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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."

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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 
OF THE PEAEL HAKBOE ATTACK 

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S. Con. Res. 27 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 24 

PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack 




PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION 

OF THE PEAEL HAEBOE ATTACK 

CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 
PURSUANT TO 

S, Con. Res. 27 

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN 

INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL 

HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND 

EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 

RELATING THERETO 



PART 24 
PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



Printed for the use of the 
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attaclf 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
79718 WASHINGTON : 1946 



^st6>^ 

PUBLIC 

.^V .. ^< 



'^ 







JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEABL 
HARBOR ATTACK 

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman 
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman 
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from 
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois Pennsylvania 

OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W\ GEARHART, Representa- 

HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California 

gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from 

J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin 
North Carolina 



COUNSEL 



(Tlirough January 14, 1946) 

William D. Mitchell, General Counsel 
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel 
JDLE M. Hannafokd, Assistant Counsel 
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 

(After January 14, 1946) 

Sbth W. Richardson, General Counsel 
Samdel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel 
JOHN E. Masten, Assistant Counsel 
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel 
LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel 



HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 



Part 
No. 


Pages 


Transcript 
pages 


1 


1- 399 


1- 1058 


2 


401- 982 


1059- 2586 


3 


983-1583 


2587- 4194 


4 


1585-2063 


4195- 5460 


5 


2065-2492 


5461- 6646 


6 


2493-2920 


6647- 7888 


7 


2921-3378 


7889- 9107 


8 


3379-3927 


9108-10517 


9 


3929-4599 


10518-12277 


10 


4601-5151 


12278-13708 


11 


5153-5560 


13709-14765 



Hearings 



Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19 
Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 
Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 
Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 
Dec. 31, 1945, and 
Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 
Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 
Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1 
Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12. 
Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, 
Apr. 9 and 11, and 



20, and 21, 1945. 

30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 
11, 12, and 13, 1945. 
, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 
Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 

19, and 21, 1946. 

26, 28, and 29, 1946. 

2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 

13, and 14, 1946. 

and 20, 1946. 

Mav 23 and 31, 1946. 



EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 

Part 

No. Exhibits Nos. 

12 1 through 6. 

13 7 and 8. 

14 9 through 43. 

15 44 through 87. 

16 88 through 110. 

17 111 through 128. 

18 129 through 156. 

19 157 through 172. 

20 173 through 179. 

21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-IUustrations. 

22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings. 

26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 

27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 

34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings. 

35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 

36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 

39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, 
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- 
ments. 



Ill 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



INDEX OF EXHIBITS OF ROBERTS 
COMMISSION 



Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 
Exh 



t No. 
t No. 
t No. 
t No. 
t No. 
t No. 
t No. 
t No. 8 
t No. 9 
t No. 10 
t No. 11 
t No. 12 
t No. 13 
t No. 14 
t No. 15 
t Xo. 1 
t No. 
t No. 
t No. 
t No. 
t No. 
t No. 
t No. 8 
t No. 9 
t No. 10 
t No. 11 
t No. 12 
t No. 13 
t No. 14 
t No. 15 
t No. 16 
t No. 17 
t No. 18 
t No. 19 
t No. 20 
t No. 21 
t No. 22 
t No. 23 
t No. 24 
t No. 25 
t No. 26 
t No. 27 
t No. 28 
t No. 29 
t No. 30 
t No. 31 
t No. 32 
t No. 33 
t No. 34 
t No. 35 
t No. 36 
t No. 37 
t No. 38 



Page 

Navy Packet No. 1) -: 1285 

Navy Packet No. 1) 1286 

Navv Packet No. 1) 1287 

Navy Packet No. 1) 1304 

Navy Packet No. 1) 1306 

Navy Packet No. 1) 1307 

Navy Packet No. 1) 1308 

Navy Packet No. 1) 1310 

Navy Packet No. 1) 1311 

Navy Packet No. 1) 1312 

Navy Packet No. 1) 1313 

Navy Packet No. 1) 1354 

Navy Packet No. 1) 1355 

Navy Packet No. 1) 1362 

Navy Packet No. 1) 1362 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1363 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1363 

Navy Packet No. 2) ^___ 1363 

Navv Packet No. 2) 1365 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1366 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1367 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1368 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1370 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1374 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1379 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1385 ■ 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1386 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1387 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1388 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1389 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1393 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1394 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1397 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1398 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1412 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1413 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1413 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1447 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1453 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1454 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1454 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1456 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1458 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1463 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1467 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1468 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1469 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1471 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1553 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1558 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1559 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1561 

Navy Packet No. 2) 1563 



VI INDEX OF EXHIBITS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 
Exhib 



Page 

t No. 39 (Navy Paclcet No. 2) 1568 

t No. 40 (Navy Packet No. 2) 1609 

t No. 41 (Navy Packet No. 2) 1612 

t No. 42 (Navy Packet No. 2) , 1619 

t No. 43 (Navy Packet No. 2) 1620 

t No. 44 (Navy Packet No. 2) 1620 

t No. 45 (Navy Packet No. 2) 1622 

t No. 46 (Navy Packet No. 2) 1647 

t No. 47 (Navv Paclfet No. 2) 1649 

t No. 48 (Navy Packet No. 2) 1749 

t No. 49 (Navy Paeliet No. 2) 1749 

t No. 50 (Navy Packet No. 2) 1756 

t No. 51 (Navy Packet No. 2) 1757 

t No. 1 (Navy, Separate Packet) 1761 

t No. 2 (Navy, Separate Paclcet) 1761 

t No. 3 (Navy, Separate Packet) 1761 

t No. 4 (Navy, Separate Packet) 1761 

t No. 5 (Navy, Separate Packet) 1762 

t No. 1 (Army) 1762 

t No. lA (Army) 1766 

t No. 2 (Army) I 1766 

t No. 3 (Army) 1766 

t No. 4 (Army) 1766 

t No. 5 (Army) 1766 

t No. 6 (Army) 1769 

t No. 7 (Army) 1769 

t No. 8 (Army) 1934 

t No. 9 (Army) 1935 

t No. 10 (Army) 1936 

t No. 11 (Army) 1937 

t No. 12 (Army) 1960 

t No. 13 (Army) 1961 

t No. 14 (Army) 1962 

t No. 15 (Army) 1968 

t No. 16 (Army) 1981 

t No. 17 (Army) 2008 

t No. 18 (Army) 2009 

t No. 19 (Army) :___ 2009 

t No. 20 (Army) 2010 

t No. 21 (Army) 2011 

t No. 22 (Army) 2013 

t No. 23 (Array) - 2013 

t No. 24 (Army) 2018 

t No. 25 (Army) 2019 

t No. 26 (Army) 2021 

t No. 27 (Army) _-- 2023 

t No. 28 (Army) 2025 

t No. 29 (Army) 2052 

t No. 30 (Army) 2071 

t No. 31 (Army) 2091 

t No. 32 (Army) 2107 

t No. 33 (Army) 2127 

t No. 34 (Army) 2127 

t No. 35 (Army) 2148 

t No. 36 (Army) 2160 



Index to Exhibits-Illustrations 2171 



HEARING 
PEARL HARBOR, EXHIBIT 143, VOL. 3 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1285 



EXHIBITS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 

Exhibit No. 1 (Na^t, Packet No. 1) Robebts Commlssiox 

[J] DECEifBEB 10, 1941. 

Outside Div. 

COLXECTOR OF CUSTOMS. 

Federal Building, Honolulu, T. H. 

Sib : On Saturday, December 6, 1941 at 12 : 05 p. m. the Chief Inspector of 
Customs was notified by the Office of the Captain of the Yard. Pearl Harbor, that 
a vessel was expected to arrive at Pearl Harbor at 6 : 00 a.m. on December 7, 19il, 
which would require Customs formalities. 

The Chief Inspector requested that the Office of the Captain of the Yard notify 
the Inspectors Office before 4 : 00 p. m. of the same day in the event of a change 
of arrival time. 

As per this request Inspector Lynch, on duty in the Insi)ector's Office 12/6 '41 
fi'om 12 : 00 noon to 4 : 00 p. m., was notified that the vessel was exi)ecred to dock 
at alx«ut 7 : 30 a. m., Sunday, Dec. 7, 1941. He in turn notified the Chief Inspector 
at his home at 3 : 55 p. m., and was instructed to inform Inspector Williams that 
the boarding detail (Chief Inspector Buta and Inspector Williams) was to report 
for duty at 7 : 0C> a. m., Sunday, Dec-ember 7. 1941. 

The two members of the boarding detail arrived at the Insi)ector's Office at 
6: 55 a. m., on the 7th, and proceeded immediately to Pearl Harbor, arriving ar 
the Office of the Yard Duty Officer, second floor of the Administration Building 
at about 7 : 20 a. m.. where they were informed that the USS ANTARES was 
outside the entrance of the harbor and was exi)ected to dock at ab<:>ut S : 30 a. m. 

At 7: 55 a. m.. wh:le awaiting the arrival of the USS ANTARES. several loud 
explosions were heard. The Yard Duty Officer telephoned immediately to asc-er- 
tain where the firing was taking place. After a very short conversation he 
reported to another party by phone, "This is no drill. Sir.", and after replying 
"Aye, Aye, Sir.'", turned to the Customs Officers and informed that Pearl Harbor 
was undergoing an [.?] Air Raid by Japanese planes. These planes could 
be plainly seen flying low over the channel from the windows of the Yard Duty 
Officer's office. 

The first raid lasted for about forty or fifty minutes after which there was a 
ten or fifteen minutes lull. Two more raids followed lasting twenty-five to thirty 
minutes each with a slight lull following. 

The planes apparently broke formation in the vicinity of Aiea Heights and 
swept down over the Channel, the Naval Air Station and Hickam Field. 

At the beginning of the attack very few antiaircraft guns were heard, although 
the mmiber steadily increased until by : 5<) a. m.. wh?n the third wave came over 
the fire of antiaircraft guns, exploding bombs and the rattle of machine guns 
caused an almost incessant roar. 

The Customs Officers remained" at the Administration Building until the third 
lull, which occurred at about 10:15 a. m.. at wh'ch time the Chief Inspector 
questioned the Captain of the Yard regarding the feasability of leaving the Yard 
and returning to town as no customs duties could be performed under the 
circumstances. 

Upon being advised that there was no reason for remaining inside the Yard, 
Chief Inspector Buta and Inspector Williams left for Honolulu arriving at the 
Federal Building at approximately 10: 45 a. m. 
Respectfully, 

(S) Andrew A. Buta, 
A. A. BrTA, 
Chief Inspector of Customs. 
(S) John D. WilUams, 
JoKx D. Wnx'Aiis. 

HoNOLrrr. T. H.. Jan. 7, 19^2. Inspector of Customs. 

Presented for information. 

(S) Warde C. Hiberly, 
Waede C. Hibeely, 

Acting Collector of Customs. 



1286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Exhibit No. 2 (Navy, Pacicet No. 1) Roberts Commission 

[J] Depabtment of Statb:, 

Washington, December SO, 1941. 
Mr. Jt'STTCE Roberts, 

Cliairvian, Commission to Investigate the Facts 
and Circumstances connected with the 
Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor. 

My Dear Mr. Justice : In your letter dated December 19, you request that I 
write to you, as Chairman of tlie Commission to Investigate the Facts and 
Circumstances connected with the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor on Decem- 
ber 7, 1S!41, stating whether 1 "conveyed to the Departments of War and Navy 
of the United States, in the period intervening between November 1 and 
December 7, 1941, warnings of the immediate danger of possible attack by 
the foicos of the Japanese Empire". You add that for your purposes it will 
be sufficient if I "will state briefly approximately the times when such warnings 
were given and. in outline and summaiy only, the purport of the warnings." 

I would say in reply that I have constantly kept myself as familiar as possible 
with all important developments and conditions arising in the relations of the 
United States with other countries. Recognizing the cooperative relationships 
which exist between the Department of State and the Departments of War and 
of the [2] Navy, especially in times of danger to this country, I had 
during the year many conferences with the Secretary of War and the Secretary 
of the Navy and at intervals conferences with the Chief of Staff and the Chief of 
Naval Operations and oflBcers of their staffs. Our conferences sought a full 
interchange of information and views relative to critical situations all over the 
world, including — of course — developments in the Pacific area. 

These exchanges of information and views were in addition to those which 
took place at Cabinet meetings and at meetings during the fall of 1941 of the 
War Council, and in numerous other conversations. At these conferences I was 
given the benefit of the knowledge which representatives of the War and the 
Navy Departments possessed of military factors involved in the world situation 
and I in turn took up political factors in the world situation and other matters 
of which I had special knowledge. 

In reply to your express inquiry, I recall that at the regular meeting of the 
Cabinet on November 7, 1941, I stated among other things that relations between 
Japan and the United States were extremely critical and that there was immi- 
nent possibility that Japan might at any time start a new military movement 
of conquest by force [.3] in accordance with her many times announced 
purpose and policy. It thereupon became the consensus of opinion that some 
members of the Cabinet might well emphasize this critical situation in speeches 
in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a devel- 
opment. Accordingly, Secretary Knox, four days later on Armistice Day, de- 
livered an address, in which he especially emphasized this imminent and dan- 
gerous situation. He expressed the following strong warning: 

" * * * We are not only confronted with the necessity of extreme meas- 
ures of self-defense in the Atlantic, but we are likewise faced with grim possi- 
bilities on the other side of the world — on the far side of the Pacific. Just what 
the morrow may hold for us in that quarter of the globe, no one may say with 
certainty. The only thing we can be sure of is that the Pacific, no less than the 
Atlantic, calls for instant readiness fpr defense. In the Pacific area, no less 
than in Europe, interests which are vital to our national security are seriously 
threatened." 

On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles, carrying out this Cabinet 
suggestion in an address, used the following language of urgent warning : 

" * * * today the United States finds itself in far greater peril than it 

did in 1917. The waves of world conquest are breaking high both in the East 

and in the West. They are threatening, more nearly each day that passes, 

to engulf our own shores. 
<• * * * 

"In the Far East the same forces of conquest under a different guise are 
menacing the safety of all nations that border upon the Pacific. [41 
«<* * * Qiij. people realize that at any moment war may be forced upon 
■us, and if it is, the lives of all of us will have to be dedicated to preserving the 
freedom of the United States, and to safeguarding the independence of the 
American people, which are more dear to us than life itself." 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1287 

It will thus be seen that knowledge of the gravity of the situation in the 
Pacific was not confined to me, but was shared by many high officers of the 
Government. I might add that throughout this perio(l officials of the Depart- 
ments of War and of the Navy manifested a spirit of wholehearted cooperation 
and indicated in statements made to me from time to time their keen concern 
regarding the seriousness and critical nuture of the danger. 

On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of the War Council, at 
which the highest officers of the Army and the Navy of course were present, I 
emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan: I 
stated to the conference that there was practically no possibility of an agreement 
being achieved with Japan; that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break 
out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safe- 
guarding our national secui-ity was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. 
At the conclusion I with due deference expressed my judgment that any plans 
for our military defense should include an assumption that [5] the Jap- 
anese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and 
also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing 
efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof. 

Sincerely yours. 

CORDELL HUIX. 



Exhibit No. 3 (Navy, Packet No. 1) Robeets Commission 

Coordinator of Information, 
Washington, D. C, January 16, 1942. 
General Frank McCoy, 

Room 2905, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 
My Dear General McCoy: I am transmitting to you herewith, a resume of 
public opinion about the Commission to Investigate the Attack on Pearl Harbor. 
As you will see this digest is based uiwn almost a thousand newspaper clippings 
from the American press, and also some material from tlie British and Canadian 
press and some short wave broadcasts from Germany and Italy. 

I trust this is the type of report which Mr. Howe, the recorder of your 
commission, had in mind, and that it will ijrove useful for your purposes. 
Very truly yours, 

William L. Lancer, 
William L. Langer 

Director of Research. 
Enclosure. 

RESUME OF PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT THE COMMISSION TO INVESTI- 
GATE THE ATTACK AT PEARL HARBOR, JANUARY 7, 1941 

Coordinator of Information — British Empire Section — Special 
Memorandum No. 30 

Resume of Public Opinion About the Commission to Investigate the Attack 
at Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941 

Coordinator of Information 
Office Memorandum 

January 16, 1942. 
To: Mr. William L. Langer 
From: British Empire Section 

Subject: Public Opinion on the Commission to Investigate the Attack at Pearl 
Harbor 

The attached resume was prepared in response to the request of W. B. Howe, 
Recorder of Mr. Justice Roberts' Commission, as set forth in his letter of 
December 19 to Colonel Donovan. 

Since this resume is for an outside agency, no attempt has been made to 
classify or stamp it. It contains nothing of a confidential nature. 



1288 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The material in this resume is based upon a careful survey of nearly a 
thousand clippings from the American press through December 28, 1941. Of 
these, only 236 dealt directly with the Investigating Commission. After De- 
cember 28 the newspaper press seems to have lost interest in the matter, though 
some references to it continue to appear in the weekly periodicals. 

We surveyed also the Canadian newspaper press and the British press, so 
far as it was available. What we found is gathered together in a separate , 
section. 

We surveyed also all available reports of shortwave broadcasting to America 
on the subject, particularly from Italy and Germany, and our' findings are 
gathered together in a section by themselves. 

Sig. Not Legible 

SUMMAEY 

The opinion of the United States press, particularly as revealed in its editorial 
comment is generally favourable to the President's appointment of the com- 
mission to investigate the Pearl Harbor disaster. The promptness of the Presi- 
dent's order as well as his choice of the personnel of the Commission is ap- 
plauded, and there is evidence of a widespread feeling of relief that a Congres- 
sional investigation appears now to be unnecessary. The press devotes more 
thoughtful and varied comment to the duties and powers of the commission 
than to any other aspect of the matter. The prevalent opinion is that the 
commission should fix the responsibility for the disaster, though some editors 
are disposed to limit its duties to fact finding and some go so far as to ascribe 
to it the power of a court martial. There is some disposition to lay the blame 
for the disaster upon the unpreparedness of the government at Washington. 
Some papers insist that the American people should know the facts, but there 
is a preponderance of opinion that popular judgment should be suspended until 
the Commission has made its report. The_ removal of the commanding officers 
whose conduct is to be investigated is unanimously approved. 

A partial survey of comment in the Canadian press reveals no direct comment 
on the investigating commission. The London Times of December IS comments 
favorably on the membership of the board. No other mention has been found 
in the English papers which are available, and reactions from other parts of 
the Empii-e are not obtainable. German, Japanese and Italian short wave 
broadcasts adopt a tone of ridicule, implying that the investigating Commission 
was appointed to cover mistakes of Washington oflScials. 

[i] CONTENTS 

United States Newspapers 

I. Personnel of the Commission 

Comments on the members and their qualifications. 
107 clippings; December 16th-28th 

II. Duties and powers of the Commission 

Purpose; area of investigation ; suggested methods of procedure. 
67 clippings ; December ir)th-22nd 

III. Probable findings of the Commission 

Speculation on verdict. 

6 clippings ; December 17th-27th 

IV. Warning against prejudging the case 

Request that American public suspend judgment until Commission 
reports. 
34 clippings; December 16th-25th 

V. Commission as an alternative to a congressional investigation 

25 clippings; December 17th-22nd. 
[m] VI Need for speed 

Commendation of President's swift action ; demand for a prompt verdict. 
28 clippings; December 16th-20th 

VII, Demotion of commanders 

49 clippings ; December 16-20th 

VIII. Publication of evidence. 

American public's insistence on right to know facts vs. recognition of 
need for secrecy. 

14 clippings ; December 16th-19th 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1289 

United States Magazines 
United States Official dispatches 
[Hi] The Foreign Press 

I. Canadian 

II. British Press 

III. Australian Press 

IV. Other Parts of the Empire 

German, Italian, Japanese Shortwave Broadcasts 

[1] Resume of Public Opinion About the Commission to Investigate the 
Attack at Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941 

united states newspapers 
I. Personnel 

The President's choice of personnel is much the most popular subject in editorial 
discussion of the investigating commission. 107 out of tiie 236 clippings, dated 
from December 16 to December 28. refer to the appointments. Of these, an 
overvrhelming majority, 104, approve unconditionally. 

Two of tlie three exceptions do not in fact disapprove. The first, an editorial 
in the Rcpuhlican, Springfield, Mass., December 23, 1941, feels that, even though 
Justice Roberts' appointment may be justified by the emergency, it violates the 
sanctity of the court. The second, an editorial in the Daily Ncics, N. Y. C, 
December 18, 1941, suggests additional members for the board. Only the Tribune, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming, December 27, 1941, expresses an openly derogatory opinion 
of associate Justice Roberts' appointment. These three editorials are quoted 
after typical examples from approving editorial comment. 

[2] "There was general satisfaction with the composition of the board, 
not only in the War and Navy Departments, which helped select personnel, but 
in Congi'ess." — Lyle C. Wilson, Staff correspondent Times-Herald, Wash., D. C, 
Dec. 17, 1941. 

"The personnel of the board appointed by the President to investigate what 
happened at Pearl Harbor could not be improved upon. At its head is a justice 
of the Supreme Court. Its other members include only such men who, trained 
in the profession of arms, are equipped to understand the military problems 
posed by the treacherous surprise attaclv. This understanding has seemed to us 
a vitally important feature of any inquiry into the 'setback', both for the sake 
of the public's perspective and for that of the morale of our fighting forces 

. . .." Editorial, Herald Trihnne, New York City, Dec. 17, 1941. 

"Headed by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, the Board has won 
unanimous appi-oval in diplomatic, congressional, and service circles, which sees 
its membership as assurance against any perfunctory 'white wash' ". — Joseph 
C. Harrison, Staff correspondent, Chrifftian Science Monitor, Dec. 17, 1941. 

[3] "The President owes it to the country to see that the promised investiga- 
tion is of the most thorough going sort, and the personnel of the board named 
practically insures this." — Editorial, Recorder and Democrat, Amsterdam, N. Y., 
Dec. 17, 1941. 

"President Rosevelt's designation of a non-military man to be chairman of 
the investigating group was believed part of an intehtion to get all the faces 
from a civilian as well as a mi^Ttary point of view." — News item. Herald Tribune, 
New York City, Dec. 17, 1941. 

"A Philadelphia law.ver, who as a Republican helped to jail the thieves who 
stole America's oil from the Elk Hills naval reserve in California during the 
administration of Warren Harding, is going tc Hawaii in a few days to find why 
it was that the United States Navy took the worst naval beating of the war on 
December 7th. 

"The man is Owen Josephus Roberts, now an associate justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States. He wears a derby, carries a cane, looks tough, and 
defers to his wife, a Connecticut Yankee. 

[^] "He was chosen to head the board of inquiry which is to examine the 
reasons why the United States army and navy failed at Hawaii in order to 
illustrate the political solidarity of the United States to the world and to the 
American people. 



1290 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"Never before has any President ever chosen any Supreme Court justice for 
any such assignment." — Richard Rendell, Staff correspondent, Times, Chicago, 
111., Dec. 17, 1941. 

"The five-man board appointed by Pre.sident Roosevelt to find out why the Army 
and Navy at Hawaii were not on the alert against the surprise attack can be 
depended upon to consider the question calmly, carefully, expertly and with a 
sense of responsibility to the country and the future efficiency of the armed 
services. Justice Roberts, who has familiarity with the Pearl Harbor defenses, 
enters the inquiry with obvious impartiality except to the national interest, and 
the military and naval nen, three of them retired, who will serve with him are 
of a caliber which insuiew that no mistaken sense of loyalty to their branches of 
the service will affect their judgment and their decision. So the verdict, in all 
circumstances, can be awaited with confidence." — Editorial, Courier-Journal, 
Louisville. Ky., Dec. 18, 1941. 

[5] "Appointment of Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, of the United States 
Supreme Court, as head of the board is especially noteworthy from the public 
viewpoint. If this important inquiry showed signs of paralysis because of 
emphasis on military detail or because of military rivalries and prejudices. 
Justice Roberts, by virtue of his judicial training and his demonstrated apprecia- 
tion of the public welfare, would be equipped to revitalize it and furnish impetus 
for a constructive conclusion." — Editorial, Tribune, South Bend, Ind., Dec. 18, 
1941. 

"Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, who has been granted special leave from 
the Supreme Court to head the board, is a man who combines a prosecutor's 
ability with a judicial temperament. His presence at tlie head of the board 
assures a thorough and painstaking investigation of the disaster — neither a 'white 
wash' nor a persecution". — Editorial, Enquirer, Cincinnati, O., Dec. 18, 1941. 

"From the viewpoint of public confidence, the appointment of Justice Roberts 
to head the board of inquiry into the Pearl Harbor debacle is perfect. The board 
contains otherwise technical [6] men of the army and navy. They will be 
useful and important as judges from their points of view. The disinterested 
judgment on which the nation will depend will be that of Justice Roberts. His 
appointment ends any suspicion that a whitewash may be contemplated." — 
Editorial, News, Miami, Fla., Dec. 19, 1941. 

"Of one thing we may be sure, and that is that the inquiry which is to be con- 
ducted by Justice Roberts will be both penetrating and fair. Its judicial nature 
is assured by its presiding officer. Tbe presence on it of experienced officers, 
guarantees that neither the technical aspects nor the interest of the armed forces 
will be slighted".— Editorial, Titnes, N. Y. C, Dec. 19, 1941. 

"The board of inquiry set up by President Roosevelt to look into the lack of 
alertness at Hawaii would in peace times be called brilliant. Since the task 
assigned it is grim and unpleasant, we prefer to call it completely competent. 
The nation may have perfect confidence that the judgment it renders will be 
just, without whitewash. 

"It is headed by Justice Roberts of the Supreme Court, [7] the only 
civilian member, who is best remembered for his extraordinary work in Investi- 
gating Teapot Dome. Justice Roberts, a Republican, was appointed by President 
Hoover. He owes nothing to the present administration. 

"Senior among the military members is General McCoy, whose skill as a soldier 
and a diplomat probably has given him a standing unequalled in our time by any 
military man. He is familiar with the Pacific, was General Wood's aide, then 
President Theodore Roosevelt's, then President Taft's. Not only his own service, 
but his attachment to those three men familiarized him with Pacific and Far East 
problems. 

"The navy is represented by Admirals Standley and Reeves, men with high 
records of service, and each retired prior to the succession of Mr. Knox to the 
navy secretaryship. The only active officer on the board is Brig. Gen. McNarney 
of the Air Corps, called on to provide the board the technical background of air 
tactics."— Editorial. Star. Rockford, 111., December 20, 1941. 

Variations from Pattern : 

"There is this criticism to be made of the board we think : It contains only one 
air fighting man, Gen. McNarney, [81 Gen. McCoy and Admirals Standley 
and Reeves are old time land and sea fighters respectively — fine fighters in their 
time, but times have changed." 

"Doesn't this board need heavier representation from the air fighting element 
of the armed services? We think it does." — Editorial, News, N. Y. C, December 
18, 1941. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1291 

"The appointment of Justice Roberts of ttie United States Supreme Covirt as 
chairman of the board investigating the surprise of the army and navy by the 
Japanese at Pearl Harbor was certain to meet criticism on the ground that the 
sanctity of the court is violated when any of its members are called vipon to 
perform other duties than those of the court itself. * * * But if there are to 
be any exceptions, the present emergency seems to offer justification." — Editorial, 
FepuUican, Springfield, Mass., December 23, 1941. 

"President Roosevelt indulged in unconscious irony when he named Supreme 
Court Justice Owen J. Roberts as head of the board to investigate army-navy 
delinquency at Pearl Harbor. 

[9] "Sixteen years ago, as special prosecutor for the government in the 
Teapot Dome and Elk Hills cases, Mr. Roberts tried to send the late Edward L. 
Doheny to jail. Doheny put up the defense that he had built oil tanks and 
reservoirs at Pearl Harbor at the request of the Navy, which had persuaded the 
sentimental oil man that the United States was about to be attacked by Japan 
at any moment. Doheny's case, in short, was the 'yellow peril'. In fact, he sum- 
moned numerous naval officers to testify that then (192G) the United States 
was expecting an assult from Japan almost any day. 

"Justice Roberts ridiculed the 'yellow peril' defense in the courtroom. He 
laughed at suggestions that Japan would ever dare to attack Hawaii, let alone 
the mainland. Mr. Roberts scoffed at the Doheny argument, which was based 
on the assumption that som.eday there would be a major war between Japan and 
the United States. Today Mr. Roberts is learning, perhaps, that he was all 
wrong 16 years ago, and that in this instance, the oil promoter was right." — 
Editorial, Tribune, Cheyenne, Wyo., December 27, 1941. 

[10] II. Duties and Powers of the Commission 

The most oiMginal and varied conmients on the investigation are those ad- 
dressed to the subject of duties and powers. Editorial opinion falls into three 
groups, (a) outlining the purpose of the commission, (b) outlining the area 
of the investigation, and (c) suggesting a method of procedure for the com- 
mission. 

The 37 clippings which refer to the purpose of the commission see it (1) as a 
fact finding board (10 clippings) ; (2) as an agency for fixing responsibility for 
the disaster (17 clippings) ; or (3) as an instrument of punishment in the trial 
of the commanders who were at Hawaii on December 7th (7 clippings). 

17 of the 25 clippings which discuss the area of the investigation, are concerned 
with specific details of the attack at Pearl Harbor. The other 8 imply that the 
board's investigation should also be turned on higher authorities in Washington 
who were indirectly responsible for the lack of alertness. 

Only 3 clippings discuss the method of procedure which the board should 
follow. One suggests that what happened after the attack as well as what hap- 
pened before it should be examined. The second advises that the board be given 
all the powers of a court martial in admitting oaths, etc. The third warns the 
investigttors [11] against interfering with the progress of the war. 

The total number of clippings concerned with duties and powers is 67 — con- 
siderably fewer than the number which discussed personnel. 

A. Purpose. — 37 clippings discuss the purpose of the committee's investigations. 
These divide into three main subsections: (1) those that see the committee S'.olely 
as a factfinding agency, (2) those that see it as an agency for fixing the responsi- 
bility, and (3) those that see it as an agency for collecting evidence leading to 
the punishment of those judged guilty of laxity. 

(1) Board as fact finding agency. — 10 clippings. 

"The legitimate purpose of this inquiry cannot be vindictive. The general 
public is not in a sadistic mood toward responsibile military officials because of 
the Pearl Harbor defeat. Thoughtfxd citizens regard this inquiry board as an 
instrument for prevention of mistakes in the future like those apparently made in 
the Pearl Harbor defense system. This, of course, means that any appearance of 
'whitewashing' would cause the public to lose confidence in the board and possibly 
in our military establishment."— Editorial, Tribune, South Bend, Ind., December 
18, 1941. 

[12] "This board will understand, and the people will agree with them, 
that the most important thing now is not to 'break' some high officer in the 
army or navy, though this may be one result of the probe, but the important 
thing is to find out exactly what happened, and why, to the end that it shall 
not happen again. 



1292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL PIARBOR ATTACK 

"Not primarily revpnge. though those who were negligent should be made 
to pay for their negligence, is the oblective of the presidential board but to 
discover ways to make sure that whatever the weakness was it shall be immedi- 
ately cured." — Editorial, Posi, Houston, Texas, December 18, 1941. 

"Finding should be determined judicially, dispassionately, expertly with all the 
facts at hand. They should have a value in outlining further military strategy; 
be a defense aid of the" future." — Editorial, Herald, Miami. Fla., December 18, 
1941. 

"Mr. Justice Roberts and his associates are not going to Hawaii to hold a 
court-martial : they are seeking facts." — Editorial, Times, Chattanooga, Tenn., 
December 19, 1941. 

[131 "Courts of investigation or inquiry are regularly held by the Navy 
Department after each disaster, such as the loss of a submarine or the grounding 
of a ship in peacetime. Some courts are in no sense court-martials but are 
rather like grand juries. They merely study and present the facts brought out 
by the testimony. Of course, the data they uncover may later be used for courts- 
martial, but unless specifically ordered they do not make recommendations." — 
Editorial, Journal, Dayton, Ohio, December 22. 1911. 

(2) Board as responsihility fix-in g agency. — 18 clippings. 

"The board of inquiry, which has no punitive powers, can be likened to an 
investigating grand jury. It could exonerate all officers concerned in the Pearl 
Harbor attacks from negligence charges, or it could turn in a report recommending 
fiffi ial reprimands or court-martial trials for cei-tain officers." — Headley Donovan, 
Staff Writer, Post, Washington, D. C, Dec. 19, 1941. 

"The public wants no scapegoats. It does expert that blame will be fixed, if 
any exists, no matter how high in scale of leadership and direction it runs. The 
purpose is not vindictiveuess, but to eliminate incompetence from the service and 
replace it with competence for the future." — Editorial, Pioneer Press, St. Paul, 
Minn., December 18. 1941. 

[IJf] "The Presidential Board of Inquiry will weigh those facts and others 
to determine full responsibility for the near-calamity of December 7 * * *, 

"This board is a blame-fixing board. Something happenetl which ought not to 
have happened, and responsibility for it is to be placed, if possible, upon certain 
individuals who failed, by reason of character, capacity or what-not, to meet the 
demands of the situation, before or after the fact." — ^Editorial, Ledger, Phila. Pa., 
December 18, 1941. 

"The job that remains for the investigating committee is to lay the blame where 
it belongs and to remove suspicion from those who do not deserve it." — Editorial, 
Call, Allentown, Pa., December 18, 1941. 

"The primary objective of the five-man board created by President Roosevelt 
to investigate why United Sates armed forces were not on the alert at Pearl 
Harbor should be the discovery of possible inefficiency among those in charge of 
defenses at the Hawaiian army and naval base. 

"Tl'ere should he no persecution or 'witch hunts'." — Editorial, Register, Mobile, 
Ala , December 18, 1941. 

[15] "This is far from saying that a full investigation of the incident, with 
a direct indication of whe'-e the responsibility rests for the damage wrought, is 
not essential. Secretary Knox has said that 'the Uni*^ed States services were not 
on the alert against the surprise attack on Hawaii.' Though the American public 
to the last citizen was equally taken unawares, equally deceived by the diplomatic 
gestures of Japan's envoys in Washington, it is imperative that they know who 
was asleep at the switch and why. For, whatever our national naivete respect- 
ing codes of honor in warfare, those in charge of our defense should have been 
prepared even for this abysmal display of trickery." — Editorial, Dispatch-Herald, 
Erie. Pa. December 18, 1941. 

"The subject is being thoroughly explored by the joint board of inquiry, headed 
by Snpreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, which has been assigned the n-isk of 
ascertaining the blame for the Pearl Harbor tragedy." — Editorial, Tijyies Herald, 
Washington, D. C, December 19, 1941. 

"It should be kept in mind that this investigation of the surprise at Pearl 
Harbor, wi'h a view to 'fixing responsibility,' has its major importance not from 
the standpoint of punishing [16] anybody but rather from the standpoint 
of finding out where all the faults appeared, so that lessons of them all may be 
learned and so that those or others like them will not occur again." — Editorial, 
Register, Des Moines, Iowa. December 19, 1941. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1293 

"We believe we may look to this board of inquiry to provide an unprejudiced, 
a complete and a politically fearless account of the Pearl Harbor disaster and 
that we may accept the verdict as to responsibility for history." — Editorial, Star, 
Rockford, 111. December 20, 1941. 

(3) Board as an instrument of punishment, 7 clippings. 

"The investigation ordered by the President is called for and if grievous mis- 
judgment is proved, it should be penalized." — Editorial, Courant, Hartford, Conn., 
December 16, 1941. 

"The country, sorrowing for its dead, will look to the President's investigating 
board to place the responsibility for these derelictions, and to take proper dis- 
ciplinary measures." — Editorial, Vindicator, Youngstown, Ohio, December 16, 
1941. 

[i7] "The investigation which has been ordered shall place definite re- 
sponsibility for that laxity. There should be no glossing over of weaknesses and 
errors. American morale will be aided and our fighting forces made more effec- 
tive if the unpleasant truths are bared and stern punitive action taken, regardless 
of the rank affected."— Editorial, Post, Butte, Rlont. December 16, 1941. 

"It is to be presumed that the man or men found to be re.sponsible for our fatal 
lack of alertness will be removed from command and that punishment will fit 
the crime — and inattentiveness, inefficiency and incompetence become crimes in 
time of war. 

"The demand for swift investigation does not arise from vindictiveness. The 
compulsion for discovering any guilty leaders springs largely from the principle 
of self-preservation, which requires that competent men be elevated and incom- 
petent men be removed as the elemental condition of victory." — Editorial, Star- 
Times, St. Louis, Mo. December 17, 1941. 

"The investigation mentioned by the Secretary is in progress. It is customary 
following any Navy or Army disaster. What it may reveal cannot be predicted. 
If there was carelessness, inattention to duty, culpable neglect, we may rest as- 
sured that it will be dis- [18] covered and properly exposed and pun- 
ished." — Editorial, Tribune, Tampa, Fla. December 17, 1941. 

"It appears that somebody was asleep at the switch in Hawaii. That is a 
military crime. In some moi'e militaristic countries than ours, high officers have 
been shot for less * * * 

"We doubt that anybody will be shot for negligence at Pearl Harbor. But 
anybody who may be found guilty should be given no second chance. He or they 
should he retired immediately from the armed services, and without public sym- 
pathv or any kind words in extenuation." — Editorial, Nctcs, N. Y. C. December 
18, 1941. 

"The only investigation of Pearl Harbor that will do the slightest bit of good 
now is to expose pitilessly the elements of failure in such a way that those same 
elements will never again contribute to another failure. Scapegoats for past 
defeats win no future victories." — Editorial, News, Beloit, Wise. December 20, 
1941. 

[19] "The board of inquiry headed by Justice Roberts will, it is hoped, 
unearth the full story of Pearl Harbor so that adequate measures may be taken to 
place the blame and punishment, no matter how high- the ramifications may 
reach. Anything less will not satisfy the people." — Editorial, Neics-Tribvne, 
Rome, Ga., December 21, 1941. 

B. Area, of Investigation. — 'The 25 clippings which discuss the actual area of 
investigation fall into two classes: 1) 17 suggest what specific aspects of the 
disaster should be examined at Pearl Harbor and 2) 8 imply that the investigation 
should include also the higher authorities in Washington. 

1. The aspects of the disaster to he examined at Pearl Harbor — "The President 
is appointing a special investigating board, and it will seek the harsh truth to 
these vital questions : 

(a) Was there dereliction of duty prior to the attack? 

(b) Was there error of military judgment which contributed to the surprise? 

(c) Why was the Japanese 'fifth-column' espionage so successful in Hawaii, 
as Secretary Knox reports?" — Joseph G. Harrison, Staff correspondent. Christian 
Science Monitor, Dec. 16, 1941. * 

[20] "The investigation will disclose facts which are not set out in Secretary 
Knox's report. Just what was the nature of the deadly fifth-column activities? 
Why was the dawn patrol ineffective? How are we to account for the absence 
of a night patrol? By what wily means were the Japanese "bie to get their 



1294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

submarines and aircraft carriers to the scene? Why the disparity between the 
dead and the injured, the former totaling 2729 and the latter 656, a sharp 
reversal of the usual experience?" — Editorial, Herald, Boston, Mass. December 
16, 1941. 

"Among the matters which the board is expected td investigate is whether war- 
ships were manned at the time of the attack and Army aviators were near their 
stations, whether mechanical devices capable of detecting approaching airplanes 
were in operation, how many anti-aircraft guns went into action when the 
Japanese planes appeared and whether naval vessels were equipped with anti- 
aircraft sighting devices. — News item, N. Y. Times, N. Y. C. December 17, 1941. 

**In addition to its task of fixing direct I'esponsibility for the Pearl Harbor 
disaster, the board may be expected to follow through on the implications of two 
other statements by Secretary Knox: [21] First, that the attack came 
from several Japanese aircraft carriers, and second, that it was facilitated by 
fifth column work on a scale comparable to that in Norway. Why, the board 
must ask, and the American people will want to know, were these carriers not 
spotted by the regular naval aircraft patrol? And how was it possible for the 
Japanese to know every detail of the disposition of the ships at Pearl Harbor 
by the aid of fifth columnists in the islands? One would think that somewhere 
in the vast ramification of fifth column activity which must have preceded the 
attack, some inkling would have been discovered by the Army and Navy intelli- 
gence services or the civil and military authorities of the islands." — Editorial, 
Neics, Buffalo, N. Y. December 17, 1941. 

"Yet something was wrong somewhere, and it is the government's purpose now 
to ascertain what precautions were lacking, to what extent fifth columnist activity 
contributed to Japanese timing and accuracy, and wherein the episode dis- 
played basic weaknesses of defense." — Editorial, Gazette, Worcester, Mass. 
December 17, 1941. 

[22] "The board must determine how far into American life the fifth column 
might have bored and also whether some of our high officers are capable of dis- 
charging their duties." — Editorial, Plain Dealer, Cleveland, Ohio. December IS, 
1941. 

"The task of the board of inquiry will be to determine whether there was any 
negligence on the part of Army, Navy or Air Corps officers that contributed to 
undue loss of life or damage of property." — Editorial, Union, Manchester, N. H. 
December 18, 1941. 

"The inquiry should disclose wherein military laxity permitted a surprise 
attack and whether that situation involved any derelictions of duty. It should 
determine whether satisfactory measures have been taken to guard against a new 
attack. Finally, it should delve into reports of extensive fifth column activity 
in Hawaii and if the potentialities of that activity require special measures for 
the protection of mainland defense establishments." — Editorial, Citizen, Ashe- 
ville, N. C. December 18, 1941. 

"The presidential commission may be relied upon to discover whether or not 
the failure of the forces to be on the alert was the [23] result of misjudg- 
ment, of dereliction, or conceivably, of a diplomatic policy of avoiding offense to 
Japan until every possibility of a peaceful settlement had been exhausted." — 
Editorial, Conrant. Hartford. Conn. December 18, 1941. 

"The board of inquiry appointed by President Roosevelt will determine whether 
the Pearl Harbor attack was made possible by general incompetency of the 
commanding officers, a temporary relaxation of vigilance, or a chain of circum- 
stances beyond the control of the officials in charge." — Editorial, Gazette, Reno, 
Nevada. December 18, 1941. 

"It should be remembered that the inquiry must determine not only whether 
these commanders were fulfilling their duty, but whether they had equipment 
necessary to fulfill that duty." — Editorial, Times, Shreveport, La. December 19, 
1941. 

"The Presidential board that is now investigating the tragedy must attempt to 
determine how and why Japane.se forces were able to make a surprise attack 
upon the fortress island of Oahu after apparently penetrating far-flung naval 
scouting lines and close-in reconnaissance by Army planes. 

[2^] "Certainly, the great loss of ships, planes and lives was largely due not 
to the fact that the siirprise attack was accomplished btit that we were not pre- 
pared for the attack at all. The following mistakes seem to have been made: 

1. Our fishting services, particularly the Navy, definitely under-estimated Japan 
and were over-confident to the point of complacency, an attitude that was only a 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1295 

reflection of the national psychology. In manoeuvers and war studies we had 
frequently reckoned with the possibility of a Japanese attack upon Midway and 
had deemed as quite practical carrier-based air attacks upon Japan — similar to 
tlie one launched by the Japanese upon Pearl Harbor. "We had always contem- 
plated tlie possibility, indeed the probabality, that war with Japan would start 
by a surprise attack without benelit of a declaration, and we had Port Arthur, 
in the liusso-Japanese war, as a foreboding precedent. Yet we apparently felt 
so secure behind the barriers of distance that such an attack on Oahu was 
scarcely considered. 

2. There was no unity of command in Hawaii. The admiral commanding 
the Paciiic Fleet had lieadquarters both afloat and ashore, but his responsibility 
was the fleet. The admiral commanding the Fourteenth Naval District (Ha- 
waii) had headquarters at Peax-1 Harbor, but his responsibility was Pearl Harbor 
and naval installations ashore in the Hawaiian Islands. The Army's air helds 
and fortitications were under command of the general commanding the Ha- 
waiian Department. The board investigating the Pearl [25 J Harbor 
tragedy \sill undoubtedly endeavor to ascertain whether there was adequate 
coordination oi' liaison between the connnanders. 

3. The Navy concentrated too many ships at Pearl Harbor at a time of tension. 

4. Apparently the ships in port were not protected by torpedo nets. 

5. Apparently much of our gasoline and oil storage in the islands was not 
uudergiound, or at least was not sufliciently protected. 

6. Our Army and Navy planes on Oahu were jammed together in small 
areas — the Army's principally at Hickam and Wheeler helds ; the Navy's prin- 
cipally at Ford Island in the middle of Pearl Harbor. 

•'The full study of these and many other factors will undoubtedly be made 
by the competent investigating board." — Hanson W. Baldwin, Columnist, N. Y. 
Times. N. Y. C, December 21, 1941. 

2. Implications that the investigation should include the higher anthorities 
in Washington — "Our forces would have defended themselves more effectively 
had they been expecting an attack. But behind their lack of such knowledge 
was a native State Department totally and blindly unaware of Japan's true 
intentions." — Editorial, Adviser, Montgomery, Ala., Dacember 16, 1941. 

[26'] "It ought to be readily established whether or not the responsible 
Army and Navy oflicers in Hawaii were adequately informed, by Washington, 
of the imminence of danger of attack. If they had been given such information 
as to point to the imperative need for being on guard, then culpable negligence 
would be indicated. Were they less accurately advised by Washington, their 
responsibility would be less direct." — Editorial, Sun, W^illiamsport, Pa., Decem- 
ber 17, 1941. 

"Whether the apparent laxity was entirely confined to Pearl Harbor or 
whether it reflects defective policy on the part of the high command in Washing- 
ton is a matter that ought to be settled conclusively by this formal inquiry."— 
Editorial. Tribune, South Bend, Ind., December 18, 1941. 

"The President's inquiry . . . will show whether the disaster at Pearl Harbor 
can be blamed upon unpreparedness at Hawaii or whether Washington ought 
to assume some of the responsibility." — Editorial, Sun, N. Y. C, December 18 
1941. 

"In one respect the board appointed by the President is [27] inadequate 
for the job the nation expects. It can investigate in Hawaii but not in Wash- 
ington. It can hardly be expected that a board appointed by the executive can 
investigate the departments of the executive government, particularly when a 
majority of its members are under the orders of these departments. " Only the 
legislative branch of the government can do that with either propriety or suc- 
cess." — Editorial, Tribune, Chicago, 111., December IS, 1941. 

"The people at home demand a complete investigation, without making a 
'goat' of any ofticer, or the 'whitewashing' of any man whose negligence or 
incompetency contributed to the loss of American lives, ships and planes. If 
the lack of alertness extended to the 'higher ups' in War and Navv Departments 
let the heads fall where found."— Editorial Capital, Topeka, Kansas, Decem- 
ber 19, 1941. 

"The responsibility is really pervasive; It involves our Navy department, our 
War department, our whole 'administration', indeed our whole nation. Bad as 
it now seems, we, including our experts, just didn't think the Japanese would 
attack without warning (though we should have), and in particular we didn't 



1296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

think they would attack with such aggressive boldness as Hawaii, so far away. 
The real blame must be diffused." — Editorial, Register, Des Moines, Iowa, Decem- 
ber 19, 1941. 

{28\ "The investigation committee named by President Roosevelt probably 
will look beyond the conduct of the officers who were upon the scene. Certainly 
this should be the case." — Editorial, Times, Gadsden, Ala., December 21, 1941. 

"Possibly the Board of Inquiry . . . will lay the blame, or some of it, a 
good deal nearer than Honolulu. ... A government engaged in negotiations 
with a country governed by a group of semi-civilized magnates should not neglect 
to warn its officers at an island outpost to be on the alert." — Editorial, Times, 
Louisville, Ky., December 22, 1941. 

C. Method of Procedure. — 

Only 3 clippings had suggestions for the actual procedure which the board 
should follow ; all were brief. 

"The board of inquiry will have to proceed under fire, so to speak, and its 
findings examined against the background of what happened after as well as 
before the surprise attack." — Editorial, Herald, Durham, N. C, December 17, 1941. 

"The board will have full powers, we trust, to admit oaths and to require the 
attendance of witnesses, precisely as a naval board bt inquiry or a naval court- 
martial would. — Editorial, News-Leader, Richmond, Va., December 17, 1941. 

[2!)] "It is essential that any prcbe of what happened at Pearl Harbor be 
conducted in such a way as not to interfere with the conduct of the war, or 
effect the morale of other army and navy officials." — Editorial, Enquirer, Cincin- 
nati, Ohio, December 18, 1941. 

[50] ///. Probable Findings of the Commission 

There is little speculation on the probable findings of the investigating board. 
Of the 236 clippings which refer to the investigation, only six voice any ideas 
as to its results, and these suggest a wide range of possibilities. 

"Perhaps an official investigation is in order to determine why the armed 
services were not on the alert against the surprise air attack. Perhaps such an 
investigation isn't in order. If one is made, then also there should be an investi- 
gation as to why the Japanese were able to establish such an effective fifth column 
in Hawaii. The activities of the subversives which made up that column are 
likely more responsible for the ability of the Japanese to launch this unexpected 
attack than any other thing." — Editorial, Arizona Republic, Phoenix, Ariz., Dec. 
17, 1941. 

"Aside from any laxity involved, there is also a question whether the report 
may not show that there were insufficient numbers of ships, planes, listening 
devices, scouting or patrol vessels, etc., and that these deficiencies were the 
result of shipment of large numbers of planes, particularly, and other defensive 
weapons, to other nations under lease-lend. That, of [31] course, is 
always a possibility. The probability seems to be, however, that the facilities 
at hand were simply not manned at the time of the attack." — Editorial, Day, 
New London, Conn., Dec. 18, 1941. 

"Probably that investigation will blast the naval careers of not a few of 
our officers, perhaps some in high places." — Editorial, Herald, Grand Rapids, 
Mich., Dec. 18, 1941. 

"While members of Congress have no desire to anticipate the findings and 
conclusions of the board named to investigate .Japan's original attack on Hawaii, 
they are convinced that the basic answer will be 'too few planes'." — Editorial, 
Tribune, Cheyenne, Wyo., Dec. 23, 1941. 

"A correspondent thinks that 'our danger lies within' and that the conserva- 
tive military mind is more dangerous than fifth columnists." — Editorial, Post, 
M'lwnukee, Wise, Dec. 24, 1941. 

"Washington advices report that the Roberts' board of inquiry left Washington 
With a distinct prejudice against the [52] Hawaiian air, land and naval 
commanders, who were not alert when the Japs attacked on December 7th. The 
investigators' perusal of confidential reports convinced them that our Pearl 
Harbor defenders should be court-martialed." — Editorial, Tribune, Cheyenne, 
Wyo., Dec. 27, 1941. 

[55] IV. Request that American Public Suspend Judgment 

34 editorials, dated December 16th to December 25th, warn the public against 
making judgments on the Pearl Harbor disaster until the investigating com- 
mittee has had a chance to report. These warnings are very brief and almost 
identical in wording. For that reason, only a few typical statements have been 
quoted. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1297 

"Pending results of the investigation, speculation on the subject does no 
good and perhaps is injurious." — Editorial, Press Telegram, Long Beach, Calif., 
Dec. 16, 1941. 

"The American people should not be prematurely harsh in their opinion, and 
we do not believe many of them have been. ... If some cherished the delusion 
that peace was possible longer than others, the fact remiains that all are awake 
now and facing a task so hard and terribly urgent that it leaves no time for 
blaming one another . . . But the assurance now exists that exact justice will 
be meted out,' and this assurance gives no room for self-righteous recriminations 
based on hindsight." — Editorial, Courier-Journal, Louisville, Ky., Dec. 18, 1941. 

[S-'f] "Both the President aud Secretary Knox chose to await the results 
of a reliable inquiry board before attempting to allocate responsibility. The 
public cannot with justice do less." — Editorial, Union, Manchester, N. H., Dec. 
18, 1941. 

"It remains to be seen what the findings of the board will be, and until they 
are made public it would be well to suspend judgment of the individuals who 
have been relieved of their command." Editorial, Evening Star, Washington, 
D. C, Dec. 18, 1941. 

"Until its (the board's) findings are made known, it is well, we think, to 
suspend any personal judgment and to avoid sweeping allegations of any kind 
going beyond Secretary Knox's declaration." — Editorial, Age-Herald, Birming- 
ham, Ala., Dec. 19, 1941. 

"Until all the facts are known it is the duty of every one to withhold judg- 
ment, confident that the commission the President has appointed will delve 
deeply, fearlessly and fairly, not alone to fix the blame but to make certain that 
whatever blunders cost us so dearly at Pearl Harbor wiU not be repeated." — 
Editorial, Times, N. Y. C, Dec. 19. 1941. 

[35] "Let the rest of us spend our energies fighting the war, not denouncing 
those actively at the front. Sucli denunciations are meat for the Axis propaganda 
sausage machines." — Editorial, Journal-Transcript, Peoria, lU., Dec. 22, 1941. 

[36] V. The Commission as an Alternative to a Congressional Investigation 
Editorial opinion is unanimous in expressing relief that a congressional in- 
vestigation has been called off, with the exception of one clipping from the Chicago 
Tribune, dated December 18, 1941. (See page 27.) Tiie reasons given by the 
25 clippings which deal with the subject are as follows : 

(a) A congressional investigation would waste time and money since the 
President has already appointed a highly competent investigating commission. 

(b) It would make secrecy in handling evidence impossible. 

(c) It might be monopolized by publicity-seeking congressmen. 

(d) It concerns a matter which, by rights, should be handled by the President. 
"Congress, though impatient as we all are to know the truth, would do well 

to refrain from investigating on its own hook until the board set up by the Pi-esi- 
dent has had time to finish its labors and report. No good and but much con- 
fusion will result from having two simultaneous and independent investigations 
of the same matter. Moreover, ample experience proves that it is all but im- 
possible for a Congressional committee to keep a secret — numbers make for 
leaks — and it is therefore certain that there are many details which responsible 
ofl5cers could reveal to a militai'y court that they would be unwilling to confide 
to less sternly disciplined ears. For the present, at least, the conduct of tlie 
■ [37] war is an executive function which can best be exercised by the Execu- 
tive Department. Legislative inquiries may later become advisable, but right 
now it would be better for everybody to keep out from under the feet of those 
who must do the main job and do it in a hurry." — Editorial, Sun, New York City, 
Dec. 17. 1941. 

"The Senate seems determined to investigate in parallel manner the Pearl 
Harbor affair, along with the investigation liy the President. 

"The investigation should be left with the President at this time, we believe. 

"This is no hour for an airing of opposite views. 

"It is a waste of time. . . . 

"Senator Johnson of Colorado aptly said, when the matter of the investiga- 
tion came up. that it should be left wholly to the President. 

"In this we cannot help but agi-ee. The country has confidence in the leader- 
ship of the President. He is our wartime chieftain. 

"Tlie investigation, carried on by the Senate, may well be of comfort to our 
enemies. No such hint of disunity should be allowed to exist." — Editorial, Post, 
Boston, Mass., Dec. 17, 1941. 



1298 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[38] "What is not needed? 

"The House Committee on Naval Affairs is reported to have under considera- 
tion an investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack to parallel the investigation to 
be made by President Roosevelt. In the Senate, Senator Vandenberg has already 
proposed broader action in the form of a suggestion for establishment of a 
committee similar to the 'Committee on the Conduct of the War' which func- 
tioned during the Civil War. 

"The sort of thing is delinitely not needed. Congress has important functions 
to perform and Congressional investigations of executive actions' rlay an im- 
portant part in the performance of these functions. But investigation of execu- 
tive actions after the event is one thing and attempted Congressional supervision 
of executive action during the event is entirely a different thing. 

"The 'Committee on the Conduct of the War' during the Civil War reflected 
no credit on Congress during that time. Nothing of that kind is wanted or 
needed now. Discipline of those responsible for admitted inefliciency at Pearl 
Harbor is clearly an executive function. Congression investigation in anticipa- 
tion of that action could only muddy the waters. 

"This war cannot be operated successfully from the floors of the House and 
the Senate. Any efforts on the part of any members [39] of Congress 
to attempt anything of that sort should be nipped in the bud. We are not only 
fighting a war in which we need unity behind leadership at home. Also we are 
fighting it in a world in which dictators are waiting and listening for just such 
division and bickering in democratic government as that wliich this Vanden- 
berg proposal would inevitably create. 

"There will be little support in the country for this proposal in Congress. 
Indeed, it seems safe to predict that there will be little support for it in Congress 
itself."— Editorial, News d Obserber, Raleigh, X. C, Dec. 17, 1941. 

"In Congress where there had been a minor and quickly squelched movement 
for an independent investigation, the purpose now is to delay any congressional 
inquiry at least until after the executive inquiry is completed." — U. P., News, 
Washington, D. C, Dec. 17, 1941. 

"Since the board is composed of able and distinguished men, this prompt move 
toward inquiry will postpone Congressional investigation and perhaps sidetrack 
it altogetlier. The latter would probably take months, and feature a lot of 
extraneous debate, [4O] and arrive at no more satisfactory conclusion 
than the President's board can reach in a fortnight." — Editorial, Telegraph 
Herald, Dubuque, Iowa, Dec. 18, 1941. 

"It may not, of course, be the only investigation ; for a disturbed Congress 
wants to get its investigatory gi-ip on this issue and it may do so yet. But at 
least the character and qualifications of the President's board pushes aside any 
questions that the lack of alertness in Hawaii will be whitewashed or, on the 
other hand, that it will become now the subject of a political fishing expedition 
by Congressmen on the make." — Editorial, Virginia-Pilot, Norfolk, Virginia, Dec. 
18, 1941. 

"One can be doubly thankful that the inquiry was not entrusted to the tender 
mercies of a congressional committee. There are men on Capitol Hill who are 
only too eager to launch investigations on the familiar witch-hunting pattern. 
But this is not a time for pi-omoting partisan politics or personal publicity. The 
public interest will be far better served by the type of inquiry which the Presi- 
dent has instituted." — Editorial, Neics, Wilmington. Del.. Dec. IS. 1941. 

[4I] "Congress has abandoned plans for separate legislative investigations 
in lieu of this official inquiry. This move is to be commended. Many revelations 
of the Pearl Harbor attack may produce military details valuable to the enemy. 
A board of experts is much better equipped to ferret out the real truth, assign 
the blame and maintain the necessary discipline I'egarding confidential disclo- 
sures. This task calls for experienced hands unhampered by partisan or political 
considerations." — Editorial, Citizen, Ashevllle, N. C, Dec. 18, 1941. 

"In large measure the speed may be for the purpose of side-tracking a full- 
dress congressional inquiry into the situation. But if that is the case, the effect 
still can be gratifying. It can give the Congress reason to believe that it will 
not have to threaten an investigation every time it looks as if serious lapses 
have occurred, that it can depend on the high command to take stern action 
and take it quickly." — Editorial, Register, New Haven, Coiui.. Dec. 18, 1941. 

"In view of the character and intentions of the presidential board it seems 
hardly necessary for the House of Representatives to interfere with an in- 
vestigation of its own. Such an [Jf2] investigation would only make the job 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1299 

of the executive more ditlicult and would result in more people knowing the 
details of the Pearl Harbor attack than is advisable for the security of the 
nation and its Pacific defenses. And generally speaking, the less interference by 
Congress in army and navy affairs, the better will the two forces be able to 
perform their jobs." — Editorial, Register, Mobile. Ala., Dec. 18, 1941. 

"Here -is a clear signal to Congress that for the time being at least it should 
keep its hands off. One notes that in each chamber certain elements, distin- 
guished by their isolationist members, are itching to launch simultaneous in- 
quiries of their own to serve as sounding boards for critics whose indignation 
over the setback at Hawaii is only matched by their previous obstruction of the 
whole defense effort. Happily the Senate leaders seem agieed that the Presi- 
dent's investigation should foi-estall any similar action in their chamber. In 
the House, meanwhile, the pressure to set up a parallel investigation is still a 
threat. May we say to our Repersentatives that the less they attempt to run 
this war the closer will come victory?" — Editorial, Herald Tribune, N. Y. C. 
Dec. 17, 1941. 

The same printed as an editorial in the Dispatch-Herald, Erie, Pennsylvania, 
December 18, 1941. 

[.).1] "The worst thing that could happen, apart from' the incident itself, 
would be to have it bandied about in a congressional investigation where speeches 
and smears would inevitably rear their heads and the quest for the truth would 
eventually be bogged down in a mass of oratory that completely obscured the 
issue." — Editorial, Sun-Democrat, Paducah, Ky., Dec. 19, 1941. 

[Jf^] VI. Need for Speed 

Twenty-eight clippings mention the need for speed in dealing with the Pearl 
Harbor episode. In some cases comment is coniined to an approving statement 
that "the President acted swiftly". Others go into more lengthly discourses on 
the need for conducting the investigation with dispatch in order not to minimize 
the value of the lesson to be learned. Interest in this subject ranged from the 
16th to the 20th after which it was dropped completely. 

"Acting with commendable promptness the government announces that a joint 
army-navy board will investigate the surprise 'stab-in-the-back' delivered by the 
Japanese against Pearl Harbor . . . 

"Already both President Roosevelt and Secretary Knox have set an example 
for the investigation board in the swiftness with which they have acted. They 
realize that a long-drawn-out or delayed inquiry will minimize the value of the 
lesson to be learned." — Editorial, Journal, Dayton, Ohio, Dec. 17, 1941. 

"There is reason for quick action, too, in determination of the whole truth. We 
have a very tough chore ahead and [//5] every delay only makes it 
tougher." — Editorial, Monitor, Concord, N. H., Dec. 18, 1941. 

"The whole proceedings were given further quickening by the investigation 
order of President Roosevelt, whose determination to get to the bottom of it and 
let the chips fall where they may, was enthusiastically received by the people." — 
Editorial, Tribune, LaCrosse, Wis., Dec. 18, 1941. 

"Tlie president has acted quickly on the report of Secretary of Navy Knox and 
the Ijoard of inquiry must make quick and full investigation . . . 

"We want no whitewashing, no procrastination." — Editorial, Journal-Times, 
Racine, Wis., Dec. IT, 1941. 

"The demand for .swift investigation does not arise from vindictiveness . . . 

"There is also the fact that, so long as it is suspected that the navy harbors 
incompetent admirals, the entire top group of officers is under a cloud of oppro- 
brium and distrust. For this reason, it is probably a matter of utmost urgency 
to able [Jf6] officers themselves that responsibility tor Pearl Harbor be 
fixed as speedily as possible." — Editorial, Sta);-Tin)€s, St. Louis, Mo., Dec. 37, 1941. 

"Tlie President has acted with commendable promptness in appointing a five- 
man board to investigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor on Sunday, D-^cember 7th. 
Anything less than an immediate, thorough-going inquiry would have laid the 
Chief Executive, as well as the Naval and Military authorities in Hawaii, open 
to the sevei-^est criticism." — Editorial, Record, Troy, N. Y., Dec. 18, 1941. 

"There is a healthy appearance here of some fast action , . , 

"At any rate the evidence to date of speedy and impartial inquiry into the 
facts and of remedial action no doubt will react well on the population as a 
whole." — Editorial, Register, New Haven, Conn., Dec. 18, 1941. 

"The investigators, headed by Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, will have the 
confidence of the country and it is to be hoped that there will be no unnecessary 
79716 — 46 — Ex. 143, vol. 3 2 



1300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

delay in performing [47] the task aud making a full report to the 
country." — Editorial, Journal, Knoxville, Tenn., December 19, 1941. 

"A board of inquiry, headed by Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts of the 
Supreme Court, is on its way to the islands where all the facts will be developed 
as rapidly as justice and fairness will permit." — Editorial, Telegraph, Macon, Ga., 
Dec. 20, 1941. 

[^S] VII. Demotion of Commanders 

Editorial opinion is unanimous in approving the demotion of the commanders. 
Interest in this subject appears only on the 18th and 19th when 49 clippings 
discuss it. 

In some cases, these statements do not bear directly upon the investigation, 
but they do indicate the extent to which the two are related in the minds of 
the public. 

In general, the clippings fall into the following classes : 

(A) 25 accept Secretary Stimson's statement that it was necessary to relieve 
the commanders of their responsibilities while they were involved in an 
investigation. 

(B) 12 feel that it was wise to remove the commanders, guilty or not, in 
order to restore the public's confidence, and to show that both our government 
and our armed forces are ready for decisive action. 

(C) 11 feel that Knox's report gives sufficient evidence to prove the com- 
manders guilty, and to justify their immediate demotion. 

(D) 1 feels that the demotion of the commanders was unavoidable but re- 
grets the humiliation involved. 

A. Acceptance of Secretary Stimson's Reasons for Removing the Com- 
manders. — "As the inquiry starts, the Army and Navy have relieved of their 
posts the high military and naval officers in command of Hawaiian defenses 
at the time of the attack. Regardless of whether these men were guilty of 
negligence or ai'e wholly innocent, this was the wisest thing to do. It would 
have been poor policy to leave 149] the responsibilities of command to 
officers facing the rigors and distractions of a formal investigation." — Editorial, 
Neics, Wilmington, Del., December 18, 1941. 

"By relieving the responsible officers of duty before the investigation starts, 
furthermore, the administration has made certain that facts, not personalities, 
will be most important." — Editorial, Repository, Canton, Ohio, December 18, 
1941. 

"Obviously, they (the commanders) could not continue to execute their duties 
and at the same time remain available for the investigating commission. With- 
out responsibility for the defense of Hawaii in the immediate future, these 
officers who were in command when the first attack was made, will be able to 
cooperate more fully with the investigators, and, if necessary, to prepare their 
own defense." — Editorial, Times, N. Y. C, December 19, 1941. 

"They were the officers responsible for the sea, land and air defenses of the 
islands' and the conduct of those defenses is now the concern of a presidential 
board of investigation. It would not have been fair to them, to the men under 
their command or to the nation to retain them in their posts while their admin- 
istrations [50] were under critical examination." — Editorial, Courant, 
Hartford, Conn., December 19, 1941. 

B. Approval of the demotion as a move to restore public confidence in the 
government and armed forces. — "The promptnes of the decision in Washington 
to make these drastic moves is a good omen for the conduct of the war, now 
and in the future. It must prove heartening to the entire country, and its 
effect upon the entire armed establishment will be invigorating." — Editorial. 
Telegram, Worcester, Mass., December 18, 1941. 

"The forthright action of the War and Navy departments in completely revamp- 
ing the Hawaiian command and that of the Pacific fleet, following immediately 
upon the President's appointment of a formal board of inquiry, serves to dissi- 
pate completely any lingering fear on the part of the American people that the 
Pearl Harbor affair would be 'whitewashed' or any incompetents retained in 
posts of command in any of the branches of the armed service." — Editorial, 
Herald-Dispatch, Huntington, West Virginia. December 18, 1941. 

"The sudden shift of ranking officers in Hawaii should be beneficial to the 
armed forces and the American public. It re- [51] fleets a detennina 
tion to eliminate from posts of greatest responsibility those who may lack the 
capacity for such commands." — Editorial, Star, Muncie, Indiana. December 19, 
1941. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1301 

^•Removal of the three men in a way makes the penalty lighter than if just 
one had been singled out, and that perhaps is fair. But the nation as a whole 
could not have complete confidence without changes in responsibile leadership 
in the Pacific." — Editorial, Globe, Joplin, Missouri. December 10, 1941. 

"Without waiting for a report from the president's board of investigation, 
the administration has removed officers in command when Pearl Harbor was 
attacked and appointed their successors. To what extent they were responsible 
for what happened will not be known imtil the board of investigators finishes 
its work. But neither the administration nor the people felt that confidence 
could be sustained or stimulated by their retention." — Editorial, Independent, 
Massillou, Ohio. December 19, 1941. 

"Secretary of War Stimson's statement on the changes in the fleet and Hawaiian 
commands — the most extensive statement made on this subject — cites as reasons 
1) the 'unpreparedness' of December 7, [5.2] which the War Department 
as well as the Navy Department now officially admits; 2) the necessary 'reor- 
ganization of air defenses in the islands; and 3) the avoidance of the situation 
that would result if the officers were still responsible for the security of the islands 
at a time when they were 'under searching investigation.' 

"All these reasons add up to the hard fact that officers in charge at a time 
of disaster rarely retain their posts. This is an old doctrine, held to generally 
by all governments and all nations and extending far back into military and 
naval history. It may involve injustice. But sometimes injustice can be cor- 
rected. The immediate need is the restoration of confidence, among officers 
and men and in the country itself; and this restoration of confidence begins 
nearly always from the installation of new commanders." — Editorial, Virginian- 
Pilot, Norfolk, Va. December 19. 1941. 

C. Approval of the demotion of the commanders on the evidence of Secretary 
Knox's report. — "We know from Secretary Knox's statement that there was negli- 
gence. That is sufficient reason why both the commander of the fleet and the 
commander of the shore forces should have been relieved of their commands." — 
Editorial. Times, Watertown, N. Y. December 18, 1941. 

[55] "The removal of the admiral, a lieutenant general, and a major general 
who were in command at Hawaii a week ago S'Uiulay was to be expected. It is 
a military maxim that there is no excuse for surprise. The service regulations 
of both the army and navy require every officer to take adequate precautions for 
the security of his own force, regardless of ordei-s or lack of oi'ders from his 
superiors. The officers who have been removed evidently failed to obey this 
first military commandment." — Editorial. Tribune, Chicago, 111., December 18, 
1941. 

"It may turn out that Admiral Kimmel and Generals Short and Martin had 
given the pi'oper orders that should have insured alertness at Pearl Harbor. 
But even so they are responsible for the obvious lack of preparation. An offi- 
cer's duty won't stop with giving orders. Even more important, his duty is to 
see they are carried out. 

"It would be disquieting, indeed, to think that our main fleet and our most 
important outpost were to be continued in the hands of men responsible for the 
calamity of December 7." — Editorial, Record. Phila.. Penna., December 19. 1941. 

D. Approval of the commanders' demotion vyith regret for the hmniliatiop, 
involved. 

[SJf] "We say the apparent necessity for such action will be regretted 
because any of us can understnnd and sympathize with the kind of humiliation 
such action entails for the officers concerned and for the services as well. 
Because despite the fact many of their fellow citizens will be constrained to 
withhold final judgment until after the President's investigating committee has 
made a full report, so far as the public generally is concerned, the high command 
in charge on that fateful Sunday of the Japanese attack is already damned for 
having been 'asleep at the switch'. 

"There will he no disputing the position of the administration, however, that 
whatever the facts may have been, it would be inadvisable not to remove those 
men from their commands pending the inquiry schedtiled." — Editorial, Journal, 
Knojv'aie. Tenn.. December 19, 1941. 

[5.5] VIII. PubJicaton of Evidence 

14 clippings suggest the desirability of publishing the results of the investi- 
gation. Of these. 10 emphasize the American public's right to know the facts, 
while four recognize the possibility that it might be better to withhold th^m 
at least utitil ,'?<»nv^ fntu^e date. Interest in this subject ranged from the 16th 
to the lOth after which there is no further mention of it. 



1302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A. Public's right to know. — "Tbe findings sliould be given to the people. Tliey 
ai'e entitled to know the wbole truth. And when the worst is known it will 
arouse the people of this nation to give of their energy, their wealth and all 
their resources, to the end that Japan and her Axis partners may pay in full 
for the crimes they are committing in their effort to destroy freedom and liberty 
throughout the world." — Editorial, Herald, Spartanburg, S. C, Dec. 16, 1941. 
"Let us not confuse the immediate issues of the war by recriminations now, 
but let us bear in mind that Congress and the people have a right to know all 
the facts."— Editorial, Neivs, Buffalo, N. Y., Dec. 17, 1941. 

"The blame for the lack of necessary precaution should be determined because 
the American people are entitled to know [56] the facts. 

"The secretary himself is involved, but whether open to any criticism will be, 
if such is the case, revealed by the testimony which should be available. 

"The nation has a right to know what might have been done to soften the 
unexpected blow." — Editorial, Journal-Times, Racine, Wis., Dec. 17, 1941. 

"Though the American public to the last citizen was equally taken unawares, 
equally deceived by the diplomatic gestures of Japan's envoys in Washington, 
it is imperative that they know who was asleep at the switch and why. For, 
whatever our national naivete respecting codes of honor in warfare, those in 
charge of our defense should have been prepared even for this abysmal display 
of trickery."— Editorial, Herald-Trihtme, N. Y. C, Dec. 17, 1941. 

"But whoever was to blame for it all, no matter how high their positions, 
that fact should be made known to the people of the U. S. who, after all, have 
seen vast destruction to their Navy and their planes, great loss of life of their 
sons and a sizable hole punched in the defenses of their liberties [57] 
and the independence of their country." — ^Editorial, Grand Rapids, Mich., Dec. 
18, 1941. 

B. Recognition of need for secrecy. — In commenting on Secretary Knox's 
statement that we are all entitled to know the facts, a Jackson, Miss., paijer 
says : 

"By 'air we presume he means that the people also are entitled to this 
knowledge, and we believe that in due time it will be given to them." — Edi- 
torial, Clarion-Ledger, Jackson, Miss., Dec. 17, 1941. 

"How much of the information gathered will be released to the public is a 
question of course; it may be that the inquiry will develop certain fundamentjil 
weaknesses in oiir defensive system that ought not to become public property." — 
Editorial, Daii, New London, Conn.. Dec. 18, 1941. 

"Unless military necessity commands complete silence, it might be helpful 
for the people to Imow just how it was that fifth column activities made them- 
selves manifest in Hawaii. Secretai'y Knox has revealed that the seditionists 
were active and effective, but he has not told the country just what it was 
[58] that those traitors did. Pei'haps there are grave and sufficient reasons 
why this information should be withheld. If it would disserve the national 
interest for thi-^ information to be supplied, nothing nioi-e should ever be said 
about it. No American has any right to seek information whose disclosure 
might imperil the country." — Editorial, Oklulionian, Oklahoma City, Okla., Dec. 
18, 1941. 

"It is to be assumed that the investigation will be held behind closed doors 
and that the reasons for secret proceedings may also cause parts of the board's 
final report to the President as commander-in-chief to be held confidential. But 
on the broad issue of lack of alertness and responsibility for it, the public 
expects the board to be plain spoken — and it probably will be." — Editorial, 
Republican, Springfield, Mass., Dee. 18, 1941. 

[59] UNITED STATES MAGAZINES 

A survey of popular news magazines of varied editorial policy reveals little 
deviation from newspaper opinion. The Nation for December 20, 1941, ex- 
presses approval of the President's appointments, and hopes the commission 
will not pull its punches. The Nation for the following week and the New Rc- 
pnhlic for both I^eceraber 22, and December 29, 1941, state that though definite 
blame cannot be laid as yet, it is possible that "Munich-minded" Washington 
officials are primarily responsible for the disaster. The Henry Luce publica- 
tions. Time and Life both for December 29, 1941, make no statement of opinion 
except to praise Justice Owen J. Robert's chairman of the commission, and give 
a brief summary of his career. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1303 

The National Week, Washington, D. C, December 26, 1941, announces the 
appointment of the commission, adding that its scope of inquiry is broad enough 
to have a real bearing on future policies. By implication, the article goes on 
to suggest that the commission may disclose lack of co-ordination between 
jealous army and navy rivals as the real cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster. 

[60] The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, December 25, 1941 makes no 
reference to the investigating commission, but gives the President a slightly two- 
edged compliment on his action in the Pearl Harbor affair. "The President ap- 
parently has not hesitated to deal vigorously with military dereliction or incom- 
petence. On the contrary, he seems to have acted with dispatch, and so far as 
can be judged, with good sense. He should act with similar strength on other 
fronts." 

The Neiv Masses, December 30, 1941, approves the President's prompt action in 
appointing an Investigating commission in the following terms: "The fact that 
our Commander-in-Chief has acted with such decision and speed will bolster 
popular morale and discipline. It will serve as a rebuke to those congressmen who 
were itching to make political capital out of the nation's defeat at Pearl Harbor." 

Monthlies dated through January, 1942 including Harpers, Fortune, Atlantic 
Monthly, etc., went to press before the event so contained no comment. This is 
likewise true of those magazines such as the Saturday Evening Post, Liberty, and 
Collier's which are not concerned primarily with last minute news reports. No 
mention of the attack appeared in the Financial Age, December 22, 1941, or the 
Financial World of the same date. 

[61] OFFICIAL UNITED STATES DISPATCHES 

An examination of cable dispatches received at the State Department since the 
Pearl Harbor disaster reveals no pertinent data. No attempt has been made to 
explore the war or Navy Department data as it is assumed that it will be examined 
directly by Justice Roberts' Commission. 

CANADIAN PRESS 

A partial survey of the Canadian press reveals only one reference to the inves- 
tigating commission which appears in the Toronto Daily Star, December 18, 1941 
as follows : 

"The United States has removed its three principal officers in the sea, land and 
air forces at Hawaii so that they may face an investigating tribunal. These men, 
if they offended at all offended by a sin of ommission * * * the British should 
remember that a disaster to Britain not less in seriousness than the disaster to the 
U. S. at Hawaii occurred off the coast of Malaya because of the deliberate, pre- 
meditated action of someone who terribly underrated air power. 

"The American press thinks that the shake-up in the U. S. High Command 
indicates an intention to use air power freely to rectify the adverse situation in the 
Far East." 

[62] No discussion of the subject has taken place in the Canadian Parliament 
which last met November 5, 1941. 

BRITISH PBESS 

This survey has been much limited by the fact that only the very few British 
newspapers which we received by air mail have been available for examination. 

The only reference to the investigating commission found thus far appeared in 
the London Times, December 18, 1941, as follows : 

"The membership of the board which will inquire into the Japanese attack on 
Hawaii is such as to deserve the fullest public confidence. Justice Owen J. Rob- 
erts of the Supreme Court, its chairman, is a man of keen and powerful mind ; 
Major-General Frank McCoy will be remembered for his work in the Far East at 
the time of the Lytton Commission ; Rear-Admiral AVilliam Standley has been 
Chief of Naval Operations : Rear-Admiral Joseph Reeves is a former Commander- 
in-Chief of the U. S. Battle Fleet, and Brigadier-General McNarney is still on 
duty with the Army Air Force." 

Official Reports of the latest House of Commons and House of Lords debates 
include no discussion of the Pearl Harbor attack nor of the President's appoint- 
ment of the investigating commission. 



1304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[63] AUSTEAXIAN PRESS 

No Australian newspapers are available as yet. We have, however, established 
contact with Mr. Alan S. Watt, Secretary of the Australian Legation who has 
been good enough to check through the cabled dispatches to the Legation from 
Australia. He reports that he finds no reflection of Australian opinion about 
the Pearl Harbor investigating commission to date. 

OTHER PARTS OF THE EMPIRE 

Newspapers are not available, and no reflections of opinion have come in from 
other parts of the Empire as yet. 

FOEBTIGN SHORTWAVE BROADCASTS 

The shortwave broadcasts from Germany, Italy and Japan refer to the ap 
pointment of the investigating commission with their usual exaggerated ridicule. 

The German radio asserts that the President, not the Army and Navy ought 
to be investigated, and adds that the impression made on the English was far 
from favorable. Broadcasts from Rome assert that the United States is receiv- 
ing just reward for their ridicule of Japan. The investigation, according to the 
Italians, is simply an admission of incompetence and confusion. 

[6//] Japanese propaganda quotes German commentators as saying that 
through the investigation commission, Admiral Kimmel and General Martin are 
being punished for mistakes made by the Washington administration. "In other 
words, they are being sacrificed so that President Roosevelt and Colonel Knox 
will be able to escape from their responsibility for the Hawaiian disaster." 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL 8UMMART 

This survey was made from the 400 United States newspapers, which are 
reviewed daily by the Press Intelligence Division of the Office of Government 
Reports. 834 clippings discussed the Pearl Harbor disaster. Of these 236 refer 
to the investigating commission. 16 United States magazines and 6 Canadian 
newspapers have also been checked. The only foreign publications available 
were the London Thnes, the Manchester Guardian, and the Ofl^cial Reports of the 
Debates in the House of Commons and House of Lords. Foreign broadcasts 
were taken from transcripts made bv the Federal Communications Oimmission, 
December 19-22, 1941. 



Exhibit No. 4 (Navy, Packet No. 1) Roberts Commission 

The Temperance League of Hawah 

25 Dillingham Building Annex, Telephone 3183 

HONOLULU, HAWAH 

Rev. Paul B. Watbrhousb Chris J. Benny Harold C. Smith 

President Executive Secretary Secretary 

Paul B. Sanbornb William C. Furer 

Vice-Presiden.t Treasurer 

Honolulu Hawaii, Jan. S, 1942. 
Hon. Owen J. Roberts, 

Chairman and Members of the Special Investigating Committee, 
Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Honolulu Haicaii. 
Gentlemen : The Temperance forces of America, Throughout the years, have 
consistently advocated sobriety both in industry and in the military and naval 
services. Failure to be guided in industry by rules of sobriety undeniably results 
in economic losses, but failure by the armed forces of the United States to observe 
a condition of strict alertness and sobriety at a time of unprecedented emergency 
might easily at such a time spell the humiliation of a Nation. 

The timing of the enemy's treacherous blow for 7 :55 on the first Sunday morning 
following pay day was no mere accident. It was based on the well known but 
grim and awful fact that we have only half a navy, half an army, on Saturday 
night and sunday morning. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1305 

Literally thousands of our men of the services, both enlisted and commissioned, 
augmented by like thousands of defense workers were joined in a Saturday night 
whirlwind which, with ever increasing tempo, was bent upon making the 
approaching Christmas Holy Season, the worst and wettest ever seen in Hawaii. 
In the tragic act which befell us, the prophet of old might have visioned the 
hand of a wrathful God stretched forth to stay the impending desecration. 

The American people everywhere are seriously asking for the truth about 
December seventh. The Temperance League of Hawaii is not asking that your 
Commission apply censure or criticism. Regret and grief already exist. But 
we earnestly beseech you to use the opportunity to impress upon the American 
public the seriousness of the present situation ; to awaken them from a state of 
self-complacency and delusion into which they have been lulled by the press, by 
the movie and by the politician and sibove all to bring about a realization of the 
unpleasant yet inevitable fact that every ounce of material and every unit of 
energy must be devoted to the gigntic challenge of winning the war. This task 
cannot be accomplished when millions in money and men will continue to be 
used for a purpose other than the great challenge, — for a purpose which, in fact, 
will hinder and hamper the efforts of iudn.'^try and the efficiency and alertness of 
our military and naval services. 

In view of the gravity of the situation we believe it to be within the sphere of 
your duty and responsibility to urge that alcoholic liquor be immediately barred 
from both navy and army, and from all vital industries. 

This request is prayerfully submitted for your serious consideration. 

Paul B. Waterhouse, 

President. 
Chris J. Benny, 

Executive Secretary. 

Royal Hawahan Hotel. 
Sunday, January 4, 1942. 
Rev. Patjl B. Waterhouse, 

President, The Temperance League of Ilaicaii, 

25 Dillingham Building Annex, Honolulu, Hatcaii. 

Deae Mb. Waterhouse: Mr. Justice Roberts, Chairman of the Investigation 
Committee appointed by the President, and now in Honolulu, has directed me to 
acknowledge your courteous letter to him of January 3rd, also signed by Mr. 
Chris J. Benny, Executive Secretai'y- 

The Commission will hold hearings tomorrow, Monday, January 5th, in Room 
300, in the Royal Hawaiian Hotel. The Chairman, on behalf of the Commission, 
has asked me to invite you and Mr. Benny to appear before the Commission 
tomorrow afternoon between two o'clock and four-thirty, in order that the Cora- 
mission may have the benefit of your testimony about the statements of facts 
in your letter, and perhaps in somewhat more detail. At the same time there 
could be an opportunity to discuss your recommendations. 

The exact time during the afternoon for your suggested appearance is for 
the moment somewhat in doubt, as the Commission will not learn until tomorrow 
morning what time Governor Poindexter will appear in answer to the Commis- 
sion's invitation. I suggest, therefore, that you telephone me tomorrow morning 
at about eleven o'clock, so that a definite hour may be fixed. 

I am assuming that you will be willing to accept this invitation. Should your 
engagements tomorrow afternoon interfere it can probably be made possible to 
receive you on the following day, although the Commission's time in Honolulu 
is necessarily limited. 

I am enclosing a copy of this letter to Mr. Benny for his information. 
Sincerely yours. 
Recorder of the Commission to Investigate the Circumstances of the 

Attack on Pearl Harl)or on December 7, 1941. 



1306 CONGRESSIONAL IN\rESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Exhibit No. 5 (Navy, Packet No. 1) Roberts Commission 

No. 3772 

united states of america 

The National Archives 

To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting: 

I Certify That hereto annexed is a true copy of the document described below, 
which is in the official custody of the Archivist of the United States and is on 
file in The National Archives, to wit : 

Executive order No. 89^3, dated December IS. 1941. 

In testimony whereof, I, Solon J. Buck, Archivist of the United States, have 
hereunto caused the Seal of The National Archives to be affixed and my name 
subscribed by the Administrative Secretary of The National Archives, in the 
District of Columbia, this 24th day of December 1941. 

[seal] Solon J. Buck 

Archivist of the United States 
By Thad Page 
Administrative Secretary. 

Executhe Order 



appointing a commission to investigate the JAPANESE ATTACK OF DECEMBER 

7, 1941, ON HAWAII. 

Pursuant to the authority in me vested by the Constitution of the United 
States, I hereby appoint as a commission to ascertain and report the facts i-elat- 
ing to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii 
on Djcember 7, 1941, the following : 

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts. United States Supreme Court, Chairman ; 

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired; 

Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired ; 

Major General Frank R. McCoy. United States Army, Retired ; 

Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army. 
The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide bases for 
sound decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the 
part of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to such successes 
as were achieved by the enemy on the occasion mentioned, and if so, what these 
derelictions or errors were, and who were responsible therefor. 

The Commission will convene at the call of its Chairman at Washington, D. C, 
will thereafter proceed with its professional and clerical assistants to Honolulu, 
Territory of Hawaii, and any other places it may deem necessary to visit for 
the completion of its inquiry. It will then return to Washington, D. C, and 
submit its report direct to the President of the United States. 

The Commission is empowered to prescribe its own procedure, [2] to 
employ such professional and clerical assistants as it may deem necessary, to fix 
the compensation and allowances of such assistants, to incur all necessary 
expenses for services and supplies, and to direct such travel of members and 
employees at public expense as it may deem necessary in the accomplishment 
of its mission. Each of the members of the Commission and each of its profes- 
sional assistants, including civilian advisers and any Army, Navy, and Marine 
Corps officers so employed, detailed or assigned shall receive payment of his 
actual and necessary expenses for tran.sportation, and in addition and in lieu 
of all other Mllowances for expenses while absent from the place of his residence 
or station in connection with the business of the Commiss'on, a per diem allow- 
ance of twenty-five dollars. All of the expenses of the Commission shall be paid 
by Army disbursing officers from allocations to be made to the War Department 
for that purpose from the Emergency Fund for the President. 

All executive officers and agencies of the United States ai"e directed to furnish 
the Commission such facilities, services, and cooperation as it may request 
■of them from time to time. 

Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
The White House, December 18, 19.'fl. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1307 

Exhibit No. 6 {Navy, Packet No. 1) Egberts Commission 

ND V PM NR 131 23 DEC 41 ;; Z TALK 232036 TORY PP GH 14 BT 

EROM : JAG WASH D. C. 

TO : COM ii 

STANLEY FOR LT COL BROWN X HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 259 

APPROVED TWENTY THREE DECEMBER 



H. J. Res. 259 

Sev'enty-seventh Congress of the United States of America ; At the F^rst 
Session ; Begun and Held at the City of Washington on Friday, the Third 
Day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Forty-one 

joint resolution to authorize the commission appointed by the president to 

conduct an investigation in connection with the attack on HAWAII, TO 

compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and 
documents 

Whereas on December 18, 1941, the President by Executive order appointed 
Owen J. Roberts, William H. Standley, Joseph M. Reeves, Frank R. McCoy, and 
Joseph T. McNarney a commission to ascertain and report the facts relating to 
the attack made by the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 
December 7, 1941 : Therefore be it 

Resolved 1)11 the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assemMed, That (a) the commission appointed by the 
President by Executive order, dated December 18, 1941, to ascertain and report 
the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces upon the 
Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941 (in this Act called the "commission"), 
may, or by one or more of its members or by such agents or agencies as it may 
designate may, prosecute any inquiry necessary to its functions at any place 
within the United States or any place subject to the civil or military jurisdiction 
of the United States. The commission or any member of the commission when 
so authorized by the commission shall have power to issue subpenas requiring the 
attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence that 
relates to any matter under investigation by the commission. The commission 
or any member of the commission or any agent or agency designated by the 
commission for such purpose maj' administer oaths and affirmations, examine 
witnesses, and receive evidence. Such attendance of witnesses and the produc- 
tion of such evidence may be required from any place within the United States 
or any place subject to the civil or military jurisdiction of the United States at 
any designated place of hearing. 

(b) In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpena issued to any person 
under subsection (a), any district court of the United States or the United States 
courts of any Territory or possession, or the District Court of the United States 
for the District of Columbia, witliin the jurisdiction of which the inquiry la 
carried on or within the jurisdiction of which said person guilty of contumacy or 
refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts business, upon application by the 
commission shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring 
such person to appear before the commission, its member, agent, or agency, there 
to produce evidence if so ordered, or there to give testimony touching the matter 
under investigation or in question ; and any failure to obey such order of the court 
may be punished by said court as a contempt thereof. 

(c) Process and papers of the commission, its members, agent, or agency, may 
be served either upon the witness in person or by registered mail or by telegraph 
or by leaving a copy thereof at the residence or principal office or place of business 
of the person required to be served. The verified return by the individual so 
serving the same, setting forth the manner of such service, shall be proof of the 
same, and the return post-office receipt or telegraph receipt therefor when 
registered and mailed or telegraphed as aforesaid shall be proof of service of the 
same. Witnesses summoned before the commission, its members, agent, or 
agency, shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are paid witnesses in the 
courts of the United States, and witnesses whose depositions are taken and the 
persons taking the same shall severall.v be entitled to the same fees as are paid 
for like services in the courts of the United States. 



1308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

((]) No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from pro- 
ducing books, records, correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedi- 
ence to a subpena, on the ground that the testimony or evidence required of 
him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture; 
but no individual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture 
(except demotion or removal from office) for or on account of any transaction, 
mattter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his 
privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that 
that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and 
punishment for perjury committed in so testifying. 

(e) All process of any court to which application may be made under this 
Act may be served in the judicial district wherein the person required to be 
served resides or may be found. 

(f) The several departments and agencies of the Government, when directed 
by the President, shall furnish the commission, upon its request, all records, 
papers, and information in their possession relating to any matter before the 
commission. 



Speaker of the House of Representatives. 



Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate. 



Exhibit No. 7 (Navy, Packet No. 1) Roberts Commission 

FEDE3BAL BUBEATJ OF INVESTIGATION, UNITED STATES DePABTMENT OP JUSTTCB 

206 Dillingham Bldg. 

HONOLTTLU, T. H., January 9, 19^2. 
Personal and Confidential 
Memorandiim to 
Mr. Justice Roberts : 

Mr. Hoover wishes me to inform you he has received information from a 
source heretofore reliable that during the time Admiral Richardson was in 
charge of the Navy at Pearl Harbor he refused to permit the fleet to anchor 
in Pearl Harbor on the ground that the Harbor was unsafe because it was not 
defendable if the fleet should be attacked there. 

Admiral Richardson is reported to have required the fleet always to anchor 
in Lnhaina Roads outside Pearl Harbor and to have advised the Navy De- 
partment that he would resist efforts to have him anchor the fleet in Pearl 
Hnrbor "at the risk of losing his command." 

For your personal and confidential information, the following radiogram was 
sent to the .Tapanese Ambassador at Washington and the Foreign Minister at 
Tokyo, December 6, 1941, by Kita, Japanese Consul General at Honolulu : 

"On the evening of the fifth the BB Wyoming and one sweeper entered port. 

"Ships moored on the sixth are as follows : 

BB-9 
CL-3 
DD-17 
AM-3 

"Ships in dock : 

cr^^ 

DD-2 

(CA and CB all gone) 
"P. S. CB cannot be found in the fieet." 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1309 

Memorandum to 
Mr. Justice Roberts 

January 9, 1942. 

Again for your couficleutial information, the letter symbols in the above message 
is the ofl5cial naval code for their ships : 

BB— battleships 
CL — light cruisers 
DD — destroyers 
AM — minesweepers 
CA — heavy cruisers 
CB — aircraft carriers 

According to my information, the above information is correct and that these 
ships were actually docked or moored at Pearl Harbor on the sixth. 

This office now has information from a Japanese taxi driver that he drove 
a member of the Japanese Conslate to Pearl Harbor Peninsula on December 
6 to look at the fleet in Pearl Harbor, and the foregoing information was un- 
doubtedly obtained by the Consulate member at that time. It is also now known 
that the same Consulate member, who came here March 27, 1941, has been 
engaged in espionage and reporting fleet movements to the Japanese Government 
since that time. 

Again for your confidential information I am quoting a radiogram that was 
sent by Kita, the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu, to the Foreign 
Minister at Tokyo. The date of this message is not known. 

"1. The Army ordered several hundred baloons for training at Camp Davis, 
N. C, on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) tue prac- 
ticability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investi- 
gation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their 
use or any preparations for constructing moorings. No evidence of training 
or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation 
would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with 
operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field and Ford Island. The whole 
anatter seems to have been dropped. 

"2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo 
defense of battleships and will report further." 

Any investigation under Clause 2 of the use of nets for torpedo defense of 
battleships would have necessarily had to be made in Pearl Harbor proper as no 
information could have been secured by visual observations from outside of the 
Harbor as the nets would not have been visible. 

This leads me to the conclusion that from this and the accuracy of fleet 
movements previously reported the Japanese Government through its Consul 
General here has someone right inside Pearl Harbor who is furnishing this 
information and that visual verification of the information reported from the 
inside is made by Japanese Consular Agents from vantage points around Pearl 
Harbor merely as a check on the information furnished by their informant or 
informants on the inside. 

I would appreciate an opportunity to discuss with you personally some phases 
of the situation out here, particularly some of the activities of the FBI in Japa- 
nese espionage matters, as well as the practical effects of the delimitation 
agreement. 

Very sincerely, 

R. L. Shtveks, 
R. L. Shivers. 
Special Agent in Charge. 



1310 COXGRESSIOXAL IXV'ESTIGATIOX PEARL H.AEIEOR ATTACK 

ExHiBrr No. 8 (Xavt Packet No. 1) Roberts Commission 

Dkuxks TtkIsed Oves. to MP & SP 

To : Military Police 

: Co. M 19th Inf. Sch. Brks. 

Arrested at the Service Cafe at 9:30 PM 12-6-41 by Officer T Sato for 

being drunk, staggering 
: Schofield Barracks 

Arrested at Maunakea & Beretania Sts. at 12 : 35 AM 12-7-41 by Officer A 

Lee for being drunk 

To : Shore Patrol 

: S S Dobbin 

Arrested at Nuuanu & Hotel Sts. at 11 : 45 PM 12-6-41 by Officer A Lee for 

being drunk 
: Pearl Harbor 



Arrested at Aala Park by Officer J C Lee at 12 : 30 AM 12-7-41 



Accidents Intolting Sebvice Pebsonnel 

1. Lt., Naval Air Station PH was involved in a minor accident with 

of 3450 Maunalei Ave. at about 8 : 30 PM 12-6-41 somewhere on Ala Wai 

Blvd. Both cars were going straight ahead, no violation indicated. 

2. of 251st. C. A. Camp Malakole was involved in a minor accident 

with of Hawaiian Village at 2:30 PM 12-6-41 on Kam Highway near 

new Pearl Harbor Gate. had been drinking and was tiying to overtake 

's car. took off after accident and information broadcasted. No 

disposition available. 

3. of Co. D 298th. Inf. Scho. Bks. was involved in a $275. accident 

with of House 834 Waipahu at 9 : 50 PM, 12-6-^1 on Kam Highway 

Honolulu side of Waipahu-Schofield junction and was injured, receiving 

an abrasion to left ear, left elbow and back; taken to "Waipahu Hospital and 

later discharged. had been drinking, was trying to make a left turn and 

was on the wrong side of the road. Charged with Sec. 6.01 TC Report No. B-44182 

4. of Co. E, 19th. Inf. Scho. Bks. drove his car off the Kaukonahua Road 

cut-off at Haleiwa at 12 : 00 noon 12-6-41. Damages S15. and none injured. 

■ had been drinking and was charged with Sec. 6281 SL '41. Report No. 

B^4001 

5. , Sgt. of Batt. C. 9Sth. C. A., Scho. Bks. drove off the road on Red Hill 

road about 4: 30 AM 12-6-41 when his car skidded. §125 damages, none injured. 
No disposition noted. No report number. 



Areests and Complaints Involving Service Personnel December 6, 1941 

1. , Co. A. 27th. Inf. Scho. Bks. was arre.sted at 12.47 AM for tamp- 
ering with vehicle belonging to parked at 832 Hauoli St. Charged with 

Attempted Malicious Conversion and defendant turned over to Military Police 
for disposition. Report Xo. E^3S65. 

2. of USS Cassin reported being struck by of Hon. Rapid 

Transit Co. at Alapai and King St. at 1.02 AM when he attempted to stop a 

fight between Mrs. , his companion and . Desired no prosecution. 

Report No. B-43S67. 

3. of USS Rigel, PH was arrested at 9 : 40 PM at Kalakaua & Kuhio 

Ave. for trying to start auto belonging to Detective . Referred to Shore 

Patrol for disposition. Report Xo. B-43976. 

4. 18th. Air Base. Hickam Field was found lying in the toilet in the 

rear of lobby of Army and Xavy TMCA about 8:00 PM with cut on head. 

Treated by Dr. for lacerated wound right post parietal scalp. Strong 

alcoholic breath. Subject did not know what happened to himself. Turned 
over to Military Police for disposition. Report Xo. B^3986. 

5. An unknown sailor was apprehended by the Emergency Hospital attendants 
for tampering with Emergency Hospital ambulance in front of Star Grill, 255 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



1311 



N. King St. 12-7-41 at 12 : 30 AM. Turned over to Shore P?trol for disposition 
before arrival of police officer, therefore, name unavailable. Report No. B-43984. 

6. of Naval Air Base was treated at Emergency Hospital for two 

inch wound on right side of face. He claimed to have been injured 12-7-41 
about 2 : 26 AM when glass from windshield of auto he was riding flew back and 
cut his face when car sideswiped a City and County street sweeper. Report 
B-44033. 

7. 21st. Signal Co. Scho. Bks. claimed to have been short changed 

by taxi driver from the Shamrock Taxi, 12-7-41 at 1 : 45 AM. Gave taxi driver 
$h. and didn't receive any change. Instructed to swear out a warrant but failed 
to do so. Report No. B^4035. 



Police Depaetment 

CITY AND COITN-TY OF HONOLtrLU 

Honolulu, Hawaii 

Jaitoakt 7, 1942. 
Hon. Owen J. Robebts, 

Associate Justice, U. S. Supreme Court, 

Honolulu, T. E. 

Deab Sir : The attached is a report showing complaints and reports received by 
this Department on December 6. 1941, relative to Army and Navy personnel. 

If there is anything further that we can do to assist you in any matter, kindly 
be assured that this Department is at your command. 
Very truly yours, 

W. A. Gabbielson, 
W. A. Gabrielson, 

Chief of Police. 
WAG : DL 
End 



JANUAKT 9, 1942. 

Mr. W. A. Gabrielson. 

Chief of Police, City and Count}/ of Honolulu, 

Honolulu, Hairaii. 

My Deub Mb. Gabkielsox : Mr. Justice Roberts has asked me to acknowledge 
with his thanks your letter of January 7. 1942. enclosing a report showing com- 
plaints and reports received by your Department on December 6, 1941, relative 
to Army and Navy personnel. 
Yours sincerely. 



Secretary, Commission to Investigate the attack on Pearl Harbor. 



Exhibit No. 9 (Navy, Packet No. 1) Robebts Commission 
Population estimates as of July 1, 1940 and July 1, 1941 



Area 


July 1, 1940 


July 1, 1941 


Citv of Honolulu . .. 


180.986 
79,899 
24.S41 
49,222 
465 
35.956 
55.rS5 


200.158 


Citvand rnnnry of Honnlnln (ETf'hisivP ofFTonoliiln niry) 


110.345 


CltyofHilc 


■>•' 667 


Countv of Hawaii (Exclusive of HUo Citv) 


45,731 


Countv of Kalawao . " .- . 


4fi4 


Counrv of Kauai .. . 


33.479 


County of Maui 


52.495 



Total. 



426,654 



465,339 



1312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
Population estimates as of July 1, 1940 and July 1, 1941 — Continued 



Race 


July 1, 1940 


July 1, 1941 


Citizens 


Noncitizens 


Citizens 


Noncitizens 




14, 359 

50, 470 

8,322 

103, 700 

24, 245 

121,312 

4,517 

17, 109 

807 




14, 246 

52,445 

8,460 

139, 299 

24, 886 

124, 351 

4,628 

18, 0.W 

832 


= 14,246 






= 52,445 






= 8,460 




2,681 
4,589 

36, 678 
2,337 

35, 498 
30 


2,328=141,627 


Chinese 


4,351= 29,237 


Japanese .. 


35, 183 = 159, 534 




2,253= 6,881 


Filipino. _ 


34,010= 52,060 


All others -- 


17= 849 








344, 841 


81,813 


387,197 i 78,142=465,339 



Apr. 1, 1940, Census, T. of H., 423,330. 



Exhibit No. 10 (Navy, Packet No. 1) Roberts Commission 

[The Honolulu Advertiser, Honolulu, Hawaii, December 16, 1941] 

Escaped Enemy Pilot Killed by Haw-Oian Pair on Niihau 

JAPANESE FLIEB THREATENED TO KILL ISL\NDB:BS 

A desperate Japanese pilot, forced down on the small, peaceful island of Niihau, 
off Kauai, held the village at bay with machineguu and side arms before he was 
captured and killed by a six-foot Hawaiian and his wife who 'got mad" when the 
enemy pilot shot the Hawaiian three times, according to a radio story broadcast 
by station KTOH, Kauai, last nigiit. 

Relating on of the most thrilling stories of the Pacific war, the narrator told 
how Benjamin Kanahele, powerful Niihau native, and his wife finally brought to 
bay the brutal invader who had threatened to kill everyone in sight. 

GIVEN LIBEETY OF ISLAND 

It was reported that the plane had been forced down on Niihau following the 
Sunday, Dec. 7, raid on Peati Harbor. Natives took the pilot's machineguu and 
side-arms from him and then gave him the liberty of the island. The pilot is 
said to have immediately contacted two Japanese residing on Niihau, Harada and 
Shintani, who on the P"'riday following the landing persuaded the natives to hand 
over the tire-arms including the machineguu. Th'^ tliree Japanese, it was reported, 
thereupon established an armed camp, each standing an eight hour watch to pre- 
vent anyone escaping to bring help from Kauai. 

In spite of this a Hawaiian, named Hauila, stole away and with a group of cow- 
boys rode IS miles across the island through a hail of machinesnn fire and man- 
aged to take off for Kauai in a whaleboat. They reached Waimea 10 hom-s later 
(Saturday morning) after rowing steadily through heavy seas. 

AEMY SQI'AD DISPATCHED 

Hauila's party contacted army authorities on Kauai and Lt. Jack Mizuba and a 
squad from the 299th Infantry returned in the whaleboat to Niihau. 

In the meantime, it was learned, the enemy pilot had sent Shintani out to look 
for Hauila. Failing to locate his quarry, Shintani disappeared into the woods» 
The flier then asked Kanahele to aid him and the remaining Japanese, Harada, 
Kanahele. pretending to agree, set out with them in search of those who were 
missing. During the search, according to Kanahele, Harada became nervous and, 
obtaining a shotgun from the pilot, placed it against his stomach and fired. It 
mis.sed and he fired again, the blast taking effect and killing him instantly. 



b 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1313 

SHOT BY PILOT 

At this moment Kanahele jumped the pilot but the latter was too quick for him 
and shot him three times, once in the shoulder, again in the ribs and finally in the 
groin. 

"Then I got mad," Kanahele said simply. 

He seized the Japanese and tossed him bodily against a stone wall, knocking 
him unconscious. Kanahele's wife, who had been following the party, leaped in 
and finished off the pilot and crushing his skull with a rock, according to the re- 
port. 

Harada's wife and Shintani were captured by Lt. Mizuha's squad and together 
with Kanahele and his wife were brought to Kauai Sunday. 



Exhibit No. 11 (Navy, Packet No. 1) Roberts Commission 

OUTLINE OF PLAN FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR CIVILIAN POPU- 
LATION OP OAHU IN CASE OF BOMBARDMENT 

March 1^5, 1941 

Table of Contents 

Page ' 

I. Mission 1 

IL (Omitted) I 

III. Brief presentation of the measures to be adopted 1 

IV. Organization of the city of Honolulu for emergency 4 

A. City Government 4 

B. Police Department 5 

C. Fire Department 5 

D. Food Supply 6 

E. Water Supplv 7 

F. Other Utilities 8 

V. Air Raids Protection System 9 

A. Basic I'rinciples 9 

B. Organization 10 

C. Duties of the Air Raid Protection Districts 11 

D. Duties in the Air Raid Protection Divisions 12 

E. Damage Control 13 

F. Personnel Control 14 

G. Structural Protection 15 

H. Construction and Design of Air Raid Shelters 16 

VI. Evacuation 18 

A. Persons to be Evacuated 18 

B. Areas to be Evacuated . 19 

C. Disposal of Evacuees__ 19 

D. Estimate of Number of Evacuees „ 21 

E. Disposition of Estimated Evacuees 22 

F. Transportation 23 

Table I 26 

Table II 27 

Table III 28 

Table IV 30 

VII. Utilization of workers 31 

A. Requirements 31 

B. Availability of Labor 32 

C. Distribution of Labor 32 

Table V (Omitted) 
Table VI 
Exhibit 1 
Exhibit 2 
Exhibit B 
Exhibit 4 

' Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and Indicate 
pages of original transcript of proceedings. 



1314 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Index to accompanying paper — Emergency organization for tlie city of Honolulu 

Figure 1. 
Figure 2. 
Figure 3. 
Figure 4. 
Figure 5. 
Figure 6. 
Pamphlet on Design of Bombproof Stmctures. 

[!'} I. Mission 

Any plan for protective measures for the civilian population of Oahu must 
accomplish a two phase mission. It must hrst avert the panic and pandemonium 
that so often accompanies the early stages of civilian bombardment by providing 
for the comparative safety and adequate care of tliose civilians in the area which 
will certainly be subjected to bombardment. Secondly the safety and care must 
be provided in such a manner as to leave available and make available the greatest 
number of these civilians for gainful employment in the defense of the territory. 
The mission must be accomplished with the least effort on the part of the military 
immediately before and at the commencement of hostilities, and must result in the 
gieatest possible assistance to the military as soon after the commencement of 
hostilities as possible. 

III. Brief Presentation of Measures To Be Adopted 

The following in brief are the measures that must be taken, from the stand- 
point of protecting the civilian population and making available a portion of that 
population to assist in the defense, to meet the situation under our discussion of the 
Enemy Force. 

1. The government of the city of Honolulu must be organized for emergency. 
The plans for such an emergency organization must include steps to be taken in 
utilizmg and augmenting the police and fire departments, steps to be taken for the 
protection and maintenance of the water supply, steps for protection, maintenance, 
and augmentation of the food supply, steps for protection and maintenance of other 
utilities and the measures to be taken to protect the securities and provide for the 
uninterrupted functioning of the f.^] necessary financial establishments. 
Preparations mxast also be made for the protection of securities and records of 
the various Government agencies of the city. 

2. An air raid warning and protection system must be organized for protecting 
the property in bombed areas and for the protection of personnel that must 
necessarily remain in or enter areas subjected to bombardment. 

3. Preparation mus:t be made for the evacuation of portions of the population 
from certain areas of Honolulu and with these preparations for their evacuation 
preparations must be made for their disposal so as to be available in the defen«!e. 

4. Finally there must be plans for the procurement and distribution of workers 
to carry out tbei=e protective measures as well as plans for the procurement and 
disti-ibution of those work^s that will be needed directly and indirectly in the 
defense of the territory. 

In the paragraphs that follow these measures will be discussed in detail and 
the steps that have been and are bein? taken will be presented as well as those 
which must be taken in tlie future. Although these measures are di«:cussed under 
tour headings it must be remembered that all are more or less closely related 
and that there must necessarily be some overlapping and repetition especially 
in ♦^I'e cons'df^ration of the procurement and disposition of workers since these 
workers must be procured and distributed for the accomplishment of all measures. 

IV. Okganizatiox of the City of HoxoLt7T.u for Emergency 

A. crrY government 

In .Tulv 1040, the Mayor of Honolulu appointed a General Committee for the 
purpose of initiating a study of an emergency di'saster plan. On Tuly 16. 1040 a 
su'^-onmrn'tfee met and considered an agenda which covers the subject of disaster 

* There are no pages 2 and S. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1315 

in a very thorough manner ; this agenda is attached hereto as Ex- [5] hibit 
1. At present the activities of this committee are at a standstill. The committee 
considers that a full time secretary should be employed to carry on the work 
until the plan is worked out, but the city has not authorized funds for this 
purpose. In spite of its present inadequacy the organization exists and with 
assistance and advice from the military could form the nucleus of an initial 
emergency planning organization. 

B. POLICE DEPABTMENT 

The Honolulu Police Department has prepared a "Provisional Police Plan 
for Emergency Guard Division", the stated purpose of which is to provide 
I)ersonuel to protect all agencies, civil and military, essential to defense and 
not guarded by military forces. This plan, to take effect when directed by 
the Department Commander, organizes four police districts of the Island of 
Oahu into boats covered by a total of 776 special police oflScers. They should 
in this phase, cooperate with and be augmented by the police agencies of the 
towns, communities, and plantations. 

The plans provide for the use of messing and housing facilities of the planta- 
tions. Equipment will consist of riot trucks with radio equipment, pickup 
trucks, and guns and ammunition, the latter to be furnished by the Army. The 
training of special officers who will be needed under this plan is already under 
way and is prescribed by a special police memorandum. There are also being 
conducted at the present time classes for key men of the public utilities com- 
panies with the idea that these men will be trained in anti-sabotage work and 
available to be sworn in as special officers when need arises. It is also con- 
templated that about 300 additional special policemen would be sworn in as 
company guards for the utilities. 

The plan provides that the regular police force of approximately 250 men 
would be used in the city proper, with the force enlarged by some of the special 
officers now being trained. 

C. FIEE DEPABTMENT 

[6] The Fire Department of Honolulu consists of nine engine companies 
with hose wagons, and the personnel consists of approximately 150 men. There 
are two other engine companies, one at Waialua and one at Wiapahu. Reserve 
Equipment consists of only one old engine. The expansion of the department 
to meet unusual fires such as would be expected in air raids would be seriously 
handicapped because of the inability to obtain additional equipment within a 
reasonable time. It would be expected that additional efficiency would have 
to be gained by the utmost use of the available equipment and by increasing 
the personnel so that the present force, which carries no extra reliefs, would 
not be overworked. The plan calls for 300 additional men for this purpose. 

D. FOOD SUPPLY 

The official engaged in the preparation of emergency plans for the Police 
Department of Honolulu reports that the total supply of food available on Oahu 
at any time amounts to about 45 days supply. This official is considering a 
public campaign directed toward having individual families increase their 
personal supply of canned goods until it equals a two weeks supply. This 
official is planning a step in the right direction but it must be made a reality 
rather than a consideration and the requirements boosted to at least a month's 
supply. This matter is of concern to the American Red Cross Representatives 
and to the Chamber of Commerce, and is included in the subjects covered by 
the Mayor's committee. 

Further action should be directed towards : 

1. Increasing stores of canned goods not only in private homes but in ware- 
houses and plantation stores. This has been suggested to the manager of the Oahu 
Sugar Company, who indicated that it was feasable for his plantation. This 
supply should be increased until in emergency w^ith reduced rations the supply 
would last from 4 to 6 months. 

2. Cooi)eration with local producers of food products for export, to the end 
that such production would be increased and utilized here. In [7] this 
respect the Oahu Sugar Company has shipped as many as 4,000 tons of potatoes 

79716 — i6 — Ex. 143, vol. 3 3 



1316 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

to the mainland in one year, and is experimenting with production of other foods. 

3. Encouraging plantations which do not now raise food for export to plan for 
maximum production of food as soon as the emergency arises. 

4. Securing the cooperation of towns and communities in planning for the 
initiation and operation of gardens by residents and by evecuees. 

5. Planning to make available when needed such stores of seed as will be 
necessary to increase the production of foods. 

E. WATER SUPPLY 

The water supply of Honolulu, which is the most vital utility, comes from two 
sources : 

(1) Two pumping stations (Kalihi and Waialae) which pump from under- 
ground sources, and three stations (Kalihi, Beretania, and Kaimuki) which pump 
from artesian wells having heads about ten feet higher than ground level at their 
locations. 

(2) A number of springs and wells in the hills back of the city which supply 
some of the upper residential districts by gravity. This source constitutes about 
15 to 20 per cent of the total supply. 

The capacities of these stations are as follows : 

Million gallons per day 

Kalihi, underground : 14 

Kalihi 14 

Beretania 10 

Kaimuki 10 

Waialae, underground 4 

Total capacity 52 

At the present time these pumping stations are supplying only 18 mil- [S] 
lion gallons per day. There are several small unimportant pumping plants which 
care for certain areas in times of drought. The only reservoirs in the system are 
some equalizing reservoirs. The whole system is interconnected, so that if one 
pumping plant is damaged, others can carry the load. If equalizing reservoirs are 
put out of Commission the work done by them can be done by the pumping stations. 

From the figures given above it may be seen that serious interference with the 
water supply by bombing would be improbable. The flow from the tunnels and 
springs will not be stopped easily by bombing, and they have a big advantage of 
being widely dispensed and inconspicuous targets. The least number of pumping 
stations which would have to be put out to reduce their capacity below 18 million 
gallon, would be three, and it would have to be both Kalihi stations and either 
Beretania or Kaimuki. Even then, the supply would be reduced only from 18 
million gallons to 14 million gallons. The capacity of all firefigliting equipment 
in the city is 13 million gallons per day, continuous operation. Under the reduc- 
tion mentioned above, to 14 million gallons per day, there would be one million 
gallons per day left for the reduced population which would be sufficient for 
drinking and cooking. Sanitary use could be restricted to the periods in which 
all fire fighting equipment was not being used, and the city could thus manage 
with three of the largest pumping stations out of action. Emergency repairs 
would be planned to prevent any part of the system being out of order any 
longer than necessary. 

F. OTHER UTILITIES 

In general, the City Engineer, the Mutual Telephone Company, the Honolulu 
Gas Company, the Honolulu Rapid Transit, the Board of Harbor Commissioners, 
and the banks of Honolulu have made no preparation for emergency other than 
the training of key employees to meet sabotage. After consultation with these 
agencies, estimates have been made and will be given under Utilization of Work- 
ers, of the number of additional workers required by the utilities to [9] 
meet expected conditions. 

An examination of the plans of the vaults of the two principal banks of the city 
disclosed that the vaults of one have overhead and side protection of 18 inches of 
reinforced concrete, and the protection of the others are doubtful because of the 
incompleteness of the plans. It is thought that all vault walls and ceilings of 
these two banks are 18 inches of reinforced concrete. This protection is not 
sufiicient to resist bombs of the sizes which may be expected, and the banks should 
plan to increase their protection in accordance with antibombardment require- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1317 

ments if possible. These two banks carry on hand about five million dollars in 
cash, and it is stated that this amount is needed for money requirements of the 
city in normal operation. However in emergency conditions they could function 
with a reduced amount of cash. 

If they feel they cannot afford to bombproof their vaults they should be 
required to construct depositories in secluded mountain areas, where natural 
bombproof cover can be utilized by tunneling, instead of construction costly 
artificial protection. Here they might have available in time of emergency a 
place of protection for their securities and that portion of the cash on hand 
not needed for their emergency functions. In a like manner preparations must 
be made to provide for the safety of securities and permanent public records 
for which the various governmental agencies of the city are responsible. 

V. Atk Raids Protection System 

A. BASIC PRXNCIPLES 

There are certain basic principles upon which the organization of an air 
raids protection system must be founded : 

1. Decentralization : All activities, to protect the population from the effects 
of air bombardment must be decentralized. 

2. Voluntary participation : In so far as possible all Executives, and workers 
of the air raids protection system must be volunteer workers. The cost of 
providing an organization to protect the populace is tremendous [iO] and 
since it is the individual that receives the protection it must be in so far as 
practicable the individual that bears the cost. 

3. Individual participation: Since the exact point of damage cannot be fore- 
cast and is equally liable to occur in any portion of the districts and divisions 
into which we propose to have the organization divided, it is essential that each 
inhabitant participate in the protective system. 

B. OEGANIZATION 

The administration and organization of the air raids protective system in the 
Hawaiian Department will be a civilian function. The chief executive of the 
system will be appointed by the Governor of the Territory and will be allowed 
such assistants as are necessary. 

A chart showing a typical formation of an air raids protection system Is 
attached hereto as exhibit (2). Reference to this chart shows that a central 
agency for the control of the air raids protection system for the city of Honolulu 
is established directly under the control of the Mayor. This plan or modifica- 
tion of it would be applicable for the entire island. Under this central admin- 
istrative unit are set up various Divisions on the island. In Honolulu these 
divisions correspond to the police districts, while in the outlying portions of the 
island they follow general geogi-aphic divisions which are indicated on Exhibit 3. 
In each division there are organized one or more protective districts, which in 
Honolulu correspond to the police beats of the city, and in outlying portions to 
geogi-aphical divisions such as towns, plantation camps, etc. Each of these dis- 
tricts is supervised by a district administration. 

In the following paragraphs will be given certain duties for which the dis- 
tricts and divisions nmst be responsible and certain facilities for which they 
must provide, together with measures discussed under the headings: Personnel 
Control, Damiage control, Structural Protection, and. Design of Air Raid Shelters. 
The latter have been so discussed for they are measures for which both divisions 
and districts are responsible and have been [11] grouped under these 
headings only to clarify presentation, 

C. DUTIES IN THE AIR RAIDS PROTECTION DISTRICTS 

Each air raids protection district will have facilities and plans for the fol- 
lowing. 

(1) Doctor, nurse teams. These plans will provide not only for doctor, nurse 
teams at first-aid stations but also for mobile units with improvised ambulances 
for the treating of those people who cannot be taken to the first-aid stations. 

(2) Rescue Squads. Pensonel of these rescue squads will be taken from 
among people who are experienced in the construction industry if possible. It 



1318 COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

is known that one of the greatest sources of danger is from injuries received from 
flying debris or collapsing buildings. The rescue squads must be prepared to 
rescue people trapped in buildings or whose shelters are buried under debris. 
Personnel of these squads must be trained in the construction business in order 
that they may know how to wreck damaged buildings without causing further 
damage. 

(3) First-aid stations will be established for the prompt treatment of casual- 
ties from air bombardment in preparation for the evacuation of these casualties 
to previously selected hospitals. 

(4) Collecting stations will be established for casuals, separated families and 
lost children. The establishment of these collecting stations and particuarly to 
an information center in connection with them will do much to reduce possible 
panic from an air-raid. 

(5) Emergency traffic control will be estabUshed by each air raid protection 
district to route traffic away from blocked streets, to establish one-way streets 
and to re-route traffic away from danger areas. In this emergency traffic con- 
trol priorities must be given to the dispatch of emergency vehicles such as fire 
engines and ambulances. 

(6) The district will exercise supervision over black-outs and other [12] 
passive anti-bombardment measures. 

(7) Alarm signals. Districts will have facilities when notified of the im- 
minence of an air raid to sound air raid alarms and also to sound all clear 
alarms after conclusion of the air raid. To avoid confusion the type of signal 
used for the air raid must be materially different from that used for the all clear. 

(S) Special watchmen and guards must be provided in air raid districts to pre- 
vent looting, 

D. DUTIES IN ATtt RATn PBOTECnVE DIVISIONS 

The organization in each air raids protection division will have facilities for 
the following. 

(1) Prompt and easy communication from the division main office to each 
air raid district. Because of the probability of disruption of the normal facili- 
ties for communication, the communication system set up by the division wiU 
include emergency messenger service by motorcyclists or automobile messengers. 

(2) Each division will establish emergency hospitalization centers. These 
centers will so far as possible be established in existing hospitals, The division 
will also establish ambulance facilities to collect air raid casualties from the dis- 
trict first-aid stations and rapidly move them to emergency hospital centers. 

(3) In each division damage control organizations will be set up. These 
will act through liaison with the regularly established facilities such as the fire 
department, the police department and the maintenance systems of public utili- 
ties. The damage control officers in each division will upon receipt from an air 
raid district of a report of damage promptly report it to the maintenance agency 
responsible. The regularly constituted Fire department, the water system, and 
all major utilities. Personnel responsible for this liaison should be regularly 
employed personnel of the public utility or department with which liaison is 
established. 

[13] (4) Each air division will maintain gas decontamination squads for 
the inspection and decontamination of areas in which gas is supposed to have 
been used. These decontamination squads will be provided with special tools 
and with protective clothing. 

(5) Each air raid division will previously select and hold available an oi)en 
area in the division to which the population may be evacuated in the event that 
their ordinary place of living is in danger from fire or other effects of the air 
bombardment. In considering these evacuation points, they should not be thought 
of as places to which the population will be evacuated to avoid an air raid. They 
should be considered, however, as safe places to which the population can be 
evacuated in the event their normal place of living is rendered unsafe. Each 
evacuation point shall be provided with air raid shelters, water supplies, toilet 
facilities, recreational facilities and other items necessary for the people who are 
brought to them from danger areas. 

(6) Each air raid division will establish liaison with the police department on 
traffic control. In the event of blocking of any major highway or street a prompt 
report will be made to the police department that the traffic may be re-routed. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1319 

B. DAMAGE CONTROL 

It must be recognized that in an air raid witli intensive bombardment the dam- 
age caused is such that the regularly constituted agencies of the civilian govern- 
ment such as the fire department, the police department and the maintenance 
forces of various utilities are unable to cope with the situation. For this reason 
the prompt cooperation of every inhabitant will be necessary to minimize and 
localize damage from aerial bombardment. Therefore, the damage control phase 
of the air raids protection system must be based on the following principles : 

a. The regularly constituted fire department will be used for [i^] major 
fires only. 

b. The regularly constituted police department will be used for emergency traffic 
control and regular police work only. 

c. Provision must be made for the prompt reporting to the water, gas, and fire 
companies of location of breaks in lines to permit by-passing these breaks. 

d. Provisions must be made in each district and division for the reinforcement 
of the fire department in event of large fires. 

e. Provisions must be made for a publicity system to warn the inhabitants of 
bad water, gassed areas, dangerous structures, live wires, and like hazards. 

f. The problem of individual damage control is extremely important and every 
effort must be made by the individual which might result in not only saving his 
own pi'operty, but also localizing damage. Each individual residence or business 
should be required to provide themselves if able, and if unable should be pro- 
vided with fire extinguishing apparatus, such as garden hoses with sprinkler 
attachments, hand pumps, extinguishers, buckets of sand, and instruments for 
the handling of incendiary bombs. They should in addition be provided with 
axes, wrecking bars, shovels, hammers, and saws for use if their buildings are 
damaged. 

F. PEBSONNEL CONTKOL 

Provision must be made for the control of personnel in order to minimize the 
effect of disruption and panic of the inhabitants from an air raid. Checking to 
see that the provisions are made is a responsibility of both district and division. 
These provisions should include the following. 

a. Identification tags. Each person should be required to wear suitable identi- 
fication tags showing his name and address. 

b. Clothing of small children should be marked with their name and address in 
such a way that the child's parents can be easily located. 

c. An educational campaign should be carried on to teach the individual 
[15] inhabitants air raid discipline. This educational campaign should cover 
what to do when the air raid siren sounds, protective measures which can be 
taken in the individual home to minimize the damage from fire, instructions as to 
the location of the nearest first-aid station, instructions on how to report damage 
and instructions on where to go for information. 

d. The use of the streets should be restricted and the general public should 
be prohibited from using them during or immediately after an air raid. 

e. The use of the telephone should be restricted and the general public should 
be prohibited from using them during an air raid or for some time thereafter. 

f. The public should be taught where the headquarters of each air raid dis- 
trict is and where the collecting points will be established for each air raid 
district, so that missing i)ersons can be located. 

g. Each household or individual business should be instructed as to the point 
to which it will go in the event of danger at its regular location. These in- 
structions will cover the location of the evacuation area for their air raid dis- 
trict ; the method of transmitting instructions for the evacuation ; the routes 
from their home or ordinary place to the evacuation area and such special pro- 
visions as are applicable to each evacuation area. 

G. STEtrCTUBAL PKOTECTION 

The provision of structural protection will be based upon the following prin- 
ciples : 

a. With the exception of certain areas which will be determine in Tvdvance, 
the civilian population will be provided with shelters at their regular place of 
residence or business. 



1320 COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

b. Since it is economically impossible to provide bomb-proof shelters, the 
maximum shelter to be provided will be that which will give protection 
[16] against splinters and blast from a 500 lb. bomb falling about 50 feet 
from the shelter. 

c. Stores, garages and similar businesses will provide shelters for their em- 
ployees and customers. 

d. Structural protection will be provided for the protection of vital installa- 
tions, not personnel, such as telephone exchanges, power plants, gas works, 
transformer stations and other installations, the continued operation of which is 
essential. 

f. Public shelters will be provided in parks, vacant lots and other locations 
in areas where large numbers of people congregate and where they will be away 
from their family or business type of shelter. Public shelters wiU also be pro- 
vided in the evacuation area for each air raid protection division. 

g. The cost of providing family shelters will be borne by the individuals. 
The cost of providing shelters in businesses will be borne by the business. 
Cost of providing public personnel shelters and the protection for vital installa- 
tions will be borne by the community. 

h. Each public or business air raid shelter will be provided with water stor- 
age, tools, first aid supplies, toilet facilities, reading matter, and other recrea- 
tional facilities for the use of the people in the shelter. Individual shelters 
will be provided with such articles as the family desires, which include first 
aid supplies, water supplies, tools and recreational facilities for the use of the 
family while it is in the shelter. 

H. CONSTBUCTION AND DESIGN OF AIB RAID SHELTERS 

In construction, design, and location of shelters the following principles will 
be followed : 

a. The individual members of the population will be instructed on how to 
build air raid shelters and where to locate them through use of [17] 
Chamber of Commerce, other Civic organizations, and through a newspaper 
campaign using all the newspapers on the island. This campaign will consist 
of articles on how and where to build shelters, simple construction drawings, 
pictures of shelters, bill of materials, types of materials to use, and methods 
of building the shelter. 

b. Local engineers and contractors will assist in the provision of air raid 
shelters. One of these will be appointed as a consultant in each air raid dis- 
trict and will be supervised by an executive in charge of air raid shelter con- 
struction in each division. The district consultants will be instructed by means 
of classes, pamphlets and other methods on their duties. The air raid shelter 
consultant in each district will be available to the inhabitants at districts for 
consultation. He will also inspect shelter location and make suggestions for 
the improvement of these shelters. 

c. For shelters in stores, garages and similar businesses, civilian engineers 
competent to design will be selected. These civilian engineers will be given 
si)ecial instructions on the principles of design of air raid shelters and a list 
of approved engineers will be published for the information of business owner.s. 
Designs for shelters of this type will be approved by the city building department. 

d. The public shelters in parks and in the evacuation areas will be designed by 
the city engineer and will be built through his office. Protection of installa- 
tions such as telephone exchanges, power plants, etc., will be designed by the 
engineers of the companies concerned. They will be furnished with all available 
material to assist in these designs. 

e. As in the control of air raid damage the enthusiastic participation by each 
individual will be necessary in the construction of air raid shelters. A competi- 
tive spirit in building these shelters should be aroused. Publicity compaigns 
should be arranged and prizes should be offered to the public for participation 
in the air raid shelter program, with suitable recognition for those individuals who 
solved their shelter program [IS] in an outstanding manner. This pub- 
licity campaign can very well be handled by the Chamber of Commerce which has 
experience in similar campaigns. It will consist of slogans and other ideas similar 
to "Clean up Week", window decorations contests, etc., which are ordinarily 
handled by the Chamber of Commerce. 

Information as to the structural requirements of air raid shelters will come 
from the office of the Department Engineer. It will be the duty of that office 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1321 

to prepare this information in a form for instructing civilian engineers and for 
dsitribution to civilian agencies such as the Chamber of Commerce and other 
civic organizations and for publishing in a newspaper campaign for the individual 
members of the population. 

As stated in paragraph 4, the air raids protection system is primarily a civilian 
organization and not military. However, the Department Commander will select 
an individual to whom the civilians can turn for encouragement, assistance, and 
advice. 

VI Evacuation 

A. PEKSONS TO BE EIVACUATED 

In general those persons who can serve the defense by remaining in Honolulu 
should remain and all others in danger areas should be removed. Tliere will be 
two classes of evacuees : those who will voluntarily or with slight persuasion 
leave, and those who must be forced to leave. There will be in the first class the 
families of military and naval personnel, transients, and residents who are will- 
ing and able to go to the mainland, to other islands, or to rural areas and who 
are not needed in the defense. Persons who cannot be used in any manner in 
the defense and who are unwilling to leave Honolulu, and persons who are un- 
willing to leave Honolulu, but who can be used directly or indirectly in the 
defense constitute the second class. In addition to these, certain woi'kers will be 
removed to sites near their defense work but their removal will be accomplished 
as part of the organization for defense and not as evacuation. 

[19] P ABEAS TO BE EVACXTATED 

These may be determined by a consideration of possible enemy objectives and 
by foreseeing the effect of bombs landing in areas which may not be logical ob- 
jectives but in which damage might be such as to produce unusual casualties 
and possible panic. Areas contiguous to pos^ble objectives listed under Enemy 
Force, and overcrowded residential sections should be evacuated. These are 
shown cross-hatched in red on the attached map (Exhibit 4) and are marked from 
1 to 4, according to priority. 

C. DISPOSAX OF EVACUEES 

There are four possible destinations for persons removed from the dang^ir 
areas : the mainland, other islands of the territory, rural districts of Oahu, and 
sparsely occupied districts of Honolulu. In the distribution of evacuees to these 
possible destinations the following plan should be followed. 

The families of army and navy personnel plus transients and residents who 
would be a burden in the defense and who are willing and able to go should be 
evacuated to the mainland if time and facilities are available. 

The remaining evacuees should be so distributed among other islands, rural 
Oahu, and sparsely occupied districts of Honolulu so that each area receive a 
just portion, due consideration being given their need for pei-sons willing and 
able to assist in defensive work and their ability tc provide for those who are 
unwilling or unable to assist in the defense. 

It is to be noted the certain of those classed as tmwilling to assist in the 
defense are those who are sympathetic with the enemy cause and would if 
properly guarded, stimulated by disciplinary measures, and supervised, be of 
assistance in the defense. These and others of the same caliber not from 
evacuated areas must be considered and provision made for their utilization in 
the plans for disposition of evacuees. 

Since in any case the greater percentage of the evacuees, and in case of lack 
of facilities and time all of the evacuees must be sent to the last two [20] 
destinations mentioned above the plan which follows will cover evacuation only 
to those destinations other than the mainland. 

Since recent warfare has shown that an enemy cannot be counted upon to re- 
frain from bombing large gatherings of civilians simply because they are not 
engaged in military activity a certain amount of dispersion will be necessary 
in the disposal of evacuees especially on the island of Oahu. However once they 
are out of dangerous and congested areas of the city and have acquired the 
habit of adopting such simple expedients as digging narrow trenches or merely 



1322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

assuming a prone position the magnitude of peril will be greatly reduced without 
elaborate plans for dispersion being necessary. 

As the evacuation may last for some time, the principle requirements of an 
ordinary place of residence will be necessary at all of the proposed destinations. 

In making dispositions so as to secure the approximate requisites of an 
ordinary residence the problem will be greatly facilitated if the evacuees are in 
a communal sense superimposed upon the existing communities. Such a disposi- 
tion will call for the full utilization and augmentation of the facilities that 
exist in the sparsely occupied portions of Honolulu, in the small communities, and 
in the camps. For example, older and more trustworthy residents of the evacu- 
ated areas would double up with residents in sparsely inhabited residential areas 
of Honolulu. Shelter for others would be provided in schools, halls, unused plan- 
tation buildings, by doubling up families, by available surplus army tentage if 
necessary. 

As a specific example, the possibilities in the use of plantation facilities for the 
housing of evacuees and for organizing units to produce foodstuffs may be judged 
by the information furnished by the manager of the Oahu Sugar Company. The 
manager estimated that the plantation would have no trouble in assimilating a 
number of evacuees equal to the present number of workers. These could be 
housed as follows : 

PfifSOtlS 

3 Clubhouses 500 

1 Skating rink 300 

1096 Dwellings ^ 2200 

Total 3000 

' (2 additional per house.) 

[211 The water supply of the plantation comes from two sources, the 
Waiahole tunnel through the Koolau Range and from eleven wells and pumping 
plants scattered within a radius of five miles from the plantation. The Waiahole 
tunnel supplies an average of 28,000,000 gallons per day, and the pumping plants 
have a total capacity of about 100,000,000 gallons per day. It would be extremely 
unlikely that sufficient sources of water could be destroyed to cause shortage at 
the plantation. Sanitary facilities would have to be installed for the skating 
rink, but are otherwise available. In addition to housing facilities available, the 
plantation is engaged in the production of potatoes and other vegetables. This 
activity should be expanded so as to employ evacuees and furnish food for 
general use. 

D. ESTIMATE OF NUMBER OF EVACUEES 

Using the figures furnished by the census officials, the 1940 population of the 
areas to be evacuated was found to be as follows : 

Area 1 38, 000 

Area 2 21, 300 

Area 3 7, 300 

Area 4 19, 400 

Total 86,000 

According to the United States Employment bureau, the percentage of the popu- 
lation of Honolulu which may be considered as gainfully employed is approxi- 
mately 30%. In time of emergency this figure may run a little higher due to 
damage control and other organizations making their call for labor but for the 
purpose of estimating the number of evacuees we are on the safe side using 30% 
which would leave about 26,000 workers residing in the areas to be evacuated. 
These workers would also have to be considered and provisions made for them. 
If they are not sent out of the city, they would be housed in relatively safe local- 
ities, and organized for the defense. In either case, they will be considered under 
the plan for housing workers described later. Deduction of the number of useful 
workers from the total leaves approximately [221 60,000 persons who 
must be evacuated. Of these it is estimated that probably 5,000 will automatically 
evacuate through the removal of the dependents of service personnel and the 
departure of transients and residents who will go through their own volition, 
leaving about 5,000 to be subjected to forced evacuation. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1323 

E. DISPOSITION OF ESTIMATED EVACUEES 

The quartering of exvacuees on Oahu must be considered in connection witli 
the quartering of the emergency workers who will be used on defense construc- 
tion and utility repair. The workers must have preference. The following 
facilities will be used for the purpose : 

(a) Doubling up in private homes. 

(b) Public buildings, particularly schools. 

(c) Plantation housing. 

(d) Army tentage. 

(a) and (b) will be used for those persons evacuated to the outlying sections 
of Honolulu, (b) and (c) will be used for persons exacuated to rural Oahu 
and to the other islands, (b), (c), and (d) will be used for emergency workers. 
Using figures for school capacities and plantation populations (workers only), 
for 1938, the latest available, it is found that the capacities for schools outside 
of Honolulu totalled 42,483 pupils and the worker population of the plantations 
amounted to 44,625 workers. Considering that each plantation could take in 
a number of evacuees equal to its present number of workers, all evacuees out- 
side of Honolulu could be provided for in this manner. If each school can house 
a number of persons equal to half the number of pupils being accommodated, 
about 22,000 persons can be housed in this manner. Although the plantations 
can probably care for evacuees more easily by expansion of their present facilities, 
and this method will be best suited to organization of workers in the produc- 
tion of necessary foods, it will perhaps be better not to burden them with the 
whole number of evacuees. Table II gives tentative lists of quotas for the 
various plantations and towns outside of Honolulu based upon [23] their 
capacities, location, and general suitability for the purpose. The information 
received from the Oahu Sugar Company has been considered with special appli- 
cation to other plantations. Table I gives tentative assignments of persons to 
buildings in Honolulu. All figures are exclusive of figures for quartering of 
workers as given in Table V and Table VI. 

The general distribution of evacuees will be as follows : 

Honolulu, outlying sections 20, 000 

Rural Oahu 11, 400 

Hawaii 10,600 

Maui 6, 500 

Kauai 5,000 

Molokai 800 

Lauai 700 

Total 55,000 

F. TEANSPOETATION 

The transportation of persons from Honolulu to other islands of the Territory 
will require marine transportation, and the removal of the remainder of the 
evacuees to rural Oahu will require trucks and busses. There are available the 
following shipping : 

(a) Inter-Island Steamship Company — 6 steamers, 5 barges, 1 tug. 

(b) Youngs Brother Company — 6 barges, 3 tugs. 

(c) Army and Navy — tugs as available. 

(d) Other sources — possibly Matson and other steamships. 

The capacity for emergency trips of the steamers of the Inter-Island Company 
as given by the Vice-President is given in Table IV, and the total is 4,200 per- 
sons. These steamers could make at least one trip per 24 hours. Young Brothers 
Company has used barges in transporting passengers between the islands and 
the president of the company estimates that if necessary 300 people could be 
carried on one barge 175' x 45', which would make 3,300 persons for the eleven 
barges available. More tugs than are available from Young [2-'/] Brothers 
and Inter-Island S. S. Company, might be necessary, and these should be fur- 
nished by the Army and Navy. This equipment could carry 7,500 persons, and 
30,000 evacuees could be removed in four days. Should transoceanic ships be 
available, the time of removal could be speeded, or the use of barges could be 
dispensed with. 



1324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

For the transportation of persons on Oahu a report of the number of taxable 
vehicles for Oahu as of June 30, 1940 gives the following information : 

Passenger vehicles 40,240 

Trucks 6,404 

Tractors & ton trucks 166 

Busses 197 

Patrons, hearses, & ambulances 17 

It is reasonable to assume from these figures which do not include the tax 
exempt government vehicles that there would be sufficient transportation to move 
the evacuees in a reasonable length of time. 

F. EESPONSIBrLITY FOPw EVACTTATTON 

A military agency designated by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian 
Department would be responsible for the evacuation. To secure effective results 
it will be necessary to obtain cooperation of the civil government before and 
during the period of the emergency, and to have the civil organization carry out 
the plan under the Hawaiian Department. The civil government organization 
must be prepared to provide for : 

1. Methods to be used to secure voluntary evacuation, such as radio, news- 
papers, etc. 

2. Procurement of workers for operation of defense and evacuation plans. 

3. Assignment of quotas of evacuees to various islands, communities, and 
plantations. 

4. Assignment and transportation of individuals to destinations. 

5. Arrangements with County Supervisors, town officials, and [25] plan- 
tation managers as to responsibility for definite numbers of persons in definite 
communities. 

6. Civil police assistance in requiring evacuation. 

7. Food supply. 

[26] Table I — Honolulu housing of evacuees 

U umber 

University of Hawaii 1500 

St. Louis College 1000 

Punahou School 600 

Roosevelt School 600 

Kamehameha (new) 500 

Kawananakoa 50O 

lolani 500 

Mary Knoll 400 

Palolo 200 

Manoa 200 

Teachers College 150 

Kalihi Ika 150 

Mid-Pacific Institute 100 

Total 7800 

Doubling up in private homes 12,200 

Total 20,000 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



1325 



[27] 



Table II. — Rural Oahu housing of evacuees 



Plantations 



Houses 



Evacuees 



California Packing Company... 

Ewa Plantation Company 

Hawaiian Pineapple; Company. 
Honolulu Plantation Company. 
*Ka!iuku Plantation Company... 

Libby McNeill & Libby 

Oahu Sugar Company 

Waialua Agriculture Company.. 

Waianae Sugar Company 

Wiamanalo Sugar Company 



185 


400 


792 


720 


683 


300 


606 




529 


1200 


200 


400 


1096 


3000 


976 


2100 


186 


300 


218 


500 



Total. 



8920 



*To be supplied with Army or Navy tentage. 



Towns 


School 
Bldgs. 


Evacuees 


Ewa 


18 

12 

11 

8 

8 

5 

9 

40 

13 


360 


Kahuku 


240 


Heeia 


220 


Hauula... 


160 


Kaauwua... . 


160 


Kaneohe . . 


100 


Laie 


180 


Waialua 


800 


Waianae . 


260 








Total 




2480 










Grand Total ..J.. 




11,400 









[28] 



Table III. — Outside Islands Housmg of Evacuees 

ISLAND OF HAWAII 



Houses 



Evacuees 



Hakalau Plantation Company 

Hamakua Mill Company 

Hawaiian Sugar Company 

Hilo Sugar Company 

Honokaa Sugar Company... 

Honomu Sugar Company 

Kaiaiki Sugar Company 

Hutchinson Plantation Company 

Kohala Sugar Company 

Laupahoahoe Sugar Company 

Olaa Sugar Company 

Onomea Sugar Company 

Paauhau Sugar Plantation Company. 

Pepeakeo Sugar Company 

Waiakea Mill Company 



369 
355 
525 
681 
657 
266 
198 
303 
703 
314 
624 
458 
266 
333 
266 



Total. 



630 
630 
900 

1,100 
950 
460 
340 
510 

1,200 
550 

1,060 
780 
460 
570 
460 

10,600 



1326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
Table III. — Outside Islands Housing of Evacuees — (Continued 

ISLAND OF MAUI 



Houses 



Evacuees 



Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Company. 

Kaeleku Sugar Company 

Maui Agriculture Company 

Pioneer Mill Company... 

Wailuku Sugar Company 

Baldwin Packers 

Maui Pineapple Company 

Libby, McNeill & Libby 



1,545 


2,000 


245 


320 


1,213 


1,600 


1,035 


1,340 


419 


540 


100 


200 


195 


400 


49 


100 



Total. 



6,500 



129] 



ISLAND OF KAUAI 



Grove Farm Ltd 


333 

650 

508 

221 

378 

1092 

756 

77 

62 

42 

115 


390 


Hawaiian Sugar Company 


760 


Kekaha Sugar Company 


600 


Kilauea Plantation Company 


260 


Kolea Sugar Company... 


460 


Lihue Plantation Company 


1280 


McBryde Plantation Company.. 


890 


Waimea Sugar Company 


100 


Libby, McNeill & Libby 


70 


Hawaiian Caimeries 


50 


Kauai Pineapple Company 


150 






Total 




5,000 








California Packing Company 


68 


120 


Molokai Ranch Company 


80 






Total 




200 








Hawaiian Pineapple Company 


621 


1,300 






Total 




1,300 









» Hall. 

Note. — No assignments are made to schools on the Island of Hawaii, Maui, Kauai, Molokai and Lanai 
as it is assumed that normal conditions will not be disrupted sufficiently to make schools available. 



[50] 



Table IV. — Data on Inter-Island Ships 





Gross 
tonnage 


Length 


Beam 


State- 
rooms 


Cabin 
passen- 
gers 


Total 
passen- 
gers 


Total 
passen- 
gers and 

crew 


Emer- 
gency 
capacity 


Haleakala 


3679 
3088 
3092 
1338 
961 
851 


360. 6' 
310' 
310' 
240. 6' 
210. 7' 
190' 


46' 

48.1' 

48.1' 

36.1' 

38' 

36' 


111 
73 
71 
46 
17 
13 


314 
210 
205 
138 
50 
39 


410 
432 
436 
234 
115 
84 


560 
503 
500 
302 
165 
132 


1000 


Hualalai... 


1000 


Waialeale. 


1000 


Kilauea 


600 


Humuula 


300 


Hawaii... 


300 







[5i] 



VII. Utilization of Woekees 
a. bequirements 



Upon the opening of hostilities a considerable number of workers will be 
needed in certain areas for : 

( a ) Construction of defense works. 

(b) Increased activity in the operation of military and civil supply functions. 
When bombing becomes intense and sustained additional workers will be 

needed for : 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



1327 



(c) Repair of damage to military and naval installations. 

(d) Repair of damage to necessary civil installations. 

(e) An organization charged with evacuation of civilians, feeding and clothing 
of evacuees, air raid warnings, care of wounded, construction of shelter for 
civilians, private damage control, and salvage. 

Probaile loorkers needed in emergency 



Present 



Additional 



Total 



Army and Navy 

Police Department 

Fire Department 

Docks and Harbor 

City Engineer 

Water Worlds 

Hawaiian Electric Company 

Telephone Company. 

Gas Company 

Emergency Evacuation and Air Raid Organization. 



250 
150 
850 
600 
250 
900 
300 
110 



14, 250 

900 

300 

1,000 

1,000 

200 

1,000 

500 

200 

500 



1 14, 250 

1,150 

450 

1,850 

1,600 

450 

1,900 

800 

310 

500 



Total. 



' 3, 410 



19, 850 



1 23, 260 



• Exclusive of present Army and Navy employment. 



[3.2] 



B. AVAILABnJTT OF LABOR 



With an estimate of almost 20,000 additional workers that will be needed 
for defense and civil activities it is pertinent to consider where they may be 
obtained. At the present time there is no great supply of unemployed labor in 
the Territory. In fact, it has been found necessary to bring many workers from 
the mainland to man the defense projects now in operation. Three sources of 
workers may be considered : 

(a) The Work Projects Administration. 

(b) Workers now employed whose services will not be needed once an emer- 
gency is in effect. 

(c) Workers who could be released from their normal employment and replaced 
by women. 

With reference to the possible sources of labor listed above, the first source, 
W. P. A., labor can be used on defense without delay, but will result in little net 
gain. At the present time there are only 794 W. P. A., workers on Oahu, of which 
624 are already working for the Army and Navy, leaving a possible net increase 
of 170. The bulk of the workers will have to be considered available only through 
the disruption of normal activities and elimination of unnecessary activities. 
The organization of the community for bombardment will thus have to provide 
for the department responsible for the utilization of manpower in defense. 

C. DISTEIBUTION OF LABOR 



The labor requirements have been broken down into localities in which labor 
units will be needed. It is proposed to locate the Navy Yard workers at Aiea, 
and if the Navy can not provide for them, to use plantation buildings. At 
Schofield Barracks workers will occupy barracks vacated by troops who will be 
in their field positions. In the plantation camps and towns, plantation and 
municipal facilities will be expanded to provide for the workers as they will be 
expanded to provide for non-effective [33] ^ evacuees. In the city of 
Honolulu it will be desirable, if not absolutely necessary, to quarter workers 
together so as to control them effectively and have them available for work when 
needed. Table VI gives a list of possible buildings in which these workers can 
be quartered. 

' (Page 34 (table V) omitted in revision.) 



1328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[S5] Tabie VI. — Quartering of Emergency labor for Use in Honolulu 

Men 

1. Jefferson School 400 

2. Ala Moana Park Pavilion 200 

3. McKinley High School 2, 000 

4. R. L. Stevenson School 700 

5. Army & Navy Y. M. C. A 150 

6. Y. M. C. A 150 

7. Farrington High School 1, 000 

8. Old Kamehameha Boys School 500 

9. F. H. A. Homes 500 

Total 5, 600 

136] Specific and detailed instructions for various agencies and organiza- 
tions recommended in this plan have been prepared and will accompany this 
paper. Sketches, diagrams, and maps containing information relative to other 
recommendations contained herein are being prepared at present and will be 
available. 

A map is available giving the number and nationality of all persons, the number 
of houses, and plantation owners for the entire ai'ea between the Koolau range 
and the Waianae Mountains. This map was completed May 13, 1940, and will 
be of great value in the final detailed disposition of evacuees. It is recommended 
that the data on this map be secured for the remainder of the Island. 



[i] Agenda fob Sub-committee on the Okganization of Emekgency Relief 

ORGANIZATION OF SUB-COMMnTEE 

(A) The resolution of Supervisor A. S. Cleghorn Robertson proposed the for- 
mation of a committee to prepare a Major Emergency Disaster Plan, and to draft 
a bill to effectuate the same for submission to the Board of Supervisors. 

(B) At the meeting of the General Committee held at the Mayor's office on 
July 8, 1940, a motion by Mr. Cain was duly passed which read in part "to 
determine how much money, if any, would be needed and how much work would 
be involved". 

(C) Mayor Crane's letter of July 16, 1940 appointing this sub-committee reads 
in part, '"to study more fully the Emergency Disaster Plan". 

The object of this committe must be deduced from the above and it is suggested 
that this committee assume as its object : 

1. The determination of whether the creation of a Major Emergency Disaster 
Plan is necessary at this time ; and 

2. If the sub-committee shall have decided that such a plan should be developed 
to determine how much money if any should be provided by the supervisors to 
facilitate the development of such a plan ; and 

3. To report in outline the requirements of such an emergency plan. 

SCOPE OF EMEEGENCY DISASTER PLAN 

Emergency disasters for which preparation is required 

Group I: Fire ; flood ; tidal wave ; earthquake ; epidemics. 

Group II: Sabotage during the period of strained relations; war with its 
attendant possibilities of; partial blockade; blockade; bombardment; bombing, 
landing of parachute troops ; landing of major boats or troops. 

Phases under tvhich plan must operate 

(A) Normal conditions. — During this period the plan must be prepared for 
the eflScient handling of the disasters listed in Group I above. 

(B) Strained Relations. — A condition of strained relations is considered to 
exist whenever it seems possible that a foreign power will attempt sabotage in 
preparation for an attack on this Territory. During such a period the govern- 
ment of the city is conducted as in normal times and by the same officials [2] 
up until the time that the governor declares martial law. At this time the 
governor will take charge of the administration with the aid of the National 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1329 

Guard, and the Emergency Disaster Plan should provide for the cooperation of 
our citizenship with the governor and the National Guard. 

At the discretion of the governor the assistance of the federal forces, Army 
and Navy could be obtained at this time and cooperation with those forces should 
be foreseen and provided for. 

(C) On the inception of war the government of this Territory will presumably 
be taken over by the military authorities and the Emergency Disaster Plan should 
provide for cooperating with the military force so that as little burden as possible 
falls on the shoulders of troops who will be necessary in the field. 

OEGANIZATION OF GENEHAX COMMITTEK FOB PBEPABING A MAJOB EMEEGENCY DISASTEB 
PLAN AND FOB THE ADMINISTBATION OF THAT PLAN UNDEB THE THEEE PHASES 
DESCEIBED ABOVE 

Precautions to &e o'bserved in appointing members to the general committee 
Inasmuch as this committee will be called upon to operate during a state of 

war every effort should be made to avoid appointing to the committee members 

of the Army and Navy Reserve or others who would be liable to be called for 

military service. 

In the following a suggested organization of such a committee is submitted, 

and listed under the various sub-committees into which it is assumed that the 

general committee will be divided, are given suggested duties for these committees. 
For administration purposes it is assumed that the Mayor and the regular 

city officials will administer the plan and they will be assisted in this : 

1. By the general committee. 

2. By the sub-committees each functioning in cooperation with the appropriate 
department of the city government. 

3. That the force available to these various city departments will be augmented 
by enlisting in these services various qualified members of our citizenship. 

Organization of committee 

1. Chairman : Mayor. 

2. Assistant Chairman : A lay member appointed by the Mayor. 

3. Secretary : An assistant to the Mayor for the purpose of preparation and 
administration of the Emergency Disaster Plan. 

4. Executive Committee : Chairman, vice-dhairman, chairman of various sub- 
committees, secretary, staff representative of tlie General commanding the 
Hawaiian Department, and staff representative of the [Si Commandant 
of the 14th Naval District, and head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

5. Sub-committees and respective responsibilities : 

(a) Law Enforcement — Chairman : Chief of Police. 
Duties: 

1. Augumented patrol. 

2. Maintenance and supervision of the prison and concentration camps. 

3. Preparation and distribution of distinguishing marks of auxiliary forces. 

4. Enforcement of special traffic regulations. 

5. Enforcement of black-out regulations, and gas attack precautions. 

6. Control of emergency alarm system. 

(b) Relief Committee: Chairman — , 

Note : The local chapter of the Red Cross will, of course, be represented on this 
committee and will be utilized for relief during the first two phases referred to 
above and for its assistance during the third. It is suggested that the chairman 
of the local chapter be considered for the appointment of chairman of this com- 
mittee. Associated with this committee should be the City and County doctor 
and, of course, the various relief agencies existing in the city. The assistance 
of the Territorial Department of Social Security should also be given consider- 
ation. 

Duties: 

1. Rationing of food. 

2. Issuance of food cards. 

3. Billeting. 

4. Medical and surgical aid. 

5. Financial assistance to individuals or families. 

6. Identification of dead. 

7. Reports of casualties. 

8. Commandeering of administration and public buildings for relief pur- 
poses. 



1330 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAKL HARBOR ATTACK 

(c) Damage Control Committee — Chairman: Chief Engineer of the City & 
County Public Works. 

Duties: 

1. Fire protection. 

2. General engineering service including : 

a. Clearing of ruins. 

b. Construction of additional defense works, bomb shelters, etc. 

c. Repairs necessary to maintaining utility services, 
f ^"1 d. Distribution of water. 

e. Sanitation. 

f. Burial of dead. 

g. Organization of transportation facilities. 

h. Organization of communication facilities including boats, trucks, 
busses, railroad trains, taxi cabs, and private automobiles. 

(d) Procurement Division: Chairman: City & County Purchasing Agent. 
Duties: 

1. Preparation and maintenance of food supplies. 

Note: This should include immediate action to increase to the utmost 
local growing of food supplies. 

2. Increase in the quantities of food reserves held in warehouses and 
other places. 

3. Maintenance of adequate fuel reserves. 

4. Purchase of arms and ammunition for the use of auxiliary forces. 

5. Purchase and maintenance of engineering supplies both for govern- 
mental use and the use of the utilities and essential industries. 

(e) Finance Committee: Chairman: City & County Comptroller. 
Duties: 

1. Preparation of methods for controlling the expenditure of emergency 
funds. 

2. Audit of expenditures. 

3. Cooperation in financial matters with the Territory and Army and Navy 
authorities. Red Cross and others. 

4. Preparation of emergency budgets. 

(f > Legislative Committee: Chairman : City & County Attorney. 
Duties: 

1. Preparation of the necessary legislative enactments to provide for the 
following : 

a. Empower the Mayor and Board of Supervisors to declare the 
existence of a state of emergency under which the following special 
powers become operative : 

[5] 1. Suspension of habeas corpus to the degree necessary 
to prevent individual citizens from committing sabotage or of 
giving alien assistance to possible enemies. 

b. Distribution under proper regulation of emergency funds for 
carrying out the various provisions of this plan. 

c. Establishment of special courts to cooperate with the military 
courts after the declaration of martial law. 

d. Abbreviated court procedure during any emergency. 

e. Preparation of emergency labor laws. 

(g) PuUic Relations and PuUicity. Chairman : . 

Duties: 

1. Establishment of headquarters office. 

2. Publicity. 

3. Preparation of manuals of instructions. 

4. Public education. 

5. Labor relations. 

6. Enrollment of individuals of all societies for service groups. 

7. Maintenance of community morale. 

AMOUNT OF WORK INVOLVED AND SPECIAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE NECESSARY 

If the above suggested organization for Emergency Disaster Plan Committee 
is accepted as reasonable, and if the duties tentatively assigned to the various 
sub-committees are accepted as essential, it becomes apparent that the task for 
this committee in the preparation of such a plan is an enormous one and that its 
administration will make demands upon the City and County officials far beyond 
their present capacity so that additional assistance must be provided. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1331 

It is suggested that consideration be given to ttie appointment of a special 
assistant to the Mayor to serve as secretary of this committee and that necessary 
oflSce space and office facilities together vpith tlie necessary clerical help, be 
provided. As a starting point it is suggested that a sum of $5000 be appropriated 
to be expended during the next six months for the puri)Ose of formulating the 
above plan. 
July 19, 1940. 

(At this point in the original exhibit there appears an Organization 
Chart, Anti-Bombardment Control, City of Honolulu, October 10, 
1940. This chart is reproduced as Item No. 1 in EXHIBITS-ILLUS- 
TRATIONS, Eoberts Commission. Following the chart there ap- 
pears a map of the City of Honolulu, T. H. reflecting areas of the city 
to be evacuated and open areas available for trench and shelter con- 
struction. This map is reproduced as Item No. 2 in EXHIBITS- 
ILLUSTEATIONS, Roberts Commission. A map of the Island of 
Oahu, T. H. is included as the next illustration in the exhibit. This 
map reflects the division of the island into Control Districts, and is 
reproduced as Item No. 3 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Rob- 
erts Commission.) 

[i] Emeegency Organization foe the City of Honolulu 

Exhibit 2 of the general plan shows a proposed i)ermanent and active organiza- 
tion for the City and County of Honolulu for anti-bombardment control. The 
organization should be accomplished through the Mayor's Committee on the 
Organization of Emergency Relief, already appointed, increasing the number 
of members, if necessary. The various divisions of the organization to be formed 
and planned through the appointment of the following sub-committees : 

a. General 

b. Housing of Etvacuees 

c. Food Supply 

d. Transportation 

e. Labor 

f. Publicity and Information 

g. Engineering 

h. Medical Service 

i. Damage Control 
That in setting up the organization and plan, the mayor and the various sub- 
committees maintain close cooperation with the governor of Hawaii, the Com- 
manding General of the Hawaiian Department, and with all private corporations 
and individuals whose assistance will be needed to make the plan a success. Out- 
lines for the various sub-committees are given on the following pages. 

In general, the chairman of each sub-committee shall be the logical person to 
direct, in the emergency organization, the activities with which the sub-committee 
is concerned. Thus, the logical person to be chairman of the sub-committee on 
engineering and to become director of engineering in the organization is the city 
engineer. It is not intended that membership on sub-committees be restricted 
to those persons suggested in the outlines. 

[2] Persons appointed in the organization and upon the committees should 
be public spirited citizens who have proven ability along the lines indicated, and 
who are willing to serve actively without pay. 

[5] GENEHAX COMMITTEE 

Chawman 

A public official or other citizen of sufficient executive ability to form the organi- 
zation and to direct it in operation, under the mayor. He should become City 
Director in Anti-bombardment work. 

Members 

Citizens qualified to assist in general organization and operations of the plan. 
There should be at least one member from each of the three divisions of the city, 
and these should become division directors. 
79716 — 46 — Ex. 143, vol. 3 4 



1332 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Duties 

(a) To recommend to the Mayor the appointment of persons to all positions on 
the city, division, and district staffs. 

(b) To instruct all other committees in their duties, and to coordinate their 
work. 

(c) To maintain contact with the Governor of Hawaii and with the Command- 
ing General, Hawaiian Department on all matters pertaining to the work of 
the organization. 

(d) To compile all instructions to personnel of the organization, after the in- 
structions have been prepared by the special sub-committees. 

Cooperation necessary 

(a) Governor of Hawaii. 

(b) Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. 

(c) General cooperation with private corporations and individuals not specifi- 
cally maintained by another committee. 

Information for the committee 

Chart showing proposed organization of the personnel engaged in antibombard- 
ment control is attached as guide in setting up the organization and appointing 
personnel. 

[^] COMMITTEE ON HOUSING 

Chairman 
Territorial Director of Social Security. 

Members 
Representative of Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association. 

" " " Pineapple Company. 

Member of Board of Supervisors. 
Representative of certain plantations. 

Duties 

( a ) To decide upon the number of persons who will be removed from Honolulu, 
and the localities to which they will be sent. 

(b) To contact plantations, city and town officials, and Boards of supervisors 
of other islands to determine the numbers of persons who can be cared for at each 
locality. 

(c) To draw detailed plans for the routing of persons from specific parts of the 
city to specific localities elsewhere. 

(d) To plan for the Housing: 

1st of labor at localities in which it is needed. 
2nd of other evacuees. 

Cooperation necessary 

(a) Committee on Labor. 

(b) Plantations. 

(c) Officials of other cities and towns of Oahu. 

(d) Boards of Supervisors of other islands. 

Information for committee 

(a) The Hawaiian Department Plan for the evacuation of dangerous areas in 
the city of Honolulu calls for the evacuation of about 55,000 persons. The Chap- 
ter on Evacuation, Tables I, II, and III of this plan outline a preliminary system 
of distribution of these persons. This distribution was based on the following 
sources of information : 

1. Statements of the Manager of the Oahu Sugar Company as to what 
might be expected of that plantation. 

[5] 2. A study of housing conditions on all plantations of Hawaii, made 
by Mr. Harry S. Bent, of the Hawaiian Pineapple Company. 

3. Reports on capacities of schools of the Territory contained in the First 
Progress Report of the Territorial Planning Board. 

(b) The chapter on Distribution of Workers, and Tables V and VI of the 
Department Plan give the labor requirements for the emergency and the distri- 
bution of the workers, which will have to be taken into consideration in housing. 
These figures were obtained from the agencies concerned. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1333 

(c) The Quartermaster of the Hawaiian Department may have on hand certain 
excess tentage which may be used for establishing camps where existing housing 
facilities cannot be used. The availability of these tents would depend upon 
military requirements at the time, and tentage should not be counted upon except 
in cases where it is necessary to house labor working on defense work, and where 
local housing cannot be obtained. 

(d) Any plan for housing must count upon doubling up in private homes, both 
in Honolulu and elsewhere, and full information to the public as what must be 
done will be necessary. 

[6] COMMITTEE ON FOOD SUPPLY 

Chairman 

Secretary of Chamber of Commerce. 
Members 

Representatives of largest wholesale grocers. 
" " plantations. 

American Red Cross Field Representative. 

Representative of Agricultural Extension Service, University of Hawaii. 

Duties 

(a) To plan to increase the available staple food supply of Oahu to at least 
three months, and if possible, to six months supply, by : 

1. Increasing stocks in warehouses. 

2. Increasing stocks in retail stores. 

3. Encouraging all home owners to keep a supply of at least one month of 
canned goods and staples. 

(b) Encourage development of the business of raising more vegetables for 
export, so that production can be diverted to local use when needed. 

(c) Planning to provide a stock of seeds, so that additional truck gardens can 
be planted as soon as it is seen that they will be needed. 

(d) Planning for the operation of emergency truck gardens under the super- 
vision of plantations and towns. Labor to come from the evacuees. 

(e) Plans for shipping to Oahu numbers of steers from cattle ranches on 
Hawaii. Steamers taking evacuees there could bring back cattle. 

Cooperation necessary 

(a) Committee on Labor. 

(b) Committee on Housing. 

(c) Plantations and cattle ranches. 

Information for committee 

(a) The manager of the Oahu Sugar Company Plantation has had experience 
in developing the growth of foodstuffs for export, [7] and can furnish 
valuable information on the subject. It is possible that other plantations may 
also have done work in this line. 

(b) The Agricultural Extension Service of the University of Hawaii should 
be consulted. 

(c) Mr. Thomas Walker, who has been working on the emergency plan of 
the police department has considered means of increasing supplies of food in 
households. 

[S] COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION 

Chairman 

Public official or citizen thoroughly familiar with transportation of all kinds 
in the Territory. 

Members 
Representatives of: 

Inter-Island Steamship Company. 
Honolulu Rapid Transit Company. 
Matson Steamship Company. 
Young Brothers Company. 
Oahu Rail and Land Company. 
Principal Taxicab Companies. 



1334 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Duties 

(a) To plan the transportation of evacuees from Honolulu to the localities 
determined by the committee on housing. 

(b) To plan the transportation of food and other supplies to communities of 
evacuees. 

Cooperation necessary 

(a) Committee on Housing. 

(b) All transportation agencies of the Islands. 

Information for the committee 

(a) Information on steamships, barges, tugs, trucks and busses is contained 
in the Chapter on Evacuation and Table IV of the Department Plan. The esti- 
mated emergency capacity of this transportation based on this information Is 
as follows : 

Inter-Island Steamship 4200 

Barges and tugs 3300 

Busses 34S8 

Trucks and trailers 1320 

(b) Plans will include not only the original use of transportation for evacuation, 
but also secondary use in supplying the services [9] and the civil population. 

(c) Oahu railroad will be preempted for military use and cannot be considered 
available. 

COMMITTEE ON LABOR 

Chairmxin 

Director of Territorial Employment Bureau. 
Members 

Representatives of plantations. 

Contractors, and other employers of labor. 

Superintendent of Public Instruction. 

Duties 

(a) To draw up a schedule of labor needs of 

1. Army 

2. Navy 

3. Emergency Relief Organization. 

4. Other departments of city government. 

5. Developing additional food supply. 

(b) To determine where the supply of labor will come from, including unem- 
ployed, those to be thrown out of work by the emergency, and those such as 
women and older children, who do not now work but who could be used to 
advantage. 

(c) To provide a method of assigning all persons able to work to the localities 
and jobs for which they are best qualified. 

Cooperation necessary 

(a) Committee on Housing. 

(b) All agencies who will need additional workers after the emergency starts. 

(c) Present employers whose activities will decrease or cease when the 
emergency begins. 

(d) Committee on engineering. 

(e) Committee on food supply. 

Information for the committee 

(a) Labor requirements for emergency work are given in the [10] chap- 
ter on Distribution of labor and Table V of the Department Plan. 

COMMITTEE ON PUBLICITY AND INFORMATION 

Chairman 

Superintendent of City Recreation Commission. 
Memiers 

Representatives of newspapers. 

Representatives of radio stations. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1335 

Duties 

(a) To plan the dissemination to the public at the proper times, by one or more 
suitable means of : 

1. Instructions as to areas to be evacuated. 

2. Procedure to be followed in evacuation. 

3. Steps to be taken to secure individual protection in areas not evacuated, 
and in evacuated areas. 

4. Information as to public shelters provided. 

5. Nature of air raid and all clear signals. 

6. Procedure to be followed upon sounding of air raid alarm. 

7. Information as to street blocks and restricted areas. 

8. Information on food supplies, water supply, and conservation of 
property. 

(b) To prepare instructions for the guidance of personnel charged with 
publicity and information in the divisions and districts. 

Cooperation necessary 

(a) All other committes 

(b) Newspapers 

(c) Kadio Stations 

COMMITTEE ON ENGINEERING 

Chairman 
City Engineer, 

Members 

Engineer of Utilities Companies. 
Engineers from various parts of the city. 

Duties 

(a) To approve types of shelter to be constructed to meet various conditions, 
and inform the Committee on publicity so that they may be published. 

[11] (b) To plan for the construction of public shelters where it is not 
practicable to require private owners to provide them. 

(c) To plan for the increased maintenance and repair of utilities now operated 
by the city. 

(d) To advise banks, the electric company, the gas company, and the board of 
water supply as to measures to be taken for protection and for repair of 
damages. 

Note. — Plans for shelters to be furnished by the Department Engineer, Ha- 
waiian Department. 

(e) To furnish instructions as to salvage and damage control to the Commit- 
tee on Publicity for publishing to the public. 

(f) To prepare instructions for the engineering personnel of the divisions 
and districts. 

Cooperation necessary 

(a) All utility companies. 

(b) Department Engineer, Hawaiian Department. 

(c) Committee on Publicity. 

(d) Committee on Labor. 

Information for the committee 

1. That the areas in which the bulk of the buildings are frame structures will 
burn must be planned from the outset. The areas where the buildings are of 
masonry, stone or brick will be even more hazardous than those that burn. In 
either area the civilians must be taught to abandon these traps of fire and falling 
debris for the shelter of open areas where they may simply lie down or seek refuge 
in rude splinter proofs and hastily constructed trenches. 

Once taught the principle they will soon acquire the habit and as the raids are 
repeated they will themselves improve their rude shelters in these relatively open 
areas. 

(a) It will not be economically possible to construct bombproof shelters for 
personnel. The following shelters should be planned : 

[12] Individual shelters for homes 

These should be dug in yards adjoining homes, and will be a trench three feet 
deep and wide enough to accommodate one i)erson. The public will be notified that 



1336 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

these trenches must be dug by the individuals to use them as the city will not be 
able to furnish them. If time and materials permit trenches with overhead 
cover should be constructed in accordance with Fig. 1. Full publicity regarding 
the details of this shelter will be published in the newspapers. 

Open trench shelters in public parks 

These will be constructed under the supervision of the Engineering Director or 
his assistants, and will consist of continuous trenches about three feet deep and 
wide enough to accommodate one person. These will be constructed in parks and 
squares, shown on the overlay which is attached to exhibit 4 (Dept. Plan), as 
soon as possible after it is known that an air raid can be expected. Publicity 
will be given to the locations of these trenches by newspapers and radio. 

Covered trench shelters in public parks 

These are designed to furnish protection from splinters, and will be built as 
shown in Fig. 1. These should not be built until open trench shelter has been 
provided for all persons needing it. Open trenches can be improved to provide 
overhead splinterproof cover. It will not be possible to construct this type of 
shelter in some of the low elevation parks such as Ala Moana, because of the 
ground water. The shelters constructed will have to be adapted to ground 
conditions. 

Existing buildings changed to provide structural protection 

Some existing buildings can be improved by structural changes to provide 
splinter-proof shelter. This type of protection should be subject to proper 
supervision, and should not be built where there is danger of a heavy building 
crushing the shelter. 

[13] (b) Attached is a paper on the design and construction of domestic 
air raid shelters taken largely from British sources and containing designs based 
on British experience. Drawings showing recommended construction are 
included. 

(c) Banks will be notified that if they desire to leave their cash and securities 
in their buildings, that their vaults are not sufficiently strong to protect them 
against one thousand pound bombs which may be expected. If vaults are to be 
made safe against such bombs they should be reinforced against such bombs, 
they should be reinforced by at least 4 ft. 3 in. of the best special reinforced con- 
crete on top and at least 2 ft. 6 in. of the same construction on the sides. This 
construction is shown in Fig. 2, attached. 

An alternative to strengthening existing vaults would be to provide in advance 
vaults tunneled in rock of one of the valleys behind the city. Nuuanu Valley is 
recommended for this purpose. To secure sufficient protection tunnels would 
need to be driven for considerable length into the hill to have at least 20 feet 
of soft rook over the vault qnd a burster course of at least two feet of specially 
reinforced concrete (such as that shown in Fig 2) must be built on the ground 
surface above the shelter. 

Such a tunnel would require considerable time for construction and would 
have to be provided for well in advance of the danger period. It would have 
considerable advantage in being located in a site which is unlikely to be bombed, 
while it is certain that the downtown bank buildings would be bombed. 

COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL SERVICE 

Chairman 

A physician or surgeon of executive ability, qualified to become the medical 
director of the emergency organization. 

Members 

Representatives of city hospitals. 

Representative physicians and surgeons from all sections of the city. 

[14] Duties 

(a) To plan for the establishment of aid stations and hospitalization in divi- 
sions and districts. 

(b) To plan the field medical work and notify Committee on Publicity of the 
arrangements so that the public may be informed. 

(c) To select and recommend for appointment doctors and nurses to serve in 
all divisions and districts. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1337 

(d) To plan the transfer of medical personnel to outlying districts where they 
may be needed by evacuees because of no local service being available. 

(e) To draw up and distribute to the medical personnel of the divisions and 
districts instructions as to duties. 

(f ) To plan for the furnishing of ambulances at critical points. 

(g) To prepare instructions for the guidance of medical personnel of the divi- 
sions and districts. 

Cooperation necessary 

(a) Committee on Publicity. 

(b) City hospitals and physicians. 

(c) Town and plantation hospitals and physicians. 

CX5MMITTEE ON DAMAGE CONTEOL 

Chairman 

Public oflBcial or citizen of executive ability, qualified to direct operations of 
damage control, including police and fire department work. 

Meml)ers 
Chief of Police. 
Chief of Fire Department. 
Engineer. 
Traffic Director. 

Duties 

(a) To foi'mulate plans under which fire department will work with augmented 
force to control damage by fire and explosion. 

(b) To study plans already prepared by police department for emergency. 

(c) To prepare instructions to be issued to public as to necessary steps for 
private damage control. 

(d) To prepare instructions for the guidance of the personnel of the divisions 
and districts concerned with the damage control. 

Cooperation necessary 

(a) Police Department. 

(b) Fire Department. 

(c) Committee on Labor. 

(d) Committee on Publicity. 

(At this point in the original exhibit there appears a series of 12 
architectural drawings which are plans for the construction of various 
types of air raid shelters. These drawings are reproduced as Items 4 
through 16 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Com- 
mission.) 

[1] DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF A. R. SHELTERS 

Domestic 

i. genebl4x 

A. Responsibility 

The responsibility for the provision of domestic air raid shelters lies with the 
individual; he shall pay all costs in connection with the installation. Expert 
advice as to location and design will be furnished by the civil authorities upon 
call. 

B. Degree of protection 

1. The minimum of protection which will be afforded by domestic shelters is 
as follows : 

a. Protection against the blast and fragmentation effect of a 500 lb. bomb 
falling at a distance of 50 feet. 

b. Direct hit of a 5 lb. incendiary bomb. 

c. Protection against military gasses. 

2. Any degree of protection above the minimum may be obtained. 



1338 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

C, Types of shelters 

1. Domestic shelters fall into two main classifications. 

a. Surface shelters (those located entirely above ground). 

b. Underground shelters ( those partially and completely below original ground 
level). 

2. When practicable, the full underground shelter is recommended because of 
the greater latei-al protection given by the ground. The surface shelter should 
only be provided where subsurface conditions (rock, coral or subsurface water) 
make the provision of underground shelters economically impossible. 

XL. DESIGN 

A. Basic considerations 

1. Location. — [2] a. In residential areas the air raid shelters should 
be installed within easy reach of the dwelling. Those shelters which are to 
serve two or more families should be centrally located. Where basements exist 
or where the dwelling is located on the side of a hill, a covered entrance is 
recommended. 

b. In selecting sites for these shelters the following should be avoided: 

(1) Proximity to heavy load bearing walls, columns, high chimneys, water 
tanks, etc. 

(2) Proximity to gas and water mains. 

2. Lateral protection. — a. In order to provide the protection required in I B 
above, the following minimum wall thicknesses shall govern in the case of sur- 
face and partially buried shelters : 

(1) li/o" of mild steel plate 

(2) 12" i-einforced concrete 

(3) 15" sound masonry 

(4) 2' broken stone 

(5) 3' earth or sand 

b. For underground shelters, the wall thickness required will vary with the 
type of adjacent materials, being in all cases less than that specified in a (1), 
(2) and (3) above. 

3. Overhead cover. — a. Surface shelters should have a minimum of — 

(1) %" mild steel plate 

(2) 5" reinforced concrete 

(3) 9" of arched masonry 

[3] b. For underground shelters these thicknesses may be reduced if suffi- 
cient natural overhead cover exists (3' minimum) ; in any event, the roof must 
have sufficient strength to support the dead load with adequate margins of safety. 

4. Entries and exits. — a. The guiding principle is that there shall be enough 
entrances to allow all persons to reach their appointed places within shelters in 
five (5) minutes. This has, however, small application to domestic shelters. 

b. Each shelter must have a minimum of two exits to eliminate the possibility 
of being trapped by a blocked passageway. Emergency exits need only be big 
enough to allow a man to squeeze out. 

c. Wherever possible, ramps should replace stairs in passageways. 

d. All entrances, unless barricaded with double doors should be placed at 
right angles to the direction of the shelter proper to reduce the danger from 
blast and fragmentation. 

5. Space requirements. — a. The minimum headroom in all shelters is 6 feet. 

b. Shelters for less than 12 people or trench shelters open at both ends will 
provide a floor space of 4 square feet per person. 

c. Shelters, other than those in b above will provide 6 square feet and 50 cu. ft. 
per person. 

B. Oas proofing 

Although there has been no evidence of any extended use of gas in the present 
European struggle, and gas protection is by inference of low [4] priority, 
it cannot be entirely disregarded. 

1. In any shelter there should be a means of allowing passage into the structure 
by humans but not by gas. 

a. A double set of doors vrill solve this problem, one to be shut before the other 
is opened. A bend in this airlock will help materially in preventing the sp] inter- 
ing of two doors. 

b. All doors and other openings should be airtight. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1339 

2. Some means of decontamination must be available. A solution is to place 
a box of sand and chloride of lime in the gasloek and require all persons to shift 
their feet through the mixture prior to entrance. 

C. Ventilation 

If a shelter is entirely sealed for the duration of the raid by airtight doors 
some means of artificial ventilation will have to be provided, in this case, a filter 
device will be necessary to neutralize gasses or as an alternative, the inlet must 
be placed high enough (30') to be in the. pure air zone. Generally however, it 
is recommended that while doors be made airtight ( by means of rubber gaskets, 
etc.), they be left open until a gas attack is imminent and natural ventilation 
be relied on solely. 

D. Utilities 

1. Lighting. — a. Lights should be provided in each shelter; if impractical to 
run extensions from main power lines, reliance can be placed on self-contained 
incandescent units or they may be carried as substitutes in the event of com- 
mercial power failure. Adequate lighting exerts a psychological factor which 
should not be overlooked. 

b. It goes without saying, that every precaution should be taken that no stray 
light should be visible from the outside. 

[5] 2. Water supply. — No water, other than drinking water carried in port- 
able containers will be necessary. 

3. Lavatory facilities. — In the case of the multi-family shelters, a septic tank is 
recommended. This can easily be partitioned off from the shelter proper. 

4. Tools. — ^A number of tools such as picks, shovels, and crowbars should be 
kept in a shelter to be used in forcing a way out if the occupants are trapped. 

in. CONSTRUCTION PBOCEDUBB 

A. Surface shelters 

It is desired to reiterate that surface shelters are definitely inferior to under- 
ground shelters and should only be built when absolutely necessary. 

1. Concrete box. — Figures 7 & 8 attached hereto show the recommended layout, 
and general construction details of this type of shelter. 

a. Space requirements: 

6 persons 4'6" x 6'6" 

8 " 4'6" X 8'6" 
10 " 4'6" X 10'6" 
12 " 4'6" X 12'6" 

b. Wall foundations should be at least 2' deep. 

c. All walls and the roof should be adequately anchored, the one to the other. 

d. As an alternative to the 5" ordinary reinforced concrete roof slab, the dove- 
tail sheeting with %" of cover precast underneath may be used; in this case the 
sheeting acts both reinforcement for and preventive to excessive spalling [6] 
from the 4" of concrete cast in place above. Dovetail sheets are placed in 10' x 2' 
units ; gauge in 24. 

e. At least one foot of sandbagging is recommended as roof cover. 

f. Emergency exits can be provided by forming an opening in one wall. Pro- 
vide two ^4" steel plates, slightly larger than opening; one plate to bear on out- 
side of wall, one on inside, attached by foot long bolts with wing nuts on inside 
plate. Intermediate space can be filled with broken stone, etc. Exit can be 
cleared rapidly by removing wing nuts. 

2. Reinforced Arch. 

This type of shelter is ordinarily installed underground or partially buried, but 
may with properly anchored footings be utilized as a surface shelter. For details, 
see B below. 

B. Underground shelters 

1. Trench type. — Figure 1 illustrates a simple type of covered trench recom- 
mended by the Britsh Home Office. Plate is self-explanatory. 

a. Access trenches are at right angles to shelter proper and are provided at each 
end, extending in opposite directions. 

b. Advisable spacing between adjacent trench shelters is 50' ; they may be inter- 
connected. 

c. This shelter is not highly recommended ; for a small difference in outlay and 
labor the arched shelter, offering more positive protection can be provided. 



1340 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. Reinforced arch. — There are several types of this shelter in use in England 
at present: brick, concrete, corrugated iron and a combination of the latter 
two. Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12 show these types. In constructing this type [7] 
which is adaptable to surface, semi or full underground construction, the fol- 
lowing recommendations may be followed. 

a. Concrete floor and footings poured initially. 

b. The dovetail sheeting is then placed in sections, assembled and then covered 
with high strength concrete. 

c. Recommended mix for concrete cover is 1:2^:3%. 

3. Culvert shelter. — Figure 4 shows tentative design of 6 man underground 
shelter designed in the Office of the Chief of Engineers. 

a. As an alternative to the emergency exit shown, a passageway similar to the 
entrance tunnel may be provided. 

b. This design is particularly adapted to those residential districts on the 
heights of Honolulu. 

4. Concrete box shelters. — Underground shelters of reinforced concrete con- 
struction may be designed to afford any degree of protection from the prescribed 
minimum to complete immunity. They will be expensive and are not recom- 
mended for general use. Figure 6 shows a Swiss design for concrete underground 
shelter: expert advice should be secured prior to initiation of construction on 
this scale. 

rv. REFUGE BOOMS IX EXISTING DWELLINGS 

If the time factor does not permit construction of external shelters, recourse 
must be made to any available space which can be arranged to provide some 
degree of protection. 

Almost any room wil serve as a refuge room if it is soundly constructed and 
if it is easy to reach and to get out of. Its windows should be as few and as 
small as possibly preferably facing a building or blank wall or a narrow street. 
If a ground floor room facing a wide street or a stretch of level open ground 
is chosen the windows should if possible be especially protected as covered below. 
The stronger the walls, floor and ceiling are the better. [8] Brick partition 
walls are better than lath and plaster, a concrete ceiling is better than a wooden 
one. An internal passage will form a very good refuge-room if it can be closed 
at both ends. A cellar or a basement is the best place for a refugee-room if it can 
be made reasonably gas-proof and if there is no likelihood of its becoming 
flooded by a burst water-main. Alternatively, any room on any floor below 
the top may be used. Top floors and attics should be avoided. 

a. Space required for rooms of normal height of 8' x 10'. An allowance of 
20 sq. ft. of floor area for each person will enable those persons to remain in 
the room with complete safety for a continuous period of 12 hours without 
ventilation. 

A. Gas proofing 

No serious amount of gas will come into a room unless there are draughts 
or currents of air to carry it in, so any cracks or openings must be sealed up. 
In old houses especially, windows and doors may shut badly. There may be 
chinks underneath the window siUs on the inside. There may be cracks in the 
ceiling. 

1. Fill in all cracks and crevices with putty or a pulp made of sodden news- 
paper. Plaster paper over cracks in the walls or ceiling. Fill in the cracks 
between the floor boards and paste sheets of paper over the whole floor. 

2. Fill in all cracks round the skirting boards, or where pipes pass through 
the walls. All trap-doors, skylights and hatches in the room should be sealed, and 
interior ventilators stopped up with rags or pasted over with thick paper. All 
ventilators in the outside walls of the house, including those below the floor 
level, should be stopped up with rags or paper. 

3. Plug key-holes. Plug waste-pipes, or overflow pipes, in any basin or sink 
in your refuge-room. If you are doubtful whether a hole or a crack lets in air, 
play for safety, and seal it up. 

4. The windows should be sealed so that draughts, or gas, cannot [9] 
come in. Wedge them firmly to keep them tightly fixed in their frames. Seal 
all round the frames with gummed strip or pasted paper, wherever there is a 
crack. Be ready to reseal the window openings if the glass gets broken. For 
this purpose have some stout materials to hang or fasten over them. Use a 
close-woven material or a blind, for instance, if it is large enough. Fasten it by 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1341 

nailing It with thin strips of wood to the window frame all round, and then seal 
the edges with adhesive tape. 

5. Doors to the refuge-room which need not be used should be sealed. Paper 
should be pasted firmly all around the cracks, especially at the foot of the door, 
and the key-hole plugged. Doors which have to be opened and closed should be 
sealed against gas. Nail a piece of wood, padded with felt, to the floor so that 
the door, when closed, presses tightly against it. Take care not to nail this piece 
of wood on the wrong side of the door so that it cannot be opened. Strips of felt 
may also be nailed round the inside of the door to exclude draughts. Fix a 
blanket outside the door if the door opens inwards, or inside the door if the door 
opens outwards, with strips of wood. The top of the blanket should be fixed to 
the top of the door frame. One side of the blanket should be fastened down the 
whole length of the door frame, on the side where the hinges are, by means of a 
strip of wood nailed to the frame. The other side of the blanket should be 
secured not more than two feet down, so that a flap is left free for going in and 
out. Arrange the blanket so that at least 12 inches trails on the floor to stop 
air from blowing underneath it. If the blanket is kept damp during an air raid, 
it will give better protection. 

B. Structural protection 

1. Protection of windows. — If possible all windows should be barricaded with 
sand bags. Beyond this splinters of glass can be prevented from being blown 
into the room covering the inside of the window at least two thin sheets of one of 
the transpai'ent or translucid non-inflamable materials now available ; non- 
inflamable celluloid is also acceptable. Although cellulose varnish is the best 
adhesive, water glass or even ordinary type glue or varnish can be used to stick 
[10] the material to the glass. Failing anything better some fabric material 
such as linen from old pillow cases or mosquito netting or even stout paper may 
be pasted on the inside of the glass. 

2. Ceilings'. — If the refuge room is on the ground floor or in the basement the 
ceiling can be supported with wooden props as an additional protection. Stout 
posts or scaffold poles are placed upright resting on a thick plank of the floor 
supporting a stout piece of timber against the ceiling at right angles to the ceiling. 
The posts are forced tight by two wedges at the foot driven in opposite ways. The 
wedges should not be driven too violently otherwise the ceiling may be lifted and 
damaged. 

3. Fire precautions. — a. The attic or top floor should be cleared of all in- 
flamable material, paper, litter, liunber, etc. to lessen the danger of fire and to 
prevent the fire from spreading. 

b. If the materials are available the floor of the attic or top floor should be 
protected in one of the following ways. 

(1) With sheets of corrugated iron or plain sheet iron, 22 gauge or thicker 
or asbestos wall board. 

(2) With 2" of sand if the floor will bear the weight. 

c. It is advisable to soak all woodwork in the attic or roof space with lime 
wash to delay its catching fire. A suitable mixture is 2 lbs. of slate lime, 1 
oz. of common salt with 1 pt. of cold water. 

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF AIR RAID SHELTERS 

Public 

The term public shelters as used herein will be taken to mean, in [Ji] ad- 
dition to those truly public, shelters for factories, large places of business and 
institutions. 

I. GENERAL 

A. Responsihilitp 

It shall be a community responsibility to provide those shelters classed as truly 
public and the responsibility of the factories and businesses to provide shelters 
for their employees and customers. 

B. Degree of protection 

The minimum of protection to be afforded by public shelters will be : 

a. Protection against the direct hit of a 50 lb. bomb. 

b. Protection against military gasses. 



1342 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

C. Types of shelters 

1. Public shelters fall into three main classifications. 

a. External shelters partly and entirely underground. 

b. Shelters within existing basements and specially reinforced refuge-rooms. 

2. It is also possible to construct surface shelters although in general the 
increased cost will be such as to render this type of construction economically 
prohibitive. 

II. DESIGN 

lA. Basic considerations 

1. Location. — The location of public shelters should be decided after a careful 
survey. It is conceivable that the warning period may be less than 5 minutes so 
that many people might be caught in the open during an air raid unless it be 
arranged so that no one would have more than a 3 or 4 minute walk to a shelter. 
Covered approaches where practicable would constitute an additional safeguard 
against being caught in the open during a raid. 

2. Lateral protection. — a. All shelters not completely buried shall have the 
[12] equivalent wall thickness of 2' of reinforced concrete. In the case of 
wholly buried shelters the guiding principle shall be that the walls shall hav^ 
sufficient thickness and reinforcing to support the total roof load, to withstand 
the static earth pressure, and the dynamic earth pressure in the case of the pene- 
tration and explosion of a near-by bomb. 

III. EXTERNAL SHELTERS 

A. An external shelter should not ordinarily be for more than 50 persons unless 
provided with traverses or right angle bends as in trenches. The minimum area 
necessary for trench shelters and what is termed the tunnel form of shelter is 
3% sq. ft. of floor per person. For all other shelters it is 6 sq. ft. per person. 
There must be one emergency exit to each 50 persons. The minimum height is 
6' X 6". In large shelters there shall be at least one entrance or exit for each 
50 persons. All doors to exits and entrances should open inwards. Air raid 
shelter doors should fulfill the following points. 

a. They should be of fire resisting construction. 

b. They should be proof against splinter penetration. 

c. Should be capable of withstanding an equivalent static pressure of 10 lbs. 
per square inch for the whole of the area of the door and a suction pressure of 
twice this amount. They should be gas-tight and water-tight. They should open 
inward. They should be as small as convenient. 

B. Shelters need not be gas-proof but must be so constructed as to be capable 
of being made gas-proof quickly in an emergency. External shelter should be 
near the usual place of occupation of the personnel for whom they are intended. 
External shelters should be at least half the height distance from tall buildings, 
chimneys, water towers, etc. 

One of the most convenient and economical ways of constructing the external 
bombproof shelter is to use large diameter precast concrete tubes, laid [iS] 
like a section of the sewer partially above the ground with a mound of earth 
over the top. 

In spite of the provision of shelters in all centers of occupation and homes 
of the people, many will find themselves in the streets at the time of an air 
raid warning. For these the underground garage which may ultimately be 
found in practically every square would be reasonably safe refuge. This is a 
form of cut and cover structure with approaching rarops which would be pro- 
vided in an emergency with gaslocks. The heavy concrete roofs supported on 
thick dividing walls automatically separates the interior of the shelter into 
cells of the size suitable for the accommodation of 50 people. "Ventilation, 
lighting, water service and sewage installations should be independently in- 
stalled in each of the shelters and emergency exits provided for each. The 
refuges must be so distributed that they can absorb within 10 minutes the 
floating population to be cared for. In order to render the cost of the work 
reasonably economic they should be preferably of a dual function so that they may 
serve some useful purpose at normal times. 

rv. SHELTERS WITHIN EXISTING STRUCTURES 

A. Excluding independent external shelters, multi-story steel-framed or rein- 
forced concrete buildings are the most suitable types for shelter accommoda- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1343 

tions. They should, however, be of fire resisting construction, preferably with 
solid concrete floors, roofs and solid cross-walls or partitions and have a fair 
proportion of solids to voids in the external walls. In general below ground 
accommodation is best. It is highly desirable that such accommodations should 
not be lower than the water mains or sewers. When the walls are of sufiicient 
thickness to afford lateral protection and the windows are of normal size, pro- 
viding that effective gas proofing is possible, the ground floor of a building may 
be considered as suitable for a location of shelters. Shelter accommodations on 
upper floors should generally be not higher than the second floor, it should have 
a minimum cover of two floors and the roof of the building. 

B. Basements should not be used as shelters if very heavy machinery is [i^l 
situated on the floors above. If basements are to be used the following points 
should be considered. 

a. Strength of ground floor. 

b. Safeguarding against flooding, 
e. Protection of windows if any. 

d. Protection against gas. 

e. The nunsber of persons the basement will hold. 

The roofs of basements shelters should be designed for a live load of 300 lbs. 
per square foot of buildings with two complete floors, 40O lbs. x)er square foot 
for three or four floors, 500 lbs. per square foot if there are more than four floors. 
All windows should be sandbagged or heavily shuttered. 



DESIGN OF BOMBPROOF STRUCTURES 

(Tentative) 

(Prepared jointly by the U. S. Engineer Office, Honolulu, T. H., and the 
Department Engineer Office, Fort Shafter, T. H.) 

[J] /. Purpose of this pamphlet 

1. In ordinary practice, structural design consists of balancing forces or loads 
on one side and resistance or strength of materials on the other with proper 
margins of safety. The forces or loads to be withstood by the structure are 
carefully analyzed and estimated. 

2. In design of bombproof structures, the same general approach would be 
ideal. Unfortunately, however, the analysis or estimate of the forces or loads 
on the structure immediately involves consideration of factors of which very 
little is linown and on which there is no bacljground of experience. Knowledge 
of the effect of existing weapons is limited and was obtained only through 
costly and elaborate experiments ; new weapons are of course a closely guarded 
military secret, and an analysis or estimate of their probable effects is only 
limited by one's imagination. European military engineers in the past few 
years, however, have been giving the design of bombproof structures consider- 
able attention, and results of their study have recently become available. 

3. It is the purpose of this pamphlet to present for general information a 
brief statement of the known effects of bombs and to discuss the most efficient 
method of structurally resisting these effects. In an effort to keep the pam- 
phlet brief, must of the analysis leading up to certain conclusions has been 
condensed or eliminated. The pamphlet is based in large part upon a very 
excellent publication of the British Home Office entitled "Air Raid Precautions 
Handbook No. 5 — Structural Defense," and all quotations are from this British 
handbook unless otherwise stated. 

4. The decision to bombproof any structure and specifically the decision as 
to the type and weight of bomb it must resist must be based upon tactical 
considerations. For all except the lighter weight bombs, the structure requires 
such detailed planning as to preclude hasty construction in an emergency. The 
amount of concrete required to protect against the heavier weight bombs is 
very large and the structure will be very costly. This expense of construction 
makes it almost as necessary, in the interest of economy of funds and effort, 
to see that no structure is overprotected as it is necessary to insure that vital 
installations are adequately protected. Consideration must be given to the 
probability of hits and the importance of the structure as compared to others 
in the immediate vicinity. The size and number of bombs available to an 



1344 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

enemy are affected by the type of base from which he can reasonably be ex- 
pected to operate; carrier based aviation cannot deliver either as powerful or 
as sustained an attack as land planes. Consideration should also be given to 
the practicability of protection of installations by duplication, dispersion, and 
camouflage ; successful use of these methods miglit make an attack so un- 
profitable for an enemy that any losses he can inflict will not be worth the 
losses he would suffer. These ai-e just a few of the factors involved ; in any 
event, [2] determination by competent authority of the size of bomb to 
be resisted should precede design of any bombproof structure. 

//. General information and definitions 

1. Bombs are classified by weight by purpose, and by strength of case. They 
are fused either for instantaneous or for delayed detonation. 

2. a. When a bomb strikes, two sets of forces must be resisted. These are 
(1) kinetic energy, which is a function of velocity, angle of fall, and weight 
of bomb; and (2) explosion, which is a function of the amount and kind of 
explosive charge, tamping factor, and characteristics of the material penetrated. 
In the case of a hit on or near a structure, these main effects cause subsidiary 
effects which must be resisted. 

b. Kinetic energy. — Subsidiary effects of the kinetic energy are dynamic load 
and penetration. The dynamic load is the true impact force. The penetrating 
effect is a function of the design and strength of the bomb case, and charac- 
teristics of the resisting material. Penetration is further subdivided into per- 
foration and penetration ; a material is perforated when the bomb passes com- 
pletely through it and comes to rest under the material, and is penetrated when 
the bomb imbeds itself in the material without passing completely through the 
layer. 

c. Explosion. — Subsidiary effects of the explosion force are true explosion, 
blast,, and fragmentation. Explosion is the disintegrating or displacing force. 
Blast is a pressure wave set up in the medium struck or in the air; it is an 
inverse function of the distance from the point of explosion and results in both 
positive and negative pressures. Fragmentation is the projection outward at 
very high velocities of fragments of the bomb case. 

3. Calculation of the exact striking or impact velocity under given conditions 
is a laborious process involving several empirical formulae. Density of air, 
wind conditions, ballistics coefficient, and other characteristics of the bomb are 
variables whose effect is difficult to evaluate and in the final analysis influence 
the ultimate velocity only slightly. The effect of air speed of plane at time of 
release is noticeable at lower altitude bombing but becomes negligible above 
8000 feet. For all practical purposes, therefoi-e, the impact velocity may be 
assumed to be a function of height of plane above ground. 

In Table I attached are given the impact velocities for the bombs under con- 
sideration, dropped from heights of 10,000, 15,000 and 20,000 feet. Calculations 
were based on an air speed of 200 miles per hour; if the tabulated data are 
increased by not to exceed 2% for each 50 miles per hour increment above 200 
miles per hour, the results obtained will err on the side of safety. 

[3] 4. No shelter should be termed bombproof "if it stops short of protec- 
tion against a bomb, with a delay fuse, that does not break up when striking a 
resisting target." It will be assumed herein that all bomb cases will be such 
that they will not break up against a resisting target, representative of the 
worst possible condition. We are concerned in this discussion with 50-, 100-, 
250-, 600-, 1000-, 2000- and 4000-pound bombs, the explosive content of each of 
which represents at least 50% of the gross weight. 

5. At the end of the World War, the "deep shelter" idea had been established. 
This consisted of constructing a concrete structure underground and covering 
it alternately with earth and crushed rock burster courses; an alternate is 
tunneling at a sufficient depth to insure immunity by reliance on undisturbed 
overhead cover to absorb the full effect of the bomb. The French and Swiss 
design their roof slabs to resist all forces and loads. The Italians and English 
employ a surface burster course designed to resist the total effect and separated 
from the structure proper by some other medium. As regards surface structures, 
there is but one method of securing protection, namely, to design the roof and 
walls to withstand total effect. "Conical and parabolic shelters have been built 
to a limited extent on the Continent," with the object of offering the least possible 
surface normal to angle of impact. The concensus of opinion now seems to 
favor the use of a concrete burster course designed to withstand the total effect 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



1345 



of a bomb, as the most practical solution ; it is with this type of design that we 
are primarily concerned. 

///. Kinetic energy 

1. The first force that a structure must withstand when struck by a bomb is 
impact. A bomb striking' a concrete or other target will perforate, penetrate 
short of perforation, or ricochet. If the bomb perforates the target prior to 
detonation, it will leave a comparatively neat hole of diameter approximately 
equal to that of projectile. If the bomb ricochets due to the angle of impact, 
there will be no noticeable effect other than the shock load necessary to deflect 
the bomb. If, however, the bomb penetrates to a certain depth prior to explo- 
sion, it will exert two definite effects on the structure: — (1) The retardation 
of the bomb from impact velocity to rest within the limits of penetration will 
impose a sudden load on the target; (2) The surface of the target sustaining 
impact will be damaged over a considerable area and a shallow, large diameter, 
"impact" crater will be formed. 

2. In the case of a solidly supported slab, the force of impact is assumed to 
be transmitted to the supporting medium as a distributed load. According to 
the best theory yet advanced, the concentrated load at point of impact spreads 
out in a "cone of pressure," 90° at apex. When the slab [4] forms the 
roof of a structure, the force of impact develops tremendous, if incalculable, 
bending moments and shear. A rough approximation of the average retarding 
force can be obtained by dividing the kinetic energy of the bomb at impact by 
the depth of penetration. It is essential that this force be considered in the 
design of roof slabs if no burster course is provided. 

3. One other result of impact on a roof slab is scabbing or spalling from the 
inner surface, the ultimate effect of which is to aid in penetration or perforation. 
The phenomenon is best explained as caused by the impact pressure wave trans- 
mitted through the slab in sufficient intensity to overcome cohesive resistance. 

4. Many attempts have been made to determine an exast formula to express 
the depth to which a projectile will penetrate a given medium. Depth of pene- 
tration is known to be a function of velocity at impact, sectional density of 
bomb, angle of impact, resistance coefficient of material penetrated and strength 
and shape of casing. All empirical formulae developed to date consider these 
factors, but are difficult to evaluate. In the last analysis, the matter is one 
which can only be settled by actual experiment. 

.5. The following data are given in the British pamphlet for depth of pene- 
tration in a slab nupported over the ichole of its surface by a bomb with a delay 
fuse and of a sufficiently heavy case as to not break or deform during the pene- 
tration. The first three columns are from the Swiss Federal Commission and 
the last column is from an investigation by Bazant. 



Weight of bomb 


Mass con- 
crete 


Reinforced 
concrete 


Specially 
reinforced 
concrete 


Mass con- 
crete and 
reinforced 
concrete 




S= 2200 lbs 
per sq. in. 


S= 3200 lbs 
per sq. in. 


S=57001bs 
per sq. in. 


S= 2800 lbs. 
per sq. in. 


Pounds: 
110 -.- 


2' 0" 
2' 0" 
3' 0" 


1' 4" 
1' 4" 
2' 0" 


10" 
1' 0" 
1' 6" 


1' 2" 


220 


1' 3" 


660 


1' 10" 


2200 


2' 7" 


4000 _ 









3' 4" 













6. When these data are plotted on semi-logarithmic graph paper (Plate I) 
Bazant's figures form a regular curve, as do also the Swiss figures tor specially 
reinforced concrete. As the data are undoubtedly based on different empirical 
formulae, checked by the results of actual bombing tests available to the investi- 
gators, with perhaps different bomb characteristic, impact velocity, etc. (none 
of which is given in the pamphlet except that Bazant [5] used an impact 
velocity of 820 feet per second, which corresponds roughly to an altitude of 
14,000 feet), it can be seen that there is a reasonably close comparison between 
the Swiss figures and Bazant's. It is believed, however, that the strength of 



1346 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Bazant's concrete (i. e., 2,800 pounds per square inch) has been given too low 
a value, and that it is actually a type of specially reinforced concrete. If similar 
theoretical curves be drawn for mass concrete and ordinary reinforced concrete 
using the Swiss figures as a starting basis and in general following Bazant's 
curve, the data may be accepted as reasonably sound for those two types of 
concrete. From these curves and specially reinforced concrete curve plotted 
from the Swiss figures, data for the weights of bombs considered in this 
pamphlet are taken to form Table 1 below : 

Table 1 



Weight 


Mass con- 
crete 


Reinforced 
concrete 


Specially 
reinforced 
concrete 




S= 2200 lbs 
per sq. in. 


S= 3200 lbs 
per sq. in. 


S= 5700 lbs 
per sq. in. 


Pounds 

SO- 


1' 9" 
1' 10" 
2' 3" 
2' 8" 
3' 5" 
4' 4" 
5' 7" 


1' 1" 
1' 2" 
1' 5" 
1' 10" 
2' 3" 
3' 0" 
3' 10" 


0' 9" 


loO 


0' 10" 


250... 


1' 0" 


600_ 


1' 5" 


1000... 


1' 9" 


2000 


2' 4" 


4000 


3' 0" 







7. As far as known, there are no American data that cover the same ground, 
that is, penetration only of concrete by bombs. 

IV. Explosion 

1. The second set of forces that a structure must withstand when struck by 
a bomb, again assuming sufficient weight of case to prevent breaking up or de- 
formation of the bomb, will be explosion. The main effects of this set of forces 
are true explosion or the disintegrating or displacing force and blast. True 
explosion varies with the charge, tamping factor, and strength of the disinte- 
grated material. Blast causes essentially the same effects as impact: — sudden 
application of force causing shear and bending moment, failure in tension on 
inner surface and some spalling. 

2. Bazant gives the following data for the thickness of concrete just perforated 
by explosion only : 



16] 


Weiglit of bomb 


Thickness just perforated by 
explosion only 


Mass concrete 


Reinforced 
concrete 


Pounds: 

110 .. .. 


2' 0" 
2' 6" 
3' 7" 
5' 5" 
6' 7" 


1' 6" 


220 


1' 10" 


660... 


2' 7" 


2,200 


4' 1" 


4,000... 


4' 11" 







If these data are plotted on logarithmic graph paper, the resulting curves 
will be straight lines as shown on Plate II. As Bazant gives his amounts 
only for mass concrete and reinforced concrete, it is believed that it might be 
advantageous to consider specially/ reinforced concrete, and a curve is drawn on 
the plate for specially reinforced concrete based on a comparison of the unit 
strengths. From these curves may be taken the thickness required to resist 
perforation by explosion of the bombs listed below : 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 
Table 2 



1347 





Thickness just perforated by explosion 
only 


- 

Weight of bomb 


Mass con- 
crete 


Reinforced 
concrete 


Specially 
reinforced 
concrete 




S= 2200 lbs 
per sq. in. 


S= 3200 lbs 
per sq. in. 


S= 5700 lbs 
per sq. in. 


Pounds: 

50 - -- 


1' 6" 
1' 11" 
2' 8" 
3' 7" 
4' 3" 
5' 4" 
6' 7" 


1' 1" 
1' 5" 
1' 11" 
2' 7" 
3' 1" 
3' 10" 
4' 11" 


0' 10" 


100 . ..- 


1' 2" 


250 - - 


1' 6" 


600 


2' 1" 


1000 - 


2' 6" 


2000 - 


3' 1" 


4000 


4' 1" 







3. As far as can be ascertained, there are no comparative American data except 
an isolated table wherein the blast effect on reinforced concrete wall is given 
as follows: 



Type of bomb 

600-1 b. 

1100-lb. 

2000-lb. 



Thickness of wall 

8.0 ft. 

10.4 ft. 

12.3 ft. 



Diameter of hole blasted 
17.2 ft. 

20.8 ft. 
24.6 ft. 



These data are not wholly experimental re.sults but are based in part upon the 
demolition formula 



R=1.22 



Vkc 



[7] 



R=Radius of rupture 

N = Number of pounds of T. N. T. 

K= Factor depending upon the material blasted. 

C= Factor depending upon location and tamping of charge. 



4. It is believed that these results are too high since the value of C in the 
formula is taken as 2, which assumes partial tamping and intimate contact with 
the base of the wall. If a bomb dropped on a horizontal slab perforates the slab, 
and the explosion occurs while the bomb is in the media under the slab, the slab 
itself then acts as part of the tamping and the explosive effect downward on the 
structure will be tremendous. If, however, the bomb does not peri'orute, but 
merely penetrates the concrete to a certain depth, it probably will not be wedged 
in place as the impact force tends to form an impact crater. Thus in the case of 
either an instantaneous explosion or a delayed explosion after penetration (not 
perforation) there is a path of least resistance to the air. In these latter two 
cases, the value of C in the formula will be considerably greater than 2 as assumed 
above. Furthermore, it has been observed during tests with inert bombs that 
concrete targets which are not perforated cause the bomb to rebound after maxi- 
mum penetration has occurred. If the delay action in the fuse is long enough to 
cover the time taken to penetrate and rebound, the explosion would not take place 
in intimate contact with the slab ; in this connection Bazant states "the explosion 
of a bomb rebounding after impact and bursting in the air, produces no noticeable 
effect on the slab." 

5. From the preceding discussion on explosion, the following, cases are arranged 
in order of the probable resulting damage to a structure : 

a. Bomb perforates burster course, and explodes in medium between burster 
and structure. — The burster course actually acts as tamping for the explosion, 
and the damaging effect of the explosion on the structure is tremendous. The 
burster is, therfore, worse than useless as it actually increases the explosive 
force. 

79716 — i6 — Ex. 143, vol. 3 5 



1348 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

6. No surface burster course provided, homh penetrates dirt and otl\er material 
above the structure and eaplodes someirherc above the structure. — Explosive 
effect is tremendous on the structure, but somewhat less than in Case "a." as 
some force is used in cratering. Case a. can approach the maximum effect of a 
camouflet. 

c. 71iick7iess of burster course just sufficient to n^ithstand penetration; delay 
of bomb fuse adjusted so explosion takes place at instant of maximum penetra- 
tion. — The explosion then talies place in intimate contact with concrete, and dis- 
integrates the burster course over a considerable area. Explosive force and 
blast are transmitted to the structure througli medium [8] separating 
the burster course and structure. 

d. Thickness of burster course just s-ufficient to imth.ftand penetration; bomb 
fused instantaneous or with sufficient delay to rebound. — Explosion has a free 
path to the air and no appreciable damage occurs. 

e. Thickness of burster course sufficient to icithstand maximum penetration 
pins additional thickness sufficient to vilhstand perforation by explosion. — 
Maximum attack occurs wlien delay of fuse is sucli that explosion takes place at 
instant of maximum penetration. Additional thickness of concrete however 
resists force of explosion. Some blast effect is transmitted through the slab; 
the amount of this which will react on the structure depends on characteristics 
and thickness of material between burster and structure. In any event, a struc- 
ture with sufficient strength to support intervening material and the burster will 
probably be able to withstand this amount of blast effect. 

V. The "Burster Course" 

1. As stated in paragraph 5, Section II. this pamplilet is primarily concerned 
with a design employing a concrete burster course to withstand the total effect 
of the bomb. The term "burster course" is a misnomer ; actually this layer of 
concrete is the main resisting part of the bombproof structure. The designation 
is used however to avoid introduction and definition of a new term. 

2. The case for which tlie burster course should be designed is outlined in 
Section IV, paragraph 5c. above. The Swiss Federal Commission and the Metz 
(French) Committee assumed that, for roof slabs, the total required thickness 
was the sum of the thickness to resist penetration alone and the thickness to 
resist explosion alone. If this same assumption is made for a solidly supported 
burster course, it can only be criticized as over conservative for it is premised 
upon explosion occuring at the maximum limit of penetration with tlie projectile 
imbedded in the concrete ; upon an angle of im»pact normal to the surface and with 
no deviation during penetration; upon a suflSciently strong casing to withstand 
impact stresses without deformation, and lastly upon a perfectly timed delay 
action fuse. Again, as before, the proper value can be accui'ately determined 
only after careful expei'imentation. The application of this assumption results 
in Table 3 below which shows theoretical thickness to withstand both impact 
and explosion : 

m 

Table 3 



Weight of bomb 


Mass concrete 


Reinforced 
concrete 


Specially 
reinforced 
concrete 




S= 2200 lbs 
per sq. in. 


S =3200 lbs 
per sq. in. 


S=57001bs 
per sq. in. 


Pounds: 

50 - 


3' 3" 
3' 9" 
4' 11" 
6' 3" 
7' 8" 
9' 8" 
12' 2" 


2' 2" 
2' 7" 
3' 4" 
4' 5" 
5' 4" 
6' 10" 
8' 9" 


1' 7" 


100 


2' 0" 


250 


2' 6" 


600 


3' 6" 


1000 


4' 3" 


2000 . . 


o' 5" 


4000 


T 1" 







3. The only comparative American data are for craters in solid rock described 
as granite poi-phyry. The results of bombing in this medium with delay action 
bombs, compare quite closely to the theoretically determined values listed in 
Table 3 for ordinary reinforced concrete. 

4. The distance between bui-ster course and roof of structure must be held 
above minimum allowances for various materials. This is not given directly 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



1349 



in the British pamplilet nor in any other paper available to this office. As a 
point of departure, however, it is believed that the maximum depth required 
in any material would be the depth to which the explosion will penetrate if the 
burster course is sufficient for penetration alone. The maximum depths for 
various materials are plotted as the curves of Plate III from empirical data ex- 
tracted from the British pamphlet. The values so obtained exceed those computed 
by demolition formulae for tamped charges, indicating that if any error exists, 
it is on the side of safety. Table 4 herewith gives the results for the weights 
of bombs discussed in this pamphlet. 

Table 4 • 



Weight of bomb 



Pounds: 
50... 
100.. 
250.. 
600.. 
1,000 
2.000 
4,000 



Earth 


Sand or 
gravel 


13' 0" 


11' 2" 


16' 6" 


14' 0" 


22' 6" 


19' 0" 


30' 4" 


25' 9" 


36' 2" 


30' 9" 


46' 0" 


38' 6" 


58' 2" 


49' 0" 



Soft rock 



6' 10" 

8' 8" 

11' 11" 

16' 0" 

19' 4" 

24' 6" 

31' 0" 



5. If the burster course is designed to withstand both penetration and ex- 
plosion, the depth of supporting medium need be but 25% of the values given 
above, except that a minimum thickness of 3 feet will govern. Anything less 
than three feet will not be adequate for the absorption of the [10] im- 
pact shock and partial failure of the structure roof may result. 

6. The ideal of overhead protection would be an arched burster course designed 
to resist total bomb effect and extended to prevent flank attack with no inter- 
vening material, save air, between the course and the structure below. Air is 
considered the optimum medium because it exerts the greatest dampening effect 
(exclusive of vacuum conditions) on the propagation of pressure waves and 
would consequently minimize impact loads on the structure proper. The enor- 
mous expense and the engineering difficulties attendant upon the construction 
of arched slabs of the required size and strength are prohibitive and make this 
solution impractical. 

VI. Lateral Protection. 

1. In order to protect the structure beneath from oblique attack by bombs, 
it is necessary that the burster course extend beyond the structure walls in all 
directions. The theoretical distance of extension should be not less than the 
radius of destruction of a bomb in the medium supporting the slab or surrounding 
the structure and preferably somewhat more. The radius of destruction or 
"effective radius" is defined as that of a sphere within the surface of which the 
explosion will completely shatter or displace all material. Calculation of this 
distance may proceed from the formula 



R=2.5 






Where C=Explosive content (lbs.) 

a=Resistance coefficient of material penetrated 
b= Coefficient of tamping 
R=Radius in feet. 

2. For preliminary purposes, the radius of destruction may be taken as equal 
to the depth of penetration of bombs in various materials. As stated under the 
discussion of impact, no exact formula has yet been derived for the determination 
of the depth of bomb penetration. Poncelet's formula, as modified by the Metz 
Committee, 

S=K.|lf (V) 

Where K=a constant 

M=mass of projectile 
d=diameter 
V=impact velocity 



1350 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAEL HARBOR ATTACK 

gives the best approximation. Plate VI, as extracted from the British pamplilet, 
is based upon this formula, aud gives the depth of penetration [11 ] as a 

function of impact velocity. To obtain the penetration of any bomb with a given 
impact velocity, the value obtained from the table is multiplied by the bomb's 
sectional density (weight in pounds of projectile divided by maximum cross sec- 
tional area in square inches). 

3. As an illustration of the required overhang : — ^Assume an underground struc- 
ture, protected by overhead layer of sand and gravel and surface buster course, 
is attacked by a ICO-lb. bomb (sectional density of 2 78 lbs. per square inch) 
dropped from 14.(XX) feet. Impact velocity is determined to be 820 feet per 
second with a possible gravel i)en'etration of 11'5". which can also be taken as 
the radius of destruction. To prevent the effect of explosion from reacting on 
the structure proper, the overhang must be at least 11'5". 

(A diagram relating to Paragraj^h 3, supra, is reproduced as Item 
:N"o. 17 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.) 

4. This amount of overhang increases with the weight of bomb to be resisted. 
It is apparent that the cost of this extension of the burster course will be high. 
It is also apparent that many structures must have one face exposed. Theo- 
retically it is possible to overhang the burster course over this exposed face by 
tin elaborate arch construction ; this, however, will be impracticable due to exces- 
sive expense and difficulties in construction. This exposed face must then be 
designed to withstand the total effect of an oblique attack by bombs. The line of 
lall will be almost parallel to the sui'face, and hence there will be no appreciable 
"penetration. The worst force on the face will be the explosion of an instantane- 
ously fused bomb, and the lace will have to be designed to withstand this force. 
The data in Table 2 above for the thickness of concrete to resist penetration 
{12} by explosion is for a solidly supported slab ; the exnosed face will not be 
Solidly supported, and will require some additional thickness and special rein- 
forcement to resist the shear and bonding forces of the explcsion. A concrete 
apron should extend beyond the exposed face as a burster course to prevent bombs 
from exploding under the floor level ; it should not be integxtilly tied to the struc- 
ture proper in order to avoid transmission of impact shocks. This extension 
should have sufficient thickness to withstand penetration, and should extend 
sufficiently far from the exposed face to insure that the force of explosion of a 
bomb striking just beyond the extension does not impose an irresistable load 
on the floor of the structure. 

5. Another condition influences the determination of the necessary overhang. 
It is known that explosives can be exploded by sympathetic detonation from 
the explosion of other charges. The distance at which this occurs is a function 
of the medium through which the detonating wave passes, of the size of the chai'ge 
and intensity of the initiating explosion and of the sensitivity of the charge 
which is sympathetically detonated. In ordinary soils and with ordinary explo- 
sives, this distance at which a sympathetic explosion may be induced by the 
explosion of a bomb charge may lie greater than the radius of destruction dis- 
cussed above. In a bombproofed magazine, the concrete walls, floor and ceiling 
will resist transmission of this detonating wave. A discussion of the determi- 
nation of this minimum distance from consideration of the separate resistances 
of the surrounding medium and the concrete of the magazine is beyond the scope 
of this pamphlet. Uidess this point is considered in the design of a magazine, it 
might be possible for the magazine to be destroyed through sympathetic detona- 
tion of its contents by the explosion of a bomb even though the design might 
insure against structural damage from the bomb explosion. 

6. The path of a bomb penetrating earth is rarely a continuation of the regidar 
curve of its fall through the air. It is deviated by local obstructions, and the 
total length of path can exceed the depth penetrated by as much as 30%. This 
path is often concave to the surface of the earth and may turn upward at the 
end. It is therefore evident that a bomb striking near the edge of the burster 
course might be deviated under the burster course and that the effective overhang 
would be decreased. This condition might be combatted by ending the burster 
course in a vertical or oblique curtain wall of relatively thin section and of a 
depth below the burster course determined by the size of bomb to be resisted. 

VII. Under-ground shelters 

1. If the structure can be located under the surface of the ground, the location 
should be investigated to determine characteristics of the ground material. If 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1351 

the material is rock, it should be again further checked to see whether the rock 
is solid and if so the kind and strength of the rock ; if not, whether it is frac- 
tured or weathered and the depth to which such fracturing or weathering has 
penetrated. If the overhead cover is good hard rock and the structure can be 
placed at a sufficient depth below the surface, a concrete burster course will be 
unnecessary. If, however, the rock is soft or not solid and the structure cannot 
be placed deep enough to obtain the minimum overhead cover required, the rock 
can be reinforced by addition [13] of a concrete burster course at the 
surface. In the ca.se of dirt cover, the concrete burster course should be assumed 
to take all the necessary force from the bomb due to penetration and explosion. 
If the burster course is designed so light that the bomb penetrates completely 
before explosion, the burster course will act as an additional tamping to the 
charge, and the explosion will be directed downward, thereby probably causing 
more damage than if the burster course were not used at all. 

2. Assuming that a surface burster course is necessary and the proper thick- 
ness determined from tables, it is particularly important that the design and 
construction procedure be carefully checked to ascertain that the unit strengths 
given in the tables are actually obtained. 

3. The aggregate and cement should comply with proper specifications; the 
former should be as heavy as possible, since it has been found that light aggre- 
gate is less resistant. Continuous depositing will be of advantage ; water/cement 
ratio should be kept to minimum requirements. Any decrease in workability can 
be offset by proper use of vibrators. 

4. Burster course slabs should always be reinforced in three directions. Rein- 
forcing steel should be placed in such a manner that the concrete will have the 
necessary unit strength in both tension and compression. It is highly important 
that a proportionate share of the steel be placed to resist shear. The bond 
strength between the ^steel and the concrete is very important. It has been found 
that a much lower allowable bond strength is necessary in bombproof design 
than in ordinary concrete design, and a large number of small bars should be 
used rather than the equivalent weight of larger sizes. On the subject of rein- 
forcement, the British pamphlet states : 

"The localised effect of a direct hit is to detach the concrete leaving the 
reinforcement bare and comparatively uninjured. This eliect seems to be 
accentuated if the reinforcement is either of large cross section, as for 
example when old rails are used, or is laid in a plane along which a line 
cleavage can be formed, as for example when a close mesh reinforcement is 
laid in sheets. Some writers explain the detachment of the concrete from 
the steel as due to the difference in the speed with which a sound-wave 
travels in the two materials. The effect of a powerful vibration running 
through the steel ahead of that in the concrete is sui'posed to break down 
the adhesion between the two materials. Accordingly, i-t has been suggested 
that the area of surface contact between steel and concrete should be large 
compared with the cross-sectional area of the steel, and that as a working 
rule the diameter of reinforcing bars should not be more than 3/4 inch or less 
than 3/8 inch. The upper is considered to be too low and mu.st give place 
to sizes determined by the ordinary code of practice." 

5. In thick slabs, it is advisable to provide horizontal layers of [IJf] two- 
way reinforcement on 6" or 8" centers with the vertical distance between layers 
about 6" or 8". To counteract failure along a line of cleavage, vertical and 
diagonal reinforcement should be ample and securely tied into horizontal steel. 
As another means of overcoming the effect of vibratory wave detaching the steel 
from the concrete, bars of extra deformed type should be used. 

6. Regular engineering formulae will apply to the design of the underground 
structure itself. The roof and walls should be designed to take care of, in addi- 
tion to their own weight, the dead load of the overhead cover. As an added 
factor of safety, the design of the structure should provide for resistance against 
impact calculated as a distributed load, in conformity with "cone of pressure" 
theory. As a precaution against possible spalling frnm the underside of the 
roof, a close mesh layer of reinforcement may be provided or the ceiling may 
be steel plated. Roof spans should be kept as short as is consistent with storage 
or shelter requirements. 

7. If the shelter is of the cut and cover variety, the back fill must have ample 
time to settle before the placing of the burster course. Likewise there should be 
no means of lateral displacement of the supporting medium afterwards. For if 
subsidence or sidewise movement does occur, the .slab ceases to be solidly sup- 



1352 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

ported and its resistance to penetration and/or explosion is decreased. In tlie 
case of a shelter with an exposed face, it may be expedient to construct a retain- 
ing wall to prevent this ; under no circumstances, however, should the foot of 
the retaining wall be connected to the structure below, for tlie transmission of 
the concussion shock tlu'ough the concrete might result in partial or complete 
failure of the underground installation. 

VIII. Surface shelters 

1. There will be many structures requiring varying degrees of protection wliich 
for any of several reasons cannot be placed underground. It can be assumed, 
from what has preceded, that for the.se installations protection can only be at- 
tained against direct hits of the lighter bombs. "A roof which could be relied 
upon to resist the attack of a heavy bomb ( ^ r)00# ) implies a thickness of mate- 
rial so great that its mere weight, apart from the impact load, would require 
supports of impractical dimensions." The resort to conical or parabolic shelters 
is no solution as the difficulties of construction are greatly increased. The pro- 
tection of surface shelters, then, has definite limitations. 

2. In design of roof slabs, full cognizance must be taken of impact load, pene- 
tration and explosion. The necessary thickness to resist the latter two effects 
may be approximated from the foregoing tables. No definite procedure has been 
developed for determining proper design to resist Ihe momentary impact load, 
save by converting the kinetic energy {t5\ at impact into an equivalent 
static force. This is not quite correct, since the effect is one of shock action and 
the load abruptly ceases. It is therefore possible that considerable deforma- 
tion and yielding could be produced without resultant failure of the slab. 

3. It is generally felt that in the case of multi-storied buildings resistance to 
perforation by total effect is not economically attainable ; however, the effect of 
a high explosive bomb detonating after perforation of roof slab can be minimized 
by construction of steel girder or reinforced concrete framed buildings with 
non-load bearing wall panels. Destruction of one or more wall panels will not 
result in collapse of the structure and will reduce damage caused by falling debris. 
Experience in Spain and China has shown that the same weight and type of 
bomb which completely destroyed buildings with solid load bearing walls, damaged 
steel and concrete framed buildings to an amazingly small extent. Floors must 
be reinforced to support debris load from the higher stories. Since the angle 
of impact will vary from 60° to 90°, foundations are liable to flank attack and 
should be designed to give maximum load distribution, reducing the pn.ssibility 
that one chance hit will cause partial or complete collapse. 

4. Structures which can be designed to resist perforation containing machinei'y 
or instruments easily damaged should be further protected by installation of a 
metal .soffit below the ceiling proper to deflect spalls and scabs. Warehouses 
of inflammable supplies should be able to resist perforation by incendiary bombs. 

5. Aside from protection against direct hits, surface structures must be de- 
signed to resist two other effects of bombs exploding in the open, namely (1) 
blast and (2) fragmentation. 

6. The detonation of an II. B. bomb sets in motion a "shock wave" of positive 
pressure followed immediately by a rarefaction or negative pressure phase. As 
the wave strikes structures and rebounds, it exerts a force in each of two direc- 
tions successively. It has been discovered that walls with equal lateral resist- 
ance to pressure and suction have failed in suction despite the fact that the 
intensity of the rarefaction phase is considerably less than the positive pressure 
phase (though of longer duration). There are several explanations of this seem- 
ing contradiction: — (1) The px-essure wave weakens the walls and thereby 
accentuates the suction action; (2) The blast enforces translatory earth move- 
ment which acts on the foundations in a direct opposite to the suction, thereby 
forming an overturning couple. 

7. External walls should be adequately reinforced against both lateral positive 
pressure and suction. They should be securely tied to cross walls. As mentioned 
previously, non-load bearing external walls are [/^] preferred in order 
to minimize damage to the complete structure in event of wall failure. 

9. The detonation of a bomb projects casing fragments with high velocity at 
all angles from horizontal up to 60°. These fragments attain velocities up to 
7000 feet per second in a very short distance, and have an effective range of about 
200 vards, at which penetration is appreciable. This visualizes detonation of 
the bomb on impact ; for delay action bomb penetrating prior to exploding, the 
effective range is considerably less. Based on experimental results, the following 
table gives the thickness of material required for protection against fragments : 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



1353 



,, ^ . , Thickness, 

Material inches 

Mild steel plate or plates of an aggregate thickness not less than 1% 

Solid brickwork or masoury, not less than 131^ 

Reinforced concrete, not less than 12 

Ordinary concrete, not less than 15 

Earth or sand, not less than 30 

Ballast, or broken stone, not less than 24 

10. To a limited extent, fragments will cause detachment of spalls from the 
inner surfaces of walls and doors, although their minute size will make any 
possible damage relatively unimportant. 

IX. Conclusions 

1. It is desired to point out that the data which have been presented are for 
maximum conditions; thus for example Table 3, which gives required thickness 
■of burster course to resist the total effect of bombs, is based upon the maximum 
penetrative effect and maximum explosive effect occurring consecutively. la 
actual practice with the bombs in use today, these two factors are mutually op- 
posed. In order that penetration may be secured without deformation, the thick- 
ness of casing required greatly reduces the quantity of explosive which may 
be placed in the bomb ; the same bomb in order to create the maximum explosive 
effect must be lightly cased, and in all probability will shatter on impact. The 
fact remains, however, that it is conceivable that casings may be developed for 
the H. E. projectiles in use which will permit maximum penetration without 
deformation at no reduction in explosive content and with no appreciable increase 
in total weight. This is an eventuality which must be foreseen, and structures 
designed accordingly. 

2. The protection against bombardment of installations vital to the defense 
must be considered at the time of their construction. Any attempt to bombproof 
an existing building built according to commercial practice will, in nine cases 
c-ut of ten, prove futile. 

[i7] 3. If bombproofing new structures is found impracticable, the alterna- 
tives of protection by dispersion and concealment still remain. Choice of proper 
location is of the greatest importance. Advantageous use of existing terrain 
features will eliminate many problems of the defense while increasing those of 
the attacker. 

4. This pamphlet is purely introductory. The design of bombproofs must of 
necessity be based largely on theoretical considerations and intelligent guess- 
work ; there is no opportunity to accumulate corroborative experience as there 
is in other types of engineering design. The subject offers a wide field for 
investigation and experimentation by those interested. Of the subject matter 
available to date, the British pamphlet, "Air Raid Precautions Handbook No. 5," 
and Information Bulletin No. 39, Subject : "The Design of Air Raid Shelters," 
Office, Chief of Engineers, 15 January, 1940, are highly recommended. 



Table I — Impact velocities 

[Feet per second] 





[18] Weight of Bomb 


Altitude at release 




10,000' 


15,000' 


20,000' 


Pounds: 

50 


745 
765 
775 
805 
810 
800 


850 
875 
885 
925 
935 
925 


925 


100 


950 


250 


960 


600 . 


1005 


1000 .. 


1020 


2000 


1000 


4000 . . 













Air speed of plane at moment of release=200 mph. 



(The last portion of this Exhibit consists of four plates illustrating 
by graphs (1) Penetration of Concrete Slab, (2) Thickness of Con- 
crete Slab Just Perforated by Explosion, (3) Depth Penetrated by 



1354 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Explosion on Surface of Various Materials, and (4) Approximate 
Depth of Penetration for Unit Sectional Density of Bomb, all of 
which refer to the action of falling bombs. These plates are repro- 
duced as Items Nos. 18, 19, 20 and 21 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRA- 
TIONS, Roberts Commission.) 



Exhibit No. 12 (Navy, Packet No. 1) Robebts Commission 

Honolulu, T. H., December 22, 1941. 
The President, 

The White House, 

Washington, D. C. 
Sir: We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social organi- 
sations in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest 
in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hei'eby wish to express our sincere 
appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by 
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short. 

We have found him at all times to be most coojperative and furthermore he 
has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for 
an emei'gency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan 
for this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such 
plan. 

General Short's thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas 
to our Territorial Legislature, to our local officials, and to our community in 
general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound 
"M-Day" Bill; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard; (c) for the decision 
to increase stored food and to produce food; and (d) for the prevention of 
sabotage. He has shown a correct and a sympathetic attitude toward the 
problems of the civil community in assuring cooperation of civilians. 

He has maintained a high morale in his Command and has conducted "alerts" 
from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing the troops and with plans, 
now looking for financing from federal funds, for adequate and safe storage of 
sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a probably emer- 
gency. 

We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go 
into various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have 
selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned. 

Meanwhile, we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high 
esteem and our full confidence in the character and ability of General Walter 
C. Short as a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be. 

This letter is prepared without the knowledge or consent of General Short 
or any other officials, merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may 
accrue to the record of such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse 
publicity or otherwise. This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest 
in the adequate defense of Hawaii and our Nation. 
With very best respects and wishes, we are 
Yours very truly, 

Lester Petrie, Mayor, City of Honolulu : C. R. Hemenway, President 
Hawaiian Trust Co., Ltd.; A. L. Dean, Vice President, Alexander 
& Baldwin ; Walter F. Dillingham, President Oahu Railway & 
Land Co. ; F. D. Lowrey, President Lewis Cooke, Ltd. ; H. H. 
Warner, Asst. Food Administrator, Oahu ; J. B. Poindoxter, 
Governor of Hawaii ; S. B. Kemp, Chief Justice Supreme Court ; 
T. G. S. Walker, Director Civilian Defense Oahu ; .John E. Rus.sell, 
President Theo. H. Davies & Son ; George V. Waterhouse, 2d Vice 
Pres. Bishop National Bank of Hawaii ; Cyril F. Dawson, Ex. Vice 
Pres. Bishop Trust Co. Ltd. ; Briant H. Wells, Executive V. Pres. 
Hawaiian Sugar Planters; H. A. Walker, President American 
Factors, Ltd. ; A.M. Lowrey, Treasurer American Factors, Ltd. ; 
P. S. Spalding, President C. Brewer & Co., Ltd. ; Frank E. Midkiflf, 
Trustee, Bernlce P. Bishop Estate; Edward R. T. Doty, Terr. 
Director of Civilian Defense; James Winne, Mgr. Mdse. Dept., 
Alexander & Baldwin (now acting as Food Administrator and 
Supply Officer). 

c.c. to General Walter C. Short. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1355 

Wae Department, 
Office of the Administrative Assistant, 

Washington, January 15, 19It2. 
Memorandum for Brig. General Joseph T. McNarney, c/o Secretary of General 
Staff : 
The attached letter with reference to Lieutenant General Walter C. Short 
is transmitted to you for the information of the Commission appointed by the 
President to investigate the Japanese attack of December 7, 1941 on Hawaii. 

John W. Martyn, 
John W. Martyn, 
Administrative Assistant. 



The White House, 
Washington, January 5, 19-^. 
Respectfully referred to the Secretary of War. 

Edwin M. Watson, 
Edwin M. Watson, 
Secretary to the President. 



Exhibit No. 13 (Navt, Packet No. 1) Roberts Commission 

[1] Navt Db3»abtment, 

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

Washington, D. 0. 

PRECIS OF TESTIMONY GIVEN BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S INVES- 
TIGATING COMMISSION 

Statements by Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N., Chief of Naval OPEajATiONs; 
Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, U. S. N., Director of War Plans Division, 
Office of Naval Operations ; and by Captain T. H. Wilkinson, U. S. N., 
Director, Naval Intelligence Division, Office of Naval Operations 

BRIEF of admiral STARK'S TESTIMONY 

In reply to a question by the Commission as to whether or not the Navy 
Department had been of opinion that war was impending with Japan, and had 
forwarded any warning to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral 
Stark stated it had been his belief that war with Japan was imminent. He 
read several despatches which had been sent to both Army and Navy forces, 
after agreement between himself and General Marshall, and stated that the 
Secretaries of War and Navy and the President had approved the transmission 
of these messages. He read the messages referred to, which are slightly para- 
phrased as follows : 

(a) Despatch from the Chief of Naval Operations on July 25, 1941, to the 
Commanders in Chief, Pacific, Asiatic, and Atlantic Fleets, the Commandant 
of the 15th Naval District (Canal Zone), and the Special Naval Observer in 
London (Vice Admiral Ghormley). 

"This is a despatch prepared jointly by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of 
Naval Operations. You will deliver copies to the Commanding Generals in the 
Philippines, Hawaii, and Panama, and also to General Chaney in London. Ad- 
miral Ghormley will inform the British Chief of Naval Staff. 

"On July 26th the United States will impose economic sanctions on Japan, 
which will embargo all trade, subject to modificaton through a licensing system 
for certain materials. Japanese funds and assets will be [2] frozen unless 
their transfer is licensed. Japanese merchant ships in United States ports 
will not be seized at this time, and our own merchant vessels for the time 
being will not be ordered to avoid Japanese ports. We do not expect an im- 
mediate hostile military reaction by Japan, but you are given this advice in 
order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against any pos- 
sible eventualities. Action is being initiated by the Army to mobilize the 
Philippine Army in the near future. Keep this despatch secret except from 
your immediate subordinates." 



1356 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(b) A despatch released by the Chief of Naval Operations on October 16, 1941, 
to the Commanders in Chief, Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic Fleets : 

"The fall of the Konoye Cabinet has created a grave situation. Should 
Konoye remain in power this resignation will cancel his previous mandate 
and his new mandate will not include reapproachment with the United States. 
Should a new cabinet be formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and 
anti-American. Hostilities between the Soviet and Japan are a strong possi- 
bility. The United States and the United Kingdom are held responsible by 
Japan for her present despei-ate situation. Therefore, it is a possibility that 
Japan may attack these two Powers. Consequently, you will take due pre- 
cautions, including preparatory deployments for war, but these should not 
disclose your strategic plan nor should they be so made as to be construed 
as provocation of Japan. Addresses will inform Army and naval district au- 
thorities of the contents of this despatch." 

(c) On October 17, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent the following 
despatch to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet: 

"As you know, the Army is now reeuforcing the Philippines by air with 
longrange bombers. I consider it of great importance to continue this move- 
ment. For this reason take all practicable precautions to insure the safety 
of the flying fields at Midway Island and Wake Islands." 

(d) On November 24, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a despatch 
to the Commanders in Chief, Asiatic, Pacific, and Atlantic Fleets, and the Com- 
mandants of the 11th (San Diego), 12th (San Francisco), 13th (Puget Sound), 
and the 15th (Canal Zone) Naval Districts and to Vice Admiral Ghormley in 
London. A paraphrased copy of the same despatch was sent to the Governor 
of Guam. This despatch read : 

The present series of negotiations with Japan have very doubtful chance 
of a favorable outcome. When this fact is considered together with recent 
statements by members of tlie .Japanese Government, and recent movements of 
[3] their naval and military forces, it is my opinion that there is a possi- 
bility of a surprise aggressive movement in any direction by Japan, including 
attack on the Philippines and Guam. The Chief of Staff concurs and asks you 
to inform appropriate Army officers. Treat this information with the utmost 
secrecy in order not to make worse a tense situation or precipitate action by 
Japan." 

(e) On November 27, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations transmitted the 
following despatch to the Commanders in Chief, Asiatic, Pacific, and Atlantic 
Fleets, and Vice Admiral Ghormley in London : 

"You are to consider this despatch as a war warning. Our conversations with 
Japanese officials regarding the stabilization of the Pacific are ended and we 
expect Japan to make an aggressive move within the next few days. The 
organization of Japanese naval task forces, and the numbers and equipment of 
the troops which they have assembled point toward an amphibious expedition 
against the Philippines, Siam, the Kru Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. Take 
appropriate defensive deployments in preparation for the execution of the 
tasks of our current joint war plan. Give a copy to officials of the districts 
and the Army. General Marshall is sending out a similar warning. Ghormley 
inform British. The Naval Districts on the continent and the authorities 
at Guam and Samoa have been directed hv- yett to take measures against 
sabotage." (Note: Admiral Stark here invited attention to the fact that except 
for about 150 marines and 450 naval officers and ratings on naval district craft 
and ashore at Guam, that island had no defenses whatsoever. The war plan 
did not contemplated defense, but merely destruction of facilities which might 
be used by an enemy who captured the island.) 

(f) On the same date, November 27, 1941, the War Department transmitted 
the following despatch to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department: 
(Note: A similar despatch was sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army 
Forces in the Far East.) 

"For all practical purposes conversations with Japan have ended. There 
is however a minor possibility that these talks will be resumed. I cannot pre- 
dict the future action of the Japanese, but hostile action by^ them is possible 
at any moment. If hostilites cannot he averted, our Government desires that 
Japan commit the first overt act, but this policy should not be construed as 
confining you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Before 
hostile action by Japan may commence, I direct that you undertake reconnais- 
sance and other measures deemed necessary although these should not be so 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1357 

obvious as to alarm civilians nor to disclose your plans. [4] Report 
what measures you take. In the event of hostilities you will execute the cur- 
rent war plan tasks so far as they relate to Japan. The circulation of this 
vex'y secret information should be limited." 

(g) On the same date, November 27, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations 
sent to the Commandants of all continental naval districts, the Caribbean, the 
Canal Zone, the Navy Yard, Washington, and Guam and Samoa, warnings con- 
cerning the critical state of the negotiations with Japan, and the imminent 
probability of the extension of military operations by Japan. 

Admiral Stark also referred to other warnings concerning the destruction of 
codes by exposed Japanese and United States diplomatic officials and forces. 
He did not read these despatches, which later were presented by Captain 
Wilkinson. For the sake of continuity, the despatches which came to the 
knowledge of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, follows : 

(a) On December 3, 1941, a priority despatch was sent to the Commanders 
in Chief, Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, and the Commandants of the 14th (Hawaii) 
and 16th (Philippines) Naval Districts as follows: 

"We have definite advices which must be believed that yesterday the Gov- 
ernment of Japan sent categorical and urgent orders to its consular and diplo- 
matic officials in Manila, Batavia, Singapore, Hong Kong. London, and Wash- 
ington, to destroy at once all but one of their codes and also to burn important 
secret and confidential papers." ^ 

(b) On December 4, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent this despatch to 
the Naval Station at Guam, with information to the Commanders in Chief, 
Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, and the Commandants of the 14th and 16th Naval 
Districts : 

"Guam is directed to destroy all secret and confidential publications, codes, 
and correspondence with certain exceptions (which were listed). In the 
event of emergency, destroy the matter which is excepted." 

(c) On December 6, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the Com- 
mander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, with information to the Commander in Chief, 
Asiatic Fleet, the following despatch : 

"Because of tlie situation of international affairs and the exposed position of 
the outlying islands which are under your command you may authorize them to 
destroy secret and confidential documents now, or under conditions of greater 
emergency [5] which may develop later. They should retain until the last 
minute only those codes required for the support of our current operations." 
(Noie: Several other despatches were sent to other outlying naval attaches and 
forces, but the Commander in Chief. Pacific Fleet, was not informed of this 
because tliese were not under his .jurisdiction.) 

Admiral Stark, in reply to questions, indicated that the despatches referring 
to attacks and expeditions against positions in the Far East, conveyed to the 
military offir-ers of the Far East and the Pacific his and General Marshall's 
opinion that the Far East would be the locality where the major sustained 
Japanese effort would be initiated. While Hawaii was not specifically . men- 
tioned as a point of attack in these despatches, a number of letters had been sent 
out during the previous year concerning the defense of the Pacific Fleet and Pearl 
Harbor against sudden raids. The Navy generally had always kent in mind the 
surprise attack by Japan on the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur in 1004, and always 
expected that war with Japan would be initiated without warning, while diplo- 
matic negotiations were still in progress. 

STATEMENT BY REAR AOMIRAL R. K. TURNER, U. S. NAVT, DIRECTOR, WAR PLANS DIVISION 

Rear Admiral Turner stated that for several months there had been in the pos- 
session of the commanders of the naval operating forces and of army commanders 
War and Navy Department war plans which envisaged exactly the war in which 
the United States is now engaged. These plans had originated in agreements 
made between United States and British Commonwealth military offi -ials. The 
Netherlands East Indies had participated in drawing no plans for the Far East 
Area. From these international plans, the Army and Navy had prepared joint 
plans, and then each Service had issued its own basic plan. The Commanders in 
Cbief of the Fleets some months ago had. in turn, issued to their principal sub- 
ordinates their own operation plans, and the operating forces of the entire Navy 
had been distributed between fleets, organized into task groups, and assigned 

^ SECRET — Suggest this not be mentioned in report 



1358 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tasks appropriate to the plans. As a part of the plan, the major portion of the 
Pacific Fleet was to base on Pearl Harbor. 

There is a publication entitled "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy. 1935", 
which is considered an integral part of all Army and Navy Joint War Plans. 
This book clearly allocates responsibility to the two services for certain general 
fields of military effort. In each of these fields, one service [G] has 
primary responsibility, and is entitled to cooperation by the other service. The 
sub-division of responsibility relating to resistance to attack on the Fleet and 
Oahu is shown in the following verbatim extracts from "Joint Action", the num- 
bers and letters referring to paragraphs of that publication. Intervening para- 
graphs, applicable to situations other than those at Pearl Harbor, are omitted. 
"3. Common mission of Army and Navy. . . . Conjointly and in cooperation 
to defend the territory of the United States against all enemies, foreign or 
domestic ; to protect and promote the interests and policies of the United States 
in peace and in war." 

"5. General functions of the Arm,y in peace and war. 

"(2) To defend the continental United States and its overseas possessions, to 
include the defense of all permanent naval bases." 

"5. b. Additional general functions of the Army in war. 

"(2) To conduct operations in support of the Navy for the establishment and 
defense of naval bases." 

"6. a. General functions of the Navy in peace and war. 

"(2) To guard the continental and overseas possessions of the United States." 
"6. b. Additional general functions of the Navy in war. 

"(2) To gain and maintain command of vital sea areas and to protect the sea 
lanes vital to the United States." 
"19. Coastal Frontier Defense. 

"b. The general function of the Army in coastal frontier defense is to conduct 
military operations in direct defense of United States territory. 

"c. The specific functions of the Army in coastal frontier defense are : 
"(1) To provide and operate the mobile land and air forces required for the 
direct defense of the coast. 

"(2) To provide, maintain, and operate essential harbor defenses, 
"d. In carrying out these functions, the Army will provide and operate or 
maintain — 

[7] "(1) Guns on land, both fixed and mobile, with necessary search- 
lights and fire-control installations. 

"(2) Aircraft operating in support of harbor defenses; in general coastal 
frontier defense ; in support of or in lieu of naval forces. 

"(3) A communication and intelligence system to include aircraft warn- 
ing service among the elements of the land defenses, with provisions for 
the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy. 
"(5) A system of underwater listening posts. 
"e. The general function of the Navy in coastal frontier defense is to con- 
duct naval operations to gain and maintain command of vital sea areas and to 
protect the sea lanes vital to the United States, thereby contributing to the de- 
fense of the coastal frontiers. 
"f . The specific functions of the Navy in coastal frontier defense are : 

"(2) To conduct naval operations directed toward the defeat of any 
enemy forces in the vicinity of the coast. 

"(3) To support the Army in repelling attacks on coastal objectives, 
"g. In carrying out these functions the N'avy will : 
"(1) Provide and operate — 

"(a) A system of offshore scouting and patrol to give timely warning 
of an attack, and, in addition, forces to operate against enemy forces in 
the vicinity of the coast. 

"(b) A communication and intelligence system among the elements of 
the sea defense, with provisions for the prompt exchange of information 
or instructions with the Army. 

"(c) Contact mines, nets, and booms, including the vessels necessary for 
their installations and maintenance. 

"(d) Inshore patrols for the protection of minefields and underwater 
obstructions other than beach defenses; for the control and protection of 
shipping in passage through defensive sea areas; for the control of ship- 
ping in defensive coastal areas, and for the prevention of enemy mining 
and submarine operations. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1359 

[8] "(e) Underwater listening posts for naval use where this service 
cannot be obtained from Army listening posts. 

"(2) Provide and maintain such fixed underwater obstructions as are 
component parts of Navy barrages; including the vessels necessary for 
their installations and maintenance. 

"20. General Functions (of Army and Navy Air Components). 

"a. It is the general function of Army and Navy air components, respectively, 
to conduct the air operations derived from the approved respective functions 
of the Army and Navy . Under this policy : 

"(1) The air component of the Army conducts air operations over the land 
and such air operations over the sea as are incident to the accomplishment of 
Army functions. 

"(2) The air component of the Navy conducts air operations over the sea 
and such air operations over the land as are incident to the accomplishment 
of Navy functions." 

"21. Primary Functions. 

"a. The air component of each service has a primary function to which its 
principal efforts are to be directed, both in peace and in war. 

"b. These primary functions are : 

"(1) The Army Air component to operate as an arm of the mobile Army, both 
in the conduct of air operations over the land in support of land operations 
and in the conduct of air operations over the sea in direct defense of the coast. 

"(2) The Navy air component to operate as an arm of the Fleet." 

"22. Secondary Air Functions. 

"a. Secondary functions of the air component of the Army are : 

"(2) Air operations in connection with the defense of important industrial 
centers and military and naval installations. 

"h. Secondary functions of the air component of the Navy are : 

"(1) Air operations, by aircraft forming part of naval local defense forces, 
for the patrol of the coastal zones and for the protection of shipping therein." 

"23. Provisions to minimize diiplication. 

"a. The functions assigned to the Army air component require the Army to 
provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily [9] designed for use 
in support of military operations, or in the direct defense of the land and coastal 
frontiers of continental United States and its ovei'seas possessions, or in repelling 
air raids directed at shore objectives or at shipping within our harbors, or in 
supporting naval forces to insure freedom of action of the fleet. 

"b. The functions assigned to the Navy air component require the Navy to 
provide and maintain all types of aircraft primarily designed and ordinarily 
used in operations from aircraft carriers and other vessels, or based on aircraft 
tenders, or for operations from shorebases for observation, scouting and patrolling 
over the sea, and for the protection of shipping, in the coastal zones. These 
aircraft may be required to operate effectively over the sea to the maximum dis- 
tance within the capacity of aircraft development." 

For the purpose of defining what has been referred to as "coastal frontier", 
the following is quoted from "Joint Action" : 

"26. a. A coastal frontier is a geographical division of our coastal area estab- 
lished for organization and command purposes, in order to insure the effective 
coordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. 
The coastal frontier of a group of islands shall completely surround such group 
or shall include the part of the group which can be organized for defense and 
command purposes. Within each coastal frontier an army officer and a naval 
officer will exercise command over all army forces and navy forces, respectively, 
assigned for the defen.se of these divisions. Coastal frontiers are subdivided 
for command purposes into sectors and subsectors." 

The defense of the various coastal frontiers is, by various war plans, assigned 
to different "categories". The current war plan assigned to the Hawaiian 
CJoastal Frontier (Army and Navy) is "Defense Category D". A definition of 
this category is as follows : 

"31. d. Category D. — Coastal frontiers that may be subject to major attack. 
Under this category the coastal frontier areas should, in general, be provided 
with the means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval 
operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of defense will 
generally find application, and a stronger outpost and a more extensive patrol, 



1360 COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

inshore and offshore, than for Cate.gorv C. will be required. Under this category- 
certain defensive sea areas and maritime control areas will be established. In 
addition, an antiaircraft gnn and machine gun defense of important areas outside 
of harbor defenses should be organized : general reserves should be strategically 
located so as to facilitate a prompt reeuforcement of the frontiers; [iO] 
and plans should be developed for the defense of specific areas likely to become 
theaters of operations. Longrange air reconnaissance will be provided and plans 
made for use of the GHQ air force." 

Rear Admiral Turner stated that Admiral Stark desired him to bring out 
clearly the fact that the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and the Com- 
mandant of the 14th Naval District, as well as the entire Navy Department, had 
for a long time been very greatly concerned over the inadequacy of the defenses 
of the base at Pearl Harbor and the inadequacy of the naval patrol of nearby 
waters. Every effort, consistent with the requirements of other naval areas, 
and within the limitations of available funds and material priorities, had been 
made to correct deficiencies. The witness pointed out that, in his opinion, this 
Blatter of preparedness for attack had two aspects: First, the availability of 
proper and adequate defensive material : and second, the readiness of the 
personnel to use the material on hand, whether adequate or not. 

The division of responsibility between the Army and the Navy is such that the 
Army provides all of the antiaircraft weapons mounted on shore for the pro- 
tection of fleet bases. In addition, the Navy has long recognized that the anti- 
aircraft batteries of ships in port must be ready for use during raid.*. The only 
naval antiaircraft batteries on shore at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 were 
those of one marine defense battalion, being held in readiness there for expedi- 
tionary service. 

The antiaircraft defenses of the ships, while not as good as was desired, had 
"been considerably improved in recent months. 

The Chief of Naval Operations had issued directives early in 1940 conceming 
the nets, anti-motor boat booms, and fixed devices for detecting submarines 
attempting to enter the harbor. Plans had been made, work had progressed, and 
the nets, booms, and harbor control posts were in place and functioning. The 
numbers of small vessels and naval aircraft for offshore patrol were not great 
enough, solely because additional craft could not be obtained in time, in spite of 
continued ffforts. 

In February 1941, following the British toriiedo attack on the Italian Fleet at 
Taranto, a study had been made in both Washington and Oahu as to whether it 
would be ipossible to employ anti-torpedo nets around the ships in Pearl Harbor. 
Several letters were exchanged on this subject. Anti-torpedo nets are very 
heavy, and once in place are diflScult to move. Previous [11] exi^erience 
had indicated that aircraft torpedoes had not been developed which would func- 
tion in water less than seventy -five feet in depth. Because of the great inter- 
ference in the movement of shipping around the restricted waters of Pearl 
Harbor, it had been decided not to employ anti-torpedo nets around the ships. 
A cii'cular letter was sent out to the Commandants of all naval districts on 
February 17. 1941 on the subject of anti-toipedo bafiles against torpedo plane 
attacks. However, developments during 1941 led the Department to the con- 
clusion that aerial tropedoes could be made to operate in shallow wiiter. and on 
June 13, 1&41, the Chief of Naval Operations sent out a new cinidar letter 
modifying the letter of Februai-y 17th. This letter contained this statement: 

"It may be stated that it cannot be assumetl that any capital ship or other 
available vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack (airplane tor- 
pedo attack) if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack 
to be developed and a .sutficient run to ann the torpedo." 

The problem of providng satisfactory torpedo nets inside of Pearl Harbor, such 
as would not unduly delay the entrance and departure of the Fleet, had not been 
solved prior to December 7, 1941. 

During the latter portion of 1940 the Chief of Naval Operations became con- 
vinced of the following : 

fa) The Army defenses of Pearl Harbor were inadequate. 

(b) Coojperation between the Army and the Navy in Oahu. for the defense of 
the Fleet and for att^ick on an enemy at sea, could be improved. 

After study of these two features in Washington and Oahu, the Secretary of 
the Navy on January 24. 1941 addressed the Secretary of War on the sul)ject, 
with a view to obtaining improvement. The Secretary of War replied on Febru- 
ary 7, 1941. Copies of these two letters are hereto attached. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1361 

As a result of this exchange, the Army put in process a program of reenforce- 
ment of the antiaircraft defenses, but decided that balloon barrages and smoke 
screens were not practicable around Pearl Harbor, because they would interfere 
with our own air operations. The Navy concurred in this decision. 

Agreement was reached between Army and Navy authorities in Oahu concern- 
ing improvement in cooperation between the Army and the Navy, and these 
authorities issued a joint plan on this subject on March 28, 1941. Instructions 
were issued by the Departments requiring these plans to he tested at frequent 
intervals through the use of appropriately designed training problems. 

[12] Special security measures for the Pacific Fleet against sudden attack 
were put in effect in May, 1940. These plans were modified from time to time, 
chiefly as regards strengthening the provisons for the safety of ships at sea. 
Since' the spring of 1941, except in emergency, the more important naval vessels 
in the Pacific Fleet have not been permitted to anchor anyplace in the Hawaiian 
Islands, except in Pearl Harbor, where it was considered that the Fleet would 
be safest from attack. The latest Fleet order on this subject is contained in 
"Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2 CL-41 (Revised)" of October 14. 1941. 
A copy of this letter will be surplied if desired, but it should not be published. 
However, paragraph two of this revised letter, (approximately the same wording 
as in previous issues), is quoted as follows: 

"2. The security of the Fleet, operating and based in the Hawaiian Area, is 
predicated, at present, on two assumptions : 

"(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present 
existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and 
misguided nationals of such powers may attempt ; 

(1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft. 

(2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in 
the Channel. 

(3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor. 
"(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by: 

(1) a surprise attack on shi^js in Pearl Harbor. 

(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area, 

(3) a combination of these two." 

It may be stated that Admiral Stark had been advised assumption (a) gov- 
erned measures for the security of the Fleet until approximately October, 1941 
During that month, Admiral Stark was informed by the Commander in Chief 
that thereafter, assumption (b) would govern measures for security of the Fleet. 

STATEMENT BX CAPTAIN T. S. WILKIXSON. TJ. S. NAVY, 
DIRECTOR, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION 

In replies to questions, the witness described naval avenues of intelligence, 
including naval attaches and additional naval observers and consular shipping 
advisers who had been [13] maintained in the Far East. Frequent re- 
ports were received from these officers. The witness mentioned other methods 
through which the Navy received secret infoi'mation. Frequent exchange of 
despatches had occurred between the intelligence organi^^ation in Washington and 
in the fl?ld. In general, the sources reported their information to Washington, 
at the same time informing the Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific 
Fleets. Care was taken here to see that these two cffi:-ers were kept fully advised 
as to developments. 

From the evidence available the Navy had concluded in November that the 
Japanese were contemplating an early attack. The witness considered that both 
Commanders in Chief had available to them the same information on which this 
corclusion was drawn here. Nevertheless, warning despatches had been sent out. 

The witnpss gave information concerning the control of fishing boats in the 
vicinity of Hawaii, and described the delimitation of the spheres of activity of 
the Naval and Military Intelligence Services and the Federal Bureau of Investi- 
gation. 

In April, 1941. the Chief of Naval Operations sent out a despatch indicating 
from past experience that the axis could be expected to initiate new activities 
on Satui'days. Simdays, and natioral holidays. Steps were taken in March. 1941, 
placing the Naval District Intelligence Oi'ganizations in an advanced state of 
readiness; constal information sections were placed in an active status last May; 
District Intelligence Organizations were further extended in that month, and a 
complete state of readiness of the Intelligence Organization was directed last 
July. 



1362 CONGRESSIOXAL IN%^STIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Exhibit No. 14 (Navt Packb:! No. 1) Robebts Commission 

Federal Btjejeatt of Investigation, 
United States Department of Justice, 

Honolulu, T. H., January 5, 1942. 
Personal and confidential. 

Memorandum to Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts. 
Re available radio facilities for transmitting airplane bearings. 

"With reference to your inquiry relative to the available facilities on the island 
for the transmission of airplane bearings to planes at sea, it has been ascertained 
that the Army equipment is only of use for a distance of approximately ten miles. 

The Federal Communications Commission facilities on the island are such as it 
is possible for them to operate at almost unlimited distances. It was ascertained 
that between December 10th and December 30, 1941, the Federal Communications 
Commission was requested on IS or 19 occasions to advise planes at sea of their 
exact location. I am also infoi-med that planes are in the habit of following the 
beam of the local commercial station, KGMB. when returning to the island. Of 
further interest in this respect, it has been reported that Japanese planes making 
the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. contained radio receivers that 
were tuned to the local commercial station KGU. The Army Signal Corps advised 
the Federal Communications Commission that upon returning to their carriers, 
tliese planes followed a frequency of 1500 kilocycles which was transmitted to 
them from the Japanese carriers. 

With reference to the Navy facilities for advising airplanes of their exact 
location, I am informed that the Navy equipment is also very limited insofar as 
its effective distances are concerned. 

With reference to the seaplane that recently made a forced landing at sea, 
Mr. LEE DAWSON of the Federal Communications Commission advised that a 
request was made of their stations by Hickam Field to transmit a bearing to 
this plane at approximately 6 : 00 p. m. The information was transmitted to 
Hickam Field, but for some unknown reason the plane was instructed to proceed 
in an exact opposite direction from the island. Mr. DAWSON stated that con- 
tinued checks on this plane revealed that they were flying away from the island 
and that Hickam Field was again advised that the plane was flying in the wrong 
direction. For reasons unknown to him, the plane continued in this course 
until approximately 10 p. m. at which time the plane ran out of gas and was 
forced to land at sea. 

Mr. DAWSON further advised that it has been the practice in the past for 
Hickam Field to make such requests of the Federal Communications Commission 
and following such times as the planes are located, the information is relayed 
back to Hickam Field where it is in turn relayed to the plane requesting its 
bearings. 

Of possible interest to you and the Commission. Mr. DAWSON advised that 
he has collected all of the reports and information relative to the plane forced 
down at sea. which information will, of course, be available to you in the event 
that you desire it. Mr. DAWSON was not advised at the time of the interview 
of your interest in this matter. 

Respectfully submitted. 

M. E. Gurnea, 
Myron Gurnea, 
Inspector, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

MG : mma. 

Exhibit IN'o. 15 (Xatt Packet Xo. 1) Roberts Commission 

(Exhibit Xo. 15 consists of thirteen srraphs prepared by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. U. S. Department of Justice, showing racial 
composition of population of the Territory of Hawaii, and related 
matters : 

1. Racial Composition of the Territory of Hawaii 

2. Japanese Activities in the Territory of Hawaii 

3. Japanese Consular Organization in Hawaii 

4. Japanese Language Schools in Hawaii 

5. United Japanese Society of Honolulu 



PROCEEDIXGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1363 

6. Major Foreign Controlled Japanese Corporations 

7. Alien Japanese Controlled Corporations in Hawaii 

8. HOMPA HOXEWANJI Organization in the Territory of 

Hawaii 

9. JODO-SHU Organization in the Territory of Hawaii 

10. Overseas Japanese Central Society 

11. Communist Activities in the Territory of Hawaii 

12. German Activities in the Territory of Hawaii 

13. Italian Activities in the Territory of Hawaii 

The above listed graphs are reproduced as Items 22 through 34 in 
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.) 



Exhibit No. 1 (Navy Packet No. 2) Robebts Commissiot* 

(Exhibit Xo. 1 is a map of the Island of Oahu, T. H. showing main 
military and naval establishments. This map is reproduced as Item 
No. 35" in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.) 



Exhibit No. 2 (Na\-y Packet No. 2) Robebts Commission 

(Exhibit No. 2 is a U. S. Navy Aviation Chart of the Hawaiian 
Islands showing the location of Mobile Aircraft "Warning Service 
Radar Stations as of 7 December 1941 with sectors showing coverage 
to the electrical horizoii. This chart is reproduced as Item No. 36 in 
EXHIBITS -ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.) 



Exhibit No. 3 (Navy Packet No. 2) Robebts Commission 

[/] Op-12B-9-McC 
(SO A7-2 (2)/FFl 
Serial 09112. 

BECRET Jajtcary 24, 1941. 

My Deab ilB. Secretary : The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl 
Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study 
by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This 
reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situa- 
tion with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and 
torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it 
is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack 
upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor. 

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or naval 
base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the 
joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character 
mentioned above. 

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are 
considered to be : 

(1) Air bombing attack. 

(2) Air torpedo plane attack. 

(3) Sabotaga 

(4) Submarine attack. 

(5) Mining. 

(6) Bombardment by gun fire. 

Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been 
provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally 
to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution 
of which I consider to be of primary importance. 

Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, 
simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 143. vol. 3 6 



1364 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, 
and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of 
carriers and their supporting vessels. 

[2] The counter measures to be considered are : 

(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before 
air attack can be launched ; 

(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their 
objectives ; 

(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire; 

(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke; 

(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages. 

The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite 
possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without 
warning prior to a declaration of war. 

Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for 
the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft 
are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and equipping of an 
Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in 
progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and sound 
locators which are only effective up to four miles. 

Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the 
standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26 3" fixed anti- 
aircraft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 
56 mobile 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft batteries 
are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the sea 
coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun bom- 
bardment, one or the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men. If 
the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-aircraft 
guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack. 

By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by additions in. 
guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen addition 3" Mobile, 
twenty-four 90 mm., and one hundred twenty 37 mm. guns will be on hand ; the 
pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the new [.?] 
radio locators will have an effective range of 100 miles. Although the caliber of 
the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude bombers, thus 
augmentation will markedly improve tlie security of the Fleet. It does not, of 
course, affect the critical period immediately before us. 

The snpniementary merisures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest value 
in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated some use- 
fulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might prove 
most advantageous. 

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals : 

(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit air- 
craft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in 
Hawaii. 

(2) That the Army gives consideration to the question of balloon barrages, the 
employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses of Pearl 
Harbor. 

(3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval 
and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against 
surprise aircraft raids. 

(4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of 
joint residiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids 
against Pearl Harbor. 

(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu 
for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long 
as the present uncertainty continues to exist. 

Your concurrence in the.se pi'oopsals and the rapid implementing of the measures 
to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the security of 
the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy 
Department. 

Sincerely yours, 

Fkank Knox. 

The Honorable The Secrktary of War. 
Copies to : Cine, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 
Coml4. Op-22, Op-30 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1365 

Exhibit No. 4 (Navy Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 
S-E-C-R-E-'T 

SrMMARY OF RkPORTS AND MESSAGES SENT TO THE CHIEF OF NaVAL OPERATIONS 

Since Attack of Pearl Harbor. The Attack Occurred at Approximately 0755 
Local Time, December 7, 1941 

7 December, 0800 

Following sent to all ships present Pearl Harbor : 
"Enemy air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not a drill". 

7 December, 0811 

To CinC Asiatic, CinC Atlantic and Chief of Naval Operations : 
"Enemy air raid. Pearl Harbor. This is not a drill." 

This message was ordered sent at same time as previous message but did 
not get on circuit until 11 minutes later. 

7 December, 0812 

Message to the Pacific Fleet ; repeated to Chief of Naval Operations : 
"Hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl Harbor." 

7 December, 0817 
To Compatwing-2 : 
"Locate enemy force." 

7 December, 0830 

To Commander Task Forces 12 and 8 : 
"Report position." 

7 December; 0842 

To all ships present, Pearl : 
"Japanese submarine in the harbor." 

times of following messages are gct 

8 December, 0^50 

To the Chief of Naval Operations : 

"In spite of security measures, surprise attack by Japanese damaged all battle- 
ships except MARYLAND. Moderate damape to TENNESSEE and PENNSYL- 
VANIA. ARIZONA total wreck. WEST VIRGINIA, OKLAHOMA, CALIFOR- 
NIA. NEVADA seriously damaged. UTAH and OGLALA turned over. HONO- 
LULU, HELENA, RALEIGH unfit for sea. VESTAL, CURTISS, damaged. 
SHAVV, CASSIN, DOWNES complete loss. Airplane losses severe. Following re- 
mains : About 13 B-17, i) B-IS, 30 pur.suit, 10 patrol planes, one patrol plane squad- 
ron at Midway. All available Army bombers requested to be sent Oahu. Following 
damage to enemy : Number of enemy aircraft destroyed. One enemy submarine 
sunk, probably two more. Now have 2 Carriers, 7 Heavy Cruisers, 3 Squadrons 
Destroyers and all available planes searching for enemy. Personnel behaving 
magnificently face of furious surprise attack. Personnel casualties heavy iu 
OKLAHOMA and ARIZONA. 



1366 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Exhibit No. 5 (Navy Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 

NA\Tr Depabtment, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 

30C1-AJ Washington, February 17, 1941, 

(SC)N20-12 
Serial 010230 
CONFIDENTIAL 

From : The Chief of Naval Operations. 
To : The Commandant, First Naval District. 

The Commandant, Third Naval District. 

The Commandant, Fourth Naval District. 

The Commandant, Fifth Naval District. 

The Commandant, Sixth Naval District. 

The Commandant, Eighth Naval District. 

The Commandant, Tenth Naval District, 

The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District. 

The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District. 

The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District. 

The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 

The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District. 

The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District. 
Subject : Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks. 

1. In pi'evious correspondence the Commandant and Local Joint Planning: 
Committees have been requested, .where considered necessary, to submit recom- 
mendations concerning the employment of nets and booms in their defenses. 
In nearly all cases the recommendations received were limited to harbor en- 
trances. One of the reasons for this was that the Department, after previously 
making studies of many harbors, submitted certain proposals for consideration by 
the Districts, but did not specifically propose any protection against torpedo 
plane attacks. 

2. The Commandants and Local Joint Planning Committees are requested, if 
they have not already done so, to consider the employment of and to make recom- 
mendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially for the protection of large 
and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors, and especially at the 
major fleet bases. 

3. In considering the use of A/T baffles, the following limitations, among others^ 
may be borne in mind : 

(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary 
to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo 
run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered. 

(b) There should be ample maneuvering room available for vessels approaching 
,and leaving berths. 

(c) Ships should be able to get underway on short notice. 

(d) Room must be available inside the baffles for tugs, fuel oil barges and 
harbor craft to maneuver alongside individual ships. 

(e) Baffles should be clear of cable areas, ferry routes, and channels used by 
shipping. 

(f) Baffles should be sufficient distance from anchored vessels to insure the 
vessels safety in case a torpedo explodes on striking a baffle. 

(g) High land in the vicinity of an anchorage makes a successful airplane 
attack from the land side most difficult. 

(h) Vulnerable areas in the baffles should be so placed as to compel attacking 
planes to come within effective range of anti-aircraft batteries before they can 
range their torpedoes. 

(i) Availability of shore and ship anti-aircraft protection balloon barrages, 
and aircraft protection. 

(j) Availability of naturally well protected anchorages within a harbor from 
torpedo plane attack for a number of large ships. Where a large force such as 
a fleet is based, the installation of satisfactory baffles will be difficult because of 
congestion. 

R. E. Ingeksoll, Acting. 
Copy to : 

Cine, Pacific 
Cine, Atlantic 
Cine, Asiatic 

C. O. Nav. Net Depot, Tiburon BuOrd 
C. O. Nav. Net Depot, Newport Op-12 

"copy" 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



1367 



Exhibit No. 6 (Navy Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 

KiMMBi- Exhibit 5 to Report of Action 

Patrol Wing Two, 
U. S. Naval Aie Station, 
Pearl Harhor, T. E., December 19, 1941. 
Memorandum for Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy. 

My Deae Admiral: In accordance with our conversation of yesterday, I am 
forwarding to you the following information : 

1. Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of 7 December, 
1941: 



Sqd. 



VP-ll, 
VP-12. 
VP-14. 
VP-21. 
VP-21_ 
VP-21. 
VP-22. 
VP-24. 



In commission 



12PBY-5 

12 PBY-5 

12 PBY-5 

12PBY-3 

1 PBY-3 (spare) 

1 PBY-3. 

14 PBY-3 

6 PBY-5 



Tot. avail. 
for flight 



12 
11 

1 10 

2 11 

1 

12 
12 
5 



Location 



Kaneohe 

Kaneohe 

Kaneohe 

Midway 

Pearl Harbor 
Pearl Harbor 
Pearl Harbor 
Pearl Harbor 



Under 


Ready 


rep. 


at base 





12 


1 


11 


2 


/ 


1 


4 


1 





2 


12 


1 


11 


1 


1 



In air 







13 

*7 




34 



RECAPITULATION 



At Kaneohe 

At Pearl 


36 
33 

12 


1 33 

3 28 

2 11 




3 

5 

1 


30 
24 
4 


13 

34 


At Midway 


J7 








Total 


81 


72 


9 


58 


14 









' 3 planes armed with two depth charges each conducting search of assigned fleet operating areas in accord- 
ance with U. S. Pacific Fleet Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised) (Task Force NINE Operating Plan 9-1). 3 
planes in condition 2 (30 minutes notice). 

2 5 planes conducting search of sector 120°-170'' radius 450 miles; departed Midway at 1820 GCT. 2 planes 
departed Midway at same time to rendezvous with U. S. S. LEXINGTON at a point 400 miles bearing 
130° from Midway to serve as escorts for Marine Scouting planes. Four planes, additional planes, armed 
with 2 500-pound bombs each were on the alert at INIidway as a ready striking force. These four planes 
took off at about 2230 GCT, uprn receipt of information on the attack on Pearl Harbor, and searched sector 
060° to 100° radi s 400 miles. One plane was under repair in the hangar at Midway. A spare plane was 
under overhaul at Pearl Harbor. 

3 Four planes conducting inter -type tactics in area C-5 with U. S. Submarine. 

* All plares, except those under repair, were armed with machine guns and a full allowance of machine 
gun ammunition. 



2. Material condition : 

(a) Of the 81 available patrol planes 54 were new PBT-5's; 27 were PBY-3's 
having over three years service. The PBY-5's were recently ferried to Hawaii, 
arriving on the following dates : 



Squadron 


No. 
planes 


Arrival date 


VP-ll 


12 
6 
12 
12 
12 


28 Oct., 1941. 


VP-24. 


28 Oct., 1941. 


VP-12 


8 Nov., 1941. 


VP-23 


23 Nov., 1941. 


VP-14 


23 Nov., 1941. 







(b) The PBY-5 airplanes were experiencing the usual shake-down difficulties 
and were hampered in maintenance by an almost complete absence of spare 
jarts. In addition, a program for installation of leak-proof tanks, armor, and 
modified engine nose sections was in progress. They were not fully ready for 
war until these installations were completed, nor were extensive continuous 
operations practicable until adequate spare parts were on hand. 

(c) The 12 PBY-3 airplanes at Pearl Harbor (VP-22) had returned from 
Midway on 5 December after an arduous tour of duty at Midway and Wake 
since 17 October. This squadron was in relatively poor material condition because 
of its extended operations at advance bases with inadequate facilities for normal 



1368 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEAEL HARBOR ATTACK 

repair and upkeep. In addition 10 of its planes were approaching 18 months^ 
service and were due for overhaul. 

(d) It should be noted that the material situation of the patrol squadrons 
made the maintenance of continuous extensive daily searches impracticable. 
Under such conditions the PBY-5's were to be exi)ected to experience numerous 
material failures which would place airplanes out of commisison until spare 
parts arrived. The PBY-3's of Patrol Squadron TWEN^TY-TWO at Pearl were 
scheduled for a week of upkeep for repair and maintenance. 

(e) Under the circumstances, it seemed advisable to continue intensive ex- 
pansion training operations and improvement of the material military effective- 
ness, at the same time preserving the maximum practicable availability of aircraft 
for an emergency. Under the existing material and spare pai'ts situation, con- 
tinuous and extensive patrol plane operations by the PBY-5's was certain to 
result in rapid automatic attrition of the already limited number of patrol planes 
immediately available by the exhaustion of small but vital spare parts for which 
there were no replacements. 

(f) In this connection it should be noted that there were insufBcient patrol 
planes in the Hawaiian Area effectively to do the job required. For the com- 
mander of a search group to be able to state with some assurance that no hostile 
carrier could reach a spot 250 miles away and launch an attack without prior 
detection, would require an effective daily search through 360° to a distance 
of at least SCO miles. As.simiing a 15-mile radious of visibility this would require 
a daily 16 hour flight of 84 planes. A force of not less than 200 patrol planes, 
adequate spare parts, and ample well trained personnel would be required for 
such operations. 

(Signed) P. N. L. Bexlixgeb. 

Rear Admiral, TJ. 8. Navy, 
Commander Patrol Wing TWO. 



Exhibit No. 7 (Xavt Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 
[2] 8-E-C-R-E-T 

SUMMAET OF REyOETS AND MESSAGES 

8 Decemier, 0-'/27 

To the Chief of Naval Operations : 

"Request you send earliest time salvage personnel and equipment plus large 
number mechanics and material, particularly structural steel and electric wiring. 
More details later." 

8 Deceml)er, 1015 
To the Chief of Naval Operations : 

"First sign of enemy activities was report 'submarine in defense area' at 
about 0715 local. There was only few minutes warning of enemy aircraft ap- 
proach which occurred at 0747. First attacks were against aircraft on ground 
at Pearl. Ewa. Kaneohe. Hickam and Wheeler and were so effective that none 
of these aircraft were immediately available with the exception of 10 patrol 
planes which were in the air. There appeared to be three separate attacks, 
ending about 0930. Enemy carriers were not sighted but indications were that 
at least one was North and one South of Oahu. Enemy bombing and torpedoing 
very effective and despite magnificent and courageous work by gun crews not 
more than a dozen enemy shut down. Following additional casualties ARIZONA 
blew up, most of her officers and men including Admiral Kidd lost. Floating 
drydock sunk. Total estimate of personnel casualties about 2S00, with one-half 
dead. About 200 civilians in Honolulu killed in bombing of docking facilities. No 
damage from mines. Pearl T'lnnnei is u«"able. In addition to ship-basod and 
carrier planes now have about 30 patrol planes, 13 Army bom'iers and 16 Army 
pur.suits available. 4 Heavy cruisers, destroyers and LEXINGTON attempting 
to intercept Southern carrier from position East of Midway. ENTERPRISE and 
other light forces guarding against repetition of raid. ^Yake reports heavily 
damaged by 80 planes. Guam reported attack by aircraft." 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1369 

9 December, 10^9 

To the Chief of Naval Operations: 

"Summary for 8 December. All local times. Oahu not raided today. Black- 
out being carried out. Two enemy cruisers attacked Midway by gunfire evening 
of the seventh. Unverified report of renewed attack 1600 today. Two more air 
attacks Midway and Guam. Aircraft again bombed Wake and unable comniuni- 
cate Wake and Guam since 2130. No attack on Johnston. From radio intelli- 
gence — two enemy units, one a carier, bearing 340°-7oO miles from Pearl at 
1600. Enemy submarines have been reported South of Oahu but have made no 
attacks. Own destroyer attacks made on them with unknown results. Enemy 
two-man subm-arine was destroyed — grounded off Bellow's Field and one oflleer 
captured. Indications were he had come from 100 miles off coast. Own forces 
are at sea to cut off enemy. Codes at Guam destroyed. My efforts devoted to 
location and destruction of the enemy forces and dispositions made with this 
in view." 

10 Dcccm'ber, 1016 

To the Chief of Naval Operations : 

"Nothing further today. There was reference to Aleutians as well as to Hawai- 
ian and Midway areas on cipher cai'ds from crashed enemy planes." 

[5] 11 Deceniber, 0925 

To the Chief of Naval Operations : 

"Only new developments were as reported in Com-14 110400 supplemented by 
m3re air attacks on submarines reported by my 102359. No doubt ENTERPRISE 
.scout bomber sunk a submarine." 

12 December, 0934 

To the Chief of Naval Operations: 

"Some contacts South of Oahu with submarines today. Three were depth 
charged and one bombed. Oil slicks were observed in all cases and air bubbles 
in one. Heard distress signals from merchant vessels CUMEO and LAHAINA 
in Latitude 27-30 N., Longitude 148 W. There was no air attack on Midway 
yesterday." 

13 December, 1003 

To the Chief of Naval Operations : 

"No new developments. I am still attacking submarines and they appear 
to be less in number arouud Oahu. There are signs that submarines are pro- 
ceeding toward the Coast from Northeast of Hawaiian areas. Also, some appear 
to be along Great Circle route. During the Midway attack of December seventh 
hits on cruisers and destroyers were plain." 

U December, 1007 

To the Chief of Naval Operations : 

"Aircraft has discovered four submarines this area today. Believe one dam- 
aged. Also one small submarine apparently entered the harbor and a depth 
charge destroyed it. There was a moonlight raid by four-engine seaplanes on 
Wake and a raid in daylight from 41 B-18 type bombers. Wake damaged 
several planes shot down two. One YMF of ours destroyed on ground, one had 
foi'ced landing, leaving one. Two Marines were killed." 

15 December, 08^9 

To the Chief of Naval Operations : 

"Only new developments Hawaiian Area were submarine activities. In addi- 
tion sinking reported by Com-14 un-successful moonlight attack was made on 
PYRO North of Oahu. CHEW was attacked by a second submarine while she 
was attacking one West of the Island. We are vigorously following up all 
contacts but no positive results can be claimed. With reference to the HOECH 
no signs of submarines prior or later by explosions." 

15 December, 2302 

To the Chief of Naval Operations : 

"There are three courses of action with reference to Wake: — (1) Strengthen 
with fighter planes and replenish ammunition. (2) Take off all personnel or 



1370 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(3) Abandon defense battalion and workers, a total of about 140O. It will 
require at least two days to reinforce, replenish and take on board a [3] 
ship a portion of the defense workers. We can embark all personnel if evacuated 
in less than one day. If bad weather it will take an unpredictably longer time. 
We can supply ammunition sufficient about one month. I have decided to 
strengthen. We can evacuate about 700 civilian workmen and I am sending 
one aircraft carrier, three heavy cruisers and a destroyer squadron to accom- 
pany TANGIER carrying supplies and ammunition. She leaves today. I also 
contemplate an attack on Eastern Marshalls for diversion employing same size 
force as for Wake. This force sailed yesterday." 

Note. — The Chief of Naval Operation replied to this despatch "Heartily 
concur," 

16 December, 0937 

To the Chief of Naval Operations : 

"There were no attacks by submarines around Oahu today but we had three 
contacts with no definite results. An enemy submarine fired shells into Kahului 
(Maui) and also Lahaina at dusk. There was a raid on Johnston Island by two 
ships about one hour after sunset. Sand Island not attacked. Only results now 
reported is fire on Johnston Island. Six large planes bombed Wake at night and 
33 aircraft bombed at noon. Damage not yet available. An enemy submarine 
was reported off Wake." 

17 December, 0928 

To the Chief of Naval Operations : 

"Little news today. There is an absence of definite submarine contacts. The 
bombardment at Kahului reported yesterday was by 5.5" gun from a submarine. 
There was no damage in this attack. Bombardment of Johnston was by two 
cruisers. No personnel were hurt — power house was destroyed." 



Exhibit No. 8 (Navt Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 

[1] S-E-C-R-E-T 

Messages and Orders From Headquarters of the Commander in Chief 
Pacific Fleet, December 7, 1941 

In accordance with orders and doctrine issued in the Security Order of 14 
October 1941, which provisions were in full effect on 7 December, it was not 
necessary for the Commander-in-Chief to issue numerous orders concerning the 
movements of the ships from the harbor to sea. Similarly the movements of 
the ships at sea were controlled by established doctrine. The orders which were 
issued on 7 December and which are set forth herein are, therefore, largely 
informatory and amplifying in character. Charts submitted in evidence before 
this Commission indicate the movements of surface and air forces, with their 
efforts to locate enemy vessels and bring them to action on December 7, 1941. 

(1) OSOO 

From the Commander in Chief to all ships and stations : 
Air raid on Pearl Harbor X. This is not a drill. 

(2) 0816 

From the Commander in Chief to all ships and stations : 

Hostilities with Japan commenced with aid raid on Pearl X. 
Note. — Transmitted to Commanding General. 

(3) 0817 

From CinC to Compatwing-2 : 
Locate enemy force. 

(4) 0832 

From CinC to all ships present Pearl : 
Japanese submarine in harbor. 

(5) 0901 

From CinC to Midway : 

Pearl Harbor bombed X No indication direction attack X Take off 
Attempt to locate and sink Japanese force X. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1371 

(6) 0902 
From CinC to Comtaskforce 3, 8, and 12 and all ships Pacific Fit : 
Execute WPL 46 against Japan. 

[2] (7) 0903 

From CinC to Wake: 

Pearl bombed by Japanese X Be on alert. 

(8) 0911 

From CinC to all sector commanders Pearl : 
Do not fire on our planes coming in. 

(9) 0920 

From CinC to Comtaskforce One : 

Battleships remain in port until further orders X Send all destroyers to 
sea X Destroy enemy submarines X Follow them by own cruisers to join 
Halsey X. 

(10) 0921 

From Cine to Pacific Fleet: 

Reported that enemy ship has red dot on bottom of fuselage. 

(11) 0950 

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce Eight : 

Two enemy carriers reported thirty miles southwest Barbers Point. 

(12) 1002 

From CinCpac to all ships present : 

Battleships remain in port probable channel mined. 

(13) 1013 

From Commander in Chief to signal tower : 

Eeport the names of all ships which have left the harbor. 

(14) 1015 

From CinC to Comtaskforce One: 
Do not send any more cruisers to sea. 

(15) 1015 

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce (verbal) Compatwing-2 to Patwing-21 : 
Search sector 000-030 Jap carrier. 

[5] (16) 1018 

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce 8, 12 and 3 : 

Search from Pearl very limited account maximum twelve VP searching 
from Pearl X Some indication enemy force northwest Oahu X Addressees 
operate as directed Comtaskforce Eight to intercept enemy X Composition 
enemy force unknown. 

(17) 1030 

From CinC to Comtaskforce 3, 8, and 12 : 

Submarine reported ten miles south Barbers Point. 

(18) 1040 

From Commander in Chief to Commander Mine Squadron Two : 

Sweep south channel from West Loch to entrance for magnetic and moored 
mines X. 

(19) 1042 

From CinC to Commandant Navy Yard : 

California is on fire inside probably two tugs with fire equipment could 
save her X. 

(20) IO4G 

From CinC to Comtaskforce Eight : 

DF bearings indicate enemy carrier bearing 178 from Barbers Point. 

(21) 1046 

From CinCpac to battleships present: 
Send pilots to Ford Island. 



1372 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(22) 1105 
From CiuCpac to all ships : 

Enemy planes coming for Pearl Harbor from south X. 

<23) 1105 
From CinCpac to all ships present info Comtaskforce Eight : 

All ships departing Pearl organize as Task Force One undivided Comdes- 
batfor assume command report to Comtaskforce Eight. 
U] (24) im 
(Verbal) From CinCpac to Combatfor for batships: 

Prepare available BB planes for search and report to subbase when ready 
and number X 2 Calif planes on Ford Island probably ready. 

(25) 1155 

From CincCpac to all ships present : 

All cruisers and destroyers depart Pearl as soon as practicable report to 
Comtaskforce One in Detroit X 

(26) 11 

From CinCpac to Minneapolis : 

Use planes to search sectors 135 to 180 distance 150 miles from Pearl. 

(27) 1158 

From Commander in Chief to Comtaskforce 12, 3, 8 : 
Cancel Midway Marine flight. 

(28) 1208 

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce Eight : 

No confirmation position enemy carrier X Have searched arc two forty 
to three six zero but not thoroughly X Planes available Pearl can not 
conduct thorough search must depend on you X Nine Enterprise planes 
landed four now being used search to northeast. 
<29) 1232 
From CinCpac to all ships present Hawaiian area : 

Enemy transports reported four miles off Barbers Point attack. 
(30) 1200 
From CinCpac to Minneapolis : 

What sector are your planes searching and to what distance. 
[5] (31) 132Jf 

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce Eight : 

Detroit Phoenix St. Louis New Orleans fourteen destroyers and four 
minelayers have sortied and are proceeding to join you also Minneapolis and 
four mine layers from operating areas send ships in to fuel as necessary. 

(32) 1328 

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce Eight : 
Your 2206 only nine arrived. 

(33) 1329 

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce Eight : 
No air attack here since about 0930. 

(34) 1332 

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce Eight info Comtaskforce One and Three: 

Radio bearing indicates Akagi bearing ISO from Pearl and another unit 
bearing 167. 

(35) 

From CinCpac to all ships present Hawaiian Area: 

Enemy radio has been heard on 6581 kcs and 458 kcs. 

(36) im 

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce Eight : 

Your 2345 and 2239 approved probably enemy submarines off entrance. 

(37) lJi35 

From CinCpac to Comtaskforce Eight : 

No definite information yet available but indications are that enemy 
carriers may be both north and south of Oahu. 

(38) 1530 

From CiuCpac to Comtaskforce 15.1: 

War declared by Japan on Britain and United States Task Force 15.1 
proceed direct San Francis(^o 1 ask Force 15.5 proceed to Sydney. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1373 

16] (39) 1100 

(Verbal) From CiuCpac to Compatwing Two : 

Direct Midway planes search sector 070-190 to maximum distance possible 
and still land Johnston by sunset X. Objective Jap carrier. 

From CinCpac to Compatwing Two info Taskforce 8, 12 : 

Lexington group Taskforce 12 proceeding to intercept enemy carrier on 
assumption it departed for Jaluit from point 2C0 miles south Pearl at 1200 
local today by 27 kts X Desire guard against rep(?tition todays raid X En- 
terprise Taskforce 8 lat 2(V45 long 150-15 X Daylight tomorrow conduct 
air searches as follows 6 PBY median 220 to 700 miles to search outer limit 
0900 X spacing 50 miles X Patron 21 transfer from Midway to Johnston 
searching maximum area en route X Maintain PBY now Johnston in readi- 
ness to take over tracking X Direct VB planes join Enterprise sunrise X 
Employ other aircraft Oahu including Army to search 360 degrees from Oahu 
distance 200 miles taking ofE 1 hour prior sunrise X Hold other aircraft as 
striking group. 
{41) J902 

From Cincpac to Comtaskforee One Eight Three and Twelve: 

Piecent radio intelligence indicated formation Japanese major units into 
two task groups X First group concentrated Indochina area X Second 
group plus three kongos unaccounted for X Opnav opinion latter force or 
part attacked Pearl XX Composition second group follows three or four 
CA two or four CV two desrons of two CL twenty eight DD one subron of 
nine dash twelve subs and fast transport force containing twenty-odd AP'S 
XX First fleet less seaplane tenders and one desron may be in support 
according Opnav. 
(42) 1917 
From CinCiiac to all ships present : 

Reference Para G PacFlt Ltr 2CIv-41 condition two effective X use maxi- 
mum dispersal planes being serviced during niglit. 
17] (43) 2000 

From CinCpac to Taskforce 8, 12, 3 : 

Do not attempt entrance heavy ships to Pearl during darkness. 
(44) 2225 
From CinCpac to Combasefor: 

Place two battle rafts outboard of each drydock caisson one to be alongside 
and one about one hundred feet out X To be in place by 0530. 



Charts were offered in evidence before this Commission showing the air scout- 
ing operations instituted on 7 December in an attempt to locate enemy forces. 
These scouting operations were under the direct command of Commander Patrol 
Wing TWO. Rear Admiral Bellinger. They were instituted by order of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, some in accordance with prearranged doctrine and 
others in accordance with orders telephoned from the headquarters of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief to Commander Patrol Wing TWO. Throughout the forenoon of 7 
December Information received by Commander Patrol Wing TWO was telephoned 
to headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, and information received at the 
headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief was pi'omulgated to the Fleet and at 
the same time telephoned to Commander Patrol Wing TWO. The telephonic 
exchanges between the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief and Commander 
Patrol Wing TWO were numerous, but in the exigency which existed they were 
not recorded. The Air Officer on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Captain 
A. C. Davis, states that he himself did most of the telephoning to Commander 
Patrol Wing Two and that all orders to that officer issued by telephone were 
in accordance with verbal instructions which Captain Davis received from the 
'Commander-in-Chief. 



1374 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
Exhibit No. 9 (Navy Packet No. 2) Robeets Commission 
Unite© States Fleet 
A16/(0828) U. S. S. Peinnsylvania, Flagship 

S-E-C-R-E-T Pearl Haeboe, T. H., 26 May 1941. 

From : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 

To : The Chief of Naval Ot)erations. 

Subject : Survey of Conditions in Pacific Fleet. 

/. Personnel 

(a) Stahility. — A most important, perhaps the most important factor in the dajr 
by day readiness of the Pacific Fleet is the question of stabilizing personnel — -both 
oflScers and men. The Fleet is doing all it can, and is making good progress, in 
absorbing new men and training nevp oflScers, but facts are facts and neither the 
Fleet nor the individual ships can be a coordinated war machine if the present 
rapid turnover of personnel is continued. 

(b) Permanency of Officer Personnel. — Regular and experienced ofl3cers have 
been detached at an alarming rate. Cooke, for example, who came to the PENN- 
SYLVANIA the latter part of February, is fourth on the list of twelve battleship 
captains in time on present billet. Executive officers are going, if anything even 
more frequently. The situation is no better in cruisers. There appears to be a 
tendency to give priority in importance to sliore duty over sea duty ; witness, 
transfer of officers skilled in fire control and gunnery to production and inspection 
jobs ashore, and the all too frequent detachment of commanding and executive 
officers and heads of departments from ships of all types. Expansion of the 
Forces Afloat does call for sacrifice in permanency of assignment in the Fleet, 
but we cannot afford to replace our experienced officers with reserves, most of 
whom are untrained, if we are to be ready for serious business. It does seem that 
much can be done toward stabilizing the experienced personnel we now have. 
Ordering captains, executives and heads of departments of the various types, 
well knowing that they will be eligible for selection and promotion within six 
months is an example of a condition readily susceptible of correction. 

(d) Permanencif of Enlisted Personnel. — The situation is well known to the 
Department, as indicated by a recent directive to take full advantage of the law 
and retain men whose enlistments expire outside the continental limits of the 
United States. The drastic trend in reduction of reenlistments in the Navy as 
a whole in the month of April is of serious import to the Fleet. Even in the Pearl 
Harbor area the wages offered ashore are so attractive and the jobs are so many 
that skilled men whose enlistment? expire are tempted not to reenlist. A recent 
survey of Battleship Division THREE indicates that of the men whose enlist- 
ments expire between 1 June and 31 August 1941, 68.9% do not intend to reenlist. 
This is in line with a recent report of the Bureau of Navigation showing a reduc- 
tion in reenlistments for the month of April from 83.09% to 6953%. The Com- 
mander-in-Chief has requested the Bureau of Navigation to initiate legislation to 
hold for the duration of the war all men now enlisted in the Navy. He [2] 
does not look with favor upon the directive mentioned in the first sentence of this 
sub-paragraph. It is discriminatory and does not apply equally to all Fleets or 
even to all ships of thQ Pac'fic Fleet, since some ships overhaul on the Coast while 
others overhaul at Pearl Harbor. 

The Fleet must and gladly will train and provide men for new construction and 
outlying stations to the limit of its capabilities, but it should be unnecessary to 
assign to shore duty so many experienced petty officers as we now find ashore. 
There is an urgent necessity that a continuous supply of recruits be furnished 
for training. It should be" pointed out that since September, with new men 
started coming in in large numbers, all vessels have had to absorb recruits in a 
large proportion. In the Fleet as a whnlo. connileme'^tc aro now made up of 
over 25% of men with the maximum of a year's .-ervice. and in some ships the 
figure approaches 50%. In the case of newly acquired transports, cargo ships, 
tankers and the like, the complements are almost 100% i-eserve. with little pre- 
vious training. Present conditions are worse rather than better when new ships 
in large numbers are added to the Navy. The situation will be extremely acute 
if we are then at war. It is obvious that there are limitations on the capacity 
of active ships for supplying the large numbers of officers and men required to 
man the Navy now building, unless the immediate fighting capacity of the ships 
Is seriously crippled. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1375 

Lang range planning, with reasonable foresight as to future needs, is an impera- 
tive necessity. It would appear that training activities ashore must be greatly- 
expanded, as the physical capacities of the ships limit the number that can be 
trained in the Fleet. The possibility that we may have to provide and quarter, 
ashore, a pool of trained men for new construction should be carefully examinea, 
and provision now made for it, if found necessary. 

A problem of immediate importance is brought about by a recent letter from 
the Eureau of Navigation which states that between now and September some 
3,0S0 men, more than half of whom are rated, will be taken from the Fleet for 
new construction and for this purpose allocations are made in the ratio of 72% 
Pacitic Fleet to 28% Atlantic Fleet. Unless a readjustment is made in these 
figures to correspond to the recent readjustment in the relative strengths of these 
Fleets, the Pacific Fleet will be seriously stripped of experienced men and may 
be unable to furnish some of the ratings demanded. 

(d) Health and Morale. — The desirability, if international conditions permit, 
of health and recreation trips to the Coast by Task Forces, each of which shall 
I)e no more than one-fourth the strength of the Pacific Fleet as now constituted 
must be given serious consideration. 

(e) Assignmettt of Flag Officers. — It is particularly desired that Vice Admiral 
Pye be retained as Commander of the Battle Force. Admiral Pye is able, vigorous, 
and loyal, and is an officer whom I would select, above all others, as Commander 
Battle Force. 

[3] (f) Uniform. — There is too much change and experimentation at this 
time. It is not important whether rank is shown on the sleeve or on the shouFder 
of the khaki uniform, nor is it important vhether the eagle of the cap device 
faces to left or to right. As for the khaki working uniform the Commander-in- 
Chief is convinced that it lessens the dignity and niilitai*j' point of view of the 
wearer and has a tendency to let down the efficiency of personnel. Reports from 
the aircraft squadrons are to the effect that from any considerable altitude they " 
are unable to detect the color of the uniform on ships at sea. 

//. Aviation 

(a) Aviation Training. — The following requirements for aviation have been 
urged but favorable action has not yet been taken : 

(1) Newly graduated pilots for carriers, battleships and cruisers should first be 
ordered to San Diego for indoctrination in Fleet squadron work and familiariza- 
tion with latest types of planes. 

(2) Replacement carrier groups should be built up at San Diego, for indoctrina- 
tion of new graduates and for rotation with groups already in carriers. 

^8) The rating of Aircrj^ft Radioman should be establ'shed. 
The following requirements are in process of correction but progress is too 
slow : 

( 1 ) The level of experience of pilots in the Fleet is very low and the total 
Bumbei' is too low. 

(2) The level of experience of aviation ratings in the Fleet is low and the 
allowances are not filled. 

(3) The rating of Aircraft Bomber, though approved, has not yet been 
established. 

(b) Aviation Material. — The following items which apply to aviation are in 
process of correction but progress is too slow : 

(1) Carrier torpedo planes are obsolescent and spare carrier torpedo planes 
are too few. 

(2) Replacement of other carrier planes with more modern types is not yet 
-completed and the replacement planes are not yet fully modernized. 

(3) There are not yet enough spare carrier planes of the new types and the 
stock of spare parts and engines is too low. 

(4) Deliveries of ordnance and radio equipment for new planes have been too 
«low. 

(5) Cruiser planes are obsolescent and deliveries of replacements have been 
^ too slow. 

(6) Modernized patrol planes are not yet available in quantity. There are none 
in the Hawaiian area and there is no early prospect for replacement of those 
of the older type now in the Hawaiian area. 

(7) There have been no deliveries of special radio equipment for patrol planes, 
•corresponds to RADAR [4] for ships, which will enormously increase 
4he potentialities of these planes. 



1376 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(8) There is a serious shortage of aircraft machine gun ammunition. 

(9) No armor-piercing bombs, antiaircraft bombs or aerial depth bombs are yet 
available. 

(10) There is a very serious shortage of aircraft torpedoes, and of equipment 
for their maintenance and overhaul. 

(11) Completions of new carriers and new patrol plane tenders are too slow. 

(12) Provision for bombs and for refueling planes at outlying bases is slietchy, 

(13) There Ikis been serious delay in deliveries of equipment under the 
cognizance of other Bureaus than Yards and Docks in connection with the con- 
struction of new air stations nad bases. 

In addition to the afore-meutioued items the following have been urged but 
favorable action has not yet been taken : 

(1) Aircraft overhaul at N. A. S., Pearl Harbor, now limited to patrol planes, 
should be expanded to provide for all planes now based in this area. Transfer to 
and from West Coast for overhaul is impracticable. 

(2) Additional barracks should be established at N. A. S. Pearl Harbor. 

(c) Separate Air Force. — This ever present question is again being brought 
to the fore, in view of Mr. Scrugham's recent utterances. It is vital that the Navy's 
air service remain as it is. Our naval aviation is generally recognized, through- 
out the world, as being the best equipped, best trained, and most advanced of 
any naval air service. This has been brought about by the mutual recognition 
of the intimate relationship between air and surface sea forces, particularly in 
far-flung operations distant from established bases. Effective cooperation, in 
naval operations, between air and surface craft requires the closest kind of co- 
ordination, predicated upon precise knowledge of each other's capabilities, limit- 
ations, and tactics. This can only be attained by day-by-day operations, assoc- 
iation, and exchange of ideas as an integral part of one organization. It is 
vital that this relationship continue, even at the expense (through tliis feature 
is greatly exaggerated) of some duplication of effort between the Army and the 
Navy. Mr. Scrugham's chief complaint, which deals chiefly with duplication of 
facilities at coastal aii' stations and the proximity of those stations to each other, 
is not a valid one. The services perform separate functions ; the Army in ex- 
tending the range of coastal batteries and the Navy in extending the mobility 
and coverage of ships in off shore search. The jjroximity of the fields to each 
other is largely a matter of the vagaries of Congress and the availability of land. 
The United States, dup to its physical separation from its most probable enemies, 
has less need for a concentrated, offensive, air-striking force than other nations. 
[5] The present GHQ air force, however, amply supplies this need. It may 
be noted, in passing, that, in spite of the fact that the Air Corps is a part of the 
Army, the strong tendency within that Corps for separation, has prevented the 
development of effective cooperation between ground and air forces. A separate 
air corps would make the situation much worse — for the Navy it would meati 
the death of naval avaition. 

The British have found it necessary to place their coastal air command under 
the direct control of the Navy. Aside from discoordination of operations, this 
command was suffering from lack of proper types. 

///. Material, general. 

(a) Priorities. — The Navy is at present suffering from a shortage of material 
and is experiencing difficultly in having this shortage corrected. The principal 
items, and those that directly affect our early readiness, are (1) small arms and 
machine gun ammunition for airplanes and the Fleet Marine Force ; (2) airplanes, 
especially those equipned with modern armor and armament ; (3) close-range anti- 
aircraft guns, especially a 1.1", Bofors, and Oerlikon ; (4) ammunition in general, 
particularly adequate reserves, and bombs of all kinds. Our ability to correct 
these deficiencies is limited by two factors, (1) aid to Great Britain, and (2) 
rapid expansion of the Army. Both of these limiting factors are admittedly of 
great importance and are entitled to proper weight in any system of priorities, 
but, from the point of view of the Fleet, it appenrs that there is a tendency to 
overlook the time factor. A priority system based on relative quantities needed 
by the three competing agencies. Britain, Army and the Navy, will prove fatally 
defective, if the tifnc of beginning active operation is overlooked. As the situa- 
tion appe.'H-s now, the Navy may be called on for active operations in contact with 
well equipped opposing forces, yet is prevented from obtaining vitally necessary 
needs by the magnitude of the needs of Britain and the Army. If we are going 
into action first, our needs must be filled ahead of the Army's and those sine qua 
non needs such as small arms and machine gun ammunition, modern airplanes^ 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1377 

and modern close-range anti-aircraft giins, must be filled ahead of Britain's. 
There is a minimum need for the Navy withcmt which it can not fight at all. 
Irrespective of how small that need may be relative to the quantitative demands 
of others it must be filled first. 

It is important to bring out this point now, since it is understood that the 
Army is basing its procurement program on a 4,000,000 man Army. If alloca- 
tion be based on relative quantities, under such a program, the Navy will get 
little consideration. The imminence of active operations should be the criterion. 
Of course, the Navy Department is in a better position to judge that than we are, 
but we've been led to believe we were pretty close to war on several occasions, 
but we still didn't get the items we need. 

(b) RADAR equipment. — Such excellent results are being obtained from the 
few RADAR'S furnished that we should install now the equipment which will 
work, and not wait for something better to be developed. Delivery of RADAR 
should be accelerated. 

[6] IV. Communications 

The need for establishment of confidential call signal is urgent. With the 
present system of calls the text of a message may sometimes be inferred from 
the radio calls used. The danger of the present system is that codes may be 
compromised, as well as information disclosed. The cryptographic aid section 
of OpNav should immediately get out confidential call signs and more crypto- 
graphic aids. 

y. Operations 

(a ) Fleet Operations. — With the recent detachment of many of the most modern 
and effective units, the adequacy and suitability of the forces remaining to 
accomplish the tasks to which they may lie assigned is very doubtful. 

In the Pacific, our potential enemy is far away and hard to get at. He has no 
exposed vital interests within reach of Pearl Harbor, and has a system of defense 
in the Mandates, Marianas, and Bonins that requires landing operations, sup- 
ported by sea forces, against organized land positions supported by land-based 
aid. This is the hardest kind of opposition to overcome and requires detailed 
preparation and rehearsal. It also requires a preponderance of light force and 
carrier strength, in which we are woefully deficient in the Pacific. Our present 
strength is in battleships — which come into play only after we have reduced the 
intervening organized positions. They (battleships) will have to be used to 
"cover" the intervening operations and prevent interference therewith, but their 
real value can not be realized until the intervening opposition has been overcome 
and a position obtained from which solid strength can be brought to bear. The 
Japanese are not going to expose their main fleet until they are either forced to 
do so by our obtaining a position close enough to threaten their vital interests 
or it is advantageous for them to do so by our having "broken our backs," so to 
speak, by going up against their land positions and attrition operations. 

The foregoing discussion is brought out to emphasize that the role of light 
forces, and particularly carriers, in the Pacific, is far more important than a 
casual evaluation of relative strength would suggest. Under RAINBOW 5, 
the Pacific Fleet (perhaps justifiably, in view of the Atlantic situation) is so 
reduced in light force and carrier strength that its capabilities for offensive 
operations of a decisive nature are severely crippled. Quick results may only 
be hoped for— common sense dictates that it is largely hope, based principally 
upon the idea that Japan will make a fundamental mistake, and that bold action 
may be able to take advantage of it. 

In the Pacific, with enemy vital interests so far away, and no bases of our 
own within striking distance, the logistic problem is acute. We have not, at 
present, sufficient ammunition, provisions, cargo ships or tankers to support active 
operations in the Western Pacific— where the real battleground will be. We are 
having difficulty, even now, supporting the construction and defense activities 
of our own outlying bases. More auxiliary vessels are needed, now, for that 
purpose, and future needs must be anticipated to allow for acquisition and 
conversion of the ships. Our past experience, in this regard, has not been a happy 
one— the lag between acquisition and entrance into service being six months to a 
year. Repair and maintenance facilities at advanced bases can not be created 
overnight, nor can the Fleet remain long without them. 

[7] (b) Fourteenth Naval District.— The defense of the Fleet based at 
Pearl Harbor is a matter of considerable concern. We should continue to bring 
pressure to bear on the Army to get more antiaircraft guns, airplanes, and 



1378 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

RADAR equipment in Hawaii and to insure priority for tliis over Continental 
and expanding Army needs. 

The naval forces available to Commandant are meager to the point of non- 
existence. A Fleet base is a place of rest, recreation, and resustinance and 
must afford protection of the Fleet at anchor and during entrance and egress 
independent of the units of the Fleet. If units of a fleet must be employed for 
its own defense, in its base, its freedom of action for offensive operations is 
seriously curtailed possibly to the point where it is tied to the base by the 
necessities for defense of that base. The need for patrol boats and other small 
craft, especially those equipped with listening devices, is urgent. The Fleet must 
be relieved of those functions which properly belong to the District. The Fleet 
does not have the destroyers or other vessels to take over those duties. The 
situation has been brought to the Department's attention by letter. It is now 
much more serious as many destroyers have been detached from this Fleet. 

(c) Marine. — The necessity for closely coordinated training of Marines and 
the ships which will support their landing operations is readily apparent. Opera- 
tions of this character require detailed training and realistic rehearsal. At 
present, the Marines and their training ground (San Clemente) are in one loca- 
tion and the ships in another, 2,000 miles away. We need a training ground 
for landing operations and a camp for a substantial portion of the Fleet Marine 
Force in the Hawaiian area. This need will be worse, if we get in war in the 
Pacific, because we will not only need a training ground and large camp site for 
Marines, but also must train and rehearse, as the campaign progresses. Army 
forces as well. 

Kahoolawe is practically undeveloped and can be used as an Hawaiian San 
Clemente. A camp site for .500 Marines has been selected and recommended 
for acquisition. This program should be pushed. 

The Sixth Defense Battalion should be brought to Hawaii now in order to 
relieve the Seventh Defense Battalion at Midway where the latter has been 
stationed for some months. Equipment for this battalion sliould be provided 
as soon as possible. Other defense battalions now in the Hawaiian area are 
being used for other outlying bases. 

(d) Logistic Support. — Ships to transport men and materials to and from the 
Coast and to supply the outlying islands is urgent. 

There is similar urgency in the need for ships to transport aircraft. Aircraft 
carriers should not be used for this purpose in peacetime and cannot be so 
employed in war. Action has repeatedly been reauested. 

VI. National policy 

(a) Although largely uninformed as to day-by-day developments, one cannot 
escape the conclusion that our national policies and diplomatic and military 
moves to implement them, are not fully coordinated. No policy, today, is any 
better than the force available to support it. While this is well recognizeil 
in principle, it is, apparently, lost sight of in practice. We have, for example, 
made strong expressions of our intension to retain an effective voice in the 
Far East, yet have, so far, refused to develop Guam or to provide adequate 
defense for the Philippines. We retained the Fleet in Hnwaii, last summer 
as a diplomatic gesture, but almost simultaneously detached heavy cruisers to 
the Atlantic and retained new destroyers there, and almost demobilized the Fleet 
by wholesale changes in personnel. 

We should decide on what we are going to do about the Philippines, now, and 
provide for their defense, if retained. It is easily conceivable that 50,000 troops 
and 400 airplanes, on Luzon, might prove a sufficient deterrent to Japan to 
prevent direct action. We should develop Guam and provide for its defense 
commensurate with its state of development. It is foolish to develop it for some 
one else to use. 

The military branches of the government should be told, by the diplomatic 
branch, what effect it is desired to produce and their judgment as to the means 
available and the manner of its accomplishment should be accorded predominant 
weight. 

Our Hemispheric Defense policy must comprehend the fullest cooperation 
between participating nations and our commitments limited by our available 
force. A strong component of that force is bases. No Hemispheric Defense 
policy that does not provide for our free use and development of South American 
bases (and local military and logistic support) can be effective. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1379 

VII. Information 

(a) The Commander-iu-Cliief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. 
He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly chang- 
ing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, 
reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to 
evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sui-e of what 
force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting 
- his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing 
and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that 
singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary 
to the conduct of military operations. 

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international 
picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge 
of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of 
timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked 
improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and ob- 
jectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander- 
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses 
of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the 
current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a 
partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of 
interruption of this truluiiig by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet 
[8] impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of dis- 
tance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local 
situation, particularly with regard to the status of curi-ent outlying Lsland develop- 
ment, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific 
Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical in- 
structions. 

It is suggested that It be made a cardinal principle tliat the Commander-in- 
Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as 
they occur and by the quickest secure inoans available. 

VIII. Puhlic opinion 

(a) As preparation for war, the current mental and moral preparation of our 
people, as reflected in the newspapers and magazines, is utterly wrong. To back 
into a war, unsupported or only half-heartedly supported by public opinion, 
is to court losing it. A left-handed, vacillating approach to a very serious de- 
cision is totally destructive of that determination and firmness of national char- 
acter without which we cannot succeed. The situation demands that our people 
be fully informed of the issues involved, the means necessary and available, and 
the consequences of success or failure. When we go in, we must go with ships, 
planes, guns, men and material, to the full extent of our resources. To tell our 
people anything else is to perpetrate a base deception which can only be 
reflected in lackadaisical and half-hearted prosecution. 

/s/ H. E. Kim MEL. 
"copy" 



Exhibit No. 10 (Navy Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 

[i] United States Pacteic F1.eet 

U. S. S. PEasfNSYLVANiA, Flagship 
Cincpac File No. 
A2-11/FF12/ 
A4-3/QL/(13) 
Serial 01646 
Coniidcntial 

Peael Harbor, T. H., October I4, I94I. 

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER NO. 2CL-J,1 {Revised) 

From : Commander-in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
To : PACIFIC FLEET. 

Subject : Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas. 
Reference : 

(a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41. 

(h) Cincpac conf. Itr. file A7-2 (13) Serial 01221 of 8 August 1941. 
79716 — 46 — Ex. 143, vol. 3 7 



1380 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(c) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. lCM-41. 

(d) Pacific Fleet Couf. Memo. No. 2CM^1. 

(e) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L-40 (Revised). 

(f ) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40. 

(g) Section 3, Chapter II, U. S. F. 10. 
(h) Chapter IV, U. S. F. 10. 

Enclosure : 

(A) Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sectors. 

(B) Measures to be effective until further orders. 

1. Reference (a) is revised herewith. References (b), (c) and (d), are can- 
celled and superseded by this letter. 

2. The security of the Fleet, operating and based in the Hawaiian Area, is 
predicated, at present, on two assumptions : 

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing 
conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided 
nationals of such powers may attempt ; 

(1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft. 

(2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the 
Channel. 

(3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor. 

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by ; 

(1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, 

(2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area, 

(3) a combination of these two. 

3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part 
in accordance with enclosure (B) or in their entirety as may later be directed by 
the Comma ndei'-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat 
in the Hawaiian Area : 

(A) Continuous Patrols : 

(1) Inshore Patrol (administered and furnished by Commandant Fourteenth 
Naval District). 

(2) Boom Patrols. 

(3) Harbor Patrols. 

(B) Intermittent Patrols: 

(1) Destroyer Offshore Patrol. 

[2] (a) The limits of this patrol shall be the navigable portion to seaward 
of a circle ten miles in radius from I'earl Harbor entrance buoy number one 
which is not patrolled by the Inshore Patrol. 

(b) Three destroyers to search twelve hours prior to the sortie or entry of the 
Fleet or of a Task Force containing heavy ships. The Fleet or Task Force Com- 
mander concerned shall furnish this patrol and when a sortie and entry occur 
in succession the Commander entering shall furnish it. 

(c) One destroyer (READY DLTTY) to screen heavy ships departing or enter- 
ing Pearl Harbor other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry. The 
Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will administer the Read Duty Destroyer 
for this purpose and issue necessary orders when requested by forces afloat. Such 
Ready Duty Destroyer shall be on one hour's notice. 

(2) Air Patrols: 

(a) Daily search of operating areas as directed, by Aircraft, Scouting Force. 

(b) An air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force. It will 
search that part of a circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel 
buoys which is south of latitude 21°20' N. The Fleet or Task Force Commander 
concerned shall furnish this patrol, establishing it at least two hours prior to 
the sortie or entrance, and arranging for its discontinuance. "When a sortie and 
entry occur in succession, the Commander entering shall supply this patrol. 

(c) Air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than 
described in foregoing subparagraph. The ship concerned shall furnish the patrol 
mentioned therein. 

(3) Daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines by Fourteenth Naval District 
Forces. The swept channel for Fleet and Task Force sorties or entries is twa 
thousand yards wide between Points "A" and "X" as defined in subparagraph (C) 
(3). below. 

(C) Sortie and Entry: 

(1) Reference (h) will not be in effect in the Pacific Fleet during the present 
emergency. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1381 

(2) The CoiamaiKlaut Fourteenth Naval District controls the movements of 
ships within Pearl Harbor, the Entrance Channel, and the swept channel. 

(3) Point "A" is midway between Pearl Harbor entrance channel buoys Nos. 
ONE and TWO ; Point "A-1" is midchannel on a line drawn 270° true from Buoy 
No. EIGHTEEN ; Point "X" unless otherwise prescribed is three thousand yards 
bearing 153° true from Point "A". 

(4) Zero hour is the time first ship passes Point "A-1" abeam for sortie, or 
. Point "A" for entry, and will be set by despatch. Interval between ships will be 

as prescribed by Fleet or Task Force Commanders. 

(5) Fleet and Task Force Conmianders shall, for their respective forces : 

(a) Arrange with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District for times of 
entry and departure, berthing and services. 

(b) Prepare and issue sortie and entrance plans. 

(c) Clear the Defensive Sea Area promptly after sortie. 

(d) When a sortie and entry occur in succession, keep entry force well 
clear of Defensive Sea Area until sortie force is clear. 

(e) Furnish own patrols except as modified by (B) (1) (b) and (B) (2)- 
(b), above. 

(6) Units departing or entering Pearl Harbor at times other than during a 
Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, request authority and services as required, 
direct from Couimaiidunt Fourteenth Naval District. 

(7) Heavy ships (including 7,r>0O ton light cruisers) maintain a minimum 
speed of 15 knots when within a radius of 15 miles from the entrance buoys to 
I'earl Harbor. During approach and entry, individual units govern movements 
to provide for minimum time in waters adjacent to the entrance. 

[3] (D) Operating Areas: 

(1) The Naval Operating Aivas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart: 
No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of refer- 
ence (g). 

(2) Ships, except submarines, shall anchor only in protocol anchorages. Pearl 
Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului are considered as such 
if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and if ships are so moored as 
not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor. 

(3) Submarines may anchor in the following placi^s: in Pearl Harbor, oft" 
Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need 
be maintained. 

(4) Submarines shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships 
except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery 
exercises, or for services to other types. 

(5) Submarine operations, except (4) above, shall be confined ordinarily to 
Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and M-24. Under special circumstances sub- 
marine squadrons may request additional areas from the ofiicer responsible for 
a.ssigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area 
allocated to surface ships and shall notify all Fleet units in the Hawaiian area. 
AVhile submarines are operating submerged in C-5 and C-7 they shall maintain 
a guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships. 

(6) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes, all operations of 
siibmarines other than those covered in sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) above, 
shall be on the surface. 

(7) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, shall ensure that commanders 
of surface and air task forces are furnished with detailed submarine schedules 
and all changes thereto. The latter shall ensure that units concerned, including 
air patrols, operating under their command are properly notified thereof. 

(8) Ships proceeding independently across the operating areas at night shall 
follow neutral zones and area boundaries where practicable. The Task Force 
Commander in the vicinity shall be informed of: (a) the route to be followed 
using point numbers on the Operating Chart, (b) time of starting route, (c) 
the speed of advance. The Task Force Commander shall notify vessels of his 
force that may be concerned. 

(E) Ships at Sea: 

(1) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as^ 
a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and airci-aft as necessary for 
screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. These- 
organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port and shall provide for the- 
following : 

(a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines. 



1382 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

« 

(b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number 
of destroyers available, priority in assignments being governed by the following: 

Priority 1 — BBs 
Priority 2 — CVs 
Priority 3 — CAs 
Priority 4 — CLs 

(c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroyers, to co- 
operate with Patrol Wings and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier 
group. 

(d) A concentration of own operating submarines prepartory to disposition 
as circumstances require. 

(e) Inner air patrol for dispositions or formations, when in operating areas. 
Such screen shall be maintained by Task Groups, if the Task Force Commander 
so directs. 

(f) Inner anti-submarine screens, insofar as practicable with assigned de- 
stroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they 
are not employed in plane guarding. 

(g) Maintenance of condition of readiness THREE on torpedo defense batteries 
and equivalent condition of readiness in desti'oyers. Supply ready ammunition 
and keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless especially 
directed. 

[^J (h) Maintenance of material condition XRAY, or equivalent in all 
ships. 

(i) Steaming darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task Force 
or by Task Groups as practicable. 

(j) Restricting use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations. 

(k) Maintenance of horizon and surface battle lookouts. 

(1) Energizing degaussing coils whenever there is any possibility of the pres- 
ence of magnetic mines. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if 
operations permit. 

(2) Ships towing targets in operating areas at night will show appropriate 
running and towing lights, except when engaged in exercises the nature of which 
requires them to be darkened. 

(F) Shij)s in Port : 

(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures 
outlined in references (e) and (f). 

(0) Defense Against Air Attack: 

(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of 
several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference 
of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in. the 
middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense 
Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located 
both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gim positions. 

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor 
plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense. 

(3) Enclosure (A) defines the air defense sectors in Pearl Harbor and is the 
basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire. Hostile 
planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships 
in that sector. However, ships in other sectors may augment fire of any other 
sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander. 

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander- 
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so 
that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector com- 
mensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized 
to depart from the normal berthing plan or this purpose Battleships, carriers, 
and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit. 

(5) The Senior Officer Present in each sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) 
(3) above, is the Sector Commander, and responsible for the fire in his own 
sector. 

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense 
Officer (N. R. D. O.). As such he shall : 

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense 
against air attack. 

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft gims emplaced. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1383 

(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging 
tlirough Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort 
between the Army and Navy. 

(d) Coordinate Fleet antiaircraft fire with the base defense by: 

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive 
of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readi- 
ness to mai^itain. 

(2) Holding necessary drills. 

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal. 

(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and 
the type of attacking aircraft. 

(5) Arranging communication plan. 

(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed. 
[5] (7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are 

prescribed : 

Condition I — Genei-al Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as pre- 
scribed by Naval Base Defense OflScer. 

Condition II — One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector 
manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base 
Defense Officer. 

Condition III — Anti-aii'craft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) 
of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four 
guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by 
Naval Base Defense Officer. 

(8) Searchlights of ships shall not be used in event of a night attack. 

(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure shall be followed by 
the task forces : 

(a) Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harhor. 

(1) Execute an emergency sortie order which will accomplish (2), (3) and 
(4) below. (This order must be prepared and issued in advance). 

(2) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating 
task force commander. 

(3) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable 
sortie. 

(4) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie. 

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force 
Commander operating at sea, advised. 

(6) Tank, Force Commander operating at sea. 

(1) Despatch striking unit. (See (E) (1) (c), above). 

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining 
surface forces at sea. 

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require. (May utilize 
unit of (E) (1) (a) for this if not needed for A/S purposes.) 

(4) Direct commander of operating submarines to carry out action desired 
of him. 

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer 
Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks or hostile planes 
sighted in the operating area. 

(c) Naval Base Defense Officer. 

(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not 
already blacked out, each unit shall execute blackout when the alarm is given. 

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of 
attacking aircraft. 

(3) Launch air search for enemy ships. 

(4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available. 

( 77) ACTION TO BE TAKEN IF SUBMARINE ATTACKS IN OPERATING 
AREA: 

(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following 
general procedure will be followed : 

Ship Attacked. 

(a) Proceed in accordance with Article 509, F. T. P. 188. Originate a plain 
language despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential details addressed for 
action to the Task Force Commander in the operating area and for information 
to Commander-in-Chief, Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and S. O. P. A., 
Pearl Harbor. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate sub- 
marine danger area, at best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor 
using zigzag appropriate for speed in use. 



1384 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[61 Ships other than one atfackerL 

(&) Battleships. Zigzag at maximum speed. Lauiicli aircraft armod for inner 
air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles dnrin.sj re- 
mainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enal)le them 
to join quickly. 

(c) Carriers. Same as for battleships, except place all aircraft in Condition 
ONE, armed. (At least one squadron with depth charges when they become 
available.) Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may be launched unarmed. 
Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task Force 
Commander or as circumstances warrant. 

(d) Cruisers. Same as for battleships, except, use one-half available air- 
craft (armed) for own inner air patrol. Send the second half to scene of attack 

(armed), to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for damaged ship if 
damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patrol. 

(e) Destroyers. Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack. 
Take determined offensive action. Screening units .ioin heavy ship units to which 
assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for de- 
parture. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task Force 
Commander when clear of Channel. 

if) Submarines. Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, zig- 
Tiagging at best speed until directed otherwise. 

\g) Minecraft. Augment screening units as directed by Ta.sk Force Com- 
mander. 

(h) Base Force. If ship attacked is damaged, tugs in operating areas .ioin 
lier at best speed, prepared to tow, slipping targets as necessary. Report in 
-code, positions of rafts abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure. 
Sortie on ordei- of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels pro- 
ceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack. 

(/.) Patrol Wings. Assume i-eadiness for search and for offensive action. 
•Carry out search as directed I)y Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish 
station patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before dayliglit 
of next succeeding daylight period. 

(j) Shore-based Fleet Aircraft. Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the 
attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instructions 
issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority. 

(k) Naval District. Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or 
■entry. Prepare to receive damaged ship (s) for repair. 

(1) S. 0. P. A., Pearl Harbor. Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie 
and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of 
units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander 
at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor enti-ance buoys. 

(m) Task Force Commander at Sea. Coordinate offensive and defensive 
measures. When immediate defensive measures have been accomplished, pre- 
scribe rendezvous and issue necessai-y instructions for concentrating and form- 
ing the Task Force. 

(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the 
prtL^sence of more submarines waiting to attack. 

(3) It must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate 
the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships 
accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble 
his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in 
order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air 
search or other means. 

[7 J 4. Subordinate Connnanders shall issue the necessary orders to make 
these measui'es effective. 

H. E. KIMMEL. 

Distribution: (5CM-41) 
List II, Case 1 : A, X. 

ENl, ENS, NA12, NDllAC, NDll-12-13-14, NY8-10, 
(1 - Asiatic, Al - Atlantic) . 
P. C. Crosley, 

Flag Secretary. 

Enclosure (A) 

(Enclosure "A" to CINCPAC 2 CL-41 (Kevised), dated May 30, 
1941, is the Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan, showing air 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1385 

defense sectors. The original exhibit contained two marked copies 
of this PLan and they are reprodnced as Items Nos. 37 and 38, 
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTEATIONS, Roberts Commission.) 

CONFIDENTIAL 

Enclosure (B) 

MEASURES TO BE EFFECTIVE UNDER PARAGRAPH 3 OF BASIC LETTER UNTIL FURTHER 

ORDERS 

(A) (1) 

(A) (2) 

Boom — aclministered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with serv- 
ices furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present. 

(A) (3) 

Harbor — administered by Commander Base Force with services furnished 
by Commander Battle Force from all ships present. 

(B) (1) (a) (b) (c) 

Furnished by Destroyers, Battle Force ; Minecraft, Battle Force ; and Mine- 
craft, Base Force, and coordinated by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force. 
(B) (2) (a) (b) (c) 

(B) (3) 

(C) (1) (2) (8) (4) (5) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (6) (7) 

(D) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

(E) (1) (a) (b) (c) (d) 

Assignments only shall be made. The Task Force Commander will hold 
one drill during each operating period, if employment permits, in tlie estab- 
lishment of units prescribed. 
(E) (1) (h) (i) (j) (k) (1) 
(E) (2) 
(F) 

The provisions of reference (e). 
(G) 

Entire article, except sub-paragraph 6 (b), which will be as arranged by 
Naval Base Defense OfBcer with Commanding General, Hawaiian Depart- 
ment. 



Exhibit No. 11 (Na\^^ Packet No. 2) Roberts Comjiission 
[1] United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship 
Copy 

5 January 1942. 
SECRET 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMISSION 

In accordance with the Commission's verbal directive, the following Summary 
is respectfully submitted : 

In summarizing the frequency of occurrence of the periods when information 
was lacking in regard to the location or activity of a group, type or unit of the 
Japanese Fleet during the last six months of 1941, necessitates a general review 
of the procedures and methods followed : 

1. Due to the distances involved, it is seldom possible to intercept the original 
direct transmissions from Japanese Fleet units at sea, consequently interception 
depends on those naval communications handled by the more powerful shore 
stations on broadcast schedules. Approximately 90% of the intercepted traffic 
is of this latter nature. A unit may be addressed by other units via direct com- 
nnmication or the ship-shore channels (rebroadcast) whether in port or at sea. 
During tactical exercises ORANGE utilizes medium and low frequencies which 
are inaudible here. During such periods it is necessary to rely on the intercept 
activities at Guam and Cavite to observe and report on these activities. When in 
port, a unit almost invariably shifts to the low-frequency, low-power, limited 
range, "harbor frequency" depriving all intercept stations of original traffic. 
Thus occurs periods when little definite information is available relative to a 



1386 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



unit's activities except that inferred from the traflSc addressed it either by the 
routing or association with other units addressed or associations with the 
originator. 

2. Changes of call signs, addresses, use of alternate, secret, tactical, and special 
calls, greatly complicates the identification of units and the reconstruction of 
the naval orgnnization afloat and ashore. The Japanese Navy shifted its call 
signs on 1 May, 1 November and 1 December, 1941. Shortly after the 1 November 
chan<;e the Japnnese began using a ''blanket broadcast" system in which no 
originator or addressee appeared, these being presumably buried in the cipher 
text. 

3. It has been a general rule that when a unit was not heard originating traffic 
or using tactical circuits it was presumed to be in port or in a navy yard in a 
relatively inactive status. 

4. It is to be noted that for the above reasons the simultaneous location of each 
Division of Battleships, cruisers, destroyers, carriers, or submarines is not pos- 
sible. Therefore, the location of Fleet Flagships and some subordinate units of 
the above types must be relied upon to establish the presumed locations or activity 
of the remainder of the related lower echelons. 

\2] 5. During the past six months. Fleet Intelligence records show that the 
occasions when uncertainty existed as to the exact location of certain types 
were: 



Type 



Total days un- 
certain 



Number of periods 



Range of 
periods 



Battleships 

Cruisers (1st Fleet). 



70 

Nearly alL 



Cruisers (2nd Fleet, less CRUDIV 7) 

CRUDIV 7 (very active on detached duty)- 
Destroyers_._ 

Carriers 



113 

63 

Very indefinite 



Seven 8-14 days. 

Almost continual absence of 
positive indications. 



Eight - 

Six 

Seven_ 
Eight - 



10-20 days. 

8-16 days. 

9-33 days. 

8-22 days. 



(If Cardiv 2, formerly very active on detached duty, be excepted from this analysis the following result is 
more typical.) 

Carriers (less Cardiv 2) | 134 .| Twelve 1 9-22 days. 

(In both cases the longest period, 22 days, was in July 1941.) 



Respectfully submitted. 



Certified to be a True Copy ; 



Edwin Thomas Layton, 
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy. 
Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 

J. M. Lee, 
Comdr., U. S. Navi/, 

Flag Secretary, 
Staff, CINCPAC-CINCPOA. 



Exhibit No. 12 (Navy Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 

Cincpac File No. 

United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Ldst of damage control officers of ships present 7 Decemher 1941 



Name of ship 


On board ship 


Damage control officer 




Yes.... 


Lt. Cdr. S. G. Fuqua. 




Yes 


Lt. Cdr. M. N. Little. 


Maryland -- - 


(?) 

No (asst was on bd.) 

Yes - 


Lt. Cdr. S. G. Davis. 




Lt. Cdr. O. C. Miller. 




Lt. Cdr. W. M. Hobby, Jr. 




Yes .,. 

No (asst on board) 


Lt. Cdr. .T. E. Craig. 




Lt. Cdr. J. A. Ralph. 




Yes - 


Lt. Cdr. J. S. Harper. 







[Penned:] Brought in at same time with Commander Fuqua— Jan 2. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1387 

Exhibit No. 13 (Navy Packet No. 2) Robeets Commission 
fi] Copy United States Pacific Fleet dar 

SCOUTING FORCE 

Peakl Haebob, T. H., December 26, 19Jfl. 
L9-3(S)/(50) 
Serial 0106A 
Confidetitial 

From: Commander Scouting Force (Administration). 
To : Commandant, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor. 
Subject : Navy Yard Pearl Harbor Pi-iority List. 
Reference: (a) Comsecfor (Admin) Serial 0104A dated December 22, 1941. 

1. The following priority list supersedes reference (a) and modifications 
thereto : 

(1) Dry dock work on ships. 

(a) HONOLULU in No. 1 dry-dock. Effect permanent repairs. Commandant 
recommend date of completion. (Continue salvage of CASSIN and DOWNES.) 

(b) HELENA in No. 2 dry-dock. Effect repairs to make seaworthy. Ship to 
be made operative on engine room and boiler rooms which were not flooded. 
Restoration of flooded machinery spaces on not-to-delay basis. Commandant* 
recommend date of completion. 

(c) TRACY on Marine Railway — overhaul docking. 
Note: 

Schedule RALEIGH for next in No. 1 Dry-dock. 

Schedule WILLIAM WARD BURROWS for next in No. 2 Dry-dock 
for straightening of rudder. 

Schedule NARWHAL (correction of oil leaks) and SHAW (installa- 
tion of false bow) to follow BURROWS in No. 2 Dry-dock. 

Schedule HULL tentatively for next on Railway to correct leaks in 
two after fuel oil tanks. Complete information not yet available. 

Schedule TROUT to follow TRACY (or HULL, if docked) for propeller, 
underwater sound, and pitometer log work. 

Schedule remainder of Mindiv ONE to follow TROUT. 

(2) Any operating ship made available for any other purpose is also available 
for preliminary radar work on a not-to-delay basis; and, if directed by Cincpac, 
the ship is available for the installation of the specific radar desigfnated. Deci- 
sions will depend upon the availability of radar material. 

[2] (At present time, the installation of SD radar in TROUT and the sub- 
stitution of one FC for FA radar on HONOLULU are involved.) 

(3) LEXINGTON — restricted availability granted on arrival to repair main 
motor stator on not-to-delay basis. 

(4) CRAVEN — restricted availability granted 20 December for repairs to #1 
gun shield. Commandant recommend date of completion. 

(5) HOPKINS — restricted availability granted 26 December to renew drain 
line in D fuel oil tanks. Date of completion 28 December. 

(6) SELFRIDGE— restricted availability granted on ari'ival. Renew torpedo 
tube mounts. (Comdesbatfor mailgram 210143 Dec.) 

(7) FARRAGUT — restricted availability granted on arrival. Renew torpedo 
tube mounts. (Comdesbatfor mailgram 210143 Dec.) 

(8) HULL — restricted availability granted on arrival to correct leaks in two 
after fuel oil tanks, if this work is found to be beyond capacity of forces afloat 
but can be performed by Yard without dry-docking. 

(9) PHOENIX — restricted availability granted 26 December for installation of 
2-171 guns ex-HELENA. This and any other Yard work on not-to-delay basis. 

(10) TROUT — restricted availability granted beginning 23 December for dry- 
docking and to install electric vapor compression stills. All other work on a not- 
to-delay basis. Commandant recommend date of completion. 

(11) CURTISS — restricted availability granted beginning 20 December. Per- 
form essential work to make seaworthy the damage to hangar, main and second 
decks, and to install radio. Current availability extends [3] through 27 
December. All other work, from view of complete repairs, should be undertaken 
on a not-to-delay basis. 

(12) McFARLAND, HULBERT — one at a time, restricted availability granted 
to install Y Gun or track for 7 depth charges on stern. Also install ballast and 
reduce height of masts. 



1388 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(13) PRUITT, PREBLE, SICARD, TRACY— expedite completion of oveinauls. 

(14) SHAW — available tor work connected with construction of false bow and 
with seaworthiness. Work should anticipate dry-docking tentatively scheduled 
above. Commandant recommend date of completion. 

(15) NARWHAL — restricted availability granted beginning 26 December for 
Yard work preparatory to dry-docking for correction of oil leaks. 

(1(5) RALEIGH — available for Yard work preparatory to dry-docking sched- 
uled above. 

(17) Yard assistance, connected with salvage, for damaged ships in the harbor^ 
as requested by and coordinated by Commander Base Force. 

(18) RIGEL — expedite completion of overhaul. 

(19) ONTARIO — expedite completion of overhaul. 

(20) RAIL — restricted availability granted beginning 21 December. Replace 
main engine cylinder. Commandant recommend date of completion. 

U] (21) SONOMA — restricted availability granted 23 December for instal- 
lation of new main circulating pump casing. Commandant recommend date of 
completion. 

/s/ R. S. McDowell, 
For M. O. Robertson, 

Chief of Staff. 
* Copy to : 

Opnav. 

Cincpae. 

Combatfor. 

Comcrubatfor. 

Combasefor. 

Coms^ubscofor. 

Comdesbatfor. 

Compatwing 2. 

Comtrainron 6. 



Exhibit No. 14 (Navy Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 

[i] C-A1-1/ND14 TAH/GMA 

(01479) 

Confidential 

DECEMBEa? 2G, 1941. 

From : The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 

To : The Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks. 

Subject : Construction Program on Oahu — Prosecution of, imder war conditions. 

References: 

(a) Budocks Conf. Desp. 181900, Dec. 1941. 

(b) OinC Conf. Desp. 240600, Dec, 1941, to Budocks, info Com-12, RoinO 

Alameda. 

1. In compliance with reference (a), it is the firm intention to proceed with the 
authorized Shore Establishment construction pi'ogram on Oahu with all possible 
effort and speed. Stress will be placed upon the following classes of structures : 

Personnel structures (except family quarters for officers and men). 

Note : Low-cost housing units will be i-ushed to completion to serve as> 
may be found practicable as workers' dormitories. 
Storage structures for all purposes, especially fireproof construction. 
Ship and aircraft operation, maintenance and repair facilities. 

2. The highest possible immediate priority under this progi-am will be given to: 
Barracks, mess hall and galley, Receiving Station. 

Bachelor Officers' Quarters, Navy Yard. 

Low-cost Plousing — 1000 units. Area III, Pearl Harbor. 

Bombproof communication centers and personnel structures at all authorized 

locations. 
Underground fuel storage and terminal facilities. 
Naval Plospital structures at Aiea. 
Fleet Supply Depot storehouses, sheds, cold storage plant, quay walls and 

pier at Kuahua. 
Dry docks. 

General and temporary storehouses, Navy Yard. 
Industrial Department improvements. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1389 

Additional facilities at Ewa Flying Field. 

Runways at Naval Air Station, Barbers Point. 

[2] Enlargement of essential facilities at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, 

and at Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor. 
Magazines at Ammunition Depot, West Loch and Lualualei. 
Magnetic Proving Ground, Beckoning Point. 
Quays and pier, Net Depot and Section Base, Bishop Point. 
Improvement of water supply. Navy Yard. 

3. Operations on projects within the Navy Yard proper and at the Naval Air 
Stations, Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe, are suffering somewhat at the moment be- 
cause of the necessary prohibition against utilizing local workers of Japanese 
extraction at these locations. Such employees are being utilized so far as possible 
on projtcls outside these areas, but the prevailing situation as to materials on 
these outside projects and the extent of such projects is limiting the number of 
workers which can be assigned. 

4. The Bureau has been requested by despatch (reference (b)) to take such 
action as may be practicable and appropriate to expedite so far as possible the 
transportation from the west coast of workers, both skilled and unskilled, who 
have been and are being recruited by the contractors. Approximately 2O0O addi- 
tional workers from the mainland are urgently required for contract operations, 
some of whom have already arrived or are enroute. These are in addition to any 
w(»rkers who may be brought in from the outlying islands. The contemplated 
construction program for the outlying islands will l)e covered by separate corre- 
spondence. 

C. C. Bloch. 



Exhibit No. 15 (Navy Pactcet No. 2) Robehts Commission 

[1] United States Fleet Sr. 

U. S. S. Penn.sylvania, Flagship 
CinC File No. 
PW2/A16-3/(022) 

January 1G, 1941. 
Confidential 

From : The Commander Patrol Wing TWO. 
To : The Chief of Naval Operations. 
Via : 

(1) The Commander Scouting Force. 

(2) The Commander in Chief, U. S. FLEET. 
Subject : Patrol Wing TWO— Readiness of. 

References: (a) OpNav Conf. serial 095323 to the commander in Chief, U. S. 
FLEET— "Protection of Fleet Aircraft." 

1. I arrived here on October 30, 1940, with the point of view that the Interna- 
tional situation was critical, especially in the Pacific, and I was impressed with 
the need of being ready today rather than tomorrow for any eventuality that 
might arise. After taking over command of Patrol Wing TWO and looking over 
the situation, I was surprised to find that here in the Hawaiian Islands, an impor- 
tant naval advanced outpost, we were operating on a shoestring and the more I 
looked the thinner the shoestring appeared to be. 

2. (a) War readiness of Patrol Plane Squadrons is dependent not only on the 
planes and equipment that comprise these squadrons but also on many operating 
needs and requirements at Air Stations and outlying bases over which the Patrol 
Wing Commander has no direct control. Needs and requirements for War Readi- 
ness include : spare planes, spare engines, hangar and beach equipment, squadron 
equipment, spare parts, stores", material, bombs, ammunition, base operating facili- 
ties, overhaul and repair facilities, qualifi-'d personnel to man all base facilities 
and shops, all in sufficient adequacy to insure continuous operating readiness. 
These cannot be provided overnight. The isolation of this locality from the source 
of supply, the distance, and time involved, make careful and comprehensive long 
distance planning mandatory. I am informed that in the past, the average inter- 
val between the normal request and receipt of material has been nine months. 

(b) Reference (a) reads, in part, as follows: "In about one year practically all 
fleet aircraft except Patrol Wing TWO will have armor and fuel protection". 
As there are no plans to modernize the present patrol planes comprising Patrol 



1390 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Wing TWO, this [2] evidently means that there is no intention to replace 
the present obsolescent type of patrol planes in Patrol Wing TWO prior to one 
year and that Patrol Wing TWO will practically the last Wing to be furnished 
new planes. This, together with the many existing reficiencies, indicates to me 
that the Navy Department as a whole does not view the situation in the Pacific 
with alarm or else is not taking steps in keeping with their view. 

3. (a) Pre.sumably, the ofBces and bureaus concerned are familiar with the 
situation in the Hawaiian Area over which they have particular cognizance; 
certainly enougji correspondence has already been written concerning patrol plane 
needs to enable bureaus and ofBces to take the necessary steps to provide and to 
anticipate such needs. 

(b) If war should break in the Pacific, there is much work cut out for patrol 
planes and undoubtedly much will be expected, of them. Considerably more 
attention will have to be paid to anticipating their needs and action taken to 
provide deficiencies by all the bureaus and ofiices concerned if patrol planes are 
to perform according to expectations. 

4. It is therefore urgently recommended that these concerned with War Plans 
and those in the Planning and Procurement Division's of all bureaus and oflices 
view the patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian Area in the light of the Inter- 
national situation in the Pacific ; that each bureau and office check and recheck 
their planning and procurement lists for present requirements and future needs 
and that immediate steps be taken to furnish the personnel, material, facilities 
and equipment required and under their cognizance, to meet the present emer- 
gency and probable eventualities. The tremendous and all consuming work of 
those in the Navy Department is fully appreciated and there is no intent to 
criticize or to shift responsibility. This letter is written merely in an effort to 
insure that we may not be "too late". 

5. The following are some of the deficiencies and requirements referred to 
above : 

[3] (a) For Patrol Wing TWO. 

1. Replace present obsolescent type patrol planes with high performance 
modern types having latest approved armor and armament features and in 
such numbers as the readiness of base operating facilities will permit. 

2. Provide squadron spares and squadron equipment in excess so as to 
have available a sufficiency to provide for shift of operations to outlying bases. 

3. Provide bomb handling eqtiipment of latest design in sufficient amounts 
as to reduce to minimum the time element involved in rearming, both at 
normal base and outlying bases. 

4. Provide ordnance material to fill and maintain full squadron allowances. 

5. Provide increased number of aircraft torpedoes when additional stor- 
age is available. Twenty-four aircraft torpedoes are now stored at the 
Sumarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H. 

6. Expedite completion and assignment of patrol plane tenders. At pres- 
ent the tenders for Patrol Wing TWO consists of the USS WRIGHT and 
the USS SWAN. The WRIGHT now is not available due to Navy Yard 
overhaul imtil March 17, 1941. 

(b) For Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. 

1. Increase capacity for overhaul and repair of patrol planes, engines, 
instruments, radio and ordnance material, and provide manufacture and 
stowage of breathing oxygen, to anticipate [4] Operating needs both 
now and as estimated for the future, through addition of shop space, addi- 
tional shops, additional personnel, additional equipment, additional supply 
of spare parts and stock. 

2. Increase and improve bomb stowage and ammunition storage through 
enlargement and preparation of present storage and installation of bomb 
handling equipment. 

3. Construction of squadron's ready ammunition storage. 

4. Additional bombs in Hawaiian Area. 

5. Additional ferries or other suitable means for transporting bombs from 
ammunition depot across water surrounding Ford Island to Naval Air Sta- 
tion, Pearl Harbor. T. H. 

6. Increase supply facilities through additional stowage, additional supply 
personnel (Officer and enlisted, additional facilities for handling supplies, 
assistance in obtaining and increasing the amount of spares and supplies on 
hand, and simplification of requisitioning spare parts and supplies. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1391 

7. Increase machine gun and rifle range facilities in Pearl Harbor Area 
to provide for more effective ground training for personnel of Patrol squad- 
rons based on Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. 

8. Provide for torpedo war head stowage-at some suitable location readily 
accessible to the [5] Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. 

9. Increase barrack space to provide for increased personnel at Naval Air 
Station and for personnel of additional patrol squadrons as may be assigned. 

(c) For Naval Air Station, Kaneohe. 

1. Expedite completion ; providing the operating facilities necessary to 
permit basing and efficiently operating the number of patrol squadrons in- 
tended to base thereon, including dredging the patrol plane operating area to 
the extent recommended, dredging ship channel, housing of the necessary 
personnel, supplying necessary boats and supplying adequate station per- 
sonnel. Anticipate engine and plane overhaul facilities to meet war require- 
ments. 

(d) For Keehi Lagoon. 

1. Take necessary steps to expedite the development of Keehi Lagoon for g 
patrol plane baSe. 

(e) For Outlying Bases; Wake, Johnston, Palmyra. 

1. Expedite completion of operating facilities with particular regard to 
dredging ship channels ; dredging landing and take-off areas ; providing gaso- 
line and oil reserves and issue facilities ; bomb and ammunition supply and 
stowage ; concrete ramps and parking area. 

(f ) For Midway. 

1. Expedite completion and establishment of Midway as an outlying op- 
erating base with the assignment [G] of necessary personnel and with 
facilities and equipment to pnivide for the basing thereon of two patrol 
plane squadrons. 

(g) Genei-al. 

1. Stop the normal shifting and I'Otating between sea and shore- and be- 
tween other activities of personnel, officer and enlisted, in Patrol Wing 
TWO, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor and Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, 
until all personnel coniplements have been brought up to the requirements 
necessary for war-time operations. 

2. Provide two sets additional beaching gear and two boats fitted with 
gasoline bowser tanks for use at each of the following outlying bases : Wake, 
Midway, .Johnston, Palmyra, Guam and Canton. 

P. N. L. Betxinger, 
Copy to: 

Comairscofor 

Com. 14 

HAS P. H., T. H. 

Prosp. C. O., NAS Kaneohe. 

Copy 



United States Fleet 
scouting force 
A16-3/ (035) U. S. S. Indianapolis. Flagship, 

Pearl Harhor, T. H.. January 21, 1941, 
C07ifidrntial 
First Endorsement to 
CPW2 conf. Itr. PW2/ 
A16-3 (022) of 1/16/41. 
From : Commander Scouting Force. 
To : The Chief of Naval Operations. 
Via : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. 
Subieet : Patrol Wing TWO— Readiness of. 

1. Forwarded. 

2. The Commander Scouting Force appreciates that the efforts of the De- 
partment toward the completion of adequate defense measures must necessarily 
be based upon the development of the entire Naval Establishment rather than 
concentration upon one point. He believes, however, that the importance of 



1392 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Pearl Harbor as the spearhead of our defenses in the Pacific, and the essential 
role of Patrol Wing TWO not only in the defense of Pearl Harbor but also in 
any operations to the westward, warrant early and full attention to the needs cited 
by the Commander of that Wing. 

3. Commander Scouting Force has, since his arrival in this area as Com- 
mander Hawaiian Detachment, been much concerned at the lack of adequate ma- 
terial and facilities for proper and efficient operation of Patrol Wing TWO in 
war. He has effected such remedial measures as lay within his power, and has 
urged upon the Department such matters as the enlargement of the originally- 
planned installation at Kaneohe Bay and the provision of gasoline and lubri- 
cating oil reserve supplies at outlying-island bases so that these bases might be 
utilized temporarily without awaiting the arrival of tenders. 

4. In view of the location of Pearl Harbor and the island bases, and the func- 
tions of Patrol Wing TWO in war in the Pacific, the Commander Scouting Force 
therefore recommends strongly that measures toward fulfilling the needs cited 
by Commander Patrol Wing TWO be given the highest priority in the Depart- 
ment's program and accomplished at the earliest practicable moment. 

Adolphus Andrews. 
Copy to : 

Comairscofor Compatwing TWO. 
ComFOURTEBN. 
NAS, Pearl Harbor, 
prosp. CO, NAS, Kaneohe. 

Copy 



[1] United States Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Pearf. Harbor, T. H., Jan. 31, 1941. 
A16-1/ 

A4-1/VZ/(0178) 
Confidential 
Second Endorsement to 
CPW2 Conf. Itr. PW2/ 
A16-3/(022) of l/ie/41. 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. 
To : The Chief of Naval Operations. 
Subject : Patrol Wing TWO — Readiness of. 

1. Forwarded, concurring with the basic recommendation and with the first 
endorsement by Commander Scouting Force. 

2. The Commander-in-Chief appreciates the spirit in which the basic letter, 
urging action toward effective readiness for missions that may be demanded of 
Patrol Whig TWO, has been written. He also appreciates the fact that action 
has already been initiated or, in some cases, is not readily practicable at this 
time with respect to a number of the basic recommendations; and that separate 
correspondence with respect to much of this material is already in circulation. 

3. It is the Commander-in-Chief's opinion, however, that the basic letter, sum- 
marizing as it does the entire patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian area, pre- 
sents a very valuable picture of the overall requirements that are urgently needed 
if the potentialities expected of patrol planes are to be even approximately 
realized. Therefore, full review of the subject, accompanied by appropriate 
action toward expediting or initiating needed developments, is urged. 

4. Attention is particularly invited to : 

(a) The desirability of better priority in the delivery of improved patrol planes 
to Patrol Wing TWO. 

(b) The great importance of increased bomb and torpedo supply, including 
not only bulk storage, but also ready storage at Naval Air Station Pearl Harbor, 
together with suitable handling and loading equipment at the Air Station, and 
improved transportation from bulk storage. In this connection, provision at the 
Naval Air Station should include two "fills" for five patrol plane squadrons and 
one aircraft carrier group. 

[2] (c) The vital necessity of expediting the readiness at outlying island 
developments of the basic essentials: gasoline and oil storage, bomb and ammu- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1393 

nition sforage, parking area, ramps aiifl dredged approaches thereto. This latter 
siibject has been discussed informally with representatives of the Commandant 
Fourteenth Naval District and is understood to be receiving full consideration. 
Departmental support, if and as needed, is urged. 

J. O. Richardson. 
Copy to: 

Comscofor 
Comairscofor 
Compatwing-2 
Com-14 
NAS P. H. 
NAS Kaneohe 

Copy 



Exhibit No. 16 (Na\-y Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 

[Penned :] Adni. Ilalsey 
[stamped:] Confidential 

[i] United States Pacific Fleet 

AIRCBAFT, battle FORCE 

U. S. S. Enterprise, Flagship 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., Januarij 1, 19Jf2. 
Summary of Action 7 December 1941 

Planes available ENTERPRISE dawn December 7. 

17 VH 

18 VS 
16 VP 
18 VT 

1 CEAG 
About 0G18 launched 18 VSB to search sector 045-134 for a distance of 150 
miles then to proceed to Pearl Harbor. This group composes as follows : 
1 CEAG 
13 VS 
4 VB 
Remaining ou board: 

15 VR f iriiipr ^^^ patrol. 

16 VF 
18 VT 

About 1020 attack group of 15 VSB armed with 1 1,000 bomb each, was dis- 
patched to a point 30 miles south of Barbers Point, due to reported enemy 
positions. 

About 1055 6 VCS from, cruisers launched to search sector 000-0i5 to distance 
of l"iO miles to return to Pearl on completion of search. No reported contacts. 

At 1345 9 VSB launched to cover sector 110 to 200 to a distance of 175 miles. 
One of the latter reported contact with surface vessels believed enemy to the 
southward of Oahu. 

About 1640, based on this contact, an attack group of 18 VT and 4 VSB was 
launched — no <^'ontact. VSB smokers and VTB planes recovered after dark, the 
latter armed with torpodoes. The 6 VF planes proceeded to Peai'l. 

LOSSES 

Morning scouting flight which proceeded to Pearl : 
VB-6— 

6-B-3 — Pilot, passenger, plane, missing. 

6-B-9 — Pilot and passenger injured — plane at NAS Pearl for repair. 
VS-6— 

6-S-3^Pilot and passenger killed — plane crashed. 

[2] 6-S-15 — Pilot, passenger, and plane missing. 



1394 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

6-S-9 — Pilot parachuted — broken leg. Passenger killed, plane ci'ashed. 
6-S-4 — Pilot parachuted — no injury. Passenger killed by gunfire — plane 

crashed. 
6-S-14 — Pilot, minor, injuries. Passenger, hospitalized, wounded. Plane 

crashed. 
6-S-16 — Pilot and passenger — no injuries. Plane crashed Burns Field 



Kauai. 



DUSK ATTACK GROUP 



6-F-l — Pilot died — hospital. Plane crashed and burned. 
6-F-4— Pilot parachuted to safety — plane crashed. 
6-F-15 — Pilot killed, plane crashed. 
6-F-lS — Pilot parachuted, died. Plane crashed. 
3-F-15 — Pilot uninjured — plane at NAS Pearl for repair. 

Summary of losses 

Pilots killed: 

VF-6 3 

VS-6 1 

Pilots missing : 

VB-6 1 

VS-6 1 

Pilots injured: 

VS-6 2 (1 minor) 

[3] Passengers killed : 

VS-6 3 

Passengers missing : 

VB-6 1 

VS-6 1 

•Passengers injured: 

VS-6 1 

Summary of plane losses 

Planes missing: 

VS-6 1 

VB-6 1 

Planes crashed : 

VS-6 5 (1 at Kauai, disposition unknown) 

VF-6 4 

Planes requiring repair : 

VB-6 1 

VF-6 1 



Exhibit No. 17 (Navy Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 

[Penned:] Halsey #1 
United States Pacific Fleet 

aiecraft, battle force 

U. S. S. Enterprise, Flagship 

Pearl Harboe, T. H., 2 January 19/{2. 
Memorandum for Admiral Standley. 
Subject : Lil)erty — Hawaiian Area. 

1. The hours during which liberty was granted in this area prior to 7 De- 
cember 1941 was in accordance with paragraph 11 of Pacific Fleet Memorandum 
6M-41, copy of which is attached. 

2. The U. S. Navy Regulations article 1729 (10) specifies that not more 
than 1/4 of the crew need be kept on board while secured to a wharf and U. S. 
Pacific Fleet Regulations article 224 (b) states that liberty should be freely 
granted when conditions on shore permit and when it can be arranged without 
detriment to the ship's work. Consequently, in the ENTERPRISE it had been 
customary to grant three section liberty. However, in that Honolulu was not 
particularly well thought of as a liberty port, commissary records of the 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1395^ 

ENTERPRISE indicate that 50% of the crew or over was normally present for 
meals during liberty hours. 

W. F. Hai.sey. 

W. F. Halsey. 
Attached are copies of two dispatches which apply to liberty after 7 Decem- 
ber, 1941. 

[1] United States Pacific Flei:t 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 
Cincpac File No. 
.\2-ll/FFl-l(l)/ 
QL(l)/P18/(397) 

Pearl Hakbok, T. H., Febntanj J^, 19^1. 

PACIFIC. FLEET MEM0RANDU3I 6M-4I 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 

To : PACIFIC FLEET and Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 

Sul).iect : Shore Patrol and Liberty — Hawaiian Area. 

References : 

(a) Cincus Itr. QL(l)/P18/( 2.567) of 16 Aug. 1940. 

(b) Cincus Itr. P18-l/f3S95) of 30 December 1940. 

(c) Cincus dispatch 032027 of September 1940. 

1. References (a), (b), and (c) are hereby cancelled. 

2. As long as the major portion of the Pacilic Fleet continues to be based in^ 
the Hawaiian area, shore patrol and liberty shall be governed by the following:; 

SHOSE PATBOIi 

3. Pearl Harbor — Honolulu. — Commander Base Force administer the Fleet 
shore patrol and beach guard in Pearl Harbor and Honolulu. 

4. The organization and facilities of the permanent shore patrol in the Four- 
teenth Naval District have been made available to the Pacitic Fleet while based 
in the Hawaiian area. Commander J. P. Dix, U. S. Navy, Permanent Senior 
Shore Patrol Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, is available as Senior Patrol 
Officer for the Pacific Fleet Shore Patrol. 

5. The members of the permanent Fleet Patrol, except those detailed in the 
Long Beach-San Pedro area, shall be assigned to duty with the Pearl Harbor- 
Honolulu Shore Patrol. Any time the services of any of these personnel are 
not required, the Commandei--in-Chief shall be informed. 

6. Lahaina. — Commander Base Force administer Fleet Shore Patrol and beach 
guard in Lahaina. 

7. A permanent shore patrol is not required in Lahaina. The patrol need be 
maintained only during lil^erty hours. A beach guard shall be maintained dur- 
ing hours boats are scheduled to operate to and from landings. 

8. Other Ports, Hau?aUan Islands. — The organization and administration of 
the shore patrol and beach guards in other ports in the Hawaiian Islands shall 
be governed by Article 251(a), U. S. Fleet Regulations, 1940. 

9. While every effort should be made to reduce to a minimum the require- 
ments for personnel for patrol from ships engaged in exercises underway, all 
Fleet units are available for their proportionate share of patrol duty. 

UBEBTY 

10. Pearl Harbor — Honohdu. — All imits of the Pacific Fleet are placed on the 
same liberty basis during the entire period the Fleet remains in the Hawaiian 
area. This includes all units normally based on Pearl Harbor, units not nor- 
mally based on Pearl Harbor, and shore based units of the Pacific Fleet in the 
Hawaiian area. It does not include the Fourteenth Naval District. 

[2] Liberty may be granted as follows : 

(a) Chief Petty Officers and Petty Officers First Class: Regular overnight lib- 
erty. 

(b) All other enlisted men: From 1500 on Mondays, Tuesdays, Tluu'sdays, and 
Fridays, 1300 Wednesday, 1030 Saturdays, and 0800 Sundays and holidays, until- 
0100 the following morning. 

79716 — 46— Ex. 143, vol. 3 8 



1396 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(c) The following exceptions to (b) may be made: 

(1) Men whose immediate relatives reside on Oahu may be granted regular 
overnight liberty. 

(2) Special requests for overnight liberty by men having bona fide invi- 
tations necessitating this privilege may be granted. 

(3) Units regularly assigned to the Hawaiian ai'ea that have normal 
working hours ending prior to 1500 on Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays, and 
Fridays, may be granted liberty to commence at the end of the regular work- 
ing day. 

12. Liberty parties arriving at Navy Yard landings between IfiOO and 1630 
shall be kept at a minimum in order that congestion in the Navy Yard may be 
reduced. 

13. Enlisted men while within the Navy Yard limits shall be instructed to pro- 
ceed to and from authorized points quietly and without loitering. 

ORGANIZED SHIP's PARTIES ASHORE 

14. (a) Ships holding organized parties ashore at other than the regularly 
designated recreation places, e. g. Fleet Camp at Nanakuli, Swimming Beach at 
Fort Weaver, etc., shall provide adequate patrol for these parties and infoi'm 
the Senior Patrol Officer at least 24 hours in advance of the time, location and 
nature of the party. When outlying locations are utilized, such parties shall 
be in charge of an officer, commissioned or warrant, or a chief petty officer. 

(b) Force Commanders are authorized to grant extensions of the liberty au- 
thorized in paragraph 11 to ships holding organized parties ashore subject to the 
provision that adequate transportation direct from the party to the ship is pro- 
vided. 

15. When the patrol is landed for the party the senior member shall immedi- 
ately report to the Senior Patrol Officer and furnish him with a copy of his orders. 

16. Parties attending entertainments or canteens in the Naval Reservation, 
Pearl Harbor, after sunset, unist be under the charge of a petty officer, and be 
marched to and from the canteen or place of entertainment. 

17. Liherty at Lahaina. 

(a) Liberty may commence as follows : 

(1) On Sundays and holidays at 1000. 

(2) On Wednesdays and Saturday at 1300. 

(3) On other days at 1600. 

(4) Supervised tours of Maui, or hiking parties at 0800. 
(,b) Expiration of liberty, other than Chief Petty Officers : 

The senior officer present in each force shall divide the force so that liberty 
for one half expires at 1800 and the other half at 1900 daily. Liberty for chief 
petty officers expires at 2200. 

Organized ship's parties — picnics, barbecues, etc. may be held ashore evenings. 
Liberty for these parties may be extended until 2300. Members of the parties 
must not be permitted to leave the group. Ships holding these parties nuist pro- 
vide the necessary patrol and insure transportation between the dock and the 
location of the party. 

[3] (c) Liberty is limited to : 

(1) Wednesdays, Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, 20% of the crew. 

(2) Other days, 10% of the crew. 

(3) Overnight liberty may be granted for enlisted men whose immediate 
relatives reside in Maui. 

(4) When a limited portion of the Fleet is present in Lahaina the senior 
officer present may increase these percentages, giving due regard to the 
facilities for handling libertv parties at Mala Wharf. 

(d) Boats: 

( 1 ) Units granting liberty to expire at 1900 shall not run boats to landing 
for liberty parties between 1715 and 1815. 

(2) All types utilize omnibus boats for liberty pai'ties as far as practicable. 

(3) Except under unusual circun}stances, stores should not be obtained from 
landing between 1600 and 2000 daily. 

18. Libert!/ Other Ports, nnwaiian Islands. — Liberty in other ports in the 
Hawaiian Islands shall be prescribed by the senior officer present. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1397 

19. Instructions issued previously which conflict with those herein are cancelled. 

20. Patrol orders now effective shall continue so until cancelled by the officers 
designated by this letter to administer patrol. 

H. E. KIMMEL 
Distribution : 

List IV, Case 2, O. 
ND11-ND14, NDllac, NYIO. 
Senior Patrol Officer Long Beach (1). 
Senior Patrol Officer Honolulu (15). 
P. C. Ckosley, 

Flag Secretary. 



3146 — M. I. N. T. 4-14 37 — 100 M. sets of 9 
U. S. FLEEf 
COMMANDER AIKCRAIT, BATTLE EORCE 

Heading: 122135. 

Restrictions on liberty are hereby modified to permit liberty for one quarter 
complement of officers and one quarter enlisted complement daily provided all 
useful armament can be manned adequately X Liberty may conunence any hour 
after O90O but expires on board ship at 1700. 
From Cincpac. 
Date: 13 Dec 41. 
Action : All ships present Pearl Harbor. 



3146— M. I. N, Y. 4-14-37—100 M. sets of 9 
U. S. Fleet 

COMMANDER AIRCK.VFT, BATTLE FORCE 

Heading : . 

All previous instructions regarding liberty Hawaiian area are liereby cancelled 
iX Liberty may be granted for not more than one quarter your complement 
enlisted personnel in each twenty-four hour period provided all useful armament 
can be manned adequately at al Itimes X Liberty may commence any hour after 
0900 but expires on board at 1700 X Overnight liberty may be authorized for 
those members of one quarter personnel on liberty having' bona fide families 
and homes ashore X In each case written authority by commanding officer 
with man's address carried by those so authorized X Personnel granted over- 
night liberty are not to be granted liberty prior to 1600 such liberty to expire 
0700 on board X No liberty personnel will be permitted on streets during night 
X Short leave for officers shall be granted on same basis X 
From : Cincpac. 
Action : Com 14 — All ships present Hawaiian area — Senior patrol officer HONG. 



Ex H BIT No. 18 (Navy Packet No. 2 ) RoBEias ('ommission 

Bt 
Patrol Wing Two, 
PW2/A16-3/ U. S. Naval Air Station, 

016 

Pearl Harbor, T. E., 1 Jan. 19.'i2, 
Confidential 

From : The Commander Patrol Wing TWO. 

To: Senior Member, Board Investigating Activities of December 7, 1941. 
Subject : Data Requested by Board. 

1. In accordance with your request I am sending herewith six (6) copies 
of Report of Army-Navy Board of 31 October, 1941. 



1398 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. The dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid Drills were held are as follows; 
24 April, 1941, 

12 May, 1&41, 

13 May, 1941, 

19 June, 1941, 
10 July, 1941, 

26 July, 1941, 

1 August, 1941, 

20 August, 1941, 

5 September, 1941, 

27 September, 1941, 
13 October, 1941, 
27 October, 1941, 
12 November, 1941. 

P. N. L. BELLINGER. 



Exhibit No. 19 (Navy Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 

[File copy] 

[Penned Notation:] Dec. 30 Adr, Pye : Introduced as a Typical Operations Program 
of Commander Task Force. 

Task Fokce One, 

Pacific Flkett, 
U. S. S. California, Flagship, 
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 30 July 19 U. 
A16-3/AUG/(0707) 
Confldenfinl 
General Plan No. 6. 

task organization 

(a) Battleline {l.t) Rear Admiral Anderson : 

(L1.2) Batdiv TWO (CALIFORNIA, PENNSYLVANIA). 
(1.1.4) Batdiv FOUR (WEST VIRGINIA, NEVADA) 4BB. 
(1.L8) Mindiv ONE 4DM. 

(b) Right Flank {1.2) Rear Admiral Leary : 

(1.2.2) HONOLULU, PHOENIX 2CLH. 

(1.2.3) Desron ONE less DALE, MONAGHAN 7DD. 

(c) Left Fl a 12k (l.J/) Captain Bowman: 

(1.4.2) ST. LOUIS, BOISE 2CLH. 

(1.4.3) Desron THREE 9DD. 

(d) Submarines (1.7) Commander Edmunds: 

(1.7.1) Subdiv SIXTY-ONE 3SS. 

(e) Patrol Planes (1.9) Lieutenant Commander Hughes: 

(1.9.2) Patron TWENTY-TWO. 

(1.9.3) Patron TWENTY-THREE 24VP. 

1. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, sorial 0713 of 5 May 1941. For the 
duration of these exercises, all contacts must be regarded as with own U. S. 
units. Should Commander Task Force ONE transmit the message "Exercise 
Conditions Ended" it shall be construed by all units to mean that exercise 
conditions no longer prevail and that there is a possibility of hostile action 
against the Task Force. 

2. This force will exercise Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, 6, 7, 8 August in 
accordance with the General Plan herein. 

3. (a) Battleline, 

(b) Right Flank, 

(c) Left Flank, 

(d) Submarines, 

(e) Patrol Planes, carry out exercises as listed below: 
Wednesday, 6 August — 

Forenoon — Sortie and Exercise 60B (Annex "A"). 
At 1815 Exercise 61B (Annex "B"j. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1399 

Thursday, 7 August — 

Forenoon — Exercise 62B (Annex "C") — ^Air Attacks. 

Afternoon — Exercise 63B (Annex "D") — Fueling from tanker; SS-DD ; 

SS-VP, SS-VOS, VCS Exercises. 
Night— Exercise 64B (Annex ' E") — SS night attacks. 
Friday, 8 August — 

Forenoon — Exercise 65B (Annex "F") — Torpedo plane and patrol bomb- 
ing attack. 
Completion Exercise 65B — Exercise 66B (Annex "G") — Zigzagging 
against submarines. 
(x) (1) Type Tactical Organization as follows: 

(a) Battleships (1.1) Rear Admiral Anderson : 

(1.1.2) Batdiv TWO (CALIFORNIA. PENNSYLVANIA). 
(1.1.4) Batdiv FOUR (WEST VIRGINIA, NEVADA). 

(b) Ldght Cruisers (1.3) Rear Admiral Leary : 

(1.3.1) Crudiv NINE (HONOLULU, PHOENIX, ST. LOUIS, BOISE). 

(c) Destroyers (1.4) Captain Bowman: 

(1.4.1) Desron ONE less DALE, MONAGHAN. 
(1.4.8) Desron THREE. 

(d) Sul/murines (1.7) Commander Edmunds: 

(1.7.1) Subdiv SIXTY-ONE. 

(e) Minecraft (1.8) Commander Crowe: 

(1.8.1) Mindiv ONE. 

(f) Patrol Planes (1.9) Lieutenant Commander Hughes: 

(1.9.2) Patron TWENTY-TWO. 

(1.9.3) Patron TWENTY-THREE. 

(2) In maneuvering to avoid air and submarine attacks, communication method 
outlined in paragraph 1140(c), Annex "K" should be used when suitable. 

(3) Speed limitations (except Exercise 61B and 62B) ; Battleships, fifteen 
knots ; foi'mation speed, fourteen knots ; Cruisers and Destroyers, twenty-four 
knots ; formation speed, twenty-two knots. 

(4) Use Tentative Light Force Doctrine, Annex "E" to Commander Task 
Force FIVE Operation Order No. THREE (Combatfor .serial 0225) and the 
signals and meanings contained in paragraph 6310 of Annex "F" of that serial 
(these signals and meanings are also included in Annex "G" of General 
Plan No. 3). 

(.5) This plan effective at 1800, five August, Type Tactical Organization in- 
itially. Communication Plan effective when signalled upon completion of Sortie. 

(6) Comply with safety precautions in Chapter V, USF 10 except as instructed 
in Annexes. 

(7) Commander Minecraft make minecraft available for destroyer activities 
whenever exercises do not specify duties for Minecraft. 

4. 

5. (a) Communications in accordance with Annex "K". 
(b) Use zone plus ten and one-half time. 

(e) Commander Task Force ONE in CALIFORNIA with Battleline. 

W. S. Pye, 
Vice Admiral. 
Commander Task Force ONE. 
Annexes: 

"A"-Exercise 60B. 

"B"-Exercise 61B. 

"C"-Exercise 62B— Air Attacks. 

"D"-Exercise 63B— Fueling from tanker ; SS-DD, SS-VP, SS-VOS, VCS 

Exercises. 
"E"-Exerclse 64B— SS Night Attacks. 

"F"-Exercise 65B — Torpedo plane and patrol bombing attacks. 
"G"-Exercise 66B — Zigzagging against submarines. 
"H"-Cruising Dispositions. 
"I"-Zigzag Plan No. 60. 
"J"-Zigzag Plan No. 61. 
"K"-Communication Plan No. 13. 
Distribution (Basis List III, Case 2) : 
Cincpac (15) 
Com 14 (15) 



1400 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

NAS Pearl (5) 

Combasefor (20) 

Comuirbatfor (20) 

Comscofor (25) 

Comcruscofor (20) 

Comdesbatfor (20) 

Comsubron SIX (8) 

Comsubron TWO (1) 

Compatwing TWO (5) 

Cominbatfor (9) 

Combatships (53) for distribution to Task Group 1.1, less CALIFORNIA. 

CALIFORNIA (5) 

Comcrubatfor (53) for distribution to Task Group 1.2. 

Desron 3 (41) for distribution to Task Group 1.4. 

Comsubdiv SIXTY-ONE (8) for distribution to Task Group 1.7. 

Compatron TWENTY-THREE (4) for distribution to Task Group 1.9. 

W. G. LUDTOW 

H. S. Covington, 

Lieutenant Commander, 
Flag Secretary. 



ANNB3X 'A" TO Commander Task Force ONE Geneeal, Plan No. 6 

Confidential 

Task Force Onk, 

Pacific Fleet, 
U. S. S. California, Flagship. 
Pearl Harhor, T. H., 30 July 1941. 

Exerci'Se GOB — Wednesday Forenoon — 6 August 

1. Destroyers calibrate rangefinders and operators until 1300 with Army range ; 
one division may begin calibrating at 0800. Commander Destroyers make de- 
tailed arrangements with Major Dingeman, USA, prior 2 August. 

2. Battleship!<. Cruiers, Minecraft and Submarines upon completion sortie, con- 
duct exercise as fallows: 

Object : To train ship and aircraft personnel in detecting and reporting 
periscopes and submarines ; to perfect procedure to act on the information. 

Wednesday, 6 August, 1000-1430. 

Type Conmiander (OCE) begin exercise when Initial position reached. 
Cease exercise whenever sufficient drill has been obtained. Submarines will 
be available from 1000 to 1430. 

Initial positions of submarines at 1000 : 

(a) One submarine Latitude 20°-40', Longitude ISS'-IO' for Minecraft; 

(b) One submarine Latitude 20°-40', Longitude 158°-00' for Battleships ; 

(c) One submarine Latitude 20°-40', Longitude 157°-50' for Cruisers. 
iBase Course for all units, ISO" true. 

Surface Type Commanders (Officers in Charge of Exercise) arrange and con- 
duct exercises to familiarize maximum number of personnel with appearance of 
periscope of submarines operating near the surface under varying speeds; and 
with appearance of submarines from aircraft. 

3. Patrol Planes exercise as directed by Commander Patrol Planes. Vse sub- 
marine assigned to Minecraft for observation training, if desired. 

4. Type Tactical Organization effective. Type Commanders desiring to com- 
municate direct with submarines use 4155 kcs. 

5. Upon completion of exercises all types proceed in accordance witli instruc- 
tions of respective Task Force Commanders for Exercise 61B. At 1730 assume 
Task Organization for Exercise 61B. 

W. S. Pye, 
Vice Adiniral, 
Commander Task Force ONE. 

W. G. LtTDLOW, 

H. S. Covington, 

Lieutenant Commander, 
Flag Secretary. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1401 

Annex "B" to Commander Task Force One General Plan No. 6 

Task Force One, 
Pacific Fleet, 
U. S. S. California, Flagship, 
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 30 Jtilij 1941. 
Confidential 

Exercise 61B — Wednesday Afternoon. Night — 6 August 

Exercise 61B is a Minor Tactical Pr<)l)lein. 
Purpose : 

To improve tactical thought and operations. 

To apply standard tactical instructions and doctrine. 

1. The maneuver will commence at 1815, August 6, at which time the position, 
disposition, course, and damage of the opposing forces will closely approximate 
that of the forces concerned as of game time 1815, July 16. <'hart and Tactical 
Maneuver 2-41. 

2. At 1815, August 6. all units are free to move as desired. 

Limiting speed 

In formation Not in formation 

BBS 15kts. 16kts. 

CLH - 25kts. 27kts. 

CLL 25kts. 27kts. 

DDs and DLs 25 kts. 27kts. 

DMs 22 kts. 24 kts.. 

SS (Surface, S'Ubmerged) - Maximum Maximum 

3. At night submarines participating in this exercise will use running lights 
while operating on surface. No contacts or gun fire by enemy forces will be 
made on submarines unless the ship itself is actually seen. 

4. AU aircraft will be given full lond of fuel prior to launching for this problem, 
but will be considered for the purposes of this exercise to have the same amount 
of fuel on board as allowed at commencement of Tactical and Chart Maneuver 
2-41. Any additional aircraft in this exercise will be considered having 100% 
fuel on board. Planes that consume all fuel, from a problem status, will be 
considered as out of action and will operate as directed m this order. 

5. Planes operating in this problem will use running lights at night. 

6. In orde-- to simulate actual war conditions enemy ships will make no con- 
tact nor w:']' they open fire until the plane itself is actually seen, except on 
Information from RADAR. 

7. Ship-based aircraft considered as lost at commencement of this problem, 
1815, August 6.. will remain on board. Shore-based aircraft in this status will 
remain at Pearl Harbor as well as 22-P-8 and 9 which are supposed to be at 
Hilo. 

8. The Chief Umpire will be Vice Admiral W. S. Pye, U. S. N. in U. S. ?■. 
CALIFORNIA. 

9. USF 79 will govern the conduct of this problem with the following 
exceptions : 

(1) RED and BLUE commanders will issue forms for umpires in their 
respective forces. 

(2) Out of action ships proceed as follows: 

(a) Turn on dimmed running lights. 

(b) Clear other units in immediate vicinity. 

(c) When clear, proceed south of Lat. 20°-40' N.. then cruise on North 
and South Courses till daylight. Arrive in vicinity of Rendezvous for 
Exercise 62B. Lat. 20°-40' N.. Long. ]58°-20' W. at 0900, August 7. 

(d) Aircraft put out of action will retui'n to Pearl Harbor. Ships if 
concenti'ated. will recover out of action aircraft by direction of Type Com- 
manders : otherwise at discretion of the Commanding Officers' on July 7 
before O90O. or after completion Exercise 62B. 

fr!) During exercise make damage reports by radio only. 

(4) Rf'ports : 

The following reports will be made out in duplicate by officers concerned, 
one popv to Commander Battle Force and one copv to Commander of Force 
(RED or BLUE). 

(a) Flimsy (Use U. S. C. & G. Chart #4116). 



1402 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(b) Narrative. 

(c) Data on contacts, gun fire, torpedo fire, bombing, damage, landing 
and recovering aircraft. 

(d) Comments and recommendations. 

10. The Commanders of RED and BLUE wili submit brief narrative and flimsy 
•covering requirements of Art. G530, US-F 79 as soon as practicable after arrival 
of Task Force ONE in Pearl Harbor, on August 14, 1941. 

11. Use U. S. C. & G Chart #4116 for track chart. 

12. All officers concerned will familiarize themselves thoroughly v^ith the con- 
duct of Strategical and Tactical Exercises USF 79 prior to commencement of 
this GXGrcisG 

13. Comply with Safety Orders, Chapter V, USF 10. 

14. At 0900, be in vicinity Latitude 20°-40', Longitude 15S°-20' and assume 
Normal Tactical Organization. 

W. S. Pye, 
Vice Admiral, 
Cvmmander Task Force ONE. 

W. G. LXJDLOW, 

for H. S. Covington, 

Ldeutenant Commander, 
Flag Secretary. 



Annex "C" to Commandee Task Force One General Plan No. 6 

Task Force One, 

Pacific Fleet, 
'Confidential U. S. S. California, Flagship, 

Pea4-l Harhor, T. H., 30 July JOJfl. 

Exercise G2B—Thiirsdaii Forenoon — 7 August 
Purpose : 

To test Cruising Disposition 6V against air attacks. 
To exercise units in defense against air attacks. 

To exercise aircraft (Airbatfor, Army Aircraft) in strafing, bombing, tor- 
pedo attacks. 

1. At 0900, Battleline guide pass through point Latitude 20°-40' Longitude 
158°-20', course 315"*, speed 10. 

At 1000. Task Force ONE less Patrol Planes and Suhmarincs be formed in 
Cruising Disposition 6V, Fleet course and axis 815°, Fleet speed 12. 

Have boiler power: Battleship, 19 knots; Cruisers, Destroyers, Minecraft 24 
knots. 

All battleships and cruisers tow targets for bombing. 

Defend against strafing, bombing and torpedo aircraft. Make "V" on search- 
light against aircraft when aircraft under fire. 

Task Force ONE will not fly aircraft. 

2. Aircraft, Battle Force and Army Aircraft will attack Task Force ONE 
Cruising Disposition and may strafe the towed targets with machine gun fire or 
bomb with miniature or water filled bombs. 

3. Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, will coordinate attacks of Aircraft, Battle 
Force and Army Aircraft ; making necessary arrangements for communications. 
Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, communicate with Commander Task Force 
ONE on 4205 kcs. using visual calls and normal cryiitographic aids. 

4. Comply with safety instructions in Chapter V, USF 10. 

5. Assume Type Tactical Organization upon signal on completion of the 
Exercise. 

6. Patrol Planes exercise as directed by T>pe Commander. 

7. Reports : 

From Commanders Aircraft — brief comment on plan of attack, number of 
plnnes. expcution, strength and weakness of Cruising Disposition. 

From Commanders Task Groups and Task Units : brief comment on fire 
control problem; lookouts: strength and weakness of Cruising Cruising 
Di5position; damage to ships and pianos if USF 79 was applied. 

W. S. Pye, 
W G. T UDLOW, Vice Admiral. 

for H. S. Covington. Commander Task Force ONE. 

Lieutenant Commander, 
Flag Secretary. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1403 

Annex "D" to Commander Task Force One Genekal Plan No. 6 

Task Fouce One, 

Pacific Fleet, 
Confidential U. S. S. California, Flagship, 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., 30 July 19^1. 

Exercise 63B — Thursday Afternoo7i — 7 August 

1. One cruiser, one battleship, one destroyer, designated by Type Commanders, 
fuel in order named from Tanker Number One (KASKASKIA) initial position at 
1230, Thursday, 7 August, Latitude 21°-00', Longitude 159°-00'. Destroyers 
screen cruiser and battleship during fueling. 

2. One cruiser, one battleship, one destroyer, designated by Type Commanders, 
fuel in order named from Tanker Number Two (BRAZOS) initial position at 1230, 
Thursday, 7 August. Latitude 21°-08', Longitude 159°-C0'. Destroyers screen 
cruiser and battleship during fueling. 

Cruisers start exercise as soon as practicable after completion Exercise 62B. 
Commander Destroyers assign two destroyers to each tanker to screen cruiser 
and battleship during fueling. 

3. Communications for Tankers (Task Group 1.6) from 1200, 7 August, until 
completion of the Exercise will be in accordance with Annex "K". 

4. Upon completion of fueling Task Group 1.6 proceed in accordance with 
instructions from Commander Base Force. 

5. Remaining battleships and cruisers exercise as directed by Type Commanders 
in Areas V-8, V-9, V-10. 

6. Destroj/ers less fueling units at 1330 or as soon as practicable after com- 
pletion of Exercise 62B search and track submarines as follows : 

For search and tracking Submai'ine Number One ( ) in Area C-10. 

For search and tracking Submarine Number Two ( ) in Area C-11. 

VCS, VOS, VP miniature bombing exercise, Submarine Number Three 

( ) in Area C-9. 

VCS, VOS from 1300-1400. 
VP from 1400-1500. 
At discretion of Type Commanders, aircraft exercise at delivering of 

messages to ships. 

7. At 1800 assume Normal Tactical Organization. 

8. At 1830 be formed in Cruising Disposition 6L. Fleet axis and course 180°, 
Fleet sneed 12. guide in battleships passing through Latitude 21°-0O', Longitude 
158°-20' at that time. 

W. S. Pte, 
Vice Admiral. 
Commander Task Force ONE. 
W. G. Ludlow, 

for H. S. COVTKGTON. 

Lieutenant Commander, 
Flag Secretary. 

Annex "E" To Commander Task Force One General Plan No. 6 

Task Force One, 

Pacific Fieiet, 
U. S. S. California. Flagship, 
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 30 July IdJfl. 
Confidential 

Exercise 64B — Thursday Night — 7 August 
Purpose : 

To exercise submarines in night attack on a disposition. 

To exercise cruising disposition in defense against night submarine attacks. 

1. Task Force ONE less fiuhm,arines and Patrol Planes be in Cruising Disposi- 
tion 6L at 1830. Fleet axis and course 180°, Fleet speed 12 knots, center pass 
throuEfh Latitude 21°-00', Longitude 15S°-20'. Burn dimmed mast head and 
side lights. Do not maneuver except in emergency. Seai'chlights may be turned 



1404 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

on attacking destroyers and submarines on surface for not more than 30 seconds. 
Use RADAR. All ships install received on navigation bridge for reception of 
voice RADAR broadcasts on 3195 kcs. All ships plot RADAR reports and when 
plot shows an attacking ship within effective searchliglit range, illuminate on 
the proper bearing to disclose the attacking ship. For this exercise only, in 
Cruising Disposition 6L, DD in station 4000, assign station 3000. 

2. Submarines and Mim craft be in position 12 miles ahead of Taslv Force ONE 
Cruising Disposition at 1915. Attack Task Force ONE. Run dnrliened when 
attacking. Turn on running lights when clear of disposition or in an emergency. 
Submarines remain on surface. 

3. Commander Submarines report when submarines and minecraft clear of 
Cruising Disposition. 

Upon completion exercise. Submarines proceed toward normal operating area 
and be in position for Exercise 6GB. 

4. Patrol Planes at Pearl as directed by Commniidpr Patrol Planes. 

5. Reports: Comments and recommendations requesu-d. 

W S. Pyb, 
Vice Admiral. 
Commander Task Force ONE. 
W. G. Ludlow, 
for H. S. Covington, 

Lieutenant Commander, 
Flag Secretari/. 



Annex "F" To Commandkk Task Force One General Plan No. 6 

Task Force One, 

Pacific Fi.ekt, 
U. S. S. California. Flagship. 
Pearl Harbor, T. H., 30 July 19 ',1. 
C<ynfldential 

Exercise 65B — Friday Forenoon — S August 

Purpose : 

To train in attacking cruising disposition with horizontal bombers and 
torpedo planes. 

To train in defending cruising disposition against bombs and torpedoes. 

1. Task Force ONE less Submarines and Patrol Planes in Cruising Disposition 
6V, in Normal Tactical Organization, defend against bombing and torpedo at- 
tacks. Use RADAR. All ships install receivers in ship and gunnery control 
stations for reception of voice RADAR broadcasts on Comliat Air Patrol fre- 
quency. 

2. Commander Destroyers (Commander Recovery Group) recover torpedoes. 
All destroyers join Recovery Group when torpedoes are fired, shifting from their 
Task Unit frequencies to 2530 kcs. Torpedoes will be returned to CURTISS 
upon next entering Pearl. In case a destroyer is not near a surfaced torpedo, 
Minecraft recover it. Upon completion recovery. Commander Destroyers proceed 
and carry out normal operating schedule. 

Cruisers upon completion Exercise proceed and carry out normal operating 
schedule. 

3. Right Flank and Left Flank aircraft assigned Combat Patrol (Flight No. 5) 
against horizontal bombers. 

Battleline aircraft assigned Combat Patrol (Flight No. 5) against torpedo 
planes and smokers. Track and mark torpedoes. 
Laimch aircraft at 0500. 
All battleships and cruisers tow targets for bombing. 

4. Patrol Planes and Army aircraft bomb and torpedo Task Force ONE. 
Patrol Planes fire tori>edoes. Commander Patrol Planes coordinate Army air- 
craft and Patrol Plane operations. Prior to practice furnish Commander Destroy- 
ers with numbers of torpedoes to be fired. Make arrangements for photographic 
planes. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1405 

5. Reports required : Photographs of torpedo tracks. 
From ships: 

(a) Times of launching; 

(b) Times of crossing target line; 

(c) Range and bearing of torpedo planes when torpedoes are launched ; 

(d) Sketch of tracks seen near each ship relative to ship. 

W. S. Pye, 
Vice Admiral, 
Commander Task Force ONE. 
W. G. Ludlow, 
for H. S. Covington, 

Lieutenant Commander, 
Flag Secretary. 



Annex "6" to Commander Task Force One General Plan No. 6 

Task Force One, 

Pacific Fleet, 
Confidential U. S. S. California, Flagship, 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., 30 July, 19J,1. 

Exercise 66B — Friday Forenoon — S August 

Purpose : To test zigzag plans against submerged submarines. 

1. When Exercise 65B is completed, and planes recovered. Commander Battle- 
ships form two battleship divisions in column of divisions, interval 10 miles. 
Leading division, without inner anti-submarine screen; use Zigzag Plan No. 61. 
Rear Division, with inner anti-submarine screen of 4DM, use Zigzag Plan No. 60. 
Battleship distance 1000 yards. Base course, 330°. Initial position of leading 
Battleship Division is Latitude 19°-.34', Longitude I.IG"-!")' at 0830. 

2. Submarines be in position at 0900 and attack Battleship Divisions in suc- 
cession. Use s.ound only in attack on rear Battleship Division. Go to deep sub- 
mergence at not less than 6000 yards from Battleships. Report when all sub- 
marines surfaced and proceed to normal operating area and carry out normal 
operating schedule. 

3. Upon completion of exercise, Type Commanders proceed and carry out 
normal operating schedule. 

4. Reports required : Comments from Battleship, Submarine, ship and division 
command. Battleships furnLsh Commander Submarines with three copies of 
courses and speeds during times of attacks. 

W. S. Pye, 
Vice Admiral. 
Commander Task Force ONE. 
for W. G. Ludlow, 
H. S. Coving,ton, 

Lieutenant Commander, 
Flag Secretary. 



Annex "H" to Commander Task Force One. Genei^al Plan No. 6 

Task Force One, 

Pacific Fleet, 
Confidential U. S. S. California, Flagship, 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., 30 July 19^. 

cruising disposition 
Information: 

The effective slant range of our five-inch auti-aii"craft batteries is 
equivalent to a surface distance of 5000-6500 yards. 

The composition of this Cruising Disposition is 4BB, 4CLH, 2DL, 14DD, 
and 4DM. 

Only one RADAR installation is available. 



1406 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL H.\RBOR ATTACK 

Assumptions: 

That enemy air attacks of all types will be encountered. 
That enemv submarines may be encountered. 
That enemy surface forces may be encountered. 

1. The means available is sufficient to eit'ectively counter any one form of 
attack at a time but is insufficient to counter all three forms if made simul- 
taneously. In the many varied situations under which a Disposition cruises 
and with the limited means available, some risks will be accepted, and a dis- 
position formed in accordance with the information available. 

2. Against air and surface ships the RADAR, in favorable geographical loca- 
tions, will be relied upon to a considerable extent. The RADAR gives an op- 
portunity to take the offensive, a factor which will be taken advantage of. 

Cruising disposition 6V 
Station Unit 

11/, 090 Batdiv 4. 

1^2 270 Batdiv. 2. 

Inner A. S. Screen Mindiv 1. 

7000 2DD left. IDD right. 

7060 HONOLULU. 2DD. IDL right. 

7120 ■ PHOENIX, 2DD right. 

71S0 2DD left, IDD right. 

7240 BOISE. 2DD left. 

7300 ST. LOUIS. 2DD, ] DL left. 

Sun Screen 2DD designated by Flank Commander near- 
est bearing of Sun. Sun screen floats with 
bearing of sun on Circle Eleven. 

Cruising disposition 6L 
Station Unit 

1 090 Batdiv 4, 2DM, 2DD right. 

1 270 Batdiv 2. 2DM, 2DD left. 

4060 HONOLULU. IDL. IDD right. 

4120 PHOENIX, 2DD right. 

4180 IDD risht, IDD left. 

4240 BOISE. 2DD left. 

4300 ST. LOUIS, IDL, IDD left. 

4000 2 DD left. 

Cruising disposition 6VS 
Station Unit 

1 ore Batdiv 4. 

1 270 Batdiv 2. 

Battleline inner A. S. screen. Mindiv 1. 

604.5 HONOLULU. 

6120 PHOENIX, 2DD right. 

7180 2DD left. 

6240 BOISE, IDD left. 

6315 ST. LOUIS. 

Sound screen in line on and normal to axis at Circle 5 — 5DD, IDL left, 4DD, 
1 DL right — distance between ships 2-500 yards. 

Cruising disposition 6S 
Station Unit 

1 090 Patdiv4. 

1 270 Batdiv 2. 

Battleline iner A. S. screen — Mindiv 1. 

5040 HONOLULU. 

5090 IDD right. 

3180 PHOENIX, BOISE, IDD left. 

5270 IDD left. 

5320 ST. LOUIS. 

Sound screen HDD, 2DL. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



1407 



4DD, IDL left, 3DD, IDL right, in line on and normal to axis at Circle 5; 
2DD right, 2DD left inclined 150° right and left respectively from flank DDs 
in line ; distance between ships 2500 yards. 

Special Instructions: 
1. In Cruising Dispositions 6V, 6YS, and 6S, Battleship distance one mile. 

2. Sun screen will be stationed by Flank Commander nearest bearing of the 
sun. Screen will consist of IDD in Cruising Disposition 6VS, and 2DD in 
Cruising Disposition 6V. 

3. Commander Battleline. when situation suitable, maneuver Battleline 
in accordance vdth communication method outlined in Parrgraph 1140 (c), 
Annex "K"'. 

W. S. Pye, 
Vice Admiral, 
Commander Task Force ONE. 
W. G. LUDiX)w, 
for H. S. Covington, 

Lieutenant Commander, 
Flag Secretary. 

(A portion of AXNEX ''H" is a graph of air patrols as ordered 
for protection of the taslv force. This ffraph is reproduced as Item 
No. 39 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTKATIONS, Roberts Commission.) 



Annex "I" to Commander Task Force One. General Plan No. 6 

(Annex 'T'- is a dia^rram of Zigzag Plan No. 60 and is reproduced 
as Item No. 40 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Com- 
mission.) 

Annex "J" to Commander Task Force One, General Plan No. 6 

(Annex "J" is a diaffram of Ziczair Plan No. 61 and is reproduced 
as Item No. 41 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Com- 
mission.) 

ANNES "K" to C0MMANDF35 TaSK FOKCE ONE GENERAL PLAN NO. 6 



Task Force One. 

Pacific Fr.Eirr, 
U. S. S. California, Flagship, 
Pearl Hcrhor. T. H., 



Confidential 
Communication Plan No. 



13. 



USF-70 effective except as modified herein. 

Exercise 61B Task Force Commanders prepare own communication plans 
subject to the instructions contained in paragraph 2220 of this communication 
plan. 

1120. (a) This plan effective upon signal after completion of sortie on 6 August 
1941. 

(b) Commander Task Force ONE General Plan No. 6 is effective at 1800 
5 August 1941. From that time until Communication Plan No. 13 is placed into 
effect, communications in accordance with USF-70; Task Force ONE radio fre- 
quency plan; ships use visual cnlis : aircraft use normal radio calls; normal 
cryptographic aids plus CSP-696 and 697 effective. 

(c)IJpou completion of the tactical exercises, Communication Plan No. 13 will 
be placed out of effect by signal, after which communications will again be in 
accordance with the last sentence of subparagraph (b) above. NEVADA continue 
distress frequency guard duties until Task Force ONE returns to port. 



1408 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1140. Special Comvninication Purposes Sought in the Condnct of the Exer- 
cises. — (a) Improvement in radio circuit discipline and efficiency. The order 
of answering and receipting for station is establislied as follows : 

(1) For sliips on a common circuit: In numerical order of thieir unenciphered 
visual call signs. 

(2) For Task Group or Task Unit Commanders on a circuit: In numerical 
order of thei,- i;;. enciphered Task Group or Task Unit designations of the organi- 
zation in effect. 

(3) When Task Group and Task Unit Commanders are on a common circuit 
with ships, the individual ships shall answer or receipt first and then the Task 
Group and Task Unit Commanders. 

The answer or receipt of a Task Group or Task Unit Commander shall be 
understood to include the flagship ; that is, the flagship shall not make a separate 
answer or receipt. 

(b) Test of methods of dissemination, of RADAR information when voice 
broadcast is used and the fleet's position may not be known to the enemy (see 
paragraph 1179 of this communication plan and Appendix 1 thereto). 

(c) Test of emergency defense maneuvering of the battleline, by battleline 
commander, day or night, using voice on warning net frequency 3195 Kcs. ; other 
station unit commanders in disposition intercepting this information and taking 
appropriate action to keep station. When the warning net frequency is to be thus 
employed. Commander Battleline will order the circuit manned, but in an emer- 
gency,' battleships will man it as a matter of routine. Use of voice for this pur- 
pose is authorized. 

1179. (a) RADAR contact reports will be broadcast by the CALIFORNIA, on 
8195 Kcs., using one of the three methods described below, depending on the 
general situation and the need for security. Which method is in use will be 
readily apparent, although it may be signalled. 

(b) Plan No. 1. — Use procedure of paragraph 1179, USF-70, except do not 
"repeat". Originator will not be stated when only one RADAR is present or in 
use. 

(c) Plan No. 2.— Use procedure of paragraph 1179, USF-70, except report dis- 
tance and bearing in terms of "polar coordinates", using circle spacing of one mile 
(see art. 915-920, FTP-188). 

If axis is being rotated, use new fleet axis as reference for polar coordinates 
from the instant that the maneuver is executed. 

Do not "repeat" reports ; omit the word "warning" ; originator will not be stated 
when only one RADAR is present or in use. 

(d) Plan No. 3.— 

"Special Purpose Code No. 1 {Appendix 1) 

(1) Authorized to be and shall be carried in aircraft. 

(2) Characters are broadcast using their phonetic equivalent. 

(3) A code group represents either bearing or distance depending on the 
order of broadcast ; bearings true from fleet center — first ; distance in miles 
from the fleet center — second. 

(4) "Spare" groups are provided for use as an amplifying after-thought. 

(5) Do not "repeat" transmissions. 

(6) Do not precede broadcast with the customary word "warning". 

(7) Do not specify originator of report. 

(8) Do not mix plain language and code. 

(9) Make following temporary penciled entries to "spare" code groups in 
both the "encode" and "decode" sections : 

Spare Group No. Meaning 

1 Aircraft. 

2 Aircraft opening. 

3 Aircraft closing. 

4 Group of aircraft. 

5 Group of aircraft opening. 

6 Group of aircraft closing. 

7 Surface ship. 

8 Surface ship opening. 

9 Surface ship closing. 

10 Force previously reported. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1409 

Example. — Group of aircraft closing, bearing 020° True, distance 25 miles from 
fleet center. "YOKE BAKER (pause) SAIL HYPO (longer pause) NEGAT 
JIG". 

2120. Condition 19 effective. 

2211. (a) Task Force ONE radio frequency plan, Appendix "B"' effective. 

(b) In the anti-aircraft dispositions, the "SUN SCREEN" will not shift 
frequency. 

(c) From 1200 7 August until completion of the fueling exercise, both tankers 
(Task Group 1.0) will guard the Task Group Commander's circuit. 

2212. Not effective. 

2216. As a matter of information, Cincpac serial 1565 of July 18, 1941, directed 
that this article be held in abeyance while the Pacific Fleet is divided into Task 
Forces. Task Force Commanders only are responsible for designating a guard- 
ship. 

The NEVADA is designated as 500 Kcs. guardship, effective at zero hours minus 
two of sortie. 

2220. The following special instructions apply to Exercise 61B only: 

(a) Exercise 61B Task Force Commanders prepare and issue own communica- 
tion plans. 

(b) Interference and deception conducted in accordance with USF-70 is au- 
thorized. 

(c) The published Task Force radio frequency plans. Appendix "B", USF-70, 
may be used if desired. 

(d) Radio Calls. — U.se CSP-776 for generating radio calls. "Setting number" 
to be used by each Task Force will be sent to Task Force Commanders by mail- 
gram. 

(e) Cryptoffraphic Aids. — Both Task Forces use List 1. 

(f) CSP-W23 and 102.',.— 

Task Force 1 use prescribed date key tables. 

Task Force 4 use key tables substituting July for August. 

(g) Umpire communications are effective. See paragraphs 2820-2843 of this 
coumiunication plan ; if these instructions are not repeated in published com- 
munication plan, insure that reference is made to them. 

(h) "Polar coordinate" method and "Special Purpose Code No. 1" may be used 
by Task Force 4, and will not be considered available to Task Force 1 for radio 
intelligence jinrposes. 

(i) Comni'ander Battle Force and Task Force Commanders will use visual calls 
and List I crypto aids on 4205 Kcs. during the exercise. 

2400. Not effective. However, Exercise 61B Task Force Commanders may 
pi-pscribe authenticators in Exercise 61B. 

2.")03. (a) Radio call signs generated by CSP-776 and associated publications 
shall be used in all exercise trafBc, except that on umpire circuits in Exercise 
OIB. visual c'alls will be used. Use local zone date for setting number. Settings 
change at midnight LZT. 

(b) For Exercise 61B use setting as prescribed by Task Force Commander.s. 

2810. Effective except for Commander Out-of-Action detachments. 

2820-2843 (inclusive). Umpire communications are effective only for Exercise 
61B. 

The following supplementary instructions are prescribed : 

(1) Interpret paragraph 2825 (c) liberally, in order that umpire traflBe 
may be expeditiously handled. 

(2) Attention is invited to the fact that 3USM-41 changed paragraph 
2824 (b) from 323 Kcs. to 544 Kcs. 

(3) On umpire circuits use visual calls. 

(4) Out-of-Action ships use visual calls and List I crypto aids on their 
assigned Task Force umpire frequency. 

3120. (a) Condition 1 effective except during Exercise 61B. 

(b) During Exercise 61B, as prescribed by Task Force Commander. 

3210. Not effective. Use Pacific Fleet Communication Memorandum 2RM-41. 

3310. Enter the following temporary call in the Visual Call Book on page 6 : 

• "F70 SCREEN, SUN." 

5200 and 5300. (a) CSP-1023 and CSP-1024 with prescribed date-key tables 
will be used by Task Force ONE. 



1410 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(b) In Exercise 61B, Task Force FOUR use date-key tables substituting July 
for August. 

(c) In Exercise 64B, submarines use date-key tables substituting July for 
August. 

6620. List 1 effective. Encrypted traffic of one force will not be decrypted by 
the opposing force. 

7120. For Exercise 61B, 544 Kcs. is also in this status. 

8000. Reports are not required. Constructive criticism and comments will 
be welcomed. 

Appendix "1" — "Special Purpose Code No. 1" (issued separately and only to 
' Task Force ONE and Cincpac). 

W. S. Pye, 
Vice Admiral, 
Commander Task Force ONE. 
H. S. Covington, 
H. S. Covington, 

Lieutenant Commander, 
Flag Secretary. 



[Notation:] H 16-3 /Aug. 

Appendix "/" to Annex "E", Comtat for Serial 0707 of SO July, WJ^l 
Confidential 

Special Purpose Code No. 1 



Encode 
Reg. No. 20O 



001 IH 

002 ZF 

003 FA 

004 PV 

005 EM 

006 FR 

007 UF 

008 YF 

009 MI 

010 MZ 
Oil SO 

012 UO 

013 YZ 

014 MU 

015 M.T 

016 MW 

017 SS 

018 FV 

019 UA 

020 YB 

021 WO 

022 MA 

023 MG 

024 SF 

025 SH 

026 UC 

027 YD 

028 BJ 

029 EF 

030 MF 

031 NO 

032 NX 

033 WP 

034 YY 

035 ID 

036 IQ 

037 KM 

038 SB 

039 LU 

040 NY 

041 FP 

042 HD 

043 NM 

044 TH 

045 VT 



046 JI 

047 YG 

048 HO 
019 UW 

050 GT 

051 JD 
042 VP 

053 ZN 

054 OM 

055 PE 

056 HH 

057 VY 

058 ZZ 

059 OZ 

060 ON 

061 PB 

062 HO 

063 JG 

064 VK 

065 ZB 

066 XV 

067 OE 

068 OK 

069 TW 

070 PP 

071 VM 

072 VO 

073 BK 

074 GU 

075 01 

076 QF 

077 RD 

078 WQ 

079 ZW 

080 KG 

081 KT 

082 MQ 

083 TR 

084 NW 

085 NZ 

086 JB 

087 HE 

088 NN 

089 TI 

090 XB 



091 PY 

092 UE 

093 JS 

094 WH 

095 IZ 

096 LG 

097 WZ 

098 AB 

099 BA 

100 FH 
lOlJO 

102 XG 

103 AR 

104 AD 

105 AU 

106 FN 

107 JL 

108 LE 

109 WU 

novo 

lUZV 

112 PI 

113 PN 

114 FG 

115 PQ 

116 WW 

117 W'Y 

118 BL 

119 GV 

120 OJ 

121 RL 

122 SK 

123 WR 

124 ZX 

125 MK 

126 MX 

127 OV 

128 FB 

129 RC 

130 RE 

131 LA 

132 HF 

133 QR 

134 TJ 

135 XC 



136 BV 

137 JX 

138 LS 

139 XP 

140 MD 

141 ND 

142 YE 

143 BO 

144 CO 

145 HV 

146 LN 

147 YM 

148 CF 

149 BQ 

150 CI 

151 JA 

152 LK 

153 NF 

154 YA 

155 WN 

156 BF 

157 BM 

158 HN 

159 HQ 

160 PS 

161 YC 

162 UK 

163 CY 

164 GW 

165 PL 

166 SV 

167 VE 

168 WT 

169 ZY 

170 00 

171 PC 

172 HL 

173 HP 

174 SI 

175 RF 

176 NB 

177 HG 

178 QS 

179 TK 

180 YH 



181 KU 

182 GI 

183 NU 
181 YR 
185 OH 
18o QH 
187 ZD 
1S8 DD 

189 EN 

190 JW 

191 NO 

192 ZK 

193 DV 

194 DF 

195 DX 

196 JZ 

197 NL 

198 QK 

199 ZA 

200 XU 

201 CU 

202 DB 

203 JR 

204 JT 

205 FT 

206 ZC 

207 VU 

208 CZ 

209 GX 

210 PM 

211 IE 

212 FF 

213 XW 

214 AE 

215 AW 

216 A L 

217 JQ 

218 FD 

219 SJ 

220 SL 

221 QE 

222 J M 

223 QT 

224 TL 

225 YI 



226 UQ 

227 WM 

228 RA 

229 ZQ, 

230 PK 

231 RN 

232 UT 

233 ES 

234 GK 

235 LX 

236 QU 

237 VI 

238 GC 

239 EU 

240 GE 

241 NA 

242 QQ 

243 RP 
214 UB 

245 YV 

246 EJ 

247 EQ 
218 LR 

249 LT 

250 PW 

251 VD 

252 XD 

253 DA 

254 FA 

255 FQ 

256 HT 

257 VG 

258 YX 

259 BR 

260 CK 
201 BY 

262 LQ 

263 HR 

264 FG 
205 SN 

266 RK 

267 JN 

268 RV 

269 UI . 

270 ZG 



271 PO 

272 VV 

273 SG 

274 BI 

275 MM 

276 SX 

277 WE 

278 I A 

279 IS 

280 QA 

281 RY 

282 WS 

283 IN 

284 IC 

285 10 

286 QD 

287 RU 

288 SZ 

289 VL 

290 ZU 

291 GQ 

292 GY 
393 NT 

294 NV 

295 PX 

296 VN 

297 RI 

298 I' G 

299 KB 

300 JC 

301 JV 

302 VH 

303 XY 

304 DG 

305 DZ 
300 DO 

307 NR 

308 FE 

309 HU 

310 SM 

311 ST 

312 LL 

313 RW 

314 U.T 

315 ZH 



316 AG 

317 YW 
.■^IS.TU 

319 CX 

320 BN 

321 PU 

322 XL 

323 KE 

324 KV 

325 RG . 

326 TM 

327 XZ 

328 KP 

329 KF 

330 KR 

331 RJ 

332 TG 

333 PR 

334 WV 

335 VF 

336 IW 

337 KC 

338 QZ 

339 RB 

340 PZ 
311 WX 

342 ZI 

343 EO 

344 ME 

345 LB 
316 LV 

347 VJ 

348 YJ 

349 EV 

350 GG 

351 I J 

352 QY 

353 HS 

354 LW 

355 FO 

356 SU 

357 LM 

358 EX 

359 VS 

360 ZE 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



1411 



(1) AA . 

(2) ER 

(3) KD 

(4) OL . 

(5) JK . 

(6) NJ . 

(7) RS . 

(8) UR 

(9) XK 
(10) ZM 



SPARE GROUPS (SG) 

(11) DC . 

(12) GZ _ 

(13) MH 

(14) HA . 

(15) LI -. 

(16) QO . 

(17) TD. 

(18) WC 

(19) YO . 

(20) UV - 



See currently effective^Commuuication Plan for instructions 



Confidential 



Special Purpose Code No. 1 



Decode 



AA ISG 
AB098 
AD 104 
AR 214 
AG 316 
AL216 
AR 103 
AU 105 
AW 915 
BA 099 
BF 156 
BI 274 
BJ028 
BK073 
BL 118 
BM 157 
BN 320 
BO 143 
BQ 149 
BR 259 
BV136 
BY 261 
CF 148 
CI 150 
CK 260 
CO 144 , 
CU 201 
CX319 
CY 163 
CZ 208 
DA 253 
DB 202 

DC iisa 

DD 188 
DF 194 
DG304 
DO 306 
DV 193 
DX 195 
DZ305 
EJ246 
EM 005 
EN 189 
E0 343 
EP029 
EQ 247 
ER2SO 
ES233 



EU239 
EV 349 
FA 003 
FB 128 
FC 114 
FD 218 
FE 308 
FF 212 
FG 264 
FH 100 
FiV 106 
FO 355 
FP041 
FQ 255 
FR006 
FV 018 
GC 238 
GE 240 
GG 350 
GI 182 
GK 234 
GQ 291 
GtT 050 
GU 074 
GV 119 
GW 164 
GX209 
GY 292 
GZ 12SG 
HA 14SG 
HC 062 
HD042 
HE 087 
HF 132 
HG 177 
HH 056 
HL172 
HN 158 
HO 048 
HP 173 
HQ 159 
H H 263 
HS 353 
HT 256 
HU309 
HV 145 
IA278 
IC 284 



ID 035 
IE 211 
IH 001 
IJ351 
IN 283 
10 285 
IQ 036 
IS 279 
IW 336 
IZ 095 
JA 151 
JB 086 
JC 300 
JD 051 
JG 063 
J I 046 
JK 5SG 
JL 107 
JM 222 
JN 267 
JO 101 
JQ217 
JR 203 
JS 093 
JT204 
JU 318 
JV 301 
JW 190 
JX 137 
JZ 196 
KA 254 
KB 299 
KC 337 
KD 3SO 
KE 323 
KF 329 
KG OSO 
K:\I 037 
KP 328 
KR 330 
KT 081 
KU 181 
KV 324 
LA 131 
LB 345 
LC 096 
LE 108 
LI 15SG 



LK 152 
LL 312 
LAI 357 
LN 146 
LQ 262 
LR 248 
LS 138 
LT249 
LU039 
LV 346 
LW 354 
LX235 
MA 022 
MD 140 
ME 344 
MF030 
MG023 
MH 13SG 
MI 009 
MJ 015 
MK 125 
MM 275 
MQ 082 
MU 014 
MW 016 
MX 126 
MZ 010 
NA 241 
NB 176 
NC 031 
ND 141 
NF 153 
NJ 6SG 
NL197 
NM 043 
NN 088 
NO 191 
NR 307 
NT 293 
NU 183 
NV 294 
NW 084 
NX 032 
NY 040 
NZ 085 
OE 067 
OH 185 
01 075 



OJ120 
OK 068 
0L4SG 
OM 054 
ON 060 
00 170 
0V127 
OZ059 
PB061 
PC 171 
PE055 
PI 112 
PK230 
PL 165 
PM 210 
PN 113 
PO 271 
PP070 
PQ115 
PR 333 
PS 160 
PT 205 
PU321 
PV 004 
PW 250 
PX 295 
PY 091 
PZ340 
QA280 
QD 286 
QE 221 
QF 076 
QH 186 
QK 198 
QO 16SG 
QQ 242 
QR 133 
QS 178 
QT 223 
QU 236 
QY 352 
QZ338 
RA228 
RB 339 
RC 129 
RD077 
RE 130 
RF 175 



RG325 

RI297 

RJ331 

RK266 

RL 121 

RN231 

RP243 

RS7SG 

RU287 

RV268 

RW 313 

RX358 

RY281 

SB 038 

SF024 

SG273 

SH025 

SI174 

SJ 219 

SK 122 

SL220 

SM 310 

SN265 

soon 

SS017 
ST 311 
SU356 
SV 166 
SX276 
SZ288 
TD 17SG 
TG 332 
TH044 
TI089 
TJ 134 
TK 179 
TL 224 
TM 326 
TR083 
TW009 
UA019 
UB 244 
UC026 
UE092 
UF007 
UG298 
UI 269 
UJ 314 



UK 162 
UO012 
UQ 226 
UR8SG 
UT232 
UV 20SO 
UW 049 
VC 110 
VD 251 
VE 167 
VF335 
VG 257 
VH302 
VI 237 
VJ347 
VK 064 
VL 289 
VM071 
VN296 
VO072 
VP052 
VS359 
VT045 
VU207 
VV272 
VY057 
WC 18Sa 
WE 277 
WH 094 
WM 227 
WN 155 
WO 021 
WP 033 
WQ 078 
WR 123 
WS 282 
WT 168 
WU 109 
WV 334 
WW 116 
WX 341 
WY117 
WZ 097 
XB090 
XC 135 
XD252 
XG 102 
XK9SG 



XL 322 
XP 139 
XU200 
XV 066 
XW 213 
XY 303 
XZ327 
YA 154 
YB 020 
YC 161 
YD 027 
YE 142 
YG 047 
YH 180 
YI 225 
YJ 348 
YM 147 
YO 19SG 
YP 008 
YR 184 
YV 245 
YW 317 
YX 258 
YY 034 
YZ 013 
ZA199 
ZB065 
ZC 206 
ZD 187 
ZE 360 
ZF002 
ZG 270 
ZH315 
ZI342 
ZK192 
ZM lOSO 
ZN053 
ZQ 229 
ZU 290 
ZV 111 
ZW 079 
ZX 124 
ZY 169 
ZZ058 



(1) 

(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 



SPARE GROUPS (SG) 

(11) ---- 

(12) __.. 

(13) ..._ 
(14) 

(15) ._._ 

(16) .___ 

(17) _... 

(18) 

(19) __.. 

(20) 



See currently effective Communication Plan for instructions 
79716 — 46— Ex. 143, vol. 3—9 



1412 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

DISTRIBUTION OF APPENDIX "l" TO ANNEX "K" OF COMTASKFOR ONE GENERAL PI>AN 

NO. 6 

Distribution (Basic List III, Case 2) : 

Cincpac (15 — Registered Nos. 1 to 15) 

Combatships (35— Registered Nos. 16 to 50) for distribution to PENNSYL- 
VANIA, WEST VIRGINIA and NEVADA. 
CALIFORNIA ( 5— Registered Nos. 51 to 55). 
Comciiibatfor (38— Registered Nos. 56 to 93) for distribution to Crudiv 

NINE, less HELENA. 
Comdesron ONE (25 — Registered Nos. 94 to 118) for distribution to Desron 

ONE, less DALE and MONAGHAN. 
Comdesron THREE (31— Registered Nos. 119 to 149) for distribution to 

Desron THREE. 
Comindiv ONE (13 — Registered Nos. 150 to 162) for distribution to Mindiv 

ONE. 
Comsubdiv 61 (8 — Registered Nos. 163 to 170) for distribution to Subdiv 

61. 
Compatron 22 (13 — Registered Nos. 171 to 183) for distribution to Patron 

22. 
Compatron 23 (18 — Registered Nos. 184 to 196) for distribution to Patron 

23. 
Calif. 3— Reg. Nos. 197-199.' 
File— Reg. Nos. 200, 201.' 
Info Copy— No. 202.' 



1 Penned notation. 



Exhibit No. 20 (Na\t Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 

Hs 
Patrol Wing Two. 
U. S. NAVAL Air Station, 
Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 22, 19-'il. 
Memorandum to Aide to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, Pearl 
Harbor, T. H. 
In compliance with your telephone request this date the following is forwarded 
for your information. 

I am on duty in the Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department, Washington, 
D. C, and was given orders to report to the Commander Aircraft, BATTLE 
FORCE for temporary special duty. Upon the termination of this duty I was 
to return to duty in the Navy Department. 

While at sea in the U. S. S. ENTERPRISE, attached to the Commander Air- 
craft, BATTLE FORCE staff, a dispatch was received from the Commander-in- 
Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, stating that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air 
Force had asked for my services and that it was therefore requested that my 
detachment to Washington be delayed for this duty. On arrival in Pearl Harbor 

I was given verbal orders by the Commander Aircraft, BATTLE FORCE to 
report to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. 

Mv orders and dispatch referred to are in the hands of the Commander Air- 
craft, BATTLE FORCE in the U. S. S. ENTERPRISE. 

W. E. G. Taylor. 
Lt. car., U. 8. N. R. 
[Penned notation:] handed to me by Mr. Howe at Pearl Harbor 12/27/41 at 

II 30 A M.— A J S 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1413 

Exhibit No. 21 (Navy Packet No. 2), Kobebts Commission 

FOUETEENTH NaVAL DISTRICT 

District Intelligence Office 

Sixth Floor, Young Hotel 

Honolulu, Hawaii 

Jan. 2, 1942. 
Memorandum for the Commission. 

Subject : Long coded message regarding arrangements for display of signals at 
Laui Kai, Kalama, and on island of Maui. 
Subject message was received from the communication company and delivered 
via officer messenger to the office of Commander Eochefort on either December 
4th or 5th 1941. 

Decoding and translation were completed during night December lOth-llth, 
1941. 

I received a copy of the translation the forenoon of December 11th 1941. 
Respectfully, 

I. H. Mayfield, 
Captain, U. S. Navy. 



Exhibit No. 22 (Navy Packet No. 2), Roberts Commission 

Cincpac File No. United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Memorandum for Lieut-Comdr. Covington. 

Attached hereto are copies of the Operation Orders for the combined inter 
Task Force tactical exercises held during the second quarter of the fiscal year. 
A— Operation Order 29-41 was for the period 9/24-9/27, 1941. 
B— Operation Order 81-41 was for the period 10/23-10/26, 1941. 
C — Operation Order 37-41 was for the period 11/21-11/25, 1941. 
A and C were held in areas to the northward of Oahu as shown by the posi- 
tions in the exercises. 

B was conducted to the southward of Oahu because it involved the actual 
firing of torpedoes and smooth water was required. 

Particular attention is invited to paragraphs 2 and 5 of the "General" situa- 
tion given in all Operation Orders. 
Respectfully. 



[Penned:] Hope this is what is desired. 



P. C. Crosley, 
P. C. Crosley, 
Flag Secretary. 



January 2, 1942. 



Memorandum for Major Allen 

The Commission desires data from logs or other sources showing whether 
and upon what dates prior to December 7, 1941, the sea areas to the north of 
the Hawaiian Islands have been used for exercises. 

Admiral Halsey believes Commander Covington may find this with Staff of 
C in C. 

W. B. Howe, Recorder. 



1414 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[1] United States Pacific Fleet. U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Peakl Haebor, T. H., 11 September, 1941. 
Cincpac File No. 
lA.4-3/FF12(1)/ 
A16-3/SEPT/(12) 
Serial 01416 
Confidential 

OiJeration Order 

No. 29-41 

TASK ORGANIZATION 

(a) Units listed in Annex "A". 

1. Current Pacific Fleet Employment Schedules and Security Orders. 

2. Units listed in Annex "A" conduct tactical exercises in the HAWAIIAN AREA 
during the period twenty-four to twenty-seven September, one nine four one. 

3. (a) Units listed in Annex "A" underway in accordance with orders of Task 
Force Commanders. Conduct exercises in accordance with Annex "B". On 
completion resume scheduled operations. 

(x)_ — 

4. Train base at PEARL HARBOR. Tenders not otherwise assigned continue 
scheduled upkeep. 

5. Use zone plus ten and one-half time. Communications in accordance with 
Annex "C". Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in MARYLAND. 

H. E. KiMMEL, 

Admiral, 
Commander-in-Chief. 
Annexes : 

"A" — Tactical Organizations and Related Details — Effective 24-27 September 

1941. 
"B" — U. S. Pacific Fleet Exercise Plan No. 8-41. Appendix No. "1" — Special 
Situation, BROWN, Exercise No. 182. Appendix No. "2"— Special Situ- 
ation, GREEN. Exercise No. 182. 
"C" — U. S. Pacific Fleet Communication Plan No. 8-41. 
"D" — Special Cruising Dispositions. 
"E" — Tentative Radar Doctrine. 
[2] Distribution: (Basis, List III, Case 1) 
Opnav (7) 
N. W. C. (3) 
P. G. S. (3) 
Com FOURTEEN (10) 
CO NAS, Pearl Harbor (5) 
CO Subbase, Pearl Harbor (5) 
Combatfor (15) 
Comscofor (15) 
Comairscofor (10) 
OG, 2nd Marine Div. (5) 
Conidr. 2nd Marine Airwing (2) 
Combatships (7.1) for distribution to Batships. 
Comairbatfor (70) for distribution to Airbatfor. 
Comcrubatfor ((50) for distribution to Crubatfor. 
Comdesflot ONE (270) for distribution to Desbatfor. 
Cominbatfor (35) for distribution to Minbatfor. 
Comcruscofor (SO) for distribution to Cruscofor. 
Comsubscofor (200) for distribution to Subscofor. 
Combasefor (205) for distribution to Basefor. 
Compatwing ONE (25) for distribution to Patwing ONE. 
Compatwing TWO (30) for distribution to Patwing TWO. 
P. C. Crosley, 
P. C. Ckosley, 

TAeutenont Com mander, 
Flag Secretary. 
9-ll-41-(1340) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1415 

[1] Annex "A" to Pacific Fleet Opeisation Okder No. 29-41 

United States Pacific Fleet 
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 
Confidential 

Peahl Harbor, T. H., 

11 September, lO^l. 

tactical oeganizations and belated details 

effective 24-2 7 SEPTEMBER 1941 

(a) Normal Tactical Organization of Task Force FOUR, Pacific Fleet: 
G4 Task Force FOUR, Admiral Kimmel. 
G4.9 Battlcline, Vice Admiral Pye. 

G4.9.1 Batdiv ONE less OKLAHOMA. 
G4.9.2 Batdiv TWO less PENNSYLVANIA. 
G4.9.4 Batdiv FOUR less COLORADO. 
G4.9.5 Desron THREE less Desdiv FIVE. 
G4.S Right Flank, Rear Admiral Draemel. 
G4.8.1 SALT LAKE CITY. 
G4.8.2 DETROIT, Desron FOUR. 
G4.7 Center, Rear Admiral Spruance. 
G4.7.1 NORTHAMPTON. 
G4.7.2 Desron SIX ( Sound Screen ) . 
G4.6 Left Flank, Rear Admiral Theobald. 
G4.6.1 PENSACOLA. 
G4.6.2 Desron ONE. 
G4.1 Air, Vice Admiral Halsey. 
G4.1.1 ENTERPRISE. 
SARATOGA. 

Desdiv FIVE (Plane Guards). 
G4.1.2 CHESTER. 
G4.2 Shore-hased Air, Rear Admiral Bellinger. 
G4.2.1 Patron FOURTEEN. 
G4.2.2 Patron TWENTY-FOUR. 
[2] G4.3 Air Targets, Commander Murphy. 

Four Utwing Planes, Marx XIV sleeves. 
G4.4 Salvage, Rear Admiral Calhoun. 

Units designated by Combasefor. 

(b) When on deployment. Center units join either Right or Left Flank, they 
will, upon execution of the deployment signal, assume new task unit designa- 
tions appropriate to the Flank to be joined, cruisers final digit of task unit num- 
ber 3, destroyers 4. 

Example: Center joins Right Flank: Task Unit 4.7.1 becomes 4.8.3, Task 
Unit 4.7.2 becomes 4.8.4. 

(c) Air Patrol Assignments : 

Flight THREE — Inner Air Patrol : Three single planes per watch, dura- 
tion of watches — Sy^ hours, Battleline. 

Flight TWO— Intermediate : Two two-plane sections per watch, duration 
of watches — 314 hours, Cruisers Center, Right, and Left. Commander 
Center, coordinate. 

Flight FIVE — Combat : As directed by Commander Air. 

Officers coordinating Inner and Intermediate Air Patrols will each, in 
addition, designate an anti-submarine striking unit of at least four planes, 
to be armed with depth charges and ready to be catapulted on submarine 
contact. 

(d) Type Tactical Organization of Task Force SEVEN, Pacific Fleet: 
G7 Task Force SEVEN, Rear Admiral Furlong. 

G7.1 Minecraft 

OGLALA, Mindiv ONE. 
G7.2 Suhmarines 

Subdivs TWENTY-TWO. FORTY-TWO, SIXTY-ONE. 
G7.3 Patrol Planes 

Patrons TV^^ENTY-TWO, TWENTY-THREE. 
[5] (e) Organization for security in accordance with Pacific Fleet Confi- 
dential Letter No. 2CL-41. 



1416 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(1) In despatches and signals this plan will be referred to as Operation Plan 
AFIRM. 

(2) If placed in effect in real emergency, this will be preceded by a plain 
language despatch : "Exercise conditions ended." 

(3) If placed in effect for exercise purposes only, each despatch in connection 
therewith will be prefaced by the word "DRILL." 

(4) Organization 

Gl Main Body, Vice Admiral Pye. 
Batdivs TWO, FOUR. 
SARATOGA. 
Desron ONE. 
G2 Striking Force, Vice Admiral Halsey. 
Batdiv ONE. 
Crudiv FIVE. 
ENTERPRISE. 
Desrons FOUR, SIX. 
G5 Attack Force, Captain Keleher. 

Desron THPtEE. 
G7 LAHAINA Force, Rear Admiral Furlong. 
OGLALA. 
Mindiv ONE. 

Subdivs TWENTY-TWO, FORTY-TWO, SIXTY-ONE. 
Basic division into Task Forces instead of Task Groups is used to minimize 
radio frequency shifts by large numbers of ships. Except for Desron THREE, 
which becomes the Attack Force, all units will establish communications in 
accordance with the communication plans previously prescribed by their 
respective Task Force Commanders for Exercises Nos. 179 and 182. 

(5) This plan is for use only during the Fleet Tactical period 24-27 September 
1941. 

[1] Annex "B" to Pacific Flket Operation Order No. 29^1 

United States Pacxfic Flee,t 
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Confidential • Pearl Harbob, T. H., 

11 September, 1941. 
Exercise Plan No. 8-41 

part I — GENERAL 

1. Exercises will be conducted in accordance with this Annex. 

2. The general objectives ai'e: Training in war operations under realistically 
simulated war conditions; test and further dev^elopment of doctrine and proced- 
ures and training in the preparation of quick estimates and plans. More specific 
objectives are designated in the various exercises. To provide command training 
for more flag ofiicers, in some exercises the O. T. C of the exercise task force is 
not the senior flag ofllcer in the force. 

3. Unless special exception is made in the individual exercise, the provisions 
of Chapter V, USF-10, will be in effect. Flights will be cancelled or discontinued 
promptly upon approach of unfavorable flying weather. Commander Aircraft, 
Battle Force, and Commander Patrol WMng TWO shall advise the Officers Con- 
ducting the Exercises when they consider weather unsuitable for scheduled opera- 
tions. All aircraft, except patrol planes designated for night flying, shall be at 
their bases by sunset. Commander Patrol Wing TWO shall advise Officers Con- 
ducting Exercises, and to whom planes are assigned, when all patrol planes have 
returned to their bases on conclusion of exercises. 

4. Speed limitations (unless otherwise prescribed): Battleships — 16 knots; 
cruisers, destroyers (including converted destroyers), carriers — 24 knots (except 
as required for operating aircraft) ; others — none. 

5. Special Instructions: For the duration of these exercises, all contacts must 
be regarded as with own U. S. Units. Offensive action between exercise op- 
ponents will be simulated only within the limits of the safety precautions pre- 
scribed in USF-10. Should the Commander-in-Chief transmit the message 
"Exercise Conditions Ended" it shall be construed by all units to mean that 
exercise conditions no longer prevail and that there is possibility of hostile 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1417 

action against the Fleet. Commander Task Force SEVEN on receipt of this 
despatch, will have all submarines sux'face, and report when [2] this is 
accomplished. All forces will thereafter take action as directed in Commander- 
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41. 

6. Surface ships indicate anti-aircraft fire by flashing V's on searchlight 
trained on target. 

7. Each exercise implies a reasonably definite tactical situation. Command- 
ing Officers are expected to maintain conditions of readiness and material 
conditions appropriate thereto, without signal. To preserve personnel physical 
capabilities, conditions must not be more severe than the constructive situation 
really merits. 

[S] PART II EXERCISES 

» Exercise No. 176 

(1800, 23 September to 1130, 24 September) 
Objects: 

(1) To train submarines in patrol operations in hostile waters. 

(2) To train destroyers in submarine detection and attack. 

(3) To train in sortie against submarine opposition. 
Procedure: 

(a) Units of Task Force ONE except submarines, minecraft, and patrol 
planes organize in accordance with current security orders by dark, 23 Septem- 
ber, at which time the Main Body and Striking Force must be south of lati- 
tude 20° 15' N. Remain south of this line until 0500, 24 September. 

(b) Units of Ta.sk Force TWO organize for sortie at 1800, 23 September. 
Commander Task Force TWO station Offshore Patrol. 

(c) OGLALA, Mindiv ONE, Subdivs TWENTY-TWO, SIXTY-ONE, Patrons 
TWEN^l^Y-TWO, TWENTY-THREE, organize as Task Force SEVEN, Rear Ad- 
miral Furlong, Task Force Commander, at 1800, 23 September. 

(d) Submarine Division TWENTY-TWO depart LAHAINA by routes north 
of latitude 20° 40' N. at 1800, 23 September; proceed and establish patrol off 
PEARL HARBOR entrance by daylight, 24 September. Attack heavy ships 
departing PEARL HARBOR. 

(e) Submarine Division SIXTY-ONE depart LAHAINA by routes south of 
latitude 20° 40' N. at 1800, 23 September ; proceed and establish patrol in 
Area V-13 by daylight, 24 September. Attack heavy ships of Task Force ONE. 

(f) Desti-oyers of the Offshore and Inshore Patrols hunt and attack sub- 
marines attempting to establish patrol off PEARL HARBOR. 

(g) Task Force ONE Attack Group Destroyers hunt and attack submarines 
attempting to establish patrol in Area V-13. 

[4] (h) Task Force ONE (Main Body and Striking Force) proceed after 

0500, 24 September to concentrate with Task Force TWO at reference point 
"A", latitude 21° 00' N., longitude 158° 30' W., at 1130. Pass through area 
V-13 en route. Defend against submarine attacks. 

(i) Task Force TWO depart PEARL HARBOR against submarine opposition 
and proceed to concentrate with Task Force ONE. Submarine Division FORTY- 
TWO sortie last and proceed to LAHAINA on the surface. This division be- 
comes a part of Task Force SEVEN upon completing sortie. 

(j) All patrolling submarines surface by 1130 and proceed to LAHAINA on 
the .surface. 

(k) Task Force SEVEN, less submarines and patrol planes, proceed at 1800, 
23 September, by route south of latitude 20° N. and west of longitude 159° W. 
to reference point "B", latitude 21° 30' N., longitude 159° W., to arrive by 
1200, 24 September. OGLALA act as radio relay vessel for patrolling sub- 
marines Commander Task Force SEVEN direct one section of patrol planes 
to locate Task Foi-ce ONE at daylight, 24 September, and coach submarines 
area V-13 to attack positions. 

Safety Precautions: Submarines on patrol, destroyers of Task Force ONE 
Attack Group, the Offshore and Inshore Patrols, will darken ship from sunset 
to sunrise. While darkened, the speed of Patrol and Attack Group destroyers 
will be limited to ten knots, but sufficient reserve boiler power will be main- 
tained for emergency backing. Running lights will be turned on by all units 
as necessary to avoid collision. For attacks during daylight, submarines will 
go to deep submergence when not less than 4,000 yards from any hostile ship, 



1418 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

and are subject to countei' attack by anti-submarine screens and patrol de- 
stroyers. 

Damage: During this exercise, damage will be assessed and applied by en- 
gaged submarines and destroyers. Out-of-action rendezvous for submarines is 
at LAHAINA, for destroyers at concentration rendezvous given above. Sub- 
marines declared out of action proceed via KALOHI Channel. Out-of-actiou 
ships burn running lights during darkness and answer challenges "OA" until 
arrived at rendezvous. 
Reports: 

(a) From Offshore and Inshore Patrols, Task Force ONE Attack Group: 

(1) Record of submarine contacts and attacks, depth charge expendi- 
tures. 

(2) Summary of damage. 

[5] (b) From Commanders Submarine Divisions TWENTY-TWO and 

SIXTY-ONE : 

(1) Record of attacks made, torpedo expenditures. 

(2) Record of dives made during darkness to escape detection, or other 
evasive action. 

(3) Summary of damage. 

(c) No umpire reports are required by Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 

[6] Exercise No. 177 

(1130 to 1600, 24 September) 
Object: 

Training in Fleet Tactics, including simulated Fleet engagement. 
Procedure: 

(a) At 1130, 24 September, Task Forces ONE and TWO, less submarines, 
patrol planes, and minecraft, assume normal tactical organization of Task Force 
FOUR. Pacific Fleet. Form Cruising Disposition 4-V, course and axis 300°, 
speed 12 knots, by 1200, at which time guide in battleships pass through ref- 
erence point "A", Latitude 21°00' North, Longitude 158°30' West, O. T. C. 
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in MARYLAND. 

(b) At 1200, surface units of Task Force SEVEN, representing an enemy 
fleet comparable in overall strength to Task Force FOUR, pass through reference 
point "B", Latitude 21°.S0'' North, Longitude 159°30' West, course and axis 
120°, 13 knots. Patrol planes not engaged in exercise 176 will be utilized in lieu 
of carrier aircraft by Commander Task Force SEVEN. OGLALA represents a 
battleline of six NEW MEXICOS. Each light mine layer in an inner area 
represents one BROOKLYN plus one squadron of destroyers, each light mine 
layer in an outer area represents one PORTLAND plus one squadron of 
destroyei'S. 

(c) Opposing fleets conduct approach and deployment. Engage on northerly 
courses. 

Safety Precautions: In accordance with USF-10. Air and surface units of 
Task Force FOUR only may use smoke. 
Damage: Do not assess or apply damage. 

Reports: Comment and recommendation by Commander Task Force SEVEN 
and Task Group Commanders of Task Force FOUR. 

Upon completion of this exercise, recover all ship-based aircraft without 
further orders. All shore-based aircraft return to Base. 

[7] Special Signals: Tlie following special signals will be used to direct 
light forces on the flanks in Fleet engagements : 

(a) "LK" — "Light Forces will operate according to battle plan indicated:" 
Plan 1 — Tactical Offensive. 
Plan 2 — Tactical Defensive. 

Plan 3 — Divided — part tactical offensive, part tactical defensive. 
Plan 4 — MaJte normal deployment, nature of initial operations to be 
decided when tactical situation is more definitely known. 

Plan 5 — Tactical Offensive — Designated units prepare to make a pre- 
liminary attack. 

Note. — If deployment is ordered before the order to attack is given, 
the designated units will take stations in the general vicinity of their 
normal deployment stations, but such as to facilitate the initiation of 
the attack. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1419 

Plan 6 — Tactical Offensive — Light Forces in the Van prepare to make a 
Simultaneous Attack. 

Note. — If deployment is ordered before the order to attack is given, 
the light forces in the van will take stations in the general vicinity of 
their normal deployment stations, but as near to the enemy light forces 
as possible without becoming engaged. 
Plan 7 — Divided— Light force units designated prepare to make simul- 
taneous attack — Units of light forces not designated operate defensively, 
but, if practicable, during the attack of the offensive units, move into an 
Outer Area and prepare to attack enemy battleline with torpedoes. 

Plan 8 — Tactical Offensive ; execute that form of attack most effective 
against enemy disposition as disclosed by information obtained. 
Plan f» — Coordinate light force and air attacks. 
[8] (b) "BE" — "Attack according to plan indicated:" 
Plan 1 — Preliminary Attack. 
Plan 2 — Simultaneous Attack. 

(c) "SOPUS POSIT D"— "Distribute units in designated lettered flank 
areas; units to occupy each area are as prescribed by designating signals fol- 
lowing each designated lettered area." 

(d) "POSIT D"— "DESIG (letter)" may be added to indicate the AREA in 
a disposition which it is desired a unit or commander to occupy." 

(e) "DUT"-— LIMITS. Establish Inner and Outer of AREA desig- 
nated. Numerals preceding signal indicate INNER limit of area in thousands 
of yards ; numerals following signal indicate OUTER limit. 

Note. — The signal characters given above for the first two signals are those 
which are now assigned in the General Signal Book for the hasic mean- 
ings. The signal characters for the third signal are recommended assignments 
since it is believed that this signal should be in the "POSIT" section. The 
signal characters of the last two signals are those which were temporarily 
assigned during a recent exercise. Appropriate signal characters must be chosen 
when entering the signals in their entirety in the SOPUS Section, 

[9] Exercise No. 178 

(1600, 24 September to 0830, 25 September) 
Object: 

(1) Training Destroyers and Cruisers in Night Search and Attack. 

(2) Training Fleet in repelling night cruiser and destroyer attacks. 
Attack Force: 

Task Force FIVE, Rear Admiral Draemel. 
CHESTER, DETROIT 
Desrons THREE, SIX 
Fleet: 

Task Force FOUR, Rear Admiral Anderson. 
As listed in Annex "A" less Attack Force. 
Procedure: 

(a) Upon completion of Exercise No. 177, units assigned assume Task Or- 
ganization of Task Force FIVE. Proceed via KAUAI CHANNEL to reference 
point "C", Latitude 22° 15' North, Longitude 157° 45' West, to arrive about 
2000. Locate, track and attack Task FOUR. Complete all attacks by 0530 
and rejoin Task Force FOUR promptly thereafter. 

(b) Upon completion of aircraft recovery following Exercise No. 177, Task 
Force FOUR form as directed by Task Force Commander. Proceed northward 
through KAUAI CHANNEL to latitude about 22° 15' North, thence eastward. 
At 0600 be within 15 miles of reference point "D", Latitude 22° 15' North, 
Longitude 157° 15' West. Defend against cruiser and destroyer raids enroute. 

(c) Both forces will maintain radio and radar silence from 1700 to 2000. 
Set radar watches at 2000. Radio silence may be broken by Task Force Com- 
manders at discretion, after 2000. 

(d) Neither Task Force Commander may issue any advance written directive 
for this exercise. "Light Forces in Night Search and Attack" is effective within 
the Attack Force for this exercise. 

[10] (e) The time from O6O0 to 0830 is a period of preparation for Exer- 

cise No. 180. During this period the Fleet will be reformed on signal from the 
O. T. C. and at 0830 will pass through reference point "D", Latitude 22°15' 
North, Longitude 157°15' West, course and axis 270°, speed 14. 



1420 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Safety Precautions: In accordance with USF-10 Smoke will not be used. 

Damage: Assess and apply damage, except that speed will not be reduced be- 
low 15 knots for destroyers and 10 knots for heavy ships. Out of action ships 
burn running lights. Out of action rendezvous : 

Latitude Longitude 

Task Force FOUR 22°00' IST'lS' 

Task Force FIVE 22°30' 157°15' 

Reports: 

(1) From Task Force Commanders: 

(a) Brief description of operations. 

(b) Track chart, single pencil copy, scale of chart #5654. 

(c) Summary of damage. 

(d) Comments on "Light Forces in Night Search and Attack". 

(2) No umpire reports are required by Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific 
Fleet. 

[ii] Exercise No. 179 

(1600, 24 September to 1600, 26 September) 

Objects: 

(1) Training in Submarine — Patrol Plane coordinated Operations. 

(2) Training in Strategical Mining. 
Forces Engaged: 

Task Force SEVEN, Rear Admiral Furlong. 
OGLALA 
Mindiv ONE 

Subdivs TWENTY-TWO, SIXTY-ONE. FORTY-TWO 
Patrons TWENTY-TWO, TWENTY-THREE 
Procedure: 

Detailed instructions for this period will be issued by Commander Task Force 
SEVEN. It is desired that the exercises include the following features : 

(a) Coordinated submarine — patrol plane operations utilizing minecraft as 
target group. 

(b) Planting a strategic minefield at night or under cover of assumed low 
visibility opposed by submarines and patrol planes. 

Reports: Brief description of operations conducted, comment, recommendation 
from Task Force Commander. 

Doctrine: "Submarine — Patrol Plane Tentative Doctrine" issued by Com- 
mander Scouting Force to Scouting Force and Task Force THREE is effective 
during this exercise period. Commander Scouting Force furnish copy to Com- 
mander Minecraft, Battle Force. 

[12] Exercise No. 180 

(0830 to 1130, 25 September) 

Object: 

Test of Fleet Anti-Aircraft Fire. 
Procedure: 

As given in Task Force ONE Exercise No. 90, enclosure (A) to Commander 
Battle Force serial 0436 of 9 May, 1941. 

Task Group FOUR THREE make one formation bombing attack by 0930 ; there- 
after make additional single or multiple attacks at discretion of Task Group 
Commander. 

Ammunition allowance is four rounds per ship, remnants if available, other- 
wise from Commander-in-Chiefs pool. 

The Fleet will be formed in battle disiwsition for this exercise. Each station 
unit form column. 

Target approaches should be made approximately at right angles to the longer 
dimension of heavy ship formations to permit the greatest practicable number 
of ships to fire without violating safety precautions. 

No ship-based aircraft are to he launched during this exercise. 

Target Group start return to Base at 1130. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1421 

[JS] Exercise No. 181 

(1200 to 1630, 25 September) 
Ol>iect: 

Test of Fleet Defense against Air Observation and Attack. 
Procedure: 

(a) The Fleet (Units participating) will be organized as Task Force FOUR, 
in Cruising Disposition 4-V, and wiU be maneuvered by tlie O.T.C. Kear ship 
of each heavy ship station unit tow bombing target. 

(b) The 1200 position of the Fleet Center will be signalled to Commander 
Shore-based Air in advance. Trackers may take ofE at 1130, and atta(?k groups 
at discretion after 1200. 

(c) Commander Shore-based Air have at least three attacks made during the 
exercise period. Each attack group will consist of at least three planes. Two 
groups may attack simultaneously. Miniature bomb attacks and machine gun 
strafing on towed tagets, and simulated torpedo attacks are authorized. Undue 
advantage will not be taken by attack groups of the "radar shadow" of OAHU, 
inasmuch as proximity to the Naval Air Stations is maintained to facilitate the 
exercise. Smoke may be used by aircraft only. 

(d) Commander Shore-based Air is authorized to arrange for Army partici- 
pation in the attacks if the Army desires to take part. Inform Commander-in- 
Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, prior to 20 September whether or not the Army will 
participate and if so whether or not the Army bombers will have fighter sup- 
port. In case of Army participation, advise the responsible Army Commander 
of the contents of Article 5213, US'F-lO. 

Damage: Damage will be assessed by aircraft but not applied, except (1) if 
a single tracking plane is intercepted it will retire to a distance of 25 miles 
and descend to 500 feet before resuming tracking operations, (2) damaged 
combat patrols must return to the Fleet Center before being assigned a new 
mission. 

[i-^] Reports: 

(1) From Commander Air : 

(a) List of targets tracked, interceptions ordered, interceptions suc- 
cessful. 

(b) Comment and recommendation. 

(2) From Radar Ships: 

(a) Comment and recommendation. 

( 3 ) From Commander Shore-based Air : 

(a) Time each attack was delivered, number of planes in attack group, 
altitude, course, speed, whether or not opposed, and if so the distance from 
bomb release point interception was accomplished. 

(b) Comment and recommendation. 

Appendix "1" to Annex "B" to Pacific Flb^it Operation Order No. 29-il 

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET 
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., 

11 September, 19^1. 

Cincpac File No, 
A4-3/FF12(l)/ 
A16-3/SEPT/(12) 
Serial 01417 
Confidential 

distributed to brown force, exercise no. 182, ONLY 

Special situation 

1. At 0500, 26 September, BROWN Covering Force is in position Latitude 
24° 00' North, Longitude 156° 00' West, in Cruising Disposition, course 230°, 
speed 12 knots. 



1422 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. At 0500, 26 September, BROWN O. T. C. receives following despatch from 
Chief of Naval Operations : 

RADIO INTELLIGENCE INDICATES GREEN FORCE OF CONSIDER- 
ABLE SIZE HEADING FOR PEARL FROM POSITION WITHIN rSO MILES 
OF LATITUDE 26° 15' NORTH LONGITUDE 161° GO' WEST AT 1030 GCT 
26 SEPTEMBER. INTERPOSE AND ENGAGE. 

H. E. Kim MEL. 

Admiral, 
Commander-in-Chief. 
Distribution: (Basis, List III, Case 1) 
Opnav (7) 
N. W. C. (3) 
P. G. S. (3) 

Comdr. BROWN (Combatfor) (140) for distribution to BROWN Force. 
P. C. Crosley, 
P. C. Crosley. 
Lieutenant Commander, 
Flag Secretary. 
9-11-41 (235) 

Appendix "2" to Annex "B"' to Pacific Fleet Opekatiox Order No. 29-41 

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET 
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., 

11 September, 19J,1. 
Cincpac File No. 
A4-3/FF12(l)/ 
A16-3/SEPT/(12) 
Serial 01418 

Confidential . 

distributed to green force, exercise no. is 2, ONLY 

Special situation 

1. At 05C0, 26 September, GREEN Raiding Force pass through position Latitude 
25° 00' North, Longitude 160° 00' West, in Cruising Disposition, course 150°. 
speed 15 knots. 

2. At 0500, 26 September, GREEN O. T. C. receives follovs'ing despatch from his 
Navy Department : 

RADIO INTELLIGENCE INDICATES BROWN FORCE CONTAINING 
BATTLESHIPS HEADING FOR KAUAI CHANNEL FROM POSITION 
WITHIN 30 MILES OF LATITUDE 25° 00' NORTH. LONGITUDE 155° 00' 
WEST AT 1030 GCT TWENTY SIXTH. INTERCEPT AND ENGAGE. 

H. E. KiMMEL, 

Admiral, 
Commander-in-Chief. 
Distribution : Basis, List III, Case 1) 
Opnav (7) 
N. W. C. (3) 
P. G. S. (3) 

Comdr. GREEN (Comairbatfor) (145) for distribution to GREEN Force, 
P. C. Crosley, 
P. C. Crosley, 

Lieutenant Commander, 
Flag Secretary. 
9-11-41 (240). 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1423 

Exercise No. 182 

(1630, 25 September to 1630, 26 September) 
Object: 

(1) Tactical Training of Task Forces in Proximity to Hostile Forces of 
Comparable Strength. 



(2) Fleet Engagement. 



OPPOSING FOKCES 



BROWN. Task Force ONE GREEN, Task Force TWO 

Vice Admiral Pve Vice Admiral Halsey 

4BB Batdivs TWO, FOUR 2BB Datdiv ONE 

ICV SARATOGA ICV ENTERPRISE 

18DD Desrons ONE, THREE 18DD Desrons FOUR, SIX 

24VPB Patrons TWENTY-TWO, 4CA Crudiv FIVE 

TWENTY-THREE ICL DETROIT 

Limiting Speeds: BROWN battleships 15 knots, GREEN battleships 18 knots, 
all cruisers and carriers 28 knots, all destroyers 32 knots. Formation and dis- 
position limiting speeds are one knot less than the maximum speed of the slowest 
ship in company. 

Procedure: Upon completion of Exercise No. 181, units listed assume normal 
tactical organizations of Task Forces ONE and TWO, respectively. Task Force 
Commanders conduct their forces to assigned initial points. Radio silence be- 
comes effective for both forces from 1800 until broken by the Task Force Com- 
mander concerned. No unit of either force may be more than 20 miles from its 
own Fleet Center and no aircraft may be in the air prior to 0500, 26 September. 

General Situation. 

BROWN and GREEN are at war. 

BROWN Covering Force, Task Force ONE, is proceeding from oi)erations in 
the HAWAII-ALASKA-WEST COAST triangle to an advance ba.se at PEARL 
HARBOR. The total available air force at PEARL HARBOR is two squadrons 
of patrol planes. Destroyers were fuelled on 24 September. No ships are dam- 
aged. All have 100% ammunition on board. 

[16] GREEN Raiding Force, Task Force TWO, has been projected toward 
this area from the westward with orders to exploit contacts under favorable 
circumstances. Destroyers fuelled on 23 September. No ships are damaged. 
All have 100% ammunition on board. 

Since 22 September, neither force has been able to operate aircraft because of 
unusually low visibility. Forecasts predict clearing by midnight, 25 September. 

Intelligence reports have indicated to each force commander that contact is 
possible, but exact dispositions and positions are unknown. 

Special Situations. 

Initial positions and instructions are issued separately to BROWN and GREEN, 
Appendices "1" and "2", respectively, to this Exercise Plan. 

The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, will function as the Chief of 
Naval Operations for both sides, and may furnish additional information and 
instructions as the exercise proceeds. 

Damage: Aircraft assess but do not apply damage. Surface craft assess 
damage, but apply only that sustained after Fleet engagement commences. 

Safety Precautions: USF-10 is effective. 

Reports: 

(1) From Task Force Commanders: 

(a) Brief description of operations. 

(b) Composite track charts, scale of chart #5654, from 0500 to engage- 
ment, and scale one-inch equals one mile during engagement. Single i)encil 
copies only are required. 

(c) Summary of Damage, divided to show condition of ships at start of 
engagement, and total at end thereof. 



1424 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[17] (2) No umpire repoi'ts are desired. Task Force Commanders make 
Commander-in-Cliief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, information addressee on operational 
despatches. This traffic will be sent on Task Force Commanders' circuit and will 
not be subject to interception nor direction finding. 

Special 8iffnnls: Same as for Exercise No. 177. 

Procedure on Completion of Exercise No. 182: Participating units retain organ- 
izations as Task Forces ONE and TWO. Reform on southerly courses. Recover 
all ship-based aircraft and direct shore-based aircraft to return to Base. 

[iS] Exercise No. 183 

(1630, 26 September to OGOO, 27 September) 
Object: 

Test of Security Organization, more than one Task Force at Sea. 
Procedure: This exercise is divided into two phases. During the first phase, 
all Fleet units will organize in accordance with security orders. During the 
second phase, certain units will assume an enemy status to add realism to the 
operation. 

PHASE I 

On signal, following completion of Exercise No. 1S2, all units assume security 
organization as given in suliparagraph (e), of Annex "A", prepare to carry out 
general tasks assigned by U. S. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41. Sur- 
face units of Task Force SEVEN screen submarine concentration while awaiting 
orders. 

Instructions for initial movements of all forces based on constructive enemy 
dispositions and intentions will be issued by despatch. These will include con- 
tact reports of submarine activity off PEARL HARBOR ENTRANCE, which the 
Attack Force will be directed to handle, and a carrier threat from the southwest- 
ward, which the Striking Force will be directed to intercept. 

Activity of the Attack Force off PEARL HARBOR ENTRANCE will replace 
the routine Offshore Patrol. This patrol will not be stationed until completion 
of this exercise at 0600, 27 September. 

PHASE II 

Upon receipt of signal to commence phase two : 

(a) Task Force TWO assume enemy status. Proceed to area V-20 and launch 
dawn air attack on PEARL HARBOR, and/or Main Body. On completion resume 
normal operating status and proceed with scheduled work. 

(b) Commander Task Force SEVEN direct Submarine Divisions TWENTY- 
TWO and SIXTY-ONE to assume enemy status, proceed and establish patrol in 
areas V-6, V-7, S-1, S-2 and U-3 west of longitude of MAKAPUU POINT. Upon 
entering any of these areas, submarines are subject to attack. Avoid destroyers 
and simulate [19] torpedo attack on heavy ships entering these areas. 
Submarine Division FORTY-TWO remain at LAHAINA until 0600, then assume 
normal operating status. OGLALA and Mine Division ONE proceed to PEARL for 
scheduled entry, but I'emain outside of submarine areas imtil after siinrise. 

(c) Task Force FIVE proceed to submarine areas off PEARL ENTRANCE. 
Hunt and simulate attacks on submarines. Enter PEARL as directed by Com- 
mander Task Force ONE. 

(d) Task Force ONE proceed to PEARL HARBOR for scheduled entry, but 
remain outside of submarine areas until after sunrise. 

Safety Precautions : Submarines on patrol, destroyers of Task Force FIVE, and 
Inshore Patrols, will darken ship from sunset to sunrise. While darkened, tlie 
speed of Patrol and Attack Force destroyers will be limited to ten knots, but 
sufficient reserve boiler power will be maintained for emergency backing. Run- 
ning lights will be turned on by all units as necessary to avoid collision. For 
attacks during daylight, submarines will go to deep submergence when not less 
than 4,000 yards from any hostile ship, and are subject to counter attack by anti- 
submarine screens and patrol destroyers. 

Damage: Assess but do not apply damage. 

Reports : 

(1) From Inshore Patrols and Task Force FIVE destroyers: 

(a) Record of submarine contacts and attacks, depth charge expenditures. 

(b) Summary of damage. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1425 

(2) From Commanders Submarine Divisions TWENTY-TWO and SIXTY-ONE : 

(a) Record of attacks made, torpedo expenditures. 

(b) Record of dives made during darkness to escape detection, or other 
evasive action. 

(c) Summary of damage. 

(3) No umpire reports are required by Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, 
[i] Confidential 

Annex "C" to Pacific Fleet Opebation Obdeb 29-41 

United States Pacific Fleet, U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship 

Peakl Habbor, T. H. 

September 11, 19Jfl. 
Communication Plan 8-41 

USP-70 effective as modified herein. For exercise 1S2, Commander Task Force 
TWO (GREEN) make own communication plan. 

1120. This plan effective 1130, September 24, 1941, (Zone plus lOi/^) until 
completion of Exercise 183. 

1179. Radar aircraft contact reports in accordance with Annex "E". 

1332. NPM Primary broadcasts are available and should be used by all Task 
Forces for strategical traffic and for tactical traffic when circuit conditions permit 

2120. Condition 19 effective. 

2211. Task Force Commanders use Annex "B" to USF-70, except that Radar 
Net Frequency is 6600kcs., which frequency will be used by Combat Air Patrol. 
The published plans assigned to opposing Task Forces must be considered as 
unavailable for radio intelligence activities as are opposite Exercise Cryptographic 
Aids and despatches. 

2212 & 2213. Not elfective. 

2216. Not effective ; see paragraph 11, Appendix "B" to USF-70. 

2JtlO. Surface vessels and submarines use authenticators for intra-Task Force 
radio communications under conditions (c) and (d). 

2510. Visual call signs, Part II, U. S. Navy Call Sign Book, shall be used on all 
exercise traffic. This includes aircraft. 

2800. Not effective. 

2120. Condition 1 effective. 

3210. Not effective. Use Pacific Fleet Communication Memorandum 2RM-41. 

5200 & 5300. CSP-1023 and CSP-1024 with prescribed key tables shall be used 
by all Task Forces except that in the following exercises the indicated Task Forces 
shall use key tables made by substituting August for September : 
Exercise 177 — Surface units of Task Force SEVEN. 
Exercise 178— Task Force FIVE. 
Exercise 182 — Task Force Two. 
Exercise 183, Phase II— Task Forces TWO and SEVEN. 

[2] 5230. Until receipt of satisfactory radio recognition device for aircraft 
the following approach and recognition procedure shall govern the approach of 
Naval aircraft to either units of the Fleet or Naval outlying island bases. Sep- 
arate special procedure will be pi'escribed for major bases and areas. 

Aircraft approach from outside of gun range in simple cruising formation (if 
more than one plane) on bearing 045° T. or 225° T. on odd days (OCT), from 
center of formation or station at 1000 feet or under. (These beai'ings may be 
changed if necessary by local authorities.) They shall never approach from the 
bearing on the sun when the sun ig low. 

If station does not recognize plane as friendly it challenges by making "Zs" 
on searchlight, or by training searchlight with red filter on plane if available; 
otherwise at shore bases use a red smoke bomb during daylight and a red rocket 
at night. 

On seeing challenge plane, or leading plane if there is a formation, replies as 
follows : 

(a) Daytime. — On odd days of the month (GCT) leave formation, circle 
to the right, and when back on the approach course, dip right wing twice; 
on even days (GCT), leave formation, circle to the left and, when back on 
approach course, dip left wing twice. This must be made distinctive, dipping 
the wing about 30 degrees to the prescribed side and returning to horizontal 
after each dip. 

(b) Niylittime. — Turn on running lights and proceed as for daytime replies 
to challenge, execpt circling may be omitted ; or make emergency identifica- 
tion pyrotechnic signal prescribed in effective CSP. 



1426 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



When approaching aircraft are recognized as friendly, the recognition station 
shall train on the approaching aircraft a powerful search-light, make "Fs" or 
show green colored light. Those signals indicate to planes that they are recog- 
nized as friendly and will not he tired on. 

In a Fleet formation the recognition stations will bo, unless otherwise desig- 
nated, those ships on the outer circle closest to approach bearings 045° T. and 
225° T. or 135° T. and 315° T. (depending on tiie day) from Feet ceniei-. 

[3] 6622. All Task Forces use List I, except in Exercise 1S2 Task Force TWO 
use List II. 

7000. Interference and deception sliall not be practiced unless specifically 
directed by Commander-in-Chief. In Exercise ISli interference and deception 
may be practiced subject to the usual safety precautions. 

8000 Reports not required. Constructive criticism and comments are 
welcomed. 
[1] Annex "D" 

To Pacific Fleet Operation Okder No. 29^1 

United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 



Covfidential 



Pearl Harbor. T. H., 

11 Septemhci; 19J,1. 



special cruising dispositions 



1. Special dispositions are prescribed in this Annex, effective during the period 
24-27 September 1941. Comments and recommendations from command are 
invited. 

2. Station assignments and sectors of radar search responsibility are given 
with each disposition. In the assignment of radar sectors, each ship will count 
its own position as the center of its sector, and obtain the true directions of 
the limiting radii by adding the given numbers to the Fleet axis. Count clock- 
wise from first to second radius. Example : Axis 050, ship's station 6030, search 
sector 320 to 100. The center of the radar search sector is at 6030 and the 
sector extends from 010 true clockwise to 150 true. 

3. In all of the special dispositions, the guide is in the van center battleship 
division. All rotations of the Fleet axis icill, however, be performed about the 
Fleet Center, the Guide maneuvering to conform. 

4. In all special cruising dispositions, station units are free to maneuver inde- 
pendently to avoid air attack. Heavy ship cohunns may increase distance to 
1000 yards. When the entire disposition is not zigzagging in accordance with a 
common plan, battleship station unit commanders may employ the special zigzag 
prescribed for Task Force ONE Exercises 67B and 68B. 

5. All deployments, day or night, are normal. 

6. In special disiwsitions 4-L, 4-R, 4-V, be prepared to change front by the 
equiang-ular rate method. 

cbxjising disposition 4-T. 

Cruising Disposition No. 4-L is a night or low visibility disposition, with tlie 
screens somewhat closer to the Fleet Center than normal to provide suitable 
density with the reduced number of screening ships available. 



[2] Batileline: 

Batdiv ONE 

BatdivTWO-.- 

Batdiv FOUR 

Destroyers 

Center 

Cruiser.-- 

Destroyers (sections) . 
Right 

Cruisers (sections) 

Destroyers (sections). 
Left 

Cruiser 

Destroyers (Sections) 
Air 

Carriers 

Cruiser 

Plane Guards 



Station assignments 



2270 

1000 

2090 --.. 

A/S Screen-.- 

6000- 

6320. 6340, 6020, 6040. 

6060 - 

5080, 5100, 5120, 5140, 5160 

&300. 

5200, 5220, 5240, .5260, 5280 

1180 

5180 

A/S Screen - - 



Radar assignment 



Trackers 
Trackers 
Trackers 



Search, sector 260 to 100. 

Search, sector 320 to 190. 

Search, sector 170 to 040. 

Trflckors 

Search, sector 080 to 280. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



1427 



[3] READY DISPOSITION 4-R 

Ready Disposition 4-R is a low visibility ov night ready disioosition for use in 
proximity to enemy forces of comparable strength. Station units are concentrated 
to facilitate handling during ciianges in course and/or axis, and to make possible 
rapid deployment. Dependence for protecjiion against siuprise destroyer and 
cruiser raids or air attack is placed in i-adar ships and the usual all around screens 
of typical cruising disposition are replaced by close screens on heavy units. 



Station assignment 



Radar assignment 



Batfleline 

Batdiv ONE.- 
Batdiv TWO. 
Batdiv FOUR 
Destroyers 

Center 

Cruiser. 

Destroyers 

Right 

Cruisers. _ 

Destroyers 

Left 

Cruiser 

Destroyers 

Air 

Carriers 

Cruiser. ._ 

Destroyers 



2270 

1000 

2090 

A/S Screen 

6000 

5000 

6060 

5050 

6300 

5310 

1180 

2180 

A/S Screen 



Trackers. 
Trackers. 
Trackers. 



Search, sector 260 to 100. 
Search, sector 310 to 210. 
Search, sector 150 to 050. 



Trackers. 

Search, sector 090 to 270. 



[^] CRtJISING DISPOSITION 4-V 

Cruising Disposition No. 4-V is primarily for defense against aircraft, 
also suitable for use when both air and submarine attacks are probable. 



It is 





Station assignment 


Radar assignment 


Battkline 

Batdiv ONE 

Batdiv TWO . 


2270 

1000- 


Trackers. 
Trackers. 
Trackers. 

Search, sector 28p to 080. 

Search, sector 000 to 230. 

Search, sector 1.30 to 000. 
Trackers. 




Batdiv FOUR 


2090 -^ 




Destroyers 


Anti-torpedo plane screen 

6000 




Center 




Destroyers (Sound Screen). 


8320 to 8040 




Right 

Cruisers 

Destroyers (Sections) 


6060 

7050, 6090, 6125, 6160. _ 




LeU 

Cruiser 

Destroyers (Sections) 

Air 


6300 

6200, 6235, 6270, 7310. 

1180, except when launching or 
recovering aircraft. 





Sun Screen of one destroyer will be stationed by a flank commander on signal, 
station at limit of visual signalling distance, outside the screen, on the bearing of 
the sun. 

[i5] Battle Disposition 





Station assignment 


Radar assignment 


Baftleline 

Battleships 

Destroyers . -- . 


0000.. 

Screen until released then join van 
inner destroyers. 

Circle 5 

Circle 6 

Circle 9 

Circle 10 

Circle 6 

Circle 7 

Ten miles on disengaged side 


Search- 

Search- 

Search- 
Search- 


-all around. 


Van 

Inner Destroyers 




Inner Cruisers ...... . . 




Outer Destroyers 

Outer Cruisers 


-all around. 


Rear 

Irmer Destroyers 




Inner Cruisers 


-all around. 


Air 


-all around. 







In the assignment of van and roar areas, the circle number given is the outer 
limit of the appropriate area. 

79716— 46— E.\. 143, vol. 3 10 



1428 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PE.\RL HARBOR ATTACK 

[1] Annex 'E" to Pacific Fleet Operation Obdee No. 29-41 

Confidential 

United States Pacifio Fij:et, U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship. 

Pearl Hakbob, T. H., 

11 September, 1941. 

TENTATIVE RADAR DOCTRINE 

1. The number of radars installed in the Pacitic Fleet has increased to the stage 
where a generally understood doctrine and standard procedure governing the 
tactical application of this equipment is essential. The tentative doctrine herein 
contained is effective from 23 September, 1941, until further orders. It is intended 
only to bridge the partially completed status of equipping the Fleet. Improvement 
in types and numbers available and ad interim exijerieuce will determine finally 
promulgated procedures. 

2. Radars installed to date are all of the search or ship control type. Within 
certain technical limitations, radar may be expected to give accurate range and 
good beamings of surface units up to 20,000-30,000 yards and aircraft up to 50-75 
miles (if altitude is sufficient to place the target plane above the radar's visual 
horizon. Equipment installed to date does not include automatic distinction 
between friendly and enemy aircraft or surface ships. Altitude of aircraft can 
only infrequently be determined with usable accuracy. Detection of submerged 
submarines, even with periscope exposed, is very doubtful. A submarine on the 
surface, due to small target area, will be detected at shorter ranges than surface 
craft, probably not over 10,000 yards. Experience to date indicates that no more 
than four or five radars of the same frequency can be used simultaneously in close 
proximity without intolerable interference. 

3. To limit the number of radars simultaneously in use, those available in any 
disposition will be assigned to : 

( a ) Search. 

(b) Track. 

4. For all dispositions, sectors of radar search responsibility will be designated 
by the O. T. C. Where the assigned sector contains more than one radar ship, 
the task group or unit commander concerned will assign watches and enforce 
radar discipline to avoid interference. Radar ships assigned to search will 
normally be pl?iced in the outer screen. 

[2] 5. Radar Control is a function of the O. T. C, who will by signal or 
other directive : 

(a) Assign search sectors if other than a standard disposition is ordered. 

(b) Assign trackers if other than a standard disposition is ordered. 

(c) Maintain a continuous plot of radar information. 

(d) Designate radars to track surface targets. Assign a "Raid Number" 
to each target or target group. 

(e) Evaluate radar plot and broadcast appropriate warnings. 

(f ) The sequence of radar control reliefs is the same as the chain of tactical 
command, but any task group commander may be directed to assume control 
for exercise purposes. Relief radar controls will be prepared to take over 
at any time. 

6. Fighter Direction is normally a function of Commander Air, who will : 

(a) Maintain a continuous plot of all radar information effecting air opera- 
tions. 

(b) Launch combat patrols on order, or (unless specifically instructed to 
the contrary) without order when definite radar contact with enemy aircraft 
is reported. The number and disposition of combat patrols is at discretion 
of Commander Air, but the section designations of patrols laxmched will be 
communicated to control and relief control ships. 

(c) Designate radars to track enemy aircraft and/or own fighters. Assign 
a "Raid Number" to each enemy air attack group. 

(d) Issue standard instructions for combat patrols and special instruc- 
tions as may be required in particular circumstances. 

(e) Direct interception of enemy aircraft by own fighters. 
[.3] (f ) Tlie sequence of Fighter Direction reliefs is : 

(1) Commander Air. 

(2) Carrier Division Commanders in order of seniority. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1429 

(3) Carriers in order of seniority. 

(4) Air Task Group cruisers in order of seniority. 

(5) Battleship Division Commanders in order of seniority. 

But any of the above may be directed to assume Fighter Direction for exercise 
purposes.' Relief Fighter Directors will be prepared to take over at any time. 

6. Search radars will : 

(a) Conduct continuous search of assigned sector at a rate of about 60 
degrees per minute. 

(b) When a contact is made, determine and report range and bearing 
once per minute until the tracker orderefl to take over this contact makes 
one report. 

(c) Maintain a plot of all contacts made. 

7. Track radars will : 

(a) Track designated targets. 

(b) Maintain plot of targets tracked. 

(c) Make consecutive reports at one minute intervals until course and 
speed of target can be determined, then at three minute intervals unless 
the target is observed to change course or speed radically. 

(d) Continue to guard assigned target bearing when target disappears 
from the radar screen temiK)rarily, as it will do at intervals if changing 
range and/or altitude. 

(c) Refer to each target by its assigned raid number. 

8. Communications: Radar reix)rts will be made in the following form to facili- 
tate plotting: 

(a) Call of originating ship. 
[4] (b) Type and numb^'r of targets; that is, air or surface, one, few 
(2 to 10). many (over 10). Substitute Raid Number if same target has been 
previously reported. 

(c) True bearing from observing ship. 

(d) Distance in thonsandft of yards from observing ship. 

(e) Zone time of observation (not of transmission). 

(f) Additional pertinent information. 
Examples : 

(1) First report by a searcher: From Cast Two Nine — many aircraft — 
two one zero — eighty — at eleven fourteen- — closing. 

(2) Control ship's order to track: To Baker Foiu- Four — track raid 
eight — two one nine — seventy-six. 

(3) Tracker's report: From Baker Four Foiar — raid eight — two two 
one seventy — at eleven eighteen — altitude between ten and fourteen 
thousand. 

9. Radar Net. The following communications will be handled on the Radar 
Net: 

(a) All orders from Radar Control or Fighter Director to radar ships. 

(b) All reports from radar ships. 

(c) All orders to Combat Patois. 

(d) All reports from Combat Patrols. 

(e) Radar Control, Fighter Director, and their reliefs will guard this 
circuit. 

10. Warning Net. The following communications will be handled on the Warn- 
ing Net : 

(a) Broadcasts of evaluated radar reports. 

(b) Broadcasts of sight or sound contacts not originally made on the 
warning net. 

[5] (c) Orders to Intermediate and Inner Air patrols, if employed. 

(d) Reports from Intermediate and Inner Air Patrols. 

(e) All ships eqiiipped to do so will guard this circuit. 

11. Separate circuits are provided for Radar Net and Warning Net in order to 
handle the volume of traffic expected diiring major air activity against a large 
Fleet disposition. In smaller dispositions and during periods of minor air 
activity, these two communication circuits may be combined on a common 
frequency by the O. T. C. Traffic on both circuits will be broadcast without 
receipt or acknowledgment, except that aircraft units will acknowledge for 
receipt of orders. 

12. Visual. During periods of radio silence all communications normally 
handled by Radar Net and Warning Net will be sent by visual, either in general 
signals or abbreviated plain language. 



1430 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

13. Radar Plotting. 

(a) Radar plotting by Radar Control and Fighter Director will be irt 
polar coordinates, origin at Fleet Center, radii in true bearings, distances in 
thousands of yards. Radar search and tracking ships will report bearing 
and distance from own ship, to avoid added "dead-time" which would be 
introduced if data were converted to origin at Fleet Center prior to broad- 
casting. 

(b) Since the Fleet Center is normally in motion, the relative movement 
plotting system will be used. With aircraft cruising speeds ten to fifteen 
times Fleet speed, the relative plot will differ but little from a navigational 
or geographic plot for anti-aircraft work. In plotting surface ships, with 
speeds on the order of one or two times Fleet speed, the plot must b? luuidled 
in relative movement . to predict time and point of contact. The 20-inch 
mooring board (H. O. 2665) is considered the smallest satisfactory plotting 
sheet. It will be convenient to plot the Fleet disposition to scale on a pivoted 
overlay which can be rotated with the Fleet axis. 

[6' J (c) Time is the essence of successful radar use. The develoi^ment by 

every prospective Radar Control and Fighter Director ship of standard 
plotting procedures to best utilize available information is absolutely neces- 
sary. Dead-time errors on the order of one minute are sufficient to cause a 
missed fighter interception, since aircraft moving in different directions at 
high speed may travel a relative distance greater than the range of visibility. 
Intercepters must be directed to a predicted meeting point. 

(d) In transmitting orders from Radar Control to Combat Patrols: 

(1) The sector-area method of interception will be used. Sectors will 
be 30 degrees each, origin at true north? designated alphabetically clock- 
wise, commencing with Sector Afirm, OOO to 030. Distance will be desig- 
nated in nautical miles from the Fleet Center. 

(2) Combat Air Patrols will be designated by squadron number and 
.section color, as Fighting Six Red (White, Blue, Black, Green, Yellow, 
Purple, Oi'ange, Silver). 

(3) The use of the following .special terms is authorized for fighter 
direction : 

Bandit — Enemy Aircraft. 

Arrow — Make good track indicated from your present position. 

Tally-ho — Interception successful. 

Wilco — Will comply with your order or request. 

[1] United States Pacific Fleetf, U. S'. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Cincpac F^le No. 
A4-3/FF12(l)/ 
A16-3/OCT/(12) 
Serial 01601 

Peakl Hakbor, T. H., 

7 October, 19J,l. 
Confidential 

Operation Order No. 31-41 

TASK ORGANIZATION 

(a) Units listed in Annex ",4". 

1. Current Pacific Fleet Employment Schedules and Security Orders. 

2. Units listed in Annex "A" conduct tactical exercises in the HAWAIIAN 
AREA during the period twenty-tliree dash twenty-six October, one nine four one. 

3. (a) Units listed in Annex "A" underway in accordance with orders of Task 
Force Commanders. Conduct exercises in accordance with Annex "B". On 
completion resume scheduled operations. 

(X) 

4. Train base at PEARL HARBOR. Tenders not otherwise assigned continue 
scheduled upkeep. 

5. Use zone plus ten and one-half time. 
Communications in accordance with Annex "C". 
Commander-in-Chief. U. S. Pacific Fleet, in PENNSYLVANIA. 

H. E. KiMMEL, 

Admiral, 
Commander-in-Chief. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1431 

ANNEXES: 

"A" — Tactical Organizations and Related Details— Effective 23-26 October 
1941. 

"B"— U. S. Pacific Fleet Exercise Plan No. 9-41. 

"C" — U. S. Pacific Fleet Communication Plan No. 9-41. 

"D" — Special Cruising Dispositions. 

"E" — Tentative Radar Doctrine (Revised 6 October 1941). 

[2] DISTRIBUTION: (Basis, List III, Case 1) 

Opnav (7) 

N. W. C. (3) 

P. G. S. (3) 

Com FOURTEEN (10) 

CO NAS, Pearl Harbor (5) 

CO Subbase, Pearl Harbor (5) 

Combatfor (15) 

Comscofor (70) for distribution to Cruscofor of Tack Force THREE. 

Comairscofor (10) 

CG, 2nd Marine Div. (5) 

Comdr. 2nd Marine Airwing (2) 

Combatships (75) for distribution to Batships. 

Comairbatfor (70) for distribution to Airbatfor. 

Comcrubatfor (60) for distriliution to Crubatfor. 

Comdesbatfor (270) for distribution to Desbatfor. 

Cominbatfor (35) for distribution to Minbatfor. 

Comsubscofor (200) for distribution to Subscofor. 

Combasefor (285) for distribution to Basefor. 

Comcrudiv FIVE (25) for distribution to Crussofor of Task Force TWO. 

Compatwing ONE (25) for distribution to Patwing ONE. 

Compatwing TWO (30) for distribution to Patwing TWO. 
P. C. Ceosley, 

Lieutenant Commander, 
Flag Secretary. 
10-7-41- (1340) 

[1] Annex "A" to Pacific Fleet Operation ORDsai No. 31-41 

United States Pacific Fleet, U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship. 
Confidential 

Peael Harbor, T. H., 

7 October 1941. 

tactical organizations and related details — E:FFE€TIVB 2.3-JI) OCTOBER 1941 

(a) Normal Tactical Organization of Task Force FOUR, Pacific Fleet: 
G4 Task Force FOUR, Vice Admiral Halsey. 
G4.5 Battleline, Rear Admiral Kidd. 
G4.5.1 Batdiv ONE. 

G4.5.2 BENHAM, McCALL, BI-UE, RALPH TALBOT (A/S 
SCREEN). 
G4.6 Right Flank, Rear Admiral Draemel. 

G4.6.1 NORTHAMPTON, DETROIT. 
G4.6.2 Desron SIX less BENHAM, McCALL, CRAVEN. 
G4.7 Center, Rear Admiral Fletcher. 
G4.7.1 MINNEAPOLIS. 

G4.7.2 Desron FOUR less BLUE, RALPH TALBOT, MUGFORD, 
(SOUND SCREEN). 
G4.8 Left Flank, Vice Admiral Brown. 

G4.8.1 INDIANAPOLIS, PENSACOLA. 
G4.8.2 Minion TWO less Mindiv SIX. 
G4.9 Air, Vice Admiral Halsey. 

G4.9.1 ENTERPRISE, LEXINGTON. 

Desdiv NINE (PLANE GUARDS). 
G4.9.2 LOUISVILLE. 
G4.1 Shore-based Air, Rear Admiral Bellinger. 

G4.1.1 Patron TWENTY-ONE (Planes available). 
G4.1.2 Marine Air Group TWENTY-ONE. 



1432 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[2] G4.2 Air Targets, Commander Murphy. 

Four (4) Utwing Planes, Mark XIV sleeves. 
(^4 S S('iJ Ti Til (1/7^^71 p^ 

G4.3.1 Subdiv TWENTY-ONE less SALMON. 

G4.3.2 Subdiv FORTY-TWO less NAUTILUS. 

G4.3.3 Subdiv SIXTY-TWO (units available). 

G4.3.4 DORSEY, ELLIOT. 
G4.4 Salvage, Rear Admiral Calhoun. 

Units designated by Combasefor. 
G4.10 Inshore Defense, Lieutenant Commander Specht. 

Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron ONE. 

(b) When on deployment, Center units join either Right or Left Flank, they 
will, upon execution of the deployment signal, assume nevp task unit designations 
appropriate to the Flank to be joined, cruiser final digit of task unit number 3, 
destroyers — 4. 

Example: Center joins Right Flank: Task Unit 4.7.1 becomes 4.6.3, Task 
Unit 4.7.2 becomes 4.6.4. 

(c) Air Patrol Assignments : 

Flight THREE — Inner Air Patrol : Three single planes per watch, dura- 
tion of watches — S^/^ hours, Battleline. 

Plight TWO — Intermediate: Two two-plane sections per watch, duration 
of watches — 3^ hours. Cruisers Center, Right and Left. Commander Center, 
coordinate. 

Flight FIVE — Combat : As directed by Commander Air. 

Officers coordinating Inner and Intermediate Air Patrols will each, in 
addition, designate an anti-submarine striking unit of at least four planes, 
to be armed with depth charges and ready to be catapulted on submarine 
contact. 
[3] (d) Organization for security in accordance with Pacific Fleet Confi- 
dential Letter No. 2CL-41 : 

(1) In despatches and signals this plan will be referred to as Operation 
Plan GEORGE. 

(2) If placed in effect in real emergency, this will be preceded by a plain 
language despatch : "Exercise Conditions Ended." 

(3) If placed in effect for exercise purposes only, each despatch in connec- 
tion therewith will be prefaced by the word "DRILL." 

(4) Organization: 

G4 Task Force FOUR, Vice Admiral Halsey. 
G4.5 Main Body, Vice Admiral Halsey. 

Batdiv ONE. 

ENTERPRISE, DRAYTON. FLUSSER. 

Crudiv SIX. 

Minron TWO less Mindiv SIX. 

Subdivs TWENTY-ONE. FORTY-TWO, SIXTY-TWO, 
DORSEY, ELLIOT. 
G4.6 Striking Force, Vice Admiral Brown. 

Crudivs FOUR, FIVE. 

LEXINGTON, LAMSON, MAHAN. 

Desron FOUR. 
G4.7 Attack Force, Captain Connally. 

Desron SIX. 

(5) All units establish communications initially on their respective task 
group frequencies when this plan is made effective. 

(6) This plan is for use only during the Fleet Tactical Period: 23-26 
October 1941. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1433 

[1] Annex "B" 

To Pacific Fleet Operation Ordek No. 31-41 

United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Confidential Pearl Harbor, T. H., 

7 October 1941. 
Exercise Plan No. 9-^1 

part I — general 

1. Exercises will be conducted in accordance with this Annex. 

2. The general objectives are: Training in war operations under i-ealistically 
simulated war conditions ; test and further development of doctrine and pro- 
cedures and training, in the preparation of quick estimates and plans. More 
specific objectives are designated in the various exercise.s. To provide command 
training for more flag officers, in some exercises the O. T. C. of the exercise task 
force is not the senior flag officer in the force. 

3. Unless special exce'ption is made in the individual exercise, the provisions 
of Chapter V, USF-10, will be in effect. Flights will be cancelled or discontinued 
promptly upon approach of unfavorable flying weather. Commander Aircraft, 
Battle Force, and Commander Patrol Wing TWO shall advise the Officers Con- 
ducting the Exercises when they consider weather unsuitable for scheduled opera- 
tions. All aircraft, except patrol planes designated for night flying, shall be at 
their bases by sunset. Commander Patrol Wing TWO shall advice Officers Con- 
ducting Exercises, and to whom planes are assigned, when all patrol planes have 
returned to their bases on conclusion of exercises. 

4. Speed limitations (unless otherwise prescribed): Battleships — IG knots; 
cruisers, destroyers (including converted destroyers), carriers — 24 knots (except 
as required for operating aircraft) ; others — none. 

5. Special Instntctions: For the duration of these exercises, all contacts must 
be regarded as with own U. S. Units. Offensive action between exercise oppo- 
nents will be simulated only within the limits of the safety precautions prescribed 
in USF-10. Should the Commander-fn-Chief or O. T. C. transmit the message 
"Exercise Conditions Ended" it shall be construed by all units to mean that 
exercise conditions no longer prevail and that there is possibility of hostile action 
against the Fleet. Commander Task Group FOUR THREE, on receipt of this 
despatch, will have all submarines surface, and report when this is accomplished. 
All forces will thereafter take action as directed in Commander-in-Chief, U. S. 
Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41. 

[2] 6. Surface ships indicate anti-aircraft fire by flashing V's on search- 
light trained on target. 

7. Each exercise implies a reasonably definite tactical situation. Commanding 
Officers are expected to maintain conditions of readiness and material conditions 
appropriate thereto, without signal. To preserve jjersonnel physical capabilities, 
conditions must not be more severe than the constructive situation really merits. 

8. In exercises where simulated air bombing attacks are scheduled, rear ship of 
each heavy ship station unit tow bombing target. When targets are streamed, 
attacks on them by miniature or water filled bombs and machine gun strafing are 
authorized. 

9. In case the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, is not embarked in the 
Operating Areas, Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, will function as the Officer 
Conducting the Exercises. 



1434 CONGRESSIONAi^ INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[3] Fart II — Exercises 

Exercise No. 18 Jf 
(1800, 22 October to 1130, 23 October) 

Ol)jects: 

(1) To train submarines in patrol operations in hostile waters. 

(2) To train destroyers in submarine detection and attack. 

(3) To train in sortie against submarine opposition. 
Procedure : 

(a) Units of Task Force TWO, except submarines and patrol planes, organize in 
accordance with current security orders by dark, 22 October, at which time Main 
Body and Striking Force must be south of latitude 20° 15' North. Kemain south 
of this line until 0500, 23 October. 

(b) Submarine Division SIXTY-TWO depart LAHAINA at 1800, 22 October, 
proceed by routes north of latitude 20° .50' Nortli and establish patrol in areas S-1 
and S-2 at earliest practicable time. Attack heavy ships of Task Force THREE. 
Upon completion of sortie, surface and proceed to LAIiAINA. Submarine Divi- 
sion FORTY-TWO remain at LAHAINA. 

(c) Task Force TWO Attack Group destroyers proceed to and search areas S-1 
and S-2 for submarines. This hunt replaces the normal Offshore Patrol. 

(d) Task Force TWO (Main Body and Striking Force) proceed after 0.500, 23 
October to rendezvous with Task Force THREE at Reference Point "A", latitude 
20° 40' North, longtitude loS° 30' West at 1130. Defend against air attack. 

(e) Patrol planes and Marine Air Group planes not engaged in routine search 
of areas and in Task Force THREE sortie air patrol, make one attack on Task 
Force TWO between 0.500 and 1000. Upon completion of this attack, one section 
of patrol planes proceed to LAHAINA area, fuel from Submarine Division FORTY- 
TWO, and return to base. 

(f) Task Force THREE sortie against submarine opposition and proceed to 
rendezvous with Task Force TWO at 1130. except submarines DORSEY and 
ELLIOT proceed to LAHAINA- submarines on the surface. 

i-'f] (g) All patrolling submarines surface by 1130 and proceed to LAHAINA 
on the surface. 

Safety Precautions: Submarines are in problem status after 1800, subject to 
hunting and counter attack. Submarine Division SIXTY-TWO, Task Force TWO 
Attack Croup destroyers, and Inshore Patrol darken ship from sunset to sunrise. 
While darkened, and north of latitude 20°45' North, the speed of destroyers will 
be limited to 10 knots, but sufficient reserve boiler power will be maintained for 
emergency backing. Running lights will be turned on by all units as nect;ssary 
to avoid collision. For night simulated depth charge attacks, destroyers will not 
press home the attack until the submarine has been illuminated and seen to 
dive, and will not pass directly over the submarine. Submarines when illumi- 
nated dive immediately to deep submergence and remain deep until well clear. 
For attacks during daylight, submarines will go to deep submergence when not 
less than 4,000 yards from any hostile ship, and are subject to counter attack 
by anti-submarine screens and patrol destroyers. 

Damarje: During this exercise, damage will be assessed and applied by engaged 
submarines and destroyers. Out-of-action rendezvous for submarines is at 
LAHAINA, for destroyers at concentration rendezvous given above. Subma- 
rines declared out of action proceed via KALOHI Channel. Out-of-action ships 
burn running lights during darkness and answer challenges "OA" until arrival 
at rendezvous. 

Reports: 

(a) From Commander Task Force TWO Attack Group: 

(1) Record of submarine contacts and attacks, depth charge expenditures. 

(2) Summary of damage. 

(b) Frojn Commander Submarine Division SIXTY-TWO: 

(1) Record of attacks made, torpedo expenditures. 

(2) Record of dives made during darkness to escape detection, or other 
evasion action. 

(3) Summary of damage. 

(c) No umpire reports are required by Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific 
Fleet. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1435 

[5] Exercise No. 185 

(1130 to 1530, 23 October) 
Ohject: 

Test of Fleet Anti-Aircraft Fire. 
Procedure : 

(a) At 1130, 23 October, Task Forces TWO and THREE assume the normal 
tactical organization of Task Force FOUR, Pacific Fleet. Form Battle Disposi- 
tion No. 3 (Article 1316, G. T. I.), course 090°, axis 000°, speed 14 knots, by 1200, 
at which time guide in battleline pass through Reference Point "A", latitude 
30°40' North, longitude 158°30' West, O. T. C. Vice Admiral Halsey in ENTER- 
PRISE. Each station unit in the disposition be in column. 

(b) Conduct test of Fleet anti-aircraft fire in accordance with Task Force ONE 
Exercise No. 90, enclosure (A) to Commander Battle Force serial 0436 of 9 May, 
1941. Address reports to Commander Aircraft, Battle Force. 

(c) Ammunition allowance is four rounds per ship, remnants if available, 
otherwise from Commander-in-Chief's pool. 

(d) Task Group FOUR TWO make one formation bombing attack by 1300; 
thereafter make additional single or multiple attacks at discretion of Task 
Group Commander. Target approaches should be made approximately at right 
angles to the longei' dimension of heavy ship formations to permit the greatest 
practicable number of ships to fire without violating safety precautions. 

(e) No ship-based aircraft are to be launched during this exercise. 

(f) The necessary public firing notice will be originated by Commander-in- 
Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 

[6] Exercise No. 186 

(1800 to 2200, 23 October) 
Object: 

(1) Training in Night Submarine Attack. 

(2) Training Battle Lookouts. 
Procedtire: 

(a) Upon completion of Exercise No. 185, the Fleet will be formed in night 
cruising or ready disposition and at about 1800 proceed on southeasterly and 
southerly courses through area C-7 south of latitude 20° 40' North and area C-6, 
north of latitude 20° 00' North. 

(b) Task Group FOUR THREE be on the surface in above areas by 180O, 
stations as designated by the Task Group Commander Attack Task Force 
FOUR. 

(c) Submarines darken ship. Ships in the Fleet disposition burn dimmed 
running lights. 

(d) Submarines will not submerge unless illuminated. Commander Task 
Group FOUR THREE designate at least four submarines to pass through the 
disposition on the surface, in order to exercise battle lookouts. 

(e) No surface ship will illuminate a submarine continuously for more than 
two minutes, but the same submarine may be illuminated by other surface ships 
in succession. Keep searchlight beams off submarine bridges. 

Safety Precautions: 

(a) Any submarine submierging will go deep and not surface again until well 
clear of the disposition. 

(b) During this exercise, surface ships will maneuver only on signal from 
the O. T. C. or in emergency to avoid collision. 

(c) Submarines turn on running lights as necessary to avoid collision. 
Reports: Comments and recommendations as desired. 

Upon completion of this exercise : 

(1) Submarines return on the surface, lighted, to the LAHAINA Area, and 
operate in rigularly assigned submarine areas until [7] completion of 
Fleet Tactical Period at discretion of Task Group Commander. Additional pa- 
trol plane fueling exercises naay be conducted by arrangement with Commander 
Task Group FOUR ONE. 

(2) When directed, Task Force FOUR divide into opposing forces and proceed 
to stations for Exercise No. 187. 



1436 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[8] Exercise No. 187 

(Daylight Period, 24 October) 

Object: Training in Torpedo Plane Attack on Fleet Disposition. 

Procedure: 

Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, is directed to issue the detailed procedure 
for this exercise. It will include the firing of actual torpedoes by Torpedo 
Squadron SIX against the capital ships of the opposing Task Force. Commander 
Task Group FOUR TWO will furnish photographic services as requested. Areas 
C-1, C-2 and C-4 south of latitude 20° 00' North are assigned for this exercise. 

[9] Exercise No. 188 

(1800, 24 October 'to 0600, 25 October) 
Object: 

(1) Training Destroyers and Cruisers in Night Search and Attack. 

(2) Training Fleet in repelling night cruiser and destroyer attacks. 
Attack Force: 

2\isk Force FIVE, Rear Admiral Fletcher. 
MINNEAPOLIS, LOUISVILLE 
Desron SIX plus Desdiv NINE 

One-Section Patrol Planes, designated by Commander Task Group 
FOUR ONE 
Fleet: 

Task Force FOUR, Rear Admiral Kidd. 

Surface Units of Task Force FOUR less Attack Force. 
Procedure: 

(a) Upon completion of Exercise No. 187, and when directed by Commander 
Aircraft, Battle Force, Task Force Commanders assigned assume command of 
Task Forces FOUR and FIVE. 

(b) The area for this exercise is a limiting ellipse, focii at Point X-ray, lati- 
tude 19° 30' North ; longitude 156° 30' West ; and Point Yoko, latitude 20° 30' 
North, longitude 158° 20' West; major axis ISO miles. 

(c) At 1800, Task Force FOUR be within 15 miles of Point X-ray. Proceed 
to arrive at 0600 within 15 miles of Point Yoke. Defend against light force 
attacks en route. 

(d) At 1800, Task Force FIVE may be at any point within the assigned area 
which is not less than 50 miles from Point X-ray. Patrol planes may be in 
contact with own, but not with enemy force at this time. 

[10] Neither Task Force Commander may issue any advance written direc- 
tive for this exercise, except that each may prescribe a tactical organization and 
Commander Task Force FOUR may prescribe a special cruising or ready disposi- 
tion and assign units to stations in it. "Light Forces in Night Search and At- 
tack" is effective within the Attack Force for this exercise. 

Safety Precautions: 

U. S. F. 10 effective. Smoke will not be used. Patrol planes may use flare 
illumination.. 

Damage: 

Assess and apply damage, except that speed will not be reduced below 15 knots 
for destroyers and 10 knots for heavy ships. Out of action ships burn running 
lights. Out of action rendezvous: 25 miles north Point Yoke. 
Reports: 

(a) From Task Force Commanders: 

(1) Brief description of operations. 

(2) Track chart, single pencil copy, scale of chart #4102. 

(3) Summary of damage. 

(4) Comments on "Light Forces in Night Search and Attack". 

(b) No umpire reports are required by Commander-in-Chief. U. S. Pacific Fleet. 



PROCEEDIXGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1437 

ill] 

Exercise No. 189 

(0800 to 1800, 25 October) 
Object: 

(1) Test of Fleet Defense against Air Observation and Attack. 

(2) Fueling Destroyers and Defense against Submarine Attack (Discretion of 
■O. C. E. ) . 

Procedure: 

(a) Upon completion of Exercise No. 188, units engaged resume normal tac- 
tical organization of Task Force FOUR, O. T. C. Commander Aircraft, Battle 
Force, in ENTERPRISE. 

(b) The 0800 position of the Fleet Center will be signalled to Commander 
Shore-Based Air in Advance. 

(c) Commander Shore-Based Air have at least three attacks made during this 
exercise period. Each attack group will consist of at least three planes. Two 
groups may attack simultaneously. Minature or water filled bomb attacks and 
machine gun strafing on towed targets, and simulated torpedo attacks are author- 
ized. Undue advantage will not be taken by attack groups of the "radar shadow" 
of OAHU, inasmuch as proximity to the Naval Air Stations is maintained to 
facilitate the exercise. Smoke may be used by aircraft only. 

(d) Commander Shore-Based Air is authorized to arrange for Army participa- 
tion in the attacks if the Army desires to take part. Inform Commander-in- 
Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and Commander Aircraft, Battle Force, prior to 18 
October whether or not the Army will participate and if so whether or not the 
Army bombers will have fighter support. In case of Army participation, advise 
the responsible Army Commander of the contents of Article 5213, USF-10. 

(e) Fueling of destroyers may be undertaken during this exercise at dis- 
cretion of Task Force Commander. 

(f) Submarines may be directed to make attacks during this exercise at dis- 
cretion of Task Group Commander. 

(g) During approximately half of the time allotted to test of Fleet Air De- 
fense, Fighter Direction Control will lie passed to the U. S. S. LEXINGTON. 

[12] (h) Tentative Radar Doctrine, issued as Annex "E" hereto, is ef- 
fective. 

Darnar/e: Will be assessed and applied by all Naval aircraft engaged. Shore- 
based Naval Aircraft, when adjudged out of action, will return to base without 
completing attack. Return will be made at minimum safe altitude until 40 miles 
from the Fleet Center, in order to clear radar screens of these "OA" aircraft. 
Damage is restored upon return to base, and these planes may participate in sub- 
sequent attacks. Combat patrols adjudged out of action will return immediately 
to the Fleet Center. Damage is restored as soon as they have landed on parent 
carrier, and these planes may be used for subsequent patrols. 
Beports: 

(a) From each Fighter Director Ship: 

(1) List of targets tracked, interceptions ordered, interceptions successful. 

(2) Comment and recommendation. 

(b) From Radar Ships : 

(1) Comment and recommendation. 

(c) From Commander Shore-Based Air: 

(1) Time each attack was delivered, number of planes in attack group, 
altitude, course, speed, whether or not opposed, and if so the distance from 
bomb release point interception was accomplished. 

(2) Comment and recommendation. 

(1800, 25 October to End of Fleet Tactical Period) 
Object: . 

(1) Task Force Entry to Pearl Harbor. 

(2) Test of Motor Torpedo Boat Tactics. 
Procedure: 

(a) Upon completion of Exercise No. 189 and when directed by Commander 
Aircraft, Battle Force, all units resume the normal tactical organizations of Task 
Forces TA¥0 and THREE. 



1438 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(b) Task Force THREE proceed to position south or latitude 20° 30' North, 
and at discretion of Commander Task Force THREE resume normal operating 
status and go ahead with scheduled work, keeping clear of other units until 
Task Force TWO entry is completed. 

(c) Task Force TWO operate north of latitude 20° 30' North. Enter operat- 
ing area S-1 or S-2 at about one half hour before daylight, and simulate bom- 
bardment of OAHU Coast Defenses. Submarines returning from LAHAINA 
for entry to PEARL HARBOR will not pass west of longitude 157° 40' West 
until after sunrise. 

(d) Task Force TWO establish routine Offshore Patrol. 

(e) Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron ONE depart PEARL HARBOR at discre- 
tion. Make dawn atack on Main Body (simulate torpedo fire). 

(f ) Smoke will tiot be used. 

(g) Upon completion of (c) and (e) above. Task Force TWO enter I'EARL 
HARBOR as directed by Task Force Commander. 

Confidential 

[1] Annex "C" 

To Pacific Fleet Operation Order 31-41 

United States Pacific Fleet 
U. S. S. FENNsrLVAjjLi, Flagship 

Pearl Habbor, T. H., 

7 October, 1941. 
Communication Plan 

USF-70 effective as modified herein or bv O. C. E. or Task Force Commanders. 
1120. This plan effective 1130. October 23, 1941, (Zone plus lOi/o) until com- 
pletion of Exercise 189. 

1177. Effective. 

1178. Effective. 

1179. Radar aircraft contact reix>rts in accordance with Annex "E". 

1332. NPM Primary broadcasts ai-e available and should be used by all Task " 
Forces for strategical and tactical traffic when circuit conditions permit. 

2120. Condition 19 effective. 

2200. O. C. E. maintain Radio watch on Task Force Commander's circuit. 

22 tL Task Force Commanders use Annex "B" to USF-70, except that Combat 
Air Patrol use 6330 kcs., and Radar reports on 3195 kcs. The published plans 
assigned to opposing Task Forces nmst be considered as unavailable for radio 
intelligence activities as are opposite Exercise Cryptographic Aids and despatches. 

2212 d 2213. Not effective. 

2216. Not effective; see paragraph 11. Appendix "B"' to USF-70. 

24i0. Surface vessels and submarines use authenticators for intra-Task Force 
radio communications under conditions (c) and (d). 

2510. Visual call signs, Part II, U. S. Navy Call Sign Book, shall be used on 
all exercise traffic. This includes aircraft. For E^cercise traffic other than 
transmissions on Warning Net and Fighter Net encipher calls in CSP-1161. 

2800. Not effective. 

3120. Condition 1 effective. 

\2] 3210. Not effective. Use Pacific Fleet Communication Memorandum 
2RM-41. 

5200 d 5300. CSP-1023 and CSP-1024 with prescribed key tables shall be used 
by all Task Forces except that in the following exercises the indicated Task 
Force Components shall use key tables made by substituting September for 
October. 

All Exercises — Submarines use Key Memo 3 K for day instead of CSP-1924. 
Exercise ISO— Task Group 4.3 
Exerci.se 188— Ta.sk Force FIVE. 

5230. Until receipt of satisfactory radio recognition device for aircraft the 
following approach and recognition procedure shall govern the approach of 
Naval aircraft to either units of the Fleet or Naval outlying island bases. 
Separate special procedure will be prescribed for major bases and areas. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1439 

Aircraft approach from outside of gun range in simple cruising formation 
(if more than one plane) on bearing 045° T. or 225° T. on odd days (GCT), 
and 185° T. or 315° T. on even days (GCT), from center of formation or station 
at 1,000 feet or under. (These bearings may be changed if necessary by local 
authorities.) They shall never approach from the bearing on the sun when 
the sun is low. 

If station does not recognize plane as friendly it challenges by making "Zs" 
on searchlight, or by training searchlight with red filter on plane if available; 
otherwise at shore bases use a red smoke bomb during daylight and a red 
rocket at night. 

On seeing challenge plane, or leading plane if there is a formation, i-eplies as 
follows : 

(a) Daytime. — On odd days of the month (GCT) leave formation, circle 
to the right, and when back on the approach cour.se, dip right wing twice; 
on even days (GCT), leave formation, circle to the left and, wlien back" 
on approach cour.se, dip left wing twice. This must be made distinctive, 
dipping tlie wing about 30 degrees to the prescribed side and returning 
to horizontal after each dip. 

(b) Niffhttime. — Tiu-n on running lights and proceed as for daytime 
replies to challenge, except circling may be omitted; or make emergency 
identification pyrotechnic signal prescribed in effective CSP. 

[3] When approaching aircraft are recognized as friendly, the recognition 
station shall train on the approaching aircraft a powerful searchlight, make 
"Fs" or show green colored light. Those signals indicate to planes that they 
are recognized as friendly and will not be fired on. 

In a Fleet formation the recognition stations will be, unless otherwise design- 
ated, those ships on the outer circle closest to approach bearings 045° T. and 
225° T. or 135° T. and 315° T, (depending on the day) from Fleet center. 

6622. Oraiting USF-73 and USF-93, all Task Forces use LJst II. In Exercise 
18S Task Force FIVE use List I. 

7000. Interference and deception shall not be practiced unless specifically 
directed by O. C. E. 

8000. Reports not required. Constructive criticism and comments are wel- 
comed. 

[1] Annkx "D" 

To Pacific Fleet Opeeation Oedee No. 31-41 
United States Pacific Fleet, U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Peael Hakbor, T. H., 

Confidential 7 October 1941. 

special cruising dispositions 

Special Cruising Dispositions as required will be provided by Exercise Task 
Force Commanders. 

[1] Annex "E" to Pacific Fleet Opekation Ordee No. 31-41 

United States Pacific Fleet, U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Confidential 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., 

7 October, 1941. 

tentative radae doctrine 

(Revised 6 October, 1941) 

1. The "Tentative Radar Doctrine" issued as Annex "E" to Pacific Fleet Oper- 
ation Order No. 29-41 is hereby cancelled. Destroy all copies. The revised doc- 
trine contained herein is effective until further orders. Additional revisions may 
be expected as numbers and types of radars installed increase and experience 
indicates desirable changes. 



1440 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. Radars installed to date are all of the search or ship control type. Within 
certain technical limitations, radar may be expected to give accurate range and 
good bearings of surface units up to 20,000-30,000 yards and aircraft up to 50-75 
miles (if altitude is sufficient to place the target plane above the radar's visual 
horizon). Undor certain technical limitations, altitude of aircraft can be deter- 
mined with usable accuracy. Details of the method have been promulgated to 
all radar ships by Commander Aircraft, Battle Force. Detection of submerged 
submarines, even with periscope exposed, is very doubtful. A submarine on the 
surface, due to small target area, will be detected at shorter ranges than surface 
craft, probably not over 10,000 yards. 

3. Experience to date indicates that no more than four or five radars of the 
same frequency can be used simultaneously in close proximity without intolerable 
interference. 

4. For all dispositions, sectors of radar i^esponsibility will be designated by the 
•O. T. G. 

5. (a) Radar Control is a function of the O. T. C, who will : 

(1) Assign sectors of radar responsibility if other than a standard dispo- 
sition is ordered. 

(2) Maintain a continuous plot of warning net information. 

[2] (3) Evaluate plots and transmit appropriate "Alerts" of impending 

surface or submarine attack, 
(b) The sequence of radar control reliefs is the same as the chain of tactical 
command, but any task group commander may be directed to assume control for 
exercise puriwses. Relief radar controls will be prepared to take over at any 
time. 

6. Radar Guard Ships. 

(a) Assignments- 

(1) In each assigned sector of radar responsibility, there will be estab- 
lished a sector, radar guard ship. 

(2) When a sector of radar responsibility contains more than one radar 
ship, the senior task group or unit commander in the sector will assign 
watches, enforce radar discipline to minimize interference, and provide for 
immediate relief in case of casualty. 

(3) Carriers will not normally be assigned as sector guard ships. See 
subparagraph 7 (a) (4) below. 

(4) Radar guard ships will normally be stationed in or beyond the outer 
screen. 

(b) Duties. 

(1) Conduct continuous search of assigned sector. 

(2) When a netv contact is made, transmit an initial report. 

(3) Track and plot each contact in own sector. When data obtained is 
sufficient to determine enemy intentions, transmit amplifying reports on 
which Fighter Director can base interception orders, and O. T. C. can base 
orders to the disposition. If possible, the amplifying reports will include 
number of enemy units, bearing and distance from Fleet center, course, speed, 
altitude, time. The first amplifying repoi't should be made at the earliest 
practicable moment, even if the information is not entirely complete. Subse- 
quent amplifying reports need be made only when changes in major variables 
(coiu'se, speed, altitude) occur. 

[3] When a target enters the sector overlap between adjacent sector 
guai-d ships, the guard ship whose sector the target is leaving will notify the 
guard ship whose sector it is entering. The latter will notify the former 
when it has located the target and assumes responsibility for it, and the 
former will not relinquish the target until this notice is received. 

(4) Notify sector commander in case of casualty or radar activity beyond 
own capacity to track and plot. 

7. (a) Fighter Direction is normally a function of Commander Air, who will : 

(1) Maintain a continuous plot of all radar information affecting air 
operations. 

(2) Evaluate plots and transmit appropriate "Alerts" of impending «//• 
attack. 

(3) Launch combat patrols on order, or (unless specifically instructed 
to the contrary) without order when definite radar contact with enemy 
aircraft is reported. The number and disposition of combat patrols is at 
discretion of Commander Air, but the section designations of patrols launche*! 
will be communicated to control, relief control and radar guard ships. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



1441 



(4) Utilize own radar to best advantage to supplement information re- 
ceived from radar guard ships, transmit evaluated information from own 
radar wlien it is pertinent to the general tactical situation. 

(5) Issue standard instructions for combat patrols and special instructions 
as may be required in particular circumstances. 

(6) Direct interception of enemy aircraft by own figliters. 

(7) Transmit completed interceptions. 

[4] (b) The sequence of Fighter Direction reliefs is : 

(1) Commander Air. 

( 2 ) Carrier Division Commanders in order of seniority. 

(3) Carriers in order of seniority. 

(4) Air Tasli C4roup, cruisers in order of seniority. 

(5) Battleship Division Commanders in order of seniority. 

Any of the above may be directed to assume Pigliter Direction for exercise 
purposes. Relief Fighter Directors will be prepared to take over at any 
time. 
8. Communications. 

(a) Wai'ning Net. In addition to traffic assigned to the warning net by 
U. S. F. 70, the following communications will be handled on this circuit : 

(1) All reports by radar guard ships. 

(2) Orders from O. T. C. or Fighter Director to radar ships. 

(3) "Alerts" by Fighter Director with respect to air targets and by 
O. T. C. with respect to surface targets. 

(4 ) Announcement by Fighter Director of Combat Patrols launched. 

(b) Fighter Net. The following communications will be handled on this 
circuit : 

( 1 ) Orders to Combat Patrols. 

(2) Rreports from Combat Patrols. 

(3) Orders from Fighter Director to carriers to launch or recover patrols. 

(4) Reports from carriers relative to launching or recovering patrols, etc. 
(To include section color designations.) 

[5] (c) Circuit Instructiovs. 

(1) Separate circuits are provided for Fighter Net and Warning Net 
in order to handle the volume of traffic expected during major air activity 
against a large Fleet disposition. In smaller dispositions and during periods 
of minor air activity, these two communication circuits may be combined 
on a common frequency by the O. T. C. Traffic on both circuits will be 
broadcast without receipt or acknowledgment, except that aircraft units 
will acknowledge for receipt of orders. 

(2) Circuits will be manned as follows, available equipment permitting: 



O. T. C. (Radar Control). 

Relief Radar Control 

Fighter Director 

Relief Fighter Director 

Radar Guard 

All others... 



Fighter 
Transmit 



Net Re- 
ceive 



Warning 
Transmit 



Net Re- 
ceive 



(d) Form of Radar Reports. To facilitate plotting, radar reports will be 
made in the following form : 

(1) Type and number of targets ; that is, air or surface, one. few (2 to 10), 
many (over 10). 

(2) True bearing from Fleet Center. 

(3) Distance in miles from Fleet Center. 
*(4) Course, true. 

*(5) Speed, knots. 

*(6) Altitude (if approximate, use low, high, very high). 

[6] *(7) Zone time of above data. 

(8) Additional pertinent information if any. 

(9) Call of originating ship. 

*Items marked (*) are not required in first contact reports. As many 
of them as can be determined without undue delay should be included in 
an amplifying report which is to be used as a basis for inteix-eption. 



1442 CONGRESSIOXAL IXVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Examples: 

First report by Radar Guard Ship : 

Few bandits — two one zero — four six — Cast two nine. 
Amplifying report by Radar Guard Ship: 

Few bandits — one eight five — three zero — one one zero — one four 
zero — very high — eleven fourteen — circling fleet toward bearing of 
sun — Cast two nine, 
(e) Form of Fighter Direction Orders. 

(1) The sector-area method of interception will be used. Sectors will 
be 30 degrees each, origiu at true north, designated alphabetically clockwise, 
commencing with Sector Afirm, 000° to 030°. Distance will be designated 
in nautical miles from the Fleet Center. 

(2) Combat Air Patrols will be designated by squadron number and 
section color, as fighting Six Red (White, Blue, Black, Green, Yellow, Purple, 
Orange, Silver). 

(3) The use of the following special terms is authorized for fighter direc- 
tion : 

Bandit- — Enemy Aircraft. 

Arrow — Make good track indicated from your present position. 

Tally-ho — Interception successful. 

Wilco — Will comply with your order or request. 
[7] (f) Visual. During periods of radio silence all communications nor- 

mally handled by Fighter Net and Warning Net will be sent by visual, either 
in general signals or abbreviated plain language. Established radio silence 
oneither circuit will be broken only on order of the O. T. C. 

9. Radar Plotting. 

(a) Radar plotting by Radar Control (O. T. C), Fighter Director, their 
reliefs, and Radar Guai'd Ships, will be in polar coordinates, origin at Fleet 
Center, radii in true bearings, distances in nautical miles. 

(b) Since the Fleet Center is normally in motion, the relative movement 
plotting system will be used. With aircraft cruising si>eeds ten to fifteen times 
Fleet speed, the relative plot will differ but little from a navigational or geo- 
graphic plot for anti-aircraft work. In plotting surface ships, with speeds 
on the order of one or two times Fleet speed, the plot must be handled in rela- 
tive movement to predict time and point of contact. The 20-inch mooring board 
(H. O. 266.5) is considered the smallest satisfactory plotting sheet. It will be 
convenient to plot the Fleet disposition to scale on a pivoted overlay which can 
be rotated with the Fleet axis. 

(c) Time is the essence of successful radar use. The development by every 
prospective Radar Control, Fighter Director and Radar Guard Ship of standard 
plotting procedures to best utilize available information is absolutely necessary. 
Dead-time errors on the order of one minute are sufficient to cause a missed 
fighter interception, since aircraft moving in different directions at high speed 
may travel a relative distance greater than the range of visibility. Intercep- 
tions must be directed to a predicted meeting point. 

10. Scciiritg. — For the present and until procediu'es are established, communi- 
cations will continue in plain language. In a subsequent revision of this doctrine, 
suitable provisions for security will be incorporated. 

[1] United States Pacitic Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 



Cincpac File No. 
A4-3/FF12(l)/ 
A16-3/NOV/(12) 
Serial 01801 
Confidential 



Pearl Harbor. T. H., 

5 November Wlfl. 



Operation Order No. 37-41 

TASK organization 



(a) Units Listed in Appendices ONE and TWO to Annex "A." 

1. Current Pacific Fleet Employment Schedules and Security Orders. 

2. This force will conduct tactical exercises in the HAWAIIAN AREA during 
the period twenty-one dash twenty-five November one nine four one. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1443 

3. (a) Units Listed in Appendices ONE and TWO to Annex "A" underway as 
directed by Task Force Commanders. Conduct exercises in accordance with 
Annex "A." Upon completion resume scheduled employment. 

(X ) 

4. Logistic support at PEARL HAKBOR. Tenders not assigned continue 
scheduled upkeep. 

5. Use zone plus ten and one-half time. Communications in accordance with 
Annex "B." Radar Doctrine issued as Annex "E" to Pacific Fleet Operation 
Order three one dash four one is effective. Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific 
Fleet, in PENNSYLVANLA. 

H. E. KlMMEL, 

Admiral, 
Commander-in-Chief. 
ANNEXES : 
"A"— Pacific Fleet Exercise Plan No. ICMl : ^^ 

Appendix "1," Special Situation, WHITE (issued separately to 

WHITE Forces only). 
Appendix "2," Special Situation, BLACK (issued separately to BLACK 
Forces only). 
"B" — Pacific Fleet Communication Plan No. 10-41. 

[2] DISTRIBUTION: (Basis, List III, Case 1) 
Opnav (10) 
N. W. C. (3) 
PC S (^) 

Cora FOURTEEN (10) 
CO NAS, Pear! Harbor (5) 
CO Sulibase, Pearl Harbor (5) 
Combatfor (15) 
Comscofor (15) 
Coiiidesbatfor (10) 
Comairscofor (10) 
Corainbatfor (5) 
CG. 2nd Marine Div. (5) 
Comdr. 2nd Marine Airwing (2) 

FOR DISTRIBUTION TO PARTICIPATINO UNITS: 

Combat.ships (35) 

Comairbatfor (35) 

Conicrubatfor (35) 

Comdesflot ONE (75) 

Comdesron FIVE (20) 

Conicruscofor (45) ' 

Combasofor (95) 

Compatwing TWO (25) 

Comdr. Marine Air Group TWENTY-ONE (5) 

CO OGLALA (5) 

P. C. Ceosley, 

Lieutenant Commander, 
Flail Secretary. 
11-5-41- (565) 

[i] Annex "A" 

To Pacific Fleet Operation Obdee No. 37-41 

United States Pacific Fleet, U. S. S. Pennsylvanla, Flagship 

Confidential Peart. Harbob, T. H., 

November 5, 1941. 
Exercise Plan No. IO-41 

PART I — general 

1. Exercises will be conducted in accordance with this Annex. 

2. The general objectives are: Training in war operations under realistically 
simulated war conditions; test and further development of doctrine and proce- 
dures and training in the preparation of quick estimates and plans. 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 143, vol. 3 11 



1444 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

3. Unless special exception is made in the individual exercise, the provisions 
of Chapter V, USF-10, will be in effect. Flights will be cancelled or discontinued 
promptly upon approach of unfavorable flying weather. Commander Aircraft, 
Battle Force, and Commander Patrol Wing TWO shall advise the Oflicers Con- 
ducting the Exercises when they consider weather unsuitable for scheduled 
operations. All aircraft except patrol planes designated for night flying, shall 
be at their bases by sunset. Commander Patrol Wing TWO shall advise Oflicers 
Conducting Exercises, and to whom planes are assigned, when all patrol planes 
have returned to their bases on conclusion of exercises. 

4. No speed limitations are imposed during the actual conduct of exercises 
listed herein. While proceeding to stations for exercises, or during normal 
cruising, speed limits are : Battleships — 15 knots ; cruisers, carriers, destroyers — 
24 knots ; others — none. 

5. Special Instructions: For the duration of these exercises, all contacts must 
be regarded as with own U. S. Units. Offensive action between exercise oppo- 
nents will be simulated only within the limits of the safety precautions prescribed 
in USF-10. Should the Commander-in-Chief or O. T. C. transmit the message 
"Exercise Conditions Ended" it shall be construed by all [2] units to 
mean that exercise conditions no longer prevail and that there is possibility of 
hostile action against the Fleet. Commander Task Force SEVEN, on receipt of 
this despatch, will have all submarines surface, and report when this is accom- 
plished. All forces will thereafter take action as directed in Commander-in- 
Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41. 

6. In case Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, is not embarked in the 
operating areas, Commander Battle Force will function as the Officer Conducting 
the Exercises. 

[S] PART II EXERCISES 

Exercise No. 191 — Minor Problem 

(0600, November 21 to 0600, November 25) 

Object: Training in overseas movement of valuable train vessels, conduct of 
covering and raiding operations. 

1. Opposing Forces 

(a) WHITE— Task Force ONE, Commander Battle Force. 
BLACK — Task Force THREE, Commander Scouting Force. 

(b) Units assigned to WHITE and BLACK are listed separately in Appendices 
1 and 2 to this Annex. Forces involved are not identical with the regular exercise 
task forces of the corresponding numbers. This method was adopted deliberately 
to introduce an element of uncertainty for each opponent as to the exact com- 
position of the enemy force. 

(c) Upon receipt of this order. Commanders WHITE and BLACK will issue 
the necessary task organizations for their respective forces. The security or- 
ganizations will be mutually exchanged between Commanders in sealed envelopes, 
to be opened in case exercise conditions are ended. 

(d) Ships of each force will fly a square flag of its distinguishing color from 
the fore-stay throughout the exercise. 

2. Damage: U. S. F. 79 is effective from the declaration of war between WHITE 
and BLACK. Task Force Commanders designate moving out of action rendezvous 
which wiU permit out of action ships to rejoin within four hours when damage is 
restored. 

Wl 3. Reports. 

(a) From WHITE and BLACK Commanders : 

(1) Brief composite narrative. 

(2) Track charts, single pencil copies, on transparent paper, Case I, 
scale of chart No. 4102 Extended, and Case III. 

(3) Summary of damage. 

(4) Summary of ammunition expenditures. 

(b) From all units: 

(1) Umpire reports, despatch and letter. 

(c) All mail reports will be forwarded within forty-eight hours of return to 
port. 

4. General Situation: 

(a) WHITE and BLACK are Pacific powers with conflicting national poli- 
cies. During a long period of international tension, relations have steadily 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1445 

deteriorated. Active hostilities are imminent. Tlirougli commitments in the 
Atlantic, WHITE has been unable to muster full Naval strength in the Pacific. 
Due to undeclared but extensive hostilities with one Asiatic power, and tenta- 
tive plans for expansion at the expense of another, BLACK has not been free 
to undertake major Fleet operations at a distance from the Asiatic continent. 

(b) Both WHITE and BLACK have been making every effort to improve 
their outlying island bases in order to increase their strength in the Mid-Pacific. 

(c) Several months previously, WHITE acquired title to Base X-Ray, an 
island in the actual position of OAHU, previously the property of an Atlantic 
power. From Base X-Ray the WHITE major Fleet Base in the Hawaiian 
Islands is assumed to be situated thirteen hundred miles bearing 350° and the 
BLACK major Fleet Base in the CAROLINE Group the same distance to the 
westward. 

[5] (d) By November 1, 1941, WHITE has pushed construction at Base 
X-Ray to such an extent that about 70 short range landplanes can be operated 
day or night and 12 long range patrol seaplanes can be operated during day- 
light only. The patrol planes must moor ; there are no beaching facilities. 
Fixed shore defenses consist of about 500 troops and four mobile 3" anti-air- 
craft guns. For purposes of this problem, the land-plane facilities described 
above are considered to be located at EWA Field and seaplane moorings in 
KANEOHB Bay. PEARL HARBOR is an anchorage only, possessing no sup- 
ply, repair, nor defense installations. 

(e) BLACK has not been able to project his chain of bases beyond the major 
base noted in (c) above. 

(f) On November 10, BLACK learns through reliable radio intelligence that 
WHITE is about to execute a plan for major reenforcement of Base X-Ray by 
movement of troops, shore batteries, ammunition, supplies, and repair ships 
either from HAWAII 1300 miles to the northward of Base X-Ray, or from 
WHITE mainland ports (which are assumed to be in their present relative 
position to HAWAII), and is expected to cover this movement with a part of 
the Fleet Units from the HAWAIIAN Area. 

(g) On November 10, WHITE learns from intelligence sources that Asiatic 
developments have probably immobilized the BLACK main Fleet for at least 
a month, but that at least one aircraft carrier, several cruisers, and several 
units of destroyers are missing from their normal bases. 

5. Special Situations are furnished separately to WHITE and BLACK as 
Appendices 1 and 2 of this Annex. 

6. This exercise will end at 0600, November 25, unless terminated earlier by 
signal from the Oflicer Conducting the Exercise. In either event. Task Force 
ONE establish Offshore Patrol by 2200, November 24, for auxiliaries to enter 
PEARL HARBOR commencing about 0700, November 25. Task Force ONE 
will maintain the Offshore Patrol until relieved by Task Foi'ce THREE at the 
end of Exercise No. 191. Units of Task Force ONE remaining at sea, proceed 
to operating areas for scheduled work as directed by Task Force Commander. 
Task Force THREE relieve the Offshore Patrol, and enter PEARL HARBOR 
as directed by the Task Force Commander. 

7. If the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, is embarked in the PENN- 
SYLVANIA, PENNSYLVANIA enter ahead of auxiliaries, disembark Com- 
mander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacificf Fleet, and sortie when entry of Task Force 
THREE is completed, rejoining Task Force ONE as directed by Task Force 
Commander. 

[1] Annex "B" 

To Pacific Fleet Opebatton Order 37-41 

United States Pacific Fleet, 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship. 

Confidential Pearl Harbor, T. H. 

November 5, 1941. 
Communication Plan 
10-41 

USF-70 effective as modified herein or by Task Force Commanders. 
1120. This plan is effective at 0000, November 21, 1941, (Zone plus 10^^) until 
completion of Exercise 191. 



1446 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

1119. Make RADAR aircraft and surface ship contact reports in accordance 
with "Tentative Radar Doctrine" (Annex "E" to Pacific Fleet Operation Order 
No. 31-41). 

13^2. Radio Honolulu (NPM) Primary Fox is available to WHITE (Task Force 
ONE) for exercise traflSc. Non-problem traflBc may be delivered to units of both 
Task Forces by Radio Honolulu. 

2121. Task Force Coumianders prescribe conditions of radio silence. 

2211. Task Force Commanders prescribe own radio frequency plans. 

2212 & 2213. Not effective. 

22 Hi. Task Force Commanders arrange guard for own Task Force. 

2ltlO. Use authenticators under conditions prescribed by Task Force Com- 
manders. 

2^30. Use authenticators as prescribed in the instructions for CSP-795. 

21,31. Not effective. 

2^32. Place authenticators after suflSx. 

21,31}. Task Force Commanders prescribe instructions for aircraft authentica- 
tion. 

2500. Radio Call Signs shall be enciphered by CSP-1161. No opposing radio 
calls recovered by use of CSP-1161 may be used in radio intelligence or deception. 

[2] 2810. The 4205 kc. series shall be guarded by the Chief Umpire, Task 
Force Commanders, and relay vessels for umpire traffic. 

2820. Use 532 kc. for all umpire and out of action communications. If distances 
require use 4205 kc. series. 

28J,3. Not effective. 

S120. Task Force Commanders prescribe conditions of visual silence. 

3210. Not effective. Use Pacific Fleet Communication Memorandum 2RM-41, 

5210. BLACK and WHITE use currently effective recognition signals followed 
by /B or /W respectively, made by flashing light when practicable. 

5230. Task Force Commanders prescribe approach procedure for recognition 
purposes. 

5300. BLACK and WHITE use CSP-1024 as currently effective accompanying 
signal, whenever practicable, by /B or /W respectively, made by flashing light. 

G622. Exercise cryptographic aids are available for exclusive assignment to 
participating exercise fleets as follows : 

TASK FORCE ONE (WHITE) use List I 

TASK FORCE TWO (BLACK) use List II 

Title 

Contact Pad (decode section) 

ECM Exercise Cipher 

Authenticator Cipher Cards 

]\Iark III Strip Alaphabet 

Mark III Strip Key List 

Tracking Code 

Aircraft Signal Book 



List I 


List II 


CSP-786 


CSP-698 


CSP-787 


CSP-699 


CSP-812 


CSP-814 


USF-52 


USF-53 


USF-85 


USF-86 


USF-87 


USF-88 


USF-64 


USF-65 


USF-66 


USF-67 



[S] Annex "B" 

To Pacific Fleet Operation Obdeb 37—41 

Co7ifidential 

6uz3. The following cryptographic aids are available to both participating 
exercise fleets : 

Radio Operators' Signal Cipher CSP-795 

Umpire Code CSP-940 

Aircraft Contact Pad Holders CSP-680 

ECM 1 CSP-691 eta 

Mark III Strip Device CSP-688 

Mark III Auxiliary Device CSP-849 

General Signal Book CSP-734 

SOPUS Signals USF-80 

Signal Vocabulary CSP-412 

Radio Call Sign Cipher No. 1 CSP-1161 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1447 

tOOO. Interference and deception may be practiced as prescribed by Task Force 
Commanders except on following frequencies : 555, 500, 532, 4205s, and 423os. 

8000. Reports are not required. Constructive criticism and comments are wel- 
comed. 

Exhibit No. 23 (Navy Packet No. 2) Kobeets Commission 

Fourteenth Naval Disteict 

District Intelligence Office 

Sixth Floor, Young Hotel 

Honolulu, Hawaii 

AJL/sc 

7 JANTJAKY 1942. 

From : The District Intelligence Officer. 

To : The President's Investigating Committee. 

Enclosures : 

(A) Five copies of excerpts from letter from Chief of Naval Operations, 

dated 15 March 1941 to Commandants of all Naval Districts, the 
Governor of Guam and the Governor of Samoa. 

(B) Five copies of a report dated 16 December 1941, Subject, Crash of enemy 

plane on Niihau, from Officer in Charge, Zone 4, to District Intelli- 
gence Officer. 
1. Enclosures (A) and (B) are forwarded herewith in accordance with your 
request made to Lieutenant ( jg) George P. Kimball, U. S. N. R. 

I. H. Mayfield, 

A. J. LOWREY, 

By direction. 



FOUBTEENTH NAvAI, DISTRICT 

District Intelligence Office 

Sixth Floor, Young Hotel 

Honolulu, Hawaii 

AJL/sc 
7 JANUARY 1942. 
From : The District Intelligence Officer. 
To: The President's Investigating Committee. 
Enclosures : 

(A) Five copies of excerpts from letter from Chief of Naval Operations, dated 

15 March 1941 to Commandants of all Naval Districts, the Governor 
of Guam and the Governor of Samoa. 

(B) Five copies of a report dated 16 December 1941, Subject, Crash of enemy 

plane on Niihau, from Officer in Charge, Zone 4, to District Intel- 
ligence Officer. 
1, Enclosures (A) and (B) are forwarded herewith in accordance with your 
request made to Lieutenant ( jg) George P. Kimball, U. S. N. R. 

I. H. Maytield, 

A. J. LOWKEY, 

By direction. 



1448 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Fourteenth Naval Distbict 

District Intelligence OflSce 

Sixth Floor, Young Hotel 

Honolulu, Hawaii 

AJL/sc 

7 January 1942. 
From : The District Intelligence Officer. 
To : The President's Investigating Committee. 
Enclosures : 

(A) Five copies of excerpts from letter from Chief of Naval Operations, 

dated 15 March 1941 to Commandants of all Naval Districts, the 
Governor of Guam and the Governor of Samoa. 

(B) Five copies of a report dated 16 December 1941, Subject, Crash of enemy 

plane on Niihau, from Officer in Charge, Zone 4, to District Intel- 
ligence Officer. 

1. Enclosures (A) and (B) are forwarded herevpith in accordance with your 
request made to Lieutenant ( jg) George P. Kimball, U. S. N. R. 

I. H. MAYFIELD, 
A. J. LOWKEY, 

By direction. 



Copy 

[1] Fourteenth Naval District 

Branch Intelligence Office 
Port Allen, Kauai, T. H. 



CBB/bn 
December 16, 1941. 



From: The Officer-in-Charge, Zone 4. 
To : District Intelligence Officer. 
Subject : Crash of Enemy Plane on Niihau. 

Enclosure: Copy of Lieut. Jick Mizuha's report on same Subject, to Lt. Colonel 
Fitzgerald, Commanding Officer, Kauai Military District, 

1. On Saturday, December 13, 1941, at 3:00 p. m., six Niihau Hawaiians, 
captained by Kekuhina Kaohelaulii, landed at Waimea, Kauai, in a whale boat, to 
report to the Robinson family of Makaweli, Kauai, T. H., the crash of a Japanese 
plane on Niihau. The crew left Niihau that same day at 12 : 30 a. m., and rowed 
to Kauai, making the trip in about fifteen hours. 

2. Lt. Colonel FitzGerald was notified and immediately organized an expedition 
squad of twelve armed soldiers from Company "M", 299th Infantry under the 
supervision of Lieut. Jack Mizuha of the same Company. The lighthouse tender 
"Kukui" fortunately was at Niihau extinguishing lighthouse lights. A dispatch 
was sent to have it return to Waimea, Kauai, immediately to take the above-named 
troops to Niihau. 

3. The "Kukui", having about twelve armed men of its own and two machine 
guns, left Waimea at about six p. m. Saturday, December 13, 1941, and arrived 
at southwest point, Keanapuka, Niihau, as Nonopapa, the main landing, was 
too rough. The party of armed soldiers went ashore Sunday about 7 : 30 a. m., 
and had breakfast, then had to walk about ten miles to the Nonopapa village, where 
the plane crashed nearby, arriving there at 1 : 50 p. m. 

4. When the troops reached the village and plane, they found that there was 
only one plane and one Japanese pilot, who had already been killed and buried. 
The plane had been burned by the pilot at three a. m. Saturday morning, De- 
cember 13, 1941. 

5. The description of the plane is as follows : The Japanese plane, burned by 
the pilot, had its fuselage burned, but the wings, tail, and engine were intact. 
It had a three-blade propeller which was bent. The plane was small, possibly 
twenty feet long, and twenty feet from wing tip to wing tip, but sturdy and 
made of metal, probably of magnesium and not aluminum. It was a fighter type 
with four 20 mm cannons, one in each wing, and two, either in the propeller 
hub and synchronized with the engine, or in the cockpit. Single engine, average 
size, possibly Curtiss-Wright engine, and had a G. E. generator, an American 
radio set (make unknown) which was damaged by the fire. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1449 

6. Rising sun insignia M^ere on each wing tip, top and bottom. The num- 
[2] ber of the plane on the tail was Bll-120. Both landing wheels were 
severely damaged. 

7. The complete details of the entire episode of the crash, as explained to the 
officer-in-charge by Mr. Elmer Robinson and Benny Kftnahele, now in Wairaea, 
Kauai, Hospital, from December 7 to 14, inclusive, is explained herein. Please 
note that this report is more brief and concise than the enclosed report to the 
Army. Mr. Elmer Robinson stated that the picture given to this oflBce was his 
compiled story of the various day-by-day incidents, and that the report made by 
Liput. Jack Mizuha included the remarks made by a large gathering of Hawaiians 
at a meeting held on Niihau, Sunday at 3 P. M. December 14, 1941. This meet- 
ing was conducted by Mr. Elmer Robinson, as he speaks Hawaiian fluently. 
Questions and answers were made in Hawaiian and translated into English. 

8. Sunday between 1 and 2 p. m. December 7, 1941, at Niihau, various Hawaiian 
residents of the island saw two planes tlying over Niihau. One ci'ashed quite 
close to the Nonopana village and the other flew on west, past the island and 
presumably crashed in the sea. However, it was never seen again. Incidentally, 
the residents of the island had absolutely no means of communication with 
Kauai or elsewhere and were unaware of the United States being at war with 
Japan. Mr. Elmer Robinson wrote a letter about December 9, 1941, informing 
the Niihau population that the United States was at war, but unfortunately it 
was not delivered by a detailed sampan. 

9. The single-seater fighter plane only had one Japanese pilot who was seized 
by the Hawaiians immediately after it crashed into a fence next to the village, 
and before the pilot could locate his pistol. Then Howard Kaleohano searched 
the plane and secured all the papers, map of Oahu, and pistol for safekeeping, 
to he turned over to the proper source ultimately. 

10. The pilot surrendered before all the Hawaiians and remained peaceful 
and friendly and lived at the village and at first was not kept in custody, but 
was allowed to roam about unguarded. At first, when spoken to, he would reply 
in English writing, then later spoke English to the Hawaiians fluently. He was 
possibly educated in the mainland. 

11. Then on Tuesday he was placed under guard of Harada and Shintani, and 
was sent to Kii, furthest northeast end of Niihau, in the hope that the pilot could 
be sent to Kauai by sampan or Robinson's whale boat that was stationed there 
in their boat house. As the sea was too rough, he was returned to the village 
and again another trip was made to Kii on Wednesday, but he was returned a 
second time on account of bad weather. 

12. Thursday, Harada complained to the Hawaiians, stating that it was a 
mistake that the two Niihau Japanese were selected as guards for the pilot. 
They were then relieved of their duty, and later on in the day, Harada, the 
[3] citizen, asked a Hawaiian to have Shintani, the alien, come and see him, 
to discuss some matters, but Shintani wouldn't come. 

13. Then on Friday Shintani had lunch with the Hawaiians. After the 
Hawaiians were through work, Shintani went to Howard Kaleohano's house at 
the village and asked for the papers. Howard was guarding the plane nearby. 
Howard Kaleohano obtained the map, then Shintani said "Not that, but the other 
papers", so he could burn and destroy them. 

14. Then Shintani produced about $200 in an attempt to bribe Howard Kale- 
ohano. He refused the bribe at first, and more so after the money was offered 
for the papers. Tlien Shintani said excitedly that it was a matter of death or 
life, and insisted that Japan made him do this. After this, Shintani disappeared 
out of the picture entirely. 

15. Friday night Harada and pilot broke into Shintani's house looking for the 
papers. As Shintani had joined the Hawaiians, they failed to secure the papers. 
Harada and the pilot then became furious, and seeing Shintani in the village 
later, chased him, but he got away. Then some of the Hawaiians were taken 
prisoners by Harada and the pilot and tied ui) — the other Hawaiians were away 
from the village. After Shintani left the village, the pilot asked Harada if he 
had another gun. Earlier in the day, Harada and the pilot had been to Kale- 
ohano's house and presumably had found the pilot's pistol during Kaleohano's 
absence, but felt that each should have a weapon with which to control their 
Hawaiian prisoners. Then Harada took the pilot to the honey house which was 
close to the village, and got a shotgun and some cartridges. 

16. About midnight the pilot attempted to send a message from his radio in 
the plane, in Japanese. A few of the Hawaiians heard him talking, but did 



1450 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

not hear a reply. The residents, knowing he had sent the message, were aware 
at this time that there was a war on and became alarmed, as they were afraid 
the pilot had sent for aid from the enemy. The pilot burned his plane at 3 a. m. 
Saturday, December 13, 1&41. At the same time, he burned Kalehano's house, 
hoping to destroy his map and papers which he thought were hidden there. 

17. The Hawaiians at the village were well scattered. Some went to the top 
of the mountain with kerosene lamps and reflectors and attempted to signal 
Kauai. Some were at the beach, while some Hawaiians wei-e riding from the 
mountains to Kii beach to prepare the whaleboat for a trip to Kauai. While 
the pilot was at the plane before burning it, the Hawaiian had the pilot's papers 
at the mountain top and later took them to Kii. Six strong Hawaiians left Kii 
in the whaleboat at 12 : 30 a. m. Saturday, December 13, 1941, for Kauai, arriving 
there about fifteen hours later, at Waimea, Kauai, at 3: 00 p. m. They reported 
to the Robinsons at Makaweli, Kauai. 

18. That night the Hawaiians on Niihau had a prayer meeting, then all left 
for the mountains to join the others who were already there. A few [4] 
stragglers were captured by the pilot and Harada who said they would be re- 
leased if they told them where the papers were. They also had two machine 
guns with them which had been taken from the plane in the afternoon. Shintani 
never at any time had any firearms and was not implicated in the case except 
for attempting to bribe the Hawaiian as previously mentioned. 

19. Saturday, December 13, 1941, at 10 : 00 a. m., Benny Kanahele attempted 
to grab the pilot's pistol but failed. Then Benny's wife who was next to him, 
grabbed the pistol and Harada pulled her away. Then the pilot, still having 
the pistol, shot Benny three times, in the right and left thighs and on his upper 
right side. All were flesh wounds. 

20. Benny Kanahele then picked up the pilot bodily and dashed his head 
on a stone wall and killed him. Harada then shot himself in the abdomen twice 
and died soon afterward. The bodies were temporarily buried at Niihau away 
from the village. 

21. The Kauai Army expedition party arrived as stated at 1 : 50 p. m. Sunday, 
December 14, 1941, at the village. They returned to Port Allen, Kauai, on the 
"Kukui" arriving about 7 : 30 a. m. Monday, December 15, 1941. Shintani, Mrs. 
Harada, and her child were brought back and were imprisoned under Colonel 
FitzGerald's control. Benny Kanahele, the wounded man, is now in the hos- 
pital at Waimea, Kauai. 

C. B. Baldwin, 
Lieutenant^ U. S. N. R. 



[1] Repoet of Events Since Sunday, Decembee 7, 1941 on Niihatt 

The Japanese plane came down near Howard Kaleohano's house on Sunday, 7 
December, 1941, between 1 and 2 o'clock in the afternoon. The plane was flying 
low about 75 yards from Kaleohano's house, apparently out of gasoline, and tried 
to zoom up again when its undergear got caught in the fence wire, and the plane 
landed flat on the ground. It must have had its landing gear down, because 
both wheels were knocked off at the time the expedition party arrived at the 
plane. Howard Kaleohano was at home at the time the plane came down, and 
he ran to it. He saw that it wasn't an American plane, and thought it strange. 
Upon reaching the cockpit, he saw this Japanese aviator with a pistol in his 
hand, trying to unstrap his safety belt. Kaleohano immediately grabbed the 
pistol, taking it away from him, and pulled the aviator out of the cockpit. Kaleo- 
hano searched him and took away from him some papers which included an 
Oahu map. At the time the aviator was in the cockpit, he immediately, perhaps 
unconsciously, thought of his papers and reached for his pocket, which put 
Kaleohano wise to it, and as a result, Kaleohano searched him outside. By this 
time the whole populace of Niihau had come to the plane and they decided to 
keep the aviator at Joseph Kele's house. 

The aviator was fed at Kele's house, and was guarded there Sunday night. 
On ^londay he was taken to Keel, where they planned to send him to Kauai 
on the Robinson sampan, but it didn't come through. The aviator was brought 
back and on Tuesday he was again taken to Keei, but the launch did not come 
in that day. He was kept at Keei Tuesday night until Wednesday morning. 
They returned Wednesday afternoon, and took him to Yoshio Harada's house. 
Five men remained to stay on guard at Harada's house. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1451 

At the time the aviator was brought to Harada's house, Harada showed no 
signs of disloyalty, and took his regular turn at guarding the aviator. 

On Sunday, when the plane first landed, Shintani, the alien Japanese, had a 
few words with the aviator, but there wasn't any lengthy conversation. 

On Thursday Harada, the citizen Japanese, asked to have Shintani come down 
and have Slaintani help guard the aviator, as he, Harada, didn't want the entire 
responsibility, being the only Japanese with the aviator, and he wanted both to 
share the responsibility. 

John Kekuhina told Shintani to come down, but Shintani said he didn't want 
to go that night but would go the following day when his work would be down 
there near Harada's house. On Friday morning Kekuhina went to Paniau (the 
high mountain) to make a fire as a signal to Kauai. Shintani went on Friday to 
Harada's house and saw Harada and the aviator. The Hwaiians had no idea 
what went on among them as they did not understand the language. They do 
not know how much conversation took place. At a little after 1 o'clock in the 
afteraoon on Friday, Kaleoao Keale was returning from work, and he saw Shin- 
tani with the two Japanese at [2] Harada's house, Shintani apparently 
eating his lunch at that time. About half an hour, Keale returned and Shintani 
was through with his lunch and had gone away. Shintani later told Keale that 
he had gone to his bee apiary to do his work. As far as Keale knows, Shintani 
didn't see the aviator or the Japanese again. 

At about four o'clock in the afternoon, Friday. 12 December 1941, Shintani came 
to Howard Kaleohano's house. Shintani woke Kaleohano up by pounding on the 
door. Shintani asked Kaleohano if he had the aviator's papers and he replied 
in the afiirmative. Kaleohano showed him first the Oahu map. Shintani replied 
that it wasn't the Oahu map he wanted. It was the other papers he wanted. 
Kaleohano went for the other papers and got them out, and showed them to 
Shintani. Shintani a.sked for them but was refused. Shintani told him that it 
meant life and death to Shintani. Kaleohano refused to give the paper. Shin- 
tani asked again, "Wont you give them to me so that I can burn them." Kale- 
ohano refused, saying it was against the law and both of them would be punished 
if the papers were destroyed. Shintani then offered money which was estimated 
by Kaleohano to be about $200.00, Shintani was refused again. Shintani re- 
peated again that it was life and death but did not say to whom, Shintani then 
disappears from the picture after this. 

At about 5 :30 Friday afternoon, the aviator and Harada, and a boy, Kalihilihi 
Niau, about 16 years of age came to Kaleohano's house. Harada was prodding the 
boy with a gun. Kalechano was in the outhouse (lavatory) at that time and 
hid from the Japanese. After looking for Kaleohano for a while, they left the 
house and went to the plane. It was at this time, it is presumed that the aviator 
recovered the pistol from Kaleohano's house. Kaleohano left the premises and 
met Kaahikili Kalimahuluhulu and explained to him the trouble, told him what 
was going on, and asked him for horses. At the same time another boy, Naalulu 
Kanahele gave him the horse and Kaleohano gave the alarm that the men were 
on the rampage. Before going to the mountains, Kaleohano returned to his house 
and hid the aviator's papers in another locality away from the hou.se, with the 
exception of the Oahu map. He then went to another house and got a pair of 
shoes and went to the mountains. He got to Paniau at about 9 o'clock, where 
some other men had kerosene lamps with reflectors, signalling Kauai. They came 
on down after putting out the Kerosene lamps and went to Keei. At half past 12 
Friday night, they left Keei and on Saturday afternoon at three o'clock they got 
to Waimea. The men who put out on the whale to come to Kauai to .sound the 
alarm were Kekuhina Kaohelaulii, commander of the boat, Howard Kaleohano, 
Akano Kaohelaulii, Enoka Kaohelaulii, Willy Kaohelaulii, and Kahokuloa Kana- 
hele. 

Sometime on B^'iday afternoon the aviator asked to go out to the toilet at 
Harada's house. He asked the guard to go across the yard to the honey ware- 
house. Harada then went out of the house also. Hanaiki Niheu, the husband of 
the school-teacher was the guard at that time, and he followed the aviator across 
the yard, followed by Harada. Harada opened the honey warehouse, and they 
went in and got Harada's shotgun, and then turned upon the guard and had him 
at his mercy. The aviator had the shotgun in his hand. They went down to the 
next warehouse below, opened it and ordered Hanaiki into it and locked Hanaiki 
in it. The rest of the guards were not present as they were [3] on the 
committee arranging the work for the next day. They didn't see any of this. 



1452 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Mrs. Niheu had been living over the hill from the ranch headquarters where 
the Haradas live. She was short of supplies and went down with her children, 
Keia, Lisa, Mele, and a little baby. They were returning to the village in a 
wagon, with Loisa riding the horse pulling the wagon. When they were past the 
upper side of the house on the hill road, Keia heard Harada calling, Harada 
ahead and the aviator following, running down the hill. Harada asked them to 
stop. Mrs. Niheu kept on going. Harada ran out and told them to stop the car. 
Harada stopped the wagon and commanded everybody to get down from the 
car, on threat of their lives. Harada held the gun at Mrs Niheu's shoulders but 
didn't shoot. The two Japanese got into the wagon and called to Loisa who was 
told to stay on the horse, to drive fast with the wagon. They held the gun behind 
Uoisa. They came to the gate to Kaleohano's house and they left the cart there 
and went to Kalechano's house. They picked up the boy at the airplane, which 
they were prodding with the gun at the time Kaleohano saw them. This boy, 
Kalihilihi, had been guarding the plane in the absence of his father. By this 
time, all the people had the alarm, and they had left the houses and gone intoi 
hiding. 

At the end of the village, the two Japanese captured Kalanapio Niiau and they 
told him to call the other people. They came down through the village, and under 
duress, Niiau was calling for the others. Kaahakila Kalimahuluhulu was at the 
house of his relatives trying to get them all out of way and got practically every 
one of them into shelter and he heard Niiau calling and he thought Niiau was call- 
ing for help. So Kalimahuluhulu answer the call. It was dark then, and when he 
went out to the road to meet them, Kalimahuluhulu was also seized as a captive. 
They tied Kalimahuluhulu's hands behind him, and with the two captives they 
came down through the town calling for the others. Nobody else came. They came 
to Joseph Kele's house, where Kalimahuluhulu saw a light which disappeared 
suddenly. No one could be found at Kele's house, so they ordered Niiau and 
Kalimahuluhulu to go down to the gate where they had left the wagon. They 
were then ordered to go where the plane was. Both captives saw that they had 
taken the cartridges out and had piles them on the wing of the plane. The 
aviator went into the plane and they heard him run the radio. He put on his 
earphones and began calling in Japanese, but the captives did not hear any reply. 
They had a big pile of cartridges and Harada forced Niiau to help him carry the 
cartridges to the wagon. Then when they came back again, the machine gun 
was taken out. Niiau had to caiTy it down to the cart. Harada told Kalimahulu- 
hulu to go to Keoikia to tell Harada's wife that he won't be back tonight — that 
they were going to look for Kaleohano. Kalimahuluhulu instead of going there 
went to the beach and joined his family there. He got his wife to untie his 
hands and got Benny Nokaka Kanahele who was there to join him to recover 
the cartridges because Harada had told him that the cartridges were enough to 
kill off every man, woman, and child on the island. Harada and the aviator had 
gone off looking for the rest of [4] the people. So Kalimahuluhulu and 
Benny came up to the deserted wagon the machine gun was missing, but the 
cartridges were there. Kalimahuluhulu took one bunch and Benny took the 
other and took them down the beach and hid them. 

Benjiy then went to take care of the family, went to get horses to hide his 
family. Benny told his family not to tell Harada about his whereabouts. 
Kalimahuluhulu and Kanahele's family were captured on Saturday morning. 
They said (the Japanese) that if they could catch Kaleohano, the rest of the 
people would be let off. If they couldn't, they would kill everybody else. 

During Friday night, these two men burned the plane and Kaleohano's house 
about three o'clock in the morning. Then they went through the village and 
shot oft' the guns on Friday night. 

The Japanese told the families to find Kaleohano. The aviator had recovered 
the pistol at tliat time from Kaleohano's house. Harada had the shotgun. The 
two Japanese started out looking. They said they would kill the two women 
and then they would kill themselves. Then afterwards they changed their idea 
and told Kalimahuluhulu's wife to go into the koa forest to find Kaleohano. 
She escai)ed in that fashion. 

Benny Kanahele had been raptured along with his family early in the morning. 
He was sent into the thickets looking for Kaleohano and came back and joined 
his wife who was held captive. That is when Mr. and Mrs. Kanahele finished 
off the aviator and Harada killed himself. (The complete story of this part of 
the story can be secured from Mr. and Mrs. Kanahele who were not questioned 
at Niihau, but were brought back to Kauai.) The guns were not recovered as 
they were hidden by the natives in the koa forest and could not be found by them. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1453 

Mr. Elmer Robinson left instructions with the natives to make a diligent search 
of the guns, and if recovered, would be turned over to him and then turned 
over to the military commander of the Kauai District. 

The above story was repeated to the undersigned oflBcer by Mr. Elmer Robinson 
who secured the story from the various natives in the village. Mr. Robinson 
secured the story in Hawaiian and translated it into English. The English 
version was talien down by this officer by stenographic notes. 

Captain Eugene MacManus, harbormaster at Port Allen, was present during 
this entire hearing. 

Jack H. Mizuha, 
1st. Lt., 299th Infantry. 
Copy 



Exhibit No. 24 (Navy Packet No, 2), Kobeets Commission 

file 7 Index 

Cincpac File No. United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship 
Secret 

Memorandum for the Commission. 

Subject : Fuze settings used by vessels at Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941. 

Tlie minimum fuze set allowed in peacetime is 3.2 seconds. Fuze Pots are 
so arranged that this setting is the minimum obtainable without adjustments 
of ihe pot. 

Methods of control of necessity vary over the range of possible control. This 
is apparent when it is realized that the range varied from 100 feet to 4500 
yards approximately. It is believed that when all reports have been received 
and adjusted, that it will be found that the great majority of the guns tired 
were in local control due primarily to the multiple targets that were presented. 

The horizontal bombing attacks came in 3 or 4 waves. The reported altitude 
of these attacks vary from 6,000 to 15,000 feet. The latter is believed to be the 
most nearly correct because observers in geographical positions that would 
allow them to estimate altitude, i. e., clear of smoke of burning oil, so estimated 
the altitude and because of the penetration of the armour piercing bombs. The 
horizontal bombers were taken under some fire, but since this attack was 
delivered after tremendous volumes of smoke from the oil fires had already 
covered the Ford Island Area, ships in this vicinity were generally unable to 
see these attacks developing. The smoke that obscured the horizontal bombers 
from the ships in close proximity to Ford Island did not obscure the ships them- 
selves from the horizontal bombers. The fuze settings used by ships with 
director control is not known. Ships not equipped with director were in local 
control, using various fuze settings. One vessel reported its 3" 50 A. A. 
firing at horizontal hombers using lu-12 second per set fuzed projectiles which 
were "short and ineffective". 

The appended photographs showing two separate horizontal bomber forma- 
tions illustrate the "shorts" and the altitude of attack. The Fleet aerologist 
without knowledge of these photographs reported the lower fleecy clouds below 
the cumulus to be at around 11,000 to 12,000 feet. 

Respectfully submitted. 

Edwin Thomas Layton, 
Edwin Thomas Layton, 
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy, 
Intelligence Officer, U. 8. Pacific Fleet. 

5 JANTTAEY 1942. 

(Two photographs are appended to Exhibit No. 24 which .show 
bomber formations and illustrate "shorts" in anti-aircraft fire and 
the altitude of attacking planes at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. 
These photographs are reproduced as Items Nos. 42 and 43 in 
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTKATIONS, Koberts Commission.) 



1454 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Exhibit No, 25 (Navy Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 
Office of the Commandant 

FOtTRTEENTH NAVAL DiSTKICT 

Pearl Harbor, T. H. 
C-A4-3/SS/ND14 

(024) 
Confidential 1 Januaby, 1942. 

Mr. Walter Bruce Howe, Eecorder of the Commission Inquiring into Incidents at 

Pearl Harbor, 7 December. 

My Deiar Mr. Howe : When I was before the commission, questions were asked 
me about the anti-torpedo net at the entrance to Pearl Harbor, whether or not 
it was closed and whether or not it was possible for the enemy submarine to 
have followed some vessel in through the gate. 

As I recall, I told the commission that the gate had been closed but that it had 
been opened to permit a garbage scow to pass in and that it might have been 
possible for the submarine to have followed this scow in. Since that time, I have 
ascertained that my statement before the commission was not entirely correct 
and I would like to revise it as follows : 

"The procedure prior to December 7, was to keep the net closed during the hours 
of darkness, only opening it when it was necessary for some vessel to pass 
through. It was opened at daylight, it being the idea that the channel entrance 
destroyer, the net vessel and other vessels in that vicinity would detect any sub- 
merged or partially submerged submarine. On December 7, 1941, the net was 
opened at 0458 for two sweepers to enter, these vessels having been out for the 
regular morning sweep. As far as can be ascertained, the net was kept open 
until 0840 when it was closed by orders. The net was not damaged. The sub- 
marine was first sighted at 0745 by YT-153 near channel buoy No. 17, close to the 
coal dock. The time that the submarine passed the net is not known but it is 
probable that it passed in very close to 0700." 

I request that you please bring this to the attention of the commission as the 
testimony which I gave before them was based on information which I then had 
but which now appears to be incorrect. 

C. C. Bloch, 
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy 
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 



Exhibit No. 26 (Navy Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 



Confi,dential 
C-2295-5 



Office of the Commanding Officeb, 

Marine Defense Forces, 
Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H., 1 January 1942. 



Status of defense battalions, Fleet Marine Force assigned to Fourteenth Naval 

District 

1. Distribution of personnel : 



U. S. M. C. 




Navy Medical 


Oft. 


Men 


Off. 


Men 





1 

204 
792 


Midway 
3rd Defense Battalion 




3 





7 


.. 4th Defense Battalion 





30 


.. .6th Defense Battalion 


F16 




Total Midway 




37 


997 


3 


16 













PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



1455 



status of defense battalions, Fleet Marine Force assigned to Fourteenth Naval 

District — Continued 

1. Distribution of personjiel : 



U.S. 


M. C. 




Navy Medical 


Off. 


Men 


Off. 


Men 


16 


272 
110 
69 


Palmyra 
1st Defense Battalion 


1 




s 


2 


3rd Defense Battalion .. 





1 


4th Defense Battalion 







Johnston 
1st Defense Battalion 




19 


451 


1 


8 


9 


197 
140 
54 


1 





8 


4 


. 3rd Defense Battalion . . 





4 


4th Defense Battalion 







Total Johnston 




17 


391 


1 


8 




Total outlying bases 




73 


1,839 


5 


32 




OAHU 

1st Defense Battalion.. 




7 


103 
558 
418 
28 


2 
3 
3 



6 


33 


...3rd Defense Battalion .. 


18 


p 22 


4th Defense Battalion 


16 


2 


6th Defense Battalion 











64 


1,107 


8 


40 








^ I, 137 


2,946 


13 


72 


V^ *.tr 







2. a. Distribution of armament : 



7"/45 cal guns 

6"/5l cal gims. 

3" AA guns 

Height Finders 

Directors., 

3"/50 Navy guns 

.50 cal. AAMG 

.30 cal. MQ... 

Searchlight unit 

Browning automatic rifles 

SCR 268 

SCR 270 



Midway 



4(a) 

6 
12 

3 

4 

4(e) 
47 
36 

6 
29 

3 

2 



Palmyra 



Johnston 



Oahu 



8(b) 
11(c) 
2 
3(d) 



20(f) 

24(g) 

3(h) 

42 

8(i) 

10) 



Notes 

(a) Two mounted; others being mounted. 

(b) Sights on 6 guns have not been modified for high speed target. This work has low priority at Ord- 
nance. Fire control equipment for only 2 guns available. 

(c) Seven employed in defense of Pearl, three of which are replacement guns. 

(d) Two not modified. No parts on Oahu available for this work. One is an M-3— no spare parts avail- 
able. 

(e) Being mounted. 

(f) Employed in defense of Pearl. 

(g) Not Defense Battalion weapons but on temporary loan for defense of Pearl, 
(h) One unit under repair. 

(i) Two to be shipped to Palmyra and one to Johnston when transportation is available. One loaned to 
Army, 
(j) In operation in Army net. 



&. Deficiencies in armament and materiel for 4 Defense Battalions. The in- 
crease in deficiencies is due to loss of materiel at Wake. Request for materiel 
to fill deficiencies will be covered in separate correspondence. 
(1) Five Inch Materiel : 
2 guns 
4 sets of fire control 



1456 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(2) Three Inch Antiaircraft Materiel: 3 batteries complete, less one 
director. 

(3) Searchlight units— 6. 

(4) .50 caliber AA Machine Guns — 13. 

(5) .30 caliber Machine Gun— 30. 
3. a. Distribution of ammunition : 



Midway 



Palmyra 



Johnston 



Oahu 



7"/45 cal. rounds 

5" common rounds 

6" illuminating-. 

3" Navv common Army gun, 

3" AA (HE) 

3"/50 Navy Qun 

.50cal. AP - 

.50 cal. tracer 

.30 cal. AP and ball 

.30 cal. tracer... 

Grenades, hand 

Signals, ground asstd 



900 

1568 

104 

801 

21. 520 

4224 

763, 951 

391.690 

2,119.840 

144, 000 

2250 

406 





900 

100 

1020 

5019 



102, 150 

87, 160 

635, 500 

137, 500 

100 

340 





860 

100 

380 

10538 



220450 

113350 

506000 

87, 000 

750 

362 



700 

5231 

120 

iQ 

24, 480 



235, 698 

244, 398 

2, 460, 560 

156, 000 

3670 





• 2500 rounds requisitioned December 26, 1941. 

Note. — The following additional amounts required for 6 units of fire will be shipped when supplied 
and/or when transportation is available: 

Midway Palmyra Johnston 

700 3" Navy common 6,000 3" H. E. AA 620 3" Navy common 

50 5" illuminating 260,000 .50 cal. A P 20, 000 .50 cal. AP 

93, 000 .50 cal. tracer 7, 000 .50 cal. tracer 

500, 000 .30 cal. ball 
5, 000 .30 cal. tracer 
650 grenades 



Copies to 



Approved ; 



CNO 

Cincpac (2) 

MGC 

Comscofor 

Combasfor 

Chief of staff 14ND 



/s/ H. K. Pickett, 
Colonel, V. S. Marine Corps, 
Commanding Marine Forces, Htli NavDist. 
CG, Haw Dept USA 
War Plans 14ND 
CO, 1st Def Bn 
CO, 3rd Def Bn 
CO, 4th Def Bn 
CO, 6th Def Bn 

/s/ C. C. Bloch, 

Rear Admiral, U. S. Navi/, 
Commandant, IJfth Naval District. 



li] 



Exhibit No. 27 (Navy Packet No. 2) Kobeets Commission 
SECRET 



HisTOEY OF Action Occtjeeing at Palmyea Island Feom Decembeb 7 to Decembeb 
31, as Compaeed feom Official Despatches and Coekespondence 

Decemter 7: 

No .Japanese attack on Palmyra. (There was no enemy activity at Palmyra 
until December 24, when the island was subjected to surface bombardment.) 

On December 11 the commandant ordered the resident officer in charge at Pal- 
myra to expedite grading on the runway and requested to know when 5,000 feet 
would be ready. 

On December 12, Palmyra informed the commandant (0700) that a third alter- 
nate radio emergency station was available when necessary and specified trans- 
mitting frequencies. 

A message filed from Palmyra at 0330 December 14 requested instructions for 
Inter-Island tugs, and also requested aviation gas and Diesel oil, etc., be reassigned 
Palmyra 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1457 

A message from the resident oflBcer in charge, filed at 0600 December 14, in- 
formed the commandant that a runway 3,400 feet long and 500 feet wide was ready 
for use. The report said that station 34 plus 00 to 37 plus 30 was [2] tilled 
and rough graded and would be read for use in three days. Five thousand feet 
with 300 foot width would be ready for use inside two weeks. 

In a routine despatch filed to Pearl Harbor at 0545 December 17, the com- 
mandant was informed by the marine detachment at Palmyra of the following 
personnel requirements : 12 three inch, 10 machine guns, 42 five inch together with 
searchlight personnel. 

Materiel requirements : one radar fire control, three searchlights, 25,000 sand 
bags, 200 reels of barbed wire and pickets ; three inch, one junction box ; six 
cable data, transmission ; three static condenser coils, generator 50 micro farad. 
Five inch, eight pads, gas check; two complete sets for cast three firing; two 
lighting circuits, range finder; fifty bulbs, lighting circuits for guns; two part 
WZPADE sets rangekeeper, mark 2. 

Ammunition requirements: Three inch, two units Navy common; five inch, 
200 rounds ilhmiinating. The foregoing was requested for immediate needs. 

The commandant warned Palmyra in a message sent at 0111 December 18 to 
be on the alert against the possibility of an attack by two enemy light cruisers. 

[3] Palmyra advised the commandant at 0730 that the Nisqually and 
Storm King (tugs) had not arrived. 

At 0700 December 20, Palmyra informed the commandant the supply of avia- 
tion gasoline (100 octane) was 36,213 gallons, (ref. 22/2357.) 

The resident oflScer in charge notified the commandant at 0800 December 21 
that the land plane runway was i*olled and ready for service from station 00 
plus 00 to 37 plus 00. From station 37 plus 00 to 48 plus 00 the fill was completed 
to a 300 foot width. 

The commandant's proposal for contract work at Palmyra (submitted in a 
sununary to the Bureau of Yards and Docks filed at 2000 December 21) stated 
that in general the plan was the same as for Johnston (to provide living and 
storage facilities and to complete only the essential projects) except that a coral 
surface I'unway of 5,000 feet would be provided. 

Palmyra notified the commandant at 0830 December 21 that the tugs Eleu 
and Maoi with barges in tow departed for Christmas Island at 0330 GCT De- 
cember 21. 

The lesident oflScer in charge. Palmyra, advised the commandant at 0810 De- 
cember 21 regarding fuel oil and gasoline supplies. 

[4] A message filed by the resident oflicer in charge at 2141 December 21 
stated that mail delivery to Palmyra was essential in the interest of maintaining 
the morale of the contractors' employes. 

Palmyra filed a report to the commandant at 0625 December 24 that the island 
was shelled by a submarine at 0500 GCT and there were no casualties. TTie 
submarine had fired six salvos and registered one hit on the dredge but no 
serious damage had resulted. 

This information was passed by CINCPAC to the commanders of Task Forces 
9, 4 and 13 at 0733. The commandant notified the chief of naval operations. 

The commanding officer of the naval air station at Palmyra in a written 
report of the action stated that the submarine opened fire at 0455 GCT and was 
first sighted south east of the island on a bearing 110 degrees true from the 
water tower and about 3.000 yards off shore. The subimarine fired six rounds 
from a gun estimated to be 3 inch, with the U. S. Engineer Department Dredge 
Safrnmento, visible to the enemy between two small islands along the south reef, 
evidently used as a point of aim. 

Apparently using a ladder spot, the submarine's first three salvos were short, 
the fourth a direct hit and [5] the remaining salvos over. The hit 
caused only minor damage, the shell striking a boat davit and after splintering, 
raking the dredge. 

All of the island's batteries were in Condition 1 before the action. The sub- 
marine was sighted by the 5 inch control party on No. 3 island before firing com- 
menced hut due to darkness and low elevation of gun platforms, the pointers and 
trainers had great difficulty in picking up the target. The battery fired two star 
shells and 12 Navy Common 5 inch A. P. shells, and although no hits were 
observed the submarine was forced to dive. 

The commanding officer reported that stations were manned expeditiously 
and without confusion by service personnel not on gun crews and civilian volun- 
teer parties. The morale was excellent, he added. 



1458 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Action was being taken to elevate gun plaforms to impi-ove the visibility of 
pointers and trainers, bis report stated. 

The resident officer in charge, Palmyra, in a message filed at 0200 December 
25, requested information from Pearl Harbor regarding the availability of 
transportation for civilians vpho desire to leave the island, the status of compen- 
sation insurance covering cases due to war [6] conditions and the plan 
of the future program and work to be completed under the present revised 
conditions. 

Information was also requested on the availability and shipping of materials 
and the availability of personnel replacements to complete the program. 

Palmyra notified Pearl Harbor at 0310 December 26 that a two plane patrol had 
arrived at the station. 

On December 26 the commandant sent a directive to a Palmyra to keep the 
minimum number of employes (not over 250) needed to complete structures and 
essential defense measures, operate mechanical equipment as well as the dredge 
and other plant. The island was to provide a 5,000 foot runway together with 
emergency defenses. 

The commandant's message advised that information requested by despatch at 
0200 December 25 should be received by letter shortly and specified evacuation 
was to include the nonessential trades and employees least skilled. 

He directed the change of the construction program as required by existing 
conditions. 

Palmyra reported the aviation gasoline supply on December 27 totaled 35,444 
gallons (100 octane). 

The resident officer in charge reported on December 28 that the runway was 
•graded and rolled to station 85 plus 00 and filled and rough graded to station 48 
plus 00, stating that this latter portion would be available for use [7] in- 
side of six days. 

Departure of a patrol plane from Palmyra for Pearl Harbor at 2115 GOT 
December 29 was reported by the station to the commander of Task Force 9. 

Palmyra requested immediate shipment by air of battery cables for three inch 
guns, stating none could be located at the station. (Despatch filed at 2345 
December 29). 

On December 30 Palmyra informed the commander of Task Force 9 of the 
arrival of two patrol planes. 

This same day the resident officer in charge filed a report of fuel oil and gaso- 
line receipts and sales and in a later despatch requested that spare parts needed 
for operation of the tug Wiki be sent by the first available special transportation. 

In despatches on December 31, the resident officer in charge requested that 
shipment of acetylene and oxygen on requisition be exi)edited, together with the 
remaining supply of dynamite and caps ordered and necessary to complete the 
central island channel dredging. The supply on hand consisted of four cases, it 
was stated. 

A further request was made to arrange for a necessary supply of Diesel oil. 
A total of 550 barrels of Diesel oil, enough for five weeks, was given as the 
island's supply and [8J the total storage capacity was 4,600 barrels, ac- 
cording to the despatch. 

The naval air station reported that its radar was in commission this date, 
addressing a despatch to this effect to the commander of Patrol Wing 2. 



Exhibit No. 28 (Navt Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 

[1] SECRET 

HisTOEY OF Action Occueeing at Johnston Island From Decembee 7 to Decembeb 
31, AS Compiled From Official Despatches and Correspondence 

December 7: 

No Japanese attack was carired out against the Naval Air Station at Johnston 
Island on December 7, 

Initial action against the island was a star shelling by a submarine on De- 
cember 12, followed by other surface raids on December 15, 21 and 22. 

On December 6, the commandant was advised by the station that 72,355 gal- 
lons of 100 octane gasoline were on hand and 5,567 gallons had been expended. 
Ninety two octane was the same, the report stated. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1459 

December 8: 

No enemy attack reported on Johnston. 

CINCPAO advised the station at 1141 December 8 that indications pointed to 
an attack there at daylight. 

December 9: 

Johnston reported to the commander of Task Force 12 and for information of 
the commandant that the island had not been bombed. 

[2] Johnston advised that Plane 21 Prep One had departed for Pearl Harbor 
at 0150 GOT. The belief was expressed that this plane had originated the mes- 
sage: "At 0300 bombed Japanese cruiser and destroyer in latitude 1702 longi- 
tude 680i, course 040 and speed 20. At 0310 attacked by enemy aircraft. At 
0326 bombed carrier 80 miles bearing 074 from Johnston." 

Johnston notified the commander of Patrol Wing 2 that two J-1 and 5 left 
the island for Pearl Harbor at 0340 GCT. 

December 10: 
No enemy attack. 

December 11: 

The marine detachment sent a request to the commandant filed at 0800 Decem- 
ber 11, for six .30 cal. machine guns, six .50 cal. machine guns, 10 automatic 
rifles, 150 steel helmets and gas masks, one searchlight less sound locater, and 
15 binoculars. 

Also requested were one captain and 45 enlisted men of the marine corps, one 
medical officer, one battery of 5 inch and one battery of 3 inch complete with 
personnel and ammunition. 

[3] Information was received from Johnston at 0805 December 11 that 
64,000 gallons of 100 octane aviation gasoline were on hand and that all bombs 
and ammunition were available for immediate use. It was stated that a night 
seadrome lighting set was installed and 2,000 feet of coral runway for land- 
planes would be ready and adequate for nine fighters or scout bombers on 
December 20. 

December 12: 

The Naval Air Station at Johnston informed the commandant in a message 
filed at 0535 December 12 that the total aviation gasoline stowage now avail- 
able was 175,000 gallons, and that 111,000 gallons could be received. The station 
at this time requested .30 and .50 cal. link belt loading machines. 

A communication (ref. despatch 7/2343) at 0620 December 12 specified radio 
buildings were separated by 250 feet, were repainted a coral color and were 
partially barricaded. 

(Surface Raid 1 12 Dec. LOT.) 

The first enemy activity at Johnston took place on the night of December 12 
when a submarine fired about six star shells on the island from 8,000 yards 
ofe Sand Islet. 

[4] In a letter from the commanding officer of the air station it was 
reported that the submarine went into action at 2115 (Zone plus lOV^ hours), 
firing at intervals of about 30 seconds. The star shells burst into about six 
greenish balls which burned for about 15 seconds. 

The Johnston 5 inch battery fired one star shell and although the illumina- 
tion from the white star was excellent, nothing was sighted, the commanding 
officer said. 

This shot from the shore battery apparently caused the enemy submarine to 
submerge believing that he had been sighted. There was no further attack, 
the report said. 

It was recommended in the report that as soon as facilities at the station could 
support operation of land planes, at least six fighters be assigned to provide 
the close in security required to prevent the shoot and dive type of raids by 
submarines. 

December 13: 

On December 13, the commandant was informed by Johnston that a supply 
of 100 octane gasoline 37,520 gallons (ref. 22/2357 of September) was on hand. 

In a directive filed to Johnston at 2315 December 13, the commandant specified 
that a force of [5] civilians be kept at the island as required to operate 
all of the power plants and continue with a program as follows : Complete gaso- 
line tanks to a usable stage, including one tank for white gasoline ; complete a 

79716 — 46— Ex. 143, vol. 3—;— 12 



1460 COXGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

runway 2,500 feet in length and construct batclielor officers' quarters and the 
dispensary. 

In addition, temporary magazines were to be constructed as necessary together 
with splinter proof shelters. 

Also on the program were construction of an emergency sewage system and a 
salt water system, a power plant and distribution system and a radar installation. 

A total of 270 civilian employees was estimated as necessary for the outlined 
work. 

The commandant directed that all other employees be evacuated, removing the 
least skilled and nonessential trades first. 

Jlaterials from the Wake barge were to be used as necessary. 

The commandant's communication advised that the Burrows could be expected 
to arrive early Monday (December 15). (Note: The William Ward Burrows 
with tow previously destined for Wake Island had been directed [6'] to 
proceed to Johnston when about 425 miles east of Wake.) 

December 14: 

No report of enemy action. 
December 15: 

A report filed to the commandant at 054a December 15 listed the 100 octane 
aviation gasoline supply at Johnston at 64,000 gallons. The 92 octane remained 
the same. 

In a despatch filed at 0530 December 15, the resident ofl5cer-in-charge gave a 
report of oil and gasoline receipts, consumptions and supplies on hand. 

The commandant reported to tlie Chief of Naval Operations at 0610 December 16 
that Johnston was bombarded by two surface ships at 1851 LCT. 

(Surface Raid 2 15 December LCT) 

The William Ward Burrows informed the commandant the island was shelled 
at 0510 GCT from the northwest for half an hour. The Burrows' message said 
the ship apparently had cleared Johnston island without being detected and was 
cruising along the southern face of Novelty shoal, adding that she expected to 
return to Johnston as soon as practicable to assist. It was specified that if the 
[7] ship was detected she would attempt to cross Novelty shoal. Aboard were 
77 civilian evacuees removed from Johnston on December 15, before the attack. 

A complete report of the shelling was filed to Pearl Harbor at OS30 Di^cember 16 
as follows: One cruiser or destroyer attacked from the northwest for 10 miimtos, 
firing 10 salvos at a range of 9,000 yards — four guns ladder spot. The second 
salvo demolished the power house. There were no personnel casualties. Sand 
Island was not under attack. 

The report added that one five inch gun was out of action due to failure of the 
counter recoil. It said that the Burrows apparently escaped to the southeast 
after safely delivering its tow. 

Johnston reported to the commander of Task Force 4 and CINCPAC (and to 
the William Ward Burrows for information) in a message filed at 1030 Decem- 
ber 16 that at dusk two ships, either destroyers or cruisers, were dimly siffhted. 
Poor visibility and very high seas would have made enemy submarine gunnery 
difficult and the shooting was excellent, making it doubtful that a submarine 
attacked. The message advised the Burrows not to return to the island. 

[S] A comprehensive report of the damage resulting from this surface attack 
was filed to the commandant from Johnston at 0110 December 17 as follows: 

The enemy registered five hits on buildings, two of which were on the con- 
tractors. The power house was completely destroyed and the stills and boilers 
were badly damaged. With a loss of 20,000 gallons of fresh water, 50,000 gallons 
remain, enough for 25 days. 

It was further stated that two hits on the permanent power house destroyed 
one generator and caused minor damage to the new boiler and to the power 
panel. The new still, which would be in operation within four days, would more 
than provide an adequate water supply, it was reported. 

A hit registered on the new mess hall but caused no damage, passing through 
the building and leaving holes, accurate measurement of which together with large 
base fragments showed the shells were 5.5 inch caliber and indicated the attack was 
by light cruisers. 

The reported stated that it was not understandable why the Japanese did not 
complete their job of [5] destruction inasmuch as they had a good range 
and the island was well lighted by a huge oil fire. It was probable that shots 
from Johnston shore batteries came close to their mark, the report added. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMAIISSION 1461 

No attack had been made on Sand Island. 

At 0713 December 17, a request was filed from the marine detachment com- 
mander for one recoil cjiinder complete with piston and filling lube to recom- 
missioD a 5 inch 51 caliber gun, mark 15. 

CINCPAC informed the chief of Naval Operations in a communication at 0928 
December 17 that the attack on Johnston was apparently by two light cruisers and 
had destroyed the power house but caused no casualties among personnel. 

December 17: 

No new attack by the enemy was reported at Johnston. 
December IS: 

CINCPAC in a message to the commander of Task Force 9 and addressed for 
information to ComTaskForce 4 and NAS Johnston, gave orders to send two 
patrol planes to Johnston Thursday (18th). These were to report to the [10] 
commanding officer at Johnston and were to be maintained at that station until 
further orders. 

The commandant informed Johnston at 2055 December 18 that two PSP had 
been dispatched to that station and shotild arrive at 1300 LCT. Johnston advised 
that two patrol seaplanes under Lt. Drake arrived at 2300 OCT December 18. 

(Johnston reported that a mud scow sighted adrift at lat. 1722, long. 16955 was 
apparently the one that departed under tow of Robin.) 

Johnston notified the commandant that two PSP departed for Pearl Harbor 
under Lt. Drake at 0715 LCT, December 20. 

At 0507 December 21, Johnston filed a report to the commander of Task Force 9 
of arrival of two patrol planes under Lt. Christopher. 

In a communication to the Bureau of Yards and Docks (filed at 2000 December 
21) tlie commandant in a summary of a proposed revisal of work plans for Wake, 
Midway, Palmyra, Johnston and Samoa stated that the proposal fcr Johnston was 
to complete the essential projects and provide living and storage facilities, estab- 
lished a coral surface landplane runway of 2,500 feet length, modify other [11] 
projects as deemed necessary and reduce the contractors' forces 30 per cent, 
leaving 270 employes. 

December 22: 

(Surface raid 3 LCT 21 December.) 

A report of enemy action tiled by Johnston at 0800 December 22, informed the 
commandant that star shells were being fired over the island. A further report at 
0921 stated that tiie enemy fired only star shells and ceased tiring after the 
island's one good 5 inch gun hfid returned the fire. It was added that the action 
was probably from a submarine. 

The marine detachment requested the commandant for 50 star shells and 
charges for 5 inch, stating there were only eight remaining. 

December 23: 

A message from Johnston at 0300 December 23 reported that two PSP under 
Ensign R. Brady arrived at the island at 1300 LCT. 

(Surface raid 4 LCT 22 December.) 

Johnston filed a report to CINCPAC and the commandant at 0520 December 23 
that the island was shelled by a submarine at 0513. 

The commandant, in a communication filed at 0635, asked Johnston how large 
a reenforcement could be taken [ 12] care of by the island with its pres- 
ent supply of food and water. The reply stated that there was an adequate food 
and water supply for 200, referring to the island's request of OSOO December 11, 
plus naval personnel. 

Johnston's report of the submarine shelling (filed at 0805 December 23) said 
that only Sand island was shelled, and that the CAA homing tower had been 
destroyed but an emergency antenna provided full radiation. Only casualty 
mentioned was Sergeant James B. Zimmerman who received a contusion on the 
left shoulder. 

A letter from the commanding officer of the air station under date of December 
23 describes the shelling of Sand Islet on December 22 as follows : 

"At 1S43. or just as the ready duty p^ane had landed and secured to the buoy, 
a flash of gunfire appeared from outside the North reef. A large submarine 
was clearly visible. The shell landed about 100 yards over the center of Sand 
Islet. The second followed about 15 seconds later and was about 20 yards to the 
left of the far edge of the island. The third was short by about 100 yards. The 



1462 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

fourth struck the CAA homing tower at its base, and the tower fell. Several 
splinters were thrown against the CAA transmitter building but the six inch 
thick concrete slabs placed there for protection prevented any damage to [13] 
the transmitters inside. Several holes were cut through the walls above the 
slabs but the splinters went out through the roof. 

"Sergeant James Bowen Zimmerman, USMC, who was occupying a Browning 
automatic rifle replacement on a small point of land near the tower was wound- 
ed in the left shoulder by a large piece of coral which was thrown by the ex- 
ploding shell." 

The report continued : "Two more shells from the submarine were overs. Just 
as the sixth was fired, our ready duty plane left the water. 

"The 5 inch battery on Johnston fired 10 salvos with each gun at 7,000 yards 
range before the submarine submerged. 

"The submarine submerged just after the plane took oflE." 

December 24-' 

On December 24, Johnston notified the commander of Task Force 9 that two 
PSP under Ensign Brady had departed from the island for Peax'l Harbor. 

In a communication filed to Johnston at 1811 December 25, the commandant 
directed that the resident [I4] officer in charge and facilities of the 
contractors' organization be placed at the disposal of the commanding officer for 
necessary defense and protection measures in the present emergency. 

(The island's work program was to include shelters and protection around key 
structures, the commandant directed.) 

It was pointed out that a concrete wall protection around buildings, as recom- 
mended by Johnston, was not satisfactory, and that sand bags would be more 
effective. 

After taking care of emergency items, the contractors' force was to complete 
personnel buildings and services. Temporary storage for ammunition, gasoline, 
and other supplies, the runway, all essential items must be completed at the ear- 
liest possible date to permit the evacuation of civilan employes and make room 
for military personnel. The permanent bombproof shelter and communication 
center will not be built as originally planned, the communication advised. Scat- 
tered splinter proof shelters would be substituted as needed. 

Later the commandant directed that Johnston [15] retain the least 
number of employes, the total not to exceed 200, to complete the essential defense 
structures including the runway to 2,500 feet length and to operate mechanical 
equipment. The least skilled and the nonessential trades would be evacuated 
first, and the military force would assist with unskilled labor as necessary after 
evacuation. The previous directive was cancelled. ' (Ref. 10714 Dec. 26-1640.) 

A letter from Major Loomis, commanding the Marine detachment, on a re- 
port of the action of December 22, noted that a flash was seen on the last salvo 
from the shore battery. It was further reported that the following day one of 
the patrol planes spotted a submarine in a position which agreed with the plot- 
ted position of this last shot within three or four hundred yards. This letter 
written December 24, stated the possibility of having sunk the submarine but 
this could not be officially claimed until wreckage is found or positive proof is 
established. It was further reported that the bottom falls off very steeply fron? 
the point beneath the plotted position of this last shot. 

The marine detachment at Johnston, in a communication filed at 1930 De- 
cember 25, requested that one [16] searchlight and ten marines be added 
to the list of requirements for the station (Dec. 11, 0800). It is suggested that 
planes assigned to the station be used to ferry machine guns and gunners, the 
message stated. 

The resident officer in charge notified the commandant at 2240 December 25 
that the force of contractors' employes at Johnston totaled 307. 

CINCPAC advised the chief of naval operations (0912 December 25) that a 
convoy would depart from Pearl Harbor on the 26th to deliver supplies and 
reenforcements to Johnston. 

The Naval Air Station, Johnston, filed a despatch on December 30, stating 
the supply of 100 octane gasoline on hand December 27 totaled 56,977 gallons. 

Another commiinication on December 30 was addressed to CIKCPAC and 
the commandant in regard to authorization to the commander of Task Group 
13.2 to remove 110 civilian employes in accordance with the commandant's 
evacuation plan filed at 1640 December 26. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1463 

Exhibit No. 29 (Navt Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 

[1] SECRET * 

HisTOEY OF Action Occurring At Wake Island Feom December 7 to December 
22, As Compiled From Official, Despatches and Correspondence 

December 7 : 

(Air Raid 1 0100 GCT 8 December) 

In the first detailed report of the Japanese attack on Wake Island, December 
7 (filed to Pearl Harbor at 0840 December 8), it was stated that 25 twin engine 
land planes attacked with 100 pound bombs incendiary cannon and machine guns 
at 0100 GCT. 

The report of damages listed destruction of eight planes on the ground. The 
landing field was described as usable. An ample supply of aviation gasoline 
remained, it was said. 

Casualties numbered 25 dead and 30 injured. 

In an earlier report (received at Pearl Harbor at 2359 December 7) it was 
stated that seven marine planes were destroyed, that there were numerous 
casualties among the aviation personnel. It was further stated that gasoline 
was on fire at the Pan American Airways base and at the air field. 

December 8 : 

A summary of logged messages between Wake Island and Northern Area 
Australia was received from [2] the Commercial Cable Company by 
Pearl Harbor on December 9 as follows, with timie given as GCT : 

(Air Raid 1.) 

At 0120. December 8, Wake being bombed by 20 bombers. Many casualties. 
Help needed. Continuous SOS until 0155. 

At 0321, heavy jamming of signals. 

At 1000, Wake Island reported a continuing inability to contact Midway island. 

From 1406 to 1418 signals were jammed. 

At 1729 from Wake Island it was reported there were only four planes 
left and many casualties. 

December 9: 

(Air Raid 2 0117 GCT 9 December.) 

The log from the Commercial Cable Company stated at 0117 GCT, December 
9, Wake Island just bombed by 20 bombers and planes departed. 

A message filed to Pearl Harbor at 0112 December 9 from Wake, addressed to 
all ships and stations, reported the station bombed with incendiaries and that 
Camp 2 was ablaze. 

Task Unit 7.2.4 reported Wake heavily bombed again at 0030. It was further 
reported that NCL (radio Wake) could not be contacted. 

[5] (Air Raid 3 190O GCT 9 December.) 

The commander of Task Group 7.2 sent a communication to CINCPAC (filed to 
Pearl Harbor at 1029 December 10) stating that one enemy land plane attacked 
Wake at 190O GCT December 9, followed by several planes five hours later. These 
attacks were opposed by anti-aircraft fire. Damage from the attacks was appar- 
ently not as severe as the previous day. 

(Air Raid 4 2350 GCT 9 December.) 

Wake reported what was termed the third raid in a despatch filed at 2359 
December 9, stating that 26 bombers at 20,000 feet attacked at 2350 GCT 
December 9. Two were owned by fighters. Additional damage was described 
as slight and there were few casualties. Enemy submarines were sighted south- 
west of the island. 

December 10: 

(Surface raid.) 

(Air Raid 5 2100 GCT 10 December.) 

In a message froni Wake at 0025 December 11, it was stated that the island 
had been shelled at dawn. One enemy light cruiser and one destroyer were sunk 
by shore batteries. The island received its fourth air raid at 2100 GCT Decem- 
ber 10. Five bombers had been shot down to date, the report said. 

It was reported from Wake via Army radio at 150O December 10 that casualties 
among Pacific Naval Air Base Contractors' employees totaled 75, according 



1464 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[4] to the foreman's estimate. Early evacuation of employees was suggested. 

Wake advised the Commandant of the district at 2145 December 10, that the 
island had been shelled at dawn by several light vessels and there were no 
casualties. One light cruiser and one destroyer were sunk and two transports 
with an escort of curisers and destroyers were sighted to the southwest. 

(Air Raid 6 2205 GOT 10 December.) 

At 2350 December 10, Wake filed a report to the Commandant that an enemy 
air raid had started at 2205 OCT. Of 17 attacking bombers, two had been shot 
down by the anti-aircraft batteries. It was reported that no damage resulted 
from the attack. Three fighters remained in service. 

December 11: 

The Commandant reported to naval operations at 0400 December 11 that Wake 
had been bombed four times and shelled once since outbreak of war. Losses were 
nine marine planes. Three enemy planes had been destroyed. 

The Commandant's message mentioned reports of the sinking of one enemy 
light cruiser and one destroyer, with several enemy light cruisers and destroyers 
with transports in the vicinity. It added that landing operations were pos- 
sibly impending. 

[5] This communication also reported that Midway had been under one 
bombardment on December 8 by cruisers or destroyers armed with six-inch guns 
and that one air raid had been carried out on December 11. Personnel casualties 
were described as not extensive. 

Both Wake and Midway were still in communication and still resisting, the 
Commandant's report said. 

(Air Raid 7 dawn 11 December.) 

A communication filed from Wake to Pearl Harbor at 2035 December 11 stated 
that a single enemy four engine seaplane attacked at dawn and was brought down 
by marine fighter planes. A train vessel in convoy was reported severely pun- 
ished. An attacking submarine was believed sunk by fighters at 0530 GCT 
December 11. The convoy was apparently headed on course 210 degrees. 

CINCPAC was informed by Wake at 2230 that the Hulbert can operate two 
marine squadrons, that the only spares are in wrecked planes, and facilities 
exist for one patrol squadron and 125,000 gallons of aviation gasoline. 

December 12: 

No enemy action reported at Wake. 

First casualty list named 30 dead. Including 26 (three of whom were officers) 
from Marine Aircraft Group 21 detachment : two from the defense battalion 
[6] detachment, and two from navy enlisted personneL One additional navy 
enlisted dead was reported in a communication December 13 

December 13: 

(Air Raid 8 1630 GCT 13 December.) 

Wake notified Pearl Harbor at 1915 December 13 that three Japanese bombers 
attacked the landing field at 1630 GCT in a moonlight raid and there was no 
damage. Later (at 2100) the raiders were described as four engine seaplanes. 
The food supply was listed at 48,000 rations (man days) and the aviation gasoline, 
200,000 gallons. 

Needs for five and three inch batteries, 50 cal. machine guns, and other required 
equipment were listed in messages this date. 

A communication relayed from Wake through headquarters of the Hawaiian 
air force on December 14 said that the Army radio station reported about 2040 
local time December 13 that the Navy and Pan American Airways radio installa- 
tions had been destroyed. The Army radio was operating from a basement. 

December 14: 

(Air Raid 9 0000 GCT 14 December.) 

A message filed by Wake to Pearl Harbor at 0220 December 14 reported an 
attack of 41 twin engine (B-18 type) planes at 0000 destroyed one fighter on the 
ground [7] and killed two marines, enlisted. Two of the bombers were 
shot down and several damaged by anti-aircraft fire. 

A later report at 0715 stated that one fighter was out of action due to a forced 
landing, leaving one effective plane. 

In a summary received at 2359. Wake reported that the first two air raids were 
made at low altitude and were very effective, causing much damage from incen- 
diary bullets together with bombs. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1465 

Following plane formations remained at high altitude apparently due to regard 
for anti-aircraft fire and the fighters. 

Numerous heavy bombs were dropped in a ladder pattern, but a slightly deflec- 
tion error prevented more extensive damage, according to the summary report. 

It was added that personnel were fairly well provided with shelters and that 
construction was underway on emplacement sand covered hangars. Water and 
fuel supplies remained exposed. 

December 15: 

A message filed from Wake at 0750 December 15 said that one submarine was 
reported sighted to the southwest of the island this morning, and that one [8] 
additional plane was now operating. (Two were now in service.) 

(Air raid 10 0700 GCT 15 December.) 

At OSie Wake said that six seaplanes (four engine type) made a night attack 
at 0700 GCT, adding that no damage was ascertainable. 

Earlier (at 0216) Wake reported that 300,000 sand bags were required. The 
commandant informed the bureau of aeronautics that 2,000,000 additional sand 
bags were needed immediately in the district. This communication was sent at 
2114 December 15. 

December 16: 

(Air Raid 11 0215 GCT 16 December.) 

Wake reported in a despatch filed to the Commandant at 0245 December 16 that 
the island was raided by 33 bombers at 0215 GCT. Extent of damage would be 
given later. At 0845 December 16 it was reported that fuel oil tanks were set on 
fire in tlie raid, and there were no casualties. 

(Air Raid 12, 0650 GCT, 17 December.) 

The commandant was informed by Wake in a communication received at 0901 
December 17 that eight four-engine seaplanes attacked a half hour after sunset 
at 0650 GCT with bombs and machine guns, causing no damage. 

[0] Damage by the earlier raids was listed as follows: The principle store- 
house containing spare parts and construction material was burned. The ma- 
chine shop, blacksmith shop and garage were destroyed. Also destroyed were 50 
percent of the heavy dogging equipment, 50 percent of transportation including 
trucks, 80 percent of the Diesel oil supply and the majority of the dynamite 
supply. 

December 17: 

The commandant, in a communication sent to Wake at 0340 December 17. urged 
the desirability of continuing the channel dredging and asked for a report on the 
feasibility of this work under present conditions with existing equipment. He 
further requested an estimate on the date of completion of dredging from the 
mouth of the channel to the edge of the turning basin. Also asked if Arthur 
Foss (tug) had been seen. 

The commanding general of the Hawaiian department in a communication 
to the commandant logged at 2314 December 17 requested the return to Oahu 
from Wake of one officer and the enlisted men of the Army on duty there in the 
air corps communication section, [10] stating that army radio equipment 
involved is available to the Navy's radio personnel, if it could be used. 

A detailed view of the situation at Wake was given the commandant in a 
communication received at 0305 December 18. 

The commanding officer reported that his only concern to date has been the 
Island's defense and the preservation of life. He stated that his submitted re- 
ports have been from this viewpoint. 

In connection with conditions affecting the completion of the channel dredging, 
he said that no night work could be accomplished because of the necessity of 
lights which would endanger security. 

Because of heavy raids which come without warning, due to the fact that the 
station has no radar, daylight working hours are limited to six he reported. 

Men who are working noisy equipment cannot be given sufficient warning. 
The equipment has been greatly reduced and there are no facilities for repair. 
Immediate replenishment of Diesel oil and dynamite supplies is required. 

[11] It was added that the morale of civilian workers in general was very 
low. In view of present conditions no date of completion of the channel could be 
predicted. 

The commanding officer pointed out that it was to be understood that relief 
from raids would improve the outlook. (The tug Arthur Foss was reported to 
have sailed on December 5.) 



1466 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

A further report received from Wake at 0310 December 18 said tliat all build- 
ings on Peale Island had been heavily machine gunned and the walls and roofs 
were damaged but repairable. 

Following is the summary : 

Building One William was hit and the frame damage, and new material was 
required for repairs. Building Three William was bombed and the frame dam- 
aged (Repairs could be made in the field). Building Eleven William was 
bombed and fire destroj'ed the structure and all the material in storage. Building 
Twelve William was bombed and the frame damaged. Building Fourteen Wil- 
liam was bombed and the steel damaged. 

[12] The report added that since the outbreak of war all of the con- 
tractors' organization has been required to assist with the military defense and 
salvage. 

The commanding oflBcer at Wake, in a despatch received at Pearl Harbor at 
0324, reported that in addition to his despatch of December 13 (224.5) the con- 
tractors' dead included approximately 15 unidentified (dead and missing) em- 
ployes. He reiterated that the general morale was extremely low and suggested 
that evacuation of employes be considered in that a large number of them were 
not effective and required subsistence. 

(Air Raid 12.) 

CINCPAC informed the Chief of Naval Operations by despatch (0838 Decem- 
ber 18) that eight large seaplanes bombed Wake last night. (This report stated 
there was less activity by the enemy in the Hawaiian Area, and listed an offensive 
submarine disposition. 

December 18: 

(Air Raid 13 2350 GOT 18 December.) 

A message filed to the commandant at 2350 December IS from Wake reported 
that the island was attacked by 27 bombers at 2350 GOT and details of the raid 
would be sent later. 
[13] Decemher 19: 

At 2115 December 19, Wake filed a damage report to the commandant as 
follows : 

The west wing of building No. 41 and buildings Nos. 43 and 44 were badly 
damaged by heavy bombs. Repair will require replacement of portions of the 
structural steel framing. Buildings Nos. 15 and 17 received slight damage to steel 
framing and considerable damage to the roofs and walls. The hull of the 
channel drill barge will require rebuilding, the report added. 

CINCPAC addressed a message to all task force commanders at 1057 December 
20 to the effect that the Triton reported at 2055 (today) that it was believed a 
Japanese submarine was within 25 miles of Wake, bearing south. 

December 20: 

(Air Raid 14 21.50 GOT 20 December) 

Wake informed the commandant and CINCPAC in a message filed at 2300 
December 20 that the island was attacked by approximately one squadron of 
carrier operated dive bombers at 2150 GCT, and that details of the attack would 
be sent later. CINCPAC, at 2337, passed this information to commanders of 
Task Forces 11, 9, 8 and 4. 
[14] December 21: 

(Air Raid 15 0120 GCT 21 December.) 

A communication filed by Wake at 0715 December 21 informed the commandant 
that 17 heavy bombers attacked at 0120 GCT. The damage from this and the 
preceding raid was summarized as follows : The 3-inch battery was struck, and 
one enlisted man (Sergeant John Alden E. Wright) was killed. The director was 
destroyed, and only one 3-inch gun of the four gun battery remained effective. 

The communication added that the power plant was damaged, more of the 
diesel oil was hit, and buildings and equipment destroyed. No more carrier planes 
had participated in the latter raid, it was indicated. 

The commandant's summary to the Bureau of Yards and Docks regarding 
curtailment of contract work stated the proposed program for Wake was to stop 
all construction work and maintain only a suflScient contractors' force to operate 
essential mechanical equipment in addition to doing work of an emergency 
nature. It was estimated a force of 250 would be required to carry out this 
program. 

[15] CINCPAC requested a report from Wake on the condition of the land- 
plane runways, specifying information regarding any change (Filed at 2145 
December 21.) 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1467 

December 22: 

CINCPAC, in a message filed at 1G19 December 22, informed Wake that Task 
Units 7.2.4. and 7.2.3. were returning to Pearl Harbor and that no friendly 
vessels should be in the vicinity of the island this day. He asked Wake to keep 
him informed. 

(Air Raid 16 0120 GCT 22 December.) 

At 0740 December 22, Wake reported to the commandant and CINCPAC 
that a combination of land and carrier based enemy planes attacked at 0120 
GCT. Carrier bombers were accompanied by modern fighter planes, the report 
said, adding that the island's fighters engaged the enemy and Lt. Davidson was 
lost and Capt. Freuler was wounded. Several enemy planes were shot down. 
There was no further damage, the report said. 

A later report (filed at 1445 December 22) from Wake stated that there was 
gunfire between ships to the northeast of the island. A message from Wake 
to Task Unit 7.2.3 (delivered at 1547) reported a submarine unit 116] 
in the vicinity of the island. 

(Surface Raid 1550 GCT 22 December.) 

At 1550 December 22 Wake informed the commandant and CINCPAC that the 
island was under gun fire and apparently a lauding attempt was underway by the 
enemy. 

At 1800 December 22, Wake reported that the enemy was on the island and 
that the issue was in doubt. 

A report filed at 1952 advised that the enemy was on the island, that several 
ships and a transport were moving in and that two enemy destroyers were aground. 

Personnel on Wake during the period of attacks has been totaled as follows: 
Of the First Marine Defense Battalion, 15 oflScers and 373 enlisted men, (these 
figures include one naval officer and six navy enlisted men) ; Marine Aircraft 
Group 21, 12 officers and 49 enlisted men (including one Navy enlisted man) ; 
Naval Air Station, six oflBcers and 28 enlisted men ; Patrol Wing, four oflBcers 
and 30 enlisted men; [17] Contractors' employees, 1,146; Pan American 
Airways employees, one white and 42 Chomorros. Mr. H. P. Hevenor, of the 
Budget Bureau, was also on the island. 



Exhibit No. 30 (Navy Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 

rjf-i Naval Air Station, 

Wake Island, December 20, 1941. 
Confidential 

From: Commanding Officer, NAS Wake. 
To: Commandant, 14th Naval District. 
Subject : Report on conditions at Wake Island. 

1. The first raid on Wake came just before noon, 8 December, 1941. Wake 
had four fighters in the air, and the battery was in condition one. Remainmg 
eight fighters were on ground spotted about one hundred yards apart. They 
were being serviced with ammunition and bombs. A force of about twenty-seven 
two-engine landplanes glided out of low clouds directly over landing field and 
released a heavy load of light and a few heavy bombs. An extremely heavy 
and accurate strafing attack was carried on at the same time. Four planes re- 
ceived direct bomb hits and three others were set on fire. The eighth was struck 
several times but was later put into commission. Tents about the field were 
riddled. Two large gasoline tanks and a large number of filled drums were set 
on fire. Three officers and twenty-one men on the field were killed or received 
wounds from which they died. One fifteen hundred gal. gas truck was destroyed. 

2. The formation continued over camp two, strafing this area. Immediately 
thereafter Pan Air was heavily bombed and machine gunned. The hotel burned 
and nearly all facilities were burned or wrecked. A large number of gasoline 
drums were fired. Five chamorro employees of Pan Air killed. 

3. The Pan Air clipper, Captain Hamilton commanding, had been unloaded 
preparatory to use as a patrol plane. At about 1250 he took olf for Midway with 
all Pan Air white personnel, and all passengers excepting Mr. H. P. Hevenor of 
the Bureau of the Budget, who remains and is well. 

4. Immediately steps were undertaken to disperse personnel, distribute food 
and water supplies, and get aviation gasoline divided into small amounts. These 
measures have been continued to date, together with construction of open banked- 



1463 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

up plane emplacements and two covered hangars in which work can be done at 
night, though they are by no means bombproof. 

5. The second raid occurred at 1130 9 December 1941, was delivered by about 
twenty-five planes from about eight thousand feet. The attack was concentrated 
on camp two and the Naval Air Station. The contractors' hospital, a number of 
barracks buildings, aerological building, construction material and spare parts 
storehouse, machine shop, garage and blacksmith shop, air [2] station 
storehouse filled with stores and advance base equipment, were destroyed. The 
radio station was riddled and a large part of the equipment destroyed. Many 
other buildings and a large percentage of equipment were damaged. Two 
bombers were shot down. Others believed damaged. 

6. Two hospital units and a communications center were established in three 
empty magazines. Due to several near hits in raid of 19 December, these are 
being removed to dugouts in a less dangerous location. Five more service deaths 
occurred in second raid, and a number of civilian deaths. Some of those killed 
were wounded in hospital. 

7. Later raids added to damage to buildings and equipment. Raid of 14 
December destroyed one airplane on ground and killed two men. Otherwise 
raids since 9 December have produced no casualties and relatively little damage to 
defenses. However, there have been many heavy bombs which have fallen very 
close to objectives. 

8. Our escape from more serious damage may be attributed to the effectiveness 
of AA fire and the heroic actions of fighter pilots, who have never failed to push 
home attacks against heavy fire. The performance of tliese pilots is deserving 
of all praise. They have attacked air and surface targets alike with equal 
abandon. That none has been shot down is a miracle. Their planes (two now 
remain) are full of bullet holes. Two forced landings, fortunately without injury 
to pilots, have occurred with loss of planes. 

9. The AA battery has been fighting with only about fifty percent of necessary 
fire control equipment. Four guns are useless against aircraft. One four gun 
unit is actually being controlled by data received from another unit several miles 
distant. 

10. Only 1 and 1/4 units anti-aircraft (3 inch ammunition) remain. 

W. S. Cunningham. 



Exhibit No. 31 (Navy Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 
U. S, Naval Aib Station 

NA41/S80(09) Palmtea Islaito DJW/Fe 

Confidential. 

From : Commanding Officer. 

To : The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 

Subject : Action, report of. 

Reference: (a) Article 712, U. S. Navy Regulations. 

1. At 04-55 GCT, 24 December, 1941, this station was fired on by an unidentified 
sumarine. The submarine was first sighted S. E. of the island on bearing 110° (T) 
from the water tower, about 3,000 yards off shore, and fired six rounds from a 
gun estimated to be about 3". The U. S. E. D. Dredge SACRAMENTO was 
visible to the submarine between two small islands along the south reef, and 
was evidently used as a point of aim. Apparently a rising ladder spot was used 
and the fall of shot was not observed in time to concentrate fire. The first three 
salvos were short, the fourth a direct hit, the remaining salvos were overs. 
The hitting shell struck a boat davit, splintered, and raked the dredge, causing 
minor damage. 

2. All batteries were in Condition I before the action. The submarine was 
sighted by the 5" control party on No. 3 Island before firing commenced, but 
pointers and trainers had great diflSculty in picking up the target due to darkness 
and low elevation of gun platforms. Two (2) star shells and twelve (12) Navy 
Common 5" A. P. shells were fired by the battery. No hits were observed but 
the submarine was forced to dive. 

3. Upon sounding of the alarm, stations were manned expeditiously and with- 
out confusion by service personnel not on gun crews and civilian volunteer parties. 
Morale was excellent. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1469 

4. Action is being taken to elevate gun platforms in order to improve visibility 
of pointers and trainers. 

5. There were no casualties to i)ersonnel. 

D. J. Wexsh. 

Exhibit No. 32 (Navy Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 

[i] NA40/A9-8 U. S. Naval Aik Station, 

Ser. 0185 Johnston Island, December 19, 1941. 

Confidential. 

From : Tlie Commanding Officer. 

To : The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 

Subject : Attaclc on Johnston Island. 

1. The U. S. S. BURROWS arrived off Johnston Island on the afternoon of 
December 15th and anchored about three miles south of the turning basin at 
approximately 1500 in order to deliver her tow to this station and to evacuate 
civilian workmen. 

2. Inasmuch as the Contractors had only two small tugs of about 100 horse 
power each, and a good sea was running, they experienced some difficulty in 
handling the heavy barge which was loaded with about 1400 tons of cargo. 

3. Meanwhile the two Navy forty foot motor launches brought off the seventy- 
seven civilian workmen that were to be evacuated from Johnston Island. 

4. The Commanding Officer went aboard the BURROWS and was sux'prised to 
learn that no naval escort had contacted that ship prior to her arrival at 
Johnston. It was anticipated that at least one destroyer would probably meet 
the BURROWS here and escort her to Pearl Harbor. This seemed to indicate 
one of two things: either all available combatant were at sea seeking contact 
with the enemy far to the Westward or our fleet was so badly battered that no 
ships could be spared away from Pearl Harbor for escort duty. Either assump- 
tion seemed to indicate that we could exi)ect no supplies from Peni-l Harbor for 
at least a month. Arrangements were therefore made with the BURROWS for 
the transfer of all available meat, fresh vegetables, welding oxygen, and some 
Marine Corps supplies such as sand bags. 

5. Because the two small tugs were still struggling with the heavy barge and 
would probably be fortunate to bring it safely within the harbor by dark it was 
not feasible to effect the transfer of these supplies before morning. , It was 
planned that the BURROWS should remain at anchor and a lighter would be 
brought alongside at dawn. The anchorage was considered relatively safe from 
submarines because that area is known to be studded with coral heads which is 
probably known to the enemy. 

[2] 6. At ISoO (Johnston Island keeps Zone plus 10^^ time) the tower 
sentry reported a flash to the northward. All hands went to General Quarters. 
The 5" and 3" batteries are manned continuously and therefore observed the 
initial flash. A radio striker was walking towards the radio shack and also 
saw the opening shots. He immediately informed the radio supervisor who sent 
out the initial message at 0520 OCT. Nothing could be seen with the naked eye 
except the flash of the gunfire. It was dusk and there was a small squall to the 
northward. "Visibility to the southward was excellent. Johnston Island and 
the BURROWS stood out in good relief. Wind was from 070° T, 20 knots, Seas, 
force 7. 

7. The flashes continued at intervals of about twenty seconds. "Various observ- 
ers reported the first shells as over or shorts. However, as no one observed both 
sides of the island at the same time, and no shorts or overs have been recovered 
to date, it appears reasonable to assume that the first shots were not hits. The 
third salvo, however, landed in the vicinity of the Contractors' power house. 
One shell passed through the upper part of the building and caused only a 
moderate amount of damage from splinters. The second, struck a pole outside 
the power house, exploded, and showered a 1200 gallon oil tank just outside of 
the power house. The tank went up in flames setting fire to the power house. 
Some splinters went into a 50,000 gallon fresh water tank which is located under 
the large water tower about 150 feet to the westward. 

8. Two more shells struck the permanent power house at the eaves of the roof 
and about thirty feet apart. They showered the interior of the building with 
fragments, causing some damage to one new generator, the electric power panel 
and various piping. No fire was started. 



1470 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

9. The two power house operators immediately secured the boilers and ran 
from the building. One jumped into a manhole alongside the road. The burning 
oil soon spread and ran down the road. The operator who took shelter in the 
manhole was in a dangerous spot when the oil ran in the hole. He quickly 
climbed out and luckily escaped with only minor burns on his hands. The 
damage control crew arrived on the scene and fought the blaze with sand and 
salt water. 

10. The fifth hit passed through the permanent mess hall without exploding 
and continued to a spot near the road where it exploded and left a small crater 
about one foot deep and two feet in diameter in the soft earth. This shell made 
a very clean entry hole that measured 5.5 inches in diameter. Its exit on the 
opposite bulkhead of the building was about 4.5 x 5 inches and very ragged. 
There were several other holes on each side of the exit hole about three inches 
long. The reason for the clean hole on one side is believed due to the shell passing 
through canex wall board. The exit was through wood which splintered and 
partially sprung back into place. 

[3] 11. As observed from the Naval Air Station at Sand Islet, Johnston 
Island seemed doomed. The large oil fire was near the up-wind end and seemed 
in good position to sweep down the entire length of the island which lies with its 
long axis in the direction of the prevailing wind. The buildings and water tower 
were well illuminated by the blaze which rose to an estimated height of fifty feet. 

12. Our five inch battery control personnel could not make out the enemy ships, 
but from the flashes of gunfire, estimated the range as 9,000 yards. The guns 
were laid in the general direction of the enemy flashes and fire was returned. 
Three rounds of star shell and seven of common were fired. One gun pointer 
"thought" he saw a dim object in his telescope. Nothing was sighted for certain. 
Shortly after our battery opened fire, the enemy ceased and never opened up 
again although he apparently had the correct range and the target was well 
Illuminated. 

13. The heavy black smoke from the oil fire further prevented the five inch 
battery, which is on the leeward end of the island, from seeing the enemy. The 
fire continued to burn for approximately forty-five minutes and was finally 
brought under control after leveling the contractors power house. 

14. Soon after Johnston Island was afire the BURROWS got underway and 
stood to the southward. 

15. Our three-inch AA battery director and height finder operators did pick up 
the enemy. The range was between 9,000 yards and 10,000 yards. There were 
at least two ships. It seemed that the attacking force consisted of surface craft, 
rather than a submarine. The operators were positive that one ship was larger 
than the other. It is possible that the ships were a light cruiser and a destroyer. 

16. Several valuable lessons were learned from this experience. Fii'st, all 
wires should be underground if possible. The shell that exploded on the pole 
outside the Contractors jwwer house severed the telephone connections between 
Johnston Island and the Naval Air Station Sand Islet. A boat had to be des- 
patched from Sand Islet to Johnston to determine the extent of damage and 
casualties. On returning the dark, the boat struck a coral head and remained 
there until morning. It is noted that a 230O volt power is strung on poles approxi- 
mately half the length of the island. It is highly recommended that in future 
installations all jjower lines be run in trenches. Second, the instantaneous burst- 
ing shell does not make a large hole in the ground, therefore, if personnel are in 
shelters that are moderately well protected (two or three feet of sand overhead) 
it is probable that they will not suffer from this [41 type of attack. Third, 
unprotected oil and water tanks and power houses are extremely vulnerable. 
Inasmuch as these facilities are so important to outlying island bases, it is recom- 
mended that immediate steps be taken to protect all oil and water tanks and the 
power houses from shell splinters. A one foot thick reenforced concrete wall 
around these installations should be adequate. Fourth, the arrangement of the 
wooden structures at Johnston Island is dangerous from a fire standpoint, be- 
cause they are arranged in a single line along the long axis of the island which 
corresponds to the prevailing wind direction. A fire well started on the up- 
wind end may clear all of these buildings. The hospital and B. O. Q. (Yet to be 
build) are on the downward end of the line. It is strongly recommended that 
instead of building the highly combustible hospital building, that a partially 
underground structure of bomb-proof construction be substituted in its place. 
This is considered vital for good morale. It would be damaging on morale to 
have sick or wounded men confined in a tinder-box hospital building while their 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1471 

shipmates took refuge in bombproof shelters during an air raid. Fifth, it is 
believed that the high water tower was the point of aim which afforded the enemy 
such an excellent target. The five known liits are uniformly disposed about the 
target in deflection. His range error on these five hits would plot about 10 yards 
plus or minus from this tower. " It is recommended that in future outlying island 
development that high water towers be eliminated, and replaced by pumping 
systems to supply water pressure. Sixth, it is believed that the outlying islands 
have little to fear from surface raiders. They apparently do not push home their 
attacks if opposition is encountered. This is substantiated by reports from the 
defense forces at Wake and Midway. 

17. The Commanding Officer believes that this station may be subjected to other 
attacks in the near future, but believes that they will be from a carrier. The 
enemy planes apparently push home their attacks when they know that no fighter 
opposition is to be expected. Even if fighters are stationed here a determined 
enemy can get in an attack, if he will accept some losses. Therefore, it is recom- 
mended that bombproof personel shelters and splinter protection for oil and 
water tanks and the power house have priority over any further wooden build- 
ing construction. It is further recommended that the seaplane ramp on .lohnstoa 
Island be constructed so that the Air Station Inay be moved to that island and 
services to patrol planes and land planes be coordinated, and the large 100,000 
gallon gasoline stowage may be used by the patrol planes. 

R. H. Dale. 

Exhibit No. 33 (Navy Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 

05 — Comiat for. Orders issued 

since. 
[1\ Confidential Confidential 

Summary of new instructions, orders, and arrangements issued since 7 De- 
cember, 1941, pertaining to the security of Pearl Harbor and the Pacific Fleet, 

Summaries are arranged by dates and in chronological order. While such 
directives are believed to be complete in the case of type commanders concerned, 
there may be additional directives issued by the Commander-in-Chief which are 
not included in this particular file. 

[2] DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY COMMANDEE-IN-CHIEF, PACIFIC FLEET 

Cincpac confidential mailgram 100143 of December 1941. Re : Redistribution of 
available ammunition. 

Cincpac mailgram 111310 of December 1941. Re: Forwarding of intelligence 
data (insignia, name plates, etc.) to Fleet Intelligence. 

Cincpac despatch 12213.1 of December 1941. Re : Modification of liberty restric- 
tions to permit ^A of complement of officers and men on liberty between 0900 
and 1700 daily. 

Cincpac cnntidential mailgram 131024 of D?cember 1941. Re: Removal 4-5" 
A. A. guns, etc., from CALIFORNIA for installation ashore. 

Cincpac confidential letter serial 02025 of 13 December 1941. Re: Ships in port 
maintaining Condition "YOKE" or "ZED" and manning all A. A. batteries. 

Cincpac confidential mailgram 160011 of December 1941. Re: Removal supply 
of paint except for necessary touching up, etc. 

[3] Pacific Fleet confidential memo No. 9CM--41 of 16 December 1941, Re: 
Mninfenance of ships, Pacific Fleet. 

Pacific Fleet confidential letter No. 18CL-41 of 16 December 1941. Re: Responsi- 
bility of Force, Type, Task Force, Unit and Ship Commanders for conservation 
of fuel. 

Pacific Fleet confidential letter No. 17CL-41 of 16 December 1941. Re : Approach 
doctrine for friendly naval aircraft. 

Pacific Fleet confidential notice No. 21CN-41 of 16 December 1941. Re: Painting 
of naval ships. 

Cincpac confidential mailgram 182243 of December 1941. Re: Modification of 
liberty restrictions to grant over-night liberty to officers and enlisted men with 
families ashore ; not over Vl personnel to be absent during either daily liberty 
period or overnight liberty period. 



1472 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Cincpac confidential letter serial 020S4 of December 21. 1941. Re: Coordination 
of patrol aircraft with light forces in night search and attack. 

Cincpac confidential serial 02079 of December 22, 1941. Re : Air patrol plan for 
sorties and entrance. 

[^] Hickam Field memorandum of 21 December, 1941. Re: Conference 
between representatives of Compatwiug TWO and Hawaiian Air Force on 
method of aircraft identification markings. 

Cincpac confidential serial 0207S of 21 December, 1941. Re: Hawaiian Naval 
Coastal Frontier Defense — Directives in regard thereto. 

Pacific Fleet confidential letter No. 20CL-41 of 21 December 1941. Re: Condi- 
tion of readiness requirements for Conditions I to IV, respectively. 

Pacific Fleet confidential memorandum No. lOCM^l of December 22, 1941. 
Re : Spotting location of mines dropped from enemy ai'-craft. 

Pacific Fleet confidential letter No. loCL-11 uf December 22, 1941. Re : Initial 
berthing of ships in Pearl Harbor to facilitate delivery of fuel and ammunition, 
etc., and final berthing to expedite repairs, provide security, facilitate sortie, 
etc. 

Cincpac confidential serial 02091^ of December 22, 1941. Re : Instructions for 
Anti-submarine patrol by aircra'ft on day escort duty. 

Pacific Fleet confidential letter No. 19CLr-41 of 23 December 1941. Re : Supple- 
mentary Instructions for Escort Commanders and Commanding Officers of 
Escort Vessels. 

[5] Pacific Fleet confidential notice No. 22CN^1 of December 23, 1941. 
Re: Control of anti-aircraft fire from ships in Pearl Harbor — "Open fire", 
"check fire", "cease fire" etc., orders to be sent by the Naval anti-aircraft 
artillery representative. 

Cincpac confidential serial 02107 of December 24, 1941. Re: Stationing of 
salvage tugs outside the net. in the channel, whenever heavy ships enter or 
leave Pearl Harbor, to render assistance and prevent a damaged ship from 
grounding in such a manner as to block the channel. 

Cincpac confidential serial 02115 of December 24, 1941. Re : Protection, by target 
rafts, of cruisers berthed in Pearl Harbor, in so far as equipment permits. 

Cinci)ac confidential serial 02120 of 2.5 December 1941. Re : All reasonable 
assistance from radio, radar and lights to be given to aircraft returning to 
Oahu during darkness. 

Cincpac conf. serial 02121 of 25 December, 1941. Re: Employment and modifi- 
cation of Motor Torpedo Boats. 

Cincpac conf. serial 02132 of 26 December. 1941. Re: Unified Grid System for 
Location of Positions in Oahu Defensive Coastal Area. 

Cincpac restricted serial 29S1 of 28 December, 1941. Re : Surprise Attack. 
. Sundays and Holidays. 

[6] DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY COMMANDEB BATTLE FORCE 

Combatfor confidential serial 01203 of 13 December 1941 (and Cincpac's en- 
dorsement thereto). Re: Suspension of steel plates from bottom of torpedo 
rafts for torpedo protection. 

[7] DIBECTrVES IBSTTED BY COMMANDER ATBCRAFT 

Comairbatfor confidential mailgram 121800 of December 1941. Re : Canopy covers 
on planes, etc., and take all necessary precautions to prevent reflection on 
surfaces. 

Comairbatfor (Comtaskfor 8) visual despatch 161812 of December 1941. Re: 
Conditions of readiness in port. 

[8] DIRECTIVES ISSUED BT COMMANDER BATTLESHIPS 

Combatships confidential memorandum No. 2 of 10 December 1941. Re: Re- 
capitulation of various despatches on current subjects. 

Combatships confidential mailgram 110230 of December 1941. Re: Manning 
complete A. A. batteries continuously by MARYLAND, TENNESSEE and 
PENNSYLVANIA. 

Combatships confidential mailgram 110717 of December 1941. Re: School of 
motion picture instructions for training in plane identification. 

Combatshii)s confidential mailgram 110850 of December 1941. Re : Reorganiza- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1473 

tion of CALIFORNIA and NEVADA of A. A. defense groups of 450 per ship. 

Combatships confidential memorandum No. 4 of 13 December 1941. Re : Recapitu- 
lation of information on current subjects. 

Combatships confidential mailgram 132005 of December 1941. Re: Repainting 
of ships with new formula and eliminate all bright or reflecting surfaces 
topside. 

[9] Combatships confidential mailgram 140027 of December 1941. Re: 
Recommending use of 5"-51 caliber batteries against torpedo planes. 

Combatships confidential mailgram 160132 of December 1941. Re: School for 
enemy plane identification. 

Combatships confidential mailgram 162030 of December 1941. Re: Distribution 
of battleship boats upon ships going to sea. 

Combatships confidential mailgram 162039 of December 1941. Re: Taking 
aboard planes and aviation personnel before going to sea. 

Combatships confidential mailgram 170925 of December 1941. Re: Preventive 
precautions against underwater damage by liquid layers inside oil tanks. 

Combatships confidential mailgram 180055 of December 1941. Re: Damaged 
battleships reduce number retained officers. 

Combatships confidential memorandum No. 6 of 19 December 1941. Re: Re- 
capitulation of information on current subjects. 

[10] DIRECTIVES ISSTJED BY COMMANDER CRUISE3K, BATTLE FOHCE 

Comcrubatfor despatch 112120 of December 1941. Re: Recall of officers and 
enlisted personnel assigned Fleet Machine Gun School and Base Force Camera 
Party. 

Comcrubatfor confidential serial 01392 of 14 December 1941. Re : General notes 
on maintenance of readiness for action. 

Comcrubatfor confidential serial 01395 of 15 December 1941. Re : General direc- 
tives on development of fighting power. 

Comcrubatfor confidential serial 01412 of 21 December 1941. Re: War readiness 
of batteries, ammunition and ammunition supplies. 

Comcrubatfor confidential mailgram 210032 of December 1941. Re: Setting of 
condition of readiness 3 in anti-aircraft and machine gun batteries. 

[11] DIKECTIVES ISSUED BY COMMANDER DESTROYER BATTLE FORCE 

Comdesbatfor confidential serial 016.59 of 13 December 1941. Re: Condition of 
readiness of battery for destroyers and tenders. 

Comdesbatfor despatch 0407 BT of 14 December 1941. Re: Handling of berth 
assignment by Comdesbatfor for all destroyers with view to developing maxi- 
mum elTective A. A. fire. 

Comdesbatfor confidential mailgram 141913 of December 1941. Re : Alertness of 
destroyer commanders during sortie and entry. 

Destroyer information bulletin No. 1 of 14 December 1941. Re: Recapitulation 
of information on current subjects. 

Comdesbatfor confidential mailgram 152143 of December 1941. Re: Screening 
vessels accompanying entering ships as close to point Affirm as practicable. 

Comdesbatfor confidential serial 01666 of 16 December 1941. Re: Comment on 
loss of submarine contacts. 

Destroyer harbor information bulletin No. 2 of 19 December 1941. Re : Recapit- 
ulation of information on current subjects. 

[12] Comdesbatfor confidential serial 01691 of December 23, 1941. Re : Naval 
base defense conditions prescribed for Destroyers and Destroyer Tenders. 

[13] DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY COMMANDER MINECRAFT, BATTLE FORCE 

Cominbatfor letter FF12-6/L9-3 of December 7, 1941. Re : Completion of over- 
haul and repairs of Mine Division ONE at earliest possible date. 

Cominbatfor confidential 1st End. FF12-6/A79(06) of December 12, 1941. Re: 
Additional Anti-aircraft Machine Guns for Mine Division ONE. 

Ui] DIRECTIVES issui':d by commander b-'^sr force 

Combasefor confidential mailgram 152100 of December 1941. Re : Limited provi- 
sions on board to maximum of six weeks' supply. 

Combasefor restricted mailgram 200032 of December 1941. Re : Transfer of motor 
boats from damaged battleships to Com 14 for harbor patrol. 



1474 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
115} DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY COMMANDER SXTBMABINE 8C0ITTINQ FORCE 

Comsubscofor serial 1872 of 10 December 1941. Re : Dispersal of living quarters 

of command personnel to reduce hostile air raid casualties. 
Comsubscofor confidential serial 01088 of 13 December 1941. Re : Setting material 

conditions for ships in Pearl. (Cincpac confidential serial 02025 of 13 

December. ) 
Comsubscofor confidential serial 01091 of 15 December 1941. Re: Providing of 

submarines with double purpose guns with mixture of A. A. and common 

projectiles. 
Comsubscofor letter No. 24-41 (Revised), of 16 December 1941. Re: Detailed 

instructions on special internal security measures for all ships of Commander 

Submarine Scouting Force. 
Comsubscofor confidential serial 01103 of 19 December 1941. Re : Dispersal of 

submarines and tenders to lessen chances of damage from air raids. 
Comsubscofor confidential mailgram 200103 of December 1941. Re : Manning of 

machine guns and A. A. Batteries by U. S. S. PELIAS. 
Comsubscofor confidential letter No. 13-41 of 20 December 1941. Re : Destruction 

bill for preventing seizure and compromise of classified material in submarines 

operating in hostile waters or on hazardous duty. 
[16] Comsubscofor confidential serial 01108 of 22 December 1941. Re : Verbal 

directives for: (1) armed sentries ashore, (2) setting of command watch cona- 

posed of senior submarine officers, (3) camouflage of submarines in Pearl, (4) 

escort of incoming and outbound submarines. 

[i7] DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY COMMANDER PATROL WING ONE 

Patwing One order No. 30-41 of November 22, 1941. Re: Internal Security — 
Watches and Duties. 

Compatwing One confidential file A8/(3) of December 9, 1941. Re: General In- 
structions for Secuiity Watches. 

Compatwing One confidential letter AS(3) 0248, enclosure (C), of Dec. 23, 1941. 
Re: Itemized list of security measures taken by Commander Patrol Wing ONE 
and by Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H., since 
December 7, 1941. 

[18] DIRECTIVES ISSUED BY COMMANDER PATROL WING TWO 

Naval base defense air force order 4-41 of 17 December 1941. Re : Security and 

readiness (material and operational) for aircraft based ashore. 
Security measures established by aircraft tenders at Hilo. (Undated). Re; 

General security measures for tenders moored at HUo. 
Verbal instructions to naval shore-based aircraft. Re : Alertness of aircraft and 

daily schedules. 
[19] 1. Retain ships (BB, CV, and CA) in Pearl only long enough to fuel and 

prepare for sea. Keep ships at sea when ever practicable. 
2. Use Pearl only as required because of necessity to fuel or for essential ma- 
chinery overhaul. 
8. AA guns manned at all times and at General Quarters, No main battery or 
5"-51 magazines to be opened except by order of C. O. 

4. % crew and officers on board. 

5. Two hours notice for getting underway unless longer period authorized. 

6. Use of nets and target rafts as torpedo protection. 

7. Combined staffs of C-in-C and Combatfor. 

8. Reorganized work of StafE and in watches for Tactical Section. 

9. Increased space available for Staff work. 

10. Issued policy re plane readiness after unity of command effective. 

11. Installed AA Guns of badly damaged ships. 

12. Organized communications with Army Intelligence Center and Harbor 

Control. 

13. Concurred in disablement of Army outlying fields and preparing main field 

for instant demolition. 

14. Assigned certain fleet units to Comdt. 14 for escort and patrol. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1475 

15. Made recommendations re depth of rafts. 

16. Assigned all aircraft from ships in port to Combatwing Two. 

17. Organized a task unit of 2 VP's for attack missions. 

IS. Reorganized communication facilities to provide more direct service between 
CincPac Tac, Compatwing Two, Com 14 and Army Int. Center. 

19. Organized mine effective system for sorties and entries. 

20. Dispersed submarine units so far as practicable. 

21. Reassigned officer and enlisted personnel of inoperative ships. 

22. Created salvage group for sorties and entries. 

23. Provided uniform grid system for all control and intelligence stations and 

operating units. 

24. Established censorship. 

25. Appointed temporarily a more experienced Chief of Staff for Operations. 
[20] 26. Used planes to search to maximum of number and radius to return 

before dark. Many inexperienced pilots makes night return 
hazardous during blackout. 

27. Gave Army additional radar equipment and personnel. 

28. Made air organization more effective. 

29. Wrote letter to Commanding General about beach patrol. 

30. Organized supply parties for DD's at Merry Point. 

31. Blackout. 

(At this point in the original exhibit there is inserted a rough sketch 
map of Pearl Harbor showing a berthing plan for ships with names 
of ships berthed inserted on the map. This map is reproduced as 
Item No. 44 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commis- 
sion.) 



Cincpae File No. 
A2-11/FF12(2) 
A16(l)/(96) 
Serial 2981 

Restricted 



United States Pacific Fleet jb 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 



Pearl Harbor, December 28, 1941. 
Pacific Fleet Notice 45N-41 



From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 

To : Pacific Fleet. 

Subject : Surprise Attack, Sundays and Holidays. 

1. Regardless of directives previously issued on the subject, the Commander- 
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is fully aware that the events of December 7, 1941, have 
caused all ships and stations of the Pacific Fleet to assume a constant state of 
readiness against surprise attack. 

2. However, it should be especially noted that the Japanese and German 
tactics and psychology make Sundays and holidays likely days for attacks. 

3. Therefore, Commanding Oflicers of all ships and stations of the Pacific 
Fleet are enjoined to be particularly vigilant on Sundays and holidays to guard 
against surprise attacks. Care should be taken in granting liberty and shore 
leave in accordance with existing instructions so that essential armament and 
ship stations can be manned and maintained in prescribed state of readiness. 

W. S. Pyk. 
Distribution: (7CM-41) 
List II, Case 2, P, X. 

ND11-ND14; EN3; NAll, 12, 13, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 37, 38; NB18; 
NY&-10 ; QA. 
P. C. Crosley, 

Flag Secretary. 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 143, vol. 3 13 



1476 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

United States Pacific Feeet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 
Al6-3/AD/(ll) 
Serial 02132 

Peael Hakbor, T. H., December 26, 1941. 
Confidential 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
To : Commander Naval Base Defense Force 
Subject : Unified Grid System for Location of Positions in Oahu Dnf ensive Coastal 

Area. 
Reference : 

(a) N. L. B. D. F. Order No. 1. 

(b) Pacific Fleef Gonf. Letter 16CL-41. 

(c) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memorandum lOCM-41. 

1. The subject system was furnished ships of the Pacific Fleet by reference (b). 
It will be noted that paragraph 3 of i*efei'ence (b) limits the use of the chart to 
certain purposes. Paragraph 6 of reference (a) is not in accord with para- 
graph 3 of reference (b). 

2. Reference (c) applies to ships in port where it will be diflScult to use the 
system prescribed in reference (a). 

3. It is, therefore, requested that paragraph 6 of reference (a) be modified to 
provide that reports be made as provided in paragraph 3 of reference (c). 

M. F. Draemel. 
Chief of Staff for Operations. 

United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 
CinC File No. 
A2-11/FF12 
Hl-3/(12) 
Serial 01989 

Confidential Peakl Haebor, T. H., December 4, 1941. 

Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. IGCL-Iil 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
To : PACIFIC FLEET. 

Subject : U. S. Army Position Grid — Hawaiian Area. 

Enclosure : (A) Construction and Method of Use of U. S. Army Position Grid for 
Hawaiian Area. 

1. The U. S. Army uses a "unified grid system" for designating positions. The 
part of this system covering the Hawaiian Area is described in enclosure (A). 

2. Each unit of the Pacific Fleet is directed to delineate this system on a 
copy of U. S. C. & G. S. Chart No. 4102. The Commander-in-Chief, United States 
Pacific Fleet, is requesting the preparation of an overprint chart from the 
Hydrographer, but it will be some time before this will be ready for issue. 

3. This chart is to be used only for identifying positions reported by the U. S. 
Army or in reporting positions direct to the Army. It is not to be used foi" 
purposes to which the Naval operating area chart is applicable. 

H. E. Kimmel. 
Distribution: (7CM-41) 
List II, Case 2. 

P. X. EN3, EN22, NAll, NA12, NA31, NA37, 
NB18, NB49, NDll-14, NY8-NY10. 
Cincaf (10). 
Cinclant (50). 

P. C. Crosley, 
Flag Secretary. 
USS Penn.— 113 — 12-4-41—1300. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1477 

United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsyi.vanta, Flagship 
Cincpac File No. 
A4-3/QL/ 
A16-3/AS/ 
Serial 02121 

Confidential Pearl Hakbob, T. H., December 25, 19^1. 

From : Commander-in-CIiief, United States Pacific Fleet. 

To : Commander Base Force. 

Subject : ]Motor Torpedo Boats — Employment and Modification of. 

1. The employment of motor torpedo boats in harbor defense suggests certain 
modifications which may improve their usefulness. It is understood that 600-lb. 
depth charges are too heavy for the light construction of the boats when handled 
on the stern, and that the 300-lb. depth charge cannot be set to detonate in less 
than fifty feet of water. 

2. Please investigate the possibilities of removing the two after torpedo tubes, 
replacing them witli racks capable of carrying and releasing 300-lb. depth 
charges, and of modifying the depth charge pistol to permit detonation of the 
charge in thirty feet of water. 

W. S. Pye. 



United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 
Cincpac File No. DA 

A4-3/VZ/(95) 
Serial 02120 

Confidential Pearl Habrob, T. H., 25 December lOJfl. 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
To : Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. 

Commander Patrol Wing TWO. 
Subject : Return of Aircraft to Oahu during Darkness— Use of Lights for. 

1. Because of the extensive daily aircraft search now in effect, involving return 
to Oahu during darkness of numerous planes at approximately the same time, 
and because of the considerable period during wliich these planes have been 
flying in darkness prior to their arrival and the difficult problem in orientation 
imposed by the approach sector requirements, the Commander-in-Chief desires 
that planes returning during darkness be given all reasonable assistance from 
radio, radar and lights. 

2. Commander Patrol Wing TWO is, accordingly, authorized to employ these 
types of assistance as may, in his opinion, be necessary either as a matter of 
routine or under special circumstances. 

3. With respect to lights that are not under the direct control of Commander 
Patrol Wing TWO, the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District shall promptly 
comply with requests made by Commander Patrol Wing TWO. Commander 
Patrol Wing TWO shall specify what lights are required, what time or times 
they shall be lighted and shall, further, inform the Commandant Fourteenth 
Naval District promptly when they are no longer needed and may be turned off. 

4. Commander Patrol Wing TWO is requested, in exercising this authority, 
to keep the use of all lights to a reasonable minimum consistent with safety of 
aircraft. 

W. S. Pye. 
Copy to : 

ConGenHawDept 
ComGenHawAirForce 

P. C. Crosley, Flag Secretary. 



1478 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 
Cincpac File No. (Es) 

II/A16-3(S)/(01-Op) 
Serial 02115 

Peakl Harbor, T. H., December 24, 1941. 
Confidential 

From : Commauder-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
To : Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. 
Subject : Berthing in Pearl Harbor. 

Reference: (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 15CL^41, (File A2-11/FF12/H1- 
1/(12) Serial 02081 of 22 December 1941) . 

1. Paragraph 4 of reference (a) is quoted : 

"Capital ships moored in berths exposed to air torpedo fire will be protected 
by target rafts at all times. Commander Base Force is hereby directed to make 
these target rafts available to the Harbor Control Officer for this purpose." 

2. The Commander-in-Chief desires that in so far as equipment permits, 
Cruisers be protected by target rafts. 

M. F. Draemel, 
Chief of Staff for Operations. 
Distribution: (Special) 
Opnav (5) 
Combatfor (5) 
Comscofor (5) 
Combasefor (5) 

Comer uscof or (35) for distribution to Cruscofor. 
Comcrubatfor (25) for distribution to Crubatfor, 
P. C. Crosley 
P. C. Crosley, 

Flag Secretary. 
12-23^1- (150) 

United States Pacific Fleet 
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 
Cincpac File No. 

A4-3/QL/(12) Sn 

Serial 02107 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., Dec. 24, 1941. 

Confidential 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 

To : Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. 

Commander Base Force. 
Subject : Sortie and Entry to Pearl Harbor— Salvage Tugs, 

1. Whenever heavy ships enter or leave Pearl Harbor, Commander Base Force 
will station salvage tugs (NAVAJO and SEMINOLE if available) in the channel 
outside the net, to render assistance and prevent a damaged ship from groundiag 
in such a manner as to block the channel. 

2. Whenever the Harbor Control OflScer ^authorizes transit of the channel by a 
heavy ship or ships, he will inform Commander Base Force sufllciently in advance 
to permit carrying out this order. 

3. "Heavy ship", ia this order, means battleships, carriers, cruisers, and auxil- 
iaries over 3000 tons or more than 300 feet in length. 

W. S. P^-E. 
P. C. Crosley, Flag Secretary. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1479 

United States Pacific Fleet 
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

[1] Cincpac File No. 

A2-11/FF12/ 

A16-3/CV/fll) 

Serial 02083 
Confidential 

Peakl Harbor, T. H., December 23, 19J/1. 

Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. WCL-U 

From : Comniancler-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 

To : PACIFIC FLEET. 

Subject : Supplementary Instructions for Escort Commanders and Commanding 

Officers of Escort Vessels. 
Reference: (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 12CL-41 

1. Reference (a) contains instructions and information for the guidance of 
escort commanders and commanding officers of escort vessels. The instructions 
and information contained herein are supplementary to those of reference (a), 
which has six sections. This letter therefore starts with the seventh section. 

(VII) General Convoy Procedure. 

(71) It is to be expected that each ship of a convoy will have information as to : 

(a) Sortie and entrance plans (where applicable), 

(b) The formation, and disposition of ships in the convoy. 

(c) Convey speed, 

(d) Codes, and ciphers, 

(e) Procedure in reduced visibility, 

(f ) Zig-zagging procedure and evasive course methods, 

(g) Action to take in case of separation or straggling from convoy (ren- 
dezvous ) , 

(h) Necessity of steaming completely darkened at night. 

(i) Dangers inherent in straggling, smoking, throwing refuse over the side, 

(j) Necessity of maintaining radio silence. 

(k) Emergency signals. 

(72) Normally, convoys are to be expected to be formed on a broad front with 
four to five ships in column with : 

( a ) Defensively armed and/or fast ships in outer columns or in the rear, 

(b) Ships in starboard or port columns according to destination (where 
applicable), 

(c) Heavy ships not stationed astern of lighter ones, 

(d) Valuable cargoes and oil tankers in inner columns, 

(e) Motor ships at rear of columns because of erratic station keeping. 

[2] (73) (a) Certain vessels in convoy may be expected to hold the follow- 
ing publications, and to be instructed in their use : 

(1) Merchant Navy Code and Decode. 

(2) Recoding Tables for (1). 

(3) Merchant Ship War W/T Call Sign. 

(4) Mersigs. 

(5) Zig-zag diagrams (1940). 

(6) International Code of Signals. 

(b) U. S. flag vessels in convoy are to be expected to hold such of the above 
as may have been issued plus : 

(1) U. S. Merchant Vessel Secret Call Signs (under preparation). 

(2) Merchant Ship Cipher. 

(3) F. T. P. 189 (which contains instructions to U. S. flag convoys). 

(74) It is expected that during an attack by the enemy the convoy will carry out 
the Convoy Doctrine which requires that : 

(a) Convoy will scatter (1) When attacked by raider. 

, (2) During night attacks, or thick 
weather, when strength of enemy 
unknown. 

(b) Convoy wiU not scatter___ (1) When attacked by submarines. 

(2) When attacked by aircraft. 



1480 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



(c) (1) During submarine attacks, or when submarines are known to be 
in the vicinity, the convoy will turn away from the sector 
presenting the greatest threat. 
(2) Ships in convoy are usually instructed not to open fire on a sub- 
marine at distances of over 6000 yards, but under that distance 
all ships that can bear will be ready to open fire if and when 
ordered. 

(VIII) Outline of Operation Order and Annexes Thereto. 

Note: All of the items following are not necessarily applicable to a particular 
operation. They are included as a check-off list in order that the Escort Com- 
mander may have some assurance that his instructions are complete. 

(81) The Operation Order. 

Annex A firm — Communication Plan. 
Special Radio Calls, Surface Ships. 
Special Radio Calls, Aircraft. 
Special Visual Calls. 
[3] Anne.r Baker — Operating Doctrine and Instructions. 

(1) Command: Succession of command in case of loss of visual 

contact. 

(2) Fog. 

(3) Heavy ships leaving disposition, action of destroyers: 

(a) Carrier. 

(b) Other combatant ships. 

(c) Convoy ships. 

(4) Condition of Readiness. 

(5) Dawn General Quarters. 

(6) Destroyer Screen. 

(a) Stationed by senior destroyer commander. 

(b) Rotation in stations to equalize fuel consumption. 

(c) Distance from Main Body, day, night, moonlight. 

(d) Use of Sound gear. 

(e) No fog signals. 

(f ) Filling gaps when destroyers leave station. 

(7) Radar Plan. 

(8) Boiler Power. 

(9) Searchlight and starshell search. 

(10) Pumping bilges. 

(11) Position Reports and reference positions. 

(12) Successive rendezvous or ships becoming separated. 

(13) Fuel Reports. 

(14) Weather and aerological reports. 

(15) Aircraft operations. 
fl6) Man overboard. 

(17) Ship torpedoed. 

(18) Towing. 

(19) Zig-zags. 

(20) Changes of course while zlg-zagging. 

(21) Signalling. 

(22) Lights. 

(23) Standard rudder. 

(24) Investigation of contacts. 

[4] (2.5) Smoke candles, not to be used by cruiser aircraft before landing. 

(26) Paravanes. 

(27) Degaussing gear. 

(28) Clianges of course after dark. 

(29) Use of whistle when changing coui'se at night. 
Annex Cast — Contact Doctrine. 

(1) General. 

(2) Submarine contact, action on : 

(a) Convoy. 

(b) Escorting cruisei-s. 

(c) Carrier. 

(d) Aircraft. 

(e) L'estroyers. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1481 

(3) Surface raider contact, action on : 

Same as (a) to (e) above. 

(4) Aircraft contact, action on: 

Same as (a) to (e) above. 

(5) Low visibility contacts. 

(6) Use of smolie. 
Annex Dog — Sortie Plan. 

Annex Easy — Cruising dispositions. 
Annex Fox — Entrance Plan. 

M. F. Dkaemel, 
Chief of Staff for Operations. 
DISTRIBUTION: (5CM-41) 
List I Case 2 ■ A * X ■ 

ENS ; 'eN4 ; FF9 ;'nD11-14 ; NDllAC ; NY8-10 ; 
Cincaf A (Type Comdrs.) ; Cinclant A (Type Comdrs.) 

P. C. Ceosley, 

Flag Secretary. 
trSS Wnit— 12-23-41— IM 

United States Pacific Fleet 
U. S. S. Pennsylvania. Flagship 

Cincpac File No. 
A2-11/FF12(2)/ 
A16-3/AD/(01-Op) 
Serial 02095 

Pearl Hakbob, T. H., December 23, 1941- 
Confidential 

Pacific Fleet Confidential Notice No. 22 CN-41 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 

To : PACIFIC FLEET. 

Subject : Control of Anti-aircraft Fire from Ships in PEARL HARBOR. 

Reference : (a) N. L. D. F. Order No. 2 of 11 December 1941. 

1. Attention is invited to the following quotation from reference (a) : 
"The Naval anti-aircraft artillery representative will control the fire of Naval 

Units and Ships in Pearl Harbor." 

2. The control referred to is the "open fire," "check fire," "cease fire," etc., 
which orders will be sent direct to ships in Pearl Harbor from the Harbor 
Control Office on the Senior OflScer Present Afloat common ASP-PEARL 
frequency. 

M. F. Deaemel, 
Chief of Staff for Operations. 
Distribution: (7CM-41) 

List II, Case 1 : P ; X ; NDll-14 ; NY8-10 ; NTS ; NTSA(l) . 
P. C. Ceosl?:y, 

Flag Secretary. 

United States Pacific Fleet sa 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 
Cincpac File No. 
A4(l)/(12) 
Serial 02091 

Pearl Haeboe, T. H., December 22, 1941. 
Confidential 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
To : Commander Task Force FIFTEEN. 

Subject : Instructions for Anti-Submarine Patrol by Aircraft on Day Escort Duty. 
Enclosure: (A) Subject instructions. 

1. Instructions for standard anti-submarine patrol by aircraft on day escort 
duty are forwarded herewith, enclosure (A), for distribution to ships of the 
Escort Force equipped with aircraft. These instructions are for use when only 



1482 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

one or two airci'aft are available. When aircraft in greater numbers are avail- 
able, the Inner and/or Intermediate Patrols described in U. S. F. 74 and 75 are 
to be used. 

2. Copies of this correspondence are being furnished to battleships, cruisers, 
carriers, and patrol plane units which may furnish air escorts. 

M. F. Dkaemel, 

Chief of Staff. 
Distribution 

Comtaskfor FIFTEEN (25 for distribution) 
Battleships (3 each) 
Cniisers (4 each) 
Carriers (75 each) « 

Comairscofor (5) 
Patwings (1 per plane) 
P. C. Crosley, 

Flag Secretary. 

Instructions for Anti-submarine Patrol by Aircraft on Day Escort Duty 

Confidential 

1. Single aircraft 

(a) When a single aircraft is acting as air escort for a convoy or for one or 
more vessels in company by day, it is essential that as large an area as practica- 
ble be covered ahead and on the flanks of the surface units. An Inner Air Patrol 
by a single aircraft is not effective, and adds little to the security of the surface 
units, particularly if the convoy is also escorted by destroyers equipped with 
sound gear. 

(b) Under the above circumstances the anti-submarine patrol will be flown 
by a single aircraft as shown in the accompanying diagram. It is imperative 
that tracks be accurately flown ; otherwise the efficiency of the search is reduced. 
Also the time at which a plane reports contact will indicate at once its approxi- 
mate position relative to the convoy, even though the plane be at the instant 
beyond sight contact. The plane having the last watch for the day should, 
whenever possible, make a brief search astern the last thing before leaving^ 
station. 

2. Two aircraft 

(a) When two aircraft operate simultaneously with a convoy, one will cany 
out the standard patrol, the second conduct search astern, covering an area from 
one beam of the convoy to the other between 10 and 20 mile radii. 

3. Aircraft on anti-submarine escort duty will, if practicable, be armed with 
depth charges. 

4. The accompanying diagram is scaled for speed of advance of convoy of 
eight knots. For greater speeds of advance, leg number 3 will be increased, 
so as to equal the distance made good by the convoy in one-half hour. 

Enclosure (A). 

(Enclosure A is a diagram of Standard Anti-Submarine Patrol for 
Single Aircraft on Escort Duty. This diagram is reproduced as Item 
Xo. 45 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.) 
Standard patrol for a single aircraft on escort duty 

Leg No. Miles 

1. 15 miles ahead of surface vessels 15 

2. 15 miles at right angles to track of surface vessels to starboard 15 

3. 4 miles ahead 4 

4. 30 miles on reciprocal track to (2) 30 

5. Back to surface vessels 20 

6. Brief search to 8 miles astern 16 

100 
Repeat 1 to 6. Aircraft are to be flown so that the circuit is completed 
in one hour. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1483 

[i] United States Pacific Fleet Sn 

U. S. S. Pennsylva>?ia, Flagship 
Cincpac File No. 
A2-11/FF12 
Hl-1/(12) 
Serial 02081 



Confidential 



Pearl Hakbok, T. H., December 22, 19^1. 



Pacific Fleet Confidentiql Letter 15 CL-Jfl 



From: Conmiander-iu-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
To : PACIFIC FLEET. 
Subject: Berthing in Pearl Harbor. 

Reference: (a) Cincpac rest, serial 240S of 25 October 1941. (b) Pacific Fleet 
Confidential Letter 2CLr-41 (Revised). 

1. Reference (a) is hereby cancelled. 

2. Effective immediately, all berths in Pearl Harbor are placed under the 
jurisdiction of the Harbor Control Oflicer (Captain of the Yard) as the repre- 
sentative of Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (Commandant, Four- 
teenth Naval District), who will assign berths to all ships present or entering 
by visual if practicable, or by radio if entry is to be made during darkness, 
consideration being given to the following: 

(a) Initial berthing shall be such as to facilitate delivery of fuel, ammuni- 
tion, provisions, and supplies. 

(b) Final berthing shall be such as to : 

(1) Expedite repairs. 

(2) Provide best security by uniform distribution of anti-aircraft bat- 
teries. 

(3) Facilitate sortie. 

(4) Facilitate normal administration provided (1), (2) and (3) are not 
made ineffective thereby. 

(c) Circumstances permitting, destroyers will be berthed initially at Merry 
Point for supplies and fueling. Before completion of fueling, the representa- 
tive of Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, will advise the Harbor Control 
Officer which destroyers should be berthed alongside tenders. 

[27] 3. Within the limitations prescribed above, priority at berths at Sub- 
marine Base shall be given to units of Submarines, Scouting Force, and near 
the Naval Air Station to Aircraft, Scouting Force. 

4. To facilitate patrol plane operations in the North Channel: (a) Berth 
X-10 will be left vacant, (b) Berth X-9 will be used only in emergency, and 
then by not more than one ship, (c) Berths on the North Channel side of Ford 
Island will contain not more than two ships abreast, and when two ships are 
abreast in any of these berths, boat booms on the channel side will be rigged in. 

5. Capital ships moored in berths exposed to air torpedo fire will be protected 
by target rafts at all times. Commander Base Force is hereby directed to 
make these target rafts available to the Harbor Control Officer for this purpose. 

W. S. Pye. 
Distribution (7CM-41) 
List II, Case 2. 
P, X, NTS, NTSA (1), ENl-3, 
NDll-16, NY8-10, NB49 (5). 
Cinclant (50). 
Cincaf (25). 

P. C. Crosley 
P. C. Ceosley, 

Flag Secretary. 



1484 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Es 



United States Pacific Fij:et 
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 



CinCPac File No. 
A2-11/FE12(1) 
F41/EF37/(01) 
Serial 02080 



PEARL Harbor, T. H., December 22, 19^1. 



Confidential 

PacMc Fleet Confi,dentlal Memorandum No. 10 CM-jl 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 

To : PACIFIC FLEET. 

Subject : Mines Dropped by Aircraft. 

1. In a recent air raid against the British, mines were drorppd Ity J:irMnes;e 
planes. In the event of a future raid, it appears possible that mines may be 
dropped in this area. With a large number of "drops" occurring at or near 
the same time, it probably will be impossible to determine which "drops" ex- 
ploded (bombs), and which did not (mines). 

2. Each ship of the Pacific Fleet will detail observers to fix and record the 
position of each "drop". The position may be fixed by the position of the ship, 
giving bearing and distance qf the "droii"', and if possible, fix The line of the 
"drop" from the ship by ranging or lining up objects on shore. 

3. Reports should be forwarded immediately in order that the area can be 
cleared at the earliest possible moment. 

W. S. Pye. 
Distribution: (7CM-41) 
List II, Case 1 :— 

P ; X ; EN3 ; NDl-16 ; NY8-10 ; NB49 ; 
Cincaf ; Cinclant. 
P. C. Crosley, 
P. C. Ceosley, 

Flag Secretary. 



[1] United States Pacific Fleet rn 

U. S. S. Pets^nsylvania, Flagship 



Cincpac File No. 

A2-11/FF12/ 

A4-3/QL/(90) 

Serial 02086 

Confidential 



Pearl Harbor, T. H., 21 December 1941. 



Pacific Fleet Confi^dential Letter No. 20 CL-H. 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. .^ 

To : PACIFIC FLEET. 

Subject: Security of Fleet at Base — modification of Conditions of Readiness. 
References : 

(a) Pacific Fleet conf. Itr. No. 2CI/-41 (Revised). 

(b) Cincpac conf. Itr. A16(l)/(11) Serial 02025 of Dec. 13, 1941. 

1. Reference (a), paragraph (G) (6) (d) (7) is changed to read as follows: 
"(7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed: 
Condition I — General Quarters in all ships. Highest material condition com- 
patible with required operations. 

Condition II — Antiaircraft batteries fully manned on a watch basis in accord- 
ance with approved Type Organization (Condition III at sea). Material Con- 
dition YOKE or BAKER. Ammunition condition of readiness as prescribed by 
Type Commander. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1485 

Condition III — One-half the antiaircraft battery manned on a watch basis 
as prescribed by Type Commander. Material Condition YOKE or BAKER. 
Ammunition Condition of Readiness as prescribed by Type Commander. 

The Senior Officer in nest or ships closely grouped will make adjustments in 
this condition of battery readiness, in order to insure best coverage of all 
practicable arcs of fire, and to reduce personnel on watch. 

Condition IV — Antiaircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) 
of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns 
required for each sector). (Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base 
Defense Officer. 

Note.— Conditions of readiness or degrees of alertness of aircraft ^re those 
prescribed by the Naval Base Air Defense Commander in separate corre- 
spondence. 

2. Reference (b) will be cancelled and this change will be in effect when the 
Base Defense Officer advises the Condition of Readiness and refers to this serial. 

W. S. Pyb. 
Distribution: (7CM-41) 

List II, Case 1 ; P, X. NB49 
ENl, ENS, NA12, NB49, ND11-ND14, 
NY8-10, 
Asiatic, (2.T) 
Atlantic (50) 

P. C. Ceosley, 
P. C. Orosley, 

Flag Secretary. 

United States Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsyi>vania, Flagship 
CinC File No. 

H12/NB/(01-Op) 
Serial 02078 

PE.VKL Harbor, T. H.. December 21, 19-',1. 
Covfidential 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
To : Commandar Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. 
Subject : Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier Defense. 

1. The Naval Base Defense Plans and orders require certain modifications to 
improve coordination between Army and Navy to: (a) permit full use of all 
weapons against hostile craft, and at the same time, (b) provide security of our 
own forces and friendly or neutral shipping from the fire of our own ships 
or shore batteries and from air attack by our own planes. To accomplish the 
above, it is essential that accui'ate information of our own forces be promptly 
disseminated. 

2. To implement that which follows, the Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal 
Frontier is hereby directed to arrange for the proclamation of a Maritime Con- 
trol Area, to include all the sea area within a circle of radius 45 miles, center 
in latitude 21°-30' North, longitude 158°-O0' West. He will require that no 
merchant shipping enter this area without his authority between the hours of 
local sunset and local sunrise. He will regulate entry into, movements within, 
and departure from the Maritime Coastal Area of all merchant shipping. 

3. The Army Information Center is the central agency for the collection and 
dissemination of information. Filter Centers will supply information required 
from Naval Activities to the Army Information Center as follows : 

4. AIR. 

(a) Search and Bombardmoit Aircraft. Bomber Command (Commander Pa- 
trol Wing TWO) is designated Filter Center for information concerning all 
planes operating under his command, and those listed in (b) and (c) below. 
Bomber Command wnll be cognizent of the positions of all planes for which he 
acts as Filter Center and will, as I'equired by circumstances, transmit this in- 
formation to Information Center and the Commander-in-Chief. 

(b) Ship-based Aircraft. To provide local control of flights of ship-based 
planes to and from ships at sea, instructions have been issued that sucli planes 
may not depart any airfield or naval air station in the Hawaiian Aiea, nor 
approach within 100 miles of Oahu without obtaining permission frona Bomber 



1486 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Command. Aiij- plane taking off and turning back -whiU' still within 100 miles 
of Oahu must promptly report its action to Bomber Command. Prescribed 
approach and departure procedures must be observed. 

(c) Civilian Aircraft, will be required by Bomber Conunand to obtain clear- 
ance from him for any flight in the Hawaiian Area. 

5. SURFACE CRAFT AND SUBMARINES. 

(a) The Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier (short title "Coastal 
Frontier") is designated as Filter Center for information concerning the move- 
ments, routes, etc., within a radius of 700 miles from Oahu, of all merchant 
shipping. Naval Transportation Service, vessels chartered or operated by the 
Army, convoys, escorts, and Coastal Frontier Forces, including Harbor Entrance 
and Offshore Patrols. Commander Base Force is directed to supply to Coastal 
Frontier up-to-date information concerning all naval auxiliaries and ocean es- 
corts under his command. As required by circumstances. Coastal Frontier will 
transmit to Information Center and Bomber Command information concerning 
the shipping listed in this sub-paragraph. Information of movements within the 
45-miIe circle is of vital importance to Information Center in tlie offensive control 
of Coast Artillery. Information of movements within the 700-mile circle is of 
vital importance to Bomber Command in the offensive control of Search and 
Bombardment Aircraft. 

(b) The Commander-in-Chief will act as Filter Center for naval combatant 
surface units, except those listed in sub-paragraph 5 (a) above, and submarines. 
He will supply information as required to Information Center. Bomber Com- 
mand and Coastal Frontier on movements of these units within 700 miles of Oahu. 

6. Conditions for Offensive Action. 

(a) As a further refinement, three conditions for offensive action are 
prescribed : 

(1) HOSTILE. When it is definitely known that no friendly ships (air- 
craft) are in the area : 

ALL BATTERIES SHOOT ON CONTACT. 

(2) FRIENDLY. When it is definitely known that own ships (aircraft) 
are operating in the particular area : 

POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION MUST BE MADE BEFORE OPENING 
FIRE. 
(3) DOUBTFUL. Own forces at sea or aircraft in the air, positions or move- 
ments not definitely known, information incomplete or inconclusive: 

WITHHOLD FIRE FOR CHALLENGE OR CHECK THROUGH INFORMA- 
TION AND FILTER CENTERS. SHOOT IF ENEMY CHARACTER IS 
PROBABLE. 

(b) Different conditions may be prescribed for different types at the same 
time, as : Air Friendly, Submarine Hostile, Surface ships Doubtful. 

(c) Different conditions may be prescribed for different sectors of the Maritime 
Coastal Area at the same time, as : Sector 120 to 240 Friendly, Sector 240 to 120 
Hostile, or Sector 240 to 120 may be further characterized as Friendly to Air, 
Hostile to Submarines and Surface Craft. 

(d) The condition to be in existence at any time will be prescribed for : 

(1) Air — By Information Center. 

(2) Naval Combatant Surface Ships and Submarines — By the Connnnnder- 
in-Chief. 

(3) Other Surface Ships — By Commander Hawaiian Naval Coastal 
Frontier. 

W. S. Pte. 
Copy to : 

Combasefor 

Comsubscofor 

Compatwing TWO 

ComGenHawDept. 

ComGenHawAir Force 

ComGen Air Raid Warning Service 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1487 

HiCKAM FiEiLD, T. H., 21 Decemier lO^l. 
Subject : Coufereuce on Aircraft Identification Markings. 
To : Commander Pat Wing 2 

Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. 
1. At a conference held 21 December 1941 between Commander O'Beirne, 
Patrol Wing 2, and Major Moore, Hawaiian Air Force, the following method of 
aircraft identification marking was agreed upon and is herewith submitted for 
the approval of their Army and Navy Commanders : 

a. Standard circles and stars will be placed on upper and lower side of right 
and left wings (for biplanes on top of right and left upper wing and on bottom 
of right and left lower wing). The centers of the star circles will be approxi- 
mately one third the distance from the wing tip to the fuselage proper. The 
diameters of the circles will be equal to the full chord of the wing. 

6. Standard circles and stars will be placed on each side of the fuselage between 
the trailing edge of the wing and the tail surfaces. Centers of the circles will be 
located to give maximum diameter to the circles. 

c. Alternate red and white stripes parallel to the longitudinal axis of the plane 
will be painted on both sides of the rudder surface proper. Seven (7) red and 
six (6) white stripes will be evenly spaced between top and bottom of the rudder, 
widths and lengths of the stripes to be dependent on size of rudder, 

O'Beirne, 
Lt. Commander, V. 8. Navy. 
E. Moore, 
Major, V. 8. Ai'mv. 
Enclosure : (A) 



United States Pacific FLEf:T 
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Cincpac File No. 
A16-3 (3)/(ll) 
Serial 02079 
Conpdent'uil 

Peaei. Harbor, T. H., Deeember .22, 19Jtl. 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 

To: PACIFIC FLEET (Carrying Aircraft). 

Subject : Air Patrol Plan for Sortie and Entrance. 

Enclosure: (A) Cincpac A16-3 (S)/(02055) of 18 December 1941. 

1. The subject Air Patrol Plan No. 1 for Sortie and Entrance is considered more 
effective for heavy ships than other standard plans. 

W. W. Smith. 

Chief of Staff. 
Distribution (7CM-41) 
List II, Case 1. 

CBF, BS, CL. CDBF, SF, CASE, 
PWl, PW2, TTSP, CUW, MAG21. 
ENll, NA12, NA37. 
Special. 

Comobswing (10) 
Senav Obswing, NAS Pearl (10) 
Senav Cruscowing, NAS Pearl (10) 
ENTERPRISE (50) 
LEXINGTON (50) 
SARATOGA (50) 
P. C. Crosley 
P. C. Croslet, 

Flag Secretary. 



1488 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

United States Pacific Fleet 
U. S. S. PENNSYI.VANIA, Flagship 

A16-3 (S)/ (02055) 
Confldcniial, 

Peari, Hakbor, T. H., 18 December 19^1. 

Ah' patrol plan, for sortie and entrance No. 1 

1. Air Patrol 

(a) The Inner Air Patrol will consist of six planes in two defensive lines of 
three each. Only the forward semi-circle will be patrolled. 

(b) Stations to be patrolled are as follows : 



sta- 
tion 



Location 



Center of ellipse (area to be covered) is on bearing 045° relative to base course distant 2000 

yards from leading ship __ 

Center of ellipse (area to be covered) Is on bearing 000° relative to base course distant 2000 

yards from leading ship. 

Center of ellipse (area to be covered) is on bearing 315° relative to base course distant 2000 

yards from leading ship 

Center of ellipse (area to be covered) is on bearing 045° relative to base course distant 5000 

yards from leading ship 

Center of ellipse (area to be covered) is on bearing 000° relative to base course distant 5000 

yards from leading ship 

Center of ellipse (area to be covered) is on bearing 31 5° relative to base course distant 5000 
lyardsfrom leading ship... 



jVltitudp 



800 
1200 
1000 
1000 
1200 

800 



2. The area covered by each of the inner line of patrolling planes will be 
an ellipse about 2 miles long and a halt' a mile wide; with the long axis normal 
to the line of bearing of the center of the ellipse. The area covered by each of the 
outer line of patrolling planes will be an ellipse covering the area between rela- 
tive bearings 020° to 070° for station 4. between relative bearings 340° to 020° for 
station 5, and between relative bearings 290° to 340° for station 6. Concentrate 
search efforts in a direction away from the sun. Attack at once any submarine 
sighted. 

(A diagram of the above described air patrol appears as a part of 
this communication. The diagram is reproduced as Item No. 46 in 
EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.) 

M. F. Draemel, 

Rear Admiral, 
Chief of Staff for Operations, 
Commander-iti-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
H. S. Covington, 

Lieutenant Commander, 
Flag Secretary. 



United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 
Cincpac File No. 
A16-3/(12) 
Serial 02084 Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 21, 19^1. 

Confidential 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 

To : Commander Destroyers, Battle Force. 

Subject : Light Forces in Night Search and Attack. 

Reference : 

(a) Comdesron Six Itr. A5-1/FC6 Serial 0199 of October 15, 1941. 

(b) Comdesbatfor 1st End. AlG-3 Serial 01451 of October 21, 1941. 

(c) Combatfor 2nd End. A16-3/FF2/A5-1 ( 13 ) Serial 011G9 of December 

1, 1941. 
1. The changes proposed in "Light Forces in Night Search and Attack" by 
references (a) and (b) are approved. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1489 

2. Ill addirion, add the following article: 

Coordination with Patrol Aircraft 

1187. Specific instructions for coordinating tlie efforts of patrol aircraft 
with night search and attack operations of light surface forces have not been 
included in the foregoing. When patrol aircraft are available to the Attack 
Force Commander they may be used to replace or supplement search or track- 
ing, to provide illumination, or to attack with bombs or torpedoes. The 
nature of the patrol aircraft operations must be decided by the Attack Force 
Commander, with full consideration for the capabilities of patrol aircraft 
under existing conditions of weather and visibility. 

3. You are requested to have the amended "Light Forces in Night Search and 
Attack" printed as U. S. Pacific Fleet Tactical Bulletin No. 5-41 and delivered 
to the Commander-in-Chief for distribution. The form should be similar to 
that of other Fleet Tactical Bulletins of recent issue. Three thousand copies 
are required. 

M. F. Draemel. 

Chief of Staff. 



Commander Battle Force 
u. s. naval message 

Heading : 1S2243 Destroy by burnins 

Confidential Mailgram 
All previous instructions regarding liberty Hawaiian area are hereby can- 
celled X Liberty may be granted for not more than one quarter your comple- 
ment enlisted personnel in each 24 hour period provided all useful armament can 
be manned adequately at all times X Liberty may commence any hour after 
0900 but expires on board at 1700 X Overnight liberty may be authorized for 
those members of one quarter personnel on liberty having bona fide families and 
homes ashore X In each case written authority by commanding officer with 
man's address on pass must be carried by those so authorized X Personnel 
granted overnight liberty are not to be granted liberty prior to 1600 such liberty 
to expire 0100 on board X No liberty personnel will be permitted on streets 
during night X Shore leave for officers shall be granted on same basis. 
DATE RECEIVED 19 DEC 41 (GCT) /DC/F CWO 

From : CINCPAC 182243 

Action to : All ships present Hawaiian area Com Fourteen. 
Info to : Sempatoft" Honolulu. 

flag seceetary 

United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Cincpac File No. 
A2-11/FF12(1) 
L9-5/(50) 
Serial 02047 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 16, 1941. 
Confidential 

Pacific Fleet Confidential Memorandum No. 9CM-41 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
To : PACIFIC FLEET. 

Subject: Maintenance of Ships, Pacific Fleet. 
References : 

(a) Cincpac Conf. Itr. L9-5/(50) Serial 01823 of November 10, 1941. 

(b) C. N. O. Conf. Itr. Op-25-FIK ( SC ) L9-3 Serial 0139623 of September 

11, 1941. 

(c) Cincpac Conf. Desp. 160232 of December 1941. 

(d) Pacific Flept Regulations, 1941, Chapter IV. 

1. Operating demands require that the present directives and facilities for 
maintenance be reviewed with a view to reducing upkeep and overhaul periods 
to the absolute minimum, and setting up the necessary administrative offices to 
insure that ships of all types returning to port get immediate action on any re- 
pairs which may be required. 



1490 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. The general outline of the plan contemplated is as follows : 

(a) Each Type and Force Commander having ships in the Hawaiian Area 
will, where not already so organized, establish an administrative office in port 
provided with technical and clerical personnel to administer the material upkeep 
of his command. Each ship returning to Pearl Harbor to be boarded as soon as 
possible by a representative of the Type Commander, and her repair require- 
ments determined and arranged for, by tender or repair ship if pi'acticable, other- 
wise by restricted availability at Navy Yard, Peai'l Harbor. The whole effort 
of all concerned to be directed toward the earliest practicable accomplishment 
of the repairs to make the ship an effective operating unit. Type Commanders 
having no tender or otlier repair facilities assigned directly under them, should 
locate their administrative offices with or adjacent to Commander Base Force, 
in order that the fullest use may be made of the repair ships assigned to the 
Base Force. Telephone communications are considered essential to the efficient 
discharge of duties of these administrative offices. 

(b) It is contemplated that the Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor will be utilized for the 
accomplishment of urgent i-epairs beyond the capacity of the forces afloat, and 
important military alterations which can be accomplished during .short periods 
of restricted availability, and during short scheduled overhauls to be known 
as "Interim Overhauls." Work involving navy yard stays of one month or 
longer, excepting work which may be necessary to make ships seaworthy, will 
be undertaken at a mainland yard. 

3. Based on the above, it is requested that the Type Commanders forward via 
Force Commanders recommendations regarding the following matters : 

(a) Proposals regarding administrative offices where not already organized. 

(b) Minimum safe ratios of upkeep to operating periods and general schedule 
proposed. 

(c) Length of "interim" and "regular" navy yard overhauls and maximum 
acceptable intervals between these. 

(d) List of ships requiring immediate assignment to an "interim" or "regular" 
navy yard overhaul before being considered an effective operating unit. 

4. For the present and until further notice, ships will only be considered not 
available for operations due to the need for urgent repairs or logistic services. 
Type Commanders in Pearl, or in their absence, their administrative offices, or 
where neither of these is available in Pearl, then the Commanding Officers of the 
ships returning to port shall keep the Commander-in-Chief continuously ad- 
vised of the availability for operations of ships in port both as to date and hour. 
Where derangements involving urgent repairs are involved give : 

(a) Brief notation of the derangement, 

(b) Estimated time, to correct, and activity undertaking work. 

(c) Limitations in speed or armament until completion of repairs. 

(d) Time required to get underway during repair period. 

H. E. KiMMEX. 

Distribution (7CM-41) 

List II, Case 2, P. X. 
ENS, EN6, EN28, ND11-ND14, 
NY8-NY10, Cincaf, Cinclant. 
P. C. Crosley 
P. C. Ceosley, 

Flofj Secretary. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1491 

United States Pacific Fleet 
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 
Cincpac File No. tlar 

.\2-ll/FF12(2) 
S19/(50) 
Serial 02050 
Confidential PeaIil Harbor, T. H., Decemter 16, 19^1. 

Pacific Fleet Confidential Notice No. 21CN-U 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
To : PACIFIC FLEET. 
Subject : Painting of Ships. 
Reference * 

■ (a) Buships Itr. C-A10/S19-(4) (341-250)/ C-EN28/A2-11 of October 15, 
1941. 

(b) Pacific Fleet Confidential Notice 15CN-41. 

(c) Buships Itr. C-S19-7(341) of October 20, 1941. 

(d) Cincpac Conf. Itr. S19/(50) Serial 01593 of October 6, 1941. 

1. By reference (a), the Bureau of Ships distributed the first revision of 
Ship Camouflage Instructions (Ships 2). dated September 1, 1941. 

2. NeAV paint products, formula 5U and formula 5TM, are under manufacture, 
and initial shipments have reached Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, where they are in 
stock. 

3. In accordance with paragraph 3 of reference (a), the following measures 
of revised Ships 2 are hereby placed in effect for ships of the Pacific Fleet : 

(a) Surface ships, less carriers — Measure 11 except that "Navy Blue", formula 
5-N will be used in place of "Sea Blue", formula 5-S. "Navy Blue", formula 
5-N, is made from untinted white base, Formula 5-U, by the addition of 15 pints 
of tinting material. Formula 5-TM, to five gallons of base. 

(b) Carriers — As in (a) above, excepting that flight decks shall continue to be 
painted in accordance with instructions issued by Commander Aircraft, Battle 
Force. 

(c) Submarines — Measure 9. 

4. Navy Blue formula 5-N has been specified instead of Sea Blue formula 
5-S because preliminary observations indicate Sea Blue to be too light in color. 

5. Inasmuch as supplies of new paint products in this area are still limited, 
application of Measure 11 is, for the present, restricted to those ships in need of 
complete repainting. ■ Measure 5, false bow waves, and Type-Concealment Meas- 
ures 6, 7 and 8 of old Ships 2 have proven valueless. Ships shall discontinue 
these, even before complete repainting is undertaken. Upon the new paint 
products becoming available in quantity, instructions will be promulgated cover- 
ing the general application of Measure 11. Experimental measures now applied 
to the PORTER, FLUSSER, LA]\ISON, MAHAN and DRAYTON shall remain 
effective until repainting is required. 

6. Instances of attempts to attain improved appearance, by adding varnish, 
linseed oil, or other ingredients not called for by the formula, or rubbing down 
exterior painted surfaces with linseed oil, have been noted. These practices 
produce glossy surfaces and increase specular reflection. They shall be dis- 
continued. 

W. W. Smith, Chief of Staff. 
Distribution (7CM-41) 

List II, Case 2 ; P, X2, X8, 
ENS, EN7, NDll-14, NY8-10, 
NB49(5), Cincaf (25), Cinclant(50). 
P. C. Ceosley, 

Flag Secretary. 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 3 14 



1492 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Tnited Stati:s Pacific Fleet 
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Ciucpac File No. 

A2-11/FF12/ 

A6-3/A16-3/P/{20) 

Serial 02041 

Confidential Peakl Harbor, T. H., December 16, 19^1. 

Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 11 CL-4I 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 

To : PACIFIC FLEET. 

Subject : Approach Doctrine for Friendly Naval Aircraft. 

1. The following doctrine shall be followed when friendly Naval aircraft 
approach either units of the Fleet or to U. S. Navy outlying Island Bases. Sepa- 
rate procedure may be prescribed for approach to major bases as has already been 
done for the Island of Oahu. This doctrine only supplements the extracts from 
effective recognition and emergency identification signals and does not replace 
them. 

(a) Aircraft approach from outside of gun range in simple cruising formation 
(if more than one plane) on bearing 045° T. or 225° T. on odd days (GCT), and 
135° T. and 315° T. on even days (GCT), from center of formation or station at 
1000 feet or under. (These bearings may be changed if necessary by local authori- 
ties.) They shall never approach from the bearing of the sun when the sun is low. 

(b) If ship or station does not recognize plane as friendly it challenges by mak- 
ing "Zs" on searchilght, or by training searchliglit with red filter on plane if avail- 
able ; otherwise at shore bases use a red smoke bomb during daylight and a red 
rocket a night. 

(c) On seeing challenge the plane, or leading plane if there is a formation, 
replies as follows : 

(1) Dai/time. — On odd day of the month (GCT), leave formation, circle 
to the right and, when back on the approach course, dip right wing twice ; on 
even days (GCT), leave formation, circle to the left and, when back on ap- 
proach course, dip left wing twice. This must be made distinctive, dipping 
the wing about 30 degrees to the prescribed side and returning to horizontal 
after each dip. 

(2) Night. — Turn on running lights and proceed as for daytime replies to 
challenge, except circling may be omitted ; or make emergency identification 
pyrotechnic signal prescribed in effective cryptographic publications. 

(d) Day or night acknotvledgement by surface unit. — When approaching air- 
craft are recognized as friendly, the recognition station shall train on the ap- 
proaching aircraft a powerful searchlight, make "Fs" or show green colored light. 
Those signals indicate to planes that they are recognized as friendly and will not 
be fired on. 

2. In a Fleet formation the recognition stations will be, unless otherwise desig- 
nated, those ships on the outer circle closest to approach bearings 045° T. and 
225° T., or 135° T. and 315° T. (depending on the day), from Fleet center. 

H. E. KiMMEL. 

Distribution: (7CM^1) 
List II, Case 2; P, X, 
ENS, NAll, NA12, NA26, 
NA31, NA37, NB18, NB49, 
ND11-ND14, NY8-NY10. 
Comdg. Gen. Hawaiian Area (25) 
Cinclant (50) 
Cincaf (25) 

P. C. Croslet, 

Flag Secretary. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1493 

United States Pacifio Fleet kii 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Peael Harbor. T. H., Decemher 16, 19-il. 
CinCPac File 
A2-11/FF12 
JJ7/A5-7/(16) 
Serial 02043 
Confidential 

Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter ISCL-'fl 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 

To : PACIFIC FLEET. 

Subject : Excessive Fuel Consumption. 

1. Reports reaching the Commander-iu-Chief indicate excessive and alarming 
rates of fuel consumption in the various types of ships. In some instances a cruis- 
ing radius of about half of that to be expected has been indicated. This is a 
matter of the gravest concern. Our theater of activity covers vast ocean areas. 
The logistic problems are difficult of solution at best. Improvement in engineer- 
ing performance is essential, in order that this fleet may not suffer serious handi- 
cap in planning and in execution of operations of the greatest importance. 

2. The Commander-in-Chief is well aware of the various considerations that 
lead to increased fuel consumption in war over that of peace. But giving due 
weight to those factors, he can not accept the poor performances which are far 
too prevalent. 

3. Force, Type, Task Force, Unit and Ship Commanders each bear a heavy 
individual responsibility in bringing about prompt and marked improvement. 
The operating seniors in prescribing speed, boiler power, and reserve requirements 
must do so in accordance with the situation existing at the time. The type and 
ship commanders must make every effort to insure eflacient plant operation in 
meeting the pi'escribed requirements. 

/S/ H. E. KiMMEL. 

Distribution: (7CM-41) 
List II, Ca.se 2 : 

P, X2, ENS, EN28. 
/s/ P. C. Ckosley. 
Flag Secretary. 



Commander Battle Force 

u. s. naval message 

Heading: 160011 Destroy by Burning 

Confidential mailgram 

Remove at earliest opportunity all supplies of paint and ingredients except as 
necessary for outside touching up and striping and marking. 
Date received : 16 Dec 41 TJ/F CWO 

From : CINCPAC 160011 
Action to : Pacflt 



United States Pacific Flesit 

U. S. S. PENNSYI.VANIA, Flagship 
CinOPac File No. 

A16(l)/(11) ib 

Serial 02025 
Confidential Pearl Harbor, T. H., 13 December, IB.'fl. 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
To : Commander Battle Force. 

Commander Scouting Force. 

Commander Base Force. 

Commander Aircraft, Battle Force. 

Commander ]\Iinecraft, Battle Force. 

Commander Battleships, Battle Force. 



1494 CONGRESSIOXAL IXVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Cruisers, Battle Force. 
Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force. 
Commander Destroyers, Battle Force. 
Commander Submarines, Scouting Force. 
Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force. 
Commander Patrol "Wing TWO. 
Commander Mine Squadron TWO, Base Force. 
Subject : Material Condition of Ships in Pearl. 

1. Ships in port will maintain Material Condition "YOKE" or "BAKER" and 
man all anti-aircraft batteries at all times. In case of air raid Condition "ZED"' 
will be taken but main battery personel of battleships and cruisers and secondary 
battery personnel of battleships will not leave anti-aircraft condition watch 
stations until relieved by regularly assigned personnel. No main battery nor 
battleship secondary battery magazines shall be opened until specifically ordered 
by the Commanding Ofiicer. 

2. Addresses are responsible to see that ships in their command are informed 
of the above by copies furnished herewith. 

/S/ H. E. KiMMEL. 

P. C. Crosley, 

Flag Secretary. 



Commander Battle Force 

u. s. navai. message 

Heading : 131024 Destroy by Burning 

Conlidential Mailgram 

Four five-inch twenty-five caliber AA guns and one mark one director mount 
removed from California are made available for installation ashore X necessary 
oflScers and men to assist installation and man this battery shall be detailed 
from California to report to fieet personnel pool ofiicer for messing and berthing. 
Date received : 13 Dec. 41 
From : CINCPAC 131024 
Action to : ComFourteen 

TJ/F CWO 
Info to : Combatfor Conibatships Combasefor NYD Pearl California Burod Op Nav 

Comdgen Hawdept Fleet Personnel (Pool Oflfice) 



Commander Battle Force 

U. S. NAVAL message 

Heading : Z F5L 122135 C8Q WING ZPQ GR 44 BT 

Plain Routine 

Restrictions on liberty are hereby modified to permit liberty for one quarter 
your complement officers and one quarter enlisted complement daily provided all 
useful armament can be manned adequately X Liberty can commence any hour 
after 0900 but expires on board ship at 1700 

TJ/F CWO 
Date received : 12 Dee 31 
From: Cincpac 122135 
Action to: All ships present Pearl 



Commander Battle Force 
r. s. naval message 

Heading: Mailgram 111310 
Plain 

It is directed that all documents insignia name plates and equipment of intelli- 
gence value be forwarded as soon as possible after capture to fleet intelligence 
for examination evaluation and dissemination X A map case delivered thirty two 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1495 

liours after the raid of seven December disclosed the position of the carrier and 
other information of importance which should have reached the Commander in 
Chief earlier X No souveniers shall be permitted to be taken until captured docu- 
ments material etc has been examined by fleet intelligence X Ships present Pearl 
morning of seven December submit mailgram report to Cincpac regarding time of 
attacks types number of planes direction altitude of attacks and other pertinent 
data such as torpedoes seen dropped bombs etc X 
Date received : 12 Dec 41 
From : Cincpac 111310 
Action to: Pacific fleet 



USS California— 9—22—41—1 M. 

Commanded Battle Fobce 

u. s. naval message 
Heading : 100143 Destroyed by burning 

Confiidential Mailgram 

Notify NAD Oahu and combasefor amount replacement ammunition required 
for all vessels each type stating time of delivery desired and whether shipment 
desired direct to dockside or by boat from Westloch X No more fifty caliber 
available for issue X Redistribute this ammunition among ship of type until 
arrival additional shipments expected this month. 
Date received 11 Dec. 41. 
From : Ginpac 100143 
Action to : Type Comdrs. 
Info to : Force Comdrs, NAD Oahu, Com Fourteen. 

/DO/F CWO 



Office of the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and Navy Yard 

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U. S. A., December 16, IQ^l. 
C-S67/Radar/ND14 

(01888) 
Confidential 

From : Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 
To : Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. 
Subject : Fleet Radar School in Hawaiian Area. 
Reference : 

(a) CincPac. conf. serial 01973 of December 1. 1941. 

(b) CincPac. conf. serial 01982 of December 3, 1941. 
1. In reply to reference (a) the following is submitted : 

fa) The area between buildings 76 and 97 which are between the Coal Dock and 
Hickam Field fence is designated as the site for the Fleet Radar School. 

(b) Funds are available and actual construction of a two-story school build- 
ing 40 by 80 feet with two 85 foot towers and one 100 foot tower will be started 
prior to December 22, 1941, and is expected to be ready for occupation and installa- 
tion of designated equipment by February 1, 1941. 

(e) Personnel for this school can he accommodated at the Navy Yard Receiv- 
ing Barracks. 

(d) As the Marine Corps equipment is identical with that of the U. S. Army, 
a combined school for Array and Marine personnel in the Salt Lake area is 
already organized and being started this week. 

(e) It is requested that a few personnel from the District and DesDiv EIGHTY 
be allowed to attend the Fleet Radar School. 

C. C. Bloch. 
Copy to : BuShips 
BuOrd 
BuDocks 
Cora.N.Y.Pearl 
ComBaseFor 
BaseForSubCom. 



1496 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

dar 
United States Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 
CinC File No. 
S81/(50) 
Serial 02048 

1st Endorsement on Combatfor Serial 01203 dated December 13, 1941 
Confidential 

Peakl Harbor, T. H., Dec. 16, 19^1. 
From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
To : Commander Base Force. 

Subject: Suspension of Steel plates from bottom of target rafts for torpedo 
protection. 
1. Forwarded, concurring. It is requested that immediate steps be taken to 
effect the recommendation contained in the basic letter. 

H. E. Kim MEL. 
Copy to : Opnav 
Buships 
Buord 
NYdPH 
Combatfor 
Com 14 



881/(01203) 

United States Pacific Fleet, Battle Force, 
Confidential Submarine Base. 

Pearl Harbor, T. //., December 13, 1941. 
From : Commander Battle Foi'ce. 
To : Commander Base Force. 

Via : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 

Subject: Suspension of Steel plates from bottom of torpedo rafts for torpedo 
protection. 

1. Discussions have been held regarding the improvement in the torpedo de- 
fense offered by target rafts if portable plates are suspended from their bottoms. 
The target rafts without such plates have a draft of only 20 or 24 feet, whereas 
the aircraft torpedoes are apparently running at a depth of about 26 feet. 

2. It appears entirely practicable to suspend steel plates about %-inch thick 
all along the bottoms of these torpedo rafts so that the bottom of the plate will 
be about So feet below the water. Such plates can be suspended by reaving a 
wire rope through holes in each end of the plate and bringing one part up on 
each side of the raft to secure over the top of the raft. Such suspension is simple 
and would prob'nbly permit towing of the assembly without much if any diflSculty. 
It is recommended that immediate steps be taken to obtain this additional 
protection. 

W. S. Pye. 
Copv to : Combasefor 
XYD Pearl 

U. S. Fleet 

COMMANDER AIRCRAFT, BATTLE FORCE 

Heading: 161812 

3146— M. I. N. Y. 4-14-37—100 M. sets of 9 
While in port maintain condition of readiness three as regards ship and fire 
conti'ol and in addition readiness of damage control organization for immediate 
counter flooding X 

TOD: 1920. 
From: Cointnskfor S. Visual XX. 
Action : Taskfor S. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1497 

Cotuairbatfor 
Commander Battle Force 

U. S. Naval Message 
Heading: 121800. 

Confidential mailgram 

During war cruising use canopy covers on planes on decTi steam with bridge 
and tire control platform windows down during day and moonlight X Take all 
necessary precautions to prevent reflection of sun and moon on surfaces X Use 
single plane scouting sections. 

Date received IS Dec. 41 (CCT) /RW/F. CWO 

From : Comairbatfor 121800. 
Action to : Saratoga-Lexington. 
Info to : Comcardiv 1, Cincpac, Combatfor, Comscofor. 



United States Pacific Fleet 

Aircraft. Battle Force 

Date: 12/22/41. 
Memorandum for Flag Sec. T'ombarfdr. 
Re: Your memo (urgent) of Dec. 22, 1941. 

1. The Flag Secretary Comairbatfor is at sea. 

2. Only the Material Staff, ABF, is based at Pearl. 

3. I have received no information of any new instructions, orders, etc., promul- 
gated by CABF since the Pearl Harbor raid. 

4. I shall give your memo to the Flag Secretary when he returns. 

Respy, 

J. N. Lyon. 
Comdr., V. S. N. 



[1] United States Pacific Fleet 

Memorandum No. 6 Battleships. Battle Force 

U. S. S. Maryij^nd, Flagship 
Confidential December 19, 1941. 

From : Commander Battleships, Battle Force. 
To: Battleships, Battle Force, present. 

Subject : Informmation — recap of. 

1. The following dispatches which have been previously sent are quoted for 
information and guidance: 

(a) From Combatships to NEVADA, CALIFORNIA, WEST VIRGINIA. 
132303. "Submit list to Pooling OflScer copy to Combatships of officers desired to 
retain for duty with ship, including officers necessary in A. A. defense groups and 
Salvage groups and essential to winding up affairs. Remaining officers will then 
be considered available for transfer." 

(b) From Cincpac to All Ships Present Hawaiian Area. 150554. "Medical 
Officers will immediately prepare skeleton health records where needed. Requi- 
sitions for emergency supplies from local sources will be submitted via Fleet 
Medical Officer." 

(c) From Cincpac to All Ships Present Hawaiian Area, Com 14. 150646. "Do 
not revoke ship warrants and appointments of any Marines transferred by reason 
of injuries or wounds in line of duty until further instructions Reference Marine 
Corps Manual 6-26 paragraph 3." 

(d) From Secnav to Alnav. Alnav 157. 151700. "Alnav act August 18, 1941, 
providing additional pay enlisted men ten dollars per month remains in effect." 

(e) From Combasefor to All Ships Present Hawaiian Area. 152100. (Para- 
phrase) "Provision stores on board will be limited to not more than a six week 
supply by all ships except Aircraft Carriers in accordance Cincpac directive." 

(f) From Com 14 to All Ships Present Pearl Harbor. 152325. (Paraphrase) 
"Reiports in connection with harbor patrol will be made by Harbor Patrol Boats 
directly and orally to nearest surface vessel wh'ch will transmit report by visual 
to Com 14." 



1498 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(g) From Cincpac to Pacific Fleet. 160011. "Remove at earliest opportunity 
all supplies of paint and ingredients except as necessary for outside touching up 
and striping and marking." 

[2] (h) From Cincpac to All Ships Present Pearl Harbor. 160016. "An 
opportunity is offered for transportation any dependent desiring first available 
evacuation to mainland. All dependents desiring such transportation register 
as soon as possible vtith transportation oflicers Navy Yard Pearl." 

(i) From Combatships to TENNESSEE, MAHYLAND, PENNSYLVANIA. 
160132. "My 110717 school for enemy plane identification and motion picture 
instruction in use of open sight will convene Wednesday 17 December. Each 
action addressee send 24 men from gun crevrs off watch plus 2 lookouts off 
watch total 26 men per ship. Report Lieut. PITTARD at Fleet Recreation Cen- 
ter at 0930. Morning period 0930 to about 1100. Send same number 1330 from 
off watch crews. Afternoon period 1330 to 1500. Daily thereafter except Sun- 
day send same number of men morning and afternoon periods from successive 
off watch sections. Other Type Commanders invited send A. A. personnel for 
instruction. Total number from all other types not to exceed 75 for any period 
of instruction. Each battleship send one A. A. Officer and other types send 
one A. A. Officer for each group of 25 men. Further details and explanation of 
scope of instruction by letter." 

(.i) From Combatships to Comobswing, MARYLAND, TENNESSEE, PENN- 
SYLVANIA. 162039. "Before going to sea ships will take on board all planes, 
aviation personnel and equipment complete. Ships inform Compatwing TWO 
of change in status when it occurs. Somobswing reassign personnel so that at 
least four qualified officer pilots and full complement of enlisted aviation per- 
sonnel are assigned MARYLAND, TENNESSEE, PENNSYLVANIA." 

(k) From Com. 14 to NAS Pearl, All Ships Present Pearl. 170235. (Para- 
phrase) "Hails from ships in the harbor and Naval Activities ashore will be 
answered as follows : "Harbor Patrol passing" by vessels of that patrol. All 
persons on watch during darkness should be given appropriate instructions." 

(1) From Combatships to NEVADA, CALIFORNIA, WEST VIRGINIA, OKLA- 
HOMA. 170315. "NEVADA, CALIFORNIA retain 500 men each, WEST VIR- 
GINIA 50 men. All men in excess of above from these ships report Fleet Pool- 
ing Officer for assignment. OKLAHOMA direct men in security and salvage 
detail report Fleet Pooling Officer for assignment." 

(m) Fi-om Combatships to MARYL.AND, TENNESSEE, PENNSYLVANIA, 
COLORADO. 170925. "To provide protection against underwater damage 
[3] ships will maintain two liquid layers in side oil tanks either oil or water 
ballast. Order of emptying should be as follows : First — Empty all bottom tanks 
and do not fill with sea water. Next — Empty side tanks which constitute third 
layer of side protection and do not fill with sea water. Last — Empty any side 
tanks which make up the two liquid layers and fill with sea water as tanks are 
emptied." 

(n) From Secnav to Alnav. Alnav 160. 171430. "December and future Log 
Books will include additional sheets N Nav 46 showing name and rates address 
of next of kin of each officer attached." 

(o) From Cincpac to All Ships Present Hawaiian Area. 172006. "No naval 
personnel shall be detailed as armed guard at Honolulu residences unless the 
Military Government states it is unable to furnish adequate protection for such 
places. When armed guards are assigned they should be ordered to that duty 
via the Shore Patrol Officer." 

(p) From Combatships to Battleships present. 180055. "My 132303 damaged 
battleships reduce number retained officers as much as possible and progres- 
sively as their services can be spared to" the Pooling Officer informing him and 
Combatships as additional officers become available for the pool." 

(q) From Cincpac to Naval Shore Activities Hawaiian Area. All Ships 
Hawaiian Area. "Have officer and enlisted personnel received since December 
6 without written orders from Fleet Pooling Officer report to that Officer at 
Receiving Barracks, Navy Yard." 

W. S. Anderson. 

Distribution: 

List I, Case 2 : BS. 

List I, Ca.se I : Fl, CBF. " 

D. H. .Johnston, 

D. H. Johnston, 

Liriitcnant Commander, Flag Secretary. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1499 

COMMANDEE Battle Force 

TJ. S. NAVAL MESSAGE 

Heading : 180055 

Mailgram 

My 132303 damaged battleships reduce number retained oflScers as much as 
possible and progressively as their services can be spared to the pooling officer 
informing him and combatships as additional officers become available for the 
pool. 
Date received : 19 Dec. 41 (GOT) 

/RW/F CWO. 
From : Combatships 180055 
Action to : Batships batfor. 
Info to : Cincpac, Combatfor, pooling officer. 



Commander Battle Force 

v. s. naval message 
Heading: 170925 

Destroy by burning 
Confidential mailgram 

To provide protection against underwater damage ships will maintain two 
liquid layers in side oil tanks either oil or water ballast X Order of emptying 
should be as follows X. First, empty all bottom tanks, and do not fill with 
sea water X Empty side tanks which constitute third layer of side protection 
and do not fill with sea water X Empty any side tanks which make up the two 
liquid layers and fill with sea water as tanks are emptied. 
Date received : 17 Dec. 1941 

/RW/F CWO 
From Combatships 170925 

Action to : MARYLAND, TENNESSEE, PENNSYLVANIA, COLORADO. 
Info to : Cincpac, Combatfor. 



Commander Battle Force 

u. s. naval message 
Heading: 162039 

Destroy by burning 
Confidential mailgram, 

Before going to sea ships will take on board all planes aviation personnel and 
equipment complete X Ships inform Compatwing Two of change in status when 
it occurs X Comobswing reassign personnel so that at least four qualified officer 
pilots and full complement of enlisted aviation personnel are assigned MARY- 
LAND, TENNESSEE, PENNSYLVANIA. 
Date received: 17 Dec. 41 (GOT) 

OL/D CWO 
Form : Combatships 162039 

Action to: COMOBSWING, MARYLAND, TENNESSEE, PENNSYLVANIA. 
Info to : Cincpac, Combatfor, Compatwing 2, Combatdiv 2, Comobsron 1. 



Commander Battle Force 

U. S. NAVAL message 

Heading : 162030 Destroy by burning 

Confidential mailgram 
Battleships going to sea will take all boat personnel and only certain boats 
specified in my serial 0978 of 15 December X To give serviceable battleships 
required number of serviceable boats to take to sea transfer boats as follows X 
WEST VIRGINIA one motor whaleboat to TENNESSEE 
ARIZONA one forty foot motor launch to PENNSYLVANIA 
OKLAHOMA one forty foot motor launch to MARYLAND X 



1500 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

All ships in port retain only boats really needed for self service X Turn over 
uuneeded serviceable boats to base force pool which is in urgent need of boats 
and report action X All ships turn in damaged boats capable of salvage or repair 
to navy yard Pearl and invoice as final disposition X Crevps of boats from 
damaged ships turned over to serviceable ships or turned into navy yard will 
report to fleet personnel pooling officer 

Date received : 17 Dec. 41 (GCT) OL/D CWO 

From : Combatships 152030. 

Action to : All battleships present Pearl Harbor. 
Info to : Combasefor, fieet pooling oflScer, Ciucpac, Combatfor, NYD Pearl. 



Commander Batti-e Force 

u. s. naval message 
Heading : 160132. Destroy by burning 

Confidential mail gram 

My 110717 school for enemy plane identification and motion picture instruction 
in use of open sight will convene Wednesday seventeen December X Each action 
Adee send twenty four men from gun crews off watch plus two lookouts off watch 
total twenty six men per ship report Lt Pittard fleet recreation center at 0980 X 
Morning period 0930 to about 1100 X Send same number 1330 from off watch 
crews X 

Afternoon period 1330 to 1500 X Daily thereafter except Sunday send same 
number of men morning and afternoon periods from successive off watch sections X 
Other type commanders invited send AA personnel for instruction total number 
from all other types not to exceed seventy five for any period of instruction X 
Each batships send one AA oflicer and other types send one AA oflicer for each 
group of twenty five men X Further details and explanation of scope of instruc- 
tion by letter 

Mailgram Date received: 16 Dec 41 TJ/F CWO 

Form : Combatships 160132. 

Action to : TENNESSEE, MARYLAND, PENNSYLVANIA 

Info to : Cincpac, Combatfor, Comdesbatfor, Comairbatfor, Comcrubatfor, Com- 
inbatfor, Comcruscofor, Comairscofor, Comsubscofor. 



Commander Battle Force 

tr. S. NAVAL MESSAGE 

Heading : 140027 Destroy by burning 

Confidential mailgram 

Consider five inch fifty one battery could be effectively used against torpedo 
planes if projectile equipped with standard mechanical time fuze X With refer- 
ence Buord letter double fox two dish one slant sail seventy eight paren two one 
six paren of June sixteenth one nine four one copy of which you received recom- 
mend results of tests be ascertained and if favorable fifty rounds per five inch 
fifty one caliber gun total five hundred rounds be supplied each BB also infor- 
mation when delivery can be effected X Above five hundred rounds would 
replace present mobilization supply of present five inch fifty one caliber 
0555LZTJV JV/F (,W0 

Date received : 14 Dec '41 
From: Combatships 140027. 
Action to : Cincap AC. 
Info to: Combatfor, Combatdiv Two. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1501 

Commander Battle Force 

u. s. naval message 
Heading : 132005 Destroy by burning 

Confidential mail gram 

Paint ship with formula 5N Navy blue X 15 pints formula 5TM to 5 gallons 
formula 5U X Tops should be painted immediately X Remainder of ship from 
upper works down as soon as practicable X Paint decks and all canvas with 
temporary deck paint X 20 pints formula 5TM to 5 gallons formula 5U X 
Eliminate all bright or reflecting surfaces topsid'e X 
Date received 14 Dec 41 
From : Combatships 132005. 

Action to: TENNESSEE PENNSYLVANIA MARYLAND COLORADO. 
Info to : Cincpac, Combatfor. 

[1] United States Pacieic Fleet 

A3-2 ( 1 ) / ( 0973 ) Battleships, Battle Force 

U, S. S. Maryland, Flagship 

December 13, 1941. 
Confidential 
Memorandum No. 4. 

From : Commander Battleships, Battle Force. 
To : Battleships, Battle Force, present. 
Subject : Information — recap of. 

1. The following i-ecap of information is forwarded for information and 
guidance : 

(a) Form: Cincpac to all ships present: 122135 restrictions on liberty are 
hereby modified to permit liberty for one quarter your complement oflScers and 
one quarter enlisted complement daily provided all useful armament can be 
manned adequately X liberty can commence any hour after 0900 but expires 
on board ship at 1700. 

(b) From: Cincpac to Pacific Fleet: 092030 the following busanda despatch 
is quoted for information and guidance of disbursing oflicers receiving per- 
sonnel without pay accounts quote payment oflBcers nurses and enlisted men 
from date loss of accounts authorized X back ci'edits for ijeriods prior such 
date not authorized X sworn certificate from each individual stating vessel or 
activity at which account last carried and names of allottees and amounts of 
allotments to each is required as pay roll voucher X disbursing officers taking 
up account forward to busanda via air mail if possible copy .sworn statement 
showing new pay number and follow with confirmation copy in separate mail 
X instructions will follow relative submission claims for ai-rears of pay unquote. 

(c) From: Combatships to Batships present: 110850 California and Nevada 
by order of Cincpac organize antiaircraft defense group of 450 men per ship 
with appropriate oflacers which personnel is not available for transfer X this 
group will stand continuous watch in three X Nevada antiaircraft personnel 
will be quartered and subsisted in Pennsylvania and California group in Mary- 
land X by request of Combasefor California and Nevada also each organize 
from ships company experienced salvage group to assist baseforce in salvage of 
ship and equipage X this salvage group will consists of engineer and damage 
control officers carpenter gunner and fifty men including engineer and artificer 
ratings X this personnel must be familiar with all phases of damage control 
including location of fittings X California send 150 men to Tennessee for quar- 
ters and subsistence X California and Nevada send remaining personnel in- 
cluding salvage group to the receiving barracks for quarters and subsistence X 
personnel quartered and subsisted as herein ordered continue members of Cali- 
fornia and N'evada ships companies respectively for duty and work in those 
ships X California and Nevada personnel other than antiaircraft defense group 
and salvage group is subject to transfer as directed by C-in-C pooling officer. 

(d) Paraphrase of despatch from- Cincpac to Pacific Fleet, Coml4 : 112357 
'•uncompleted Bunav orders involving detaclunent officers from Pacific fleet 
ships and stations will not be executed X where relief has reported relief will 
report to pooling officer receiving barracks at first opportunity also officers de- 
tached awaiting transportation will report pooling officer X all transfers or- 



1502 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

dered for enlisted personnel suspended X those waiting transportation in Pearl 
report pooling officer. 

[2] (e) Paraphrase of despatch from Cincpac to all ships present Hawaiian 
area : 121151 "forward Bunav one copy muster roll X my zero eight zero five four 
zero X Cincpac will forward combined report usual notification death injured and 
missing X information concerning next of kin where records are available should 
be furnished Bunav by each ship" 

(f) From Cincpac to Pacific Fleet: 111310 it is directed that all documents 
insignia name plates and equipment of intelligence value be forwarded as soon 
as possible after capture to fleet intelligence for examination evaluation and 
dissemination X a map case delivered thirty two hours after the raid of seven 
december disclosed the position of the carrier and other information of impor- 
tance which should have reached the commander in chief earlier X no souviners 
shall be permitted to be taken until captured document material etc has been 
examined by fleet intelligence X ships present pearl morning of seven december 
submit mailgram report to Cincpac regarding times of attacks types number of 
planes direction altitude of attacks and other pertinent data such as torpedoes 
seen dropped bombs etc. 

(g) From: Combatships to Maryland Tennessee Pennsylvania info Cincpac: 
112126 report to me as soon as possible number rounds replacement service 
ammunition all calibres necessary to fill to mobilization supply X report also 
amount fifty calibre on hand. 

(h) From Combatships to Maryland Tennessee Pennsylvania California Nevada 
info Cincpac Combatfor 110230 Maryland Tennessee Pennsylvania maintain com- 
plete antiaircraft battery manned continuously in four watches jpersonnel per- 
mitting otherwise three watches X maintain material condition yoke ready to 
take zed with dispatch X California Nevada continuously man part of antiair- 
craft battery practicable with reduced personnel in four watches. 

(i) From Secnav to alnav 072221 naval personnel including coast guard and 
marine corps will wear uniform at all times while on duty and when travelling 
by government conveyance X civilian clothing may be worn at home or during 
recreation or exercise or when travelling by other than government conveyance 
X disti'ict commandants maj^ use discretion at prescribing clothing to be worn by 
intelligence personnel. 

(.1) From Secnav to alnav: 072336 place naval censorship in effect. 

(k) From Combatships to Batships batfor: 121856 report number and type 
boats serviceable X number and type lost or damaged beyond repair X number 
and type needing repair and extent of damage X ships retain custody of own boats 
until otherwise directed. 

(1) From Combatships to Maryland Tennessee Pennsylvania Nevada: 110717 
a school of motion picture instruction for training in plane identification and local 
control with open sights for 5" AA guns is being established X It g f pittard in 
charge ensign j Stevens assistant both ex-Arizona X first instruction limited those 
men who have not had previous instruction use of open sights X pointers trainers 
and gun captains only will attend X school will be held at fleet recreation center 
and will commence in about a week X not more than 150 [3] men can be 
accommodated at a time X men from types other than BBs are invited not to 
exceed seventy five men for 6ach school period X definite instructions as to date 
and time of starting school will be issued hiter. 

(m) From Secnav to alnav: 0923.58 place in effect immediately instructions 
governing maritime and aerial warfare may nineteen forty one except as modified 
by supplementary instructions issued from time to time, 

W. S. Andeeson. 

Destruction: (7CM-41) 
List I, Case 2: BS. 
List I, Case 1 : PI. CBF. 

D. H. Johnston, 

D. H. Johnston, 

Lirntennnt Commander, Flag Secretary. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1503 

Commander Battle Force 

u. s. naval message 

Heading: 11085J3. Destroy by burning 

Confidential mailgram 

California and Nevada by order of Cincpac organize antiaircraft defense group 
of 450 men per sliip vpith appropriate oiiicers which personnel is not available for 
transfer X This group will stand continuous watch in three X Nevada anti- 
aircraft personnel will be quartered and subsisted in Pennsylvania and California 
group in Maryland X By request of Combasefor California and Nevada also 
each organize from ships' company experienced salvage group to assist baseforce 
in salvage of ship and equipage X This salvage group will consist of engineer 
and damage control ofiicers carpenter gunner and fifty men including engineer and 
artificer ratings X This personnel must be familiar with all phases of damage 
control including location of fittings X California send 150 men to Tennessee for 
quarters and subsistence X California and Nevada send remaining personnel in- 
cluding salvage group to the receiving barracks for quarters and subsistence X 
Personnel quartered and subsisted as herein ordered continue members of Cali- 
fornia and Nevada ships companies respectively for duty and work in those ships 
X California and Nevada personnel other than antiaircraft defense group and 
salvage group is subject to transfer as directed by C-in-C pooling otticer. 
Date received : 11 Dec '41 

JV/F CWO 

From : Combatships 110850. 

Action to : Batships present. 

Info to : Cincpac, Combatfor, Combasefor, Cine pooling officer. 



Commander Battle Force 

u. s. naval message 

Confidential mailgram 
Heading: (110717 Destroy by burning 

A school of motion picture instruction for training in plane identification and 
local control with open sights for 5" AA guns is being established X LT G. F. 
Pittard in charge Ensign J. Stevens assistant both ex-Arizona X First instruc- 
tion limited those men who have not had previous instruction use of open 
sights X Pointers trainers and gun captains only will attend X School will 
be held at fleet recreation center and will commence in about a week X Not 
more than 150 men can be accommodated at a time X Men from types other 
than 8BS are invited not to exceed seventy five men for each school period X 
Definite instructions as to date and time of starting school will be issued later. 

Date received : 11 Dec '41. JV/F CWO From : Combatships 110717. 

Action to : Maryland, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Nevada. 

Info to : Cincpac, Combatfor. 



USS California— 9-22-41-lM. 

Commander Battle Force 

u. s. naval message 

Confidential mailgram 
Heading: 110230 Destroy by burning 

Maryland Tennessee Pennsylvania maintain complete antiaircraft battery 
manned continuously in four watches personnel permitting otherwise three 
watches X Maintain material condition yoke ready to take zed with dispatch X 
California Nevada continuously man part of antiaircraft battery practicable 
with reduced personnel in four watches. 

Date Received: 11 Dec. 41 (GCT). /DC/F CWO 

From : Combatships 110230. 

Action to : Maryland, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, California, Nevada. 

Info to : Cincpac Combatfor. 



1504 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

UNITED States Pacific Fleet Battleships, Battle Force 
U. S. S. ilAEYLAND, Flagsliip 

Dcccmhcr 10, J9J,1. 
CoiifidoiiidI 
Memoranda Xo. 2 

Fi-om: Coiumander Battleships, Battle Force. 
To : Battleships, Present. 
Subject : Information — recap of. 

1. The following despatches which have been previously sent are quoted fnr 
information and guidance: 

From Cincpac — "To be posted on all bulletin boards of ships in harbor. Yi'ur 
conduct and action have been splended. We took a blow yesterday. It will not 
be a short war. We will give many heavy blows to the Japanese. Carry on." 

Ships provide containers and place trash and garbage on fleet landing; pnlilie 
works will remove containers. 

From Cincpac — "Report names, rates and former ships of any survivors nn 
board to Lt. Cdr. Nevius at Receiving Barracks, Navy Yard, by messenger." 

From Comobswiug to CBF, into CBS.— "Request all ships operating planes from 
shore send all aviation personnel ashore with plane equipment and bedding." 
Passed to BBs for action. 

From CBS to BBs present. — "Take great care not to ignite oil on water. Keep 
hose ready also boat fire extinguishers. Keep oil washed away from ships and 
boats." 

From CBS to BBs present. — "Do not throw wood or trash overboard." 

From Combasefor — .'Ships docked in Navy Yard shall request replacement 
service ammunition from NAD Oahu for delivery direct by trucks. Ships berthed 
in stream or at Ford Island shall request ammunition from West Loch for de- 
livery by boats which will be furnished by West Loch." 

From Coml4 to All Ships Present Hawaii^ — "Sunken enemy submarine located 
Lat two one two two zero five Long one five seven eight two seven. Marked by 
two cork buoys with USS YORKTOWN marked on." (The location is west side 
of North Channel near Buoy #5, at entrance to Middle Loch.)' 

From Cincpac to All Ships Present. — "Resume transfer of patients according 
to previous directives and not to emergency activities." 

From Combasefor to All Ships Present. — "Send all diving equipment partial 
or complete, divers portable welding and cutting outfits and portable pumps 
with hose and connections that are not immediately required to pool in 
ARGONNB. Request for above equipment to be made on Combasefor." 

From Cincpac to All Ships Present. — "No test or warming shots will be fired 
from any automatic gun." 

From Secnav to Alnav. — "Place in effect immediately instructions governing 
maritime and aerial warfare 1941 except as modified by supplementary instruc- 
tions issued from time to time. 

From Combasefor to All Ships Present. — "Paragraph one B and one E of Opnav 
restricted serial 904716 of 29 April 1941, not being complied with. All classes of 
outgoing U. S. Mail must be censored. Censorship stamp will be placed on lower 
left hand of address side and also facing slips of letter ties prepared by ship 
board mail clerks. Postage is required on all mail matter except when in accord- 
ance with paragraph 2 section 515 postal laws and regulations. No rank or 
desigijation shall appear on any mail matter." 

W. S. Axnp:its.iN. 
Copy to : Cincpac. 

Combatfor. 

D. H. Johnston, 

D. H. Johnston, 

Lieutenant Comwnnder, Flag Secretary. 

Mail gram 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1505 

Confidential 
210032 

Myser 0332 of March 26 X While in port set ammunition condition of readi- 
ness three in antiaircraft and machine gun batteries using one half one point one 
clips available loaded five rounds per clip X Take action prescribed Myser 01348 
and para 4 Myser 01253 in order safeguard against deterioration one point one 
clip spring and antiaircraft time fuzes X Maintain condition of readiness three 
in accordance with annex A to crubatfor type Instructions. 

Flag Yeo 

Fm : Comcrubatfor 
To ; Crudiv 9 



[1] United States Pacific Fleet Cbuiseks, Battle Force 90-Pn 

U. S. S. HoNOLVLU, Flagship 
A16-3(l)/ 
A5-1 (1)/S78 

Serial 01412 December 21, 1941. 

Confidential 

From : The Commander Cruisers, Battle Force. 
To : Cruisers, Battle Force. 
Subject : War Readiness of Batteries, Ammunition, and Ammunition Supply. 

1. The following steps in the preparation for war of the various batteries 
and their ammunition supply have been compiled from recent Gunnery School 
recommendations, studies and tests of ammunition supply during the past ten 
months. They are itemized herewith for the guidance of personnel concerned : 

A. General 

(1) Provide canvas (or thin rubber) muzzle covers for all guns. See BuOrd 
Circular Letter A-325 of Nov. 24, 1941. 

(2) Provide drinking water in magazines, handling rooms, and at gun sta- 
tions. (Aluminum water breakers or thermos jugs are suggested). 

(3) Provide long-sleeved aprons or loading jackets, and gloves where needed, 
for personnel in magazines and handling rooms. Arrange suitable stowage 
for this gear convenient to but outside magazine spaces. See personnel indoc- 
trinated in use. (Battleships have reported sweat shirts well suited for this 
purpose, in place of jackets). 

(4) Arrange for stowage of magazine battens clear of personnel as ammuni- 
tion is removed from magazines. 

(5) Place in effect war-time check-off lists for all batteries similar to that 
submitted in report of Light Cruiser 5-inch Antiaircraft and Broadside Gunnery 
School, 1941. 

B. Stotvage and. liandllng, 6" and 5"/ .'iS projectiles 

(1) Remove grommets of all projectiles stowed on base and in ready stowage 
or upper rows of bins. Substitute therefor a canvas strap interwoven between 
rotating bands of projectiles in each bay. Retain sufficient grommets to equip 
all projectiles in one shell-handling room ; turn in remainder to nearest ammu- 
nition dei>ot. 

(2) Provide linoleum or cobbler's knives fitted with wrist lanyards to enable 
shell-passers to cut lashings and grommets as necessary. 

(3) If sufficient personnel are available, station 9 men on shell-deck of 6"/47 
caliber turrets and ti'aln them to rotate as hoistmen and shell-passers. 

C. Potvder magazines and handling rooms 

(1) Provide rawhide maul, wire-cutters and sufficient tank wrenches each 
magazine; also pinch bar if considered necessary. (Handle of tank wrench 
should prove adequate for fi-eeing tanks wedged in stowage). 

(2) Provide putty knives or other suitable hand tools fitted with wi'ist lan- 
yards to facilitate removal of cork spacers from 6"/47 caliber powder tanks. 

(3) Provide canvas or muslin bags with frame to hold open for 6"/47 caliber 
tank tops and spacers, if desired. Bags to be stowed outside magazines except 
when in use. 

(4) IMark tanks with suitable color scheme to indicate normal routing of 
ammunition in action. 



1506 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(5) Prepare aud post in each magazine scliematic diagram showing normal 
routing in action, with order of opening tanks and order of removal of empties 
indicated thereon. 

(6) Cut or remove vpires on tank covers of all accessible powder tanks. Make 
routine check every two weeks to see tank covers set up tightly. 

D. Gun room, Q" /1ft caliber turrets 

(1) Provide receptacles (bags or metal boxes) for primer protecting caps 
as they are removed from cartridges. 

(2) Arrange for one or two men with wooden hoe or rake to clear empties 
from under the overhang of Turret III, BROOKLYN Class, in case 6-inch bat- 
tery is engaged. 

E. Antiaircraft ready ammunition {5-inch and M. O.) 

(1) Unless action is imminent, take action prescribed paragraph 4 Comcru- 
batfor serial 01253 of Oct. 31, 1941, to protect time fuzes. 

(2) Load l".l/75 caliber ready ammunition five per clip unless action is 
iumiinent. Inspect l".l/75 re'ady clips frequently for evidence of weakened 
siprings, and change clips monthly in order to minimize possibility of defective 
.spring action. 

(3) Inspect belted caliber .50 machine gun ammunition frequently for 
evidence of corrosion. 

F. When action is prohahle. 

(1) In setting Ammunition Condition of Readiness in 6"./47 caliber tur- 
rets, use most remote powder charges that are accessible, or charges that block 
aisles or scuttles essential to maintenance high rate of delivery of ammunition. 
If time and circumstances permit, remove tanks thus emptied from magazines, 
and stow in drill cartridge stowage. 

(2) Loosen covers of all accessible powder tanks and set up hand tight. 

G. During lull in action, or after action is ended 

(1) In 6"/47 magazines, remove only those empty tanks necessary to permit 
access to other ammunition. Note that additional six-inch charges from ad- 
jacent magazines, if required for certain turrets, can be removed from tanks 
and passed via scuttles to magazine (s) where needed. 

(2) Redistribute available ammunition as opportunity permits, taking into 
account the guns remaining in action. 

2. Always make careful inspection of all replacement ammunition when 
received to ascertain the following : 

(a) Kind of time fuze and color of tracer. (Containers may be incorrectly 
stenciled). 

(b) Absence of cork particles or other foreign matter adhering to case that 
might cause the case to jam on loading, or prevent firing pin from making good 
contact with primer. 

(c) Evidence of over-sized or damaged cases, or over-sized cork plugs that 
would result in a jam on loading. Cases that appear doubtful should be gauged 
as accurately as possible, or set aside. Note that Art. 972 (80), U. S. 
Navy Regulations permits fitting ammunition in guns by hand on order of the 
Commanding Officer, after firing pins have been removed and firing circuits 
disconnected. This should normally be resorted to only when the suitability of 
ammunition must be determined without delay, and no other means are available. 

(d) Evidence of loose wind-shields on 6-inch projectiles, or damaged bour- 
relets and/or rotating bands ; also loose cartridges, split cases or other defects in 
machine gun amnnmition. All doubtful ammunition should be set aside to be 
returned to a depot if practible. or in case of necessity, to be fired after 
all other ammunition is expended. 

H. F. Leart. 
Distrihution: 

Addressees (3 each) 
Crudiv-8 (3 each) 
DETROIT (3) 
RALEIGH (3) 
H. J. Martin, 
H. J. Martin, 

Flag Secret aril. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSIOlSr 1507 

Al&-3/( 01395) United States Pacific Fleet 

Crxhsers, Battle Force 
U. S. S. HONOLULU, Flagi^bip 
Confid^nt'ol Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 15, 19Ifl. 

From : Commander Cruisers, Battle Force. 
To: CRUISERS, BATTLE FORCE. 
Subject : Development of Fighting Power. 
Reference: (a) Comcruscofor conf. memo. A16-3 of December 11. 1941. 

1. Reference (a) is quoted in part for information. 

"3. Several 3" and 5" guns have recently jammed due to oversize cartridge 
cases. In time of war, with mass production, oversize cases will probably occur 
more frequently than in peace time. It is, therefore, essential that all cartridge 
cases be gauged before they are placed in ready boxes. Gauging a cartridge case 
is a relatively minor operation but it would be criminal negligence if a gun were 
iiuL out of action — even tempoVarily — because of an undetected oversize case. 
If 3" gauges are not available, fit the cartridge in the gun. 

2"4. Reference (a) commented on the difficulty experienced in estimating 
target angle and speed in Advanced Day Battle Practice caused by the towing 
ship's searchlights trained on the firing ship. This use of searchlights in a day 
action is worthy of consideration. In a day light action, if at all ijossible, keep 
your searchlight trained on the enemy ship; it will hinder him in detecting your 
course changes. 

"5. Remember not to leave a charge in a hot gun (See U. S. Fleet Confidential 
Notice lUSCN^l) ; unload through the muzzle. 

"6. In a recent night attack problem, a heavy cruiser was surprised and illumi- 
nated by a light cruiser in the screen of the opposing force. The light cruiser had 
been sighted by lookouts on the five inch battery sevex-al minutes before the light 
cruiser illuminated, yet the lookout's report did not get through to the ship con- 
trol station in time. Lookout report communications must be continually studied 
and improved in order that an effective and positive system be developed and 
maintained. This point cannot be emphasized too strongly. Lookout reports, no 
matter from what source, must get through to proper control stations immediately, 
distinctly, and correctly. It would be another case of gross negligence if vital 
information of the enemy were obtained by some one station in a ship and that 
information not made immediately available to proper authority. Establishing 
some system of lookout report communication system is not enough, continual 
drills and improvements are required to obtain the desired results. 

"7. In recent night firings there has been too much delay in opening fire after 
the firing ship has been disclosed by firing star shells or by oi)ening searchlight 
shutters. It is realized that in a target practice using one-half of the limited 
allowance the target should be illuminated sufficiently to provide an adequate 
point of aim. However, ships should not lose sight of the fact that in a night 
action, once a ship discloses itself, fire must be opened on the enemy (assuming 
that enemy character has been established) even if the point of aim is indistinct. 
Therefore, it is essential that batteries and searchlights be on the enemy bearing 
and that fire is commenced immediately after illumination of the target by the 
searchlights. If star shells are used, searchlights and batteries should open 
up with the firing of the first star shell spread, since firing of the spread 
discloses the direction of the ship to the enemy and illumination and fire by the 
enemy may be expected immediately. Bear in mind that the most effective 
star shall illumination can be nullified by the enemy by counter illumination 
with searchlights. Communication between ship control, fire control and search- 
lights must be quick and positive. 

"8. Night action procedure (covered in separate letter). 

"9. Fire control radars are now being installed in our ships. The capabilities 
of these instruments must be developed to the highest possible degree and, at 
the same time, their limitations must be known. Regardless of how proficient 
we become in the use of the radar, we must continue to develop and maintain 
our lookouts and optical rangefinders. 

"10. CHICAGO (CA29) attained a rate of fire at ADBP (Protracted) of 

2.68 s. p. g. p. m. for 42 salvos ; during a considerable part of the practice the 

rate was over 3 s. p. g. p. m. She had three salvos in the air at all times and 

had 29 straddles in range; the first eighteen salvos were straddles. A rate of 

79716— 46— Ex. 143, vol. 3 15 



1508 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

fire of 3 s. p. g. p. m. can be maintained in these cruisers and should be the goal 
of all ships. It is not necessary to attempt to break speed records ; a deliberate 
smooth and rhythmic procedure will automatically attain the desired speed. 

"11. The A. A. creeping barrage developed by CHICAGO (see my serial 0885) 
of Sept. 17, 1941) is considered a most effective defense against multiple dive 
bombing, strafing, or torpedo attacks. Ships should instruct their 3" and 5" 
batteries in this method of fire. It is planned to have ships use this method of 
local control in AABP 'G' type firings whenever they can be arranged. 

"12. I assume that ships will now be permitted an allowance of target ammu- 
nition to be used at the discretion of Commanding Ofticers. If at all practicable, 
we will continue to fire practices at towed high speed targets and sleeves. How- 
ever, at times, towed targets will not be available. Ships should then, whenever 
possible, fire at improvised drift point-of-aim targets (see my serial 01152 of 
December 3, 1941), burst targets (see my serial 01109 of November 20, 1941) 
and balloons. 

"13. HCTB, Chapter XIV, paragraph 1424, prescribes that, in Amcon I and 
II, the top row of the 5" ready boxes be filled with illuminating projectiles at 
night. At the discretion of Commanding Oflicers, only five illuminating pro- 
jectile cartridges need be stowed in each ready box day and night. This will 
eliminate unnecessary shifting of ammunition. One hoist, however, should be 
filled with illuminating ammunition at night unless conditions indicate that 
star shells will not be used. Cartridges in fuze pots in Amcon I and II should 
be covered with the fuze pot covers when necessary to keep off direct sun rays 
and salt water spray. 

"14. Concentrate on enemy ship and aircraft identification instruction. 

"15. Now is the time when each officer and man must know and carry out ina 
job. Personnel will continue to be the dominant factor in our gunnery. Work 
to establish a fighting spirit. We uuist conduct an offensive war and strike 
hard, fast and often." 

J. Caey Jones, 

Chief of Staff. 

Distribution : 

Each addressee (5). 

H. J. Martin 

H. J. Maktin, 
Flao Secreturu. 



United States Pacific Fleet 

A16-3( 1)7(01392) Cruisers, Battle Force 50-RWB 

U. S. S. HoNOLiTi.u, Flagship 

December 14, 1941. 
Confidential 

From: Commander Cruisers, Battle Force. 
To : Cruisers Battle Force. 
Subject : Maintenance of Readiness for Action, Notes on. 

1. The following notes on the maintenance of readiness for action in light 
cruisers are disseminated for guidance. Many of the points discussed have been 
brought out in previous correspondence and in critiques of damage control train- 
ing battle problems. However, they are repeated herein for emphasis. 

WATCHES 

2. In port, the stationing of two Condition III watches simultaneously has been 
found advantageous. This puts all personnel, except those assigned to essential 
services, on a watch-and-watch basis. The complete anti-aircraft battery, aug- 
mented by spare .50 caliber and all Marine and landing force .30 caliber machine 
guns, are continuously manned. 

3. At sea, Condition of Readiness II is usually maintained, with modifications 
as circumstances permit. The latter includes using main battery personnel for 
essential cleaning and services. If the situation permits setting Condition III 
in the batteries, the damage control organization should still be maintained 
es.sentially in Condition II. An adequate watch must be stationed in Central 
at all times with this station in continuous communication with damage control 
repair stations and with conning officers. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1509 

WATERTIGHT INTEGRITY 

4. Light cruisers are not provided with any defense against submarines except 
gunfire, ramming, evasion and maintenance of watertight integrity. Of these, 
the latter, maximum subdivision with watertight integrity, is most important. 

5. Since danger from submarine and aircraft torpedoes is continuously present, 
closure of light cruisers must be maintained at better than Material Condition 
Baker or Yoke. Vessels should be continuously in Material Condition Afirm or 
Zed, or a modification thereof which will allow setting of complete Afirm or Zed 
in 30 seconds to 1 minute. The fittings to be considered for modification of ma- 
terial condition Afirm or Zed (i. e., opening during) are as follows: 

(a) Potable water: 

(1) Drinking fountains — all fittings. 

(2) Staterooms — all fittings. 

(3) Washrooms — fittings to a minimum number of washrooms to accom- 
modate personnel off watch. On 10,000-ton light cruisers, the forward 
officers' and crew's third deck washrooms should be kept continuously closed. 
All officers use one washroom. In general, the crew should be accommo- 
dated in after washrooms on the second deck or above. . 

(4) Galleys — all fittings. 

(5) Scullery and pantries — all fittings when in use. 

(6) Laundry — all fittings when conditions permit its use. 

(b) Salt water: 

(1) Flushing and firemain — open flushing supply and drain valves only 
to the waterclosets in use. Open firemain riseu^^ut-outs so weather deck 
fireplugs can be used for obtaining water for essential cleaning. 

(2) Eductor valves — open as few as possible, e. g., for the scullery and 
sick bay. 

(c) Deck drain valves: 

(1) All deck drain valves should be reclassified "X" and kept closed ex- 
cept when their use is necessary. In rough weather these drain valves can- 
not be opened on the third deck at all because water will back up. This is 
pai'ticularly so in the sick bay country of 10,000-ton light cruisers. 

(d) Ventilation: 

(1) Air flushing, in accordance with bills recently approved, should be 
used continuously whenever conditions permit. Keep ventilation closed ofC 
from all spaces not used. 

(2) Central and Plot in 10,000-ton cruisers can maintain their cooling and 
recirculating systems but will need air flushing twice each watch. OMAHA 
Class cruisers will probably require continuous air flushing in these spaces 
until an emergency arises. 

(3) Gyro rooms, in the tropics, will usually need continuous ventilation to 
keep temperatures down and to make the rooms tenable for personnel. 

6. Now, in order to make possible the quick opening and quick closing of fittings 
included above, such fittings should be indicated by large red arrows, preferably 
outlined by luminous paint. All hands must be instructed to close these fittings 
at once when the word is passed : "Emergency — set material condition Afirm 
(Zed)." Also, all personnel after closing all fittings should remain in the com- 
partment wherever they may be. There should be absolutely no breaking of 
Material Condition Afirm (Zed) until the attack has been repulsed or a hit has 
been sustained. In the latter case, repair personnel must pass through tended 
doors to the scene of the hit. 

7. Dog wrenches, as well as other wrenches, must be maintained in their 
installed holders. Men must not take such wrenches, e. g., pipe wrenches, from 
one side of a door to the other. 

8. Care must be exercised by all personnel in the operation of quick closing 
doors to prevent undue wear. A stop should be provided on the knuckles of the 
operating gear on quick closing scuttles in order to prevent these from jamming 
when open. 

9. Fore and aft traffic below the 2nd deck should be strictly limited. Reach 
lower deck compartments via scuttles rather then hatches wherever possible. 
Fore and aft traffic should be limited to 2nd deck and above. Use escape tubes, 
where fitted, for changing watches and thus save doors. 



1510 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

MESSING 

10. Potable water in portable drinkiug fountains, canteens or coffee pots, with 
paper cups, should be available at all stations. Trash cans should be available 
there for disposal of used cups and other trash. 

11. All meals should be so arranged that not more than about 25% of oflScers 
and crew are in messing spaces at once. Sandwiches and coffee should be avail- 
able to all hands throughout the night. 

BERTHING 

12. At sea, no berthing on the first platform deck should be permitted as long as 
underwater attack may be probable. Spaces below the third deck should be kept 
closed at all times as far as practicable. With personnel on conditiim watches, 
there will be sufficient berthing space for the remainder of the crew on the third 
deck and above. 

COMFORT OF PERSONNEL 

13. No smoking should be permitted below decks while the ship is in Condition 
Afii-rn or Zed. To do so quickly fouls the air. 

14. If personnel below decks are well separated into various compartments 
during Condition Afirm or Zed and lie down there, they will perspire less and 
breathe more slowly so that the air will remain relatively pure for a longer period. 

15. Soil buckets, together with toilet paper (and Patapar bags, if available), 
must be distributed to all stations and personnel must use them. Watertight 
integrity cannot be broken, during an emergency, to allow personnel to reach 
water closets. 

DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION 

16. Nervous tension, particularly in personnel below decks, will be greatly 
lessened if they are kept informed as to the situation within the ship and as to 
the enemy contacts. The general announcing system and fire control telephone 
can be used for this. 

CLEANLINESS OF THE SHIP 

17. Off watch i^rsouuel and men stationed below decks, when no emergency 
exists, must be required to keep their parts of the ship clean. Particular atten- 
tion must be given to water closets and washrooms which, after a series of emer- 
gencies, soon become dirty. 

18. Fresh water must be conserved but men, particularly food handlers, must 
be watched to see that in the excitement they do not overlook opportunities for 
bathing. Especially, see that men are clean at meal times. 

MATEBIAL ITEMS 

19. All material items which are not essential to military efficiency should be 
removed as soon as practicable in accordance with Cincpac despatch 130931 ; 
Comcrubatfor despatches 110254, 11233S and 122240; and approved strip and 
clear ship for action bills. 

20. All fire fighting equipment must be complete and in excellent condition. 
This must be checked at once. Portable CO2 fire extinguishers should be filled 
and distributed in compartments along the damage control deck. A coiled fire 
hose with nozzle should be distributed to compartments on the damage control 
deck as far as practicable. Provide also as many fog nozzles as are available 
or can be made. 

21. Hand tools for repair parties should also be distributed along the damage 
control deck. Snippers for cutting locks must be included in these tools. At sea, 
at least, all compartments should be unlocked as far as it is safe to do so. Do 
not leave locks dangling as they will .iam doors being closed hurriedly. 

22. Each man should carry a flashlight and a pocket knife. 

23. Protective clothing suits should be issued at once to all personnel having 
exposed battle stations and other personnel should be required to wear complete 
uniforms. These measures are necessary to reduce casualties due to flash burns 
The protective suits will be more comfortable if laundered before they are 
worn. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1511 

24. Constantly check the high pressure air baulvS to see that they are charged. 
Instruct all personnel as to the high pressure air and gas ejection systems. 
Check Bristol valve settings. 

25. Keep telephone repairmen on duty continuously. Do nol assemble too 
many telephones in one compartment. 

2t). Glass airports may be unishipped and stowed below to reduce missile 
hazard. 

27. Since lower deck airports have been blanked, it is necessary to rig two sub- 
mersible pumps in series in order to remove water from a second platform or hold 
compartment and discharge it overboard. In some cases it will be possible to 
run the discharge to another compartment which is served by the main or sec- 
ondary drainage systems. 

DISTKIBXJTION OF LIQUIDS 

28. All voids and lower deck compartments should be sounded hourly until 
every man of repair parties is familiar with the locations of sounding tubes. 
Thereafter, one sounding per watch should be sufficient. 

29. The prescribed "Conditioning and Sequence of Emptying Fuel Oil Tanks" 
should be followecl at all times, except when changes may be necessary due to 
damage sustained. 

30. The record of the condition of fuel oil, water, and void compartments 
should be kept corrected (to the minnte) in Central Station. 

Distribution: H. F. Leary. 

Each addressee (5) CO DETROIT (5) 

Comcruscofor (5) CO RALEIGH (5) 

Comcrulant (5) CO MARBLEHEAD (5) 
H. J. Martin 
H. J. Martin, 

Flag Secret-nry^ 



CoMMAXDER Battle Force 

U. S. NAVAL MESSAGE 

Heading : Z 0CF5 112120 CDIV9 Q 0Fo 0F7 GR 16 BT 

Recall all officers and enlisted personnel assigned fleet machine gun school 
and base force camex*a party. 
Tor 2143 

Date received 11 Dec. 41 TJ/F cwo 

From: Comcrubatfor 112120 
Action to : Crudiv 9 
Info to : Combatfor Combasefor 



United States Pacific Fleet 
Cettisees. Battle Force 

U. S. S. HoNOLiiLU, Flagship 

Confidential December 22, 1941. 

Memorandum for : Lieutenant Commander H. S. COVINGTON, USN, Flag Secre- 
tary, Conunander Battle Force. 
The enclosed documents have been issued by Commander Cruisers, Battle 

Force since 7 December and deal with the subject matter mentioned in your 

memorandum of 22 December : 

1. Commander Cruisers, Battle Force Serial 01392. 

2. Commander Cruisers, Battle Force Serial 01395. 

3. Commander Cruisers. Battle Force Serial 01412. 

4. Commander Cruisers, Battle Force Mailgram 210032. 

Respectfully, 

Robert L. Taylor, 
Robert L. Taylor, 
Acting Flag Secretarij. 



1512 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

United States Pacific Fleet 

Destroyeirs, Battle Force 
File A16-1 
Serial 01691 
Confidential U. S. S. Whitney, Flagship, 

% Fleet Post Office, 

Pearl Habboe, T. H., 

Dec,ember 23, 1941. 
From: Commander Destroyers, Battle Force. 
To: Destroyers, Battle Force. 

Subject : Security of Fleet at Base — Modifications of Conditions of Readiness. 
References : 

(a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 20CLr41, Serial 02086 of 21 December 
1941. 

(b) Comdesbatfor Confidential Letter A16-1, Serial 01659 of 13 December 
1941. 

(c) Comdesbatfor Confidential Letter S78, Serial 042 of December 19, 1940. 

(d) Destroyers, Battle Force, Confidential Letter No. 3-41, Serial 0797 of June 
25, 1941. 

1. In complying with the provisions of reference (a), the following naval base 
defense conditions of readiness are prescribed for destroyers and destroyer tenders : 

condition I 

(a) General Quarters. 

(b) Highest material condition compatible with required operations. 

(c) Ammunition Readiness Condition I (Reference (c) ). 

CONDITION II 

(a) Anti-aircraft batteries manned on a watch basis as for Condition HI at sea 
(Reference (d)). 

(b) Material Condition Baker. 

(c) For guns manned, Ammunition Readiness Condition I: for all other guns, 
Condition HI (Reference (c). 

CONDITION III 

Destroyer Leaders 

(a) Both 1.1 machine guns and two (2) other machine guns manned at all times. 

(b) A fire control oflicer on watch at all times. 

Destroyers 

(a) One 5-inch gun manned and ready to fire at all times. 

(b) From 30 minutes before sunrise to 1^/4 hours after sunrise, the director 
shall be manned uad operating. During this period an additional 5-inch gun shall 
be manned. 

(c) Two machine gun crews on watch at all times. 

(d) A fire control oflicer on watch at all times. 

Tenders 

(a) Machine guns manned at all times. 

(b) Material Condition "BAKER" insofar as is compatible with the discharge 
of tender functions. 

All Classes 

(a) Material Condition "BAKER" (For destroyers). 

(b) Ammunition Readiness Condition I for guns manned; Condition HI for all 
otliers (Reference (c)). 

CONDITION IV 

(a) Guns will be manned as directed by the Sector Commander. 

(b) Ammunition Readiness Condition I for guns manned. 

2. Reference (b) is automatically cancelled and superceded by this letter when 
reference (a) is placed in effect. 

W. M. Fechteler. 

Chief of Staff. 
Distribution: 

List I, Case 3, DBF, PI, CBF, ND14. 

Fred R. Sticknet, 
Flag Secretary. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 5113 

United States Pacific Fleet 
Destkotees, Battle Fobce 

File A8 U. S. S. Whitney, Flagship, 

Serial 01673 % Fleet Post Office, 

Confidential Peiael Harbor, T. H., 

December 19, 1941- 

Dbstboyeb Habboe Information BrnxEinN No. 2 

supercedes DESTROYEB information BULLETTIN NO. I SERIAL 01660 OF DEOEMBEIl 14, 

1941 

1. Liberty — Comiaander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Confidential despatch 
182243 December is in effect. 

Before granting any liberty it is imperative that you ascertain the degree ol' 
readiness for sea assigned your ship. Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, will 
endeavor to have this infoi-mation available on your arrival ; but it must be 
realized that this is not alvpays practicable. 

Uniform. — Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet despatch 132232 December 
is in effect : 

"Uniform for personnel going on liberty oflBcers service dress whites enlisted 
men undress vphites afirm with neckerchief #X Aviation and submarine 
personnel may proceed to and from shore in khaki." 

2. Material Condition of Ships in Pearl. — Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, 
Confidential Letter A16-1 Serial 01659 of December 13, 1941, is quoted in part : 

"1. In complying with reference (a), ships of this command shall be governed 
by this directive. 

"2. Destroyer Leaders. — (a) Both 1.1 machine guns and two (2) .50 caliber 
machine guns manned at all times. 

(b) A fire control oflicer on watch at all times. 

"3. Destroyers. — (a) One 5-inch gun manned and ready to fire at all times. 

(b) From 30 minutes before sunrise to ly^. hours after sunrise, the director 
shall be manned and operating. During this period an additional 5-inch gun shall 
be manned. 

(c) Two ..50 caliber machine gun crews on watch at all times. 

(d) A fire control officer on watch at all times. 

"4. In selecting the guns to be manned consideration shall be given to the 
following : 

(a) The sector in which berthed. 

(b) Location of nearby ships and other interferences. 

(c) When two or more ships are nested together, the effectiveness of the 
nest as a unit." 

3. Water Covipensation (BallaMing) . — An undamaged destroyer with a rea- 
sonable amount of ammunition on board should get rid of all water ballast before 
entering port, regardless of the amount of fuel on board. 

If you have water ballast in the ship after arrival in port, jwoceed as follows : 

(a) Slight contamination — Pump overboard. 

(b) Heavy cwitamination — Request services of an oil barge from Com- 
mander Base Force (Comtrainron 8) for tran.sfer of oil sludge. 

4. Service for Supply of Fuel, Water, Ammunition, Depth Charges, Torpedoes, 
Lubricating Oil, Provisions, Clothing and Small Stoves, and General Supplies. — 
See Comtrainron 8, Base Force, letter L8/FF5/ (048) of December 11, 1941. A 
member of the Staff of Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, is on duty at Merry 
Point. 

5. Armed Sentries. — Numerous cases have been reported of sentries firing on 
our own small boats. Reasonable caution must be exercised and careful instruc- 
tions should be given each armed sentry in security measures and in the proper 
use of arms. 

6. Maintenance of Communications. — (a) All ships in harbor will maintain a 
continuous transmitter and receiver watch on 2562 Kc (CincPac Harbor Circuit). 
It is of paramount importance that arrangements be made for immediate internal 
routing of traffic received over this circuit. While within the limits of the harbor, 
ships proceeding to sea or entering port, will maintain watch on this circuit in 
addition to assigned tactical circuits. 

Delete (b) All ships in harbor maintain an intercept on 900 Kc (General Warn- 
ing Net). 



1514 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(c) All ships guard normal "Fox" circuits individually or arrange for nest 
guard. 

7. Repairs. — Upon arrival, each ship needing repairs should inform their tender 
by despatch or messenger. It is not necessary to submit repair requests, but 
when time permits a covering repair request should be submitted direct to the 
tender Repair Officer. In cases where major repairs are required which affect 
the material readiness of the ship Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, iu 
WHITNEY, should be notified. 

8. Boats. — If you need boats, ask for them. If they can be obtained you will 
get them. 

9. Boat ill ff ill Haihoi: — When neon range. lights for aircraft are lighted, boats 
burn dimmed running lights and a dim all around blue light. Keep clear of 
these ranges, and when necessary to cross them do so at right angles to the range 
and as rapidly as possible. Be on the alert for planes landing or taking off. 
At all other times between sunset and sunrise, boats run completely darkened. 
Have a man stationed forward as far as possible away from the engine noises to 
answer hails. Reduce boating at night to a minimum. 

10. Libert 1/ Boats. — Provided bv tenders to destroyers berthed as follows: 
WHITNEY— Berths X-2, 3, 8, 11. 12, 13. 

DOBBIN— Berths X-14, 15, 18 ; D-5, 6. 9. 

11. Sound Gear. — Tenders will make routine inspection of sound gear with- 
out request. However, if there is any known derangement make special request 
by signal or messenger. 

12. Visual Signallinf/ in Harbor. — Visual signals have poor security against 
observation by unauthorized persons ashore. Plain language visual signals and 
flag hoists concerning preparations for getting underway, getting underway, opera- 
tions at sea, etc., shall not be transmitted except in emergency. Use messengers 
by boat. 

13. Suspicious Activities in Harbor. — Report suspicious activities in the harbor 
direct to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District (Harbor Defense Officer) 
by messenger to nearest telephone, by visual signal by day, or by radio (2,562 
kcs) at night. If the situation warrants, take direct action, informing Com- 
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and Commander Destroyers. Battle Force. 

W. M. Fechteiee. 

Chief of Staff. 
Distribution : 

List II ; Case 2 ; DBF. M MS2. MS4. X2. 
List II : Case 1. PI, CBF, CBS, CCBF, ND14. 
Fred R. Stickney, 
Fked R. Stic net. 
Flag Secretary. 

United States Pacific Fleet Destroyers, Battle Force 
S68/A16-3 
Serial 01666 

U. S. S. Whitney, Flagship 

% Fi-eet Post Office. 

Pearl Harbor. T.H.. 

December 16. 19.', J. 
Confidential 

From : Commander Destroyers, Battle Force. 
To : Destroyers, Battle Force. 
Subject : Submarine Contacts — Loss of. 

1. The following comment received by Coaimander Destroyers, Battle Force, is 
quoted : 

"Many destroyers have made good contacts with enemy submarines near Pearl 
entrance — and destroyer captains have stated that as they make the approach, 
with almost perfect contact, and are within about 150 yards of the submarine 
and ready to attack, they lose contact quickly on one bow or the other indicating 
the enemy submarines are very maneuverable, probably small, and are well trained 
in eluding surface attacks." 

2. The attention of all commonding officers is directed to the inherent limita- 
tions of the imderwater sound echo ranging equipment, that in general contact 
may be lost during the approach, at a distance depending upon the depth of 
the submarine and the velocity gradient. For a submarine at 100 feet sub- 
mergence and a normal velocitv gradient, contact may normally be lost at about 
200 yards. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1515 

3. The conolusions quoted in paragraph 1 to the effect that, because coutact is 
lost within about 150 yards, the '"enemy submarines are very maneuverable. 
probably small, and are well trained in eluding surface attacks"' are not neces- 
sarily true in so far as they indicate the size of the submarine. 

4. It is expected that enemy submarines of the tyi)e recently captui'ed must 
operate at very shallow submergence and consequently contact may be main- 
tained up to very .short range. In the absence of positive information, however, 
the loss of contact at 15O-250 yards is no criterion as to the type of submarine or 
its capabilities. 

5. During an attack the loss of contact at 150-2.50 yards must not in itself be 
interpreted to mean that the attack will be inelfecive. In the absence of other 
indication that the attack will be ineffective a normal barrage should be dropped. 

M. F. Deaemel. 
Distrihtition: 

List II ; Case 1, PI, BF, DBF, M, 

CMS2. CMD4, MD4, CMD5, MD5, 
CMD6, MD8. 
ROGER B. TANEY (2 copies). 
Fred R. Stickney, 

FkED R. SnCKNEY, 

Flag Seeretarif. 



Heading: 152143. Commander Battle Force Destroy by burning. 

U. S. NAVAL Message 

Confidential mailgram 

MYSER 01447 of October 20, 1041, subject Pearl Harbor sortie and entry X. 
For entry screening vessels accompany ships screened as close to point affirm 
as practicable instead of breaking off at point XRAY. 
Ref : Comde.sbatfor Ser-( 01447) -Pearl Harbor sortie and entry. 
Date received : 16 Dec 41 TJ/F CWO 

From : Comdesbatfor 152143. 
Action To : Pacflt. 



United States Pacifio Fleet 
destroyers, battle force 

U. S. S. Whitney, Flagship, 
File AS % Fleet Post Office, 

Serial 01<560 Pearl Harbor, T. H., 

Confidential December 14, 1941- 

Destroyeb Information BtnxEmN No. 1 

1. Liberty — Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet despatch 122155 December 
is in effect : 

"Restrictions of liberty are hereby modified to permit liberty for one quarter 
your complement officers and one quarter enlisted complement daily provided 
all useful armament can be manned adequately X Liberty can commence any 
hour after 0900 but expires on board at 1700." 

You may grant liberty in accordance with the above, subject to the degree of 
readiness for sea assigned your ship. 

Uniform — Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet despatch 132232 December 
is in effect : 

"Uniform for personnel going on liberty officers service dress whites enlisted 
men undress whites afirm with neckerchief X Aviation and submarine personnel 
may proceed to and from shore in khaki." 

2. MatPvial Conditiofi of Shii)S in Pearl — Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, 
Confidential Letter A16-1 Serial 01659 of December 13, 1941, is in effect. 

3. Water CoiJipensatioi) (Ballasting) — An undamaged destroyer with a rea- 
sonable amount of ammunition on board should get rid of all water ballast 
before entering port, regardless of the amount of fuel on board. 

If you have water ballast in the ship after arrival in port, proceed as follows: 
(a) Slight contamination — pump overboard. 



1516 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(b) Heavy contamination — request services of an oil barge from Commandei' 
Base Force (Contrainron 8) for transfer of oil sludge. 

4. Services for Supply of Fuel, Water, Amnnniitioti. Depth Charges, Torpedoes, 
Lubricatinff Oil, Provisions, Clothing and Small Stores and General Supplies — 
See Comtrainron 8, Base Force Letter L8/FF5/(048) of December 11, 1941. A 
copy is attached. A member of Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, Staff is 
on duty at Merry Point. 

5. Armed Sentries — Numerous cases have been reported of sentries firing on 
our own small boats. Reasonable caution must be exercised and careful in- 
structions should be given each armed sentry in security measures and in the 
proper use of arms. 

6. Maintenance of Communications — 

(a) All ships in harbor will maintain a continuous transmitter and receiver 
watch on 2562 Kc (CincPac Harbor Circuit). It is of paramount importance 
that arrangements be made for immediate internal routing of traffic received 
over this circuit. While within the limits of the harbor, ships proceeding to sea 
or entering port, will maintain watch on this circuit in addition to assigned 
tactical circuits. 

(b) All ships in harbor maintain an intercept on 900 Kc (General Warning 
Net). 

(c) All ships guard normal "Fox" circuits individually or arrange for nest 
guard. 

7. Repairs — Upon arrival, each ship needing repairs should inform their tender 
by despatch or mesisenger. It is not necessary to submit repair requests, but 
when time permits a covering repair request should be submitted direct to the 
tender Repair OflScer. In cases where major repairs are required which affect 
the material readiness of the ship Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, in 
WHITNEY, should be notified. 

8. Boats — If you need boats, ask for them. If they can be obtained you will 
get them. 

9. Boating in Harbor — ^When neon range lights for aircraft are lighted, boats 
burn dimmed running lights and a dim all around blue light. Keep clear of these 
ranges, and when necessary to cross them do so at right angles to the range and 
as rapidly as possible. Be on the alert for planes landing or taking off. At 
all other times between sunset and sunrise, boats run completely darkened. 
Have a man stationed forward as far as possible away from engine noises to 
answer hails. 

10. Sound Gear — Tenders will make routine Inspection of sound gear without 
request. However, if there is any known derangement make special request by 
signal or messenger. 

M. F. Draemel. 
Distribution: 

List II, Case 2, DBF, M, MS2. MS4, X2. 
List II, Case 1, PI, CBF, CBS, CCBF. 
Fred R. Stickney, 
Feed R. Stickney, 

Flag Secretary. 



Mailgram 

From: Comdesbatfor Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 14, JOJ/l. 

Action to : Pacific Fleet 

Special Instructions 

Confidential 

If not encrypted by originator do not transmit by radio without thorough para- 
phrasing and encrypting. 
141913 

MYSER 01447 of October 20, 1941, subject Pearl Harbor sortie and entry X 
Limited experience to date indicates necessity for minor variations to meet par- 
ticular situations X Destroyer commanders be alert to take appropriate action 
X Submit recommendations in the premises to originator 
Authenticated : 

R. R. McCoy. 

R. B. IMcCoY, Lt., U. S. N. 

Desbatfor Communication Officer. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1517 

VISUAL 

14 December 1941. 

From : Comdesbatfoi' 

To : Comdesflot ONE 
0407 BT 

Comdesbatfoi- will handle berth assignments for all destroyers 
(Note. — The policy regarding berthing of destroyers is as follows: No more 

than two destroyers at a buoy, except alongside tenders ; berths assigned with a 

view to developing maximum effective antiaircraft fire.) 



United States Pacific Fleet 
Desteoyeks, Battle Fobce 

U. S. S. Whitney, Flagship, 
File A16-1 %FLEEr Post Office, 

Serial 01659 Peakl Harboe, T. H., 

Confidential December 13, 1941. 

From : Commander Destroyers, Battle Force. 
To : Destroyers, Battle Force. 
Subject : Material Condition of Ships in Pearl. 
Reference: (a) CincPac Conf. Ltr. A16(l)/(11) Serial 02025 of December 

13, 1941. 
Enclosure: (A) One (1) copy of reference (a). 

1. In complying with reference (a), ships of this command shall be governed 
by this directive. 

2. Destroyer Leaders. — (a) Both 1.1 machine guns and two (2) .50 caliber 
machine guns manned at all times. 

(b) A fire control officer on watch at all times. 

3. Destroyers. — (a) One 5-inch gun manned and ready to fire at all times. 

(b) From 30 minutes before sunrise to 1% hours after sunrise, the director 
shall be manned and operating. During this period an additional 5-inch gun 
shall be manned. 

(c) Two .50 caliber machine gun crews on watch at all times. 

(d) A fire control officer on watch at all times. 

4. In selecting the guns to be manned consideration shall be given to the 
following : 

(a) The sector in which berthed. 

(b) Location of nearby ships and other interferences. 

(c) When two or more ships are nested together, the effectiveness of the nest 
as a unit. 

5. Tenders. — (a) Material Condition "BAKER" insofar as is compatible with 
the discharge of tender functions. 

(b) .50 caliber machine guns manned at all times. 

M. F. Draemel. 
Distribution : 

List I. case 3, DBF. 
Fred R. Stickney 
Fred R. Sttcicney, 
Flag Secretary. 

United States Pacific Fleet • 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania Flagship 
Cincpac File No. 
A16 (1)/(11) 
Serial 02025 Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 13 1941. 

Confidential 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 

To: Commander Battle Force. 

Commander Scouting Force. 

Commander Base Force. 

Commander Aircraft, Battle Force. 

Commander Minecraft, Battle Force. 

Commander Battle Ships, Battle Force. 



1518 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Commander Cruisers, Battle Force. 
Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force. 
Commander Destroyers, Battle Force. 
Commander Submarines, Scouting Force. 
Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force. 
Commander Patrol Wing TWO. 
Commander Mine Squadron TWO, Base Force. 
Subject : Material Condition of Ships in Pearl. 

1. Ships in port will maintain Material Condition "YOKE" or "BAKER" and 
man all anti-aircraft batteries at all times. In case of air raid Condition "ZED" 
will be taken by main battery personnel of battleships and cruisers and secondary 
battery per.sonnel of battleships will not leave anti-aircraft condition watch sta- 
tions until relieved by regularly assigned personnel. No main battery nor battle- 
ship secondary battery magazines shall be opened until specifically ordered by 
the Commanding OflScer. 

2. Addressees are responsible to see that ships in their command are informed 
•of the above by copies furnished herewith. 

H. E. KlMMEI, 

/S/ P. C. Ceoslet, 
Flag Secretary. 

United States Pacific Fleet 
* destroyers, battle foece 

U. S. S. WHITNEY. Flagship. 

% Fleetf Post Office 
Peart. Harbor, T. H., December 22, 19^1. 
Memorandum for : Flag Secretary, Combatfor. 

Forwarded herewith in compliance with request contained in your memorandum 
of December 22, 1941, are the following listed copies of instructions regarding 
security ships of Desbatfor while in Pearl Harbor promulgated by Comdesbatfor 
since the attack on December 7, 1941. 

(a) Comdesbatfor Serial 01659, December 13, 1941. Subject: Material Con- 
dition of Ships in Pearl. 

(b) Comdesbatfor despatch to Comdesflot ONE, December 14, 1941 (See note 
thereon ) . 

(2) Comdesbatfor Serial 01660, December 14, 1941. Subject : Destroyer Infor- 
mation Bulletin No. 1. 

(d) Comdesbatfor Serial 01673, December 19, 1941. Subject: Destroyer Har- 
bor Information No. 2. 

Respectfully, 

Fred R. Stickney. 
Feed R. Stickney, 

Flag Secretary. 



United States Pacific Fleet 

Mineckaft, Battle Force 

Pf^rl Harbor, T. H., December 23, 19.',1. 
Memorandum for : Flag Secretary, Staff of Commander Battle Force. 
Reference : (a) Your memo of December 22, 1941. 

Enclosure: (A) Comindiv ONE conf. Itr. S79/(0310) of December 10, 1941 with 
end. thereto. 

(B) Combinbatfor Itr. FF12-6/L9-3 of December 7, 1941. 

1. In connection with your urgent memorandum, no special written instructions, 
additional to those issued prior to December 7, 1941, have been issued to Mine- 
craft, BATTLE FORCE, relative to security, as none were found necessary. The 
fact that Mine Division TWO opened fire on enemy planes as soon as the first 
plane came in range, about 2 oi- 3 minutes after the first alarm, speaks for itself. 

2. Enclosures (A) and (B) relative to security, only in a general way, are 
forwarded for infoi'mation. 

3. Many minor details connected with security in general of Minecraft Ships, 
Mine School, and the Mine Assembly Plant ;it West Loch have Ix^en arraiiiied 
orally and in conference with interested officers in char.sie by Commander Mine- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1519 

craft. The detail of 108 Minecraft personnel at West Loch Mine Assembly Plant 
have six (6) Lewis 30 caliber machine guns and about fifty (50) rifles and have 
been stationed to assist the marines in the defense of that place. 

G. D. Hull, 
Captain, U. S. Navy, 
Commander Minecraft, Battle Force. 



FF12-6/A79 
(06) 

United States Pacific Fleet 

Minecraft, Battle Force 
Confiilcntiul 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 12, 1941. 

Flrt^t Endorsement to Connndiv ONE Conf. Itr. 879(0310) of 12-10-41. 

From : Commander Minecraft. BATTLE FORCE. 

To : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. 
Via : Commander Battle Force. 
Subject : Additional Anti-aircraft Machine guns for Mine Division ONE — 

request for. 
1. Forwarded, recommending tliat the vessels of Mine Division ONE, as well 
as the ships of Mine Division TWO be equipped, as soon as possible, with their 
full allowance of anti-aircraft armament. 

G. D. Hull, Chief of Staff. 



S79/(0310) JFC:les 

United States Pacific Fleet 

Minecraft, Battle Force 

Mine Division One 

U. S. S. Pruitt, Flagship 

Confidential 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 10, 191,1. 

From : Commander Mine Division ONE. 

To : Commander Minecraft, Battle Force. 

Subject : Additional A. A. Machine Guns for Mine Division ONE — request for. 

1. All vessels of Mine Division ONE have only two caliber .50 A. A. Machine 
guns. This installation together with 3"/23 gun is entirely inadequate. 

2. If additional caliber .50 A. A. machine guns become available through sal- 
vage, it is strongly recommended that ships of Mine Division ONE be given high 
priority in obtaining four or six additional caliber .50 guns per ship during the 
current overhaul. The additional guns to be mounted as in the HOVEY. 

3. It is urged that this matter be taken up with higher authority afloat. 

4. If 20 mm. guns should by any chance become available, it is recommended 
that six or eight such guns replace the caliber .50 guns requested in paragraph 
two above. 

J. F. Crowe, jr. 



FF12-6/L9-3/ 23-jee 

United States Pacific Fleet 

Minecraft, Battle Force 

U. S. Subaiarine Base 

Pearl Harbor. T. H., December 7, 191,1. 
From : Commander Minecraft, Battle Force. 
To : Commander Mine Division ONE. 
Subject : Navy Yard Overhaul, Mine Division ONE. 

1. Confirming verbal directions, it is desired that all equipment under repair 
in Mine Division ONE be completed and reassembled as quickly as possible, and 
the Division prepared for sea at the earliest possible date. 

G. D. Hull, Chief of Staff. 

Copy to : Combatfor. 



1520 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

United States Pacific Fleet 

Base Force 
U. S. S. Akgonne, Flagship 

Pearl Habbor, T. H., 22 December, 191^1. 
Memorandum for Flag Secretary, ComMtfor: 

1. In reply to your memorandum about new instructions, etc., regarding the 
security of Pearl Harbor, the following i-eport is submitted : 

(a) The oflacers attached to the Staff of Commander Base Force are 
standing four hour watches on the bridge of the ARGONNE with instruc- 
tions to report ship movements, and other information to the Chief of Staff 
and the Admiral. 

(b) The ARGONNE was directed to stay in Condition Two at all times. 
Respectfully, 

South wick. 

E. P, Southwick, 

Flag Secretary. 

Thanks for your very kind note — can't tell you how much I appreciated your 
thoughtfulness. 

O. 



Commander Battle Force 

V. S. NAVAL message 

Heading: 200032 

RESTRICTED 
Mailgram 

Upon verbal authority of CincPac ComBaseFor was directed to permanently 
transfer ten motor boats from damaged batship vessels to comfourteen for 
harbor patrol X ComBaseFor has transferred CombatDiv one barge one Okla- 
homa motor boat one California motor boat two West Virginia motor boats X 
Request five additional motor boats be made available from batships to fill 
number required X Crews not required 

Date received 19 Dec. 41 /DC/F CWO 

From : ComBaseFor 200032 
Action to : ComBatShips 
Info to : CincPac ComBatFor 



Commander Battle Force 
u. s. naval message 

Heading: 152100 

Destroy by burnins 

Confidential mailgram^ 

In accordance with CincPac directive all ships except aircraft carriers will 
limit provision stores on board to not more than a six weeks supply 
Date received : 16 Dec. 41 TJ/F CWO 

From : ComBaseFor 152100 
Action to : Asp Hawaiian area. 
Info to : CincPac. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1521 

liefer to No. FF12-10/A8. 

United States Pacific Fi.eet StiBM^KiNES, Scouting Force Vd 

Serial 01108 U. S. Submarine Base, 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., 22 Dec. 19U- 
Confidential 

From : The Commander Submarines, Scouting Force. 
To : The Commander Battle Force. 
Subject : Security of Pearl Harbor and Ships of the Pacific Fleet — Instructions 

and Orders Issued since December 7, 1941. 
Reference: (a) Memorandum of the Flag Secretary, Combatfor, dated December 

22, 1941. 
Enclosure : 

(A) Comsubscofor eonf Itr FF12-10/Aie-3(4) Serial 01088 of December 

13. 1941. 

(B) Comsubscofor conf Itr FF12-10/S78 Serial 01091 of December 15, 

1941. 

(C) Consubscofor conf Itr FF12-10/L9-1 Serial 01103 of December 19, 

1941. 

(D) Comsubscofor conf Itr FF12-10/A2-ll(7)/A7-3 Serial 01105 of De- 

cember 20, 1941. 

(E) Comsubscofor restr Itr FF12-10/A2-11(7)/A8, Serial 1848 of December 

16, 1941. 

(F) Comsubscofor Itr FF12-10/N4 Serial 1872 of December 10, 1941. 

(G) Comsubscofor conf mailgram 200103 of Dec. 

1. Einclosures (A) to (G) inclusive are forwarded herewith in compliance 
with your request in reference (a). 

2. In addition to the above written directives the Commander Submarines, 
Scouting Force, has verbally directed the following : 

(a) Establishment of armed sentries in the Submarine Base and instruction of 
sentries. 

(b) Establishment of sentries at the main entrance to the Administration 
Building, Submarine Base, and locking of all other entrances between sunset 
and sunrise. 

(c) Setting of "Command Watch" composed of Chief of Staff, and Division 
Commanders of Submarine Divisions 42, 43, 61 and 62. Establishment of con- 
tinuous coding watch. Establishment of Staff Duty Oflficer Watch. Establish- 
ment of continuous watch in the Flag Office. 

(d) Camouflage of submarines in Pearl Harbor. 

(e) Escort of incoming and outward bound submarines through harbor defense 
area and to within 100 miles of entrance to Pearl Harbor. 

E. R. Swinburne, 
E. R. Swinbubne, 

Flag Secretary. 



United States Pacific Fleet Bn 

Submarines, Scouting Force 

FF12-10/A2-11 ( 7 ) /A7-3 

Seriak-01105 U. S. Submarine Base, 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 20, 1941. 
Confidential 

Submarines, Scouting Force, Confidential Letter No. 13-41 

From : The Commander Submarines, Scouting Force. 
To: Submarines, Scouting Force. 
Subject : Destruction Bill. 

1. Submarines when assigned hazardous duty, i. e., when entering hostile waters 
where attack is likely, shall take necessary action to prevent loss or compromise 
<'f all secret and confidential matter and material. The destruction and final 
disposition of the respective items listed below will be governed by special circum- 
stances and existing condition. Therefore, the time and place for such destruc- 



1522 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tion must obviously be left to the discretion of the individual submarine com- 
manding officer. 

(a) Items to be landed prior to departure on hazardous duty : 

(1) Confidential files (letters, bulletins, etc.). 

(2) Qualification notebooks. 

(3) Unnecessary instruction books and pamphlets. 

(4) Unnecessary blue prints, ship's plans, etc. 

(b) Upon arrival in hostile waters, where salvaye is possible, destroy: 

(1) Unnecessarv registered publications including FTP's, ORD's and 
CSP's. 

(Retain those CSP's specifically assigned to submarines on hazardous duty). 

(2) All remaining items under (a) not previously landed or destroyed. 

(c) At abandon ship: 

( 1 ) Destrov underwater sound equipment : 
Receiver (QC and JK), 
Polarizer (QC), 
Driver (QC). 
(Lower both sound heads). 

(2) Destroy T. D. C. and associated equipment. 

(3) Destroy cipher unit in ECM 2. (Throw overboard, if possible). 

(4) Destroy al Iremaining CSP's. (Thi'ow overboard, if possible). 

2. Squadron Commanders will insure that necessary demolition equipment 
has been furnished each ship prior to departure on war patrol or when engaged 
in hazardous duty and that personnel have been instructed in the Use of the 
equipment. 

T. Withers. 
Distribution : 

Pac. List 7CM-41. Lii<*t I, Case 2 ; 
PI, CSF, SSF. Special ; Comsubaf. com- 
sublant (5), Com 14, Is. Off. (2). 
E. R. Swinburne, 
E. R. Swinburne, 

Flag Secretary 



Outgoing Dispatch 

UNITED States Pacific Fleet Submarines, ScotTTiNG Force 



Heading : 200103 
Confidential 



Mailgram, 



Information vessel man two fifty caliber machine guns at all times X Man all 
anti-aircraft batteries from one half hour before daylight to one half hour after 
daylight 

From : Comsubscofor. 

Date : 20 Dec. 

to (for action) : Comsubron six. 

To (for information) : Pelias. 

United States Pacific Fleet • 

sxjbmarines. scouting force 
FF12-10/L9-1 
Serial 01103 

U. S. Submarine Base, 

Pearl Harbor, T. H.. 

December 19, 1941. 
Confidential 

From : The Commander Submarines, Scouting Force. 
To : The Commander Submarine Squadron Four. 

The Commander Submarine Squadron Six. 
Subject : Dispersal of submarines and tenders. 

1. It is necessary to keep submarines and tender facilities dispersed as much as 
possible at berths to lessen the chance of damage to them during air raids. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1523 

2. The following is the maximum concentration of vessels which will be al- 
lowed without prior authority of Commander Submarines, Scouting Force. 

(a) PELIAS (AS14) berthed at S-13 and FULTOX (ASH) upon arrival 
at new quay wall as near the shore end of slip as possible. 

(b) Submarines— One alongside each FELIAS and FULTON, one astern 
of each PELIAS and FULT(JN, one at berth S-2. one at S-6. one at S-9. 

(c) Rescue Vessels — One at old quay wall, one at new quay wall. 

(d) LITCHFIELD (DDS^G) and SEAGULL (AM.SO) at any berth. 

3. Commander Submarine Squadron Four will control berthing to maintain 
this dispersal. 

T. Withers. 
Copy to : 

Cinpac 
Com 14 
E. R. Swinburne, 
Flag Secretary. 



United States Pacific Fleet 

Submarines, Scouting Force 
FF12-10/A2-11(7)/ 
AS 
Serial 1848 

U. S. Submarine Base, 

Pearl Harbor, T. H. 

December 16, 1941. 
Restricted 

submarines, scouting force, letter no. 24-41 (revised) 

From : The Commander Submarines, Scouting Force. 

To : Submarines, Scouting Force. 

Subject : Special Internal Security Measures. 

Reference: (a) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 191^0 (restricted) 

(b) Submarines, Scouting Force, Letter No. 13-41. 
1. The following special internal security measures are effective : 

(a) On all ships 

(1) No personnel, including Army and Navy, but excluding i-egularly at- 

tached members of the crew, shall be admitted to any submarine at 
any time unless properly identified by an officer attached to the sub- 
marine, who shall ascertain that the person has some specific bus- 
iness on board. 

(2) Ships undergoing overhaul at a Navy Yard shall obtain from the Yard 

authorities a list of the workmen working on board. An officer shall 
inspect and check each workman coming on board, with this list, and 
shall also inspect any tool box, bag, or package the workman may 
be carrying. 

(3) The Officer of the Deck. Junior Officer of the Watch, Chief Master at 

Arms, and all petty officers on watch shall be armed with pistols at 
all times and supplied with adequate ammunition. 

(4) All officers shall be supplied with pistols and ammunition. 

(b) On all Stlbmarines 

(1) The provisions of Submarine Force Instructions concerning watch 
standing shall be modilied to the extent that one commissioned of- 
ficer Security Patrol shall be on board each submarine at all times. 
In view of the small number of officers attached to a submarine, he 
may also be the Duty Officer. These provisions are minimum re- 
quirements and shall be augmented by unit commanders or com- 
manding officers to such an extent as may be necessary to insure 
security. 

(2) In addition to the regularly assigned men on watch, the Security Patrol 

shall be augmented by a watch consisting of one man of the rating of 
chief, first class, or second class petty officer qualified in submarines, 
standing a heel and toe watch at all times. 

(3) The Security Patrol shall make thorough inspections of vital parts of the 

ship at irregular intervals. 

79716— 46— E.\. 143, vol. 3 -16 



1524 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(4) All security patrols shall be armed with pistols and carry ammunition and 

shall be instructed and trained in the use of the pistol, with particular 
attention to safety precautious. Attention is directed to reference (b). 
While in port, keep rifles, pistols and machine guns immediately available 
for use by personnel of regular watch. Unit commanders sliall specify 
number of weapons and stowage arrangements. 

(5) The Security Patrol is maintained to detect sabotage, attempts at sabotage, 

subversive activities, and other unauthorized occuri-ences. In addition 
to definite, detailed, specific instructions which Squadron Commanders 
are hereby directed to issue for the various classes of submarines under 
their command, members of the Security Patrol shall be confidentially 
and thoroughly instructed in tlie following: 

(a) The importance of reporting disloyal actions on the part of any 

man at any time. 

(b) The necessity for correcting any result of sabotage if it en- 

dangers the safety of the ship, bearing in mind the desirability 
of keeping all evidence to assist in apprehending the culprit. 
Force shall be used if the occasion demands, in order to appre- 
hend the offender or to prevent damage or further damage, 
(e) The necessity for repeated observation and knowledge of the 
position of valves, levers, locks, etc., to vital parts of the 
submarine to enable them to detect attempts at sabotage. 

(6) The enlisted Security Patrols shall have no additional duties while on 

watch as such and their inspections shall be in addition to those normally 
carried out in peacetime routine. 

(c) On Rescue Vessels and Mmesweepers 

(1) The instructions enumerated above for submarines shall be applicable 
to rescue vessels and minesweepers except that warrant officers may 
be substituted for commissioned officers. 

(d) On Destroyers 

(1) Instructions for the "ALERT" Condition issued by Commander De- 
stroyers, Battle Force, shall be carried out. 

(e) On Tenders 

(1) Tenders shall carry out the instructions applicable to cruisers set 
forth in reference (a). 
2. Submarines, Scouting Force, Letter No. 24-41 is superseded by this revision 
and should be destroyed. 

T. Withers. 
Dlstri})tition: 

Pacific List 7CM-41 

List I, Case 2 : CSF ; SSf less CSF ; SSF (less SSIO) 
Atlantic List llCM-41 
• List I, Case 2 : SO 
E. R. Swinburne. 

E. R. SWINBUKNE, 

Flag Secretary. 

United States Pacific Fleet 

StJBMABiNES, Scouting Force 
Serial 01091 

U. S. Submarine Base, 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., 
Confidential December 15, 1941. 

From : The Commander Submarines, Scouting Force. 
To : The Commander Submarine Squadron Four. 

The Commander Submarine Squadron Six. 
Subject: Common VS Anti-aircraft Projectiles. 
Reference: (a) Bulletin of Ordnance Information No. 3-41. 

1. The allowance of service projectiles for submarines with double purpose 
guns has recently been changed. The removal of all anti-aircraft projectiles 
and replacement of this type with common jji-ojocti'^s was authorized. In view 
of the present critical ammunition situation in the Hawaiian Area, it is desired 
tliat submarines with double purpose guns retain on board tlie present allowance 
of common and anti-aircraft projectiles. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1525 

2. The Bureau of Ordnance conducted tests with 3" 50-caliber anti-aircraft 
ammunition wliich are described in paragraphs 44 and 45 of reference (a). 
Considering the type of target against which a submarine may expect to effec- 
tively use its gun and the fact that 3" 50-caliber anti-aircraft projectiles will 
usually give good explosive action against 14" to %" plating, it is felt that 
the mixture of common and anti-aircraft projectiles may prove to be a desirable 
and effective ammunition allowance. 

3. The anti-aircraft and common pi'ojectiles should be so arranged in the 
magazines that ammunition supplied to the gun will provide a mixture of both 
types. Submarines should be instructed to set the fuzes of anti-aircraft pro- 
jectiles on "safe" when firing against surface targets. 

T. WiTHEIBS. 
E. R. SWINBTJENE, 

Flag Secretary. 

From : The Commander Submarines, Scouting Foi'ce. 

To : Submarines, Scouting Force. 

Subject : Material Condition of Ships in Pearl. 

Reference: (a) Cincpac Conf. Itr. A16(l)/(11) Serial 02025 of December 13, 

1941. 
Enclosure: (A) Copy of reference (a). 

1. Enclosure (A) is furnished herewith for information and compliance. 

C. W. Styee, 
Distribution: Chief of Staff. 

List I, Case 2: 
SS4, SS6. 

E. R. Swinburne, 
E. R. Swinburne, 
Flag Secretary. 



United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Cincpac File No. jb 

A16(l)/(11) 

Serial 02025 

Peael Habbob, T. H., December IS, I94I. 
Confidential 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
To : Commander Battle Force. 

Commander Scouting Force. 

Commander Base Force. 

Commander Aircraft, Battle Force. 

Commander Minecraft, Battle Force. 

Commander Battleships, Battle Force. 

Commander Cruisers, Battle Force. 

Commander Cruisers, Scouting Force. 

Commander Destroyers, Battle Force. 

Commander Submarine, Scouting Force. 

Commander Aircraft, Scouting Force. 

Commander Patrol Wing TWO. 

Commander Mine Squadron TWO, Base Force, 
Subject : Material Condition of Ships in Pearl. 

1. Ships in port will maintain Material Condition "YOKE" or "BAKER" and 
man all anti-aircraft batteries at all times. In case of air raid Condition "ZED" 
will be taken but main battery personnel of battleships and cruisers and sec- 
ondary battery personnel of battleships will not leave anti-aircraft condition 
watch stations until relieved by regularly assigned personnel. No main battery 
nor battleship secondary battery magazines shall be opened until specifically 
ordered by the Commanding OflScer. 

2. Addressees are responsible to see that ships in their command are informed 
of the above by copies furnished herewith. 

H. E. Kimmel. 
P. C. Crosley, 
P. C. Ckosley, 

Flag Secretary. 



1526 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Refer to No. United States Pacific Fleet 

FF12-10/N4 SuBMAKiNEs, Scouting Force Rs 

Serial 1872 U. S. Submarine Base, 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., JO December 19.>,1. 
From : The Commander Submarines, Scouting Force. 
To : The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 
Subject : Quarters, Bachelor Officers — Request for. 

1. At present the facilities for quartering Submarine Division Commanders 
and officers of the Staff of Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, are entirely 
inadequate and, in addition, have the undesirable feature of being concentrated 
in one cirridor of the submarine officer's quarters. Cots are being used b.v half 
of the officers. • As officers are now disposed it is possible that a bomb hit or a 
surprise raid by saboteurs would dispose of the entire staff. As an extension of 
bachelor officers quarters now provided and to effect dispersion, houses in the 
Navy Housing Project in Makalapa area are requested as follows : 

Chief of Staff and four (4) Division Commanders — One three bedroom and 
one (1) two bedroom house. 

Seven Staff Officers — One (1) three bedroom and two (2.) two bedroom 
houses. 

T. WlTHEHS. 

Note : Dispersal of Staff Officers. 



Refer to No. A8/(3) 0248 

United States Pacific Fleet 
AiRCKAFT Scouting Force 

PATROL WING one 

Ca 

Fleet Air Detachment. 

Naval Aib Station. 
Confidential Kancohe Bay, T. H., Dec. 23, 1941. 

From : Commander Patrol Wing ONE. 
To : Commander Battle Force. 
Subject: Security Measures — Patrol Wing ONE at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe 

Bay, T. H. 
Enclosure : 

(A) Copy Internal Security — Watches and Duties — Patrol Wing ONE 
Order 30-41. 

(B) Copy Gtyieral Instructions for Security Watches. 

(C) Itemized list of Security Measures taken since December 7, 1041. 

1. Enclosure (A) is a copy of the Security Measures placed into effect by 
Commander Patrol Wing ONE at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H., soon 
after the Wing was organized at this station. The Staff Administrative Watch 
referred to in paragraph 2 (a) 1 of Enclosure (A) was placed in effect on Novem- 
ber 20, 1941. Enclosure (B) is a copy of General Instructions for and posts 
assigned machine gun nests, and Security Watches, in Hangar — Beach area 
allocated to Patrol Wing ONE. These instruction.s were issued December 8, 
1941 verbally and December 9, 1941 by written order. Enclosiue iC) is a list 
of Security Measures taken by Commander Patrol Wing ONE and the Connuand- 
ing Officer, Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, T. H.. since December 7, 1941. 

K. McGlNNIS. 

C(^py to : CPW-2 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1527 

liefer ro No. A8/(3) 

United States Pacific Fleet 

Aircraft Scouting Force 

PATROL wing one 

Lin 

Confidential 

By Commander Patrol Wing One 

1. Establishment of an Armed Seaman Guard of 6S men to assist in the security 
of the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay. T. H., made necessary by the withdrawal 
of the major part of the US Army. 

2. Establishment of machine gun nests along the seaplane ramp area on the 
bay to forestall any possible enemy landing in this area. (See Enclosure (B).) 

3. Establishment of an air plotting and operations room with special telephones 
to vital areas for the rapid and nositive control of plane operations. 

4. Maintaining of all flight crews, for planes, in hangar during night so that 
they may be more ready for emergency take-off. 

5. Establishment of machine gun nests in vicinity of squadron area other 
than those mentioned above, to afford some measure of defense against dive 
bombing and straffing attacks. 

6. Maintenance of constant surveillance of the station proper from observa- 
tion tower by fine officer and four look-outs on a continuous watch. 

7. Maintenance of a sizeable armed guard, sleeping locked in an important 
center such as armor.v, bombsight storage, magazines, disbursing office, etc., in 
addition to sentries guarding the buildings. 

By the Navax, Aie Station. Kaneohe, T. H. 

1. Establisment of security patrols — thirteen (13) two (2) man patrols to 
guard station against sabotage and surprise attack. This action made neces- 
sary by withdrawal of a large portion of Army forces. 

2. Establishment of strategically located machine gun nests throughout the 
station. 

3. Blocking of landing mat, at night, and manning of machine gun posts in its 
vicinity during the day to prevent enemy landing thereon. 

4. Building of several concrete-steel air raid shelters, details of dug-outs and 
protected defense positions. 

5. Camouflage painting of all buildings to blend in color with the natural sur- 
roundings. 

6. Surfacing of areas to permit dispersal and camouflage of planes. 

7. Beginning work on construction of revetments for planes. 

8. Disbarring from access to the station all Japanese employees of govern- 
ment, families, or contractor. 

9. Effective night black out. 



A8/(3) 

United States Pacific Fleet 

Aircraft Scouting Force 

PATROL wing one 

Confidential 

Fleet Air Detachment, 
U. S. Naval Air Station, 
Kaneohe Bay, T. H., December 9, 19U- 

General Instructions for Sectt!Ity Watching 
Purpose 

1. Tlie following watches will be stood daily by squadrons based at Naval Air 
Station. Kaneohe Bay. in order to afford security to the ramp area, buildings, 
and squadron equipment: from (1) internal sabotage, (2) unlawful entry into 
squadron areas, either from the Bay or from land. 



1528 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

2. Location of posts and equipment : 

Bay 



Burned hangar 


Ramp'area— A & R 


VP-11, VP-14 


New hangar 


2 men, 1 .30 cal. MG, 2 
pistols (VP-11). 


1 sentry (VP-12) 


2 men, 1 .30 cal. MG 
■ (VP-12) — 1 sentry 
each. 


2 men, 1 .30 cal. MG 

(VP-14). 



3. Personnel mi Watch— MetJwd of Watch Rotation. — A watch shall consist of 
the following number of men, up and alert : 

(a) 1 security watch officer. (In charge.) 

(b) 2 P. O. watch Roving Patrol (supervise sentries under direction of 
security watch officer). 

(c) 1 sentry in A & R Bldg. 

(d) 1 sentry in VP-12 hangar. 

(e) 1 sentry in VP-14 hangar. 

(f ) 2 men at each MG nest. 

In addition to above personnel, a duty section of at least ten men shall be 
provided by each squadron and these men shall sleep in the squadron hangars and 
shall remain in the squadron area from sunset until sunrise. The purpose of 
these men is to provide a reserve to reinforce the men on "watch in an emergency. 

Hours of watches: 

(1) 1630-2130. 

(2) 2130-0130. 

(3) 0130-15 minutes after sunrise. 

Method of rotation: 

(a) Commencing with Patrol Squadron ELEVEN. Squadrons shall furnish 
personnel for the Petty Officers of the watch and Security Watch Officer in 
rotation. The first watch shall be assumed by Patrol Squadron ELEVEN, 
Squadrons moving up on successive days. 

(b) Patrol Squadron ELEVEN shall provide personnel for the following posts 
from 15 minutes prior sunset to 15 minutes after sunrise : 

1. M. G. nest in burned hangar. 

2. Hangar sentry in own hangar. 
Patrol Squadron TWELVE: 

1. MG nest in own hangar. 

2. Hangar sentry in A & R building. 
Patrol Squadron FOURTEEN : 

1. MG nest in unfinished hangar. 

2. Sentry in own hangar. 

(c) Anniiiff of sentries: 

1. Security Watch Officer — 1 automatic pistol with 5 clips ammunition. 

2. Petty Officer of the watch — do plus bayonet. 

3. Hangar Sentries — 1 pistol, 5 clips ; 1 bayonet. 

4. MG nests — 1-30 caliber machine gun, 500 rounds ammunition. 

5. Reservp Duty Sections — Thompson sub-machine guns, BAM and rifles 
plus suitable amounts of ammunition. 

4. The purpose of the watch is as stated in paragraph one (1) above. If 
enemy opposition developes in such force as to overcome the resistance supplied 
by the personnel on watcli and as augmented by other two duty sections, then 
personnel should give ground only as necessary while retiring to final rallying 
point on control Tower Hill. 

5. Challenges and replies shall be prescribed by competent authority. All 
sentries will patrol their areas constantly. 

K. McGiNNis. 



PROCEEDINGS jOF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1529 

[1 ] United States Pacific Fleet 

AiBCEAFT Scouting Force 

Patrol Wing One 
A2-ll(24)/A8/(3) Lin 

Serial No. 1569. 

Fleet Air Detachment, 

Naval Air Station, 
Kaneohe Bay, T. H., 

November 22, 1941. 

Patrol Wing One Order No. 30-41 

From: Commander Patrol Wing ONE. (Commander Fleet Air Detachment) 

To : Fleet Air Detachment. 

Subject : Internal Security — ^Watches and Duties. 

Reference i 

(a) FAD, NAS, Kaneohe Bay, Order No. 23-41. 

(b) PW-1 Order No. 28-41. 

1. References (a) and (b) are hereby cancelled and superseded as hereafter 
directed. 

2. The following watches shall be established as indicated : 

(a) 1. Staff Administrative Watch — when so directed by Commander Patrol 
Wing ONE. 

2. Staff Tactical Watch — when so directed by Commander. Patrol Wing ONE. 

3. Fleet Air Detachment Duty Officer (Fleet Air Detachment Security Watch 
Officer) — whenever two or more squadrons are based ashore. 

4. Assistant Fleet Air Detachment Duty Officer — whenever one or more squad- 
rons are based ashoi'e. 

5. Squadron Duty Officer. 

6. Assistant Fleet Air Detachment Security Watch Officer — unless otherwise 
directed by the Senior Fleet Air Detachment Officer Present, one officer per Unit 
shall be on duty whenever one or more squadrons are based at the Fleet Air 
Detachment. 

7. Shore Patrol. 

8. Squadron Duty Sections. 

9. Pettv Officer of the Watch. 

[2] 'lO. Security Watch Sentries. 

11. Base Radio Watches. 

12. Tower Watch Officer. 

13. Tower Watch Petty Officer. 

14. Armoi-v Watch. 

15. Office Watch. 

(b) The duties associated with the foregoing watches are as prescribed below : 

1. Staff Administrative Watch 

(a) In a rotation as prescribed by the Staff Operations Officer there shall be on 
duty at all times, a line officer eligible to command, as prescribed by Commander 
Fleet Air Detachment. 

(b) Duty hours when ship based or shore based. 

1. When Commander Patrol Wing ONE and Staff are embarked in a tender 
this duty shall be continuous for twenty-four hours beginning at 0800 each 
day (0900 on Sundays and Holidays). 

2. When Commander Patrol Wing ONE and Staff are based ashore this 
duty shall be continuoUvS for twenty-four hours beginning at 0700 each day 
(0800 on Sundays and Holidays) and will be stood in the Wing Area during 
working hours. After working hours the officer having this duty will be on 
call, but may leave the Wing Area, keeping the Fleet Air Duty Officer and 
the Patrol Wing ONE Office apprised of his whereabouts, and remain where 
he may be reached by telephone. At no time, when away from the Wing 
Area, shall he be in a locality where he cannot return to the Wing Area 
within thirty minutes after being called. He shall remain within the confines 
of the Naval Air Station. 



1530 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

[S] (c) In tlie absence of Couimaiuler Patrol Wing ONE (and/or Com- 
mander Fleet Air Uetacliment), the officer liaviii.y this duty will act for him in 
all matters, not pertaiifin,^ to policy, referring any matters about which he is in 
doubt to the Staff Operations Officer or to the Senior Fleet Air Detachment Naval 
Aviator present. 

2. Staif Tactical Watch 

(a) During Tactical Exercises, or when prescribed, there shall be on duty at all 
times, in rotation as prescrilied by the Staff Operations OfBt-er. a line officer eligible 
to connuand. as prescribed by the Staff Operations Officer. 

(b) The duties of the officei- having this duty will be : 

1. Keep a record of all patrol planes in the air with time of take oft", track, 
and estimated time of return. 

2. Keep a check on '"plan" reports, reporting immediately to Commander 
Fleet Air Detachment if such report is not made within :)0 minutes of time 
prescribed. 

3. Keep a running narrative of all pertinent despatches received and sent. 

4. Keep informed of local weather conditions and, if possible, of weather 
conditions in operating areas. 

5. Plot on the proper chart the positions of any objectives reported by our 
forces, with all pertinent data. 

3. Fleet Air Detachment Duty Officer 

(a) In a rotation, as prescribed by the Senior Naval Aviator eligible for this 
duty, excepting Commanding and Executive and Flight Officers, and as approved 
by the Staff Operations Officer, there shall be on duty at all times, a regular line 
officer eligible to command who is attached to an aircraft. 

(Note. — Page 4 was missing from original exhibit and is not available.) 

[-5] (f) When night flying is to occur he shall: 

1. See that necessary measures for the operation are initiated in a timely 
manner and that the Naval Air Station Officer-of-the-Day is pi-ovided with 
all pertinent information. 

2. See that all preparations by both fleet and station personnel are com- 
pleted prior to the time for conunencing night operations. 

3. Provide assistance and advice as requested by the Naval Air Station, 
particularly in regard to the establishment of any temporary lighting or 
comnninication facilities that may be necessary. 

4. Request the Senior Officer Present Afloat to have all ships pi-esent 
turn on red truck lights during the iieriod of operations except for opera- 
tions occurring when these lights are regularly maintained. 

5. Notify the plane guard vessel. 

6. ;See that proper securing measures are carried out upon the com- 
pletion or cancellation of flying, including notification to the plane guard 
vessel. 

(g) He shall keep informed as to movements to and from the Fleet Air De- 
tachment of fleet planes not based at the Fleet Air Detachment. He shall check 
all arrival and departure reports against each other to see that airplanes depart- 
ing from or for the Fleet Air Detachment arrive at destination and shall also 
require duty officers to obtain releases from him for such departing planes and 
to report .to him any planes which appeal" to be overdue. 

(h) He shall require the tower duty officer to inform him of all ship move- 
ments in or out of the Harbor. He shall report same to Commander Patrol 
Wing ONE, and/or Commander Fleet Air Detachment, and to the Staff Operations 
Officer. 

r^] (i) He .shall inspect the meals and mess gear; and grant passes for 

early and late meals, giving proper notification to the Naval Air Station Officer- 
of-the-Day. 

(j) Outside of working hours he shall keep informed of all messages sent and 
received and take necessary steps to insure that replys are sent as required 
below. Messages requiring answers will be answered in accordance with the 
following table. If for any reason data for reply is not available within the 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1531 

periods specified, a despatch stating the reason for delay, and the time answer 
may be expected, will be forwarded to the originator. 

(1) Priority: To be answered immediately. The reply should be ready 
to go in less than two hours. 

(2) Roiiti7ie: To be answered immediately if practicable. Messages re- 
ceived Saturday morning should be an.swered by noon that day if possible. 

(3) Deferred: On working days deferred messages shall be answered by 
noon subsequent to the time of arrival. Messages received Saturday morn- 
ing should be answered by noon that day if practicable. Answers to deferred 
mes.sages dated on a Saturday, Sunday, or Holiday, unless some particular 
urgency is indicated, may be deferred until noon next working day. In 
cases where answers are not prepared by action addressees within the 
time limit si)ecified, the communication ofiicers will report the facts to the 
Command or Department concerned. 

He shall refer to the Staff Duty Officer all despatches on which he is uncer- 
tain as to the proper action to be taken. 

(k) After working hours he is authorized to release routine despatches and 
those regarding emergency reports. 

[7] (1) He shall keep a rough log, entering such matters as affect units 
based at the Fleet Air Detachment, including official calls made or returned 
by Commander Patrol Wing ONE, or the Commander Fleet Air D?tachnipnt : 
arrivals and departures of units, etc. The log shall be presented to Patrol 
Wing ONE Operations Officer, or in his absence to the Commander Fleet Air 
Detachment, for inspetcion each forenoon, except Sundays and Holidays. 

(m) He shall keep informed as to the present and prospective status of the 
weather, and shall disseminate pertinent aerological information through the 
unit commanders and the Tower Duty Officer. 

(n) He shall require frequent rigid inspections of sentries and security 
measures by security watch officers outside of working hours. In this capacity 
he shall act as Senior Security Watch Officer, Fleet Air Detachment, and shall 
be responsible that prescribed security measures are strictly enforced. 

(o) He shall require unit duty officers to report when their units cease flying 
for the day and also when the units are secured. 

(p) Upon receipt of airci-aft movement reports indicating pending arrival 
of Fleet Aircraft at the Fleet Air Detachment he shall take stops to insure 
that proper facilities are provided for their servicing and for the reception, 
transportation, berthing and messing of personnel. In the case of arriving 
officers of or above the rank of commander, the Duty Officer will personally 
receive them. 

(q) He shall take steps to insure that special services such as early and late 
meals and boats, night flying lights, etc., requested by fleet units from the Air 
Stations are provided. Whenever practicable he shall arrange to combine 
requests of separate units in order to eliminate as far as possible duplications 
of services at approximately similar times. 

(r) He shall require the duty sections and restricted men of all squadrons 
to be mustered at the times specified below, making an entry in the log as to 
the [S] result of each muster and r*eport absentees in writing to the 
commanding officer concerned : 

Restricted men muster at : 

1. Ordinarv working days: 1315. 1.530, 2000 

2. Full Holiday ; 0730, 1000, 1300, 1630, 2000 

Squadron Duty Sections as prescribed in paragraph 8, below. 

(s) He shall cause all serious violations of flight rules that come to his 
attention or the attention of other duty officers to be reported in writing to the 
commanding officer concerned, and to the Commander Fleet Air Detachment, 
routing such reports via the Staff Operations Officer. 

(t) In case of a crash, he shall take steps to insure that rescue and medical 
facilities are at once dispatched, that Commander Fleet Air Detachment is in- 
formed of the known facts and that the squadron concerned takes charge of 
salvage operations. He .shall, for the latter purpose, ascertain immediately from 
the commanding officer of the unit concerned, or his representative, the re- 



1532 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

quirements in the way of boats or trucks for salvage and shall assist in 
meeting these requirements. 

(u) He shall be entirely familiar with the measures in force for dispatching 
the ready duty tender and ready duty destroyer in case of crashes at sea. 

(v) He shall maintain the following records and publications up to date in his 
office and shall turn them over to his relief; any shortage shall be reported im- 
mediately to the Patrol Wing ONE Staff Operations Officer : 

1. One copy Patrol Wing ONE Instructions. 

2. One copy Patrol Wing TWO Instructions. 

3. One copy AirScoFor Instructions. 

4. One copy AirScoFor Operating Manual. 

5. One copy Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, Orders. 

6. One copy N. A. S., Kaneohe, Air Operations Manual. 

7. One copy Naval Air Station, Pearl, Regulations. 

[9] 8. One copy Naval Air Station, Pearl, Air Operations Manual. 

9. One file of special orders and instructions to the Fleet Air Detachment 
Duty Officer. 

10. One file of Fleet Air Detachment and Patrol Wing ONE Orders. 

11. Log. 

12. Ready tender and ready destroyer lists with instructions for contacting 
and dispatching them, 

13. One copy of Roster of Officers, 14th Naval District, Patrol Wing ONE, 
Patrol Wing TWO, Naval Air Station, Pearl, and Naval Air Station, Kaneohe 
Bay, and a list of personnel attached to Fleet Air Detachment Units. 

4- Assistant Fleet Air Detachment Duty Officer 

(a) To act as assistant to the Fleet Air Detachment Duty Officer. 

(b) To stand a continuous twenty-four hour watch from a daily detail of four 
chief petty officers, as prescribed by the Patrol Wing ONE Staff Operations 
Officer, (one chief petty officer or petty officer, first class, shall be detailed as 
permanent Assistant Fleet Air Detachment Duty Officer and shall be on duty from 
the beginning to close of working hours). 

(c) To stand watch in the Duty Officer's office, which he will not leave unless 
relieved by the Duty Officer. 

(d) To be armed with an automatic pistol. 

(e) To muster the restricted men in person in the Duty Office at the times 
specified in paragraph 3(r) above. 

(f ) He shall keep a quartermaster's notebook of all routine matters, receive 
schedules and incoming mail, file despatches and he shall keep himself informed 
at all times as to the location of the Duty Officer and shall report to him immedi- 
ately any circumstance that requires his action. 

[10] (g) A messenger of the watch will be supplied by the squadron furnish- 
ing the Duty Officer. He shall : 

1. Wear undress whites, neckerchief, and band and pistol belt. 

2. \^'atches shall be stood as follows : 

1245 to 1600 0000 to 0400 

KiOO to 2000 0400 to 0800 

2000 to 2400 0800 to 1245 

3. He shall remain in the Duty Officer's office at all times except when 
required for messenger duty or absence for meals. 

4. He shall answer the telephone, and police the office. 

5. Squadron Duty Officer 

(a) In a rotation as prescribed by their respective squadron commander, there 
shall be on duty at all times, an officer attached to each squadron, who shall be 
known as the Squadron Duty Officer. 

(b) He shall perform such duties as are prescribed by his commanding officer 
in relation to his particular squadron. 

(c) Whenever his squadron is not secured he will remain in the Fleet Air 
Detachment Area. 

(d) Upon securing the squadron he will report the fact to the Duty Officer and 
will notify the Patrol Wins ONE B.iso Radio Station. While his squadron is 
secured, the Squadron Duty Officer will remain within telephone call and will keep 
the Fleet Air Detachment Duty Officer and the Patrol Wing ONE Base Radio 
Station informed as to his whoreahouts. At no time, when away from the Fleet 
Air Detachment Area, shall h*^ he in a locality where he cannot return to his 
squadron area within thirty minutes after being called. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1533 

(c) When directed by his commanding oflScer, he may serve as Security Watch 
OflBcer for his squadron. [11] He shall inspect planes and hangar areas 
to ascertain that all security measures have been taken for the night prior to 
reporting the squadron secured to the Duty Officer. 

(f ) As a direct representative of the Squadron Commander, he shall be present 
for all launching and recovering of squadron planes, fueling and parking opera- 
tions. He shall carry out the flight schedule and plan of the day, and shall keep 
the squadron area policed at all times. 

(g) He shall maintain the squadron log in accordance with existing instruc- 
tions. 

(h) He shall make special arrangements for meals, obtain special dungaree 
and meal passes for men working overtime. He shall keep personnel in prescribed 
uniform. 

(i) He shall ensure that flight and operation schedules, duty and watch bills, 
etc., are forwarded to arrive at their destination in time. 

(j) He .shall handle arrival and departure reports for planes in his squadron, 
and make necessary communication arrangements. 

(k) He shall insure that sentries are alert are properly instructed in their 
duties and are familiar with the following : 

1. Use of the pistol — safety precautions. 

2. Limits of their post. 

3. Proper challenging procedure. 

4. Proper whistle signals. 

5. Authorized personnel in area assigned. 

6. Fire-alorm procedure. 

7. Black-out procedure. 

8. Defensive measures against landing parties. 

9. Securing of planes and equipment. 

6. Assistant Fleet Air Detachment Security Watch Offlcrr 

(a) In a rotation as prescribed by the Senior Duty Officer, from a watch list 
promulgated by Commander [12] Fleet Air Detachment, there shall be on 
duty, daily from the end of working hours until the beginning of working hours 
the next working day, three officers attached to Fleet Air Detachment Squadrons 
who shall be known as the Assistant Fleet Air Detachment Security Watch 
Officers. One of these officers shall be continuously on duty from the close of 
working hours until the beginning of working hours the next day. When on 
duty he shall be up, alert, fully clothed and armed. He shall be charged under 
the Duty Officer for the proper performance of all sentries and the carrying out 
of all prescribed security measures in the squadron areas. Until properly relieved, 
he shajl remain in the immediate vicinity of the squadron areas at all times. He 
shall keep the Duty Officer informed of his whereabouts. He shall sleep in his 
own squadron area. 

(b) When practicable, and at the discretion of the respective squadron com- 
manders, this duty may be combined with that of Squadron Duty Officer. 

7. Shore Patrol 

(a) When, and as required, personnel of attached units shall be ordered to duty 
as Shore Patrol. 

(b) Instructions for members of the Shore Patrol are issued by the Comman- 
dant, Fourteenth Naval District, or the Senior Officer Present. 

8. Squadron Duty Section 

(a) Duty sections of at least one quarter of the enlisted personnel of each unit 
shall be maintained on board at all times for the purpose of standing required 
watches and for such additional work as may be required by routine operations 
or emergencies. 

(b) They shall muster at the times listed below, in their own squadron areas: 
Working days — 1250 (or 10 minutes prior securing) 1600, 2000 (bunk 

check). 

Full Holidays— 0830, 1300, 1630, 2000 (bunk check) . 
[13] Dungarees may be worn at first muster on working days and on half 
holidays. The uniform of the day will be required at all other musters. 

(c) A pettey officer, first class, will be designated by each squadron as Duty 
Section Leader. He will be cliarged with knowing the whereabouts of all the 
men in his duty section, and the squadron restricted men, after working hours. 
At 2000 (or 15 minutes after completion of the first movie sliowing) , if so directed 



1534 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

by the Duty Officer he may conduct a bunk check of the duty section and restricted 
men, reporting the results to the Assistant Fleet Air Detachment Duty Officer. 

9. Petty Officer of the Security Watch 

(a) In a rotation as prescribed by their respective squadrons, from a watch 
list promulgated by Commander Fleet Air Detachment, there shall be on duty, 
daily from the end of working hours until the beginning of the next working day, 
a petty officer who shall be known as the Petty Officer of the Security Watch. 
Preparation of this list shall be a duty of the Senior Fleet Air Duty Officer. He 
shall be armed and supplied with a bicycle by his own squadron. 

(b) He shall be charged with the following detailed duties : 

1. To exercise supervision over all sentry posts within the Fleet Air De- 
tachment Area. 

2. To make an inspection of each sentry post twice hourly. 

S. To challenge every person seen oh his rounds and determine his authority 
for being within the Fleet Air Detachment Area. 

4. To take any person, found on his rounds or turned over to him by a 
sentry, if not known to him to be authorized to be in the Area, and place 
him in the custody of the Duty Officer. 

5. To report any infractions of their orders by sentries to the Security 
Watch Officer. 

[IJf] 6. To ascertain before going on watch what persons are author- 
ized to be in the Fleet Air Detachment Area. 

7. To relieve any sentry, if necessary, foi- a short jjeriod t<> answer a call 
of nature. 

8. To call the watcli reliefs one-half hour before changing the watch. 

9. When directed by the Duty Offirer, to change the required sentry watch 
order boards frorh "Working Hours" to "After Working Hours", or vice versa. 

10. Security Watch Sentries 

(a) Squadron Commanders will assign competent personnel to man the Security 
Watch posts as directed by Commander Patrol Wing ONE. (See appended 
sketch for location and number of sentries.) 

(b) They will be armed and equipped as prescribed by competent authority. 

(c) They shall carry written instructions stating their duties while on watch. 

11. Base Radio Watches 

(a) Squadron Commanders will assign competent personnel to man the Base 
Radio Station as directed by Commander Fleet Air Detachment. 

12. Tower Watch Officer 

(a) In a rotation as prescribed by the Senior Duty Officer, from a watch list 
promulgated by Commander Fleet Air Detachment, there shall be on duty 'daily, 
during regular flying hours, an officer who shall be known as the Tower Watch 
Officer. 

(b) He shall be charged with the following duties : 

1. To stand a continuous watch in the control tower during flying hours. 

(An appended sketch for location and nnmber of sentries referred 
to in Section 10-A, snpra, is reprodnced as Item No. 47 in EXHIBITS- 
ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.) 

1. Assistant Security Watch OflScer. 

2. letty Officer of the Security Watch (on bicycle — supervises all sentries). 

3. Three Hangar Sentries. 

4. Three Plane Sentries. (Number of sentries may be increased if planes are dispersed 
more widely.) 

5. Ramp Patrol — on bicycle — patrols entire Seaplane Ramp. 

[l.'>] 2. To maintain constant observation on all planes flying within 
his range of vision. 

3. To regulate air traffic in accordance with instructions issued by the 
Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station, and cause the appropriate signals 
to he displa.ved. 

4. To report to the Duty Officer and to the Commanding Officer of the 
squadron involved, any violation by planes of air traffic rules. Such re- 
ports are to be routed via the Staff Operations Officer. 

5. To report immediately to the Duty Officer and then to the Staff Oper- 
ations Officer, any crash which is visible. 

6. To be relieved only after receiving word from the Duty Officer that 
units basing at the Fleet Air Detachment have secured flying. 



PROCEEDIXGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1535 

((•) Daring uiglit flying and other flying oufside the regultir flying hours, 
the Senior Commanding Officer of squadrons participating will assign an oflicer, 
from a squadron engaged iu these flights, to this duty. 

13. Tower Watch Petty Officer 

(a) Iu a rotation as prescribed by their respective squadrons, from a watch 
list promulgated by Commander Fleet Air Detachment, there shall be on duty 
continuously, during regular flying hours a petty officer, who shall be known 
as the Tower Watch Petty Officer. 

(b) He shall be charged with the following duties : 

1. To stand a continuous watch in the tower during patrol plane flying 
hours. 

2. To assist the Tower Watch Officer as directed. 

[16] (c) During night flying and other flying outside the regular flying 
hours the Senior Commanding Officer of squadrons participating will assign suf- 
ficient petty officers, from squadrons engaged in these flights, to maintain this 
watch. 

1^. Arniori/ Watch 

(a) When directed by competent authority, a watch will be maintained in 
each squadron armory, daily from the end of working hours until the beginning 
of the next working hours. 

(b) This watch will be stood- by personnel as directed with the following 
special duties: 

1. To maintain the security of the squadron armory from unauthorized 
entry. 

2. To remain in the armory at all times except to go to meals or answer 
calls of nature. When leaving the armory for these purposes he shall notify 
the nearest Security Sentry of his departure and shall expedite his return. 
He shall lock the armory whenever he leaves it for a period in excess of 
ten minutes and turn the keys thereto over to the Security Officer, obtaining 
them from that officer on his return. 

(c) He shall be armed with a .45 caliber automatic pistol and ammunition. 
15. Office Watch 

(a) A watch is to be maintained in the offices of each squadron and of Com- 
mander Patrol Wing ONE daily, from 1300 to 0700. This watch will be per- 
mitted to sleep on a cot in the office in the vicinity of the main safe. 

( b) This watch shall be stood by competent personnel, thoroughly familiar with 
the office routine. 

[17] (c) He shall receive routine mail, and promptly turn it over to the 
Squadron Duty Oflicer (Staff Duty Officer in the case of the Wing Offi;e Watch), 
who shall initiate such action as he may deem necessary. Confidential mail shall 
be received and signed for by jiersous designated by their commanding officer. 

(d) In case any unauthorized person enters an office the office watch will take 
him into custody and turn him over to the Duty Officer. 

(e) Whenever an office is left unoccupied it will be locked, and the keys thereto 
will be turned in to the Duty Officer's office. 

K. McGinnis, 
K. McGinnis, 
Commander, U. S. Navii. 
Commander Patrol Wing ONE. 



Patbol Wing Two, 
U. S. Navax Aie Station, 
Pearl Harbor, T. H., Decemher 22, 1941. 

The following instructions were issued verbally on December 18, 1941, to all 
naval aircraft units based ashore : 

ALEETNESS 

General Controlling Policies 

Maximum scattering and revetment protection to be employed as practicalile 
for all planes. 

Upkeep and maintenance to be handled as far as practicable with minimum 
interference with the READINESS schedule below. 



1536 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Except when based ashore for more than a few days, only 50% of aircraft 
carrier planes to be subject to the requirements of the READINESS schedule. 

Schedule 

From 30 minutes before sunrise to 0800 and from 1 hour before sunset to 30 
minutes after sunset 1/3 Army pursuit and Navy fighters in air. 

All other Army and Navy planes, including pursuits and fighters and excepting 
searching planes, warmed up, manned and ready to take off. 

Between 0800 and 1 hour before sunset: 1/6 Army pursuit and Navy fighters 
in air. 1/6 Army pursuit and Navy fighters warmed up, manned and ready to 
take off. All other Army and Navy planes, including pursuits and fighters and 
excepting searching planes, to be on one hour's notice. 

Betiveen 1/2 hour after sunset and 30 minutes before sunrise: y^ planes on 1 
hour's notice, % on 4 hour's notice. 

The following security measures were established by aircraft tenders at Hilo : 

(a) Remain moored for each type of threat unless circumstances at the time 
indicate better security will be obtained by getting under way. Raise steam 
when and as threats develop and be prepared to slip mooring lines and leave 
on one boiler (15 minutes). 

(b) Move merchant ships away from dock so that only navy ships will be 
moored there. 

(c) Establish boat patrol. 

(d) Request Army to guard docks. (Note: Also the merchant ship dock). 

(e) Mount 30 caliber machine guns to sweep dock and provide sentries near 
ship in addition to Army sentries at head of dock. 

(f) Coopex'ate fully with the Army in defense and other matters. 

(g) Keep all civilians off dock unless on legitimate business and identity 
carefully established. Inspect all trucks for sabotage material. 

(h) Obtain telephones for communication with the Army and car transporta- 
tion for conferences, etc. 

(i) Keep ships in Condition III security day and night and provide 4 inch 
gun crew with small arms. 

(j) Follow Army (Hilo) air-raid and black-out operations and signals. 

(k) Request Army to provide searchlight illumination of harbor if submarine 
enters. Navy to control. 

PW2/TF9/A8/A16-3/ Naval Base Defense Air Force, 

0839 Task Force Nine, U. S. Naval Air Station, 

Confidential Pearl Harbor, T. H., December 17, 1941. 

Naval Base Defense Air Foeoe Order 4-41 (Task Force Nine) 

Subject : Security and Readiness. 
1. Conditions of readiness for each unit will be prescribed as mdicated below : 

material readiness 

AFIRM All aircraft ready. 

BAKER 50% of aircraft ready. 

CAST 25% of aircraft ready. 

DOG . 12%% of aircraft ready. 

EASY Not ready or not available. 

operational readiness 

Times listed below are the maximum allowed for the first plane to get into the 
air fully equipped. 

Condition Time 

1 10 minutes. 

2 30 minutes. 

3 1 hour. 

4 2 hours. 

♦ 5 4 hours 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1537 

2. Unless otherwise specified, planes are considered "ready" if in following 
condition when launched : 

(a) Fueled and armed as directed. 

(b) All gear stowed and secured. 

(c) Guns ready and full ammunition allowance on board. 

(d) Fully equipped (codes, navigation gear, etc.), 

(e) Fully manned. 

3. Naval and Marine Corps aircraft based on Pearl Harbor, Maui, Ewa and 
Kaneohe are attached to Naval Base Defense Air Force for the duration of their 
stay ashore. 

4. At every base where aircraft may be located, a ready duty detail will be 
maintained at all times which will be prescribed in the manner indicated in 
paragraph 1. Unless otherwise directed. Condition BAKER ONE will obtain 
during daylight and CAST TWO during darkness for all units except carrier 
groups. In order to provide for necessary maintenance, rest and repairs while 
ashore, carrier groups, less fighting squadrons when otherwise directed, will 
maintain Condition CAST ONE plus CAST THREE during daylight and CAST 
THREE during darkness. 

5. Upon arrival ashore, fighting squadrons will report to the Army Interceptor 
Command for duty and, imless otherwise directed, will report as available 50% 
of their numerical strength in order to provide for necessary maintenance, rest 
and repairs. 

P. N. L. Bellinger, 
P. N. L. Bellinger. 

Distribution: CinCPac (10), Comiscofor (20), Comairscofor (25), Compatwing 
One (10), Patron 11 (5), Patron 12 (5), Patron 14 (5), Wright (3), Hulbert 
(2), Ballard (2), Avocet (1), Patron 21 (5), Patron 22 (5), Patron 23 (5), 
Patron 24 (5), Curtiss (3), Tangier (3), Thornton (2), McFarland (2), Swan 
(1), NAS PH TH (5), NAS Kaneohe Bay (5), NAS Midway (3), NAS Wake 
(3), NAS John.ston (3), NAS Palmyra (3), Comdt. 14 N. D. (15), Comairbatfor 
(10), Com. Gen., H. A. F. (5), 14th Pursuit Wing (10), 5th Bombardment 
Wing (25), ComUtWing (5), VJ-1 (5), VJ-2 (5), VJ-3 (5), VO-VCS Re- 
pair Unit (15), ComMarAirGroup 21 (10), Comtaskforce One (10), Com- 
taskforce Two (10), Comtaskforce Three (10), Comtaskforce Seven (3), 
Enterprise (3), SenAirGroup Comd. (3), VB-6 (3), VF-6 (3), VS-6 (3), 
VT-6 (3), Lexington (3), Group Comdr. (5), VB-2 (3), VF-2 (3), VS-2 (3), 
VT-2 (3), Saratoga (3), Group Comd. (5), VB-3 (3), VF-3 (3), VS-3 (3), 
VT-3 (3). 

Patrol, Wing Two, 
U. S. Naval Air Station, Wn 
Pearl Harhor, T. H., December 22, 1941. 
Memorandum for : Flag Secretary, 

Staff Commander Battle Force. 
1. Your urgent memorandum of December 22, 1941, to Flag Secretary, Patrol 
Wing ONE was inadvertently opened by me. From its contents I deducted that 
it applied to Patrol Wing TWO as well, hence the enclosures. I conveyed the 
contents of the memorandum to the Duty Officer at Patrol Wing ONE by tele- 
phone and the answer will be returned by air guard mail tomorrow afternoon. 

R. R. Ballinger, 
R. R. Ballinger, 

Flag Secretary. 



1538 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

S-A16-3/ND14 Office of the Commandamt 

(006) Fourteenth Naval District 

AND 

Navy Yard, 1'karl Harbor, Hawaii, U. S. A. 

Secret 5 January, 1942. 

Alemorandum: 

Subject : Measures of Security takeu in Navy Yard, Fourteenth Naval District 
aud Outlying Stations since December 7. 

Doubled guards around Navy Yard, placed guards at Wahiawa, established 
patrol in Housing Area. 

Offshore patrol stations. 

Escort system put into effect. 

Nets ordered closed at all times except when vessels are entering. 

Light-indicator net placed inside Pearl Harbor net. 

System of harbor patrol strengthened and PT boats with depth charges kept 
back of net for attack in case submarine gets through net. 

Sonic buoys put down, detector loops laid. 

Twenty-five small boats commandeered, conversion started. These vessels to 
carry depth charges, machine guns, for the purpose of close inshore patrol around 
the Island. 

Guns removed from ships damaged being put in four batteries of four guns 
each at Hickam Field and Ritle Ranue. 

Preparing air raid shelters for employees of the Navy Yard, residents of the 
Housing Areas, et cetera. 

Camouflaged oil and water tanks, painted windows in shops black. 

Preparing No. 2 dry dock to take an airplane carrier. 

Expediting work on new hospital and medical supply depot. 

Endeavoring to disperse stores by renting warehouses in town, moving limited 
amount of Navy oil from Navy Yard to town. 

Evacuating Navy personnel and civilians as rapidly as possible. 

Removed all American citizens of Japanese ancestry from laboring forces of 
various activities. 

Closing up all sampans in harbor, preparing order to i)ermit limited fishing 
activities under proper supervision. 

Took over oil conservation in Territory. 

Assisted in organizing cargo control, pooling trucks, stevedores, etc. 

Expediting completion of ships under repair and overhaul. 

Strengthening of garrisons at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra. Endeavored 
to do same for Wake but could not do so. 

Endeavoring to repair floating dry dock. 

Expediting No. 3 dry dock. 

Making preparations to establish joint operation center in tunnel at Aliamanu, 
designing and making estimates for joint operation buildings Armv and Navy at 
Salt Lake. 

Expediting Salt Lake. Expediting barracks. 

Expediting underground fuel. 

Gave pertinent instructions to Midway in regard to use of aircraft. 

C. C. Bloch, 
Rear Admiral, U. 8. Navy, 
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1539 

Office of the C!ommandant 

Fourteenth Naval District 

Peabl Harbor, T. H. 

S-A16-3/ND14 
(006) 

5 January, 1941. 
Secret 
Alemorandum: 

Subject: Measures of Security taken in Navy Yard, Fourteenth Naval District 
and Outlying Stations since December 7. 

Doubled guards around Navy Yard, placed guards at Wahiawa, established 
patrol in Housing Area. 

Offshore patrol stations. 

Escort system put into effect. 

Nets ordered closed at all times except when vessels are entering. 

Light-indicator net placed inside Pearl Harbor net. 

System of harbor patrol strengthened and FT boats with depth charges kept 
back of net for attack in case submarine gets through net. 

Sonic buoys put down, detector loops laid. 

Twenty-five small boats commandeered, conversion started. These vessels to 
carry depth charges, machine guns, for the purpose of close inshore patrol around 
the Island. 

Guns removed from ships damaged being put in four batteries of four guns each 
at Hickam Field and Rifle Range. 

Preparing air raid shelters for employees of the Navy Yard, residents of the 
Housing Areas, et cetera. 

Camouflaged oil and water tanks, painted windows in shops black. 

Preparing No. 2 dry dock to take an airplane carrier. 

Expediting work on new hospital and medical supply depot. 

Endeavoring to disperse stores by renting warehouses in town, moving limited 
amount of Navy oil from Navy Yard to town. 

Evacuating Navy personnel and civilians as rapidly as possible. 

Removed all American citizens of Japanaese ancestry from laboring forces of 
various activities. 

Closing up all sampans in harbor, preparing order to permit limited fishing 
activities under proper supervision. 

Took over oil conservation in Territory. 

Assisted in organizing cargo control, pooling trucks, stevedores, etc. 

Expediting completion of ships under repair and overhaul. 

Strengthening of garrisons at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra. Endeavored 
to do same for Wake but could not do so. 

Endeavoring to repair floating dry docks. 

Expediting No. 3 dry dock. 

Making preparations to establish joint operation center in tunnel at Aliamanu, 
designing and making estimates for joint operation buildings Army and Navy at 
Salt Lake. 

Expediting Salt Lake. Expediting barracks. 

Expediting underground fuel. 

Gave pertinent instructions to Midway in regard to use of aircraft. 

C. C. Bloch, 
Rear Admiral, U. 8. Navy, 
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 143, vol. 3 17 



1540 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 
Office of the Commandant 

FOUBTEENTH NavAl DISTRICT 

Peakl harbor, T. H. 

5 January 1941. 
S-A16-3/ND14 

(006) 
Secret 
Memorandum : 

Subject: Measures of Security taken in Navy Yard, Fourteenth Naval District 
and Outlying Stations since December 7. 

Doubled guards around Navy Yard, placed guards at Wahiavy^a, established 
patrol in Housing Area. 

Offshore patrol stations. 

Escort system put into effect 

Nets ordered closed at all times except when vessels are entering. 

Light-indicator net placed inside Pearl Harbor net. 

System of harbor patrol strengthened and PT boats veith depth charges kept 
back of net for attack in case submarine gets through net. 

Sonic buoys put down, detector loops laid. 

Twenty-five small boats commandeered, conversion started. These vessels to 
carry depth charges, machine guns, for the purpose of close inshore patrol around 
the Island. 

Guns removed from ships damaged being put in four batteries of four guns 
each at Hickam Field and Rifle Range. 

Preparing air raid shelters for employees of the Navy Yard, residents of the 
Housing Areas, et cetera. 

Camouflaged oil and water tanks, painted windows in shops black. 

Preparing No. 2 dry dock to take an airplane carrier. 

Expediting work on new hospital and medical supply depot. 

Endeavoring to disperse stores by renting warehouses in town, moving limited 
amount of Navy oil from Navy Yard to town. 

Evacuating Navy personnel and civilians as rapidly as possible. 

Removed all American citizens of Japanese ancestry from laboring forces of 
various activities. 

Closing up all sampans in harbor, preparing order to permit limited fishing 
activities under proper supervision. 

Took over oil conservation in Territory. 

Assisted in organizing cargo control, pooling trucks, stevedores, etc. 

Expediting completion of ships under repair and overhaul. 

Strengthening of garrisons at Midway, Johnston and Palmyra. Endeavored 
to do same for Wake but could not do so. 

Endeavoring to repair floating dry dock. 

Expediting No. 3 dry dock. 

Making preparations to establish joint operation center in tunnel at Aliamanu, 
designing and making estimates for joint operation buildings Army and Navy 
at Salt Lake. 

Epediting Salt Lake. Expediting barracks. 

Expediting underground fuel. 

Gave pertinent instructions to Midway in regard to use ot aircraft. 

C. C. Bloch, 
Rear Admiral, V. S. Navy, 
Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 



TMS/1 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1541 

Commandant, Foubteenth Naval District 
peabl habbob, t, h. 



Restricted 

To: Commandant, 14th Naval District (District Classified Files). 

From : Investigating Committee. 

Subject : Officer Messenger Mail — Receipt of. 

Reference: (a) Article 76 (4), (6), U. S. Navy Regulations, 1920. 

1. Receipt of the belovr Identified Officer Messenger Mail for further delivery, 
or transhipment, is hereby acknowledged : 

Identification Mark : ND14/0028. From : Com 14. To : Inves. Committee. 

Received By 



Date Received Signature- 
Rank 

778 S/M Base, P. H— 12-4-41— 500. 



TSB/— 
Confidential 

C-C81/S76/ND14 (01425) 

20 Decembeb 1941- 
From : The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 

To : The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H. 
Subject : Enemy mine and bomb disposal squads. Fourteenth Naval District. 

1. Mine and bomb disposal squads are being organized to care for the recovery 
or destruction of enemy bombs or mines dropped or planted within the Naval 
reservations of the Fourteenth Naval District. 

2. The Navy bomb disposal squad will have charge of the recovery or de- 
struction of bombs dropped or planted within the following areas : 

(a) Pearl Harbor 

(b) Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor 

(c) Naval Air Station, Kaneohe 

(d) Naval Ammunition Depot, Lualualei 
(c) Honolulu Harbor (water areas only) 

3. The Navy Mine Disposal Squad will have charge of the recovery or de- 
sti'uction of all mines dropped or planted within the Hawaiian area. 

4. The Commanding Officer, Bureau of Ordnance Mine Defense Activities, Third 
Floor, New Wing, Administration Building, (Telephone 2114 and 2166), will have 
jurisdiction over all mine and bomb disposal squads of the Fourteenth Naval 
District. 

5. It is requested that the Army authorities having jurisdiction over like activi- 
ties cooperate with the above office in order that both Army and Naval authori- 
ties may be fully informed of and may inspect all types of enemy mines and bombs 
which may be recovered within the Hawaiian area. Accordingly, the Command- 
ing Officer of the Naval unit has been instructed to inform the Army authorities 
of any mines or bombs, or any other explosive material which may be salvaged 
in the Naval reservations of this District. 

0. C. Bloch. 



1542 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

TSB/-^ 
CJonfidential 
C-S81/S76/MD14 (01430) 

21 December 1941. 
Prom : The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 
To : The Commanding OflBcer, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. 
Subject : Mine and Bomb Watches, Establishment of — 

1. Immediately upon receipt of this order you will proceed to establish, 
organize, equip, and train a mine and bomb watch to observe and plot the location 
of any enemy mines or bombs which may fall within the confines of the Naval 
reservation under your command. 

2. The mine and bomb watch stations will be manned at all times during an 
alert. 

3. You will report as soon as mine and bomb watches are organized and ready 
to act. 

4. Upon the completion of every alert you will immediately notify the Bureau 
of Ordnance Mine Defense Activities OflSce (telephone 2114 or 2166), Third Floor, 
New Wing, Administration Building, Pearl Harbor, T. H., whether or not any 
bombs or mines have been located within the confines of the station under your 
command. If mines or bombs have been located, the exact location of such 
bombs or mines will be reported to the above office for decision as to whether such 
mines or bombs shall be recovered or destroyed. 



cc: CinCPac 



C. C. Bloch. 



0-S81/S76/ND14 (01431) TB:mw:cl 

Confidential 21 Decembeb 1941. 

From : The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, 
To : The Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, 

Pearl Harbor, T. H. 
Subject : Mine and Bomb Watches, Establishment of — 

1. Immediately upon receipt of this order you will proceed to establish, organ- 
ize, equip, and train a mine and bomb watch to observe and plot the location of 
any enemy mines or bombs which may fall within the confines of the Naval reser- 
vation under your command. 

2. The mine and bomb watch stations will be manned at all times during an 
alert. 

3. You will report as soon as mine and bomb watchers are organized and 
ready to act. 

4. Upon the completion of every alert you will immediately notify the Bureau 
of Ordnance Mine Defense Activities Office (telephone 2114 or 2166), Third Floor, 
New Wing, Administration Building, Pearl Harbor, T. H., whether or not any 
bombs or mines have been located within the confines of the station under your 
command. If mines or bombs have been located, the exact location of such 
bombs or mines will be reported to the above office for decision as to whether 
such mines or bombs shall be recovered or destroyed. 

cc : CinCPac 

C. C. Bloch. 



C-S81/S76/ND14 (01432) TSB :mw :cl 

Confidential 21 December 1941. 

Prom : The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, 

to The Commandant, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H. 

Subject : Mine and Bomb Watches, Establishment of — 

1. Immediately upon receipt of this order you will proceed to establish, organ- 
ize, equip, and train a mine and bomb watch to observe and plot the location of 
any enemy mines or bombs which may fall within the confines of the Naval reser- 
vation under your command. 

2. The mine and bomb watch stations will be manned at all times during an 
alert 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1543 

3. You will report as soon as mine and bomb watches are organized and ready 
to act. 

4. Upon the completion of every alert you will immediately notify the Bureau 
of Ordnance Mine Defense Activities OlHce (telephone 2114 or 2166), Third Floor, 
New Wing, Adminstration Building, Pearl Harbor, T. H., whether or not any 
bombs or mines have been located witliin the confines of the station under your 
command. If mines or bombs have been located, the exact location of such 
bombs or mines will be reported to the above office for decison as to whether such 
mines or bombs shall be recovered or destroyed. 

C. C. Bloch. 
cc : CinCPac 



C-S81/S76/ND14 (01433) TSB: mw : cl 

Confidential 21 December 1941. 

Prom : The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 

To : The Commanding Officer, Naval Hospital, Pearl Harbor, T. H. 

Subject : Mine and Bomb Watches, Establishment of — 

1. Immediately upon receipt of this order you will proceed to establish, organize, 
equip, and train a mine and bomb watch to observe and plot the location of any 
enemy mines or bombs which may fall within the confines of the Naval reservation 
Tinder your command. 

2. The mine and bomb watch stations will be manned at all times during an 
alert. 

3. You will report as soon as mine and bomb watches are organized and ready 
to act. 

4. Upon thfe cpmpletion of every alert you will immediately notify the Bureau 
of Ordnance Mine Defense Activities Office (telephone 2114 or 2166), Third Floor, 
New Wing, Administration Building, Pearl Harbor, T. H., whether or not any 
bombs or mines have been located within the confines of the station under your 
command. If mines or bombs have been located, the exact location of such bombs 
or mines will be reported to the above office for decision as to whether such mines 
or bombs shall be recovered or destroyed. 

C. G. Bloch. 
CC: CinCpac 



TSB/mw 

Confidential 

OS81/S76/ND14 (01434) 

21 Decembeb 1941. 
From : The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District 
To : The Commanding Officer, Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, T. H. 
Subject :Mine and Bomb Watches, Establishment of — 

1. Immediately upon receipt of this order you will proceed to establish, organize, 
equip, and train a mine and bomb watch to observe and plot the location of any 
enemy mines or bombs which may fall within the confines of the Naval reservation 
under your command. 

2. The mine and bomb watch stations will be manned at all times during an 
alert. 

3. You will report as soon as mine and bomb watches are organized and ready 
to act. 

4. Upon the completion of every alert you will immediately notify the Bureau 
of Ordnance Mine Defense Activities Office (telephone 2114 or 2166), Third Floor, 
New Wing, Administration Building, Pearl Harbor, T. H., whether or not any 
bombs or mines have been located within the confies of the station under your 
command. If mines or bombs have been located, the exact location of such bombs 
or mines will be reiwrted to the above office for decision as to whether such mines 
or bombs shall be recovered or destroyed. 

C. C. Bloch. 
CC : CinCPac 



1544 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATJION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Confidential 

C-S81/S76/ND14 (01435) 21 Decembee 1941. 

From : The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District 

To : The Inspector in Charge, of Ordnance, Naval Ammunition Depot, Lualualei, 

T. H. 
Subject : Mine and Bomb Watches, Establishment of — 

1. Immediately upon receipt of this order you will proceed to establish, organize, 
equip, and train a mine and bomb watch to observe and plot the location of any 
enemy mines or bombs which may fall within the confines of the Naval reservation 
under your command. 

2. The mine and bomb watch stations will be maned at all times during an alert. 

3. You will report as soon as mine and bomb watches are organized and ready 
to act. 

4. UiK)n the completion of every alert you will immediately notify the Bureau 
of Ordnance Mine Defense Activities Office (telephone 2114 or 2166), Third Floor, 
New Wing, Administration Building, Pearl Harbor, T. H., whether or not any 
bombs or mines have been located within the confines of the station under your 
command. If mines or bombs have been located, the exact location of such bombs 
or mines will be reported to the above office for decision as to whether such mines 
or bombs shall be recovered or destroyed. 

C. C. Bloch. 
CC : CinCPac 



Confidential 

C-S81/S76/TMD14 (01429) 21 Decembeb 1941. 

From : The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 

To : The Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station, Kaneohe, T. H. 

Subject : Mine and Bomb Watches, Establishment of — 

1. Immediately upon receipt of this order you will proceed to establish, organ- 
ize, equip, and train a mine and bomb watch to observe and plot the location of 
any enemy mines or bombs which may fall within the confines of the Naval reser- 
vation under your command. 

2. The mine and bomb watch stations will be manned at all times during an 
alert. 

8. You will report as soon as mine and bomb watches are organized and ready 
to act. 

4. Upon the completion of every alert you will immediately telephone the 
Bureau of Ordnance Mine Defense Activities Office, Third Floor New Wing, 
Administration Building, Pearl Harbor, T. H. (telephone 2114 or 2166), whether 
or not any bombs or mines have been located within the confines of the station 
under your command. If mines or bombs have been located, the exact location 
of such bombs or mines will be reported to the above office for decision as to 
whether such mines or bombs shall be recovered or destroyed. 

C. C. Bloch. 

CC : CinCPac 



Confidential 21 Decembee 1941. 

From : The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 

To : The Port Captain, Honolulu, T. H. 

Subject : Mine and Bomb Watches, Establishment of — 

1. Immediately upon receipt of this order you will proceed to establish, organize, 
equip, and train a mine and bomb watch to observe and plot the location of any 
enemy mines or bombs which may fall within the confines of the Naval reservation 
under your command. 

2. The mine and bomb watch stations will be manned at all times during an 
elert 

3. You will report as soon as mine and bomb watches are organized and ready 
to act. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSIOIST 1545 

4. Upon the completion of every alert you will immediately notify the Bureau 
of Ordnance Mine Defense Activities OflSce (telephone 2114 or 2166), Third Floor, 
New Wing, Administration Building, Pearl Harbor, T. H., whether or not any 
bombs or mines have been located within the confines of the station under your 
command. If mines or bombs have been located, the exact location of such bombs 
or mines will be reported to the above office for decision as to whether such mines 
or bombs shall be recovered or destroyed. 

C. C. Bloch. 

cc: CinCPac 



Chaplain's Office 

FOUETEENTH NaVAL DiSTEICT 

Peakl Hakboe, T. H. 

From: CinCPac. Mailed at: Ofiicer Mess. 

Action : Cominron 2. Date : 11 Dee '41. 

Info : Combasefor 
Com 14 

Comtrainron 6 
110034 

Until further orders take charge oft shore patrol and motor torpedo boats co- 
ordinate with Com 14. Conduct magnetic sweep off entrance daily and arrange 
with Com 14 for sweeping channel and harbor. 

Feank Reaniee, Ens. USNR. 



C. B. Momsen,/EHR 

Office of the Commandant 

FOUBTEENTH NAVAX DiSTElCT 

Peael Haeboe, T. H. 
C-A3/FE10/ND14 ( 01363 ) 
Confidential 

From : Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. 
To : Commander Mine Squadron Two. 

Subject : Administration of Offshore Patrol and Escort Ships. 
Reference: (a) CinCPac conf. mailgram 110034 of 11 Dec. 1941. 
(b) CinCPac conf. disp. 140357. 

1. Reference (a) directs Commander Mine Squadron Two to take charge of 
Offshore Patrol and motor torpedo boats, coordinating their activities with the 
Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. Mine Squadron Two consists of thirteen 
DMS's plus four DM's temporarily assigned from Mine Division Two, plus twelve 
PT's, motor torpedo boats. 

2. Normally four of the units of Mine Squadron Two will be in port undergoing 
overhaul, upkeep, etc. One of this group will be assigned to the duties of backing 
up the net. The Commanding Ofiicer of this one should report to the Captain 
of the Yard who will issue orders to him direct. 

3. Nine DMS's or DM's with sound apparatus will maintain offshore patrol 
line while the remaining four, including those without listening gear will back 
up the line. 

4. By reference (b) the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet directed all 
task force commanders to make requests for escorts to Commandant Fourteenth 
Naval District. The Port Director is charged with clearing all requests for es- 
corts and will request from Commander Mine Squadron Two the number of 
escorts required for each ship or convoy. The number of escorts required will 
be based upon the value of the ship, the value of cargo, or the number of ships 
to be escorted. 

5. When the number of escorts withdrawn from the Offshore Patrol reaches 
four, further withdrawals will reduce the effectiveness of the Oifshore Patrol, 
and additional demands for escort made upon Commandant Fourteenth Naval 
District (Port Director) will be referred to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. 
Pacific Fleet. 

6. Particular care will be given to the assignment of escorts to inter-island 
ships in order not to usurp an excessive number of the escorts available. It 
may be necessary to restrict sailings of inter-island craft. 



1546 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

7. The Inshore Patrol will maintain two destroyers with listening gear on 
patrol at the channel entrance. If Inshore Patrol vessels are not available, the 
Commander Inshore Patrol will make necessary details from the Offshore Patrol. 

8. Mine Squadron Two, acting as Offshore Pati'ol, is assigned Call G4.5. 

J. B. Earle, Chief of Staff. 
Copy to CinCPac. 
Copy for Commander Derx. 



17 DECEMBEa^ 1941. 
Confidential 

Memorandum for: Major General H. T. Burgin, U. S. A. 

Headquarters Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command 

Fort DeRussy, T. H. 
1. I am in receipt of your memorandum of 14 December and regret that an 
immediate reply was not prepared, but certain points had to be clarified before 
we could give the proper answers. I will discuss your suggestions in the order 
in which they were made. 

(1) All U. S. submarines which enter the Oahu defense area, that is, the sea 
area within the range of the Coast Artillery guns, will be escorted by one or 
more destroyers and the Army will be notified of their presence. Any other 
submarine appearing in these waters is enemy. 

(2) Number 2 is answered by the answer above. 

(3) Number 3 is answered by the answer above. 

(4) The Harbor Control Post is being notified by "Robert" of all radar surface 
contacts. The Harbor Control then reports back whether they are friendly, 
enemy, or unidentified. If unidentified and within the range of the searchlights, 
the H. C. A. C. are notified to sweep the area with searchlights for identification 
purposes. If the contact is enemy, H. C. A. C. will be informed immediately. 
In the near future Inshore Patrol vessels will be searching around the entire 
island and H. C. A. C. will be notified as to their locations. 

(5) H. C. A. C. must consider that any submarine that appears within the 
range of the batteries that is unescorted is an enemy submarine. 

0. C. BiJOCH, 
Rear Admiral, U. 8. N., 
Comniand'ant, Fourteenth Naval District. 



Office op the Commandant 

FOTJKTEENTH NaVAL, DiSTBICT 
AND 

Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U. S. A. 

C-S67/IIADAR/ND14 ( 01420) 

Confidential 

From : Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. 

To : Commander Inshore Patrol. 

Subject : Use of RADAR in waters adjacent to OAHU. 

1. In order that a more specific coverage of RADAR plots may be made in 
waters adjacent to OAHU it is proposed to have ships of the Inshore Patrol 
and the Offshore Patrol investigate certain contacts that are adjacent to their 
patrol areas. 

2. In the future when RADAR plots are received in waters within fifteen 
miles from Barbers Point or Diamond Head the Offshore Patrol will receive a 
message merely giving the plots of the contact in the AWS coordinates. The 
Commander Offshore Patrol will have to determine whether he can spare a ship 
to investigate this plot. The availability of ships for investigation will be 
known only to the Commander Offshore Patrol, and if he is able to make the 
investigation he will reply "Affirmative". If he is unable to make the investi- 
gation, he will reply "Negative". In the event that the reply is "Negative", 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 



1547 



other patrol craft, sampans, aircraft, or DD's from other task forces may be 
assigned to that Investigation. 

J. B. Eable, 
Chief of Staff. 
Copy to : 
CinCPac 
Compatwing 2 

Sr. C. G. OflScer 
Comdr. Offshore Patrol 
Comdr. Sampan Group 
Copy sent to Comdesdiv 80 
12/20/41 



C-N20-8/ND14 
(01387) 

Confidential 



FOUBTEENTH NaVAL DiSTBICT 

Pearl Harbob, T. H. 



-djw 



Decembeb 16, 1941. 



From : The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 

To: All Ships, Pacific Fleet. Hawaiian Department Headquarters — Fort 

Shafter, T. H. 
Subject: Sono Buoys — Installation of. 

1. Fifteen (15) light gray, fifty gallon, barrel shaped buoys, with approxi- 
mately one foot freeboard have been planted on an arc of radius approximately 
one mile between bearing 090° and 260° true from channel entrance buoy num- 
ber one. 

2. These 15 buoys are in groups of 3. The center buoy has an 8 foot antenna 
which has often been mistaken for a submarine i)eriscope. 

C. C. Bloch 
C. C. Bloch. 
Distribution : 

Addressees. 

CinCPac 

Coast Guard 

PT's 

PatWing TWO 

Inshore Patrol 

Capt. Yard 



Confidential 



Table (1) 



Telephone Atjthenticatob Grid 



M 


Z N A 


P 


E 


U K D 


W 


R 


L I H 


J 


Q 


V C T 
Table (2) 


G 


P 


N D 


E 


J 


H K B 


F 


S 


MAX 


L 


Q 


R C Z 
Table (8) 


T 


E 


D S R 


H 


W 


G I 


A 


Y 


K E L 


F 


Q 


N Z M 


U 





Table (4) 




I 

S 

M 
C 


K Q P 
G J 

X W V 
L A U 

Table (5) 


R 
N 
T 
B 


P 
D 
Z 
M 


G E C 
L F 
LAW 
I U Q 

Table (6) 


J 
B 
H 
K 


Q 

K 
T 
X 


J D L 
M H A 
R Z N 
P C G 


E 
S 

u 
w 



Register No. 


" 




Table (7) 




A 
J 
T 
C 


M I N 
L D 
R G U 

HEX 

Table (8) 


Z 
B 
F 
K 


Z 
T 
U 
G 


F M H 
Q X W 
S W C 
J I A 


E 

P 
R 



1548 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

Instructions for use 

The method of selecting a CHALLENGE and determining the correct REPLY 
is as follows : 

Two letters, not on the same line or column, selected at random from the 
grid in use, constitute the CHALLENGE. The other two letters which com- 
plete a rectangle are the REPLY. 

In transmitting the REPLY the first letter of the REPLY must he that let- 
ter which appears on the same line with the first letter received in the 
CHALLENGE. 

Example (Table 1) : 

A message is received in the proper form but the authenticity of the trans- 
mitting station is doubted. The receiving station immediately sends the 
CHALLENGE, "MJ". If the correct reply, "PR", is not immediately given by 
the talker, he is assumed to be an enemy. If the CHALLENGE had been 
given as "JM" in the above example, the correct REPLY would become "RP". 

IF FURTHER AUTHENTICATION DESIRED THE CALLING NUMBER 
MAY BE CHECKED AND CALLED BACK. 

W. E. Guitar 
W. E. Guitar, 
Lt. Commander, USN., 
Asst. District Communication Officer, l^th Nav Dist. 



Confidential 
C-A16-3/A4-3/QW/ND14 (01423) 

Headqtjaeters Naval Base Defense Fobce 

(FOUETEENTH NaVAL DISTRICT ) 

Pearl Haeboe, T. H., 20 December, 1941. 
Naval Base Defense Okdee No. 8 

1. It may be expected that enemy radio will jam circuits used by the Harbor 
Control Post. A secondary means of getting certain vital information to the ships 
present is being established. The very essential orders to commence fire and 
cease fire will be duplicated by the signal tower in the Navy Yard. 

2. During daylight when an air raid alarm is sounded or a condition of alert is 
announced, the emergency pennant will be hoisted by the signal tower. The 
orders to commence fire and cease fire will be given by radio as usual, but will be 
duplicated by the general signal ROGER, and NEGAT ROGER with the emer- 
gency pennant. 

3. Lights have been installed on the mast of the signal tower so that they can 
be controlled from the Harbor Control Post. Three green lights in a vertical 
row six feet apart will be the signal to "commence fire" ; three red lights on the 
same mast will be the signal to "cease fire." 

J. B. Earle, 
J. B. Eaele, 

Chief of Staft. 
Distribution : 

CinCPac: 750 

Inshore Patrol : 35 

Offshore Patrol : 50 

N. T. S. : 10 

Sr. Officer Coast Guard : 20 

Pearl Harbor Group : 30 

Compatwing Two : 20 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMIS^lO^l!^ '^"* 1549 

Headquaeters Naval Base Defense Force 
(Fourteenth Naval District) 

Pearl Harbor, T H., It December I941. 

Naval Base Defense Order No. 7 

1. All indicators will be under the direct supervision of Lt. Comdr. Boyd. He 
will hjve charge of the Q Station material, detector loops, hydrophones, and other 
underwater defense equipment, and will supervise the Watch OflScers. 

2. The Q Station will be located in the old radio school at Fort Kamehameha. 
There will be stationed at the old Q Station two MTB's with depth charges. The 
Q Station Watch Officer will evaluate the information that he receives and will 
be the one to decide whether or not a submarine enters the channel. On a posi- 
tive report to the MTB's on duty the MTB's will attack with depth charges without 
further orders. The Watch Officer will notify the Captain of the Yard immedi- 
ately after notifying the MTB's. 

3. The Captain of the Yard will have thi'ee MTB's on duty inside the net. These 
plus the destroyers backing up the net will stand by to attack. 

4. There is an indicator loop inside the torpedo net and when this gets a posi- 
tive reaction the Captain of the Yard will again be notified. The MTB will watch 
the submarine indicator net and should this show a positive reaction the MTB's 
will attack and destroy the submarine. Always be on the alert for more than one 
submarine. 

J. B. Earle, 
J, B. Earle, 
Chief of Staff. 
Distribution : 

All Task Groups 

Inshore Patrol 35 
Offshore Patrol 50 
Pearl Harbor Group 30 
Sr. C. G. Officer 2 



Headquarters, Naval Base Defense Force 
(Fourteenth Naval Distbict) 

Pearl Harbor, T. H., 16 December 1941. 

Naval Base Defense Force Order No. 6 

Subject : Line of division. Inshore Patrol-Pearl Harbor Group, in the Pearl Harbor 
Channel. 

1. Beginning this date the waters of the Inshore Patrol will be extended to 
include the entrance channel, that is, the waters from the entrance buoys to 
the net. 

2. The operation of the net and the control of the channel traflSc will remain 
under the command of the Commander Pearl Harbor Group. 

J. B. Earle 
J. B. Earle 
Chief of Staff. 
Distribution : 

Inshore Patrol 35 
Offshore Patrol 50 
Pearl Harbor Group 30 
Sr. C. G. Officer 2 
O. O. Nas, Kaneohe 10 



1550 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

He;m>quabtess Naval Base Defense Force 
( E\)Ubtb:enth Naval District) 

Peakl Habbob, T. H., 14 December, 1941. 

Naval Base Defense Obdek No. 5 

1. All ships entering and departing from PEARL HARBOR and HONOLULU 
HARBOR will acquaint themselves with the swept channel, and use only this 
channel. 

2. Vessels proceeding between PEARL HARBOR and HONOLULU and vice 
versa will make passage from channel entrance to channel entrance outside 
of the 100 fathom curve. 

C. C. Bloch 
C. C. Blooh. 
Distribution : 

Inshore Patrol 35 

Offshore Patrol 50 

Sr. C. G. Officer 20 

Pearl Harbor Group 30 

N. T. S. 200 

CinCPac 750 



Confidential 
C-A16-3/A4r3/QW/ND14 (01365) 

Headquaetees Naval Base Det^nse Force 
(Fourteenth Naval District) 

Peael Habsbor, T. H., 14 December 1941- 

Naval Base Defense Order No. 4 

The following code words and meanings will be used to transmit information 
from the Harbor Control to all ships PEARL. At 0000 local time each day a 
message will be sent by HCP giving a single number. This number will indicate 
the manner of matching the code for the next 24 hours. Thus if the signal, 
given at 0000 is FIVE, move code word No. 5 opposite No. 1 message. All code" 
words then match up with their corresponding messages, for that day. This 
order becomes effective 0000 19 December 1941. 

J. B. Earle, 
J. B. Earle, 
Chief of Staff. 
Distribution : 

All Ships of the Fleet 750 
Inshore Patrol 35 
Offshore Patrol 50 
N. T. S. 12 

1. Baseball 

2. Bobsled 

3. Desk light 

4. Fishrod 

5. Football 

6. Hayrake 1. U. S. planes taking off. 

7. Lawnmower 2. U. S. planes landing. 

8. Man rope 3. No U. S. planes in the air. 

9. Nail hole 4. Enemy planes coming in. 

10. Nugget 5. Check fire. 

11. Opener 6. Enemy submarine in harbor. 

12. Paperweight 7. Open fire. 

13. Peephole 8. Enemy vessels off shore. 

14. Rat trap 9. Stop all boats in harbor — mines. 

15. Rawhide 10. Enemy submarine in channel. 

16. Reptile 11- Cease fire. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1551 

17. Rope end 12, Resume fire. 

18. Sliderule 13. 

19. Stepladder 14. 

20. Telephone 

21. Typewriter 

22. Whale oil 

23. Wheelbarrow 

24. Windmill 

He^adqtjaetebs, Naval Base Defense Force 
(Fourteenth Naval District) 

Peakl Harbob, T. H., ^5 December I94I. 

Naval Base Defense Order No. 3 

1. All reports involving United States ships or aircraft must be reported by the 
term: "United States Cruiser" (Submarine, Airplane, etc.), not "Friendly" or 
"Our" or other broad terms. If the vessel is definitely not United States, it must 
be reported as "Unidentified" unless it is definitely known to be enemy or some 
other nationality. 

2. Only four ways of reporting ships are to be used : 

(a) "United States" 

(b) "Unidentified" 

(c) "Enemy" 

(d) "British", "Dutch", etc. 

J. B. Earle 
J. B. Earle, 
Chief of Staff. 
Distribution : 

Inshore Patrol (35) 

Offshore Patrol (50) 

Sector (30O) 

Sta. Off. U. S. C. G. (20) 

P H Group (30) 

Marines (25) 

Patwing Two (2,000) 

Restricted 14th Naval District, 11 December 191^1. 

NLDF Order No. 2. 

Headquarters Hawaiian Depai*tment Field Order No. 2 is quoted herewith : 

"1. The Commanding OflScer, 5od Brigade (AA), will control fire of all Army 
and Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery on OAHU. The Naval anti-aircraft 
artillery representative at the Aircraft Warning Service Information Center wiU 
control the fire of naval units and ships in Pearl Harbor. He will be furnished a 
direct line in the Army Cable System to Headquartei-s, Fourteenth Naval District 
for this purpose. At night no anti-aircraft artillery unit will fire without the 
authority of the battalion or higher commander, unless it is individually attacked. 
During the day, no anti-aircraft artillery unit will fire without the authority 
of the senior battery officer present unless it is individually attacked. 

"2. Anti-aircraft weapons of other than units described above, will remain out 
of action unless individually attacked. At such times, fire will be limited to enemy 
planes within five hundred (500) yards. 

"3. Battery and company officers will explain to every man in their units the 
necessity for remaining cool and not firing on our own troops either in the air 
or on the ground, even though firing is heard in the vicinity. 

"4. The necessity for the conservation of .50 caliber ammunition will be im- 
pressed on personnel manning these weapons. 

"5. There is being manufactured locally as rapidly as possible improvised anti- 
aircraft .80 caliber machine gun mounts which will be issued to ground troops at 
the rate of twelve (12) per infantry company. Priority of issue to machine gun 
companies. 



1552 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

"6. Anti-aircraft machine gun firing, both .30 and .50 caliber, from field positions 
to test or warm-up machine guns is prohibited." 

The Commander Naval Local Defense Force is in agreement with the above 
order and directs full cooperation by units of the Naval Local Defense Force. 
The Commander Local Defense Force will generally follow the fire control of 
Commanding Officer 53d Brigade (AA). 

The Commander Naval Local Defense Force is in agreement with the above 
tinue warming up shots and test shots from machine guns. 

C. C. Bloch, 
Rear Admiral, U. 8. N., 
' Commander, Naval Local Defense Force. 
.J. B. EAitLB, Chief of Staff. 



FOUETEENTH NavAJL DISTRICT, 

Pearl Harlor, T. H., 2 December 1941. 

LocAi, Base Defense Force Okdee No. 1 

Subject: Unified Grid System for Location of Positions in the Oahu Defensive 

Coastal Area. 
Enclosure : 

(A) Special Military Map "BB". 

(B) Figures 1 and 2 explaining system. 

1. The unified grid system as used by the U. S. Army will be adopted for use 
of the Naval Local Base Defense Force. 

2. Basic square.— A grided BASIC SQUARE measuring 900,000 yards West 
to East and 800,000 yards South to North (Figure 1 attached) is superimposed 
on the map of Oahu and vicinity with its center near the center of the Island. 
Each side of the BASIC SQUARE is divided into ranges numbered from 1 to 9 
west-to-east and from 2 to 9 south-to-north. Each of the resulting seventy two 
squares, indicated by a two figure number, measures 100,000 yards on a side and 
is termed a REGION. 

3. Region. — In the Special Map of Oahu and vicinity on which the grid system 
has been superimposed, that Island is included in REGION 55. Contiguous 
waters to a distance of approximately 20 miles are included in contiguous 
REGIONS, i. e. 44, 45, 46 ; 54, 56 ; 64, 65, 66. 

4. Areas. — Each REGION (Figure 2 attached) is divided into ten ranges let- 
tered from A to L from west to east, and into ten ranges, lettered from A to L 
from south to north. Each of the resulting one hundred squares measures 
10,000 yards on a side and is termed an AREA. The letters E and I are omitted 
in lettering AREAS for communication reasons. Each AREA is designated by 
two letters, namely, the letter of the west-to-east range followed by the letter 
of the south-to-north range. Assuming that the REGION in Figure 2 is number 
55 in BASIC SQUARE of Figure 1, then the point X in Area DC Is located within 
10,000 yards by the group 55 DC (Region 55, Area DC). 

5. Locations within areas. — For the indication of locations within each AREA 
coordinates are used. By this system, any LOCALITY can be described within 
an AREA to within 1,000 yards; any POSITION to within 100 yards; and any 
POINT to within 10 yards. A LOCALITY within an AREA is designated to 
within 1,000 yards of two digits, the first the abscissa and the second the ordi- 
nate, each representing thousands of yards measured from the southwest corner 
of the AREA. Thus, again assuming that Figure 2 is REGION 55. X is located 
to within 1,000 yards by the group 55 DC 62. In like manner, a POSITION is 
designated to within 100 yards by two digits giving the abscissa and two giving 
the ordinate, each pair of digits representing hundreds of yards. Similarly six 
digits designate a POINT within an AREA to within 10 yards. Thus X is 
located to within 100 yards by 55 DC 6221, and to within 10 yards by 55 DO 
62.5214, the first three digits being the abscissa and the last three the ordinate. 

6. In the future the unified grid system will be used by the Inshore Patrol 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1553 

and vessels in the defense sectors in reporting objects such as mines dropped 
from aircraft during air raids and at such other times as the system becomes 
applicable. 

C. C. Bloch 
C. C. Bloch, 
Rear Admiral, V. 8. N., 

Commander, 
Naval Base Defense Force. 
Distribution: 
CinCPac 2 
PatWing TWO 2 
Comdr. Sector 1 10 
Comdr. Sector 2 10 
Comdr. Sector 3 10 
Comdr. Sector 4 10 
Cnpt. of Yd. 10 
Inshore Patrol 10 
Comdr. Mine Defense Unit 2 

(Enclosure (A) is a special Military Map "BB", showing a gridded 
basic square superimposed on a map of Oahu for location of positions 
in that area. This map is reproduced as Item No. 48 in EXHIBITS- 
ILLUSTEATIONS, Roberts Commission.) 

(Enclosure (B) consists of two figures explaining the unified grid 
system for location of positions. These figures are reproduced as 
Item No. 49 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commis- 
sion.) 

Exhibit No. 34 (Navy Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 

U] Secret 

History of Action OcctniKiNG At Midway Island From December 7 to December 
31, As Compiled From Official Despatches and Correspondence 

December 7: 

A report from Midway addressed to CINCPAC and filed to Pearl Harbor at 
1235 December 12, referring to Sunday's action, stated that it was indicated that 
shore batteries registered three 3 inch hits on an enemy destroyer and two 5 inch 
hits on an enemy cruiser. The message further stated that reports also indicated 
that two enemy cruisers and two enemy destroyers took part in the action. 

At 0130 December 8 a message was filed to the district intelligence officer via 
cable from Midway stating that at 0110 things are fairly quiet now. The con- 
tractors' buildings are still burning. Raiders sent in about 15 incendaries. 
There are two deaths and 12 casualties, the communication added. 

CINCPAC, in a message filed at 1003 December 13, informed the Chief of Naval 
Operations that there were no new developments and that Midway claimed hits 
on a cruiser and a destroyer during the night of the 7th. 

[2] December 8: 

No enemy action reported at Midway. 

The commander of Task Force 9 at 0135 December 8 sent an order to Midway 
for Patron 21 to fuel with 1,200 gallons, arm with two 50O pound bombs and 
search sector 190 degrees to 070 degrees to maximum distance possible and land 
at Johnston by sunset, with Japanese carriers the objective. 

At 1030 December 8 Midway reported that shell fragments from the bombard- 
ment indicated that 6 inch guns fired on the island. The report stated the Phil- 
ippine clipper captain had sighted two ships, either destroyers or cruisers, pro- 
ceeding at high speed on course 240 T. 40 miles from the island at 1045 OCT 
December 8. (Note: Capt. Hamilton of the Philippine Clipper, interviewed by 
the District Intelligence Office after his arrival in Honolulu December 8, is said 
to have reported sighting the wakes of two vessels 35 miles from Midway at 1110 



1554 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

GOT December 8. No explanation is offered for the discrepancy between this 
time and the time (1045) reported from Midway nor for the discrepancy between 
the time the Midway despatcli was shown filed (1030) and the time the clipper 
captain was said by this despatch to have sighted the two ships.) 

[3] Midway reported to the commandant at 1359 December 8 that the 
Philippine clipper had departed for Honolulu. 

December 9: 

Midway reported to the commandant at 0450 December 9 that radar bearings 
showed three and possibly four fair targets circling four to seven miles distant. 
The island reported the targets could not be sighted. 

December 10: 

At 0313 December 12 a communication was filed from CINCPAC to Midway 
asking if the island was bombed by aircraft yesterday the 10th and if so, to 
report the details. A negative reply was received at 0401. 

A message filed to Midway from CINCPAC at 2038 December 10 had advised 
that an enemy carrier might be north of Midway in position for a plane attack 
on the afternoon of the 10th or at daylight on the 11th. The message urged 
Midway to be fully propai'ed to resist with all means and to disperse personnel 
and equipment not needed for defense. 

The commandant notified CINCPAC at 0100 December 11 that the Midway 
cable (iperator told Honolulu, "Air raid on. See you later," at about zero hours 
the 11th. 

[4] December 11: 

Midway informed CINCPAC at 2035 December 11 that all material of patrol 
wing 2 was intact. The island estimated that one squadron of patrol planes 
could be operated for 30 days, but that 5,000 spark plugs were needed. 

In an earlier communication (filed at 1930 December 11) Midway addressed 
the following information to CINCPAC : 

The station had material and facilities to maintain 18 marine planes (SBD-1), 
three SB-2U and one F4F for six weeks. 

Supplies were 700,000 gallons of aviation gasoline, 50 drums of 1120 oil, and 
150 drums of 1100 oil. The patrol plane report was to follow, the communication 
added. 

At 2315 December 11, Midway informed CINCPAC that on hand were 294 
Mark 1 — 3 one hundred pound bombs ; 66 Mark 13 — 1 one thousand pound bombs ; 
148 Mark 12 and 56 Mark 9 five hundred pound bombs ; 48 depth chai-ges ; 157,000 
rounds of .50 cal. and 379,000 rounds of .30 cal. 

The commandant reported to the Chief of Naval Operations December 11 a 
summary of enemy action at Midway [5] including one bombardment on 
the 8th (6 inch CLS or DDS) and one air raid today. Personnel casualties were 
stated not extensive. 

December 12: 

No enemy action reported at Midway. 
December 13: 

No enemy action reported at Midway. 

The commandant was advised by Midway at 2345 December 13 that the avia- 
tion gasoline supply including that of Pan American Airways totaled 707,000 
gallons. 

December 14: 

No enemy action reported. 
December 15: 

No enemy action reported. 

At 0815 Midway sent radar reports to the commandant. 

A request for information on friendly ships in the vicinity, in order to eval- 
uate radar readings was filed by Midway to the commandant at 0915 December 15. 

December 16: 

In a message filed at 0035 December 16, CINCPAC informed Midway of an order 
to Marine Aircraft Group 21 to [6] fly and base marine squadron 231 there, 
departing from Pearl Harbor at daylight Tuesday (16th). Patrol Wing 2 was to 
provide a patrol plane escort. The NAS Midway was to assure readiness of 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1555 

revetments and communications from the radar to Eastern Island. (This message 
was also addressed to the commander of the air group, the commander of Task 
Force 9 and, for information, to commanders Task Forces 11 and 16. ) 

A routine despatch from Midway to CINCPAC listed ammunition expended 
since the last report as : 57 rounds of 5 inch, 90 rounds of 3 inch AA, 13 rounds 3 
inch common, 9,000 rounds of .50 caliber, and 4,000 rounds of .30 caliber. 

At 0145 CINCPAC was advised by Midway that the man-days food supply 
included : Contractors', 150,000 ; Navy, 30,000^ and marine, 50,000 with only 30,000 
man-days of yeast. 

At 0645 CINCPAC received a cabled request from Midway for fire fighting 
equipment (ref. 15/0645). 

CINCPAC received a cabled communication filed at 0715 stating the need for 
200 rifles, 100 pistols, 20 automatic rifles, 1,000 hand grenades and the necessary 
accessories to include 15,000 rounds for pistol and 50,000 rounds for rifle. 

[7] A cable filed to CINCPAC at 0930 requested spare parts to insure opera- 
tion of the radar, listing the necessary material. 

At 1502 December 16 CINCPAC informed Midway that radio bearings indicated 
the presence of an enemy carrier in the vicinity of the island. 

CINCPAC advised Midway in a communication filed at 2357 December 16 that 
on receipt of information this morning by cable that an air raid was underway. 
The VM5 en route was recalled. It was stated that this was one of a number of 
alarming reports received during the past ten days through the cable company. 
The order was given to take appropriate action. 

December 17: 

Midway stated an urgent need for a search type radar (SCR 270-B) in a 
message filed to the marine quartermaster at Pearl Harbor at 0530 December 17. 

December 18: 

At 2340 December 18 a message was filed by Pearl Harbor to Mare Island (ad- 
dressed for information to the Bureau of Ships and Midway) stating that it was 
imperative that material be sent to Pearl Harbor immediately. (Ref. [8] 
BUSHIPS 25 1904 conference of October regarding azimuth indicators for the 
outlying islands.) 

December 19: 

At 2010 December 19 Midway notified Wake (and informed the commandant and 
the commander of Task Force 9) that one PSP had departed from Midwav for 
Wake at 1820 GCT. 

Midway filed a communication at 1110 December 19, addressed to the comman- 
dant, stating that witlj planes arriving tliere, it was absolutely essential for the 
island to know the disposition of forces in its area in order to prevent bombing 
of friendly forces. 

The communication added that it was also essential that proper recognition 
signals between aircraft and surface craft be issued the station, and that a com- 
munication plan should be sent from Task Force 4. It was requested that units 
of United States forces be instructed to remain a minimum of 14,000 yards outside 
the reef during tlie hours of darkness to prevent their being fired upon from shore. 
The intention was expressed to fire on all targets inside this distance. It was 
further requested that the station be advised when this warning was issued and 
receipted for. 

In a message at 2355 December 19, CINCPAC. referring to his communication 
of 2357 the 16th. advised Midway that the [.9] cable operator there again 
reported an air raid at 2042 (Midway's time) yesterday. Acknowledgment was 
renuested and was received from Midway at 0350 December 20. 

Midway reported the arrival of one PSP at 0345 GCT in a communication filed 
to the commander of Patrol Wing 2 (info. Wake and Com 14) at 0455 Decem- 
ber 21. 

In his summary of contract work renuired curtailed under the present sitxia- 
tion. the commandant specifi«^d to the Bureau of Yards and Docks that at Mid- 
way it was intended to eliminate proiects which would require a long time for 
completion to a usable stage. Examples given were the dredfring of the break- 
water and waterfront work. He proposed to stop work temporarily on the 
submarine base buildings and modify other projects to suit the immediate needs. 
He also expressed the intention to reduce the contractors' force 50 per cent, to a 
total of 770 workers. 

79716 — 46 — Ex. 143, vol. 3 18 



1556 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

December 23: 

CINCPAC addressed a communication to Midway at 0323 December 23 (and 
for information to Com 14, Task Force 17 and Task Force 8) stating tliat the 
Japanese had carried out a lauding attack at Wake (today) and no communica- 
tions had been received from the island since 1952 GCT. It was added that 
Task Force 8 comprising a [10] carrier, three heavy cruisers and nine 
destroyers would cover Midway during the operations of Task Force 17. 

At 0657 December 23, the commander of Task Forces 11, 17, 9, 7 and 14) that 
it was proposed to start a search at 1800 GCT December 23 of sector 180-360 
degrees True, radius 220 miles, from a position bearing 305 miles from Point Dog. 

At 0839 December 23, CINCPAC filed the following orders to the commander 
of Task Force 14 (addressed for information to the commanders of Task Forces 
11 and 8, and to the commandant) : Enroute to Pearl Harbor, marine fighting 
squadron 221 will be flown oft to base at Midway December 25. The Tangier 
with an escort of two destroyers will be detached to arrive at Midway Decem- 
ber 26 to disembark the personnel and material of the squadron together with 
pther available cargo that may be needed at Midway. On completion of this 
assignment the Tf.ngier and her escort will return to Pearl Harbor. The naval 
air station at Midway was ordered to clear the Wright before the arrival. 

CINCPAC advised the commanders of Task Forces 8 and 17 (info CTF's 4, 7, 
9, 11 and 14) at 1549 December 23 that the Triton reported having been trailed 
by anti-submarine units about 800 miles bearing 258 T. from Midway. 

[11] December 24: 

The Chief of Naval Operations was informed by CINCPAC (communication 
filed at 0957 December 24) that since both submarines previously assigned to the 
Wake area had been withdrawn because of material casualties, the Pompano was 
being sent to patrol and would arrive on December 26. 

This communication also stated that VMF 221 would land at Midway on Decem- 
ber 25, and included a summary of the submarine attacks at Johnston and 
Palmyra. 
December 25: 

The commanding general of the Hawaiian department, in a communication to 
the commandant at 0400 December 25, requested that the army communication 
personnel at Midway be transported, preferably by plane, to Oahu and stated the 
air corps equipment would be placed at the disposal of the navy when the army 
detachment departed. 

The commandant notified Midway that this evacuation was authorized by the 
first available transportation and that the equipment could be retained for use 
on the island, if desired. 

A message sent by CINCPAC to the Wright at 1152 December 25 stated the 
urgency of providing a continuous [12] patrol and observation of the entire 
beachline at Midway during darkness. The Wright was authorized and directed 
to remove from the Tangier 12 .50 caliber anti-aircraft machine guns with five 
units of ammunition, and marine personnel of the 5 inch group and machine gun 
group totaling three officers and 78 men for this observation force. The tangier 
was to be available to evacuate workmen in accordance with the commandant's 
instructions. (Ref. 10680.) 
December 26: 

At 0837 December 26, CINCPAC informed the Chief of Naval Operations that 
the marine fighting squadron 221 was now at Midway. 

The commander of Task Force 17 filed a communication to CINCPAC at 0300 
December 26 stating the force and the USCG Walnut would depart for Pearl 
Harbor at 2000 GCT. 

December 27: 

In a despatch filed by Midway at 2350 December 27 (addressed to CINCPAC 
and,. for information, to the commandant) it was stated that the senior marine 
aviator present had specified that pi'oper defense of the island required two 
[13] squadrons of patrol planes and three more fighter squadrons. This was 
concurred in by the commanding officer of the station, the communication said. 

Midway notified the commandant that the aviation gasoline supply on Decem- 
ber 27 totaled 698,000 gallons. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1557 

Decem'ber 28; 

On December 28, Midway informed the commandant that gun calibration tests 
at the station were scheduled daily from 0700 to 0730 and between 1500 and 1530 
LCT. It was requested that a warning be issued to this effect. 

A letter report by the commanding officer of the Naval Air Station at Midway 
gave a description of the action of December 7 as follows : 

1. Enemy ships attacked this station at 2130, Midway time, 7 December 1941, 
firing shells from the westward, out of range of the shore batteries. At 2135 
ships opened fire from the southward. The attack lasted about thirty minutes. 
Hostile shjps estimated as two cruisers and two destroyers. 

2. Marine Casualties: 
Killed : 

First Lieutenant George H. Cannon, USMC 

Private first class Elmer R. Morrell 
[141 Wounded : 

PI. Sgt. William A. Barbour, serious 

Corp. Harold R. Hazelwood, not serious 

Pvt. Lyle D. Trowbridge, not serious 
Navy Casualties: 
Killed : 

Ensign Donald J. Kraker, USNR 

Tuttle, Ralph E., F.2c, USN 
Wounded : 

Ballauf, Charles, ACNM, USN, serious 

Baltusnik, John, CRM, USN, serious 

Truitt, M. D., Ensign, USN, not serious 

Barnes, Jesse R., AMM2c, USN, nx>t serious 

Maudlin, G. L., RMle, USN, not serious 

Marini, D. L., MM2e, USN, not serious 

Mitchell, D. B., Sealc, USN, not serious 

Felton, H. E. Sealc, USN, not serious 

Schooley, F. S., MMlc, USN, not serious 

3. Marine Material Damage: 

One searchlight badly damaged and one .50 caliber machine gun destroyed 
on hangar. 

4. Navy Material Damage: 

(1) SEAPLANE HANGAR. Hit by six 6" shells roof completely burned, 
but structure fairly [15] well preserved. Lean-tos intact except 
for shrapnel damage. Sprinkler system out of commission due to severed 
feeder pipes. 75 pei'cent of stores in hangar lost. One plane completely 
demolished in hangar. One badly damaged due to shrapnel, but repairable. 

(2) TORPEDO AND BOMB SIGHT BUILDING. One shell exploded in- 
side destroying one corner of building. Also shrapnel damage. 

(3) POWER HOUSE. No damage inside. Operation continues. Three 
or four 6" shells hit walls and roof. Also hit by shell ricocheting from 
laundry roof. 

(4) PARACHUTE LOFT AND UTILITY BUILDING. One shell hit, 
shrapnel damage to part of the upper roof structure. 

(5) LAUNDRY BUILDING. One 5" shell ricocheted off roof. No in- 
terior damage except wood splinters. 

(6) NEW (UNFINISHED) RADIO TRANSMITTER BUILDING. Six 
or seven 3" shells hit concrete walls. Three penetrated. Only minor damage. 

[16] 5. Pan American Airivays System Direction Finder Damage: 

Six out of eight direction finder masts hit. Cannot function. One small 
building remains intact; the other damaged considerably by one shell hit 
and shrapnel. Apparently 3" shell fire. 

6. Shells were apparently 6, 5 and 3" and were incendiary and H. E. No 
enemy planes attacked. 

7. Ammunition expended: 

Machine Gun group: 

.30 cal. approximately 450 rounds 

.50 cal. approximately 100 rounds 

.50 cal. 4,250 rounds lost in hangar fire 
5" group: 9 rounds 
3" group: 13 rounds Navy Common 



1558 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

8. Damage to enemy: 

One 3" battery Navy Common, 

Three hits on a destroyer, two in superstructure, one in forecastle 
area near water line. 
One 5" battery. 

Two hits on a cruiser near water line forward. Smolie poured out 
from this ship, action [17] was broken off and a withdrawal 
to a point fifteen miles to the southwest was covered by a smoke 
screen. The other ships rendezvoused at this point and remained 
in that area for about two hours. 

9. The conduct of all hands, both service and civilian personnel #as of the 
highest order. 

Exhibits No. 35 (Navy Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 
U. S. Naval Air Station 

MIDWAY ISLAND 

NA38/A16-3 

Confidential 

From : Commanding Officer. 

To : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. 

Subject : Action of 7 December 1941. 

1. Enemy ships attack this stiition at 2130, Midway time, 7 December 1941, 
firing shells from the westward, out of range of the shore batteries. At 2135 
ships opened fire from the southward. The attack lasted about thirty minutes. 
Hostile ships estimated as two cruisers and two destroyers. 

2. Marine Casualties. — Killed : First Lieutenant George H. Cannon, U. S. M. C. ; 
Private first class Elmer R. Morrell. Wounded : Pi. Sgt. William A. Barbour, 
serious; Corp. Harold R. Huzelwood, not serious; Pvt. Lyle D. Trowbridge, not 
serious. 

Navy Casualties. — Killed : Ensign Donald J. Kraker, U. S. N. R., Tuttle, Ralph 
E., F. 2c, U. S. N. Wounded : Ballauf, Charles, ACMM, U. S. N., serious ; Baltusnik, 
John, CRM, U. S. N., serious ; Truitt, M. D., Ensign, TJ. S. N., not serious ; Barnes, 
Jesse R., AMM2c, U. S. N., not serious ; Maudlin, G. L., RMlc, U. S. N., not serious ; 
Marini, D. L., MM2c, U. S. N., not serious; Mitchell, D. P.., Sea. Ic U. S. N., not 
serious ; Pelton, H. B., Sea. Ic, U. S. N., not serious ; Schooley, F S., MMlc, 
U. S. N., not serious. 

3. Marine Materiel Damage. — One searchlight badly damaged and one .50 
caliber machine gun destroyed on hangar. 

4. Navy Materiel Damage.— (1) SEAPLANE HANGAR. Hit by six 6" shells. 
Roof completely burned, but structure fairly well preserved. Lean-tos intact 
except for shrapnel damage. Sprinkler system out of commission due to severed 
feeder pipes. 75 percent of stores in hangar lost. One plane completely de- 
molished in hangar. One badly damaged due to shrapnel, but repairable. 

(2) TORPEDO AND BOMB SIGHT BUILDING. One shell exploded Inside de- 
stroying one corner of building. Also shrapnel damage. 

(3) POWERHOUSE. No damage inside. Operation continues. Three or four 
6" shells hit walls and roof. Also hit by shell ricocheting from laundry roof. 

(4) PARACHUTE LOFT AND UTILITY BUILDING. One shell hit, shrapnel 
damage to part of the upper roof structure. 

(5) LAUNDRY BUILDING. One 5" shell ricocheted off roof. No interior 
damage except wood splinters. 

(6) NEW (UNFINISHED) RADIO TRANSMITTER BUILDING. Six or seven 
3" shells hit concrete walls. Three penetrated. Only minor damage. 

5. Pan American Airicays System Direction Finder Damage. — Six out of eight 
direction finder masts hit. Cannot function. One small building remains intact, 
the other damaged considerably by one shell hit and shrapnel. Apparently 3" 
shell fire. 

6. Shells were apparently 6, 5, and 3" and were incendiary and H. E. No enemy 
planes attacked. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1559 

7. Ammunition expended. — Machine gun group : 

.30 cal. approximately 450 rounds. 

.50 cal. approximately 100 rounds. 

.50 cal., 4,250 rounds lost in hangar fire. 
5" group: 9 rounds. 
3" group : 13 rounds Navy common. 

8. Damage to enemy. — One 3" battery Navy Common. 

Three hits on a destroyer, tvs'o in superstructure, one in forecastle area near 
water line. 
One 5" battery. 

Two hits on a cruiser near water line forward. Smoke poured out from 
this ship, action was broken ofC and a withdrawal to a point fifteen miles 
to the southwest was covered by a smoke screen. The other ships rendez- 
voused at this point and remained in that area for about 2 hours. 

9. The conduct of all hands, both service and civilian personnel, was of the 
highest order. 

C. T. SlMAB. 

Copy to : Com 14 

Exhibit No. 36 (Navy Packet No, 2), Robebts Commission 

United States Mabine Cobps 

heaoquartebs, sixth defense battalion, fleet mabine fobcb, midway islands 

Confidential December 12, 1941. 

From : Commanding Ofiicer, Defense Garrison. 

To : The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. 

Via : Senior OflJcer Present 

Subject : Report of action on night of 7 December, 1941. 

1. At 2130 on 7 December, 1941, two unidentified vessels opened fire on Sand 
Island from the southwest, out of range of shore batteries. Initial fire was 
short, falling in the lagoon. Fire was raised, falling in lagoon and on beach 
near "A" battery and the radio towers. Fire was again raised, clearing the 
dunes and hitting the hangar, setting it on fire. The tarpaper roof of the 
hangar burned freely lighting up the hangar area and silhouetting objects 
between firing ships and hangar. 

2. At 2150 two ships approached south side of southwest end of Sand Island 
from the southwest. These ships were travelling at high speed. The leading 
ship was a destroyer while the trailing ship was identified as a light cruiser. 
The leading ship was illuminated by searchlight and fire opened by shore 
batteries at 2155 at 4500 yards. "D" battery, firing 13 rounds of Navy common 
shell with director control, scored three observed hits on leading ship ; two on 
superstructure, putting the forward gun out of action, and one near water line, 
forward. Only two guns on "D" battery could bear on target. "B" battery firing 
9 rounds of 5" Navy A. P. from Eastern Island scored two observed hits on 
starboard side of trailing ship near water line, forward. The only searchlight 
that could effectively bear, illuminated the leading ship and was fired on by 
trailing ship and put out of action by shell fragments. Some of the overs 
from this firing landed in Par Air radio direction finder area. Searchlight 
was In action only three to four minutes. The Japanese flag was seen flying 
from the leading ship. Leading ship opened fire on hangar when Illuminated 
and continued firing until forward gun was put out of action. Both ships were 
struck almost Immediately by 3" and 5" shells and .50 caliber machine gun 
fire. They broke off the action by changing course from northeast to south, 
four shots were fired at Eastern Island. Black smoke was seen to emit from 
hole in side of trailing ship when it was hit by 5" shells. .50 caliber machine 
gun fire hit superstructure. Fire by Sand Island battery was opened at 4500 
yards. Ships turned at 3500 yards. 

3. An annlysis of the action causes me to arrive at the following conclusions 
as to the Japanese method of attack : 



1560 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

a. Facts. — There was a bright moon. All the new construction was white 
and glistened in the moonlight. The many windows in the hangar reflected 
moonlight. The reef stood out clearly. Both islands and all ships present 
were darkened. Buoy lights were out. Troops were at their stations and other 
personnel were dispersed. 

b. Tactics. — It appears that two ships laid off to the west of FRIGATE out of 
range of shore batteries, and opened fire while two other ships laid off to the 
southwest and spotted the firing of the first two ships onto the island. As soon as 
the hangar was well afire the ships to the west ceased firing while the two ships 
to the southwest started a run from southwest to northwest to close the range 
and run east parallel to the reef using the burning hangar as a target. The first 
salvos from these ships fell short striking the new laundry and the new power 
house. It seems that the ships were surprised to be illuminated and fired upon 
from the southeast coast of Sand Island and Eastern Island at the same time. 
Men on the leading ship were seen to scurry for cover when shore batteries and 
.50 caliber machine guns opened fire. The Japanese took full advantage of the 
moon for spotting and approach. The reflection of the moon on white buildings, 
window glass and white squares on water tanks must have been visible for miles 
at sea. The sand looked like snow and the breakers on the reef clearly outlines 
the island area. It was an ideal night for such an attack. Since the attack, 
steps have been taken to repaint and camouflage fuel tanks, water tanks, light 
roofs, buildings, etc. 

4. After the action was broken off the Radar reports indicated that several 
vessels rendezvoused about ten miles south of Sand Island. They remained in 
that vicinity for about two hours, all but two ships left. Greenish yellow glows 
on the horizon to the south were observed during the night as late as 0028 Decem- 
ber 8, 1941. 

5. Enemy Material. — Fragments and duds found indicate that H. E. projectiles 
with nose fuze were employed. None of the projectiles burst in the air ; all bursts 
were on impact. Several duds were found on West beach. 

6. The conduct of the personnel of this battalion was highly satisfactory. All 
hands proceeded about their duties in a cool, calm and businesslike manner. 
There were several outstanding instances of coolness, high sense of duty, and 
bravery. First Lieutenant George H. Cannon, Battery Commander of Battery 
"H", after having received wounds that fractured both legs and pelvis, when 
"H" Battery CP in the second deck of the new power house was hit, refused to 
be evacuated before his men who were wounded by the same shell. He died from 
loss of blood. Corporal (CP) Harold R. Hazelwood, switchboard operator for 
Battery "H" CP, received a compound fracture of the left leg when struck by 
shell fragments of projectile that bux-st in CP. In spite of his wounds and the 
shock he suffered, he immediately set up the CP switchboard again and reestab- 
lished communications. Corporal (CP) Dale L. Peters, who was checking on com- 
munications in the hangar tower was blown through a window ; he recovered his 
senses and started down the tower. In his dazed condition he opened the wrong 
door and fell about 14 feet on top of some men who broke his fall. He again re- 
covered his bearings and assisted in removing large aerial bombs from the burning 
hangar. These are only a few of the outstanding cases, 

7. Personnel casualties — 

a. Killed : 1st Lt. George H. Cannon, Private first Class Elmer R. Morrell. 

b. Seriously wounded : Platoon Sergeant William A. Barbour, Corporal 
(CP) Harold R. Hazelwood. 

c. Shell shocked : Pvt. Lyle D. Trowbridge. 

8. Materiel damage (U. S. Marine Corps). — a. A shell exploded immediately 
below and in front of a SL, the fragments smashing the glass door, lamp head, 
operating and feed mechanism, trunion arm and ventilating motor, piercing the 
mirror in numerous places and cutting two tires. Also a cable of another SL was 
cut by shell fire. No damage to positions. 

b. One .50 caliber machine gun complete with mount and cradle was destroyed 
when the roof of the Naval Air Station hangar on which it was emplaced, burned, 
dropping the gun to the deck beneath. 4250 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition at 
the gun position was exploded by the fire. 

/s/ H. D. Shannon. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1561 

1st Endorsement 

Confidential 12 Dec., 1941. 

Naval Air Station, Midway Islands. 
From : The Senior Officer Present. 

To : The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T. H. 
Subject : Report of action on night of 7 December, 1941. 
1. Forwarded. 

/S/ C. T. SiMAKD. 

Exhibit No. 37 (Navy Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 

[1] District Public Works OflScer 
Pearl Harbor, T. H. 

Midway Island, 17 December, 1941. 
823 
Confidential 

PtTBLic Works Office 

FouRTEENrH Naval Distkict 

PEAEL HAKBOB, U. S. A. 

From: Resident Officer in Charge, Contracts NOy-3550 & NOy-4173, Midway 

Island. 
To: Officer in Charge, Contracts NOy-3550 & NOy-4173, Pearl Harbor, T. H. 
Subject: Miscellaneous Comments, covering period 1 December 1941, to 17 

December, 1941, 

Peeiod 1 DECEMBBas, 1941 TO 7 December, 1941 

1. Construction was proceeding as usual, but was fast approaching a stagnation 
point because of lack of material and locations for approved structures. The 
last cargo ship brought little of consequence so far as construction work was 
concerned, and that was lost by subsequent fire in the hangar. The last cargo 
ship, mentioned above, left here the evening of 6 December, 1941, with fuel 
barge "E" in tow. 

2. During this period the U. S. C. & G. S. survey ship left for another assign- 
ment, after having made a good hydrographic survey of our channel, anchorage 
area and south reef, and determinations of our latitude and longitude. They 
checked our triangulation points and base line system very closely. 

3. Also during this period the Coast Guard Lighthouse ship was in our waters, 
assisting in setting out our navigational aids. The two (2) large entrance 
buoys had been set, and numerous resettings accomplished. The gas lamp in 
the Coast Guard Lighthouse had been in process of removal and replacement. 

4. Also, during this first week of December, the one remaining Pilot and 
the Benson were dredging in the entrance channel and turning basin, in order 
to eliminate the high spots as shown by the Geodetic Survey soundings. Some 
of the material so dredged was found suitable for aggregate, fortunately. 

[2] 5. Several temporary buildings were started in connection with the 
construction work here, as per our recent correspondence, and the construction 
on Eastern Island special facilities was well under way. 

period 7 DECEMBEB, 1941, TO 17 DECEMBER, 1941 

1. The entire outlook for Midway has changed. The shelling from Seacraft 
started about 9 : 30 PM, in the evening of 7 December 1941, a most gorgeous moonlit 
night, and lasted about one hour. This shelling, insofar as construction work was 
concerned resulted in : 

(a) A severe fire in the hangar which burned practically the entire 
roof, and charred or watersoaked beyond usability, about forty (40) percent 
of the cargo stored in that building, and buckled the member of four (4) 
interior trusses in the south half of the hangar. The leanto sections were 
undamaged, and fortunately, Contractors' pex-sonnel sleeping in the north 
leanto were not bit by shellflre. The structural damage appears to be about 
25 percent. 



1562 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

(b) A puncture of the 200,000 gallon salt water tank near the middle of 
the vertical height, by one shell of approximately 6" diameter. 

(c) Direct hits to the parachute loft and maintenance building, which 
caused some damage to structure and broke most of the glass in the south- 
westerly sides. 

(d) A hole in the roof of the new laundry caused by a ricochette shot or 
by shrapnel. 

(e) Two (2) direct hits to the power house, which did no structural 
damage ; in fact one shell was prevented from bursting by the resistance of 
the concrete in a three-way corner between flue, sidewall & roof, on the 
southwest. 

(f) Direct hits to the partially completed communication center, which 
left gaping holes in the side walls and structure, but did not materially 
damage the conduit system therein. 

(g) The complet^e destruction of the Pan-American direction finder and 
beam. 

[3] 2. The shelling and subsequent frequent alarm whistles, have to a large 
extent undermined the morale of the Contractors' organization. Loud and boister- 
ous language of the "second guessers" has poured out for my benefit, concerning 
the assininity of the way this station was planned and managed during the con- 
struction period so far, and that certain parties will certainly be told off when the 
time came. The consequence has been that there has been a division of effort 
which is not conducive to a wholesome situation. It is my opinion that with few 
exceptions, should construction proceed, the top personnel of the Contractors' 
organization should be replaced, and that with the exception of volunteers, no 
present personnel in any grade be retained, and as a matter of fact, the sooner some 
changes are made, the better for the situation here. 

3. During the period since the shelling, we have of course ceased construction 
work on the station facilities as such, and have been busily engaged in defense 
work. The following things have been done and are in the process of doing : 

(a) Dugouts constructed at all defense positions for Marine forces, and 
adequate shelters for communication center, for Commanding Officers' head- 
quarters, and for some other personnel. Many of the dugouts for other per- 
sonnel are temporary, and are being replaced with permanent type which will 
be more protection and which will not enganger the health of the camp, 
which has thus far remained surprisingly good. 

(b) All buildings and tanks painted gray. 

(c) All window glass sprayed with lamp black and oil to prevent glare. 

(d) Radar Building completely enclosed in a sandfilled crib. As it was, it 
made a beautiful target, entirely unprotected. 

(e) New magazines have been covered with sand, and used for dispersion 
of food supplies and other essential materials, and for hospital and personnel 
shelters. More could be used. 

(f ) All range markers and similar items are removed. 

(g) Many channel markers have been removed and temporarily replaced 
with bamboo markers. The buoy in Wells Harbor has been sunk. 

[4] (h) C. A. A. light removed and placed on one of the tanks in the 
Marine Area, for a challenging and identifying signal. 

(i) Water-still placed in operation at Eastern Island, (150, Contractors' 
personnel assigned to Major Benson there). 

(j) Civilian defense corps organized to aid in maintenance and supplying 
guard and sentry service during continued blackout. The fire brigade is 
carrying on as a well organized group. 

(k) Construction of a new 3" anti-aircraft battery at the waterfront 
to replace the present battery near the aviation gas tanks. (This is a major 
operation, ordered by the Commanding OflBcer). 

(1) Beginning construction for the position for 7" guns, which came on 
last cargo vessel. (Ordered by Marines.) 

(m) A temporary ramp for seaplane service is being constructed at Eastern 
Island, and temporai\v ga.ssing facilities are being made. An operating area 
has been miarked out northerly from Eastern Island. 

(n) A sand blanket has been placed on all roofs. 

(o) Independent sources of power supplied to all cold storage units. 

(p) Many other items of maintenance and operation and preparation for 
emergency, with respect to utilities, phone service and general communica- 
tions have been accomplished. Supplies of all sorts have been dispersed as 
widely as possible. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1563 

4. In doing the above things we have used of construction materials some 5,000 
sacks of cement, all of our heavy timber, much of Wolmanized tongue and groove 
building lumber, a large part of our plyvpood (much of vphich burned in the 
hangar), all our stock of steel plate, most of the available bolt stock, and prac- 
tically the entire stock of electrical wire and supplies and a great deal of the 
available sheet piling. When the defense work required by the Marines, NAS 
and Contractors is accomplished, there will be practically no supply of con- 
struction material left. Of the remainder, a complete inventory will be made. 

[5] 5. It is obvious, I think, that continued construction here is now im- 
possible, and until a continued source and delivery of supplies is assured, no 
attempt should be made to continue. Until such a time, then, the personnel 
here is 75 percent too great for any practical use. Also, until such a time in the 
future, (after the present defense work is accomplished), there is no need of 
any Civil Engineering Corps Construction Personnel, which might be used to 
advantage elsewhere than in routine maintenance work. One ensign could handle 
the routine with a civilian volunteer staff of operators. 

6. It has also been demonstrated that the conspicuous color scheme, com- 
bustible roofing material, quantity and type of windows, and inflammable con- 
struction types, are inconsistent with defensability. For example : 

As planned, the permanent telephone switchboard would have been in a 
frame structure. Also, the Commissary and Cold Storage Building is of 
light Transite and fireproof construction generally, except for the wood-base 
mopped-tar roof. 

Reinforced concrete and steel construction types are very definitely indi- 
cated. For roofs, corrugated iron seems to be our anwser; in fact there 
would have ben very little cargo damaged in the hangar had there been this 
type of roof. A revision of ideas concerning construction here would seem 
to me to be entirely in order, to be consistent with defense and future use of 
these Islands, whatever that may be in the light of this present situation. 

7. It is also apparent that overhead storage of water, fuel oil or gasoline Is 
no value. High water tanks furnish a fine means of locating us, and above ground 
tanks generally make fine targets. We have estimated that it would take over 
500,000 sand bags to give us any protection for the fuel tanks, and at that, only 
for protection against shapnel, not against direct hit or sabotage. It is the 
opinion of the Marine Unit that the ground cover over the aviation gas tanks is 
inadequate. 

8. The above remarks are given for inforn>ation concerning the situation here 
in light of the recent attack. It is hoped that I may be given the opijortunity 
to discuss all of these matters with you at the earliest possible moment before con- 
tinuance plans are perfected. 

PAxn> F. Keim. 



Exhibit No. 38 (Navy Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 

Report of Army-Navy Board 

31 October 1941 

[J] In compliance with radiogram to the Commanding General, Hawaiian 
Department, dated 2 October 1941 and a similar radiogram to the Commandant, 
14th Naval District, a Joint Army-Navy Board was convened to prepare recom- 
mendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas for all purposes 
for the entire Hawaiian Area with particular recommendations on the jurisdic- 
tion of the Kahuku Point Area. The board met at 0900 October 7, 1941 and 
frequently thereafter until final recommendations were submitted. Present were : 

Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. A. 

Read Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. N. 

Brigadier General H. C. Davidson, U. S. A. 

Lieutenant Commander S. E. Burroughs, U. S. N. 

1. A general discussion was held concerning the various Army-Navy aviation 
activities, the available training areas, the present congestion of aircraft areas, 
the expected expansion of aircraft of both services in the near future with 
the attending operational diflSeulties which such expansion would produce. 

2. In order that the board could intelligently approach the problem which 
confronted it, it was necessary to have such infoi'mation as was available as 
to the total number of airplanes of both services for which operating facilities 



1564 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

should be made available. The following lists show the number of aii'planes 
which were considered. 

NAVY 

14th Naval District Aircraft : 

Patrol planes 84 

VSO seaplanes 48 

Fleet Aircraft : 

Airplanes (10 Aii-craft Carrier Groups) 750 

Cruiser and Battleship Seaplanes : 

Seaplanes (approximately) 75 

Patrol Wings One and Two : 

Patrol Planes 98 

Marine Aircraft Groups : 

Airplanes 162 

Utility Aircraft : 

Airplanes (various types) 88 

Total 1,305 

ABMY 

54 Group Program : 

Combat Airplanes 

B-17 170 

A-2a-A 27 

P-40 163 

P-88 163 

C-47 20 

[2] Present Assignment: 

Combat Aii'planes : 

B-17 12 

P-40 104 

A-20-A 12 

0-47 - 13 

Obsolescent Airplanes : 

B-18 30 

P-36 50 

P-26 17 

Total 781 

OAHU 

Air Fields Available: 

Army : Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Bellows Field. 

Navy: Ford Island, Ewa, Kaneohe. 
Air Fields Proposed: Kahuku, John Rodgers (commercial), Barbers Point, Keehi 
Lagoon (commercial, under construction). 

OUTLYING ISLANDS — HAWAIIAN ARCHIPELAGO 

Army: Barking Sands, Kauai; Burns Field, Kauai (commercial, too small for 
bombardment airplanes) ; Morse Field, Hawaii ; Hillo, Hawaii (Municipal Air- 
port) ; Lanai (under construction) ; Homestead Field, Molokai (used jointly 
Army-Navy and commercial.) 
Navy: Maui (Navy and commercial) ; Hilo (temporary facilities patrol planes) : 
3. The problem confronting the board as it pertains to Naval aviation was 
summed up by the Naval representatives as follows : 

a. The Navy requires shore air bases for the use of carrier aircraft in order to 
maintain them in a proper state of training for war readiness. With the immi- 
nent increase in numbers of Army and Navy aircraft operating from Oahu, the 
congestion of air space for training and the shortage of suitable sites for air 
bases on Oahu must be recognized as becoming serious problems. Lack of suit- 
able harbor and deck facilities in islands of the Hawaiian group other than Oahu 
precludes the development of these islands as bases for carrier-based aircraft, 
since it is essential that carrier planes be readily accessible to their parent ves- 
sels. For this reason Oahu is the only logical island lor the development of 
additional facilities for shore basing of carrier air groups. Carrier aircraft. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1565 

when based [3] on shore, must, on account of the nature of their func- 
tions, be considered in a mobile state of readiness and not definitely fixed or 
attached to any shore base. Nevertheless, there must be provided on shore suit- 
able and adequate facilities for the basing and operating of such aircraft just 
as definitely and specifically as if they were intended to be shore based perma- 
nently. It is estimated that approximately ten carrier air groups will be shore 
based in the Hawaiian Area at any one time. It is essential that shore bases 
be available for these air groups in order that a proper state of training may be 
maintained. These shore bases must necessarily be located on the island of Oahu 
where transportation facilities are available between bases and berths of parent 
vessels both for transferring personnel and equipment, and for reasons of readi- 
ness. In addition, in order to provide air space and fields for the conduct of 
daily training of these air groups, adequate aviation facilities must be available 
not only on Oahu but on other islands of the Hawaiian Group. 

b. The Navy has under lease approximately 70 acres of land on Kahuku Point. 
There is a landing strip and a dive-bombing target on this area that is con- 
tinually in use by shore-based carrier aircraft in connection with training 
operations. If this area is given over to the Army for construction of an air 
base, its loss will be strongly felt even now, when congestion on Oahu is but a 
portion of that of the future, and adjustments must be made not only for loss of 
the existing landing strip and target area, but also for the reduction of the Navy 
air space involved. With the arrival of each additional carrier group in Oahu, 
further adjustments will be required to permit the necessary training to proceed. 

c. The principal joint task assigned to Army and Navy forces permanently 
based in the Hawaiian Islands is "to hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval base." 
The importance of Oahu in the Hawaiian Group is due entirely to the existence 
of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and its attending activities. The existence of 
Army Forces and Navy District Forces in great numbers in the Hawaiian Islands 
is solely for the pui^pose of maintaining the usefulness of Pearl Harbor as a base 
for the various units of the Fleet. The value of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to 
the Fleet is in providing means for Fleet units to be maintained and continued 
in effective operating readiness at a point well advanced to the westward. It 
therefore appears that any military or Naval air units on Oahu which unneces- 
sarily interfere with the maintenance of proper readiness of Fleet units and 
which are not required on Oahu for the security of Dahu, but are required in 
the Hawaiian Area, should be based on other islands of the Hawaiian Group. 

4. It appears necessary, to develop to maximum practicable capacity all sites 
on Oahu considered suitable for air bases ; to construct auxiliary fields where 
practicable ; and, at the same time, to avoid creating an undesirable degree of 
air congestion in the vicinity of Oahu that will defeat operating effectiveness. 
In planning the above developments, due consideration should be given to pro- 
viding adequate dispersion. 

e. To provide for future requirements of Army and Navy air forces in the 
Hawaiian Islands, it appears necessary to develop all suitable air base sites 
on islands of the Hawaiian Group, other than Oahu, to their maximum practicable 
capacities. In order to carry out estimated requii-ements, these developments 
should precede or at least proceed with any further developments on Oahu. 
This may not be entirely practicable of accomplishment, but every effort should 
be made to do so. A fair-sighted policy in which currently foreseen needs are 
subordinated to and coordinated with a general plan of ultimate development 
should be adopted now. Otherwise, inevitable future expansion will cause a more 
diflScult problem to arise at a later date. 

U] f. There is every desire of the Navy to cooperate with the Army to the 
fullest extent, but in the case under consideration there is insuflBcient space on 
the island of Oahu for the numbers of aircraft involved, even in current plans, 
to base thereon at the same time. As both services are basing their require- 
ments on the part they are expected to play in national defense, it follows that 
final decision as to the action to be taken should be based on the effect of the 
various alternatives on over-all national defense. 

4. The problem confronting the board as it pertains to Army aviation was 
summed up by the Army representatives as follows : 

a. The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base 
against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution to be made by the Hawaiian 
Air Force in carrying out this mission is : 

(1) To search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action 
by bombardment aviation. 



1566 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

I 

(2) To detect, intercept and destroy enemy aircraft in tlie vicinity of 
Oahu by pursuit aviation. 

b. Due to the limited range of pursuit aviation and the uncertainty of ascer- 
taining the direction of appi'oach of enemy aircraft maliing an attacli on the 
Pearl Harbor Naval Base, it is mandatory that the air fields from which pursuit 
aviation operates, in the performance of this mission, be situated on the Island 
of Oahu. Under no other condition could there be assui-ance that enemy aircraft 
could be intercepted before they reached their bomb release line. The minimum 
requirements of pursuit aviation for its mission is two groups. The number of 
airplanes at present allocated to a pursuit group, which is 163, necessitates two 
air fields be available on this island. One of these groups is now permanently 
located at Wheeler Field where atmospheric conditions at times offer an obstacle 
to their continuous operation. To insure that at least one group of pursuit 
aviation may operate without being hampered by weather conditions, it should 
lie located at approximately sea level elevation. The Kahuku Point area has 
been selected as having the necessary level ground and weather prevailing to 
satisfy these conditions. Furthermore, by having all Army pursuit aviation 
located at Wheeler Field and Kahuku Point, it makes it possible to carry out the 
pursuit mission and training therefor on the north side of Oahu, removing all 
pursuit aircraft from the air congestion which prevails over the Pearl Harbor 
area. The Kahuku Point area also lends itself to the establishment of grounds 
targets, in its immediate vicinity, which are so essential to proper progress in 
pursuit training. This still leaves one group at Wheeler Field withont proper 
ground gunnery facilities which cannot be obtained on the Island of Oahu. The 
nearest point where these facilities can be made available is on the Island of 
Molokai where one gunnery range has been established. 

c. There is allocated to the Hawaiian Air Force ^9 A-20-A aii"planes which 
form the support command to assist the ground forces of the Hawaiian Depart- 
ment in their mission of defending the Pearl Harbor Naval Base. These airplanes 
must, of necessity, be closely associated with the ground troops which they serve, 
both for training and to facilitate their employment in time of war. The home 
for the support command is established at Bellows Field. 

d. The bombardment command of the Hawaiian Air Force consists of 182 
heavy bombers. To I'elieve congestion, all of the training for heavy bombard- 
ment is conducted over water or land areas removed from the Island of Oahu. 
This number of heavy bombers over-taxes the capacity of Hickam Field, their 
home station, to such an extent that provisions must be made for the training of 
approximately one-half of this force from outlying fields on other islands of the 
Hawaiian Archipelago. 

[5] e. To establish permanent stations for air organizations on other islands 
in this group entails changing the defense plans for these islands that security for 
these bases may be established. This would require a decided increase in the 
numl>er of ground troops or such a dispersion of available forces as to destroy 
their effectiveness. This cannot be done except at enormous expense of time 
and money. For this reason the home base for bombardment aviation and the 
large quantities of bombs and other supplies necessary for continued operations 
must be placed under the protection of the ground defense installations on Oahu. 
Operations may be conducted from outlying fields in the Hawaiian group in the 
beginning of the attack but as the attack is pressed home these bombers will be 
forced to fall back upon their protected home bases. While the training of bom- 
bardment units is normally conducted in areas distant from the Pearl Harbor 
area, it would be practically impossible to control this force in time of actual 
hostilities if they were stationed on outlying islands. Radio is the sole means 
of communication and is too susceptible to interference to furnish a positive 
medium of control. A positive means of communication is a prime requisite for 
successful air operations. It must be in being and constantly used prior to the 
beginning of hostilities. Further, it must be pointed out that bombardment avi- 
ation must be protected by every available means of ground and anti-aircraft 
defense, i. e., pursuit aviation, antiaircraft artillery and aircraft warning service. 
Duplication of these defenses on outlying islands is manifestly prohibitive. There- 
fore, as pursuit concentrations for the defense of Oahu must be located on Oahu, 
it is imperative that bombardment aviation must be based on Oahu under the 
protection of the Interceptor Command. 

f. The 20 transports must of necessity operate fronT Hickam Field as that is 
the base at which technical supplies are concentrated for which the transports 
furnish transportation to ouM.ving fields where training is being conducted. Sup- 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1567 

ply and maintenance facilities also require the same protection from the ground 
and air as is required for grounded bombardment aviation. 

g. In case of actual war, the majority of the Fleet units, with their carriers 
attached, would be at sea, leaving ample air field facilities for such naval aviation 
as might be left behind and for all Army aviation participating in the defense 
of these islands. Therefore, the problem which confronts this board is to find a 
attached, would be at sea, leaving ample air field facilities for such naval aviation 
training for both the Army and the Navy and to suggest such sites as might be 
develoced to increase these facilities. 

h. A careful survey has been made of the entire Island of Oahu for sites on 
which landing fields can be constructed. On this island, with the exception of the 
Kipapa Gulch area, ail level ground that might be availale for air fields is either 
so occupied, projects are underway for preparation of air fields, or the turbulence 
in the air created by the close proximity of mountain ranges precludes such 
development. The site commonly referred to as the Kipapa Gulch area will 
accommodate two 5000-foot runways free from obstructions. The greatest handi- 
cap to the use of this area is that it is about two-thirds of the distance between 
Pearl Harbor and Wheeler Field which would further increase the congestion of 
the air over this part of the island. It would also remove from cultivation a 
highly productive tract of land. The Kipapa Gulch area is the only site remain- 
ing where an air field could be constructed. The principal objection to the use of 
this site, which is congestion of the air over the Pearl Harbor area, is much less 
of a handicap should this site be used for the training of carrier groups than it 
would be as a station for Army pursuits aviation. The use of this site by the 
Navy would permit the concentration of carrier-group training for Naval aviation 
on the south side of the island of Oahu, at Barber's Point, Kipapa Gulch, and 
Ford Island. As the training from [6] these stations would be entirely 
under Naval control it lends itself to aerial traflSc regulations which would be 
difiicult to attain if large numbers of airplanes of the two services were inter- 
mingled. The Kipapa Gulch area is advantageously located for occupancy of 
carrier-group aviation in that the site is readily accessible to the parent vessels 
of the carrier groups. It would permit facility in the transfer of personnel and 
supplies to and from the parent vessel in Pearl Harbor. It would be advanta- 
geous in making for ease of supervision of the training of all carrier-based Naval 
aviation. 

i. The Army is cognizant of the fact that with the increase in carrier-based 
aircraft contemplated for this area, serious problems arise as to sufBcient air and 
ground space on Oahu. It is also cognizant of the fact that air units in Hawaii 
will, within the next few months, be reinforced with pursuit and bombardment 
aircraft for which bases must be available now, while the additional carriers 
anticipated for this area will not be available for an elapsed time of from one to 
three years. 

j. That far-sighted and long-range planning must be done there can be no doubt. 
But, provisions for aircraft which may be available within three years should not 
be allowed to disrupt the plans, training and employment of the Army Air Force 
tmits in this area at a time when they may be required for immediate use against 

hostile threat. 

k. This problem can be solved by restricting the number of carrier groups 
to that which can be adequately accommodated on existing Navy facilities and 
those Navy projects which are now under development. 

5. Conclusions: That the board concludes that it has been presented with a 
problem for which a satisfactory solution to all concerned cannot be obtained 
due to the fact that — 

a. The Army estimates its requirements from directives emanating from the 
War Department. 

b. The Navy estimates its requirements from directives emanating from the 
Navy Department. 

c. There is insufficient space on the Island of Oahu to provide for the esti- 
mated future requirements of both the Army and the Navy. 

6. Joint recommendations — a. That it be agreed that in order not to delay 
starting the development of an important strategical base, the board recommends: 

(1) That the Kahuku Point area be developed immediately by the Army 
as an air base. 

(2) That as the Army representatives hold that the Kahuku Point air 
base should be available for Army air units solely and the Navy representa- 



1568 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

tives hold that the Kahuku Point air base should be available for temporary 
use by the Navy when circumstances so require, the extent of availability of 
this base to the Navy as vrell as the extent of the availability to the Navy of 
all other Army air bases on the Island of Oahu, be left to the determination 
of higher authority as the solution of this problem transcends the perogatives 
of this board, 
b. That progress be continued on the development of air bases on islands of the 
Hawaiian Group, other than Oahu, which are now under construction. 

[7] c. That in order to reduce air congestion on Oahu, all existing and new 
sites of strategical importance on islands of the Hawaiian Group other than Oahu, 
suitable for air bases and auxiliary operating fields be expanded or developed 
to maximum practicable capacities and that such developments have the same 
high priority as any development proposed for the Island of Oahu. 

d. That all sites on the island of Oahu suitable for air bases and auxiliary 
operating fields be developed to maximum practicable capacities at the same time 
avoiding the creation of an undesirable degree of air congestion in the vicinity of 
Oahu. 

e. That the existing revised Joint Army-Navy agreement relating to operating 
areas be placed in force — adjustments which may become necessary, from time 
to time, to be accomplished by conference between local representatives. 

P. N. L. Bellingeh!, 
Rear Admiral, U. S. N., 

Senior Naval Member. 
F. L. Maetin, 

Major Oeneral, U. S. A., 
Senior Army Member. 



Confidential 

17 War 

Washn DC 210P Oct 2 1941 
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department Ft Shafter TH 

One eight six second September twenty-three reurad Navy Department in- 
structed commandant Fourteenth Naval District in radio September Twenty 
six to confer with you and submit joint recommendations covering allocation 
aircraft operating areas for all purposes for entire Hawaiian area stop This 
has War Department approval stop Navy radio stated further joint recom- 
mendations on Kahuku Point desired stop You are authorized to confer on 
this latter matter but wiU be guided by instructions to you in General Marshalls 
letter of August nineteen. 

Adams 
156P/2. 

Exhibit No. 39 (Navy Packet No. 2) Roberts Commission 



Cincpac File No. 

A16-3/(020SS) 



United States Pacitic Fle3;t 
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship 



Peabl Harbor, T. H., Dec. 21, 191(1. 
Secret 

From : Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy. 
To : The Secretary of the Navy. 
Via : The Chief of Naval Operations. 
Subject : Report of action of 7 December 1941. 
Enclosure : 

(A) Partial narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on Pearl 

Harbor, 7 December 1941. 

(B) Cincpac secret letter Lll-1 (1) (50) serial 02019 of December 12, 1941, 

to OpNav. Subject : Damage to Ships Pacific Fleet Resulting From 
Japanese Attack 7 December 1941. * 

(C) Supplementary partial report of damage to ships. 

(D) Disposition of own forces, sortie from harbor, and conduct of the 

search. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1569 

1. The first indication of the attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 
December 1941 was a telephone report received by the Staff Duty Officer from the 
Fourteenth Naval District Duty Officer at about 0720 (LCT), It reported an 
attack by the WARD on a hostile submarine off the entrance of Pearl Harbor. 
Twenty minutes thereafter another telephone report from Operations Officer, 
Patrol Wing TWO, was received that a patrol plane had sunk a hostile submarine 
south of the entrance buoy. This was followed by an additional telephone report 
from the Fourteenth Naval District stating the WARD was towing a sampan 
into Honolulu. At about 0752 a telephone report was received from the Navy 
Yard Signal Tower as follows : "Enemy Air Raid — Not Drill.'" Almost simul- 
taneously Japanese planes were observed over the Fleet. Dive bombers were 
bombing the adjacent air fields, accompanied by torpedo plane attacks on the 
ships in the harbor. From then on there was almost continuous enemy air 
activity of some kind over the harbor, but there seemed to be separate periods 
of intense, activity as if different new waves were arriving prior to departure of 
last one. The first of these periods lasted from about 0755 to around 0820. An- 
other period was from about 0900 to 0930 and consisted mainly of dive bombers, 
a third wave, by high altitude bombers, interspersed with dive bombing and 
straffing came over about 0930. Meanwhile enemy submarines were reported in 
Pearl Harbor. One submarine was rammed and sunk by the MONAGHAN. All 
enemy planes withdrew about 1000. 

2. It appears that the raid on OAHU was excellently planned and executed 
in that every air field on the island was bombed and strafed in an attempt to 
demobilize all planes. 

3. Before the attacks were completed. Commander Patrol Wing TWO, in 
accordance with standard orders, established such search as he was able to do 
with the planes remaining. 

4. It is estimated from the radio calls exchanged, bearings received, and ex- 
amination of enemy crashed planes, that 4 to 6 Japanese carriers participated 
in the raid. Enclosure (D), forwarded herewith, represents the disposition of 
our Task Forces in effect for 7 December, as well as the action taken to locate 
and destroy the enemy forces. 

5. All reports received from commands afloat are unanimous in their praise 
for the magnificent behaviour of our personnel. Specific cases deserving com- 
mendation and reward will be reported in separate correspondence. 

6. Partial report of damage, as submitted in enclosure (B) is supplemented 
herewith by enclosure (C). 

7. Revised reports of casualties to personnel are being submitted as fre- 
quently as sufficient accurate data are available. Additional information con- 
cerning the results of the action on 7 December will be forwarded as soon as 
the remaining missing narratives have been received. 

H. E. KiMMBX. 



Cincpac File No. 
A16-3/(05)/ 
Serial 02100 

United States Pacifio Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Peakl Habboe, T. H., December 23, IQ^l. 

1st Endorsement on Admiral KimmeVs A16-3/(02088) dated December 21, 1941. 

From : Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. 
To : The Secretary of the Navy. 
Via : The Chief of Naval Operations. 
Subject : Report of action of 7 December 1941. 
1. Forwarded. 

W. S. Pye. 



1570 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 



Cincpac File No. 
A16-3/( 02088) 



United States Pacific Fleet 

U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 



Peael Habboe, T. H., December 21, 1941. 
From : Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy. 
To : The Secretary of the Navy. 
Via : The Chief of Naval Operations. 
Subject : Report of action of 7 December 1941. 
Enclosure : 

(A) Partial narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on Pearl 

Harbor, 7 December 1&41, 

(B) Cincpac secret letter Lll-l(l) (50) serial 02019 of December 12, 1941, 

OpNav. Subject: Damage to Ships Pacific Fleet Resulting From 
Japanese Attack 7 December 1941. 

(C) Supplementary partial report of damage to ships. 

(D) Disposition of own forces, sortie from harbor, and conduct of the search. 

1. The first indication of the attack on Pearl Harbor on the morning of 7 De- 
cember 1941 was a telephone report received by the Staff Duty OflScer from the 
Fourteenth Naval District Duty Officer at about 0720 (LCT). It reported an 
attack by the WARD on a hostile submarine off the entrance of Pearl Harbor. 
Twenty minutes thereafter another telephone report from Operations Officer, 
Patrol Wing TWO, was received that a patrol plane had sunk a hostile submarine 
south of the entrance buoy. This was followed by an additional telephone re- 
port from the Fourteenth Naval District stating the WARD was towing a sampan 
into Honolulu. At about 0752 a telephone report was received from the Navy 

•Yard Signal Tower as follows: "Enemy Air Raid — Not Drill." Almost simul- 
taneously Japanese planes were observed " over the Fleet. Dive bombers were 
bombing the adjacent air fields, accompanied by torpedo plane attacks on the 
ships in the harbor. From then on there was almost continous enemy air ac- 
tivity of some kind over the harbor, but there seemed to be separate periods of 
intense activity as if different new waves were arriving prior to departure of last 
one. The first of these periods lasted from about 0755 to around 0820. Another 
period was from about 0900 to 0930 and consisted mainly of dive bombers, a third 
wave, by high altitude bombers, interspersed with dive bombing and strafiing 
came over about 0930. Meanwhile enemy submarines were reported in Pearl 
Harbor. One submarine was rammed and sunk by the MONAGHAN. All enemy 
planes withdrew about 1000. 

2. It appears that the raid on OAHU was excellently planned and executed in 
that every air field on the island was bombed and strafed in an attempt to de- 
mobilize all planes. 

3. Before the attacks were completed. Commander Patrol Wing TWO, in accord- 
ance vi^ith standard orders, established such search as he was able to do with the 
planes remaining. 

4. It is estimated from the radio calls exchanged, bearings received, and exam- 
ination of enemy crashed planes, that 4 to 6 Japanese carriers participated in the 
raid. Enclosure (D), forwarded herewith, represents the disposition of our 
Task Forces in effect for 7 December, as well as the action taken to locate and de- 
stroy the enemy forces. 

5. All reports received from commands afloat are unanimous in their praise 
for the magnificent behavior of our personnel. Specific cases deserving com- 
mendation and reward will be reported in separate correspondence. 

6. Partial report of damage, as submitted in enclosure (B) is supplemented 
herewith by enclosure (C). 

7. Revised reports of casualties to personnel are being submitted as frequently 
as sufficient accurate data are available. Additional information concerning the 
results of the action on 7 December will be fordwarded as soon as the remaining 
missing-narratives have been received. 

H. H. KIMMEL. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1571 

United Stateis Pacific Fleet 
U. S. S. Pennsylvania, Flagship 

Cincpac File No. 

The attached report (enclosure (A) ) is compiled from the narrative reports 
received from each ship listed in the second column, in addition to the incoming 
and outgoing messages of the Commander-in-Chief's file and a few intelligence re- 
ports. 

This is only a partial report as individual ship's reports are still being received. 
The report contains a few inaccuracies which when time permits, will be checked 
and verified and a corrected report submitted to the Department. 

[i] narrative of events OCCURING during JAPANESE AIR RAID ON 

DECEMBER 7, 1941 

0618 On the morning 7 Dec. Task Force 8 (ENTERPRISE, NORTHAMPTON, 
SALT LAKE CITY. CHESTER, (Crudiv 5), DUNLAP, ELIOT, FAN- 
NING, BENHAM, GRIDLEY, MAURY, BALCH, (Desron 6) were re- 
turning to Pearl Harbor after completing mission vicinity Wake Island. 
From position approximately 215 miles West of Pearl routing scouting 
flight launched. Flight had orders to search ahead sector through 045- 
135° for distance 150 miles. Thence planes to proceed to Pearl. Three 
planes also launched to establish inner air patrol. 

OCiSO ANTARES Arrived off Pearl Harbor, from Canton and Palmyro with 50O 
tons steel barge in tow. Sighted suspicious object 1500 yds. on stbd. 
quarter. Appeared to be small submarine but could not positively 
identify it. Accordingly notified inshore patrol ship, WARD to investi- 
gate it. 

0633 ANTARES Observed Navy Patrol plane circle and drop 2 smoke pots 
near object. 

0645 ANTARES Observed WARD commence firing for 2 minutes. Patrol plane 
appeared to drop bombs or depth chnrged object which disappeared. 

0700 VP Squadron 24 Had four of the six PBY5 planes depart Pearl Harbor for 
scheduled training exercise in operating area C-5. One of the remain- 
ing two planes was out of commission for structural changes ; the other 
in standby status for ready duty. 

[2] 0700 Plane 14P-1 sank enemy sub. 1 mile off P. H. entrance. FORCES 
UNDER COMMAND OF PATWING TWO (COMTASKFOR 9) disposed 
as follows : 
Patron 21— Midway : Patron 11, 12, 14, Kaneohoe; Patron 21. 22, 23, 24, 
Pearl Harbor. WRIGHT enroute from P. H. for Midway. Condition of 
readiness B-5. (5U'% aircraft on 4 hours notice). Siiecific duty assign- 
ments required 6 planes from Patron 14, 24, and 12 to be ready for flight 
on 30 minutes notice. Total number of planes ready for flight or in the 
air in 4 hours or less : 72. At time first bomb dropped 14 patrol aircraft 
were in the air (7 on search from Midway), 58 ready for flight in 4 hours 
or less. Nine undergoing repairs. 

[3] 0735 PATRON 21 Patwing 2 staff duty officer received and decoded 
message 14P-1 sank enemy submarine one mile off' Pearl Harbor. 

0740 PATRON 21 Staff duty officer C-C informed by CPW2 of patrol plane 
sinking report. Patwing 2 proceeded to draft a search plan. 

Wi 0715 KEOSANQUA Began to receive tow from ANTARES. 

0726 HELM Underway from berth X-7 for deperming buoys at West Loch. 
All hands at special sea detail stations. Both boats manned and in the 
water with instructions to follow the ship to West Loch. All magnetic 
compasses and chronometers had been left in the BLUE preparatory to 
deperming. 

0743 Local hostilities commenced with air raid on Pearl. Received message 
from plane #7 of VP14 to CTF 3 that plane had sunk one enemy subma- 
rine one mile off Pearl Harbor entrance. 
79716 — 46— Ex. 143, vol. 3 19 



1572 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

0745 AVOCET Moored at Berth F-IA, NAS Dock, Pearl Harbor. Bomb explo- 
sion and planes heard and sighted attacking Ford Island hangars. 
TUCKER Nested alongside WHITNEY. 5" gun #3 could not be fired. 
All other guns and .50 cal. machine guns fired at attacking planes during 
all attacks. No loss of personnel or material. It is believed this vessel 
shot down three or four enemy planes. 
PATRON 11 Two planes in hangar — 4 planes at south end of hangar — 
6 planes on ramp. As soon as raid started three rifles were manner 
immediately. Two machine guns manned in a plane being removed from 
the hangar. Machine gun position in plane abandoned and guns moved 
to a safer position. Set up 2 machine gun nests near south end of 
hangar. Damage received : 7 planes burned ; one wrecked ; and four 
damaged but can be repaired. All hangar, ofiiee equipment, and stores 
destroyed. 

[5] 0745 PATRON 12 Two planes moored in Kaneohe Bay, two in hangar 
and 8 on parking apron. Upon being attacked manned machine guns 
in planes, mounted machine guns in pits and used rifles. Observed sec- 
ond wave of horizontal bombers did not release bombs. Own losses — 
8 PBY-5"s — planes completely destroyed, two severly damaged ; two 
moderately damaged, all hangar, office equipment and stores destroyed. 

0750 TRACY Moored port side to Berth 15, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, under- 
going overhaul. PREBLE and CUMMINGS moored to starboard in that 
order. Ship totally disabled with main auxiliary machinery boilers 
and gun batteries dismantled. 

0750 TAUTOG Observed enemy three plane formation of dive bombers over 
Aiea fleet landing on southwest course. Enemy character not discovered 
until bombs were dropped. 

0750 CALIFORNIA Sounded general quarters and set condition Zed. Lieuten- 
ant Commander M. N. Little, First Lieutenant was S. O. P. on board and 
made preparations for getting underway. 

0750 CASSIN'S Commanding Officer observed about 100 feet away from star- 
board side of dry dock #1 at altitude of 100 feet and airplane with 
large red disks on bottom of wings. Sounded general quarters and made 
attempts to locate ammunition; part of 5" guns under overhaul. .50 
calibre machine e;uns were unlimbered. 

[6] 0750 PATRON 21 Drafting of CPW2 search plan completed. 

0750 OKLAHOMA (0750 or 0753) struck by 3 torpedoes on port side frames 
25, 35-40 and 115. Ship heeled to port 45° meanwhile A. A. batteries 
manned and G. Q. executed. Rapid heeling of ship and oil and water 
on decks rendered service to guns ineffective. 

0750 CURTIS Moored in berth X-22, condition X-RAY. Number 3 boiler 
steaming. Ship at G. Q. Ship straffed by fighter planes. Observed 
bomb hit on VP hangar at NAS. UTAH, RALEIGH and RICHMOND 
attacked by torpedoes. 

[7] 0750 PYRO Secured along West Loch dock, stbd. side to. Heard noise 
of low flying aircraft and explosion in Navy Yard area. Observed two 
low wing monoplanes about 100 feet above water head for PYRO's port 
beam. Planes zoomed clear of ship and was observed to be Japanese. 
Sounded General Quarters and prepared to get underway. 

0752 AVOCET Sounded General Quarters and opened fire with 3" A. A. bat- 

tery. Hit .Japanese plane which had just turned away after torpedoing 
CALIFORNIA. Plnne burst into flames and crashed near Naval Hospital. 
Fired 144 rounds 3"/50 cal. and 1750 rounds .30 cal. 

0753 PRUITT Reports 10 planes flying low, 200 feet, bombed Ford Island and 

blew up hangar. 
07.53 TERN Notified of attack and made preparation for getting underway. 

0753 TRACY Observed BBs attacked from astern by about 10 dive bombers. 

Torpedo planes at about 100 feet approached from Easterly direction 
attacking BBs. O. O. D. saw dive bombers attack BBs (10 planes and 
Ford Is. from North). Attack followed by horizontal and dive bombers 
on sam.e objective plus ships in dry dock. 1 dive bomber passed close 
enough to observe that it was a single engine by-plane probably type 94. 

0754 GAIMBLE Heard explosions on Ford Island. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1573 

[S] 0755 BAGLET Moored Navy Yard Pearl Harbor, berth B-22, repairs to 
starboard bilge keel. Sighted dive bombers in action over Hickam Field. 
They were believed at that time to be Army bombers. Shortly after this 
time enemy plane approached from the direction of Merry Point at about 
3O40 feet altitude and dropped torpedo on OKLAHOINIA and retired. 
Opened up with forward machine guns on attacking plane. Machine 
gun fire bagged 8th plane, it swerved and torpedo dropped and exploded 
in bank 30 feet ahead of BAGLEY. Plane finally downed in channel. 
Continued machine gunning enemy planes. 3 planes believed to have 
been shot down by BAGLEY. 

BOBOLINK Observed about 12 dive bombers centering their attack south 
hangars of Ford Island. 

BREESE floored in berth D-3, Jliddle Loch, in nest with division order 
of ships from starboard U. S. S. RAMSAY, BREESE, MONTGOMERY, 
and GAMBLE. 

Observed bombing of old hangar on Ford Island. Sounded General 
Quarters, set Condition "A", and made preparations for getting under- 
way. Sent boats to lauding to pick up men. 

CACHAT-OT ^Moored at Berth # 1, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor undergoing 
scheduled overhaul. 

CASTOR Sounded general quarters. Ship berthed at Merry Point. 

CONYNGIIAM Heading north moored starboard side to WHITNEY at 
berth X-8. REIl ). TUCKER. CASE, and SELFRIDGE outboard. Ship 
undergoing routine tender overhaul, receiving power from tender. Noted 
large fire on Ford Island and observed horizontal and dive bombing planes 
attacking. Sounded General Quarters. 

DEWEY Observed UTAH to be torpedoed and to list rapidly. DEWEY at 
nest, DesDiv ONE, with PHELPS alongside port side DOBBIN at X-2 
under overhaul. 
[9] 075") DOLPHIN Moored portside to Pier 4, Submarine Base, Pearl 
Harbor. Japanese aircraft delivered dive bomb and torpedo attack on 
Pearl Hxrbor. Sounded General Quarters. 

HELM Turned into West Loch channel and headed up toward deperming 
buoys. 

HENLEY Through error in gangway watch in calling crew to quarters 
for muster at 0755, General Alarm was sounded instead of gas alarm as 
customary. Observed first torpedo plane attack on UTAH. Crew pro- 
ceeded to Battle Stations while General Alarm .sounded the second time. 
Set material condition AFIRM. Made pi'eparations for getting under- 
way. Opened fire on light bomber, altitude about 17,000 feet apparently 
steady on Northerly course ; approaching from seaward and passing over 
Ford Island. 

HONOLULU Moored port side to berth B21 Navy Yard, Pearl with U.S.S. 
ST. LOUIS alongside stad. side. Planes were seen diving on HICKAM 
FIELD. At the same time a wave of torpedo planes were seen approach- 
ing over fleet landing. Sounded general quarters and passed word 
"Enemy Air Raid". Ship prepared to get underway. A.A. batteries 
came into action gun by gun as they were manned. 50 caliber and 30 
caliber M.G.'s fired on enemy torpedo planes attacking the BB's. From 
this time until raid ended 30 caliber, 50 caliber and 5"/25 A.A. guns 
fired at every available target. Service ammunition expended 2,800 
rounds of 30 caliber, 4,500 of 50 caliber, 250 rounds of 5" /25 caliber. 

12 two-seat low wing monoplanes flying low from Southeast dropped 
one torpedo at each battleship. Saw two planes destroyed. 

18 low-wing dive bombers from Southeast. All bombed Hickam Field. 

MinDiv ONE LTndergoing scheduled overhaul, moored in repair base. 
Guns and ammunition removed. Crews, except the watch on board, 
living in Navy Yard receiving barracks. 
[10] 0755 MinDiv ONE Japanese planes were seen to attack the BB's. 
Men were sent to adjacent ships, NEW ORLEANS, SAN FRANCISCO, 
and CUMMINGS, to assist in niatming A.A. Guns and handle ammuni- 
tion. Meanwhile receiving barracks sent men (our) to other ships to 
assist in fighting fires or handling ammunition. These men reported 
to PENNSYLVANIA, CALIFORNIA, and WHITNEY. Also in the 
Yard. Miner's Mates were sent to West Loch. 50 and 30 caliber MG's 
were reassembled and remounted and ammunition was obtained from 



1574 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

NEW ORLEANS, SAN FRANCISCO and Marine Barracks. These 
guns were used against the enemy making the later attacks. No ship 
of division suffered damage. 
PATTERSON Moored at berth X-11, battle stations manned. Opened fire 
with main and 50 caliber batteries. The PATTERSON considered that 
at least one enemy plane was shot down. The plane Claimed by PAT- 
TERSON was one observed diving on CURTISS approaching from ahead 
at about 400 ft. altitude. Plane was seen to fall apart at same time 
shot was fired by #2 gun. 

PHOENIX First attacking plane sighted from Signal Bridge attacking 
from north of Ford Island. Plane had all guns firing. Passed over 
stern of Raleigh and proceeded toward Ford Island Control Tower and 
dropped bomb. 

PREBLE On 7 December was undergoing Navy Yard overhaul at berth 
Z-15 with no ammunition on board and the engineering plant dismantled. 
First attack on battleships began with about 20 torpedo planes. Planes 
were in low horizontal fiight when observed and attacked from eastward. 
Enemy planes approached battleships to close range before releasing 
torpedoes. 

RALEIGH Commanding Officer felt diill explosion and looking out air- 
port observed water boiling amidships. Received report that Japanese 
were attacking fleet. Sounded geiieral quarters. 

Both planes were successfully hoisted out by hand power. Doctor 
was directed to report to SOLACE. [11] Damage repair party 
was sent to capsized UTxiH to cut men out of hull. Sent Signal to 
send pontoon and a lighter alongside from BALTIMORE to RALEIGH. 
These were delivered and secured to port quarter and acted as an out- 
rigger. Torpedoes, minus warheads were pushed overboard and beached 
at Ford Island. Al stanchions, boat skids and life rafts and booms 
were jettisioned. Both anchors let go. 

RAMAPO O. O. D. observed Japanese dive bomber come in close and 
drop couple of bombs. Sounded General Quarters and opened fire with 
A. A. Guns (3"/). Motor Torpedo Boats on board also opened fire with 
machine guns. Order of attack observed to be dive bombers strafing, 
torpedo planes, dive bombers bombing, horizontal planes bombing. 
Our personenl reported 3" shell hit plane. No losses in personnel and 
no material damage. 

RAMSAY Moored at berth D-3 observed bomb land on western end of 
Ford Island. 

REID Observed unidentified plane attacking Ford Island. 

SOLACE Received report of air raid, closed all watertight doors and 
ports, called away rescue parties ; prepared hospital facilities and sent 
2 motor launches with rescue parties to ARIZONA. 

SUMNER Was moored to the new dock at the southern end of the Sub- 
marine Base, port side to, bow to eastward. Armament is four 3" 
23 caliber A. A. guns, four 50 caliber machine guns, and one 5" 51 caliber 
broadside. 

SWAN Sounded General Quarters. In Marine Raihvay, boiler upkeep. 
Observed bomb dropped on South ramp of Fleet Air Base. 

TAUTOG Observed about 20 planes approaching on line of OAHU rail- 
road tracks, and over Merry's point. Torpedoes were dropped from 
about 50 feet after submarine base pier was passed. Fourth plane in 
line and plane near end of line were shot down by this ship and HUL- 
P.ERT before torpedoes were dropped. 
[12] 0755 A Japanese plane flew from North to South over a fish pond 
adjacent to water front resident of Lt. R. B. Black, U. S. N. R. on, 
the East shore of Pearl City Peninsula. A long burst of machine gun 
fire was directed at the breakwater enclosing the fish pond, and a single 
fisherman wearing a white shirt was seen to run rapidly along the 
breakwater. This material is forwarded to indicate that enemy pilots 
were directing fire at individuals (civilians) at a considerable distance 
from any military objectives. 
0755 VESTAL Sounded General Quarters. Manned A. A, battery, 3" A. A. 
and 5" broadside and .30 cal. M. G. 
VIREO Moored inboard at Coal Dock (seaward end) with TURKEY, 
BOBOLINK, and RAIL, outboard. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1575 

WIDGEON No remarks except machine gun and rifle fire used against 
enemy. No losses or damage. 

WEST VIRGINIA Passed word "Away fire and rescue party" followed 
by General Quarters. Two heavy shocks felt on hull of W. Va. Ap- 
parently forward and on port side. Ship began to list rapidly to port. 
Another third heavy shock felt to port. Plane on top of turret 4 caught 
on fire. A heavy explosion occurred with about 20° list on ship to 
port. Central station directed to counterflood. The following last ex- 
plosion flashed a flame about 15 feet high occurred forward on ARI- 
ZONA. A second flash occurred on the ARIZONA higher than the fore- 
top. Burning debris rained on Quarter Deck of W. Va. After the 2 
ARIZONA explosions the W. Va. began to right itself when a large 
fire broke out amidships. Word received from central station to aban- 
don ship. A wall of flame advancing toward the W. Va. and TEN- 
NESSEE from the ARIZONA. W. Va. personnel began to abandon ship 
as fire had grown out of control. Meanwhile magazines of W. Va. had 
been flooded. W. Va. personnel report to TENNESSEE. Remaining 
survivors ashore and elsewhere sent back to W. Va. to tight fire. Fire 
on W. Va. extinguished Monday afternoon. 
[13] 0756 BOBOLINK Ready duty status, moored at next end, of coal 
docks with VIREO and TURKEY inboard, RAIL outboard. Informed 
by 'gangway watch that Japanese Planes were bombing us. Sounded 
General Quarters. 

GAMBLE Wave of about 50 Japanese planes attacked Battleships and 
Naval Air Station. Ford Island, planes flying at low altitudes about 
500 feet over Battleships from direction of Diamond Head, about 700 
feet over Ford Island. Five successive waves of the attack of about 10 
planes each. 

MinDiv TWO Went to General Quarters and set Condition "A". 

THORNTON Reports attack by Japanese Airci-aft commenced ; General 
Alarm was sounded and all hands went to Air Defense Stations. 
THORNTON moored port side to dock at Berth S-1, Submarine Base, 
Pearl Harbor. Stations manned were as follows: Control, Machine 
Gun Battery Control, Repair, and 4 .50 cal. Machine Guns, 3 .30 Cal. 
Lewis Machine Guns. 3 .30 Browning automatic rifles, and 12 .30 cal. 
Springfield rifles. 
0757 Ensign Chiles of JARVIS called Lieut. Ford and said "Someone is bomb- 
us". 

BREESE Opened fire with ..50 cal. machine guns. 

CONYNGHAM Observed Torpedo planes attacking RALEIGH, UTAH 
and DETROIT from the West. 

DEWEY Sounded General Quarters. 

HELENA Moored at 1010 Dock, Berth 2, portside to Dock, OGLALA 
alongside starboard side. Reported observed planes over Ford Island, 
14,000 ft. altitude. Signalman on bridge with previous duty on Asiatic 
Station identified planes immediately. General Alarm sounded and 
service ammunition broke out. 

HULL GENERAL QUARTERS. Prepared to get underwav. 
[14] 0757 NEW ORLEANS Moored at Berth 16, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor 
undergoing Engine Repairs, receiving power and light from Dock. 
Sighted Enemy planes dive bombing Ford Island ; sounded General 
Quarters. 
0757 PENNSYLVANIA In Drv Dock #1. 3 Propeller Shafts removed. De- 
stroyers CASSIN and DOWNES in Dock ahead of PENNSYLVANIA. 
Floating Dock West of new drv dock adjoining PENNSYLVANIA occu- 
pied by SHAW. Cruiser HELENA and OGLALA at Berth B-2 (PENN- 
SYLVANIA normal berth). CALIFORNIA in F-3. MARYLAND in F-4 
inbonrd. OKLAHOMA outboard : Berth F-6. TENNESSEE Inboard WEST 
VIRGINIA outboard, F7 ARIZONA. F8 NEVADA. Machine Guns m 
foremast manned and condition watch of A. A. jjersonnel available. 
Ship receiving steam, water and power from yard. Heard explosions 
on end of Ford Island and realized an Air Raid in progress after 2nd 
explosion. Air defense sounded, followed by General Quarters. Set 
Condition YOKE. 
0757 SUMNER Signal watch and Quartermaster on Bridge sighted ten dive 
bombers attacking Navy Yard. Observed two explosions in Navy Yard. 
Sounded Alarm. 



1576 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 

0757 TREVER Mine Division FOUR moored at Buoys D-7 bows toward Pearl 
City, in order from North : TREVER, WASMUTH, ZANE, and PERRY. 
Sounded General Quarters at time when first bomb was dropped by Japa- 
nese on North side of Ford Island. 

0757 WASMUTH WASMUTH reports first Japanese planes attacked. Went to 

General Quarters at once with all guns in action within 3 minutes. How- 
ever, as ship was inside nest of four, only two after gvuis could bear. 
Made all pi-eparations for getting underway. 

[15] 0757 PATRON 21 First Bomb dropped near VP-22 Hangar. Message 
order broadcast to all ships present "AIR RAID P. H. X THIS IS NOT 
DRILL" (a similar message was sent by CinCPac). 

il6] 0757 ZANE ZANE moored bow and stern to nest with INIine Division 
FOUR at buoys D-7; order from port to starboard: TREVER, WAS- 
MUTH, ZANE and PERKY. First call to standby colors sounded. 
Signalnjen on watch observed single Japanese plane drop bomb from 
about 10(X)0 feet on southern end Ford Island after approach from 
Northward. Sounded General Quarters : manned A. A. battei-y. Com- 
menced firing with A. A. battery at all planes passing within reasonable 
distances. Made all preparations to get underway. 

0758 ANTARES ANTARES heard explosion in Pearl Harbor and observed 

Japanese planes delivering attack. 

0758 BAGLEY, BAGLEY observed Torpedo Plane come in from direction of 
Merry Point between Navy Yard and Kuahua Island, 30 or 40 feet alti- 
tude, headed for OKLAHOjMA. About 2 or 3 hundred yards from 
OKLAHOMA, plane dropped its torpedo and hit OKLAHOMA amidships, 
sounded General Quarters and commenced firing. Hit fourth plane 
coming in which was seen to crash in channel off Officers' Club landing. 
IMachine gun fire on 8th plane made it swerve to left causing torpedo to 
drop and explode in bank about 30 feet ahead of BAGLEY. Number one 
machine gun downed plane in Navy Yard channel. Third torpedo plane 
hit by BAGLEY was observed headed for light cruisers HONOLULU 
and ST. LOUIS astern of BAGLEY. Plane went out of control, dropped 
its torpedo and seemed to hit L-head Crane in Navy Yard. This was 
about the eleventh plane to come in. Next plane hit by BAGLEY came 
over dock but was downed with a short burst. Torpedo dropped in 
lumber pile and plane believed to have crashed on dock. Fifth plane 
brought down by BAGLEY came down on starboard side, nose directly 
up into air and spun into crash loosing its torpedo. Sixth plane brought 
down by BAGLEY was a dive bomber during second phase of attack and 
after torpedo attack. This plane was shot down by 5" gun and those 
from other ships. 

117] 0758 CUMMINGS CUMMINGS observed enemy planes making tor- 
pedo attack on Battleships moored to East side of Ford Island. Sounded 
General Quarters. 

0758 GAMBLE Went to General Quarters, opened fire with ..50 cal. machine 
guns on planes passing over nest at about 800 feet altitude. Set Material 
Condition Affirm except for certain protpcted Ammunition Passages. 

0758 JARVIS General Quarters sounded on JARVIS. 

0758 HULBERT HULBERT sounded General Quarters. Torpedo plane 
sighted heading West over East Lock preparing to launch torpedo against 
Battleship off Ford Island. HULBERT reports bringing down 1 Jap- 
anese Torpedo Plane by .50 cal. A. A. fire from Berth S-3, Submarine 
Base. 

0758 HULL Gangway watch opened fire with .45 caliber pistol on two (2) 
planes crossing bow within 50 varcls. 

0758 MUGFORD Moored Port side to' the U. S. S. SACRAMENTO, Berth No. 6, 

Navy Yard. U. S. S. JARVIS moored Port side to MUGFORD. Attack 
started. Japanese planes dive on Ford Island. Several large bombs 
struck the sea plane landing ramp followed by explosions near hangers. 
Several Japanese planes came in low from Soutwest and released tor- 
pedoes which struck OKLAHOMA and WEST VIRGINIA. Enemy tor- 
pedo planes came in continuously from same direction and fired torpedoes 
at the Battleships. 

0759 RE ID RE ID went to General Quarters. 

0758 RIGEL Ford Island attack by 10 dive bombers from North at 10,000 feet. 



PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 1577 

[18] 0758 TENNESSEE TENNESSEE attacked by enemy planes (Japa- 
nese). Oily water around stern burning. Canvas awning on stern on 
tire, Turret III. Smoke pouring into Repair I. Smoke so thick, cannot 
see. Repair I have men standby magazine flood. Turret III. All boats 
on fire. Fire in Maintop, secondary aft. Fire in maintop seems to be 
out. WEST VIRGINIA'S quarterdeck and planes on tire. Fire on Tur- 
ret III. Could not get morphine out of doctor's room because it was 
unsafe; men report that room was too hot to go in and cut safe open. 
D-310 excessively hot — investigate. Squadron of planes diving on Navy 
Yard. Repair I, unit 3, abandoned station — too hot. Fire on topside 
seems to be under control. D-310-A is all right. Set Condition ZED 
in lower handling room of Turret III. OKLAHOMA seems to be cap- 
sizing. CALIFORNIA down by the stern. WEST VIRGINIA has 
pretty bad fire below Signal Bridge. TENNESSEE was hit twice, soon 
after attack began; one hit (bomb) on face of Turret II, and bomb hit 
on top of Turret III, penetrating. 

0758 THORNTON THORNTON commenced firing with .50 cal. machine gun 

battery followed immediately by .30 cal. machine guns and .30 cal. rifles. 

0759 GAMBLE GAMBLE opened fire with 3"/23 cal. AA guns, firing as planes 

came within range, fuses set 3 to 8 sees. 

0759 HELM First enemy plane sighted in sJiallow dive over Ford Island, 
headed Northwest. Observed first bomb hit on hangar at southwest end 
of Ford Island. Called crew to General Quarters. Opened magazines 
and got ammunition to guns. 

0759 JARVIS Lieut. Ford and Lieut. Johnson of JARVIS reach bridge. Jap 
torpedo planes coming in at 30 to 60 second intervals, approaching from 
Merry Point direction and attacking BBs. 

[19] 0759 SUMNER Observed torpedo planes approach over S. E. Loch 
attacking BBs. circling Ford Island and flying off to south west. 

0759 WHITNEY Observed air raid attack by Japanese air force and explosions 
on Ford Island, WHITNEY moored bow and stern to buoys X-8 and 
X-8x, 6 fathoms of water, supplying steam, electricity, fresh and flush- 
water to CONNYNGHAM, REID, TUCKER, CASE, and SELFRIDGE, 
moored alongside to port. 

0759 PELIAS PELIAS reports 9 dive bombers attacked out of direction of sun 
the Battleships. One broke off and dive bombed PENNSYLVANIA. 

0800 Two officers from ship hiking in back of Aiea witnessed attack. 

They stated later that 3 separate flights of planes appeared at 3 levels ; 
low. medium and high from the north. 

0800 VIREO C. O. VIREO heard an explosion. Immediately Japanese planes 
were seen, and General Quarters sounded. 

0800 ANTARES ANTARES under machine gun fire. Topside hit by machine 
gun bullets, bomb and shell fragments. Being unarmed no offensive tac- 
tics were possible. In order to avoid placing ship and personnel in 
jeopardy, authority was requested to enter Honolulu Harbor. 

0800 COMINBATFOR Comincraft in OGLALA observed enemy bomb fall sea- 
ward and Ford Island ; no damage. The next bomb caused fires near 
waters. Flames flared up from structures southend of island. Next 
bomb fell alongside or on board 7 battleships moored at F-1 eastside 
of Ford Island. Jap planes flew between fifty and 100 feet of water, 
dropping 3 torpedoes or mines in channel on line between OGLALA and 
seaw