade, anti- 
aircraft, and attached units, including available Naval and Marine 
Corps anti-aircraft artillery and the aircraft warning service in the 
anti-aircraft defense of Oahu. Now, that is the basis for the estab- 
lishment of the aircraft warning service and its responsibility. 

General McCoy. Who is responsible for that service in the Army, 
and to whom does it operate? 

Major Lawton. The interceptor command operates with an air 
officer in command. The actual operation of the sets is [18] a 
Signal Corps function, sir, and is supervised by the Department Signal 
Officer, Colonel Powell. 

General McCoy. What is the name of the officer who was in com- 
mand of it and in charge of it and responsible for it on that day ? 

Major Lawton. Colonel PoAvell is the Department Signal Officer 
who controls the operation of the aircraft warning service sets. The 
interceptor command was operated by General Davidson of the Air 
Force on the day in question. 

The Chairman. Now, you had part of another order, you said, that 
applied. 

Colonel DoNEGAN. S. O. P. 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. Under "Standing Operating Procedure" : 
The interceptor command will coordinate and control the operations 
of pursuit aircrafts, anti-aircraft artillery, including available Naval 
and Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery. Aircraft Warning Service 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 17 

and attaclied units, and will provide for the coordination of anti- 
aircraft measures of units not under military control, to include: 

(1) arrival and departure of all friendl,y aircraft; 

(2) the coordination of the anti-aircraft fire from naval ships in 
Pearl and/or Honolulu Harbors ; 

(3) transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies. 

The Chaiu3Ian. Now, were the same officers you have named 

Major Lawtox. General Davidson. 

The Chairman. responsible under that order? 

Major Lawtox. Yes, sir. This is merely an amplification of tlie 
Field Order 1, and this part of the document is restricted. That 
document is secret. This is put out to give it the greatest dissemina- 
tion to the troops. 

The Chairman. That is, the first document from which you read is 
secret ? 

[19] Major Laavton. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Second is a general order to go to troops? 

• Colonel DoNEGAN. Well 

Major Law^ton. It is a 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Go ahead. 

It is restricted so that we can give a greater distribution on Field 
Order No. 1. We gave those to the major echelon commanders : divi- 
sion commanders, air force commanders, and Coast Artillery com- 
manders. 

The Chairman. Eef erring now to No. 1 ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. No. 1, yes, sir. This (indicating) 

The Chairiman. Referring now to the general operations ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. S. O. P., "Standing Operating Procedure," which 
is a break-down of Field Order No. 1, and a lot of the secret informa- 
tion, particularly concerning ammunition, C. P.'s, and other secret 
information, is deleted. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Colonel Donegan. In order that it could get down to the regiments 
and battalions, lower echelons. 

The Chairman. Four echelons? 

Colonel Donegan. Lower echelons, lower units. 

Admiral Ree\-es. Major, referring to the Aircraft Warning Service, 
was it part of their dutv to transmit these warnings to all concerned, 
l)oth Army and Navy? Was that part of the Aircraft Warning 
Service ? 

Major Laavton. No, sir. They got the information at the informa- 
tion center. 

The Chairman. "They" meaning the Navy or other 

Major Lawton. The Aircraft Warning Service got the informa- 
tion at the information center. These stations are set up at various 
points around the Island. They are connected by telephone to this 
center, where there is a large map board. As information comes in 
it is plotted on the map board. Various tellers sit above this board 
on a raised platform and can see [W] the information as it 
comes in plotted on the board. If there are many airplanes movintr in 
a certain direction, or one airplane, unknown or friendly, that infoi-nia- 
tion is available to each one of these tellers the minute it is placed on 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 1 3 



18 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the board. There is an evaluator or control officer there, who, in cage of 
doubt of a flight, attempts to evahiate the information. Each officer — 
the naval officer present and the pursuit and bombardment officers 
present are expected to keep track of all the planes they have in the 
air and know where they are, so that when a flight appears on the 
board the controller briefly will ask if anyone claims that flight ; and if 
it is a Navy flight in that area he claims it, and it is immediately 
marked "Friendly." If it is an Army flight, why, it is also so claimed. 
Any flights that are not claimed are put down as "Unknown," which 
is practically synonymous with "Enemy" if enemy forces are known 
to be capable of being in the vicinity. 

The Chairman. Now, I think Admiral Keeves wanted to know in 
a little more detail what your arrangement was whereby the naval 
commander got that information. 

Major Laavton. That was transmitted by this naval 

The Chairman. Teller? 

Major Lawton. Naval representative from Patrol Wing 2, who had 
a direct line to Patrol Wing 2. From there it was relayed to the har- 
bor control post. 

Admiral KEEArES. All I wanted to know, specifically, was not who 
did this duty but whose responsibility it was. An Aircraft Warning 
Service is of no value if the information is not transmitted to those 
who are interested. 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Was that part of the responsibility of the Aircraft 
Warning Service? 

General McCot. Isn't that covered in your order there that you just 
read? 

[21] Admiral Reeves. Yes, sir, if you read the Order No. 1. I 
think it covers that point, and I wanted to clear it up. 

Major Lawton. I think I know that. "The interceptor command 
will" — in the third item, transmission of 

Admiral Ree\t:s. That is the item. 

Major Lawton. Let me see how it is worded — "will provide for the 
coordination of anti-aircraft measures of units not under military con- 
trol, to include transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested 
agencies" ? 

Admiral Standley. That is the answer. 

[22] Admiral Reeves. Yes. All I wanted to know is whose 
responsibility it is to transmit the aircraft warning to the proper 
people, both Army and Navy. Is that a part of the aircraft warning 
service ? 

You see what I want to know ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Major Lawton. I hesitate to say, sir, definitely. This order here is 
purely an Army order. This is not a joint order here. It says he is 
resposible for transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested 
agencies. That is an Army order. 

Admiral Reeves. Yes, an Army order, but the Army had the duty 
and responsibility of this aircraft warning service, did it not? 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. 

Admira,l Reeves. And did that duty include the transmission of 
the warning? The warning is not a warning unless it is transmitted 
to somebody. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 19 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Did this aircraft warning service include the 
transmission of the warning to Army and Navy people concerned ? 

Major Lawton. I would sooner have General Davidson, the Inter- 
ceptor Commander, answer that question, sir, but I would like to say 
that I believe that the way that responsibility was set up was for the 
Army to get the information, tell immediately or see immediately 
that his naval officer present in the information center got it. It was 
then his responsibility to telephone that to the Navy, to the Pat. Wing 
2, which in turn transmitted it to the Harbor Patrol Board. 

Admiral Reeves. Such an arrangement would be an information 
rather than a warning service, would it not ? The Army would col- 
lect the information, but if they didn't transmit that it would not be 
a warning. 

Major Lawton. That is right. 

[23] General McNarney. It would be a warning once it was 
turned over to the proper naval officer. 

Admiral Reeves. Well, what I am trying to clear up is whose re- 
sponsibility it is to transmit this warning for the Army. 

Major Lawton. I think it is the Army's responsibility to give it to 
the naval officer in the Naval Information Center. It is then his re- 
sponsibility to transmit it farther than that. It is given to the Navy, 
to that officer in the Information Center. What he does with it there- 
after is purely his naval function. 

Admiral Reeves. Well, he then becomes a part of Army's aircraft 
warning service, doesn't he? 

Major Lawton. He is a liaison officer, yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. He is a member of the aircraft Army warning 
service ? 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. 

Colonel Donegan. He is a liaison officer at the information center 
representing Pat. Wing 2. He is there to watch the board, as I un- 
derstand it. He is not there under control of General Davidson. 

Major Lawton. No, he is not under control of the Army officer, if 
that is what the Admiral means. 

The Chairman. As I get your statement. Major, it is that whatever 
the order may spell out itself, the officers in command worked out a 
system whereby those who were interested, whether Army or Navy, 
sat at this board. 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And obtained the information, and it was their 
responsibility to transmit it either to the Army or to the Navy, as the 
case might be. 

Major Lawton. That is right, sir. 

The Chairman. Whatever the order might spell, that was [^4] 
the practice that was in vogue at the time ? 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Is that right ? 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. It is a common service ? 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. And those individuals, whether Army or Navy, 
were really carrying out the duty of this aircraft warning service, 
because that is a part of the duty ? 



20 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Major La WTON. Yes, sir. I think that is correct, sir. 

Admiral K?:eves. This naval officer, then, was serving in the Army 



aircraft warning service by transmitting the warnings 

Major Lawton. He was serving within it, yes, sir, but not under 
the command of the Interceptor Commander at all, sir. He is merely 
in there to get that information. 

General McCoy. You speak of the Information Center. Whom 
was that mider ? 

Major Lawtox. That comes under the Interceptor Commander, 
sir. That is the aircraft warning service Interceptor Commander. 
The aircraft warning service is under the Interceptor Commander, 
as stated in those orders. 

Colonel DoNEGAN. That is General Davidson. 

Admiral Reeves. Yes. That office and all those serving in that 
office were under this xVrmy officer who had control of this warning 
office ? 

The CnAiR3iAN. So I take it. 

Major Lawton. Except, Admiral, that General Davidson did not 
direct this naval officer to do anything particularly with this infor- 
mation. He had it and could send it to any naval agencies that he saw 
fit to send it to. . 

General McCoy, In other words, he was a liaison officer, instead of 
being there to report to the commander, General Davidson ? 

[25] Major Lawton. Yes, sir. He was not under General 
Davidson's command at all, sir. 

The Chairman. In other words, if he did not appear on a given 
morning it was not a matter of discipline for General Davidson to 
handle? 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That was a Navy function? 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. To see that he was there ; is that right ? 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. And then this system of aircraft warning, so far 
as the Army was concerned, stopped dead in this office and never 
reached the Navy unless the Navy did something about it ? 

Major Lawton. Under the normal setup, yes. sir. However, if 
the naval officer was not there during drills and an officer was available, 
he would relay such information as he could, but the Army did not 
feel the responsibility for warning that naval function, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. For warning the Navy? 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. And the aircraft warning service, for which the 
Army was responsible, did not feel responsible for notifying or warn- 
ing the Navy of any aircraft ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Are you qualified to state that at all? It is 
General Davidson's function. 

Major Lawton. The operation actually within the intelligence or 
the interceptor command actual operation as it was carried out, I 
would prefer that General Davidson answered those questions. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Major Lawton. I can say how it functioned, but what responsi- 
bilities were prescribed within there I cannot say, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 21 

[^61 Admiral Reeves. You do not feel qualified to interpret 
this order ? 

Colonel DoNEGAX. Xo, sir. 

Admiral Ree^-es. That is not part of it ? 

Colonel Doxegax. No. sir. We supervise the operation of the 
interceptor command and the Information Center as an echelon of 
the Hawaiian air force and under the Department, and General David- 
son has been desiornated as the Interceptor Commander. 

General McCoy. I would like to ask that note be made to have the 
order produced that sent the naval officer, by name, to the Informa- 
tion Center. That would be a Navy order. Because we can question 
General Davidson, and he may say, "Well, he was sent to me by the 
Navy." I think it would be 'well to have the order which sent the 
naval officer to the information service. 

The Chairmax. That will be added to your requests, Mr. Recorder. 

General McCoy. Yes. by name ; and a copy of the instructions that 
he had, whether he was to report to General Davidson as a liaison 
officer or what responsibility General Davidson had for him. 

Colonel Doxegax. May I make a statement off the record for the 
information of the Commission ? 

The Chairmax. Yes. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

General McCoy. I think that ought to be a matter of record. 

Colonel Doxegax. What I was trying to get away from. General, 
is, the operations are within General Davidson's interceptor com- 
mand. I don't know what orders he put out, but I thought the Com- 
mission had the picture that a Navy officer was supposed to be there 
that morning. To my knowledge I don't believe it was expected that 
a Navy officer be there [27] at the time of the attack on Decem- 
ber 7. Do you agree to that ? 

Major Lawtox. Yes. 

Admiral Ree\'es. We are a little ahead of what we are trying to get 
now. 

The Chairmax. Yes, I think we are. 

General McNarxey. Yes, finally. 

The Chairmax. I think we have got enough on the record now so 
that we shall not forget to go into this matter, but perhaps we ought 
to get those in command to tell us about the situation. 

General McCoy. Yes. 

General McNarxey. If I might make a suggestion, I would suggest 
the Commission study the Joint Basic Plan, the Field Order No. 1, and 
the Standing Operating Procedure, and the military members deter- 
mine whether or not in their opinion they are tactically and strate- 
gically sound, clear, and concise and in sufficient detail so that if carried 
out they would have provided a reasonable defense for Oahu. I think 
we should determine that before we ask a lot of questions. In other 
words, at the present moment, unless I know what the standing orders 
and procedure were. I cannot really ask an intelligent question. I can 
get a lot of details and a mass of data, but I cannot apply them. I would 
like to study these documents before we go ahead. 

[28] The Chairman. All right. Now, is there anything else 
that these gentlemen need bring us for study at the moment, or have 
vou got what vou need. General ? 



22 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McNarxey. Well, this will do for the time being, and of 
course as we get further along we should go into the standing orders 
of the Air Force particularly. We are not particularly concerned with 
the ground troops because they did not come into the picture, but we 
are very much concerned with the operations of the Air Force, and 
I would like to have the detailed orders issued by General Martin, by 
General Davidson, and by the bomber command also. 

The Chairman. Now^ have we called for this note before ? 

General McNarney. No, sir, we have not called for the detailed Air 
Force orders yet. 

The Chair^ian. Is it time to call for them now so as to have them 
ready when we get to them ? 

General McNarney. Well, we should first study this. I do not want 
to take on too much at one time. 

The Chairman. All right. Just keep it in mind, what you need 
secondarily. 

General McNarney. Yes. 

The Chairman. Now, can these gentlemen leave these here for study 
for the time being ? 

General McNarney. I see no reason why they should not. If you 
happen to have some more copies around here it might be well to 
furnish them. 

Colonel DoNEGAN. You can get the official copies at the adjutant 
general's office. 

The Chairman. That would give one copy all around. 

Major Lawion. May I make a statement in connection with the 
question of Admiral Reeves, which I am not quite sure of the pur- 
pose of his question, but I would like to state that in the Aircraft 
Warning Service and the interceptor command we have had joint 
drills twice a month for some little while, and [29] the naval 
representative was there, and the Army commander with his staff, and 
we actually went through all the motions, including the sending out of 
airplanes to intercept — to locate and bomb sleds which were towed 
by carriers, and bombers, in accordance with joint agreement, acting 
under control of Pat. Wing 2, and our pursuit ships were sent out 
by the interceptor command to intercept the attacking planes coming 
in. The system actually worked, and the information relayed, and 
has been operated through drills, relayed by the naval liaison officer 
to the proper naval agency. As to details of those, I think General 
Davidson can give much more than I can, sir. 

The Chairman. Colonel, while you were out it was asked whether 
the warnings of November 24 and 27 were received by the Army. 

Colonel Donegan. Referring to radios from the War Department? 

The Chairman, Yes, sir. 

Colonel Donegan. Generally they were. 

The Chairman. To whom would they go when received ? 

Colonel Donegan. They came in here to the signal officer. In se- 
quence they were decoded, sent by officer messenger to our department 
adjutant general, who personally takes secret messages of that type 
up to the chief of staff, and the chief of staff presented them imme- 
diately to the department commander. It is a standard routine. 

The Chairman. Standard procedure? 

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 23 

General McCoy. How long does that routine generally take ? 

Colonel DoNEGA^r. With the exception, sir, the message of 

The Chairman. Now, how did those messages come to you ? By 
radio from Washington? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes, sir ; in code. 

The Chaikman. In code ? 

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. 

[SO] The Chairman. Over the Army's radio ? 

Colonel DoNEGAX. Yes, sir. All messages came over the Army 
radio except the message of December 6-7 which came over R. C. A. 

The Chairman. We know that. Well, now, perhaps following 
General McNarney's suggestion we can excuse these gentlemen now 
and discuss these ordersT Is that satisfactory to the Commissioners ? 

Admiral Standley. Ask him one more question. 

The Chairman. Yes? 

Admiral Standley. Does he know why that message of December 7 
came over R. C. A. ? , /^ » a 

The Chairman. Do vou know why that message came over R. C. A. ? 

Colonel Donegan. No, sir. We were on the receiving end. 

The Chairman. I know you were. 

Admiral Standley. Do you know the reason why that did not come 
by radio ? 

* Colonel Donegan. No, sir. We have never had a break in our com- 
munications. 

Admiral Standley. In your radio? 

Colonel Donegan. It has been functioning continuously. 

The Chairman. Well, Colonel, who is the signal officer who was 
responsible for the operation of your receiving station on fhe morn- 
ing of December 7 ? 

Colonel Donegan. Colonel Powell is the Department signal officer 
who is responsible for all signal activities. 

The Chairman. All right. Now shall we excuse these gentlemen 
and keep these papers for the time being ? 

Major Lawtton. I would like to call the attention of the Commis- 
sion to Annex No. 7 in this plan, which provides for joint security 
measures, protection of fleet and Pearl Harbor base. 

[SI] The Chairman. Annex 7? 

Major. Lawton. Yes, sir. This provision was not actually in 
effect that morning, but it was a provision — an agreement that was 
made to take care of .such an event. 

The Chairman. It was not in effect that morning? 

Major Lawton. It was not in effect, no, sir. 

Admiral IlEE^^:s. When was it made? 

Major Lawton. It was made the 28th of March, 1941, and signed 
the 2d of April, 1941, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you know why it was not in effect that morning? 

Major Lawton. Because there was no indication whatsoever here 
that there was an outside threat. 

The Chairman. Colonel, you said that the alert that was in effect 
was Alert No. 1 ? 

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That was not an alert, if I understood you cor- 
rectly, against airplane raid? 



24 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel DoNEGAx. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. But was against sabotage only? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And, of course, what state of alert you were in 
depended upon the orders issued by the commander here 't 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes, sir; also depended upon the information 
that the commander had. 

The Chairman. I understand that. 

Colonel DoNEGAN. We had no information of any kind that there 
was a threat from without, and our radios from the War Department 
on October 16. wdiich I think the Commission has seen, 

The Chairman. We have seen them. 

Colonel DoNEGAN. — 27, and 28, all referred to sabotage and not to 
take any action to arouse. 

The Chairman. We are familiar with those, October 16, \S%~\ 
27, and 28. 

General McCoy. Well, the Army furnished the Navy warning of 
November 27 wliere it said, "This is a war warning" ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Not to my knowledge, sir. I didn't see it. If 
the Department commander did, I didn't see it. The general men- 
tioned the date November 27, on November 28 the commander sent 
a radio to the adjutant general stating that this Department was on 
alert for sabotage and in liaison with the Navy, but there was nothing 
in — the radio you refer to I have no knowledge of. 

The Chairman. Now we will excuse you gentlemen for the time 
being. I hardly need say to you that on your honor as officers I 
request that nothing that takes place here be disclosed outside. 

Colon^ DoNEGAN. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Please do not discuss it with anyone. 

Major Lawton. Yes, sir. 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Do you want the other witnesses to remain 
outside? 

The Chairman. Who are they, and for what purpose are they ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. G-2 was here ; he is gone. 

The Chairman. All right. We will send for them if we need them. 
They are easily available, I take it ? 

Colonel DoNEGAN. Yes, sir. 

(Thereupon Colonel Donegan and Major Lawton left the hear- 
ing room.) 
[S3] VII, par. 6 

Upon establishment of aircraft warning service, provision will be made for 
their transmission of information of the location of distant hostile and im- 
friendly aircraft. Special v.ire or radio circuits will be made available for 
the use of the naval liaison officers so that they may make their own evaluation 
of available information and transmit them to their respective organizations. 
The information relating to the presence or movement of hostile aircraft off- 
shore from Oahu. which is secured through naval channels wil be transmitted 
without delay to the aircraft warning service information center. 

VII, par. 7. 

The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 (these 
are the wire and radio systems on the Island) after establishment will be manned 
and operated. No. 2 alerts, joint exercises which involve these communications 
systems and such other facilities as may be agreed upon by the commanding 
general, Hawaiian Department, and the naval base defense officer. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 25 

The Chairman. The Commission will be under the necessity of 
explaining in its report in some way how the injunctions of the Army 
and Navy defense plan, the local Hawaiian defense plan, made pur- 
suant to the over-all plan of the two departments and other subsidiary 
plans, which were obligated on both commanders, are to be summar- 
ized and stated so as to indicate the propriety of the commanders' 
following the injunctions in these various plans. 

The Army and Navy probabh^ will not consent to our quoting the 
plans in extenso or naming them so as to identity them. 

After the Recorder has submitted to the Commission a form and 
the Commission has agreed upon the form, the consent of the War and 
Navy Departments to the use of the form will have to be obtained 
before it can be embodied in our report. 

(There is attached summary dated 22 December, 1941, signed by 
Kendall J. Felder, Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.) 

[33a] Headquarters Hawaiian Depaktment, 

FoBT Shattee, T. H., 22 December 19.',1. 

1. SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION AS OF 7:30 A. M., 7 DECEMBER 191,1: 

A. Naval Operations: No knowledge of Japanese naval vessels in waters farther 
East than the China sea, although it was known that they had bases in the 
Mandate Islands and in all probability had naval craft in those waters. Nothing 
had been received from the Naval Intelligence, between November 27th and 
December 7th, to indicate any movement of carriers east of the Mandate Islands. 

B. Air OiJcratiOiis: No information to indicate operations of Japanese aircraft 
other than on the Asiatic mainland and areas adjacent thereto. It was known 
that no land based Japanese aircraft could operate from nearer than the Man- 
date Islands (approximately 2100 miles). It was also known that no nation 
possessed aircraft which could operate from that distance and return to its base. 

C. Local Situation: Instructions from the War Department announced that the 
international situation was critical and directed precautions be taken against 
possible sabotage and subversive acts. 

(1) Diplomatic Activities: On Saturday, December 6th, it was learned 
through local investigative agencies that papers at the Japanese consulate 
were being destroyed by burning. 

(2) Concentration d MoDcments of Local Attends: None. The entire local 
population was quiet and no indications of domestic unrest appeared. 

(3) Sabotage: Warnings were prevalent that acts of sabotage were im- 
pending but no action on the part of the residents of the Territory indicated 
that subversive acts would be committed. 

On Saturday evening, December 6, at about 6 : 00 P. M., a transcription 
and translation of a trans-Pacific telephone conversation between a local 
alien and an unknown party in Tokyo was received. This conversation 
had taken place on December 5th. There were certain features about this 
conversation which were suspicious, although the communication in its 
entity appeared innocuous. Efforts were made Saturday night to evaluate 
this conversation but it was impossible to reach any specific conclusion 
as to the meaning thereof. 
[SSi] D. Precautions Taken: Alert No. 1 was in operation and had been 
since November 27, 1041, with the counter-subversive section of the G-2 Office in a 
fully alerted condition. In addition thereto the Aircraft Warning Service was 
In operation from two hours before dawn until one hour after dawn each day. 
Conclusion: 
A. Capabilities: 

1. There was a possibility that disruption of relations, or war, might result at 
any time from overt acts i)y Japan either in the form of military action in the 
Far East, sinking of transports enroute to the Philippines or other similar acts. 

2. With the large part of the American Navy based in the Hawaiian waters 
the probability of an attack by the Japanese carriers was believed to be negligible. 

Kendall J. Fielder, 
Kendall J. Fielder. 
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C, 

A. C. of S., 0-2. 



26 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



[34] The Commission examined the joint coastal frontier defense 
plan, Hawaiian coastal frontier, short title HCF 41, dated 11 April^ 
1941. Tliis document establishes the responsibility for the prepara- 
tion of plans and orders as a basis for their protection, the method of 
coordination between the Army and Navy, delimits the areas of re- 
sponsibility and assigns tasks and forces. 

The Commission also examined Field Order No. 1 (tentative) Head- 
quarters, Hawaiian Department, 28 November, 1941. This document 
states the mission of the Army forces, distribution of troops and mis- 
sions of the 24 Infantry Division and 25 Infantry Division, the Ha- 
waiian Coast Artillery Command, Hawaiian air force. Department 
preserve, Company A First Chemical, and the 11 Tank Company. 

The Commission also examined the Standing Operating Procedure, 
Hawaiian Department, 5 November, 1941. This document covers 
tactical principles, security, liaison, issuance of orders, movement, anti- 
aircraft defense, and alarm systems. It defines the different categories 
of alerts under which the defense will be conducted, the various cate- 
gories of readiness for aircraft, intelligence operating procedures, es- 
sential elements of enemy information, measures to obtain and handle 
information, the method of supply, evacuation, and traffic control. 

The Chairman. We will adjourn at this time until;tomor,ro.w morn- 
ing at nine o'clock. 

(Thereupon, at 4: 15 o'clock p. m., the hearing was adjourned until 
tomorrow. Tuesday, December 23, 1941, at 9 o'clock a. m.) 

IS4-A] The Commission considered the following extracts from 
a brief estimate of the situation contained in Section II of the Ha^waiian 
Defense Project, Ke vision of 1940, dated 1st December, 1940, 

3. The Enemy. 

a. Probable Enemy. Any war in the Pacific involving the United States, in 
so far as can now be foreseen, will be with Orange, which is rated as a first class 
world power. 

b. Orange Nation. The capability of the Orange Nation for waging warfare 
is as outlined in Current War Department Combat, Economic and Political Esti- 
mates and amplified in the War Department Digest of Information. 

c. Orange Population in Hawaiian Islands. A tabulation as of June 30, 1938, 
shows the Orange population of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS and the ISLAND OF 
OAHU. 

(i) Hawaiian Islands. 





Aliens 


Citizens 


Total 


Dual Citi- 
zens 


Orange % 
of Total 

Population 
(411.485) 


Male 


19, 845 
17,111 


62. 605 
53, 978 


82, 450 
71,089 


(39, 441) 
(34, 006) 




Female 








Total 


36, 956 


116,583 


153, 539 


(73, 447) 


♦37. 31 






{2) Island of Oahu. 




Aliens 


Citizens 


Total 


Dual Citi- 
zens 


Orange % 
of Total 

Population 
(227,140) 


Male 


9,922 

8,555 


31,302 
26, 990 


41, 224 
35, 545 


(19,720) 
(17.003) 






♦33.8 







♦Percentages of other groups by racial extractions: Filipino, 12.83; Chinese 6.9; Hawaiian and Part Ha- 
waiian 15.1; [34-B] Portuguese 7.4; Porto-Rican 1.8; Korean 1.6; Other Caucasian 16.5 (of which 
almost half are Army and Navy personnel and their dependents). 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 27 

d. Forms of hostile attacks. The basis of the forms of attack listed below is 
the War Department assignment of Category "D" to this Department. 

(1) Possibly enemy attacks against the OAHU area in the order of probability 
are: 

(a) Submarine — torpedo and mine. 

(b) Sabotage. 

(c) Disguised merchant ship attack by blocking channels, by mines, or by 
air or surface craft. 

(d) Air raids, carrier based. 

(e) Surface ship raids. 

(f) Major combined attack in the absence of the U. S. Fleet. 

(2) Sabotage and Internal Dissension. 

(a) It is believed that the Orange population in the HAWAIIAN 
ISLANDS, in event of war, will divide itself as follows : 

(1) Loyal to the United States. This group vsdll certainly include 
some American citizens of Japanese origin. 

(2) Passive until developments indicate definitely the probable victor, 
when it will join that side. This group will probably include a fair 
proportion of the aliens and many citizens. 

(b) Sabotage may include one or more of the following acts : 

[34-f] (1) Destruction of electric light plants, works, and water 

supply reservoirs. 

(2) Destruction of food supplies. 

(3) Destruction of means of transportation, roads and railroads. 

(4) Arousing inhabitants to insurrection. 
5. a. Basis for Planning. 

(1) Missions and Conditions. 

(a) All defense plans of Oahu will be based upon the following conditions : 

The currently assigned category of defense will be Category D (see 
par. 1 &). 

The defense of Oahu will be joint defense by Army and Navy forces uq^er 
the missions as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange 
(see par. 1 «). 

(&) Possible and Probable War Situations are: 

(1) That sea lanes from continental United States to Hawaii are open and, 
that the garrison of Hawaii will be reinforced from continental United 
States. 

(2) That the most probable form of attack is a surprise attack consisting of 
raids, and bombardments by ships' fire and air forces, and action by local 
sympathizers. 

(3) That the sea lanes from continental United States will be closed and that 
there may be an attack by a major expeditionary force. From the War Depart- 
ment point of view, this contingency is so remote that it will make [S^-D] 
no additional alowances of either men or reserves to meet it. This is commonly 
referred to as the "cut-off from the Mainland situation". 

(4) The latter contingency forras the basis for our training, as being all inclu- 
sive and providing maximum reality for the troops during their training. 

6. Conelusion. 

To adopt a defensje plan adequate initially, to meet an enemy's maximum effort. 
This plan is outlined in the next paragraph. 

c. Scheme of defense, command organization, and missions assigned to major 
echelons upon initial deployment : 

(1) The defense of Oahu combines an air, naval, antiaircraft, seacoast and 
beach and land defense, together with the supervision and utilization of civilian 
activities and utilities and, under martial law, their control. To effectively 
accomplish this defense, particularly when its elements must be controlled simul- 
taneously, the Department Commander decentralizes his command function by 
assignment of definite missions of responsibility to major echelon commanders, as 
follows : 

(a) To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Division. 
The beach and land defense of Oahu. (For details, see paragraph 6) . 
The beach and land defense is based upon the principle of the "position in 
readiness", which permits concentration of forces in critical areas and 
assures flexibility to meet external and [3'f-E] internal attacks. 

(ft) To the Commanding General. Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery 
Brigade: The antiaircraft and seacoast defense of Oahu and in addition fur- 
nishing the necessary support to the beach and land defense and the naval 
forces. (See paragraph 6). 



28 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(c) To the Commanding General, Haicaiian Air Force: In carrying out the 
air defense, he may conduct independent operations or may operate in con- 
junction with, supported by, or in support of naval air forces, or temporarily 
under the direction of the Naval Air Force Commander as provided in Chap- 
ter II, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, and v\all cooperate with all forces 
in direct defense of Oahu. 

d. Assignment of reinforcements received in this Department: Reinforce- 
ments as received will be assigned to commanders to assist them in the mis- 
sions assigned in paragraph c. above. Reinforcements will be trained in 
organizations. 

e. Defense of Islands other than Oahu: Forces available preclude a deter- 
mined defense of Islands other than OAHU. Units of the Hawaii National 
Guard, stationed on those Islands will prevent civil disturbances, protect 
landing fields used by our troops and resist landing attacks. The Hawaiian 
Air Force will resist use of airports on outlying fields by an enemy. 

f. Supplies for the defense. See paragraph 11, below. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 29 



[35], CONTENTS 



TUESDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1941 

Testimony of— I'age' 

Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army 37 

Brigadier General Howard C. Davidson, United States Army Air 

Corps 170 

Brigadier General Jacob H. Rudolph 198 

Major Brooke E. Allen, United States Army Air Corps 203 

1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 31 



136J COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE 
ATTACK OF DECEMBEE 7, 1941, ON HAWAII 



TUESDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1941 

Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shafter, Territoy of Haioaii. 
The Commission met at 9 o'clock a, m., pursuant to adjournment 
on yesterday, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Su- 
preme Court, Chairman, presiding. 



Associate Justice Owen J, Roberts, United States Supreme Court, 
Chairman ; 

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired ; 

Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy Retired; 

Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired ; 

Brigadier General Joseph T, McNarney, United States Army; 

Walter Bruce Howe. Recorder to the Commission ; 

Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal 
Adviser to the Commission ; 

Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission. 

proceedings 

The Chairman, The Commission will come to order. Call General 
Short. 

(Thereupon General Walter C. Short entered the hearing room.) 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn, General ? 

You do swear by Almighty God, the Searcher of all hearts, that the 
evidence you are about to give before this Commission shall be the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and so you shall 
answer at the last great day? 

General Short. I do. , 

[37] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT 

The Chairman. What is your name, sir? 

General Short. Walter C. Short. 

The Chairman. What is your rank? 

General Short, Major General, United States Army. 

The Chairman. Briefly, what had been your service record in the 
Army, General? 

General Short. I was commissioned from civilian life as second 
lieutenant in March, 1902, and as rank from February 2, 1901. I have 
been in service continuously since that time. 



32 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

During that period I have had service in the Philippines, Alaska, 
Mexico, Germany, Puerto Rico, Hawaii. I had approximately 11 
months with the Pershing Expedition in Mexico. I went overseas 
and was gone altogether a little over two years. 

The Chairman. When were you appointed to the post of com- 
mander in the Hawaiian Islands, General ? 

General Short. On February 7. I arrived here February 5, but 
General Herron left on the 7th. 

The Chairman. 1941 ? 

General Short. Yes. 

The Chairman. Did you ask for this command ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you know of any influence that was brought to 
bear or occasioned to obtain the command for you ? 

General Short. I specifically, after the Chief of Staff told me that 
he was going to designate me, I asked him if there was nothing better 
than a routine peace-time assignment, then not to do so on account of 
the health of my wife's father, but he considered it important and 
ordered me here. 

The Chairman. Have you been in continuous command of this 
department since February 7, 1941 ? 

General Short. I have, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. In the period of the emergency. General, how 
many times were there warnings which caused alerts to be ordered 
here ? Give us your [-5<9] best memory. 

General Short. We had some practice alerts without any warning. 
I am inclined to believe that there was one alert that I cannot give 
you the date of, but about the date, after the freezing of the assets in 
the banks. I had a warning that caused me to go on alert against 
sabotage because I realized that the people were much more restless 
than they had been any time before. 

The Chairman. Was that No. 1 alert ordered ? 

General Short. Yes. 

The Chairman. No. 1 was the only alert that has been ordered ? 

General Short. Except in connection with maneuvers. 

The Chairman. Wliat is that? 

General Short. Except in connection with maneuvers. 

In May I had a No. 3 alert and we carried right straight on for 12 
days with construction of fortifications and maneuvers. 

The Chairman. Do you happen to remember whether the Na\^ 
communicated to you a telegram of October 16, 1941, relating to the 
status of the negotiations with Japan? 

General Short. Yes, they did, but from the time I put on alert 
No. 1, after the banks were closed, I do know I kept a close guard on 
straight through all over utilities, but I did not think that it wag 
necessary to do anything more at that time. 

The Chairman. You refer in your report, which we have had the 
opportunity to read, to the communication of November 27. 

General Short. Yes. 

The Chairman. That, I believe, was from the Chief of Staff? 

General Short. That was direct from the Chief of Staff, yes. 

The Chairman. Did you at that time also obtain from the Navy, or 
was there sent to vou from the Navy, a copy of a telegraphic com- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 33 

munication by the Secretary of the Navy to the, I think, Commander 
in Chief of the Fleet here? 

General Short, I don't remember. I perhaps saw it in that I was 
in conference with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Block on the 27th 
for two or three hours. I was in conference with him on December 
1 — Admiral Kimmel [39] on December 1 and with both of them 
on December 3 ; so in all probability I did see the one to which you refer. 
I am not sure whether it was sent to me officially. 

The Chairman, We made a call upon your staff to produce any 
copy that the Navy may have furnished to you. 

General Short. Yes. 

The Chairman. That call was made only yesterday afternoon and 
has not yet been answered, so it does not appear yet whether you of- 
ficially were apprised. 

General Short. I unquestionably knew anything of serious import 
because I was in repeated contact with them at that time. 

The Chairman, There was also a telegraphic communication from 
the Chief of Naval Operations, I think, to the Commander in Chief 
of the naval force here about November 24 which had to do with the 
same subject, the tenuous character of the negotiations. Do you re- 
member that? 

General Short, I don't remember that specifically. 

The Chairman. I suppose the same answer applies to that, also. 

General Short, Very frequently if Admiral Kimmel had something 
I should see he would send someone from the staff over and then let 
me read his copy but not give me a copy. 

The Chairman. I understand you ordered No. 1 alert on Novem- 
ber 27? 

General Short. Yes. 

The Chairman. Now, I have examined you just in a preliminary way 
thus far. The Commission has thought perhaps that you cared to 
make a running statement of the situation. 

General Short. I would like that very much. 

[40] I have drawn up a very complete statement in writing, and 
there are certain points that I would like to emphasize, and if it not 
taking too much time of the Commission I would like very much to 
orally go through a number of things. 

The Chairman. General, we have every bit of time necessary to 
give you an opportunity to state everything you have on your mind 
about this matter. 

General Short. Yes, I think I can emphasize, make some points 
much plainer, by talking to you. 

The Chairman. Now, without questioning you further — I have 
developed merely preliminary to bring us up to date 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I would like you in ^^our own way and at our 
own leisure to make a very full statement of whatever occurs to you 
as important to this investigation. Before you do that, I presume 
that this folder you have handed us is a folder of supporting docu- 
ments in connection with your statement? 

General Short, It is a complete statement and supporting docu- 
ments, both. 

The Chairman. There is a statement here? 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 1 4 



34 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. The first 60 pages is a statement, and the others 
are supporting documents. 

The Chairman. This (indicating) is the statement? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And under your oath as a Avitness you state that 
this statement is as if you had given the testimony here under oath? 

General Short. Yes, sir, and I have signed the statement, and every 
exhibit has been true copied, I think, by an officer. 

The Chairman. Thank you, sir. Now you may proceed. 

General Short. I would first of all like to read the message that I 
received from the Navy of October 16, because of the last paragraph : 

The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations 
which I have been directed to pass to yon. Quote : 

[41 J ".Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave situation. If a new cabi- 
net is formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic. If the 
Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not 
include rapprochement with the United States. Either way hostilities between 
Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since Britain and the U. S. are held 
responsible by Japan for her present situation there is also a possibility that 
Japan may attack those two powers. View of these possibilities you will take 
due precaution including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose 
strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan." 

I wish to call attention to that last paragraph : 

"* * * take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as 
will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against 
Japan." 

Now I would like also to read the (me I received from the Chief 
of Staff, radiogram, on the 27th, because it is the same tenor : 

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes 
with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come 
back and' offer to continue stop. Japanese future action unpredictable but hos- 
tile action possible at any moment stop. If hostilities cannot comma repeat 
cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first 
overt act stop. This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed 
as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense stop. 
Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnais- 
sance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should 
be carried out so as not comma repeat comma to alarm civil population or 
disclose intent stop. Report measures taken stop. Should hostilities occur 
you will carry out the tasks W2] assigned the rainbow five so far as they 
pertain to Japan stop. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information 
to minimum essential officers. 

I want to call attention to that last clause, to limit it, the dissemina- 
tion of this, and I think that I limited it to the Chief of Staff and G-2. 
1 think I am correct. But you have the same thing in here "not to 
alarm civil population or disclose intent." I want to call particularly 
attention to that. 

The Chairman. Would it disturb your statement if one or another 
of us interrupted you? 

General Short. Not in the least. 

The Chairman. May I ask at that point 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Tlie Chairman. — — whether you did report the measures taken to 
your sujjerior? 

General Short. I did. I will come to that a little later. 

The Chairman. All right. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 35 

General Short. I reported very specifically exactly what I had 
done. 

The Chairman. All right. 

General Short. When I got this wire I talked the matter over with 
my Chief of Staff. 

The Chairman. Who is your Cliief of Staff? 

General Short. Colonel Walter C. Phillips. I did not call in 
my G-3. 

The Chairman. Is G-3 operations? 

General Short. Operations, yes, sir. 

I did not call in my operations officer as Colonel Phillips had been 
operations officer up to a very short time before, just a few days, and 
I thought he and I knew enough about the situation that we did not 
need to get advice of G-3. G-2 did see the message. 

Xow, I want to explain — and at that time, then, immediately Alert 
No. 1 was ordered into effect. I will explain just very briefly, not go 
into what Alert No. 1 meant 

[4^1 The Chairman. I think from the S. O. P. here we know 
about that. 

General Short. You think you know, and that you don't even need 
a general presentation? 

The Chairman. Do we need it, gentlemen? 

General McCoy. I do not think so. We discussed that very care- 
fully- 

The Chairman. We discussed it very carefully yesterday. We 

have been over the orders. 

General Short. I was going to point out that 2 included defense 
against air attack. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Short. And 3, defense against an all-out attack. 

The Chairman. Right. 

General Short. The first was sabotage, uprisings, and subversive 
action. 

The Chairman. All right, sir. 

Gener^il Short. Now, in addition to ordering Alert No. 1, 1 ordered 
the Aircraft Warning Service to work daily two hours before dawn 
and until one hour after dawn. Now, this was a new service that we 
had. At that time we had just gotten in the machines and set up. 
I thought this was fine training for them. I was trying to get training 
and was doing it for training more than any idea that it would be real. 
But that was the time of day when they should get the training, as it 
is the most dangerous time of day. ho they were ordered to work 
from four; they worked from four o'clock to seven. They construed 
six o'clock as dawn, which was about right, and worked from four to 
seven daily. 

The Chairman. How long had any of those mobile units been 
available, how long before December 7 ? 

General Short. I think about November first. 

The CiiAiRiMAN. And some of the mobile units, then, if I understand 
your testimony, had been in operation three hours each morning? 

General Short. All 

The Chairman. Since about November first? 



36 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. No, no. They had been in operation all day long, 
but they hadn't been in operation from four o'clock in the morning. 
On 14.4.] November 27 I started them operating at from four to 
seven. 

The Chairman. From four to seven. 

General Short. They had been working with them, getting them set 
up and trying to learn something about them for probably three or 
four weeks before that time. Our fixed stations were not yet installed, 
as we had to build roads to the top of two or three mountains, one of 
them 10,000 feet high, in order to get them up there. 

The Chairman. Yes. Now, when I interrupted, you said you had 
issued orders to have those stations 

General Short. We issued the order by telephone, and there were 
three reasons why I decided to issue the order for Alert No. 1 rather 
than for Alert No. 2 or 3. In the first place, with the population we 
have here there was a very strong possibility of sabotage. Individual 
sabotage was the thing that I feared more than anything else. I didn't 
fear uprisings ; I didn't think that they would dare take a chance on 
that. 

In the second place, I had no information to indicate an attack, so 
it did not appear essential to prepare against a real attack. The sabo- 
tage was a direct possibility. 

In the third place, if I ordered Alert 2 or 3, I interfered very seri- 
ously with the training. No. 2 would have interfered seriously, parti- 
cularly with the air and anti-aircraft training ; 3 would interfere seri- 
ously with all training. It was impossible to do any orderly training 
with them on. 

The Chairman. Were your troops really in need of training ? 

General Short. We have thousands of new men. Some of them had 
not completed the 13 weeks' training when we got them over. We have 
a complete regiment of anti-aircraft that is all draft. We have a regi- 
ment of engineers that is very largely draft. Some of them had six or 
seven weeks when they came over. And we have men that have come 
and gone through the reception center, draftees from the Territory that 
had gone in the two Hawaiian National Guard regiments here. So 
that there was a decided necessity for real training. I will cover that 
with regard to the air corps a little more. 

Now, in the carrying out of anti-sabotage measures it can be done 
[^5] very much better and with less men if the planes and the com- 
mand are not dispersed too widely. With the Alert No. 1 where we 
were carrying it out for sabotage the planes were kept in the vicinity 
of the landing mat or the apron in groups, so they could be guarded 
very closely. If we had gone to Alert No. 2, then some bombers 
would have been sent to outlying islands where our garrisons are 
extremely small, or put in the air, and you cannot keep them in the 
air indefinitely. The pureuit planes would have been distributed in 
their bunker all around the perimeter of Wheeler Field and around 
the perimeter of Bellows Field, and it would take maybe hundreds 
of men to protect them reasonably well from sabotage. 

Now, this was especially true because we had not constructed man- 
proof fencing with floodlights around these fields. I put in for money 
on the 15th day of May for putting manproof fences and floodlights 
around all of the critical installations. That part of the money was 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 37 

approved, some on July 11, and on August 12 we got approval for 
some more. I had asked for $210,000. We got about $200,000. The 
orders were placed on the mainland for the material because it simply 
was not available in Honolulu. The defense work has cleaned out 
practically all essential material here. Up to the time of the attack 
a small amount of this wire, not all the parts, had been received by 
constructing quartermaster for the Chemical Warfare, and some ord- 
nance staples. The District Engineer, who does the work for the 
airfields, had not received any material for fencing on the airfields. 

You understand, this is a question of priority. We were not given 
the top priority. The Navy in certain construction work had the top 
priority and could get their things through at once. We had to take 
our turn to get the material. Then we had to take our turn to get it 
on the boats, and in spite of repeated following up it had not arrived 
at that time. 

The Chairman. Do I understand, then, that Hickam Field was 
open to the road and the adjoining land ? 

General Short. The back part of Hickam Field was fenced, but 
there was no fencing off, which we wanted very much to do, of the 
hangar line from all of the living part of the field, which made the 
guarding extremely difficult. 

[4^] And another thing, at Hickam Field it was impossible to 
completely disperse the planes there on account of the nature of the 
soil. That is all filled ground, and with those heavy planes that when 
they are loaded weigh up to 50,000 pounds you didn't dare get them 
off there. I had asked in February for money to put in runways and 
bunkers. It could only be done with heavy material. My engineers 
with their equipment could not do that. 1 had asked for money for 
that, and it had been going back and forth ever since that time. I 
had gone ahead without any money at Wheeler Field and built the 
bunkers with my aviation engineering troops. I could not do that 
on account of the nature of the conditions. You can't dig ground 
there ; you run into water. You have to bring in the earth and build 
it up. 

Now, to take up the question of having no information to indicate 
an attack, as I say, I was in constant communications with the 14th 
Naval District. I had nothing in the way of alarming news. In our 
coastal frontier defense plan we coordinate the work of the Army and 
Navy by mutual cooperation. In paragraph 18 (i) of that plan — you 
will find it exactly in there, anyway — it provides definitely that the 
Navy is responsible for distant reconnaissance. That has been in 
effect for some time. Then on March 21 we had a board with the idea 
of making this cooperation closer, and Admiral Bloch and I signed 
an agreement that went into effect at once, providing that if the Navy 
di'd not have enough long range patrol planes to make reconnaissance 
they could call on the Army, and that when they did call on the Army 
the planes acted under the tactical control of the Navy. In other 
words, the Navy gave them their mission, gave them their full instruc- 
tions, told them where tliey would probably find American boats, so 
that they would not by any chance fire upon them or bomb tliem, and 
exactly what they wantecl them to look for. The question of just 
how tiie total reconnaissance was carried out was never known by me. 
If they called on us for a squadron of planes they would assign it to 



38 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

a certain sector, say maybe from zero to 70 degrees, to search out 600 
miles, or whatever it was. I assumed that the Navy planes were 
searching all the other critical areas, and they probably were. I say, 
that was a matter that was not under my control. 

[4-7] The Chairman. May I interrupt you there a moment? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. On or about December 7 had the Navy called on you 
for any additional detail of reconnaissance planes? 

General Short. Thev had not. From November 27 they had at no 
time called on me for additional reconnaissance. 

The Chairman. Under that agreement? 

General Short. Yes, sir. I will bring that out. 

The Chairman. All right. Perhaps I am jumping ahead of you. 

General Short. From March 21 on we had repeatedly carried out 
exercises along that line. We liad a mininnun of one exercise a week, 
and sometimes exercises more frequently than that, but we were work- 
ing constantly to perfect that coordination. This has no direct bear- 
ing, but to show what we were trying to do, that some agreement pro- 
vided that when we were using fighters over the Island of Oahii then 
they turned their fighters over to my command. We were trying to 
get coordinated whole in that. 

The Chairman. We are quite familiar with that agreement. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. We studied it yesterday. 

General Short. Now, to go into the question of the interference 
with training if I ordered Alert No. 2 or 3, this was particularly true 
with reference to the training of the air corps and particularly im- 
portant. As yon know, this B-17, the Flying Fortress, is a plane that 
has not been distributed to the Army generally very long. We have 
had some for a few months, and training a complete combat team for 
that plane, including bombers, takes a very considerable time. We 
have been required to send nine out of twentv-one bombers to the 
Philippines with the trained crews. Then we had been told that we 
were going to have to carry on a large ferrying operation of planes to 
the Philippines. We had previous to November 27 sent 18 trained 
combat teams for these ships to the mainland ferry. We had 17 more 
ready to send. We had also been told that we would get 12 additional 
planes to make up very soon, so we were trying to train those. 

Now, we have to train those crews only six B-17's. We had twelve 
here [48] but in order to keep the planes going, that were ready, 
through to the Philippines, we didn't dare let them go on without part 
replaced. Well, they kept our minimum of spares down to where we 
could use only six planes. In other words, to train all these extra 
crews we had only six planes that we could use. So if we put those 
six planes in a state of readiness and dispersed them and kept them 
warmed up most of the day, it completely stopped the training and 
we definitely woidd not be able to carry out the ferrying mission that 
we had been ordered to carry out to the Philippines. We were con- 
stantly mindful of the fact that we might have to give up our route 
bases of Midway and Wake and were working just as rapidly as pos- 
sible to develop an alternate route down by either Palmvra or 
Christmas and Canton and Suva and Townsville, Australia. We had 
all of those fields well under construction and were pushing everything 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 39 

to the limit, and we felt like we had to push the training of our combat 
teams in exactly the same way. So that had a decided influence on de- 
ciding to not order an alert that put the air out where they could not 
train. 

This is the reply that I sent in answer to that radiogram of No- 
A'ember 27 : 

Re your radiogram number four seven two twenty seventh report Department 
alerted to prevent sabotage period liaison with Navy. 

Xow, that should have given the War Department very exact infor- 
mation of just what I was doing, of the nature of the alert. I did not 
say "Alert No. 1." I didn't want anybod}^ to have to run and look 
up and find out what it was. I said, "Alert against sabotage." 

I got a reply back from the Adjutant General the next day : 

[JiO] 2Sth. Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken im- 
mediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility 
of War Department I'aren see paragraph 3 Mid SC30-45 end paren stop. Also 
desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide 
for protection of your establishments conmia property comma and equipment 
against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propa- 
ganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop. This does not 
repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop. Protective 
measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding im- 
necessary publicity and alarm stop. To insure speed of transmission identical 
telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect 
your responsibility under existing instructions. 

They thought that the question of sabotage, subversive activities, 
and espionage w^ere so important wiien they sent me this that they 
sent a copy right on to the individual air stations to impress them 
all the more. You will notice here that there was the question that 
nothing was said about anything but sabotage, subversive activities, 
and espionage. 

I received three message up to that date, October 16, November 27, 
and November 28. They emphasized right straight throught that 
we must not disclose our stand and that we must not alarm the popu- 
lation and that we must take measures to protect against sabotage, 
against espionage, and against subversive action. Nowhere did they 
indicate in any w^ay the necessity for protecting against attack. 
They also did indicate definitely that we must avoid publicity and 
avoid alarming the public. If I ordered a complete alert against 
attack, it would have alarmed at least the Japanese population. 

You will also notice they made no objection whatever to my wire 
where I stated I was alerted for sabotage. If they had any idea that 
tliat was not a correct order, they had all the opportunity from No- 
vember 27 to December 7 to come back and say, "We do not consider 
the action taken by j^ou as sufficient and that you shoidd instead take 
action to defend yourself against air attack." 

[SO] In other words, I took it as a tacit agreement w'ith the 
course I had taken and that there was no objection raised, and I cannot 
see how I could draw any other conclusion. 

Now^, to show that I was carrying out exactly their instructions in 
regard to sabotage, on November 29 I sent another wire. I said : 

Full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field 
of investigative responsibility of War Department. Paragraph 3 Mid SC.SO-45 — 



40 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

That applies entirely to the delineation between the actions of the 
FBI, ONI, and G-2 respectively of the military forces, and of the 
FBI carrying out the work with respect to the civilian population. 
The three worked very close together. 
(Continuing:) 

Military establishments including personnel and equipment stop. As regards 
protection telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma this headquarters 
by confidential letter dated June 19 1941 requested the Governor of the Territory 
to use the broad powers vested in him by Section 67 of the Organic Act which 
provides comma in effect comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders 
of military and naval forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to 
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection et cetera stop. Pur- 
suant to the authority stated the Governor on June 20th confidentially made a 
formal written demand of this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish 
such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and 
lawless violence in connection therewith comma being committed against vital 
installations and structures in the Territory stop. Pursuant to the foregoing 
request appropriate military protection is now afforded vital civilian installa- 
tions stop. In this connection comma at the instigation of this headquarters 
the city and county of Honolulu on June 30th 1941 enacted an ordinance which 
permits the Commanding General Hawaiian Department comma to close comma 
or restrict the use of and travel upon comma any highway within the city and 
the city and county of Honolulu on June 30th 1941 enacted an ordinance which 
county of Honolulu comma [51] whenever the Commanding General 
deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense stop. The au- 
thority thus given has not yet been exercised stop. Relations with FBI and aU. 
other federal and territorial oificials are and have been cordial and mutual 
cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters. 

I want to explain my reason for»some time at least — say the last 
year and a half or two years when during perhaps tests *or certain 
alarming conditions that they have been placing sentinels over essen- 
tial utilities without any legal authority. I felt that if these sentinels 
who are protecting transformer stations or waterworks should fire 
upon someone that I had no legal protection whatever, and that was 
my reason for calling upon the Governor to make this request. That 
placed the military command in a much better situation. 

Also I had no authority to close roads, and for that reason I asked 
the City and County Council to give me that authority and assured 
them that I would only use that when necessary. So I thought that 
I was in a much better legal status than they had been theretofore. 

I will now take up what happened from November 27 to December 
6, Alert No. 1 remained in effect. Troops went on with their routine 
training. The Aircraft Warning Service worked, as part of the 
interceptor command, was working every morning until 4 and 7 and 
was working each station on its own from 7 to 11 and was making 
necessary reports and so forth from 1 to 4 o'clock in the afternoon. 

I might explain what we mean by the interceptor command. We 
have for the purpose of combat, we place pursuit airplanes, anti- 
aircraft artillery, Aircraft Warning Service, under the command of 
what we call the interceptor commander. 

The Chairmax. Would you read that part back to me ? 

The Reporter (reading) : 

We have for the purpose of combat, we place pursuit airplanes, anti-aircraft 
artillery. Aircraft Warning Service, under the command of what we call the 
interceptor commander. 

General McCoy. Who was that commander? 
General Short. General Davidson. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 41 

[-5^] General McCoy. Of the Air Service? 

General Short. Yes. The purpose of this is that it is necessary 
in air combat, anti-aircraft defense, that they are supposed to stop 
in a split second. It may be that otherwise you may be firing upon 
your own airplanes because they are following the enemy so closely 
in the fight. 

During this work from 4 to 7 there was always the interceptor con- 
trol officer working with the Aircraft Warning Service and getting 
their work coordinated. 

Admiral Standley. AVas General Davidson alsa authorized to co- 
ordinate anti-aircraft fire of the district under that command? 

General Short. Yes. As a matter of fact, I think it was an excel- 
lent idea having the Navy here, and if you gentlemen have an oppor- 
tunity to visit that interceptor command, I think it would be good to 
do so. They will be moving their underground station in just a few 
days, and you will see how it works, carrying all marine anti-aircraft 
ashore because under the anti-aircraft command, he controls the whole 
of the anti-aircraft fire here. 

Admiral Standley. You mean in the Navy Yard ? 

General Short. Yes. We have many of our people in the Navy 
Yard now. If a ship is in the harbor, we do not get our coordination 
to a point where he would order the ship to fire. 

Admiral Standley. It is intended to be the case? 

General Short. Yes. It may be extremely difficult to develop it, 
but that would have to go on through the Navy Yard, all the way 
through in one extra step. 

Admiral Standley. It is provided in the plan? Is that what you 
mean ? 

General Short. We do not say in the plan that we would control the 
fire on the sliip, but unquestionably that would be the next step in the 
coordination. 

General McCoy. The reason was to get a quick warning to the ship ? 

General Short. Yes, because otherwise they would be firing on 
their own ships. 

The Chairiman. Would you read that last statement of the general? 

[SS] (The reporter read the last statement of General Short.) 

The Chairjian. You mean because otherwise they would be firing on 
their own planes ? 

General Short. Yes. We say ship sometimes for a plane. I 
probably should not do it in this case. 

General McCoy. That coordination was not in effect on Novem- 
ber 27? 

General Short. No. For the guns manned by the Marines inshore 
it was in effect. 

I was also working quite repeatedly with the Chief of Air Service 
because the Marines ashore were changing constantly. They would 
bring an outfit in here from Midway and then send the force out, and 
the result would be that they did not fit in as a team, not quite so 
closely, but the purpose was the same. The performance was not 
quite so perfect. 

To go ahead with what took place, as I said, on the 27th of Novem- 
ber I had a conference with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Block, 

with reference to the reinforcement 



42 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of the naval commands of Midway and Wake by Army pursuit planes. 
General Martin, commander of the Air Force, with his chief of staff, 
Colonel Mollison, were with me. We talked over every phase of the 
subject. They had already ordered the Marine planes out and felt 
at that time that it was better, better to let that move continue and 
to delay any taking over or reinforcement by the Army. Admiral 
Kimmel sent in a recommendation to that effect, and I was in full ac- 
cord with it as long as 1 was able to do so. 

On December 1 I had a conference which lasted for some time. 
We had another wire with reference to the possibilty of the Army 
relieving the garrison completely at Midway and Wake; so we had 
a long conference that morning. On the morning of the 2d he came 
to my quarters and I went over an eight-page letter that he had writ- 
ten to the Chief of Naval Operations explaining his stand in this 
matter. We had a conference on the morning of the 3d, as I re- 
member. 

The Chairman. What was the purport of this letter ? 

General Short. In regard to the relieving of this situation. I did 
not want it effective at that time. I did that because of these air 
fields that were in the process of construction. Then they had a lot 
of [Sj.] civilians at Wake and also at Midway. The question 
of supplies was difficult because it was a complicated situation. I 
put in a recommendation that the relief should not take place now and 
to hold up until the construction was completed, and if it took place 
anyway that they shoulcl send in the same five garrisons that they had 
so as not to deplete the water supply. 

The Chairman. The proposed operation was to send other troops 
there and to bring back those who were there ? 

General Short. The idea was to make the Marines definitely avail- 
able for any fleet and land exercises that they wanted or were going 
to operate so as to take bases in the mandated islands. It was to let 
the Marines act as an expeditionary force. 

The Chairman. By substituting the Army? 

General Short. Yes. They told us they would send replacements, 
and we had instructions that the Army should take the defense of 
Canton Island also. That was to take over the defense of Canton 
Island. 

On 'December 4 one of my staff officers, Major Fleming, had a con- 
ference with the Fleet Marine Officer, Colonel Pfeiffer, relating to 
the use of Marine five-inch guns at Canton Island. 

I am bringing out these conferences to show that I was in constant 
touch with the Navy, and to show the character of the conferences be- 
cause if they had information of Japanese carriers in that part of the 
water and were worried about a possible attack I would certainly have 
become aware of it when we were talking about tlie possibility of 
sending an expeditionary force to the relief of the Marines. We 
would not have talked about transporting them out there without 
clearing out the carriers first. 

So, while I do not remember exactly asking a specific question as 
to the location of the Japanese carriers, I had a very decided impres- 
sion that at that time there was nothing in the situation that the 
location the the Japanese carriers was worrying us at that time. In 
fact, the question came up very definitely by a question of Admiral 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 43 

KimmeFs. During this conference on the 27th with General Martin, 
his chief of Staff, Colonel MoUison, the question was asked, and I 
would like to read it since his [55] statement is more definite 
than my recollection : 

I certify that on November 27, 1941, I accompanied General Short and General 
Martin to Admiral Kimmel's office for conference relative to sending Army pursuit 
planes to Midway and Wake. As this would unquestionably weaken the defense 
of Oahu, Admiral Kimmel asked a question of Captain McMorris, his War Plans 
Officer, which was substantially as follows : 

Admiral Kimmix. "McMorris, what is your idea of the chances of a surprise 
raid on Oahu?" 

Captain McMoRms. "I should say none, Admiral." 

At tliat time tliere Avas no exception taken to that statement by either 
Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Block, and apparently the Navy felt that 
they had definite information of the location of carriers and major 
ships of the Japanese and that there was no question in their minds of 
the possibility or probability of a surprise attack upon Oahu. 

At this tinie they had at no time requested the Army planes to assist 
in distant reconnaissance. The whole combination convinced me that 
the Navy had definitely enough information as to the location of the 
Japanese carriers and that they did not think it was necessary to make 
distant reconnaissance or that they be sent planes for making such 
reconnaissance because they did not call on me. 

I want to point out also that the Hawaiian Department has no in- 
formation service for locating Japanese or other foreign ships. We are 
dependent wliolly on the information that we get from the 14th Naval 
District or from the War Department in Washington which gets its 
information through the Navy Department. The Navy does have an 
intelligence service for obtaining this information, and we are depend- 
ent on them for that kind of information. 

General McCoy. Was there any definite arrangement on that be- 
tween the Army and the Navy ? 

General Short. Possibly in Washington. I do not know. I have no 
agents outside the Hawaiian Islands. There is no possibility or way for 
me to know except through the District here or through the War 
Department because I maintain no agents anywhere in the world. 

[SS] General McCoy. I am clear about these frequent confer- 
ences which are followed by signed agreements, but was there any 
agreement that they would furnish you this information ? 

General Short. They made themselves definitely responsible for dis- 
tant reconnaissance and for locations. We were in constant touch with 
G-2 and ONI. There was a complete exchange of information. If we 
))icked up any information ^^e gave it to them and they gave it to us. 
If I picked up information through channels coming from Japan we 
would put this information that we felt was first-hand immediately at 
the Navy's disposal and I gave it to them as quickly as possible. We 
frequently had no way to varify that information, but we gave the 
information, and I am sure that they were just as liberal with us. 

If probably certain groups of Japanese ships were seen near the 
Philippine Islands or the mandated islands they would not have re- 
peated it to us, not thinking it affected us like it did the Navy, but it 
unquestionably would have gone into Washington and would have 
been reported by Washington to the Philippine Army. 



44 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. The only thing that the joint agreement between 
you seems to cover is distant reconnaissance ? 

General Short. Yes. That was very definitely placed upon the 
Army even to the point of controlling the plans, which is the only 
logical way because otherwise if two people are made responsible they 
may be making reconnaissance in the same sector and another sector 
may be forgotten. 

On December 5 a B-24, which is a new type of bomber plane, came 
into Hickam Field from the mainland on its way to the Philippine 
Islands, and it was to carry en route, I believe, a photographic machine 
over the mandated islands. 

General McCoy. What date was that? 

General Short. December 5. It is in there. When this plane 
came in it was not sufficiently armed for combat but had only one 
..30-caliber gun and only two .50-caliber guns in the tail. It had no 
ammunition. It could not even have fired if it wanted to. In spite 
of coming in that condition, the War Department sent that ship in 
that condition, and the telegram that followed — from that they real- 
ized it was coming in [57] without proper armament from this 
wire which they sent : 

Reference to B-dash 24 airplanes for special photo mission stop. It is desired 
that the pilots be instructed to photographic Truk Island in the Caroline group 
Jaluit in the Marshall group stop. Visual reconnaissance should be made simul- 
taneously stop. Information desired as to the number and location of naval 
vessels including submarines connua air fields comma aircraft comma guns 
comma barracks and camps stop. Pilots should be warned islands strongly 
fortified and manned stop. Photograph and reconnaissance must be accom- 
plished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity 
stop. Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed stop. 
Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self- 
preservation stop. The two pilots and copilots should be instructed to confer 
with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advice stop. If 
distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great comma suggest one B 
dash 24 proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake comma then Philippines 
by usual route photographing Ponape while en route Moresby stop. Advise 
pilots best time of day for photographing Truk and Jaluit stop. Upon arrival 
in Phillipines two copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to General 
MacArthur comma Admiral Hart comma Admiral Kimmel comma the Chief of 
Naval Operations comma and the War Department stop. 

This next sentence is the sentence that is important from my point 
of view. 

Insure that both B dash 24 airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition 
upon departure from Honolulu. 

Now, the fact is that they sent them to Honolulu without being 
properly equipped. In other words they considered that the hazard 
of carrying the extra weight between the mainland and Honolulu Avas 
greater than the possibility of a Japanese attack. They apparently 
did not consider it likely to be attacked in that they sent the plane out 
in that way. 

I sent tiie message back when I got this message on the same day. 
I told them that the planes had arrived without guns and without 
ammunition. I told them that I was going to hold them until they 
got the proper [55] equipment and asked for a delay for the 

proper equipment and that it was not safe to proceed, a safe procedure 
for them to carry out. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 45 

Incidentally, I said with respect to our operations to the Philippines 
that in ferrying our planes, that when our planes left here they had 
instructions to fly over the mandate islands at 20,000 feet and leave 
Wake at night and be prepared to defend themselves. 

I had given instructions two months before I had this because I 
did not think it safe to send a man out where he would be murdered 
without having a chance to fight. 

In spite of the fact that I wired the War Department on the 6th 
about this plane coming in in that manner, they continued to send 
planes from the mainland without being properly armed and equipped. 

On the morning of November 7 

The Chairman. December 7. 

General Short. December 7. 

The plane left from Hamilton Field, and I am going to give 
Eastern Standard Time, because that would be the hour the War 
Department would have knowledge of it. There were two scout 
planes left the mainland, one at 12 : 30 December 7 Eastern Standard 
Time, and one at 1 : 30 December 7 Eastern Standard Time. These 
planes were B-17's, 12 of them. 

General McCoy. These are four-engined bombers? 

General Short. Yes, big planes, B-17's. They had no ammunition. 
The guns were cosmolined so they could not have been fired. The 
guns were not bore sighted. In other words, if they fired they could 
not count on making their hits. The crews were skeleton crews. In 
these skeleton crews they had a pilot, a copilot, an engineer, navigator, 
and radio operator, but these crews would not be enough to man the 
guns even if the guns had been in shape to be fired and even if they 
had ammunition, which they did not have. I am bringing this out to 
indicate that in the mind of the War Department that they were not 
thinking in terms of an attack on Honolulu even as late as 1 : 30 on 
the morning of December 7. They still considered that the hazard 
of carrying the additional weight in ammunition was greater than 
the hazard of the possibility of a Japanese attack. 

[^o9] General McNarney. In the last sentence of your statement 
you say : 

Up to that moment the War Department had given me no indication of a crisis 
in the American-.Japanese relations. 

General Short. That is corr^t. I will go ahead with that. I had 
nothing f roiii the War Department since November 27 as I had noth- 
ing except what was in the daily newspapers. The reports in the pa- 
pers and the statement of the President did not give any indication 
that there was going to be any sudden stoppage like that, and if the 
War Department had any siich communication it did not indicate 
it to me. 

General McNarney. You did not consider the cable of November 
27 a warning ? 

General Short. Yes, it was a warning, but the fact that the nego- 
tiations had been resumed and Mr. Kurusu had gone on there that 
there was a serious attempt being made to get together. I considered 
that the War Department if they were aware that there was some 
crisis in our relations, would have let me know. 

We had the warning of the 27th in the way of avoiding publicity 
and alarm, but nothing from the War Department that there was any 



46 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

warning of any sudden split-second stop. I think if they had some 
information they would have given it to me and let it go out. What 
happened later in the morning indicates they would have given it 
to me. 

I did not state that these 12 ships that they sent from the mainland 
without ammunition arrived right in the midst of the first attack. 
It was not a theoretical thing at all. The first planes that landed at 
Hickam Field — the first plane was destroyed by the attack of a Jap- 
anese plane just as it hit and landed. Four out of those 12 planes 
were destroyed before getting to the ground without any possibility of 
replying to the Japanese attack. It was not a theoretical thing be- 
cause it happened to them as they arrived and it was a very vital thing. 

Apparently later that morning the War Department got some 
alarming information. I have no way of knowing how they got the 
information. However, they filed at 12 : 18, Eastern Standard Time, 
December 7, which is 6 : 45 our time here, Honolulu — they filed a mes- 
sage with the R. C A. to ask me and General Martin — that message 
had to be encoded before it was filed. [60] I think the estimate 
of an hour would be an extremely short time for the encoding of the 
message and filing it with R. C. A. Our experience would indicate a 
great deal more time for that. We cut that down as a minimum. 

Here is what the message said, and this to my mind is the most 
important thing I received from the War Department : 

529 7th Japanese are presenting at 1 p. m. Eastern Standard Time today what 
amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code ma- 
chine immediately stop. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not 
know but be on alert accordingly stop. Inform naval authorities of this com- 
munication. 

In view of what happened it is perfectly apparent that they de- 
stroyed their code machines in order to put into use a new code that 
they knew nobody had broken or could get their information. 

That message, as I say, was filed at 6 : 48 in Washington. It was 
received here by the R. C. A. at 7 : 33. I do not know what caused 
the R. C. A. to delay delivering the message immediately because it 
would have to be delivered by a messenger, but I suspect that at the 
time the messenger was getting under way, the attack, which was at 
7 : 55, had started, and the messenger did not care to be roaming around 
during an attack, and it was brought to the Signal Office at 11 : 45. It 
was decoded and delivered to the Adjutant General of the Depart- 
ment at 2 : 58 in the afternoon. You can see the time it took to de- 
code it, so I do not think I am very much wrong when I say that it 
must have taken at least one hour to decode it; so that if we assume 
that they started to encode it that they had the information as early 
as 5 : 45 Honolulu Time. If they had telephoned me urgent, tele- 
phoned the corps in the clear, I could have had the information at 6 
o'clock in the morning without any question at all because we talk 
repeatedly and when we get the call through I receive these things 
in around 15 minutes. 

On that point also we have one of these speech scramblers^ and there 
is one in the office of the Chief of Staff. While they are not considered 
as safe as code, they are reasonably safe. 

If they had felt this was a probability of an attack on Honolulu, 
they could have put the call through, and if they felt there was a 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 47 

possibility of an attack certainly then they had every great duty to 
get that information [6'i] to me as rapidly as possible, and if 
that call was put through to me and got to me as early as 2 o'clock, or 
I should say 6 o'clock, which was two hours in which to arrange every- 
thing and make absolutely ready for a Japanese attack. 

As I say, that reached me seven hours after the attack. During the 
attack that morning I had gone to our defense command post and told 
Colonel Phillips to call the Chief of Staff and get the information as 
soon as it was decoded. He asked if we had received a message, but we 
had not received it even then. 

The Chairman. Can you tell me at what hour Phillips telephoned ? 

General Short. I left this office sometime around 8 : 35 or 8 : 40 and 
Colonel Phillips put in the call and I went to the command post. I 
don't know how long it took to get the call through but my feeling 
is sometime around, it must have been around 9 o'clock. Anyway it 
was before 2 : 58 in the afternoon. That was all that was said at that 
time. Apparently the War Department became aware a little later of 
the significance of the message and of our not getting it until seven 
hours after the attack. 

On December 9 they sent a message. 

[62] Five four nine ninth please advise immediately exact time of receipt 
of our number five two nine repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu 
exact time described message transmitted by Signal Corps staff and by what 
staff officer received. 

I sent the following reply to that : 

Re your five four nine radio five two nine — 

That is their radio. 

delivered Honolulu via RCA seven thirty three morning seventh stop. Received 
signal oflSce Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh. This time approxi- 
mate but within five minutes. 

It might have been eleven-forty or eleven-fifty, but it is within five 
minutes of being correct. 

Deciphered message received by Adjutant General Hawaiian Department two 
fifty eight afternoon. 

Now, even at this late date it appears to me that when the War 
Department sent this message they still had the feeling that extreme 
secrecy in not letting the Japanese l-now that they had hroken their 
code^ or how they had gotten this information, was more important 
than the speed of transmission of this message to me, because other- 
wise they wouldn't send it by code, which anybody knows takes hours 
longer; that they were trying to maintain secrecy, and in attempting 
to maintain secrecy they did not get the message to me until seven 
hours after the attack. I think it an extremely important point to 
consider. 

The Chairman. May I interrupt you there ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. . 

The Chairman. You had a War Department radio communication 
system ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The* Chairman. Have you made any inquiry as to whether that 
was in [63^ working order on the day hi question. 



48 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. Oh, it was in working order all the time. They 
may have thought ours was loaded up and that the RCA would be 
faster. I don't know why they sent it RCA. I don't know. 

The Chairman. Had you and had the Navy Department, the Army 
staff in Washington, knowledge of a radio communications system 
installed by the F. B. L? 

General Short. I don't know whether the War Department had or 
not, but they definitely knew that I have that secret phone and with 
connections to the secret phone right in the Chief of Staff's office, 
the fastest thing that could possibly come through. 

The Chairman. Did you know that the F. B. I. had its own direct 
line of radio communication ? 

General Short. I knew that they had communication, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. With Washington ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. We at times got messages, but most of 
our messages were over the Army net. I don't know why they could 
have used it. 

The Chairman. You had at times gotten messages over the RCA 
hook-up, hadn't you? 

General Short. Oh, yes, probably because our net was badly loaded 
up. So I didn't think anything of it. I haven't been in Washington 
since the emergency, and I don't know whether the RCA has an office 
right alongside of radio in the Munition Building. I imagine they 
have, and that they probably would send it whichever one was least 
loaded at the time. I don't know. That would just be an inference. 

The Chairman. Had you ever received any communication from 
Washington or had you ever sent any communication to Washington 
over the F. B. I. net? 

General Short. I don't think so. I have talked with Mr. Shivers, 
the head of the F. B. L, a number of times, [^^] 'and when he 
told me that he would — talked over with him the proposition of his 
communicating with his Department something that I felt was better 
for him to take up, instead of my taking up officially through the 
War Department. We had very frequent conferences. INIy G-2 was 
very close to him, and I will say that the F. B. I. had always worked 
a hundred percent in every way. There never was any difference of 
opinion, and anything he had we had. 

There were two — I may be taking up a good deal of your time. 

The Chairman. I want you to be very full in your statement, 
General. 

General Short. I would like to paint the whole picture, and I can 
make it a little plainer orally. There were two instances 

General McCoy. We might take a five minute recess. 

The Chairman. Yes, suppose we take a five minute recess. 

General Short. All right, sir. 

The Chairman. It is a long stretch. 

General Short. It does not bother me ; it is just up to you gentle- 
men. 

General McCoy. We will stretch ourselves. 

(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess, at the conclusion of 
wl'ich the hearing was resumed as follows:) 

The Chairman. We are ready to resume. General. Perhaps the 
General wants to know what the last question and answer are, Mr. 
Reporter. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 49 

General Short. I think I am perfectly straight. 
The Chairman. All right. Go ahead. 

General Short. I think I am perfectly straight. Thank you. 
There were two incidents that occurred Sunday morning, [^5] 
the 7th, that might have had a very great result if they had been inter- 
preted differently at the time. About seven-fifteen a submarine 
entered Pearl Harbor, got inside the net, apparentl}^ followed a ship 
in. It was attacked immediately by naval ships and was sunk. They 
did not apparently draw the conclusion that this was the forerunner 
of an air attack or a general attack, and I was not notified until after 
the attack had taken place. In fact, the information came out to me 
in a discussion between Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel and 
Secretary Knox and myself. If they had drawn the conclusion that 
it might be the forerunner of an air attack or a general attack, unques- 
tionably I would have been notified at once. There would not have 
been time to get the planes in the air, all of them, probably, because 
they were not warmed up, but there would have been time to disperse 
them in the bunkers, because they could be taxied without being fully 
ready to go in the air, and it probably would have saved a consider- 
able number of planes. I think it would not have prevented the attack 
at Pearl Harbor. We couldn't have met the enemy out at sea some- 
where and stopped them. 

The other incident was in connection with our Aircraft Warning 
Service. They had worked from four to seven that morning and 
closed the interceptor command station at seven o'clock. There was 
one of the stations, the Opana Station, on the high ground south of 

Kahuku Point, 

General McCoy. Let us get that fixed, will you ? 
The Chairman. Wait a minute. There is a map. 
(A map was produced.) 
The Chairman, What is that last point? 

General Short. Kahuku Point. That is up to the 

The Chairman. Spell it, please. 

General Short. K-a-h-u-k-u. Kahuku Point is up there (indi- 
cating). This Opana Station is along on the right here, [661 
somewhere along in liere (indicating). It isn't marked on the map, 
up to the north. That station, just on its own — th.ej worked nor- 
mally for training from seven to eleven every day, and apparently they 
just thought they wouldn't knock off just because it was Sunday, and 
the station went ahead and worked ; and at seven-twenty the noncom- 
missioned officer in charge of the detector station picked up a consid- 
erable flight of planes at 132 miles distance and three degrees east 
of north. Apparently there was enough movement of his detector 
that it rather excited him, and he called in the Aircraft Warning 
Information Center, got the operator, and the operator got Lieutenant 
Tyler, who was the ^control officer for the interceptor command. He 
had not left. While the station was closed he was still there. The 

operator told him to investigate 

The Chairman. Was he an Army officer ? 
General Short. Yes, sir. He was an air officer. 
The Chairman. Air officer. 

General Short. From the pursuit outfit, because thev exercised the 
control of the fighting planes at Wheeler Field. He talked with the 
operator, and then the operator called the Opana and talked with 

79716—46 — Ex. 143, vol. 1 5 



50 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the Opana Station. The operator was rather impressed by the Opana 
Station because they seemed a little excited about it, and he asked 
Lieutenant Tyler if" he should order the rest of the men back imme- 
diately to the interceptor station. Lieutenant Tyler in his affidavit, 
which you will have in your records, stated that he thought it was 
one of three things : 

That there were naval ships making flights from carriers. And, 
incidentally, there were two carriers out that morning, one going up 
towards Midway and the other down towards Johnston Island, with 
task forces. It was not unusual to pick up a group of planes some 
distance out that were operating [67] off of carriers. 

The other thing, he thought that it might be a flight of planes out 
of Hickam. We started flying normally around four o'clock in the 
morning, and it was not unusual for the station to pick them up. 

The third thing that he assumed it might be was a flight of bomb- 
ers from the mainland. He had noticed during his tour that morn- 
ing Hawaiian music on the air all the time from four o'clock on 
through, and ordinarily they don't broadcast music at that time of 
the morning on KMG. He knew from experience that when a flight 
of planes was coming in from the mainland they played the Hawaiian 
music, and it was understood that that acted as a beam to lead them 
in. And he was right in that assumption that it did mean a flight 
coming in from the mainland, and the flight, as I say, arrived within 
five minutes of the opening of the attack, arrived right in the midst 
of the attack; so that it was pretty hard to say that he was illogical 
in his conclusions. He had no niformation that definitely should 
frighten him. He figured there were three things that might be. He 
didn't figure that it might be a Japanese attack, so he did not alert 
the Hawaiian air force. If he had called the Hawaiian air force 
right then and alerted them there would have been time to disperse 
the planes just the same as there would after the seven-fifteen attack, 
but not to get them in the air. It was just one of those errors in 
judgment that it would be pretty hard to blame the Lieutenant for, 
because he had three perfectly logical things to give him that; and, 
as he says in his affidavit, he had seen the board look like that before 
when the carriers were out training, and that he didn't get excited 
about it, didn't think much about it, and that might have made a 
very great change if he had taken different action. 

General McCoy. That was not passed on to you or your [68] 
immediate staff? 

General Short. Not until afterwards. I mean he stayed right at 
the control station then, and the minute the first bomb was dropped 
he realized what was going on, and he gave — he alerted Wheeler 
Field then, but there were so many things that I was looking after 
that morning that I didn't discover that incident, I don't think, until 
the next day. It wasn't of any importance after the thing had hap- 
pened, anyway, then, and I don't believe it came to my attention until 
the following day. 

General McCoy. Would it naturally come to you, or would it come 
to someone else? 

General Short. Well, if he had been sure that it was enemy planes 
it would have gone first of all to Wheeler Field, and then it would 
have come right to our station. It should have been to me in the 
course of a minute or two if they had taken it 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 51 

General McCoy. Seriously. 

General Short. Seriously. 

The Chairman. To get it clear in my own mind, this operator at 
the Opana Station got this information from the sea. He called 
the^ 

General Short. Immediately the operator. 

The Chairman. He called the interceptor command station ? 

General Short. Yes; and the operator was on duty there. He was 
alwavs kept on duty there, and Lieutenant Tyler 

The Chairman. And Lieutenant Tyler happened to linger there at 
the closure of the station? 

General Short. After. He was there. 

The Chairman. If the thing had been hooked up for emergency 
there would have been a Navy liasion officer there at the boards 

General Short. Oh, yes. About thirty people would have [69] 
been there. 

The Chairman. And it just happened that Tyler, of those thirty 
people, lingered on after the station had closed? 

General Short. Yes. sir. 

The Chairman. Is that it? 

General Short. Yes, sir. Of course we didn't have as big a setup 
on that training side as we would now when you are with a battle 
condition. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Short. Because it would be conducted virtually for the 
training of these new mobile stations. We had the interceptor com- 
mand and anti-aircraft tied in to just get everybody working together, 
but they were not in full force like they would be under battle 
conditions. 

General McCoy. Could you state whether there was a naval officer 
there that morning ? 

General Short. There was not, for some reason, a naval officer there 
during the period four to seven. There had been on previous days, 
and as a matter of fact the Navy had felt that it would be a good idea 
to have a little more of that, and they had arranged — th« interceptor 
command and the Navy and the whole group had worked out, on 
just a volunteer basis, of continuing that training every day until four 
o'clock in the afternoon, but decided that on Sunday they would only 
work until seven, but the Navy had been instrumental in even extend- 
ing that period, and it had been agreed that they would work right 
through until four o'clock. I had not ordered that, but that was just 
something they were doing on their own. 

The Chairman. And under working conditions when the interceptor 
command station was open there would be a lieutenant from your 
command ? 

General Short. Well, of course under battle conditions General 
Davidson would be right there himself, and the anti- [70] 
aircraft commander, and there would be a total group of about thirty 
officers there. 

The Chairman. Including the naval officer ? 

General Short. Including the naval officer. I think three naval 
officers is the normal quota that they have there. 

The Chairman. That they have in that office? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 



52 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. All under the general command of General 
Davidson ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Well, would he have any command over the naval 
officers ? 

General Short. Only that they would be responsible for getting 
the information to the Navy. That was their only function, would 
be to get the information to the Navy in the minimum of time. 

The Chairman. Of time. 

General McCoy. In other words, the information service would 
have 

General Short. Oh, yes. 

General McCoy. It went there, did it ? 

General Short. It would have any 

General McCoy. Did it go to the information service center? 

General Short. It goes into the information service in the inter- 
ceptor command, and it goes right from there to the two air fields — 
three air fields, and then it goes on what we call the G-2 net and is 
distributed to the Navy and to our staff. 

General McCoy. But it didn't this morning? 

General Short. No, it wasn't — as a matter of fact, what they would 
have done right then and what they did do just a little while later, 
would have called the — we had one general ['^^^ staff officer 
immediately on duty answering telephone call, staying all night in 
the office to answer them. It would have gone right to him if he had 
gotten it immediately and then transmitted it. You see, we v/ere not 
set up with our battle command post at that time, so it would have 
come in right here to the general staff officer immediately on duty, and 
it would have taken a minute or two longer to get to me. 

General McCoy. It is not clear to me yet how far along that went. 
You speak of the fact that Lieutenant Tyler evaluated it to whom? 

General Short. To himself. He was the officer of the interceptor 
command that was in charge of the interceptor station during this 
practice, don't you see ? 

General McCoy. Yes. But you said he called up somebody? 

General Short. No, he did not. He had not done it until after the 
attack came. Then he immediately called Wheeler Field, alerted 
Wheeler Field, which was the thing that would have been very valu- 
able if he had done it to start with. 

Admiral Standley. He called the Opana Station ? 

General Short. Oh, he called Opana Station and talked with Opana 
Station to verify what they had, don't you see ? So he would have that 
understanding. He talked it over with them. 

General McCoy. Where was he ? 

General Short. He was right over here in this interceptor command 
post that I said I would have you to see. 

General McCoy. In the information center ? 

General Short. Well, they have a combination, and the aircraft 
information center is part of the interceptor command. The pursuit, 
the interceptor commander commands the pursuit planes, the Aircraft 
Warning Service, and the anti-aircraft battery. They are all tied in 
in one place. 

General McCoy. And that you call the information center [7^] 
interceptor information center? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 53 

General Short. We call it the interceptor command, and the infor- 
mation center pertains to what the signal people bring in. You see, 
they have these mobile stations, and of course when we are operating 
in battle conditions all of the searchlight posts and all of the O. P.'s 

of the Coast Artillery everything of that kind comes in, so 

that 

General McCoy. Where is that center? 

General Short. It is just over here about 300 yards in the signal 
depot. 

General McCot. In this post? 

General Short. Yes, sir. In the next probably four or five days — 
we have built — it will be moved into its underground station. It is 
almost completed. We have been working for some months on an 
underground station that would stand any kind of bombing, and it 
will be moved in there. Right now it is very vulnerable. 

General McCoy. That naval officer was a liaison officer ? He wasn't 
sent over to be under the command ? 

General Short. Well, it worked out that he is really strictly, you 
might say, under the command, because it isn't just the same as an 
ordinary liaison officer is at a headquarters and when something of 
importance turns up he takes it to his headquarters or goes and gets 
something that they wanted, but that man takes a phone, a headset 
there, and he sits right there and sits where he can watch the board, 
so he can report in split seconds to the Navy Information Center, so 
for all intents and purposes you might say he is more nearly a part of 
the command than a liaison officer. 

General McCoy. Do you happen to know what Navy orders were 
given to those officers when they reported there? 

General Short. I do not. General Davidson could probably give 
3'ou that much more definitely, the exact mission. 

\7S] General McCoy. All right. 

General Short. And I think that you will have a clear picture, if 
you will go take a look at the interceptor command with its full force. 

General McCoy. Yes. Is it in actual operation today ? 

General Short. Oh, yes ; 24 hours of the day. 

General McCoy. Yes. And we could go there any time ? 

General Short. You could go there any time. There is normally 
a little more to see at night, but I don't imagine there is now because 
we are not flj^ing at night except for business. I think it would be 
highly beneficial if you would take a look. You would see exactly how 
they work, and I think when they move to tJieir new station under- 
ground that there is going to be room there for the Navy to set up 
a corresponding information service on their surface ships, and it 
would be highly beneficial, because sometimes when we send out on 
distant patrol there has been a little discrepancy in the information 
that they had about our own ships. On that board, with use of the 
aircraft warning service, you see just exactly what is going on all the 
time. 

Admiral Standley. I would like to ask a question. 

The Chaikman. Certainly. Go ahead. 

Admiral Standley. Did I understand you to say that there was no 
naval officer present from four to seven that morning? 

General Short. There was not. 



54 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Standley. Was General Davidson there from four to 
seven that morning ? 

General Si-iort. I don't thing General Davidson ^Yas there. 

Admiral Standley. Do you know what crew was there? 

General Short. Lieutenant Tyler was the officer that was officially- 
detailed. 

Admiral Standley. He was there afterwards ? 

General Short. Well, he was there during the period four [7^] 
to seven ; lie was in charge. 

Admiral Standley. But you don't know 

General Short. He was in charge, I am sure, was the officer in 
charge. 

Admiral Standley. Yes. 

General Short. See ? 

Admiral Standley. Yes. Now, General Davidson can tell us that, 
then. 

The Chairjian. Yes. 

General Short. Yes, sir. And I think that you will find in Lieu- 
tenant Tyler's affidavit here he states definitely that he was in charge. 
There wasn't any reason why General Davidson should have heen there 
personally just at that time, because it was not a battle condition. 

Admiral Standley. Now, as a general proposition. General Short, 
the defense of the Island is a coordinated defense, a coordination of 
the Navy and the Army facilities ? 

General Short. It was. 

Admiral Standley. The facilities here? 

General Short, It was. 

Admiral Standley. Yes. I mean up to December 7. 

General Short, l7th ; yes, it was. 

Admiral Standley. And it was by cooperation that those various 
stations were operated ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. And that was by agreement of the general and 
the commandant of the district? 

General Short. The commandant of the district was supposed to be 
the channels of communication, and when things were drawn up 
formally and signed Admiral Bloch and I signed them, 

Admiral Standley. No. 

General Short. But Admiral Kimmel was in on the thing [75] 
just as much as Admiral Bloch. 

Admiral Standley. But when an agreement was signed, for in- 
tsance, that the warning station should be under the Army, wasn't it 
understood that the Navy's cooperation there in the way of officers, 
and so forth 

General Short. Oh, yes. 

Admiral Standley. Would be in charge of that officer? That is, 
if it were a Navy res])onsibility ? 

General Short. I would say there would be no question about it at 
all. I don't know that that detail ever came up. I don't remember 
it ever being discussed. Now, we have discussed, something like — 
oh — probably a month ago, the desirability of getting what you might 
say would amount to common command posts right alongside of each 
other, and I had taken Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch over 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 55 

our whole system of underground command posts. ]My command post 
was up in the Aliamanu Crater. 

General McCoy, Where is that ? 

General Short. That is where the ammunition — it's about a mile 
and a half out to the west towards Pearl Harbor. We had consid- 
ered 

General INIcCot. That's where the reserve ammunition is ? 

General Short. That is where the reserve ammunition is, in the 
same general crater. There is room enough — I had men up there and 
showed Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch that there was room 
enough for them to develop the tunnel — rooms right across our tunnel 
so they could have their command post there, and there was room 
enough where we were putting in this interceptor command that by 
a little more excavation they could have their air command right there 
to work with them ; and we felt that the bomber command post, which 
is just to the south of the crater, right very close to Pearl Harbor and 
Hickam was an appropriate place for them to put their command of 
what they call the Pat. Wing 2. That's their patrol planes. That 
he [7^j should have been^because they worked in very close 
touch with our bombers. We felt that that would have been a very 
excellent place for them to construct their underground command post 
right alongside, because our bombers come under command of Pat. 
Wing 2 when they go out on distant reconnaissance. And that had 
been under consideration. We had our command posts either fully 
built or well along, so we didn't figure we could change our plan very 
well, but that they could go right in and develop right alongside of us. 
And it would be highly desirable; it would make things work much 
faster in a fight. 

Admiral Staxdley. Let me ask this, General Short: In all of these 
developments here in recent years hasn't it been the policy to thor- 
oughl}^ consider the functions of any station, like j' our warning signal 
station, and decide between jon and the proper naval officials where 
that responsibility and command sliould lie, and place it there? Isn't 
that correct ? 

General Short. I think that there has been closer cooperation in 
the last eight or ten months here than there ever has before. There 
have been times in the last twenty years where the cooperation was 
not very close. Admiral Kinnnel and Admiral Bloch and I have 
been very frank with each other. We have talked things over, and 
we have usually been able to agree fully on important things. And 
as I say, on this question of the command post, before, up to recently, 
I don't believe that the Navy had considered that it was necessary ; 
and I can see from the point of view of the fleet commander he had 
expected when the fight came on that he wouldn't be down here in the 
harbor; that he would be on the high seas fighting. So Admiral 
Bloch's 14th District was the one tliat would have been most inter- 
ested in joining up with us on command ])osts. 

Admiral Standley. From your experience, when it was finally 
settled as to where the post should he. and so forth, it would be per- 
fectly definite, with a definite responsibility? 

[77] General Short. Well, the way we had divided the responsi- 
bility, when the fighting was on land it would be my responsibility; 
when the fighting was on sea it would be his. 



56 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Standley. That was a fairly definite understanding, how- 
ever, between you and Admiral Bloch? That is what I mean. 

General Short. Oh, yes. And it was laid out pretty much in the 
plan drawn up : if we fought at land I would control ; if we fought 
at sea I would turn my bombers over to him and they would control it. 

General McNaeney. General, in view of the fact that our radio de- 
tectors cannot distinguish between friend and foe, was there any 
normal routine operating procedure by which the Navy and our bom- 
bardment units and our pursuit units kept the information center 
informed as to the location of friendly flights ? 

General Short. The commander of the interceptor station was 
the same man who commands the pursuit aviation. He would know 
about his pursuit. He was in instant touch, just a direct line — just 
pick up a phone — with the bomber outfit, and he could verify, and 
they would — no matter how much information, every time we picked 
up a group of planes we verified, because we didn't want to be firing 
on our own planes. We verified instantly where there was a group of 
planes, and we verified with the Navy. 

General McNarney. The verification was ofter the fact, though. 

General Short. We didn't have — just in ordinary times that were 
considered peace around here, when those detector stations were work- 
ing, that verification was not carried out. What they were trying to 
do then was to become expert in picking up planes, because the man 
out on that station is never going to know whether it is friend or foe. 
All he can [78] do is report it into the information center. It 
is immediately verified whether there are friendly planes at that place, 
and that should not take but just a minute to get the verification. And 
even if you had your plot ahead of time I still feel that you could 
verify, because it is always possible for a mistake to have been made, 
and you wouldn't want to fire on your own planes. So if you picked 
up planes a hundred miles out or fifty miles out, before you would 
send someone out after them you would get a verification. 

General McNarney. There was no attempt to verify on the morn- 
ing of December 7, as I understand. 

General Short. No. As a matter of fact, if he had he would have 
gotten a verification, very definitely, that planes were coming in from 
San Francisco, and they arrived within five minutes after. They 
undoubtedly would have told him yes, there were planes coming in, 
and Lieutenant Tyler thought he knew they were coming in on 
account of this broadcasting of Hawaiian music at that time of the 
morning, which was only done to serve as a beam, so he probably — 
and also Admiral Halsey had an airplane carrier up to the north, 
and Admiral Brown's task force down towards Johnston Island 
had out a carrier force, so of course verification with the task forces 
would have required more time, because they would have to send out 
to the fleet and see if the fleet was participating in any kind of opera- 
tions ; I mean in any routine training. 1 mean when the task forces 
went out I don't think the people at fleet headquarters would know 
just when Admiral Halsey was going to send some of his planes into 
the air as a matter of practice. I think that would be correct. Admiral 
Standley and Admiral Keeves probably conld tell definitely about 
that: that I don't think he would be limited, when he started out 
here, to just sending planes at a certain time; I think he could send 
them any time he wanted to. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 57 

[791 Is that correct, Admiral Standley? 

Admiral Standley. Right. 

General Short. No, that was not verified. Apparently Lieutenant 
Tyler did not consider the possibility at all of it being enemy ships. 

General McCoy. In the first place, as far as he knew there was no 
enemy. 

General Short, No, there was no enemy as far as he knew, definitely 
no enemy. 

I will take up now what happened at the time of the attack. The 
first attack at Hickam and Pearl Harbor hit about 7 : 55. I heard the 
first bombs, and my first idea was that the Navy was having some 
battle practice, either that they hadn't told me about or that I had 
forgotten that they had told me about: that the report might have 
come in, just routine, and that I hadn't remembered the battle pratcice. 
When some more dropped I went out on the back porch to take a look 
what was going on, and about that time the chief of staff came run- 
ning over to my quarters about three minutes after eight, said he had 
just received a message from Wheeler or Hickam, or both — I have 
forgotten which — that it was the real thing. 

I immediately told him to put into effect Alert No. 3. That's all the 
order we needed. And by 8 : 10 that had been given. It showed 
immediately the value of having definite plans. They were all worked 
out right down to the company, where everybody knew exactly what 
his job was, because there was no confusion ; we didn't have to issue a 
long-winded order; we didn't have to take any time except just to 
phone to the four major units and put into effect Alert No. 3. 

Now, when I did that I just knew there was an attack; I didn't 
know how serious the attack might develop. If they would take a 
chance like that, they might even take a chance on a landing of troops, 
and so I sent everybody to his battle position. If they had been in 
alert for an air atack the two [80] divisions, the 24th and 25th, 
would have gotten on their battle positions. They still would have 
had to have been sent. We would have had to say, "Put Alert No. 3 
into effect." I thought it was important to get completely prepared 
as long as there was attack of any kind, and that went out. 

At the time that the attack started, all of the antiaircraft batteries 
had skeleton crews right at their battery positions. They all had small 
arms ammunition, .30 caliber and .50 caliber and pistol ammunition, 
in their immediate possession. All but four of the batteries had their 
ammunition for the three-inch guns immediately accessible. For in- 
stance, down at De Russy the ammunition was in the casemate. They 
had to carry it probably 75 yards, but their men were right there, and 
the guns were all set up and in position, but the ammunition was not 
right alongside of the gims. There were four batteries that had to go 
further for their ammunition. There were four batteries of the 64th 
infantry; they were Batteries B, C, D, and F, The first one of those 
batteries started drawing its ammunition at the Aliamanu Crater, 
where we had our ammunition in caves, at 8 : 15. to show how promptly 
that they got into action. And by 10 : 15 they had all drawn what we 
call a day of fire, which for that particular battery is 300 rounds per 
gun. So there was no lost motion. There wasn't any confusion as to 
what should be done. They moved out, and they had about a thousand 
yards to go, and by 8 : 15 they were actually drawing the ammunition, 
the first battery to arrive. 



58 CONGRESSIONAL INVP:STIGATION PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCoy. And the batteries you say all had the ammunition 
at the 

General Short, Immediately accessible. They were not right 
alongside tlie gun. I say they had to step into the casemate and 
probably carry the ammunition 75 yards. Down at Fort Kamehameha 
they probably didn't have to carry it that [81] far, and they 
were in action very quickly as a result of that. The casemate was 
closer to the position. 

General McNarney. Under Alert Xo. 2 would ammunition have 
been present at all times ? 

General Short. Under Alert No. 2 the amnnmition would have 
been right alongside of the guns, but if we had put our anti-aircraft 
guns all out and started carrying anmuuiition, like, say, at Fort Da 
Kussy, which is right in the city where everybody could see it, and put- 
ting live ammunition out alongside of the gun, we knew we would not 
have been carrying out the War Department's intentions to not alarm 
the population. We could turn out for maneuvers under ordinary 
times and nobody would be alarmed at all ; but under the strain they 
had, when you got to the point of putting live ammunition right at 
the gun, that they could see — the small arms ammunition in the boxes ; 
they couldn't tell. But the live ammunition for the three-inch guns 
would have been very apparent if we had had it there ready for im- 
mediate use, and unquestionably would have caused a certain amount 
of publicity that would have alarmed the people to a certain extent. 

The first firing by automatic weapons, guns of the anti-aircraft, was 
at 8 : 05, a battery at Camp Malekole out at the west end of the Island. 
Apparently a plane came over there and they brought it down. 

In the south group — that is the group protecting Pearl Harbor and 
Fort Kamehameha — all of the automatic weapons were in action by 
about 8 : 20. The first of the three-inch gunds to fire down there was 
at 8 : 30, and all of the three-inch guns were in action b}^ 10 o'clock. 
Whether some of them were not in action earlier because they didn't 
have a target I don't know. Naturally they wouldn't fire if they 
didn't have a target. 

The east group, which would include Fort Ruger, De Kussy, out in 
there, apparently had no guns or was slower in getting [82] the 
three-inch into action. 

Now, in the statement that you gentlemen have there is a detailed 
report there in one of the annexes from every battery, showing just 
whn it was alerted, ready for action, and when it actually did its first 
firing. The detail is very definitely there. 

The Hawaiian air force when the attack hit 

General McCoy. Before you leave that may I put in the record, 
then, that there was no anti-aircraft fire in action against the first 
attack ? 

General Short. Yes. Oh, yes, the first attack lasted, took — prac- 
tically the whole of the south group got in action during that first 
attack. The attack lasted — it hit at 7 : 55, and it lasted apparently — 
there were stray planes around there up to 8 : 30 or a little bit — maybe 
even later than 8 : 30. The second attack took place at 9 o'clock. We 
brought down several planes in that first attack. As early as 8 : 05 
we brought down a plane at Malekole, and the 98th Anti-Aircraft 
Coast Artillery up at Schofield brought down a plane I think at 8:15. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 59 

General McCoy. But we might say that the attack was delivered 
first ? 

General Short. First, yes. As a matter of fact, nobody would have 
fired if they had seen it, because they didn't expect — the only officer 
of any rank who observed the planes before they actually dropped a 
bomb, Colonel Potts, commanding the 98th Field Artillery, just hap- 
pened to be out near his organization and saw this group of planes 
lis they came over Wheeler before they started their dive, and he 
thought it was some — they looked very much like the Marine fighters 
in appearance, and he thought it Avas a bunch of Navj^ or Marine dive 
bombers just doing a little practice, until lie saw a bomb meet a ship, 
and then of course a second later an [83] explosion, and his 
outfit — lie alerted it at once, and it got a plane very early there. But, 
as I say, he watched those for a minute or two in the sky thinking they 
were friendly planes. They were too far up to see any insignia on 
them, and in general profile, why, they are very much like the fighters 
of the Navy and Marines, not like the Army planes. He knew they 
were not Army planes. 

The other planes, however, the ones that attacked Pearl Harbor, 
from all descriptions, especially the torpedo planes, came in so low 
that nobody could have seen them at any distance. As I understand, 
they came in at about 200 feet, so that they were practically upon the 
ships there before they were observed. They were very close to them. 

General McCoy. Coming from what direction? 

General Short. Coming from Diamond — along Diamond Head. 
Apparently, from the plotting of the detectors, they came in from 
the north towards Kahuku, and then Kahuku lost them. I mean 
Opana Station lost them, probably when they got the Koolau ISIoun- 
tains between the planes and the station. They couldn't detect them, 
and they apparently skirted the east side of the Island, came around 
Diamond Head and headed right for Hickam and Pearl Harbor. That 
is just estimate, but that is the way it looked, considering the fact that 
they lost them, and they must have been low from the time they 
started along the east side of the Island because if they had been 
up in the air at all the detectors would have picked them up. So 
they were probably flying at a very low altitude so as not to be picked 
up." 

[84'} Is that all you want ? 

To go on to the Hawaiian Air Force, then, the pursuit planes were 
on three fields that morning. They were at Wheeler Field and at 
Bellows Field and an emergency field that we use for never more than 
a squadron, at Haleiwa up on the north side of the Island. We had no 
buildings there ; we just had a landing mat, and we kept them up there 
in camp for certain training, and we had a squadron there. 

General McCoy. That is just north of Wheeler Field, is it? 

General Short. It is light — yes, practically straight north, about 
7 miles north of — I can show you. 

Admiral Reea^s. Can you point that out there? 

General Short. I can show you. Wheeler Field is right here south 
of Schofield. Bellows Field is about in here (indicating on map). 
About in here. The Haleiwa Beach is right — the field is about here 
(indicating). You can see there are three different points on the 
Island. Now, on each one of those fields those planes were not dis- 



60 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

persed; they were grouped because the protection for sabotage was 
more complete. We had bunkers enough at Wheeler that we had con- 
structed with our engineer troops starting along about May or June, 
as I remember, in the middle of May, that we could have put approxi- 
mately 120 of our pursuit planes in those bunkers if we had felt as 
though the condition made it essential. 

The bombers at Hickam were all just off of the mat or on the land- 
ing aprons. The ones that were not in commission for flying, like the 
six B-17's that we had had to take parts out of, were probably in the 
hangars where the work would be difficult. I think that those were 
all in the hangars. The heavy planes, as I said earlier, couldn't be 
scattered very far up on the runways because of the nature of the 
ground, and we had not built bunkers there because we had been try- 
ing for nine months to get money from the War Department — and you 
will find all the papers, all the documents in here on that subject 
[8-5] (indicating) — and we had not succeeded in doing it. 

The result was that out of the six B-l7's that were really in opera- 
tion I think two of those were put out of commission, and some of 
the others that were damaged were planes that were not in commission 
anyway, and then of course some of them that came in from the main- 
land were put out of commission. We had heavy losses there with the 
old B-18's also. For some reason, we had 10 A-20's and they were not 
touched. Why they were not touched it is just almost impossible to 
say, but they were at the north — off the north end of the runway and 
not as plain as the others, and they were not touched at all. 

Immediately that the first attack was over, the aviation engineer 
troops stationed at Hickam and Wheeler started clearing the runways 
so that they could get the planes in the air, and by 8 : 50 all of the pur- 
suit that was serviceable were in the air. Some at Haleiwa, when at- 
tacked — some of those planes were in the air earlier, and one lieutenant 
up there brought down four planes ; another brought down two planes. 
By 11 : 40 all of the bombers that were still serviceable were in the air 
under Navy command. They were turned over immediately to the 
Navy according to the plan, and they were in the air and sent out on 
distant reconnaissance at 11 : 40 in the morning, all that were still 
available. 

Now, I have got a tabulation ; there is a detailed tabulation in the 
study there, in my statement, that shows just what the condition of 
the planes was immediately before the attack, what damage was done, 
and then the planes that we had in commission on December 20. In 
other words, we had been able to put a great many back into commis- 
sion. 

[86] We thought when we first looked at our Hawaiian Air 
Depot that things were completely wrecked, but we found that we 
were able to salvage approximately 80% of the machines, and the 
new machines that had been constructed had not been damaged and 
that those in the machine shop should be put in ditferent places be- 
cause we cannot afford to take another chance of having them 
damaged. 

As far back as February, or two weeks after I came in, I tried to 
get money from the War Department to put the maintenance under- 
ground, and it was something like $3,800,000, and the War Department 
said that it cost too much money. Now they have already started on 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 61 

that. We got practically what amounts to a blank check after the 
attack, and the work has actually started. 

The Chairman. I understood you said you salvaged 8% ? 

General Short. 80% of the repair machines. 

The Chairman. 80% ? 

General Short. 80% , yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I misunderstood you. 

General Short. 80%. That is important because without that we 
would not be able to put our machines back in commission, to get our 
planes like that without that. Immediately before the attack we had 
80 pursuit planes in commission. We had a lot of old planes. I do 
not know for certain how many, but we had six reconnaissance in com- 
mission and seven out of commission; 39 bombers actually in commis- 
sion and 33 out. INIany of these were seven years old, and there were 
always considerable pursuits getting out of commission. 

During the raid there was some degree of damage. Eighty -eight 
pursuits were damaged and six reconnaissance and thirty-four bom- 
bers. 

On December 20, to show how the maintenance had succeeded in 
getting into the work, we had 61 pursuits in commission and 22, just 
small ones that could be used by their squadron. [87] I believe 
83 that could fly probably within 24 hours where they had only 80 
in commission before that time; in other words, the maintenance has 
been keener since the attack. They have been working 24 hours a day, 
and with respect to the Hawaiian Air Depot, machine shop, we have 
the reconnaissance planes, six in flight condition, commissioned, and 
two that could be repaired; 50 bombers in commission and 13 that 
could be put in commission, bait we received 29 in the meantime, large 
bombers from the mainland. I don't know whether that 29 included 
four that were destroyed or not. I could not say definitely on that, but 
it shows that our repai#work got under way very fast, but of the eight 
we got, we were pretty well set up for repair work. 

Of the planes the Army brought down we made a very careful and 
detailed study, and there is in the book there a statement of every plane 
that any battery or any individual brought down and the statement as 
to whether it was verified. It shows 38 planes brought down, but Col- 
onel Fielder said that to be conservative 9 planes we should not have 
which we claimed. The Army brought down 29. 

General McCoy. Is that what the Army brought down ? 

General Short. The Army brought down 29 or possibly 38. I do not 
know what the NaA^y did. Yoii can get the facts from them as to what 
the Navy brought down. We have reason to believe that they possibly 
lost a complete squadron on account of the message the Navy picked 
up from a squadron commander sent in to his carrier saying that he 
was lost and he was out of gas : so there is a possibility that there was 
a complete squadron lost in addition to what was brought down. 

To take up what happened to the ground forces, the 24th Division, 
which is in battle position in the north area (indicating on map), 
north of Schofield, it started fighting at 8 : 10. It was assembling and 
it was attacked and returned the [88] fire of the enemy ma- 

chine guns. It was attacking also with machine guns and it returned 
the fire with automatic rifles. The division had no antiaircraft bat- 
tery as such but were using fire on the enemy planes as early as 8 : 11. 



62 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

They move to battle position about 8 : 30, and at 5 o'clock in the after- 
noon all troops in this group were in battle position and had one day 
fire. During the night a second unit of fire was issued. They make 
it a practice to have two days of fire at a battle position. We think 
that is as much as we should distribute here. 

The 25th D'nision also started moving to its battle position at 8 :30, 
and by 4 in tlie afternoon was on its battle position with one day of 
fire. 

General McCoy. Where was this battle position ? 

General Short. The 25th, all through the southern sector out 
through the beaches and getting some behind, in the rear of the beaches 
and the reserves over back there and just this side of Schofield. If it 
had not been for the anti-aircraft it would have taken them more time 
for these divisions to move out.' It is a question of the roads and how 
many people you could put on the road, and when Ave moved them out 
during the air attack we do not permit them to move closer than 200 
yards between trucks because you take too much of a chance of having 
big losses during an air attack. That is what causes a great deal of 
time in moving out, not having them bunched. We insisted they not 
bunch. 

General McCoy. Are tliey kept in battle position now? 

General Short. Yes. Not only that, but they are perfecting their 
field fortifications. We started in last May. We had maneuvers on 
May 12, and for one week I had the troops digging in battle position. 
For years they have gone along saying, "There is where we would 
dig," but I got the authority from the War Department to get some 
money to put in machine gun replacements, positions for 75's, and got 
them actually [89] digging in. We did not clear the fields 
where they would destroy the cane fields because that is a small job, 
but in places dug right out the coral, which is quite a long job and 
takes pressure and engineering equipment. » 

The first week we dug and then moved into the 24th of May and 
then dug from the 24th of May until the 30th of June. After the 1st 
of July the War Department would not let me spend the training 
money. Up to the 30th of June I could have used the training money, 
but I went back after that to get as little as $125,000 for making that 
construction, field fortifications, and was constantly turned down; 
so we did not accomplish much in perfecting the field fortifications 
from the 1st of July until this happened. 

On the 8th the engineers were distributing — we just went ahead 
and bought the materials and they were distributing the revetting 
material. The troops were working constantly over the field fortifica- 
tions from the time they took up these positions on December 7. 

I may say this : that the fire data for machine guns and artillery 
had been very carefully calculated and even before we started digging 
digging at all. That applies for both machine guns and artillery, and 
they were check for fire data. All guns were checked on the 8th and 
9th and corrections made, so they should have been able to use their 
fire and know they are going to hit what they are firing at. 

Right after this attack the value of our organization with the civil- 
ians for defense became very apparent. They had organized 20 
civilian emergency aid station groups. They got into action very 
rapidly and helped evacuate the casualties from Hickam Field, 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 63 

We had 16 surgical groups organized of the leading surgeons in 
town, all completely set up >Yith instruments and so forth hy 9 o'clock, 
and they started reporting at Tripler Hospital, and by 9 : 30 they had 
all routine operations going on. 

[90] General McCoy. Are they under the Reserve or under the 
Red Cross? 

General Short. We have an INI-Day Bill which was put through 
here that gives the Governor the power to do this ahead of time, and 
we had a great deal of trouble pushing it through, and I finally went 
down and made a talk to the Senate and we got that bill pushed 
through some two or three months ago. They gave certain money to 
the Governor to go ahead and do these things and it authorized him 
to do different kinds of things, and if he wanted to he could declare 
an emergenc}'. 

He never declared an emergency but he organized committees and 
things of that nature, and the medical society was extremely active 
here, and our medical Avork is highly organized, and the Red Cross 
also. 

I had many conferences with him. and a man c:tme from Washing-^ 
ton and he convinced him that we should have $200,000 worth of* 
medicine and a regular course of supplies, and many of them had come 
in or we had them on hand. 

These people got into action very quickly. We had the evacuation 
business worked out, and the evacuation of Hickam Field and Wheeler 
Field began at 12 o'clock by these civilian evacuation outfits. They 
were moved mostly to school buildings, and we set up cots and so 
forth. 

As a matter of fact, some women and children came here because 
we were constructing two imderground places, one for the interceptor 
command that was not in use, and one for the cold storage plant that 
is still being used in case of an air raid alarm because they just 
stopped work temporarily. The civilian agencies under the direction 
of G-1 carried out these functions. Some of them moved in their 
own vehicles, and they were operating several busses which were sent 
to move them out quite rapidly. 

That showed the value of having civilian units interested in that 
thing. Their interest is much keener now than it was [91] be- 
fore, but they have been going ahead in the work. 

The FBI and G-2 started immediately rounding up all the ele- 
ments we had on the list. We had the list all prepared of all aliens 
that we considered dangerous, consular agents, and shinto priests 
particularly, and they rounded up 370 Japanese, 98 Germans, and 14 
Italians. 

We made plans ahead of time for the use of the Immigration Sta- 
tion and of the Quarantine Station. They started at the Immigration 
Station and as they got croM'ded moved to the Quarantine Station on 
Sand Island and used the Immigration Station as a reception center 
and then moved them across. 

As far as I know, most of these people are still there. They had 
hearings and they will be released if they are able to prove absolutely 
that they are not dangerous and should* be released. I do not know 
what the number is out there. 



64 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Very soon Governor Poindexter put the M-Dtiy Bill into effect. He 
talked to me at that time and told me he would put that into effect, 
and then on the next day he said we would declare and put martial 
law in just as soon as I felt it was necessary. I thought the thing 
over a while, and while they could do a great deal under the M-Day 
Bill — he could do practically everything except that he could not use 
the funds as freely as I could under martial law, and we decided the 
next morning that it would be better to declare martial law, and he 
declared martial law and asked me to take over the responsibilities for 
carrying it out. 

To show how the work went on, the District Engineer had the work 
organized to repair the broken water main at Hickman Field, which 
was serious because we used this aqua system to flow the gasoline on 
water on all airfields, so without the air pressure we had to use hand 
pumps, and that means that effects a great deal of difference as well 
as the fire hazard that existed at that time. They made most of the 
repairs at night and they got to it quickly. 

[92] As soon as rnartial law was declared I had the District 
Engineer take over all civilian supplies and equipment on the Island. 
He also took charge of the contracts and told them to drop all work that 
was not defense work and got them organized, and our nrst effort was 
on the air fields. 

We had only one field that really was satisfactory for the largest 
bombers, and that was Hickam Field. We had only 2,750-feet runway 
at Bellows Field, and within four days we had 5,000 feet, to show how 
rapidly the District Engineer did his work. 

On Wheeler Field they had less than is necessary for heavy bombers. 
He started right in building bunkers at Hickam Field and doing that 
by contract with heavy equipment. He started a new air field at 
Kahuku Point. 

General McCoy. Where is that? 

General Short. That is up in the northern part of the Island [indi- 
cating on map] . We had to go back and forth to the War Department 
and the Navy Department, and the Navy had some bombing range, so 
we were delayed getting the money, getting the thing started. 

We improved, however, putting bunkers in, and we tried one three 
miles south of Kipapa, and I think that is the choice place on the Is- 
land for an air field, but the War Department overruled it. That has 
since been started so as to have sufficient air fields here with runways 
of not less than 6,000 feet so that they really can employ a large num- 
ber of planes. We never had the planes that we should have nor what 
the program called for. 

Our program if carried out would have given us 184 B-17's by June 
30 next and 3G0 pursuit planes. W^hether it would have been carried 
out on time I do not know, but these fields have to be acquired anyway. 
There was also a field at Maui, but it was only about 3,500 feet long, 
and we agreed that field should be used by the Navy for carrier planes 
because they used that position at Lahaina Road. After [9S] 
this attack I had a conference with Admiral Block and Admiral 
Kimmel and they agreed to put a squadron of B-17's there. 

That field has l)een under way and definitely will be completed and 
have about 5,000 feet rather than 1,000. So we will be able to develop 
that field for the outlying islands. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 65 

We had also one at Barking Sands on Kauai, but that is not paved, 
only rough, and cannot be used by the large bombers. All that work 
is being put under way as rapidly as possible, and as of the end of the 
month we will have plenty of fields because of the fact that many we 
can use now. After turning us down on many things for months we 
have practically a blank check now. 

We were building air fields that in the appropriation bill that was up 
they had something like $20,000,000, so we expect that at the end of 
December we would have the money anyhow. So we started immedi- 
ately without waiting for anything, and everything is going along as 
rapidly as possible. 

I took the following action as soon as martial law was declared: 
The courts were closed. Later on we opened up the courts for civilian 
things, equity cases, and things of that kind, but not the criminal 
court. The officials were all asked to continue in their official posi- 
tions, and all did so. An advisory committee was appointed, headed 
by the Governor. 

The sale of liquor, including wine and beer, was stopped. That was 
about all the action that taken at the time. 

Now, I would like to give, just to show that I have not been asleep 
?ince I have been here commanding, that I have been working seriously, 
and just to give you a little indication of some of the things that I have 
done and that I have attempted to do. Frequently I could not carry 
them on because I could not get the money for them, but at least it 
shows the way I have been trying to conduct my command. 

I took command on the 7th of February. On the 19th I wrote a 
letter to the Chief of Staff, which you will find in [94] there, 
and we made a survey of the things that I thought were most impor- 
tant. I told him what we had been doing and gave the estimates and 
took up the question of the coordination with the Navy, which was not 
as complete as it should have been, but I think we made great strides 
during that time. I believe the Navy will tell you that coordination 
is much closer than we had it before. 

With respect to the question of distribution and protection of air- 
craft, I asked for funds for bunkers at these air fields and runways and 
so forth, I asked for improvements for the anti-aircraft defense. I 
was considerably interested in improving the weapons and getting 
enough personnel. We were having to have our personnel perform 
dual missions of heavy battery and coast defense battery and perform 
anti-aircraft mission, and the thing got to a point where they needed 
to fire on enemy ships, and then make up their minds which was more 
important in the mission of fighting, 

I was trying to get personnel. The Navy was very much interested 
in anti-aircraft defense and air. Their keen interest was in those 
two things. 

I took up the question of improving the harbor defense guns. They 
had no splinterproof at any of the guns. In modern guns they are 
protected against air and we had gotten some money on that. 

The searchlights in many cases needed modernizing, and we put 
in a project on that. 

We needed arrangements for moving our supplies and reserves more 
quickly. We did not get much for motor trails during the period, 
as a total for the last year, and we did not have the motor trails and 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 1 6 



66 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

roads that would enable us to get to our positions as quickly as possible. 

In JNIanualia Road, which is a critical point, it would take to move 
from our reserve position two hours and 26 minutes. After we built 
the motor trail there we could move the same [95~\ reserves in 
26 minutes. Without the mone3^ we could not carry out this work. 

I took up the question of bombproofing of tlie vital installations like 
the command post, and we practically completed our job in Aliamanu 
Crater; our interceptor command control operated in a week, and 
our bombproofing is 30% complete. The command post for the 24th 
Division is just started. I took these things upon February 29. 

I particularly recommended getting the Hawaiian Air Depot 
underground because I foresaw it was the biggest building in sight 
except the barracks and was sure to be an object of attack, and 
apparently it was the first thing hit on Hickam Field, and according to 
eyewitnesses, the first plane that hit it just plowed straight into it. It 
Vv-as a suicide proposition, and whether it was that or not I don't know, 
but the eyewitness said that and perhaps he knew exactly what he 
was heading for. 

The Chairman. When you say the air depots, do you mean the 
hangars ? 

General Short. No. The Hawaiian Air Depot controls all supplies 
and all heav}^ maintenance, parts of material and all mechanical 
work. There are certain types of mechanical work which are clone 
at Schofielcl, and some of the heavy work is done at the post, but when 
they come to the more serious operations they have to go down to the 
Hawaiian Air Depot, where they have excellent mechanics, and the 
heavy work is done there. 

I think that if they lost that we would be in a very bad way, or if 
they lost the machines we would be in a very bad way. 

I wanted to put it in the gulch where we would get a runwaj'' of 
4,000 feet, and get the maintenance underground, because maintenance 
was a most serious thing. You could disperse your planes, but this 
question of dispersing the [961 maintenance in four places 
because it is too dangerous to leave them all in one place. 

General McCoy. Were any of these skilled mechanics casualties? 

General Short. I do not know, frankly. I doubt if there were 
many, because it was Sunday morning. If it was Monday morning 
or any other morning they would have been considerably^, but I do 
not think it would be many. We did not have any great push of work, 
and I do not think they were working Sunday morning. Some of 
them may have been killed on returning back if they went down there 
and started to help, but they probably were not in the first attack, 
because I do not think they were in operation except for the watch- 
men. 

General McCoy. Are they civilians? 

General Short. Almost all civilians, and men with a great deal 
of experience. 

I took up later the question of antisabotage. the question of supplies, 
vital installations, ammunition, depots, gasoline storage of all kinds 
and that I largely got. 

The Chairman. Was that not all taken care of? 

General Short. No, because while we actually had the money since 
August, getting priorities is an entirely different thing. I had writ- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 67 

ten to the War Department and had gone to the Governor to try to 
get a priorities ollice established here. I think it was approved in 
principle before December but not actually established so far as an 
office here was concerned ; so we had no use out of it. 

I had no luck in getting authority to bombproof the gasoline stor- 
age. The War Department wanted to disperse that rather than bomb- 
proof it, and it prol^ably would be splinterproof. We did not receive 
the money for that, although there was correspondence on it since 
February, 

General McCoy. Did you lose any? 

General Short. No, we lost none. 

[97] General McCoy. It is all underground now ? 

General Short. It is not exactl}^ underground. 

The Chairman. Now the gasoline is underground ? 

General Short. No. It will be six to nine months before it is com- 
pleted. Maybe they can make it by April, but on Red Hill Bridge 
they have been working 24 hours a day for months. It is all above. 

The Chairman. It is still in the big tanks, sticking up? 

General Short. Those are largely oil. Do not misunderstand me, 
Mr. Justice. We have some gasoline underground, under the air 
fields, but it is not bombproof. It is more than splinterproof; it is 
halfway in between. We did not lose any of tliat, but there were 
some 4,000,000 gallons. Aviation gasoline was in the hands of various 
oil companies, vrhich is all above ground where it can be hit. 

The only underground gasoline we have is the aqua system in the 
field, and we liave put in some 50,000-gallon tanks that are safe. If 
we get our reserve gas bombproof both for motors and for aviation, 
it would be good, because it would be bad to lose the gasoline here. 
We have carried on some experiments recently with alcohol. There 
are two breweries in town and thev worked it so Ave could use alcohol 
up to 80%. 

I took inventory on the 8th of the gasoline in town and started 
rationing it right away. We found we had four months supply of 
gasoline on the island for the normal rate of use. 

I have made during the last few months a considerable number 
of requests for an increase in planes, and there have been definite in- 
dications of planes. If the program that had been set up was car- 
ried out, it would give us an increase in planes by J/ime 30 — which 
depends on the manufacturer — but the War Department was very 
favorable to it. 

I thought when I got here that while the Navy had developed the 
new facility at Kaneohe Bay, where they put in a channel to bring 
the cruisers in, that the war plans still [98] provided that the 
Army would not assume the responsibility for defense. 

I wrote the War Department that I would assume the responsibility 
and asked that the war plans be changed. 

I talked with Admiral Block and he agreed. I asked for a garrison. 
They cut the garrison to half of what I asked for, but when we sug- 
gested getting 2,300 men in the garrison about the 1st of September, 
they told me I had to start the theatre operating type of barracks out 
there. 

I got most of them constructed out there. Then I got word that the 
troops would not be sent until sometime in January. 



68 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCoy. Just where is that ? 

General Short. That is this position (indicating on map). The 
Navy position is here; the Army post is in here (indicating). You 
will find 8-inch guns there; not what we should have. When these 
troops come in they will increase the number of guns there, and I think 
eventually they will be sending some new 8 -inch guns. That is impor- 
tant because with that channel the enemy can now run his ships in, 
whereas before he could not do anything. 

The War Department plan has never provided any defense for the 
outlying islands. When I got here I started to construct these emer- 
gency landing fields, as I felt we had to have some defense. So I sent 
one regiment without asking any authority. I sent a battalion to 
Hawaii, a battalion to Kauai, a battalion less a company to Maui, and 
a company to Molokai. 

I sent 75 guns to each which could be used on the beach or moved 
around, and a considerable number of guns, machine guns. 

I felt that was the thing to do that I could consider it without hav- 
ing any authority for it and not waiting to get some increases. The 
War Department has indicated since I told [99] them that 
we should have the proper garrisons there. They indicated since 
December 7 that they will furnish the troops there. It has not been 
a matter of any importance so far, but it is just a picture of the things 
I was trying to do to maintain the defenses here and to show that I 
was really working at it. I made recommendations that I have sub- 
mitted since February and which have been authorized since Decem- 
ber 7, and they have gone further in a number of cases. 

Soon after I got here I looked into the question of civilian defense, 
and one thing of particular importance at this island is that is not 
growing the food to feed itself; probably not over 15 or 20% is grown 
here. It seems that the main proposition is to grow cane and 
pineapples. 

I decided I would start a program of getting the food situation in 
better shape and a number of other things. I had expected to talk 
before the Chamber of Commerce on April 6, so I decided I would wait 
until then and lay the program before the people at that time, because 
I thought that probably every businessman in the Island of Oahu 
would be present at that meeting. 

I took up four different items at this time for the production and the 
supply of food. 

For years they had been working on a question simply of what would 
be done if the production of food decreased in an emergency. The 
Department of Agriculture was carrying on some experiments, and 
the University of Hawaii also at that time. We got a committee work- 
ing on this particular work. This committee was largely representa- 
tive of the sugar-plantation people and the pineapple-plantation peo- 
ple and the large plantation people, representatives from the Univer- 
sity and the Department of Agriculture. 

We got a report on the number of these sugar plantations and al- 
lotted so many acres to each different plantation so that they would 
have some truck gardening. We divided up this ground so that one 
plantation would grow 300 acres of [100] potatoes or maybe 
5 of tomatoes and another would grow something else. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 69 

We made up a list of seed required for that and placed these orders 
in the mainland with proper seed companies subject to telegraphic 
order. 

We made up a list of the tools that each plantation would need to 
switch from heavy agriculture like cane to truck gardening. 

From the 10th or the 11th, three or four days after the attack, I had a 
meeting of all of the big companies, and they act as factors for all the 
plantations, and I had a meeting of them and with the Governor's Food 
Control Committee and certain other leaders interested in this thing. 

We had an inventory taken of food beginning on the 8th. We tried 
to get an inventory for the last two or three months because we had 
attempted to get out of Congress $3,400,000 for food storage and $2,500,- 
000 for the supply of vital necessities for human consumption and $900,- 
000 for feed, largely for cattle and poultry, and they did not even grow 
the feed for that. It was held up by that body and apparently there 
was no chance to get any action on it without taking inventory because 
someone in Congress said : 

For nine months they have been getting their supplies through, so there is no 
use worrying about it. 

Wlien we got this inventory, it was a disappointment even to me. I 
figured on 50 or 60 days of supplies in the hands of the retailers and 
wholesalers, and it turned out that we had only 37 days. I had only 
one day of rice and 18 days of flour. We did not want to start ration- 
ing the people. The big companies were perfectly capable of handling 
the distribution when they could get the shipping to take it in. 

I had this meeting and I told them the plan which I had prepared 
and asked the War Department to guarantee 20,000 pounds a month 
to supply the current needs of food and as an [iOl] opening 
for that suggested $3,400,000. That is all that was asked at that time, 
and I asked these people to get in touch with them and try to get that 
money for that purpose. 

These people agreed that they would start on the production. This 
was the 10th or the 11th. I had the District Engineer order a supply 
of seed and tools because we had tried to have each plantation do the 
work. These orders were placed at any rate. The engineering office 
was tied up, but he bought them. So the War Department indicated 
that should be done and have it straightened out. 

At this time I emphasized the organization of doctors and nurses and 
Red Cross, and that was extremely well carried out and in good shape. 

I advocated the organization of an auxiliary police force and fire 
department. There was an actual organization effected of these men of 
an actual police force and they turned out several times for training a 
day or so, and they took hold very well when things happened. 

I also organized at that time plans for the evacuation of women and 
children, not only of the Army post but along the docks, and practically 
the whole of that line is a proper military objective. The gasoline and 
oil is right down there in plain sight. If they put the docks out of 
commission it would be a very serious thing because practically every- 
thing the island is using is brought in from there. So it meant 40,000 
people had to be moved out, and if they started bombing these it would 
be a very serious situation. We made at this time plans for the com- 
plete evacuation and had detailed plans for shelters, and we asked the 



70 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

War Department and the Governor also to ask through the Civilian 
Defense organization that Mayor La Guardia is the head of — the 
Office of Defense, I think it is— for $2,800,000. We received that since 
December 7. We got it since December 7. These are some of the items 
that were taken up at that time. 

[lO^] On the question of the M-Day Bill, I do not know whether 
you are familiar with the form of that or not, but I believe this is the 
only place that it is in effect, and I do not think there is any other place 
where the state has passed an M-Day Bill giving the Governor the 
authority to protect the organization and to get so many things done 
during an emergency. We have it here. We got that bill through. 

The Governnor made little use of it until later, and I should say 
he would have made it if he had know what was going to take place, 
but it was of considerable advantage and I would say practically that 
I do not think it would have gone through at all except for being 
pushed by the Army. I went down there and talked to them. 

We got a Home Guard Bill for the purpose of helping out in place 
of the National Guard group that went out in the service. These can 
man the guard groups, guard the utilities, and release the Army sol- 
diers for combat work. That was put through at the last meeting 
and it went into effect since December 7 ; the Governor had not seen 
fit to call them out because they made an appropriation of only 
$50,000,000. Now they have 1,200 men in that fort actually employed 
in guarding the utilities. [lOS] You may not think it has a very 
direct bearing, but I feel that I would like to have you know that the 
civil community does not think that I have let them down. 

The Chairman. Does not what? 

Admiral Standley. What? 

General Short. Does not think that I have let them down. Here 
is a letter that was brought out to me yesterday, a copy of a letter that 
has been to the President and has been signed by almost every leader 
of importance in town. I would like to read this letter to you if 
you don't mind. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Short (reading) : 

We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social organiza- 
tions in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest 
in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere 
appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by 
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short. 

We have found him at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he 
has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for 
an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan 
for this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such plan. 

General Short's thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas 
to our Territorial Legislature, to our local officials, and to our community in 
general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound 
"M-Day" Bill ; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard: (c) for the decision 
to increase stored food and to produce food ; [lOJf] and (d) for the preven- 
tion of sabotage. He has shown a correct and sympathetic attitude toward the 
problems of the civil community in assuring cooperation of civilians. 

He has maintained a high morale in his Command and has conducted "alerts" 
from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing the troops and with plans, 
now looking for financing from federal funds, for adequate and safe storage of 
sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a probable emergency. 

We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go into 
various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have 
selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 71 

MeaDwhile, we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high esteem 
and our full confidence in the character and ability of General Walter C. Short as 
a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be. 

This letter is prepared without the knowledge or consent of General S'hort or 
any other officials, merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may accrue 
to the record of such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse publicity 
or otherwise. This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest in tlie 
adequate defense of Hawaii and our Nation. 

With very best respects and wishes, we are 
Yours very truly, 

The gentlemen signing this : 

Lester Petrie, Mayor of the City of Honolulu, [/05] C. R. Hemen- 
way. President. Hawaiian Trust Company, A. L. Dean, Vice-President, 
Alexander & Baldwin Company, Walter F. Dillingham, President of 
Oahu Railway & Land Co., F. D. Lowrey, President, Lowers & Cook, H. 
H. Warner, Assistant Food Administrator, J. B. Poindexter, Governor 
of Hawaii. S. B. Kemp, Chief Justice, Supreme Court, T. G. S. Walker, 
Director of Civilian Defense of Oahu, John B. Russell, President of T. H. 
Davies & Company, George S. Waterhouse, Executive Vice-President, 
Bi.shoi3 National Bank, Cyril F. Damon, Executive Vice-President of 
Bishop Trust Company, Briant H. Wells, Executive Vice-President, 
Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, H. A. Walker, President. Amer- 
ican Factors, Limited, S. JM. Lowrey, Treasurer, American Factors, P. B. 
Spalding, President of C. Brewer & Company, Frank E. Midkiff, Trustee 
of the Bishop Estate, Edouard R. L. Doty. Territorial Director of 
Civilian Defense, James Winue, Manager Merchandise Department, 
Alexander & Baldwin. 

Those represent most of the financial interests of the Islands, and 
that is a more definite statement than it would be almost any other 
place I know, on account of the way that business is conducted here, 
and I believe that that should indicate to you that the leaders in this 
community don't feel that I have been laying down on the job. 

Here is a letter here from the Director of Civilian Defense that I 
would like to read to you : 

Please allow me to express my sincere regret that [106] our contact 
through Civilian Defense Plans has terminated. 

It was greatly due to your help and backing that our" Civilian Organizations 
were so far advanced that they were able to function so splendidly during the 
attack. 

You will always be able to recollect that your determination to have our 
Civlian Groups Prepared saved many lives of our Sailors and Soldiers through 
the organized effort of our Civilian Defense Medical committee and the many 
trucks that we had ready to be turned into ambulances at a minute's notice. 

Please be assured that you will carry the sincere thanks and Aloha of your 
many friends here who realize the distress you saved by urging and helping us 
to be prepared. 

Yours very sincerely, 

T. G. S. Walker, 
Director, Civilian Defense. 

I would appreciate it if the Commission would see fit to call before 
it some of the senior officers of my command who know what I have 
done. They have had the responsible positions enough to know what 
I have b.^en doing. General Martin you will have before you anyway. 
I would like to suggest that you call General Burgin, commandiug 
the 

The Chairman. What is the name ? 

General Short. General Burgin, commanding the Coast Artillery. 
H. T. Burgin. General Maxwell Murray, commanding the 2r)th Di- 
vision. 

General D. R. Wilson, commandinjr the 24th Division. 



72 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

And Colonel E. M. Wilson, commanding the post of Fort Schofield. 
That is our one big post. 

All of these officers have had enough to do with my [107] 
planning and carrying it out that they can give you a correct picture 
of what my work has been like. 

I would also like, if you feel that you could do it, to call the Gov- 
ernor, and he has indicated that he is perfectly willing to be called 
in spite of the fact that he has been sick. Possibly Mr. T. G. S. Walker, 
the Director of Civilian Defense ; Mr. Frank Locey, who is the Com- 
missioner of Agriculture and the head of the Governor's Food Control 
Committee. He knows more about my work than most people. And 
some of the prominent business leaders. In Honolulu you can almost 
say that the heads of the five big companies and Mr. Walter Dilling- 
ham, those six men, practically control the business of the Island. 
Any of them will know the work I have done. 

Gentlemen, that is about everything that I have to present, and I 
appreciate very much your consideration. 

The Chairman. General, have you some questions you would like 
to ask? 

General McNaeney. I have a number of questions I would like to 
ask. 

General, the cable of October 16 directed that (1) to take due pre- 
caution; (2) to prepare deployments. That of November 27 stated 
that hostile action is possible, and to undertake reconnaissance. Do 
you feel that ordering Alert No. 1 was carrying out these directives? 

General Short. My reconnaissance under the plan with the Navy is 
limited to just the immediate offshore of the Island, ordinarily limited 
to 15 miles. The Navy have assumed full responsibility for the distant 
reconnaissance. 

General McNarney. Was the inshore reconnaissance undertaken? 

General Short. The inshore reconnaissance was a daily thing. We 
had planes all around the Islands just constantly. [108] And 
if we had had them in the air 24 hours of the day, that inshore would 
not have accomplished anything, because the attack started from much 
further out. 

General McNarxet. As I remember, you stated in your statement 
that you assumed that the Navy was sending out the proper recon- 
naissance covering the proper areas. Did you know that they were? 

General Short. I knew it was their full responsibility, that if they 
could not do it they would call on me for bombers to assist them. 
That was in the definite agreement. I didn't think that I had a 
right to call on them for a daily report of what they were doing. 
They had task forces out all the time. I don't know just where they 
went, and I don't know just what they did when they went out. 
That was a naval problem. 

General McNarney. Didn't you feel it was part of your responsi- 
bility for the security of your command that you should have that 
information available? 

General Short. I didn't feel that they had certain information in 
regards to the location of Japanese boats. I felt sure that if they 
had anything to indicate any Japanese carriers or anything within a 
thousand miles or probably closer than the Mandate Islands, which 
are 2,100 miles, they would have told me, and I did not feel that it 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 73 

was my business to try to tell Admiral Kimmel how he would conduct 
his reconnaissance. I think he would have resented it very much. I 
knew definitely that there were no land bases of the Japanese closer 
than about 2,100 miles, and that from all information available there 
were not bombers that can go 2,100 miles and bomb and return. 

General McNarxey. At any time during the operation of the In- 
formation Center up here was anything shown on the board as to the 
location of the Navy patrols? 

[^09] General' Short. Oh, you couldn't go over there any time of 
the day — you couldn't go to any one of the stations at any time and 
watch for 15 minutes and not see planes. There were always planes 
in the air here. The only time that there wouldn't be planes in the 
air would probably be about between 11 o'clock and 4. They didn't 
do much flying between 11 o'clock at night and 4 in the morning. 
But you couldn't tell whether they were Navy planes or Army planes, 
or both. Anybody who has lived here in the last year would know 
he could hardly ever step out of his house without hearing planes, and 
the stations would pick up every one of them. All you had to do was 
watch any station, just drop in one of them any time and they would 
see a plane that's 35 miles out or 50 miles out, or whatever it was, and 
you would watch the course that they were taking. They could pick 
them up almost any time except between 11 and 4. 

General McNarney. I think in your statement you said that you 
thought Alerts Nos. 2 and 3 would interfere with training. Don't 
you believe that the actual occupation of battle positions is better 
training than the normal routine of peacetime training? 

General Short. Not in this particular case with the air corps. The 
air corps had a very specific mission assigned to them of preparing 
so many combat teams to ferry planes to the Philippines. You 
can't afford to start half-trained men taking planes all the way from 
San Francisco to the Philippine Islands. They have got to be trained. 

General McNarney. Would not the best training be actual recon- 
naissance out over the water? 

General Short. No, because you have to do this, and you know, 
General, enough about the training of workmen, when you are going 
to make a B-IT pilot you have got to step him up ; you can't just jump 
him right from his training ship [1^0] to a B-17. Ordinarily 
they have been putting them on the B-18's for a certain period and 
then putting them on the A-20's and then putting them as a copilot 
on the B-17. 

Now, that is just the pilot business, and you have got your bombers, 
which is a very slow proposition, and we had a total of six ships to do 
all this training, and you couldn't — if you sent this out, if I played 
fair with the Navy, if t agreed with them that I would turn my bomb- 
ers over to them any time that they asked for them for reconnaissance, 
I had no business rushing out there on my own on distant reconnais- 
sance. I would just be covering probably the same sector they covered, 
using up my planes when thev needed them, and they wouldn't be 
available; and if I put them down there and kept them warmed up 
24 hours of the day. scattered them out and kept them warmed up 
ready to go in the air 24 hours a day. I couldn't use thorn for training 
these pilots for ferrying missions, and the situation didn't look to me 
like it justified that. And you know that you can only work so many 
hours a day on the thing. 



74 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McNarney. Now, on your anti-sabotage measures were 
tliere insufficient men available to protect the i^lanes if .they were 
dispersed ? 

General Short. No, if we wanted to put our whole command on 
that kind of business, but it didn't look like it was necessary. I did 
not believe — from the wires of the War Department, they said 
nothing whatever about an attack by air ; and when I told them what 
I was doing on the 28th day of November they never came back and 
said, "Well, this sabotage business you are doing all right, but you 
need to carry it a step further and protect against attack." If they 
had said that I would have gone ahead immediately, but they appar- 
ently accepted my decision as to what to do, and they were there 
where they should know more about the inter- [-?-?-?] national 
situation than I did. 

There was one thing I didn't cover, gentlemen ; I would like to. It 
has been bjought out a good deal by the questions of the General. I 
would like to read my conclusions to you. 

1. The radiogram from the War Department of October 16th emphasized that 
measures taken by me during the grave situation of the Japanese negotiations 
should not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against 
Japan. 

The radiogram of November 27th reiterated that action should be carried out 
so as '"not repeat not to disclose intent", not alarm civil population, and avoid 
unnecessary publicity. 

When the War Department was notified that the Hawaiian Department was 
alerted against sabotage it not only did not indicate that the command should 
be alerted against a hostile surface, sub-surface, ground or air attack, but replied 
emphasizing the necessity for protection against sabotage and subversive meas- 
ures. This, taken in connection with the two previous radiograms mentioned, 
indicated to me a tacit consent to the alert against sabotage ordered by the 
Hawaiian Department. 

2. The Hawaiian Department is not provided with an agency for locating enemy 
ships in various parts of the world. Such information as it may acquire on this 
subject must be obtained from the Fourteenth Naval District or from the War 
Department. 

The "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" places 
upon the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District the responsibility for 
distant reconnaissance. Annex #'7 to the "Joint [112] Coastal Frontier 
Defense Plan" provides that when naval forces are insufficient for long distance 
patrol and search operations and army aircraft are made available, these will be 
under the tactical control of the naval oommand during search operations. That 
means that the army planes receive their missions and all instructions from the 
naval commander and carry out the search as he deems necessary in order to 
carry out his responsibility for distant reconnaissance. 

During the period November 27th to December 6th, the Navy made no request 
for army planes to participate in distant reconnaissance. To me this meant that 
they had definite information of the location of enemy carriers or that the number 
unaccounted for was such that naval planes could make tlie necessary reconnais- 
sance without assistance from the army. During this period I was in frequent 
conferences with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and the 
Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and at no time was anything said 
to indicate that they feared the possibility of an attack by the Japanese by air. 
In fact, the sentiment was expressed by a naval staff oflicer that there was no 
probability of sucli an attack. With a large part of the United States Navy in 
Hawaiian waters and with their sources of information. I was convinced that 
the Navy would be able either to intercept any carrier attempting to approach 
Oahu or at least to obtain such information from task forces or by reconnaissance 
as to make them aware of the presence of carriers in the Hawaiian waters and 
of the possibility of an air attack. 

[lis] S. Action of the War Department on December 5th, and as late as 
1 : 30 A. M., Eastern standard time, December 7th, in dispatching planes from the 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 75 

mainland to Honolulu without ammunition indicated that the War Department 
did not believe in the probability of an early Japanese attack upon Honolulu. 

I felt that I had a right to expect the War Department to furnish me by the 
most rapid means possible information should a real crisis arise in Japanese 
relations. I did not expect that when the crisis arose the desire for secrecy would 
be considered more important than the element of time. Had the message in 
regard to the Japanese ultimatum and the burning of their code books been given 
me by telephone as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time for en- 
coding and decoding, etc., I, in all probability, would have had approximately 
two hours in which to make detailed preparations to meet an immediate attack. 

4. I feel that my work in the Hawaiian Department should be judged by my 
activities throughout the complete period from the assumption of command on 
February 7th until my relief upon December 16th. I believe that any careful 
examination of my work during that period will prove that I have worked very 
seriously at the job and have accomplished measures of very considerable im- 
portance. I do not see how I could better have carried out what appeared to be 
the desires ,of the War Department unless I was supposed to know more than the 
War Department about the danger of Japanese attack and more than the Navy 
Department about the location of the Japanese carriers. To have taken more 
steps in preparation against a Japanese [114] attack than I did would 
certainly have alarmed the civil population and caused publicity contrary to 
War Department instructions. I do not believe that I should be found guilty 
even of an error in judgment because I did not have the vision to foresee that the 
War Department would not notify me of a crisis in the least possible time and 
that the Navy with its large fleet in Hawaiian waters would not be able to carry 
out its mission of intercepting Japanese carriers, or at least detecting their 
presence in Hawaiian waters and informing me of the fact. 

General McNarney. I have a few questions on this operating pro- 
cedure, and maybe you could clear up a few things for me on that. 

General Short. All right^ sir. I would be glad to. 

General McNarnet. First, on the covering letter distributing this 
it states : General and special staff sections and commanders of major 
echelons also will submit their standing operating procedures. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

General McNx\rney. I suppose that they are slightly in more detail ? 

General Short. A great deal more in detail. What happened when 
the division got this — and this had been in the course of preparation 
for two or three months ; we had put out tentative ones, and we had 
made changes suggested through lower echelons, and they had worked 
along the same line. When we got ours in final shape and it went 
out, then the division commander of the 24th and 25th divisions, com- 
mander of the hai-bor defense troops and of the Hawaiian Air Force 
drew up theirs and submitted them. Their subdivision units, taking 
for instance in the division of regiment, drew up a plan of standing- 
operating procedure U^S] that would conform to the others. 
So right down to the company everybody knew what he was going to 
do. Before we could put this into effect it had always been necessary 
to get out a long order to do things, because they had been making a 
point of maintaining a lot of things secret that I felt should not be 
kept secret. If you maintained it a secret you could not expect the com- 
pany commander or the noncommissioned officer down in the company 
to know what to do when the thing arose. Our idea was to draw the 
thing up so as a matter of training it would get clear down to the 
private in the organization, so if you said Alert No. 1 he would know 
what his part was. And it really worked, because we had no confu- 
sion, and I think it is the only sound way to do it. 

General McNarney. I ask the Eecorder, when we call the other 
heads of departments and the commanding officers, generals, of the 



76 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

major units, that they be asked to bring their copies of their standing 
operating procedure with them. Some of these might sound like 
repetition, but I still would like to ask them again. 

General Short. I think you will find this : not with the divisions 
because they are pretty definitely set ; I think you will find if you ask 
the air force that they would say they would change or that they 
would prescribe more in detail some of the things that were prescribed 
before. I mean we have developed since December 7 certain routine 
of putting so many pursuit in the air an hour before daylight. Every 
time a bomber squadron is ordered off the ground we get the pursuit 
over to the air field before it goes. Those details may not be in their 
standing operating procedure. I say if they would rewrite them 
today they would he more detailed, but that is a question they are 
bound to learn and put in more detail. 

[JIS] General McNarney. Paragraph 6 of the standing operat- 
ing procedure says : 

Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or 
air forces. 

You felt that Alert No. 1 took care of that particular paragraph 
under the existing situation ? 

General Short. Under the existing situation I felt definitely it did. 
I didn't think there was any possibility of a ground attack. Of course 
there would always be the possibility of an air attack, but from the 
information I had I thought it was highly improbable. 

General McNarney. Paragraph 7 states: 

During all operations and alerts, a liaison officer with motor transportation 
will be sent from each of the following units to Department Headquarters and 
will remain thereat except when on a mission to their own headquarters : 

Those are the 24th Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, the 
Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, Hawaiian Air Force, the 86th 
Observation Squadron, and each department reserve unit. Were 
those liaison officers actually present ? 

General Short. I am quite sure they were actually present from 
both sides in the 25th Division. The 25th Division command post 
had been changed so it was right in the tunnel with us, and there was 
no occasion for their having a liaison officer. I could step down there 
or they could step up to my headquarters in walking a hundred feet. 

General McNarney. Were they on duty 24 hours a day ? 

General Short. Someone is always there, and that is particularly 
true — has been — during this period with the air and the anti-aircraft 
harbor defense. Now, the Hawaiian Air Force, they would be in — 
they changed the command post until they are just like being from 
here to there (indi- [JJ7] eating), so it has not been necessary 
for them to have a liaison officer because we were in immediate touch 
with them. 

General McNarney. Did Alert No. 1 provide for any exchange 
of liaison officers to be made? 

General Short. No, sir. 

General McNarney. Paragraph 10 covers anti-aircraft defense. 
Subparagraph d. states the responsibilities of unit commanders for 
the maintenance of air guards to give timely warning, adoption of 
necessary measures to prevent hostile observation, and the reduction 
of vulnerability to air attack and observation by dispersion of per- 
sonnel and materiel when in bivouac. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 77 

General Short. Now, what alert are you reading under? 

General McXarney. This is the general paragraph on anti-aircraft 
defense. 

General Short. Yes. Well, that is depending on the type of alert. 

General McNarney. And my question is, Does paragraph 10 apply 
to Alert No. 1 ? 

General Short. It would not apply to Alert No. 1 because the 
troops are not out on their positions. 

General McNarney. Paragraph 11 states that an adequate alarm 
system will be established in connection with protecting of important 
installations. Was that alarm system ever completed ^ 

General Short. We have an alarm system. We have 1400 klaxons. 
They are not as loud as they should be. They are the type that we used 
in France as gas warnings. At all these installations there are tele- 
phones, so that they can give an alarm system that way. On account 
particularly of the civil population we should have — and money has 
been requested for that — we have been trying to get them on our own 
for some time — some large sirens that could be heard all [iiS] 
over the city. We haven't sufficient of them. I have given the City 300 
of the small klaxons, but they don't work very well. They do pretty 
well in posts and out in the open, and they don't do very well in the city. 

General McNarney. Under paragraph 15, which covers Alert 
No. 2, it is really not pertinent to what we are talking about, but I 
would like to ask one or two questions : 

Subparagraph d.(6) states: 

Place 240-milliineter howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards and, 
when directed, place ammunition at positions. 

General Short. Well, I will tell you why that is. Those are manned 
by the Field Artillery, and it is done that way because there is not 
enough personnel. Those are extra guns above organizational equip- 
ment, and we figure on sending those out, when Alert No. 2 goes, before 
the rest — before the division ever moves to its position, because when 
the division starts moving to its position there are not men available 
to take out the 24:0's. So on Alert No. 2 they go out and go into posi- 
tion and just leave enough men there to guard them. That is the 
thing that takes time ; and, as I say, we had not the men to man those 
that we probably have now because we got in a lot of men day before 
yesterday, but that was a provision for manning equipment over and 
above organizational equipment, doing the best we could to get the 
heavy guns in position before the third alert was necessary. Inci- 
dentally, General, we manned about on the average two or three times 
the fire equipment here that is provided for as standard equipment. 

General McNarney. Yes, I know about that. 

General Short. For instance, in the rifle companies that have as 
many as 24 heavy machine guns issued to them we are manning a tre- 
mendous fire power. 

General McNarney. Subparagraph e. says : 

Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that 
[119] railway batteries will remain at Fort Kamehameha or where emplaced. 

General Short. We have changed that as a matter of safety because 
at Kamehameha — it is so close to Hickam Field — theye were all on 
tracks there ready to be dispatched wherever there was a threat. We 
had actually sent all of them away from there on account of the fact 



78 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that they are too close to Hickam Field. We put one at Browns Mill 
on the West Coast ; we put two up on the north coast because we haven't 
the harbor defense guns up there to protect it that we have on the 
south. We put one out at Kaneohe Bay. We just took it off the rail- 
road tracks and moved it out there on trucks and put it just on rails, 
so that we provided some long range fire power there, because it was 
the only way to do it, so that now there is not a one of those batteries 
at Fort Kam, Three all are ready and can be moved anywhere by 
rail. Incidentally, we have probably by this time completed a track 
going up through the middle of the Island, There was a stretch 
there of about four miles that was not joined up, and we couldn't 
move except by the track around the perimeter of the Island. We got 
money some little time ago, and I think that has been completed in 
the last four or five days so that we can move our railroad guns now 
either by the regular railroad around the perimeter of the Island or 
by coming down through the center where we connected up. 

General McNaknet. Now, as I understand, Alert No. 1 does not 
require either the occupation of battle stations by the Aircraft Warn- 
ing Service, its releasing the 

General Short. It does not, but in this particular case I did require 
it because those people needed training. 

General McNarney. Yes, but what I wanted to ask you, to restate 
the additional 

General Short. The requirement was made — it was using [l^O] 
this instance where we turned out an Alert No. 1 to train this new 
organization, was the real purpose of it. It is not part of Alert No. 1. 

General McNarney. That is, you went beyond Alert No. 1 ? 

General Short. We went beyond Alert No. 1, to the extent of order- 
ing the Aircraft Warning Service to work two hours before dawn and 
one hour after dawn, the most dangerous part of the day, I think you 
will agree, as far as any air attack is concerned. If I had made it up 
to about eight or nine o'clock it would have been immensely better. 

General McNarney. Paragraph 14g. states, District Commanders, 
assisted by air corps troops, will defend the air fields. 

General Short. That is on the outlying islands. We have a district 
commander of the Island of Kauai, and we have two air fields there, 
one at Barking Sands and one at Burns Field at Port Allen. There is 
a company of infantry at each air field and then two companies that 
are held as a reserve. There is an air detachment of probably 60 men 
at each place, and the district commander, since he is the air officer — 
that is, at any one of the fields there is no air officer there permanently ; 
the district commander is responsible for the defense. 

General McCoy. Were any of those district troops in action ? 

General Short. No, sir. There was no attack at all except shelling of 
one of the towns in Maui by submarine three or four days later. We 
have a setup of a district commander at Maui and one at the large island 
of Hawaii also. 

General McNarney. That does not apply to the mainland or to 
Oahu, then? Oahu? 

General Short. No, there is not any district command. The de- 
partment command has the responsibility here, but those [-?^-?] 
people are separated. The Island of Hawaii is 200 miles away. 

General McNarney. I mean on the Island of Oahu the protection 
of the air fields is the air corps function ? 



PROCEEDI]N^GS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 79 

General Short. The immediate protection of the air field is the 
function of the air field commander, supervised by the Hawaiian Air 
Force. 

Now, we have asked eventually to put a battalion of infantry at each 
one of those air field, but there were plenty of men, especially at 
Hickam Field, corresponding to number of planes. They had between 
five and six thousand men there, and when you consider the total 
number of jolanes they had to operate, it gave them two or three thou- 
sand left over that could have been used for immediate defense. They 
actually had two battalions of five hundred men each trained with 
machine guns and rifles for the immediate defense. They had been 
required to train those. We had sent infantry officers down there to 
give them that training, for defense against parachute troops and 
landing by gliders, air transports, or anything of that kind. I figured, 
in the last analysis, that when tlie time came that they were trying to 
land it would mean that we would not have many airplanes to be operat- 
ing and that the air troops ought to be able to fight for their own 
protection, in the last analysis, and ought to have enough men trained 
as infantry to take guns and fight, and that training had been given 
to them. And in the last maneuvers, in the last exercise, we assumed 
that the planes had been put out of commission, and we even took 500 
of those men and put them down to take over a section of the beach, 
so that — at least figured to make a final counter attack, just to carry 
out the idea that any man, when his weapons were gone, could still fight 
as an individual ; if liis planes had been knocked out by the enemy, that 
he didn't sit down with his arms folded and say to somebody, "Come 
protect me." 

[122] General McNarnet. Did they ever actually set up any 
espionage or counterespionage organization here ? 

General Short. Oh, yes. We have got a very elaborate — it has been 
in effect for years. 

General McNarnet. Under the Army? 

General Short. Yes, and works very closely with the F. B. I. and 
also with O. N. I., and practically verything that F. B, I. knows, my 
G-2 knows. I don't think they hold out at all. And the same way, 
if we have anything we give it to them. Their offices are as close as 
from here to the window (indicating) to each other downtown, our 
contact office and Mr. Shivers' office, and tliey are in constant touch. 

General McNarney. I have no further questions. 

General Short. May I^-I just received a letter from the Governor 
of Hawaii here, if I may impose on you long enough. 

The Chairman. Yes, you may. 

General Short. I have not read it myself, and I would like to read 
it to you : 

Having noted in the pxiblic press that an investigation is being ^nacle as to 
the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in Hawaii on Decemlier 7, 
1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a statement as to the state 
of preparedness of the civil comnninitios of these Islands for war when they 
were so insidiously and treacherously attacked on December 7, 1941. 

The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these 
Islands were important to National Defense from a military standpoint, but it 
has been only since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941 that it has 
been brough home to the civil population the importance of the part it would 
[12S] play in the event of a war In the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens of 



80 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

these Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud 
to be the Chief Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging the 
population to prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint 
efforts of the Army and civil population in planning and preparing for this 
emergency was magnificently rewarded. 

It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations 
which bore fruit on December 7, 1941 : 

(1) The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act by a special session of 
Legislation called for that purpose. This legislation permits a mobilization of 
the entire civil economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in 
the event of disaster. By virtue of this act, civilian defense was planned and 
many of its phases were brought to such a point of preparation that they were 
able to go into action immediately and to function effectively on December 7, 
1941. 

Now that is what we call the M-day Bill. 

(2) The production and conservation of food: Householders were persistently 
urged to stock their shelves in canned food. It is estimated that this resulted 
in increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than 
twenty percent. 

Incidentally, that was not included in the inventory taken on the 8th 
and 9th. 

Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and storage for food 
reserve. This appropriation has, [124] since Decemlier 7, 1941, been author- 
ized. By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made for the procurement 
and storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas with quick growing food 
crops. Agreements were also made for the growing, in normal times, of those 
crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In furtherance of this plan, 
the War Department was induced to permit the purchase of Island grown pota- 
toes for the use of the Army although the price was above that of mainland 
potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies of food asked for 
in the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity for building an 
adequate warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is now available for 
the storage of food supply when it arrives. 

(3) The medical facilities for the care of the injured and wounded during 
any disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these 
Islands for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical pro- 
fession of the Islands with all its medical facilities. Approximately three thou- 
sand persons were given training and instruction in First-Aid as required by 
the Red Cross. The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the auduous 
tasks of evacuation. Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit consist- 
ing of personnel of about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps of one 
hundred and forty improvised ambulances were organized. The performance 
of their tasks by these groups was one of the highlights of the civil defense 
efforts on December 7, 1941. 

(4) Plans for the evacuation of women and children and the preparation of 
shelters for workers [125] in essential indus.tries had reached a high state 
of ijerfection on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from 
areas attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner. 

(5) An auxiliary police force to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was 
organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly 
when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. Their work of this 
force was exceptional and excellent. 

(6) Legislation authorizing a home guard was enacted at the special session 
of the Territorial Legislature. It was well planned and so organized that 14C0 
of such home guardsmen could and were placed on duty thereby relieving members 
of the Army for other military duty. 

(7) There were many other matters too numerous to detail here which were 
planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the 
bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public 
service in times of emergency. 

All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local authori- 
ties, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded 
since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 81 

of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly 
as a direct result of prior planning and training. 

It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil authori- 
ties. The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a treacherous 
attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in your 
demonstrated abilities. [126] I wish to state that the magnificent way in 
which the Territory of Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large 
measure due to your foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf 
of the Territory. 

You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit. 
Very sincerely yours, 

J. B. POINDEXTER, 

Governor of Hawaii. 

Now, if it is satisf actoiy, I would like to have a coj)y of this made 
and placed in your folders. 

The Chairman. Yes, I think you may. 

General Short. I will get those copies made, and if you can spare 
your folders for a few minutes some time I will furnish the copies. 

The Chairman. Make them, if you please, and one of your aides 
can bring them over. 

General Short. An hour after I leave here it will be ready to be put 
in here. 

The Chairman. Probably you had better let the stenographer have 
it for incorporation in his minutes, and then he will return it to any 
officer you will designate. 

General Short. TYcII, I have a copy of it here. That is not a true 
copy (indicating), but I will have the ones that go in your book made 
a true copy. 

The Chairman. Admiral Reeves, have you any questions ? 

Admiral Reeves. I have only one or two questions. 

You gave. General, three reasons why you ordered Alert No. 1 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. instead of Alert No. 2. One of those [127] 

reasons was that Alert No. 2 would interfere with certain training. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Ree\tes. Specifically, with the training on B-17's? 

General Short. Yes, sir, more than anything else. 

Admiral Reeves. More than anything else. 

General Short. It would have interfered with the training of thou- 
sands of new men also. 

Admiral Reeves. Yes. Would the sending aloft during the dawn 
period, when you had the interceptor system in operation, of your pur- 
suit planes, have interfered seriously with training? 

General Short. I doubt. Admiral, if there was ever a day when 
there wasn't a very considerable amount of pursuit in the air every 
morning, I mean habitually. 

General McCoy. At that time, you mean ? 

General Short. Yes, habitually there were planes in the air from 
four o'clock on. There were planes in the air almo.st all the time 
except from about eleven o'clock at night until four o'clock in the 
morning. As I said before, you couldn't step out of your house and 
look in the air without seeing planes. They were just constantly 

The Chairman. Well, they were the planes of your inshore patrol ? 

General Short. Well, they were planes that were in training, but 
they would see just as much as — yes, they would have only been in 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 1 7 



82 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

shore patrol; they wouldn't have gone over 15 miles; they wouldn't 
have seen anything that those training planes wouldn't have seen con- 
stantly. 

General McCoy. Well, they were apparently not up on that Sunday 
morning. 

General Short. Tliat Sunday morning they were not up, most un- 
usual. Each Sunday morning you are likely to 

[128'] General McCoy. How do you explain that? 

General Short. I wouldn't be able to explain it without asking 
General Davidson just why ; but if they had been up and training they 
wouldn't have had ammunition, for normally in the training they did 
not carry ammunition. 

Admiral Reeves. I was not referring so much, General, to training 
measures. Alert No. 1 did not require your planes to be in the air? 

General Short. No, sir. Alert No. 1 did not cover preparation 
against an air attack at all. It's sabotage, uprisings, and subversive 
measures. 

Admiral Reeves. Had our pursuit planes been in the air, ordered 
there as a security measure during the dawn daylight period, they 
would have been an added security, would they not? 

General Short. They probably would have been back on their fields 
about seveji o'clock. I mean, you can't just keep them in the air con- 
stantly. We had decided that some two hours before claw^n until one 
hour after dawn was the dangerous time, and just as we were working 
"our interceptor station the chances are that if we had had a dawn 
patrol out it would have returned before eight o'clock. There is no 
question, if we had had pursuit in the air fully armed and expected 
this attack at eight o'clock, why, we probably would have — we might 
have been able to stop it to a very considerable extent, at any rate. 
Some of them would have gotten through. We think they had ap- 
proximately 160 to 180 planes in the attack. 

Admiral Reeves. But had that contingent of armed pursuit planes 
been aloft, opposition to a surprise raid would have been possible? 

[129^ General Short. Oh, yes. 

Admiral REE^^s. Now, in addition to that, and in addition to the 
conditions prescribed by alert No. 1, had you had the anti-aircraft 
batteries manned during the morning period, that would have added 
security, wouldn't it ? 

General Short. Well, it would have added security, the anti-aircraft 
batteries. They were in action as soon as ten minutes after the — 
some of them as early as ten minutes after the attack. 

Admiral Reeves. For planes 

General Short. It would have been an added value. 

Admiral Reeves. Yes. 

General Short. No argument about it at all. 

Admiral Reeves. Yes. 

General Short. If we had known 

Admiral Reeves. If you, instead of limiting your dawn daylight 
alert to two hours after dawn, had placed the limit a little later on, it 
would also 

General Short. It would have been an added factor. 

Admiral Reeves. It would have been an added factor. 

General Short. Of course, you have got to take this into consider- 
ation : just like Colonel Potts looking right at this group, witli a con- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 83 

dition of peace, he had no idea, looking right at the squadron, that it 
was not friendly planes until he saw the first bomb drop. I mean the 
condition was such. Now, if we had had that wire that was turned 
over to R. C. A. at 6 : 48, then we would have been expecting attack. 
That was the thing that would have made the difference. But with- 
out that wire, if we had had nothing else and if we had had troops in 
the air, they still probably wouldnx have thought they were enemy 
planes. 

Admiral Reeves. Of course you would adopt security measures at 
other times than a time when you were expecting an attack, wouldn't 
you ? 

[ISO] General Short. Oh, if you were at war, yes. If you were 
at war you would carry — you would carry 

Admiral Reeves. Or in case of possibility of war? 

General Short. It is determined absolutely by your estimate. My 
estimate of the situation here was that the only thing that could 
seriously be expected was sabotage. I was fully prepared against 
sabotage, and there has been no sabotage from November 27 to this 
date. Now, there have been people who have been stationed here in 
5^ears past who have felt that serious things would happen. We have 
had complete control of that. That was my estimate. My estimate 
was that the War Department would let me know of a crisis and that 
the Na\^ would let me know of the presence of any carriers in 
Hawaiian waters, and without that there couldn't be an air attack. 

Admiral Reeves. In reference to this distant reconnaissance, a 
carrier operating at high speed, say 30 knots, might have been several 
hundred miles, perhaps 500 miles away, the night before? 

General Short. Oh, yes. No question about that. 

Admiral Reeves. So that clistant reconnaissance covering the 
circumference of a circle 500 miles 

General Short. Wouldn't do any good. 

The Chairman. If what ? 

General Short. We had planes. 

Almiral Reeves. (Continuing) did not guarantee that you 

would be notified of the approach of that carrier? 

General Short. Not if it stopped at 500 miles, no. Our plan and 
the plans we had sent in to the War Department called for recon- 
naissance out to a thousand and fifty miles, based on very accurate 
study as to how close they could come, making the most of the use of 
darkness, don't you see, to get in, and we figured that the distant 
reconnaissance should go to a thousand and fifty miles. That was 
as far as our B-17's [J31], could carry it; and that that was 
the — and there is a very long study in the War Department that we 
put in on that. But as I understand it the Navy is not limited to re- 
connaissance for their information of hostile ships, and we had a defi- 
nite line of Mandate Islands, that that was the closest land base that 
the Japanese could have, and that was 2,100 miles. 

The Chairman. If it is convenient we shall adjourn until 2 o'clock. 
I do not want to interrupt you, Admiral. You may go on. 

Admiral Reeves. Yes. 

The Chairman. Shall we adjourn, then, to 2 o'clock, and you will 
return then at 2 o'clock? 

General Short. Yes, sir. Now may I collect these (indicating) 
and put in that letter then ? 



84 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. We will leave them right here at the 
desk so you can have an officer collect them. 

General Short. I will have them collected, and I will get that 
communication in. 

(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m,, a recess was taken until 2 o'clock 
p. m. of the same day.) 

[132] AFTERNOON SESSION 

(The Commission reconvened at 2 o'clock p. m., upon the expiration 
of the recess.) 

The Chairman. Admiral Reeves, any questions? 

Admiral Reeves. No, I have no questions. 

The Chairman. General, you referred to several conferences you had 
with the Commander in Chief of the Fleet and the Commander of the 
14th District in the period from November 27 to December 7. 

General Short. Yes. 

,The Chairman. Was any estimate of the situation discussed be- 
tween you at those conferences? 

General Short. We discussed the estimate in this way, particularly 
in reference to the relief. If a relief was sent to any of these islands, 
there are no harbors at Wake or Johnston or, I do not think any, at 
Palmyra, where large transports could pull up and begin discharging 
troops, and we discussed the danger that would exist during the 
period when the troops were discharging because it would take some 
hours to do so. 

The Chairman. That means that you were discussing a possible 
danger ? 

General Short. A possible danger. 

The Chairman. Due to Japanese hostilities ? 

General Short. Yes. 

The Chairman. Within a period of a few days these transports 
would be going across ? 

General Short. I don't know when they would be going across. 
We recommended that it be put off till the completion of these fields, 
which would mean 2 or 3 months, but it was always a possible danger. 

The Chairman. I am not referring so much to that as I am refer- 
ring to these telegrams with respect to the strategy indicating that 
the War Department and the Navy Department [ISS] were 
progressing before the outbreak of hostilities ? 

General Short. Yes. 

The Chairman. Or the severance of diplomatic relations. Did you 
discuss that situation with your naval colleagues? 

General Short. I did not go into detail. Admiral Kimmel at one 
time — I don't remember his words — but he expressed the idea that he 
was handicapped by having to absolutely maintain a defensive atti- 
tude. May I say if I speak perfectly frank — 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Short. May I say that the Navy, and I think Admiral 
Standley and Admiral Reeves will bear me out, that the Navy are 
more careful about their secret information than any other depart- 
ment of the Government. They are possible more careful than the 
War Department. I would hesitate lots of times to ask for specific 
information because I knew the point of view they took about secrecy 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 85 

and that they would not tell their staff officers as must as I told mine. 

The Chairman. Well, that is not exactly what I am getting at. 
After all, I am only a laj^man, but reading the communications of 
the War and Nav}'^ Departments sent to you from the period of 
October 16 to November 27 I should have expected when I looked 
at them that there was a possibility of imminent danger of hostile 
attack from Japan, a surprise attack. 

Did you get that impression, or was there any discussion between 
you and your Navy colleagues as to that ? 

General Short. The most positive expression we got over this period 
was that by — when Admiral Kimmel asked his War Plans Operations 
Officer what he considered was the possibility of a surprise attack on 
Oahu, and he said, "None." 

If Admiral Kimmel did not agree with that conclusion he made 
no expression of it to the contrary. 

The Chairman. If I get the right impression from your testimony, 
it is this : that while the force knew that Oahu [^M] was sub- 
ject to a surprise attack, none of you envisaged it within a period of 
days or weeks ; is that right ? 

General Short. I had the feeling, and I know it was on my part 
and Admiral Kimmel's that as long as he had as much of his exercises 
of the fleet here in Hawaiian waters, that they would not try to take 
a chance with a carrier attack. If the fleet had been ordered away 
from the Hawaiian waters I would have been extremely apprehensive. 

I knew that they had a force out constantly, carriers with perhaps 
90 planes, scouring the seas, but I did not believe it was possible for 
them to actually carry through an attack without the Navy getting 
something and becoming suspicious. 

The Chairman. Unless I am misinformed, the general understand- 
ing in both the Army and Na^'y has been for many years that a surprise 
airplane attack might be the method of Japanese attack on Oahu? 

General Short. I definitely would have expected it if the fleet had 
not been here. 

The Chairman. Well, wouldn't the fleet in Pearl Harbor be a very 
fine target for such an attack? 

General Short. That is true. There were two task forces out at 
that time with airplane carriers. I believe that is the first time since 
I came here in February when all the ships have been in the harbor. 
I did not know until the next day that they were in. They come in 
and they go out constantly on exercises. I cannot say this is correct, 
but I think they probably had more battleships here then than at 
any time since I have been here. 

The Chairman. You say in your report to the War Department 
that because of the seriousness of the situation depicted in the Chief 
of Staff's telegram of November 27 that you ordered Alert No. 1 ? 

General Short. Yes. 

[ISS] The Chairman. What did you mean in your statement 
about "the seriousness of the situation"? 

General Short. I figured that we were always in very great danger 
here from sabotage. Take for instance when they closed down the 
banks. I thought then that there was a very great possibility that 
there may be something of that kind, and I put an Alert No. 1 in. 
I felt that an^ change in the situation for the worse at all might cause 



86 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the Japanese agents — as there were some here — to attempt to carry 
out sabotage operations that would hurt us. 

The Chairman. From the time you came into the command of this 
Department, sir, did you have any information of subversive activi- 
ties of any kind on this island, furnished through your own intelli- 
gence, the Naval Intelligence, or the FBI ? 

General Short. We knew, and we had a list of probably something 
over 500 people. We had something over 300 we knew and also the 
consular agents. 

I do not believe since I came here that there has been any act of 
sabotage of any importance at all, but the FBI and my intelligence 
outfit knew of a lot of these people and knew they probably would 
watch the opportunity to carry out something. 

The CHAiRMAisr. What is the military opinion as to the most dan- 
gerous time for an airplane raid on Oahu ? 

General Short. About dawn or maybe two hours before dawn, be- 
cause we figure that they will do more damage if they can hit in the 
dark or just at dawn and get back to their ships. If they attacked 
entirely at night they might get back to their ships and not be able 
to land on them. Then they could not land without turning on their 
lights. I do not think any of them like to land on the ships at night, 
and we figured they would never attack so early that they would get 
back to their ships when it would not be daylight, but that they would 
always attack about dawn. 

[1S6] The Chairman. Under the conditions prevailing since 
you came here, which dawn was the most dangerous dawn from the 
point of view of attack? Which day of the week? 

General Short. Definitely figuring the day of the week, you would 
probably say they would figure Sunday would be the day that there 
would be more people off and that the command would be less on 
Sunday than any other time. 

The Chairman. What was the condition with respect to leaves over 
that week-end ? 

General Short. No different from the other. 

The Chairman. No different from any other week-end? 

General Short. No, sir. 

The Chairman. But different than week-days, though ? 

General Short. Our distance is so short that any man can get back 
to his post in an hour and can get back to their posts from town 
within 30 minutes. So with respect to the amount of time involved, 
the onlj^ reason is that Saturday night was the only night they could 
stay out, because on week-days we worked them hard. They would 
not have any way of going out because that was the difference between 
Sunday morning and other mornings. 

The Chairman. What was the percentage of effectives on station 
on that Sunday morning ? 

General Short. I imagine that would run about 

The Chairman. Eighty percent ? 

General Short. Eighty percent or maybe more, because I would 
say probably 90% of them — they will not get home until 2 or 3 o'clock 
in the morning, so they are very much discouraged from staying in 
town. 

The Chairman. What was the condition of the anti-aircraft crews 
on that Sunday morning? Were they skeleton crews? • 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 87 

General Short. Yes. skeleton crews at every ^n. 

General McCoy. You mean available for manning? 

General Short. No, on account of sabotage we had covered 
IJ37] every gun, covered every installation with the men right at 
the weapon, because we were taking no chance of sabotage. 

The Chairman. When you had your discussions, sir, from Novem- 
ber 27 to December 7 with the Navy commanders, were you informed 
of what scouting forces they had out? 

General Short. No, sir. I usually knew that they had task forces 
out. We usually talk about it. 

The Chairman. There was no discussion about increasing the 
patrol ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Was there any call upon you for additional planes? 

General Short. No. There was no time when we refused planes to 
them. They understood perfectly well they would be made available 
if necessary, if we had them. 

The Chairman. You liad no information as to a message from the 
Island, either by the FBI or your own intelligence department, to some 
Ja])anese person in Japan ? 

General Short. The evening before they listened in to a telephone 
conversation in Japanese between a local man here and somebody in 
Japan. This was about 6 : 30 Saturday night, and it was a very good 
attempt so that we were not even able, even today reading it, there is 
nothing that you can tie to except a conversation about general condi- 
tions here among the Japanese people. The only thing that would 
arouse your suspicions now is about asking how many ships there were 
in Pearl Harbor. The reply from the man at this end was that ships 
were in and out all the time and there were some, but not so many in 
recently as there had been back in September or January last year, that 
the number was cut down. In other words, indicating that there was 
some withdrawals of ships. 

The Chairman. Where were you staving that night, Saturday 
night? 

[J38] General Short. I went up to Schofield Barracks. 

The Chairman. Were you on duty ? 

General Short. No, I went to a dinner and left there sometime after 
10 o'clock. I was right here. 

The Chairman. You slept here in your headquarters? 

General Short. Not in my headquarters but in my home. 

The CHAiR:NrAN. You said something about knowing that there was 
a Navy carrier working to the north ? 

Genera] Short. Yes. Admiral Halsey had a task force in the direc- 
tion of Midway. I did not have official notice, but from talks I knew 
definitely that they had a carrier and a task force to the south because 
I sent an officer. I asked permission to send one of my officers with 
that task force because they were carrying out fleet land exercises that 
I wanted information on. I did not have an officer with the forth to 
the north. 

The CHAiR:\rAN. General, there was a third attack at 11 o'clock on 
the morning of December 7, was there not? 

General Short. It depends. I think there was. It depends on the 
exact location. Some say the attacks were at 8, 9, and 10, and another 



88 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

will say there is a definite attack at 11. I think it depends on the exact 
location. I would say at that time a definite attack was at 11 : 30. 

The Chairman. Was it effective ? 

General Short. They all caused losses. The big losses were the 
torpedo-plane attack on the first attack. 

The Chairman. Did greater losses occur in the 11 o'clock attack 
than the earlier ones ? 

General Short. They were greater than in the 8 o'clock attack. In 
the last two attacks we caused the most losses. We brought down two 
of their planes. I don't know if we brought down any more than that 
in the first attack. 

In the records you have the planes destroyed and that will also 
show the exact time on every plane. 

[139] The Chairman. There were some statements in the news- 
papers — whether responsible or not — that some of the general officers 
in charge of defense of the Island due to drinking were not in proper 
condition. What do you have to say about that ? 

General Short. I am sure it is absolutely wrong. In the first place 
General Martin, who is head of the Air Force, never takes a drink. I 
have never seen him take a drink. I don't think he has taken a drink in 
years, because he has some sort of stomach ulcers. 

I have seen General Burgin take a cocktail. I take a cocktail myself. 
General Davidson, who handles the pursuits, never takes a drink. So 
when that question is raised, there are two of the three that I know 
never take a drink. 

I think General Kudolph takes a drink before dinner, but I have 
never seen any general officer in this command who has ever shown up 
in the District at any time having been drinking too much. 

The Chairman. Since you have been here, do you know of any 
general officer under your command who has ever been unfit for duty 
due to excessive drinking? 

General Short. No, and I am sure that the condition has never 
existed. I know them all individually, and I am sure that it never 
has existed. 

General McCoy. I know them all and I can concur in that state- 
ment. 

The Chairman. I tliink that statement should be in the record. 

General, Colonel Fielder furnished you, I suppose, under date of 
the 22d of December, 1941, a summary of the situation as of 7 : 30 a. m. 
December 7, 1941. 

General Short. That would go to General Emmons, who has re- 
lieved me in command. 

The Chairman. That was made up after the fact ? 

[14-0] General Short. Yes. We put out a daily summary of in- 
telligence about being in combat. 

General McCoy. May I ask the General to look at that and see if 
he agrees with that estimate of the situation ? 

The Chairman. Yes, I would like to have him do that. I would be 
very glad if you would do so. General, and look over it carefully and 
slowly. 

(The Chairman handed a report to General Short.) 

The Chairman. At our request, a telephone conversation referred 
to in General Short's testimony has been furnish for the information 
of this Commission. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 89 

(There was a discussion off the record.) 

The Chairmax. Now, General, you have looked over this estimate 
of conditions prepared by Colonel Fielder ? 

General Short. Yes. 

The Chairman. Would you say that expresses your view of the 
situation ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. There is only one thing I did not know 
until the next day. I did not know the FBI had discovered some 
papers were burned at the Japanese Consulate. I did not know that 
until the next day. 

The Chairman. You do not know whether the FBI reported that 
to some of your subordinates on the 5th or 6th? 

General Short. They may have reported it on the Cth, because the 
officers were right alongside of each other. I knew it the next day. I 
talked with Mr. Shivers. 

I knew there were some burned papers that they had actually ar- 
rested or interfered with the burning of papers and had gotten a 
complete file. 

The Chairman. I understand that the FBI rescued some papers 
from the fire ? 

General Short. That was the next day. They got almost a complete 
file. 

\H1^ The Chairman. They did? 

General Short. Yes. 

The Chairman. Neither your inteligence nor any other intelligence 
unit in touch with you knew anything about a secret code of blinker 
signals here? 

General Short. No, sir. It was common practice with the fisher- 
men in fishing offshore to have lights so that they can judge their re- 
turn, and that has been largely true in Hawaiian waters from Japa- 
nese fishermen and that serves as a beacon light for them. Some of 
these may have been fakes and some of their signals bona fide to get 
the fishermen in. 

The Chairman. I understand that after the airplane attack these 
Japanese fishing boats started to talk on the radio so that they blurred 
out your signals so that you were not able to judge what was going on. 
Is that true ? 

General Short. I think that is rather an exaggeration. I think you 
can ask Colonel Fielder about it, because I do not know ail about the 
details. I was quite busy after the attack. 

General McCoy. Is this Colonel Fielder a G-2 ? 

General Short. Yes. He can answer that question. 

The Chairman. I have no other questions. 

Admiral Standley. General, since December 7 the principle here 
regarding the command has been changed? 

General Short. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. It is now under the principle of unit}- of com- 
mand? 

General Short. Yes, under the Navy. 

Admiral Standley. Who is that officer? 

General Short. Admiral Pye until Admiral Nimitz gets here. 

Admiral Standley. It is under the command of the United States 
fleet? 

General Short. Yes. 



90 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[I43] Admiral Standley. Not the commandant of the District? 

General Short. No. The commandant of the District is junior to 
the Army commander, and that is the way it is for tactical purposes. 
The Navy has taken over the military governorship. 

Admiral Standley. In that change in command or the principle of 
command, has there been any change in the organization or authority 
or responsibility for defense of the island ? 

General Short. That has happened since I was relieved from com- 
mand. 

Admiral Standley. You would not know of that? 

General Short. No, I would not. I know since the order was re- 
ceived that General Emmons had a long conference with Admiral 
JPye, but I do not know the details of any understanding of theirs. I 
doubt that it has affected the principle very much except that now in 
place of getting coordination, Admiral Pye would be able to order it. 

Admiral Standley. You spoke in one case here of getting certain 
messages or a message from Admiral Kimmel ? 

General Short. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Then in other cases you got messages or an in- 
terchange of messages with Admiral Block ? 

General Short. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. ^Vliy is that? 

General Short. Our prescribed channel for anything formal is Ad- 
miral Block, but if there is a formal agreement, they print it and 
Admiral Block would ordinarily sign that agreemenL Very fre- 
quently I get word from the War Department to confer with the 
Commander in Chief of the fleet and Admiral Block practically al- 
ways sat in one those conferences, too. 

Admiral Standley. Then would it be possible for Admiral Kimmel 
to get a message from the Chief of Naval 0]5erations, relaying certain 
warnings and so forth, and you not receive that message? 

[14^] General Short. Yes, it would be possible without that 
message specifically telling him to furnish to to me, he would only give 
it to me ats a matter of information. 

Very frequently if he got any information that he thought was of 
importance and he knew it was not being furnished to me, he would 
send a staff officer to me to show it to me or else give me a paraphrased 
copy. Sometimes he did one and sometimes the other. It was volun- 
tary on his part. 

Admirnl Standley. Was there any sort of embarrassment or mis- 
understanding or anything untoward because of the fact that there 
were two officers down there to deal with ? 

General Short. No. We had very friendly relations. Most of 
the time we all three sat in on a discussion. 

Admiral Standley. You don't remember haviufr seen or heard of a 
message that started out, "This is a war warning"? 

General Short. No, sir, I didn't see it. 

Admiral Standley. That message never got to you ? 

General S'^ort. No. 

General McCoy. Didn't it instruct the admiral to inform him? 

General Short. May I ask the date of that message? 

The Chairman. November 27. 

General Short, It mav have been the same. It may have been the 
same as my message of the 27th. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 91 

The Chairman. No. It started out, "This is a war warning." 

General Short. I don't remember seeing it. I think I would re- 
member seeing that. ' 

The Chairman. I think I asked you whether you thought you had 
been apprised of that message but you said you did not recall, that 
3^ou had been in conference with the Navy officers and supposed you 
had seen it. 

General Short. Oh, I was in conference for two or three hours. If 
they got that later in the day 

(l^] The Chairman. You were in conference with them again 
later than this? 

General Short. Yes. 

The Chairman. They may or may not have shown it to you, but 
that is the best you can say on that? 

General Short. I do not know whether I saw it or not. I am not 
sure. 

The Chairman. Have I asked your staff whether there is any report 
of the Navy having messaged it to you ? 

General Short. No. 

The Chairman. We have not received any reply ? 

Mr. HoAVE. There was some difficulty in the files. 

General Short. I did get a message from the Chief of Staff on the 
same day. 

General McCot. Did you show it to the admiral? 

General Short. I think I did. We had the same procedure that 
anything that is important, I send a copy right over by the staff officer, 
and especially if the Chief of Staff said to give this information to the 
Navy, then I would send it over just as promptly as possible. 

General McCoy. I remember Admiral Stark read that to us and he 
said it instructed Admiral Kimmel to show it to the Army man. 

General Short. I may have seen it. It may not have had any in- 
formation that wasn't in mine of the 27th, in which case I would 
remember it. 

Admiral Standley. But you don't remember that statement ? You 
say you don't remember the wording, "This is a war warning"? 

General Short. That is correct. I don't remember. 

Admiral Standley. General, you made statements in regard to anti- 
aircraft. That is now installed here? 

General Short. Yes. It is about six weeks since that work started. 

Admiral Standley. Is it entirely completed? 

[14o] General Short. No, sir. We were authorized to begin 
three fixed and six mobile stations. We started building these fixed sta- 
tions. We had to build a roa dto the mount of TIaleakela, 10,000 feet 
high, and they are putting in a station there now. That is the highest 
mountain we are putting one on. 

We started putting one, which is almost completed, on the Island of 
Kauai. The Navy has one force to the northwest. 

They started putting one on Kahala that is almost completed. That 
is a steep grade. You have to use a cable. We have been four months 
trying to get a priority on a cable. So, of the fixed stations, none of 
them were in operation. 

Later on. probably a month ago, we wore authorized to build three 
additional fixed stations that have been started. Our mobile stations 
are working and six fixed stations are working. 



92 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Standley. How long has it been since you first requested 
this detector material ? 

General Short. I would say it is probably back about March 6 that 
we knew about the attachment, because I made a serious effort to have 
some of these things operating by July 1. The parts did not arrive. 

Admiral Standley. What was the reason for the delay in obtaining 
this material ? 

General Short. Of course, it is a new thing and it had to be manu- 
factured. These electrical things take time. Apparently they could 
not get it out fast enough. That is the demand of electrical things in 
every way, not just aircraft warning. 

Admiral Standley. You referred to the possibility or the fact that 
certain alerts would interefere with your training? Is it also a fact 
that certain material which you have furnished to outlying stations has 
also been at the possible expense of your defense ? 

General Short. Yes, that is true. We had a total of [146] 
21 B-17's. We sent nine of those to the Philippines and I have ready 
six more with parts to go. That order was cut down to six planes in 
operation. Then tlie War Department asked me if we could let them 
have 48 75-millimeter guns, and I think it was somewhere around 120 
30-caliber machine guns. I wired back that we could spare the ma- 
chine guns. We had to take the beach guns to spare the 75's, but I 
thought the Philippines were in a more difficult way and possibly 
needed them worse, and I told them they would be ready, and I put 
them in the boat and sent them to the Philippines in the next 24 or 
48 hours. 

Admiral Standley. In other words, in the coordination plan, the 
general plan, you had time to deplete some of j'our own defenses ? 

General Shoft. Yes, but I thought if I informed the War Depart- 
ment about the To's they might not have ordered them sent. 

General McCoy. May I ask a question about the ammunition ? Did 
you send at any time in the recent past aerial bombs or reserves of 
ammunition to the Phillippines ? 

General Short. I know we haven't sent aerial bombs. I don't be- 
lieve we sent off the ammunition with the 75's. If they told us to I 
would have sent it, because we had enough ammunition that we could 
have done it without depleting our supplies. 

Admiral Standley. You referred to the request for funds and your 
delay's in obtaining money or materials, delays in building projects. 
Could you tell us what steps have been taken in the way of training and 
operations which would bring out and emphasize the needs of this com- 
mand both for the Army and the Navy in order to secure the material 
for its protection and function as a secure base ? 

General Short. I think the Navy agreed with me in the building of 
the air and the anti-aircraft which were the first [M^l things 
that we needed, and if the fleet left and took most of it for distant 
reconnaisance there would not be anytliing else to do about il. So ^ve 
made a comprehensive study and had asked to have possibly 184 B-17's 
so that we could make a 360-degree patrol for a thousand miles. 

Admiral Standley. What I am trying to bring out is whether the 
Army and the Navy engaged in joint problems, in joint evaluations 
fox tiie purpose of bringing out the needs for defense? 

General Short. The Navy participated in INIay from the 12th to 
the 24th. We had maneuvers, and the Navy participated in the air 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 93 

phase of those maneuvers and had fleet exercises. There were fleet 
exercises about the last week in March and the first week in April to 
get our two air forces Avorkinf^ in coordination. We haven't had any 
exercises in land operations. With respect to the land forces getting 
land operations against this Island, the ground force would not get 
the same exercises, the same as against the Island of Kauai, because 
that represented the characteristics that he thought he might run into 
out in the Mandate Islands. I think that was the main purpose he 
took his task force there, and this was the reason they were away from 
8 o'clock Sunday morning before this attack started. The reason I 
sent the officer along was to observe these land operations. 

Admiral Standlet. From your knowledge or from the facts that 
you have, do you know how far back, how many years back the Navy 
and the Army have been building up on joint operations here, joint 
exercises or how long the joint exercises have been between the fleet 
and the Army ? 

General Short. I think it must be back to 1934, but I think we had 
more detailed exercises in recent months than ever before and in many 
exercises was just working as a team. 

Admiral Standley. Were you here when the fleet came here in 1925 ? 

[J4^] General Short. I was never stationed here until last Feb- 
ruary. 

Admiral Standlet. You spoke about going before the Senate here. 
How many members of that Senate are Japanese ? 

General Short. There is one or two, I think no more than two. 

Admiral Standlet. Does the House have any greater number ? 

General Short, The House may have as many as four or five. I 
don't know exactly. 

Admiral Standlet. Do not put this in the record. 

(There was a discussion off the record.) 

Admiral Standlet, That is all. 

General McCot, Does it show in your statement the description of 
the attacks as to the results and as to the effects and as to the time 
and the losses on both sides ? 

General Short. I have given the detailed studies there of the planes 
before the attack, the ones damaged, and the ones back in commission 
on December 20. I showed what damage we inflicted on the enemy in 
the way of planes. I do not believe I put in there the losses in men. I 
think i can probably give that to you from memory. 

The dead up to December 20 was nine officers and 22S enlisted men ; 
the wounded, 16 officers and 435 enlisted men. Some of those were 
slight wounds and some of them were serious. 

General McCot, Can you state where those occurred ? 

General Short, They occurred very largely at Hickam Field. There 
were 38 killed at Wheeler Field. 

In Hickam Field most of the losses occurred there — there is a large 
barracks that houses 3,500 men, and they bombed that barracks, and 
practically anybody who was on the top floor in that barracks was 
killed or seriously wounded. The people on the first floor weren't 
injured at all. It is a three-story building. Most of the losses were 
taken right in that one barracks, 

[149] General McCot. Were there any losses in attempting to 
get the planes into the air? 



94 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. Yes. There were some planes pnlled right out of 
the fire. That started at Wheeler Field, where they succeeded in 
pulling the planes out of the fire. 

General McCoy. Have you made any investigation of these sepa- 
rate incidents at Hickam' Field and at Wheeler Field and at other 
installations ? 

General Short. As to just exactly the details? 

General McCoy. As to what happened ? 

General Short. We have gotten in detailed reports, and I have 
gone over them and tried to arrive at what happened. Of course, 
there are always discrepancies. You get a difference of opinion as to 
just what happened. 

I have gone over them and I have culled from the statements of the 
anti-airci'aft and made a chart showing exactly when the battery 
started firing and what it thought itbrought down. 

I have a statement in there showing when the pursuit planes were 
put in the air, which was 8 : 50, and some of them earlier, and the 
bombers took off at 11 : 40 under naval control. I don't know if these 
bombers were actually in the air earlier than that or not. 

General McCoy. The commanding officers in each one of these 
places have made reports? 

General Short. Yes. 

General McCoy. Did you make any investigation as to the conduct 
of the senior officers in these installations ? 

General Short. All the reports I have about the conduct indicate 
that everybody at the time was excellent in conduct. I know I talked 
with Colonel Fielder, who is commanding that post there, and he told 
me he was machine-gunned getting across the road from his quarters 
to the hangar while the first attack [ISO] was going on. He 
was not hit, but the Japanese planes came down the line and turned 
around and came back and had apparently figured the officers would 
be trying to get across the road to the hangar line, but I am not sure 
whether there were four officers, or whether they were killed in getting 
across the road by the planes. 

General McCoy. Do you know if all the commanding officers were 
present in the garrison ? 

General Short. Yes, I know they were all present. 

Admiral Staxdley. If I may, before we leave this there were some 
headlines in the papers before we left the States, charges and so forth, 
and among them I will start out with the newspaper account given 
out by the Secretary of the Navy on his return. He stated that, as T 
remember, the Army and Navy were not on the alert. Is that in his 
statement ? Did he say the Army and the Navy, or the military and 
the naval forces? I think he said the Army and the Navy, but of 
that I am not certain. 

General Short. I think he said the service. The first report I saw 
said "service", and then another report said "the Army and the Navy." 

General McCoy. What do you think that was based on ? 

Admiral Standley. The one I saw said the Army and the Navy. 

General McCoy. What do you think that was based on. General? 

General Short. I talked with Mr. Knox for probably an hour and a 
half or two hours. I gave him very largely but not in as great detail 
what I have told you gentlemen here this morning. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 95 

General McCoy. You did not present anything to him in writing? 

General Short. None whatever, no. It was over at Admiral 
Kimmers quarters. 

11-51'] General McCoy. Were the admiral and you together at 
the time? 

General Short. Yes. Secretary Knox, Admiral Kimmel, Admiral 
Block, and Captain Smith, and I think Captain ;Mc:Morris was there 
part of the time. 

General McCoy. Do you know whether he made any other in- 
vestigation ? 

General Short. He came over to my command post the following 
morning and wanted to get a picture of how we organized the fight- 
ing, and I had a conference arranged and I had all of our detailed 
moves, showing the who^e location and the sea-coast fire and the loca- 
tion of the lines and the location of our observation posts and detailed 
maps showing the location of the air fields and everything of that 
kind, and of our communications. 

Then I had a series of staff officers for three minutes, and of each 
of them he asked questions. 

The conference was arranged by Colonel Phillips taking about 
three minutes to describe to him the general plan of defense of the 
Island. That was outlined by Colonel Powell next, the Signal Officer 
of the Department, explaining in detail our signal system with maps 
so that he could get a picture of what kind of communications we 
had. That was followed by Major Lawton describing the coast and 
artillery defenses and the location of the guns and the sea-coast fire 
and the range of the different gims, and things of that kind. 

Then General Martin took up the question of the air work, the 
aircraft work, and the Secretary asked him many questions, and in 
place of what was to be three minutes for discussion, it probably went 
into ten minutes. 

Following General IMartin, the 24th Division operations, or the in- 
fantry, was described b}^ General Brush presenting the ground de- 
fenses of the 24th Division. Then the operations officer of the 25th 
Division presented — no, it was the officer \^152'] of the 24th pre- 
senting the ground defenses and General Brush presented the 25th 
ground defenses. 

We tried to give him a complete picture of just how we were or- 
ganized to fight and how we carried it out. 

When he told me what he wanted I asked him and he said that 
was all he wanted. Then Colonel Phillips was finished presenting 
that and he asked questions for about 15 minutes, largely of the air, 
about what was done at that time, and then he went through my 
command post, and I took him through. 

So far as I know, that was the only investigation he made of what 
happened in the Army forces. I am quite sure that was all he saw. 

General McCoy. So far as you know, did your subordinates all carry 
out their missions and duties? 

General Short. Yes. 

General McCoy. To your satisfaction ? 

General Short. I think without exception. I think there may have 
been some feeling in the War Department that maybe the air had been 



96 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

a little asleep or something. General Arnold, the Chief of Staff of 
the air called me. He talked with Colonel Phillips. I was out at 
the time. He asked Colonel Phillips whether he was satisfied with 
General Martin's action, and he said he had somebody he could replace 
him with. 

Colonel Phillips told him he thought I was, but he left word and 
told me to radio. I radioed as soon as I got in that I was completely 
satisfied with Martin's conduct. 

General McCoy. Have you been conscious, as a responsible com- 
mander, of the Avay these Axis attacks have been carried out ? 

General Short. What is that ? 

General McCoy. Have you been conscious, as a responsible com- 
mander, of the way the Axis powers have successfully launched each 
attack without a declaration of war, a surprise attack, particularly 
in the air and against air fields? 

General Short. Yes. I have realized that particularly. [i^^] 
As I say, if the fleets had not been present in Hawaiian waters I 
would have expected such a thing, but I did not think it was possible 
with the fleet here. 

General McCoy. Do you remember the beginning of the Russo- 
Japanese War and the attack on the Russian fleet? 

General Short. Yes, I remember that perfectly. 

General McCoy. In other words, having that in mind, and what 
has happened during this war and things of that nature, these surprise 
attacks in each case, why did it happen that there remained in your 
mind the threat only of attempted sabotage ? 

General Short. Because I felt that if the Navy which had enough 
resources in the way of intelligence agencies and so forth, and if the 
Navy with enough ships out on task forces with forces out week after 
week covering several hundred miles, and I felt that if they did not 
succeed in intercepting a carrier they would at least know if they were 
within hundreds of miles of Hawaii. We all recognized the facilities 
which they had in the way of ships and planes. 

General McCoy. It is an old habit of responsibile soldiers to con- 
sider the worst that might happen. Not what you think is going to 
happen but the worst that might happen from the enemy. 

General Short. Yes. 

General McCoy. Did you think of that ? 

General Short. Yes ; frankly I had thought of that. I took into 
consideration all my wires from the War Department where they were 
interested in not alarming the public and not causing publicity and 
actions about sabotage and subversive movements, and I had sent 
my order to them and they knew exactly what I was doing, and they 
did not raise any objection and they did not say I was not doing the 
right thing, and I thought they knew more about what was going on in 
a diplomatic way than I did. 

General McCoy. I am conscious as an old soldier of the [io-4] 
great irritation in reading in the papers at home suspicions of the 
reasons for the Army and the Navy not being on guard; not being 
ready to have any suspicions, but having in mind the fact that for 25 
years this particular command has just been training and preparing 
for this very thing. 

General Short. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 97 

General McCoy. There have been various things said to the effect, 
in one of them, that on Saturday night everybody was out on parties 
^nd that there was unusually heavy drinking in Hawaii. Now, with- 
out making any direct charges, just those general statements, and I 
am satisfied that no such things did occur because you would not know 
what every officer in your command or your soldiers were doing, but 
are you satisfied that ^vhatever they did had nothing to do with what 
happened the next morning? 

General Short. I am absolutely positive. My men are not the 
men who would get involved in getting drunk. My two air men 
never take a drink. General Martin and General Davidson have not 
had a drink in j^ears. I do not know whether they ever have, but I 
inow in years they have not had. 

I am sure nothing anybody did the night before had anything to do 
with what took place the next morning. 

General McCoy. Have you looked into the fact that this surprise 
attack occurred on Sunday morning and what happened in the past 
on Sunday morning as to the subordinate officers and men being on 
duty? 

General Short. Well, I know the division, the 24th Division, was 
already turning out Avithin 15 minutes, in time to reply to anti-air- 
craft guns or machine-gun fire from the air. The whole division had 
moved out by 8:30, and the same thing with the 25th Division. These 
troops were going out when the Alert No. 3 was ordered. 

General McCoy. Do your records indicate how many men were 
present ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

[JoS] General McCoy. May we have that looked into, Mr. Re- 
corder? I would like to know how many men were present for duty 
unci how many were absent. 

Is it possible to get that from your records? 

General Short. The records would not show whether they were 
present right at the formation, but I think that they would know 
when the men fell in how many men there were. If a company had 
only three or four men missing apparently they would not have taken 
the time for a full roll call at all. 

[155A] General McCoy. I doubt very much if they had roll calls 
in most cases. 

General Short. I don't imagine. That is, they would know gener- 
ally whether they had 95% or whether they had a much smaller number. 

General McCoy. Were you conscious that these Axis movements al- 
most without exception took place on Sunday ? 

General Short. I don't remember that I had noted that particular 
thing. 

General McCoy. At any time, as far as you remember, had you 
thought of the fact that Sunday was the most dangerous day? 

General Short. I had not given that particular thought. " Here that 
would probably affect us less than almost any place be(?ause, I say, the 
men get to their posts in thirty minutes to an hour, and practically 
nobody ever stays in town. 

General McCoy. Did you issue any instructions in view of the alert 
as to the number of men or proportion of men that should be permitted 
to leave their commands ? 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 1 8 



98 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Short. Ordinarily a minimum of 50% is kept in the post at 
all times on alerts. 

General McCoy. But did you issue any special order as the result of 
the alert? 

General Short. No. It has been my practice that on any kind of 
alert 507o of the command must be immediately available to turn out, 
and in certain organizations there must be a hundred percent, complete. 

General McCoy. Did you issue any special instruction on that score ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

General McCoy. As a result of the imminence of hostilities ? 

General Short. Not on that particular point, because we had — the 
reserves were maintained at certani definite places, [io6\ full 
battalions. 

General McCoy. Did I understand you to say that it was not cus- 
tomary for the Admiral to notify you when his fleet was leaving or 
entering the harbor? 

General Short. No, sir, I did not get notice. 

General McCoy. You never did ? 

General Short. No, sir, not personally. Now, of course, my harbor 
control post knew every time a ship went in or out, but whether — any 
kind of a ship. 

The Chairman. And where would that information be deposited as 
a matter of record ? 

General Short. The harbor control post down at Fort Kamehameha ; 
it was a combination post that the Army and the Navy operate there, 
and no 

The Chairman. I mean, that didn't come to your headquarters? 

General Shout. No, it didn't come to my headquarters. I could 
have had it come to my headquarters. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Short. But I did not have it come to my headquarters. 
No boat can come in or go out without signalling that post and getting 
authority, and that was operated in combination, Army and Navy. 
The chief thing was that, so that our harbor defense guns would know 
any minute whether — we could tell them whether to fire on a ship or 
not. 

General McCoy. Do you know or have you been informed since of 
when the battle ship divisions came into Pearl Harbor ? 

General Short. I am of the opinion that they came in the Saturday 
afternoon, but I am just relying on memory without ever having any 
official report, so it would be better not to say. 

General McCoy. Did the Admiral at that time ask you for any spe- 
cial protection or to be on guard to protect his ships? 

[157] General Short. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Nor Admiral Bloch ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

General McCoy. So that there were no special precautions taken? 

General Short. None. 

General McCoy. When the fleet was in or out of the harbor? No 
change? 

General Short. No. Just regularly they were always sending 
out a couple of task forces and would be bringing another one back in, 
and they handled that themselves except for this harbor control post. 

General McCoy. I have no further questions for the present. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 99 

The Chairman. I have another question or Iavo, General. Would 
it be true to say that this attack was a complete surprise to both Army 
and Navy? 

General Short. I think so, definitely. 

The Chairman. And would it be true to say that its initial success 
was due to a lack of a state of readiness against an air attack of this 
kind by both branches of the service? 

General Short. Partly. I will say this: that if we had been ab- 
solutely on the alert for this kind of an attack, I believe that those low 
flying planes that came in at 200 feet would probably have gotten in 
regardless. It's pretty hard — your gunfire is very ineffective 
against planes as low as 200 feet, and the chances are they would have 
gotten in. We would have probably gotten a lot of the others. 

The Chairman. Who is your chief intelligence officer? 

General Short. Colonel Fielder. 

The Chairman. Who is Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell? 

(xeneral Short. Ha is what we call the contact officer. He stays- 
he has charge of our counterespionage group and works [^^<^] 
intimately with F. B. I. He has his office downtown right adjoining 
F. B. I. and works intimately with them, and he has a group of 
counterintelligence police working under him. 

The Chairman. Did you get any report through your Intelligence 
on December 3rd with respect to a radio message to Japan giving a 
pretty definite outline of the form and nature of this attack? 

General Short. I don't remember anything of that kind at all. Are 
you sure that it was not deciphered after the attack? 

The Chairman. No, I am not. 

General Short. No, I know I didn't — I haven't seen all of those, 
but in this file of the consul, the Japanese consul, that the F. B. I. got 
when they went there to — wdien they went to arrest them there they 
got this file, and they sent the file down to Naval Intelligence to be 
broken, and I understand that they did get very definite information 
as to the nature of the attack. 

The Chairman. Were you informed on December 3rd, 1941, that 
the Japanese consulate was burning its papers and records? 

General Short. No, sir, I was not. 

The Chairman. I understand you personally were never informed 
of the occurrence of that ? 

General Short. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Of that occurrence, whenever it took place, until 
after the attack? 

General Short. That is correct. Are you sure of the date, Mr. 
Justice ? 

Admiral Standley. I have the 6th. 

General Short. I think it was December 6th that they show rather 
than the 3rd, and I didn't know — 

The Chairman. I am not sure of the date. 

General Short. I didn't know until the next day ; I did not [JoO] 
until the next day when I checked with Mr. Shivers, the head of the 
F. B. L, that there had been any burning of papers before. 

The Chairman. You don't know when your staff was informed of 
that fact? 

General Short. I do not. 

The Chairman. Allri"ht,sir. That is all I have. 



100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Reeves. General, you said that had you been fully alert, 
and had this attack not been a surprise, that you think the low flying 
planes might have been successful ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Because your guns wouldn't be effective against 
them? 

General Short. They are not as effective. 

Admiral Reeves. Do you mean that you relied entirely on anti- 
aircraft gunfire for security, or do you rely also on pursuit and fighter 
planes ? 

General Short. If you knew exactly the minute that that attack was 
going to take place, you would have your pursuit in the air to meet it, 
and you would try to meet it many miles out; but if you had a squadron 
on the ground ready to go into the air there would be quite a possi- 
bility that those first low planes would have gotten in before you could 
have gotten to them. Without you had been tipped off that an attack 
was going to take place at a certain hour and certain minute you would 
never have — you couldn't possibly keep all your pursuit in the air 
constantly for that kind of a proposition. 

Admiral Reeves. If you had been fully alert your radio detector 
service would have given warning of the approach? 

General Short. Radio detector service covers 

Admiral Reeves. And your fighter planes might have been in the 
air ? 

General Short. They gave us 35 minutes warning. If a [160] 
state of war had existed and we liad had a squadron always ready to 
take off, we undoubtedly would have gotten that squadron in the air. 
We could not keep all of our planes in such a state of readiness that we 
could get them all in the air in 35 minues. 

The Chairman. That was on account of the size of your field rela- 
tive to your planes ? 

General Short. Well, no. I mean you couldn't do that day in and 
day out ; you would wear out your troops and your planes, and you 
wouldn't have anybody when the crucial time came. 

General McCoy. You spoke, however, of the air being full of planes 
every morning starting at four o'clock in the morning. Apparently 
there were none up on this morning, of all others? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Sunday morning. Have you looked into the reason 
for that? 

General Short. I have not looked into the reason for that because 
the details of the — I mean the exact time that the field sent up a certain 
group of pilots for training was a detail that they ran, and I have 
not looked into it. 

General McCoy. General Davidson would know about that ? 

General Short. General Davidson and General Rudolph would both 
know the reasons why. 

General McCoy. What is General Rudolph's command? 

General Short. Rudolph commands the bombers, the bomber wing. 

General McCoy. General Davidson commands the pursuit planes? 

General Short. General Davidson commands the pursuit planes. 

General McCoy. x\re there any of the air attack planes here, air 
attack squadrons? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 101 

[J61] General Short. Air what? 

General McCoy. Or do they have any of those nowadays ? 

General McNarney. The A-20's have taken their place nowadays. 

General Short. The attack. 

General McNarney. The two-engined light bombers, A-20 attack. 

General Short. Yes. 

General McCoy. They don't have that low flying formation that you 
used to have ? 

General McNarney. No ; that has been somewhat passe since they 
have built the two-engined light bomber which they call the attack, but 
they do do some'low flying. 

General McCoy. Would such planes be able to handle such an attack 
as these low flying torpedo planes made ? 

General McNarney. They could, yes, but would probably use the 
A-20A fighter. 

The Chairman. Did j^ou have any A-20's? 

General Short. Yes, sir. We had ten. I think there were nine in 
commission and one out on that morning. 

The Chairman. Did I understand you to say that the bulk of the 
morning flying was practice flying ? 

General Short. Yes, just ordinarily, just regular and regular 
training flying. 

The Chairman. Training flying ? 

General Short. Yes, sir, the bulk of all the flying. The only time 
that we did straight reconnaissance flying was when we were carrying 
out a problem with the Navy or sent out for long distance leconnaissance 
for the Navy. 

The Chairman. Was there any warning system on Hickam Field? 
And, if so, how was the alarm to be set off? 

General Short. The details of that, I believe it would be safer if 
you ask 

[1G2] The Chairman. All right. 

General Short. Because I might be wrong in the thing. 

General McCoy. Were the pursuit planes armed and supplied with 
ammunition at all ? 

General Short. They were not. 

General McCoy. If they went up at all they had 

General Short. They had to arm their — yes, they did ; they had to 
arm their planes. 

General McCoy. In other words, up to that moment the planes were 
not on a war footing ? 

General Short. They were not, no sir. 

General McNarney. Have you reached any conclusion as to why the 
Japs picked approximately eight o'clock to make their attack? 

General Short. No. The only way you could arrive at it would be 
the fact that they made up their minds — that they knew we would 
figure that it had to be made sometime around the vicinity of daylight 
to get the benefit of the darkness hour running their carriers in, that 
we might be expecting them more about dawn, and that they would 
delay it an hour as a bigger surprise. That is the only conclusion I 
could draw, that they figured they would get more surprise out of it at 
eight o'clock then they would at dawn, and maybe — that's just 
guesswork. 



102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McNarney. That would be my conclusion ; more surprise. 

General Short. Yes. They expected us to be more careful at the 
most dangerous hour, which we were. 

Admiral Eee^tcs. Could it have been possible that they were aware 
of your standing order to secure at seven o'clock each morning? 

General Short. It could be possible. 

Admiral Reeves. That was true, was it, that that was a standing 
order ? 

[163] General Short. Oh, yes, that was it, because that was just 
a routine training proposition. It would have been probably fairly 
easy for them to obtain that order; we have fully 1500 Japanese 
serving here as enlisted men. 

Admiral Eeeves. You say this was a routine training operation. 
You didn't man those radio detector stations, then, as a matter of 
security ? 

General Short. Both, but the basic thing was that I knew that they 
needed this training worse than any other part of the command. They 
were new, so I took — I thought I would make them take it more 
seriously: I put them in this alert specifically to give them — not so 
much that I thought that they were going to be used to the real thing 
but to get the battle training at the hours when it was most needed and 
most difficult. 

General McCoy. In other words, there were no troops in your com- 
mand ready for war at that moment ? 

General Short. No, sir. They were ready for uprisings. They 
were — we were definitely organized to meet any uprising or any act 
of sabotage or anything of that kind. A battalion of troops was the 
bigirest unit that was ready to fight right tlien. 

General iMcCoT. Were the bombers in the same state of unprepared- 
ness as the fighting planes ? 

General Short. Yes, sir. Without 

General McCoy. And as I remember you said all these planes that 
were ferried back and forth in recent months enroute to the Philippines 
arrived here without arms or ammunition ? 

General Short. Well, what I was talking about, the ones that came 
in then, I said that in the planes that we sent on I saw that they were 
in an instant state of readiness before they were let out. Now, that 
did not apply to bombs ; that [164] applied only to machine gun 
ammunition to defend themselves. They could not have made part of 
the flight with bombs. They could make it with machine gun ammu- 
nition, and if they had a fuU weight of bombs they couldn't make the 
flight from Wake to Port Moresby, and what we were doing was not 
arming for offensive action; we were arming for the personal pro- 
tection of the person]iel. I think most of the previous planes coming 
in had had their machine guns, but that we had equipped them with 
ammunition here, and I had no orders from the War Department ; I 
took tliat responsibilitv myself. 

General INIcCoy. A^Tiat became of those two photograph planes 
that were on the mission to the 

General Short. Only one of them ever got here. I don't know 
what held it up on the mainland. And the one that got here was 
parked in a hangar and was destroyed. We didn't send it on be- 
cause it was not equipped so it could protect itself, and we didn't have 
the adapter, so we could not put in the guns. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 103 

General McNarney. Did you discuss with the Navy the category 
of aleit required to meet the situation as it was known to you on 
November 27 ? 

General Short. They knew. They knew, I am sure, that we were 
not in — not alerted to resist an air attack, that we were alerted thor- 
oughly for sabotage. 

General McNarnet. You didn't actually coordinate with the Navy 
as to whether they considered Alert No. 1 sufficient? 

General Short. I didn't go down and ask the Navy, no, sir, whether 
they considered it sufficient. I am sure from all of our talk that every- 
body understood just what was being done. 

The Chairman. This Alert No. 1 or Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3 is 
referred to in this joint defense plan. Was it intended that the same 
alert would be ordered by the Navy as by the Army in each case ? 

General Short. I hadn't — yes. 

The Chairman. I am very much in difficulty because of my [-?^^] 
lack of knowledge of military procedure. 

General Short. Well, I would say that the same situation that would 
cause me to go on the alert against an air attack should cause the 
Navy to get all their ships out of the harbor because they could not 
defend themselves when they are huddled in the harbor. If they 
were going on an alert against air attack I think they would move out 
all their major ships. If they were going on alert against submarine 
they would probably prefer to have them inside. 

Admiral Standley caji answer that much better than I can. Would 
that be correct? 

Admiral Keeves. During war, General, 

General Short. Beg pardon ? 

Admiral Reeves. During war, actual war, are you not on the alert 
always against an air attack? 

General Short. You would during war, yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Yes. Well, now, at the present time we are at 
war. 

General Short. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. By your testimony just now, do you expect the 
Navy to remain at sea throughout the duration of the war, because of 
that' threat? 

General Short. I would expect them to come into the harbor only 
a part of the time. I wouldn't expect them, if they had a dozen 
battleships here, ever to put them all in the harbor at the same time; 
and, when they put them in, that they would have their task forces 
of airplane carriers, cruisers, and destroyers where they could be 
reasonably sure of detecting any enemy carriers far enough out to 
protect their battleships. I don't believe that the Navy would start 
a battleship from here lo San Francisco tomorrow by itself, because it 
couldn't protect itself. 

Tlie Chairman. Genei-al McNarney, have you another question? 

\J66] General McNarney. No, sir, I have no more. 

The Chairman. Admiral Reeves? 

Admiral Reeves. No, I have nothing more. 

The Chairman. General? Admiral? 

Admiial Standley. Yes, I would like to pursue this just a little bit 
further. 



104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Your answer to that last question, General Short, brings up the- 
whole question of what is the purpose of a naval base. 

General Short. The purpose of a naval base, as I see it, is to pro- 
vide facilities to which the Navy can go for servicing the ships and foi 
repairing them and for supplying them. 

Admiral Standlet. What of recreation for your crew and rest for 
your crew ? 

General Short. Of course that does enter in. That would be sec- 
ondary in case of a real fight. 

Admiral Standley. Well, then would you expect the Navy to pro- 
vide their own security in that case, or whose responsibility is that? 

General Short. It would be everybody's responsibility. 

Admiral Standley. The what? Whose?, 

General Short. If they are in a state of war — if there had been a. 
state of war and I knew that the Navy was bringing in all those battle- 
ships, I would have doubled my alertness with regard to my air pro- 
tection, definitely, but I w^ould have expected tliem to have every 
anti-aircraft gun on their ships absolutely alert and to have all 
possible marine anti-aircraft under my command for the same purpose. 

Admiral Standley. Well, but what I am trying to get at is. Is it 
your concept — suppose this war lasts a year — is it your concept of this 
base that the Navy is to go out and stay out? 

General Short. I think • 

Admiral Standley. Or could it — is the base to be used as a place 
of rest, a haven where the Navy can go in and be [167~\ pro- 
tected ? What is your belief ? 

General Short. I don't believe, under modern conditions of aviation^ 
that there is any restricted area where it will ever be safe for the Navy 
to go in and huddle. 

Admiral Standley. Well, but that is afterthought. Now, what has 
been the concept of this base from the beginning of time? 

General Short. The concept of the base, before the air accounted for 
as much in the fighting game, was that they could come in here, they 
could put out their submarine nets, and they would be relatively safe. 
I think the Navy has been perfectly conscious in the last two or three 
years that this was too restricted an area for the fleet; that a bay like 
Manila Bay, extending from Cavite to Manila Bay probably 60 miles 
long would be an immensely safer place to put a fleet in view of an air 
attack, because you could disperse them and you wouldn't have such 
an enormous target. All joi\ had to do was to drive by down here when 
the fleet was all in ; you can see that they just couldn't be missed if they 
had a serious air attack. There were too many — there was too little 
water for the number of ships. 

The CiiAiRMAN, I don't understand your testimony. General, at ally 
to imply that it wasn't your obligation to protect that harbor in every 
way you could. 

General Short. No, not in the least. I am implying that it would be 
practically impossible to protect the ships in such a restricted area 
against a serious attack, no matter how nmch you tried; that they 
would be so close together that they would be bound to suffer losses, 
and I don't believe the Navy at war would ever take a chance on 
putting the entire fleet in Pearl Harbor. 

The Chairman. In other words, you say that no matter how ap- 
parently impregnable the defense against air attack was made, 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 105 

[1681 if you had been on the complete alert and had had every 
machine and every fightino; airship and every anti-aircraft gun that 
you could specify, you could not guarantee the Navy that you could 
keep one or more planes from getting in there and making a hit on a 
battleship ? 

General Short. Definitely not ; the area was too restricted. 

Admiral Standlet. Have your ideas materially changed since the 
7th of December? 

General Shokt. Not on that point. That has been apparent and I 
believe that you will find that Admiral Kimmel would have had the 
same idea, that the area was too restricted in case of war to have the 
fleet in there. 

Admiral Standley. Well, your basic plans state specifically that 
that is the responsibility of the forces here, to protect that base. 

General Short. That is correct. 

Admiral Standlet. All right. Now, if you had those ideas have 
you discussed them with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch along 
those lines? Have you ever discussed with them the situation, or 
rather, whether or not they should bring their fleet in, or how many? 
Has that ever been discussed ? 

General Short. I don't think that I have discussed that particular 
point as to how many ships they would bring in. 

Admiral Standlet. I haven't anything further. 

The Chairivian. Anything more, gentlemen ? 

(There was no response.) 

The Chairman. Well, General, we may have a postscript. 

General Short. All right, sir. 

The Chairman. We may think of something else we may want to ask 
you about. 

General Short. All right, sir. 

The Chairman. So I have no doubt you will be available if we need 
you. 

1^69] General Short. All right, sir. 

The Chairman. We will excuse you for the time being, sir. 

General McCot. And I think we might say that if as a result of this 
testimony and our questions he wislies to present anything he may. 

The Chairman. Yes, further; if anything su]:)plenientary occurs to 
you that you think we ought to have, please feel free to furnish it. 

General Short. Thank you very much. And if I may I would like 
to say to Admiral Standley that I am not trying to set up any idea of 
naval tactics; that I am just talking from the point of view of the de- 
fense that I could afford Pearl Harbor or that anybody else could have 
afforded it if the area were too restricted for the number of ships ; that 
far be it from me to try to present a tactical doctrine for the Navy. 

Admiral Standlet. I am not looking at it, General, otherwise ; I am 
just trying to get a basic understanding. 

The Chair^nian. I think you will appreciate. General, in view of the 
situation and nature of this inquiry, that nothing that has gone on in 
this room should be disclosed by you or discussed by you with anyone. 

General Short. Yes. I was" not offering it as 'a criticism' of the 
present situation. It is simply that the condition had changed over a 
period of years. When Pearl Harbor was first built it was adequate. 

The Chairman. You got my caution about not discussing? 

General Short. Yes, sir. 



106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Thank you, sir. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

The Chairman. All right. Let us call General Davidson. 

[170] TESTIMONY OF BEIGADIER GENEEAL HOWARD C. 
DAVIDSON, UNITED STATES ARMY AIR CORPS 

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. What is your full name, General? 

General Davidson. Howard C. Davidson. 

The Chairman. What is your rank? 

General Davidson. Brigadier General, Air Corps. 

The Chairman. And what was your official function on December 
7th and theretofore in the Department of Hawaii ? 

General Davidson. Commanding General, Fourteenth Pursuit 
Wing. 

The Chairman. As part of your duties you had the interceptor serv- 
ice, the airplane interceptor command. Tell me what your tasks were 
as such. 

General Davidson. I had the pursuit wing, sir, but the interceptor 
hasn't really been formed — the intei'ceptor command hadn't really 
been formed up to that time. I don't think it has been formed still. 

The Chairman. Then, the pursuit wing 

General Davidson. The pursuit wing, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. was your particular care. 

General Davidson. My particular care. 

The Chairman. And in that connection what materiel did you have 
under your command ? 

General Davidson. I had two groujis, one of four tactical squadrons 
and one of three tactical squadrons that were able to operate. Two 
other squadrons we had jiist been ordered to activate, but they had 
no airplanes. 

The Chairman. Did you have a trained force to man all the squad- 
rons you have mentioned ? 

General Davidson. Yes, sir. Not the two that have been activated. 

The Chairman. No. 

General Davidson. Thev had 

[in] The Chairman. But the others? 

General Davidson. The other seven, yes, sir. Now, they were not 
very well trained, sir. They had a force, though. We were in process 
of training them at the time. 

The Chairman. What was your routine, so far as the squadrons 
under your command went, on and before December 7 ? 

General Davidson. We were occupied principally in attempting to 
train the new pilots that had been assigned to us. We received the 
pilots with 200 hours flying, none of which had been in pursuit air- 
craft and none of which had ever fired a machine gun, and we were 
occupied principally in attempting to train those pilots. 

The Chairman. At what hours in the day were training flights being 
made ? 

General Davidson. We trained until about four p. m., sir, each day, 
and then on alternate weeks the field was assigned to one of the groups 
for night flying. We didn't try to fly both groups at night. We were 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 107 

operating both groups off Wheeler Field, and it was a little congested 
there for night flying. 

The Chairman. None of your operations were off Hickam Field? 

General Davidson. No, sir. They are now, but they were not at that 
time, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, when would the training fliglits begin in the 
morning ? 

General Davidson. They would begin at about seven-thirty, sir. 

The Chairman. What, if any, planes, to your knowledge, were flying 
in the coastal patrol from four a. m. to seven a. m. or eight a. m. ? Any ? 

General Davidson. Why, the plot shows there were planes flying, but 
I couldn't say, sir, whether they were coastal patrol planes or not. 

[173] The Chairman. Well, we have had information that in 
the early morning planes were flying all around the coastal area. Were 
those the planes under your command ? 

General DA\aDS0N. No, sir. 

The Chairman. They were not ? 

General Davidso"N. Not under my command, sir. 

The Chairman. Was there anyone else who had command of flying 
equipment besides yourself on the Island ? 

General Davidson. Yes, sir. General Eudolph and 

The Chairman. His were bombers, were they not ? 

Gejieral Davidson. His were bombers, and Admiral Bellinger had 
pati'ol planes, and there were some marine planes at Ewa, but 

The Chairman. At what ? 

General Davidson. E-w-a. "Ever" tliey call it. But whether they 
were flying or not I could not say, sir. 

The Chairman. Well, then, on a week day morning none of your 
command would be flying between four and eight in the morning? 

General Davidson. Well, about seven-thirty on a week day. This 
7th was Sunday. 

The Chairman. I know it was. 

General Davidson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I am trying to draw the distinction between Sunday 
and week days. 

General Davidson, Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. There were none flying at any time Sunday morning, 
were there ? 

General Davidson. None on Sundays of ours, as far as I know, at that 
time. 

The Chairman. That was because the men were resting on Sundays ? 

General Davidson. Yes, sir. 

[173] The Chairman. General McNarney, have you any ques- 
tions ? 

General Davidson. May I amend that sir ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General DA\^DS0N. One plane had gone to Molokai, a bomber, and 
it came back just in the midst of this raid. It might have been flying 
at that time. 

General McNarney. Have you a standing operating procedure ? 

General Davidson. We have. I just sent for some copies. The near- 
est approach to it is a paper here [indicating]. We were trying to ex- 
plain the duties of the interceptor command. We called it "Tentative 



108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Manual of Interceptor Command Organization Procedure, and Oper- 
ation for Air Defense." But it is a rather elementary effort to explain 
to the pursuit units exactly what the duties of the interceptor command 
were. 

The Chairman. Well, I am only a layman anud don't know your 
military procedure, and therefore I am a little at large on this ques- 
tion. Let me clear it if I can. Am I to understand that the force 
under you and the small bomber force of General Rudolph were the only 
forces available to repel the airplane raid on Pearl Harbor ? If not, 
will you tell me what the total available force for that purpose was on 
December 7 ? 

General Davidson. As I say, there were 34 marine planes, I think 
mostly dive bombers, over there, and I imagine they could have been 
considered a part of the force that was available. 

The Chairman. Now, under the coordination plan, in the case of an 
air raid would those marine planes be available to you or to General 
Martin ? Who would take command of them ? 

General Davidson. If they were fighters they were available to me, 
but if 

The Chairman. If they were dive bombers ? 

General Davidson. Dive bombers, they probably would be — come 
to me also. That is, in our joint maneuvers they have [^74] 
often assigned me some dive bombers, which we didn't use as dive 
bombers : we used them to attempt to track the enemy back to the 
carrier in which he came, but the joint agreement says that bombers 
will be assigned to Patrol Wing 2 and the fighters to the Fourteenth 
Pursuit Wing for operation. 

The Chairman. Wlio had command of the Fourteenth Pursuit 
Wing? 

General Davidson. I had the command of the Fourteenth Pursuit 
Wing. 

The Chairman. You did. Now, I have your two groups of pursuit 
planes in mind ; I have General Rudolph's small force of bombers. 

General Davidson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And perhaps six — in mind. I have the 34 planes 
of whatever character the Marines had who would come under your 
command to repel an attack. Now, what else had you ? 

General Da\t;dson. Nothing else, sir. 

The Chairman. Nothing more ? 

General Davidson. Nothing more, no, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, if a state of war had been declared, would 
plans have been made to coordinate a repulsive action against a possible 
raid? 

General DA\qDS0N. The plans were already in operation, sir. We 
had 

The Chairman. What alert would that be ? 

General Davidson. That would be Alert No. 3, probably, sir. We 
were on Alert No. 1. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General McCoy. "Wliat were your duties under that alert ? 

General Davidson. Simply guarding against sabotage, and we had 
direct orders, in a telegram from Hawaiian Air Force, not to dis- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 109 

perse the airplanes ; that the airplanes would be kept [^75] con- 
centrated so they would be easier to guard against sabotage. 

The Chairman. Who issued that order? 

General Davidson. General Martin, sir. One was signed "H. A. 
F.," which means Hawaiian Air Force, and the other was signed 
"Martin." There were two telegrams. 

The Chairman. General Martin was your superior? 

General Davidson. Yes, sir. He is the Commanding General of 
the Hawaiian Air Force. 

The Chairman. What other units did he have under his command ? 
He had Rudolph's command under him ? 

General Davidson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And yours ? 

General Davidson. And mine, 

The Chairman. And anything else ? 

General DA\qDSON. except, in hostilities the operational control 

of his bombers would go to Pat. Wing 2. 

The Chairman. General McNarney ? 

General McNarney. You are familiar with the Standing Operating 
Procedure of the Department, aren't you ? 

General Davidson. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. And the covering letter on the distribution of 
the Standing Operating Procedure, as dated the 5th of November, 
requires each subordinate headquarters to furnish their standing 
operating procedure. Have you ever drawn one up ? 

General Davidson. No, sir. We got a notification from the Hawai- 
ian Air Force that they would — when they put this alert on on No- 
vember 27 they gave us a notice that they would draw up their stand- 
ing operating procedure, but until that time they simply defined to 
us the various types of alert. 

General McNaeney. Under Alert No. 2 what dispositions would 
you have made ? 

General Davidson. We would put the airplanes in the [i^'^] 
bunkers, and we keep half the people there generally ready to fly. 

General McNarney. What state of readiness would you have? 
What percentage of — what state of readiness ? 

General Davidson. Could I look at the paper, or do you want me 
to 

General McNarney. Surely ; look at the paper if you wish. 

General Davidson. I have it right here (indicating). The state of 
readiness is prescribed in the order, and it is called operational degree 
of readiness: 1 is four minutes; 2, thirty minutes; 3 is one hour; 4 
is two hours; 5 is four hours; and then, the Alert No. 2: Maintain 
aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this head- 
quarters. 

General McNarney. Have you ever directed or have you ever ac- 
tually issued any order as to what your state of readiness would be? 
You say, "as directed by this headquarters." 

General Davidson. This is from the Hawaiian Air Force. 

General McNarney. Yes. Oh, that is directed by the Hawaiian 
Air Force? 

General Davidson. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. The state of readiness of your conmiand? 



110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General DA^^DSON. They designate the state of readiness. 

General McNarney. In other words, yon received orders from 
higher authority as to the proportion of your command which should 
be in state No. 1 ; is that correct ? 

General Davidson. May I just show you the telegram ? 

General McNarney. You might read it. 

General Davidson. The telegram says— this was sent on Novem- 
ber 27 : 

Air force 27 OB Priority 

HAF Four two C period place Alert number one in effect immediately stop 
anti-sabotage only stop this [lit] is an actual repeat actual alert not a 
drill. 

Signed AGHAF 340P. 

Then that was followed by the next telegram. It says : 

Under alert number one aircraft will not be dispersed stop all units continue 
training imder condition easy five. 

That means E-5. 

General McNarney. Four hours? 

General Davidson. Easy five is just normal training condition, go 
I'ight back to normal training on the easy five. 

General McNarney. Did you have any information of the reasons 
why Alert No. 1 was put into effect ? 

General Davidson. As a matter fact I wasn't here when No. 1 was put 
into effect. I went to the United States on October 15 to study the 
interceptor command setup and didn't return until November the third, 
so I never gave it a thought as to why it was. 

The Chairman. You mean December 3rd. 

General Davidson. December 3rd, yes, sir. I came back about De- 
cember 3rd, and when I came back we Avere in Alert No. 1 easy five 
condition, which was an anti-sabotage alert, and the only effect that 
had had on us was to double our guard, practically. 

General McCoy. And to concentrate your planes? 

General Davidson. We concentrated — we kept them parked in that 
same place. General, all the time, anyway; we just did not disperse 
them. It was a concrete mat on which we had rings to tie them down 
at night. 

[178] General McNarney. You then had no actual knowledge of 
the existing condition known to the higher command here, as to the 
actual existing situation against Japan ? 

General Davidjon. No, sir. I had just come back on the 3d. I 
spent — I got back on the 3d ; I spent the 4th and the 5th either writing 
up — finishing the reports or talking to the staff of the Hawaiian Air 
Force, telling them of the setup in the United States on both the inter- 
ceptor command and the maintenance command, which was very diffi- 
cult to understand. It was contemplated putting in both those 
commands here. 

The Chairman. What do you refer to by the interceptor command, 
which 3'ou say had not been established ? 

General Davidson. The interceptor command is a combination of 
the pursuit units plus the air warning, aircraft warning regiment of 
signal corps troops princii^ally and operational control of the anti- 
aircraft artillery. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 111 

The Chairman. Well, now, a portion of the eqiiij)ment for the air- 
craft warning system had been received ? 

General Davidson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That was under your connnand, was it not? 

General Davidson. Xo, sir. 

The Chairman. Under whose? 

General Davidson. That was under the signal corps. They were 
installing these units. 

The Chairman, Well, who was responsible for the training of the 
men in the uso of these units ? 

General Davidson. We had built, through the help of the signal 
corps, a small information center with material that we could find 
on hand here. You probably will visit it; it's on the top of a little 
concrete v\'arehouse of the signal corps. But up until that time the 
signal coi'ps had handled the construction of it. The troops that 
were being trained in it are all signal corps troops and were still under 
the signal [179] corps, but 

The Chairman. Under whose command was Lieutenant Tyler? 

General Davidson. He was under my command and had been sent 
there as duty officer for that day for that training. 

The Chairiman. Well, what were his duties? 

General Davidson. We were trying principally to train the operating 
crews of the Radar stations — we call them Derax stations; the Navy 
calls them Radar — and the plotters around the board at that time, sir. 

The Chairman. Well, I still don't quite understand what Lieu- 
tenant Tyler's duties were on that morning of December 7. 

General DA\^DSON. He was the duty officer in the place there, to 
see that that training went on, and he was being trained himself, sir. 

The Chairman. Well, he is not a signal corps officer, is he? 

General DAvrosON. No, sir. He is an air corps officer. Around 
this board you have a controller, and on his right is a pursuit officer, 
and he was really acting as a pursuit officer for that day but was 
actually just being trained himself. 

The Citair:\ian. Where were you on the morning of December 7 
when the attack occurred ? 

General Daa^dson. I was in my quarters at Wheeler Field. 

The Chairman. Was it your order that the stations should be shut 
down at 7 o'clock on the morning of December 7 ? 

Gen.eral Davidson. No, sir. That was the department had issued 
such orders as that. They operate the station from 4 to 7. 

General McCoy. Are you in command of that station now? 

Genei-al Davidson. Now I am, sir. The order was just published 
a few days ago that the 14th Pursuit Wing Headquarters of my 
headquarters company would be constituted the headquarters in 
headquarters company of the interceptor command, [ISO] and 
the 14th Pursuit Wing would be designated. 

General M<'(^oy. So that now you have command of the whole lay- 
out of the detector system ? 

General Davidson. Yes, sir. 

General INIcCoy. And the anti-aircraft service, as j'^ou call it? 

General Davidson. Yes, sir. 



112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCoy. And your own groups ? 

General Davidson. Our own wing, yes, sir. 

General McCoy. But that was not the case on December 7 ? 

General Davidson. No, sir. The Aircraft Warning Service is still in 
process of being activated. We have recommended that the signal 
company that's operating now be used as a cadre to form this aircraft 
warning regiment which will operate the Aircraft Warning Service. 

General McCoy. Does that include also the present setup for aerial 
alarm? 

General Davkson. Yes, sir, and the operating of the stations on tne 
outlying islands, too, sir. 

The Chairman. The permanent station? 

General Davidson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. At the time of the first attack on the morning of 
December 7 how many men of your command were present for duty ? 

General Davidson. I couldn't tell you that, sir. 

The Chairman. Are there any data available on the subject? 

General Davidson. I suppose we could get that, sir. We could get — 
I don't know just what it would be. It would be the morning report. 

General McNarney. The morning report. 

The Chairman. When would the data for the morning report be 
gathered ? 

[i<57] General Davidson. It comes in in the morning, sir. 

The Chairman. No. I mean when would the data be gathered for 
the report? Before 7 o'clock ? 

General Davidson. I think so, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Would you see if those data can be obtained, and 
give the Commission a memorandum of the number of men present and 
the number of absentees on that morning from your command ? 

Can you state, General, whether there were less planes in the air 
early Sunday morning, December 7, than usual? 

General Davidson. Well, we generally don't have any planes in the 
air on Sundays. 

The Chairman. So that there would be less in the air than on a 
week-day ? 

General DAvmsoN. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Is there any warning signal at Hickam Field that 
can be sounded as an alarm to the men ? 

General Davidson. Yes, sir. We have what we call the alert signal. 

The Chairman. What is it ? A siren ? 

General Davidson. No, sir. It's a gong that's beaten on. We tried 
tlie siren, and it's not very effective, and every time they have a fire 
you didn't know whether you were being alerted or whether it was a 
fire signal. 

The Chairman. Is there the same system at Wheeler Field ? 

General Davidson. I though you asked Wheeler Field, sir. 

The Chairman. I asked Hickam. I asked first for Hickam Field. 

General Davidson. Yes, sir, I think Hickam uses the siren. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether those were sounded on the 
morning of the attack, and if so, when? 

General Davidson. I liad an officer call up and order the [^82] 
alert sounded, but 

The Chairman. When ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 113 

General Davidson. About 8 : 05, sir. 

The Chairman. That was after you had by the use of your own 
senses observed the attack ? 

General Davidson. Yes, sir. I heard the first bombs dropping, and 
about 8 : 05 we sounded the alert. 

The Chairman. Where is your home on the Island ? Near either of 
the fields? 

General Davidson. It's on Wheeler Field, sir. 

The Chairman. On Wheeler Field ? 

General Davidson. On Wheeler Field. 

The Chairman. The bombs were being dropped at Hickam Field at 
that time, were they not? 

General Davidson. They were dropped at Wheeler Field, too, about 
that same time. 

The Chairman. Both at the same time ? 

General Davidson. They seemed to have attacked both fields almost 
simultaneously. 

The Chairman. Have you had any report that one of your officers 
or soldiers saw the approach of this fleet some time before it reached 
any of the fields and gave an alarm ? 

General Davidson. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You have heard of no such thing ? 

General Davidson. I do not believe it. either. 

The Chairman, You do not believe such a thing occurred ? 

General Davidson. No, sir. The fleet looked very similar to Navy 
airplanes. They were painted a gray like the Navy, and their sil- 
houettes are quite similar, and I do not believe that it would have 
caused anyone to give an alarm. 

General McCoy. Lieutenant Tyler didn't report to you that there 
were planes approaching? 

General Davidson. Yes, sir. Lieutenant Tyler had a [-/55] 
chance to become a hero, but it would have been ftn accident if he had, 
because the board simply shows a little series of arrows pointing down 
as they come across the sea space, and there were many other arrows 
there, and if he had divined that that was a Japanese attack in peace- 
time it would have been almost a fifth sense. 

I have that sheet if you want to see it. 

The Chairman. I think it is attached to General Short's report to the 
Secretary of War. 

General Davidson. Oh. 

The Chairman. And that we have seen it. 

General Davidson. Yes, sir. We are having that same difficulty 
right now, sir, trying to determine friendly airplanes from foes. The 
system in England, where this was evolved, is what they call an 
I. F. F. — "Identification Friend or Foe" — setup on friendly airplanes ; 
and by directing a radio beam on that the plane will t*ell you if it's a 
friend ; and if it does not tell you it's a friend, it's a foe. But we have 
no such system, and we are in great difficulty now, still, trying to iden- 
tify friend from foe, because they send out these patrols six and eight 
hundred miles to sea, and then they turn around and come back, and 
you have to divine each one or attempt to divine which are the friends 
and which might be foes. We are doing that through making them 
report when they are 100 miles offshore their exact position. Then if 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 1 9 



114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that coincides with the arrows we assume that it's a friend. But if by 
chance they have shot down — maybe they have shot down a friend 
right there at that spot when he reports, and they would come in and 
we would plot them in as friends. 

The Chairman. I suppose you can coordinate the thing to some slight 
extent also by keeping very accurate track from the Navy of where 
their task forces are? 

General Davidson. They are doing that now, but they [i5^] 
4ire very chary, as these two admirals can vouch for, of reporting the 
position at sea, afraid it will give away the ship from which they have 
taken off. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Davidson. But we have gotten them to have the airplane 
report its position, thinking that that will not divulge the position 
•of a warship out there. 

General McNarney. Does not the radio detector give the indication 
as to the number of airplanes in a flight? 

General Davidson. It gives a big echo for a big plane, and it gives 
a big echo for a big fligiit, but the best we have gotten so far is to 
tell whether it's more than three. Now, with our present equipment, 
if it's more than three and there is any doubt about it we send a pur- 
suit patrol out there to meet it head-on, but a big ship like the B-17 
gives a big echo, and often we get that reported as two or three and 

go out and it's a 

General McNarney. Well, a flight of nine or twenty-seven, as con- 
trasted to one of three, shows up on the detector, does it not? 

General Davidson. Well, it did on this Opana detector, which is the 
best one we had, but ordinarily the operators have not been able to 
tell us anything beyond the fact that they believed it's more than three 
airplanes. 

The Chairman. Well, now, this system was not nearly in as perfect 
order on December 7 #s it is now ? 

General Davidson. No; no, sir. And we were doing operational 
training, you might say, on that system at that time. 

General IMcNarney. In order to get the record straight 15 i. of 
the Standing Operating Procedure of the Haw^aiian Department 
states that tlie Department Signal Officer will (1) insure occupa- 
tion of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then 
release it to the interceptor command; (2) insure that joint army- 
navy connnunications are in readiness for immediate employment. 
This is under alert No, 2. I [J^S5] understand, then, that un- 
"der alert No. 1 the Aircraft Warning Service had not been turned over 
to you? 
General Davidson. No, sir. 

General McNarney. You had no control over it? 
General DayIdson. Except We were attempting to teach these people 
how to operate it. We had our own Signal Corps Officers there and 
Signal Corps men; and the G-3 of the 14th Pursuit Wing, in con- 
junction with a Commander Taylor who had been loaned to us by the 
Navy, were attempting to teach these soldiers how to operate this 
board. 

General McNarney. Well, in effect they had operational control, 
but you were exercising your control only for the purposes of training ? 
General Davidson. Yes, sir. That is about the situation. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 115 

General McNarney. You were not exercising operational control 
for the purpose of security ? 

General Davidson. No, sir, because the board was not manned 24 
hours a day, which it would have to be for the purpose of security. 

General McNarney. As you knew the situation at that time did you 
feel that there was any necessity for operating the RDF for the pur- 
pose of security ? 

General Davidson, No, sir, I never thought there was any necessity 
for it. 

The Chairman. As I understand it, it operated week-days and Sun- 
days as a training proposition ? 

General Davidson. Yes, sir, as training, and Sundays it shut down 
at 7. 

The Chairman. And other days at what time ? 

General Davidson. The schedule, I think at other days it shut down 
on Department orders at 7, but our people had them come back and 
operate, I think, until 11, and then in the afternoon they used that for 
maintenance to get the equipment in shape to operate the next day. 

[186] The Chairman. The reason, I presume, that the orders 
were to shut down at 7 on Sunday was, again, that Sunday was par- 
tially a day of rest here? 

General Davidson. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. Now, the Navy man that you stated was assist- 
ing you was there for training purposes, to assist you in training or 
for training of himself ? 

General Davidson. He was assisting to get the board in operation. 
He had been stationed in England and w\as quite familiar witli the 
board, had been sent out here by the Navy for some purpose, and 
we liad without any orders simply borrowed his services. 

General McNarney. He was not there, then, for the purpose of 
affording information of anti-aircraft to the Navy? 

General Davidson. No, sir, he was not there operating as the Navy 
liaison particularly. 

The Chairman. Well, now, I understand that under your routine 
procedure there was a Navy liaison officer at the board? 

General Davidson, Yes, sir, there is. There is now, yes, sir. 

Tlie Chairman, Well, was there anterior to December 7 ? 

General Davidson. No, sir, I don't think so. 

The Chairman, You think not? 

General Davidson. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Therefore, it would not be extraordinary if there 
was no Navy officer there on Sunday morning, December 7 ? 

General I)A^^DS0N. No, sir. We were running the board more to 
train the operators. I think that's what the order called for, to 
train the Radar station operators. 

The Chair]man. So that do I understand that Lieutenant Tyler 
did call the Navy? 

General Davidson, No, sir, 

[187] The Chairman. He didn't call them at all? 

General Davidson, No, sir. 

The Chairman. He made the best approximation he could of the 
situation and decided thai there was no necessity? 

General Da^tldson. Decided that we had a flight coming over from 
tlie mainland that could have been wandering up there, and the 



116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Navy — well, even after December 7 they put off airplanes from car- 
riers that came in exactly that same way, without notifying us. 

General McNarney. Well, I take it, inasmuch as you personally 
had not been warned that there was a serious situation confronting 
the United States with respect to Japan, that similarly your subordi- 
nate ofiicers had no idea that the situation was at all serious, and this 
lieutenant could not be expected to be on the lookout for enemy 
aircraft ? 

General Davidsox. No, sir. I would say that if he had been on 
the lookout it would have been prescience beyond the ordinary per- 
son's capacity, knowing as little as he did about the situation. 

The Chairman. Admiral Keeves? 

General McNarney. Well, 

The Chairman. Go ahead. 

General McNarney. What did you think the situation was with 
respect to sabotage when you received the order for alert No. 1? 

General Davidson. We were very much afraid of sabotage. Every 
time we dispersed our airplanes — and we dispersed them on several 
other alerts before — we spent a lot of our time guarding them out 
there on those dispersed positions, expended a lot of energy in the 
guards ; and around the airplanes here, even without an alert, we had 
very heavy guards. And then when the alert for anti-sabotage came 
we doubled the guards there and also guarded many vital places on 
the post, like [188] water system and transformer station. 

General McNarney. What were the facilities on the field for pro- 
tection, such as barbwire fences or manproof fences, searchlights, 
and so forth ? 

General Davidson. We had been promised manproof fences, but 
they never had materialized. We had no barbed wire. 

General McNarney. How much of the field was open to ingress 
from the outside ? 

General Davidson. There is a public road going through the center 
of the field. 

The Chairman. What field ? 

General Davidson. "Wheeler Field. And all the rest of the field 
was open to ingress. There was a public road running along the 
edge of the field on two sides. On the third side is a gully that 
leads into the pineapple fields. 

General McNarney. Do you know the size of the guard that you 
maintained under condition of alert No. 1? 

General Davidson. Yes, sir. We had about a hundred and fifty 
men in addition to the men that the groups — the tactical groups — 
had down there. 

General McNarney. If your airplanes had been dispersed under an 
anti-sabotage alert, how many additional men would be required? 

General Davidson. It would have taken about two and a half times 
that many. 

General McNarney. Wliat was your total strength available for 
guard without seriously interfering with the operation of your 
aircraft? 

General Davidson. We had trained with rifles 500 men just for that 
purpose, for anti-sabotage work, and I think we have been main- 
taining 511 there at Wheeler for the big part of the time since that 
raid, to guard this 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 117 

General McNarney. Well, what effect would it have on [-?5P] 
your operations if you had used these 500 men? 

General DAvrosoN. Well, it is seriously affecting our operations 
now, and we still are using many of those 500 men. 

General McNarney. In what way is it affecting it? Planes out 
of commission ? 

General Davidson. Well, the planes are not out of commission now, 
because we have been reduced in — but it's affecting us in that the men 
that are in the squadrons are having to stay on duty longer than they 
would if they had their full quota. 

The Chairman. You have taken men from the flying squadrons for 
guard work ? 

General Davidson. Yes, sir. As many as 34 men in — a squadron 
just repoi'ted this morning they had 34 men of their squadron up at 
Wheeler Field doing guard duty. 

General McCoy. In other words, you are still more afraid of 
sabotage than you are of the enemy? 

General Davidson. We are still afraid of sabotage, yes, sir, and 
the field is difficult to guard, and it seems very difficult to get other 
troops to guard it. 

General McCoy. Well, what difference has war made to you in 
your handling your command? Are vou still handling it on the 
same line that you did before December 7 ? 

General Davidson. I don't understand that, sir. We have got all 
the airplanes alerted in the morning from 5 : 30 until 8, Then one 
squadron stays on alert which is ready to take off in four minutes, 
and the others are in a state of readiness. Then at I think its 4 
o'clock they all come back on alert. So it's quite different. They 
are all operating on dispersed positions. 

General McCoy. Are they all armed and equipped with ammuni- 
tion, and so forth ? 

General Davidson. All armed and equipped, yes, sir. 

General McCoy. That was not the case before December Y? 

[190] General Davidson. We did not have the guns loaded. 
That was our biggest difficulty the day of the attack, vrs to try to get 
the guns loaded, especially since one of the hangars wlitie we had a lot 
of our ammunition stored was afire, and the ammunition was afire too. 

General McNarney. Did you have loaded belts available? 

General Davidson. Yes, sir, the belts were available, but the boxes 
were burnt up. 

General McNarney. I notice in General Short's testimony that he 
said that on December 7 the pursuit planes in commission were 80, pur- 
suit planes out of commission 69. Will you please explain this rather 
large percentage of planes out of commission? 

General Davidson. The percentage I do not believe is large com- 
pared to other places. I inquired about that when I was back on the 
mainland, and about 60% of these new planes is about the average for 
in commission. Our great difficulty was in getting spare parts for these 
new planes, the P-4d's especially. 

General McCoy. Have you received any additions to your force in 
the way of trained fighting pilots since the outbreak of war? 

General DAvmsoN. No, sir. 

General McCoy. They are still these amateur pilots ? 



118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Davidson. We are training these pilots — we were training 
these pilots on December 8, sir ; still training them. We have men that 
haven't fired yet, and we are trying to get them trained. We have 
stopped that now because we just haven't got the facilities, but will 
start it again just as soon as we get new planes, which are coming in 
now. They are in the depot now. 

General McCoy. Do I understand that there are no trained fighters 
over here at all? 

General Davidson. Oh, no, sir. We have trained fighters, [i^-?] 
but we have got a number that have not been trained. They come over 
here, General, with 200 hours. We get them in a batch like 50. We 
got 58 with 200 hours. 

[19£] General McCoy. Right from school ? 

General DA\r[DS0N. Right from school, and they have never even 
been in a pursuit plane. 

General McCoy. How many trained fighting pilots do you have? 

General Davidson. We have 150 now, but of these I would say at 
least 50 are this new batch which have just finished. 

General McCoy. Are these men who did so well some of the new- 
comers ? 

General Davidson. One of them was one of the newcomers. He did 
very well. He got four. 

The Chairman. What was his training before ? 

General Davidson. He had just finished the ground gunnei-y course. 
He got in the plane and got four, but he had just finished the ground 
gunnery course. 

General McCoy. How many planes did you get in the air in these 
attacks on the Sunday ? 

General Davidson. We got about 17 actually in the air, and I think 
three more were shot down as they took off from Bellows Field. 

General McCoy. Where were the others of the 150 trained pilots? 
Why didn't they get in the air? Was it because of the construction 
of the planes ? 

General Davidson. Our first job was to get the good ones out from 
the burned ones. The planes were all jDarked like on this table here 
(indicating). Some were set afire and some were not, and we had 
tried to get them apart, to get the planes that would roll out of the 
burned mass and the burned hangars. AVe had great difficulty rolling 
them because they shot the tifes off many of them. Even of the ships 
which were not afire, they might be next to a ship that was afire, but 
it would not roll from the fire because the tire of one of the wheels 
had been shot off. 

General McCoy. That was the first attack? 

[19S] General Davidson. We did not have very much of a sec- 
ond attack, sir. Our second attack was more or less shooting off the 
additional ammunition that they had left from some other attack as 
they came by Wheeler Field on their way out. 

General McCoy. There were just two attacks on Wheeler Field? 

General Davidson. Yes. 

The Chairman. Were there any planes flown from Hickam Field 
at all? 

General Davidson. There were bombers, yes. 

The Chairman. Nothing but bombers? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 119* 

General Davidson, Yes. I do not think any of tliem got off at all. 

The Chairman. There were no other planes but boniBers there? 

General Davidson. No, sir, nothing but bombers. 

The Chairman. Any other questions? 

Admiral Standley. Just one question. Lieutenant Tyler, who was- 
in the Aircraft Warning Station that morning, first observed from the^ 
Radar- 
General Da\^dson. No, sir, the Radar is miles away from here. 

Admiral Standley. That is at the Opana Station? 

General DA^^DS0N. Yes. 

Admiral Stanley. He received that. 

General Davidson. He just received the telephone call. 

Admiral Standley. He saw nothing himself? 

General Davidson. No, sir, he didn't see anything. 

Admiral Standley. Your board at the center was not working? 

(xeneral Davidson. No, sir, there were not any plotters there. The 
plotters had all gone home, and they telephoned it from Opana Sta- 
tion, and the man with the telephone on his [i^4] head, he 
plots the position they give him, but they had all gone home. 

General McNarney. It might be interesting for the Commission 
if yon would explain the operations of the detector system from the 
observation station right on through. 

General DA\aDS0N. The Radar station is a high-frequency radio. 
It sends out a beam similar to a beam of light. It cannot go over a 
hill or over the horizon. It strikes a solid object and reflects back 
let us say a little figure on the screen. The screen is a glass screen 
and there is a tube there, and the man has a mask on his face and he- 
looks into it at this light or flash like a flash from a spark plug, and 
you see it on a ground glass. When it hits that object, that echoes it 
a little. If it is a big echo, it echoes it quite a lot, and if it is a land 
echo it echoes a little different reading, and if it is an echo of a ship 
at sea, it echoes a slightly different reading. 

It is sometimes difficult to tell a ship at sea from an airplane,- 
but they generally tell them because the ship at sea does not move, 
and the airplane does, and they can see the movement in this screen. 

He then brings this echo into the movement of his screen and gets 
the range reading, and he reads through the azimuth and sends that 
to his plotter, who plots that on the chart, and sends it in to our 
plotter upon this map of Oahu and the vicinity, and it is sent in by 
X and Y coordinated. 

He calls off the square in that position, say squares 3 and 4, and 
plots them, and that is how anybody in the information center knows 
about it, and that is all anybody in the information center sees or 
knows about that plot. 

The plotting is done there with the board, and the controller stays 
in front watching this map, and he has on his right a pursuit officer 
and on his left his general radio officer and switches the radio from 
one place to another so [J9o] he can get the radio to control 
the ships and the airplanes in the air. 

There are other personnel around the board, anti-aircraft and 
Nav}^, air raid precautions officer and Federal Communications officer, 
and several others. 



120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

They all simply look at the board and they generally take the neces- 
sary action without having any orders issued. It is simply a fast 
method of command, trying to do away with orders as much as 
possible. 

When the action is to be taken by the pursuits, the controller tells 
the pursuit officer next to him how man}* airplanes he wants in the 
air, aiVd he picks off the exact squadron and he orders them off right 
from that board. Then they have a radio transmitter there, and he 
communicates with the squadrons in the air, and they draw a point at 
a certain altitude and they have that circle so that we will know 
where they are. In the system they generally turn that flight or 
squadron over to the interceptor, who handles the intercepting itself 
and handles the intercept from the control center because our station 
is so narrowed down. 

General McCoy. Would you be at headquarters ? 

General DAvrosoN. Yes, although on the mainland, take for in- 
stance the one at Mitchel Field, the headquarters of the interceptor 
command is Mitchel Field. The control centers are at Boston, New 
York, and at Philadelphia. Isn't that right? 

And each one of these is in control of a group commander who 
takes all necessary steps to intercept the hostile planes coming into 
his area, his group area. He defends that area against hostile attack 
without any further orders from the interceptor commander. The 
interceptor commander has a general board showing the situation 
in all areas of his command, and if one needs reinforcing or help, he 
orders it, but the actual defense of the area is entrusted to the group 
[196^ commander who has charge there. 

I think that covers it. 

The Chairman. Do you have any questions ? 

Admiral Standley. Off the record. 

(There was a discussion off the record.) 

General McNarney. What date was the interceptor command 
activated ? 

General Davidson. I would have to look at the order, but I would 
say about the I7th of December. 

The Chairman. Admiral Reeves. 

Admiral Reeves. Your evidence has been extremely clear and spe- 
cific, and it is of great value to the Commission. I have only one or 
two questions that I would like to ask you merely in order to clarify 
this information. I call your pursuit planes fighters. 

General Davidson. Yes, we call them fighters. 

Admiral Reeves. Are these fighters more effective if you have them 
all concentrated on one field, or are they more effective if they are 
dispersed to various fields? 

General Davidson. They are more effective if dispersed to the fields, 
and we are making every effort we can to get them dispersed. 

Admiral Reeves. It adds to the risk of sabotage but adds more to 
the effectiveness of your operations ? 

General Daat^dson. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. I understand that the torpedo planes came in 
from the East flying at a low altitude? 

General Davidson. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. If you had warning of their approach and had 
gotten your fighting planes in the air in an attack on these torpedo 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 12! 

planes flying at low altitude, would you have expected your attack 
against those planes to have been effective ? 

General Da\^dson. Yes, they were quite slow. 

[197] Admiral Eeeves. That is, if you had warning of their ap- 
proach and had your planes been in position you would have them in 
the air and your attack on those torpedo planes would have been effec- 
tive and might have been perfected, among other things ? 

General Davidson. Yes. I am sure it would have been perfected. 
I think they could have shot down most of them because they were 
quite slow. 

Admiral Reeves. Before they reached their objectives? 

General Davidson. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. Your interceptor system would not likely pick up 
sucli low-flying planes ? 

General Davidson. If the plane is low it is difficult because it gets 
down below the horizon and only the very high stations will pick 
them up. 

The Chairman. As a matter of fact, the interceptor did not get them 
at all when they got behind that big eastern ridge of the Island ? 

General Da^tldson. I do not know, sir. As soon as they get behind 
anything which will give a reflection, they go off our screen. With 
thi's type of radio, it cannot hit anything without bouncing back. 

The Chairman. If somebody put his hand up, that would indicate 
it? 

General Davidson. Yes, even a bird will do it. 

General McCoy. You spoke of the British having a much better sys- 
tem. Why haven't we got that ? 

General Davidson. I don't know, sir. 

Admiral Standley. This is off the record. 

(There was a discussion off the record.) 

The Chairman. Is there anything further, gentlemen ? 

You understand. General, that anything that has been said in thi& 
room is not to be disclosed or discussed with anyone else ? 

IWSI General Davidson. Yes. 

The Chairman. We will now have General Rudolph. 

(Thereupon the witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.) 

TESTIMONY OP BRIGADIER GENERAL JACOB H. RUDOLPH 

The Chairman. Wliat is your full name. General? 
General Rudolph. Jacob H. Rudolph. 
The Chairman. And your rank ? 
General Rudolph. Brigadier general. 

The Chairman. And your assignment in the Hawaiian Department? 
General Rudolph. Commanding the 18th Bombardment Wing. 
The Chairman. How lono; have you held that position here, sir ? 
General Rudolph. Since November, 1940. 

The Chairman, Where were you, sir, on the morning of December 7 
last? 

General Rudolph. At Hickam Field during the entire attack. 
The Chairman. Are your quarters as officer near the field ? 
General Rudolph. I don't know what you mean by "near the field". 
The Chairman. I mean, where is your home? 
General Rudolph. Right on Hickam Field. 



122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Eight there ? 

General Rudolph. Yes. 

The Chairman. So you were in your quarters, in your living quar- 
ters, when this attack took place ? 

General Eudolph. Yes. 

The Chairman. You had no warning of it? 

General Eudolph. Not the slightest. 

[109] The Chairman. What did your command consist of that 
day? 

General Eudolph. I had two groups of five and eleven bombers; 
12 B-17 airplanes ; 30 B-18's ; 12 A-20's. 

The Chairman. Under what order was the field being maintained 
that morning with respect to alert 1, 2, and 3? 

General Eudolph. It was under alert No. 1. 

The Chairman. And had been since November 27? 

General Eudolph. Yes. 

The Chairman. What guard were you maintaining at your planes 
that day? 

General Eudolph. I had the planes guarded well at night, and then 
I changed the heavy guard that was on at night and lessened the guard 
during the daytime because we were carrying on actual flight opera- 
tions and were getting ready to actually do training in squadrons. 

The Chairman. You were ? 

General Eudolph. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Had vou been training from Hickam Field, taking 
off from Hickam Field claily? 

General Eudolph. Every day. 

The Chairman. Were you training pilots and crews for heavy 
bombers ? 

General Eudolph. We were training ferry crews to get them pre- 
pared to go to the mainland and bring the heavy bombardment planes 
this way. 

The Chairman. There were planes from your command in this 
training work in the air practically every morning? 

General Eudolph. Yes, and every night. 

The Chairman. You were out at night, too ? 

General Eudolph. Yes, at least four to five nights a week. 

The Chairman. Were these planes armed for action, those being 
used in the training? 

[200] General Eudolph. We were having a limited amount of 
gunnery in both the B-18 type and the B-17 type. 

The Chairman. That meant arms and ammunition? 

General Eudolph. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Were any of j^our planes in the air at 7 : 55 on that 
Sunday morning? 

General Eudolph. I would not be positive. I know they got ready 
to go in the air. 

The Chairman. Did any of your planes get in the air and get into 
action in any of the attacks that morning? 

General Eudolph. Not until after the attacks. 

Tlie Chairman. You had no orders with respect to preparedness 
for airplane raids except the one order for alert 1 ? 

General Eudolph. It depends. It did not inchide airplane raids ; it 
included sabotage. Therefore, we bunched the planes because we 



PROCEEDINGS OP ROBERTS COMMISSION 123 

could have much better protection against sabotage. If with a raid 
we would have them dispersed. 

The Chairman. An}^ other questions? 

General McNarney. If alert No. 2 had been in effect, would that 
seriously have interfered with your training? 

General Rudolph. AVell, in alert 2 one cannot do a great deal of 
training. That is, I would have to stand by and start dispersing them 
and not go ahead with my normal training. In No. 1 1 would go ahead 
with normal training. 

General McNarney. Did you have any information of the inter- 
national situation with respect to United States and Japanese rela- 
tions ? I mean official information ? 

General Rudolph. Not the slightest. 

The Chairman. There was no general order or anything of that 
kind issued that there might be suspected an attack in the immediate 
future? 

General Rudolph. None wdiatever ; none whatever. If we had the 
slightest inkling we would have gone into a dispersed position, but 
we were doing that in accordance with alert 1, [^Ol] which to 
us means getting them into a close area and guarding them very care- 
fully against internal sabotage, not raids. 

General McCoy. Has there been any sabotage in your planes at any 
time ? 

General Rudolph. We found several positive indications of sabo- 
tage within our own group. We found the gaps in the spark plugs 
hammered together. That is, in the. back of the spark plugs were 
little points that connect it to the electrode and have a 10.000th 
clearance, and they had hammered them against the electrode. That 
was somebody from our own organization. 

General McCoy. Have you discovered him ? 

General Rudolph. Not yet, no, sir. 

We found the oil block in the oil tank cut to a point where it almost 
dropped off. We had several other unmistakable evidences of 
internal sabotage. 

General McCoy. Was that recently? 

General Rudolph. Yes, within the last two or three months. 

General McCoy. Do you employ any Japanese in your shops or 
maintenance? 

General Rudolph. None whatsoever. Mine are all enlisted men. 

General McCoy. During these whole negotiations, you were not 
conscious of imminent hostilities ? 

General Rudolph. We certainly were not. 

The Chairman. As an instructing officer in the strategy of war, 
would you have expected one form of attack by Japan to be an attempt 
at a raid on Pearl Harbor ? 

General Rudolph. I liave conceived the possibility of that. 

The Chairman. You would want to guard against it in the event 
of a state of Avar between the two countries? 

General Rudolph. Yes, sir. rightly so. 

[2021 The Chairman. If you were given a warning in the 
words, "This is a war warning," would you be ready? 

General Rudoij'h. Yes. We certainly w^ould never have had them 
on the apron that Sunday morning. We would have scattered them 
as well as we could over Hickam Field. 



124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. They would have been ready to get in the air? 

General Rudolph. We would have been ready even though it was a 
Sunday morning. 

The Chairman. Don't you think that a Sunday morning at dawn is 
about the most likely time for such a raid ? 

General Rudolph. Truly so. 

The Chairman, Any further questions ? 

Admiral Rebates. No questions. 

General McNarney. No questions. 

The Chairman. Admiral Standley ? 

Admiral Standley. No. 

The Chairman. General McCoy ? 

General McCoy. No. 

The Chairman. General Rudolph, of course you understand that 
the nature of the Commission's procedure is such that it is highly im- 
portant that you do not discuss anything that has been answered here 
or said here nor discuss it with others. I will ask you to observe that. 

General Rudolph. Yes. 

The Chairman. Thank you, General. 

Now let us have Major Allen. 

(Thereupon Major Brooke E. Allen was sworn in due form by the 
Chairman.) 

l^OS] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR BEOOKE E. ALLEN 

The Chairman. State your name, Major. 

Major Allen. Brooke E. Allen. 

The Chairman. And your rank is what? 

Major Allen. Major, Air Corps. 

Tlie Chairman. Where are your quarters, as such, Major, on the 
Island ? 

Major Allen. At Hickam Field. 

The Chairman. Were you in those quarters on the morning of De- 
cember 7 ? 

Major Allen. I was, sir. 

The Chairman. Would you start from the beginning without ques- 
tioning and tell us what you saw and what was done? 

Major Allen. At the time of the attack I was asleep, and I heard 
planes diving and an explosion. As I looked out my bedroom win- 
dow I could see a number of planes in a column in a dive, and as I 
looked they released bombs apparently in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. 

I rushed out and put on a robe and rushed outside to get a better 
look at them, and realized we were being attacked by Japanese planes. 

I went in and immediately put on my uniform and rushed down to 
my hangar, and at the time I was in command of a squadron. My 
first idea was to save as many planes as possible. I managed to get 
into one of the B-17's that were assigned to my squadron. 

At that time the attack was being conducted on Hickam Field on the 
hangar line. I got inside one of the planes. The guns were in the 
plane. We put the guns in readiness to fire. My first idea was to 
take off. I was unable to start one engine. I started with only three 
of the engines. 

I got the crew, the best I could gather. I taxied across the field, 
about which time the attack apparently subsided. I observed am- 
munition bomb trucks being pulled out of the [^^^] ammuni- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 125 

tion storage area loaded with bombs. The thought occurred to me to 
try to load the bombs so I could attack any enemy ships in the vicinity. 
We Avere in the process of loading bombs -vrhen the second attack 
occurred, during which time they bombed the hangar line. Then the 
bombers, apparently having bombed Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field, 
were strafing the vicinity in which we were loading the bombs. In 
the meantime the crews from my squadron were trying to disperse 
the Army planes in the squadron. 

During this strafing attack we were getting some distance away 
from the airplane, and as a result of the attack that airplane vras so 
badly damaged that I was unable to fly it. One engine was completely 
shot up and one wheel was shot from under it. 

So we turned our attention then to another B-17 airplane in the 
squadron and started in loading it with bombs to put it in readiness 
for a mission. 

By that time the attack had apparently ceased, and I reported 
immediately to the wing commander for instruction. We were told 
to get a pursuit escort and arrange for protection of our take-off, 
and got off the ground sometime after 11 o'clock — about 11:30 — 
with instructions to attack two enemy carriers reported about 35 
miles south of Barbers Point. 

The Chairman. Where is Barbers Point? 

Major Allen. Right in here (indicating on map). 

Major Saunders took a B-17 and I took one. We had some pursuit 
escort at the time. 

We proceeded south of Barbers Point and saw no enemy activity 
there at all. We began a search to the southwest and northwest, 
there being no information available. 

After some two or three hours JNIajor Saunders had to turn back 
on account of engine trouble. I remained in the air until approxi- 
mately 7 o'clock that evening and I saw no enemy activity at all. 

[205'] • I stayed in the quadrant to the northwest and southwest 
(indicating on map) . 

The Chairman. No pursuit was attempted to the north by anyone, 
so far as you know ? 

Major Allen. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You two were probably the only ones that were 
fit or could be escorted ? 

Major Allen. So far as I know we were the only two fit to fly 
at the time. There was another plane fit to fly which had some 
trouble on the take-off and could not get off. He jammed his pro- 
peller on the take-off and was unable to get off. 

The Chairman. You were innocent of any thought of an airplane 
raid when you went to bed on Saturday night, I supose? 

Major Allen. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You heard no discussion even informally of a 
possible attack by Japanese planes? 

Major Allen. No, sir, there was no indication of such. 

The Chairman. So far as you know, the general sentiment among 
the Army men was that there was no thought of a possible attack 
at all? 

Major Allen. I would say particularly so in the Air Corps be- 
cause the fact that most of our striking force was taken from here, 
and we were more or less in the status of ferry training, ferrying 



126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

B-17's to the Philippines. We had been conducting training in the 
squadron toward that end for some time. 

General McCoy. If this attack had not occurred in a few days, 
this would have gone off ? 

Major Allen. I would have gone, ferrying planes to the Philip- 
pines. 

The Chairman. Would you say your training was not at all on a 
war footing ? 

[206] Major Allen. No, sir. Our training had been conducted 
almost entirely toward ferrying planes to the Philippines. Our com- 
bat training had been more or less halted, and the other training 
had been given priority. At the time of the attack there were some 
of our combat crews back on the mainland waiting to ferry the planes 
back. 

The Chairman. Any questions. General ? 

General McNarney. Did you see any planes come in from the 
mainland approaching north? 

Major Allen. I did, sir. 

General McNary. What did you observe ? 

Major Allen. Well, when I arrived on the hangar line one of the 
first things I saw was a B-17E flying over the hangar line very 
low. I had never seen a B-17E before and I was a little confused 
about it. As a matter of fact, I had no knowledge of the flight from 
the mainland. It was a secret flight, of course. When I first saw 
these four-engine bombers flying over I was confused because I knew 
the}; did not belong to the Hawaiian Air Force. My first thought 
was, "Where did the Japs get four-engine bombers?" In a few 
minutes I realized that was one of ours and that this was undoubt- 
edly some flight from the mainland, and then I knew the ships were 
coming over from the mainland. 

I observed a number of others flying around, and one in the process 
of landing, with a Japanese right on his tail firing at him. When 
he was ready to land a pursuit plane pulled away, and the truck 
pulled this way, and he had to cut around, and there was a burst 
from the anti-aircraft which went off right opposite him, but he 
managed to circle around and land successfully. 

General McNarney. Was that the only case you observed of our 
own anti-aircraft firing at our own planes ? 

Major Allen. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. There was no reason to bieleve that [BOT] 
our own anti-aircraft would not be able to identify that as an American 
plane? 

Major Allen. No, sir. I can see why they would be confused, be- 
cause they had no knowledge of that type of plane coming in, and 
they were not familiar with that type of plane in the Hawaiian Air 
Force because we had no planes of that type. Our planes were smaller 
and these planes were the B-lTE type, which is different from the D. 

General McNarney. How many men in your squadron were de- 
tailed to guard your airplanes? Or were the guards furnished by 
other units ? 

Major Allen. We furnished the guard for our own airplanes, and 
that was handled by a guard group. The regular troop organized a 
gi-ouj) for each guard and ran its own guard, a sergeant for the guard 
and a corporal for each relief. I don't remember the exact number. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 127 

but it was from five to six men who were detailed daily as members 
of the guard group to guard the airplanes from that group. 

General McNarney. How many men would have been required if 
the airplanes would have been dispersed ? 

Major Allen. No more than that number except possibly one addi- 
tional man. At the time of the attack there were two B-l7D's and 
four B-18's, When we disperse tlie airplanes we always, instead of the 
normal guard, we keep one member of the ground crew armed and at 
the airplanes during all hours. 

Gene'"al McNarney. Well, would the furnishing of these additional 
six men have interfered in any manner with your training? 

Major Allen. It is bound to. Any men you lose is bound to affect 
your training. 

General McNarney. Would it have seriously affected your 
training ? 

Major Allen. Not seriously, no, sir, but it would be a matter which 
would depend on the number of men you are required to furnish. 

[208] General McCoy. In wartime you are called on for a great 
number of men, including the guard. With respect to the case now, 
have they been replaced as guards by ground troops? 

Major Allen. I cannot answer that. I have not been on tactical 
duty for the last week or so. I understand that the ground crew 
has been increased by some troops. 

General McCoy. Where did you get your escort planes that day? 

Major Allen. From Ilickam Field. They were P-40's. I remem- 
ber seeing four of them. They were merely to protect our take-off 
and stayed with us on!}' a short time after the take-off. 

General McCoy. I have no other questions. 

The Chairman. Admiral Reeves ? 

Admiral Ree\t2S. No. 

The Chairman. Admiral Standley? 

Admiral Standley. You spoke about one of the planes being inter- 
f erred with by a truck ? 

JNIajor Allen. I don't think I did, Admiral. 

Admiral Standley. You mentioned something like that. 

Major Allen. Yes, one of the planes from the mainland when it 
was landing. The bombs are delivered to the planes by what is called 
a bomb trailer, a four-wheel trailer with a truck pulling it. The 
very first I remember seeing getting the bombs loaded at the airplane, 
they were scurrying all over the field, and the bomb storage area 
is at about in the vicinity whei'e the planes are dispersed, and they 
were getting on the runway, trying to get the bombs to the airplanes 
to fly, those which were in commission. 

Admiral Standley. Off the record. 

(There Avas a discussion off the record.) 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Major, I need hardly say 
to you that you should not discuss anything that has been said here. 

{209] "iNIajor Allen. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. This is off the record. 

(There was a discussion off the record.) 

The CiiAnoiAN. We will adjourn at this time until 9 o'clock to- 
rn on*ow morning. 

(Thereupon, at 5: 2.5 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken until 
tomorrow, Wednesday, December 24, 1941, at 9 o'clock a. m.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 129 



[^i] CONTENTS 



WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 24, IWl 

Testimony of— T&ge^ 

Colonel Walter C. Phillips, General Staff 212 

Brigadier General Duiward S. Wilson, Commanding 24th Infantry 

Division 247 

Major General Maxwell Murray, United States Army, 25th Division— 259 

Major General Henry T. Burgin, Coast Artillery, United States Army__ 268 

Colonel Walter C. Phillips, General Staff 284 

Lieutenant Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, General Staff, United States 

Army 287,311 

Lieutenant Colonel Melvin L. Craig, Provost Marshal, Hawaiian De- 
partment 301 

Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant to Departmental 

G-2, United States Army 314 

Major General Frederick L. Martin, Air Force, United States Army 320 

Lieutenant Colonel Carroll A. Powell, Signal Corps, United States 

Army 352 

Colonel Robert H. Dunlop, Adjutant General Department, United States 

Army 365 

Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, United States Army 36S 

Major Kenneth P. Bergquist, Air Corps, United States Army 377 

Major Lorry Norris Tindal, Air Corps, United States Army 390 



^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



79716 — 46 — Ex. 148, vol. 1- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 131 



Vm] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE 
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII 



WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1941 

Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shaffer, Territory of Hawaii. 
The Commission met at 9 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment on 
yesterday, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme 
Court, Chairman, presiding. 



Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, 
Chairman; 

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired ; 

Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired ; 

Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired ; 

Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army ; 

Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission ; 

Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal 
Adviser to the Commission ; 

Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission. 

PROCEEDINGS 

The Chairman. Well, are we ready to proceed, gentlemen ? 
Admiral Reeves. We are ready to start. 

The Chairman. Shall we call Colonel Phillips? He is General 
Short's chief of staff. 
Admiral Reeves. Yes. 
The Chairman. Colonel Phillips. 

\fA2'\ TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WALTER C. PHILLIPS, 
GENERAL STAFF 

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.) 
The Chairman. Your full name, please I 
Colonel Phillips. Walter C. Phillips. 
The Chairman. Your rank ? 
Colonel Phillips. Colonel, general staff. 

The Chairman. And your position in the Department of Hawaii 
has been what ? 

Colonel Phillips. I have been the chief of staff. 
The Chairman. Since General Short came here? 



132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir. I became chief of staff on the 6th of 
November. 

The Chairman. What position did you hold before that ? 

Colonel Phillips. I was G-3, sir. 

The Chairman. G-3. G-3 is Information, is it not ? Intelligence ? 

Colonel Phillips. G-3 is Operations. 

The Chairman. Operations? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. G-2 is Intelligence? 

Colonel Phillips. G-2 is Intelligence. 

The Chairman. Colonel Phillips, I show you a telegram received by 
the Navy on 28th November and sent by Naval Operations on 27th 
November. Did the Navy furnish you a copy of that telegram ? 

Colonel Phillips. I do not believe so, although I do not remember 
exactly, sir. 

The Chairman. I notice that in the telegram the instruction is, 
"Inform District and Army Authorities." 

Colonel Phillips. I do not believe so, although I do not remember 
exactly, sir. 

The Chairman. I notice that in the telegram the instruction is, "In- 
form District and Army authorities." 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. "District" evidently referring to Naval District? 

Colonel Phillips. Referring to Naval District. Fourteenth 
[S13] Naval District. 

The Chairman, This telegram, I suppose, was dispatched to the 
Commander in Chief of the Fleet? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, under your routine, if information had been 
furnished pursuant to that direction, where would that information 
have been lodged in your organization ? 

Colonel Phillips. That information, secret nature, comes directly 
from the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet ordinarily by an officer 
directly to the Department Commander. 

The Chairman. And would it go to General Sliort in person or to 
you as his chief of staff? 

Colonel Phillips. If the general is present I usually direct that 
directly to him; otherwise it would come to me and go directly to 
him when he — 

The Chairman. Is available ? 

Colonel Phillips. Is available, yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. In such a case, Colonel Phillips, would any record 
whatever be made in your department of the receipt of such infor- 
mation ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I have made a call, or the Commission has made 
a call, for your records anent this telegram, and that call has not 
yet been answered. Have you had anything to do with searching for 
the information ? 

Colonel Phillips. I knew nothing at all about the call having been 
made, sir. 

The Chairman. It was made through Major Allen, who is the 
officer assigned to us. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 133 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

The Chairmax. And I heard from him that there was some diffi- 
culty about identifying the message and determining in what file it 
was. 

[214-1 Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You have heard nothing about it ? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Will you take it upon yourself, please, to determine 
what if any records ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. That was what date, sir ? 

The Chairman. The date of receipt here bv the Navy is November 
28, 1941. 

Colonel Phili.ips. Subsequent 

The Chairman. The date of the message is October 27. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. November. 

Colonel Phillips. November 27. 

The Chahoian. 27. That was the date it was dispatched. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question? 

The Chairman. Certainly. Go ahead. 

General McCoy. Colonel Phillips, I remember the two also. That 
is, General Short received a like message in different language on the 
27th or 28th? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. From the War Department ? 

Colonel Phillips. From the War Department. 

General McCoy. What was the routine in connection with that 
message? In other words, did it come personally to General Short? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Or did it come to you ? 

Colonel Phillips. It came directly to me through our General. 
The adjutant general brings that directly to me by an officer messenger, 
and General Short was here in the office at the time. I delivered 
it personally to him. 

General McCoy. Yes? 

Colonel Phillips. As it happened, there was an officer [215] 
present. The adjutant general was present talking with General 
Short at the time. 

General McCoy. Did you furnish a copy at that time to the Com- 
mander of the Fleet? 

Colonel Phillips. I will have to look in my records about that, sir. 
I am not sure that we directed. We ordinarily do. 

General McCoy. Would you make a note to see whether you fur- 
nished them with a copy? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. I will look for that, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. If you want to ask anything about the text, there 
it is (indicating). 

In reply to the message that General McCoy has just asked you 
about, that of November 27 from the War Department, the reply, 
copy of which was furnished us by General Short yesterday, is to the 
effect that he had alerted the Department to prevent sabotage. 



134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Phillips. That is correct, sir. I ordered that at once, at 
the direction of the Department Commander. 

The Chairman. To your knowledge was there any discussion of 
that part of the message which indicated that hostilities might break 
out at any moment? 

Colonel Phillips. As I recall, sir, we — that was read and reread a 
number of times, and the gist of the thing seemed to be that sabotage- 
sabotage, subversive uprisings; and as a result we acted accordingly. 
No, hostilities and attack from without, any such thing, wasn't visual- 
ized by us at that time. We had our alert No. 1, as we call it, foU 
sabotage and suppression of subversive uprisings within. We didn't 
visualize anything from without at that time, sir. 

The Chairman. I suppose the Army command here was cognizant 
of the fact that a Japanese air raid might be one element of any hostile 
outbreak, any hostile action? 

[^IS] Colonel Phillips. Possibility, yes, sir, but not particu- 
larly connected with sabotage. 

The Chairman. Of course not. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Then I gather that the thing that impressed the 
responsible officers here, and was discussed on the receipt of that tele- 
gram, was sabotage, and that only ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. That is it exactly. 

The Chairman. Where were you the night of December 6, Colonel ? 

Colonel Phillips. The night of December 6 I was in my quarters by 
about 11 : 30. Mrs. Phillips and I were invited to a dance, and we left 
rather early and were back in the quarters here at Shafter. I live at 
Shafter here. 

The Chairman. And what was the first knowledge you had of an 
attack on the morning of Sunday, December 7 ? 

Colonel Phillips. I was dressing, partially dressed, and the explo- 
sion, firing, is the first that I heard, evidently from bombs. I imme- 
diately went through my own mind : This is Sunday. What can this 
be ? We planned nothing. Oftentimes the Navy was out on a prob- 
lem, or we were doing a little firing with our coastal defense, or some- 
thing of that kind, from time to time, but I was thoroughly familiar 
with everything of that kind that went on, and could see no justifica- 
tion for anything of the kind. And a member of my staff, G-1, called 
me and says, "This is attack. Attack." 

I says. "It must be, because we have nothing planned today." With 
that, I shouted to my family and ran over to the Department com- 
mander's quarters just next door and told him what I believed to be 
the facts, that we were being attacked, and recommended that the 
troops move out under alert No. 3 at once. He approved it. I came 
to headquarters here and initiated that move without delay. I ran all 
the wa}' to Headquarters, and in the meantime collected my G-4 
[^i7] "^ and my G-1 on the way up, and we issued those orders by 
phone. 

The Chairman. Were they promptly carried out? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir, so far as I have been able to ascertain. 

The Chairman. Have you ? 

Colonel Phillips. I have attempted. I did at the time, because I 
put my G-3 right out immediately. That's his function, to go out and 
see how the troops are operating, and they moved out. I think the 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 135 

25th Division moved out in better form than ever before in their 
historv. 

The"^ CiiAiiorAX. In otlier words, the G-3 alert was carried out 

Colonel Phillips. Absolutely. 

The Chairman. as it was intended it should be? 

Colonel Phillips. Absolutely. That is, the alert 3; not the G-3 
alert, sir. The alert No. 3. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Colonel Phhxips. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Colonel, it is the practice for the men in service to 
have a great many parties on Saturday nights here on the Island, isn't 

it? * 

Colonel Phillips. I do not think more than ordinary. 

The Chakman. You do not? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Were there a lot of large parties at which drinking 
was going on on the island and at which officers were present on the 
night of December 6? 

Colonel Phillips. Not that I know of, sir. 

The Chairman. Not that you know of? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Was the affair that you attended a reasonably 
sober affair ? 

Colonel Phillips. Quite, yes. sir. 

[218] The Chairman. Have you any knowledge of any officer 
who was disabled to have gone on duty if there had come a call at 
midnight Saturday night ? 

Colonel Phillips. None whatsoever. 

The Chairman. You have none ? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir. 

The Chahiman. Where was the dance that you attended ? 

Colonel Phillips. At Schofield Barracks. 

The Chairman, Given by some officers there ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir ; at the Officers' Club on the post. 

The Chairman. It has been the practice, I presume, to grant 
week-end leaves or Saturday evening leaves to a great many of the 
men in the service here, both officers and enlisted men ? 

Colonel Phillips. Not during the period of alert, sir. We were 
under alert No. 1, and we were granting passes to but very few. We 
considered ourselves on duty all the time. 

The Chairman. You think, then, and I presume you can't have 
specifically accurate knowledge, that there were comparatively few 
officers and men on leave that Saturday night and over the Sunday? 

Colonel Phhxips. I should say comparatively few, yes, sir. Yes, 
sir. To give you my actions before I left here — I did this nightly in 
order that I— this is particularly. since November 27th. I would in- 
form message center. We had an officer of the day, a staff officer of 
the day, on duty here all the time, and I would tell him whenever I 
left the post. He kneM* exactly where I could be found 24 hours out 
of the 24. I checked in at our message center, our signal office, to see 
what messages had come in and what the situation was as far as could 
be determined from messages we had received. When I came back 
from the party that night I did the same thing, went to the staff 
officer of the day, which was located in [219] the adjutant gen- 



136 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

eral's building, checked through his messages and found nothing except 
routine nature. 

The Chaieman. Alert No. 1 being in effect, is it your belief that 
all officers in responsible command were in touch with the message 
center in the same way that you were ? 

Colonel Phillips. The Department commander was, and myself. 
"We didn't believe it was necessary for others. If there had been 
anything of importance they would have been informed at once. 

The Chairman. General, have you any questions? 

General McNabney. Colonel, did I understand you to say that 
Alert No. 1 was ordered immediately after the receipt of the message 
of Novembers?? 

Colonel Phillips. 27th, yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. That was ordered prior to the receipt of the 
message on November 28 relative to sabotage ? 

Colonel Phillips. Well, I am speaking of the receipt of the mes- 
sage here. I am not — I thought it was on the 27th. Now, the 
sabotage message was the one that we ordered the Alert No. 1 on, sir. 

General McNarney. You did nothing, then, on the message of 
November 27? You did nothing on the receipt of that message? 

The Chairman. Here they are. Colonel (indicating documents). 

Colonel Phillips. Could I refresh my memory ? 

The Chairman. Yes. Here is the November 27th one. Admiral, 
you have a reply to this message in your folder. 

Admiral Standley. Yes. Here it is here. 

The Chairman. My folder must have it. 

Admiral Standley. It refers to the 27th. 

Colonel Phillips. This is the message that we alerted. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. And when was that received? 

[220] Colonel Phillips. This was 11—6 the 27th here. 

The Chairman. This goes out under what? 

Colonel Phillips. 11—6 p. m. the 27th. This is 

The Chairman. The 27th? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

The Cpiairman. The 27th? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. This was 1 : 16 p. m. the 27th, and 
this went out at 5:40 p. m. the 27th (indicating). That was all on 
the 27th. 

The Chairman. That means that the long message from the War 
Department was received at 1 o'clock, at 1 : 16 on the 27th ? 

Colonel Phillips. 1 : 16, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And at 5 : 40 p. m. on the 27th you sent your reply? 

Colonel Phillips. 27th ; that's right. 

The Chairman. That you had alerted against sabotage ? 

Colonel Phillips. That's right. Yes, that's correct. 

The Chairman. Now, have you got that clear ? 

General McNarney. Yes. In other words. Alert No. 1 

General McCoy. Mine, I notice, is dated at Washington the 28th. 
That must be a different message. 

Admiral Reeves. It must be a different message. 

The Chairman. It must be a different dispatch. It is in Exhibit b. 

General McCoy. Here it is. 

Admiral Standley. 5 : 40, 27 November. 

Colonel Phillips. That's right. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 137 

The Ch AIRMAN, Here it is. Now oo ahead. 

General McNarney. In otlier words. Alert No. 1 was ordered prior 
to the receipt of the War Department message of November 28, 
which was concerned primarily with sabotage? 

The Chairman. Do you find the 28th? 

Colonel Phillips. I haven't that, sir. 

[££1] The Chairman. Where do you find the one of the 28th? 
Under Exhibit 1? 

Admiral Standlet. Signed "Adams," right next. 

General McNarney. "G." 

The Chairman. "G." There is the new one (indicating). 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, that's right. 

General McNarney. Going back to the message of November 27, 

The Chairman. Colonel, that is under b. : 27th. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. (Continuing.) -; — I fail to find in that mes- 
sage anything relating to sabotage specifically, but I do find certain 
terms: 

•Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action probable at any 
moment. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 
General McNarney. I also find : 

Policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of 
action that might jeopardize your defense. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. I also find a direction to "undertake such recon- 
naissance and other measures as you deem necessary." 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. Do you feel that the Alert No. 1 carried out 
the directive contained in the message of the 27th ? 

Colonel Phillips. We felt so at the time, sir. We felt that we were 
alerting the entire command and our immediate threat was right here. 

General McNarney. Do you know whether the gist of the directive 
of the 27th was communicated to any senior staff officers or senior 
commanders of the Department ? 

Colonel Phillips. I can't tell you that. There was a [22^] 
question of the minimum essential officers being informed in regard to 
this. At the last sentence it says, "Limit discussion of this highly 
secret information to the minimum essential officers," and that was 
done. 

General McNarney. Will you tell the Commission who were the 
officers that was communicated to ? 

Colonel Phillips. I informed the G-3. I don't know whom the 
Department commander informed. I believe I also informed the G-2. 

(reneral McNarney. Are you the senior member of the Local Joint 
Planning Committee, senior Army member? 

Colonel Phillips. By order, yes, sir; I have never functioned as 
such. 

General McNarney. Since when have you held this position? 

Colonel Phillips. Since I became chief of staff. 

General McNarney. There have been no meetings of the Local 
Joint Planning Committee since that time ? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir. 



138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McNarney. What is your idea of the fiuictioii of the Local 
Joint Planning Committee ? 

Colonel Phillips. My idea is, of course, controlled more or less to 
conform to what we have as a joint plan, and I should say that when- 
ever changes are necessary, why, that joint committee should meet and 
modify the joint plain that we have. 

General McNarney. You did not consider that the situation as 
known to you on November 27 and 28 required any revision of the 
existing plans or any examination into the propriety of making a new 
plan ? 

Colonel Phillips. We were all familiar with the plan thoroughly, 
sir, and a change was not deemed necessary at that time. 

[£23] General McNarney. What is the normal routine method 
by which the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, the 
Commander in Chief of the Fleet, and the Commander of the 14th 
Naval District maintained close liaison and contact with reference to 
the existing situation ? 

Colonel Phillips. By personal conferences at one or the other 
headquarters. 

General McNarney. Did you, as Chief of Staff of the Department, 
confer with any Navy officers during the period November 27 to De- 
cember 7 ? 

Colonel Phillips. I did not. I was occupied with the duties of my 
office here at headquarters practically the entire period. 

The Chairman. Admiral ReeA'es? 

Admiral Eee\t5s. I have nothing, Mr. Justice. 

The Chairman. Admiral Standley? 

Admiral Standley. I would like to ask you a few questions. Colonel. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. This party at the club at the barracks that you 
attended, this dance — 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Was General Short there? 

Colonel Phillips. I can't say, sir. It was a large party. 

Admiral Standley. Was this a club party, or were there other — Was 
this a private party, and were there other parties at the club? Was 
this a private party ? 

Colonel Phillips. It was the ordinary evening club dance, and this 
was a private party, not a club entertainment. 

Admiral Standley. And there probably were many other parties? 

Colonel Phillips. Many other parties, yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Many other parties? 

[224] Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. And those parties consisted of — what were the 
personnel at those parties? 

Colonel Phillips. Officers and their wives, generally speaking ; some 
civilians. 

Admiral Standley. Both. 

Colonel Phillips. Invited guests. 

Admiral Standley. Largely officers of the post? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Is liquor sold in the club ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COmMISSIOX 139 

Admiral Standley. At the Schofield Barnicks? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. There is liquor there at Schofield? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir, just like ordinary clubs throughout the 
Army. 

Admiral Staxdley. Suppose there was obviously a drunkenness 
among the officers thre : what would be your responsibility in the mat- 
ter, as Chief of Staff if any ? 

Colonel Phillips. Well, sir, I of course did not have the situation 
to face. I would have, of course, taken disciplinary action, perhaps 
put the officer concerned under arrest, send him to his quarters, or re- 
port him to his commanding officer. There was no indication of such 
thing. 

Admiral Standley. You feel, and felt then, that you had a responsi- 
bility in case there was a drunken orgy fit the club that morning?. 

Colonel Phillips. Most assuredh'. Most assuredly. 

Admiral Standley. That is. your responsibility as to the conduct 
and the morale of this post would involve a responsibility which re- 
quired you to take action of some kind if that occurred ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Is that true ? 

[22S] Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standi^y. Was any such action taken ? 

Colonel Phillips. There was no occasion for such action, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Just one other question : You would be cognizant 
of the disciplinary measures taken at this post since you have been 
here; is that true? 

Colonel Phillips. Absolutely, sir. 

Admiral Standley. What has been the record of punishment for 
drunkenness at this post among the officers ? 

Colonel Phillips. There has been ver}' little drunkenness among the 
officers here, sir. We have had — I can't say ofihand, but perhaps two 
or three trials since the first of March when I arrived, but those are — 
I am not positive about that, sir. 

The Chairman. The records will indicate it ? 

Colonel Phillips. Oh, yes, the records will. 

The Chairman. Will you make a memorandum for us of all such 
instances of charges of drunkenness ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Just a moment. When I used the expression 
"post" I meant this Department. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. I understood that, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Command. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. General McCoy ? 

General McCoy. Have you ever had occasion, Colonel Phillips, to 
report to your commander any such individual derelictions or cases of 
drunkenness ? 

Colonel Phillips. Not at this Department, sir; never. 

General McCoy. Did you see any evidence of drunkenness that night 
at the dance at Schofield Barracks ?* 

Colonel Phillips. I did not. 

General McCoy. Never even occurred to you? 



140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

me] Colonel Phillips. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Was it a dinner dance ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. The usual post dinner dance at the club ? 

Colonel Phillips. The usual, the ordinar}^ post dinner dance, and 
Major and Mrs. Dupree — he is adjutant of Schofield Barracks — had 
quite a large party of, I should say, 40 people, officers and their wives 
chiefly. 

General McCoy. Had it ever occurred, in consideration of what 
might follow on an alert, that it would be proper to lay down that 
there should be no social activities during an alert ? 

Colonel Phillips. That has never been considered, no, sir. 

General McCoy. In other words, after you were warned on the 27th 
that war was imminent and hostile action might occur, unpredictable, 
from any direction, you still carried on the usual social amenities and 
activities ? 

Colonel Phillips. There were not so many present, of course, be- 
cause many officers were involved in duty. We are very closely 
packed here ; we can get to our stations in a very few minutes. Ordi- 
narily there is no distance involved, any place in the Island, and there 
had been no restrictions in social functions. 

The Chairman. If an Alert 3 had been ordered, there would have 
been? 

Colonel Phillips. Quite different. Quite different. 

The Chairman. Everybody in effect would have been on post ? 

Colonel Phillips. Absolutely, just as it has been since Alert 3 has 
been in effect. 

The Ghairman. Alert 3 has remained in effect since December 7 ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. May I ask another question ? 

The Chairman. Certainly. 

[■2^7] General McCoy. In your consideration with your com- 
niander on receipt of this warning of November 27 did you discuss 
these first phrases that General McNarney called to your attention : 
''Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at 
any moment" ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. "If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States 
desires that Japan commit the first overt act" ? 

Colonel Phillips. Exactly. 

General McCoy. "This policy should not repeat not be construed as 
restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your de- 
fense"? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. "Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed 
to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem 
necessary" ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Now, that is the body and the gist of the whole 
dispatch. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. But on that you simply ordered Alert No. 1, with 
regard to sabotage, which is local 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 141 

Colonel Phillips. Exactly. 

General McCoy. and hasn't anything to do with hostile action 

as stated there ^ 

Colonel Phillips. We^ 

General McCoy. Did yon discuss those statements and those warn- 
in.gs with the commanding general? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. What was the 

Colonel Phillips (interposing). The thing that might jeopardize 
our defense the most was an organized internal uprising right in our 
midst here, with the large Japanese ' [228] population led by 
aliens. With the Pacific Fleets here responsible for distant reconnais- 
sance under our plan we felt, while a possibility of attack from the 
outside — while it was possible, it was rather remote, and the thing that 
would jeopardize our defense plan the most would be an organized up- 
rising right in our midst, to sabotage our seacoast defense, sabotage 
our planes, and generally disrupt our plan of defense on the Island. 

General McCoy. Excepting what actually did happen? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. And you didn't envisage that happening at all? 

Colonel Phillips. Not with distant reconnaissance provided by the 
Navy. 

General McCoy. Were you informed that such distant reconnais- 
sance was being cai-ried out? 

Colonel Phillips. I do not know that we were in so many words. 
We assumed that we were carrying our part of the plan, and I don't 
know that there was even any thought of anything else. 

General McNaeney. Was there any discussion of it? 

General McCoy. But I can't quite get yet why you thought that, 
with these statements that I have just read, which are the burden of 
the whole dispatch. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. I was controlled in my action, sir, 
by the directive of the Department Commander. 

General jVIcCoy. Were you informed by the Naval District of the 
arrival of the battleships in the harbor? 

Colonel Phillips. I was not, sir. I can't say whether the Depart- 
ment Commander was or not. I was not, sir. I never knew whether 
the ships were in or out. 

General McCoy. Wouldn't that affect any plan for defense that you 
mioht have, whatever? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir, it should have affected that, [229] 
sir, but as Chief of Staff I never knew. 

General McCoy. Did it ever occur to you that that was one of your 
main functions here ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. To help protect the fleet? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. But you automatically thought that that followed 
from your 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir. That was a matter the Department Com- 
mander was attending to personally, sir. 

General McCoy. Were not you usually with him at these confer- 
ences with the Commander of the Fleet ? 



142 CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Phillips, No, sir, I was not. 

General McCoy, Were you with him when he had any conferences 
with the Navy during that period of November 27 to December 7 ? 

Colonel Phillips, No, sir. 

General McCoy. Who was with him on those conferences? Are 
you informed as to that? 

Colonel Phillips. I believe his aide, sir. 

The Chairman. Who is his aide? 

Colonel Phillips. Captain Truman. 

General McCoy. Captain who? 

Colonel Phillips. Truman. 

General McCoy. At any time during the period of the alert from 
the 27th of November to December 7 did you have any conference 
with your vis-a-vis in the Navy or with any officer in the Navy? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir, I did not. 

General McCoy. Did anybody of your staff ? 

Colonel Phillips. None of my staff, no, sir. 

General McCoy. And neither the Operations nor the G-2, as far as 
you know? 

[^30] Colonel Phillips. As far as I know, no, sir. The Depart- 
ment Commander was handling all that himself. 

General McCoy, I have no further questions. 

The Chairman. If your Department, Colonel, was informed of the 
nature and tasks of the scouting forces of the Navy, that information 
came to the Department Commander himself, in your belief? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. I have some questions. 

On receipt of this cable of November 27 you discussed the matter 
with the commanding general, did you not ? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir. 

General McNarney. Was there any discussion as to the type of alert 
which should be put in? That is, did you consider No. 2 and No. 1 ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. Or just No. 1? 

Colonel Phillips. We considered exactly Avhat we should put in, 
whether 1, 2, or 3, 

The Chairman, Wliat was the objection to putting in 2 or 3, if any? 

Colonel Phillips. There was no particular objection, sir. It was 
considered that 1 was what we desired and required. 

The Chairman. Are there further questions ? 

Admiral Standley. I have one ; I am not quite ready yet. 

General McCoy. I have one: Colonel Phillips, under Alert No. 1, 
the very first line, the very first sentence, 14, page 3, it states,_"This 
alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the 
Islands, with no threat from without." 

Colonel Phillips, Yes, sir. 

General McCoy, Now, here was a warning telegram that did men- 
tion hostile action and unpredictable action from without, from the 
War Department, 

[£S1] Colonel Phillips, Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. So that that line is absolutely inconsistent, then, 
with the instructions from the War Department, is it not? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 143 

Colonel Phillips. It says, "with no threat from without," sir. 

General McCoy. So that Alert No. 1 is not consistent, I take it, 
with these instructions from the War Department, Had that incon- 
sistency in the very first paragraph of Alert No. 1 occurred to you? 

Colonel Phillips. It had not, sir. At the time I saw no inconsis- 
tency, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Colonel, in this Standing Operating Procedure 
under the duties for the interceptor command — that is paragraph 15 

J- (2). 

Colonel Pkhxips. Page i . 

Admiral Standley. On page 7. The first paragraph of j. says that 
the interceptor command will coordinate and control the operations 
of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, including available naval 
and Maritime Corps anti-aircraft artillery. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Now, that would involve, would it not, the 
artillery or the anti-aircraft artillery on board ships in the harbor; 
and then to follow^ up I will help you, will follow^ up 2 : it says — 
coordination of anti-aircraft fire with naval ships in Pearl and Honolulu harbors. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. So that automatically, then, your plan takes 
care of the ships that are in the harbor; wouldn't it? 

Colonel Phillips. We had planned that. That feature of this had 
never been settled in any joint agreement at all at that time, sir. 

[£S2] Admiral Standley. But it was on operating procedure? 

Colonel Phillips. This w^as at the time, yes, sir. 

General McCoy. I understand, however, the interceptor command 
was not constituted until the I7th; is that correct? 

Colonel Phillips. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. Why was it that that had not been activated prior 
to December 7, Colonel ? 

Colonel Phillips. We did not have the Radars. They are still not 
installed. Making every effort that we can to get them in, sir, and 
that was the basis of the interceptor commancl, we felt: Aircraft 
Warning Service. 

The Chairman. Well, now, when was this operating procedure 
adopted? 

Colonel Phillips. This was signed on the 5th of November, 1911, 
sir. 

The Chairman. And it was therefore — what was written about 
the interceptor command? Was it prospective? 

Colonel Phillips. Exactly the same as the Home Guard ; there is a 
reference here to the Home Guard, which had not been in existence, 
was not at that time. It has just been organized. 

Admiral Standley. Were there any other parts of this procedure 
that were not operative at that time? 

Colonel Phillips. I believe not, sir. 

General McCoy. Was there a provision made in this Alert No. 1 
for aerial warnings, for warning against hostile aircraft? Any sys- 
tem, in other words, in effect? 

Colonel Phillips. I do not understand that question, General. 



144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCoy. Well, I notice since the attack you have issued an 
instruction establishing an aerial warning service with sirens in the 
tower downtown, and so forth. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. That was not in effect on December 

[2SS] Colonel Phillips. That was not in effect at this time, sir. 

General McCoy. Nor any other system 

Colonel Phillips. Of air raid warning, no, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Coloney, you just stated that the Radars were not 
installed. Do you refer to the permanent stations? 

Colonel Phillips. The permanent installations, yes, sir. We had 
temporary mobile stations. We had six mobile and six permanent 
provided. 

Admiral Reeves. Were the mobile stations installed? 

Colonel Phillips. The mobile stations were in position, yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Yes? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. On page 1 of Alert No. 1 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Or no. On page 1 of the Standard Operating Pro- 
cedure I notice under the term "security," under (6) : "Security." 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. "Every unit is responsible for its security at all 
times from hostile ground or air forces." 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. What measures for security did you envisage as 
being normally taken under that provision? 

Colonel Phillips. That is set forth in that Field Manual 100-5, 
sir, which gives the^ — makes the unit commander responsible for his 
security. General statement as to that. 

General McCoy. Did it provide for having ammunition at the gims 
and the guns in readiness and a skeleton crew at the guns ? 

Colonel Phillips. In case the guns were out, yes, sir, I should say 
so ; that would provide — that is a normal battery function, I should say. 

1^34] General McCoy. When they were in the field, you say ? ' 

Colonel Phillips. When they were in the field, yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Do you know whether on December 7 antiaircraft 
guns were ready for action with ammunition present at the ginis ? 

Colonel Phillips. They were moving in under Alert — these were 
mobile units, sir. They were moving in under Alert 3 just as soon as 
they got their orders. 

General McCoy. But they were not prepared under Alert No. 1? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir, they were not in position under Alert 
No. 1. That is not required, sir. 

General McCoy. Is there any provision under the standing orders 
as to where ammunition and bombs for the air fleet should be kept? 
I will make that a little explanatory by telling you that a statement 
has been made that at Hickam Field the ammunition was in the hangar. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes. 

(jeneral McCoy. Which were immediately set on fire. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. That's what leads me to ask this question. 

Colonel Ppiillips. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 145 

General McCoy. In other words, was there any inspection and report 
to you as to the security of ammunition and its availability against 
innnediate surprise attack? 

Colonel Phillips, No report made, sir. 

The Chairman. Colonel Phillips, when the message of November 
27 was received I understand you had three mobile Radar units? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Was there any discussion, in view of the possible 
outbreak of hostilities, of the necessity for working those Radar units 
24 hours a day ? 

[2S5] Colonel Phillips. No discussion of that so far as I know, 
sir. 

The Chairman. Then, in spite of the availability of those units 
your Department depended simply upon the scouting forces of the 
iNavy and such intelligence information as the Navy might otherwise 
obtain to warn you of any hostile attacks? 

Colonel Phillips. I would say so, sir. 

The Chairman. In other words, the system of training on the 
Radar units went on as before? 

Colonel Phillips. We had no trained operators. We were exert- 
ing every effort we could to train these men. Tliey were all rank 
amateure; nobody was a professional on the Radar. We were 
devotmg 

The Chairman. Well, Avas it because of that deficiency that you 
didn't give orders for the Radar equipment to be worked full-time, 
or was it because that expedient didn't occur to you ? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir; there was no discussion of that, sir. 

The Chairman. So that any inquiry I might make now as to why 
the senior officers of the Department did not give instructions for 
the use of the Radar equipment continuously would be simply specu- 
lation on your part as to why somebody didn't think of it ? 

Colonel Phillips. The Radar and its operation was under the 
interceptor commander and also the Department signal officer at that 
time. He was training these people, and that was his function. 

The Chairman. I understand that. • 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. But inquiry could be made of one or both those 
men ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. As to whether it was not possible to keep [236] 
the equipment working continuously ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Is that right ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. That's true, sir. 

The Chairman. But, as I understand your answer, that expedient 
occurred to nobody and was discussed by nobody in the superior 
command ? 

Colonel Phillips. So far as I know, sir, that was not discussed. 
It's possible that the Department Commander took consideration of 
that. I didn't. 

The Chairman. Now, isn't it a fact that those things were not 
discussed because no one in the superior command liad the slightest 
notion tliat there would be any raid within any reasonable number of 
days? You all felt secure against a raid ? 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 1 11 



146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel PiiiLLn'S, We felt secure against a raid, particularly with 
the Fleet here, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Well, now. Colonel, had you, in fact, a right to 
rely on the Navy's scouting unless you knew what the extent and 
the nature of that scouting Avas ? For example, if you had been told 
that the Navy had available but a single task force for that purpose 
would it not be obvious to you that but a single task force couldn't 
cover the four points of the compass of this Island ? 

Colonel Phillips. Certainly it would, yes, sir. 

The Chairmax. And you didn't know how many forces they had 
out? 

Colonel Phillips. As I said a while ago, sir, I never knew what 
the Navy had. 

The Chairman. I have no further questions. 

General McCoy. I noticed in General Short's report to the War 
Department and also in his statement to us that he mentions and gives 
full particulars of the operation of the [237'\ Radar on the 
morning of the 7th. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Including the volunteer action of one of the oper- 
ators that did find a large force of planes approaching the Island. 
It is carried forward in these statements up to the point where 
Lieutenant Tyler — is it ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Lieutenant Tyler evaluated the information. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

Greneral McCoy. When did you discover that? 

Colonel Phillips. As to the evaluation of the 

General McCoy. As to the whole story that is stated here. 

Colonel Phillips. The whole story? Peihaps on the 8th or 9th. 

General McCoy. There was no report made to you at the time? 

Colonel Phillips. There was no report at the time. I reported it 
to the Department Commander as soon as I 

General McCoy. How did you discover it? 

Colonel Phillips. It was "reported by the signal officer. Depart- 
ment signal officer, Colonel Powell. 

General McCoy. What was the nature of his report to you? 

Colonel Phillips. Informal report, sir. 

General McCoy. What did he say ? 

Colonel Phillips. He told me of the circumstances and that they 
were retained — they were running from 4 to 7 normally, and that 
after 7 these planes had appeared on the graph of the Radar, and 
that Tyler had considered they were either planes being ferried from 
the mainland as we had been getting them in from time to time — of 
course that was very secret. Sometimes they knew, and he had 
known of them arriving ; or they were planes from the Navy carriers. 

General McCoy. Dicl you inform anybody in your command — 
[2S8] that is, the ground command — of the arrival of those planes 
that morning ? 

Colonel Phillips. Of the arrival of the B-l7's? 

General McCoy. Yes, from the mainland. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Whom ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 147 

Colonel Phillips. The Hawaiian Air Force, 

General McCoy. Were they mistaken on their arrival for hostile 
planes by any member or any detachment or any anti-aircraft or- 
ganization, as far as you know ? 

Colonel Phillips. As far as I know, no, they were not. 

General McCoy. You do not know whether they were fired on by 
our own guns ? 

Colonel Phillips. I do not know about that, sir. 

General McCoy. Has any report 

Colonel Phillips. There have been no reports to that effect. 

General McCoy. Have you made inquiry since December 7 as to 
what went on in these various posts and fields on that day? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir, through my staff, through my G-3, G-2. 

General McCoy. Have there any reports been called for from the 
commanding officers of the different fields and posts as to what hap- 
pened on that morning? 

Colonel Phillips. I do not believe so, sir. 

General McCoy. In other words. General Short's report to the 
War Department, a copy of which has been furnished us, was made 
up without finding out what happened in his subordinate— — 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir. He visited personally every post; he 
was out on reconnaissance the entire period personally nudiing that 
report. 

General McCoy. You think he knows, then, what happened 
[239] on each field and post at that time ? 

Colonel Phillips. He was inspecting continuously. 

General McCoy. Since that time? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir, during that — during the 7th and follow- 
ing, subsequent thereto. 

General McCoy. I understand that he established immediately 
what you call your advanced 

Colonel Phillips. Command post. 

General McCoy. Command post, in the crater ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Do you remember about what time that was 
established ? 

Colonel Phillips. Very shortly; I should say aroinid 9, perhaps 
9 o'clock, 9 : 30, it was being opened. 

General McCoy. It was functioning, then, during most of the 
succeeding raids ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. That is, I take it there were three raids, were 
there? 

Colonel Phillips. There were three to my knowledge. I remained 
here, sir. 

General JNIcCoy. That is, you remained in this building? 

Colonel Phillips. I remained in this building, my office just in 
there (indicating). We had our scrambled phone to Washington in 
this little booth right here, and I w^as directed to remain here and 
did not go to the forward command post until Tuesday following the 
attack. 

General McCoy. Who was in charge of it during the Sunday 
morning after it was established? 



148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Phillips. General Short was there himself, G-3 was 
there, and the bulk of G-2; the headquarters commandant, Major 

Henderson, was there establishing the post, and he of course is 

[B4O] General McCoy. That was the normal arrangement for 
it? 

Colonel Phillips. That was the normal arrangement, yes, sir. 
Normally the Chief of Staff, of course, would have been there; but 
due to our telephone arrangement with Washington and the necessity 
that the Department Commander felt for getting information to 
Washington and from Washington I remained near this phone and 
did all the talking with the War Department. 

General McCoy. How many times did you talk with them that 
day ? Do you remember ? 

Colonel Phillips. Two or three, sir. 

General McCoy. Did 5^ou take a transcript of your conversation? 

Colonel Phillips. I did not, sir. Most of them were in the — first 
call I put in at the direction of the Department Commander, General 
Marshall. 

General McCoy. The Chief of Staff', you mean '( 

Colonel Phillips. To the Chief of Staff, yes, sir. 

General McCoy. You talked to him personally? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. How many times that morning ? 

Colonel Phillips. We only called once, as I recall. 

General McCoy. Did he call you back at any time that day ? 

Colonel Phillips. I believe he did, sir. There is a record of that. 
There is a record of the number of calls. 

General McCoy. Yes. Could you sit down and think it over and 
dictate the nature of your conversation to General Marshall ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. I think it would be well. 

The Chairman. Will >ou make a memorandum to do it and come 
back later when we have got through these other matters ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Was there any other time between November 
[24^] 27 and December 7 that the Department Commander or you 
talked with the Chief of Staff or anybody else in the War Department 
about the measures taken for security here ? 

Colonel Phillips. I did not, sir, and I do not believe that the 
Department Commander did. 

General McCoy. Was it customary in time of crises to use the 
telephone with the office of the Chief of Staff in Washington? 

Colonel Phillips. It was used very very seldom, sir. 

General McCoy. Why was that the case? That is, I mean it is 
the quickest means of communication. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Now, why was it not used in time of emergency 
more frequently, say ^ 

Colonel Phillips. I could not say as to that, sir. 

General McCoy. Did you possibly feel that it Avas not as safe as 
a code message by radio ? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir. With this phone it's a highly secret 
arrangement. It's a scrambled phone, and we feel its use is ex- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 149 

tremely — that is limited ; we shouldn't use it but on a highly impor- 
tant—or for highly important calls. That is the impression that the 
Department Comiiiander gave me. It is the most secret, we think, 
I don't know. 

General McCoy. And it is certainly the quickest? 

Colonel Phillips, No question about that, sir. 

General McCoy. You talk in the open, and it scrambles itself? 

Colonel Phillips. That's right. You raise a little plug on the phone 
itself. There are definite instructions as to how to place the call. 
The operator says, "Go ahead," and you pull out this little plug, and 
that scrambles your conversation. 

General McCoy. Both ways ? 

Colonel Phillips. Both ways. He pulls out the plug on [^^^] 
his phone. 

Admiral Standley. That is understood beforehand? 

Colonel Phillips. Oh, yes, yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Have you any such arrangement with the Navy 
here on the Island ? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Do you have a direct line between commanders- 
in-chief and the commander here ? 

Colonel Phillips. We have in the forward C. P. 

General McCoy. But not here ? 

Colonel Phillips. Not here, no, sir ? 

General McCoy. It would go here through the city central, would 
it? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. Well, no. We have cables here direct 
to Pearl Harbor but no direct connection. The forward C. P., we 
have a phone directly — onto the Department Commander's desk di- 
rectly from the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. 

General McCoy. How would you get the Commander in Chief 
normally here at headquarters? 

Colonel Phillips. Call Pearl Harbor, sir. 

General McCoy. That would go into a military central, would it? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir, right here, sir. 

General McCoy. It would not go downtown to the civilian central ? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir, I do not believe so. I believe that is 
correct, sir. 

General McCoy. In other words, there is a military central here 
and a naval central down at the 

Colonel Phillips. A naval central down there. 

General McCoy. At Pearl Harbor? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes. sir. 

[^^5] General INIcCoy. How long does it take physically to get 
from here to Pearl Harbor in case of emergency? 

Colonel Phillips. From 15 to 20 minutes, sir. 

General Marshall. Were there any liaison officers exchanged as a 
result of Alert No. 1? 

Colonel Phillips. Prior to Alert No. 1, we had a naval officer on 
duty at this headquarters in G-3 office, and we had also an Army 
officer on duty in the operations section of Admiral Bloch's staff. 

General McCoy. That was prior to Alert No. 1 ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 



150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCoy. What happened after Alert No. 1 ? 

Colonel Phillips. There was no change in that made. 

General McCoy. So that there was a naval officer? 

Colonel Phillips. There was a naval oificer here, and we had an 
Army officer there. 

General McCoy. Was that the case on Sunday ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Who was that naval officer? Do you know? 

Colonel Phillips. Lieutenant Burr. 

General McCoy. Is he here now at this headquarters? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. That is normal for him to be here? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. Well, he is in the forward command 
post. 

General McCoy. But he is here now — oh, he is in the forward com- 
mand post now ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. And who is the Army officer on duty over there 
at the District ? 

Colonel Phillips. Lieutenant Colonel Dingman. 

General McCoy. What are their respective duties? 

Colonel Phillips. I do not believe they have ever been [^44] 
given prescribed duties. They are liaison officers. 

General McCoy. Embraced under the term "liaison officer"? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, liaison officers. 

General McCoy. I have no further questions. 

Admiral Standley. Colonel, you took over the duties of Chief of 
Staff on the 6th of November? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. This Standing Operating Procedure is dated 
November. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. '41. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. And it says that — 

This replaces, supersedes Tentative Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian 
Department, 14 July, 1941. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Do you know what brought about the issuing 
of this draft of the standing order, of the Standing Operating Pro- 
cedure ? 

Colonel Phillips. Of this one (indicating), sir? 

Admiral Standley. The one dated November 5. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. It was a result of — this tentative pro- 
cedure was published, and all major echelon commanders were directed 
to submit suggested changes, and these changes were considered by 
the Department Commander, G-3 Section, gone over very thoroughly, 
and various conferences were held with the major unit commanders. 
Those changes were all embodied in this volume which was issued 
the 5th of November (indicating). 

Admiral Standley. Were those conferences attended or taken part 
in by the Commandant of the 14th District? 

Colonel Phillips. They were not, sir. 



PROCEEDIXGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSIOX 151 

Admiral Staxdley. They involved ca number of commitments or 
requirements for naval action or cooperation? 
[243] Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Were those various j)hases approved by tire 
Commandant of the District ? 

Colonel Phillips. They had not been taken up with the Navy so 
far as I know, sir. 

The Chairman. In other words, that ties in with your statement to 
General McNarney that there had not been a meeting of the Joint 
Plannino; Committee since you had become Chief of Staff? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir; that is correct, sir. 

General McCoy. Did vou furnisli the Navy with a copy of this 
Alert No. 1 ? 

Colonel Phillips. I cannot say about that, sir. I did not myself. 

General McCoy. Will you make a note and make sure of that, please? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Did the Navy have a corresponding plan, so far 
as you know ? 

Colonel Phillips. I do not, sir. 

The Chairman. Can you say whether anything of that nature was 
furnished to you ? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir. 

The Chairman. And if it was. where Avould it be located in this 
Department ? 

Colonel Phillips. It would be — if anything of this nature was 
furnished, it would come through me, and I do not believe that such 
a thing exists. 

The Chairman. To your knowledge were the naval commanders 
advised that you had put Alert No. 1 into operation? 

Colonel Phillips. They were, sir. 

The Chairman. And how were they to know what Alert No. 1 com- 
prised? Would it mean anything to them for you to tell [^-j^] 
them that Alert No. 1 liad been put into effect ? 

Colonel Phillips. Not as such, no, sir. 

The Chairman. In other words, — 

Colonel Phillips. I am not positive of that. sir. I am not positive 
about it. 

The Chairman. You think that what was communicated to the 
Navy by General Short would be known by General Short and his 
aide, rather than by you ? 

Colonel Phillips. That is right. 

The Chairman. Nothing came to your knowledge with respect to 
the state of preparedness that the Navy was in in view of these 
warnings? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Did j-ou have any conference or conversation with 
the Naval officer in the G-3 about it f 

Colonel Phillips. The G-3 had in the course of normal operations 
the naval — naval liaison officer is in with all G-3 conferences. 

General McCoy. It would be one of his functions as liaison 
officer 

Colonel Phillips. That's right. 

General McCoy. to have a copy of Alert No. 1, Avould it? 



152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. And he would probably furnish it to his own 
headquarters ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Colonel, if the Navy had put in operation an 
operation order which involved cooperative measures or joint action, 
would you expect the Army liaison officer to inform the commanding 
general of it ? Would that be part of his responsibility ? 

Colonel Phillips. That would be the normal thing, yes, sir, I would 
think. 

Admiral Standley. But wouldn't the normal thing be to W/] 
have this commanding general and the Commandant of the District 
discuss such a procedure as that ? 

Colonel Phillips. That's right. 

Admiral Standley. Prior to putting it into effect ? 

Colonel Phillips. Prior to its adoption, yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Do you know whether General Short had such 
a discussion or not ? 

Colonel Phillips. I do not. 

Admiral Standley. I have nothing further. 

The Chairman. Have you anything further? 

General McNarney. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You will get the matters that we asked you for, 
Colonel, will you, as expeditiously as you can reasonably ? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And, Colonel, on account of the nature of this 
inquiry it is enjoined upon witnesses that they shall not discuss any- 
thing that has gone on in this room or discuss it with anyone else. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And I will ask you to observe that caution. 

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, gentlemen, I am not sure whom we have here. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

The Chairman. Call in General Wilson. 

TESTIMONY OP BRIGADIER GENERAL DURWARD S. WILSON, 
COMMANDING 24TH INFANTRY DIVISION 

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Your full name. General ? 

General Wilson. Durward S. Wilson. 

The Chairman. And your rank ? 

General Wilson. Brigadier General, commanding the 24th Division. 

The Chairman. General McCoy, will you examine him? 

[^4^] General McCoy. Is j^our division constituted on a war 
footing now ? 

General Wilson. Do you mean as to strength, sir, or activities? 

General McCoy. Yes, as to organization of the division on a war 
footing. 

General Wilson. I don't believe I follow you, General. As far as 
its activity is concerned, it is. It's considerably under strength, if 
you have reference to that. 

General McCoy. Well, I had reference both as to organization and 
strencth. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 153 

General Wilson. As to organization, it is organized along the lines 
of a triangular division, with a considerable number of shortages. In 
other words, the personnel is not more than two-thirds strength, 
officers for duty approximately 50. Certain installation — units such 
as the Quartermaster Battalion, Medical Battalion are both way mider 
strength. For instance, the infantry regiments have a strength of 
enlisted personnel of around 2,000, whereas they are supposed to have 
around 3,200, and about 40-odd officers for duty. The artillery also 
is way under strength; we understand replacements are on the way. 

General McCoy. When was this division formed ? 

General Wilson. October 1 this year, sir. 

General McCoy. Were all the personnel brought here from the 
States since then? 

General Wilson. Oh, no, sir. The Hawaiian Division that existed 
here was split into two triangular divisions. I might also state that 
one of the three regiments belonging to the 24th Division is not under 
my command; it is the 299 Infantry, which is scattered throughout 
the outlying islands, defending them. 

[249] General McCoy. Under district commanders? 

General Wilson. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. You have no responsibility for them at present ? 

General Wilson. No, sir, none whatever. In fact, they were de- 
tached some time ago before the organization of the two triangular 
divisions. 

General McNarney. General, were you ever informed of a War 
Department cable dated November 27 which outlined the situation be- 
tween the United States and Japan and gave certain directives? 

General Wilson. On I think it was the 27th I was informed by an 
officer who had come from Department Headquarters ; I was given a 
message something to this effect — it wasn't even written : that nego- 
tiations with Japan seemed to be off, that the United States would sit 
tight, await action by Japan. That was the intent of the message 
which I received. 

General McNarney. Who delivered this message ? 

General Wilson. It was delivered by Colonel Haynes, who is G-2 
of the 25th Division. He got it from Department. The Department 
directed that he deliver it to me. He delivered it to me after dark. 

General McNarney. When did you receive the orders to go on Alert 
No. 1? 

General Wilson. Alert No. 1, 1 think it was that same day, the 27th. 
I am quite positive of that, because after I got this message from 
Colonel Haynes we of course put it into effect. We have a Standing 
Operating Procedure, so that we can tell them to carry it out. But 
as soon as I got that message, which was after dark, I assembled the 
regimental commanders from my chief of staff', only very few. be- 
cause I was told to keep it secret, had a little discussion with tliem 
and directed [^50] that every installation which we were guard- 
ing, vital installations, be inspected that night. 

General McNarney. What did Alert No. 1 involve to your com- 
mand? 

General Wilson. Alert No. 1 involved proper measures against 
sabotage, under the supposition that there was no threat from the out- 
side, and the measures that we put into effect were as follows : A num- 
ber of vital installations were protected by standing guards. These 



154 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

had been carefully selected in advance. Standing guards were put 
upon them, and in addition we had patrols cover the principal roads 
throughout the north sector. In addition we had a battalion of in- 
fantry alerted and ready to move on very short notice. 

General McNarney. Were there any observational units on the 
beach ? 

General Wilson. No, not — no. This Alert No. 1, as I stated, was 
based upon no outside threat. It was against sabotage. 

General McNarney, Did you have any information on the 27th 
that the War Dej^artment had sent a message which stated in effect : 
Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at 
any moment? 

General Wilson. Not in that manner. I have stated to you the 
import of the message which I received on the 27th. 

General McNarney. There was no indication in that message that 
hostile action might be expected? 

General Wilson. No. No, because the following day the newspaper, 
as I remember it — because it impressed me that we were bound to great 
secrecy, and the newspapers stated practically the same thing, and that 
is that negotiations looked like they were practically finished and that 
our country woidd wait and allow Japan to take the initiative. 

General McNarney. Did the fact that negotiations were [^-5i] 
practically finished lead you to believe that there was a possibility of 
action against the Island of Oahu ? 

General AVilson. No. I had 'no feeling whatsoever that there 
would be any action that we wouldn't get wind of. Now, as to what 
action would be taken — no, I didn't expect — personally didn't expect 
any attack on the Philippines, because I figured r 

The Chairman. On Hawaii. 

General Wilson. I mean on Hawaii, because I figured that with the 
patrol system and the strength that we have here Japan would make 
her effort in another direction. 

General McNarney. You mention a patrol system. Wliat do you 
know about the patrol system in effect? 

General Wilson. I know nothing about it. That I could testify to 
only by hearsay, about a Navy patrol, inshore and offshore patrol. I 
know nothing. All that is kept very secret, and I know nothing 
about it, except just what you hear. 

General McNarney. Can you give the Commission a brief narrative 
of your actions after the attack started ? 

General Wilson. As soon as the — I was at my quarters at the time 
the attack started. 

General McNarney. Where are your quarters ? 

General Wilson. They are in the 21st Infantry Area at Schofield 
Barracks, about five minutes from my command post by car. Sunday 
is my day for taking it easy, and I was in bed when the first bomb 
sounded, landed. I arose and dressed, went out in front, and while I 
could hardly believe it I saw that they were Jap planes. I immedi- 
ately jumped into my personal cai- and di'ove as quickly as I could to 
my command ])ost. There I found my chief of staff had preceded 
me; he lived nearer. He had gotten there, and he had already issued 
orders to supplement Alert No. 1 : in other words, to direct the troops 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 155 

to get their machine guns into anti-aircraft [252] position just 
as cjuickly as possible, some of our units having ah-eady anticipated us 
and got them there; in addition, to send patrols throughout our whole 
sector for observation of the beach, and to increase the standing guards. 
Tliat action was all taken by the time I got there. About — I can't 
give you the exact time, but I would say it was approximately 8 : 50— 
as far as we could determine this attack came about 8 : 05, and within 
a few minutes after that my chief of staff had issued these instructions 
to the troops. About 8 : 50 we got word from Department that Alert 
No. 3 would go into effect at once. That was an all-out defense where 
our troops moved and get into their defense position, and that was 
immediately initiated. 

General AIcCoy. Did it work satisfactorily to you ? 

General Wilson. Yes, sir, it worked very satisfactorily. 

General McCoy. Could you say, just off the bat, what proportion of 
your connnand, first as to officers and next as to men, took part in that 
initial mo^'ement? That is, was there any particular proportion of 
your command, both officers and men, absent on pass? 

General Wilsox. General, I am not aware of the — I haven't the 
details on the proportion, but I would say that the bulk of our com- 
mand was in the quadrangles preparing to move very shortly after the 
alert sounded. 

The Chairman. What do you mean by the bulk of your command ? 

General Wilson. Well, I would say at least 80%. 

General McCoy. Did you make any check on that at any time? 

General Wilson. The regimental commanders of course checked. 
I haven't the figures myself, sir. 

The Chairman. Where are they lodged ? 

General Wilson. I be,g your pardon ? 

The Chairman. Where are they lodged, if anywhere, the [£531 
figures ? 

General Wilson. Within the regiment, sir. 

The Chairman. Are they furnished to the adjutant general? 

General Wilson. I am not certain, sir. The figures may have been 
collected by my own adjutant general. That is a point that has 
escaped me, because — I might state in that connection that we are 
not able to immediately jump into our transportation and move out 
into our position, and by the time the troops were ready to move 
the troops were all there. There are many preparations that have 
to be made. We have a great many sector weapons. For instance, 
we have organizations that have as many as — rifle companies that 
have as many as 24 machine guns, and ammunition had to be loaded. 
Up until that time were were allowed to have 1,000 rounds of machine- 
gun ammunition loaded in belts. That's four belts, but of course 
we had to load a lot more. So I don't think the exact number that 
initially turned out when this alert sounded has any particular bear- 
ing, because they were there by the time we did move out. 

The Chairman. Your apprehension is that there were not many 
passes and not many men on leave on Sunday morning? 

General Wilson. That's right, sir. 

The Chairman. You think less than 10% of your command? 



156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Wilson. I said I would estimate 80% were present, so 
it would run about 20%. 

The Chairman. Twenty percent ? 

General Wilson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And under Alert No. 1 that was not an ab- 
normal number of leaves ? 

General Wilson. Well, no, sir, I wouldn't think so, because, as I 
stated, we had a battalion alerted and kept ready for a quick move- 
ment; and, as I stated, this alert is all based on sabotage, no threat 
from the outside. Therefore, [2S4] we put no particular re- 
straint on the men, granting of passes for the men, so long as we had 
the troops that we needed to meet the sabotage threat. 

The Chairman. Where were you Saturday night, sir ? 

General Wilson. I was at Schofield. 

The Chairman. At a party ? 

General Wilson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. What sort of party ? 

General Wilson. This was a dinner dance and a cabaret — so-called 
cabaret one of the very talented young ladies had worked up, some 
singing and dancing and song, and it was a combination dinner dance 
with some dancing by these people. 

General McCoy. By post ladies ? 

General Wilson. Yes, sir. Oh, yes. It was called Ann Etzler's 
cabaret. It is a feature that they put on annually. 

The Chair :\iAN. Wliat time did it break up ? 

General Wilson. I think I left about 11 o'clock, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you see drinking there ? 

General Wilson. No more than normal. 

The Chairman. What is normal? 

General Wilson. Well, over here cocktails are served before din- 
ner. I saw no drinking in the evening. 

The Chairman. Did you see anybody who was apparently under 
the influence of liquor there ? 

General Wilson. No, sir. 

The Chairman. If anybody in your command who was there was 
under the influence of liquor, what would have been your duty in 
the premises? 

General Wilson. To take the proper action, sir. 

The Chairman. What would that be ? 

General Wilson. Investigate the case, sir, and, if necessary, put 
the officer under arrest and, if circumstances justified, try him by 
general court martial. 

The Chairman. There was nothing approaching that sort of 
1^65] thing, was there? 

General Wilson. No, sir. In fact, I might state that I think the 
liquor angle at the point with which I have been stationed, Schofield, 
is excellent. People take a drink when they want it, and maybe before 
dinners people will have a drink or two, but you don't see people who 
are intoxicated, in other words. 

[£56] General McCoy. Have you had occasion to court-martial 
any of your officers or men for drunkenness ? 

General Wilson. No, General. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 157 

The Chairman-. On this night you saw nobody the worse for liquor? 

General Wilson. No, sir. 

The Chairman. And there was no reason why if they went home 
they would not be fit for active duty the following morning ? 

General Wilson. Absolutely. 

The Chairman. I have no further questions. 

Admiral Standley. In regard to the passes of men on liberty, do 
you have a check to your company commander or anybody else by a 
check of the men going out and coming in ? 

General Wilson. The men who go on a pass check out except in 
certain particular cases. We have what we call good conduct passes 
where the men are allowed out for a certain length of time without 
checking in. 

Admiral Standley. How is he to get past the entrance ? 

General Wilson. Each man has his pass. 

Admiral Standley. He has his pass ? 

General Wilson. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. If he does not go out on a good conduct pass, 
he is checked out on the pass ? 

General Wilson. That is right. 

Admiral Standley. And he is checked when he comes in ? 

General Wilson. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Then you could give an absolute record of the 
state of your command at practically any time of the night? 

General Wilson. You could give an approximate number. That 
is, of the men having good conduct passes, there is no check made at 
the gate. The check is made within the organization, within each 
company. I could not possibly check each [267] company, 
but we could probably approximate this. 

Admiral Standley. What percentage of the men have good conduct 
passes in the regiment ? How many men ? 

General Wilson. I could not tell you the proportion of them because 
that is worked out within the lower units based on certain regulations 
that were set down as to what constitutes good conduct, and they will 
vary with the various organizations. 

Admiral Standley. Could you recall whether or not at some period 
it may have involved your whole company ? 

General Wilson. Oh, no, no, sir. It never would be thgt. 

Admiral Standley. It is limited ? 

General Wilson. Yes. At this particular time it would be a limited 
liberty because of the fact that we are on alert No. 1 and were using a 
great many of our men for patrol duty and standing guard duty at the 
vital installations and so on, so that the number on pass would be less 
than in normal peace time. 

General McCoy. Was there any anti-aircraft action against the 
enemy on the part of your command ? 

General Wilson. On that morning? 

General McCoy. Yes. 

General Wilson. Yes, sir. Before I left my quarters. In fact, by 
the time I got out of my house there were machine guns mounted and in 
operation, 19 and 21. The men themselves had gotten these machine 
guns out and had gotten to work. As soon as my chief of staff got out 
of headquarters he directed them. 



158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCoy. Did they have any effect, so far as you know? 

General Wilson. Well, I don't know, General, whether we succeeded 
in getting any of them or not. 

General McCoy. But they were in action ? 

[£S8] General Wilson. Yes, in action. 

General McCoy. Who is your chief of staff? I would like to know 
his name. 

General Wilson. That is Colonel Spraggins. 

General McCoy. I would like to see a man like that who takes the 
initiative instead of waiting. 

General Wilson. Well, he is a very fine officer, gentlemen, and you 
will probably run across him at some time. He is a nephew of Colonel 
Eckles. 

General McNarney. Do you have the written standing order of 
procedure ? 

General Wilson. Yes, the standing operating procedure. 

General McNarney. Did you bring a copy of it ? 

General Wilson. Yes, I have six copies here that were called for. 

General McNarney. Would you leave those with the Commission ? 

General Wilson. Yes. 

There is one statement that I would like to make if I may. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Wilson. I have been very much impressed myself since Gen- 
eral Short arrived in this department at the initiative and the activity 
that he has exerted over this command. 

I came over here a year ago. I came here in September last year. 
Before that time nothing had been done in the way of fortifications. 
There was much discussion about it. I know I remarked that it seems 
there was a lot of talk but no work. 

General Short initiated fortifications work and initiated some very 
live maneuvers and got them alerted. As division commander I am 
very sure that he succeeded in getting many machine gun emplace- 
ments constructed prior to December 7 [^69] without the 
money for them, and the department commander tried to get them 
and had very little money to do it wath. It was done mainly by sal- 
vaged material here. 

I simply wanted to make that voluntary statement that I feel that 
in the short time that General Short has been here that we have been 
more on the alert, that there has been more initiative, more aggressive- 
ness, and all the fortifications that were never initiated prior to his 
coming here were started in May and continued up until December 7. 

The Chairman. Are there any other questions ? 

Admiral Ree\^s. No. 

The Chairman. General, with respect to our function here we think 
it is necessary that the witnesses called here shall not disclose what 
goes on in the room nor discuss their testimony Avith anyone else, and 
I will ask you to observe that. 

General Wilson. Yes, sir, I realize that. It stays with me. 

The Chahiman. Thank you, General. 

Call General Murray. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 159 

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL MAXWELL MURRAY, 
UNITED STATES ARMY, 25TH DIVISION 

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.) 

General Murray. I have six copies of the Standing Operating Pro- 
cedure. 

The Chairman. What is your name, General ? 

General Murray. Maxwell Murray. 

The Chairman. And your rank? 

General Murray. Major General, United States Army. 

The Chairman. In command of the 25th Division ? 

General Murray. In command of the 25th Division. 

The Chairman. General McCoy, will you examine? 

General INIcCoy. Give us some idea of the present condition of your 
organization with regard to the type of division and the [260] 
strength. 

General Murray. The division is now organized as a modified tri- 
angular infantry division. The strength is approximately 8,000 men. 
I do not have the exact figures this morning. It was 7,940 as of the 
last check I made yesterday or the day before. 

General McCoy. What should it be under the tables of organiza- 
tion? 

General Murray. It should be under the tables of organization. 
General — I am not certain. I think it is probably 12,000 men. We 
are short in headquarters communications, the signal corps units, mili- 
tary police units, and are quite low in the infantry strength. Our 
authorized strength is 7,000 as against 3,000. I have one National 
Guard regiment of two battalions, which is a strength of approxi- 
mately 900 men as opposed to a full war strength. 

General McCoy. Is the division equipped and armed for war serv- 
ice? 

General Murray. Yes, but not with standard equipment. We have 
just reorganized as of October 1st from a half division with artillery 
units and we had a great number of artillery units, of the British 75 
model 1917, left over from the 1917 emergency, and the howitzer 
equipment is 1917, 155 millimeter, and 75 millimeter tank guns, and 
we had improvised sets for those 75's and I have that organized so 
that I am using them for adapting the anti-tank guns, so they would 
be effective. 

General McCoy. Will you state what happened on the morning of 
December 7? 

General Murray. Yes, sir. I got up early, which is unusual for me 
on Sunday morning. I planned to take a horseback ride and I went 
to the window to see whether it was possible to ride. 

I heard a dive bomber coming over my quarters, so I looked [261] 
out so that I could report him for coming so low into an occupied area. 
The plane went over my place about 75 yards, and I could not identify 
him. I thought he was going to land at Wheeler Field. I ran to the 
front door and turned to take my watch so that I could report the 
time he landed. As I Avas watching him, I saw him drop his first 
bomb very clearly. My first thought was that there was some crazy 



160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

aviator dropping a practice bomb on the dump there. Just then a 
bomb exploded. So I went into my quarters and told my wife and 
told her to get under cover and then I called next door to my aide 
and then took my wife and daughter to cover. This was about eight 
o'clock. I am not certain as to the exact time. I took them to cover 
about eight o'clock, and this was about 7 : 53 when the attack began. 

I took them to the barracks and then began to get the information 
from department headquarters and then decided to order all artillery 
of the 25th Division moving out, and at 8 : 20 starting to draw am- 
munition. The artillery did not draw any ammunition under Alert 
1, but the artillery was all set to move and they were drawing am- 
munition and they were loaded before the roads were clear for them 
to move fast. 

General McCoy. Were you at the command post at this time ? 

General Murray. I went direct to my division office, whjch is a 
frame building, and the machine gun strafing was heavy. So I 
moved my staff there and stayed in there directly across the street. 
That was the only protection we had from overhead fire. As a 
matter of fact, one bomb landed in my front yard and struck the 
house of my chief of staff, but it did not actually strike my house. 

General McCoy. Did you take any action as division commander 
for the purpose of getting the artillery set in place ? 

General Murray. I sent word up to the infantry post by telephone 
to get the machine guns on the roofs, but the machine [26^'\ 
guns were on the roofs and they were firing within ten minutes. They 
had gotten started before we could get the telephone through. 

General McCoy. Did they have any effect? 

General Murray. No, sir, I don't think so. We had no anti-air- 
craft weapons then in the division, no seacoast anti-aircraft. We 
had 30 caliber machine guns, and that is supposed to provide for an 
emergency, anti-aircraft fire, but it is not a very effective seacoast 
mount there until it is sandbagged up. 

General McCoy. Wlien did Alert No. 3 start ? 

General Murray. It was approximately nine o'clock, General. I 
have it in the records. Would you like to have the exact time? 

General McCoy. No. I just want to follow through what your 
actions were. 

General Murray. It was approximately nine o'clock. The machine 
guns were in action on the roofs, and the artillery was at the other 
end of the post. 

They were getting some strafing, and they were probably firing 
with the B. A. R.'s, shooting operations for close defense, anti-aircraft 
fire. 

General McCoy. Was the artillery all motorized ? 

General Murray. Yes, all truck-drawn. 

General McCoy. What did you do after you got Alert No. 3? 

General Murray. I transmitted it to the organizations which were 
loading. I had already given them the verbal order that No. 2 was 
in effect. That meant they should start loading, getting ammunition. 

Several days before the alert I violated the usual regulations re- 
garding ammunition by moving all infantry ammunition except high 
explosives into the company barracks, the barrack rooms, and that 
meant that most of them had as much as 30 rounds [263'] of 
ammunition in the belts; so they were ready for immediate action. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 161 

0"(linarily we do not keep loaded ammunition in the barracks, but 
I had a full unit of fire for each rifle, and most of them going into 
operation except for the high explosives. 

General McCoy. Why did you do that? 

General Murray. Because of the situation at Schofield. I think 
you know the situation at Schofield. We have a very congested mag- 
azine area there that was built for peacetime, but when a whole post 
starts to draw ammunition at once, it would be just like a slaughter 
with the Japanese bombs dropping into that area while they were all 
drawing ammunition. It would be just hopeless. 

The Chairmax. You did not expect Japanese bombs when you gave 
that order? 

General Murray. No, sir, I did not. I was just looking after the 
alert. I thought there might be a surprise raid. 

The Chairman. By plane? 

General Murray. JBy boat. I never dreamed that there was a pos- 
sibility of carriers. The answer was just to draw and try to move 
forward and to be able to move without delay, without two or three 
hours delay that would be accasioned by drawing for 20,000 men going 
through two gates, one gate going in and one gate coming out and 
there would be that congestion there and the exposed position of the 
troops. It took approximately six hours to draw the ammunition 
from the magazines due to the congestion in the area. 

The Chairman. Alert No. 1 did not call for that? 

General Murray. No, except for what we call emergency ammuni- 
tion of 20 rounds per rifle, but we had the ammunition at hand except 
the artillery. 

The Chairman. When would you be ready under that alert? 

General Murray. I was ready inside of an hour. As a [2641 
matter of fact, Alert No. 1 required us to get one battalion ready, ready 
to suppress sabotage, ready to move in an hour. 

The Chairman. Wlien did you get Alert No. 1 ? 

General MurRxVy. November 27th. 

The Chairman. What communication did you get with respect to 
the Japanese situation at or about the time you got Alert No. 1? 

General Murray. I am sorry. I haven't got my teletype message 
here. I just took it when it came off. There was some telephone call, 
and we advised them we were under attack, and we got some other 
stuttering messages. 

The Chairman. No, I do not mean that. When was Alert No. 1 
issued ? 

General Murray. November 27th. 

The Chairman. Was there any communication with respect to the 
Japanese situation ? 

General Murray. There was no expression of imminent action then. 
The negotiations were apparently progressing, and everybody was 
following it carefully, and the only concern we had was a possible 
attempt at sabotage of our communications systems or possibly some 
of the Hawaiian projects or the vital installations such as water. We 
had a very heavy guard on our electrical plants, substations, and 
communications. 

The Chairman, Did you have any communication on the 27th from 
headquarters here as to what the probabilities tlien were? 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 14:}, vol. 1 12 



162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Murray. Not that I recall, sir. If I may refresh my recol- 
lection (referring to a paper). Unless I am very mucli mistaken the 
only thing on November 27th was a telephone connnimication that Alert 
No! 1 had been ordei-ed. Alert No. 1 inunediately put in the standing 
operating procedure and simply required : "This is not a drill," and I 
took the first message over the phone at my office. However, there was 
nothing to indicate a change from the steps described in the standing 
operating [265] procedure. 

The Chairman. There was no message by any staff officer to you 
stating that any communication had been received from the War 
Department indicating an imminent state of hostilities? 

General Murray. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You did not know about that at all ? 

General Murray. I don't recall it. There was a liaison officer at 
department headquarters and we knew we were — I might say I talked 
with General Short several times personally between November 27 
and December 7. As a matter of fact, our last conference was in this 
office on December 6, in which I brought out a number of shortages that 
were reported particularly in the personnel, officers, and the fact that 
the statf of one battalion consisted of the major commanding the 
battalion and no other officer. 

General McCoy. In this conference with General Short, did he 
speak to you about any messages he had received from the War 
Department ? 

General Murray. Yes, sir, a number of them. 

General McCoy. What was the nature of them ? 

General Murray. The nature was in general that he had not been 
able to get funds that he had requested to build the defenses, installa- 
tions, and field fortifications, and we needed the material very much. 

General McCoy. Did he give any indication as to the international 
situation as outlined by the War Department ? 

General Mutiray. No, sir, except in general. No, in our discussion 
he brought out the fact that he had been able to take the necessary ac- 
tion on our plans to prevent sabotage, but I recall no other threat 
that was mentioned at any time. 

The Chairman. Where were you on the night of December 6, sir ? 

[266] General Murray. I was in my quarters the whole evening — 
no, sir, I was at a dinner at the club on Saturday evening until about 
ten-thirty and then went home. 

The Chairman. There was a party ? 

General Murray. A small dinner. 

The Chairman. There was a party at the post ? 

General Murray. Yes, but I was at a small dinner. They had a 
small cabaret show that started about seven o'clock in the evening with 
some dancing, two or three dancers, and then there was general 
dancing. 

The Chairman. Did you observe any drinking there that night, 
General ? 

General Murray. Nothing unusual. As a matter of fact, there was 
some drinking. I had a cocktail or two before dinner. I liad nothing 
at dinner. I saw no signs of it. In fact. I haven't seen for months 
nnv pviilt^pcp of excessive drinking in the club. 



PROCEEDIXGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 163 

The Chaikman-. You have not? 
General Murray. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Was there a large percentage of your command on 
leave Saturday night and Sunday morning? 

General Murray. No, sir. 

The Chairman. There was not ? 

General Murray. No, sir. I do not. as division commander, keep a 
record of the men who are actually authorized to be absent at amuse- 
ments, but the amusements of the post of Schofield are on the post at 
Schofield. Of course lately Honolulu has been very crowded and it 
is very expensive, and the junior officers get their amusement on thp 
post with amateur theatricals and card games, and such, and three 
dances a week. They have a dance on Wednesday in which the music 
stops at ten o'clock. 

[267] General Short had curtailed all late parties shortly after 
taking connnand of the department. The last hop was allowed to go 
until twelve o'clock, and the bar closed at the same hour. 

Admiral Staxdley. How about the moving pictures? 

General Murray. The last moving picture gets out about ten-thirty. 
The movies have been running three shows and they start about five 
o'clock or five-fifteen and the last show was from eight-fifteen to ten- 
fifteen, which the officers attend. 

Admiral Standley. How many movie houses do you have? 

General Murray. Three permanent and three temporary ones, of 
which one was a cantonment type building, and one was open-air sur- 
rounded by canvas, like the ones you see at the roadside in the States, 
open, with no covering at all; and one in a tent, rather small, at the 
replacement center for the new draftees who had been coming in about 
a week before the attack. 

Admiral STA^^)LEY. Do you permit civilians from outside in the 
vicinity of Schofield to come into the movies ? 

General Murray. Yes, there are quite a number of them, many of 
the civilian employees of the post, and many in the adjacent town, 
find there are also a few Americans who live over in Wahiawa, and 
they come over to the post movies when there is a movie there that 
tliev think worth while driving two or three miles for. 

Admiral STAxm.EY. Is it the practice of your men geneitilly to at- 
tend your moA^es in the post or to go into Honolulu ? 

General Mxkray. Generally in the post, sir. I would say 95 out 
.)f 100. J 

The Cifairman. Any other questions? 

Admiral Ree'S'es. No. 

Tlio CHATR:srAN. General, because of the nature of our investigation 
it is desired that the questions asked here and the testimony given is 
such tliat anything that happens in the [^dS] room sliall not be 
discussed in any manner, nor disclosed nor discussed by you with 
anyone else. 

G-^nc^al Mi-rray. T understand that thoroughly. 

The Citatr^iax. Avd you will observe that admonition? 

(k'noral Murilvy. Yes, sir. 

Tlie Cfiatrmax. Call General Burgin. 



164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENEEAL HENRY T. BUEGIN, 
COAST AETILLEEY, UNITED STATES AEMY 

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you state your name, sir? 

(xeneral BuRGiisr. Henry T. Burgin. 

The Chairman. And your rank? 

General Burgin. Major General. 

The Chairman. And your command here? 

General Burgin. I command tlie Coast Artillery commands which 
consist of two parts, the seacoast artillery on the one hand and the 
anti-aircraft artillery on the other hand. 

The Cpiairman. General McCoy, will you examine ? 

General McCoy. Is your commmand on a war footing? 

General Burgin. It is on a war footing, yes, sir. 

General McCoy. As to strength? 

General Burgin. It is below strength considerably, in the nature of 
about 900 men at the present time, short in the whole command. That 
condition has gotten rapidly worse since the policy of sending men 
back after one year's service and the men who are 28 years old. 

Wlien I came over in August we were above strength by a couple of 
hundred men, but now we are below strength by approximately 900. 

General McCoy. Have you sent any replacements to the Philippines ? 

General Burgin. No, sir, I have not ; not from here. 

General McCoy. You are not short in the noncommissioned 
[^69] officers? 

General Burgin. No, sir. 

General McCoy. You have not been depleted ? 

General Burgin. Not in that line, no, sir. We have recently sent 
some detachments to the outlying islands in the Hawaiian group. 

General McCoy. Do you have a close liaison with the Navy? 

General Burgin. Yes, sir, with the Naval District Commander, 
Admiral Block. I have no communication with the fleet as the fleet, 
but my dealings are with the Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral 
Block. We have a close cooperation there. 

General McCoy. When Alert No. 1 was ordered on the 27th of 
November, what happened so far as your command was concerned ? 

General Burgin. My harbor defense troops were right at their guns, 
their operations, and slept, bedded down and ate there. 

My anti-aircraft troops stayed in their home positions and went on 
guarding that property and guarding against sabotage, acts of sa- 
botage, internal disorders, but not with the idea of an outside attack. 

General McCoy. At that time were you informed either by the 
Department Commander or by any member of his statf as to the nature 
of the orders or directives on that subject from the War Department 
which caused the alert ? 

• General Burgin. I put Alert No. 1 in effect immediately, and after 
assuring myself that it was going smoothly, I came up here. I talked 
to the Department Commander on other subjects and that, and I saw 
the Chief of Staff. He handed me out of the safe this, and said, "Do 
you want to see this put into effect?" and I said I did. 

[270] He showed me a radio to the effect that diplomatic rela- 
tions had broken down completely. It was more or less of that nature. 
I talked very little. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 165 

The Chairman. Is that the telegram (handing telegram to General 
Burgin) ? 

General Burgin. It probably is, sir. Yes, sir, that is it. I saw that 
telegram. That was shown to me as an explanation why Alert No. 1 
was put into effect. 

General McCoy. Did it occur to you that Alert No. 1 was the 
consistent order to follow that telegram ? 

General Burgin. It seemed to me. It seemed to be perfectly proper 
at the time, although I talked with Colonel Phillips, and he said, "We 
are going on Alert No. 1 now." 

I expected it to follow immediately with Alert No. 2, which is where 
we take ammunition. We waited for Alert No. 2 or 3 to go into effect 
and it did not take place. 

The Chairman. Did you have any further talk with Colonel Phillips 
or with the Department Commander between November 27 and De- 
cember 6 '{ 

General Burgin. I did not, no, sir. 

The Chairman. You were not here at headquarters during that 
period, were you ? 

General Burgin. No, sir. To my best recollection, no, sir, not on that 
subject; certainly not on the subject of the alert or the war. 

General McCoy. Were you surprised completely by the attack ? 

General Burgin. I was, yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Why ? 

General Burgin. In the discussion with the Navy people and with 
General Short himself the question came up several times, the ques- 
tion of a carrier getting close enough to this shore to land or to attack, 
and the assurance was always that it could not be done. We had the 
Navy scattered, scouting out [27 J] with the naval patrols and 
it was felt they would certainly detect any such movements before they 
could get near enough to land a plane. 

General McCoy. Do you remember any particular naval officer 
making that statement ? 

General Burgin. Yes, talking to Admiral Bloch. I am quite sure 
he did. General Short is the man who expressed himself forcibly 
along that line also, my Department Commander. 

General McCoy. Did he tell you what he based it on ? 

General Burgin. No, sir. 

General McCoy. He did not state it was as a result of any confer- 
ence with the Admiral ? 

General Burgin. No, sir, not in particular, sir, but it is my impres- 
sion he got it from talks with the Navy people. 

General McCoy. Did you accompan}' (jeneral Short on any con- 
ferences with Admiral Kimmel ? 

General Burgin. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Your liaison was entirely Avith Admiral Bloch? 

General Burgin. Yes. 

General jVIcCoy. Was that frequent ? 

General Burgin. Rather infrequent, sir. I had a representative 
in his office there and have had for two or three months, called the 
Harbor Control Post. There are three officers there on continuous 
duty. 

General McCoy. Do they have any additional officers in your 
headquarters ? 



166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Bukgin. No, sir, I didn't have until after December 7tli 
to now. 

The Chairman. There were three officers in the command post? 

General Burgin. Yes, sir. 

The Cetairman. An ofiicer of your command ? 

General Burgin. Yes, sir. 

[27S] The Chairman. An officer of the Navy ? 

General Bttrgin. No. It is a Navy control post, sir, called the Har- 
bor Control Post, operating at Pearl Harbor. It is purely a Navy 
post. 

My representative goes over there as liaison officer, and for example 
there might be a ship, an enemy ship coming in, and the Navy control 
tells me'whether I should open fire on the ship or delay firing and 
let the Navy take care of it. 

General McCoy. That comes to you from your representative? 

General Burgin. Yes. 

General McCoy. Do you have a wire? 

General Burgin. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Wliere is that ? 

General Burgin. Fort De Russy. 

General McCoy. In a bombproof place ? 

General Burgin. Semi-bombproof. It is a 14-inch battery maga- 
zine. 

General McCoy. You control from your command post all coast 
artillery functions ? 

General Bubgin. That is correct. I control absolutely the sea- 
coast defense against surface sliips. As soon as the anti-aircraft 
goes into operation, actual fire, that goes over to the interceptor 
command. I train it and put it into position, but in order not to 
shoot our own planes, it goes to the interceptor command. 

General McCoy. Did it go over to the interceptor command on 
the 7th? 

General Burgin. Yes. It has been going over within the last two 
or three months. They have been working on it quite extensively. 

General McCoy. Was it functioning on the 7th ? 

General Burgin. It was functioning, sir, for two or three months. 

127S'] General McCoy. That is with regard to anti-aircraft? 

General Burgin. It has been functioning, sir. I have turned my 
aircraft over to the intercept command. 

The Chairman. Who was that interceptor commander ? 

General Burgin. General Davidson, of the Air Corps. 

General McCoy. Have you had any conferences with the District 
Naval Commander since November 27, since this alert went into effect? 

General Burgin. No, sir. I had no direct conference, only through 
my harbor control post. 

General McCoy. Were you informed as Coast Artillery Commander 
of the arrival of the fleet in Pearl Harbor ? 

General Burgin. In the days immediately preceding the 7th of De- 
cember, no, sir. 

General McCoy. Wasn't it one of your functions to protect the fleet 
when it is in Pearl Harbor ? 

General Burgin. I don't think so, sir. That is a broad question. 
The mission is to protect Pearl Harbor from this Tshind. Of course 
we do what we can to protect the fleet against both Furf-ice ships pj.id 



PROCEEDIXGS OF KOBERTS COMMISSION 167 

from the air, but so far as protecting- the fleet in Pearl Harbor from the 
air by anti-aircraft fire alone, I do not think it is possible to do it. We 
could derange and break up and perhaps make the attack less severe 
than it would ordinarily be. 

General McCoy. ButVoukhvt it be useful for you to know when the 
fleet comes into the harbor? 

General Biji;gin. Yes, sir, it certainly would. My positions with 
the anti-aircraft are the same whether the fleet is in the harbor or tiie 
fleet is not in the harbor, but there was the condition of readiness for 
Alert No. 1 and there were the fixed anti-aircraft guns along the coast. 
They were in position ready to shoot. 

General McCoy. Did thev shoot? 

[27i] General Burgin. Yes. 

(xeneral McCoy. Did they have any efTect ? 

General Burgin. We claimed eight planes, all told, with the small 
arms fire and the anti-aircraft fire. 

General McCoy. These anti-aircraft guns were operating under the 
interceptor command ? 

General Burgin. Yes, sir, they were, although they were shooting at 
everything in the air that morning. With respect to the interceptor 
command, I don't think they had much control because of the condi- 
tions of the attack, but they just shot at them. 

General -McCoy. Where were you at the time this happened, this 
attack? 

General Burgin. At 8 :0r) when the first shock came, I was asleep in 
my quarters about a hundred yards fi'om the command post. 

General McCoy. What did you observe on the morning of the attack ? 

General Burgin. I felt the shock of the torpedoes first. I got up and 
I could see the anti-aircraft fire from the fleet guns. I knew what it 
was. I came back into my office, which is only a short distance from 
my house. I got a message. from the Department saying that Alert 
No. 8 was in. I immediately sent that out to my post units. They were 
out in their positions within ten minutes. They got into position, some 
of them in a very short time — fifteen or twenty minutes — and othei-s 
had to go to the other side of the Island and did not get into position 
until the afternoon. 

A great many of the anti-aircraft batteries did get into position and 
^id considerable firing, both the 3-inch guns and the machine guns. 

General McCoy. Do you know whether any low flying torpedo 
[^75] planes were brought down ? 

General Burgin. Not to my knowledge, sir. I don't. It was reported 
that two were, but I have no official information on that, sir. 

General McCoy. So far as you know, none of your guns brought 
them down? 

General Burgin. Mygims? 

(General McCoy. None of your guns? 

(leneral Burgin. I am quite sure none of my guns brought them 
down. If they were brought down, they were Na'\''y guns. 

General McCoy. Were they too low-flying for your guns? 

General Burgin. Not with my machine guns or automatic weapons, 
but too low-flying for tlie 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, yes. 

General McCoy. Were your coast defense guns there, the anti-air- 
craft guns firing at those torpedo planes ? 

General Burgin. Not at the torpedo planes, no, sii-. 



168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCoy. They came in too low and too fast ? 

General Burgin. Too fast and too low and before anybody knew 
they were there. 

The Chairman. Under Alert No. 1, as I understand it, most of your 
guns were ready to go into position but they were not in position ( 

General Burgin. That is absolutely correct. 

The Chairman. Would that mean with ammunition ? 

General Burgin. Ammunition? It is different for different bat- 
teries. We have been working for months getting the ammunition 
near the positions where the guns would be firing. That was worked 
up in nearly every instance. There were some half dozen batteries 
whose ammunition was still out in the main magazine in the crater, 
and of course, they had to go there to get the ammunition. 

[£76] Even with the guns with the ammunition nearby, the am- 
munition was boxed, and it takes some time to get the actual ammuni- 
tion there and shooting, but that had been done in some cases inside of 
fifteen minutes. 

The Chairman. Where were you on the night of December <^^ 

General Burgin. I was at Fort Kuger, down in my command. 

The Chairman. Not out at the party ? 

General Burgin. Yes, we had a little dance out at Fort Ruger. It 
broke up at ten o'clock and I went home. 

The Chairman. Did you see any drinking there ? 

General Burgin. A little, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you see anyone under the influence of liquor ? 

General Burgin. Absolutely no one, no, sir. 

The Chairman. You are clear about that ? 

General Burgin. Yes, sir, absolutely, sir. 

The Chairman. The men you saw there could have left and gone to 
their stations and been adequate at that moment 'i 

General Burgin. Everyone of them, yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Have you had any disciplinary trouble or such in 
recent months ? 

General Burgin. No, sir, I have not. I have been in command since 
August 7th only. 

I have been very careful about that particular thing. I have not 
seen a single drunken officer in the whole time, either in my command 
or anyone else's command. 

General McCoy. Have you had much trouble from drinking among 
the enlisted men ? 

General Burgin. Not anything unusual, no sir. There were a few 
old-time drunks that you can't get away from, but as a general rule 
the men are far better than the men we had years ago. They drank 
their beer and seem to enjoy it, and let it go at that. 

[^77] General McCoy. Have you had occasion to try any officer 
since you have been here for drunkenness ? 

General Burgin. No, sir, not even any suspicion of charges. 

General McCoy. You have been satisfied with the morale and dis- 
cipline of your command ? 

General Burgin. Yes, sir; no question about that, sir. 

General McCoy. There would be more trouble Avith your command, 
I take it, than with any other command in the Army on the Island 
on that line, if there was trouble? That is so from the nature of 
their stations; you are closer to Honolulu, in other words. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 169 

General Burgin. Well, sir, tht\t depends. I don't think so, sir. 
The men from Schofield and other places get down to Honolulu 
almost as often as my men do. 

(ieneral McCoy. Well, as a matter of fact, Fort De Kussy is right 
in town i 
. General Burgin. Yes, sir. 

(General McCoy. In Honolulu? 

General Burgin. Yes. 

General McCoy. Have you seen signs of any disorder or drunken- 
ness among the soldiers around you? 

General Burgin. A little bit. There are a few honky tonks just 
over the fence where we had some brawls within the last two or three 
months where two enlisted men were severely injured. One was 
stabbed in the neck, and the other in the arm, but there is so little 
of it. 

General McCoy. Is there any of it? 

General Burgin. Yes. 

General McCoy. Did any of these brawls occur on the night of 
December 6 or the morning of December 7 ? 

General Burgin. No, sir. They were at least six weeks or two 
months prjor to that. 

General McCoy. What proportion of your command would you 
estimate was ready for immediate duty on the morning of [278] 
December 7th ? 

General Burgin. I have not found anyone who was not ready. 

General McCoy. Your estimate is that your whole command was 
ready? 

General Burgin. Yes, my whole command was ready. 

The Chairman. What about the men on leave, officers or men? 

General Burgin. They were on leave, but they were back the next 
morning and probably were home asleep. 

The Chairman. You think everybody bunked there that night who 
was supposed to be there? 

General Burgin. Yes, sir. There may be some instances of offi- 
cers visiting, but they hurried in there and came to their post. 

General McCoy. Were there any officers reported absent at the 
time of the surprise attack ? 

General Burgin. No, sir, except one who was killed trying to get 
back to his place ; a bomb hit him. 

The Chairman. You said something before that after you got 
Alert No. 1 you were staying around waiting for Alert No. 2 or Alert 
No. 3 to come through, and apparently surprised that you did not 
get it. Am I right in that understanding? 

General Burgin. Yes, sir, that is the thing in back of my mind all 
the time. I kept e:^pecting to hear this next alert, to get my action 
ready and to get in position. I had nothing to base that on but just 
my feeling in the matter. 

General McCoy. Was that caused by the dispatch shown to you 
from the War Department? 

General Burgin. No, that is the only dispatch I saw (indicating). 

The Chairman. That says, "Hostile action possible at any mo- 
ment." 

General Burgin, Yes. 



170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[£79] The Chairman. That did not influence your judgment ? 

General Burgin. It certainly did, yes, sir. 

General McNarney. I think he stated Colonel Phillips mentioned 
something. 

General Burgin. Yes, if hostile action started, but I don't think it 
occurred to our men that hostile action would occur here in Hawaii. 
We expected — at least in my mind — that at some distant place some 
distant ship would be sunk, and that would be the overt act which the 
President wished to be done. It never occurred to anybody's mind 
that the attack would be right here in Pearl Harbor. 

The Chairman. You mean that before war was declared there 
might be a hostile raid ? 

General Burgin. Yes, but we were ready with Alert No. 1 and in 
a few minutes we could get to our battle positions with everything 
ready. We thought we had plenty of time to do that and we didn't. 

General McNarney. Would you know the naval patrols that vvere 
out? Would you know the routine naval patrols out scouting? 
Would you know that ? 

General Burgin. No, not completely. We don't know that now. 
We know there are twelve destroyers out there, but we don't know 
where they are. We cannot know that. We know they are friendly 
ships, but it is pretty hard to tell whether you are a friend or an enemy 
out there, the ships look so very much alike. 

General McNarney. The Navy does not indicate to you what 
patrols are out? 

General Burgin No, except what type of destroyer they are. 
When they come in to Pearl Harbor they let us know. 

General McNarney. Do you furnish that information to anyone 
else? 

General Burgin. Only to G-3. 

[£80] The Chairman. You do furnish it to G-3? 

General Burgin. Yes. 

The Chairman. When did you communicate or furnish the infor- 
mation ? As soon as you got it ? 

General Burgin. As soon as we got it, yes, sir. We did not com- 
municate the information about the offshore patrol, which is a run- 
ning matter. For example, if the fleet is sending a carrier back here 
for supplies, or something of that kind, we hear nothing but that 
they will enter Pearl Harbor at a certain hour or that it expects to 
clear Pearl Harbor at a certain hour. 

General McNarney. Was that true on December 6 ? 

General Burgin. No. 

General McNarney. What proportion of your guns were not in 
position then, or I might say, what proportion of your guns are mobile 
guns? 

General Burgin. The great majority of them are mobile; I would 
say 80% of them. I can get the figure. 

General McCoy. That is anti-aircraft? 

General Burgin. Yes, anti-aircraft only. Is that what you mean, 
General ? 

General McNarney. Yes. 

General Burgin. There are 60 mobile and 26 fixed. Since the Tth 
we added 12 guns of the Marine Corps that are mobile; so at the mo- 
ment there are 72 mobile o-inch and 26 fixed o-inch. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 171 

General McNarney. What proportion of the 37 millimeters have 
been furnished? 

General Burgin. 20 guns out of 140. 

General McNaeney. How about the .50 calibers? 

General Burgin. I have not got the figures exactly on the .50 cali- 
bers, but we have got about 40% of what we are supposed to have. 

General McNarnet. You are using the .30 calibers for substitute 
weapons ? 

[^Sl] General Burgin. Yes, wherever we can with improvised 
tripods, wherever we can use them. 

Admiral E.eevt;s. Do you have anmiunition for your machine guns? 

General Burgin. Yes, sir, ammunition for the machine guns, yes. 
but we had no ammunition for the 37's until about two days before 
December 7, and then 9,000 rounds arrived, so each gun has about 
600 rounds only. 

Admiral Reeves. Do you expect to get any Bofors or Ooerlikon 
guns. 

General Burgin. I have no information on that, sir, except a per- 
sonal letter from mj' Chief of Staff in Washington, in which he 
said that the Bofors" was a very fine gun and that they were trying" 
to get some for everybody. That is all I have on that. 

Admiral Keeves. None have been assigned to you ? 

General Burgin. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Any other questions ? 

Admiral Standley. General, you stated you had three officers in 
the harbor patrol station. . That was under the control of the Navy? 

General Burgin. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. How long prior to December 7th was this 
man detailed there '( I mean your detail. 

General Burgin. There was one m^an, one officer. Major Dingham. 
and one enlisted man, prior to December 7th. On December 7th it 
was increased so that we keep one man there all the time. 

Admiral Standley. Was his detail changed after December 7th 
or were his duties exactly the same after December 7th as before? 

General Buk(}in. They were added to considerably after December 
7th and we were beginning to function continuously and getting the 
information from the Navy, but up to that time it [£82'] was 
still the practice, and then it was a continuous operation. For example, 
we did not get notice of the ships coming in and out of the harbor of 
Honolulu. Now we do. Now we know what is coming in. 

Admiral Standley. Into the harbor of Honolulu? 

General Burgin. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. You did not get Honolulu before ? 

General Burgin. No, we did not get Honolulu at all. 

Admiral Standley. What about Pearl Harbor? 

General Burgin. We did not get Pearl Harbor ordinarily; I only 
got it when we were j)racl icing. 

Admiral Standley. What was that man supposed to do? He was 
there all the time? 

General Burgin. No. 

Admiral Standley. Not all the time ? 

General BnwiN. Not all the time, no, sir. Tlie functions were in 
the daytime. 

Admiral Standley. They were there every day? 



172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Burgin. Yes, every day. 

Admiral Standley. Their purpose was to keep you informed as 
to what was happening every day ? 

General Bukgin. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. So it was the duty of that officer to keep you 
informed about the ships going in and out ? Is that a fact ? 

General Burgin. That is what he was there for, yes, sir, when 
we functioned on a war basis, but up to the time Alert No. 3 went 
into effect, we were not functioning on a war basis. 

Admiral Standley. But he was kept there daily all the time? 

General Burgin. The harbor patrol post was working all the time, 
but the Army representative was not functioning all the time, con- 
tinuously. He was just setting up the skeleton and [283] 
framework when it came to a stage where it got working. 

Admiral Standley. But he got the information just the same every 
day when the ships came in and out ? 

General Burgin. He should have, yes. 

Admiral Standley He should have had that information? 

General Burgin. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. It was his business to get that information? 

General Burgin. Yes. 

General McCoy. Do you remember whether you were informed of 
the entry of battleships to Pearl Harbor ? 

General Burgin. No, sir, I was not. We did not expect to. 

The Chairman. Why not? 

General Burgin. We were not functioning on that basis. The Navy 
never gave us any information before December 7th except when we 
were practicing. 

General McCoy. In other words, it was purely a training matter? 

General Burgin. Yes, sir, purely a training matter up to the morn- 
ing of the 7th of December. 

The Navy was quite secret and they gave us practically nothing in 
that way except when we were practicing, training. 

The Chairman. Any other questions? 

General McCoy. No. 

The Chairman. General, the nature of our inquiry is such that we 
must ask you not to disclose or discuss anything that has taken place 
in this room or discuss your testimony with anyone. 

General Burgin. I shall not. 

General McNarney. Will you leave copies of your Standing Operat- 
ing Procedure? 

General Burgin. Yes. 

The Chairman. Call Colonel Phillips. 

[^5^] FUETHER TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WALTER C. PHILLIPS, 
GENERAL STAFF 

The Chairman. Do you have the information that we desired, 
Colonel? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes. One question was, was the Navy furnished 
a copy of the Standing Operating Procedure? 

According to our records, on or about November 5th, the Navy re- 
ceived ten copies of the Standing Operating Procedure. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 173 

In a telephone conversation with Commander Momsen — and I be- 
lieve he is operations officer for Admiral Block now — he states that 
he has nine copies in his safe now. 

General McNarney. Does that include Alert No. 1? 

Colonel Phillips. Our Standing Operating Procedure, yes, sir. 

General McNarney. Alert? 

Colonel Phillips. Yes. complete copies of them. 

In regard to the record of Army officers tried for drunkenness in the 
Hawaiian Department. I am only going to March 1st, the date of my 
arrival here. There have been no trials of officers for drunkenness in 
the Department since March 1, 1941. Charges were preferred against 
Second Lieutenant Seacat. 8th Field Artilleiy Battalion, on October 
3rd. Upon investigation, the investigating officer recommended a 
leprimand, which was given. 

Memo, relative to the telephone conversation with the Chief of 
Staff, Washington, about 9 a. m. on December 7, to the best of my 
recollection : 

General Marshall, this is Colonel Phillips, Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department 
stating that General Short, who is now on reconnaissance, has directed me to call 
yon and give you the situation. We are now being attacked by Japanese planes. 
Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, and Pearl Harbor are being attacked. 

\'^8S] General Marshall asked, "Did you get my message?" 

Reply: "What message?" 

General Marshall : "A radio I sent you last night." 

Eeply : "It has not been received." 

General Marshall : "Continue with the description." 

They were not his exact words, but he used words to that effect. 

Some hangars and planes have been destroyed. Our casualties have not been 
heavy. All trooi>s in the Department are now moving to their field positions. 

General Marshall : "Keep me informed." 

There is no record in the Chief of Staff office files. We keep a record 
of incoming messages and outgoing, and their disposition. There is 
no record of a message on the 2Tth or the 28th being delivered to the 
Navy. G-3 believes that the message — both messages were taken by 
the Department Commander to the Navy. I have a faint recollec- 
tion 

The Chairman. What is that ? 

Colonel Phillips. I have a faint recollection that this was the case, 
although there was no record and there would not be a record made 
of that in our files. 

The Chairman. Was there any record of a communication to the 
commander of the fleet of November 27th which includes the words 
"inform Army" or words to that effect, which was received by you ? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir. 

The Chairjvian. You have no record on that subject at all? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Does that cover everything we asked you? 

Colonel Phillips. That covers everything you asked me, yes. 

The Chairman. Any other questions? 

Admiral Standley, Yes. Just a moment. I want to ask you one 
quefetion. 

['^86'] The Chairman. Yes. Another question occurred to me. 



174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION fEARL H.ARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Standley. You say there is no record of a message having 
been sent to the Navy ? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir, not in my ofiice, so far as we can find. 

Admiral Standley. Your reply to that message states, "liaison with 
Navy." 

Colonel Phillips. That meant that the Department Commander 
had gone to the Navy. 

The Chairman. Colonel Phillips, did you show this message of the 
27th from General Marshall to any of the Department Commanders, 
to your recollection ? 

Colonel Phillips. I did not, no, sir. 

The Chairman. You did not? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir. It is possible the Department Com- 
mander did, but I don't know about that. 

The Chairman. Did he see it? 

Colonel Phillips. The Commander saw it, yes, sir. 

The Chairman, Did you show this message of General MarshalPs 
to anyone, this message which states that negotiations with Japan were 
about to be terminated, and so forth ? 

Colonel Phillips. To the Department Commander? 

The Chairman. I mean the Division Commander. Did you show 
it to any Division Commander ? 

General McCoy. To the Division Commander of the Coast Artil- 
lery ? 

Colonel Phillips. No, sir, I did not, personally; no, sir. 

The Chairiman. One of them has a recollection that he saw it here 
at headquarters. 

Colonel Phillips. Through the Department Commander then, sir. 

The Chairman. No, he stated you showed him a message. [278] 
I believe that is in General Burgin's statement. 

Colonel Phillips. I have no recollection of that, sir. 

The Chairman. It was something to the effect of, "Would you 
like to see a message about putting Alert No. 1 in effect?" and he said, 
"Yes," and you showed it to him, got it from the safe and showed it 
to him. Do you remember that ? 

Colonel Phillips. It is possible, but I do not recall it. 

The Chairman. That is all. 

It has been suggested that we have a recess now. 

(There was a brief recess. The following then occurred:) 

The Chairman. Shall we have Colonel Fielder now ? 

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL KENDALL J. FIELDER, 
GENERAL STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY 

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you state your full name. Colonel? 

Colonel Fielder. Kendall J. Fielder. 

The Chairman. And your rank ? 

Colonel Fielder. Lieutenant Colonel. 

The Chairman. And your command here? 

Colonel Fielder. G-2, General Staff. 

The Chairman. You are chief? 

Colonel Fielder. Chief, yes. 

The Chairman. Since when ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 175 

Colonel Fielder. July 22nd, 

The Chairman. What, if any, infbrma^ion. Colonel, did your 
department or your G-2 have with respect to hostile action by the 
Japanese fleet or by carriers ? 

Colonel Fielder. None. 

The Chairman. You did have cognizance of certain intercepted 
messages, did you not, on the days of December 5th, 6th, and there- 
abouts ? 

Colonel Fielder. Military messages? 

\J<S8] The Chairman. No, from a Japanese on the Island here. 

Colonel Fielder. Yes, I had knowledge of a trans-Pacific telephone 
conversation. 

The Chairman. Were yom advised between what parties that tele- 
phone conversation took place ? 

Colonel Fielder. The party in Tokyo was unknown; it was Dr. 
Mori here in Hawaii. 

The Chairman. Wlio is Dr. Mori ? 

Colonel Fielder. He is a civilian, but I know, sir, that I did not 
know him. I had never heard of him prior to this, although I under- 
stand the F. B. I. did have him on their suspect list. 

The Chairman. Were you furnished a transcript or a translation 
of that message ? 

Colonel Fielder. About 7 p. m. Saturday, December 6. 

The Chairman. Did you take it up with anyone ? 

Colonel Fielder. I took it up with General Short at that time. 

The Chairman. Tell us the conversation, will you please? 

Colonel Fielder. My contact officer brought it to my division. We 
then went to General Short's headquarters and read it over and dis- 
cussed it. We tried to figure the significance of it but we were un- 
able to attach any military significance to it. 

Tlie Chairman. Did you obtain any radio intercepts in the day 
prior to December 7th? 

Colonel Fielder. No, sir. 

The Chairman. No? 

Colonel Fielder. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Were there any in which you were unable to 
break the code and forwarded them to Washington for decoding? 

Colonel Fielder. Not to my knowledge. That could have happened 
without my knowledge. 

\3S9] The Chairman. How? 

Colonel Fielder. Because our signal officer or possibly one of the 
other investigative agencies, such as the F. B. I. or the O. N. I. or my 
own contact officer might have done so, but not to my knowledge. 

The Chairman. It would not necessarily come to you ? 

Colonel Fielder. No, sir, it would not. 

General McCoy. Why wouldn't it have come to you? 

Colonel Fielder. If it was one of the other agencies it would not have 
necessarily come to me. It wf)uld do me no good unless it was a decoded 
translation. If it was decoded shortly after, it would come to me 
thereafter. 

General INIcCoy. But wouldn't it have to go to some agency to be 
decoded and forwarded ? 



176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Fielder. Yes. That agency would be either the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation or the Office of Naval Intelligence or my own 
office. We all have translators. 

The Chairman. Have you since the attack become cognizant of the 
fact that a code was intercepted which would be used to signal the 
attack on Pearl Harbor? 

Colonel Fielder. Yes. 

The Chairman. Wlien did you become cognizant of that? 

Colonel Fielder. I don't remember the date, sir. It was right after 
the attack, of course. 

The Chairman. Did you become cognizant of the fact that there had 
been such a code ? 

Colonel Fielder. Yes. , 

The Chairman. That code, as your information now is, contained 
signal code words for directing the attack on Pearl Harbor, did it not? 

Colonel Fielder. Yes. 

The Chairman. And who got hold of that code ? 

Colonel Fielder. That code was gotten by the Federal [290'] 
Bureau of Investigation after the attack by a search of the Japanese 
Consulate. 

The Chairman. Was there any attempt by the military authorities 
to get a translation of the intercepted code done at Washington ? Let 
me ask you this : Is it a fact that the War Department in Washington 
intercepted three code words and advised you of the three code words 
they intercepted, and this before December 6th? 

Colonel Fielder. Not to my knowledge. 

The Chairman. Wouldn't "there be any knowledge of that? 

Colonel Fielder. There might be knowledge at this headquarters 
here through the signal officer. It should come to me. 

The Chairman. It should come to you ? 

Colonel Fielder. Yes, I should know about it before it happened, but 
I did not. 

The Chairman. It has been reported to me that about ten days before 
the attack a code was intercepted which could not be broken, but it was 
forwarded to Washington to the War Department to be broken, and the 
War Department found out it could be broken and did break it, and 
found it contained three important signal words which would direct 
the attack on Pearl Harbor, and that the War Department subsequently 
intercepted over the radio those three signal words and forwarded them 
to the military authorities here as an indication that the code had been 
followed and that the attack was planned. 

Colonel Fielder. I have no knowledge of that whatever. 

The Chairman. You know nothing about it ? 

Colonel Fielder. No. 

The Chairman. You had no communication from the War Depart- 
ment as of December 5th forwarding to you the meaning of the three 
code words which would be the signal for the attack? 

Colonel Fielder. No, sir, it never came to my attention. 

[291] The Chairman. After the Japanese Consul had burned 
his papers, the code message here was discovered ? 

Colonel Fielder. Yes, the code book was. 

The Chairman. Which contained all sorts of information as to 
signal lights, blinker lights, and so on, which would be used to advise 
the Japanese fleet ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 177 

Colonel Fielder. Yes. 

The Chairman. You knew nothing of that before the attack? 

Colonel Fielder. No, sir. 

The Chairman. What, if any, interceptor device were you using 
on the Island then ? 

Colonel Fielder. We had none. 

The Chairman. You had none ? 

Colonel Fielder. No, sir. This is hearsay, but I have been told 
that such a service was requested by the signal officer over a year ago, 
but it was turned down. 

The Chairman. Did the Federal Bureau of Investigation pass on 
to you anything they discovered about subversive activities or any- 
thing of that kind ? 

Colonel Fielder. Yes. We worked in close relationship. 

The Chairman. There has been entire harmony there ^ 

Colonel Fielder. Yes. 

The Chairman. They were not able to furnish you anything of 
significance of a possible attack prioi- to December 7th? 

Colonel Fielder. That is correct. I had talks with Inspector 
Shivers since that time, and he told me that he knew that the entire 
espionage ring centered around the Japanese Consulate, but diplo- 
matic immunity prevented his investigation, and that anything he 
did might start the overt act which would create war. 

The Chairman. In other words, he could not search the Consulate 
any more than you could ? 

Colonel Fielder. That is correct. 

[292] The Chairman. I understand that this message in 
Japanese was tapped over the telephone ? Is that your understanding? 

Colonel Fielder. Yes. That was a trans-Pacific telephone, which he 
had authority to do. He could intercept a cable message, but nothing 
at the Consulate. 

The Chairman. This was a commercial message? 

Colonel Fielder. Yes, a commercial niessage. 

The Chairman. Since the outbreak of hostilities have you had any 
access to the records of the commercial radio here? 

Colonel Fielder. No, sir, that is supervised by the Navy. The Navy 
has censorship over the commercial radio. 

The Chairman. I suppose tliere is no reason why w^e cannot sub- 
pena any of the messages that were put on or that came in. I mean 
the local office of the radio company. 

Colonel Fielder. That is right. I see no reason why. 

The Chairman. I suppose that short of a declaration of war, you 
could not demand copies of those messages? 

Colonel Fielder. No, sir, I could not. 

The Chairman. You had no advice from the Navy at any time of 
ships moving in the Pacific that would indicate anything with respect 
to Honolulu ? 

Colonel Fhclder. No, sir. All I could say was that they had bases 
in the Mandate Islands. 

The Chairman. That the Japanese did ? 

Colonel Fielder. Yes. 

The Chairman. With respect to subversive activities, as I under- 
stand it, there was very little evidence that any of the bureaus or 
services could work on ? " 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 1 13 



178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Fielder. I had 1113' own Intelligence, and most of our agents 
were engaged primarily in that. We had reason to believe that sub- 
versive acts would be committed, and most of our efforts were directed 
along those lines. 

The Chairman. There has not been any word on the Island 
[29S] of secret meetings or Bund meetings, Japanese Bund meet- 
ings, if I may call them that, or anything of that sort ? 

Colonel Fielder. No, sir, tihere has not. The few meetings that were 
held are attended by one of our agents. 

The Chairman. Wliat sabotage have you known of prior to the 
attack ? 

Colonel Fielder. None, sir. 

The Chairman. General Rudolph said there had been some sabotage 
in the airplanes. 

Colonel Fielder. I had them investigating as to whether they were 
actions of sabotage, and none have been proven. 

The Chairman. He thought some spark plugs showed that the 
points had been hammered back down to the contacts possibly by some- 
one in the plane, in the airplane service. 

Colonel Fielder. That is entirely possible, but our investigation 
revealed that the irregularities probably were spite on the part of 
local soldiers. That is the only thing that came to my attention. 

The Chairman. You mean spite against a superior ? 

Colonel Fielder. Perhaps. The persbnnel concerned have bem 
disposed of. They are no longer here, but there were two or three 
instances in one particular organization which indicated that per- 
haps 

The Chairman. That they were disgruntled ? 

Colonel Fielder. Yes. 

The Chairman. Colonel, when did it come to j^our knowledge that 
the Japanese Consul was beginning to burn his papers? 

Colonel Fielder. I think on the 6th of December. 

The Chairman. No. 

Colonel Fielder. No, it must have been before that time. It came 
to my attention on the 6th of December. 

The Chairman. I am informed that it was on the 3rd or the 5t]i. 

[294] Colonel Fielder. That is entirely possible. The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation reported it to my agent, and I in turn 
reported it at a staff meeting on the morning of Saturday, December 6. 

The Chairman. Did you attach any significance to the fact that the 
Consul was burning his papers at the time? 

Colonel Fielder. It was suspicious, but we burn secret papers every 
day in the world, and we have a can out there that does nothing but 
burn secret papers. I discussed that on that day with the F. B. I. 

The Chairman. You are familiar with the fact that when a consul 
or diplomatic representative is about to make his getaway that the 
first sign is the burning of the consulate papers ? 

Colonel Fielder. Yes, we were quite suspicious of that. 

The Chairman. Wasn't the Department Conmiander convinced by 
that fact that w^ar was imminent? 

Colonel Fielder. No, sir, apparently not. We know war was immi- 
nent, sir. 

[^.9-5] The Chairman. Imminent? 



I 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 179 

Colonel Fielder, Yes, sir. 

The Chaikman. You didn't think it was going to reach Hawaii, 

did you ? 

Colonel Fielder. Not in that form, no, sir. 

The Chairman. Not in the form of an airplane raid ? 

Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir. We suspected organized 

The Chairman. Sabotage ? 

Colonel Fielder. Sabotage. 

The Chairman. And you thought there was such organized sab- 
otage, perhaps, in spite of the fact that you had never been able to 
uncover a sign of it ? 

Colonel Fielder. We did. Just the mere fact of approximately 
160,000 people of Japanese extraction would lead us to believe that a 
certain number of them would be loyal to the Japanese Empire. 

The Chairman. I believe no further questions. 

Admiral Standley. How many Japanese are there in the whole 
Islands ? 

Colonel Fielder. 160,000, approximately. 

Admiral Standley. In the whole Island ? 

Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir. That's all of them. Those are people of 
Japanese extraction. There are approximately 35,000 aliens. The 
rest are dual citizens. 

Admiral Reeves. How many are there on the Island of Oahu ? 

Colonel Fielder. I beg pardon, sir? 

Admiral Reeves. How many are there on the Island of Oahu? 

Colonel Fielder. Of Japanese extraction ? I don't have those fig- 
ures in mv head. sir. I can get them very easily. I think it is in the 
neighborhood, though, of 80,000. 

The Chairman. Did your command make any investigation along 
the coast in the two mojiths before the attack for [£96] blinker 
signals, light signals, offshore signaling? 

Colonel Fielder. We did not. 

Tlie Chairman. You did not ? 

Colonel Fielder. For the reason that that is very prevalent over 
here between the fishermen and the shores. They use a lighting sys- 
tem to direct the fishing fleet into the various channels, and they home 
on these signals. They have been doing that commercially for years. 

The Chairman. Are there a lot of small entrances around the 
Island, other than the big entrance? 

Colonel Fielder. Yps, sir. 

The Chairman. There are? 

Colonel Fieij)er. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. "Wliere the fishermen come in ? 

Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir, there are many of them. 

The Chairman. Prior to the attack had you any record of the 
number and location of snjall radio sets on fishing boats here? 

Colonel Fielder. No, sir. 

The Chairiman. They were very common, too ? 

Colonel Fielder. They were very common, and literally hun- 
dreds — I won't say hundreds but dozens of residents were authorized 
amateur — so-called "ham"^operators. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Colonel Fielder. IMany of these, of course, were Oriental. 



180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Yes. Are there any further questions ? 

General McNaknet. How often did the commanding general hold 
staff meetings ? 

Colonel Fielder. Once a week. 

General McNarney. Was that normally on Saturday morning? 

Colonel Fielder. Saturday morning only. 

General McNabney. Was the War Department message of Novem- 
ber 27 discussed at any staff meeting? 

[297] Colonel Fielder. Yes, it was. It was either discussed — I 
believe that message was passed around to the staff officers. They 
were called in, a few at a time, and permitted to read the message. 
That's what took place in my own case. I was called in and read the 
message, and I received a similar one from G-2 section of the War 
Department the same day. 

General McNarnev. Now, you state you received a similar one. 
What do you mean, "a similar one" ? The same message ? 

Colonel Fielder. Mine was much shorter than that, but the gist of 
it was that war was imminent and to be — that we might expect 
sabotage. 

General McNarney. That was dated November 28, was it not? 

Colonel Fielder. 27th. 

The Chairman. It is dated the 27th in this from the War Depart- 
ment. Receipt is dated here the 28th, I don't know why. 

General McNarney. You received that on the 27th ? 

Colonel Fielder. 27th was the date of the War Department mes- 
sage. Now, we would normally receive most of our messages in the 
morning of the day following the date of their transmission, because 
the transmission is usually done at night. 

General McNarney. This message \*as not discussed in the full 
staff meeting, then ? 

Colonel Fielder. I don't remember whether it was or not. It was 
brought to my attention, and I can't remember whether it was — I 
know right away they ordered an alert, No. 1 alert, but whether or not 
it was discussed in detail at a meeting I don't know. 

General McNarney. Did the Department Commander call for any 
suggestions, advise, or opinions from his staff? 

Colonel Fielder. He did from me. He called me in and asked me 
what we should do, and I told him that I recommended the No. 1 
alert remain in effect indefinitely and that I utilize all of my agencies 
for additional investigations, snooping around the various communi- 
ties, intensify their [^98] activities, in other words. 

General McNarney. What were your relations with O. N. I. previ- 
ous to November 27 ? 

Colonel Fielder. We have a meeting — the relations are very close; 
we meet once each week, the O. N. I., the F. B. I., and my office, but 
we have the closest of relations. I have a teletype machine, for 
instance, in my private office. It is connected only with F. B. I. and 
O. N. I. and the Navy Yard and the Provost Marshal. The relations 
have been quite cordial and close. 

The Chairman. You mean messages can come both ways on that 
or go both ways on it ? 

Colonel Fielder. Yes. 

The Chairman. Between your agencies? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 181 

Colonel Fielder. Yes. It's a complete loop. 

General McNarney. Had there been any significant messages 
between November 27 and the date of the attack? 

Colonel Fielder. From whom ? 

General McNarney. On the teletype. 

Colonel Fielder. No ; nothing relating to a possible attack. Most 
of the messages are in the nature of suspected individuals who are 
possibly Nazi-inclined or Communistic in their tendencies or disloyal 
or something like that. 

General McNarney. In your meetings with O. N. I. did you ever 
discuss the location, disposition, possibility of attack by Japanese 
forces ? 

Colonel Fielder. No, never discussed it. We probably di-scussed 
attacks in general — the probability of attack, perhaps, and the possi- 
bility of it — in a more or less informal discussion, but we never dis- 
cussed it with viewpoint of apprehension, you might say. 

General McNarney. With any thought that it would actually 
happen to you ? 

[299] Colonel Fielder. That's right. Any discussion that we 
had was more or less informal discussion. 

General McNarney. Academic. 

Colonel Fielder. Academic, exactly. 

General McNarney. Did the Navy furnish you any information 
as to what they picked up over their radio intercepts? 

Colonel Fielder. No, not in relation to this. I get a lot of news 
broadcasts from them and propaganda and things like that, but they 
have given me nothing directly related to this attack. 

General McNarney. Did they give you nothing relative to the 
movement of Japanese vessels? 

Colonel Fielder. Oh, you mean now? 

General McNarney, Now and prior to the time — 

Colonel Fielder. They didn't prior, no. 

General McNarney, They do now ? 

Colonel Fieldp:r. They do now. 

General McNarney. 1 have no further questions. 

The Chairman, Have you anything? 

Admiral Reeves. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Colonel Fielder, the nature of our investigation is 
such that we feel it necessary to warn those who come here that they 
should not disclose the testimony or anything that occurs while they 
are in the room or discuss it with any other officer or person. 

Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir, I shall observe that. 

The Chairman. May I ask you to do that ? 

Colonel Fielder. Yes, said. 

General McCoy. May I ask one thing more? The question oc- 
curred to me to check upon where General Wilson, commanding the 
Division 

Colonel Fielder, I beg your pardon ? 

General McCoy, General Wilson — commanding the 24th Division, 
is that? 

[SOO] Colonel Fielder. Yes. 

General McCoy. stated that either you or some officer from 

Headquarters gave him the gist of this War Department message. 



182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HAEBOE ATTACK 

Colonel Fielder. You speak of the one of the 27th ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General McCoy. Yes. 

Colonel Fielder. It probably was the Chief of Staff. I did not. I 
hadn't talked to him at all about that. 

General McCoy. My remembrance was that he said an officer at 
G-2 or "G-2" came out and gave him the gist of that message upon 
which the alert No. 1 was based. General Burgin also said he saw it. 

Colonel Fielder. That could very easily — I have over 50 officers in 
my section, and the Chief of Staff might have gi-abbed someone as 
a messenger. That is quite possible, but it wasn't to my knowledge, 
sir. I didn't do it personally. 

General McCoy. And you didn't do it through any of the com- 
manders ? 

Colonel Fielder. No, sir. That's a command function rather than 
intelligence. 

General McNarney. Just a minute. I have one more question. Is 
this the message you referred to as having been received by you from 
G-2 (indicating) ? 

Colonel Fielder. No, that is not it. Shall I get a copy of it? 
Would you like it ? 

General McCoy. There is a copy here. 

Colonel Fielder. I believe it is. I turned it over — ^no, sir, that 
still isn't it. This one had about five lines, sir. 

The Chairman. Will you get it? 

Colonel Fielder. I think it is on the way here now. I know it has 
been assembled. It has been taken from my section. I can — ^if you 
will give me about five minutes, sir, [SOI] I will look it up. 

The Chairman. Would it he in this dossier? 

Colonel Fielder. No, I don't think it would. 

The Chairman. Wouldn't it 'i 

Colonel Fielder. That looks like it right there. That looks like it 
might be a copy of it. No. sir, that isn't it. 

General McCoy. It came to you from Miles, did it? 

Colonel Fielder. Yes, it came from General Miles, only about four 
lines. It said war was imminent and to be — that we could expect 
sabotage. That was the gist of it, four lines. 

The Chairman. Welf, when you get it let Major Allen know that 
you have it, and you can bring it right in, if you will. 

Colonel Fielder. Very well. I know it's on the way to this Com- 
mission, sir, because they got it out of my office early this morning to 
be presented to you. 

The Chairman. Well, we haven't seen it yet. At least I think not. 
Will you trace it up ? 

Colonel Fielder. I will trace it up, sir. 

Major AiXEN. Colonel Craig, the Provost Marshal. 

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL MELVIN L. CEAIG, PEOVOST 
MAESEAL, HAWAIIAN BEPAETMENT 

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.) 
The Chairiman. Your full name? 
Colonel Craig. Melvin L. Craig. 
The Chairman. And your rank? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBEETS COMMISSION 18u 

Colonel Craig. Lieutenant Colonel. 

The Chairmax. And j'oiir commission here in this Department, 
or your office, the office yon hold ? 

General McCoy. Assignment. 

Colonel Craig. Provost JVIarshal. 

The Chairman'. Assiijnment ? 

Colonel Craig. Department Provost Marshal. 

[302] The Chairman. Since when ? 

Colonel Craig. Since July — it was a year last July, almost two 
years now. 

The Chairman. In your official capacity you are supposed to know 
the conditions within this District with respect to lav/ and order by 
troops and officers ? 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. What have you to say as to the condition on the 
night of December 6, 1941 ? 

Colonel Craig. The condition as to law and order on the island 
of December 6, 19-11, was A^eiy good. 

The Chairman. Any reports of misconduct or drunkenness by 
enlisted personnel ? 

Colonel Craig. Nothing unusual. 

The Chairman. What is unusual ? 

Colonel Craig. Well, 

The Chairman. Or, rather, what is usual on a Saturday night? 

Colonel Craig. Saturday night we usually have 70, 80 arrests, 
drimkenness. 

The Chairman. For drunkenness ? 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And you perhaps had 70 or 80 that night? 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That is of enlisted personnel ? 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. What was done with those 70 or 80 on Saturday 
night ? 

Colonel Craig. The most of them were returned to their stations. 
That is, those from Schofield were returned to Schofield ; those from 
Fort Kamehameha were returned to Kam. The other ones were de- 
tained, those that were beyond — seemed what we might call passed 
out — detain those at Fort Shafter [r30S] guardhouse over- 

night. 

General McCoy. How many of those ? Do you remember ? 

Colonel Craig. Well, I should say offhand approximately 21 
roughly. 

General McNarney. I think we might have the exact figure. 

The Chairman. I would like to have the exact figures. 

Colonel Craig. I can get the exact figures for you. 

The Chairman. I would like you to furnish them to us. 

Colonel Cr-a.ig. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Arrests and detentions and returns for that night. 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Anything with respect to officers that night ? 

Colonel Craig. Nothing to my recollection, no, sir. 

The Chairman. Have -you any records that would show ? 



OK 



184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir, I have the records. 

The Chairman. Will you consult them ? 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And certify the fact to us? 

Colonel Craig. That is the night of the 6th? 

The Chairman. That is right, sir. 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. It might be well to have the comparison of 
the night of the 6th with two or three other Saturday nights. 

The Chairman. Will you do that for us ? 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir. Very well, sir. 

The -Chairman. Pick them out over the the two or three previous 
months at random, some Saturday nights, and see what the record 
shows. 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir. 

General MoCoy. Would you say that that was a small proportion 
of a command of this size ? 

[S04] Colonel Craig. Yes, sir, it is. I think it is remarkably 
small for the number of men we have here. 

General McCoy. How would it compare, possibly, with civilians 
of like number? 

Colonel Craig. Well, I would say it would be comparatively — well, 
I couldn't answer that question; I would have to check the records 
of the civil police. 

General McCoy. Yes. Would you be able, for instance, to check 
the civilian records? 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir, if they wei-e available. 

General McCoy. On a Saturday night ? 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Fine. Would you make it your business to get in 
touch with the Chief of Police and get comparable records for the 
Oity of Honolulu ? 

Colonel Craig. We are in very close contact with the Chief of Police 
all the time, and our relations have been very — hundred percent. 

The Chairman. In connection with that get us, as nearly as you 
can, the male population of the City of Honolulu and the number of 
arrests for drunkenness by the police of Honolulu on three or four 
Saturday nights. 

Colonel Craig. Very well, sir. 

The Chairman. That would not be a difficult thing to get ? 

Colonel Craig. No, sir. They have that information right available. 

General McCoy. I think we might state to the Provost Marshal the 
reason we are asking these questions. 

The Chairman. Certainly. 

General McCoy. So that he could possibly even give us a better 
picture than what we asked for. For instance, there have been tele- 
grams received by all the members of this [SOSI Commission, 
before it left the United States, from certain organizations asking us 
to investigate what they stated were reports of great revelry and 
drunkenness on the night of December 6 amongst the officers and 
soldiei-s of this command. 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir. Well, I can get that record in figures for 
you. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 185 

General McCoy. So that we would like to get a sort of picture, 
comparative picture, 

Colonel Craig. I see. 

General McCoy. that would show just what did occur on that 

night. 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir. Vei-y well, sir. 

General McCoy. And comparable notes over a period of, say, some 
month or two. 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Does that cover it from your point of view, Mr. 
Justice ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Colonel, where were you on the night of December 6? 

Colonel Craig. I think I was home, from my recollection; I just 
hadn't thought about it, but I think that I was home that night. I 
don't think I went out anyplace. 

Admiral Standley. Where is it ? 

Colonel Craig. Sir? 

Admiral Standley. Where is your home? 

Colonel Craig. Right here on Fort Shaf ter. 

General McCoy. In other words, you weren't called out during the 
night? 

Colonel Craig. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Due to any unusua'l happenings ? 

Colonel Craig. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Mobs or brawls or anything like that? 

Colonel Craig. No, sir, nothing unusual. 

General McCoy. Where were you on the morning of the [SW] 
attack? 

Colonel Craig. Right at my quarters, No. 8 on the Department 
Headquarters, Fort Shafter here. 

General McCoy. What did you do ? 

Colonel Craig. I got up about 7 o'clock, had breakfast, dressed. I 
usually ride Sunday morning, a little exercise, and I dressed for riding 
and had gone up to my bedroom again — it was about 8 : 15 I guess — 
went out to look for the morning paper before this, and we hadn't re- 
ceived it yet, and I didn't think anything unusual about that. 

I was up in my room, and I saw Colonel Phillips, the Chief of Staff, 
who lives two doors below me, walli:ing up the street in front of the 
house. He was dressed in uniform. At that time I had heard shell- 
fire over here, landing over here in the Damon estate, and could hear 
airplanes in the air, and at that time Colonel Phillips took up the 
double-time. He came up towards Headquarters here. 

So I immediately went downstairs and came up to Headquarters 
here, and Colonel Phillips informed me that Alert No. 3 was in effect. 
When I first heard this firing the thought occurred to me that it was 
artillery firing falling short. I didn't know whether the Coast Artil- 
lery were having target, practice or not, but that's what I thought it 
was at first. I really didn't know it was an attack until I came up to 
Headquarters, and that was about 8 : 25, I would say. I immediately 
went down to my office and alerted my commands. 

The Chairman. Were you apprised of the contents of the War De- 
partment's telegram of November 27 as a result of which Alert No. 1 
had been put into effect ? 



186 CONGRESSIONAL IN^'ESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And how were you apprised of the contents of 
that message ? Was it shown to you ? 

Colonel Craig. It was read to us right here at the staff [-307] 
conference. 

The Chairman. When wt^s the staff conference at Avhich it. was 
read ? On the day it was recei ved 'i 

Colonel Craig. On the day it was received, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. The staff was assembled to hear it, were they? 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Was there any discussion as to what was tlie ap- 
propriate measure to take in the light of that message ? What I mean 
is 

Colonel Craig. Nothing more than Alert No. 1 was in effect. 

The Chairman. Well, was that put in effect as a result of the staff 
conference or before the stalf conference, if you know ? 

Colonel Craig. Well, that v.as put into effect as the result of the 
staff' conference, I believe. 

The Chairman. Well, I ask you. Was there any discussion as to 
what would be the appropriate orders in the light of that telegram, in 
the light of that message ? Did you talk it over ? 

Colonel Cr.vig. No, sir. We didn't. I didn't stay; I just got the 
telegram and went back and put my Alert Order No. 1 in effect. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Colonel Craig. That was the only — it didn't last very long. 

General McCoy. Who held the staff conference ? 

Colonel Craig. I think it was Colonel Phillips, the Chief of Staff. 

The Chairman. And if I get your testimony correctly. Colonel, 
what he did was to acquaint the staff' wuth the message and say that 
Alert No. 1 was to be consequently ordered [o08] into effect ? 

Colonel Craig. That's right. 

The Chairman, Any other questions ? 

Admiral Standlet. Yes, I would like to ask: In the number of 
arrests during the day here or the evening are some of them sent back 
to barracks ? 

Colonel Craig. Yes. 

Admiral Standlky. Without any record ? 

Colonel Craig. No, si r. We kee|.) a record of them, yes. 

Admiral Standley. If you pick them up, take charge of tliem, there 
is always a record ? 

Colonel Craig. That's right, yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. There is a naval patrol 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir, shore patrol. 

Admiral Standley. in connection with it? 

Colonel Craig. They were right next door to my office downtown. 

Admiral Standley. And any records they have would be the same 
as you have? If you pick up a sailoi- man and turn him over to the 
patrol you would make a record of it ? 

Colonel Craig. No, sir, we don't pick up the sailor men. That is 
done by the shore patrol. 

Admiral Standley. Done by the patrol ? 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir. They handle all theirs, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. So they will have in all probability a similar record 
as to their forces 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 187 

t'olonel Craig. That's right. 

The Chairman. That you have with respect to your forces ? 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir. 

General ]McXarnet. When you get up your records will you let us 
have one on pay night, records as to the arrests on payday night? 

[o09] Admiral Standlet. Yes. 

Colonel Crato. Well, you know, we hu e a dispersed payday over 
here now, just tiie last couple of months. That is: Hickani, the Air 
Corps paid in one night, and the Coast Defense another time. It's 
spread out over a period of time. That is, it just happens the last two 
months an order — the arrests were getting pretty large, and of course 
we had more troops, too, but they dispersed the paydays over a period 
of time, but I can give you the reports on the number — on who was paid 
and what troops confined that night. You see, we don't have just one 
payday any more like we used to do. 

The Chairman. Now, sir, what you could do would be to go back to 
a period three or four months ago when you did have a pay night, and 
get that. 

Colonel Craig. Oh, yes, sir, I can get that very easily; yes. 

The Chairman. Approximate number. 

General McCoy. Were you conscious on Saturday night of any 
unusually large number of sailors being in town? 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir, I did; I noticed that there were quite a few 
sailors in town. 

General McCoy. In other words, you knew the fleet was in the 
harbor, did you ? 

Colonel Craig. Well, I noticed that there were an awful lot of 
sailors in the streets. I didn't know, of course — that's all that I 
observed. I didn't know that the fleet was in, but it seemed to me 
there were a lot of sailors in town on the evening of the 6th, I was 
down there about 6, between 6 and 7 o'clock, I think it was, and I 
remember seeing a lot of sailors in the street. 

General jNIcCot. But even so, there was nothing that caused you 
to stay downtown that night due to anything unusual? 

Colonel Craig. No, sir, not to the best of my recollection. I think 
that I was at home that evening ; I could check [SIO] it up with 
my wife. 

General McCoy. In other words, it wasn't so outstanding that you 
remembered anything about it particularly? 

Colonel Craig. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Have you heard any comment in town here among 
civilians, any charges that the Army or the Navy ran riot that night, 
a lot of them. 

Colonel Craig. No, sir. This is the first I have heard of it. I 
haven't lieard anything like that. 

The Chairman. Colonel, in view of the nature of our investiga- 
tion we feel it is necessary to caution witnesses not to reveal questions 
and answers or anything that took place in the room. 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And not to discuss it with anyone. 

Colonel Craig. Very well. 

The Chatrman. We shall ask you to follow that injunction. 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir. 



188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. And when you are ready with your information 
if you will let Major Allen know we will try to call your office. 

Colonel Craig. Very well. 

Mr. Howe. Colonel Fielder has that message, G-2 of the Army. 
There are no other witnesses. 

The Chairman. Where is the adjutant? Has he got his figures? 

Mr. Howe. I imagine. The adjutant general is called to stand by 
for 2 o'clock. 

The Chairman. Oh, he is ? 

Mr. Howe. In case General Martin does not come. 

[Jii] rURTHEH TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL KEN- 
DALL J. FIELDER, GENERAL STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY 

The Chairman. Colonel Fielder, what is the message that was given 
you ? 

Colonel Fielder. This is from General Miles, War Department Mes- 
sage 473, secret, dated 27 November : 

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate stop. Hostilities may 
ensue stop. Subversive activities may be expected stop. Inform commanding 
general and chief of staff only. 

General McNarney. What was the time of receipt ? 

Colonel Fielder. I don't have that recorded on here. It got to me 
on that same day. I showed it to the Chief of Staff and the general 
on that same day. 

Tlie Chairman. That isthe 27th ? 

Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. Did you show that to them before Alert No. 1 
was ordered? 

Colonel Fielder. I don't remember in relation to that whether it 
had. I don't remember which message was received first, this one or 
the one to the Commanding General. 

General McCoy. Well, I think it is important for us to have that, 
and certainly your signal office would have some record of that as to 
the exact time of receipt. Would you look into that, please ? 

Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir, I will, sir. 

The Chairman. Just certify it to us if you can get it. 

Colonel Fielder. I might clarify one point, sir, that General McCoy 
asked about my having been reported as talking to General Wilson. 
I was sent out by General Short to inspect the — to see that the provi- 
sions under Alert No. 1 had been put into operation, but that was 
some time — that was several days after the 27th. 

[SW] General McCoy. Yes. 

Colonel Fielder. That is the only time that I could have possibly 
talked to him. 

The Chairman. I think he mentioned an officer of another name ; I 
don't think he mentioned you. 

Colonel Fielder. No, sir, I did not talk to him. 

The Chairman. He made some allusion, but I think" it was not your 
name, sir. 

Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Do you remember a staff conference on the morn- 
ing of November 27 or 28 where this message may have been read and 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 189 

the other message that came through to the Department Commander 
on the same date was read to the assembled staff '? 

Colonel Fielder. I don't remember in detail, no, sir. I know that 
it was shown to me, because I'm right in the next room (indicating). 

General McCoy. But you don't remember any staff conference where 
the whole staff was there? 

Colonel Fielder. No, sir, I don't remember that. 

General McCoy. And where these messages were read ? 

Colonel Fielder. No, sir. 

General McCoy. I believe that is all. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

Colonel Fielder. I now have the hour of the decoding of General 
Miles' message to me of November 27, and the decoding hour is 4 p. m. 

General McCoy. Were those messages together discussed or taken 
to the Department Commander, as far as you know? 

Colonel Fielder. I discussed mine with the Commanding General 
and the Chief of Staff only, as directed ; it was not discussed at staff 
meeting. When the message came in — the first message came in — I was 
immediately called in, because I am in the next room, and 

[SIS] General McCoy. That is the message from the War De- 
partment, Marshall ? 

Colonel Fielder. Yes. I read that before the 4 p. m. conference. 
There was a staff conference of the four heads at 4 p. m. on the 27th, 
but I in the meantime had already been given the information, and I 
had started action so far as my agencies were concerned. The train- 
ing section, G-3, was told at this conference at 4 that the Department 
Commander had decided to put Alert No. 1 into effect, and to get 
busy and see that it was carried out. 

General McCoy. And both these telegrams were available at that 
time ? 

Colonel Fielder. They were available at that time, yes, sir, but the 
conference did not see this one ; they don't know yet that this one was 
received, except the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff. 

The Chairman. Thank you. 

(Thereupon, at 12 : 50 o'clock p. m. a recess was taken until 2 o'clock 
p. m. of the same day.) 

[SI4.] afternoon session 

The Commission reconvened at 2 o'clock p. m., at the expiration of 
the recess. 

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE V/. BICKNELL, 
ASSISTANT TO DEPARTMENTAL G-2, UNITED STATES ARMY 

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Your full name? 

Colonel Bicknell. George W. Bicknell. 

The Chairman. Rank^ 

Colonel Bicknell. Lieutenant Colonel. 

The Chairman. Your assignment here, sir? 

Colonel Bicknell. I am the assistant to the Departmental G-2. 

The Chairman. Colonel, we have had news of one intercepted tele- 
phone conmiunication shortly before December 7 which I believe was 
.turned over to vou by the F. B. I. 



190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel BiCKNELL. That's right. 

The Chaikman. Where did you take it ? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. I brought it directly to the Department Com- 
mander. 

The Chaikman. And what discussion was had about it, if any? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. I stated that the message looks somewhat sus- 
picious to me in p)art. At present, up until that time, having just 
received it only an hour — less than an hour before that, I had not 
been able to make any evaluation of it, but there were certain portions- 
of that that did appear to be suspicious. 

The Chairman. Were you and the Department Commander able 
to make anything out of it that would putt you on any alert as to any 
hostile action? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. No, sir. 

[S15] The Chairman. Had you gotten fi^om the Navy Intelli- 
gence or F. B. I. — and I understand you all worked in conjunction 

Colonel BiCKNELL. That's right. 

The Chairman. any message that would arouse suspicion of any 

hostile action? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. Nothing of the kind, no, sir. 

The Chairman. Nothing or the kind ? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. No, sir. 

The Chairjman. You were unable to know what was being sent 
from the Consulate ? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir, that's true. 

The Chairman. And were you able to get anything from the com- 
mercial radio ? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. We were not authorized to do that. 

General McCoy. Did you make an attempt, that is? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. I did not make the attempt, no, sir. I believe 
there were some attempts made by the other services, but we did nor. 

The Chairman. You felt that you were forbidden in peace time 
to doit? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. That's right. It is illegal to do that in jDeace 
time. 

The Chairman. Sir? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. It was considered illegal to do that in peace- 
time. 

The Chairman. Yes. You knew nothing of any code or blinker 
sigTials, or what have you, of the same character until after the 
7th; is that right? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. That is correct, after the 7th. 

The Chairman. You then obtained some infonnation about that? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. From the consulate? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir. 

[^l'&] The Chairman. Wlien did you get information that the 
Consulate was burning its papers? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. 1 received that information at 5 o'clock Friday 
afternoon. 

The Chairman. That would be the 4th ? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. The 4th, yes. sir. 

The Chairman. Did you advise your Department 

Admiral Reeves. 5th. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 191 

General McCoy. 5th. 

Colonel BiCKNf:i.L. 5th. j'es. sir. 

The Chaiemax. Did you advise your Department Commander of 
the matter? 

Colonel BiCKXELL. I advised them. That is, I gave all that in- 
formation to the congregated staff heads at the staff conference at 
9 o'clock Saturday morning. 

The Chairman. Nine o'clock Saturday? 

Colonel BicKNELL. Saturday morning. 

The Chairman. Saturday morning. Did you impart to the c; i\- 
f erence the significance of that ? 

Colonel BiCKNELi.. 1 did. I said that was a most interesting laet. 

The Chairman. What is the significance i 

Colonel BicKNELL. That they Mere burning the papers. 

The Chairman. What is the significance, in your judgment ? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. The inference of it, in my jud,gment, is th-.t 
that is one of the signs that something is going to liappen somewhere. 

The Chairman. So that you are at the very brink of war 

Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir. 

The Chahuvian. when a consul 

Colonel BiCKNELL. starts burning the papers. 

The Chairman. gets ready to flee, aren't you ? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir. 

[J77] The Chair3ian. So that you explained that that meant 
that some hostilities were probablj" going to break out immediately? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. I didn't make that explanation at the staff con- 
ference. 

The CiiAiKJiAN. You did not ? 

Colonel BiCKNEiL. But I sr.id tliat it was very significant, in view 
of the present situation, that the consul was burning the papers. 

The Chaii?]\ian. You liave no doubt that there were communications 
back and forward to Ja])an from the consular office here, have you? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. I fee] certain that the entire espionage system 
headed up at the consular office. 

The Chairman. There seamed to be no wav that you could break 
through that? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. No, sir. 

The CHAimiAN. Any other questions? 

Admiral Reeves. I would like to know what the reaction at the 
staff conference was to your statement that this burning of papers j^ou 
thought was significant. 

Colonel BiCKNELL. Thei-e was no comment that I know of. 

Admiral Ree\-es. No comment on it whatever ? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. No, sir. Of course, I might explain that under 
the delineation agreement that was published a year ago in June the 
F. B. I. and the Navy jointly were m charge of Japanese espionage. 

The Chairman. They were? 

Colonel BiCKNEi.L. Yes, sir, amongst the civil community, and the 
Army was only charged with espionage within the military establish- 
ment. 

The Chairman. I didn't know that. 

Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir. That is the joint agi-eement of 

(The witness examined papers.) 



192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Oh, you need not refer to them; your word 
[318] is quite sufficient. 

Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir. I think it was in July of 1941. 

The Chairman. Then, legal or illegal, if there were attempts to 
break the communication system between here and Japan it was an 
r. B. I. or a Navy job '? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. Or a Navy job, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Colonel BiCKNELL, We work in very close connection with them, 
but it was their responsibility only. 

The Chairman. But they gave you nothing? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir, that's true; they gave us nothing. 

The Chairman. Except that the F. B. I. gave you some things after 
the fact that were too late to use ? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Colonel, what do you know about an interception of 
a message having certain code signal words that were to be used to 
signify — to signal the attack on these islands ? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. That message was turned over to the F. B. I. 
encoded in a file of papers which were removed from the consulate after 
the police established a guard at the consulate. The story as related by 
them is that they smelled papers burning when they went in the con- 
sulate on the morning of the 7th. 

The Chairman. Yes? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. They saw smoke coming from behind a door. 
They asked the consul if there was a fire, and he said, "No; there 
is just something in there." They opened the door, which was a 
double door, and found a wash tub on the floor in which they were 
burning these documents. The room was full of smoke, and there 
was just one brown — this bellows type envelope that was full of 
papers that had not been destroyed. They [319] removed 
that — I don't think the consul knew that they got it — and brought it 
down to the F. B. I., and we turned it over immediately to the Navy 
Intelligence, inasmuch as Commander Rochefort has the key to some 
of their codes. Within I tliink it was less than 24 hours Commander 
Rochefort had broken one of the messages in this file in the consulate, 
which gave the system by which various lights, star boats, and other 
systems 

The Chairman. That is the so-called Kita, K-i-t-a, code? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I refer to something else which you may or may 
not know anything about; I refer to the fact that some ten days 
before December 7 it is supposed that a Japanese code message was 
intercepted and was broken down by the Department in Washington, 
one of the military departments, which gave certain key words which 
would be flashed over the radio directing the attack on Pearl Harbor. 

Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes. 

The Chairman. And that, having broken that down, one of the 
military establishments in Washington caught over the radio the 
three key words and relayed them here to you. When I say "you," 
to the Islands. 

Colonel BiCKNELL. Yes. 

The Chairman. Do vou know of aiiv such storv? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 193 

Colonel BiCKNEUL. I never heard of such a thing, no, sir. 

The Chairman. Never heard of it? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. No, sir. 

The Chairman. I have no other questions. Are there any other 
questions ? 

Admiral Reeves. I would like to asTi if in close cooperation with 
the Nav}' and F. B. I. — if from Commander Rochefort or the Navy 
you learned anything about the collection of Japanese ships in the 
mandated islands. 

[3i20] Colonel Bickneel. No, sir. I knew nothing. We had no 
information from Navy, at all. 

Admiral Reeves. No information about that movement of any 
ships ? 

Colonel BiCKNELL. We knew nothing of any of the fleet or where 
they were. 

I'he Chairman. Colonel — go ahead. 

Admiral Reeves. I have nothing else. 

The Chairman. Complete. 

Admiral Reeves. No; I was going to say that I had nothing else. 

The Chairman. Colonel, in view of the nature of our investigation 
we shall enjoin upon you that you shall not disclose what has been 
asked you or what you have testified here or discuss this testimony 

Colonel BiCKNELL. Certainly. Very good, sir. 

The Chairman. witli, any other person. 

Colonel BiCKNELL. Thank you, sir. 

The Chairiman. Thank you, sir. 

General Martin. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL FREDERICK L. MARTIN, AIR 
FORCE, UNITED STATES ARMY 

(Thereupon the witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Your full name ? 

General Martin. Frederick L. Martin, 

The Chairman. Your rank ? 

General Martin. Major General, Air Force. 

The Chairman, And your assignment here^ 

General Martin. My assignment has been as Commanding General 
of the Hawaiian Air Force from November 2 until December 17 when 
I was relieved. 

The Chairman. Do you care to make any statement about the oc- 
currences off your own bat, General, or would you prefer [^;?i] 
that you be questioned about the situation? 

General Martin. Well, I might state what little I know about what 
happened and what we tried to do to fight back. I was coming down 
to my breakfast on Sunday morning, December 7, just before 8 o'clock, 
when I heard a very violent explosion in the vicinity of the Pearl 
Harbor Navy Yard. I ran to the door just in time to see the second 
airplane making the dive release its bomb and pull up. I saw the 
red circle 

The Chairman. Where were your quarters, sir? 

General Martin. They are on the channel that leads into Pearl 
Harbor. 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 1 -14 



194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. So that you had a view of the harbor ? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. This was about — this bombing was oc- 
curring probably less than a mile from my position. I saw the red 
circle on the wing tip of this airplane as it pulled out, and I knew 
it was Japanese. I rushed back to the telephone, called General David- 
son, who was in charge of the intercept command, to tell him to get 
his pursuit ships in the air just as fast as he could, and he said they 
were being attacked at the same time and that they were struggling 
to get their ships in position so they could get them off. 

I then tried to call General Rudolph, who was in command of the 
bomber command, and I could not get him at his telephone. So I 
got in my private car and drove to my headquarters as quickly as 
possible, so as to get communications with everyone. I found my 
staff assembling very rapidly, and we communicated with those that 
we could. We tried to get such information as we could from the 
intercept command to give us an indication of the location of these 
carriers, because our ambition at the time was to try to get the car- 
riers if we possibly could. I called Admiral Bellinger on the field 
phone which I have in my office, which connects the two of us. As 
you know, the Navy is responsible for the search, and they also have 
turned over to them our bombardment in case of [322~\ attack. 
I talked to him, and the bombardment was so heavy at the time we 
could hardly hear each other, and he said he had no information 
whatever to give me any light as to whicji direction to go to find the 
carriers. I called him back later ; he still had no information. The 
information we got at the time from the intercept command led us 
to believe that there was a carrier not far distant from the southern- 
most point of Barbers Point, which is out in this direction [indicating], 
and they indicated it might be 25 or 40 miles from there ; that there 
was considerable air activity in that direction. 

Of the airplanes we had, which were not very many, of bombard- 
ment airplanes we had in commission, loaded as quickly as possible, 
four A-20's, which are a light type of light bombardment airplane. 
As soon as they were loaded we gave them a mission. After finding 
that they had no mission from the Navy and they had no instructions 
from the Navy, I myself gave them a mission of trying to find the 
carrier that was south of Barbers Point. They took off at 11 :27, four 
of them. They did not succeed in finding anything in that direction. 

The Chairman. When did the bombardment by the Japanese cease, 
as nearly as you know ? 

General Martin. I have no information from anyone as to just 
when it ceased. Everyone seems to know when it began, but no one 
seems to know exactly when it ceased. There were three distinct 
attacks. 

The Chairman. Yes, three waves. 

General Martin. Three waves. One started at about 8 o'clock and 
lasted for about 30 minutes, and there was another one at 9 o'clock 
or just after, and the third one was probably in the neighborhood of 
9 : 45 to 10 o'clock. No one seems to know tlie exact time of the third. 

The Chairman. Well, when you got this pursuit squadron off at 
11 : 20 or thereabouts, the bombardment had ceased by [SBS] the 
Japanese ? 

General Martin. No, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 195 

The Chairman. Well, that is what I want to know. 

General Martin. Some of the pursuit got off before the bombard- 
ment had ceased, and I saw their first attack was made on some ships — 
that is, within my view. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Martin. — was made on some ships that were attacking 
the Ewa Marine Station ; that is south here a short distance. 

The Chairman. Then they went off to the south southwest in 
pursuit ? 

General Martin. Our information was to the effect that they left 
south or west of south. 

The Chairman. Yes. Had any of the Japanese attacking planes 
in your observation gone off' in that same direction ?^ 

General Martin. Yes, sir ; that's what I was saying. 

The Chairman. That is why you suspected a carrier? 

General Martin. Yes, that's what I was saying. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Martin. And one of our pursuit pilots had shot down two 
of the Japanese planes leaving in that direction. 

The Chairman. I see. 

General Martin. We had that information. After we dispatched 
this, the first four A-20's, we were given a map that had been I'e- 
covered from a pilot that had been shot down on the edge of Fort 
Kamehameha, which is right on the edge of the military reservation 
of Hickam Field. This map had approximately ten courses laid 
out on it to a point northwest of the Island of Oahu, which indicated 
that they either had left carriers there or expected to return to carriers 
in that direction. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

[324'] General Martin. And as we got other ships in commission 
we dispatched them a little after 12 o'clock, as I remember, in the 
northerly direction, but they didn't succeed in finding anything. As 
to what position they launched the ships from the carriers, we do not 
know, but from the time of the attack we suspect they were in the 
neighborhood of 200 miles from here, and it is pretty likely that they 
steamed back from that position before they recovered their airplanes. 

The Chairman. Away from the Island ? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. So it was possible for them to be ap- 
proximately 300 miles from here at that time. Now, there is nothing 
positive about that. 

The Chairman. I understand. 

General Martin. The control officer in the intercept command did 
not give us any information that there were carriers in that direction, 
although, as you probably have received testimony, we were receiving 
all sorts of spurious messages with reference to the positions of the 
carriers. They were in every position around here, but they never 
mentioned the northerly position, which now would lead us to* believe 
that they probably were in that position rather than south or east. 

The Chairman. Were you acquainted with the condition of the 
radio air after these attacks, or have you since learned of the condition 
of the radio air? I understand it was full of 

General Martin. Well, to this extent: that we have had consider- 
able interference, and they have tried to monitor the position to 



196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

locate the position of the instruments that are causing the inter- 
ference. 

The Chairman. Yes. We have heard that the sea was full of 
Japanese ships that all started talking on small radio sets and 
jammed the air. 

[S25] General Martin. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. With contradictory talk and signals. 

General Martin. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That is the fact, is it ? 

General Martin. We have learned that since, and we were getting 
this information that we knew in all probability was spurious, but 
we couldn't differentiate one from the other. 

The Chairman. That would indicate a perfectly complete espio- 
nage system operating before the attack, here in the Islands, wouldn't 
it? 

General Martin. Justice Roberts, they had complete information 
of everything. It is impossible for one to believe that such a well- 
coordinated attack could have been made. They knew the exact posi- 
tion of everything. In their attack upon our installations they picked 
out those things of greatest importance to our future effort. They 
started in on our engineering establishments and our depots and our 
ships that were in the line, the armed forces 

The Chairman. Ships that were in the line, you say ? 

General Martin. Ships that were on the line. 

The Chairman. On the line. 

General Martin. Unfortunately, as you probably know, we were 
in Alert No. 1, which means prevention against sabotage, and that 
means pulling in your equipment so you can protect it from things 
that are moving on the ground, and that was the most unfortunate 
thing of all. After we got our ships dispersed, which was between 
the first and second attacks, we only lost one bombardment airplane, 
and that was of an obsolete type. 

The Chairman. In other words, the third wave didn't get home 
at all, so to speak ? 

General Martin. Well, the success of the third wave was small as 
compared to that of the others, and the third wave [S26] was 
largely horizontal bombing; there was very little bombing, but there 
was a good deal of strafing that preceded each bombardment attack, 
and this strafing was very effective. They had mounted in the wings 
of their ships 7.7 millimeter weapons and something that corresponds 
to our 20 millimeter weapons, and some of the ammunition in these 
belts was armor piercing. 

The Chairman. Was what? Armor piercing? 

General Martin. Armor piercing. Others were incendiary, and 
most of them were tracer, so the destruction of the ships was largely 
from this strafing. 

The Chairman. You gathered that they even knew the location of 
ships in the harbor and picked their ship ? 

General Martin. There is no question about that. 

The Chairman. Picked individual ships as their individual 
targets ? 

(Teneral Martin. In my mind there is no question about that. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 197 

The Chairman. Were you apprised of the contents of the Chief 
of Staff's message of November 27, the day that Alert No. 1 was put 
into operation ? 

General Martin. Well, I am apprised of one message. I did not 
receive the last message until after all this was over. 

The Chairman. Oh, I understand that. 

General Martin. I am apprised of one message in which he said 
to take such measures as necessary to prevent subversive effort — 
M^ords to that effect. 

The Chairman. Well, there was more in it than that, wasn't there, 
General ? 

General Martin. Yes, sir, there was more in it than that. They 
said that 

The Chairman. Did you see the whole message ? 

General Martin. I read it, and then it was put in the secret files 
of tlie Department. 

[S27] The Chair]vian. Yes. Can you say if that is the message. 
General (indicating) ? 

General Martin. Yes, sir, that is the message. He mentions that — 

you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you 
deem necessary. These measures should be carried out so as not to repeat not 
to alarm civilian population or disclose intent. 

The Chairman. "Wliere was that shown you, General Martin? 
Here? 

General Martin. As I remember, I was called to General Short's 
office right here. 

The Chairman. Yes. Were the staff present? 

General Martin. My staff? 

The Chairman. No. no. General Short's staff. 

General Martin. Not that I remember. 

The Chairman. You mean you were called in alone ? 

General Martin. I believe my chief of staff was with me. 

The Chairman. Yes ? 

General Martin. And probably General Short's chief of staff. 

The Chairman. Yes ? 

General Martin. I do not remember exactly as to who was pres- 
ent when I went in, but there were not many. 

The Chairman. And you do not remember at what hour of the day 
that was? This message, to refresh vour memory, was received at 
1:16 p.m. 

General Martin. Well, it was one afternoon. 

The Chairman. It was in the afternoon? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And was it the afternoon on which the Alert No. 
1 was ordered ? 

General Martin. It was ordered immediately after that, yes, sir. 

Tlie Chairman. Immediately after? 

[S28] General Martin. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you discuss the significance of that message 
with the Department Commander? 

General Martin. Nothing more than he said that we were going 
into Alert No. 1 right away and that we would prevent — take all 
necessary precautions against sabotage. 



198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Martin. It was felt at the time that sabotage was the 
thing to guard against an attack. 

The Chairman. Why ? 

General Martin. I cannot say. Probably geographical location 
and the fact that we had no information to the contrary. 

The Chairman. Now, between the time that Alert No. 1 was put 
into effect, which happens to have been November 27, and December 
7, did you hear — were you apprised of any other information or any 
other fears or any other intention to put the command into a more 
alert position ? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. I have a message from my own chief, 
General Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Force, which I have brought 
along with me here I might read. 

The Chairman. I wish you would. 

General Martin. This was dated November 28 and addressed to 
the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, 
T. H., attention Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force : 

That instructions substantially as follows be issued to all establishments and 
units under your control and command is desired against those subversive activi- 
ties within the field of investigative responsibility of the War Department (see 
paragraph 3 MID SR 30-45). The present critical situation demands that all 
precautions be taken at once stop. It is desired also that all additional measures 
necessary be initiated by you immediately to provide the following: protection 
of your [329] personnel against subversive propaganda, protection of all 
activities against espionage, and protection against sabotage of your equipment, 
property and establishments stop. This does not repeat this does not rei)eat 
not authorize any illegal measures stop. Avoiding unnecessary alarm and pub- 
licity protective measures should be confined to tliose essential to security stop. 

It is also desired that on or before December 5 this year reports be submitted 
to the Chief Army Air Forces of all steps initiated by you to comply with these 
instructions stop. 

Signed 

Arnold, 

Adam, Adjutant General. 

The Chairman. What is your reply, sir? 

General Martin. The answer to that was given as follows : 

Chief of the Abmy Air Forces, 

Washing ton, D. C: 

Following report in compliance with instructions contained in AGWAR 4A4-28 : 
instructions contained in subsequent radiogram issued to all establishments and 
units under control of Hawaiian Air Force on 29 November stop. Entire subject 
of protection recently I'eceived, and continues to receive, detailed and compre- 
hensive attention as result of these reports prepared by special investigator dur- 
ing June and July 41 stop. 

Additional steps initiated specifically to comply with subject radiograms 
substantially as follows : assembly of intelligence officers of the major subdi- 
visions of Hawaiian Air Force 29 November stop. Personal inspection of stations 
and activities by Air Force Commander one and two December. Increase in size 
of guard where desirable stop. Instructions issued to expedite overhauling of 
pass system, civilian and military, now in progress stop. This entire department 
is now operating and will continue to operate under an alert for preven- 
tion [330] of sabotage activities stop. 

Secrecy discipline being given all emphasis practicable through official and 
quasi-official agencies stop. Work has actually been begun on essential protective 
fencing and floodlighting projects stop. 

With reference to counter propaganda, the problem is educational rather than 
regulatory and at pi-esent is being dealt with through the medium of squadron 
talks stop. Need is felt for a War Department publication (possibly in form of 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 199 

development and extension of forewords suggested, FM21-100) suitably arranged 
and worded for use of relatively inexperienced personnel, dealing with status of 
soldier as citizen, ideals and doctrines influencing founders of American govern- 
ment, structure of government, place of military establishment in the structure, 
national objectives, both domestic and international, together with discussion of 
those forms of government inimical to democratic form stop. 

Signed 

Mabtin N. 

The Chairman. Any further communication from your chief after 
that and before the attack ? 

General Martin. Not that I remember of. 

The Chairman. It would be in your file if you had one ? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. If you had been in Alert No. 3 would your situation 
have been bettered to meet this attack? 

General Martin. Very materially, because our intercept command 
would have been in operation, and as we were so hard pressed for 
training our problem here has been impressed on us as one of training. 
We have a lot of new men and a lot of new equipment, and the in- 
tercept command is one that requires specially trained men for the 
manning table, and we endeavored to train these men as quickly as 
we could, because the equipment [331] had been set up but re- 
cently. And we were working all day long through the week, but on 
Sunday they were only working from 4 to 7 o'clock. Now, had that 
been in operation by more skilled operators we would have had suffi- 
cient warning so that we could have intercepted before they reached the 
bomb release line. We did not have enough equipment here, airplanes, 
to have prevented attack of that intensity, but we could have reduced 
the effects of the attack very materially. 

The Chairman. Your considered judgment is that even if you had 
had warning of the attack sufficient to get your ships into action still 
you had not enough equipment to have entirely prevented damage in 
Pearl Harbor? 

General Martin. No, sir, we could not. I make that statement for 
this reason: that we had but a hundred and one of the P-40 type,' 
which is the later type of pursuit airplane, and, as I remember, 39 of 
the P-36 type, which is an obsolescent t^ype of pursuit airplane that 
does not have the requisite fire power. That is not sufficient. In our 
estimation we should have two fully-equipped groups of pursuit avia- 
tion or approximately 200 pursuit airplanes to ward off such attack. 

The Chairman. You mean 200 fit to take the air? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. On iiotice. 

General Martin. And I have so recommended. In addition to 
that, we have had a great deal of trouble with reference to getting the 
requisite amount of spare parts. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Martin. Of course our program at first, as you know, was 
one of all-out production. 

Tlie Chairman. Yes, sir. 

General Martin. And then we had to pick up the spare parts later. 

[332] The Chairman. Yes. 

General Martin. And while we are getting some spare parts under 
control now, it hasn't been, and about half of this number of airplanes 



200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

we had were out of commission for one reason or another. So we had 
on the morning- of this attack approximate!}^, as I remember, 64 of the 
P-40 type and — let me refer to my notes. 

The Chairman. Yes, certainly. 

General Martin. I think it was 24 of the other type. (The wit- 
ness referred to notes.) Twenty of the P-36 type. That would make 
it about 84, which was less than half of that which would be necessary. 
Now, of that number we lost about — a large part of our equipment in 
this attack by being on the ground. But had we been alerted and 
ready we would have had approximately 80 airplanes ready to meet 
them. 

The Chairman. General, do you use intoxicating liquor? 

General Martin. No, sir, not for many years. 

The Chairman. Where were you on December 6, the evening or 
night of December 6 ? 

General IMaetin. That was a Friday evening ? 

The Chairman. No ; it was a Saturday evening. 

General Martin. Saturday? Oh, yes, Saturday' evening. I think 
I attended a dinner part^^ at the club, at Hickam Field. 

The Chairman. Schofield Barracks? 

General Martin. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Wliere? 

General Martin. No, I was not at Schofield Barracks. I was at 
Hickam Field. 

The Chairman. Hickam Field. You saw other officers there? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. What was their condition? 

General Martin. As to sobriety it was nothing to criticize. They 
were having a drink now and then. 

[SSS] The Chairman. Yes? 

General Martin. But no one showed the effects of it. 

The Chairman. Wlien you left could the rest of them have left and 
taken battle stations with full efficiency? Was there anyone there 
.who wasn't fit to go out and take his command ? 

General Martin. So far as I know there was none. Judge. You 
will have to qualify that because it's a question that even medical 
officers would discuss as to the effects of one drink on a man. 

The Chairman. Yes, exactly ; I understand. 

General Martin. And a great deal depends on the individual. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General Martin. But I would consider any of them could have 
taken their positions and put up a good fight, without any question 
in my mind. 

The Chairman. All right. That is what I wanted to know. I 
think I have no other questions. General McNarney, have you any ? 

General McNarney. Have you the Standing Operating Procedure 
of the Hawaiian Air Force ? 

General Martin. That Standing Operating Procedure came out 
for the Department on the 5th of November, and there were certain 
changes that had to be made on it. Our staff were working on it, and 
it had not been published at this time. For the Alert No. 1 we pub- 
lished — (The witness examined documents.) I don't know whether 
I brought it with me or not. Yes : for Alert No. 1 we published this 
paper right here (indicating). 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSIOX 201 

General McNarnet. The Commission has copies of those. 

The Chairman. We have copies of that. 

General McNarney. We have a copy of that. 

The Chairmax. We have a copy all right, 

[S34-] General Martin. The purpose of withholding the finished 
preparation of that report was that we had General Davidson and 
Major Meehan back on the mainland at a maneuver, and we wanted 
the value of their experience there to guide us in the preparation 
of this report. 

General McNarney. When you were informed by the Commanding 
General of the Department that Alert No. 1 would go into effect, did 
you have any reaction or apprehensions that this type of alert was 
not sufficient to meet the situation as then known to you ? 

General Martin. I must say that I did not. 

General McNarney. If Alert No. 2 or No. 3 had been put into 
effect, .would it have seriously disrupted your training program ? 

General Martin. Yes, it would, very materially. 

General McNarney. If under Alert No. 1 it had been the practice 
to distribute your airplanes in their bunkers and disperse them, would 
that have seriously disrupted training? 

General Martin. Not seriously disrupted training; it would have 
increased the guard very materially, and the Air Force is furnishing 
the guard, so you would have to take them out of the tactical units 
in order to increase the guard. 

General McNarney. Would it have affected maintenance? 

General Martin. It would, yes. 

General McNarney. To any considerable extent? 

General Martin. Our estimate — because we have done that — our 
estimate is that it is about 25%. We have practiced all these alerts 
from time to time, had drills on them, and everyone knows how to 
perform the duties in connection with a specific alert. The men — 
the airplanes have been dispersed a number of times on Alert No. 2, 
in simulated Alert No. 2. 

General McNarney. Under Alert No. 2 what is the state of readi- 
ness of your interceptor command ? 

[SS5] General Martin. The interceptor command is in opera- 
tion continuously while the alert is on. 

General McNarney. What is the state of readiness of the actual 
forces ? That is, you probably have one squadron ready to go in four 
or five minutes? 

General Martin. Oh, you mean the pursuit forces ? 

General McNarney. Yes, the pursuit forces. 

General Martin. We have a state of readiness in addition to the 
alert, you know. 

General McNarney. Yes. 

General Martin. The state of readiness indicates whether they are 
all ready, one- fourth ready, one-eighth ready, or whether they are — 
of course, with a No. 2 you couldn't have the last, which is that training 
goes on as usual and you have four hours to get to your post. 

General McNarney. Do you know what the standard procedure is 
under Alert No. 2 ? For instance, at dawn how many squadrons would 
you have ready to go ? 



202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Martin. Well, under Alert No. 2 you have to specify the 
state of readiness, and the state of readiness indicates the number of 
airplanes that are are ready to go. 

General McNarney. Well, in your practices under Alert No. 2 
would your state of readiness be prescribed ? 

General Martin. Well, we have different ones. Sometimes we have 
all of them ready, and sometimes we have only a fourth of them ready, 
and sometimes we would just have one squadron in each group ready. 

General McNarney. In other words, it depends on the situation 
existing at the moment? 

General Martin. It depends upon what we prescribed at the time; 
there was no set rule for it. 

General McNarney. You prescribed in accordance with your idea 
as to the existing situation ? 

General Martin. That is right. 

[S36] General McNarney. You previously mentioned the fact 
that a large number of airplanes were out of commission. That was 
true not only in the pursuit but also in the bombers and reconnaissance. 
Was that primarily due to a lack of spare parts ? 

General Martin. Well, we had a particularly vicious condition in 
reference to the B-17 bombers that had just come to our attention, and 
that is in the assembling of these leakproof tanks. The grommets 
fastening the tanks in position had not been properly placed, and the 
gasoline had gotten into the ingredient between the two layers of this 
composition which was supposed to swell up when the gasoline came in 
contact with it, and it had expanded down into the tank until the 
capacity of the tank had been very much reduced, and we did not find 
this until we began to get a red color to the gasoline, and we upon 
investigation found that about half of the tanks that we removed were 
so damaged, and reported to the Chief of the Air Corps this condi- 
tion. We found it at the time when we received instructions to send 
all of our remaining B-17's to the Philippines, and we asked that we 
be permitted to delay their departure till the last of the ships in transit, 
which was granted, and this was for the purpose of getting them in 
commission, as well as for extending the training, because the few 
that had a part of the tankage could be used for training missions 
here. And then we were also changing the engines on those ships so 
as to insure that the engines on the airplanes, these 12, would have 
the proper interval between overhaul and inspection to permit their 
making that transit. So had the transfer been completed we would 
have had no B-l7's at all. 

General McNarney. Was the Aircraft Warning Service under your 
control on November 27 ? 

General Martin. The what? 

General McNarney. The Aircraft Warning Service. 

General Martin. No, sir. 

General McNarney. Radar? 

[337] General Martin. No, sir. 

General McNarney. When was it placed under your control ? 

General Martin. It has never been placed under our control. It 
operates — cooperates with the intercept command, which is wrong of 
course. 

The Chairman. You mean it is a component part of the interceptor 
command ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 203 

General Martin. Yes, sir. I intended to speak to Greneral Short 
about having it transferred, now that it was in operation, to the con- 
trol of the Air Force and the intercept command. That is where it 
belongs. 

General McNarney. Has it been placed under your command or 
was it placed under your command after the attack? 

General INIartin. No, sir, not to my knowledge. I knew nothing 
about that, if it has. 

The Chairjman. Perhaps it was after your relief. I think we were 
told that it was done on December 17. 

General Martin. I have been in the hospital since last Sunday a 
week ago, and if it has been done it has been done since probably 
General Emmons came. 

General McNarney. Wlio prescribed the hours of operation for 
the 

General Martin. That was arranged by the intercept command and 
the chief signal officer or the signal officer having charge of the air 
warning service company. 

The Chairisian. General Davidson is subordinate to you, is he not ? 

General Maetin. He is the intercept command. He is the pursuit 
commander and the intercept commander. 

The Chairman. And in both capacities he is under you ? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. That is right. 

The Chairman. Therefore, if the interceptor command had been 
organized and integrated it would have been under you ; it [338'\ 
didn't need to be transferred to you, did it ? 

General Martin. That is perfectly correct. 

The Chairman. Now, we have had some information. General, that 
it wasn't activated until December 17, ten days after the attack. 

General Martin. Oh, it has — as soon as the first stations were in a 
position so they could operate and we could get personnel trained for 
that operation, they have been conducting drill in order that they 
could train additional personnel as rapidly as possible so as to man all 
the stations, and we finally had six mobile stations but none of the 
fixed stations. There are supported to be six fixed stations, which have 
not been in position and are not in position yet. 

The Chairjsian. Had there been any emergency requiring continu- 
ous operation of one or more of the mobile stations, had you a force at 
your command then that could have kept those stations operating and 
reporting to the control room ? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You had? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. They were not well trained men, but 
they were men sufficiently skilled that they could get information to 
us that would be of value, that we could investigate to find out the 
facts. 

The Chahoian. Now, with your knowledge of the setup. General, 
if you had been given Alert No. 3 would those mobile stations have 
been running 24 hours a day? 

General Martin. They probably would not have run 24 hours a 
day, but enough of them would have been in operation at any time 
out of the 24 hours that we could have gotten information. The 
reason I say that is that if you ran them 24 hours, as we had in the 
first 



204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. You play them out ? 

General Martin. We found out that the machinery wears [339] 
out. So to prolong the life of the machinery we kept enough in opera- 
tion at all times so that we could get a semblance of information. If 
we saw something of importance, then we would put the others in. 

The Chairman. Excuse me for interrupting you. 

General McNarnet. Would you have had authorit}^ on December 6 
to order 24-hour operation? 

General Martin. Would I have had the authority? 

General McNarnf-y. Yes. 

General Martin. I am sure if I had requested it I could have 
obtained it. 

General McNarney. You yourself did not have authority to order 
operations? 

General Martin. It was in complete operation, but it hadn't been 
turned over to the Air Foi ce as yet. 

The Chairman. Well, who had it ? 

General Martin. He is talking about the Air Warning Service; 
aren't you ? 

General McNarney. About the Air Warning Service. 

General Martin. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Well, who had it if you didn't ? 

General Martin. It was under the signal officer who was in charge 
of the installation of the equipment. 

The Chairman. Oh, I see. 

General McCoy. He is not an operating man. 

The Chairman. No. 

General McNarney. Did you have any information on December 6 
of the naval patrols that were actually operating? 

General Martin. No, sir. 

General McNarney. Did the Navy as a matter of course furnish 
you this information, or if you desired it would you have to go after it? 

General Martin. They never have furnished us any information as 
to what they learned from their reconnaissance and WO'] 
search. Had they found something of interest to us, they probably 
would have done so. 

General McNarney. After the attack what was the situation ? 

General Martin. After the attack they had very little with which 
they could work. I, as I told you, had talked to Admiral Bellinger, 
which is my contact with the Navy, twice during the morning while 
we were being attacked ; and, learning that some of the bombardment 
planes that were in a state of readiness, could go on a mission, and 
loaded, had not been assigned a mission, I assigned them myself. 
There was a mission assigned in the afternoon of that day by Admiral 
Bellinger, late in the afternoon. I was in the bombardment com- 
mand post when this message came in : they wanted to search for a 
carrier which was reported to be about 65 miles north of here, and this 
was late, so late that it was hardly possible for them to get this infor- 
mation or to see anything before it became too dark, but they went out. 

The Chairman. Who went out? 

General Martin. The six B-lT's, in answer to this request. 

The Chairman. Yes ? 

General Martin. They did not find anything in that position. I 
Avill get the exact time of this in just a minute (examining papers). 



PROCEEDIXGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 205 

Three B-lT's went out at fifteen-twenty to eight een-twenty-five, three 
hours and five minutes. The bearing was between 1C5 and 195 degrees. 
That's from three-twenty to six-twenty-five. 

Admiral Reeves. Well, tliat is not north. 

General ISIcCoy. What is the bearing ? 

Admiral Reeves. What is the bearing \ That bearing is not north, 
is it ? 

General Martix. 165 to 195. You see the spread in the search 
[indicating] , 

\Skl\ Admiral Reeves. Are you referring to compass bearings? 

General Martin. Sir ? 

Admiral Ree\-es. That would be to the soutliward if you are re- 
ferring to compass bearings. 

General Martin. This is an azimuth. 

Admiral Reeves. Yes. 

General Martin. Wait a minute. You are right. It is not north. 

Admiral Reeves. No. 

General Martin. This is in a southerly direction, south and south- 
easterly. 

Admiral Reeves. Yes. 

General jVLvrtin. That is the information I had here on this chart 
that I held. I was sitting there in the office, and they said that they had 
information that there was a ship 65 miles north of here. 

Let me see if I can find anything more on that subject. 

[J^^] General Martin. It says 165 to 195. They flew in sight 
contact with each other on a course between 165 to 170 and about a dis- 
tance of TO miles. No enemy contact was made. 

This mission was ordered by the Navy. 

Admiral Reeves. No flight was sent to the north ? 

General Martin. No, sir. Evidently this is wrong. 

The Chairman. After the 7th, General, were you advised by the 
Nav}' what task force they had out scouting and where it was ? 

General Martin. No, sir. We had to seek for that information 
as we had to know where their ships were, and it was quite difficult 
to know the position of friendly ships. That has since been arranged, 
but it was no true at the time or immediately afterward, to identify 
a signal that would mean whether you could identify the friendly 
ships, which has since been arranged. You had to go clown close 
to see whether they were friendly or enemy, which is fatal to us. 

The Chairman. It takes too long \ 

General Martin. No, if you get too close you lose your ship from 
anti-aircraft fire. 

Admiral Reeves. The records on the morning of December 7 show 
that the enemy force proceeded in a northerly direction at 10 : 27 and 
10 : 29. 

General Martin. I have spoken to the control officer since then 
and they said that was the position in which the entry was made 
that morning which they overlooked and that there was such an 
entry on the board, but there was no indication of that course being 
an important one at that time. 

Admiral Reeves. That information was not brought to your at- 
tention in the morning ? 

General Martin. No, sir, not until they analyzed the history of 
the control chart. 



206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Reeves. You said, General, had Alert 2 been in effect it 
would have seriously interferred with your training. [<?-^] Did 
you refer to the training that was in progress for ferry service or 
combat ? 

General Martin. No, sir. I have reference to both, because we had 
both problems of training here. We were required to train crews to 
ferry these ships to the Philippines, and we had our problem to get the 
combat crews trained also, and we had not reached our quota. I am 
speaking of the bombardiers primarily. 

Alert No. 2 requires a certain proportion of the men to always be 
available for carrying out the mission. As to whether you are in a 
state of readiness, the proportion of your command which is placed in 
a state of readiness will affect the training. If it is a serious threat 
you will have all your men in that state. If no threat is imminent, 
you may take, say, one squadron of each group. 

Admiral Reeves. In Alert No. 2 you would have been obliged to do. 
h certain amount of flying? 

General Martin. Alert No. 2 means searching as well as flying. 
Admiral REE^^s. Yes. 

General Martin. We would have tried to continue with that par- 
ticular phase of the matter. 

Admiral Ree-v^s. You would have fighter planes in the air? 
General Martin. No, sir. You do not have the fighter planes in the 
air because they have such a limited amount of fuel. You can't afford 
to try it in getting them off in the air on a mission like that because you 
take the chance of having them out of the fight when the fight 
comes on. 

Admiral Reeves. I do not follow you. I would think that you would 
have your fighters in the air ready to fight. I do not mean if their 
gas is exhausted, but you would certainly send fighters up in certain 
periods of the day. 

General Martin. It would depend on when the fight came in. 
[S441 If they went on and exhausted their fuel and the fight came 
on, they would be of no value to you. 

Admiral Reeves. But in a state of Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3, would 
you keep your fighting planes on the field with the gas tanks full ? 

General Martin. It depends on the situation. Generally speaking 
you would keep them on the field and make ready to get them off on 
information issued from the interceptor commander as to the direction 
of the attack in order that you could intercept that attack before it got 
to bombing the field. 

Admiral Reeves. If you had fighters in the air, they could intercept 
them quicker than if they were on the ground ? 
General Martin. Yes, that is true. 

Admiral Reeves. Therefore, it would seem that the fighters would be 
in the air on Alert No. 3 or Alert No. 2 at the critical periods protect- 
ing against a surprise attack? 

General Martin. We think it is tactically unsound to do that; our 
teaching is contrary to that. 

Admiral Reeves. You could intercept the attack sooner, don't you 
think so ? 

General Martin. Yes, if you expedite by contact with the enemy and 
have enough fuel to carry through to the end, it is very desirable. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 207 

Admiral Reeves. So you think in Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3 your 
training would have been interfered with in aviation ? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reea^s. If they were engaging in war maneuvers, recon- 
naissance, fighter tactics, wouldn't all that be useful training? 

General Martin. I do not get that question. 

Admiral Ree\'es. In Alert No. 2, that does not prevent your carry- 
ing out reconnaissance, does it? 

[SJ^] General Martin. No, sir. In fact. Alert No. 2 means to 
carry out reconnaissance. 

Admiral Reeves. That would be useful training, wouldn't it? 

General Martin. Yes. The point is, you can't get training for the 
bombardier. You get training for the pilot and the copilot, but you 
are getting no training for the bombardier, and the gunners get 
very little training, and your mission fails if they do not destroy 
their target. 

Admiral Reeves. It is not quite clear to me to what extent a war 
condition interferes with war training, because war training is a part 
of war operation. In a condition of Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3, your 
planes would have guns and ammunition? 

General Martin. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Don't you think. General, that on this Sunday 
morning, December 7th, if you had been in a condition of Alert No. 2 
or Alert No. 3, that you would have been better off ? 

General ]\Iartin.' Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. You would have been? 

General Martin. Yes, we would have been much better off. 

Admiral Reeves. Even at the sacrifice, in your opinion, of a certain 
amount of training? 

General Martin. Yes. If the attack was so imminent as that, you 
would have to sacrifice everything in order to meet the attack. 

The Chairman. Alert No. 3 implies that an attack is imminent? 

General Martin. Yes. 

The Chairman. You would have to sacrifice some training and 
stay ready ? 

[346] General Martin. Had we gone into Alert No. 2, our in- 
formation was sufficiently adequate to indicate that we could expect the 
danger of attack for a certain period and we could carry on a certain 
amount of training in order to bring additional crews up to combat 
efficiency. 

The Chairman. Any further questions? 

Admiral Standley. This is off the record. 

(There was a discussion off the record.) 

The Chairman. Anything further? 

General McCoy. Did you consider this an order from Washington 
to yourself as chief of the air service, for you to take local disposition 
here when you were under another commander yourself that you give 
instructions under Alert No. 1? 

Genei-al Martin. No, it was not in accordance with the Department, 
but it was in full accord with the instructions already issued, prac- 
tically all instructions here which were already put in force, and there 
was no discord. 



208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCoy. Had you received your orders from the head of 
the air service in Washington direct ? 

General Martin. I don^t remember receiving other orders. 

General McCoy. Didn't this surprise you to get an order from the 
War Department? 

General JMartin. My reaction was I thought they were very much 
concerned with respect to subversive activities and they wanted to be 
sure we had the information here and would hike steps to counteract 
it. That was my information. 

General McCoy. Did you report that order to General Short? 

General Martin. Yes, he knows about it. 

General McNarney. That is the same one General Short received 
on November 28th which states, ''This message is to be sent direct to 
all air fields." 

General Martin. I might explain that this message was [3p'] 

addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, de- 
coded, and he saw the message l^f ore I did. 

General McNarney. The message was sent to the Department 
Commander ? 

General McCoy. It was. 

I would like to go back to this other dispatch on the 27th. Do vou 
have it there ? Is that 472 ? 

The Chairman. 472. 

General Martin. 472 on the 27th ? 

The Chairman. That is under B ? 

General McCoy. Yes. Do you have it ? 

General Martin. Yes, I have 472 in front of me. 

General McCoy. Tell me again when this was communicated to you 
in person by General Short. 

General Martin. He called me to his office in the afternoon before 
Alert No. 1 went into effect. 

General McCoy. In reading that telegram you will notice down 
about two-thirds of it that it indicated the imminence of hostilities 
with Japan ? 

General Martin. Yes. It says that if hostilities cannot be avoided 
that the United States desires Japan to commit the first overt act. 
Is that what you have reference to ? 

General McCoy. Yes. It says: 

This policy should not repeat uot be construed as restricting you to a course 
of action that might jeopardize your defense prior to hostile .Japanese action. 

Don't you think that Alert No. 1 did that, did that plainly after what 
happened, and didn't you think so at the time ? 

General Martin. I have to admit that I did not. 

General McCoy. You mentioned an inspector last July. Who was 
that? 

General Martin. That was Colonel Burwell. who made an [34-8] 
inspection of all our air force activities to determine the possibility of 
sabotage, and we had taken steps after receiving his report to prevent 
those things that he thought might happen. 

General McCoy. What did he think might happen ? 

General Martin. He was very much concerned about the protection 
of the B-17's, as he thought they could be sabotaged by men getting 
near enough to them to interfere with the airplanes or the wires or the 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 209 

instruments or the controls, and he M'as concerned about the possi- 
bility of incendiar}^ activity and so forth. 

General McCoy. Did he make any recommendation about the dis- 
position of the planes themselves ? 

General Martin. Yes. 

General McCoy. What were they ? 

Genei-al Martin. In order to protect them against sabotage he rec- 
onniiended that they be brought into close formation or in a small, as 
small an area as possible, so that they could be more easily guarded. 
He said this thing of having them in an exposed position was not the 
best possible protection for them as a man can come up in the night and 
throw an incendiary bomb into a plane. 

General McCoy. That is, having them dispersed in the bunkers ? 

General Martin. Yes. 

General McCoy. He did not call attention to the danger of having 
them together, as has been shown throughout this war in attacks on 
airplanes? 

General Martin. No. That is absolutely the wrong position for 
airplanes to be in if they are going to be attacked from the air. 

General ISIcCoy. I take it, then, that at the time you received this 
imminent hostilities report, it did not occur to [34-9] you at 
that time that it was possible that such an attack as was made could be 
made ? 

General Martin. No, sir. I will say that we discussed this thing not 
only among ourselves but with the Nav}^, and it was the accepted con- 
sensus of opinion in the Department and various other departments 
about the danger of losing any task force of that nature, but on account 
of the Pacific fleet being in this position, that the opportunity of such 
an attack was practically nil. 

The Chairman. You say you and the Navy really agreed on that 
proposition before this war telegram came ? 

General Martin. Yes, not afterwards. 

The Chairman. No. 

General Martin. We discussed the possibility of such a surprise at- 
tack, and that was the consensus of opinion among everyone that we 
talked to, Avhich would be anybody who would be taken into our 
confidence. 

General McCoy. After these instructions about Alert No. 1. you 
were only concerned with sabotage and the protection of your planes 
on the ground against subversive activities ? 

General Martin. Yes. That was our opinion, to be correct, the 
thing to do under this condition. We thought the explosion would 
come from within rather than without as soon as hostilities were de- 
clared between the two countries; so on account of living here with 
these people and knowing the condition with respect to sabotage, we 
were very alive to that particular situatbn but not sufficiently sensitive 
to the other. 

General McCoy. Do you know anyone who took the other position ? 

General Martin. No, sir, I do not. Some of the Navy claim that 
they have now, but they never expressed it in my presence. 

\3o0] The Chairman. This is off the record. 

(There was a discussion off the record.) 

General McCoy. With respect to the Burwell repoit you mentioned 
did it envisage at all an attack such as happened here ( 

79716 — 46— Ex. 143, vol. 1 — —15 



210 CONGRESSIONx\L INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General Martin. His report was based entirely. General, on sabo- 
tage, the possibility of sabotage and the method of preventing it. It 
increased the guard and watchfulness of communications and passes 
for individuals and things of that nature. It was all based on that. 

General McCoy. Did he make any recommendations about the pos- 
sibility of an attack that might catch you in this exposed position? 

General Martin. No, sir, he did not. 

General McNaeney. I have seen that Burwell report. I read it at 
the hotel before I left Washington. It was particularly concerned 
with sabotage, and I looked at it and saw what guard measures he had 
recommended, and I could find no place where he recommended any- 
thing except anti-sabotage, and I knew that was in effect, so I was not 
particularly interested in it. 

General McCoy. The reason I brought that up was because I heard 
of this report and it seems to have a pertinent bearing on the state of 
mind of General Martin. 

General Martin. I hate to say it, but we have been thinking of sabo- 
tage and not of an attack from the surface. 

The Chairman. Are there any further questions ? 

General McCoy. I have no other question except one, and this may 
have been brought out, but in drawing up the air side of Alert No. 1, 
you were consulted on that ? 

General Martin. Yes. 

General McCoy. And you made no objection to it as a passive de- 
fense ? 

[351] General Martin. That is right. 

If I say at the end here, it might be interesting to the Board to 
know that we have submitted here from my headquarters on the 20th 
of August a plan for the employment of long range bombardment 
aviation in the defense of Oahu which requires only 180 long range 
bombers, and as the allocation of airplanes which I received indicated, 
they were sending us 180, I thing it would accomplish this object, and 
in my opinion — and mj^ opinion is getting of less value — but this 
report or this plan, if carried into execution, can give security to this 
place for approximately half the cost of one battleship so that nothing 
can get in on the surface; maybe some submarines, but nothing on the 
surface. If I can, I would like to leave it with you. 

The Chairman. Yes, we would be very glad to have it. 

That will be marked as Martin Exhibit No. 1. 

General McCoy. I would like to have the Burwell report. 

General Martin. Yes. 

The Chairman. And when it is received it will be marked as Martin 
Exhibit No. 2. i 

General Martin. You gentlemen are aware of a joint agreement 
between the Army and the Navy with respect to the air forces? 

The Chairman. Yes, we are. 

I neglected to ask you, considering the state of alert in which you 
were under orders, what was the performance of your troops when the 
attack came ? 

General Martin. Justice Roberts, I have never been so proud of men 
in my life. 

Tlie Chairman. From all I have heard I think that you may well 
feel that way, General Martin. Your force was practically complete 
and ready to go on station ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 211 

[SS2] General Martin. They were at their stations by the time 
I got there, so far as I could ascertain. I do not know how they got 
there so quick. Upon arriving at my office we were then being attacked, 
and so far as I know, practically every man was on duty. 

The Chairman. That is fine. This will be off the record. 

(There was a discussion off the record.) 

The Chairman. Any other questions ? 

General McCoy. No. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, General. Of course I need 
hardly say that our inquiry is confidential and we will ask you not to 
disclose anything that has happened in this room or to discuss it with 
the men outside. 

General Martin. I understand that, sir. 

The Chairman, Thank you very much. 

Call Colonel Powell. 

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL CARKOLL A. POWELL, 
SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY 

(The witness was sworn in due foi'm by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you state your full name, Colonel ? 

Colonel Powell. Carroll A. Powell. 

The Chairman. And your rank? 

Colonel Powell. Lieutenant Colonel, Signal Corps. 

The Chairman. How long have you been here ? 

Colonel Powell. I have been on the Island since July 3, 1939. 

The Chairman. In the same capacity ? 

Colonel Powell. I was Department Signal Officer for about a month, 
and then I was relieved by Colonel Van Duzen. He came in August, 
and the following year, 1940, he left in October, and I was again 
appointed Department Signal Officer. 

The Chairman. And you have been such since 1940 ? 

[353] Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. Had the intercepter command been organized in 
accordance with the Standing Operating Procedure on December 7, 
1941? 

Colonel Powell. It had not, sir. 

The Chairman. Under whose responsible direction were the de- 
tector instruments on that day ? 

Colonel Powell, They were under my direction, sir. 

The Chairman. It was planned when you had your system operat- 
ing satisfactorily that it should be turned over to the interceptor com- 
mand ? 

Colonel Powell. That is right. 

The Chairman. You were in a period of training at the time? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Your period of training was not affected, I take 
it, by the installation of Alert No. 1 ? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir. 

The Chairman. And the training had been between the hours of 
four and seven at the various mobile stations prior to December 7 ? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir. It was just during the daytime or morn- 
ing, and my previous answer was incorrect. I did not quite understand 
your question. 



212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

At the beginning of Alert No. 1 1 was on tlie mainland at that time. 

The Chairman. You were? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. I was with General Davidson. We were 
going around the country visiting the various interceptor commands 
there, getting information on how we wei-e going to improve our opera- 
tions here, and when this Alert No. 1 was put into effect, Colonel 
Murphy — he was the acting department [354^ signal officer in 
my place — and he told me G-3 gave the order to operate the stations 
two hours before daylight and one hour after daylight. 

When I got back — I got back the 3rd of December — and I saw 
Colonel Murphy on the 4th, and he reviewed the whole situation for me. 

I asked him about that particular point, these orders, and he told 
me he had received them from G-3, and I said they appeared to me to 
be satisfactory for the situation on hand. 

The Chairman. If you had had Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3, was the 
training sufficiently advanced so that you could get the stations run- 
ning smoothly, or some of them, every day ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You had sufficient personnel trained then to do it? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, sir, we had. We were using some of the men 
18 hours a day, which is not conducive to good work, but the stations 
were in position on training and location, and in most stations we are 
dependent on the men plotting. 

The Chairman. They are the permanent stations? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. You had one at Opana? 

Colonel PowTELL. Yes. 

The Chairman. Where was your other mobile station for training? 

Colonel Powell. I can tell you on the map. AVe had one here at 
the peak (indicating on map) . Then we had one over here at Waianae. 

The Chairman. That is about the center, along the western shore ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. That was covering the sector frm here (in- 
dicating) up through here and down to here, because these mountains 
will obstruct it. 

[S55] Then we had one at Fort Shafter, in the back here, and 
that would only cover the sector down through here. 

Then we had one at Koko Head. That was covering this sector 
here. We felt that should give us the most protection here through 
this area (indicating). 

Then we had one over here about Kaaawa. 

The Chairman. Which was approximately in the center of the 
east coast? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, that covers down to here, right here Then 
we had this Opana station, and then we had one at Kawailea. That 
was over here and down through here (indicating). 

The Chairman. You were training at all these stations ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. Wliile it may have been difficult in view of your 
training to get every one of these stations running 24 hours a day, 
you could have had such stations going 24 hours a day ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, but there are not enough here to give you 
clear protection all the way down, because you have to shut down 
your machines for mechanical difficulties and repair them, and the 
generating plants which have been running quite successfully, but 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 213 

they don't stand a 24-hours operation very long. They are only 
emergency sets, and we did not put the permanent power in from the 
Hawaiian Electrical Company for the reason we believed they were 
just temporary training stations, but thereafter we made progress 
with them, and we are putting them in now. 

The Chairman. That is the temporary stations? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, we are putting power in these temporary 
stations. 

The Chairman. You are? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, until we get the permanent stations in. 
Opana will be a permanent station also. 

The Chairman. Are you a member of the staff of this department ? 

[36€] Colonel Powell. Yes, I am department signal officer. 

The Chairman. Were you appraised of the contents of a War 
Department message of November 27, 1941, that came in the same 
time Alert No. 1 was ordered? 

Colonel Powell. I was not here, sir, at that time. 

The Chairman. Oh, yes. I forgot. You were on the mainland ? 
• Colonel Pow^ell. Yes. 

Tlie Chairman. If anyone would he apprised from your branch of 
the service, it would be Colonel Murphy? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. Nothing was said to you about the reason for the 
alert? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir. All I know was what I read in the papers 
on the mainland on that subject. 

The Chairman. Where were you on the evening of December 6 ? 

Colonel Powell. I think I was at my home. 

The Chairiman. And you were at your home on the morning of 
December 7? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. They called me up. 

The Chairman. The first information you had was when they 
called you? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. Where are your living quarters? 

Colonel Powell. Down in Honolulu. 

The Chairman. In the city? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

General McCoy. With respect to that message from the War 
Department 

General McNarney. Before we leave that, did you have any system 
of ground observers in the aircraft warning: system? 

Colonel Powell. No, we do not think there is any need for ground 
observers here. That was borne out in the air [357] observa- 
tions on the mainland at the interceptor command exercises in Seattle. 
The observers can't see any more or can't see as much as our detectors 
can. The distances are so short that before the observers can get any- 
thing, the planes are away. 

General McNarney. If you had observers on the outlying islands, 
wouldn't that have afforded some protection ? 

Colonel Pow^ell. That would have meant a radio phone call here 
to give us that information because there are no cables between the 
various islands, and the only way is by radio phone. 



214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McNarney, It would have been comparatively simple to 
equip them with radio phones, would it not? 

Colonel Pow^ELL. Well, your answer would be the answer to that, 
but as I say, we were in a state of training, not worrying about 
detectors on the other islands. 

General McNarney. Maybe I can make it clear this way : What 
system of aircraft warning service did you have prior to the time you 
received your mobile detector sets? 

Colonel Powell. We had none. There was no system before for 
covering anything. 

General McNarney. Was there any system planned ? 

Colonel Pow^ell. No, sir. 

The Chairman. There is another subject that I would like to ask 
you about. 

Admiral Standley, If I may ? 

The Chairman. Yes, go ahead. 

Admiral Standley. In regard to your schedule, you say the sched- 
ule of four to seven went into effect on Alert No. 1 ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Is that correct ? 

Colonel Powell. That is correct. 

Admiral Standley. That was ordered as a part of Aleit No. 1 ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

[358] Admiral Standley. You would have a schedule from four 
to seven ? 

Colonel Povn'ell. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Prior to that, did you have any regular sched- 
ule for the period of training? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir, it is quite difficult to get the people trained 
and we would have to take the individual sets and put the men out 
and train them, and that report came to our information station, but 
we probably started in the morning, probably about nine o'clock, and 
worked until eleven one clay, and probably in the afternoon, or we 
would have arrangements with the air corps to send out a fleet, and 
if they came in w^e could go out and practice. It was just a practice 
condition. It was practice. 

Admiral Standley. You were here on the morning of the 7th ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. On that morning, that Sunday morning, had 
there been any special orders changing the routine as a skeleton 
organization after seven o'clock, or was there any change in that ? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir, no change. 

The Chairman. The standing order of four to seven was in effect? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, sir, four to seven was in effect. 

General McCoy. This pick-up which occurred was just a routine 
training thing ? 

Colonel Powell. It was just a routine training thing. 

General McCoy. As I remember, the station had closed down and 
one of tliem stayed down there operating on his own ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. All the men are all keen about this thing. 
It is to me an interesting thing, and the men are all keen and anxious 
to learn all about these sets, especially the operators of them. It is 
almost fantatic the way these things [SSP] operate, and the 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 215 

men are all anxious to learn about them. This particular one wanted 
to work longer to get more training, because we were to put control 
sets on the other islands, and he wanted, I suppose, to become one of the 
operators on the other islands. That he did not say but that is what 
they were working for, to be able to operate those sets on the other 
islands. 

The Chairman. I want to ask you about your radio communications 
with the War Department. Was it the practice of the War Depart- 
ment to go on the air at any particular time ? 

Colonel Po^vELL. Yes, we have general schedules with them and 
We are on the air all the time and they are on the air all the time. 
They can shift to us any time and call us. 

The Chairman. Did you make any inquiry to discover whether 
there was an attempt to call you on the morning of December 7th? 

Colonel Powell. There was no record in our department. 

The Chairman. In the office ? 

Colonel Powell. There is no record. 

The Chairman. There is no record of an attempt to get you? 

Colonel Powell. No. 

The Chairman. Were there any peculiar weather or atmospheric 
conditions on that morning that you know of which would have 
prevented the War Department getting through to you? 

Colonel Powell. I can't answer that question, but I will find out. 

The Chairman. I wish you would. 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. I wish you would find out whether there was any 
difficulty in getting to you or anything preventing you from receiving 
on that morning, and if so, what the difficulty was. 

[360] Colonel Powell. This is on December 7th ? 

The Chairman. This was the morning of December 7th from, let 
us say, five to eight. 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. As chief signal officer, do you know whether the 
AVar Department in Washington has used the RCA commercial 
circuit ? 

Colonel Powell. Occasionally they use it to cable. 

The Chairman. What was the occasion for their using the com- 
mercial cable? If they could not get through to you? 

Colonel Powell. As a general rule. We relay from 'Frisco. The 
RCA may have had access through a certain frequency which we did 
not have, and they gave it to them and sent through 'Frisco. 

The Chairman. You do this only in case your own Army radio is 
not working properly ? 

Colonel Po-\A^LL. Yes, sir, that is my understanding. 

General MoCoy. Or it might be loaded? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, it might be loaded in AYashington sending 
to other places and our not being loaded. 

General McCoy. Yes. 

The Chairman. There is a limit to the load? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. I might have all the load I can handle 
because I relay all traffic from Manila, and I have my own men to 
take care of that situation, to report and read the message and then 
retransmit to Manila. I handle that traffic and refile that traffic to 
Manila. 



216 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. That gives me a thought. Would there be a rec- 
ord here of your having handled a message for Manila that morning? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. In the same sense and in the same verbiage as the 
message they got here through EGA '? 

{S61] Colonel Powell. Yes. However, that would be in code. 

The Chairman. Never mind whether it is in code. You would for- 
ward it in the same code ? 

Colonel Powell. We can decode it. 

The Chairman. You would forward it in the same code? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. You would have a record here showing you re- 
forwarded a message that morning ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. Please get it for me. 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. There is a telephone communication direct with the 
chief of staff in this building ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, and it is in the Aliamanu Crater. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether the War Department was 
familiar with the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had a 
direct radio line from Honolulu to the F. B. I. lieadquarters in Wash- 
ington ? Did you know of that fact ? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir, I did not. 

You say a direct telephone line ? 

The Chairman. No, a radio. 

Colonel Powell, No, sir, I did not know that. 

The Chairman. Perhaps neither did the War Department know it. 

Colonel Powell. I would probably have known about it. I should 
have known about it, because they could probably have relieved some 
of our load. 

The Chairman. The fact is, there is a connnunication line to the 
central F. B. I. office from Mr. Shivers' office here, and you did not 
use it ? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir, I did not know it existed, because I am in 
charge of the messages and the only other people I ever used are the 
Navy. 

['362] The Chairman. The Navy had a radio communication to 
Washington ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. They communicated direct to Washin^on. 

General McCoy. I would like to follow that dispatch that arrived 
here but was not delivered until the afternoon. 

The Chairman. The dispatch of the 7th which was delivered to the 
Department Commander on the afternoon of the 7th. 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. Would that go through your office? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. For what purpose? 

Colonel Powell. For delivery and decoding. 

The Chairman. When it was brought over, it was sent from Wash- 
ington at what time ? 

Colonel Powell. I would have to get the message on that. It would 
be after midnight. 

General McCoy. I thought he could describe the message. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 217 

Colonel Powell. No, I have not got that here. The messages are 
m our secret files. 

General McCoy. Do you know what message we are talking about ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. I am in charge of messages and I investi- 
gated that because the chief of staff asked me to see what it was. 
Do you want our copy of the message ? 

The Chairman. That will be contained in the code room in Wash- 
ington as to the date of delivery? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir, that only gives us the date and hour that it 
was delivered to the RCA in Washington. 

The Chairman. We would like to have it. 

Colonel Powell. It would merely show the time it was received by 
the RCA in Honolulu. 

General McCoy. Can you tell us what happened after it got to 
the RCA office in Honolulu ? 

[S63] Colonel Powell. I investigated that and the message 
shows it was received here at 7 : 33 a. m. in Honolulu. It was delivered 
by a messenger. He brought it out here along with a lot of personal 
messages. We handle all messages from RCA, and we put them out 
on our own delivery system for delivery to the various outlying posts. 
That is a service we give to the officers because otherwise these per- 
sonal messages would not be delivered until the next day. 

.He brought this message out and left it here, and on that particular 
message he did not get a receipt for it ; so therefore there is no record 
of the actual time of delivery that we can show except what the young 
man says. 

He says he found it there about 11 : 55 laying with a bunch of mes- 
sages that had been delivered to the office by this messenger who had 
left RCA some time that morning. 

He got by the boy because he was rushing a message for the Com- 
manding General which' he delivered, and as he came back the mes- 
senger was there, and he was kidding him for having this red circle 
on his arm, and he said he had better take that off or somebody might 
take him for a Japanese. That is how he knows that boy did deliver 
that message. 

General McCoy. Do you know what time it was received downtown ? 

Colonel Powell. Seven thirty-three in the morning. 

General McCoy. Do you know approximately from this reliance 
on your man's memory of this incident about what time it was deliv- 
ered here ? 

Colonel Powell. About eleven-thirty. 

The Chairman. Has the messenger been interrogated about it? 

Colonel Powell. I only investigated the men here. 

The Chairman. Your own men ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. There was considerable excitement around 
at the time, so I didn't get down to the code room [364] until 
two o'clock. It was decoded and delivered at three o'clock to the 
Adjutant General. 

The Chairman. We had better see it. 

Colonel Powell. Do j^ou want a photostatic copy? 

General McCoy. I do not know whether it is necessary to see it, 
because they will have a full account in Washington. 

The Chairman. It is a very important message. 



218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCoy. Yes, I think it is a very important message. I 
think we had better have it. 

The Chairman. Will you bring a copy of it? 

Colonel Powell. This message had taken us an hour to go through 
the code machine and had to be played back to make sure it is accurate, 
so it was about a half hour that we spent in decoding it. 

The Chairman. In your judgment, would it take longer to encode 
it than to decode it? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir. 

The Chairman. It should be about the same time ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

General McCoy. If you lost an hour in coding it, you would say 
that the scrambled phone would have been much better? 

Colonel Powell. Absolutely, yes. I think that is what caused them 
to inquire. I don't know what time the message came in, but they 
inquired of me where the message was, and that is how I found out 
where it had gotten lost. 

The Chairman. Anything further? 

General McNarney. No. 

Admiral Reeves. No. 

The Chairman. The nature of our inquiry is such, Colonel, that 
we feel it necessary that you should not refer to your testimony here. 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. Or anj^thing that occurred in this room, and do 
not discuss your testimony here with any person. 

[365] Colonel Powell. Very well, sir. 

The Chairman. Thank you. 

TESTIMONY OP COLONEL ROBERT H. DUNLOP, ADJUTANT GENERAL 
DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES ARMY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you state your name, Colonel? 

Colonel DuNLOP. Robert H. Dunlop. 

The Chairman. And your rank ? 

Colonel Dunlop. Colonel, Adjutant General Department. I am 
Adjutant General. 

The Chairman. And you have been for how long ? 

Colonel Dunlop. Since the first of last June. 

The Chairman. As such, sir, do you have any records for us 
which indicate the absences or the complement of forces which were 
on hand on the morning of December 7, 1941 ? Let me make myself 
clear. We thought perhaps j'^ou could give us some approximation 
of whether there were a vast number of leaves in the force when the 
attack occurred on Pearl Harbor, or whether the forces were practi- 
cally intact when the attack took place. 

Colonel Dunlop. They were practically intact. The only men 
who were absent were, I would say, very few, due to the proximity 
of the center of population in the Island of Oahu. For instance, 
most officers, or especially the men, might go to Honolulu, but in a little 
after twelve o'clock there is no place for them to stay with the 
exception of possibly— well, I would say 50 out of my department 
spending the night on the sland of Oahu, and they go to a place like 
Pawaa, a cabaret, but they don't stay tliere. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 219 

In order that I might get the information I have prepared a radio 
this morning and sent it out to the echelons, the stations, and so on, 
to get a reply at ten o'clock tomorrow morning, sir. It states: 

[366] Estimated percentage of strength your command who were present for 
duty at zero eight hundred comma seven December forty one will be radioed 
or otherwise submitted this headquarters not later than ten hundred comma 
twenty five December nineteen forty one period for the purpose of this report 
personnel absent on pass will not repeat not be considered present for duty. 

The Chalrmax. You think the records at the various commands 
will be adequate to supply that information ? 

Colonel DuNLop. I am not sure about that, sir, because there are 
so many, and a great many of the well behaved soldiers have their 
good conduct cards, and they go out, and there could be a number 
that might not be there the next morning. Now, whether the first 
sergeant is going to know about it the next morning at eight o'clock 
or not is problematical, but I do not expect to get actual figures. I 
did not ask for any figures, but just a percentage. 

The Chairman. You think those percentages can be given and that 
they will be approximately correct? 

Colonel DuNLOP. Yes. There won't be any great absenteeism be- 
cause tliey would be home the night before. 

The Chairman. Do most civilian amusements in Honolulu close 
down at midnight ? 

Colonel DuNLOP. Yes. The sale of liquor stops at twelve o'clock 
ancl there may be a few places, the Swanky Franks, and such, that 
run after, but the soldiers begin to go home, and the sailors too. They 
go home in great numbers after that. 

Of course there was a payday in there. We have staggered pay- 
days, but they had some paid, but I could hold up my hand and 
really say that I do not believe there were any great absentees at 
eight o'clock the next morning. 

The Chairman. Where were you on the night of December 6, sir? 

[S67] Colonel Dunlop. I was here in the post. Yes, I went to 
the movies at Fort Armstrong. I came back and got a message for the 
chief of staff and gave it to him before I went to bed. 

The Chairman. Did you see any disorder in town that night, 
Saturday ? 

Colonel DuNLOP. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Any signs of drunkenness or carousing? 

Colonel Dunlop. No, sir, I didn't notice anybody out here at all. 

The Chairman. Were there some soldiers on the street ? 

Colonel DcTNLOP. As usual, yes. 

The Chairman. This was Saturday night? 

Colonel DuNLoP. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. What was your observation with respect to sobri- 
ety or the contrary among the officers and men in this Department? 

Colonel DuNLOP. I have not noticed any excessive drinking among 
the soldiers, any more than any place in the service, or during my 
service. I very seldom see a drunken officer. As I stated before, the 
only time that I ever saw a drunken officer was the occasion of the 
annual alunnii dinner at West Point, and this was about three o'clock 
in the morning, and maybe I didn't have any business l)eing at the 
club at that time. Officers do not get drunk any more, sir. 

The Chairman. I am fflad to hear that. 



220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel DuNLOP. I mean, as a general thing. 

The Chairman. Any further questions ? 

General McNarney. No. 

Admiral Eee^^es. No. 

Admiral Standley. No. 

The Chairman. Colonel, we desire that no communication of what 
goes on in this room shall be made, and your testimony shall not be 
discussed with anyone. 

[368^ Colonel Duneop. It shall not be mentioned, sir. 

The Chairman. If you care to, you can send the summary that you 
get in answer to your radio to Mr. Howe, our Recorder, who will 
incorporate it in the record. He will give you his address at the 
hotel. 

Colonel DuNLOP. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Call Lieutenant Tyler. 

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT KEEMIT A. TYLEE, AIE COEPS, 
UNITED STATES AEMY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you state your full name. Lieutenant? 

Lieutenant Tyler. Kermit A. Tyler. 

The Chairman. And your rank ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. First Lieutenant, sir. 

The Chairman. What was your assignment prior to December 7, 
1941? 

Lieutenant Tyler. I was assigned to the Eighteentli Pursuit Squad- 
ron. 

The Chairman. Were you at any special duty on or about Decem- 
ber?, 1941? 

Lieutenant Tyler. My special detail was pursuit officer at the in- 
t<^rception control board. Fort Shafter. 

The Chairman. That is right here on this reservation ? 

Leutenant Tyler. Yes. 

The Chairman. Tell us all that happened that Sunday morninjr. 

Lieutenant Tyler. On Sundaj^ morning I reported, in compliance 
with my instructions, to the interception control board, at four o'clock 
in the morning. There was no activity observed on the board, as near 
as I remember, until, I suppose, 6 : 10 or thereabouts. At that time a 
number of plots or indications, some arrows, appeared on the board 
to show that there was aircraft flying around the islands. I noted 
that there [S69] was on'e in the vicinit}' south of Kauai and 
there was also one south of Molokai shortly after seven o'clock in the 
morning at a distance of — I think it was — 130 miles north of Oahu. 
A couple of plots appeared on the board. 

This activity gradually increased in the general direction of the 
Island. I think it was just about seven o'clock. 

All the plotters that put these arrows on the board folded up their 
equipment — they have headsets to receive their information — and 
folded up their equipment and went out to breakfast. All the rest 
did as they were doing. 

At that time, just prior to this folding up, I noted that there was 
a man on the drafting board and was completing this tiling. I did 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 221 

not know wb.at lie was doing. I asked him what his job was, as to 
what he was doing, and he tokl nie he makes a historical record of the 
plots that appear on the board. In other words, if they were practic- 
ing something, generally to find out what it was so that we can trace 
it back. 

I don't remember that these two plots north of the Island were on 
the main board. They were some distance out, but I Imow they were 
on the drafting board, because I saw they were side by each. 

The Chairmax. Is this the plot (handing a document to Lieuten- 
ant Tyler) ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. This does not look to me like the one, but it may 
have been. 

The CiiAiRMAx. Well, at any rate, it was a plot something like that? 

Lieutenant Tyler. Yes. 

The Chairman. That is the idea of the plot ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. Yes. 

The Chairman. When you looked at it you saw what ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. I saw those two little plots. It was right after 
that that the operator, or all the fellows and [370] this drafts- 

man also left. 

The CiiAiR3iAN. Did you do anything about the plots ^ 

Lieutenant Tyler. No, sir. I had previously only once seen the 
board in operation, and it looked to me like the usual thing. I had 
seen just the same setup on the board, saw these plots all over the 
place, and I had no reason to suspect, so far as I am concerned, that 
there was anything irregular going on. 

The Chairman. You thought these might be friendly planes? 

Lieutenant Tyler. Yes, sir. That is my thought. I did not know 
they were anything else. I thought that is what they could be, or 
possibly some friendly craft. 

About seven-twenty the operator from Opana contacted the station. 

The Chairman. You were still in the control room ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. Yes, I was detailed from four to eight a. m. 

The Chairman. Why would you stay there after the headset op- 
erators had left ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. Well, I was detailed to be there those hours, 
so I just stayed. 

The Chairman. And you stayed? 

Lieutenant Tyler. Yes. About seven-twenty, I believe, the oper- 
ator of the Opana radio direction finding station told me that he had 
followed these plots and that there was a large number of aircraft, 
he thought. 

Well, perhaps I should have done something. I don't know, but 
it seemed to me that there was still nothing irregular, that they prob- 
ably might be friendly craft. So I thought about it for a moment 
and said, "Well, don't worry about it," and went back awaiting the 
hour and time until the next relief. 

At about between ten and five minutes of eight I heard some noise 
outside and went out to see what was going on, and saw what I 
thought to be Navy bombers in bombing practice over [371] 
at Pearl Harbor. Thereafter I heard a few bursts of antiaircraft fire. 

About a little after eight Sergeant Starry from Wlieeler Field 
called me and said, "There is an attack at Wheeler Field," and I told 



222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the operator to remain on duty, so I immediatelj^ told him to recall 
the plotters and receivers of this information. 

They came back and it was at about that time that Major Tindal, 
one of the controllers, came in and took charge of the situation. 

From then on I just assisted him in communications and whatever I 
could do. I still did not know very much about the setup because of 
my first experience. 

The Chairman. You attempted to trace back the Japanese planes? 

Lieutenant Tylee. They were plotted, I believe, on this historical 
record. I did not oversee it, because there was quite a bit going on 
and it was lots doing. 

The Chairman. You got the impression that they did trace the 
planes going to the north after the attack? 

Lieutenant Tyler. The stations were all operating. The plotters 
were there; so I thought the operators certainly got them. 

The Chairman. Lieutenant, was the information that these stations 
received, which was coordinated at the control room, to your knowl- 
edge transmitted by telephone to the air force so as to direct the air 
force to get the pursuit planes in the air after the air bombardment? 
The stations were kept running in tracing these Japanese planes? 

Lieutenant Tyler. Yes, sir, as soon as the call was made. 

The Chairman. No one from the control room would have sent to 
the particular officer of the air force whatever information you got? 

[S7'2^ Lieutenant Tyler. I did not personally call anyone. 

The Chairman. Did tl^ey send any command there 'i 

Lieutenant Tyler. I was the only officer there, sir. 

The Chairman. And the men? 

Lieutenant Tyler. Yes, until Major Tindal got there. 

The Chairman. When did he get there ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. Eight-fifteen or eight-twenty. 

The Chairman. Then when you started to trace the receding planes, 
didn't Major Tindal call up the air force base, to your knowledge, 
and direct them, tell them in which direction they had gone ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. I don't know that. Major Bergquist and Major 
Tindal were really in charge, as they had training on the mainland 
and were working with the installation. 

The Chairman. And you were more or less an observer after that ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. That is correct, yes. 

General McCoy. Was there any other officer there at that time? 

Lieutenant Tyler. No, sir. I was the only officer there until the 
Major came or it may have been a signal corps officer before that, but I 
don't know. He didn't have anything to do. 

General McCoy. Didn't you transmit this information of the 
plotted planes to anyone ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Why not? 

Lieutenant Tyler. The historical record was there, and I felt if 
they had anything left to fight with, it would be there to use. As a 
matter of fact, it didn't occur to me to do anything about it at the 
time, sir. I was so confused with the situation. 

The Chairman. I think you perhaps misunderstood General Mc- 
Coy's question. As I understand your testimony, it was that [S73] 
before you knew of the actual attack you thought that this was a 
normal movement of friendly planes? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 223 

Lieutenant Tyler. That is riglit. 

The Chairman. Therefore you did not communicate with anyone ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. That is right. I communicated with no one. 

The Chairman. Of course, you would have if you had thought 
these were enemy planes ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. Yes. 

General McCoy. Did you know of the coming in of the friendly 
planes from the mainland ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. No, sir, I did not. However, I suspected they 
were coming because as a matter of fact on coming to work from two- 
thirty to four I heard the station so I thought these were B-lT's 
coming in, and that confused me still more. 

The Chairman. You thought they were friendly planes? 

Lieutenant Tyler. I thought they were off course and that they 
were maybe working out some problem, and it confused me. 

The Chairman. And on this particular morning the Navy may 
have had a task force in that neighborhood ? 

Lieutenant Tyler, The movement of the Navy was usually secret, 
more so than we are, sir. I do not know what they are doing. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether there is a closer liaison 
between the Army and the Navy than there was before December 
7th with respect to the direction and location of Navy scouting forces ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. I do not know that, sir. That is under bom- 
bardment. I am in pursuit, so I do not know that. 

The Chairman. That is not under your province ? 

[S74] Lieutenant Tyler. No, 

General McCoy. You are attached to the detector service? 

Lieutenant Tyler. I worked for two days after the raid and then 
I went to the subordinate unit at Wlieeler Field and worked there up 
until another week, and I was on flight patrol with my pursuit 
squadron for four days after that. I am now back down here. I 
have been here for three days working in the control unit. 

The Chairman, You are in the control room ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. Yes. 

The Chairman. Any other questions? 

General McNarney. Was there a controller on duty that Sunday 
morning? 

Lieutenant Tyler. Major Tindal was one of the controllers. 

General McNarney. What time did he get there ? 

Lieutenant Tyler, He got there at eight-twenty. 

General McNarney. I mean prior to that time, before 7 a. m.? 

Lieutenant Tyler, No, sir. 

General McNarney. There was no controller there then ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. No, sir. 

General McNarney. Were you acting both as controller and as 
pursuit officer? 

Lieutenant Tyler. Well, sir, I did not know what my duties were. I 
just was told to be there and told to maintain that work. 

General McNarney. That is your experience as controller or pursuit 
officer, or did you have any experience? 

Lieutenant Tyler. I had once previously seen this being made 
around the Island, We walked through the" installation and had the 
situation explained to us. 



224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McNarney. You had no experience as controller or pursuit 
officer ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. I was detailed once before as pursuit officer. 

[^75] General McNarney. You really had no conception of 
what your duties were ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. I had very little, sir. 

General McNarney. This was purely a practice run, to your knowl- 
edge ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. There was actually no one stationed in readi- 
ness that morning, the 7th, Sunday? 

Lieutenant Tyler. No. 

General McNarney. There was nothing in readiness? 

Lieutenant Tyler. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Did you report afterward any of these plots to 
anyone ? 

Lieut-en ant Tyler. I reported, sir, I believe, to Major Tindal. This 
may be all wrong, but 1 know someone asked, "Why didn't we plot 
this thing?" and I remember reporting in the confusion to, I think 
it was. Major Tindal or Major Bergquist, and I think General Short 
also saw me, but I can't think what it was, and I told someone, and I 
think he gave it to him. 

Admiral Reeves. Who detailed you to this duty? 

Lieutenant Tyler. I was detailed by order of the Fourteenth Pur- 
suit Wing operations officer, who is Major Bergquist. 

Admiral Reeves. He did not tell you what you were to do there or 
what your duties were ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. I was instructed to become acquainted with the 
situation, and the previous Wednesday I had reported there for duty, 
and there was an operator there, and I called and he said, "We are 
getting this in Saturday and we have to have someone there," and I 
was looking around finding out what I could do. 

Admiral Reeves. How long have you been in the air service in the 
Army? 

[S/6] Lieutenant Tyler. Foui- years and two months, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. No other questions. 

Admiral Standley, You say you were detailed from four to eight 
that morning ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. If nothing had happened in the ordinary course 
of events, would you have stayed for relief at eight o'clock ? 

Lieutenant Tyler. I believe there was another relief detailed, sir. 

Admiral Standley. But you don't know? 

Lieutenant Tyler. The thing seemed to be that it was shifted be- 
cause I was previously detailed Saturday afternoon, and then it was 
shifted to Sunday, and I don't know whether we had any detail 
scheduled or not, so far as there was relief. 

Admiral Standley. What about on Wednesday? 

Lieutenant Tyler. I was detailed on Wednesday from twelve thirty 
tt» sixteen hundred — four o'clock. 

Admiral Standley. Were you relieved then? 

Lieutenant Tyler. No, sir. 

The Chairman. The station closed ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 225 

Lieutenant Tyler. Yes. 

General McCoy. In other words, this was just a drill? 

Lieutenant Tyler. Yes. 

General McCoy. That is all. 

The Chairman. Lieutenant, our inquiry is such that we will ask 
you not to discuss the testimony that has been given here by you or 
anything said while you have been in the room. Do not discuss it 
with anyone. 

Lieutenant Tyler. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. 

We will take a recess for a few minutes. 

(There was a brief recess. The following then occurred:) 

[Sr?] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR KENNETH P. BEEGQUIST, AIR 
CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY 

(The oath Avas administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Your full name ? 

Major Bergquist. Kenneth P. Bergquist. 

The Chairman. Your rank ? 

Major Bergquist. Major, Air Corps, sir. 

The Chairman. Your assignment here ? 

Major Bergquist. The Hawaiian Interceptor Command, sir. 

General McNarney. What particular position in the Interceptor 
Command ? 

Major Bergquist. I am the operations officer of the Hawaiian In- 
terceptor Command, sir. 

The Chairman. As such have you to do with the Warning Service? 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Is that your particular assignment now? 

Major Bergquist. My assignment includes the operations of the 
Hawaiian Interceptor Command, a part of which is the operational 
control of the Aircraft Warning Service. 

The Chairman. Yes. When was that interceptor service set up as 
outlined in the Operating Procedure? What date? We have been 
told December 17 ; is that about right ? 

Major Bergquist. That is the date that the Hawaiian Interceptor 
Command, as that name, was ordered, sir. 

The Chairman. Yes. Now, what was being done with the devices 
for warning on and before December 7, 1941 ? 

Major Bergquist. We were operating them, sir. 

The Chairman. As a regular service to the Department? 

Major Bergquist. We were setting up the information center, sir, 
and I was working at that most of the time to get that functioning. 

The Chairman. And how much were you operating your [378] 
detecting devices each day? 

Major Bergquist. We were operating them from 4 in the morning 
a week prior to this, sir. We were operating them from 4 in thel 
morning until 11 in the morning. Four to seven was as ordered 
by, I believe, a verbal order from the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian 
Department, and from 7 to 11 we were operating them for tlie pur- 
pose of calibrating the instruments and training our pursuit pilots 
in interception. 

79716—46 — Ex. 143, vol. 1 16 



226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Standley. That was what period? 

The Chairman. What? 

Admiral Standley. What period was that ? ■ 

The Chairman. That was from 7 to 11. 

Admiral Standley. Seven to eleven? 

Major Bergquist. Seven 

Admiral Standley. Yes, but what period ? What period of days ? 

The Chairman. A week. 

Major Berqquist. That schedule was approximately taking in a 
week before and previous to that. 

The Chairman. A week before the 7th ? 

Major Bergquist. Sir, previous to that we were operating them dur- 
ing the period 7 to 12, 1 believe it was, sir, and also two or three hours 
in the afternoons. 

Admiral Standley. In addition from 4 to 7? 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. In other words, were attempting to get 
the sets calibrated and get all our personnel trained. 

The Chairman. Now, do you know why the order was during this 
week prior to December 7 that you sliould operate from 4 to 7 a. m. 
each day ? 

Major Bergquist. I do not, sir. The Hawaiian Interceptor Com- 
mand was not set up. Therefore, the Aircraft Warning Service was 
operating directly under the Department signal officer, and we had 
no control whatsoever over it, but we were [379] as a matter of 
cooperation and coordination operating, and the period 4 to 7 was 
ordered for the detector stations but for nothing else. 

The Chairman. And you operated, therefore, on the morning of 
Sunday, December 7, from 4 to 7? 

Major Bergquist. The detector stations were operating at that 
time, sir. 

The Chairman. As a matter of training, or what? 

Major Bergquist. On Sunday morning, sir, I would say as a matter 
of compliance with the order. On the weekday mornings, other 
mornings, they were, in addition to compliance with that, operating 
as a matter of training, and I also had assigned watch officers during 
those periods in order to train them, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, was Lieutenant Tyler one of the men you 
assigned as a watch officer? 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. That was done just on the part of the 
wing on my own hook, so to speak. We were not required to do that, 
but 

The Chairman. You were not? 

Major Bergquist. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Who would have operated the service? 

Major Bergquist. As far as I can see, sir, they would have just 
operated with the Aircraft Warning Service personnel. They would 
have had no Air Corps officers there, but I took it upon myself to 
have these watch officers assigned as long as those stations were re- 
quired to operate, so that I could train my officers in the system. 

The Chairman. And therefore Tyler was sent up and other officers 
Avere sent up to get familiar with the things? 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Is that about the size of it ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 227 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. I had a roster of officers. I published 
a roster of officers. 

[380] The Chaieman. Who were to go up there in turn? 
Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And various times. You would not expect Tyler 
to know very much about the whole thing, would you? 

Major Bergquist. Xo, sir. I just hadn't had time to get around to all 
officers that were on this roster. I was trying to teach as many as I 
could, to acquaint them with the system. 

The Chairman. Then, I take it that Tyler had no duty, so to speak, 
there, of communication or warning or anything of that kind, had he ? 
Or what was his function? 

Major Bergquist. My instructions, sir, were verbal to these officers : 
that they were to go down there during the times I specified, acquaint 
themselves with the whole setup as far as they possibly could, and if 
anything went wrong they were to notify me. 

The Chairman. Now, what do you mean by "anything went 
wrong" ? 

Major Bergquist. Well, in an emei-gency thej should have notified 
me. 

The Chairman. So that if Tyler had been conscious that what was 
being recorded in front of his eyes was a flight of enemy airplanes he 
should have called you? 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, was it likely that Tyler would identify this 
flight as enemy planes? 

Major Bergquist. I don't believe so, sir, due to the fact that we had 
not had the Navy liaison position manned so that we could know the 
movements of the naval air forces. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Major Bergquist. And so it was logical for him to assume that 
there probably was a friendly carrier up in that area operating their 
planes. 

The Chairman. Now, had there been a Navy liaison officer [381] 
there, on the earlier daj^s prior to Sunday, December 7 ? 

Major Bergquist. No, sir. We were trying to get that arranged, 
sir. 

The Chairman. That hadn't been set up ? 

Major Bergquist. No, sir. 

The Chairman. So it was not unnatural that tliere was no Navy 
officer there that moining? 

Major Bergquist. That's right, sir. 

The Chairman. Is that riglit? 

Major Bergquist. That's right, sir. We had a meetiiig on the 24th 
of November of coast officers and representatives from the Navy in 
order to try to get an interceptor command — or interceptor informa- 
tion center, rather — operating. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Major Bergquist. And ironically we said— I have the notes on 
that meeting— and we said that we had hoped to get everything op- 
erating within a period of two weeks, and I think that was just about 
two weeks to the dav that we had the attack. 



. 228 CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. And therefore you hadn't notified the Navy that 
things were running so now that there would be a regular routine 
whereby a Navy officer could be there as liaison officer? I say, you 
hadn't sent them that notice yet? . Or had you? 

Major Bergquist. No, sir. Commander Taylor who was loaned 
to the Army by verbal arrangement to help with this setup, had 
contacted the Commander-in-Chief's staff, I would say, approximate- 
ly on the 24th, thereabouts, sir, and had asked for liaison officers to 
be assigned. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Major Bergquist, But they had not been assigned, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, it was contemplated that when your staff had 
been properly trained and you had your liaison arranged and estab- 
lished with the Navy this communication center would be run under 
regular orders and that the information would be released to the 
Army and Navy as received ? 

[382] Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. On the 24th of November 
we wanted to expand every effort to get it operating on a 24-hour-a- 
day basis. 

The Chairman. You couldn't run these little mobile stations that 
much a day, could you ? 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir, we can. They are operated by an aux- 
iliary power unit. 

The Chairman. Yes ? 

Major Bergquist. And we had also made arrangements and asked 
the signal officer at that time to bend every effort to get us commercial 
power put in at these positions, which he said he was going to do, but 
in the meantime they could be operated by these engines. 

The Chairman. Yes. They would wear out pretty fast if you 
ran them ? 

Major Bergquist. Well, the main difficulty was the gasoline en- 
gines that ran the generators. 

The Chairman. Oh, yes. 

Major Bergquist. They were subject to failure on occasions, but 
they could be operated. 

The Chairman. So that if there had been an emergency whereby 
it became critical to sweep the seas with these detectors around Oahu 
you think you could have arranged, subject to breakdowns, to run a 
24-hour detector ? 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You had enough persomiel to work it out, did you? 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And you don't know why you were instructed to 
run a regular tour of three hours daylight or dawn, do you? 

Major Bergquist. Well, you see, when you say why I was, I mean 
I wasn't in the organization that was ordered to do that. 

The Chairman. Which organization was ordered to do it? 
[S83]^ Signal corps? 

Major Bergquist. It was the Aircraft Warning Service company 
which operated directly under the Department signal officer, and we 
were just cooperating with them on the basic principles. 

The Chairman. Until the time would come for you to take it over 
as part of the Interceptor Command? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 229 

Major Bekgquist. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Any questions, General McNarney? 

General McNarney. If you had been operating on a wartime basis 
how many pursuit officers would be present in the information center? 

Major Bekgquist. There would be a controller and a pursuit officer, 
both of which would be flying officers of the Air Corps. 

General McNarney. Had you a trained controller? 

Major Bekgquist. I considered myself trained as a controller, sir, 
and also Commander Tyler or Major Tindal; any one of the three 
of us could have taken over controller, as we did after the attack. 

General McNarney. None of the three were present that Sunday 
morning prior to the attack? 

Major Bergquist. No, sir, not prior to the attack. 

General McNarney. Did you have any trained pursuit officers? 

Major Bekgquist. No, sir. 

General McNarney. You were training Tyler as a pursuit officer? 

Major Bekgquist. Yes, sir. May I retract that? One officer who 
I know could have been considered a trained pursuit officer was at 
Wheeler Field. 

General McNarney. If you had been in condition Alert No. 2, how 
many squadrons would you have had in the first [384] degree 
of readiness at the hour of the attack? 

Major Bergquist. That being the dawn period, sir, we would have 
had all available squadrons on the alert. When I say "on the alert," 
I mean that all the planes are in the dispersed position, the pilots are 
in a tent or dugout near their planes, with their flying equipment on 
readj' at a moment's notice to jump in their planes and get off. In 
other words, it would take them from the time they were ordered off 
from one to three minutes before they would be in the air. 

Tlie Chairman. You mean your engines would be warmed up? 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir, and there would be a man sitting in the 
cockpit. As soon as the signal came he would start the engine. In 
the meantime the pilot would slip his parachute on and jump in the 
plane. 

General McNarney. During your maneuvers here what was the 
rendezvous of the pursuit that took off on the dawn period? 

Major Bergquist. We have initial points around the Island which 
we have had for — I think I made them up about approximately two 
years ago now, initial points. In other words, this Island "being 
rather roughly a square shape, each corner of the Island plus one point 
in the middle — I can enumerate them for you, sir, or show you them 
on a map. 

The Chairman. Tliere is a map right behind you. 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. Kahuku Point is Affirm or Point A. 
That is phonetic. Ulupau Head is Point Baker. Koko Head is 
Point Cast. Hickam Field is Point Dog. Barbers Point is Point 
Easy. Waianae parenthesis City — ^Waianae City — is Point Fox. 
Kaena Point is Point George. Haleiwa is Point Hypo. Wheeler 
Field is Point William. 

In other words, the system that we have been operating on for the 
past two 3'ears is that if we get a warning of an enemy coming from 
any direction, if I knew the general direction it is coming from the 
system was to immediately dispatch pursuit to the initial point nearest 



230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to the approach of the [385] enemy, and then while they were 
getting there and gaining their aUitude, then from the information I 
had I wonld try to figure out their course for collision, interception. 
That was prior to the operation of the Radar. Our system now is, 
with the Radar plot we also will plot our own pursuit, and we can 
direct them right from the board by giving them course changes fol- 
lowing their plot. 

General McNarney. You still get them off to initial point, though ? 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. During your practices how was the radio com- 
munication between you and the patrol in the air? 

Major Bergquist. Fair, sir. Not good. 

General McNarney. Not good ? 

Major Bergquist. No, sir. That has been one of the worst things 
over here, is the radio communications. 

The Chairman. What is the matter with it? 

Major Bergquist. The transmitters in the airplanes are too weak, 
and the transmitters we have had on the ground are too weak, but we 
now have, I believe, a satisfactory system right now, because we have 
some stronger transmitters. 

General McNarney. If the information center had been in operation 
the controller would give the order for take-off, or the pursuit officer? 

Major Bergquist. The controller would tell the pursuit officer to 
order so many squadrons off and tell them where to send them. 

General McNarney. And the controller determines the number of 
pursuit that takes off? 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. The controller, being the more experienced 
officer, 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. determines that, and the pursuit [386] 

officer is really just a method of transmitting information? 

Major Bergquist. More or less, yes, sir. He helps the controller. 

General McNarney. Yes. 

Major Bergquist. He is really the assistant controller, but normally 
he just operates to direct — to carry out the orders of the controller. 

General McNarney. The controller has the mike in his hands ; he 
can talk direct into the air then? 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. You speak of arriving on the morning of the 7th 
at the center. At what time did you arrive there? 

Major Bergquist. I did not arrive there, sir, until approximately 
10 o'clock, 10 : 15. The first thing I did. was to try to get an organiza- 
tion at Wheeler Field of what we had left, to get the squadrons 
organized into — I mean even if we had to disband one squadron and 
take the airplanes we had left and organize them into an air unit. 
Actually control is centered at Wheeler. That is, this is merely a re- 
lay point, because we had most of our squadrons at Wheeler. Get 
them — be sure that that was operating. I directed the signal officer 
to check all our lines, and as soon as I had finished that then I immedi- 
ately started out for the information center at Shafter. 

General McCoy. Did Lieutenant Tyler bring to your attention this 
peculiar plotting that would have indicated the approach of the enemy 
planes ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 231 

Major Bergquist. No, sir. I had no inkling that he even saw a plot. 
General McCoy. When did you discover that ^ 
Major Bergquist. The next day, sir. 

General McCoy. Were you conscious of the fact that it was im- 
portant to follow these planes out to their aircraft [387] car- 
rier ? 

Major Bergquist. I should have been, sir. I was not that morning. 
General McCoy. So that nothing was done toward following them 
out ? 

Major Bergquist. Not that I knoAv of, sir. 

The Chairman. Nothing was done, no directions were given from 
the control room, the information center^ 

Major Bergquist. No, sir. I believe that Major 

The Chairman. The operator? 

Major Bergquist. Major Tindal was there operating. 

The Chairman. Well, do you mean yon don't know what he did, 
or you do know ? 

Major Bergquist. I do not know what he did up to the time I got 
there. 

The Chairman. Yes. After you got there what was done? 

Major Bergquist. It is not clear in my mind exactly. I cannot 
give the sequence of wdiat I did. The only thing I can say is that I 
immediately went to work and tried to get everything functioning 
properly. I went from one position to the other in an attempt to 
make it function. 

The Chairman. I suppose your crews for your stations had all dis- 
banded and gone? 

Major Bergquist. They were called back, sir, at the time of the 
attack. 

The Chairman. And went back to their stations at the mobile 
units? 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. In fact, they have those base camps 
near there, their stations. 

The Chairman. I see. 

General McCoy. Wliat were they called back for? 

Major Bergquist. Well, as soon as we knew that we had been at- 
tacked, from then on we were on 24-hour-a-day operation. \3S8] 
Immediately ordered that. 

The Chairman. And then they were starting tracing, were they, 
from their stations ? 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And w^ere those tracings coming into the informa- 
tion center? 

Major Bergquist. I believe they were, sir. 

The Chairman. And you think Tindal was acting as controller? 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And somebody was relaying information as to 
where these planes were going, or were they able to find them, or 
what was it? 

Major Bergquist. I do not know, sir. 

The Chairman. You don't. You didn't stay there? 

Major Bergquist. Yes. sir, I did after I got "there, but all the pilots 
of those planes were going out, as far as I know, had disappeared by 



232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the time I got there. You see, tliat was two hours — a little over two 
hours after the attack. 

The Chairman. Where had they disappeared to ? 

Major Bergquist. I mean, evidently the planes had gone so far 
out that we couldn't pick them up even. 

The Chairman. I see. 

Major Bergquist. But it is not clear in my mind, sir, exactly what 
I did when I got there or what I saw. 

The Chairman. You don't know whether the control room was all 
in service in advising air service as to where these planes were disap- 
pearing to ? You can't say that ? 

Major Bergquist. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Whatever happened in that respect happened be- 
fore you got there ? 

Major Bekgquist. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. Normally would the bombardment have an 
[389] officer in the control room to relay information to the bom- 
bardment ? 

Major Bergquist. Yes. sir. We had a bomber liaison officer there. 

General McNarney. Was there one there on the morning of the 
7th? 

Major Bergquist. No, sir. 

General McNarney. At any time? 

Major Bergquist. No, sir, I don't believe we got one there until 
either that afternoon or the next day; probably that afternoon. 

General McCoy. Is the center functioning now ? 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. How would it be if we stroll over with you. Major, 
and see it? 

ISIajor Bergquist. We would like very much to have you come, sir. 

The Chairman. I guess we just have about time to do it before we 
have to leave to beat the darkness. If there are no otlier questions 
from the major we will do that. 

General McCoy. We might do that on the way home. 

The Chairman. On the way, yes. 

Let me just say to you, Major, that under our regimen here we de- 
sire that the witnesses say nothing about the questioning here. 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Or discuss what goes on in this room with anyone. 

Major Bergquist. Kight, sir. 

Colonel Brown. Major Tindal is here. 

The Chairman. Perhaps we shall bring him in, and we will be with 
3'ou in a minute. 

Major Bergquist. Yes, sir. 

[3901 TESTIMONY OP MAJOR LORRY NORRIS TINDAL, 
AIR CORPS UNITED STATES ARMY 

The Chairman. What is the full name ? 
Major Tindal. Lorry N-orris Tindal. 
The Chairman. What is your rank? 
Major Tindal. Major in Air Corps, sir. 

The Chairman. And your assignment is noAv to the Interceptor 
Command? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 233 

Major TiNDAL. No, sir. I am assigned to Hickam Field. 

The Chairman. What were your duties on the morning of Decem- 
ber 7? 

Major TiNDAL. ]\Iy duties on the morning of December 7 were my 
normal duties as S-2 and assistant S-3 of the 18th Bomb Wing, sir. 

The Chairman. What had j'our duty to do with the information 
service ? 

Major TiNDAL. I was sent to New York to go to their school earl}' 
in the year, and later on I was transferred to Hickam Field, so that 
on December 7 I had no connection with the Interceptor Command. 

The Chairman. Did you appear at the information center at any 
time that morning ? 

Major TiNDAL. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Under what circumstances? 

Major TiNDAL. Well, I knew they would probably not be fully 
manned, and I thought that I was the nearest one and could get there 
sooner, so I went tliere. 

Th^CnAiRMAN. Now, when you got there what condition of affairs 
did you find ? 

Major TiNDAL. The condition of affairs was a little muddled up and 
everybody was in somewhat of an uproar because of the suddenness 
of attack, but the K. D. F. stations were working, and the boys were 
manning the board. 

[SPl] The Chairman. Were you able to trace the course of the 
retreating Japanese planes ? 

Major TiNDAL. No, sir. The retreat of the planes seemed to me 
from the directions of the board to go to the southwest, and the plots 
would have appeared to go about 30 to 50 miles — somewhere there 
about that distance — to the southwest, and mill in a circle, and we 
would lose them. There were two distinct circles in that area. 

The Chairman. You traced nothing away to the northward? 

Major TiNDAL, No, sir. If there was anything going away to the 
northwest it was probably a thin plot that I didn't see. 

The Chairman. You were acting for the time being as controller, 
were you? 

Major TiNDAL. Yes, sir, and practically everything else, too. 

The Chairman. You had assisted in setting up this information 
center before you went back to Hickam Field, did you ? 

Major TiNDAL. Partly, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Yes. "Are there any questions ? 

General McNarney. Did you communicate the probability of what 
you might believe to be planes going out or landing on carriers to 
anyone ? 

Major Tindal. I communicated this to the Air Force, sir. 

General McNarney. The Air Force. 

Major Tindal. Yes. sir; those I could get hold of immediately, I 
knew that, because I knew theirs was in operation. Their office was 
manned. I am not sure ; I don't remember whether I communicated 
that to the Navy or not. I may have. I was running around from 
one station to another there, from one position to another, and I am 
not sure how many other places I sent it to, but I know I did send it 
to Air Force. 

Admiral Ree\tes. Did your plot show any indication of a surface 
ship to the soutliwest ? 



234 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Major TiNDAL. No, sir. It just showed the plots. Are [.392~\ 
you familiar with those plotting boards, sir? 

Admiral Beeves. No, I am not. 

Major TiNDAL. Well, they put down a series of little arrows. 

Admiral REE\Ti:s. Yes ? 

Major TiNDAL. And the arrows proceeded to the southwest between 
30 and 50 miles away and then formed a circle, indicating many air- 
planes, and there were two distinct circles about 10 miles apart. 

Admiral Refa-es. Well, I understand your instrument will indicate 
a small flight or a large flight. 

Major TiNDAL. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Or that it will indicate perhaps a surface ship. 

Major TiNDAL. Yes, sir. That's quite correct, sir. 

Admiral Eee^-es. Provided the altitude is sufficient. 

Major TiNDAL. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Eeex-es. Well, was your instrument in such a position that 
it would have shown the presence of a separate ship 40 or 50 miles 
away to the southwest ? 

Major TiNDAL. That's quite a long range to pick up a surface vessel 
from these ground — from these R. D. F. stations. 

Admiral Reeves. Yes. Of course your instrument is at a high 
altitude ? 

Major TiNDAL. Well, even so, even if the instrument is high, there 
is too much shadow from the water itself. 

Admiral Reem^s. Yes. Your waves. Your waves pass too close 
to the surface. 

Major TiNDAL. Yes, sir. I did, though — in those circles I did 
have we could have picked up a surface vessel on account of many 
plots of airplanes in the immediate vicinity. 

Admiral Relets. Well, now, the testimony you have given would 
indicate these planes disappeared by landing on a carrier? 

[393] ]\Iajor Tixdal. That's what it indicated to me, through 
looking at the board, sir. 

Admiral Reev^es. Yes. I have nothing further. 

The Chaikman. Thank you very much. Major. Please observe 
secrecy as to what has been said in here and what has been done in 
here. 

Major TiNDAL. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Don't coimnunicate it to anyone. 

Major TiNDAL. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Will we have time to step in ? We might ask the 
major if he would go down with us ; we might like to take a look at 
that center. 

Major TiNDAL. Very well, sir. 

General McNarney. We would like to go to the information center 
right now. 

Major TiNDAL. Very Well. Fine. Will you have enough trans- 
portation ? 

General JNIcNaenet. Yes. 

INIajor TiNDAL. I have my car out there. 

(Thereupon, at 4: 55 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken until 
Fridav. December 26, 1941, at 9 o'clock a. m. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 235 



[S94] CONTENTS 



FRIDAY, DECEMBER 26, 1941 

Testimony of — Page ' 

Colonel Carroll A. Powell, Signal Corps, United States Army 395, 428 

Lieutenant Kenneth M. Taylor, Air Corps, United States Army 415 

Lieutenant George S. Welsh, Air Corps, United States Army 422 

Sergeant Mobley L. Hall, United States Army 428 

Captain Frank W. Ebey, Coast Artillery, United States Army 437 

Colonel William J. McCarthy, Coast Artillery, United States Army___ 442 

Private Creed Shortt, United States Army 452 

Lieutenant Stephen G. Saltzman 455 

Sergeant Lowell Vincent Klatt, United States Army 463 

Lieutenant Colonel Jack W. Howard, United States Army 469 

Lieutenant Howard Frederick Cooper, United States Army 473 

Lieutenant Colonel Melvin L. Craig, Field Artillery, United States 

Army 478 

First Lieutenant James K. Thomas, United States Army 484 

Sergeant Ralph Trauger Ullrich, United States Army 486 

Private Raymond F. McBriarty, United States Army 490 

Captain Melbourne H. West, United States Army 496 

First Lieutenant Willis Theodore Lyman, United States Army 500 

Sergeant June D. Dickens, United States Army 504 

Charles J. Utterback 509 

Edwin St. J. Griffith 517 

Albert L. Brenckman 520 



' Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages 
of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 237 



{395-\ COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE 
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7 , 1941, ON HAWAII 



FRIDAY, DECEMBER 26, 1941 

Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, 

Fort Shafter^ Territory of Hawaii. 
The Commission reconvened at 9 o'clock a. m.. Associate Justice 
Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, pi^siding. 



Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, 
Chairman ; 

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired; 

Rear Admiral Joseph M, Reeves, United States Navy, Retired; 

Major General Frank R, McCoy, United States Army, Retired; 

Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army; 

Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission; 

Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal 
Adviser to the Commission ; 

Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission. 

proceedings 

FURTHER TESTIMONY OF COLONEL CARROLL A. POWELL, 
SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY 

The Chairman. Now, since you have been here before. Colonel, 
have you investigated the atmospheric and radio conditions on the 
Island of Oahu on the morning of December 7 ? 

Colonel Powell. I did not investigate the atmospheric conditions 
but just took our log that we worked with from AVashington and 
the trouble we had that morning. 

At 1 : 40 a. m. we were contacted with Wasliington. Our frequency 
here was 8160. Washington's was 88G0. We had been \3ne^ 
contacting them previously and we were clearing corrections. AVe had 
been clearing corrections, errors, and we had a readability of four, 
which is very poor. 

At 2 : 40 a. m. we were still clearing our corrections of the previous 
errors and had a readability of four. The frequency was the same. 

At 3:40 a. m. we were still clearing our corrections. The reada- 
bility was the same. It was very difficult to ^ai anything through that 
morning. 



238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

At 4: 20 a, m. we were still clearing our corrections, but we decided 
we would go on another frequency. It was getting so bad that our 
signals were not clearing. 

General McNarney. What time was this? 

Colonel Powell. Four-twenty a. m. 

General McCoy. Hawaiian time? 

Colonel Powell. Hawaiian time. 

This has been a terrifically bad reading of signals due to atmos- 
pheric conditions all the way through. Our signal set was very poor. 
That was S-1 to S-2. 

We shifted at 4 : 20 a. m. to 12240 frequency. 

The Chairman. 12240? 

Colonel Powell. Twelve comma two-forty cycles. Washington 
was still on 8860. 

At 6' a. m. we were unable to hear Washington on that frequency, 
and we shifted to 12090 and tried to listen to Washington. We were 
unable to get him at 6 a. m. or 7 a. m. 

Then we shifted at 7 : 20 to the listening station 12075, hoping we 
might break through. There was a lot of interference developed 
about that time. 

General McCoy. What kind of interference ? 

Colonel Powell. Static. I think it might have been — the oper- 
ators, the men could not tell me whether it was other radios or not, 
but tliere is a possibility. This comes in on a siphon recorder, and 
it shows up on this little tape. Our [o97] indications are both 
static and possibly something else. 

We shifted to WAR at 7 : 30 to 1600, and we heard them then. We 
heard them on this. We had interference from our WVY, which is 
the San Francisco station. We were unable to keep them on or to 
get any signals or messages through. Then at 9 : 05 he told us to get 
him and he would relay through San Francisco. That is what we did 
at that time. 

General McCoy. That is very interesting. 

The Chairman, That is very interesting, and it confirms what 
French said. 

Colonel Powell. The other question was 

The Chairman. Before you get to that, there was another thing. 
We want to know whether there was any message received between 
5 and 8 a. m. on December 7 which you relayed to Manila ? 

Colonel Powell, No, sir, there was not, because we did not get any- 
thing. 

The Chairman, You are to produce General Marshall's message 
that arrived on the morning of the 7th ? 

Colonel Powell, Yes, sir (handing a document to the Chairman). 
That was dispatched at 12 : 18 p. m., which is 6 : 48 our time here. 

The Chairman, That was dispatched from Washington at 6 : 48 
your time ? 

Colonel Powell, Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. The date there shows it was received at 7 : 33 your 
time ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, downtown. 

The Chairman. There is no evidence here of when it went in and 
out of San Francisco ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 239 

Colonel Powell. No, sir. It was relayed at San P'rancisco by E. C. 
A. to this station. They do not work Washington direct. They read 
the tape, and as the operator read the tape, this is the time showing 
it was coming in. I think that is what it meant. There was some 
considerable delay in getting it out to [308] us. 

The Chairman. Yes, we understand that. I believe that covers 
everything that we asked Colonel Powell to bring us. 

Colonel Powell. You asked me to find out whether a message had 
been sent to Manila. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Colonel Powell. There was a message, and this is a message or a 
copy of the message which they sent to Manila asking whether they 
had ever received such a message, and this is the message that was 
sent to them. 

The Chairman. How do you know that? 

Colonel Powell. This came back. 

The Chairman. If the message to Manila did not go through your 
station, relayed through, how do you know that ISIanila got this? 

Colonel Powell. This is after tlie thing was all over. This was 
during that day or during that afternoon in which we had contact 
with Washington, and they asked if tlie message going to Manila — 
asked whether they had received this R. C. A. message. Tlien it went 
to the decriptographer and then it was delivered to me, and this an- 
swer came back. I think they figured out here the Honolulu time so 
you can get the comparison of it. 

The Chairman. But you say this transmittal of the Washington 
message for iNfanila which, I understand, did not go through your 
station 

Colonel Powell. That is right. 

The Chairman. And it arrived in jVIanila, according to subsequent 
records, at what time ? 

Colonel Powell. Eight-twelve a. m. Honolulu time. 

The Chairman. That is to say, the R. C. A. message to you, sir, got 
here at 7:33 a. m. 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. And the R,. C. A. message in the same tenor 
[S99] got to Manila in the same comparative time at what time? 

Colonel Powell. Eight-twelve on the same day. 

The Chairman. What would that indicate to you, Colonel, that 
the R. C. A. message was put through to you by R."^ C. A. before they 
picked up Manila ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Because Manila got it at what time ? How much 
later? 

Colonel Powell. Forty-five minutes. 

The Chairman. Later than you did? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. That may be due to atmospheric conditions 
again. They have a more powerfiil transmitter than I had. Their 
transmitter at Manila is 25 kilowatts; ours is only 10 kilomatts. 

If I had a transmitter as high as theirs I could have maintained 
traffic to Washington very easily then because I could have busted 
through those atmospheric conditions, but I could not do it with only 
a 10-kilowatt station. 



240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCoy. You would consider that weakness in your trans- 
mitter a military weakness in a fortress of this type ? 

Colonel Powell. I do, sir, yes, sir, very definitely, sir. I do not 
recall what the Navy transmitter is, but it is much more powerful 
than mine. 

General McCoy. You do not know whether the Navy had trouble 
that morning? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir, I do not. 

The Chairman. Their log will show it ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, their log will show it. That is the Lualualei 
Station. That is heavier than mine. 

Admiral Standley. Do you know of any reason why the Army 
strength should be less than the Navy strength ? 

The Chairman. You mean as to a transmitter ? 

Admiral Standley. Yes. 

[400] Colonel Powell. It is just a matter of lack of funds. 

Admiral Standley. That is your opinion ? 

Colonel PoWEiL. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Have you ever asked for a heavier or for more 
transmitters ? 

Colonel Powell. I have asked for additional transmitters. I got 
it but I didn't get a chance to say what size it would be and I have 
installed that. 

Admiral Standley. Are you familiar with the Navy uses for radio 
at this station ? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. You do not know whether the Navy uses their 
station for broadcasting air reports and time signals in this whole 
ocean ? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. You do not know that ? 

Colonel Powell. No. 

Admiral Standley. The Army does not do that ? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir, we do not do that. That is all the function 
of the Navy. 

General McCoy. Do you have a personal conference from time to 
time with your parallel communications officer in the Navy? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Do you keep in close personal touch ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. He is a very fine officer, Commander 
Graham. 

The interference from other stations, the Japanese station would 
not show up on our recorder as an individual station, but it is very 
possible and it could happen. 

[401] Thev have a 25-kilowatt transmitter beamed on this Is- 
land here, and they could shift over entirely into any frequency they 
want and get a beam and get to jamming up anything. 

I was listening to it last night. 

The Chairman. You were? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, and it comes in very powerful. It is beamed 
right here. 

The Chairman. Where is that located? 

Colonel Powell. Tokyo. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 241 

• The Chairman. In Tokyo? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. That is a 25-kilowatt transmitter. It sends 
its beam on us and puts in signals at 52 decibels, and the Navy station 
puts out from 10 to 15. 

The Chairman. You could easily pick it up ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. I am trying to rent a station to counteract 
that same thing. 

The Chairman. To jam it? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

General McCoy. When was this powerful Japanese station put in? 
Do you know? 

Colonel Powell. That I don't know, sir, but it has been picked up 
over here for some time, and I have been here two years and a half, 
and it has been coming over that time. We have been noticing them 
and they have been putting out this propaganda. Now the propa- 
ganda is in English. They have a Britisher or a Japanese youngster 
who has studied in England, because he has a very decided British 
accent. 

There might have been interference at that time. They could 
swing into any frequency they wanted to to jam anything they 
wanted to. 

General McCoy. In other words, they can jam you but you cannot 
jam them? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, they have a more powerful station than 
I have. 

[4^03\ Admiral Standley. Are you responsible for the com- 
munications that you have on the Island? 

Colonel Powell. The only communications? 

Admiral Standley. And outlying posts ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Do you have a signal post at Kahuku Point? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir, we do not as yet. That has just been 
made an Army post. 

Admiral Standley. Do you have any station on the north coast 
around Kahuku Point ? You have a station at Opana ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, we have a direction finder station at Opana. 

Admiral Standley. Do you have any of the responsibility as to the 
guard? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Do you have any watch on them ? 

Colonel Powell. There are men guarding them. 

Admiral Standley. They would not be under you ? 

Colonel Powell. No, sirj they are not under me. 

Admiral Standley. Are your men under cover in this station? 
Do they have a regular post under cover in the buildings? 

Colonel Powell. They did not at that time. 

Admiral Standley. Were they out in the open ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, because we only considered this as a training 
station until the others were completed. 

Admiral Standley. Are you positive there were guards at that 
station on the morning of December 7? 

Colonel Powell. I don't know. The Army commander was respon- 
sible for the guards. 

79716—46 — Ex. 143, vol. 1 17 



242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Standley. That is Colonel Fielder? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir, that is the commanding general in that 
division, in that area. 

Admiral Standley. Of the Infantry? 

[403] Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. That would by Murray or Wilson? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

General McCoy, Did I understand you to say you had no communi- 
cations with the other islands in this group ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, we have radio communication with the other 
islands. We have our own system and by Mutual Telephone Company 
radio system. That is by voice. They have it on the principal islands, 
but not on Lanai ; but they have a radio phone service to Kauai, Maui, 
JMolokai, and Hawaii, and it goes through the interisland system. 

General McCoy. I thought you said there was none? 

Colonel Powell. I said there was no cable station. There is no sub- 
marine cable station. That is not practical because it is so very ex- 
pensive to lay it and the waters are very deep, and the cable would 
have to be swinging around and it would be worn out. 

General McCoy. From the viewpoint of security, you think the 
present setup of wireless telephone and radio is sufficient? 

Colonel Powell. I think it is, yes sir, because if they wanted to 
they could cut the cable just as quickly as thej^ jam up the radio. 

General McCoy. Do you know whether any of those communica- 
tions systems were working on that Sunday ? 

Colonel Powell. That I do not know, sir. 

The Chairman. By that question do you mean the ones in operat- 
ing order or whether they were actually sending and receiving? 

General McCoy. Well, I had in mincl whether they had been put 
out for some reason. 

Colonel Powell. I could tind that out. 

General McCoy. Atmospheric conditions or jamming or from some 
local Japanese effort. 

1-4:04] Colonel PowelIj. I can say 1 don't believe they were. 

The Chairman. Were what? 

Colonel Powell. AVere operating. They Avere operating. I think 
they were operating because I would have heard of it because I am 
in close contact with the Mutual Telephone Company and I think 
they would have expressed to me statements as to the conditions tak- 
ing place at that time. 

The Chairman. Will you find out and let us know within the next 
hour whether the telephone system on the Island was working and 
whether your radio system was working that morning? 

Colonel Po\\t:ll. Yes. They go on a different frequency. Theirs 
is a very high frequency, and for that reason it is better. They are 
very high in the air, practically line of sight. 

General McCoy. Did we ask you when you were on the stand before 
as to whether you were conscious of any concerted effort to jam you at 
any time during Sunday, any jamming from fishing boats or such? 

Colonel Powell. Nothing" was reported to me. I got the logs on 
that situation and I have gone over the logs, and according to the 
report of the operators and the logs, there was no attempt to do that 
tliat morning. 



PROCEEDIXGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 243 

Tlie Chairman. Does your last answer mean that j'ou do not think 
this 25-kilowatt station in Tokj^o was attempting to jam the Array 
radio line from Washington that morning ? 

Colonel Powell. I saw no evidence of it. As I say, it could be 
jwssible, but the tape does not show there was any effort. A concerted 
attempt at jamming would show up in a regular beat. 

Tlie Chairman. The tape does not indicate that ? 

Colonel Powell. Xo, sir, no regular beat. 

General McCoy. In other M-ords, you would assume that had the 
attack not occurred that normally that interference would [40o] 
be atmospheric? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, that is what I thought about it, because we 
have been having that same experience right along. This is a bad 
time of the year to transmit with our transmitter to Washington. 
We might be a complete day without communication to Washington 
due to atmospheric conditions, the time of the moon and so on, that 
sometimes no one was able to transmit to Washington. 

The Chairman. The same thing does not necessarily apply to their 
ability to transmit to you because their station is more powerful? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. But as it was, your reception was very bad that 
morning ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. Any other questions? 

General McCoy. Didn't you have some questions you wanted to 
ask concerning this scrambled telephone ? 

The Chairman. When was your scrambled telephone instrument 
installed here ? 

Colonel PoAVFXL. It was about a year ago. It is a very secret thing. 
Very few people know about it. 

The Chairman. We are keeping everything secret, but we have got 
to know the facts. 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. Because it was so very secret, was there any under- 
standing here that it should be used only in emergency cases, or was 
it generally used ? 

Colonel Powell. It was only for the use of the commanding gen- 
eral and the chief of staff. Nobody else used it or had the key to it 
except the commanding general and the chief of staff. 

The Chairman. That would indicate that it was an emergency serv- 
ice? 

[406] Colonel Po\\t:ll. Yes, a confidential service. 

The Chairman. A confidential service. 

Colonel Powell. Yes. It is fairly confidential, but it is not secret 
by any means. 

The Chairman. Why not ? 

Colonel Powell. Just because of the mechanics of the thing. Our 
transmission to San Francisco is all scrambled by the Mutual Tele- 
phone Company. 

The Chairman. That is the Mutual Telephone Company here? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, and the E. C. A. at San Francisco. For 
scrambling done here, a radio or an ordinary receiver could not pick 
up that message. 



244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. If I had an ordinary receiver I would hear a series 
of queer words which did not mean anything 'i 

Colonel Powell. That is correct. 

The Chairman. And the Mutual office here has to advise San Fran- 
cisco which dial they are using in order to unscramble it? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chaieman. Then San Francisco has got to set its dial at a 
certain point '? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. So that San Francisco will hear it clearly? 

Colonel Powt:ll. Yes. 

The Chairman. They have the same system from San Francisco 
into Washington ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. So that if anybody was going to listen in on an- 
other set, he would have to know which dial they are going to use 
to get it ? 

Colonel Powell, He would not know the tyi)e of instrument ? 

The Chairman. The type of instrument ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

[407'] This scrambler here has an addition to the scrambler, 
put in by the Mutual Telephone Company so that the message is 
double scrambled. A very interesting thing happened. We installed 
the outfit about a year ago, and the telephone circuit from Tokyo 
uses the same scrambler as this Mutual does from here to San Fran- 
cisco. 

So when we put this on the circuit, Tokyo called up right quick 
and wanted to know what we had done to the circuit between Honolulu 
and San Francisco because they said they could not understand it 
and wanted to know what was being done to it; so we have been 
watching that telephone circuit and reading it all the time — everything 
that goes on. 

The Chairman. Is that telephone circuit a radio circuit? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. It is not run on a cable? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir. The only cable is the cable company. 

The Chairman. I thought this was a wire ? 

Colonel Powell. It is simply a radio. 

General McCot. So they could listen in ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

General McCoy. And you put in a second scrambler to cover that? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. That is what they called up for and wanted 
to know what we had done to the circuit. 

The Chairman. You do not know if they ever found out or not? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir. We just told them something had hap- 
pened, or Mutual told them something had happened to the circuit, 
and that is all. 

I have been assured by the board in Washington that, so far as this 
particular circuit ever getting out of the United States, that does not 
mean it makes it private because they can [408] undoubtedly 
find out that, I suppose, or shift it or make it themselves ; so it is not 
a secret means of transmission. It is what you might call a private 
means of communication. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 245 

The Chairman. But rather dangerous to use ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

General McCoy. What caused it to be put in? Was it put m on 
your recommendation ? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir, it was a system put in under orders of the 
Secretary of War, I understand, in that he wanted to talk to all 
commanding generals in the area in the United States, and then he 
had one put in over here in Puerto Rico — no, in Panama, so he could 
have a private means of communication so everybody would not be able 
to listen in on his conversation. 

General McCoy. Do you know whether there are any Japanese in 
the telephone central office here ? 

Colonel Powell. There are no alien Japanese in the telephone cen- 
tral, and the Department Commander has placed me in kind of charge 
of the telephone company, and they have cooperated very well and 
have removed all aliens from the telephone circuits going to the main- 
land, and have eliminated them from all very important key jobs. 
They had no aliens, but only people of Japanese ancestry, which they 
have taken out. 

General McCoy. Has it occurred to you that it might be an addi- 
tional safeguard for the telephone company to cut out all telephones 
to aliens or Japanese on this island at this time, during the war? 

Colonel Powell. We did discuss that, but we didn't think it was 
of any advantage because of the fact that the Navy censors all trans- 
Pacific calls, and I have a crew of 30 people censoring all interisland 
calls ; so nothing can get on the air or the radio that we do not want 
on the air. 

General McCoy. But they could communicate using the Mutual 
system ? 

[409] Colonel Powell. They could do that, because this is an 
automatic exchange. 

The Chairman. There is no operator ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. 

The Chairman. This is off the record. 

(There was a discussion off the record.) 

General McNarney. On your trip to the mainland to inspect the 
Radar system, were there any permanent stations on your trip, or 
were they all mobile? 

Colonel Powell. The ones I saw were mobile. 1 just heard of one 
that was a permanently installed station, I think it was in Maine, 
but I did not get a chance to see it. 

General McNarney. Do you know what particular priority you 
were on for the permanent station order ? 

Colonel PowETT.. Well, we had authority to biiild these stations, and 
the i^lans were drawn up by the District Engineer, and he is to proceed 
to build them, but it was just a question at that time if there was any 
urgency. That is, we wanted to get them done as promptly as ]iossible, 
but we did liave difficulty getting the cable for Mount Kahala. and a 
few other things for the oilier stations here tliat were not ready: but 
as to priority we had sots here to install in this station, and they have 
been here for aijpi-oxiniately three months, and the stations haven't 
been finished due to the lack of our ability to get the materials to 
finish them. 



246 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCoy. Do you have that material now ? 

Colonel Powell. Tl^e last of it is here, the power plants. 

General McCoy. Do yon know when they will be here? 

Colonel PowioLL. No, sir. They were beino; bought by the District 
Engineer, so I did not check that part of it. We had a conference yes- 
terday on that ])articular thino, but we are starting. 

General McCoy. Did the conference bring out the probabil- 
ity [4^0] of the permanent installations being completed? 

Colonel PoT\nELL, The station at Maui will be up in about two weeks. 
The equipment has been there and the building. 

The Chairman. Is the power plant there ? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir. The signal corps power plant is there, but 
I am going to divert one of tliese to gi"^'e our power to operate the radio 
sets and other things like that temporarily, but the buildings are just 
being completed, and that coming back from Maui has given me a few 
items that the'District Engineer is clearing up with the engineer there 
and has directed them to be completed promptly. At Haleakala the 
shelter building was not completed and the water supply was not com- 
plete, and it is very cold up there, which you would not imagine. They 
had a barrel of ice there and they had no heat, and they were putting 
in commercial power to augment our ])ower. 

Kauai is in about the same condition. They expect to get them going 
in about two weeks. 

General McCoy. What alternative action has been taken for security 
purposes pending the completion of these stations? 

Colonel Powell. We have concentrated at this island all our port- 
able Radar sets. By that means we hope we will have our security 
sufficient in this particular island. Now, that is about the best answer 
1 can give you. 

General McCoy. What could be done to supplement that for ad- 
ditional security during this dangerous period? 

Colonel Powell. We would have to have more portable Radar sets. 
I was talking to General Emmons several times, and he wanted me to 
let him known in particular how many more we would have to have, 
and that is the reason for the conference yesterday, determining how 
many more we would have to have until these permanent stations are 
fixed because it would take us two weeks to get the portable stations 
here, if there are my available on the mainland. 

I believe in the meantime we may be able to get these fixed [4^^] 
stations completed so that we would not need these mobile stations 
and operate them. 

The Chairman. Has there been any system of observers on the out- 
lying islands who could radio in any information of enemy planes ob- 
served by them ? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir. 

The Chairman. I suppose it would be possible to put observers on 
the outlying islands and let them radio messages in of planes coming 
in? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. The question there is with respect to trans- 
mission. I have taken over practically all amateur radio sets in the 
Island, and I have to change them from their frequency to meet our 
frequency, and that is being done now, and they will be installed on 
these islands. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 247 

The Chairman. So the}' can warn you ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, 

General McNarxey. Couldn't these observers talk over the inter- 
island telephone system? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, they could. ]My answer was that we did not 
think the situation here was so serious that we should try to get them 
from the other islands because we felt that these Radar sets would 
give us sufficient protection in an emergency, and we could put them 
in different positions. 

General ^IcXakney. Have you looked into the plans around 1935 
to see what system there was of aircraft warning then completed prior 
to the development of the Radar systems ? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir, I did not. I have not looked into it. 

The Chairman. When you came here, sir, was there stny warning 
system established on the outlying islands ? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Over the telephone or radio ? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir, because at that time they were [4^2] 
concentrating all their defense here on the Island of Oahu, ancl we 
had no military people, no organization of any kind on the other 
islands. There were no militar}^ organizations for defense on the 
other islands. 

The Chairman. There was no thought of putting out scouts or out- 
posts on these islands for your help and assistance? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir. This is the system that has been de- 
veloped since then. It has only been the responsibility of the signal 
corps since the development of the Radar. 

General McCoy. Do you have in effect local aerial warning sets ? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, sir, by which we are now warning the people. 

General McCoy. Yes. 

Colonel Powell. By means of broadcasting stations downtown and 
by means of other things, whistles that we can get set up and get in 
Avord of an air raid, which is an air-raid warning system, and we 
thought of putting stations all over the Island and installing these 
sirens just as soon as we get them. 

There was a telegram came here the day before yesterday advising 
that the signal corps was getting them at San Francisco, or anticipat- 
ing getting them for deliveiy at the earliest possible time. 

General McCoy. There was no such thing provided for prior to 
the attack? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir, only we had discussed that with the de- 
fense counsel. I went down there and we were developing a plan to 
do that, the Governor's committee, and had assumed control of it, 
and felt at that time the responsibility was to take care of the field ; 
that is, the air fields and the Army posts; and the civilians, that thej 
should take care of their own. 

(xeneral McCoy. Did you have on the air fields any warning service 
prior to the attack? 

14^3] Colonel Powell. We had made tests at Wheeler Field of 
various sirens to determine what siren was the best to install, and 
we recommended to the War Depaitment that we be given authority 
to buy certain sirens, and they came back and said they were develop- 
ing sirens and that as soon as they were available they would send 
them to us. 



248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCoy. But they were not on the air field at the thne 
of the attack? 

Colonel Powell. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Was there any other warning service on these 
fields, that you know of, under your control ? 

Colonel Powell. None on the fields under my control, no, sir. 

General McCoy. That is all. 

The Chairman. Any other questions. 

Admiral Standley. I would like to ask a question off the record. 

(There was a discussion off the record.) 

General McNarney. What was the approximate date on which it 
was decided to install this Radar system on the Island? 

Colonel Po^at:ll. I will have to get my records out. I would say 
about a year and a half ago. 

The War Department sent out a directive to the Commanding 
General to direct him to state our requirements for these Radar sys- 
tems, and this board was appointed and travelled all over the Islands 
to determine on the locations for the various sets. 

That report went into Washington and it was approved, and then 
they got that appropriation from Congress and we started to build 
them. 

Then recently, about four months ago, they said, "We think you 
should have four more stations." So we studied it and located these 
four more stations on the Islands, and they have been in the process 
of doing that. 

[4i4] General McNarney. Are these positions based on the 
experience of the board? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. That is all the information there was. 
Nobody from this Department had gone to England to study the 
situation. We just had to take what was reported by the observers 
and base our positions on their report, which sometimes is quite dif- 
ficult to understand. 

General McNarney. Do you know how long the Army and Navy 
have been experimenting with this sort of thing ? 

Colonel Powell. I can't answer that question except by guess- 
work. ' 

General McNarney. What would you guess? 

Colonel Powell. I would say about four years. 

General McNarney. In other words, the decision to put these in 
was based upon the successes of the instruments in this war? 

Colonel Powell. In England, yes, sir. 

General McCoy. As I remember, they were carrying on experi- 
ments for at least four or five years back? 

Colonel Po\vell. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. At Monmouth ? 

Colonel PoA\T2LL. Yes. It was so secret that nobody got in there. 
I used to try to get in there because I am an electrical engineer and 
was interested, but it was so secret nobody could get in there. I just 
heard they were doing something like that. 

Admiral Standley. The Chief of Staff told me about it at least 
three years ago. 

Colonel Powell. As I understand the situation, the British have 
had a well-developed situation, but they did not let us know anything 



PEOCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 249 

about it, so we had to start in right from scratch and work it up by 
our own help and not with the help of the British. 

General McCoy. This is an American system, not British? 

Colonel Powell. Yes. It is different, as I miderstand it, [il5] 
from what the British system is. 

General McCoy. Would it be possible to get the British to give us 
the results of their successes? 

The CiLviRMAX. Off the record. 

(There was a discussion off the record.) 

The Chaikmax. Any other questions? 

General McCoy. No. 

The Chairman. Will you get us that information, Colonel? 

Colonel Po"WELL. Yes. 

The Chairman. The Army has produced the Burwell report, which 
the Recoider has marked Martin Exhibit 2, and which will be a part 
of our record. 

Call Lieutenant Taylor. 

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT KENNETH M. TAYLOE, AIR CORPS, 
UNITED STATES ARMY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give us your full name, Lieutenant? 

Lieutenant Taylor. Kenneth M. Taylor. 

The Chairman. You are a lieutenant in the Army ? 

Lieutenant Taylor. Yes, sir. 

The Chair:man. With what assignment? 

Lieutenant Tayi.or. Pilot, 47th Squadron. 

The Chairman. Will you examine, General? 

General McCoy. Is that Hickam Field or Wheeler Field ? 

Lieutenant Taylor. AVlieeler Field, sir. 

General McCoy. Pursuit squadron? 

Lieutenant Taylor. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. We would like to have a narrative from you first. 
Give whatever information you know and simply tell us what hap- 
pened to you during the morning of the attack until your own activities 
M'ere over that day. Just give us a running narrative without any 
attempt to give us more than just what [4^^] happened, what 

you saw and what you did. 

Lieutenant Taylor. Well, sir, on the morning of the 7th I was at 
Wheeler Field at the Officers' Club when the bombing began. Lieu- 
tenant Welsh and I got in my car and drove to Haleiwa. We had 
been in the field there for the past week or thereabouts, as one squadron 
is at all times recently. 

When we got out there mostly new men were there. I saw the new 
men, and so Lieutenant Welsh and I took two planes that they w^ere 
servicing and got ready to go up. We had called them or somebody 
had called them ; so they were practically ready when we arrived. 

There were some other officers there getting ready to take off, but I 
think they followed us in about 30 minutes; I am not sure, but Lieu- 
tenant Welsh and myself started patrolling the Island. There wasn't 
any .50 caliber ammunition, so we landed at the field. That was be- 



250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tween the first bombing and the second bombing. I got .50 caliber 
ammunition in mj' plane and Lieutenant Welsh got some in his. 

From there on things got kind of jumbled, because we took off, and 
as we took off they were coming over the field. 

The Chairman. This is the second attack? 

Lieutenant Taylor. Yes. We landed three times, it seems like. It 
is kind of jumbled in my mind which time we did go back, but I would 
say this time they were going very low over Pearl Harbor, and the 
men left, and I took my plane around and took off right into them so 
they could not run me down too easily. I made a nice turn out into 
them and got in the string of six or eight planes. I don't know how 
many there were. I was in them. I was on one's tail as we went over 
Waialua, firing at the one next to me, and there was one following 
firing at me, and I pulled out. I don't know what happened to 
the other plane. Lieutenant Welsh, I think, sliot the other man clown. 
Then we patrolled some more over Ewa. At that time there was a 
whole string of planes looking like a [4^'/'] traffic pattern. We 
went down and got in the traffic pattern and shot down several planes 
there. I know for certain I had shot down two planes or perhaps 
more; I don't know. 

At that time Lieutenant Welsh and I got separated. He came back 
to Wheeler Field, but I believe I landed about three times. I just 
landed and got ammunition and went back. I think that is all. 

The Chair3ian. Were you getting breakfast at the time of the 
attack? 

Lieutenant Taylor. No, sir, I was still in bed when the first bomb 
hit. I thought a Navy man had probably gone off the main route, 
so I didn't get up until the second one and then went out just as they 
were machine-gunning the club at that time, and they were machine- 
gunning all around while we were driving for the post. 

The Chairman. Wliat sort of plane were you up in that morning? 

Lieutenant Taylor. A P-40B, sir. 

The Chairman, What is the crew in that plane? 

Lieutenant Taylor, Just myself. 

The Chairman. Just one man ? 

Lieutenant Taylor. Yes, 

The Chairman. Will you examine. General ? 

General McNarney. You say your squadron was stationed at Ha- 
leiwa ? 

Lieutenant Taylor, Yes, 

General McNarney, How many planes were in that squadron, if 
you remember? 

Lieutenant Taylor, I think we had four P-40's and ^wo or three 
P-36's, and B-12's — six. I don't know whether I should mention 
them, because they are obsolete. 

General McNarney. How many of those were in commission? 

Lieutenant Taylor. That morning we used four altogether [4-^8] 
at different times. They were landed out there and we had got to- 
gether and sent more up. 

General McNarney, Where were the enlisted personnel in your 
squadron ? 

Lieutenant Taylor. Well, they were there at the field. 

General McNarney. Thev were stationed at the field ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 251 

Lieutenant Taylor. Yes. 

General McNarxey. And the officers were there ? 

Lieutenant Taylor. It being Saturday night, some of them were 
sleeping or in there. 

General McNarney. Normally, when you are stationed at Haleiwa, 
you sleep there ? 

Lieutenant Taylor. I would say normally, yes. 

General McNarney. Who is 3^our squadron commander? 

Lieutenant Taylor. Major Austin. 

General INIcNarney. Where was he ? 

Lieutenant Taylor. He was on Molokai. 

The Chairman. He had been sent there on some special mission ? 

Lieutenant Taylor. No, sir, he was deer hunting over the week-end. 

The Chairman. He was on leave ? 

Lieutenant Taylor. Yes. 

General McNarney. Who was in charge of the squadron ? 

Lieutenant Taylor. Lieutenant Rogers. 

General McNarney. Where was he? 

Lieutenant Taylor. He was there when I got there at the field. 
He was at the field at the time and later took up a plane. 

General McNarney. You say you and Lieutenant Welsh went and 
took off. 

Lieutenant Taylor. Yes. 

General McNarney. Were . you directed to go up by anybody 
14^9] or did you just go on your owm initiative ? 

Lieutenant Taylor. No, sir. 

General McNarney. You were not directed by anyone? 

Lieutenant Taylor. No, sir, we were not directed by anybody. He 
was the assistant operations officer, so we just went off. 

General McNarney. In other words, no squadron commander gave 
you any orders? You just took off on your own initiative? 

Lieutenant Taylor. No, sir, there was nobody there who could give 
us orders with the exception of Lieutenant Rogers, so we went ahead 
and took off. I imagine the orders would be the same. 

General McNarney. You say you had no .50 caliber ammunition? 

Lieutenant Taylor. Yes. 

General McNarney. Is .50 caliber ammunition usually carried at 
Haleiwa ? 

Lieutenant Tayi.or. It should have been. We did not have any 
gunnery there, but for normal gunnery that would be done with .30 
caliber. 

General McNarney. Was your plane already loaded with .30 caliber 
ammunition, or were they putting it in? 

Lieutenant Taylor. They were loading it at the time. They were 
doing it when we got there. 

General McNarney. The men were loading when you got there ? 

Lieutenant Taylor. Yes, the men were loading when we got at the 
field. 

General McNarney. No one gave you any instructions as to what 
particular part of the Island you were to patrol ? 

Lieutenant Taylor. We called the patrol at the interceptor center 
and they gave us Easy to patrol. That is Barbers Point. We went to 
Easy, but there were not any planes there. 



252 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[4^0] We then came back and got .50 caliber ammunition. Our 
communications were very poor. You know how it is trying to get 
communications on a ship. One minute you can and the next minute 
you can't. So from then on we took it entirely on our own. From 
now we were on our own at that time. 

The Chairman. Lieutenant, had you had any training firing .50 
caliber ammunition before ? 

Lieutenant Taylor. I had fired it once or twice before. 

The Chairman. How long have you been in training here ? 

Lieutenant Tatlor. I have been over here since about — I graduated 
April 25 from the flight squadron. 

The Chairman. This was your 200 hours ? 

Lieutenant Taylor. Yes. There was a month's difference. I 
arrived here in June and I started flying probably June 10 or 11. 

General McNarney. How much time did you get while you were 
here? 

Lieutenant Taylor. I got more time than the rest of them. I think 
I got 430 hours up to that time. 

General McNarney. Do you know whether your squadron had any 
operating plan, standing operating procedure and method of take-off 
and initial point and so forth? 

Lieutenant Taylor. The only plan I know of we got to take orders, 
but it has changed constantly since then. We have changed our tactics 
considerably as to the formation of flight and the method of take-off 
and the metliod of landing. Then I had these M I reports. From 
them we got a general idea of what we were to do in the beginning, but 
they never appeared that we used them as our plan. We never had 
any set plan, I would say ; I don't know, T am not positive. 

General McNarney. If you got the signal to take off, where would 
you go ? 

[J^^i] Lieutenant Taylor. I would turn in mj control and they 
would tell me where to go when I contacted them. 

General McNarney. Isn't there a normal initiative point of rende- 
vous? 

Lieutenant Taylor. No, sir. 

General McNarney. Do you know all the initial points on the 
Island? 

Lieutenant Taylor. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. Call them off. 

Lieutenant Taylor. It starts with A. That is Kahuku. The next 
is Ulupau, Baker; then Koko Head, which is Cast; Dog is Pearl 
Harbor ; Easy is Barbers Point ; Fox is 

Admiral Standley. Lualualei ? 

Lieutenant Taylor. Lualualei. The next is Kaena Point. That is 
George. Next is Hypo, Haleiwa, where we are stationed. Then 
William, which is Wheeler Field. Robert is the interception center. 

General McNarney. Do you think everybody in your squadron was 
thoroughly familiar with these points? 

Lieutenant Taylor. No, sir. I would not say they were all familiar 
with them. Most of them carried maps with them. I know the order 
came out that we were to know them. 

General McNarney. Could you travel out to any point in the Island 
which Mas given to you, say Easy? Are you familiar enough with the 
Island to be able to go to Easy ? 



I 



PROCEEDIXGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 253 

Lieutenant Taylor. You mean if it was heavily overcast and I could 
not see where I was ? 

General McNarney. No. If you knew your location, could you 
actually take your course which would take you within two or three 
miles of Easy? 

Lieutenant Taylor. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Do I understand that you have received a commen- 
dation from the Department since the attack? 

[432] Lieutenant Taylop.. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. In what form? 

Lieutenant Taylor. I understand I am to receive the D. S. C. AW 
I know is just what I read in the newspapers. 

General ^IcCoy. I congratulate you. 

Lieutenant Taylor. Thank you, sir. 

The Chairman. Any questions of the lieutenant ? 

General McCoy. That seems to be all. 

The Chairman. Our inquiry is of such nature that we ask all wit- 
nesses who come here to not discuss their testimony with anyone on 
the outside or to refer to it in any conversation with anyone as to what 
went on in this room. 
.Lieutenant Taylor. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I will ask you to observe that. 

Lieutenant Taylor. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Thank you, sir. We have been glad to have you.. 
Lieutenant. 

Lieutenant Taylor. Thank you, sir. 

The Chairman. Call Lieutenant Welsh. 

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT GEORGE S. WELSH, AIR CORPS, 
UNITED STATES ARMY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you have a seat, Lieutenant, and give the 
reporter your full name? 

Lieutenant Welsh. George S. Welsh. 

The Chairman. And your rank is lieutenant ? 

Lieutenant AVelsh. Yes. 

The Chairman. What was your assignment on the 7th of December ? 

Lieutenant Welsh. I was assistant operations officer, 47tli Pursuit 
Squadron. 

The Chauoian. General McCoy, will you examine Lieutenant 
Welsh ? 

[4^3] General McCoy. General McNarney. 

General McNarney. Where were you stationed on the morning of 
December 7 ? 

Lieutenant Welsh. At Haleiwa. 

General McNarney. Where were you personally ? 

Lieutenant Welsh. At Wheeler Field, Officers' Club. 

General McNarney. Normally, would the pilots and enlisted men 
of the squadron stationed at Haleiwa remain there overnight? 

Lieutenant Welsh. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. Were any of your personnel on the alert or in a 
state- of readiness on December 7 ? 



254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Lieutenant Welsh. No, sir. 

General McNarnet. Will you tell the Commission what you did 
personally from the time you heard the first bomb drop ? 

Lieutenant Welsh. When I heard them I stayed in the club and 
then watched for about five or ten minutes, I imagine, and then we 
got in Lieutenant Taylor's car and drove to HaleiM^a. 

General McNarney. What was the condition of the field when you 
arrived there and what happened ? 

Lieutenant Welsh. They had been alterted, apparently, from 
Wheeler Field, because they were loading the airplanes, and we received 
orders from control to take off and proceed to Easy, which was 
Barbers Point, at 8,000 feet. 

General McNarney. How did you get the order from the control? 
By telephone ? 

Lieutenant Welsh. When we got the order, yes. We got over to 
Easy and didn't see any planes. We didn't get a radio, so we went 
around by Wheeler and saw a B-17 and saw Japanese strung out 
strafing Ewa. I came back to Wheeler Field and tlie Japs were attack- 
ing and came back to Wheeler Field, so we came back to the field and 
then took off again. 

[.^4] General McNarney. When you first landed at the field, 
what was happening at that time ? 

Lieutenant Welsh. They were dispersing the airplanes. I got am- 
munition and gasoline and we took off again. 

General McNarney. Was there any difficulty in getting the am- 
numition or gasoline? 

Lieutenant Welsh. We had to argue with some of the ground crew. 
They wanted us to disperse the airplanes and we wanted to fight. 

Finally I got the ammunition, and just as they were loading some 
50 caliber, the Japs came back again. We took off directly into them 
and shot down some. I shot down one right on Lieutenant Taylor's 
tail. 

I went back to Ewa and found some more- over Barbers Point and 
engaged them there. Then I came back to Wheeler. I landed there 
arid then I went up and found none around five miles Barbers Point. 
I continued around for 45 minutes. I didn't have a regular patrol. 
Then there was no more action. 

General McNarney. How many planes in your squadron did you 
get in the air? 

Lieutenant Welsh. While the Japs were still over the Island? 

General McNarney. I mean the morning of the attack or during 
the course of the attack. 

Lieutenant Welsh. I would say four, or maybe six, airplanes. I am 
sure it was four. 

General McNarney. Did they go off singly or in formation ? 

Lieutenant Welsh. Lieutenant Taylor and I took off in formation. 
Lieutenant Brown. Webster, and Rogers took off. We were in forma- 
tion and broke away and just disorganized, getting any airplane we 
could. 

General McNarney. Are you familiar with all the initial [4^5] 
points about the Island? 

Lieutenant Welsh. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 255 

General McXarxey. Would you say you were familiar enough with 
the Island and sufficiently familiar with the topography to be able to 
fly direct to an initial point ? 

Lieutenant Welsh. Yes. 

General McNarney. Could you say that for tlie rest of the pilots 
of the squadron? 

Lieutenant Welsh. I can now, sir, but I could not then. It has 
been very well impressed upon us now, but before that I don't think 
very many of them knew them. 

General McNarxey. How long have these initial points been estab- 
lished here? 

Lieutenant Welsh. AVell, I arrived in February last year, and they 
were established then. 

The Chairman. February, 1941, you mean? 

Lieutenant Welsh. Yes. 

The Chairman. This year you mean ? 

Lieutenant Welsh. Yes. 

General McNarney. Who is your squadron commander? 

Lieutenant Welsh. Major Austin. 

General McNarxey. Where was he at the time ? 

Lieutenant Welsh. He was on the Island of Molokai. 

General McNarxey. Who was acting squadron commander? 

Lieutenant Welsh. Lieutenant Rogers is acting squadron com- 
mander. 

General McNarxey. Where was he? 

Lieutenant Welsh. At Wlieeler Field. 

The Chairman. Had he been in the Officers' Club there ? 

Lieutenant Welsh. No, sir, he was in his own quarters. 

General McNarxey. Do j^ou know when he arrived at Haleiwa ? 

Lieutenant Welsh. He arrived there about the same time I did. I 
saw him getting out of his car. 

[4^6] General McNarney. Did he take off? 

Lieutenant Welsh. He took off, too, about a half hour later, I be- 
lieve. 

The Chairman. Where Avere you on the night of December 6, Sat- 
urday night? 

Lieutenant Welsh. At Honolulu, Hickam Field, and Pearl Harbor. 

The Chairmax. Did you have a party? 

Lieutenant Welsh. Yes, sir. 

The Chairmax. You were on leave ? 

Lieutenant Welsh. Yes. 

The Chairmax. How many planes do you think you got? 

Lieutenant Welsh. I only saw four hit, sir. 

General McCoy. You were given credit for bringing down four 
planes, were you not ? 

Lieutenant Welsh. Yes, sir. I was given credit for five, but I did 
not see the other one. 

The Chairmax. Anything further? 

General McCoy. No, sir. 

Admiral Staxdley. You were assigned to special detail at Haleiwa ? 

Lieutenant Welsh. I had a regular duty, yes. 

Admiral Staxdley. Did you have a tour of duty at Haleiwa with 
officers assigned to the tour of duty, daytime? 



256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Lieutenant Wfxsh. No, sir, our whole squadron was mdved to 
Haleiwa for 15 days approximately for training in the field. 

Admiral Standley, Your planes were parked there? 

Lieutenant Welsh. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. What sort of guard was over your planes at 
that time ? 

Lieutenant Welsh. I imagine a regular field guard, I am not posi- 
tive about it, but at least one man for every plane, armed with ]3istol 
and rifle. 

[4^7] Admiral Standley. Were there any officers assigned to 
duty with that detail so that there was some ofiicer there every day? 

Lieutenant Welsh. Yes, w^e had an officer there and four or five 
others, pilots, but they were new pilots and apparently they had 
never flown P-40's, and we didn't take them. ' 

Admiral Standley. Well, did you at any time stand a tour of 
duty? 

Lieutenant Welsh. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. During your tour of duty, what was your re- 
sponsibility as to these planes ? 

Lieutenant Welsh. To guard the planes fi'om sabotage. We were 
on alert for sabotage then. We did not have any instructions against 
aerial attack ; it was all ground defense, and I was to inspect the guard 
twice during each relief. 

Admiral Standley. How many guards did you have stationed? 

Lieutenant Welsh. At Haleiwa? 

Admiral Standley. Yes. 

Lieutenant Welsh. Twenty-three, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Were they armed? 

Lieutenant Welsh. Yes, with a pistol, and some with pistol and 
rifle. 

Admiral Standley. Were there any machine guns ? 

Lieutenant Welsh. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Did they have ammunition? 

Lieutenant Welsh. They had .30 calil^er ammunition but no .50 
caliber. 

General McCoy. Was there any installation of antiaircraft guns 
ready for action then? 

Lieutenant Welsh. No, sir, there were none ready. There were 
pits dug, but no guns in them. 

Admiral Standley. Were there any instructions issued to those 
guards as to what to do in case of an enemy airplane coming over? 

Lieutenant Welsh. No, sir. 

[4^8] Admiral Standley. There was no indication that sabo- 
tage might take the nature of an attack from above ? 

Lieutenant Welsh. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. That is all. 

The Chairman. We will ask you ijot to discuss the testimony that 
you have given here or anything that has happened in this room? 

General McCoy. I congratulate you on your D. S. C, Lieutenant. 

Lieutenant Welsh. Thank you. sir. 

Colonel Brown. Colonel Powell is back with some information you 
wanted. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 257 

FURTHER TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL CARROLL A. 
POWELL, SIGNAL CORPS, U. S. ARMY 

Colonel Powell. I have cliecked with the general manager of the 
telephone company and he told me that there was no unusual amount 
of traffic that they carried on Sunday morning, that it was just the 
same amount, and the technical staff report there were no unusual dis- 
turbances on their frequency. 

The Chairman, That would indicate there was no jamming? 

Colonel Powell. Yes, sir. 

Their frequency is 35 to 40 megacycles. 

The Chairman. Thank you. Colonel. 

Major AxuEN. The next is Sergeant Hall, sir. 

The Chairman. Very well. 

TESTIMONY OF SERGEANT MOBLEY L. HALL, 
UNITED STATES ARMY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Have a seat. Sergeant, and give your name to the 
reporter. 

Sergeant Hall. Mobley L Hall. 

The Chairman. Where were you assigned on the morning of 

[Jfi9'] December 7, sir? 

Sergeant Hall. Well, sir, I was in my quarters in the new defense 
housing project. When the first bomb dropped I knew something 
was wrong, and I knew my duty was to report to my place of duty. 

The Chairman. Where w as your place of duty ? 

Sergeant Hall. At the hangar. 

General McXarney. What squadron did you belong to, or what 
job did you hold in the squadron ? 

Sergeant Hall. Crew chief, headquarters squadron, 18th Pursuit. 

General McNarney. Go ahead with your narrative. Sergeant. 

Sergeant Hall. I got in my car and went down to the hangar 
to see what was happening, and it was as I arrived there the bombing 
was going on, and as soon as that was over I saw the planes. We had 
only three planes. 

General McNarney. How many planes did you have in the 
squadron ? 

Sergeant Hall. Three. 

General McNarney. What was your regular assignment there? 

Sergeant Hall. Three planes was the only ones : two AT-6's and 
one OA-9. 

General McNarney. None of those were combat planes? 

Sergeant Hall. No, sir. Two of them was on the line, the OA-9 
and the AT-6, Mine was in the hangar, which was burned. 

I saw one still in a whole piece which was parked by the 0x^-9. As 
soon as the bombing was over I had instructions and all I did Avas 
pull it off the ramp, and the oil hues were shot off. I thought it was 
on fire and switched it off at tlie end of the ramp. As I got it over 
they came back, and then I left. There was nothing then I could do 
because I thought the airplane was burning, and then Ave all went 
to work [45^] on the fire and tried to get the hose to put 
the fire out. 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 1— — 18 



258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Where were your quarters ? 

Sergeant Hall. 724. 

General McNarney. That was in the barracks ? 

Sergeant Hall. No, sir. That is in the new defense housing at 
Kemoo Farms. 

The Chairman. Were j^ou patrolling near the house? 

Sergeant Hall. No, sir. I had just gotten up. 

General McNarney. Where were you on the night of December 6? 

Sergeant Hall. I was home. 

General McNarney. Are you married? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. How quickly, according to your observation, did 
the men respond when these bombs were heard ? 

Sergeant Hall. Well, sir, as best I could say, everybody was there. 
They seemed to be there and doing everything as rapidly as possible. 

The Chairman. Was there practically a full complement of the 
airplane force on the field promptly ? Was it that practically every- 
one who was assigned there was working there that morning? 

Sergeant Hall. Well, sir, that is hard to say ; I would not say. 

The Chairman. Of course, I realize you did not stay there to count 
them. 

Sergeant Hall. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Were there many leaves that Saturday night? 

Sergeant Hall. As usual. 

The Chairman. More than usual? 

Sergeant Hall, Sir, I could not say; not that I know of. As soon 
as my work was over, I would always go home. 

General McNarney. Who is your squadron commander? 

[4^1] Sergeant Hall. Lieutenant Armstrong. 

General McNarney. Did you see him on the morning of the 7th? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. Did he give you any instructions as to what 
to do? 

Sergeant Hall. Well, sir, he didn't come down to the squadron till 
after the attack. He came down the line with his flying clothes on, but 
somehow he tackled some kind of job before he got to the squadron. 

General McNarney. Do you know anything about a guard on the 
field the night before? 

Sergeant Hall. No, sir, I do not. 

General McNarney. You do not know anything about that? 

Sergeant Hall. No. 

General McNarney. Were there any machine guns or automatic 
weapons placed around the field for anti-aircraft protection? 

Sergeant Hall. I don't know about that, sir. I understood we 
were on the alert. I thought we were. 

General McNarney. What kind of alert did you think you were on? 

Sergeant Hall. When the first alert just went on it was four min- 
utes and then E5 — four hours, and all I knew was to^ stick close by. 

General McNarney. When were you informed of the alert? Do 
you know the date? 

Sergeant Hall. No, sir, I do not. 

The Chairman. It would be more than a week before the attack? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes. 

The Chairman. I suspect that it was November 27 ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 259 

Sergeant Hall. That is just about when it was. 

General McNarney. How soon did it take to go on Easy? 

[4^2] Sergeant Hall. I know I was on guard in the hangar 
with our whole crew, 24 of our members, and I was trying to bring 
some of them out. 

General McNarnet. Which ships were in commission on the morn- 
ing of December 7? 

Sergeant Hall. My own ship, which had just been put in com- 
mission. I had just put a new engine in, and that was why it was in 
the hangar. 

General McCoy. Did it burn up? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. It did? 

Sergeant Hall. Completely. 

General McNarney. What type ship was this you taxied out? 

Sergeant Hall. AT-6. 

General McNarney. Did it burn up? 

Sergeant Hall. No, sir. 

General McNarney. You saved that one? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes. 

The Chairman. Didn't you say the oil lines were shot off? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes. 

The Chairman. With machine-gun bullets, I suppose? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes. 

The Chairman. When you got there and the Japanese were strafing 
your field with machine guns, did they get some of your fellows? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Were your quarters bombed or strafed? 

Sergeant Hall. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Was the barracks that was hit by the bomb at 
Wheeler Tield? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes. 

General McNarney. Were your barracks bombed and burned? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes, it was bombed, but not burned. It was burned 
slightly, but all that fire we exterminated. I [433] believe 
my barracks was the only barracks that was severely bombed, and they 
had some strafing. 

General McNarney. How long have you been in the service, Ser- 
geant ? 

Sergeant Hall. Three years and seven months, sir. 

General McNarney. How long have you been over here? 

Sergeant Hall. I came over here in September, 1938. I have been 
here ever since. 

The Chairman. Any other questions? 

Admiral Standley. Sergeant, you spoke of your own plane being 
in the hangar? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes. 

Admiral Standley, Was there any effort or plan for defense against 
sabotage of that plane in the hangar? 

Sergeant Hall. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. The other two planes were out on the line? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes. 



260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Standley. Were there any plans for protecting those 
planes against sabotage ? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes, sir, we had guards for patrolling that area. 

Admiral Standley. Did you have anything to do with the guards ? 

Sergeant Hall. Well, our guard is run, it seems to me, changed ever 
so often and they work in shifts. 

General McCoy. Was there any infantry guard in the post, so far 
as you know ? 

Sergeant Hall. Well, sir, not around the airplanes, because our 
Air Corps men patrolled the airplanes. 

General McCoy. Did they come to you? You took your turn at 
guard duty, I suppose ? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes. 

[4^4] General McCoy. What were your instructions in the event 
of danger from aloft or by plane ? 

Sergeant Hall. Well, sir, my instructions were naturally — all we 
had was on sabotage, and that was to investigate, and if anybody was 
fooling around, give them a chance to halt three times, as usual, and 
then, why, shoot. Those instructions we always gave the sentries. 

General McCoy. Was there any sabotage, so far as you know? 

Sergeant Hall. No, sir, so far as I know. 

General McCoy. No attempt at it ? 

Sergeant Hall. No. 

General McCoy. Was there any firing against the Japanese on 
Wheeler Field, so far as you know? 

Sergeant Hall. Well, my ammunition wavSn't sufficient to fire at the 
airplanes. 

General McCoy. Did they get any machine guns in action? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes, sir. Sergeant Bayon got the first machine 
gun set up. It was a .50 caliber, and he is credited with shooting an 
airplane down that went into Wahiawa, went down. 

The Chairman. Were machine guns actually placed around the 
field? 

Sergeant Hall. They had to go to the supply room to get them out. 

The Chairman. To get the guns and the supplies ? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes. 

The Chairman. You were not expecting that type of attack on the 
field? 

Sergeant Hall. No. 

General McCoy. Were you very much surprised when it happened ? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes, sir, I certainly was, although I looked for it, 
but I did not believe it was real. 

[43S] The Chairman. Had there been any talk among the troops 
or your crowd, your fellows, of a possible Japanese air raid here? 

Sergeant Hall. No, sir. 

The Chairman. No one was expecting an air raid attack? 

Sergeant Hall. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Were you conscious almost immediately that they 
were Japanese planes, or did you think it maybe was some friendly 
plane that was carrying out a maneuver or something of that sort? 
What was your reaction to it? Wliat was your impression? 

Sergeant Hall. Well, sir, my impression was when I heard the first 
bomb drop, I knew something was wrong. I did not know what it 
was, but I knew I was supposed to report to my place of duty. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 261 

General McCoy. Were you able to see that they were Japanese 
planes? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes, sir. I looked at them for a while and I recog- 
nized the rising sun on the airplane. 

The Chairman. Before you got to your place of duty ? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes. 

The Chairman. On the first attack, were they flying low? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes, very low. 

The Chairman. And strafing? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes, and bombing. 

The Chairman. And bombing? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes. 

The Chairman. From a vevj low altitude ? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes. 

The Chairman. When you went toward Wheeler Field, how many 
planes did it seem to you were attacking the field ? I know you did 
not count them. 

Sergeant Hall. They had to be anywhere from 12 to 15. 

[^•i6'J The Chairman. It must have been that many? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes. 

General McNarney. How many were brought down at Wheeler 
Field, if you know ? 

Sergeant Hall. No, sir, I don't know. 

General McNarney. Did you see any Japanese planes brought 
down ? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes, sir, this one. I didn't see it fall but I saw it 
later after I got a chance to go over there. 

General McNarney. Do you know what attack that occured in? 

Sergeant Hall, The first attack, sir. 

The Chairman. Thev got the machine guns up and hit one in the 
first attack? 

Sergeant Hall. Yes. 

General McCoy. How many attacks were there ? 

Sergeant Hall. There were actually two that I know of. After the 
fi.rst attack they didn't go very far but they came back and started 
strafing. 

The Chairman. Sergeant, did you get an impression as to what 
direction they came from into Wheeler Field ? 

Sergeant Hall. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You could not ascertain that ? 

Sergeant Hall. No. 

The Chairman. Any other questions? 

General McCoy. I think not. 

Tlie Chairman, The nature of our inquiry is such that we think 
it necessary to ask the witnesses not to discuss with anyone their testi- 
mony or what has been said while they have been in the room. I will 
ask you to observe that. 

Sergeant Hall. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Sergeant, have you been commended for your 
action ? 

[^■57] Sergeant Hall, Only by tlie squadron commander, sir. 



262 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN FRANK W. EBEY, COAST ARTILLERY, 
UNITED STATES ARMY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give the reporter your full name, 
Captain ? 

Captain Ebey. Frank W. Ebey, Captain, 55th Coast Artillery. 

The Chairman. What was your assignment on the morning of 
December 7? 

Captain Ebey. I was commanding Battery B, 55th Coast Artillery, 
Fort Kamehameha. 

The Chairman. Where is Fort Kamehameha? 

Captain Ebey. Eight at Hickam Field. 

General McCoy. Would you show it on the map ? 

Captain Ebey. Yes. It is right here (indicating on the map). 

Admiral Standley. Is the fort across the channel ? 

Captain Ebey. Yes, Fort Weaver. 

The Chairman. Are your officers' quarters right there at the 
battery ? 

Captain Ebey. About two and a half blocks from my battery, sir. 

The Chairman. Where were you when you first learned of the 
attack? 

Captain Ebey. I was sitting on my lanai reading a book, when I 
first heard this commotion. I thought it was a Navy plane, but we 
were on an anti-sabotage alert, so I got my gun and went up to the 
battery. I did not think we were being attacked. I just stayed there, 
and the first indication was a plane dove at me, letting go machine 
guns at me, and I saw dive bombers coming down on Pearl Harbor, 
and I knew what it was. 

[4^8] _ The Chairman. It was a surprise to you ? 

Captain Ebey. Yes, I was sort of stunned. 

The Chairman. What was your equipment at your post? 

Captain Ebey. My equipment was four 155 millimeter guns, truck 
drawn, and we had some .30 caliber machine guns with anti-aircraft 
mounts. 

The Chairman. Were your machine guns in place? 

Captain Ebey. No, sir. The machine guns are not anti-aircraft 
machine guns ; they are used for ground defense, but my supply ser- 
geant was there with a few rounds of machine-gun ammunition, and 
I got the battery and the men from Fort Kam, and the machine guns 
were coming at us, and I ordered the machine guns set up in the rear 
of my place. We set them up in the tennis court. I sent two thirds 
down to load the guns and one third down to get ammunition. We 
loaded up the guns with the ammunition and started firing. 

We established these machine gun positions there and started firing 
at 8 :13. I looked at my watch. 

The Chairman. Where were the machine guns before you set them 
up in your tennis court ? 

Captain Ebey. They were right in my supply room, sir, ready to go 
to work. 

The Chairman. Could you use your big guns for anti-aircraft 
action? 

Captain Ebey. No, sir, they are designed for no purpose except 
coast defense or against land attack. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 263 

The Chairman. Then what was done ? 

Captain Ebet. We went to battle position. 

General McCoy. Did you have any target in the harbor or any har- 
bor mount ? 

Captain Ebey. No, sir, our battle position is this point (indicating 
on map) , Barbers Point. We had to cross the harbor. We had this 
position here (indicating) by barge, and then by road, but we did 
manage to bring down two planes in [4^^] the second attack 

with macliine guns, two fighter planes that came over our barracks, 
and we knocked them down. 

General McCoy. Which must have been a great satisfaction to you ? 

Captain Ebey. It was a great satisfaction, sir. 

General McCoy. You saw no submarines or other hostile water 
craft? 

Captain Ebey. I saw no submarines or any water craft. We were 
too busy trying to get what was in the air. 

We got the barge loaded between the second and last attack. As 
we went out of the channel tAvo fighters dove on us and machine- 
gunned us. The machine guns were firing back, but they didn't hit 
any of our men. It seemed like they were unloading a truckload of 
high-explosive ammunition. 

As they passed over us, some cruiser there let go_with all the equip- 
ment, and these two ]^lanes seemed to dissolve in the air. They must 
have cut them to 

The Chairman. Cut them to pieces ? 

Captain Ebey. Yes, and I have some scraps of the stuff left. 

The Chairman. You had machine guns in your barge? 

Captain Ebey. Yes, and we fought back. I personally handled the 
machine gun on the barge and we fought back. 

I might say that Quartermaster Mr. Jack Barros made six trips un- 
der fire across Pearl Harbor, and he certainly did his job well. 

That is all we did, sir. We went out to Barbers Point to battle 
position, and we went out and got our guns into position and were 
ready to fire at 3 o'clock. We were completely ready to fire. 

The Chairman. That is the Coast Artillery ? 

Captain Ebey. The Coast Artillery, yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Did you get any instructions from high au- 
thority? 

[4-4^] Captain Ebey. Yes, my battalion commander. 

General McCoy. Who is he? 

Captain Ebey. Colonel McCarthy. He was at the battery a min- 
ute before I was and he said, "Get your guns ready and rolling," and 
I said, "They are all made ready now." 

The Chairman. Was your full complement of men pra'ctically on 

Captain Ebey. They were all on hand, sir. Of course, it was the 
day before pay day, and we were on an anti-sabotage alert, and not 
many of them could leave anyhow. 

The Chairman. Were there many off on leave Saturday night? 

Captain Ebey. No. The ones tliat could did, but it was the day 
before pay day, and many of them were financially unable to go. 

The Chairman. Where were you on Saturday night ? 



264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Ebet. Well, I am a sort of bachelor. My wife and daugh- 
ter are in the States, and I was reading a book called "John Brown's 
Body." 

General McCoy. That is a very good book, sir. 

Captain Ebey. Yes. I was reading about the surprise at Shiloh 
Church when the attack occurred. 

The Chairman. Any other questions? 

Admiral Standley. Yes. 

Captain, had you received any instructions in any way which would 
lead you to believe that there had been any warning in regard to an 
attack? 

Captain Ebey. We were on the anti-sabotage alert, sir, and with 
the international situation it might occur some day, and we were hold- 
ing the infantry reserve in case of any uprising. 

We had gone^ so many times to our war position that it just seemed 
like drill even when they were firing at us. None of the men got 
excited. 

[441] Admiral Standley. There was nothing in the way of an 
expression that would indicate that there was apprehension among 
those in the War Department or in headquarters of an attack other 
than sabotage? 

Captain Ebey. No, sir, I had no idea by any expression of any at- 
tack being imminent. 

Admiral Standley. Off the record. 

(There was a discusson off the record.) 

Greneral McCoy. Did you have liaison with the Navy at all? Any 
information from, the Navy previous to this attack ? 

Captain Ebey. Well, sir J I may say that the Navy impressed me with 
the efficiency of their barrage and they really saved the lives of many 
of this group when this cruiser shot those planes up, but I believe the 
battery commander would know about the liaison wdth the Navy. 

General McNarney. How did you get this barge across? 

Captain Ebey. It is pushed. They had this harbor boat, and we just 
pushed it across. 

General McNarney. Who manned it? 

Captain Ebey. It is manned by a crew of two sailors and chief engi- 
neers and master and several employees of the Quartermaster Corps. 

General McNarney. They were there available at the time. 

Captain Ebey. Yes, everybody was on the job. 

General McNarney. Where do they live ? 

Captain Ebey. They live right almost at Fort Kamehameha dock. 

General McCoy. Wlio was in command of it then ? 

Captain Ebey. Colonel E. B. Walker. 

General McCoy. Have you been commended for your action on that 
day? 

Captain Ebey. No, sir, it was just — I did not do anything more than 
the rest of the battery did. They were all just [44^] calm. 
We were being shot at and we could not do much else than fire back. 

The Chairman. Any further questions? 

General McCoy. No. 

The Chairman. Captain, we think it necessary in view of the nature 
of our inquiry to ask the witnesses not to discuss their testimonv or 



PROCEEDINGS OF EOBERTS COMMISSION 265 

what occurs in this room with anyone, and we will ask you to observe 
that. 

Captain Ebey. Yes. sir. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. 

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WILLIAM J. McCARTHY, COAST 
ARTILLERY, UNITED STATES ARMY 

(The witness was sworn in due fonn by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Please sit down, Colonel, and give your name to 
the reporter. 

Colonel McCarthy. William J. McCarthy. 

The Chairman. AVhat was your assignment on the morning of 
December 7, Colonel ? 

Colonel McCarthy. Commanding officer. First Battalion, 55th 
Coast Artillery, Fort Kamehameha, Territory of Hawaii. 

The Chairman. Wliat was your first information that you had been 
attacked? 

Colonel McCarthy. About 7:45 Sunday morning I heard several 
planes. They don't bother me any. 

The Chairman. You heard the planes before you heard the shoot- 
ing? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, for this reason, that my quarters are such 
that the planes flying in and out of Hickam Field always fly over my 
quarters. 

It wasn't until I heard the bombing and explosion and the tat-tat- 
tat of machine guns that I knew what it was. That was at 7 : 45. 

[44^] My first reaction was that this is a funny time for the 
Air Corps to start trouble. I got out just in time to see a single-seater 
Japanese plane flying over my quarters. 

The Chairman. Did you have any trouble in identifying it ? 

Colonel McCarthy, No. There was the insignia the red ball, and 
his two machine guns were both going. I knew I was safe because he 
had just passed me and headed for Hickam Field. 

That immediately excited my curiosity, and I went to the telephone 
and called to see what it was all about. The telephone operator could 
not give me any information, so I immediately got in my car and 
alerted my other batteries and t9ld them to get rolling, that is, 
Battery A and C. 

The Chairman. Was the captain who was just in here under your 
command ? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes. he is under my command. He commanded 
Battery B. 

I told him to get rolling and get to war position. 

At that time there was a lot of machine-gun bullets all around the 
place, and I reached the battery which is at the lower end of Oahu 
Point, and a Japanese plane had just struck a tree and caromed off 
the first tree and struck into a wall at my right at the ordnance 
machine gun shed. That plane was on the ground. The pilot was 
dead, having left the pilot stuffed in the tree, but the plane was on the 
ground, and the engine went around the ordnance shop. [444] 
In caroming off he struck several men who were in the road. One 
man was completely decapitated. Another man apparently had been 



266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

hit by the prop, because his legs and arms and head were off, lying 
right on the grass. The pilot was dead, as I say, in the plane. 

By that time headquarters battery, A battery and B battery, were 
firing with machine guns, auto rifles, and rifles at the planes going over. 

The Chairman. Where were the machine guns before the action 
began ? 

Colonel McCarthy. They were in the battery areas. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Colonel McCarthy. Pulled out of the storeroom, and everybody 
started firing. 

The Chairman. Was your command intact that morning? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Were there many leaves over that 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir. They were intact. There were no 
leaves other than the usual granted. There were at least 50% of all 
commands present, and probably more than that, because nobody had 
any money, and they all stayed in the post. 

The Chairman. General ? 

General McNarney. Colonel, when did you receive the orders to 
go on Alert No. 1 ? 

Colonel McCarthy. Alert No. 1 ? About the 21st or 22nd of Novem- 
ber. We were on Alert No. 1 and 2 up to the time of the attack. 

General McNarney. When were you ordered on Alert No. 2 ? 

Colonel McCarthy. About the 30th, and that was taken off about 
the 3rd or 4th. 

The Chairman. There was a period in there that you were on 2, 
was there? 

[44^1 Colonel McCartpiy. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. What does Alert No. 1 entail in your com- 
mand? 

Colonel McCarthy. Alert No. 1 entails anti-sabotage guard, guard 
of installations, consists primarily of merely guards armed with rifles 
to protect vital installations. 

General McNarney. While you were on Alert No. 2, what addi- 
tional measures did you take ? 

Colonel McCarthy. The additional measures involved in Alert No. 
2. sir, were to increase the guards. We had doubled guards on every 
place. 

General McNarney. You set up'no machine guns? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir. 

General McNarney. Or anti-aircraft work? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir; just guards, anti-sabotage. 

The Chairman. Were you expecting any attack in the nature of a 
Japanese air raid, Colonel ? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir. 

The Chairbian. Heard no suggestion of any such thing ? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Over this period ? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir. 

General McNarney. Where are your battle positions ? 

Colonel McCarthy. My battle positions, sir, are located on the 
south shore. My command post is at station B, commonly called the 
Ewa group. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 267 

General McCoy. Will you show us on the map, please ? 

The Chairman. Would you? 

Colonel McC.^ETHY. Yes, sir, gladly. - 

(The witness went to a map.) Barbers Point lighthouse (indicat- 
ing) . My command post is right behind on a hill called Puu Palailia. 
That is mV command post. I have two [U6^ giuis at Awanui 
Gulch, r have four guns immediately to the left of Barbers Point 
lighthouse on the beach. I have four guns, battery C, at Fort Weaver, 
mounted on Panama mounts, and I have four guns at Fort Kame- 
hameha mounted on the beach just to the left of Battery Selfridge, all 
mounted on Panama mounts with the exception of the ones at Barbers 
Point, which are dug in, the ordinary field positions. All these guns 
are on the beach. 

General McNarney. And how many automatic or infantry weapons 
do you have in your command for close-in defense? 

Oolonel McCarthy. For close-in defense, for the defense of the 
materiel I am armed Avith .30 caliber rifle, machine guns .30 caliber, 
and automatic rifles, Browning automatics, B.A.R. 

General McNarney. Are any of those set up for anti-aircraft de- 
fense ? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir. They are all around the guns. 

General McNarney. When did any of your weapons get into action 
on that morning ? Do you know ? 

Colonel McCarthy. The first somewhere between eight o'clock and 
eight-ten, but that was right in the battery areas at Fort Kamehameha. 

General McCoy. Did any of your guns go into action at all against 
the Japanese? 

Colonel McCarthy. The 155's, no, sir; none of my guns have been 
in action yet, sir. 

General McCoy. Did you see any targets at all on the sea or at the 
entrance of the harbor ? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Submarines? 

Colonel McCarthy. Submarines were out there, but we were told 
not to fire on them. When I say "not to fire on them," we were told 
to hold our fire until we were directed to fire, [4-4^] although 
we have an order that if we cannot positively identify a submarine 
we will fire on it, in our own judgment. All American submarines 
now are to be convoyed or escorted by a destroyer, so that if we see 
a submarine that is unescorted it is presumably an enemy and we 
will fire on it. 

General McNarney. Those are the orders in effect at the moment? 

Colonel McCarthy. At the moment, yes, sir. 

General McNarney. Were they in effect on December 7? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir. 

General McNarney. How did you get your firing — or would you 
have gotten your firing orders, on December 7 ? 

Colonel McCarthy. From the harbor. Harbor defense. 

General McNarney. From the harbor defense? 

Colonel McCarthy. At Fort Kamehameha. 

General McNarney. Good communications? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir. They are perfect. 



268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McNarxey. How soon did you get your command post 
manned ? 

Colonel McCarthy. The command post, sir, was manned all the 
time. 

General McNarney. That is your battle position command post? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir. That was manned ever since the 
day of the original alert. 

General McCoy. Did you get any orders from higher authority 
that day? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Acted entirely on your own initiative ? 

Colonel McCarthy. , Yes, sir. As soon as I saw what was happen- 
ing I told the batteries to roll, to get out to their positions. I might 
interpose this: Battery A of course was in position right there at 
Kam. Battery C guns were in position at [M^] Weaver, and 
the only battery that had to be emplaced was B battery at Barbers 
Point. C and B battery started across the channel on the barge going 
about eight-thirty. They couldn't get across at that time due to the 
fact that the Navy destroyers were just pouring out of there just as 
fast as they could go, with all guns blazing, all their anti-aircraft, 
and naturally we couldn't block the channel to them. As soon as we 
got clear on the second attack we cleared across, and B battery was 
strafed going across with their guns. 

General McNarney. Did you receive an Alert No. 3 status from 
the higher command on that day ? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir, although I was in Alert No. 3. 

The Chahjman. After you got started you were^ 

Colonel McCarthy. I just went out there with ammunition. 

General McNarney. Now, you stated that you were on alert No. 2 
for a few days during this period. Would there be any records in 
your headquarters showing when you received the Alert No. 2 and 
when you went off of it, or was that entirely a verbal order? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir, there would not be, because those were 
verbal instructions from the post commander. 

General McCoy. In the nature of drill ? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir, they were not in the nature of drill. 
The commanding officers of the variou Ijattalions were called in and 
told that Alert No. 2 was on, to double the guards, and three or four 
days before the attack it was eased off. 

General McCoy. Have you a mimeographed sheet showing what 
Alert No. 2 is? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir. It is contained in S. O. P., Standing 
Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department, which all organi- 
zations or battalions at least^ 

General McNarney. Who is the officer that called you in [44^^ 
and gave you the order for Alert No. 2 ? 

Colonel McCarthy. If I recollect correctly, it was Colonel Walker. 

General McCoy. He is your regimental commander ? 

Colonel McCarthy. He is the post commander, yes, sir. 

General McCoy. He is also regimental commander ? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Did that apply to the whole coast defense system, 
do you know, or simply to your post ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 269 

Colonel McCarthy. I wouldn't know, sir. I know it applies — it 
applied to our post, because anything that would affect the whole 
system would come from the Hawaiian coast artillery command. 

General McCoy. And you are quite sure that you never got an order 
for Alert No. 3? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir, not on the 7th I didn't, except: the 
only order that we received that might be interpreted as an Alert No. 3 
was the message of three o'clock in the afternoon, or in the after- 
noon — just what time I don't recall — that all officers would report 
to their battle stations and remain there. That was a message from 
harbor defenses at Pearl Harbor. 

General McNarney. Do you keep any war dairy in your organi- 
zation ? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. Did you keep it prior to December 7? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir. 

General McNarney. Have you one for December 7 ? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. I have nothing further. 

The Chairman. Any further questions, gentlemen? 

Admiral Standley. I would like to ask some. 

Under Alert No. 2, Colonel, that you went into on about [4^6'] 
the 30th, what is your liaison there with the Navy ? 

Colonel McCarthy. Our liaison with the Navy, sir, operates through 
Pearl Harbor, through a naval liaison officer called the harbor con- 
trol post, the navy yard. I personally have no direct connection with 
it. That is, if I want to find out anything I call harbor defenses, 
and they get the harbor control post of the navy yard and get rulings 
on any questions. 

Admiral Standley. Is there any Army liaison at harbor control 
post? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir. That's Captain Eby that was in 
here, is the liaison officer in the harbor control post now. 

Admiral Standley. Was he before ? 

Colonel McCarthy. Not before the night of the 7tli, but there was 
one, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Who ? 

Colonel McCarthy. Colonel Dingman. 

General McCoy. Do you get a report as to the ships that come in 
and out? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir. we get that direct from harbor de- 
fenses. In other words, a friendly ship coming out, they notify us 
that one DD or one BB or aircraft carrier is leaving port or will 
ply 

General McCoy. Did you get any such notices on the day of tlie 7th ? 

Colonel McCarthy. I would have to consult the record, sir. There 
Avere so many things came in there, I wouldn't remember. We un- 
doubtedly did, though, late in the afternoon or in the afternoon or 
night. 

General McCoy. Are you conscious of any particular responsibility 
on your part when the fleet is in the harbor? 



270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir, very much so. It is my duty to protect 
and keep that channel clear against all landing [4^1] forces 

and to see that the Navy has safe conduct through there. 

General McCoy. Were you conscious of any particularly added re- 
sponsibility when the fleet was in the harbor ? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir. I must prevent any foreign vessel, 
warcraft, from entering that harbor. 

General McCoy. Is the torpedo net there under your control or 
defense ? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir. That is entirely under the control of 
the Navy, sir. 

General McCoy. You have no guns that would help protect that? 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir, I have : A battery at Fort Kamehameha 
could shoot right down that channel, and I could have the guns at Fort 
Weaver turn around and shoot at it. 

General McCoy. Did you learn from the Navy at any time on the 
7th of the presence of any submarine ? 

Colonel McCarthy. I presume it came from the Navy. My own 
headquarters notified me that there were enemy submarines off Barbers 
Point, and I was alerted on Alert 3, condition of readiness 2, ready to 
go in action immediately, not later than five minutes. 

General McCoy. Did you see any submarines that day ? 

Colonel McCarthy. Our own, yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Did you see any enemy submarines ? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Colonel, this liaison between, or on this post, 
harbor 

Colonel McCarthy. Harbor control post. 

Admiral Standley. Harbor control post. That liaison. That has 
existed for how long ? Do you know ? 

Colonel McCarthy. Well, I have been here, sir, twenty-seven or 
-eight months, and to my knowledge that has been in existence all the 
time. 

[4S2] Admiral Standley. Yes. 

General McCoy. Have you direct communications with the navy 
yard? 

Colonel McCarthy. Sir? 

General McCoy. Have you direct communications to the navy yarr' 
or direct wire, or what ? 

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir, I have no direct communication with the 
navy yard. All our communications are addressed to the harbor de- 
fenses of Pearl Harbor, and there is an officer there who contacts the 
navy control post. 

General McCoy. I have no further questions. 

The Chairman. Colonel, we will ask you not to discuss what has 
gone on in the room while you were here, with anyone. 

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Thank you, sir. 

Major Allen. Private Shortt, Fort Kamehameha. 

The Chairman. Private, will you be sworn ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 271 

TESTIMONY OF PEIVATE CKEED SHORTT, UNITED STATES ARMY 

(The oath ^vas administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Give the reporter your full name, will you? 

Private Shoktt. Creed Shortt, 

The Chairman. What command are you in, Shortt ? 

Private Shortt. Fort Kam Coast Artillery. Rather, ambulance. 
Fort Kam ambulance driver. 

The Chairman. Who was your immediate commander on the day of 
December 7? 

Private Shortt. Sir? Major Gill was in charge of the dispensary. 

The Chairman. Where were you when the attack came on? 

Private Shortt. Well, sir, I was at the motor pool down there wash- 
ing the ambulance when the attack first began, and I [4^3] hit — 
went to the dispensary. 

The Chairman. A little bit louder. I don't hear you. 

Private Shortt. Sir, I was down there at the motor pool washing 
the ambulance, sir. I had the left fender, just got it waxed, and when 
the attack began I pulled out and went to the dispensary. That was 
my first move. 

The Chairman. What hour, as nearly as you know, was that? 

Private Shortt. Sir, by the clock down there it was eight o'clock, 
about eight o'clock when it happened. 

General McCoy. Where was this, Private ? 

Private Shortt. Sir? 

General McCoy. Where was this ? 

Private Shortt. Fort Kam dispensary. 

The Chairman. Did you notice the size of the flight that went over 
there? Have you any notion of the number of planes that came in on 
the first attack? 

Private Shortt. No, sir, I didn't. I just looked up and saw that 
there red rising sun on it. 

The Chairman. Yes. Were they flying high or low? 

Private Shortt. Sir, they was flying low. 

The Chairman. What character of planes ? 

Private Shortt. Sir? 

The CiiAiRiNtAN. Single seaters, any of them ? 

Private Shortt. Sir, they was kind of single-seated, flying pretty 
low. 

The Chairman. General McNarney? 

General McNarney. You said you went to the dispensary? 

Private Shortt. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. Wliat did you do there? 

Private Shortt. Sir, went there, went out — went down and picked 
up some men Avhere the ])lane crashed. 

General McNarney. How many officers or men were in the dispen- 
sary at the time? 

[iSi] Private Shortt. Sir, there was Major Gill and Captain 
Ketchman and Captain Smith and Captain Garry. 

General McNarney. Did they organize a litter service or an ambu- 
lance service, or how did you get these men ? 



272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Private Shortt. Sir^ 

General McNarney. I say, how did you get tliese, how did you pick 
these wounded men up ? Did you have a litter service or ambulance 
service ? 

Private Shortt. Litter. I just went out and it took — I went out and 
picked them up by myself, sir. I went out to get them. 

General McNarxey. Did nobody help you? 

Private Shortt. Xo, sii'. AVe got down and there were some fellows, 
and I got them to give me a hand. 

General McNarxev. Who directed you to pick them up? 

Private Shortt. Sir? 

General McXarney. Did anybody- direct you to go out and pick 
them up ? 

Private Shoktt. No. sir. They just said there was a plane crashed, 
and I went on out to ]3ick them up. 

General McXarney. How many wounded were brought into the dis- 
pensary that day? 

Private Shortt. Sir. there was nine wounded. 

General McNarxey. They were all coast artillery men ? 

Private Shortt. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Were there any Japanese wounded? 

Private Shortt. No, sir. The Japanese, he was killed. 

General McNarney. What did you do with him ? 

Private Shortt. Sir, I didn't pick the Japanese up. I just took care 
of tlie wounded. 

The Chair:max. Anything further? 

General McNarxey. No, sir. 

The Chairmax'^. Don't discuss your testimony here with [4^^ 
anyone, Shortt, outside of the room. 

Private Shortt. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. We are much obliged to you. 

^Nlajor Allex. Lieutenant Saltzman, Schofield Barracks. 

The Chairmax^. Will you be sworn ? 

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT STEPHEN G. SALTZMAN, UNITED 
STATES ARMY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairmax. GiA'e the reporter your full name, will you, Lieu- 
tenant ? 

Lieutenant Saltzmax. Stephen G. Saltzman. 

The Chairman. Of what unit are you a member ? 

Lieutenant Saltzmax'. 98th Coast Artillery, sir. 

The Chairmax^. And where is the headquarters of that command? 

Lieute'nant Saltzmax. The upper post, Schofield Barracks. 

The Chairmax. And where are your quarters, your personal 
quarters? 

Lieutenant Saltzmax. JNIj^ personal quarters are at the upper post, 
the regimental area. 

The Chairmax. What was your assignment? What is j^our spe- 
cific command? 

Lieutenant Saltzmax. Sir, I am regimental communications officer. 

General McCoy. Regimental? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 273 

Lieuteiiant Saltzman. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Will you tell us in your own way when you first 
learned of the attack, and go on from there and tell us what you ob- 
served and what j^ou did, Lieutenant? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. I will try to, sir, to the best of my knowledge. 
I was lying in bed about quarter of eight Sunday morning, the 7th 
of December, and I heard the fleet that attacked Wheeler Field come 
over my quarters, and I have been interested in the air corps for 
some time. I knew [4^^] immediately that they were not 
American planes; they didn't sound like American planes. And I 
threw^ a towel around myself and went outside and saw that they 
v.'ere Japanese planes, ran down to the switchboard to call the com- 
manding officer, and his line was busy, so I told the operator to get 
in touch with him and tell him that we were under attack. Just 
about that time they opened up over Wheeler Field. I ran back, and 
there were officers standing around in the quadrangle, in the officers' 
quarters, and I shouted to them that it was an attack, and threw on a 
pair of coveralls and pistol and runs down and turned some of the 
men out in the regimental area where the barracks are, and saw that 
they w^ere drawing ammunition. We already had small arms ammu- 
nition in our storerooms due to the alert which we had had for a 
week, and I drew^ some pistol ball and went up to the motor park, 
and there were drivers up there, and our regiment — the alert plan 
on which each man has a job, and I sent the drivers off to their ap- 
pointed stations and — 

Yes, sir? I thought you were going to ask a question (addressing* 
General McCoy). 

And at approximately eight-fifteen the guns had started to move 
out of the motor park. One point of interest I think you might be 
interested in is the fact that the whole flight that came down came 
over Kolekole Pass and directly over our gun park, and we had 24 
guns and 6 directors and height finders sitting there in the gun park, 
and one group — one small bomb would have done a great deal of 
damage. 

General McCoy. Did or would have done? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. Would have done. 

The Chairman. Would have done. 

Lieutenant Saltzman. I don't see how anybody going over as low as 
they were could have missed seeing them. I believe that they were 
interested in only their ultimate purpose, which was [-^57] to 
lay low the air force. 

About that time I took off for my regimental comnumications shop. 
INIy men were there loading up the truck. I had been battalion com- 
munications officer, and that detail had already left for their field 
positions. The alert, as far as I could determine, was sounded at eight- 
twenty. I went through VVlieeler Field, drove a ton and a half truck 
of the regimental comnumications detail out of the gun ])ark at H : 25, 
and it was under attack at that time. I dropped guards at my ter- 
minal cans to guard the wires, and went over to connnand post which 
is approximately 300 yards due west — east of AVheeler Field. 

Wliile we established communications I heard what sounded like 
two planes pulling out of a dive over Kam Highway, a,nd I giabbed 
a rifle from one of the men standino- there and a couple of clips of 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 1 19 



274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ammunition — it was a Browning automatic rifle — and ran outside, 
dropped to my knees, and Staff Sergeant Klatt was behind me, and 
we got on our knees to study the planes and make positive there were 
no friendly pursuits in the air. Nobody was firing at it. Just then 
he opened up with his four machine guns, and I think I was too 
mad to be scared. He wasn't more than a hundred feet off the ground. 
We opened up at him, and fortunately for us there were high ten- 
sion lines behind us, and he had to pull out of his dive or I am afraid 
I wouldn't be sitting here. He crashed about — after we emptied 
our clips he crashed the other side of the building. Two pilots in it. 
We ran over there, and it was a Pratt- Wliitney engine in the machine, 
and it worried me. I thought I had made a mistake, and after the 
Air Corps Intelligence got over there they determined that it was 
Japanese. 

The rest of the morning was spent in preparing the command 
post, and the regiment itself seemed to move into the field with very 
little delay and confusion, and never in the whole time, the whole 
action we had, did I notice any chaotic con- [4^5S~\ ditions. 
The men — it was — well, it was gratifying to see the way the men 
went to their jobs under attack the whole time. 

The Chairman. What state of readiness or unreadiness would your 
command be in to meet an attack of this kind under the alert that 
was then in effect ? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. Sir, we had been alerted, I believe, the Sun- 
day before in a No. 1 Alert, which under the Standing Operating 
* Procedure in the Department is an anti-sabotage alert, in which the 
guard was doubled — I believe our guard was tripled, and live am- 
munition was issued to it in place of the guard ammunition. All 
the batteries, all the organizations, drew a day's fire for each man 
and kept it in their storerooms. Then men were not issued the am- 
munition. 

The Chairman. Personally? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. That is our state of readiness ; our guns were 
all in the gun park, in the moving, traveling position. 

General McNarney. What equipment did you have in your regi- 
ment ? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. I beg pardon, sir. 

General McNarney, What equipment did you have in your regi- 
ment ? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. Sir, we had two battalions of 3-inch guns. 
In a second battalion we used all M-i equipment, which is 1940 or 
later, and the first battalion is armed with the 1923 gun and the 
T-83 directors, which is older equipment. 

The Chairman. Is your regiment a mobile regiment of artillery? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. Sir, our regiment is a semi-mobile regiment. 
However, we have I believe almost enough motor transportation to 
make it completely mobile. 

General McNarney. How about automatic weapons? What did 
you have? 

Lieutenant Saltzman, Sir, we had no automatic weapons [4^9] 
other than .30 caliber Brownings with infantry adapter mount for A. A. 
fire. 

The Chairman. You had no machine guns? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 275 



Lieutenant Saltzman. Sir, we had these .30 caliber machine 

The Chairman. Yes, but you had no anti-aircraft guns? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. No, sir. There were infantry machines with 
an anti-aircraft adapter for high elevation. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General McCoy. Were they in position ? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. No, sir, they were not. 

General McCoy. Where were they ? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. I believe they were in the battery storeroom, 
sir. I believe that some of the guns had been kept out on the entrances 
to the regimental area in nests, I think just maybe two or three with 
ammunition. 

General McNarney. Where are your normal gun positions? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. Our regiment is — our first battalion of our 
regiment is assigned to the defense of Wheeler Field. The second 
battalion is McOpper out at Bellows Field. 

General McNarney. I presume that you have been in position many 
times ? 
♦ Lieutenant Saltzman. Yes, sir, we have. 

General McNarney. Your replacements all prepared, and every- 
thing? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. Sir, our emplacements were in very good 
shape, but they were not in what I consider a shape to stay in the 
field for a campaign. The field fortifications for the guns themselves 
and the ammunition .pits were all dug and ready to go, and they 
stand today almost exactly as they were then. However, we had to 
dig into the ground for barracks for the men, you see. 

The Chairman. You mean to keep them on position ? 

1460'] Lieutenant Saltzman. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. What happened to the battalion whose station 
was Bellows? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. Well, sir, they got under way very fast. 
They, as far as I can ascertain, were in position down there about two 
hours after the first alarm. 

General McCoy. They were in your same park, however, at the 
time of the attack? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. Yes, sir, that's correct. 

General McCoy. Had to go how many miles ? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. Well, sir, if they had gone over the Pali 
Road it would be, I should judge, 40 miles, but if they had gone around 
Koko Head it would have been closer to 60. 

The Chairman. Lieutenant, we have heard something here about 
an Alert No. 1 ordered on November 27. Does that correspond with 
your recollection ? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. Yes, sir, it does 

The Chairman. Now. was that order changed at any time between 
November 27 and December 7, the date of the attack ? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. Sir, I have heard rumors that it was, but 
we never had notification of it. 

The Chairman. Have you heard rumors that for a few days an 
Alert No. 2 was in effect? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. No, sir, I am not familiar with that at all. 

The Chairman. Well, what are the rumors of change that you 
have heard? 



276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Lieutenant Saltzman. I was told that Saturday night before the 
attack, December 6, that the alert had been called off completely, no 
alert, and that the units hadn't been advised of that, because 

The Chairman. So that they still assumed that it was in effect ? 

[46'i] Lieutenant Saltzman. Yes, sir. 

The CHAiRaiAN. All right. I think the rumors are probably wrong, 
but we want to get all the light we can on this situation. 

General McNarney. Sitting around barracks or sitting around 
talking with your contemporaries did you ever discuss an air raid, 
the possibility of an air raid? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. Sir, knowing that the signal corps — the air 
warning service has outposts all over the Island and on other islands 
and that they are manned almost continually and that the Navy 
patrols these waters, I never felt that we would be completely sur- 
prised the way we did. I don't think anybody thought that we would 
be surprised. 

The Chairman. You know the situation was tense, didn't you, as 
between Japan and the United States? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. Yes, sir. I did. 

The Chairman. All right. Did it ever come into your mind that 
Japan might take off in^these hostilities by air-raiding the Island of 
Oahu ? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. Sir, in my wildest dreams I couldn't fathom 
it. I couldn't see how, completely surrounded as she was by what 
would turn into hostile forces, she could dare to do a thing like that. 

The Chairman. And you think your state of mind was not unusual 
amongst the military commands on this Island ? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. Sir, among the junior officers I believe it 
was the same as I felt. 

General McNarney. How long have you been in the service ? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. One year January 2nd, sir. 

General McNarney. Are you a reserve officer ? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. Where did you come in from, what school ? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. University of Delaware. 

[462] The Chairman. Where is your home ? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. Wilmington. 

General McNarney. Did you have any training before you came 
in as a coast artillery officer ? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. No, sir, I hadn't. 

General McNarney. What did you study at school ? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. Economics, sir. 

General McCoy. What was your remark there ? 

General McNarney. No previous training. 

Lieutenant Saltzman. I had four years of R. O. T. C. 

General McCoy. At the University of Delaware ? 

Lieutenant Saltzjian. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Lieutenant, Avhere were you on the night of De- 
cember 6 ? 

Lieutenant Saltzman. The night of December 6 I was in the 98th 
Officers' Club playing cards. 

The CiiAiRaiAN. We have heard rumors that a lot of the forces on 
this Island was off at parties on Saturday night and tliat there was a 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 277 

good deal of drunkenness. What do you know or what have you heard 
on that subject ? 

Lieutenant Saltzmax. Sir, I can only speak for the officers of the 
98tli. I remember that night most of the junior officers were gath- 
ered in the club there, and we were sitting around and we were 
drinking, and I don't remember — recall any instances of drmikemiess. 
I didn't move out of the area at all that night ; I can't say. 

The Chaikmax. Up to the time you left the club, Lieutenant, was 
there any officer there who wouldn't have been fit on account of drink- 
ing to respond when an alert was given ? 

Lieutenant Sai.tzmax. I don't believe so, sir. 

The Ciiairmax. There was drinking there '( 

[iSSI Lieutenant Saltzmax. There was drinking, yes, sir. It 
was mostly beer. 

The Chairmax. INIostly beer ? 

Lieutenant Saltzmax. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. What you would call normal drinking ? 

Lieutenant Saltzmax. I would, sir. Yes, sir. 

The Chairmax. Was your command practically intact as respects 
presence at their quarters on the morning of this attack? 

Lieutenant Saltzmax. Sir, a report was required three or four days 
ago concerning the number of men present for duty, and as I recall 
it it was 95% present for duty. 

General McCoy. Both officers and men ? 

Lieutenant Saltzmax. Yes, sir. 

The Chairmax. Any other questions, gentlemen ? 

(There was no response.) 

The Chairmax. Lieutenant, we have found it necessary to enjoin 
upon witnesses here in this inquiry that they do not discuss it, speak 
to others about it at all. about what went on this room. 

Lieutenant Saltzmax. Very well. 

The Chairmax. I shall ask you to observe that. 

Lieutenant Saltzmax. I will, sir. 

The Chairmax. Thank you very much. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) t 

The Chairmax. All right. Next witness. 

Major AiiLEX. Sergeant Klatt, Schofield Barracks. 

The Chairmax. Will you be sworn? 

TESTIMONY OF SERGEANT LOWELL VINCENT KLATT, UNITED 
STATES ARMY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairmax. Will you give the reporter your full name. Ser- 
geant ? 

[404] Sergeant Klatt. Lowell Vincent Klatt. 

The Chairmax. What is your command. Sergeant? 

Sergeant Klatt. I am in charge of wire communications for the 
98th first battalion. 

The Chairmax. That is the same outfit to which the lieutenant who 
was just here belongs? 

Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir. He is regimental officer. 

The Chairmax. "\'Vniere are your headquarters ? 



278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Sergeant Kjl.att. Our headquarters are at Schofield Barracks, sir. 

The Chairman. Were you at Schofield Barracks Saturday night, 
December 6 ? 

Sergeant Klatt. I was, sir. 

The Chairman. You were not on leave ? 

Sergeant Klatt. No, I wasn't. 

The Chairman. Where were you on the morning of the 7th when 
this attack broke? 

Sergeant Klatt. Well, when it first started, sir, I was in the mess 
hall having my breakfast. 

The Chairman. What did you hear first? What first attracted 
your attention? 

Sergeant Klatt. Well, the first that attracted my attention was the 
squadron of planes coming in over Kolekole Pass and right over our 
mess hall. 

The Chairman. You could hear them ? 

Sergeant Klatt. You could hear them when they went over low, 
yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Were they high or low ? 

Sergeant Klatt. I would say they were quite low. 

The Chairman. Without my asking you, then what happened? 
What did you do? 

Sergeant Klatt. When we first heard them go over, why, we paid 
very little attention to them, figuring it was some of [4^S'] 
either Wheeler Field or Hickam Field planes that were out on ma- 
neuver or something like that. And shortly thereafter, why, we heard 
these concussions down around Wheeler Field, and also machine gun 
fire, and at that, why, we all ran out and stood out around the yard 
watching to see what happened. At first we didn't know just what to 
expect, and as we saw smoke and flame coming up from Wheeler Field 
and as these planes would tear over the barracks, why, we Vx^ould see 
them cut loose with their machine guns, and num.erous places there 
was splinters flying and things like that. And at that, why, I figured 
it was something important, so I told my detail to get their packs, get 
the tificks down, and be ready to take off. And while I was doing 
that Lieutenant Saltzman gave the word that we were on the alert, 
to go to our battalion command post and set up communications. 
Well, I had my truck down in short order and loaded it, got my men 
aboard, and we took off 20 minutes — 20 minutes, 2.5 minutes after 
eight and started for our battalion command post. 

The Chairman. Where is that? 

Sergeant Klatt. That is on the other side of WahiaAva, ii. a C. C. 
camp. 

The Chairman. How far ? 

Sergeant Klatt, I would say offhand about three and a half miles. 
And as we started for there, why, we passed Hickam Field, and we 
could see that it was all in flames, and we could see these planes diving 
down and concussions of bombs, and so forth, and so it looked very 
real to us, of course, and we got over there, and we were setting up 
communications, and shortly thereafter Lieutenant Saltzman came in, 
and he told us it was the real thing, boys. That's just the way he said 
it. And as we were setting up our switchboards, telephones, and so 
forth, connecting our wires, why, we heard two planes pull out of a 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 279 

[4^6] dive over Wheeler Field, and they came right over Kam 
Highway so that they headed directly into us to strafe us. Lieutenant 
Saltzman wasn't armed with a rifle or anything like that, and he 
gi-abbed a B.A.R. from one of the boys that were there, and using him 
as a cue, why, I also grabbed one, and we got down on our knees and 
started firing at these planes as they came towards us, and right di- 
rectly behind us was a high tension line, and as they pulled out and 
peeled off to tlie right and the second one peeled off to the left, and 
just as he peeled off to swing away from us, w^iy, we cut loose with 
the Browning automatics, and within a second or two seconds at the 
most we heard this crash and a blast. And as there were no planes 
in our innnediate vicinity at the moment, why, we ran around the 
corner of the building. AVe hadn't seen it crash or anything like that ; 
it had passed around the corner of the building from us. We ran 
around the corner, and we could see this plane in flames, and we ran 
over there, and the gasoline and everything had spread so far, and 
everything was 

The Chairman. Burning? 

Sergeant Klatt. Burning, and the heat was terrific. We couldn't 
get very close to it. And after a while, after it had burned itself out 
practically, why, we got in there and we investigated as much as we 
could — just looking, naturally, curious, why, we had the wing sections 
and saw the motor was an American make motor and American prop, 
and Lieutenant Saltzman told me that the parachute itself \mxs an 
American parachute. And, well, that's about all there was to it, 
and we went back and finislied setting up our communications, get- 
ting the command post in order. 

The Chairman. And then you stayed at the command post what? 
The balance of the day? 

Sergeant Klatt. Well, I have been there ever since, sir. 

The Chairman. Been there ever since ? 

[467] Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Did both planes crash or just one ? 

Sergeant Klatt. No, sir; only the second one, the one that swung 
to the left. We didn't get a chance to fire at the first one to amount 
to anything because he pulled away from us pretty fast, but the other 
one pulled — swung right around broadside to us. 

General McCoy. Was there more than one pilot ? 

Sergeant Klatt. Yes, there was a pilot and observer, or another 
one right in behind him anyway. It was a two-passenger plane. 

General McCoy. Both burned, were they? 

Sergeant Klatt. Yes, both burned very badly. 

General McCoy. Both killed in the crash? 

Sergeant Klatt. I believe they were, sir. At least, when we got 
there they were making no effort to get out ; they were just all crashed 
down in the cockpit, from what we could see of them. 

The Chairman. General JNIcNarney? 

General McNarney. Sergeant, what were your duties under Alert 
No. 1? 

Sergeant Ki^tt. Well, our duties under Alert No. 1, as we had al- 
ways done before, was to go over and set up the battalion command 
post and remain in constant attendance, and in case of any wire com- 



280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

munication going out it was our job to go out and fix it, splice lines 
for any breaks or shortages or anything like that. 

General McXarnf.y. You were not m position under an Alert No. 
1, were you? 

Sergeant Klatt, No, sir, we weren't 

The Chairman. Under 1 you were to keep wire conmnniications in 
contact to the command post, were you ? 

Sergeant Klatt. That's right, sir. 

General MgNarney. Did you mount any guard any place? 

[4-68] Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir, there was guards — as soon as 
Lieutenant Saltzman was there, why, he mounted a guard around the 
C. C. post there, the command post. 

General McNarney. That was after the fact, though, wasn't it? 

Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir, that was after it had started. 

General McNarney. What were your normal routine duties before 
the attack, from November 27, on, during th^. period of alert? 

Sergeant Klatt. Well, we had gone out and we had checked all 
our lines, our line for our battery into the command post. We 
weren't — we didn't have our switchboard in or telephones or anything 
like that. They were left back in the barracks supply room, and it 
was my job to see that they were all right. We had had no orders to 
move out in the field and maintain the post. 

General McNarney. What percentage of your detail was required 
to remain on the post ? 

Sergeant Klatt. Well, I have seven men in my detail, a corporal 
and six privates, besides myself, and I always had at least four of the 
men tliere and myself, or a corporal and four men were always there. 

General McNarney. How many men of your detail got to the com- 
mand post that morning? 

Sergeant Klatt. They were all present, sir. 

General McCoy. Did you have any casualties ? 

Sergeant Klatt. No, sir, there was none. 

Tlie Chairman. We shall ask you. Sergeant, not to disclose any 
questions or any of the testimony you have given in the room or dis- 
cuss the matter with any of your fellows. 

Sergeant Klatt, Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. 

Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir. 

[4^9] Major Allen. Colonel Howard, at Fort Armstrong, 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn ? 

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL JACK W. HOWARD, UNITED 
STATES ARMY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give your full name to the reporter? 

Colonel Howard. Jack W. Howard, Lieutenant Colonel, Q. M. S., 
Supply Officer, Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, Fort Armstrong, 
T.H. 

The Chairman. Where is Fort Armstrong, Colonel ? 

Colonel Howard. Well, that's located down on the waterfront, on 
Ala Moana and Richards Street. 

The Chairman. It is in the citv ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 281 

Colonel Howard. Oh. yes. 

The CiiAiRMAx. It is iii the city, on the front ? 

Colonel Howard. Right in the city, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Will you tell us when you first knew of the attack, 
where you were, and what happened as you observed it ? 

Colonel Howard. I was getting ready to play golf at the Waialae 
Golf Club when I heard over the radio a call for everybody to report 
to their stations, wliich I did. 

The Chairman. Where would you report then ? At your quarters ? 

Colonel Howard. At Fort Armstrong, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. At Fort Armstrong ? 

Colonel Howard. At the depot. 

The Chairman. What time did you get there? Do you know? 

Colonel Howard. I would judge it was about 8 : 45. 

The Chairman. The first attack was in progress or nearly over at 
that time? 

Colonel Howard. Yes, sir. 

[470] The Chairman. Did you observe where the attackers in 
the first attack went after they 

Colonel Howard. I did not, sir. As a matter of fact, I was on my 
desk, and I wasn't out looking. 

The Chairman. Where were j'ou on the night of December 6, sir, 
and Sunday morning ? 

Colonel Howard. I was at the depot. 

The CHAiR:\rAN. On the night of December 6 ? 

Colonel Howard. Oh, no, no. I was at home. 

The Chairman. At home ? 

Colonel Howard. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And were your quarters in the city ? 

Colonel Howard. No, sir. I live out at Kahala about four miles 
from the depot. 

The Chairman. So you know nothing about conditions in the city 
the night before ? 

Colonel Howard. No, sir. 

The Chairman. General ? 

General McNarney. What do you store in your depot ? 

Colonel Howard. All supplies for the Hawaiian Department. 

General McNarney. All nature of supplies ? 

Colonel Howard. Quartermaster supplies. 

General McNarney. The General Quartermaster? 

Colonel Howard. Class 1, class 2, class 3, and 4 supplies. 

General McNarney. Were any calls made on you on the morning of 
December 7 when you got there ? 

Colonel Howard. Plenty. 

General McNarney. What types of supplies were most needed ? 

Colonel Howard. Principally equipment and arrangements for 
food, bedding also, all classes of clothing and equipage and all classes 
of subsistence. 

General McNarney. How large a place do you have in the depot? 

[471] Colonel Howard. I have about 100 to 125 people under 
me. 

General McNarney. Enlisted or civilian. 

Colonel Howard. Some enlisted and mostlv civilian. 



282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McNaeney. How about the civilians ? Did they turn up ? 

Colonel Howard. Yes, sir. Most of them came in right away. 
Some few women did not show up. 

General McNarney. Did you have standard orders as to what 
l^ersonnel 

Colonel Howard, They were to all report in. My key personnel 
report in; that was the standing order: the key personnel report in 
immediately, and then they call their own branches to come in if 
necessar}^ 

General McNarney. On or about November 27 Alert No. 1 was 
ordered in effect? 

Colonel Howard. Yes, sir. 

General McNarxey. Under Alert No. 1 what precautions were 
taken to guard the depot? 

Colonel Howard. Other than the usual guard, none. 

General McNarney. What does the guard consist of ? 

Colonel Howard. It consists of a post that runs across — runs up 
and down the Ala Moana and a post that runs up and down the 
Halekauwila Street, and, oh, those posts are not over a block and a 
half long, one of our city blocks here. Then, there is a roving patrol 
that visits those two guards, I think about every hour. 

General McNarney. Was the depot easily distinguishable as a 
target ? 

Colonel Howard. Yes, it is, very. 

General McNarney. Were there any arrangements made for anti- 
aircraft protection of the depot under any type of alert? 

Colonel Howard. Outside of the use of our own troops, which was 
set up as the original program, we were to take over [4'^2] the 
defense of our own depot and Fort Armstrong. 

General McNarney. What arms did you have for this purpose? 

Colonel Howard. We had automatic rifles and rifles. 

General McNarney. And no machine guns? 

Colonel Howard. Not at that time. 

General McNarney. Have you now? 

Colonel Howard. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. How many? 

Colonel Howard. That I would hesitate to say. Being in com- 
mand, I am not handling the troops directly. I wouldn't say. 

General McNarney. Do you know what type of machine guns they 
are? 

Colonel Howard. Browning. 

General INIcNarney. Browning .30 caliber? 

Colonel Howard. Yes. 

General McNarney. Adapted for anti-aircraft fire ? 

Colonel Howard. I think they are now. I think they have got 
their adapters on. I am not certain as to that. If they haven't 
the adapters on I am sure that Colonel Sothern who has command of 
one of those detachments as to the actual guard, has rigged up some me- 
chanical attachments which will act as an anti-aircraft mount. 

General McNarney. Did your issuing of supplies proceed smoothly 
on the day of the attack? 

Colonel Howard. Yes, sir, very, outside of the usual confusion in 
a situation like that. 



PKoCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 283 

General INIcNarxey. Was there any jamming up of motor transpor- 
tation in the vicinity of the depot? 

Colonel Howard/ No more than usual. 

General McXarney. Is there a traffic control there ? 

Colonel Howard. Oh, yes; we got our traffic control to working 
right away. 

[4.7S] General McNarnet. I have no further questions. 

The Chairmax. Admiral? 

Admiral Reeves. No, sir. 

The CiiAiRMAX. Colonel, we shall ask you not to discuss with any- 
one outside your testimony here or anything that has happened in 
the room. Thank you, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Colonel, will you point out where Kahala is 
and where you live ? 

Colonel Howard. Kahala is right out in this area right out here 
[indicating]. 

Admiral Standley. Is that right near Waialae golf course ? 

Colonel Howard. Yes, sir ; just a very short ways. 

Major Allex. Lieutenant Cooper, Hickham Field, 

The CiiAiRisrAX, Lieutenant Cooper, will you be sworn, sir? 

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT HOWARD FREDERICK COOPER, 
UNITED STATES ARMY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairmax. Will you give your full name to the reporter ? 

Lieutenant Cooper. Howard Frederick Cooper. 

The Chairmax. And what was your assignment on and before 
December 7, Lieutenant? 

Lieutenant Cooper. I am commanding officer of the headquarters 
squadron, 17th air base group. My duties are on the ground; I have 
nothing to do with the air. 

The Chairmax, Where were you on the morning of December 7 at 
about 7: 45? 

Lieutenant Cooper. At about 7 : 45 I was sleeping. 

The Chairmax^ In barracks ? 

Lieutenant Cooper, At my quarters. 

The Chairmax. In your quarters. Your quarters are how near to 
Hickam Field? 

Lieutenant Cooper. My quarters are right at Hickam Field. 

The Chairmax. Right on it. What Avas the first thing that 
[474] attracted your attention, sir ? 

Lieutenant Cooper. The first thing that attracted my attention was 
the loud explosions along Pearl Harbor, after which I woke up and 
looked out, and I saw smoke coming out of Pearl Harbor. I figured 
it was very strange to have the Army — the Navy practicing on Sunday 
morning right in the harbor. And about that time I heard loud bursts 
on Hickam Field. 

The Chairmax. Go ahead and tell us what happened, what you did. 

Lieutenant Cooper. Naturally, I got out, put some clothes on, and 
ran out to the rear of Hickam Field. Dive bombers were tearing the 
place to pieces, blasting everything, coming down so close that I fig- 
ured it was dangerous to run out, so I went out the front, and by that 



284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

time some of the other officers were up. And I noticed the high- 
altitude bombers coming over about over the officers' club, which is 
about 300 or 400 yards away, and there were two formations of five 
planes in each, I would estimate at about 12,000, 15,000 feet, traveling 
very slowly, proceeding to Pearl Harbor, 

The Chairman. Proceeding to Pearl Harbor? 

Lieutenant Cooper. To Pearl Harbor. 

The Chairman. From what direction were they coming? 

Lieutenant Cooper. From the ocean. 

The Chairman. From the ocean ? 

General McCoy. From the south ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General McCot. From the south ? 

Lieutenant Cooper, From the south, yes, sir. When tliey were over 
Pearl Harbor they dropped their bombs, and the formation was per- 
fect, so perfect, and the timing on the dropping of the bombs was so 
perfect, that I could follow them down in V formation right to the 
ground, right to the impact. 

General McNarney. What did they hit? 

[^75] Lieutenant Cooper. They hit Pearl Harbor, something in 
Pearl Harbor; I couldn't see because of the buildings in close front. 
These two waves I noticed turn around, one wave turn around one way 
and another wave turn around another way. Well, I forgot about 
those planes for a while, got my steel helmet and my gas mask and 
went down to the hangar line. First I went down in my car, and I 
turned around and left the car home because the place was bombed, 
and I got down there and got in contact with my first sergeant, and he 
said that all our men were out of the barracks. I told him to keep the 
men separated. Of course the damage seemed pretty considerable at 
the time. I walked up to the parade ground. There were some ma- 
chine guns out there, but they AA'ere all out of commission, lacking any 
water cans, and men were busy trying to put them to Avorking order. 

The Chairman. That was on the parade ground ? 

Lieutenant Cooper. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. They had not been in position before the attack, 
these 

Lieutenant Cooper. No, sir, not in position; they were just being 
brought out. 

The Chairman. Where did they go to get them ? 

Lieutenant Cooper. They got them anywhere they could find them, 
and all the men showed remarkable courage bringing all of these 
weapons out, trying to put them together. And about tliis time, while 
I was down at one of the guns. I could imagine that the high-altitude 
bombers were close overhead because of the anti-aircraft fire just 
blasting the skies, ,and it was all black, and before I knew it they had 
probably dropped their second bomb load from high altitude, and that's 
what sprayed the large barracks. 

The Chairman, That struck the large barracks? 

Lieutenant Cooper, That struck the large barracks and [-47^] 
splattered on the ball diamond and the parade ground. 

The Chair3Ian, How many attacks would j^ou say there were, how 
many separate attacks that morning? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 285 

Lieutenant Cooper. I would say that the whole thing was one attack. 

The Chairman. You would ? 

Lieutenant Cooper. It was split up in dive bombers and high-alti- 
tude bombers. While the high-altitude bombers were attacking Pearl 
Harbor the dive bombers were damaging Hickam Field, and when 
the high-altitude bombers came over Hickam Field the dive bombers 
were attacking Pearl Harbor, and they worked in tliat system. It was 
very methodical. 

The Chairman. Well, was there not a respite around nine o'clock ? 
We have rather gotten the impression that there was a first fierce at- 
tack about eight o'clock and another fierce attack about nine and an- 
other about eleven. Was it your observation that there seemed to be 
planes over you during that whole period from eight to eleven? 

Lieutenant Cooper. Well, when those high-altitude l.'ombers were 
bombing Pearl Harbor the dive bombers were attaclcing Hickam 
Field. 

The Cpiairman. And vice versa? 

Lieutenant Cooper. And vice versa. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Lieutenant Cooper. And while the high-altitude bombers were going 
out to the ocean again to get a bearing on Hickam Field I was — ^the 
men — in fact, a lot of the men were watching the dive bombers attack- 
ing Pearl Harbor. 

The Chairman. Yes ? 

Lieutenant Cooper. And of course the high-altitude bombers were 
on a misison to bomb Hickam Field this time, and they would come 
over and bomb Hickam Field, and of course they would have to go out 
again to come back on another mission, \l7?"] and the dive 

bombers came right after them. It was a methodical system whereby 
they wouldn't bomb any of their own planes. 

The Chairman. General ? 

General McNarney. Which squadron did you say you belong to? 

Lieutenant Cooper. Headquarters squadron, 17 air base group. 

General McNarnet. What are the duties of the headquarters 
squadron ? 

Lieutenant Cooper. Purely administrative. All the men are dis- 
persed, scattered throughout the field and working in offices, libraries, 
and base maintenance when we have extra men. 

General McNarney. Do you furnish any guard ? 

Lieutenant Cooper. We furnished — at the time that the thing hap- 
pened we had about four men on guard. 

General McNarney. Wliat type of alert were you on on the morn- 
ing of December 7 ? 

Lieutenant Cooper. We were on status AS and Alert No. 3, where- 
by only the ground defense was alerted. 

General McNarney. Status A-3. Is that a local directive for 
Hickam Field? 

Lieutenant Cooper. That is the directive for Hawaiian Department, 
Alert 3. 

The Chairman. When was Alert 3 ordered ? 

Lieutenant Cooper. It was ordered two weeks before the attack or 
thereabouts. 



286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McNarney. Under that status of alert how many men of 
your squadron do you permit to be absent at any one time? 

Lieutenant Cooper. Fifty percent of men and officers. 

General McNarney. How many do you estimate were present 
[4.78] that morning, on the morning of December 7 ? 

Lieutenant Cooper. I believe close to all of the men were there. Veiy 
few men have any place to stay in town anyway, so they all reported 
back to the field. 

General McNarney. Where did your men go, the most of them? 
Did they go to their duty stations, to their typewriters, or did they 
stay out on the field ? 

Lieutenant Cooper. Most of the men in my squadron had drawn 
rifles and ammunition and were out along Hangar Avenue. 

General McNarney. What is your record of service, Lieutenant? 

Lieutenant Cooper. I was ordered to active duty on the 7th No- 
vember, 1940. I am now serving my second tour. 

General McNarney. Where did you come from ? 

Lieutenant Cooper. Honolulu, sir. 

General McNarxey. Honolulu. Are you a native? 

Lieutenant Cooper. Yes, sir. 

General McNarxey. A native of there. 1 have no further questions. 

The Chairman. We find it necessar}^ Lieutenant, to ask that you 
do not discuss your testimony here, or anything that happened in this 
room, with anyone else. 

Lieutenant Cooper, Yes, sir. I will do that. 

Major Allen. The Provost Marshal is here, sir. Would you like 
to hear him at this time ? 

The Chairman. Yes, we shall be glad to see him. 

FURTHER TESTIMONY OF MELVIN L. CRAIG, LIEUTENANT 
COLONEL, FIELD ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY 

The Chairman. Have you the information we requested ? 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir, I believe that I have. 

On the night of December 6, between 6 p. m and 6 a. m. the total 
number of soldiers arrested was 43, and 38 of these men were arrested 
for being drunk and 4 for being A. W. O. L. IP'^] Out of these 
43, 42 were returned to their organizations and one man was confined. 

The civil police record for that night : they had a total.of 90 arrests : 
drunkenness 39, gambling 39, threatening 2, theft 1, auto theft 1, 
drunk-driving 1, other misdemeanors 3, assault and battery 3. A total 
of 90. 

Comparing that with previous Saturday nights at payday, the 
night of July 31 from 6 p. m. to 6 a. m. we had 80 arrests. That is 
soldiers. Out of these, the number that were returned to their organi- 
zations was 48. 

On the night of August 30 between 6 p. m. and 6 a. m. we had 87 
arrests. That is the military. Number of men returned to their 
organizations was 30. 28 were turned in for safekeeping tliat night. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 287 

In the night of October 1, total number of arrests was 87. Number 
of men returned to their organizations was 40, and 47 confined. 

On September 2 we had 21 arrests, 20 men confined and 1 returned 
to his organization. 

September 30, 79 arrests, 35 returned to their organizations and 44 
confined. 

Then in November they started to distribute the paydays, and on 
November 3 Schofield Barracks was paid. Number of arrests was 67. 
Number of men returned to their organizations was 49. Number of 
men confined was 18. 

And November 7: number of arrests 70, number of men returned 
to their organizations 10, number of men confined 60. 

Tlien on December 3 — that was the payday before — the total num- 
ber of arrests that night was 114. 98 of these men were returned to 
their organizations ; 16 were confined. But as far as the records show 
there was a relatively small number on the night of the 6th. 

The civil police on November 15 arrested 74. That's [4^0] 
civilians. 

The CiiAiRMA^r. Yes. 

Colonel Craig. Not soldiers. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Colonel Craig. November 22, 63 ; November 29, 68. 

General McCoy. So in every case there were more civilians arrested 
than soldiers ? 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir, it works out about that way. The popula- 
tion of the City of Honolulu and police district #1 — that includes 
just the City of Honolulu and around this area here — that is, men 
over 21 years of age — is 61,800. 

That is as far as I went back ; I thought that that was the informa- 
tion the Commission desired. 

The Chairinian. I think that is exactly what we want, sir. 

Colonel Craig. Yes, sir. 

The Cpiairman. Now, was there anything else that we asked the 
colonel to get us ? I think not. 

Mr. Howe. I have nothing else, no, sir. 

Colonel Craig. There were no officers on the night of the 6th. 

The CHAiR:\tAN. No officers detained? 

Colonel Craig. No officers. And, as I stated before, I checked on my 
activities that night, and I was home at eight o'clock, and I was home 
all evening until Sunday morning. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir. 

Colonel Craig. Yes. 

Mr. Howe. I have a report from Colonel Dunlop of the Adjutant 
General's Department on the consolidated report on the radio question 
you sent out as to men on hand, in percentages of men on hand. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Ho-WTD. And also one from General Davidson referring to 
Wheeler Field. 

[4^1] The Chairman. I think we shall just ask the stenog- 
rapher to copy this report of Robert H. Dunlop into the record. 



288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(The report referred to is as follows:) 

26 December 1941. 
Memorandum to : Major Brooke E. Allen, Air Corps. 

In response to a radiogram of this Headquarters sent to all major echelons, 
post and district commanders, the following tabulation shows the percentage of 
strength present at 8 a. m., 7 December 1941 : 

24th Inf. Div., Schofield Barracks, T. H 90. 0% 

25th Int. Div., Schofield Barracks, T. H 85. 6 

Hawaiian C. A. C. 

Hq & Hq Btry, HCAC 86. 

Hq Btry & Intelligence Btry, 53d CA 88. 

Harbor Def. of P. H. (includes the following 97th CA, Ft. Kam., 

T. H.) 97.0 

Harbor Defenses of Honolulu 91.0 

64th O. A., Ft. Shafter, T. H 89. 5 

SSth C. A. (includes 97th CA, at Scho Bks) 94.0 

251st C. A. (Camp Malakole) 67.0 

Hawaiian Air Force, T. H. 

Hq & Hq Squadron, HAF 100. 

19th Transport Squadron 90. 

428th Signal Maintenance Co 96.0 

Tow Target Detachment 91. 

5th Chemical Co. Service 100.0 

7th AC Sq Communications (based on total strength including 

men on DS) 53.0 

7th AC Sq Weather 90. 

407th Signal Co. Avn 97. 3 

18th Bomb Wing, Hickam Field, T. H 94. 

14th Pursuit Wing, Wheeler Field, T. H. 

Officers 95.0 

Enlisted men 84. 

[482] Scholield Barracks, T. H. (Non-Divisional Units less re- 
ception center) 93. 49 

Trainees at Reception Center 27.0 

Hickam Field, T. H 84. 

Wheeler Field, T. H. (non-tactical units) 

Officers 97.0 

Enlisted men 81. 

Fort Armstrong, T. H 81. 

Percentage of Strength present at 8 : 00 a. m., 7 December 1941 : 

Bellows Field, T. H. 

Officers 51.0 

Enlisted men 85. 

Kilauea Military Camp, Hilo, Hawaii 

Permanent Det 80. 

Visiting Det 70. 

Hawaii Dist, Nat. Guard Armory, Hily, Hawaii 95. 

Maui Dist, Nat. Guard Armory, Wailuku, Maui ^- 59. 7 

Tripler Gen. Hospital, Ft. Shafter, T. H. 

Officers 20.0 

Nurses 99. 

Det. Med. Dept 97. 

Det. QMC 100. 

DHST, Ft. Shafter, T. H 95. 

Hawaiian Ord. Depot, Ft. Shafter, T. H. 

Officers 42. 

Enlisted men __— 95. 

Kauai District, Lihue, Mauai Not received. 

ROBEET H. DUNLOP, 

Colonel A. G. D.. 
Adjutant General. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 289 

[483] The Chairman. The interceptor command report reads 
thus : 

(The report referred to was read into the record by the Chairman, 
and is as follows :) 

HEIAdQUARTEES HAWAIIAN iNTEBCEPTOtl COMMAND 

23 December 1941 
Honorable Owen J. RoBBatTs, 

Associate Justice of The United States, 

Chairman Investigating Committee, Fwt Shafter, T. H. 
My DE.AE Mr. Justice Roberts : As requested by your Committee, the following 
figures on the strength of Wheeler Field as of midnight &-7 December 1941, are 
submitted : 
Preseut : 228 Officers. 2547 Enlisted Men. 
Absent: 1 Officer. 406 Enlisted Men. 
Of the 406 men absent : 

373 were on Detached Service (Schools, etc.) 

5 were sick 
21 were on furlough 
2 absent without official leave 
5 absent in confinement 

406 Total. 

H. C. Davidson, 
Brigadier General, Air Corps, 

Commanding. 

The Chairman. That seems to be a reasonable report, doesn't it? 

General McNarney. Yes. 

The Chairman. Copy that, Mr. Reporter, if you will. 

Major Allen. Lieutenant James K. Thomas, sir. 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn. Lieutenant ? 

im] TESTIMONY OY FIRST LIEUTENANT JAMES K. 
THOMAS, UNITED STATES AKMY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Give your full name to the stenographer. 

Lieutenant Thomas. James K. Thomas. 

The Chairman. What was your assignment here on December 7, 
1941, Lieutenant? 

Lieutenant Tiio]\ias. I was post signal and post signal property 
officer at Hickam Field. 

Tlie Chairman. Hickam Field? 

Lieutenant Thomas. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Where were you on the morning of December 7 
when the attack broke? 

Lieutenant Thomas. I was at my quarters when the first attack 
broke. 

The Chairman. Will you tell us what you observed and what you 
did and saw done after that? 

Lieutenant Thomas. Well, I believe it was one of the very first 
bombs awoke me, and I saw that there had been a hit of some sort in 
Pearl Harbor area; I couldn't tell just what, from my quarters. I 
proceeded out into the front of the house. I noted some planes which 
I believe were dive bomber type carrying the Japanese insignia, which 



79716 — 46— Ex. 143. vol. 1- 



290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

were coming low over my quarters at that time, coming from the 
direction of Pearl Harbor toward our H. A. D. area. That awoke me 
to what was going on, and I went back and dressed immediately and 
went to my quarters. 

The Chairman. Which were? 

Lieutenant Thomas. The headquarters building at Hickam Field, 
automatic telephone exchange. 

The Chairman. You were in charge of that communications post, 
were you ? 

-Lieutenant Thomas. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And I suppose your duties at the post did [4^5'] 
not permit of your observing very much outside? You were pretty 
busy ? 

Lieutenant Thomas. Well, I was in and out quite a bit, sir. We 
immediately went to work laying field wire to set up an advance com- 
mand post. 

The Chairman. Where? 

Lieutenant Thomas. In the officers' quarters area, at Colonel Farth- 
ing's quarters. 

The Chairman. Were your men under fire when they were doing 
that? . ■ , 

Lieutenant Thomas. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Where were you Saturday night, sir? 

Lieutenant Thomas. I was at my quarters. 

The Chairman. What percentage of your command reported 
promptly ? 

Lieutenant Thomas. I would say that every man was there within 
15 minutes. 

The Chairman. Full complement? 

Lieutenant Thomas. Yes, sir. I had — no, sir, I will retract that. 
There were two men on post who rang in about an hour later, as 
rapidly as they could get there from Honolulu. 

The Chairman. General McNarney? 

General McNarney. No. 

The Chairman. Have you anything? 

Admiral Reeves. No, sir. 

General McNarney. You say you were setting up an advance com- 
mand post. Was that in accordance with Standing Operating Pro- 
cedure or was it an order given that morning ? 

Lieutenant Thomas. We had established no definite location of an 
advance command post, but it was in our operating procedure that 
such would be set up immediately, and the location would depend 
on the situation. 

[4^61 General McNarney. Who picked the location? 

Lieutenant Thomas. Colonel Farthing. 

General McCoy. Who was the colonel ? 

Lieutenant Thomas. Colonel Farthing. 

General McCoy. Was he post commander? 

Lieutenant Thomas. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Is there anything further ? 

General McNarney. No. 

The Chairman. Lieutenant, we shall ask you not to discuss or dis- 
close anything that went on in the room while you were here. Thank 
you, sir. 



PROCEEDI^^GS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 291 

Lieutenant Thomas. Thank you. 

Major Allen. Sergeant Ullrich, Hickam Field. 

The Chairman. Sergeant, will you be sworn, sir ? 

TESTIMONY OF SERGEANT RALPH TRAUGER ULLRICH, 
UNITED STATES ARMY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. What is your full name ? 

Sergeant Ullrich. Ralph Trauger Ullrich. 

The Chairman. What command are you in, Sergeant? 

Sergeant Ullrich. Base engineering, sir, at Hickam Field, 22d 
Materiel. 

The Chairman. And where are your quarters ? 

Sergeant Ullrich. Quartered in the barracks, sir. 

The Chairman. AVere you on duty on the morning of December 7 ? 

Sergeant Ullrich. I was, sir. 

The Chairman. Where were you when the attack broke? 

Sergeant Ullrich. At Hanger 15, sir, the base engineering shops. 

The Chairman. You had already gone out to the shops before 
the attack broke, had you ? 

[487] Sergeant Ullrich. Yes, sir ; I had. 

The Chairman. What was the first thing you heard or saw ? 

Sergeant Ullrich. Well, as near as I can give it to you, sir, we 
had orders to report into the shop at 7 : 30 in the morning, between 
7 : 30 and 8, so I got up there about 7 : 30, and practically everyone 
else was there. We heard some airplanes overhead and heard some 
explosions over near the Navy sector. We all walked outside, and 
I heard someone make the remark that "If that's fooling I'll believe 
anything." 

General McCoy. That what? 

The Chairman. "If that's fooling I will believe anything." 

Sergeant Ullrich. And just about that time we seen a formation 
of airplanes coming from the south side of the field, from over Fort 
Kamehameha. 

The Chairman. Were they high or low, Sergeant? 

Sergeant Ullrich. I would judge about 200 feet, sir. 

The Chairman. Is that all ? 

Sergeant Ullrich. Probably a little higher. Just then there was 
an explosion occurred near us, and we all scattered. Some of us went 
through the hangar, and there was a number of explosions in there. 
When the dust and everything settled, what of us were on our feet 
yet, we run outside, and then they began machine-gunning us. 

The Chairman. These were dive bombers and machine-gun straf ers, 
were they ? 

Sergeant Ullrich. Yes, sir. So after that was over I went back 
in the hangar, helped to pick up the wounded. We got them out, I 
went down to the barracks, and sometime later it started all over 
again. 

The Chairman. There seemed to be a second attack? 

Sergeant Ullrich. Yes, sir, there was. 

The Chairman. Was Hickman Field bombed from a high 
[4^S] altitude, as well as this low-flying stuflf? 

Sergeant Ullrich. I couldn't say, sir, as to the high altitude. 



292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. You don't know. Your contingent was all on hand 
that morning, were they ? 

Sergeant Ullrich. The greater i)ercentage, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. General? 

General McMarney. Was it normal routine to work on Sunday 
morning in the base engineering shop, Sergeant? 

Sergeant Ullrich. No, sir, it wasn't. We had a B-24, and they 
were doing some work on it, that we had worked on late Saturday 
evening, and then they expected some more airplanes in in the morn- 
ing, and we had orders that the entire crew would come out and 
report for duty. 

General McNarney. Did your outfit furnish any guard? 

Sergeant Ullrich. They had some on ground training that I know 
of, but I don't know how many, or so forth. 

General McNarney. What guard was on the shops ? 

Sergeant Ullrich. Well, there was no guard at all around the 
shop, sir, that I Iniow of. 

General McNarney. Do you keep the shops locked at night? 

Sergeant Ullrich. Yes, sir, they are locked, and then they have 
the necessary guard, but they were not from my organization. 

General McNarney. Anybody sleeping in the hangar? 

Sergeant Ullrich. No, sir. And then they did have guards up 
there while the B-24: was parked. We were doing some work on it. 
What organization had them I don't know. 

The Chairman. Did you observe any of these 4-engine bombers 
come in that morning on a flight from the continent? 

Sergeant Ullrich. No, sir, I didn't. 

The Chairman. From the mainland? 

Sergeant Ullrich. No, sir, I didn't. 

[^55] The Chairman. You didn't see them. 

General McNarney. How many ships did you have in the shop? 
Have you any idea ? 

Sergeant Ullrich. There weren't any at all in our shop, sir. Ours 
is all machine shop, engine setup, sheet metal, and so forth. 

General McNarney. How much damage was done to your equip- 
ment ? 

Sergeant Ullrich. Well, not near as much as I thought at first, sir. 
I lost a few grinders, drill presses; that's about all. Practically all 
my welding equipment was ruined because it was down there in that 
far corner where the first large bomb hit. 

General McNarney. Did you have any fire in your hangar? 

Sergeant Ullrich. Just a small one, sir, of no importance. About 
the only fire I seen was an arc welder burned up, and a few points. 

General McNarney. How many men were disabled in your hangar 
when the hit came ? 

Serjeant Ullrich. They figured about 60-odd, sir. That is the 
organization. In my department there was around 50-some-odd men. 
I had 20-some-odd casualties, and they weren't all there at the time. 

General McNarney. I have no further questions. 

The Chairman. We shall ask you not to disclose the questions or 
anything that happened in the room, Sergeant. 

Sergeant Ullrich. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 293 

Sergeant Ullrich. Yes, sir. 

Major Allen. Private McBriarty, Bellows Field. 

The Chaieman. Will you be sworn ? 

[490] TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE RAYMOND F. McBRIARTY, 
UNITED STATES ARMY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman, Give your name to the reporter, please. 

Private McBriarty. Private first-class Raymond F. McBriarty. 

The Chairman. Wliat is your branch of the service, McBriarty? 

Private McBriarty. Air Corps, sir. 

The Chairman. Where are you stationed ? 

Private McBriarty. 1 am stationed at Bellows Field, sir, in the 
86th observation squadron. 

The Chairman. Wliat are your duties there ? 

Private McBriarty. I am aerial gunner and armorer, sir. 

The Chairman. Were you in the air on December 7 ? 

Private McBriarty. Sir, after the attack we got in the air. 

The Chairman. How long after the attack? 

Private McBriarty. Sir, I'd say about five minutes after the field 
was strafed. 

The Chairman. What? 

Private McBriarty. About five minutes after the attack, sir. 

The Chairman. Will you inquire, General ? 

General McNarney. Yes. 

Was there any other outfit stationed at Bellows Field besides the 
observation squadron ? 

Private McBriarty. Yes, sir. The 44th pursuit was stationed 
there. 

General McNarney. Wliat airplanes are j'ou equipped with, your 
squadron ? 

Private McBriarty. Sir, our squadron is equipped with the 0-47 B. 

[491] General McNarney. How many? 

Private McBriarty. Sir, we had at the time, I believe there was, 
six in commission. 

General McNarney. Wliat time was the attack made on Bellows 
Field? 

Private McBriarty. Sir, at 8 : 30 one ship came over from the sea 
and fired on the shore, I don't believe it inflicted any casualties, and 
I don't know where the bursts landed, I heard them myself, and from 
there proceeded to go to church, and later I seen a B-17-B-17 D I 
believe — was landing down wind on the runway, and at about nine 
o'clock whistles blew around the camp, and everybody proceeded to 
their stations, the sections where they worked. I ran from church down 
to the section, and that was the time the large attack started, sir. There 
was no bombs dropped. It was just a strafing of the field. 

General McNarney, You didn't realize then, when the first attack 
was made by this single plane, that there had been a heavy attack on 
the Island? 

Private McBriarty, No, sir. I seen the plane, and the bullets 
sounded just like blanks, like — like blanks that the U. S. Army uses, 
and the ship looked like the AT-G trainer the Army has. 



294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McNarney, And your commanding officer didn't realize 
that an attack was in progress ? 

Private McBriarty. Sir, I couldn't say whether he did or not. 

General McNarney. Well, you say you went to church. Was that 
voluntary ? 

Private McBriarty. That was on my own, sir. 

General McNarney. That was voluntary? Nobody told you 
that 

Private McBriarty. No, sir. I had seen that one plane, and some- 
body in the barracks asked me what it was, and I told [-^^^] him 
it was a plane with two red balls, so I just proceeded to go to church, 
and of course thinking about it, and then when I seen this B-17 land- 
ing down wind, that should have — more should have dawned upon me. 
It didn't. 

General McNarney. Well, you received no instructions from any of 
your 

Private McBriarty (Interposing). superior officers, no. 

General McNarney. noncommissioned officers or officers that 

anything unusual was happening ? 

Private McBriarty. No, sir. 

General McNarney. And you say a signal was sounded? 

Private McBriarty. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. Where were you then ? 

Private McBriarty. I was in the church at the time, sir. 

General McNarney. And where did you go then ? 

Private McBriarty. Sir, then I ran down to the line and proceeded 
into the armament shack and grabbed my gun, and another fellow fol- 
lowed me out with ammunition, and I got into the Major's ship. Major 
Stewart's ship, and mounted my gun and put my ammunition in my 
own gun and loaded it and went around and was proceeding to put 
ammunition in the fixed guns when the attack started ; and when the 
first wave of planes came over I hit the dust. After it passed over I 
crawled in the cockpit, and I expended 450 rounds on them. I believe 
it was 450 ; I couldn't exactly say up to the dot, but I know it was over 
400, in 100-round ammunition cans. 

General McNarney. It was on the gromid ? 

Private McBriarty. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. And did you notice any results? 

Private McBriarty. Well, sir, one plane — one plane was coming 
down, just came right down the runway, didn't seem to have any 
objective at all, just fired on the ramp. Well, I know I hit that, but 
I could see that it sort of — it was so darned close, I could see holes 
going in the fuselage behind [493] the pilot, but I doubt 
whether I got him. 

Then there was another one that dived straight on me. I fired 
right into its motor, and after he came out of his dive he pulled awful 
hard on the stick, not as any regular pilot would do, and I might 
say he was an awful poor pilot, because the way he was following in 
on his gunnery line, why, he tried to fire — to follow me straight in, 
and to correct his fire, why, he gave it too much rudder from one side 
and then too much rudder on the other side, and he completely missed 
his target. 

General McNarney. You think he was an inexperienced pilot ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 295 

Private McBriartt. Yes, sir ; I would say most of them were, from 
the way they banked their ships. They skid all around. They really 
were rugged with the controls, really pretty rugged with them. 

General McNarney. Kough? 

Private McBriarty. Yes. 

General McNarney. When did you take off? 

Private McBriarty. Sir, I said — I'd say we took off about five 
minutes after the attack, and when we got up in the air the Major's 
plane was acting sort of rough. We were going to — I believe we were 
going to proceed to go out to sea, to try to follow them, but I don't 
think the Major took the chance with the ship ; it was pretty rocky. 
I don't know whether the ship was hit or not, but it had plenty of 
chance to be hit. 

General McNarney. And you came back in and landed ? 

Private McBriarti'. Yes, sir, we came — proceeded back to land. 

General McNarney. Did any other ships of your squadron take off ? 

Private McBriarty. No, sir, no ships of our squadron took off, but 
one P-40 from the 44 Pursuit took off, and that went down, as I 
understand. I don't know whether any more took off or not, sir. 

General McNarney. Was there any great amount of damage done 
[494] to the airplanes there ? 

Private McBriarty. Sir, from the 86th squadron there was only — 
there was an 0-49 completely ruined, shot through the dashboard and 
the controls ; the wings were all ripped up, and there was one hole in an 
elevator in an 0-47. 

General INIcNarney. That is all. 

Admiral Standley. I would like to ask one question: Have you 
knowledge of anyone observing planes that morning flying over or by 
your post, by Bellows Field, approaching the Island? 

Private McBriarty. No, sir ; I haven't heard of anybody at all that 
has seen anything of that kind. 

The Chairman. Was your contingent all present and accounted for 
that morning when you were needed? 

Private McBriarty. Sir, most of our men were. We were pretty 
well johnny-on-the-spot. 

The Chairman. What? 

Private McBriarty. We were pretty well eye-on-the-spot that 
morning. 

The Chairman. Commanding officers all there and taking charge? 

Private McBriarty. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. About what time was it when you came out of 
church when this attack occurred? 

Private McBriarty. Sir, I would say it was about nine o'clock, 
almost on the minute. 

Admiral Reeat.s. You had heard nothing before that except this 
one plane that vou told us about? 

Private McBriarty. Yes, sir, just this one plane. Sir, what drew 
our attention to it was the B-17, which is unusual, it is such a small 
field, and then, besides, coming down wind, why, we thought there 
was something fishy. 

Admiral Standley. Did if make a good landing? 

Private McBriarty. No, sir. It was with the wind, and it [4^5'\ 
landed about midrunway and went off the end of the ramp. There is a 
big knoll there, and the plane was a complete washout. 



296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Standley. Was the pilot killed? 

Private McBriarty. No, sir. He had three men wounded. They 
had been attacked on the way over here, and there was no ammunition 
in the plane, and evidently they couldn't fire back. I imagine — I 
couldn't say exactly the true facts of the case, so I would rather it was 
taken away from me. 

General McCoy. Was that the only plane of that type that landed 
there that morning ? 

Private McBriarty. Yes, sir, it was the only B-17. 

The Chairman. Is the B-17 one of our planes ? 

5i'ivate McBriarty. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. That is the big 4-engine flying fortress. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Private McBriarty. B-17 D I believe, sir. 

The Chairman. I wonder if that wasn't one of those that was 
coming in from San Francisco. It wasn't armed? 

Private McBriarty. No. It had guns and everything else, sir, but 
it lacked the ammunition. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Private McBriarty. I know we took the guns out of it and placed 
them up for ground defense. 

The Chairman. Anything further? 

(There was no response.) 

The Chairman. Do not discuss the testimony or what has been 
asked you here, with anyone else. 

Private McBriarty. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. 

Major Allen. Captain West, Camp Malakole. 

The Chairman. Captain, will you be sworn? 

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN MELBOURNE H. WEST, 
UNITED STATES ARMY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give your full name to the reporter, 
please ? 

Captain West. Melbourne H. West. 

The Chairman. What is your branch of the service. Captain? 

Captain West. I am in the Coast Artillery Corps, sir. 

The Chairman. Where were you stationed on the day of December 
7, 1941? _ 

Captain West. I was stationed at Camp Malakole, at Barbers Point. 

The Chairman. At Barbers Point? 

Captain West. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Well, your headquarters were not at Barbers Point, 
were they ? 

Captain West. I described Camp Malakole as being at Barbers 
Point. I was at Camp Malakole. 

The Chairman. I see. 

Captain West. Our headquarters is there. 

The Chairman. What was the first you knew of the attack on 
December 7 ? 

Captain West. Only by my own observation. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 297 

The Chairman. That is what I want. 

Captain West. At eight o'clock in the morning I was having break- 
fast at the officers' mess, and I was officer of the day, and heard what 
sounded like gunfire, which sometimes is not unusual, and it continued 
to get louder, and I went outside and observed in the sky all the smoke 
coming from Pearl Harbor, in that direction, and the shrapnel in the 
air, so I knew it wasn't gunfiring, and shortly after eight o'clock I 
heard machine gunfire from — it sounded like from the air, and it was 
from the air over Camp Malakole, strafing of enemy planes over that 
camp. 

[4^7] The Chairman. Did you have any machine gun defense 
there? 

Captain West. We had ground machine guns, sir. We were pro- 
tecting our own equipment against sabotage at that time. 

The Chairman. You were under Alert No. 1 at that time? 

Captain West. That's right, sir. 

The Chairman. And did you get your machine guns into action, 
Captain? 

Captain West. Yes, sir ; not only those machine guns but other ma- 
chine guns which were for anti-aircraft protection, that would be 
moved out later on, but they were put into action during — oh — the 
third or fourth strafing attack. 

The Chairman. You got them out of storage as fast as you could 
and set them up, did you ? 

Captain West. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Was your contingent up to full strength that morn- 
ing? 

Captain West. No, sir. There were some men on pass. Some 
men were on pass. The guard battery was there a hundred percent, 
and we had a standby battery there, and I can't — I dont' know how 
many were on pass, but very few, sir. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Captain West. Small percentage. 

The Chairman. General? 

General McNarney. Wliat equipment have you in your batteries, 
Captain? 

Captain West. Have I in my battery, or 

General McNarney. Yes. In your battery what equipment do you 
have? 

Captain West. I was commanding officer of the searchlight bat- 
teries. 

General McNarney. Oh, the searchlight batteries. 

Captain West. Yes, sir. We have all of our equipment there, of 
course: the 3-inch guns of the other batteries and [4^<§] the 
.30- and .50-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns. 

General McNarney. Was any of the equipment in place ready to 
fire? 

Captain West. No, sir. It was in the storage area. 

General McNarney. How long did it take you to get into posi- 
tion ? 

Captain West. I was at camp, and I can't state the time that the 
machine guns were in position at Pearl Harbor, but they got down 
there ready to fire within one or two hours after that time. The 



298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3-inch guns moved out of there — it takes considerable time to place 
those ready to fire; it was some time in the afternoon before the 
3-inch guns were ready in their war positions. 

General McNarney. What were their war positions; will you tell 
us? 

Captain West. Their war positions were down on the Ewa plain. 
There were three gun batteries, two in a southerly direction from Ewa 
and one near West Loch. 

General McNarney. Will you point those places out on the map? 

Captain West. One gun battery was down here southeast of Ewa 
(indicating), another here (indicating), and another up near West 
Loch. 

General McN'AR]srEY. Do you know what time you received the 
orders for you to take up your battle position ? 

Captain West. I don't know, sir. As officer of the day I gave the 
call to arms at 8 : 10. I tried to get through to the 53 brigade and 
also the commanding officer, and I couldn't do that, so on my own 
I gave that call to arms. 

On the time that we received the order to go into Alert No. 3, I 
cannot give that to you exactly. It was between 8 and 9, all I can say. 

[499] General McNarney. Well, this call to arms, position — 
is that the order to move out, or just alert? 

Captain West. That alerted everybody; that is, to get every man 
into their — to get their equipment together, personal equipment to- 
gether, and stand by for further orders. 

The Chairman. You got the Alert No. 3 around eight, between 
eight and nine, did you? 

Captain West. That's right, sir. 

The Chairman. From headquarters? 

Captain West. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You had been in Alert No. 1 for how long. Cap- 
tain ? 

Captain West. Since the 27th of November. 

The Chairman. Yes. Had there been any interval of Alert No. 1 
or 3 in between there, between the 27th of November and December 7? 

Captain West. No, sir. 

The Chairman. It had all been Alert No. 1 ? 

Captain West. Alert No. 1. We were taking all precautions 
against sabotage. 

The Chairman. Yes. Anything more? 

(There was no response.) 

The Chairman. We shall ask you not to discuss the testimony that 
you have given or anything that has occurred in the room while you 
were here. Captain. 

Captain West. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. 

Major Allen. Do vou want to hear some others, sir? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Major Allen. Lieutenant Lyman, sir. 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn, sir? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 299 

[500] TESTIMONY OF FIEST LIEUTENANT WILLIS THEODORE 
LYMAN, UNITED STATES ARMY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give your full name to the reporter^ 
please ? 

Lieutenant Lyman. Willis Theodore Lyman. 

The Chairman. And to what command are you attached? 

Lieutenant Lyjian. First Lieutenant, 251st Coast Artillery, Anti- 
Aircraft Battery E. 

The Chairman. And where in that capacity was your personal 
station on the morning of December 7? 

Lieutenant Lyman. Sir, at Camp Malakole. 

The Chairman. The same station as the captain, the previous wit- 
ness? 

Lieutenant Lyman. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. What was the first warning you had of an attack? 

Lieutenant Lyman. Sir, at eight o'clock my captain and myself 
were just getting up preparatory to going to church; they were going 
to dedicate our chapel. And the phone call came asking for Lieu- 
tenant Lytton of our command, asking for him. His wife was phon- 
ing and stating that there was a lot of noise, and she said a lot of big 
black things dropping around the place up there at Wahiawa, which 
is near Schofield Barracks. We could hear the sound of explosions 
at that hour — that was about two or three minutes to eight o'clock, 
sir — and I could hear it over the phone, and I assured her that I 
thought it was just a practice bombing on the north side of the Island 
by the air corps. And then she hung up, and I stepped out to the 
porch of the officers' barracks, looked toward Pearl Harbor, and saw 
the bursts of high explosive in the air, and I knew that was not right. 

At the same time I could observe three planes circling low 
[601] and left, following the hills from Fort Berrette toward 
camp. I rushed back to my room, grabbed my glasses, took a look, 
and the captain was right with me. We saw the red insignia, and 
I told the captain and Captain Byars, the battalion executive, that 
those were Japanese planes, and Captain Byars said, * 'Alert the bat- 
talion," and Captain Mclntire and I both hit the phone at the same 
time to alert the battery. That was approximately three minutes 
after eight, sir. We then completed dressing and ran over to the 
battery and went to work. 

The Chairman. Had you any ant i- aircraft guns in place? 

Lieutenant Lyman. We did not at that time, sir. We are a machine 
gun battalion. We are in the machine gun battalion and are the 
machine gun battery of the automatic weapons battalion, and we had 
our .30 calibers out. I got two of them out on the line, and we got 
a chance to fire. 

The Chairman. Where did you get them out from? 

Lieutenant Lyman. From our ordnance room, sir, which is — well, 
it is kind of hard to describe from here. 

The Chairman. Never mind. It is some distance from where you 
set up your guns ? 



300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Lieutenant Lymax. We set up about fifty yards inmiediately toward 
the sea from the barracks. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Lieutenant Lyman. And fired from there. 

The Chairman. If you had been in Aleit No. 2 or Alert No. 3, 
where would those guns have been ? 

Lieutenant Lyman. Under Alert No. 2 we would probably have 
been in the field, sir, because we go into the field on Alert No. 3. 

The Chairman. Yes. Wlien did you get Alert No. 3 from head- 
quarters? 

Lieutenant Lyman. So far as I know, sir, we never received that, 
but we received orders to move at about ten o'clock, and [SO^I 
I called the first platoon out and went to Pearl Harbor after we had 
fired on these planes at Malakole. 

The Chairman. Was your fire effective ? 

Lieutenant Lyman. We got one plane definitely, sir — I believe they 
are going to give us credit for it — and the other plane is a question 
mark. I noted in the journal that I wasn't sure about the other one, 
but it seemed to have some trouble getting away. 

The Chairman. General McNarney ? 

General McNarney. At what altitude were the planes that vou 
fired at? 

Lieutenant Lyman. The first plane that we fired at, sir, was ap- 
proximately a hundred yards. The second plane was 75 feet at the 
lowest point, and at that point we, as far as I know about it, on one 
fire only had two guns going, sir, two .30 caliber on the old umbrella 
mounting, model 1918 mount, and it was almost pointblank fire both 
ways. One of our boys, Fairbanks, was struck in front of me by one 
tracer stream, and the other tracer stream from the plane was about 
as far away from me as between this gentleman here and myself (indi- 
cating), and he's recovered and is back with us. 

That plane dipped to about 75 feet, and at that point when it fired 
— we fired at it — we could see — I saw one tracer ricochet off of the 
plane near the junction of the wing and the fuselage there by the 
cockpit, and it ricocheted off the plane, and the plane made a climbing 
turn to the left and wheeled on out and kept dipping down like this 
and struck the water some distance out. 

The Chairman. What did you think of the way they handled 
their planes? 

Lieutenant Lyman. Their flying, sir, was skillful. They took their 
time. They apparently knew exactly where they were going. I 
didn't think much of their bombing. They fired on [603] our 
little group of three trucks on the way in to Pearl Harbor, so we 
stopped and piled out and shot at them with our rifles, and rode in, 
and while we were emplacing the 50''s on the roof of the shop supply 
building in Pearl Harbor — that's building 150 where I put one section, 
put the first section I took out with me — they attacked us twice there, 
and that was at about eleven o'clock. I think my journal shows that 
about 11: 12 we received the first one, and then the second one was 
about three or four minutes later. Things happened pretty rapidly ; 
you didn't have time to keep track all the time. 

They knew where they were going. And their speeds, approxi- 
mately, I judge from our target practice work, didn't exceed more 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 301 

than about 200 miles; the last group — we shot at that last gi'oup at 
Malakole — was approximately 200. 

General McNarney. What type were they? Single seaters, or 
what? 

Lieutenant Lyma^j. Two types. The first group that we saw come 
over, and the first warning we had that they were actually going to 
strafe the camp, they cleared their guns, and they were a type that is 
like a pursuit, except the trailing edge of the wing might have been, 
instead of being tapered, straight like our P-40's. Their planes were 
plainly a hybrid, no definite type such as ours; a rounded nose like 
a P-36, and the buck end of those wings looked like those old Douglas 
0-19's we saw in the maneuvers in '-10, although not quite so much 
cut in. And then the ones that we shot at were apparently a two- 
pjace ship. And could only fire straight forward. Their guns fire 
from the leading edge of the wing. We picked up some of the slugs. 
I have one slug with a steel jacket and — steel core, and the base of the 
shell said 7.7, would be about 25. 

General McNarney. I have nothing further. 

The Chaikmax. Any further questions? 

(There was no response.) 

[504] The Chairman. Lieutenant, we shall ask you not to dis- 
cuss what has gone on in this room with anyone. 

Lieutenant Lyman. Yes, sir. I understand. 

The Chairman. Thank you, sir. 

Major Allen. There is one more witness, sir. 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn ? 

TESTIMONY OF SERGEANT JUNE D. DICKENS, UNITED STATES 

AEMY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chainnan.) 

The Chairman. Give you full name to the reporter, will you, 
please? 

Sergeant Dickens. June D. Dickens. 

The Chairman. Sergeant, what was your tour of duty on the morn- 
ing of December 7, 1941 ? 

Sergeant Dickens. I was sergeant of the guard, sir. 

The Chairman. Where? 

Sergeant Dickens. I was sergeant of the guard at Camp Malakole. 

The Chairman. At Malakole"? 

Sergeant Dickens. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That is coast defense ? 

Sergeant Dickens. No, sir. That is anti-aircraft. 

The Chairman. Anti-aircraft. Same unit as the lieutenant who 
has just been here. Lieutenant Lyman? 

Sergeant Dickens. Yes, sir; we are all in the same regiment, sir. 

The Chairman. All in the same regiment. Where were you when 
the thing broke ? 

Sergeant Dickens. I was on the guardhouse porch there, sir. I 
had just got up, and I went out there to make up my guard book, 
and just as the corporal went down to get breakfast, why, I turned 
around and says, "So long. Take it easy," and [606] I stepped 
out there, and about that quick, why, the crack of machine gunfire 



302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

cut loose. It was two Japanese dive bombers. I am quite sure as 
to what they were because I took a good look at them. 

The Chairman. Wliere were they coming? Over Malakole? 

Sergeant Dickens. Yes, sir. They were going directly down Cali- 
fornia Street in Malakole. 

The Chairman. They were? 

Sergeant Dickens. They were going directly over the center of 
Battery B's barracks, and I looked up, and that is when the machine 
gunfire cut loose. They seemed to have picked out the ammunition 
dump as their target. 

The Chairman. Of course you were not in a position to fire at 
those? 

Sergeant Dickens. Yes, sir, but I wheeled out as many machine 
guns i^s I could. 

The Chairman. Where were your machine guns ? 

Sergeant Dickens. I had one sabotage truck on the beach, and I 
hall one other sabotage truck at the guardhouse, and I am pretty sure 
there were six planes. As the first two went over they fired at them 
from the beach there. They saw what was happening and didn't 
hesitate. 

The Chairman. That truck was manned at the time? 

Sergeant Dickens. Yes, sir. It always had been manned. 

The Chairman. It had been manned? 

Sergeant Dicilens. We man all our trucks 24 hours. 

The Chairman. That was under Alert No. 1 ? 

Sergeant Dickens. Yes. 

The Chairman. Anti-sabotage ? 

Sergeant Dickens. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And there was enough of a crew there to go right 
to work, was there '? 

Sergeant Dickens. There certainly was, sir. 

[506] The Chairman. And they did get additional machine 
guns ? 

Sergeant Dickens. I warned the second battalion — they are the 
machine gun outfit — that we were being attacked, and to wheel out as 
many guns as they could, and the marine outfit up at the beach, I 
think they may have been at Malakole; now they camp at Nanakuli. 
They came and manned their five .50-calibers on the beach up there — 
the}^ were having target practice a week before — and returned as much 
fire as they could. We had two B. A. E. men on the fire tower there, 
which brought down one plane. It was quite remarkable. 

The Chairman. Two of your men? 

Sergeant Dickens. Yes, sir, two men on guard up there. It was 
a guard order that we had two B. A. R. men there. And as the plane 
swooped down to do its best to wipe out the Marine Corps, the B. A. R. 
men let go with automatic, short bursts, and it banked right down and 
went into the ocean. 

The Chairman. Were those all the planes, those six or so, that went 
directly over you? 

Sergeant Dickens. There were six. 

The Chairman. That is all? 

Sergeant Dickens. There was one bomber that come in from the 
west. It was a heavy bomber. I couldn't quite make out what it was. 
The motors on it were pointed ; it had four motors on it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 303 

The Chairman. I guess it was one of our own. 

The Witness. It might have been. 

The Chairman. One that was coming in from San Francisco and 
didn't know. 

General McNarnet. Did you fire on that, Sergeant? 

Sergeant Dickens. No, sir, I didn't. If you don't know what the 
plane is you don't want to shoot at it; it might be your own. 

The Chairman. It was. " 

[S07] Where were you the night of December 6, Sergeant? 

Sergeant Dickens. December 6 I was at the guardhouse. It was 
a funny thing about that. That afternoon, Saturda}?^, we observed 
a Japanese fishing boat off the coast of Malakole there. Well, they 
naturally called me down there to see what it was. I knew what a 
Japanese boat looked like if I saw it. The boat was within 50 yards 
of the shoreline, and there were two men trying to swim in to shore. 
So I unlimbered my 45 and walked down to the beach and told them 
if they come any closer I would shoot to kill. They started treading 
water and headed back to their boat and went back, and that's how 
I mounted a machine gun truck up there, my two B. A, R. men and 
machine gun loaded, and told them if they ever came back again I 
would start opening fire, because they are not supposed to come near. 
The boat came back three or four times, but it didn't come into ma- 
chine gun range. It's in the guard order at Malakole that I wrote 
it in. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

[SOS] General McNarney. You thought that boat was getting 
its feet warm trying to sabotage your equipment ? 

Sergeant Dickens., We are suspicious of the Japanese or Chinese 
{•round here and if they start fooling around the camp we don't take 
any talk from them. 

General McNarney. Did you report that incident to an5^one? 

Sergeant Dickens. Yes, the officer of the day was with me, and he 
went back to investigate. 

The Chairman. You say it was entered in your journal ? 

Sergeant Dickens. Yes, before I left the guardhouse on that day, 
I made notes about the attack and how many planes there were and 
the description of the planes, and I left it there for the next sergeant to 
write it in. 

The Chairman. You say you were on duty until what time Satur- 
day night ? 

Sergeant Dickens. I was on duty all night. 

The Chairman. You were on duty all night ? 

Sergeant Dickens. All night, sir. 

The Chairman. And then you started to get breakfast after your 
tour of duty ? 

Sergeant Dickens. I didn't get breakfast until the next day then. 

The Chairman. How long have you been in the service ? 

Sergeant Dickens. I have been on active service more than a year. 

The Chairman. Where were you called in from ? 

Sergeant Dickens. I was called in from the National Guard. 

The Chairman. What group? 

Sergeant Dickens. The California group. 

The Chairman. Any other questions ? 



304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McNarney. No. 

The Chairman. Just do not disclose nor discuss with anyone any- 
thing that was said in this room. 

Sergeant Dickens. Yes, sir. I have a short memory. 

[S09] The Chairman. Thank you very much. 

We will adjourn at this time until 2 : 15. 

(Thereupon, at 1 : 30 o'clock p. m., the hearing was recessed until 
2 : 15 o'clock p. m. of the same day.) 

AFTERNOON SESSION 

(The hearing reconvened at 2 : 15 o'clock p. m., upon the expiration 
of the recess. ) 

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES J. UTTEEBACK 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give us your full name, please ? 

Mr. Utterbagk. Charles J. Utterback. 

The Chairman. And what is your profession ? 

Mr. Utterback. I am head foreman for the District Engineers. 

The Chairman. Where were you on the morning of December 7? 

Mr. Utterback. At Hickam Field. 

The Chairman. At what hour? 

Mr. Utterback. I went to work at 6 : 30 in the morning, sir. 

The Chairman. Is your position here under the Army or is it a 
civilian position? 

Mr. Utterback. I am a civilian, sir, working for the District Engi- 
neers. 

The Chairman. Will you tell us what your first warning or your 
first knowledge of the attack was and tell us what you observed ? 

Mr. Utterback. I was walking toward Mat A, which is the main 
mat at Hickam Field, air side, and I heard a large explosion, and I 
first thought — the first thing that I thought was the dynamite blew 
up, because we were loading the dynamite. 

[SW] ■ I glanced toward Pearl Harbor and I saw this large 
black smoke rising. 

About the time I looked up I heard another explosion, and then I 
saw a lot of planes flying toward us, and about this time the man with 
me remarked that they were Japanese planes, and they were right 
over us. 

The Chairman. Were those planes flying high or low ? 

Mr. Utterback. Very low, sir. 

The Chairman. What firing did they do? Were they dropping 
bombs? 

Mr. Utterback. The first planes that came over dropped bombs, sir^ 
and they flew right over the — the fii-st one I saw dropped a bomb which 
was at the repair hangar. It hit that kitchen, just this side of it. It 
dropped the first bomb there. 

The Chairman. Did they seem to be going fast or not? 

Mr. Utterback. No, they were not very fast, just slow cruising 
speed, flying very low and not very fast at all — very slow-flying planes. 

The Chairman. Tell us what else you saw. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 305 

Mr. Utterback. When this happened, why I saw the Japanese 
planes. We could see the markings on them because they had the 
red insignia on the bottom of the wings. 

I being a War Veteran tlien suggested that the men with me should 
take cover ; so we ran back to the side of the road and went in the ditch 
along the Fort Kamehameha highway, which was 75 feet from there. 

We went in this ditch and waited for a while. They were flying 
around in circles. They seemed to fly out to sea, and then came back 
again. 

I saw my men seemed to be dumbfounded, and I told them to get 
under cover. I told these men to take cover. Then I telephoned 
the exchange to see what message there was. I [5^-?] wanted 
to get to the foreman, and the telephone operator was there, and he 
wasn't there. At that time some Army officers appeared on the scene. 
I went back to my men, and they were under the trees; so I asked the 
Army officer there in charge if he would get these men under cover. 

He told me to take them over to the old mortar casemate, and we 
found it was locked, but we got them under shelter for a while ; so I 
told them to take cover back to the mortar battery. 

I stayed there. That was when the second attack come over, and 
they were starting to strafe the ground. We laid along the casement 
there. So then we went back to the mortar battery. We were in 
there and we stayed in there probably an hour or so. Some of our 
men helped to get the lights running, and I sent mechanics to the 
gun battery to get the engines running. 

The colonel had asked for volunteers, and I sent a bunch of men 
to dig trenches. They had no toilet facilities there, and there were 
no water facilities. We sent men out for water. 

At this time my direct superior got in touch with me and told me 
to go and clear the streets and shut the water off. This was about the 
third phase of it. 

They were very high at this time and dropping heavy bombs at the 
last attack. 

I was near the parade ground at Hickam Field trying to shut off 
the main when the last attack came over, and they seemed to be drop- 
ping a heavy load on the ball diamond. One hit the railroad track, 
and the rest of them didn't hit anything. I don't think any bombs 
hit any building in the last attack. The only one that did damage 
was the one that hit the railroad track. 

The Chairman. When did you observe any of our own [S12^ 
airplanes getting into the air? 

Mr. Utterback. I could not say, sir. There were some planes try- 
ing to land. They were trying to land, and it was while I had the 
detail out trying to get some water — I imagine 9 o'clock — that I 
noticed a couple of our small fighting planes flying very low after 
the Japanese planes, chasing them across, because I had hollered at 
the gunner from Fort Kamehameha to quit firing because it was one 
of our own planes.' That was during the second phase, but the anti- 
aircraft seemed to be in action. It didn't take them long. 

The Chairman. Probably they drove the last planes very high and 
spoiled their aim ? 

Mr. Utterback. Yes. The anti-aircraft in less than 10 minutes 
were putting up a barrage from the Pearl Harbor side, were putting 
up quite a barrage. 

79716 — 46— Ex 143. vol. 1—21 



306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCoy. Was that on Hickam Field ? 

Mr. Utterback. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. This anti-aircraft fire ? 

Mr. Utterback. No, sir, it seemed to come from Pearl Harbor. 
There was no anti-aircraft fire on Hickam Field, to my knowledge. 
There was from behind Fort Kamehameha, but not at that time. 

General McCoy. What was your general impression of the conduct 
of the officers and the soldiers of the service under this shock, surprise, 
and so forth ? 

Mr. Utterback. I can say the younger officers — I even remarked to 
someone later there how cool they were. There was some excitement, 
There are always some excited men, but I think they were very cool 
and conducted themselves in a very sober manner. 

General ]\IcCoy. And the soldiers also ? 

Mr. Uttekback. Yes, because it was only 45 minutes until they were 
storing ammunition in the casemate and bringing up [51S] 
surplus ammunition. 

General McCoy. Was there anything exceptional that you noticed? 
Was there aiiything that struck you at the time as being an excep- 
tionally bad act or anything of that sort? 

Mr. Utterback. No. The only thing I noticed that I thought was 
exceptional was how quick some of the officers got to their posts on 
Fort Kam, and I know several of the officers, and it seemed they got 
to their posts very rapidly because the old battery was manned — it 
seemed like it wasn't more than 20 minutes until they were ready at 
that old mortar battery. 

General McCoy. Were there any anti-aircraft guns there? 

Mr. Utterback. No, sir, but the coast defense were being manned 
very rapidly. I also noticed men in the hangars that came out fast 
trying to get the planes out, but they were strafed away. 

General McCoy. Did you see the bomb that hit the barracks? 

Mr. Utterback. No. sir, because the large hangar hides the barracks 
from where I was at that time, but I did see Hangar 13 hit. and I also ' 
saw the kitchen go up in flames, but I saw the direct hit on the repair 
hangar. They were right over that, and it seemed like they were just 
almost on it. They hit it several times but the first bomber hitting the 
repair hangar was very low. He was just right over it. 

General McCoy. Did you see any Japanese planes knocked down? 

Mr. Utterback. No, sir. I only saw one. I don't know whether 
he was knocked down or shot down. That was the only one sir. 

The Chairman. Any other questions ? 

Admiral Standley. Where do you live? 

Mr. Utterback. I live at 1419 Konia Street. 

Admiral Standley. Where is that ? 

Mr. Utterback. That is on the Heights, Kamehameha Heights. 

[514] Admiral Standley. Kamehameha Heights? 

Mr, Utterback. Yes. 

Admiral Stanley. That is back from Fort Kamehameha ? 

Mr. Utterback. No, sir, that is the heights over here (indicating), 
right behind here. That is m.y house where I live over there. 

The Chairman. That is toward Diamond Head? 

Mr. Utterback. No, sir. That is right behind here. There is the 
school over there. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 307 

Admiral Standley. What are your contacts in daily life ? Recrea- 
tion and so forth aside from those at Hickam Field? 

Mr. Utterback. You mean those I contact with ? 

Admiral Standley, Yes, your friends and so forth. 

Mr. Utterback. I have the men I work with, sir. 

Admiral Standley. They are all civilians? 

Mr. Utterback. Yes, all civilians. 

Admiral Standley. Do you ever associate with the military to any 
extent except in your work ? 

Mr. Utterback. No, sir, except in my work. 

Admiral Standley. What, if any, comments or general impressions 
among the civilians and among your associates have been expressed in 
regard to the whole action on the 7th? 

Mr. UiTERBACK. You mean the remarks that were said, sir? 

Admiral Standley. Yes, the general understanding, the general 
comment on the whole situation. 

Mr. Utterback. The only thing I heard that morning, sir, was, 
"They caught them asleep, by God." That is all you would hear: 
"They caught them asleep, by God." I think I heard that comment 
50 times that day. 

General McCoy. How long have you been working here ? 

Mr. Utterback. I have been on Hickam Field ever since it started, 
since 1936'. 

General McCoy. What would you say about the normal habits of 
the officers and the men at Hickam Field? 

[515] Mr. Utterback. Well, I have nothing but the highest 
respect for them, sir. I have been around the Army and in it practi- 
cally all my life and I have seen nothing disorderly about any officer 
there. 

General McCoy. Have you noticed any unusual drinking or drunk- 
enness among the Army personnel since you have been here ? 

Mr. Utterback. No, sir, no more than any other place. 

General McCoy. In other words, what would your general comment 
be about the Service men there ? 

Mr. Utterback. Well, this is a small island and from the viewpoint 
of the Service men it has been very outstanding, sir, the soldiers and 
sailors here, because with so little recreation here they have to let some 
steam loose, and it has been outstanding from what I have seen. 

General McCoy. Who is the engineering officer with whom you 
contact ? 

Mr. Utterback. I am with the civil service. I am working directly 
under Colonel Wyman. 

General McCoy. That is Rivers and Harbors? 

Mr. Utterback. Yes. 

The Chairman. There has been a great deal of gossip in the news- 
papers about the Army men here having a pretty good time, and a 
great deal of drinking and so forth, and about a great deal of slack- 
ness. What is the opion around among the civilians in the vicinity of 
Pearl Harbor ? You realize we have got to get at the facts. 

Mr. UnERBACK. As I said before, there is probably a good deal of 
drinking, but with the large amount of men here, and as I say, there 
is no recreation for them, and I know myself, and probably some of you 
gentlemen do too, that back in 1916, 1917, and 1918 we had no recfea- 



308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tion, and that was about the only thing you had to do, to get tanked 
up. That is just natural. I do not think it exists any more than 
among the civilians. 

[SW] The Chairman. No more in the Army than among the 
civilians ? 

Mr. Utterback. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Isn't there some place for them to go in town? 
For instance, isn't there an Army and Navy YMCA? 

Mr. Utterback. Yes, but it is small for the amount of men. 

General McCoy. Does the USO have a house in Honolulu ? 

Mr. Utterback. No. They were raising funds for it, but there 
hasn't been any money for it unless it was started since the 7th. I 
know up to that time I don't think there has been any money for it. 

The Navy had a recreation place out here but that was the only thing 
outside of their beach. 

Admiral Standley. That was the Richardson Athletic Field ? 

Mr. Utterback. Yes. 

General McCoy. Have you been in any of the hospitals here ? 

Mr. Utterback. Yes, I have been in Tripler. 

General McCoy. Does that impress you as being a good hospital? 

Mr. Utterback. Yes. I was in there three years ago when I fell 
and broke my arm and my shoulder on federal duty, and I was treated 
very nicely, being a civilian. I was treated exceptionally well and had 
a good doctor. 

General McCoy. Do they have a Red Cross unit in that hospital ? 

Mr. Utterback. Yes, sir, there is a Red Cross unit there. 

The Chairman. Any other questions ? 

Admiral Standley. No. 

The Chairman. Please observe silence about what has gone on in 
this room and do not discuss what has been said by you or anyone else. 

Mr. Utterback. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Thank vou very much. 

[517'] General McCoy. Thank you. 

TESTIMONY OF EDWIN ST. J. GRIFriTH, UNITED STATES 
ENGINEERS 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give us your fiill name? 

Mr. Griffith. Edwin St. J. Griffith. 

The Chairman. And what is your official position ? 

Mr. Griffith. I am chief inspector and associate engineer. United 
States Engineers. 

The Chairman. Is that a military or civilian unit? 

Mr. Griffith. Civilian unit, sir. 

The Chairman. Where were you on the morning of December 7? 

Mr. Griffith. I was at the base yard. We were taking inventory. 

The Chairman. Where is that base yard ? 

Mr. Griffith. That is between Hickam and Fort Kamehameha. 

The Chairman. What was the first thing you observed? Tell us 
your observations around the fort and what happened, as nearly as 
you can. 

Mr. Griffith. We had just gotten started taking the inventory, 
or just about to get started, and we heard some shots, machine-gun 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 309 

shots. I went out of the building we were in and looked out and saw 
a plane coming in a westerly direction about 100 feet or possibly more 
above us, which swooped down and machine gunned the place while 
it was in flight, and then swung around. 

At first we thought that was our own maneuvers, military maneu- 
vers, and many others seemed to think the same thing. 

Just after it occurred I looked toward Hickam Field and saw 
another plane drop a bomb in the vicinty of the AC repair hangar, 
the one that was badly damaged, and then I knew it was Japanese 
planes. 

The official that was in charge of the inventory asked me [518] 
if I would call Mr. Sisson, who is our boss, aiid ask him what he 
wanted us to do, or whether he wanted us to continue in this inventory. 

I could not get Mr. Sisson, so I called Major Robinson, and then 
fiinally I called Colonel Wyman. He said, "Use your own judgment." 

Then we went from there over to the section that was wooded near 
Fort Kamehameha, I should say, about half past eight, and the raid 
started at 8 o'clock sharp. 

We stayed there under the trees for some time, possibly another 
half hour. Then the second raid started, and they put us in the 
magazine shelter in Fort Kamehameha proper. 

We stayed there until it seemed to be quiet, about noon, and we 
came out and went back and stayed around in the base yard where 
our supplies are, and stayed there that afternoon and that night. 

About half past 10 or 11 o'clock there was evidently another raid. 
We saw the tracer bullets, and I heard some shooting, but we could 
not see anything, but we knew it was another raid. 

The Chairman. That was in the evening ? 

Mr. Griffith. Yes, in the evening. We waited all that night and 
the next day. There wasn't anything of any particular moment then. 

The Chairman. Could you see when they put the United States 
planes in the air? 

Mr. Griffith. I didn't see any planes at the time that the first raid 
was on. I did see later on planes coming back, which we thought 
were some of our patrol planes coming in. I can't say just exactly 
what time that was. 

The Chairman. That was after the raid was over? 

Mr. Griffith. Yes. after the raid was over. 

The Chairman. Where were you living in Honolulu ? 

Mr. Griffith. I live at the housing, the Hickam housing. [SW] 
That is right adjoining the field. 

The Chairman. That is right adjoining the field ? 

Mr. Griffith. Yes. 

The Chairman. "What has been your observations of the conduct 
of the officers and the private personnel of the Army here? Has 
their conduct been outstanding or poor ? Was there a lot of drinking ? 

Mr. Griffith. That is a hard question to answer. 

The Chairman. I realize that, but we have a hard matter to decide 
here and we have to have the facts. 

Mr. Griffith. I believe there is quite a little of that goes on. 

The Chairman. Where were you Saturdav night, sir? Were you 
out? 

Mr. Griffith. Saturday night? 

The Chairman. December 7. 



310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Griffith. I was home. I was home — ^no, I was not ; I was out. 

I went to a show in town with my boy. 

The Chairman. Was there any disorder of an unusual character in 
town that night? 

Mr. Griffith. I didn't notice any. 

The Chairman. I suppose there were many soldiers and sailors in 
town that night? 

Mr. Griffith. I saw many, but I didn't notice anything disorderly. 

The Chairman. You did not ? 

Mr. Griffith. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Has there been among your acquaintances and 
friends, as you talk over the situation, any comment on the drinking 
by the troops and officers here? 

Mr. Griffith. Not to any great extent. 

The Chairman. It has not been a matter of comment ? 

Mr. Griffith. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Any other questions ? 

[S20] General McCoy. Have you served with the Army in any 
other station? 

Mr. Griffith. I have been at Hamilton Field. 

General McCoy. Is there any comparison that you could think of as 
to the conduct of the soldiers and sailors here and those you noticed 
on the mainland ? 

Mr. Griffith. My only comment is I have noticed that the men we 
come in contact with on the mainland were not quite so interested in 
taking over the construction work as it was being done. They did 
not delve into it so minutely as they do here at Hickam Field. That 
is my only comment. 

It was rather irksome here at Hickam Field. Some things we felt 
should have been left to us. That is my only comment. 

The Chairman. How about the conduct of the officers and men at 
Hamilton Field and here as to whether there was drinking and their 
conduct generally ? 

Mr. Griffith. I don't believe I have noticed any. 

The Chairman. Any other questions? 

General McCoy. No. 

The Chairman. We are asking you, Mr. Griffith, not to comnjuni- 
cate anything to anyone that has happened in this room or to discuss 
your testimony with anyone. 

Mr. Griffith. Yes. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much for coming. 

TESTIMONY OF ALBERT L. BEENCKMAN, UNITED STATES 
ENGINEERS 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. State your full name, please. 

Mr. Brenckman. Albert L. Brenckman. 

The Chairman. Are you a resident of Honolulu ? 

Mr. Brenckman. No, sir. I live in Hickam Housing, right next 
to the field. 

{521] The Chairman. What is your position? 

Mr. Brenckman. T am assistant associate engineer, Area No. 2, 
United States Army Engineers. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 311 

The Chairman. Are you a civilian employee ? 

Mr. Brenckman. Yes, I am a civilian employee and an ex- Army 
man. 

The Chairmax. In what branch of the Service were you ? 

Mr. Brenckman. I enlisted in the 9th Ambulance Corps in 1917, 
and enlisted here, and I was transferred subsequently to the Hawaiian 
Infantry for discharge in 1919. 

The CiiAiRMAx. Were you at your living quarters at Hickam Field 
on the morning of December 7 ? 

Mr. Brenckman. No, sir. Mr. Griflath, Mr. Utterback, and the 
hangar force were at what we call Fort Kamehameha Base Yard 
preparing to take inventory because we were to take over the Base 
Yard for our own operations, and I was at that point when the first 
attack occurred. 

The Chairman. What did you first see up there, sir? 

Mr. Brenckman. I looked up, and I heard quite heavy avaiation 
noises coming from overhead, and I looked up and saw these green 
planes with torpedoes under them, flying very low and circling out 
toward Pearl Harbor. I then followed then; with my eye, and all of 
a sudden there was a large explosion, so I jumped in the nearest ditch 
and stayed there during the first strafing. 

The Chairman. How long did the first attack last? 

Mr. Brenckman. W^ell, it seemed like hours, but I think it was 15 
minutes. 

The Chairman. Was there a second attack ? 

Mr. Brenckman. Yes. We were largely disorganized. We had 
no place to go, so we gathered by the old trench battery in Fort Kame- 
hameha, and while we were there trying to find a safe place — which 
we did find for the women — the second attack occurred. The ma- 
chine-gun bullets were shooting around, and [622] we went 
to one of the magazines, and so far as I could see they just about re- 
peated the same tactics, and then they came the other side over to- 
ward the hangars, but it was too hard for us to see anything definite. 
We were back against the wall. I would say that w^as about 9 : 30 
or thereabouts. 

The Chairman. And then there was a third attack? 

Mr. Brenckman. Yes. I stayed there approximately for three 
days and three nights. On that night about 10 : 30 or 11 another 
attack occurred, and all we could see were tracer bullets. 

The Chairman. You do not know whether that was a sortie or some 
maneuvering by our own planes ? 

Mr. Brenckman. No. 

The Chairman. You do not know whether it was a Japanese raid? 

Mr. Brenckman. No. Then about 4 : 20 the next morning there 
was another raid, cannonading over Pearl Harbor. I don't know 
what that was, but I saw nothing after the first two. 

The Chairman. How long have you been here in Honolulu ? 

Mr. Brenckman. I came over in March as associate engineer and 
have been at Hickman Field since the 12th of November. 

General McCoy. Wliat has been your observation as to the habits 
of the officers and men in this department, particularly with respect 
to drinking? 

Mr. Brenckman. I haven't associated with any of them, so I would 
not know about that. 



312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. You had no observation of that? 

Mr. Brenckman. No. 

The Chairman. Have you been around on Saturday nights? 

Mr. Brenckman. Yes, I have. I could not very well afford to go 
to any of the night spots, and I don't believe I have ever seen an of- 
ficer under the influence of liquor at all. 

The Chairman. You have not ? 

Mr. Brenckman. No, sir. I have seen several enlisted [523] 
men, but having had a lot of experience in sabotage and arson investi- 
gating. I am not too sure whether some of them were under the influ- 
ence of liquor. I think they were just waiting for somebody to ap- 
proach them and ask them a question, so I am not too sure about that. 

The Chairman. You heard no gossip or talk about that ? 

Mr. Brenckman. No. 

The Chairman. You have not ? 

Mr. Brenckman. No. 

General McCoy. You, as an old soldier, know that there is a cer- 
tain amount of drinking always among younger men in the Army ? 

Mr. Brenckman. Yes, definitely. 

General McCoy. From your experience and what you have seen 
since you have been here, has it occurred to you that it might be worse 
now than it used to be? 

Mr. Brenckman. Well, yes, sir, in this respect: that prohibition 
occurred in July. That was in July, 1917. From then on there was 
very little drinking unless it was bay rum or something like that, but 
at that time I was only 16 and I did not go in for night life, and I 
never associated any downtown outside of a few reserves living 
in the boarding house, rooming house, until my wife got there, and we 
never felt much like staying out. So I never had a chance to asso- 
ciate with any of the personnel except some of the Navy men who 
lived in our boarding house. I am trying to say that the civilians 
seem to be more addicted to it than the Service people. We had more 
drinking parties and brawls around our neighborhood among the 
civilians than the Service people did. 

That is my observation, although having been in the Service I know 
that a Service man does like a drink too. 

General McCoy. Were you close enough to see how the officers and 
men reacted under this shock of surprise ? 

Mr. Brenckman. Yes. We were in pretty close contact [524-] 
with them during the second attack and between the two attacks. 
We got in with my employees in the mortar magazine over at Fort 
Kamehameha, and the younger officers there seemed to be quite busy, 
and the colonel in charge — I don't know his name — but he was all 
right. He just had everything under control. He was getting every- 
thing set, and he seemed to be handling it very well, so far as I could 
see. The conduct there was reassuring to many of the employees 
who were a little bit jittery. As a matter of fact, inside 20 minutes 
they had already broken the men up into groups, laboring crew and 
so on, and got them ready. I don't know how long it was, but I am 
sure it started clicking right off the bat. 

The Chairman. Any other questions? 

Admiral Standley. When you saw these planes in the first instance, 
could you get any idea of the direction from which they came ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 313 

Mr. Brenckman. They seemed to be coming in from the ocean. 

Admiral Standley. From Barbers Point? 

Mr. Brenckman. No, sir, over the other way. 

Admiral Standley. That is toward Koko Head ? 

Mr. Brenckmax. Yes, toward Waikiki. They seemed to go in 
this way and then come back and swing in the back and drop the 
bombs. As I say, I didn't expose myself very much after the first one 
or two drops. 

Admiral Reeves. You said the first planes you saw were torpedo 
planes ? 

Mr. BRENCKiviiVN. Yes. I saw these enormous torpedoes. They 
seemed to be almost the length of the plane at the time. 

Admiral Reeves. Do you have any idea how many of those planes 
there were ? 

Mr. Brenckman. No, sir, but there seemed to be no end of them. 
They seemed to be zipping in there no more than two or three hundred 
feet flying over us. 

Admiral Reeat.s. How many would you say you saw? 

[■5£o] Mr. Brenckman. I saw at least six. They went down as 
soon as they got over the oil tanks in Pearl Harbor, and then they 
machine-gunned some on the way back. One soldier took some shots 
on the second attack, but they did not have any effect. The officer 
told him he was wasting ammunition. 

General McCoy. Did you see torpedo planes in the second attack? 

Mr. Brenckman. No, sir, I don't remember seeing them. After 
that we were not allowed to go out^nd expose ourselves but went under 
this canopy. 

The Chairman. Anything more, gentlemen ? 

Admiral Standley. I think not. 

The Chairman. We will ask you, Mr. Brenckman, not to refer to 
your testimony or to talk to anyone or to refer to anything that has 
occurred in this room. 

Mr. Brenckman. Yes, sir. 

(Thereupon Mr. Brenckman left the hearing room.) 

The Chairman. There is ordered to be placed in the record a com- 
munication from Major General Maxwell Murray to Major General 
Frank McCoy under date of December 25, 194:1, correcting, in certain 
respects, General Murray's testimony given before the Commission. 

(The communication above referred to is as follows:) 

8ECKET 

December 25, 1941. 
Major General Frank McCoy, 
c/o A. D. C. to Chairman, 

Military hivcMigating Committee, Fort Shafter, T. H. 

My Db:ar General McCoy : After leaving the committee room yesterday morn- 
ing and reconsidering the questions which were made to me concerning the 
message received immediately after Alert No. 1 was ordered on November 27, 
I remembered that I had directed that a copy of an important message received 
[526] be filed in my G-2 safe. 

As I stated to the committee I sent a liaison officer to the Headquarters 
Hawaiian Department as soon as the Alert No. 1 was announced on November 27. 
About an hour later he reported to me giving information substantially as I gave 
it to the committee. However, when I remembered that I had directed this 
liaison officer to make a copy of the message and lile it in the safe at my head- 
quarters for future reference, I decided to send for it and fiu'nish this copy to 



314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

you. At the time this liaison officer gave me the message he told me that he 
had been allowed to read the message received from the War Department but 
was not permitted to make a copy of it. He was instructed to read it and repeat 
it to me in person, and he carried out his orders to the letter. The copy of the 
message as filed in my safe follows : 

(Quote) "Negotiations have come to a standstill at this time. No diplo- 
matic breaking of relations. We will let them make the first overt act. You 
will take such precautions as you deem necessary to carry out Rainbow 
plan. 

Do not excite the civilian population. This will be held to minimum 
people. Above message is signed Mabshall." (End quote) 
I repeat that the above message was written from memory (by my liaison 
oflicer) approximately three-quarters of an hour after my liaison officer had 
read it at the Department Headquarters. I received it in my headquarters at 
Schofield Barracks. I do not recall any other conversation or message from the 
Department which indicated an emergency more acute than that pictured in 
the message quoted above. 

The above may be of interest to the committee as an indication of- exactly 
what information was given the Division Commanders after the initial Alert No. 
1 was ordered. 

[5^7] I also recalled after leaving the committee room that I was in error 
in stating that I had received the announcement of the Alert by telephone directly 
from the Department Headquarters, and that I had been in my Division Head- 
quarters at the time the Alert was called. Upon checking this statement after 
my return to my headquarters yesterday I recalled I had left my headquarters 
temporarily, for dental treatment at the Post Hospital and while there received 
the telephonic message directly from my Chief of Staff. The Alert was being 
announced to the troops when the message reached me. I do not consider this 
statement as having any major bearing on the information of your committee 
but I do not wish to allow a misstatement of my whereabouts, even though unin- 
tentional, to be recorded. 

I am sorry that I have not had the pleasure of seeing a little of you during 
your stay and trust that before you leave I will have the opportunity to see you 
again. 
With kindest regards, I am 
Very truly yours, 

(Signed) Maxwell Murray, 

Major General, 

U. 8. Army. 

The Chairman. We will adjourn the hearing until tomorrow morn- 
ing at 9 o'clock, at Pearl Harbor. The Commission will now go on a 
visit of inspection to the barracks, posts, and if possible, Pearl Harbor. 

(Thereupon, at 3:05 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken to 
tomorrow, Saturday, December 27, 1941, at 9 o'clock a. m., at Pearl 
Harbor.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 315 



1628-] CONTENTS 



SATURDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1941 

Testimony of — 

Page 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, United States Navy 529' 

i528a] Note.— On January 6, 1942, Admiral Kimmel recommended to the 
Commission a revision of the transcript of his testimony before the Commission 
given December 27 and 28 in certain specitied instances, each of which was set 
forth in a letter signed by him and dated January 5 and submitted to the Com- 
mission January 6. (That letter is quoted in full in the transcript for January 6.) 
Thereupon the Commission directed that the transcript of Admiral Kimmel's 
testimony be revised with each of the specified corrections except that one recom- 
mended for page 622, line 2 of the transcript, which correction was made by 
Admiral Kimmel in testimony given before the Commission on January 6 and 
so appears in the transcript for that day. Each revision now appears in the 
transcript on a page or pages marked "Corrected" immediately following the 
page of the transcript where the subject matter of such revision appears and 
is marked "See following page." 

1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 317 



V^m COMMISSION TO INVESTmATE THE JAPANESE 
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII 



SATURDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1941 

Lounge or The Wardroom, 
Submarine Squadron Four, 
United States Submarine Base, 

Pearl Harbor, T. H. 
The Commission met at 9 o'clock a. m., Associate Justice Owen J. 
Koberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding, pur- 
suant to adjuornment on yesterday. 



Associate Justice Owen J. Kobert, United States Supreme Court, 
Chairman ; 

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired ; 

Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired ; 

Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired; 

Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army ; 

Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission ; 

Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal 
Advisor to the Commission ; 

Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission. 

proceedings 

The CHAIRMAN, Good morning, Admiral. 
Admiral Kimmel. Good morning. 
The Chairman. Will you be sworn? 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, 
UNITED STATES NAVY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Admiral Kimmel. 

Admiral Kimmel. Would it be possible for me to have Admiral 
Theobald with me to assist me ? 

The Chair:man. Certainly, sir. Let him come and sit [^SSOI 
there beside you, sir. 

Admiral Kimmel. I have a statement here. 

The Chairman. We would be very glad to hear that in the first 
instance. Admiral. 

Admiral Kimmel. Shall I read it? 

The Chairman. Yes. 



318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Kimmel. You might sit with me here (addressing Admiral 
Theobald). 

(Admiral Kimmel read from a statement.) 

(See following page.) 

Admiral Kimmel. I think you have, gentlemen, a report of the 
action of 7 December which I signed on 21 December. 

The Chairman. I think we do not have it yet, Admiral. I have 
not seen it. 

General McCoy. No. 

The Chairman. That is your report to the Secretary of the Navy ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. We would be glad to have a copy of it. We have 
not a copy of it as yet. 

Admiral Kimmel. I was informed that you had been given a 
copy of it. 

General McCoy. We asked for a copy but have not received it. 

The Chairman. No, sir; we have not received it, Mr. Recorder? 

Mr. Howe. No. 

Admiral Kimmel. I thought you had it. 

The Chairman. No, sir. We have not had it. General Short's 
report was in Washington before we left, and we obtained a copy of 
it, and also here we got a copy of it. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, this report was made up on the 21st — I 
signed it on the 21st of December. 

The Chairman. Well, we haven't had it yet. 

[530 Corrected A ] The following statement was read by Admiral 
Kimmel as noted on page 530. 

In submitting the report of operations undertaken on 7 December it is pertinent 
to state that only incomplete and rather hurriedly made reports have been received 
from Patrol Wing 2 and the task forces vphich were operating at sea. The staff 
of the Commander-in-Chief has been continuously engaged in planning for and 
directing operations which have been undertaken since the attack. If discrep- 
ancies exist, as they probably do, in these reports, it is due to a lack of full 
information, and it will probably be some time before complete reports can be 
assembled. 

It has been our endeavor to get ahead with the war operations and to attend 
to the multitudinous details of reorganization and reconstruction which arose 
as a i-esult of the attack, rather than to concentrate on the preparation of re- 
ports of what had occurred. 

The reports are still coming in from individual ships, and I understand the staff 
of the Commander-in-Chief is devoting as much time as they can to compiling 
these reports, which will be submitted in due course, and from them a much more 
effective reconstruction of events can be made. 

[531] Admiral Kimmel. And that was forwarded by the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, and I am sure that I was informed that you had a 
copy. 

The Chairman. There has been some slip about it. 

Admiral Standley. Forwarded to Washington from here, was it. 
Admiral ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Here is a report; it is a very short one. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel, It gives a narrative of events which we have 
reconstructed from all sources. 

The Chairman. Yes. Well, that would be helpful to us. 

Admiral Standley, No, we haven't got it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 319 

The Chairman. We haven't got it. 

Admiral Kimmel. You haven't seen that ? 

The Chairman. No. 

General McCoy. My remembrance, Mr. Recorder, was that we asked 
on our arrival here for any reports that the admiral had made to the 
Navy Department. 

Mr, Howe. Yes. 

General McCoy. But we have not received them yet. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, the report had not been made when you 
arrived ? 

The Chairman. When we got here, no. 

Admiral Kimmel. And we got it up very hurriedly, the best we had, 
and I thought you had the report. 

Admiral Thfobald, I have sent for additional copies. 

Mr. Howe. Will you look that up ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Perhaps I had better read the report. 

The Chairman. I think perhaps you had. I think that would be 
a good preliminary. 

(Admiral Kimmel read from a report.) 

(See following page.) 

Admiral Kimmel. That is all the report proper, but in addition to 
that we have four enclosures. One is a partial narrative of events 
occurring during Japanese air raid on 

[S31 Corrected A\ On page 531 Admiral Kimmel read: 

Report from Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy to the Secretary of the 
Navy, dated December 21, 1941 number A16-3/(020S8). The subject: "Report 
of the Action of 7 December 1941." Copy of this report appended marked Kim- 
mel exhibit number — . 

\53ii'\ Pearl Harbor of 7 December, second is the damage to ships, 
and the third is a supplementary partial report of damage to ships, 
and the Inst one is disposition of all known forces, sortie from harbor, 
and conduct of the search. 

Now, this narrative of events occurring during the Japanese raid 
on 7 December has been reconstructed from dispatches received and 
from the reports received from individual ships, and this narrative 
does not represent the information that I had at the time. This is 
reconstructed afterwards. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. I might say that the first word I had personally 
of any untoward incident was about 7 : 30. I was telephoned at my 
quarters that an attack had been made on a submarine near Pearl 
Harbor. Yv^e have had many reports of submarines in this area. I 
was not at all certain that this Avas a real attack, I had issued orders 
about the 27th of November that all submarine sound contacts were 
to be considered hostile and they were to bomb them, and that was a 
distinct change from the policy we had been following before that 
time. We had prohibited ships from bombing hostile submarines 
except in the defensive sea area, which was about three miles from 
the shore line. That procedure was approved by the Navy Depart- 
ment. I reported last February that I would be delighted to give 
orders to bomb, to depth-charge any submerged submarine that we 
didn't know about, and I was told that the former policy was the one 



320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

that should be followed. The Navy Department never changed that. 
I changed it on my own responsibility and informed the Navy De- 
partment of all 1 had done, and that was the reason that these ships 
promptly made the attack on tlie submarine when it was discovered 
in the operating area. However, as I say, there were a great many 
false contacts, and I was not convinced at that time that there was an 
actual attack. You will see that that is pertinent as this investigation 
goes on. 
[S33'\ At 6 : 18— Shall I read this ? 

The Chairman. Yes, if you will, sir. Yes, please. 

Admiral Kimmel. It is quite long. 

The Chairman. Well, it will orient us, I think, in the whole situa- 
tion. Don't you. Admiral ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I think it will assist, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

(Admiral Kimmel read from document entitled "Narrative of 
Events Occurring During Japanese Aid Raid on December 7, 1941.") 
(See following page.) 

******* 

Admiral Kimmel (reading) : 

0745 Avocet. Moored at Berth F-IA, NAS Dock, Pearl Harbor. Bomb ex- 
plosion and planes heard and sighted attacking Ford Island hangars. 

The Chairman. Now, Admiral, that means that at 7 : 45 your in- 
formation station or your headquarters received that message from 
the steam Avocet; is that it? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, sir. 

The Chairman. What does the "Avocet" mean ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Avocet is a mine sweeper converted for use of 
the aircraft, as an aircraft tender. 

The Chairman. Ship moored? 

Admiral Kimmel. Ship moored at Berth lA, Naval Air Station 
Dock, Pearl Harbor. 

The Chairman. And at 7:45 there was a bomb explosion on her? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, no. 

The Chapman. Oh. 

Admiral Kimmel. She heard a bomb explosion, and she heard the 
planes and sighted them attacking Ford Island hangars. 

The Chairman. And she reported that at 7 : 45 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, no. No, sir. This report is taken from the 
report made by the Avocet. 

The Chairman. Oh, yes. After the fact. 

[S3S Corrected Al (On page 533 Admiral Kimmel read from 
document entitled "Narrative of Events Occurring During Japanese 
Air Raid on December 7, 1941.") 

Add the following : 

This narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 
1941 is submitted as enclosure (A) to the report of the action of 7 December, 
1941, submitted by Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel on December 24, 1941, letter 
number A16-3,/(020SS), and is appended to the record as enclosure (A) to 
Kimmel Exhibit Number — . 

[534^ Admiral Kimmel. After the fact, yes, sir. 
The Chairman. And you have reconstructed it now ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 321 

Admiral Kimmel. We are reconstructing here. 

The Chaieman. In order of time ? 

Admiral Kimmel. In order of time. , 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is what we are trjdng to do. 

The Chairman. I understand it. 

Admiral Kimmel. These reports were not prepared by me, sir. 

The Chairman. I get it now. 

Admiral Kimmel. At this time they had no time to make reports. 

The Chairman. I understand. 

Admiral Kimmel (reading) : 

The Tiicker was nested alongside the Whitney. 5-inch gun No. 3 could not be 
fired. All other guns and .50 caliber machine guns fired at attacking planes dur- 
ing all attacks. No loss of personnel or material. It is believed this vessel 
shot down three or four enemy planes. 

This is the Tucker's claim, you understand. 
The Chairman. Yes, I understand. 
Admiral Kimmel. This is what the Tucker claims. 
Admiral Standley. She is a destroyer ? 
Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir, she is a destroyer. 
(Admiral Kimmel read further.) 
(See following page.) 
******* 

Admiral Kimmel. The Tracy is a destroyer, by the way. 

******* 

Now, I might interject here that, while these times are the best 
they can get, they were taken under stress. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. And you have got to evaluate that, but this is 
the best that we have. 

[5S4- Corrected A'] (On page 534 Admiral Kimmel read from 
document entitled "Narrative of Events Occurring During Japanese 
Air Raid on December 7, 1941.") 

Add the following : 

This narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 
1941 is submitted as enclosure (A) to the report of the action of 7 December, 1941, 
submitted by Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel on December 24, 1941, letter number 
A16-3/ ( 02088 ) , and is appended to the record as enclosure (A) to Kimmel Exhibit 
Number — . 

******* 

[S35] (Referring to item "0755, Raleigh," report p. 11 :) 
He has covered a considerable period there, and he did not do all 
that at 7 : 55. 

******* 

I might say that the Ramapo was loaded with five motor torpedo 
boats which were being sent out to the Asiatic station, and they were 
later on taken off. 

******* 

(Referring to item "0759, Jarvis," report p. 18 :) 

The Chairman. What are BB's, Admiral ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Battleships. 

The Chair]man. And where is Merry Point ? Off to the eastward ? 

70710 40 -Ex. 143, vol. 1 22 



322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

(Admiral Kimmel read further.) 

(See following page.) 

The Chaikman. Since you started, Admiral, your aides have handed 
us a copy of this chronological statement. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And I think that what you have read is sufficient to 
indicate the onset of the attack. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, the balance of it is all here, and as I under- 
stand it each ship reports what it was doing at a given hour or a given 
minute. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is right, sir. 

The Chairman. And I do not believe it would pay us to put the 
admiral to the burden of reading all that, when we have it here for 
ourselves if it becomes material. I leave that to the members of the 
Commission, though. How do you feel about it? 

Admiral Standley. It seems to me we could dispense with that and 
go to the task force report. He has another report there of damage, 
which is a summation of this, and I think we 

[S36 CorreGted J.] (On page 535 Admiral Kimmel read from 

document entitled "Narrative of Events Occurring During Japanese 
Air Eaid on December 7, 1941.") 

Add the following : 

This narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 
1941 is submitted as enclosure (A) to the report of the action of 7 December, 
1941, submitted by Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel on December 24, 1941, letter 
number Al(>-3/( 02088), and is appended to the record as enclosure (A) to Kim- 
mel Exhibit Number — . 

\oS6'\ can dispense with that and go to the task forces. 

The Chalrmaist. Does that seem a good idea? We shall have all 
this before us to read, anyway. 

Admiral Reeves. If there is any special portion of the naTrative that 
he would like to call attention to, we might have that. 

The Chairman. Yes. Admiral, if beyond what you have read there 
is any special portion of this narrative that you think it important to 
call to our attention, we should be glad to hear it. 

Admiral Kim]mel. I think there is no special portion of the narra- 
tive which I haven't — I have covered that in a separate way, and I 
would suggest that we take up the question now 

The Chairman. I think this chronological statement is very impor- 
tant for reference. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. That is right. 

The Chairman. But it really does not give us as good a synopsis 
as j)erhaps you can give us yourself. 

Admiral Kimmel. That is what I was coming to. I have now 

Admiral Standley. He has a prepared statement. 

The Chairman. As I understand it, you have a synopsized statement 
of your own. Admiral, which you are going to give us. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Chairman. I do not know whether you have them or not, but 
at your convenience we would like to have five copies of this report. 

Admiral Kimmel. The whole thing? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 323 

The Chaikmax. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. Entire? 

Admiral Theobald. Five of the entire report. 

Admiral Kimmel. Including everything? 

The Chairman. The narrative. 

[SS7] Admiral Theobald. Damage and everything? 

Admiral Kjmmel. The narrative? I mean the report with all the 
enclosures ? 

The Chairman. Yes, exactly. Then we can use it at leisure, you 
see. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The CiiAiRMAx. We have one copy, here, Admiral, now. 

Admiral Tiieobai^d. You want four more, then ? 

The Chairman. We want four more. 

]Mr. Howe. Five more. 

The Chairman. Five more, yes. 

Admiral Kjmmel. May I call your attention to one part of. this, 
sir. I would suggest you take that up next. I have a copy of it 
here. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you, Admiral : Have you a prior run- 
ning statement covering your communications with the Department 
in Washington, and so forth, leading up to the 7th ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You have ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir, but I was trying to give you a picture 
of what had occurred, first. 
■ The Chairman. Yes, sir. I quite understand that. 

Admiral Kimmel. And the efforts just to 

The Chairman. To repel the attack. 

Now, you were coming to the disposition of the attack forces on 
that morning. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

(Admiral Kimmel read from report entitled "Disposition of Task 
Forces.") 

(See following page.) 

Admiral Kimmel. Incidentally, I might add at this point that in 
accordance with the security measures we had in effect it provided 
that patwing 2 should start this search immediately without any 
orders from me, and he had already started to do 

■[■537 Corrected A^ On page 537 Admiral Kimmel read fi-om 
report entitled "Disposition of Task Forces on December 7." 

Add the following: 

This report wns endosure (D) to the report of the action of 7 Decemhpr 
1941, submitted by Roar Arlniiral H. E. Kimmel to the Secretary of the Navy, 
dated December 21, 1941, letter number A1&-3/ ( 02088 ) and it is appended to 
the record as enclosure (D) to Kimmel exhibit number — . 

[SSS] what he could before he got this order. 
(Admiral Kimmel read further.) 
(See following pages.) 

\5S8 Corrected Al In presenting this statement to the Hoard, T must 
emphasize that the picture presented is that of events and actions before the 
attack nad must be considered in that light. It is a comnion tendency, empha- 



324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

sized iu this case by tlie magnitude and effects of tlie later developments, to judge 
events in the past by the actualities of the future, thus discounting the assumptions 
upon which the past actions were based. I cannot overemphasize tlie point that 
this entire situation can only be reviewed fairly and intelligently, by divorcing from 
our minds, to the extent that this is ix)ssible, the facts as we now know them, and 
to concentrate upon the situation as it appeared to the Commander-in-Chief 
before the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December. In stating this, I would like it 
understood that I am not attempting to avoid any responsibility which is legiti- 
mately mine. I was the Commander-in-Chief Of the Pacific Fleet and that Fleet 
was seriously damaged, with a resultant effect which far transcends the fate or 
fortune of any individual. However, in justice to myself, to the Navy as a whole, 
and for the future welfare of our Country, it is vital that events be dispassionately 
reviewed in their proper perspective. The statements which follow are based 
upon this premise, and will present as complete a picture as possible of our efforts 
to get the Pacific Fleet ready for war, to insure its security at its base, and to 
evaluate and meet by appropriate action, each situation as it was presented at the 
time. 

Underlying all my actions were these basic considerations : — 

First. Constantly changing regular personnel, both ofiicers and enlisted, and 
the induction of new personnel, including a substantial portion of recruits [538 
Corrected B] and reserves, made it a vital necessity to maintain an intensi- 
fied training program. This necessitated, if maximum results were to be achieved, 
confinement of our operations to areas close to Pearl Harbor where target and 
training services were available. 

Second. It was essential to push a material improvement program covering 
installation, as soon as available, of short range anti-aircraft guns, radar equip- 
ment, lookout equipment, additional personnel accommodations, splinter protec- 
tion and many other incidetal alterations. 

Third. Maintenance of reasonable security of Fleet units, both at sea and at 
an exposed base, poorly equipped for its own defense, was vital. Even aside from 
its defense, the deficiencies of Pearl Harbor as an operating base, presented a 
difficult problem which had to be met. 

Fourth. Under approved War Plans, it was essential to initiate, promptly, 
offensive action in the IVIid-Pacifie and beyond, in order to contribute to the defense 
of the position of the Associated Powers in tlie Far East and Malaya by relieving 
tlie pressure in that theater, which by all agencies, was conceived to be the locale 
of initial enemy operations. The Navy Department's plan that an early initial 
offensive be undertaken in that area had a vital influence on my thought and 
actions in each new situation. 

In order to clarify the situation existing in the Hawaiian Area at the time of the 
surprise attack on December 7, it should be stated that : — 

fa) Pearl Harbor is a Fleet base for upkeep, repair and recreation. 

(b) The defense of Pearl Harbor rests with the Army, in accordance with Joint 
Army and Navy action. (Chapter 1. Paragraph 5 (a) (2) ). 

[588 Corrected C] (c) The Navy had definite plans and was ready. 

(d) We had an extensive training program to maintain the efficiency of all 
Fleet units. 

My conception of a Fleet base is a haven for refit, supply, and for rest and 
recreation of personnel after arduous duties and strt^nuous operations at sea. I 
knew, as responsible officers have long known, that I'f^arl Harbor, with its single 
channel and its congested moorings and industrial facilities is vulnerable as a 
base for heavy ships, particularly vulnerable to surprise air attack. Air attack 
at dawn can be guarded against only by a 360 degree search before dark to a 
radius of 800 miles, and this would require eighty-four planes daily, and three 
times that number to maintain continued daily flights. We have never had 
more than one third the latter number of naval patrol planes in the Hawaiian 
Area. We must depend upon pre-daylight search, radar warnings, and a base 
defense so effective that a raid can be repelled with certainty. We have not an 
adequate base defense today. 

Before assuming command of the Pacific Fleet on 1 February 1941, I made a 
survey of the defenses of Pearl Harbor and of security measures in effect in 
the Fleet. I had been informed by the Chief of Naval Operations that hostilities 
in the Atlantic might begin at any time and that a war on two fronts was possible. 

I was astounded at the existing weakness of the Pearl Harbor defenses, and, 
collaborated with my predecessor in the preparation of a letter dated 25 January 
1941 to the Chief of Naval Operations. This letter pointed out: — 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 325 

(a) The critical inadequacy of anti-aircraft guns available to defend Pearl 
Harbor, necessitating during war the constant manning of ships' anti-aircraft 
guns [538 Corrected D] while in port. 

(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land based aircraft, neces- 
sitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet 
planes for local patrols. 

(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District — 
subchasers and patrol boats. 

(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore. 

We recommended that measures to correct these deficiencies take priority over 
the needs of continental districts, the training program, and material aid to 
Great Britain. Some remedial progress was made. The War Department pro- 
vided fighting planes. 

My next step, 15 February, was to organize security measures for ships at sea, 
to guard against surprise attack, submarine or air. The order promulgating 
these securitv measures was revised from time to time and reissued in latest 
form as Confidential Letter No. 2CL (Revised) dated 14 October 1941. Measures 
prescribed in this order were rehearsed frequently and regularly by forces both 
at sea and in port. In Pearl Harbor ships were so moored that arcs of fire were 
allocated by berths, and assurance was made that dispersal of ships permitted 
best i)ossible anti-aircraft fire in all dii-ections. 

All during the period of my command of the Pacific Fleet I had to balance 
the requirements of training, material upkeep and military alterations of the 
Fleet against the isecurity measures to be kept in effect. The availability of 
ships and planes for active war operations was one of my constant concerns. 
Obviously the maximum security could not be obtained unless we very drastically 
sacrificed the necessary training to bring and maintain the ships of the Fleet 
to a satisfactory [338 Corrected E] battle condition. Constant personnel 
changes, both of officers and men, made this training mandatory. This applied 
to all types of ships and aircraft. My files are filled with the efforts we made 
and the steps we took to overcome difficulties. Our training program was 
thorough and I believe produced rapid and effective results. In accomplishing 
this training we had to accept continually throughout the past ten months a 
somewhat reduced security against a surprise attack. Had we not accepted 
this risk, Fleet training would have ceased. Immediately upon taking command 
I took steps to coordinate as well as my powers permitted, the efforts of the 
Army and Navy air forces stationed in the Islands. 

The Fleet was divided into three Task Forces and the schedule of operations 
required at least one Task Force at sea at all times, available to strike in the 
event of a surprise. Often two Task Forces were at sea at the same time but 
never three. Training operations were intensive, but it is necessary always to 
provide time in port for overhaul of machinery, against the day when all forces 
might be called upon for action against the enemy. 

We worked out a comprehensive plan to utilize all the forces in Hawaii to 
the maximum in the event of a surprise attack. Frequent drills were held, 
deficiencies corrected in so far as possible, and every effort made to perfect the 
organization by trial and error. Day by day, over several months I had con- 
sidered when we should establish the maximum .security measures and I realized 
at all times that this would be a difficult decision to make. The despatches and 
other information we received were carefully evaluated and I kept my principal 
subordinate Admirals and the Commanding General informed of tlie situation as 
it developed. The action I took was [.538 Corrected F] dictated by my 
own best judgment after such consultations and I think these subordinates were 
in substantial agreement with the action that I took from time to time. 

War was threatened many times ditring the past year and I had to consider 
at all times the physical effect on the personnel of the Fleet of long periods of 
watch standing in port during peacetime and the result that the demands might 
not destroy the very vigilance that we were seeking to promote. The security 
measures in effect in the ships of the Fleet while at sea were of the highest order. 
We considered a massed submarine attack on the ships at sea in the operating 
areas as a probability and effective me;isnres were taken to combat this menace. 
We considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor as a remote possibility, but one 
to be guarded against, and training and plans were made for this contingency 
to the limit of forces available. Just when to place in effect to a maximum 
these measures was our problem. From the actions of the Navy Department I 
believe they shared the opinion that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was a remote 



326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

possibility. Our correspondence bears this out. At the time the attack took 
place conversations were still being conducted in Washington. For an attack 
to be launched on this place the forces had to leave Japan at least two vpeeks 
prior to the conclusion of the conversations. Our radio and other intelligence 
gave no indication of such a move. 

From 1 February to the date of the raid, both by official and personal corre- 
spondence, I continuously demanded of the Navy Department ammunition, mod- 
ern planes, more destroyers, patrol craft for the Fourteenth Naval District, sea 
train vessels for transporting aircraft from the Coast, radar for all ships, IFF 
for planes, sound detection devices for small craft. My replies [538 Cor- 
rected G] from the Department almost invariably were to the effect that 
the major effort would be in the Atlantic. This statement may be verified from 
the files of the Commander-in-Chief. Many of the most powerful and modern 
units of the Pacitic Fleet were transferred to the Atlantic. Flight deck merchant 
vessels under conversion and small craft such as subchasers were diverted to 
the United Kingdom. I asked for more men, and was told that the Ai;lantic 
Fleet needs were even more pressing than those in the Pacific, the Atlantic 
Fleet was under complement also. Although shooting orders had been issued 
in the Atlantic and in the South East Pacific East of Longitude 100° W., as late 
as 23 September 1941 I was directed by the Chief of Naval Operations not to 
bomb suspected hostile submarines except in the restricted area close to Pearl 
Harbor channel, and was Informed that in the event of hostilities with Japan 
there was no intention to further reduce the Pacific Fleet except for the with- 
drawal of four cruisers about one month "after Japan and the United States 
are at war." 

Failure to obtain mpn and materials demanded for the Pacific Fleet is not a 
defense against having been taken by surprise. I submit, however, that repeated 
rebuffs of my recommendations and constant insistence of the Navy Depart- 
ment that the major emphasis was to be placed upon operations in the Atlantic 
strongly contributed to my estimate that an air attack of the nature and force 
of that delivered on 7 December was not to be expected. Without warning from 
Washington, I had no reason to consider December 7th as different from other 
times of diplomatic tension with Japan. Throughout my tenure of office as 
Commander-in-Chief I have kept my Task Force and Type Commanders in- 
formed of the existing situation as presented to me by the Department. I 
[538 Corrected H] believe ail of tlipse office) s hehl views similar to mine. 
It must be evident today to anyone who studied my correspondence with that 
agency, that the Navy Department up to December 7th did not believe that 
Japan would make an air attack on Pearl Harbor nor that hostilities were 
unduly imminent. My frame of mind was necessarily influenced by the action 
of the Department and the letters and despatches which I received therefrom. 

If the President, the State Department, and the Navy Department at any time 
during the Washington negotiations with the Japanese emissaries gathered a 
more alarming viewpoint regarding possible Japanese military action against 
this Fleet, I was never so informed. The absence of such a warning from 
Washington could not fail to affect most decisively every estimate of the situation 
which I made up to the time of the attack. 

The Commander-in-Chief received but one war warning, dated 27 November. 
It read as follows: — 

"OpNav to Cincpac and Cincaf. Negotiations with Japan looking toward 
stabilization of the conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move 
by Japan is expected within the next few days. This is a war warning. The 
number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Naval Task 
Forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, 
or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Esecnte appropriate deployment prepara- 
tory to carrying out defense tasks only assigned in WPL 46. Similar warning 
being sent by War Department. Guam and Samoe directed take appropriate 
measures against sabotage." 

There was a warning sent to Commander Naval Coastal Frontier 
info CinCPac on 29 November. 

This despatch indicated confinement of original attack to Philippines. N. E. T., 
and Singapore. On 30 [.53« Corrected I] November the Chief of Naval 
Operations sent following despatch to Cincaf :— ♦ 

'OpNav to Cincaf, info Cincpac. It is indicated that Japan is al>ont to attack 
points on the Kra Isthmus by overseas expeditions. In order to ascertain the 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 327 

destination of this expedition and for security, Cincaf is directed to cover by air 
the range from Manila to Camranh Bay for three days. Instruct planes to 
observe only. They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but 
must defend themselves if attacked. If expedition is approaching Thailand 
inform MacArthur." 

The Secretary of the Navy has stated that a special warning was sent by 
the Department of Cincaf on the day preceding the surprise attack. The fact that 
such warning was not delivered to me indicates that the Administration did 
not expect an air attack on Oahu. 

We did expect a surprise submarine attack upon our ships at sea. There 
have been several such suspected attacks in the past, but no real evidence 
that they were genuine. We have for ten months been fully prepared for sub- 
marine attack. On 28 November, without reference to the Department, I 
ordered all ships to depth bomb suspected submarine contacts in all of the 
Oahu operating areas and confined submerged operations of our own submarines 
to certain limited areas. This readiness to meet the submarine menace is evi- 
denced by the fact that when a submarine was discovered near the entrance to 
Pearl Harbor early on 7 December, it was promptly attacked by the nearest 
destroyer. When during the aerial attack on Pe^rl Harbor a destroyer making 
emergency sortie sighted a submarine in the channel ahead, the destroyer 
passed over the submarine and destroyed it by prompt depth charge action. 

In the light of what has happened it is easy to state l.')38 Corrected J] 
that we should have placed in effect all security measures and should have 
utilized our patrol squadrons to the maximum of their capabilities. At the time 
of the attack we had one squadron of patrol planes based on Midway and five 
and one-half squadrons based on Oahu. Of these one squadron had just re- 
turned from seven weeks extensive operations based on Midway and four and 
one-half squadrons had recently been delivered by air from the factory at 
San Diego. While operable these four and one-half squadrons required con- 
siderable work to make them effective. Difficulties were being experienced with 
this new type and the al)sence of spares made it highly desirable to economize 
on their operations in order to have them available in an emergency. The Armv 
was having difliculties with their four-engine bombers and it had been reported 
within the week that they had only six in operating condition. A flight of 
Army bombers arrived during the raid, but they had come from the mainland 
without ammunition. About a ujonth before the raid we had sent two. squad- 
rons of patrol planes to the Coast to be replaced. I accepted with reluctance 
this reduction of our patrol planes but took the risk in order to have the new 
patrol planps available before delays incident to expected bad winter weather. 
I cite this as one of the many decisions that had to be made. 

At the time of the attack the anti-aircraft batteries of ships in harbor were 
partially manned and they opened fire promptly on the first attacking planes. 
Two torpedo planes of the first wave were shot down before they launched their 
torpedoes and a third plane immediately after launching torpedoes. Only the 
short range weapons could be used against the low flying enemy planes in the 
harbor crowded with our ships and this Fleet is woefully deficient in short range 
anti-aircraft weapons. The use [538 Corrected K] of .5" guns on the 
low flying first attackers would have wrought great havoc on our ships and on 
the shops and residences of the Navy Yard and nearby settlements. Furthermore, 
the fuse settings cannot be set low enough to cause the shells to burst in front of 
these planes when they came into view over the trees and houses almost right 
on our ships. In spite of that I think they used them. 

The Japanese espionage and intelligence service in the Islands was and is 
excellent. We know now that the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu cabled, 
over our cable, the daily movompnts of our ships during the days immediately 
preceding the attack. Charts taken from enemy planes and a submarine prove 
that the Japnnese knew the berth numbers and names of every ship in the hnrbor. 
This intelligence service placed us under a t^M-rific handicap, a hiindicap that has 
existed during all the time the Fleet has been based on Pearl Harbor. That 
Japan was maintaining an effective intelligence service in the Hawaiian Area 
difficult to apprehend with the peacetime methods has been well known to us 
throughout our stay in these waters. 

On the other hand, the intelligence service available to me was ineffective and 
inaccurate. I had never been able to obtain from my Government a definite 
statement of the action it would take in certain eventualities. Correspondence 
in the Commander-in-Chiefs files can be introduced in evidence to confirm this. 



328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Letters and despatches received from the Chief of Naval Operations in the days 
immediately preceding hostilities indicated a Japanese movement to the South- 
ward. My radio intelligence was misleading as was that promulgated by the 
Mavy Department. On December 1, the Director of Naval Intelligence issued a 
bulletin stating that there were [538 Corrected L] strong indications 
pointing to an early attack on Thailand and that "The major capital ship strength 
remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers." We 
have evidence now that four or more carriers took part in the attack at Oahu. 

The heaviest damage suffered by the Fleet was that delivered by torpedo attack. 
The Navy Department was convinced that aerial torpedoes would be ineffective in 
Pearl Harbor and we had discounted that menace. The anti-torpedo baffle had 
been considered, both by the Commander-in-Chief and by the Commandant, 
Fourteenth Naval District. In his letter of 1.5 February 1941 the Chief of Naval 
Operations had stated : — "A minimum depth of water of 7.5 feet may be assumed 
necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. 150 feet is desired." The 
depth of water in and around available berths in Pearl Harbor does not exceed 
45 feet. 

We knew the international situation was serious, but it had been serious for 
much more than the 10 months I served in command of this Fleet. Messages 
which I received from the Navy Department and our radio intelligence gave no 
indication that anyone considered an air attack on Oahu more than a remote 
possibility. 

I went over each day all despatches and intelligence reports received. My 
staff were untiring in their efforts. On the Saturday preceding the attack we 
carefully evaluated the situation. It was appreciated that the situation was 
growing increasingly critical. Although I did not expect the United States to 
become involved immediately, a written memorandum, by my direction, was kept 
available as to the course of action to be taken if hostilities should come. The 
last revision was made on December 6. 

It was felt that the most serious hazard would [538 Corrected 31] be 
from submarine attacks and that the most important considerations were to mini- 
mize the danger from them and to start offensive action by movement against the 
Marshalls at the earliest possible moment. This movement involved the ad- 
vancement of patrol planes to Wake and Johnston and an increase of the number 
at Midway. 

A careful evaluation of the factors involved, the information from the Navy 
Department, and the concept of the war by the Department ns indicated by the 
Departmental War Plans led very strongly to the conclusion that utilization of 
patrol planes for searching the Hawaiian Area for a possible but improbable 
enemy was of much less value than being prepared to immediately advance those 
planes to our distant island bases. To aid in their protection and to cover effec- 
tively the advancement of mobile surface units for offensive operations in the 
Marshall Area and to support these operations when commenced. 

My operating plans, based on the Department's concepts of the war — in which 
I was in general accord — and its orders had been approved, by the Department. 
I was prepared to commence war operations, and felt keenly that vigorous offen- 
sive action should be initiated as promptly as possible after hostilities commenced. 

By our operating plans no more than two squadrons of patrol planes were to 
be retained in Oahu. 

The purpose of such planes was primarily to cover the sea lanes toward the 
Coast and toward the South Seas against enemy auxiliary cruisers, submarines, 
etc., that might raid our communication lines. It was thoroughly realized that 
they were far too few in numbers to maintain any effective search around Oahu 
against enemy carriers. All other patrol planes were to be used in connection 
with offensive operations. 

[588 Corrected N] The Department with much more complete information 
than we had clearly indicated that they discounted the probability of an attack 
on Oahu. The attitude of our government was evidenced by acceptance of our 
war plan ; by priority given to Europe and the Atlantic Fleet in assignment of 
aircraft, anti-aircraft weapons and other security installations; by transfer of 
the greater part of long range bombers from Oahu to the Philippines and by the 
proposal (which incidentally I did not accept) to transfer fifty pursuit planes 
from Oahu to Midway and Wake. 

Subsequent developments show that all of Washington as well as the Fleet were 
somewhat prepared for a treacherous initiation of war, if Japan should decide 
on such a course, but we were all in error as to the date, the direction and the 
character of that treacherous attack. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 329 

I have constantly given serious consideration to the question of the availability 
of patrol planes when hostilities broke out. As I have previously stated we 
had 69 patrol planes on Oahu on December 7. Of these 61 planes were in flying 
condition. Had I started the continuous patrols on November 27, the day the 
war warning was received, it is probable that this number would have been some- 
what less by December 7. Fifty-four of these planes were of the PBY-5 type 
which had recently arrived from the mainland. There was a practical absence of 
spare parts for these new planes. Some material difficulties were being experi- 
enced and all of these new planes were due to be fitted with armor and leakproof 
gas tanks, before being entirely suitable for war service. 

Maintaining continuous search using all planes in flying condition beginning on 
27 November and continuing indefinitely had to be balanced against the proba- 
bility [538 Corrected 0] of attack on Oahu and the desirability of having 
all our patrol planes in operating condition when war came. 

Excluding the PBY-5 type an effective search could not be made with what 
remained. I therefore determined that our best course was to bend every effort 
towards getting the patrol planes ready for unlimited war operations than to 
expend their efforts in partial and ineffective peace-time searches. To insure 
against a surprise attack from fast carrier-based planes it is necessary to patrol 
the evening before to a distance of 800 miles on a 360 degree arc. This requires 
84 planes on one fiight of 16 hours. The pool for a protracted period of searches 
of this character would require 252 planes. In addition, a dawn patrol to a dis- 
tance of 300 miles is a further necessity. One hundred patrol planes would be 
required for this dawn patrol. This would be required for assured security 
against an attack because any search of 800 miles radius is certain to encounter 
daily many areas of greatly reduced visibility. Needless to say, had I known 
of the imminence of an attack on Oahu on or about 7 December, I would have 
utilized all planes to the limit of their capability accepting the necessary risks of 
such operations with the new patrol squadrons. 

I believe the Fleet was in as an effective state of readiness as it was humanly 
possible to place it under conditions that existed during the past ten months. 
I am sure that my files and the testimony of responsible officers in the Fleet will 
bear out the statement that I left no stone unturned and spared no effort to have 
this Fleet ready to fight. 

[S39] I can at the present time present certain exhibits which we 
have here to show the steps taken in the fleet to obtain the state of 
readiness which, I think, may be germane to the investigation. Shall 
I go ahead with them, sir ? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Kimmel. Exhibit 10, paragraphs 7 and 9. Even before I 
assumed the duties of Commander-in-Chief, I had collaborated with 
my predecessor, Admiral Richardson, in preparing a letter to the 
Navy Department setting forth the inherent weakness of the fleet's 
base in Hawaiian waters. This letter went forward to the Depart- 
ment over the signature of Admiral Richardson. As it is very impor- 
tant, I shall read tlie entire letter : 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., January 25, 19.'fl. 
From : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. 
To : The Chief of Naval Operations. 
Subject : Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOC. 
References : 

(a) Opnav secret despatch 212155 of January. 1941. 

(b) Opnav memorandum for Secnav Op-12-GTB of November 12. 1940. 

1. Reference (a) was received by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, one 
day prior to the arrival of Commander IMcCrea at Pearl Harbor enroute to the 
Navy Department. It is considered desirable to take advantage of his return to 
inform the Chief of Naval Operations of the views of the Commander-in-Chief 
as to the new situation. 

2. In view of rpference (a) and some degree of ui'gency implied therein, it is 
considered that study of the new situation and the preparation of plans therefor 
should take priority over the preparation of plans for [5/i0] Rainbow 
No. 3. Unless advice to the contrary is received, this will be done. 



330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3. The new situation, as visualized by tbe Commander-in-Chief, alters the 
assumptions and concepts of Rainbow No. 3, principally in that the major offensive 
effort of the United States is to be exerted in the Atlantic, rather than in the 
Pacific, and in that a "waiting attitude" will be taken in the Pacific, pending a 
determination of Japan's intentions. If Japan enters the war or commits an 
overt act against United States' interests or territory, our attitude in the Pacific 
will be primarily defensive, but opportunities will be seized to damage Japan as 
situations present themselves or can be created. 

4. Under the foregoing general conception, it is deemed desirable to outline 
as briefly as possible, certain tentative assumptions, upon which the actions 
of the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific wnll be predicated. These are: 

(a) The United States is at war with Germany and Italy. 

(b) War with Japan is imminent. 

(c) Units of the Pacific Fleet may be detached to the Atlantic on short 
notice. The numbers and types of these units are at present unknown. 

(d) At least three German raiders are in the Pacific. 

(e) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take 
any form — even to attacks by Japanese ships fiying German or Italian flags 
or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be con- 
sidered [5411 sidered German or Italian. 

(f) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying pos- 
sessions or naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to 
block the channel, are possible. 

(g) Local sabotage is possible. 

5. Under the foregoing assumptions, the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will assume 
the tasks listed below. Wh.ere deemed appropriate, measures to be taken under 
the tasks will be included. 

M'tiiting Attitude 

(1) Take full security measures for the protection of Fleet units, at sea and 
in port. 

In the performance of this bank, the Fleet is severely handicapped by the 
existence of certain marked deficiencies in in the existing local defense forces and 
equipment both Army and Navy. These deficiencies will be set forth in detail 
later, but are mentioned here in order that certain measures listed below may be 
more clearly understood. 

At present, the following measures, among others, will b :> lequired to accom- 
plish the above task : 

(a) Expand patrol plane search to the maximum, reinforcing Patrol Wing 
Two with units from Patrol Wing One. 

(b) Establish inner air patrol over Pearl and Honolulu Harbor entrances 
and approaches, augmenting Army planes with naval and marine planes as 
necessary. 

(c) Arrange for alertness of a striking force of Army bombers and pursuit 
planes ; supplemented by available Navy or Marine planes. 

[5.'t2] (d) Augment Army A. A. defenses with A. A. batteries of Fleet 
units in Pearl Harbor. 

(2) Keep vessels of all types in constant readiness for diatant service. 

(3) Assist in local defense of the Fourteenth Naval District. 

This task will require augmentation of District forces by the assignment of 
Fleet units until suitable vessels, including those of the Coast Guard, become 
available to the Commandant. 

(4) Protect United States' shipping. This will require the following: 

(a) Provide escort for important ships. 

(b) Route allied and United States' shipping in the Fleet Control Zone. 
(e) Base cruisers on Samoa to cover shipping in the South Seas. 

(d) Despatch the Southeastern Pacific Force. 

(e) Establish escort and patrol group between Hawaii and the West Coast. 

(f ) Maintain striking group to operate against raiders (search for raiders 
might afford opportunity to reconnoiter the Marshall Lslands without pro- 
voking Japan). 

(5) Protection of outlying islands. This will require the following: 

(a) Establish defense battalions at Midway and Samoa and smaller units 
at Johnston, Wake, Palmyra and Canton. 

(b) Maintain submarine patrols at all the above-mentioned islands, except 
Samoa. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 331 

(c) Despatch two submarines, plus the ORTOLAN, for the defense of 
Unalaska. 
[543] (6) Adjust U. S. Fleet training to war conditions. 

(7) Make initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and raiders in the Northern 
Pacific. 

(8) Establish submarine patrols in the Marshall Islands, withdrawing them 
from own outlying islands as neces.sary. 

(9) Make early reconnaissance in force of the Marshall Islands. Thereafter 
conduct a general surveillance of that area and make raids on forces, material 
installations, and communications therein. 

(10) Make periodic sweeps toward the Marianas and Boniiis. 

6. It will, of course, be realized that the effectiveness with which the tasks set 
forth above can be prosecuted is dependent upon the forces available, especially 
after the withdrawal of the Atlantic reenforcements. If a carrier is to be in- 
cluded in the Atlantic reenforcement, one of the LEXINGTON class should be 
selected due to diflBculties of handling in Pearl Harbor. There is, however, 
definite need for all four carriers under the tasks assigned this fleet. 

7. In connection with the execution of the foregoing tasks, and with par- 
ticular reference to the early initiation of offensive operations, it must be 
pointed out that the existing deficiencies in the defenses of Oahu and in the 
lucnl defense forces of the Fourteenth Naval District impose a heavy burden 
on the Fleet for purely defensive purposes. Ideally, a Fleet Base should afford 
refuge and rest for personnel as well as opportunity for maintenance and 
upkeep of material installations. When Fleet planes, Fleet guns and Fleet 
personnel are required to be constantly ready for defense of its own Base, the 
wear and tear on both men and [5U] material can not but result in im- 
paired readiness for active operations at sea. The most outstanding deficiencies 
affecting this readiness of the Fleet are : 

(a) The critical inadequacy of A. A. guns available for the defense of 
Pearl Harbor, necessitating constant manning of ships' A. A. guns while 
in port. 

(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land-based aircraft, 
necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use 
of Fleet planes for local patrols. 

(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval 
District, necessitating detail of Fleet units to this duty. The detail of 
Fleet units to this duty not only results in loss, to the Fleet, of the avail- 
ability of important vessels, but also results in the forced employment of 
ships whose more valuable characteristics will be largely wasted due to 
the nature of their tasks. This is particularly true where destroyers must 
be diverted to local A/S patrol, off-shore patrol and local escort. These 
duties could better be performed by submarine chasers, converted gunboats 
and converted escort vessels. 

(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore. 

8. It is considered imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to 
correct the critical deficiencies enumerated above. It is further believed that 
these measures should take priority over the needs of continental districts, the 
training program, and [5//5] material aid to Great Britain. 

9. It is recommended that the Alaskan and Hawaiian reenforcements re- 
patched as soon as possible in order that necessity for heavy escort may not 
f erred to in paragraph 2103 (a) (5) of W. P. L. 44 (advance copy) be des- 
embarrass the U. S. Pacific Fleet in its later operations. 

10. This letter has been prepared in collaboration with the prospective Com- 
mander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N. It 
represents his, as well as my own, views. 

J. O. RiCHAKDSON. 

Exhibit 11. In view of the fact that by far the most important dam- 
age received by vessels of the Fleet in the attack of December 7, 1941. 
was inflicted by torpedo acti(m, I desire to read into the record at 
this time a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations, the subject 
of which was : "Anti-torpodo Bafiles for Protection Against Torpedo 
Plane Attacks, Pearl Harbor'', dated February 15, 1941. (See fol- 
lowing page.) 



332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I will read this letter in part : 

February 15, 1941. 
From : The Chief of Naval Operations. 
To: The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. 

Subject : Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl 
Harbor. 
1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl 
Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. 

Admiral Staxdley. Will you read that again? 

Admiral Kimmel. I beg your pardon ? 

The Chairman, He did not get that. Read it again. 

[S4S Corrected A'\ The letter referred to on page 545 was pre- 
pared in the Navy Department after the attack at Taranto and all 
the quoted matter on pages 546-547 was a part of the same letter. 

\51^6^^ Admiral Kimmel (reading) : 

1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl 
Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the 
relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl 
Harbor. In addition the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room 
limit the practicability of the present type of baffles. 

2. Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in 
planning the installation of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which 
the following may be considered : 

(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy -five feet may be assumed nec- 
essary to successfully drop torpedoes from' planes. One hundred and fifty 
feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experiment- 
ally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 
knots. Desirable height for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hun- 
dred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, 
but this may be altered. 

That is about all there is to it. That is the crux of it. 
Admiral Theobald. Yes. 

General McCoy. Was that since the British attack on Taranto? 
Admiral Kimmel. I beg your pardon ? 

General McCoy. Was that prior to the attack on the Italian ship 
in Taranto? 

Admiral Kimmel. I did not find it out. 

Admiral Theobald. I think it is. 

General McCoy. What is the date of that letter ? 

[5-^7] Admiral Kimmel. February 15th. 

The Chairman. February 15, 1941 ? 

Admiral Kimmel. February 15, 1941. 

I think this was, yes, sir. 

(Reading:) 

As a matter of interest the successful attacks at Taranto were made at very 
low launching heights at reported ranges by the individual aviators of 400 to 
1300 yards from the battleships, but the depths of water in which the torpedoes 
were launched were between 14 and 15 fathoms. 

The Chairman. That is 90 feet? 
Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 
(Continuing reading:) 

The attacks were made in the face of intensive and apparently eri-atic anti- 
aircraft fire. 

I have Exhibit 12 here, which is a chart of Pearl Harbor showing 
that 45 feet is the maximum depth in the harbor. That is ponK^thing 
that you can verify. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 333 

The Chairmax. We have it here on the board. 

Admiral Kimmel. I think everybody knows it anyhow. 

I might say that the torpedo business was a complete surprise to me. 
Had it not been for the torpedoes I think the damage would have 
been enormously less. 

Admiral Standlet. May I ask a question ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Staxdley. Admiral, had there been any communications 
from the Chief of Naval Operations or from the Navy Department 
later than February 15 modifying the content of that letter about the 
depth of water? 

Admiral Kimmel. So far as I know, no, sir. I will [-54<5] 
search for it and make certain. 

Admiral Standley. Before I left Washington I saw a copy of a 
letter from the Bureau of Ordnance under date of July in which they 
referred to this letter stating that they found they could fire torpedoes 
at a lesser depth. I wish you woidd see if you have any such informa- 
tion from any source. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. I asked them to do that for me. 

The Chaieman. Let us take a recess now for about five minutes. 

(There was a brief recess. The following then occurred :) 

Admiral Kimmel. I recall a letter from the Bureau of Ordnance on 
that subject, but it did not greatly modify this letter. 

Admiral Standley. I did not see the original letter, but I saw the 
second letter. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Because I particularly asked about it, but I am 
not sure it modified that letter to any extent. 

Admiral Kimmel. As a result of these facts, under date of March 
12, 1941, 1 wrote the Chief of Naval Operations a letter accepting the 
fact that torpedo baffles not be installed in Pearl Harbor until a light 
efficient torpedo net could be developed and supplied to the area. It 
is an unfortunate fact that by December 7, 1941, the light efficient net 
had not been made available to Pearl Harbor for the protection of the 
vessels moored therein, and the endorsement on the investigation made 

(See following page.) 
by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District : 

In view of the contents of reference (a), the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific 
Fleet, recommends that until a liglit efficient net, that can be laid temporarily and 
(luickly is developed, no A/T nets be supplied this area. 

[S4-S Corrected A] On page 548, line 7 from bottom : 

Delete the word "investigation" and insert the word "recommenda- 
tion." 

[549] That was on the basis of that. 

In the letter of the Bureau of Ordnance which modified this, I par- 
ticularly stated that I did not take it in, and after this the thing was 
thoroughly gone over. That was what remained in my mind. We 
will look it up, sir. 

(See following page.) 

Under date of 20 March 1941, Rear Admiral Bloch, Commandant of 
the Fourteenth Naval District, wrote a letter to the Department on 
the subject: "Anti-torpedo Baffles for Protection Against Torpedo 
Plane Attacks." 



334 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Paragraph 3 of that letter read as follows : 

lu view of the foregoing tlie Commandant does not recommend the use of 
baffles for Pearl Harbor or other harbors in the Fourteenth Naval District. 

That is the essence of the letter. 

From the day I assumed command of the U. S. Fleet, February 1, 
1941, the security of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters was a matter 
of earnest concern to me. I immediately initiated a study of this 
subject and under date of February 15, 1941, I issued an order to the 
Fleet entitled "Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas." 

Admiral Theobald. I do not think jou need to read "G", as it is in 
the next one. 

Admiral Kimmel. I put that in to show that we started on this 
immediately. 

Exhibit 16. After eight months' experience as Commander-in-Chief, 

1 decided on certain revisions and elaborations of my original order 
on this subject, and under date of October 14, 1941, I issued another 
order on the subject of security of the Fleet at base and in operating 
areas. This order covered the subjects of Continuous Patrols, Inter- 
mittent Patrols, Sortie and Entry, Security in Operating Areas, Se- 
curity of Ships at Sea, and Defense Against Air Attack. Further 
subjects covered were : "Action to be Taken if Submarine Attacks in 

[S49 Corrected A] 

REVISION 

On page 549, line 2, delete "In the letter of the Bureau of Ordnance 
which modified this, I particularly stated that I did not take it in, 
and after this the thing was thoroughly gone over. That was what 
remained in my mind. We will look it up, sir." and insert, "I have 
some recollection of such a letter but its contents left me with the 
conviction that we were safe from torpedo plane attacks in Pearl 
Harbor. That was what remained in my mind. We will look it up, 
sir." 

On page 549, line 14 from bottom : 

This order was submitted as exhibit 15 by Admiral Kimmel and is 
appended as part of the record herein as Kimmel exhibit number — . 
[650] Operating Area." That I was not unmindful of the possi- 
bility of a surprise attack upon the Fleet is evidenced by paragraph 
2 (h) of both my security orders. In both these orders this paragraph 

2 (b) read as follows: 

That a declaration of war may be preceded by : (1) A surprise attack on ships 
in Pearl Harbor, (2) A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating 
areas, (3) A combination of these two. 

I think it may be well for me to read this security order in toto. 
I will read the whole thing : 

From Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
Subject : Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas. 
Reference: (a) to (h). 
Enclosure : 

(A) Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sectors. 

(B) Measures to be effective until further orders. 

General McCoy. What is the date of that, Admiral ? 
Admiral Kimmel. That is dated October 14 and this supersedes the 
order covering the same ground issued on February 15, 1941. We is- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 335 

sued an order and after eight months we gathered together the evi- 
dence that ^Yas in the original order and made a revision. 

The Chairman. That security order will be placed in the record. 

(See following page.) 

(Admiral Kimmel read from the security order paragraph (G) 
on page 4 of the order and paragraph (3) found on page 6 of the 
order. ) 

Admiral Kimmel. There are various other provisions which I had, 
covering the actions to be taken by the various commanders at the time 
of the air .attack. 

The Chairman. Unless the Commission desires otherwise, I suggest 
that Admiral Kimmel's report of December 21, 1941, be marked "Kim- 
mel No. 1" and attached to each of the copies of 

[■550 Corrected A] On page 550, line 10 from bottom : 

This order was submitted as exhibit 16 by Admiral Kimmel and is 
appended as part of the record herein as Kinniiel exhibit number — . 
[5ol] the notes of this day so that it will be in the same copy as 
the Admiral's testimony. 

It is also suggested that this order of October 14, 1941, be attached 
to each page of the notes of this day as "Kimmel No. 2," so that we 
will have it in the same testimony and under the same cover. 

Is that all right, gentlemen? 

Admiral Standley. Yes. 

(The order of October 14, 1941, Kimmel No. 2, is as follows:) 

(See following page.) 

[551 Corrected A\ Here include printed co])y of Pacific Fleet 
Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 (Eevised) dated October 14, 1941. 

Five printed copies to be supplied by Admiral Kimmel. Number 
printed copy page 551 Corrected A. 



Cincpac File No. 

A2-11/FF1/ 

A4-3/QL/(0271) 



[55/6] United States Pacific Fleet 
U. S. S. Penmsylvania, Flagship 



Peakl Hakboe, T. H., February 15, 1941. 



Confidential 

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER NO. 2CL-U 

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
To: FLEET. 

Subject : Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas. 
Reference : 

(a) U. S. Fleet Conf. Letter No. 8CL-40. 

(b) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L-10 (Revised). 

(c) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 9L-40. 

(d) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40. 

(e) Section 3, Chapter II, U. S. F. 10. 

(f ) Section 4, Chapter IV, U. S. F. 10. 

1. Reference (a) is hereby cancelled and superseded by this hotter. 

2. The security of the Fleet operating and based in the Hawaiian Area may 
reasonably be based on two assumptions: 

(A) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present exist- 
ing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and mis- 
guided nationals of such powers may attempt : 

(1) sabotage from small craft on ships based in Pearl Harbor, 

(2) to block the Entrance Channel to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruc- 
tion in the Channel, 

(3) lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor. 



336 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(B) That a declaration of war might be preceded by ; 

(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor. 

(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area, 

(3) a combination of these two. 

3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part 
or in their entirety as directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, 
or the Senior Officer Present Afloat in the Hawaiian Area : 

(A) Maintain continuous patrols: 

(1) Channel Entrance plus a ready duty destroyer moored near coal dock. 
[551c] (2) Boom. 
(3) Harbor. 

(B) Intermittent patrols: 

(1) Patrol Wing TWO shall search assigned operating areas and vicinity prior 
to entry therein by operating forces and in early morning on subsequent days. 

(2) An off-shore destroyer patrol of three destroyers beginning twelve hours 
prior to the sortie and/or entry of heavy ships to search that part of the circle 
of a radius of ten miles from the entrance buoys not patrolled by the Channel 
Entrance Patrol. This patrol shall be furnished by Comm'ander Destroyers, 
Battle Force, on request of Task Force Commander. 

(3) A7i air patrol shall be established at least two hours prior to the sortie of 
the first heavy ship to search that part of the circle of a radius of thirty miles 
from the entrance channel buoys which is South of latitude 21°— 20' N. This air 
patrol shall be furnished: for sortie, from ship or carrier-based aircraft by the 
Senior Officer Present Afloat of unit remaining in the Harbor on the request of 
the Sortie Task Force Commander ; for entry, by the Task Force Commander 
entering ; when a sortie and entry occur in succession, by the Task Force Com- 
mander entering. 

(4) Daily sweep. Sweep for magnetic land anchored mines. 

(C) Operating areas: 

(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart 
No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of refer- 
ence (e). 

(2) When ships operate at sea from Pe'arl Harbor they shall be organized as a 
Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and patrol aircraft as necessary 
for screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. 
These organizations shall be promulgated prior to le'aving port and shall provide 
for the following : 

(a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines. 

(b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of 
destroyers available in the priority : 

Priority 1— BBs 
Priority 2— CVs 
Priority 3— CAs 
Priority 4 — CLs 
\551d] (e) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroy- 
ers, to co-operate with Patrol Wing TWO and Army Air Units in destroying 
hostile carrier group. 

(d) A concentration of operating submarines preparatory to disposition as 
circumstances require. 

(D) Sortie and Entrance: 

(1) Comply with instructions in U.S.F. 10. 

(2) Patrols outlined in (B) (2) and (B) (3) above, shall be established and 
commanded by the Sortie Commander except when forces are entering only, in 
which case they shall be established and commanded by the officer commanding 
the Task Force entering. When forces sortie and enter consecutively the com- 
mand of the patrols will be turned over to the entry Task Force Commander on 
completion of the sortie by the Sortie Task Force Commander. These patrols 
shall continue until released by the Task Force Commander of the sortie in case 
of sortie only, or by the Task Force Commander entering in case of entry or 
successive sortie and entry. 

(3) Degaussing coils, if calibrated, shall be energized in water of less than 
sixty fathoms. Unless the Entrance Channel has been swept for magnetic mines. 
Commander Base Force shall furnish a tug, minesweeper, or small ship without 
protection to precede the first heavy ship in which the degaussing gear is inoper- 
ative. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit. 

(E) Conditions of ships at sea: 

(1) Ships, except submarines, shall not anchor in unprotected anchorages. 
Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului may be considered 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 337 

as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and ships are so moored 
as not to be subject to torpedo tire ^rom outside the harbor. 

(2) Task Force, or Task Group Commanders, if directed by the former, shall 
maintain inner air patrol for disposition or formations, when in assigned oiper- 
atinff areas. 

(3) Maintain inner anti-submarine screens insofar as practicable with as- 
signed destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening 
when they are not employed in plane guarding. 

(4) Maintain condition of readiness THREE on torpedo defense batteries and 
equivalent condition of readiness in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition and 
keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless especially 
directed. 

[551e] (5) Maintain material condition XRAY, or equivalent in all ships. 

(6) Steam darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task Force 
or by Task Groups as practicable. 

(7) Restrict use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations. 

(8) Maintain horizon and surface battle lookouts. 

(9) Submarines shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships 
except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery 
exercises, or for services to other types. 

(10) Submarine operations, except (9) above, shall be confined ordinarily 
to Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and ]\I-24. Under special circumstances 
submarines squadrons may request additional areas from the ofticer responsible 
for assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area 
allocated to surface ships and shall notify all Fleet units in the Hawaiian Area. 
While submarines are operating submerged in C-5 and C-7 they will maintain 
a guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships. 

(11) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes all operations of 
submarines other than those covered in subparagraphs (9) and (10) above, 
shall be on the surface. 

(12) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, off 
Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols 
need be maintained. 

(13) Commanders of surface task forces, when they have been designated, 
shall be furnished with detailed submarine schedules and all changes thereto. 
Commanders of surface task forces shall ensure that all air patrols are properly 
notified thereof. 

(F) Condition of ships in port 

(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures 
outlined in references (b), (c) and (d). 

(G) Defense against air attack 

(!) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists 
of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumfer- 
ence of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center 
in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine 
Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns 
are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions. 

[551f] (2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in 
Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the 
local air defense. 

(3) As a basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft 
fire, berths in the harbor are assigned to air defense sectors as follows : 

Sector I— Berths F2-F8, K2, CI to C5. (Sector defined by approximate 
bearings 045° to 190° true from assigned berths). 

Sector II— Berths Fl, F9, Bl-3, Dry Docks, DG Calibrating Buoys, Tl^, 
WD-2-3, D2-7, X22, X23. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 190° 
to 270° true from assigned berths). 

Sector III— Berths Dl, D9, FlO-13, X2, X15, X18. (Sector defined by 
approximate bearings 270° to 000° true from assigned berths). 

Sector IV— Berths X3, X4, X5. X6 to X14, X17, C6. (Sector defined by 
approximate bearings 000° to 045° true from assigned berths). 

Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be consi<lered as the primary targets 
for ships moored at that sector's berths. But ships at other sector berths may 
be used to augment fire outside their sector at the discretion of the Sector Com- 
mander. 

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander- 
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 1 23 



338 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tliey may develop the maximum anti-air<"raft gunfire in each sector commensu- 
rate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to 
depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, 
and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit. 

(5) The Senior Officer Pre.-ient in sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) 
(3) above, is the Sector Commander, and will be responsible for the fire in his 
own sector. 

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense 
Officer (N. B. D. O.) . As such he will : 

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense 
against air attack. • 

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced. 

(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arrang- 
ing through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air 
effort between the Army and Navy. 

[SSiff] (d) Co-ordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense 
by: 

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (esclusive of 
the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to 
maintain. 

(2) Holding necessary drills. 

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal. 

(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the 
type of attacking aircraft. 

(5) Arranging communication plan. 

(6) Notify all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed. 

(7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed: 
Condition I — General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as pre- 
scribed by Naval Base Defense Officer. 

Condition II — One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector 
manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base 
Defense Officer. 

Condition III — Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of 
at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four 
guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by 
Naval Base Defense Officer. 

(8) Searchlights of ships will not be used in event of a night attack. 

(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure will be followed by the 
task forces : 

(a) Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor. 

(1) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating 
task force commander. 

(2) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable 
sortie. 

(3) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie. 

(4) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force 
Commander operating at sea advised. 

[oolli] (b) Task Force Commander operating at sea. 

( 1 ) Despatch striking unit. 

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining 
surface forces at sea. 

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require. 

(4) Direct commander of operating submarines of action desired of him. 

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer 
Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks, or hostile planes 
sighted in the operating area. 

\_5-51 >] (c) Naval Base Defense Offlcer. 

(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not 
already blacked out, each unit will execute blackout when the alarm is given. 

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of 
attacking aircraft. 

(3) Launch air search for enemy ships. 

(4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available. 

(H) Action to he taken if submarine attacks in operating area: 

(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following 

general procedure will be followed : 

(a) Ship Attacked. Proceed in accordance with Article 509, F.T.P. 188. 

Originate a plain language despatch, urgent precedence, containing details and 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 339 

addressed to all ships present in Hawaiian waters. To insure rapid delivery 
this despatch should be transmitted by the attacked ship to the Task Force 
Commander, to all ships present in Pearl Harbor on the harbor circuit in effect, 
and to Radio Honolulu (NPM) on 355 kcs. for Commandant Fourteenth Naval 
District, and relay on schedule. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear 
the immediate submarine danger area at best remaining speed, then proceed 
toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use. 
Ships other than one attacked. 

(b) Battleships. Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for 
itaner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during 
remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable 
them to join quickly. 

(c) Carriers. Same as for battleships, except all aircraft will be placed in 
Condition ONE, armed. Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may be launched 
unarmed. (At least one squadron with depth charges when they become avail- 
able). Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task 
Force Commander or as circumstances warrant. 

(d) Cruisers. Same as for battleships, except that one-half available aircraft 
(armed) will be used for own inner air patrol. The second half will be sent to 
scene of attack, armed, to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for 
damaged ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patrol. 

(e) Destroyers. Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack. 
Take determined defensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to 
which assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for 
departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task 
Force Commander when clear of Channel. 

[551 j] (f) Sudmarines. Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned 
areas, zigzagging at best speed until directed otherwise. 

(g) Minecraft. Augment screening units as dii-ected by Task Force Com- 
mander. 

(h) Base Force. If ship is attacked, tugs in operating areas slip tows and 
join her at best ^peed, prepared to tow. Report in code positions of raits aban- 
doned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for deijarture Sortie on order (if Senior 
Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels proceed at discretion, keeping 
50 miles from scene of attack. 

(i) Patrol Wing TWO. Assume readiness for search and for offensive action. 
Carry out search a-s directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish 
station patrol 220 mile radius from serene of attack at one hour before daylight 
of next succeeding daylight period. 

(j) Shore-iased Fleet Aircraft. Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the 
attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instructions 
issufd by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority. 

(k) Naval District. Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or 
entry. Prepare to receive damaged ships (s) for repair. 

(1) SOPA, Pearl Harbor. Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie and 
direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of 
units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander 
at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. 

(m) Task Force Coiinnandrr at sea. Co-ordinate oft'ensive and defensive 
measures. When immediate defensive measures have been accomplished, pre- 
scribe rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming 
the Task Force. 

(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate tlie 
presence of more submarines awaiting to attack. 

(3) It must be remembered too that a single submarine attack may indicate 
the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships 
accompanied by a carritA-. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble 
his Task Groups as quickly as tlie situation and daylight conditions warrant in 
order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy sliips tliat may be located by air 
search or other means. 

H. E. KiMMEr,. 
Distribution : 

(List II, Case 1) : 

O ; X ; AAl ; AAAl ; ENl ; EN3 ; 
NA12; NDllAC; ND11-12-I3-14. 

P. C. Ceosley, 

Flag Secretary. 



340 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[SS2] Admiral Kimmel. Exhibit 18. The close cooperation re- 
(See following page.) 
quired between the Army and the Navy in the Hawaiian Area has 
always been thoroughly recognized by botTi services. Coordination 
of effort between the two services throughout my tenure as Comman- 
der-in-Chief of the United States Fleet was obtained by cooperative 
effort between the Commanding General and myself. The weakness 
of this command setup was finally recognized by the authorities in 
Washington and this recognition led to the only thoroughly satis- 
factory type of command in the premises, namely: "Unity of Com- 
mand. Under date of December 17, 1941, Naval Operations ad- 
dressed the following despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. 
Fleet, I quote herewith a paraphrase of that despatch : "Command- 
ing General, Hawaiian Department informed by UpNav and Chief- of 
Staff that Army of Hawaiian Coastal Frontier is now under C-in-C in 
Pacific. Obtain an exact copy of the Chief of Staff's despatch to the 
Commanding General." 

General McCoy. What date is that ? 

The Chairman. December 17, 1941, 

General McCoy. Did you make any recommendations as to the 
unity of command before the attack? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, sir, I made no recommendations on the sub- 
ject. I talked about it on various occasions. It was a subject that 
has long been before the two services. I think it was recognized by 
everyone that the unity of command is essential to any effective effort. 

General McCoy, Had you served on the joint board ? 

Admiral Kimmel, I beg your pardon ? 

General McCoy, While in the Navy Department had you served on 
the joint board ? 

Admiral Kimmel. No, sir, I never served on the joint board. 

General McCoy. Did you know that that subject was up before 
the joint board before? 

[S52 Corrected A ] On page 552, line 1, delete words "exhibit 18." 

[5526] United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 
Cincpac File No. 
A2-11/FF12/ 
A4-3/QL/(13) 
Serial 01646 
Confidential 

Peael Harbor, T. H., October 14, 1941. 

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER NO. 2CI^U (Revised). 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
To : PACIFIC FLEET. 

Subject : Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas. 
Reference : 

(a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41. 

(b) Cincpac conf. Itr. file A7-2(13) Serial 01221 of 8 August 1941. 

(c) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. lCM-41, 

(d) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 2CM-41. 

(e) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L-40 (Revised). 

(f) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40. 

(g) Section 3, Chapter II, U.S. F. 10. 
(h) Chapter IV, U, S. F. 10. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 341 

Enclosure : 

(A) Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sectors. 

(B) Measures to be effective until further orders. 

1. Reference (a) is revised herewith. References (b), (c) and (d), are 
cancelled and superseded by this letter. 

2. The security of the Fleet, operating and based in the Hawaiian Area, is 
predicated, at present, on two assumptions : 

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing 
conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided 
nationals of such powers may attempt : 

(1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft. 

(2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the 
Channel. 

(3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor. 

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by : 

(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, 

(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area, 

(3) a combination of these two. 

3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part 
in accordance with enclosure (B) or in their entirety as may later be directed by 
the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat 
in the Hawaiian Area : 

(A) Continuous Patrols : 

(1) Inshore Patrol (administered and furnished by Commandant Fourteenth 
Naval District). 

(2) Boom Patrols. 

(3) Harbor Patrols. 

(B) Intermittent Patrols: 

(1) Destroyer Offshore Patrol. 

[552c] (a) The limits of this patrol shall be the navigable portion to sea- 
ward of a circle ten miles in radius from Pearl Harbor entrance buoy number one 
which is not patrolled by the Inshore Patrol. 

(b) Three destroyers to search twelve hours prior to the sortie or entry of 
the Fleet or of a Task Force containing heavy ships. The Fleet or Task Foi'ce 
Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol and when a sortie and entry 
occur in succession the Commander entering shall furnish it. 

(c) One destroyer (READY DUTY) to screen heavy ships departing or enter- 
ing Pearl Harbor other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry. The 
Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will administer the Ready Duty De- 
stroyer for this purpose and issue necessary orders when requested by forces 
afloat. Such Ready Duty Destroyer shall be on one hour's notice. 

(2) Air Patrols: 

(a) Daily search of operating areas as directed, by Aii'craft, Scouting Force. 

(b) An air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force. It will 
search that part of a circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel 
buoys which is south of latitude 21°— 20' N. The Fleet or Task Force Commander 
concerned shall furnish this patrol, establishing it at least two hours prior to the 
sortie or entrance, and arranging for its discontinuance. When a sortie and 
entry occur in succession, the Commander entering shall supply this patrol. 

(c) Air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than 
described in foregoing subparagraph. The ship concerned shall furnish the patrol 
mentioned therein. 

(3) Daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines by Fourteenth Naval Dis- 
trict Forces. The swept charmel for Fleet and Task Force sorties or entries is 
two thousand yards wide between Points "A" and "X" as defined in subpara- 
graph (C) (3), below. 

(0) Sortie and Entry: 

(1) Reference (h) will not be in effect in the Pacific Fleet during the present 
emergency. 

(2) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District controls the movements of 
ships within Pearl Harbor, the Entrance Channel, and the swept channel. 

(3) Point "A" is midway between I'earl Harbor entrance channels buoys Nos. 
ONE and TWO ; Point "A-1" is midchannel on a line drawn 270° true from Buoy 
No. EIGHTEEN ; Point "X" unless otherwise prescribed is three thousand yards 
bearing 153° true from Point "A". 



342 CONGRESSIOXAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(4) Zero hour is the time first ship passes Point "A-1" abeam for sortie, or 
Point "A" for entry, and will be set by despatch. Interval between ships will be 
as prescribed by Fleet or Task Force Commanders. 

(5) Fleet and Task Force Commanders shall, for their respective forces: 

(a) Arrange with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District for times of 
entry and departure, berthing and services. 

(b) Prepare and issue sortie and entrance plans. 

(c) Clear the Defensive Sea Area promptly after sortie. 

(d) When a sortie and entry occur in succession, keep entry force will 
clear of Defensive Sea Area until sortie force is clear. 

(e) Furnish own patrols except as modified by (B) (1) (b) and (B) (2) 
(b), above. 

(6) Units departing or entering Pearl Harbor at times other than during a 
Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, request authority and services as required, 
direct from Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. 

(7) Heavy ships (including 7,500 ton light cruisers) maintain a minimum 
speed of 15 knots wlien within a radius of 15 miles from the entrance buoys to 
Pearl Harbor. During approach and entry, individual units govern movements 
to provide for minimum time in waters adjacent to the entrance. 

[552d] (D) Operating Areas: 

(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart 
No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of refer- 
ence (g). 

(2) Ships, except submarines, shall anchor only in protected anchorages. 
Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului are considered as such 
if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and if ships are so moored as not 
to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor. 

(3) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, off 
Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, ofe Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need 
be maintained. 

(4) Submarines shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships 
except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery 
exercises, or for services to other types. 

(5) Submarine operations, except (4) above, shall be confined ordinarily to 
Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and M-24. Under special circumstances sub- 
marine squadrons may request additional areas from the oflBcer responsible for 
assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area allo- 
cated to surface ships and shall notify all Fleet units in the Hawaiian area. 
While submarines are operating submerged in C-5 and C-7 they shall maintain a 
guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships. 

(6) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes, all operations of sub- 
marines other than those covered in sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) above, shall be 
on the surface. 

(7) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, shall ensure that commanders of 
surface and air task forces are furnished with detailed submarine schedules and 
all changes thereto. The latter shall ensure that units concerned, including air 
patrols, operating under their command are properly notified thereof. 

(8) Ships proceeding independently across the operating areas at night shall 
follow neutral zones and area boundaries where practicable. The Task Force 
Commander in the vicinity shall be informed of: (a) the route to be followed 
using point numbers on the Operating Chart, (b) time of starting route, (c) the 
speed of ndvance. The Task Force Commander shall notify vessels of his force 
that mav be concerned. 

(E) Ships at Sea: 

(1) WJien ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as 
a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and aircraft as necessary for 
screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. These 
organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port and shall provide for the 
following: 

(a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines. 

(b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of 
destroyers available, priority in assignments being governed by the following: 

Priority 1— BBc 
Priority 2— CVs 
Priority 3— CAs 
Priority 4— CLs 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 343 

(c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroyers, to 
co-operate with Patrol Wings and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier 
group. 

(d) A concentration of own operating submarines preparatory to disposition 
as circumstances require. 

(e) Inner air patrol for dispositions or formations, when in operating areas. 
Such screen shall be maintained by Task Groups, if the Task Force Commander 
so directs. 

(f ) Inner anti-submarine screens, insofar as practicable with assigned destroy- 
ers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are 
not employed in plane guarding. 

(g) Maintenance of condition of readiness THREE on torpedo defense batteries 
and equivalent condition of readiness in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition 
and keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless especially 
directed. 

[552e'i (h) Maintenance of material condition XRAY, or equivalent in all 
ships. 

(i) Steaming darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task 
Force or by Task Groups as practicable. 

(j) Restricting use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations. 

(k) Maintenance of horizon and surface battle lookouts. 

(1) Energizing degaussing coils whenever there is any possibility of the pres- 
ence of magnetic mines. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided 
if operations permit. 

(2) Ships t owing targets in operating areas at night will show appropriate 
running and towing lights, except when engaged in exercises the nature of 
which requires them to be darkened. 

(F) Ships in port: 

(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures 
outlined in references (e) and (f). 

(G) Defense against air attack: 

(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of 
several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference 
of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the 
middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine De- 
fense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns 
are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions. 

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor 
plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense. 

(3) Enclosure (A) defines the air defense sectors in Pearl Harbor and is the 
basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire. Hostile 
planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships 
in that sector. However, ships in other sectors may augment fire of any other 
sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander. 

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander- 
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so 
that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector com- 
mensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized 
to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, car- 
riers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths 
permit. 

(5) Tlie Senior Office Present in each sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) 
(3) above, is the Sector Commander, and responsible for the fire in his own 
sector. 

(6) The Commandant 'Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense 
Officer ( N. B. D. O. ) . As such he shall : 

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense 
against air attack. 

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced. 

(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arrang- 
ing throngh Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air 
effort between the Army and Navy. 

(d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by: 

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive 
of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness 
to maintain. 

(2) Holding necessary drills. 

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal. 



344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and 
the type of attacking aircraft. 

(5) Arranging communication plan. 

(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed. 
[522f] (7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are 

prescribed : 

Condition I — General Quarters in all ships. Condition, of aircraft as pre- 
scribed by Naval Base Defense Officer. 

Condition II — One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector 
manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base 
Defense Officer. 

Condition III — Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) 
of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of 
four guns required for each sector) . Condition of aircraft as prescribed by 
Naval Base Defense Officer. 

(8) Searchlights of ships shall not be used in event of a night attack. 

(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure shall be followed by 
the ta.sk forces : 

(a) Senior Officer EniMrked in Pearl Harbor. 

(1) Execute an emergency sortie order which will accomplish (2), (3) and 
(4) below. (This order must be prepared and issued in advance). 

(2) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating 
task force commander. 

(3) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable 
sortie. 

(4) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie. 

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force 
Commander operating at sea, advised. 

(6) Task Force Commander operating at sea. 

(1) Despatch striking unit. (See (E) (1) (c), above). 

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining 
surface forces at sea. 

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require. (May utilize 
unit of (E) (1) (a) for this if not needed for A/S purposes.) 

(4) Direct commander of operating submarines to carry out action desired 
of him. 

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer 
Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks or hostile planes 
sighted in the operating area. 

(r) Naval Base Defense Officer. 

(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If ■ not 
already blacked out, each unit shall execute blackout when the alarm is given. 

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of 
attacking aircraft. 

(3) Launch air search for enemy ships. 

(4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available. 

(H) Action To Be Taken If finhmarine Attacks In Operating Area: 
(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following 
general procedure will be followed : 
Ship Attacked. 

(a) Proceed in accordance with Article .509. F.T.P. 188. Originate a plain 
language despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential details addressed for 
action to the Task Force Commander in the operating area and for informntion 
to Commander-in-Chief, Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and S.O.P.A., 
Pearl Harbor. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate 
submarine danger area, at best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl 
Harbor using zisfzag appropriate for speed in use. 

\552g'] Ships other than one attacked. 

(b) Battleships. Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for 
inner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during 
remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable 
them to join quickly. 

(c) Carriers. Same as for battleships, except place all aircraft in Condi- 
tion ONE. armed. (At least one squadron with depth charges when they be- 
come available.) Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may be launched un- 
armed. Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task 
Force Commander or as circumstances warrant. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 345 

(d) Cruisers. Same as for battleships, except, use one-half available air- 
craft (armed) for own inner air patrol. Send the second half to scene of attack 
(armed), to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for damaged ship if 
damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patx'ol. 

(e) Destroyers. Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack. 
Take determined offensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to 
which assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for 
departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task 
Force Commander when clear of Channel. 

if) Suhmarmes. Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, 
zigzagging at best speed until directed otherwise. 

ig) Minecraft. Augment screening units as directed by Task Force Com- 
mander. 

(ft) Base Force. If ship attacked is damaged, tugs in operating areas join 
her at best speed, prepared to tow, slipping targets as necessary. Report in 
code, positions of rafts abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure. 
Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels pro- 
ceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack. 

(i) Patrol Wings. Assume readiness for search and for offensive action. 
Carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish 
station patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight 
of next succeeding daylight period. 

(;■) Shore-based Fleet Aircraft. Prepare to relieve planes in the air over 
the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instruc- 
tions issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority. 

(A-) Naval District. Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie 
or entry. Prepare to receive damaged ship(s) for repair. 

(1) 8. O. P. A., Pearl Harbor. Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie 
and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of 
units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Com- 
mander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. 

(m) Task Force Commander at Sea. Coordinate offensive and defensive 
measures. When immediate defensive measures have been accomplished, pre- 
scribe rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming 
the Task Force. 

(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the 
presence of more submarines waiting to attack. 

(3) It must be remembered too. that a single submarine attack may indicate 
the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships 
accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assem- 
ble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant 
in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by 
air search or other means. 

[5527!.] 4. Subordinate Commanders shall issue tlie necessary orders to 
make these measures effective. 

H. E. KiMMEL. 

Distribution: (5CM-41) 
List II, Case 1 : A, X. 

ENl, EN3, NA12, NDllAC, NDll-12-13-14, NY8-10, 
(Al-Asiatic, Al-Atlantic). 
P. C. Crosley, 

Flag Secretaru. 

[■552i'] (At this point in the original transcript there appears a 

map reflectinfi; the Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan. This 
map will be found reproduced as Item No. 37, EXHIBITS-ILLUS- 
TRATIONS, Roberts Commission.) 

[.552 j] Confidential 

Measures to be Effective Under Pabagraph 3 of Basic Letter Until Further 

Orders 
(A) (1) Inshore patrols. 
(A) (2) 

Boom — -administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with 
services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present. 



346 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(A) (3) 

Harbor — administered by Commander Base Force with services furnished 
by Commander Battle Force from all ships present. 

(B) (1) (a) (b) (c) 

Furnished by Destroyers, Battle Force ; Minecraf t, Battle Foi*ce ; and 
Minecraft, Base Force, and coordinated by Commander Destroyers, Battle 
Force. 
(B) (2) (a) (b) (c) Daily search opn. areas. 

(B) (3) 

(C) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (6) (7) 

(D) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

(E) (1) (a) (b) (c) (d) 

Assignments only shall be made. The Task Force Commander will hold 
one drill during each operating period, if employment permits, in the estab- 
lishment of units prescribed. 
(E) (1) (h) (i) (j) (k) (1) 
(E) (2) 
(F) 

The provisions of reference (e). 
(G) 

Entire article, except sub-paragraph 6 (b), which will be as arranged 
by Naval Base Defense Officer with Commanding General, Hawaiian 
Department. 

Enclosure (B) 

[SSS] Admiral Kimmel. I had heard it was before the joint 
board on many occasions, and I liad heard that in time of war they 
would probably appoint a man who would have absolute command 
of the forces in any one area, but I knew nothing had been done, and 
I knew that in tim? of peace the probability of getting any action was 
just about nil. 

Exhibit 19. Throughout the time that I was acting as Commander- 
(See following page.) 
in-Chief of the Fleet the cooperation and coordination of the efforts 
of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Area were guided by "Joint 
Action, Army and Navy." This publication was prepared by the 
Joint Board and promulgated to the two services by a joint order 
signed by the Secretaries of War and Navy. The most vital consider- 
ation in all efforts of cooperation was the coordination of the actions 
and operations of the air forces of the Army and the Navy. " 

I shall read paragraph d(3) on page 14 of "Joint Action of The 
Army and The Navy," which reads as follows : 

A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning serv- 
ice, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt ex- 
change of information or instructions with the Navy. 

That comes under the heading of, "The specific functions of the 
Army is coastal frontier defense," and in carrying out these functions 
the Army will provide and operate or maintain : 

A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning serv- 
ice, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt ex- 
change of information or instructions with the Navy. 

Then on page 32 of the "Joint Action of The Army and The Navy," 
paragraph z : 

[SSS Corrected A'] On page 553, line 7, delete the words "exhibit 
19." 

[554] An aircraft warning service is a commtinication and intelligence 
service which forms part of the communication and intelligence service of the 
frontier defense. Its purpose is to warn centers of population, industrial plants. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS C0MMIS3I0X 347 

public utilities, and military and naval establishments of the approach of hos- 
tile aircraft, and to alert Air Corps units and antiaircraft artillery units. It 
consists essentially of observers, of information centers for plotting the courses 
and distributing information of approaching hostile planes, and of the necessary 
communications. 

Through verbal agreement with the Commanding General, an agree- 
ment for joint air action by Army and Navy forces was drawn up un- 
der date of 20 March 1941, and signed by'^the Commanding General 
and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, who was des- 
ignated as Naval Base Defense Officer in my Security Orders of 15 
February 1941 and 14 October 1941. 

I might add that before I took over command, I took steps to talk 
to the Commanding General and the Commandant of the Fourteenth 
Naval District and to my own air people, and I told them that we must 
get some method of operating the Army and Navy in conjunction with 
the other, to get some coordinated effort. 

As a result of their efforts and a great many other people. Admiral 
Bloch and General Short ordered a board to consider this method of 
coordination and efforts with the Army air force, and under date of 
the 20th of March they got an agreement, and the agreement is laid 
down here : 

20 March 1941 
When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval 
Base Defense Officer (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that 
the [555] threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to 
warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are 
necessary to make available withotit delay to the other commander such propor- 
tion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that 
joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans : 

1. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the 
tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine 
the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due con- 
sideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes 
released to Nnvy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain 
available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, uutil comi^letion of the 
mission, when it will revert to Army control. 

2. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will 
be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense 
Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength tjo participate in these missions. 
With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter 
ail-craft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force 
will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for main- 
tenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, 
if is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control. 

3. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search opera- 
tion.s. and Army aircraft are made. available, these aircraft will be under the 
[556^ tactical control of the naval commander directing the searcli operations. 

4. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the 
protection of friendly surfnce ships, tlie force assigned for this mission will pass 
to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission. 

(See following page.) 

MAILGRAJI 

:Mailed at: 
Pkakl Harbor, T. H., 120001 April 191,1 
From : Naval Rase Defense Ofl^cer 

(Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) 
Action to: Cincpac. Pncific Fleet P^)rce Commnnders k Tvpe Commanders 

Compatwing 2, Dist. IMnr. Officer. Capt. Yard. G. O.'s Dist. Activities & Units 

as per distribution list of N. B. D. O. Operation Plan N(\ 1-41 with annexes 

A. B. C, D. & E. 
Information : 

Cincpac 

Comdg., Gen. Hawaiian Dept. 



348 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

CONFIDENTIAL 

In accordance with paragraph (X) of naval base defense officer operation plan 
No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941, Revision of annex baker (Naval base defense air 
force operation plan No. A-1-41 dated 9 April 1941) is issued in replacement of 
annex baker dated 28 February 1941 and the latter will be destroyed. 

C. C. Bloch, 
Rear Admiral, U. 8. N., Commander Naval Base Defense Force {Com- 
mandant Fourteenth Naval Dist.) 

Authenticated : 
J. W. Bays, 

Lieutenant, U. S. Navy. 

[556 Corrected A'\ On page 556, line 7, paragraph "4" the fol- 
lowing authentication should