(navigation image)
Home American Libraries | Canadian Libraries | Universal Library | Community Texts | Project Gutenberg | Children's Library | Biodiversity Heritage Library | Additional Collections
Search: Advanced Search
Anonymous User (login or join us)
Upload
See other formats

Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

rE 







Given B^ 



t 





'^' 



3^ 



PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORB THS 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 

OF THE PEAEL HAEBOE ATTACK 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS "^^ 

FIRST SESSION ^ ^ J^ 

PDESUANT TO ' /V 5"^ 

S. Con. Res. 27 



,cju. 



A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, IWl, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 23 
PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Inyestigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 

OF THE PEAEL HABBOR ATTACK 

CONGEESS or THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGEESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

Sc Con. Res. 27 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 23 
PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




PUBLIC 



UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
79718 WASHINGTON : 1946 




(H^^z 



C l^fv.) 






'/9S' 




JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representiitive from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 



WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois 
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine 
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- 
gan 
J. feAYARD CLARK, Representative from 
North Carolina 



JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
Pennsylvania 

BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- 
tive from California 

FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 
Wisconsin 



COUNSEL 



(Through January 14, 194G) 
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
Gerhaud a. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JrLE M. Haxxafoud, Assistant Counsel 
John E. Mastex, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 
Seth W. Richakdsox, General Counsel 
Samuel H. Kaufjian. Associate General Couns 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
EiiWARD P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
Logan J. Lane, Assistatit Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 


Pages 


Transcript 




Hearings 


No. 




pages 






1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


Nov 


. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


2 


401- 982 


1059- 2586 


Nov 


. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945, 


3 


983-1583 


2587- 4194 


Dec. 


5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 


4 


1585-2063 


4195- 5460 


Dec. 


14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 


5 


2065-2192 


5461- 6646 


Dec. 


31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


Jan. 


15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 


7 


2921-3378 


7889- 9107 


Jan. 


22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946., 


8 


3379-3927 


9108-10517 


Jan. 


30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6. 1946. 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


Feb. 


7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


Feb. 


15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 


11 


5153-5560 


13709-14765 


Apr. 


9 and 11, and Mav 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OP JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 
No. 



12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 through 25 

26 

27 through 31 

32 through 33 

34 

35 

36 through 38 

39 



Exliibits Nos. 

1 through 6. 

7 and 8. 

9 through 43. 

44 through 87. 

88 through 110. 

Ill through 128. 

129 through 156. 

157 through 172. 

173 through 179. 

180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 

Roberts Commi.ssion Proceedings. 

Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 

Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



IV 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 






I?: ■'■' 

H 






O 
< 

o 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1946 


Pages 

5269-5291 

3814-3828 
3450-3519 

"'"5089-5122 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 J 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 
""471-510" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


1 :^ 11 iiTt^eoi 

11O11111111111111111102CD1 

g 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i-i 1 1 

0. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 01 1 

(? : ; ! 1 ; ; : ; ; 1 ; i : ; ; ; ; ; : ; "^ ; 


Joint 

Committoe 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 !N 

. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1— T 

^ ; i i i 1 i i ; i i i ; i i i i i i i i i i 1 


Joint 
Committee 
E.xhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 
""660-688" 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
liarbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

3105-3120" 

2479-2491 

4022-4027" 
148-186 



2567-2580" 

3972-3988 

2492-2515 

1575-1643" 

3720-3749' 
1186-1220 

1413-1442" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

'"391-398" 
"115-134' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18, 1941, 

toJaa. 23, 1942) 


Pages 

203-209 

1127-1138 
1033-1038 

1719^1721' 

1219-1224' 

""886-951' 
1382-1399 

""377-389' 
1224-1229 

"314-326" 


o 

Q 


Allen, Brooke E., Maj 

Allen, Riley H 

Anderson, Edward B., Maj 

Anderson, Ray 

Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm 

Anstey, Alice 

Arnold, H. H., Gen 

Asher. N. F., Ens 

Ball, N. F., Ens 

Ballard, Emma Jane 

Barber, Bruce G 

Bartlett, George Francis 

Bates, Paul M., Lt. Conidr 

Beardall, John R., Rear Adm 

Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens 

Beatty, Frank E., Rear Adm 

Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm 

Benny, Chris J 

Benson, Henry P 

Berquist, Kenneth P., Col 

Berry, Frank M., S 1/c 

Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen 

Bicknell. George W., Col 

Bissell, John T., Col 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



lO o 
ICO 

I I 

lO o 



(M GO 

05 00 

CM CO 

I I 

Oi CO 
coco 

CS! CO 



CO "* 00 

O'-H o 
I (M CO 

^ I 1 

IC I> GO 
CO l^5 (M 



1-H O 

I 00 
^ 00 



M^ coco 

<OI> CT> 

CO OOO 

CM CO I 

I I GO 
GO l> "^t^ 

crs CD GO 
lO o 
C^ICO 



I O "-^ •* LO CO CO 
1 CO C^J •* CO CO o 
lO O -^ CM CO .-^ 
I CM "^ I COCO"*! 

I I I CO I I I 

I LQ ic -^ 00 CO lO 
I .-H ^ rt lO CM 05 
I OO CMCC O 
I CM •* COCO-«** 



Tfi CO lO 

00 05 lO 
>-( CO ^ 
CO I CM 
I O I 
CO t-t^ 
CO CO CM 



I CM CM 

I I 
I CO o 
I LO CO 



CM 05 

I I 

CM CD 
00 






Q 



W 



O 






o o 

CXI 

rC bC 



a 

o , 



^ o 

Is 

03 o 



c 3 . 5 :7: 



O 






o 

OS 

2S: 



.^03 ^-^ 



.o^li 



3tj 



O 



i-'^.§ 



«« pq« 



c c 

- _ _ O 3 

(^ tl (4 ^ t^ kl 






o3t— 1 
1-5 . 



o 



O 



. c 



c3^pq o ^- 



071 .s 



O 0; QJ 



^_ G ^-1 f- t-( +- 

pqpqpqpqfflwmWMPQWn 



PQO 



o p 



C a 



t: 3 c.H o 



C^ ^ ^ 

000 



p-t . 



9 C g Cm 

■'egpic_g 
a; 2 .0-2 

^^00 o 
00000 



C o o 

a c o 
000 
000 



VI 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



c o ■' 



u 






» o 

si 















«^ lO 



^^ c 



Oh 



■S pI 



. rf) <-* 






CO -^ 02 rf< 






la. 3>;o3; 

. i; ^ O C -w OJ 






: O 






O&q 



oc o 

I I 

lO CD 
^ 00 



C<JC5 
COl-H 

1 I 
ooo 

^05 



M 1°2 

; E 2 ^ hS " ;2 



S.c 



e — ^ 



C *5 .— <^ ^ .— _-- c^ 

•3E2:2:-gB2^ 



CO o 

00 -< 

&. I I 

-eoo-H 
>* CO 



C (TO CO 
00 CD05 

-H O —< 

^ ^ 1 

I I o 
1> iC ,— I 

r- to 



CO— I 05 
rt- 1> O 
oc iC lO 

I ^ I 

(N I -^ 

^ GCO 
OOCO lO 



o 

o 



*s 
o 



2"- 

.- o 

^% 

o 



o 



kJ !2; "S" 

3 3 83 S 

OOPP 



6 

<1 



g 

-5 

CO 



03 

^ o3 lU 0) 

fiQfifi 






1)2; 

'02 
IP 









<i^ c S 



« = — • 



c3 



s^ „-^ 



C C 3 

ppSfiQPQ 



- ,-2^ J.- 
E h-, .2 "'=5 •- 

_ b£ 3 ~ .^ O 

■ o •;: = - ,- ,•- 
^^ ^- a; f« o o 
C O to 0) t; "7^ 

P 3 3 (>, gj gj 

QPPQWW 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



VII 



o2 



g;2 






-f O 



00 00 
rtl O 
QOTJ^ 



(M CO lO 
(N-* CO 

iC CO 00 

(N r-l(N 

I I I 
-X>-* GO 

lO (M 00 
(N --KM 



t^OO 

'^ CO 

l-HCO 



COojiM 



O lO CO 
Ca LO (N 
COCO (N 

I I I 

oocoi> 

CM tJhtJi 



lO "—I 

-r;- CD 
1 CO CD 

I CO CO 

^ O 

O lO 

I coco 
I coco 



^ CO(N 
O ^ 00 

CO CO CO 

I I ^ 
r^-H I 

00 .-H o 
(N COI>- 

CO 



1> —I 

O5C0 



t^ LO 

CO(M 

00 I 
(M 00 

05 



CO 






CO 
o ^ tc o o 






ao^ 



.bd r 






(U sf G 



03 



u '^ 



c .G »; r 
^- «* G — o 

> o8 03 OJ.ii; 



bC .O C - S 
C t> c S o o 

_C _-+;^ 03 « O O 



03 r- 



tf 



go 

^ o3 



o 



^■-^i^ o3 

■i s 03-1 

Sm tn 3 3 



t>- C -C a; 
S o3 o3 0) 

P^OOO 



U 



^^ d 



o 



W tn 



.p 



c x:^ 









G-c 



O 03 o3 O) 
,-:; tn (h (1 

oooo 



\o 



"^ 



-73 « 
'^ o 



o'g3 
1^ 






VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



c3 -in 
a <o-9i ' 

.2 -2 2 m 

C o 



o 



l^g^ 






CO 



iiO' 



E2 I 1 I 

T CD iC (N 
^ CO lO 00 

'^ I I I 

O O lO 
C^ ■* I> 






"."tici 



0(4 









:.2SJ 












lg 









Co* *- - "^ 

■i-^Z; O.I; -"2 

n 'c .t; ^ ^ 3 ?- 



^n>'- 



Oh 






P 



^6 






Oh 






05 

<N i-0 

I I 

CO LO 

o a> 

(M CO 



Od 



o ^ 

O-H 






^W 






;32X; 



0) o 

o';=:.*f CO ^.'£ 'CO 
o|5^-§B2S^ 



a; 






Or'^^^ 



ii^U 



H^l .^, 



r ^r^■cCT3 






m 

rtOo 



OJ. 






o r 
o . - 









►-5 



- >'7: ^ S? c 



Ci-.(-.!-..-')03GfcH 
C3ci3o3o3cjtioa> 



.•z: 00 



000 



O O r< =3 
"-; r< ET' 73 



13 = 



O 3 3 3 



-3^_ <1> 

c c f ^ 

hH WH C 3 

H-l l-L( )— I hH 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



IX 



I I I I I I I I I I ( 

C50Q(NOfCiCOrH-^t^(M 
03— i(MC0-*'l<iCiOiOt^ 



I rU 



^r^ 



^^ 



■^-^ CO 



^-^^ 



h- O lO 
OO O) 
1> lO ^ 

I I I 
O '^ CO 
C-. C^T to 

O lO TfH 

(N C^ ti 






fOOO 
fOfO 

cc t> 

CI IN 

cot> 



I I XX I I I I 



o 
O 



O 



o 



T3 

S 
O 

O 



c a - 

C^ rt c3 S3 
-I >-: >i', )— 1 1^ 



1-5 o -M ^^ 

, ^ +J a t- 5 

c3 "^ '^ izT— "— ~ 
03 4) oj .;:d .S ." 



o 

o 

pq 



<: 

^ !3 ^ c' 

- r'Ci— I 

C Or? t^ 



73 
.«2 ! O 

>ra r 



=! S ~ -G S 



bC tC tC bC tDj_ 

.2 .2 .2 .2 .2 ."S . 

k> «^ k^ ly \yt l> ! 

HH h^ l-2-i h^ hH h^ ( 



O ;-( 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945, 

to May 31, 

1940 


O O500 iiiiii _- -O 1 1 

CD 1 1 1 1 1 locD ill 11 'S;;^o 1 1 

lOiliiiiOiCO S^"^'' 

lO ^ 1 1111111111 i^lf^iO 1 1 

&>0 iC2-^ii lliOil 

c lo (M CO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2: S i> 1 1 

a,io 00 11111111.1 i22-H 1 1 

lo Tt^ 1111 2i-^"^'' 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

541-553 

182-292 

"140^142" 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

103 
107-112 

186 
219-222 

102 


Joint 

Committee 

E.xhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


1 1-H 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 

^1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No 

140 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


Pages 

904^918 

628-643 

"734-740" 

""§52-885' 


Joint 

Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 

266.5-2695" 
3028-3067 

1161-1185" 

2787-2802" 
1014-1034 
1678-1694 
3226-3250 

2362-2374" 

2-54" 

T. S. 2-52, 

192-226 

3126-3152 

1816-1913 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

214-225 
363-367 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Deo. 18, 1941, 

toJan.23, 1942) 


iiOi'-Hi<ML0iiii0iiii'^iii»-0 i(M|OS 
iii.O>t^iCOC:iiiOOiiiiOiiiO iiOOOiO 
« 1 1 ^ 1 ^ 1 1 1 1 1 (M 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 00 iCOTfHCO 
5,1 1,— 1 1,— 1 irJHr-l 1 1 Il-H 1 1 1 ij 1 1 1,— 1 iICO'— 1 
a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 --1 
(i, 1 iCD iCD 1 00 1 1 iiN 1 1 1 lO 1 i iCO i(N 
1 1-^ lUO 1 1 1 lb- 1 1 1 1 10 1 1 1 Ci leo 
lli-Hli-HI OllllNll t^ 1 


a 


Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN 

Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen 

Landreth, J. L., Ens 

Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0 

Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col 

Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC 

Lawton, William S., Col 

Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN 

Leahy, William D., Adm 

Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm 

Lewis, Fulton, Jr 1. 

Litell, S. H 

Locey, Frank H 

Lockard, Jo.seph L., Lt., USA 

Lorence, Walter E., Col 

Lumsden, George, Mai 

Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN 

Lynch, Paul J 

Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr 

]\iac Arthur, Douglas, Gen 

Marshall, George'C, Gen 

Marston, Morrill W., Col 

Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



XI 






i 



00 r-^ 
Oi O 



COO lO 
CO C5 (M 

.-I I Tt< 

Tficoco 
I "^ I. 

(M CO 



lO 



CO uo (N O [sj 
CI (M CO '* X5 
00 C-J 00 GO f^ 



CD 00 CO CO , 
CO ^ O CO ( 

00 Ci 00 CO 

CM CO(N CN 



i' 



(N ■* (M 

,- r-( •^t^ 

^ -* I 

1 I CO 
CO TTl CO 
OJOrH 

CO '^f 



05 tH 
.-H(N 

eoiM 

I ± 

CDt^ 

eoc<) 



CO 00 

I <N 

CO I 
COCO 



OOiOlM 
CO C5 lO 

O Tfi tH 

CD(M 
Ca T)H 

CO '^ ^ 

O 



cL; 



■<ti 00 

00 lO 

I ^ 
CO I 

00 r^ 



S is c 



§§S 



s : p. 

=« re ^-^ -ieP^ 
■ c « .S ti =3 n g a 

Scpl tH u3 O O ti O 

° >,ffiQOOOPl 
ojeSoocJcioc;) 



O 



H 






o 



bc 






tJD - 

'S o ►" 

_ ^ C i-H 

a; o G b 

O) CU 01 ° 
►4 M H^ ^ 

o w « « 






P^* 



^ cc ,C'-S o3 03 O i3 



O 

BO 

<^ 

tH , 

Sk 

- t- 

-G oS 

'5 o 



^^ 



H-i rG o) 

-h" flX3 tH 

OOOPLi 



o 

o 

1^ .S 3 'C 

q3 tH tH -fj 
O) a; (U <u 
PmPhPhPh 



XII 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



1^ o ^ ^ 



O 05 
(NO 






^Z; 



^ E'n^'r, " 



ci 






• > o o 



Ox -- 

Oh 






1-5 as^ss: 
c s £ ?: >, g 0.2 

=; K S C 5 -^ 



Z^ fZ f2 cic 1^ "^ 

I CN lo r; " Z- 
^ (M _L -!- ' 



O i 



t^N- , 



to ' 



I 00 00 
lOO 

looT 

I t>. r-H 

o 






<u o 



Ch 






0(N 
--H (N 



OOO 

ISO'S 

CO C4 

OiO 

cor- 

C: CO 
CO C-! 



<© lo coin 

OJ O CO 1-H 
Cj --H O 05 
coco (M CO 

oco CO >o 
o >o c^ 00 

03— c: 00 

CO CO (M CO 



OOO 
C50 



OCiO 
«DCO 

c:50 



?° .bo? 



Q 'P ■*^ CC "^ .iS *CO 

^§6 «Bog 



LTOOOi 

r^iMop 



<i 



o ^ 1 

CO^ 

I I 

(N lO 

CO CO 



COrt< 
CC 00 

r-00 

7.4 



^ 1 o 



o 
if c ^ 






Cicd o 
« O 

.s & & 

OOO 



O 



o 



. o> 
lO ~ 

= ^S 
O S d 

■*^ ■♦^ ^r 
PhPhP-i 



-J &. (U 



^O 



rt 



S t> o o 



INDEX OF WITNESSES 



xm 



lOeo 

!■* o 

I coco 

I CO 



CO (^^ 

en to 

I I 
O C5 
^ lO 

o -o 



(M -^ — I 

r-l lO O 

I ! ! 
t- C:i O 



i 



OOV'-H 



uL, 



ci 



OOCO IM 

.-< r-l CO 

cj cot^ 

r-H CCCO 



iCO-*l 

I obo 
I to CO 



ooeoixM 

I>CD <Xi CO 

I COCO i-H 

t- i I I 

CI 03 CO ^ 

o 00 o Tt< 
lo CO o 
CO CO --H 



O CO 
(M CO 

I I 

.-I (M 
!M CO 
(N CO 



CO lO C: as 



co^ m 
oc C' o 

r-l CO CO 

I I lO 

^ r^co 

CO iX) CO 

M< CO 



o to 

CO(^! 

coc-^ 
cs CO 

4^ 

lO o 
coca 
c^ CO 



CO 



ci 



ob 



I ^o 



cL, 



;-3 



o 



O O QJ _§ . 
-O "H _- oT M 









o3 



-3 ^ 



o 



r'-^ ^: 


^ 




a 


c <s a 

Safe 


o 


o 


^ 2M 


■-5 


^Hn- 




CO ^ O 


o 


-t^ 03 CO 




'-I 






prl 


X!X3^ 


o 


o o o 


o 


PhPhP^ 


« 



o r 
o o o o 






o b 

«^ ^ d 

-d . ^ 

^ VI in 

T3 yj CO 

3 P =! 



U 






< 



H-5.5f 



bD 



o 



o 



w 



o i4 

r2 ^ 



73 



-^ a3 ^ S 
ij^ c !^ ~ a 

S3 o « « o 
02 02 05 02 00 



O 



O 



o (-i 



|02 



Oh 

iU 



il— I O 



U O QJ -C 
02 02 02 02 



r <u Qj a a 

02020202 



XIV 



CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee. 

Nov. 15, 1915, 

to May 31, 

1946 


I'g iiii 'M i ii i ii^^si i iii i i i 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


Pages 

4-9 
"335-375" 

411-413 


.Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

148 

(Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 23, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

09' 
195-197 

203-204 

185" 


Joint 

Committoo 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarko 

Investigation, 

Sept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


11 1 1 i(N 1 1 1 1 l(N 1 1 ill III 
2. 1 1 111 II III II III III 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


lo lllll(N r-illl I^-_tro 111 III 

it^ iiiiit^ ooiii i2^^-^ 

« i(N 1 1 1 1 110 1 1 1 i2?^00 III III 

^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r-l 1 1 1 l^fp 1 III III 
.OlO 1 1 1 1 1 GO 1 1 1 1 1 ^ ' Tfl III III 

Q,i(N IlllKM t^.iiii'^^l- IJI 111 

1^ ! ! 1 1 l'^ fe 1 1 1 1 w^ ; 1 ; ; | ; 


Joint 
Committee 
E.xhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Ilarbor Board, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
3644-3650 
276-541, 
4411-4445 

3265-3286 

1539-1575" 
4037-4094 
C 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart Inquiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
June 15, 1944) 


Pages 

32-65" 
323-334 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

143 

(Roberts 

Commission, 

Dec. 18. 1941, 

toJan.23,1942) 


lOf^iOiiiii KNiiOOO 

iCO-^iOiiiil i-^iiCT-O III 111 

«I,-IC£!T}< t^llr^OO 111 III 

§.l|rH|lllll |rt||_,^ 111 III 

.0 il^ 1 (N 1 1 1 1 1 1 

fti iCOt-iO lllll lOO 1 1 IC 111 III 

1 --> '* 1 1 1 1 1 1 CO 1 1 OD 1 

lO lllll ll>llr-lOO 


d 
1 


Short, Arthur T 

Short, Walter C, Maj. Gen 

Shortt, Creed, Pvt 

Sisson, George A 

Smedberg, William R., II, Capt. USN_- 

Smith, Ralph C, Maj. Gen 

Smith, Walter B., Lt. Gen 

Smith, William W., Rear Adm 

Smith-Hutton, H. H., Capt., USN 

Smoot, Perry M., Col 

Sonnett, John F., Lt. Comdr 

Spalding, Isaac, Brig. Gen 

Staff, W. F, CH/CM 

Stark, Harold R., Adm 

Stephenson, W. B., Lt., USNR 

StOphen, Benjamin L 

Stimson, Henry L 

Stone, John F 

Street, George 

Sutherland, Richard K., Lt. Gen 



INDEX OF WITNEbSES 



XV 



I I I I ^ ^ ^ ^^ 

TfH C: f C I I .1 I 
IM -rP CO t^ 



I 1 



(Ml> O 

i-iiOO 

Tt< — I LO 
rt CS TtH 

GO CO 00 

CO '-^ 'i^ 

^ c^ -^ 



t- CO 

03 CO 



oo 

COIM 

I I 

(N 00 

,-hO 

oo 

CO(N 



i 



(NC5(NO 
CO-* '^(M 



OOt^'-i C5 
CC -* ■* (N 
CO ■* (N 



CO 00 
C0 1> 

I ^ 

O I 
O CO 

coo 



0(N 005 
(M CDb-OO 
00 CO CO TJH 
^-H I I 
I I OOO 

o; ^ o 00 

O CD CO ■<*< 

00 00 



(N rH CROC 

t^O0'-i(M 
(N COC^ rfi 

I I I (N 
(N COCO(M 






73 O! 



^ 3 5 .S G 



c3 





tf a 


^ 


;^ 


•-5 


c 
< 




■J 


« 












o 


•^ 


;-i 


k. 


a 




c 


O 


o 












o 


a; 


L^ 


>^ 


i^ 


is 


OJ 


."^ 


03 




Oir-i 


HHh 






O 



o 



tf 



'O 



:p^ 



SO o 

1-5 g O 

t» s ^ 
£S§ 

O O !-. 



' tc o : 

• S 7 c .2 g 

O >' « 3 S 



5 -a •? 



C - -C ^- 

2 ra oj c 2i 

= c G 3 i; 

s .t; .;^ >H 3 



o 
O 

■» - 1> 

£ 03 a; 

fcH O S 



Q 



^ g^pq o 3 

^-£;^ o 2 § 

+^ -^ cs 03 03 03 



-t^ c3 1 



■■^^^ 



0) "^-i -7-1 
I— 1 <U 03 OJ 

o o — 
"So a-^ 

O O Q « 



la 



o a> 



2 a 

w a 

Phcc 



XVI CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Joint 

Congressional 

Committee, 

Nov. 15, 1945. 

to May 31. 

1946 • 


: i : i 1 Is i : : i i i i i i i i ili i 
,;:::: 17 :;::;:: : ; : ; ;^7 : 
1- : ?5 ::::::; : ; : ; ;^s ! 

►-11 r^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111 if^co 1 

;:::: :'^ ::;:::; : : : ; i^"^ : 


Joint 

Committee 

Exiiibit No. 

149 

(Hewitt 

Inquiry, 

May 14 to 

July 11, 1945) 


O CCC0C<liOiii 1 

1 1 1 1 1 1 ^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 GC lO O ■ lO 1 1 1 1 
g TjiiiiiiiO^iCCDiTfiiii 1 

.a 1 1 1 1 1 1 Ci 1 1 1 1 1 1 CD T-H t-. 1 (M 1 1 1 1 

N 00 l>-rf<05i'*iii 1 

iiiiiiCOi COiOiOi->*iii 1 


Joint 
Comn\ittPR 
Exhibit No. 

14S 

. (Clausen 

Investigation, 

Nov. 2:?, 1944, 

to Sept. 12, 

1945) 


Pages 

187-189 
105-106 


Joint 

Ccmmiittee 

Exhibit No. 

147 

(Clarke 

Investigation, 

Kept. 14 to 

16, 1944; July 

13 to Aug. 

4, 1945) 


^ : ; i i ; ; i i i i i 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

146 

(Navy Court 

of Inquiry, 

July 24 to 

Oct. 19, 1944) 


1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lo : 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 iO> 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
g 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

c 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1— 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
^ : ; ; 1 i : 1 ; ; ; ici ; 1 ; : ; ; ; ; ; 

1 1 1 1 1 1 00 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 

111 lO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 


Joint 
Committee 
Exhibit No. 

145 
(Army Pearl 
Harbor Hoard, 

July 20 to 
Oct. 20, 1944) 


Pages 
2722-2744 
312^-3124 

1980^2007" 
245G-247S 

134.5^1381" 

910-931 
3663-3665 

3677-3683" 

3750-3773 
3357-3586" 

2580a-2596 


Joint 

Committee 

Exhibit No. 

144 

(Hart In(iuiry, 

Feb. 12 to 
Juno 15. 1944) 


Pages 
""279-288" 

379^382 


Joint 

Committee 

E.vliibit No. 

143 

(Rolierts 

Commission, 

Dee. 1«, 1941, 

toJan. 23, 1942) 


Pages 
1311-1329 
496-499 
1830-1842 

1334-1346" 

""247-259" 

1525-1538" 
1683-1705 


S 

p 

1 


Wells, B. H., Maj. Gen 

West, Melbourne IE, Lt. Col 

Whaling, William J., Lt. Col 

White, William R., Brig. Gen 

Wichiser, Rea 1^ 

Wilke, Weslie T 

Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm 

Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen 

Wilson, Erie M., Col 

Wimer, Benjamin R., Col 

Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm 

Wong, Ahoon 11 . _. 

Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR 

Woodward, Farnslcy C, Lt. (jg), USN. 

Woolley, Ralph E 

Wright, Wesley A., Comdr 

Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col 

York, Yec Kam 

Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN 

Zucca, Emil Lawrence 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 603 



1976] CONTENTS 



FRIDAY, JANUARY 2, 1942 

Testimony of — Page ' 
Vice Admiral William Frederick Halsey, United States Navy, Com- 
manding Aircraft Battle Force, Pacific Fleet . 978 

Lieutenant Commander Samuel Glenn Fuqua, Damage Control Officer, 

United States Navy 1025 

Ensign Nile Everett Ball,, Commanding Officer, Motor Torpedo Boat 

Squadron One, United States Naval Reserve 1033 

Captain Irving Hall Maytield, United States Navy, Intelligence Officer, 

14th Naval District 1039 

Lieutenant Commander Edw^in Thomas Layton, United States Navy 1068 

Commander Joseph John Rochefort, United States Navy, Commander- 
in-Chief Combat Intelligence 1096 



^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



79716 — 46— Ex. 143, vol. 2- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 605 



V977] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE 
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII 



FRIDAY, JANUARY 2, 1942 

Lounge of the Wardroom, 
Submarine Squadron Four, 
United States Submarine Base, 

Pearl Harbor, T. E. 

The Commission reconvened at 9 : 30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to 
adjournment on Wednesday, December 31, 1941, Associate Justice 
Owen J. Koberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding. 

PRESENT 

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, 
Chairman ; 

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired. 

Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired ; 

Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired; 

Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States x\.rmy ; 

Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission ; 

Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal 
Advisor to the Commission ; 

Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission. 

proceedings 

Colonel Brown. Admiral Halsey, Damage Control Officer of the 
ARIZONA, is here. 

The Chairman. All right. Bring Admiral Halsey in. 
Good morning. Admiral. Will you be sworn? 

[P75] TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM FREDERICK 
HALSEY, UNITED STATES NAVY, COMMANDING AIRCRAFT 
BATTLE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Be seated, sir, and give your name to the reporter. 

I would like Commander Covington, please. 

Admiral Halsey. William Frederick Halsey, Vice Admiral, United 
States Navy, Commanding Aircraft Battle Force, Pacific Fleet. 

The Chairman. Commander Covington, I would like you to get, 
if you will, please, the record of the receipt of the message from the 
Chief of Naval Operations which he forwarded on the 24th of Novem- 
ber. 



606 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Covington. You want the message itself? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Commander Covington. 24th ? That is not the 27th, Mr. Justice ? 

The Chairman. 24. I want to know if there is one here. 

Were you in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7, Admiral? 

Admiral Halsey. I was not, sir. 

The Chairman. You were with a task force? 

Admiral Halsey. I was. 

The Chairman. On the high seas? 

Admiral Halsey. I was, sir. 

The Chairman. Admiral Kimmel has suggested that you be called 
as a witness here, and I am not sure what he had in mind with respect 
to your testimony. Have you anything in mind, sir, that could be 
helpful to this Commission in connection with this air-raid attack? 

Admiral Halsey. Possibly my experience as a sea and Naval officer 
at sea at the time, what we knew and didn't know, principally, and 
what happened. 

The Chairman. Well, where was your force at the moment, 
[9T9] on that morning? 

Admiral Halsey. At the time of the attack we were some 150 to 175 
miles to the westward, southward and westward. 

The Chairman. Was either the MINNEAPOLIS or the INDIAN- 
APOLIS a ship of your fleet? 

Admiral Halsey. They were neither ship in mv task force. I had 
Task Force 8, and the INDIANAPOLIS was iii task force— I have 
forgotten the number of it, they were changing so fast; and the 
MINNEAPOLIS I believe was acting independently to the southward 
of Oahu. 

The Chairman. Had you any intimation of hostile ships on the 
surface or hostile planes in the air on that morning? I mean on your 
own fleet and before you heard from Oahu. 

Admiral Halsey. I had no intimation. One half hour before sun- 
rise we flew off a scouting flight to cover 60 degrees from either bow 
of my force, to scout to a distance of 150 miles and then to land at 
Ford Island. We received no reports from any scout of any hostile 
ships or aircraft during this flight. I had been on the bridge from 
approximately 5 : 30 in the morning until about 8, when I went down 
below to my cabin to get breakfast. At this time and for ten days 
preceding a strict radio silence had been enjoined on my force. 

The Chairman. Do you know why? 

Admiral Halsey. Why? Oh, yes. Do you want the answer to 
that? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Halsey. The reason for this radio silence — I suppose I 
can talk freely here? 

The Chairman. Yes, absolutely. 

Admiral Halsey. The reason for this radio silence is the fact that 
we had gone to the vicinity of Wake Ishind to land 12 jNIarine fighting 
planes, and there had been a warning from the Chief of Naval Opera- 
tions that the conversations with the Japanese representatives were 
about to break down, and to be prepared for eventualities. It was 
suggested at that time that 1980] 50 Army pursuit planes be 
placed on Wake and 50 pursuit be placed on Midway. There was a 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 607 

conference in Admiral Kimmel's office, I believe on the 27th — I am sure 
the 27th of November, attended by General Short, General Martin, his 
chief of staff, Vice Admiral Brown, Kear Admiral Bellinger, and 
many members of Admiral KimmeFs staff, — I don't suppose you want 
them emunerated? 

The Chairman. No. 

Admiral Halsey. And myself. 

The Chairman. We have been informed that that conference had to 
do with conditions on Wake and Midw^ay, relief of Marines, and what 
not. 

Admiral Halsey, You don't want me to go into this ? 

General McCoy. I would like to hear the Admiral give his version 
of that. 

The Chairman. Yes, we would like to have your version of it. 

Admiral Halsey. For various reasons it was decided not to send 
the Army pursuit ships to these two islands at that time. There are 
many things that have happened since then, and I am not quite sure of 
my memory on the thing, but one of the principal reasons advanced was 
that we could land the Army pursuit ships on Wake and Midway, but 
there would be no way of getting them off because they could not land 
on board a carrier. 

Another reason was the lack of experienced — and this is entirely 
from memory, I mean — the lack of experienced pilots to handle the 
ships over water, which they had not been used to doing. There was 
much discussion on this point, and it was finally agreed that if we did 
have to meet the Japanese it would be better to meet them with the 
best available airplanes we had. The Army pursuit is a much better 
fighting plane than the Navy fighters because it is not necessary to 
sacrifice weight in these planes in beefing them up for landings on 
carriers. 

[981] It was finally decided that Marine planes should be sent 
to Wake, and the U. S. S. WRIGHT was dispatched about the 25th 
or 26th of November with spares, a skeleton of ground crew, and vari- 
ous equipment and ammunition. After landing this ammunition — 
after landing this equipment — the personnel and equipment, the 
WRIGHT was supposed to pick up— the WRIGHT was supposed to 
return to Midway and land other equipment at that point. There was 
no intention at that time to land any fighting planes at Midway, the 
principal reason being that there were only six or possibly a few more 
Marine fighting planes remaining. 

However, there was a squadron of Marine scouting and bombing 
planes that could make the flight from Oahu to Midway, and they 
were prepared — they were instructed to make all preliminary flights 
necessary for a long-distance flight. This had to be done in a secretive 
manner, and they were told that they were being tested for long-dis- 
tance flights. 

The day before, the 27th of November, my task force leaving on 
the 28th, the lieutenant colonel commanding the Marine air group. 
Colonel Larkin, was instructed by me to have 12 planes ready to join 
the ENTERPRISE at sea. Thev were told to proceed from Ewa 
Field to Fordlsland and to report to the ENTERPRISE group com- 
mander. I told Colonel Larkin to tell the commander of this group 



608 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of 12 planes that we had some special experimental work we wanted 
to accomplish and that they would be on board for possibly two nights. 
We took two Army P-40 planes to sea with us when we left Pearl 
Harbor. These planes were flown off the carrier so as to make sure 
that it could be done. We found out afterwards that it had already 
been done on another carrier on the East Coast. 

General McCoy. Were these two-engine planes? 

Adimral Halsey. All single-engine planes, sir. 

We proceeded — on leaving port I directed all ships to assume a con- 
dition of readiness for instant combat : bring ammunition up to the 
guns, keep it there. I directed the war heads on the torpedoes, the 
aviation torpedoes 

[982] General McCoy. What kind of torpedoes ? 

Admiral Halsey. Aviation torpedoes, aerial torpedo — they were 
just plain torpedoes but adapted for the use on planes. (Continu- 
ing) — be placed on the torpedoes, that bombs be broken out and 
brought up where they could be immediately brought to the flight 
deck, and that fuses be ready to be placed in immediately. I had all 
machine guns on the planes loaded — had all the machine-gun ammu- 
nition in the planes in a fully loaded condition. We daily scouted 
200 miles ahead of the ship. 

On arrival in the vicinity of Wake, and still to keep radio silence, 
there was a prearranged time for the flight of the Marine planes to 
take off so they would land at Wake, as I remember it, at 9 : 30 in the 
morning. 

General McCoy. What date was that? 

Admiral Halsey. That was on the — let's see. The 28th was a Fri- 
day, and this was on the following Wednesday. Third of December 
this time; where we were, the 4th of December, across the date line. 

We put off an early morning scouting flight that morning to cover 
our advance, but with instructions not to approach within anti-air- 
craft fire of Wake. The 12 Marine planes were flown off, and six 
scouting planes were detailed to escort them into Wake. The trip to 
Wake of these planes was made without incident. On completion 
of this flight we retraced our steps to Pearl Harbor, carrying out the 
same daily scouting flights. During this cruise it was necessary to 
refuel all the destroyers once on the way out and four destroyers on 
the way back. 

As I sat down to breakfast that morning they brought me in a dis- 
patch which said, "Air raid. This is not a drill." I have forgotten 
the exact wording of the dispatch, but "Air raid. This is not a drill." 
My first reaction was, a very strong one 

[983] Admiral Standley. From whom was tliat dispatch? 

Admiral Halsey. I beg your pardon? 

Admiral Standley. From whom was that dispatch ? 

Admiral Halsey. From the Commander-in-Chief. 

[984] My first reaction to this despatch was that my planes were 
being fired on. By a coincidence, my planes were due to arrive at 
Pearl Harbor just at the time the first attack took place. It took me 
a matter of minutes to realize that this was not the case, and I was 
very much perturbed in that I was afraid tliat my planes were being 
shot at, as we still maintained the radio silence. 

However, there were lanes of approach that our people knew about 
and I felt sure they would be recognized in coming in. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 609 

Immediately I found it was business, we armed our remaining scout- 
ing; and bombing planes, which amounted to fifteen, I believe, with 
1,000 pound bombs, and we placed the torpedoes on the eighteen avail- 
able torpedo planes. 

We hoped we would receive some information as to the whereabouts 
of the enemy carriers. At this time we were close aboard or very 
close aboard Kaula Rock, which is just to the southward of Niihau. 

We received various messages, most of which were confusing, in 
regard to the possible whereabouts of enemy carriers, and other mes- 
sages of no value of any sort. We decided there was no information. 

There was a possibility of these carriers being to the northward 
and westward of Kauai. I then directed commander of cruiser divi- 
sion 5, who was in my task force and had three cruisers, to launch six 
planes and to scout that area and then return his planes to Pearl 
Harbor. 

During this flight one plane of cruiser division 5 said he had con- 
tacted with enemy fighter. This report was never forwarded to us by 
voice or key, and the lad made his first report when he arrived at Pearl 
Harbor and reported to commander patrol wing 2, Admiral Bellinger. 

If he did have contact with an enemy plane, it was [^SS] 
probable that this was the Japanese plane that landed on Niihau. 

Later in the day I requested that my planes at Pearl be returned 
to the ship, and stated that I was depending on the forces in Pearl for 
information, and I was holding my striking group for action. 

I was then informed that a search — I have forgotten the area of this 
search of doubtful utility — had been made, and requesting me to make 
a search. 

Before this we had received a message from the MINNEAPOLIS 
stating an enemy carrier or enemy carriers were in the sail area. This 
Avas followed up shortly afterwards by a message stating — I think it 
was specifically — that there were two enemy carriers in the southwest- 
ern half of sail 1. 

Admiral Standley. Sail 1 being where? 

Admi]-al Halset. Being southward of Oahu. 

The Chairman. And sail 2 being where ? 

Admiral Halsey. They are in the area southward. I don't know if 
that is on the chart, but they are just the operating areas. 

The Chairman. Both of them are to the southward ? 

Admiral Halsey. Both of them are to the southward of Oahu. 

General McCoy. This was about what time. Admiral ? 

Admiral Halsey. This was about one or two o'clock in the after- 
noon. 

Upon receiving this message we launched fifteen scouting bombers 
with 1,000 bombs and a full load of gas — 320 gallons. 

They had hardly formed up over the ship when another message 
came from the MINNEAPOLIS that there are no enemy carriers in 
sight of the MINNEAPOLIS. 

The Chairman. And the MINNEAPOLIS was where at that time? 

Admiral Halsey. ?t was to the southward of Oahu. It was 
[98{J] not working with me; it was working independently. 

Admiral Reeves. Did the MINNEAPOLIS give her position at 
the time she sent the message ? 

Admiral Halsey. I don't remember, Admiral, whether she did or 
not, but we knew in general where she was and we were prepared 



610 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to solid these out because the sail area is not very large and we could 
cover that area with the fifteen planes. 

Admiral Reeves. You knew the operating area that she was in? 

Admiral Halsey. Yes. 

We then held these planes overhead until the message arrived from 
the Commander-in-Chief stating that scouting around Oahu had not 
been adequately covered, and giving the areas that had been covered. 

We placed these on a chart and picked out what we thought would 
be a good area to cover with the planes we had. We then directed 
a search of 200 miles with these fifteen planes in that sector. 

The Chairman, What was that sector, sir ? What direction was it ? 

Admiral Halsey. It was to the southward and westward, sir. I 
might add here that with the very meager information we had, it in- 
dicated to us that the enemy was probably to the southward and west- 
ward. Apparently I was just 180 degrees wrong. 

These planes scouted this area, and we finally received a report from 
one plane of an enemy carrier and cruiser in latitude such and such 
and longitude such and such. 

At this time it was a quarter past to half past four. We launched 
our eighteen torpedo planes and four scouting bombing planes with 
smoke tanks and six fighting planes as a combat patrol over this at- 
tacking force. 

A further report from the plane making the so-called [^^T"] 
contact with the carrier said he was being chased by an enemy fighter 
and then he went off the air. This attacking group that we launched 
was launched just before dusk. I had hoped that we would be able to 
reach and report the position of this carrier before dark, and they 
did ; but unfortunately there was nothing there. They searched back 
and forth and found nothing. 

In the meantime, Eear Admiral Draemal had joined me with var- 
ious ships that had gotten out of Pearl Harbor after the attack. I 
directed him to take charge with all his force, and in addition my 
three cruisers and all destroyers except two that we kept with the 
carrier, to form a scouting line and search the area where the reported 
contact had been made. He joined me the next morning at daylight. 

I held the carrier clear of this position, ready to attack if anything 
was discovered. 

We directed this attacking force to land at Ford Island upon com- 
pletion of their duty. Unfortunately most of them did not do this. 
The 18 torpedo planes and the 4 smokers returned to the vicinity of 
the ship, and we returned them on board on a very dark night with- 
out accident. 

The 6 fighters came into Ford Island, and 4 of them were shot down 
by their own anti-aircraft. 

General McNarney. What time was that. Admiral? 

Admiral Halsey. What time ? 

General McNarney. What time of the day was that? 

Admiral Halsey. That they landed on board ? 

General McNarney. No, that they were shift down. 

Admiral Halsey. Somewhere between 7 : 30 and 9. I do not have 
the exact time. 

I might say that when the first attack occurred there was no more 
radio silence, and the air was full of messages. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 611 

I had no information at this time of what had been the results of 
the JajDanese attack on Pearl Harbor. I reported [.9S8] that 

I was sending in this flight and requested that they be not fired on 
when they landed. 

The first information I had of the seriousness of the situation at 
Pearl Harbor was, I believe, the next morning when Admiral Draemal 
sent me a signal, "Believe Admiral Anderson's force immobilized." 

Shortly after that our planes were landed on board and we got 
the first story of what had actually happened here. 

The Chairman. Where were you lying then, sir ? 

Admiral Halsey, At that time we were about 70 miles to the 
southward of Pearl. 

I might add that the lad who reported the contact with the 
enemy was very badly out on his navigation. He ended up in Kaneohe 
after dark that night. On questioning him when he returned on board 
the next day, I am still very much in doubt as to' what he actually saw 
at that time ; certainly no carrier or cruiser. On questioning him about 
the fighting planes he mentioned several planes, twin-engine, and they 
iiiust have been Army A-20's. 

We lost some planes and lives in this first flight to Ford Island this 
morning. 

Do you care for the numbers ? 

General McNarney. Yes. 

Admiral Halsey. We lost that early morning 

Admiral Reeves. Which morning was that ? 

Admiral Halsey. That was the morning of the 7th of December. 
That was before then. 

We launched the command air group and 17 scouting bombing 
planes. 

The losses in the bombing and scouting were : 6-B-3, pilot, passen- 
ger, plane, missing. 

6-B-9, pilot and passenger injured, plane at Naval Air Station. 
Pearl, for repair. 

1989] Scout squadron 6. 6-S-3. Pilot and passenger killed; 
plane crashed. 

6-S-15. Pilot, passenger, and plane missing. 

6-S-9. Pilot parachuted; broken leg. Passenger killed, plane 
crashed. 

6-S-4. Pilot parachuted. No injury. Passenger killed by gunfire 
Plane crashed. 

I might say here that this plane shot away all its ammunition from 
the rear gun. The pilot said he shot one Japanese plane, going down 
in flames. His passenger was reported being wounded. He lost con- 
trol of the plane at 1,000 feet and jumped, and he was shot at on the 
way clown in his parachute, and he landed in the road over in Ewa. He 
made his way to Pearl Harbor without telling anybody his experi- 
ences, and he immediately jumped in another plane and went out on a 
200 mile scouting flight. 

6-S-14. Pilot, minor injuries, Passenger, hospitalized, wounded. 
Plane crashed. 

6-S-16. Pilot and passenger, no injuries. Plane crashed Burns 
Field Kauai. 

This man saw a Japanese plane and immediatelj^ dove on him and 
then landed on Kauai and was hospitalized there for one or two days. 



612 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

He then requested to make a reconnaissance flight, which he did, and 
he came in and landed, but they had constructions at the field and he 
got too close to one and smashed his plane, not seriously. 

Dusk Attack Group : 

6-F-l. Pilot died, hospital. Plane crashed and burned. 

6-F-4. Pilot parachuted to safety. Plane crashed. 

(3_F-15. Pilot killed. Plane crashed. 

6-F-18. Pilot parachuted, died. Plane crashed. 

3_F-15. Pilot uninjured. Plane ai> Naval Air Station, Pearl, for 
repair. She had 28 or 30 bullet holes in her. 

[990] The summary is: 4 pilots killed and 2 pilots missmg; 3 
passengers killed and 2 passengers missing ; 2 planes missing and 9 
planes crashed, some of which are capable and have since been re- 
paired. 

General McNarney. Did the firing on our planes take place after 

dark? 

Admiral Halsey : Yes. This is hearsay, and I have not checked it, 
but they came in with lights on and everybody having been notified, 
and the communications were that they were to get through, to come 
into the field. They made one mistake, which is a perfectly normal 
one. Instead of landing when they first shot at the field, they circled, 
and then somebody with an itching trigger finger turned loose, and 
then everybody turned loose. 

This lad that finally landed his plane with 28 or 30 bullet holes 
in her went to Ewa field and then went right over the top of the trees 
and came in at full speed and landed. 

General MoNarney. Did they attempt to land at Ford Island or 
at Ewa ? 

Admiral Halsey. Ford Island. 

General McNarney. Do you happen to know whether the first re- 
port from the MINNEAPOLIS as to the information of the enemy 
forces in the sail area was actually sent by the MINNEAPOLIS or 
was it a spurious report? 

Admiral Halsey. I have asked for a check of those reports but 
to date I have not gotten one. It is a very difficult thing — where we 
are out and she is in — to get these things ; but I have asked for those 
but we have not gotten them. 

My presumption is that this report was an actual report, but that 
it was an error in coding. 

I might add another thing. The Commander-in-Chief directed 
me to take charge of the force at sea at this time, as Vice Admiral 
Brown's task force was close aboard or fairly [991] close 
aboard Midway, preparing to land some marine planes. Admiral 
Brown himself in the INDIANAPOLIS was down by Johnston Island. 

Again, with the very meager information I had, I still thought that 
enemy carriers were to the southward and westward. I picked out 
an arbitrary spot to the southward and westward of Barbers Point 
at about 200 miles, and directed Admiral Brown's task force to inter- 
cept and destroy enemy carriers probably running to the bases in 
the Marshall Islands. 

They then asked the Commander-in-Chief whether this canceled 
the order for landing the marine planes at Midway. I took it upon 
myself to reply that the order was canceled and to carry out my 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 613 

order. I sent this for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, 
and he confirmed my action. Again, I was wrong 180 degrees in 
my guess. 

General McNarney. Admiral, in your practice maneuvers in the 
operating area, did you ever operate to the northward ? 

Admiral Halsey. Normally, no. All operating areas were to the 
southward of Oahu, the principal reason being the necessity of tar- 
gets and various things which were gotten at more easily to the south- 
ward area, and the weather is usually much better for handling the 
targets in that area than it is to the northward, but we have done 
considerable operations to the northward. 

Admiral Standley. You have done none to the northward ? 

Admiral Halsey. We have done considerable operations to the 
northward, but the normal training periods are to the southward. 

General McNaeney. Do you think it had any effect on the actual 
direction of the attack ? 

Admiral Halsey. Undoubtedly, sir. 

General McNarney. Admiral, do you consider the carrier primarily 
an offensive or defensive weapon? 

[99'21 Admiral Halsey. An offensive. 

General McNarney. Would you give the Commission a very brief 
statement as to your ideas as to the strategy of the operations of a car- 
rier force ? 

Admiral Halsey. What is that? 

General McNarney. Of a carrier force. 

Admiral Halsey. I did not get the first part of the question. 

General McNarney. I say the strategy of carrier operations. 

Admiral Halsey. I think General Forrest's description is the best 
thing I know, to get the other fellow with everything you have and as 
fast as you can and to dump it on liim. You have to scout out and find 
it, and as soon as you find it, send everything you can at him and hit 
him with it. 

General McNarney. As a commander of a task force, you would 
have no hesitancy in using your carrier as an offensive weapon? 

Admiral Hx\lsey. I would consider myself to be a very poor speci- 
men of a naval officer if I thought in any other direction. 

General McNarney. You do not believe a carrier is designed pri- 
marily to protect the heavy units of the fleet ? 

Admiral Halsey. No, sir, decidedly not. 

General McNarney. Do you think the Japanese have the same idea 
as to carrier operations ? 

Admiral Halsey. The Japanese from the operations here showed 
that they plainly did not. 

The Chairman. They do not? 

Admiral Halsey. That they do not have. 

General McNarney. Have you ever considered the possibility of 
a carrier raid on Pearl Harbor ? 

Admiral Halsey. Yes. 

[9dS] General McNarney. And what were your ideas in the 
matter ? 

Admiral Halsey. I did not think they would do it. 

General McNarney. And why not ? 



614 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Halsey. I thought it would be taking too much of a chance 
for it. I did not think they would do it. I thought they would be 
fully occupied out in the East. I thought their equipment, accord- 
ing to the reports we had, was below what it turned out to be, and I 
thought the number of planes they had definitely were very much 
below what they turned out to be. I did not think they would take the 
chance. I thought they would try some underhand method of attack, 
such as they did, but 1 thought it would be submarines. However, 
the whole of the security orders around here were written on the 
strength of the possibility of such an attack. 

General McNarney. When did the ENTERPKISE return to Pearl 
Harbor ? 

Admiral Halsey. About five o'clock in the afternoon of the 8th 
8th of December. 

General McNarney. By whose direction? 

Admiral Halsey. The Commander-in-Chief's. 

General McNarney. How soon could it have been prepared to take 
to sea again ? 

Admiral Halsey. We left at four o'clock the next morning. 

General McNarney. You were fully fueled and ready to operate? 

Admiral Halsey. We were ready to operate but we were not fully 
fueled. We had 40 to 50% of fuel on board. Outside of that we were 
practically ready to operate, and remain out for one week. 

General McNarney. How soon after the afternoon of December 
8th could you have prepared a task force for operations in the vicinity 
of Wake? 

Admiral Halsey. As soon as we could have gotten fuel [^9941 
on board. 

General McNarney. What would your guess be as to that? 

Admiral Halsey. To have my task force left here, three cruisers, 
nine destroyers, and the ENTERPRISE, all completely fueled with 
the exception of the ENTERPRISE— and the ENTERPRISE could 
have been completely fueled within and left by eight o'clock that 
morning. 

General McNarney. Would it have been necessary to take a tanker 
with you? That would be for operations in the vicinity of Wake? 

Admiral Halsey. Depending on how long you were going to re- 
main there. On my first trip to wake we had no tanker and we were 
at sea from the 28th of November until the 8th of December. 

General McNarney. I have no further questions for the moment. 

The Chairman. Admiral Reeves? 

Admiral Reeves. No, I have nothing. 

The Chairman. At the conference of November 27th, Admiral, 
were you shown or apprised of a despatch from the Chief of Naval 
Operations which, among other things, said, "This is a war warning"? 

Admiral Halsey. I don't remember the words, "This is a war warn- 
ing." I Avas shown and had been shown all despatches, and I was kept 
fullv informed at all times of everything that the Commander-in- 
Chief had. 

The Chairman. So if, on the afternoon of November 27th, he re- 
ceived a despatch from the CNO containing that phrase, you prob- 
ablv saw it ? 

Admiral Halsey. Undoubtedlv. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 615 

The Chairman. It raised no thought in your mind of a hostile air 
attack on Pearl Harbor should war break out? 

Admiral Halsey. I was rather busy at that time, sir, thinking of 
what might happen to my own task force on the way [995] to 
Wake and back, and I fully expected that I might be in combat before 
I got back here. 

The Chairman. The Naval Intelligence at that time had indication, 
as you were apprised of, indicating hostile action by Japan far to the 
westward of Hawaii ; is that correct ? 

Admiral Halsey. Not necessarily. The message from the CNO 
led me to believe that something was going to happen, and I was pre- 
pared to take action immediately in case I met any hostile forces on 
my way to or from Wake. 

The Chairman. From your experience, sir, what would you say 
would be the reasonable time to sortie off Pearl Harbor a force which 
included six battleships tied up there and auxiliary vessels which, ac- 
cording to your knowledge, was there on Sunday morning, December 
7, and if you were in command when do you thing you could accomplish 
the sortie ? 

Admiral Halsey. My own craft — and I mean the destroyers and 
so forth — could start to get out almost immediately. The cruisers, I 
should say, would be ready to start within an hour, and the battle- 
ships within two hours. That is, to make the start out. 

When Admiral Reeves was in command he gave us a surprise sortie 
in San Pedro, and I believe that is about the time it took to accomplish 
the sortie, and I believe it took that time and I believe we were out 
in less than two hours. 

The Chairman. Would it have been the practice on such a Sunday 
morning to have steam up on the battleships tied up ? 

Admiral Halsey. It is never the practice in port to have steam up ; 
it is not necessary except for the 

The Chairman. One boiler ? 

Admiral Halsey. Yes. 

The Chairman. Then it would involve the time of getting full 
steam up ? 

Admiral Halsey. Yes. 

[996] The Chairman. That is why it would take something 
like two hours to get moving ? ^ 

Admiral Halsey. A destroyer can get under way with one boiler 
very quickly. They raise steam as she goes out. 

The Chairman. In the event of a hostile air attack, the effort would 
be to sortie the battleships? 

Admiral Halsey. A great deal depends, sir. We might have had 
a very much worse catastrophe here if these vessels had been in the 
process of sortieing when this happened. For instance, my ship, my 
task force had planned to be off Pearl Harbor about seven o'clock in 
the morning, and by the grace of God we had bad weather out there 
that held us up and I could not have gotten in until about four o'clock 
in the afternoon. 

It might have happened that I would be in the middle of the chan- 
nel when this thing happened, and that would have been very serious, 
because we would have been sunk, and then we would have something. 

Admiral Reeves. What is your flatship. Admiral ? 



616 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiial Halsey. The USS ENTERPRISE. 

The Chairman. The USS ENTERPRISE, a carrier. 

Admiral Reeves. In connection with the question of sortieing fol- 
lowing an air attack, yon might run into an even worse submarine 
attack outside the harbor, might you not ? 

Admiral Halsey. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. It is a question of sortieing or not to sortie? 

Admiral Halsey. Yes, except if we have the planes available. 

With respect to the question of submarines, since this thing occurred 
I have had eight different contacts with enemy submarines on the 
surface, none of which had been closed than 30 or 40 miles, but we 
have been able to bomb these people on the surface as they were crash 
diving. 

[9&7] On one occasion the same lad that I described as having 
parachuted out of his plane and being shot at on the way down and 
who jumped in another plane caught a submarine on the surface and 
dove on it, and he was machine gunned all the way down by two 
machine guns on the submarine. When he got down he dropped his 
bomb, a 500-pound bomb, on a four-tenth second; he pulled short 
and came back and he saw the submarine going down again with the 
machine guns still firing. 

Now, whether we hurt them or whether they are just stupid, I 
don't know. 

I believe of the first five contacts we had with any submarines to 
the northward of Oahu that there were three submarines they caught 
in the morning and bombed them and started looking for them in the 
afternoon and caught two of those three on the surface in the 
afternoon. 

On the last trip when we were covering two task forces on the way to 
Jaulit and Wake there was one caught on the surface and bombed. 
About two or three hours later he came up and on the telephone made 
a tremendous fuss. Unfortunately we had nobody on the ship who 
could understand Japanese, but we decided we would look for him 
that afternoon and we sent a scouting expedition out of three planes to 
hunt for him, and they found him again on the surface and bombed 
him the second time and had two good detonations. [998] A 
third bomb was a dud, undoubtedly due to the fact that it was dropped 
from too low an altitude. It takes-r-you have to have a thousand feet 
to drop them. We had another contact. We were not sure whether 
it was a whale or a submarine. This lad dove on him and made a 
direct hit, and there is no question about that, and some of his friends 
w^ere ribbing him about it; he said, "AVell, if it was a whale it was the 
first whale I have ever seen that exhausts through its tail." 

Admiral Reeves. To return, Admiral, to this question of sortie in 
case of a surprise air attack in Pearl Harbor, there are several factors 
to be considered. Of course, dispersal of the ships is advisable, but 
in attempting to disperse battleships moored in Pearl Harbor you 
would have to consider, would you not, the risk of their being sunk 
in the channel getting out, and the added risk of a second attack not 
from airplanes but from submarines after you got out? 

Admiral Halsey. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. So that the decision to sortie after a surprise air 
attack has been made would necessarily have to cover those considera- 
tions, would it not? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 617 

Admiral Halsey. I think very decidedly so, sir. Unless you have a 
long- warning of an air attack, which is highly improbable, I think 
probably one of the worst things you could do w^ould be to attempt to 
sortie your force. 

Admiral Reeves. Yes, that is the point I wanted to bring out. If 
you can sortie deliberately with protection against submarines before 
the air attack strikes you, it is one thing, but to sortie after the air 
attack has been made you would run the risk of this group waiting 
for you outside. 

Admiral Halsey. Yes. 

General McCot. Isn't it possible, however, knowing that submarines 
would probably be waiting for you, to make proper preparations for 
preventing them from doing any harm, and do harm to them rather ? 
For instance, I notice outside the [999] harbor ever since the 
Tth of December they have been keeping a very close patrol of fast sub- 
marine chasers and destroyers and all kinds of craft, so that it would 
lutturally be more dangerous for the enemy than for yourselves, 
wouldn't it? Or couldn't you make it that way if it has not already 
been made ? I would assume that it has already been made perfectly 
safe for our ships to go out, because they have been going in and out 
ever since the attack, with submarines all around here. 

Admiral Reeves. The proper preparation against submarine attack 
on the sortie of a fleet would involve several days of preparation. 
Wlien I sortied the fleet into Pearl Harbor I had 30 submarines out- 
side waiting to attack us. I spent three days and three nights, pa- 
trolling the area outside of Pearl Harbor in relatively shoal water, 
and when the fleet sortied we had fair assurance that it was impossible 
for any submarine to be in this area of shoal water. 

General McCoy. Well, that is the fact now, isn't it? I mean normally 
when at war you have these waters at the entrance of Pearl Harbor 
thoroughly patrolled all the time? 

Admiral Reeves. We were discussing a surprise attack such as this. 

General McCoy. No, but in war time it would be different, wouldn't 
it, than it was, of course? 

Admiral Reeves, Oh, yes. I do not think that a surprise attack in 
war time would have the same surprise elements in it that this thing 
had. 

General McCoy. No. 

The Chairman. Admiral, have you heard anything of a radio signal 
from the MINNEAPOLIS on the morning of December 7 to the effect 
that she had sighted Japanese naval vessels? 

Admiral Halsey. Yes, sir. I reported that in my — (indicating). 
Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That is covered in your testimony. And you think 
that that was probably a mistake ? 

Admiral Halsey. I think it was. My own idea of it in UOOO] 
discussing it with various people was that it was an error in coding. 

The Chairman. An error in coding? 

Admiral Halsey. Instead of saying that there were no vessels in 
sight, they coded it wrong and said there were vessels in sight. 

The Chairman. I see. 

Admiral Halsey. That is purely my own idea of it. 



618 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCoy. Is it not customary in such a code message to repeat 
the "not" or the "no" several times ? 

Admiral Halsey. Not in a code message. 

The Chairman. Do you know anything about the monitoring of the 
radio messages on the island here ? Do you know how many monitoring 
sets are maintained here ? 

Admiral Halsey. No, sir, Ido not. 

The Chairman. Who would be likely to know about that in the 
Navy commands ? 

Admiral Halsey. The communication officer on the CinC's staff. 
I don't exactly understand — I possibly don't understand what you 
mean by "monitoring." 

The Chairman. As I understand it, where radio messages are likely 
to be received from a friendly fleet there are operators who sit and 
work the needle on a dial constantly in order to determine, within the 
sector they are monitoring, the nature of the messages that are coming 
in and endeavor to find the channel on which their own or any other 
message they are interested in is to come in. 

Admiral Halsey. I didn't understand what you meant. My answer 
would be very different, sir. That is done, insofar as the equipment 
is available, on practically every ship in the Navy. 

Admiral Standley. And at every station ? 

Admiral Halsey. Pardon? 

Admiral Standley. And at every station ? 

Admiral Halsey. Arid at every station. 

[1€01'\ The Chairman. It has been reported to me that there 
are but four monitor sets operated, or were prior to December 7, on 
the island, which would mean that each monitor would have to take 
one quarter of the 360 degrees on the dial, or whatever number of 
degrees short-wave messages come in on. Do you know anything 
about that ? 

Admiral Halsey. No, sir. That is, what you are talking about now 
are stations here. That probably would be under Admiral Bloch. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Halsey. And probably they do have — they are very lucky 
if they have a watch in four on that thing and keep it going. That 
means 12 men going day and night. You can't keep them on more 
than about four hours at a time. 

The Chairman. No. 

Admiral Halsey. But I question that. I think probably they may 
have 12 so-called experts, and I think they have a lot more than that, 
strikers and lower-rated men. 

General McCoy. Admiral, have you investigated, or has so far as 
you know the Commander-in-Chief investigated, the unfortunate 
happening to your returning planes to Ford Island and to the Naval 
or to the Marine field ? 

Admiral Halsey. Yes, sir. It has been investigated, and, as I say, 
the only answer is communications breaking down, although Ford 
Island Tower and Ford Island knew it. It Avas very difficult to get 
these communications for the ships scattered around, and I don't know 
if any of the shore batteiies fired or not, but they were all on edge, 
having been through that experience in the morning, and one man 
with an itchy trigger finger turned loose, and everything burst loose. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 619 

General McCoy. Had they received your message that you were 
sendino; the planes to land there? 

Admiral Halsey. Oh, yes. Yes, indeed, that message had been 
received, and there was a — I don't know how many people in the 
Ford Island control tower attempting to get this word [1002] 
around to everybody, so they would not fire on them. 

General McCoy. You speak of having 18 torpedo planes on your 
carrier; the ENTERPRISE, I take it. 

Admiral Halsey. Yes. 

General McCoy. Do you think those torpedo planes are as effec- 
tive as the Japanese planes proved to be ? 

Admiral Halsey. I hope they are a lot better, sir. 

General McCoy. Do they carry as heavy a load ? 

Admiral Halsey. Just as heavy a load, yes. 

General McCoy. What? 

Admiral Halsey. Just as heavy a load, and they are just as good 
planes, and our lads will carry them in just as far. 

Admiral Reeves. You mean the war head's charge, General? 

General McCoy. Yes. 

Admiral Halsey. That is what I interpreted it to mean. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

General McCoy. You speak of having been 180 degrees wrong. 
Did you come by that from elimination ? 

Admiral Halsey. I determined that by the fact that the next day 
or the day after — I have forgotten which — these carriers attacked 
Midway, so that they must have been up to the northward or we would 
have caught them on our search to the southward. Incidentally, I 
could not search with my ships that far because I did not have enough 
fuel left, and I had to conserve that and be ready to go fast if any- 
body was there and get them, and then let somebody tow me in if 
necessary. 

Admiral Standley. May I ask a question ? 

The Chairman. Certainly. 

Admiral Standley. Admiral, concerning this discussion about 
sortie, are you cognizant of the two messages which were sent out, 
one by the Commander-in-Chief and one by Admiral Furlong, direct- 
ing sortie on that morning? 

Admiral Halsey. Directing sortie? 

Admiral Standley. Sortie of the fleet. 

[loos'] Admiral Halsey. No, sir, I am not. 

Admiral Standley. You do not know that those orders were issued ? 

Admiral Halsey, I do not. 

Admiral Standley. Your fleet actually sortied? 

Admiral Halsey. Pardon, sir. 

Admiral Standley. But the fleet, the part of the fleet that was 
able, actually did sortie that morning and during the attack? 

Admiral Halsey. They did. 

Admiral Standley. Is that true ? 

Admiral Halsey. That is true. 

Admiral Standley. You were asked a question in the beginning 
of your statement as to why radio silence. Would you please answer 
that, the reason for radio silence? 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 143, vol. 2 3 



620 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Halsey. Because we were on a very secret mission, to land 
these Marine fighting planes on Wake without \he then possible enemy 
learning of it. I might say, the results — I saw a report the other day 
of what these 12 fighting planes accomplished on Wake, and despite 
the fact that there was no Radar on Wake — it hadn't been landed — 
it was little short of remarkable. 

Admiral Standley. Then, the reason for radio silence was that 
you suspected or you thought it possible that there might be a Jap- 
anese attack? 

Admiral Halsey. Exactly. 

Admiral Standley. Had you in your considerations and your stud- 
ies and your estimates of the situation envisaged a surprise attack by 
the Japanese ? 

Admiral Halsey. In general, yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Why, or from what, did you draw that con- 
clusion ? 

Admiral Halsey. From their action against the Russians in 1904 
at Port Arthur and from the — let's see — their action against the 
Chinese, I felt that they would stab us in the back if and when they 
saw the opportunity. 

Admiral Standley. And you then were in the position and the 
condition to meet any surprise attack that might have been delivered 
on your force? 

Admiral Halsey. I thought we were, sir, very decidedly. 

Admiral Reeves. You were on a complete war footing, in other 
words ? 

Admiral Halsey. Absolutely a war footing, except I was not using 
bombs and torpedoes at that time. I could have gotten my planes 
armed with bombs in less than half an hour and my torpedo planes 
armed in, oh, an hour to an hour and a half. 

Admiral Standley. Admiral, you had sent out a scouting flight 
in the morning of December 7. 

Admiral Halsey. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. What was the purpose of that flight? 

Admiral Halsey. To see that there was no possible enemy — to 
see that there were no possible hostile craft between me and my base. 

Admiral Standley. In other words, it was a protection of your own 
force ? 

Admiral Halsey. It was a protection of my own force, with, of 
course, the full knowledge that I would, if I saw anything, report 
it to high authority, not for action but for information. 

Admiral Standley. Was it known at Ewa Field or at Pearl that 
those planes of that flight were to land at Ewa on the completion of 
their fliijht? 

Admiral Halsey. That is a normal thing, sir, when carriers are re- 
turning, to send their planes in. I Avas nervous about that, but in order 
not to break radio silence I didn't bi-eak it, and there were approach 
lanes, altitudes to come in. and everything else to identify them as 
friendly planes, and people knew where they came in, and I did not 
think there would \J00r5] be any trouble. In fact, I gave it 
hardly a thought until I got the first report of this air raid. Then I 
thought that my planes were suspected of making a raid. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 621 

Admiral Standley. Well, then, observers on the island might have 
anticipated the approach of friendly squadrons or groups of planes 
from almost any direction from the carrier ? 

Admiral Halsey. From almost any direction from a carrier, except 
that there were certain specified lanes in which they had to enter, at 
a certain specified altitude, from a certain distance. 

Admiral Standley. You speak of a number of conflicting messages 
received on the ENTERPRISE that morning, messages which led 
you to believe that the enemy carriers were to the southward. Have 
you made any attempt or has your communication officer made any 
attempt to analyze your messages received, to determine whether or 
not those were real messages or phony messages, messages attempting 
to deceive ? 

Admiral Halsey. The messages I do not think we have made any 
special attempt to analyze, except that we know the messages giving 
so-called radio bearings and the suspected position of the carriers were 
genuine. The other messages that came out about battleships four 
miles south of Barbers Point and sampans flying the American flag 
and coasting up and down the eastern Coast of Oahu fljnng — an Amer- 
ican vessel and American planes and parachute troops landing, and 
describing their uniform and the marks on their sleeve — I just throw 
those into the discard, didn't pay any attention to them. 

Admiral Standley. Then you are certain that various messages 
received were phony messages ? 

Admiral Halsey. I don't know if they were phony or excitable 
messages. 

Admiral Standley. Now, Admiral, how long have you been serv- 
ing in this station? 

Admiral Halsey. In my present position, or how long in the fleet? 

[1006] Admiral Standley. No; the present position in the 
Hawaiian area. 

Admiral Halsey. I have been out here since the fleet originally 
arrived in April, April 30 — I don't want to get twisted up on my years. 
When did I come out here? '39 or '40, I guess. April, 1940. 

Admiral Standley. During your duties, during the time that you 
have been on duty at this station, your present command, have there 
been estimates, various estimates, of the situation made as to possi- 
bilities of attack from enemies in the Pacific ? 

Admiral Halsey. In this way : There has been a planning force, 
which is a very large one, under Admiral Kimmel, that has been work- 
ing up plans for a war in the Pacific. At the time that Admiral 
Kimmel took over command there were security orders about patrols 
of destroyers when we lay at Lahaina Roads, and various boat patrols 
while we were in Pearl Harbor. There was very little done about the 
organization of defenses of Pearl Harbor. He immediately insisted 
that this be gone into and gone into very thoroughly, that the Army 
and the Navy get together, particular!}^ about the air defenses of Pearl. 
He insisted on — there was a total lack or almost a total lack of bombs 
and ammunition in this area. He moved heaven and earth to get this 
ammunition out to Pearl. He said he wanted something started, and 
started right away. That w^as general instructions to everybody. 

On the strength of that I got in touch with General Martin, told 
him what we had. I finally passed it on to Admiral Bellinger, who 



622 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was permaneaitly ashore as commander of Patrol Wing 2, to take 
charge of the Navy defense forces. 

Admiral Standley. Admiral, we know that. 

Admiral Halsey. All right. 

Admiral Standley. What I am trying to get at is this. 

Admiral Halsey. I beg your pardon. 

Admiral Standley. If you don't mind, yes. We know that. 
[1007] We have got that phase of it. What I wanted— I have all 
these things, and various plans— you have war plans in the Pacific, 
have you not ? 

Admiral Halsey. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. And if this were the situation : if war were 
declared, let us say, prior to December 7, if war had been declared then, 
where would you have expected an attack? From which direction 
would you have expected the attack to come if you had made any 
plans ? 

Admiral Halsey. I think that there would have been a very difficult 
decision to — a very difficult conclusion to arrive at, Admiral.' I think 
that a coverage with what we had in the way of Navy patrol planes 
and Army bombers and Army Radar was the iDest thing we could hope 
for. It might have come from any direction in 360 degrees. 

Admiral Standley. Well, let us suppose, Admiral, that we did not 
have adequate force to patrol all areas 360 degrees around Hawaii. 
What sectors would you have considered searching first ? 

Admiral HALSEY.'^The southward and westward first, and to the 
northward. 

Admiral Standley. Why the southward and westward first? 

Admiral Halsey. Just because that is on a line with their Japanese 
possessions, and I know that they are— I believe; I don't know— I 
believe that their carriers are more or less oil hogs, and they have to 
nurse them. 

Admiral Standley. In other words, then, you believe that the at- 
tack would normally come from the mandate islands ? 

Admiral Halsey. Exactly. 

Admiral Standley, And your search would have been in that 
direction ? 

Admiral Halsey. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Would that have any influence in regard to the 
direction in which you searched on the morning of the 7th? 

[1008] Admiral Halsey. Undoubtedly. 

Admiral Standley. Admiral, normally in Pearl Harbor you have 
under your command what vessels? When your force, the force of 
which you are normally in command, is in Pearl Harbor, what vessels 
have you under your command ? 

Admiral Halsey. Previous to the 28th of November we had been 
operating in three task forces out here : Task Force 1, Task Force 2, 
and Task Force 3. I had command of Task Force 2. That consisted 
of three battleships, the NEVADA, OKLAHOMA, and ARIZONA, 
crudiv 5, 

Admiral Standley. Crudiv 5 consists of what ? 

Admiral Halsey. That consists of the NORTHAMPTON, SALT 
LAKE CITY, PENSACOLA, and CHESTER. 

Admiral Standley. Large cruisers? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 623 

Admiral Halsey. Ten thousand-ton heavy cruisers, (Continu- 
ing) — and one to — it was changed — one to two squadrons of de- 
stroyers or mine layers. 

Admiral Standley. Did you say the aircraft carriers? 

Admiral Halsey. Pardon. 

Admiral Standley. Did you say the aircraft carriers? Did you 
have any aircraft carriers ? 

Admiral Halsey. And the ENTERPKISE. 

The Chairman. And the ENTERPRISE. 

Admiral Standley. How many men were normally in that com- 
mand, approximately ? 

Admiral Halsey. Oh, I would say approximately 6500 men. 

Admiral Standley. Probably between six and seven thousand men ? 

Admiral Halsey. Six and seven thousand, yes, sir; that is a very 
rough estimate. 

Admiral Standley. And as commander of that force, Admiral, are 
you familiar with the regulations for liberty of your men in this 
port? 

Admiral Halsey. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. What are those regulations as regards 
[loos'] ^ time? 

Admiral Halsey. Now or then ? 

Admiral Standley. Then. 

Admiral Halsey. The regulations were that the 

Admiral Standley. I mean prior to December 7. 

Admiral Halsey. — men's liberty expired at — the non-rated men's 
liberty expired at — I am a little bit leery of this thing, a little bit 
confused about it now, because I haven't thought about it for a long 
time, but it expired, as I remember it, at 10 o'clock at night or 9 o'clock 
at night. The rated men and chief petty officers — first-class petty 
officers went up to 1 or 2 o'clock in the morning except those men who 
had families residing here, who were allowed to remain ashore 
overnight. 

Admiral Standley. Then, except those men who had families and 
lived here, all men were required to be back aboard ship ? 

Admiral Halsey. Without refreshing my memory I am a little bit 
uncertain about that. I think it may be the chief petty officers had 
overnight liberty if they required — if they wanted it. I am not abso- 
lutely certain on the point- 
Admiral Standley. Who would know positively about it, if you 
know? 

Admiral Halsey. They have it. I can look it up on the records. 
They had it in the Commander-in-Chief's records. 

The Chairman. Would you mind looking it up and simply sub- 
mitting a memorandum? You can send it to the Recorder, at any 
time. 

Admiral Standley. I would like to know absolutely the correct 
statement on the liberty. 

General McCoy. Have those orders been changed since the 7th 
of December? 

Admiral Halsey. Yes, sir. One quarter of the crew is now allowed 
ashore between the hours of 9 in the morning and 5 o'clock in the night, 
provided that all anti-aircraft [1010] batteries can be fully 



624 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

manned, and that has since been changed so that officers and men who 
have bona fide homes may on special request and with special permis- 
sion remain asliore overnight. 

General McCoy. Are the officers obliged to remain aboard ship now, 
or are they given certain liberty? 

Admiral Halset. Those that have families ashore, one quarter of 
them may remain, but they have to be back by 7 o'clock in the morning. 

Admiral Standley. What would be your regulations or standing 
orders in regard to the men aboard for duty? What proportion of 
your creAV and officers, if any, was required to be aboard for duty 
when you were in port yet ? 

Admiral Halsey. Again I would have to refresh my memory on 
that. I think it was 50% had to remain on board. 

Admiral Standley. Would you give us a meroranclum? 

Admiral Halsey. Yes, I will give you a memoraiidum on that, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Were there any special regulations in regard to 
sufficient complement to man the anti-aircraft batteries? 

Admiral Halsey. Not at that time, unless an air-raid warning was 
called. 

Admiral Standley. I would like you to check on that, too, sir. 

General McCoy. Admiral, when you were talking about this con- 
ference with the Army and Navy staffs and commanders, I am not 
sure that you were quite consistent about the dates. 

Admiral Halsey. I may be wrong on that date. I thought it was 
the 27th. It may have been the 26th. It was either the 2'6th or the 
27th. 

General McCoy. You also speak, as I remember — it is not to trip 
you up ; I just want to get the record straight. You spoke of a con- 
ference which you attended, you thought, on the 27th, and that you 
were informed then of a dispatch from the [1011] Navy 
Department ? 

Admiral Halsey. I think I Avould recognize that dispatch if I 
saw it. 

The Chairman. Did 3^ou see this dispatch which was received on 
the 25th, Admiral (indicating) ? 

Admiral Halsey. This one is 24th at 2 : 05. 

The Chairman. It was received the 25th here. 

Admiral Halsey. It was received here the 25th. See, that would 
be 

The Chairman. In the morning. 

Admiral Halsey. 3035 would be 6 : 35 in the morning. 

The Chairman. Yes, 

Admiral Halsey. I think I have seen j;his dispatch. This is not the 
one I referred to and spoke about sending the Army P-40's to Wake 
and Midway, but I am sure I have seen this dispatch, sir. 

The Chairman. And then the dispatch about the Army planes was 
after the other dispatch of the 27th ? 

Admiral Halsey. It was an identical dispatch sent to the Army 
general and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. 

The Chairman. Well, then, that is still another dispatch than the 
one we have. 

Admiral Halsey. That is the one I am referring to. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 625 

The Chairman. That is still another that we haven't been looking at 
critically. ^ 

Admiral Halsey, It mentioned sending 50 Army pursuits. 

General McCoy. To get back so that we shall be sure to have this 
record straight about this conference, I think you mentioned that 
3'ou thought it was on the 27th, but later on in talking about the 
WRIGHT 

The Chairman. You said she went on the 26th, I think. 

General McCoy. You said she went on before that date. 

Admiral Halsey. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. So I just want you to clear up that little [lOM] 
inconsistency in the record. 

Admiral Halsey. It is an inconsistency — inconsistent testimony on 
my part ; there is no inconsistency in the acts we were doing for some 
ten days or two weeks or more previous to this time. The Commander- 
in-Chief had decided that he had to increase defenses of Wake and 
Midway. The only air that he had control of that he could put out 
there were either carrier planes or Marine planes. He had given 
orders through me to work up skeleton crews — ground crews — for both 
places, to take such accessories and spare parts as we had available, 
and to get them ready to go on practically instant notice. Sometime 
within a week before the 27th of November he had directed that this 
be carried out. The WRIGHT was then loaded, with this purpose, 
not only for the Marine planes that were going to Wake and Midway 
but also for the patrol planes that were going to base in these two 
places. This was all done a matter of many days before the confer- 
ence of which I spoke. 

General McCoy. And the WRIGHT sailed, as I remember, on 
the 

Admiral Halsey. She sailed, I am sure — What day was Thanksgiv- 
ing? She sailed on Thanksgiving Day. 

Admiral Standley. 27th. 

Admiral Halsey. No, no. It was before that, sir. 

General INIcNarney. 20th, I believe. 

Admiral Halsey. What? 

General McNarney. Thanksgiving was the 20th this year, I believe. 

Mr. Howe. Yes, it was. 

Admiral Halsey. It could have been that soon — well, maybe it was. 
I remember — this is off the record : I remember being in swimming at 
Waikiki Beach. I thought it was Thanksgiving; maybe it was the 
Sunday I was in swimming and I saw the WRIGHT — swimming 
around— sort of steaming out, and I knew where she w^as bound. It 
was some date before I put to sea. 

[1013] General McCoy. So that it was before this conference 
of the 27th? 

Admiral Halsey. The arrangements had been made for it long 
before this conference of the 27th. 

General McCoy. Were you also in command of the task force that 
went out to relieve Wake? 

Admiral Halsey. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Later on? 

Admiral Halsey. The two task forces that went out — the task force 
that went out to relieve Wake was in command of Admiral Fletcher. 



626 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I came in to refuel and followed them out two days later to back 
them up. 

General McCoy. I notice your aircraft carrier here at the dock. 
Is it protected against submarine attack by nets or baffles of any kind ? 

iVdmiral Halsey. We have target rafts all around the ship. 

General McCoy. Was that the case before December 7 ? 

Admiral Halsey. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley, Admiral, in ordinary procedure when a secret 
message is received is it paraphrased before it is circulated or shown to 
people who have a right to see it ? 

Admiral Halsey. Oh, yes, that is — I presume that is always done. 

Admiral Standley. That is? 

Admiral Halsey. I have never looked into that, Admiral, but I am 
quite sure it is always done. 

Admiral Standley. And you received or saw no message in which 
there was a statement that it was a war warning? 

Admiral Halsey. I cannot be sure of that. I think it would have 
made an impression on me if I had seen it, and I do not remember. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

The Chairman. Mr. Reporter, will you note that we shall ask the 
Navy to furnish the paraphrase of this message, and that we return 
now the message itself, through the Recorder's hands. 

[1014] Admiral, will you give the Commission your estimate of 
the air situation here at Pearl Harbor and the defense against air 
attack as it stands today, as to adequacy ? 

Admiral Halsey. I would be very glad to answer that question, 
sir, but I have no first-hand knowledge of what is present. I know in 
general terms what is supposed to be done. I know what my own 
force is supposed to contribute towards that end. I do not know how 
many bombing planes the Army has available, I do not know how 
many pursuit planes the Army has available, and I don't know, except 
within rather wide limitations, the number of patrol planes, which 
don't come under me, that are available. 

The Chairman. Well, now, let me break that down. Let me break 
your answer down. What is your force supposed to contribute to- 
wards anti-aircraft defense of this Island ? 

Admiral Halsey. When my planes are based ashore — and when I 
speak of "my planes" I speak of the 

The Chairman. The carriers. 

Admiral Halsey. — planes on the three carriers. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Halsey. The fighting planes, on an air-raid alarm, pass 
immediately over to the command of the pursuit. They call it the 
pursuit wing? 

General McNarney. Interceptor force now. 

Admiral Halsey. Inter — ? 

General McNarney. Interceptor command now. 

Admiral Halsey. Interceptor. They are passed completely over 
to the interceptor command. A certain number of scouts and bombers 
are made available to chase the enemy out in case he is dropping in, to 
find out where his carriers are, and the remaining planes are to be used 
as a striking group. They are all fully armed when ashore : the tor- 
pedo planes with their torpedoes on board, the scout bombers with the 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 627 

500-pound bomb [1015] on board, and the fighting planes with 
a full load of ammunition. 

The Chairman. I gather that when carriers are in port the planes 
are always based on shore. 

Admiral Halsey. Always. 

The Chairman. You empty the carrier of planes before she docks, 
do you not ? 

Admiral Halsey. Yes. 

The Chairman. I also gather from your answer that none of your 
planes would be patrol planes for distant reconnaisance from land 
bases ? 

Admiral Halsey. No, sir, they would not, except on a minor scale 
in case of necessity ; some of my planes can scout 300 

The Chairman. Two hundred miles? 

Admiral Halsey. Three hundred and fifty. 

The Chairman. Now, Admiral, what is your conception of a proper 
scout reconnaissance for the protection of Pearl Harbor as a routine 
reconnaissance in time of war ? 

Admiral Halsey. A 360-degree search, which would go as far as 
you can cover and still have ammunition on board to hit anything that 
you see on the way out there. 

The Chairman. And get back home. 

Admiral Halsey. And get back home. 

The Chairman. The same day. 

Admiral Halsey. Yes, sir, morning and night. 

The Chairman. And, whatever may be the available planes on this 
island at the moment, you would feel that they were inadequate for 
the purpose unless they could conduct such a 360-degree search to at 
least eight to nine hundred miles from the coast of Oahu every day? 

Admiral Halsey. I would; absolutely inadequate. Of course, the 
planes that we have now in carrying a bomb can not proceed further 
than 700 miles, including the Army B-l7's. 

[1016] The Chairman. That is hardly enough, is it, to be sure? 

Admiral Halsey. No, sir, it is not enough, but it is the best we can do 
with what we've got. 

The Chairman. Perhaps it is unfair to ask you, sir, a hypothetical 
question, but if you had been in command of the defense against air 
attack of this Island and had what you considered an important warn- 
ing of probable impending or possible impending attack, would you 
have been satisfied, if you had the means to do it, with anything less 
than such a search daily? 

Admiral Halsey. No, I would not. I might add that — I think 
I am correct in this statement — at the time of the attack on Pearl 
Harbor the Army bombers were not being used in search. 

The Chairman. You are correct in that, sir ? 

Admiral Halsey. And there was not unity of command at that time. 

The Chairman. Not as it has been established since December 17. 
There was, however, a cooperative agreement that I think would 
have covered the situation. 

Admiral Halsey. I use that expression 

The Chairman, Technically. 

Admiral Halsey. — advisedly, sir. 

The Chairman. Anything, gentlemen ? 



628 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Standley. Well, Admiral, to follow that for a moment, 
under the conditions of training and the conditions of supplying out- 
lying stations, as I presume you are familiar, prior to December 7, do 
you think you would have made any different disposition or would 
there have been any different disposition made if there had been unity 
of command ? 

Admiral Halsey. If I had been in command ? 

Admiral Standley. Yes, or if there had been unity of command. 

Admiral Halsey. Absolutely not, sir. Absolutely not. [1017] 
I think that Admiral Kimmel far exceeded any authority he had 
in making every effort possible, with very inadequate means, of bring- 
ing those outlying islands up to the greatest strength he possibly 
could. 

Admiral Standley. Now, one other question I want to ask you. 
You spoke about the task of following the planes out to locate the 
carrier. 

Admiral Halsey, Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Under whom would those planes operate? 

Admiral Halsey. Under Admiral Bellinger. 

Admiral Standley. Admiral Bellinger ? 

Admiral Halsey. Yes, sir ; as Commander of the Base Air Defense. 

Admiral Standley. From j^our knowledge was any such effort made 
on the morning of the Tth ? 

Admiral Halsey. I have no knowledge of anything that happened 
on the morning of the Tth. I got one report from one of my planes 
that had landed on Hickam Field that the enemy planes had appar- 
ently disappeared to the northward and westward. I had no report 
from any Radars anywhere else, although my, own Radar showed 
activity in that general direction, which I took to be Army and patrol- 
boat planes. We have no recognition signals in any of our planes. 

General McCoy. However, those planes coming in to the two fields 
from your carrier have communications by which they can communi- 
cate with the control officer at each field, haven't they? 

Admiral Halsey. Absolutely, sir. They are on — they were at that 
time on the Luke Field control tower frequency, which is different 
from the other fields around here that I am speaking of. 

General McCoy. Do you know whether they communicated to the 
control officer on their arrival or inunediately before their arrival, 
asking for authority to land ? 

[1018] Admiral Halsey. We do not ask for authority to land 
in the Naval planes, sir. We do not. Up to that time we had not 
been controlling them down to the ground. They come in at certain 
areas — as I say, in certain lanes, certain altitude recognized. They 
come over and land at Luke Field. Sometimes they call up before- 
hand. Under ordinarv peace-time conditions we would have sig- 
naled in to Pearl : "Carrier'group leaving ENTERPRISE for Pearl." 
Under these conditions we made no report and depended upon the 
fact that they were coming in in the recognized lanes at the recognized 
altitudes. 

General McCoy. I understand that you did send a message after 
you heard of the attack. 

Admiral Hasey. It was too late then, sir. Our planes were in here. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 629 

General McCoy. Some of them came in at night, though, I under- 
stand. 

Admiral Halsey. Oh, they — pardon me. I thought you were talk- 
ing ahout the forenoon flight. The night flight, we did report that 
they w^ere all coming in. 

Admiral Standley. Tell him about the Ewa Field. They came in 
from the carrier in the morning, see, at 8 o'clock. The ones that 
landed at night came in down at the seaplane base. 

General McCoy. Yes, but I wanted to make sure that I got it right, 
that he did — as soon as he heard of the attack he did communicate. 

Admiral Halsey. That night flight. 

General McCoy. For these night flights coming in ? 

Admiral Halsey. That night flight, I communicated fully that they 
were coming in. 

General McCoy. Do you know whether your communications officer 
got an acknowledgement of that ? 

Admiral Halsey. Oh, yes. It was fully known by the authorities. 

\^1019'\ Admiral Standley, Has a board of investigation been 
ordered on that? And if so, whom ? 

Admiral Halsey. On what, sir? 

Admiral Standley. On the firing on those planes. 

Admiral Halsey. No, sir, there has been no board of investigation 
ordered on anything around here that I know of so far. I presume 
that they considered that this Commission would cover it. I don't 
know. I might add, we had only been in port two days up until day 
before yesterday since the 28th day of November, so we have had very 
little time for any boards or anything. 

Admiral Standley. In answer to a question you stated that the 
regulations in regard to liberty had been changed since December 7. 

Admiral Halsey. Yes. 

Admiral Standley, Why? 

Admiral Halsey. I presume so that there would be no question of 
not having adequate men on board to man the guns and man the fleet, 
officers and men on board to man the guns and man the fleet at all 
times, and I think that the same regulations would have gone into 
effect anywhere under a wartime condition. 

Admiral Standley. But men are now going on liberty in the morn- 
ing? 

Admiral Halsey. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley, What is the reason for that? Is it not because 
the ships are operating on a strenuous schedule, and this is to provide 
liberty for the men when they come in here ? 

Admiral Halsey. I was just considering that point. I think that 
is the only reason for it, sir. The officers and men, I might add, are 
getting the smallest amount of relaxation, particularly fliers. They 
come in from ten days to twelve days strenuous work out at sea, and 
they immediately [1020^ land ashore, and 50% of them are 
on almost immediate notice, so that they never get away from this 
strain and tension they are under. We are trying now to see if we 
can't possibly take some place uptown and get these lads absolutely 
away from everything and put them up there and let them think of 
something else besides flying and fighting. 



630 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCoy. Isn't this a time of particularly imminent danger, 
however, for this fleet in port ? 

Admiral Halsey. I quite agree, sir, and I quite agree with every- 
thing that we are doing, but at the same time we still have to think 
of the morale of the men, and we can't afford to break them down, 
to be always on their toes, when there is a chance to let them relax. 

Admiral Standi.ey. Isn't that the purpose of a base for a fleet? 

Admiral Halsey. Pardon, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Isn't that one of the purposes of a base for the 
fleet? 

Admiral Halsey. Absolutely. 

Admiral Standley. A place where the ships can come in and let 
the crew relax ? 

Admiral Halsey. Absolutely. 

Admiral Ree^^s. Admiral, I want to ask you two or three questions. 
How far is Midway from Honolulu? 

Admiral Halsey. Roughly 1100 miles. 

Admiral Reeves. I would like to ask you your opinion of the secur- 
ity of Pearl Harbor as a base, and of vessels of the fleet anchored in 
Pearl Harbor. I want to know^ what your view of their security would 
be under these conditions if you had long-range scouts or patrol planes 
based and operating from Midway, also operating from Honolulu, and 
operated daily to a radius of, we will assume, 800 miles from Honolulu 
at dusk; in addition to that patrol, if you had planes scounting from 
Honolulu to a radius of 360 miles at dawn; and in addition to these 
planes you had Radar stations on Oahu operating [lOi^l] 21 
hours a day; and, in addition to those, you had striking forces of air- 
planes based on Oahu. Assuming all that, what is your view of the 
security of Pearl Harbor and of vesels of the fleet anchored in Pearl 
Harbor against an air attack, either surprise or otherwise? What is 
your opinion of the security of Pearl Harbor and the vessels in it 
under those conditions? 

Admiral Halsey. I think under those conditions the vessels in Pearl 
Harbor would be as secure as it is humanly possible to make them. 

Admiral Ree\'es. Do you think they would be as secure as they 
would be if they were operating continuously at sea ? 

Admiral Halsey. From horizontal bombers, there is a small prob- 
ability that they might be more secure at sea. From dive-bombing 
attacks and torpedo-plane attacks I think they would be much more 
secure in Pearl Harbor. 

Admiral Reeves. Considering all the various manners and methods 
by which a fleet is menaced, including submarines, aircraft bombing 
of all sorts, do you think the security of the fleet would be greater in 
Pearl Harbor or at sea ? 

Admiral Halsey. In Pearl Harbor. 

Admiral Reeves. Do you think that the provision of aircraft and the 
setting up of the procedure that I outlined is a practicable one? 

Admiral Halsey. Absolutely, if we can hold Midway. 

Admiral Reeves. Do you thing that this patrol and protection of 
Honolulu, Pearl Harbor, could be effected by planes operating from 
Oahu if Midway were eliminated? 

Admiral Halsey. I do. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 631 

Admiral Reeves. It would be better protected if we bad Midway 
to give us advance warnino;? The difference would be that you would 
require more planes on Oahu to do it than if you based some at 
Midway ? 

Admiral Halsey. Well, I base that, sir, on the fact that [1022] 
the patrol from Midway would give us possibly more advance warn- 
ing than we could get from our patrol here. 

Admiral Reeves. Right. That was what I wanted to bring out. 

General McCoy. With the American Fleet based in Pearl Harbor, 
is not Midway safe from the Japanese ? 

Admiral Halsey. If we can get our fleet out there in time and hit 
what they bring in, it is safe. 

General MoCoy. Isn't that what you would welcome? 

Admiral Halsey. I would welcome it, yes, sir, if I could be out there 
and get them. 

General McCoy. Well, isn't there a task force out in that direction 
all the time ? 

Admiral Halsey. There hasn't been, up to the time that this thing 
happened. Since then we have had task forces out there. As a matter 
of fact, I was telling Admiral Standley yesterday, I sent two, I be- 
lieve, rather unique signals. About 5 o'clock in the afternoon on the 
24th of December I sent a signal to my force, "Merry Christmas," the 
first time I had a chance to get a signal through. About 5 o'clock on 
the following day I sent another signal, "Merry Christmas," repeated 
it when I crossed the date line. 

General McCoy. I flew over the fleet anchorage in the West Indies 
last spring. It was then in Vieques Sound, and I talked to some Naval 
men about that new plan for making Vieques Sound much more shel- 
tered by the building of breakwaters, and so forth, and I was told that 
the new naval base at San Juan, Puerto Rico, was what might be 
called an operating base but that the fleet would never go in there, first, 
because it was too large and, next, because the capital ships couldn't 
go into San Juan, but that it was the ideal situation for a fleet ren- 
dezvous, assuming that Vieques would be made more secure from 
weather by the contemplated breakwaters and that the near-by oper- 
ating base, with the submarine base [1023~\ at the Virgin 
Islands, and so forth, made it an ideal situation. 

Now, isn't that situation pretty much the same here ? Haven't you 
a fleet anchorage over here at Lanai — isn't it? 

The Chairman, Lahaina. 

Admiral Halsey. Lahaina Roads. 

General McCoy, What is it called ? 

Admiral Halsey. Lahaina Roads, 

General McCoy. Lahaina Roads. 

Admiral Halsey. Between Lanai and Maui and Molokai. 

General McCoy. Isn't that the same situation that they have, prac- 
tically, at San Juan, Vieques, there? 

Admiral Halsey. I am not familiar with the Vieques fleet anchor- 
age, never having seen it, but the great trouble with Lahaina Roads 
is, there is no way of protecting the fleet from submarine attack. The 
waters are too deep and the current is too swift for any effective 
mining. Maybe they can come to some sort of a scheme. We are wide 



632 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

open in all directions to submarine attack, and it is a very unsafe 
anchorage at the moment. 

General McCoy. And it cannot be mined ? 

Admiral Halsey. That is, not to any secure position. 

General MoCoy. So far as you know, has that ever been consid- 
ered and careful surveys made on those lines? 

Admiral Halsey. It has, I am quite sure. I personally have never 
been mixed up in it, but I have talked lots about it and heard people 
discuss it, and they have looked into it and they have found out it 
is a very difficult thing to do. As a matter of fact, up until a year ago 
last October the fleet used to use Lahaina Koads as a base. I went 
back to the West Coast or mainland in the middle of October; I 
stayed there until the middle of January, and I came back here. They 
had stopped using Lahaina for that very reason and were basing all 
the ships here in Pearl and keeping the fleet at sea at \102J^\ 
all times. 

The Chairman. Where is Lahaina Koacls, then? 

Admiral Halsey. It is right between Molokai and Maui and Lanai. 

The Chairman. In here (indicating on map). 

[^10251 The Chairman. Any more questions of the Admiral? 

Admiral Standley. No. 

The Chairman. Admiral, clue to the nature of our mission here 
we have asked all witnesses to observe the rule that nothing that 
goes on in this room may be mentioned to anyone outside this room. 

Admiral Halsey. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. We are very greatly indebted to you for your 
testimony. 

Admiral Halsey. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Commander Fuqua. 

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDER SAMUEL GLENN FUQUA, 
DAMAGE CONTROL OFFICER, UNITED STATES NAVY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will 3^011 state your full name and rank. Com- 
mander ? 

Commander Fuqua. Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy, 
First Lieutenant and Damage Control Officer. 

The Chairman. Of the USS ARIZONA? 

Commander Fuqua. Yes, the USS ARIZONA. 

General McNarney. Where were you on the night of December 6 ? 

Commander F\jqua. I was aboard ship, sir. 

General McNarney. Did you stay on board that night? 

Commander Fuqua. Yes, I had head of department duty there 
that night. 

General McNarney. AVill you describe to the Commission your 
duties as damage control officer? 

Commander Fuqua. The damage control officer has to do with the 
watertight integrity of the ship and to keep it afloat in case of dam- 
age in battle. 

General McNarney. What is the size of the detail under [1026] 
control for this purpose ? 

Commander Fuqua. I do not understand the question. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 633 

General McNarnet. How bi^ is the damage control section? Do 
j-ou have a certain number of petty officers and enlisted men in that 
damage section, or do they all have their own duties? 

Commander Fuqua. No, sir. I had a lieutenant who was assistant 
damage control officer, a chief boatswain, a carpenter, and an ensign. 
I had about 85 artificers, ship fitters and maintenance men under my 
direct supervision. 

General McNarney. Do you know how many of those were present 
for duty on the morning of December 7 ? 

Commander Fuqua. To my knowledge they were all present except 
the assistant damage control officer. 

General McNarney. What was the state of the watertight integrity 
at the time of the attack ? 

Commander Fuqua. To the best of my knowledge all watertight 
integrity doors below the third deck were closed. From 1600 until 
eight o'clock the following day the watertight doors below the third 
deck are required to be closed. 

Admiral Standley. What was that answer? 

Connnander Fuqua. From 1600 to eight o'clock the following morn- 
ing, the watertight doors below the third deck are required to be 
closed. 

Admiral Reeves. Could you speak a little louder ? 

Commander Fuqua. Yes. 

General McNarney. Is there any inspection to see whether these 
regulations are carried out ? 

Commander Fuqua. Yes. 

General McNarney. AVas there any inspection made on the evening 
of December 6 ? 

Commander Fuqua. Yes. 

General McNarney. As damage control officer, what instructions if 
any did you give when the attack first started? 

[lO^?] Commander Fuqua. When the attack first started I was 
in the ward room having breakfast. 

Admiral Standley. Could you speak a little louder? 

The Chairman. He was in the ward room. 

Commander Fuqua. I was in the ward room having breakfast. 
There was a short signal on the air raid siren of about one second 
duration. I notified the anti-aircraft control officer, who was in the 
ward room at this time, to man the anti-aircraft batteries. He told 
me that he thought they were just testing the loud speakers. 

Admiral Standley. What is that? 

Commander Fuqua. He thought they were just testing the loud 
speakers, as the loud speaker system had gone out previous to the 
attack. 

I said, "No. That sounds like an air raid alarm to me." 

However, I still thought there was a possibility that someone had 
brushed against the handle on the alarm. 

After the anti-aircraft control officer on duty had left the ward 
room, I proceeded to the telephone in the ward room and telephoned 
to the officer on the deck to pass the word, "Anti-aircraft batteries." 
When I was unable to get him on the phone I proceeded to the port 
side of the quarterdeck. As I came out the port side of the quarter- 
deck there was a plane flew up overhead at a height of 50 feet with 
machine guns firing. I glanced up and I saw it was a Japanese plane. 



634 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Then I proceeded to No. 4 turret to the starboard side of the quarter- 
deck, on the double. 

When I rounded the No. 4 turret I saw the officer of the deck up for- 
ward and reported to him to sound general quarters and pass the 
M'ord 

Admiral Standlet. What is that ? 

Commander Fuqua. I reported to the officer of the deck to sound 
general quarters and pass the word 

[1028] Admiral Reeves. You passed the word to what? 

Commander Fuqua. I passed the word to the officer of the deck to 
sound general quarters and pass the word to set material condition 
ZED as final damage control condition for battle. 

Admiral Reeves. What does ZED mean ? 

Commander Fuqua. Everything is closed up except the necessary 
hatches that have to remain open during battle. About this time I 
heard a plane overhead. I glanced up. I saw a bomb dropping which 
appeared to me was going to land on me or close by. 

The next thing I remember I came to on deck in a position about 
six feet aft the starboard gangway. I got to my feet and looked around 
to see what it was that had knocked me down. Then I saw I was 
lying about six feet from a bomb hole in the deck. This bomb had 
hit the face plate of No. 4 turret, had glanced off that and gone through 
the deck and had exploded in the captain's pantry. 

General McNarney. How many decks down was that? 

Commander Fuqua. It pierced one deck. 

Then I glanced up forward and saw the whole midship a mass of 
flames in that section of the ship. 

Admiral Reeves. What is that? 

Commander Fuqua. A mass of flames. 

Admiral Reeves. A mass of flames ? 

Commander Fuqua. Yes, sir. 

Shall I continue ? 

Admiral Reeves. Yes. 

Commander Fuqua. Then I ran forward to make preparation to 
fight the fire. There I met Major Shapler, United States Marine 
Corps, who had just come down from the after defense station. 

He told me at this time that he observed a bomb go down [1029] 
the stack. As the fire hose were laid out in the quarterdeck in an 
effort to fight the fire, there was no water in any hose. 

At this time, which I judge to be about 0815, the ship had apparently 
broken in two as there was water lying on the deck just abaft of the 
break of the deck at frame 88. 

I then attempted to keep the fire back by dipping water from the 
side in buckets and by the use of COo fire extinguisher. We were able 
to keep the fire from spreading aft until we could pick the wounded 
up off the deck and place them in boats to transfer them to Ford Island. 

General MoNarnet. What was feeding the fire? 

Commander Fuqua. What? 

General McNarney. What was feeding the fire at this time ? 

Commander Fuqua. It was oil all over the ship as far aft as frame 
90 and on the water. 

I would judge about 8 : 15 or 8 : 20 1 saw a tremendous mass of flames, 
the height of 300 feet, rise in the air forward, and shook the ship aft 
as if it would fall apart like a pack of cards. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 635 

It was tlieii I realized that the forward magazine had exploded. 
I then directed that the after magazine be flooded. This was done, 
but the man who flooded the after magazine was not saved. 

Admiral Standlet. What is that? 

Commander Fuqua. He was not saved. He is missing. 

At this time, about 8 : 20, all the guns on the boat deck had ceased 
firing. 

Being that the ship was no longer in a fighting condition, I ordered 
the remaining people in the after turrets to abandon ship. The only 
possible thing that I could see that could be done at this time was to 
transfer the wounded and those burned, who were running out of the 
flames, to Ford Island. 

[lOoO] With the assistance of a rescue boat from the USS 
SOLACE, approximately 100 men who were burned and wounded 
were transferred to Ford Island. After this operation was completed, 
at about 0845, 1 made a thorough search of the after part of the ship, 
which was accessible, for wounded and uninjured personnel. 

About 0845 I directed that the forward lines of the USS VESTAL, 
which vessel was tied up to the port side astern, be cut. This was 
done and I believe the VESTAL cut their own after lines. 

Admiral Standlet. And this vessel drifted clear? 

Commander Fuqua. Drifted clear. 

General McCoy. Was it on fire? 

Commander Fuqua. From the knowledge gained later, the VES- 
TAL did receive two bomb hits, one forward and one aft. As I under- 
stand it, the forward bomb hit started the fire, and the after bomb 
passed clear through the VESTAL without exploding. 

I finally left the ship myself about 0915, and proceeded to the receiv- 
ing barracks at Pearl Harbor to report in. I learned later from the 
battle report of the USS VESTAL that the AEIZONA received one 
torpedo hit and possibly two ; these torpedoes passing under the stern 
of the VESTAL and apparently striking the ARIZONA up about 
frame 35 on the port side. However, this was not possible to verify 
as the entire forward part of the ship was destroyed. 

Admiral Reeves. Was frame 35 up by the forward magazine? 

Commander Fuqua. That is right at the forward magazine. 

General McNaknet. Will you describe to the Commission by what 
means you would keep it afloat if the torpedo hit and your vessel 
started to list? What would your action be as damage control officer? 

Commander Fuqua. The action would depend on the amount of 
[1031] list from it. If the list was such as not to interfere with 
the operation of the guns and the machinery, the list would be removed 
by shifting immediately in the water in order to bring the ship back 
on an even keel. However, if the list was such as to interfere with 
the operation of the gun battery or the machinery, the ship could be 
brought back on an even keel by counter flooding the voids on the oppo- 
site side from the side at which the torpedo struck. That is the 
diagonal position. 

General McNaeney. There was no opportunity or necessity in this 
particular case to take such action ? 

Commander Fuqua. No, sir, there was no opportunity for this. 

General McNarney. Were you the senior officer on board that morn- 
ing? 

79716— 4G— Ex. 143, vol. 2 4 



636 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Fuqua. I was the senior survivor. The captain and 
the admiral were on board. 

General McCoy. Where were they ? 

Commander Fuqua. I would like to add something to that state- 
ment about the captain and the admiral. 

Shortly after I came to on deck, not having seen the admiral or 
the captain and knowing they were on board, I directed that the cap- 
tain's hatch on the starboard side of the quarterdeck be opened. Then 
I sent an officer down to look in the captain's cabin and the admiral's 
cabin to see if they were there. The search revealed that they were not 
there. 

I then inquired from the personnel available at that time if they 
had seen the captain or the admiral. The officer of the deck had gotten 
trapped in the officer of the deck's booth forward on the starboard side 
of the quarterdeck by fire, and had to jump overboard. No one had 
seen the captain or the admiral. 

1^1032'] I learned later from the officer of the deck that he had 
seen the captain proceed to the bridge. This was apparently a little 
before I came to on deck or while I was lying on deck as a result of the 
bomb hit. 

After the fire, which was put out after burning for a period of two 
days amidships, I went on board to search for the bodies. We found 
the admiral's body on the boat deck, or we found a body which I believe 
to be the admiral's body on the boat deck, just at the foot of the flag 
bridge ladder. The captain's body was never found. However, the 
captain's ring and some coat buttons Avere found on the flag bridge. 

Ensign D. Hein, United States Navy, was on the bridge during the 
attack. In some manner he got off the bridge. I discovered him 
about two days after the attack in the United States Naval Hospital 
in Pearl Harbor. In his statement he stated that he saw the captain 
himself and a quartermaster on the bridge. He also stated that the 
quartermaster reported to the captain that there was a bomb hit 
either by or on No. 2 turret. The next thing he reported was that the 
ship was sinking like an earthquake had struck it, and the bridge was 
in flames. He was lying on the deck in front of the wheel, and he 
struggled to his feet and ran off the bridge down the flag bridge to 
the port side and fell onto the boat deck. 

Those are his words : The boat deck was a mass of flames, and the 
men were dying all around. He said that he thought he would lie 
down and die with them. Then he thought that he would go down 
the port side of the quarterdeck and lie down there, which he did. 

In picking up the wounded off the deck aft, he was one of the per- 
sons I apparently put in the boats. 

General McNarnfa'. I have no further questions. 

Commander Fuqua. I might add that in order for the torpedo to 
strike the forward magazine, it has to pierce two voids and two oil 
tanks. 

{1033'] General McNarney. I have another question here. Do 
you think that a bomb could go down the smokestack of a vessel in 
view of the fact that a bomb does not fall straight? 

Commander Fuqua. I could not say, sir. I suppose it is possible, 
but it seems to me improbable. 

General McNarney. Do you have any recollection of the height at 
which these bombs were released? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 637 

Commander Fuqua. I would say between eight and ten thousand 
feet. As I glanced up, when I was going around No. 4 turret, I saw 
these planes — as I remember, there were five — and they were between 
eight and ten thousand feet, I would judge. 

General McCoy. I thought you said one plane was only 50 feet 
above you ? 

Commander Fuqua. I believe that was a torpedo plane which re- 
leased a torpedo and was strafing as it passed over. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Please observe the cau- 
tion and do not discuss what you have testified to here with anyone. 

Commander Fuqua. Yes. 

The Chairman. Ensign Ball. 

TESTIMONY OP ENSIGN NILE EVERETT BALL, COMMANDING OFFI- 
CER, MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRON ONE, UNITED STATES 
NAVAL RESERVE 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. State your full name., 

Ensign Ball. Nile Everett Ball. 

The Chairman. What was your command on the morning of De- 
cember 7, Ensign ? 

Ensign Ball. I was officer of the deck, torpedo boat squadron one. 
We had six boats in the squadron, sir, and they were nested in three 
nests alongside the dock, and we [JOSi] had a barge known 
as YR-20, which is the headquarters of the office and the nests of the 
guns. 

The Chairman. Where were you standing when the attack started? 

Ensign Ball. On the front of the barge. 

The Chairman. On the front of the barge ? 

Ensign Ball. Yes. 

The Chairman. Where were your machine guns ? 

Ensign Ball. Two on the barge and two on each of these oil boats 
alongside the barge. 

The Chairman. What did you do ? 

Ensign Ball. You mean at the time I first noticed the attack? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Ensign Ball. I was standing talking to the chief machinist mate, 
and I noticed the planes coming in over Ford Island and I saw the 
rising sun on them, and it was apparent that it was a Japanese attack, 
but his statement was, "Surely they are not Japanese planes." 

Anyhow, two things happened that convinced me that they were 
not our planes, and that was I noticed the explosion, and then they 
approached and I saw some planes coming in a dive with machine guns 
rattling. Then I gave the order to man the guns. 

The Chairman. How soon did you get your guns into action ? 

Ensign Ball. I would say in about two minutes time. 
■ The Chairman. Your ammunition was in the boxes ? 

Ensign Ball. Yes. 

The Chairman. In the clips for such guns ? 

Ensign Ball. Yes, but there were two steps involved in connection 
with the firing. One of them was, the air compressor had to be 
started — the generator in the engine part — and the air compressor 



638 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

started in to operate the turrets; and [1035] to pick up the 
boxes and put them into machine guns was the next thing. 

The Chairman. Were you able to hit any of these oncoming planes ? 

Ensign Ball. The best I could find out from the men who were not 
actually firing and who had a chance to watch was that they definitely 
saw bullets go into these three planes ; but there was no definite assur- 
ance that we were totally responsible for any one plane. 

The Chairman. What was the caliber of your guns ? 

Ensign Ball, Fifty caliber, sir. 

General McCoy. Were they in easy range ? 

Ensign Ball. They were in easy range, yes. 

The Chairman. Flying low? 

Ensign Ball. Yes. For instance, the one we feel most certain we 
can claim credit for was one of the torpedo planes that approached 
from over the sub base, using this channel to come into the sub base 
as a bowling alley and launch the torpedoes, and they were down 
within 50 feet. 

The Chairman. They were? 

Ensign Ball. Yes. 

The Chairman. Where would this bowling alley end up? 

Ensign Ball. This channel goes into Ford Island just about the 
middle, and you have that row of battleships right here (indicating). 
They would go into them and I could not see how they launched their 
attack from that point, but some officers on the motor torpedo boat 
on the dock, they saw them launch their fish, and they said one they 
hit was the CALIFORNIA and then they would go off, peel off, and 
come back, and then peel off to the right and launch one at the bat- 
tleship aft. 

The Chairman. Any further questions ? 

Admiral Standley. Will you give us as well as you can [1036] 
the sequence of the fighting planes from what you observed and where 
they came from. In other words, tell us the direction of the waves 
and how many there were. Do you have any definite picture of that 
in your mind? 

Ensign Ball. I noticed somewhere in the neighborhood of eight, 
as I remember — six or eight of them. They seemed to be coming in 
from the west, and as they came in over the west, over the drydock 
in which the PENNSYLVANIA was 

The Chairman. Over the PENNSYLVANIA drydock? The float- 
ing dock? 

Ensign Ball. No, sir, not the floating drydock. 

The Chairman. The stationary drydock? 

Ensign Ball. Yes. They came in from that direction as from 
Hickam Field, like they just went over Hickam Field, and it was about 
within a minute or two after that that they started to come down the 
channel here (indicating) . That is this channel right here. 

The Chairman. This channel? 

Ensign Ball. Yes. They would come in this channel and that is 
the bowling alley they used. 

Then within two or three minutes after that they started to peel 
off out of the sun and come out of the sun and conie across the sub 
base over there. 

Admiral Reeves. Could you tell the torpedo planes from the fighters 
or from the dive bombers? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 639 

Ensign Ball. Well, Admiral, unless it is close enough for me to 
see the torpedo. I can usually tell the fighters, but the bigger ones, 
I do not know them by silhouette. 

Admiral Standlet. There was no one approaching from Ford 
Island toward you? 

Ensign Ball. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. And then circling and coming back in that 
direction ? 

[1037] Ensign Ball. The ones I noticed were coming more 
from the north and at a high altitude. Some seemed to come out over 
Ford Island coming from the northwest and they seemed to go to 
the northeast. 

Admiral Standley. They were coming from the northeast and 
going out northwest? Going out toward Ford Island? 

Ensign Ball. They were coming in over Ford Island and then 
going in this direction (indicating). Say this is northwest (indi- 
cating) and they were coming in over Ford Island, because they had 
the hangars there, and then they dropped bombs on the hangars, and 
then they would come into position about over the battleships and 
then they w^ould go over them and get into position to raid again, 
and then they would go off in that direction to the northeast. 

Admiral Standley. The picture was that you saw the planes com- 
ing in over Hickam Field and coming over the PENNSYLVANIA? 

Ensign Ball. Yes, and then they came in this way (indicating) as 
far as the other side of the barracks, coming out of the sun because 
the sun was up in that position (indicating), but when they started 
to come out of the sun, they were high, except the first ones, which 
came down low, the torpedo planes. 

Admiral Standley. Were there distinct waves of them ? 

Ensign Ball. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. What was the difference in time between 
them? 

Ensign Ball. In my opinion — and that would be purely a guess — 
but I would say between the first wave and the second wave there was 
maybe twenty minutes or maybe fifteen minutes, but I do not know, 
because we were busy trying to prepare ourselves. 

Admiral Standley. What is your estimate as to the number 
[1038] of planes engaged in all the waves ? 

Ensign Ball. I could estimate it, but I really do not think it would 
be a good estimation, due to the fact that I was busy and did not have 
time to stay and w^atch the fight, because I had so many things to. 

Admiral Standley. That is all. 

General McCoy. What is your first name? 

Ensign Ball. Nile, sir. 

The Chaieman. Thank you very much. Ensign. 

Admiral Standley. Off the record. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

The Chairman. Do not discuss with anyone what has gone on in this 
room. 

Ensign Ball. No, sir. 

The Chairman. We will adjourn now until 2 o'clock. 

(Thereupon, at 12:45 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 
o'clock p. m. of the same day.) 



640 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
\^1039'\ AFTERNOON SESSION 

The proceedings were resumed at 2 o'clock p. m., at the exxDiration 
of the recess. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN IRVING HALL MAYFIELD, U. S. NAVY, 
DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 14TH NAVAL DISTRICT 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give your full name to the reporter ? 

Captain Mayfield. Irving Hall Mayfield, Captain, United States 
Navy. 

The Chairman. Captain, what was your duty on the morning of 
December 7 last ? 

Captain Mayfield. I was District Intelligence Office, 14:th Naval 
District. 

The Chairman. Did you have your office here or in the City of 
Honolulu ? 

Captain Mayfield. In the City of Honolulu, sir, sixth floor of the 
Alexander Young Hotel. 

The Chairman. I understand that that was in close proximity to 
the Army Intelligence and with the F. B. I. office. 

Captain Mayfield. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. Did those agencies work in harmony with you? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Was there any difficulty about exchange of infor- 
mation at any time between you ? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, your function was anti-sabotage to discover 
Japanese espionage and I suppose any other information of a military 
or naval nature that you could gather in this island ? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

[i6'^6>] The Chairman. Or in these islands. How long had you 
held that office, sir ? 

Captain Mayfield. On the 15th of March, 1941, sir. 

The Chairman. Was there anything that you or your staff dis- 
covered which could in any way indicate the presence oi hostile forces 
in this neighborhood about December 6 or 7 ? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Since the attack on December 7 have you discovered 
any means of communication that the Japanese have from this island ? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. May I qualify that, sir, to say that 
I know they did communicate by the regular channels of the regular 
commercial communication companies. 

Tlie Chairman. Telephone and cable ? 

Captain Mayfield. Telephone. 

The Chairman. Is there a cable to Tokyo ? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir; telephone, cable, and radio. 

The Chairman. And radio. Have the files of those commercial 
companies been opened to you since the declaration of war? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir, but they had not before. 

The Chairman. They had not. I understand. And you had no 
authority under the law to examine them before the attack? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 641 

The Chaieman. And as a result of your investigation of those 
messages have you come to any conclusion as to where the focus or 
center of the Japanese information was on this island ? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You did find some messages from the consulate, 
did you not? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Have they been decoded or translated or interpreted 
since December 7 ? 

[lOP] Captain Mayfield. Not all of them, sir, but practically 
all that were sent or received since the first of December I believe 
have been. 

The Chairman. What do they disclose that is of importance here ? 

Captain Mayfield. They disclosed the consulate general was re- 
ceiving information as to ship movements and reporting it to his home 
government. 

The Chairman. That is to say, when ships were coming into port 
here and when they were going out? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Wliat were in port, and so forth ? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Did he use a code ? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You have been able to break it, have you ? 

Captain Mayfield. Not I personally, sir, but an agency here has. 

The Chairman. Has. You had no information that led you to 
think that there was an offshore signaling system in operation here 
prior to December 7 ? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Did you obtain any information that the cruiser 
MINNEAPOLIS on the morning of December 7 was in contact with 
Japanese ships ? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Have you had any information that a cruiser — I 
should think it would be the MINNEAPOLIS — had her planes en- 
gaged by Japanese planes on the morning of December 7 ? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. May I say there, sir, that such infor- 
mation would not necessarily come to me. That would go to Fleet 
Intelligence. 

The Chairman. Fleet Intelligence. And you do not have anything 
to do with Fleet Intelligence? You are District [^0421 In- 
telligence Officer? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir, I do have a complete exchange of 
necessary or desirable information between myself and Fleet Intel- 
ligence. 

The Chairman. Are there any other questions? 

Admiral Standley. Wouldn't that information. Captain, come to 
the communication officer rather than the intelligence officer? 

Captain Mayfield. Regarding the MINNEAPOLIS, sir? 

Admiral Standi^y. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. If her planes were engaged by enemy planes? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. The communication officer would have a record 
of that, wouldn't he ? 



642 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain MAYnEt,D. Yes, sir, he should have. 

Admiral Standley. Not necessarily, but 

The Chairman. Intelligence? 

Captain Matfield. He would not ordinarily forward it to me. 

The Chairman. Are there any other questions ? 

Admiral Reeves. Did any of the messages which you later obtained 
refer to movement of Japanese men-of-war ? 

Captain Matfield. No, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. To whom were the messages addressed that the 
consulate general sent reporting movements of ships ? 

Captain Matfield. To the best of my recollection, sir, they were 
addressed to Tojo, the minister, in some instances for delivery to the 
Japanese Navy Department. 

Admiral Reeves. They went to Tokyo? 

Captain Matfield. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Were any messages that you have discovered 
inquiries of the consulate general requesting reports or information? 

[104s] Captain Matfield, I believe there was one — I can't be 
positive of this — asking that he make report of movements. 

Admiral Reeves. Movements of what ? 

Captain Matfield. Of American men-of-war. 

Admiral Reeves. Where did that come from ? Do you know ? 

Captain Matfield. To the best of my recollection, it was from 
Tokyo, sir. I have seen so many messages in the last few weeks, sir, 
that it is difficult for me to remember each one. 

Admiral Reeves. What do you know about the fifth column in 
Oahu? 

Captain Matfield. I believe it exists, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. You have no information in regard to the per- 
sonnel in the fifth column ? 

Captain Matfield. Not definite information, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Did you have a list of the individuals that were 
suspect ? 

Captain Matfield. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Did you have anything definite in regard to any 
of them ? 

Captain Matfield. Nothing conclusive. The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and District Intelligence — Naval District Intelligence 
organization — were of the opinion that the so-called consular agents 
were perhaps a fundamental part of the organization. 

Admiral Reeves. Were any of the suspect individuals that you had 
on your list American citizens ? 

Captain Matfield. I think they were, sir. I would hesitate to give 
a yes or no answer. 

Admiral Standlet. You mean the Japanese citizens or 

Admiral Reeves. Yes, I mean American. 

Captain Matfield. Yes, I understand what you meant. 

Admiral Reeves. Naturalized Japanese. Or plain American citi- 
zens, for that matter. 

[1044] Captain Matfield. Some of them I would think were, 
sir. I would hate to say yes or no to that, sir, without checking. 

Admiral Reeves. You think some of them were Americans? 

Captain Matfield. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. I mean by that, not naturalized but American. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 643 

Captain Mayfield. American-born. 

xidmiral Reeves. American people. 

Captain JNIayfield. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. Not of Japanese descent. 

Captain Mayfield. Oh. No, sir, I didn't mean that. There were 
a number of suspects of various races, naturalized citizens. 

Admiral Reeves. Yes. 

Captain Mayfield. American citizens who were on the suspect lists 
of the three investigative agencies. 

Admiral Reeves. What do you know about the Japanese fishing 
fleet? 

Captain Mayfield. Very little definitely, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. About how many Japanese-owned and -operated 
boats are there in these waters ? 

Captain Mayfield. I couldn't give you that information, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Couldn't even estimate it ? 

Captain Mayfield. It would be purely a guess, sir. I would say, 
as a guess, probably 75. 

Admiral Ree\t]S. You have made no list of them and made no in- 
vestigation in regard to them ? 

Captain ISIayfield. Yes, sir. 

Acbniral Reeves. Have you a complete list of the Japanese fishing 
boats ? 

Captain Mayfield. I believe I have a complete list, sir. 

Admiral Reei'es. Their ownership ? ' 

[104s] Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. And registration? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reea^s. Have you a list of the equipment carried on each 
of these boats ? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Have you found on these Japanese fishing boats 
any equipment not connected with fishing ? 

Captain Mayfield. Nothing except radios that I have any knowl- 
edge of, sir, and ordinary navigational equipment as might be ex- 
pected in a boat of that type. 

Admiral Ree\"es. You found nothing that would be preparatory 
to carrying torpedoes or launching torpedoes? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. On the fishing boats? 

Captain MxVyfield. No, sir. 

Admiral Ree\^es. Have the fishing boats operated in a suspicious 
manner at any time, so far as you know ? 

Captain Mayfield. There have been many reports of such opera- 
tions, sir. Of those whose investigation I have knowledge of, no sus- 
picion was ever confirmed as to any subversive action. May I add 
there, sir, that the investigation of those craft is nominally done either 
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Coast Guard. 

Admiral Reeves. You would know of the result of the investigation, 
of course ? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Ree\"es. No instance of fishing boats making contact with 
Japajiese men-of-war off Honolulu ? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 



644 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Reeves. No instance of Japanese fishing boats leaving in 
a sudden group on a rumor of a school of fish and then returning a 
few days later as a group ? 

Captain Mayfield. I have heard of none, sir. 

[lO^G] Admiral Reeves. Would these Japanese fishing boats be 
intimately familiar with all the inlets and waters of the Hawaiian 
Islands? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Ree^t<:s. Have any of them operated in inlets or coastal 
waters they would not ordinarily operate in as fishing boats? Have 
they entered certain portions or inlets around the Island where fishing 
boats would not ordinarily enter? 

Captain Mayfield. Not to the best of my knowledge, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. How closely are you in touch with the intelligence 
work done by Commander Wilson? 

Captain Mayfield. Very close touch. 

Admiral Reeves. He is not under you, is he ? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

The Chairman. His work is of an entirely different type than yours, 
is it not ? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir, but we collaborate on a great many 
things. 

The Chairman. Has it come to your notice that in the Japanese sub- 
marine beached here near Bellows Field the bread on board was Love's 
bread ? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir, It had not. 

The Chairman. Manufactured on the Islands. 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

The Chairman. There has come no rumor of that to you at all ? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

The Chairman. I understand it to be the fact ; I don't know where 
I gathered that information. Would that indicate that some Japanese 
fishing boat or something of the kind was working offshore to supply 
Japanese from here? 

Captain Mayfield. That has long been my suspicion, sir, but I have 
never been able to 

The Chairman. Confirm it? 

[1047] General McNarney. Do any Japanese fishing boats have 
a right to enter Pearl Harbor ? 

Captain Mayfield. Do any of them ? 

General McNarney. Have the right to enter Pearl Harbor ? 

Captain Mayfield. I am not familiar with the details of the regu- 
lations in that respect, sir, which are issued by the Commandant of the 
Yard or the Captain of the Yard. 

The Chairman. How large a force of investigators have you under 
you. Captain? 

Captain Mayfield. I have at the present time ten, sir. 

The Chairman. Ten men? 

Captain Mayfield. For investigative work. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Captain Mayfield. I have others for other 

The Chairman. Clerical work? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 645 

The Chairman. Do you know of a man here, Japanese, named Otani, 
a fish dealer, wholesale fish dealer ? 

Captain Maytield. I don't recall the name, sir. 

The Chairman. Did it come to your attention that he advertised a 
large party, opening his retail fish market, on Saturday evening, the 
6th? 

Captain MAYriELD. I don't believe so, sir. I cannot remember. 

The Chairman. There has been some rumor I have heard since I 
have been here that a number of Japanese establishments held open 
house on Saturday evening, the 6th, and served a great deal of liquor. 
Have you heard anything of that? 

Captain Maytield. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Has your attention been called to an advertisement 
that was run in both of the local papers on the evening of December 
5 by the Japanese Importing Company advertising its silks? 

Captain Mayfield. I have seen such an advertisement by [104^] 
the Hawaii Importing Company. 

The Chairman. I guess it is Hawaii Importing Company. With 
a Japanese column down the left-hand side of the advertisement? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Has that been translated? 

Captain Mayfield. I am not sure that I have seen that particular 
advertisement, sir, with the Japanese column. 

The Chairman. I haven't, either, but someone here on the Island 
has told me about it. 

Captain Mayfield. I have seen many copies of that particular ad- 
vertisement from the Hawaii Importing Company listing various 
kinds of silk. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Captain Mayfield. Some of these names of silk were alleged not to 
exist, that it was not the name of a silk. That I have been investigat- 
ing, and at least on one or two instances by investigators now tell me 
that that is a recognized 

The Chairman. Name of a silk ? 

Captain Mayfield. Name of a silk. 

Admiral Reeves. Have you a staff of translators in your organiza- 
tion?. 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

Admidal Reeves. Covering all languages or just merely the Jap- 
anese language ? 

Captain Mayfield. Practically all languages, sir. I have one man 
who is a phenomenal linguist. 

The Chairman. Have you any information as to anyone connected 
with the Kita message that was discovered and decoded after the con- 
sulate was seized ? Have you any information as to anyone connected 
with that other than the Japanese consul ? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You think there was someone else connected 
[1049] with it? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Is that person capable of any further subversive 
activities ? 



646 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. He was on the suspect list and was 
immediately arrested on the beginning of hostilities. 

The Chairman. Do you confirm the fact that there was fire burn- 
ing on Maui on the morning of the attack or the night before the 
attack ? 

Captain Mayfield. The best of my information is that there was 
such a fire burning, sir. I am attempting at the present moment to 
check that definitely. 

The Chairman. That was one of the signals in the secret message 
that were to be displayed ? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. In that connection, sir, to the best of 
my knowledge the signals that were to be given from the other places 
mentioned in that message were not given. 

The Chairman. You do not know of any light in the dormer 
window ? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you think you know where the dormer win- 
dow was? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You do. Do you know where the clothes line 
was on which the white clothes were to hang? 

Captain Mayfield. I believe I have that within three houses. 

The Chairman. Of course, if the Navy could have obtained any 
knowledge of that code there would have been an alert on the 5th, 
6th, and 7th of December? 

Captain Mayfield, Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I suppose there really was no way, within the law 
of the United States, that you could get to those messages? 

[1050] Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You would have had to break the law in order to 
get those messages from the commercial companies ? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. I would question that. Did you try by friendly 
interest with those companies to get them ? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. How long ahead of the incident? 

Captain Mayfield. Since I arrived, sir. 

General McCoy. Did you take it up through the Navy Depart- 
ment to go to their chiefs in America on that subject? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You tried to deal with their local representatives 
here ? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. I had had previous experience in such 
matters and knew that it was against the law, against international 
treaty; and when one high official of one communication company was 
here I did arrange through him to obtain in a roundabout way cer- 
tain information from the files of his company. The local manager 
in each case of each of the companies declinecl to accept the respon- 
sibility of allowing me access to his files. 

The Chairman. And didn't? 

Captain Mayfield. I had obtained such information in another 
locality on a previous occasion years before, due to the connivance, 
if I may use the word, of the local manager. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 647 

The Chairman. This superior executive happened to be the execu- 
tive of the company that didn't have the messages you needed? 

Captain Maytield. No, sir. They gave us — those were some of the 
most important messages. 

The Chairman. Before December 7? 

Captain Maytield. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. But they didn't spell any attack? 

[1051] Captain Maytield.- No, sir. It was the custom of the 
Japanese consulate general to switch its traffic each month; for the 
month of November practically all of their traffic was given to Mackay 
Radio, for the month of December to tlie Radio Corporation of 
America. 

The Chairman. And the Radio Corporation of America was not 
cooperative to give you messages ; is that it ? 

Captain Maytield. They did at the end, sir. 

The Chairman. What do you mean by "at the end"? 

Captain Maytield. Just shortly before. 

The Chairman. Before December 7? 

Captain Maytield. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You didn't get this Kita message from them, did 
you? 

Captain Maytield. No, sir. 

The Chairman. And they didn't turn that over to you ? 

Captain Maytield. The manager turned over — went through his 
files and gave me copies of every message — that is, he said that he gave 
me a copy of every message — from the 1st of December on. 

The Chairman. This is before December 7? 

Captain Maytield. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. This message, however, didn't purport to be from 
the consul, did it ? I think it purported to be from somebody named 
Kita, didn't it? 

Captain Maytield. He is their consulate general, sir. 

The Chairman. Kita is the consulate general ? 

Captain Maytield. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. But you unfortunately didn't catch this message ? 

Captain Maytield. In time, no, sir, because the code had to be 
broken and the message translated. 

The Chairman. Oh, I see. Then you got it. The F. B. I. got a 
copy of this message in code when they raided the [1052] con- 

sulate ? 

Captain Maytield. Yes. 

The Chairman. You had already gotten it? 

Captain Maytield. No, sir, not that one. 

The Chairman. Oh, you had not? 

Captain Maytield. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Wliy do you suppose that slipped? 

Captain Maytield. I don't know, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Do you think that there are methods available to 
the Japanese or their agents now in Oahu for communication to out- 
side areas? 

Captain Maytield. I believe there are, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. By what method do you think they may be com- 
municating ? 

Captain Maytield. By some short-wave radios. 



648 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Reeves. That reminds me. Have you a list of the trans- 
mitting stations in Oahu, or are there stations of which you have no 
knowledge ? 

Captain Mayfield, I believe there are stations of which I have no 
knowledge. All amateur stations, of course, are licensed, but there 
was no way to prevent a person buying material and assembling it 
into a transmitter and using it. 

Admiral Reeves. Have you made any effort by interception and 
direction finders to locate these unauthorized sending stations? 

Captain Mayfield. I have not, sir, no, sir. That has not been con- 
sidered as in my province. 

Admiral Reeves. Is there any agency that has been doing that? 

Captain Mayfield. The Army is now trying to do it, sir, with direc- 
tion finder stations located at various points to get cross bearings; 
but, as you know, sir, the range of the radio spectrum, it is so — it is 
very difficult to locate the station and get the direction finder stations 
on it unless it [lOSS] transmits for a considerable period of 
time. 

Admiral Reeves. Had the Army made this effort before Decem- 
ber 7? 

Captain Mayfield. I don't know, sir, or to what extent. I believe 
they had made some effort, but the plan that I speak of was only placed 
into effect perhaps two weeks ago. 

Admiral Reeves. Do you know if they have had any success what- 
ever? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir, I don't. 

The Chairman. I have heard from gossip that they seized several 
stations as a result of that guessing match. 

Captain Mayfield. Assuming that the bearings from these stations 
are taken on the same transmission, it is frequently due to difficulty 
of terrain, to make sure that the wave of the transmitter — of the di- 
rection finder is accurate and then to actually get to the exact locality 
of the transmitting station. 

The Chairman. I think also. Captain, it is not at all impossible for 
a man to buy a receiving set and, if he knows anything about this 
radio business, to transmute that into a sending set with very little 
alteration. I have so heard. 

Captain Mayfield. I am not sufficiently expert, sir, 

The Chairman. I am not an expert, but I have heard that said. 

Captain Mayfield. But I do believe, sir, that he could buy the 
necessary parts 

The Chairman. Parts, yes. 

Captain Mayfield. And build it. There are a number of amateurs 
who are capable of doing such things. I do know of a rumor, which 
I believe to be true, that there were a number of amateurs who were 
paid small amounts by the Japanese-language newspapers to listen 
to the Domei news, the Japanese news, copy it, and then turn it over 
to the newspaper. 

The Chairman. There are Japanese short-wave broadcasts 
[10S4] that come in here regularly now, are there not? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir, about 36 hours out of 24. 

The Chairman. I am told it comes in clearer than that from the 
Pacific Coast. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 649 

Captain Mayfield. I think that would depend on many 

The Chairman. Has it been attempted to jam it? 

Captain Mayfield. I have heard that an attempt has been made, 
sir. How effective it was I do not know. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether there is any American prop- 
aganda being locally broadcast in Japanese on the Island now? 

Captain Mayfield. To the best of my knowledge there is not, sir. 

The Chairman. Have you anything further? 

Admiral Standley. Captain, do you have direct communication 
with the Director of Naval Intelligence in Washington, or are your 
communications solely through the Commandant of the District? 

Captain Mayfield. Through the Naval Communications system, 
sir, I send in dispatches, if I have reason to, without — necessarily with- 
out reference to the Commandant. 

Admiral Standley. Commandant of the District? 

Captain Mayfield. Unless it affects him. 

Admiral Standley, And he communicates with you the same way ? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Did he give you any information prior to De- 
cember 7 in regard to movements of Japanese vessels ? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. You received no message from him ? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. That information probably. Admiral, 
would go to the Commandant for operations rather than to District 
Intelligence. 

Admiral Standley. Yes, but you got no such message ? 

[loss] Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Did you receive any message warning about 
subversive activities and warning about directing guarding against, 
prior to December 7, immediately prior to November 

Captain Mayfield, No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Between November 26 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Nothing direct from Naval Intelligence? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. I was attempting to operate my organi- 
zation under the directive of the Secretary of the Navy directing tHiat 
the intelligence organization be completely mobilized for M-day, but 
I had received no information as to when M-day was. 

Admiral Standley. Was that a specific instruction from the Sec- 
retary of the Navy ? 

Captain Mayfield. To all Naval Districts. 

Admiral Standley. How long ago? 

Captain Mayfield. It was dated either the 25th or the 27th of May. 
I think it was the 27th. If my memory is correct, the President de- 
clared an emergency on the 25th. 

Admiral Reeves. Captain, is not the presence of such a large number 
of Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands a cover or camouflage for agents? 

Captain Mayfield. Could be very easily, sir.. 

Admiral Reeves. I mean there are so many Japanese people 
here 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves, — that Japanese agents are difficult to find in that 
maze ? 



650 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Mayfield. Very difficult, sir. It has been my experience, 
with which I believe the other two investigative agencies agree, that to 
investigate a Japanese is exceedingly difficult and can really only be 
done by another Japanese. 

[1056] Admiral Reeves. Have you any solution to offer to im- 
prove that condition ? 

Captain Matfield. No, sir. 

The CiLViRMAN. Ninety percent, I understand, of the Japanese-blood 
Americans go to language schools and speak Japanese; is that right? 

Captain Matfield. I believe that is true, sir. 

The Chairman. Do the Japanese on this Island live in Japanese 
quarters of the town or spread out all over town ? 

Captain Matfield. Both, sir. 

The Chairman. Both ? 

Captain Matfield, There are localities almost entirely Japanese, 
and then you will find Japanese spread out in any section of town. 
The same applies to Chinese, Koreans, and others. 

General McCot. Aren't there amongst those American-Japanese 
some persons whom you could trust as American agents ? 

Captain Matfield. I have not found one, sir. 

General McCot. You haven't had any confidence in any of them ? 

Captain Matfield. Not to that extent, sir. 

General McCot. Out of 120,000 people here? 

Captain Matfield. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You have had no Japanese-blood agent under you? 

Captain Matfield. No, sir. I have had one man as a translator 
and interpreter whom I trust to a very considerable degree, but I 
would not trust him with very confidential or secret matter. 

General McCot. Have any Japanese of American naturalization or 
American citizenship willingly come to you with any information at 
any time ? 

Captain Matfield. Yes, sir. 

General McCot. About the Japanese? 

[1057] Captain Matfield. Not concrete definite information, 
sir. 

General McCot. But warning you in some respect ? 

Captain Matfield. No, sir. I believe, if I may with the permission 
of the court venture an opinion, that the Japanese that I know best 
and that other Americans know best are the ones who are really to a 
very large extent straight-forward and honest and that they them- 
selves do not know the spies. I have been told that by a number of 
them. They have come to me and volunteered assistance. I couldn't — 
didn't feel that I could give them names of suspects, but I asked 
them to furnish me information as to who they suspected might be 
carrying on subversive action, sabotage, espionage. They don't know. 

Admiral REE\rES. Never furnished .you the name of a single person? 

Captain Matfield. They have furnished me names, yes, sir, but no 
definite information. 

Admiral Reeves. Have you ever found that the names furnished by 
any of these Japanese have reallj^ been suspicious to you? Have you 
ever confirmed their suspicion? 

Captain Matfieij). No, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 651 

Admiral Reeves. If every Japanese on this Island of Oaliu were 
transported to some other place, would that help you in your work? 

Captain Matfield. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Do you think you can ever be successful in your 
intelligence work unless that is done? 

Captain Matfield. I believe that a reasonable measure of success 
could be attained, given a long time in which to accomplish it. 

The Chairman. But we are in war now. 

Captain Matfield. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. And to close up sources of information, to cover 
up sources of vital military information being [1058^ trans- 
mitted from this Island outboard, there is only one way to do it, and 
that is to get all the Japanese herded together and under control. 

Captain Matfield. I am not sure that that would stop it, sir. 
There are other people who might be capable of 

Admiral Reeves. You think, in other words, that there are Japanese 
agents which are not Japanese? 

Captain Matfield. That is my suspicion, sir. I have nothing defi- 
nite to found it upon. 

General McCot. Have you interviewed this American lawyer who 
was counsellor to the Japanese consul? 

Captain Matfield. I don't remember his name, sir. 

General McCot. Were you not conscious there was an American 
counsellor ? 

Captain Matfield. Yes, sir. 

General McCot. And that he was 

Captain Matfield. I personally have not interviewed him, no, sir. 

General McCot. And that he was employed up to the date of the 
7th of December? 

Captain Matfield. I have heard of that, sir, but I have not inter- 
viewed him personally. 

General McCot. Do you know whether the Army Intelligence Officer 
has? 

Captain Matfield. No, sir, I do not. 

General McCot. Were you not conscious that there was such a one 
before the 7th of December ? 

Captain Matfield. Yes, sir. 

General McCot. Was he a suspect? 

Captain Matfield. I cannot remember, sir. I would have to have 
his name and then search my files. 

General McCot. I don't know anything about him; I only saw it 
in the newspaper. 

Captain Matfield. Yes, sir. 

11059] General McCot. That he resigned the day of the 7th. 

Captain Matfield. There are many 

The Chairman. Of course he would not in times of peace — or even, 
I think, now in times of war — be a source of information, General. 
Whatever was communicated to him would be communicated in profes- 
sional confidence. 

General McCot. I question that, because I have been an intelligence 
officer myself, and I have used an agent of the Japanese Embassy in 
Washington. 

7971 6— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 2 5 



652 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. You mean the lawyer? 

General McCoy. He was not a lawyer. 

The Chairman. No. 

General McCoy. But he was employed by the Japanese Embassy, 
and that has been a very common case in Manila, I know. 

The Chairman. It seems to me there are difficulties about either 
Admiral Reeves' suggestion or yours; I think the Constitution of 
the United States would have to be amended in order to deport an 
American citizen from this island, and I do not think you could ever 
compel a lawyer to tell what he had learned in professional confidence. 

General McCoy. No, you don't compel him ; you arrange so that he 
willingly does it. A man who will be counsellor of the Japanese con- 
sulate in the time of the last six months could be bought very easily, 
I should think. He certainly would be a very primary source of 
information. 

Mr. Chairman, will you show those warning telegrams to the intelli- 
gence officer? 

The Chairman. Yes, certainly. These are paraphrases, Captain, of 
original messages (handing documents to the witness). • 

General McCoy. Does it use the term "war warning" in that para- 
phrase ? 

The Chairman. There is one of them that has the "war [lOOO] 
warning," just the 27th. 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Haven't you seen those before? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

General McCoy. And you have not been informed of a war warning? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

General McCoy. How were you conscious of the imminence of trou- 
ble and emergency before December 7, or were you not conscious of it ? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Not even from the newspapers^ 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

General McCoy. You speak of this very complete information serv- 
ice that you since discovered through the Japanese consulate. You 
would naturally assume that would be the case through a consulate, 
wouldn't you? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

General McCoy. You wouldn't? 

Captain Mayfield. I did not assume that it would be through the 
consulate. In fact, I doubted if it was through the consulate, that 
the consulate was the head of it. 

The Chairman. You mean your suspicion was that the consulate 
arranged for somebody else to be sending these messages so as to throw 
suspicion away from his office? 

Captain Mayfield. Not that, sir, but I felt that the consulate would 
perhaps be advised of the existence and would cooperate with the net, 
but that the consulate — this was my own suspicion — that the consulate 
itself was not the head of the net nor necessarily an important part 
of the net, as the consulate might expect to be closed in similar fashion 
to the German and Italian consulates, and that therefore they must 
have prepared a plan which could be carried on without any assistance 
from the consulate. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 653 

[1061] General McCoy. Did you receive from Naval Intelli- 
gence prior to December 7 any reports from the Navy attache in 
Tokyo? 

Captain Mayfield. From time to time, yes, sir, I have. 

General McCoy. Did they not give warning or tell of naval move- 
ments, just as the Japanese consulate did here to his government? 

Captain Mayfield. None that I saw, sir, except possibly movements 
for — nothing indicating an approach in this direction. 

General McCoy. In other words, we are left with no information 
from Japan, and the Japanese government getting everything that 
happens on our side ; is that not correct? 

Captain Mayfield. That is my belief, sir. 

General McCoy. Were you conscious of that before December 7? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Is there no way that you can think of remedying 
such a dangerous situation or helping to remedy it? 

Captain Mayfield. We were doing our very best to gain the infor- 
mation, sir. The most reasonable source was the files of the various 
communication companies, which were not opened to us. 

General McCoy. Well, now, I question that, again. I have got to 
have this clarified. You told us that you hadn't received any of these 
code messages prior to December 7. Then you go and tell us that 
you did arrange beforehand. 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir, I did. 

General McCoy. Yes. Well, then I should think 

Captain Mayfield. That was only with one company, sir. 

General McCoy. Well, having done it with one company, don't you 
think it was likely that you could have with the others if you went 
about it the right way? 

Captain Mayfield. Both — I was trying to get the information from 
other companies, but the local managers declined to [1062'] give 
it to me. 

General McCoy. Did you know that the chairman of the board of 
the RCA is a retired officer of the United States Army, General 
Harbord ? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Did you know that the president of that company 
is a colonel in the Reserve Corps ? 

Captain Mayfield. Mr. SarnofF, sir? 

General McCoy. Yes, sir. 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. I didn't know that he was in the Army 
Reserve, no, sir. 

General McCoy. Well, he is a colonel in the Army Reserve. 

Captain Mayfield. Yes. 

General McCoy. Don't you think that you could have arranged 
through them to have gotten information here confidentially ? 

Captain Mayfield. I did arrange through Mr. Sarnoff when he 
was here, sir. 

General McCoy. I thought you said that the RCA had the 
December 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That is what he got. 

Captain Mayfield. And that is what I got. 



654 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCoy. But yet you did not get this message, this import- 
ant message that would have blown the whole thing open; to your 
Commander-in-Chief? You mean to say that you did not get that 
before December 7? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

The Chairman. I think you are wrong about that, Captain. 

Captain Mayfield. I didn't get it decoded. 

General McCoy. Well, that is the point. 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Now, how long ahead did you have that in 
[1063] code form? 

Captain Mayfield. I can't answer that offhand, sir. 

General McCoy. Well, I should like to be informed of that, and 
I should like to know why it was not decoded until after the attack. 
And I should like to ask one or two other questions : 

Is it not a fact that you left the Commander-in-Chief absolutely 
without any warning of any kind of what happened, from the point 
of view of the intelligence? 

Captain Mayfield. I had no warning myself, sir. 

General McCoy. Well, you say, then, that you did not give the 
Commander-in-Chief any warning of any kind before December 7? 

Captain Mayfield. I didn't have any information about that to 
warn him. 

General McCoy. Well, answer my question : 

You did not inform him ? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

General McCoy. That is all I wanted to ask. 

The Chairman. You will get us the information of when jou 
were given that Kita message, the code message? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And what you did with it, where you forwarded it, 
and when, and when you got the return ? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Just put that on a memorandum and submit it as 
part of your testimony. 

Are there any other questions ? 

Admiral Standee y. Just one I want to ask. 

Captain, have you knowledge of the reports that Japanese tankers 
would come to the mainland for oil and bring a crew of reserves and 
that they would go ashore in uniform of the Japanese Navj'^ and that 
while ashore they would change uniforms, and another thirty would 
come back and go back to the ship ? [1064] Ii^ other words, they 
used that means of exchanging Japanese. 

Captain Mayfield. I never heard of that, sir. 

Admiral Standley. You never heard of that method ? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. All right. 

General McCoy. I would like to ask one other question : Did the 
Commander-in-Cliief know that you had that message uncoded prior 
to December 7 ? 

Captain Mayfield. I did not have it uncoded prior to December 7. 

General McCoy. No, you didn't have it uncoded. I said, did he 
know that you had it in your possession before December 7 ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 655 

Captain Mayfied. To the best of my knowledge lie did not, sir. 

General McCoy. Why didn't you tell him? 

Captain Mayfield. That wasa message — that particular message — 
there have been so many messages. To the best of my recollection 
that particular message was one of the messages that came from the 
consulate and not one that I obtained from the communication com- 
pany. 

General McCoy. But you just informed me that you had it in an 
uncoded form prior to December 7. 

Captain Mayfied. And I would like to retract that statement, sir. 
I do not believe that that is correct, but I will have to verify that. 

The Chairman. I think you will find that you did have it and that 
also it was probably found in mutilated form in the consulate. , 

Admiral Standley. It might help, Mr. Chairman, if we would all 
know just exactly what message you are talking about. I think before 
we should go into this question we might have the full data as to the 
message we have reference to. 

[1065] The Chairman. The message is a message of 3 December, 
1941, from Kita to Foreign Minister, Tokyo, "Secret Military Message 
No." blank; "By Chief of Consulate's code) To: Chief of Third Sec- 
tion, Naval General Staff. From : Fujii. 

"Re signals I wish to simplify communications as follows." 

And then it goes on to give a code of communications which will 
show by various signs : that all battle force has sailed ; several aircraft 
carriers plan to put to sea ; all carriers have sailed, on certain dates, 
which are the dates from 4th to 6th inclusive. Then the signals : set 
a light in Lanikai beach house at night. 

One light indicates code sign number 1, which tells what the car- 
riers are doing. One light from 9 to 10 p. m. indicates two ; two lights 
indicate five, six, seven, and eight, which are all code signals for bat- 
tleships being in or out of the harbor, and so forth. 

2. On Lanikai coast during daytime from 8 a. m. until noon every 
hour one piece of linen cloth indicates one, two, three, or four of the 
code. Two pieces of linen cloth indicate five, six, seven, and eight of 
the code, 

3. In Lanikai Bay during the daytime in front of harbor (offing) 
a star boat with one star on sail indicates one, two, three, four ; two : 
a star and figure "III" indicates five, six, seven, and eight. 

■ Light in the dormer window of Kalama house from 7 p. m. to 1 a, m. 
every hour indicates three, four, five, six, seven, eight, 

K(3rMB want ads 9 : 45 a. m. : 

A Chinese rug, and so forth, for sale, in the want ad column, apply 
to P. O. Box 1476, indicates three or six. 

A complete chicken farm, and so forth, four to seven. 

Beauty operator wanted, five or eight. 

If a signal in any of these methods is impossible, on Maui Island 
at a point located between lower road six miles [1066'] north 
of Kula Sanitorium, and so forth, which can be seen from the sea to 
the southwest and southeast of Maui, until the receipt of the signal 
"EXEX". This will be repeated for several days : A small fire on the 
high peak. 



656 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Seven p. m. to eight a. m. indicates three or six; eight p, m. to nine 
p. m. indicates four or seven ; nine p. m. to ten p. m. indicates five or 
eight. 

That is the message. 

Captain Mayfield. That message I did not have decoded until after 
the 7th. When that message was decoded and shown to the Com- 
mandant he immediately directed that I be informed. F. B. I. and 
my organization immediately divided the territory. My organiza- 
tion took the Lanikai sector, and Federal Bureau of Investigation the 
Kalama sector. We immediately sent men to investigate. My 'men 
remained there for about eight days and were unable to find that any 
of those signals were ever sent. Many of the occupants of the houses 
had moved out immediately subsequent to December 7. Those occu- 
pants were interviewed around town to endeavor to discover if they 
had seen any such signals. I have been unable to discover any person 
who saw any of those signals made. A number of people who were 
questioned by my agents at Lanikai stated that the sailboat signal 
could not have been given for a period of at least a week preceding the 
7th because no sailboats were out of that type, the small star boat; 
that the weather and sea were far too rough for sailing of that type of 
boat. 

Admiral Standley. Captain, now j^ou know the message; we have 
identified the message. Do you know or do your records show when 
you got that message and how you got it ? 

Captain Mayfield. I am not sure that I can definitely show from 
my records when that particular message was received. I believe that 
that was among the messages received from the consulate which, when 
I saw they were in code, were immediately sent to Rochefort. There 
was no way of telling which was [^1067'] important and which 
was not important from the code until it had been translated. 

Admiral Standley. And Rochefort is the communication or the 
intelligence officer for the Commander-in-Chief? 

Captain Mayfield. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Or for the District? 

Captain Mayfield. He is under the District, sir. 

Admiral Standley. The District. But that bunch of messages were 
sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the District ? 

Captain Mayfield. They were sent by me, sir, directly to Com- 
mander Rochefort. 

Admiral Standley. And there is where messages of this type would 
have been decoded ? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. And the only place? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. That is the only one that can do it, T suppose? 

Captain Mayfield. So far as I know, that is the only agency that 
can do it. 

General McCoy. I know we were questioning the Army intelligence 
officer. 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Fielder, isn't it? 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 657 

General McCoy. This message came in question, and we tried to 
follow it throught him, and he said, as I remember, that such messages 
were turned over to you for the experts. 

Captain Mayfield. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. And that the Army did not have 

Captain Mayfield (interposing). Yes, sir. And at that time, sir, 
there were also coming in other bits of information in Japanese or 
in code. If it was something from a plane or believed from a plane, 
it was immediately sent to the [1068] fleet intelligence officer, 
since he had readily at his command aviators and submarine officers, 
which I did not have. Commander Rochef ort has the only unit capable 
of breaking codes. 

Admiral Standley. And when was the first time you heard the 
results of that decoding? 

Captain Mayfield. I can't from memory give you the exact date, 
sir, but it was one or more days after December 7. 

Admiral Standley. And prior to December 7 you had no informa- 
tion or no intimation that any such information was in those mes- 
sages ? 

Captain Mayfield. None whatever, sir. 

The Chairman. Thank you, Captain. We shall ask you not to dis- 
cuss or impart to anyone or with anyone anything that has gone on in 
this room. 

Captain Mayfield. Aye, Aye, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDEE EDWIN THOMAS 
LAYTON, UNITED STATES NAVY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give your name and rank to the reporter, 
please ? 

Commander Layton. Lieutenant Commander Layton, Edwin 
Thomas. 

The Chairman. Commander Layton, you are fleet intelligence offi- 
cer, are you ? 

Commander Layton. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. As such did you have any information which would 
lead you to suspect hostile Japanese operations in the first week in 
December ? And if so, what ? 

Commander Layton. Yes, sir. From various sources available to 
naval intelligence, and principally reports of naval attaches, naval 
observers, Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, from the intelli- 
gence unit of the Sixteenth Naval District 

[1069] The Chairman. Where is that? 

Commander Layton. Cavite, sir (continuing) — and the intelligence 
unit, the Fourteenth Naval District, there were available dispatches 
which gave rise to a firm belief that some action by Japan was 
impending. 

From the best evidence available, as I recall it, about the middle 
of November the normal organization of the Japanese fleet was dis- 
rupted ; and, while this disruption may have taken place prior, it was 
apparent at about that time the Commander-in-Chief of the second 
fleet was placed in a position far more important than his normal 



658 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

administrative job. That is, it appeared as if, instead of prospective 
operations by fleets, there was to be an operation by task forces or task 
force, and that the Commander-in-Chief of the second fleet was to be 
put in supreme command of this operation. 

From radio intelligence it was apparent that the direction of this 
move was to the south. From reports of attaches and observers along 
the China coast and from British intelligence, the movement of troop 
ships, their cargo, troops, and type of equipment indicated an expedi- 
tion which would be amphibious in nature: that is, requiring an act 
of landing and transportation ashore. 

When this became apparent a report was made to the Chief of Naval 
Operation's by the Fourteenth Naval District unit and was commented 
on by the Sixteenth Naval District unit at Cavite. This task force 
seemed to include most of the second fleet less certain units, all of the 
third fleet plus certain units from the first fleet, plus the great ma- 
jority or all of the combined air force, and associated with it was the 
French Indo-China force or sometimes called the Southern Expedi- 
tionary force, and the South China fleet. 
I thing I have covered it. 

The Chairman. From that what did you, as an intelligence officer, 
deduce as to the direction of the hostile movement? 
\^1070^ Commander Layton. To the south, sir. 
The Chairman. What do you mean by "To the south" ? 
Commander Latton. Toward the Malay barrier, or against Singa- 
pore direct, or against their objective, oil, in the Netherlands Indies, 
or a combination movement with the possible inclusion of preparatory 
acts against the Philippines. 

The Chairman. Did the intelligence data that you have just out- 
lined indicate the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers ? 

Commander Latton. No, sir. It would — with the exception of car- 
rier division 3. 

The Chairman. You spoke of some air force. 
Commander Layton. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That was not the carriers of the Japanese navy? 
Commander Layton. No, sir. The combined air force as I spoke 
of it consists of the shore-based aircraft of combatant nature from 
the various locations in Japan and its possessions. It is distinct and 
completely separate from the carrier aviation force. 

The Chairman. Now, had your intelligence, in the late days of 
November or early days of December, any inkling of the where- 
abouts of the Japanese carriers ? 

Commander Layton. There had been no positive indications of 
the location of the Japanese carriers with the exception of carrier 
division 3, which was associated with the Southern movement for 
some time. 

The Chairman. What was carrier division 3? Two carriers? 
Commander Layton. Two carriers, sir; the Ryu jo and the Hosho. 
The Chairman. Now, did your command have knowledge of the 
number of Japanese carriers in their navy? 
Commander Layton. Yes, sir. 
The Chairman. How many were there? 
Commander Layton. Ten, sir. 

{1071'] The Chairman. So you have accounted for two? 
Commander Layton. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 659 

The Chairman. Of the other eijjht I understand yon to say there 
were no definite indications as to their location ? 

Commander Latton. No positive indications of their location. 

The Chairman. What presumptive? 

Commander Layton. It is very difficult in this nature of intelli- 
gence to say where a man is from his traffic. If he receives it by the 
broadcast method he can be at sea, but he is sometimes in port. AVlien 
carriers are not heard from, if they do not originate traffic, they are 
most likely in port, because there they are on low-frequency low- 
power circuits that cannot be heard, or on the ship-shore circuit, 
which is verv low power, and sometimes they have a direct wire to 
the beach. While of course the traffic originated for them f rorn with- 
out their area is still received and still on the air, that condition ex- 
ists. That condition also exists a good part of the time, and it is 
only when they originate traffic themselves at sea that direction-finder 
bearing can be taken to ascertain their general line of bearing; and 
with the direction-finder net — for instance, Oahu and Cavite and 
Guam — a fairly good strategic cut is made as to their location ; also, 
when they are at sea, by the type of their traffic ; whether it is aj 
tactical traffic or administrative traffic — that is, they use their own 
tactical calls or their own administrative calls — one may deduce and 
surmise the type of exercises they are involved in, and also, from 
the type of traffic they have had before that, what is their immediate 
objective. 

The Chairman, Now, what was the type of carrier traffic that you 
were listening in on in the fortnight before December 7 ? 

Commander Latton. I myself cannot speak from firsthand. 
[1073] I received this information from the officer who is called 
chief of combat intelligence at the Fourteenth Naval District, w^ho 
furnished me a daily summary. 

The Chairman. And who is he ? 

Commander Latton. Commander J. J'. Rochefort. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. All right. What did he report to you? 

Commander Latton, The traffic for the carriers was heard, but 
there had been no traffic originated by the carriers, and on the daily 
sheet sent over — the daily summary is shown. Would you care to 
see one (indicating) ? 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Commander Latton. Just open one at random: the general com- 
bined fleet, air fourth fleet. After this they are in more detail. Gen- 
eral combined fleet, fourth fleet, fifth fleet, submarines, China, and 
third fleet. 

The Chairman. Which fleet is carriers? 

Commander Latton. It is called the carrier fleet, sir. 

The Chairman. The carrier fleet? 

Commander Latton. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Commander Latton. And on these were carried carriers : "No 
information." 

The Chairman. "No information." Now, you had to depend on 
his appraisal of what he picked up? 

Commander Latton. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And to depend on his summary ? 

Commander Latton. Yes, sir. 



660 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. And from what he gave you in that footnote you 
could make no definite surmise that the remaining eight carriers were 
out of port? 

Commander Laytgn. No, sir. Of course, along with his informa- 
tion plus incoming dispatches I reported each day to Admiral Kimmel 
at 8 :15, in which we went over the situation of [107S] that day 
as it pertained to the past days and made an oral and informal sum- 
mary of the intentions, disposition, composition, and the fact that there 
were carriers not known within the summary, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, if the carriers wanted to fool you the best 
way for them to fool you would be not to talk, wouldn't it ? 

Commander Layton. That is the best way to fool anyone, sir. 

The Chairman. And from the lack of signals in the sea to the 
northward of Oahu in the days preceding this attack, you have sus- 
pected the carriers were not talking, have you not ? 

Commander Layton. In reviewing it I have suspected that they 
sailed under sealed orders, and I am positive, from reviewing the rec- 
ord, that they did no talking, because our operations would have cer- 
tainly heard them. 

The Chairman. That is what I thought. 

Commander Layton. As a matter of fact, that morning after the 
attack had commenced I was phoned from Combat Intelligence, and 
he said that the Commander-in-Chief of the carrier fleet is being heard 
now, but the only direction finder we can put on him is the bilateral. 
It gives it either north and south or east and west, two ways, and the 
bearing is either north or south, and they knew it the instant he spoke. 

[1074^ The Chairman. I suppose you were familiar with these 
telegrams from the CNO of the 24th and 27th of November? 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

The Chairman. This was a part of the intelligence you had to 
appraise ? 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

The Chairman. I have no other questions. 

General McNarney. How long did this carrier silence persist, Com- 
mander ? 

Commander Layton. Could I review the record ? Specifically I do 
not remember. 

General McNarney. Yes. 

Commander Layton. On the 13th of November there is a report: 
"Carriers remain relatively inactive. Settso is still with them and 
they may be engaged in target practice." 

The Chairman. That is tlie summary ^ Is that where that is from ? 

Connnander Layton. That is the summary, yes. 

I left out one matter. May I refer to it ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Commander Layton. On or about the 24th of November, the split- 
ting of the Japanese fleet into those task forces and the apparent inten- 
tions became very marked, and I mention the despatch sent by the Com- 
mandant Fourteenth Naval District regarding tlnit. In his despatch 
he stated that there was considerable concentration of submarines and 
air groups in the Marshalls whicli comprised Airon 24 and at least one 
carrier division plus units of probably one-third of the submarine fleet. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 661 

The Chairman. Now, that carrier division would probably be com- 
posed of three carriers'? 

Commander Layton. Tavo, sir. 

[107S] The Chairman. Now, if they came across, it would be 
natural for that fleet to stop at Jaluit for refueling? 

Commander Layton. Yes, sir. 

The Chah^man. And if they stopped at Jaluit, your summaries 
indicate they w^ere never picked up afterward ? 

Commander Layton. Yes. That is correct. 

The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District in commenting to 
the Fourteenth Naval District in a despatch said that they had no 
indication as to it. 

The Chairman. That is, they were at the Marshalls ? 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

General McNarney. You lost a carrier on the 13th of November. 
You subsequently picked up one division on the 24th of November, 
but there was no other information from that one carrier in the 
Marshalls from the 13th of November until the 7th of December; 
is that correct ? 

Commander Layton. Nothing specific, no, sir. 

General McNarney. Nothing specific ? 

Commander Layton. No, sir. 

General McNarney. Did that in itself raise any question in your 
mind? 

Commander Layton. No, sir, because that same situation has arisen 
at other times. As I said before, if they are in port and not using 
their radio, they may still receive traffic as they did during this 
period, but they will originate none, and during the course of the 
year there are other times when such units are not heard. 

General McNarney. It would be interesting to me if you would 
check back in your records and give me other periods of the year in 
which there were such silences. 

Commander Layton. Yes. I can get that from our records. 

The Chairman. Yes, search your records, and when you have the 
information, put it in a form which may be presented to us [1076] 
as your testimony, or come back here and we will hear you. 

General McNarney. This lack of traffic was not specifically com- 
mented upon by the Commander-in-Chief as something to be noted ? 

Commander Layton. As a matter of fact, the Commander-in-Chief 
commented upon that specific matter and I gave him the same state- 
ment I made here, that that happens frequently and it is a normal 
assumption that they were then in port. 

Incidentally, the carriers prior to that had done considerable around 
the China coast toward Takau in Formosa; and prior to that there 
had been carrier concentrations and activities in Louchoo Island at 
Naha. 

General McNarney. Didn't the formation of the task forces under 
the C&C of the second fleet with available carrier force arouse your 
curiosity ? 

Commander Layton. In a way, yes, sir. They formed a similar 
task force, although not as large, in the group when they first partici- 
pated in their so-called "Benevolent Mediation" in Thai and French 
Indo China last February, at which time they had one carrier division 



662 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

assigned for a covering force which went down there for a display of 
power that was necessary ; and again in June or Jnly when they forced 
their demands on French Indo China to base the armed troops in North 
French Indo China. 

The Chairman, Where did they come from ? 

Commander Layton. One carrier division, one heavy cruiser divi- 
sion, two destroyer squadrons, one seaplane tender division, plus the 
third fleet, when it was organized, plus the other time, the South China 
fleet. 

General McNarney. How much larger was this task force under 
the second fleet than the task force you just spoke of? 

Commander Layton. Roughly, three times, sir. 

General McNarney. Three times in combat vessels ? 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

[1077] General McNarney. How much larger in transports? 

Commander Layton. Well, I do not know exactly how many trans- 
ports. I am a little out of my detail. However, we have estimated 
the first and second base forces with the third fleet consisted of 27 
and 17 transports respectively covered by converted subchasers, mme 
sweepers, mine layers, and other small craft, or medium small craft. 

General McNarney. Am I right in my assumption that the Japanese 
second fleet was about three times as large as the other organization 
you mentioned? 

Commander Layton. Yes, sir, the organization under the command 
of the second fleet; that is, the second fleet less certain units plus cer- 
tain of the first fleet units plus the third fleet plus the South China 
fleet, the southern expeditionary forces — was in force at least three 
times larger than the units previously employed in the French Indo 
China area. 

Admiral Eeeves. In this organization under the second fleet com- 
mander, which is three times greater than the previous organization, 
it contained two carriers ? 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. Whereas the previous organization contained only 
one carrier ? 

The Chairman. No. 

Commander Layton. No, they contained two carriers. 

The Chairman. But one division. 

Commander Layton. One division in each. 

Admiral Ree\tes. So the number of carriers was the same? 

Commander Layton. The number of carriers was the same, yes. 

Admiral Reeves. That is all. 

Admiral Standley. In regard to the sending of the radio or the 
absence of the radio being due to the fact that the ships were in port 
and not sending out the radio, does that [1078'\ apply to bat- 
tleships also? 

Commander Layton. It applies to all types, yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. I would like to have this same thing to show 
the battleships in port and when there was no traffic there. 

Commander Layton. Yes, I will cover the entire area during the 
year. 

The Chairman. Give us a memorandum on that. 

Commander Layton. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 663 

Admiral Standley. Let me ask you this question: Has the Naval 
Intelligence in Washington all the information for making the esti- 
mates of the situation and drawing conclusions? That is, from the 
Philippines, from Guam, and the Fourteenth District? 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. And in addition to that they have their own 
information ? 

Commander Layton. From my knowledge, they have, sir, but I do 
not know how much. 

Admiral Standley. If that is true, wouldn't they be in a better 
position to estimate the whole situation than you are here? 

Commander Layton. That is the way the system is laid. 

The Chairman. If you are an intelligence officer for the Commander 
of the Fleet of the United States, you do not expect that anything 
of value to you as to any important situation would be withheld from 
you by the authorities in Washington, do you? 

Commander Layton. No, sir. 

The Chairman. It would be part of their duty to send you every- 
thing? 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

The Chairman. Then why did you say they did not ? 

[1079] Commander Layton. I merely meant that as an answer 
to a specific question that we were receiving copies of reports. 

The Chairman. Do j'^ou mean they have more incoming matter, 
which they digest, and then send you the gist of it ? 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

Admiral Ree\^s. That would naturally be the case because their 
work does cover a broader field than yours ? 

Commander Layton. Yes, and also the war plan and the general 
naval intelligence service plan is such that Washington will be the 
central distribution point of these specific units like the one in the Six- 
teenth District and the Fourteenth District and the one at Guam, who 
in turn will keep the commanders fully informed. 

Admiral Standley. You felt sure you would receive all conclu- 
sions from the naval intelligence that were of any importance to you, 
but not the unnecessary details ? 

Commander Layton. Exactly ; yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Did they give you any warning of this attack? 

Commander Layton. No, sir, not here in Hawaii ; no, sir. There 
was a warning that the negotiations were breaking down. 

General McCoy. You mean the ones you saw ? 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

The Chairman. The ones we have here (indicating) ? 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

General McCoy. Have you been able to verify your statement since 
the attack from what happened at Wake and the reports from Wake 
and the reports from the Philippine operations as to the presence of 
the Japanese fleet in the Philippines and the Japanese task forces at 
Wake? 

Commander Layton. In general, yes, but specifically in some cases 
it is quite difficult, but I would like to review this in one respect. That 
is, that the Japanese change their [1080] calls and if there is 
a difference in the calls, then your organization must change. 



664 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Japanese normally change their calls on the first of November 
and the first of March or April. That is the sea call. They would 
also change their shore calls twice a year. They did that one month 
earlier; they changed their calls on the first of October. That was 
obvious, because they were having a lot of communications, and about 
the 30th of October "it was apparent that they were going to do some- 
thing in the line of communications. By that time we had them 
pretty well lined up. We had the major units lined up. 

They changed on 1 November, Japanese time 000. Their communi- 
cations became very involved. They would send the same message 
time and time again, obviously because they were not sending it to 
the right address, and the same message to one man would be sent and 
would come back later. 

That was remarked by the interceptor operators, who were trained 
along that line. That continued for October. 

The Chairman. For November. 

Commander Layton. For November. So, you see, to state specifi- 
cally which unit is a little difficult. 

Then they changed again on December 1st, and that was remarked 
upon; but then they have been increasing their means of communica- 
tion, of security, which they tried out during November. So, to 
answer your question specifically, is a little difficult. 

I might say this, that the reports from the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Asiatic Fleet, and the reports from the American observer in 
Singapore, and the Commander-in-Chief of the British Far East 
naval forces, have tended to confirm the initial distribution of the 
task force in the south. 

The attack on Wake, I am positive, was made with part of the task 
force that attacked here, plus, aided by having [lOSl] rein- 
forcements from certain forces from the Marshalls area. 

General McCoy. Why didn't the so-called relief force which went 
to Wake attack that force instead of turning around and coming back? 

Commander Layton. General, I cannot say that. That is really 
out of my sphere. 

General McCoy. You would, of course, inform the commander of 
that force what you knew of before he left? 

Commander Layton. Yes, sir, and he was kept informed while he 
was at sea. 

The Chairman. I assume that was the decision of the Comander-in- 
Chief? 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

General McNarney. What is your best estimate of the force attack- 
ing Wake? That is, land-based and sea planes. 

Commander Layton. The Commander-in-Chief's estimate of the 
land and sea plane tenders of the third division in the movements as 
of the 7th of December was 262 planes, of which amount 150 were 
estimated to be in the Marshalls. This was not unusual, as they had 
had aircraft concentration in that area before. 

General McN.vrney. Were those all land-based aircraft? 

Commander Layton. With the exception of some of the sea planes 
that are based on land and some sea planes based on tenders, and a 
converted tanker and converted freighter. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 665 

All these initial attacks on Wake were made by Navy twin-engine 
bombers, probably based on Eniwetok and Wotze or Taroa in the 
Malolead Atoll. 

The Chairman. Will you show those to irte on the map? 

(The witness indicated on the map.) 

Commander Layton. It is my belief that the four-engine sea planes 
which bombed Wake came from at or near the Atoll of Utrik. 

[lOS^] The sea borne forces are not as clear, but I estimate 
that they were the old cruisers, Tenryu and Tatsuta, and possibly ac- 
companied by the new cruisers Tone and Ohikuma. It is positive 
that Wake was attacked by carrier-based planes the day before the 
landing was successful. From the best information available I be- 
lieve this carrier, Soryu, was one of those which attacked Hawaii. 
The transports were probably from the six based with headquarters at 
Jaluit. 

General McNarney. How many four-engine and two-engine 
bombers do you think they used? 

Commander Layton. The four-engine sea planes amounted to a 
maximum of eighteen, as I recall it, and the two-engine bombers 
amounted to as high as forty-one, I believe. 

General McNarney. What is your estimate of the number of car- 
riers used in the attack on Oahu ? 

Cormnander Layton. Four, sir. 

General McNarney. Have you arrived at their names? 

Commander Layton. Yes, sir. From the recovered documents, 
instruments such as radios, drift sight, and so forth, I have identified 
definitely four carriers: the Akagi, which is the flag of the first 
carrier fleet, the Kaga, the Hiryu, and the Soryu. 

From the captured documents and such, which gave the composi- 
tion of the striking force, it appears that there were six carriers in- 
volved in the operation. The lack of definite indications of the other 
two leads us to believe that they were held in reserve to attack any 
task force or group, particularly carriers of ours, attempting to cut 
off or to close in on the four carriers in the attack. 

This task force, according to the documents, consisted of six car- 
riers: the Akagi, the Kaga, the Hiryu, the Soryu, the Shokaku, and 
the Zuikaku ; the cruisers Tone and Chikuma ; the ex-battle cruisers 
Hiyei and Kirishima, plus Desron, one [1083] from the first 
fleet, which consisted of the old cruiser Abukuma, and three destroyer 
divisions, a total of 12 destroyers. 

General McNarney. What do you mean by an ex-battle cruiser? 
What are they now ? 

Commander Layton. They are carried officially as battleships 
since they were modernized. 

General McNarney. What speed do they have ? 

Commander Layton. 26 knots. 

General McNarney. How many planes were on the four carriers 
which you believed were involved? 

Commander Layton. From the best information available the 
Kaga and Akagi carried and operated a maximum of 60 planes in 
each ; the Hiryu and Soryu operating a maximum of 53 planes each. 

General McNarney. Do you have any information tending to show 
which of these carriers the torpedo planes were on ? 



666 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Layton. I am positive that the torpedo planes, the 12, 
were from the Kaga. From the one torpedo plane wreck salvage, I 
recovered a mimeographed chartlet with these anchorages, and each 
anchorage was marked cr numbered. Although much the worse for 
wear from 12 days in the water, there were 12 targets picked up off 
the plane and its course was marked in red. The others were picked 
up with the course marked in blue. 

From the location of this plane and its position when shot down, 
I believe it was a red plane and that there were 12 — from the instru- 
ments and documents picked up — from the Kaga. The documents 
will not show the number of torpedo planes on the Kaga because the 
Kaga planes could have gone to the Shokaku, and the Shokaku planes 
could have gone to the Kaga. 

General McNarney. Do you have any idea about the blue planes? 

Commander Layton. No, sir. 

[1084-] In the task force organization of this striking force, this 
being a radio group carrying signals in the sea planes, they gave calls 
of the first wing and the second wing, and the first wing consisted 
of four squadrons of torpedo planes, one each from the Akagi, the 
Kaga, the Hiryu, and the Soryu. That is, there were two 12-plane 
squadrons with the exception of the Hiryu and Soryu, which were 
only 10. 

The second wing consisted of six squadrons, four squadrons being 
dive bombers and two squadrons being torpedo planes. 

By Japanese torpedo planes, as understood in the Japanese Navy, 
are meant the torpedo planes both carrier and high-altitude horizontal 
bombers. 

General McNarney. From that would you make an estimate that 
there were four squadrons of torpedo planes and four squadrons of 
dive bombers and two squadrons of dive and high-altitude bombers 
in the attack ? 

Conmiander Layton. That is my estimate with the exception of 
your last statement. I believe there were four squadrons of torpedo 
planes and horizontal bombers, four squadrons of dive bombers plus 
four squadrons or more of fighters. 

I have not recovered documents to give me the fighter organization. 

General McNarney. Of the first and second wings, as I understand 
it, they had ten squadrons, from your statement ^ 

Commander Layton. Twelve, sir; six in each. The first wing had 
four squadrons of torpedo bombers and two squadrons of dive 
bombers; the second wing had four squadrons of dive bombers and 
two squadrons of torpedo planes. 

It is possible that the Shokaku and Zuikaku were in the attack. 

General McNarney. A total of 12 squadrons of bombers and torpedo 
planes ? 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

[1085] I have it here, four or more squadrons of torpedo planes 
and horizontal bombers ; four or more squadrons of dive bombers plus 
considerably more than four squadrons of fighters. 

General McNarney. Can you break these bomber and torpedo 
squadrons down except to say you have a total of 12? You have four 
in each, which gives you only eight. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 667 

Commander Layton. I left off the planes from the Shokaku and 
Zuikaku which, I do not believe, participated in the action, and they 
were not included in the organization which I gave. 

General McNarney. Oh, I understand you now. 

Commander Layton. Yes. I think that the torpedo planes — that 
is, the two squadrons — were actually torpedo planes, and the other 
half of the two squadrons were horizontal bombers. 

I have one picture that shows 12 horizontal bombers in flight. 

General McNarney. That is one squadron ? 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

General McCoy. It is possible for horizontal bombing to be done 
so as to hit battleships successfully and, as was mentioned, to have 
only two bombs fall on Ford Island ? 

Commander Layton. General, I do not understand. 

General McCoy^. I am just referring to some testimony of Admiral 
Bellinger which he gave, stating that only two bombs fell on Ford 
Island ; yet on the perimeter of Ford Island ships were bombed very 
successfully. That does not look like horizontal bombing to me. That 
is, from a high altitude. I cannot conceive that they are so accurate. 
Certainly it was not pattern bombing. 

Commander Layton. From reading the reports I have not believed 
that it was pattern bombing. The impression that I have received 
was that the hits received by some of the \_10S6] battleships 
were horizontal bombing and indicated a degree of accuracy. 

General McCoy. And very low? 

The Chairman. Six thousand feet. 

Commander Layton. They were quite high, I would say. Well, I 
would say somewhere between six and ten thousand feet, from the 
bulk of evidence, and from the commanding officers. 

There was a very interesting telegram came in from Singapore 
which gave the results of Japanese horizontal bombing, which were 
equally accurate, and they gave the height as 12,000 feet. 

I would say the MPI was plus or minus 9 to 15 feet rather than 
yards. 

General McNarney. You did not recover anything in the way of a 
bomb sight, did you ? 

Commander Layton. No, sir, the torpedo plane carried no bomb 
sight, but in the horizontal bombs that shot down they set the fuse 
too short, because they did not get high enough. 

General McNarney. What w^as the fuse setting, if you know ? 

Commander Layton, No, sir. 

General McNarney. Will you find that out ? 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

General McNarney. And add that to it. 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

Admiral Keeves. Let me see if I have your estimate of the planes 
in the attack. There were two torpedo plane squadrons, two horizontal 
bomber squadrons, and four dive bomber squadrons and at least four 
fighter squadrons. Is that right ? 

Commander Layton. Four and many more fighters. 

Admiral Eeeves. Fighting planes ? 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 143, vol. 2 6 



668 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Reeves. That is 12 squadrons at that time? 

[1087] Commander Layton. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. How many in the fighter squadrons ? 

Commander Layton. Twelve. 

Admiral Reeves. There were 12 in which squadron? 

Commander Layton. Twelve has been their tactical unit, although 
in the operations from what I have heard it is frequent that they 
will gather in from other units other planes into their unit and they 
may have a tactical unit of 18 planes, but 12 is the operating unit 
from the carrier. 

Could I add something which you wanted me to say about the 
bombs on Ford Island ? 

From what I have read, the bombing of Ford Island was dive 
bombing, and that immediately thereafter the torpedo planes were 
seen approaching the island and along with the torpedo planes were 
horizontal and dive bombers. That is the first wave that Ford Island 
was only dive bombed and only strafed. 

I believe, although I may be incorrect, that the majority of the 
attack on the Army air fiekls was to cut down the pursuits and some 
was done by the fighters, but they did not want to waste the big bombs, 
but to save these torpedoes for the battle line and for the carriers. 
Incidentally, they thought they had a carrier on that position, at 
Ford Island, because they had that particularly lined up. 

The Chairman. As we have been given the picture, the first two 
bombs hit on the nose in Ford Island. 

Conmiander Layton. Yes. 

The Chairman. You think they were dive bombers? 

Commander Layton. From the reports I have read and the messages 
I have seen and from the reports of officers and commanders, that was 
the first thing they saw. 

The Chairman. That is, dive bombers ? 

Commander Layton. Yes. They saw the dive bombers and 
[1088] heard the whine of the bomber coming down and then 
finally pulling out of the dive. 

General McNarney. From your analyses of the reports, how 
many attacks were there ( 

Commander Layton. They seemed to be waves to me. The first 
wave was about 7:51; the second wave somewhere around 8:30; and 
the third wave conunenced about 1) o'clock. 

General McCoy. What is your estimate of the enemy losses? 

Commander Layton. I have estimated the planes shot down in 
and about Pearl Harbor by the Navy fighters to be between 12 and 
18 planes. I have attempted to find out and to make a better analysis, 
but there are so many conflicting reports — that is, everyone claims 
the same plane — that 1 woukl like to get a better sununation. 

In time I expect to have in better detail when all the ships have 
been heard from who have been asked to send in the chart showing 
where each plane has dropped. 

The Chairman. Are you aware of the fact that a number of planes 
did not reach their carrier on the return? 

Commander Layton. Yes, sir, for two reasons: first, that of the 
danger involving the return to the carriers due to lack of fuel, and 
the second reason is that the Japanese themselves announced that 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 669 

they lost '29 planes. Incidentally, that is the highest plane loss the 
Jajianese have ever announced, including the time she lost 53 on 
the Emporer's hirthday. when she announced none. 

General McNarnky. If she announced that she has lost 29 planes, 
she would normally announce only those planes which she knew the 
United States knew she had lost. In other words, the 29 planes were 
lost over Oahu. 

Commander Layton. That may be true, General. 

The Chairman. Then that would come very close to your estimate 
of 28. 

\JiM9] General McNarney. In other words, there is no reason 
why Japan would announced losses about which we knew nothing? 

Commander Layton. No, sir. As a matter of fact, Japan rarely 
announces losses of planes. The standard ending of a communique 
is "All planes returned safetly," 

General McNarney. I know it is the common practice of the 
British to announce only those losses of which they think the Germans 
know about. They never announce losses which they think the Ger- 
mans do not know. 

Commander Layton. That has occurred to me. 

General McCoy. How many planes did the Army shoot down ? 

Commander Layton. I do not know. General. There was a com- 
nuniique out which stated that they shot down 22, I believe. 

General McCoy. It was 21 they reported to us. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General McNarney. I think it was 22 sure and possibly 28. 

General McCoy'. What about the story that the Navy picked up 
about a lost squadron at sea which could not get back to the carrier? 

Commander Layton. I have not heard they lost a squadron, sir. 
I have heard of a lost fighter who was lost and who had attacked the 
NORTHAMPTON in a scouting section south of Niihau, and after 
making several attempts, with 25 bullet holes in it, it left with smoke 
streaming out of it. 

The Chairman. We heard testimony in the hearings at Fort 
Shafter that some 18 planes had been heard to call that they were 
out of gas and then could not reach their carrier. 

Commander Lay^ton. Commander Rocliefort can testify to that. 
I know there was a call identified as a leader — how big a leader I do 
not know. That was at sea around 12 :35 local time. He said, "I 
have fuel for ten minutes." 

At 12 :40 local time he said, "I will fly as long as I have fuel." 

[1090'] The Chairman. That was from the leader? 

ComnuHider Lay'ton. He made the call Kanure, which the inter- 
ceptor operato}- who took it and was handling his messages thought 
that he was possibly the connnander of that group. 

The Chairman. Commander, you were at conferences with the 
Commander-in-Chief, I presume, between November 27 and Decem- 
ber 7, respecting the instant situation? 

Commander Layton. Yes. I was in conferences daily. 

The Chairman. Had 3'ou the slightest suspicion of a possible air 
attack upon Pearl Harbor? 

Commander Layton. No, sir. 



670 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Why not, when you had the warning and from 
what you knew about the situation that Japan would strike and prob- 
ably strike hard and even before war was declared? 

Commander Layton. Yes, That had all been considered. 

The Chairman. That had all been considered ? 

Commander Latton. Yes, that had all been considered and dis- 
cussed. 

The Admiral, in fact, said one day, "Where are the battleships?" 

I said, "I don't know. Their location has not been known for more 
than a week." 

He said, "Do you think they could be off here or out at sea without 
our knowing it?" 

I said, "Yes, if they have maintained radio silence." 

He said, "Do you think they are?" and I said, "No." 

He said, "Where do you think they are?" and I said, "I estimate 
they are in port, having completed two weeks' operations, and they 
are having overhaul for new operations." 

[lO&l] Greneral McNarnet. Was there some discussion held 
with reference to the carriers ? 

Commander Latton. Yes, only not so specific. The Admiral knew 
of the carriers down there, I am sure. 

General McNarnet. He did not wonder whether they might be 
opposite Oahu ? 

Commander Latton. I do not doubt that he did because he has a- 
mind that could make you wonder very much. 

That was mentioned at the same time but the repetition was not 
made. 

General McNarnet. Was there any discussion as to where the car- 
riers were the previous two weeks ? 

Commander Latton. Yes. I said they had been down at Takau 
in Formosa, and they had been active with the target ship Settso on the 
I7th, I believe, and there had been considerable air activity; that car- 
rier division 3 was enroute or in the South China Sea, and one of the 
carrier divisions was reported to be in or near the Mandates, and the 
others were getting tlieir bases all set, but their location was not known. 

Could I add one observation here? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Commander Latton. Another point in that same discussion was 
brought up. While I am no strategist, I made the observation that the 
formation of the task force, as I saw it, of the strength to the south, 
that the best of their cruisers, the Tone and Chilmma, were not in the 
force, and that most of their fast power was headed to the south, and 
that the idea of carriers operatmg by themselves without a good 
strong support did not look very logical. 

The Chairman. That was not in the discussion? 

Commander Latton. No. 

The Chairman. That was your own ratiocination? 

Commander Latton. Yes, that was my own opinion, sir. 

The CirAiRMAN. Not being a Navy man myself, the enumeration of 
the task forces in which these attacking [1092'] carriers were, 
sounded to me like a not inconsiderable force. 

Commander Latton. You mean the carrier fleet ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 671 

The Chairman. Yes. As you enumerated them where you have bat- 
tle cruisers, destroyers, and so on, it would seem that it would have 
taken a very considerable task force from here to equal that force in 
strength, would it not ? 

Commander Layton. It would take a considerable force, but they 
would be quite vulnerable. 

The Chairman. They would ? 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

The Chairman. Why do you say so ? 

Commander Layton. That is my opinion. I am not an expert. 

The Chairman. Neither am I. 

Commander Layton. That a carrier is very vulnerable — although 
potent also. However, when a carrier is caught without her planes 
absolutely ready or her area patrols or if it is bad weather and she 
cannot get her aerial patrols up, or if she has a hole in her sound screen, 
then a submarine can do a tremendous amount of damage. 

If the weather is bad and scouting cannot be continued over a wide 
area, superior forces, and even light cruisers which are not superior, 
can throw a shell onto her carrier deck and render the use of her own 
planes impossible. 

Admiral Reeves. As I understand your estimate, there were four 
and possibly six carriers in the division. 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. And two cruisers ? 

Commander Lay^ton. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. The Tone and Chikuma and two ex-battle 
cruisers ? 

Commander Lay'ton. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. And 12 destroyers ? 

[1093] Commander Layton. Yes, and the old cruisers. 

Admiral Reeves. And that is the striking force ? 

Commander Layton. Yes. As I obtained that from the radio call 
sheet out of the plane. 

Admiral Reeves. Then in strength, that is hardly equal to the 
strength of our task force, three of which we had out, except in car- 
riers. That is, a carrier in each one, three heavy cruisers 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. And 12 destroyers? 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. And that was 12. They did have more carriers 
in this one group ? 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. Wliat are those old cruisers ? 

Commander Layton. In guns they have 14-inch guns; in armor 
they have 8-inch side armor, but they are very vulnerable to a good 
8-inch shell. 

The Chairman. Any other questions? 

Admiral Reeves. No. 

The Chairman. We find it necessary to ask all the witnesses not to 
discuss anything that has occurred in this room. Do not discuss it 
with anyone. 

Commander Layton. Yes. 



672 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. I trust you will observe thut. 

Commander Layton. Yes. I \vill prepare this matter for you. 

The Chairman. Yes, and send it to the Recorder, Mr. Howe, when- 
ever you have it ready. 

Commander Layton. Yes. 

The Chairman. With the permission of the Commission I am going 
to insert in the record the paraphrases of these two messages which 
have been referred to during the testimony of this and other witnesses. 

11094^ (The two messages above referred to are as follows:) 

U. S. Naval Communication Sermce 
Secret commander-in-chiek 

(Classification) u. s. pacific flekt 

Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. 

Please return to coding officer for burning when of no furtlier use. 

"In our opinion a surprise aggressive movement in any direction by the 
Japanese including an attack on the Pliilippines or Guam is a possibility. 
This is indicated by the doubtful chances of favorable outcome of negotiations 
with Japan coupled with statements of their government and movements of 
their army and naval forces. In order not to complicate an already tense 
situation or precipitate Japanese action utmost secrecy is mandatory. The 
Chief of Staff i-equests that action addressees inform local army senior officers. 
He has seen this dispatch and concurs. Guam will be advised in separate 
correspondence." 

CBO WJE 

Date 25 Nov 41 

Serial No. 11-763 

Originator OPNAV 

Action CINCAF CINCPAC Connnandants 11th, 12th, 13th, and 1,1th Naval 
Dists. 

Information Spenavo London CINCLANT. 



[1095] U. S. Naval Communication Service 

Secret commander-in-chikk 

(Classification) u. 8. pacific fleet 

Paraphrase 

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch. 

Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use. 

"Consider this dispatt-h a war warning. Tlie negotiations with Japan in 
an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected 
to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious ex- 
pedition against either the Philippines, Tliai or Kra Peninsula or possibly 
Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and 
the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive 
deployment in prei>aration for carrying i)ut the tasks assigned in WPL 40 only. 
Guam Samoa and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate 
measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War De- 
partment. Inform naval district antl army authorities. British to be informed 
by Spenavo." 

CBO WJE 

Date 2S Nov 41 

Serial No. 11-856 

Originator OPNAV 272337 

Action CINCPAC CINCAF 

Information CINCLANT Spenavo. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 673 

[1096'] TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER JOSEPH JOHN ROCHEFORT, 
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES 
NAVY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will j^ou give your name and rank to the re- 
porter ? 

Commander Rochefort. Joseph John Rochefort, Commander, 
United States Navy. 

The Chairman. Commander, you are the Chief Intelligence Officer 
of the Fourteenth Naval District, are you not? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. If I may amend that, sir, I am 
the officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit, as distin- 
guished from the District Intelligence Officer with which I have no 
connection. 

The Chairman. I do not get the distinction between your func- 
tion and that of the Fleet Intelligence Officer on the one hand and 
the District Intelligence Officer on the other. Will you distinguish 
that for me ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. The District Intelligence Officer 
is a member of the District Stall' of the Commandant. His duty 
has more to do with defense. That is, it is in connection with sub- 
versive activities, aliens, sabotage, and that sort of thing. 

Combat Intelligence is a term that has been derived from a unit 
of the fleet and has to do with intelligence that is obtained particu- 
larly during and prior to hostilities and has to do with the functions 
of the enem3\ In other words, on the staff of the operations sec- 
tion, which is primarily concerned with movement as to intelligence 
and organization and more with enemy movements — I might say 
that, my duties and the fleet intelligence officer are quite parallel 
except that his duties also comprise the duties normally of the Dis- 
trict Intelligence Officer. 

The Chairman. The District Intelligence Officer did have 
\1097] an arrangement with the RCA to obtain transcriptions of 
certain commercial messages forwarded from Honolulu, and particu- 
larly by Kita, the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, between 1 December 
and 6 December, 1941. They were in a code which he was unable to 
read and he turned them over to you for assistance ; is that correct ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I refer now particularly to a telegram which was 
forwarded on the 3rd of December and I ask you if you remember 
when you received that from the District Intelligence Officer. 

Commander Rochefort. It was either Thursday night, the 4th of 
December, or Friday, the 5th of December. I believe it was during 
the night, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you make a record of the receipt of such things? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You have to rely on your memory ? 

Commander Rochefort. I will put it this way : the reason we do 
not is that they do not exist. The document in question, as far as we 
are concerned, up to the 7th of December, did not exist. 

The Chairman. What do you mean by that? 



674 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Rochefort. Well, there used to be a federal law, sir, 
about that, but that does not exist now. There is no record of it at all. 

The Chairman. Were you able to break that message ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Will you tell me when you broke it? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir, about approximately midnight 
Wednesday 10 December. 

The Chairman. Not until then ? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. 

The Chairman. So that neither the District Intelligence [1098] 
Officer, your command, the Fourteenth Naval District, or the Com- 
mander of the fleet had any knowledge of the contents or meaning of 
that message until after December 7? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Was that one of a number of messages handed to 
you? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, there were several messages handed 
to us either Thursday night or Friday. That is, I was informed to 
make the regular arrangement, but there were, I think, three or four 
such messages. 

The Chairman. In a batch ? 

Commander Rochefort. In a batch received Thursday night. 

The Chairman. Were vou able to uncode any of them before the 
8th? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. 

The Chairman. So this one failed of uncoding not because it was 
the last but because you were not able to break it until then? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, it was a variation of several systems, 
and actually we did have the key to it. There was the point that the 
fellow who did his job did it backwards, which we never suspected. 
The fellow set the message up backwards, which held us up three or 
four days. If he had done his job properly we would have had it 
Friday morning. 

General McNarney. You mean the coder? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes. As a matter of fact, that had hap- 
pened at other times but we did not try that particular point until 
Wednesday. 

The Chairman. Commander, did you pick up any radio talk after 
the attack which indicated that some of the Japanese planes were 
unable to reach their carrier for lack of gas? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. What was the effect of the information that 
[J099] you did pick up? 

Commander Rochefort. The sequence of the events, as I recall 
them, was a series of messages from a plane or a squadron of planes 
or a group of planes to the effect that he asked for a bearing on his 
ship. Then he said he had ten minutes of gas left and he said he 
would fly as long as possible, and then he said he had five minutes 
supply left, and that is all we heard. He said nothing after that. 

We identified him at the time as being a commander of a group of 
planes, possible a subdivision, or a squadron conmiander. 

General McCoy. Were you able to spot him on the map at the time ? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. The transmission time was very 
brief. The transmissions were only a matter of two or three seconds, 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 675 

and it is extremely difficult to get any sort of bearing within that 
period of time. 

The Chairman. Do you have a system of monitoring radio com- 
munications on this island? 

Commander Rochefort. We have a system, yes. 

The Chairman. How many monitoring stations do you have regu- 
larly ? 

Commander Rochefget. We had on the 3rd of December three 
direction finders, and in addition one in Dutch Harbor, and one in 
Samoa. They together comprised the mid-Pacific direction finder 
net under the direction of the Commandant Fourteenth Naval Dis- 
trict. They have been used and are being used to detect transmissions 
and to obtain bearings on the same. That has been in existence for a 
number of years. 

The Chairman. Do you consider that number of stations sufficient 
for the purpose ? 

Commander Rochefgrt. I would like to add one more station 
at Midway, which was installed last August at the direction of 
[1100] the Commandant. 

Insofar as the transmissions from the Japanese fleet in the 
Western Pacific are concerned I believe the stations are being used 
in the Far East net in Guam and Cavite, and they are loosely 
connected with us, and w^e control the whole outfit. 

Insofar as the fleet itself is concerned, I think that the stations 
are sufficient insofar as local transmission is concerned. Additional 
stations might be used, however. 

The Chairman. How about the local stations? Do you monitor 
these local messages? 

Commander Rgchefort. I am not referring to the local stations; 
I mean the enemy units that may be picked up. I do not mean 
anything on this island at all, sir. 

[1101] The Chairman. No. 

Commander Rgchefort. That has been decided as a function of 
the Army by the Joint Board. 

The Chairman. I see. 

Commander Rgchefort. That is their function, and we are not in 
that. I mean by "local stations" enemy units within five or six hun- 
dred miles, some tactical setup. 

The Chairman. What I meant was the manipulation of sets to 
discover who is sending messages. 

Admiral Standley. From our own force. 

The Chairman. From our own — from the Island and to the 
Island. I am particularly thinking of interception of Japanese 
espionage or sabotage messages. 

Commander Rgchefort. Oh, sir, that is done physically by the 
F. C. C. under the Army control. 

Admiral Reeves. What is the F. C. C? 

Commander Rgchefort. Federal Communications Commission, 
sir. They have what they refer to as monitoring sets. We never 
use the term in what we speak of at all. 

The Chairman. Yes, that is what I got: * 'monitoring sets." 

Commander Rgchefort. Yes, they use that term, and they con- 
sist of small mobile units which run around in automobile trucks, 



676 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and they get bearings and that sort of thing, and they will get the 
bearing from here (indicating) and run out two or three miles and 
get another bearing. 

The Chairman. And find out where the set is working? 
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. They refer to those as moni- 
toring sets. 
The Chairman. Yes. 

Commander Rochefort. And those are all under the control of 
the F. C. C. 
The Chairman. They are? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. We have nothing to do with 
that at all. 

The Chairman. I suppose we can find out who has got [1102] 
control of that here? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir, we can. The Army has been 
handling that matter. It probably would be Colonel Bicknell, and 
I understand there is some discussion now relative to coordinating 
some of the D. F.'s used by the various Naval air stations for hom- 
ing planes, tying all those in together, but that has always been a 
function of the F. C. C. 

The Chairman. You have nothing to do with it ? 
Commander Rochefort. No, sir. No, sir. Our business has to 
do with the Japanese, but I think there has perhaps been a little 
misconception, sir, there. When we refer to D. F. stations — direc- 
tion finder stations — we are referring to the Navy net. 
The Chairman. Yes. 

Comm'ander Rochefort. Which envisages picking up transmis- 
sions and running them through. 

The Chairman. Well, I thought that perhaps your intelligence 
service was attempting to spot these little stations on the Island 
through this monitoring. 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. We are not designed for that. 
The Chairman. I see. 

Commander Rochefort. As an example, our main D. F. station 
is very inaccurate under two or three hundred miles. 
The Chairman. I see. 

Commander Rochefort, So it is of no advantage. 
The Chairman. It wouldn't be useful? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. It is built for four or five 
thousand miles. 

Admiral Standley. Commander, what is the procedure in regard 
to guarding wave lengths of the different task groups, and that sort 
of thing, in the communication center? 

Commander Rochefort. You mean of our own transmission, sir? 
[1103] Admiral Standley. Yes. 

Commander Rochefort. That is done by the District communica- 
tion officer, sir. He controls certain frequencies of our transmission 
from the District connnunication offices at Wahiawa, and the fleet in 
turn guards the so-called fleet frequencies. The District guards the 
shore frequencies and the regular schedules witli Washington, Cavite, 
and Dutch Harbor, and so on, and the fleet guards their own, and we 
are operating just the opposite way from that : we are'guardinf every- 
body else's frequencies but our own. 

Admiral Standley. Yes. Your direction finder. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 677 

Commander Rociiefort. Yes, sir. We are not at all interested in 
our own transmission at all as to the combat intelligence unit. 

Admiral Standley. I think what the Chairman is after — I know 
what he is trying to get at is who received or would receive messages 
coming in here from various sources, some our own, some from oper- 
ating outfits, shore boats, fishing boats, and what not. Would the 
guards of our wave lengths in the communication center give him that 
information? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. If the transmissions, either en- 
emy or our own, were on frequencies or frequencies close to our own 
frequencies — that is, the frequencies assigned us by the Federal Com- 
munications Commission — were close to that, they would naturally 
intercept them. If, however, a transmission was made on a frequency 
which was not a fleet frequency or not a shore frequency, we will say 
perhaps a frequency that might have been assigned to the Germans, 
we would probably not be covering it here at all. It is purely a 

Admiral Standley. Yes. 

The Chairman. Well, then, there are two things that you probably 
aren't covering. You probably aren't spotting illicit sending stations 
on the Island at all, and you wouldn't [i^O^] be spotting com- 
munications into the Island unless they were on or near some of the 
frequencies you have; is that right? 

Commander Rochefort. If I may say so, I think we are still a little 
off from each other. I was referring initially to the direction finders. 

The Chairman. Yes, I understand this. 

Commander Rochefort. Now we are talking about transmissions 
that are either from enemy or our own. We make an attempt in our 
organization to cover every possible transmission that is being trans- 
mitted by the Germans, Italians, Japanese, or who it may be; and 
the number that we actually cover is limited only by the number of 
men we have and the number of receivers we have. At the present 
time we are covering in our so-called interceptor watch, which inter- 
cepts enemy transmissions in the form of radio messages and copies the 
radio messages intact — we are covering perhaps 10 to 15 to 20 frequen- 
cies which are more or less well-defined. 

In other words, we know that Tokyo has a circuit with Sasebo and 
Kure and Yokosuka. We copy that constantly. In Tokyo is what 
we call the Yutsu broadcast, which is a fleet broadcast sent out to every- 
body, and we copy that, and we copy the various commanders-in-chief. 
We copy those so-called standard ones. 

Then we have, in addition to that, what we call the search watch, 
depending again on the limitation of the number of operators, but 
each operator has usually two to three receivers, which is about his max- 
imum he can control. 

The Chairman. And he works around on different frequencies? 

Commander Rochefort. We just search from the bottom of the band 
to the top of the band ; we just go from one end of it to the other. 

The Chairman. And the search would be much more complete if 
you had a greater number of operators ? 

[IIOS] Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And less of an arc to cover ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. The only limiting factor is the 
number of trained men and the number of receivers that are available. 



678 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now, we have plenty of receivers, but the number of trained men is 
rather limited, and every effort has been made by everybody con- 
cerned — the Department, the fleet, and ourselves — to build that up, 
but the attrition is rather high, and at the present time we have 65, 70 
men that are doing just that and nothing else. 

The Chairman. Of course they have to work in short shifts, because 
it is very intense work ? 

Commander Kochefort. It is rather intense, sir, because it differs 
from — in a technical sense it differs from our own in that our own stuff 
comes in very loud, it is our own language, and everything else ; and 
this stuff we are getting — we have to reach out for it and pull it in. It 
is much more difficult to copy. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Commander Kochefort. But we cover — ^I think that we may say that 
we cover the thing very completely. 

The Chairman. Well, now, you have not got a net out for messages 
that are coming in to foreign agents on the Island here by little weak 
shoi't-wave sets from somewhere else, have you ? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir, but I think that we would hear 
them if they were, what you might say, on any standard frequencies or 
perhaps any standard transmitters, or if they were in a very low wave 
band or on a very high wave band we would miss them ; but if they 
were on anything standard such as a trans-Pacific telephone between 
Tokyo and South America or on any of the propaganda broadcasts 
from Tokyo, on any of that sort of thing we would hear them, because 
we copy them fairly solid. We also copy the German schedules very 
[1106] solid that we can hear. 

The Chairman. Now, the other end of the proposition, picking up 
fellows who are illicitly sending from small sets on the Island, you are 
not equipped to pick them up ? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. That is, not as a sender — as I 
said, it is the — that comes under the defensive ; sabotage or anything 
of that nature is really the D. I. O. We are concerned with what the 
enemy fleet is doing. 

The Chairman. I understand. Are there any further questions, 
gentlemen ? 

Admiral Reeves. I think we might in a sense cover the testimony 
that we have just had from the fleet intelligence. 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. I understood from him that much of the data 
which he sent he receives from your office. 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Admiral Reeves. You collect it and transmit it to him? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. I understood from him that there are blank spaces 
in the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers. 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. That you would hear them at times, and then 
there would be periods when you did not hear them, and you trans- 
lated that to mean that they Avere perhaps in port; at least, they were 
maintaining radio silence on high frequency. Do you remember the 
last three of the Japanese carriers prior to December 7 ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 679 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. Beginning about the 

Admiral Reeves. This is sort of repetition. 

The Chairman. I know, but it straightens it up. 

Commander Rochefort. Beginning about the first of November it 
became apparent to us in a study of the traffic that there was something 
afoot. We couldn't put our hands on it as to what it was to be or any 
direction or anything \1107^, else being indicated, but it became 
apparent that there was something building up. It had the same ap- 
pearance as the move against Hainan some years ago and as the move 
against Indo-China last spring. We have been forecasting just by 
studying the traffic. Everything seemed to be centered around Palao. 
Then later the activities seemed to move out in this direction toward 
Jaluit, which indications were all reported by daily summaries to the 
fleet and to the Commandant. 

About the 25th or 26th of November it also became apparent that 
there was a concentration of submarines and aircraft carriers, and it 
looked like one battleship division, in the Marshall area, which was 
one of the first indications we had had of close cooperation between 
the aircraft and the submarines. That built up until about the end 
of the month we were so sure of the thing and so positive that we sent 
a dispatch to the Department telling them of our thoughts on the 
matter, of what we had worked out, and it still looked like everything 
was down around Palao with the exception of these vessels over in the 
Marshalls that didn't make sense. We were quite positive that the 
carriers were there. We knew that. That was approximately the 
end of November or possibly the first of December. 

Admiral Reeves. How many carriers did you estimate they had ? 

Commander Rochefort. We estimated one division, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Two carriers? 

Commander Rochefort. Two carriers or possibly three. 

Admiral Reeves. Yes. 

Commander Rochefort. And one battleship division, with all of 
the 4th Fleet submarines and at least one or two squadrons of sub- 
marines from the fleet itself. In other words, the submarines in the 
Marshalls had been built up quite a bit. About a day after that the 
carriers just completely dropped from sight; never heard another 
word from [^1108^ them. And the only thing we could 

say was that the carriers were not heard. We just hadn't heard the 
carriers any more. Whether they were the same carriers that came 
here, whether they were the covering force of carriers, of course, we 
don't know, but they just completely dropped out of the picture ap- 
proximately the first of December ; battleships likewise. 

The Chairman. Well, you hadn't located all the carrier fleet of 
Japanese planes in the Marshalls? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir; only one division. 

The Chairman. But only a couple, one division ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir, one division ; it would be two or 
three. 

The Chairman. And then there was information that one division 
was down in the neighborhood of Thailand with that enormous fleet 
down there? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir, that was all stated also. 



680 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Yes. And that would leave a matter of four car- 
riers unheard of anywhere, wouldn't it? 
Admiral Keeves. Six. 
The Chairman. Six? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. If there were three in the Mar- 
shalls and three in Thailand, that left them actually one carrier or 
one carrier and three converted carriers. 
The Chairman. Yes. 

Commander Rochefort. A maximum of four. 
The Chairman. But if there were two in each of those places it 
would have left them a maximum of six ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir, including the converted carriers 
it left them that. 

Admiral Reeves. There were either four or six whose whereabouts 
you didn't know ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir, but these we did 

Admiral Reeves. Well, when did you hear of these carriers ag;ain ? 
[1109] Commander Rochefort. The 7th of December, sir. 
Admiral Reeves. Well, now, the carriers that attacked here, how 
many do you estimate in that fleet? 

Commander Rochefort. I estimate three, sir. 
Admiral Reeves. Three? 

Commander Rochefort. Three, yes, sir. A possible four, but I am 
inclined to believe three, and the others were, I would say, in the 
immediate area within 500 miles. 

Admiral Ree\tes. They were in reserve? 
Commander Rochefort. The other three, perhaps. 
General McNarney. Can you name the ones that you think were 
here? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir : the Kaofa, the Akagi, and the 
Soryu. If there was a fourth one it was the Hiryu. That is Cardiv 1 
and Cardiv 2, sir. 

Admiral Reea^s. Well, which ones do you think were in the 
Marshalls ? 

Commander Rochefort. The division in the Marshalls, sir, we 
thought at the time that it was Cardiv 1, the Kaga and the Akagi, but 
we weren't sure. There were no names mentioned. 

The Chatrmax. In other words, it was two of those that seem to 
have been liere, isn't it? 
Admiral Reeves. Yes. 
Connnander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 
The Chairman. In other words, they worked around, your 

theory 

Admiral Reeves. Did you hear the — is it Shokaku? 
Commander Rochefort. Shokaku. 
Admiral Reeves. How do you spell it? 
Commander Rochefort. S-h-o-k-a-k-u. 
Admiral Reeves. The Shokaku. 
Comniander Rochefort. And the Zuikaku. 
Admiral Reeves. How do you spell that? 
Commander Rochefort. Z-u-i-k-a-k-u. 

[IlK'] Admiral Reeves. Had you heard them at any time? 
Commander Rochefokt. No, sir. They never appeared in the pic- 
ture at all, hut they were in the striking force. From the information 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 681 

we received subsequent— that is, during the 7th— from guards and 
one thing and another, the striking force was composed of the Kaga, 
the Akagi, the Hiryu, the Soryu, the Shokaku, and Zuikaku, six 
carriers, the Kirishima and the Hiei, two old battleships. 

Admiral Keeves. How do you spell Kirishima? 

Commander Rochefort. K-i-r-i-s-h-i-m-a. And the Hiei, H-i-e-i, 
two old battleships; and the two old cruisers, the Tone and the 
Chikuma. 

Admiral Reeves. Yes. 

Commander Rochefort. One desron and an unknown number of 
destroyers. That was the so-called striking force. 

Admiral Reeves. Yes. 

Commander Rochefort. And it was listed as the No. 1 striking 
force. 

Now, of those carriers either three or four came here. 

Admiral Reeves. Were in the attack? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. The cruisers did not show up 
until the following day when the Abukuma sent a message that he bore 
90 degrees 110 miles from somebody else, which indicated that he 
was actually with the organization. He belongs in the 4th Fleet nor- 
mally, which is the Mandate fleet. 

Admiral REE^^s. Well, now let me ask : There were carriers operat- 
ing in the vicinity of Wake Island ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Do you know how many and which they were? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, it was the Soryu and Hiryu. 

Admiral Reeves. The Soryu and Hiryu? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. And the Soryu you think was here ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

[1111] Admiral Reeves. And the Hiryu? 

Commander Rochefort. The Hiryu, I question whether she was 
here or not. She may have been in this immediate area, but I question 
whether she participated in the attack. 

Admiral Reeves. How do you spell Hiryu? 

Commander Rochefort. H-i-r-y-u, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. And you are sure that they were at Wake Island? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. We gave ^ bearing to the fleet 
Sunday evening placing the Soryu by name close aboard Wake, I 
would say within a hundred miles of Wake, and it turned out that 
Wake had an attack that Sunday afternoon. We didn't know about 
that until later, but the radio bearings — he had given bearings — put 
the Soryu right close to Wake, about a hundred — between a hundred 
and two hundred miles to the northwest of Wake. 

General McNarney. What date? 

Admiral Reeves. What date? 

Commander Rochefort. That would be Sunday. 

The Chairman. December 2 ? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir, that was the 

The Chairman. The following Sunday. 

Commander Rochefort. That was the day before Wake was 
captured. 

Admiral Reeves. That would be December 14. 



682 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Rochefort, Yes, sir, that would be the following 
Sunday. 

General McCoy. Wake was captured the 22nd. 

Commander Rochefort. 22nd. It took two weeks. Yes, sir, it 
would be two weeks ; it would be the 21st. 

Admiral Reeves, It would be December 21 ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. They had plenty of time to get there. 

The Chairman. Oh, yes. 

[iyi2] Commander Rochefort. We had run them out, sir — sev- 
eral times we had received bearings from the Soryu. On Tuesday, for 
example, we have a report here, which would be the 9th, they had some 
air operations, and they had some trouble, apparently. They lost some 
planes. They were conducting homing operations for planes on Tues- 
day, the 9th. That placed them about 500, 600 miles northwest of here 
on Tuesday, the 9th, and they were having some difficulty themselves 
with their planes. 

Admiral Reeves. What other forces did you locate at Wake on the 
21st? 

Commander Rochefort. On the 21st we located 

Admiral REE^^:s. Or about that date ? 

Commander Rochefort. We located — during the night of Sunday 
we located what looked like a cruiser. We call them a fleet unit. We 
couldn't identify them : a cruiser and several Naval auxiliaries which 
Wake Island said the next day were transports. 

Admiral Reeves. I see. Is this information given to the fleet? 

Commander Rochefort, Yes, sir. 

Admiral Ree\t:s, Was it given — well, you wouldn't know, would 
you, whether it was giveai to the task force that he had operating near 
Wake at that time? 

Commander Rochefort, No, sir, I didn't know that. 

Admiral Ree\t:s, You didn't know that? 

Commander Rochefort. The arrangements we make — we had and 
do have still now — are that we make a daily report to the Commander- 
in-Chief, 

Admiral Reeves, Yes, 

Commander Rochefort, A daily summary report. And in addition 
to that we give the Commander-in-Chief, as it occurs, anything of any 
immediate interest. Regardless of what it is, we give him that im- 
mediately. What action is taken on it, of [1113] course, we 
don't know. 

Admiral Ree\t:s. Well, did you know of our task force in the vicinity 
of Wake? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. You did? 

Commander Rochefort. We did know that, and 

Admiral REE^'ES. Do you know how far our task force was from 
Wake on December 21 wlien you located these carriers there? 

Commander Rochefort. Not definitely, sir, I do know that they 
were to have landed their planes on INIonday afternoon. 

Admiral Reeat:s. The 22d?^ 

Commander Rochefort, Yes, sir, they were to have landed planes 
on Wake. I make that statement because the other fellow to the south 
was to have his D-day started at 1630 here Sunday, and this other thing 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 683 

up at Wake was to have been 24 hours later, which would have placed 
it Monday afternoon our time, local time. 

General McNarney. How soon after the attack December 7 did 
you have a definite location of any of the carriers or cruisers or battle- 
ships taking part in this task force? 

Commander Rochefort. About 10 :30 Sunday morning we received 
one bearing from our radio station at Heeia. The CXK, the big radio 
direction at Lualualei, had gone out of commission due to a failure of 
communications. We didn't know at the time what it was, and yet still 
don't know. I am inclined to think it was just excitement of various 
people in pulling out plugs. We couldn't reach them through any 
communication, so we had to use the station at Heeia, which is a radio 
direction finder that can give only reciprocal. It is termed a bilateral 
one, and they gave us calls and they told us — this was approximately 
10 :30 Sunday morning — that the man in command was Commander 
Carrier Divisions. We had [1114-] already identified him as 
Comcardivs, and they call themselves the 1st Air Fleet, but we had 
always identified him as Comcardivs or our Comairbatf or. He bore 
either 357 or 178. That was approximately 10:30 Sunday morning, 
and other bearings received from the same station were approximately 
on the same bearing. It varied two or three degrees one way or the 
other. Beginning about noon Sunday no other bearings 

The Chairman. Well, now, wait. That wouldn't identify them for 
an attack, would it? 

Commander Rochefort. This was two or three hours after the 
attack, sir. 

The Chairman. No, but if you wanted to go out and attack him, 
would that one bearing help you ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Where would it show you he was? 

Commander Rochefort. He couldn't be more than 200 miles to the 
north or 200 miles to the south. 

The Chairman. He would be either 

Commander Rochefort. Either one or the other, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. One or the other. 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. He had to be one or the other. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Commander Rochefort. And through a limitation of aircraft op- 
erations he would be expected to be within 200 miles. 

The Chairman. Go ahead. 

Commander Rochefort. Nothing else was heard that day from any 
of the units other than airplanes returning to the ships. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Commander Rochefort. In which th^ gave numerous bearings, 
such as, "You bear from me 314" and "You bear from me 324," and 
"Your course is so and so." Other than those bits of information 
there were no transmissions from the ships [i-?-?5] until Tues- 
day, when the position of at least one carrier was fixed as being ap- 
proximately four or five hundred miles between here and Midwaj'^ 
to the north, generally on a line with the Island, sir; I would say 
probably a little north of French Frigate. 

Admiral Reeves. Would not the reciprocal bearing which you 
had — What was it? 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 2 7 



684 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Rocpiefort. 178-357, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. 178-357? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Admiral REE^'ES. Would not that reciprocal, coupled with the 
message from the carrier to planes in the air, "You bear such a direc- 
tion from me" — would not those two bearings identify the carrier 
as being north or south ? That is on the assumption that the planes 
were between him and the Island somewhere. 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. And if they bore 180 from the carrier, the carrier 
must be north of Oahu? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, do you mean to say that you would have 
deduced from that whether the carrier was north or south? You 
would have deduced — 

Admiral Reeves. Oh, yes. 

The Chairman. — he was north? 

Admiral Reeves. Now, we will say here this is 178 — call it 180. 
That would mean that tlie carrier was due south of us. Or reciprocal 
360 it would be due north of us. 

The Chairman. That is right. 

Admiral Reeves. Now, if the carrier radioed to a plane, "You bear 
180 from me," the plane was south of the carrier. 

The Chairman. Yes, and going north. 

Admiral Reeves. Returning from Oahu. Therefore the carrier 
must be north of Oahu. 

\_1116'\ The Chairman. That is right. 

Commander Rochefort. I give this direction, sir, incidentally — 
when I say "314" it might have been 316, 315. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Commander Rochefort. This is from memory. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Commander Rochefort. The only thing we got after 10 : 30 were 
the fragments of plane text messages from the airplanes who were 
apparently lost. 

The Chairman. Yes. Evidently still flying home to their carriers. 

Commander Rochefort. Yes. They were still going home, and 
it came about the same as this fellow who said that he was running 
out of gas. 

Admiral Reeves. The direction finder on tlie carrier picks up the 
direction of the plane from the plane's radio and then informs the 
plane where he is in reference to the carrier. 

General McCoy. That was reported to the fleet intelligence officer, 
was it? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. When I say the fleet intelligence 
officer I mean that the only people that we dealt with, by direction 
of the Commandant — and we still deal with them — is the fleet intel- 
ligence officer, and he is our — and he is the other end of the telephone 
line from us, and he feeds everything he gets from us to the proper 
sources. 

General McNarney. Whose responsibility would it be to forward 
the information available at 10 :30 a. m. on December 7, these bearings, 
to the task force then at sea ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 685 

Commander Rochefort, Well, that would be an opinion on my 
part, sir; I would say the Commander-in-Chief. 

General McNarney. It would not be yours ? 

Commander RocHEroRT. No, sir. We are in a shore establishment, 
sir. 

General McNarney. As soon as you transmit it to the [1117] 
fleet intelligence officer your responsibility for the dissemination of 
information has ceased? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. You see, by direction of the 
Commander-in-Chief about the only way in which we were interested 
in the units at sea was in connection with the plot of the Pacific which 
we maintain ; and in connection with that and the routing of convoys 
times will occur when convoys may pass close to one another without 
each one having any knowledge of that, and by arrangement with 
the Commander-in-Chief we were directed to inform those people 
direct, but other than that we have no — we would not issue any 
orders or issue any directives or anything to any AA units of the 
fleet, naturally. 

General McNarney. Is this 10:30 December 7 the time of the 
receipt of this or the time of dispatch to the fleet intelligence officer ? 

Commander Rochefort. They were practically simultaneous, sir. 
I say 10 : 30. It may have been 10 : 28 or 10 : 32 ; I mean it is an 
approximate time. It was still during the attack; the attack was 
still going on at that time. In other words, it was probably the first 
wave going back — the torpedo planes going back is what it was. 
Insofar as the responsibility of getting the information out, I am 
hardly qualified to pass on that. 

General McNarney. Would that be Fleet Operations that should 
do that or Fleet Intelligence ? 

Commander Rochefort. I don't think Fleet Intelligence would 
issue any instructions to the fleet, sir. At least, they didn't when I 
was in the fleet. Of course that depends on the organization of the 
staff, and it depends on the Commander-in-Chief's wishes. 

The Chairman. Anything further, gentlemen^ Admiral? 

Admiral Standley. No. 

Admiral Reeves. I wonder if Commander Rochefort has any 
[1118] information or intelligence that he thinks might be useful 
to the Commission in our investigation here that we haven't covered. 

Commander Rochefort. Well, of course we have that series of dis- 
patches, and everything, that Mr. Justice Roberts just referred to, 
but of course there has been considerable work done on that sort of 
traffic, on the so-called diplomatic traffic, but there was very little 
attempt to cover any of the so-called consular traffic. In the first 
place, from personal knowledge of mine, we have been unable to get 
it from the companies. 

The Chairman. They just wouldn't give it up? 

Commander Rochefort, Well, they were amply protected by law, 
sir. 

The Chairman. I know they were. 

Commander Rochefort. And there was question there of jeopardiz- 
ing themselves and running afoul of the various law agencies, and 
one thing another, we had. 

The Chairman. Yes. 



686 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Rochefort. The net result being that no attempt had 
been made — no concerted effort had been made to get in until I under- 
stand Mr. Sarnoff was here, and we put it up to him again. I say 
"we"; I mean the people in the District. And I understand that he 
had made arrangements for obtaining it in the future. We could 
read most of that stuff as it came in. The simpler ones we could 
read. Of course, in the new system it would take a week or a month 
to run it through. For example, one message was sent on the 30th 
of December from Tokyo to Shanghai which was delivered to us and 
which we could read right off, but no attempt out here has been made 
to copy that sort of thing. We did have a large file of it that we 
have accumulated since the 7th of December, but 

Admiral Reeves. Off the record. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

[iii^] The Chairman. Commander, I understand you to say 
that you think no difference in the plans would have been made if the 
Commander-in-Chief had had the Kita message of December 3 soon 
after it was sent ? 

Commander Rochefort. Well 

The Chairman. Because similar messages stating the in and out of 
the fleet and the constitution of the fleet in Pearl Harbor had been 
a common matter of sending back and forth, in your judgment? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes. 

The Chairman. All right. 

Commander Rochefort. That matter had been going on for a num- 
ber of years. 

The Chairman. That matter had been going on for a number of 
years? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. Are you familiar with the message sent on the 
morning of December 7 by the chief of staff of the Army which was 
not received until later in the day ? 

Cominander Rochefort. No, sir, I have not seen it. 

General McNarney. Is there a copy of that available here? 

The Chairman. December 7. 

General McCoy. Tlie message of Marshall says that didn't get 
through until after the attack. 

The Chairman. I do not think it is in General Short's testimony. 
It is not in General Short's testimony, is it ? 

Admiral Standley. That was the message in which he said that 
the negotiations — handed it to him at 1; I think he mentioned the 
hour 1 o'clock. 

The Chairman. Yes, their burning their papers. 

Commander Rochefort. We had that information on Wednesday, 
sir, relative to the burning. As a matter of fact, we sent 

[1120] The Chairman. Now, you had information on Wednes- 
day that the consul here was burning his papers, didn't you? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. We are the one that gave that 
to Washington. 

The Chairman. Oh. 

Commander Rochefort. We told them he was. They told us that 
London and Washington were burning them, and then we told them 
also that these people here were. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 687 

The Chairman. Please observe the caution not to discuss what has 
gone on in this room with anyone, 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

The Chairman. Suppose that on the 7th you had gotten a message 
that indicated that the Japanese were presenting an ultimatum, that 
they were destroying their code machine and burning their codes, that 
the significance of this action was not understood but that everybody 
should be on the alert : would that have changed your view as to the 
probability of an immediate attack on Pearl Harbor, as an experienced 
Naval officer? 

Commander Eochefort. If I had received a message such as that I 
would have taken w^hatever steps I could have taken to insure an 
adequate defense against sabotage and perhaps a daylight raid, 
insofar as the material would permit: in other words, insofar as 
the planes that we had. If I had received such a message I don't 
think that I would have expected six aircraft carriers the same day. 

General McNarnet. For the sake of argument. Commander, if you 
intercepted that message and you were the only one in receipt of it, 
what would you have done with it ? 

Commander Rochefort. Well, that message there, sir, (indicat- 
ing) ? 

General McNarney. Yes. 

Commander Rochefort. You mean if I had been, say, the [1121] 
watch officer that received it ? 

General McNarnet. That is right. 

Commander Rochefort. Or the duty officer that received it? 

General McNarnet. That is right. 

Commander Rochefort. I w^ould have delivered it immediately to 
the senior officer, to the responsible officer. 

General McNarnet. Who would that be ? 

Commander Rochefort. That would be the commanding general, 
sir. That is, I am assuming that is an Army message now. Or if it 
were a Navy message 

General McNarnet. No ; I mean it is a Navy message. 

Commander Rochefort. If it were a Navy message I would deliver 
it immediately to the Commandant ; or if I were attached to the fleet 
I would deliver it immediately to the Commander-in-Chief. 

General McNarnet. With what recommendation or what remarks, 
as an intelligence officer, as we will assume that you were — let us go 
back now. We will assume that you delivered this message to 
Admiral Bloch and he asked you for your interpretation of it. 

Commander Rochefort. I would tell him it looked damn' bad and 
we ought to take whatever steps we could. 

General McNarnet. It to you would have been much more serious 
than the message referring to the signals that you spoke of at a 
later date ? 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir, it would have been. Of course, 
the message referring to the signals, with what I know about the Jap- 
anese, were run by the foreign office people, having no connection 
with the military at all. In other words, the foreign office has always 
collected a vast amount of useless information. Our records over there 
indicated — we have hundreds of messages over there that are just 
trash collected by the foreign office, of which this report of [ll^^'j 



688 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

departures and arrivals and all that sort of thing, and burning of 
lights and that sort of thing, have been a part. However, any action 
indicated by the military of Japan, Army or Navy, would have been 
much more" significant than anything started by the Foreign Office. 

Admiral Reeves. You would have interpreted this message, would 
you, that it meant war? 

Commander Eochefort. I would have interpreted that message, 
sir, that it meant at least a complete breaking off of relations in the 
immediate future ; at least that. 

Admiral Reeves. Would you have considered this message more 
significant than a message which said, "This is a war warning"? 

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. That would have been fairly 
serious itself. 

Admiral Reeves. You saw such a message, did you not ? 

Commander Rochefort. I saw a message indicating a breakdown 
of negotiations, yes, sir. It started out something like that, a break- 
down of negotiations. 

The Chairmax. Does that message look as if it were for militaiy 
consumption rather than State Department consumption? And I 
now refer to the Kita message. 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. "Chief of Third Section," and so forth. 

Commander Rochefort. 1 may say so, sir, that those are our trans- 
lations on there, and in many cases where thev will refer a thing to 
the Third Section of the Naval General Staff or to the Chief of 
Military Affairs Bureau, and everything, it doesn't mean the same 
to them as it does to our Navy Department. It doesn't mean the same 
at all. For example, last summer all of the commercial shipping 
in the Pacific, all the Japanese commercial shipping in the Pacific, 
was controlled and handled by what we would call the Ship Move- 
ment Section of the Navy Department, and I don't believe it was the 
ship movement section of the Japanese Navy De])artment. I think 
it was a [1123] civilian organization, but it may or may not 
have had the orders from the Navy Department. 

The Chairman. It may or may not have had what? 

Commander Rochefort. A directive from the NaN-y. They have 
so many things that are semi-military and semi-naval. 

The Chairman. Thanks, Commander. 

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. We shall adjourn until tomorrow morning at 
9 : 30. 

(Whereupon, at 5 : O,") o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken until 
tomorrow, Saturday, January 3, 1942, at 9 : 30 o'clock a. m.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 689 



U12J^] CONTENTS 



SATURDAY, JANUARY 3, 1942 

Testimony of — Page ' 

Ensign Natlian Fredericli Asher, U. S. S. Blue, United States Navy 1127 

Cliief Charles Herbert Shaw, Chief Torpedo Man, U. S. S. Blue, United 

Navy . 1138 

Ensign John Lewis Landreth, U. S. S. Nevada, United States Navy 1146 

Lieutenant Colonel Claude A. Larkin, United States Marine Corps 1156 

Chief Carpenter's Mate James Joseph Curley, United States Navy 1171 

Captain Freeland Allen Daubin, Commander Submarine Squadron 

Four, United States Navy 1178 

Boatswain Adolph Marcus Bothne, U. S. S. Oklahoma, United States 

Navy 1181 

Carpenter's Mate Walter Frederick Staff, Second Class, U. S. S. Okla- 
homa, United States Navy li86 

Captain James Marshal Shoemaker, United States Navy 1191 

Commander Harold Montgomery Martin, United States Navy, Com- 
manding U. S. Navy Air Station, Kaneohe Bay . 1206 

Lieutenant Colonel Leonard D. Weddington, Commanding Officer, 

Bellows Field, United States Army 1213 

Ensign John Reginald Beardall, Jr., U. S. S. Raleigh, United States 

Navy 1219 

Seaman Frank Mauthe Berry, Seaman First Class, U. S. S. Raleigh, 

United States Navy 1224 

Lieutenant Commander William E. G. Taylor, United States Naval 

Reserve 1229 

Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, United States Navy 1241 



^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 691 



Um-] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE 
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII 



SATURDAY, JANUARY 3, 1942 

Lounge of the Wardroom, 
Submarine Squadron Four, 
United States Submarine Base, 

Pearl Harbor^ T. H. 

The Commission reconvened at 9 :30 o'clock a. m., pnrsuant to ad- 
journment on yesterday, Associate Justice Owen J, Roberts, United 
States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding. 

present 

Associate Justice Owen J, Roberts, United States Supreme Court, 
Chairman; Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Re- 
tired ; Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired ; 
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired ; Briga- 
dier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army ; Walter Bruce 
Howe, Recorder to the Commission; Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, 
United States Marine Corps, Legal Advisor to the Commission ; Albert 
J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission. 

proceedings 

The Chairman. I have a letter here under date 1 January 1942 from 
Admiral Bloch, which embodies a correction of certain of his testi- 
mony. I think the reporter should add this and have it embodied in 
the statement of his notes as part of Admiral Bloch's testimony. The 
letter is as follows : 

When I was before the commission, questions were asked me about the anti- 
toi*i>edo net at the entrance to Pearl Harbor, whether or not it was closed and 
whether or not it was possible for the enemy submarine to have followed some 
vessel in through the gate. • 

[ii26] As I recall, I told the commission that the gate had been closed but 
that it had been opened to permit a garbage scow to pass in and that it might 
have been possible for the submarine to have followed this scow in. Since that 
time, I have ascertained that my statement before the commission was not entirely 
correct and I would like to revise it as follows : 

"The procedure prior to December 7, was to keep the net closed during the 
hours of darkness, only opening it when it was necessary for some vessel to pass 
through. It was opened at daylight, it being the idea that the channel entrance 
destroyer, the net vessel and other vessels in that vicinity would detect any sub- 
merged or partially submerged submarine. On December 7, 1941, the net was 
opened at 0458 for two sweepers to enter, these vessels having been out for the 
regular morning sweep. As far as can be ascertained, tlie net was kept open 



692 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

until 0840 when it was closed by orders. Tlie net was not damaged. The sub- 
marine was first siglited at 0745 by YT-153 near channel buoy No. 17, close tO; 
the coal dock. The time that the submarine passed the net is not known but it is 
probable that it passed in very close to 0700." 

I request that you please bring this to the attention of the commission as the 
testimony which I gave before them was based on information which I then had 
but which now appears to be incorrect. 

The Chairman. I have also a memorandum from Captain Mayfield, 
Avhich I will ask the reporter to embody in the notes of today. 
I will now read it : 

Jan. 2, 1942. 
Memorandum for the Commission. 

Subject : Long coded tnessage regarding arrangements for display of signals at 
Lanikai, Kalama and on island [1127] of Maui. 

Subject message was received from the communication company and delivered 
via officer messenger to the office of Conmiander Rochefort on either December 
4th or 5th 1941. 

Decoding and translation were completed during night December 10th — 11th, 
1941. 

I received a copy of the translation the forenoon of December 11th 1941. 
Respectfully, 

I. H. Mayfield, 
Captain U. 8. Navy. 
Have the Major bring the first witness in. 

TESTIMONY OF ENSIGN NATHAN FREDERICK ASHER, TJ. S. S. 
BLUE, UNITED STATES NAVY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. AVill you give your full name and rank to the 
reporter ? 

Ensign Asher. Nathan Frederick Asher, Ensign, United States 
Navy. 

Admiral Standlet. What duty were you performing on the morn- 
ing of December 7 ? 

Ensign Asher. I was commanding officer, U. S. S. BLUE. 

Admiral Standlet. U. S. S. BLUE? 

Ensign Asher. Yes, Destroyer 387, sir. 

Admiral Standlet. Are you a Naval Academy graduate? 

Ensign Asher. Yes. 

Admiral Standlet. What class? 

Ensign Asher. 1939, sir. 

Admiral Standlet. Where was the BLUE when the attack began 
on Pearl Harbor on the morning of the 7th? 

Ensign Asher. The BLUE is moored singly at Berth X-Ray 7; 
the HELM was alongside the BLUE that morning, but she got under 
way about 7 o'clock. 

Admiral Standlet. AVill you tell us what you observed [1128] 
happened that morning? 

Ensign Asher. I Avas seated in the Wardroom with three other 
officers from the BLUE when the gangway watch notified me that the 
UTAH had been torpedoed by Japanese aircraft. I immediately 
dashed out of the Wardroom and ordered to sound the general alarm 
and to pass the word to man all battle stations. 

I proceeded to the bridge and there I saw a munber of Japanese 
airplanes diving at ships in Pearl Harbor. I called the engine room 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 693 

and told the engineer to light off No, 2 boiler. No. 1 boiler was already 
lit off for auxiliary purposes. 

I told the control man to notify the control to open fire immediately 
on enemy planes. I did not wait for any signal to open fire because 
I had heard some machine-gun fire from other ships in the harbor. 

We had no annnunition by the guns; all ammunition was in the 
magazine. We had approximately 960 rounds of .50 ctiliber machine- 
gun bullets belted at each machine. 

We opened fire with our machine guns at approximately five minutes 
after 8, and about seven minutes after 8 we opened up witli our 5-inch 
gims, with our main battery, at the Japanese planes diving in the 
harbor. i 

The signal was hoisted in our sector to prepare to get under way, 
and we had already made our preparation, and upon the execution of 
that signal I ordered the chain unshackled and we cut loose our wire 
to free ourselves from the buoy in the quickest manner, and we pro- 
ceeded out of the channel through the north channel out of Pearl 
Harbor. 

While we were under way we maintained our fire at the Japanese 
planes diving at the ships and we saw four planes that I think we shot 
down — four planes in the attack. 

Before we got under way No. 4 gun crew^ shot a plane which crashed 
near Pearl City. When the crew saw that plane down, [1129] 
they stopped shooting and proceeded to pat each other on the back. 
Then the chief gunner's mate went back there, thinking there was a 
casualty because he did not hear the firing. Then they went back to 
their battle stations and continued fire. 

When we got abeam where the UTAH had been torpedoed we 
noticed a lot of wood floating in the water. I presume that came from 
the topside of the UTAH after she had gone down. We stopped our 
engines so we would drift through it without causing any damage to 
our hold plating. 

When we w^ere abeam of Westlock Channel we saw a series of bombs, 
which I first thought was the ammunition dump going up but which 
I now believe was just a series of six bombs dropped by planes which 
dove at us. 

When we neared the entrance of the channel we were attacked by 
approximately three or four planes, and we were hit by none. 

When we were abeam Weaver Field, I went at 25 knots. There was 
a mine sweeper in front of me, and I did not see his paravane and I 
ran through his paravane and I believe I cut it in two. 

Before we had gotten under way I received a signal over the voice 
radio to sortie eastward, and I believe that came from Batdiv 4. 
I set the course 120 through and proceeded to a regular assigned sector, 
patrol sector 3. When I got to the middle sector, I slowed down to 
10 knots and started patrolling, using the echo range. 

About 20 minutes after we slowed down I noticed that we had our 
first contact about 1300 yards. .1 developed the contact and dropped 
four depth charges. 

Admiral Standley. It w^as a submarine contact? 

Ensign Asher. Yes, a submarine contact. I ran by the spot where 
I dropped the depth charges and turned around and picked up what 
1 thought was the same contact and I didn't know whether it was the 



694 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

first contact or another because the second contact was in approxi- 
mately the same position. I [IISO] dropped two additional 
depth charges. I then turned around and observed a large oil slick 
on the water, and we observed bubbles coming to the surface along 
the length of approximately 200 feet. 

At that time everybody on the bridge thought the submarine was 
coming to the 'surface ; so I ordered action to the starboard and to 
man the batteries ready to open fire if she did surface, but nothing 
ever developed from that. So I believe that submarine was sunk. 

Then we proceeded patrolling, and in about 30 minutes after that 
the ST. LOUIS came steaming out, and we got our third contact, and 
that contact was in the vicinity of the ST. LOUIS. 

I hoisted the signal emergency unit. I believe it was 2 : 10. I do 
not recall the exact number. I headed at flank speed to the spot and 
dropped two additional depth charges. I circled around and ob- 
served an oil slick over that depth charge from that contact. I did 
not see any air bubbles rising to the surface as on the second attack. 

Then the ST. LOUIS sent us a visual to screen. I took the screen 
and we proceeded at a course 180. We were joined by the MONAG- 
HAN and the PHILLIPS, and the BLUE took the screen station 
to the starboard, and the MONAGHAN took the screen station to the 
port bow of the ST. LOUIS, and the ST. LOUIS sent us a signal. 

They had received word that there were enemy ships off Barbers 
Point. The ST. LOUIS sent us a signal to proceed to engage the 
enemy. We cleared the ship for action — we started to clear the ship 
before we got under way from Pearl Harbor. Then we got our tor- 
pedoes ready for torpedo attack. We had nine torpedoes ready for 
attack and we got our smoke devices ready to lay a screen. We headed 
for Barbers Point but did not see anything, and we later joined the 
rest of the force, which consisted of the ST. LOUIS plus Desron 1, 
Desron 6, \nSl] the DETROIT, the NEW ORLEANS, and 
the PHOENIX. 

We joined that force, and the BLUE was directed to take a station 
five miles off in place of the DETROIT; so we joined the remainder 
of our division. While we were proceeding to join the rest of our 
division, the torpedo war head fell on deck and started to roll around. 
I was forced to slow down to five knots, and the chief torpedo man 
grappled with the war head and chucked it over the side on my orders 
because I did not think we had time to lash it securely. 

Then we joined the rest of our force and later on formed the dis- 
position for that night. 

The following morning we were directed to screen the ENTER- 
PRISE with Destroyer Squadron 1 and return to Pearl Harbor Mon- 
day evening at 9 o'clock. 

Admiral Staxdley. What was the BLUE in for? 

Ensign Ashek. It was in for regular buoy upkeep. 

Admiral Standley. Buoy upkeep? 

Ensign Asher. Yes. We had just returned from a week's operation 
at sea. We returned on Friday. 

Admiral Standley. You did not expect quite to get away before the 
end of the week ? 

Ensign Asher. No, sir, we expected to be in port about another 
week. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 695 

Admiral Standley. Were you the senior officer on board that 
morning? 

Ensign Asher. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Wliat other officers are there on board the 
BLUE that are senior to you ? 

Ensign Asher. The commanding officer and the executive officer, 
the gunnery officer and the engineering officer. 

Admiral Standley. They were ashore ? 

Ensign Asher. Yes, sir, they were ashore. 

Admiral Standley. Is that the routine procedure for destroyers to 
go in for weekly overhauls ? 

[11S2] Ensign Asher. Yes, sir. We have four qualified officers 
on the deck in port and we stand one and four. The four are the 
gunnery officer, the engineering officer, the communications officer, and 
myself. 

The communications officer was ashore at the time plus another 
reserve engineer. 

Admiral Standley. Is there a senior officer assigned to the group 
under overhaul ? 

Ensign Asher. Normally there is, sir, yes, but the HELM had left 
us that morning at approximately 7 o'clock to go to Westlock, and we 
were left singly at the buoy. 

Admiral Standley. So you were the senior officer present at that 
time by the buoy ? 

Ensign Asher. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. How many men of the crew were on board, or 
what percentage of the crew were on board that morning ? 

Ensign Aaher. I think it was approximately 80%, sir. That is 
about 135 men. 

Admiral Standley. Did they have liberty the previous evening? 

Ensign Asher. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. When did that liberty expire? 

Ensign Asher. Well, for the chief and the first-class petty officers 
it did not expire until 7 : 30 Monday morning, and for other ratings 
it expired on board 1 o'clock Sunday morning. 

Admiral Standley. How many planes would you estimate you 
observed in the attack from the time you opened fire until you went 
out of the channel and were outside ? 

Ensign Asher. I would say about 80 planes, sir; there were a 
number of them that were flying very high in groups of five or six. 
They were out of range of our A A guns flying from the south, flying 
north, and took a course directly [11S3] over Ford Island. I 
observed about four flights of these planes. 

Admiral Standley. What height would you estimate they were 
flying? 

Ensign Asher. Oh, I am hardly a good judge of height, and my 
estimate would not be anything but a guess, but I would say they 
were about 15,000 feet or more. 

Admiral Standley. Did you talk with any air men in regard to the 
height of these planes as to' what their height was? 

Ensign Asher. No, sir, I have not. 

General McCoy. With respect to the height of these planes did 
you notice what type planes they were? Do you think they were 



696 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

a different type from those that were flying low, or were they simply 
planes which had gone up after making the attack? 

P^nsign AsHER. I think they were jdanes that went up after mak- 
ing the attack, sir. They looked to he the same kind. I did not bother 
to look at them very long because I was very busy with other things 
at the time, but they looked to be the same type. They did not look 
like any large bombers. They were single-engine size. 

General McCoy. Were you conscious of recognizing any torpedo 
planes ? 

Ensign Asher. Yes, sir. I recognized a number of torpedo planes. 
They seemed to be the ones that were flying very low and making 
deliberate attacks on the battleships. They were flying at a height 
of a few hundred feet. 

General McCoy. . You spoke of one that was shot. 

Ensign Asher. Yes, they shot the wing off that one. 

General McCoy. Was that a torpedo plane? 

Ensign Asher. Yes, sir, that was a torpedo plane. 

General McCoy. There has been talk in the newspapers about dive 
bombers. Did you see what seemed to be dive bombers, or were they 
simply low-flying bombing planes? 

Ensign Asher. I would say they were low-flying planes, [1134] 
sir. I did not see any dive-bomber attacks. They all flew very low. 
None of them came in from any high altitude at a steep angle to 
make an attack. I would say they were all low-flying bombers. 

Admiral Standley. You said your ammunition of your 5-inch 
guns was in the magazine. You had annnimition in belts at the ma- 
chine guns? 

Ensign Asher. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Is that correct ? 

Ensign Asher. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. What was the state of readiness of your anti- 
aircraft battery and machine guns? 

Ensign Asher. We had belted annnunition, 960 rounds at each 
gun, and the ready boxes were dogged down. That was at the 
station. 

Admiral Standley. What about the crews for the guns? 

Ensign Asher. We did not have any guns manned. We did not 
have any readiness at the guns. 

Admiral Standi>ey. Is there any order in regard to having the 
crews available to man these guns? 

Ensign Asher. Yes. sir, from the duty section. We ha\e men for 
each station from the duty section, and we would still be able to 
open fire with all machine guns and two AA guns. 

The Chairman. In other words, in the routine orders the men 
who are <m leave do not amount to sufficient number to destroy a full 
crew for every gun? You keep sufficient for your guns always? 

p]nsign Asher. Yes, sir, we do. 

The Chairman. What was the condition of the men on the BLUE 
when they got back on Saturday night? 

Ensign Asher. There were several men who, I would say, had been 
drinking and still had a hangover, but in the morning of the attack 
they all snapped to and very readily and they \113o] all re- 
marked that they had never sobered — the few that were under the 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 697 

influence of liquor — later said they had never sobered up so fast in 
their lives, and one of these same men performed very outstanding 
work, as range operator, and later worked as range finder operator. 

General McCoy. Did your crew click after the first surprise? 

Ensign Asher. Yes, sir, they clicked 100%, and I think we were 
one of the first to open fire with the 5-inch battery, I believe, in that 
vicinity, and our machine guns opened very promptly, and I still 
do not see how they got their ammunition from the magazines to the 
guns in the fast and swift manner that they did. 

We maintained our continuous fire without any interruption ex- 
cept when the No. 4 ammunition hoist stopped and we failed to get 
ammunition up to No. 4 again for a while, but that was very readily 
repaired. The fault in tliat was due to the oil being shut off joy 
mistake. 

General McCoy. Will you explain that incident in full, please? 

Ensign Asher. Well, wdien the ammunition hoist stopped, this 
gun captain from No. 1 gun went to No. 4 ammunition handling 
room to try to repair the casualty, and they could not get the hoist 
started. He got on his knees and started to pray and said, "Oh, Lord ! 
Oh, Lord ! Make this gun ammunition hoist work just this once." He 
was praying with tears coming from his eyes, and this tall colored 
fellow who was stationed in the handling room, looked down and said, 
"'AVhy, Smith, you got the oil turned off." 

He immediately jumped to his feet and said, "It's all right, Lord, 
Igot it now." They got the hoist started and got the ammunition up. 

After we got out of the channel, there was one thing I left out. 
As soon as we cleared the channel I lit off No. 3 [11361 ^i^d 
4 boilers so we would have enough steam for maximum speed, and 
they kept the four boilers lit until we returned to port on Monday 
night. 

We took our ammunition and filled up my stateroom plus the com- 
munication officer's stateroom with star shells. We kept those state- 
rooms filled. Then we replenished our depth charge racks after we 
joined the rest of the force. 

We did that while going out at 20 knots, and I think they did very 
excellent work, the men taking those depth charges out of the storage 
lockers and putting them in the racks at that speed. 

General McCoy. Were you on the bridge all this time ? 

Ensign Asher. Yes, I was on the bridge until I returned to port 
Monday night. The control officer remained in control during the 
entire period, and the assistant first lieutenant went about the ship 
attempting to bolster up the morale of the crew, which I ordered him 
to do, and I ordered that the crew be properly fed. We set up three 
messes while we were out and fed them regular chow. 

General McCoy. Did he report favorably about the morale? 

Ensign Asher. He reported favorably "about the morale of the 
crew, and I think the morale was outstanding. 

Soon after that I set Condition 3 watch to maintain readiness at 
machine guns and all AA guns plus the torpedo tubes. Then we let 
them go below and sleep, but they said they would rather stay at the 
guns, and be there in case anything happened. 

They did sleep at their guns, and there was one man selected to 
remain awake at all times so he could wake them up instantly. The 



698 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

men preferred to remain at their battle stations until they returned 
to port to the regular Condition 3 watch. 

General McCoy. Were you fully equipped while you were on the 
bridge with weapons, field glasses, and so forth ? 

[1173] Ensign Asiier. We had field glasses, yes, sir. We did 
not have any small arms on the bridge. 

General McCoy. What did you do with the field glasses? 

Ensign Asher. Well, I threw the field glasses overside. I do not 
know what my motive was. I just was kind of mad. 

General McCoy. Did you throw your field glasses at anything? 

Ensign Asher. Well, just in the direction of a diving plane, sir. 
It was just a momentary outbreak, I guess, sir. 

General McCoy. They were fiying very close ? 

Ensign Asiier. Yes, they seemed to be coming in between the 
WHITNEY and the BLUE, and then headed down the north channel 
launching the torpedoes. 

General McCoy. Whom was your ship named after ? 

Ensign Asiier, After Victor Blue, sir. 

General McCoy. Do you know, what Admiral Victor Blue did in 
the Spanish War? 

Ensign Asher. I do not know exactly, sir. I know be performed 
outstandingly in the Spanish-American War, sir. 

General McCoy. Yes, he was one of the heroes of that war, and 
I hope there will be a similar instance here. 

That is all. 

Admiral Standley. I have a few questions. I notice that Admiral 
Nimitz is trying to get some Naval Crosses for some of the members 
of the Navy. Were you included in that? Have you received any 
commendation for your work on that day? 

Ensign Asiier. No, sir, thus far I have received no word, sir. 

Admiral Standley. That is all. 

The Chairman. We are indebted to you for your testimony. En- 
sign. Please do not indicate to anyone what has gone on in this room. 

Ensign Asiier. No, sir. Thank you, sir. 

[1138] General McCoy. I have one or two questions. Wait a 
moment. 

Were they Naval officers or Reserve officers ? 

Ensign Asher. They were Reserve officers, sir. I wish to com- 
mend them very highly, sir. I did so in my letter to the Commander- 
in-Chief on tlie report of the air raid. 

They were Ensign IVIoldafsky, who is now torpedo officer and com- 
munications officer while the regular communications officer was in 
the hospital. That is, he was formerly communications officer. 

There is also Ensign Wolfe, who was assistant gunnery officer who 
performed remarkably well and remained in control during the entire 
time and solely controlled the battery during the fire; also Officer 
Scott, who is a newcomer to the BLUE as my assistant. He was 
greatly responsible for keeping up the morale of the men. He circled 
around the ship, giving them the glad hand. 

That is about all I have to add. 

General McCoy. Thank you very much. 

Ensign Asher. Thank you, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 699 

TESTIMONY OF CHIEF CHARLES HERBERT SHAW, CHIEF TORPEDO 
MAN, U. S. S. BLUE, UNITED STATES NAVY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will yon give your full name and ranlc to the 
reporter ? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Charles Herbert Shaw, Chief Torpedo- 
man, U. S. S. BLUE. 

Admiral Standley. What duty were you performing on the morn- 
ing of December 7 ? 

Chief Torpedoman Siiaw. While I was on board I was chief tor- 
pedoman on the ship. 

Admiral Standley. The U. S. S. BLUE ? 

[1139] Chief Torpedoman Shaw. The U. S. S. BLUE, sir. 

Admiral Standley. What time did you report on board? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. I stayed on board the whole 48 ; I didn't 
go ashore. 

Admiral Standley. Were you on the duty section? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Sir? 

Admiral Standley. Were you a part of the duty section ? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Do you know approximately how many of the 
C. P. O.'s were on board ? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. I believe they were ashore, sir. 

Admiral Standley. How many are there on board ? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Well, I do not know, just offhand, sir. 

Admiral Standley. About how many are there? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. About 14, sir. 

Admiral Standley. About 14? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Will you tell the Commission your experiences 
on the morning of December 7 ? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Well, we were just about finishing break- 
fast. 

Admiral Standley. Finishing breakfast at what time ? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Well, it seemed to be just about five 
minutes to 8, because the general alarm went off, and everybody made 
the remark, "General alarm on Sunday morning? What has hap- 
pened? What's funny about it?" because we usually do not — we 
usually sound the general alarm every morning to test out, except 
Sunday morning. 

About that time the chief quartermaster on duty went up on deck 
and then came back and passed the word that the Japanese were at- 
tacking us and to man the machine guns. 

Admiral Standley. Then what happened? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. At that time I came up and I had six 
torpedoes which I had brought below, the water compart- [^-?40] 
ments and the fuel tanks, and there were two of them charged up, and 
also one of the ones was in the shack and the after body was on deck. 
So, the first thing I did was to get these charges up and in a fully ready 
condition and also the other one back together and put them in a ready 
condition. 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 2 8 



700 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Standley. What happened to that torpedo that was not 
together? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. The one that missed fire i 

Admiral Standley. The one that the boy lost overboard. 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. We had the torpedo all ready and the 
tripping latch on the tube was on. I was standing alongside there. 
We closed the door on the impulse charge chamber and were putting 
in another impulse when it went off. 

As the torpedo went off, it went forward and broke the guide stud 
and the head went off on the deck, and that was rolled over the side.. 
We were just making a turn about that time, and they pushed it off. 

Admiral Standley. You mean when the torpedo was fired? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes, sir. that torpedo fired. 

Admiral Standley. Then what happened to it^ 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. The torpedo fired in the tube. After it 
was turned forward, the forward torpedo was turned aft, and when 
the torpedo fired it sheared the guide stud off the head and the air 
flask, and it dropped on the deck and they pushed it over the side. 

Admiral Standley. These were war heads? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes, sir. That front nose ring was 
smashed and it cut through the middle of the war head itself where it 
hit the other forward head. That head there was smaslied up on the 
side, and the torpedo in the forward tube had gone forward and broke 
the guide stud. As it hit there it bounced forward again and the trip- 
ping latch in the tube was down ; so that started the torpedo off. It 
was in a fully ready condition. 

Admiral Standley. Did it explode after it went overboard? 

[114.1] Cliief Torpedoman Shaw. No, sir. I imagine the fan 
was out of shape when she turned over. 

Admiral Standley. It was unarmed? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. It was unarmed, but in a fully ready 
condition. 

Admiral Standley. It would have required a run to be armed? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. Let me see if I get this straight for the moment. 
One torpedo in the after tube was turned forward? 

Chief Torr)edoman Shaw. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. And the forward tor})edo tube was turned aft? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. And one tor])edo had the impulse charge in the 
chamber and it went off? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes. 

Admiral Reextis. And it fired off the torpedo? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. And that torpedo hit the forward tube? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. And the liead was sheared off? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Tlie torpedo in the after tube was sheared. 

Admiral Ree\t.s. The bolts or rivets were sheared off from the air 
flask? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. That was the head tliat went on deck? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. Did you do anything then ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 701 

Chief Torpecloman Shaw. The torpedo in the after tube — the air 
flask to the air body that was aft. that I had to crawl in there and 
to line the turn aft and to secure that the best way I could because 
here was no guide stud holding [1^43] it back, and the same 
way with the forward tube. I had that to line up, too, to close the 
air arm to keep them from running. 

Admiral Reeves. Has the BLUE standard toipedoes? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Xo, sir. We have four-barreled tor- 
pedoes. 

Admiral Reeats. Those are the two torpedoes? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes, sir. on the starboard side. 

Admiral Reeves. Tlie others were already in connnission? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. When did you get those torpedoes to the dis- 
abled side? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Those torpedoes were all ready. I would 
say, about 12 or 1 o'clock. All the torpedoes were ready in the 
station. 

Admiral Reea^es. You were busy then most of the time with these 
torpedoes ? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes, sii". 

Admiral Reeves. Then you did not observe much about the planes? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Just what I could see from the star- 
board side. 

Admiral Standley. Is there anything that you think would be of 
interest to the Commission? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Well. I don't know, sii-, unless it would 
be these logs and the smoke as we were going out. I think we were 
very lucky with these logs and the smoke. 

I also did observe what seemed to be a string of bombs going up 
Westlock that seemed to explode, and the first group seemed to hit 
in the channel on the left bank, and the other group hit just inside 
the jungle and you could see the spouts in the sand. 

They got outside and depth charged. I did not observe what 
happened to the first one. but after the second one there seemed to 
be a big black oil slick come up. 

[lli-3] Admiral Standley. Do depth charges themselves make 
any oil slick? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Well. I don't know, sir. Most of the 
times I have seen them if the water is a little shallow, they will kind 
of have a muddy stuff come up, but this time it seemed to be a black 
oil slick. It was not that of mud. 

Admiral Standley. In this case what was it? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. In this case it seemed to be like an oil 
slick. 

Admiral Standley. Are you married? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Is vour wife here? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. No, sir, she is in San Diego. 

Admiral Standley. What are the habits generally of the petty 
officers and chief petty officers when they go to shore? Do they go 
up to Honolulu frequently at nights? I mean those whose families 
are not here. What is the'^general practice, if you know ? 



702 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Chief Torpeclonian Shaw. Well, on the BLUE, I don't think the 
men stay in town very much. 

Admiral Standley. How long has the BLUE been here ? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. It first came out when the fleet came 
out in 1939 and then went back to the States one time for about six 
weeks, and for a longer time at Bremerton for overhaul. I believe 
that is all except I went down to San Diego one time. 

Admiral Standley. Have you been ashore in Honolulu on any 
Saturday nights? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. I have quite a while back, but I have 
not been ashore in about six weeks now. 

Admiral Standley. What is the general condition around Hono- 
lulu with respect to the liberty men? Do the liberty men usually 
visit places on shore leave? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Well, most of the fairly decent 
[7i44] places are so crowded that you can hardly get in any of 
them, it seems to me. 

Admiral Standley. Most of what ? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Places you can get a beer or something 
like that, but you can get that just any place. 

General McCoy. Are there any places that the sailors can go to 
such as the YMCA's or any clubs kept up by any organizations here 
for the benefit of the enlisted personnel ? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. I believe there is, but the only place 
I have ever gone to was the YMCA. 

General McCoy. Is that an adequate and pleasant place to go to? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Well, it seemecl pleasant enough to go 
to, but there are so many trying to get accommodations there that 
it— 

The Chahiman. You mean it is overcrowded? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes, it is overcrowded and if you go 
ashore on Saturday and if you do not get a room by 1 o'clock there 
is no use in going, because they are all filled. 

General McCoy. Was that the only place in which you could get 
a room? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. No, there are several other hotels. The 
only other place I ever stayed at was the Alexander Young. 

General McCoy. Have you ever been to the Outrigger Canoe Club? 

-Chief Torpedoman Shaw. No. 

General McCoy. Have you ever heard of it? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. No, I haA^en't, sir. 

The Chairman. What was the shape of the men on this Sunday 
morning when they came back from leave? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. This Sunday morning? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. One of the first ones to man the torpedoes 
came back 20 minutes before it happened, and I saw [^HS] noth- 
ing wrong with him, because he performed his work right along with 
me. 

The Chapman. You saw nothing about him in the way of intoxi- 
cation ? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. No, sir, not in the BLUE. 

The Chairman. Not in the BLUE? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. No, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION . 703 

Admiral Standley. Around the streets when you finished your 
work, did you notice any unusual conditions, evidences of drunkenness 
in the street among the men? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. No, no more than it looked more suspi- 
cious because a man would be in uniform, but I don't think any more 
than in any other place. 

Admiral Standley. Were you ashore in San Diego ? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Did you notice the conditions there of a great 
many sailors on the streets on Saturday nights ? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. When I have been there it seemed to me 
just about the same as here. 

Admiral Standley'. About the same as here? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Did you notice any particular difference in the 
conduct of the men there and here ? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Not except probably I think a little 
better. 

Admiral Standley. A little better here? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. No, a little better at San Diego. They 
seemed to be more happy there than here. That is all. 

Admiral Eeeves. How many torpedo tubes are mounted on the 
BLUE? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Four four-barrel tubes. 

Admiral Reeves. What number of torpedoes does she carry ? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Sixteen. 

Admiral Reeves. One for each tube? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes. 

[1J4(^] Admiral Reeves. When you cleared the entrance that 
Sunday morning, how many of those tubes and torpedoes were ready 
and in commission? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Nine torpedoes were ready to fire except 
to put the impulse charge in. 

Admiral Reeves. You had them ready at noon ? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes, just about noon, because all we had 
to do was charge the air flask and refill them with fuel and water 
and ignite them. 

Admiral Reeves. Those were torpedoes under overhaul? 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes. 

The Chairman. Anything further? 

Admiral Ree\'es. That is all. 

The Chairman. Do not discuss with anyone on the outside what has 
been said in this room. 

Chief Torpedoman Shaw. Yes. 

Colonel Brown. This is Ensign Landreth. 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn. Ensign ? 

TESTIMONY OF ENSIGN JOHN LEWIS LANDRETH, 1J. S. S. NEVADA, 
UNITED STATES NAVY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 
The Chairman. Will you state your full name and rank ? 
Ensign Landreth. John Lewis Landreth, Ensign. 



704 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Adinira] Reeves. Where are you stationed, Ensign? 

Ensign Landreth. On the NEVADA, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. AVhat special duty do you have there? 

Ensign Landketh. I Avas in tlie anti-aircraft section, sir. I was in 
the anti-aircraft directory. 

Admiral Reeves. Controlling the fire for the anti-aircraft opera- 
tions? 

Ensign Landreth. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves, Where were you on Sunday morning, December 7? 

Ensign Landreth. I was on board, sir. 

[ IIJ^?] Admiral Reeves. Will you tell the Commission what you 
experienced and what you saw on that Sunday morning? 

Ensign Landreth. Well, w^hen I got up to my station I saw^ the 
ARIZONA already, directly ahead of the NEVADA, already in a 
very bad shape. She was afire and down by the bow and sinking rap- 
idly. She looked to be in a very bad condition. 

General McCoy. How soon was this after the attack? 

Ensign Landreth. It was about three minutes after 8. That is as 
close as I can say. 

General McCoy. You were below deck when it happened ? 

Ensign Landreth. Yes, I was below deck when the general alarm 
went. 

Admiral Reeves. Proceed with your statement. 

Ensign Lancreth. Then the directory got on some high-altitude 
l)ombers and began to pick up some coming straight down the line, 
down the battle line, and it was a few minutes after this that we re- 
ceived the first torpedo. 

The plane came in very close, about midway of the channel, and 
(h'opped his torpedo and then turned right. 

Admiral Reeves. How far was she when he dropped the torpedo? 

Ensign Landreth. She was about midway in the channel, I would 
say, about 500 yards, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Did you see her drop the torpedo? 

Ensign Landreth. Yes. After we got the t()r})edo, it evidently 
didn't cau.se a great deal of jar, not as much as we expected; but it 
did jar loo.se her synchronizer from the range finder. Then it was a 
little difficult and slower because of the limited field of the range finder : 
so we went into local control until we could get on with both the di- 
rector and the range finder, at which time we went back into direct 
control. 

The Chairman. Was the })lanc which firetl that torpedo hit bv any- 
thing? 

Ensign Landreth. Not until after it dropped its torpedo. \^llJf8\ 
I did not see it hit, but I understood it was hit when it turned away 
and went astei-n, and there was a man with the M) caliber machine gun 
and I undei'stand thai man riddled the plane and it crashed aft of 
the NEVADA. 

There was a second torpedo plane came in at us wliicli did not get 
to us. It apparently was hit by machine-gun fire. It seemed afire and 
it .started to smoke. It then turned to the left and went away without 
firing its torpedo on us. 

During the next hour we picked uj) some high-altitude bombers as 
best we could and got in to shift to direct control as soon as possible, 
and we staj^ed in local control until we couhl get set on it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 705 

After about an hour the ship got under way. When we got about 
in the middle of the channel we were then attacked by dive bombers, 
and of course our setup there was under local control. [114^9] 
We could do nothing but watch up in the directory. They dropped 
quite a few on us before any hit, probably ten, fifteen, maybe ten or 
fifteen came in and dropped, aiid they were going some short, and 
sprays were rising out in the water probably a hundred, two hundred 
feet, and others were going over us, over toward Ford Island, and then 
we began to get hits. The most noticeable to us were the ones that — 
one went right through our directoi-y platform. We had — three planes 
came in. One plane came in and dropped one short. We could see 
that one go short and land out in the water. Another one came in a 
little too far to the left and dropped it over us, and the third one came 
in right in between those, and we could see before he did that it was 
going to be fairly close, and when he dropped it the bomb came right 
directly at our directory, and we were certain it was going to hit us. 
It hit about a foot from the director and went through the director 
platform, went through the navigation bridge deck, went through the 
signal bridge and down into the captain's cabin and exploded some- 
where probably below the captain's cabin, caused great damage in 
personnel in casemate 4 and casemate 6, just went below and was 
stopped by the third deck, armor deck. 

The Chairman. Was your captain aboard ? 

Ensign Landreth. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Who was in command? 

Ensign Landreth. Lieutenant Commander Thomas was the duly 
commander, and he was in charge of the ship, sir. 

The Chairman. Well, after that last bad hit what did you do? 
What did the ship do ? 

Ensign Landreth. Well, we stayed there, and very shortly after 
that we received another hit on the boat deck, and we were also receiv- 
ing hits all this time on the forecastle. In fact, we were hit on the 
forecastle before we were hit — got the []loO] hit through the 
director platform, several hits. The first one, the chief boatswain's 
mate, was on the forecastle directing activities up there, and a direct 
hit struck up there which killed him, hit very close to him. 

The Chairman. Were you able to go on out of the channel? 

Ensign Landreth. Yes, sir. We went over by the floating drydock 
first. We were given orders not to go out of tlie channel. We went 
over b}^ the floating drydock, and then we got away from there. A 
destroyer I understand exploded over there, and we went over where 
we are now across from the air station. 

The Chairman. Did you go over there under your own power, so 
far as you know ? 

Ensign Landreth. I think we were aided by tugs at that point, 
although I am not absolutely certain of that, sir. After we got over 
there tlie activity subsided. We looked around, and we couldn't get 
communications with the guns, and everything apparently was aban- 
doned on the boat deck. Of course we had had great casualties, es- 
pecially from the bomb that had struck on the boat deck, so we aban- 
doned our station, went into sky patrol where Ensign Taussig was. 
Ensign Taussig had been hurt very early in the battle. He was in the 
starboard director. And went out and looked around, and things 



706 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

were pretty much afire around. The signal bridge was ablaze, and 
had gone up to the navbridge and coming up on top our own platform. 
In fact, just before we took Ensign Taussing down, the sky control 
was beginning to blaze on the starboard side. 

The Chairman. Did you get that fire out? 

Ensign Landeeth. No, sir. That went for quite a while, that blaze, 
and practically it destroyed most of the structure up there. 

General McCoy. When did you abandon ship ? 

[IISI] Ensign Landreth. We didn't abandon ship, sir. We 
stayed on the ship throughout. The battle was over. We took En- 
sign Taussig down, and by that time officers who had not been on the 
ship were coming on the ship, and they were organizing firefighting 
parties, and we were trying to — we didn't have any water up on the boat 
deck to fight fire. We were trying to get all the ammunition out of the 
ready boxes to keep them from exploding. On the port side we did get 
all ammunition on out. On the starboard side there was one ready box 
that exploded. We went below to attempt to get water up there to 
fight the fires, and the engineers were having some difficulty in getting 
the water up there. Then we had very little ammunition up, and our 
hoists were no longer operative, and so we went — I went below to at- 
tempt to get some ammunition up. By this time there were officers 
had come aboard and had taken charge of the anti-aircraft battery. 
Plenty of officers up there at that time. 

Admiral Standley. Are you still living on the NEVADA? 

Ensign Landreth. Not living on her, sir. We are still standing 
watches out there. 

Admiral Standley. There is a watch on board. Where did you get 
tlie water to fight the fire with on the upper deck when you didn't have 
any water on board before? 

Ensign Landreth. They were fighting fire with both buckets and 
with firefighting equipment, their CO^. 

Admiral Standley. Did the tugs that pushed you over there, shoved 
3^ou over there — did they take part in tlie firefighting? 

Ensign Landreth. I am not certain about that, sir. I was below 
decks trying to get water from tlie engineers, and we were trying to 
get ammunition. I wasn't up there during most of the firefighting. 

Admiral Standley. You were on deck during most of the [11S2'] 
attack, practically all througli the attack? 

Ensign Landreth. Yes, sir. I was in the director during the 
entire battle, sir. 

Admiral Standley. What is the altitude or elevation of the director ? 
How long does it take you to get up there, when one is down below? 
Is it an elevated station ? 

Ensign Landreth, How high is it ? 

Admiral Standley. Yes, how high. 

Ensign Landreth. It is just above the navigation bridge, sir. From 
the boat dock, next is the signal bridge, then the navigation bridge, 
and then we arc right on the deck above that, sir. 

Admiral Standij^.y. What was your estimate of the number of planes 
that took i^art in that attack that morning? 

Ensign Landreth. In the — on the entire ? 

Admiral Standley. Yes, during the entire morning. What would 
be your estimate? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 707 

Ensign Landketh. I would have said between 150 and 200 planes, 
sir. 

Admiral Standley. Did you observe high flights of planes? 

Ensign Landretii. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standeey. What was your estimate of the height of those 
planes ? I 

Ensign Landreth. I estimated them at 10,000 feet, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Were they high bombers or were they apparent- 
ly planes that had expended their ammunition and were flying back 
over? 

Ensign Landreth. No, sir ; they were high-altitude bombers. 

Admiral Standley. High bombers? 

Ensign Landreth. Yes, sir. They were flying in in V formation. 

General McNarney. Did your director indicate an altitude which 
you could read off ? 

[11S3] Ensign Landreth. It did, but I don't remember what it 
was, sir. I don't remember observing that. 

Admiral Standley. What was the direction from which this flight 
came, if you observed from what direction ? 

Ensign Landreth. It came from dead ahead, right down the battle 
line, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Was that a torpedo plane, the first plane ? 

Ensign Landreth. Oh, the torpedo plane 

Admiral Standley. No ; I mean the first flight that you observed. 
What was that ? Was it torpedo or was it strafing, or what kind of a 
flight? 

Ensign Landreth. The first that I observed was the torpedo planes. 
I understand the strafing planes came in first. I understand on the 
starboard side while I was up there there was still strafing going on, 
but I didn't observe any strafing. 

Admiral Standley. Now this is off the record. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

Admiral Reeves. You have described one torpedo hit on the NE- 
VADA alongside your mooring, and a second torpedo plane which 
turned away without launching its torpedo. Were there any other 
torpedo hits on the NEVADA at her mooring ? 

Ensign Landreth. Not as far as I know, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Were there any bomb hits on the NEVADA at her 
mooring ? 

Ensign Landreth. I do not believe so, sir. I believe the bomb hits 
were all received after she got out into the channel. 

Admiral Reeves. All the bombing, then, on the NEVADA occurred 
while she was under way, and not while she was stationed at her 
mooring ? 

Ensign Landreth. Yes, sir. 

[11S4] Admiral Reeves. Were there any other torpedo attacks 
on the NEVADA after she got under way ? 

Ensign Landreth. No, sir, not as far as I know. 

Admiral Reeves. Do you know where the torpedo hit the NE- 
VADA? 

Ensign Landreth. It hit her forward, sir, about a hundred feet — 
a hundred and fifty feet from the bow. 

Admiral Reeves. Do you know why it became necessary to beach 
the NEVADA? Was it due to that torpedo hit? 



708 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Ensign Landreth. No, sir, I don't believe it was, although it might 
have been. 

Admiral Reeves. Do you know of any other underwater damage to 
, the NEVADA except the torpedo hit? 

Ensign Landreth. No, sir. Of course it has — now it has quite a 
few holes in it caused from the bombs, that are under water. It was 
an hour after we got the torpedo hit that w^e got under way, sir. That's 
the reason I say that 1 don t think the torpedo caused the necessary — 
caused the beaching. 

Admiral Reeves. I have no more questions. 

General McCoy. Did the captain get back aboard ship before the 
ship was aground ? 

Ensign Landreth. No, sir, I don't believe so. I think it was after 
it was aground, although I am not certain of that either, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Were you a part of the duty section that night ? 

Ensign Landreth. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. You could have gone ashore had you wanted to ? 

Ensign Landreth. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Would you know of the number or of the per- 
centage of the crew that were on board ? 

[11S5] Ensign Landreth. Percentage of the crew or the officers, 
sir? 

Admiral Standley. The crew that was on board the next morning. 

Ensign Landreth. It would have been a pretty high percent of the 
crew aboard, sir, because almost all our — most of our men were aboard, 
sir : that is, in the Sixth Division, and I think there was a high per- 
centage of the crew was aboard. 

Admiral Stanley. What percentage of the officers would you say 
were on board ? 

Ensign Landreth. I would say 95%. 

Admiral Standley. What complement — what was the number of 
officers required to be on board to satisfy the duty conditions? 

Ensign Landreth. One-fourth, sir. 

Admiral Standley. What was the contemplated officers total com- 
plement of the Nevada ? 

Ensign Landreth. I am not absolutely certain of the figure, sir. I 
think there was about 80. 

Admiral Standley. How many officers like you who were not in the 
duty section were on board that morning? 

Ensign Landreth. Well, there weren't a great number, although I 
am not certain of a figure, sir. I don't think there were very — there 
were not an awful lot, not very many. 

Admiral Standley. Did any cases come under your observation 
where you think tliat enlisted men were not fit for duty that morning 
on account of drunkenness ? 

Ensign Landreth. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Insobriety? 

Ensign Landreth. None came under my observation. 

Admiral Standley. They all functioned and performed their duties 
under stress? 

J^1]S6] Ensign Landreth. Yes, sir. They were all — our divi- 
sion I think did very well, sir, in all cases. I saw no cases that didn't 
perform better than we expected them to. 

Admiral Standley. I have no further questions. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 709 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Ensign. Please observe 
the rule not to speak of what has gone on in this hearing room to any- 
one outside. 

Ensign Landreth. I will, sir. 

The Chairman. Thank you, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. What class were you in at Annapolis? 

Ensign Landreth. '41, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. '41? 

Ensign Landreth. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Colonel Larkin, will you be sworn? 

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL CLAUDE A. LARKIN, 
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give the reporter your full name and 
rank? 

Colonel Larkin. Claude A. Larkin, Lieutenant Colonel, United 
States Marine Corps. 

The Chairman. Colonel Larkin, what is your duty on the island of 
Oahu, or was it on December 7 ? 

Colonel Larkin. I am in command of the flying field at Ewa. 

The Chairman. Prior to the attack what force of planes and what 
types of planes did you have under your command there? 

Colonel Larkin. I had 47 aircraft of the fighter type, dive bomber 
type, and utility type. 

The Chairman. Were all of the 47 in condition for use on that 
morning ? 

Colonel Larkin. No, sir. 33 of them were in condition. 

[lis?] The Chairman. How were they disposed before the 
attack? 

Colonel Larkin. The}^ were parked around the perimeter of the 
landing areas with a reasonable degree of security in the way of dis- 
persion. 

The Chairman. Any of them anchored offshore ? 

Colonel Larkin. No, sir. They are all land planes. 

The Chairman. These were all land planes ? 

Colonel Larkin. These were all land planes. 

The Chairman. How many of those were available for distant 
reconnaissance ? * 

Colonel Larkin. Nineteen to a medium distance. 

The Chairman. What do you call medium distance? 

Colonel Larkin. The particular type on the field at that time, up to 
200 miles. 

The Chairman. Prior to December 7 had any of them been regu- 
larly and as a matter of routine used for reconnaissance to that extent? 

Colonel Larkin. No, sir, not as a regular matter of routine. AVe had 
worked on tactical problems up to 150 miles. 

The Chairman. Were any of those planes under your command in 
the air on the morning of December 7? 

Colonel Larkin. No, sir. 

The Chairman. At 7:50? 

Colonel Larkin. No, sir. 



710 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. In what state of readiness were they, and how 
many were in a state of readiness ? 

Colonel Larkin. They were all on 2-hour readiness, and one-third 
of the total 33 were on 30-minute standby. 

The Chairman. How many of those planes were destroyed in the 
attack ? 

Colonel Larkin. All of then were either destroyed or totally dis- 
abled for a matter of days. 

The Chairman. Where were you when the attack came on ? 

[11S8~\ Colonel Larkin. I was on my way from my home in 
Honolulu to Ewa, arriving at Ewa during the first attack at or about 
8:25. 

The Chairman. From your own observation and from the reports 
that have been rendered to you can you state, first, wliat character of 
planes made the first attack on Ewa Field ? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. A formation of between 18 and 24 fighter 
aircraft, fighter type Japanese aircraft. 

The Chairman. Now, the fighter type, as I understand, uses ma- 
chine guns ? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. They are not bombers ? Or are they bombers ? 

Colonel Larkin. At times they are bombers, but in this attack they 
used only guns, at that particular attack. 

The Chairman. Yes. From what direction, as you are advised, did 
that attack come in ? 

Colonel Larkin. From the north and west at an altitude of about 
1,000 feet, distance of between one and two miles. 

The Chairman. And then planed down to use their guns on your 
field? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. That attack lasted between twenty and 
thirty minutes. 

The Chairman. Were there subsequent waves came over? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. When, and what sort of waves? 

Colonel Larkin. There were two other distinct attacks made, one 
about fifteen minutes after the first attack, made by single-engined dive 
bombers which were very comparable to our SBD type aircraft. That 
attack lasted from about fifteen to twent^^-five minutes, and that sec- 
ond attack was followed liy a third attack at about fifteen minutes later, 
lasting about fifteen to twenty minutes. The last at'tack was made by 
fighter aircraft. After the third and last attack there [1159] 
were two or three two-plane sections remainino^ over the field until the 
Japanese aircraft had assembled in the vicinity of Barbers Point. 

The Chairiman. Now, from Barbers Point where did they go, to 
your observation, after tliey had assembled? 

Colonel Larkin. My observation, they went south and west to sea. 

The CiiAiR]NrAN. What number of planes made that exit from the 
island to the south and west ? 

Colonel Larkin. That I can't say. We estimated that there were 25 
fighter types covering the rendezvous or assembly point of the Jap- 
anese aircraft. 

The Chairman. Had you anti-aircraft equipment on your field ? 

Colonel Larkin. No, sir, not — we had .30 caliber guns, nothing 
larger. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 711 

The Chairman. Were they in action when you arrived at the field ? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Are you advised how promptly they got in action 
on the attack ? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir ; just as quickly as the alarm was sounded 
some of those guns went into action, and after the first attack we 
reorganized and armed and put all guns, including rifles, Thompson 
machine guns, and anything we could get, into action. 

The Chairman. Were you able to bring down any of the enemy 
planes ? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. We are positive of one and quite sure of 
the second one. 

The Chairman. Where was the ammunition for your anti-aircraft 
fire at the time of the attack? 

Colonel Larkin. I had ammunition in every squadron [^i60] 
ordnance room, in the central ordnance room, and in the guard house 
at the entrance to the flying field. 

The Chairman. It wasn't at the guns ? 

Colonel Larkin. It was in — not actually at the guns — in the vicinity 
where all guns could have been loaded iii two to three minutes' time. 

The Chairman. Had you been by orders of any superior officer put 
on the alert against an aircraft raid ? 

Colonel Larkin. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Had any order been issued to be on the alert against 
such a raid ? 

Colonel Larkin. No, sir. Only in the directives as issued and orders 
previously ; no order that morning. 

The Chairman. Nor in the day or so previously, giving you warn- 
ing of an aircraft raid ? 

Colonel Larkin. That is correct. 

The Chairman. Now, what were the directives that were in opera- 
tion at the time, were in effect ? 

Colonel Larkin. The condition of alert and readiness, which was 
thirty minutes, requiring one-third of all tactical aircraft to be on 
thirty -minute readiness, all aircraft to be on two-hour readiness. 

The Chairman. Now, from whom did that order issue to you, sir ? 

Colonel Larkin. That comes through my chain of command and 
from commander aircraft battle force, who is my immediate superior 
in this area. 

The Chairman. Who is the commander aircraft battle force ? 

Colonel Larkin. Admiral Halsey. 

The Chairman. Admiral Halsey. 

Colonel Larkin. At this particular time Admiral Halsey was at sea, 
and in that case I then come under commander patrol wing 2, who is 
Admiral Bellinger with the exception [1161] of the fighter 

aircraft. 

The Chairman. Which are to be held at the command of General 
Davidson ? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir ; interceptor command of the island. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. General? 

General McCoy. Did you get any orders at all that day from General 
Davidson ? 

Colonel Larkin. No, sir. 



712 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McNarney. How many fighters did you have available for 
that interceptor command? 

Colonel Larkin. I had seven. Twelve of that squadron were on 
Wake Island at the time. 

General McNarxey. How many of your men were available to go 
in the air after the attack? 

Colonel Larkin. None. 

General McNarney. AVhat have you got now? 

Colonel Larkin. I have five SBD's, one R3D2, which is commonly 
known as a DC-5. I have turned over two F— iF fighter type to com- 
mander aircraft battle force, and one other utility aircraft. I have 
eight 17-scouter type aircraft in Midway and fourteen fighter types 
in Midway, of my group. 

General McCoy. Did any of Admiral Halsey's carrier planes return 
to the field that morning? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. At what time? 

Colonel Larkin. There were four — there were six came in between 
the first and second attacks, about S : 30 to 8 : 35. They landed. I im- 
mediately ordered them into the air. After the third attack four 
SBD's from the ENTERPRISE came in. We armed them with 
500-pound bombs and reloaded their machine guns, and I reported 
they were there ready. About ten o'clock they were ordered off my 
field. Three of them could get away. One [1163] had a hole 
in his gas tank and remained on the field until the tenth of December, 
that landed at Ford Island that night? 

General McCoy. Did vou shoot down any of your own planes that 
day? 

C'olonel Larkin. No, sir. We had none in the air. 

General McCoy. No. I mean of those from the fleet, from the 
ENTERPRISE. 

Colonel Larkin. No, sir. 

General McCoy. They all came in safely? 

Colonel Larkin. They all came in safely. 

General McCoy. Did they report their '^•oming to the control of- 
ficer ? 

Colonel Larkin. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Why? 

Colonel Larkin. That I don't know. 

(jeneral McCoy. They have a normal lane to come in, I believe, have 
they not ? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. They came down in the normal method 
of identification and procedure and came to our field, and we took them 
aboard. 

General McNarney. What happened to the ones you ordered into 
the air after the first attack? 

Colonel Larkin. They did not return to Ewa. I think later on they 
went to Ford Island : tliat is, to the best of my knowledge. 

The Chairman. Now, there was a flight of planes off Admiral Hal- 
sey's fleet that landed in there that night, was there not? 

Colonel Larkin. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you know whether there was a flight of his planes 
that landed at Ford Island that night? 

Colonel Larkin. No, sir, I do not. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 713 

The Chairman. We have been informed that he had sent out 
[J16S] a search late in the evening from liis fleet and that those 
planes came in at night, and some of them through error were fired 
on. You know nothing of that incident? 

Colonel Larkin. No, sir. 

The Chairman. They may have landed at Ford Island ? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. None 

General McCoy. Were any of these planes shot down by the Japa- 
nese? 

Colonel Larkin. That 1 can't definitely say. We saw one of these 
planes — I can't definitely say it was one that had landed on my — on 
Ewa Field. We saw one of these ENTERPRISE airplanes and one 
Japanese airplane collide in the air. Both of them fell and burned 
about a half mile south and east of Ewa, Ewa flying field. 

The Chairman. But you do not know whether that is one of those 
that you had sent up from the field or was that was coming in from 
the ENTERPRISE? 

Colonel Larkin. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Colonel, you say that these ENTERPRISE 
planes were landed safely ? 

Colonel Larkin. On my field, yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. On your field? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. And except for that one incident of the crash, 
none of them was fired upon, none of them disabled, none of them 
wrecked, pilots killed and passengers killed, in coming in? 

Colonel Larkin. That is correct. 

Colonel Brown. I believe, sir, he is talking about a landing in the 
morning, and those that were fired on came in at night on Ford 
Island. 

Admiral Standley. Do not take this. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

[1164] Colonel Larkin. All the planes that landed at Ewa 
landed in the morning and were taken and either put in the air im- 
mediately or rearmed and refueled and ordered into the air by Ford 
Island control, and by Wheeler control. 

Admiral Standley. You spoke, Colonel, about a condition of readi- 
ness. Are you familiar with an estimate of the situation which is en- 
titled, "Addendum to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan 
No. A-1-41," under dace of March 31 ? I will show it to you. 

Will you hand that to him, sir ? 

(A document was handed to the witness.) 

Admiral Standley. You might look through that and see if you 
recognize it. 

Colonel Larkin. No, sir, I have never seen that. 

Admiral Standley. Where did you get your instructions in regard 
to the readiness condition ? 

Colonel Larkin. We got them through orders, verbal, telephone, 
and mailgrams, and different conditions through commander aircraft 
battle force. 

Admiral Standley. Did you sit in or take part in any of the con- 
ferences and discussions between the commander patrol wing 2 and 
the commanding general Hawaiian air force? 



714 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Larkin. No, sir. I might clarify that. Admiral, by saying, 
I assumed command at Ewa on the 18th of November. 

Admiral Standijey. Oh. 

General McCoy. Had you received any war warning from your 
superiors ? 

Colonel Larkin. The normal orders only, and reading over letters, 
bulletins, and the normal routine orders was my only source of in- 
formation. 

General McCoy. You were not conscious of receiving any war warn- 
ing on the 27th of November ? 

Colonel Larkin. No, sir. 

[1165] General McCoy. There were no orders, as far as you 
remember, that changed your normal status of training and responsi- 
bility prior to December G due to the imminence of hostilities? 

Colonel Larkin. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Colonel, your force consisted of VS and VB ? 

Colonel Larkin. And VF. 

Admiral Standley. And VF. Now, then, the VS and the VB's were 
part of a task force ? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Do you recall what that task force designation 
was ? 

Colonel Larkin. Task force 3 at that time. 

Admiral Standley. And as part of the base defense force where 
were they assigned? In other words, under certain conditions part of 
your planes automatically went to General Martin, and under the 
same conditions part of them went to Admiral Bellinger? 

Colonel Larkin. The task force 3, the VS and VB airplanes went 
to Admiral Bellinger; the VF airplanes went to General Martin as 
the interceptor command. 

Admiral Standley. Yes. Now, how were you informed or where 
did you inform yourself of that task force? Where did you get that 
information when you arrived here? 

Colonel Larkin. By conference with my executive officer and my 
operations officer and my staff who had been here prior to my arrival. 

Admiral Standley. So then you were not familiar at all with this, 
that is, in detail, except as ^^ou got it from your subordinates here, 
this general estimate of the situation? 

Colonel Larkin. That is correct. I have never seen that estimate. 

[1166] Admiral Standley. You are not cognizant of this 
statement — wait a minute now; I Avill get what I want. 

In paragrapli IV. (e) it says: "None of the above actions can be initiated by 
our forces until an attack is Icnowu to be imminent or lias occurred." 

Are you familiar with that decision? 

Colonel Larkin. I have heard that discussed. I am not entirely 
familiar with it. 

Admiral Standley. In paragragh IV. (a), "Action open to us," 
in the same pamphlet: 

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward thronsb 360 degrees to 
reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable 
but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for 
a very short period and as a practical measure cannot, therefore, l)e under- 
taken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within 
rather narrow time limits. 

Are you familiar with that decision, too ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 715 

Colonel Larkin. Not from that publication. I have heard that 
and have discussed that particular phase of that publication. 

Admiral Standley. Was that the generally accepted decision on 
the evenintr of December 6? 

Colonel Larkin. I believe it was, yes, sir. 

General McNarney. Where were you on the night of December T ? 

The Chairman. December 6? 

General INIcNarnet. On December 7. 

Colonel Larkin. I was in camp at Ewa. 

General McNarney. Sunday night. Did any of your anti-aircraft 
weapons go into action during that night? 

Colonel Larkin. No. We had no truly anti-aircraft. We had 
only .30 calibers that had been taken from the rear seats of our de- 
stroyed planes, plus ten .30 caliber water-cooled [1167] more or 
less ground machine guns. 

General McNarney. None of these weapons went into action? 

Colonel Larkin. None. 

General McNarney. Sunday night? 

Colonel Larkin. Sunday night. 

Admiral Standley. I want to ask some more questions, General. 

General McNarney. Go ahead. 

Admiral Standley. Colonel, this is a part of the assigned mission 
of the search and attack group : "Trail attacking carrier type planes 
to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group." 
I understand all of your planes were out of commission. 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Do 3'ou know whether any of that task group 
did perform that part of the mission, did try to trail the planes? 

Colonel Larkin. I do not know. 

The Chairman^ What was the condition of your personnel on the 
morning of December 7, Colonel ? Were they present at their stations ? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir, I would say more than 80% were present, 
both officers and men. 

The Chairman. Had leaves been granted the night before? 

Colonel Larkin. Only the regular liberty for the men and shore 
leave for certain officers. I required a certain number of officers on 
the station at all times. 

The Chairman. When did your enlisted personnel come back from 
leave ? 

Colonel Larkin. The single men come in at twelve. The married 
men with families on the island, a certain percentage had permission 
to stay at home. 

The Chairman. Any evidence that the men on leave had imbibed 
too much the night before ? 

[1168] Colonel Larkin. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Would you know of it if there had been instances 
of it in your command? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You are clear about it? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. Only — may I clarify that? 

The Chairman. Yes? 

Colonel Larkin. Due to the distance of Ewa from Honolulu my 
personnel get into Honolulu very seldom. They go to the little sugar 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 2 9 



716 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

mill town of Ewa and the little sugar mill town of Waipahu, and 
there are few of them get into Honolulu proper. 

Admiral Standlet. Colonel, in the case of disciplinary measures 
who in your command hears the mast on reports of infractions of 
discipline? 

The Chairman. Who takes the mast for reports? 

Colonel Larkin. The squadron commanders handle the more or 
less routine ordinar}^ offenses. I hold mast for the more serious or 
major offenses. 

Admiral Standley. You would know\ then, in that capacity, if 
there was general infraction of the regulations or propriety in re- 
gard to sobriety? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir; I can definitely say, that morning dur- 
ing the attack I did not see one man who had more than he could 
liandle. 

General McCoy. Did your command come to the front and center 
quickly and click throughout as you \Yould have them do? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. I asked a question. I am not sure whether I 
made it comprehensive enough to cover the point of whether you 
received any orders at all during the day of the attack from higher 
authority. 

Colonel Larkin, None whatever, except when I reported the four 
SBD type aircraft had landed ; we had rearmed them, and I [1169] 
re]3orted them in a state of readiness for anything within their capa- 
bilities, and they were held by orders of the operation officer com- 
patwing 2 in that state until 10 o'clock, when they were ordered to 
Ford Island. 

General McCoy. Were the communications working that day 
throughout to higher command? , 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir; not too well, but they were working. 
They were satisfactory. 

General McCoy. Were you informed of what happened during 
the day at any time at Pearl Harbor? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. Meager information. By "meager" I 
mean the highlights I would be directly interested in. 

General McCoy. In other words, ^^ou got no orders, but you did get 
sufficient information to know what was happening? 

Colonel Larkin. Xo, sir. 

General McCoy. Did that apply also to your liaison with the Army? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. I talked to the interceptor command on 
two or — three occasions on the 7th of December. 

General McCoy. Would you be informed by the interceptor com- 
mand of any missions that they sent up that day from other fields? 

Colonel Larkin. No, sir. 

General ]\IcCoy. And you were given no mission whatever during 
that whole day? 

Colonel Larkin. None whatever. 

General McCoy. Either from Army or Navy? 

Colonel Larkin. That is correct. 1 might add that I had informed 
both the interceptor command. Army, and mj'^ immediate superior, 
compatwing 2, that I had no planes available. 

The Chairman. Except as you altered that inforjuation when the 
four planes that came in were available? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 717 

[1170] Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. I might clarify that: they 
were not mine; they belonged to the ENTERPEISE carrier group. 

The Chairman. Oh, I see. 

General McCoy. But you informed them of the missions that you 
gave them? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Colonel, was it routine for you to inform the 
proper authorities of the availability of planes under your command'^ 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Each day? 

Colonel Larkin. Each day. 

Admiral Standley. It was likewise your duty to inform those same 
commanders if there was any change in that status; is that correct too? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. And that procedure you obtained from your 
subordinates ? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. And not from the prescribed procedure in 
this order? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. Our method was, my operations officer 
evei'v afternoon at three o'clock told my immediate superiors what 
planes we would have available for the next day's operations. Planes 
and types. 

The Chairman. That was so that either your immediate commander 
or in the proper circumstances the commander of patwing 2 could 
order your planes on missions? 

Colonel Larkin. That is correct. 

General McCoy. Colonel, were you the senior marine air officer in 
Oahu? 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Is there any other question for the Colonel ? 

[1171] (There was no response.) 

The Chairman. Colonel, we have asked all the witnesses who have 
appeared before us not to discuss what has gone on in this room, or 
their testimony, with anyone. 

Colonel Larkin. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And we shall ask you to observe that. Thank you 
verv much. 

Will you be sworn ? 

TESTIMONY OF CHIEF CARPENTER'S MATE JAMES JOSEPH CURLEY, 
UNITED STATES NAVY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you sit down there, sir, and give your name, 
rank, and command to the reporter ? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. James Joseph Curley, sir, chief 
carpenter's mate. 

The Chairman. What ship were you on? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley.' USS NEVADA, sir. 

The Chairman. Where were you on the NEVADA on the morning 
of December 7? 



718 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curlet. You mean when the trouble 
started ? 

The Chairman. When the attack came on. 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. When the attack came on I was 
in the chiefs' quarters, sir. • 

The Chairman. You were in your own quarters ? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Had you been on leave the night before? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Had there been manv men on leave from the 
NEVADA the night before ? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. That I couldn't say, sir. 

The Chairman. You don't know? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. I don't know. The only [1172] 
men that would be on leave would be the — that is, on liberty — would 
be the chiefs and first-class petty officers, and there wouldn't be many 
of them because most of them have their families in the States. 

The Chairman, The enlisted personnel that had leave or liberty on 
Saturday night would all be back on the ship before Sunday morning, 
would they ? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And to vour knowledge they were back? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. AVhat shape was the crew in that morning to per- 
form its duty, according to your observation? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Excellent, sir. 

[117S] The Chairman. You saw nobody who was the worse for 
having had a bad night Saturday night ? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curt-ey. No, sir. 

The Chairman. What first drew your attention to the attack? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. I was talking to the chief ship's 
fitter who had just relieved the security patrol. He had taken over the 
8 patrol watch that morning, and he and I heard the machine-gun 
chatter. He having the security watch, he ran to the topside. I fol- 
lowed him. 

When we got up there there was a plane with the rising sun insignia 
on it, at which she turned her belly to us toward the opposite side of 
the ship from where Ave were at, but we could see it from the deck shop. 

Then I heard the explosion somewhere in the harbor, and we were 
notified to man our general-quarter stations. 

The Chairman. To your knowledge, how many torpedoes did the 
NEVADA receive while she was in the berth ? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. One that I know of. 

The Chairman. Did that disable her so that she could not navigate? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. No, sir. The NEVADA got under 
way to sail in 14 minutes. 

The Chairman. In 14 minutes? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Yes. 

The Chairman. How many boilers had been operating through the 
night ? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Well, that I could not say. I am a 
deck petty officer, but I imagine it would be one for auxiliary purposes. 



\ 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 719 

The Chairman. Chief, was there any emergency lookout? What 
Avas your duty ? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. My duty was to man the repair 
tube. 

[ii74] The Chairman. What force was under you for that 
duty ? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Well sir, I had 15 men in my re- 
pair party located in the forward part of the ship surrounding the 
No. 1 and No. 2 barbettes on the third deck. 

The Chairman. Did your crew take their stations there with you ? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Yes, all my men were aboard. 

The Chairman. What were you called upon to do from the time of 
the attack until the NEVADA was beached? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. There wasn't anything we were 
called upon to do, sir. Everything we do is what we had to do every 
time during drill, to close all the Zed fittings which would lead to the 
magazine below our station. 

The Chairman. Did you do that ? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Yes. 

Our party is divided into two groups, and we had two talkers. The 
first one is the first repair party and the second is the second repair 
party, and their duties were to immediately open up the air to the guns. 

The Chairman. Was that done? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. That was done, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Neither you nor any of your party were under any 
obligation to man the guns ? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Sir ? 

The Chairman. You were not a part of the gun crew ? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. No, sir, we were not a part of the 
gun crew. 

The Chairman. Did your anti-aircraft fire get into action on the 
ship promptly, as you observed it? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Yes, sir. They must have; they 
must have. 

The Chairman. When the NEVADA found it necessary, in order 
to get out of the channel, to beach, did she do it under [1175'] 
her own power? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. We had orders not to leave the 
harbor, sir. We had already been hit, and I guess it was because 
they did not want to block the channel that they did that. They 
did not want to block the channel for other ships. 

The Chairman. Do you say that a heavy bomb hit on the bow 
of the NEVADA after she got under way and when she was going 
down past Ford Island? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. I should say three or four bomb 
hits there were, and then I was knocked out. 

The Chairman. You were knocked out? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Yes. 

The Chairman. Did you come to or did they have to bring you to ? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. They gave me artificial respira- 
tion, sir. 

The Chairman. Was that from the force of the bomb? 



720 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Chief Carpenter'a Mate Curley. No, sir, it was the smoke coming 
up from the officers' quarters; it didn't penetrate the armor plate, 
however. The armor deck withstood the bombs wonderfully. 

The Chairman. They did withstand the bombs well? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Yes. That is in the vicinity of 
our station. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. We could see the deck come right 
down and go right up. 

The Chairman. Was that 4-inch? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. That is 5i^-inch. 

The Chairman. 5%-inch? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Yes. 

The Chairman. Any other questions? 

Admiral Standley. Yes. 

What was the state of readiness of the NEVADA habitually 
[1176] when she was in port? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Well, we always had a guard 
watch, sir, and the guard watch was always observing. 

Admiral Standley. What was that? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. The guard patrol was always 
observing our ship. 

Admiral Standley. Was some of your division a part of the 
security watch? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. How was the rest of the watch constituted? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. The chief ship's fitter was in 
charge of the watch and we must keep the machine guns manned, 
and that is his duty, to check all the men manning the machine 
guns on the third deck patrol and the topside patrol where we are 
always on alert. 

Admiral Standley. And that was part of the routine of the bat- 
tleship NEVADA when she was in port? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. That is everyday routine; at sea 
we have the security patrol also. 

The Chairman. That means that the liberty group was cut down 
to take care of the security patrol? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. The security patrol was taken 
from the duty section, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Chief, you are a part of the damage control 
organization of the ship, are you not? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. I think you said that several bomb hits on the 
NEVADA did not penetrate the armored deck? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. In the vicinity of my station, 
sir. That would be from frame 30 to frame 60 port and starboard 
side. 

Admiral Reeves. I think the testimony was that most of the bomb 
hits were in the forward part of the ship. That would come within 
the area which you supervised, would it not? 

[1177] Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Well, from the topside 
and what we can see, they all appear to be forward of frame 30. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 721 

Admiral Keeves. Forward of frame 30? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Keeves. Do you know whether any of the bomb hits 
penetrated the underwater integrity of the ship? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. They are patching up forward 
on the starboard and port side in the vicinity of the gasoline store. 

Admiral Reeves. Where was that torpedo hit? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. The torpedo hit was abreast of 
No. 2 barbette on the port side about frame 43, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. That was within your area ? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Yes. 

Admiral Reeves. Why did they beach the NEVADA? Do you 
know ? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. No, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Was it due to this torpedo hit or to the bomb 
hits? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. That I could not say because I 
was out about that time. 

Admiral Reeves. You have no knowledge personally on any un- 
derw^ater damage by this torpedo? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. All I could see was that they 
Are working on the patches forward of frame 30. 

General McCoy. How large are these holes you are speaking of? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Cukley. That I do not know, sir, only 
what is rumor. 

Admiral Standley. The previous testimony has indicated that 
there were several holes in the ship made by bombs. 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Those are the ones I am speak- 
ing of, forward of frame 30. 

[117S] Admiral Standley. That is up forward where the big 
hole is ? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. That is forward of the big hole. 
The big hole is approximately at frame 43. 

Admiral Standley. What was the cause of this puncture? Was 
it caused by the bomb going through the side, or how did it happen ? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Evidently the bomb went through 
the ship's side and then skidded out through the side. 

Admiral Standley. What caused this big hole? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Which one ? 

The Chairman. The biggest hole of all. The one they are put- 
ting the big patch on. 

Admiral Standley. Was the underwater damage due to the tor- 
pedo and not to these bomb hits ? 

The Chairman. The big hole was caused by the torpedo and not 
by the bombs ? 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Any other questions ? 

Admiral Reeves. No. 

The Chairman. Please do not discuss your testimony with anyone 
or mention what has gone on here. 

Chief Carpenter's Mate Curley. Yes, sir. 

Colonel Brown. Captain Daubin, sir. 



722 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN FREELAND ALLEN DAUBIN, COMMANDER 
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR, UNITED STATES NAVY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you state your full name ? 

Captain Daubin. Freeland Allen Daubin, Captain, United States 
Navy. 

The Chairman. Captain, I understand that you have some docu- 
ments which were recovered from some of the Japanese troops in the 
attack on December 7 ? 

[1179] Captain Daubin. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. What are they, sir ? 

Captain Daubin. I have some charts and copies of the log that 
we recovered from the Japanese submarine No. 19. 

The Chairman. That is the one that went ashore near Bellows 
Field? 

Captain Daubin. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Are these in shape so that they can be left with 
the Commission ? Are these copies or originals ? 

Captain Daubin. These are copies, sir. 

The Chairman. Of course, they are secret. 

Captain Daubin. Yes, sir, very secret. 

The Chairman. The Commission has a number of these secret 
papers which have been submitted to it, and it will not disclose any- 
thing except with the approval of the Secretaries of War and Navy, 
when it comes to make its report. 

Do you feel that under those circumstances it w^ould be proper to 
leave them with us ? 

Captain Daubin. I do. 

The Chairman. Thank you. 

Have you anything to add. Captain, that you think will be helpful 
to the inquiry which this Commission is undertaking? 

Captain Daubin. I have nothing to add, sir, except the informa- 
tion that is contained in these charts and the log from the Japanese 
submarine No. 19. 

The Chairman. It may be that when you have submitted these 
papers that we will have to ask for some explanations of them; and 
3'ou will be available ? 

Captain Daubin. Yes, sir. I am right here in the base. I am in 
command. 

The Chairman. Thank 3^ou very much. 

Admiral Standley. I understand. Captain, that these originals 
have all been forwarded to the Navy Department? 

Captain Daubin. Yes, sir. 

[1180] The Chairman. What is this in the brown envelope? 

Admiral Standley. That is the description of the submarine, 
isn't it? 

CajDtain Daubin. Yes. 

The Chairman. The designation on this document in the brown 
envelope is, "Description aaid photographs Japanese midget sub- 
marine No. 19." 

Captain Daubin. It starts on page 8. 

The Chairman. The log starts on page 8 ? 

Captain Daubin. And it continues to page 20 in that book. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 723 

I might add that there are some extracts from the log of the Jap- 
anese submarine No. 19 that was picked up out in the harbor. 

The Chairman. The envelope will be marked Daubin Exhibit 
No. 1. 

(Brown envelope was marked Daubin Exhibit No. 1.) 

The Chairman. I also notice a brown paper folder which I under- 
stand contains photostats of certain maps? 

Captain Dauijix. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And charts? 

Captain Daubin. Yes. 

The Chairman. And designations in typewriting attached to the 
various maps ? 

Captain Daubin. Yes. 

The Chairman. This will be marked Daubin Exhibit 2. 

(Folder of charts was marked Daubin Exhibit 2.) 

Captain Daubin. I might add that in reading these you have to 
use a glass, sir. I will give you a glass for that purpose (handing 
magnifying glass to the chairman) . 

The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you very much, Captain. 

Colonel Brown. Boatswain Bothne. 

[1181] TESTIMONY OF BOATSWAIN ADOLPH MARCUS BOTHNE, 
U. S. S. OKLAHOMA, U. S. NAVY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. State your full name, sir. 

Boatswain Bothne. Adolph Marcus Bothne. 

The Chairman. And what was your duty on December 7, 1941, 
Boatswain ? 

Boatswain Bothne. I was ship's boatswain, U. S. S. OKLAHOMA, 
sir. 

The Chairman. Where did you spend the night of December 6 ? 

Boatswain Bothne. On board the U. S. S. OKLAHOMA. 

The Chairman. What were you doing at the time the attack came 
on? 

Boatswain Bothne. I was in the after end of the superstructure 
deck where the side cleaners' lockers are. I had my side cleaners 
ready to go overside. 

The Chairman. Had you finished your breakfast? 

Boatswain Bothne. Yes. 

The Chairman. From where you were, did you have a view of the 
harbor ? 

Boatswain Bothne. No, sir. 

The Chairman. What was it which first attracted your attention 
to the attack ? 

Boatswain Bothne. The mate in flie 6th Division started scream- 
ing, "Get the guns covered; them Japs are bombing everything in 
sight." 

The Chairman. Had you heard any machine-gun fire or bombs 
before that? 

Boatswain Bothne. No, sir. 

The Chairman. What did you do when you heard the screaming? 



724 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Boatswain Bothne. I went down to the main deck aft of midships 
where the loud speaker is and passed the word for general quarters 
and set material condition Zed. 

The Chairman. How did the men respond? Promptly? 

Boatswain Bothne. Prompt, yes, sir. 

[11821 The Chairman. How soon after were j^ou delivering 
fire? 

Boatswain Bothne. We were delivering no fire from the five twenty 
fives, and I didn't hear any .50 caliber, although the men said they 
were firing with the .50 caliber, afterward, but I didn't hear a shot 
of fire on the OKLAHOMA that morning, sir. 

The Chairman. What happened to the OKLAHOMA itself? 

Boatswain Bothne. I walked out on deck and passed this word; 
the torpedo hit aft of frame 115. 

The Chairman. Where would that be between the bow and the 
stern? I do not know where frame 115 is. 

Boatswain Bothne. Almost astern, sir. 

The Chairman. The OKLAHOMA was lying in the outside berth? 

Boatswain Bothne. Yes. 

The Chairman. Outside the MARYLAND? 

Boatswain Bothne. Yes. 

The Chairman. Did you see the man launch the torpedo? 

Boatswain Bothne. No, sir. I got out on deck after that. 

The Chairman. What was the effect of that hit. Boatswain ? What 
was the effect on the ship ? 

Boatswain Bothne. None that T noticed right then, sir. I didn't 
even feel the ship shake. 

The Chairman. What happened next, according to your obser- 
vation? 

Boatswain Bothne. I went back to see why the anti-aircraft bat- 
teries were not firing, and the ready boxes were still locked on the 
port side. 

The Chairman. Were the crews there ? 

Boatswain Bothne. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Then what happened? 

Boatswain Bothne. Then I went forward. We had the fire and 
rescue chest at the stack there, and as I walked foiward there was 
another torpedo hit about a third of the way aft \11S3] of the 
ship. 

The Chairman. What did tliat do to the ship? 

Boatswain Bothne. I still didn't notice any effect from it. 

The Chairman. You did not? 

Boatswain Bothne. No, sir, never felt it even. 

The Chairman. Then what happened? 

Boatswain Bothne. The fii'e and rescue chest was locked: so I 
went amidships to the gear locker and picked out a hammer and a cold 
chisel. 

The Chairman. To knock the locks off? 

Boatswain Bothne. Yes, and when I got it tliere was a third tor- 
pedo hit in the middle of tlie ship, and the slii]) started to list notice- 
ably then. I had to walk uphill to go to the starboard side, and after 
they had the ready boxes open there and tlie anuuunition out they 
had no air to load the guns, and one of the men said there was no fire 
locks on the guns. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 725 

The ship was listino; badly to port at that time. I didn't notice any 
action on the MARYLAND up to that time, but decided we would 
go over to the MARYLAND (runs and get them in action. 

We went overside and started for the MARYLAND and got to the 
blister ledge, and the MARYLAND lines were still holding, although 
the ship was listing 45 degrees. So I yelled up to everybody to stay 
where they were. They picked it up, and everybody sat along the 
blister ledge. 

We were all perched along the blister ledge and there must have 
been about 150 men there. 

Then the ship seemed to hesitate, to be stationary. 

The ChaikmajSt. Then what happened ? 

Boatswain Bothne. They hit it with another torpedo. 

The Chairman. Another one ? Four ? 

Boatswain Bothne. Yes, because that one I felt, because she bounced 
up, and when she settled down she turned. 

The Chairman. What complement was there on the OKLAHOMA 
[1184] that morning of the attack ? 

Boatswain Bothne. About 1200. 

The Chairman. They were all on board ship? The whole 1200 
were aboard ? 

Boatswain Bothne. There were a few men ashore, the chiefs and 
the first class and the group that had overnight privilege. There were 
very few had their families out at that time. Very few stayed out 
overnight. 

The Chairman. How much of this group of 1200 men got off the 
OKLAHOMA?, Your fellows sitting along the ledge jumped to the 
MARYLAND, I suppose? 

Boatswain Bothne. Most of them went down in the water. 

The Chairman. They did ? 

Boatswain Bothne. Yes. I slid down the side myself. 

The Chairman. Into the water? 

Boatswain Bothne. Into the water, and then got into a motor 
launch, and we picked up two boatloads of men out of the water. 

The Chairman. Was there a serious loss of life on the OKLA- 
HOMA? 

Boatswain Bothne. About 400, sir. 

The Chairman. You don't say ! 

Boatswain Bothne. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Was the captain on board when this occurred? 

Boatswain Bothne. No, sir. 

The Chairman. He was ashore? 

Boatswain Bothne. Yes. 

The Chairman. Who was commanding officer at the time or who 
was senior ? 

Boatswain Bothne. Commander Kenworthy. 

The Chairman. Was he second in command ? 

Boatswain Bothne. Yes. 

The Chairman. What paticular security order was there that re- 
quired the gun crew to be at their guns all the time, [IISS] 
Boatswain? Isn't there an order in force that requires the crews to 
be at the anti-aircraft guns ? 

Boatswain Bothne. Not to my knowledge in port, sir. 



726 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. What were the orders with respect to the manning 
of the guns and the organization of the gun crews? What were the 
orders that were then in force. Do you know what the orders were ? 

Boatswain Bothne. No, sir, I don't. 

The Chairman. Did you have any duty with respect to firing the 
anti-aircraft guns ? 

Boatswain Bothne. No, sir. 

The Chairman. That was not part of your duty ? 

Boatswain Bothne. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You were not part of the gun crew? 

Boatswain Bothne. No, sir. 

The Chairman. So far as you know, none of the OKLAHOMA 
guns got into action before she turned over ? 

Boatswain Bothne. The anti-aircraft five twenty fives. 

The Chairman. The five twenty fives did get into action? 

Boatswain Bothne. Did not get into action. 

The Chairman. Did not ? 

Boatswain Bothne. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You did not hear the .50 caliber, but you were told 
by someone that they were fired ? 

Boatswain Bothne. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Anything further ? 

Admiral Standley. No. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Please do not discuss your 
testimony here or mention to anyone what has gone on here. 

Boatswain Bothne. Aye, aye, sir. 

Colonel Brown. Carpenters Mate Staff. 

11186^ TESTIMONY OP CARPENTEE'S MATE WALTEK PREDRICK 
STAPF, SECOND CLASS, U. S. S. OKLAHOMA, U. S. NAVY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. State your full name. 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. Walter Fredrick Staff. 

The Chairman. What ship are you with? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. The OKLAHOMA. 

The Chairman. Were you off ship on Saturda}'^ night, December 6 ? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. I was off Saturday. I came back early, 
about 7 o'clock Saturday evening. 

The Chairman. What is your rank ? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. Carpenter's mate, second class. 

The Chairman. Carpenter's mate, second class? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. Yes. 

The Chairman. Where were you on board ship when the attack 
came on ? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. I was in the carpenter's shop. 

The Chairman. You therefore did not have a view of the harbor at 
that time? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. No, sir, I did not. 

The Chairman. When you learned that there was an attack, what 
did you do? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. I passed the word general quarters and 
went promptly to my quarters. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 727 

The Chairman, You had no duty at that time with respect to the 
anti-aircraft guns ? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. No, sir. 

The Chairman. What did you do or where did you go when the 
general quarters was called ? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. I went to the forward part of the ship, 
to the pump room, to the fresh water tanks. 

The Chairman. Was that your station under Condition Zed ? 

Carpenter's Mate St^vff. Yes. 

The Chairman. Then during the attack you remained inside 
[1J87] the ship and not out on deck ? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. Yes, sir, I was inside the ship. 

The Chairman. From your position, what did you learn was going 
on? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. I felt several explosions, but they seemed 
to be from the anti-aircraft fire, and there was just a jar and we were 
busy setting Zed when the lights went out. 

The Chairman. The lights went out? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. Yes. 

The Chairman. Did you remain at your station until the ship 
listed ? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. Yes. The ship was on a very bad list. 

The Chairman. Were you called upon to abandon ship? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. No, I didn't hear any word at all because 
the man could not get any station on the telephone. 

The Chairman. The phones were out of order ? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. Yes. 

The Chairman. When the ship turned over, where were you ? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. There was a bad list on it; the ship was 
very bad and we had four men with us, and two of them got hysterical 
and they started to leave when the lights went out. They started to 
leave, and it was a very bad list, so we followed them. 

The Chairman. You got on deck ? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff, No, sir, we didn't get out. It rolled 
over. 

The Chairman. How did you get out? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. They took us out Tuesday morning through 
the ship. 

The Chairman. So that after it had gone over, there was still air 
in it and you could still stay above water? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. Yes, there was a good bit of " [1188] 
air and fuel oil. 

The Chairman. You got caught in there when it turned over ? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. Yes. 

The Chairman, How many got out ? 

Carpenter's IMate Staff, Two of us got out and two of them 
drowned when it rolled over. 

The Chairman. There were some other men who also got out? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. Yes, they got 34 of them altogether, and 
two of them died. 

The Chairman. Can you give us any idea of how long it was from 
the time that you felt the first little jar until that ship went over? 



728 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. My watch stopped at that time, two min- 
utes after 8. 

The Chairman. Two minutes after 8? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. It must have been a quarter to 8 when 
they first sounded the alarm, or very close to it. 

The Chairman. So in a matter of 15 minutes, according to your 
guess, your ship turned over^ 

Carpenter's ^late Staff. I would say that is very close to a quarter 
to 8 when tJiey sounded the alarm. 

The Chairman. I think you are very liberal in j^our estimate. Our 
general impression is that it was 7 : 55. 

(^arpenter's Mate Staff. It could have been. 

The Chairman. That would mean that the ship went over in seven 
or eight minutes ? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. Yes. 

The Chairman. Did you feel each individual and separate torpedo 
shock ? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. Well, I felt several jars. I did not know 
they were torpedoes. When the lights went out we were down in the 
station, and that was the worst explosion. 

The Chairman. Tlie testimony that we have had indicates that there 
were four torpedoes shot into her side. 

[1189] Carpenter's Mate Staff. Yes, I felt at least four ex- 
plosions. 

The Chairman. You felt at least four explosions? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. Yes. 

The Chairman. And they came very close together? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. Yes, very close together. 

General McCoy. Were you able to get any food ( 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. No. 

General McCoy. After you were trapped in ^ You had no water? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. No, no food at all or water. 

Genetal McCoy. How much of a space were you confined in ? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. It was a large space but we had to stay 
on the high side. It was locked up, and we did manage to get in, 
but we had to beat the lock off. 

General McCoy. How did you call attention to the fact that you 
were there? How did they find you? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. We tapped with wrenches. 

General McCoy. There w ere two of you rescued there ? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. Yes. 

General McCoy. Were you mucli tlie worse for wear? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. Sir ? 

General McCoy. Were vou much the worse for wear when you got 
out? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. Oh, very weak and hungry. 

General McCoy. You felt you were being rescued, didn't you, when 
the thing first happened? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. Well, not at first, I didn't. 

General McCoy. You were there from Sundav morning until Tues- 
day? 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. Yes. 

General McCoy. I have no other questions. 

Admiral Standley. How do you account for the fresh air in there ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 729 

[^1190^ " Carpenter's Mate Staff. We were in the forward air 
compressor room and we had the compressed air, I suppose, from 
those tanks. 

Admiral Standlp:y. That is all. 

The Chairman, Thank you very much. Do not discuss with any- 
one on the outside what has been asked you here. 

Carpenter's Mate Staff. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. We will adjourn now until 2 o'clock. 

(Thereupon, at 12 : 80 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock 
p. m. of the same day.) 

[iiPi] AFTERNOON SESSION 

The proceedings were resumed at 2 o'clock p. in. at the expiration 
of the recess. 

The Chairman. Mr. Reporter, w^ill you note that there is a com- 
munication from Admiral Halsey in answer to the request of the 
Commission for information with respect to the liberty granted the 
personnel of the fleet. This will not be copied in the notes of testimony 
but is marked Halsey No. 1, for the information of the Commission. 

(Document with respect to liberty granted personnel of the fleet 
was marked Halsey Exhibit No. 1 for identification.) 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn, sir? 

TESTIMONY 01" CAPTAIN JAMES MARSHALL SHOEMAKER, 
UNITED STATES NAVY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give the reporter your full name, please? 

Captain Shoemaker. James Marshall Shoemaker. 

The Chairman. And your rank? 

Captain Shoemaker. Captain, U. S. Navy. 

The Chairman. And your duty on December 7, 1941 ? 

Captain Shoemaker. Commanding officer. Naval Air Station, Pearl 
Harbor. 

The Chairman. Where were you on the morning of the attack, sir? 

Captain Shoemaker. At the onset of the attack I was in my quar- 
ters on the Naval Air Station. 

Mr. Chairman. Where were you on the night of December 6 ? 

Captain Shoemaker. I was on the Naval Air Station. 

The Chairman. You were home that evening ? 

Captain Shoemaker. I was home that evening. 

[1192] The Chairman. What efl'ective force had you at your 
command on the morning of the attack? 

Captain Shoemaker. I had a trained seamen guard of 200 men, 'a 
marine detachment of approximately 100 men, and two officers. 

The Chairman. What materiel? 

Captain Shoemaker. Rifles, pistols, aircraft machine guns, both 
.30 caliber and .50 caliber; no heavier weapons. 

The Chairman. Did you have any planes under your control? 

Captain Shoemaker. I had four aeroplanes — pardon me; five 
aeroplanes of the utility unit of the Naval Air Station. They were 
not damaged. 



730 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. It was not part of your function to command or 
control fighter planes or bombing planes ? 

Captain Shoemaker. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Or planes of that type ? 

Captain Shoemaker. No, sir, I had no combatant planes under my 
command. 

The Chairman. Was your station attacked ? 

Captain Shoemaker. Yes, sir. My station was surrounded by the 
fleet moorings, and it was in the middle of the attack. 

The Chairman. How many bombs fell on your air field? 

Captain Shoemaker. The island — the Naval Air Station, Pearl 
Harbor, comprises the island of Ford Island in the middle of Pearl 
Harbor. On Ford Island, as nearly as we could count, there were a 
total of 11 bombs struck the island. Most of those bombs were aimed 
at battleships moored alongside. 

The Chairman. And fell on the island ? 

Captain Shoemaker. That's correct, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Did your force get into action promptly with anti- 
aircraft ? 

Captain Shoemaker. My force got into action with the second at- 
tack, and, as far as we could tell, very effectively. 

[1J93] The Chairman. They were not in action on the first at- 
tack ? 

Captain Shoemaker. No, sir, they were not. 

The Chairman. The ammunition not there? Was the ammunition 
not there to 

Captain Shoemaker. The ammunition was distributed with my sub- 
armories on the island. The men were taken — we all were — complete- 
ly by surprise with the first attack. 

The Chairman. And they were not able to get their ammunition 
from the armories in time to get their guns into action? 

Captain Shoemaker. Yes, sir, that's correct. 

The Chairman. There had been no orders requiring you to have any 
ammunition at the guns ? 

Captain Shoemaicer. No, sir. 

The Chairman. If such an order were to be given, who was your 
commanding officer who would give you such orders ? 

Captain Shoemaker. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval 
District. 

The Chairman. You remember some planes from task force No. 3 
coming into your field on the night of Sunday, the 7th ? 

Captain Shoemaker. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Were vou on the field on the evening of December 
7th? 

•Captain Shoemaker. I beg your pardon. Admiral — or ]\[r. Justice 
Roberts. I was thinking of the 6tli. I do remember that, planes com- 
ing in on the 7th. I was on the field, and during the latter part of 
their attempts to get onto the field I was in the land-plane control 
tower. 

The Chairman. Some of those planes were fired on by some of your 
force, weren't they? 

Captain Shoemaker. Those planes were fired on by every gun in 
the Pearl Harbor area, as nearly as I could tell. There were six land 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 731 

planes approached the field. Four of them were shot [IJOn 
down. I might add that the firing did not start on Ford Island • it 
started in the Navy Yard area. ' 

The Chairman. Yes ? 

Captain Shoemaker. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You had had no warning at Ford Island that those 
planes intended to land, I understand. 

Captain Shoemaker. As nearly as I can tell, those planes contacted 
the land-plane control tower by radio as they approached the island, 
and were told to come right in. The leader said he was going to circle 
Pearl Harbor before landing, and he was told, ''No. Come right in 
and land." Unfortunately, he didn't do what he was told 

The Chairman. He did circle, did he? 

Captain Shoemaker. He started to circle, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And then somebody let fly ? 

Captain Shoemaker. Somebody let fly, and I never saw so many 
bullets in the air m my life and never expect to— all tracer bullets at 
night. It was dark. 

The Chairman. Are there any other questions « 

General McNarney. Were the airplanes lighted? Did thev have 
warning lights on ? •'^ 

Captain Shoemaker. I just saw one. General. They had the run- 
ning-I am told-this IS hearsay-that they had-they all had their 
running hg^ts on as they approached Pearl Harbor from the direc- 
tion of the Pearl Harbor channel or Hickam Field. 
General McNarnei'. How about the landing lights « 
Captain Shoemaker. Several turned them off when the firing 
started, so I am told. ^ 

in^l? hS^ McNarney. How about the landing lights ? Were the land- 
thf tmie"' ^'^''^^''^''^- ^^'^ laiiding lights were not lit on the field at 

General McNarney. I mean on the airplanes 

U^f] Captain Shoemaker. No, sir. No landing lights. Kun- 

Sp fight """ ''^^ '"''"^'^^ ^'^^''^ ''^ ^^^ blue-green w?ng 

General McNarney. Did you not receive a message from the task 
force that the planes were on the way ? 

.,Sr.7rl^.^T^'^^'^i^^' ^^""'^ messages come to the fleet air detach- 
ment. General which is a separate entity from the Naval Air Station 

General McNarney. Would that be to Admiral Bellinger? 

Captain Shoemaker. It would be Admiral Bellingerl representa- 
tive, yes, sir : commander fleet air detachment xepresenta 

General McNarney. Did your personnel in the control tower know 
that they were on the way ? 

Captain Shoemaker. Yes, sir, they did 

General McNarney. Prior to the time that they contacted them? 

toi»?h?;S^^^- ' ^'^^' ''• ™^ ^^' ^^-"' ^--y- I -s 
General McCoy. Isn't the control tower under your command ? Is 

the control tower and personnel under your command ? ^'''^'^^'''^ ^ ^' 
Captain Shoemaker. The control tower is under mv command (^An 

oral, but It IS manned by the fleet personnel normSfy Tthi S^ 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 2 10 



732 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

the personnel in the control tower, with the exception of the ENTER- 
PRISE group commander, who was there, were my personnel. The 
E'NTERPRISE' group commander, however, I am told was there at 
the time these planes approached the island. They were planes from 
his air group. 

General McNarney. Did the guns on Ford Island participate after 
the other guns opened up ? 

Captain Shoemaker. Yes, sir, they did. 

General McNarney. The gun crews on Ford Island had not been 
warned, then, that friendly airplanes were to come in that evening? 

[1196] Captain SnoEMAiiER, No, sir. There wasn't time, as I 
remember it. I myself didn't know they were coming in until I saw" 
the shooting start as I was driving down toward the control tower. 

General McCoy. Were you conscious that it was a mistake at that 
point ? 

Captain Shoemaker. No, sir, I was not. 

Admiral Standley. Captain, where was your anti-aircraft battery 
mounted over on Ford Island on the night of the 6th? 

Captain Shoemaker. On the night of the 7th, sir ? 

Admiral Standley. On the nignt of the 7th, yes. 

Captain Shoemaker. On the night of the 7th we had anti-aircraft 
guns in improvised emplacements in at least 50 places on Ford Island, 
all around. 

The Chairman. That post had then been set up during the day of 
Sunday, the 7th? 

Captain Shoemaker. That had, sir. 

The Chairman. In other words, your anti-aircraft equipment had 
been increased during that Sunday on Ford Island? 

Captain Shoemaker. Yes, sir, it had. A large number of these 
guns were manned by refugees from the battleships. 

The Chairman. Some of the guns had been taken off the battle- 
ships ? 

Captain Shoemaker. That is correct. They had come ashore with 
their light machine guns. 

Achniral Standley. Have you any permanent installations over 
there on Ford Island, any anti-aircraft guns? 

Captain Shoemaker. We have nothing larger than 37-millimeter, 
Admiral. We have an armory anti-aircraft battery that has four 
37-millimeter guns on the Island, a No. 50. 

Admiral Standley. Are they a permanent installation? 

Captain Shoemaker. The emplacements are permanent. [1197 \ 
The guns were unfortunately missing on the 7th. The armory wasn't 
there. The anti-aircraft defense battalion, or company, rather, was 
]iot on the Island on the 7th. 

Admiral Standley. Have vou still got an Aimv company on Ford 
Island? 

Captain Shoemaker. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. What are they doing there? 

Captain Shoemaker. They are manning 37-millimeter and .50 cali- 
ber guns around the edge of the Island. 

Admiral Staxdt.ev. Which is part of the anti-aircraft defense 
force ? 

Captain Shoemaker. Part of the anti-aircraft and surface defense 
also against raiding parties and enemy aircraft. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 733 

The Chairman. Where was that Army company on the morning 
of Sunday, the 7th? 

Captain Shoemaker. They were at their regular station, which 1 
believe is Camp Malekole out by Barbers Point. 

The Chairman, Were they withdrawn every night from Ford 
Island? 

Captain Shoemaker. They had come aboard Ford Island from time 
to time in the last several months for a few days on tactical exercises. 

The Chairman. I see. 

Captain Shoemaker. But they had never been permanently sta- 
tioned there. 

General McNarney. Were they there on the night of December 7 ? 

Captain Shoemaker. No, sir, they were not. 

General McNarney. They hadn't arrived the day of December 7 
at all? 

Captain Shoemaker. No, they didn't show up on December 7. I 
asked Colonel Potts, who was their commanding officer, I believe. 
He said that they were not allowed to come to Ford [1198] 
Island on the 7th. 

General McCoy. Were they asked for? 

Captain Shoemaker. No, sir, we didn't ask for them. We pre- 
sumed that doctrine would send them there immediately there was 
an attack, but they didn't show up. 

General McCoy. Under whose command were they ? 

Captain Shoemaker. I don't know. General. 

Admiral Standley. Since the 7th have there been any guns in- 
stalled, any change in the battery as it was on the night of the 7th 
over there ? 

Captain Shoemaker. We have readjusted the anti-aircraft and' 
surface defenses of Ford Island, Admiral, by removing a great num- 
ber of improvised emplacements and spotting them scientifically 
around the Island with the help of the Army. 

Admiral Standley. In other words, then, you have increased your 
anti-aircraft fire ? 

Captain Shoemaker. We have increased its effect, sir. We have 
increased its effectiveness, yes, sir, greatly. 

Admiral Standley. You have. Do you grant regular liberty at 
Ford Island, of the men at Ford Island, every day ? 

Captain Shoemaker. Our liberty schedule calls for men to be ashore 
during daylight one day in four, except for married men, who may 
option the daylight liberty one day in four or overnight liberty one 
day in four ; one-fourth of the men, that is. 

Admiral Standley. What was the regulation in effect before the 
7th? 

Captain Shoemaker. Before the 7th there was 50% ashore and 
50% aboard. 

Admiral Standley. How did you get your liberty men back and 
forth ? 

Captain Shoemaker. By boats and ferry. May I go back to that 
question about how was the liberty before the 7th ? [1199] The 
married men only were allowed ashore after midnight. 

Admiral Standley. On the 7th ; prior to the 7th. 



734 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Shoemaker. Prior to the 7th, yes, sir. The transportation 
between Ford Island and the Navy Yard is by our boats and by our 
ferryboat. 

Admiral Standley. Did the ferryboat operate on the morning of 
the 7th? 

Captain Shoemaker. It did, yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. What schedule did it keep ? Do you recall or 
do you know ? 

Captain Shoemaker. The ferry was ready to leave Merry Point just 
at the time of the first attack, on the 0800 trip. The officer of the day 
held it up until the first attack had passed. The ferryboat then came 
aboard the Island crowded with men anxious to get to their stations. 

Admiral Standley. Do men on the battleships, liberty men, also 
come off on that ferryboat ? 

Captain Shoeiniaker. No, sir. They used their own ships' boats, 
except for carrier personnel or sea plane tender personnel, who were 
moored to our own docks there on Ford Island. 

Admiral Standley. What was the reason for the crowding of the 
ferry at eight o'clock if you only give liberty until midnight ? Who 
were the men that came off from it ? 

Captain Shoemaker. Enlisted men from the Naval Air Station and, 
I am told, from the great number of the ships moored next to Ford 
Island. I don't mean to say that really was crowded. I was told 
there was about 150 men on the ferry, which would be about our over- 
night crowd. 

Admiral Standley. Who handled the mast cases at Ford Island, 
regular punishment at the mast? 

Captain Shoemaker. I do, sir. 

Admiral Standley. You handle that ? 

[1200] Captain Shoemaker. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. What is the record of your command in regard 
to sobriety of your men ? 

Captain Shoemaker. Very few cases of drunkenness, Admiral. 
Very few. 

Admiral Standley. How many officers live on the station ? 

Captain Shoemaker. At the present time they all live on the station ; 
at that time a total of about 80 officers, roughly half of which are 
ensigns, before the 7th. Roughly 20 officers lived on the station. I 
beg your pardon. Roughlj' 40, of which 20 were ensigns living in the 
bachelor officers' quarters. 

Admiral Standley. In general what are their habits in i-egard to 
overnight leaves? Are they generally ashore or generally in their 
quarters ? 

Captain Shoemaker. The bachelor officers, sir, or the station 

Admiral Standley. Bachelor officers. 

Captain Shoemaker. The station oflicei-s Uw — conunissioned offi- 
cers occupying quarters on Ford Island, for the most part, were always 
aboard after midnight. Bachelor officers I venture to say were aboard 
earlier than that. 

Admiral Standley. Do you know whether there were any night 
clubs or whatnot that can be open after midnight in Honolulu^ 

Captain Shoemaker. No, sir, I don't. I do know that there were a 
number when I lived in town that were open after midnight, but the 
bars closed at midnight in accordance with the local law. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 735 

Admiral Standlet, Do you have any recreation facilities on Ford 
Island? 

Captain Shoemaker. Yes, sir, limited. 

Admiral Standley. For both officer's and men ? 

[1201] Captain Shoemakek. For both officers and men, yes, sir. 
We have a small golf course for officers and men. Shall I enumerate 
them, sir ? 

Admiral Standley. Yes. 

Captain Shoemaker. We have a small golf course for officer's and 
men, tennis court for officers and men, two swimming pools for en- 
listed men, one swimming pool for officers, a beer garden for enlisted 
men, a small officers' club with attached bar for officers, a recreation 
room in the bachelor officers' quarters with a bar attached for officers, 
sailboats, and boxing ring where we held weekly boxing meets. There 
may be more, Admiral. 

The Chairman. Baseball diamond ? 

Captain Shoemaker. The baseball diamond had been ruined by new 
construction this summer and was to be replaced this winter. 

Admiral Standley. In regard to entertainments at night or dances, 
do you liave any of those entertainments over there? 

Captain Shoemaker. The entertainments at night on the Island 
were held roughly once a month in a small clubhouse with dance floor 
for officers. The enlisted men had their beer garden open until ten 
o'clock at night. However, our dances for enlisted men were held in 
Honolulu. Our last enlisted men's dance was held on the 19th of 
November. 19th of November in the Armory in Honolulu, where we 
had 2,000 men, free beer, and no drunks. 

Amiral Standley. Were you aware of any advertisements or notifi- 
cation on the 6th of December to the effect that certain clubs or fisheries 
or whatnot in Honolulu were going to be opened and were giving free 
drinks ? 

Captain Shoemaker. No, sir. This is the first time I have heard of 
that. 

Admiral Standley. Nothing like that came to your knowledge ? 

[1202] Captain Shoemaker. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Do they have a club over at the Navy Yard — 
over on this side in the Naval Station ? 

Captain Shoemaker. Yes, sir, they have an officers' club and an 
enlisted men's recreation center. 

Admiral Standley. How often do the officers give dances in those 
clubs? 

Captain Shoemaker. Once a week, I believe. Admiral. I am not 
sure. I have been to several of them. I think it is — I think it was 
every Saturday night. 

Admiral Standley. Do the officers as a general thing attend those 
dances or do they prefer to go uptown ? 

Captain Shoemaker. I can't answer that. Admiral. 

The Charman. Anything, General? 

General McNarney. No. 

Admiral Reeves. On the morning of December 7 how many air- 
planes were on Ford Island other than those under your command ? 



736 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Captain Shoemaker. There were two squadrons of utility planes, 
totaling probably 30 or 40 utility planes, and I think two and a half 
squadrons of patrol planes. 

Admiral Reeves. Were the patrol planes hauled out or were they 
moored? 

Captain Shoemaker. All of the patrol planes were clustered around 
hangar 6, the hangar that was bombed. 

Admiral Ree\-es. Do you think Ford Island was attacked direct 
on the bomb hits or accidentally ? 

Captain Shoemaker. No, sir. I think that the first blow struck 
in Pearl Harbor was a bombing attack on our sea plane hangar. 

Admiral Reeves. You think it was directed at the hangar? 

Captain Shoemaker. I am sure it was, yes, sir. We had a total 
of six bomb hits in the vicinity of the hangar, [l^OS] includ- 
ing one that hit the hangar, and there were no ships in the vicinity at 
all. I believe that that was the first blow struck here, followed by the 
torpedo attack? 

Admiral Reeves. You think yOur hangar was bombed before the 
torpedo attack? 

Captain Shoemaker. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, I do. 

Admiral Reeves. Captain, did you observe the high-altitude bomb- 
ers that day? 

Captain Shoemaker. No, sir, I did not. T saw dive bombing but 
no high-altitude bombing. 

Admiral Reeves. You are sure it was dive bombing and not level 
fight at a relatively low altitude ? 

Captain Shoemaker. The bombing attacks that I personally saw 
were, you might call, glide bombing. 

Admiral Reeates. Yes. 

Captain Shoemaker. Gliding down at an angle of about 30 de- 
grees below the horizontal. I saw bombing attacks on the RALEIGH 
and on the DOBBIN, and that was the technique used, a rather gentle 
glide. 

Admiral Reeves. And in these gliding attacks thoy dropped bombs? 

Captain Shoemaker. They did. yes, sir, and they didn't hit an}'- 
thing on the DOBBIN. Tliey dropped tliree at the DOBBIN, one 
after the other, and all missed. 

Admiral Reeves. From about what altitude were they dropped? 

Captain Shoemaker. It looked to be about 300 feet, perhaps 400 
feet. 

The Chairman. And then they pulled out? 

Captain Shoemaker. Pulled right out and went away in — weaved 
their way out. 

The Chairman. You didn't see any high altitude bombing your- 
self? 

[1204] Captain Shoemaker. No, sir, I did not. I saw some 
Japanese planes circling overhead, but I thought at the instant they 
were photographic planes. I did not see any high-altitude bombing. 

General McCoy. If there had been high-altitude bombing, there 
probably would have been a great many more shell struck Ford Island ? 

Captain Shoemaker. I am sure of that. General. I am positive of 
that. I remember noting that the clouds were broken over Ford 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 737 

Island. A high-altitude bombing attack would have been rather 
difficult. 

General MoNarney. Could you tell if there was any noticeable 
delay on the bombs from the time they struck until the time they ex- 
ploded? 

Captain Shoemaker. There was some delay. They did not strike 
on impact, but that 

The Chairman. You mean they did not explode on impact. 

Captain Shoemaker. They did not explode on impact. Thank you, 
sir. But they exploded right under the water. The ones in the 
attack on the ]30BBIN are the only ones I saw hit the water ; I didn't 
see any other bombs hit. I saw other bombs being dropped, but I 
didn't see where they hit. 

Admiral Keeves. There were no dud bombs dropped on Ford Is- 
land that you later recovered? 

Captain Shoemaker. None. The fleet bomb expert thought he 
had found three duds in a small field over there, but after they dug 
down quite a ways they found that they had all explodfed in the 
ground, all three of them. 

Admiral Reeves. Have you heard that some of these Japanese bombs 
were converted 15-inch shell ? 

Captain Shoemaker. I have heard that, but this bomb expert as- 
sures me that that isn't so., that they were not converted shell. They 
were a very heavy-case bomb, however. I have a piece of [1205] 
steel about this big and this thick (indicating) that went through my 
bedroom in my quarters after I had gone to the war, and he says that's 
a piece of a Japanese bomb. 

Admiral Reeves. Were they what you would call armor-piercing 
bombs ? 

Captain Shoemaker. Yes, sir, a very heavy case with a relatively 
light charge. 

Admiral Reeves. I haven't anything further. 

The Chapman. Thank you very much. Captain. Will you please 
observe the caution not to discuss what has gone on in this room with 
anyone ? 

Captain Shoemaker. I shall, yes, sir. 

The Chahjman. Thank you, sir. 

Captain Shoemaker. Good day, gentlemen. 

Major Allen, Mr, Justice, Mr, Howe just called from Admiral 
Kimmel's quarters and says that Admiral Kimmel would like to know 
if there would be any objection if Admiral Theobald was present 
when Admiral Kimmel went over the transcript. 

The Chairman, There would be objection. 

Major Allen, There would be objection? 

The Chairman, There would be objection. 

Major Allen. Very well, sir. 

The Chairman. In other words, advise Mr. Howe that it is Ad- 
miral Kimmel's testimony, for which the Admiral takes responsibility, 
and he will have to con his own testimony. 

Major Allen. Very well, sir. 

Colonel Brown. Commander Martin. 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn? 

Commander Martin. Yes, sir. 



738 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[m06] TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER HAROLD MONTGOMERY 
MARTIN, UNITED STATES NAVY, COMMANDING U. S. NAVY AIR 
STATION, KANEOHE BAY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give the reporter your full name and 
rank? 

Commander Martin. Commander Harold Montgomery Martin, 
Commander United States Navy, commanding U. S. Navy Air Station, 
Kaneohe Bay, Territory of Hawaii. 

The Chairman. Commander Martin, where were you on the morn- 
ing of December 7, 1941 ? 

Commander Martin. At home, sir, in quarters A, Navy Air Station, 
Kaneohe Bay. 

The Chairman. Where were you on the night of December 6 ? 

Commander Martin. At home, sir. 

The Chairman. Had you any special orders with respect to your 
air station other than the routine that had been pursued prior to 
December 7 ? 

Commander Martin. We had been warned on Friday, the 5th, in- 
directly that the possibilities of sabotage were unusually imminent. 

The Chairman. What if any dispositions did you make to meet that 
danger ? 

Commander Martin. We had been expecting sabotage attempts for 
quite some time and had taken all measures that we could think of to 
meet them. On the morning of the 6th at personnel inspection the crew 
was again addressed on the possibilities of this particular danger, and 
the standing orders emphasized, mostly with a view of keeping the 
people in the alert status that they had been for some time, sir. 

The Chairman. What forces and what material had you under your 
command at your station on the morning of December 7? 

Commander Martin. Under my command at the air station were 
[1207] 303 naval personnel plus 31 officers and 93 marine plus two 
officers. 

The Chairman. What planes? 

Commander Martin. The planes at the Naval Air Station, with the 
exception of one utility plane, are assigned to commander patrol wing 
1, who uses our station as a base. 

The Chairman. Who was commander of patrol wing 1 at that time? 

Commander Martin. Commander Knefler McGinnis. 

The Chairman. And to what superior officer did he report? 

Commander Martin. At the present time patrol wing 1 — or at that 
time, rather, patrol wing 1 was operating under the command of 
commander patrol wing 2. 

The Chairman. Who was Admiral Bellinger. 

Commander Martin. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Can you state to us what the resources of patrol 
wing 1 on your field were that morning? 

Commander Martin. Patrol wing 1 had attached to it 36 PBY type 
aircraft, all of which I believe were in commission. Three of these 
were out on the patrol that morning. 

The Chairman. Where? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 739 

Commander Martin. I do not know the particular sector that had 
been assigned to patrol wing 1 as of that date. 

The Chairman. In what state were the others as respects readiness ? 

Commander Martin. I am not too familiar with the exact condition 
of the peisonnel at that time, but I believe that most of the crews 
were in their barracks or at their quarters in BOQ. 

One other thing I might add : there was at that time the regular 
watch on the hangar, which consists of a ready-duty plane and a crew 
of about 30 men. 

The Chairman. Was your field attacked by the Japanese ? 

Commander Martin. The station itself was, sir. The [1208] 
station consists of both the sea plane area and the field. 

The Chairman. Were any of those planes anchored out? 

Commander Martin. Yes, sir. Four planes were moored in 
Kaneohe Bay at about a thousand yards apart. 

The Chairman. The rest were at the field or at the hangar or 
where ? 

Commander Martin. The remaining planes were parked on the 
ramp except for four w^hich were in No. 1 hangar. 

The Chairman. Now describe the attack and its effect, if you will. 

Commander Martin. About 7 : 45 I was having a cup of coffee 
in my quarters, which are the most seaward quarters of the station, 
when — May I give this in the first person, sir ? 

The Chairman. Certainly. 

Commander Martin. — when I heard a group of planes.- I walked 
to the window and had the impression that a carrier group was about 
to land at our field. The first unusual thing that I noticed was that 
they were making a right-hand turn, which is contrary to the station 
fiight rules. They were about 800 feet and approaching almost head 
on. At about that time they exposed their fuselage, and my young 
son invited my attention to the fact that they had red circles on 
them. It is rather hazy from then on, sir. 

The Chairman. Do the best you can. 

Commander Martin. I grabbed a pair of trousers and jumped in 
the car and drove to the administration building. I had just gotten 
in the car when the firing commenced. The planes by that time were 
very low but were momentarily hid from my view by the high hill, 
Hawaiiloa. While rounding the high hill I noticed one plane climb- 
ing toward our tower — they Avere right down off the rooftops — and 
shooting at the control tower. When I reached the administration 
building the firing had become quite heavy, and the first plane on 
the water had [1309] begun to burn. A message was tele- 
phoned to the Fourteenth Naval District duty officer, who informed 
me that thej^ also were being attacked. I thought at first that it 
might have been an isolated raid here. 

The first attack aparently consisted of 12 fighters who in appearance 
resembled the Army's F-36's. That attack lasted about eight 
minutes, during which time all exposed planes were set on fire. Fire 
apparatus and firefighting crews rushed to the burning planes, and 
along with the assistance of the contractors' civilian personnel attempt 
was made to drag the burning planes clear of the hangars. Salvage 
operations were well along, and it looked as if the hangar could be 
saved, when the second attack (about 25 minutes later) commenced. 

The Chairman. What was the force that made the second attack? 



740 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Martin. The second attack consisted of aparently 18 
planes, half of which appeared to be bombers, dive bombers, although 
their attack could best be described as glide bombing. Preceding 
and during the actual bombing another strafing attack was made. 
About 18 bombs have been located, most of them falling on the 
southern side of the hangars and on the southeastern corner of No. 1 
hangar. This attack destroyed the planes in the hangars. The fire 
engine ignited the hangar itself. In size the bombs apparently were 
between 150 pounds and 200-pound and from the fragments we have 
collected appear to have been armor-piercing shells, since the case 
was extremely heavy. 

By the time the second attack had developed, anti-aircraft measures 
had been established and rifles and machine guns distributed to the 
personnel. During the second attack one fighter was obviously badly 
hit, apparently wounded, because he flew straight into t^ie hill., 
Several other planes appeared to be giving off a vapor mixture which 
looked as it might be [l!2iO] leaking gasoline. One other 
plane was reported from several sources to have crashed off Kailua 
Beach some distance at sea, but has not been found as yet. 

The CHAiRMAisr. Did your anti-aircraft artillerj^ get into action on 
the occasion of the first attack ? 

Commander Martin. Our anti-aircraft consists merely of machine 
guns and rifles, but there was a great deal of fire before the end of 
the first attack, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Y ou had no .50 calibers, then ? 

Commander Martin. The patrol wings manned all of the .50 
calibers which were in the planes, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Most of the planes, however, were set afire, I 
understand. 

Commander Martin. Yes, sir, but in the initial attack, before, it 
looked like some of them were going to be saved. The burning started 
rather slowly. It was from incendiary bullets, and even while some 
of them were burning they — 

The Chairman. They fired them ? 

Commander Martin. — they were firing the machine guns, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. No plane escaped such damage as would render 
it for the time unusuable? 

Commander Martin. I have been informed that out of the — T 
didn't quite understand. Did you say that "no plane"? 

The Chairman. I asked you whether any plane escaped attack so 
that it would be usable at the moment. 

Commander Martin. The answer to that is No, sir. Nine of the 
planes have since — 

The Chairman. Been restored? 

Commander Martin. Been restored, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General McCoy. Were you in touch with Bellows Field at that 
time? 

[1211] Commander Martin. Many of the stories and informa- 
tion that has since been gained — we are unable to substantiate the 
evidence itself, but apparently one plane from the group that com- 
menced the attack on Kaneohe dropped off and. flying real low. 
strafed Bellows Field. I have been informed that a civilian em- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 741 

ployee of the contractors phoned Bellows Field at the first attack, 
but they by that time were also being attacked. 

General McCoy. So you feel that on the first attack they attacked 
you before they did Bellows Field ? 

Comrnander Martin. I think one of the group that came in over 
our station went over to Bellows Field afterwards, sir ; yes, sir, that 
is the best information I have. 

General McCoy. So it was practically simultaneous? 

Commander Martin. Yes, sir. We are only about ten miles apart 
in air line distance. 

General McCoy. Did you get any warning from outside your post 
at any time prior to the attack? 

Commander Martin. No. sir. From all that I can learn I believe 
the firing commenced at Kaneohe first of all. 

General McCoy. At what time ? 

The Chairman. At 7 :45. 

Commander Martin. It was sometime after 7:45, very — one or 
two minutes, I would guess. 

General McCoy. Did you notice the direction from which these 
planes came? 

Commander Martin. Yes, sir; they approached from slightly 
west of north. 

General McCoy. Did you notice any torpedo planes? 

Commander Martin. No, sir. To amplify that other question, 
sir, the second attack, which consisted of bombers, was noticed by 
Mrs. Martin as coming in directly from the seaward, which is slightly 
east of north. The view up there is absolutely wide open so that 
you can see. 

[1212] General McCoy. You noticed nothing suspicious of any 
kind prior to the attack? 

Commander Martin. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Will you please observe 
the rule that nothing that has taken place in this room is to be dis- 
cussed with anyone outside? 

Commander Martin. Yes, sir. 

[1213] Colonel Brown. Colonel Weddington, Mr. Chairman. 

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL LEONARD D. WEDDINGTON, 
COMMANDING OFFICER, BELLOWS FIELD, UNITED STATES 
ARMY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 
The Chairman. Will you give your name, please ? 
Colonel Weddington. Leonard D. Weddington. 
The Chairman. You are a colonel in the United States Army? 
Colonel Weddington. Lieutenant Colonel. 
The Chairman. Lieutenant Colonel? 
Colonel Weddington. Yes. 

The Chairman. What was your post and duty on the morning 
of December 7, 1941, Colonel? 
Colonel Weddington. Commanding officer. Bellows Field. 
The Chairman. Was that field attacked on that morning? 



742 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Weddington. Ye^s sir. 

The Chairman. By ™\f ,^^^ ;:^ ^„g ^ single airplane, and about 
Colonel Weddington. First theie was a singie f 
an hour later about nine airplanes. 
The Chairman. Nine? 

Sri""; ■?;«",» -i,™ a. »«, .«• n- »~ 

Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. At that momenta 

Colonel Weddington. Yes. 

The Chairman. Did you see the plane? 

Colonel Weddington. No, sir. attacked, did you? 

The Chairman. You S^^ word t at it ^ ^^^^ ^^1^ 

Colonel Weddington Yes ^f ^^dTotte^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^ of the 

X^/pl'anS^^iSt^-niM^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^ 

" Chairman. Can you give us the approximate hour of that 

'^''S^-^Tw^^^oL. About 8 : 35, 1 believe 
The Chairman. What kind of attack was it ^ 

Colonel Weddington. It was a fighter aiipiane wiui 

'"^Tt"cir™l '^^ttliS^P^to. Where did it go. 

^JIIThImT Tou wir™ thS^^^^^ the second attack ca^e, 
I take it^ 

?rci«Z™ Wha.'t'pe .e,.e the nine planes that made that 

Colonel Weddington. They were fighters. 

The Chairman. No bombs? 

Colonel Weddington. No, sir. 

The Chairman. No dive bombers ( 

Colonel Weddington. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Machine gunning? 

Colonel Weddington. Yes. ■ 

The Chairman. Did they fly high or low ^ 

Colonel WEDmNGTON. Fairly high. I do not believe an> of them 
were over 1500 feet high. 

The Chairman. What damage did that attack doi 

Co W Weddington. About the material-they wounded one man 
and rifire a g!asoline tank truck, and a few holes in the rooves 
and shot down one officer of the 44th Squadron who was getting into 
Ws airplane to take off, and shot down two that took off, and damaged 
one 0-49 airplane, and one 047 was hit, but the damage was so slight 

as to be disregarded. x ^u ^ 4.- ? ix7U„f 

The ChairSan. What airplanes did you have at that time? What 

was your total number of planes there? o vv • • i. a 4.^^ 

[ihis] Colonel Weddington. The 86th Subdivision had two 

0-46's, and I believe five or six 0-47's. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 743 

The 44th Squadron was there for gunnery practice, and I believe 
they had either 11 or 12 P^O's. 

The Chairman. You mean they were parked on the held { 

Colonel Weddington. They were parked on our field, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. They had been left there on Saturday ? 

Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir. They had been there about three 
xyppTjc T believe. 

The Chairman. Were there any planes in the air from your field 
when the attack came on? 

Colonel Weddington. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Were there any planes fit to take the air after the 
attack at your field occurred? 

Colonel Weddington. After the first or second ? 

The Chairman. Either one. 

Colonel Weddington. Yes, we got the P-40's ready between the first 
and second attacks, because we did not know whether they were coming 
back there, but we still knew the attack was going on over here. 

The Chairman. Did any of your planes actually get in the air ? 

Colonel Weddington. Two of them got in the air but were shot down 
immediately as they got off the runway. 

The Chairman. None got off ? 

Colonel Weddington. One 0^7 took off after the attack was over 
and tried to track them but never caught them. 

The Chairman. Never caught them? 

Colonel Weddington. No, sir. 

The Chairman. In which direction did they go as they left your 
field? 

Colonel Weddington. Toward Kauai. 

The Chairman. Toward Kauai ? 

[121€] Colonel Weddington. They were over Kaneohe going 
from our place. 

The Chairman. That would be to sea east and north ? 

Colonel Weddington. West and north. 

The Chairman. Yes, that is correct, west and north. 

Colonel Weddington. West of northwest. 

General McNarney. How many P-40's were available after the 
first attack to take off? 

Colonel Weddington, After the first attack ? 

General McNarney. Yes. 

Colonel Weddington. I am not positive, but I believe there were 11 
or 12. 

General McNarney. Where they in commission ? 

Colonel Weddington. I am not sure. 

General McNarney. Where did the pilots of the P-40's spend the 
night of December 6 ? 

Colonel Weddington. Part of them were back in Wheeler Field. 
Part of them were in their tents. They had tents separate from the 
tents occupied by the other officers in the post. 

General McNarney. Do you know whether they were in a state of 
i-eadiness on the night of December 6? 

Colonel Weddington. The only readiness that we had on was a 
No. 1 Alert, which was ground, sabotage only, and they being for 
aerial gunnery were only responsible for a close guard on their own 
airplanes and had nothing to do with the ground defense of the post. 



744 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McNakney. How many of those P-40 pilots got off there 
prior to the second attack ? 

Colonel Weddington. I haven't heard a report on it. I saw three 
or four before the second attack. 

General McNarney. How many P-40's did they attempt to get off? 

Colonel Weddington. Attempt to get off? 

[1^17] General McNarney. Yes, that they attempted to get off. 

Colonel Weddington. Well, counting the one man that was shot 
getting in the airplane, that made three. 

General McNarney. . There were only three pilots in the ships? 

Colonel Weddington. Yes, because they didn't have ammunition 
and they weren't going out to them until the ammunition was loaded. 

General McNarney. They were loading the ammunition? 

Colonel Weddington. Yes, they had the airplanes loaded with .30 
calibre, and as fast as they got the .50 they would try to get off. 

General McNarney. When did you get the order to go on Alert 
No. 1? 

Colonel Weddington. I believe it was the latter part of November, 
I think it was. It was probably the 27th or 28th. 

General McNarney. What steps did you take in connection with it? 

Colonel Weddington. The 50 men were armed, who composed the 
ground defense unit, and were ti*ained to take their positions and were 
assigned the positions and were issued what little ammunition we 
had, but the guard itself was depleted after about two days, I think, 
because the ground defense unit was turned into the post guard, and 
it was reorganized. 

General McNarney. What positions were your airplanes in under 
this order? 

Colonel Weddington. During this alert? 

General McNarney. Yes. 

Colonel Weddington. They were all in one bunch. 

General McNarney. Was it customary to keep them that way 
all the time or only when you were on Alert No. 1 ? 

Colonel Weddington. All the time. 

General McNarney. All the time? 

Colonel Weddington. Yes, our space was very limited there. It 
was impossible at the time to keep the number of [1218] air- 
planes that we had there under cover — that is, more than possibly 
25 to 50. So, for the convenience of the guard they were kept to- 
gether in a place. 

General McNarney. Did you have any ground anti-aircraft de- 
fense in the planes on December 7 ? 

Colonel Weddington, Any anti-aircraft defense? 

General McNarney. Yes. 

Colonel Weddington. Not when the first attack came. 

General McNarney. Did you get any in the planes before the sec- 
ond attack came? 

Colonel Weddington. Yes. 

General McNarney. What did that consist of ? 

Colonel Weddington. The 298th Infantry, Hawaiian National 
Guard, got two .30 caliber anti-air craft machine guns into position 
:it the end of the runway in a hole they had there for it and we got 
all the machine gmis we had issued, but they had no ammunition in 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 745 

the belts, and as I told the ground defense officer when I arrived at 
the field — he asked me about setting the machine guns out, and I 
told him to get the machine guns into position and shoot at the Jap- 
anese, because I saw it was Japanese, and if we did secure the am- 
munition to get it to its position. 

General MoNarney. Where did you have to go to get the am- 
munition ? 

Colonel Weddington. We had to come to the crater, and all the 
ammunition we got that we got out of storage 86, that was already 
belted for the machine-gun lire, out of the 86th Squadron Reserve. 
The post had no ammunition ; it wasn't authorized any ammunition. 

General McNarney. Did your fire have any effect ? 

Colonel Weddington. I saw the effect of one man firing. I saw the 
gasoline coming from one of them during the attack. After this 
man had fired on him, I saw he was afire and he had a stream of gas 
coming from that tank. 

The Chairman. These planes which attacked you you attacked 
[1219] only with machine guns? 

Colonel Weddington. That is all : only with machine guns, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you have a hangar out there ( 

Colonel Weddington. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Any further questions? 

General McNarney. No. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Colonel. We will ask you 
to observe the caution and do not discuss what you have testified to 
here or what has gone on in this room. Do not discuss it with any- 
one outside. 

Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Colonel Brown. Ensign Beardall. 

TESTIMONY OF ENSIGN JOHN REGINALD BEARDALL, JR., U. S. S. 
RALEIGH, U. S. NAVY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. What is your name. Ensign? 

Ensign Beardall. John Reginald Beardall, Jr., sir. 

The Chairman. You are an ensign in the United States Navy ? 

Ensign Beardall. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. When did you graduate from the Academy ? 

Ensign Beardall. 1941, sir. 

The Chairman. With what ship were you connected on the 7th 
of December, 1941 ? 

Ensign Beardall. The U. S. S. RALEIGH, sir. 

The Chairman. A cruiser? 

Ensign Beardall. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Where were you on the night of December 6 ? 

Ensign Beardall. I was in Honolulu, sir, on shore leave, sir. 

The Chairman. When did you get back to your command ? 

Ensign Beardall. At 1:15, approximately, sir. 

The Chairman. What kind of shape were you in when you got 
back? 

[12W] Ensign Beardall. Well, not the best shape, sir, but not 
the worst. 



746 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Did you have some drinks ? 

Ensign Beardall. Yes, I had some drinks. 

The Chairiman. What was the first you knew about the attack on 
that morning? 

Ensign Beardall. Well, I was asleep in my room below, sir, and 
the torpedo struck us amidships, and the concussion woke me up. 

I got out of bed and went to the quarterdeck, and the word was 
passed about that time that we were being attacked by Japanese 
planes. 

I saw a plane which was already passing over us. I could see the 
rising sun on the wing, sir. 

The Chairman. Where did it disappear to ? 

Ensign Beardall. Well, it went over and then banked around to 
the left. 

The Chairman. Over where? 

Ensign Beardall. It passed over the RALEIGH and banked 
around to the left, and it was coming out down the entrance. 

The Chairman. Then did you see that plane return again? 

Ensign Beardall. No, sir, we lost the plane. 

The Chairman. And what orders were passed on the RALEIGH ? 

Ensign Beardall. To man the AA battery, sir. 

The Chairman. What state of readiness was your particular bat- 
tery in ? 

Ensign Beardall. Well, we had ammunition at all 3-inch guns. 

The Chairman. You mean it was there before you got there? 

Ensign Beardall. Yes, sir, it was in the ready boxes at the guns. 
The machine guns had a thousand rounds apiece, and the 1.1 machine 
guns had 1904 rounds in each of the clip rooms. 

The Chairman. What proportion of your gun crew at your sta- 
tion were on hand ? 

Ensign Beardall. Well, it was a ship's order for one half 
[12211 of the AA battery to be on board at all times and one half 

in each liberty group. 

The Chairman. Was your one half available? 

Ensign Beardall. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. How quickly did you get firing? 

Ensign Beardall. In approximately five minutes, sir. 

The Chairman. What proportion of the complement of the 
RALEIGH was on board ship when the attack took place? 

Ensign Beardall. I should say two thirds. 

The Chairman. And what proportion of the officer personnel was 
on board ship ? 

Ensign Beardall. I should say about two fifths. 

The Chairman, Who is your commander? 

Ensign Beardall. Captain R. B. Simons. 

The Chairman. He Avas on board ? 

Ensign Beardall. Yes. 

The Chairman. He took command ? 

Ensign Beardall. Yes. 

The Chairman. Was your personnel in good shape at the work 
that morning? 

Ensign Beardall. Yes, sir, I think in exceptionally good shape. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 747 

The ChairmxV.n. What has been your general observation since 
you have been in Oahu as to the conduct of the officers and the men 
when on leave ? Has there been a great amount of drinking going 
on when they have leaves ? 

Ensign Beardall. No, sir, I do not believe there is any at all, sir. 

The Chairman. You think the morale has been good in that 
respect ? 

Ensign Beardall. I think the morale has been very good, sir. 

The Chairman. What did the RALEIGH get in the way of hits? 

Ensign Beardall. She had a bomb hit aft, which exploded after 
passing through the ship. 

[12B2] The Chairman. In the water? 

Ensign Beardall. It passed through the ship and went out the 
side and exploded on the bottom. 

The Chairman. On the bottom? 

Ensign Beardall. On the bottom of the bay. 

The Chairman. In the harbor, you mean ? 

Ensign Beardall. Yes. 

The Chairman. There was no attempt to get her under way or 
to move her ? 

Ensign Beardall. No, sir, the engineering spaces were flooded, 
or at least half of them were. 

The Chairman. When you got to your gun position, what kind 
of planes did you observe making the attack? You spoke of one 
torpedo plane. Did you see any others? 

Ensign Beardall. I remember the torpedo plane in the vicinity, 
but there was no other attack on the RALEIGH at that time. In 
fact, there were no other attacks on that side of the island. 

The Chairman. Did you see any dive bombers ? 

Ensign Beardall. Yes, I saw Ford Island bombed, and the 
RALEIGH was dive-bombed by 15 planes. 

The Chairman. Most of which missed her ? 

Ensign Beardall. Most of them missed her, yes. They were close 
misses. 

The Chairman. No high bombing? 

Ensign Beardall. I saw some planes that were flying at a high 
altitude, sir, but I did not personally see them drop a bomb. 

The Chairman. They may have been photographing? 

Ensign Beardall. They may have been, or they may have been 
forming up. 

The Chairman. I have no further questions. 

Admiral Standley. Ensign, are you in the water integrity group 
of the RALEIGH? 

[122S] Ensign Beardall. No, sir, in the gunnery department, 
sir. 

Admiral Standley. Do you have a water-tight integrity group 
there? 

Ensign Beardall. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Can you state, from your knowledge, the gen- 
eral condition as to procedure after the RALEIGH was bombed? 
What happened ? 

Ensign Beardall. Condition Zed was set right away, sir, and then 
we went ahead with counterflooding afterward. I learned that more 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 143, vol. 2 11 



748 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

from the reports of what I heard other people say than from any 
observation I made myself. 

Admiral Standlet. Do you know whether the RALEIGH was 
thought to be sinking? 

Ensign Beardall. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Was thought to be turning over ? 

Ensign BEARDALii. Yes, we stood by to abandon ship. 

Admiral Standlet. Was that condition corrected by watertight 
integrity control? 

Ensign Beardall. Somewhat. We were sinking slowly, and a 
lighter came by after the attack started and they passed some wire 
cables around the hull, and about an hour and a half after we had 
some sort of outrigger affair on the port side due to this lighter being 
connected to us by wires. 

Admiral Standlet. And that condition lasted through a period of 
two or three days ? 

Ensign Beardall. Yes, sir, they stayed alongside the lighter until 
we went into the Navy Yard a week ago. 

Admiral Standlet. And the RALEIGH is in dry dock now? 

Ensign Beardall. Yes, sir, it is in dry dock this morning. 

Admiral Reeves. That is all. 

The Chairman. Any questions. Admiral? 

Admiral Reeves. No, sir. 

[1224.] The Chairman. Thank you very much, Ensign. Please 
observe the caution not to discuss with anyone what has gone on in 
this room. Do not discuss it on the outside. 

Ensign Beardall. Aye, aye, sir. 

Colonel Brown. Seaman Berry. 

TESTIMONY OF SEAMAN FRANK MAUTHE BERRY, SEAMAN FIRST 
CLASS, U. S. S. RALEIGH, U. S. NAVY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. State your full name, sir. 

Seaman Berry. Frank Mauthe Berry. 

The Chairman. What ship are you connected with ? 

Seaman Berrt. U. S. S. RALEIGH, sir. 

The Chairman. What type ship is that? 

Seaman Berry. A light cruiser, sir. 

The Chairman. Where was she moored on the morning of Decem- 
ber?? 

Seaman Berry. The north side of Ford Island just forward of the 
UTAH. 

The Chairman. On the north side? 

Seaman Berrt. Yes, sir, that is Berth Fox 13. 

The Chairman. Next to the UTAH? 

Seaman Berrt. Yes, just forward of her, sir. 

The Chairman. Had you been on liberty Saturday night, the 6th ? 

Seaman Berrt. No, sir, I had duty ; I had watch. 

The Chairman. You had duty? 

Seaman Berrt. Yes. 

The Chairman. In what part of the ship were you when the attack 
started ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 749 

Seaman Berry. I was on the port side quarterdeck and this torpedo 
hit right underneath us. 

The Chairman. M^as the first thing you knew about the attack the 
torpedo that hit or did you see bombs and machine gunning before 
that? 

[1££S] Seaman Berry. Well, the starboard side quarterdeck 
was painted, so the watch on the port side and I didn't notice any 
bombing of Ford Island, but we did notice a plane in the air flying 
very high, but I didn't think anything of it. 

The Chairman. You though that might be practice? 

Seaman Berry. Yes. As a matter of fact, the officer of the deck 
thought it was practice, and he asked me if I thought we should call 
the AA battery for a practice drill. 

The Chairman. The first thing that woke up the crew and the of- 
ficers of the RALEIGH was when she was hit by a torpedo? 

Seaman Berry. Yes. 

The Chairman. Was that on the other side from where the torpedo 
hit? 

Seaman Berry. I watched them drop. 

The Chairman. That is what I want to know. How did they drop 
the torpedo? 

Seaman Berry. How did they drop it ? 

The Chairman. Was it low ? 

Seaman Berry. Yes, sir, he came in quite low. 

The Chairman. How far away from you did he launch the torpedo ? 
That is a pretty wide stretch of water from you, isn't it ? 

Seaman Berry. Yes. He dropped it a little beyond midstream. 

The Chairman. Beyond midstream? 

Seaman Berry. Yes. 

General McCoy, Did you realize he was torpedoing at the 
EALEIGH? 

Seaman Berry. Sir? 

General McCoy. Did you realize that he was shooting at 
the RALEIGH? 

Seaman Berry. Well, at the time I saw it drop I did not know what 
it was. I really did not know what it was. 

The Chairman. You really did not know they were dropping 
[1226] a torpedo at you, did you? 

Seaman Berry. No, sir. I asked the officer of the deck what was 
dropping, and he said, "I don't know." He thought it was practice. 

The Chairman. You even then did not know it was a torpedo plane? 

Seaman Berry. No, sir, I did not. 

The Chairman. Did that torpedo which hit you do much damage 
to the RALEIGH? 

Seaman Berry. Well, we didn't list a lot. 

The Chairman. You did not? 

Seaman Berry. No, it was just a gradual listing. Of course, it 
vibrated the ship a lot. 

The Chairman. It did vibrate the ship a lot? 

Seaman Berry. Yes, it did. There was water by our feet and there 
was water at the quarterdeck, and it got washing around a little. 

The Chairman. I presume that there was a general quarters call on ? 



750 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Seaman Berry. No, sir. I ran to the opposite side of the quarter- 
deck where the alarm is and I pulled the alarm, but it did not go off. 

The Chairman. It did not go off ? 

Seaman Berry. No, sir, the electricity went the first thing. 

The Chairman. Did you get the anti-aircraft guns into action on 
your ship ? 

Seaman Berry. Yes, sir, I think we w^ere the first ones. 

The Chairman. How about the crews ? How were the guns manned 
at that time Sunday morning ? 

Seaman Berry. They were manned at all times. You mean before 
the attack? 

The Chairman. Yes. Was the ammunition at the guns? 

Seaman Berry. Yes. The ready boxes were there. 

The Chairman. Was the gun crew on board ? 

[1227] Seaman Berry. Well, yes, sir. Of course, at the time 
they attacked, any man who is near the gun will man the gun. There 
was a crew, but anybody who is standing by and who can work it 
will go in. 

The Chairman. There is a rule that a certain part of every gun 
crew is to be on board and a certain part on liberty? 

Seaman Berry. Yes. 

The Chairman. And they were on hand ? 

Seaman Berry. Yes, 

The Chairman. And anybody who could work the gun got to it? 

Seaman Berry. Yes. The guncrews were on. 

The Chairman. Did you get hit again? 

Seaman Berry. Well, about an hour later were were hit; a bomb 
struck aft. 

The Chairman. Aft ? 

Seaman Berry. Yes. 

The Chairman. Did it do serious damage ? 

Seaman Berry. No, sir, it wasn't severe; it just went through the 
ship and out through the bottom. 

The Chairman. That is all I have. 

Admiral Standley. What duty were you performing? 

Seaman Berry. I had the quartermaster watch. 

Admiral Standley. How many planes do you estimate took part in 
the attack. How many planes were there? It has been indicated that 
there were possibly three waves. How many planes would you esti- 
mate took part in the attack ? 

The Chairman. That is altogether? 

Seaman Berry. I would be afraid to estimate it, sir. 

The Chairman. Of course, we do not suppose that you took time 
out to count them. 

Seaman Berry. No, sir. After that, I got on the gun myself and 
started to work on the gun. I was opening up the new cases that came 
up from the magazines and taking the caps off, 

[1228] Admiral Standley. Are you still on board ship? 

Seaman Berry. Yes, sir, I am still on board. 

The Chairman. I suppose there were quite a number of men from 
the EALEIGH on liberty? 

Seaman Berry. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 751 

The Chairman. On shore leave? 

Seaman Berry. Yes. 

The Chairman. They all came back about what time that night ? 

Seaman Berry. Well, the biggest part of the liberty party came 
back about 1 o'clock, but we still had quite a few stayed all night. 

The Chairman. The liberty party ? 

Seaman Berry. Yes. 

The Chairman. And petty officers ? 

Seaman Berry. Yes. There is quite a few on special liberty. 

The Chairman. Were those that came back in good condition for 
work ? 

Seaman Berry. Yes. 

The Chairman. Or were some of them tight? 

Seaman Berry. Well, I only saw three or four of them, sir. 

The Chairman. They seemed to have had a few drinks? 

Seaman Berry. Yes, sir, but they got right to work. It didn't stop 
them any. 

The Chairman. These fellows were working the next morning? 

Seaman Berry. Yes, sir, and they worked all that night; no one 
hardly got any sleep. They were pumping the flooded compartments. 

The Chairman. Any other questions ? 

Admiral Standley. Yes. Did the bomb or the torpedo destroy the 
power of your ship ? 

Seaman Berry. The torpedo destroyed the power right at the 
beginning. 

Admiral Standley. And you had no electricity or force in 
[12£9] the water mains? You had no pressure? 

Seaman Berry. No pressure, no, sir; none in the freshwater lines. 
We did not have anything. 

Admiral Standley. That is all. 

The Chairman. Do not discuss with anyone your testimony or what 
has been said here. Thank you very much. 

Ensign Berry. Aye, aye, sir. 

Colonel Brown. Lieutenant Commander Taylor. 

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDER WILLIAM E. G. TAYLOR, 
U. S. NAVAL RESERVE 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. State your full name. 

Commander Taylor. William E. G. Taylor. 

The Chairman. Commander Taylor, you had something to do with 
the installation of the detector device on the island of Oahu, did you 
not? 

Commander Taylor. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I understand that you had some contact with this 
device in England ? 

Commander Taylor. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And the Army borrowed you to aid them in setting 
up the system here ? 

Commander Taylor. Yes, sir, that is correct. 



752 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. In what state of preparedness or readiness was the 
interceptor command here or the warning system or the warning net 
and the rest of the paraphernalia on or about December 7, 1941? 

Commander Taylor. It was not ready by any means, sir, for air 
warning, for air interception, and we were still trying to pull the last 
threads of it together and to get the information center mounted. I 
think we had something in the neighborhood of two or three more weeks 
work before we could get them functioning. 

[1230] The Chairman. As I understand it, it would ultimately 
have in this information center a naval liaison officer ? 

Commander Taylor. Yes, sir, it would have several liaison officers — 
to have a regular watch of naval liaison officers. 

The Chairman. That wasn't instituted for the practice drills that 
had taken place ? 

Commander Taylor. No, sir. We had asked for them. 

The Chairman. You had asked for them ? 

Commander Taylor. They were forthcoming from the Commander- 
in-Chief and we expected to have them within a week. They were be- 
ing withdrawn from the fleet pool. We were going to get the reserve 
ensigns and get them trained to do the job there, but it would have 
taken a week or ten days to train them to do the job properly. 

The Chairman. But no such thing had been instituted on Decem- 
ber 7? 

Commander Taylor. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Were you cognizant of the fact that when Alert 
No. 1 was ordered on November 27, General Short also ordered the in- 
terceptor command or the air warning system to be in operation from 
4 a. m. to 7 a. m. each day ? 

Commander Taylor. Yes. 

The Chairman. Did you have any conference with General Short 
about the purpose of that order ? 

Commander Taylor. No, sir, I have not seen the General. I never 
have seen the General. 

The Chairman. You never saw the General ? 

Commander Taylor. No, sir. 

The Chairman. What was your understanding as to the reason why 
that was put into effect? 

Commander Taylor. We had the place operated from 6 o'clock in 
the morning until 11:30. as the equipment was breaking down oc- 
casionally; the auxiliary power equipment was breaking down, and 
then I believe it was General Short s order that tlie [1231] op- 
erations should be from 4 to 7 o'clock in the morning. They didn't 
install the commercial power. 

We were planning as soon as possible to get the full operations re- 
sumed and to go on a 24-hour basis. At the time, on December 7, and 
up until that time, the information center was functioning under two 
departments : under the Hawaiian Department and under the inter- 
cejDtor command; so we had a little bit of confusion as to which was 
going to operate it. 

The Chairman. The interceptor command and the Signal Service 
were both busy with it ? 

Commander Taylor. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 753 

General McCoy. There were no permanent stations operating at 
that time, though ? 

Commander Taylor. Detector stations? 

General McCoy. Mo. permanent stations. 

Commander Taylor. No, sir, there were no permanent stations here 
at all. We had mobile detector stations. We still have them on the 
island. They are the only ones we have. 

As I understand it, the permanent radar systems that are to be put 
in will be practically the same e(i[uipment but will be housed instead 
of on truck. 

General McCoy. But with different power ? 

Commander Taylor. It would eventually be commercial power, yes, 
but it would be some time before it would be put in. 

The Chairman. I understand that the warning net connecting the 
mobile stations at the different places with the information center that 
you have in now is a temporary affair? 

Commander Taylor. Yes. 

The Chairman. And what are the lines? Are they just temporary 
lines ? 

Commander Taylor. Yes, sir. Some of them are temporary, but 
they are all in cable. 

The Chairman. They are in a cable ? 

Commander Taylor. Yes, it is all in a cable, but the [12S2] 
temporary is the best equipment that we could get and get it in a hurry. 
It is to be installed in bombproof. 

General McCoy. Has it been installed in bombproof yet ? 

Commander Taylor. No, sir, the bombproof is not ready, and the 
telephone equipment has not arrived from the mainland. I think it 
will probably take two weeks or a month to get it installed in there 
when the equipment arrives. 

General McCoy. So it is still a very sketchy performance ? 

Commander Taylor. It works very well, but it is not bombproof. 
It is in a pretty vulnerable place, although it is fairly well guarded, 
but it is very easy to sabotage it if anybody wants to. 

The Chairman. It is still subject to these local break-downs ? 

Commander Taylor. Occasionally, yes, sir. It is very crude equip- 
ment. 

Admiral Standley. Has the operation been satisfactory since De- 
cember 7 considering the state of preparedness of the personnel ? 

Commander Taylor. In some respects, yes, sir, because we do think 
the}^ are good for air warning. It is pretty good for interception, but 
we can't get height when they get back there from the land just off- 
shore. We can't make interception with it. 

General McNarney. Do you believe there is need for a system of 
ground observers to supplement the radar? 

Commander Taylor. We have ground observers, but unless we can 
get a very good observer system with trained people we find that they 
are more of a hindrance than a help because we get so many false 
reports coming in. 

On the day of the raid we had the Coast Artillery — which we are 
using — and they sent in very queer reports. 

General McNarney. Is there any attempt to filter those out ? 



754 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAKL HAKBOR ATTACK 

[12SS] Commander Taylor. Yes, we filter those out now, which 
means rechecking and rechecking, because they are not well trained 
observers. 

General McNarney. But it could be better? 

Commander Taylor. Yes. 

General McNarney. As time goes on ? 

Commander Taylor. Yes, sir, it is getting better, yes. 

General McNarney. How long do you think it will be before you 
have an eflEicient service ? 

Commander Taylor. I think it is almost as efficient as can be made 
with the best equipment. I do not think there is any better equipment 
being made on the mainland. 

General McNarney. So far as you know, there is no equipment be- 
ing made which will give you altitude ? 

Commander Taylor. Nothing I know of that is in production, no, 
sir. 

General McNarney. Do you know about the I. F. F. equipment ? 

Commander Taylor. Yes. 

General McNarney. Is any scheduled to come out? 

Commander Taylor. The I. F. F. equipment I do not believe will 
work in this case because the I. F. F. will only show up on the detector 
station on the proper frequency. The I. F. F. and the detector station 
have to be on the same frequency. These stations are on the same fre- 
quency, but the carrier planes have a different frequency ; so the I. F. F. 
may work on the carriers and won't work when it comes into port, and 
vice versa. 

We improvised this after December 7. We made an improvised 
system for the planes, which was to keep track of every plane at sea 
and when they came in, and we used the approach procedure so that 
nothing could come in until we had a chance to look it over carefully 
before it got to port. When anything not identified came in against 
the approach procedure \J~-''i] ^ve deemed it hostile and sent 
fighters off to intercept them. 

General McNarney. With the information you have, can you iden- 
tify them for interception purposes ? 

Commander Taylor. Well, we can't depend on getting the fighters 
at the proper height. With the proper detector equipment you could 
send out one or two planes to intercept a raid because you could put 
them at the proper height ; but with this thing you have to send out a 
couple of squadrons to find them. 

The Chairman. You mean there is no equipment available in the 
United States which will obtain height for you ? 

Commander Taylor. Nothing. The onl}' equipment I know which 
does obtain height is the equipment used aboard ships. We borrowed 
one of those sets and installed it here in our system, but unfortunately 
it won't work in these mountains. 

The Chairman. It will not work ? 

Commander Taylor. No, sir. We are trj'ing to find something to 
make it work now. 

The Chairman. You do not know why it will? 

Commander Taylor. Yes. 

The Chairman. You do know why? 

Commander Taylor. Yes. 

The Chairman. You are not very hopeful ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 755 

Commander Taylor. Yes. We do not think we will have any 
success. 

General McNarney. Why won't it work ? 

Commander Taylor. It has, in addition to this beam, which heads 
out straight, it has two side lobes which pick up the mountain range, 
so you can't pick up anything in any direction. That is, we can pick 
up beyond that, but we have a 20- to 30-mile blind area in the mountain 
range, and it shows up on the screen 360 degrees around. 

General McNarney. You cannot locate it? 

Commander Taylor. From where our blind spot is. 

The Chairman. What is the objection to the blind spot if [1235] 
it is only 20 miles from the system ? 

Commander Taylor. That is on the net we can pick up things at 
a distance, but we can't make interception. We can't get height to 
get interception, but we hope we will be able to direct our fighters 
and to see our fighters as they go out. 

The Chairman. This blind space prevents you from seeing your 
fighters as they go out? 

Commander Taylor. Yes, we never know where our fighters are. 

General McNarney. Do the British have the same trouble? 

Commander Taylor. No, sir. They have got four different types 
of detector equipment. Theirs is working very well, but ours is very 
obsolete and crude equipment. 

The Chairman. In other words, to make this a real information 
station means tliat we have to get the British plans and to get in- 
struments constructed in accordance with them? 

Commander Taylor. Yes, sir, at least as good as their equipment 
is, and it would take perhaps two types of equipment to work the 
island here. 

Admiral Standley. Haven't we got any of the British types? 

Commander Taylor. To my best knowledge we have the informa- 
tion on the British radar equipment, but we do not have any of the 
equipment in ])roduction. 

General McCoy. Do you have reason to think that the enemy has 
the radar ? 

Commander Taylor. I was told the enemy has a low-frequency de- 
tector unit. I know the Germans have had it for fighter control and 
they also started to use it for fire control in France this last March. 
When we sent our raids over there, France, we could see their fighters 
come up to intercept them, and they used the same sort of detector, 
the fighter detector system, that the British use. ' 

Tlie British knew the Germans were working on the equipment be- 
fore the war started. 

[1236'] The Chairman. The Germans developed it originally? 

Commander Taylor. No, sir, the Germans and the British were both 
working on it before the war started. They talked very freely about 
it. Before the war the British had a very good detector system and 
operations room and that was all set up before the war started. 

The Germans apparently didn't have the system working, but now 
they are using the same equipment for fighter control, and I assume 
that they have passed it on to the Japanese. 

General McCoy. I understood they had it on the BISMAECK. 
_ Commander Taylor. Yes, sir, and it is very evident in their anti- 
aircraft defense and they are accurate on heights. 



756 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chaieman. When did you enter the regular service, sir ? 

Commander Taylor. Sir? 

The Chairman. When did you enter the regular naval service ? 

Commander Taylor. I never had been in the regular Navy ; I was 
in the Naval Reserve since 1925, and after that the Marines, and when 
the war began I joined the British air corps and then came back to 
do this work. 

The Chairman. What is your profession, sir ? 

Commander Taylor. I have been in naval aviation most of my life. 

The Chairman. Naval aviation? 

Commander Taylor. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. With respect to the information about the op- 
eration of the radar, did you communicate particularly with the Com- 
mander-in-Chief and his staff in regard to your work ? 

Commander Taylor. I worked very closely with the Commander- 
in-Chief's staff, and I found them more helpful than anyone else. 

Admiral Standley. Can j^ou tell me how this training and this 
station operated ? That is the one we saw the other day. 

[1237] Commander Taylor. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. That is the warning station where you have the 
big board and the various operators there ? 

Commander Taylor. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. That is under the interceptor command? 

Commander Taylor. It is now, yes. 

Admiral Standley. Was it under the Signal Corps ? 

Commander Taylor. It was the Signal Corps's responsibility to 
develop the information center and train the personnel. 

Admiral Standley. And then turn over to the interceptor com- 
mand? 

Commander Taylor. The interceptor command, I think, was the 
one to put in the controller and do the interceptions. 

The Chairman. And the Signal Service was still to do the main- 
tenance ? 

Commander Taylor. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. What was the kind of training that was given 
there before December 7 ? What was the process of operator training ? 

Commander Tayix)R. The first thing to do was to put out the de- 
tector station and to train the operators around the island to read the 
screen and to pass the information to us. It takes a long time to 
train these operators, and we did not have anywhere near enough. 

The next thing was to train the plotters on the board, who are at 
the other end of the direct telephone line from the detector operators. 

We got the detector stations and the plotters functioning together. 

The thing was to get the detector station connected up with the sj's- 
tem of plotting and sending in the instructions and the pursuits — we 
were working on the fighters and pursuits at Hickam Field, giving the 
technical information and working on the radar station. 

[12SS] Then the next thing was to try to get the anti-aircraft 
guns and to control them. We were just getting the officers in the posi- 
tions in the information center at the time that war was declared. We 
did not get them all in, and it takes time getting the men trained in 
the different types of equipment, but we had gotten a few anti-aircraft 
people and had gotten control of the guns. 



PROCEEDINGS OP ROBERTS COMMISSION 757 

The Navy personnel were forthcoming, and we had gotten the 
bombers and I think we had only two from them. That is about all 
we asked for up to that time. 

The only other person we had on training — we had one officer on 
watch, and on the morning of December 7 we had one officer who had 
no experience as a controller and was there trying to learn as much as 
he could about the information center. 

Admiral Staxdley. Was this a case where you felt jt^ou were re- 
sponsible for setting this up or rather forcing this on the organiza- 
tion, or rather that it was up to you to push the thing and get the 
officers ? 

Commander Taylor. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. And you were haying a little difficulty getting 
the personnel ? 

Commander Taylor. Yes. I do not think most of the people real- 
ized the importance of the thing until they actually got in and looked 
at it. It sometimes does take a little time and sometimes a conference 
to get things going. 

Admiral Standley. There was nothing whatever reliable about 
your warning service that morning of December 7? 

Commander Taylor. No, sir, nothing, nothing at all. That raid 
coming in might have been the Army or Navy planes or they might 
have been ferrying planes going to Australia or might have been any- 
thing. On that morning we could not have identified those planes. 

Admiral Standley. Someone said that after the attack that station 
was more or less manned and that these planes [l^SO] were 
tracked on the detector ? 

Commander Taylor. I did not get there until 9 : 30 that morning, 
sir, and the station was going. We were trying to man all stations 
as fast as we could. We are using our crews, but there was a large 
amount of unworthy information coming in and going out as to what 
was going on, and I could just barely remember what went on. I 
spoke to the sergeant who was the man at the phone whether he passed 
any information to the Navy, and he said he did. He did give the 
information that the raid was coming from the southwest, which still 
may be true, but we were working on a 24-hour basis for three or four 
days until we got the thing going, and it is pretty hard to tell that in 
particular. 

The Chairman. You think that due to the untrained personnel and 
the confusion going on that it is pretty hard to depend or to put any 
dependence on what happened after 9 : 30 that morning? 

Commander Taylor. Yes, sir. I saw the historical plot afterward. 
There is one man who keeps a plot of everything that shows up on the 
board. It was analyzed, and I could not be sure what went on. 

Admiral Standley. Did you see the plot that was made of the sup- 
posedly oncoming Japanese ships ? 

Commander Taylor. Yes. If it had come in on the board when I 
was there it would not have meant anything to me with the stage of 
development of this information center here at the time. We would 
have a pretty difficult time finding out. We would have to go to 
Kaneohe Bay and we would have to go to those at Pearl Harbor and 
all the bombing squadrons and the carriei-s which never warn us when 
they come in. 



758 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

It may have been a carrier group or it may have bene a ferrying 
flight which was coming over. 

Admiral Standley. If you had been there and had seen it on the 
screen, what would you have done ? 

[1240] Commander Taylor. I don't think I would have done 
anvthing. 

General McCoy. You would have thought they were friendly planes 
coming in ? 

Commander Taylor. Yes. 

General McNarney. You are probably the most experienced con- 
troller on the island at this time ? 

Commander Taylor. I was the only one, so far as I know, but I do 
not think anybody could have said what they were. We have times 
when a whole carrier group of 72 planes may come in from a distance 
at sea. 

General McNarney. What experience have you had as controller? 

Commander Taylor. I haven't had very much at controlling, but 
I worked in the operations room with the air force and I was a squad- 
ron commander, and occasionally — very infrequently — I would go 
over and control my own planes ; but I had no actual experience as a 
controller. I would just take over the control just for the fun of it. 

General McNarney. What squadron did you have ? 

Commander Taylor. I had the First Eagle Squadron. 

General McNarney. How long did you have it ? 

Commander Taylor. I had it from October until June this j'ear. 

General McCoy. I congratulate you on being here. 

Commander Taylor. Thank you, sir. 

The Chairman. Anything further? 

General McCoy. No. 

The Chairman. Thank jow very much. Do not discuss with anyone 
what has gone on in this room. • 

Commander Taylor. Yes. 

il241^ TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN, U. S. 

NAVY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you state your name, Admiral ? 

Admiral Brown. Wilson Brown. 

The Chairman. You were on December 7 and are now commander 
of one of the task forces based in Honolulu, or in Pearl Harbor? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. On December 7 the task force I had 
command of was divided into two groups. The major group was 
under the command of Admiral Newton and consisted of the carrier 
LEXINGTON and two cruisers escorting with seven destroyers and 
was on a mission to Wake under the independent orders from the 
Commander-in-Chief to deliver some Marines and fighting planes 
at Wake. 

My personal command at that time was the cruiser INDIAN- 
APOLIS, my flagship, and five old destroyers now used for mine- 
sweeping purposes. 

The Chairman. Where was your flagship on the morning of 
December 7 ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 759 

Admiral Brown. We were at Johnston Island, Mr. President. We 
had orone there for the purposes of seeking advice from the local 
experts and to test out the Higgins landing boat and to land them 
on the coral reefs and to land them with the use of dynamite in 
clearing away the coral obstructions. 

I would like to say, if I ma}', that the major mission of my task 
force up until December 7 had been to develop the technique and to 
assemble the materiel for land operations, and our work for the 
previous six months had been directed particularly to that end, work- 
ing with the Army and the Marines and developing the technique in 
assembling materiel for amphibious operations. 

The Chairman. Was the INDIANAPOLIS actually at Johnston 
Island on the morning of December 7 ? 

[i^4^] Admiral Brown. Yes. We had just arrived at John- 
ston Island and we had loaded one boat from shore when we received 
word. 

The Chairman. Upon receipt of the first dispatch, how did you 
move, sir ? 

Admiral Brown. We immediately notified the commanding officer 
of Johnston Island. We were in a quite exposed condition, exposed 
submarine waters, and I was immediately conscious that they might 
have submarines at sea or at each of the islands. We had our planes 
in the air and we recovered the planes. 

Then I immediately received orders from the Commander-in-Chief 
to go, as directed, by the senior officer afloat at sea, who was com- 
manding Task Force No. 8 under a mission. 

We received instructions before we recovered our planes to ren- 
dezvous at a given destination set up northwest about 500 miles away. 

The Chairman. You immediately started on to your rendezvous? 

Admiral Brown. Yes. The mine sweeper D. M. S. with what 
technique we had, they were to return immediately to Pearl Harbor 
as part of the squadron, my hope being that if the attacking carriers 
returned by the southern route that we would have a direct line on 
them from Pearl Harbor to Jaulit, and we hoped we might make con- 
tact with them by these destroyers. 

The Chairman. As a matter of fact, did either your destroyers or 
your flasgship or your planes make any contact with them? 

Admiral Brown. No, sir. 

To pursue the history on the INDIANAPOLIS and the rest of 
the task force, it was about noon on Sunday that I received other 
orders from the commander of Task Force 8 which indications led to 
the conclusion that the enemy might be withdrawing from a given 
position southwest of Pearl I^arbor toward Jaluit, which would have 
put the INDIANAPOLIS practically on the line, [12JfS'\ as 
we were the closest to that line. So. instead of joining the rest of 
the task force we immediately proceeded back to the position toward 
Johnston and searched with my planes on Sunday and on Monday, 
and then joined up with the rest of the task force on Tuesday morn- 
ing, when we continued the search. 

If the enemy left from a point southwest of Pearl Harbor and 
maintained a speed of not greater than 20 knots, then we should have 
lined up with them the next day ; which leads me to the belief that 
they are able to maintain such a speed of 20 knots, which seems im- 



760 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

probable because of the fuel limitation, or that they retired to the 
northwest. 

[1£44-] The Chairman. The indications seem to point rather to 
the latter possibility now ; do you not think so ? 

Admiral Brown. I have not had time, sir. I have been to sea most 
of the time. I haven't heard or discussed it with others, but — and I 
do not know how much information they have here now as to their 
probable movement. 

The Chairman. Were you in personal contact with the Commander- 
in-Chief between November 27 and December 7? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Had you any discussion with him, or was there any 
discussion by him in your presence, of the impending threat of actual 
hostilities ? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir, the Commander-in-Chief kept me fully 
informed of all developments. He showed me his personal correspond- 
ence and all dispatches and all secret instructions, and I believe that I 
was fully informed of the situation as he saw it and as it was made 
known to us. 

The Chairman, He made certain dispositions, I understand, toward 
Wake and/or Midway based upon the thought that there might be an 
outbreak of hostilities. 

Admiral Brown. He was making every effort to increase the strength 
of those outposts, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Was there any discussion of a possible hostile raid 
from the air on Pearl Harbor in these talks ? 

Admiral Brown. I think we all had in mind the probability that 
Japan would have submarines in these waters before thev made any 
declarattion of war. We had in mind the possibility of ner sending 
carriers to raid shipping. I remember that at some time previous to 
December 7 — I don't know how long before — we discussed the possi- 
bility of her sending raiders to attack this island, and our general 
conclusion was that they would not take the chance. At least, that 
was my opinion. 

The Chairman. You thought it highly improbable? 

[12451 Admiral Brown. I thought it highly improbable be- 
cause, in the first place, the patrol wings have been on practically a 
war status for at least three months, and I think longer, making daily 
patrols, including Saturday and Sunday. 

The Chairman. Now, Admiral, let me stop you there. Where do 
you get the information that that is so, that your statement in that 
respect is accurate ? 

Admiral Brown. Well, I think I was so informed by Admiral 
Bellinger. 

The Chairman. Do you know that there was no regular patrol at 
a distance of six, seven, or eight hundred miles in any given sector 
at any time ? 

Admiral Brown. No, sir, I am not familiar with that. 

The Chairman. Your belief was quite to the contrary ? Your belief 
was quite to the contrary, whether misinformed or not? 

Admiral Brown. I knew, of course, that the number of planes 
available to make what you might call a thorough search was inade- 
quate, but I believed that a search of a kind was being mada every 
day. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 761 

The Chaieman. What do you mean by "a search of a kind," 
Admiral ? 

Admiral Brown. Well, what I had in mind was that patrol planes 
left this island and made a circle of the island morning and afternoon. 

The Chaieman. Well, now, that is what I should call, not being much 
of an airman or a sailor, an inshore patrol; isn't that what you call it, 
to patrol a distance of fifty miles, we will say, around the island? 
Fifty miles out? 

Admiral Brown. I am not familiar with what their instructions 
were and how far they went. 

The Chaieman. There is a thing in the standing procedure of the 
Army that is called an inshore patrol, by which I [1^4^] un- 
derstand they meant a nearby patrol of the shores of the island. Our 
information is that there was no such patrol maintained. 

Admiral Beown. Well, I can't, of course, speak with firsthand 
knowledge, but 

The Chairman. You thought there was such ? 

Admiral Brown. I thought there was, yes, sir. 

The Chaieman. Yes. Now, with respect to a distance patrol, did 
you think that there was any sort of adequate distance patrol ? And 
by "distance patrol" I mean a patrol that might discover a carrier 
which would run in under cover of darkness. 

Admiral Brown. Well, nothing like the patrol that is being carried 
out at the present time. 

The Chaieman. No. 

Admiral Brown. I, of course, knew that. I knew we didn't have a 
sufficient number of planes to conduct such a search; but I thought, 
from the enemy's standpoint, having their agents here, and plenty 
of them, who are very accurately informed, that they knew there was 
a great deal of air activity and that the chance of being picked up 
by the number of planes that were constantly in the air here — if I had 
been in their boots I would have thought I had a very slim chance of 
getting in without ^tting caught. 

The Chaieman. General McNarney ? 

General McNarney. Admiral, were any of your forces directed to 
take part in the operations for the relief of Wake ? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir, we were trying to — ^the then task force 12 
returned to port on I think it was 14 December. We were here for 
one day. I had instructions to proceed with that force and a tanker 
to deliver an attack on Jaluit or such other enemy base in the Mar- 
shalls as I might select, 24 hours prior to the time that the reinforce- 
ments were due to be [12p] landed at Wake. We left within 
24 hours and were prepared to carry out that assignment, when we 
received instructions from the Commander-in-Chief not to do it but to 
proceed to the support of the other task force that had been ordered 
to land reinforcements at Wake. 

General McNarney. What was your approximate position when 
you received orders to support the other task force ? 

Admiral Beown. I had decided, rather than attack Jaluit, which 
had been indicated in my original orders, that I would attack the 
Gilberts. I made that decision because I believed that it was a very 
great hazard of the carrier to take her into a position where we 
could deliver an effective attack on Jaluit; whereas, having informa- 
tion that came to us while we were enroute that the Japanese had 



762 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

seized and occupied the Gilberts and had a considerable air force 
there — the term was that the Yokohama — "a Yokohama group and 
carrier" — that we would slow up their move to the southward and 
that we would create the diversion which was the primary purpose 
of my original orders. My orders to attack at the south were given 
in the hope that such an attack would draw their air forces down 
to the south and allow the other task force to get into Wake without 
being attacked; so that at the time my orders were changed I was 
within 36 hours high-speed steaming of Jaluit. 

General McNarney. What date were your orders changed ? 

Admiral Brown. I think I would have to consult the record for 
that. Let's see. It was about 36 hours before D-day, and I am a little 
hazy now about what D-day was. 

General McNarney. Was D-day Sunday, the 21st? 

Admiral Brown. No. D-day was delayed by the Commander- 
in-Chief 24 hours after I left, and we were to attack Monday morn- 
ing, and the reinforcements were t o be launched on Tuesday morning. 

The Chairman. That would be Monday morning the 22nd5 
[1^8] would it not? 

General McNarney. Yes. 

General McCoy. That was the week following; that is, the 14th? 
Monday, the 14th? 

The Chairman. No. 

Admiral Brown. No, sir; two weeks later. 

The Chairman. Monday, the 22nd. 

General McNarney. Did you ever make contact with the other 
task force ? 

Admiral Brown. Not by sight, no, sir. Immediately upon the re- 
ceipt of change of orders we steamed to the Gilberts. And, see, our 
position was pretty well south. We were down about latitude — I 
think it was seven, and they were up in twenty -something. 

(The witness went to a map.) 

The Chairman. That is ten, isn't it (indicating) ? 

Admiral Brown. We had been up in here (indicating). We came 
pretty close to Howland and Baker. I think we were down about 
latitude three, and then we proceeded immediately to the northwest. 
The other one we assumed was approaching from the north of Wake. 
We got to a position about here (indicating) when our instructions 
were to return to Pearl. 

General McNarney. Did you make any contact with any enemy 
at all? 

Admiral Brown. We saw nothing. We had one very disappoint- 
ing false alarm. Throughout our trip to and from we had our search 
planes out covering an area sometimes a hundred miles and some- 
times two hundred miles, and one of them reported an enemy carrier 
at one time, and we thought we had the chance of a lifetime, but it 
proved to be a dynamite barge that had been cast loose by one of the 
contractors a week before that drifted about nearly a thousand miles 
from the place where it was let go. 

General McNarney. Was your personal reaction to being [1^49] 
recalled one of disappointment? 

Admiral Brown. Well, naturally we were all tremendously anxious 
to relieve Wake. I was personally very conscious of the serious risk 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 763 

that we were putting our carrier in. My personal opinion at this 
time is that carriers are our greatest naval asset. The fuel situation 
on such an expedition is one of serious concern. We had covered 
something over 2,000 miles at rather high speed to meet the time 
schedule. We had a tanker with us and refueled all destroyers, all 
ships of the force, in rather rough water, barely in time to be able to 
proceed to carry out the orders. But had we carried it out, all of the 
destroyers would have been almost out of fuel 24 hours after the at- 
tack, which is not a pleasant situation to be in. If weather had en- 
abled us to reservice them or if we had not been in the presence of a 
superior enemy naval force, we could have refueled, but that ques- 
tion of fuel on these long distances is a very serious one. 

General INIcCoy. What was the extreme range of your destroyers? 

Admiral Brown. Well, we were very disappointed to find that un- 
der the conditions of operating in constant readiness for higher speed 
the radius is not nearly as great as the theoretical radius. 

General McCoy. What is the theoretical radius? 

Admiral Brown. The theoretical radius of these destroyers at 
economical speeds is about 6,000, but steaming at 15 knots and being 
ready to go to 20, and within a limited time to be ready to go to 25, 
and from then on up to full speed, they burn nearly 50% more than 
the theoretical, so that under those conditions the steaming radius 
is not much in excess of 2,000 miles. This past week 

General McCoy. Hadn't that been discovered before this period? 

[J2S0] Admiral Brown. Yes, but I think not fully appreci- 
ated. We have had, of course, for the past several years — for the 
past 20 years we have had fleet problems that simulate war condi- 
tions as closely as we can do it, but these expenditures this past 
month have been a source of concern to me and greater than I had 
expected. 

General McCoy. Did you receive through the Commander-in-Chief 
or any other means a war warning from the Navy Department on 
November 27 or thereafter? 

Admiral Brown. I was here at Pearl Harbor at that time, sir, and 
I saw all of his communications, I think, up until the day I left, 
which was the Friday before: the 5th. 

General McCoy. Do you remember a dispatch which started out, 
"This is a war warning"? 

Admiral Brown. No, sir, I do not. I think that must have been 
received after I left. 

General McCoy. Would you show the Admiral those dispatches, 
please? 

The Chairman. Have j^ou our paraphrases of them ? 

Mr. Howe. Yes. 

Mr. Schneider. I have them out in the file. 

The Chairman. We have taken only paraphrases of them. 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. In the meantime have you any questions? 

General McCoy. Yes. 

How long have you been on this station, Admiral ? 

Admiral Brown. Since the first of last February, sir. 

General McCoy. February? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. 



764 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCoy. Prior to these recent task group assignments 
what force had you ? Wliat was your command ? 

Admiral Brown. They had three major task force organizations 
in effect for the past six months, as my memory serves me, [1251'\ 
when, I explained, I relieved Andrews as Commander of the scout- 
ing force; and then several months after relieving, the whole fleet 
was broken up into three major task forces, and I had command of 
Task Force 3, and the major mission assimied to me was, as I said 
before, to develop the technique and assenible the necessary material 
for amphibious operations. 

The Chairman. This is the telegram here (indicating). 

Admiral Brown. No, sir, I do not remember to have seen that. 
And yet I note that it was sent the 28th of November. 

The Chairman. Received 28 November. 

Admiral Brown, Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Sent the 27th. 

Admiral Brown. I remember to have seen instructions from op- 
erations about taking a defensive deployment and to have discussed 
that with the Commander-in-Chief. I do not recollect the first 
phase of the dispatch predicting an aggressive move. 

The Chairman. Did you see the dispatch of November 24 which 
is underneath the one you have looked at, Admiral ? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Are you sure? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. I don't remember that in just that 
form, but I remember the sense of the second one. 

The Chairman. Well, this is a paraphrase. 

General McCoy. You are sure that you did not see the war warn- 
ing of the 27th? 

Admiral Brown. Well, I was under the impression that I have 
seen everything, but I am sure that if worded as that is it would 
have made an impression. I have no recollection of having seen 
that one, but I was under the impression that I had seen everything 
that the Commander-in-Chief received, and I know that that was 
his intention, that all flag officers should see them. 

General McCoy. That was a very important dispatch of the 
[1252] 27th. 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. I was in almost daily communication 
with the Commander-in-Chief at the time I was in. I am a little — 
I think I was in a little period of about one week — the 7th — ^I 
probably was at sea at the time that message was received, the 27th. 

Admiral Standley. To continue, Admiral, prior to the forming 
of these three task groups — and what was that time? When were 
these three major task groups formed? 

Admiral Brown. Well, it is my recollection. Admiral, about April 
or May. 

Admiral Standley. And prior to that time you as commander of 
the scouting force were operating out of Pearl Harbor for training 
purposes ? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Target practice? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. And training? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 765 

Admiral Standley. When you took your force out of Pearl Har- 
bor — the scout force I am talking about now — for training purposes, 
what was the condition you set for the ships when they left harbor? 

Admiral Brown. We were on practically war conditions, sir, ex- 
cept, that is, we never anchored; we kept under way at all times. 
We darkened ship. We did not have a condition watch at all times 
on the anti-aircraft battery, but we had drills from dawn until night, 
intensively, throughout the time since I arrived until this moment. 
Of course, the entire fleet here considered their major mission one 
of training and preparing men for the increased Navy, and I think 
our thoughts were very largely concentrated to that end. I have 
never known the Navy to work harder than it has in the past year. 

Admiral Standley. And the condition you set when you 
[l^SSl were out on those training periods was practically one 
of a war status, a cruising status ? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir, except that we did not maintain at all 
times the state of readiness that we do now, at present in condition 
3 or 2 at all times, which means that we have all anti-aircraft guns 
manned, we have at least one of the turrets manned at all times, and 
we have people standing by. That is a very killing routine for the 
crew. It means that nobody gets very much sleep, and a very broken 
sleep. But the so-called intertype tactics which were intended to 
simulate possible war action — we did fully simulate all war condi- 
tions ; and the cruisers of the scouting force, when sent on escort duty 
with vessels to the Philippines and other places, were on a full war 
basis. They darkened ship, and they were standing in condition 3 
at all times with all their anti-aircraft manned. 

Admiral Standley. In other words, then, ships operating out of 
here for training, and so forth, were in a status of apprehension as to 
surprise attack ? 

Admiral Brown. Partly that, Admiral, and partly as a method 
of training for war. I think we were all — I know that I was appre- 
hensive of a possible submarine attack at any time. I never would 
have agreed to anchor at Lahaina. The ships were under way all 
the time; they were darkened; we zigzagged; we behaved as if — we 
didn't exchange umpires ; we haven't for the past three or four months. 

Admiral Standley. And, as I understand it, the division of the 
fleet into task forces with an operating period so that either one or 
two of the task forces were out all the time was intended to avoid 
the risk of anchoring outside of Pearl Harbor. 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. I believe that that was one of the 
purposes. 

Admiral Standley. And the purpose of that was to avoid 
[12S4] a surprise submarine attack ? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir, but, as I say, primarily for training, I 
think. 

Admiral Standley. But you said yourself, you would not think 
of anchoring your fleet in Lahaina Roads. 

Admiral Brown. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Why not ? 

Admiral Brown. Possibility of a surprise attack. 

General McCoy. But by submarines, you mean ? 



766 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. You had no anticipation of an air attack? 

Admiral Brown. No, sir, I hadn't. I suppose perhaps my state 
of mind was influenced too much by what I thought they might do. 
I expected the Japanese to take action against Singapore or Thailand, 
in the hopes that the United States would not carry out its threat 
to take a hand. I did not expect them to start the ball with an attack 
on this place. 

General McCoy. As the result of that dispatch of November 24, 
assuming that you had not seen the war warning, as a result of that 
dispatch did you take any additional measures of security at sea? 

Admiral Brown. Not at sea, no, sir, because I feel that for the 
past six months the forces at sea have taken all necessary precautions. 

General McCoy. On the other hand, since war is declared you say 
that you have taken other precautions? 

Aclmiral Brown. We have stricter watches, sir. In the meantime 
we are not getting the same kind of — the kind of training for our 
enlisted men that we did before. It has stopped some of that training. 

General McCoy. But you were training for war, were you not ? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. And you are at war. 

[12SS] Admiral Brown. Now we are at war, and we are not 
getting the amount of target practice that we did before. We are not 
having time to instruct individuals. 

General McCoy. In other words, your fleet was not prepared for 
war then ? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir, I think we were prepared for war. It 
is, I think, the same thing in the Army, that j'ou have to keep develop- 
ing your new men as they come in, and we are trying to double the 
size of our personnel in four years. Had we gone to a strictly war 
basis six months ago we wouldn't have as many trained officers and 
men today as we have now. And of course we have had a great many 
apparent crises in the course of the past six months. 

Admiral Standlp:y. Admiral, in regard to the personnel situation 
here in this Hawaiian area, what has been the condition in regard to 
the attrition of crews of your ship due to expiration of enlistments 
and sending them back home ? 

Admiral Brown. It has been a matter of great concern, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Will you tell us what percentage of the crew 
you would probably send back? 

Admiral Brown. I can't give you the figures. Admiral, by ex- 
piration of enlistment. That has been very great. I think that the 
changes of personnel aboard ship have been due more to transfers to 
put new ships in commission, and they have taken our trained men 
out and been very slow in sending us recruits to train up. 

Admiral Standley. And then is it not true that a considerable 
period is wasted because men will not reenlist on board here but go 
back to the States and reenlist there? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir, there was a good deal of that. 

Admiral Standley. And that required new men coming in? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 767 

Admiral Standley. Which would not be the case if they [1256] 
were in home port? 

Admiral Brown. Well, I am afraid a lot of them were tempted by 
the very high pay; what percentage I am not in a position to say. 
I think that the commander of base port would know that better than 
any of the rest of us. I have been very much pleased by the num- 
ber who have reenlisted in spite of the condition, because I think it is 
a very great temptation to them to accept these high-priced jobs 
ashore when men have got families and children to bring up. But 
as to whether being out here or whether we were based on the West 
Coast would have affected that number, I think it would some but 
not a great deal. 

The Chairman. Admiral Reeves? 

Admiral Reeves. Admiral, you stated that on the 14th of De- 
cember you were ordered to take command of a task force and to 
attack Jaluit? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. What, was the composition of that force? 

Admiral Brown. It consisted of the carrier LEXINGTON, the 
three cruisers INDIANAPOLIS, CHICAGO, and PORTLAND, 
and nine destroyers. 

Admiral Ree\^s. And you stated that you abandoned attacking 
Jaluit and decided to attack the Gilbert Islands instead. That was 
on your own initiative and decision ? 

Admiral Brown. No, Admiral. If I may correct your question, 
my orders were not specifically to attack Jaluit. My orders were 
to attack Jaluit or such other base as I might decide, or not to make any 
attack at all if my best judgment indicated that to be necessary. That 
is the way my orders read. 

Admiral Reeves. Yes, that is what I understood, but your de- 
cision not to attack Jaluit but to attack the Gilberts was your own de- 
cision ? 

[1257] Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves, After sailing? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Did you report the objective that you had se- 
lected to the Commander-in-Chief? 

Admiral Brown. No, sir. I sent no radio communication what- 
ever from the time I left until I received the orders to change, ex- 
pecting that any such communication would be intercepted and they 
would have an inkling that we were down there. 

Admiral Reeves. But before you reached the Gilber:ts you re- 
ceived orders from the Commander-in-Chief directing you to sup- 
port another task force which was to relieve Wake; is that correct? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. For brevity what your task force called? 

Admiral Brown. My task force was called No, 11. 

Admiral Reeves. No, 11, And the force relieving Wake? 

Admiral Brown, Was No. 14. 

Admiral Reeves. Who commanded that? 

Admiral Brown. Admiral Fletcher. 

Admiral Reeves, Do you know the composition of that force? 



768 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Brown. He had the carrier SARATOGA and three 
cruisers — I can't name them — and a number of destroyers, I think 
about six. 

Admiral Reeves. Do you know of any other task force connected 
with this expedition to Wake? 

Admiral Brown. Well, task force 8 was sent out also, consisting 
of the carrier ENTERPRISE, as a supporting force. I think they 
were stationed somewhere in the neighborhood of Midway. 

Admiral Reeves. The ENTERPRISE. And any other ships? 

[1£S8] Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. There were some cruisers 
and destroyers with that force. 

Admiral Reeves. You don't know how many? 

Admiral Brown. Not more than three cruisers and I think about 
six destroyers. 

Admiral Reeves. And before you had joined task force No. 14 — 

Admiral Brown, (interposing). Excuse me. I never did join it. 

Admiral Reeves. I say, before you joined task force No. 14 enroute 
to Wake Island, — 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. — what were the next orders you received? 

Admiral Brown. I was told to return to Pearl Harbor. I was 
told that Wake was already occupied, and to return to Pearl Harbor. 

Admiral Reeves. Who issued those orders? 

Admiral Brown. Commander-in-Chief, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Do you remember the date you got those orders? 

Admiral Brown. Well, I think it was that Monday, which would 
have been the 22nd, I think. 

Admiral Reeves. Monday, the 22nd? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Was that D-day? 

Admiral Brown. That was D-minus-one day, sir; they were one 
day ahead of us. 

Admiral Reeves. One day short ? 

Admiral Brown. They were one day ahead of us. 

Admiral Reeves. This was one da}'^ before Wake was to be re- 
lieved ? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Reeves. Do you know if the relief force No. 14 [1^39] 
received similar orders? 

Admiral Brown. I am quite sure they did, yes, sir. I think that 
they were — it was in the same dispatch as my own. Both forces were 
to return toward Pearl. 

Admiral Reeves. 1 suppose you liave no idea wh}'^ this expedition 
was canceled? 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir, I was told — my dispatch indicated that 
intercepted dispatches showed an assembly of a strong force in the 
Marshalls: number of ships, types unknown, and I have been told by 
Admiral Pye since, that he considered that to bring the carriers into 
that position at that time was inviting loss of one or more carriers. 

Admiral Reeves. I have no more questions. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Admiral. Our Commission 
is such that we feel it necessary to ask you not to discuss your testimony 
with anyone, sir. 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 769 

The Chairman. Or anything that happened here. Thank you very 
much, sir. 

Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. We are sorry to have to drag you right in after a 
bad term of service. I hope you will have a good rest. 

Admiral Brown. Thank you. 

The Chairman. We shall adjourn, to meet Monday morning at the 
Royal Hawaiian Hotel at 9 : 30 o'clock a. m. 

( Wliereupon, at 5 : 10 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken until 
Monday, January 5, 1942, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Honolulu, 
at 9 : 30 o'clock a. m.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 771 



imo-\ . CONTENTS 



MONDAY, JANUARY 5, 1942 
Testimxjny of — Page' 

George Shadford Waterhouse, Executive Vice President of the Bishop 
National Bank of Honolulu, President of the Chamber of Commerce 

of Honolulu 1262 

Rt. Rev. Samuel Harrington Littell, Bishop of Honolulu, Protestant 

Episcopal Church of America 1272 

Leslie Ernest Eichelberger, YMCA Secretary, Honolulu, T. H 1286 

William A. Gabrielson, Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H 1206 

Major General Briant H. Wells, United States Army, Retired 1311 

Henry Pratt Judd, Professor of Hawaiian Language and History, 

University of Hawaii 1329 

Weslie Theodore Wilke, Executive Secretary, Army and Navy YMCA, 

Honolulu, T. H 1334 

Joseph B. Poindexter, Governor ,of the Territory of Hawaii 1840 

Lester Petrie, Mayor of the City of Honolulu, T. H 1857 

Right Reverend James Joseph Sweeney, Bishop, Roman Catholic Di- 
ocese of Honolulu 1368 

Reverend Paul B. Waterhouse, President of Temperance League of 

Hawaii 1373 

Chris J. Benny, Executive Secretary, Temperance League of Hawaii 1382 



^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 773 



[mi] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE 
ATTACK OF DECEMBEK 7, 1941, ON HAWAII 



MONDAY, JANUARY 5, 1942 

Suite 300, Royal Hawaiian Hotel, 

Honolulu^ T. H. 
The Commission reconvened at 9 : 30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to ad- 
journment on Saturday, January 3, 1942, Associate Justice Owen J. 
Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding. 

PRESENT 

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, 
Chairman ; 

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired; 

Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired; 

Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired; 

Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army; 

Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission ; 

Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal 
Advisor to the Commission; 

Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission. 

PROCEEDINGS 

Colonel Brown. Mr. Waterhouse. 
The Chairman. Will you be sworn? 
Mr. Waterhouse. Yes, sir. 

[1262'] TESTIMONY OF GEORGE SHADFORD WATERHOUSE, EX- 
ECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE BISHOP NATIONAL BANK OF 
HONOLULU, PRESIDENT OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF 
HONOLULU 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give your full name, Mr. Waterhouse? 

Mr. Waterhouse. George Shadford Waterhouse. 

The Chairman. What business are you in in Honolulu ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. I am executive vice president of the Bishop Na- 
tional Bank of Honolulu. 

The Chairman. You are also president of the Chamber of Commerce 
of Honolulu? 

Mr. Waterhouse. I am at the present time, yes. 

The Chairman. How long have you lived in Honolulu ? 



774 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Waterhouse. Sixty-six years, sir. 

The Chairman. You were born here? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Mr. Waterhouse, have you had occasion to observe 
the conditions here on Saturday nights and pay nights among certain 
members of the Army personnel and Navy personnel on leave in the 
city of Honolulu ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. To a certain extent, yes. 

The Chairman. Where do you live, sir ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. I live up Nuuanu Valley on Coelho Way. 

General McCoy. Is that near the golf club? 

Mr. Waterhouse. It is about a .quarter of a mile below the club. 

The Chairman. Have you had occasion to be in town on Saturday 
nights from time to time ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. What can you say as to the behavior of the men of 
the Army and of the fleet here on Saturday nights ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Well, you see something occasionally that is out 
of order, but as a general rule it was very fine, I think. 

[J263] The Chair^i.an. You did not see what you would call 
excessive drunkenness and disorderly conduct, did you? 

Mr. Waterhouse. No, sir. 

The Chairman. I suppose that when men are on leave that some men 
will get drunk? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Oh, yes. 

The Chairman. How has been the military and naval policing of 
their own forces here ? Has it been adequate ( 

Mr. Waterhouse. Adequate, 5'es, sir; that is, in my opinion. 

The Chairman. There has been a great deal of talk to the effect that 
there was drunkenness on Saturday niglit which affected the morale 
of the fleet and of the Army on Sunday morning when this attack 
came on. Do you have any personal knowledge that would confirm 
that accusation ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. None. 

The Chairman. Now, have you heard from anyone who purports to 
have personal knowledge any such statement with respect to the situ- 
ation on Saturday night to the effect that it was bad? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Well, I have heard general rumors of a party out 
at Schofield, quite a wild party that night. That is, that is only a 
rumor. 

The Chairman. That is the only rumor that you have heard? 

INIr. Waterhouse. Yes. 

The Chairman. Anything else? 

Mr. Waterhouse. No, nothing else. That is the only one I heard. 

The Chairman. General, any questions? 

General McNarney. No. 

The Chairman. Admiral Reeves? 

Admiral Ree\'es. No. 

Admiral Standley. Have you heard any rumors as to the presence 
or lack of presence of the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet or of any 
of his senior officers on that morning, on the [1264] morning 
of December 7 ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 775 

Mr. Waterhouse. On the morning of December 7? Yes, I heard 
rumors but they were from — I didn't take much account of them. I 
heard one rumor that Admiral Kimmel was on the golf course and 
another that he was on Kauai hunting. Now, I do not know that. 
That is simply a humor but I have not put nnich faith in that. 

Admiral Standley. Mr. Waterhouse, have you ever gone out on 
Saturday night to dinners at any hotels or other places where they 
have Saturday night music and dining and so forth ? 

Mr. WaterhouoE. I have at times, yes. 

Admiral Standley. What has been the decorum or conduct of the 
naval officers at those dinners? Have they been wild parties, as you 
would express it, or have they been just as you would expect them to 
be ill an}^ place ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. What I would expect at any place. There is a 
great deal of dancing and some drinking, but I have never seen — and 
when I say "never" — maybe once or twice, but nothing in any way ex- 
cessive — very seldom anything excessive. 

Admiral Standley. If there was anything excessive it was an in- 
dividual case ratlier than a general practice? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes. It was so that I had no objection to my wife 
dancing with the officers ; so you could see wdiat I felt about it. 

General McCoy. Were you surprised at this attack? 

Mr. AVaterhouse. I was, sir. I was very surprised. I would not 
believe it at first. I thought it was just a practice until I saw some- 
thing hit on the side of the hill very close to the house about a quarter 
of a mile up and the dirt and dust rise and then the whizz of the bullet 
or something came ])ast us. 

General McCoy. Had vou had any warning of any kind before the 
attack ? 

[1265] Mr. Waterhouse. None at all. 

General McCoy. What was the first warning that you had? 

Mr. Waterhouse. The radio announcement that the Japanese were 
attacking us. 

General McCoy. Did you believe it ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. I did not correctly, no. 

General McCoy. Until you saw" these things? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes, for about a half hour I didn't credit it. 

General McCoy. Have you ever dined at Schofield on Saturday 
night? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. That is the night for the customary what might 
be called post hop ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes, I think it is. 

General McCoy. And dinner dancing? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes. 

General McCoy. On any of these occasions that you went up there 
was there any undue action due to drinking or what you might call 
a wild party? 

Mr. Waterhouse. No. I had no criticism about any of these parties 
myself. I am not a heavy drinker and still I had no criticism. 

Admiral Standley. Have you attended the Saturday night hops at 
the Naval Station, Pearl Harbor? 

Mr, Waterhouse. Yes. 



776 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Standlet. Wliat was your opinion of those? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Perfectly all right, so far as I saw them. 

Admiral Standley. Thank you. 

General McCoy. Have you ever seen any commanding general or 
admirals here under the influence of liquor ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Never. 

General McCoy. Never ? 

[1£66] Mr. Waterhouse. No. 

General McNarney. Mr. Waterhouse, among your business associ- 
ates what is the general reputation of General Short with regard to 
his alertness and as to his general efficiency and the way he handles 
his command ? 

Mr. AVaterhouse. There is a great deal of confidence in General 
Short I think. There are certain rumors going around about the way 
he fell down. 

General McNarney. I do not want rumors but your information 
about the general reputation of him. 

Mr. Waterhouse. I know there is a great deal of confidence in him 
because we did get up a letter in his favor and most of the people who 
were asked to sign it signed it. 

General McNarney. Was that the general feeling prior to Decem- 
ber 7th? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes. The only criticism I heard against General 
Short was that he was anti-British. There were numerous Britishers 
told me they had no use for him. That is the only criticism I ever 
heard of General Short. Otherwise, everyone in the business com- 
munity seemed to be in favor of him, to have every confidence in him. 

General McNarney. You were perfectly satisfied that the War 
Department had placed a competent officer in command? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes. 

General McNarney. How about Admiral Kimmel? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Well, there was some criticism about the Admiral 
downtown that he would not cooperate with the Army. Otherwise, 
everybody seemed to have confidence in him, but there was a certain 
criticism downtown that he would not cooperate with the Army. 
Now, whether that is true or not I can't say but that was the feeling 
downtown in the street. 

General McNarney. You have nothing concrete to offer in that 
respect? 

Mr. Waterhouse. No, I have not. I asked someone, some [1367] 
businessman, what he meant by that and he said, "Well, I have 
heard — he did not say from whom — but he said, "I have heard there 
was criticism of Admiral Kimmel tliat the flyers should take turns in 
patrolling and that Admiral Kimmel replied the Navy can take care 
of itself." 

Otherwise there was perfect confidence in Admiral Kimmel. Most 
of us admired Admiral Kimmel. 

General McNarney. I have no other questions. 

The Chairman. Mr. Waterhouse, did you approve of the action of 
the military authorities in declaring martial law here in the emer- 
gency ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes, I did. I did not approve of the Governor 
handing it over to the military authorities, but I approved of it. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 777 

The Chairman. Of the martial law ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes, of the martial law. 

The Chairman. You have a very difficult problem here with a large 
Japanese poulation? 

Mr. Waterhotjse. Yes. 

The Chairman. In your judgment is it wise to give the population 
any latitude at this time or should they be held firmly in control? 

Mr. Waterhouse. I am very proud of the situation so far as Hono- 
lulu is concerned. I have heard that it is not so on the Island of 
Hawaii, but so far as Honolulu is concerned I am very proud of the 
situation. 

The Japs did not have any organized fifth column, which they were 
afraid to, because there were so many good organizations that they 
were afraid to begin anything. That is my feeling. 

I would not favor corralling them as a whole. I would not favor 
that. 

The Chairman. Mr. Waterhouse, are you conscious of the 
[1£68] fact that there was a very large number' of so-called 
Japanese agents loose on this island before December 7th? 

Mr. Waterhouse. I understood that the F. B. I. had picked up 
about 650 and there were a good many of them here, but that is just 
my feeling, being proud of the situation, because those people who 
were in here were not fifth columnists — those who had come in later 
and found the situation to be well in hand here, that they were 
afraid to. I believe they could have done a great amount of harm 
to Honolulu if they had been organized. They could have fired 
lumber piles and the oil tanks and the waterworks, but they were 
afraid to organize because of the feeling that there was among the 
American people. 

The Chairman. Now, Mr. Waterhouse, as a leading businessman 
and citizen here, would you advocate going back to the peacetime 
conditions now and letting the Japanese have the liberty which they 
had in peacetime? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes. I think the F. B, I. gathered up all the 
ones to be afraid of; I would, yes. 

The Chairman. You do ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes. 

The Chairman. You know, of course, that the Japanese espionage 
on this island prior to December 7 was perfect ? You know that, do 
you not? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes, but at the same time that was not organized ; 
they did not organize ; they could have done more harm to us. 

The Chairman. You are speaking of sabotage? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes. 

The Chairman. If the Japanese are turned loose, do you think 
there is any security against the Japanese Government being advised 
again of conditions exactly the same as they were before December 7? 

Mr. Waterhouse. No, I don't believe they could. I think 
[1269] the wrong was all in the immigration station. The Jap- 
anese Hotel Association was listed in our telephone book, the Japanese 
Hotel Association. 

In regard to the immigration station they ran the immigration 
station, and it was entirely wrong in my opinion. 



778 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. You mean the Japanese Hotel Association really 
ran the immigration station ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes, look in the old telephone book. The Jap- 
anese Hotel Association was in care of the immigration station and 
they ran the immigration station and all these people coming from 
Japan came through that way and got in without trouble. 

Now the situation is different. I have no fear from now on. That 
is my opinion. 

The Chairman. Any other questions? 

Admiral Standley. Mr. Waterhouse, going back to General Short, 
with respect to General Short's activities here and his efforts to 
coordinate the civilian activities and the facilities and so forth, have 
they been greater, in your opinion, than those who preceded him? 

Mr. Waterhouse. No. He carried on along the same lines as 
General Herron did. He iust urged us to prepare the same way as 
it was started by General Herron. 

Admiral Standley. But he did take a very active interest? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes, he got us, to a certain extent, prepared, I 
think. 

General McCoy. In your remark about the lack of cooperation by 
the Navy which was, I think you stated, just gossip 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes, it was. 

General McCoy. Could such gossip be probably due to the fact 
that you were in closer relation with the Army than you were with 
the Navy ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. No, it came from the downtown businessmen, 
[1'270] but I am in closer touch perhaps with the Arni}^ than with 
the Navy, but the Army people with whom I associated would never 
make a remark to me of this sort. They never have; they never 
criticized the Navy at all, but this came from business people. 

Neither General Frank nor General INIartin ever criticized the Navy 
in any way, and I knew both of those people very well. 

Admiral Reeves. Referring to the rumors as to the conduct of the 
Army and Navy personnel on liberty, briefly what is your estimate 
as to those rumors ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Well, I did place a little — I thought it was 
probably true about the xVrmy and the Navy because I talked to a 
good many officers in the Navy of lower rank than the xVdmiral, and 
the feeling against the Army is not cooperative at all so far as my 
conversation with these peo])ie was concerned. 

Admiral Reeves. I was referring to their conduct, sobriety, drunk- 
enness, and that sort of thing. What credence did you place in the 
rumors regarding that phase? 

Mr, Waterhouse. Oli, I didn't believe it myself because I have 
never seen it. I have been out a good many times to dinners and 
things of that sort on Saturday night with both the Army and the 
Navy and I have never seen anything to criticize and I did not be- 
lieve it. 

Admiral Reeves. That is all. 

The Chairman. Anything further? 

General McCoy. May I ask another question just as a matter of 
general interest? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 779 

Is there any one man here in the Hawaiian Islands, an American, 
that you would describe as the leading citizen of Hawaii^ 

Mr. Waterhouse. No, I do not believe so. 

The Chairman. Mr. Waterhouse, you know the general purpose 
of this inquiry ? 

JNlr. Waterhouse. Yes. 

[li^71\ The Chairman. Is there anything else on your mind, 
any fact, which you think might be helpful to us in coming to a con- 
clusion ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. No. I do not like to say something, but there is a 
feeling downtown wondering why General Martin was included in 
the order, because he was under General Short, following the instruc- 
tions of General Short presumably. 

The feeling downtown is wondering why General Martin was in- 
cluded and not some of the lower admirals, for instance. 

As a matter of fact, General Martin never drank at all, if you care 
to have that information. 

The Chairman. We happen to know that. 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes. 

The Chairman. Mr. Waterhouse, the nature of this inquiry is such 
that we will ask you not to discuss j^^our testimony outside this room or 
to say what went on in this room. 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Before he goes I would like to ask him this 
question : Mr. Waterhouse, are j^ou familiar with the so-called big five 
companies of Honolulu ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. I am. 

Admiral Standley. Will you name them, please? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Alexander & Baldwin; C. Brewer & Company. 

Admiral Standley. What do they do? 

Mr. WxVterhouse. They are sugar agents. 

Castle & Cook ; American Factors. 

Admiral Standley. What do they do? 

]Mr. Waterhouse. American Factors are sugar agents and they also 
do a general mercantile business and wholesale business. 

Then there is Theo. Davies & Company. 

Admiral Standley. What business are they in ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. They are sugar agents and general merchandise. 

\^1272'] The Chairman, Are you connected with any of them, 
sir? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Well, no. I am executive vice president oi the 
bank, and my brother, who is president of Alexander & Baldwin, is 
president of the bank. In that I am connected with them. 

The Chairman. Are there also representatives of this firm repre- 
sented on your board ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes. The manager of Davies & Company, Mr. 
Hussell, is on our board. 

Admiral Standley. That is all. 

The Chairman. Thank you, sir. 

Colonel Brown. This is Bishop Littell. 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn, Bishop ? 



79716—46 — Ex. 143, vol. 2 13 



780 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

TESTIMONY OF THE RT. REV. SAMUEL HARRINGTON LITTELL, 
BISHOP or HONOLULU, PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF 
AMERICA 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give us your full name, Bishop ? 

Bishop LiTTELL. Samuel Harrington Littell. 

The Chairman. And you are Bishop of the Episcopal Church here? 

Bishop Littell. Yes. 

The Chairman. How long have you been on the island, Bishop ? 

Bishop Littell. Twelve years. 

The Chairman. Have you held your present office during those 
twelve years ? 

Bishop LriTELL. All the time, yes. I was consecrated Bishop here. 
I came from China. I was 31 years in Hangkow and was transferred 
here 12 years ago. 

The Chairman. We have heard a lot of rumors, Bishop, about the 
conduct of the officers and the men of the Army and the fleet on the 
Saturday night preceding this attack here Q'STS] with respect 
to intoxication. Do you have any personal knowledge by which you 
can throw any light on that particular matter? 

Bishop Littell. First of all, I live downtown in Honolulu, right in 
the city, and I did not happen to be there because I had a full day in 
preparation for my Church, but I have the word of persons whose 
word I have confidence in who have reported things to me which I can 
only say second-hand. I am not giving any personal testimony, but 
I can testify about other Saturday nights. 

The Chairman. What has been the general condition on Saturday 
nights as you observed them ? Of course, there is a large number of 
men on leave then ? 

Bishop Littell. Yes. 

The Chairman. It runs into the thousands? 

Bishop Littell. Yes, it does, but for the most part I think they are 
extremely well behaved and disciplined. The Army has been most 
careful in having its own Army police downtown and the Army men 
who do not behave are taken care of and are taken away into the cus- 
tody of the Army, so we do not have the same condition with the Army 
as with the Navy situation. The Navy is a much more difficult proposi- 
tion. 

There is the question of the ships coming and going. There is not 
the continuity that there is in the Army. There is nothing against 
it and I think the Navy has tried well to cope with the situation, but 
you have times when you have large numbers of the fleet and also the 
Army in town, but it is better than at any other time. 

The Chairman. You mean in these recent months ? 

Bishop Littell. Yes, far better than ever before. There is no ques- 
tion about that. 

The Chairman. Of course, you understand, Bishop, that when the 
fleet comes in here it comes in from a very strenuous term of service 
at sea ? 

[1^74] Bishop Littell. Yes. 

The Chairman. And it is necessary to give these boys shore liberty 
for recreational purposes? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 781 

Bishop LiTTELL. Yes. 

The Chairman. And to relieve that strain from arduous duty ? 

Bishop LiTTELL. Yes, and I sympathize with that, and as far as the 
ships changing from time to time and different men coming ashore, 
different personnel and different officers in charge, and there is not 
the continuity that you have in the Army. Naturally I do not say 
anything against that because it is better than it has been in my 12 
years here. 

But to get back to the Saturday nights, I can only give testimony 
from people who know firsthand, and I am an officer — that is to say, 
I am a very active member of the Temperance League of Hawaii, and 
then you may put me down as a narrow-minded prohibitionist and a 
total abstainer, but I ask you to forget that. 

I am interested in temperance and that is what I am interested in, 
temperance and discipline and the welfare and control, and that is one 
of the aims of this Temperance League, rather than absolute absti- 
nence. So my object has been not to narrow it down to being a com- 
plete prohibitionist. That has not been the work which we are press- 
ing for, but to work for temperance, and temperance to me means tem- 
perance in everything, work, recreation, and so on, and total abstinence 
is a misuse of the word "temperance." 

Now, I have had some effect in getting into that organization many 
people like myself who are not total abstainers but by no means who 
are in favor of an open house, so to speak. 

However, the thing that disturbs me so because it is so continuous is 
the unceasing cocktail parties given in the homes of the commissioned 
officers in town. 

[1276] That has been a serious matter in regard to what we 
might call the temporary use of their time and strength and intelli- 
gence. Now, what you heard about the Saturday nights among the 
officers may be being too drunk or groggy and what I would have 
expected from other Saturday nights, that you could hardly get them 
to work. 

The Chairman. That is what you have heard ? 

Bishop LiTTELL. On other occasions, and I have been, being a 
Bishop, invited to cocktail parties, if it is some official function and 
it is a case of being in and out and perhaps staying a short time, but 
the cocktail parties among the services have been beyond all reason 
and all social requirements, and I am not talking about the quantity 
of drinking, but I think there has been right up to the 7th, but it has 
been a little more dangerous in that it has been quieter in their homes 
than in the case of a service man who would be seen drinking. 

But that brings up the whole question of the community welfare 
and the connection with other people and what the officers and the 
men do in the Army and the Navy in regard to drinking and the 
morale in town and the effect it has. Many times I am included among 
those invited to these cocktail parties and when there is going to be 
a wild one, I am not included. 

I get invitations and I go on occasions and occasionally not. My 
wife and I go to pay our respects and we do or do not take anything ; 
generally we don't. I may take some tea or something. We are not 
looked upon as anything queer if we do or if we don't. 



782 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

However, there is the pressure from sources now upon the office of 
the Military Governor to relax these restrictions as it was announced 
recently, which would result in letting down the restrictions com- 
pletely. That will have, I say, a [1276] serious effect on the 
town in the case of morale. Now, that was plainly something coming 
from Colonel Green's office which would have the effect of getting 
great attention as though to increase the idea that nothing is going 
to happen here again. 

The Chairman. In other words, you think that to open up this 
town again and take off the military law would be a very dangerous 
thing ? 

Bishop LiTTELL. Yes, sir ; even if it is only on beer, because it is an 
indication to the civilian population that things here are not so bad 
after all. Now, they are bad here after all, and if there is a relaxing 
of the alertness on the part of this community then something may 
happen. 

The Chairman. Your present view is that it would be a great mis- 
take to relax the military law? 

Bishop LiTTELL. Yes, and not only in alcohol. 

The Chairman. But in every way ? 

Bishop LiTTELL. Yes. And it will have a bad effect on the com- 
munity and the community will continue to go down in this sense of 
the urgency and will defeat the purpose of it, because they will say 
that the military men do not think it is so bad and they will think it 
cannot happen again and believe that it won't happen again, and there 
is an enormous sense of relaxation in many cases and of relief. I do 
not think it is just a case of patience regarding a blackout. That will 
come presently, but the blackout is not the cause. It is just the gen- 
eral feeling as they read in the paper the other day in the dispatch 
under Colonel Green's name about the relaxation, that they would 
want to sell liquor, and they say that it is all right because the Army 
knows about it. 

If the Army and the Navy do these things it will let them down^ 
and they should not, unless they want our morale to go to pieces. 

Now, all I am saying here is under the seal. 

11377] I might say that if anybody wants to keep up morale 
in this community that the best thing to do is to keep the restrictions 
in effect and to leave things under the conditions that they are and 
there will be no such thing happen. 

We want to do everything we can. We have been trying to help to 
keep the morale up. Nobody has worked harder than I have in con- 
nection with this thing. Wlicn it started sometime ago, everybody 
pooh-poohed the idea, but our house has been an open house since 
last January for the enlisted men. We have got others interested in 
it and some arranging parties for the men and setting up places for 
entertainment purposes ami taking care of the men. However, for 
the Army to say that it is all right and to release these restrictions 
at this time is just to tell he people tha it is no as bad as we bought 
it was and it is not going to hoppen again and wewilllet you know in 
plenty of time when it does happen and the}' will say that it is not 
so bad. 

The Chairman. What effect will the relaxation of the stiff control 
have on those of Japanese blood ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 783 

Bishop LiTTELL. It is not a question of loyalty ; it is mostly a ques- 
tion of leaders, but it will be one of the first things, in my mind, that 
will get back to Japan. That is the liquor business which now has 
been worked out so completely, and then they will know that what 
happened on December 6th and 7th is about to be relaxed again and 
they will know about it and rejoice. 

They know and you know the reason for it, particularly with 
respect to the question of restrictions. We require automobile li- 
censes. Ships must be at top-notch perfection. We require licenses 
for plumbing, electrical fixtures, and practically any business that 
affects the lives of people must be at top-notch perfection. When 
they ordered martial law it was saying that it was one of the re- 
quirements that the men must [1278] be at top notch, and 
it was a inost important thing that they be at top notch. How are 
these civilian people or tlie Army service people going to get in top- 
notch condition unless they do that? 

Now, this is not a lecture. I am not interested in a temperance 
lecture, but I am just saying these things. First, we must have top- 
notch alertness in all of us as a requirement or we cannot have good 
morale. 

I was talking with our police official here and I was told that 
there was only one arrest on New Year's Eve for drunkenness and 
that is a very fine thing. That is one of the most important things 
that has ever happened here or anywhere else that I know of, par- 
ticularly in a population of this size. That is one of the first things 
to think. about. 

When you are speaking of the highest efficiency in morale, and 
you let these things down, then word gets around that you are not 
proclaiming an absolute prohibition on the sale of liquor, then they 
will say that the seriousness of the things that went into effect on 
December 7th do not hold now. Then it becomes a case where you 
let down the restrictions and the morale goes down too. 

If you change the communication from the office of the Military 
Governor as made that Sunday morning and relax the conditions, 
then you get a general let down. You cannot put into an airplane 
something defective. You cannot put anything in when it is not 
going to work out, because you cannot have old defective machinery. 
You can't speak about sabotaging personal efficiency and the intelli- 
gence and physical help of people by having these things in effect 
and then letting them down, and I tell you that it is all a part of 
the general picture and those things are in the minds of people and 
they may say that the same reasons are not true at this time, but I 
think they are the same reasons. 

The second thing is the pressure for income to the Territory. It 
is the same old almighty dollar again, which [1279'] has 
ruined us for many years, or is the root of many evils, as St. Paul 
says. 

There is the organized pressure from the trade, and I realize that 
it is one of the sources of the largest income and there was the sug- 
gestion of no income coming in to the Territory. 

I think that may be true that that was perhaps one of the official 
reasons, but the pressure was there from the people who want to 
sell as well as the reason with respect to the income to the Territory. 



784 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now, the same is true with respect to automobiles and rubber 
tires and many other things that may be necessary, but we have 
these restrictions now on all of them and many of them are money- 
producing things to the Territory. I am not just picking out this 
one. Those are the two things I wanted to say. 

The Chairman. Leaving the liquor question aside for the moment, 
do you think it would be a safe thing to turn back the government 
here to the civil authority and to lift the military control entirely? 

Bishop LiTTELL. Not for a minute, no more than a minute, no 
more than I think we are ready for statehood here at this time. Of 
course it is going to be up to the Military Government and there 
should be full cooperation. We ought to try to get in all cases the 
elements which have not been fully cooperative or have not been 
sympathetic. 

The Chairman. In other words, you fear the wide-open situa- 
tion as it was before December 7 and its effect on the Japanese 
sympathizers ? 

Bishop LiTTELL. I have not mentioned the Japanese; I am speak- 
ing of the white people, and what I say is not for publication. 

The Chairman. No, of course not. 

[1£80] Bishop Littell. The reason for a large measure of the 
lack of civilian sympathy with the growing forces of the last two 
or three years and with the military control which is necessary, is 
on the part of the controllers of business, the real rulers of the in- 
dustry, the business people, the trade, the corporations, on these 
islands, and the work they have carried on. I think you may have 
heard them referred to as the Big Five. 

•All I need to say is that the Bi^ Five has seen the increased threat 
to their absolute control of everytliing on this island coming in with 
the increases in the Army and the Navy. The Big Five is not back 
of me in our civilian work that we have tried to build up with the 
forces of the Army and the Navv- 

I am invited to Army and Navy functions and I always try to 
go because I am a civilian and also because I have connections in 
the Army and the Navy through the chaplains. Wlienever I was 
invited to these functions it always makes one think why none of 
the heads of the social or business life here were present at those 
functions. 

General Herron has done more in that respect in recent years to 
bring the two groups together and to entertain them, and I have 
attended some of these, but you would not find anybody there by the 
name of Castle or Cooke or Waterhouse. 

The Chaikman. Do you mean that they do not want any inter- 
ference here? 

Bishop Littell. They know that the Army interference and the 
martial law is the final step which takes away the possibility of their 
control here. 

Now, if this got into the public press, my name would be mud. 

The Chairman. It is confidential. 

Blishop Littell. Yes, I know, but we are talking about life in the 
community and you have got to realize the situation [I-^SII 
here. I can make an exception of Walter Dillingham. He is an 
exception, Walter is, but his brother is as bad as the rest of them. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 785 

Then William Castle is taking over the Ked Cross, but the Red 
Cross is a harmless thing, and it does not interfere with their activities, 
but at the Army or Navy public functions there are not these people 
present. Then you could go through the names of the people who 
make these appointments and who hold them like that. 

Up until two or three years ago they were against statehood because 
they controlled things in the Territory. Then when something or 
other came from Washington or thev didn't like the appointment of 
Governor Poindexter and they said they would elect their own Gover- 
nor. Then about two years ago when the situation changed they went 
over for statehood and they wanted to get statehood as fast as possible. 
It then became a question for the voters and they controlled all the 
plantation labor and they controlled all the business, business houses 
connected up with them, and they had many people in their employ and 
connected up with them, and they were in favor of statehood. 

Then in the last November election which was supposed to be a 
secret ballot, it was over half, but it was not a full vote in favor of 
statehood. 

That was taken as the main issue to the Legislature but it was not a 
sweeping vote. 

I was on the mainland so I did not vote, but I was very much 
interested in knowing about that vote, since it was a very important 
thing here, wishing to make this the 49th state, but it was never 
mentioned in either house of the Legislature in the sixty days. 

Then when they had the M-day business and we had a special session 
of the Legislature to pass certain measures including [1282] an 
appropriation for money to live on, it was not mentioned, and it was 
supposed to be the most important issue, the plebiscite among the 
people, but they did not dare to mention it because it would have been 
turned down. 

Now, that has nothing to do with the Japanese. Of course the 
Japanese were involved, because there were many Japanese laborers, 
but it was not the issue. That was not the question. The issue was 
who was going to run this island and who was going to run things as 
they were before. 

The issue was who was going to run the island. The issue has 
nothing to do with race or nationality or loyalty or disloyalty. It was 
who was going to run these islands. Was the President of the United 
States going to be the one who would appoint the Governor or not? 
I think it would be a very sad day on this island to have anyone else 
do the appointing than the President of the United States. 

The Chairman. I think that is beyond the scope of our inquiry. 

Bishop LiTTELL. Yes, I know it is, but I am getting back to morale, 
because the business life and social life is tied up with it. We are at 
war and we have to expect certain things. They should not be holding 
off, the leaders of industry, because they do have a monopoly and they 
do many things, and they are out of the reach of many people. 

If you speak to them there is absolute loyalty to the United States. 
There is no question about that. That is all I want to say on that, but 
there is that lack of cordiality on the part of the business leaders, and 
that is something that I have run up against all the time, and it is 
very difficult to get any of these people together, except perhaps Walter 
Dillingham, and they would not come over to the Bishop's house or 



786 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

have an entertainment or take part in it, and there are others, and 
they have turned ns do\ni flat be- [1283] cause they were not 
interested, the Castles and Cookes and those of the Matson Line. They 
have everything- in their hands. 

Of course this is not for publication. 
The Chairman. No. 

Bishop LiTTELL. I cannot be quoted in public or give my opinion on 
topics or tell my clergy or laity what I think about any topics in any 
church. In otlier words, I may be familiar with politics but none of my 
clergymen can discuss things in that way and I may not know whether 
they are Republicans or Democrats, and as soon as you mention politics 
in the Church, that is not the proper function, and if it is a Democratic 
sermon the Republicans do not like it, and vice versa. 

I am explaining just what I think here, and I am not against the 
Big Five, but I know they are the ones who have made it impossible 
in many ways, and we sympathize with the Army and the Navy and 
they may not be in sympathy with the Army and Navy developments 
here because their whole business is threatened. That is all on that. 
If you want me to go on, keep on on morale, and the reason why the 
morale is not good in certain respects is, among other things, because of 
the lack of access to privies and toilets, and these same people control 
the land and the buildings and so forth. 

The Chairman. I think that is beyond the scope of our inquiry. 
Bishop LiTTELL. Yes, but I am thinking about morale, and when 
these peoj)le do not have a place to go, for the civilians to go to, or the 
Army and Navy men, when you have around ten or fifteen thousand 
here and they have no place to go to for the necessity of relieving 
nature and they are around the Cathedral grounds and the Capitol 
grounds, and pretty nearly everywhere they can go, then it is a serious 
[1284] question. 

One of the first things I did was to take it up with General Short 
and ask him what he was going to do about it. He took it up with 
the Mayor and with the committee and they took it up with the Park 
Commission to find places so that they might enlarge the park facili- 
ties and wliere they had two toilets they put in four stand-up places, 
or they made twelve instead of six. 

Now, that is a matter of health which has an effect on morale, and 
when these people come into town and they do not have any place 
to m) and you have the large increase in the Army and Navy and the 
deiense workers and they have no place, and the defense workers have 
nothing, and there are not sufficient places for them to relieve them- 
selves and it is a health problem and a verj'^ serious one, and you have 
a lot of defense workers here. 

Then there are not sufficient drinking fountains for them, for the 
soldiers and the sailors, and they cannot quench their thirst when they 
are ashore, and they go down to the beach or to Punchbowl or those 
places around town and they drift into various places and they can- 
not get anything to quench their thirst or go into any place unless 
they come into a hotel where they may not be wanted or they cannot 
go into a bank where they do not feel at home and they do not have 
any water to drink, but the soldiers and sailors should have a place 
where they can get a drink when they come in: to have a drink of 
water, ancl some place for other purposes. Tluit is a serious situation 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION ^ 787 

that has been caused by the necessity of the Army and the Navy and 
these defense workers comino; to this outpost. 

There we have a situation of some 155,000 people where they do not 
have any phxce to ^et a drink of water, and then all these defense 
people coming in whei-e they come to town for [1285] certain 
business or recreation, why it becomes more than a civilian problem. 

I think that is all. 

The Chairman. Any questions ? 

Admiral REE^'ES. No, sir. 

Bishop LiTTFXL. I did not know exactly what you wanted to ask 
me and Mr. Howe said that you would develop it when I got here. 

I am interested in civilian morale. I believe this letting down would 
be bad. Those things are necessary; those three things, not to let 
down on the liquor restriction, and the second is to use more of the 
people who really control the finances here, and the third is the ques- 
tion of having some place where these men can quench their thirst. 
We should have all these things. 

I thank you, gentlemen. 

The Chairman. Thank you, bishop. 

[12S6] Colonel Brown. Mr. Eichelberger. 

The Chairman. Mr. Eichelberger, will you be sworn ? 

TESTIMONY OF MR. LESLIE ERNEST EICHELBERGER, YMCA 
SECRETARY, HONOLULU, T. H. 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give your full name to the reporter? 

Mr. Eichelberger. Leslie Ernest Eichelberger. 

The Chairman. What is your business, Mr. Eichelberger? 

Mr. Eichelberger. I am YMCA secretary. 

The Chairman. How long have you been such ? 

Mr. Eichelberger. About 24 years. 

The Chairman. How long have you been on the island ? 

Mr. Eichelberger. Ten years. 

The Chairman. And have you been YMCA secretary or connected 
with the YMCA here during that ten years? 

Mr. Eichelberger. All of that time, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. What facilities has the YMCA in Honolulu? 

Mr. Eichelberger. The civilian YMCA has three large buildings, 
all three with dormitories and physical equipment, the gymnasium, 
swimming pools, and the customary YMCA equipment. You are 
familiar with the Army and Navy YMCA? 

The Chairman. We want to hear about it from you, sir. 

Mr. Eichelberger. The Army and Navy YMCA is not under my 
jurisdiction, because the Army and Navy Department is handled 
directly by our Army-Navy Committee from New York. It has a 
very large and very fine building. 

The Chairman. Where ? 

Mr. Eichelberger. It is also in Honolulu. 

The Chairman. Located? 

Mr. Eichelberger. Just a block from the Central YMCA. It is on 
Hotel Sireet at Richards. 



788 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Who, to your knowledge, is in charge of that 
branch ? 

[1287] Mr. EicHELBERGER. Mr. Weslie Wilke, W-i-1-k-e. 

The Chairman. Has he been here for some time ? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. Yes, he has been here seven or eight years at 
least. 

The Chairman. And would be available ? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. Would be available and would be very happy, 
I am sure, to cooperate. 

The Chairman. Do the soldiers and sailors on leave or liberty use 
your civilian YMCA buildings ? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. As well as the Army and Navy building? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. Yes, sir ; not to the same extent, of course. 

The Chairman. No. 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. But vcry largely, at that. 

The Chairman. Yes. Now, Mr. Eichelberger, have you ever been 
in any other city that was adjacent to a large naval station or a large 
Army post ? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. Not for a long period, but I have been for 
short periods at San Diego and other similar places. 

The Chairman. What is your observation as to the morale, as 
far as drinking and carousing is concerned, of the enlisted men who 
come on leave and liberty into Honolulu? Is it good? Is it fair? 
Is it bad, to your personal knowledge ? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. Mr. Chairman, that is so difficult to answer, 
because we only notice the ones who are drinking. 

The Chairman. I know that. 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. I would Say fair or better than fair. 

The Chairman. You quite understand that in a large Navy post 
where big units of the fleet come in the men necessarily are given shore 
liberty? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. Yes. 

The Chairman. For recuperation. 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. Yes. 

[1288] The Chairman. And you understand that the problem 
always arises then, when liquor is available, of policing the men's use 
of liquor ? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. It is a very serious problem, and in general the 
men respond very well. 

The Chairman. They do ? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. In my opinion. 

The Chairman. You do not think the condition has been out- 
standingly bad here ? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. No. It lias been distressing but not propor- 
tionately — not worse than it would be in any similar concentration 
of men, civilians or university men or any other crowd. 

The Chairman. That is exactly what we wanted to know, sir. 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Have you observed the effect of the declaration 
of military law here after the attack? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 789 

The Chairman. Do you think it was a wise thing to put military 
law into effect ? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. I suppose it was necessary. 

The Chairman. Do j^ou think it is just as necessary now as it was 
when it was put into effect, having in mind the large proportion of 
Japanese blood in this town ? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. I am mo]«e familiar with those of Japanese 
blood than many people, because one of our branches has at least 80% 
of its membership of Japanese blood, 2,000 or more members. I have 
no greater fear from them, as a rule, than from any other second- 
generation people on the mainland. I think their percentage would 
be just as easily controlled and just as loyal. 

The Chairman. How would you control espionage if you didn't 
do it by military government? It was not controlled before Decem- 
ber 7. That is obvious now. 

[1289] Mr. EiCHELBERGER. Yes. 

The Chairman. Obvious to you, isn't it? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. I have had no first-hand evidence, your Honor. 

The Chairman. I can say to you that it is perfectly evident 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. Yes. 

The Chairman. — that Japanese sources on this island furnished 
the most meticulous information to the Japanese military organization. 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. Well, that is obvious, that someone did, surely. 

The Chairman. Yes, I think so. Now, how could you control that 
if you threw the town open to the civil authorities again as it was open 
for the months before December 7? I want your view as a citizen, 
how you would control it. 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. As a citizen I feel that during the emergency 
perhaps martial law is necessary. 

The Chairman. Do you think that the emergency is over? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. I do iiot. It Very obviously is not. 

The Chairman. You think the lesson of one attack indicates the 
possibility of another attack on Pearl Harbor ? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. Yes. I think the average civilian has less fear 
of further attacks than the service personnel. 

The Chairman. Do you think that is a good attitude here now ? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. I think it shows splendid confidence in the armed 
forces. 

The Chairman. The same confidence they had on and before De- 
cember 7 ? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. I think so ; I think every bit as good. In other 
words, I have talked with many people, and I tnink they have a feeling 
that something slipped one time that isn't going to slip again. 

The Chairman. Suppose nothing slips and that our armed 
[1290] forces do the very best they can in the course of an attack 
here; the attack might yet be a very serious thing for these aliens; 
might it not ? 

Mr. Eickelberger. Yes. 

The Chairman. And is it your view that every measure ought to be 
taken by the Army and Navy, even military law, if they think that im- 
portant, in order to mitigate the seriousness of an attack if one comes 
or prevent one if possible? Or would you think that it now is the 
time to go back to civil government with all the liberties of the citizen 
that were permitted to those of foreign blood before the attack ? 



790 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. EiCHELBERGEE. Mr. Chairman, I feel that military law is prob- 
ably necessary. I would like to see it relaxed insofar as safety measures 
would warrant. There are certain specific ways in which citizens, 
civilians, w4sh it might be relaxed. I think in general they are willing 
to yield in judgment if the authorities don't think it should be relaxecl, 
but I think they would like some explanations in some cases as to why 
it isn't relaxed. « 

The Chairman. Have you in mind the curfew ? 

Mr. EiciiELBERGER. Yes, for one thing. 

The Chairman. The blackout? 

Mr. EicHELBERGER. The blackout. If the blackout could be relaxed 
in any Avay without hazarding the population, even if it were made a 
curfew after 9 o'clock, or something of that sort. Xow, perhaps there 
is just as great danger between 6 and 9 as there is any other time — 
that is not for me to say — but there is great restlessness and dissatis- 
faction because of the curtailing of the early evening activities : people 
who work until 5 o'clock and rush home to eat in the dark, and don't 
' see their friends; they work Sundays — many of them, that is. 

The Chairman. It is a great hardship. 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. It is war, and they are willing to accept it if 
it is essential, but if it is not entirely [1'291] essential it would 
be very reassuring if there could be a little relaxation there. 

The Chairjnian. General? 

General McNarney. Mr. Eichelberger, you stated that you have 
talked to a great many people about the situation here. What was 
your general impression of the feeling of the people in Oahu as to 
the efficiency of General Short, who was placed here in command of 
the Army forces? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. I tliiulv I haven't known anyone intimately who 
would know of his efficiency as a militar}'^ man. There was confi- 
dence in his attitude as a military governor, and prior to his as- 
sumption of the position of military goverr.or there was good will 
on the part of the civilian population and a feeling that he under- 
stood the interracial situation and was sympathetic to the problems 
of the island. 

General McNarney. How about Admiral Kimmel? 

Mr. Eichelberger. Less was known about him in the circles in 
which I move, and I didn't hear liim discussed. I heard General 
Short discussed more often by peoj)le interested in civilian morale and 
in reassuring the citizens of Oriental ancestry that they would get a 
square deal. There had been great fear of mass concentration camps 
and things of that sort. General Short's attitude )uid been quite re- 
assuring in that connection, along with that of INIr. Shivers of the 
F. B. I. and other men who had assured the population that there 
would not be unfair mass rouiulups. and that established confidence 
in his jurisdiction when he became military governor. 

General McCoy. In connection with your concern about the re- 
strictions of martial law, does that also apply to the embargo on 
liquor? Would you think that that should be relaxed? 

Mr. Eichelberger. My personal judgment and my objective judg- 
ment might be at variance there. I would personally be happy if it 
were not relaxed. Objectively it may be necessary to relax it some- 
what. 

[1^92] General McCoy. Why? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 791 

Mr. EicHELBERGER. I Can't say why. I can only say that there is 
pressure on those of us who would rather it were not relaxed. There 
is pressure on us to change our opinion. Perhaps that is commercial 
pressure. Perhaps it is from some other source. 

General McCoy. To ^^'hat source do you attribute it? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGEK. There are many men who want to have ac- 
cess to liquor regardless of whether it might be slightly harmful 
or not ; I mean harmful from a defense standpoint. 

The Chairman. Do you think the attitude of business-as-usual on 
the islands has something to do with the liquor business as well as 
other businesses here? 

]\Ir. EicHELBERGER. Probably the liquor people feel there is dis- 
crimination against them, and they perhaps don't see as clearly as 
some others do that an intoxicated man or a partly intoxicated man is 
difficult for a sentry to handle. 

The Chairman. He is a liability. 

Mr. EicHELBERGER. He certainly is. 

The Chairman. Have you any questions? 

Admiral Reeves. No, sir. 

The Chairman. We are very much obliged to you. 

Mr. EicHELBERGER. May I volunteer one or two other comments ? 

The Chairman. Yes; I was going to ask if you had any thoughts 
that would be useful to us. 

Mr. EicHELBERGER. Mr. Justice, some of us feel that morale on this 
island and in the whcrle Territoiy would be greatly helped if the 
mainland mail and inter-island mail could be expedited some way. 
We know from cablegrams that letters are held up somewhere be- 
tween the Coast and here and have been for several weeks at a time : 
remittances to people who receive salaries from the mainland ; things 
of that sort are causing a great deal of embarrassment because of 
conditions [1293] which we do not understand. 

Now, if there could be any way of speeding up mail, I am sure you 
appreciate that problem, because it causes some concern. Now, one 
group will say, "It's probably held in censorship," and another one 
will say, "I'm afraid they are sinking more boats with mail on than 
we're told." And so the feeling of confidence is lessened by the mere 
fact that mail isn't coming through. If it is held up in censorship, if 
that statement could simpl^^ be made it would relieve some tension. 

Then, we feel that there is a great deal of breakdown of morale 
because of the children being kept home from school. I am sure the 
military governor is aiming to open the schools as soon as possible. 
We would like to urge that. The civilians feel that some slight hazard 
from bombs isn't as great as the certain hazard of idleness and the 
enforced concentration of children in their own neighborhoods with- 
out anything to do, and we would hojDe there could be something 
done there. 

Then, if there could be — ^your Honor, I appreciate that perhaps I 
have no right to make such suggestions because I know that there are 
reasons which I don't know aJDOut, but if there could be some more 
frankness officially about submarine operations in the vicinity it would 
be reassuring. We get news that submarines have shelled nearby 
cities. We get great volumes that submarines have been sunk, but no 
official statements. If we could know that a submarine was sunk the 



792 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

day after Lahaina was shelled, or some such thing, it would be very 
reassuring to the civilian population. They know the Navy and the 
Air Force are on the alert, but in as far as it lies within the judgment 
of the authorities a little more frankness in that direction would be 
very helpful. 

The Chairman. Of course that is military. 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. That is military, granted, and that is why I say 
I hesitated even to make that suggestion. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

[J294] Mr. EiCHELBERGER. The mail, the schools, some help on 
the blackout, and possibly a little more information about getting 
some of the trespassers would be helpful. 

General McCoy. Who supports the YMCA ? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. The population. It is locally supported en- 
tirely. 

General McCoy. Does the major part of the support come from big 
business here ? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. About a little over 50% of it comes from the 
Community Welfare Fund, which is contributed to by all businesses 
large and small and individuals. The balance comes from our own 
membership income, men paying for service they receive. 

General McCoy. Do you get any support from the mainland ? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. Quite the opposite. We contribute rather gen- 
erously to enterprises outside of the Territory : that is, to our national 
council work and to foreign work in South Aiperica and in the Orient 
and elsewhere. 

General McCoy. Is there a U. S. O. organization here? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. You work through them, too, do you ? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. You are a part of that ? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. We are a part of the U. S. O. 

General McCoy. Have they a new building here ? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. The building was just begun when the December 
7 raid occurred, and of course it is suspended now, but the work is 
being done through the member agencies and is under way in very good 
shape, although not in very visible shape, not nearly as dramatically 
as if there were a building with the label on it. 

General McCoy. Have you any association with the Red Cross? 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. Yes. sir. 

General McCoy. In what way ? 

[WOS] Mr. EiCHELBERGER. Acquainted with many of the people 
who are officials and volunteers in it. 

General McCoy. It does work in connection with the Army and 
Navy on posts and in the hospitals, as I understand it. 

Mr. EiCHELBERGER. Yes, but it also is doing a great deal in the 
city in first-aid classes, in bandage, dressing, and things of that sort, 
and there is a Red Cross motor corps of drivers who are ready on 
call, women who have cars of their own, many things of that sort. 
It is certainly not limited to the posts. 

General McCoy. Have you a YMCA building at each one of the 
Army and Navy posts? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 793 

Mr. EiCHELBEROER. No, sir. The only building of any size is the 
one downtown^ which is an Army and Navy YMCA. There was 
a small Navy 1 MCA at Pearl Harbor, but there hasn't been a building 
anywhere else on the island. Mr. Wilke of the Army and Navy 
YMCA has assigned men to be resident at Schofield and to operate 
activities there, but without a building. 

General McCoy. I have no further questions. 

The Chairman. Mr. Eichelberger, the nature of our inquiry is 
such that we shall ask you not to discuss your testimony before us or 
anything that has gone on here with anyone outside. 

Mr. Eichelberger. That is granted. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Eichelberger. And a pleasure to meet you. 

The Chairman. A pleasure to have you here, sir. 

Colonel Brown. Mr. Gabrielson, Mr. Justice. 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn, sir ? 

[1296] TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM A. GABRIELSON, CHIEF OF 
POLICE, HONOLULU, T. H. 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give your full name to the reporter? 

Mr. Gabrielson. William A. Gabrielson. 

The Chairman. You are the Chief of Police of Honolulu? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And have been for how long ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Since the 9th day of August, 1932. 

The Chairman. And as such official have you had occasion to 
observe the conduct of the men from the Army and Navy who are 
in leave in Honolulu, particularly on Saturday nights? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Have you ever had an official station near any 
other large Army or Navy concentration on the mainland? 

Mr. Gabrielson. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Your first experience in a city which had a Navy 
Yard and an Army post was in Honolulu, then ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. No, I wouldn't say that. I was on the San Diego 
Police Department. 

The Chairman. Oh. Well, then you did see something of that 
kind before? 

Mr. Gabrielson. That was prior to 1917. 

The Chairman. The concentration of Navy men and x\rmy men 
was not so large there at that time ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Chief, what is your opinion as to the effectiveness 
of the control of drunkenness by the Army and Navy in respect of 
their men on leave here? 

Mr. Gabrielson. It is very good. 

The Chairman. It is good? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, excellent. 

The Chairman. There are cases of drunkenness, of course? 

[129'/'] Mr. Gabrielson. Lots of it. 



794 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. You understand that when men are given leave 
and liquor is available you have a police problem ? 

Mr. Gabkielson. Certainly. 

The Chairman. And you think that police problem has been well 
handled by the Army and Navy patrols, do you 'i 

Mr. Gabrielson. I would like to say that it is inconceivable the sup- 
port and the cooperation between the civilian police, the shore patrol, 
and the military police. 

The Chairman. It has been good, has it? 

Mr. Gabrielson. It has been excellent. It couldn't be any better. 

The Chairman. Do you think, or not, that this necessary evil of 
men taking too much liquor when they are on leave has been well 
controlled here ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. It has. 

The Chairman. Has the morale in that respect of the Army and 
Navy men been better or worse than that of the civilian population 
over which you have control, in your opinion and observation? 

Mr. Gabrielson. No, I think it would be about the same. 

The Chairman. You do? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You get drunks in the civil population on Saturday 
evenings, don't you ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Plenty of them. Our drunks ai-e increasing about 
25% a 3^ear over the preceding year. 

The Chairman. Of course you don't have an}^ jurisdiction over 
the Army or the Navy drunks, do you ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, we do. 

The Chairman. Do you ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Oh, yes. 

The Chairman. What do you do? Turn them over to the M. P.'s? 

[1298] Mr. Gabrielson. We turn them over to the M. P.'s or 
either branch. 

The Chairman. I see. 

Mr. Gabrielson. If we arrest them and bring them in they are 
simply turned over to them without any charges. 

The Chairman. I see. They handle the cases themselves? 

Mr. Gabrielson. They handle them, yes, sir. On a busy shore 
patrol — or a busy Navy night when the Navy has their pay day, in 
town we have shore patrol walk with the civilian police. 

The Chairman. I see. 

Mr. Gabrielson. In that way that stops any argument that you 
haven't a right to arrest. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. (tabrielson. And that has worked out very satisfactorily. 

Mr. Chairman. We liave heard rumors. Chief, that tliere was an 
unusual amount of wild parties and drinking on Saturday night, 
December G. What is your official knowledge of any such thing? 

Mr. Gabrielson. I have no official knowledge; only hearsay. 

The Chairiman. You have heard rumors to that effect ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Have you credited the rumors? 

Mr. Gaprieison. No, sir. 

The Chairman. You do not believe them ? 



I 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 795 

Mr. Gabrielson. Oh, yes, I do, because we had an awful lot of 
troubles with officers living off the post and these drunken parties. 
We have an awful lot of complaints. In those drunken parties or 
noisy parties we go out — our policy is to go out and inform the people. 
We very seldom make an arrest, because if we did we would have 
no corroboration testimony the next day, because all people want to 
do is to have that party stopped. And that could easily be accounted 
for; [12991 when they get loose they want to have a good 
time. 

The Chairman. You mean that you have had complaints of parties 
at officers' homes where the officers live out of the Navy Yard or off 
the post ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, sir ; out here at Waikiki a lot of it. And at 
the same time we have had a lot of civilians. 

The Chairman. Complaints about civilian parties ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, sir, a lot of it. Probably two thirds of our 
police problems here are what we call Hawaiian love : that is, a person 
gets drunk and then goes home and talks to his wife by hand. We 
have an awful lot of that. Many times practically every officer of 
the beat is on one of those parties, on one of those complaints. 

The Chairman. Goes home and is rough? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Very rough. That is a Hawaiian custom. 

The Chairman. General? 

General McNarnet. Does that apply to the Army and Navy per- 
sonnel, this last? 

Mr. Gabrielson. No, no, no. No. That is a Hawaiian custom, you 
might say, of the people who were born and raised here. No; very 
little of it in the Army or Navy. 

General McNarnet. Have you any record of the number of officers 
or enlisted men living off the post whom it was necessary to warn on 
the night of December 6 ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. I could get that if there was any that came in, 
because we keep a complete record. 

The Chairman. Will you get it for us ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And just memo it to us as part of your testimony. 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, sir. We have a complete record of every 
report that comes in to the Department. 

The Chairman. Please give us that for the testimony. 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, sir. I will send it right on. 

[1300] General McCoy. That is for Saturday night. 

Mr. Gabrielson. Saturday night, December 6, yes, sir. 

General McNarnet. Do you know anything about the rumors that 
certain Japanese places of refreshment were serving free drinks to 
white people on the night of December 6 ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. No, sir, I never heard that. 

The Chairman. Off the record. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

The Chairman. Do you know of an opening of a new market b}'' 
one Otani, a prominent Japanese? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. .When was that opening? 



79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 2 14 



796 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Gabrielson. That was December 5 is when I got the invitation 
to attend. 

Tlie Chairman. Do you believe that free liquor was served there? 

Mr. Gabrielson. It would be the custom for them to do it, to some 
of their best guests — or to their guests. That is a custom of the islands 
here. 

The Chairman, Do you know where Otani is now? 

Mr. Gabrielson. I understand he is interned. 

The Chairman. Have you any questions? 

Admiral Reeves. From your observation and experience do you 
think the conditions on Saturday night, December 6, were worse than 
on any other Saturday night ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. No, sir ; they were just normal. 

Admiral Reeves. That is all I want to ask. 

The Chairman. Admiral? 

Admiral Standley. Chief, are there a large number of enlisted men 
ashore during w^eek da3's, too, when the fleet is in the harbor? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Any material or perceptible difference between 
Saturday night and Wednesda}^ night when the fleet is in? 

[ISOl] Mr. Gabrielson. As a I'ule there are more oiRcers — there 
are more sailors on shore on a Saturday than there are on other nights. 
Saturday night is our busy night, and right after the first there are 
always more soldiers and more sailors. There were a lot of sailors — I 
was around ; I am around every Saturday night checking up, and there 
was a lot of sailors on shore Saturday night. 

Admiral Standley. But there also are a lot of sailors on shore dur- 
ing week nights? 

Mr, Gabrielson. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Do you know how late they were on shore on Sat- 
urday night, the majority of them? 

Mr, Gabrielson. I think around 11 o'clock. Most of them go back 
betweeai — before 11 or right after 11. They change the hour of shore 
leave sometimes, but between 11 and 12 we have quite a problem up 
there in front of the Army and Navy YMCA. 

The Chairman, You mean a transportation problem? 

Mr. Gabrielson. A transportation problem, yes, sir, of getting 
those busses in, and we stop traffic flowing Waikiki on Hotel Street 
so that the busses will have the whole street, and the taxis, to get the 
sailors out. We have taken as high as 10,500 out in an hour. 

General McCoy. Would that problem be the case on Saturday night ? 

Mr, Gabrielson, I don't think there was that large a shore leave on 
that Saturday night. It was just a normal Saturday night. With the 
anticipation of Christmas coming along we anticipated a greater 
amount of sailors, soldiers, and civilians on the streets on those nights. 
They started to shop early this year. In fact, the stores reported a far 
greater sale in November than they ever had in the history of the com- 
munity. 

Admiral Standley, Chief, are you kept advised of the liberty hours 
of the fleet in here ? 

[1302] Mr, Gabrielson, No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Are your forces in any way connected with 
picking up AOL's after midnight or after 1 o'clock? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 797 

Mr. Gabriel8C)n. We did for a while when they had the shore leave 
up to dark some months ago. The}!' curtailed the shore leave, and we 
would assist the shore patrol in picking them up, and we would pick 
them up if there Avas no shore patrol officer with us. 

Admiral Standley. How long ago was that? Do you remember? 

Mr. Gabrielson. That was some months back ; the exact time I don't 
know. 

Admiral Standley. Do you know the occasion for that change? 

Mr. Gabrielson. No, sir, I don't. I don't recall why it was. 

Admiral Standley. Chief, there is a rumor I have heard, which ap- 
l^arently came from someone in your force who was given credit for 
knowing, that some of the officers were not on the station here, namely, 
that Admiral Kimmel was not on the island and could not be found on 
the morning of the 6th. Have you heard anything of that report ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. I have nothing further. 

General McNarney. Chief, what is the status of the Police Depart- 
ment under military law ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. We are under the shore patrol — I mean the military 
police. Provost Marshal. 

General McNarney. You get your directives, then, from the Pro- 
vost Marshal? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, sir. In other words, we carry on — his orders 
are that we carry on as we have been, but we work closer in traffic 
matters. 

General McNarney. But you are subject to his direction [7J0J] 
if he sees fit to give you a directive ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And has that worked without hitch? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Or without troube? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, sir. absolutely without — you can't conceive 
the closeness with which we have always worked together, and still 
continue. 

Admiral Standley. In other words, military law has practically 
made no change in your operations of the Police Department? 

Mr. Gabrielson. No, sir, not a bit ; only gives us a little more prob' 
lems, that's all. 

General McNarney. What is your feeling as to the necessity or the 
advisability of relaxing certain of the provisions that have been put 
into effect, such as liquor, blackout, curfew? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Personally I would like to see it as it is. Liquor, 
I would like to see some regulation worked out where people get a 
certain amount of bottled goods and take it home, and make it a very 
stiff sentence if anyone was caught with an open bottle on the street 
or in their cars. If you or I or anyone wanted to get a bottle they 
could go down and get a bottle and take it home. But I should hate 
to see them open up the saloons again, and I would hate to see them 
alloAv them to have bottled goods outside of their house, because I am 
afraid that if you did that some of these young sailors and soldiers 
that haven't been over here very long — there would be a lot of trouble. 
They would see a Japanese walking down the street, and Bang! — or 
a Hawaiian. And I am afraid that there would be a great deal of 
trouble if that liquor was not tight. 



798 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

We have over here a lot of these young roughnecks, and we used to 
have a lot of gang fights. Sometimes the soldiers and [ISOJ^] 
sailors were responsible, and sometimes the local boys were responsible. 
Unfortunately our judge has never been in a gang fight, and we would 
have to give him testimony of everybody that struck somebody, and 
that can't be done. I was in one of those gang fights, and I got hit with 
it felt like a sledge hammer. I couldn't see who hit me. 

The Chairman. And the judge wouldn't hold anybody unless you 
could swear to that ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. No, unless I could swear that so and so hit me. 
But we would have a lot of trouble about it, and I think it is a good 
thing to keep people off the street during this emergency. 

General McNarney. Do you think that if the emergency lasts for, 
say, two years, you should continue to enforce an early curfew ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. I think it might be a thing that people could visit, 
visit homes, but not to let them congregate around on the streets ; make 
them go to and from wherever they were going. It is rather hard 
now on a lot of people. They can't visit. Take my wife: she has got 
to stay home alone every night, and now there is just a sample of one 
individual, and it is rather hard to sit in a dark house every night all 
alone. If a person could get out, visit around, it would make a dif- 
ferent feeling amongst the civilian population. 

General McNarney. How about keeping the movie open until, say, 
9 : 30 or 10 o'clock ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Well, there is a good argument on allowing that to 
be done, say, earlier than 9 : 30, 10 ; say not later than 8 : 30 to be let 
out, because you can figure that out: when they start, you see, they 
go for every two hours; if they started at 10 o clock — 10, 12, 2, 4, 6, 
8 — they would get out at 8. 

General McNarney. Yes. 

The Cpiairman. Chief, if you did that you would have to 
[130S] let those of Japanese blood go, who of course are American 
citizens ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes. 

The Chairman. You would have to let them go just as you would 
others, would you not ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Oh, absolutely. 

The Chairman. Now, you would to some extent lose control of the 
Japanese blood if you did it, would you not? 

Mr. Gabrielson. We would, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, you are cognizant, I take it, of the fact that 
the Japanese had perfect information for their attack of December 7 ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I don't know whether you are cognizant of it. 
Are you ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, they did. 

The Chairman. You know that their information, their intelli- 
gence, was literally perfect ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. It was. 

The Chairman. And you know that that was the fact in spite of 
three agencies here doing all they could to break through, and not 
breaking through, not getting anything, really. Now, you had a large 
number of Japanese consular agents here, didn't you i 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 799 

The Chairman. And nothing was done to restrict their activities, 
was there, before December 7 ? 

Mr. Gabkielson. Not that I know of; none that I know of. 

The Chairman. You yourself were cognizant that there was an 
unusually large number of people connected with the Japanese Con- 
sulate here? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, and I know that the consul here had the 
reputation of being the smartest man in the service. 

The Chairman. Now, if you relaxed the military control [1306] 
of those of foreign blood who might wish to aid Japan you would 
immediately increase your problem of counterespionage, would you 
not? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. I think — I gather from the atmosphere of this com- 
munity — that those of Japanese blood are very much frightened at 
present, very very scared ; is that right, according to your observation? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, they are, but if anybody landed they would 
be different. If they landed any parachutes or landed any troops 
here then you would have another problem, because a lot of them 
would go over to them. 

The Chairman. You have no doublt of that, have you ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. No. 

The ChairmaSt. Even those who are so-called American citizens? 
They still 

Mr. Gabrielson. Put us in their place. If we were in Japan what 
would we do ? 

The Chairman. I quite understand, but there seems to be a feeling 
here that we ought to open up Hawaii now to business as usual and 
put it back on the plain civil basis that it was before December 7, and 
that no harm would come from any Japanese : he would be loyal, and 
he would be a good citizen. Now, what is your view, after your years 
of experience ? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Keep it military. 

The Chairman. What? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Keep it military as it is. If you want to have 
safety you had better do that. 

The Chairman. General? 

General McNarney. How is the blackout being observed ? In other 
words, do you have many complaints ? 

Mr, Gabrielson. You come out some night with us. 

General McNarney. I was out once. 

Mr. Gabrielson. You were ? Well, did you find many ? 

[1307] General McNarney. No ; I could find tint one ray of 
light. I compared it to the blackouts in London and in Moscow, 
and it is better than in London and as good as in Moscow. 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes. Well, there is a lot of complaints that we 
have, but it is just the least bit of light some place . You don't see 
any place lit up. Once in a while we get' some stores down there 
where people have gone away, or we had a restaurant the other 
night : they went away and left the lights. It was 4 :30, and it was 
light, and they forgot the lights. And there are a few stores every 
night or so that do that, but you don't see any houses lit up. 



800 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. I can testify that the thing is perfect; I have 
been out. 

Mr. Gabrielson. If any of you other gentlemen would like to go 
out some night we would be glad to send you out. 

Admiral Standley. I think I would like to do that some night, 
Chief. I will get in touch with you. 

Mr. Gabrielson. Well, you get in touch with me, and I will be 
glad to. 

General McCoy. Haven't you been out any night? 

Admiral Standley. Oh, I have been out, but I have gone to and 
from prior. 

Mr. Gabrielson. I w^ill tell you, you go out now between 7 and 9 
and you will see how damn dark it is. 

Admiral Standley. Well, I have been on the street up on the hill. 

Mr. Gabrielson. The only lights you see are the lights down at 
Hickam and Pearl Harbor where they are working and along the 
docks. They work down there. And then where they have these 
people interned on Sand Island they have a little light; they are 
getting that fixed now. But for the citizens, they observe it very 
good. I'll tell you, the Japanese people are very law-abiding. They 
are far better than the w^hite race in being law-abiding. 

[1J08] The Chairman. Orders are orders, 

Mr. Gabrielson. Orders are orders, and they obey their parents. 
It is a disgrace for a policeman to come to their house, and they are 
very law-abiding. The Chinese are next, and the haoles are next. 
The haoles are about three times worse than the Japanese. 

The Chairman. Who are haoles? 

Mr. Gabrielson. You and I, white people. We have some terrible 
ones over here. 

The Chairman. Admiral? 

Admiral Ree\'es. No, sir. 

Mr. Gabrielson. Now let's see. You wanted to get that infor- 
mation of ■ 

The Chairman. Of any reports of riotous parties on Saturday 
evening, December 6. Complaints of noise and riot. 

Now, Chief, you have a long experience in this island. Have 
you any facts or any thoughts or any opinions to offer this Com- 
mission that will help it in forming its conclusions? 

Mr. Gabrielson. No, I don't think I have. 

The Chairman. You think we have emptied you by our questions, 
do you? 

Mr. Gabrielson. As far as my information is concerned, the only 
thing I can say: there is too much red tape in doing everything. 

The Chairman. Is that a criticism of the Army and Navy? 

Mr. Gabrielson. It is a criticism of the United States Govern- 
ment. Say before they start I would like to make a suggestion or 
recommendation, and that is that the Navy enlist men for the shore 
patrol and let them serve their enlistment as shore patrol officers. 
In the first place, we would get much better service from the shore 
patrol than we do. It is the system under which they work. They 
will have a large shore party, and then (hey will send over so many 
men to act as shore patrol. They don't know anything about it. 
They [lo09] don't know what to do, and they have to arrest 
their buddies, and they just don't do it. Now, the military police 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 801 

have an organization in which they are in there for the duration of 
their enlistment. 

The Chairman. And they are trained? 

Mr. Gabrielson. And they are trained, and they are far more effi- 
cient. Now, that is, it is the system that I am tallying about, not the 
individual men. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Gaurielson. But if they could — and I think the Navy is large 
enough, and I think the Navy over here should organize a shore patrol 
of men who do nothing but that work. 

The Chairman. Chief, what was your observation of General 
Short's efficiency so far as concerns integrating the civilian defense 
here and the military arm? Had he been busy on that? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes, General Short — I might give you, if you care 
to, a little history of what we had been doing under General Herron. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Gabrielson. He asked if we could organize a group of guards 
to take over the guarding of all public utilities and all communication 
lines and bridges of the Army outside of reservations. I told him that 
we could. We then organized 2500 men. We had them semi-trained 
in theory. We had officers go out and lecture to them, we gave them 
first aid, we had them given instructions in the riot gun. Those men 
were organized so that they could be called out on a very short notice. 
General Short was in accord w^ith that, and then this act of the Home 
Guard was put in, and these men were not used. 

The Chairman. General Short was active in getting the M-Day Bill 
passed too, was he not? 

Mr. Gabrielson. Yes. I understand that he w^as. 

The Chairman. Have you any questions? 

[1310] (There was no response.) 

The Chairman. Our investigation, Chief, is such that we feel it 
necessary to ask you not to discuss outside with anyone what went in 
in this room. 

Mr. Gabrielson. I will observe that. Thank you. 

The Chairman. Thank you, sir. 

[1311] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL BRIANT H. WELLS, 
UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give your full name to the reporter, 
General ? 

General Wells. Major General United States Army, Retired, and 
Executive Vice President and Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Plant- 
ers Association. 

The Chairman. How long have you lived on Oahu, General ? 

General Wells. I arrived here on 24 October, 1930, and with the 
exception of some short leaves — one of them as long as six months on 
the mainland — I have been here ever since. 

General McNarney. In what capacity did you first come here ? 

General Wells. T first came here in connnancl of the Hawaiian Divi- 
sion, stationed at Schofield Barracks, and served there for 11 months, 
and then T succeeded to the command of the department at Fort Shaf- 
ter. I held that command 4 years and 3 months. 



802 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairiman. And you retired from the service when you were 
commander of that department? 

General Wells. Yes. 

The Chairman. And you continued to live here? 

General Wells. Yes. 

The Chairman. Are you familiar with the work of General Short 
since he has l)een Department Commander here ? 

General Wells. No, I cannot say I am familiar with his military 
work. I have met him on numerous occasions in connection with his 
cooperation with the civilian community. I have visited at his home 
and I had him at my home, but I have not discussed the defense plans 
or the military action with him except in the way of old friends talk- 
ing about personalities, perhaps. 

[1312] The Chairman. From your observation, was he active 
and interested in integratino; the civilian defense with the Army de- 
fense ? 

General Weixs. I thin.k very much so, yes. 

The Chairman. You think he made some progress in that respect? 

General Wells. Yes, I do. 

The Chairman. Was the attack on Oahu on the morning of De- 
cember 7 a surprise to you. General ? 

General Wells. It was, indeed ; yes. 

The Chairman. Was it the opinion in the community here that 
there might be such a raid on the island or was that ruled out of the 
probabilites as you gathered the opinions here? 

General Wells. That is a hard question to answer. My own opinion 
from the time I was in command, and perhaps I have uttered it in the 
critiques, maneuvers, and so on, among the officers in my command 
that no nation would ever attack these islands for the purpose of cap- 
turing them unless they had possession of the sea and control of the 
sea lanes. 

If they had that control they could bring as many men as they 
wanted, and they would never bring fewer than they wanted, and 
they probably knew how many we had here. 

It would be a case of our being under a state of siege for a while, 
but that was my opinion with respect to an attack for the purpose of 
capturing it. We ahvays emphasized the danger of a raid. That 
might come at any time. I have always had in mind that there might 
be one. I might say that I have given very little thought to that since 
the presence of the fleet here. 

I have been asked numerous times by people who were a little 
anxious, about whether they should go back to the mainland and 
what were the prospects of an attack here, and I said that it was in- 
conceivable to me that the Japanese or any other nation could pull 
off even a raid here while our whole American [I-jIS] fleet is 
in these waters. That, of course, was on the presumption that they 
were not only in the waters but that they were on guard. 

I think that was the general impression. 

The Chairman. You thought that it was inconceivable that such 
a raid would take place in Pearl Harbor here? 

General Wells. Yes, and that was the opinion of most informed 
people. 

The Chairman. Do you have any knowledge of the habits of the 
soldiers and sailors on leave or liberty on Saturday nights when a 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 803 

great number of leaves were granted? Did you have occasion to be 
in the city and to observe them ? 

General Wells. Well, I was chairman of what you might call the 
Mayor's entertainment committee for the enlisted men of the ser- 
vices. That was a committee of five citizens, and we had a great 
many subcommittees. We had one committee on church work and 
Mr. Wilke of the YMCA, and he coordinated his work with the 
churches with respect to the men on leave. 

We had another one for visiting the homes. Many people opened 
their homes; then we had another one on dancing. Mrs. Pflueger 
was in charge of arranging dances for the men, and there were a 
couple of other various committees that I will not mention, which 
covered the whole situation. 

These committees preceded the activities of the U.S.O. which 
have taken them over and which have charge of them. 

There was a great deal of activity and many people tried to be of 
some help to so many soldiers and sailors coming ashore on week- 
ends and Wednesday afternoons and more or less, after they had once 
seen the city, there was very little for them to see, and w^e wanted 
to get them out around the island and had trips and have them 
visit the homes and be hospitable. This community is more or less 
very hospitable. 

I used to attend some of the dances and look them over and 
[131-i] I got the impression that the morale was high and that 
they were having a good time. They appreciated all that was being 
done for them. As an old Army man I thought a lot of it was a lot of 
fol-de-rol. They do not need so much petting as they are getting, and 
they had some books sent out to the camps and some of the National 
Guard people have established some libraries. 

The Chx^^irman. How about the behavior on Saturday night with 
respect to drunkenness? 

General Wells. Well, I can't say I was downtown very often late 
Saturday night, but I will say I have never seen a better behaved 
bunch of soldiers and sailors. They are a clean bunch of boys. That 
was noticeable. 

That was remarked upon. The Chief of Police has told me that 
they are getting in very little trouble. During my administration 
here the behavior of the soldiers and sailors as far as I observed it 
was excellent. 

The Chairman. Have you heard rumors that one reason for the 
severity of the losses of the United States on the morning of the 7th 
of December was that both officers and men had been drinking to 
such an extent the night before that they were not fit for full ser- 
vice on the morning in question? Have you heard such rumors? 

General Wells. No, I have not. 

The Chairman. You have not? 

General Wells. No. 

The Chairman. There have been such rumors which have come 
to us. Do you credit them from your knowledge of conditions here ? 

General Wells. No, I do not. 

The Chairman. What do you have to say as to the condition of 
the officers of the Army and Navy so far as they came under your 
observation with respect to night drinking parties around the island ? 



804 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[ISIS] General Wel^ls. I guess I go to as many tea parties as 
anybody does, as the average citizen, and I would say I have never 
seen a naval officer drunk since the fleet has been here. I can say 
that with very rare exceptions I haven't seen a sailor on the street 
except once in a while you would see them wobble along under the 
supervision of the military police or the shore patrol who had been 
under tow and were taking them home, but nothing like I have seen 
in other times. 

The Chairman. You would say that the conditions have been better 
here in recent times than they were in earlier days? 

General Wells. I think that considering the number of people here 
that they are far better than they were in my 44^/^ years of military 
service. 

The Chairman. General, did you have any apprehensions of 
espionage or sabotage from those of Japanese blood on the island, 
whether alien or citizens, before December 7th? 

General Wells. Did I have any apprehension ? 

The Chairman. Yes, of sabotage or espionage. 

General Wells. No. I would say in that connection that I have 
had occasion to talk to people of that ancestry, both people who 
are and who are not citizens, particularh^ the new Americans, and I 
have always had the attitude that we never would know concerning 
certain individuals. 

We could not expect unanimity of loyalty. We do not find that 
anywhere, even among the Anglo-Saxon citizens. But to credit( 
sabotage, I don't think so here. I did not have any credit as to the 
sabotage stories. 

There have been dire predictions made for 40 years, and since I 
have been here, which is 11 years now, about what was going to 
happen in case we had war with Japan. You may be familiar with 
the old story of the naval woman wlio was supposed to have asked 
her maid about what was going to happen and what was she going 
to do in time of war, and her reply was, "I am going next door and 
kill the woman over there, and the maid [^^16] over there 
will come over here and kill you." That is an old stoiy. It has 
been repeated many times. We have been told about dire predictions 
that the docks would be burned and that the guns would be taken 
from the rear, and that many things would be destroyed, and the 
waterworks would be bh)wn up, and all kinds of dire predictions 
that would happen. 

Even before, when I was in command, there was a report that 
50,000 Japanese were armed and they had their organization and 
would rise up overnight. 

I never believed these things. I took the precaution to find out 
about them and none of these things ever happened. I have always 
said that in time of peace you may never know and we never are 
sure of anyone, but whenever it comes down to an emergency you 
can tell and it would not take more than a week to know where 
people stood. 

I have always believed that when the Japanese are citizens of 
Japanese ancestry that it is not ])ossible to wipe out citizenship. Our 
whole country is made up of ])eople from all races and one citizen 
is just as good as another citizen as far as rights are concerned. By 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 805 

rounding them up and puttino; them in a corner you can make them 
disloyal just as by pushing them in the face and showing that you 
suspect them. 

That is not my idea. 

Then, as an example, we have the commissioners who investigate 
this island with respect to statehood and they have about 25 con- 
gressmen sent over and they have hearings for a three weeks' period 
and they go around to the other islands and talk to a number of 
people, and some of them are outstanding citizens and some are crack- 
pots. They hear both sides; then they wind up by saying that you 
have a great population here, a great area, and this is a matter of 
concern, and then the question of education and that you are entitled 
to statehood but you have got a lot of people down here that we don't 
know about and therefore we are not prepared — or words 11317] 
to that effect — to recommend statehood at this time. That is what 
Hawaii has suffered under for years. 

We never do know, and while I see that these predictions have been 
made, they have not happened so far, and maybe they won't. I do 
not say they won't happen, but it has not happened yet. 

Then one of the cabinet officers came down here to report and when 
he was asked if there were any fifth columnists here he said that it 
was the greatest efficiency in that line that has come out of the war 
since Norway. 

I think that is slanderous; it is not true. 

The Chairman. Were you conscious of the fact that there was a 
vast corps of so-called Japanese consular agents at work here? That 
is, under the consulates prior to December 7? 

General Wells. Yes. I might say in that connection that for times 
back even into my command my G-2 officer said that there were these 
consular agents up and down in the islands, but I was never able to 
find to what extent they were consular agents. 

I made an investigation and I concluded they were just Japanese 

desiring to keep in touch with their people and they would have com- 

. munications with various people but I did not see any way to counter 

it than to find out about who they Avere, and on many occasions I 

found that they were working, reliable people. 

They had a certain natural attachment, perhaps, for their own 
country and they would write letters to the consul once in a while 
and they were giving us information — some of them, and it was quite 
common that while we knew the consul when he came, he would come 
by and make a trip around the islands and get in touch with these 
people, but that they were agents in the sense of being spies I never 
have believed that the^v were. 

The Chairman. Did you have any notion prior to December 7 
[1318] that Japan had critical and accurate information of every- 
thing that there was on these islands and that was going on on these 
islands ? 

General Wells. Well, if you had lived here as long as I have and 
seen the place fill up and the roads and other improvements made and 
were familiar with the type of workmen that we get coming through 
here, Japanese, Portuguese, and many others, and these trips and so 
forth, it is inconceivable that anybody who wants to know anything 
could not find it out without having a lot of spies. That has always 
been my view. 



806 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Then we have the prohibition against taking photographs of vari- 
ous installations, guns, ammunition, and storage. They take pre- 
cautions, and I think they are necessary, but you have ships coming 
in and out all the time and the Japanese training ships coming in 
here and receiving the courtesies of the port and being turned loose, 
anywhere from 75 to 100 cadets in training, and they associate with 
their friends in town and get taxis, automobiles, and ride around. So, 
as far as information is concerned, I do not see how it can be helped, 
because when anybody wanted the information he could get it. In- 
sofar as getting information is concerned, I do not think it could be 
helped. 

The Chairman. Do you think it was a wise thing to declare martial 
law when the emergency occurred on December 7 ? 

General Wells. I don't know. I don't know if my opinion is worth 
anything, particularly in answer to a question from a Justice of the 
Supreme Court, but I always did feel this way : than even when the 
people were talking about the so-called M-day that martial law would 
be required anyhow. That is, some kind of authorit}^ should be given 
to the commanding general, and they should work in connection with 
the civil government insofar as it is necessary for the execution of 
the plan of defense. I never had any idea that they should interfere 
with [1319] it. I do not believe in that. I certainly would 
not think that. 

By that I mean there is a certain plan of defense here that the com- 
manding general is responsible for and he is to be given sufficient from 
Washington to make that plan effective and Washington is responsi- 
ble for giving him all the means to carry on his plan. 

Now, if the commanding general wanted to say that the Kame- 
hameha Road will be closed for traffic on that road between such and 
such a time and for such and such a day, that he should have the author- 
ity to do so, but without asking, say, the INIayor or anyone else. 

Then if he wants to do certain work on a water system or take over 
the communications or the docks and the shipping and things of that 
kind, it should be necessary for him to do that without any difficulty 
in order to move his troops wherever he wants to. In other words, to 
carry out his plan he should have that authority, and I do not know 
anything short of martial law which will do that. 

The Chairman. Do you think that the situation today requires that 
that still be the case ? 

General Wells. Yes, I tliink the commanding general should have 
the authority in every particular to carry out his plan of defense, and 
I think that he should utilize the civilian setup. 

The Chairman. Yes, certainly. 

General Wells. To utilize it to the limit, and I know people here 
are yearning to do it, and I do not think you could ever find a com- 
munity that is more cooperative than they are here because they have 
lived with the Army and Navy here longer than any otlier community 
that I know of. They are a nationally-minded people. They want 
to help. 

I think if I may be jiermitted without criticism to say that they 
feel sometimes as if they are not being used to the [1320] ex- 
tent that they would like to be used, and tliey have been somewhat 
patient under the conflicting orders, which is more or less natural, 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 807 

particularly in view of the fact that General Short comes in and gets 
these things started and then there is a new man coming in and there 
is still some confnsion until it is worked out. 

General McNarney. General, you were in command of the Ha- 
waiian Department for a while. You said you had talked with Gen- 
eral Short and you had met him. You must have formed your per- 
sonal opinion as to his competency to hold his command here and to 
carry out the defense of this place. I would like to know what your 
personal opinion of General Short is. 

The Chairman. Of course, this is absolutely confidential. Noth- 
ing said goes out of this room. 

General Wells. Well, I have known General Short for a number 
of years. I have never served in the same outfit with him but have 
known his reputation and have seen him a good deal since he has been 
here. 

I would say that General Short is as good as the average officer 
who would be assigned to this command. 

Of course, it is an unfortunate thing when anything like this hap- 
pens. I do not know that I should go any further in answering that, 
l3Ut I do not feel that when any disaster as great as the one which hap- 
pened here comes, that it is the responsibility of the case that no man 
can be relieved of. Excuses do not excuse. 

I feel that 'waj toward the General. I would hate to have his 
career ended because there is a lot left in him for something else. If 
I were in command myself I would expect to be relieved under con- 
ditions of this kind. However, I would not expect to have my whole 
career blasted, but I would expect to have that under the circum- 
stances. A captain losing a ship often goes down with it. 

General McNarney. Do you know Admiral Kimmel at all in- 
timately? 

[IS^l] General Wells. Only since he has been here. I have 
met him quite a number of times. 

General McNarney. Wliat opinion have you formed as to his 
capabilities ? 

General Wells. I think he is a man of very high character. As to 
his efficiency I know nothing except what I have been told. He was 
rated as very high. I would not have any way of judging his efficiency. 

General McNarney. So far as you know, was the civilian com- 
munity satisfied with the two chief commanders? 

General Wells. I do not think the civilian community knew any- 
thing, very much about his ability. I think they were a little peeved 
at one time by the talk he made before the Chamber of Commerce 
where he criticized the place quite harshly for the lack of prepara- 
tion in connection with the whole thing and that, I think, made them 
feel not so cordial toward him as toward General Short, but that is 
only the impression of the things that I have heard. I do not know 
that it is of any value, but I have heard that they did have that feel- 
ing that his criticism was not called for. 

General McNarney. What is your feeling toward the relaxation 
of the liquor restrictions ? 

General Wells. You mean my opinion about doing it now? 

General McNarney. Yes. 

General Wells. Well, I do not think it would hurt anything. I 
would relax them if I were in command. I do not know for what 



808 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

time. I never tlioii<i;ht of it before, but it mioht be for certain hours 
in the afternoon, maybe, or something of that kind. 

I did not believe in prohibition. I think our people have taken the 
personal restrictions splendid and fine. I do not know that there is 
any discontent on the island, but if it is going to continue indefinitely, 
you will begin to see [1J32] the usual bootleggers coming in, 

and I would hate to see that come about. 

General McNarnet. What is your feeling about the curfew? 

General Wells. Well, I think this : that if the time comes — and I 
hope it is here now — when patr()lling and scouting are sufficiently 
efficient to give a reasonable time of alarm warning that then they 
could relax the blackout. Say up until nine o'clock or maybe ten. 
That would help the moralp of the people. They could get an alarm 
system going so that they can quickly give the alarm for the black- 
out and have everybody in, but I do not approve of what has hap- 
pened up to date. 

I think the people would appreciate it very much if it could be 
relaxed a little in that respect because of this gloom most of the time 
and everybody cannot fix the blackout material that the people who 
are better fixed can do. Howevei', I think the scheme of keeping the 
people off the streets during the blackout is good. 

Admiral Reeves. General, it is obvious that the success of the raid 
on December 7 was partially and 'perluqis entirely due to the informa- 
tion in the hands of the Jaj^anese. A\liat steps do you think would 
be effective to prevent such information reaching Japan in the future? 

General Wells. You mean reacliing them from now on ? 

Admiral Reeves. Yes, from now on. 

General Wp:lls. Well, I certainly would censor everything. I sup- 
pose it is being done. I suppose I would see that no radiograms or 
cablegrams or anything of that kind were transmitted tliere. I sup- 
pose those steps have already been taken. If they are taken I do not 
know of anything or an}' way that the information about here can 
i-each there. 

The Chairman. Suj^pose we let tlie fishing fieet start out in full 
force again? 

General Wells. What is that 'i 

[l'],23] The Chatijman. Suppose we let the Japanese fishing 
fleet out again in full force. 

General Wells. I have always considered the Japanese fishing 
fieet as an asset. 

The GiLMRMAX. Well, it is an asset in the sense that it is a great pro- 
vider of food. 

General Wells, Well, there has beeu a great deal of talk and ))e()ple 
would say, '"Just think of all these sampans around here, not knowing 
who was loyal and so forth." For a great many peojile you never 
can tell. 

I said, "What is to prevent us from taking the boats ami using them 
for ourselves if the Government wanted to T' 

They are a means of getting food. I certainly would see that they 
were out fishing under the supervision of the N^avy or put our own 
crews on them or at least put a guard on the alien crews. I thiidc they 
ai'e a big asset. I certainly think they perform a consideral)le function 
in sup[)Iying and serving food to the i)eo[)le. 



I 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 809 

Admiral Reeves. Would yon take any measures restricting the Jap- 
anese on the island other than censorship? 

General Wells I do not know what steps have been taken, but I 
always had in mind that they would take the leaders in tow. I think 
they have been taken in tow. There may be some out, but it is my un- 
derstanding that the F. B. I. got about 800 in the immigration station 
and conducted an investigation. 

I may say that I have been rather intimate with Mr. Shivers who is 
in charge of the F. B. I. He has a large F. B. I. outfit here, and I have 
assisted him whenever I could. 

There are 35 plantations throughout these islands in our Hawaiian 
Sugar Planters Association with which I am associated. 

1 have taken up Avith the managers of these 35 plantations the ques- 
tion of furnishing Mr. Sliivers a list of the Japanese, aliens as well as 
citizens born, on these plantations. 

I also wanted their estimate of the character of every- [1324-1 
body and some indication of those that he thought might be disloyal 
in case of what happened now, and those he felt he could absolutely 
bank on in an alarming situation and those leaders that he could not. 

I think Mr. Shivers has a lot of these reports but he was astounded 
about it, although it was not much of a surprise to me, about the very 
few people that these managers were willing to put down as being 
suspicious characters. However, from now on I see no reason why 
the situation should not be controlled through the F. B, I. and the 
Army and the Navy Intelligence agency. People have had very trying 
times, of course. 

General McCoy. Would you be in favor of rounding up all the 
Japanese on one island under a guard ? 

General Wells. That is a fantastic idea which I discounted years 
ago. That was the idea that some people had when I first came over 
here and I think it is the most foolish situation that I could think of. 

General McCoy. You do not think it would be practical ? 

General Wells. No, sir, I do not think it would be practical to start 
with. It may be advisable for a certain number when you investigate 
them as the federal agencies are and to have a concentration camp ; I 
don't know, but they can't get a better place than they are now taking 
care of them and keeping them. If it is necessary to establish some 
other camp on one of these islands somewhere, there is no place to put 
them and it would only be a nuisance and a bother. Kahoolawe has 
nothing on it and Niihau might be a pleasant place. Very few people 
ever get a chance to see it. 

General McCoy. In the case of a future Japanese major attack on 
these islands — assuming that the fleet would be unable to prevent the 
Japanese attack — do you think that the people of Japanese blood 
would go in with the Japanese landing parties or undertake sabotage, 
the sabotage which has been [1325] envisaged by certain re- 
sponsible officials from time to time? 

General Wells. I never have thought so. I think the recent ex- 
perience has indicated that they would not. I cannot imagine a more 
favorable opportunity for sabotage then that which was here on De- 
cember 7th and nothing happened. If there had been any concerted 
informatioin going back and forth on that occasion, the people here 
looking for such a thing to happen, they certainly had every oppor- 



810 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tunity for it when it occurred and they could have done anything they 
wanted to because even the emergency guards were not out. 

The Chairman. Do you know that General Short had ordered his 
Alert No. 1 which was an alert against sabotage and therefore there 
was a doubled guard ? Do you know that ? 

General Wells. I did not see any on the streets. I have seen the 
alert on the bridges. I suppose No. 1 Alert, if that is sabotage, would 
be on all the time. 

The Chairman. No, it has not been. 

General Wells. To answer your question. General McCoy, with re- 
spect to the people of Japanese blood, second generation and some 
third generation, and there are a number of them who don't even 
speak Japanese or understand it and they have graduated from our 
schools, and it has been the policj^ of the War Department to have 
the R. O. T. C. in these schools and they are eligible for commissions 
in the Reserve Corps, and when they started the draft they drafted 
them, and I think in the last draft there were 75% of the people of 
Japanese blood. They are being trained now at Schofield Barracks. 

I must assume that they will be loyal. If a man is in the United 
States service he is under the orders of his officers, and if he is disloyal 
there is a way to take care of that and you and I know what it is 
and that is the best way to handle that thing. I do not think we should 
refuse to give a man a gun or let him handle a bayonet for fear that 
he will stick our [132^6] own troops in the back. 

As far as the alien population is concerned, we do not always ex- 
pect that they will be loyal, but I think a great many of them would 
be. The story that they will get on the beaches when there is a force 
attacking here and they do not have anything but clubs and they might 
club our men and assisting the forces landing on the beach — that is 
just inconceivable to me. If some group started they would be 
promptl}^ be taken care of if we have any efficiency. 

General McCoy. This group you think would be loyal to the uniform 
of the United States? 

General Wells. Yes, the Hawaiian Division is. 

General McCoy. I mean this 75% of those of Japanese blood? 

General Wells. Yes, I think there are indications that they would 
be. 

General McCoy. Do you think they should be left here or taken to 
some other field of operations ? 

General Wells. I think they should be treated like any other of our 
citizens until they commit some overt act which justifies handling them 
different. 

I think that is the question with respect to loyalty just as we had 
in the other war. You and I remember the situation when we had 
people coming into the camp and some of them could not speak Eng- 
lish and we had some trouble in training them but they turned out 
to be loyal Americans, and so far as I know we had very little diffi- 
culty with them. 

Of course you could take the whole outfit under surveillance if you 
wanted to, but I think these suspicions have gone on long enough and 
have been disproved, it a]^pears to me. I am Avilling to wait and see 
what if anything they will do. 

If I were in connnand of the beach patrol and the beach defense, I 
would not hesitate to use the National Guard and to put those in it, 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION Sll 

these drafted men, just like I would use the [1327^ other 
troops. We have plenty of people observing what is going on and 
Ave could give them very good notice of what is going to happen before 
anything does happen* as far as it concerns the island here. Our 
danger comes from not knowing what is going on overseas. 

Admiral Standley. You spoke of your relations with the head of 
theF.B. I., Mr. Shivers? 

General Wells. Mr. Shivers, yes. 

Admiral Standley. And also as commanding general here for four 
years you must have had quite a lot of experience with the question 
of cooperation between G-2, the Naval Intelligence, and the F. B. I. 
What is your estimate of that cooperation or lack of cooperation and 
coordination ? 

General Wells. In my time we did not have any F. B. I. to amount 
to anything. As far as the Navy and Army were concerned the 
cooperation was cordial and sufficient and I would say as perfect as 
it could be. We didn't have the agencies in town like now. They 
were out on the post, but my G-2 was all the time cooperating with the 
Naval Intelligence. 

There was an F. B. I. man here for a while by the name of Mac- 
intosh, I think. He was here all alone. He did not have anyone else 
with him. I used to see him once in a while. He used to investigate 
the various activities, violations against the federal law. Sometimes 
he would ask for your opinion about somebody who was going to be 
appointed a judge, or something like that. 

Eventually it was ruled in Washington that there was not enough 
work for an F. B. I. man here and he was taken away. Then there 
was something that happened in connection with opium and he came 
back here again and then was gone again and was sent to Buffalo. 

When President Roosevelt was here I was in command and I 
mentioned that to him. I said, "It is not my job particularly 
[1328] ' but I think this is a place that is sufficiently important to 
place here an F. B. I. agency and they should have someone here all 
the time and not have the case of someone here for a while and then 
being taken away when the Director of the Budget cuts the appropria- 
tion and then sends the man somewhere." 

He told me to make a note of that among other things that he 
wanted, and I did, and then this resulted, and it has been growing 
ever since. 

General McCoy. What was the reason for having the F. B. I. agency 
here in addition to j^our own G-2 or the O. N. I. ? 

General Wells. You are asking for an opinion about peace times. 
The Army and the Navy officials are not supposed to be digging into 
the private affairs of other people. The Congress is very jealous of 
that and whenever they find out that our G-2 has done anything 
they are likely to cut the appropriation, because they said, "You 
military people are spying on the civilians." 

It was not a case of spying on them and if you wanted to send 
a military intelligence man to a labor union meeting and they found 
it out, there was trouble. 

We needed a federal agency here at all times to investigate these 
things, because the military is supposed to be subordinate to the 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 2 15 



812 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

civilian life in time of peace, and the only way to get it was to have 
those people here who could get the information. 

General McCoy. If you had found your G-2 prying into private 
business during peace times, you would have stopped it? 

General Wells. Not unless I thought somebody was going to catcli 
me. 

General McCoy. If we did not have martial law these same peace- 
time conditions would govern and the Army and Navy intelligence 
would not be able to do the job efficiently ? 

General Wells. That is right. 

[1S29] There has been a lot of fine cooperation between them 
since Shivers came to establish this rather large agency here, because 
he has been able to get things done and he was always working in 
cooperation with the Army and the Navy. 

The Chairman. Anything further ? 

Admiral Staxdley. No. 

The Chairman. The nature of our inquiry is such that we are com- 
pelled to ask the witnesses not to discuss their testimony, or to men- 
tion to anyone on the outside anything that has happened in this 
room. 

General Wells. Yes. 

The Chairman. We will ask you to observe that. 

General Wells. I will be glad to do that. 

The Chairman. Thank you. General. 

Colonel Broavn. Mr. Judd. 

The Chairman. Will j^ou be sworn? 

Mr. Judd. Yes, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF HENRY PRATT JUDD. PROFESSOR OF HAWAIIAN 
LANGUAGE AND HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you state your full name for us, pleased 

Mr. Judd. Henry Pratt Judd. 

The Chairman. What is your ])rofessioiL sii-? 

Mr. Judd. I am professor of the Hawaiian language and history at 
the I'niversity of Hawaii. 

The Chairman. I think you ai-e also an ordained minister? 

Mr. Judd. Yes. 

The Chairman. Do yon have a church here as minister? 

Mr. Judd. Yes. I i-un a Hawaiian church. 

The CiLMRMAN. I believe you have lived here all your life? 

11330] Mr. Judd. Sixty-one and a half years, sir. 

The Chairman. Kumors have come to us, Mr. Judd, to the effect 
that the morale of the Army and Navy officers and men on this island 
prior to December 7, 1941, was bad in connection with the amount of 
excessive di'inking, and that the men were not, by reason of that fact, 
up to their duties on tlie morning of December 7th. Now, we would 
like to know what you know fiom your ])ersonal observations which 
would tend to confirm or to contradict those rumors. 

Ml'. Judd. Yes, sir. My observation both on the streets of Honolulu 
as well as at Schofield Barracks where I go every summer because I 
am in the National Guard and have been for 20 years, is that the 
morale of the men was excellent. As I see them on the streets of 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 813 

Honolulu the men seem well behaved and it would be an exception to 
see an intoxicated soldier or sailor. I would say tluit the morale of 
the men was excellent and the men were avcU behaved and a credit to 
the United States Government and to the representatives of the 
American people. 

The Chairman. From your observations you would not expect 
that the Saturday nio;ht indulo-ences would result in any important 
diminution of the efficiency of the Army and the Navy on the morn- 
ing of December 7th ; is that right? 

Mr. JuDD. Sir, I heard afterward that there was something, but so 
far as I know I saw^ nothing in the way of general intoxication or 
general letting down. 

The Chairman. You say you heard afterward? 

]\Ir. JuDD. Yes. 

The Chairman. I take it you have heard the same rumors that we 
have, that officers were unfit for dutv and many men were unfit for 
duty? 

Mr. JuDD. Yes, I heard that the higher-ups were having a party in 
this hotel. 

The Chairman. In this hotel? 

[13S1] Mr. JuDD. That is the rumor that has been going around. 

The Chairman. What higher-ups? Army or Navy? 

Mr. JuDD. Well, they said the admirals. I suppose that is the Navy. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Do you get around to social affairs ? 

Mr. JuDD. Yes. 

The Chairman. Do you meet both Army and Navy officers? 

Mr. JuDD. Mostly Army officers. 

The Chairman. What have you to say about the decorum in the 
matter of intoxication and drinking at parties ? 

Mr. JuDD. Well. I w^ould say it is comparable to the civilian life; 
no more drinking than among the civilian population, general speak- 
ing. 

The Chairman. Honohdu is a very generous place in the matter of 
entertainment, isn't it ? 

Mr. JuDD. Yes. 

The Chairman. People are social-minded here ? 

Mr. JuDD. Yes. 

The Chairman. And I suppose the Army and Navy personnel, the 
officers particularly, are invited to parties very frequently? 

Mr. JuDD. Very much so, sir. I think the civilian population 
appreciates the Army and the Navy very much. 

The Chairman. You have observed the work of the military law 
since it was put into effect on December 7th ? 

Mr. JuDD. Yes. 

The Chairman. Do you think it was a wise thing to put into effect 
after the attack? 

Mr. JuDD. I do, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you think it is working well? 

Mr. JuDD. Yes, sir, excellent. 

[1332] The Chairman. Would you be in favor under the present 
state of affairs to relax it and to turn the thing over to the civilian 
authorities in toto? 



814 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr, JuDD. No, sir, not until the Japanese menace is cleaned out of 
the eastern part of the Pacific. We have got to get the submarines out 
of this section. Then it may be a time to relax it. 

The Chairman. What is your view with respect to those of Japan- 
ese blood? Would you expect that in case of attack on this island 
that they would adhere to the United States ? 

Mr. JuDD. I would expect that a large majority of them, yes, a 
large proportion of them. 

The Chairman. You are conscious that there is a minority that 
would probably not ? 

Mr. JuDD. Yes, just like probably on the mainland, where you have 
many people of German extraction. 

The Chairman. Are you conscious of the fact that the Japanese 
espionage with respect to the affairs among the Army and Navy on this 
island was practically perfect? 

Mr. JuDD. It must have been just about perfect. 

The Chairman. Do you think that the maintaining of the military 
law here will have some deterrent effect on the reduction of that in 
respect to any future attack here? 

Mr. JuDD. Yes. If Japan knows that our men are scattered all over 
the island, I think there is little danger of any repeated attack or a 
second attack. 

The Chairman. Do you think that if Japan were consicous of the 
fact that civilian authority was entirely restored and that persons of 
Japanese blood had the same liberty that they had in peacetime, that 
there might be another one ? 

Mr. JuDD. I think that as long as we have the splendid and efficient 
Army and Navy establishment here that I think that Japan would 
not try to go after us in spite of the fact [lJ3o] that there may 
be 10% of the population who are potential saboteurs. 

The Chairman. You would wish to retain the military control of 
things for the time being? 

Mr. JuDD. Yes, as long as there is any menace at all, it should be 
retained. 

The Chairman. Any questions, General ? 

General McNarney. No questions. 

The Chairman. Admiral Reeves? 

Admiral Reeves. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Mr. Judd, you have been here for 61 years? 

Mr. Judd. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. There have been many occasions when the fleet, 
not being based here, has visited here on problems, say, in 1925, I 
think in 192T, and 1932. 

Do you have any knowledge of the entertainments having been 
given by the various Governors of the Islands to the officers of the 
fleet and there being large parties at this hotel or some other hotel 
involving practically all the higher officials of the fleet? Have you 
attended any of those parties ? 

Mr. Judd. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. That is all. 

The Chairman. General McCoy, any questions? 

General McCoy. No. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 815 

The Chairman. The nature of our mquiry is such, Mr. Judd, that 
we will ask you not to discuss with anyone on the outside anything 
that has taken place in this room. 

Mr. Judd. That is the understanding. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir. 

We will adjourn at this time until 2 o'clock. 

(Thereupon, at 12 : 30 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock 
p. m. of the same day.) 

[1334] AFTERNOON SESSION 

The proceedings were resumed at 2 o'clock p. m., at the expiration 
of the recess. 

Colonel Brown. Mr. Wilke, Mr. Justice. 
The Chairman. Will you be sworn, sir ? 

TESTIMONY OF WESLIE THEODORE WILKE, EXECTJITIVE SECRE- 
TARY, ARMY AND NAVY YMCA, HONOLULU, T. H. 

(The oath was administered in clue form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give your full name to the reporter? 

Mr. Wilke. Yes, sir. Weslie Theodore Wilke. Not the man who 
ran for President. 

The Chairman. How long have vou been on the island, Mr. Wilke ? 

Mr. Wilke. Since '32. 1932. 

The Chairman. And in what capacity have you been here? 

Mr. Wilke. I have been the executive secretary of the Army and 
Navy YMCA all during that period, coming here from Panama, where 
I was in a similar capacity. 

The Chairman. How long had you served in the same capacity in 
Panama ? 

Mr. Wilke. Three years in Panama. 

The Chairman. Had you been in Army-Navy YMCA service any- 
where else before that ? 

Mr. Wilke. Oh, yes. In California. 

The Chairman. Where? 

Mr. Wilke. Vallejo, opposite Mare Island. 

The Chairman. Opposite Mare Island ? 

Mr. Wilke. Yes. 

The Chairman. Where else? 

Mr. Wilke. That's all. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Wilke. Well, I served with the YMCA during the war over- 
seas, and then was out and came back in. 

[133S] The Chairman. Yes. Mr. Wilke, you have had a great 
deal of opportunity to observe these Army and Navy boys on leave, 
haven't you, on liberty? 

Mr. Wilke. That's all I have been doing. 

The Chairman. We have heard numerous rumors that on Saturday 
nights here in Honolulu there has been a great deal of drinking and 
bad conduct amongst the troops. Now, first of all, has there been 
much of that ? 



816 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. WiLKE. There is a certain amount of drinking. My considered 
opinion is that it isn't as great as it would be among the same number 
of civilians. 

The Chairman. Are you conscious of the attempts of the Army and 
Navy police and patrol to control that situation ? 

Mr. WiLKE. Absolutely ; work right with them all the time on that 
very thing. 

The Chairman. Are they pretty efficient ? 

Mr. WiLKE. They are very efficient. 

The Chairman. And you are, of course, conscious that when a large 
fleet comes ashore and a great many men are turned loose in a city 
like Honolulu where liquor is obtainable it is impossible to prevent 
some drinking ? 

Mr. WiLKE. Certainly. 

The Chairman. Certainly. 

Mr. WiLKE. We take care of many intoxicated men in our place. 
By that I mean, if a man is intoxicated somewhat we put him to bed, 
send him back to his station when he is sober. That is simply a condi- 
tion that results from a little too much liquor. But the great mass of 
the men certainly are not afflicted that way. 

The Chairman. Now, Mr. Wilke, I gathered that you thought con- 
ditions here were better than in other places where you had served; 
Panama, for example? 

Mr. Wilke. No, I don't believe they are any better or any worse. 
Conditions are different in each place, and certain [13S6] ele- 
ments in the local conditions affect it. 

The Chairman, Certainly. 

Mr. Wilke. But I don't believe the men are any different here than 
they are in San Diego. 

The Chairman. There have been rumors that there was so much 
drinking amongst the personnel on the night of Saturday, December 6, 
that a large proportion of of the force was unfit for duty that morn- 
ing. What have you to say as to your personal observation on that 
evening ? 

Mr. Wilke. I wouldn't believe that to be true. 

The Chairman. Was Saturday evening, December 6, any worse 
than any other Saturday evening, to your observation, where there is 
a similar crowd ashore ? 

Mr. Wilke. I don't think so. It probably was worse than it would 
be now with the saloons closed. 

The Chairman. Oh, I quite understand. 

Mr. Wilke. But I think it was a normal Saturday evening. 

The Chairman. You would have not nuich opportunity to observe 
the habit of the officers of either arm of the service with respect to 
liquor, would you ? 

Mr. Wilke. Well, not to a great extent. I know a great many offi- 
cers, of course, but we cater largely to the enlisted personnel. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Wilke. Yes. And the officers, our contact with the officers, 
comes through the fact that most of them get their transportation 
back to the station from our place there, you see, the bus station. 

The Chairman. The officers? 

Mr. Wilke. Yes, officers. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 817 

The Chairman. Have you seen intoxicated officers going back and 
forth, to report? 

Mr. WiLKE. Occasionally. 

The Chairman. Occasionally ? 

Mr. WiLKE. Occasionally, yes, sir. 

[13S7] The Chairman! Mr. Wilke, how in your judgment has 
the martial law operated here? Well i' 

Mr. Wilke. I think it has operated well. It is inconvenient, per- 
haps, but it is operating well. 

The Chairman. I suppose your stay on this island has acquainted 
you with the amount and character of those of Japanese blood, whether 
aliens or citizens, hasn't it ? 

Mr. Wilke. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you think that the continuance of martial law, 
if there is an emergency and a danger of possibl}^ another attack from 
Japan, will have any effect in keeping that element of the population 
in line? 

Mr. WiLiiE. I think so. 

The Chairman. AVoiild 3'ou abrogate it and go back to civil life 
now? Would you want that done, as a citizen here, if you thought the 
emergency were not over ? 

Mr. Wilke. As a citizen I would not do it. 

General McCoy. I think I have one or two little points that I should 
like to have Mr. Wilke consider. 

Since the draft act went into effect quite a large proportion of the 
soldiers drafted from the Hawaiian Islands would naturally be of 
Japanese blood, wouldn't they? 

Mr. Wilke. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Would you have a feeling that they would be loyal 
soldiers to the American flag? 

Mr. Wilke. My feeling has always been that they would be loyal. 
So far, from what little observation I have had of them, because they 
have been stationed away from us to a considerable extent, I have no 
reason to change my mind. 

General McCoy. Do the Japanese parents seem to resent tlie fact 
that their sons are serving under the American flag ? 

Mr. Wilke. I can't answer that question. I know no parents that 
I have talked with. 

General McCoy. It would have been better for us to have [133S] 
asked that question of the general secretary. 

Mr. Wilke. Yes. He has contact with the civilians. You under- 
stand, here our YMCA setup is quite different than elsewdiere; the 
Army and Navy YMCA is totally and entirely separate from the civ- 
ilian organization. We are part of a national organization that serves 
military and naval personnel. We do not, except that we work to- 
gether in many ways, but we 

General McCoy. I am on your board. 

Mr. Wilke. Yes. 

General McCoy. Your national board. 

Mr. Wilke. Yes, sir. I am glad to hear that, sir. 

General McCoy. Do many of the soldiers and the sailors spend the 
nicrlit in the club? 



818 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr WiLKE. Before the blitz we had to set up cots in our place two 
or three times a week. Every bed would be occupied every night. 
We have 400 beds. We set up 375 cots, and we had the men sleeping 
on the floor in many of the public rooms. So that that partially 
answers your question. It was not possible to give all-mght liberty 
to a great number of men who might want it because there were not 
suitable accommodations ashore to take care of them. Of course 
that is all changed, because there is no all-night liberty now except 

^^ General McCoy. Do you know what the regulations of the Army 
and Navy were about all-night liberty prior to the attack^ 

Mr WiLKE. As to which men secured all-night liberty ? My feeling 
is that it was rather liberal, that a man whose record was good could 
ffet all-night liberty if he requested it. . vi ^ 

Genera! McCoy. Was there a large number of such liberty men on 
the nidit of December 6? ^ ^ ,. ^ u^ ^ -4. 

Mr WiLKE. Yes, there was. Of course I don't know that it was 
proportionately any gi^eater than it would be any other Saturday 
n ght. I don't suppose it was, but our building was crowded tha 
niSht, and we had-I can't tell you exactly, but we probably had 
700 people sleeping in the place that night. -, • -, ^ ui 

[im] General McCoy. Did you have any disorder or trouble 

with them ? 

GenS'amcCo?'. What time did they go back to their stations ? Do 

^'""Mr^'wiLKE They went back instantly when they heard the an- 
nouncement. Our'dining room was completely filled with men. 
reT'ble every stool, ?very chair was filled and when the radio 
announcement came that all men were to go back they dropped then 
knives and forks and left. In two minutes they were gone. That was 
their response to that. The reaction ^vas instantaneous. Every man 
jack left for his post, even though hardly any of them believed at that 
moment that it was anything but an alert. , , , , , .9 

General McCoy. There were no olhcers there to herd them out i 

Mr WiLKE, There were no officers. 

General McCoy. All on their own initiative? 

Mr WiLKE Yes. The announcement was made by one ot our stall 
over the loudspeaker, who got the announcement over the radio. The 
morale of the men was high, and I saw no one tliat morning, and I 
was right there, who was in the least under the influence ot liquor. 

Not a man. ^ • 1 ^ -.i u 

Admiral Keeves. The men who stayed overnight with }^)u would 

have been the men most likely to have been under the influence of 

liquor, would thev not? 

Mr. WiLKE. A great many of them would. , • ^i 

Admiral Keeves. The men who were sober went home during the 

night? 

Mr. WiLKE. Those . ., . • . • *^ 

Admiral Reeves. I mean, the probability is that any intoxicated 

man would have stayed ashore rather than gone back earlier 111 the 

^"Mt. Wilke. Well, on Saturday night. Admiral, the men usually 
have a forty-eight, and they don't have to go back [1^0] un- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 819 

til the next day, so most of those men are perfectly all right. Now, 
men who are intoxicated that we handle are usually men who get too 
much to drink in some place and they bring them up in taxicabs and 
unload them at our place. Now, there are some of those — that's 
bound to happen — but the percentage is so small that it really isn't 
worth remarking about. 

General McCoy. How many would you say, just offhand, on a big 
night like Saturday night, would be turned in that way to you? 

Mr. WiLKE. Fifteen, perhaps. Twelve, fifteen, in there. And out 
of a thousand men you wouldn't consider that a proportion for a jam- 
boree such as Saturday night would naturally be when they go ashore. 

General McCoy. I have no further questions. 

The Chairman. We have asked all the witnesses not to communi- 
cate what goes on in this room to anyone outside. 

Mr. WiLKE. That's right. Certainly. 

The Chairman. We are very much indebtd to you for your com- 
ment and giving us the benefit of your testimony. 

Mr. WiLKE. I think you recognize the fact that I am a strong ad- 
herent of the enlisted personnel of the Army and the Navy ; nobody 
can tell me anything wrong about them. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Colonel Brown. Governor Poindexter. 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn, Governor? 

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH B. POINDEXTER, GOVERNOR OF THE 
TERRITORY OF HAWAII 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give the reporter your full name, Gov- 
ernor ? 

Governor Poindexter. Joseph B. Poindexter. 

The Chairman. How long have you been governor of the Hawaiian 
Islands ? 

Governor Poindexter. Since the 1st of March, '34. 

[IS4I] The Chairman. Have you heard anything that led you 
to believe that there might on or about December 7 be' an air raid? 

Governor Poindexter. Not a word. I was as much astonished as 
any person could possibly be over an unexpected happening. 

The Chairman. Would it be fair to say that the general feeling 
here was one of security against such a thing. Governor ? 

Governor Poindexter. Well, I believe that at that time it was. 
Of course, there has been a general feeling here that when anything 
did happen it would happen to Hawaii because we were here at the 
outfront, the outpost. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Governor Poindexter. But I am sure it was my feeling, and I think 
it was the feeling of most of the public here, that while this conference 
was going along in Washington, and while we feared the result of 
that conference wouldn't be what we hoped for, yet that under those 
circumstances there wasn't a possibility, I might say, or a probability 
of anything occurring like did happen on the 7th of December. 

The Chairman. As I understand it, was it at your initiation that 
martial law was declared in the emergency ? At your request ? 



820 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Governor Poindexter. No. It was at the request of the Army. 

The Chairman. At the request of the Army ? 

Governor Poindexter. General Short. 

The Chairman. Do yon think it was a good thing to do in that 
emergency ? 

Governor Poindexter. Well, this was the way it was represented. 
Of course, being a civilian, I was not very keen about having martial 
law, you will understand, but a disturbance that we had here and 
the large Japanese population that we have in Hawaii was the reason 
that was advanced why that could be better handled through martial 
law than by civil authorities. In other w^ords, there was an uncer- 
tainty of what attitude they would take. 

[I342] The Chairman. And I suppose that uncertainty persists 
as to at least a minority of them toda5^ does it not ? 

Governor Poindexter. Well, I think that 

The Chairman. Of course you understand that this testimony is 
wholly confidential. 

Governor Poindexter. "Wliat ? 

The Chairman. I mean this testimony is wholly confidential; this 
is not to be published. 

Governor Poindexter. Oh, yes. 

I feel this way about it, and perhaps I am more cautious than the 
average citizen: that there is some danger here yet in the situation 
with reference to some of these aliens. I am inclined to think, from 
the attitude taken by a great many of these 3'oung Japanese, that their 
desire is to be loyal, and of course many of them are in the public 
service, and many are draftees out at Schofield and in the Army, but 
that there are saboteurs here I am quite convinced. 

There has not been much evidence of sabotage, but that may be 
due to two things: one, the fear of the effect of martial law. the fear 
that it puts in their hearts.: and the otlier thing, most of these aliens 
are old people. I mean Japanese aliens; they are old people, and 
they are too old to be active themselves, and they have lived here so 
long that while they are Japanese at heart I feel that they just are 
not physically able to get out and do much. 

There are soine here — some ):)riests in the Buddhist church and some 
of these language-school teachers — that in times past have been re- 
ported to me as being i-eserve officers in the Japanese Army. There 
has been no evidence of any attempt at sabotage on the part of any 
of those two classes, but undoubtedly somebody is doing spy work 
here, and they are the people that I have in mind that are responsible 
for this spy work. 

The Chairman. It is perfectly evident from our investigation, Gov- 
ernor, that the Japanese were advised in (he most \1343] me- 
ticulous detail as to all topographical facts respecting Pearl Harbor. 

Governor Poindexter. Yes. 

The Chairman. And as to all the tactical dispositions they had 
evidently perfect infoi-mation. That must have been obtained by some 
spy system on this island: isn't that your view? 

Governor T^oinukxtkr. Well, of course, topograiihical facts, they 
are here and open and have been always open. 

The Chairman. Very difficult to conceal them. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 821 

Governor Poindextee. Their ships would come in here, and in the 
past we had reason to believe that — I am speaking of their training 
ships. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Governor Poindexter. — reason to believe that they left people here 
and took on others in place of them, so when they sailed they had a 
full crew. 

The Chairman. But somebody had been left here ? 

Governor Poindexter. Somebody had been left and others had been 
taken on. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Governor Poindexter. And it is from them, of course, that — this 
is just my own surmise. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Governor Poindexter. It was from such class of people that they got 
the topographical situation. I know when they would come in town 
they would make trips around the island, be taken to this place and be 
taken to that place. So I feel that they have known the conditions in 
the island so far as the harbors and the ports and the forts and the 
public buildings and all that — they have known this for years. 

Of course, as to what they knew as to the berthing of those ships out 
there or the condition that existed on Sunday, I don't know. 

[1344] The Chairman. Were you conscious, Governor, that 
there were an inordinately large number of consular agents attached 
to the Japanese Consulate here for the past months ? 
. Governor Poindexter. No, I didn't. 

The Chairman. Or wouldn't that come to your attention? 

Governor Poindexter. That wouldn't come to my attention, no. I 
didn't know that. We inmiediately took charge, of course, of the 
Japanese Consul. 

The Chairman. I know that. I know it was seized the minute war 
was declared. 

Governor Poindexter. And of course I presume it has been reported 
to you the amount of money we found on them, which we thought 
was unusually large. 

The Chairman. No, I didn't know that. 

Governor Poindexter. Well, we can get those figures for you, but 
it was 

The Chairman. Would Mr. Shivers of the F. B. I. have them ? 

Governor Poindexter. Mr. Tree has them, and I think — ^yes, Shiv- 
ers would have them. He has them, yes. It was somewhat over $20,- 
000. Some of that, however, was in the safe. Some was on their per- 
sons. But we felt it was an unusual amount of money to have around 
in a place like Honolulu where there are banks, you know, and we don't 
like — I don't like to carry money. 

The Chairman. Governor, I want to ask you a question. 

Governor Poindexter. There was another thing, a point there on 
this possible notice that they might have had. We made a survey of 
our food here. We closed all stores one day and made them take an 
inventory of everything they had. We found the supply of rice was 
unusually short, very much below what it should have been, and nat- 
urally that aroused some suspicion as to why that should exist; and 
our investigation showed that these Japanese merchants, or some of 



822 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

them, when customers would come in to buy a sack of rice, would tell 
them, [I34S] "You better buy two sacks." 

Now, that may have been due to either one of two reasons: one, 
of course, that they had advance notice of what was coming; the other 
was the rising price of rice. Rice of course has been going up, liko 
all other articles, and it is their primary food. It is their bread. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Governor Poindexter. And it may be that they were being advised 
from an economic standpoint. But, anyhow, we know that the most 
of them did; they accepted that advice and instead of buying one 
they bought two, and I presume — we found one fellow with a whole 
truckload. of rice. So that it aroused my suspicion, anyhow, that per- 
haps it was something more than just the economic side of it. 

The Chairman. Governor, what has been your observation as to 
the conduct of personnel of the forces when they are ashore here? 
Has there been anything out of the ordinary in the way of drinking 
and disorder ? 

Governor Poindexter. No, indeed. I have observed that the last 
few years rather closely, and I feel that there was nothing whatever 
that would subject them to criticism. Once in a while some fellow 
would get a little too much booze, of course, and maybe he would 
reel a little bit ; but the conduct of the enlisted men — or of the officers, 
as far as that goes — I thought was very much improved in the last 
few years over what it used to be here when the boys would come 
ashore. They were a little bit rowdy. But not this time at all. It 
was unusual to me, the exemplary conduct that they exhibited. Quite 
pleased with it. I know we often spoke about it, what a high type 
class of young fellows they had in the Navy. I think there has been 
a great improvement in the enlisted men in the Navy, and in the 
Army too, over when I jfirst came in contact with them. Young fel- 
lows, you know, that are high-school boys and some of them college 
boys, well behaved. We [IS46] have had them in our home, 
groups of them. 

The Chairman. Chosen at random? Groups chosen at random? 

Governor Poindexter. Just say, "We will take so many today." 
You know, we did that for a while here. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Governor Poindexter. We were trj'ing to entertain them all. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Governor Poindexter. And perfectly behaved. Gentlemen. Just 
put it that way : thev were perfect gentlemen. 

The Chairman. General McNarney? 

General McNarney, Governor, we had a statement' made before 
us today that the Japs ran the Immigration Service here. 

Governor Poindexter. Ran it? 

General McNarney. Ran the Immigration Service, and that any 
Japanese who wanted to come in was always taken care of. Can 
you give us any light on that subject? 

Governor Poindexter. Well, I will say that is news to me, General. 
I never even have heard a rumor of it, and I would say, putting it 
very mildly, I doubt it. 

The Chairman. The story was. Governor, that an association called 
the Japanese Hotel Association had a great pull down at the Im- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 823 

migration Bureau, and they were always able to wangle through any 
Jap that they wanted to get in. That is about the story, isn't it. 
General ? 

General McNarney. That is about the story, yes. 

Governor Poindexter. Well, of course there is this Japanese Hotel 
Association, and most of the Japanese, at least when they want to 
leave, riiake all the arrangements through one of these hotel man- 
agers, but you are getting them in — well, I just say that is news to 
me. I really have no information on it at all. 

General McCoy. Under whom does that Immigration Service 
function ? The Treasury ? 

[1347] Governor Poindexter. It is under the Department of 
Justice now, you know. 

The Chairman. It was moved to the Department of Justice from 
the Department of Labor. 

Governor Poindexter. Yes, it was. It was Labor, but about a year 
ago — was it? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Governor Poindexter. In the recent past it was transferred to the 
Department of Justice, and of course the same personnel remained; 
but I have found Mr. Strench, so far as I have had any dealings with 
him, to be upright and straightforward, and I am really astonished 
that there is any such charge, I will be frank with you. 

General McCoy. Were you conscious of their being a large number 
of Japanese agents and spies, we will call them, here prior to the 7th ? 

Governor Poindexter. No; I would have no means of knowing. 

General McCoy. Was that brought to your attention ? 

Governor Poindexter. I would have no means except, as I have told 
you, that I suspicionecl these priests and these school teachers. Of 
course, not so many of the school teachers ; there haven't been so many 
of them brought in. But I am inclined to believe that a very good 
percentage of these Buddhist priests are actually reserve officers that 
are in the Army over there or that are sent in here for a purpose other 
than what it was presumed to have been. 

General McCoy, Was there any attempt ever made to prosecute 
them, so far as you know, by the federal authorities ? 

Governor Poindexter. No. You see, under the law they could come 
in as priests or teachers. The law permitted that, and I don't know 
under what act they w^ould prosecute them. General. 

Another time here years ago there was a very corrupt [134^1 
Immigration Service here, but that had peculiar reference to Chinese, 
and they were bringing back a great many Chinese in here that 
shouldn't be here. But that ended in the early 20's, 1920, '21. That 
thing was discovered, and some were prosecuted, and one or two killed 
themselves, and the whole thing was changed as far as personnel was 
concerned, but I really haven't heard any charges against the present 
personnel clown there. 

The Chairman. Governor, how many of the young children of 
Japanese blood of school age go to these Japanese-language schools? 
Could you give us an idea of the proportion of them ? 

Governor Poindexter. No, I couldn't, but I could say this: that 
the number attending has been decreasing. 

The Chairman. Has it? 



824 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Governor Poindexter. Yes. I would think probably practically all 
of the first generation from the immigrant attended Japanese schools, 
but as you get farther away from the immigrant they get further 
away from the Japanese culture and the attachment to the Japanese 
costums; and I think, as I think most of us think here, that in the 
course of time these schools will just pass out of existence for lack of 
support. 

The Chairman. You do? 

Governor Poindexter. Of course, it won't be in a few years, but 
it will eventually come. A great many of the younger people are 
complaining, you know, about this burden on them, sending their 
children to school; and when the old people die who are really the 
urge to educate them in Japanese, that influence is gone, and thev iust 
quit. That's all. 

The Chairman. Governor, what has been your observation of the 
conduct and efficiency of General Short in connection with integrating 
civilian defense and military defense here ? 

Governor Poindexter. Well, I had great confidence in General 
Short. 

The Chairman. You had great confidence in him ? 

[1S4^] Governor Poindexter. Of course, I never knew Gen- 
eral Short until he came here. 

The Chairman. Quite so. 

Governor Poindexter. But I will say this, I will say that Gen- 
eral Short was constantly urging for a long time this preparedness 
on behalf of the civilian population, and he spoke in season, and 
once or twice I thought maybe out of season, on that. One time 
he delivered an address on food, and I felt rather alarmed at it 
because I thought he was al aiming the people unnecessarily, don't 
you see? That was quite some time ago. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Governor Poindexter. Wlien I say "out of season," that is what 
I had reference to. But I think, after all, his attitude in that re- 
spect was right. He seemed very nmch concerned about the situa- 
tion here with reference to the civilian population, and he urged 
us constantly and I think was largely responsible for the original 
start ofall of this organization. You see, we organized, and I doubt 
if there is any other community anywhere that was really better 
organized from the civilian standpoint than we were when this thing 
came. There was some confusion, of course. There was confusion 
everywhere, but they did a good job. The medical Avas particularly 
well organized. We had wardens appointed, and they had their 
various groups. It has probably been explained to you how they 
worked out, and on the whole I have only the highest words of com- 
mendation for the civilian population on that day. 

The Chairman. How about your civilian evacuation committee? 
Is that functioning well now? Is it ready to move if it is called 
upon? 

Governor Poindexter. Well, yes. It functioned that day. 

The Chairman. It did? 

Governor Poindexter. Of course we had no refuges then. Since 
what they call J-Day, Jap Day, the President has allotted $2,800,000 
for the purpose of building shelters and places of [1J50] 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 825 

refuge, and under the instructions that was to be done in connection 
with the Army. Well, the engineers took that over. They have 
coinpleted a cam}) out at Wahiawa, another at Kalili — that is up in 
this end of the town (indicating — and they are working now or 
should be working and I assume they started — ^I think they expect 
to start Sunday — on Palolo, which is just up here toward the moun- 
tains (indicating). Those would be the three which I think that 
the plan called for, the main evacuation camps. And then they 
have been constructing shelters around public places along the 
waterfront, and things of that kind. It is only quite recently we 
got the money, but I think the thing is in very good shape. 

The Chairman. You ought to have sufficient money to do the job 
now? 

Governor Poindexter. Yes, I think so. I think we have. 
General McCoy. And that is being done through the District 
Engineers ? 

Governor Poindexter. He is doing the actual construction. You 
see, he had all the material in this town, building material. 
The Chairman. They commandeered all that? 
Governor Poindexter. They just commandeered it, and he has the 
labor and the organization, so we made an arrangement with him 
by which he was to go into this valley and construct this refuge, the 
buildings and whatever was necessary, furnish the material, furnish 
the labor, and as we directed the spot he went in and built it. 
General McCoy. Does he work with your evacuation committee? 
Governor Poindexter. Oh, yes. Yes, yes, he is. That is, to that 
extent. He asked us to say where they shall go, and he wants some 
advice as to the type and the equipment that will go in, but he just 
goes ahead and from there on it is just like a contractor entering 
into a contract: he does the work, [ISol] furnishes the ma- 
terial, and I think that is in as good shape as it could be expected. 

General McCoy. Does the evacuation committee also concern itself 
with the evacuating to the mainland? 

General Poindexter. Well, take the Iwilei district, for instance. 
Of course, that is done under the Army orders. That is the indus- 
trial district out here where the tanks are, oil tanks and the storage. 
They evacuated everybody, men, women, and children. 

Of course, now, you take these danger zones like around here. On 
account of this fort over here. Fort De Russy, they expect to evacuate 
the women and children in case of emergency. Of course the men, 
they are supposed to be having something to do; \^'e don't want to 
put them out where they can't be of assistance. Those plans have 
been pretty well worked out, General, and I think that they will 
function all right. Here is the danger zone around Fort De Russy, 
say. They propose to do this : they will go to these people and warn 
them that they are in the danger zone and that they had better 
evacuate. Some of them of course will say, "No, I don't want to." 
Well, we are going to leave them there at their own risk except that, 
when the time comes that they are actually in danger, then they will 
be moved out. And the whole city has been plotted on that basis. 

Admiral Standley. I want to ask a question of the Governor. If 
it has been covered, tell me. Then he can answer it. 

Governor, the belief has been expressed here that because we had 
no evidences of sabotage during this raid on the Tth that was an in- 



826 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

dication that there are no plans for sabotage in the future. Is that 
your view ? 

Governor Poindexter. No. No, I wouldn't go that far, Admiral, 
at all, because we are taking precautions agaiiist possible sabotage. 

[13S2] Admiral Standley. In other words, this raid the other 
day was just the conditions under which there would be no sabotage 
if they had the desire to come in later and take the place, capture it? 

Governor Poindexter. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. In other words, they would be particular not 
to commit any acts of sabotage in this raid if they had any idea of 
coming here later and trying to capture the place ; is that your view ? 

Governor Poindexter. Well, I don't know that I look at it exactly 
that way. As to sabotage, of course, I take it that the saboteurs would 
be in small groups. One man would go down here and probably try 
to plant a charge of dynamite under any public utility, for instance, 
or a public building, and I doubt if there are any widespread plans 
among the Japanese people to commit sabotage, but I don't doubt that 
there are individuals among them who would if they could get the op- 
portunity and could do it without fear of the consequences. 

Admiral Standley, But the people's suspicions are not allayed or 
the belief that there may be sabotage is not allayed, then, by the fact 
that you didn't have any in the last raid ? You are still on the lookout 
for it? 

Governor Poindexter. Oh, yes. We are guarding all these what 
we consider vulnerable points, every one of them. Oh, no; I think 
that would be unfortunate if we took that view. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

Governor Poindexter. You see, we have a great population of 
Japanese that have never been put to the test. We don't know how 
they are going to react. One man's opinion is just as good as another's 
as to what is going to happen so far as they are concerned. My opinion 
is that most of these young Japanese want to be loyaFto the United 
States. I am not certain of all of them, and I am very certain that the 
old people still cling to Japan. And did you have figures on [1353] 
the population? 

The Chairman. No, we did not, and if you have them we would like 
to have them. 

Governor Poindexter. I put some down that I took from my annual 
report this year. 

The Chairman. Thank you. That will be helpful. 

Governor Poindexter. It shows the population by counties and 
cities and shows the total population broken down by races. 

The Chairiman, May we put that in our record? 

Governor Poindexter. Yes, indeed. That is why I brought it. 

The Chairman. With the consent of the Conunission we shall put 
this in our record as part of the Governor's testimony. 

General McCoy. Let us have the summary of it, will you, please? 

Admiral Keei'es. Yes. 

The Chairman. If you will summarize it for us. You need not take 
it, Mr. Eeporter. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

(The tabulation of population estimates referred to is as follows:) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 
[1354] Population Estimates As Of July 1, 1940 and July 1, 1941 



827 



Area 



July 1, 1940 



July 1, 1941 



City of Honolulu 

City and County of Honolulu (exclusive of Honolulu City) 

City of Hilo 

County of Hawaii (exclusive of Hilo City) 

County of Kalawao - 

County of Kauai 

County of Maui 

Total 



180, 986 
79, 899 
24, 341 
49, 222 
465 
35, 956 
55, 785 



200, 158 
110, 345 
22, 667 
45, 731 
464 
33, 479 
62, 495 



426, 654 



465, 339 





July 1, 1940 


July 1, 1941 


Race 


Citizens 


Nonciti- 
zens 


Citizens 


Nonciti- 
zens 


Total I 


Hawaiian- 


14, 359 

50, 470 

8,322 

103, 700 

24, 245 

121,312 

4,517 

17, 109 

807 




14, 246 

52, 445 

8,460 

139, 299 

24, 886 

124,351 

4,628 

18, 050 

832 




14, 246 


Part-Hawaiian 







52, 445 


Puerto Rican 




8,460 


Caucasian- 


2,681 
4,589 

36, 678 
2,337 

35, 498 
30 


2,328 
4,351 

35, 183 
2, 253 

34, 010 
17 


141, 627 


Chinese . ... 


29,237 


Japanese 


159, 534 


Korean.. 


6,881 


Filipino* 


52, 060 


All others 


849 






Apr. 1, 1940, Census, T. of H 


344, 841 


81,813 


387, 197 


78, 142 


465, 339 
1 123, 330 















1 Figures under "Total" and last entry (April 1, 1940 Census figure) appear in pencil on copy of tabulation 
submitted to the Commission. 

[1SS6] The Chairman. Are there any other questions of the 
Governor ? 

Governor Poindexter. Returning to General Short, I want to im- 
press, gentlemen, that my opinion is that General Short was very 
much responsible for what we did accomplish in the way of organiza- 
tion here. I think his whole heart was in the situation. Of course, 
it is connected with the military situation, undoubtedly. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Governor Poindexter. And I feel, in justice to him, that I ought to 
say that I do believe that without the push and the effort that he made 
the civilians wouldn't have realized what possible danger they were 
in. And they were well organized, and they functioned splendidly. I 
really am proud of the civilian population, the way they came through 
in this crisis. 

The Chairman, I think their attitude now is excellent. 

Governor Poindexter. There has never been any panic. Of course 
a great many of them are a little bit jittery, but there has never been 
any panic, and they have kept their heads well ; and I feel that if we 
have to go through it again we will go through it of course even better. 
We learn from experience. They are accepting this blackout, which 
isn't very agreeable to any of us, in good spirits. Of course there is 
grumbling; of course they naturally have to let loose a little bit and 
grumble. 

The Chairman. That is the privilege of an American citizen, to 
grumble. 

Governor Poindexter. Well, as I said, I do not think any commu- 
nity Could have done better. I feel that everybody has cooperated 
throughout. 



79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 2- 



-16 



828 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Well, li there are no other questions we shall thank 
you very much, Governor, for attending our session 
^Governor Poindexter. Well, sir, I am glad. I hope [I006] 
\i there is anvthinff further vou will call on me. 

ThTcHAiRMAN."l Shall ask you, as we have other witnesses, not to 
disclose anything that has occurred m here. 

Governor Poindexter. Oh, no, no. 

The Chairman. Our testimony is confadentiaL 

Governor Poindexter. Thank you. 

The Chaieman. We appreciate your coming to us, sir. 

(Governor Poindexter, having been excused, was recalled, and tes- 

'^ G~^^^^^^^^^ first part here (referring to document. 

Population Estimates) is broken down by counties covers the whole 
islands ; the second part, the racial groups. It is just the whole island, 
and it is not broken down before this. 

The Chairman. By counties, but it is the entire islands i 

Governor PoiNDiixTER. Yes. 

The Chaieman. It covers every island^ i . •. • ^r 

Governor Poindexter. Yes, and this figure m pencil is what it iifdi- 
cates, the Census of 1940 (indicating). 

The Chairman. 1940. 

Governor Poindexter. It shows the increase. 

The Chairman. Thank you. ,i • i 

Governor Poindexter. AVe had no way of breaking this down, 01 

I hadn't. ^ . „ 

The Chairman. Well, that is sufficient for our purposes. 

Admiral Reeves. Yes. . 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn, sir i 
Mayor Petrie. Yes, sir. 

11357] TESTIMONY OF LESTER PETEIE, MAYOK OF THE CITY 

OF HONOLULU, T. H. 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 
The Chairman. Will you give the reporter your full name, sir? 
Mayor Petrie. Lester Petrie. _ ^. „ ^. , , , 
The Chairman. You are ^layor of the City of Honolulu? 
Mayor Petrie. Yes, sir. , , t , ^ ic 

The Chairman. For liow long have you held that ottice « 
Mayor Petrie. Since the first of the year. 
The Chairman. First of '41 ? 
Mayor Petrie. Of '41, 1 should say. 

The Chairman. The City is now under military law, under mar- 
tial law, is it not? ^ ^ T 1 . 
Mayor Petiue. To a certain extent, I would say, yes, as 1 iindei- 

stand it. . ^ .1 j.i i 

The Chairman. Do you tliink that it was necessary at the outbreak 
of this emergency to put the city under special martial control? 

Mayor Pftrie. Well. I didn't see any objection to it under the con- 
ditions that it was put under: I thought it was for tlie best for the 
city. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 829 

The Chairman. If there is an emergency and a danger of further 
aggression by the Japanese, do you think that the present status is a 
good one for the protection of the community, or would you lift the 
military control ? J ^'^ ^^^^ 

The Chairman. Yes, wholly on a peace-time basis. 

Mayor Petrie. If we had further trouble? 

The Chairman. If there is an emergency. If you thought there 
was a danger of another attack now within the near future, do you 
think it would be safe? ' -^ 

Mayor Petrie. Would we be better off under civil \13S81 
government ? L^<>'^oj 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mayor Petrie. I think we would be better off as we are 

1 he Chairman. You do ? 

Mayor Petrie. I think so. 

sui^rlf ?o yorsirl"' "^^^ '''' ""'''''' ^^^ ^^'^^'^ ^-'b-' ^ --P^^^e 

Mayor Peteie. It was, sir. I watched it for a half an hour from 

my house-I hve up on the hill, and I have a perfect bird's eye vTew 

lookP^' 7^°^' ''^''"*^T i^V^^" there-and I cmildn't believe^L ll 
looked to me very much like a practice smoke screen. The smoke was 
rfhti^Vt ThTw^. ' going right over the entrance to the harboi' Tnc 
1 thought that was a perfect demonstration. I got my o-lasses out 
and saw the fire burning on the ground, didn't sSe Jy irecomTo 
from the haiigars, and they seemed to be intact, and r'^ould see hf 

S'the^ ? s"^" \l '^'r^!^'' ^^^"^^-^^ bl-k clouds that they make 
nilhly ^ ^^^ detonation possibly of bombs which I thought 

entrancr' """"" """''' '^'"' "' ""^^^' ^"^"^ ^^^^ ''''^''^ ^^ outsid^ the 

Then I got a little suspicious, and then Mr. Walker rano- ud ind 

"as'lfein'cf iTaclil "w llT "".?tV^^^ P^^^'^^-- thaTifieTarb" 
was pemg attacked Well, I says, "It can't be. Tommy. I have been 

came a couple of projectiles right in front of me. I Sdn' s"e fl em 
bnt I could hear them going by. And he says, "I think t's rea " 
No ; I was really surprised, gentleman. 

hJt '^''-"'""''- N«; "i the troops, of the boys on leave, shore leave 

ioSr tiZ noriT '"*'"»" ""' "°"'^ ^'''"^^ »" '° ^a™ »" »?"- 
U "^JiTf?"'*'?^,- '^^^T ''^^ •"'™ some talk— you may have heard ' 



830 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. And has anything come to your attention, as an 
official of the City, that would lead you to believe that those rumors 
were true ? 

Mayor Petrie. No, there has not. 

The Chairman. Has the morale of the troops and their behavior 
when they were on leave been generally good ? 

Mayor Petrie. They have, to my observation. 

The Chairman. I suppose men will get drunk when they are on 
leave, and you have had that experience? 

Mayor Petrie. I haven't seen much of it. 

The Chairman. You have not ? 

Mayor Petrie. To be honest about it. I have seen some of the boys, 
yes. We had them out entertaining them one night, and a few of them 
possibly got a little too much, and it was nothing out of the ordinary. 
Out of 50 there might have been a couple of the fellows 

The Chairman. Drank too much. 

Mayor Petrie. — in uniform, that had, because it was easy to get, 
and the citizens had them, as hosts, and were putting it in their hands, 

The Chairman. General McNarney ? 

General McNarney. No. 

Mayor Petrie. On the streets I think their condition [1360] 
has been unreproachable ; no complaint at all. 

The Chairman. Admiral Keeves? 

Admiral Reeves. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Admiral ? 

Admiral Standley. I haven't anything. 

General McCoy. I think that I would like to ask a few questions 
about the Hawaiian population. We are conscious, of course, of the 
problem you have of so many aliens and such a large population of 
Japanese blood. Have you been fearful of that Japanese jDopulation, 
as a responsible official here of the government ? 

Mayor Petrie. I have never worried much about it myself. I have 
noticed every time I have been on the mainland the feeling that there 
seems to be, a little fearful of the Japanese clown here, and I have 
been asked if we are not afraid of tiiem. My answer has always been 
in the negative, that I did not fear, jmrticularl}^ when we had so many 
of our own troops here; I didn't think that there Avould be any oppor- 
tunity for them to do anything if they did feel that way. 

It has often been discussed about some of our younger generation 
coming up. I have no right to say that the American locally born men 
are antagonistic to our form of government. The question has been 
asked me, once, if I thought they would be loyal in time of trouble. 
Well, my answer was that I had no right to say otherwise. I have 
grown up with them here. I have been here for 62 years. I was born 
in San Francisco and brought here as a babe and am now going on 
to 6-1 years old. I was about 2 years old or a year and a half when 1 
came here. 

I have practically grown up with them. 

I was on the railroad here, took u}) my first employment after leav- 
ing school and was there -IG years up to the time of my taking over a 
full-time government position ; and during that time on the railroad 
we had nothing but Japanese section men, principally the older 
age, aliens, and I had a whole lot [iJ67] to do with them. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 831 

There were a few of them possibly that you might suspicion some- 
times, but now those old fellows— they are all in the older -age, and 
1 don t think that they are interested. I think they are looking for 
peace. That is my personal opinion of these older fellows, and I 
know a great many of them. Some of them are still on the railroad. 
Ihen the younger element comes along, and among the younger I 
think that they are pretty well Americanized, I would say, the ones 
that are just getting out of school and possibly have been out of school 
for tour years. 

Then you may have another group in there, I would say around 
about 40 or somewhere, that have gi-own up and possibly did not have 
the opportunities or see the conditions particularly, the— well, what 
would I use there ? The national conditions exemplified here possibly 
through the military forces here. They have been increasing con- 
siderably lately. 

Then you might think sometime if they did happen to get in here, 
a question might arise in your minds whether some of them wouldn't 
be up m the front line with them, the little older ones there. 
The Chairman. You would not feel too sure ? 
Mayor Petrie. I wouldn't swear to that. 
The Chairman. You would not feel too sure ? 

Mayor Petrie. Some of that particular group up along in there that 
have been educated, have a good education, you might be a little 
kanalua, as we would say. I wouldn't use the word "suspicious," but 
doubtful, you might say. Or it might be possible that you might 
find some of them, as I say, who would pick up with them and fall 
right in line with them. But as a whole I think the younger genera- 
tion is not that way. 

The Chairman. I suppose they go to foreign-language school 
largely because the old ones insist that they shall ? 
Mayor Petrie. That is it, I think, yes. 

The Chairman. If they had their choice they probably [1S02] 
wouldn't go to foreign-language school ? 

Mayor P'etrib. They wouldn't bother with it, no. They start right 
m as soon as they are old enough to walk, almost, and go to our schools 
and get into their schools. 

Admiral Standley. Does the Jap younger generation attend the 
movies to any extent? 
Mayor Petrie. Sir? 

Admiral Standley. Does the younger generation go to the movies to 
any extent? 

Mayor Petrie. Oh, yes, quite a little. 

Admiral Standley. Wliat kind of movies? Do they have Japanese 
films here, or do they go to see the American movies ? 

Mayor Petrie. They have two theatres, I believe, that show Jap- 
anese films. I couldn't say really, now, how they are patronized. 
I have never been to them. They have two larg§ theatres here. One 
is one of our local concerns and one a theatre of their own, just put 
up recently, opened up two or three months ago. I couldn't say what 
their reactions are, what pictures they do show. I have never been to 
one of them. 

General McCoy. You think that most of these that have been in- 
terned on Sand Island should be kept interned ? 



832 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mayor Petrie. Well, it would depend a whole lot on who they are — 
and what yon know of them or whoever has them there knows of them. 
I don't know of any that's over there. In fact, I don't know of any 
Japanese that are over there, except I have heard offhand that some 
of these older financial men here are there. 

General McCoy. Were you conscious of an}- large number of Jap- 
anese aliens coming into the islands or into the city prior to December 
7 that you had a suspicion of ? 

Mayor F'etrie. No. 

General McCoy. Or reported to you as being suspicious characters ? 

Mayor Petrie. No. You mean coming in from away from 
[1S63] away from the islands ? No. I did not know of it. Never 
brought to my attention, and never heard it mentioned. 

General McCoy. What would you think of the loyalty of these 
selectees that are now in the service? 

Mayor Petrie. They are the younger group. My honest opinion, 
as I say, is that I have no right to say that they could othenvise 
than loyal. There might be 

General McCoy. In other words, you think they should be treated 
as American citizens until there is some evidence of their disloyalty? 

Mayor Petrie. I don't know whether you could say that one of 
them would be maybe as loyal as my boy or your boy, but as a group 
that way I think you have no right to say that they are not, and per- 
haps nothing else other than that language school that they went to. 
Now, what they have had imbued into them there 

General McCoy. In case of a Japanese landing on this island in 
force do you think that they would remain loyal ? 

Mayor Petrie. I think the younger ones would. 

General McCoy. But you would watch the rest ? 

Mayor Petrie. I think they are wise enough to know where their 
interests are, where their best interests are. 

General McCoy. If the Japanese army landed on this island they 
might think their interests lay the other way? 

Mayor Petrie. Well, that would he hard to say. If they were pos- 
sibly approached in a certain way, saw certain temptations or cer- 
tain temptation were put before them, I don't know whether you could 
consider them on the same status as myself or any other American 
citizen. It might be a question there. 

General McCoy. That would l)e another reason for continuing mar- 
tial law, would it not? 

Mayor Petrie. I think that martial law right now is not too much 
of a hardshi}). It ])ossibly has affected much [J-^(U] business 

here. It no doubt has affected many of the Japanese businesses, I 
guess, and many more of our own, I think. 

General McCoy. That would indirectly affect the American business, 
wouldn't it? 

Mayor Petrie. Yes, it affects quite a little business here, and it may 
be you have heard expressions made that possibly it could be released 
a little bit and let normal conditions have a little more leeway as far 
as business is concerned. 

General McCoy. Wouldn't that put the Japanese — that is, Ameri- 
can citizens of Japanese blood — exactly in the same status as you and 
other Americans ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 833 

Mayor Petrie. Well, they are right now, aren't they, under the 
present martial law, many of them? 
General McCoy. No. 
Mayor Petrie, These younger ones are. 
General McCoy. They are not. 

Mayor Petrie. Unless there are restrictions against them that 1 
am not aware of, as a race. 

General McCoy. Restrictions can be put under martial law that 
could not be put under normal conditions? 

Mayor Petrie. Oh, yes. I think you could — at least, we should — 
have control of it. The military governor or our civilian governor 
should retain control. 

General McCoy. Under the martial law? 

Mayor Petrie. Under the martial law. But possibly business could 
be eased up a little bit, restrictions against business. There is quite 
a little alarm. It has caused quite a little unemployment now, al- 
though there are quite a few requests for labor. 

[IMS] The ChairmxVN. You mean defense workers? 
Mayor Petrie. But there is still a lot of unemployment here that is 
not employable as labor. That is, requests, you see, around town 
among the business people. 

General McCoy. What has been your responsibility so far with re- 
spect to tying up the whole fishing fleet ? Does it affect the community 
particularly? 

Mayor Petrie. Tying up the fishing fleet ? 
General McCoy, Yes, the Japanese fishing fleet. 
Mayor Petrie. I have never given that very much thought. I do 
not see why we can't bring in the fish, but I think you would pay more 
for local fish than you would for imported fish. That is, if we had a 
period of time to bring the fish in. 
General McCoy, You would not expect any danger ? 
Mayor Petrie, I think they suffer themselves. They are more of 
a fish eating nation, particularly the older ones. They are the prin- 
cipal sufferers, 

AVith regard to myself it has not affected me at all. 
General McCoy. Have you been conscious of the danger from the 
Japanese having control of the fishing fleet ? 
Mayor Petrie. Yes, I think there is a danger here. 
General McCoy. What would you think if martial law were re- 
moved here ? 

Mayor Petrie. If you would remove it altogether? I do not think 
it should be removed altogether. I would feel safer if you would 
still have charge of it. I do not think right now would be the best 
time to put us back to normalcy again. 

General McCoy. In this catastrophe of December 7, how did your 
local doctors come to the front and center ? Are you conscious of their 
work? 

Mayor Petrie. Yes, it was wonderful. We prepared ourselves a 
way back. I think it was along in — I just made a note of that (re- 
ferring to a paper). It was back in April that we organized the 
Disaster Council and erected a major disaster [1366] council 
to prepare ourselves. That was baclv in April. We passed it on April 



834 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

26 and had a major disaster council. That major disaster council was 
composed of our citizens here. 

On June 16, we gave General Short authority to close all roads 
leading to or from places that he desired to close for military purposes. 

Then on December 2nd we introduced this rent control bill and 
passed it on December 13. That is the official activity we took. 

Then in the meantime we were organizing different divisions of 
this council. We organized medical units and the training of them 
and the hospital units and the transportation facilities were all pooled, 
ready to act. We organized all the information we had. 

We had not started on the bomb shelters but we got the information 
on them from an engineering standpoint. We had our fire wardens. 
We had about 3,0000 of them listed over the different districts set out 
in blocks. 

We had all plantations organized. We set up facilities and trained 
150 civilian police w^ho were all prominent citizens around town. 

The people responded 100% and I am very proud of the response 
of the people of this city on that occasion and the way they turned 
out on that morning. 

The Chairman. That is fine. 

Mayor Petrie. We purchased between $30,000 and $40,000 of medi- 
cal supplies and we had them all here, stored in the basement of the 
City Hall, and we had them distributed on that day between the Army 
and the Navy and our own groups. 

We had ordered $50,000 or $60,000 worth of fire equipment. We 
received most of the hose but unfortunately the pump units we have 
not here yet. I believe they are in San Francisco. We have not 
gotten them here yet, but we had three units out at [1367] 
Hickam Field and two of them were damaged. 

The Chairman. And you lost three firemen? 

Mayor Petrie. Yes, three firemen and several were injured from 
shrapnel and machine-gunning. I think the city has responded in a 
wonderful way. The citizens have responded wonderfully and we 
have great respect for our leaders on these disaster councils. 

General Short's representative and a representative of the Navy 
sat in on all our meetings in an advisory capacity. Much of our 
information was gathered from them and we received their advice. 

Admiral Standley. Have you had any union labor trouble here? 

Mayor Petrie. Nothing like what they had on the mainland. We 
have had some, but conij)ared to tlie mainland we have had nothing 
like it. 

Admiral Standley. Thoy cooperated fully with you in your efforts? 

Mayor Petrie. Yes. Oh, yes, they have. 

Admiral Standley. Tliat is all. 

The Chairman. Any further questions? 

General McCoy. No. 

'The Chairman. Th;ink you very nuich for coming here. We will 
ask you not to discuss anything that has gone on in this room. 

Colonel Brown. Bishop Sweeney. 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn, Bishop? 

Bishop Sweeney. Yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 835 

[1308] TESTIMONY OF THE RIGHT REVEREND JAMES JOSEPH 
SWEENEY, BISHOP, ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OP HONOLULU 

(The oath was admmistered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give your full name to the reporter, 
Bishop ? 

Bishop Sweeney. James Joseph Sweeney. 

The Chairman. You are the Catholic Bishop of Honolulu? 

Bishop Sweeney. Yes. 

The Chairman. How long have you held that office ? 

Bishop Sweeney. I was appointed on the 20th of May, 1941. I took 
office here on the 10th of September, 1941. 

The Chairman. Had you been in Oahu before that time? 

Bishop Sweeney. No. 

The Chairman. Had you had opportunity to observe the conduct 
and morale of the enlisted personnel of the Army and the Navy during 
their leave on shore, particularly on Saturday nights? 

Bishop Sweeney. No, I have not; not directly. I get that from the 
chaplains. 

The Chairman. There have been rumors which have come to this 
Commission which we feel it our obligation to investigate, that there 
was a great deal of drinking and drunkenness on that Saturday night 
which may have affected the effectiveness of the personnel on the 
morning of Sunday, December 7 ? You may have heard such rumors ? 

Bishop Sweeney. No, I have not. You see what happened — I was 
away at the time. 

The Chairman. You werfe away? 

Bishop Sweeney. Yes, I was away. I left here on the 24th of 
October to report to Washington and did not get back until it had 
happened, and I was fortunate to get back. 

The Chairman. Have you had any reports from those under your 
charge ? 

[1369'] Bishop Sweeney. No, I have not, not in regard to that 
point at all. 

The Chairman. Do you have any views, sir, that you would care 
to state as to whether you think the martial law declared here has been 
a good thing in the emergency ? 

Bishop Sweeney. I have some notes here regarding the present 
situation that I would like to present. 

The Chairman. We would like to have them, sir. 

Bishop Sweeney. I do not mean anything to be in the way of a 
criticism or anything like that. I am merely stating some opinions 
that I have formed. 

My first feeling was that we are living a very abnormal life here 
at the present time. I have felt that it was necessary to return to 
normal life as much as possible. I thought that the first thing was 
in connection with our schools. The children are around the streets 
and they are at the movies and playgrounds, but particularly on the 
streets, and I am afraid that we will have trouble with the children 
and especially those of high school age unless there is some sort of 
supervision. 

I have thought that if they were under the protection of mature 
men and women teachers that they would be as safe in school and 



836 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

perhaps safer than they would be on the streets. I tliought that the 
engineering department of the United States Army could inspect every 
school building, both public and private, and make some provisions 
for possible air raid shelters so that the children could go down there, 
and the teachers would be drilled and then they could bring them 
immediately to that place. 

I am merely commenting upon what I have seen and heard on the 
mainland before I left. 

The second thought that has come to me was that after all that has 
happened here, these Hawaiian Islands have been developed 
[IS/O] by American enterprise and I have wondered whether it 
is wise in view of that fact to evacuate so many of our American men 
and women. Now, I do not think they are evacuating the men, but 
many of the women are going, and perhaps some men, and taking 
with them their families. I have had three or four instances in 
the past week. 

I am 'afraid that if a great number of these do that you are going 
to have a predominantly Oriental population here. I am not saying 
anything against their people or the different races or the citizens 
here, even those who are patriotic, but this is America and if we have 
merely an Oriental population, the Islands go down, and there is going 
to be the moral problem so far as the personnel of the Army and Navy 
are concerned. We can't hope to keep the men away. They want 
the comforts of American life even though they are at war, and if 
there are no Americans here, it is going to be very bad. 

We must also face the fact that the majority of the inhabitants of 
these Islands have what you might say is not a high mental develop- 
ment, and it is really necessary to increase the education of these peo- 
ple as to what should be done in case of emergency. The mere an- 
nouncement on the radio or even in the newspapers is not sufficient. 
Many of them do not even read the papers and many of them do not 
listen to the radios. 

We have got to get a more complete education to the people as to 
what should be done, and I might say almost a drilling in case of 
emergency and in air raids. 

The fourth point that I would like to present is that because of the 
closeness of the buildings here and the fragile material of which the 
majority of them are made, I think it would be a good idea if we had 
fire wardens at almost every block particularly in the thickly popu- 
lated sections of the city. You cannot depend on the home owner, 
particularl}' [IJ/J] when you are dealing with the class of 
jjeople in the closely congested regions, particularly the Oriental type. 
You cannot (le})end on them to act in an emergency. An incendiary 
bomb can do a great deal of damage. 

The Chairman. Has the system of fire wardens been established 
here ? 

Bishop Sweeney. I have not heard of it. 

The Chairman. I think the authorities here have been working 
and organizing such a block distribution of wardens. 

Bishop Sweeney. The only thing I noticed here is that on occasions 
when I go out and I have a j)ermit to go out when it is necessary, 
and I come back many times at night and I see lights showing. Of 
course we know it is a blackout, but it could be an incendiary bomb, and 
how long it would take to find out may be another matter. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 837 

Another point I have, and that is that I realize that it is perfectly 
natural for rumors to start up at a time like this and for such rumors 
to spread, but I think certain measures should be taken not only to 
scotch those rumors but possibly that the truth concerning the situa- 
tions, which would not be useful to the enemy in any way, should be 
brought to the people's attention. That is particularly true in respect 
to communications which should be established particularly between 
the mainland and here. 

I do not mean without censorship, but I mean to increase the censor- 
ship so that it can be done more quickly. Now, I think it is three weeks 
for air mail. 

Many people on the mainland, when I left, had the impression that 
Hawaii just did not exist. Many of them told me, "Bishop, it is no 
use to go back ; there is nothing to go back to." 

They had the first reports which came out telling of the trouble 
and the losses here; then the^^ suddenly stopped; then there was no 
Avord at all ; then the rumors started. I mean, [1372'] that they 
should be quieted in some way without aiding the enemy. I realize 
that many of these things are difficult to accomplish. 

The Chairman. You are the third person who suggested opening 
up the communication lines more quickly between here and the main- 
land. 

Bishop Sweeney. Yes. And because of the abnormal life we will 
have to take greater measures to protect the health of our, people. 

The Chairman. Yes, both for health and for morale. 

Bishop Sweeney. Because of the abnormal life it may go on for 
three or four weeks and then it is going to wear them down. 

In connection with that, I think that the evacuation system is some- 
thing which should be taken into consideration. I think it is going 
to have a bad effect on the natives here. I have gotten this from various 
sources. If people are going out, then they are saying that it is 
going to happen, and they are doomed. 

The Chairman. That is a very interesting story. 

Bishop Sweeney. It has a bad effect on them. Of course, we know 
differently, but it is hard to get them to believe these things. 

The Chairman. Aii}^ questions? 

General McNarney. No. 

Admiral Reeves. No. 

The Chairman. Bishop, we thank you very much for coming before 
us. 

Colonel Brown. Reverend Paul Waterhouse. 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn ? 

[1373] TESTIMONY OF EEVEEEND PAUL B. WATERHOUSE, 
PRESIDENT OP TEMPERANCE LEAGUE OF HAWAII 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 
The Chairman. Will you give us your full name ? 
Mr. Waterhouse. Paul B. Waterhouse. 

The Chairman. Mr. Waterhouse, you are president of the Temper- 
ance League of Hawaii? 
Mr. Waterhouse. Yes. 
The Chairman. How long have you lived on the Island, sir ? 



838 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Waterhouse. My parents Avere born here and I have been here 
ever since 1885 off and on, and for the last seven years I have been here 
continuously. 

General McCoy. As a clergyman ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes. 

General McCoy. With what church? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Well, it is the Congregational Church and the 
Hawaiian Board of Missions. I am superintendent of the Bible Train- 
ing School. 

General McCoy. It is supported by the American Board of Missions ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. No. We help them rather than they help us. The 
Hawaiian peojole here have contributed to the American Board of 
Missions rather than their contributing to us. We are self-supporting. 

The Chairman. Your organization has communicated with the Com- 
mission, and so far as we can observe the only question in which we 
both are interested in jointly is the question of how far the indulgence 
in liquor by the enlisted men or the officers might have contributed to 
the lack of morale when we were under attack on that Sunday morn- 
ing. We would be glad if you would tell us what you have observed 
about the morale of the enlisted men in connection with this question 
of liquor when they are on liberty or leave in Honolulu. 

[1374-] Mr. Waterhouse. Anyone who lives in Honolulu cannot 
fail to see especially a few clays after payday the great amount of 
looseness in the morale that there is here, and the 104 liquor places 
which are located in a central place between where they have to come 
into town from Fort Shafter or Schofield into this place and they have 
to go through that little bottleneck and it is just full. 

The Chairman. Of course you realize that the officers of the Army 
and the Navy have to deal with a situation and not a theory? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes. 

The Chairman. And when the men ha%e worked on a hard post or 
when the men have returned from a long and arduous cruise, it is nec- 
essary to give them leave for recreation or else the men will wear out. 
The officers have to give the men leave where they are stationed. If 
liquor is sold it is inevitable that the men who want it will by it when 
there is no violation of the law. You realize that? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes. 

The Chairman. Do you think that the officers have taken the best 
steps that they can, under existing conditions, with the open-licensed 
saloons, to police their men? 

Mr. Watorhouse. I think there is a definite effort upon the part of 
the officers to try to keep their men out of trouble. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Waterhouse. And if you get drunk, we will have somebody to 
take care of you and get you back safely home. I think that has been 
the attitude, to try to keep them out of trouble and I think that is so. 

That, to my mind, is aside from the question as to whether these 
men will be in the proper morale in case of attack if a person is drunk 
or partly drunk, and that is the question, it [137S] seems to 
me, that we are facing today. 

The Chairman. Are you accjuainted with the statistics of the 
cases of drunkenness in the civilian population here as against the 



\ 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 839 

military population on Saturday nights over the last six or eight 
months ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. No, sir. 

The Chairman. We have the police records before us, and we 
have the records of the military police, who make a record of every 
man who is picked up or who is arrested. They are taken over by 
the military police or the shore patrol, and I presume that those 
are the most accurate statistics that we can get. 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes. 

The Chairman. You would not know how the civilian behavior 
compares with the behavior of these boys on leave, would you, so 
far as drunkenness is concerned? 

Mr. Waterhouse. No, sir, I have no accurate figures, but it goes 
without question that down there in that bottleneck district where 
the service men are at, it is from five to one. 

The Chairman. As compared with the civilians? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes, in that district. 

The Chairman. I gather from your communication to us_that 
your view was that in the emergency that liquor should be pro- 
hibited to sailors and soldiers and to all the personnel of the Army 
and the Navy? 

Mr. Waterhouse. We do feel that the order that closed the liquor 
places at this time was the wisest thing that could possibly be done 
at this time under the attack, and it seems to me, as I sense the situ- 
ation in Honolulu and on these Islands, particularly so here, that 
the wisdom in closing these saloons was right in line with the best 
strategy that could possibly be made, and I am sure that these 
people, the civilians of Honolulu, feel that way, and if anything 
was due to the lack of morale of [1376^ the soldiers because 
of drunkenness and things of that sort, we feel that this strategy 
in closing up was the best thing at this time, when we do not know 
when the next attack will come. 

It is strategy to keep up the morale of our men to the highest* 
pitch. We do not allow aviators to drink if they are going to fly. 
Why should we let our men or individual civilians as well as any- 
body else do it? Let us shut them all off during this emergency. 

Now, I am not talking about the question of people who like 
liquor. We recognize that. That is not what I am talking about:. 
I am not fighting against it. I am thinking about the strategy at 
the present time. It seems to me that there should not be a letting 
down or the people will say that the military forces do not think 
it is so bad. 

The Chairman. You believe that the present military regimen 
should be maintained? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes, that is exactly what my thought was in 
coming here, that that should be maintained during this emergency. 

I am not talking about the general thing as to whether you or I 
wish to drink, but in this emergency it is necessary to keep our civil 
morale up and the military morale up to the highest pitch in order 
to get the greatest efficiency. 

We have a lot of defense workers here and there is a so-called 
hotel that used to be the boys' Kamehameha School, which has been 
turned into a defense workers' hotel. The morale there so far as 



840 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

drunkenness is concerned is very low. Isn't it the thing for our 
defense workers to be at the highest pitch if we are at war and we 
do not know when the next attack will come? Isn't that the best 
strategy? Isn't it? We have to carry on until such time as the 
blackout is over and we have to carry on with these things and then 
go back. 

[1377] The Chairman. What made you fear it would be 
changed? Wliat made you fear the liquor regulations would be 
changed ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Well, there are two things that made me think so. 
First was the statement in the paper by Colonel (ireen with respect 
to the liquor business and the restrictions, and the meeting of the 
liquor dealers, retail as well as wholesale, and the night clubs and 
such, as to how liquor should be handled, but I do not care a bit about 
their ideas of how it should be handled. I think this is a case for the 
military to decide, as to how it is to be handled, rather than the liquor 
dealers. 

General McCoy. Who are these liquor dealers ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. They are people in town, civilians, just like any- 
where else. 

General McCoy. Are they Americans ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. I think Mr. Benny will have better figures on 
that than I. A large number of the liquor licenses are issued to aliens. 

General McCoy. To aliens? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes, aliens have liquor licenses. 

General McCoy. Wliat aliens are they ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Japanese, to a considerable extent. 

General McCoy. Who are the big men, the wholesalers? 

Mr. Waterhouse. They are American citizens. 

General McCoy. Now, would they come under this heading that 
we have heard talked about here, known as the Big Five? 

Mr. Waterhouse. I do not think so. It is the Liquor Dealers' 
Association. The Big Five, of course, are interested in liquor to a 
certain extent like this hotel here which dispenses liquor, and that 
is under the Big Five, but not primarily so, not primarily so. 

The Chairman. It is more scattered than that? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes, it is more scattered than that. 

[137'8'\ General McCoy. Has it always been the case that it 
has been wide open here with respect to liquor? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Just like the rest of the country : about the same. 
Of course, it has been a great increase with the increase in personnel. 

General McCoy. Was proliibition in effect here? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes. AVe were just like any other part of the 
United States. 

General McCoy. What happened at that time? 

Mr. Waterhouse. During prohibition. 

General McCoy. Yes. 

Mr. Waterhouse. Just about the same, whether you were in In- 
dianapolis, San Francisco, Los Angeles, or New York. It was about 
the same. There was bootlegging and there is bootlegging now. It 
was just about the same. I do not think it was any different. 

General McCoy. Have you made any protest against this soften- 
ing of military rule to anyone ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 841 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes. 

General McCoy. To the responsible military authority? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes, I have sent one communication to Colonel 

Green. We would like to present the question from this angle: in 

other words, to protect America. Tliat is what I am talking about. 

General McCoy. Have you had an interview with Colonel Green? 

Mr. Waterhouse. No, that has not been granted. We are hoping 

to have it. 

We are in close touch with the Liquor Commission and I think the 
Commission has done its best under almost impossible conditions. 
The liquor situation here is rather out of hand, and they have but 
12 inspectors and they can hardly cover the whole thing. 

[1379] It is very hard to control, and I think that the Liquor 
Commission has done its best, but the liquor men do not like them, and 
in the last Legislature they put through several bills, railroaded them 
through, weakening the control of the Liquor Commission. 

But, gentlemen, our appeal is in the face of the emergency, you un- 
derstand. 
The Chairman. We get your point, sir. 
Mr. Waterhouse. That is it. 

The Chairman. You are not pressing the general problem of pro- 
hibition ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Not at all. We are very urgent in insisting up- 
on the consideration of keeping our strength at its highest pitch, and 
I do not believe in loosening up that military order which came right 
in time, and I do not believe it should be relaxed at this time until the 
danger is over, and I do not think it is. Therefore, we are urging 
that you gentlemen consider the thing from that angle. That is our 
position. 

The Chairman. Any questions? 

General McNarney. Yes. I am referring to your letter of Jan- 
uary 3rd, with respect to the time of the attack, in which you said, 
"It was based on the well known but grim and awful fact that we 
have only half a Navy, half an Army, on Saturday night and Sunday 
morning." 

Is that a well known fact that we have only half an Army and 
Navy ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. I think that is overstated, half a Navy and half 

an Army. Half the Navy is not here. Half the Navy is off during 

week-ends, perhaps, in and out, but you can't afford to let them all off. 

General McNarney. Do you have any statistics to show that half of 

the men on liberty were drunk ? 

[1S80] Mr.' Waterhouse. No. 

General McNarney. Then it is quite a bad overstatement, isn't it? 
Mr. Waterhouse. I think to say that half the men were drunk or 
intoxicated is an overstatement. 

General McNarney. Do you think it is an overstatement to say that 
half of the personnel of the Army and Navy were in here Saturday 
night ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes. The fact is a civilian does not know how 
many men there are here. 

The Chairman. We have the statistics. 

Mr. Waterhouse. You know fully, but I do not pretend, but being 
a civilian, and wlien they are on the streets and it is a small town here 



842 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and the streets are narrow, and with this bottleneck filled with men, 
it looks like an awful lot of men. That is what gives us that impres- 
sion. 

General McNarney. May I ask if you- think it is good for civilian 
morale in the Island of Oahu or for the Nation to put out that type 
of information which would tend to make the people believe that 
50% of the Army and the Navy men were unfit for duty on Sunday 
mornings ? Do you think this loose statement of yours in this letter is 
a good thing to put forward to the people ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. I think it is not good to put it forward to the 
people in that statement, no, and we do not have any figures to put 
it that high, and I think it is not good, but at the same time I had the 
feeling that — not expecting an attack, and we did not expect to be 
attacked or we would not have been caught, but I have thought, an- 
ticipated, as it were, that 50% of our personnel were not on the up 
to the minute and they did not expect an attack. 

General McNarney. Do you have any basis other than just your 
your own opinion that 50% of the personnel were not fit and ready for 
duty? 

\1381] Mr. Waterhouse. I can't argue on the 50%. 

General McNarney. Can you argue on 20% ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. Oh, yes, I think I could. 

General McNarney. Can you show us any statistics ? 

Mr. Waterhouse. I cannot show you statistics. Statistics are hard 
to get unless you can go out and count them, and how are you going 
to count them? 

However, Mr. Benny and Mr. Sanborne, Principal of Kalakaua 
Intermediate High School, and Mr. Castle, of Castle & Cooke, who 
went down into town on December 6 — they went down about ten 
o'clock and on through until one o'clock, and made an investigation 
of what was going on in Honolulu on that Saturday night. 

These three men, an educator, a businessman, and our secretary, 
can give you this information. 

General McNarney. I would be glad to hear it. 

Mr. Waterhouse. But when you come to the figures, it is hard to 
get them. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. 

INfr. Waterhouse. I appreciate your courtesy and the opportunity 
to be here. 

The Chairman. Of course, we have been glad to hear you, sir. I 
mi gilt say that the nature of our inquiry is such that we ask all wit- 
nesses not to discuss their testimony or what goes on in this room 
witli anyone on the outside, 

Mr. Waterhouse. Yes. 

Colonel Brown. Mr. Benny. 

The Chairman. AVill you be sworn, sir? 

Mr. Benny. Yes. 

113S2] TESTIMONY OF CHRIS J. BENNY. EXECUTIVE SECRE- 
TARY, TEMPERANCE LEAGUE OF HAWAII 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 
The Chairman. Will you give your full name to the reporter? 
Mr. Benny. Chris J. Benny. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 843 

The Chairman. What is your occupation, Mr. Benny? 

Mr. Benny. Executive Secretary of the Temperence League of 
Hawaii. 

The Chairman. Is that a paid position? 

Mr. Benny. It is a paid position, yes. 

The Chairman. That is your only employment ? 

Mr. Benny. Yes. 

The Chairman. That is your only gainful employment? 

Mr. Benny. Yes, my full-time employment. 

The Chairman. How long have you been such ? 

Mr. Benny. A year and two months. 

The Chairman. How long have you been on the Islands ? 

Mr. Benny. Off and on for 35 years. 

The Chairman. And continuously for how long back? 

Mr, Benny. For the last 10 years. 

The Chairman. Were you in the city of Honolulu on the evening 
of December 6, 1941? 

Mr. Benny. Yes. 

The Chairman. What observation did you make as to the condi- 
tion of the enlisted personnel of the Army and Navy in the city on 
the night? 

Mr. Benny. Myself and Mr. Paul Sanborne and Mr. Thomas 
Retogle decided that we would make a tour of the city. At nine 
o'clock we met at the Army and Navy YMCA. We walked down 
Hotel Street to River Street; up River Street to Beretania, and to 
Nuuanu, and down Nuuanu and back to Beretania to the [1'383^\ 
Army and Navy YMCA where we stood for perhaps three-quarters 
of an hour. 

The Chairman. What was the condition of the men as you observed 
them? 

Mr. Benny. There were a great many men in the city that night, 
both Army and Navy. 

The Chairman. I suppose they w^ere rather congregated in that 
particular neighborhood that you have referred to? 

Mr. Benny. Yes, in that neighborhood. They were crowding the 
streets as well as taverns and dispensaries, and of course doing some 
Christmas shopping. 

We noticed a number of drunken Army and Navy men and a great 
many sitting at the tables in the taverns drinking beer and hard 
liquor. We loitered on the streets, standing outside some of these 
places, both the taverns and the liquor dispensary establishments, to 
observe whether the men were going up and down to the entrances to 
the houses of prostitution. Some of these places are located along 
Hotel Street, River Street, and Beretania. 

The Chairman. Can you tell us approximately how many sailors 
or soldiers you saw in a condition where they were not able to take 
care of themselves? 

Mr. Benny. We made no count. 

The Chairman. You made no count? 

Mr. Benny. No. 

The Chairman. Were the military police on hand? 

Mr. Benny. The military police, yes ; and the shore patrol. 

The Chairman. Were there any men in custody'? 

7971C— 46— "Ex. 143, vol. 2 17 



844 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Benny. I did not notice any instances, no. 

The Chairman. Have you looked at tlie police records as to the 
number of civilians intoxicated and arrested on Saturday night? 

[IJSJf.] Mr. Benny. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. On Saturday night, December 6? 

Mr. Benny. No, I am sorry; I have not. 

The Chairman. Of course, I suppose you would not have access 
to the military police records and the shore patrol records. 

IMr. Benny. No. We have not asked for it. 

The Chairman. Have you observed the conditions on other Satur- 
day nights when there were a great many soldiers and sailors on 
leave ? 

INIr. Benny. I have made it a point to be on the streets on pay day 
nights and the nights following them, and I have made a general 
observation, yes. 

The Chairman. Were the conditions, to your observation, on Sat- 
urday night, December 6, worse than on those other niglits? 

Mr. Benny. I believe there were more men in town. 

The Chairman. More men? 

Mr. Benny. Yes. 

The Chairman. Was there more drunkenness ? 

Mr. Benny. I could not say more or less; I would not be able to 
say. 

The Chairman. Would it be fair to say you saw 50 men intoxicated 
that night? 

Mr. Benny. I would say more than that. 

The Chairman. Would it be fair to say you saw a hundred men 
intoxicated ? 

Mr. Benny. I have no count. I made no check. The greatest num- 
ber of drunks were observed at the Army and Navy YMCA as they 
came back from their visit in the city and were making themselves 
ready to go back to the ships or the camp. 

The Chairman. The busses leave from there to take the men back 
to the Navy Yard? 

j\Ir. Benny. Yes, and also Schofield Barracks. 

[Ir385] The Chairman. So the men would congregate back there 
in order to get back to their posts ? 

Mr. Benny. Yes. 

The Chairman. Mv. Benny, of course the sale of liquor is authorized 
here and was on December 7 in the cit}' of Honolulu ? 

]\Ir. Benny. Yes. 

The Chairman. I take it that you understand that after men have 
had a hard tour of duty in Army work or a hard cruise in Navy work 
that it is essential to grant them leave for recreation. 

Mr. Benny. Yes. 

The CiiAiRiMAN. And of course we necessarily meet the problem 
that liquor is sold where these men go. Now, do you think that the 
officers of the Army and Navy have attempted to police this thing, to 
do the best they can under the circumstances, or do you think the 
thing has been let to ride along? 

Mr. Benny. I am inclined to say that it has been let ride although 
I do think it was necessary to let down here for a period of recreation 
or rest, following a tour of dut3^ 

The Chairman. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 845 

Mr. Benny. I think I do know the desires of the Army and Navy 
men, and have for practically all my life. I have been employed at 
the Army and Navy YMCA as a religious director in that organiza- 
tion, and I have engaged in conversations with a great many service 
men. I feel I know their needs and what they desire most when they 
come ashore. 

Would it be all right if I make a general statement at this time? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General McCoy. Based on your experience? 

Mr. Benny. Yes. I believe that the average service man wants 
social contacts with the civilian population, that he desires that more 
than anything else. I believe that has been [1386^ largely 
not available to him in the city^, perhaps due to the great number of 
men here and the limited civilian population. 

I would like to say that I feel that the city should share a measure 
of the blame. We discussed recreation for many months, and some- 
thing has been done, but not on a scale large enough to occupy the 
interests of the service men. There is nothing here left for them to 
do except to wander the streets and to enter the first place that pro- 
vides entertainment, where perhaps light and wai'mth and society can 
be found, and I believe that perhaps is back of the frequenting of 
those places. 

The Cha-irman. I think so. Of course, the difficulty is that these 
men are strangers to most of the civilian population. There is some 
reluctance on the part of the civilian population to open their doors to 
men whom they do not know. There is a natural reluctance on the 
part of them to do that and it is a very difficult problem to integrate 
such a large group of men into the community. I think you recognize 
that fact? 

Mr. Benny. Yes. 

The Chairman. There is an Army and Navy YMCA and there is a 
Navy Recreation Center, but neither of these things, the things you 
are speaking of, can be supplied that way. They do not take the place 
of being in the homes or in the ordinar}- civilian life ? 

Mr. Benny. Not to any considerable extent. 

The Chairman. In other words, they are a poor substitute for 
them? 

Mr. Benny. Yes. The average service man, as I know him — and 
I am a civilian onl}- — has been a lonely individual in the city. He 
does not like it and he wants to get back to the coast. I know from 
personal knowledge of the service men that many of them have written 
to their Congressmen and their [1387] commanding officers 
for a leave of absence in order to get back home for a while, and I 
would like to say that I feel that the pressure there has been very 
great. That goes for both the Army and the Navy. 

The Army man is, of course, a little differently situated in that 
he has his quarters and they are fixed more or less at home, while the 
Navy man has no home. 

The Chairman. Any questions? General McNarney? 

General McNarney. I am referring to the letter which was sent 
by your organization dated January 3rd, and speaking of the timing 
of the enemy attack, the letter states, "It was based on the well known 



846 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

but grim and awful fact that we have only half a Navy^ half an Army, 
on Saturday night and Sunday morning." 

Do you consider that a correct statement? 

Mr. Benny. I would like to say that this letter was written by a 
member of the executive connnittee of the League, Mr. William C. 
Furer. Mr. Furer is the secretary of the Engineering Association 
and is an architect of the city and has been for a long time. 

I had written a letter to be addressed to this Commission, but ac- 
cepted that letter as written by Mr. Furer as a better one. 

So, in signing that letter I gave it my approval. 

General McNarney. Do you believe it to be a fact ? 

Mr. Benny. The term "half an Army and half a Navy" might be 
an exaggeration. 

The Chairman. Don't you believe it is an exaggeration? 

General McNarney. Do vou think it bears any semblance to the 
truth ? 

Mr. Benny. A great many xA.rmy and Navy men came to the city 
on Saturday nights. 

I would like to quote a statement at this time. The night watch- 
man at the Army and Navy Y said that 10,000 men were in the 
[ISSS] city on Saturday night. 

General McNarney. And there were 5,000 of them drunk ? 

Mr. Benny. No, 

General McNarney. Well, I am quoting from your letter. We 
want to know the truth or falsity of it. 

Mr. Benny. I am not willing to say that, sir. 

General McNarney. Well, you make allegations in an official docu- 
ment to the Commission. Are we to place credence in what you say 
or not? 

Mr. Benny. Not half that many, no. It is impossible to know. 

General McNarney. Were there a thousand drunk? 

Mr. Benny. I could not say. 

General McNarney. Were there a hundred drunk? 

Mr. Benny. I do not know. 

General McNarney. i ou possess no personal knowledge to state 
that there were one hundred, which would be only 1% of 10,000? 

Mr. Benny. It is impossible to make any statement. 

General McNarney. Then why is it necessary to make a statement 
like this? We are reasonable men. You do not have to make a 
statement like that in order to have us let you come before us for a 
hearing. What is the effect of things like that getting in the paper? 
What is the effect on the people, the civilians, on the morale of the 
fathers and mothers of everybody back home? 

A statement like that here, to my mind, is so bad that it is worse 
than a thousand men getting drunk. That is my opinion. 

Do you think that if my mother read that half of the men in the 
Army were drunk and not fit for duty that she would feel very good 
about it ? 

Mr. Benny. No, of course not. No. 

[1389] General McNarney. No. When you know it is false and 
not the truth, why do you put out statements like that ? 

Mr. Benny. It would not be jiossible to make any statement, would 
it? 



I 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 847 

General McNarney. It is possible to make any trntliful statement, 
yes, but not a false statement like that. 

Mr. Benny. It would be difficult to determine. 

General McNarney. Well, you certainly know that it is not true? 

Mr. Benny. I could admit — I would be glad to — that it is an ex- 
ageration so far as my personal observation goes, yes. 

General McNaeney. So far as any facts or any evidence is con- 
cerned which can be gathered from any agency on the Island of Oahu, 
it is false, isn't it? 

Mr. Benny. I would not be willing to say yes or no to that. I can't 
say yes or no. The service men are scattered over a wide area in this 
city; they are not all on Hotel Street or in the Y. They go to these 
places, the taverns out at Waikiki. 

General McCoy. Do you know how many men spent the night in the 
Army and Navy YMCA ? 

Mr. Benny. I do not know, sir, but that could be easily checked. 

General McCoy. Yes. 

General MoNarney. Mr. Benny, in your opinion, are the streets of 
Honolulu not safe for women ? 

Mr. Benny. Not safe? 

General McNarney. Unsafe. 

Mr. Benny. Because of service men ? No, they are not unsafe, no. 
I think a great many of the civilian population do not come downtown, 
but not through any fear of personal safety. 

[1390] General McNarney. Do jou have any reason to think, 
from your observation, that the success of the Japanese attack was 
in any way due to what you saw on the streets on Saturday night? 

Mr. Benny. I am not a strategist. That would be, again, out of my 
line. I can easily see that a man under the influence of liquor the 
night before and who has remained so until the next day would be 
unfit for njilitary service. 

General McNarney. You do not have any data which would lead 
you to believe that many men who did not return to the ship that 
night — and you know that the men have to be back at a certain time ; 
you are conscious of that ? 

Mr. Benny. Yes. 

General McCoy. I think it was twelve o'clock they said they had to 
be back, except those few outstanding men who were permitted to stay 
out overnight. I think there were some number reported in the Y 
that night. 

Do you know how many were reported of those as having shown any 
signs of intoxication? 

Mr. Benny. No, sir, I am sorry; I do not. 

General McNarney. Have you interviewed the director of the Army 
and Navy Y as to the state of the men the next morning? 

Mr. Benny. No, I have not. 

General McNarney. I wish you would. 

The Chairman. Do you know him? 

Mr. Benny. Yes, I know him. 

The Chairman. Is he a creditable and reliable person? 

Mr. Benny. Yes, sir; decidedly so. 

General McNarney. Would you please get his views as to the condi- 
tion of the men the next morning? 

79716— 46— Ex. 143 54 



848 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Benny. Yes. 

The Chairman. Any other questions? 

Admiral Standley. 'Do you know how many sailors are located in 
this harbor? 

[1391] Mr. Benny. No. 

Admiral Standley. Did you know how many there were on De- 
cember 7 ? 

Mr. Benny. No. 

Admiral Standley. You have no idea ? 

Mr. Benny. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Would it surprise you if I told you that there 
were over 40,000 men based in this port that night ? 

(There was no answer.) 

Admiral Standley. You are interested in the security of the coun- 
try, are you not ? 

Mr. Benny. Yes, absolutely. 

Admiral Standley. And you are interested in the welfare of the 
men? 

Mr. Benny. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. The men who bear the brunt of that security? 

Mr. Benny. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Then what do you think the effect was if 100 
men were drunk or even if a thousand men were drunk — what do you 
think the effect of that statement is on the rest of the 39,000 or 39^900 
men ? 

What effect do you think a statement like that will have when it 
goes home to their mothers? 

What do you think the effect on the national defense is, and the 
effect on the men who have to bear the brunt of that defense ? 

Have you ever given a thought to tliat ^ 

Mr. Benny. I have taken the part of the service ])ersonnel for man)^ 
years. I have a great sympathy for them and I think I have under- 
stood their problems. 

Now, I believe it is something more than that. I believe that the 
taverns have become an excuse for the attitude of indifference on 
tlie part of the conunuuity in a big way. I think [1J92] that 
they just have permitted tlie men to find tlieir own entertainment, 
and the only entertainment open to them is the tavern. 

Admiral Standley. I suppose to wake up the comnnmity to its 
responsibilit)^ vou are willing to make a slanderous statement about 
39,900 men ? 

Mr. Benny, I did not make a slanderous statement. 

Admiral Standley. Don't you consider that slanderous? That 
statement was not true. Don't you consider that slanderous about half 
a Navy and half an Army? Don't you consider that slanderous? 

Mr. Bkxny. I have not considered it such. I am sorry, gentlemen, 
if you think that. If you think it is slanderous, why, let me make the 
necessary apology. 

Admiral Standley. That is what I do think. You have made a 
slanderous statement. You have not made it public l)ut you have 
made it to us, and it seems to me that a statement like that should be 
corrected, because that statement is being whispered around on the 
mainland. We have had word from people in Tennessee that this 
thing has happened. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 849 

Don't you think there is more than an apology due to make this 
correction ? 

Mr. Benny. Yes, but how to make a suitable apology to correct the 
situation. 

Admiral Standley. Yes. 

Mr. Benny. That would be hard to do. 

Admiral Standley. Yes. When you start something like that it is 
hard to stop it. 

Mr. l^NNY. If that report is to be considered, it is a general state- 
ment, rhat IS with my contact with the community. 

Admiral Standley. Well, any organization like your organization 
IS supposed to have as its mission the welfare of the whole country 
When such an organization makes such a [1393^ loose state- 
ment like that, how m God's name can you expect to do that when you 
make stjitements like that which are not the truth and when you 
know It IS not the truth and if you do not know, you should have It 
seems to me that there is need for a greater correction than just a 
hearing before this Commission in order to correct this. There is 
something more necessary to correct this than just a hearing before 
this Commission. 

The Chairman. Are there any other questions of Mr. Benny « 

General McCoy. Yes. I would like to question Mr. Benny about 
his statement that nothing has been done for the soldiers in this com- 
munity. 

Is there any organization under the churches? 

Mr. Benny. Yes. 

General McCoy. Haven't a great many of the citizens thrown open 
their homes and received the soldiers and sailors ? 

Mr. Benny. Yes, sir; that is correct. 

General McCoy. And haven't there been clubs organized for their 
entertainment ? 

Mr. Benny. Yes, that is also correct; yes. 

General McCoy. And the Y is also a very successful organization « 

Mr. Benny. The Army and Navy Y has done a very fine job here. 

General McCoy. I am a member of that national board and I was 
conscious of the fact that they had a very successful center here and 
that the Y work has been doing well for many years. 

Mr Benny. Yes, sir ; they have done a very fine job since the services 
have been increased. They have done a very creditable job, noticeably 

General McCoy. Do you know of any organizations of women here 
who have tried to provide homes and dances where the men \139Jl\ 
might meet nice girls ? 

Mr. Benny. Yes, sir there have been such organizations started. 

General McCoy. I take it that due to the very large number of 
sailors, about 40,000, and probably 50,000 in the Army 

General McNarney. Yes, about 50,000. 

General McCoy, —that it is quite a problem in a town of this sort 

Mr. Benny. Yes. 

General McCoy. I take it that your organization is concerned with 
temperance and not with prohibition ? 

Mr. Benny. We are concerned mostly with temperance, education, 
yes, sir. ' 



850 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCoy. Have you taken up with the civilian authority or 
with the military and naval authorities and presented any protest here 
or any suggestions that would help to solve this problem ? 

Mr. Benny. As the opportunity presented itself, yes, occasionally 
we have. 

General McCoy. These are Americans, are they not, who have these 
saloons and night clubs, and so forth ? 

Mr. Benny. A percentage of them are, I think, Japanese. I don't 
know how many of those Japanese are aliens. 

General McCoy. Are you conscious of any change since martial 
law was declared with respect to improvements with regard to the 
sale of liquor? 

Mr. Benny. Very much, very decidedly. 

General McCoy. You think the conditions have been improved? 

Mr. Benny. Very much so, yes. 

General McCoy. Would you be in favor of continuing that em- 
bargo during the duration of the emergency ? 

[139S] Mr. Benny. Yes, sir, with certain qualifications, so long 
as other projects or enterprises are restricted and limited. I see no 
reason why we should especiallv select the liquor industry. 

General McCoy. AVhat qualifications do you mean ? I am not clear 
on that. 

Mr. Benny. Well, I mean there are certain commercial enterprises 
which have been limited to a large extent in the natural operation 
of the commercial business during this present emergency and prior 
to the emergency. 

General McCoy. Do I understand that you would like to see the 
embargo on liquor continued but certain changes made in it? 

Mr. Benny. No, but I would like to see all institutions, all com- 
mercial enterprises treated alike. I think to lift the embargo on 
liquor would be showing a little partiality. 

General McCoy. Well, what reason do you have to think that it is 
going to be lifted ? 

Mr. Benny. There was an announcement in the paper that the re- 
striction would be modified. 

General McCoy. Did it say what restrictions? 

Mr. Benny. The restriction on the liquor situation; that it would 
be modified for a time when a plan was devised. 

General McCoy. It did not say when? 

Mr. Benny. It did not say when ; no. sir. 

General McCoy, Was that announcement made by any respon- 
sible authority ? 

Mr. Benny. I believe so. It is in the paper today. 

General McCoy. Who made it? 

Mr. Benny. Mr. Coll, president of the Liquor Commission. Then 
Colonel Thomas Green, advisor to the Military Governor also made 
a statement, according to the papers. 

General IMcCoy. To the effect that the liquor restrictions 
[1S96] would be modified ? 

Mr. Benny. Yes. 

General McNarney. Have you considered the discrimination 
against other businesses, if the liquor restrictions were lifted, due to 
the fact that there was no shortage in liquor? 

Mr. Benny. I beg your pardon ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 851 

General McNarney. Well, say automobiles and tires are restricted 
because there is a shortage of automobiles and tires. Would you con- 
sider that a discrimination between the two types of business? 

Mr. Benny. I believe it w^ould be an unfair basis for a decision; 
yes, sir. 

General McNarney. Don't you think that the military control is 
based more on the amount of material available than anything else? 

Mr. Benny. Well, to illustrate, perhaps the building of houses may 
be one, home building, at the present time. 

General McNarney. Well, there is a great shortage of lumber and 
building materials w'hicli are needed for defense work. It is neces- 
sary so far as house building is concerned to impose certain restric- 
tions on it for the time being. 

Mr. Benny. Yes, and also possibly lumber. 

General McNarney. That is in the same category. 

Mr. Benny. Yes. 

General McCoy. Mr. Benny, you have been talking about enlisted 
men. Do you have any comment to make upon the conduct of the offi- 
cers of the Army and Navy with respect to drinking? 

Mr. Benny. I have acquaintances with officers both in the Army 
and Navy and that comes about through my connection with the Army 
and Navy YMCA and particularly with the chaplains and others who 
come into the building, but I have no comment to make on that point. 

[13971 General McCoy. Did you see any officer of the Army or 
Navy intoxicated that evening when you were downtown ? 

Mr. Benny. No, I did not. 

I think the point can be made that not all of the Army and Navy 
personnel were in uniform. 

General McCoy. Was the military police of the Army and the naval 
patrol functioning properly that night, so far as you could see. 

Mr. Benny. Yes. They are always available and always have been 
available and patrolling the streets. 

General McCoy. And so far as you know they take care of the sol- 
diers and sailors ? 

Mr. Benny. The military personnel are turned over to the military 
police. 

General McCoy. Was that done that night, if you know? 

Mr. Benny. I would not know, but I presume that would be the case. 

General McCoy. You do not know how many were arrested that 
night? 

Mr. Benny. No, but I would like to make a statement. I have 
somewhere in the office a copy of the duties of the shore patrol, and 
I recall that one of them, Rule No. 5 of the shore patrol, states that it 
is the requirement to take care of the men and see that they do not get 
into trouble, and I would like to express that as an opinion and have 
it inserted that unless there is a violation there is no arrest made for 
drunkenness but rather something in the nature of a commitment. 

The Chairman. Would you be surprised to know that on the night 
of December 6 between 6 p. m. and 6 a. m., the total number of soldiers 
taken into custody was 43, and 38 for being drunk and 4 for being away 
Avithout leave, and that out of these 43, 42 w^ere returned to their 
organizations and one man was [1398] confined for being 
drunk. 



852 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Now, would you have thouglit that that would be a normal record? 

Mr. Benny. I do not know that ; I am sorry. 

General McCoy. Mr. Benny, don't you think that that is a very 
small proportion, considering the fact that there were about 100,000 
Army and Navy men here ? 

Mr. Benny. The proportion is always small, but I think that is a 
fair statement. The condition in most intoxicated situations under 
any circumstances is that the proportion is small in the number of 
people drunk, and in fact the proportion of those who use liquor is 
small. 

General McNaeney. I agree with you. 

General ISIcCoy. Don't you think that that is a pretty good record, 
considering the fact that there were 100,000 soldiers and sailors on a 
Saturday night, the night after pay day? Isn't that a very small 
proportion of the men not able to go back to their places ? 

Mr. Benny. Shall I answer that? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Benny. There are many drunks who may not be observed or 
not taken into custody by the military police. The same would hold 
true among the civilians. 

I assume that the percentage of men arrested for drunkenness does 
not represent the total number. 

The Chairman. The recap sheet for the shore patrol indicates there 
were 38 arrests for serious offenses and 41 for minor offenses, which 
would include drunkenness, I suppose. 

Does that seem to be the average ? 

Mr. Benny. I do not know what the average is. 

The Chairman. Any other questions? . 

Admiral Standley, You said you had quite a lot of YMCA service? 

[1399-] Mr. Benny. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Have you had service other than in Honolulu? 

Mr. Benny. No, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Has your experience with the Naval personnel 
been here ? 

Mr. Benny. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. At no other locations? 

Mr. Benny. No. 

Admiral Standley. At no other place where we have Navy bases? 

Mv. Benny. No. 

Admiral Standley. That is all. 

The Chairman. Any other questions of Mr. Benny? 

Admiral Reeves. No. 

The Chairman. The nature of our inquiry is such that we will ask 
you not to discuss your testimony with anyone or to disclose what 
went on in this room. 

Gentlemen, we will adjourn at this time until 9 o'clock tomorrow 
iviorning. 

(Thereupon, at 4:35 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken until 
tomorrow, Tuesday, January 6, 1942, at 9 o'clock a. m. at the Royal 
Hawaiian Hotel.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 853 



lUOO'l CONTENTS 



TUESDAY, JANUARY 6, 1942 

Testimony of Page ' 
Robert L. Shivers, Special Agent in Charge of Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, Territory of Hawaii 1401 

Angus M. Taylor, Jr., United States Attorney, District of Hawaii 1447 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, United States Navy — Recalled 1469 



^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 855 



won COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE 
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII 



TUESDAY, JANUARY 6, 1942 

Suite 300, Koyal Hawaiian Hotel, 

Honolulu^ T. H. 

The Commission reconvened at 9:30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to ad- 
journment on yesterday, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United 
States Suj)reme Court, Chairman, presiding. 

PRESENT 

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, 
Chairman; Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Re- 
tired ; Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired ; 
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired ; Briga- 
dier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army; Walter 
Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission; Lieutenant Colonel Lee 
Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal Advisor to the Commis- 
sion; Albert J, Schneider, Secretary to the Commission. 

PROCEEDINGS 

The Chairman. Call Mr. Shivers. 

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT I. SHIVERS, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARG? 
OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, TERRITORY OF 
HAWAII 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give the reporter your full name, Mr. 
Shivers ? 

\_1JiJ02^ Mr. Shivers. Robert L. Shivers. 

The Chairman. Mr. Shivers, you are an attorney at law? 

Mr. Shivers. No, sir, I am not. 

The Chairman. You are and have been for some time the local 
agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ? 

Mr. Shivers. I am the special agent in charge of the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation in Hawaii. 

The Chairman, And how long have you held that position, sir? 

Mr. Shivers. Since the office opened here in August, 1939 ; August 
24th. 

The Chairman. Mr. Shivers, was there at any time an arrangement 
or agreement made between you and the information or intelligence 



856 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

services of the Army and Navy for a division of the work of those 
agencies and yourself ? 

Mr. Shivers. There was no such agreement made or entered into by 
us. There was an agreement that was entered into by the F. B. I. in 
Washington, O. N. I. in Washington, and G-2 in Washington. 

The Chairman. How did that divide up the work of counter- 
espionage ? 

Mr. Shivers. That originally divided it in this way : The Army 
Intelligence was to be responsible for all intelligence and all general 
intelligence investigations, including espionage, sabotage, and sub- 
versive activities, within the Army Establishment. The Naval Intelli- 
gence agency was to have exclusive jurisdiction over all naval installa- 
tions and over all naval personnel. The F. B. I. was to have the civilian 
angle of it. 

Now, that agreement was originally entered into in Washington. 
I received a notice of that, and the other agencies out here received 
such a notice. Subsequently that original [1403~\ agreement 
was modified to the extent that the Naval Intelligence would have 
jurisdiction over all espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities and 
general intelligence activities with respect to the Japanese populace. 

The CiiAiRMAX. The Naval Intelligence would? 

Mr. Shivers. The Naval Intelligence, yes, sir. I understand that 
that was brought about by Mr. Hoover, the Director of the F. B. I., 
by Admiral Anderson, who was then in charge of O. N. I., and by Gen- 
eral — no. Colonel. Who preceded General Miles at O. N. I.? 

General McNarxey. I can't think of his name right now. 

Mr. Shivers. I know it as well as I know my own. 

The Chairman. An Armj^ colonel was in charge of general in- 
telligence ? 

Mr. Shivers. An Army colonel was at that time in charge of general 
intelligence. It was my understanding that Mr. Hoover told the 
other agencies that the F. B. I. was not prepared to take over the gen- 
eral intelligence work pertaining to the Japanese. 

The Chairman. Now, you mean by that the Japanese population? 

Mr. Shivers. The Japanese population, both of Hawaii and on the 
Mainland United States, and that the Navy would carry on that work 
until the F. B. I. had gotten in a position where thej^ could take it over. 
At the time we got into the general intelligence field we did not have 
any Japanese translators, we had not conducted any investigative ac- 
tivity into Japanese intelligence, and it was agreed between those 
three gentlemen that the Navy would continue 

Admiral Reeves. When was that, Mr. Shivers? 

Mr. Shivers. That was early in 1940, sir. (Continuing:) — that the 
Navy would continue until such time as the F. B. I. was able to build 
up its sources of information, its translators, et cetera, and until 
such time as it was in a position to take \i404] over. 

The Chairman. Now, up to December 7, 1941, had the F. B. I. had 
taken over that Japanese field? 

Mr. Shivers. It had not; no, sir. The F. B. I. ever was working in 
collaboration with the Navy out here and with the Army Intelligence 
out here. 

The Chairman. How large a staff did vou have here up to Decem- 
ber?? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 857 

Mr. SiiivEKS. On December 7 I had a staff of approximately 25, in- 
cluding clea-ical employees. 

General McCoy. Were tliey all Americans ? 

Mr. Shivers. All Americans except one — all Americans, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Had you then been able to find a responsible person 
to do Japanese translating for you? 

Mr. Shivers. Oh, yes, we liave a Japanese translator. 

The Chairman. You have one now? 

Mr. Shivers. Oh, yes, and have had for several months. 

General jMcCoy. When you speak of these as Americans, were any 
of them of Japanese ancestry ? 

Mr. Shivers. We had a Japanese translator of Japanese ancestry, 
yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Only one ? 

Mr. Shivers. Only one. 

General McCoy. The rest were all what you might call 

Mr. Shivers. All American. 

General McCoy. Anglo-Saxon? 

Mr. Shivers. Anglo-Saxon, yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Not of alien blood ? 

Mr. Shivers. Not of alien blood. 

The Chairman. JMr. Shivers, will you tell the Commission what 
your conception is of the difficulties of getting intelligence here as to 
Japanese activities on tlie Island and [14'0S] Japanese naval 

activities off the Island ? 

Mr. Shivers. I don't quite understand the question, sir. 

The Chairman. I say, state, if you will, to the Commission what dif- 
ficulties you saw here in getting tliis information as to Japanese activi- 
ties. Were there difficulties ? 

Mr. Shivers. Oh, there were very extreme difficulties. 

The Chairman. Well, now, what were they, and wliy were they ? 

Mr. Shivers. W^ell, I can explain that in tliis way : by saying that 
when I came out here to open the office of the F. B. I. on August 24, 
J 939, 1 found that the Army and Navy had been here with intelligence 
offices over a number of years. I therefore was under their influence 
for a period of, I would say, several months. I found tliat tliey had 
accumulated a store of information, or rather, the names of various 
and sundry individuals in Hawaii, Japanese agencies and people of 
Japanese blood who were considered to be suspicious, people who in 
their judgment should be interned in the event of hostilities involving 
the United States and Japan. 

I made a tour of all of the Islands in Hawaii, asking the so-called 
haole populace — the businessmen, the plantation managers, the planta- 
tion owners — about the Japanese conditions and the Japanese situa- 
tion. I got just about as many different answers as the number of 
people that I talked to. So far as I could learn the haole populace in 
Hawaii was not in a position to give any accurate information about 
the Japanese populace because there had been very little intercourse 
between tlie two. They could only give you surmises, they could only 
tell you what they thought would happen, but for factual information 
it didn't exist. 

And that is one of the difficulties in conducting general intelligence 
investigations here, is that the Japanes community [I4O6] is 



858 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SO closely woven together and there is such a circle within the Japanese 
community that it is very difficult for the haole mind to penetrate it. 
To a large extent the average haole does not know the Japanese psy- 
chology, he does not know the Japanese mind, and for that reason he 
did not know what was going on within the inner circles of the Jap- 
anese community. 

General McCoy. What do you mean by "haole" '? 

Mr. SHI^^RS. I mean, that is the Hawaiian term for white. 

The Chairman. From such data as you could obtain you did get up 
a list of suspicious persons, or the Army and Navy had such a list? 

Mr. Shivers. The Army and Navy had such a list. They had very 
little factual information to support such a list. We asked the Army 
and the Navy to turn over to us at that time a list of all of their sus- 
pects. We were trying to concern ourselves primarily with the internal 
security of the Island by learning the identity of those people who 
would be a menace to our security in the event of war. We therefore 
requested the Army and the Navy to turn over to us their lists of A 
and B suspects. 

The Chairman. What do you mean by A and B ? 

Mr. Shivers. The A suspect was the individual who was to be in- 
terned in the event of hostilities with Japan. The B suspect was the 
individual kept under surveillance in the event of war with Japan. 

The Army had some 700 individuals on their A list and some thou- 
sand on the B list. We then began to conduct investigations of those 
individuals to find out their background and their activities. We then 
saw that we did not have a sufficient background knowledge of the 
Japanese, so we then began what we call a Japanese survej^ of the en- 
tire Islands. That took into consideration all of the Japanese socie- 
ties, the control of the Japanese consulate over the various societies, 
the control of m07] the Japanese consulate over the alien 
Japanese. 

We learned that there were some 234 Ja{)anese consular agents who 
had been appointed by the Consul General of Japan here in Hawaii. 
Those men were scattered strategically throughout the Hawaiian 
Islands. We saw and the Army saw and the Navy saw that if used 
as an espionage ring they would be in a position to furnish the Jap- 
anese consulate with espionage information from every corner of the 
Hawaiian Islands. 

The Chairman. Now, there is something in our record somewhere 
to the effect that there was a movement to arrest those people for fail- 
ing to register. 

Mr. Shivers. There was. 

The Chairman. When was that ? 

Mr. Siii\T.RS. In April, 1940, I submitted a list of all of the con- 
sular agents in Hawaii to the F. B. I. in Washington and asked the 
F. B. I. in Washington to ascertain from the State Department if 
those individuals had registered in accordance with the Act requiring 
the registration of agents of foreign principals, also to ascertain 
whether or not they had been noticed to the State Department by 
the Japanese Government as diplomatic officials. 

I received — I think I have that right here, if you don't mind my 
referring to it. 

The Chairman. No, certainly not. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 859 

Mr. Shiv^eks. On September 3, 1940, I advised the Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington to this effect : 

There has been transmitted herewith a list of Japanese acting as consular 
agents within the Territory of Hawaii for the local Japanese Consul. It is ob- 
served in the Act governing the registration of agents of foreign principals and 
of foreign governments tluvt there are [i^OS] exempted from its pro- 
vision — 

Then I go ahead and quote that provision. 
The Chairman. Yes. 
Mr. Shivers. Then I say : 

It is requested that it be ascertained of the Department of State whether or 
not the names, status, and character of duties of the aforementioned consular 
agents are of record in the Department of State. If so, it is desired to know 
whether such consular agents can be considered to fall within the scope of the 
Act. If it is determined that these consular agents are not subject to the pro- 
visions of the Registration Act, as such, would their status be changed in any 
respect so that they would come within the purview of this Act, provided they 
are engaged in disseminating propaganda for the Japanese Consul or the Japanese 
Government? 

It has been learned from a confident source that one of the consular agents 
telephoned to the Japanese consulate in Honolulu and asked a representative of 
the consulate if he should register under the terms of the Alien Registration Act. 
The member of the consulate staff advised the consular agent that he was not 
subject to the terms of this Act and should not register because he was a diplo- 
matic ofiicer under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Foreign OfBce. 

These four hundred consular agents — I said four hundred. There are really 
only 234. 

— are scattered throughout the Hawaiian Islands and the Bureau can readily 
see that they constitute a source of infoi'mation over wide areas, which if used 
for espionage purposes would be in a position [1^09] lo furnish the con- 
sulate invaluable information on fleet movements, Army posts, and all general 
information that would be of value to the Japanese Government. 

In the event it is determined that any or all of these consular agents are 
subject to the provisions of the Registration Act, this office desires to conduct 
an immediate investigation for the purposes of ascertaining their activities look- 
ing toward a prosecution of those consular agents who have violated the terms 
of the Registration Act by not having registered as prescribed. 

While this office is not aware of the full extent of the duties of the consular 
agents, it is believed that they are required to look after the interests of the 
Japanese populace in their respective communities, to keep alive the Japanese 
spirit, and to do the bidding of the Japanese consulate. They are undoubtedly 
looked upon by the Japanese populace as representatives of the Japanese con- 
sulate and the Japanese Government and the Emperor of Japan, and for that 
reason wield considerable influence in determining the actions and molding the 
thovight of the Japanese populace in Hawaii, especially among the alien element. 

Then subsequently I received a letter from the Bureau in Wash- 
ington that said : 

For your Information with regard to the progress being made in the possible 
prosecution of Japanese consular agents there is enclosed a photostatic copy of 
a letter dated July 25, 1941, addressed to the Attorney General by the Secretary 
of War, together with a photostatic copy of the enclosure contained therein. 

[I41O] The Department has previously advised that the State Department 
has entered no objection to the prosecution of these consular agents, but in view 
of the objection entered by the Secretary of War, the Criminal Division is not 
prepared at this time to authorize prosecution of these agents, but still has the 
matter under investigation. 

Now, prior to that communication I informed the Bureau on June 
23, 1941, that — I made reference to a telegram from the Bureau of 
June 2nd stating that the Attorney General's office of the Department 
had requested an opinion from the United States Attorney of Hono- 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 2 18 



860 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

lulu regarding prosecution under the Registration Act of the 234 
Japanese consular agents in Hawaii. 

As stated in the aforementioned wire, Mr. Angus Taylor, Jr., acting United 
States Attorney here, wired the Department recommending immediate prosecu- 
tion but advised at the same time that Lieutenant General Walter Short, Depart- 
ment Commander of the United States Army in Hawaii, was opposed to such 
action at this time on the grounds that it might react unfavorably on the Japanese 
community, although such action would not interfere with any plans of the 
Hawaiian Department for the defense of the Islands. 

The United States Attorney is in receipt of a further communication from the 
Department requesting to be advised if there has been any change in the opinion 
of General Short concerning this matter and requesting to be advised of the 
practical effect of his opposition. 

Acting United States Attorney Angus Taylor has informed me that he has 
communicated with General Short U-'fU] through Lieutenant Colonel 
M. W. Marston who is in charge of the Military Intelligence Office for the 
Hawaiian Department, and has been informed that the General has not changed 
his opinion in this matter and will actively oppose the prosecution of these indi- 
viduals by recommending to the War Department, if necessary, that the matter 
be taken up with the Attorney General with a view of preventing the arrest and 
prosecution of the Japanese consular agents at this time. 

As I understand it, the primary objection of Genei-al Short is that since the 
Registration Act has been in effect since September, 1989, he does not believe 
it would be considered fair play if the Government should at this time arrest the 
234 Japanese consular agents who have been acting as such since the enactment 
of the law, and he feels that it would be regarded by the Japanese community 
as a hostile act designed to harass the Japanese aliens and American citizens 
of Japanese ancestry in the Hawaiian Islands. 

The Chairman. Now can you give us a little background on that, 
Mr. Shivers? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir, I can. 

The Chairman. Were you in touch with the AVar and Navy De- 
partments on this question and with Mr. Taylor? 

Mr. Shivers. You will recall that in one of those letters there I 
said that the United States Attorney had been requested to give an 
opinion as to whether or not these people should be prosecuted. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Shivers. The United States Attorney considted nie on that. 
At that time the United States Attorney had not been furnished with 
copies of the reports that had been submitted by [-?-^^] our 
office for the simple reason that the Department of Justice itself, the 
Attorney General's office, decides the question of prosecution on viola- 
tions of the Registration Act, bearing in mind that in ])rosecutions 
under that statute tlie venue lies in the Disti'ict of Cohnnbin. How- 
ever, it was the thought of the Attorney General that these men would 
not have to be prosecuted under the amended act requiring the regis- 
tration of agents of foreign principals but could be i)rosecuted under 
the original act, which requires notice to the State Department of 
all agents of any foreign power. 

Mr. Taylor consulted me, and I then called a meeting of Captain 
Mayfield, who was the District intelligence officer. Naval District in- 
telligence officer. Lieutenant Colonel M. W. Marston, who was then 
the G-2 officer, and his assistant, Lieutenant Colonel (leorge W. Bick- 
nell. I told them that I had received a request from the United States 
Attorney to furnish him with all of the information that had been 
developed on these consular agents and that he was going to report 
to the Attorney General his opinion as to whether or not they should 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 861 

be prosecuted, I informed them that I thought that they should 
take the matter up themselves with their respective commands, who 
at that time were Admiral Bloch and General Short, and that since 
it was purely a criminal proceedings I did not suppose that they would 
have any objection to it, although I thought that they should be con- 
sulted on the matter. 

The following day we met again, and Captain Mayfield, represent- 
ing Admiral Bloch, stated that the Admiral was all for prosecuting 
these consular agents and that they should be, in his judgment, pros- 
ecuted. Colonel Marston, representing General Short, made substan- 
tially the same report that I have just read to you. 

The Chairman. That tlie Army thought they ought not to be? 

Mr. Shivers. The Army thought that they should not be. 

[IJf.lS'] Mr. Taylor, the United States Attorney, asked me what 
my opinion was. I told him that, as you know, this office cannot 
j-ecommend to the United States Atorney either for or against pros- 
ecution in any criminal case. We merely submit the facts to you. 
I said, "I do feel, however, since the Arm}^ is responsible for the de- 
fense of these Islands, that we as an organization should not do any- 
thing that is going to embarrass the Army in the defense of these 
Islands, and that we should give consideration to General Short's 
position." Mr. Taylor thereafter did recommend to the Department 
of Justice that they should be prosecuted, and he quoted Admiral 
Bloch and General Short. 

Then there came an opinion from the War Department. There- 
after there was an opinion from the War Department. Thereafter 
there was a request from the War Department which was transmitted 
to the Attorney General by the Secretary of War quoting a para- 
phrased telegram which had been sent to the War Department by 
General Short on July 22, 1941, which says : 

We are at present engaged in a counter propaganda campaign whose object 
is to encourage lo5'alty of the Japanese population of Hawaii on promise of fair 
treatment. The present ontloolv of results of this campaign on entire popula- 
tion is very favorable. Success of the campaign would promote unity and great- 
ly reduce proportions of our defense problem. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917 
referred to in your radio of July 19, 1941, has been in effect here since August of 
3939 with no attempt at local enforcement. As result of careful survey of sit- 
uation, considering available facts and opinions F. B. I. and other federal agen- 
cies I believe not over ten percenf of the unregistered consular agents in Hawaii 
are aware they have violated our laws. I believe further that prosecution at 
this \ lJi.lJi\ time would unduly alarm entire population and jeopardize 
success our current campaign to secure loyalty Japanese population. 

In my opinion fair play demands that warning be given to consular agents 
to register by a certain date on penalty of prosecution. I believe development 
of loyalty among Japanese population more important than punishment of a few 
individuals. It is impracticable to place total Japanese population of one hun- 
dred sixty thousand in concentration camps. 

The Chairman. That is General Short's? 

General McCoy. That letter is signed by the Secretary of War? 
Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Personally signed by Mr. Stimson? 
Mr. Shivers. Here is the Secretary of War's letter. Do you care 
for me to read that to you, sir? 
General McCoy. Yes. 
Mr. Shrters. "Washington," — 
Admiral Standley. What is the letter he just read ? 



862 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chaikman. That is an excerpt from the Secretary of War's 
letter, isn't it ? 
Mr. Shivers. You will understand that when I read this letter here. 

Wae Department, Washington 

July 25, 1941 
The Honorable, The Attorney General. 
Dear Mr. Attorney General : 

Upou receipt of your letter of July 14, 1941, on the subject of the prosecution 
of certain unregistered Japanese consular agents in the Territory of Hawaii, I 
dispatched a secret radiogram to the Commanding General, [1415] Hawai- 
ian Department, directing him to radio his recommendations stating clearly 
his reasons and objections if any to the proposed prosecution. 
A paraphrased copy of his reply is attached hereto. 

I concur in the statements and objections set forth by the Commanding 
General, Hawaiian Department, and strongly recommend that a warning be 
issued to these unregistered Japanese consular agents, through their accredited 
Consul General in Honolulu, to register by a certain date, say within a period of 
thirty days after promulgation of the warning, under penalty of prosecution 
for violation of our laws. 

I believe that such a warning will effect the desired registration and contribute 
materially toward the Commanding Generals campaign to secure the loyalty of 
the Japanese population of the Territory. 
Sincerely yours, 

Henry L. Stimson. 

Secretary of War. 

The Chairman. Now, Mr. Shivers, was a warning issued then? 

Mr. Shivers. There was no such warning issued. 

The Chairman. Why not ? You don't know ? 

Mr. Shfvers. That I don't know, sir. 

The Chairman. You think that was intended to be a warning by 
the War Department ? Or by the Attorney General's office ? 

Mr. Shivers. I think it was a suggestion by the War Department 
that the Attorney General's office 

The Chairman. The Attorney General's office. 

Mr. Shivers. should issue such a warning. 

The Chairman. Well, we will find out from Mr. Taylor why 
[J4^J6] it wasn't. He would know? At least, he would know 
whether he got any instructions? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, he would know that. 

General McCoy. Do you know yourself? 

Mr, Shivers. So far as I know, no warning was issued and no pro- 
visions for any warning were made. 

The Chairman. And you don't know why? 

Mr. Shivers. I do know this : that subsequent to this I received in- 
structions from the Bureau in Washington to conduct very thorough, 
complete investigations of all of the Japanese consular agents for the 
purpose of ascertaining in detail what their activity was, whether 
or not they had engaged in any subversive activities or in the dis- 
semination of any propaganda, and that upon the completion of these 
investigations the matter would again be referred to the Department 
for an opinion. 

The Chairiman. Now we have gotten along to the middle of 1941, 
haven't we? 

Admiral Standley. What was the date of the 

The Chairman. We have passed midsummer. 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir, we have passed midsummer. July, 1941. 
July 25, 1941. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 863 

The Chairman. Well, now, did you start on the investigation? 

Mr. Shivers. Immediately, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Wliat did you discover? 

Mr. Shivers. Well, in the beginning we made about — we conducted 
investigations of about twenty of these consular agents back in April, 
1940. 

The Chairman. Yes ? 

Mr. Shivers. And probably before April, 1940. And sent those in 
to Washington, and those reports were referred to the Attorney Gen- 
eral. We did that in order to give the Department the facts with re- 
spect to the operations of these consular agents here, and at that time 
it was pointed out that the acts of one [^4^7] are undoubtedly 

common to the acts of all and that determination of a violation can 
undoubtedly be made from the facts that have been submitted in 
these reports. 

Then, after receiving the further instructions after this adjudica- 
tion had been made, we then assigned five men to conduct thorough 
immediate investigations of all the Japanese consular agents. We 
have quite a number on Hawaii, Kauai, Maui, and Honolulu, and 
those investigations have disclosed that they have been quite promi- 
nent in collecting comfort kits, moneys, and funds for transmittal to 
Japan and have been the leaders in the Japanese community, have 
filled out all of the papers necessary for the alien to fill out for trans- 
mission to the consulate. They also engage in filling out applications 
for deferment for military service, which they transmit to the Consul. 
They also handle expatriation matters, which they transmit to the 
Consul. And they also assist in the Japanese commercial census which 
is taken in Hawaii about every five j^ears. 

The Chairman. You mean taken under the Hawaiian Government? 

Mr. Shivers. No. 

The Chairman. Or taken under the Japanese Government? 

Mr. Shivers. Taken under orders of the Japanese Government 
through either Consul. They also assist the dual citizen in filing his 
Army registration papers when he attains his majority. As you gen- 
tlemen know, all persons born in Hawaii of alien parents prior to 1924 
are automatically dual citizens. 

General McCoy. Dual citizens? 

Mr. Shivers. Are automatically dual citizens. 

The Chairman. They become citizens of the United States, but un- 
der the law of Japan they do not, unless they so elect, lose their Jap- 
anese citizenship? 

Mr. Shivers. That is correct. In Japan they are Japanese citizens. 
In America they are American citizens. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

[U^S] Mr. Shivers. All those born subsequent to 1924 are not 
considered citizens of Japan unless they are registered with the Jap- 
anese Consul in Honolulu by their parents within fourteen days after 
birth. 

The Chairman. Now, Mr. Shivers, were a number of these con- 
sular agents American citizens, or were they all aliens ? 

Mr. Shivers. I would say 99% of them were aliens. 

The Chairman. Aliens? 

Mr. Shivers. That is approximately correct. 



864 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chaibman. Yes. Mostly aliens? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, what has become of them now? 

Mr. Shivers. They are in mass in the detention camp. 

The Chairman. They have been interned? 

Mr. Shivers. They were picked up on December 7. 

General McCoy. All of them ? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. They never did register? 

Mr. Shivers. They never did register. 

The Chairman. And you only found them by ascertaining then 
status from their activities, I presume? 

Mr. Shivers. No, sir. Prior to 1941 the Nippu Jiji— Nippu Ji]i 
is a local Japanese paper— prior to 1941 the Nippu Jiji published in 
its Japanese directory the names and addresses of all Japanese consular 
agents. We were able to learn their identity through that directory. 

The Chairman. Directory. 

Mr. Shivers. But beginning with the directory that was published 
in 1941 their names were omitted, and they were omitted at the re- 
quest of the Japanese Consul, because he had learned that an investi- 
gation was being made of them. 

The Chairman. Of course. It strikes me that that was a very 
large staff of consular agents for this Territory. How [1419\ 
did you feel about that ? 

Mr. Shivers. Well, it struck me this way : Of course, the United 
States would not have been permitted to have had such a setup in 
Japan or any other foreign country, and it struck me as constituting 
an espionage network which if we had had one like it, even in Hawaii, 
we would have known much more than we did Imow, because it was 
ideally set up. 

If you have the time and are interested I can show you a chart here 
on the Japanese consulate setup here in Hawaii. 

(The witness produced a chart.) 

The Chairman, Nine on his .staff". The advisory council noted 
here, is that of American citizens or Japanese? 

Mr. Shivers. The advisory council, sir ? 

The Chairman. Dr. Mori and others. 

Mr. Shivers. The advisory council is composed of leading alien 
Japanese businessmen and professional men in Honolulu. 

The Chairman. I se« they have got one AVade Warren Thayer 
here. He is probably an Anglo-Saxon, isn't he? 

Mr. Shivers. Wade Warren Thayer is an Anglo-Saxon. He is the 
registered attorney for the Japanese Consul in Honolulu. He re- 
signed December 7. 

The Chairman. Then, you have classified the agents by islands? 

Mr. Shivers. According to islands, yes, sir. 

General McCoy. And they number how many? 

The Chairman. Two hundred and thirty-four, do they not? 

Mr. Shivers. I think the final count was 219, sir; some had gone 
back to Japan. 

General McCoy. And as far as you know they have all been in- 
terned since December 7? 

Mr. Shivers. EveiT one of them, yes, sir. 

General McCoy. None escaped ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 865 

Mr. Shiyees. No, sir. I think we — in fact I know we have all of 
them. 

[14^0] The Chairman. The heading, "Registered Agents of 
Foreign Principals," refers to actually registered agents of Japanese 
business concerns, I presume ? 

Mr. Shivers. No, sir. Registered agents of the foreign principals, 
the foreign principals in that case being either Japan or some agency 
in Japan. 

The Chairman. In Japan. Well, then there were some that did 
register? I see they are called "Registered Agents of Foreign Prin- 
cipals." 

Mr. SHrv^ERS. Oh, yes. That's another story. Now, Wade Warren 
Thayer is the registered agent, because he is the attorney for the 
Japanese consulate. Theo. H. Davies & Company is registered as 
agent of the British Government or some British agency. Bowman, 
Deute, Cummings, Inc., is registered as, I believe, advertising agencies 
— relation agencies of Japanese Tourists' Bureau, I think. Nippon 
Yusen Kaisya is the NYK steamship line office here in Honolulu. 

The Chairinian. In other words, there is no violation of any law as 
respects those fellows? 

Mr. Shivers. Well, let me; may I see that a second? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Shivers. The gentlemen listed here as Daizo Sumida, Dr. Iga 
Mori, Seizo Yamamoto, they registered as agents of a foreign prin- 
cipal after we had developed an offense against ^them. There were 
four Japanese men here who back in early 1940 got together and 
agreed with the Consul to contribute a sum of $2,500 to the Pan-Pacific 
Union here. That $2,500 was to go to the Pan-Pacific Union to defray 
the expenses of an individual connected with the Pan-Pacific Union by 
the name of Frank A. Von Heiland, who was suspected of being a 
Japanese and German espionage agent here in Hawaii. 

The Japanese Consul General went to these four men and asked 
them if they would act, as it were, as a front for him [i-^i] in 
turning this money over to the Pan-Pacific Union, ostensibly to create 
a department of Pacific affairs in the Pan-Pacific Union but in reality 
to be given to Frank A. Von Heiland by the Pan-Pacific Union through 
arrangements that they had previously made. Well, there were Daizo 
Sumida, Seizo Yamamoto, Matsura Soga, the publisher of the Nippu 
Jiji, and one other individual. Now, Daizo Sumida, Dr. Iga Mori, 
Seizo Yamamoto, and Matsura Soga, they are the four individuals 
who took the money from the Japanese Consul. The check was given 
by the Japanese Consul to Sumida. Sumida deposited the check for 
$2,500 in his own account and then drew a check payable to the Pan- 
Pacific Union on his account in the sum of $2,500. 

Well, during the course of the investigation it developed that they 
were just simply fronting for the consulate, and the manner in which 
they got the money into the Pan-Pacific Union was a ruse — the purpose 
of it was a ruse, and the actual fact was that the money was to go to 
Frank A. Von Heiland, who was going to use that in publication of 
the Pan-Pacific Union magazine, and that matter was of course re- 
ported and referred to the State Department. The State Depart- 
ment held that they were in violation of the act requiring the registra- 
tion of agents of foreign principals. They registered and withdrew 



866 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

at the same time, and by registering thereby confessing that they 
should have registered before, but coincident with filing they 

The Chairman. Quit. 

Mr. Shivers. — quit, and no prosecution was instituted. 

General McCoy. What is the Pan-Pacific Union? 

Mr. Shivers. Tliat is an organization that at one time was quite 
prominent here and on the Mainland. It was originally headed by 
Mr. Wallace Hume Ford. Perhaps you gentlemen may know him. 

General McCoy. That has no connection 

Mr. Shivers. Has no connection with the Institute of [i^^] 
Pacific Relations. 

The Chairman. What was the man's name ? 

Mr. Shivers. Wallace Hume Ford. 

For the past year and a half it has not been active at all except 
insofar as it was able to entertain some of the Japanese celebrities 
who came by here, and other Pacific figures, before the commercial 
relations with Japan were halted. 

The Chairman. Mr. Shivers, I take it you have found it impossible 
to get a Japanese agent or agents here under the Bureau that you 
could trust ; is that right ? 

Mr, Shivers. I wouldn't say that, Mr. Justice. I would say this : 
that it is next to impossible to get one whom you can trust who would 
be in a position to know what is going on. 

The Chairman. The alien Japanese or the ill-affected Japanese 
are clams, are they? It is a tight ring? 

Mr. Shivers. It is a very tight ring. You must remember that 
we have 41,387 alien Japanese in Hawaii. Now, we have 24,000 alien 
males and about 16,000 alien females, and it is almost next to im- 
possible to get one on whom you could rely who is sufficiently well 
informed or close enough to the alien enemy to actually be in a posi- 
tion to know what is going on. 

General McCoy. A number of these local Japanese of American 
citizenship are graduates of the University of Hawaii? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. And have gone through the R. O. T. C. and are 
therefore reserve officers of the United States ? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. And are now on active service, are they not? 

Mr, Shivers. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Would you have trust in them or any of them? 

Mr. Shivers. I would, yes, sir. 

[14^S] General McCoy. They are now in the United States 
service ? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. In an article published in the Reader's Digest on 
"Japanese Saboteurs in Our Midst" there is this statement with 
reference to the Japanese of like background in the United States: 

Of the loyalty to the United States of thousands of our West Coast Japanese, 
particularly the Nisei, or American-born, there is and can be no question. In 
fact they have supplied much of the information our government has. 

Now, that is with reference to those on the West Coast. Would 
you state whether that would apply here? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 867 

Mr. Shivers. I would say this, General, that the Nisei out here — 
that is, some of them — have supplied us with quite valuable infor- 
mation, and even since the outbreak of hostilities they have supplied 
us with names of alien Japanese who they say should be interned. 

The Chairman. How are you conducting your investigation, Mr. 
Shivers, to determine which of these interned Japanese may be 
liberated ? Are you making such investigation ? 

Mr. Shivers. We are not making such investigation, Mr. Justice. 
That is the responsibility of the hearing board. 

The Chairman. Who is the hearing board ? 

Mr. Shivers. That was appointed by the Military Governor, con- 
sists of five individuals, I believe, who gives to each a proper hearing. 

The Chairman. Are some of them being turned out, so far as 
you know? 

Mr. Shivers. So far as I know none have been released by the board. 
Now, there were some released by the military authorities before they 
went before the board. The plan here, [^4^4] as you gentle- 
men may already know, was to apprehend every German and Italian 
alien in the Hawaiian Islands in the event of a declaration of war on 
the axis powers. That was done with the exception of the aged and 
infirm. Practically every German alien and every Italian alien in 
Hawaii was picked up on December 8, and some of those have since 
been released on the representations of some of the people here who 
were willing to vouch for them. 

General McCoy. Without investigation on your part ? 

Mr. Shivers, At the direction of the Army authorities, yes, sir. 

General McCoy. And without investigation on your part ? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You did not pick up every alien Japanese? You 
couldn't? 

Mr. Shivers. We could not do that. 

The Chairman. You picked up those that were suspected ? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman, Did you form any opinion as to where the center of 
Japanese espionage was here? 

Mr. Shivers. Very definitely, sir. I am satisfied that it was cen- 
tered in the Japanese consulate. 

The Chairman. Now, you were not able to break into the communi- 
cations of the Japanese consulate with Japan on account of legal bars, 
as I understand it. 

Mr. Shivers. That is correct. 

The Chairman. Until war was declared ? 

Mr. Shi\^rs. Until war was declared. We had attempted to get 
the cooperation of the commercial radio communication offices here in 
furnishing us with the information, but were unable to do so. 

General McCoy, Do you know whether the Army and the Navy were 
able to do that ? 

[14^5] Mr. Shivers, I know this, sir : I know that the Navy be- 
ginning about November 24 or 25 was able to effect an arrangement 
with one of the commercial communication companies here to obtain 
all of the traffic between Honolulu and the Japanese Government in 
Japan, I don't believe, however, that any of that material was gotten 
together for the Navy until after December 7. 



868 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Some of it was, Mr. Shivers, we have learned. 
Arnongst others that Kita dispatch was delivered either the 5th or 
6th in a batch of stuff from that connnunication company, but no 

Mr. Shivers. No ; that is the material that I obtained. 

The Chairman. Well, I know you got it too, but we rather get the 
impression that it was turned over — you got it when you got to the 
consulate ? 

Mr. Shivers. No, sir ; I got it from the radio company myself. 

The Chairman. Oh, you did ? Well, that was never translated until 
after the 

Mr. Shivers. Until after the Yth. 

The Chairman. Yes. It couldn't be, could it? 

Mr. Shivers. The Navy had its arrangement with one company here, 
and I think it went into effect about December 1st. 

The Chairman. That is about right. 

Mr. Shivers. But my impression is that if they got it they were not 
able to have it translated. 

The Chairman. They were not. 

Mr. Shivers. Until after December 7. 

The Chairman. They were not able to make it out. 

Mr. Shivers. If we had had an arrangement with the other com- 
panies whereby we could have gotten that information, we [i4'26] 
would have known what was going to happen before it did. 

General McCoy. Did you see Colonel Sarnoff when he was here, 
the president of the Kadio Corporation ? 

Mr. Shivers. I did not, no, sir. 

General McCoy. When was he here ? Do you know ? 

Mr. Shivers. The latter part of November. I knew that some ar- 
rangements were going to try to be made with him, and for that rea- 
son I kept out of the picture entirely. 

The Chairman. Mr. Shivers, are you acquainted with a thing, the 
association called the Japanese Hotel Association? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Is it your notion that that association was active 
in getting men through the immigration bureau that perhaps ought 
not to have gotten in here? Have you ever heard such rumors? 

Mr. Shivers. Oh, I am quite satisfied of that, sir, in this way: The 
Japanese Hotel Association interested itself primarily^ in keeping 
records of all Japanese who came into the Hawaiian Islands for any 
purpose whatsoever, and they now probably have the records that 
are much more complete even than our own immigration. They have 
furnished evidence for the immigration authorities on which certifi- 
cates of birth could be granted and on which re-entry permits could 
be given. That is to say, they will find the michvife or somebody who 
knows the midwife who was present when this particular Japanese 
was born. 

I would say offhand that the language newspapers, the Hotel As- 
sociation, the Japanese-language schools have been the three worst 
subversive elements in Hawaii. Definitely the language school has 
prevented the assimilation of the American way of life on the part 
of the Japanese. 

The Chairman. What is your view as to the Shinto priests here 
and the teiichers in these Japanese-language schools ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 869 

[I427] Mr. Shivers. Fifty-one percent of the teachers in the 
Japanese-language schools are alien. Forty-nine percent are Ameri- 
can. The" Shinto priests are all very definitely dangerous. All of 
them, Shinto priests, are now in custodial detention. There are two 
sects, the church and state sects, of Shintoism. 

The Chairman. The church and state sects ? 

Mr. Shivers. Church and state sects of Shintoism. All state Shinto 
priests some time ago, about a year ago, were raised by the Japanese 
Government to a position equal to military officers, and we felt that 
that of itself was sufficient justification for their internment in the 
event of hostilities. We tried to approach this — the Army and the 
Navy and I have tried to approach the situation out here by endeavor- 
ing ito first find out what the possibilities were and make provisions 
for eliminating those. We Imow that the consular agents were 
definitely a source of potential danger. We know that the Shinto 
priests were. We know that the Japanese-language schoolteachers 
were. By eliminating those in the event of war we had other things 
then that we would have to deal with, and those would be out of the 
way, believing and feeling that the leadership would be taken if and 
when those individuals were interned. 

General McCoy. Were you able to get all of them? 

Mr. Shivers. Sir? 

General McCoy. Were you able to get all of them ? 

Mr. Shivers. Not all of the Japanese-language school-teachers have 
yet been picked up. 

General McCoy. Were you able to get all the priests ? 

Mr. Shivers. All of the Shinto priests, yes, sir. We also are daily 
getting a number of young people, both aliens and citizens, who have 
recently served in the Japanese Army and who have returned to Hawaii 
as late as June, 1941. 

[14^8] The Chairman. People who have actually served in the 
Japanese Army ? 

Mr. Shivers. People who have actually served in the Japanese Army, 

The Chairman. They would be, of course, aliens? 

Mr. Shivers. Oh, yes ; some aliens and some citizens. 

The Chairman. Some citizens ? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes. 

General McCoy. Army and Navy, T suppose ? 

Mr. Shivers. Army and Navy. We had some in the air corps, some 
in the infantry, some in the navy. 

The Chairman. I suppose that a great source of danger here was the 
uncensored short-wave radio sets, Mr. Shivers ? 

Mr. Shivers. That certainly is a definite threat and is now being 
used — is still being used to 

The Chairman. You think it is still being used ? 

Mr. Shr'ers. I think it is undoubtedly still being used for dissemina- 
tion of information to the army as to the territory. 

The Chairman. Now, how much monitoring are you able to do, or 
are any of these agencies able to do, of these radio sets ? 

Mr. Shivers. That is the problem of the signal corps of the Army 
and the Navy and the F. C. C. We do not monitor those. 

The Chairman. You do not monitor them ? 

Mr. Shivers. No, sir. 



870 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. I have heard it said somewhere here that there are 
but four monitoring sets in use on the Island now. Do you know any- 
thing about that? 

Mr. Shivers. I think, sir, the F. C. C. may have four monitoring 
Bets ; I mean by that, mobile. 

The Chairman. Mobile sets ? 

\_12Jf9'] Mr. Shivers. Mobile sets, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. In order to pick up a station that is sending from 
the Island ? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Get bearings on it? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And locate it? 

Mr. Shivers. But I am satisfied that there are considerably more 
than four actually doing the monitoring. 

The Chairman. Actually doing the monitoring ? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. As a result of that do you have knowledge whether 
sets have been picked up ? 

Mr. Shivers. Sets have been picked up ; whether as a result of that, 
I don't know. I rather doubt that it has been as a result of their loca- 
tion, but sets have been picked up in the general localities where the 
direction finder indicated. 

The Chairman. Of course it is very easy to construct a small sending 
set, isn't it? 

Mr. Shivers. Vei-y simple to one who knows how. 

The Chairman. Yes. Is there any Japanese-language propaganda 
being put out by the American authorities on Oahu now ? 

Mr. Shi\'ers. There is not. 

The Chairman. Is there much Japanese propaganda coming over 
short wave from Tokyo ? 

Mr. Shivers. Oh, yes. 

The Chairman. There is ? 

Mr. Shivers. Oh, yes. 

The Chairman. In Japanese? 

Mr. Shivers. In Japanese and in English, which is having its effect 
on the Japanese populace here. 

The Chairman. Well, now, is there any way to reach that ? 

\^1J{30^ Mr. Shivers. There is no way to reach that, sir, except by 
counterpropaganda and trying to jam the stations. 

The Chairman. Has there been any success in jamming them? 

Mr. Shivers. Not wholly, no, sir. They have been jammed at 
times, and other times they could not be jammed. I think the most 
effective way to combat that would be to have our own counterpropa- 
ganda system, which I understand is now in the process of being set up. 

The Chairman. It is in process of being set up ? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Mr. Shivers, do you happen to know whether the 
Army and the Navy were cognizant of your radio communication with 
your home office in Washington? 

Mr. Shivers. Oh, I know that the Army was. 

The Chairman. You do know that the Army was ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 871 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. And, oh, I know that the Navy was, too. 
Now, when I say Army and Navy I am referring to their intelligence 
agency. I know that Army intelligence knew that we did it, and 
I know that Navy intelligence knew that we did it. 

The Chairman. You don't know whether the operating staffs knew 
about it? • 

Mr. Shivers. I don't know about that. 

General McCoy. Have they ever used it ? 

Mr. Shivers. No, sir. 

General McCoy. They could have used it, of course, if they had 
asked you ? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you happen to know whether your radio was 
receiving satisfactorily on the morning of December 7 ? 

Mr. Shivers. It was, yes, sir. We received several messages on 
the morning of December 7. 

The Chairman. On that morning? 

[1431] Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Around the time of the attack ? 

Mr. Shivers. No, sir ; it was subsequent to the attack. 

The Chairman. Subsequent to the attack? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. We have been deeply impressed with the fact that 
the Japanese had perfect intelligence as to everything on this Island — 
topography troop movements, vessel movements, and everything else — 
and that the United States had practically no intelligence as to Japan- 
ese movements. Do you think that it was possible to have overcome 
that defect in our own information, from your experience here ? 

Mr. Shivers. From my experience here I think it could have been 
overcome. I don't think it could have been overcome here. I think 
there were but very few people, if any, not over one, perhaps two, 
who knew exactly what the Japanese contemplated. I think it could 
have been offset in Japan or somewhere in the East. 

The Chairman. Do you happen to know whether we have any 
espionage system in the East? 

Mr. Shivers. I do not, sir. 

The Chairman. And you don't happen to know whether we have 
any Army or Navy intelligence spies in Japan ? 

Mr. Shivers. I do not, sir. 

The Chairman. You think that would have been the only source, 
really, and not a source here on this Island ? 

Mr. Shivers. Oh, I don't see how we could have possibly gotten it 
here unless we would have had access to all of the diplomatic chan- 
nels that exist here. 

The Chairman. In other words, if you had had access to the mes- 
sages that they were sending over the commercial radio you might very 
well have spelled out a warning of action against this Island from 
those ? 

[14-32] Mr. Shivers. I think very definitely we would have 
known that, sir. 

Do you gentlemen — I don't know whether you want me to volunteer 
anything or not. 



872 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Certainly we do. We want to hear everything that 
is on your mind. 

Mr. Shivers. You asked me a moment ago if I thought I knew where 
the center of the Japanese espionage system was. I said the Japanese 
consulate. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Shi\^rs. I have reason for saying that, if you want those rea- 
sons. 

The Chairman. Well, do we want to go into the reasons ? I think 
your judgment is what we want on that. 

Mr. Shivers. I mean I can more or less give you documentary proof 
of that. 

General McCoy. I think your statement is sufficient. 

[143s] The Chairman. I think your statement is enough. 

Do you have anything. General ? 

General McNarney. No. 

The Chairman. Admiral Eeeves? 

Admiral Reeves. No. 

Admiral Standley. I would like to ask a question or two. 

I am I'ather at a loss to understand your statement about the divi- 
sion of the duties. You said the Navy had been assigned to the 
Japanese General Intelligence, as I understood you; is that correct? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir. 

Let me go over that again, sir. Originally the Army was respon- 
sible for their own personnel and installations; the Navy was respon- 
sible for their personnel and installations, and the F. B. I. was respon- 
sible for the civilian program. That was modified so that the Navy 
had jurisdiction over all this general intelligence pertaining to the 
Japanese by reason of the fact that the F. B. I. was not prepared to 
take over the investigating of the civilian Japanese in connection with 
the general intelligence because they did not have the language facili- 
ties and did not have the translators and, as I say, they did not know 
anything about it up to the time we took over back in 1939. 

Admiral Standley. The Navy was responsible for general intelli- 
gence relating to and concerning Japanese? 

Mr. Shivers. That was their prime responsibility, yes. 

Admiral Standley. And when the question of these consulates came 
up, the Navy recommended that the}^ be prosecuted ? 

Mr. SHI^^:RS. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. And the Army recommended to the contrary? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. And the Army opinion prevailed? 

[14^4;] Mr. Shi\'ers. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Does that make sense to you? Here is the 
Navy, responsible for it and the Navy recommends that these people 
be prosecuted, and the Army opinion prevails. It does not make 
sense to me. Does it make sense to you ? 

Mr. Shivers. Well, sir, that was the matter that was decided back 
in Wasliington. I have my own personal opinions about it. 

Admiral Standley. I would like to ask you this question : We know 
that in this attack on the Tth of December, or at least we have been 
informed by the people here, that there have been no acts of sabotage, 
no acts whatever during this raid. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 873 

Mr. Shivers. That is correct, sir, so far as I kiiow, and I think I 
would know if there had been any. 

Admiral Standley. Is that, in your opinion, conclusive evidence 
that if another attack should take place that there would be no sabo- 
tage ? 

Mr. Shh^rs. Absolutely not. 

Admiral Standley. Does that convey to you the possibility that 
that was deliberate so as not to alarm the people about sabotage so 
that when the real test came that sabotage would be effective? 

Mr. Shivers. It certainly could be so construed. 

Admiral Standley. I have heard the statement made here that 
because of the fact that there was none that there would not be any. 
Do you think that the people may be lulled into a false sense of security 
because of the lack of sabotage ? 

Mr. Shivers. I think undoubtedly there are some proponents here 
who would be lulled or want to be lulled into that train of thought and 
who would probably tiy to lull other people into that train of thought. 

Admiral Standley. You do not think that opinion is generally 
accepted ? 

Mr. Shivers, No, I do not by any manner of means. 

{11^35'] Admiral Standley. In your efforts here to obtain in- 
formation, you did not make an effort to go into the messages sent out 
by the private cable company, did you? 

Mr. Shivers. I made an effort to try to get them. 

Admiral Standley. But it was not successful ? 

Mr. Shivers. No, sir.. 

Admiral Standley. Have the F. B. I, — and do not answer this if you 
do not want to — been successful in accomplishing that in other places ? 

Mr. Shivers. That, sir, I would not be able to say because I have 
not been on the mainland in about two years. I could only say this : 
that you are dealing with different individuals and you may be able 
to talk one man out of something and you may not be able to talk 
the other man out of it. 

Admiral Standley. You were not able to talk any of these people 
out of it? 

Mr. Shivers. Well, we all tried it. 

The Chairman. Mr. Shivers, did you discover any cash funds in 
the consulate when you raided it? 

Mr. Shtvtrs. We did not raid it, sir. 

The Chairman. Well, who did? 

Mr. Shivers. I will tell you exactly what happened there. On the 
morning of December 7 before noon, about 10 or 11 o'clock, I found 
oiit that the Japanese Consulate was not guarded. 

The Chairman. It was not guarded? 

Mr. Shivers. It was not guarded. Thej'- still had telephone com- 
munications going in and out. I tried to find out who could prop- 
erly take over that duty there and I could not find anybody who 
would do it, so I instructed the Chief of Police to place a guard around 
the consulate for the protection of the consul general and the mem- 
bers of his staff and the consular property. That was done about 
noon. 

When they arrived, the consul was burning his documents, 
[^llf36'\ which he had been doing for several days previously. He 



874 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was just walking out to play a game of golf, and he had a document 
strapped to his leg which they found, but that document was of no 
importance. 

The Chairman. Was there a considerable amount of cash in the 
consulate ? 

Mr. Shivers. I understand there was around $20,000 there. 

The Chairman. In cash? 

Mr. Shivers. In cash, yes, and that was taken by the consul to 
the bank. I understand it was deposited there under the freeze order 
regulations. 

The Chairman. Where is the consul now? 

Mr. Shivers. He is at the consulate. 

The Chairman. He is in the consulate? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes. 

The Chairman. Is he telephoning much? 

Mr. Shivers. No, sir. I think his lines have gone dead or some- 
thing. 

The Chairman. Let me ask you this question, Mr. Shivers: You 
have been here quite a number of years. I gather from what you 
said that you think there are a number of young Japanese who would 
be loyal to the United States of America ? 

Mr. Shivers. That is correct, sir. I think there are some Japanese 
citizens of Japanese blood who are loyal, yes. 

The Chairman. What would you think would be the attitude of 
a considerable number of Japanese if an apparent successful invasion 
of this island by Japan was in progress? 

Mr. Shr^rs. You might modify that by saying this, that in my judg- 
ment the alien Japanese and on through some of the second-generati(m 
Japanese, that just as soon as Japan achieves some temporary decisive 
victory, the old spirit will begin to bubble forth, and at that time we 
are going to have some very serious trouble because of the cockiness 
of some of the alien Japanese, which is going to offend the white 
Americans, [1437] the Chinese, or the Filipinos. 

Such clashes can, as you gentlemen know, probably and possibly lead 
to a general riot. 

Now, if there should be an out-aud-out attack on this island by the 
Japanese Navy, reinforced by tlieir air arm, I think you could expect 
95% of the alien Japanese to glory in that attack and to do anything 
they could to further the efforts of the Japanese forces. 

You would find some second- and third-generation Japanese, who 
are American citizens but who hold dual citizenship, and you would 
find some of those who would join forces with the Japanese attackers 
for this and other reasons. Some of them may think they have si5'f- 
fered discrimination, economic, social, and otherwise, and there would 
probably be a few of them who would do it. 

The Chairman. What is your judgment as to the necessity for the 
future for maintaing such a strict military control as now exists? 

Mr. Shivers. I would say my best judgment, sir, is that the longer 
martial law is in effect the better off we will be here, and the opportuni- 
ties for that type of work will be kept to a minimum. 

The Chairman. I gather from what has been said that the Japanese 
around here are pretty well cowed and afraid ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 875 

Mr. Shivers. They are well afraid, pretty well afraid by this show of 
military force. I think that according to the Japanese psychology we 
can expect them to be subservient as long as America is on top. When 
we begin to suffer defeats, which we probably will, and they achieve 
some temporary decisive victory they will bubble forth and they will 
not show such subservience as they do now. As long as we are on top 
they will, but some of them will probably do anything they can. 

The Chairman, Thank you very much. 

General McCot. I would like to ask some questions. 

Mr. Shivers. I would like to ask if you gentlemen are [HS8~\ 
familiar with the signal system that was set up here on the island. 

The Chairman. You are refering to the message? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes. Are you familiar with the other messages, the 
contents of the messages ? 

The Chairman. Yes. You mean those messages setting up the sig- 
nal lights? 

Mr. Shivers. Those that preceded ; anything in regard to the move- 
ment of ships. 

The Chairman. Is that the Kita message ? 

Mr. Shivers. I do not know whether I should volunteer any evidence. 

General McCoy. Yes, decidedly so. Let us have it. 

The Chairman. This is after you discovered the evidence ? 

Mr. Shivers. The Dr. Mori message. 

The Chairman. Yes, we have the Dr. Mori telephone message, yes. 

Apparently the Army and the Navy were not able to interpret the 
meaning of that message as a warning of the attack ? 

Mr. Shivers. No, sir. 

These are the messages. On December 6, 1941, from Tojo, Foreign 
Minister, to Consul, Honolulu : 

Please inforai us immediatelj' of any rumors of movements of warships 
after 4tli. 

Tojo. 
December 5, 1941, from Kita to Foreign Minister, Tokyo : 

One, three battleships mentioned in your X239 of Friday morning, the 5th, 
entered port. They expect to depart port on the Sth. Two, on the same day 
LEXINGTON and five heavy cruisers departed. Three, the following warships 
were anchored on the afternoon of the Sth : eight battleships, three light cruisers, 
sixteen destroyers. Came in four cruisers of HONOLULU type and two de- 
stroyers. 

December 4, 1941, from Kita to Foreign Minister ■ 

[1439] On the afternoon of the 3rd British man-of-war entered Honolulu 
and departed early on the 4th ; about 1100 tons ; one stack and had four-inch 
guns fore and aft. Immediately after entering port, crew went ashore and were 
receiving mail at the British Consulate." 

December 4, 1941, from Kita to Foreign Minister, Tokyo. 

At 1300 on the 4th a light cruiser, HONOLULU class, hastily departed. 

December 3, 1941, from Foreign Minister to Kita, Consul, Hono- 
lulu: 

Strictly secret. Would like you to hold your list of code words (also those 
used in connection with radio broadcast) right up until last minute. When 
break comes burn immediately and wire us to that effect. 

Are you familiar with the system of signals ? 
The Chairman. Yes. 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 2 19 



876 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Shivers. And who prepared them? 

The Chairman. Who did prepare them? 

Mr. Shivers. A man by the name of Otto Kuehn. 

The Chairman. A German alien? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes. 

The Chairman. He prepared the offshore signals ? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes. He prepared the light on Lanakai that was to 
be prepared in the beach house, and the light in the Kalama house 
through the dormer window at his home. 

He was also to furnish signals to be given by an automobile, and 
if you remember, one light meant 1, 2, 3, 4, and two lights meant 
5, 6, 7, 8. 

Of course, we do not have a full story out of Mr. Kuehn. He 
admits, however, that he has been more or less working with the Jap- 
anese Government since about 1935 or 1936. He does not exactly 
admit that, but from what he has told us we know that he has been. 

He has received some $40,000 from Japan. 

[144^] In the latter part of October or the first part of Novem- 
ber the vice consul and another employee of the consulate who came 
here in June, 1940, Mori Morea, and a boy who drove for the consulate, 
went over to Kuehn 's home and at that time there was delivered to 
Kuehn the sum of $14,000. 

That Kuehn said he got from a Japanese whom he had never seen 
before and he can't explain why he got it. 

He said he went to the consul around the latter part of November 
trying to get the consul to send some money to his son, who is in Goeb- 
bels' department in Germany. 

The Chairman. In Goebbels' department? 

Mr. Shr'ers. Yes. The consul agreed to send $500 to the boy 
through Japanese channels. 

He then thought he should return the favor and asked the consul if 
he could fix up a set of signal devices for Japanese submarines off the 
Oahu coast. 

I have been working on that now and we will undoubtedly be able 
to clear up that situation soon. 

The Chairman. Haven't there been some indications that there 
was a signal light burning on Maui on the night in question ? 

Mr. Shi\t.rs. I do not think so, sir. We had an indication that 
there was a fire at Haleakela either Sunday or Monday night, and 
somebody went up there to the fire and when they got there two men 
scurried away. 

Now, the point iriven for the system of lights in Maui is the home 
of Carl Bassele. He bought a home about three months ago there. 

Carl Bassele claims to be of Swiss extraction, but I think he was 
trained in Germany. He is now a naturalized citizen but one of the 
most rabid and pro-Hitlerite individuals around here. 

So, it is quite possible that this money that Kuehn got from the 
consul was used to help Bassele buy this place on [144^] Maui 
for that particular purpose, although he claims the signals were not 
given and he had no intention about giving them. 

The Chairman. These messages that you have read to us between 
Kita and Tokyo were sent as commercial messages? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 877 

The Chairman. And you were not able to get those since you were 
not able to have access to the files ? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes. That was over the Mackay system. 

The Chairman. Which was not open to you before ? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes. 

The Chairman. Any other questions ? 

General McCoy. Yes. 

Do you have a recollection of a German, a member of the Foreign 
Office, by the name of von Trott, who came over here any time since 
the war began ? 

Mr. Shivers. Not that I know of, no, sir. 

General McCoy. He is amember of the German Foreign Office 
and he was in the United States. 

Mr. Shivers. You mean since 1939? 

General McCoy. Yes. He attended the Institute of Pacific Rela- 
tions in Virginia Beach. 

Mr. Shivers. Yes; yes, I do remember that definitely now. Yes, 
he did come through here. 

General McCoy. He has quite a world-round background. He came 
to the United States ostensibly to represent Germany at that con- 
ference. He left in December or January. That was 1939 and 1940. 
He was coming here to Honolulu and to Japan. Does that recall him 
to your mind? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, very definitely. 

General McCoy. He associated with Mr. Charles F. Loomis, secre- 
tary of the Institute of Pacific Relations and other members of that 
organization. 

Mr. Shivers. Yes. 

General McCoy. Did you have occasion to follow him ? 

[J44^] Mr. Shivers. He left, sir. He was here just one day; 
then he left for Japan. We didn't follow him since that time, although 
I think on the mainland he was checked up and investigated while he 
was on the mainland. 

As a matter of fact, I received a wire from the mainland that he was 
coming here and would contact certain individuals. I thought that was 
interesting. 

General McCoy. You do not know whether he lieas been in associa- 
tion or communication with people on the island since that time? 

Mr. Shivers. No, sir, I do not. 

General McCoy. He happens to be in Brazil just now. He is a friend 
of mine and I have had occasion to watch him through my associa- 
tions and through the State Department, and I knew he w^as coming 
through here after the conference. 

Mr. Shivers. I handled that personally, myself. I made that inves- 
tigation here and my recollection now is that he came out on the boat 
and probably went out on the Clipper. 

General McCoy. Have you react this article in the Reader's Digest 
on Japanese sabotage? 

Mr. Shivers. No, sir, I have not read it. 

General McCoy. It is titled, "Japanese Saboteurs in Our Midst," 
and is by Stanley High and is in the Reader's Digest for January 1942. 

It is mostly in connection with Japanese subversive action on the 
mainland. However, I would like to ask certain questions about it. 



878 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

It states : 

Last winter two retired Japanese officers — one for the Army and one for the 
Navy — toured our West Coast states to stir Japan's agents to renewed activity. 
They carried with them a secret document entitled The Triple Alliance and the 
Japanese- American War. One copy got into American hands. 

[144^] Do you know of any such document ? 

Mr. Shivers. No, sir. 

General McCoy. It states also: 

This textbook has much to say about Japan's "surprise fleet," with its "mine 
layers capable of carrying a heavy load of mines for distribution in American 
sea routes of merchantmen and battleships." "We can then," the booklet con- 
tinues, "strike the enemy fleet at a most opportune time and cut off communication 
lines as well as merchantmen." 

Have you had any information to that effect about such a surprise 
fleet? 

Mr. Shivers. Nothing about such a surprise fleet. We have had 
information that there were probably submarines off the coast of Lanai 
and Molokai. That was long before the hostilities. I would say that 
was about several months ago. 

General McCoy. Was that information given to the Navy? 

Mr. Shivers. That information came from the Navy to us, direct 
to us. 

General McCoy. Another document captured "is a map, likewise 
printed in Japan — an overall key to our Pacific naval defenses includ- 
ing Hawaii." Have you heard of any such map ? 

Mr, Shivers. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Have you seen any map of that sort? 

Mr. Shivers. Nothing except the map since the raid, sir. 

General McCoy. That was taken from the Japanese submarine? 

Mr. Shivers. I have seen that map. sir, and I have also seen maps 
apparently taken from some of the planes. 

General McCoy. From the Japanese planes? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir, from the aviators killed. 

General McCoy. It also states that more than 60% of California's 
American-born Japanese hold dual citizenship. [^4^] What 
percentage would you think would be the case here of those who hold 
dual citizenship? 

Mr. Shivers. I would sav it would be quite higher. 

General McCoy. Higher? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes. We have not been able to get any accurate in- 
formation on that because for a period of years the Japanese Consulate 
has refused to divulge that information, although they did give it up 
until several years ago. 

I would hazard a guess. I do not think over 15,000 expatriated citi- 
zens are in Honolulu, 

The Chairman. You mean not over 15,000 who have relinquished 
their Japanese citizenship? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes. 

General McCoy, Are there any Japanese Buddhist temples in 
Hawaii ? 

Mr, Shivers, Oh, yes, yes, quite a number, sir, 

Generay INIcCoy, Are there any Shinto shrines here ? 

Mr, Shivers, Yes, and if you gentlemen are interested I will leave 
this with you, because this gives the setup in Honolulu and also some 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 879 

of the Other sections, and it does give a graphic picture of thp Tnna 
nese activities here. Woiihl vou like to have ft? ^ ''""'^ °* *^' '^^P^" 
Ihe Chairman. Certainly. 
General McCoy. May we have it for our files « 
Mr. Shivers. I can give yon a copy for your files, sir. 

would ^\h.TT''' T^^f\^«"^ be very valuable to us, sir. If you 
would like to have a photostatic copy made, you can do that ^ 

Mr. Shivers Well, there are also others, but I can leave this here 
ItZr: Z^f"'-'' ''-' ^^— ^^^^ -^ ^---^ -f iLl^s 

Mr. Shivers. I would consider that so, yes, sir. 
IIUS] General McCoy. There is alko this statement: 
Almost every Japanese family in the U S is i mpmha,- nf r, ^xr >. 

controlis in the hauls rfotofJaSn^?op-flSts^^^^^^^ association; its hidden 
tionf *^^* ^^^^^«Pond with your information here as to the organiza- 

Mr Shivers That exactly corresponds to the organization here 
but where they have hundreds we have thousands. ' 

General McCoy. It also states : 

tio?'V'hteve'/sf mSt'a^ZdSro? T^' '^^'"^^^ ^^ *^^ '^^^^^'^ ^-««a- 
is forthwith formed It serves thP^oLS^ Japanese are gathered, an association 

trol of theL As'oition ™o SngT^K^^^^^ .C^" 

wholly in the hands of aliens Rphin^i tv^o ^^^^^^^^^ of Japanese— is almost 

anT4t\zatt^''l!ereT"'^'°''' "'*'' ^°"'' ''^P^"^""^ *at there is such 

Tn^n^AS" «'"'?• * "^'"- J '^^ '"'''""8 Japanese organization is the United 
^irt thtL®""-'''*/' ''"i™"y hundreds of societies radiate from that 

'■' Gentfr^iit^^TaL^^r^'" ''"' '"' '"' "^^ ^^' ^"*- 

be?n| cultlvi/e,]. '"'"'°''' °' "«= S^^^-^^t of the !jnf,ecl States the fielf is 

Is that correct ? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, that is correct in theory. The possibilitv is therP 
They have a setup and they can use it if they want to.^'^ ' 

in pe'ac"' timef '" ^^"' '' '' ^^"'^^'^^^^ ''^ ^^^ ^-^ «f ^^e United States 
Mr. Shivers. Yes. 
Mr"" ^^l^.'^^^'iJ- ^"^ H^^der martial law, it would not be ? 

C pAp. iT/ n ^^'■S'^' ','.^ '■ '^ ^^ "«* "^der martial law. 
General McCoy. Eeading further : 

we'rViVS'S^n^sSs^Stl^^^^^^ f'."/^"''^ ^"^^^^ ^^^ ^-^ed States 

u or any such sales talk. Driven by their own well-nurtured patriot- 



880 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ism and apparently unmolested by the government they are plotting against, 
their part in the anticipated triumph appears to be well prepared. 

Would you say that is correct ? 

Mr. Shivers. No, I would be inclined to doubt that except that it 
may apply to individuals, but not to the group entirely. 

General McCoy. You feel that the apparent freedom of the Japan- 
ese agents here has been due to the action of the War Department and 
its representative here, the Commanding General ? 

Mr. Shivers. I do not get that question, sir. Would you read it for 
me? 

(The last question of General McCoy was read by the reporter.) 

Mr. Shivers. No, sir, I do not. 

General McCoy. Well, your evidence would show that the failure 
to prosecute and to stop this type of work here was due to the recom- 
mendation of General Short that it would interfere with the efforts 
to keep intact or to play up to the [^-^4^] loyalty of the Jap- 
anese community? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, sir, but my statement there should be construed 
this way, that it was because of the position taken by General Short 
that the Japanese consular agents were not prosecuted criminally 
for having violated the provisions of the registration act, and in 
presenting the question of prosecution to the representatives of the 
Army and the Navy Intelligence, I felt that they should be con- 
sulted and they should give the opinions of their representative com- 
mands because I did not believe that the civil government should 
without their knowledge commit either the Army or the Navy to any 
lines of action that they would have to approve, or which would inter- 
fere with their actions and operations. 

General McCoy. You would consider that an error of judgment on 
the part of the Commanding General here, in the light of the subse- 
quent events? 

Mr. Shivers. Yes, I would consider it so, yes. 

General McCoy. I have no further questions. 

The Chairman. Thank 3^ou very much, Mr. Shivers. We are asking 
all witnesses not to discuss their testimony or to disclose outside what 
has gone on in this room. 

Mr. Shivers. Yes. 

Colonel Brown. Mr. Taylor. 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn? 

Mr. Taylor. Yes. 

TESTIMONY OF ANGUS M. TAYLOR, JR., UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 
DISTRICT OF HAWAII 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give your full name to the reporter and 
official position? 

Mr. Taylor. Angus M. Taylor, Jr., United States Attorney, Dis- 
trict of Hawaii. 

The Chairman. How long have you been District Attorney, Mr. 
Taylor? 

[144^] Mr. Taylor. I have been District Attorney since Novem- 
ber 16, 1940. 

The Chairman. Before that what position did you hold? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 881 

Mr. Taylor. I was first Assistant United States Attorney in this 
district. 

The Chairman. From what time ? 

Mr. Taylor. From January, 1940, up until that time. 

The Chairman. Did you come to the island in January, 1940? 

Mr. Taylor. I did, sir. 

The Chairman. Before that you were an agent of the F. B. I. ? 

Mr. Taylor. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. How long had you been an agent for the F. B. I. ? 

Mr. Taylor. Since 1934. 

The Chairman. You had been working on the mainland ? 

Mr. Taylor. Yes. 

The Chairman. Where have you been stationed, Mr. Taylor? 

Mr. Taylor. I have been stationed in various places. Customarily 
we go to Washington for a period of training, and then I worked in 
San Francisco, Washington, D. C., Minneapolis, Minnesota, and in 
the South, Memphis, Tennessee, Nashville, and Knoxville, the Far 
West, and practically all over the United States except the New Eng- 
land States, where I never have been. That is the only part I did not 
cover. 

The Chairman. We have some evidence, Mr. Taylor, that in 1940 
or 1941 the question arose as to the prosecution of certain consular 
agents of Japan. Are you familiar with that situation ? 

Mr. Taylor. I am familiar with the whole situation, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. When, according to your judgment, did the ques- 
tion of that prosecution first arise? 

Mr. Taylor. During the early part of 1941. I think it [^W] 
was in March that it came to my attention officially. 

The Chairman. Were you present at any conferences with respect 
to the proposed prosecution or suggested prosecution ? 

Mr. Taylor. I was, sir. Would you like me to qualify my state- 
ment? 

The Chairman. Yes, tell us your story as you have it. 

Mr. Taylor. I would be glad to, and just so the members of the 
Commission will know the facts and to get the background, I w411 give 
it. 

As United States Attorney it is my duty to decide whether or not 
certain criminal prosecutions are instituted within my district. For 
that reason I have close contact with all federal agencies and also the 
agents of the Army and the Navy who carry on investigative work. 

During 1940 ancl the latter part of 1939 the F. B. I. came here. I 
had been an agent, and I came out here originally for the F. B. I. in 
1935 for a short period. Getting back to the subconsular agents, they 
had been investigated by the F. B. I. and the reports were submitted 
directly to the Attorney General through their investigative units. 
For reasons of their own, certain facts would not come to the atten- 
tion of the district attorney here until the thing had reached its matu- 
rity ; and there was then the question whether the prosecution should 
be instituted. 

During 1941, May, I think it was, I had a communication from the 
Attorney General of the United States in connection wnth the work 
which had been done by the F. B. I. I was familiar with that because 
I was familiar with the work that they were doing and with the 
agents, and had daily contact with them. 



882 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

In that connection he asked me. if I would give my opinion as to 
whether the prosecution should be instituted against these several sub- 
consular agents. 

I having been here off and on since 1935 had a very definite attitude 
toward the Japanese, and at the request of [14^0] the Attor- 
ney General I contacted General Short and Admiral Bloch and asked 
them to send their representative to my office for a conference, which 
they did. They were Captain Mayfield of the Navy O. N. I. and 
Colonel Marston, G-2, representing General Short. Mr, Shivers of 
the F. B. I. was also present. 

We discussed the thing back and forth. It had been discussed for 
many years about what to do with the 130,000 alien Japanese here. 

We had the discussion, and the conclusion was this : I recommended 
to the Attorney General that these men be prosecuted. That was as 
early as June of 1941. I stated in my letter to him — which I have no 
objection of producing for you gentlemen, although I did not bring 
it here — that I felt that if we were ever going to divorce the influence 
of Tokyo from the Japanese in the island we had better begin now, 
because force was the only thing that they understood. 

In that same letter I outlined my opinions to the. General, which 
was referred to his staff officer, Colonel Marston, and they turned 
thumbs down on it due to the fact that they had their propaganda 
program, which to my mind was an appeasement program, saying, 
"If you be nice,^ood boys, we won't bother you." 

Captain Mayneld representing the ideas of Admiral Block recom- 
mended that we institute prosecution in the routine manner. My idea 
was to just proceed along, because we did not want to cause any flare, 
and my recommendations were forwarded, and that's all there was to 
it. 

Now, Mr. Justice Roberts, would you like me to give you my opinion 
as to my attitude with respect to this ? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Taylor. I would like to make this statement and it is based 
on my experience from observations from time to time, and that is 
that the Intelligence officers of both the Army and the Navy and other 
agencies that 1 have become ac(iuainted [14-5^] with are fine 
men but they are not trained in basic investigative work. They do not 
have the same kind of basic training that the civilian agencies do 
have. 

As early as 1935 I was in close touch with both the Army and the 
Navy Intelligence officers. There were certain problems during that 
time that were referred to, and they worked with my assistance. 

In 1939 Mr. Shivers came here with a small force and then it grew 
to a large force. Colonel Marston became closely associated with 
them. He had trained investigators working here, and at that time 
the Japanese problem specifically was being handled by the Navy 
Intelligence due to the fact that they had the interpreters, the trans- 
lators, and certain facilities which the F. B. I. did not have. As time 
went on the F. B. I. assumed certain responsibilities, and I do want to 
say, in my opinion, due to the experience that the F. B. I. could exer- 
cise a good deal of influence over the Army Intelligence officers. Now, 
it has been the opinion that a majority of the Japanese will be loyal, 
absolutely loyal. I feel that that is an opinion which has been arrived 
at due to certain economic causes. The Japanese block here is a very 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 883 

powerful one, and they have been careful enough in keeping it toned 
down. 

If this territory were a state they would immediately step forward, 
and they could then control the local legislatui-e or they could elect 
the governor, either a puppet or one of their own kind, or they could 
send to Congress Japanese or else men whom they could control. 

Now, I think the statistics will show that they have held back on the 
suffrage in this territory. 

Now, another point that affects the economic life of this territory 
is the tremendous control in that there is no room for a competitor, 
and they must conform or they will be ruined and have the whole thing 
smashed, and they could even establish their own insurance company. 
They own factor houses [-?4^^] something like the Big Five, 
and they have the association, and they control many things; they 
control distribution. You see the problem of these 130,000 people 
influenced by their race and their economic life. 

Well, those things would cause any person that Mr. Shivers would 
have contacted six months ago to say, "We have worked with these 
people, the Japanese, for days, day in and day out, and we consider 
them absolutely loyal." 

I am not surprised that having this get into the investigative hands 
and into the chief and then up to the intelligence officers all the way 
to the top, to the General in the Army and to the Admiral. If they do 
not get the proper information they cannot work on it intelligently. 

Now, even as late as November il, 1941, we had a public statement 
made by Mr. Shivers in which he was quoted in the "Advertiser" in 
which he stated in substance that the Japanese have nothing to fear 
and that we are not going to jail them, but that only the people who 
violate the law will be jailed. Now, of course that is fundamental. 
We do not jail anybody unless he violates the law. 

Well, now, during that time and prior to that time a speech like 
that made on the islands was in my opinion probably the biggest joke 
the Japanese have ever heard, to have anything like this coming from 
the investigative officers, but my opinion was formed on the Japanese 
prior to the Yth of December and it is based on information which I 
liave received in this territory. 

Now, is was my idea, as I told the Attorney General, that it was 
necessary to go ahead with this prosecution. I said the Japanese 
system, to a large extent, worked through the contact of these sub- 
consular agents and that when they took the census of the Japanese 
population that was for military purposes or for other purposes but 
that it was a technical violation of the law and was the only means by 
which we could get at them to dig [^4^3] into their espionage 
system. 

Some people will tell you, and I think if you go into the files of the 
investigative agencies you will find, that we have little or nothing in 
our hands with respect to the Japanese espionage system. Some peo- 
ple will say that they knew all about it before the 7th, but I was very 
familiar with the work of their organization and I was generally 
familiar with the subject and worked with all their investigative 
agents, and I had no idea, but these things happened, and there is noth- 
ing to give us any information about it. 

Well, I do not know how far you gentlemen want me to go. I do 
not want to go into too much of a detailed background, but this is a 



884 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

thing that is directly affected by the economic problems and has affected 
the economic life of this territory for years, and it will affect it as 
long as the control is concentrated in the hands of a few men who 
have their own selfish interests and they are used to doing business as 
they want to do business and in no other way, and they will brook inter- 
ference from no one. 

I do not know how much you want me to say. 

The Chairman. This is just following it up. 

With regard to the Army's belief that it would be better not to 
liave this and the advice received at that conference, what mstructions 
did you receive from then on ? 

Mr. Taylor. After recommending that these prosecutions be insti- 
tuted — I think it was June 21, 1941 — and at the same time the General 
through his staff officer gave me his opinion on it and began working 
through the Secretary of War. Then my next communication was to 
the effect that whether I should proceed with the prosecution unless I 
could give some more reasons to the Secretarj'- of War and there was 
a cablegram from General Short in which he stated that he had been 
advised by the F. B. I. men and many other investigative agencies — 
to the War Department — that such propaganda program would be 
successful and [^4-^-^] they had nothing to fear. 

There were other communications and the thing was terminated, 
but I had already communicated with Washington, with the Depart- 
ment of Justice, as to whether I should come to Washington and lay 
the facts before them, and they were still considering whether I would 
be authorized to travel when this thing happened on that Sunday. 

This has been going on for years. With respect to this particular 
problem they had a technical violation and that is just where it stood. 

Then on that Sunday they picked these people up. They are now 
in custody but they could have prosecuted them before. That is the 
status of the subconsular agents at the present time. They are in 
custody, but they were known for years and nothing was done about 
it until hostilities began. 

The Chairman. What is your attitude as to the Japanese here, 
should there be any Japanese victories or should there be a threat 
of a real invasion here by the Japanese, on this island? 

Mr. Taylor. I think, Mr. Justice, that there is no doubt that a 
majority of the younger Japanese of the third generation or American 
citizens will immediately turn over to their own race. There is no 
question in my mind about that. 

I appreciate the fact tliat many of them would like to lead a peace- 
ful, normal life here, and maybe that is why they came here, and many 
would like to be loyal, but no matter whether they would like to live 
a peaceful life — and the Japanese as a rule are a law-abiding group — 
but it is the system they have. The head of the group is the martyr 
of the family, and his word is law. No one can question his opinion 
in any way. If he orders it thev must do it. Then he is answerable 
to the district leader or the subconsular agents, in some instances, 
and that man is answerable to the consul himself or to the military 
agent and then right back to Tokyo. 

[M^S] Their Emperor is not just like our President; he is a 
god, and of course, as we all know, to defy him in any way would 
make the individual have to live a life of purgatory So, in my opin- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 885 

ion, whether they would like to lead as peaceful a life as possible, there 
is no question about it, because if he receives his order from the higher- 
up, whether from his agent or someone in the district or from the con- 
sul or the military agent, it will be carried out, in my opinion, no mat- 
ter whether he personally wants to do it or not. 

The incident at Niihau should have convinced anyone if they needed 
convincing, because they went right over to help that aviator. Mr. 
Robinson said to me that he was quite sure that those Japanese there 
would have been loyal to us, but tlie minute that aviator landed they 
gave him assistance, and the one that probably doubted what he was 
doing killed himself, which is a custom of theirs. 

Based on my experiences of the Japanese in this territory and on 
my information I think that if there were an invasion or something 
of that sort that they would go over to the other side. 

Now, an interesting point on that is that prior to joining the Axis 
the Japanese we had in the country — and I checked on this and I have 
it from sources, an uncle who investigated it, and there was comment 
as to whether the Axis were right, whether the Germans were right or 
whether the British were right, but immediately upon joining the 
Axis there was no discussion about the war. They just stopped talk- 
ing about it and they would not talk about it, and there was always 
the hope for peace between Japan and the United States and never 
any talk about war, and that was also in the local press. I could go 
on like this. Do you want me to ? 

The Chaieman, I gather from what you say that you think it 
essential that the military control here should remain ? 

Mr. Taylor. That I do, most emphatically. I still have [1456] 
my civilian title, but I have acted as legal advisor to the executive 
officer of the Military Governor, Colonel Green, and I have been 
working with Colonel Green, but I still maintain my own office, but I 
do feel that you should know that I have studied this situation. I 
came in this territory with the Antitrust Division to look into these 
corporations and the structure of these corporations and so on and I 
learned the bad side of this territory, not both sides as you see here, 
as commissions do — of course there has never been a commission like 
this — but the usual commission sees only the beauty, and they make 
an investigation, and they are wined and dined and they see some hula- 
hula girls, and they go out and they see the Japanese children saluting 
our flag one time and do not see them thumbing it the next. 

Now, I feel very strongly on this problem, and I have sent my re- 
ports back to Washington and they have been filed away, and I think 
it is important that you gentlemen realize the strength of this thing. 
You should realize the lobby that they maintain in Washington and 
the strength that they have. I can show you that by an example. 

The United States (jovernment had ordered our office to file a suit 
for a certain piece of property, and this property was owned by the 
Hawaiian Dredging Company, which is a firm -yhich is controlled and 
owned entirely b}^ Walter Dillingliam, a very powerful figure in this 
community. 

[1457] As assistant I was instructed to file this condemnation 
suit. I did, included a certain area, and also in that area it included 
all of the main buildings there were, and where a pier was to be con- 
structed they already had piers there. Well, he has numerous con- 



886 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tracts with the Army and Navy. Well, they were aghast when the 
Army had requested that we take over the facilities down there. I 
said, "Well, I anj sorry. I have had instructions from the Attorney 
General, and the certificate of necessity was signed by the Secretary 
of War." 

Of course, we went right ahead with it, condemned it. The title 
was vested in the United States, or rather, immediate possession, and 
we proceeded under 171 of Title 50 in that particular case and went 
right ahead. 

Well, they could exert such power that about, oh, sometime after- 
wards their attorney, Mr. Rand, came to me — he represents some of 
the Dillingham interests — and said, "Mr. Taylor, you will receive a 
wire from the Attorney General in a few days instructing you to dis- 
miss parcels 1 and 2," that area at which their facilities were located. 
And I did receive that wire, and we dismissed those parcels 1 and 2, 
at the suggestion of the Secretary of War, right on down the line, and 
that was contrary to the wish of the Commanding General of this area 
here now — if you can figure that one out. 

And it is a stupid proposition from a business standpoint. Here we 
give back to them an area within a danger area which will be a govern- 
ment reservation, which we will have to give them some right of way 
to go over to get to their property there, which in itself is dangerous; 
and if we ever need that area now we will pay through the nose for it, 
a dollar or so a square foot. It is very valuable industrial property 
now. 

But that is just one of the instances there, and it has always been 
an old Hawaiian custom. "Well, here is Taylor out here in 1935. 
He is digging into this anti-trust business." And it is off the subject, 
but it is on the subject, as far as [Jl4o8] concerns the powers 
that they could exert back there. Here we had an open and shut 
violation of the anti-trust laws. I followed my report in, and pretty 
soon all gone, nothing done. Nothing ever done. They did cancel 
those contracts, which were absurd, in violation of many laws, but 
no action was ever taken. And the next year, I found, now the same 
situation exists, and this sort of thing is rampant. Not only myself. 
I think you should ask other people that have had difficulties of that 
sort. 

Here we commenced an action here by the noruud moans of com- 
munication, such as naval radio or commercial radio. What do 
they do? They are on the long distance telephone. They have the 
mattress all set to receive the bomb when it gets to AVashington. and 
it hits lightly and is covered over, and that's all there is to it. And 
those things are not idle fancies of mine but all can be borne out by 
records. And that is a thing, that force and that selfish feeling, that 
has formed the opinions of these men which were transmitted to our 
officers here and on up to our higher officers up to the commanders 
which shaped the policy of this Territory in reference to the Japanese. 

Admiral Standley. Mr. Taylor, confining your answer to the mar- 
tial law, do you think that, for instance, it should be modified in con- 
nection with the school children going to school? Do you think it 
should be modified to some extent there ? 

Mr. Taylor. May I say this: that right now, for instance, I think 
there should be certain relaxations and modifications when we get a 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 887 

general alarm system in. We don't have one now. There is no way 
to put out a general alarm in this territory at the present time, and 
I personally advocate opening the schools, because I think it would 
help the morale of the people in general, when we had a general alarm 
system that would alarm every [14^9] one and when we had 
adequate bomb shelters to take care of them in the event of a raid. 
Those two things. Wlien you can answer those two questions, I 
would say yes. It helps out the mothers with crowded homes. They 
have the children hanging around there getting into trouble, stum- 
bling over everybody. It would help morale of everybody to have the 
schools open. But right now it is a safety factor, and that alone, 
and I think that that is the idea of the Military Governor, and as 
soon as those two safety factors can be provided for he will relax 
that order in reference to the scliools and any other type of public 
meeting that is necessary. 

Admiral Standley. I noticed in this morning's paper that there 
was a notice of a meeting of the liquor board on Fridfty to discuss 
the relaxation of the martial law in regard to liquor. AVhat is your 
idea in regard to that ? 

Mr. Taylor, Well, I think that would come back — you see, under 
the present setup, going on my theory, and which a few people are 
coming over to now — ^I had very few in my camp up here until a few 
weeks ago, but I have a few more followers now. But it is an ex- 
cellent thing from a law enforcement standpoint to have every citizen 
in his home. Then with the potential saboteurs that might be roam- 
ing around, if we caught any man on the street : "Wliy are you there?" 
he has got to explain why he was there, in no uncertain terms, or he 
is subject to prosecution. 

Well, now, that can't go on forever, but we have problems here 
that don't exist, say, in places like England where they have almost 
a unified population and a general alarm system and numerous bomb 
shelters, and the saboteur is the exception there rather than the usual 
thing that you might run into. 

The liquor is a problem. Now, I think if you will investigate other 
countries you will find that most of them have light wines and beers 
that can be sold, and that is the normal drink [14^01 consumed 
by the average person, and they have allowed the pubs to be open 
until about nine p. m., from twelve to about nine p. m., and it is a 
means of recreation for the enlisted men and otlier personnel of that 
type and I think has a good effect. 

But then, on the other hand, you have got to consider the problem 
of transportation. We have our bases located a good way from the 
city here, and there is the question of law enforcement with these men 
half swacked after being in these pubs here. Yet, on the other hand, 
it is really a need for fighting men to have some recreation and relax- 
ation. But then you have got to consider, when you consider liquor, 
the safety angle, the curfew law that is now in existence, the trans- 
portation problem; and if you relax anything I think that a very 
limited relaxation as far as public places are concerned would be, 
after these other safety factors have been taken care of, all right, and 
I think I would advocate it. I don't think that for any extended 
period of time we can be as rigid as we are now, and it will have a 
direct effect on the morale of the fighting men and the citizens here. 



888 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

But I think, as far as whiskey and hard liquors are concerned, they 
l^robably could be sold by the package to the individual, to be con- 
sumed in homes and not in public places. Then that would keep them 
at home, and it would keep down the general bellyaching that you 
might hear; and then with the combination of a later curfew, which 
you might establish at any hour you wanted — seven, nine, or ten — 
it would probably regulate the whole problem, help morale in general, 
and we would be able to operate from the standpoint of law enforce- 
ment. I have the personal belief right off the bat that no liquor, black- 
outs forever — this, that, and the other — that hurts morale in the long 
lun. You can't go forever like this. The people have reacted splen- 
didly, and with very few exceptions from the very morning of the 
invasion right on up they turned to, the high and the low, the man in 
the street and the boys shouldering arms. And they gave their houses, 
\j46l] they gave their automobiles, everything. All blacked out. 
Only a mistake where it wasn't completely blacked out. And that 
can be worked out, I think, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Is it your idea to make no changes about the 
relaxation until these safety measures are put into effect* 

Mr. Taylor. Absolutely. And I think that for myself and for you 
gentlemen while in Honolulu, of course, we have to sacrifice some- 
thing now on our setup, but it is worth it to our general safety ; and 
I think, from the stand])oint of any relaxation, there has been a little 
private indignation of the bar to try to further relaxation of the gen- 
eral orders suspending the activities of the general courts and circuit 
courts, the Territorial circuit courts here, because some of the lawyers 
were not making as much money as usual. Well, I think a lot of us 
are not going to make as much money as usual before this thing is 
over, and I think it is entirely selfish and would weaken the whole 
structure of martial law in this territory to relax in any way the court 
orders now in existence, because due to the weight of authority — 
there is very little authority as far as martial law is concerned and 
no situation exactly comparable to this. But I feel that if we should 
allow the civil courts to operate even in a limited manner without 
juries, without subpenaing witnesses — that is, members of the Army 
and Navy personnel — we would so Aveaken our ]3osition on the other 
side that our military commission functioning here, its riglit to func- 
tion in the jurisdiction, might be seriously impaired. But if in six 
months from now or one month from now things do clear up in such 
a way those things can be changed, but right now I think we should 
hold everything steadfast — if it is — and dig in, and then we can relax 
as Ave see fit later on. We can't do it at one time, or you can't satisfy 
everyone in this town, or any town, as to [J4&^] what they 
want. It is impossible. 

Admiral Standley. I liaA^e no further questions. 

Admiral Reeves. T have nothing. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. District Attorney. 

Mr. Taylor. All right, sir. Nothing else ? 

The Chairman. No. 

Mr. Taylor. Could I make a statement independent of questions, 
Mr. Justice Roberts? 

The Chairman. Yes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 889 

Mr. Tatix)r. I would like to make this one statement: I feel that 
there has been in existence prior to the invasion, and, as the evidence 
has come to me, since the invasion, a lack of coordination between the 
federal investigative agencies of this Territory. Now, I am referring 
specifically to the F. B. I., to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and to 
G-2. Those three. And I think it so important that it should be 
brought to your attention ; and it is a thing that, due to the relation 
with these organizations, a statement of which I made to you in the 
first instance, I have a chance to closely observe. 

Now, from an ideal standpoint one of those agencies should be desig- 
nated as a clearing house, and any information that came to any of 
the three should be carefully cleared through the other two. It would 
eliminate the great deal of loss of time. They would be able to in- 
telligently do the work of the offices. 

Now, I know that it will be denied probably, and probably has been 
denied. You get the picture of a very rosy existence, friendship, arm 
in arm going together, but that is not the case, and I think it is time 
now for us to throw aside those little petty jealousies. 

The F. B. I., of course, is a fine organization, an organization that I 
was attached to for a long time. I have great faith in their ability, 
but there are other good investigative agencies, too. The Army has 
a good man here, the Navy has [i4^-^] a good man here, and 
they should get together, throw off their personal feelings, and all 
three work in harmony ; and I think possibly if that had been done we 
might have scratched the Japanese espionage system, rather than each 
agency hoping to break the big spy case first. And that is not idle 
talk.' I know that. I worked with those men. Naturally, from a per- 
sonal standpoint each agency wants to break the first big spy case. It 
didn't make any difference to me; I would have prosecuted whether 
the Navy broke it, the Army broke it, or the F. B. I. broke it ; and unless 
you have an intelligence clearing house and harmony among those 
organizations we won't get that information that is so vital to us 
now, we've got to have, and the officers in command of these units here, 
and it will directly affect tactical problems and internal problems and 
the whole picture. 

Unless we have intelligent information no officer can operate his 
fleet or operate his army or any part of it or command his district 
intelligently, and that is one of the paramount difficulties as far as I 
see it, besides this other thing that has happened. I would like to see — 
and I think the men here probably can work that out, but it has not 
been worked out up to this time, and even after the invasion there was 
still evidence in existence — and that is the thing that should have 
ended all feeling — of personal feeling right here. Even if there had 
been any in the past, it should have been stopped right there. 

Admiral Standley. May I ask one question 'i 

Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. About the Adjutant General here. General 
Smoot, is it? 

Mr. Taylor. Yes. General — Colonel Smoot. 

Admiral Standley. Does he command the Hawaiian troops that are 
drafted ? 

[14-64] Mr. Taylor. Colonel Smoot was the officer in charge of 
the Hawaiian National Guard prior to the institution of the selec- 



890 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tive service system. At that time he was made director of the selective 
service system. Now, since the invasion there was some talk of his 
being in command of a home guard, but by order of the Commanding 
General the home guard was put under the Provost Marshal and 
is at the present time. I noticed in the press this morning there was 
some statement about his going to command some other outfit prob- 
ably equivalent to a home guard, of men up from I believe 18 to 44 
or 40. I don't remember the age limit, but anyway Smoot appears 
again this morning as being the officer in charge of some new home 
guard outfit, but I know definitely that he was first in charge of the 
home guard of Hawaii, and then that was transferred by the Gen- 
eral's orders to the Provost Marshal and is now under the Provost 
Marshal. - 

Admiral Standley. In your suspicion of the loyalty of the Ha- 
waiians of Japanese blood, does that extend also to those who have 
been drafted into the service and are now being trained in the Army ? 

Mr. Taylor. I think so, sir. I think there is no limit; that is, as 
far as my statements go I think that one of the biggest mistakes 
we could ever make is to have men out there in a position where they 
could do harm to us, and you see these vital projects being guarded 
and you wonder wliether we have been invaded when 3'ou look at them : 
it is strictly Japanese around the installations around here, guard- 
ing those posts. I personally am bitterly opposed to that, and would 
put them in a work battalion and put them out somewhere, out where 
they could do no damage, except dig a little bit if you want them to dig. 

Admiral Standley. I have no further questions. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

Admiral Standley. I would like to follow your statement 
[7^.5] there in regard to these various investigative agencies. I 
understand that these agencies have responsibilities which are inde- 
pendent of each other : the Navy, Pearl Harbor, the Army, the Army 
installations, the F. B. I., with the civilians. Is that your under- 
standing ? 

Mr. Taylor, That is correct, sir. And prior 

Admiral Standley. Wait a minute. 

Mr. Taylor. Oh. Pardon me. 

Admiral Standley. I want your answer to that. Now, then, there 
is necessarily, where these people are working as they are here, an 
overlapping of duties? 

Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Functions. Well, now, with the setup as it is, 
that is, the state, the fact that there are separate agencies, they have 
separate responsibilities ; they liave overlapping responsibilities. Just 
liow would you get that central agency ? Put them all under one head ? 

Mr. Taylor. Yes, I think it would be very well theoretically to be 
under one head. They could be divided up. Prior to the invasion, 
for instance, if the F. B. I. had got a certain set of facts that led 
them to Pearl Harbor they couldn't go through and go on and call on 
them. That in my opinion is absurd. They should carry on through. 
They would turn them over to O. N. I. then, and probably they wouhl 
give them all the information or possibly just say they have a pos- 
sible suspect in the yard there and go and look and find out who he is, 
and then you lose the very basis of the investigation, and you can't 
carry it through. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 891 

I think at this time what should happen is that there would be a 
general clearing house there. The minute Capatin Mayfield would 
know about it Colonel Feilder would know about it or Shivers would 
know about it, and if necessary assign one man from each office, and 
there would be no feeling whatsoever; \^lJf66^ carry right on 
through, going into any district they wanted to go into. They would 
all be informed of what happened; while in the past what actually 
happened was: In certain cases there when they got outside of this 
plan, that jurisdictional plan which you just mentioned, well, they 
would very definitely refer it to the other one, and that was all there 
was to it. If they were able to break the case, fine. 
'. And that is manifested in the Coquelle case. You are strangers 
here. That was the case there involving a civilian employee down at 
Midway. Mr. Shivers had the name first. He just turned it over, 
and they checked it, and you probably read about it in the press. 
This was a man who secreted certain maps of an area, Midway 
Island, and when they found out and he was apprehended by the 
Navy here the Navy carried through on the case entirely. Well, then 
when the case actually broke Shivers wanted to know from me what 
it was all about. I said, "See Captain Mayfield. He can tell you. 
I am not going to give you his confidential files." 

"Oh, that's all right. We will just let it go." 

Well, that is right on the line. That is no condition to exist as far 
as our work is concerned here. We will never get anywhere that 
way. 

And these Japanese are the most difficult people to deal with in 
the world from the investigative standpoint. With any other race 
you would be able to deal through informers; Hell, you can buy 
them off for anything. But not Japanese. Money means nothing 
to them. You can't put the fear of God into them. They don't care 
about any threats of any sort of bodily harm that can be done to 
them. 

Admiral Standlet. Then I gather that your criticism is not of 
individuals but of a system ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Taylor. Well, I think the system is bad, but I think the in- 
dividuals that are carrying out the system in some \^H67\ in- 
stances must broaden their vision, must be able to take advice from 
not only their superiors but from men working under them, and I 
refer to Mr. Kobert L. Shivers specifically, or he will never get any- 
where, never be able to comprehend the situation. 

Admiral Standley. Your criticism, then, is of Mr. Shivers ? 

Mr. Taylor. On that line, on that one thing, yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. As to the Army and Navy officials have you 
criticism of them in the same line ? 

Mr. Taylor. I think from that standpoint that each of the agencies 
have in the past held out things on the others, and when and if they 
petered out to nothing, sure, they gladly sent G-2 or O. N. I. or 
F. B. I. a complete report of what fizzled out. 

We had a most amazing case here- — I would like to tell you about 
it if you would like to hear about it — that brings out my one point on 
the one thing : 

O. N. I. was dealing with the Mitosi case we refer to here, the 
phoney spy case. Someone from oue of the other federal agencies 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 143, vol. 2 20 



892 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

there, the tax unit, came in and said, "I have got a real man here that 
can turn over the spies to you." That was the thing we would all 
grab at. That was the best news anybody ever had. 

Well, O. N. I. didn't say a word to anybody about it. "We have 
got a spy catcher here now, and we are going to keep him." 

Well, what happened, he was a phoney. He was going out and 
he got cards, and he had these old alien Japanese filling them out: 
name, address, religion, and so forth. Where are you from? And 
then after they signed it he would put on there the oath of loyalty to 
the Japanese Government. It states, in substance, "I will protect 
any spy that comes into the Territory of Hawaii and assist him iij 
any way that I can." 

That was red hot. Then he had the old alien where he [-?-^^<§] 
wanted him. So he would take that card in and come back to the victim 
and say, "The Naval Intelligence — " or the Army Intelligence — "has 
gotten that card out of my possession, but I have a Japanese clerk in 
that office, and if you will give me $2,000 I can recover that card for 
you." And it was an excellent shakedown racket practiced over here, 
and here the Navy main informer was the shakedown artist and at the 
same time he was giving this information to the Navy, when if they 
had checked with the F. B, I. they had a long record there. He had 
been in Kaneohe, the bughouse over here. 

The police, to show how little they knew what they were doing, 
picked up the Navy's prize informer. Now, they took and incarcerated 
him, turned him over to the F. B. I., and the F. B. I. wouldn't even 
let the Navy see him. Figure that one out. 

Admiral Reeves. I think somebody had better get busy on these 
things. 
The Chairman. I think so too. 

Mr. Taylor. And the case is pending in my court now, the whole 
record, the whole report. And then of course, certainly, there was a 
conference there. So the main informer of the Navy was picked up 
here, and the F. B. I. had him and they wouldn't let them see him, 
and they got together, and they were at loggerheads. The Navy still 
thought they had a good informer in this man* because he was giving 
them very thorough information in reference to spies, and they had 
nothing but a big shakedown scheme. And still that was the whole 
mess there, and the one was holding the other. And there are other 
instances. 

But there is no time now for a man's personal vanity to be satisfied. 
It is the old feeling that "I want to control everything." I have not 
said for a minute that the F, B. I. is not an outstanding investigative 
organization. Mr. Hoover is a fine man; he has got fine men under 
him. But when his men get too little to be able to cooperate a hundred 
percent with the [14(>0] other investigative agencies or to take 
advice, it is time for them to resign. 

Admiral Standley. I haven't anything further. 
The Chairman. Very much obliged to you, sir. We have asked all 
the witnesses to observe the caution not to discuss anything that has 
occurred in the room. 

Mr. Taylor. All right, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, you have some Army and Navy men out there. 
Mr. Taylor, I don't think Mr. Kimball could cover anything on this 
back£:round that you haven't covered. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 893 

Mr. Tayx,or. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Could he ? 

Mr. Tayx,or. Well, I know that you gentlemen are in a hurry, Mr. 
Justice Roberts, but I would suggest, sir, rather than take one man's 
opinion for this vicious setup that is in existence, that you hear from 
men born and raised here. 

The Chairman. Well, we have got ample evidence, I think, along 
the lines of your view about martial law here and about not relaxing 
the military control. There have been various citizens who have testi- 
fied along that line, and I think that is the thing that he is particularly 
interested in. 

Mr. Taylor. Well, he is. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED 
STATES NAVY— Recalled 

The Chairman. Admiral Kimmel, we have received your state- 
ment of the corrections and additions that you desire made to your 
evidence as given. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. We are going to include in the record your com- 
plete statement of your desire as to corrections; and then, in order 
that we shall have the story complete, for the use of the Commission 
we are going to have a retranscript of [1^70] your evidence 
made with these insertions and corrections. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. We feel that we ought not to alter the record as 
it was made the other day, but in order to have this a sensible running 
statement that we can follow, we are going to have the whole tran- 
script, this part, revised w^ith your corrections, so that our eye will 
catch the corrections and we shall have a running statement and a con- 
nected story instead of the broken story that the record shows. 

(Statement of Admiral Kimmel as to recommendation for revision 
of transcript is as follows :) 

Honolulu, T. H., January 5, 19^2. 
From : Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy. 
To : President's Commission to Investigate the Attack on the Fleet at Pearl 

Harbor on 7 December 1941. 
Subject : Recommendation for Revision of the transcript of Rear Admiral H. B. 
Kimmel's testimony before the Commission on December 27 and 29. 

1. On page 530 of the transcript to the record there appears a statement "Ad- 
miral Kimmel read from a statement." It is requested that this statement be 
Included in toto at this point, to face page 530. The statement tliat was read 
follows : 

"In submitting the report of operations undertaken on 7 December it is per- 
tinent to state that only incomplete and rather hurriedly made reports have 
been received from Patrol Wing TWO and the Task Forces which were operat- 
ing at sea. The Staff of the Commander-in-Chief has been continuously engaged 
in planning for and [Hll\ directing oi)erations which have been under- 
taken since the attack. If discrepancies exist, as they probably do, in these re- 
ports, it is due to a lack of full information and it will probably be some time 
before complete reports can be assembled. 

"It has been our endeavor to get ahead with the war operations and to at- 
tend to the multitudinous details of reorganization and reconstruction which 
arose as a result of the attack rather than to concentrate on the preparation of 
reports of what had occurred. 



894 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"The reports are still coming in from individual ships and I xmderstand the 
Staff of the Commander-in-Chief is devoting as much time as they can to com- 
piling these reports which will be submitted in due course and from them as 
much more effective reconstruction of events can be made." 

On page 531 there appears a statement "Admiral Kimmel read from a report". 
It is requested that this should be amplified to include the statement that "Ad- 
miral Kimmel read from a report from Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy 
to the Secretary of the Navy, dated December 21, 1941 number A16-3/( 02088). 
The subject: "Report of the Action of 7 December 1941" Copy of this report 
appended marked "Kimmel exhibit number ". 

On pages 533, 534, and 535, it is stated that "Admiral Kimmel read from a 
report entitled 'Narrative of Events Occurring During Japanese Air Raid, Decem- 
ber 7, 1941' ," The following additions should be made : 

"This narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 
1941 is submitted as enclosure (A) to the report of the action of 7 December 
1941, [14721 submitted by Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel on December 21, 
1941, letter number A16-3/ (02088), and is appended to the record as enclosure 
(A) to Kimmel exhibit number ." 

On page 537, the statement appears that "Admiral Kimmel read from a report 
entitled 'Disposition of Task Forces on December 7'." There should be added 
at this point the statement that this report was enclosure (D) to the report of 
the action of 7 December 1941, submitted by Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel to the 
Secretary of the Navy, dated December 21, 1941, letter number A16-3/( 02088) 
and it is appended to the record as enclosure (D) to Kimmel exhibit number . 

My written statement of 17 pages which I read at the hearing on 27 December, 
together with such interpolations as may have been made in the reading thereof 
has been omitted from the transcript. It is requested that this statement, to- 
gether with all interpolations that may have been made be included, beginning 
on page 538 of the transcript. The insertion of this statement is considered 
absolutely essential for the completeness of my recorded testimony. 

On page 546 and page 547 I request that it be made clear that the letter referred 
to was prepared in the Navy Department after the attack at Taranto and that 
all the quoted matter on these pages were a part of the same letter. 

On page 548, 7th line from the bottom — the word "investigation" should be 
changed to "recommendation." 

On page 549 — It is requested that the following be eliminated beginning with 
line 2, "In the letter of the Bureau of Ordnance which modified this, I particularly 
stated that I did not take it in, and [/-'/7-^] after this the thing was thor- 
oughly gone over. That was what remained in my mind. We will look it up, 
sir," and the following inserted in its place "I have some recollection of such a 
letter but its contents left me with the conviction that we were safe from torpedo 
plane attacks in Pearl Harbor. That was what remained In my mind. We will 
look it up. sir." 

14th line from the bottom, add — This is my exhibit 15 and should be appended 

as part of tlie record as Kimmel exhibit number ^and so referred to at this 

point. 

On page 550, line 10 from the bottom — It is requested that this security order, 

my exhibit number 16, be appended to the record as Kimmel exhibit number 

and that a note to that effect be made at this point. 

On page 551 — The order of October 14. 1941, "Kimmel exhibit number 2," 
should be inserted at this point in its entirety as Kimmel Exhibit. This is num- 
bered Exhibit 16 in Admiral Kimmel's folder. 

On page 552, line 1 — The words "exhibit 18" should be deleted as they are not 
gei'mane at this point. 

On page 553, line 7 — Delete the words "Exhibit 19" which are not germane 
at this point. 

On page 556 it i.s noted that following paragraph 4 of the joint air agreement 
the authentication is omitted. This authentication is: "Approved 21 March 1941, 
signed C. C. P.LOCH, Rear Admiral. U. S. Navy, Commandant 14th Naval District 
and W. C. SHORT, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding Hawaiian 
Department." 

[i7/74] On page 55&-0, line 2 fi'om the bottom — before the word "Pearl" 
insert the words "the defense of". 

On page 558, line 1 — there should be put a period after "practically" and 
the remainder of the sentence deleted. 

On page 561, line 18 — change to read 'We had not suflScient air force to main- 
tain this patrol and if the patrol had been sent out we had no air striking force 
left to go after the enemy when we found him". 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 895 

On page 562 reference is made to Kimmel exhibit 3, to be included in the 
testimony. This has already been quoted in extenso in the transcript beginning 
on page 556 and extending to page 556-0 through pages 556-A-556-N, and con- 
cludes on page 556-0. 

On page 567 at the bottom of the page add : "This is included as my exhibit 

number 9", which I request be appended as Kimmel exhibit number , and 

be so referred to at this point. 

On page 571, line 9 — delete the words "I think" and substitute the word "for". 

On page 571, lines 12 and 13 — delete the words "which were" and the words 
"and they". On line 16 substitute "80%" for '99%" and in line 18 substitute 
"90%' for "99%". Line 21 — change to read: "It appears that almost all the 
ships were firing with one or more guns within two minutes of the first alarm". 
Line 11 from the bottom — change to read : "We had all guns fully manned, in 
full operation and inflicting damage within five minutes of the first alarm". 
The remainder of the paragraph to stand as it is. 

On page 572, line 18— change to read : "Some of them didn't even think about 
reporting the time they opened fire". "This is a special report in answer to a 
specific questionnaire". 

[1^75] On page 573, line 7— delete the words "no matter whether we had 
the same man or not". Line 12 adds: "Except that two .50 caliber guns were 
completely manned". 

On page 575, line 7 — change "Unav" to "Bunav". 

On page 577, line 10 from the bottom — delete the words "they also made 
another". Ltne 9 from the bottom should read : "They were to make the daily 
search until further orders". Line 8 from the bottom — -delete the words "and 
because we only had that one patrol squadron there". Begin a new sentence 
with "We". 

On page 578, line 8 — change the word "They" to "We". 

On page 602, line 13 from the bottom — change to read : "It is the same subject", 
etc. 

On page 604, line 14 — change "landed" to "launched". 

On page 607, line 8 — change to read "To cover that circuit around Oahu con- 
tinuously we had to have two or three hundred planes to insure against a sur- 
prise air attack". Line 14, change to read : "We would have to run a patrol", 
etc. Line 18 — following "but" eliminate 'to do anything but and substitute 
"doing anything other than what" . 

On page 611, line 5 — change "decks" to "docks" ; eliminate "the bridges" and 
substitute "board". 

On page 612, line 1, add : "We delayed the sortie of heavy ships due to the 
report that mines had been dropped in the channel". Line 2 — eliminate the word 
"them" and substitute "the cruisers". Line 3 — change to read : "By that time 
the mine report was discounted and she went out". 

On page 612, line 8 — change to read : "Batdiv-1, consisting of three ships, came 
in on the third: Batdiv-2 [1^/76] and 4, consisting of five ships, came in 
some days before that". 

On page 614, line 13 from the bottom — change the word "agreement" to "sched- 
ule". Line 11 from the bjOttom — change to read : "and they were due to come in, 
Task Force One on 28 November and Task Force Two on 5 December. Task 
'Force Three was due to depart Pearl on 5 December and to return on 13 
December". Line 4 from the bottom — after the word "had" insert the words 
"more than". 

On page 615, line 8 — change to read "I think that Task P^orce Three w^as out 
in its entirety" and eliminate the words "I think the Task Force was out at 
Midway in its entirety". ' Line 16 — Change to read : "Yes, any immediate danger, 
yes. As I look back, with the information service that we now know the Japanese 
had, they would not have attacked until our ships came into port. If our 
ships had been at sea the Japanese would have held olf for another chance and 
tried another time". 

On page 616, line 2 — after the word "embarked" add "American passengers". 
Line 2 after the word "we" change the word "have" to "had". Line 3 after "be- 
lieve" change "it" to "American passengers". Line 4 after the word "sea" put 
a period. 

On page 618, line 2 from the bottom — change "have 4" to "had 12". 

On page 619, line 10 from the bottom, add : "From Pearl Harbor". 

One page 622, line 2 — put a period after "this". Remainder of paragraph 1 to 
read "We discovered a chart on one of these submarines. On this chart a track 



896 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

was laid down. This track, where it passed the net, was later investigated and 
under the net in wake of this track was sufficient water for this submiarine to 
have [-^-^77] passed without disturbing the net. The statement I have 
made was reported to me but I have not checked it". 

On page 623, line 5 from the bottom — eliminate the words "it is in this report" 
and substitute therefor "there was an intelligence report some time ago, as I 
remember it", etc. 

On page 624, line 4 from the bipttom — place a period after "report" and substi- 
tute "then the air raid started" for "that an air raid started". 

On page 625, line 3 — eliminate the paragraph and substitute therefor : "No sir" 
"I had no report that an airplane had attacked a submarine. All that was 
reported to me was that a destroyer had depth bombed a submarine". 

On page 626, line 11 — eliminate the words "and of the board" and substitute 
therefor the words "that bore". Line 13 — eliminate "twenty-ninth" and sub- 
stitute "twenty-seventh". 

On page 627, line 10 from the bottom — after "175" insert the word "patrol". 

On page 628, line 7, eliminate the words "planes for defense" and substitute 
therefor the words "plans for advance". 

On page 631, line 2 from the bottom — change "no" to "yes". 

One page 633, line 6 from the bottom — eliminate the word "difficult" and sub- 
stitute the word "duty". 

On page 636, line 3 from the bottom — after the word "very" insert the word 
"good". 

On page 639, line 10 from the bottom, add : "When I received the air raid 
warning at about 7 : 50 a. m. and immediately after saw the planes attacking the 
Fleet in Pearl Harbor". 

[l^'^'S] On page 664, in order to clarify the record it is suggested that 
the letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants of the various 
Naval Districts, dated February 17, 1941, number OP-30 C 1— AJ (SC) N20-12 
serial 010230 be inserted in the record at this point. 

On page 665, line 17 — eliminate the word "Whitehead" and substitute the 
word "wide". 

On page 666, line 7 — eliminate the words "there was one torpedo by the 
RALEIGH and I got that and examined it, but the one up here blew the head ofiE 
and I do not think they recovered the head". 
Reason. This statement does not make sense and is not essential testimony. 

On page 672, line 5 from the bottom — eliminate the words "leave that out". 

On page 692. line 2 — eliminate the word "first''. After "out" in the 3rd line 
delete "nothing whatever stayed at this end" and substitute therefore: "About 
every second time the ships went out they stayed at sea about five extra days 
and we had five days of combined tactics and minor strategy by the forces out". 

On page 692, line 15 from the bottom — eliminate the sentence "A whole lot 
of the stuff is we lack experience". 

Also "General McCoy In questioning the Army Commander the other day 
Admiral Kimmel will you cut that out, that's all right, I don't — I'd rather not 
say." 

In connection with the discussion which appears on page 694 I did not bring 
out a fact which was well known to me and that is that my headquarters furnished 
the headquarters of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department with 
a copy of our operating schedule which [iJTS] showed the ships which 
would be in port during any given period and also the ships which were at sea and 
the general areas in which these ships were operating. 

On page 697, line 13 — change the word "motored" to "motive". Line 12 from 
the bottom — change to read "over and above the extended overhaul period which 
occurs at intervals of between 20 and 24 months". 

On piige 700, line 4 — change "battle" to "battleship". Line 11 from the bottom 
— change to read "only by having double crews for each plane and by having 
new planes coming in vei'y rapidly". 

On page 701, last line — change "personally" to "permanently". 

On page 705, 6th line from the bottom — change to read "I think there were 
five battleship captains — I can get you a list of them for the record". 

On page 707, line 4 from the bottom — change the word "deck" to "board". 

On page 709, line 12 from the bottom — after the word "would" put in the word 
"not". 

On page 710, line 10 — after the word "that" put in the word "way". 

On page 712, lines 9 and 10 from the bottom — change the word "Koonce" to 
"Coontz". 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 897 

On page 713, line 11 — eliminate the words ''Chief of Staff" and substitute the 
words "Commander-in-Chief and his Staff". 

On page 715, line 4 from the bottom — change second "director" to "chief". 

On page 716, line 5 — eliminate "that" and the comma following. 

[1^80] On page 718, line 8 — eliminate the word "familiar" and substitute 
therefor "friendly". 

On page 727, line 14 from the bottom — delete the word "and" before "catch". 

On page 728, line 8 — change the word "release" to "relief". Line 10 from the 
bottom — eliminate the words "of known weight" and substitute "and supplies". 

On page 731, line 7 — change "twenty-fourth" to "twenty-seventh". 

On page 732 — Admiral Theobald's answer at bottom of page — strike out entire 
answer and substitute therefor : "You asked for this paper this morning. It 
shows the Admirals at sea who were senior to Admiral Kimmel and who were 
jumped by him when he became Commander-in-Chief". 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I would like to say that I have submitted 
to the Commission this letter of January 5 requesting that the tran- 
script of my testimony which you permitted me to examine be revised. 

I found on examining the transcript of testimony that many essen- 
tial features of my testimony had not been recorded in the transcript. 

The Chairman. That is right. 

Admiral Kimmel. I feel that unless these are included, in order in 
which I presented them to the Commission, that the testimony will 
not present an accurate picture of my position and my actions prior 
to and doing the attack. 

In addition to this, the transcript contains a large number of cleri- 
cal inaccuracies which either distorted or clouded the meaning or 
produced passages which were unintelligible. I spent the better part 
of two days, assisted hy Rear Admiral Theobald and a stenographer, 
in my endeavor to reconstruct an accurate version of the testimony 
which I [14^1] presented before this Commission. In view 
of the extensive change necessary in the transcript, I request that I 
be given another opportunity to examine the transcript after the 
corrections have been made. 

The Chairman. It will be a pretty big job for us to get this re- 
write of the transcript, but I suspect we can arrange that to the 
Admiral's satisfaction. How about that? 

General McCoy. I should think so. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, sir, I can be available to examine it as 
fast as they finish it. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. And I should be able to finish my examination 
as soon as they finish the culmination of it. 

The Chairman. Well, we will get in touch with you and advise 
you how we can arrange that. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. That was just a suggestion, I mean. 

The Chairman. Well, we want to meet your views about that, and 
I think we can. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, I understand that you wish to add to your 
testimony something that you omitted on page 694, and I want to see 
that we have this : 

In connection with the discussion which appears on pa^e 694 I did not bring 
out a fact which was well known to me, and that is that my headquarters 
furnished the headquarters of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian De- 
partment with a copy of our operating schedule which showed the ships which 
would be in port during any given period and also the ships which were at sea, 
and the general areas in which these ships were operating. 



898 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[llt82'] Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. That is the fact? 

Admiral Kimmel. That's a fact. 

The Chairman. And you wish that added to your testimony ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. And in amplification I had written 
out practically the same thing in other words here. But, in addition 
to that, the Commanding General requested me to supply his head- 
quarters with only one copy of such schedules, for security reasons. 
This practice of supplying the Commanding General with a copy of 
our operating schedules was initiated several months before the attack, 
and continued. 

That was something that of course I knew perfectly well, but I 
can't recall everything. 

The Chairman. Certainly. 

Admiral Kimimel. There is one additional thing sir, that I would 
like to call to the attention of the Commission. In my testimony I 
indicated that we believed we could not keep up a continuous search 
and patrol with the long-range planes available, except for a very 
short time. I wish to invite your attention to the joint air operating 
plan and estimate in effect at the time of the attack. This operating 
plan had been in effect for several months. You will note that this 
same conclusion was arrived at by the two senior air commanders in 
the Hawaiian area, Rear Admiral Bellinger, commanding Patrol 
Wing Two, and Major General Martin, commanding the Hawaiian 
Air Force. I cite this merely to demonstrate clearly that this matter 
had been thoroughly considered months prior to the attack. 

Now, I haven't the papers here, but an examination of that joint 
air operating plan, which was gotten up by Major General Martin and 
Rear Admiral Bellinger and approved by General Short 

The Chairman. And Admiral Bloch. 

Admiral Kimmel. — and Admiral Bloch, contained that very 
[llfSS^ statement. 

The Chairman. We have the paper before us. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. I knew you did. I just want to call 
attention to that. 

Admiral Theobald. It is in evidence in one of the other exhibits. 

Admiral Kimmel. It is in evidence, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Kimmel, I just want to call attention to that last thing. 

The Chairman. Now, there is a matter that in your interest we 
would like to ask you about for a moment. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. We find on examining the transcript that, while 
you state that you learned of the attack, it is not clear where you 
were on the morning of December 7 when you first learned of it. 

Admiral Kimmel. I was in my quarters in the Navy Yard area. 
They telephoned to me the air raid warning, which came almost im- 
mediately after I got the word of the submarine attack, and I went out 
of my quarters, saw the attack, the first attack made by the planes. 

The Chairman. Yes, sir? 

Admiral Kimmel. Got into the car and went directly to my head- 
(luarters, and I was in my headquarters 

The Chairman. And your headquarters are where with reference to 
Pearl Harbor? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 899 

Admiral Kimmel. At the Submarine Base. 

The Chairman. At the Submarine Base? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And from the Submarine Base you directed and 
issued your commands? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. That is correct, sir. 

[i4^4] The Chairman. To meet the emergency? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. That is correct, sir. 

The Chairman. You remained on duty there throughout the attack? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. We wanted just to clear that up. I think that clears 
it up, doesn't it? 

General McCoy. Not entirely. 

Admiral Kimmel. Off the record, sir. And I mean off the record, 
because they have put in a lot of these things here. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

General McCoy. I would like to get that on the record. 

The Chairman. Yes, I want it on the record. 

Admiral Kimmel. It happens that after I had reached my head- 
quarters and was watching the attack out of the window a .50 caliber 
machine gun bullet struck me on the chest a glancing blow. I picked 
it up ; I have the bullet now. 

Admiral Theobald. Spent bullet. 

Admiral Kimmel. Sir? 

Admiral Theobald. It was a spent bullet. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

The Chairman. General, you have some questions? 

General McCoy. Yes. I am just thinking a moment. 

Have you presented in evidence in your hrst appearance before the 
Commission or in this corrected report a sequence of orders that you 
issued that morning during and after the attack? 

Admiral Kimmel. That was contained in the — wait just a moment. 
The substance of it was contained in the 

The Chairman. Report of December 21st? I don't think so. 

Admiral Kimmel. No. I was trying to get the thing the way I 
designated it. "The disposition of task forces." 

The Chairman. Which is to go in here now ? 

[14S5] Admiral Kimmel. Which is a part of the record. In 
addition to that, we presented to the Commission, as I recall it, the 
dispatch orders that we sent out. That, I think, is a part of the en- 
closures which Mr. Howe has. 

Mr. Howe. Yes, I have those right here, sir. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

[14^86] General McNarney. Admiral, were you cognizant of the 
incident which happened on the night of December 7 with regard to 
losing some of our carrier planes ? 

Admiral Kimmel. Did I know about it? 

General McNarney. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I did. 

General McNarney. Did you direct any investigation to be made 
of it? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

General McNarney. Have any corrective measures been taken? 

Admiral Kimmbti,. Yes. 



900 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McNarney. That is all I wanted to know. 

Admiral Kimmel. I might say this, as long as this has been brought 
up, that about 10 o'clock in the morning Admiral Halsey asked me if 
the fields in here were available, whether Ford Island was available for 
his planes in case of necessity. I answered yes because they were. 

I did not think any more about it. He notified us that six fighters 
were coming in. The Commandant of the District knew that six 
fighters were coming in and my headquarters knew the six fighters were 
coming in, and the Army knew the six fighters were coming in, and we 
informed all the ships in the fleet that the six fighters were coming in. 

They came in with lights on. 

The Chairman. Running lights? 

Admiral Kimmel,. Yes, with running lights on. Unfortunately, in- 
stead of going right down and landing at Ford Island, the smoke from 
the burning oil overshadowed the whole place and they were blinded 
and tried to get in there and they came right up over the ships. 

Now, you must remember that these people on the ships had under- 
gone a terrific experience. One ship opened fire, and the trigger fingers 
were very itchy, and when that one ship opened fire the whole bunch 
opened in a fusillade. 

[l^S?] The minute the first one opened fire I sent out the signal, 
"Cease fire. Cease fire." and the commandant of the District sent out 
the signal to cease fire. 

You can well understand the feelings of these people on the ships 
when they saw those planes coming over them after having had their 
first baptism of fire. I cannot find it in my heart to be too harsh on 
the people who opened fire. 

Much as I regret the incident, I know of nothing that we could have 
done other than what we did do that night to prevent it. 

With the steps that have been taken, I feel certain that nothing like 
that will ever occur again, and if we have the warning that we had 
given them, it will not happen. 

General McNarney. I had a report that our planes were fired on 
again on the morning of the 8th. Have you heard that ? 

Admiral Kimmel. On the morning of the 8th ? 

General McNarney. Do you have any information on that ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I have not heard of it. 

Admiral Theobald. Late on the evening of the 7th 18 BSP's came 
in from the ENTERPRISE and they were shot at. 

General McNarney. Off the record. 

(There was colloquy ofi' the record.) 

The Chairman. If there is anything else that you wish to explain 
with respect to your testimony, do not hesitate to communicate with 
us, and we will give you the opportunity to do so. 

Admiral Kimmel. Thank you very much, sir. I have not anything. 

The Chairman. Well, there may be something which may occur to 
you, and if it does call it to our attention. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. 

Admiral Theobald. General, do you want the signals that we sent 
out on the morning of the 8th? 

General McCoy. I think I would like to have in the record [HS8] 
the report that went out that day showing what action was taken by 
the Navy to meet the situation, beyond what is in the testimony. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 901 

Admiral Kimmel. General, yon must realize that a great many of 
these orders were issued by telephone and no record whatsoever was 
kept of them. Things were happening fast and we were trying to get 
things done. 

General McCoy. Well, I just wanted to make sure that we covered 
the whole point of the aggressive action, so to speak, the comeback of 
the naval units. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

The Chairman. We will adjourn at this time until 9 o'clock tomor- 
row morning, in order that the Commission may visit certain of the 
defense installations on this island. 

(Thereupon, at 12: 50 o'clock p. m., the hearing was adjourned until 
Wednesday, January 7, 1942, at 9 o'clock a. m., at the Royal Hawaiian 
Hotel.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 903 



[^•^^] CONTENTS 



WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 7, 3942 

Testimony of — Page * 

Richard K. Kimball, Manager of Halekulani Hotel, Honolulu, T. H 1494 

Lieutenant George P. Kimball, United States Naval Reserve 1507 

Yee Kam York, Field Examiner and Auditor, Territorial Tax OflSce, 

Honolulu, T. H 1525 

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, United States Navy — Recalled 1538 

Captain Walter Standley DeLany, United States Navy — Recalled 1538 

Lieutenant H. H. Henderson; Military Intelligence, United States 

Army 1571 

First Lieutenant Byron M. Meurlott, Military Intelligence, United 

States Army 1574 

Frank Edward Settle, Draftsman 1579 

Colonel Harry K. Pickett, United States Marine Corps 1584 

Major Alfred R. Pefley, United States Marine Corps 1587 

Examination of Witnesses appearing voluntarily in Response to Invi- 
tation of the Commission, published January 5th, 6th, and 7th 1595 



^ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 905 



Vim-] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE 
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII 



WEDNESDAY, JANUABY 7, 1942 

Suite 300, Royal Hawaiian Hotel, 

Honolulu^ T . H. 
The Commission reconvened at 9 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjourn- 
ment on yesterday, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States 
Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding. 

PRESENT 

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, 
Chairman ; 

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired; 

Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired ; 

Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired; 

Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army ; 

Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission ; 

Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal 
Advisor to the Commission; 

Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission. 

PROCEEDINGS 

The Chairman. Mr. Reporter, in answer to the Commission's call 
for all complaints and reports received by the Police Department of 
the City of Honolulu on the night of December 6, Mr. Gabrielson, the 
Chief of Police, has furnished a complete report which should be 
copied into the record at this point. 

(The document above referred to is as follows:) 

[i45i] DRUNKS TURNED OVEB TO M- AND S- 

To Military Police : 

. Co. M. 19th Inf. Sell. Brks. Arrested at the Service Cafe 

at 9 : 30 P. M. 12-6-41 by Officer T. Sato for being drunk, staggering. 

• . Schofleld Barracks. Arrested at Maunakea & Beretania Sts. 

at 12 : 35 a. m. 12-7-41 by Officer A. Lee for being drunk. 

To Shore Patrol : 

. S. S. Dobbin. Arrested at Nuuanu & Hotel Streets at 11 : 45 

p. m. 12-6-41 by Officer A. Lee for being drunk. 

. Pearl Harbor. Arrested at Aala Park by Officer J. C. Lee at 

12 : 30 a. m. 12-7-41. 

ACCIDENTS INVOLVING SEaiVICE PUSSONNKL 



1- Lt., Naval Air Station PH was involved in a minor acci- 
dent with of 3450 Maunalei Ave. at about 8:30 p. m. 12-6-41 

somewhere on Ala Wai Blvd. Both cars going straight ahead, no violation 
indicated. 



906 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

of 251st. C. A. Camp Malakole was involved in 'a minor 



accident witti of Hawaiian Village at 2 : 30 p. m. 12-6-41 on 

Kam Highway near new Pearl Harbor Gate. ^had been drinking 

and was trying to overtake car. — — — — - — took ofC after accident 

and information broadcasted. No disposition available. 

3. of Co. D. 298th. Inf. Scho. Bks. was involved in a $275. acci- 
dent with of House 834, Waipshu at 9 : 50 p. m. 12-6-41 on Kam 

[1492] Highway Honolulu side of Waipahu-Schofield junction and 

was injured, receiving an abrasion to left ear, left elbow and back ; 



taken to Waipahu Hospital and later discharged. had been drink- 
ing, was trying to make a left turn and was on the wrong side of the road. 
Charged with Sec. 601 TC. Report No. B-44182. 

4. of Co. E 19th Inf. Scho. Bks. drove his car off the Kaukonahua 

Road cut off at Haleiwa at 12 : 00 noon 12-6-41. Damages $15. and none in- 
jured. had been drinking and was charged with Sec. 6281 SL '41. 

Report No. B-44001. 

5. , Sgt. of Batt. C. 98th. C A. Scho. Bks. drove off the road 

on Red Hill road about 4 : 30 a. m. 12-6-41 when his car skidded. $125. dam- 
ages, none injured. No disposition noted. No report mimber. 

ARRESTS AND COMPLAINTS INVOLVING SERVICE PERSONNEL DECEMBE31 6, 1941 

1. Co. A. 27th. Inf. Scho. Bks. was larrested at 12 : 47 a. m. 



for tampering with vehicle belonging to parked at 832 Hauoli 

St. Charged with Attempted Malicious Conversion and defendant turned over 
to Military Police for disposition. Report No. B-43865. 

2. of USS Cassin reported being struck by of 

Hon. Rapid Transit Co. at Alapai and King St. at 1 : 02 a. m. when he attempted 

to stop a fight between Mrs. his companion and . 

Desired no prosecution. Report No. B-43867. 

3. of USS Rigel, PH was arrested at 9: 40 p. m. at Kalakaua & 

Kuhio Ave. for trying to start auto belonging to Detective . Re- 
ferred to Shore [1493] Patrol for disposition. Report No. B-43976. 

4. 18th Air Base, Hickaui Field was found lying in the toilet 

in the rear of lobby of Army and Navy YMCA about 8 : 00 p. m. with cut on 
head. Treated by Dr. Raymond YAP for lacerated wound right post parietal 
scalp. Strong 'alcoholic breath. Subject did not know what happened to himself. 
Turned over to Military Police for disposition. Report No. B-43986. 

5. An unknown sailor was apprehended by the Emergency Hospital attendants 
for tampering with Emergency Hospital ambulance in front of Star Grill, 255 
N. King St. 12-7-41 at 12 : 30 a. m. Turned over to Shore Patrol for disposition 
before arrival of police oflScer, therefore, name unavailable. Report No. B-43984. 

6. of Naval Air Base was treated at Emergency Hospital 

for two inch wound on right side of face. He claimed to have been injured 
12-7-41 about 2 : 26 a. m. when glass from windshield of auto he was riding 
flew back and cut his face when car sideswiped a City and County street sweeper. 
Report B-44033. 

7. 21st Signal Co. Scho. Bks. claimed to have been short 

changed by taxi driver from the Shamrock Taxi, 12-7-41 at 1 : 45 a. m. Gave taxi 
driver $5, and didn't receive any change. Instructed to swear out a warrant 
but failed to do so. Report No. B-44035. 

Colonel Brown. Mr. Kimball. 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn. 

[IW] TESTIMONY OF RICHARD K. KIMBALL, MANAGER OF 
HALEKULANI HOTEL, HONOLULU, HAWAII 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman, Will you give your full name to the reporter, Mr. 
Kimball? 

Mr. Kimball. Richard K. Kimball, manager of Halekulani Hotel, 
owned by my family. 

The Chairman. Mr. Kimball, you were born in Hawaii, were you 
not? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 907 

Mr. Kimball. I was, sir. 

The Chairman. And your family has been here for many years? 

Mr. Kimball. My father came here in 1901 from Boston, and my 
grandmother was born in Tahiti and came here and was married on 
Kauai. 

The Chairman. How long have you been manager of the Haleku- 
lani Hotel? 

Mr. Kimball. Actively for three or four years. My father has 
been retired. He died a few months ago. I have been with him 
since 1933. 

The Chairman. You have been a member of the Territorial Legis- 
lature, have you not ? 

Mr. Kimball. That is correct, a member of the House of Repre- 
sentatives. 

The Chairman. For how many sessions? 

Mr. Kimball. Two sessions, 1937 and 1939. 

The Chairman. First of all we would like to know from your ob- 
servation what has been the conduct of the officers of the Army and 
Navy who have been guests or visitors at the Halekulani Hotel, with 
respect to temperance and intemperance ? 

Mr. Kimball. I would say the guests who have been registered 
guests, that their conduct has been excellent. [149S] I would 
say the senior officers who had dinner parties, as Admiral Kimmel, 
who was there on that Saturday night as well as having been there 
for other parties — but the senior officers' conduct has been very fine 
indeed. Some of the junior officers of the Army and Navy have used 
our house without a key, the lanai, for cocktail parties, and that has 
been almost notorious and it is difficult in stopping those cocktail 
parties, but that is the way with the younger men and they are out 
for having a good time, but that was long before the war started. 

The Chairman. Since the emergency started have you had occa- 
sion to observe both the junior and senior officers with respect to 
temperance? 

Mr. Kimball. Not so much so the junior officers, no. 

The Chairman. "What about the conduct of the enlisted personnel 
if they are on leave in Honolulu, from your observation? 

Mr. Kimball. I would say it is very good, very good as a whole. 

The Chairman. Of course you understand that when officers of 
the fleet or Army give leave to a large number of men and liquor is 
sold lawfully, that you cannot keep these men out of the saloons. 

Mr. Kimball. I understand that, and I am a special police reserve 
officer and I have been on active duty for the last four or five months 
with the police, and I would say it has been exceedingly good so far 
as the enlisted personnel are concerned. 

The Chairman. Martial law was declared on December 7 and has 
been in effect since. I want to know your view as a citizen interested 
in the City of Honolulu as to whether you think that should be 
abrogated. 

]\Tr. Kimball. No, not in the least, no. 

The Chairman. Having that in mind, that the emergency 
[/4^] exists and that another attack might well be planned on 
Hawaii, do you think that the martial law should be held firmly? 

79716 — 46— Ex. 143, vol. 2 21 



908 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Kimball. Firmly, and also that no one should be allowed on 
the streets any more than they are now, without a real reason and 
without a proper pass to identify themselves. I have been on police 
duty night after night, and it is wonderful to see how the streets are, 
and that is as it should be. 

The Chairman. What is your view as to the possible disloyalty of 
Japanese aliens and first and second generation Japanese if there 
should be an attack on this Island or if the Japanese should make a 
threat here ? 

Mr. Kimball. I feel as in the case when the aviator landed on 
Niihau, and I brought this along (referring to a newspaper)- but the 
two Japaneses over there went with the aviator against the Hawaiians 
of the Island. Mr, Robinson, the man who owns that Island loved 
those two Japanese and felt they were very loyal and true and would 
never turn against him, but they did. They captured the Island of 
Niihau and had it as a Japanese prize for a short time. 

That is an example of their loyalty to us when they have a chance 
to be loyal to their Emperor. 

I would say that the vast majority of Japanese are — and I am going 
to be a candidate for election again in this Territory and the Japanese 
almost dominate the vote, .but I have said it openly before and I will 
do it again — that the vast majority of Japanese would be loyal to us 
just so long as we were on top, but they would turn just as soon as the 
tide began to turn, and I think that very few of them would remain 
loyal long enough to go down fighting for the American flag — very 
few. 

The Chairman. Mr. Taylor yesterday thought that there might be 
certain business interests in the community that would bring strong 
pressure to have the civilian rule restored so U4^7^ that busi- 
ness could function more freely, and he thought that to yield to that 
business motive would be a mistake under the present conditions. 
How do you feel about that ? 

Mr. Kimball. I agree with him absolutely. Shall I elaborate? 

The Chairman. He fully went into his reasons. I simply was in- 
terested in know whether you concurred in his statement. 

Mr. Kimball, Yes, I do. 

The Chair -NrAN, Any questions? 

General McCoy, It just occurs to me in your mentioning of this 
incident on Niihau that we have not a record of that in our testimony, 
and it seems to me to be an outstanding incident that certain indica- 
tions can be drawn from both as to the Japanese and the Hawaiians, 

Do you happen to know whether this account in the newspaper is 
a full and accurate account? 

Mr, Kimball, I do not say that it is a full account, but the facts 
have never been repudiated, I think that the gist of it is there. 

General McCoy. I wondered if that case had been investigated 
officially. Do you Icnow? 

Mr, Kimball, I could not say. 

The Chairman, Off the record. 

(There was colloquy off the record,) 

The Chairman, In connection with Mr, Kimball's testimony he 
has filed a copy of the Honolulu "Advertiser" of Tuesday, December 
16, 1941. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 909 

Admiral Standley. Mr. Kimball, you said you had been serving 
with the police as a reserve officer. 

Mr. Kimball. That is right, without pay. 

Admiral Standley. Without pay. That has been for several 
months ? 

[14^8] Mr. Kimball. "We were trained and started back last 
summer. The chief asked for 150 young businessmen in town to 
volunteer for police training. It was a movement particularly to get 
the business people of Honolulu interested in his problem, and he 
went before the session of the Legislature and asked for 100 more men 
and tried to convince them, and he did convince us, and a group of us 
got together and went to the press to get favorable editorial comment 
and went to the Legislature, and we were able to get him the appro- 
priation for 100 additional officers. 

Admiral Standley. What was the nature of the training? 

Mr. Kimball. We were trained first at night classes once a week 
for three hours, at the Central Grammar School Auditorium. That 
was just lecturing. And then demonstration in jiujitsu, but not real 
juijitsu classes for six weeks, but we saw how the police officers are 
trained. 

Then we went out on prowl duty in the radio cars one night a week, 
and we are doing that now as a regular thing. We did that to see 
how they worked and learned the general technique. 

The chief had in mind that if there was a major riot on the water- 
front that he could put his real police officers down there and leave 
the reserve officers to patrol the rest of the community, and I wish to 
commend the chief of police (m his whole conduct throughout this. 

Admiral Standley. Did this duty take you into the congested dis- 
tricts of the city ? 

Mr. Kimball. No, my area was out in the residential area, not in 
the slums, if that is what you mean. 

Admiral Standley. You did not get down in those areas? 

Mr. Kimball. No. 

Admiral Standley. You do not know anything about the men on 
liberty there from the Army or Navy on Saturday nights? 

[14^9] Mr. Kimball. No, I would not know. 

Admiral Standley. Do not take this. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

[1500] Admiral Standley. I understand that there has been 
some effort toward providing rest centers for crews of vessels which 
have come back from long cruises, naval vessels. Have you any 
information in regard to such efforts ? 

Mr. Kimball. Yes, I have. I was asked by — this is off the record 
again. Shall I give the names of the officers who have contacted me 
on the subject? 

Admiral Standley. Put it on the record, yes; I want the story. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Kimball. Commander O'Leary asked me, as manager of the 
Halekulani Hotel, if we could provide for a group of 60 or so men 
coming in from sea duty a place where they could come and relax 
and get away from the Navy Yard for a few days. He got the idea, 
I believe, because we had just had a group of New Zealand and 
Australian troops at the Halekulani Hotel who were brought down 



910 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

from the Coast, had been here for a week or so and then taken back 
again because they couldn't get them back to New Zealand. He had 
seen how nicely they fitted in there among the guests. It seemed to 
be a lift to their morale to be there, and he felt it would be fine if 
these men that he knew of, apparently, that were coming in could 
come in and do likewise, have a good bed and get away from the en- 
vironment and get a little sunshine, as he put it. And he made ar- 
rangements for them, and the men did come, conducted themselves 
very nicely. 

I sent Admiral Bloch a letter suggesting if he had any other groups 
of that sort coming that we would be glad to take care of them on 
a moderate basis. I didn't mention the price we would charge. 
Admiral Bloch called me on the phone shortly afterwards and asked 
me to quote him right over the telephone what we would charge for 
also food, not only give them a room. I said that we would not be 
interested in feeding them. It would be too much of a problem. 
Much of our staff were gone, [1501] taking waiters* jobs out 
in these camps and various places, so that our staff is materially 
reduced, having no more tourists coming in ; and he asked me to let 
him know immediately. what we would charge per man. 

I wrote him a letter — and I will submit you a copy of that letter 
if you would like — stating that we would not be able to feed them 
but we could house them, and if necessary we would give them the 
cash each day for their food, so that they wouldn't be out of cash 
any day, and we would make them a price of say, $2.50, and we 
would give them a bed a night for a dollar and give them a dollar 
and a half out of cash, which we would charge the Navy $2.50 a 
man for. That is, they would be feeding themselves; that was a 
little too much of a job. He wanted us to take up to 200. I said we 
could only take 60, 75 at the most, at the present time, because at 
the present time we have about 50, 60 tourists at the hotel. 

Admiral Standley. And the conduct of those men was exemplary? 

Mr. Kimball. Oh, I should say so. Fine. 

General McCoy. Are you through, Admiral? 

Admiral Standley. Yes. 

General McCoy. Are you acquainted with the efforts of certain 
ladies of the community, headed by Mrs. Wayne Pflueger and Mrs. 
Edward Carpenter, to provide such environment for sailors and 
soldiers when they are ashore in Honolulu ? 

Mr. Kimball. Yes, through the papers I have seen about it. I 
haven't followed it very closely. 

General McCoy. I understand they have taken over a club known 
as the Outrigger Club. 

Mr. Kimball. In the Advertiser I notice an advertisement that 
hostesses would welcome fleet personnel ; "service personnel," I be- 
lieve it says, and states the prices for sandwiches and coffee and 
things. 

General McCoy, And there has been an effort on the part [1602] 
of the community to meet the situation of soldiers and sailors in the 
city of Honolulu on liberty ? 

Mr. Kimball. You mean before the war started? 

General McCoy. Yes. 

Mr. Kimball. Grafter? Before the war ? 

General McCoy. At any time. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 911 

Mr. Kimball. The whole time I would say that the community's 
interest in the welfare of the men has been most noticeable. I mean 
they were very anxious to help, and they have done a lot, and people 
have had them into their homes on numerous occasions. My wife has 
gone down and been a taxi-dance girl at the sailors' dances and things, 
and lots of girls here have done it. Anything to help the men have a 
good time for an evening, I would say it is very commendable the way 
the community has conducted itself in that way. 

The Chairman. Have you any questions, General? 

General McNarney. No. 

The Chairman. We are very much obliged to you, Mr. Kimball. 

Mr. Kimball. All right. 

The Cjiairman. Please observe the caution : we have asked all wit- 
nesses not to discuss what has gone on in here. 

Mr. Kimball. May I leave something with you here that I feel is of 
interest to the Commission? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. Kimball. We had recently a special session of the legislature, 
and previously a regular session. At that time there was a very, very 
bitter fight between the Dillingham interests and the Castle & Cooke 
interests- which are the controlling interests of the Big Five, as it is 
known, over a Pier 15 for the harbor, which could make it possible to 
stop doing business with the Dillinghams, both their railroad and 
their wharves; and I went to great effort after I found out 
how [16031 unfair the Dillinghams were being taken in this 
thing by the Governor, the Board of Harbor Commissioners, the con- 
trolling group in the legislature, and the agents for the Matson Steam- 
ship Company. But I went to Mr. Dillingham. The whole story is 
too long for the record, but I got interested in his fight, on an honest 
and fair crusade, and made every effort I could to expose the scandal 
of the way he was being beaten. 

I had pictures taken of the harbor front, which the press was saying 
was congested because of lack of wharf space. I showed empty 
wharves. At the time of the congestion Castle & Cooke purposely 
created a congestion on the harbor frontage here in order to make it 
seem to the public necessary to build a huge public wharf with public 
funds, which would give them the opportunity to have a complete 
monopoly here. 

They talked the Governor into agreeing with them, and the Board 
of Harbor Commissioners, three of the members of which were bit- 
terly opposed to Mr. Dillingham for previous personal reasons, and 
they wanted to destroy this old wharf and build a big new one there. 

I contended that the old wharf was still handling cargo — ships at 
that date were there discharging cargo — and that the present time 
wasn't a time to destroy a wharf and build with new materials and lots 
of men at this time a new wharf. 

And this is a matter of great importance in the Territory here, and 
it shows how far these groups, particularly the Castle & Cooke group, 
would go to use the press for propaganda purposes. They had every 
merchant in the Territory afraid to come out and help Mr. Dilling- 
ham, because the merchant has to get his cargo in here by Castle & 
Cooke, Matson, the public carrier. The ships were overbooked, and 
a merchant wouldn't be able to get his freight in if he opposed in any 



912 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

way. A member of the senate who was interested in getting his mer- 
chandise in was able to get more than anyone else in his particular line 
of business all during this time, and he was a [iSOJ/.'] very 
vigorous crusader for the Castle & Cooke cause. The press criticized 
him at this time, critciized Castle & Cooke on that particular issue. 
But I bring this to your attention to show how far these interests, 
particularly the Castle & Cooke interests, will go to achieve their 
economic ends. 

I have two wires, one sent by Governor Poindexter to Mr. Warner in 
Washington, and I want to leave these for your record, if I may, these 
two wires. 

The Chairman. All right, sir. 

Mr. Kimball. A man in the Maritime Commission, on receiving 
word from the Governor, went to Matson to find out the other side of 
the story, and if j^ou read those wires they are very significant; the 
one from the Governor first. That is that one (indicating). 

The Chairman. What bearing, in your judgment, has this matter 
you just talked to us about, on the present situation ? 

Mr. Kimball. Well, I feel that the conduct of both the Army and 
the Navy here — their plans, whatever they have done — has been in- 
fluenced by both the Dillingham interests and the other interests when 
what the Army or Navy planned to do in any way conflicted with the 
plans of either the Dillingham interests or the Big Five; and I con- 
tend that they are so influential in Washington that they are able to 
have their way one way or another, and I am convinced of that, and 
this is my personal experience with it. I have many, many instances 
I can cite. 

The Chairman. You think the Army and the Navy ought to have 
their way in an emergency like this? 

Mr. Kimball. I believe if we are going to be an outpost of national 
defense for this side of the hemisphere then the Army and Navy 
should at least be able to do it as they want to do it, and not have pri- 
vate interests here dictate what shall be done or what shall not be done. 
Difference of opinion of interests in the Territory. This wire (indi- 
cating) makes it [Io05] questionable whether the Maritime 
Commission ought to take it up. Admiral Bloch, General Short, and 
Governor Poindexter recommend priorities for essential foodstuffs, 
recommend it unequivocally. I mean they were urging me. Ad- 
miral Bloch got after me and he just ijave me the devil in no uncertain 
terms for not going harder after these things in Washington. In 
Washington somehow pressure is put on so that the people there say, 
"The interests in Hawaii are differing in their opinion. The sugar 
interests don't agree with the Admiral and the General and the Gov- 
ernor. Therefore we had better not do anything about it." That is 
just as definite as anything can be, and that has been the case here for 
many years, that no one has been able to rise up and question these 
interests here economically. They have been broken financially, and 
their prestige sociallv is broken. So that the individual who tries 
to question them either ends up by taking to liquor or leaving the 
Territory here. 

Fortunately my family has a business that does not depend on the 
Big Five or Castle & Cooke or Matson or any other group for their 
existence. Tourists out here, men coming from the mainland with 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 913 

their families, have had in the past to make fake bookings out of this 
hotel in order to get passage on a Matson steamship. After they ar- 
rive here they are cancelled, and they already have bookings with us. 
That is a matter of record ; many many letters I have on hie. I can 
get you reputable people in Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and 
anywhere that can substitute that, and the letters talk for them- 
selves. But we have been able to get them anyhow, because they in- 
sisted on coming to our hotel. Therefore I have been able to be inde- 
pendent politicially in our legislature. They have tried to discredit 
me in every way. 

General McCoy. Who is Mr. Warner? 

Mr. Kimball. Mr. Warner is the head of the agriculture extension 
division at the University of Hawaii. The Governor [ISOd] 
appointed Mr. Warner and myself a committee of two to go into 
the food storage problem here. The Big Five did not want a big 
supply of food brought in here, and they have effectively blocked it 
up until war was declared, and I have a great deal of information, 
enough that I can substantiate that statement with. The f 6od storage 
plan, which you may have heard about in Washington — three and 
a half million dollars that was turned down by the Budget Bureau 
about four months ago — was blocked, I am convinced, by people in 
Honolulu here who used their influence in Washington to discredit 
our proposal, the proposal of General Short, Admiral Bloch, the Gov- 
ernor, and his committee; and Admiral Bloch I think will testify the 
same way. Incidentally, I want to commend Admiral Bloch on his 
vigorous attitude towards the food problem; he has been very keen 
to see it here. 

The Chairman. Anything further, General? 

General McNarney. No. 

The Chairman. Admiral? 

Admiral Reeves. No, sir. 

The Chairman. We are very much obliged to you, Mr. Kimball. 

Mr. Kimball. All right, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you want to leave these with us (indicating tele- 
grams) , or do you want to take them ? 

Mr. Kimball. I would like to leave them with you. 

The Chairman. All right. We would be glad to have them. 

Mr. Kimball. I don't like to leave the impression that Governor 
Poindexter is dishonest. I believe that Governor Poindexter was 
misled in his judgment of this Pier 15, of the necessity for a Pier 15, 
and he is a very stubborn person, and he didn't like to change his 
stand. I believe he was just mistaken. 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn ? 

[1S07] TESTIMONY OP LIEUTENANT GEORGE P. KIMBALL, 
UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give your full name and rank to the 
reporter ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. George P. Kimball, Lieutenant Junior Grade, 
United States Naval Reserve. 

The Chairman. In what capacity are you serving in the Navy, now, 
Lieutenant ? 



914 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Lieutenant Kimball. In the District Intelligence Office. 

The Chairjman. Who is your chief there ? 

Lieutenant Klmball. Captain Mayfield. 

The Chairman. We have been impressed, Lieutenant, by the fact 
that the intelligence services seem to have gotten very little in the 
way of espionage information on this island prior to December 7, 
I believe. How long were you in that service, sir, prior to Decem- 
ber?? 

Lieutenant Kimball. I reported for active duty on April 15, 1941. 

The Chairman. So you had had a matter of eight months' serv- 
ice there ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. What particular branch of intelligence work were 
you doing during this period ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. I was doing office work, sir, evaluation and 
dissemination, and so on. 

The Chairman. Would you be in a position to know whether there 
was cordial cooperation with your service by the services of the Army 
andtheF. B. L? 

Lieutenant Kimball. I would be in such a position, sir. 

The Chairman. What judgment did you form as to that, as to 
whether there was a central clearing of valuable information here ? 

Lieutenant Kjmball. Well, the chiefs of the three lidos'] 
branches met weekly every Tuesday, Mr. Shivers and Colonel Bick- 
nell of the Army contact office, and Captain Mayfield, and the per- 
sonnel of the three offices would constantly visit back and forth 
getting information from the files of the other two offices. I know 
as far as we were concerned, because I had more or less charge of it, 
all pertinent information that we obtained, either from local sources 
or that we received from ONI, the Office of Naval Intelligence in 
Washington, we would send copies of to G-2 and to F. B. I. 

The Chairman. And did they reciprocate by sending you any- 
thing they picked up ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. They would send us more or less their com- 
pleted work. 

The Chairman. Completed work? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Their reports as completed. We would try 
to send them as much as we could that was of general information, 
other than matters of purely naval interest. 

The Chairman. Do you feel that at this time the system of three 
divisions of information or intelligence here locally on the island can 
be bettered ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. I believe that the coordination can be im- 
proved. In other words, I believe there has been full cooperation 
but perhaps not full coordination. 

The Chairman. What is your diagnosis of why it seems to be im- 
possible to break into the Japanese community here and get what is 
going on in the way of espionage and subversive activities? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Well, one reason, we have all tried it. That 
is, the F. B. I. and our office, which have, as you may realize, under a 
tripartite agreement executed some time ago — the Office of Naval 
Intelligence and the F. B. I. have concurrent jurisdiction, as they 
refer to it — it is really responsibility — for the Japanese subversive 
activities; and we have both tried to develop informants and contacts 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 915 

amongst the [1609] Japanese themselves, among the second- 
generation Japanese, but those young men are no closer, really, to the 
Japanese that we are really after than we are ourselves personally. 
And they have tried to help us as much as they could, but 

The Chairman. They don't know much? 

Lieutenant Kimball. They don't know much, either. 

The Chairman. Who does know ? Who are the head devils in the 
Japanese intelligence here? 

Lieutenant Kimball. The Japanese Consulate. 

The Chairman. And alien Japanese aiding him? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Yes. 

The Chairman. Aliens. 

General McCoy. Consular agents? 

Lieutenant "Kimball. The consulate heading it up and using per- 
haps some but by no means all of their consular agents. The consular 
agents are used mostly by the consulate for administrative purposes : 
that is, reporting deaths, births, marriages, and other such matters 
in the Japanese community. 

General McCoy. Having to do with dual citizenship ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Yes, sir. One of the phases. 

The Chairman. Well, the fact is that you haven't been able to 
break into the ring very successfully, have you. Lieutenant? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Not yet. We feel that we are getting a 
little bit of information now that may lead somewhere. 

The Chairman. You do? 

Lieutenant Kimball. That is, that in connecting it up with the 
consulate the difficult thing is to connect individuals with the con- 
sulate in other than purely legitimate activities. In other words, the 
heads of the two Japanese banks have had for a long time frequent 
intercourse^ with the consulate, which is easily explainable by them. 
The head of the local Japanese steamship line, the NYK, people like 
that; so it has been difficult to find people who haven't had an 
[JSIO] absolutely legitimate explanation for their intercourse with 
the consulate. 

General McCoy. Who has succeeded the consul in the heading up 
of Japanese information since the 7th of December ? 

Lieutenant Kimball, We absolutely don't know, sir. We know it 
must be someone, because we believe that the consul felt for some time 
that he might be closed up any time after the Italian and German 
consulates were closed throughout the country; and there is no ques- 
tion that they made plans, had an alternative plan, and have one that 
they are operating under today, and we absolutely don't know where 
that is. 

The Chairman. Has any other government taken over the consulate 
here for the duration, any neutral government? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Sweden was supposed to, but the Swedish 
consul here is a very busy American doctor of Swedish ancestry. Dr. 
Larsen, and I don't think he has been able to do anything in that 
direction, so I think everything is in status quo. 

General McCoy. Has there been any continued suspicion of the 
former legal advisor of the Japanese Consulate, Mr. Thayer ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. No, no suspicion attaches to Mr. Thayer so 
far as I know. 



916 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCoy. How long had he been the legal counsel or counsel- 
lor of the consulate ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. A number of years, General ; oh, I would say 
15 or 20 years, I believe. 

General McCoy. Is he an American in good standing here other- 
wise? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Oh, yes. Yes, very much so. He is a mem- 
ber of the bar, has been for some 40 years, and has been head of the 
Boy Scouts here for many years, and all of my contacts with Mr. 
Thayer professionally as a lawyer before going on active duty led 
me to believe that he was a very loyal American. 

[ISll] The Chairman. Have you any questions, General? 

General McNarney. Do you believe that information on the situa- 
tion here is going out to Japan now ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. The only indication we have of that is their 
broadcasts from Tokyo. I haven't had much time to listen to them, 
but their overseas broadcasts probably do contain some information 
that is more than just guesswork and more than they were able to 
obtain in their one raid. That is probably going by short-wave. 

The Chairman. You think there are some short-wave sets working 
here still ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. I am not a technical man on radio. 

The Chair:man. No. 

Lieutenant Kimball. But that is my understanding, that is my 
belief, but I have no information at all, because all the licensed short- 
wave operators were put out of business immediately. 

The Chairman. Yes. It has to be a bootlegger if it is anybody? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Yes. 

General McNarney. Have you any personal knowledge of the ac- 
tivities which took place on the island of, I think, Niihau? A Jap- 
anese airplane landed there and took over the island. 

Lieutenant Kimball. No. There is a report. I have read a report 
by an Army officer who went over as soon as they got word on Kauai, 
and a second-hand report that the representative of the District Intel- 
ligence Office on Kauai wrote. He didn't go ovei- to the island, but 
he interviewed and questioned people who had been over, and re- 
constructed it to the best of his ability; and then this Army officer — 
incidentally, a second-generation Japanese lieutenant; I can't remem- 
ber his name — who went over with this expedition on the lighthouse 
tender, about a dozen men, and brought back the Hawaiian who 
actually killed the pilot, and his wife, and brought them back for 
[1512] hospitalization. And so those reports are available. 

The Chairman. What do they indicate ( Outline the incident as 
those reports indicate it. 

Lieutenant Kimball. The incident is quite hazy ; it is quite jumbled. 
The facts are not clear, but the plane came down, and these Hawaiians 
had no idea of what it was or why, because they have no radio at all 
over on the island, and the people didn't know the war had started. 
The pilot got out and was unarmed, and he started to attempt to dis- 
pose of his confidential papers and documents and codebooks, and so 
on, in his plane, and they became a little suspicious, and they wouldn't 
let him do that, and took him to the house of one of the natives and 
kept him there. And then they thought he was a pretty good sort, and 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 917 

they allowed him a certain amount of leeway and latitude, and finally 
he got back to his plane and got his service pistol, I believe, and took 
control of the situation, and locked up the native who was his host, 
who was keeping him and then joined with this — first, before that 
happened, the two Japanese on the island, one Hawaiian-born and one 
alien, came into the picture while the Japanese pilot was still being 
kept as a prisoner, so to speak; and the citizen Japenese joined witli 
him apparently quite willing. The alien was more reluctant, and the 
citizen got a shotgun. That is, acting in concert the pilot and the 
citizen Japanese did the holding up of the rest of the people, and 
then several of the natives became alarmed and walked to a distant 
part of the island where there was a whaleboat, in which they put out 
for the island of Kauai, and the Japanese knew that. Then he tried 
to destroy — then he finally got back and burned his plane, but the 
natives were holding his codebooks — codebook and charts and so on — 
and he couldn't get them, and that was what he really was after. And 
finally the shooting broke out, and the citizen committed suicide ; and 
the Hawaiian — Kanahele I think his name was — who was shot at and 
wounded by the pilot, kind of grabbed [1513] him and killed 
him, with the aid of the Hawaiian's wife. In the meantime the pilot 
had set fire to his plane, and whether he got all of it, whether he de- 
stroyed all of his material or not I don't know, but at least his charts 
I think were recovered by the Army expedition that went over there. 
But the illuminating thing about it is the citizen who so readily 
joined with him when he thought the Japanese had the upper hand. 

The Chairman. Is that your general impression? 

Lieutenant Kimball. The general impression — the report by the 
officer, Army ofiicer who went over there, probably gives the — I have 
just read it once hurredly. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Lieutenant Kimball. And the newspapers have it but not in much 
detail. 

The Chairman. Lieutenant, is that your impression of the attitude 
that is likely to be taken by these citizen Japenese if Japan appears to 
be getting the upper hand ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Not all of them by any means, but by a great 
many who are today perfectly law-abiding citizens, if they felt — in 
other words, some would go down with us if it came to that point, and 
others wouldn't care to, but they want to appear to be with us today, 
and they are perfectly law-abiding and probably won't do anything 
as long as they 

The Chairman. Remain as they are. 

Lieutenant Kimbaix. — remain as they are, under control. 

The Chairman. Are there any further questions? 

General McCoy. How would we be able to get a copy of that report ? 
Would you be able to furnish us a copy of the Army officer's report, 
or would you prefer to have us get it through the Army ? 

Lieutenant Kimball, I could have one of our stenographers copy 
it very easily, General, and send it out to you. 

The Chairman. Will you do that ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Yes, Mr, Justice. 

[15U] General McCoy. Thank you. 



918 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. Five copies. You can just carbon it, can't you? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Five copies, yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Lieutenant, where is your home ? 

Lieutenant Kjmball. At the Halekulani Hotel, Admiral. 

Admiral Standlet. Were you appointed to the Reserve Corps from 
Hawaii ? 

Lieutenant Kjmball. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. This has been your home ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. It has always been my home, yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. Always been your home ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. You lived here ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. In connection with your statement to the effect 
that information is still going out of Oahu, and in connection with the 
resignation of Mr. Thayer on the 8th of December after the attack, 
had it ever occurred to you that that might be the very logical way 
that Mr. Thayer would retain a continuous contact with the Japanese 
consul: get out immediately and giye the impression that he was 
through, and then continue that contact in another way ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. It could be. It is possible, sir. 

Admiral Standley. I jiist wanted to suggest that to your mind. 

Lieutenant Kimball. JPossible. I will bear that in mind, sir. 

General McCoy. Has he been questioned at all by the Naval Intelli- 
gence, as far as you know ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. No, sir, he hasn't. He was hurt quite badly 
fighting a fire in his neighborhood and has been at home, and I think 
he has only just recently returned to his office downtown. 

[1515] General McCoy. Have you, as a neighbor and possibly 
a friend, had any suspicion of him at any time as being involved in 
any Japanese subversive activities or cognizant of them:? 

Lieutenant Kimball. No, I haven't. I haven't, General. I haven't 
had any such suspicion. If Mr. Thayer were apprised of what little 
even we know of the espionage activities that the consulate, his former 
clients, have been engaged in, I think that he would probably be quite 
shocked. I mean he would probably have — he has no conception of 
what those people have been doing. 

The Chairman. He has been representing them in their business 
affairs, I take it. The consul has, I suppose, a lot of business, legal 
business ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Giving them opinions on the application of 
local law to one situation or another, but there were various matters 
that we know they didn't consult him on : they consulted Japanese 
lawyers on. 

The Chairman. There are Japanese lawyers on the island, ai-e 
there ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Oh, yes, Mr. Justice. 

The Chairman. A number of them ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. There are about, oh, eight or nine, perhaps 
ten, here in Honolulu now. 

General McCoy. Members of the bar ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Members of the bar, yes, sir. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 919 

Greneral McCoy. Were they by such membership obliged to be Amer- 
ican citizens ? 

Lieutenant Kimbau.. Yes, sir, under the rules of the Supreme Court 
here. 

Admiral Standlet. Lieutenant, in the espionage work upon which 
you are engaged secrecy is one of the great necessities or requirements, 
isn't it? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Yes, sir. 

Admiral Standlet. In order to get information you can't 
[1516] let the world know what you are doing; isn't that true? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Surely. 

Admiral Standlet. It has been suggested here that one of the faults 
of the system here — the three systems — is the fact that they don't 
immediately communicate these suspicions of something going on; 
or, if they feel that they have a source of information, that they 
should give it to the other two services at once. Wouldn't that 
rather jeopardize in many cases, or hasn't it been felt that that would 
jeopardize, the success of such an agency ? 

Lieutenant KimbAll. Yes, that is one of the things that we are 
up against. It is desirable often to let the other two agencies know 
immediately, so that if they have any information that fits in with 
the information in the possession of the originator or the original 
recipient of the immediate report, it is advantageous. On the other 
hand, one or the other of the two other agencies might conceivably 
take some other action in the case that would be a tip-off. It is 
awfully hard to — you can't lay down any fixed rule of procedure. 

The Chairman. Is it a fact that the F. B. I. are not allowed to 
conduct investigation on Navy premises and that if they have a case 
they have got to run it as far as the Navy Yard and then turn it 
over to you ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Under what they call the — under this agree- 
ment all reports of subversive activities on naval reservation affecting 
Navy personnel or civilian employees or contractors' employees — 
Navy contractors' employees — are the responsibility of the Office of 
Naval Intelligence for investigation, but we have always tried to 
work in close cooperation with them, and they give us information, 
and they obtain as quickly as they can give it to us — for instance, 
they are investigating a certain individual in town and they find that 
he associates with some yard employees, and they give that to us 
immediately. 

11517] The Chairman. You run the yard end of it down ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. That's right. 

The Chairman. So you think the thing is working out pretty well, 
do vbu, this division of responsibility? 

Lieutenant Kimball, Not as well as it could, perhaps. There 
probably isn't as close coordination as there should be. 

Admiral Standlet. Lieutenant, have you knowledge of any cases 
where the Navy Department had even gone so far as to enlist in the 
naval service F. B. I. representatives and taken them on board ship 
in order to help solve situations? 

Lieutenant Kimball. I have never heard of such a case, Admiral. 

Admiral Standlet. Well, I do know that is a fact. 

The Chairman. Here, you mean ? 



920 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Standley. I don't know that it is here. 

The Chairman. Somewhere. 

Admiral Standley. But I know that it has been done. 

General McCoy. What is the representation on the part of Naval 
Intelligence as to responsibility on the part of Naval Intelligence for 
subversive activities among the natives ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Reservations, you say? You mean among 
the Japanese ? 

General McCoy. Yes. 

Lieutenant Kimball. Well, now, the Japanese field, the Japanese 
problem, under this agreement was left the joint responsibility of the 
Office of Naval Intelligence and F. B. I. ; and we have fallen down in 
that in the past; prior to the outbreak of war our attempts at joint 
ijivestigations there were not successful. Joint investigations of a 
particular Japanese or a Japanese commercial establishment or a 
hotel or barber shop or something like that, or an individual — group 
of individual Japanese, would be left to an agent from the F. B. I. 
and to an agent from the Office of Naval Intelligence, two agents to 
work on the same case. That wasn't successful. [I0I8] It was 
too much "Let George do it. After you." That sort of thing. That 
wasn't successful. It is a matter of who is in charge. Well, nobody 
is in charge. Well, all right, nobody is in charge, and the thing 
drifts. That was not successful. 

General McCoy. Were 3'ou cognizant of the fact that there were, 
prior to December 7, several hundred consular agents here who were 
not registered under the law ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. I was cognizant of that fact, General. 

General McCoy. Do you know why they were not prosecuted or 
warned to register ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Only by hearsay. 

General McCoy. Did you feel that that was a great danger your- 
self, to have them loose without any supervision ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. I thouglit that they clearly came within the 
provisions of the Registration Act and should have been required to 
register, and, if they failed and refused, then prosecuted. That was 
merely my personal opinion. 

[1S19] General McCoy. Hoav long has the Navy had a counter- 
espionage organization on the Islands? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Well, we liave had the District intelligence 
for a number of years, but it was very small and veiy inadequate. 

General McCoy. Inadequate? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Very inadequate in size and personnel up 
until the end of 1940, and then they began to gradually add to it. 

General McCoy. What was the size of the counter-espionage organ- 
ization as to the number of field operators you had on December 6? 

Lieutenant Kimball. We had a dozen in the main office, over at 
Pearl Harbor, and in the individual branch offices. There was one 
man at the Kanelie Naval Air Station and a man at the Naval Muni- 
tion Depot at Lualualei, and one on each of the main islands. 

General McCoy. Is there any shortage of funds at this time for this 
purpose ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. I am not familiar with that. General. I could 
not say. I have had nothing to do with the administrative end of 
the office and I could not tell you that. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 921 

The Chairman. Was your office cognizant of the fact that some of 
these ishmds had sheriffs and some peace officers who were Japanese? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Yes. 

General McCoy. Were any of those agents whom you mentioned of 
Japanese blood ^ 

Lieutenant Kimball. No, we had no agents in the office of Japanese 
blood. We have one Hawaiian and one Chinese-Hawaiian. 

Admiral Standley. Do you have any translators of Japanese blood? 

Lieutenant Kimball. We have a Japanese translator, yes. 

[1620] Admiral Standley. But so far as you know, there were 
no Japanese agents ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. We have undercover informants who volun- 
teer. They are nonpaid informants. They are the people I men- 
tioned before, citizens of Japanese ancestry. We placed a good deal 
of confidence in them, but I think they were as much in the dark, I am 
convinced, as some of the rest of us. 

Admiral Standley. Do you have any check on the Japanese 
translator ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. He had been in the office for quite a long time. 
Admiral ; before I came on active duty. He did not have access to or 
work with the confidential files. His work has largely been trans- 
lating newspapers up to the war, and of recordings of overseas broad- 
casts from Tokyo, and that sort of thing. 

Admiral Standley. You accepted them without question ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Yes, sir. His work was always subject to 
check by his immediate superior. Lieutenant Carr, who is head of the 
translation section and who is a very gifted linguist. 

Admiral Standley. Does he speak Japanese ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Yes, very well. He speaks that along with 26 
other languages. 

We have several other language officers. 

Admiral Reeves. Am I correct in my understanding of what you say 
that the intelligence work among the Japanese populace is the joint 
responsibility of the Navy Intelligence and the F. B. I. ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Yes, that is correct. 

Admiral Reeves. I understood from the testimony of Mr. Shivers 
that it was the Naval Intelligence responsibility alone under this dis- 
tribution of the work by the agreement that you had entered into. 

[1S21] The Chairman. I did not so understand his testimony. 
I understood his testimony was that the F. B. I. was originally to take 
it all but that it was not equipped to take it all and asked the Navy to 
come in until they could be so equipped, and since that time there has 
been a division of it. 

Lieutenant Kimball. That is correct, Mr. Justice. 

Admiral Reea^s. Who has the responsibility now ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. It is still joint. Admiral ; it is still a joint re- 
sponsibility. We have no limit. We have no lines of demarcation or 
division. 

Admiral Reeves. The F. B. I. has never taken that over entirely ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. No, they have not. 

Admiral Reeves. But that was the original plan, that the F. B. I. 
would take that over when they were equipped to do so ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Yes, and then they found particularly here 
and I believe on the West Coast also that the Navy had been working 



922 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

along that line to such an extent that they had a lot of background 
information, and that was one of them, one of the observations that 
the Navy continue in the field of Japanese activities, Japanese espio- 
nage and propaganda. 

Admiral Reeves. How has this joint responsibility of the Navy and 
the F. B. I. worked out with respect to the Japanese populace ? How 
has it worked out ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. It has caused somewhat of a hiatus. It has 
caused a few holes in the fish net unfortunately, but through no one's 
fault in particular. That is the case when two organizations try to 
cover an entire field without any demarcation or delimitation, and 
you do not always know where the other fellow is going to put his 
neck and he does not know where you are going to put your neck. 

Admiral Reeves. Then there is no clear understanding [1622] 
between the Navy and the F. B. I. as to the character of work that each 
shall undertake ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. No, it is case by case. We will not investigate 
a case they are actively investigating because of the duplication. 

Admiral Reeves. Is it possible, then, that both the Navy and the 
F. B. I. may concentrate on subversive activities among the Japanese 
populace and both have overlooked the espionage activity? 

Lieutenant Kimball. I think there has been that tendency. The 
F. B. I. called that internal security, to go after people who have what 
they call definitely nationalistic tendencies. That is, they referred to 
to those who were strongly pro-Tokyo who perhaps would be danger- 
ous in the event of war, and those are the people who are at present 
on Sand Island. 

Of course, a good Japanese agent is not going to be actively pro- 
Japanese and offensively so. So, I think perhaps they may have over- 
looked some of the most important ones for those who have been 
most offensive by their statements. 

General McCoy. I understand those now interned on Sand Island 
are being investigated by a board before which they can appear and 
state their case. Are you familiar with that board ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. That is the internment procedure. They were 
taken over originally for temporary custodial detention, and their 
cases are now being heard by two boards functioning in the same 
manner. They are two three-man boards. 

The board or boards determine whether they should be interned 
for the duration of the war. 

General McCoy. Are they civilian boards? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Yes, sir. General. 

General FcCoy. Completel}'? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Yes, on the boards are only civilians 
[1523] and they are advisory only. 

General McCoy. They cannot turn a man loose just on his own 
statement ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. No. That is subject to the approval of the 
Military Governor. 

General McCoy. Are steps taken to investigate the background of 
these people before the military authorities act on them? Do you 
know whether they do that, or simply review the proceedings of the 
board ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 923 

Lieutenant Kimball. All the people on Sand Island were previously 
investigated, and they were put there as a result of the investigation 
which was completed prior to the outbreak of the war. 

The Chairman. They were placed on a list after the investigation? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Yes, sir, Mr. Justice. The F. B. I. has got a 
list, of course, and some of them were names that our office had con- 
tributed — a great many — and others that they had discovered them- 
selves, and otliers that the Army had contributed. 

The Chairman. Would it be difficult for you to get us a copy of 
that working agreement between the three agencies? Is it in the form 
of a letter? 

Lieutenant Kimball. No. 

Geneial McCoy. I think if possible that it would be better for us 
to get that. 

The Chairman. I think the Army Intelligence offered to give us 
a copy. 

Lieutenant Kimball. I can get it easily enough. 

The Chairman. There would not be any difficulty on your part 
in producing it ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. No, I could go right to Captain Mayfield. 

[1534] The Chairman. You can say to him that either he or 
Colonel Bicknell offered it to us and we passed it by. I would like to 
look at it. 

Lieutenant Kimball. I can get five copies made of that agi*eement. 

Admiral Reeves. Do you think that the intelligence work now 
conducted by these three agencies would be more efficient and con- 
ducted in a better manner if there were only one controlling head in 
charge of the three agencies? 

Lieutenant Kimball. That would be possible, Admiral, only inso- 
far as the work did not apply purely to one service or the other. The 
Office of Naval Intelligence should properly have the exclusive respon- 
sibility for the workmen at Pearl Harbor and to investigate the back- 
ground of those of foreign ancestry or people working at the yard 
about whom there may be reports that they are acting suspiciously. 

Admiral Reeves. Do you understand that my question is applied 
to the local situation? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Locally, as applied to the Japanese, I think 
it would be more advantageous to have it in one head, yes, without 
losing any of the advantages of having the different ideas coming 
from the Army on one hand, the Navy on the other, and the F. B. L 
on the third. I think the power and the control should be in one per- 
son's hand as far as the Japanese are concerned. 

Admiral Reeves. That is what I mean. That is all. 

The Chairman. Will you please observe the caution not to discuss 
with anyone what has gone on in this room ? 

Lieutenant Kimball. Yes. 

[1525] TESTIMONY OF YEE KAM YORK, FIELD EXAMINER AND 
AUDITOR, TERRITORIAL TAX OFFICE, HONOLULU, HAWAII 

(The oath was administered in due fonn by the Chairman.) 
The Chaieman. Will you give your full name to the reporter? 
Mr. York. Yee Kam York. This is my American passport (hand- 
ing paper to the chairman) . 

79716 — 46— Ex. 14S, vol. 2 22 



924 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I originally had this passport from the Philippines. Are you Gen- 
eral McCoy ? 

General McCoy. Yes. 

The Chairman. How long have you been in Hawaii ? 

Mr. York. Well, I was born here and I left here at an early age — 
I think I was about ten — and returned the latter part of 1937 after the 
second attack by Japan on Shanghai. 

The Chairman. You are employed here, are vou not? 

Mr. York. Yes. 

The Chairman. In what capacity ? 

Mr. York. I am employed as held examiner and auditor at the 
Territorial Tax Office, in the Bureau of Examiners. 

The Chairman. You have had occasion, then, to talk to many 
Japanese who are also American citizens ? 

Mr. York. Yes, sir, and aliens. 

The Chairman. And aliens too ? 

Mr. York. Yes. 

The Chairman. Will you give the Commission the benefit of your 
judgment as to the attitude of the Japanese population on these Islands 
in an emergency or in case of a Japanese threat or attack upon Hawaii ? 

Mr. York. My very mature judgment as very reluctantly given is 
that in case of the acid test that a good part of them cannot be de- 
pended upon. 

The Chairman, That comes from observing their conduct 
[1S26] and talking with them ? 

Mr. York. Yes. 

The Chairman. And from knowing something about their psy- 
cliology ? 

Mr. York. Yes, and I know their mental setup and I draw a parallel 
from my experience in China and throughout China and I knew the 
Japanese there. 

I was for ten years the submanager of the Chungking Industrial 
Bank and I came in contact with Japanese bankers, financiers, mer- 
chant men, consular officials, and army and navy officers. 

My bank used to finance the war materials and munitions before the 
war and I had personal contact with them. 

General McCoy. I understand that you have also lived and had 
business affairs in Manila ? 

Mr. York. I lived in the Philippines for ten years. In fact I am 
an honor graduate of the Sebu High School, the oebu Provincial High 
School. 

I will show you evidence of that (handing a paper to General 
McCoy). This goes back to 1917, when I graduated from the Sebu 
Provincial High School. 

General McCoy. You have always been an American citizen? 

Mr. York. Yes, sir. I have a letter from the Consul General Goss. 
I believe he is now ^Minister to Australia. 

The Chairman. Any further questions? 

General McNarnev. Do you have any personal knowledge of any 
individual who Avas or is engaged in subversive activities in tlie Terri- 
tory? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 925 

Mr. York. I know of one, but I think he has left here. I associated 
with him in my tax work, and he looked to me like he was a naval com- 
mander. He was down around Haleiwa. 

General McNarney. Where? 

Mr. York. That is on the other side of Oahu. This was [1627'] 
back in August or September — I don't exactly remember the date 
— of 1940, and he was leaving evidently on the pretext that his father 
and mother were sick in Japan. 

General McNarney. What action led you to believe that he was an 
agent ? 

Mr. York. My association with the Japanese Army and the navy 
officers is such that his manner, his conduct, is one hundred percent 
naval conduct. 

He had a son in the University of Hawaii and he had a son in high 
school at the time, and he was leaving in a very broken up shape. He 
had two fishing boats, powerful-motored boats. 

General McNarney. Did you ever get in any one of those boats ? 

Mr. York. No. I saw them right next to the place. 

General McCoy. Is that near the Naval Station ? 

Mr. York. No, nothing. I believe the Army was just trying to fix 
up some kind of — they were just planning to build up in that Haleiwa 
district. That is near the Haleiwa hotel. 

General McCoy. There is a flying field there now ? 

Mr, York. I think they knew what was coming before. Certain 
soldiers in this place were guarding that little bridge which crosses 
that place. 

General McCoy. Were you familiar with the fact that a large num- 
ber of Japanese consular agents were on the Islands prior to Decem- 
ber?? 

Mr. York, Well, you see, my own observation is this and it is my 
judgment that was arrived at and I have no malice toward anyone, 
you see, but there was the parallel, and I could only draw a parallel, 
but they make the most efficient use of the organizations as an instru- 
ment of the Army and the Navy. [IS^S] As to the consulate, 
I have good reason to believe that the consulate, the churches, and even 
certain Japanese merchants, prominent ones, work very closely. 

You may not believe it, but I have had occasion to call at the con- 
sulate. You ask about any Japanese and they go and open a book and 
know the name of that person and his wife's name and how many chil- 
dren, and the age and what the occupation is. They go to that extent, 
a very detailed extent. 

General McCoy. That is, the dual citizens ? 

Mr. York, Japanese, yes, dual citizens. Yes, I think they have every 
Japanese of Japanese blood listed. 

T was surprised myself because I did not expect them to have that 
system. 

General McCoy. Would you have confidence in any Japanese ? 

Mr, York. I think there are some, but that "some" is the minority. 
That is, the Japanese. That is the biggest problem we have in Hawaii, 
how to segregate or how to maintain our security without making the 
few loyal ones suffei- for any potential danger from the rest. 



926 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCot. Have you been at any time in touch with the Army 
or Navy Intelligence here? 

Mr. York. Here? 

General McCoy. Yes. 

Mr. York. In fact, I drafted a letter and I said to my wife several 
times, you see — as far back in July, 1941, I drafted a long letter but 
unfortunately I addressed it to Admiral Bloch and T failed to com- 
plete that letter, as I changed my mind at the last minute, because I was 
afraid how — you see I live out in the country and my family is sur- 
rounded by Japanese and I was afraid I would be identified and my 
family might be harmed, so I was afraid. 

I leave home early in the morning and return after business hours 
and my family is there all alone. I have no [IS^O] public road 
of access except a trail. That is a footpath. 

General McCoy. Where does your family live ? 

Mr. York. I own my home under a mortgage. After I returned 
here I bought the land and built the house with the mortgage, you see, 
in Kalihi Valley. That is near Fort Shaf ter. 

In fact, just before eight o'clock on that Sunday morning I was still 
in bed, reading a magazine. I was late, as usual, on Sunday morning, 
and I heard a bomb explosion. My ear — having heard so many bomb 
explosions in China — caught it and I told my wife, I said, "I heard this 
funny explosion. Why don't you go out and see what it is?" 

So I jumped out of bed. My wife said. "It is only some target prac- 
tice." 

So I got out of bed. I took my field glasses. I have a very powerful 
German glass. I looked toward Pearl Harbor and there I saw it was 
already burning, about eight o'clock. I could hardly believe my eyes 
for one hour until I looked at the place. I told my wife, I said, "These 
Americans, when they have maneuvers, tliey certainly make it real- 
istic." 

General McCoy. You could not believe your own eyes ? 

Mr. York. No, I could not believe my eyes. 

I saw two or three planes flying high and there was anti-aircraft, and 
no plane shot down, and I said, "That confirms my belief. Nothing was 
shot down, so it must be a maneuver." 

Along, I think, about half -past eight or nine, three flying fortresses 
came low, right almost over my house, and I think I could see the men 
inside in the flying fortress. There were four motors. The three of 
them circled low. 

At that time I thought it was still a maneuver, until a hand grenade 
or either a small bomb exploded from about here (indicating) to about 
over to that tree (indicating). 

As I was carrying my little boy, instinctively I jumped [1S30] 
back and I told my wife, I said. "This looks too serious to be a maneu- 
ver." I ordered my family back in the house. I said it looked real 
because of the explosion and after, the three flying fortresses. 

Subsequently I thought that the hand grenade, if it was a hand gren- 
ade, must have been dropped by the Japanese plane when flying over. 

These three flying fortresses had no armor or at least they had no 
ammunition. They were flying low in order to protect themselves, to 

five themselves a chance for protection of the anti-aircraft that was 
ring around Fort Shafter. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 927 

Subsequently I thought these three flying fortresses came from the 
coast, although I had no information. I just state this to the General, 

General McCoy. Do your Chinese friends have any concerted associ- 
ation to protect themselves against the Japanese here? 

Mr. York. Here? No. I think the Japanese are just — they just 
have not got that unity of action. The Chamber of Commerce is sup- 
posed to be their strongest organ, but I was surprised to see that they 
are very individualistic ; they stand alone. They do not have organized 
effort, you see. They are very poor in that respect. 

The Japanese are very strong in that respect. What the organ say, 
everybody follows. 

The Hawaiian Islands is an economic — in fact absolutely under 
Japanese economic control. 

If you allow me, I mention the incident of the fishing boat. They 
control all these fishing boats and construction work. In fact, if you 
(k)n't use Japanese labor you can't hire anybody to go on the building. 
All construction work is by them, and the restaurants and all saloons 
and bars and dispensaries, flower shops, hogs — the pig industry. 

[1531] General McCoy. Do you consider that a great danger? 

Mr. York. You see the Japanese always — I can only draw from the 
parallel — but these are sponsored by the Government. I left the Phil- 
ippines in 1919 and at that time I was the only graduate or practically 
the only Oriental graduate in the Philippines Sebu Provincial High 
School ; but in 1919 the Japanese began to come in by shiploads. 

They always go, and again I am drawing from a parallel,' from my 
experience in China. Here in the Hawaiian Islands, the American 
so-called democracy and freedom of religion and education, with all 
those practically assists them in this espionage. In China there is 
restriction against them, and still they find ways and means to estab- 
lish schools and get a hold. 

In French China in Siccawai they bring the Japanese boys in and 
make them go to school and make them travel extensively and inten- 
sivel3^ They know every field and every section, and when the attack 
comes they know every corner of China, to the surprise of the Chinese, 
and then we found out that they had established their schools and 
they had their gi-aduates and they made the honors and they made them 
travel, and they always bring a camera around to every place and 
picture things. 

General McCoy. Do you think it is wise to enlist the Japanese boys 
liere in our Army ? 

Mr. York. I think as long as the Japanese secret organs still have 
contact, it is dangerous. I would not approve of them being in any 
vital thing; I would not approve of them in any vital service; maybe 
something that is not vital. 

Admiral Standley. How many planes do you estimate were in the 
air on that day ? 

Mr. York. From my observation? 

Admiral Standley. Yes. 

Mr. York. I observed it through the attack. 

[1-532] Admiral Standley. What was your estimate? 

Mr. York. I think it was around 30 or 40 planes. 

The Chairman. That is over Pearl Harbor ? 



928 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. York. Yes. Of course, I could not see the other sections. My 
place has a good view of Pearl Harbor. I am on a hill about 800 feet 
high. 

General McCoy. You could tell from your house how many ships 
were in the harbor? 

Mr. York. No, I could not tell that, because the trees are in the way. 

Another impression I had was this, and I could not understand it, 
even to this day, and that is, why the American forces at Pearl Har- 
bor allow the Japanese aliens and Japanese nonaliens to live all 
around that harbor. I cannot understand why the whole harbor 
should not be reserved for naval activity. 

In fact, one Japanese doctor had one of the best residences in the 
best site and he could see all that was going on. 

At different times the Navy prosecuted some Japanese who had 
some fishing boats around Pearl Harbor, and even one fishing boat 
was claimed to come from Hilo. 

That is to me 100% agent activity and not ignorance. They claim 
they did not know anything about the naval regulations prohibiting 
any ship or fishing boat to come by or near Pearl Harbor, 

Then the language schools and churches, especially the churches 
which tie up the so-called American-Japanese to the Japanese Mikado. 

Admiral Standley. Do you knoAv what happened to these boats of 
this Japanese naval officer? 

Mr. York. No. 

Admiral Standley. Did he take his boys back to Japan? 

Mr. York. He left his family behind at the time. I thought you 
were referring to the fishing boats. 

[1S33] Admiral Standley. No. 

Mr. York. Oh, pardon me. He left his wife and his children 
behind. 

Admiral Standlj^y. Do you know where these boats went? 

Mr. York. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Where they are now? 

Mr. York. No, I don't know. I only knew at the time. 

I questioned him, trying to establish indirectly some evidence, 
whether he was earning more than what he reported. So I questioned 
him, whether he had a fishing boat and he said — You know the an- 
swer. They try to tell you that they have nothing and they hesitate 
in the typical Japanese way, but I kid my patients a little and then 
question them two or three times, the same question in a different way, 
and then he said, "One." And then he said "Two,'' and then he tells 
you how much his catch is and how much he makes. 

General McCoy. Do you speak Japanese? 

Mr. York. No, I do not. Unfortunately, due to my duties, they 
did not allow me to learn it. I was so busy and I did not expect to 
make use of it. 

General McCoy. You spoke to him in English? 

Mr. York. Broken English, so-called pidgin or Japanese English. 

The Chairman. Thank you very nuich. 

Mr. York. One statement I would like to make. 

The Chairman. Yes. 

Mr. York. I think the Army action succeeded in — I mean those 
in the Army or Navy or aircorps, but I feel the Army did something 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 929 

through the alertness, taking certain positions in a certain way, that 
I think they succeeded in quelling any uprising that might have oc- 
curred if Japanese were able to land any forces. 

To give you an illustration, there was the little Island [i-534] 
of Niihau at which there are 180 Hawaiians and three or four Japanese 
and only one Japanese family. 

You probably heard about that. 

The Chairman. Yes, we know about that. 

Mr. York. And that one Japanese, who is an American citizen, 
turned right over to them. 

The Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands are such that if there is no 
Japanese here or landing force, everything is all right, but once the 
hostile enemy force lands here, you can't depend on the local popu- 
lation. 

That is the parallel with China. They came into China as mer- 
chants, businessmen, and they were all right, but as soon as the Jap- 
anese Army is five or ten miles away from the place, they just string 
arm bands across them, and even with sticks, and they are military in 
civilian attire. 

When they come in they guide the Army and the Navy to each road 
and tell them where the prominent people are and corral them and 
then tell them where the police station and the Chinese barracks are 
located. They know everything. 

I believe from the fact that they attacked all vital point sin Oahu 
shows that it is long planned. That is from my observation. 

I mention only a specific case in August or September, 1940. For 
instance, if they want to live here, they must have tax clearance. That 
is why I can make contact with them, and I can question where they 
have been employed, but some of them say, "No, I have not worked." 
One I asked said he worked at Fort Armstrong, and I asked him how 
long, and he said, "No, I have not worked there." 

I said, "That was only a minute ago. Now you say that you have 
not worked there. How can you change tliat statement?" I said, 
"What job were you doing?" He hesitated. Then he told me where he 
worked and I asked him how long he had been working, [1535^ 
and so on. Then one man said he had not worked for six months 
because he was discharged, but I see all these people, Japanese nurses, 
carpenters, fishing men, merchants, clerks, and all types of Japanese. 

One statement I would like to say. I hope it will not turn out to 
be a fact, but I think it is potential. Ever since this Pearl Harbor 
attack, a lot of Japanese are taking out tax clearance for taxi licenses, 
and they may be beginning to use them to spy on different things. 

The Chairman. Did you say taxi licenses ? 

Mr. York. Yes. Because they have to come to us to get the tax clear- 
ance before they can get a taxi license. I thing that should be checked 
into. 

I have the official documents, but unfortunately they have never 
coordinated the activities in the District. The director of immigra- 
tion — they think they have certain duties and that is all, with respect 
to immigration. But I have looked around at all these books and 
returns and you see how these prominent groups get in and they control 
things. 



930 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Here, though, there is no work in cooperation, no correlation of 
things. If they had correlation and coordination. Pearl Harbor would 
not have happened. 

Another thing, they control the dispensaries on the Hawaiian 
Islands and all these saloons and dispensaries, and the people go in 
there, the defense workers, to have a good time and get talking, and 
anybody could hear what they say, and you could also see all the ships 
in Pearl Harbor. 

Another point is this: on a certain day you have the sailors and 
soldiers off because of pay day and they know that. I wonder if the 
Army or Navy could not change their pay so that the whole force would 
not be paid on one day, so they do not have their leave of absence at 
that time and certain forces are always functioning. 

[J536] Another thing, I have in my office, as my official duty, 
I go into Fort Kamehameha and I see Hickam Field and all those 
planes. They are just on the field like sardines, so close. 

I think the Chinese are more efficient and give more efficient protec- 
tion to their planes. They have fewer planes and therefore they are 
very valuable. They always put sand bags around and you can't 
bomb all of them at the same time and in the enemy attack they can't 
drop bombs at random. 

Among other things I think about when I was called over to Fort 
Kamehameha on official duty, I look at these planes and they are a 
sure target. 

Why should Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field be so close ? 

Another thing, why not put a tunnel through Kalihi? Then put 
some fighting planes and some bombs in there and have the space so 
that they can come through on both sides. There will be plenty of 
room there for the storage of planes and food. Wliy is that not done 
instead of having the planes out in the open? Now the Japanese 
could see those things. They practically know how many planes you 
have. 

I am surprised myself at things. I am no military technical expert, 
but I have experience, and I guide myself by my experience. I lost 
everything in the second war. I was worth over a quarter of a million 
dollars and I lost everything by surprise. I came over here, and as 
President Roosevelt says in his speech, they could take it, and we took 
it, and I lived on something. I have a good position, so everybody 
says. I may earn very little, but I still- go on. 

I would like to contribute my services to the United States, the 
country of my adoption. I called on the different Government agen- 
cies and I am surprise. They say, "Well, you go see so-and-so." In 
fact, I saw the F. B. I. once. I went to Fort Shaffer to see General 
Martin. I didn't see the [15S7] General. The Captain said, 
"we are purely military agencies," and to see Colonel Bicknell. How- 
ever, I have heard of Colonel Bicknell, and I was supposed to inter- 
view him. I tried to see someone in authority to tell them what I 
have, to give them the benefit of my experience, and I went and told 
the F. B. I. that I saw certain lights, blinkers, from places, and they 
told me, "You go and check it and then come back to us." 

I felt, I was disappointed, and went back to my wife and said, "They 
expect me to be an active agent when I was not." 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 931 

I asked them to make a certain time for an appointment and I would 
come and take them, but they would not. They said they were too 
busy. 

Now, I am not here to run down anything, but that shows you the 
situation. Of course they are busy; I know that, but that is lack of 
coordination and correlation of the services here. 

Tlie Chairman. Thank you very, sir. Please do not discuss what 
has happened in this room. 

Mr, York. There is one other thing: that is, the Admiral or the 
Commander-in-Chief and the Commander of the Air Force, and I 
know you have things to consider, but it is within my province to bring" 
out the Chinese historical adage, to practice the principle of redemp- 
tion through a life of service so you will not play into the hands of 
the enemy. 

That is, the chief officers responsible here, like Admiral Kimmel 
and General Short and this Chief of the Air Force, I think they should 
be given a chance to serve the country, to serve the United States in- 
stead of being so crippled under a demotion or under a transfer that 
they would be unable to serve the United States. 

The Chinese are historical and they always consider a [1538^ 
certain merit of the case and they give them a chance to serve their 
country again. 

I do not write Chinese, but I spoke to my wife, and asked her to 
make this Chinese adage, and I would like to offer this to you (hand- 
ing a paper to the chairman) . 

Any Chinese scholar can give a book in those four characters. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. 

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED 
STATES NAVY— Recalled 

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN WALTER STANLEY DeLANY, UNITED 
STATES NAVY— RecaUed 

Admiral Standley. Captain DeLany, the question was asked here 
yesterday as to the operation of a search after the attack on December 
7 for the purpose of locating enemy transports or surface ships. By 
the plan as drawn up and agreed to by General Short and Admiral 
Bellinger, the duty of search in a surprise attack was on the air force. 
Do you have any records to show what searches were made after the 
attack? 

Captain DeLant, Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Will you please present to the Commission any 
records which you have which will show that search? 

Captain DeLany. These are tracings from the reports that were 
submitted by the respective task force commanders. 

The first tracing here indicates the search that was carried on by the 
Enterprise planes when they left their ship at 6 : 15 in the morning. 
That was before hostilities were declared, and the Enterprise was 
returning to Pearl Harbor after her trip to Wake. 

General McCoy. Does the legend on the chart explain that ? 

[1SS9] Captain DeLany. Yes. 



932 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The search was made from 0140 to 0150, a distance of 150 miles, and 
then the pilots were directed to return and land at Ewa, and they were 
caught coming in. 

General McCoy. We would like to have these charts as a part of the 
record. 

Captain DeLany. Yes. 

This is a second tracing which indicates the track of the planes 
south of Oahu after the attack, and the tracks of the different planes 
are marked in different colors. The lines of search of planes of Pat- 
wing 14 are indicated by these red lines here (indicating). 

In that connection this document here shows the prearranged 
searching plan which existed in the event that a contact was made, 
showing that planes VP-14 would cover this sector (indicating) and 
11 here (indicating) and 12 here (indicating) and this would be VOS 
covered by VO-VSO-VJ and Army as available. 

Admiral Standley. These are the sectors ? 

Captain DeLaxy. These are the sectors, yes. 

General McCoy. Are they specificallj^ named ? 

Captain DeLany. Yes, the directive to Compatwing 14 indicated 
that in the event of contact he would search sector here (indicating) 
and that Patwing 24 would search this sector (indicating) and the 
planes available would go into this sector (indicating) on their search 
in the event of contact. That accounts for the fact, as noted, that 
when contact was made the planes of VP-14 covered in this particular 
sector here (indicating). 

The Chairman. How do you mean wlien contact was made? 

Captain DeLany. 1 mean when a submarine contact was made, and 
when a contact developed, they searched in that sector, as wa.s shown 
here before they went off in the morning. 

General McCoy. In other words, it was automatic? 

[IS4O] Captain DeLany. Yes, they went in to that particular 
sector ( indicating) . 

General McCoy. What could you say about the northern search 
resulting in any contact? 

Captain DeLany. As the planes became available after the con- 
tact, the different colored lines indicate the sectors of the planes as 
they went in the sectors. For instance, this area down in here (in- 
dicating) is covered to 200 miles by six VO-VS and they were or- 
ganized in tliat sector to search in this area (indicating). 

This sector to 200 miles was covered by nine SBD's Avhich landed 
here (indicating), re-armed and went out. 

The remainder of the search was instituted by the direction of 
the Commander-in-Chief to Patwing 2 as planes became available, 
and in this particulai- case nine SBD's were available and they were 
armed and went out from the ENTERPRISE. 

Admiral Standley. When was that? 

Captain DeLany. Around 11 : 50. 

General McCoy. Was that while the attack was on ? 

Captain DeLaxy. Xo, that was after the attack, because they wei-e 
armed at Ewa or wherever they could get armed and get gasoline. 

Two A^J's were armed and sent out in tliese two sectors nortliward, 
and at that time there was the report that one of them was attacked 
by an enemy plane at 1310 at the end of his 300-mile search. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 933 

Admiral Standi-ey. When did you get that report? 

Captain DeLany. Not until it was over. 

The Chairman. You mean the following day ? 

Admiral Kimmfx. Not until he came back. 

Captain DeLany. I do not know whether his radio was out or not. 

General McCoy. In other words, you had no information that day 
of au}?^ contact ? 

[io^i] Admiral Kimmel. No, sir. 

Captain DeLany. This sector (indicating) is heavily covered on 
account of the fact that there were reports of a carrier to the south- 
west of Oahu. There were radio bearings which indicated that the 
carrier was down in this sector (indicating) and an afternoon search 
from the carrier reported, as also developed erroneously, that they 
had seen the carrier down in that sector (indicating). 

As we liad tlie information and the search was assigned and thei*e 
were reports, erroneous reports from the pilots of the ENTERPRISE. 
that is why they are concentrated around here. 

While that search was going on ai'ound Oahu, this represents the 
tracks of planes VP-21 that had been based at Midway and at the 
direction of the Commander-in-Chief had been directed to search 
the sector 070 to 190. 

General McCoy. Was there any contact ? 

Captain DeLany. No, 

General McCoy. When was Midway attacked? 

Captain DeLany. I cannot answer that without referring to the 
record. 

General McCoy. Was it attacked that day or the following day? 

Captain DeLany. My recollection is that it was the following day. 

The Chaerman. That is what I think the testimony shows. 

Captain DeLany. The planes were directed to search that sector 
(indicating) and land at Johnston before sunset the 8th of December. 

The Chairman. Was this search from Midway made on the 7th? 

Captain DeLany. Yes. 

The Chairman. And ordered to be made after the attack? 

Captain DeLany. Yes. As a matter of fact, those planes were in 
the air at the time of the attack, and then this additional search was 
made. We had a squadron of VP's at Midway. \_150] This 
was a normal search they conducted. * 

The Chairman. But this was an additional search ordered by the 
Commander-in-Chief on the 7th? 

Captain DeLany. Yes, and in addition to that there was the direc- 
tion of the Commander-in-Chief that the planes take off the next 
morning on another search and were directed to go to Johnston and 
cover that large area here and land at Johnston before sunset. 

Admiral Standley. Are the times indicated? 

Captain DeLany. No, sir, I have no record of them. They will as 
they become available. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

General McNarney. Wliy was the order given that the planes at 
Midway go back on the 8th ? 

Captain DeLany. They were brought back and landed at Johnston 
and then brought back to Oahu to strengthen the patrol of Oahu. 



934 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, they were brought back to Pearl Harbor to 
strengthen the patrol here and told to cover this area in here. 

Captain DeLany. These planes were sent originally to cover this 
area here (indicating) and to cover the two carriers that might have 
been in this general direction (indicating) as both carriers were re- 
ported to have been in that general west direction, so from Midway 
westward was covered by the search of the VP's. 

Admiral Standley. Off the record. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

Admiral Kimmel. Our directives to Patwing 2 were given by tele- 
phone and we made no record. 

Admiral Standley. Would Patwing 2 have the time of take-off and 
return ? 

Admiral Kimmel. I doubt it very much. 

Captain DeLany. This was drawn up after the people had a 
[154^1 chance to sit down. 

Admiral Kimmel. Under the circumstances with the planes taking 
off they did not have much chance for paper work. 

Admiral Standley. Many of the pilots were in planes that they had 
never flown before? 

Captain DeLany. Yes. 

The next search conducted is one that was conducted by the ENTER- 
PRISE fighter planes. This was in the afternoon. 

General McCoy. The afternoon of the 7th ? 

Captain DeLany. Yes. 

This is predicated on the fact that radio bearings and also intelli- 
gence information indicated that there were carriers southwest of 
Barbers Point. There was the report that these pilots had sighted a 
carrier. Then after that report was made this (indicating chart) 
represents the tracking of the planes sent out with torpedoes and 
bombs to locate that carrier. Then these planes did not get back until 
after sunset and landed on the deck with their torpedoes and bombs. 

' This next search is the one conducted by surface ships, again based 
on the fact that the carrier was supposed to be southwest of Oahu, 
and the destroyers ran a search curve in an attempt to locate the car- 
rier by task force 8, represented by these charts here, and also task force 
12, and these circles represent the speed and the track of the enemy 
carrier and the tracks of the destroyers during the night and back 
there again the next morning. 

The Chairman. Just to tie this up, I would like to ask Admiral 
Kimmel if these searches and these operations were made by his order 
that day? 

Admiral Kimmel. They were made by my general directive issued 
to the Commander Taskforce 8. 

The (vTTATRTvrAx. Who was Admiral Halsey? 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, who was in tlie operation area, and the 
various forces to report to Admiral Halsey, and then we [^15441 
gave him the information and advice on which the order was issued. 

The Chairman. That was my understanding of his testimony. 
Admiral Kimmel. I think it would be well for me if I were per- 
mitted to read those messages which I sent. 

The Chairman. Wouldn't it be a matter of accuracy if these were 
taken and copied into oiir record ? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 935 

Admiral Kimmel. It will only take about ten minutes, and my yeo- 
man is now making six copies for the record of the Commission. 

The Chairman. I do not see any reason to take them down steno- 
graphically and put them in the record. 

Admiral Kimmel. I just want to make sure that you know what 
I did. I do not insist on it. 

Admiral Standley. If you are going to read it straight through, 
then there is no necessity for doing that, but if you are going to read 
it and interpolate, then it is necessary to have it. 

Admiral Kimmel, In accordance with orders and doctrine issued 
in the Security Order of 14 October 1941, which provisions were in 
full effect on 7 December, it was not necessary for the Commander- 
in-Chief to issue numerous orders concerning the movements of the 
ships from the harbor to sea. Similarly the movements of the ships 
at sea were controlled by established doctrine. The orders which were 
issued on 7 December and which are set forth herein are, therefore, 
largely informatory and amplifying in character. Charts submitted 
in evidence before this Commission indicate the movements of surface 
and air forces, with their efforts to locate enemy vessels and bring 
them to action on December 7, 1941. 

0800— 

This is local time — 

Admiral Standlet. When you are not quoting, I wish you would 
tell us. 

[i5^r5] Admiral Kenimel (reading) : 

0800: From the Commander in Chief to all ships and stations. 

Air raid on Pearl Harbor. This is not a drill. 
0816: From the Commander in Chief to all ships and stations. 

Hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl. 
Note. — Transmitted to Commanding General. 
0817 : From CinC to Compatwing 2. 

Locate enemy force. 
0832 : From CinC to all ships present Pearl. 

Japanese submarine in harbor. 
0901 : From CinC to Midway. 

Pearl Harbor bombed. No indication direction attack. 

Take off attempt to locate and sink Japanese force. 
0902: From CinC to Comtaskforce 3, 8. and 12 and all ships Pacific Fleet execi 

WPL 46 against Japan. 
0903 : From CinC to Wake. 

Pear] bombed by Japanese. Be on alert. 
0911 : From CinC to all sector commanders Pearl. 

Do not fire on our planes coming in. 
0920 : From CinC to Comtaskforce One. 

Battleships remain in port until further orders. 

Send all destroyers to sea. Destroy enemy submarines. Follow them 
by own cruisers to join Halsey. 

Admiral Standley. Would you read that again? 
Admiral Kimmel (reading) : 

0920 : From CinC to Comtaskforce One. 

Battleships remain in port until further orders. Send all destroyers 
to sea. Destroy enemy submarines. Follow them by own cruisers to join 
Halsey. 

[1S40] Admiral Standley. To join what? 
Admiral Kimmel. To join Halsey. 

Follow them by own cruisers to join Halsey. 
0921 : From CinC to Pacific Fleet 



936 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Reported that eueiiiy ship has red dot on bottom of fuselage. 
0950 : From CinCPac to Comtaskforce Eight : 

Two enemy carriers reported thirty miles southwest Barbers Point. 
1002 : From CinCPac to all ships present. 

Battleships remain in port probable channel mined. 
1013 : From Commander in Chief to signal tower. 

Report the names of all ships which have left the barbor. 
1015 : From CinC to Comtaskforce One. 

Do not send any more cruisers to sea. 

From Cincpac to Comtaskforce Nine Compatwing 2 to Patwing 21 search 
sector 000-030 Jap carrier. 

The Chairman. What time was that? 

Admiral Kimmel. 1015. (Continuing reading:) 

1018 : From CinCPac to Comtaskforce 8, 12 and 3. 

Search from Pearl very limited account maximum twelve VP searching 
from Pearl. Some indication enemy force northwest Oahu. Addressees 
operate as directed Comtaskforce Eight to intercept enemy. Composition 
enemy force unknown. 

That was 1018. 

Admiral Standley. Off the record. 

There was colloquy off the record.) 

[1547] The Chairman. Now, I think that General McNarney 
wants a question in order to avoid reading all that the order relates and 
having you repeat it, and his question is to the effect : Wh}', Admiral, 
did you suggest there was a probability or a possibility of a carrier to 
the northward? 

Admiral Kimmel. Because I thought that was the most probable 
direction of an attack coming against this place. 

The Chairman. But, as I understand it, you say you gave that direc- 
tion to the commander of Task Force 8 not making it too strong 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. so as to warn liim to watch that area. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Now, I think we have got that ; is that right? 

General McNarney. Yes. However, the charts submitted do not 
show that any search was made to the northward; is that correct? 

Captain DeLany. No, sir. That is not correct. 

General McNarney. I mean by the task force at sea. 

Captain DeLany. By the task force at sea? 

General McNarney. By the task force at sea. 

Captain DeLany. No, sir; they were made from the island. 

The Chairman. I suppose. Captain, you would say in effect that the 
search made from Midway, the northern sector of that search, was 
to the northward of Oahu ? 

Captain DeLany. Yes, sir; very definitely, sir. 

The Chairman. And to intercept any carrier to the northward ? 

Captain DeLany. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You see what I mean, General? 

General McNarney. They were too early in the afternoon to inter- 
cept a carrier 

Captain DeLany. That is correct. 

[1548] General McNarney. — making the attack at 8 : 55 — at 
7 : 55 in the morning. 

The Chairman. At what? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 937 

Admiral Kimmel. But, General, the search was made to the north- 
ward with planes from Oahii. 

General McNakney. This is what I want to bring out. Take this 
off the record for a minute. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

General McNarney. Let us get that on the record, then. 

The Chairmax. State jour question again, General. 

General McNarney. My understanding of your 1015 message is that 
you warned the task force at sea that there might be a carrier to the 
northward and directed him to undertake the necessary search. The 
charts submitted show that no such search was undertaken. Have 
you any explanation for this? 

Admiral Kimmel. The task force at sea, before they could organize 
ii search to the northw^ard, and from information which they had 
obtained, decided that the most profitable area to search was to the 
southward. 

The Chairmax. Now resume your summary of your orders. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. sir. Can you tell me where I left off? 

The Chairmax. 1018, wasn't it? It is that long one. 

General McNarxey. 1018. 

The Chairmax. That is the last one. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, that is right. 1018. 

1030 : From CinC— 

The Chairmax (interposing). Before going to that, I should like 
to have these things straight on the record. Now, that order that 
you sent out for search was directed to three task forces ; is that cor- 
rect ? Task Force 8, Task Force 3, Task Force 14 ? 

Captain DeLaxy. Three. Eight, and Twelve. 

Admiral Staxdley. Three, Eight, and Twelve? 

[1549] Admiral Kimmel. That message there was sent to Com- 
taskforce 8, 12, and 3. 

Admiral Staxdley. Wait a minute now. 

Admiral Kimmel. Is this on the record? 

The Chairmax. Yes. 

Admiral Staxdley. Yes, it is on the record. That answers my 
question. General McNarney referred to a task force. I would like 
to have it shown that that should read "task forces." Either of three 
task forces directed their search to the southward. That shows the 
whole picture. 

Admiral Kimmel. I did not direct the task forces at sea to conduct 
any search. I directed the task forces at sea as follows: 

Addressees operate ais directed Comtaskforce 8 to intercept enemy. 

Admiral Staxdley. That is right. I wanted to get the three. 

The Chairmax. In other words, you gave them what information 
or suspicion you had and left final disposition of the forces on sea to 
Admiral Halsey, the commander of Task Force 8; is that right? 

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct, yes, sir. 

The Chairmax. All right. Go ahead. That clears it up. 

Admiral Staxdley. That is what I wanted to get. 

The Chairmax. Yes. 

Admiral Kimmel (reading) : 

From CinC to Comtaskforce 3, 8, and 12. 



938 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McNaricet. At what time ? 
Admiral Kiiiunel. 1030. 

Submarine reported ten miles south Barl)ers Point. 
1040: From Commander in Chief to Commander Mine Squadron Two. 

Sweep south channel from West Loch to entrance for magnetic and 
moored mines. 
[1550] 1042: From CinC to Commandant Navy Yard. 

CALIFORNIA is on fire inside probably two tugs with fire equipment 
could save her. 
1046: From CinC to Comtaskforce Eight. 

DF bearings indicate enemy carrier bearing 178 from Barbers Point. 
1105 : From CinCPac to all ships. 

Enemy planes coming for Pearl Harbor from south. 
1105 : From CinCPac to all ships present info Comtaskforce Eight. 

All ships departing Pearl organize as Task Force One undivided 
Comdesbatfor assume command report to Comtaskfoi'ce Eight. 

And at 1046 : 

From CinCPac to battleships present. 
Send pilots to Ford Island. 

1141 : Verbal order. 

From CinCPacific to Combatfor Batshlps. 

Prepare available BB planes for search and report to subbase when 
ready and number. 2 CALIFORNIA planes on Ford Island probably ready. 
1155 : From CinCPac to all ships present. 

All cruisers and destroyers depart Pearl as soon as practicable report 
to Comtaskforce One in DETROIT. 

General McCoy. In what ? 

Admiral Kimmel. DETROIT. 

Captain DeLany. DETROIT, the flagship of Rear Admiral 
Draemel. 

Admiral Kimmel. DETROIT is the flagship of the destroyers 
battle force of Rear Admiral Draemel. 

11: From CinCPac to MINNEAPOLIS. 

Use phmes to search sectors 13.") to 180 distance 150 miles froni Pearl. 

General McCoy. What direction would that be? 

[1551] Admiral Kimmel. Tliat is the southward. 
Admiral Ree\i:s. Southeast. 
Admiral Kimmel (reading) : 

1158 : From Commander in Chief to Comtaskforce 12, 3. 8. 

Cancel Midway Marine flight. 
1208: From CinCl'ac to Comtaskforce Eight. 

No confirmation iM)sition enemy carrier. Have searched arc two forty 
to three six zero but not thoroughly. Planes available Pearl can not 
conduct thorou.i^'h search must depend on you. Nine ENTERPRISE planes 
landed four now being used search to northeast. 
1232 : From CinCPac to all ships pre.sent Hawaiian area. 

Enemy transports reported four miles off Barbers Point attack. 
1300: From CinCPac to MINNEAPOLIS. 

What sector are your planes searching and to what distance. 
1324 : From CinCPac to Comtasi<force Eight. 

DETROIT PHOENIX ST. LOUIS NEW ORLEANS fourteen destroyers 
and four minelayers have sortied and are proceeding to join you also 
MINNEAPOLIS and four mine layers from operating areas send ships 
in to fuel as necessary. 
1328 : From CinCPac to Comtaskforce Eight. 

Your 2206 only nine arrived. 
1S29: From CinCPac to Comtaskforce Eight. 
No air attack here since about 0930. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 939 

1332 : From CluCPac to Comtaskforce Eight Information 
Comtaskforce One and Three. 

Radio bearing indicates AKAGI bearing 180 from Pearl and another 
unit bearing 167. 

This is one on which there is no time : 

From CinCPac to all ships present Hawaiian area. 

[1552] Enemy radio has been heard on 6581 kilocycles and 458 

kilocycles. 
1430: From CinCPac to Comtaskforce Eight. 

Your 2345 and 2239 approved probably enemy submarines off entrance. 
1435: From CinCPac to Comtaskforce Eight. 

No definite information yet available but indications are that enemy 
carriers may be both north and south of Oahu. 
1530: From CinCPac to Comtaskforce 15.1 

War declared by Japan on Britain and United States Task Force 15.1 
proceed direct San Francisco Task Force 15.5 proceed to Sydney. 
1700: (Verbal) From Cincpac to Compatwing Two. 
Direct Midway planes 

Commander DeLany (interposing). That's the Midway planes. 
Admiral Kimmel (continuing reading) : 

— Midway planes search Sector 070-190 to maximum distance possible 
and still land Johnston by sunset. Ol3.iective Jap carrier. 
1845 : CinCPacific Compatwing Two information Taskforce 8 and 12. 

LEXINGTON group Taskforce 12 proceeding to intercept enemy carrier 
on assumption it departed for Jaluit from point 200 miles south Pearl at 
1200 local todav at 27 knots. Desire guard against repetition today's 
raid. ENTERPRISE Taskforce 8 latitude 20-45 longitude 150-15. Day- 
light tomorrow conduct air searches as follows : 6 PBY median 220 to 700 
miles to search outer limit 0900. Spacing 50 miles. Patron 21 transfer 
from Midway to Johnston searching maximum area enroute. Maintain 
PBY now Johnston in [1553] readiness to take over tracking. 
Direct VB planes Join ENTERPRISE sunrise. Employ other aircraft 
Oahu including Army to search 360 degrees from Oahu distance 200 miles 
taking off 1 hour prior sunrise. Hold other aircraft as striking group. 
From Cincpac to Comtaskforce One 

The Chairman. Any hour? 

Admiral Kjmmel. 1902. I beg your pardon, sir. 1902. 

The Chairman. 1902. 

Admiral Kimmel (continuing reading) : 

— Eight, Three and Twelve. 

Recent radio intelligence indicated formation Japanese major units 
into two task groups. First group concentrated Indo China area. Sec- 
ond group plus three Kongos unaccounted for. OpNav opinion latter 
force or part attacked Pearl. Composition second group follows three 
or four CA two or four CV two desrons of two CL twenty eight DD one 
subron of nine dash twelve subs and fast transport force containing 
twenty odd AP's. First fleet less seaplane tenders and one desron may 
be in support according OpNav. 
1917: From CinCPac to all ships pi*esent. 

Reference paragraph G Pacific Fleet Letter 2CL-41 Condition Two ef- 
fective. Use maximum dispersal planes being serviced during night. 
2000 : From CinCPac to Taskforce 8, 12, 3. 

Do not attempt entrance heavy ships to Pearl during darkness. 
2225 : From CinCPac to Combasefor. 

Place two battle rafts outboard of each drydock caisson one to be 
alongside and one alwut one hundred feet out. To be in place by 0530. 

Charts were offered in evidence before this Commis- [1554] sion 
showing the air scouting operations instituted on 7 December in an attempt 
to locate enemy forces. These scouting operations were under the direct 
command of Commander Patrol Wing Two, Rear Admiral Bellinger. They 
were instituted by order of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, some 
in accordance with prearranged doctrine and others in accordance with 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 143, vol. 2 23 



940 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

orders telephoned from the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief to 
Commander Patrol Wing Two. Throughout the forenoon of 7 December 
information received by Commander Patrol Wing Two was telephoned 
to headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, and information received at 
the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief was promulgated to the 
Fleet and at the same time telephoned to Commander Patrol Wing Two. 
The telephonic exchanges between the headquarters of the Commander- 
in-Chief and Commander Patrol Wing Two were numerous, but in the 
exigency which existed they were not recorded. The Air OflEicer on the 
Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Captain A. C. Davis, states that he 
himself did most of the telephoning to Commander Patrol Wing Two and 
that all orders to that officer issued by telephone were in accordance with 
verbal instructions which Captain Davis received from the Commander- 
in-Chief. 

The Chairman. Now, it will help the reporter if those sheets that 
you used can be turned over to him, 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

The Chairmax. Note, Mr. Reporter, that the plats discussed by 
Admiral Kimmel and Captain DeLany are marked in the order that 
they were discussed: Exhibit A of this date. Wliat is the date? 

Captain DeLany. Tth, sir. 

The Chairman. Exhibit B of this date, Exhibit C of this date, and 
Exhibit D of this date. 

[ISSS] (Plats discussed by Admiral Kimmel and Captain 
Delany were marked Exhibits A, B, C, and D of January 7. 1942, for 
identification.) 

The Chairman. I suspect none of these existed on the date of the 
crisis ? 

Captain DeLany. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Made from records? 

Captain DeLany. These were all made from reports. 

Admiral Kimmel. Do you want more copies of them? 

The Chairman. No; I think we shall keep them in our archives, 
and any member can examine them or we can discuss them together. 

Admiral Kimmel. Well, then we won't need to make them. 

The Chairjcan. I think you will not need to make them. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

The Chairman. Admiral Kimmel produces certain excerpts from 
the correspondence between himself and CNO beginning 13 January 
and ending 2 December, 1941. 

In producing these excerpts Admiral Kimmel states that they are, 
of course, excerpts from longer letters, that they do not purport to be 
excerpts from all of the correspondence, that they have been hurriedly 
]3repared from the total correspondence, and that he desires no infer- 
ence to be drawn that he has either attempted to draw correspondence 
only favorable to himself or the reverse in selecting these excerpts. 
He submits them only for such assistance as they may be to the Com- 
mission, and with the statement that so far as he is concerned the Com- 
mission is at liberty to examine in Washington the complete file of 
correspondence between himself and CNO if it wishes further infor- 
mation as to the same. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir, gentlemen, in AVashington or right here 
now. 

Admiral Reeves. Either here or in Washington. 

The Chairman. And also states that the complete file of [1556] 
correspondence is in his possession and that if before the Commission 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 941 

is in his possession and that if before the Commission leaves it desires 
further to examine it it will be at the disposition of the Commission. 

That ought to state your position accurately, I think. 

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. It is ordered that the excerpts produced by Ad- 
miral Kimmel be copied in the record immediately following this 
statement. 

(Extracts from correspondence between Admiral Kimmel and 
Chief of Naval Operations are as follows : ) 

United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Cincpac File No. 

SECRET 

S-E-C-R-E-T 

EXTRACTS FROM SECRET LETTERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE COMMANDEB-IN-CHIEF AND 
THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

13 January; 

Chief of Naval Operations writes Admiral Kimmell concerning his appoint- 
ment as Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and presents his estimate of the 
international situation. He expresses the opinion that we are heading straight 
for war and he does not see how we can avoid it. It may be a matter of weeks 
or days. He is terribly impatient at the slowness with which things move in 
the Navy Department in preparing the Navy for war. He does not want to 
become involved in the Pacific if it is possible to avoid it but realizes that 
we may become involved in the Atlantic and the Pacific at the same time. 

27 January: 

Three days before taking command of the Fleet Admiral Kimmel writes the 
Chief of Naval Operations that he has made a hurried survey of the situation 
and is particularly impressed with the lack of Army equipment [1557] 
"as to defending this base". He thinks the supply of an adequate number of 
Army planes and guns for the defense of Pearl Harbor should be given the 
highest priority. A secure base is of paramount importance. He has given 
Commander McCrae complete notes on his ideas, with the request that McCrae 
present them to the Chief of Naval Operations on his arrival in Washington. 
The prospective Commander-in-Chief stresses the importance of filling all 
ships to capacity with personnel, not only because of the shortage of person- 
nel but in order to train men for new construction. He mentions a Fleet 
Personnel Board now in session to make a study of the required complement 
to man the guns of each ship of the Fleet. 

29 January: 

Chief of Naval Operations informs Admiral Kimmel that he is still fighting 
for personnel. With the Army building up to li/^ millions he can not under- 
stand why he has to fight so hard for almost every additional man for the 
Navy. In this and in subsequent correspondence he infers that the President 
is averse to increasing the enlisted complement of the Navy. 

10 February: 

CNO informs Cincpac that he continues in every way possible to fight com- 
mitments or dispositions that would involve us on two fronts. He mentions 
a conference in the White House. He states that he continues to impress 
General Marshall to reinforce Oahu and elsewhere and that General Marshall 
is going to send out 81 fighters. He hopes also to get Marines to Midway, 
Johnston and Palmyra. He states that every time he gets in the White House 
which is rather frequently, he struggles for additional men. The President 
simply has his own ideas about men. He feels that he could go to Capitol 
Hill and get all tJie men he wanted if he could just get the green light from 
[1558] the White House. 

18 February: 

Cincpac protests the recent action of the Bureau of Navigation in taking from 
this Fleet 40 officers who have had post graduate ordnance instruction. Many of 



942 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

these officers are occupying important positions in tlie Fleet and it seems unwise 
wlien war is imminent to send on shore our best officers. He reports that he 
landed a full complement of Marines at Midway. He states he will be ready to 
send a detachment of cruisers, destroyers, and a carrier to malje a cruise to 
Manila or elsewhere as proposed but advances the opinion that we should be pre- 
pared for war when we make this move. He complains of tlie lack of local 
defense forces for the Fourteenth Naval District which can be defended only by 
draining small craft from the Fleet. He speaks of Admiral Halsey's futile at- 
tempts to obtain from the Bureau of Ordnance the number of bombs needed and 
recommends that bombs be forwarded even though the magazines to stow them 
are not ready. He states "I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air or com- 
bined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. I feel that immediate practicable 
steps should be taken to minimize the danger of damage inflicted and to insure 
that the attacking force will pay. We need anti-submarine forces — destroyers 
and patrol craft. Patrol plane squadrons will help when they arrive." He men- 
tions having sent a despatch outlining the minimum complements prescribed for 
ships by the Fleet Personnel Board for each type. He wants lockers and bunks 
built into ships to permit increasing the size of crews. He asked that drastic 
steps be taken to stop the continual turnover of personnel, particularly qualified 
personnel. He demands the supply of modern type planes throughout the Fleet 
and forwards a copy of his letter to the Bureau of Aeronautics. [1559] He 
states "I have gathered the distinct impression that the Bureau of Aeronautics is 
primarly concerned with the expension program and that the supply of planes 
and personnel to man the Fleet takes a secondary place." 

22 March: 

CNO replies that he regrets he is forced to transfer from the Fleet so many 
officers with ordnance training but states that the procurement situation in the 
Bureau of Ordnance is critical. He adds : "You may expect a similar effort to 
get legally trained officers in legal jobs ashore." He states that : "Need for the 
destroyers in the Atlantic Fleet right now is such that we will not be able to 
help you with additional destroj^ers for some months, in fact we may have to 
take some away from you soon." He agrees that it is desirable to acquire the 
NEW JERSEY and the MANHATTAN sea train vessels but says the President 
cut out the MANHATTAN'S and funds had not been made available for the 
NEW JERSEY'S. He states that the SecNav approved recommendations for 
three additional store ships but the President cut it to two, and the status of 
legislation appropriating money for these two is indeterminate at the present. 

22 April: 

Cincpac to CNO. He recommends the establishment of a nucleus of trained 
officers and trained men in each type in the Fleet. He asks that legislation he 
obtained to prevent the discharge of qualified men and to permit them to remain 
in their present billets. 

Jf April: 

CNO writesChincpac that the Japanese situation looks a trifle easier but the 
Department cannot be sure what the Oriental plans really are. He believes 
that Nomura earnestly desires to avert a crisis with the United States. Mq 
considers the situation obviously critical [1560] in the Atlantic and is hope- 
less unless we take strong measures to save it. 

19 April: 

CNO quotes the President as saying that as soon as the Australian expedition 
returns he wants to send out more such expeditions. He wants our ships to 
keep popping up her and there just to keep the Japs guessing. "This of course 
is right down the State Department's alley". "To my mind a lot of the State 
Department action and recommendations are no less than child's play and I 
have practically said so in many words (sic) in the presence of all concerned. 
I acquiesced in the Australian cruise with far more grace the (sic) I would 
have otherwise." He speaks of the necessity to remove to the Atlantic from 
the Pacific Fleet 3 BB's. 1 CV. 4 CL's and 2 squadrons of Destroyers. This is 
to be the first echelon for the battle of the Atlantic. It was agreed to, author- 
ized by, and directed in its detail by he Presiden. 

5 May: 

Cincpac protests to CNO on the loss of so many experienced men upon the 
expiration of their enlistment to take positions in civil life because of the 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 943 

high wages prevailing. He asks congressional legislation to freeze enlist- 
ments. He asks the CNO to Indicate to the material bureaus the shortage of 
shipping in order that they might go out of their way to meet our demands for 
cargo such as bombs and ammunition. 

16 May: 

Cincpac writes the CNO that he is greatly concerned about the ammunition 
situation. He is unable to get sufficient target practice ammunition to complete 
training. He complains of the shortage of machine gun ammunition, particularly 
.50 caliber, which places us in a [1561] serious position. He stresses the 
need for gunnery school target practice ammunition and states that the situa- 
tion in regard to reserve service ammunition is entirely unsatisfactory. 

15 May: 

CNO writes Cincpac that the Navy Department is aware of the Fleet's diffi- 
culties in connection with the loss of experienced men. The proposal to auto- 
matically extend enlistments during war and national emergency was intro- 
duced in the Senate but has not been introduced in the House as Mr. Vinson is 
apparently oposed to it. He indicates that there are no additional patrol craft 
that can be furnished the Fourteenth Naval District. "I must confess that our 
preliminary survey in this matter does not appear to be promising. I am 
keenly aware of your desire to save wear and tear on your destroyers. We are 
bending every effort to be prepared for war when and if it comes." 

27 July: 

Cincpac writes CNO a long letter covering the needs of the Fleet. Among the 
items mentioned are : — 

The importance of keeping the iConsmander-in-Chief advised of Depart- 
ment policies and decisions and changes in policies and decisions to meet 
changes in the international situation. 

What will be the U. S. attitude toward Eussian intervention in the war? 
Present plans do not include Russia and do not provide for coordinated 
action, etc. 

Will England declare war on Japan if they attack Maritime Provinces and 
if the answer is in the affirmative will we actively assist as tentatively 
provided in the case of Singapore and N. E. I. 

Are plans being prepared for joint action, mutual {1562] support, 
etc.? 

If England declares war on Japan and we do not, what is the attitude in 
regard to Japanese shipping, commerce, raiders, etc.? 

Need for transports and light destroyer transports. 

Need for Marine equipment, particularly antiaircraft guns and .50 caliber 
machine guns. 

The need for ammunition handling and stowage facilities ashore. 

The importance of building up Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to the point 
contemplated by the Greenslade Board. 

Need for additional personnel. 

Need for a hospital ship in the Pacific Fleet and for completion of a new 
hospital at Pearl Harbor. 

Urgency for small craft in the Fourteenth Naval District. 

Need for acquiring and assembling advanced base material at Mare 
Island. 

Urging that all available light craft in the Pacific be fitted with depth 
charges and listening gear. 

Communications. The inability to obtain RADAR's and "IFF" equipment 

Aviation requirements and need for new torpedo planes. 

Conversion of merchant vessels for carrier landing training. 

Need for development of air fields authorized in the Islands. 

25 July: 

CNO states that Cincpac may be called upon to furnish [1563] a car- 
rier for the purpose of transporting airplanes to an Asiatic Russian port. The 
President has told him to be prepared for it. 

2^ July: 

CNO writes that the President has finally approved a figure of 553,000 enlisted 
men and 105,000 Marines but what a struggle it has been. If we could only 
have gone full speed ahead two years ago, but that is water over the dam. 



944 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

SO July: 

Cincpac protests supplying aircraft to the Russians wtien our own deficiencies 
are so great. He does not want to divert a carrier from its proper duties to act 
as an aircraft transport. He asks wliy ttiese planes cannot be flown out by 
Alaska and Eastern Siberia fields. He states that a carrier sent on such a 
mission to the Westward of the Japan-Kurile line must be protected and that its 
minimum escort and protecting force should be the entire Pacific Fleet. To 
deliver aircraft to Asiatic Russian ports in one of our carriers is to invite war. 
"If we have decided upon war it would be far better to take direct offensive 
action. If for reasons of political interest it has been determined to force Japan 
to fire the first shot, let us choose a method that will be more advantageous to 
ourselves". 

SlJuly: 

CNO states that the converted LONG ISLAND is promising for her size and 
better than he had hoped for. "We have six more converting which will be 
much longer than this and may be superior in every way. They will, in all 
probability go to the British. In fact, we are doing the work on Lend-Lease." 
He states : — "Policy seems to be something never fixed, always fluid and changing. 
There is no use kicking on what you can't get {156^^ definite answers 
for." He thinks that the Jap reason for holding off in Siberia until the Russo- 
Japan situation clarifies is that one of the reasons is Indo-China and pressure on 
Thailand puts Japan in a better position for an all-out cleanup in China. "I 
believe the proportion of our population which feels we should enter the war is 
relatively small." 

12 August: 

Cincpac asks that highest priority be given the manufacture and supply and 
installation of RADAR. He again asks for patrol vessels for the Fourteenth 
Naval District. He stresses the need for ships of all types and states : — "This is 
a vast ocean". The Marines have been sent to Wake. Some of the defense 
battalions are shy in equipment. The anti-aircraft giins for Wake are not 
equipped with directors. The battalions are short in .30 and .50 caliber machine 
guns and ammunition. He begs that some attention be given to the permanency 
of detail of captains and executive officers of heavy shii)s and mentions having 
recommended to the Bureau of Navigation the detail of younger officers to 
command destroyers and asks that squadron commanders be detailed only from 
experienced destroyer officers. He stresses the need for 20.000 additional men 
in the Fleet as soon as possible. 

21 August: 

CNO replies on the i)ersonnel situation but states that the Atlantic is much 
more in need of men than is the Pacific Fleet. 

26 August: 

Cincpac protests the transfer of 222 I'ated and experienced men from/ the 
Pacific Fleet to fit out the U. S. S. HORNET air squadrons on the Atlantic Coast. 

28 August: 

CNO to Cincpac: — "With regard to the general [i.T65] situation in the 
Pacific about all I can say is that Japan seems to have arrived at another one 
of their indecisive periods. Some very strong messages have been sent to them 
but just what they are going to do I do not know." 

19 August : 

CNO in a long letter to Cincpac replies to Cincpac letter of 26 July on the 
needs of the Pacific Fleet. In this letter it is stated why the different Bureaus 
cannot provide the equipment demanded for the Pacific Fleet. Some is under 
experimental stage and others cannot be obtained. 

12 Septemher: 

Cincpac writes to CNO. Noted that the Southeast Pacific Force has shooting 
orders for surface raiders east of 100° West. He asks what orders to shoot 
should be issued in various areas of the Pacific. He asks what to do about 
submarine contacts suspected to be Japanese, off Pearl Harbor and vicinity. Our 
present orders are not to bomb unless they are in the defensive sea area. He 
states "A strong Pacific Fleet is unquestionably a detriment to Japan. A weaker 
one may be an invitation." He complains of our shortage of carriers, cruisers 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 945 

and destroyers. He asks that the NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON be 
sent to reinforce the Pacific Fleet. 

gt') September: 

CNO replies that at the present time the President has issued shooting orders 
only for the Atlantic and the Southeast Pacific area. If Japan should attack 
Siberia the policy of the United States and that of the United Kingdom has not 
yet been clarified. He quotes article 723 U. S. Navy Regulations on the subject 
of using force and the legality of \ising force against a foreign and friendly 
State. He adds:— "The existing orders not to bomb suspected submarines ex- 
cept in the defensive sea [1566] areas are appropriate". "'If conclusive 
evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near U. S. 
territory then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such 
submarines would appear to be our next step". Also, "We have no intention of 
further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that prescribed in Rainbow FIVE; 
that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month after Japan and the 
United States are at war" ! "The existing force in the Pacific is all that can be 
spared for the tasks assigned your Fleet". 

22 October: 

Cincpac informed CNO that on receipt of despatch concerning the change in 
the Japanese cabinet he made the following dispositions : 

Continued maintaining the patrol of two submarines at Midway; 
Despatched twelve patrol planes to Midway ; 
Started two submarines for the patrol of Wake ; 

Despatched the CASTOR and two destroyers to Johnston and Wake with 
additional Marines and stores ; 

The CURTISS arrived at Wake with gasoline, lubricating oil and bombs; 
Prepared six patrol planes at Midway for Wake, replacing these six by 
others from Pearl Harbor; 

Sent additional Marines to Palmyi-a ; 

Placed on 12 hours notice the Task Force under Admiral Pye, then on 
the West Coast for a recreation cruise ; 

Prepared six submarines to depart for Japanese waters ; 
Placed additional security measures in effect in the operating areas out- 
side Pearl Harbor ; 

Delayed the sailing of the WEST VIRGINIA for the West Coast until time 
when she was actually [1567] required at Puget Sound. 
Informed CNO that every exercise plan finds us short of destroyers and stated 
that in order to get anything like the capabilities of the heavy ships made effec- 
tive we required at least two more squadrons of destrovers. Again asked that 
the NORTH CAROLINE and WASHINGTON or some other battleships be sent 
here to strengthen the Pacific Fleet. Asked for all long range submarines that 
can be sent here. Asked for more cruisers to take care of the Japanese raider 
activities after the outbreak of war. Asked for another carrier. Asked for sea 
train vessels to transport aircraft. Asked for RADAR and states that the first 
ones received for the HONOLULU class are of practically no value, being of 
the wrong type. 

20 October: 

Having been informed by Mr. Hallet Abend that the British Consul had in- 
formed Australia and New Zealand that England would declare war on Japan if 
the latter attacked Russia, Cincpac asks in that event what the United States 
would do. 

6 November: 

Cincpac forwards to CNO his estimate of the Japanese bases and forces in the 
Mandates. He again calls attention to the anti-submarine effort that will be 
required in this area and at sea if our oi>ei'ations are to be carried on with a 
leasonable security. In this letter he lists all types which are lacking sound 
eqnipment and asks that something be done about it. There are in this area 29 
ships which can be fitted with sound gear and which nre not so fitted. 

7 November: 

CNO approves the dispositions made by Cinpac after change in the Japanese 
cabinet. He notes the desirability of many things for the Pacific Fleet, particu- 
larly [1568] destroyers and cruisers but states that he just has not any 



946 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to give us. He states that King in the Atlantic is really up against it for destroy- 
ers for escort. He states the NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON will not 
be available before March and that he is assigning them to the Atlantic for train- 
ing. "Due to the urgency for providing destroyers of the Atlantic Fleet with 
high speed anti-submarine searching equipment, 27 of the 29 Model 'QC retract- 
able domes and projectors have been diverted from Pacific Fleet craft and will be 
sent to the Atlantic". He mentions two sea train vessels recently acquired and 
undergoing conversion. One of these will be sent to the Atlantic and one to the 
Pacific, but "if we have to send planes to the Near East we may have to use these 
ships for that purpose". He speaks of merchant ships to be converted to aircraft 
carriers but states that right now these ships are engaged in important duties and 
cannot be converted. Conversion will take from 12 to 15 months. At the same 
time he states that things seem to be moving steadily toward a crisis in the 
Pacific. "Just when it will break no one can tell". 

15 November: 

Cincpac asks for an additional 19,000 men and complains that material and 
personnel are being diverted to the Atlantic. He states : — "If this Fleet is to 
reach and maintain a satisfactory degree of readiness for offensive action the 
foregoing requirements must be met; and it must not be considered a training 
fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the shore establishment". 

14 November: 

CNO states that just what we will do in the Far East remains to be seen. 
He attaches an estimate submitted by General Mai'shall and himself to the 
President, Far [1569] Eastern situation. In this estimate the President 
is informed that the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet 
and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Pacific. It dis- 
cusses in detail the situation in the Far East and makes certain recommenda- 
tions, one of which is that the despatch of United States' armed forces for inter- 
vention against Japan be disapproved. 

In this same letter CNO states that the flight deck merchant ship LONG ISLAND 
is far from satisfactory so far as speed is concerned, and adds : — ''Incidentally, 
five of these type are being converted in our yards for the British, under Lend- 
Lease". He encloses a study made by the General Board on the subject of the 
fortification of Guam. 

25 November: 

CNO to Cincpac. "It might interest you to know that King strongly recom- 
mended his taking the destroyers which we now have on our West Coast ports 
and the Secretary was sold on it". (From this statement it does not appear that 
the Secretary of the Navy expected hostilities to open in he Hawaiian Area). 
Again the task of the Atlantic and the need for ships and transports are 
stressed. CNO has at last succeeded in getting the President to authorize draftees 
for the Navy. 

In an undated postscript to this letter the CNO states : — 

"I held tins up pending a meeting with the president and Mr. Hull today. I 
have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk 
with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity 
of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. 
Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles 
an [1570] attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing 
thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to 
occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the 
strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was 
not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still 
rather look for an advance into Thailand, Iiido-China. Burma Road area as the 
most likely. 

"I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will 
be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may 
do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we 
may do nothing — I think it is more likely to be 'anything'." 

2 December: 

Cincpac to CNO. This letter is almost entirely on the defenses of the outlying 
islands and the recommendations from Navy and War Departments in the past 
few days that soldiers be used to replace Marines. Cincpac quotes to CNO the 
statement of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Detachment that 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 947 

Army pursuit planes cannot operate farther than 15 miles from land. He states 
that if this be the case Army pursuit planes will be of very little use in an out- 
lying island. He calls the CNO's attention to the fact that he has issued orders 
to the Pacific Fleet to bomb all submarine contacts in the operating areas around 
Oahu. 

— End— 

[157J] Admiral Kimmel. May I get that "back when they are 
finished with it ? I would like to have it. 

The Chairman. All right. We will have it sent back to you to 
complete your file. 

Admiral Kimmel. Will that be all, sir? 

The Chairman. Yes. If there is anything that occurs to you, sir, 
let us know, and we shall be glad to have you appear before us. 

Admiral Kimmel. I will if it does, but just at present I have nothing- 
further to say. 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn ? 

TESTIMONY OF FIRST LIEUTENANT H. H. HENDERSON, MILITARY 
INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES ARMY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Give your full name and rank to the reporter, 
please. 

Lieutenant Henderson. H. H. Henderson, First Lieutenant, Mili- 
tary Intelligence. 

The Chairman. How long have you been in the Army Intelligence 
in the Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant? 

Lieutenant Henderson. Since September, 1938. 

The Chairman. During that time has the liaison between F. B. I., 
Army, and Navy, to your observation, been an intimate one? 

Lieutenant Henderson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Have you found any evidence of one or the other of 
those agencies attempting to investigate things and not advising the 
other until the investigation was complete ? 

Lieutenant Henderson. No, sir, I never noticed that. 

The Chairman. Why do you think it has been that the intelligence 
services have not been able to break through the Japanese ring of 
silence here ? 

[1572] Lieutenant Henderson. Well, I really don't know, sir. 

The Chairman. Have you been detailed to do some work on the 
Japanese end? 

Lieutenant Henderson. No, sir, I haven't. 

The Chairman. As I understand it, under the agreement you look 
after military matters. Army matters, exclusively ? 

Lieutenant Henderson. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Whereas the Navy and F. B. I. have Japanese mat- 
ters under their particular care ? 

Lieutenant Henderson. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

The Chairman. Do you think that the espionage against the Jap- 
anese could be better conducted if there were a single agency through 
which everything cleared and which had direction of all avtivities? 

Lieutenant Henderson. Well, it might possibly be, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Have you any other questions ? 



948 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

General McCoy. Are you a Keserve Officer? 

Lieutenant Henderson. Yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Are you a native of Hawaii ? 

Lieutenant Henderson. No, sir. I came over here from Fort Sam 
Houston, sir. 

General McCoy. For what particular reason were you detailed for 
this duty? DoyoukiV)w? 

Lieutenant Henderson. Well, I was transferred into the Intelligence 
Service in 1927 after being on a probationary duty for a couple of 
years. I was in the Intelligence Police Corps, and I came up to this 
from that. 

General McCoy. You had no special qualifications for intelligence 
service here in Hawaii? 

Lieutenant Henderson. No, sir. I was just a replacement. 

General McCoy. Due to special knowledge of languages or anything 
of that sort ? 

Lieutenant Henderson. No, sir. 

General McCoy. What has been your particular assignment ? 

[1S7S] Lieutenant Henderson. Well, sir, now as an officer I 
am an administration officer for the contact office downtown. 

General McCoy. Does the administrative work go smoothly and 
satisfactorily in connection with the liaison with the Navy and the 
F. B. L? 

Lieutenant Henderson. Yes, sir. Our cooperation is especially good 
with the F. B. I. Of course they are right on the same floor with us, 
practicall}^ in the same office, although we have had no difficulty with 
the Navy at all. They have been very cooperative. I think all three 
of the services are working very closely together. They have been 
so far as I can see. 

General McCoy. I have no further questions. 

The Chairman. Any questions? 

General McNarney. Have you any intelligence police under your 
control ? 

Lieutenant Henderson. Yes, sir. Not exactly under my control 
but within the office. 

General McNarney. I mean in your organization. 

Lieutenant Henderson. Yes, sir. 
, General McNarney. Where are they stationed ? 

Lieutenant Henderson. Right down in the Dillingham Building 
right in town. 

General McNarney. Where do they usuallj' do their business? 
Where do they operate ? 

Lieutenant Hendj:rson. Well they are circulating around town and 
also on the various posts whenever tliere is a necessity for it. 

General McNarney. Have they turned up any subversive action or 
acts of sabotage ? 

Lieutenant Henderson. So far they have — well, there's lots of 
subversive activity been turned up, but no concrete acts of sabotage 
have been uncovered; lots of reports of it, but it never developed 
into anything concrete. 

\ 1-57 If] General McNarney. You say there is lots of subversive 
action turned up? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 949 

Lieutenant Henderson. Well, it is more reports of subversive activi- 
ties than there were actual cases. 

General McNarney. Did you ever get any concrete evidence on 
any particular person ? 

Lieutenant Henderson. No, we haven't developed anything where 
it could develop into a trial. 

General McNarney. I have no further questions. 

Admiral REE^^ES. I have nothing. 

The Chairman. Thank you. Do not discuss what has gone on in 
this room with anyone. 

Lieutenant Henderson. No, sir. 

Colonel Brown. Lieutenant Meurlott. 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn, Lieutenant? 

TESTIMONY OF FIRST LIEUTENANT BYRON M. MEURLOTT, MILI- 
TARY INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES ARMY 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give your full name and rank to the re- 
porter ? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. Byron M. Meurlott, First Lieutenant, Mili- 
tary Intelligence. 

The Chairman. How long have you been with the Military In- 
telligence on the island ? 

Lieutenant Meurlott., Sixteen years, sir. 

The Chairman. You have been here all the whole 16 years? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And have been devoting yourself to intelligence 
work? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Are you a native of the islands? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. No, sir. 

The Chairman. Has your intelligence department in the Army had 
any particular mission with respect to the Japanese [1575] 
civilian population here ? 

Lieutenant Meurloti. To some extent, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. We have understood that that was the particular 
care of the F. B. I. and the Navy and that you confine yourselves more 
particularly to Army matters. Hqw about that? 

Lieutenant Muerlott. Well, until comparatively recent years 
neither the F. B. I. nor O. N. I. was active here, and we more or 
less 

The Chairman. You took it on? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Have you been able to discover any overt acts of 
sabotage on the island ? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. No, sir. 

The Chairman. I suppose that if you had any information of 
espionage on the part of Japanese you turned it over to one of the 
other agencies for investigation, or did you run it out yourselves? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. In the earlier years, I say, before the O. N. I. 
and the F. B. I. entered the field, we referred, of course, any sus- 
picions of espionage or sabotage directly to the War Department, and 



950 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

our department has attempted in the past to carry out certain inves- 
tigations. 

The Chairman. Now what is your practice ? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. At the present time and since the President 
issued his order of instructions concerning the delineation of duties — 
that was about 18 months ago, I believe. 

The Chairman. Jlist a little louder. 

Lieutenant Meurlott. That was about approximately 18 months 
ago. (Continuing:) — we have confined our activities to Army per- 
sonnel and civilians under military jurisdiction. 

The Chairman. And have referred questions of Japanese sabotage 
or espionage in the civil population to the other agencies ? 

\^1576'\ Lieutenant Meurlott. To the Y. B. I., yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Do you report that promptly to those agencies 
if anything comes to your notice ? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. How do you think the system has been working 
here, of three agencies ? Have they cooperated ? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. I believe so, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You do. And you think the work is pretty well 
coordinated ? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. I believe it is, yes, sir. 

The Chairman. Aa\j questions? 

General McNarnet. How long have you been on active duty? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. As a Reserve Officer? 

General McNarney. As a Reserve Officer. 

Lieutenant Meurlott. Since April 5, 1941. 

General McNarney. What was your status prior to that time? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. I was the senior corps of intelligence police 
member in the Army. 

General McNarney. How many other police were there besides 
yourself ? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. I beHeve there were 15 throughout the Army 
at that time. That was before the expansion occurred. 

General McNarney. What is your force here now ? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. We have a present authorized strength of 35. 

General McNarney. AVhat is your actual strength? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. Well, we got in eight new ones yesterday, 
plus the 19 we previously had, would make us 27 at the present time. 

General McNarney. You have served here for 16 years, you say? 

Lieutenant Meurlotf. Yes, sir. 

General McNarney. What is your opinion, from your experience 
over here, as to the loyalty of the average Japanese ? 

\_1577'\ Lieutenant Meurlott. It is just purely my opinion, sir? 

The Chairman. Yes. 

General McNarney. Well, based on your experience, 16 years as 
a military policeman. 

Lieutentant Meurlott. I would say that there would be a very small 
percentage that would be loyal to the United States: less than ten. 

General McNarney. How about the R. O. T. C. men at the Univer- 
sity and the high school? Is there a higher percentage loyal? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. Possible. I w^ouldn't answer or guess on 
that. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 951 

General McNarnet. You wouldn't like to draft them, though? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. No, sir. 

General McNarney. Approximately how many names has the 
Army turned in of characters who should be interned in time of war ? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. I should estimate it at approximately a 
thousand. 

General McNarney. Who determines the ones actually to be taken 
up and interned? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. That was more or less decided jointly be- 
tween our office and the F. B. I. 

General McNarney, In other words, a large number of names that 
were turned in were thrown out on further investigation ? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. I believe that to be true, yes, sir. 

General McCoy. Do you speak Japanese? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. No, sir. 

General McCoy. Hawaiian? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. Well, I can understand certain Hawaiian 
and also certain Japanese, but I have never made a study of it. 

General McCoy. I have no further questions. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. 

[L578'] Admiral Standley. Wait a minute. I want to ask a 
question. 

The Chairman. Oh. 

Admiral Standley. Just what is the limitation of the Army's G-2 
functions or intelligence functions ? Is it by location or is it by races 
of people, or what? Just what are the Army responsible for now un- 
der the new setup ? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. Well, as a matter of fact, I'd like to have an 
answer to that myself, sir. 

Admiral Standley. That is the reason I asked the question. 

General McCoy. Are you familiar with the agreement between the 
three services? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. In a general way, yes, sir. 

Admiral Standley. I haven't anything further. 

General McCoy. Who was your particular superior, your chief? 

Lieutenant Meurlott. Colonel Bicknell is head of my particular 
department. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Lieutenant. Please don't 
discuss what has gone on in this room with anyone. 

(Thereupon, at 12 : 35 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock 
p. m. of the same day.) 

[1679'] AFTERNOON SESSION 

(The Commission reconvened at 2 o'clock p. m., upon the expiration 
of the recess.) 
Colonel Brown. Mr. Settle. 
The Chairman. Mr. Settle, will you be sworn ? 

TESTIMONY OF FRANK EDWARD SETTLE, DRAFTSMAN 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 
The Chairman. Will you give your name and address to the re- 
porter? 



952 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mr. Settle. Frank Edward Settle. My present address or my home 
address on the mainland ? 

The Chairman. Your home address. 

Mr. Settle. My home address on the mainland ? 

The Chairman. Your home address here. 

Mr. Settle. Red Hill, Honolulu. 

The Chairman. Where is your home on the mainland ? 

Mr. Settle. Salt Lake City, Utah. 

The Chairman. You came out here and have been doing some work 
at Midway, have you not ? 

Mr. Settle. Yes. 

The Chairman. What is your profession, sir? 

Mr. Settle. Draftsman, civil engineering draftsman. 

The Chairman. Were you employed by the government or by a 
contractor ? 

Mr, Settle. By the contractors. 

The Chairman. When did you arrive at Midway? 

Mr. Settle. On October 10. 

The Chairman. When did you leave Midway ? 

Mr. Settle. On December 27. 

The Chairman. I understand from our Recorder that you have 
some knowledge and information with respect to the attack on Midway 
and the situation there. Will you in your own way please tell us what 
you have? 

[1S80] Mr. Settle. Yes. I have a way of timing ; I time things 
subconsciously. 

I was in the harbor on the morning coming back to land at 11 : 30 
when we were notified there was troulDle. 

The Chairman. When was that? 

Mr. Settle. That was on Sunday, December 7. 

Then that evening at supper Mr. Sheik, who was the contractor or 
superintendent at Midway, warned us in a very positive manner that 
we would be shelled or bombed that night. 

The Chairman. That would be the night of the 7th ? 

Mr. Settle. Yes. at supper on the evening of the 7th, yes, and that 
we should hunt a ditch or hole and crawl in it and lay down and stay 
there. So naturally there was quite a bit of excitement around there 
and we were talking about it. My barracks is 18-B, which is the 
closest barracks to the high point of the island, and that is only 32 
feet high on the high point. 

I was sitting back on the steps talking, and about half past nine 
I went to my home, barracks. Of course, it was blacked out. 

I was sitting on the edge of the bed taking off my shoes when the 
first shot came. I went to look and it was about 9 : 32, 

The Chairman. Was tliat shot from a cruiser or a bomb from an 
airplane ? 

Mr, Settle. I didn't know at the time; so I took off across the 200 
yards to the high point of the island from my barracks and I went to 
the high point to get out of the line of fire which would be on an angle, 
because I knew they would be after the hangar and the electric works. 

So I stayed on the high point and viewed the entire proceeding. 
There were several shots fired before I reached the top: whether our 
batteries or the ships fired the shots I do not know. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 953 

[JSSl] 1 was trying to see my watch and to time the flashes and 
the explosion but I could not see. 

I do not know just how long the bombing lasted, but about 17 min- 
utes after the first shelling it ceased and the first plane started warming 
up. I am a fairly good judge of time and that was about when the 
first plane started warming up. That was about 10 : 15. 

It took oft' at 10 : 35. That was the only plane that took off. 

The CiiAiKMAN. How many planes were there? 

Mr. Settle. I believe there were 16 Navy planes and 2 Dutch planes. 
One Navy plane was in the hangar. That is what ctxused the fire and 
burned the roof of the hangar and also some valuable merchandise 
that was stored in there. 

Of course they had a good water system, but no water. The water 
system was a failure because there was no water. 

The Dutch ship was riddled with about 200 shrapnel holes, and the 
Pan-American crew came over to help. 

There were several of us on this high point, and this plane just 
circled the island. I do not think it was out of our sight for 15 minutes 
for the next half hour. 

The Chairman. You mean the American plane? 

Mr. Settle. Yes. Our Navy plane did take off. There were three 
or four men getting off the planes into the water. We figured about 
35 knots as the speed, and that would be 160 miles off Midway at dusk. 
The plane that took off came in at 4 o'clock. 

The Chairman. How many planes were there in the patrol ? 

Mr. Settle. Different planes at different times. Sometimes it was 
many and sometimes fewer. They were going and coming. We kept 
no count of them. 

The Chairman. You kept no count? 

Mr. Settle. No, we kept no count, but there were always from 
seven to twenty planes. Navy planes, on the apron. 

[1682] The Chairman. You say this Dutch plane was riddled ? 

Mr. Settle. Yes. 

The Chairman. How many other planes w-ere destroyed or 
damaged ? 

Mr. Settle. One Navy plane was burned completely. 

The Chairman. In the hangar ? 

Mr. Settle. Yes. That is what set the merchandise afire, and the 
Dutch plane was riddled and the other Dutch plane and the five Navy 
planes were out on the apron. 

The Chairman. They were not seriously damaged ? 

Mr. Settle. No. 

The Chairman. You do not know how many bombs or shots the 
Japanese planes delivered? 

Mr. Settle. No planes. 

The Chairman. Were they cruisers ? 

Mr. Settle. All shells, all shelling. They w'ere two cruisers. 

I saw the flashes and got out the next morning and laid a stick to 
compare it right at this point so I could locate the exact position as 
to the reef, because the reef on the west side is out away from the is- 
land. I laid this stick clown so I could locate it the next morning to see 
where it was in regard to the reef, to estimate the distance from 
Midway. 



954 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The Chairman. What was that distance? 

Mr. Settle. It was five and a half miles. 

The Chairman. You could not make out what the Japanese ships 
were ? 

Mr. Settle. No, but they were shooting four- and eight-inch shells. 

The Chairman. What is that ? 

Mr. Settle. Eight- and four-inch shells, because we had the butts 
of some shells. 

The Chairman. Was Midway attacked again? 

Mr. Settle. No. 

[158S] The Chairman. That was the only one ? 

Mr. Settle. Yes. 

The Chairman. When did you say you got off ? 

Mr. Settle. On December 27. 

Oh Monday night, just south of Midway, I was on guard, having 
had some military ex])erience, and I was on guard duty, and I heard 
a faint boom just over the horizon. That is, I was on guard and I 
noticed the flashes south of Midway and I heard the faint boom just 
over the horizon. 

The Chairman. You do not know what that was ? 

Mr. Settle. No, I do not. 

The Chairman. Did any naval vessels of the United States land at 
Midway in the week before December 7? 

Mr. Settle. Tlie Coast Guard patrol. 

The Chairman. Only ? 

Mr. Settle. Yes, only. 

The Chairman. No carrier or large ship came in ? 

Mr. Settle. No. That channel is only 26 feet. 

The Chairman. Yes, we know that, but they usually anchor offshore. 

Mr. Settle. They might have done that at night, but I did not 
see them. I heard notliing about it, any reports to that effect. 

The Chairman. You do not know wliere the airplane crew was 
prior to the attack or what they were doing? 

Mr. Settle. Not from pei'sonal knowledge, no. 

The Chairman. Any questions ? 

Admiral Ree\t:s. No. 

The Chairman. Will you please observe the caution not to discuss 
on the outside what has gone on in this room ? 

Mr. Settle. No fish ever got caught by keeping its mouth shut. 

Tlie Chairman. Off the record. 

(There was colloquy off the record.) 

I /.>?4] Colonel Brown. Colonel Pickett. 

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL HAREY K. PICKETT, UNITED STATES 

MARINE CORPS 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.) 

The Chairman. Will you give your name, sir, to the reporter, and 
your title? 

Colonel Pickett. Harry K. Pickett, Colonel, United States Marine 
( 'orps. 

The Chairman. Were you in command of the Marine force that was 
dispatched to Midway? 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 955 

Colonel Pickett. I will explain that, sir. My duties before Decem- 
ber 7 were that I was commanding officer of the Marine barracks, 
Navy Yard, and District Marine Officer of the 14th Naval District. 
As District Marine Officer it was my duty, as specified by the Com- 
mandant, to coordinate the activities of all Marine defense battalions 
assigned to this district. In that capacity I was in charge, under the 
supervision of the Commandant, of the Midway garrison as well as the 
other islands before and after the outbreak of war. 

The Chairman. A^Hiat forcg did you have on Midway prior to 
December 7, 1941 ? 

Colonel Pickett. The Sixth Marine Defense Battalion. 

The Chairman. Wliich consisted of what ? 

Colonel Pickett. It consisted of 30 officers and 795 enlisted men of 
the Marine Corps, and three officers and sixteen men of the Medical 
Corps of the Navy. 

The Chairman. How many of them were on Midway prior to 
December 7 ? 

Colonel Pickett. All of them. 

The Chairman. All of them ? 

Colonel Pickett. Yes. 

The Chairman. The force that you have just described was on 
Midway ? 

[1586] Colonel Pickett. Yes. 

General McCoy. Was there any naval personnel besides the medical 
unit? 

Colonel Pickett. The force I have just referred to was the entire 
defense force, which is apart from the Naval Station personnel, which 
comes under the station commander. I do not have the figures on 
that. 

The Chairman. Were there naval personnel on Midway ? 

Colonel Pickett. Yes. 

The Chairman. You do not know how many there were ? 

Colonel Pickett. No, I do not. 

General McCoy. Who was in command of Midway ? 

Colonel Pickj:tt. Of the Naval Station was Station Commander 
Simard. I do not recall his first name, and of the Sixth Defense 
Battalion was Lieutenant Colonel H. D. Shannon. 

The Chairman. Where is Colonel Shannon now ? 

Colonel Pickett. He is at Midway. 

General McCoy. There are tw^o separate commands, then ? 

Colonel Pickett. Not exactly separate. The Defense Force Com- 
mander is under the orders of the Station Commander, but there is 
more or less a separation, a recognized distinction between the purely 
Station personnel and the Defense Force. 

General McCoy. There is one man on the island responsible for 
the defense, in the last analysis ? 

Colonel Pickett. I think that is correct. That is the Station 
Commander. 

Tlie Chairman. What equipment in the way of anti-aircraft artil- 
lery or planes was at Midway just prior to December 7? 

Colonel Pickett. You said anti-aircraft? 

The Chairman. Anti-aircraft, artillery, and planes. 



79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 



956 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Colonel Pickett. There were three batteries of four guns each of 
the three-inch anti-aircraft mobile guns of the Army. There were 
thirty .50 caliber anti-aircraft machine guns. There were thirty .30 
caliber ground machine guns. There were six [1S86] anti- 
aircraft searchlights, and 29 automatic rifles; and there were three 
batteries of two guns each of the five-inch .51 caliber guns, naval guns. 

In the line of their equipment there were three radars of the tvpe 
SCR268. 

In addition to that there were four 7-inch, .45 caliber guns and four 
3-inch, .50 caliber guns which had been shipped to Midway and were 
in the process of being mounted. 

The Chairman. What about the airplanes? 

Colonel Pickett. I am not familiar with the situation with refer- 
ence to aircraft there. 

The Chairman. Was that under a command separate from yours? 

Colonel Pickett. Yes, entirely so. 

The Chairman. Would that be the Naval Commander ? 

Colonel Pickett. Yes. 

The Chairman. Under the post commander? 

Colonel Pickett. Under the post commander, yes. 

The Chairman. What do you know from the reports as to the attack 
on Midway? When did it occur and what was its nature and so 
forth? 

Colonel Pickett. I read Commander Simard's report but did not 
bring a copy with me. As I recall it, the attack came on the night of 
the 9th or 10th of December. 

The Chairman. We have evidence here that it occurred on the night 
of the 7th. Is that wrong ? 

Colonel Pickett. I am not sure, but it seems that thinking back 
over the circumstances at the time that I made a mental note that the 
force that attacked there might have been the same one that attacked 
here, and I am speaking of an aircraft raid, which, I think, came 
there on one of the nights. 

The Chairman. Would there be any impropriety in your letting us 
have either the report or a paraphrase of the report or reports? 

[Jo87] Colonel Pickett. My operations officer is on the phone 
now getting it. I am sorry about that. I would have prepared an 
answer to it if I had known. 

The Chairman. Are there any other questions? 

Greneral McCoy. There were two reports, one from the Station 
Commander and one from your command? 

Colonel Pickett, General, these things happened so fast that I 
cannot say as to the dates and how many reports I read of it, but I 
think it is well to wait until we get the report. That will speak for 
itself. 

Colonel Browx. Major Pefley is here. 

The Chairman. Will you be sworn? 

Major Pefley. Yes. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR ALFRED R. PEFLEY, UNITED STATES 

MARINE CORPS 

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairnuin.) 

The Chairjvian. Colonel Pickett has suggested, sii*, that he did not 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 957 

bring the report of the action at Midway, Major. Do you have the 
benefit of that report? 

Major Pefley. I called on the telephone. It was at 2155, five min- 
utes to 10 p. m. on December 7. 

The Chairman. Does the report indicate what the attacking force 
consisted of? 

Major Pefley. It consisted of a small cruiser and a heavy cruiser, 
so far as we could determine. 

The Chairman. It was not an airplane attack? 

Major Peflet. No, sir, it was not. 

The Chairman. And this firing was from a considerable distance 
offshore, I take it? 

Major Peflet. This firing was first about 10 miles offshore, as I 
recall it, and then they later came in closer. When they came in closer 
the searchlights from Midway picked them up and one of our batteries 
opened fire, at which time 11S88'\ they turned away. 

General McCoy. Is there any report of the damage done to them ? 

Major Pefley. The people at Midway report that her ships made 
considerable smoke when they turned away and appeared to have 
suffered two hits. 

The Chairman. The Japanese, so far as you know, have not returned 
to Midway? 

Major Pefley. They have not returned to Midway, no, sir. 

The Chairman. Any further questions ? 

Admiral Standley. Is there any damage report on the station itself? 

Major Pefley. Yes, the roof of the hangar was set afire and some 
materiel in the hangar was damaged from dropping fire brands from 
the roof. 

Admiral Standley. That was caused by shellfire? 

Major Pefley. That was caused by shellfire. 

Colonel Pickett. May I answer that ? 

Admiral Standley. Yes. 

Colonel Pickett. I have some information on that. As I recall, that 
first dispatch said there were 18 or 20 direct hits on the island at that 
time and described the damage just mentioned by the other witness; 
and stated that several hits were observed on the enemy ships and 
that they went away from shore, and the radars indicated that there 
was some movement on the boats in a small area, which might have 
indicated that they were engaged in some rescue work. 

Just about a week ago the Japanese reported the killing of a general 
and a colonel in the attack on Midway ; so it is quite well established 
that considerable damage was done to them. 

Admiral Standley. Would you tell us what islands constitute the 
14th Naval District ? I mean what outlying islands. [ISSBI We 
know the Hawaiian group. 

Colonel Pickett. Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and while Wake, I 
believe, lies outside the geographical limits of the District, it was more 
or less so considered as being in the District. 

Admiral Standley. As being in the District ? 

Colonel Pickett. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. Samoa is not in this District ? 

Colonel Pickett. No. 

General McCoy. I would like to have the reports furnished of the 
commanding officers. Will you please furnish copies of them ? 



958 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Major Peflet. Yes, we can give them to you. 

Colonel Pickett. That report was from the station commander. 

The Chairman. And will you request the District Commander to 
furnish us such a report ? 

Colonel Pickett. Yes. 

General McCoy. I think it might be well for us to have furnished 
reports for all these islands. We may not have use for them, and then 
again we may. 

The Chairman. Will you speak to Admiral Bloch about it, as to the 
reports of anything from the other islands? 

Colonel Pickett. Yes. 

The Chairman. That is, the reports of the attack or observations of 
hostile fleet or anything on these islands at that time, December 7, 
and the next few days. You have that in mind ? 

Major Pefley. Yes. 

The Chairman. Just make that request. 

Anything further ? 

General McCoy. If they are making copies, they might make five 
copies for us. 

The Chairman. Yes, if it is convenient. 

[1590] Major Pefley. Yes. 

The Chairman. Do you have anything in mind, Colonel, or you, 
Major, any other fact that might be pertinent to the subject of our 
investigation as to the circumstances of the attack on Pearl Harbor? 

Colonel Pickett. Nothing more than perhaps you might be inter- 
ested in knowing that at the barracks and the Navy Yard we had 13 
machine guns in action in about 20 minutes after the attack started, 
and we either shot down or took part in shooting down three raiding 
planes. I said "took part in" because one plane was claimed by about 
a dozen people. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. 

Admiral Standley. I would like to ask a question or two. 

What was the status of your anti-aircraft guns at the time? 

Colonel Pickett. They were machine guns. 

Admiral Standley. What was the status of those gims when the 
attack started ? 

Colonel Pickett. They were in the gun shed. 

Admiral Standley. It took 20 minutes to get them out and get them 
in operation ? 

Colonel Pickett. Yes. 

The Chairman. They were not out on location at the time of the 
attack? 

Colonel Pickett. They were not set up, no, sir. 

Admiral Standley. WasHhat a special disposition or was that the 
usual storage for the guns? 

Colonel Pickett. That was the usual storage for the guns. 

Admiral Standley. No unusual precautions were taken as a result 
of instructions received immediately preceding the attack ? 

Colonel Pickett. No, sir, but I might say that in the War Plans or 
in the plans for defense or this area that we [ISOl] contribute 
what anti-aircraft troops we have available to the Army for tactical 
assignment. That is their mission, and we merely augment their forces 
by whatever we might have available. That is not our mission, but 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 959 

we merely have that materiel and ammunition on hand and put that 
into action quickly without waiting for an assignment. 

Admiral Standley. Would that state of readiness be only as ob- 
tained in the Army forces or the fleet forces? 

Colonel Pickett. As regards the Army entirely. 

Admiral Standley. The Army entirely? 

Colonel Pickett. Because it was their mission to provide the anti- 
aircraft protection for the Pearl Harbor area. 

The Chairman. You had a number of exercises and drills in simu- 
lation to repulse aircraft attack ? 

Colonel Pickett. Yes, that is a part of the routine training. 

The Chairman. When you had such problems or exercises, who was 
in command of your guns ? 

Colonel Pickett. They belonged to the various defense battalions 
which I believe were stationed at Pearl Harbor. 

The Chairman. Who had command of them ? Who told you. when 
to fire or had command over the disposition ? The Navy or the Army ? 

Colonel Pickett. The Army. • 

The Chairman. Who was the Commander from whom you got your 
instructions in such a drill? Were you under the command of the 
Army? Was it General Davidson or General Martin? 

Colonel Pickett. I have not made myself clear. The drills are 
routine training matters. 

The Chairman. Yes, I know that. 

Colonel Pickett. The alerts and arming the battle stations would 
be an entirely different matter, and when the Marines went to the 
Army groupment, they were assigned to their tactical positions, but 
in the routine defenses the final [Jo92-1593] direction was 
under the anti-aircraft group commander. 

The Chairman. Of the Army ? 

Colonel Pickett. The Army, yes. 

General McCoy. Did you get any orders from him that day ? 

Colonel Pickett. We put out two anti-aircraft gun batteries and, 
to the best of my recollection, thirty-seven .50 caliber anti-aircraft 
machine guns and fifty-one .30 caliber machine guns without waiting 
for instructions from the anti-aircraft brigade commander. 

As the situation developed we reported our dispositions and they 
were approved and were continued and we occupied thereafter them 
for a matter of several days before any readjustment was made. 

The Chairman. I think that answers it. 

Admiral Standley. Your anti-aircraft guns were a part of the 
Army fire group ? 

Colonel Pickett. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. And to be controlled by the group com- 
mander of the fire group, the fire sector ? 

Colonel Pickett. Yes, sir. The Army calls that a groupment of 
the anti-aircraft machine-gun group and the anti-aircraft gun group. 

Admiral Standley. You are a part of the group ? 

Colonel Pickett. Yes. 

Admiral Standley. As a result of the drills and exercises do you 
take up a fire sector without any instructions if there is something 



960 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

in that sector, or is there an automatic designation in the sector with- 
out any instructions from the fire group control ? 

Colonel Pickett. No. That is because the presence of the Ma- 
rine anti-aircraft is merely an accident, and the Army would not 
make a disposition of the Marines in that particular. It is purely 
a supplementary proposition rather than an integral part. 

[1594-] The Chairman. Is there anything further? 

Admiral Standley. No. 

The Chairman. Thank you very much. Do not discuss with anyone 
what has gone