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Full text of "Pearl Harbor attack : hearings before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, 79th Congress, a concurrent resolution authorizing an investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and events and circumstances relating thereto .."
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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAEL HAEBOE ATTACK
CONGEESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1&41, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES y Z '
RELATING THERETO
PART 26
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY
Printed for the iise of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor AttadI
^
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEAEL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGBESS or THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS ^
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27 ^/^^^
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN /> i. -T\
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL ^-?ri-/ ^
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 26
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79716 WASHINGTON : 1946
/^v)
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERB COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Hlinois Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMBR FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California
gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from Wisconsin
North Carolina
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
William D. Mitchell, General Counsel
Gerhard A. Gesell, Chief Assistant Counsel
JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel
John E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel
Samuel H. Kaufman. Associate General Counsel
JOHN E. Masten, Assistant Counsel
Edward P. Morgan, Assistant Counsel
Logan J. Lane, Assista7it Counsel
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
Pages
Transcript
Hearings
No.
pages
1
1- 399
1- 1058
Nov,
. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2
401- 982
1059- 2586
Nov
. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945,
3
983-1583
2587- 4194
Dec.
5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4
1585-2063
4195- 5460
Dec.
14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5
2065-2492
5461- 6646
Dec.
31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6
2493-2920
6647- 7888
Jan.
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7
2921-3378
7889- 9107
Jan.
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
8
3379-3927
9108-10517
Jan.
30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9
3929-4599
10518-12277
Feb.
7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10
4601-5151
12278-13708
Feb.
15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11
5153-5560
13709-14765
Apr.
9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part
No. Exhibits Nos.
12 1 through 6.
13 7 and 8.
14 9 through 43.
15 44 through 87.
16 88 through 110.
17 111 through 128.
18 129 through 156.
19 157 through 172.
20 173 through 179.
21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings,
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
IV
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15. 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5269-5291
3814-3826
3450-3519
""5089-5122
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
""471-516"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
1 ITt< 1 I 1 I 1 t 1 1 1 1 1 1 t 1 1 II ITj^CO 1
iicOiiiiriiii O^iCOi
^\ \ ! : ; ; : ! : ; : ; ; 1 ; ; ; : ; 1 "^ 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l(N
. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r-T
1 1 i ; ; I ; 1 1 ; ; 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ; ; 1 1 1 1
Joint
Committee
Exhy^it No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
""660-688"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
3105-3120'
2479-2491'
4022-4027'
148-186
2567-2580'
3972-3988
2492-2515
1575-1643"
3720-3749"
1186-1220
1413-1442"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
""391-398"
"115-134'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
toJan. 23, 1942)
Pages
203-209
1127-1138"
1033-1038
1719-1721"
1219-1224'
"886-951'
1382-1399
"377-389"
1224-1229
"314-320'
i
%
Allen, Brooke E., Maj
Allen, Riley H
Anderson, Edward B., Maj
Anderson, Ray
Anderson, Walter S., Rear Adm
Anstey, Alice
Arnold, H. H., Gen
Asher, N. F., Ens
Ball, N. F., Ens
BaUard, Emma Jane
Barber, Bruce G
Bartlett, George Francis
Bates, Paul M., Lt. Comdr
Beardall, John R., Rear Adm
Beardall, John R., Jr., Ens
Beattv, Frank E., Rear Adm
Bellinger, P. N. L., Vice Adm
Benny, Chris J
Benson, Henry P
Berquist, Kenneth P., Col
Berry, Frank M., S 1/c
Betts, Thomas J., Brig. Gen
Bicknell, George W., Col__ _
Bissell, John T., Col
INDEX OF WITNESSES
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VI
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1915,
to May 31,
1948
Pages
5080-5089
'""3826-3838
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
Mav 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
163-181
"418^423'
"451-464"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
'8'7-B "
205
"B223-224"
B6.5-66
B229-231
49-51
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
1 j I 1 1 1 1 111 j 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 1
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
495-510
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
4125-4151
1695-1732
2745-2785
4186-4196
3196^3261'
1928-1965
3642-3643
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to ,
June 15, 1944'
Pages
""179-184"
"'105-114"
96-105
74-85
'"368-378"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
Pages
478-483,
301-310
1171-1178'
1178-1180'
1659-1663,
170-198
"812-843,'
1538-1571
504-509
2-32'
365-368
1747-1753"
1
Craige, Nelvin L., Lt. Col
Creighton, John M., Capt. (USN)
Crosley, Paul C, Comdr
Curley, J. J. (Ch/CM)
Curts, M. E., Capt., USN
Daubin, F. A., Capt., USN
Davidson, Howard C, Maj. Gen
Davis, Arthur C, Rear Adm
Dawson, Harry L
Deane, John R., Maj. Gen
DeLany, Walter S., Rear Adm
Dickens, June D., Sgt
Dillingham, Walter Y
Dillon, James P
DiUon, .John H., Maj
Dingeman, Ray E., Col
Donegan, William Col
Doud, Harold,' Col
Dunlop, Robert H., Col
Dunning, Mary J
Dusenbury, Carlisle Clyde, Col
Dyer, Thomas H., Capt., USN-__
Earle, Frederick M., W/0
Earle, John Bayliss, Capt., USN
INDEX OF WITNESSES
VII
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VIII CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
! ! iS i i i i i i i i i 1 i 1 l^^^i I li^^s
1 1 iti : : I ! 1 1 : ! 1 . ! ! icJ^-g'? i \^^^oc
1 ' ! 'S ' ' ! : : 1 : 1 1 ! ! 1 is^§^ i !S-*^~=^"<=^"
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II. 1 ! ! ! 1 ! ! ; : : : 1 ; '^ i : cdoJj
III 1 ! 1 I I 1 ! 1 I 1 1 I 1 ; 1 iN-<i'i>
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
428-432
414-417
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
212-213
i6o-i6i
182
"'166-161'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
^ '''''' 1 I 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I ! ! !
►^ ' ' ' ' ' II
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
;Oct. 19, 1944)
tOl...O IN I.r-ll
l^iii.CDilill.t^iliii l.iCl
i^O l.l.-'^l.l.lllt^ I.QOl
^^ 1 ,, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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tXiO 1 1 1 .0 .Oillll 1 1^ 1
t^ 1 1 . .■* l^ . . 1 1 1 1 100 1
1 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 1 . .1111 II 1
,— . . 1 . . ...... ..... 11 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
.0^ 1 •^ 1 .0(M . 1 1 iTt<l^ III . 00 . 1
.Oil:^ il^ 1 . ■* -^ 1 1 1 i.-H^ III it^ 1 1
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.oa>. .lOiiiiKNOiiii 1 II
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Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
1 1 1 1 1 ! 1 1 ! 1 1 1 .... 1 1 . .0 1
I. . 1 . 1 ICO 1
11 1 1 : 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 IT !
«; i 1 1 1 1 1 1 ; 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1^ 1
1 1 .-^ 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
toJan. 23, 1942)
1 1 1 1 1 1t1< 1 1 1 .0 1 ICO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 t^iilit^lit^lll llil
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1 1 1 1 1 .t^ . 1 1 ICO 1 1^ 1 1 1 till
. 1 . 1 .. 10 1 1 1 1 CO 1 1 III 1 1 1 1
^
Hamilton, Maxwell M., State Dept
Hannum, Warren T., Brig. Gen
Harrington, Cyril J
Hart, Thomas Charles, Senator
Hayes, Phihp, Maj. Gen
Heard, WiUiam A., Capt., USN
Henderson, H. H., Lt., USA
Herron, Charles D., Maj. Gen
Hill, William H., Senator
Holmes, J. Wilfred., Capt., USN
Holtwick, J. S., Jr., Comdr
Hoppough, Clay, Lt. Col
Hornbeck, Stanley K
Home, Walter Wilton
Howard, Jack W., Col
Hubbell, Monroe H., Lt. Comdr
Huckins, Thomas A., Capt., USN
Hull, Cordell
Humphrey, Richard W. RM 3/c
Hunt, John A., Col
IngersoU, Royal E., Adm
Inglis, R. B., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
IX
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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945.
to May 31,
1946
§ ; 1 1 ! i :§g : : ; : : : : : 1 : i^"-'§ ; !
s : : ! 1 : :57 : : : : 1 1 : 1 i : ig^S i !
»i 1—1 1 Ill ''
^,o C-. -* . i^^iO 1 1
.«? iC (M CO . 1 1 . ^' X t^ 1 1
o -* ^ „ o . 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
Mav 14 to
July 11, 1945)
Pages
541-553
182-292
"140^142'
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
103
107-112
186
219-222
102
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
Ifi, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
. I— 1 ..... 1 ......11 11
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
Pages
904-918
628-643
'734-746'
''852-885"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
2665-2695'
3028-3067
1161-1185'
2787-2802'
1014-1034
1678-1694
3226-3250
2362-2374'
2- .54'
T. S. 2-52,
192-226
3126-3152
1816-1913
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
214^225
363-367
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
toJan. 23, 1942)
1 . CO 1 ^ 1 (M '-0 . . . LO . . . . Tf. 1 1 1 10 . (N 1 135
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11,-HirHi Oii'C^iii. ...t^ 1
"Witness
Krick, Harold D., Capt., USN
Kroner, Hayes A., Brig. Gen
Landreth, J. L., Ens
Lane, Louis R., Ch. W/0
Larkin, C. A., Lt. Col
Laswell, Alva B., Col. USMC
Lawton, William S., Col
Layton, Edwin T., Capt., USN
Leahy, William D., Adm
Leary, Herbert F., Vice Adm
Lewis, Fulton, Jr
Litell, S. H
Locey, Frank H
Lockard, Joseph L., Lt., USA
Lorence, Walter E., Col
Lumsden, George, Maj
Lyman, W. T., Lt., USN
Lynch, Paul J
Lynn, George W., Lt. Comdr
MacArthur, Douglas, Gen
Marshall, George C, Gen
Marston, MorriU W., Col
Martin, F. L., Maj. Gen
INDEX OF WITNESSES
XI
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XII
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION TEARL HARBOR ATTaCS
Joint
Congressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 1945,
to May 31,
1946
Pages
5210
4933-5009
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1915)
Pages
"387-388"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
14S
(Clausen
Investigation,
Nov. 23, 1944,
to Sept. 12,
1945)
Pages
45-46
"179-181"
232
76^77"
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investigation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1944; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
•3111 III III 1 1 ' ' 1 1 1 1
^111 III III 1 1 1 1
Joint
Committee
E.xhibit No.
146
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19, 1944)
1 iiO III III .--f ^(>fl--"(M 1 1 1 1 00 00
1 iC5 n^f^fSoOW^ 1 I'* 1 lOO
1 1 IT III III Tc^^S::;:: 1 IT I \f^
1 1 Iti III III <^j.c^TTT 1 Itl I lotT
til 1 il^ III III JCf^-^cOi-i 1 ii-i 1 It^-H
1 itP III III r~.r-^f^i^ 1 ,^ 1 iiOOi
Joint
Committee
E.xhihit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Harbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Pages
1107-1166,'
12iO-1252
3636^3840"
2375-2398,
3990-3996
3153-3165
2S23-2933
3885-3915
1968^1988"
1035-1070
778-789
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
June 15, 1944)
Pages
147-169
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18, 1941,
to Jan. 23, 1942)
II II 1 1 1 1 .. 1 1 1 1
1 1 ^j-i^ T^ 1 1 CD 1 ,^,-rco t 1 1 CO ■* 1 1 1 1
1 liToooi 1 1 10 ii212'^< • ' 10000 1 1 1 1
« 1 iojoS4 1 : i igg ! ; icii^ 1 1 1 1
1 i?^^S 1 ! ^ 1^^ 1 1 1^°° 1 1 1 1
a
Pettigrew, Moses W., Col
Phelan, John, Ens
Phillips, Walter C, Col
Pickett, Harry K., Col
Pierson, Millard, Col
Pine, Willard B
Poindexter, Joseph B., Gov
Powell, BoUing R., Jr., Maj
PoweU, C. A., Col
Powers, R. D., Jr., Lt. Comdr
•
Prather, Louise
Pratt, John S., Col
Pye, William S., Vice Adm
Rafter, Case B
Raley, Edward W., Col
Ramsey, Logan C, Capt., USN
Redman, Joseph R., Rear Adm
INDEX OF WITNESSES
xm
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MOJCOCOCQ
XVI COXGRESSIOXAL IXVESTIGATIOX PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Joint
Confiressional
Committee,
Nov. 15, 194.5.
to May 31.
1940
1 1 1 1 1 1^ 1 1 1 1 •(-T'f 1
0511IIIIII IlllJyCOl
-1 1 ?2co 1
g 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i«o 1 1
O.I111IICO 11 liii.i,COi
.? 1 1 1 1 1 i<M 1 1 II i£2o 1
' M i M 1" i i i i i i ; i i i M"" i
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
149
(Hewitt
Inquiry,
May 14 to
July 11, 1915)
iiiiiiOiiiiiiCDCO(NiOiii 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 rH 1 CC lO O 1 lO 1 1 1 1
giiiiii-^iiiiiiCOiOCDi^iii 1
o'liiiiiciiiiiilci-Mt^KNiii 1
-^iiiiiioci t-^a5iT}<iii 1
COiiiiiiCOiOiOi-*iii 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
148
(Clausen
InvestiRation,
Nov. 23, 1944.
to Sept. 12,
1945)
1 I ! 1 1 1 1 o 1 ! 1 1 i CD 1 1 I 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 lOO 1 1 1 1 lO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
147
(Clarke
Investifjation,
Sept. 14 to
16, 1914; July
13 to Aug.
4, 1945)
1 1 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
140
(Navy Court
of Inquiry,
July 24 to
Oct. 19. 1944)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lo 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
OJ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
gill o
1 i i i i i i i i ; i i^J i i i i i i i i i
11 1 1 lOO 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 Oil
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
145
(Army Pearl
Ilarbor Board,
July 20 to
Oct. 20, 1944)
Tf^TH it^OO 1 1 l^^iC Ico 1 1 CO Ico 1 1 o
■<J<(N lOt^ 1 1 lOCCOCD lOO 1 1 t^ iCO 1 1 <5
Si>-H iO-* 1 1 IC003CO ICO 1 1 i> 1 lo 1 1 "£5
c,(NCO i(N(NliirHlcOicOii eOiCOii '^
^c4i ;d.ci ! ! i^ScJd iti. 1 ; i iri ! I i
(N(M lOOiO 1 1 ITJ-05C0 it^ 1 1 lO 1 lO 1 1 oh
r^r-i lO^^ 1 1 ICO CD icD 1 1 t> 1 CO 1 1 to
(N CO n-ilM III,-! CO 1 CO 1 1 CO 1 CO 1 1 C^
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
144
(Hart Inquiry,
Feb. 12 to
Juue 15, 1944)
1 1 1 1 1 loo 1 i 1 i 1 i i 1 l(N 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 100 1 1 1 1 OO 1 1 1 1
2 ' ; ' ' ' '<N ' .CO 1 1 1 1
Cv 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
o 1 1 , 1 1 ,o 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 idi 1 1 1 1
■S 1 1 1 1 1 it^ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 lt>. 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 i(M 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 iCO 1 1 1 1
Joint
Committee
Exhibit No.
143
(Roberts
Commission,
Dec. 18. 1941.
toJau.23. 1942)
Pages
1311-1329
496-499
1830-1842
1334-1346"
"247-259"
1525^1538'
1683-1705
Witness
Wells, B. IL, Maj. Gen
West, Melbourne IL, Lt. Col
Whaling, William J., Lt. Col
White, William 11., Brig. Gen
Wichiser, Ilea B
Wilke, Weslic T
Wilkinson, T. S., Rear Adm
Willoughby, C. A., Maj. Gen
Wilson, Durward S., Maj. Gen
Wilson, Erie M., Col
Wimer, Benjamin R., Col
Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm
Wong, Ahoon H _
Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR
Woodward, Farnsley C, Lt. (jg), USN.
Woolley, Ralph E
Wright, Wesley A., Comdr
Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col
York, Yee Kam
Zacharias, EUis M., Capt., USN
Zucca, Emil Lawrence
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 1
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 144
[TOP SECRET]
RECORD OF PROCEEDIXGS OF AN EXA^VIINATIOX OF
WITNESSES CONVENED BY ORDER OF THE SECRE-
TARY OF THE NAVY
To Record TssxriioisrY Pertixext to the Japaxt:se Attack on Pearl
Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, ox 7 December 1941
February 12, 1944— June 15, 1944
[I] INDEX
Page 1
Organization of examination 1
Introduction of counsel 1
Modification of counsel 391
Reporter sworn 2, 29, 32, 225, 288, 308, 363
Adjournnients 1, 31, 53, 73, 85, 96, 104, 114, 134, 146, 1©, 178, 194, 204,
205, 206, 214, 228, 249, 262, 272, 278, 292, 307, 323, 334, 337, 347, 354, 362, 367,
37, 382, 390, 398, 403, 412, 425, 430.
Notifications of meetings to Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel 1, 2, 74, 206, 338
Closing entry 432
Ui]
TESTIMONY
Name of witness
Claud C. Bloch, Admiral, USN (Ret)
Benjamin Katz. Commander, USN
W. W. Smith, Rear Admiral, USN...
L. D. McCormick, Rear Admiral, USN
Walter S. DeLanv, Rear Admiral, USN
Arthur C. Davis, Rear Admiral, USN
M. E. Curts, Captain, USN
P. N. L. Bellinger, Vice Admiral, USN
Wilson Brown, Rear .\dmiral, USN
William S. Pye, Rear Admiral, USN
Robert O. Glover, Captain, USN._ .__
Paul C. Crosley, Commander, USN
Willard A. Kitts, III, Rear Admiral, USN
Vincent R. Murphy, Captain, USN
Joseph J. Rochefort, Commander, USN
Edwin T. Layton, Captain, USN..
W. L. Calhoun, Vice Admiral, USN
GranvUle C. Briant, Commander, USNR
Charles H. McMorris, Rear Admiral, USN...
Richmond K. Turner, Vice Admiral, USN
John L. McCrea, Captain, USN
Theodore S. Wilkinson, Rear .\dmiral, USN..
Aubrey W. Fitch, Vice Admiral, USN
George VanDeurs, Captain, USN
William F. Halsey, Jr., Admiral, USN
Irving H. Mayfield, Captain, USN
Johp Henry Newton, Vice .\dmiral, USN
William B. Stephenson, Lieutenant, UNSR...
Howard F. Kingman, Rear .\dmiral, USN
WiUiam E. G. Taylor, Commander, USNR...
L. F. SafEord, Captain, USN
Herbert F. Leary, Vice Admiral, USN...,
J. B. Earle, Captain, USN
Wesley A. Wright, Commander, USN
Charles Wellborn, Jr., Captain, USN
Walter S. Anderson, Rear Admiral, USN
Roland Munroe Brainard, Vice .\dmiral, USN
R. E. Schuirmann, Rear .-Vdmiral, USN
Joel W. Bunkley, Rear Admiral, USN (Ret)..
Royal E. Ingersoll, Admiral, USN..
Examined
by exam-
Verified >
ining oflacer'
2,86
147
29,54
184
32, 54, 55
184
66
184
74
205
96
141
105
147
115
194
135
170
147
195
170
205
179
205
185
205
195
204
207
338
214
272
225
262
229
262
233
335
250,262
338
273
338
279
292
288
292
290
292
293
322
308
322
314
322
323
335
335
391
338,348
354
355
383
363
391
368
378
379
404
383
404
391
402
399
404
404
431
413
431
415
431
^ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent
pages of original exhibit.
79716 — 46— Ex. 144 2
[in]
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS
Exhibit
Ctiaracter of-
Admitted
in
evidence '
Letter ^rom Adm. Hart to Adm. Kimmel of 2/17/44-..
Letter from Adm. Kimmel to Adm. Hart of 2/19/44
Letter from Adm. Hart to Adm. Kimmel of 3/4/44
Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41 (Revised)
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (JCD-42)
Dispatcti: CNO to CINCPAC; 16 Oct. 41; Ref: 162203
Disp: CNO to CINCPAC; 24 Nov. 41; Ref: 242005
Disp: CNO to CINCPAC; 27 Nov. 41; Ref: 272337
Disp: CNO to com pnncf; 28 Nov. 41; Ref: 290110 :...
Disp: OpNav to CINCAF; .30 Nov. 41; Ref: 300419
Disp: OpNav to CINCPAC; 3 Dec. 41; Ref: 031850
Disp: CNO to CINCPAC; 26 Nov. 41; Ref: 270038
Disp: CNO to CINCPAC; 26 Nov. 41; Ref: 270040
Disp: CNO to CINCPAC; 29 Nov. 41; Ref: 282054
Disp: CINCPAC to OpNav; 28 Nov. 41; Ref: 280627
U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan (Rainbow 5)
Ltr from CNO to CinCPac; 15 Feb. 41; re: anti-torpedo baffles, Pearl Harbor
Ltr from CinCPac to CNO; 12 March 41; Re: anti-torpedo baffles, Pearl Harbor
Ltr from CNO to Com 14; 13 June 41; re: anti-torpedo baffles
Letter from Adm. Hart to Adm. Kimmel of 3/10/44
14CL-11 (Revi^ied); re: organization of PacFlt into task forces
Ltr fm Com 14 to CNO with enclosure of Joint Estimate of 3/31/41, dated 1 May 41...
Ltr from Com 14 to CNO; 30 Dec. 40; re: security of Fleet and ability of local defenses to
meet surprise attacks
Ltr from ComPatWingTwo to CNO; 16 Jan 41; re: readiness of ComPatWingTwo...
Ltr from CominCPacFlt; 13 Aug. 41; re: employment schedules, 2nd Quarter 1942
Employment Schedules 3rd Quarter 1942
Employment Schedule — Task Force One
Employment Schedule— Task Force Two
Employment Schedule— Task Force Three
Verification letter— V. Ad. Bellinger. _
Letter from Adm. Hart to Adm. Kimmel; .3/22/44
Letter fm Dist. Atty. to Atty Gen; Hawaii; 6/4/41
Verification letter— Comdr. Rochefort
Verification letter — V.Ad. Turner
Verification letter— Captain McCrea
Letter from Adm. Hart to Adm. Kimmel; 4/24/44
Verification letter— R. Ad. Kingman
Verification letter— V.Ad. Leary
State Dept. publication: PEACE AND WAR, 1931-41
Ltr fm SecNav to SecWar, 24 Jan. 41; and reply fm SecWar to SecNav, 7 Feb. 41; re
security Pearl Harbor against attack
Verification letter— R. Ad. Bunkley
Verification letter— Admiral Ingersoll
87
128
179
180
181
181
181
194
206
325
338
338
338
338
391
391
406
407
431
431
[i] RECOMMENDED SEQUENCE FOB BEADING THE TESTIMONY CONTAINED HEREIN
Insofar as there was a plan for the sequence of witnesses, it consisted of exam-
ining officers who were in Hawaii, 7 December 1941, and then following what
they brought out by examining officers who were elsewhere, most of such being
of the Navy Department. However, it was necessary to seize opportunities when
and where officers were avaifable and irrespective of logical sequence.
Therefore, in reviewing this testimony it will be advisable to depart from the
order of the actual proceedings and the following sequence is recommended.
However, some reviewers may find that for them the flow of thought will be
better if Part III is read before Part II.
PART I— INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE
Name
(1) Theodore S. Wilkinson, Rear Admiral, USN
(2) Howard F. Kingman, Rear Admiral, USN
(3) Irving H. Mavfield, Captain, USN
(4) William B. Stephenson, Lieutenant, USNR
(5) Benjamin Katz, Commander, USN
(6) L. F. SafEord, Captain, USN
(7) Joseph J. Rochefort, Commander, USN
(8) Wesley A. Wright, Commander, USN
(9) Edwin T. Layton, Captain, USN
Duty in 1941
Director of Naval Intelligence
Chief, Domestic Intelligence Branch, O.
N.I.
D. I. O., 14th Naval District
Attached to D. I. O., 14 N. D
0-in-C, Code Room, Naval Communica-
tions (1944).
0-in-C, Communications Intelligence,
Naval Communications.
0-in-C, Combat Intellieence Unit, 14 N. D.
Attached to Combat Intelligence Unit, 14
N. D.
Intelligence Officer, CinCPac
Page No. J
279
335
308
323
29,54
207
379
214
1 Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent
pages of original exhibit.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 3
PART II— OFFICERS OF THE PACIFIC FLEET, INCLUDING 14TH NAVAL DISTRICT
Name
Duty in 1941
PageNet
(10) Claude C. Bloch, Admiral, USN (Ret).___
(11) J. B. Earle, Captain, USN
(12) Granville C. Briant, Commander, USNR.
(13) M. E. Curts, Captain. U. S. N
[S] (14) William E. G. Taylor, Commander,
USNR.
(15) W. W. Smith, Rear Admiral, USN
(16) Charles H. McMorris, Rear Admiral, USN
(17) L. D. McCormick, Rear Admiral, USN...
(18) Vincent R. Murphy, Captain, USN
(19) Walter S. DeLany, Rear Admiral, USN. .
(20) Willard A. Kitts, III, Rear Admiral, USN
(21) Arthur C. Davis, Rear Admiral, USN
(22) P. N. L. Bellinger, Vice Admiral, USN....
(23) Aubrey W. Fitch, Vice Admiral, USN
(24) George VanDeurs, Captain, USN
(25) Wilson Brown, Rear Admiral, USN
(26) William F. Halsey, Jr. Admiral, USN
(27) John Henry Newton, Vice Admiral, USN.
(28) Paul C. Crosley, Commander, USN
(29) William S. Pye, Rear Admiral, USN
(30) Herbert F. Leary, Vice Admiral, USNc...
(31) Walter S. Anderson, Rear Admiral, USN.
(32) Joel W. Bunkley, Rear Admiral, USN
(Ret).
(33) W. L. Calhoun, Vice Admiral, USN
Commandant, 14 N. D
Chief of Staff, Com 14
Aviation Aide, Com 14, _
Communications Officer, CinCPac
Attached to Army as radar advisor
Chief of Staff, CinCPac
War Plans Officer, CinCPac
Assistant War Plans Officer, CinCPac
Assistant War Plans Officer, CinCPac
Operations Officer, CinCPac
Gunnery Officer, CinCPac
Aviation Officer, CinCPac
Commander, Patrol Wing Two
Commander, Patrol Wing Two (1940)
Attached to PatWingTwo
Commander, Scouting Force, PacFlt, and
Commander, Task Force Three.
Commander, Aircraft Battle Force, PacFlt,
and Commander, Task Force 2.
Commander, Cruisers Scouting Force,
PacFlt.
Flag Secretary, CinCPac
Commander, Battle Force, PacFlt, and
Commander, Task Force One.
Commander, Cruisers Battle Force, PacFlt
Commander, Battleships Battle Force,
PacFlt.
Commanding Officer, U. S. S. CALIFOR-
NIA.
Commander, Base Force, PacFlt
2.86
368
229
in.i
338, 348
32, 54, 55
233
66
195
74
185
96
115
288
290
135
293
179
147
363
391
413
225
PART III— OFFICERS OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT
(34) R. E. Schuirmann, Rear Admiral, USN
(3.5) Royal E. Ingersoll, Admiral, USN
(36) Richmond K. Turner, Vice Admiral, USN..
(37) Robert O. Glover. Captain, USN
(38) John L. McCrea, Captain, USN
(39) Charles Wellborn, Jr., Captain, USN
(40) Roland M. Brainard, Vice Admiral, USN
(Ret).
Director, Central Division, OpNav
Assistant Assistant CNO.
Director of War Plans, OpNav..
Attached Plans Division OpNav .
Aide to CNO
Administrative Aide to CNO
Director of Ship Movements Division,
OpNav
404
415
250, 262
170
273
383
309
^ Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent
pages of original exhibit.
In reply address
Secretary of the Navy
and refer to No,
[Ail)-\ [Copy]
Navy Department,
Washington^ 12 February 191^.
JAG:D-1:LLP
PRECEPT FOR AN EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES AND THE TAKING OF TESTI-
MONY PERTINENT TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR, TERRITORY
OF HAWAII
From : The Secretary of the Navy.
To : Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.
Sub] : Examination of witnesses for purpose of recording and preserv-
ing testimony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
T. H., on 7 December 1941.
Whereas, on 7 December 1941, Japanese armed forces made an
attack against Army and Navy installations and ships of the United
States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Oahu, Territory of Hawaii,
which attack was a complete surprise to the commanders of the said
installations and ships, and
4 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Whereas, regrettable loss of life and extensive damage resulted from
the said attack, and
Whereas, certain members of the naval forces, who have knowledge
pertinent to the foregoing matters, are now or soon may be on danger-
ous assignments at great distances from the United States, and
Whereas, it is now deemed necessary, in order to prevent evidence
being lost by death or unavoidable absence of those certain members
of the naval forces, that their testimony, pertinent to the aforesaid
Japanese attack be recorded and preserved,
I hereby detail you to examine such members of the naval forces
thought to have knowledge of facts pertinent to the said surprise attack
and fully record the testimony given thereby. Under the authority
of Title 5, Section 93, of the U. S. Code, you are authorized and directed
to administer an oath to any witness called by you to testify or depose
in the course of this examination into the subject-named matter.
In view of the fact that Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S.
Navy, Retired, was, on 7 December 1941, serving on active duty as
the commander-in-chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, with the rank of Admiral,
U. S. Navy, and . [A {£) ] therefore, has an interest in the mat-
ter into which this examination is being made, you will notify him
of the times and places of the meetings to be had and that he has the
right to be present, to have counsel, to introduce, examine, and cross-
examine witnesses, to introduce matter pertinent to the examination
and to testify or declare in his own behalf at his own request.
Upon completion of the examination you will submit a complete
record of all the testimony taken, including any documents introduced
therein, to the Secretary of the Navy.
The provisions of Sections 733 and 734, Naval Courts and Boards,
will govern the proceedings of this examination, in so far as such
provisions are applicable thereto.
The necessary clerical assistance to aid you in recording the testi-
mony will be furnished you upon your request by the appropriate com-
mand in the area in which meetings are held.
(SGD) Frank Knox.
[B'] Office of the Secretary.
JAG:D-l:ps.
Department of the Navy,
Washington 2S, D. C, 16 Feb WU-
To : Captain Jesse R. Wallace, U. S. Navy.
Via : The Judge Advocate General.
Subj : Orders as counsel to assist examining officer.
1. You are hereby directed to report to Admiral Thomas C. Hart,
U. S. Navy, Retired, as counsel to assist him in the examination of
such members of the U. S. naval forces thought to have knowledge of
facts pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 De-
cember 1941, which examination was directed by my precept of 12
February 1944.
/s/ Frank Knox,
Secretary of the Navy.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY
1-End.
IT February 1944.
To : Captain Jesse K. Wallace, U. S. Navy.
1. Delivered.
/s/ T. L. Gatch,
T. L. Gatch,
The Judge Advocate General.
Confidential
2-End.
To : Captain Jesse E. Wallace, U. S. Navy
1. Reported this date.
17 February 1944.
/s/ Thos. C. Hart,
Thomas C. Hart,
Admiral., U. S. Navy., Retired.
[C] Office of the Secretary.
JAG : D-1 : ps
Department of the Navy,
Washington 25, D. C, 16 Feb. 19U.
To : Lieutenant William M. Whittington, Jr., U. S. N. R.
Via : The Judge Advocate General.
Subj : Orders as assistant counsel to assist examining officer.
1. You are hereby directed to report to Admiral Thomas C. Hart,
U. S. Navy, Retired, as assistant counsel to assist him in the examina-
tion of such members of the U. S. naval forces thought to have knowl-
edge of facts pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H.,
on 7 December 1941, which examination was directed by my precept
of 12 February 1944.
/s/ Frank Knox,
Secretary of the Navy.
l-End.
17 February 1944.
To : Lieutenant William M. Whittington Jr., U. S. N. R.
1. Delivered.
/s/ T. L. Gatch,
T. L. Gatch,
The Judge Advocate General.
Confidential
6 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
2-Encl.
17 Feb 1944.
To : Lieutenant William M. Wliittington Jr., U. S. N. R.
1. Reported this date.
/s/ Thos. C. Hart,
Thomas C. Hart,
AdTTiiral^ U. S. Navy^ Retired.
[Z>] Office of the Secretary
JAG : I : ps
(SC)/P16-4/00
Department of the Navy,
Washington 25, D. C, 27 April 19U-
To : Captain Jesse R. Wallace, U. S. Navy.
Via : The Judge Advocate General.
Subj : Orders as counsel to assist examining officer.
Ref : (a) SecNav. Itr., JAG:D-l:ps (SC) P16-4/00, dated 16 Feb-
ruary 1944, with endorsement thereon.
1. When directed by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Re-
tired, you will consider yourself relieved of the duties assigned by
reference (a) and will then report to the Judge Advocate General
and resume your regular duties.
/s/ James Forrestal,
Acting Secretary of the Navy.
JAG:AJ:RLD
Office of the Judge Advocate General,
Navy DepaTtment, Washington, D. C.
28 April 19U.
End-1
From: The Judge Advocate General.
To : Captain Jesse R. Wallace, U. S. N.
1. Delivered.
/s/ F. L. Lowe,
F. L. Lowe,
Assistant Judge Advocate General.
Confidential
2nd Endorsement
Navy Department,
Washington, D. 0. 9 May 19U.
From: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy (Ret).
To : Captain Jesse R. Wallace, U. S. Navy.
1. Relieved as counsel to assist the examining officer. You will
carry out the basic orders.
/s/ Thos. C. Hart. '
Thos. C. Hart.
A true copy. Attest :
Thomas C. Hart,
Admiral, U. S. Navy, Retired,
Examining Officer.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 7
[E] Office of the Secretary
JAG:I:ps
(SC)P16-4/QE3
Department of the Navy,
Washington 2-5, D. C, 28 April 19U
Toi : Lieutenant William M. Whittington, Jr., U. S. N. K.
Via : The Judge Advocate General.
Subj : Orders as assistant counsel to assist examining officer.
Ref: (a) SecNav Itr., JAG:D-l:ps (SC)P16^/QR3, dated 16
February 1944, with endorsement thereon.
1. Keference (a) is hereby modified to the extent that when directed
by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Xa\^^, Ketired, you will assume
the duties of counsel to assist him in the examination of such mem-
bers of the U. S. naval forces thought to have knowledge of facts
pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7 De-
cember 1941, which examination was directed by my precept of 12
February 1944.
/s/ James Forrestal,
Acting Secretary of the Navy.
Office of the Judge Advocate General,
JAG : AJ : RLD Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
28 April 19U-
End-l
From : The Judge Advocate General.
To : Lieutenant William M. Whittington, Jr., USNR.
1. Delivered.
/s/ F. L. Lowe,
F. L. Lowe,
Assistant Judge Advocate General.
Confidential
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY
[i] PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HAET INaUIRY
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1944
First Day
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.
The examination met at 9 : 00 a. m.
Present : Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Examining
Officer,
The examining officer read orders from the Secretary of the Navy,
originals prefixed marked "B" and "C" detailing Captain Jesse R.
Wallace, U. S. Navy, and Lieutenant William M, Whittington, Jr.,
U. S. Naval Reserve, to act as counsel and assistant counsel, respec-
tively, to the examining officer. Captain Wallace and Lieutenant
Whittington took seats as such.
The examination was cleared, and the examining officer read the
precept, original prefixed marked "A(l)" and "A (2)".
All matters preliminary to the examination having been determined,
and the examining officer having decided to sit with closed doors, the
examination was opened.
The examining officer introduced in evidence a certified copy of
his confidential letter of 17 February 1944 to Rear Admiral Husfcand
E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, interested party, appended hereto
marked "Exhibit 1".
The examining officer introduced in evidence the original of a
letter from Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired,
interested party, signed by Captain Robert A. Lavender, Retired,
by direction, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, Ex-
amining Officer, dated 19 February, 1944, appended hereto marked
"Exhibit 2".
The examining officer announced that the request of the interested
party contained in the above mentioned letter is approved, to the
extent that the interested party will be afforded a reasonable time
to prepare for the examination, and that the examination, upon
completion of the present session, will adjourn until called by the
examining officer.
The examining officer stated that on 19 February 1944, he had
delivered to Captain Robert A. Lavender, U. S. Navy, Retired,
counsel for Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired,
interested party, two copies, marked Confidential, of the precept
signed by the Secretary of the Navy, dated 12 February 1944,
ordering the present examination.
The examination then, at 10: 15 a. m. was adjourned to await the
call of the examining officer.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY H
m PEOCEEDINGS Of THE HART INaUIRY
TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 1944
Second Day
Navt Department,
Washington, D. O.
The examination met at 9 : 07 a. m.
Present : Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining
officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.
The examining officer introduced Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S.
Naval Reserve, as reporter.
The record of proceedings of the first day of the examination was
read and approved.
The examining officer and the reporter were duly sworn.
The examining officer read a copy of a letter, dated 4 March 1944,
from the examining officer to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,
U. S. Navy, retired, interested party, informing him of the beginning
of proceedings in the present examination of witnesses and the taking
of testimony pertinent to the precept, appended hereto marked "Ex-
hibit 3 (1) and (2)".
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as f ollow^s : This examination
is convened by order of the Secretary of the Navy, dated 12 February
1944, for the purpose of examining witnesses and the taking of testi-
mony pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, T. H., on 7
December 1941. The precept states that certain members of the naval
forces, who have knowledge pertinent to the foregoing matter, are now
or soon may be on dangerous assignments and that it is now deemed
necessary, in order to prevent evidence being lost by death or unavoid-
able absence of those certain members of the naval forces, that their
testimony pertinent to the aforesaid Japanese attack be recorded and
preserved. From available records, it is believed that you have knowl-
edge pertinent of the aforementioned attack. The examining officer
asks your statement of facts personally known to you covering certain
points. In such statement you should, as far as you can, speak from
your knowledge prior to the event and as the situation presented itself
before the actual attack. In making such statement, your attention
is invited to Sections 280 and 281 of Naval Courts and Boards, regard-
ing the use of documents to refresh and supplement your recollection.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
12 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
1. Q. Admiral, will you please state your name, rank, and present
station.
A. Claude C. Bloch, Admiral, U. S. Navy, Ketired, on duty as a
member of the General Board, Navy Department.
[3] 2. Q. What duties were you performing on 7 December
1941, Sir?
A. I was Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, Com-
mandant of the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor, and Commander of the
Hawaiian Sea Frontier.
3. Q. For how long had you been Commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District?
A. I reported on April 10, 1940.
4. Q. Who was your immediate superior in performing these
duties, Sir?
A. By order of the Navy Department, I was a member of the forces
afloat, Subordinate to Commander of the U. S. Fleet.
5. Q. Will you please explain the nature of your organization under
the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet.
A. Admiral Kimmel relieved Admiral Eichardson as Commander-
in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet in February, 1941, and almost immediately
thereafter he issued a Base Defense Order known as "2CL". Its date
was in February sometime. And in that order, the Commandant of
the District, who was me, was Commander of the Base Defense Force.
The object of that order, as I understand it, was to assure the security
of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet, insofar as the Commander-in-Chief
and his forces could augment the forces of the Army, who really had
the responsibilitv for the defense of all land areas, and Pearl Harbor
particularly. This order was subsequently revised in October, 1941,
by another order known as "2CL (Kevised)", and in that order some
changes were made in the original order. In the Fall of 1940, as
Commandant of the District and having a very close liaison with the
Army, I became convinced that the Army's means of defense, insofar
as it related to aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, was insufficient, and I
discussed this matter with the Commander-in-Chief, which was Ad-
miral Richardson. I told him my views and he became alarmed and
he asked me how many guns the Army had, anti-aircraft guns, how
niany fighter planes, and how many bombing planes. And I told
him approximately how many I understood that they had and, as the
result of that conversation. "Admiral Richardson went to the Com-
manding General, General Herron, and asked General Herron to go
around with him and intervieAV, first-hand, the officers and find out
what guns, what planes, and what forces the Army had there. At
the conclusion of this tour around the Army posts. Admiral Richard-
son gave me a memo informing me of a number of anti-aircraft gims,
the number of planes, marks and models, that were in existence at
Oahu and discussed the matter again with me. As the result of this
information and my conversation with Admiral Richardson, I wrote
a letter to the Navy Department setting forth the numbers and that I
considered the defense inadequate and presented the entire matter
to the Department. This letter was taken by Admiral Richardson and
he put a strong endorsement on it and sent it to the Navy Department.
Note : The letter mentioned by the witness was later introduced as Exhibit 23
of his testimony when he was recalled at a later date. Record page 87.
i>r6ceedings of hart inquiry 13
A. (Continued) That correspondence was the basis of a letter
written by the Secretary of Navy to the Secretary of War, under date
of 24 January 1941 in which the Secretary of Navy presented this
condition to the War Department and expressed his anxiety about the
security of Pearl Harbor, and asked 14} that some action be
taken immediately.
Note : The letter mentioned by the witness has been identified by the examing
officer as being a letter from the Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War, dated
January 24, 1941, file No. Oi)-12B-9-McC, (SC) A7-2(2)FF1, Serial 09112, and
copy of which is now on file in the Secret-Confidential File Room with the Chief
of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. The answer of the
Secretary of War to this letter has been identified by the examining officer as
being letter of February 7, 1941, subject : "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii",
the original of which is on file in the Secret-Confidential File Room with the
Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. ( Subsequently,
both letters were introduced in evidence as "Exhibit 40", Record Page 407.)
A. (Continued) Before we received any information from the
Navy Department about what was happening about this letter, Ad-
miral Kimmel superseded to the duties of Commander-in-Chief and
he was even more concerned — or equally concerned, I'll say, not more
concerned, with the security of the ship's in Pearl Harbor from an air
attack. And when I refer to "air attack", I don't mean an air attack
necessarily which would initiate a war but I mean any air attack
which might develop in the course of a war. So he went over certain
information that had been left by Admiral Richardson and decided
that as long as the ships in the harbor had certain anti-aircraft bat-
teries themselves, they should be used to the fullest extent in increas-
ing the volume of fire and protection that the Fleet would have in
the harbor, over what could be furnished by the Army itself. Fur-
thermore, he decided that inasmuch as the Navy also had a lot of
planes on shore — usually had a lot of planes on shore, a great many
of them carrier planes lliat had been sent ashore while the carriers
were alongside, they should also be used. Admiral Kimmel loaned
to me Admiral Halsey from his command and Admiral Bellinger from
his command to talk over with the Army how we could coordinate
the action of the planes. They reported to me before they had their
meeting with the Army authorities, and, I suggested to them that
all the fighting planes that we had on shore, at any time that an attack
might be made, would be placed under the Army's command for
fighter purposes, to be run by the Army in such way as they saw fit ;
that all bombers that the Army had which were capable of going to
sea would be likewise turned over to the Navy command for fighting
off ships and carriers. That agreement was reached and signed.
Then we had in the security order the use of the ships' batteries for
anti-aircraft purposes, all Navy planes, fighting planes, to be consol-
idated for use in attacks under the Army, and all Army bombing
planes capable of flying over the seas to be consolidated with Navy
bombers under Admiral Bellinger. Concerning the order itself, inso-
far as it related to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District,
who was a task force under this order ; it specifically assigned to him
the duty of operating the gates, sweeping mines, and using local
defense forces a certain ways for patrol of the harbor, and also, iti
one paragraph, more or less summarized the duties of the task force
commander.
14 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6. Q. Admiral, I show vou a document. Can you identify it, sir?
A. This is "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter, 2CL-1941 (Revised)"
and it is the order of which I spoke in my testimony.
[6] The letter was thereupon filed in evidence and is appended
marked "Exhibit 4 (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6)".
7. Q. "Wliere was Admiral Kimmel on the morning of December
T, Admiral?
A. Admiral Kimmel's Fleet Headquarters were on the second floor
of the Submarine Base, which is immediately adjacent to the Navy
Yard at Pearl Harbor. I have no first-hand information where he
was at the time of the attack but I believe he was in his residence,
which was about a half mile away from the Submarine Base.
8. Q. Had he been physically present in Oahu during several days
before the attack ?
A. Yes.
9. Q. Where were your headquarters. Sir ?
A. Mj'' headquarters were in the office building which is located in
the heart of the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor.
10. Q. In carrying out the functions you have outlined as a Task
Force Commander, you have referred to an agreement had with the
Army. Could you further identify that. Sir, does it have a name?
A. I don't believe that I know the title of it. The agreement was
a local agreement between the Commanding General, Hawaiian De-
partment, Lieutenant General Short, and the Commandant of the
Fourteenth Naval District. After the agreement was made, it was
submitted by me to the Commander-in-Chief for his approval and
he did approve it. I do not believe that it was sent to the Navy De-
partment in the first instance, but I have a definite recollection that
at a later date Admiral Stark asked for a copy of it because someone
had told him about it and he said that so far as he knew it was the first
agreement of its kind between the Army and 'Navy and he wanted a
copy here to see if he couldn't get similar agreements in other districts,
and I believe a copy was sent to him.
11. Q. Admiral, I show you a document. Can you identify it, Sir?
A. This is a Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of the Hawai-
ian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department, Fourteenth Naval Dis-
trict, short title "JCD", I think we called it, " '42". It was signed on
April 11 by the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department
and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.
12. Q. Is that the document to which you have just referred, the
agreement to which you have just referred?
A. No, this is not the one. This is not the one that I just referred to.
13. Q. The agreement to which you referred and this document,
both relate to agreements between "the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval Dis-
trict. Can you give the relationship between the two?
A. This later document, which I now have before me, JCD,
Hawaiian Department, '42, is a part of the War Plans known as
"Rainbow 1", and it was a requirement that all commandants submit
such a plan of their joint action. The other agreement which I refer
to was supplemental to this and was made in order to clarify a situ-
ation with regard to command relations between the [6] air
forces of the Army and the Navy Air ; and I'm sorry that I can't re-
member the exact date of it, nor have I been able to find a copy in
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 15
the Department since I have been here, though I looked once. It must
be here.
14. Q. Was this document now before you the plan under which
you were operating on 7 December 1941 ?
A. That was the plan, the joint agreement, for the Hawaiian coastal
defense that was effective from the date of signature, but all features
there were not in execution hj the terms of the plan itself. The plan
was not to be executed until "M" day, unless the War and Navy Depart-
ments decided to put it into effect sooner or unless the Commanding
General and Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District should
mutually agree that certain parts of it or the whole thing should go
into effect sooner. Actually, on the 7th of December, certain features
of that plan were in effect. For instance, by the plan, the Navy, in
paragraph 18 (a) was required to furnish inshore patrol. We had
an inshore patrol working on 7 December. By (b), we were required
to have offshore patrol. An offshore patrol of an intermittent char-
acter, forces being furnished by the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S.
Fleet, was in effect at that time, usually at the time of sortie, (c) and
(d) were not in effect, except (d) was partially in effect by this joint
air agreement we held, as we usually had a lot of wheeled fighting
])lanes on shore which, at the time of attack, would be turned over to
the Army, (e), which is the harbor control post, was effective and in
active operation, (f), which was installation and operation of an
underwater defense, was effective. We had some buoys, sono-buoys.
I'm not sure whether the magnetic loops had been laid, or not. I
think they had been and were in operation. Nets, torpedo nets, at the
entrance to both Honolulu and Pearl Harbor were in operation,
(h), sweeping channels and mine fields: they were swept every day.
(i) distant reconnaissance; the district had no forces capable of per-
forming that task, as the Commander-in-Chief and the Navy Depart-
ment knew. We had been informed that 108 patrol planes would be
furnished us at the earliest possible date but none had come to Pearl
Harbor, and I believe, on that particular point, that I had asked Ad-
miral Kimmel about the distant reconnaissance and asked him if he
would furnish me patrol planes, and he told me he would do what he
could, but he couldn't make any promises of furnishing a force because
there was a possibility of the Fleet leaving and taking its forces with it.
(k) maintenance of guard against sabotage: that was effective.
(1) : with regard to supplying local communication service for prompt
transmittal and interchange of intelligence, that was being worked
on and largely effective, (m) : all preparations had been made to
assume censorship of the part that the Navy was to assume censor-
ship of and was put into effect immediately after the attack, (o) :
supply and hospitalization provisions had been made for that.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note : Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the
conclusion of the proceedings to War Plans Division, Commander-in-Chief
U. S. Fleet's Ofiice, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the
document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 5".
[7] 15. Q. This joint plan, you stated, is based on Kainbow
No. 1 Plan, Admiral. Did it also take into consideration the pro-
visions of the letter 2CL-41 ?
16 CONGRESSIONi^L INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. This plan JCD--42 was a Navy Department plan. 2CL-41 was
the Commander-in-Chief's order and I do not believe they are in
conflict. As a matter of fact, I think 2CL-41 contains certain pro-
visions that are also in JCD-4:2. But, the difference was that 2CL-41
was effective from the date of its signature and was in execution the
entire time, but JCD--12 does not necessarily go into execution until
"M" Day, except insofar as it relates to items agreed to for execution
ahead of time.
16. Q. Your agreement with respect to the use of aircraft was
effective on December 7 ?
A, That was effective from the date of signature and to be in ex-
ecution in the same manner as JCD-42.
17. Q. Admiral, did you look upon Admiral Kimmel's physical
presence in Pearl Harbor as having become a fairly permanent con-
dition ?
A. Admiral Kimmel moved his offices ashore in February, 1941,
almost immediately after he assumed command, and with exception of
possibly a couple trips at sea and one trip to Washington, he was there
the entire time, so I looked on him as being permanent, although he
told me that in time of hostilities that he would go to sea. That was
liis intention.
18. Q. Did you, during those last few weeks prior to 7 December
and in carrying out the duties which had been imposed upon you or
which you had assumed in connection with security, feel any embar-
rassment or, say, unhappiness in your required cooperation with the
Army on account of Admiral Kimmel's presence ?
A, Well, I wasn't unhappy and I can't say tliat I was embarrassed.
My relations with Admiral Kimmel were extremely good, extremely
cordial ; my relations with the Commanding General were cordial and
our cooperation, I thought, was good. But the Commanding General
had a right to go to the Commander-in-Chief directly and he also had
a right to discuss matters with me, and, on one or two occasions, I didn't
know exactly whether he had discussed matters with Admiral Kimmel
before or whether he was coming to me in the first instance, but I can't
say that it caused any disagreement because I talked everything over
quite fully with Admiral Kimmel and I don't think there was any
doubt in my mind as to where I stood in the picture.
19. Q. Admiral, this plan. Exhibit 5, JCD, required of both the
Army and Navy certain functions, many of which would require close
coordination. Will you please make a statement of anything within
your knowledge as to how this plan worked out in the days leading
up to the 7th of December, particularly with respect to coordination
between the Army and Navy in preparing to execute this plan, and in
carrying out the planning functions for which it provides, the Joint
Planning Committee and representatives and all ?
A. I had subordinates who dealt with the Army constantly, about
the details of the plan, two in particular, the Chief of Staff, Captain
J. B. Earle, and the War Plans Officer, Commander C. B. Momsen.
They had to carry the load, but they were almost in constant contact
with the Army. And the District Communication Officer, Captain
Graham, I think he was just before Pearl Harbor, was in constant
communication, geting communications straightened out, making
preparations for the necessary teletypes and telephones, radio. While
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 17
we had differences of opinion, there were none of them serious. Some
of them [S] were referred to Washington but they were al-
ways settled and I don't know that you can ask any more than that.
I thought that our preparations were being prosecuted very vigorously.
20. Q. During the time that your representatives were working with
the Army, were you kept fully advised as to the work of the Joint
Planning Committee and the other representatives ?
A. I think so.
21. Q. This joint coastal plan requires considerable on the part of
the Army. Was there brought to your attention in any way the ability
of the Army, from the viewpoint of both materiel and personnel, to
carry out the commitments of the plan ?
A. As I have stated before, we knew the Army was deficient in
anti-aircraft guns and fighting planes and bombing planes, back in
the Fall of 1940. After the Secretary of Navy wrote his letter of
January 24, 1941, subsequent to that date a large number of fighters
were sent out to Hawaii. Some bombers; a large number of fighters
and some bombers. So far as I know, no additional anti-aircraft guns
were sent. So it was my knowledge that their fighter strength had
been increased considerably. I believe they had somewhat in excess
of 250 fighting planes on the 7th of December, but their anti-aircraft
guns were deficient in nmnber and we knew that. We knew nothing
about the deficiencies of the coast guns, the coast artillery. I had no
knowledge as to whether the personnel of the Army was deficient or
adequate, but was very definitely of the opinion that it was being in-
creased all the time and was considered, with certain minor deficien-
cies, adequate by the Army for its task.
22. Q. Similarly, you previously stated that there were certain
deficiencies in your force.
A. Well, I knew the Army had a deficiency in numbers and types
of planes capable of performing one of their agreed functions. That's
the inshore air patrol. They had told me they only had three planes
capable of performing that duty and they knew that I had no recon-
naissance planes attached to the District.
23. Q. Did you or your representatives, together with the Arpiy
officers in Hawaii, endeavor to make any sort of makeshift arrange-
ments to fill these deficiencies caused by shortage of personnel or ma-
teriel, prior to the 7th of December?
A. I had pressed the Bureau of Personnel on the question of officers
very vigorously ; I had quite a number of reserve officers, but I wanted,
in the key posts, more experienced officers and I was never able to get
what I considered an adequate number in those positions.
24. Q. What I had in mind. Admiral, was that there are certain
functions, such as distant reconnaissance, that you could not carry out,
which the war plans called for, similar
A. (Interposing) I had represented that to the Navy Department
and asked for aircraft. I had taken it up, talked with the Command-
er-in-Chief, about it and asked him if he would supply the planes for
it and he told me he could not commit himself to that duty, except in-
sofar as was possible on any [9] occasion ; that he might have
to go away from the locality and take his forces with him and the
District should really have its own forces.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 144 3
18 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
25. Q. What I Avas g-etting after, Sir, was the practical problem
as to what was done in the absence of the ability to fill all the commit-
ments, to do as much as you could with what you had.
A. It is my very definite understanding that, in the absence of any
planes of my own, any missions of reconnaissance to be performed
would have "to be performed by the Fleet planes. That's the patrol
planes belonging to the Fleet; and, it was also my very definite under-
standing that Admiral Kimmel reserved, to himself or his command,
his echelon of command, the handling of patrol planes for oversea
work; although, order 2CL did, insofar as it related to an air attack,
place dispatch of essential planes under the Commandant of the Dis-
trict in a supervisory way. Actually, it was done by a Fleet officer.
Rear Admiral Bellinger. He was Commander of the Patrol Squad-
rons of the Fleet. He was also in command of the Base Defense Air
Force. So, while the order says that the Commandant of the District
would dispatch planes to look for carriers and enemy vessels in the
case of air attack, actually it was done by Admiral Bellinger, and it
seems obvious that the Commandant of the District couldn't use pa-
trol planes without permission of the Fleet because the planes were
employed by the Fleet on other missions. It had to be done by the
Fleet, and I don't believe there was any confusion of thought. It was
well understood, and, owing to the fact that Admiral Bellinger was
both my Task Group Commander and a Fleet Air Commander, Ad-
miral Kimmel actually would be the officer — or somebody delegated by
him would be the officer who designated what reconnaissance was to
be made.
26. Q. Admiral, you gave in numbers of Army fighters what really
amounts to a very strong force. Wliat did you know of the relative
efficiency of the personnel of the fighter command ?
A. Well, my knowledge of the capabilities of personnel is not first-
hand information. I heard from other people. I think though it is
fair to state that they had some good pilots and many inexperienced
ones.
27. Q. Did you have an airman on your staff ?
A. Up 'till the summer of 1941, I had no airman on my staff whom
I could use. At that time, I was able to obtain, by calling into active
duty from the reserve at Honokdu, quite a good man except that he
had been out of the Navy for a number of year ; he was a good flyer
and a dependable and loyal man. Admiral Kimmel was very coopera-
tive. He placed Admiral Halsey and Admiral Bellinger at my disposal
on a number of occasions and I never hesitated to call on them, and I
also had the Commanding Officers at the Air Stations at Kaneohe and
Pearl Harbor, who were in my command. I could talk with them.
They were difficult to get hold of but I could and did talk with them.
28. Q. Did you get advice from any of those officers concerning the
efficiency of any of those officers — thet^fficiency of the Army pilots?
A. I can't say that I did. As usual in conversation, after our joint
exercises, and Ave had a great many of them, I would hear the usual
criminations and recriminations between the Army and Navy as to
about how poor the other felow had been and what he failed to do, and
so forth and so on, but whether they were correct or not, I don't know.
[10] 29. Q. Inasmuch as even in those days, it was rather
generally known that the best defense against an enemy air attack
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 19
lay in fighters, numbers of planes, and efficiency was highly important,
was it not ?
A. I think it was generally accepted that, in view of the deficiency
of the guns of the Army for anti-aircraft purposes, that we had to
depend largely on the fighters. In addition to these 250 fighters that
the Army had of their own, that is my recollection of the number,
the Navy usually had quite a large number of fighters available that
were to be turned over to the Army. Each morning at eight o'clock
Admiral Bellinger, who was Air Commander under 2CL, would give
the Army a list of the planes that were available to them that day for
fighters and they were supposed to send to him at that same time
a list of Army bombers that were available to the Navy. That was
done. That was routine. Whether it was done on the 7th of December,
I don't know.
30. Q. Admiral, do you know of any other instructions issued to
you or to other officers in Hawaii at the time relating to — by Admiral
Kimmel, concerning the defense of the Island, other than this 2CL-41 ?
A. 2CL is a governing order for base defense. It also governs
sorties and a number of other things. Contributory to that order, of
course every task force commander got out a great many orders of
their own. For instance, the Commandant of the District, the Base
Defense Officer, had to get out an order about the minesweepers, about
the nets. I also got out one order which required the Air Commander
of the Base Defense Force, Admiral Bellinger, to get out an order
about the air defense. All of those were contributory to the plan
and were not signed by Admiral Kimmel. The Army had copies of
them and at first we had hopes, when we had the drills — we had an
air raid drill and blackout drill once a week to start with and, later
on, we couldn't have it that often — and we had hopes the Army would
come in on the drills. They didn't always come in. On occasions we'd
have a carrier at sea coming in and she would send her air group in
and on those occasions nearly always the Army joined. We had some
interferences because the time I would choose for the air raid drill
wasn't always agreeable to other forces ; it interfered with their work,
the force commanders at sea. Some of them complained. Then just
about the time this order was issued we decided that we would set
the dates two or three months ahead, certain definite dates when
everyone would know they were going to happen on that day. We
definitely prefaced every air raid drill by broadcasts on a frequency
that all ships at sea were guarding and all ships in port and all sta-
tions, telling that this was a drill so there would be no mistake be-
tween the real thing and a drill. We always let them know, ahead of
time, when we would have a drill. But I know of no other order
issued by Admiral Kimmel.
31. Q. In your conversations with Admiral Kimmel, did he indi-
cate that this was his basic order, so far as his participation in the
defense was concerned ?
A. No, I don't know that he ever said that. If you are trying to
establish command relations, I think it was thoroughly well under-
stood by Admiral Kimmel, and by the Commandant of the District,
that the Commandant of the District would do everything in his
power and everything would be done to the best of the Commandant's
ability.
20 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
32. Q. Admiral, JCD, as of course you will recall, has several
entries concerning what would be done when certain reenforcements
were available, the [11] plan, of course, to be effective, on
"M" Day when it was declared. In the meantime, and prior to such
declaration, of course some plan for security of the Fleet was neces-
sary. My understanding of your testimony was that you look upon
the 2CL-41 as, in effect, being the security plan and putting into
effect everything in the way of precaution which was required by
the JCD and for which you had forces available; is that ri^ht?
A. No, that is not correct, in this respect. While I think that
'2CL-41 is consistent with JCD, it actually puts into execution certain
requirements of JCD but not all of them. For instance, it puts in the
minesweeping, it puts in the inshore patrol, it puts in the underwater
defenses — that is the nets, but it did not — I see no place in 2CL-41
where the distant reconnaissance was put in force.
33. Q. That is about the only
A. (Interposing) If you will examine JCD, you will find that
the Army is charged with the defense of the land insofar as it relates
to the coast and anti-aircraft defenses and with particular respect
to Pearl Harbor. In other words that was their specific responsibil-
ity : it might be said that the Navy had no responsibility because there
is nothing said in JCD to the effect that the Navy had any responsi-
bility for protecting Pearl Harbor against an air attack, but yet, by
2CL the Commander-in-Chief felt the necessity, on account of the
fact that he had means that he could use, that he must help out.
34. Q. Admiral, the Army's warning system, particularly the radar
part of it ; what steps did you take to ascertain the Army's efficiency
in that respect ?
A, Such information as I had about the Army's warning I had
received from the Army and the contacts of my subordinates with
Army subordinates. I made no formal requests for information but
I kept in touch by contact — occasionally. General Short would tell
me something about it and frequently some of my subordinates would
contact the Army and let me know the situation. When I arrived in
Honolulu in 1940, General Herron was in command and he told me
at that time — that was in April, 1940 — they were putting in this
warning net, that they were starting to put in the radar, t\iat they
were making the surveys and selecting the sites. And he told me
how wonderful it was and I told him I knew very little about it, al-
though some of our ships had it. When General Short came in Feb-
ruary, we talked about it and as the net progressed in completion, he
came to me — I think it was in September or October, 1941 — and told
me he had no operators, that he wanted to begin to train his operators.
None of the Army knew how to train them and he wanted to know
if there was anything I could do to help him. I told him I had no
means myself but the Fleet had radar operators and the Fleet had
radar installations, and I made the request on the Commander-in-
Chief to permit General Short to send a number of his men to sea,
which he did. In November, it was my knowledge that they were
training the operators and that they were having difficulties; this
information came to me — I don't know whether General Short came
to me or whether my subordinates told me, having obtained it from
their opposite numbers in the Armj- — and as of December I thought
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 21
that the net was still in the condition where all the kinks were not
out of it and they were still training operators and could not be de-
pended upon, but I had no knowledge as to whether or not they were
standing regular watches on it, nor did I make any inquiries about
it. And I would like to supplement that statement by [1^]
saying at that time, December 7 or thereabouts, that we had not
developed a means for controlling our own aircraft to the degree that
we knew where they were at all times — or that the Army had not
developed any means to know where all the planes were at all times —
friendly planes, so that they could differentiate friendly planes and
other planes.
35. Q. Admiral, will you please explain the facilities you had for
obtaining intelligence of possible enemies, what your setup was.
A. We had a unit at Pearl Harbor, when I arrived, composed of
communicators and intelligence people, Japanese language students,
and they were separated into two units and their information had to
be coordinated, and all the information we got from that intelligence,
by radio intelligence and such other information as we got from that
unit, was transmitted to Cavite and the Navy Department. They had
a private circuit or private channed, they talked to us and we to them
telling what we were getting, and the material was correlated and sent
out. That was our principal source of Japanese intelligence ; We also
got the intelligence that was collected at Cavite. That was sent to us
over this private channel and we knew that. When I arrived, I was
dissatisfied with the organization and I organized it into one unit
known as "Combat Intelligence" where they were under one head,
which unit consisted of radio direction finders, radio interceptors,
and all the other things they had with one officer in charge. In the
middle of July, 1941, when we had the facilities, we put them in one big
room in the basement of the office building, a secure place, with their
own channels of communications to the radio stations and radio direc-
tion finders, and so on ; I always did my best to augment the force by
getting more men and better men. In addition to that unit, we had
the District Intelligence Officer who was in close touch with Army
intelligence and the FBI ; we had local intelligence that way, and, we
also had such reports as were sent by the Office of Naval Intelligence
in Washington. We kept touch with the Commander-in-Chief as
best we could. He was on shore and within a mile and a half of us. I
never had any way to know whether I got everything, or not, but I had
the feeling that we were getting everything that was pertinent. The
Commander-in-Chief had many sources of information that I didn't
have. He had all of his subordinates in the Fleet. He unquestionably
had a good many reports from ONI and the Chief of Operations that
I knew nothing about unless I happened to hear about them ; I think
he conscientiously endeavored to give me everything that he thought I
should have. I had a very definite feeling that the Navy Department
knew more about the situation and were able to evaluate matters far
better than we were because they had the liaison of the State Depart-
ment, the political situation, the Department of War, and the Presi-
dent. I thought their knowledge was far greater than ours about
actual conditions.
36. Q. Please state the name of the Intelligence Officer in command
of this Combat Intelligence unit.
22 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Rochefort; I think his name is Commander J. J. B-ochefort.
37. Q. He was a subordinate of yours?
A. He was a subordinate of mine and, in a way, he was also, while
he had no orders to be, a subordinate in the Fleet. This unit was a Fleet
unit and the Commander-in-Chief had the right to take any man
away if he wanted to for other purposes.
[IS] 38. Q. Was the information that they received always
delivered to the Commander-in-Chief?
A. All of it. As a matter of fact, my Staff, my subordinates, had
orders to send the Fleet everything that could possibly have any bear-
ing on movements : ships coming in or going out, enemy, or anything
new. This had to be done as the Commander-in-Chief was physically
j)resent in the place ; it was very simple to do it. I think he was also
on our teletypes to the Army and he had the same telephone lines to
the Army that we had, so he was in a position to get the information
over these circuits.
39. Q. Did you also receive intelligence or other dispatches from the
Navy Department relating to the international situation and possible
enemy action ?
A. My recollection is that originally, in 1940, they were sent to the
Commandant as an addressee and, later on, they were all sent to the
Commander-in-Chief, as the addressee, and I was not always
included as an addressee, although, on some occasions, I was. On
other occasions, it was stated in the dispatch that I was to be shown
this dispatch. While I have no way of knowing whether I saw every-
thing that came in, or not, I think that Admiral Kimmel endeavored
to keep me informed. Of course, it must be borne in mind that Ad-
miral Kimmel, as well as Admiral Richardson, had almost constant
communication with the Chief of Naval Operations by mail. Occa-
sionally, I would see one of the letters, but not alwa5^s.
40. Q. Can you recall any specific messages relating to the inter-
national situation in the Pacific or intelligence of Japan which were
received in the two months preceding Pearl Harbor ?
A. Yes, I can, and I would like to go back to the summer of 1940, if I
may, because I think it is pertinent to this examination. Sometime in
the summer of 1940, the date I can not recall. General Herron, the
Commanding General, came to my office and stated that he had just
received a dispatch from the Chief of Staff of the Army to the effect
that an overseas raid was impending and that he was to go on the full
alert at once. He told me that he had received this dispatch, that it
was a bolt from the blue, that he knew nothing about it, but he had gone
on the alert and came down to see me and wanted to know if I had
received a similar dispatch. I told him, no ; I knew nothing about it.
He then said that he was very much disturbed about this, he didn't
know the nature of the raid, didn't know when it was going to be,
what it was about, but he wanted my advice. And I said, "Well,
I'm not the senior officer present in the Fleet. While I am an of-
ficer of the Fleet, there is a superior officer here. Vice Admiral
Andrews, and I think you had better show him the dispatch."
We went aboard the Flagship and told Admiral Andrews about this,
and after conference, it was decided by Admiral Andrews that we
would have morning and dusk reconnaissance patrols, and patrols were
then ordered to be sent out. The Commander-in-Chief was Admiral
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 23
Richardson, but he was not present. Admiral Andrews sent him a
dispatch telling him of the condition. Admiral Richardson flew in
and as he had never heard of the warning, he sent a dispatch to the
Chief of Operations and it was my recollection that he never received a
reply to it. Now this alert continued for some two or three weeks.
When the Army had this alert, had been warned of an overseas raid,
they were not told it w^as an exercise or drill, they were told it was an
overseas raid that was expected. The Navy was in a [i^] posi-
tion of knowing nothing about it. I think, subsequently, the Com-
mander-in-Chief got information about it here in Washington, but, so
far as I know, we got nothing there. To go ahead with your question,
the Neutrality Act was in effect. The President had issued an order
covering the movement of submarines in our territorial waters, and
about the maintenance of neutrality and the responsibilities of com-
mandants and Naval officers and Army officers in connection with it.
In 1941, possibly July or August, some tense situation arose and I can
not recall how we received information of it, whether it was by letter to
the Commander-in-Chief or the radio. At any rate. Admiral Kimmel
had a conference on the subject and I suggested to him the advisability
of sending out reconnaissance patrol planes with the median line of the
sector pointing to Jaluit. I think the sector was 15 or 20 degrees.
And we sent planes out every morning to 500 miles. He adopted the
suggestion and sent planes out a few days and it was discontinued. In
October, I remember distinctly a dispatch, but I do not remember
whether I was an addressee or whether the Commander-in-Chief
informed me, but I remember a dispatch to the effect that there was a
change in the Japanese Government and we might expect things to
happen in the next few days. I'm quite sure Admiral Kimmel had a
conference after that, although it is hard for me to remember when we
had the conferences because I saw Admiral Kimmel practically every
day; I can not remember whether General Short was present, or
Admiral Pye, Admiral Halsey, or who was present. Again, on
November 27, a warning was received which was stated to be a war
warning. That dispatch was received, I think, on Thursday, the 2Tth
of November in the afternoon, somewhere around four o'clock. I was
not on the station. I had gone up town to the hospital to see a patient
and when I returned the Chief of Staff telephoned to me and told me
he would like to come over and see me. He came over and he had a
paraphrase of this dispatch. As I recall it, I saw Admiral Kimmel the
next morning. I can not recall who was present besides myself.
There were other persons there. In that dispatch there was a term
used whereby he was directed to take defensive deployment. Just
exactly what Admiral Kimmel's opinion was, I don't know, but it is a
fact, at that time, there were four submarines deployed to the west-
ward, two at Midway and two at Wake. They were there for informa-
tion purposes ajid defense. I don't know what orders they had. Some
other instances came up in the Summer of 1941, prior to "this warning
on the 16th and prior to this warning on the 27th that caused me to
write letters to the commanding officers of the outlying bases. Under
the District, we had outlying bases at Palmyra and Johnston, we had
one at Midway, and one was under construction and being garrisoned
at Wake. The substance of my letter to these commanding officers was
to try and train their civilian workers there in the use of the arms to
24 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
supplement the armed forces. Somewhere about that same time, Mid-
way, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston, having been designated as defen-
sive sea areas by Executive Order of the President, I gave the com-
manding officers instructions about the planes that came in there that
were not identified as being friendly ; they were to be fired on. I think
that all those actions were taken as the result of some warning or some
feeling on my part, derived from some definite information I had
received that the situation was tense. Now there were a lot of other
dispatches that were received and I am unable to remember now
whether my knowledge of those dispatches, warning dispatches, was
information that's been acquired since the 7th of December or whether
it was before.
[IS] 41. Q. Were you receiving, during those few days prior to
7 December, any radio intelligence which was supplied by your Combat
Intelligence Unit based upon things which they received from Japa-
nese in Oahu?
A. We received nothing from the Japanese on Oahu, except I had
knowledge from the District Intelligence Officer of the existence of
about 200 representatives of the Japanese Consulate spread over Oahu
and who were not registered agents of the Japanese Government. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation had definite information to convict
these men of being unregistered agents. While anxious that they be
indicted and tried, the Army would not agree and the matter was
referred to Washington and the War and Navy Departments agreed
that they would not be brought to trial.
Note : A letter on this subject written by the witness has been identified by the
examining officer as being one from the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District
to the Chief of Naval Operations, classified Secret, dated November 10, 1941, file
S-A8-5/EF37/ND14, Serial 01216. The reply thereto is identified as letter from
the Chief of Naval Operations to Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, classi-
fied Secret, dated 6 December 1941, file (SC)A8-5/EF37, Serial 01348816. Both
of the above mentioned letters are now on file in the Chief of Naval Operations
Secret and Confidential File Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
42. Q. Then you were unable to get any information at all based
upon communications which those Japanese were sending out ?
A. We were unable to get any information based on dispatches being
transmitted by the Japanese. The various communication companies,
commercial communication companies, did not and would not give us
dispatches.
43. Q. Did those dispatches go entirely by cable ?
A. They went by cable.
44. Q. None by radio ?
A. So far as I know, none by radio.
' 45. Q. You have mentioned. Admiral, the warnings received prior to
December 7. Will you please state what you felt to be the probabilities
and possibilities of surprise hostile action on the part of the Japs, if
you have any thought beyond what you've given us ?
A. The dispatch of November 27 had as its preface that negotiations
with Japan, looking toward a stabilization of the Pacific area, had
stopped. Then the dispatch went ahead to say that they expected
action on the part of Japan within the next few days, based on that
premise. Then the dispatch went on to some extent in giving a deploy-
ment of Japanese forces, amphibious forces, pointing to general war on
the south coast of China, Siam, and also a statement in the dispatch to
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 25
the ejffect that this was a war warning. Subsequent to the receipt of
that dispatch, negotiations were resumed. That had a very definite
effect on my mind ; that while the negotiations had stopped once, and
this was the reason that they thought tliat action by Japan was due in a
few days ; subsequently, negotiations were resumed ; there was uncer-
tainty in my mind as to whether anything was likely to happen
immediately. Furthermore, as I stated before in this examination, I
felt that the authorities in Washington had far more information, were
far abler to evaluate the situation than I was and I had no apprehen-
sion around December 7 that any hostile action in that area was immi-
nent. I know now, and, as I stated before, I'm not sure whether I
knew [16] this before the 7th of December, or not, that a dis-
patch had been sent about the end of November to the Commander-in-
Chief of the Asiatic Fleet giving him a warning that something was
likely to happen, and I believe in that dispatch it was mentioned that
the action might be against the Philippines. I can not recall it exactly
but I have that impression. But so far as the Hawaiian area was
concerned, I had no feeling of impending hostilities around the 7th of
December.
46. Q. Will you please relate what action was taken by the Army
and Navy with respect to the security of Pearl Harbor after the re-
ceipt of the dispatches of November 27. of which you know.
A. I knew that the Army had been alerted and I thought they were
in a general alert. I believe that General Short told me they were
alert and I thought it was a general alert. Either on the 7th or 8th
of December, I asked General Short about it and he told me, no, it
was only a partial alert, what they call alert No. 1. He might have
told me they were alert No. 1 and I confused it with our condition 1.
Our highest form is 1 and their lowest form is 1. So far as the Navy
is concerned, I know of nothing particular, except the Commander
of the Inshore Patrol at Pearl Harbor had called in the Commanding
Officers of Destroyer Division No. 80 — they were the only four ships
that I had for the inshore patrol and only one of those was equipped
with listening gear — and had given them a pep talk. Admiral Kimmel
had issued an order about the 27th of November to the effect that any
submarines found running submerged in the defensive sea area should
be depth charged, and at this pep talk these young men were told to
be on their toes. It was my own thought that any action taken by
Japan prior to a declaration of war, or after a declaration of war,
would be in the form of concentrated submarine attack on the ships
of the Fleet, in the operating areas, and they might make an effort
to get in the Harbor. That was the reason for the pep talk. I know
no other action was taken as a consequence of the warning of the
27th of November.
47. Q. The letter here, Exhibit 4, or 2CL-41, provides for three
conditions of readiness. Would you please state, with respect to these
conditions, the condition that existed on December 7, prior to the
attack ?
A. So far as I know, there was no condition prescribed by the Com-
mander-in-Chief and the order gives, as a duty for the Commander
of the Base Defense, the duty of advising the senior officer present
and afloat the conditions of readiness, advising him what condition
of readiness should be kept. What the Fleet orders were in addition
26 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to the advice that they were to receive from the Commander of the
Base Defense Force, I don't know.
48. Q. Did you take any action as Commander —
A. (Interposing) So far as I know, I advised no condition of readi-
ness. I might say that I felt tliat I could not independently advise
a condition of readiness without the knowledge of the Commander-
in-Chief ; I believe the order has a parenthetical expression in it that
says I shall advise, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, the .state
of readiness that shall be kept, which indicates that the Commander-
in-Chief would already know; I felt any action that I might take
should be consistent with the other things in the Fleet, the conditions
of employment, that they had been in or were in, and the future move-
ments. This belief of mine was borne out subsequent to the 7th of
December when I advised the condition of readiness, and I was in-
formed by the acting Commander-in-Chief that he wanted a cliiferent
condition of readiness.
[171] 49. Q. Please state anything within your knowledge relat-
ing to any effort which was made after the warning contained in the
dispatch of November 27 to establish a distant reconnaissance.
A. There were orders contained in 2CL about the patrol of the op-
erating areas and the covering of the forces going out and coming in,
and, in addition to that, either the Commander-in-Chief or the Com-
mander of Air Force Scouting Fleet were undertaking other recon-
naissances of which I was not intimately informed of; so far as any
additional reconnaissances being conducted by air, I have no knowl-
edge. In other words, I know of no additional aerial reconnaissance
that was made as the result of the dispatch of the 27th of November.
I did take one other step that I have forgotten to mention that has
just occurred to me. The Honolulu area was under command of the
District Coast Guard Office. The Coast Guard had been placed under
my command prior to the 7th of December. They had three cutters.
Captain Finlay, who was the District Coast Guard Officer, was the
Port Commander of Honolulu and I required him, on receipt of this
dispatch of 27th of November, to put an inshore patrol out of Hono-
lulu, the same as we had at Pearl Harbor, except at Pearl Harbor
it would be conducted by Destroyer Division 80.
50. Q. Do you know of any other steps that were taken to counter
possible enemy action on the morning of December 7 ?
A. No, I do not.
51. Q. I understand that you made no recommendation toward in-
stituting distant air reconnaissance?
A. No, I did not.
52. Q. Going back to communications from the Department and
your reaction thereto, do you recall being informed that the Japanese
had been detected destroying some of their codes and files in certain
localities?
A. I recall the existence of certain dispatches to the effect that the
Japanese were believed to be desti-oying their papers, dispatches.
53. Q. Do you remember the dates; was it after the 27th of No-
vember ?
A. I think it was around the 3rcl of December.
54. Q. What was your reaction to that intelligence?
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 27
A. Well, I'm not sure that I remember exactly what my reaction
Jkvas, except that they might be doing it and they might not be doing
it, and I didn't know, I had no way of knowing what they were de-
stroying and what they were burning and whether it was something
that was really filled with meaning, or not. It might be and it might
not be. But I still had a belief that as long as there were negotia-
tions going on in Washington there was a possibility of this period
of waiting being extended. I had a very definite feeling that we were
going to have war sometime in the future, but just how far in the
future, I was unable to predict.
55. Q. Was the subject of the dispatch to which you have just re-
ferred discussed between you and Admiral Kimmel?
A. The dispatch of the" 27th?
56. Q. Of the ord, about destroying the codes.
A. Perhaps it may have been. I don't remember.
[18] 57. Q. Was any action of any kind that related to the de-
fense of Pearl Harbor taken as the result of that dispatch ?
A. The security measures prescribed and the additional inshore pa-
trol in Honolulu, and the warning that was given the destroyer cap-
tains, and the fact that I believed that the Army was on a full alert,
were the only measures that I know that were taken.
58. Q. The JCD plan calls for planning between your representa-
tives and those of the Army. Do you know whether these warning
messages were available to this planning group ?
A. I do not believe that they were informed. The messages were
secret messages and we were admonished to keep them secret to pre-
vent alarming people, and one thing and another, and I'm not sure —
my own War Plans officer knew about them but I don't know whether
the Army's War Plan people knew about them.
59. Q. Did you consider it a function of the joint planning repre-
sentative and other planning representatives to keep abreast of such
developments and take them into consideration in the preparation of
plans?
A. Not as a joint organization. 1 considered that I had to keep my
own war planner advised and I did. He knew everything that came
in.
60. Q. But the planning of any action taken as the result of such
warning messages, you felt to be a matter personal between you and the
Cormnanding General, so far as it affected your joint plans?
A. I felt there was a definite agreement between the General and
myself as to our responsibilities, and within my own responsibilities the
planning that I did could be done independently of him, but some-
thing that involved joint planning, of course, it had to be taken up
with the joint planners, and I had to take it up with the General. And
if you visualize the fact that General Short and I saw each other very
frequently. Admiral Kimmel and I saw each other practically every
day, it is hard to believe that anything of any importance should take
place or that anything should be received of even small importance
that wasn't discussed between us, because it is only fair to assume
that we discussed everything.
61. Q. But any joint planning which would be necessary as the result
of such warning would be the function of the highest echelon of com-
mands? And all information that you had, such as condition of the
28 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A.rmy with respect to alerting their personnel, you received from the
Commanding General and not through any liaison or other channels?
A. He had in my office an Army Colonel who was a representative of
the General and was known as a liaison officer, and I had in the Gen-
eral's office a Lieutenant of the Naval Reserve of the Fourteenth Dis-
trict who was my representative up there and was a liaison officer, and
these men were supposed to be informed, although I will say that my
liaison officer did not know of dispatches that had been received be-
cause I didn't consider it was proper to tell him. He was quite inex-
perienced. Nor am I sure that the liaison officer from the Army in my
office knew about them, but we were in close touch through those liaison
officers who were there for that purpose and we felt we knew what was
going on. Indications are that there are some things we were not
correctly advised on or informed about.
[19] 62. Q. Admiral, please explain the method of rapid com-
munications which existed between your headquarters and those of the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.
A. The communication plan gotten out in connection with 2CL
called for a broadcast frequency from the Base Defense Commander to
all ships and points. I don't recall the frequency but every station was
required to keep a broadcast receiver of standard wave length and we
gave all of our notices of air raid drills, commence fire, cease fire, what
was taking place, over that and it was supposed to be listened to at
all times by all ships at sea and by the group commanders in port and
by my own stations, like Kaneohe and the ammunition depot and the
air station at Pearl Harbor and the net depot, and various other places,
submarine base. In addition to that, we were actively prosecuting the
rapid communication by telephone under JCD. We had teletypes be-
tween Army Headquarters and my Headquarters. I think there was
a branch of that in Admiral Kimmel's office. We had difficulty in get-
ting direct line to Kaneohe, and I think it had just been established.
Formerly we had to go through central in Honolulu but I think we had
just succeeded in having the Army put down a special line for us to
Kaneohe. We had a telephone from the Harbor Control and Com-
mand Posts, both Honolulu and Pearl Harbor, to the gates. I had a
telephone between the Harbor Control and the Artillery Headquarters.
I think we had a direct line between my headquarters and General
Short's headquarters in what he called his "Message Center". My
Harbor Control and Operation room was manned twenty-four hours a
day. There were always talkers, listeners, and officers on duty there.
In addition to that, we had duty officers on duty in the building. The
Chief of Staff and the War Plans operation officer and myself all lived
close to the Harbor Control Post and could be gotten by yard telephone.
All of the lines planned had not been finished. We had means for
rapid communication.
63. Q. Did this include communications with the Army warning net
system ; warning net ?
A. The Army warning net lines came into a certain place known as
the "Interceptor Command" where they had the plotting room. I'm
not sure how well organized the Interceptor Command was prior to
December 7, but I think it was just in the forming. There was a
means for communicating — for providing a communication from that
room to my headquarters, which I immediately put into effect after
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 29
the attack on the 7th of December. My talkers, teletype operators,
who operated with the various Army places connected with, were there
all of the time, twenty-four hours a day, and they were in constant
practice communication with these outlying places, but it is my recol-
lection that I was told on several occasions that the Army ends of the
line always went dead in the evening, that they could not get anybody
on it. It had been a matter that we had taken up, or tried to take up
to get rectified, because we wanted Army twenty-four hour a day com-
munication.
64. Q. Did you have in effect any liaison or the presence of a naval
officer with the Interceptor Command ?
A. There was no officer detailed specifically at the Interceptor Com-
mand. As I said before, I don't think the Interceptor Command was
completely formed up and I am very definitely of the opinion that
the Army did not keep a twenty-four hour watch in the place. The
place was not completely organized. Immediately after December 7,
they staffed the place by calling in a lot of young women from Hono-
lulu and training them in their duties and, at that time, they asked for
watch officers there to communicate with the Navy, although it [20]
had been my plan that the communications would be sent by Army
people to us and received by the Navy people, but we sent Navy people
there on December 7.
65. Q. This net had been in use during some of your tactical exer-
cises, had it not ?
A. I think not. I have no recollection of it ever having been used
in any tactical operations. The Army was training operators princi-
pally and trying to get the system so it would work. There was a great
deal of trouble with the electronics in it and they had asked for help ;
they had come to me once and wanted assistance, had been referred to
the Commander-in-Chief, and there was some officer who was tran-
siently present at the Commander-in-Chief's headquarters whom he
sent up there to help them, but, that officer was on his way to join
some ship, and when he joined up, another officer, by the name of
Taylor, appeared. He had had a great deal of experience in radar
and he was sent by the Commander-in-Chief to help the Army ; but,
that was an effort on the part of the Navy to get the Army's net going ;
he was not sent there with any orders as liaison, and while I knew he
was there, I had no idea that he was there in any other capacity other
than as an expert to try to assist them with their electrical and mechan-
ical difficulties.
_ 66. Q. Just how far did you feel you could rely on this net to as-
sist you in obtaining a warning of approaching aircraft prior to De-
cember 7 ?
A. I had no feeling of confidence or reliance on it because I was very
definitely of the opinion that it wasn't completely formed up ; the oper-
ators were not completely trained, and we had no way — no way was
then established so we could tell what planes of our own were where
they could be completely identified.
67. Q. Were the Army and Navy planes operating in the Hawaiian
area at that time equipped with any modern recognition devices, such
as IFF ?
A. No. We had a standard procedure of entrance to Oahu and of
departure from Oahu; certain grooves Army and Navy planes must
30 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fly in coming in and going out in order that we might know, assum-
ing the planes that flew in those grooves were our planes and those
that flew somewhere else were not ours. In addition to Army and
Navy planes, there were commercial companies operating from Oahu,
interisland companies operating planes to adjacent islands, Pan Amer-
ican operating planes to the trans-Pacific, and there was an air school
located on the municipal airport, John Eogers Field, which had planes
up and these planes were controlled by the Civil Aeronautics Author-
ities.
68. Q. Did the Army warning net have any set up for visual ob-
servation of approaching aircraft, if you know?
A. The Army had a number of observation posts around the Island
of Oahu and on adjacent islands, but unless they were in a full out alert,
these posts would not be manned, but they were of no real use be-
cause they all didn't have means of rapid communication direct from
the post to headquarters.
[21] 69. Q. Was there any arrangement made by the Navy for
obtaining information with respect to approaching ships or aircraft
by visual observation?
A. None that I know of, except the signal tower.
70. Q. Do you recall ever having given General Short any ground
for supposing that our task forces at sea were anywhere near an ade-
quate guard against a surprise attack by carriers ?
A. I gave General Short no reason for believing that our forces at
sea were adequate warning against hostile attack.
71. Q. Referring to the Army's 'force of fighters, were the flying
fields available on Oahu adequate for the use of all those planes?
A. The Army's main fighter field was Wheeler Field, which was
near Schofield Barracks. They had another fighter field at Bellows
Field, which was on the northeast side of the Island, and an improvised
field somewheres in the neighborhood of Haleiwa. Some three to four
months previous to December 7, General Short had made a request on
me to release a field which the Navy had at Kahuku Point to the Army
and I had taken it up with the Commander-in-Chief and, as a re-
sult, we had appointed Admiral Bellinger and Admiral Halsey to
discuss the entire matter with Army air authorities. This joint con-
ference made a report in which they recommended that the Navy keep
Kahuku Field. I endorsed on the report to the Commander-in-Chief
my opinion that it should be given to the Army and he approved my
recommendation. There were other things in the recommendatiton
but that was the principal thing. He approved my recommendation
and it was sent to the Navy Department. So far as I know, no reply
had been received to that prior to the 7th of December. In my opin-
ion, the Army did not have an adequate number of fields to disperse
their fighters on.
72. Q. This is a matter of defensive attitude. As regards operation,
were they hampered as regards inadequacy of fields?
A. I can not answer that.
73. Q. Admiral, what provisions were made for obtaining and dis-
seminating to the Army, particularly, anv intelligence information,
and particularly contact reports, obtainecl by any^of the task forces
or other forces operating in the Hawaiian area ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 31
A. All such reports woiild be received in the headquarters of the
Commander-in-Chief who had two courses of action open. One was to
have them sent to the xVrmy through the District Headquarters, in-
forming the District at the same time, or else sending them direct to
both places, as he had direct means of communication'on the same tele-
phone line that we had — teletypes that we had.
74. Q. Was any such information actually received on the morning
of December 7 ?
A. On the morning of December 7, the only contact that was made
prior to the air raid was with an enemy submarine. This submarine
was sighted by U. S. S. WARD, which was inshore patrol, and the
U. S. S. ANTARES, I believe. I received no report from the AN-
TARES. I did receive at 7 : 12 a. m. a telephone message from the
Chief of Staff telling me that he had received a dispatch from the
WARD that was somewhat difficult to understand, that he had been at-
tacked and was counterattacking a submarine at the entrance to the
channel at Pearl Harbor. He further stated that he was then engaged
[£2] in escorting a sampan toward Honolulu. The Chief of Staff
gave me this message. I asked him what it was ; is it a real submarine
or is it a report ? We had had a number of false reports in the past and
he said he didn't know, and I couldn't understand from the nature of
the dispatch whether it was bona fide or sound contact or sight con-
tact, whether he had been fired upon or had fired, and I asked him to
get it cleared up immediately. Captain Momsen was sent immediately
to headquarters: dispatched another destroyer and tried to get in-
formation from the WARD. Before we got the information straight-
ened out, the air attack was on. Admiral Kimmel was informed — at
least his operations watch officer was informed about the entire matter
just at the same time we were.
75. Q. Do you know whether that information was conveyed to
the Army ?
A. So far as I know, it was not. I'm not sure ; but, I don't think it
was.
76. Q. And there were no other similar information received to
your knowledge?
A. No other contacts.
77. Q. Reverting to that dispatch from the Department, 27 No-
vember, containing the war warning, there was also a directive to
effect a defensive deployment. It really was a directive, was it not?
A. I think it was.
78. Q. Did you give any thought at the time to what you considered
that directive to mean for the Navy forces, other than those belonging
to the District?
A. I have a distinct recollection of Admiral Kimmel discussing that
matter in my presence with someone else. "Wlio it was, I can not recall.
Probably some member of his Staff. The terminology employed is not
one that I've ever heard used before. In dealing with war plans,
naval tactics, it has always been our practice to use very precise ter-
minology with definite Iniown meanings. So far as I know, I have
never encountered that terminology before. It's quite possible — this
is a matter of opinion — that Admiral Kimmel might have construed
that the fact that he had submarines at Wake and Midway was a
32 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
defensive deployment or he may have asked Admiral Stark what it was.
I don't know whether he did, or not.
79. Q. What did it mean to you ?
A. I don't know.
80. Q. The war warning message, of course, was also to be com-
municated to the Hawaiian Department. Those words "defensive
deployment" being, as you say, unusual, did it occur to anyone to dis-
cuss with the Army whether or not those words had a definite mean-
ing which might be obscure to you ?
A. Not so far as I know, although I believe the dispatch directed the
Commander-in-Chief to transmit a copy of this dispatch to the Com-
manding General.
81. Q. Then, in effect, it was somewhat in the nature of a dispatch
to both Services ?
A. It was addressed to the Commander-in-Chief; he was the action
addressee. He was told to inform Commandant Fourteen and the
Commanding General.
1^3] 82. Q. Admiral, this dispatch of 27 November, which will
be introduced as an exhibit before you finish your testimony and
we'll ask you to identify it then, went on to direct appropriate de-
ployment preparatory of carrying out defensive tasks assigned in
WPL 46, which was the Rainbow 5 Plan. I note that your Joint
Coast Defense Plan expressly states it is based on plan Rainbow
No. 1. Would you please explain anything you know or anything
within your knowledge with respect to the situation among the
higher echelons of command in Hawaii as to which plan. Rainbow 1
or Rainbow 5, should form the basis for planning or which was con-
sidered as the plan which would probably be used in the event of war ?
A. Rainbow 1 contemplated the United States being against the
Axis Powers and Japan without any assistance except, maybe, some
of the South American Republics. We had had that and JCD was
based on that. Rainbow 3 had been received some two or three
months before and Rainbow 3 was based on the assumption that the
United States would be allied with Great Britain and the Dutch
East Indies against the Axis Nations and Japan. And the disposi-
tion of the Hawaiian Department in that was just the same as in
Rainbow 1. Now I don't recall Rainbow 5 distinctly, when we had
receieved it, if we had received it or how long before we had re-
ceived it, but it is my impression that the provisions in there were
about the same as they were in 1 also, that is in so far as related to
the Fourteenth Naval District.
83. Q. Are you familiar with the general nature of the task as-
signed to the United States Pacific Fleet in these plans; were there
specific references to whether the plans called for offensive or de-
fensive action?
A. No. 1 was defensive, purely defensive. No. 3, as I recall it, had
offensive tasks in it. I remember for our Forces we had to sever the
lines of communication from Japan in the East and I think it re-
quired certain offensive action from the Asiatic Fleet which was to be
reenforced from the United States Fleet. Rainbow 5, I don't recall
the tasks in there, although I've read them. I don't recall them now.
84. Q. You did know, however, did you not, that an early offen-
sive movement was required of the Pacific Fleet in the event of hos-
tilities with Japan?
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 33
A. In Rainbow 3, I knew it was required and I assume I knew it
was required in 5 if the record shows I received it. It is not quite
clear in my mind. But I knew that offensive action was required in
3, and if 5 had been received, and I assume that it had been received,
I'm not sure about it, I knew that offensive action was required. But
Rainbow 1 was the only one where we were on purely the defensive.
85. Q. That being the case, that CinCPac Fleet was expected to
make an offensive movement quite early, did it seem to you at the
time that such requirement was difficult to reconcile with the re-
quirements for security of the Fleet which obtained up to the out-
break of war?
A. Admiral Kimmel had told me on the occasions which I had
asked him for patrol planes to supply the District's deficiencies in
that respect, that he would do what he could and supply them when
he could, but he couldn't make any commitments because he ex-
pected the Fleet, parts of the Fleet, to leave there in the case of
hostilities and he might go. He didn't say he might go but he would
go. So far as I was concerned, I can not say that I gave any very
deep study to what the Fleet was going to do, how they were going
to do it, when they were going, or how we could preserve the se-
curity [^4] of the place after they were gone because I had
so many things to do that I could only do so many. I was very
much dissatisfied with the deficiency in my forces that were re-
quired for me to perform my tasks, and JCD had been approved by
both the Commander-in-Chief and the Navy Department ; it was not
only my plan but their plan. I had made representations to the
Navy Department about the deficiencies of the forces, both surface
and air. As late as the Summer, I had made a reappraisal of the
forces and made definite and urgent recommendations to the Navy
Department for ships and planes, which they had promised to do
as soon as they could. What went on in the minds of the planners
and operating people of the Fleet, Commander-in-Chief, I don't
know, but I know they did have plans for offensive action.
86. Q. Then nothing was represented to you by the Commander-in-
Chief to the effect that he could not take any other particular or
specific security measures because of his commitments for those offen-
sive movements?
A. No, I remember no such representations.
87. Q. Admiral, as Commandant of the Navy Yard, much of your
time and thought was given to the employment of its forces on both
maintenance and alterations to ships of the Fleet. Those alterations
directed made by the Department were considerable, were they not ?
A. Our principal activity in the Navy Yard was a twenty-four hour
a day schedule of docking, keeping ships' bottoms clean. This had
been in effect for over a year. The first instance the Department sent
a schedule of docking out in order to keep the ships in condition, which
required a lot of ships to go to the coast for docking, and we told them
by working three shifts a day we could absorb a lot of this at Pearl
Harbor and this was done. So far as alterations to the Fleet were
concerned, I don't know of a great many which were being done at
Pearl Harbor, although unquestionably we had some in the nature of
adding more guns to the anti-aircraft battery and also some radar
installations, but I don't recall any tremendous number of other
alterations. To understand how the Navy Yard worked, we worked
79716 — 46— Ex. 144 4
34 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in close touch with the Commander-in-Chief's people. We worked
on the ships and they sent us the work to do. The force was expand-
ing rapidly. In April, 1940, I think there were two thousand total
employees, which included maintenance and office force in Pearl
Harbor, and by December 7, I think that had been built up to some-
thing like eight or ten thousand. I'm not sure of the exact size. It
was expanding very rapidly.
88. Q. Then the alterations directed by the Department to be made
at Pearl Harbor were never any considerable embarrassment, insofar
as you know, concerning affecting the operations of the Fleet?
A. Well, I can not answer that categorically because I don't know.
We took the work load that was thrown on us. They knew how much
we could take ; we told them what we could do at all times. They knew
what we had to do and we did it as fast as we could. However,
whether that interfered with the mobility of the Fleet, I'm not pre-
pared to state. I don't know.
89. Q. Admiral, you stated, sometime back, that Admiral Bellinger,
acting as your subordinate in the matter of relations with the Army,
advised the Army each morning as to the number of fighter planes
available for Army use [^S] in the event of emergency or hos-
tilities. Do you know how many planes were available to the Army
at the time of the December 7 attack?
A. There were, or had been, four carriers at Pearl Harbor at various
times, and on December 7 two carriers, the LEXINGTON and EN-
TERPRISE were away from Pearl Harbor on missions. The SARA-
TOGA and YORKTOWN were on the coast. It is my recollection
that both those ships carried, the planes to the coast. It is my recol-
lection that the LEXINGTON and the ENTERPRISE had their
planes with them so the only planes that were left at the air station at
Pearl Harbor at Ewa Field were a number of Marine fighting planes
belonging to the Fleet Marine Force. I believe there were about 70
Marine planes. How many were available on that morning, I do not
know.
90. Q. Do you know what number of the 250 Army planes were
effective planes, in condition for use?
A. The Army had a number of P-36's, I think they were, when I
arrived in Pearl Harbor. And after the letter from the Secretary of
Navy to the Secretary of War, the Army sent a large number of fighter
planes out ; sent them out by Navy carriers and put them ashore for
the Army air fields, and I think most of those planes were the type
known as P-40. There might have been some P-36's with them but
mostly P-^0. It is possible I may be mistaken in saying P-39, but
I think that's what it was. I guess I'm wrong, it probably was a
P-36. P-^O's came and they were supposed to be the latest thing.
They were a disappointment in the respect that they were only good
for about fifty-five minutes in the air and they couldn't go out of sight
of land, or only a little out of sight of land, or they'd have difficulty in
getting back.
91. Q. Do you know whether the fighter planes were, in fact, used
for inshore air patrol purposes ?
A. They were not. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian
Air Force, General Frederick Martin, told me that he only had three
planes for inshore air patrol. He couldn't use the bombers because
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 35
they couldn't see and he couldn't use the fighters because they couldn't
carry bombs and couldn't see very well either. I believe that prior to
December 7 one of the planes cracked up so he only had two planes on
December 7.
92. Q. Did the Army make a similar report to you or your subordi-
nate commander concerning the number of bombers available for
patrol ?
A. I think they did.
93. Q. Do you know the number of such planes that were available
on the morning of December 71
A. I don't know what the Army report said. It is my belief that
the Army had a few old bombers that were obsolescent, that there were
in 1940, and after the Secretary of Navy's letter they bad started
sending in some B-l7's. I think the ones they originally had, were
known as the B-18, and they were obsolescent and we begiyi to get in
some B-l7's. I think that the first B-l7's came out wei^ ferried on
to the Far East, some twenty-five or thirty of them. That was some-
wheres in September or October. And that on December 7 that in
addition to the B-18's, there probably were not over ten or fifteen
B-17's there. As a matter of fact, a squadron of B-17's [26]
has been dispatched from San Francisco on the night of December 6
and they arrived at Hickam Field in the midst of the air attack and
some of them were lost.
94. Q. Just how did the command over these planes pass from the
Army squadron or other commanders to the naval commanders?
A. My general understanding is that Admiral Bellinger would
direct his fighters, his fighters that were assigned for the day, to report
to the Army and this man would go up and report to the Army. They
had a frequency. And the Army bombers reported to the Navy the
same way.
95. Q. After they were air-borne?
A. Yes, after they were air-borne.
96. Q. Do you know whether those able to fly did so report during or
after the attack?
A. I don't know, definitely.
97. Q. Admiral, aerial torpedoes were used in the attack, were they
not?
A. Yes. sir.
98. Q. Would you please outline the facts related to the protecting
of ships in Pearl Harbor with respect to attack by aerial torpedoes,
what had been done and so on ?
A. The Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet had received a letter from
the Chief of Operations in which the question of placing nets around
ships in Pearl Harbor was discussed. It gave the information that
one net, a single net, was forty per cent effective and another net, if
spaced 100 feet apart, was ninety per cent effective. That made the
outer net 190 feet from the ship's side. CNO wanted recommenda-
tions from the Commander-in-Chief concerning the netting in of
ships. The Commander-in-Chief and I discussed the matter. I was
not very familiar with the capabilities of aircraft torpedoes but I
recollect the Commander-in-Chief asked the Navy Department, the
Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, in what depth of water could an
aerial torpedo be expected to be used effectively. I remember a letter
36 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
coming back from the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance which stated,
in effect, that judging from our own torpedoes that seventy feet was
necessary for their effective use; seventy feet of water. The water
in Pearl Harbor is forty-five feet deep, and I think when the Com-
mander-in-Chief got that information that he then wrote a letter to
the Chief of Operations and the Navy Department. The Chief of
Operations and the Commander-in-Chief agreed that there was no
need for netting in the ships. I have heard subsequently that a letter
was afterwards written by the Bureau of Ordnance modifying the
original letter. I never saw the modifying letter and I'm unfamiliar
with it.
99. Q. Would you consider the matter of safety through static
means of the ships, from attack by torpedo while in Pearl Harbor,
as your responsibility?
A. The operation of netting in the ships would be a function of
the District forces; the net depot would handle that task, using their
craft and their nets. If I had thought it necessary, I would have
recommended it to the Commander-in-Chief. The Commander-in-
Chief might have had other ideas. One of our seaplane take-offs is
right up the Pearl Harbor channel; the best take-off area [271
we had. And at one point in this take-off it had to pass within, I
think, two hundred feet of one of the berths in order to get the nec-
essary straight runway to take-off with a loaded seaplane. Naturally,
I didn't want to place any obstructions in the Harbor unless it were
absolutely necessary. Moreover, the question of getting ships in and
out quickly was affected by whether or not they had nets around them
and T don't think the Commander-in-Chief or the Commandant of
the District wanted to hamper their mobility or their ready mobility
unless it was absolutely necessary. I knew little or nothing about the
effectiveness of the net except what I was told by the Bureau of
Ordnance: forty per cent by the single net and ninety per cent with
the double net. I knew very little about whether torpedoes could be
used in shallow water of forty-five feet and I depended on the tech-
nical sources of information. Wlien the matter was referred to the
Commander-in-Chief by the Chief of Operations and he reached a
conclusion, I assumed that that was final. I agreed with him and
did not protest his decision. After all, the matter was referred to
Washington and the Bureaus in Washington probably had more
information — certainly had more information than we had on the
subject — so no question was raised about it at all. The practice is
today there to net ships. Of course, they have ample supplies of nets
there for that purpose. At the time this question was brought up, we
didn't have enough nets to maintain the gates ; when we first put the
gates down in the Harbor, we had to use old net which was left over
from the first World War and didn't get our new nets — we didn't get
our nets for Midway until quite late. In other words, regular nets
weren't forthcoming in quantity.
100. Q. About how late did you get a sufficient supply of nets for
the gates at Pearl Harbor. Honolulu, Midway, and so forth?
A. We had our nets in Honolulu installed in the summer of 1941,
but, as I recall it, the Honolulu gate was made up of 1918 net and
sometime subsequent to that we received enough net to replace that
with new net. I don't know how late it was. As far as Midway is
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 37
concerned, we had projects at Midway for installation of nets but I
don't believe that at the beginning of war they had been actually
installed at Midway. That's my recollection. I'm quite certain
after the 7th of December when I wanted nets for dry docks, caissons,
floating dry docks, and for ships at anchor, we didn't have nets and
we had to improvise. We tore down fences, tore down the fence
between Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor Navy Yayrd, took the
extruded material that was used for the fence and welded it, lapwelded
it to other sections in order to get a sufficient baffle that we could hang
in the w^ater at the ends of docks and around ships. And in so doing,
of course, we had no knowledge whether that kind of net would be
any good at all, but it was the best we had. We also took all of the
target rafts we had and hung sections of fence below them and put
them in front of the dock caissons and some of the important repair
docks.
101. Q. Are you able to say that the nets would not have been
forthcoming had you asked the Department for them ?
A. I'm unable to say that with any authority.
102. Q. Admiral, was it necessary that this seaplane area, to which
you have referred here as requiring the passing of the vicinity of the
berth, be used at all times ? I mean were there times when only that
one seaplane area take-off was available?
A. We had two areas. One was north of Ford Island and one was
south of Ford Island. That area was the best area for taking off and
was used when [28] possible. Sometimes it was not possible
to use that area. Sometimes it was not possible to use the other area
because we were continually conducting dredging operations in the
Harbor and had these dredges and piles stuck out and we might have
to use the other area. Pan American planes usually use the area
north of Ford Island. There were times though that either one or
the other could not be used.
103. Q. What types of ships use the berth adjacent to this take-off
area south of Ford Island?
A. We had one carrier berth there and I think four or five battle-
ship berths, although the battleship berths could take other types,
depending upon whether they were filled, or not.
104. Q. On the Tth of December, were the berths alongside of the
south side of Ford Island filled with battleships?
A. Yes, with the exception of one ship, I think they were in pairs ;
two ships in each place, an outer and inner ship. The practice was
for the battleships to come in north about Ford Island and go down
and head out. They were always moored heading out, and the
arrangement of the berthing was made by Commander, Battleships.
The berths were assigned to him and he could assign them as he saw
fit; he usually assigned them in the sequence for sorties: so they
could move right out.
105. Q. It was he who made the decision to moor them in pairs,
although that practice wasn't in compliance with the letter 2CL-41?
A. He made the decision how they were to be berthed. He was
limited in his choice by the number of berths he had available and the
number of ships he had in port. The battleships, I think, were in two
separate task forces, and, one was supposed to be at sea while the
other one was in port, so that the station and liberty facilities would
38 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
not be congested. But on the morning of December 7, I think all
available battleships were in Pearl Harbor, both task forces, eight
battleships.
106. Q. Were those most severely damaged in the outer position at
the moorings ?
A. Yes, sir. The ones in the inner berths practically escaped tor-
pedoes except in the case of the — I think it was the HELENA and
the OGLALA were moored abreast at 1010 pier. The HELENA was
torpedoed; she was outside. She was torpedoed but the explosive
effect was enough to sink the inner ship too, the OGLALA.
107. Q. There were no other berths available so that the use of
pairs could have been avoided ?
A. I think not. There were two carrier berths on the north side
of Ford Island. I think they were known at F-7 and 8, or F-8 and
9. I've forgotten the numbers. They were built for carriers and,
on this occasion, one had been assigned to the UTAH and one had been
assigned to the RALEIGH.
108. Q. Who was the senior officer present at Pearl Harbor other
than the Commander-in-Chief?
A. Vice Admiral Pye was present. He was the next senior. He
was not on board his Flagship at the time of the attack.
109. Q. Do you know whether a sortie order was issued following
the attack ?
[BO] A. I believe it was. An order was issued to sortie in
accordance with the security plan and quite a number of ships went
out ; small ships. The NEVADA was attempting to go out when she
was attacked and torpedoed. She was the only battleship that
actually got under way.
110. Q. Do you know who issued the sortie order?
A. I'm not sure but I think it was issued from the Flagship of
Admiral Pye.
111. Q. Admiral, during 1941, do you recall having received from,
the Navy Department any intelligence concerning professional, per-
sonal characteristics of the leading Japanese Admirals ?
A. No, I don't recall any.
112. Q. Did you ever hear the characteristics of Yamamoto, for
instance, discussed ?
A. Not prior to December 7.
The witness was advised that he would be recalled at a later date
for further examination, was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 12 : 28 p. m., took a recess until 2 : 30
p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.
Present : The examining officer and his counsel and assistant coun-
sel.
The examining officer introduced Leonard D. Brown, civilian, as
reporter, who was duly sworn.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered, was informed of
the subject matter of the examination, and was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.
A. Benjamin Katz, Commander, U. S. Navy, Officer in charge of
the Code Room of the Navy Department.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 39
2. Q. Commander, are you the regular custodian of the classified
communication files of the Navy Department?
A. Yes, sir, I am the custodian of classified dispatch files.
3. Q. There are certain dispatches which this examination would
like to have. I will give you the dates of those and if you are the
custodian and have them in your custody, will you please produce
them. The first is a dispatch of 16 October 1941 from the Chief of
Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.
A. I have one that is addressed to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Meet, and also to the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, and Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet for action.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
[SO] Note : Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned
at the conclusion of the proceedings, to Code Room, Navy Department, Washing-
ton, D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended
marked "Exhibit 6".
4. Q. If you have the dispatch of 24 November from the Chief of
Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, please
produce it.
A. I have the message.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the
conclusion of the proceedings, to Code Room, Navy Department, Washington,
D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked
"Exhibit 7".
5. Q. If you have a dispatch addressed to Commander-in-Chief
Pacific Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, by the Chief
of Naval Operations, dated 27 November 1941, please produce it.
A. I have that message also.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examing officer.
Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the
conclusion of the proceedings, to Code Room, Navy Department, Washington,
D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked
"Exhibit 8".
6. Q. If you have a dispatch addressed to the Commander-in-
Chief Pacific Fleet by the Chief of Naval Operations on 29 November,
please produce it.
A. Yes, sir, this is it.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note : Because of the secret nature of the document, it was retiarned at the
conclusion of the proceedings to Code Room, Navy Department, Washington,
D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked
'Exhibit 9".
7. Q. If you have a dispatch in your custody addressed to the Com-
mander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, information Commander-in-Chief
Pacific Fleet, by the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 30 November
1941, please produce it.
A. I have it, sir.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note : Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the
conclusion of the proceedings to Code Room, Navy Department, Washington,
D. C . A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked
"Exhibit 10".
40 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
8. Q. If you have in your custody the dispatch of 3 December,
1941, [31] addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to
Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, Commander-in-Chief Pacific
Fleet, and Commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Dis-
tricts, please produce it.
Ar I have that.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note : Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned at the
conclusion of the proceedings to Code Room, Navy Department, Washington,
D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked
"Exhibit 11".
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged
to make any further statement covering anything relating to the sub-
ject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter
of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought
out by the previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 2 : 50 p. m., adjourned until 9 : 30 a. m.
tomorrow.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 41
PKOCEEDINGS OF THE HAKT INaUIRY
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8, 1944
Third Day
Navy Department,
Washington^ D. G.
The examination met at 9 : 30 a. m.
Present: Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, exam-
ing officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.
The examining officer introduced Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Sec-
ond Class, U. S. Naval Reserve, as reporter, who was duly sworn.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the second day of the examination until such time
as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the
examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as follows: Admiral Smith,
I am directed by the Secretary of Navy to record testimony perti-
nent to the facts attending the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on
7 December. My precept states that this is for the purpose of having
on record testimony Avhich eventually might be lost due to death or
any cause which might make a witness unavailable when the time
comes. There is possibility that this testimony will be used in future
legal proceedings. Now, in such testimony as you give us, I ask
that as far as you can, you speak from your knowledge which you had
prior to 7 December and from facts which presented themselves to
you before that date. I realize that that is a long distance back, and
if at any time you have means of refreshing your memory from docu-
ments, or otherwise, we will stop and permit you to do so.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.
A. W. W. Smith, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, serving as Director,
Naval Transportation Service, Naval Operations.
2. Q. What was your assignment of duty on 7 December 1941?
A. Chief of Staff, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
3. Q. On what date did you assume the duties of Chief of Staff to
the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet?
A. On February 1, 1941, the date on which Admiral Kimmel be-
came Commander-in-Chief. I might add that I served a year and
a half, prior to that date, as Captain of one of the Admiral's cruisers
42 J CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
when he was Commander Cruisers Pacific Fleet ; and before that date
I don't recollect having seen him.
4. Q. As the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific,
or United States Fleet, did you supervise all the divisions of the Staff ?
A. Yes, everything.
[33] 5. Q. Then everything that transpired between the Staff
members and the Commander-in-Chief passed back and forth through
you?
A. Yes, it did. The Commander-in-Chief very frequently would
have certain members of his Staff in his office, and spent a great deal
of time down in the War Plans Office, and I had other things to do,
but nothing was ever completed without my knowledge. I was in
his confidence all the time.
6. Q. Did this relate only to matters of major importance?
A. To everything. The usual thing in the morning was to look over
the dispatches and talk with him, and then the Fleet Intelligence
Officer would come in with his later information. Then, the members
of the Staff would be called together at least once a day, not always
a full conference, but the people concerned.
7. Q. Were you shown all confidential, secret intelligence concerning
the Japanese, both from the Navy Department and from the Staff
organizations on Oahu ?
A. Yes. My recollection is, we got very little on Oahu except Fleet
Intelligence, which was more on the possibility of sabotage than on
the war, but we had radio intelligence, and every time the three Force
Commanders were in port, or even one or two of them, as a matter
of fact, the Commander-in-Chief would have them over, and his Type
Commanders who were in port, and have the Intelligence Officer point
out on the chart his estimate, by radio intelligence, of where all units
of the Japanese Fleet were, at the time.
8. Q. Were you present at such conferences ?
A. Yes, all of them.
9. Q. What other members of the Staff were fully informed of all
intelligence in this manner ?
A. Always the War Plans Officer, who was Captain, now Rear
Admiral, McMorris; and the Operations Officer, Captain DeLany, now
Rear Admiral DeLany ; the Fleet Intelligence Officer, and the Fleet
Communications Officer, and as many others as the Commander-in-
Chief thought necessary, but those four were always in on it.
10. Q. By "Fleet Intelligence Officer", do you mean Layton?
A. Yes, sir ; Commander Layton.
11. Q. You don't include Rochef ort ?
A. No, sir. Rochefort was Combat Intelligence Officer under the
Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and was not brought
into these conferences at all.
12. Q. Do you feel that the Commander-in-Chief kept you fully
advised as to his thoughts and reactions to all such intelligence in-
formation ?
A. I do. The Commander-in-Chief showed me every letter he wrote,
or received — wrote to or received from the Chief of Naval Operations.
These letters were usually personal letters because the Chief of Naval
Operations had used that form of correspondence for long before
Admiral Kimmel took over, and these papers had to be considered
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 43
as official papers and they were filed, although they were personal
letters. The Commander-in-Chief numbered them all, and I saw
everything that he wrote or received.
13. Q. Do you know wliere that file is, at present?
[34] A. So far as I know, it is still in there with the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. It was there when Admiral Nimitz took over,
as are also the letters of Admiral Richardson, who preceded him ; he
left his personal file there, too, because he said it was official business.
14. Q. Were you afforded an opportunity to express your views to
the Commander-in-Chief concerning matters of major importance?
A. Yes, sir; always. I might add that that was one of the first
things the Commander-in-Chief told me when he took over, that he
had had experiences in the past where people were not kept informed
and he wanted me to remind him to keep his Force and Type Com-
manders informed of everything that was going on.
15. Q. What members of Admiral Kimmel's Staff messed with
him?
A. Only the Fleet Operations Officer, who was Assistant Chief of
Staff, and the Chief of Staff, i. e. Admiral Kimmel, DeLany, and
myself. When McMorris, War Plans Officer, was with us at sea, he
also was a member. Now, when he moved ashore, the mess was in-
creased to include the War Plans Officer, Captain McMorris ; the Fleet
Aviator, Captain A. C. Davis, now Eear Admiral Davis — and I think
that is all.
16. Q. The Staff conference — was it a daily routine matter?
A. No, sir. There was no set hour for it. He had a conference
practically every day, and he would send for the people that he
wanted. He would usually have over there officers from the Fleet at
the same time. He also very frequently, at his conferences, would
send for Admiral Bloch and Admiral Pye, especially Admiral Pye.
1 have known him to have Admiral Pye over there two or three times
a day. Admiral Pye was important.
17. Q. Admiral, would you please advise us as to the organization
of the Pacific Fleet just prior to Pearl Harbor, both as to the Type
Organization and the Task Force Organization, as you recall it?
A. The Type Organization had existed for considerable time. That
is, the Commander Battleships, Commander Destroyers, Commander
Cruisers, and the Commander Scouting Force, who was Admiral
Brown. One of the first things that Admiral Kimmel did was to
split them up into three task forces, exclusive of submarines. Admiral
Pye, who commanded the battleships, had one task force consisting of
battleships and destroyers; Admiral Halsey had a task force of
carriers, cruisers, and destroyers; and Admiral Brown — ^Wilson
Brown — had the third task force, in which he had a carrier, cruisers,
and destroyers; and for operation or exercise purposes, battleships
would be transferred to those task forces. One task force was always
at sea and very often two, and they held exercises against each other.
Sometimes all three would be at sea.
18. Q. Were there task forces, other than those you have men-
tioned, which were composed of the combatant ships?
A. No, sir ; except the submarines and the service force, there were
only those three major task forces. Patrol Wing Two was organized
as a task force to operate with the Fleet.
44 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
19. Q. How about the forces ashore, sir?
A. Well, with the exception of the Fourteenth Naval District, the
Navy had no forces ashore. Of course, they had Marines and an
offshore patrol of destroyers, under Com 14.
[S5] 20. Q. Was the Fourteenth Naval District a Task Force, a
subdivision of Admiral Kimmel's command ?
A. Yes, the Fourteenth Naval District was under Admiral Kim-
mel's command, and it was listed as a Task Force under his command.
I have forgotten just exactly what it was called, but the Fourteenth
Naval District has always been under the command of the Com-
mander-in-Chief.
21. Q. How did Patrol Wing Two fit into this Task organization ?
A, Patrol Wing Two was under the Commander-in-Chief, based
on land, and furnished planes — was used mostly for a constant patrol
of the areas in which the Forces were operating. There was a daily
patrol at all times, regardless of whether the Fleet was operating
south of Oahu or north, the operating area was always protected by
planes, against a possible submarine attack, and, of course. Patrol
Wing Two also had planes at Midway, and made trips to Midway and
Wake. The Commander, Patrol Wing Two, Admiral Bellinger, was
very often brought over to the Commander-in-Chief's and assigned a
task in connection with the operations that were projected.
22. Q. Did the Commander of Patrol Wing Two come under the
Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District ?
A. Yes, he did.
23. Q. Would you explain just how that relationship works?
A. You see, he was based on Ford Island and was within the Com-
mandant's jurisdiction, but both were under the Commander-in-
Chief, and he was subordinate to the Fourteenth Naval District, but
Admiral Kimmel very frequently would assign him a task, without
going to Admiral Bloch.
24. Q. Was the organization of the Pacific Fleet by Forces and
Types a published document?
A. My recollection is that it was issued monthly.
25. Q. Was the Task Force organization similarly published ?
A. Yes, it is all a matter of record.
26. Q. Admiral, would you please explain the relationship between
the Commander-in-Chief and the Army Commander, in Hawaii ?
A. Admiral Kimmel assumed command only a week or two before
General Short arrived. Before General Short had taken over as Com-
manding General, Admiral Kimmel went around to see him, both were
in civilian clothing, and discussed all the problems of the Pacific as
Kimmel saw them. The relations between General Short and Admiral
Kimmel were better than those I had ever seen between a commanding
general and an admiral, either there or in other places. They were
together, I should say, at least twice a week, very frequently with their
Staffs, and sometimes more frequently than that. We always invited
the Army to take part in our exercises, and then developed a relation
such that Army planes would use Navy fields and Navy planes would
use Army fields. It was found that the bombs of one would not fit the
racks of the other, and that was remedied. The relations between
the Army and the Navy out there were excellent.
27. Q. Under the official set-up, Admiral Bloch, rather than
Admiral Kimmel, was the opposite of General Short, was he not ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 45
A. No, sir. Admiral Kimmel never looked upon it that way. He
felt that he was General Short's opposite.
[36] 28. Q. Was it not the case that the War Plans, and other
official documents, were based upon the probability or possibility that
Admiral Kimmel would be absent from Pearl Harbor?
A. Yes, sir; and in the book known as "Joint Army and Navy
Action", the chart shows Admiral Bloch as the one, and the diagram
leads to units of the U. S. Fleet, if present; but Admiral Kimmel felt
that when he was present, he was the man who should deal with the
Army and with everything else. He took that responsibility.
29. Q. But nothing in the way of official arrangements on paper,
to that effect, was ever drawn up, was it?
A. To my knowledge — no, sir.
30. Q. That seems to have been an arrangement which might have
left Admiral Bloch in some state of uncertainty^ as to his own rela-
tionship with the Commanding General. Do you recall any difficulties
incident to that ?
A. No, sir, I do not. As I have said before, Admiral Kimmel sent
for Admiral Bloch very frequently and I never saw anything in
Admiral Bloch's attitude indicating that he resented that. I have
known occasions when Admiral Kimmel went to Admiral Bloch's
house at night, on receipt of information, to talk things over and ask
his advice. He had a great deal of respect for Admiral Bloch.
31. Q. Admiral, under the provisions of the Joint Action Army
and Navy, what method of command as between the Army and Navy
was in effect at Hawaii ?
A. My recollection is that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
had the predominate interest, and I think General Short recognized
that fact.
32. Q. Although the mutual cooperation method was actually in
effect, was it not?
A. Yes, sir. You see, when Admiral Kimmel took over, the first
thing that I did before assuming the duty as Chief of Staff, was to
inquire all of the means of defense of Oahu. Pearl Harbor had no
defense whatever, in itself. I was informed that the Army had no
airplanes less than six years old — six years, in design. The Army had
some 36 portable 3-incli guns that could be thrown around Pearl Har-
bor for the air defense. We were not very much impressed with that
and realized that any defense of Pearl Harbor would have to be by
the Fleet, itself, which it was.
83. Q. Returning to this Kimmel-Bloch-Short relationship, the
War Plans, Joint Action Pamphlet, and all, very definitely put the
Navy's part of the responsibility for the security upon Bloch, did it
not?
A. Yes, sir.
34. Q. Was the reason that the Army and Navy business was be-
tween Kimmel and Short, instead of between Bloch and Short, due
to the fact that Bloch had practically no force, or was it due more to
the physical presence of Kimmel in Pearl Harbor during those
months ?
A. Kimmel's attitude was that Bloch was under his command and
that when he was in port, he had the responsibility and he dealt di-
rectly with Short. Probably one reason was that he had a force that
Admiral Bloch did not have, but he felt that Bloch was his subordi-
46 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
nate while in port, and he dealt directly with the Army. Usually,
however, he would call in Admiral Bloch if he had anything impor-
tant to say.
[37] 35. Q. Then the primary reason was Kimmel's physical
presence at Pearl Harbor ?
A. Yes, sir; and, of course, when he moved ashore, which was in
the summer of 1941, after he moved ashore and was there all the time,
practically, he just assumed that responsibility of a permanent nature.
36. Q. In speaking of responsibility, do you include responsibility
for the Fleet units' safety, as well as for the installations, themselves,
at Pearl Harbor ?
A. Yes. The plan put out by the Admiral, fifteen days after he
took over, directed the Fourteenth Naval District, as well as the Fleet
units, what to do in case of an air attack or a submarine attack. The
ships' moorings were changed so that they were moored in sectors,
where each ship would have a clear arc of fire, and all the moorings
would be covered, and if one task force was out, the moorings were
shifted to maintain that arc of tire ; and if one area was not occupied,
the one task force coming in was told where to distribute their ships
and where to tie them up so that every arc of fire could be covered.
It was realized that the only defense was by the Fleet. There was
no defense ashore, except the net or the gate.
37. Q. Was this letter that you referred to subsequently revised ?
A. It was revised about the middle of October, 1941.
38. Q. I show you Exhibit 4 before this examination. Could you
identify that ?
A. Yes, that is the one, revised. The original" issue was the 15th of
February. This was revised the 14th of October.
39. Q. Does this document. Exhibit 4, contain all instructions that
Admiral Kimmel issued with respect to the defense of the base at
Pearl — the security of the base at Pearl Harbor?
A. To the best of my recollection — it is a long time ago, of course —
everything is in that letter. I don't recall anything else.
40. Q. This letter, Exhibit 4, prescribes certain tasks in connection
with the security of Pearl Harbor, to be performed by the Command-
ant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Many of these tasks involved
coordination with the Army. Was it Admiral Kimmel's intention that
Admiral Bloch operate directly, or cooperate directly, with the Army
in this connection, or through him ?
A. I think, directly; I am quite certain, directly. You see, the
Commander-in-Chief occasionally went to sea for tactical exercises,
and Admiral Bloch had to carry on directly with the Army.
41. Q. Was the Commander-in-Chief apprised of all the plans that
were adopted between the Army and the Commandant, Fourteenth
Naval District?
A. Yes, sir.
42. Q. Were you familiar with the Joint Defense Plan which was
signed by the Commanding General of the Hawaii Department, Gen-
eral Short, and Admiral Bloch, as Commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District?
A. I don't remember it.
43. Q. This is Exhibit 5 before this examination, and is that plan?
A. Frankly, I do not remember having seen that document before.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 47
IBS'] 44. Q. Admiral, was the status of the Fleet, with respect
to materiel and personnel, satisfactory to Admiral Kimmel at the time
he assumed the command thereof; that is, of the Pacific Fleet?
A, No, it was not ; he demanded such things as radar — at the time
he took over, to my knowledge, there were only radars on four cruisers
and on the carriers. He asked for it on all ships. He asked for addi-
tional aircraft guns. He asked for self -sealing tanks for airplanes,
and when he finally got tliem, they had to be installed at Pearl Harbor.
He continually asked for men. He demanded them so many times that
some members of the Staff advised him that he was only boring the
Department with it, because he usually got an answer back that the
men were not available. He would ask for 20,000 men; 10,000 to fill
vacancies in the Fleet, and 10,000 for more training, because he knew
that men had to be sent back for new construction, and the answer
he invariably got was that, "The men are not available. They are
needed in the Atlantic." In fact, a few days after Pearl Harbor, we
received an official letter stating, "I know that you would like to have
20,000 men, and we would like to give them to you." As I remember
the exact wording : "The war is in the Atlantic and we here in Wash-
ington think you are sitting pretty in the Pacific." Tliat letter was
actually received a few days after Pearl Harbor, although written
before, of course.
Note: The examining officer identified the letter mentioned by the witness as
being one in the form of a personal letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Navi-
gation to Admiral H. E. Kimmel, dated 25 November 1941, tile No. FF12/MM(55),
and copy is now on file in the Secret — Confidential File Room of the Bureau of
Personnel, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
A. (Continued.) The letters from the Chief of Naval Operations
were usually personal letters, but they were along the same line, such
as, "I have seen the President and I am sorry but he will not give you
any more men." And while talking along that line, I might say
that in — I think it was towards the end of May, 1941, while at sea,
we issued orders by calling destroyers alongside, and detached the
YOKKTOWN ; Battleship Division Three, which was then the strong-
est division of the Fleet; Cruiser Division Eight, of four modern
cruisers; and, I believe, two squadrons of destroyers, which sailed
under sealed orders, went through the Panama Canal and into the
Atlantic. Those ships were all returned after war was declared, 'and
they were equipped with all of the modern devices that we had tried
to get for them while they were in the Pacific Fleet.
45. Q. What was the result, in your opinion, of these personnel and
materiel shortages on the training program — the efficiency of the train-
ing program of the Pacific Fleet ?
A. I think it did not lower the efficiency of the Pacific Fleet. As a
matter of fact, the complements had just been revised and I have always
felt that they were unnecessarily large. The Fleet was adequately
manned, and I considered the ships very efficient and the efficiency of
the Fleet was not harmed by this ; but, the Commander-in-Chief was
looking into the future when he would have to send these men home
for new construction.
46. Q. Did that condition ever develop, prior to the 7th of Decem-
ber, whereby the Fleet was reduced due to transfers to new construc-
tion?
48 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. No, it did not ; not below the level necessary.
47. Q. Did any of these matters affect the maintenance of the Fleet
and the efficient condition of maintenance of materiel ?
[39] A. No. Units of the Fleet were sent to the Coast shortly
before Admiral Kimmel assumed his duties of Commander-in-Chief,
for degaussing and the installation of armor — what do you call it —
splinter armor around the decks and anti-aircraft guns. We had a
plan mapped out approximately a year in advance for the overhaul
of ships when they needed docking and repairs, and that was continued
and was in effect when the attack was made on Pearl Harbor. The
materiel condition of the Fleet was all right. It was satisfactory to
the Commander-in-Chief.
48. Q. Were you able to keep abreast of the program of alterations
as laid down by the materiel bureaus of the Navy Department?
A. Yes, sir; pretty well.
49. Q. Did it interfere with the operations and training of the Fleet
to carry out this program ?
A. No, it did not.
50. Q. Did these conditions such as you have outlined have any ad-
verse effect on the morale and health of the personnel of the Fleet ?
A. As far as morale and health of the personnel of the Fleet is con-
cerned, remember that the Fleet went out there in April of 1940, with
the idea of carrying on a six-weeks Fleet problem, and was held out
there indefinitely. The morale of the Fleet did not suffer. In the sum-
mer of 1941, we arranged a schedule whereby small task forces of one
or two battleships, cruisers, and destroyers would proceed to the coast
of California and remain there for a period of approximately ten
days, and return. The force was never large enough to weaken the
Fleet, and this step was not taken until at a conference with his Flag
Officers, the Commander-in-Chief discussed the question and it was
decided by all that it would be a very good thing for the Fleet to keep
some of them constantly going back to the coast. About this time,
we had completed a stadium which seated about 5,000 men. That took
care of the morale of the men pretty well. There may have been a
question in the minds of the Flag Officers, and some Captains, as to
why they were being kept out there — I had heard discussions of that,
unQfficially — knowing that part of the Fleet had been moved to the
Atlantic Coast. A great many felt that the Administration was keep-
ing them out there unnecessarily since there was no danger of war in
the Pacific. The movement of part of the Fleet to the Atlantic Coast
undoubtedly had some effect on the minds of the personnel in the Fleet.
The health of the officers and men of the Fleet was never impaired by
remaining in Pearl Harbor, in fact, it was excellent.
51. Q. Did the fact that the Fleet was based at Pearl Harbor, rather
than on the mainland, affect the materiel conditions and the materiel
readiness of the Fleet?
A. No, it did not.
52. Q. For war?
A. No, it did not. I might add to that last statement, that he often
discussed the question of the condition of the Fleet, and we felt that
it was better out there than when it had been based on San Pedro, and
I remember the Commander-in-Chief making the statement that we
had been wrong by basing our ships at San Pedro and going out for
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 49
the day and shooting, that he found the best thing was for them to
take them out for a week and keep them going day and night.
[4-0] 53. Q. Within your knlowledge, did Kimmel ever make
any definite recommendations that the custom of basing the Fleet at
Pearl Harbor should be changed — during 1941, I am speaking of —
and returning to the old way of basing on the California Coast?
A. To my absolute knowledge, he never made such a recommenda-
tion by letter or dispatch. In July, I think, 1941, he made a trip to
Washington. He was accompanied only by Captain McMorris. If
he ever made any such recommendation, it might have been done at
that time, but I think I should have heard about it. I never heard
him say to me or any member of his Staff, that the Fleet should return
to the Coast, although he knew that his predecessor had recom-
mended it.
54. Q. Referring to your statement about feeling within the com-
mand which was promoted by the transfer of certain powerful units
to the Atlantic Coast, do you think that the mental attitude of the
various senior officers in the Fleet was in any way adversely affected
by the long maintenance of the position in Hawaii ?
A. No, I do not. By tliat statement, I meant that the danger of
immediate outbreak of war might have been more evident to them had
the units of the Fleet not been taken away. There was no dissatis-
faction or loss of morale.
55. Q. Then, I understand you to mean that, in your opinion, the
general war-mindedness of the personnel of the Fleet was improved
by its retention in Hawaii ?
A. Yes, sir, I think it was. You see, in the early part of our stay
out there, the entire Fleet was anchored at Lahaina Roads, with all
lights on. I think the Fleet did get war-minded, because they began
moving into Pearl Harbor, and even moved the carriers in — moved
everything in, and, of course, invariably operated without lights.
56. Q. Admiral, you have stated that when you assumed the duties
of Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, you made
a survey of the Army's ability to defend Pearl Harbor. Please state
any knowledge you have of subsequent improvements in the situation
in that respect, if any ?
A. The situation was considerably improved after the arrival of
General Short. He had modern planes out there, modern fighters, be-
fore the war broke, P-40's, some Flying Fortresses, and I have traveled
across the Island and seen the fighters staked out. When the attack
came on Pearl Harbor, after the warnings they had, the Army had
assumed, as perhaps they had been trained to, that if there was to be
an attack, there would be sabotage, and they feared sabotage more than
an attack, and brought them all in the hangars, and that is why they
were all burned up.
57. Q. Was Admiral Kimmel familiar with the state of personnel
and materiel readiness of the Army to carry out its commitments as to
the defense of Pearl Harbor, just prior to the Japanese attack?
A. Yes. He had a shock, though, in the week preceding Pearl Har-
bor, when we had orders from the Navy Department, and General
Short had orders from the War Department, to prepare a plan immedi-
ately for bringing all the Marines off of the outlying islands, and all
the Marine and Navy planes in the outlying islands, and replacing them
79716 — 46 — Ex. 144 5
50 CONGRESSIONAL IN^TSTIGATION PE.\RL HARBOR ATTACK
with soldiers and ■with Army planes, and. as I remember it. practically
the entire week before Pearl Harbor was spent with the two Staffs
together. The Army was undecided whether to put P-39*s or P-40's
on these islands. We told them that any planes they put on Wake
would remain there for the duration, in case of war. because they
[4i] would have to take off from a carrier and could not come back,
and we had no means of puttmg a ship in there to bring them off. and
during the discussion of this, with General Short and his staff, the
Commanding General of the Army Air Force (General Martin) and
Admiral Pye were present, and also Admiral Wilson Brown, the War
Plans Officer, the Operations Officers, and I believe Admiral Bloch.
Admiral Kimmel said. "What can I expect of Army fighters on
Wake?*' And General Martin replied. "We do not allow them to go
more than fifteen miles off shore." That was a shock to all of us. and
Admiral Kimmel's reply was. ''Then, they will be no damn good to
me." The exchange was never made because the war broke before-
hand. The only dispute between the Army and Xavy over that ex-
change was that General Short said. "'If I have to man these islands.
I shall have to command them." Admiral Kimmel replied, "Xo. that
won't do. If the Army commanded one of the islands. I wouldn't be
able to get a ship into one of the ports'", or words to that effect, and
General Shoit said. "Mind you. I do not want to man these islands.
I think they are better manned by Marines, but if I man them. I must
command them." That was as near to a dispute between General
Short and Admiral Kimmel as I ever saw, but the plan was made and
submitted but never carried out.
58. Q. This was a definite order issued by the two Departments?
A. Yes. sir : bv dispatch.
59. Q. About what date?
A. To the best of my recollection, about seven days before Pearl
Harbor.
60. Q. What was to be done with the Marines and the Marine
planes ?
A. That we did not know. We wondered why — whether they were
needed elsewhere. We thought perhaps that it was planned to pre-
pare an expedition force and the Marines were needed elsewhere. Xo
member of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff knew why that was done,
and we still don"t understand why it was not carried out. or what they
had in mind — what the Department had in mind at the time.
61. Q. Had the Army situation with respect to anti-aircraft artil-
lery been bettered ?
A. Xot to my knowledge, no.
62. Q. Did they have facilities for obtaining early information of
the arrival of enemy forces by water or air ?
A. The Armv ?
63. Q. The Army.
A. Xo. The Army had just built a radar station, but it was not in
operation. They had a Xaval officer named Taylor, a Reserve, who
had had considerable experience in England, and he was assigned to
the Army with the idea of teaching them how to operate the radar,
but it was not in full operation, and of course the radar of the ships
was no good because they couldn't go through the hills surrounding
Pearl Harbor.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 51
64. Q. The fact that the Army radar station was not functioning
was known to Admiral Kimmel. was it not ?
A. Yes. It had just been completed and was not ready for opera-
tion. It had been on that morning of 7 December but he hadn't
known it.
[42] 65. Q. "Were you familiar with the local defense forces
available to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Xaval District to
execute his functions in conjiection with the security of Pearl Harbor ?
A. I was. at the time. I doubt if I could quote them now. however.
66. Q. Was Admiral Kimmel also familiar with this situation?
A. Yes.
67. Q. Was it your belief that the Army and Xavy, operating
through the local defense forces, were capable of furnisliing complete
defense of the Pearl Harbor base against air attack?
A. We thought so at the time. I realize now, we were not.
68. Q. Were you familiar witli the plans for recomiaissance and
inshore-off-shore patrol then in effect ?
A. Yes.
69. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel take any action, to your knowledge,
to augment the forces of the Army and the Fourteenth Xaval District
prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, at any time, in order to enable
them to carry out their defense functions ?
A. He continually asked for more Xavy planes. What recom-
mendations he made for the Army, 1 don't recall, or what recom-
mendations General Short made, but I know that they conferred on
it very frequently. I don't believe that Admiral Kimmel made
recommendations for building up the Army — General Short would
make those recommendations to the War Department.
70. Q. Did he augment the local forces with any aircraft or vessels
of the Fleet, to your knowledge, for defense purposes ?
A. Well, he had a destroyer off-shore patrol that was built up,
and. as I say. the operating forces were always protected by air
coverage against submarines. We were very submarine-conscious
and one reason for that was that we had several sound contacts —
perhaps all of them were false. On one occasion, which was in the
month of February, before Admiral Kimmel had been in command
a month, we had a contact by two destroyers south of Diamond Head,
and it moved slowly so that they had it for 36 hours. It occurred
a^ain a month later. We never found exactly what it was. but we had
officers go over to the Bishop Museum to learn all they could about
the waters around Honolulu, and came to the conclusion that it was
two different water levels, or water temperatures. The destroyers
had claimed that they had heard propeller noises. At one time, Ad-
miral Kimmel, about 6 o'clock in the morning, told me to issue orders
to Admiral Draemel to bomb this thing, depth charge it. Before
the order went out, however, he cancelled it. and reported the fact
to the Chief of Xaval Operations, saying that he had no authority
to do this, except within the three-mile limit arotmd Pearl Harbor.
and the reply he got was "Thank God you didn't. It might have
caused international difficulties." or words to that effect." So. we
had so many of these contacts, probably all of them false, that we
were stibmarine-conscious more than air-conscious, and I think every
one ill the Fleet expected if an attack came, it wotild be by submarines
52 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
rather than aircraft. You will notice that that order covers both air
and submarine attack, but I believe that the people of the Fleet felt
little danger of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.
71. Q. Was this off-shore patrol maintained at all times, or
intermittently ?
[4S] A. At all times.
72. Q. What belt around Oahu did it cover, in distances?
A. The area south of Pearl Harbor. Occasionally we had destroy-
ers go around the Island at night, but our destroyers at that time were
not equipped with radar, they were equipped with sound. There was
not a constant patrol around the Island, we didn't have enough de-
stroyers for that purpose, but there was a constant patrol in the
operating area south of Pearl Harbor.
73. Q. Do you know if any other patrol, either air or destroyer,
was maintained by either the Army or the Navy ?
A. To the best of my knowledge, there was no patrol maintained
by the Army. The patrol maintained by the Navy was ns extensive
as Commander PatWing Two felt he could make it. He claimed
that he did not have enough planes to maintain a patrol, daily patrol,
in all directions from Oahu, and for that reason the air patrol was
.confined to the operating areas — the regular patrol.
74. Q. Do you know whether the statement or views of Commander
PatWing Two were based upon the fact that a continuous air patrol
would fatigue personnel and wear out materiel, or was he referring
to his inability to make such a patrol over short periods of time?
A. Based entirely on materiel.
75. Q. Long-range, every day ?
A. Yes. The planes wouldn't stand it.
76. Q. Then the onlv two types of normal patrol maintained, say,
a month before Pearl Harbor, that you know of, were destroyers off-
shore, and the air patrol covering the operating areas?
A. Well, we had a Patrol Wing at Midway, of course, and they
very frequently patrolled back and forth, going by way of Johnston's
Island; and of course we had planes on Wake, but there was no
patrol such as we use today, the long-range, daily patrol.
77. 0. Would you please "explain what action was taken by the
Task Forces while at sea to obtain information of important enemy
movements in the close vicinity of Pearl Harbor?
A. When the Task Forces were engaged in operations, they were
blacked out at night. They had destroyer protection. There was no
long-range search, however, made by the carriers with planes, against
an enemy.
78. Q. They were not, then, considered as a part of the reconnais-
sance facilities for the defense or security of Pearl Harbor?
A. Not until the week preceding Pearl Harbor, when Admiral
Halsey, in the ENTEEPRISE, was given instructions by Admiral
Kimmel not to return with the Task Force but to take 18 Marine
fighters out to within 200 miles of Wake and fly them off, because
the Commander-in-Chief was not satisfied with the defenses of Wake,
and of course it was for that reason that the ENTERPRISE was
not lost, because she was due to be in the port, where the UTAH was
tied up, during the attack. Before he left. Admiral Halsey said
"This is a very secret movement. What shall I do in case I meet
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 53
Japanese forces?" And Admiral Kimmel said "In that case, use
your own discretion." And Admiral Halsey replied "Those are the
best orders I have ever received, and to keep my movements secret,
if I find even a Japanese sampan, I will sink it," So that trip I
believe Admiral Halsey had an air search out all the time, in fact,
I know he did.
[44-] 79. Q. Under the Army-Navy agreement, responsibility for
the defense of Pearl Harbor against air attack, bombardment from
ships, and landing forces, of course is all Army responsibility. Are
you sure that you have conveyed to us all steps known to have been
taken to ascertain the Army's readiness to meet their conmiitments on
Oahu?
A. Yes, sir.
80. Q. About how many Army pursuit planes did you understand
to be available on Oahu ?
A. Something in the vicinity of a hundred, I should say.
81. Q, Wliat do you know about their combat efficiency, particularly
as regards personnel ?
A. Well, we didn't have a very high regard for it. That was based
upon our observations during Fleet Operations, when their Flying
Fortresses Avould come over at almost smoke-stack level, and showed
an utter disregard for possible anti-aircraft fire. In the operations
between our planes and theirs, our aviators, possibly prejudiced, ex-
pressed the opinion that they were not very good.
82. Q. Now, you are talking about the Army bombers, or the Army
pursuits ?
A. Both.
83. Q. Insofar as you did give thought to the possibility of a
Japanese air raid, what did you consider the most effective defense
against it ?
A. The most efficacious defense against it, we felt, was from our
own carrier planes, and when the attack occurred, our carriers were
all at sea.
84. Q, Do you say that because of the doubt you had of the efficiency
of Army aircraft ?
A. That is part of it, yes, sir. I may be unjust to the Army in that.
It may have been prejudice on the part of Navy fliers, but the opinions
expressed by our aviators, as I saw, were not very complimentary to
the Army fliers.
85. Q. You also knew that as against a Japanese carrier raid, the
Army radar could not be depended upon to give warning?
A. Yes, sir.
86. Q. Then, if you realized the danger of such an air raid, which
events proved was not only possible but probable, you would have
seen that outside of anti-aircraft gunfire, there was no security to our
installations in Pearl Harbor, including the Fleet, — is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
87. Q. Do you recall the Fleet Aviation Officer having given any
opinions or advice on the matter ?
A. No, sir ; I do not recall that he ever did.
88. Q. Admiral, you were familiar with the basic War Plans in
effect in the months leading up to Pearl Harbor, were you not?
A. Yes.
54 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
89. Q. Were you familiar with the missions assigned therein to the
United States Pacific Fleet?
[4^] A. I do not recall what the detailed mission of the Pacific
Fleet was, except that we had no orders what to do in case of war, or
where to go.
90. Q. Do you recall whether the tasks assigned the United States
Pacific Fleet were offensive or defensive, in their nature?
A. My recollection is — they were defensive.
91. Q. Do you recall whether they called for any contemplated
movement to the westward ?
A. I am positive they did not. I am now thoroughly familiar with
the War Plans, but I know that the Fleet had no orders or plans to
move to the far westward, such as to relieve the U. S. Asiatic Fleet.
The witness was directed to refresh his memory on the point in
question, and be prepared to answer in more detail later.
The reporter withdrew and Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval
Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously
taken was still binding.
92. Q. Admiral, what intelligence organizations were available to
the Commander-in-Chief to give him enemy intelligence, with respect
to the Japanese particularly?
A. There was the intelligence organization of the Fourteenth Dis-
trict, and there was the intelligence officer. The Fleet Intelligence
officer and his assistant, a Lieutenant Hudson, were both Japanese-
language-speaking officers. Just what intelligence they got from the
Army, I do not recall. We had our dispatches, of course, from the
Department and radio intelligence. The Fleet Intelligence officer
believed he knew where all units of the Japanese Fleet were and would
report them from day to day. Of course, it turned out he was wrong.
93. Q. The Commander-in-Chief then was given the intelligence
information available in the Combat Intelligence Office of the Four-
teenth Naval District ?
A. Oh, yes.
94. Q. Were you also acquainted with such information ?
A. Yes, every morning the Fleet Intelligence officer came to the
Commander-in-Chief about nine o'clock in the morning, after the
Commander-in-Chief had read the morning dispatches, and gave him
the latest information. I was always present when he did.
95. Q. Did the Office of Naval Intelligence provide the Commander-
in-Chief with periodic information as to Japanese current movements ?
A. I can recall only their pamphlets, stuff that they regularly put
out. I don't recall any dispatches from Naval Intelligence.
96. Q. Are you familiar with their fortnightly summaries that they
provide to the senior command afloat ?
A. Yes.
97. Q. What information was furnished concerning Japanese naval
leaders ?
A. The best information that we received on Japanese naval leaders
came through Commander McCrea on his return from a mission to
the Commander-ih- [46'] Chief Asiatic. That was a week be-
fore Admiral Kimmel took over and gave Admiral Hart's estimate of
each one of these Japanese naval leaders and was the best estimate we
ever received. I can not recall that we ever received one from Naval
Intelligence or from the Navy Department.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 55
98. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel receive this information from Com-
mander McCrea ?
A. Yes, he and Admiral Richardson, Captain McMorris, the War
Plans oflficer, and I were together on the PENNSYLVANIA in the
Commander-in-Chief's cabin when McCrea came through and we had
an all afternoon conference. McCrea read out from this little book
that he carried these comments. They were copied down and put
in the secret file.
99. Q. Did his information include information concerning Japa-
nese Admiral Yamamoto ?
A. Very much so; yes. As I recall the comment on him, he was
efficient and bold, a poker player, and dangerous. I may have those
words wrong but that's the impression I got at tlie time.
100. Q. During 1941, was Admiral Kimmel informed as to the
duties being performed by Admiral Yamamoto in the Japanese Navy,
as to his position ?
A. I'm quite certain ; yes.
101. Q. The Commander-in-Chief was in touch with anything vital
in the way of local intelligence obtained in Hawaii, was he not?
A. Yes, sir, except that we did not have access to the files of the
cable office. The Fleet Intelligence Officer had made some effort to
get these files. My recollection, it was taken to Mr. Mackey of the
Postal Telegraph, being contraiy to the United States law to divulge
a telegraph or cable message. At that time, there were certain
Japanese codes which we could break and the intelligence officer felt
that if he could get those messages he might learn what was going on.
We didn't get them until three days after Pearl Harbor. We never
got anything from that before the war.
102. Q. Do you know anything of an attempt having been made to
arrest or otherwise segregate suspected Japanese agents?
A. I remember an incident a few months before the war where an
American came from San Francisco ; he had communicated with the
Fleet Intelligence Officer before doing so. He was in the employ of
the Japanese and was sent out by the Japanese, by plane. The intel-
ligence officer made contact with him by placing an officer in yeoman's
clothes, and we removed from the files two or three papers, mostly on
the results of target practice, and gave them to this American who
flew back to the West Coast and, as the result of all this, a Japanese
Lieutenant Commander and a Japanese servant, I believe a Charlie
Chaplin, were arrested. No action was taken. The State Depart-
ment intervened and the Japanese Lieutenant Commander was re-
turned to Japan. What happened to the Japanese servant, I don't
recall, but we knew that the money had come from the Japanese Em-
bassy. We did not know of the activities of Japanese agents in
Hawaii, although it had been developed years before that some of the
priests were ex-Army officers. I was informed by Captain Kilpatrick,
who had been a previous Intelligence officer, that an effort was made
to deport one of these priests, but is was found nothing could be done
because of an old agreement between the United Stated and Japan,
based upon our missionary activities of the past, that once a man m
the religious status arrived in the country, if he chose to undertake
other activities, nothing could be done about [^7] it. I know
that Admiral Bloch knew of that case. In the summer of 1940, when
56 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Eichardson had the Fleet, we were ordered to rendezvous the
entire Fleet one afternoon well off shore and a course was set toward
San Pedro. I believe that no one beyond the Staff of the Commander-
in-Chief knew why we were out. We changed course after dark and
stayed at sea for a week or more, preserving radio silence, and en-
gaged in no real tactical operations. What this was all about, I have
never learned. But on our return to port, I learned, through Ad-
miral Bloch, that there had been a great deal of activity on the part
of Japanese communication between Oahu and the Island of Hawaii,
trying to learn the whereabouts of our Fleet. We knew there were
Japanese agents working but, to the best of my knowledge, the Fleet
Int'elligence Officer and the Commander-in-Chief did not know who
these Japanese agents were. We suspected all of them.
103. Q. Then you do not recall a discussion between the Army and
Navy at Oahu concerning the rather wholesale arrests or segregation
of some agents?
A. No, sir, I do not. I believe that the Army did have certain
Japanese spotted with the idea of taking them in, in case of war, but
I did not take any active part in discussions of that.
104. Q. Other than daily reports by Layton, in which he considered
that he knew the location of all important Japanese naval units, do
you recall receiving any other similar intelligence during the last few
weeks of 1941 ?
A. We had frequent dispatches on the course of events from the
Navy Department. The last of which I believe was the 27th of
November. No, sir, all that I received was through the Fleet Intelli-
gence Office.
105. Q. On or about 1 December '41, where do you recall that infor-
mation to have indicated the important Japanese naval units to be?
A. I can not recall that in detail. One Fleet was supposed to be at
Truk, and, to the best of my recollection, the main part of the Japa-
nese Fleet was supposed to be in Empire waters.
106. Q. What about the carriers ?
A. We had no knowledge of those; no. The Fleet Intelligence
Officer said that he did not know where they were.
107. Q. Do you recall any difference of opinion between the radio
intelligence units of the Fourteenth District and Cavite concerning
the location of enemy carriers ?
A. No, sir, I do not.
108. Q. Admiral, you have referred to certain dispatches received
by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from the Navy Department
with relation to the international situation in the Pacific. I have here
Exhibit 6 before this examination, dispatch of 16 October 1941, ad-
dressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief
of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Asiatic Fleets, which I will give to you
and ask whether you are familiar with that dispatch ?
A. Yes, sir, I remember it.
109. Q. Thisdispatch was received by the Commander-in-Chief ?
A. Yes, sir.
110. Q. It is noted that this dispatch refers to the grave interna-
tional situation and indicates possible action, aggressive action, on the
part of [4^] the Japanese. Do you recall whether the Com-
mander-in-Chief and his Staff made any estimate of the situation in
the Pacific in the light of the contents of this dispatch ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 57
A. To the best of my recollection, no specific change of plan was
made because we had received warnings constantly — I should say
weekly — for a period of more than a year ; warnings long before the
Commander-in-Chief ever took over, or Admiral Kimmel ever took
over. These were in the form of letters, usually from the Chief of
Naval Operations, who frequently wound up his letters by saying "It
may happen tomorrow." So that the Fleet had been pretty much on
the alert from the time it got out there. I don't recall that anything
was done particularly about that dispatch ; the 16th.
111. Q. The dispatch also provides that the Commander-in-Chief
Pacific Fleet inform appropriate Army and Navy District authorities.
Do you know that this was done?
A. Yes. I may get that mixed up with a later dispatch. Fre-
quently, those dispatches of that nature were taken over by the Fleet
Intelligence Officer in person to General Short and Admiral Bloch
was always asked to come over and read them in the Commander-in-
Chief's office. In a later dispatch. General Short was sent for ; a dis-
patch of that nature which I think was dated the 27th of November.
There were so many of those that I may confuse one with the other.
112. Q. We'll get to the others shortly and you may have some
comment on them in general. Now I'd like you to confine your testi-
mony about what you know about the individual ones. Do you know
whether or not any discussion of the meaning and the possible reper-
cussions which might follow, meaning of the contents of this dispatch,
were discussed by the Commander-in-Chief with General Short or with
Admiral Bloch or both?
A, I can not recall in this specific case, but I believe that every one
of the messages of that nature were discussed by General Short, Kim-
mel, and Admiral Bloch.
113. Q. What was the nature of such discussions?
A. Well, usually we would call in members of the Staff and, as I
said before. Admiral Pye, if in port, and would exchange ideas and
information on it.
114. Q. Did these discussions include coordinated efforts to resist
any attempt by the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor?
A. Frankly, I do not believe that the Commanding General or
Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel expected an attack upon Pearl
Harbor, except by submarine.
115. Q. Was there any discussion as to the availability of the proper
means on the part of any of the Services to carry out its functions in
protecting Pearl Harbor in the light of the warning?
A. The warning was not made that Pearl Harbor would be attacked.
The warning indicated that the attack would go elsewhere. We never
received a warning about an attack on Pearl Harbor.
116. Q. Was there any contemplation by any of the parties that
conferred of an attack on Hawaii by air, any time that you recall?
[4^] A. No, I do not, except, as I stated before, the ships were
so berthed that they had a clear arc of fire for anti-aircraft guns in all
four sectors, and that when a task force came in, the senior officer of a
sector invariably reported that he had taken over command of that
sector. I believe that's laid out in that October 15 letter.
117. Q. Do you ever recall that General Short asked for any assist-
ance from Admiral Kimmel in providing for the defense of Pearl
Harbor should it be attacked by air?
58 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. No.
118. Q. Do you ever recall Admiral Bloch asking for assistance
from the Fleet carrying out the functions assigned him by the security
letter, Exhibit 4?
A. No, never.
119. Q. This dispatch. Exhibit 6, further provides that the Com-
manders-in-Chief addressed, including Commander-in-Chief of the
Pacific, should take precautions, including preparatory deployment
as will not constitute stategic intention or constitute provocative action
against Japan. Do you recall the action taken by the Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific Fleet in response to this directive ?
A. My recollection is that in each one of those cases, including the
one you mentioned, his alert was sent to the forces in the operating
areas and, on those occasions, the training exercises were halted and
the ships assembled with their destroyer screen and placed, until
further orders, as a Fleet and still kept at sea. The ships in port,
however, were not moved out. Conditions of readiness were prescribed
for ships in port.
120. Q. You speak of the task forces being alerted. Do you mean
that a prescribed state of readiness was designated ?
A. I believe the October 14 letter told what to do. The message was
sent out : Task force operating at sea. Dispatch striking unit. Make
appropriate defense disposition of heavy ships and remaining sur-
face forces at sea. Dispatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances
require. Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Defense Officer and Senior
Officer embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks
or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.
121. Q. It is your belief then that after receipt of this dispatch of
October 15 and its further promulgation to the forces afloat, that the
action — preparations were made to take the action contemplated by the
security letter?
A. On several occasions that was done.
122. Q. Was this con/^entrating of ships intended as a protective
measure for the task force or for offensive action, or as a protection
to the base ?
A. Not for the protection of the base. For the protection of the
heavy ships in the task force and to organize a striking force if the
enemy were sighted. There was no idea of protecting the base with
the Fleet.
123. Q. Are you familiar with any movements of forces other than
those incidently at sea which resulted from action taken as a result of
this dispatch. Exhibit 6?
A. That's not quite clear.
[SO] 124. Q. Are you familiar with any other deployment made
or movement of ships or aircraft or personnel in compliance with the
directive contained in this dispatch, other than the concentration of
task forces incidently at sea ?
A. No, I'm not.
125. Q. I show you here a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions to the Commander-in-Chiefs of the Asiatic, Pacific Fleet, and
certain Naval District Commandants, Exhibit 7 for this examination.
Are you familiar with that document ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 59
A. I recall it vaguely. It does not stand out in my memory. As I
say, it was one of several. I may confuse one ^Yith the other, but I
notice that it speaks of attack on the Philippines or Guam.
126. Q. Do you know whether this dispatch was received by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet ?
A. I do not swear to it ; no. '
127. Q. I have here Exhibit 8 before this examination which is a
dispatch addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Command-
er-in-Chiefs of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets for action. Are you
familiar with that dispatch?
A. Very much. This is the one that I remember above all others.
This was received somewhere in midaf ternoon of the 27th of November.
General Short was immediately sent for and the conference was held
and by six o'clock that evening the Army was on the march. Un-
fortunately, what they did was to station men at the public utilities,
the reservoirs, the bridges — in other words, they alerted against sabo-
tage; sabotage because it was the consensus from this dispatch that
the attack would, as it states, be against the Philippines or Thai
or Kra Peninsula, possibly Borneo. What was considered most likely
by the Navy was a submarine attack on our forces at sea and, by the
Army, sabotage from the enormous Japanese population in the Islands.
At that time, we had two of the three task forces at sea and one of
these returned on the 5th of December, which placed two in port, 1 at
sea, but the carrier of the task force returning on 5 December remained
at sea to deliver planes to Wake.
128. Q. Admiral, at the conference with General Short, was this
dispatch carefully considered by the assembled Army and Navy officers
so as to determine its exact meaning, insofar as it could be determined ?
A. I should say yes, certainly.
129. Q. Was the study made in the nature of an estimate of the situ-
ation ?
A. No. But remember this is only one of a great man}^ warnings.
130. Q. Were any decisions arrived at as to coordinated action to be
taken with respect to the security or defense of Pearl Harbor, in the
light of this warning ?
A. I think the question of the defense of Pearl Harbor, in the light
of that warning, was never raised except the danger of sabotage by
the large Japanese population in the Islands. That's to the best of
my recollection.
131. Q. Did the question of possible attack by air arise ?
A. No.
[SI] 132. Q. Was the Navy fully apprised at that time of the
contemplated action of the Army ; I mean the alert against sabotage
only ?
A. I was not. I don't believe the Commander-in-Chief was.
133. Q. Was the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District
present at this conference?
A. Yes. He got there before General Short did.
134. Q. Were measures to be taken by his task force — that is the
Commandant's Task Force — discussed?
A. I don't recall.
135. Q. Was any action taken in the light of this dispatch to aug-
ment the forces of either the Army or the Commandant of the Four-
60 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
teenth Naval District, so as to assist them in defense from air attack?
A. Not tliat I recall, although a squadron of B-l7's took oti' from the
Coast a few days later and actually arrived on the morning of Pearl
Harbor. Whether that was instigated by the Commanding General
or by the War Department, I do not know. They arrived with
machine guns mounted and no ammunition, during the attack.
136. Q. Were the task force commanders at sea apprised of this
warning ?
A. Yes, they were apprised of all warnings received.
137. Q. Were they given any specific directives with respect to
action to be taken by the task forces in the light of the warning ?
A. Only that as laid down in the directive of 15th of October.
138. Q. Was any action taken to change the condition of readiness
of the vessels at Pearl Harbor in the light of this warning?
A. It is very difficult for me to recall that because I get confused
between that period and the period immediately afterwards when we
shifted from Condition 1, 2, and 3 so frequently. I believe that we
did before the war, but I may possibly be in error on it.
139. Q. You mean the condition of readiness of the ships in the
Harbor were changed during that period ?
A. Yes, they were frequently done for drill purposes also, before.
140. Q. But you do not know what condition of readiness was taken
following the receipt
A. (Interposing) No, I do not. It should be shown in the files,
however, of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
141. Q. Admiral, you will note in the dispatch a directive concern-
ing a deployment. State what you considered that directive to mean
when you saw it.
A. It was impossible to keep the entire Fleet at sea at all times and
had we put the entire Fleet at sea, everytime we got a warning, the
Fleet would have been worn out. As it was, we were fueling our task
forces at sea. As I remember the decision was made to take the pre-
cautions that we had for months laid down in case of one of these
warnings, but to make no change in the disposition of the forces in
port. As I say, at the time of this warning, two of the three task
forces were at sea. It was at this time, however, that the Commander-
in-Chief sent the ENTERPRISE task force to deliver planes to Wake
and that Force was fully prepared to take offensive action against
anything it might meet. There was no disposition made by the Fleet
for the defense of Pearl Harbor, because I believe that no one on the
Commander-in-Chief's Staff or his force believed that an air attack
would be made on Pearl Harbor.
[52] 142. Q. Was what the dispatch says concerning a prepara-
tion for doing something else a consideration when it was decided not
to change any movements ?
A. We had sufficient forces at sea to do what the war plan called
for.
143. Q. Do you recall what ships were returned to Pearl Harbor
between the receipt of this dispatch and 7 December?
A. Yes, sir, the task force— I believe it was Admiral Pye's Task
Force that returned on the 5th of December, two days before Pearl
Harbor, with the battleships, cruisers, and destroyers; also part of
Admiral Halsey's Task Force.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 61
144. Q. Did that considerably increase the number of ships that
were in the Harbor?
A. Very considerably. When that task force entered. Admiral
Brown's Task Force departed, I think on the 4th of December, and
that Task Force had no battleships in it. He had the LEXINGTON
and some cruisers and destroyers in his Task Force. So the result
was we had two of the task forces in port when this thingf happened;
two of the task forces, with the exception of the ENTERPRISE,
Admiral Halsey — and accompanying light forces of Task Force Two.
145. Q. Then, in effect, rather than a deployment involving move-
ment outward, there really was a movement of ships inward after the
receipt of the war warning?
A. Yes, but not as a result of the war warning. This was our
planned operations for the month. It mav very well be that these
plans were known to the Japanese and that thev chose their time when
we had scheduled two task forces in port. They were operating on
schedule. It was not changed as a result of this.
146. Q. In other words, the operating schedule made and printed
weeks previously was not departed from ?
A. Yes, sir, that's correct, with the exception of the one outfit going
to Wake.
147. Q. This particular dispatch (indicating Exhibit 8) is different
from all other warnings received previously in that the words "War
Warn in sf" were used. Wliat was your own reaction to those particu-
lar words?
A. My reaction was we knew that negotiations were still going on ;
Mr. Kurusu had flown through a few days before: we were in great
doubt as to what was happening. Mr. Kurusu's plane broke down in
Midway. Admiral Bellinger called up at night and asked permission
to flv him on in a PBY, and I said, "No, it mav be that the plane was
told by the Administration to break down. They know more what's
goms on than we do. Let him stay there."
148. Q. Didn't that happen considerable time previously?
A. Not very long previously, to my recollection. Previous to this
dispatch, yes.
149. Q. But this dispatch states that negotiations have ceased.
A. As a matter of fact, they had not ceased. Admiral.
150. Q. Then the use of the words "War Warning" did not impress
you as requiring any increase in security precautions or any departure
from the scheduled routine deployment?
A. No, sir, with the exception of the protection of ships at sea as
laid down in our October 15 directive. They did not impress me that
there would be an attack on Pearl Harbor.
IBS'] 1 51. Q. And in your recollection, all others with whom you
were officially associated had reactions similar to yours?
A. Yes, sir.
1.52. Q. After the receipt of this dispatch. Admiral, is it not true
that von realized that a greater part of the arc of approRches to the
Pearl Harbor area were not covered bv any air or surface forces to
give information as to the approach of any possible enemy?
A. Yes. sir.
158. Q. Was this matter discussed at the conferences, either with
the Army or by Admiral Kimmel ?
62 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. The danger of ever having an attack on Pearl Harbor?
154. Q. The fact that so much of the arc was not covered by any
means.
A. No, sir. That is the last warning that I recall, except that we
got one about 5 : 30 p. m. on the 7th of December, through the Army.
It had originated the day before and was sent by cable. It was de-
livered by General Short^s Aide to us some ten hours after the attack
on Pearl Harbor.
155. Q. I have here Exhibit 9 before this examination, Admiral,
which is a dispatch transmitted by the Chief of Naval Operations to
the Commanders-in-Chief — to certain Frontier Commanders, with
copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. It is dated November
28, 1941. Are you familiar with it?
A. I don't recall this message. I probably saw it at the time but
I don't recall it. I note that it states that this WPL will not be placed
in effect in the Pacific.
156. Q. Admiral, I have here a dispatch, Exhibit 11 before this
examination, addressed by the Chief of Naval Operations to Com-
manders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets, and Commandants
Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval Districts, dated December 3, 1941.
Are you familiar with that dispatch, sir ?
A. Yes, I remember that.
157. Q. Upon seeing this, did you not consider that the steps being
taken by the Japanese were extremely significant as point out future
action ?
A. I did.
158. Q. Did it leave much, if any, doubt in your mind that they were
about to make a hostile move ?
A. No. In fact, as I recall, we had, by that time, received word from
the Asiatic Fleet that heavy Japanese movements were on the way
to the southard. It did not occur to us, however, that the attack was
coming in our direction.
159. Q. That is, your reaction was that the Japs were about to go
to war with someone but it, in no way, conveyed to you any increased
imminence of danger of an attack against Pearl Harbor?
A. No, sir. I believed, from previous warnings that we had had,
that the attack was going to be possibly against the Philippines but
toward the Malay Peninsula.
160. Q. And within your remembrance, was the reaction of the
others with whom you were associated at Admiral Kimmel's Head-
quarters quite similar to your?
A. Yes, sir, it was.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 12 : 30 p. m., adjourned until 9 : 30
a. m., tomorrow.
PRbCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 63
PROCEEDINGSIOF THE HART INQUIRY
THURSDAY, MARCH 9, 1944
Fourth Day
Navy Department,
Washington., D. C.
The examination met at 9 : 30 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Ketired, examining officer,
and his counsel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the third day of the examination until such time as
it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the
examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, U. S. Navy, the witness under examina-
tion when the adjournment was taken, entered. He was warned that
the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his
testimony.
Examination by the examining officer (Continued) :
159. Q. Admiral, you testified that in the week or so prior to the
attack on December 7 several conditions of readiness were prescribed.
Do you know if these conditions were at any time prescribed by Ad-
miral Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet ?
A. My recollection is that the condition of readiness came from the
Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. I do know that Ad-
miral Kimmel had prescribed them as a drill. Whether he actually
ordered it, I do not recall. However, all of this is a matter of record
and can easily be ascertained from the files of the Commander-in-Chief
of the Pacific Fleet or from the then Communications Officer, Cg.ptain
Curts, now in the Navy Department.
At this point, in order to introduce certain documents into the pro-
ceedings which were not until now available, for use in the further
examination of this witness, the examining officer directed that the
present witness withdraw and Commander Benjamin Katz be recalled.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
Commander Benjamin Katz, U. S. Navy, was recalled as a witness
by the examining officer and was warned that the oath previously taken
was still binding.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. Do you have in your custody a dispatch dated January 26, 1941 ,
transmitted from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, reference office No. 270038?
64 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I have that, sir.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note : Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned
to the Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A descrip-
tion of the document [55] introduced in evidence is appended
marked "Exhibit 12".
2. Q. Do you have in your possession the dispatch of November 26,
1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief
Pacific Fleet, office reference 270040 ?
A. I have that too, sir.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note : Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned
to the Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A descrip-
tion of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked
"Exhibit 13".
3. Q. Do you have in your possession a dispatch dated November
28, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-
Chief Pacific Fleet, office reference 282054?
A. Yes, sir, here it is.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note : Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned
to the Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A descrip-
tion of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Ex-
hibit 14."
4. Q. Do you have in your possession a dispatch from the Com-
mander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, dated November 28, 1941, to the Chief
of Naval Operations, office reference 280627?
A. I have that. Here it is.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note : Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned
to the Code Room, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A descrip-
tion of the document introduced in evidence is appended marked
"Exhibit 15''. ...
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to
make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject
matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of
record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out by
the previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, U. S. Navy, was recalled as a witness
by the examining officer, who warned that the oath previously taken
was still binding, and continued his testimony.
(Examination by the examining officer continued :)
160. Q. Admiral, the Pacific Fleet confidential letter, No. 2CL^1
(Revised), which is Exhibit 4 before this examination, provides that
the Commandant of the Fourteenth District, as the Naval Base De-
fense Officer, should advise the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl
Harbor, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States
Pacific Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain. Do you
[56] interpret that directive to grant authority to the Com-
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to order conditions of readiness?
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 65
A. Yes, I do. In my recollection, that was what was in effect at
the time.
161. Q. Do you know what condition of readiness was in fact in
effect just prior to the attack on the 7th of December?
A. I do not. It is impossible for me to remember details that
lontT ago. However, the fact that the ammunition was readily obtain-
able and the guns were manned very promptly on the morning of 7
December, I believe that a condition of readiness had been prescribed.
162. Q. Where were you when the attack commenced?
A. I was at home. I believe I was one of the first notified. I was
at breakfast at home in Honolulu when I received the telephone call
saying, "This is not a drill." I proceeded immediately to Pearl Harbor
in my own automobile.
163. Q. At about what time did you arrive at the Navy Yard in
Pearl Harbor?
A. At about twenty minutes after eight.
164. Q. What was your observation as to the readiness and effec-
tiveness of the batteries of the various ships in meeting the attack?
A. All ships seemed to be firing. The sky was full of bursts. I
could see those long before I got down there. The ARIZONA had
already been hit and was smoking. Not only the batteries were firing,
but men and machine guns and rifles were all over the tops of build-
ings and out in the park and everybody was shooting.
165. Q. Did you receive a report of any contact wdth submarines
on that morning, prior to the attack, on the part of naval vessels of
the United States?
A. I did not. The report of the submarine w\as received by the
Staff Duty Officer who was Commander Murphy, who delivered the
message to Admiral Bloch, and, I believe, to Admiral Kimmel. My
recollection is that Admiral Bloch informed the Secretary of Navy
a few days after Pearl Harbor that he had received this message at
7 : 15. Talking to Captain Maddox, who was on board the ANT ARES,
the ANTARES had been about to enter Pearl Harbor and as she
turned, the conning tower of the midget submarine broke the surface.
He called this to the attention of the destroyer WARD who sank the
submarine, and the WARD informed the signal tower, unfortunately
by signal, that he had attacked a submarine at the entrance to Pearl
Harbor. As Captain Maddox said at the time, he regretted that he
had not put the thing out by radio in plain language telling everybody
that it actually was a submarine and it actually had been sunk. You
see, we had received so many false submarine reports before that
time. I do not remember the exact wording of the signal sent through
the signal tower, but I gathered from what Admiral Bloch told us
later that he did not consider it as serious as it actually was. I'm
quoting from a conversation between Admiral Bloch and the Secre-
tary of Navy, a few days after Pearl Harbor, in the presence of
Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Pye and General Short and myself.
But the first message I got was that Pearl Harbor was under attack.
I received no message before that about the submarine. You must
also realize the communications between Pearl Harbor and Honolulu
were very poor. Efforts had been made for months to get more trunk
lines through but it was sometimes very difficult to communicate be-
tween the two places. It was particularly difficult to communicate
79716 — 46— Ex. 144 6
66 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
with the Army. It had to go through several stations. The Fleet
Communications Officer can give you more details of this than I
can, but I do know it had been taken up months before, both by the
Army and Navy, to improve these communications. [S7] In
fact, I was quite astounded that the message from the Fleet Office
ashore in Pearl Harbor reached me as quickly as it did. I do not
know whether any attempt had been made to inform me of the sub-
marine attack, but if any attempt was made, I never received it.
166. Q. Do you recall the initials of the Commander Murphy who
was the Staff Duty Officer?
A. V. R. Murphy, now head of the Post Graduate School at Annap-
olis.
167. Q. What consideration, if any, had been given by the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet or the members of his Staff to the
possibility of a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor prior to any decla-
ration of war?
A. I believe every consideration that was given is laid down in that
directive that you have, dated the 14th of October (indicating Exhibit
4) . There was no one, to my knowledge, on the Commander-in-Chief's
Staff, or, from later inquiries I have made, in the Navy Department
itself, who believed that there was danger of a surprise air attack on
Pearl Harbor. As I have stated yesterday, it is provided for in our
directive but in the minds of the peo})le out there, it was not expected.
168. Q. As I understand the directive, that sets up the measures to
be taken in the event of an air attack. What precautions were taken to
get advance warning of an air attack ?
A. We had no air patrol to the northard ; we had submarines patrol-
ling at Wake and Midway and had had them there for some time. I
would say that on the morning of the 7th of December no special pre-
cautions were taken against air attack. The air patrol to the South of
Oahu was being maintained.
169. Q. And upon what consideration was this decision that such a
surprise attack was not considered a possibility based ; why was the
possibility of a surprise attack not considered and taken into consider-
ation in formulating the security plans of the Fleet ?
A. I believe that the attitude was very well stated by the War Plans
Officer in his testimony before the Roberts Board when asked that
question. I don't know whether it is a matter of record, but I was
informed at the time his reply was: "I didn't believe they had the
guts to try it, and if they had, they wouldn't get away with it." Un-
fortunately, I believe that was the attitude of most of us.
170. Q, Under the Navy's usual methods, everything of that sort is
primarily based upon an estimate of the situation, is it not?
A. Yes, sir.
171. Q. Those estimates usually contain the courses of action open
to the enemy ; is that right ?
A. Yes, sir.
172. Q. Do you recall any serious consideration in any estimate^of
the situati(m which was made of that particular course of action, which
naturally was open to the enemy?
A. The estimate of the situation is laid down in the Pacific Fleet
Contributory War Plan issued about the 1st of July, 1941, and it did
not, to the best of my knowledge, consider that the Japs would make
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 67
an attack against Pearl Harbor. It contemplated their action against
Malay and the Philippines, with raids on our outlying islands: Wake,
Midway, Palmyra, Johnston. To the best of my knoAvledge, this esti-
mate did not consider an air attack possibility against Pearl Harbor
itself.
[5<S] 173. Q. Admiral, I show yon a publication which is listed
as ''U. S. Fleet Operating Plan, Rainbow 5''. Do yon recognize that?
A. I do. It was issued after I'eceipt of the Basic War Plan, Rain-
bow 5, and Avas prepared by Captain — now Read Admiral McMorris
and his Staff in the Wai- Plans Division of the Commander-in-Chief's
Staff. It was issued about July 1, 1941.
174. Q. Was it approved by xVdmiraO^immel as the Commander-in-
Chief of the U. S. Pacific Fleet ?
A. It was approved and signed by Admiral Kimmel.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
!Note : Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned
to Registered Publications Section, Chief of Naval Operations Office,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document
introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 16".
175. Q. Admiral, are you familiar with the contents of this docu-
ment which has just been introduced and identified as Exhibit 16 before
this examination ?
A. Yes.
176. Q. In your testimony of yesterday, with reference to the Basic
War Plans, you made certain statements concerning the tasks assigned
the U. S. Pacific Fleet. Since tliat time, through the use of this ]ilan,
have you recalled to your memory more specifically the provisions of
the plans provided herein?
A. Yes, sir, there were a numl)er of task forces, and the Task Forces
1, 2, and 3 stand out in my mind more than the others. Task Force 1
was the battle force under Admiral Pye. He then had six battleships
and cruisers and destroyers, the exact number I do not remember. He
Avas the supporting force. And striking Task Force 2, under Admiral
Halsey, consisting of one division of battleships and one carrier,
cruisers, and destroyers, was to make a raid on the Marshalls, sup-
ported by Task Force 1 of heavy ships. Task Force 3 under Admiral
Wilson ]3roAA'n, Avas composed of one carrier and some eight heavy
cruisers, and destroyers, and that Task Force was scheduled to raid
enemy commerce. AH of this was in accordance with the basTc plan.
The basic plan also called for us to capture — to deny to the enemy the
Marshalls and Carolines and to capture a fleet base in Truk. You
Avill find that the Pacific Fleet Plan is divided into scA^eral phases,
because obviously the capture of Ti-uk was impossible. We had only
one division of transports, then under intensive training at San Diego
for amphibious operations; we had none in Pearl Harbor. We had
only a few hundred Marines; we had no supply ships beyond those
necessary to service the Fleet, and the outlying islands. In fact, we
found it rather difficult to supply the outlying islands wnth what we
had, so that we could not have possibly taken any of the Marshall
Islands. We could raid them but Ave could not capture them. The
plan called for the movement, as soon after declaration of war as pos-
sible, of the Second Marine Division from the California Coast to
Hawaii. I might add also, the submarines were given the task of es-
68 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tablishing patrols in enemy Empire waters, and in the Marshalls and
Carolines. Their plans were all made and what to do. but we were
continually Avarned not to take any action nntil Ja]ian made a move
which indicated openino- of hostilities. We had not based our subma-
rines in Japanese waters, but we had established a submarine patrol
operating from Wake and from Midway.
177. Q. Admiral, confining the problem to the first phase, notably
the intended raid to the westward, was readiness for that step to be
made immediately after [5^] the outbreak of hostilities very
much in the picture around Admiral Kimmel's Headquarters and to
such an extent that it amounted to a major preoccupation?
A. It was very much in the minds of Admiral Kimmel and of Ad-
miral Halse^y. In fact, Admiral Halsey was anxious to go.
178. Q. Did that preoccupation have any decided effect on the meas-
ures for security of the Fleet while in Pearl Harbor?
A. I believe that the question of the security of the Fleet in Pearl
Harbor was not seriously considered. The Fleet was ready to carry
out its task at the outbreak of war. The question of an attack before
negotiations were completed, in spite of the fact that the Japs had
done it in previous wars, was not, in my opinion, seriously considered.
There was a great deal of confusion in the minds of the entire Staff.
They knew that Mr. Nomura and Mr. Kurusu wei-e still in Washing-
ton, and perhaps we were too trustful.
179. Q. Referring to your testimony about qualities of Japanese
naval leaders, did you not receive anything direct from the Navy
Department and in addition to what Commander McCrea told you?
A. Not to my recollection ; no, sir.
180. Q. In the minds of the A^arious members of the Pacific Fleet
Staff, do you remember much expression of opinion as to the relative
efficiency of the Japanese navy prior to the outbreak of the war?
A. It was very much discussed at Staff conferences and it was
brought out by the Fleet Intelligence Officer, as it had been brought
to my attention years before through Commander Rochefort while
on the Staff of Admiral Reeves in 1935, that we had very little knowl-
edge as to the efficiency of the Japanese Navy, but it had spent a great
deal of time at sea and we believed it was A^ery efficient. We had a
high regard for the Japanese Navy on the meager information
obtainable, and Ave were informed by our intelligence officer that ir
was impossible to get any information on the Japanese Fleet since
our ships Avere never near it. And when ships of our NaA-y visited a
Japanese port, such as the ASTORIA did, about 1939, if they met
units of the Japanese Fleet, those units Avei-e immediately surrounded
by a smoke screen. All of our infoi*mation on the Japanese Fleet was
by radio intelligence only, meaning as to its location.
181. Q. Then you did not, in the Office of the Commande*-in-Chief,
tend to underestimate the Japanese, as we noAv know Avas the case in
other circles?
A. Not at all. We did not underestimate them.
182. Q. Admiral, I gather from your testimony that you, yourself,
were very much preoccupied Avith the day to day administratiA-e duties
of the position of Chief of Staff. Did you think at the time that you
were being left insufficient time for thought on matters of greater
import, particularly into the future?
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 69
A. I felt then, and still feel, that entirely too much of my time was
taken up with administrative matters. I was warned to that effect by
my predecessor, Admiral Taffinder. While still afloat, while the
Commander-in-Chief was in the PENNSYLVANIA, there was time
for deep thinking because it was possible to close the door and shut
people out and there were intervals at sea when we had plenty of time
for thought, but when the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff moved
ashore, with the desk always full of papers and many times a day
spending hours in conference with the Commander-in-Chief and as
many members of his Staff as he had present, I found it difficult to
keep the day by day routine going. And I found it almost impossible
to give deep thought to future events. I did know, however, that we
had four very competent officers in War Plans who were spending all
of [00] their time on that and I attempted, so far as possible,
to keep the pressure off of those officers because the pressure is high
in a Staff organization on shore where the Chief of Staff has one very
small office and people are constantly coming in and going out.
183. Q. Who, if anyone, was to blame for that situation in which
you found yourself ?
A. Possibly I was to blame myself. I had given instructions to the
Flag Secretary as to the type of papers which were to be shown to
me and many, many papers were not brought to me at all. I attempted
to reduce that paper work, but the Commander-in-Chief, whose office
was next to mine, rang my bell perhaps too frequently and kept
me too long in the office. He knew that because I told him so. But
he was a very energetic man, he worked long hours, and when some-
thing was on his mind he would always send for me and usually for
several other members of the Staff. I believe now that we spent en-
tirely too much time in those discussions.
184. Q. Do you blame anyone outside of the Fleet ?
A. No, sir, I do not. The entire Navy system of paper work,
as you know, is somewhat to blame, but it was not any more so in the
Pacific Fleet than it was in the rest of the Navy organization.
185. Q. Do you think that the fact that you, yourself, spent most
all of your time and energy on the day-to-day administrative matters
left the Commander-in-Chief correspondingly free to give thought to
matters of- greater importance, particularly dealing with the future?
A. I tried to make it that way, and I believe he was more free.
I know he was much more free than I to think of future events. The
Commander-in-Chief's day did not end at the office; he considered
these things far into the night in his quarters.
186. Q. Admiral, was the matter of the protection of the ships
berthed in Pearl Harbor from torpedoes dropped from aircraft con-
sidered by the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff?
A. Yes, and by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.
In the Summer of 1941, we had a communication in the form of an
official letter from the Chief of Naval Operations asking whether
we needed barrage balloons and torpedo nets for protecting berths.
This letter was accompanied by a letter from the Bureau of Ordnance
which stated definitely that torpedoes launched from aircraft could not
be effective in a depth of water less than 75 feet. The question of
the advisability of installing nets about the berths at Pearl Harbor
was thoroughly discussed by the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Bloch,
70 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Pye, and members of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff. The
chart showed that we had practically no spots where the water was
more than forty-six feet in depth. And I remember at that conference
Admiral Bloch havinjo; stated that these nets would further reduce the
manuevering room in the waters of Pearl Harbor, and that if torpedoes
were not effective in such shallow water, it would seem unnecessary
to use torpedo nets. As a result of that conference, an official letter
was signed by the Commander-in-Chief. I would not trust my mem-
ory to the extent of making a definite statement, but I believe that the
letter to the Navy Department stating that we did not want torpedo
nets was originated by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval
District, and that the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet put a
concurring endorsement on it. At any rate, I know that we officially
informed the Navy Department that Ave did not consider nets neces-
sary. I believe the opinion expressed by the Bureau of [61]
Ordnance was based, of course, on our own torpedo experience and
we did not have the information on the Japanese torpedo.
187. Q. Admiral, I show you here several letters, a part of the Se-
cret-Confidential Files of the Navy Department. Can you identify
them?
A. I remember the letter from the Chief of Naval Operations on 15
P'ebruary, 1941, very well. It is this letter I had in mind in my
recent testimony. I do not recall ever having seen the second letter.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note : Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned
to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document
introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 17".
1S8. Q. Admiral, I show you a letter signed by Admiral Kimmel, on
file in the Secret-Confidential Files in the Navy Department, dated
March 12, 1941. Can you identify it?
A. Yes; it passed through my hands before it was signed by the
Commander-in-Chief and this letter was written as a result of the
conference to which I referred. I was under the impression that
it was an endorsement on the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval
District's letter but I see it originated in the Office of the Commander-
in-Chief. I do know, however, that Admiral Bloch was very much
in the discussion before that decision was reached.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note : Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned
to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the docu-
ment introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 18".
189, Q. Admiral, I show you a letter, now on file in the Secret-
Confidential Files, Navy Department, dated June 13, 1941, addressed
by the Chief of Naval Operations to the several Commandants of
Naval Districts, and marked that a copy was furnished, amon^ others,
to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Can you identify that
letter as anything you received ?
A. I do not recall ever having seen that letter.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note : Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned
to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of Naval Operations,
PRQCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 71
Navy Department, Washington, D, C. A description of the docu-
ment introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 19."
190. Q. Admiral, do you recall whether the decision of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, as outlined in his letter of March 12, 1941, Exhibit
18, was at any subsequent time reconsidered by the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet?
A. I'm positive it was never reconsidered. I believe that in the
original discussion one of the factors that were stressed was that these
old battleships of ours, all overweight and drawing much more water
than they were designed to draw, were very difficult to handle at slow
speeds, and that the argument advanced by Admiral Bloch was that
these torpedo net baffles would restrict too [62] much the
maneuvering room in Pearl Harbor in the vicinity of the berths. But
the main reason for stating that they were not necessary was that
impression carried by this CNO letter that torpedoes could not be
expected to be effective in depths of less than 75 feet and that a depth
of 150 feet was preferable.
191. Q. In discussing the possibility of providing torpedo baffles,
was consideration given to the fact that in the channel that approaches
Merry Point, there would probably be clear water for torpedoes to
run a sufficient distance to arm themselves, thus making an approach
by torpedo planes from that direction a distinct hazard to battle-
ships moored along the south shore of Ford Island?
A. Yes, consideration was given to that, but it was not a question
of whether there was sufficient water for the torpedo to arm itself
but it was the 75 foot depth required which made us believe that the
torpedo could not be launched in that water. I would like to bring
out in this record an opinion that is very strong with me, that we are
entirely too secretive about such thinjis as torpedoes and that we
do not give enough information to the Fleet itself. I have in mind a
movement ordered in the early part of 1941 when a number of cruisers
and destroyers were ordered to Samoa by the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions and they were to be prepared for distant service. The Com-
mander-in-Chief, himself, did not know what this service would be.
It turned out to be a cruise to Australia and New Zealand, but the
destroyers were ordered to equip themselves with the Mark VI ex-
ploder. This dispatch was read by the Commander-in-Chief in my
cabin and I asked him if he knew what the Mark VI exploder is.
He did not. I told him that I suspected it was a magnetic head be-
cause such a magnetic head had been mider experiment while I was
manufacturing officer for torpedoes in Newport in 1928 and 9. I
had never been able to get any information on whether this magnetic
head had been a success. We sent for the Fleet Gunnery Officer.
Captain Kitts, now Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, and
asked him if he knew what the Mark VI exploder is and he replied
that he did not, although he had been a gunnery man practically dur-
ing his entire career. We returned to port and sent for Admiral
Draemel, then commanding the Destroyers of Pacific Fleet. Neither
Admiral Draemel nor his Staff had ever heard of the magnetic head.
The exploders were in store at the Submarine Base at Pearl Harbor
and the submarine people were the only ones who had any knowledge
in the Fleet. Now if all of our torpedo information is kept as secret
as the Mark VI exploder was kept, then I can understand why we
72 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
didn't know at what height or depth of water a torpedo could bei
launched from an airplane. I bring that out in my testimony in the
hope that in the future things will not be kept so secret.
192. Q. Admiral, was the use of barrage balloons, which happens
to have been considered along with the baffles, abandoned for the
same reason that you didn't feel that torpedoes could run?
A. Yes, that is my recollection.
193. Q. Admiral, in your testimony yesterday you made reference
to the proposed relieving of certain Marine units in the outlying
islands by the Army. I now show you a dispatch which has been
identified as Exhibit 12 before this examination. Can you identify
it in connection with your testimony ?
A. Yes, that is the message I had in mind in my testimony yes-
terday. I don't know the exact date, but I stated at the time I believe
it was received in the week preceding Pearl Harbor.
[^S] 194. Q. Similarly, I show you Exhibit 13 before this ex-
amination.
A. The Army received a message similar to that (indicating pre-
vious Exhibit 12). Yes, I remember also that the Army had no guns
to put on the islands. It was agreed that we would leave our guns
there.
195. Q. Can you identify Exhibit 15 before this examination?
A. Yes, I remember that dispatch which was prepared as a result
of the conference we had with the Army. You will note that it ques-
tions the usefulness of Army airplanes since they cannot operate more
than twenty miles off shore, and it answers the question of whether
Army bombs can be used in Navy planes, or Navy bombs in Army
planes. That had already been remedied. And it also makes that
statement, as of 26 November, that Marine fighters were being sent
to Wake. This was the special trip that the ENTERPRISE made.
196. Q. Similarly, I show you Exhibit 14. Can you identify that,
sir, as a dispatch under consideration by the Commander-in-Chief?
A. Yes, I have a recollection of that dispatch, and the SARATOGA
was in San Diego at the time, I believe.
197. Q. Admiral, it is noted that the first two dispatches, by exhibit
numbers 12 and 13, were transmitted by the Navy Department on the
26th of November, 1941, and that the Commander-in-Chief replied
to these dispatches on November 28, 1941. It is also observed that the
war warning dispatch was dated November 27, or the day intervening.
Would you please explain to us the consideration given by the Com-
mander-in-Chief to this problem in connection with the war warning
problem, and give particular reference to the bearing of this problem,
presented by this series of exhibits, on the actions and thoughts of
the Commander-in-Chief as it related to his decisions with respect
to the war warning?
A. I don't believe that the dispatch concerning the outlying islands
was considered related to the war warning. We had the impression
that Marines were needed elsewhere. Also it is my recollection that
the discussion didn't end Mnth the dispatch sent by the Commander-
in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet on tlie 28th of November, but it lasted sev-
eral days as plans were being made. I have always felt that the ques-
tion being given such full consideration by the combined Staffs of the
Army and the Navy was diverting at a time when we should have
been thinking about other things.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 73
198. Q. Then you think that it amounted to a decided mental pre-
occupation on the part of the highest Army and Navy officers in
Hawaii?
A. I certainly do.
199. Q. Referring to your previous testimon}^ concerning person-
nel of the Pacific Fleet, was the Fleet being hampered and adminis-
trative difficulties and work increased bj^ repeated directives to trans-
fer personnel elsewhere ?
A. We had, for years, before us this problem of repeated transfers
of personnel, and most officers complained of it, but the plan of new
construction was known and, in my opinion, the efficiency of the
Fleet didn't suffer from too frequent changes of personnel.
200. Q. Admiral, was the lack of mental apprehension of a carrier
raid based upon preoccupation incident to what would be required
of the Fleet in the way of an offensive movement at the beginning of
a war?
A. No.
[64] 201. Q. Was that same lack of apprehension in any degree
incident to the administrative difficulties facing the Fleet which were
caused by long-time basing at Pearl Harbor?
A. In my opinion, no.
202. Q. Was it due to a lack of warning of possible surprise attack
from the Navy Department; lack of warning from the Navy De-
partment ?
A. I think very possibly, yes. This and the fact that all of our
warnings mentioned attacks in the Far East probably resulted in a
state of mind where we did not believe that we would be subjected
to an air attack at Pearl Harbor. We did expect a submarine attack.
I believe you will find that the mental attitude of every one, practically
every one out there, was such that they did not expect an air raid
on Pearl Harbor, although plans were made to meet one, as I have
said, by the stationing of ships and conditions of readiness.
203. Q. You've mentioned in previous testimony warnings of sur-
prise hostile action somewhere having been received over a long period
of time prior to 7 December. Do you think that so many of those
warnings had been received that it was something of the nature of
too much crying "wolf" ?
A. I most certainly do, because those warnings had been received
not only during Admiral Kimmel's administration but the files show
they had been received at least six months previously by Admiral
Richardson, usually in weekly letters from the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions in the form of personal letters, all of which were kept on file.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged
to make any further statement covering anything relating to the sub-
ject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter
of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought
out by the previous questioning.
The witness made the following statement: The thought I have
had in mind is that we spent too much time in worrying about the
outlying islands. We had large forces of civilians working on Wake
and Midwav and the Connnander-in-Chief spent a great deal of time,
in fact more time than I think we should have spent, in efforts to com-
plete the defenses of the outlying islands. He even went to the extent
74 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of personally auditing the records of the number of rounds of ammu-
nition of all sorts on each island. He was much more concerned about
the outlying islands than about Oahu, as the estimate shown in the
Pacific War Plan will indicate. Looking back upon it, I think that
we probably gave too much thought to these islands and not enough
to the larger thing. I may be wrong about that but that is my opinion.
(Examination by the examining officer continued :)
204. Q. That is the way it looks to you now ?
A. Yes.
205. Q. It did not so occur to you at the time ?
A. It did at the time. And to emphasize that, I will state that one
afternoon I went into the Commander-in-Chief's office and found him
comparing these lists of ammunition with a list brought over by Ad-
miral Bloch at the [SS^ Commander-in-Chief's direction.
The two papers disagreed. And I made the remark that the Com-
mander-in-Chief should not be counting bullets, that he had a Staff to
do that. Both Admirals laughed and agreed with me.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 11 :05 a. m., took a recess until 2 :30
p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.
Present: The examining officer and his counsel and assistant
counsel.
Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
took seat as the reporter and was warned that the oath previously
taken was still binding,
[66] No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination
were present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface
to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. Admiral, please give us your name, rank, and present station.
A. Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick, Assistant Chief of Naval Op-
erations for Logistics Plans.
2. Q. Where were you stationed on December 7, 1941, sir?
A. I was Assistant War Plans Officer to the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet.
3. Q. Was tlie War Plans Office of the Coi;^mander-in-Chief, U. S.
Pacific Fleet, divided by duties ?
A. Yes.
4. Q. Will you please explain just where you fitted into that di-
vision of duties ?
A. Under Rear Admiral — he was then Captain — McMorris, I was
responsible for the preparation of the written War Plans for the
Pacific Fleet, which were required to implement the basic Navy war
plans then in effect.
5. Q. And how long prior to December 7 had you been performing
these duties, sir ?
A. I reported for that duty on February 1st, 1941.
6. Q. In connection with your performance of your duties, were
you familiar with this document, which is Exhibit 16 before this
examination ?
A. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 75
7. Q. In connection with the Exhibit before you, will you please
state the commitments the U. S. Pacific Fleet provided during the
first phase of the war, such as contemplated by Rainbow 5 plan?
A. In general, it was to defend the United States and its posses-
sions, some of which were in special categories, specifically Guam,
which was in the category "F", which indicated that it was more or
less indefensible; it was to divert the Japanese strength away from
the Malay Barrier by raids, and the capture of positions in the Mar-
shall Islands ; to protect our sea communications ; raid the enemy sea
communications — I believe that, more specifically, it was to interrupt
the Japanese communications east of Longitude 180.
8. Q. With respect to the task forces composed of combatant ships,
then this would provide basically for offensive operations, is that not
correct, sir ?
[67] A. That is correct, up to the extent of the capabilities of
the Fleet at that time, which limited such operations to raids.
9. Q. Please explain briefly what parts and what percentages of
the ships available, to the Cominander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, would
thus be engaged in offensive operations during this first phase, or first
phase providing for Japanese participation in the war?
A. If you are taking into account the use of a covering force, you
might say that it was the whole of the Fleet.
10. Q. Was there any question in your mind as to the adequacy of
the forces then available for making that first raid to the westward?
A. I would say that I was of the opinion that with the three car-
riers which were attached to the Fleet, if they had been available,
we could have raided an island in the fringes of the Marshalls without
undue risk. At that time of December 7, there were only two carriers,
there being one at the Navy Yard.
11. Q. Was it the custom, or, we will say, the routine of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to keep this part of his plan in any
way fluid, to fit the availability of his forces, or did you simply hope
to carry out the plan as laid down, with whatever might be available?
A. I can't state for certain, but I believe that it was the intention
of the Commander-in-Chief to carry out the plan, even with the two
carriers that were available. I would like to make it clear that that is
not confirmed knowledge. But, the Fleet was organized at that time,
before the outbreak of the war, into three main task forces of which
one was a striking force, with the main carrier strength, one was a
covering force, and one was the force that we visualized would sup-
])ort whatever amjDhibious operations were conducted. These three
forces were trained together, went to sea together, and were specifi-
cally ordered to train for the tasks which their names imply.
12. Q. I understand from your answer. Admiral, the, that the oper-
ating schedules were more or less built around the War Plans, insofar
as the operations of the task forces were concerned.
A. That is correct, with the one exception that we had no actual
amphibious forces available to us out there, or with any certainty of
getting them in any very short period, with the possible exception of
the Second Marine Division, which was the Fleet Marine Force.
13. Q. Admiral, were you present at the conferences of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific'Fleet, with his Staff, which related to war
plans, future war planning?
A. At a small percentage of them.
76 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
14. Q. Were yoii familiar with the general attitude of the War
Plans Division, as it reflected the Commander-in-Chief's attitude with
respect to his current thou<^hts Avith respect to the international situ-
ation and possible future Fleet operations in case of war?
A. I think that Captain McMorris kept his section adequately
informed, but there were undoubtedly matters that he and Admiral
Kimmel, discussed, of which we were not informed — the remainder
of the section was not informed.
[68] 15. Q. Did the War Plans Section make its own estimates
of the situation, of possible enemy action, or war operations?
A. I can remember only about two formal estimates of the situ-
ation that were prepared along those lines. I would say that the
Commander-in-Chief arrived at his opinions of what enemy action
might be more through the means of these conferences that I speak of.
16. Q. During your preparation of war plans did you not, though,
perhaps informally rather than formally, in estimating the situation,
keep fully apprised of such information as was available with respect
to the international situation ?
A. I would say that I was quite generally informed of the informa-
tion that Admiral Kimmel received along those lines, but the usual
channel of information was from the Navy Department to Admiral
Kimmel, in the first place, rather than through any channels that
the staff might have to do with.
17. Q. Did you, in your war planning, cover all possible courses
of action, as you saw them, of the enemy, Japan, in the event of war?
A. Yes.
18. Q. In arriving at such decisions as to possible courses of action,
would you please outline what you believed to be the courses that were
open to the enemy ?
A. The courses open to the enemy, as we saw them, were in the
nature of raids on our positions and communications by means of
air and submarine attacks, and the seizure of our possessions which
lay easily within their reach. I will change that to the seizure of all
possessions in the Western Pacific. So far as any employment of
their heavy forces, you might say that it was considered most improb-
able that they would venture out of the Western Pacific.
19. Q. You no doubt listed a possible attack by air on Pearl Harbor
as a course of action, though: sir?
A. Yes.
20. Q. In the preparation of plans, AdmiiHl, which situation was
of major concern to the staff planners — the offensive movements of
the Fleet or the security measures needed to protect the islands to
the westward of Hawaii ?
A. I think probably the best ansAver that I could make to that
question is to state where I think the predominant attention was
focused — preparation for offensive movement, the countering of Jap-
anese action against Wake and MidAvay, and protection of the Fleet
against submarine attack. In regard to attack by air at Pearl Har-
bor, it Avas of course given full consideration, and a great deal of time
and attention had been, or rather, Avas placed on defensive measures
against such attack. Immediately after Admiral Kimmel took com-
mand, he activated our planning' with the Army, on Oahu, with the
idea of making up complete plans for repelling an air attack. As
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 77
regards the probability of such attack, particularly before war was
well luider way, there is no doubt that a very low degi'ee of prob-
ability was assigned to it. If you like, I can go into more detail in
connection with the actual preparations that were made under
Admiral Kimmel's direction.
[69] 21. Q. No, we don't need that. That opinion just ex-
l)ressed — was that based upon careful consideration of the availability
of the forces that the Japanese had, and in such an investigation did
Admiral Kimmel call in the advice of any of the Navy aviation per-
sonnel ?
A. I would say that the capabilities of the Japanese from this point
of view, were constantly in mind, but undoubtedly were greatly under-
estimated. I don't think that any of us, including Admiral Kimmel's
aviator advisors, had any real conception of how far the Japanese had
come in their training and preparations for such an attack as they
made. With respect to Admiral Kimmel's aviation advisors, I would
say that they were able, as near as I know, and had full opportunity to
present their views.
22. Q. But you do not recall any clisagTeement in that general point
of view on the part of any of our aviation personnel ?
A. I do not.
23. Q. Admiral, I show you a letter — are you familiar with that —
which is Exhibit 4 before this investigation ?
A. Yes, I am.
24. Q. Was that prepared by the War Plans Section of the Staff,
sir?
A. It was prepared chiefly by the Operations Section of the Staff,
although I should say that the War Plans Section had sufficient oppor-
tunity to advise on it.
25. Q. That letter, of course, was intended to provide for the secu-
rity of the Fleet while in bases, particularly Pearl Harbor. In your
preparation of war plans did the War Plans Section consider that
the protection afforded through the means set out, to be adequate for
the security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor prior to the declaration of
war?
A. I should say that we had the opinion that this was the best
deployment and arrangement that we could make with the forces
that we had. When it came to being ready to have war brought ti>
Pearl Harbor, the next day, you might say, no one was under any
illusions as to the inadequacy of many parts of the means at hand.
In general, I might make the remark that it didn't seem possible to
be ready in all respects for war until mobilization had been accom-
plished,* and the deployment of extra forces that everyone knew
would be necessary, had been accomplished.
26. Q. Did the offensive mission of the combatent forces during this
first phase of war enter into your conclusions with respect to the
adequacy of the security measures provided in this letter?
A. I don't believe I understand that question.
27. Q. In connection with the security of Pearl Harbor, was con-
sideration given to using Fleet units to augment the Army and local
defense forces in event of war, or surprise attack?
A. Yes, decidedly. The Fleet would constitute the backbone of any
defense of its own security, and there were little available in the way
78 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
of naval force in the Fourteenth Naval District which would con-
tribute in any degree. The necessity for training for offensive mis-
sions, or any other part of war, naturally makes it impossible to keep
the forces wholly employed in routine security measures.
[70] 28. Q. Then, the foremost thought in the minds of the
Commander-in-Chief's war planning advisors was the offensive move-
ments to be contemplated, rather than the security angle ?
A. I don't think that is true, to the state of imbalance, although it
was the intention to make the maximum offensive use of the Fleet
which its comparatively small size permitted.
29. Q. Admiral, what sources of enemy intelligence were available
to the War Plans Section of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff?
A. We had, of course, the routine publications of the Office of Naval
Intelligence, and the studies on Japan, and the Japanese. As regards
any operational or combat intelligence, if you might call it that in
time of peace, I would say that there was no information that came
to us except I think that we were cognizant of all warnings that came
to the Commander-in-Chief during the pre-war period.
30. Q. Did the Intelligence Section of the Staff provide you with
periodic reports as to the information available to them ?
A. I may be drawing a blank, but I don't believe I ever saw one. If
there was such a one, undoubtedly Admiral Kimmel used it, and
probably told Admiral McMorris. I will answer that question by
saying that I had no knowledge, I personally had no knowledge of
any Japanese movements until we saw despatches, I think about two
despatches, in the days just before the war, in which the Asiatic Fleet
had seen large movements on the way south, off Indo-China.
31. Q. Do you recall the source of that information, sir?
A. I believe that came in the form of a despatch from the Navy
Department, but I am not quite sure.
32. Q. But you were not furnished with daily or periodic reports
by the Staff Intelligence, or Fleet Intelligence?
A. For the War Plan Section, as a whole, I would say not. The
answer is "No."
33. Q. In formulating such estimates of the situation as you did
work through, were the personal characteristics of the Japanese naval
leaders taken into consideration ?
A. No specific characteristics were ever, in any estimate that I had
any part in the preparation of.
34. Q. Did War Plans section receive any^ intelligence dervided
from local sources?
A. I remember no instances of it, except a case or two of dealmg
with counter-espionage.
35. Q. Did you ever hear anything concerning a Navy effort to
have certain Japanese agents arrested, or otherwise segrated, some-
what prior to 7 December, 1941 ?
A. I have no recollection of it.
36. Q. You were cognizant of what is known, or what has come to
be known as the "War Warning Despatch" from the Navy Depart-
ment, 27 November ?
A. I remember one such despatch which had.
[71] 37. Q. You know what I am talking about ?
A. I had the impression this is it.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 79
38. Q. When did you first see that dispatch ?
A, Probably the day that it came in.
39. Q. Do you recall any particular significance which you then
attached to those words "War Warning" ?
A. To me, the words were impressive as a general method of alert-
ing for war, but I might add that I had seen a good many messages
during the previous months which were only slightly less impressive.
40. Q. At that time, did any thought come to you that perhaps the
force in Pearl Harbor should be doing anything different from what
they were actually doing, and continued to do until 7 December?
A. I think we all, on Admiral Kimmel's Staff, had knowledge of
the warning, reviewed the measures that might be taken, and I am not
quite sure as to just the exact measures that were taken, but I think it
was as a result of this message that some further action was taken in
regard to Wake, and our ships in Pearl Harbor were always in a des-
ignated condition of readiness and, although at this time it was the
lowest condition of readiness, as I remember it, all higher conditions
of readiness would have considerable effect on the condition of the
personnel and their ability to continue the program of training for
war.
41. Q. That dispatch contained a directive concerning deployment.
Do you recall at the time what that directive meant to you ?
A. It meant that the forces should be placed in the best position to
initiate tasks in the War Plan, if war eventuated immediately. It did
puzzle us that the term "defensive deployment" was used. My recol-
lection is that further strengthening of the islands to the westward
and defensive submarine patrols were the only changes that Admiral
Kimmel and his Staff could derive from this directive.
42. Q, Insofar as the security of the Fleet was concerned, the Jap-
anese submarines were the major considerations, is that right?
A. That is undoubtedly true.
43. Q. Is it true that concern for the outlying islands west and south
was a major worry, as regards a surprise attack?
A. Aside from submarine action, that is my recollection.
44. Q. So, security of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor was really quite a
minor consideration in the thoughts of everyone, is that correct?
A. Except for the submarine menace already mentioned, which
might include a submarine entering the harbor, I think that is true.
I can say that I know of no one present at Pearl Harbor who was not
completely surprised by the Japanese air attack.
45. Q. As one of the associate members of the Staff, rather than
simply as a War Plans officer, do you recall having had any particular
doubts as to the ability of the Army Air Forces on Oahu to meet their
commitments as regards the security of the Fleet?
[7;^] A. In line with what I said about all forces being insufii-
cient for a state of actual war at Pearl Harbor, the Army aircraft were
insufficient in number, and due to the limitation of Army fighters
over water, were of limited usefulness for that purpose.
46. Q. What was the particular difficulty about Army fighters fly-
ing over water ?
A. My understanding is that it was the lack of navigational equip-
ment and some weakness in radio — probably no radio.
80 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
47. Q. Was comparative efficiency of personnel in your mental pic-
ture at tTie lime?
A. No, sir.
48. Q. Admiral, did you take part in the joint planning with the
Army located on Oahu ?
A. I took part in some of the conferences which were held- in con-
nection with the joint defensive and security matters, which I have
already mentioned were initiated by Admiral Kimmel.
49. Q. Did you take part in any conferences during which the warn-
ing message, Exhibit 8, was discussed ?
A. I am quite sure that I was present at one conference that
Admiral Kimmel held in connection with this message.
50. Q. At that conference, was the meaning of this message dis-
cussed with the Army officers ?
A. I haven't an exact recollection of this particular instance, but
it was my observation General Short usually attended Admiral Kim-
mel's conference when warning messages were discussed.
51. Q. Were the relations of the Army and Navy with respect to
contemplated action, joint action, cordial, at these conferences?
A. According to my observation, yes.
52. Q. Then Admiral, you participated, as a Planning Officer, in
the work which led up to 2CL-41 (revised), which is Exhibit 4 in
these proceedings ?
A. I did, insofar as there was joint planning with the Army.
53. Q. Admiral, we have no further questions to ask you. We will
be very glad if you will give us any other testimony pertinent to the
facts which you consider would be helpful.
A. I am very glad to testify that, in my opinion, no one could have
been more whole-heartedly and self-sacrificingl}^ devoted to getting
the Fleet ready for war than Avas Admiral Kimmel. There is no doubt
about the fact that we, at Pearl Harbor, did, for various reasons, have
what you might call a blind spot in connection with any real proba-
bility of the carrier raid on Pearl Harbor. I think that with the
means at hand, and with the known difficulty of detecting such an
approach, it has been proved many times by our carrier task forces
in this war, that we would have suffered almost as greatly, if this blind
spot that I mentioned had not existed.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
[7-?] The examining officer informed ^he witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating
to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be
a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully
brought out by the previous questioning.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 3 : 80 p. m., adjourned until 2 : 45 p. m.
tomorrow.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 81
Vm PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HAKT INaUIRY
FBIDAY, MARCH 10, 1944
Fifth Day
Navy Department,
Washington^ D. C-
The examination met at 2 : 45 p. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer,
and his counsel and assistant counsel.
Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken
was still binding.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the fourth day until such time as it shall be reported
leady, and in the meantime to proceed with the examination.
The examining officer introduced in evidence a copy of a letter,
dated 10 March 1944, from the examining officer to Rear Admiral
Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, informing him of the prog-
i-ess of proceedings had under the precept, appended hereto marked
"Exhibit 20".
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface
to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station, sir.
A. Walter S. DeLany, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Assistant Chief
of Staff for Readiness, of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S.
Fleet.
2. Q. What duties were you performing on 7 December 1941, sir?
A. Assistant Chief of Staff and Operations Officer for the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the P^leet.
3. Q. And how long had you been performing those duties?
A. Well, since February, 1941, when Admiral Kimmel took com-
mand, and previous to that, I had been his Chief of Staff when he was
ComCruBatFor.
4. Q. Admiral, available records indicate that you have knowledge
pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that occurred on
7 December 1941. Please state the facts within your knowledge con-
cerning the attack and the major events leading up thereto. It is
79716 — 46 — Ex. 144 7
82 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
especially desired that you cover the followinfr, and a written copy
of this question is handed you so that you may refer to it as you testify :
Forces available to CinCPac, with organization tliereof. Briefly, the
general nature of the tasks assigned in the War Plans to the Fleet
during the early phases of war with Japan. Methods of training the
Fleet prior to the attack and the relationship of this [75]
training to the war tasks. Consideration given by CinCPac and his
Staff to the possibility of a surprise attack on the ships and installa-
tions at Pearl Harbor and security measures adopted with respect
thereto. Information available as regards the imminence of hostil-
ities with Japan with the source thereof. Action taken by CinCPac
during the weeks preceding the attack in the light of such informa-
tion. Relations with the Army Command on Oahu, particularly with
respect to mutual cooperation in the preparation for war.
A. Well, I think so far as tlie first question there, "Forces available
to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, with the organization thereof,"
the most accurate statement of the forces availffble appears in the
Commander-in-Chief's Confidential Letter 14CL-41, of 31 October
1941, which cancelled a previous organization of a similar nature, and
is a revision of the task force organization.
5. Q. May I interrupt, sir? Do you have in your custody a copy
of that order? I would like to introduce it in evidence and then give
it back to you, so we would know where it is.
A. I have the Chief of Naval Operation's file copy of it, because
when I saw this question, I went to the files of the Vice Chief of Naval
Operations and got his copy.
The document was introduced in evidence bj'' the examining officer.
Note : Because of the confldeutial nature of the document, it was returned to
Admiral DeLany. A description of the document introduced in evidence is ap-
pended marked "Exhibit 21".
A. (Continued.) I would like to have this included. I want to
point out that this reference is not a new concept of the organization
of the Pacific Fleet, because the Fleet had been organized into task
force organizations, the same as this, ever since about April of 1941.
The main difference between this and the previous letter was that it
made the Connnandant of the Fourteenth Naval District a task force
commander under the Commander-in-Chief whose primary mission
was to train, organize, and develop the island bases in order to insure
their defense and provide efficient service to ilie Fleet units engaged
in operations. It also provided on paper fov the organization of
submarines and patrol planes into task foi-ces, although this was
true before this letter of 31 October placed it into the Fleet Organi-
zation on paper.
6. Q. Would you like to go right ahead, sir ?
A. So far as this next general statement is concerned, the War Plans
Section of the Staff was continually keeping Pacific plans up to date,
and was forced to revise them continually because I think you are
familiar with the fact that the Pacific Fleet hud been rapidly decimated
in that carriers and battleships and destroyers and transports and
other types had been withdrawn from the Fleet. The concept of
what could be done in the Fleet with the forces available had to be
changed continually, with the reduction of the forces that became
available to the Commander-in-Chief. So far as the situation around
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 83
Pearl Harbor was concerned, we did keep a plan which was in posses-
sion of the Duty Officer continually, on what would be done with the
forces in the Fleet that were available in the [76] in the event
that we were informed that war had been declared against Japan. One
of the things was the raiding forces to the northward, and another,
as I recall it, was a strike in the Marshalls. It was not possible to
make those things effective because of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Plans were actually available and the people on the Staff knew what
they were, and everybody knew what tliey were supposed to do.
This question of "training the Fleet" I think I have already men-
tioned the fact that one of the first things the Commander-in-Chief
did when he assumed command out there was to change the organiza-
tion of the Fleet from a type organization into a task force organiza-
tion, with the available forces in the Pacific Fleet roughly divided
into three task forces, so that the types of the Fleet could become
familiar with the requirements of inter-type tactics in a combined task
force. That even went so far as to require the patrol planes and the
submarines to be assigned to the surface ship task forces. In all train-
ing exercises in the operating areas, the surface, submarine, and air
forces available in the Pacific area conducted coordinated and inter-
type tactics. In addition to that, the Army Air Forces were always
invited and usually did participate in the exercises at sea. Their long-
range planes would come out and look for the task forces operating
in that area. It is my personal belief that so far as that joint training
was concerned, there was a very clear understanding between the
people of my own echelon of what the joint problem in the area was.
I believe that there is, there must be, copies of the letters on file
which were issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, which
required Army planes to land on Navy fields and to be serviced by the
Navy, and required Navy planes to land on Army fields and be serviced
by them. I think there was a very definite understanding between
the people that Army and Navy bombs had to have certain modifi-
cations in order to fit into each other's planes, and all that had been
taken care of in the training exercises that had been conducted before
this 7th day of December.
The Fleet letter which the Commander-in-Chief issued early in
February and then kept modernized, so to speak, indicates the concept
which everybody had out there, that it was a joint responsibility
and a joint job to do what they could do to defend Pearl Harbor in
in the event of an attack. I think everybody realized that the defense
of the Island did depend on the Navy there, because certainly the Army
didn't have any ground forces, anti-aircraft installations, radar, or
anything else that would make Pearl Harbor a well-defended operat-
ing base. The training of the Fleet had been given such considera-
tion, and as I say, it was organized into what the Commander-in-
Chief's concept of a war task force would be. I believe his concept
has been shown to be correct because if we look at any of the task
forces that appear in this letter we see that their organization is
almost identical with the present carrier task forces.
Our training operations were not confined to particular areas. We
operated to the northward of the Island and operated to the south-
ward of the Island. The Commander-in-Chief personally discussed
this training with the Commanding General out there, and I know,
84 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
SO far as any relations with the Army on my [77] own level
were concerned, that we discussed them frequently. We used Army
facilities in our range-finding checks. We developed the use of smoke
outside the harbor. And the Army was enthusiastic about the train-
ing cooperation they got from us because they had high-speed targets
running .around the Island that they had never had before and I am
sure that we appreciated very much the service we got from them.
I know the same thing existed about air, because I mentioned that
before. The training was not only conducted with the idea of train-
ing the Fleet in seagoing tactics in the operating areas, but as that
letter there shows, we also had given quite some consideration to the
defense of Pearl Harbor, and I believe that you are familiar with the
defense letter that shows how carefully the ships had been moored in
Pearl Harbor and how the sectors were assigned and what the whole
concept of the defense was.
We did conduct numerous air raid drills, and whenever a drill was
conducted, we carefully analyzed what had been done at the drill, so
far as communications and joint cooperation was concerned. In that
connection, I feel that the Commandant of the District there, too, was
entirely familiar with the whole concept of the thing because he was
the Base Defense Officer, so far as local defense was concerned, and
as I pointed out, in this letter here he was actually a task force com-
mander within the Pacific Fleet organization for outlying bases. It
wasn't only the defense of Pearl Harbor that was involved but also
the defense of the outlying islands with which the Commandant of
the Fourteenth Naval District was concerned. I know that nothing
was undertaken having to do with the training for the defense of the
bases that the Commandant of the District and the Commanding
General of the area were not consulted about.
This next thing of "surprise attack on the ships and installations at
Pearl Harbor"— I will say it this way — from my own personal point
of view, and with a rather complete knowledge of the dispatches and
correspondence within the command out there, I did not and never
would have expected that the Japs would attack Pearl Harbor as they
did. I believe that everyone there was of the opinion that our danger
lay in the fact that submarines might operate in the area and also
that there might be sabotage on the Island. The general concept of
our defense of the Island and the security of the Base there was based
on that idea. I believe that you know that ill several instances that
it was suspected that submarines might be operating off the Island
and I think probably it is a part of the previous record, the decision
that the Commander-in-Chief took regarding his defense of the Island
against submarines and the exchange of correspondence between the
Commander-in-Chief and the Navy Department on the question of
dropping depth charges on what was supposed to be sound contacts
off the Island.
I have covered tlie training and general set-up that we had for the
security measures around the Island, and I believe that the security
letter of the Commander-in-Chief's which was in effect at the time was
quite indicative of our concept of what might happen there.
7. Q. May I interrupt. Admiral? This is Exhibit 4 before the
examination. May I ask if that is the letter to which you have been
referring?
PitOCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 85
A. Yes, 2CL-41 of October 14, which revised previous letters on
that same subject.
8. Q. And that is the one to which you referred ?
A. Yes.
[78] 9. Q. I just wanted to get the record straight.
A. (Continued.) This question of "Information available as re-
gards the imminence of hostilities with Japan", I believe I saw every
dispatch that came into the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters out
there, and there had been a series of these dispatches, but I think in
no single instance was there any expression in any dispatch which
indicated that anybody here in Washington, or anybody any place
else, had the belief that hostilities would open with an attack on
Pearl Harbor. The information, I think, indicated that there were
movement of transports and the Japanese Fleet. There was every
indication that something was going to break because the dispatches
indicated burning codes, and so forth, but from my own point of
view there, as I said before, there was nothing in any dispatch which
indicated that hostilities would be started the way they did.
"Action taken by the Commander-in-Chief during the weeks pre-
ceding the attack'', I know that the Commander-in-Chief was fully
aware of the fact that a tense condition was existing, he appreciated
that, and, in my opinion, he took proper precautions to safeguard
the Fleet whenever it was in the operating areas conducting vital
training exercises. I believe that he was familiar with the terribly
weak defense of Pearl Harbor and realized that the main defense
of the place from an air attack lay in the anti-aircraft guns of the
Fleet, and I believe that his letter there, which we referred to before,
his security measures, indicated that he had given a lot of thought
to that. As I mentioned previously, he did have a plan which every-
one on the staff knew about, as tq what would be done with the
Fleet there in event hostilities did break out. and I feel certain that
the Commandant of the District and the Commanding General of
the Hawaiian Area, and every senior officer in the Fleet organization
was given the information that the Commander-in-Chief had. I
know that the Commandant and the Commanding General attended
numerous conferences when this whole matter was discussed.
This "Relations with the Army Command on Oahu, particularly
with respect to mutual cooperation in the preparation for war" — I
think that the Commander-in-Chief, as I said before, discussed all
mattei's with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Area, and
that there was a mutual understanding of what cooperation was going
to be required under a joint effort in the Hawaiian Area. I think
that the Army was entirely familar with the efforts that the Na\'y'
was making to secure more equipment for the Navy in the area, and
I believe, too, that the Navy was familiar with the communications
that went on between the Commanding General and the War De-
partment in his effort to get more material into the Hawaiian Area.
They both appreciated that whether it was anti-aircraft, radar, or
aircraft, or anything else, the whole area was woefully weak and
both of them knew of the efforts that the other one was making to get
more of such materials. I feel that the training exercises that were
conducted by the joint effort out there indicates that there was an
understanding of the problem, and I can certainly say that the re-
86 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
lationships between the Army and the Navy out there was one of
complete understanding and very close relationship.
10. Q. Admiral, do you feel that everything was done that was
possible with the forces under your disposal, under the Commandei*-
in-Chief's disposal, to secure early information of possible attack, con-
sidering the shortage of aircraft suitable for that purpose, and the
shortage of ships, the necessity [75] for carrying on the
training program, the general situation, in the light of the warning
dispatches — did you consider that you had done everything
reasonable ?
A. Yes, within our concept, as I said before, and the belief that
enemy activity within the area would be confined to submarine
activities and sabotage within the Island.
11. Q. Admiral, are you familiar with the dispatch that was re-
ceived on the 27th of November, which contained a war warning,
which is Exhibit 8 before this examination?
A. Yes.
12. Q. Do you know, sir, whether Admiral Kimniel discussed this
dispatch with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian
Department ?
A. I believe that he did, and, as I say, that with the feeling that
I don't believe any dispatch ever came to the Commander-in-Chief's
Headquarters of this importance that was not discussed before the
Commandant of the District and the Commanding General.
13. Q. Were you present at this discussion?
A. Yes, I am quite sure I was.
14. Q. Did it discuss an interpretation of the meaning of the
dispatch with respect to the war warning angle?
A, Yes, and, as I recall the thing, I believe that the Island was
alerted on this dispatch and I believe that the Commander-in-Chief
put certain aspects of that security letter in effect with the forces
afloat.
15. Q. Admiral, this dispatch. Exhibit 8, requires certain action
in the nature of deployment. Will you please state, as well as you
can recollect, your reaction to the meaning of that provision?
A. I think tlie fact that the Fleet was organized into task forces
which, from tlie concept of the organization and the missions assigned
to them were to be offensive in nature, indicates the actual deploy-
ment of the Fleet. The fact that the Commander-in-Chief issued,
or rather, directed compliance with certain paragraphs in 2CL was
indicative of the fact that he appreciated a situation had arisen
wherein he had to take action to prevent a surprise attack on the
Fleet at sea from submarines, which, as I said before, was the general
concept that everybody had of the way that action might be taken
in the Hawaiian Area. No further action, so far as offensive deploy-
ment or offensive steps should be taken in this thing because the very
nature of the organization of the Fleet was such that the Fleet had
been organized and ready for a deployment for offensive action.
16. Q. Admiral, do you know of any action taken by the Com-
mander-in-Chief other than' that you have outlined in compliance
with that directive?
A. So far as aircraft is concerned, Commander ComPatWingTwo
was given orders to accelerate the refitting of all the planes in the
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 87
Hawaiian Area which had come to us without self-sealing tanks and
other offensive war equipment on board. I don't remember when the
submarines were sent out on patrol at Midway and Wake; I don't
recall whether that was incident to this dispatch, but I am quite sure
it was very close to this time.
[SO] 17. Q. Admiral, were you familiar with the Army's air-
craft warning service — radar?
A. Yes, I think I was. Of course there wasn't very much to be
familiar with.
18. Q. Do you recall its condition as to readiness for use on the 7tli
of December ?
A. I believe that the radar itself Avas operative, and that certain
periods were assigned for training operators. I know that not only
the Commander-in-Chief's Staff but the people in the Naval District
and the Army and ComPat Wing Two's Staff had paid a lot of atten-
tion to the aircraft warning set-up that was to go into the District, be-
cause the organization actually appeared on paper, a diagram of the
stations, the personnel that were required to man it, had all been actu-
ally prepared and, well, all we needed was the equipment which just
didn't get there.
19. Q. The Commander-in-Chief's Staff, then, didn't rely on it for
any information at that time.
A. No, because the whole warning service that was in existence on
that day was just the normal telephone communication that existed in
the Island, and as I said, the radar itself had just been installed and
was being used for training operators. The idea that the Island would
have an air warning service was fully accepted, and we knew that we
were supposed to get the equipment but it had not arrived and we
were prepared to use it as soon as we could get the equipment because,
as I said before, the actual diagram and layout of the whole warning
service, organization, equipment, personnel, and the need for the re-
spective stations had all been drawn up.
20. Q. Admiral, you stated several times that you and other mem-
bers of the Staff didn't think a surprise attack by air possible at Pearl
Harbor. Could you develop your reasons why that wasn't taken into
consideration, or was deemed an improbability?
A. I believe that I am correct in stating that the last information
which we had regarding the location of the Japanese Fleet placed
them in home waters. I believe the idea that the Japanese Fleet
would come to the Pearl Harbor area for an attack was not considered
likely because of the inherent danger that was involved, and also the
fact that from my own point of view, and that was discussed out
there, there was one thino; that would inflame Americans into Avar and
that was an attack on their home territory. We frankly felt that with
the indecision that we knew and interpreted from the dispatches as
to what America would do if Japan went into the Malays or went
into India, or went into any other place, — it was such that tlie Japanese
must hnve been of the same opinion that we had there, that the one way
to incite America into the war was to come over and attack the Ha-
waiian Islands and I believe, and still feel as I always felt, that the one
single thing that put America in the war with a bang, was the attack on
Pearl Harbor and I don't believe anything else would have done it.
I think that there was a lot of discuss^ion about that around the Pearl
88 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Harbor area as to just what an attack of Pearl Harbor would mean
to the United States, and to throwing the United States into a full
war effort, and all-out against Japan.
[<9i] 21. Q. In that formulation of opinion did you give much
weight to the characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders. Admiral
Yamamoto, in particular, who had been described as bold, reckless,
an air expert, a man who built up the Japanese Naval air forces ; was
that given much weight ?
A. Yes, I think that that was discussed, among other things, in the
general concept of what might happen in the event that Japan decided
to take some offensive action.
22. Q. During that tense period preceding 7 December, were the
outlying islands, notably Midway, Guam, and Wake in particular, a
matter of great concern to the Commander-in-Chief's Staff?
A. Yes, sir, very definitely so, and it was at the insistence of the
Commander-in-Chief that the defenses of Midway and Wake were
pushed and strengthened, because I think he appreciated the value of
those two places. As you know, prior to this time, the Army and
Navy out there were quite involved in a discussion which originated
here in the Navy Department as to putting planes on those islands.
The Commander-in-Chief made the decision, himself, to put Navy
planes on those islands and as you know, the task force was out there
at the time of the attack putting planes on both the islands. In addi-
tion, everything was set up and patrol planes were actually operating
from Midway.
23. Q. Did the Departments' proposal to make certain shifts in
those garrisons from Marines to the Army cause additional worry and
concern ?
A. Yes, they did ; because so much was involved in the thing. There
are differences in the tables of organization of the Army and the
Marines. The Marines are set up with a defense battalion organiza-
tion and I believe I am correct in saying that there is nothing com-
parable to that in the Army setup. And, there was the fact that it
would have meant shifting not only personnel but equipment, with
vital shipping and other things involved. Then there was a continued
discussion as to whether Army fighters would go into the islands, and
we just couldn't see how that could be done, and that caused a lot of
concern and was a subject of many conferences not only between the
Commander-in-Chief and the Commanding General, but also between
the respective members of the Army and Navy Staffs out there.
24. Q. And it came at a bad time ?
A. Yes, sir; I think it was just about the time this dispatch was
received, if I remember correctly. (Exhibit 8.)
25. Q. In late 1941, what were your own thoughts concerning the
correctness of the Department's action in continued basing the Fleet
at Pearl Harbor?
A. Well, to be very frank. Admiral, it is my own opinion and I be-
lieve it is the opinion of other people that were there, that we could
not see the consistency in basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, with the
idea of having it as a threat to Japan, and at the same time being con-
tinually advised of the fact that whenever we asked for material, we
were more or less told that the war was in the Atlantic, and that we
were continually being picked upon to get units of the Pacific Fleet
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 89
moved into the Atlantic Ocean. Admiral Kimmel had the same point
of view because I believe that his trip to Washington, here, in the early
summer of 1941, one of the subjects of discussion, involved that very
thing.
26. Q. As seen by you as the Operations Officer, were the attendant
difficulties of maintenance of supplies and materials, supplies for the
Fleet, health and morale of personnel, such as to make that long-con-
tinued basing out there questionable?
[82] A. So far as the morale of the officers and enlisted men of
the Fleet was concerned, the biggest single factor that came into that
was the one of indecisiveness. I believe that the sailorman's nature
is such that he is satisfied to serve where he is ordered, if he knows
that is what he is going to do. The rather indecisive attitude about
whether you were going to stay at Pearl Harbor or whether you were
going back to the Coast, and what you were going to do, was a matter
of concern to everybody out there because it did make it very difficult
to handle the whole morale situation. As you know, we did attempt
to send units back to the Coast to let them get a bit of a blow back
there, but I do believe that the question of nobody knowing just what
was going to happen, whether the Fleet was going to stay out there,
was a difficult thing to overcome. So far as the material conditions of
the Fleet were concerned, it is my opinion that the organization of
the Fleet into task forces which required the operating part of the
Fleet to be at sea for as long as ten days, in which they were continually
busy, and then permitting them to come into port for a period of ten
days, contributed to the betterment of the material conditions of the
Fleet because you had a long enough time in port to overhaul, and
people knew that they were going to be in for that length of time
and the entire up-keep project for that period could be laid out. I do
believe that the material condition of the Fleet was improved by the
operations of the Fleet by the task forces. I don't believe that the
continued steaming for ten days, under normal conditions, so far as
maintenance, engineering plant, and so on, were concerned, affected
the material condition of the Fleet. So far as supplies, and so forth,
were concerned, well we just didn't get any of the new material that
we read about in letters and books that came to us, so that we weren't
too much affected by that except to hope and pray that our turn would
come to get something.
27. Q. The Fleet's presence out there increased the war-mindedness
of the personnel, did it not?
A. It resulted in the development of a lot of war time practices
which were beneficial to the Fleet when war was declared, in that every
type of ship out there was required to fuel at sea, every type of ship
was required to go into a reasonable organization that was practical,
battle organization, instead of just a paper one, because Avhen the Fleet
went to sea they actually stood condition watches, and a lot of paper
organization that existed in all types had to be revised to meet war time
conditions. I think that the fact that the Fleet was required to steam
darkened, and the fact that they exercised inter-type tactics developed
an understanding between the task force commanders and the lower
echelons of the different types, that proved invaluable in war. As to
whether or not people became war conscious out there, I believe that
everyone realized that the situation was getting graver and that there
90 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
would be a war with Japan, but I believe that the war-mindedness
turned more toward war time training than it did toward the actual
thought that today or tomorrow we were going to be in a war.
28. Q. One of the personal duties of the Operations Officer was the
getting out of a periodical known as "Schedule of Employment", is
that correct?
A. Yes, sir,
29. Q. For what period did you get them out — how long?
A. They were originally prepared on a quarterly basis which at-
tempted to match up task force operating periods with navy yard
overhauls, and also the [S3] requirement that certain types be
degaussed, and have the new anti-aircraft splinter protection put on.
I believe I am safe in saying that practically none of those quarterly
employment schedules were ever carried out in their entirety because
different units of the Fleet would be detached and either sent to the
Atlantic, or in the later sunnner. instituted the convoy systems to the
Philippines, so that all those employment schedules were deleted or
continually under revision.
30. Q. But thej^ were gotten out for a three months period, at the
time?
A. Yes, sir.
31. Q. About how long before a period began was the coming
schedule issued?
A, As I recall it, about six weeks before the end of the quarter
the task force commanders were required to submit their next quarter's
schedule, and that they had about ten days to put that in, and then at
the end of that time, the whole quarterly schedule of requirement for
services, such as aircraft, and target vessels, and things like that, were
discussed and the schedule appeared ]H-obably three weeks before the
beginning of the next quarter. That is my recollection of it.
32. Q. The schedules were printed?
A. Yes, sir.
33. Q. Under what classification?
A. I believe that up until about June or July they appeared in a
Restricted Classification, and afterthat, they were Confidential. That
is my off-hand remembrance of the thing.
34. Q. About how many copies of that were printed each time?
A. I don't know.
35. Q. Was it available for the scrutiny of a good many people?
A. I would say that every commanding officer and all the heads
of departments on board ships had access to the thing, in view of the
fact that all of the heads of de])artments of the ships were interested
in the ship from a training and material point of view, on the schedule.
36. Q. Well, I gather from that testimony that for any potential
enemy who is bent on a surprise attack, possession of one of tho.se
schedules would have been invaluable, would it not?
A. Under normal conditions, yes, sir ; but as it developed, I think the
schedule that appeared in print for the last — for the second quarter
of the year, was not actually effective on the 7th of December because
it did not, as I recall, contain the carrier trips to either Midway or
Wake, That is something that has to be verified, but that is my own
recollection.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 91
37. Q. But I understand that there were a considerable number of
copies of that printed document, and in all, they were in the hands of a
good many individuals?
A. That is correct.
The reporter withdrew and Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S.
Naval Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath
previously taken was still binding.
[84] 38. Q. Admiral, coming back to this Exliibit 4, which is
Pacific Fleet confidential letter 2CL-41, we have been given to under-
stand that the preparation of this document was in the hands of your
operational section of tlie Staff, is that correct, sir i'
A. Yes, sir.
39. Q. With respect to the air patrols that were to be maintained,
this provides for daily search of the operating areas, air patrols
covering entries and sorties. Would you please state why, if you
recollect, air patrols were limited solely to these patrols?
A. Well, the main reason was we felt that the possibility of a
submarine attack in the operating area was something that we had
to guard against. The patrols on sortie and entrance were definitely
with the idea of attempting to prevent any blocking of the channel
in and out of Pearl Harbor. The patrols that were maintained were
a part of the routine work of the patrol planes there, entirely separate
from long-distance training flights which the Commanders of the
Patrol Wings there carried out, and were also dependent on the num-
ber of long-range patrol planes which were available in the area
actually flyable and the limited number of pilots that were available.
40. Q. Were you familiar with the large type Army airplanes that
were available to the Hawaiian air force in the months preceding Pearl
Harbor?
A. Generally, yes.
41. Q. Was consideration given to the, augmenting of the overseas
patrol with this type of plane ?
A. Not as a part of the regular long-distance search, but I believe
I'm correct when I say that -long-range Army planes actually trained
with and flew with Navy patrol planes for Army training in naviga-
tion and overseas flights. «
42. Q. Admiral, as Assistant Chief of Staff, were you and the other
members of the Staff' thoroughly satisfied with the intelligence re-
ports you were getting: in other words, did you feel that you could
rely on the information that you had ( I'm referring back to the
earlier questions as to why the air attack was so much discounted as a
possibility.
A. In answering that, I'll say that I believe that the information
that was furnished us from our own Staff Intelligence Officers and
from the Intelligence Officers of the Fourteenth Naval District, be-
tween whom there was very close cooperation, was the best informa-
tion that those two sources could assemble and prepare for presenta-
tion to the Commander-in-Chief from what they were able to get in
the area.
43. Q. Were you fully aware that their sources were inadequate, in
a sense ?
92 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Yes. I feel that there was a general feeling among all of us out
there that we were more or less operating in the dark, not only from
the information that we were able to collect by our own means in the
Pearl Harbor area but also the information that was furnished us
from other sources.
44. Q. Would that answer be descriptive of your attitude both as to
location of Japanese units and as to the international situation and
probabilities of an immediate war ?
A. Definitely yes to both.
[8S] The examining officer did not desire to further examine
this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged
to make any further statement covering anything relating to the sub-
ject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter
of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought
out by the previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 4:10 p. m.. adjourned until 9:30
a. m., tomorrow.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 93
IS6] PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HAET INQUIEY
SATUBDAY, MARCH 11, 1944
Sixth Day
Navy Department,
Washington,, D. C.
The examination met at 9 : 30 a. m.
Present : Admiral Thomas C. Hart. U. S. Navy, Retired, examining
officer, and his counsel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as re-
porter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still
binding.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the fifth day of the examination until such time
as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the
examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, Retired, was recalled as a
witness by the examining officer, and was warned that the oath pre-
viously taken was still binding.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. Admiral, in your earlier testimony before this examination
you referred to a joint agreement signed by the Commanding Gen-
eral of the Hawaiian Department and yourself as Commandant of
the Fourteenth Naval District covering the use of aircraft. I show
you a document which is contained in the Secret-Confidential Files
of the Navy Department. Could you identify this document, sir?
A. This document that I have before me was sent to the Chief of
Naval Operations in a letter dated 1 May 1941 and was signed by
me and is the document which I referred to previously. The letter
has two enclosures : "B", which is the joint agreement referred to, and
"C", a joint estimate of Base Defense Air and Army Air Force Com-
manders ; dated 31 March 1942.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note: Because of the secret nature of the document, it was returned, at the
conclusion of the examination, to the Secret-Confidential Files of Chief of Naval
Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the docu-
ment introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 22".
2. Q. Admiral, I noted that this document. Exhibit 22, is dated
before the issuing of the latest JCD, which is before this examination
as Exhibit 5. Did this Exhibit 22 go out of effect with the issuing of
the new JCD, Exhibit 5 ?
94 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. No. JCD^2, which was signed subsequently to this air agree-
ment, contains a provision in Paragraph 21 tliat Annexes I to VII
continue effective with JCD-42.
3. Q. Then this agreement with respect to aircraft, which is Ex-
hibit 22, was in effect up until the time of the attack, Admiral?
A. Yes, sir.
[S7] 4. Q. Admiral, also in your earlier testimony, you have
referred to a letter written by you as Commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District concerning the security of Pearl Harbor, and to the
endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief thereon. I show you a file
which has been taken from the Secret-Confidential Files of the Navy
Department and ask you whether you can identify the basic letter
ancl the first endorsement thereon ?
A. I identify this letter as being the letter I referred to.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note : Because of the secret nature of the document, at the conclusion of the
examination it was returned to the Secret-Confidential Files of Chief of Naval
Operations. Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the document
introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 23".
5. Q. Admiral, having read this letter again, is there anything that
you would like to state with respect to its contents?
A. I might invite attention to the fact that this letter, dated 30
December 1940, calls attention to the lack of reconnaissance planes
and to the necessity for having to use reconnaissance planes from the
Fleet as the District forces had no such planes. I also wish to invite
attention to an error made concerning the vessels of Destroyer Divi-
sion 80. It was stated in the lettei- that the vessels of that Division had
listening gear. As a matter of fact, only one vessel of this Division
had listening gear at the time of Pearl Harbor attack. By listening
gear, I am referring to supersonics. Throughout the letter are con-
stant references to the lack of suitable craft for the proper protection
of an important base. Mention is made also in the letter of the lack
of defense of Lualualei and Kane^he. Subsequent to the time of writ-
ing this letter, I took up with the Commanding General the question
of the defense of Kaneohe. When the Kaneohe Air Station was estab-
lished, there was in existence a standing agreement between the Army
and Navy that the Army would not have to defend Kaneohe, as they
had said that thej^ could not do it. This agreement had been made
by some predecessor of mine. The Commanding General agreed with
me that the Army should defend Kaneohe and a rough scheme of de-
fense was drawn up and forwarded to Washington and the Joint
Planners of the Army and Navy agreed to the Army taking over the
defense of Kaneohe. The Army had also insisted that Lualualei could
not be defended, although I understand, at the present time, they
now admit that it can be defended. In the endorsement of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, I wish to invite attention to his opinion, on the
7th of January, 1941, of the improbability of an air attack under
present conditions and also to his opinion on that date that there
was no practicable way of placing torpedo baffles or nets within the
Harbor without greatly limiting the activities within the Harbor and
interference with the take-off of patrol planes. I also further wish
to invite attention to the Commander-in-Chief's opinion, expressed
in paragraph 5 of his endorsement, that adequate and sufficient forces
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 95
should be supplied with a higher priority than was to be given to con-
tinental districts.
6. Q. Admiral, in your thinking, with respect to any possible at-
tack on Pearl Harbor, prior to the time of the attack, did you ever
consider the influence on public opinion in the United States that such
an attack as occurred would produce?
[88] A. I can not sa}^ that I'd ever seriously considered, nor
did I hear anybody else talk about, what the effect on public opinion
would be by an attack made on Pearl Harbor.
7. Q. Admiral, did you, in your shore establishments at Pearl
Harbor, have any anti-aircraft weapons?
A. There were Marine defense battalions coming and going at
Pearl Harbor. They were part of the Fleet Marine Force and were
sent out primarily for the purpose of garrisoning the island bases.
I think at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, on December 7,
there was one such Marine battalion at Pearl Harbor and they had
some anti-aircraft weapons. Our plan was made to turn those over
to the Army for anti-aircraft defense or Army control, and after
the attack they were turned over. Normally, a defense battalion had
twelve three-inch anti-aircraft gims and a number of .50 calibre
guns. Whether this battalion had all of those weapons, or not, I
don't remember.
8. Q. How about your own Marine detachments, Sir, were they
provided with anti-aircraft weapons?
A. The}' had nothing that I know of except their small arms and
machine guns, and they were not intended for anti-aircraft. Of
course, they could be used and probably were on the 7th of December.
9. Q. Admiral, were there any attempts at sabotage within the
naval establishments at Pearl Harbor on the' 7th of December, 1941?
A. Prior to the 7th of December, we had many complaints that our
internal security orders were unnecessarily rigid, but I believe they
were all reasonable and sound, and the mere fact that, so far as I
know, there was never any sabotage at Pearl Harbor, with the ex-
ception of one or two isolated cases, both of which were disgruntled
sailors, leads me to believe that they had a highly deterrent effect.
There was no sabotage on the 7th of December, insofar as I know.
10. Q. Had you instituted any conditions of readiness with respect
to such guards and other personnel as were under your command
with respect to protection from sabotage?
A. I recall none, except our regular security orders.
11. Q. Keverting to this document, labeled Exhibit 22, there is
attached thereto a joint estimate concerning air action which is
dated 31 March and is signed by Major General Martin and Rear
Admiral Bellinger. Under the heading of "Possible Enemy Action"
appears the following: "It appears that the most likely and dan-
gerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed
that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from
one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300
miles." Was that estimate carried through and was any particular
attention paid to it by the higher command echelon, including you?
A. The joint agreement made between the Commanding General
and the Commandant became an annex unde^- JCD^2 and was ef-
96 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fective. Every Force Commander necessarily had to get out his
orders. Although Admiral Bellinger was a Naval Base Defense
Air Officer, under CL2, he had also been one of the important officers
in working with the Army to reach the joint agreement, and he and
General Martin made plans to implement the joint agreement, and
this joint order is the plan. The Commandant of the [89]
District received the order and it must be assumed that he was
familiar with it. In the joint operation plan, Admiral Bellinger and
General Martin made certain decisions, one of which was that their
force would locate the attack forces initiating hostile action against
Oahu, and, on page 4, under section 4, they made some discussion of
their search plans. In this discussion, it was stated : "A search plan
will be desirable. It can only be effectively maintained with the
present personnel and materiel for a very short period and as a
practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other
intelligence indicates a surface raid is jjrobable within ratlier nar-
row time limits." On page 8, under section 5, there was included a
discussion of conditions of readiness for the air forces. In this dis-
cussion. General Martin and Admiral Bellinger referred to estab-
lishing a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be main-
tained by each unit is, at all times, prescribed by the senior officers
present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information cur-
rently available to them. Wliether or not I concurred with the sur-
veys of opposing strength and the possible enemy action and; the
action open to us in the joint plan, I can not remember definitely as
to details. But I feel quite certain that, generally speaking, I took
no exception to their plan.
12. Q. You have testified that prior to 7 December you thought the
probability of a JapaYiese carrier air raid was very remote. In
formulating that opinion at the time, did you have in mind the
opinion expressed by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger?
A. I don't know. I was of tli« opinion that a carrier attack against
Hawaii, preceding a declaration of war, was remote. Just what all
of the logical processes were that caused me to arrive at that con-
clusion, I'm unable to say, but I believe that one important con-
sideration was my belief that a large body of surface vessels, which
would be necessary to launch such attacks, could not cross a large
expanse of water, which they would have to cross, without our having
some prior knowledge.
13. Q. Do you remember whether or not the existence of that
formally expressed opinion by those two officers who, presumably,
were the most experienced in their own line, was generally known in
the upper echelons of command around Oahu ?
A. The Commander-in-Chief had a copy of this Joint Air
Operating Plan and he had on his Staff competent officers and I
think it is fair to assume that he must have known about the plan.
I also believe that General Short must have known about the plan.
14. Q. I'm questioning you particularly as regards this formal
joint estimate by those two officers. Did you know of any other
formally expressed opinions that were given by officers experienced
in aviation on that particular point?
A. I can not definitely say any certain officer had ever expressed an
opinion that such an attack was improbable. I had considerable con-
tact with Admiral Halsey, who was Commander, Air Battle Force, as
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 97
did the Commander-in-Chief. I had considerable contact with Cap-
tain Martin, who was in Command of the Air Station at Kaneohe,
and Captain Shoemaker, who was in Command of the Air Station
at Ford Island. I do not recall specifically any comment one way or
the other by these officers. Yet, I very definitely had the opinion that
an attack by air, prior to declaration of war, was remote. Unques-
tionably, this opinion can not have been [90] reached by me
independent of all other opinions and conversations that I had with
other officers. At this late date, and even at the time of the Roberts
Commission's meeting, I was unable to analyze my opinion and to
determine the various factors which had caused me to reach that
opinion.
15. Q. Then you are unable to give me any clue to anj^ other
formally expressed opinion on the point by air officers; is that right?
A. I am not able to give you any clue to any other expressed
opinion by air officers.
16. Q. Admiral, is it proper to say that the situation, during 1941,
was with the Pacific Fleet held in a "position of readiness" at Pearl
Harbor ?
A. The Fleet arrived in Pearl Harbor in April, 1940, and never
departed in its entirety up until December 7. What the reasons were
for keeping it in Pearl Harbor, I can only guess. I think that all
Fleet officers, all people connected with the Fleet, endeavored to keep
it in a state of "readiness".
17. Q. Then you think the expression "position of readiness",
applied to the location of the Fleet, is not really correct?
As I stated before, I can only guess as to the reasons why the
Fleet was kept in Hawaii.
18. Q. From your observation u^. until, say, November, '41, what
did you feel was the overall effect upon actual war readiness of the
Fleet, having maintained its position in Hawaiian waters over such
a long period?
A. I know that the Commander-in-Chief, in 1940, was somewhat
concerned over the stay of the Fleet in Hawaiian waters and that he
took steps to arrange having small detachments of the Fleet go back
to the West Coast for short periods. I think that after 1940-1941,
prior to December 7, that the Fleet was forced to carry out its ex-
ercises and training under conditions which imposed considerable
strain. I mean by this that the Fleet had to conduct exercises and
yet, at the same time, had to take certain measures to be ready to
defend itself in case of a sudden attack, and such conditions, over an
extended period of time, must necessarily have imposed considerable
anxiety upon responsible officers.
19. Q. What was your observation of the effect of those conditions
that you just mentioned?
A. I can not give any accurate impressions. In my own position,
I had so many things of my own that were closer to me and with
which I was more intimately concerned, that I didn't have very
much time or opportunity to note what was taking place in the
Fleet.
20. Q. You recall that certain of the Pacific Fleet's forces were
detached somewhere during 1941, some of those detachments going
to the Atlantic permanently, insofar as it was known, another de-
79716 — 46-T-Ex. 144 8
98 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tachment going to the South Pacific. Did you notice any particular
effect on mental attitudes due to those occurrences?
A. In a general way, I knew that detachments of the Fleet were
going to other places. I knew specifically that certain cruisers went
to Australia and New Zealand. I knew that, on one occasion, the
entire [91] Fleet was ordered to go to mid-Pacific, east of
Hawaii, and remain in a condition of radio silence and without
knowledge on the part of anyone as to where they were for a long
period of time. But what the reasons were for these movements or
what the effects were on our own personnel, I don't know.
21. Q. I believe that in your area a great deal of construction work,
preparation of new installations, was in progress in 1941 ; is that
correct ?
A. That is correct.
22. At the time, did you think that those installations were gen-
erally too elaborate and hence being completed too slowly to accord
with the general situation that faced our Nation ?
A. At Pearl Harbor, there w^ere two projects of paramount impor-
tance, one of which was a new, big dry-dock, another of which was
two smaller, twin dry-docks, and a third was underground fuel oil
storage. These projects were pressed to my utmost, and, being of
somewhat impatient temperament, I naturally thought they were
going too slow, although actually the record will show that they
progressed very rapidly. There were innumerable other projects,
such as the Air Station at Kaneohe, rehabilitation of Ford Island, the
Air Station at Barbers Point, the Air Station on Maui, which were
all underway, to say nothing of new cold storage plants, new wharves,
new docks, barracks, new improvised Marine camp to take care of five
thousand Marines; all on Oahu. Then over and above these were
the island bases: Palmyra, Johnson, Midway, and Wake. These
island bases had been originally conceived as being very small. They
were only to consist of a deep water area for seaplanes taking off, and
certain minor things, such as gasoline stowage, and small living facil-
ities. As time went on, they expanded in their scope. Midway was
required to have a landing strip. Midway became quite a considerable
air station. Midway was planned for quite a considerable submarine
base. All of these things placed quite a load on the District, and our
natural tendency was to endeavor to simplify to the barest essentials.
General requests for revisions of plans and for expansions came from
the Fleet itself, and in all of those cases, after discussing the matters
involved with the Commander-in-Chief or his representative, the Fleet
wishes were followed, if the Commander-in-Chief felt they were nec-
essary. Wake Island was not started until 1941. Prior to starting
it, I wrote to the Navy Department, via the Commander-in-Chief, and
asked if the place should be started at this late date. The Navy De-
partment replied, in what I considered to be a rather unusual commu-
nication, to the effect that the Commander-in-Chief and the Com-
mandant were the officers on the spot and they would have to make
the decision. This having been thrown in our laps, the Commander-
in-Chief and I considered the question. I was of the opinion that
Wake would be untenable and that it was a mistake to start it. The
Commander-in-Chief heard me and discussed it with officers of his
Staff, in my presence, and the decision was to start it. This station
was a station of considerable extent and the final plans contemplated
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 99
seaplane base, air strip, and some submarine facilities. Maui Air
Station was started as an improvement to the municipal airport to
accommodate wheel planes, with small barracks and facilities to
accommodate one carrier group. Before the original plans had been
completed, approved extensions were underway to make it a much
larger place than ever was contemplated. [92] In the light of
hindsight, I don't say that these extensions were incorrect. More
probably they were correct but, at that time, my idea was to complete
the places as quickly as possible and get the civilian component out
and get the garrisons in.
23. Q. Were the designs and specifications on broad lines fixed by
the Navy Department or by the authorities in Hawaii ?
A. Originally, the designs were fixed by the Navy Department, but
as the work became greater and greater, details of design were largely
left to the District.
24. Q. But on broad lines, everything about those installations
was then decided by the Navy Department, rather than by local au-
thorities ?
A. In fact, all construction work had to receive the decision of the
Navy Department, because expenditures of funds were involved and
the funds had to be forthcoming from the Navy Department.
25. Q. Reverting to my original question on this subject, did you
consider that any or all of these installations were conceived on too
elaborate lines and, consequently, slow of construction ?
A. I felt that my position as the Commandant of the District was
one of service and when ideas occurred to me that something was too
elaborate or too expensive, or possibly was not necessary, I would
present my argument, but if the Connnander-in-Chief, who would
have to use these facilities, stated that he wanted them, my job was to
do them. As far as the extravagance and expansiveness of the project
was concerned, I believe that all of the specific plans of structure were
fairly simple and as inexpensive as they could be made, under the
circumstances.
26. Q. In, say, November, 1941, were you or others in the high
command echelon that you know of particularly worried about the
situation in the outlying islands?
A. I will say that I think the Commander-in-Chief and the Com-
mandant of the District were both concerned about the situation in
the outlying bases.
The witness was duly warned.
The examining officer then, at 10 : 41 a. m., took a recess until 11 : 13
a. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.
Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel,
the reporter, and the witness.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, Retired, the witness under
examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned
that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his
testimony.
[9S] Examination by the examining officer: (Continued)
27. Q. Was it what you would call a primary worry ?
A. All of the outlying bases with the exception of Palmyra were
dependent upon distilling plants for their water. Therefore, their
capacity to support personnel was limited by their distilling capacity.
100 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
This meant that as long as civilian workmen were on the islands,
working on public works, not as many military personnel as was de-
sirable could be placed in the garrisons. We were also much con-
cerned about our ability to supply the islands with the necessary items
of stores and food, as at no time did we ever have what we considered
to be adequate transportation. The Commander-in-Chief actually
had to supply cruisers to transport personnel and equipment. The
concern of the Naval authorities was heightened in the summer of
1941 by the request of the Army to ferry bombers to the Far East
ria Midway and Wake. This meant additional supplies of gasoline,
and so forth. Concern was also involved by the decision of the Army
to build a separate line of bases, whereby planes could be ferried from
Hawaii southard to the Australian area, and the amount of naval
effort which would unquestionably be required to assist them. In the
late autumn of 1941 the question was raised by the Army and Navy
authorities in Washington about garrisoning the outlying bases with
Army personnel and using Army planes on them for defense pur-
poses. All of these questions caused much concern and many cases
compromises had to be reached which were forced by circumstances
then existing.
28. Q. In, say, November, 19411, was the security of the outlying
islands as against a surprise attack, a primary worry to you and others
in the high echelon of command ?
A. It was a concern of some weight. In some way, I had gotten
a date fixed in my mind that any move on the part of Japan would
be April or May. How I got this information or from what source
I don't know, but in connection with Wake Island, I had spent some
personal effort and a great deal of District effort in devising a means
to use the lagoon there by ships of moderate draft, so that it could be
completed prior to April or May 1942, rather than the original plan,
which would have required several months longer. The Commander-
in-Chief was anxious to put a large garrison in Wake Island when
the water capacity of the island would only support about 1500 men.
In order to expedite construction work there, a minimum force of
about 1050 was required, so this limited the garrison on Wake to,
roughly speaking, between four and five hundred. At Midway, there
was a large garrison, in the neighborhood of 1,000 men, but a larger
garrison could be put there as soon as the civilians were evacuated.
They could not be evacuated at that time, although the work was
drawing to a close rapidly. In Johnston Island, there was particu-
larly an acute situation. The islands are very small and the garrison
was necessarily small in order that we could retain civilian workers.
In Palmyra, we were working on a long airstrip and devoting every
effort to its completion at the earliest possible date as the airstrip
there, in conjunction with the airstrip which we were constructing
in Samoa, formed a second chain for ferrying planes to the southwest.
All of these matters caused concern. The security of bases depended
upon just when a war should break out and the condition of readiness
at the time.
[94] 29. Q. Were you no more apprehensive of a surprise
attack on those outlying islands than you were of such an attack on
Oahu?
A. I was more apprehensive about an attack on Guam, Wake and
Midway, than I was of Oahu.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 101
30. Q. In late November, '41, did the concern and worry concern-
ing those situations seem to influence anyone as regards the security
on Oahu ?
A. I'm not conscious of anyone lessening his alertness or concern
over any part of his duties. If such "was the case, it must have been
unconscious because I'm fully convinced that everyone out there was
trying his utmost to be on his toes all the time.
31. Q. A somewhat hypothetical question: Could the carrier raid
of 7 December have damaged us more effectively and more lastingly if
the objective of the attack had been directed against installations other
than those which were attacked?
A. In my opinion, yes, we would have been damaged infinitely more
than we were. At Pearl Harbor, on December 7, the objectives of
the Japanese were, first, the air fields, and then capital ships of the
Fleet. In my opinion, with a different method of attack, the Japanese
might have caused our entire Fleet to sortie, to seek them out. We
know accurately now what force was brought on the attack against
Pearl Harbor. Had our ships been effective in making a concentra-
tion outside of Pearl Harbor, a serious question is in my mind as to
whether or not the entire Fleet w^ould not have been destroyed, in
view of the powerful force that the Japanese had in the area. But
even assuming that the form of attack that was made had been pursued
vigorously against our oil supply, which was all above ground, against
our drydocks, repair shops, barracks and other facilities, storehouses,
I feel that insofar as the prosecution of the war was concerned, that
we would have been very much worse hurt than we were by the attack
on capital ships, even though we did have a tragic loss of life.
32. Q. Will you enlarge a little upon that statement as regards the
oil tanks?
3. The oil storage, fuel and diesel at Oahu, amounted to approxi-
mately 4,000,000 barrels. All of this oil was stored in tanks above
the ground, metal tanks, with the exception of one concrete tank
embedded in the ground but visible from the air. These tanks were
located in two groups of tanks known as the "Upper Farm" and
"Lower Farm." They were immediately adjacent to the submarine
base, industrial navy yard, hospital, and Hickam Field. Struck by
bombs and set on fire, not only the reserve oil would have been
destroyed but the burning oil would have flowed over the dykes and
caused wide conflagration in the yard and general area. Ships desir-
ing oil would have been unable to obtain it. Submarines desiring
diesel oil would have been unable to obtain it. We had one drydock
with a battleship in it, and two destroyers, on December 7. If the
caisson had been breached, the dock would have been partially
destroyed and the ships in it would have been wrecked; a serious
casualty would have been the loss of our machine shops and the tools,
our storehouses with the spare parts, spare torpedoes, storehouses with
our food supply for 50,000 men for a hundred days and all the various
elements that went [9S~\ to make up the requirements of the
base. An attack on the ammunition depot at Lualualei certainly
would have destroyed our radio transmitting stations which were
located there and might have destroyed some of the ammunition
storage.
33. Q. It has been brought out that prior to 27 November, and ex-
tending back a considerable period, the Fleet had received from Wash-
102 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ington numerous warnings of impending difficulties with the Japanese.
Were you, by late November, '41, so affected by that multiplicity of
warnings as to effect your reaction to the war warning which was
given in definite form on 27 November ?
A. Not consciously so, but there had been a number of warnings,
and I'm of the very definite recollection that the Commander-in-Chief
preceding Admiral Kimmel, and Admiral Kinnnel, himself, had
received written warnings, possibly in personal correspondence from
the Chief of Naval Operations. I'm very definitely of the impression
that this same question had been discussed by Admiral Richardson
and myself in 1940, and that either he or I or both of us had been of
the impression that too many warnings were being given and that it
might ultimately have a bad effect, but I think I can say that so far as
I was conscious of it, in the end of November or early part of Decem-
ber, I knew of no lessening of sensitivity on my part, although,
perhaps, such did exist. I was not conscious of it.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this w^itness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged
to make any further statement covering anything relating to the
subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a mat-
er of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought
out by the previous questioning.
The witness made the following statement : I have mentioned in my
previous testimony that I considered that the Navy Department had
far more information about the general situation, the possibility or
probability of hostilities, and the political situation than anybody in
Hawaii could possibly have, and that they were in a far better position
to evaluate this information than we in the field were. Quite a
number of warnings were sent out by the Department from October to
December. Yet, with the sendings of all these warnings, the Navy
Department never once saw fit to exercise the most certain way of
placing everyone on the alert. In JCD-42, and I think in other war
plans, the Navy Department had a means of putting into effect all of
the war plans prior to "M" day, which would have the effect imme-
diately of indicating to everyone concerned, not only in Oahu but in
every other place, that, in their opinion, something was about to
happen quickly. Such an action on the part of the Navy Department
did not necessarily — did not mean that hostile action was to be under-
taken by our forces, and I believe that that is so stated explicitely in
some of the war plans. Yet, I believe that if this procedure had been
adopted, it Avould have been far more effective than the sending out
of a lot of information and warnings in various telegrams, and par-
ticularly inasmuch as the most important warning dealt largely with
conditions in the Far East. I have ascertained, subsequent to Decem-
ber 7, that on or about the 27th of November, the State Department
sent a note to the Japanese Government which, I believe, was [90]
couched in the most positive and uncompromising terms. I knew
nothing of this dispatch, nor do I believe anyone in Hawaii knew
anything about it until after the 7th of December. In any evaluation,
such a dispatch would have important weight.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer, then, at 11:49 a. m,, adjourned until 9:30
a. m., Monday, March 13, 1944,
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 103
PKOCEEDINGS OF THE HAET INQUIRY
MONDAY, MARCH 13, 1944
Seventh Day
Navy Department,
Washington., D. C.
The examination met at 9 : 30 a. ni.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer,
and his counsel and assistant counsel.
Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, tJ. S. Naval Reserve,
took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken
was still binding.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the
record of proceedings of the sixth day of the examination until such
time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with
the examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface
to the tesimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present station.
A. Arthur C. Davis, Rear Admiral, U. S. N., Assistant Chief of
Staff for Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
2. Q. What duties were you performing on the Tth of December,
1941?
A. I was Fleet Aviation Officer of the Pacific Fleet.
3. Q. And how long had you been performing those duties, sir?
A. For approximately a year and a half.
\97'] 4. Q. Admiral, available records indicate that you have
knowledge pertinent to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that
occurred on 7 December, 1941. Please state the facts within your
knowledge concerning the attack and the major events leading up
thereto. It is especially desired that you cover the following, and a
written copy of this question is handed you so that you may refer to
it as you testify :
The advice that you gave the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
with respect to possibility of a surprise air attack on the ships and
installations at Pearl Harbor, together with the basis and reasons
therefor.
If you did not advise the Commander-in-Chief in this respect, please
state the views held by you prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor with
respect to the possibility of such an attack.
104 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The information you had prior to 7 December 1941 regarding the
Army Interceptor Command, including :
(a) Number and types of its planes,
(b) Sufficiency of air fields for operation and dispersal of airplanes,
(c) Caliber and experience of its pilots,
(d) The nature of training in progress,
(e) Its air warning net,
(f) Provisions made for command in the air, including direction
of planes, so as to bring them into combat with the enemy in the event
of surprise attack, and
(g) Any matter relating to the ability of the Army Interceptor
Command to carry out its commitments under the War Plans.
Please include any advice you gave Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, in
this respect.
Information regarding efficiency of Japanese Naval aviation avail-
able to you and your conclusions drawn therefrom.
A. My duty, as Fleet Aviation Officer, was primarily, if not almost
entirely, concerned with technical training and logistics matters. As
was the case with th6 Staff as a whole, our primary interest for many
months had been the improvement in strength and proficiency of the
Pacific Fleet. As is no doubt well known, it had not been possible,
for various reasons, including appropriations, to develop the Fleet
to a point which, it is now known, was necessary. However, this fact
made it all the more important to concentrate on all phases of materiel
and training. I, myself, had little to do with considerations of attack
possibilities and I do not recall ever being directly consulted on such
matters by the Commander-in-Chief. Naturally, the subject was fre-
quently discussed among members of the Staff and also by the Com-
mander-in-Chief with the Staff at times when I was present. From
these discussions, I can definitely state my opinion that it was the
Commander-in-Chief's belief that it was vitally necessary to continue
as long as possible with training and other Fleet improvements and
that going into a defensive status would interfere with [98]
this work, so that I am conviced it was his sincere intention to accom-
plish all that could be done before hostilities began and that he
believed there was still time to keep the work going.
As to the imminent possibility of attack, I only occasionally saw
or heard of warnings that may have been received by the Commander-
in-Chief. I know that there had been many warnings of varying
degrees of seriousness over a number of months, and I had the impres-
sion that it was within the Commander-in-Chief's discretion to deter-
mine how far to go in action with regard to such warnings. I believe
his thought, throughout, was to take precautionary steps within reason
but to regard the warnings as all the more reason for concentration on
improving the Fleet's readiness.
During the period of strain which finally led up to the events of 7
December, I am certain that the Commander-in-Chief gave the situa-
tion the carefulest possible consideration. I have to admit, however,
that I was, myself, concerned because of information that was available
in the press and that I concluded that there must be other information
which had not been shown me that influenced the decision to take no
greater precautionary steps than were taken.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 105
As to advice with regard to precautions, I was asked not so much
for an opinion as to whether or not the fullest precautions should be
taken, as for information with regard to the practicability of compre-
hensive searches and their effect on training. Comprehensive and
extensive air searches were practicable and I so stated. I also stated
the fact that this would very definitely interfere with progress in
general in aviation training in the Fleet. This, as was the case in
the Fleet as a whole, was important in view of the training demanded
by the rapid expansion that was already beginning to take place.
With respect to the surprise air attack, I naturally expressed the
opinion that this was possible and that it could only be prevented by
the most extensive searches and efforts to intercept at sea by air and
surface vessels. I did not, however, realize to what a high degree of
proficiency Japanese naval aviation had been developed. I do not
believe that anj^body else in the American Navy had an}^ proper con-
ception of this development, either. Certainly I had never seen any-
thing, either officially or unofficially, that would lead me to suppose
that Japanese naval aviation was to tremendously effective and well
developed as it turned out to be.
This is so well known now, by the average naval officer, that one is
apt to forget how universally it was not known before the Pacific war
began. I consider this primarily an indication of how effectively the
Japanese succeeded in keeping their high state of development secret.
I am sure that our Naval Intelligence organization did its best to keep
the Navy fully informed, but I am convmced that information on
this subject was' lacking.
Perhaps a simpler wa}^ to put all this is that I do not believe the
Commander-in-Chief regarded the damage possibility that might re-
sult from a Japanese air raid as very great. I know that he was con-
cerned, of course, regarding all damage possibilities, but it was appar-
ent that he felt that training and improvements of our own Fleet still
had priority, particularly in view of what I understood at the time to
be his belief [99] that there would not, at that time, be any
overt action.
Precautions to a certain degree had been taken, of course. It had,
for a considerable time, been standard practice to provide daily cover-
ing sweeps by air for all sea areas in the Hawaiian area in which any
of our forces might be operating. Also, occasional searches in other
sectors, to long distances, were made and sometimes maintained for a
considerable time. The idea of these was to give the impression of
comprehensive search and at the same time to avoid really extensive
interference with other forms of training.
Although I did not feel that I had sufficient information as to the
actual situation to undertake to question the Commander-in-Chief's
policy, as 7 December approached I was concerned about the general
situation with respect to our outlying islands. For this reason, I
stressed the necessity for providing some form of air protection at
Wake and Midway, which it would have been too late to attempt
after actual emergency had arisen. Action was finally taken in this
connection and that is why the attack on 7 December found the
ENTERPEISE taks force on its way back, having landed Marine
fighting planes at Wake, and the LEXINGTON task force on its way
to land Marine aircraft at Midway.
106 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
5. Q. Were you familiar with an arrangement between Com 14
and the Army for joint command in the air of Army and Navy aircraft,
under certain conditions ?
A. Yes, sir.
6. Q. Were you familiar with an estimate of the situation by Ad-
miral Bellinger and General Martin in which the possibility of a
surprise air raid figured
A. Yes, sir.
7. Q. Did you have that estimate at all in mind during the days
which led up to 7 JDecember?
A. I did.
8. Q. But I understand, from your testimony, that you made no
particular estimate, yourself, along that same line, formal or other-
wise?
A. No, sir, it was not that I made no estimate, or did not consider
it ; it was rather that this, like all of the other very comprehensive and
thorough preparatory plans that were made, was contingent, as to
its being placed in effect, on prior decision that the situation justified
taking up what might be called a defensive deployment. As to
whether or not it should, at any given point, have been taken up, I
necessarily considered that the Commander-in-Chief's estimate was
final.
9. Q. And your advice on the point was not asked ?
A. No, sir.
10. Q. Did you see the Navy Department's dispatch of 27 November,
the one which has come to be known as the war warning (indicating-
Exhibit 8)?
A. No, sir.
11. Q. You never saw it prior to 7 December ?
A. No, sir.
[100] 12. Q. Admiral, did I understand you correctly, earlier
in your testimony, to say that in your opinion a comprehensive air
search could have been carried on at that time ?
A. Yes, it could.
13. Q. Would you elaborate on that just a little bit, as to how a 360
degree distant reconnaissance could have been carried on with the
material at hand at that time ?
A. There were not enough planes and pilots to establish and main-
tain a long-range, 360 degree search indefinitely, or even for more than
a limited time. There were, however, enough to approximate this by
using relatively short-range planes in the least dangerous sectors, and
by obtaining some assistance from available Army aircraft, so that I
think it could have been undertaken, had it been considered essential,
on the basis that reenforcements could have arrived before personnel
and materiel fatigue set in. Unless reenforcements arrived, it could
not have been maintained.
14. Q. You may proceed to the written question given you, passing
on to the Army part.
A. Prior to 7 December, I had relatively little detailed information
regarding the Army Interceptor Command. I knew approximately
the numbers and types and my recollection is that they had about 170
P-36's, P-39's, and P-40's, of which the greater number were P-36's
and P-39's. Judged by modern war standards, there were enough air
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 107
fields to operate them, but not enough to provide adequate dispersal
and protection, nor were revetments and dispersal runways provided
at the various fields.
As to the caliber and experience of the pilots, they were, naturally,
none of them experienced in war combat. I had the impression that
the state of training did not average very high, for the Army was
handicapped by expansion requirements and there had to be a choice
between numbers and skill. I know that they were doing all in their
power to improve their skill, and that they were busily engaged in
training at all times.
The Army's air warning net had not yet been fully developed. It
was, broadly speaking, still in a status of test, completion, and train-
ing, rather than on a full-out basis of readiness such as is now recog-
nized as standard. In fact, continuous watches were not yet being
<5tood. It was only fortuitous that radar indications of approaching
aircraft were seen on the morning of 7 December.
As to provisions made for command in the air, including directions
for interception, these were still only of a general nature and there
had been, to my knowledge, no real development along that line by
drills, although drills had been held. There were two reasons for
this : one is that the air warning net and radar warning system had not
yet been completed and placed in actual operation; the other is of a
general nature, but, nevertheless, important — the Hawaiian area had
not yet been placed on the basis of unity of command so that, human
nature being what it is, progress along the lines of mutual drills was
slower than it might have been. I kept Admiral Kimmel informed of
the general status of the Army Interceptor Command and arrange-
ments for carrying out the joint directive, including progress and
development and completion of the air warning net. I was, on the
whole, well impressed with the potentialities of the Army Interceptor
Command, and with the progress in developing the system. I did not
feel, however, that it was yet ready for fully effective employment.
[JOl'j 15. Q. Admiral, what information was available to you as
to the character and ability, and so forth, of the various Japanese
Naval leaders?
A. I knew nothing about them.
16. Q. Were you present when Captain McCrea discussed these
leaders with the then Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Kichardson, in
the presence of Admiral Kimmel, and some of the Staff, in Januarv,
'41? •^'
A. No.
17. Q. What did you know, prior to the attack, concerning the
character of Admiral Yamamoto?
A. JNothing.
18. Q. Admiral, in connection with your duties, did you confer with
the Army command and echelons of command corresponding to your
position — the Army located on Hawaii — regularly?
A. There was not, in fact, anvbodv in the Armv with an assignment
similar to mine. I was Fleet Aviation Officer on the Commander-in-
Chief's Staff. General Short had no corresponding Staff Officer. The
Army Air Corps Commanding General was his senior airman. I
consulted with him and his juniors, occasionallv. but the primary con-
tact between Army Air and Naval aviation was between the Army Air
108 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commanding General and Admiral Bellinger, who was Commander,
Patrol Wing Two. In short, my job was not an executive job.
19. Q. Were your relations with the senior Army Aviation Com-
manders cordial ?
A. Yes, sir, they were extremely cordial and remained so through-
out the time I was on duty on the Commander-in-Chief's Staff, which
extended through June, 1942. After 7 December, and the establish-
ment of unity of command, I worked very closely with Army Air in
the area in order to be certain that everything possible Was done effec-
tively, and I could not have asked for better and more intelligent
cooperation.
20. Q. Admiral, were you, prior to 7 December, familiar with the
use of aircraft torpedoes ?
A. Yes, sir.
21. Q. Had you given consideration to an attack on the ships in
Pearl Harbor by this means?
A. Yes, sir.
22. Q. Will you please state your views as of that time as to the pos-
sible outcome of such an attack — the possible success of such an attack?
A. My views at that time were based on what I recall to be a definite
statement by the Bureau of Ordnance that a torpedo attack in Pearl
Harbor, because of the shallow depths, was not practicable. As I re-
call it, this, together with the desire to have major ships readily able
to move in an emergency, was what influenced the Commander-in-
Chief in his decision not to protect the major ships in Pearl Harbor
with torpedo nets. Shortly after 7 December, I recall a dispatch from
the Bureau of Ordnance which clarified its position in the matter.
The general tenor of this dispatch was that actually torpedoes could
be effectively used in depth as shallow as Pearl Harbor, but that some
of them would hit the bottom. The only way I can reconcile this with
earlier views is the peacetime attitude; that [102] is, the first
question in peacetime had always been whether or not a torpedo could
be recovered after a practice drop. Since it was desirable to avoid loss
of the torpedoes, the data given to the Service naturally stressed the
necessity for depths that would insure against the loss of all but erratic
torpedoes.
23. Q. You had no information concerning aircraft torpedoes then
that caused you to disagree with the Commander-in-Chief's decision ?
A. No. In fact, the opposite was the case.
24. Q. Admiral, did you consider the Fleet aircraft would be nec-
essary to the defense of Pearl Harbor against air attack?
A. No, nor did I believe that they should be considered assigned
for that purpose, except in the case of shore-based patrol planes.
It was my belief that any Fleet aircraft that might be present should
be made available while present, but, naturally, carrier aircraft, by
definition, had to be considered primarily available for their mission,
which certainly was not that of local defense.
25. Q. In the weeks leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, was
it customary for carrier aircraft to have guns installed when oper-
ating ?
A. I cannot state positively after more than two years, but I think
so.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 109
26. Q. Do you know if they were kept ready for combat use while
shore-based at Oahu ?
A. As in the previous question, I am not positive, but I think so.
27. Q. Are you familiar with the condition of readiness for battle
of the Marine planes that were present at Barber's Point on the
day of the attack?
A. No.
28. Q. Had carrier planes previously been assigned to the Army
Yor use under the plan then in effect during any training exercises?
A. Yes, sir, I think so, but I can not state positively.
29. Q. Prior to becoming air officer on the Commander-in-Chief's
Staff, what was your assignment ?
A. What was the last part of that ?
30. Q. What was your job?
A. I was Commander Aircraft, Asiatic Fleet, and Commanding
Officer, U. S. S. LANGLEY.
31. Q. As such, you had long experience with PBY planes, did you
not?
A. Yes, sir.
32. Q. And under circumstances under which their ability for
reconnaissance, distant reconnaissance, was very much in the picture ?
A. Yes, sir.
33. Q. Based on that experience, which indicates you are an expert
in the line, I will ask you a question which is perhaps somewhat
hypothetical but is pertinent : Air reconnaissance over 360 degrees
has frequently been mentioned. The entire circumference was not
of equal importance, was it?
A. No, sir.
[103] 34. Q. A considerable arc to the north and west and
another to the south and w^est were the most important; is that true?
A. Yes, sir, that is true, but it doesn't naturally follow that they
would be certainly sufficient.
35. Q. Assuming a coverage of, say, 180 degrees so divided north
and south, with the long-range planes which were available, includ-
ing the Army's; suppose a distant reconnaissance patrol had been
established upon the receipt of the Department's dispatch of 27
November. At that time, about what chance would you have esti-
mated there was that such patrol would have intercepted the Japanese
carriers the day prior to the attack?
A. My estimate at that time would have been that the chance was
fairly good, perhaps two out of three, of course subject to reasonable
breaks on weather and visibility. Based on knowledge since acquired,
primarily that from war results to date, I should be inclined to put
the chance no better than one out of two. We have, ourselves, quite
often made an attack wherein Japanese search planes failed to sight
our forces, even though in many of these cases we know that they
were making intensive search flights. In the Guadalcanal landing,
as an example, a Japanese search plane, under scattered cloud con-
ditions, came close enough to our force actually to be sighted by long-
range telescope from the ENTERPRISE, but failed to see and report
the force. In a number of other cases, their search planes either
failed to pass near enough for a sighting report or were hampered
by bad visibility. On the other hand, the chances have always been
110 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
good enough so that defensive search is more than justified. In the
case of the attack on Pearl Harbor, it could have been possible for
the Japanese, by correct timing, high speed run-in and long-range
launching of their carrier groups, to have been outside of search
radius of our patrol planes the day before. I have always been of
the opinion that the Japanese did launch at very long range in order
to make certain that no search would find them the day before. They
took this chance long-range launching, I believe, for the sake of cer-
tainty of surprise. Therefore, I think that in the specific case of the
Pearl Harbor attack, our chances of sighting the Japanese by a previ-
ous day's search were actually less than one in two.
36. Q. Would a radar warning net, involving search radar only,
which was properly manned and fully efficient, have contributed any
greater degree toward the certainty of ample warning for us?
A. Yes, sir.
37. Q. Are you positive of that, and that the degree of certainty
would have been quite considerable?
A. On the premise which I understood to be that it was an effective
and efficient warning net; yes, sir.
38. Q. Then, in short, the most vital preparation that forces on Oahu
could have had to prevent such a surprise air raid, would have been a
proper radar net, is that the case ?
A. Hardly to that extent, Admiral. I believe that the present pro-
vision, and the provision that should be made, is what is standard
practice everywhere now. This involves both long-range search and
effective radar warning nets. It is always best, if there is any chance
of doing so at all, to have more warning than that which can be given
by any local radar search. I believe that the two are complementary.
I believe that radar is more certain, all things considered, than the air
search. On the other hand, the [i04.] warning it gives is very
much more brief than that which can be had from unsuccessful search.
This, of course, is another way of stating the old truism that it is better
to hit an enemy before he starts than when he arrives.
39. Q. Have you any evidence indicating the distance from Oahu at
which the Japs did actually launch their planes ?
A. Shortly after 7 December, I saw a chart recovered from a Japa-
nese scout bomber which had been shot down, which had navigational
lines drawn on it. These lines indicated the probability that this air-
plane had been launched from a point 250 miles North of Oahu and
that it was to be recovered several hours later about 175 miles North of
Oahu.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was previleged
to make any further statement covering anything relating to the sub-
ject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of
record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out
by the previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 11 : 20 a. m., adjourned until 2 p. m..
tomorrow.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY HI
U05-\ PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HAET INaUIKY
TUESDAY, MARCH 14, 1944
Eighth Day
Navy Department,
Washington^ D. G.
The examination met at 2 p. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer,
and his counsel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as re-
porter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the seventh day of the examination until such time
as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the
examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface
to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.
A. Curts, M. E. ; Captain, U. S. N. ; Staff, CominCh.
2. Q. Where were you stationed on the 7th of December, 1941 ?
A. I was attached to the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, as Pacific Fleet Communication Officer.
3. Q. And how long had you been so serving prior to that date,
approximately ?
A. Approximately two years, under two different Commanders-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.
4. Q. Had you ever had any previous experience of that nature ?
A. Yes, sir ; several years.
5. Q. With the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, established in a
shore command post, through what agencies did you transact the
Fleet's communications?
A. Insofar as practicable, and nearly to 100 per cent, in the same
manner in which we would have communicated with the mobile units
of the Fleet while aboard the U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, the Pacific
Fleet Flag.
6. Q. Did you use the ships' installations?
A. We had our own radio station at the sub base to communicate
with the ships in the Harbor and with the task force commanders at sea
directly from that station. We also had facilities for utilizing the
112 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
fixed radio communication facilities of radio station NPM, both by
radio control and by land line in parallel. The installation ashore and
the location of the U06] Commander-in-Chief's headquarters
temporarily ashore, in no way hampered the mobile Fleet communi-
cations of the Commander-in-Chief and, to a certain degree, facilitated
his communications with the shore activities of the Sea Frontier and
the Army and the higher command echelons in the Continent.
7. Q. Then, in effect, you both received and transmitted at that
station at the Submarine Base just the same as if you were on board the
Flagship ; is that true ?
A. Yes. We paralleled the shore control lines with radio lines be-
cause of our apprehension to sabotage of the land lines. When on the
morning of December 7 a bomb or a shell cut the majority of control
lines in the Navy Yard, CinCPac did not lose control of transmitters
which he was using to work the ships present in the Harbor, the task
force commanders at sea, and all ships at sea.
8. Q. Didn't you have telephone lines to the ships that were berthed
alongside ?
A. No, sir, only few instance. Some of the ships had telephone
lines on the regular Pearl Harbor exchange, but that circuit, in no
sense, could be called a military circuit.
9. Q. Your communications between Headquarters and ships were
entirely satisfactory in all respects then, I take it?
A. Yes ; we never lost control of the radio lines even during the at-
tack. We continued to handle combat traffic. Every ship in Pearl
Harbor was guarding a common frequency, regardless of administra-
tive organization. This circuit was supposed to be controlled by the
Sea Frontier Commander and was primarily established for the issu-
ance of fire control orders, as the batteries of such ships as were present
had, by prior arrangement, been made available to the Sea Frontier
Commander to assist him in defending the Naval Base.
10. Q. The Commander-in-Chief used the same call, same set of
calls, whether he was afloat or ashore ?
A. Yes, sir, we made no difference in our communications, external
communications, while located at the sub base, from those ordinarily
performed on the ship, except that for the Harbor circuit, of which
I have previously spoken, which was under the control of the Sea
Frontier Commander, who was also the District Commandant. We
had special calls made up and promulgated for use on that circuit
so that the Army, if they needed them, would have these calls available.
11. Q. Communications to the mainland and other points far re-
moved, were always through Fourteenth Naval District equipment; is
that right?
A. Yes, sir. Ordinarily the communications to Washington and the
mainland were via radio station NPM, which station was under the
control of the Fourteenth Naval District.
12. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief have his own coding boards so
that the District personnel had nothing to do with his dispatches?
A. Yes, sir, we operated exactly as though we were aboard ship,
using the same facilities, and we kept ourselves mobile to the extent
that we could go aboard ship at any time on two or three hours notice,
with personnel, code ciphers, and some special equipment.
PBOCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 113
[107] 13. Q. Still speaking of conditions as of November, '41,
what arrangements were there under your charge for communica-
tion with Army and with Naval units on shore Hawaii, outside of
Pearl Harbor?
A. In general, we communicated with the Army and the District
by telephone.
14. Q. Was that through the city exchange ?
A. No, sir, through the Pearl Harbor exchange. We, ourselves,
had a switchboard which had trunk lines to the regular Pearl Harbor
exchange and to the city exchange.
15. Q. Then everything went through the city switchboard?
A. No, sir. The District switchboard, or the switchboard at Pearl
Harbor, had some but not all of the District facilities tied into its
board. Others were obtainable through the city board. The tele-
phone situation on Oahu, prior to December 7, was far from satis-
factory. All trunk lines were overloaded, insufficient equipment was
available to take care of the rapidly expanded Naval and Army facil-
ities, and the civilian telephone company found itself in the same
position in regard to civilian telephone service.
16. Q. Did the Army organizations on Oahu have direct telephone
connection between their various posts and stations ?
A. In general, yes, but by a very poor Army cable system, which
was subject to constant breaks and deterioration from years of serv-
ice. As a matter of fact, the Navy also used this Army cable system
and it was partially because it was so unsatisfactory that I paralleled
it with radio, in order that I might key the transmitters of NPM
regardless of failures of this cable from either deliberate sabotage
or because it was generally unreliable.
17. Q. Did you have a direct wire to that Army system ?
A. Yes, sir, for keying of transmitters and I believe for some tele-
types only; not for telephone.
18. Q. Admiral Kimmel's Headquarters was on the teletype system
then ?
A. I believe that prior to December 7, we had some teletypes in-
stalled. However, there was a great shortage of teletypes on the
Island and but few of the units desiring same had been able to obtain
them.
19. Q. Are you able to tell us anything about the means of com-
munication with planes in the air in the vicinity of Oahu, including
whether or not it was satisfactory ?
A. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the communication with
planes in the air was almost entirely through their base stations. In
general, such communication was fairly satisfactory. After Decem-
ber 7, planes in the air were governed by the policy that all planes
on a common mission, whether Army, Navy, Marine Corps, land or
seaplanes, would be on a common frequency, and that the Shore
Commander of this mission and the parent stations of the planes
would all guard this common frequency.
20. Q. Was not that the case prior to 7 December; did not that
machinery exist?
A. Only for drills, to the best of my recollection. As a matter of
fact, the only missions assigned were drill missions.
79716— 46— Ex. 144 9
114 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
21. Q. Was it necessary, before conducting a drill, to make special
arranfrements for those communications ?
A. Yes, sir.
[lOS] 22. Q. Do you recall any particular difficulty in com-
municating with the Air Station at Kaneohe Bay ?
A. Yes, sir. Telephone service — teletype service to Kaneohe Bay
from points on the Island of Oahu was entirely inadequate and, in
several occasions, air commanders reported that it was quicker to
take off from the southside of the Island and fly to Kaneohe than it
was to try to telephone; with a considerable degree of truth. In
addition, Kaneohe was established as a Naval Air Station with inade-
quate radio equipment. If my memory is correct, it was actually
commissioned before a single piece of radio transmitter apparatus
was furnished for installation on the Island by the Navy Depart-
ment. There existed, insofar as their local radio communications
were concerned, portable apparatus which was supposed to be used
for landing forces and special use by CinCPac.
23. Q. Captain, looking back upon the few weeks leading up to the
attack on Pearl Harbor, what stand out in your mind as your greatest
difficulties of that time? I mean, of course, as regards your own
place in the picture.
A. Personally, I had been apprehensive for a long time, not just
two weeks, about the danger of Japan starting a war without formal
declaration. Insofar as my own work was concerned, I was princi-
pally worried because, to my mind, there was not a single unity of
command organization, either authorized or set up, and I believe
anyone who has had any experience with military communications
will agree that if command is not definite and not set up, it is well
nigh impossible to anticipate the communication needs when an
emergency occurs. I, personally, was very apprehensive of local
sabotage, there being in the neighborhood of 150,000 Japanese on the
Island of Oahu alone.
24. Q. In that sabotage, you mean particularly as against your
important land lines ?
A. I rather expected sabotage against both the land line control
wires, the telephones, but more particularly against the transmitters
and service proper of the shore installations outside of Pearl Harbor.
It would have been possible also to have wrecked, with comparative
ease, the transmission power lines of the electric companies, which
were quite vital to our communications. I had an arrangement
whereby, from local power at the sub base, I could key the trans-
mitters in San Diego and carry on Fleet communications from that
point. In fact, we often did so and we did so to a certain extent on
the morning of December 7.
25. Q. As regards the Communication Officer of the Fourteenth
Naval District, was he wholly independent of you or was he, with
his own organization, fitted into your own organization ?
A. Organizationally, he operated directly under the Commander
of the Sea Frontier and of the Fourteenth Naval District. At all
times, he, individually, was 100 per cent cooperative with us, and his
attitude at all times was that the shore radio facilities under his
command were primarily for service to the Fleet.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 115
26. Q. Do you remember if there was a considerable traffic con-
gestion in, say, November '41, over the radio system between Oahu
and the Continent ?
A. No, I do not, sir.
27. Q. In the few weeks prior to 7 December, were you cognizant
that there was much Japanese originated traffic, particularly outgoing
traffic?
A. No, sir. You don't mean from the Island of Oahu ?
[109] 28. Q. No.
A. No, sir, I was not, but I was not in the Intelligence Department
of CinCPac Staff.
29. Q. Then that was a subject in which you had no responsibility
and concerning which you were not informed, is that correct ?
A. That is correct, sir.
30. Q. I believed you were stationed at the Experimental Labora-
tory, Bellevue, sometime in the past ; if, so, when was it ?
A. During 1936 to 1938.
31. Q. While there, did you have any duties in connection with the
development of radar ?
A Yes sir.
32. Q. What duties?
A. I was liaison officer for the Eadio and Sound Division, and as
such closely watched development of radar, contributed what I could
to it, kept the Navy Department informed as to the progress thereon.
33. Q. Did you have any administrative work in connection with
that development ?
A. Yes, sir; practically all duties I just spoke of were administra-
tive.
34. Q. You used the word "liaison."
A. Yes, sir. I controlled the funds, pushed the applications, en-
deavored to bring it over from a scientific study to an instrument
which could be used aboard ship.
35. Q. You were then a sort of manager and steerer of the tech-
nicians and scientists who were working on the development ; is that it ?
A. Yes, sir ; a steerer but not in direct control thereof.
36. Q. Was there anyone on the officer's list who was in any better
touch with that development when you left it in 1938 than you were ?
A. I don't believe so, sir.
37. Q. What was the state of that development when you left, in
general terms, as regards its application for war use ?
A. In the summer of 1938, the frequencies, which we were then able
to use with radar, had been so shortened that it was practical to in-
stall it on board ships of the carrier and battleship class. One model
had been tested aboard a destroyer with some degree of success. It
had been decided to build a shipboard radar copied directly after the
one installed on top of the Naval Kesearch Laboratory for tests on
board a battleship.
38. Q. At that time, and using the laboratory installation under
average conditions, how far could you detect a medium size plane in
flight at the maximum altitudes at which planes fly ?
A. The rotating model, at the Navy Kesearch Laboratory, in the
spring of 1938, was able to detect aircraft at the higher altitudes to
116 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
distances up to 100 miles, with an azimuth discrimination of better
than one degree and a position angle discrimination of approximately
six degrees.
39. Q. At that time, had any knowledge of this development been
communicated to the Army Signal Corps ?
A. Yes, sir.
[110] 40. Q. When?
A. Radar, as we know it, was disclosed to the Army by permission
of the Chief of Naval Operations, in about January, 1937. It did not
appear at that time that we would be able to get a small enough an-
tenna to work aboard ship, and because of its tremenduous defensive
value to the Army, full disclosure was made.
41. Q. After leaving Bellevue, were you able to keep in any sort of
touch with subsequent developmnts ?
A. I lost touch for about one year, except for minor information.
At the end of that year, I went to Staff communication duty and fol-
lowed the development as closely as possible, being interested in its
potentialities for the Fleet.
42. Q. In, say, the summer of 1941, how far had the Navy gotten to-
wards actually using and installing radar on board ship ?
A. There were approximately twenty search type (CXAM) radars
installed on carriers, battleships, and cruisers.
43. Q. In general, what results were they giving as results search
for aircraft ?
A. From the low altitude positions aboard ship, they were, in gen-
eral, reliable to distances in the neighborhood of seventy-five miles.
44. Q. What would be the relative difficulties of radar installations
on board ship, as compared with similar installations on shore?
A. The principal difficulty of installing a radar aboard ship lies
in the necessity of having a large antenna which must be free to rotate,
either in its own right or by turning the ship. The larger the antenna
is, the better angular discrimination will be obtained and and to a
lesser degree a better range will be obtained. Topside space on a ship
is at a great premium. Similar conditions do not prevail ashore, and
a fairly large structure built, if necessary, on a railroad turntable, can
be erected.
45. Q. By the end of November, 1941, had the Army Signal Corps
gotten to installing and being ready to work radar equipment ?
A. In November, '41 the Air Warning Service for Oahu were install-
ing radars on various points in the Island of Oahu. I should say that
approximately four Air Warning Service radars had been installed at
that time but they were definitely in a training status and were not be-
ing used as an inegral part of the Air Warning Service except during
brief periods of drill.
46. Q. Do you know whether or not the design and conception of the
appartus was entirely satisfactory for war purposes ?
A. The early warning sets being installed on Orahu are the Army
270 type which are still being used in a great many locations. They
were not a perfect instrument but properly operated and installed,
they are reasonably satisfactory. In November, 1941, the Air Warning
Service out on Oahu knew very little about this new art. They were
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 117
trying to learn how to install them and how to use them at the time of
the attack.
47. Q. During those intervening years, had you been personally of
the belief that a device of that nature was a very satisfactory security
[iii] measure in a situation like that on Oahu ?
A. Yes, indeed. Search radar extended all the value of aircraft
warning service by observers to times of low visibility and to dis-
tances far beyond the visible range. It, of course, would have to be
coupled with knowledge of the presence of friendly forces or planes
or by an efficient electrical identification system which wasn't at that
time in existence.
48. Q. Did you then know of any reason why the Army Signal
Corps had not been properly equipped with this device as soon as we
had the radar on board ship ?
A. No, I don't know what delayed the Army in the securing of radar.
To my mind, their problem was much simpler than that of the Navy's,
as they could use larger equipment, at longer frequencies, and in a
part of the radio spectrum more familiar to manufacturei-s and
scientists.
49. Q. Did you ever advise Admiral Kimmel or the senior members
of his Staff concerning the state of efficiency of the Army's radar on
Oahu?
A. Yes, sir. I informed Admiral Kimmel that the Army radar
was in an instruction status only, and not in an operational status.
Such was the case on December 7, 1941.
50. Q. In late November, '41, did you see the various dispatches from
the Navy Department which contained warnings of the imminence of
hostilities with Japan?
A. I believe I saw all of them, sir.
51. Q. When you first saw the Department's war warning dispatch
of 27 November '41, what was your reaction to the words "war warn-
ing"? What did you think it called for in the way of action, in the
way of security measures, or other action ?
A. My first reaction was that it was just another war warning, as
we had had several dispatches extending over a long period of time,
which, although they didn't contain the words "war warning", were,
in fact, war warnings. This, plus the inclusion of information in this
dispatch giving the probable location of the attack, took the keen edge
off the dispatch so far as Honolulu and Pearl Harbor were concerned
in connection with an air or amphibious operation. This (indicating
Exhibit 8) dispatch, along with several others received about that time,
increased my own worry about the danger of local sabotage, particu-
larly because of sabotage reference to Guam and Samoa.
52. Q. Do you recall your reaction, if any, from the use of the word
"deployment" and the language around that word ?
A. My only recollection is that I questioned how to take a defensive
deployment, as this dispatch, coupled with other dispatches which told
us to take no offensive action until attacked, confused me as to how I
would have placed units of the Fleet, had I been the Commander-in-
Chief.
53. Q. Captain, I show you a dispatch which is Exhibit 11 before
this examination. Have you seen that dispatch ?
118 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I don't recall having seen that dispatch. I may have seen it but
I don't remember it at this late date.
54. Q. Captain, it is noted that the dispatch which you looked at a
while ago, the November 27 dispatch, which is Exhibit 8, directs that
the Army authorities be advised as to the contents of the dispatch.
Will you [^^^] please explain your system for conveying such
information to the Army ?
A. Our ordinary system in Pearl Harbor was to make a paraphrase
of such a dispatch, send an officer with the original and with a para-
phrase to the addressee's communication office, and have them ask the
Commanding General whether he was satisfied with the paraphrase
and then to sign the dispatch, the original, as having received the same.
This particular dispatch wasn't handled in that manner. This dis-
patch was delivered to Admiral Kimmel who kept it in his desk drawer
with all copies thereof, and, upon my telling him that I had to deliver
it to the Army, he informed me that he would take care of it by sending
his intelligence officer to deliver this dispatch to the Commandant of
the Fourteenth Naval District and to General Short. I tried to get
him to let me get their signatures but Admiral Kimmel refused, saying
that Commander Layton had taken care of it. I questioned Layton
as to whether he delivered it and he stated that he had delivered it
to the Fourteenth Naval District and, in the presence of Captain Earle,
the Chief of Staff, had delivered a copy to General Short's G-2 officer
for delivery to General Short, and later Layton informed me that
this officer, this G-2 officer, told him that he had given the dispatch
to General Short personally in his bedroom that night, I was quite
concerned, personally, about upsetting the system of receipts, but in
my own mind, I am satisfied that this dispatch was delivered to both
the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and to General
Short, although I held no receipt.
55. Q. Do you recall what date that dispatch was received by the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?
A. It was about the 27th of November. There was no inordinate
delay in this dispatch.
56. Q. And the day of delivery to which you referred is the date
of receipt — I mean, delivery to General Short and Admiral Bloch ?
A. I believe so, but I am not certain.
57. Q. Do you recognize this dispatch, which is Exhibit 6 before
this examination ?
A. I recall having seen that dispatch.
58. Q. Do you recall anything about its delivery to the Army ?
A. No, I do not recall this individual dispatch, I feel certain that
it was because in the review of all dispatches prior to this time, we
found no non-deliveries, howeA^er, I can not recall this delivery of the
individual dispatch,
59. Q. Do you recall any other dispatches, other than the one of
November 27, that delivery was not made in a normal manner ?
A. Yes, I believe there were certain dispatches which were handled
through Intelligence G-2 channels, against my protest, which was
made only because it upset bookkeeping, not because I had any doubt
that the information would ultimately reach the addressee.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 119
60. Q. At the time that you were the Fleet Communications Officer,
what was the practice with respect to the retention of such dispatches
in the files ? I'm getting at the period of time they were retained.
A. We would keep all such dispatches two years, and, in fact when
I left, I left directions that all traffic which might be pertinent to Pearl
Harbor be retained in the files.
[113] 61. Q. Did these file copies show the signatures of General
Short which you have testified about, indicating his receipt of the
dispatches ?
A. I believe so, except the one of November 27, 1 know does not con-
tain his receipt.
62. Q. What system did the Army follow in delivering to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, information that they received and
were directed to pass on to the Navy ?
A. They sent it down by officer-courier, and obtained a receipt for
it, in general. There may have been times in which they delivered
traffic directly to Admiral Kimmel and I may not have seen it.
63. Q. Was any delivery normally made to you personally ?
A. No, sir ; to my Communication Watch Officer.
64. Q. Do you recall the receipt from the Army of a dispatch origi-
nated on the 27th of November, 1941, in the War Department, contain-
ing a warning similar to that contained in the Navy dispatch of the
same day?
A. Frankly, I do not recall. There were many warning dispatches
received over a long period of time. If we received it, I feel sure it is
in CinCPac files.
65. Q. Captain, j^ou've testified, with respect to your apprehensions,
that your communication installations might suffer from sabotage in
tlie event of hostilities or a surprise start to hostilities. Did your
communication installations in fact suffer on 7 December 1941 from
sabotage ?
A. No, sir ; I saw no evidence of sabotage, interference, or deception
by the enemy, or by local Japanese.
66. Q. You referred to the lack of radio equipment at Kaneohe
at the time the station was commissioned. Was this condition reme-
died prior to the attack on December 7 ?
A. Yes, sir; the radio equipment was, but the telephone lines were
still far from satisfactory. We had made them put in some direct
telephone lines and teletype lines, but they were none too good.
67. Q. Were they on the teletype system?
A. There were all kinds of teletype circuits around there. I believe
they had a teletype installed between Kaneohe, Com 14 and Ford
Island.
68. Q. Were you cognizant of an important dispatch from either
the Chief of Staff, Army, or the Chief of Naval Operations, giving a
very definite warning of the imminence of hostilities which was de-
layed in transmission and not received until sometime late on 7
December ?
A. Yes, sir. I believe that there was a joint dispatch sent by War
and Navy through the War Department, via ECA communications, to
Shafter at Honolulu, which was not received at Shaf ter until after the
attack had commenced and was not received by CinCPac until late on
120 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the afternoon of the 7th. I believe that dispatch indicated the im-
mediate opening of hostilities.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to
make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject
matter [-?-?4] of the examination which he thought should be a
matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully
brought out by the previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 3 : 40 p. m., adjourned until 11 a. m.,
tomorrow.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 121
[ii5] PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIEY
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 15, 1944
Ninth Day
Navy Department,
Washington^ D. C.
The examination met at 11 : 07 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer,
and his comisel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the eighth day of the examination vmtil such time
as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the
examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface
to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present station.
A. Patrick Neison Lynch Bellinger, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy;
Commander, Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, with administrative offices
at Norfolk, Virginia.
2. Q. What duties were you performing on the 7th of December,
1941?
A. On the 7th of December, 1941, I was Commander, Patrol Wing
Two ; I was also controlling Patrol Wing One, which was also based on
the Island of Oahu with headquarters at Kaneohe ; I was Commander,
Fleet Air Detachment on Ford Island; I was Commander, Task
Force Nine, which was the Task Force of the patrol planes and tenders
and such other units as may be assigned by the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet; I was also assigned as liaison with the Commandant
of the Fourteenth Naval District in connection with aviation facilities
being developed at the various outlying islands, such as Midway,
Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston. In addition, I was Commander, Naval
Base Defense Air Force, which was an organization set up by direction
of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and headed by the Com-
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who was termed Cornmander,
Naval Base Defense Force.
3. Q. Admiral, please relate, approximately, the forces normally
included in your command as Commander, Patrol Wing Two, and un-
der your control the forces of Patrol Wing One.
122 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. There were several squadrons of patrol planes with a total of
eighty-one planes on December 7, together with the aircraft tenders
assigned.
4. Q. Were there any additional aircraft available to you as the
Base Defense Force Air Commander ?
A. Under the setup of the Naval Base Defense Air Force, in case
of emergency, aircraft of the Navy that were then on shore from
carriers and otherwise, came under this Command. However, the
fighting planes were further assigned, through my organization, to
the Army Fighter Command for operation. [-?i^] Also, such
planes of the bombardment type as the Army might make available
were subject to my operational control in such capacity.
5. Q. Admiral, will you give us, please, the approximate location,
with respect to Oahu and the outlying islands, of the patrol planes on
December 7.
A. There were 36 planes at Kaneohe Air Station, 33 planes at Pearl,
and 12 planes at Midway. Twelve of the planes at Pearl had returned
on 5 December, having had, prior thereto, an extensive tour of duty
at Midway and Wake.
6. Q. For how long a period preceding the date of the attack had
patrol planes been stationed at Midway and Wake ?
A. The squadron I last referred to as having returned to Pearl
on 5 December had been stationed at Midway or Wake since 17
October.
7. Q. Were any additional planes sent to the outlying islands be-
tween the 27th of November and the 7th of December, 1941 ?
A. I don't remember the date that one squadron was dispatched to
Midway in connection with a Fleet operation in the reenforcement
of Wake, but I am practically sure it was prior to November 27,
shortly thereto. I don't believe any of my patrol planes were dis-
patched from the Island of Oahu to outlying islands subsequent to
November 27.
8. Q. Do you recall that the Fleet operation to which you referred
was the sending of a task force to deliver fighter planes to Wake ?
A. Yes.
9. Q. It was that?
A. It was in connection with sending Marine planes to Wake.
10. Q. Admiral, please outline the general nature in the deployment
of patrol planes in the several months preceding the attack, that is,
the nature of the training and so forth.
A. The main effort was expansion training, expansion meaning
the qualifying of personnel to form additional patrol plane crews,
and to qualify them all personally in their main job. Shortly before
December, the patrol plane squadrons were attached for operational
control to various task forces of the Fleet, they worked in connection
with the training operations that these task forces were conducting.
Later, this organization was done away with and the operation of
patrol planes with task forces was done by assignment as directed by
higher authority. New i^lanes, with which Patrol Wings One and
Two were being equipped, arrived in Oahu in accordance with the fol-
lowing dates: 12 planes, 28 October; 8 planes, 28 October; 12 planes,
8 November ; 12 planes, 23 November ; 12 planes, 23 November ; all of
1941. These planes were the PBY5 type, for which there were scarcely
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 123
any spares on hand to maintain. Therefore, a great deal of time and
effort was utilized in maintenance difliculties and also in the prepara-
tion of this new type of plane for war conditions.
11. Q. Were these operations conducted under an approved quar-
terly deployment schedule?
A. Yes, under approved schedules. Sometunes they were not quar-
terly.
12. Q. But they were announced well in advance ?
A. Yes.
13. Q. Do you remember how they were classified ?
A. I think they were confidential.
[117] 14. Q. Admiral, will you please state the condition of the
patrol planes on Oahu on December 7, with respect to their material
readiness for operations ?
A. In accordance with information I gain from notes made on De-
cember 19, 1941, the following was the situation: 36 planes were at
Kaneohe ; 33 planes at Pearl ; and 12 planes at Midway. Of these 81
planes, 9 were under repair; 58 were in commission, and 14 were in
the air.
15. Q. Were the Marine planes on Oahu subject to your operational
control during emergencies up to 7 December, or were your duties in
coiinection with the Fleet Detachment confined to those planes on
Ford Island?
A. In my status as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, the
Marine planes functioned under my operational control when drills
were scheduled, or when there was an actual emergency. That is, those
planes that were made available to me. However, I wish to differen-
tiate between the bombing and scouting planes and the fighting planes,
the latter, of course, functioned under the iVrmy Fighter Command.
16. Q. In general, what was the state of training of the patrol plane
personnel just prior to 7 December, '41 ?
A. In general, it was good, but there was a lot actually to be per-
fected as was proved after December 7. However, we were short
of our allocated number of crews for patrol planes, and the main
training was the expansion training which was being conducted in
order to increase the number of crews that would be available.
17. Q. This examination has received an estimate of the situation
which is an inclosure to a letter marked Exhibit 22, which is purport-
edly approved by you in your capacity as Commander, Naval Air Base
Defense Force. I hand you the Exhibit ; do you identity the inclosed
estimates ?
A. Yes, sir. This paper was practically wholly prepared by my
organization.
18. Q. Do you have in your custody a copy of the Naval Base De-
fense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41 to which this estimate is
a supplement ?
A. No.
19. Q. It is noted that this estimate recognizes as possible enemy
action almost identical with the action of the Japanese Navy on 7
December 1941, and arrives at decisions for the defense of the ships
and installations at Pearl Harbor from such enemy action. I would
like to discuss certain aspects of the estimate to obtain additional infor-
mation with respect thereto and to obtain information as to how the
124 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
resultant plan worked out when the attack came. It is noted that the
estimate, under "Action open to us", provides for daily patrols as fa,r
as possible to seaward through 3G0 degrees. It further states that this
would be desirable but that it could only be effectively maintained with
personnel and materiel then available for a short period. Would you
please explain more fully the reason that the extended patrols had to
be so limited ?
A. Because of the number of planes available, the limitations of
personnel, and the maintenance problems of the aircraft available.
As a regular proposition, it is believed that a crew could conduct one
patrol every third day of the type listed in the estimate. Crews have
done more than that at times for short periods, but the physical fatigue
is something that has to be watched in the conduct of continuous
search operations. It was estimated that to conduct a search through
360 degrees, to a distance of at least 800 miles, [ii5] assuming
a 15 mile radius of visibility, would require a daily flight of 84 planes.
Therefore, to conduct a continuous search of this type would require
an overall force of approximately 200 planes. There is always a
question, of the life of the planes versus the physical fatigue of the
crew. The planes now stand up and can operate continually more and
to a greater extent than can the crews. Therefore, the question of
number of planes and number of crews for these planes, in order to
place them in the air each day a flight of 84 planes, becomes a matter
of adjustment and not a concrete statement as regards to the actual
number of planes required. But, undoubtedly, it would require 252
crews and more than 170 planes.
20. Q. Admiral, were considerations given to extending a distance
patrol to cover the more important arcs rather than the total of 360
degrees?
A. Many phases of a possible attack were considered, and in air raid
drills, our own carriers were used. Their location was unknown even
to myself. There was no hard and fixed decision as to what direction
a possible attack might be launched, although the wind direction indi-
cated that the northern sector might be more desirable. The location
of bases from which such attack might come were in the southwesterly
direction.
21. Q. Were not such sectors as a narrow one to the southeastward
fairly well covered by the presence of other islands in the chain;
another, similarly, northwest toward Midway ; and was not the steamer
lane to the mainland so well occupied that a narrow sector there also
would most likely be unused by the enemy ?
A. Yes, sir, that is correct, except that there were no planes oper-
ating from outlying islands except Midway at that time.
22. Q. You would not expect an enemy to send in an attack which
went anywhere near those rather narrow sectors, would you ?
A. No, sir. The enemy, undoubtedly, would endeavor to guard
against all detection, shipping, and such other operations as they might
assume were in progress.
23. Q. What is the basis of those words in the estimate which you
have just stated, that a distant reconnaissance would have to extend
to at least 800 miles ?
A. The following applies to 22 December conditions: Launching
radius of enemy carriers, estimated at 300 nautical miles; enemy's
night-run, estimated at 27 knots times 13 hours, equals 351 miles;
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 125
enemy's day run, before search planes reach 300 mile radius, 81 miles ;
radius to cover effective at dark, 732 miles. The PBY plane was the
only type of plane the Navy had to conduct this search with, and 800
miles was considered about the maximum length of leg that could
be carried out by the PBY plane. And to give another estimate for
the PBY on the basis of 25 miles visibility, I quote the following:
"Kadius of delay search, 800 miles ; number of searching planes daily,
25 mile visibility, 50 ; flight times per search plane, 16i/^ hours ; total
IDlanes hours per month, 24,750; total number of planes required, 150;
number of flight crews required, 225; engine changes per month,
average, 821^; spare engines required, 182; fuel consumption per
month, gallons of gasoline, 1,980,000; search effectiveness estimated
at 50 per cent."
24. Q. Was the 300 miles estimated as an enemy launching radius
rather a high estimate?
A. Yes, I thought they would come in closer, but that was selected
as giving the enemy the advantage in the estimate.
[1J9] 25. Q. Admiral, were the PBY patrol bombers equipped
with radar at that time, that is, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor ?
A. No.
26. Q. Did conditions of personnel and materiel improve between
the 31st of March, 1941, the date of the estimate, and December 7,
1941?
A. In this way only, that gradually facilities were being built up,
that obsolete planes were gradually being replaced, that more mate-
riel was gradually being sent out, but even up until November 23,
when I received word from an officer who had just arrived in a ferry
flight from the Pacific Coast and who had made a special trip to
Washington for me, informed me that from all information he could
receive, the Atlantic was receiving the priorities.
Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken
was still binding.
27. Q. Were these changes sufficient to cause you to reconsider your
estimate of the situation made in March of '41 — were there enough
differences ?
A. Changes?
28. Q. You stated that they did improve somewhat, and I won-
dered if you considered them sufficient
A. No ; by no means.
29. Q. The estimate further provides that in view of the difficul-
ties that you have just discussed, extensive daily patrols could not be
undertaken unless intelligence indicated that a surface raid was prob-
able within rather narrow time limits. Did jou receive intelligence
of this nature prior to the December 7 attack?
A. No.
30. Q. Also as an enclosure with Exhibit 22 before this examina-
tion is a supplement, or annex, to a plan signed by the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District. I show it to you. Do you recognize it ?
A. Yes.
31. Admiral, did you consider that this agreement authorized you,
acting under Commander Base Defense Force, to call on the Army Air
Forces in Hawaii, for planes of an appropriate type that they might
126 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
have, to augment your available planes for search purposes, in the
absence of a declared or recognized emergency ?
A. No, it did not give me that authority, and any time that use of
Army planes was involved, and they were involved only prior to
December the 7th in case of drill, special arrangements had to be made
ahead of time in order to utilize Army planes in the drill, and on.
account of failure to get joint action in these drills, it was necessary to
set up a pre-determined schedule for drills which the Army was asked
to agree to. The Army's point of view was that they were so busy
training their personnel that they could not divert them to drills. If
you will note in this paper, in paragraph 2, "When the Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense
Officer agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently
imminent to warrant such action, each Commander will take such
preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay
to the other Commander such a portion of the air forces at his dis-
posal. . . ." and so forth. That was one of the main impediments
of this agreement and of this organization. No air [1W\
defense can be effective unless it is functioning 24 hours every day,
and this set-up that existed in the Hawaiian Islands was a paper
organization which could not really function to prevent, or take action
in an air attack. It was not the primary objective of either Army or
Navy. There was no unity of command or control,
32. Q, Was the paragraph 2, of this annex to which you have just
referred, used prior to the attack so as to bring the plan into effect?
A. Actually, no. At time of attack, I received no word from any-
body. We took action directly with the Bomber Command, General
Rudolph, and he agreed to do all he could in carrying out my desires.
33. Q. However, could not an agreement between j^ou and your
opposite number in the air, as to correct action, have been reached
under a declaration by the highest echelon that danger of attack
existed, or even if the two of you, from what you knew, had made
such an estimate ?
A. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and myself,
were in very close accord on many subjects and we worked together
in drills, outside of air raid drills. If he saw or I saw an emergency
situation, I feel very sure that he would have cooperated in any
specific instance.
34. Q. Admiral, you have several times referred to "drills". Did
you include in this, regular tactical exercises, involving units of the
Fleet, carriers, and so forth ?
A. What did you say ?
35. Q. Did you include in that term "drills", regular scheduled
tactical exercises?
A. That was other than air raid drills, I am speaking about.
36. Q. Yes, but that includes regular Fleet tactical exercises in
which the Armj' Air participated ?
A. No, these were special drills or exercises that were arranged
between the Army Air Force Commander and myself.
37. Q. Did not the Army also participate in some of the Fleet exer-
cise periods with their Air arm ?
A. Yes, by special arrangement.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 127
38. Q. Did the conditions as to cooperation which you have men-
tioned apply in the same manner as they did during your drills
arranged among the Air Commanders ?
A. Yes.
39. Q. Admiral, had you been physically present in Pearl Harbor
in the week or so preceding the attack on 7 December ?
A. Yes, I was at my quarters, and in bed with the "Flu" for approx-
imateh^ five days prior to December 7th, and December 7th was to be
my first day up from the "Flu".
40. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch, which is Exhibit 6 before
this examination. Do you recognize that dispatch as one you saw
prior to the attack ?
A. I don't recall ever seeing that.
[i^i] 41. Q. It is noted from your testimony that on the day
following the date of this dispatch certain patrol planes were dis-
patched to Midway. Was this in accordance with and in compliance
with orders of higher authority, sir ?
A. Yes, sir.
42. Q. Do you recall whether the dispatching of that squadron had
been planned in advance, or whether it was a sudden decision?
A, I think it was a sudden decision by the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific.
43. Q. Were you advised of the reason for dispatching the squad-
ron at that time?
A. I don't think so, except that, as I remember, it was done in
connection with reenforcements at Midway, and, later, at Wake,
connection with reenforcements at Midway, and, later, at Wake.
44. Q. Admiral, I show you another dispatch, which is Exhibit 7
before this examination. Had you seen that prior to the attack on
Pearl Harbor?
A. No.
45. Q. And another dispatch. Exhibit 8; had you seen that prior
to the attack on Pearl Harbor ?
A. No.
46. Q. Were you advised
A. (Interposing) As a matter of fact, I didn't see it until about
five days afterward, when Admiral Kimmel showed it to me; after
December 7.
47. Q. Weve you advised, in any manner, of the receipt of a dis-
patch of this nature about this time ?
A. No, not prior to December 7.
48. Q. I show you Exhibit 9. Had you seen that prior to the at-
tack on Pearl Harbor?
A. No.
49. Q. Had you seen the dispatch. Exhibit 11?
A. No.
50. Q. Was any other intelligence relating to American-Japanese
relations, or the Pacific situation, received either from local or other
sources which caused you to extend the air patrols prior to the launch-
ing of the attack on December 7?
A. The newspapers, of course, were all alarming ; rather, the news-
papers indicated a critical situation. I was reading- those. There
128 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
were no special flights that were carried out, other than the training
exercises and the security flights that were ordered by the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific.
51. Q. I had in mind, Admiral, the revision of the estimate to the
effect that extensive patrols could not be undertaken unless intelli-
gence indicates that a surface raid was probable, within rather nar-
row time limits. None of the intelligence information received by
you, if you did receive any, was sufficient to bring about the excep-
tion here to your patrols so as to cause you to expand the areas pa-
trolled by air?
A. In order to expand the patrols to the extent that would have
been necessary to get early information of an approaching force, it
would have [122] been necessary for me to take the question
up with higher authority, in order to carry out such employment
of my forces. That would have been either through the District
Commandant, who was Commander of the Naval Base Defense Force,
of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. The situation in the
Pacific had been critical for sometime, but at some times it had ap-
peared to be more critical. It was a question, from the newspaper
accounts, of whether the situation was more critical prior to Decem-
ber the 7th then it had ever been before, or not.
52. Q. Did you receive orders from higher authority in the period
between 27 November and 7 December to extend the air patrol in
any way?
A. N'ot from Oahu; only in connection with the operations that
were taking place at Midway and Wake, and that was for a particular
reason with reference to our own forces that were in that vicinity.
53. Q. During those days of j^our illness, did you do any business
at all, or did the officer who normally would succeed you, carry on
the work of your command ?
A. He came in to confer with me, brought papers for signature,
but relieved me of most of the work of the command.
54. Q. Who was he?
A. Captain Logan Ramsey.
55. Q. And you received nothing from him other than, as you
have stated, what was in the newspapers, indicating an}^ particular
reason for thinking of security in Pearl Harbor?
A. No, sir.
56. Q. It appears that very important information and Navy De-
partment directives were not passed to you. Being a very important
subordinate commander, I have to ask how Admiral Kimmel did get
advice and information concerning air matters. Insofar as you Iniow,
who acted along that line?
A. I dealt directly with Admiral Kimmel quite considerably, and
also with his Aviation Aide, who was Captain Davis and Admiral
Kimmel seemed to be very much interested in aviation matters.
57. Q. Did you ever talk over with him the possibility of a carrier
raid by the Japanese ?
A. No, not in conversation. The actual wording of the estimate
was never discussed with Admiral Kimmel. In fact, it was never dis-
cussed to my knowledge, except in my own organization and with
the Army personnel concerned; Army and Air personnel concerned.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 129
However, this estimate was part of the original assignment given me
by Admiral Kimmel in connection with his desire to bring about a
coordinaatetd scheme of air defense of Oahu.
58. Q. Then insofar as you knew, Admiral Kimmel had never paid
any unusual attention to that part of the Army and Navy joint esti-
mate M'hich set forth the possibility of the carrier raid; is that true?
A. Not to my knowledge did lie go into any particular phase of it.
He knew, of course, of all that had been done in the work with the
Army in bringing about this organization, but I was not satisfied with
the organization and I so expressed to him and I am sure that he was
not, for the simple reason that it was based on too much cooperation
and also on the assumption that it would go into effect Avhen an emer-
gency arose, and no organization of this kind is any good unless it
functions twenty-four hours a day prior to any air attack, completely
and fully manned. And there were insufficient [123] personnel
actually in my establishment to have such an organization function-
ing that way, and I am sure it was the same with the Army.
59. Q. As regards Admiral Bloch, under whom you acted in a cer-
tain capacity, did you have frequent conversations with him concern-
ing this same general subject?
A. Yes, sir; but not too frequently. At the beginning when the
organization was being set up, I worked with Admiral Bloch, either
personally or with his representatives, considerably. Later I took
up with him matters in connection with arrangements for air raid
drills or matters pertaining to failure of the organization to function
particularly as applicable to the Army. As he was not an air man,
I only took those subjects up witli him that I felt he should know and
which he, through his relationship with the Commanding General
of the Army, could rectify.
60. Q. As the tenseness of the situation in the Pacific grew, during,
say, October and November, there was no particular conversation
thereby instituted with Admiral Bloch, is that true?
A. I had many conversations about the various aviation develop-
ments that were in his District. The prior answer was with reference
to the air defense, only; but since all aviation developments such as
at the outlying islands and Kaneohe and Pearl were under Admiral
Bloch, many of these matters came up for discussion and they like-
wise had a bearing on the air defense of that area.
61. Q. Having participated in that joint estimate back in March,
1941, as the tenseness of the situation in the Pacific grew, did not those
portions of the estimate dealing with the carrier raid come back into
your mind?
A. Yes, sir. I remember discussing the subject matter with a high
Navy Department official during his visit to Oahu, wherein he com-
plimented me on the organizattion that had been set up, indicating
cooperation with the Army, and I told him that that was all right,
but it wouldn't work in case of war. He mentioned that practically,
we were at war, and I stated "Well, true, but not shooting war, yet,
in the Pacific." I indicated that there must be unity of command to
make it work and also additional facilities and equipment.
The witness was duly warned.
The examining officer then, at 12 : 45 p. m. took a recess until 2 : 00
p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 144 10
130 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Present: The examining officer and his counsel and assistant
counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Keserve, took seat as re-
porter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy, the witness under
examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned that
the oath previously taken was still binding.
(Examination by the examining officer continued :)
62. Q. It has been brought out in other testimony that the esti-
mated most [-?^4] probable courses of Jap action in a surprise
attack would be either a submarine attack on ships at sea or a sabotage
on Oahu, or both. Were you concurring in those opinions in late
November, 1941 ?
A. Yes, sir, I concurred in the opinion that there might be Jap
submarine activity and also sabotage on the Island of Oahu. Of
course, I did not discount the other possibilities as indicated in the
estimate, but I thought it most probably would be a submarine attack
or sabotage.
63. Q. Admiral, during your testimony, with respect to the plan
for the deployment of aircraft, through the means of mutual coopera-
tion, you have expressed your opinion to the effect that this was not
the best plan which might be used. Did you make any recommenda-
tions or take any action with respect to higher authority changing
the method of command at Oahu ?
A. I didn't think that any joint plan, based on cooperation alone,
would function or could function properly in an emergency, and I
mentioned my more or less dissatisfaction with the general setup of
this air defense, both personally in conversation to Admiral Kimmel
and also at one time to Mr. Forrestal, the Under Secretary of Navy.
64. Q. Admiral, were you responsible in any way for the defense
of outlying islands, such as Midway and Wake ?
A. No, except in this way, that in the war plans of the Pacific, prior
to December 7, my job was to control the air operations from Wake,
Midway, Palmyra, and Johnston, with headquarters on Midway.
65. Q. Were these to be offensive or defensive deployments ?
A. Presumably both, insofar as the forces available and the situ-
ation demanded.
66. Q. Did your responsibility in this respect cause you any con-
cern or preoccupy your mind in the days prior to the attack with
respect to your more immediate duties at Oahu ?
A. My immediate duties at Oahu was expansion training rather
than defensive operations against a possible attack. The need for
this expansion training in aviation was very vital because every
operating outfit was concerned in this expansion, and qualified per-
sonnel were being drawn from operating units to be sent to training
establishments for further expansion in training. As a consequence,
the expansion training was vital and that was what was stressed by
high authority. Now with reference to anything taking my mind
away from the situation, I was vitally concerned and worried about
the lack of many things that were required in the Pacific area which
Honolulu represented the main base of, as official correspondence will
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 131
show. But you must remember that this Naval Base Air Defense was
an organization set up to meet an emergency. It was hoped that that
emergency would arrive after prior information which would set the
organization in operation.
67. Q. I had particular reference to your planning preparation of
security measures under your duties as the Base Defense Air Com-
mander and possibility of the responsibility for defense of the out-
lying islands, and the need for employment of aircraft there, amount-
ing to a concern and preoccupation in connection therewith.
A. The planes which I had command of, insofar as outlying islands
were concerned, had no particularly offensive ability. That is, the
patrol planes, except within limitations. To indicate my concern,
with reference to these outlying islands, I would like to refer you to
a letter which I wrote the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, from
Commander, Patrol Wing Two, Serial No. 0026, dated 22 October
1941, subject : Types of combatant aircraft for a [1£S'\ Pacific
campaign, in which I stressed the need for 160 long-range, high-
speed, land plane bombers, and 160 interceptor fighters for operations
in connection with Midway and Wake Islands, and also the develop-
ment of these Islands to accommodate operating complements of
these planes.
68. Q. Admiral, in your estimate of the situation, dated 31 March
1041, which is a part of Exhibit 22 before this investigation, you
pointed out that long-range or distance reconnaissance was possible
only for short periods of time when intelligence reports indicated a
probable attack on Oahu. Did both the Naval Base Defense Officer
and the Commander-in-Chief know that that situation continued to
obtain up to December 7?
A. I'm practically sure that they did. The Commander-in-Chief
was very aware of the spare part problem with which we were con-
fronted with reference to the 54 planes of the PBY5 type.
69. Q. Whose responsibility was it to order distance reconnaissance
when it was indicated that there was a probability of an attack on
Oahu?
A. I would assume it to have been that of the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific. If an emergency was apparent, I would have taken the initia-
tive, and I am very sure that the Commandant of the Fourteenth
Naval District would have taken the initiative, but lacking definite
information, then, in view of the employment of forces involved, it
becomes a question of authority of the Commander-in-Chief.
70. Q. Admiral, please outline the patrols that were maintained
prior to the attack on the morning of 7 December 1941.
A. There were three planes on patrol on the morning of 7 December
1941 whose job was to search the operating areas being utilized by
units of the Fleet on that day in the early morning. This form of
security patrol was a daily routine occurrence in accordance with
instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. That was
from Oahu. From Midway, seven planes were conducting a search
between 120 to 170 degrees from Midway for a distance of 450 miles.
71. Q. Was that also a normal routine search?
A. The one from Midway was a special search, conforming to an
operation directed by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.
132 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
72. Q. Were there any normal, daily searches made from Midway
by patrol planes ?
A. When planes are based on an island, they conducted search
operations from that island, but, normally, they were not based on
Islands except for special circumstances.
73. Q. Please relate, if it is within your knowledge, the searches
conducted from Midway on 6 December 1941.
A. On 29 November, a squadron at Midway was directed to search
area within 100 miles of Midway daily and to be prepared to shift
base to Wake. There is an operation order issuecl by me as Com-
mander, Task Force 9, to Patrol Squadrons 21 and 22 and Commander,
Task Group 9.2, which required prescribed flights on certain days
from Midway. On December 5, the requirement was to search Sector
126-168 to 525 miles, using 6 planes. The searches from Midway and
also from Wake were in connection with a task force that was aug-
menting air strength on Wake, and the completion of that assignment
in connection with Wake was supposed to be on the 5th of December,
I believe. The operation order that I'm referring to is in Mailgram
from ComTaskForce-Nin&, No. 292103 of November, 1941. I do not
recall the searches made from Midway on 6 December 1941.
[1£6] 74. Q. Admiral, with respect to the conditions of readi-
ness prescribed in the estimate, please relate the condition of readi-
ness in effect on the morning of 7 December, prior to the attack.
A. The following was the condition of readiness of patrol planes
of Patrol Wings One and Two on the morning of December 7 : VP-21 :
7 planes in the air conducting search 120 degrees to 170 degrees to a
distance of 450 miles from Midway ; 4 planes on the surface at Midway
armed, each with two 500-lb, bombs and on 10 minute notice. VP-11
at Kaneohe: 12 planes ready for flight on 4 hours notice. VP-12
at Kaneohe : 6 planes ready for flight on 30 minutes notice : 5 planes
ready for flight on 4 hours notice. VP-14 at Kaneohe : 3 planes in
the air on morning security patrol, armed with depth charges ; 3 planes
ready for flight on 30 minutes notice; 4 planes ready for flight on 4
hours notice. VP-22 at Pearl Harbor : 12 planes ready for flight on
4 hours notice. VP-23 at Pearl Harbor : 11 planes ready for flight
on 4 hours notice. VP-24 at Pearl Harbor : 4 planes in the air con-
ducting intertype tactics with U. S. submarines; 1 plane ready for
flight on 30 minutes notice. All planes were equipped with machine
guns and ammunition.
75. Q. What planes for distant reconnaissance did General Ru-
dolph's routine report of 5 or 6 December make ready to you for that
week-end ?
A. In a dispatch dated December 5, from the Headquarters,
Hawaiian Air Force, stated that there were available 8 B-l7's, 21
B-18's, and 6 A-20's, all in Condition Easy 5, which is as follows:
"All aircraft conducting routine operations. None ready for the pur-
pose of this plan. Degree of readiness : All types, 4 hours." Or the
above planes, the only types for really effective search missions were
the B-17 type. The JB-iS and the A-20 were effective for short-range
bombing.
76. Q. Who established this condition of readiness* with respect
to the Navy planes ?
PRdCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 133
A, The condition of readiness of aircraft, with respect to air raid
precautions, was set by the Commander, Naval Base Defense, or higher
authority.
77. Q. Were you satisfied with the prescribed condition of readi-
ness, if you recollect?
A. With the work in hand and under the conditions as I saw them,
yes. One must remember that the situation in the Pacific, so far as
. anticipating an emergency, had been going on for sometime.
78. Q. Admiral, you have testified with respect to the report of
available planes made to you by the Army. Did you make a similar
report of naval planes available, addressed to the Army?
A. I did.
79. Q. Will you please give us the substance of that report?
A. On 6 December. I quote a dispatch to the Commanding Gen-
eral, Hawaiian Air Force, from Commander, Naval Defense Air
Force : "7 fighters, 5 Condition 5. 9 scouts, 3 Condition 4, 6 Condition
5." Condition 4 means all types ready in two hours. Condition 5
means all types ready in four hours.
80. Q. Did this include the Marine Corps planes available ashore?
A. I think that this was entirely the Marines, although I'm not posi-
tive. I quote another dispatch from the Marine Air Group in reporting
their readiness to Commander, Patrol Wing Two: "18 scout bombers:
3 Condition 4. 15 [127] scout bombers, Condition 5. For De-
cember 5, 6, and 7."
81. Q. Admiral, we do not have your Air Force Operation Plan
No. A-1^1. Was that plan actually in effect prior to the attack?
A. The plan, as a plan that would go into a functioning state when
put into such a state, was in effect prior to December 7, but the plan was
not a functioning affair except when placed into being.
82. Did the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor place it into being?
A. The Japanese attack did place it into being. There were no
orders received by me from any higher authority prior to starting all
action that could be taken.
83. Q. The plans, then, for coordination and exchange of planes be-
tween the Army and Navy, became effective with the initiation of the
Japanese attack?
A. It did.
84. Q. How many of the Army planes reported available actually
reported to you after the attack was initiated and the plan became
effective ?
A. That is a question I was never able to find out. It finally became
a question of asking General Rudolph to get planes going as soon as
he could on prescribed searches which I requested. We did have certain
information as to what the Army sent out but I never was convinced
of the accuracy of what actually went out and what they actually did.
85. Q. Were communications established between any of these Army
bombers and you as the Air Commander ?
A. No. The control of communications between the plane and the
base was internal in the Army, and the Navy did not have communica-
tions with the Army planes in the air. Any communications to or from
the planes was transmitted to the Army planes from the Army Base.
That condition prevailed for several months after December 7 when
it was finally arranged to set up a communication arrangement within
134 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the bombing planes of the Army so that we could get communication
direct with all planes, Army and Navy, that were functioning on the
same mission.
86. Q. Do you know if any of the Army planes established com-
munications with your subordinates in the air after the attack was
initiated ?
A. No, none that I know of, and I'm sure that there was none.
[1^8] Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, TJ. S. Naval
Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously
taken was still binding.
87. Q. In general. Admiral Bellinger, what was the state — what was
the adequacy of radio communications available to you for handling
your aircraft in the air?
A. We were actually able to communicate with planes in the air from
our Base. The communication system utilized was the installations at
the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor. To meet the various conditions
of air operations that were required, considerably more communication
facilities were established both at Kaneohe and at Pearl, even to the
extent of building, subsequent to December the 7th, a communication
and air control center. The difficulty of communication between Pearl
Harbor and Kaneohe, itself, was considerable.
88. Q. Did communication or radio matters of this type, that is, the
material angle, come under the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval Dis-
trict, and his Communications Officer — that is, base?
A. The shore-based installations came under the air stations which,
in turn, came under the Commandant.
89. Q. Was the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District
familiar with your deficiencies in the radio field ?
A. I feel that he was familiar with it, because I endeavored to keep
him acquainted with deficiencies.
90. Q. Was the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, familiar with
this problem?
A. Yes, I feel very sure he was familiar with it.
91. Q. Admiral, was any remedial action taken by your superiors
with respect to your communications deficiencies prior to December 7?
A. Yes. I would sar the answer to that question is, "Yes." Action
was being taken, an effort was being made to improve deficiencies, but
the question was always, with us, would the deficiencies be provided in
time.
92. Q. And it turned out they were not ?
A. Not in all respects. I would like to refer to a letter, which was
one of the first letters I wrote upon my arrival in Pearl Harbor, con-
cerning deficiencies with which I was concerned in that area. This is
a confidential letter, File Number 022, of 16 January 1941, from
Commander Patrol Wing Two, to the Chief of Naval Operations,
Subject : "Patrol Wing Two — readiness of."
93. Q. Admiral, I show you a letter which has been obtained from
the Secret-Confidential Files of the Navy Department. Is that the
letter to which you refer?
A. It is.
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining oflSicer.
Note : Because of the confidential nature of tne document, it was re-
turned at the conclusion of the proceedings to Secret-Confidential Files
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 135
of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington,
D. C. A description of the document introduced in evidence is ap-
pended marked "Exhibit 24".
[129] 94. Q. Admiral, of the planes reported by you as avail-
able to the Army, how many of these planes actually reported to the
Army after the attack was initiated?
A. That, I am unable to say. I feel very sure that the planes re-
ferred to were the Marine ])lanes based at Ewa, and I feel very sure
that these Marine planes were damaged by machine-gun fire from
enemy planes on December 7,
95. Q. Admiral, were you advised of a contact with a Japanese sub-
marine on the morning of 7 December 1941, prior to the launching of
the air attack?
A. No. _
96. Q. I mean, it happened prior to the launching of the air attack?
A. Prior to the attack?
97. Q. Yes.
A. No, I was not informed, evidently, because of my being laid up,
as soon as I might otherwise have been informed. One reason for the
delay in the knowledge of the presence of an enemy submarine was the
fact that the dispatch informing the forces of this fact were coded,
which caused delay both in sending and in receiving.
98. Q. Do you know if any of your subordinates were informed of
this contact prior to the time the Japanese launched their air attack?
A. This is a narrative of events in accordance with data taken from
an official letter prepared by me on 20 December : "0700 Patrol Plane
14P(1) sighted and attacked enemy submarine one mile off Pearl
Harbor entrance. 0715 Message coded and transmitted to Base. 0735
Message decoded and information received by Staflf Duty Officer.
0737 Message relayed to Operations Officer. 0740 Message relayed by
telephone to Staff Duty Officer of Commander-in-Chief. 0750 Search
plan drafted by Operations Officer. 0757 First bomb dropped near
VP-22 hangar. 0758 Message broadcast to all ships present 'AIR
RAID PEA.RL HARBOR. THIS IS NO DRILL'. 0800 Search
plan transmitted by radio and telephone and received by some of the
planes in the air at 0805."
99. Q. Admiral, your estimate of the situation
A. (Interposing) Excuse me. You asked me when did I know about
that?
100. Q. Yes.
A. I didn't know about it until I arrived at the office. My first in-
formation was by telephone from my Operations Officer that we were
under air attack. The plane that sighted and attacked the submarine
assumed that he sank or damaged same. This was, I believe, the opin-
ion expressed by the destroyer which aided also in the attack.
101. Q. Admiral, your estimate of the situation, enclosed with Ex-
hibit 22, in its list of decisions, states : "Provided a means for quickly
starting all required action under this plan when * * * (c) informa-
tion is received that attack has been made on Fleet units." I assume
that the operation plan which was built around this estimate contained
a similar provision. Do you consider that the episode of the sub-
marine would have the effect of placing your operations plan into
136] CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
execution as soon as this information reached the higher command
authorities ?
A. That is a doubtful question, whether it would have or not, so far
as the Army aircraft were concerned.
[ISO] 102. Q. Admiral, was any attempt made, that you know
of, at your Command Headquarters, to relay the information of the
attack on the submarine to the Army Air Forces authorities?
A. I don't know of any action of that kind. It, went to the Com-
mander-in-Chief's office, his Staff Duty Oflicer, I don't think it went
to the Army. Normally, it would not have gone to the Army because
it is doubtful what action they would have taken in connection with
that particular submarine. There was grave doubt in the mind of the
pilot of the plane, at the first sighting, whether that was an enemy sub-
marine or merely one of our submarines, on account of its location
relative to the destroyer, and its location relative to the entrance, but
having no information of a U. S. submarine in that area, he then
definitely assumed that it must be an enemy submarine.
103. Q,. If a message had been relayed to the Army that an enemy
submarine had been sunk, would that have placed your air operating
plan in effect ?
A. I doubt it. I think it would have required some higher authority
in the Army to place it in effect. Now, in order to amplify that state-
ment, I would like to refer to an air raid drill which was planned by
the Army subsequent to the joint estimate and orders issued setting
up the air defense plan. During one night, prior to the operations for
the next day, I received a message stating that the Bomber Command
was no longer subject to the orders of Commander, Patrol Wing Two.
I wondered what was the matter. I finally found out that the Army
wanted to revert to the old "Joint Action" wherein, if the Navy wanted
the Army to assist, it was necessary for the Navy command to so re-
quest the Army. Therefore, in the early morning, at 5 :00 o'clock, the
Army Bomber Command asked if I was going to request the Army
to assist. I informed him that I did not understand that that was
necessary in our agreement, that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific,
was the only one to ask the Army to assist. He stated he would like
to participate in this drill. I said I would give him the information
and he could act as he saw fit, and in accordance with his orders. After
that, I made an official report of same to the Commander-in-Chief
and also the Commander, Naval Base Defense, and also prepared a
letter for the Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, to General
Short, trying to straighten this out. In other words, to place the
plan for air defense into effect evidently required authorization from
higher Army authority for each instance. My letter, just referred to,
was designed to correct that situation.
104. Q. Admiral, please outline the operations of the Search and
Attack Group under your command, after the attack was initiated by
the Japanese.
A. In accordance with my data, which I think is correct, planes of
various types, including patrol planes, utility planes, VOVS planes,
and Army planes — were dispatched covering sectors primarily from
the North through. Southwest. Three B-l7's were requested to make
the flight covering a sector through 165 True to 095. This was at the
instance of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, who, from certain
information, felt that the Japanese carrier force was in that area.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 137
Eight utility, eleven patrol planes, and six VOVS planes, and nine
SBD planes were the Navy planes participating. The total Army
planes participating were five B-l7's, three B-18's, and six A-20's.
105. Q. What else, upon what information was the choice of sectors
to be searched based ?
A. Wind direction, the general relative strategic locations, and the
general information as developed from the departing Japanese planes.
106. Q. Do you know what information the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, had as a basis of the search to the southeasterly?
A. A radio bearing, I presume.
[131] 107. Q. Admiral, please give us, along broad lines, such
information or even impressions as you had, say, November, 1941, as
regards the ability of the Army Interceptor Command to carry out its
commitments toward protecting Pearl Harbor from an air raid.
A. My impression might be expressed by saying that the Army was
not ready to perform their part in the protection of Pearl Harbor, and
I might say that the need for training of their persomiel was one of
the reasons brought up for their reluctance to have air raid drills prior
to December the Tth. I would say that they were not ready, from the
point of view of their radar installations, their ability to control their
fighter groups, in the number of planes they had, and in the quality
of the general run of their pilots.
108. Q. Did you ever advise either Admiral Kimmel or Admiral
Bloch to that effect?
A. Not in so many words, but there were conversations in regard
to what the Army was able to do and in regard to the number of planes,
and it was also known that the Air Control Center of the Army Inter-
ceptor Command was in process of being organized.
109. Q. During your association with the Army, did you ever detect
any prevalent belief that they expected the Navy's forces at sea to inter-
cept a carrier raid ?
A. No, but in discussing various plans with the Commanding Gen-
eral, Air Force, Hawaiian Area, he apparently expected the Navy
to have early information of the movement of enemy forces, so that
a raid might be anticipated more definitely.
110. Q. Have you any idea upon what they based that impression?
A. He assumed that the intelligence service would give that infor-
mation and he seemed surprised when I told him that we should
not expect such information.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as
reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still
binding.
111. Q. Did you know, prior to 7 December, of Admiral Yamamoto's
previous experience with the Navy Air ?
A. Yes, I think so.
112. Were you ever told anything about his personal character-
istics?
A. I have read — I'm not sure whether it was prior to December 7,
or not, about his characteristics.
113. Q. You have testified concerning the inadequacy of our planes
suitable for reconnaissance to extend the full 360 degrees search to the
distance deemed requisite. Did it ever occur to you to have ready
modified plan, confining the search to the most probable areas, so that
138 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
you would more or less build your suit in accord with the amount of
cloth that was available ?
A. Yes, and that was actually proved in practice in what we subse-
quently did with the planes we had available in the daily search that
started on December 7.
114. Q. Did you ever get so far along that line as to have what might
be termed an "As-Is" plan for air reconnaissance, based upon what was
actually available?
A. Subsequent to December 7, there was a daily search conducted.
There were so many planes available
[1S2] 115. Q. Not before December 7?
A. We had search plans made to cover various distances and various
sectors and depending upon the number of planes available for search,
the sector to be placed in that part of the compass rose where the
most logical location of enemy forces were assumed to be.
116. Q. In your previous testimony, I believe you stated that under
the full 360 decree reconnaissance you expected about a fifty per cent
chance of sighting an enemy within the waters covered ; is that correct ?
A. Correct.
117. Q. So that even if you had, prior to December 7, been supplied
with planes and had actually carried on such a search, that fifty per
cent measures about what you thought at the time of the chances.
In the light of subsequent experience, what did you think of the cor-
rectness of that figure, fifty per cent ?
A. I think the fifty per cent would be raised considerably because
of the development of radar.
118. Q. Without radar?
A. The fifty per cent was based on twenty-five mile visibility and the
various conditions of visibility in the Pacific are quite changeable.
Perhaps fifty per cent may be underestimating, but in judging from
reports of per cent of coverage of the sectors, assigned individual
planes, on search flights subsequent to December 7, considerable areas
were poorly covered on account of the weather condition.
119. Q. In view of that degree of probability of detection in a car-
rier raid, what other instrumentality, which would have been availa-
ble on December 7, '41, w^ould have given a greater measure of security ?
A. You mean in addition to aircraft?
120. Q. No, in lieu of.
A. Considering what was available, I know of nothing more that
would give more practical assurance of timely information.
121. Q. What about radar?
A. If radar had been available, then, as it is today, of course the
search by planes would have been very much more effective.
122. Q. Was search radar not developed to a high degree of effi-
ciency at that time ?
A. No.
123. Q. Were our ships not equipped with search radar that was
reasonably efficient at that time ?
A. Some were equipped, but all of them were not equipped. Some
few ships were equipped.
124. Q. How about those that had the equipment, were they not
efficient ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 139
A. They were not as effective as tliey are today. However, it was a
great advantage to have radar and every effort was being made, I
know, to get them on ships, particularly aircraft carriers.
125. Q. Kadar on shore was under Army cognizance, was it not?
A. Yes, sir.
[133] 126. Q. As far as you know, was the quality of the mate-
rial available to the Army inefficient?
A. I would say that it was not completely effective ; even sometime
after Pearl Harbor, many planes arrived without being detected.
127. Q. Admiral, am I correct in saying that you had two commands
during the weeks prior to December 7, one Commander of Patrol Wing
Two, directly under Aircraft Scouting Force, who, in turn, came
directly under the Commander-in-Chief ; and, two. Naval Base Defense
Air Officer, directly under the Naval Base Defense Officer, who was
Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, who, in turn, came
under the Commander-in-Chief ?
A. Yes, sir.
128. Q. All of the distance reconnaissances contemplated in your
estimate of the situation, dated 31 March, contemplated by JCD-42
and the addendum thereto, would all be carried out in your capacity as
Naval Base Defense Air Officer, would they not?
A. Yes.
129. Q. That being the case, would you give us your reasons why,
earlier in the day, you said that you looked to the Commander-in-Chief
and not to the Naval Base Defense Officer, Commandant, Fourteenth
Naval District, for directives as to whether a long-distance reconnais-
sance was necessary because of developments?
A. Normally speaking, the reason for long-distance reconnaissance
would be known to the Commander-in-Chief prior to its being known
to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and, in view of
the fact that the deployment of planes, as units of the Fleet, under the
Commander-in-Chief, must be known to him in order that he would
know what he had available to use at any time when he wanted to use
them. So that, acting for the Commander-in-Chief, the Commandant
of the Fourteenth Naval District might start action, but presumably I
would get the word from the Commander-in-Chief, perhaps at the
same time that he got it. Although, in an emergency, the set-up of the
organization did give the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval Dis-
trict, as Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, the authority to start
action.
130. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff fully realize that
you looked directly to them for instructions on distant reconnaissance
rather than to the immediate superior under the plans, the Naval Base
Defense Force Commander?
A. Actually, I looked to the Commander, Naval Base Defense Force,
and when I arranged or when a drill was arranged, it was arranged
either by my initiating it to him or by his initiating it, but in view of
my relationship with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, I felt
that he should know how his planes were being employed and he always
knew when a drill or operation of that kind was in progress.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to
make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject
matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of
140 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out
by the previous questioning.
[13i\ The witness made the following statement : Prior to his
assuming command of the Pacific Fleet, I called upon Admiral Kimmel
to offer my congratulations. During my visit he expressed his interest
in the aviation situation in the Hawaiian area and indicated that when
he assumed charge of the Pacific Fleet he would take steps to bring
about a coordinated Army-Navy plan for air defense. Shortly after
Admiral Kimmel assumed command of the Pacific Fleet he sent for me
and told me to report to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval
District for the purpose of working out an Air Defense Plan in con-
junction with the General in command of the Army Air Forces,
Hawaiian Area. I proceeded on the duty assigned working closely
with the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. The Army
Air Forces did not take the initiative in the preparation of the Air
Defense Plan but followed along with the Navy, although it is stated in
an official report of an Army-Navy Board concerning aircraft operat-
ing areas in the Hawaiian area, dated 31 October, 1941, signed by
Major General Commanding Army Air Forces, Hawaiian Islands, and
myself, "The mission of the Army in Oahu is to defend the Pearl
Harbor Naval Base against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution
to be made by the Hawaiian Air Force in carrying out this mission is :
(1) To search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of
action by bombardment aviation. (2) To detect, intercept, and de-
stroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu by pursuit aviation."
The joint estimate of the situation was practically in toto prepared by
Patrol Wing Two and from this emanated the orders prepared by
Patrol Wing Two and by the Army Air Forces. As a result, there
were evolved plans and a skeletonized organization which were to be
placed into effect either by higher authority or by an emergency. The
basis of coordination was to be by mutual cooperation. Although it
was realized that facilities, personnel, and equipment were inadequate
for proper and continuous air defense, the main idea was to evolve a
plan and organization that would make the most of the tools that were
available and conditions that were existing. It is foolish to think that
such a skeletonized organization functioning on the basis of coopera-
tion by the Navy and Army Air Forces and set up to be put in motion
by special orders or by an emergency occurring, remaining practically
non-existent except during periodic drills, could go into action and
function effectively^ at the occurrence of an actual emergency. An
organization of this nature to be effective must function twenty-four
hours every day, and prior to an air raid not subsequent thereto. How-
ever, considering shortages, and deficiencies, other necessary employ-
ment of forces, such as expansion training and development of facili-
ties, and lacking unity of command, little if any more in the way of
readiness could be expected. It is believed that Admiral Kimmel saw
this picture very realistically and I know of no man who, under the
circumstances, could have done more. I know this, that the existing
deficiencies, the varied duties and schedules of employment, the lack of
authority due to lack of unity of command, placed the Commander
Naval Base Defense Air Force in a very embarrassing position.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 4: 35 p. m., adjourned until 10 a. m.
tomorrow.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 141
ViS5-\ PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INaUIRY
THUBSDAY, MABCH 16, 1944
Tenth Day
Navt Department,
Washington^ D. C.
The examination met at 10 : 14 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examing officer, and
his counsel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as
reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still
binding.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the ninth day of the examination until such time
at is shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with
the examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected w4th the examination were
present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface
to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present station.
A. Wilson Brown, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Naval Aide to the
President of the United States.
2. Q. What duties were you performing on the 7th of December,
1941, sir?
A. I was in command of what was known as Task Force 3 of the
Pacific Fleet. My orders to sea duty designated me as Commander,
Scouting Force, Pacific Fleet. 1 am not quite sure whether my orders
from the Navy Department w^ere ever changed from Scouting Fleet
to Commander of the Task Force. The thought has just occurred to
me, I rather think they were, but my orders on December 7 as Com-
mander, Scouting Force, may not be correct.
3. Q. In the weeks leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor, did
you not have administrative duties in connection with the Scouting
Force, in addition to your duties as Task Force Commander?
A. No, I never had any administrative duties. The administration
was carried out by type commanders and as the Commander of the
Scouting Force, I had no matters of administration. I had, by desig-
nation, some administrative duties ashore which had to do with some
of the recreation bases for the men and other administrative duties
that had to do with preparation for amphibious warfare.
142 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
4. Q. Did you perform such duties as the approval of the employ-
ment schedule, which included submarines and aircraft of the Scout-
ing force ?
A. I don't understand that.
[136] 5. Q. Did your duties include the approval of the quar-
terly employment schedule for submarines which were included in
the Scouting Force ?
A. No, the employment schedule for the Fleet was prepared by the
Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, after discussion and consultation
with task force commanders, but the schedule was prepared by the
Commander-in-Chief for the entire Fleet and all of its units.
6. Q. Admiral, will you please state where you personally were on
the 7th of December, 1941?
A. I was on board the U. S. S. INDIANAPOLIS, Avhich was my
Flagship at that time. I arrived at Johnston Island almost at the
exact moment that we received a dispatch that Pearl Harbor had been
attacked.
7. Q. Admiral, this is a calendar covering that period; it is in col-
umns here, sir. We would like, if you can give it, your statement as
to where you were during the period from the 26th of November
through the 6th of December ?
A. Well, I tried to refresh my memory yesterday from reading the
record that was given to me of the Roberts Board testimony, and
there still remains in my mind some doubt as to whether I returned
from a tour at sea of about ten days on the 26th of November or the
27th. It was about that time. In other words, I know that I left
Pearl Harbor on the 5th of December. I had been in Pearl Harbor
for a period of about one week, possibly eight days, and if it was a
week, that would have meant returning on the 28th, and if it was
ten clays, it would have meant returning on the 26th. So there is
an element of doubt in my mind as to when I arrived. I could find
out from my record, if it is a matter of moment.
8. Q. Admiral, you stated that you returned to Pearl Harbor, after
a period at sea, at about the 26th to the 28th of November. Could you
please state how long you had been at sea prior to your return at
that time ?
A. Not with certainty. My belief is that it was a period of about
eight or nine days at sea.
Q. How long had you been in port prior to that period at sea ?
A. I have records at home from which I can give those exact dates,
but my memory is not sufficiently accurate for me to attempt to say
without consulting them. In general, the periods at sea and the
periods in port varied between one week and ten days.
Memo: The examining officer directed the witness to consult his
records and make such further response as they indicate necessary to
complete his answer before verifying his testimony.
A. (Continued. See Record Page 170.) My personal records indi-
cate that Task Force 3 returned to Pearl Harbor from sea on 26
November ; remained in port until 5 December and sailed for assigned
missions at sea on 5 December.
10. Q. Admiral, as a Task Force Commander, and one of the senior
Admirals of the Pacific Fleet, during the period preceding the attack
on Pearl Harbor, it is believed that you were familiar with the em-
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 143
ployment and training of the Fleet and the reasons for such employ-
ment ; also with the security measures prescribed by the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Please outline, briefly, the facts within your
knowledge with respect thereto and state your opinion at the time
as to the soundness of the methods used, particularly with respect
[137] to the possible sacrifice of some elements of security to
further training.
A. I would like to divide my answer in two parts. First, I should
like to refer to the statement that as a senior Task Force Commander
I was "familiar with the security measures". I think that state-
ment is not accurate. I was not familiar with the details of the em-
ployment of submarines, of the extent and nature of the air search,
of the Army defense measures, or with the measures of internal de-
fense on the Island of Oahu, other than in the most general terms
as I was able to gather them from frequent conferences held by the
Commander-in-Chief with the Army and with the Navy on various
subjects. I was also not familiar with the details of the defense
measures under way to establish the security of the outlying Islands :
Johnston, Palmyra, Wake, and Midway, except that I knew that the
Commander-in-Chief and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval
District were bending every effort to complete the defense of those
outposts before the outbreak of war. To answer the second part of
the question, about the effect of training on security measures of the
Fleet, I would like to go back to a period six months before December
7 when the Fleet was divided into three task forces. That reorgani-
zation assigned to me the task of developing the technique and as-
sembling materials for amphibious warfare. Before the reorganiza-
tion, I had expressed my keen interest in that subject and a conviction
that the Fleet should develop a major part of its energy to that form
of naval warfare. Therefore, during the six months preceding the
attack on Pearl Harbor, my own energies and the energies of my Staff
were directed primarily to the subject of amphibious warfare. We
also took part in Fleet tactical problems which were held for the
training of ofiicers and men in the Fleet, and involved a vast amount
of work and preparation for review on the game board at the com-
pletion of exercises. For over a year before Pearl Harbor, I believe
that all major task force commanders recognized that the primary
mission of the Fleet was one of training, because of the large naval
building program then in progress and the known need of raj^id edu-
cation of officers and men to man the ships that would soon join the
Fleet. During that year, it is my impression that we must have had
at least half a dozen alarms when it appeared that war would break
with the Japanese at any moment. At each alarm, the question arose
and was debated as to whether we should take defensive measures
or whether we should continue our training. By "defensive meas-
ures", I mean whether each ship of the Fleet should go to Condition
Three, which would involve so many night watches that little could
be accomplished during daytime in training and education. My feel-
ing was, and I think it was shared by most of the others, that in
order to complete our training as far as possible, we must continue
training exercises until the moment that war developed, which is what
happened in the Fleet. During the last days of November, 1941, the
subject of defense measures was discussed by the Commander-in-Chief
144 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in conference with a group of senior officers, of whom I was one. My
recollection of those conferences is that our greatest concern was the
security ^f the outlying islands. We had all believed that Japanese
submarines would be in Hawaiian waters when they declared war,
when the Japanese decided to go to war. We had discussed the possi-
bility of an air raid on the Islands and my own opinion was that it was
possible but highly improbable, and that Fleet dispositions should
be made for the defense of Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra, rather
than for the defense of Pearl Harbor, where we all believed the
greatest threat was from local sabotage. On December 7, two of the
three task forces were at sea, all engaged in some form of support for
the outlying Islands, while continuing sea training in going to and
from assigned stations. My own Task Force Three was divided into
two parts, the carrier and two of the cruisers and some destroyers
[1S8] were enroute to Wake Island with Marines and air reen-
forcements. I had the INDIANAPOLIS with six old destroyers
converted to sweepers engaged in an attack mission and exercise on
Johnston Island. We had with us, at the time, a number of the local
authorities on South Sea Island formations. They were with us for
the purpose of demonstrating what could be done with dynamite to
break through barrier reefs on the weather side to a sufficient extent
to allow small boats to attack from the weather side, rather than
from the lee side where the attack might be expected. I cite that
simply to indicate that my particular group were at Johnston because
of our preoccupation with the exposed position and the probablity
that if an attack was directed at the Hawaiian Islands, those outlying
stations would be attacked first before they were ready to defend
themselves ; while the second part of my task force was engaged on a
similar mission to Wake. It is my recollection that Admiral Halsey
had taken reenforcements to Midway. I'm not sure. He was up in
the neighborhood for some purpose connected with the reenforcement
of one of the outlying islands. I would like to complete the comment
on that phase with the statement that as I look back on the year 1941,
I feel that the entire Fleet, officers and men, were very conscious that
war was coming, that all hands were working to their utmost en-
durance to accomplish as much for the improvement of the Fleet as
they could in whatever time might remain available to use for prepara-
tion, and that spirit animated all hands through that year.
11. Q. Admiral, how frequently did you confer with the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, concerning matters of importance to
the Fleet?
A. I think it is correct to say that, in general, the task forces were
at sea nearly sixty per cent of their time, and in port about forty per
cent. During the time in port, reviews of tactical exercises were held
on the game board and such reviews usually required about two days.
During the week before December 7, I think I was in almost daily
conference with the Commander-in-Chief. During previous weeks,
I think I always had at least one and sometimes more during our pe-
riod in port. In other words, I was present a greater number of times
the first week in December than at any other time.
12. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel express his views freely to you with
respect to Fleet activities?
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 145
A. I don't know that I can answer that question. Admiral Kimmel
always had a definite purpose in mind in sending for me and he usu-
ally had very clear-cut instructions to issue or definite questions to ask.
I think he was more apt to ask other people's opinion than he was to
tell other people his own until he was ready to issue instructions, and
when he issued instructions they were clear-cut and positive.
13. Q. Admiral, were you kept informed of intelligence received by
the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, concerning the international
situation and the movement of the Japanese land and naval forces?
A. All senior oflicers received the naval intelligence bulletins. The
Commander-in-Chief showed some of us some of his correspond-
eenc with the Department. I have no way of telling whether he
showed us all that he received, or not. My feeling is that it was
his wish to keep the senior officer fully informed of the situation and
what he was doing about it, and what he looked to us to do about it.
His method of carrying out that wish w^as to send for us wlien he
wished to issue instructions or seek our counsel. And, at that time,
he would pass around a file of dispatches which we read there in his
office, in turn. That method had the virtue of limiting knowledge of
controversies and alarms to a small group. It had the disadvantage
that sometimes [139] we h^d to read dispatches while others
were talking and discussion was going on that I found interfered
with m,y strict attention to what I was reading. I go into that detail
because I wish to explain why, in the Koberts Board hearing, I was not
able to say positively whether I had seen all of the dispatches that
they showed me, or not. I feel I was shown, while I was in port, all
of the important messages. Whether I saw the particular one that
they quoted of 27 November, I do not yet remember.
14. Q. Admiral, were the Commanding Generals of the Army sta-
tioned in Hawaii present at any of these conferences which you at-
tended with the Commander-in-Chief?
A. They were present, at about half of them, I should say.
15. Q. And they were advised of information in the hands of the
Commander-in-Chief and consulted in the manner you have outlined
as to the method used to consult you and the other senior naval officers,
were they?
A. I think so. I could see no distinction between Army, Navy, or
Marine Corps. The Commander-in-Chief summoned those whose
duties had to do with the subject he had to discuss, and when it was
a matter of security, naturally the Army was just as much involved,
or possibly more, than any of us at sea.
16. Q. In discussing dispatches and intelligence information re-
ceived, did the Commander-in-Chief express his interpretation of the
meaning of such information for the benefit of other officers?
A. I think, as a rule, the dispatches spoke for themselves pretty
clearly. I can't recollect any particular dispatch that left any doubt
in the mind of the readers what it meant. If you have particularly in
mind the warning that was imminent, which was the general tenor of
the message that was received on the 27th of November, as I under-
stand it, it is my recollection that there was a prolonged discussion as
to what that might involve for our forces and what we should do about
it, and what our opinion was about the probable developments ; where
the Japanese would attack, and when, and how.
79716— 46— Ex. 144 11
146 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
17. Q. And opinions with respect to such matters were freely ex-
pressed and welcomed?
A. Yes.
18. Q. Did this also include action being contemplated by the Com-
mander-in-Chief , Pacific Fleet, in the light of such information ?
'41, when the Commander-in-Chief contemplated very radical changes
A. I remember quite distinctly an alarm that we had in February,
in the movement of ships, the assemblage of forces, because of the
threatened outbreak of war, and I remember that I, for one, advised
against making any such changes at that time on the general theory
that the changes contemplated would have seriously delayed many of
our training processes and set us back probably as much as a month.
And I remember that my feeling then in February, '41, and also in
November, '41, was, as I have stated before, that as far as the units
of the Fleet were concerned, our training must remain the major effort
until the moment of outbreak of war, which might require other dispo-
sitions.
19. Q, Admiral, do you recall seeing the dispatch addressed by the
Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
on 16 October 1941, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor? This is
the dispatch which I refer to ; it is Exhibit 6 before this examination.
[140] A. I remember being informed of the resignation of the
Japanese Cabinet and of the tense situation that could be expected
to follow. I can't say definitely whether I saw this dispatch, or not.
I was informed of the sense of it whether I saw the dispatch, or not.
20. Q. Do you recall any conference with respect to the situation
as outlined in this dispatch held by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet?
A. Not distinctly, but, as I said before, I think there were at least
six alarms of similar nature in the course of the year 1941.
21. Do you recall. Admiral, any change of the deployment of the
task forces or the disposition of vessels or aircraft made shortly after
this date, 16 October 1941, which you may attribute to the directions
contained in this dispatch. Exhibit 6 ?
A. I think that about that time the haste in the preparation of the
outlying islands was increased, if that's possible. It certainly became
a greater source of concern to all those in authority. I remember in
my own case that I had prepared, about that time, a written recom-
mendation to the Commander-in-Chief that shore defenses be estab-
lished on the Eat Islands and a request that I be permitted to take a
portion of my task force to visit the Aleutians, I sent in the recom-
mendation about the defending the Aleutians. I did not send in my
request to go up because of the strained situation and the evident ne-
cessity of keeping our naval forces concentrated.
22. Q. Do you recall any additional security measures effected
shortly after that date which might be attributed to the dispatch of
16 October 1941?
A. Oh, yes. It is my impression that about that time all available
anti-aircraft guns from the Army were assembled in the neighborhood
of Pearl Harbor, and in view of the pitiful shortage of such weapons,
that all available automatic weapons were borrowed from Marines
and ships established in the general area of the Navy Yard and of
the air fields. The Fleet had anti-aircraft watches prescribed, not
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 147
around the clock in order not to interfere too greatly with train-
ing. The practice from about October on was to have anti-aircraft
ammunition at the guns. And as I look back on it, it seems to me that
those measures were reasonable and probably as thorough as are now
being carried out in various theatres of war. I noted with interest
in visiting Africa that some of our air fields within easy bombing
distance of enemy bases don't appear to be any more strongly defended
than Pearl Harbor was during November. '41 .
Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken
was still binding.
23. Q. Admiral, you have already mentioned the dispatch of
November 27, but, despite that, I would like to have you look at it as
Exhibit 8 before this examination to see if you can now recall having
seen it prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
A. I remember being shown this report by the Roberts Committee.
I did not then and I do not now remember seeing a dispatch which
started, "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." I was
familiar, at the time, with the other statements made in this' dispatch.
Whether I obtained that message through reading it or being in-
formed of it verbally, I do not now remember.
[i^-?] 24. Q. Do you recall having seen in a dispatch any phras-
ing similar to what appears about the word "deployment", in this
dispatch ?
A. I think so, yes.
25. Q. Do you recall your reaction at the time to those words — any
wonder as to the meaning, or what the Navy Department intended
should be done by those orders, or in the light of those orders ?
A. I think that the two task forces were sent to the general vicinity
of the outlying islands in pursuance of those instructions.
26. Q. I understood, from your previous testimony, that those task
forces were engaged in building up the defenses of those islands by
carrying reinforcements in to them ?
A. Yes, that is true ; but they were also in a position to attack any
attackers of those places.
27. Q. Were there instructions to remain there for that purpose?
A. No.
28. Q. But still you think that the movements of those forces did
amount to the kind of deployment which is mentioned in that dis-
patch ?
A. I remember that we discussed what we ought to do, as a result
of the warning by the Department. What the Commander-in-Chief
had in mind in directing these moves, beyond reinforcing the islands,
I don't know. I do not recollect that any other course of action oc-
curred to me at the time, such as, we will say, getting all hands to sea,
and having the Fleet formed against an attack by the Japanese fleet,
because the thought that the Japanese fleet would attack never oc-
curred to me. I can only speak for myself. I don't know what the
Commander-in-Chief had in his mind.
29. Q. Do you recall any quandary in your mind as to the ap-
parent mixture of defensive and offensive attitude which seems to
surround that phrasing ?
148 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. No, sir ; I do not, because I have no clear recollection of seeing
this entire message, or in studying it, or discussing it. I remember
only the general discussion for several days of what we ought to do to
meet the threatened situation.
30. Q. Admiral, do you recollect the attendance of any of the Army
high command at these discussions, at that time ?
A. Yes.
In order to facilitate the verification of testimony given by Rear
Admiral Arthur C. Davis, U. S. Navy, who is now available, the exam-
ining officer directed that the present witness withdraw and that Rear
Admiral Davis be recalled.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
Rear Admiral Arthur C. Davis, U. S. Navy, who had previously
testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his
oath previously taken was still binding and stated that he had read
over the testimony given by him on the seventh day of the examina-
tion, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.
[14^] Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, IJ. S. Navy, the witness
under examination prior to the recalling of Rear Admiral Davis, en-
tered. He was warned that tlie oath previously taken was still bind-
ing, and continued his testimony.
(Examination by the examining officer continued :)
31. Q. Did these discussions at which the Army was represented
constitute a full and complete discussion of the entire situation in the
Pacific, Admiral ?
A. I don't remember ever attending a formal — a conference where
the entire situation was discussed from beginning to end, as a formal,
joint discussion of joint action.
32. Q. Did they go so far as to discuss courses of action which might
be available to the Japanese in the event they decided to start a war
against the United States ?
A. My rather vague recollections of the discussions in which the
Arniy took part are that they had mostly to do with internal security
on the island, and secondly, with what shortages existed in defense
weapons such as radar, antiaircraft weapons, and various forms of
aircraft.
33. Q. Do you recall any discussion of a surprise aii' attack on
Hawaii 'i
A. I remember one time, I would say in November, when somebody
suggested that that might happen.
34. Q. Was the Army present at that time, sir ?
A. I don't remember that. I remember that Admiral Halsey was
present and that I expressed the opinion that Japanese fliers were
not capable of executing such a mission successfully, and that if they
did, we should certainly be able to follow their planes back to their
carriers and destroy the carriers so that it would be a very expensive
experiment.
35. Q. Were you cognizant, at that time, of the personal character-
istics of Admiral Yamamoto, in general, as a naval officer, but in
particular as regards his interest and work in building up the Jap-
anese Naval Air Force ?
A. I knew that Admiral Yamamoto was a very zealous, enterprising
officer. I knew that the Japanese Naval Air Force was considered to
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 149
be mucli more efficient than the Army Air Force. My erroneous be-
lief, at that time, was that all Japanese fliers were distinctly inferior
to American fliers. I based that opinion on a conversation I had
with an American who had spent twenty years in Japan as head of
the Singer Sewing Machine, sometime late in November. That gentle-
man was brought to my cabin by my Intelligence Officer because of the
opportunities that he had had to observe the Japanese at first-hand. He
stated that of course he had had no opportunity to observe either naval
or Army fliers, but that the civilian aviation in Japan was so badly
kept up that the Singer Sewing Machine Company had issued instruc-
tions to all their employees forbidding them to ever ride in Japanese
commercial aviation, and that the general belief was that the Army
and the Navy were not very much better. I do not remember ever see-
ing intelligence reports, prior to Pearl Harbor, that gave a different
picture of the skill of the Japanese fliers.
36. Q. Do you recollect any change in the employment of the vessels
and aircraft of the Pacific Fleet occurring between 27 November and
7 December, 1941, which you may attribute to the receipt of the infor-
mation contained in this dispatch ; other than the movements you have
already referred to ?
A. The published schedule of employment had to do only with the
dates on 1^4-^] which task forces would go to sea and the date
on which they would return. Their employment during periods at
sea was usually not settled until a few days before leaving port, so
that I do not know how the forces might have been employed the week
before Pearl Harbor, had we not realized that war was imminent.
37. Q. Do you recall any additional security measures which were
placed in effect during that week which you may attribute to the
receipt of the dispatch or the information contained therein ?
A. I don't remember the date when instructions were issued about
the anti-aircraft alert, and special anti-submarine instructions, but
sometime during November, I feel sure that we were all warned to
be more, — very much on guard, be prepared for air attack, be pre-
pared and always on guard against submarine attack. I can not say
when those instructions were given. I am inclined to think that they
were reiterated from time to time during November, probably October.
38. Q. Admiral, the Chief of Naval Operations' dispatch of 27 No-
vember that you have before you now contains a directive in general
terms regarding certain deployments. Do you recall whether or not
in the discussions of the contents of this dispatch, any mention was
made of the necessity of reporting to the Navy Department what
deployments or what defensive measures had been carried out pur-
suant to this directive ?
A. No, I don't remember ; but I would not be apt to be consulted
about what report would be made to the Department.
39. Q. Admiral, normally would you consider that the recipient of
such a directive as that you have before you should make a report
to the Navy Department of what had been done pursuant to that ?
A. No, I would not except it. I would not have made a report, had
I been in Admiral Kimmel's position.
40. Q. Admiral, were you familiar with this document which is
Exhibit 4 before this examination ?
150 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I undoubtedly was familiar, at that time, with this order. I had
forgotten about it up to the present moment, except that it confirms
what I had said before, that it was my impression that the Fleet had
been made conscious of possibilities and directed to be on guard.
41. Q. Did you' feel, Admiral, prior to the December 7 attack, that
this order adequately provided for the security of your task force
while at Pearl Harbor ?
A. Yes. I was very conscious that the defenses of Pearl Harbor
were quite inadequate in anti-aircraft guns, radar, and planes — types
and numbers of planes. I was also aware that these shortages had
been repeatedly brought to the attention of the Department, and that
we were informed that it was not possible to meet those shortages
because of more pressing needs in the war in the Atlantic.
42. Q. Will you elaborate that reply in so far as concerns the ability
of the Army on Oahu to meet its commitments toward the security of
Pearl Harbor?
A. It is my recollection that I overheard Admiral Kimmel fre-
quently question General Short as to what equipment the Army had
to defend Pearl [^44] Harbor against enemy air attack, and
that General Short replied that his equipment was wholly inadequate
and that he had done everything possible to try to have it increased.
43. Q. In those discussions, or at other times, did you ever hear
anything which gave you the impression that the highest Army com-
mand echelons expected our Fleet to intercept any carrier raid ini-
tiated by the Japanese ?
A. I don't know that I ever overheard any discussion with the Army
about a carrier raid, but it was my understanding then, and it is my
understanding now, that at that time the general agreement between
the Army and Navy was that the Navy should do the scouting at sea
and the Army's function was to attack the enemy when located by the
Navy.
44. Q. But you do not recall hearing of any impression that the
Army was depending upon the ships of the Pacific Fleet to intercept
a carrier raid ?
A. Not that they were depending upon the ships, but I would have
expected them to depend upon naval planes to discover the approach
of the enemy.
45. Q. While your task force was at Pearl Harbor prior to De-
cember 7, did you, on your own initiative, prescribe any additional
security measures?
A. I did not. I felt that the instructions issued by the Command-
er-in-Chief were well considered and thorough.
46. Q. To what extent did you feel that the vessels of the Fleet
present at Pearl Harbor would be required to contribute to the defense
of Pearl Harbor in the event of an air attack?
A. Knowing that the Army defenses were wholly inadequate, I
think the whole Fleet felt that the ships would have to depend upon
their own anti-aircraft for their own defense, while in Pearl Harbor,
as well as at sea.
47. Q. Admiral, this Exhibit No. 4, provides, under part G, which
is labeled "Defense Against Air Attack", that "the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District, as Naval Base Defense Officer, advise the
Senior Officer Embarked at Pearl Harbor, exclusive of Commander-
in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, what condition of readiness to maintain."
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 151
Were you, at any time, the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor,
exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, that is, any time prior to
December 7 ?
A. I think not. I was the junior of the three Task Force Com-
manders — wait a minute — I might have been. I would like to change
that — I may have been.
48. Q. Under the setup here established, did you feel that you
would have prescribed conditions of readiness to be maintained by the
vessels present, or that j^ou should rely on the advice of the Com-
mandant in this respect ?
A. I had complete confidence that the orders issued by the Com-
mandant were all that the circumstances required.
49. Q. Do you recall having received any advice or orders concern-
ing the condition of readiness to be maintained by vessels in Pearl
Harbor ?
A. Not prior to December 7.
50. Q. The schedule of employment for the Fleet was a printed
document, was it not ?
A. Yes, it was in the form of a graph which showed the periods at
sea for each task force, the general nature of their employment at
sea, and periods in port and that covered a period, I think, of about
three months.
[14^] 51. Q. Was the quarterly issue in effect that which was to
terminate at the end of December ?
A. Yes, sir.
52. Q. Were there a good many copies printed and issued ?
A. I do not know about that. I'm trying to think how many were
issued to my own force ; I can not say ; I know that the information
was treated as confidential, not as secret, that for at least six months a
very determined effort had been made to impress on all hands the
necessity for being very cautious in ever discussing fleet movements ;
the families were well indoctrinated with the idea that they might
be tricked into answering a question as to whether their husbands
were in port or out; that very severe penalties were threatened to
anybody who was not security conscious ; but, of course, I believe that
the Japanese were quite familiar with everything about our proposed
schedule.
53. Q. You think it is quite possible that the Japanese, in effect, had
a copy of that employment schedule?
A. I think it is quite probable.
54. Q. As you recall, do you think it was essential to print scheduled
movements of ships of the Fleet so far in advance ?
A. Not essential, but it was very helpful in planning work and
educational training schedules. I did not think of it, at the time, as
being an unwise practice ; as I look back on it now, I think it would
have been better had we not issued it.
55. Q. We have considerable testimony from other officers of the
Pacific Fleet to the effect that there was rather common agreement
that if the Japanese made a surprise attack upon Hawaii, it most
likely would be either by submarine or by saboteurs. Did you entirely
share that opinion in October-November, '41 ?
A. I did.
152 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
56. Q. Then you considered the possibility of a carrier air raid
extremely slight?
A. I thought it extremely slight.
57. Q. During those last few days prior to 7 December, when your
own task force was in Pearl Harbor, did it ever occur to you that
they were in a dangerous position and, during this period of waiting,
would be better off at sea ?
A. No, on the contrary, I felt, as I have said before, that the chance
of an air attack was extremely remote because of my misunderstand-
ing of Japanese air ability. I did not consider the air a menace. I
was not concerned about the security of the ships in Pearl Harbor.
And I tliought it very necessary — because of the intensity of the train-
ing schedule at sea and the hours that men were called upon to work,
that when they returned to port they should get rest and diversion in
preparation for the following tour at sea. Perhaps, I may be per-
mitted to say at this time that I had watched the threat of war with
Japan, of course, with tremendous interest. I directed the thoughts
and studies of my Staff to all the books about the Japanese and the
Japanese methods of waging war. My Staff and I were in almost daily
conference, discussion, about possibilities. My own estimate in De-
cember was that the Japanese, having observed a reactionary Congress
and the reluctance of the people of the United States to go to war,
would avoid an open break with the United States and confine their
first attack to one against the [M^] Dutch or the British. I
probably banked too much on that estimate of the situation.
58. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch addressed by the Chief of
Naval Operations to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and
Pacific Fleets and Commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth
Naval Districts, on 3 December 1941. It is Exhibit 11 before this
examination. Are you familiar, or were you familiar, with that dis-
patch prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor ?
A. I think so, but I am not certain as it must have come about the
time I went to sea. I believe, however, that I did see it and I do not
remember to have been impressed by the significance of the alleged
instructions to Japanese representatives in Manila and Washington.
It occurs to me now, however, that the inclusion of Manila and
Washington does not necessarily indicate an intention to attack us
but might be in order that they would not be found at fault in case
we made Avar because of their attack on one of our — because of their
attack against another country.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to
make any further statement covering anything relating to the sub-
ject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter
of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought
out by the previous questioning.
The witness made the following statement: The sinking of the
PRINCE OF WALES and the EEPULSE, as well as our own losses
at Midway and the Coral Sea, fully demonstrated the ability of
Japanese naval fliers to inflict heavy damage on naval vessels no
matter how well ships might be prepared for attack nor how fully
manned the then anti-aircraft batteries. These demonstrations of the
ability and determination of Japanese fliers must now make it evident
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 153
to all that no matter what our state of alert or deployment at Pearl
Harbor on December 7, 1941, might have been, we were bound to suffer
great damage even though a more effective alert would have destroyed
more Japanese j)lanes. Even if we had known the Japanese intention
to attack Pearl Harbor, we could not have kept our ships at sea
indefinitely waiting for the blow to fall. Japanese agents in Honolulu
were always free to pick the date and hour of attack. It seems to me
that to find fault with individuals for the lack of weapons, for the
lack of alertness, or for incomplete deployment will not. assure security
for the future. On the other hand, the high state of efficiency main-
tained while doubling the size of our Fleet in two years, the seaman-
ship, gunnery, and fighting ability of our Navy during two years
of war reflects the quality of our naval leadership and of our training
processes during the pre-war period as well as during the war period-
On December 7, 1941, the Japanese dared to risk an attack on our
Fleet at Pearl Harbor only because they had complete information
about our dispositions; their agents ashore were able to observe and
report the state of our defenses; and their so-called diplomatic agents
on the spot were able to direct the moment of attack. I wish to go on
record as being of the opinion that the major lesson for the nation
to learn from the attack on Pearl Harbor is that we should never
again allow enemy aliens within sighting distance of a major operat-
ing base from which considerable portions of our naval and air
forces can be observed.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 11 : 45 a. m., adjourned until 9 : 80
a. m., Saturday, March 18, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 155
lun PKOCEEDINGS OF THE HABT INaUIRY
SATURDAY, MARCH 18, 1944
Eleventh Day
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.
The examination met at 9 : 35 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer,
and his comisel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as
reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still
binding.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the tenth day of the examination until such time
as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with
the examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
Captain M. E. Curtis, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified, was
called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously
taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony
given by him on the eighth day of the examination, pronounced it
correct, was duly warned and withdrew.
Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy, Retired, who had previously
testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his
oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read
over the testimony given by him on the second and sixth days of the
examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned and withdrew.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to
the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present duty sta-
tion.
A. William Satterlee Pye; Read Admiral, United States Navy;
president, Naval War College, and Commandant of the Naval Operat-
ing Base, Newport.
2. Q. What duties were you performing on 7 December 1941 ?
A. Commander, Battle Force, United States Pacific Fleet, and
Commander of Task Force One.
3. Q. How long had you been with the Pacific Fleet and in what
capacities?
156 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. From the 6th of July, 1937, to July, 1939, as Commander,
Flotilla One, Destroyers, Pacific Fleet ; from July, 1939, until January,
1910, as Connnancler, Destroyers, Pacific Fleet ; from January, 1940, to
January, 19-41, I was Commander, Battleships, United States Fleet;
from January, 1911, until after Pearl Harbor, Commander, Battle
Force, United States Fleet.
[14^] 4- Q- ^n 7 December, '11, were you the Senior Officer
Present in the Pacific Fleet other than the Commander-in-Chief?
A. I was.
5. Q. Admiral, as best you can recall, will you give the periods,
working back from December 7, during which you were in port for the
four months preceding December 7 ?
A. I was in port previous to December 7 from Thursday, November
27. I had been at sea with my Task Force since November 21. Pre-
ceding that period, I can not recall the exact dates of being in port
and at sea, but the general program was one-third of the time at sea
and two-thirds in port, the Fleet being operated in three task forces.
As I recall, it was about the middle of October until early in November
that I had been on the West Coast with a temporarily organized
task force. This task force left Honolulu for the West Coast some-
where around the 14th or 15th of October.
5a. Q. Admiral, how would you describe your relations with Ad-
miral Kimmel with regard to the frequency with which he consulted
with you, and the completeness of his consultations ?
A. When the Commander-in-Chief moved his headquarters ashore,
he turned over to me, in effect, the training program, particularly that
of Task Force 1, but, on each occasion when Task Force 1 had a period
at sea, one of the other task forces worked with us for one day on
tactical maneuvers. INI}' effort during this period in Honolulu was
primarily directed toward the training of the forces of the Fleet. In
that respect, my consultations with the Commander-in-Chief were
frequent. In regard to the general conditions, it was his practice, at
least once upon each period in which I was in port, to call me to his*
office to show me those dispatches which he considered to be of interest,
both with regard to the Fleet and to the general situation. He fre-
quently also showed me letters which he had received from the Chief
of Naval Operations. In addition to that, it was customary for him
to call in his Intelligence Officer and to have him explain the situation
of the Japanese Fleet insofar as it was known or assumed by the
Intelligence Section of his Staff. I considered Admiral Kimmel to
have the greatest interest in all matters pertaining to the efficiency of
the Fleet or to the use of the Fleet in the event of war. I have never
known any Commander-in-Chief in the United States Fleet to be more
interested in the training or activities of the Fleet. Due to the large
amount of correspondence with regard to materiel, the general logis-
tics situation, and to the international situation, he felt that he could
not devote as much attention to training as he would like to have done
and, therefore, gave me the responsibility for that particular function.
6. Q. Sir, in arriving at his decisions of a major nature, was it
Admiral Kimmel's practice to consult freely, not only with members
of his Staff, but also with other senior officers of the Fleet, to give
full consideration to their advice, and did you feel that in forming his
own decisions he acted on this advice ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 157
A. I feel that during the three or four months preceding the war of
December 7, that Admiral Kimmcl consulted with all of the Flag
Officers to obtain their reaction to the situation as he assumed it to be,
and their opinion as to what could be done with the forces available
in the event of war. About five months before the war, or December
7, a plan was developed for the use of the- Fleet which included an air
attack on the Marshall Islands by the carrier groups, supported by
the battle line. This plan had been developed to the point where we
considered it advisable to play it in the method of a chart maneuver.
It was impossible to keep this maneuver going at the usual rate, but
he did direct the various task group commanders to [^4^] make
maneuvers corresponding to periods of time, whereupon all of their
tracks of their respective forces were noted on a master plot in the
Headquarters and any contacts noted, assuming that the Japanese
forces would operate as the Commander-in-Chief's Staff considered
that they would operate, that is, the Japanese Staff estimate was
planned by Admiral Kimmel's Staff; the ships were maneuvered as
they though such forces would operate. This chart maneuver had been
carried on for a period of approximately a month but the game time
was much less. Because of the frequent absence of forces from port,
actually represented a period of about one week in game time. I cite
this to show that the plan for the use of the Fleet as it existed had been
made out with all Flag officers and Commanders, Task Forces, cog-
nizant of it, and that we were endeavoring, by the use of the strategic
chart maneuver, to throw some light on the soundness of the plan.
With respect to the general situation, as Commander of Task Force 1,
every time I came into port, I was informed of the situation so far as
Admiral Kimmel understood it and was asked my opinion as to the
significance of the messages or letters from the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, which he showed me.
7. Q. Admiral, during this period, what was the situation as re-
gards frequency of consultation with the high echelons of Army officers
present in Oahu at that time ?
A. That, I'm unable to say. Personally, I attended no conferences
in which the situation was discussed by the Army high command.
8. Q. Admiral, with respect to your consultations with Admiral
Kimmel, you were primarily concerned with Fleet operations, is that
not correct, sir?
A. That's correct ; only with Fleet Operations.
9. The Army, of course, was concerned with security features.
Would you say this was the reason you would most likely not be pres-
ent when Admiral Kimmel consulted with the Army ?
A. I should say so. As far as concerned the defense of the Fleet
in port and of the area immediately adjacent to the Island, there were
two people, other than myself, who were primarily responsible for
advice to the Commander-in-Chief, namely, Commander of the Army
Forces and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.
10. Q. What did you consider to be the primary mission of the
Pacific Fleet during the latter half of the year, 1941 ?
A. Training for the conduct of war, in order to be able to start
operations immediately upon the declaration of war.
11. Q. Please outline, generally, the war tasks assigned to the
Pacific Fleet under the war plans then existing during the latter half
of 1941.
158 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. The plan was to use the Fleet to create as much activity as possi-
ble in the Eastern Mandate area, to force the Japanese to send naval
forces and air forces there in order to reduce as much as possible the
strength of the enemy available in the Philippines and China Coast
area.
12. Q. At that time, that -is during the last six months of 1941, did
you feel that the training mission of the Fleet was occupying such a
predominate position in the minds of the Commanding Officers that
the war tasks were being relegated to the background of the picture ?
A. I did not, although I think the training was carried out more
extensively than it ever had been before, and, in my opinion, the Fleet
was in the highest state of efficiency that it ever had attained on
December 7. The fact that [^^0] we had plans, that we were
engaged in a strategic exercise to determine how those plans could be
carried into effect, is evidence that the war operations were not being
neglected.
13. Q. Admiral, during the period in question, could you state,
generally, what transfers were taking place as regards material and
personnel to other areas other than the Pacific Fleet ?
A. In June of 1941, there were detached from the battle force three
battleships, four light cruisers, and one squadron of destroyers, with
orders to report to Commender-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet. If I recall
correctly, there had been detached one division of destroyers previous
to that time ; so that the power of the Pacific Fleet had been materially
reduced in order to strengthen the forces in the Atlantic. I do not
consider that this detachment would actually have made much differ-
ence in what the Pacfic Fleet could have accomplished, because the
situation with regard to logistics was such that the Pacific Fleet could
not have operated more than 2500 miles from Honolulu, no matter
what its strength. The number of tankers available had been seriously
reduced and the amount of fuel oil in Honolulu storage had likewise
been reduced to purely the amount that was considered necessary as a
reserve.
14. Q. Sir, in addition to the detachment of the units which you
mentioned in your answer, was there any widespread detachment of
individual officers to either the Atlantic Fleet, or returned to the main-
land to man new construction ?
A. There was. I couldn't state the percentage, but there was a tre-
mendous depletion of the personnel of the Pacific Fleet in order to
man new construction.
15. Q. What protest or recommendations were made by the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in regard to detachments of both units
of the Fleet and personnel ?
A. I don't recall that I have seen or did see any of his official cor-
respondence in that respect. However, I recall many letters, personal
letters, to the Chief of Naval Operations with respect to these detach-
ments, in which he stated that the efficiency of the Pacific Fleet was
being reduced to an unsatisfactory point for the conduct of war.
16. Q, Sir, do you recall the answer or reaction of the Chief of
Naval Operations, or the Navy Department, to these representations
by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?
A. The reactions I received from the letters from the Chief of Naval
Operations was that the situation in the Atlantic was very much more
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 159
dangerous than the one in the Pacific and that the Atlantic had to be
taken care of first.
17. Q. What was the state of mind on the part of the Commander-
in-Chief, his Staff, and other senior officers of the Fleet, as to the cor-
rectness of this attitude on the part of the Department ?
A. I can only state my own, it probably being indicative of theirs.
The reaction in my mind was that whatever happened in the Pacific
would be on the initiative of the United States; that I felt that our
Government had decided that if we went into war, we would have to
lick the Germans first, that we probably would not be engaged in war in
the Pacific except at our own volition. I think that the basis of that
was sound. I think that had the Japanese not attacked Pearl Harbor
that we would have been months later in getting into the war in the
Pacific. In my mind, the attack on Pearl Harbor was the worst
psychological blunder that any nation has ever made.
[ISJ] 18. Q. Admiral, do you recall whether or not you ex-
pressed those opinions to the Commander-in-Chief and whether or
not he made any statements to you as to whether or not he agreed or
disagreed with your estimate?
A. I couldn't say that I ever used those words, because I don't think
any of us felt that that attack would be made before a declaration of
war, if ever. But I believe that that was the way most of us felt,
and, confirming that as being the opinion in Washington, in a letter
from the Chief of Naval Operations received about the time of the
warning message, the Chief of Naval Operations used words somewhat
of this tenor : "I do not know what this Country will do." In other
words, it impressed me, and I think probably those others who saw
it, that the option was going to rest with us.
19. Q. Admiral, on approximately what date did the Pacific Fleet
move to Pearl Harbor as its base?
A. I think it was in April, 1940. We went out there presumably
on a cruise anticipating remaining in Pearl Harbor for about a period
of ten days, but before that ten day period was over, the Commander-
in-Chief was directed to remain in Pearl Harbor, to retain the Fleet
in Pearl Harbor.
20. Q. Sir, when it became known to the Commander-in-Chief and
to you and others that the decision had been made to base the Pacific
Fleet in Pearl Harbor indefinitely, what were your reactions to the
wisdom of this decision ?
A. There were two reactions. The first was that it was a move
towards Japan, which might incite them to take action ; and the second
was that it was a very poor time to make such a move because we were
not prepared to move to the westward in case of war, because of the
lack of proper logistics support. I think that all officers recognized
one great advantage in having the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, That one
was that in order to spend the money on the ships for repairs and
overhaul in Pearl Harbor would permit the Navy Yard to be expanded
at a greater rate and thus be better prepared to handle the Fleet in
the event of a war in the Pacific.
21. Q. Admiral, in two or three of your answers, as I understand
them, you've mentioned shortages, deficiencies in logistic support for
the Pacific Fleet. Could you amplify that subject a bit, indicating
what were the most critical of those shortages ?
160 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Probably the greatest deficiency was tankers. The other defi-
ciency was the inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as a base. But Pearl
Harbor Navy Yard was in a state of development and in order to
continue that development, the money that was normally assigned
to a yard performing repairs, would go to Pearl Harbor if the ships
of the Fleet were to be repaired there, and, consequently, such action
would permit the industrial element in the Yard to be built up.
22. Q. Admiral, did you feel, at that time, that these deficiencies
or shortages in logistics were such that the Fleet was not in a condi-
tion of materiel readiness to carry out its offensive war tasks as out-
lined in the then existing war plans ?
A. The existing war plans were rather indefinite as to what the Fleet
could do. As I say, the estimate by the Commander-in-Chief, and I
think agreed by all of the officers in responsible positions, was that
the Fleet could not operate to the westward of the Marshall Islands.
It was very questionable in my mind that even with plenty of tankers
that the Fleet could have operated much farther west than that, because
of the lack of adequate repair facilities or bases of any kind. There-
fore, I considered the situation with regard to the Fleet was such that
it could not have carried on an offensive as far to the westward as
the Philippines or the Japanese Islands.
[152] 23. Q. Referring to your testimony to the effect that you
did not think the Japanese would initiate a war. In the estimate
behind that opinion, did you take into account the fact that steps
had been taken to freeze the Japanese credits so that they would have
at least great difficulty in obtaining petroleum products, tin, rubber,
and so forth, from the East Indies?
A. In my statement, with regard to the initiation of the war, it was
the initiation of war against the United States that I referred to. It
was firmly believed that the Japanese would go into the Dutch East
Indies and possibly into Singapore and Thailand, so that while we
had anticipated war, an extension of the war in the Pacific, we did
not anticipate that they would take action against the United States
at that time. May I add that they could have obtained the rubber,
tin, and so forth, without initiating war with the United States.
24. Q. The logistic deficiencies. Admiral, were well known to the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, of course?
A. Yes, sir.
25. Q. Do you know of any action that he took with respect to
remedying the situation?
A. I remember of being informed by him of numerous letters which
he had written but I can not recall the letters or having seen the
letters.
26. Q. Admiral, what response did the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, get to his attempts to remedy his logistic deficiencies?
A. I should say very little. The rate at which the fuel oil was
being used in Honolulu, during the training periods previous to Decem-
ber 7, was greater than the rate at which fuel was being delivered, and
the reserve was being reduced.
27. Q. Sir, I hand you a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions to CinCPac, and other addressees, dated 16 October 1941, which
is Exhibit 6 before this examination. When did you see that dis-
patch ?
PRdCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 161
A. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time I've seen this
dispatch. At the time it was received, I was in California with Task
Force 1 on a two weeks trip for recreation for personnel. My Force
was in San Pedro at the time and I did receive a dispatch from the
Commander-in-Chief stating that the — I don't remember the words of
the dispatch, but, in general terms, that the general situation was
considered serious. I immediately put my Task Force on twelve hour
notice preparatory to return to Pearl but no further word was received
before the scheduled date of sailing on the return trip to Honolulu,
which was sometime around the end of October.
28. Q. After your return to Pearl Harbor, were you apprised of
the subject matter of the dispatch?
A. In general terms, yes, that the situation had been considered
serious at that time. My return was two weeks or so after the date
of this dispatch and while it was mentioned to me, so far as I am aware,
I never saw the full dispatch before.
29. Q. Do you recall whether or not you were informed that the
dispatch contained a statement to the effect that an attack by Japan
on the United States was a possibility?
A. I don't believe I was so informed.
[1S3] 30. Q. Do you know of any additional security meas-
ures or other action undertaken by the Comn)ander-in-Chief, Pacific
pursuant to this dispatch ?
A. I was not there. The only information I have was the dispatch
he sent to me, which indicated to me that he might want us to return
almost immediately and I put the force on twelve hour notice. After
I got back to Honolulu, I found he had sent another dispatch, which
\Nas never received by me, putting my Task Force on twelve hour
notice. When he received my dispatch putting it on twelve hour
notice, he thought it was in answer to his. We just happened to hit
on the same twelve hour notice.
31. Q. Did any of the vessels of your task force return earlier than
planned in the employment schedule ?
A. Not that I know of.
32. Q. Admiral, you have stated that you were at sea during the
period 21-27 November. I hand you a dispatch from the Chief of
Naval Operations to CinCPac and other addressees, dated 24 No-
vember, which is Exhibit 7 before this examination. When did you
first see this dispatch ?
A. I saw this dispatch first on Saturday, November 29. Task
I'orce 1 and Task Force 3 had been engaged in a strategic problem
which ended on Sunday, the 23rd. My task force was not due to
enter Pearl until Thursday, the 27th. On the night of the 24th, I
)-eceived a dispatch from the Commander-in-Chief to take all precau-
tions against possible submarine activity. From the time of the re-
ceipt of that dispatch until after the entry of Task Force 1, com-
plete defensive formations and operations against possible enemy
submarine activities were taken. It had been the custom for the
Commander-in-Chief to signal to incoming task force commanders
when he desired to have a conference with them. No such signal
was received upon my entry, nor later, but, upon Saturday morning,
I went to the Commander-in-Chief for a conference on my own voli-
tion. It was at that time that he showed me this message. He called
79716 — 46— Ex. 144 12
162 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in his Intelligence Officer and the Intelligence Officer explained the
locations of the enemy forces, so far as he was able to judge, which
indicated no unusual activity in the major forces of the Japanese
Navy. He also showed me the latest letters he had received from
the Chief of Naval Operations, which I mentioned, and in which the
Chief of Naval Operations said, "I do not know what we will do,"
was one. We discussed any possible action that would be taken by
Task Force 1 at that time, and Task Force 1 being the only task force,
with the exception of the battleships of Task Force 3, being in port,
we decided that there was no action that could be taken by that task
force which would better prepare them for the possible action that
might come. Task Force 2, under Vice Admiral Halsey, had gone
out before my task force returned to port, and part of Task Force 3,
as I recall it, left on the same day that I had entered. So that there
were in Pearl Harbor, at the time I saw this message, no carriers and
only the portion of the destroyers of the Fleet assigned to Task
Force 1.
[1S4-] Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval
Reserve, took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath pre-
viously taken was still binding.
Examined by the examining officer (Continued) :
33. Q. Admiral, your attention is invited to certain wording in the
dispatch before you to the effect that a surprise attack in any direc-
tion might be anticipated. Was any particular consideration given
to that wording by the Commander-in-Chief and his advisers as
regards the possibility of that direction being Oahu ?
A. I was not present at any conferences between the Commander-
in-Chief and his Staff, or other senior officers. So far as I can re-
call, there was. between Admiral Kimmel and myself, no discussion
as to the possibility that Oahu might be attacked by air. There
was, and had been for some months, a feeling that a surprise attack
by submarines might be possible. The differentiation between these
two attacks, at least so far as I was concerned, was based on the be-
lief that a submarine attack could be made without definite proof
that it was enemy action, whereas, an air attack could not. In the
absence of any protection by carriers, it was felt that the Fleet in
port, with the presumed effectiveness of the Army Air Forces, would
be in a better position for defense than they would be at sea.
34. Q. Admiral, in the dispatch that you have before you there is
a directive that Army officials be informed. Do you have any knowl-
edge as to whether that was, in fact, done, and to what extent they
were consulted?
A. I have no knowledge.
35. Q. Sir, I hand you a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions to CinCPac, and other addressees, dated 27 November 1941,
which is Exhibit 8 before this examination. Will you state when you
first saw this dispatch ?
A. To the best of my recollection, on Saturday, the 29th of
November.
36. Q. In other words, the two dispatches. Exhibits 7 and 8, were
seen and discussed at the same time ?
A. I am positive — ^yes, these two were seen at the same time, the
29th of November.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 163
37. Q. In addition to the dispatch that you received at sea in re-
gards to precautions against submarine attack, do you know what
action was taken by the Commander-in-Chief pursuant to these two
dispatches?
A. I don't recall any positive action other than his talking over
with me these dispatches.
38. Q. In a previous answer, I understood you to say that the Com-
mander-in-Chief called in his Intelligence Officer, into this confer-
ence on the morning of 29 November, and received a report from him
as to the then whereabouts of various units of the Japanese Fleet.
At that time, what degree of credibility did you assign to this intel-
ligence report ?
A. I think the credibility assigned was fairly high, in view of the
fact that there was no other intelligence or information by which a
comparison or evaluation of the respective points of view might be
made.
39. Q. At that time, did you know what sources the Intelligence
Officer was relying on for his information ?
A. Yes.
40. Q. In the dispatch of 27 November, Exhibit 8, what interpre-
tation was placed on the wording, in general, which directs that cer-
tain deployments be made?
[ISS] A. In order to execute the plan of the Fleet, it would
have been necessary to recall the task forces which were at that time
absent, in order to properly prepare them, from a logistic point of
view, and consequently there was no deployment that could be made
immediately that would have better prepared Task Force One than
that which existed. Task Force Two was on its way to ferry some
fighting planes to Wake and was not expected to return for over a
week, consequently there appeared to be no action to be taken by the
Pacific Fleet that would have better prepared it against an indefinite
date of beginning operations, than that which was then in progress,
41. Q. Admiral, am I correct in saying that the return of your
task force to Pearl Harbor on 27 November was done in accordance
with the then existing employment schedule ?
A. It was.
42. Q. What was the nature of the employment of the task force
for its scheduled tiine in port, beginning 27 November?
A. Overhaul and training and preparation for the next period
at sea. In addition, and as a part of that training, the holding of
a critique for the exercise which had been terminated on the Sunday
previous to our entering port. That exercise had been one to develop
air attack on an escorted convoy group, and alternatively, the defense
of such a group. Task Force Three, containing a carrier, had been
the force which attacked Task Force One, which was acting as escort
to the convoy group. I state this primarily to indicate that the
question of air attack at sea was uppermost in the minds of all of
the officers during the period of training. The system of training
that had been developed for these exercises was the most extensive
that had ever been practiced by our Fleet. Before the problems were
executed at sea, they were played out on the Maneuver Board which
was established on shore at the Submarine Base Bachelor Officers'
Quarters. The problems having been laid out and commented upon,
on the Board, previous to the exercises at sea, were then carried out
164 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
as an exercise at sea. Upon return to port, the exercise was criticised,
the critique being held on the Maneuver Board, as had been done
on the same exercise before the Fleet went to sea. So, for each exercise,
there were three distinct periods of mental training — the prepara-
tion and trial of the exercise before it was carried out at sea, the con-
duct of the exercise at sea, and the critique of the exercise after we
returned from sea. This critique was to be held on Wednesdaj^ fol-
lowing our return to port, and with the exception of the Saturday
morning when I went up to see Admiral Kimmel, I was primarily con-
cerned with preparing the critique of this exercise for presentation
on the Wednesday following.
43. Q. In other words, is it correct to say that no change in the
scheduled employment of your task force was made by virtue of this
dispatch ?
A. No change was made. The only thing was that during the
period at sea, from the time we got that dispatch we were especially
careful about maintaining the maximum effectiveness of the anti-
submarine defense.
44. Q. When was your task force next scheduled to go to sea,
Admiral, if you recollect?
A. About December 11th, I should say, — we were generally in
about two weeks.
45. Q. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, did you receive any
orders changing that scheduled sortie ?
A. No, I did not.
llS6] 46. Q. Did you receive any orders or instructions chang-
ing the procedure while in port which would indicate any change
in the contemplated use of your task force when it went to sea for its
next scheduled period ?
A. None that I recall.
47. Q. Did your task force have its full allowance of ammunition
and other stores such as would equip it for combat purposes in event
of war ?
A. To the best of my knowledge, every ship had adequate material
on board to exercise its functions in time of war. Many requests
had been made for modifications of the anti-aircraft armament, to
include more machine guns, which had not been received, but the
vessels themselves, in their then state of equipment, were readv to
fight.
48. Q. What I had in mind. Admiral, was to determine from any
action taken whether the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, felt
that on your next departure, you might be leaving on an assigned
war task which would require additional ammunition or equipment,
and as to whether any such was provided during this period.
A. Well, we were kept up to a point where we expected to be able
to operate at any time, should it be required, and I don't think there
would have been any hesitancy about going ahead and executing that
plan which had been contemplated, had we gone to war under normal
conditions.
49. Q. You feel that your ships, had they sortied in accordance
with the schedule, would have been so prepared ?
A. Yes.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 165
50. Q. Admiral, I hand you a dispatch dated 28 November, from
Chief of Naval Operations, in which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific,
is an information addressee, which is Exhibit 9 before this examina-
tion. Will you state whether or not you saw that dispatch, and if
so, when ?
A. To the best of my knowledge, I did not see that dispatch before
December 7th.
51. Q. Admiral, I hand you another dispatch, which CinCPac was
only an information addressee, from OPNav to CinC Asiatic Fleet,
dated 30 November, which is Exhibit 10 before this examination. Do
you recall whether or not you saw that dispatch, and if so, when?
A. It is difficult for me to say whether or not I saw this dispatch
previous to December 7th, but I believe that I saw it on Wednesday
or Thursday, the 3rd or 4th of December, after the critique of the
exercise which the Fleet had been holding — I saw the Commander-
in-Chief for a short time and again on Thursday, the 4th. It is
my opinion that on one of those two days he showed me this dispatch.
52. Q. Do you recall if the indications mentioned as to the direction
of a Japanese attack caused any change of the attitude on your part
over what you had had as a result of the preceding dispatches?
A. I think it tended to confirm the reaction of the previous dis-
patches that the activities were anticipated, even by the Department,
in the Far East.
53. Q. Admiral, I hand you a dispatch dated 3 December, from
Chief of Naval Operations to CinCPac, and other addressees, which
is Exhibit 11 before this examination. Did you see that dispatch?
[1S7] A. I saw this one on either Wednesday or Thursday —
Wednesday, the 3rd, or Thursday, the 4th — this one I am confident
I saw before December 7th, This one we discussed — I discussed with
the Commander-in-Chief only to this point : "most of their codes", it
said, it did not say "all", I don't suppose they could have said "all",
but this same idea had been expressed in the newspapers of that day
or the day before. We were completely unaware of the methods by
which this information was received and we did feel that if inferences
were to be drawn from this, that the best place to draw them was where
they had the maximum information.
54. Q. In your discussions with the Commander-in-Chief as to the
significance of this dispatch, was any particular mention made of the
fact that among the places listed where it was thought the code and
cyphers had been destroyed, were the capitols of the United States
and the Philippines?
A, I don't recall any particular discussion of those two points, but
it seemed perfectly evident that this could precede war by many
days ; that it was not to us indicative of immediate action ; and we were
also, as I say, unaware of the source of information. As this informa-
tion had appeared in the papers, it probably did not mean as much
to us as though we had been aware of how the Department obtained it.
55. Q. Admiral, in addition to the series of dispatches that you have
just seen, what other intelligence reports, or information were avail-
able to the Commander-in-Chief and to you, as one of his advisers, in
making your estimates of the situation as regards the probability of
immediate hostilities ?
166 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
. A. There were none available to me, and as I have previously stated,
my primary concern was the training of the Fleet. On no occasion was
I called into conference with the other Flag Officers and Admiral
Kimmel to discuss the possibility of immediate action by Japan.
56. Q. At that time did you feel that you, and the other com-
manding officers, in Oahu, were sufficiently informed as to the interna-
tional situation, or did you feel that you were more or less operating
in the dark, out there?
A. Well, I can only speak for myself. I don't know how the others
felt. I felt we were operating pretty much in the dark.
57. Q. In making your own estimates of the situation, and in giving
such advice to the Commander-in-Chief as you did, how much con-
sideration was given to the fact that the Axis nations had been
departing from the usual rules of the game, usually, in making surprise
attacks without formal declarations of war?
A. I don't think — a great deal. It seems to me, and it seemed to me
then, that in every case of a surprise attack there must be something
to be gained by it to make it worth while. I felt, and I presume others
felt the same way, that the reaction of the United States to a surprise
attack would so arouse the people that it would be a very bad psycho-
logical blunder for any nation to do such an act against the United
States.
58. Q. Also with relation to your estimates of the situation, do you
recall any emphasis being given, or any consideration being given to
the personal characteristics of the Japanese high command, with rela-
tion to any specific individuals of the Japanese high command ?
A. If any such studies were available to the Commander-in-Chief,
I have never seen them.
59. Q. Although it is apparent that the matter was not particularly
discussed [1^^] ii^ your presence, did you ever feel, during
those days, that enough attention was being given to the study of the
psychology of the Japanese in general, particularly their military
cult?
A. Well, I had personally considered it quite extensively, but to
what extent it was given consideration by the Commander-in-Chief
and his Staff, I don't Imow.
60. Q. Admiral, had you formulated an opinion as to the capability
of the Japanese naval air arm prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?
A. I think the general impression was that they were fairly good.
I don't believe that we thought that they were as good as they appeared
to be immediately after Pearl Harbor. In the rules that had been used
for the exercises in relation to the efficiency of aircraft, I should say
that full weight had been given to the value of air attack as indicated
in the particular exercise that was completed by the First and Third
Task Forces on Sunday, the 23rd of November. The complete convoy
had been wiped out and many of the escorting vessels seriously
damaged by constructive bombing. I feel that the attitude of the
Fleet toward aviation was confirmed by the later effects. I do not
believe that the air has proved any more efficient than we had given
it credit for, with this one exception — that I don't believe any people
before the war, especially not in the United States, believed that such
a large percentage of the industrial capacity of the country, or any
country, would be put into aviation. There is one thing with regard
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 167
to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and aviation, which I think should
be stated : Some discussion had been held between the Commander-
in-Chief and the Bureau of Ordnance as to the possibility of using
torpedo planes in shallow water. The Bureau of Ordnance had ex-
pressed an opinion that the use of torpedo planes in less than 75 feet
of water would probably not be eflfective. As the water in Pearl
Harbor was shallower than that, there was probably created an
opinion in the minds of the officers of the Fleet, that the torpedo plane
could not be used there as effectively as it was used.
61. Q. Admiral, in that connection, did you have any reason to
question that information that you received from the Navy Depart-
ment in regard to torpedo planes, and did you feel that the Fleet was
relatively safe from torpedo attack in Pearl Harbor?
A. While I won't say that we felt we were relatively safe, we felt
that the efficiency of any torpedoes used in that area would be very
much below what might be expected in the open sea. Most of our own
torpedoes, dropped from planes, at that time were diving in the
neighborhood of 75 feet before they ran.
62. Q. You had no information to the effect that other nations
might have developed torpedoes that would be effective at lesser
depths?
A. We had no information as to what they actually had developed.
63. Q. Had you any information, sir, as to the aggressive spirit
which the Japanese naval air arm displayed on that occasion, — any
advance information?
A. No, I don't recall that we had any particular data with regard
to that. I think everybody felt that they had plenty of spirit, if they
decided to it, they would come in hard — there wasn't any question
about that. We had had air raid drills frequently in port, and had a
standard routine for it. The defenses of the Fleet, of course, were
largely in the hands of the Army, and the condition of readiness was
not set by the Fleet, itself, but was set by the Commandant of the
Fourteenth Naval District.
[159] 64. Q. Admiral, in several of your previous answers you
liave touched on your own estimate of the situation as regards the
])robability of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and on the reasons
why you and other officers present did not rate it very high, as a pos-
sibility. Is there anything you can add to what you already said as
to your estimate of that probability, and the reasons for that state
of mind ?
A. I don't know that there is much that I can add. I think I have
explained, from my point of view, several features, and a primary
feature of all was that I felt that Japan could gain more by delaying
our entry in to the war than they could possibly gain by any damage
that they could do at Pearl Harbor. I am still firmly convinced that
that was the case. I am also convinced that that was the opinion held
in Washington, at least to this extent, that on the day the Secretary
of the Navy arrived at Pearl Harbor, after the attack on Pearl Harbor
on the 7th of December, one of the first statements he made was that
no one at Washington had stated to him any possibility of an air
attack on Pearl Harbor, even Kelly Turner, who was the most aggres-
sive minded of all. These are not quotations, but that is the sense of
what he said. I think the feeling that was in Honolulu was greatly
168 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
influenced by the attitude of the Department through the preceding
months, in taking away forces from the Pacijfic and indicating
throughout that they considered the situation with Germany much
more serious than with Japan, and that there was inadequate knowl-
edge of a shift of opinion in Washington, if there was one; that there
were no real definite instructions received out there after November
29, I think it was. The only other dispatch that I recall seeing was
that one about the burning of the communications cipher code. Dur-
ing that period of about a week, many things were happening in
Washington of which we in the Fleet were not cognizant. So far
as; I know, there was never any follow-up, either on that message
received on the 16th of October — even after stating that condition
existed, there was never any relaxation of a state of emergency indi-
cated, and yet, six weeks went by before the attack. It seemed to me,
and I think it seemed to all, that they were merely additional con-
firmations of a general feeling that war was approaching, and that
we, the Fleet, should be in a state of readiness to carry out our part
in the plan. If any change or immediate indication of war had been
made in the Department, it seems to me that the message previously
referred to would have been followed up by further messages ; at least
to the extent of asking the Commander-in-Chief what he had done,
or what he intended to do.
65. Q. The war plan which was current appears to have been dated
sometime in May, 1941, and the growth in tenseness of the situation
in which Japan was concerned, was rapid after that. During those
months, did it occur to you that the effective war plan had become out
of step with the real situation ?
A. I think that the plan for the actual use of the Fleet had not
become out of step, because due to lack of logistic facilities, it was
impossible for the Fleet to take any more offensive action than the
contemplated attack on the eastern Mandates in order to try to relieve
the situation in the Far East.
66. Q. As regards the broader concept behind the plan, to the effect
that our position in the Pacific was purely defensive, did you think
that part had become out of step ?
A. So far as the Pacific Fleet was concerned, it seemed to me it was
only one thing we could do and we were prepared to do that ; we dis-
cussed, in this problem we were carrying on at the time what we
could do with the Fleet. Well, you couldnt do much because it didn't
have oil to get anywhere, and you didn't have repair facilities if you
got there, and so far as the Fleet was concerned, 1^60] the
only thing of any usefulness that could be done was to make an attack
on the Marshalls with a view to drawing much of the enemy strength
to the westward with a view to helping the Allied Forces around
Manila and the East Indies. So, so far as I was concerned, the ap-
proach to that possible entry in the war had no particular effect on the
thing that could be done with the Fleet. At the time I first learned
about these messages. Task Force Two was bound out to Wake, part
of Task Force Three had gone out to Johnston Island. There was,
at that time, nothing that could be done by Task Force One, and it
was felt if anything did occur, we should get the other task forces
back as quickly as possible and prepare to carry out the plan that had
been prepared — for the Fleet to move out to the Marshall Islands.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 169
67. Q. Then no apparent fault in the basic war plans occurred to
you during those months ?
A. Well, my opinion about the plan, Rainbow Five, was that it was
not kept up to date, that people were not sufficiently concerned with
keeping the plan abreast the changing situation. If you go still far-
ther back than that, I consider that the whole basic war plans, as I
have known them for years, have really not been operations plans but
development plans. They have been used as a lever to get more men
and ships and naval shore establishment development.
68. Q. Admiral, I hand you an estimate drawn up by Commander
Patrol Wing Two and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force,
Army, dated 31 March 1941, which is a part of Exhibit 22 before this
examination. Were you familiar with this estimate prior to Decem-
ber 7th?
A. To the best of my knowledge, I never saw it before December 7th.
69. Q. In this estimate your attention is invited to a statement
made in Paragraph Ill(b), that "It appears that the most likely
and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack." Do
you feel that this estimate is completely out of step with the estimates
of the Commander-in-Chief and other senior officers present in Oahu
at that time ?
A. Well, in making an estimate of enemy capabilities, there are
two methods of procedure : One is known as the method of intentions,
and the other is the method of capabilities. The higher up you are
in the scale of command, the more apt one is to use the method of
intentions, or trying to determine what the enemy intends to do. In
the lower echelons of command, in which Rear Admiral Bellinger
was, at that time, he was more concerned with the physical capacity
of the enemy to do certain things in relation to the activity which
he is commanding. For that reason. Admiral Bellinger, being re-
sponsible for the use of the aircraft based on shore to cooperate with
the Army in defense of the Fleet, or at least to obtain information
for the Fleet in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, would have
assumed situations which required action by his force, and naturally
one of those was the information, preceding an offense against air
attack on the Island of Oahu, of vessels in the immediate vicinity. I
feel that this particular position of Admiral Bellinger led him to
this conclusion as being necessary for him to make out his plan, and
a perfectly legitimate assumption as a basis for his plan, but that does
not mean that the enemy was more apt to do that than something
else. So far as I can see Admiral Bellinger's assumptions do not indi-
cate that he anticipated an attack in advance of a declaration of war.
[161] Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took
seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was
still binding.
70. Q. Admiral, am I correct in saying that the Commander-in-
Chief and his senior advisers all considered that the primary mission
of the Pacific Fleet was training, and that that training would continue
until such time as immediate hostilities were indicated ?
A. That is correct. And with the tremendous shift in personnel
that was constantly taking place, it was absolutely essential that
training be kept up to the last moment.
170 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
71. Q. Did you feel at that time that all necessary steps had been
taken to effectuate a rapid change from the training mission to the
war mission when hostilities became imminent ?
A. Yes, I considered that the Fleet was capable of proceeding on its
war mission immediately.
72. Q. Referring back to the dispatches that you examined earlier,
in the dispatch of 27 November, the statement was made to the
effect that aggressive movements by Japan could be expected within
the next few days. Did you feel that that statement on 27 Novemebr
should have caused a change in the mission of the Fleet ?
A. I did not consider that any change was necessary. This dispatch
is addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet; Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for action. It was common knowledge that
was expected to make an aggressive move into Thailand, and there is
nothing in this message that indicates specifically any apprehension
on the part of the Department that the aggressive move is to be
made against the United States. The extent to which an aggressive
move against Thailand or against British or Dutch possessions in the
Far East might influence the United States is not mentioned.
73. Q. Admiral, how often were the employment schedules for the
Pacific Fleet drawn up and published ?
A. I couldn't say definitely, but my estimate would be about once a
month.
74. Q. What classification was given to those published documents ?
A. Confidential, I should say, although I can't swear to it.
75. Q. In general, how wide a distribution did the employment
schedules receive ?
A. Through Commanding Officers, I should say, but, naturally,
when each Commanding Officer knew the schedule, or each Task Force
Commander knew the time he was going to be at sea, he had to make
out an employment schedule still more in detail for the various ships,
often including various types of target practice and tactical exercises.
Those that included target practice, naturally information had to be
given to the Gunnery Officers and the gunnery personnel of the ship.
So it became well known. Such schedule generally provided for
routine periods at sea for each of the three specific task forces.
[162] 76. Q. During the months leading up to Pearl Harbor,
and in view of the tense international situation and the general feeling
that war with Japan would come soner or later, did you have any ap-
prehension as to the wisdom of publishing such schedules, from a
security point of view ?
A. No, I can't say that I did. The schedules had to be worked in
such a way that some of the ships were at sea all the time, and in order
to carry out the exercise of the Fleet, the people that handled the target
practice material, the drones, and so forth, had to know well in ad-
vance that certain exercises would be carried out. I don't feel it
would have made any particular difference, if an air attack was to
have been made on Pearl Harbor, what particular task force was in.
The case as it occurred was probably the most advantageous to the
United States, because had carriers been in Pearl Harbor under the
conditions of the attack, they probably would have been sunk, and that
the loss of obsolescent battleships was less serious than would have
been the loss of carriers.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 171
77. Q. Admiral, as a matter of fact, how closely did the ships present
in Pearl Harbor on December 7 correspond to the published employ-
ment schedule ?
A. So far as I recall, Task Force 1 was scheduled to be in port at
the time of the attack. Task Force 3, I believe, intended to be at
sea. Because of some additional duty that had been given to Vice
Admiral Brown, he proceeded with a part of his task force, I don*t
remember exactly, but not including the battleships, to Palmyra or
Johnston, one of those, and as I recall it the three battleships of the
First Division, which were normally in his task force, returned to
port several days in advance of the normal schedule of that task force.
The witness was duly warned.
The examining officer then, at li : 50 a. m., took a recess until 1 : 45
p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.
Present : The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and
the reporter.
Eear Admiral William Satterlee Pye, U. S. Navy, the witness under
examination when the recess was taken, entered. He was warned
that the oath previously taken was still binding, and continued his
testimony.
(Examination by the examining officer continued :)
78. Q. Admiral, upon whom did the responsibility for the defense
of Pearl Harbor against attack rest?
A. Primarily upon the Army. Naturally, the vessels and naval
units in the Harbor were required to take such action as they could
on their own behalf.
79. Q. Are you able to cite any plan or other commitment by the
Army assuming responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor ?
A. I never saw any plan gotten up by the Army, but by The Joint
Action of the Army and Navy. The Army is charged with such
responsibility.
80. Q. During the year 1941, what information did you have as to
the ability of the Army to fulfill its commitments for the defense of
Pearl Harbor and how did you evaluate this information ?
[16S] A. It was definite knowledge that the air force available
to the Army and the anti-aircraft installations were below those which
were considered necessary for proper defense.
81. Q. Was the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, fully aware of
this situation ?
A. Yes, to the best of my knowledge and belief, and I am quite
confident that he had expressed this idea to the Chief of Naval Op-
erations and also to the Army officer in command.
82. Q. Can you outline, in very general terms, what precautions
the Army had taken against a surpise air attack?
A. The only direct information that I have came to me after the
attack on Pearl Harbor, which was to the effect that in their interpre-
ation of the order received, their primary active had been taken to
prevent sabotage.
83. Q. Are you familiar with the Army's anti-aircraft warning net?
A. Yes, of the fact they had many lookout stations in the Island,
for visual observation of approaching planes. I was not familiar with
the state of radar development. Radar at that time was considered
a very secret instrument and while the Navy had made use of it to
quite a moderate degree, it was my general understanding that the
172 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Army was behind in this development. I had knowledge that the
Army was intending to install radar equipment in the Island, but,
to the best of my knowledge and belief, I had no information that
even one such instrument had been established.
84. Q. As contrasted with the available means for detecting the
approach of hostile aircraft, what defenses did the Army have against
such an attack, once the attack had arrived ?
A. They had fighting planes and mobile anti-aircraft batteries. So
far as I am aware, these mobile anti-aircraft batteries had been de-
ployed for use by December 7.
85. Q. At that time, what was your appraisal of the state of readi-
ness of the Army's fighter planes, and do you recall that this was dis-
cussed by the Commander-in-Chief and other senior officers present
there ; what appraisal they made of the ability of the Army Fighter
Command ?
A. I don't recall any special discussion of that fact, other than the
general position that the Army's installations were not what we'd like
to have them. It was not known to me that at any time previous to
December 7 the Army had taken any action which reduced the effec-
tiveness of their aircraft defense.
86. Q. Admiral, I hand you the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense
Plan for the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier and Fourteenth Naval Dis-
trict, which is Exhibit 5 before this examination. Were you familiar
with this plan at all prior to December 7, 1941 ?
A. Yes, I had read that plan.
87. Q. By the terms of this plan, upon whom was the responsibility
for carrying out distance reconnaissance off Hawaii ?
A. It would be, apparently, the Navy, under the direction of the
Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.
[164] 88. Q. Did you know whether or not such reconnaissance
flights were being carried out by naval aircraft during the period
from October through December '41 ?
A. I knew that such patrols were being carried out in certain in-
stances, and that they were covering areas in which the operating
forces of the Fleet were usually engaged in target practice. The im-
mediate extent of the aircraft search, I did not know. The plan for
that was not part of my immediate responsibility and I assumed they
were doing the best they could with what they had.
89. Q. Sir, do you know whether any additional reconnaissance
flights were ordered after the warning dispatch of 27 November ?
A. I have no positive knowledge.
90. Q. As you would interpret the terms of this plan, upon whom
was the responsibility to order such reconnaissance flights when the
situation indicated that they would be necessary?
A. I think that under the plan, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Pacific Fleet would be responsible for designating a policy.
91. Q. Referring back to your earlier answer that the Commander-
in-Chief and his advisers were aware of the inability of the Army to
fully carry out its mission of the defense of Pearl Harbor against
attacks of all kind, including air attack, what steps were taken by the
Commander-in-Chief to augment the defenses of Pearl Harbor against
such an attack ?
A. Additional destroyer and small craft patrols in the areas off
the entrance. So far as the air is concerned, I don't know what, if
any, additional patrols were actually put in operation.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 173
92. Q. Sir, I hand you Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter, 2CL-41
(Revised), which is exhibit 4 before this examination. Were you fa-
miliar with the terms of that at the time of its issue ?
A. I was.
93. Q. Admiral, in paragraph "G" of this 2CL letter, under the
duties of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, is listed
"advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor, exclusive of
the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, what condition of readi-
ness to maintain." It does not seem to be stated definitely who should
order the condition of readiness, but is the interpretation of that that
the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor should actually issue
the order prescribing the condition of readiness ?
A. My interpretation was that the Commander of the Fourteenth
Naval District would inform the Senior Officer Present Afloat as to
the condition warranted by the existing circumstances, and the Sen-
ior Officer Embarked would order the Fleet to assume such condi-
tion.
94. Q. From 28 November to 7 December, were you the Senior
Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor?
A. I was.
95. Q. Did you prescribe any condition of readiness for the ships
in the Harbor pursuant to this ?
A. Condition 3 had been prescribed as the standard condition and
was in effect on December 7. It had been prescribed previous to our
last entry but it was understood that Condition 3 would be the condi-
tion unless other notice was given.
[16'S] 96. Q. During the same period, did you receive any advice
from the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as to maintaining
any other condition or any directive from the Commander-in-Chief
as to maintaining a higher condition ?
A. No, sir.
97. Q. Admiral, in the same paragraph, your attention is invited to
a provision that "the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, shall
arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced".
Were any Army guns actually emplaced at Pearl Harbor on Decem-
ber 7?
A. I believe that there were certain anti-aircraft, fixed defenses, not
in the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor. I believe this order is in-
terpreted to relate to the mobile guns. So far as I know, they had not
been distributed with any intention of defense of the Naval Base
previous to December 7.
98. Q. At what distance were these Army guns from the Base, the
nearest of the Army guns ?
A. I think there was one battery of guns at or near Kamehameha,
which was near the entrance to Pearl Harbor. Others were not lo-
cated within five miles of Pearl Harbor, but I think within two miles
of the City of Honolulu. They were closer to the Port of Honolulu
than they were to Pearl Harbor.
99. Q. Up until the time of the attack, did any naval officer have
any authority over the use of those guns ?
A. None that I know of.
100. Q. Sir, did the Navy have any anti-aircraft batteries on shore
at Pearl Harbor on 7 December ?
A. So far as I recall there were none until after the attack.
174 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
101. Q. Admiral, under subparagraph 5, of paragraph "G", of 2CL,
the Senior Officer Present in each Sector, described in the preceding
paragraph, is responsible for the fire in his own sector. Was that in-
terpreted to mean that the Senior Officer Embarked could direct the
Sector Commanders or was each one of them an entirely free agent ?
A. The interpretation was that he was a free agent, because the time
element would not permit the senior man to act. However, that
paragraph was discussed many times with the Commander-in-Chief
before December 7, pointing out to him with the possible distribution
of any attacking planes, it would be impossible for anybody to direct
fire. It actually was true on the morning of December 7, that the
planes came from so many directions that it was impossible to control
the fire of the ships in any one sector.
102. Q. Then, as I understand you, as a practical matter, each ship's
batteries were their own directors?
A. As a practical matter, that's what it amounted to. Each ship
knew the general direction that they were to guard and that they had
a primary responsibility for that direction of approach, but I think
when they found something they could shoot at in some other direc-
tion that they shot there too.
103. Q. Admiral, there's another subparagraph in this same para-
graph "G" that I'll ask you to give your interpretation of. That is
subsection "a" of subparagraph "9", which states that "the Senior
Officer Embarked at Pearl Harbor shall execute the emergency sortie
order" which will accomplish certain [^66] results listed there-
after. "This order must be prepared and issued in advance." Does
that mean that a plan for sortie was drawn up in advance and given to
the Commanding Officers so that all that would be necessary, in the
event of an emergency, would be an order for execution?
A. By the time that had been in effect for — this was in revision ; the
original was much earlier than this — there was a definite order of the
sorties, the order of ships being the destroyers, cruisers, and battleships,
and all that was necessary to give in this case was the order to execute
an emergency sortie.
104. Q. In other words, the plan was in the hands of the various
commanding officers ?
A. The plan for sortie was in the hands of the commanding officers.
105. Q. Admiral, on the morning of December 7, when and by whom
was the order for execution issued ?
A. I was on shore at the time the attack occurred and returned to
the CALIFORNIA at approximately twenty minutes of nine, about
forty minutes after the original attack. Upon my arrival on board,
my Chief of Staff informed me that this provision had been carried
out and that the order for emergency sortie had been given by him.
That was when the attack had first been made. By the time I arrived,
about forty minutes after the first shots, some of the destroyers were
underway; one or two cruisers were underway then or immediately
afterwards ; none of the battleships were in condition to proceed to sea
with the exception of the NEVADA which started out in accordance
with the order. About the time she passed the Flagship, executing
this maneuver, we came to the conclusion that one ship outside would
be no better off than inside and would probably be in more danger of
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 175
submarines, and as she passed us, we directed her to anchor. She had
not gone more than a quarter of a mile beyond that when she was
bombed and was unable to maneuver to an anchorage and was actually
beached in the channel. About this time, we received an order from the
Commander-in-Chief that no other ships would sortie. That order was
passed around by visual, I believe, but I think it had little effect, be-
cause all of the ships that could move by that time were out. That's
with regard to the sortie. Most of the destroyers did get out. There
were several of the cruisers, among them the DETROIT, the Flagship
of destroyers, got out. There were no carriers present ; no heavy ships
could go out. That was the condition after the attack. Several light
cruisers had been damaged. No heavy cruisers were in port except
alongside the dock under overhaul.
106. Q. Under Condition 3, what was the approximate number of
anti-aircraft gims which were being manned by each of the battle-
ships in Pearl Harbor?
A. The battleships, as they were disposed there, were in two sectors.
That required four gims in either sector. That required only eight
guns to be manned, in accordance with the order, but I'm quite certain
that there were more manned. I'm quite certain that there were at
least two on each battleship manned. I believe that order was given
by Commander of Battleships.
107. Q. About what percentage of the total anti-aircraft batteries
of battleships would that be ?
A. It varies somewhat. It would be about — most of them had eight ;
I think it probably would run about twenty-five per cent.
108. Q. Approximately what proportion of officers and men of the
ships of [167] your task force were on board their ships by
the time the Jap attack started ?
A. A check of that was made after the attack and, as I recall it, at
the time the attack started, there were about seventy per cent of the
officers on board and ninety-eight per cent of the enlisted personnel.
109. Q. Wliat was the condition of the ships as regards watertight
integrity, meaning the closure of watertight doors and hatches?
A. Everything was supposed to be closed except during working
hours. They were allowed to open whatever doors were necessary
during the daytime to carry out their work.
110. Q. This being Sunday morning, you would normally expect
practically everything to be closed then, was that the case?
A. That was not true on the CALIFORNIA, which happened to
be my Flagship, because they were working on Sunday morning in
the compartments. I can not say about the other ships, and I can only
say that through information received from the Commanding Officer.
111. Q. In such a situation as developed under that attack by the
Japanese, who, if anyone, would normally be expected to order fire
opened by the anti-aircraft guns ?
A. It was the general understanding in any attack that fire would
be opened without waiting for orders.
112. Q. So far as you know, were any orders given ?
A. Not to my knowledge, but I was not on board at the time.
113. Q. Do you know ot any orders, other than that for sortie,
which your Staff gave prior to your arrival ?
176 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. No.
114. Q. Admiral, did you feel, at the time, that the Commander-
in-Chiel's instructions adequately provided for the security of your
task force when it was in Pearl Harbor ?
A. The only thing that was questionable in my mind at all was
the part about the sector fire control. I never felt that ships could
be held to fire in one sector, nor did I think that if they had targets
in another sector they should be confined to the one sector. That had
been discussed with the Commander-in-Chief on several occasions.
In fact, I had written a modification of the order which was not in
effect but simply to eliminate the responsibility which I did not feel
could be carried out by any Sector Commander; that if an attack
should come and from different directions, that no one should be
held responsible for designating targets, that ships should fire wlien
they had the opportunity.
115. Q. Did you feel that the whole scheme of things there relating
to the defense of Pearl Harbor were as good as could be done, look-
ing at the overall picture ?
A. Yes, I think that as far as the Fleet was concerned, and, I can
not say for the Army because we were not informed — I was not in-
formed as to what the Army actually was doing.
116. Q. In connection with the command relationships, did you feel,
at that [i^S] time, the need for unity of command there?
A. I felt that for at least ten years before.
117. Q. Unity of command, as a general project, had, for long,
been a matter of discussion within the Navy, had it not ?
A. Yes.
118. Q. During those few weeks prior to 7 December, do you recall
any specific discussions which actually looked to following through
to an early improvement ?
A. I couldn't place the exact time, but for more than a year pre-
vious to that time, I had been advising several Commanders-in-Chief
that the coordination was not adequate and that they should get some
Army officer on their Staff so that it could be better arranged at least.
119. Q. You looked upon that as a minimum step ?
A. As a minimum step, due to the fact that it seemed impossible to
get anything higher than that.
120. Q. Admiral, did you take part in the conferences with respect
to the replacing of the Marines in the outlying islands with Army
troops ?
A. No. I was present during a part of one discussion between the
Commanding General and Commander-in-Chief with regard to who
should man several of the islands, but I was merely a listener and
took no part.
121. Q. Had you discussed the defense of the outlying islands with
the Commander-in-Chief ?
■A. No.
122. Q. Do you know whether the position of those islands, with
respect to defense, was a matter of grave concern to him?
A. I believe it was.
123. Q. But you didn't discuss it so as to be familiar with his views?
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 177
A. He didn't discuss it with me. He had his Marine and Army
people, but he didn't discuss it with me.
121. Q. Returning to your testimony concerning the Army's radar
installations, were you aware, in those days, of the great part which
radar had played in the defense of Britain against the German bomb-
ing attack?
A. In a general sense ; yes.
125. Q. Had you heard enough about it to bring home to you that
it was a most essential installation, essential to the security while
in Pearl Harbor ?
A. Yes.
126. Q. Had the radar installations of ships of your own personal
command arrived at a state of real efficiency by early December, '41?
A, The efficiency, compared to what it was a year later, might be
considered low, but this was due more to the types of radar than to
the personnel. The type on the PENNSYLVANIA was very satis-
factory; the CALIFORNIA had a different type which was less
satisfactory, but had been used with a very good success at maneuvers
and the location of planes. Within a short trip, after the beginning
of the war, while at sea, planes of the clipper type had been picked
up and tracked distances of eight-five miles with the radar on the
PENNSYLVANIA.
[169] 127. Q. Do you know of any reason why the Army's Sig-
nal Corps radar system should not have arrived at an equal state of
development and efficiency?
A. None at all. As I have previously stated, it was known that
the Army was trying to get radar out there and it was their intention
to install it, but I had never been informed that one set had arrived.
128. Q. Did it occur to you, at any time between your return to
Pearl Harbor, about 27 I^ovember, and the Japanese attack, that
it would be well for you to take your battleships to sea in view of what
you knew about the deficiencies in the defense abilities of the Army ?
A. No, because it was our confirmed opinion that our greatest
danger was from submarines, and that the Fleet at sea was certainly
in much more danger from submarines than it was in port. Also, in
view of the fact that we had no carriers to go with us, we would have
had no air cover at all, and had we run into an air attack at sea, we
would have been in presumably a worse position than we were in port
where the Army had some protection for us.
The examing officer did not desire to further examine this
witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged
to make any further statement covering anything relating to the
subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a
matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully
brought out by the previous questioning.
The witness made the following statement : I would like to state as
my definite opinion that Admiral Kimmel was a most efficient Com-
mander-in-Chief, that when he was nominated as the Commander-
in-Chief, although I did not expect to stay at sea at that time, I wrote
him a letter congratulating him on his selection, and I firmly believed
that he was as good as any other officer that could have been selected.
79716 — 46— Ex. 144 13
178 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
He had shown tremendous interest in the tactical development of the
Fleet while in the Command of Cruisers, and he and I had worked
continuously together for six months in trying to develop the tactics
of light forces. In this respect, his interest was superior to those of
any Commander-in-Chief I had served with. He was also tre-
mendously interested in the material and the logistic support of the
Fleet, and worked conscientiously in all respects to bring the Fleet to
its highest state of readiness in preparation for war.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 3 :43 p. m., adjourned until 2 p. m.,
Monday, March 20, 1944.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 179
urn PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HART INaUIRY
MONDAY, MARCH 20, 1944
Twelfth Day
Navy Department,
Washington^ D. G.
The examination met at 2 p. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Ketired, examining officer,
and his comisel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the eleventh day of the examination until such time
as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with
the examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. Navy, who had previously
testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his
oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that, in accordance
with the examiningofficer's directive at the conclusion of his answer
to 9. Q. (Record TPage 136), he desired to make further answer,
which, for the purpose of continuity, was inserted at the conclusion
of his answer to 9. Q. With this addition, he pronounced his testi-
mony correct, was duly warned and withdrew.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was in-
formed of the subject matter of the examination as follows : Captain
Glover, I constitute an examining board acting under a precept from
the Secretary of Navy to record testimony under oath concerning
the facts surrounding the surprise attack of the Japanese on Pearl
Harbor on 7 December 1941. The purpose of the recording is to
have preserved testimony of witnesses who might not be available
at some future time and will be needed for some purpose possibly
not known now. The precept contains the words "pertinent to the
facts", which constitute the gist of my instructions in that line. It
appears that I have to make my own decisions as to what is pertinent
and what is not, and in previous testimony facts come out whiqh
point the way to other facts, which, in the first instance, do not seem
particularly connected but probably are. I believe that you are in
position to testify concerning some of those points. I will be asking
you to give testimony on things which were known to you over two
years ago, and must ask you to testify from what you then knew, as
well as you can, unaffected by what you have learned since. Please
do your best in that respect. We will pause at any time for you to
refresh your memory by consulting documents or otherwise. I will
180 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
give you an opportunity to verify your testimony in rough and correct
it if necessary.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer:
1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station ?
A. Captain Robert O. Glover, U. S. Navy, attached to the Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, and also in the Office of the Assistant
Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics Plans.
\_171-172^ 2. Q. What duties were you performing during the
calendar year of 1941 ?
A. I reported to the Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, in January, 1941, and during 1941 was assigned various
planning duties while in the office. Up to about August, 1941, my
duties were in connection with all the color plans, with my principal
attention being given on the Pacific and Asiatic areas. In August,
1941, the planning problem was concentrated by what is known as
"WPL-46", or "Rainbow 5".
3. Q. Were you the specialist on Pacific plans in the War Plans
Division during those months ?
A. 'After August, I was given special cognizance of certain parts
of WPL-46. These parts are : Part 3, Chapter II, Sections 1 and 2 ;
Chapter III, Chapter V, Sections 2 and 3 ; Part 5, Appendix 2- Chap-
ters II and IV and V. These sections generally dealt with the Pacific,
Asiatic, and the Naval Transportation Service.
4. Q. On about what date did WPL-46 become effective?
A. About August, 1941. I think that's correct, Admiral. There
ought to be a letter when it became effective.
5. Q. Did the plan contemplate Japan as an enemy ?
Yes, sir. The plan divided possible enemies into two categories:
first consideration being given to Germany as an enemy; the plan
further considered Japan as an enemy.
6. Q. Was there anything in the plan, WPL^6, which indicated
that hostilities with Japan could eventuate otherwise than at Japan's
own initiative?
A. I don't recall the plan indicating by what means hostilities with
Japan might occur, except to state possibly following a period of
strained relations.
7. Q. Can you give the approximate date of the preparation of
the plan ?
A. The plan was completed in May. Preparation of the plan
covered several months prior to that date. It was a continuing
process.
8. Q. Was the plan based upon the forces which were then actually
stationed in the Pacific or did it look forward to changes in those
forces ?
A. The plan states that deployment of forces had practically all
been made. Redeployments of forces prior to May and up through
June and August had been made. The plan contemplated the dis-
patch of certain forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic.
9. Q. What was the approximate composition of the forces thus
detached, and about wlien was the actual detachment made?
A. As I remember, the forces set up in the plan to be detached was
one cruiser division. Other detachments had been made durins: 1941.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 181
prior to August. The approximate size of these forces were : one BB
division, one crudiv, and one desrons.
10. Q. Was there any other considerable detachment of forces
from the Pacific Fleet, detachments which were of a permanent nature
or of a temporary nature, which continued over a considerable period ?
A. The principal force involved were submarines, two divisions,
No. 202 and 203, which were directed to remain in the Asiatic rather
than being withdrawn to the Pacific Fleet.
[173] 11. Q. Was there a movement of forces to Australian
waters which endured over any considerable period ?
A. In July, 1941, a task force of cruisers was dispatched from
Pearl for the purpose of escorting to Australia a Dutch ship loaded
with aircraft and carrying, as passengers, Chinese air pilots. This
task force remained in Australia approximately four days, and then
returned to Pearl Harbor via Fiji.
12. Q. As regards reenforcements to the Pacific Fleet, did the War
Plans Division not have in mind any increases in that force during
the first few months after the plan became effective?
A. No.
13. Q. Then was it the case that you intended WPL-46 to be a
strictly "As-Is" plan, based entirely upon realism and what was
actually available in the way of forces ?
A. My concept, at that time, was that the plan made a deployment
of forces on a realistic basis to meet the situation that might develop.
14. Q. Did you consider that there was available to the Comman-
der-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, an adequate logistic support for what the
plan called for from forces under his command?
A. I believe that he had adequate logistic facilities for his initial
defensive task assigned by the plan.
15. Q. Did the plan not call for offensive measures on the part of
the Pacific Fleet?
A. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was given an offensive
task to prepare for the capture of positions in the Caroline area. He
was also given the task to support the forces of the associated Powers,
by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through
the denial or capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids
on enemy sea communications and positions. My concept of the plan
was that the initial attitude of the Pacific Fleet was defensive, and
that it did not have the means available to assume an outright offen-
sive, and it would not have the means available to assume an outright
offensive attitude for sometime.
16. Q. However, was not the diversionary movement, which you
have just mentioned, som.ething to be classed as a decidedly offensive
movement ?
A. I believe his action in that case, to my mind, had better be
described as by raids rather than by movement of total force.
17. Q. Did you consider that the logistic support provided the
Pacific Fleet was sufficient for such raids?
A. Yes, sir.
18. Q. In the course of your work, during the first half of 1941, did
it occur to you that our general method of producing, issuing, and
keeping up to date of basic war plans was in any way defective?
A, My initial impression, when I first joined the office in January,
was that the preparation of our war plans was a very laborious and
182 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
slow process. WPL-46 was based on Staff conversations between the
British, Canadians, and the United States. I, personally, did not
take part in those conversations and my only connection with the plan
was after it had been issued. I considered WPL-46 was prepared
reasonably expeditiously, and issued to interested officers expedi-
tiously. It represented a realistic appreciation of the situation exist-
ing at that time, and a calculated risk in the Pacific.
[174] 19- Q- You have just said, "at that time." Was it your
feeling that WPL-46 tended to be too much frozen or was the plan,
itself, and methods for employing it sufficiently elastic to meet situa-
tions as they would arise in the future ? •
A. I felt, at the time, that the plan was elastic. In fact, the plan
did meet the situation in the future. Lines of communication were
maintained to Australia, and the enemy denied the Pacific east of 180
degrees.
20. Q. Was any special provision included in the working methods
of the War Plans Division for keeping the plan in step with forces
available as changes therein would eventuate ?
A. Yes, sir. On 21 August 1941, a memorandum from the Head of
the Plans Section of the War Plans Division, was issued which states
the following pertinent to the question :
Plan Section, War Plans Division, is charged with (a) Preparation of changes
in the plan made necessary by changes in the assumptions or in the strategic
situation, or which may be required to keep the plan current with administrative
action; (b) The preparation of directives placing the whole or any part of the
plan in effect; and (c) The continuous evaluation of the strategic situation so
that advice may be given in regard to the composition and distribution of forces,
operations, and other matters in relation to the execution of the plan.
Note : The examining -officer identified the memorandum mentioned above as
being one dated August 21, 1941, classified Restricted, addressed to "Plans Sec-
tion, War Plans Division", Subjct : — "Cognizance of Navy Basic War Plan —
Rainbow No. 5", signed by Captain C. J. Moore, U. S. N. Said memorandum is
on file in the War Plans Section, Commander-in-Chief office, Navy Department.
21. Q. Do you recall any action effecting the content of the plan,
itself, in consequence of that directive from which you have just
quoted ?
A. As I recall, no change was made in the plan prior to December.
22. Q. Do you recall any consideration having been given in your
offices to our Government's action in freezing the Japanese credits in
this country sometime during the first half of 1941 ?
A. I can recall nothing definite in regard to freezing these credits
as it affected war plans.
23. Q. Was the situation, the international situation, upon which
any war plan is presumably based, reestimated in the light of Japan's
probable position in being denied strategic materials incident to the
freezing of credits.
A. I can only assume they were. I, personally, had no part in that
matter. My only assumption is that Japanese action must have been
considered during the aforementioned Staff conversations.
24. Q. Had such a reestimate been made, would you not have been
concerned in it?
A. I would probably have known, if such was going on.
25. Q. As you recall, who would have actually made the estimate
or the reestimate ?
A. Probably Admiral Turner, assisted by Captain C. J. Moore.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 183
[175] 26. Q. Was it well known to the War Plans Division that
the situation visavis Japan grew in intensity from, say, June, '41
onward ?
A. The intensity of the situation was common knowledge with the
officers of the War Plans Division. I discussed the matter personally
with Captain Wright, who was a special assistant to xVdmiral Turner.
27. Q. What was done toward a reestimate of the situation in the
Pacific in the light of that tense situation ?
A. No action, as far as I know, was taken to modify WPL-46.
28. Q. And no formal reestimate was made ?
A. To my knowledge ; no.
29. Q. Did the War Plans Division know that the Army took steps
in the summer of 1941 to build up its forces in Hawaii and the Philip-
pines ?
A. Yes, sir; particularly the Philippines.
30. Q. Did the Division participate in any of the discussions or
estimates which lead to that action by the Army ?
A. I don't know ; personally, 1 took no part in any such discussions.
If held, they must have been held by the director.
31. Q. Do you recall if, at that time, you thought that such build-up
was putting the Navy out of step with the Army or that it was a matter
of getting the Army up into step with the Navy in the Pacific area?
A. In the case of the Philippines, my thought, at that time, was
that our forces there, our Navy forces there, were only adequate for
a defensive action, and the build-up of the Army would only add to
their deficient strength. In the Hawaiian area, by view was that the
build-up of the Army forces brought them more in line with the
strength of the naval forces deployed.
32. Q. You have stated that a fundamental idea of the basic plan
was that our attitude in the Pacific was defensive. Did that idea
prevail in the War Plans Division right up to 7 December '41 ?
A. That was my personal view, and I believe it was the view held
generally by the officers of the War Plans Division.
33. Q. That being the case, did the question arise in your offices in,
say, October, '41, or thereafter, of the correctness of retaining the
Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters ?
A. I do not recall any study either being made or any conversations
pertinent to the question after August, 1941, when WPL-46 became
effective.
Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken
was still binding.
34. Q. Is it your recollection that during the latter half of 1941
the Fleet was being retained in Hawaiian waters primarily for the
defense of our positions in those waters, or, to be in a position of
readiness for making the offensive movements which the Plans called
for?
A. My concept was that the Fleet was there for both purposes —
first to assist in the protection of the United States east of the 180th
Meridian, and, secondly, to be in a position from which raiding op-
erations could be projected.
184 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[176] 35. Q. What thought or consideration, if any, was given
in your offices concerning the security of the Fleet in the Hawaiian
area against a surpise attack by the Japanese ?
A. Referring again to the order of August 21, 1941, signed by the
head of the Plans Section, War Plans Division, one paragraph of this
order designated Commander Ansel, in collaboration with Captain
Wright, to draft daily and submit to the Director (Admiral Turner)
a short strategic summary of the international military and political
situation. Commander Ansel, in preparing these summaries, had
made available to him dispatches of Military Intelligence Division,
Naval Intelligence Division, the State Department, and the press.
While a surprise attack by the Japanese was discussed, no definite
warning, as far as I know, was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet.
The examining officer directed the reporter to re-read the question.
A. (Continued.) I don't think we were worried about it.
36. Q. Will you please ascertain if those daily studies by Com-
mander Ansel are still on file in the Department, and, if so, enter data
in the record from which they could be identified ?
A. Yes, sir.
Note : From information later furnished by the witness, the examining officer
identified the memoranda under discussion as being those contained in a notebook
titled "Daily Information Summary — Op 12", now on file in the Combat In-
telligence Section (F-20) of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet,
Room 3704, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.
37. Q. Was that because of your low estimate of the probability
that the Japs would attack in that way, or because of your belief in
the security measures both by the Fleet and by the Army forces which
were charged with the security of Pearl Harbor ?
A. I don't believe it was generally felt by the officers in the Plans
Division that the Japanese would strike in the way they did. In my
own case, I did not feel so. I felt that there were adequate means
available to the Army and Navy.
38. Q. By the last part of your answer, do you mean, among other
things, that the Army forces on Oahu were fully adequate to the de-
fense of Pearl Harbor against an air raid ?
A. I felt we had adequate air forces there, adequate Army air forces
there, to repel a Japanese air attack ?
39. Q. During those days in which the situation with the Japanese
was becoming so very tense, do you recall any concern within your
offices over the possibility of severe damage by sabotage from the large
number of Japanese on Oahu ?
A. Yes, sir; I recall that matter being discussed. If my memory
serves me right, it appeared in the warning dispatch either by the
Army or the Navy, to the Commanders in the Hawaiian area.
40. Q. Do you remember if that caused any reconsideration of the
retention of the Fleet in Hawaiian waters ?
A. I have no knowledge of any discussions in regard to the question
asked.
41. Q. Will you give, insofar as you can remember, the views held
in your offices in, say, October, 1941, on the situation as regards the
outlying islands such as Wake and Midway?
A. I discussed Wake with, as I recall. Captain Moore, and it was
Moore's view and mine, that we should not attempt to fortify Wake.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 185
The question was up because of a letter from the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, stating L^'^'^l that it was his intention to do so.
I believe the decision was made to go along with the Commander-in-
Chief's recoimnendation. As regards Midway, the view in the offices
of the Plans Division was that we should attempt to maintain our
position there. This view, as I remember, was concurred in b}^ the
Commander-in-Chief.
42. Q. Then as you recall — our sending forces in to Wake — was at
the initiative of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?
A. Yes.
43. Q. Did the Pacific War Plan then current contain any provi-
sion for putting parts only of the plan into effect?
A. The plan provided "for execution, in part, by dispatch, indicat-
ing the nations to be considered enemy and the tasks to be executed,
or excepted, and the preliminary measures to be taken in preparation
for the execution of the entire plan, or additional tasks, thereof.
44. Q. In order to connect up the Board's record in general, will
you explain, briefly, the meaning of " 'M' Day", and the connection
of that term with the Pacific War Plan then current ?
A. "M" Day is commonly understood as the day of execution of a
war plan. In the case of WPL-46, "M" Day, unless otherwise desig-
nated, was to be the date of an Alnav dispatch worded as follows:
"Execute Navy basic war plan Rainbow No. 5." Upon receipt of this
Alnav, the Naval establishment was to proceed with the execution of
WPL-46, including acts of war. WPL-46 stated that all parts of
the plan might be executed at once, or in part by dispatch indicating
the enemy, tasks to be executed or excepted, and the preliminary
measures to be taken.
45. Q. In, say, late November, 1941, could an "M" Day have been
declared in such a way as to become effective only in the areas west
of the Pacific Coastal Frontier areas?
A. Yes, that could have been done.
46. Q. What would have been the effect of such a declaration ?
A. Naval forces based on Hawaii and on the Asiatic station could
have been ordered to place WPL-46 in effect. Of necessity, the
method used in declaring "M" Day west of the Pacific Coastal Frontier,
would have required that these forces be informed that war had not
been declared. The declaration would have had the effect of direct-
ing the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, Commandant, Six-
teenth Naval District, the Governor of Samoa, and the Governor of
Guam, to take certain mobilization deployments. The effect certainly
would have been to alert all naval commanders at sea west of the
Pacific Sea Frontier.
47. Q. Would you have thought, at that time, that sucli declara-
tion would have been more effective in putting our forces upon the
alert than the method actually used by the Department promised
to be?
A. Using the method under discussion of "M" Day did not occur to
me at that time. Possibly its use might have beeil more effective.
48. Q. Could a directive from the Department, placing portions of
the current Pacific War Plan into effect, have served as a more definite
means of putting our forces upon the alert?
186 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I believe that the plan did not lend itself very easily to be put
into effect as a means of warning only. The plan was based on war
activities and if used only as a means of warning, would, in my opin-
ion, have required quite a lengthy dispatch in explanation of what
was exactly intended.
[178] 49. Q. Is it true that the War Plan then current really
did not contemplate the advent of hostilities through surprise action
of any enemy, but rather was primarily based upon our starting a war
ourselves, through definitely offensive action, after a proper declara-
tion of war ?
A. It is my view that the plan contemplated the commencement of
hostilities after a declaration of war.
50. Q. I pass you a document which, before this Board, is known
as Exhibit No. 5. Were you familiar with it?
A. Yes, I have seen this document before, when it was first issued.
51. Q. And it had been approved by the Navy Department?
A. Yes, sir.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as re-
porter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still
binding.
52. Q. What agency would be required in putting that plan in effect
and how would he have to act ?
A. The plan provided to become effective on "M" Day, or that cer-
tain features of it might be placed into effect by the War, Navy De-
partment^ or the local Commander prior to "M" Day. The plan states
that "M" Day might precede a declaration of war.
53. Q. Was there any reason why the Department should not have
ordered that plan into effect on or about 27 November ?
A. No, sir, I see no reason why that plan could not have been made
effective, if desired.
54. Q. At the time, would you have thought that action to be a very
effective means of placing the forces in Hawaii on the alert?
A. Using that method didn't occur to me at that time. Admiral.
55. Q. Do you recall any discussion, or other happenings in your
offices, during 1941, concerning putting into effect the unity of com-
mand project for Hawaii ?
A. The matter was discussed but never came anywhere near fol-
lowing through to any action.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged
to make any further statement covering anything relating to the sub-
ject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter
of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought
out by the previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 4 : 05 p. m., adjourned until 9 : 30 a. m.,
tomorrow.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 187
[179] PKOCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY
TUESDAY, MABCH 21, 1944
Thirteenth Day
Navy Department,
Washington^ D. 0.
The examination met at 9 :50 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer,
and his counsel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the twelfth day of the examination until such time
as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the
examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected wdth the examination were
present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface
to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.
A. Commander Paul C. Crosley, U. S. Navy, Executive Officer,
Postal Affairs, Division Naval Communications.
2. Q. Where were you serving on the 7th of December, 1941 ?
A. On the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as Flag
Secretary.
3. Q. Do you have in your possession the Pacific Fleet Employment
Schedule covering the second quarter of the fiscal year 1942 'I
A. I do. I have the copy issued by the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, dated August 13, 1941, in which the sechedule is outlined
and was duly authenticated and distributed to Force and Type Com-
manders, Pacific Fleet, OpNav, CinCLant, Commander-in-Chief
Asiatic JFleet, Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District; ten copies
each to action addresses, and three copies each to the Type Com-
manders
The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note : Because of the confidential nature of the document, it was returned at
the conclusion of the proceedings to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of
Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the
document introdnced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 25",
4. Q. Is this copy, this document, complete?
A. No. When drawn from the files, it was observed that enclosure
(A) thereto was missing.
[ISO] 5. Q. What is the nature of enclosure ( A) ?
188 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Enclosure (A) is a photostatic copy of a diagrammatic layout
of the schedule as written in the letter.
6. Q. Do you have an employment schedule for any other quarter
which has attached to it such a photostatic copy ?
A. Yes ; I also drew from the files of the Chief of Naval Operations
proposed employment schedule for the ensuing quarter, schedule
dated 10 NovemW 1941, which has an enclosure similar in form to
that one originally contained in the schedule dated August 13,
Exhibit 25.
"The document was introduced in evidence by the examining officer.
Note: Because of the confidential nature of the document, it was returned at
the conclusion of the proceedings to the Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief of
Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the
document introduced in evidence is appended marked "Exhibit 26".
7. Q. Do you have any knowledge as to the present location of the
missing enclosure to Exhibit 25 ?
A. No, I do not, and when inquiry was made as to its location, the
Secret File Room stated that they did not know what disposition had
been made of it.
8. Q. Do you have any knowledge as to when it was found to be
missing from the letter ?
A. No, sir, I do not, except that the file room informed my officer
messenger that previous requests had been made for copies of this cor-
respondence.
9. Q. In addition to the copies of this letter required for the distri-
bution you have outlined, to the best of your recollection, how many
other copies were made at the time ?
A. To the best of my knowledge, there were no spare copies made
except for the files of the Commander-in-Chief, which we usually did
with all correspondence in case an additional copy was required by
some visiting Flag Officer; in other words, someone would come in
to see the Admiral and he'd want to give them one of the copies. We
always kept a record of it if that was done. The only way we could
determine whether any additional copies of this were issued, would
be to check the receipt record in Honolulu and Pearl Harbor.
10. Q. Were copies distributed among the members of the Com-
mander-in-Chief's Staff ?
A. They were.
11. Q. To what members, as you recall ?
A. The Operations Officer, the War Plans Section, and that was
all ; the other was a copy that was routed around. Oh, one other ; the
Admiral kept one in his book.
12. Q. Was any method of accounting prescribed for the copies
that were distributed ?
A. None other than the usual receipt cards system where the
addressee would send back a card acknowledging receipt of a letter
or the usual registered receipt handled through the guard mail system.
[181] 13. Q. Did the Task Force Commander supplement
this employment schedule with schedules of their own ?
A. They did. Each Task Force Commander printed this schedule
and gave it a distribution in accordance with the Pacific Fleet mail
distribution list.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 189
14. Q. Do you have in your possession copies of the employment
schedules for the three task forces covering the second quarter for the
fiscal year of 1942 ?
A. I do. I have Task Force One, Two, and Three schedules.
The documents were introduced in evidence by the examining
officer.
Note : Because of the confidential nature of the documents, they were returned
at the conclusion of the proceedings to tlie Secret-Confidential Files of the Chief
of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. A description of the
documents introduced in evidence are appended marked "Exhibit 27", "Exhibit
28", and "Exhibit 29" respectively.
15. Q. It is noted that the three Task Force Schedules, Exhibits 27,
28, and 29, are all in printed form. Where would the printing of these
schedules take place ?
A. Usually it can be determined by the printer's symbols on the
schedule. Normally, it is done by the Flagship of the Task Force Com-
mander, or, if he is at sea, he will leave the printing work to be accom-
plished ashore by whatever print shop is designated by the Force
Commander of the Commander-in-Chief, depending upon what print-
ing facilities are available. Some of the printing in Pearl Harbor was
done by the Submarine Base, some by the Commander Service Force,
most of it by the Commander Service Force's Flagship. But for rush
work, the Flagship of the particular Command involved was usually
used. Task Force One Schedule does not indicate what ship it was
printed on, but the CALIFOKNIA, at that time, was doing most of
their work and it is safe to assume that the CALIFORNIA printed
that schedule. Task Force Two likewise does not show the printing
shop, but the ENTEEPRISE had printing equipment and as the
Flagship of Commander, Task Force Two; it is safe to assume that
the ENTERPRISE did the work. Task Force Three, with the
LOUISVILLE as Flagship, does not indicate the print shop but it is
also safe to assume that ship did the printing. I mi,ght add, that these
printing jobs were normally supervised by an Ensign, commissioned
officer, attached to the Staff or to the ship's complement, and the prac-
tice was for that officer to watch and maintain custody of the schedules
to and from the print shop to the point of distribution.
16. Q. It is noted that the schedules are assigned no registered num-
bers. Wliat system was in use for accounting for copies distributed ?
A. No system of accounting was maintained as it was treated the
same as confidential correspondence.
17. Q. Have you information as to the number of copies that were
actually struck off in the print shops of these schedules ?
A. The printer did not include that information on the three Task
Force Schedules, but a close estimate can be made from the distribu-
tion list.
[182] 18. Q. That list does not show the spare copies printed,
does it ?
A. No, sir. I might add, the consensus of opinion seems to be that
it was necessary to give these schedules as wide a distribution as pos-
sible because of the various activities concerned in the operations out-
lined therein, such as supplies, gunnery schedules, and other impor-
tant operations requiring close coordination between the various Type
Commanders. This was particularly emphasized in the shift-over
190 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to the task forces, when ships of different types were operating in the
various task forces.
19. Q. Will you please state the distribution made of one of the
employment schedules, say Exliibit 27, Task Force One, to whom
copies were distributed, and how many copies to each ?
A. The distribution list for the Task Force One Employment Sched-
ule included as special distribution: the Chief of Naval Operations
(50 copies), the Navy Department bureaus (3 to 20 copies), the Fleet
Personnel Officer (2 copies), the Commandants of the 11th, 12th, 13th,
14th, and 15th Naval Districts (2 or 3 copies), the West Coast Re-
ceiving Ships, Ammunition Depots and Supply Depot (1 copy each),
the West Coast and Pearl Harbor Navy Yards (3 or 4 copies). Battle
Force Mail Clerk (2 copies). Commanding General, Hawaiian De-
partment (1 copy). Commanders in Chief of the Asiatic and Atlantic
Fleets (8 copies each) ; plus the regular distribution to the Task Force
including Type, Squadron, division and commanding officers ships.
Marine and aircraft units (1 to 5 copies each). Total distribution^
729 copies. I have estimated that it would take approximately 600
copies of each of the Employment Schedules of the other two task
forces to complete the distribution prescribed for those schedules.
Thus, a total of approximately 1,929 copies of the three task force
employment schedules were required to complete all designated dis-
tributions.
20. Q. With reference to the Commander-in-Chief's employment
schedule. Exhibit 25, does that show the movements of ships in and
out of Pearl Harbor and the dates which it was planned that they
would be present therein ?
A. It infers the same information by stating when the operating
period commences and ends, as well as the upkeep period. It also
includes tactical periods. These schedules could not be religiously
followed because of diversions and other incidental changes that
occurred from time to time, but they were very closely followed.
21. Q. Then one in possession of that schedule could calculate, in
advance, the ships that were likely to be in Pearl Harbor on any given
date?
A. That is correct. To the best of my memory, the WEST VIR-
GINIA was an exception. As I recall, the WEST VIRGINIA was
scheduled for overhaul period on the West Coast and I was present
in the Admiral's cabin at the time the desirability of retaining her at
Pearl Harbor was discussed, and, at that particular time, he had lost
the service, temporarily, of two of his battleships and considered it
desirable to retain the WEST VIRGINIA and defer her overhaul
period until the balance of battleship power was back to normal. I
believe, otherwise, the WEST VIRGINIA would have been on the
West Coast on that date (7 December 1941) .
22. Ql Similarly, from the employment schedules of the Task
Force Commanders, could one determine in advance what ships would
normally be present in Pearl Harbor on a given day ?
A. Yes, because the Task Force Commanders' schedules were much
more in [ISS] detail, whereas the Commander-in-Chief's
schedule was a general schedule. I might add that it is my positive
conviction that if any leakage of schedule information occurred, it
could be obtained much more easily from the Task Force Command
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 191
schedule, and subsequent correspondence, than from the Commander-
in-Chief's schedule, because everyone recognized that the latter was
always subject to detailed changes after its issue. Also, the mimeo-
graphing and printing of the Commander-in-Chief's schedule was
under very close supervision in a very small office; any spare copies
misdirected could easily be detected.
23. Q. Do you recollect anything which indicates any particular
attention to be given to the security of the information contained in
the Task Force Commanders' employment schedules ?
A. No, sir, I do not.
24. Q. Inasmuch as a great number of copies of the Task Force
Commanders' schedules were actually printed and issued, did it oc-
cur to you, during that time, that security of the Fleet in Hawaiian
waters was beingJLhereby endangered ?
A. No, sir. Eiverybody had been thoroughly indoctrinated and
instructed not to discuss the proposed ship movements, repeated let-
ters had been issued on the subject, and warnings by the Commander-
in-Chief. The actual movements of the ships could easily be observed
from any vantage point in Pearl Harbor or from merchants in town,
but I do not ever recall having heard anyone discussing prospective
movements.
25. Q. Did you ever hear anyone discuss the possibility of a spy
obtaining one or more copies of the Schedules containing this infor-
mation, which would be vital because it indicated movements of units
of the Fleet so far in advance ?
A. No, sir. It would have been quite easy for anyone to obtain the
information, if they had so desired, by copying it from the schedules
in the various offices of the addressees, although I believe it would have
been difficult for an agent to have obtained a copy without its disap-
pearance being noted, because the schedules were frequently referred
to by the persons concerned with carrying them out.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged
to make any further statement covering anything relating to the sub-
ject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter
of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought
out by the previous questioning.
The witness made the following statement : I have no written docu-
ments to back up my statement, but I was frequently present when
Admiral Kimmel would receive or send correspondence to the Navy
Department, both official and unofficial, personal or otherwise, and I
repeatedly heard him complain that he could not get what he was
asking for, materiel and personnel that he considered essential to put
the Fleet in the proper fighting condition, and I know that this wor-
ried him considerably and that he never ceased trying. In some cases,
he was successful, but in those cases, it appeared to be purely action
which he initiated himself rather than outside assistance. As an
example, the security measures that he placed into effect in Pearl
Harbor, as well as the training of the crews in gunnery and tactical
drilling. I recall a particular message, (although I did not have cus-
tody of it) , I recall C-?^-^] a particular message which arrived
shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor and I distinctly recall that
192 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the impression of all those who read the message was similar to other
messages of that nature that had been received, and it did not strike
anyone as being any more critical, although I never heard individual
opinions expressed on the subject by the Admiral. I believe this
message to which I refer is the one about which there was considerable
publicity after the attack. I recall, one day, I can not tell accurately
whether it was before the receipt of this message or after, but the
Admiral walked to the chart in his office and said something like, "I
wonder what those rascals are up to now". I believe it was at the time
when the Japanese were reported en route to the East Indies area.
The impression that I'm trying to create is that everyone that I had
contact with on the Staff, as well as visitors to the Headquarters, felt
that the situation bore watching, but that with the representations
being made in Washington, at that time, that there had been no critical
change other than would normally be expected, and that no definite
word indicated that we could believe otherwise.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 10 : 50 a. m., took a recess until 2 p. m.,
at which time the examination was reconvened.
Present : The examining officer and his counsel and assistant coun-
sel.
Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken
was still binding.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, U. S. Navy, who had previously testi-
fied, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath
previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over
the testimony given by him on the third and fourth days of the exami-
nation, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.
Commander Benjamin Katz, U. S. Navy, who had previously testi-
fied, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath
previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over
the testimony given by him on the second and fourth days of the
examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.
Rear Admiral L. D. McCormick, U. S. Navy, who had previously
testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his
oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read
over the tetimony given by him on the fourth day of the examination,
pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to
the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
[185] Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. Sir, will you state your name, rank, and present duty station ?
A. Willard A. Kitts, III, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Assistant Chief
of the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department.
2. Q. What duties were you performing on 7 December 1941?
A. I was Fleet Gunnery Officer of the IT. S. Fleet — U. S. Pacific
Fleet.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 193
3. Q. And how long had you been on Admiral Kimmel's Staff in
that capacity?
A. Since the first day of February, 1941.
4. Q. Admiral, would you make a statement as to your relations with
Admiral Kimmel, with these points in mind: The frequency with
which he consulted you, and whether or not those were individual con-
sultations or general Staff meetings ?
A. My relations with Admiral Kimmel were quite close and inti-
mate, both personally and officially. I had served with Admiral Kim-
mel intermittently since 1918. I had served part of every sea cruise
with Admiral Kimmel except one, when he served in the Orient and
I served in the Pacific Fleet on the West Coast. My official relations
and contacts with Admiral Kimmel were frequent, but in general not
in Staff meetings and consultations. I was, as Fleet Gunnery Officer,
part of the Operations Division of the Staff, and Staff consultations
were generally attended by the Chief of Staff, the Operations Officer,
the War Plans Officer, and Intelligence Officer. However, Captain,
now Admiral, DeLany, who was Operations Officer, passed on all infor-
mation in which members of the Operations Division of the Staff had
interest. Aside from that, I had very close and frequent contact with
the Admiral several times a week, and usually alone, in that my pri-
mary duties, as he had laid down for me when I first joined the Staff,
were the gunnery training of the Fleet — more than the gunnery train-
ing, the general Training of the Fleet; a matter in which he was
greatly interested and which he continually checked up with me about.
5. Q. Admiral, did you feel that the attention of the Commander-in-
Chief was primarily occupied with the training mission of the Fleet, to
a point where war readiness was somewhat relegated to the back-
ground ?
A. Well, you must understand that I was the Training Officer and
the Gunnery Officer of the Fleet ; therefore matters that he discussed
with me dealt with those problems. I know they held a very high place
in his mind and he was greatly concerned about furthering the training
of the Fleet and took many, what at the time appeared to be, radical
steps, in bringing that about. As to his interest in training occupying
him to the extent that the war readiness of the Fleet was neglected,
that doesn't follow. I do not think that he was unduly occupied with
training matters to the extent that he lost sight of the other aspects of
readiness and security.
6. Q. Sir, prior to December 7th, were you shown, or were you
familiar with the contents of various dispatches coming from the
Navy Department containing warnings of the possibility of hostilities ?
A. I was not shown any warning dispatch. It is my understanding
that those were revealed and discussed at Staff conferences which, in
general, I did not attend. However, the purport of all those that
had anything to do with my particular work on the Staff was passed
to me and I did know of the general tenor of some of the warnings.
I can not state as to how many of those were [iS6] passed on
to me by Admiral DeLany.
7. Q. Admiral, prior to December 7, 1941, what was your own per-
sonal estimate as to the probability of an air attack on Oahu ?
A. My own personal opinion was that an attack on Oahu was defi-
nitely possible. I think my opinion was reflected in a Fleet Circular
79716 — 46— Ex. 144 14
194 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Letter which I helped compile, that is, 2CL-41, which by my recollec-
tion was revised a couple of times. I think it was first written in Feb-
ruary or March, 1941. As a matter of fact, seven or eight months
after the attack on Pearl Harbor its major part was still in effect in
the Fleet, One of the chief considerations of that letter was that the
Fleet could be attacked and if it were attacked, it would be by sub-
marine attack, an air attack, or a combination of the two. It was
widely discussed between Captain, now Admiral, DeLaney, and my-
self, that the presence of either submarines or aircraft would lead us to
look for the other. I haven't access to that letter, but I believe that
thought was written into one of the drafts. I did not think the at-
tack — an air attack on Pearl Harbor was probable, but it was con-
sidered as a very serious possibility.
8. Q. Admiral, I hand you a letter from the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, to the Pacific Fleet, dated October 14, 1941, styled "2CL-
41 (Revised)", which is Exhibit 4 before this examination. Is this
the letter to which you referred in your last answer ?
A. This letter is a revision of the letter to which I referred. I think
this letter follows very closely the previous and original draft. I
probably had nothing to do with the draft of the revision because at
the time it was issued I was on temporary duty in Washington.
9. Q. Would 3'ou give the approximate date of that temporary
duty in Washington, the time you were absent from Pearl Harbor?
i^. I left Pearl Harbor on 6 October, 1941, and returned on 8 Novem-
ber, 1941.
10. Q. Referring back two questions to your answer that you did
not consider a surprise air attack a probability but a strong possibility,
would you say that that represented the consensus of opinion of other
members of Admiral Kimmel's Staff?
A. Yes, sir. This letter, which I consider one of the most important
letters which was issued to the Fleet, so states. '
11. Q. Sir, can you amplify a bit the reasoning behind this statement
that you have made, which is, as you say, contained in 2CL-41 ; can you
junplify on the reasons behind the basis for this statement?
A, Well, a large part of the world was at war. We were engaged
in quasi-war in the Atlantic — this is all my opinion, my reasoning —
we were engaged in a diplomatic controversy with Japan which finally
ended in conferences in Washington. I, personally, had been in the
Hawiian detachment and had arrived at Pearl Harbor in the Fall of
1939, and all the signs indicated to me, and I can't speak for other
members of the Staff, but I feel that they were of like mind, in the
discussions with them, that it would be very difficult for us to avoid
eventual war.
12. Q. Admiral, at that time, what was your evaluation of the in-
telligence reports available to you and other members of the Com-
mander-in-Chief's Staff as regards the relations between the United
States and Japan?
[187'] A. Well, my evaluation of the situation, my own evalu-
ation of the situation, was somewhat colored by a secret message which
I delivered by word of mouth from Chief of Naval Operations to the
Commander-in-Chief exactly one month before Pearl Harbor. I had
been absent from the Fleet for thirty days, and prior to that time I
had not, as a regular routine, attended the Staff conferences — I was in
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 195
what you might call the second echelon — I did, through conversations
with the Fleet Intelligence Officer, know the estimate was that the
Japanese were on the move in the Far East and it was a matter of
common knowledge in the press that we were trying to persuade Japan
to move no further, and that representatives of the Japanese had
gone on to Washington to discuss the matter. My estimate as to it,
I saw, was colored by the message I brought from Admiral Stark to
Admiral Kimmel which I did not interpret in any way to Admiral
Kimmel other than learning the message by rote. The only interpre-
tation I made of it was to myself. I told no one of this message except
Admiral Kimmel, himself. My own conclusion was that the proba-
bility was that the move would be in the Far East.
13. Q. Admiral, can you state the contents of that message from
Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel?
A. Yes. Admiral Stark outlined one or more courses of action
which the Japanese might follow, and the United States' probable
reaction thereto. A surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was in no wise
presaged by that message which I carried.
14. Q. Sir, upon your return from Washington to CinCPac Head-
quarters, what was your feeling at that time as to whether the De-
partment here in Washington was furnishing full information to the
Commander-in-Chief Pacific in regard to the Japanese situation?
A. Having carried that message, I could personally have no other
thought but that information, as it was available here in Washington,
was furnished, in that case, to the Commander-in-Chief.
15. Q. During the month or six weeks prior to December 7th, what
information was available to you and other members of Admiral
Kimmel's Staff, as regards the then location of the Japanese Fleet?
A. I can not speak as to what knowledge other members of the Staff
had. My recollection is that I had knowledge of a large concentra-
tion of Japanese naval forces near Camranh Bay. From the time I
returned from Washington until the attack on Pearl Harbor, I had
not seen any warning messages.
16. Q. Sir, in considering the possibility of a surprise air attack,
was any great emphasis placed upon the form that the attack might
take — whether by bombs or by torpedoes?
A. All methods of air attack were considered — by high bombers,
dive bombers, and by torpedo planes. The danger of a particular type
of attack, that is the torpedo plane attack, was minimized in my mind
by information contained in one or more letters from the Chief of
Naval Operations. I can not quote or recollect the exact phraseology
or the figures given. However, to me and in my recollection, the
purport of that information was that the success of a torpedo attack,
against ships in a harbor with a depth of less than ten fathoms was
improbable. In discussions with the War Plans Division of the Staff,
my recollection is that we wanted nets to counter such an attack, but
the information at the time as to the probability of the success of
such an [iSS] attack allowed us to put the nets, which were
not available and hard to get, on a lower priority than other war
materials which we needed. There was never a feeling in my own
mind that such an attack was impossible, or that nets being available,
we should not have them, but the nets definitely took a low priority.
196 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
I draw no conclusions for anyone else but myself — they took low pri-
ority in my mind. I have a recollection of more than one letter re-
ceived from the Chief of Naval Operations on the subject of torpedo
nets. And, serving in the Bureau of Ordnance, I have had made a
search of Bureau of Ordnance files for any letters written by the
Bureau of Ordnance dealing with torpedo nets and addressed to the
Commandant of the District, or the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific,
and have been unable to locate any. The only letter I have been able
to locate is a copy of one from the Chief of Naval Operations to the
various Commandants, with information copies to CinCPac.
17. Q. Admiral, I hand you a letter from Chief of Naval Opera-
tions to the Commandants of the various Naval Districts, with the
information copy for CinCPac, dated June 13, 1941, which is Exhibit
19 before this examination. Do you recall having seen that letter?
A. I think I did see this letter. I do not remember it exactly, but
I am led to believe I have seen it before because the figure of "10
Fathoms" which had been in my mind in the past two years, is in
this letter, and I imagine I got that date from this letter. I do not
recollect the letter in detail.
18. Q. Admiral, during the period in question, what information
was available to you as to the frequency with which the Japanese
had used torpedo plane attack ?
A. I do not believe I had any information at all as to what the
Japanese, up until the attack on Pearl Harbor, had been able to do
with torpedo planes and torpedoes as an aircraft weapon. As I look
back on it now, I know of no instance where they used the torpedo
plane in action. Although they were undoubtedly well drilled in its
use, I had no information on it.
19. Q. Sir, were any a'dditional security measures against torpedo
plane attack undertaken pursuant to the statements of the letter of
June 13 that you just examined?
A. I have no access to the files, but I have a definite impression that
the idea of torpedo nets was not abandoned but was given a low pri-
ority, a lower priority than other material which was required. I
do not recollect any conversations with the Commandant of the Dis-
trict, to whom these letters were addressed, with copies to CinCPac,
although quite possibly conversations were had with them. They were
frequent visitors at our Headquarters, and these matters were dis-
cussed from time to time. My recollection was that the nets were
not available, that the ships would have to be left free to maneuver,
and make quick exits from the Harbor if necessary, and that the non-
availability of the nets and desire not to have the Harbor cluttered
up had a bearing on our placing the nets at that time in a relatively
low priority.
20. Q. Admiral, who was responsible for the defense of the naval
base at Pearl Harbor against an attack of any kind ?
A. Well, not referring to this letter, 2CL--41, but to my memory of
the letter, which I think is important because I helped to write it —
the thought behind the letter — we had spent a great deal of time and
effort and ammunition in the training of the Fleet in anti-aircraft gun-
nery. The defense of [^89] Pearl Harbor, since it was a shore
base, was, in accordance with the terms of this letter, placed in the
hands of the District Commandant, and when one or more ships of the
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 197
Fleet were in Pearl Harbor, the guns of the Fleet were turned over to
the District Commandant in the person of the Harbor Control Officer,
as anti-aircraft weapons in the defense of the harbor. When I say
responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was placed in the hands
of the Commandant, I mean to the extent that alerts were passed on
to the ships by him, the conditions of readiness, and the red, yellow,
and green signals were all controlled by the Harbor Control Post. I
had a fairly intimate knowledge of the setup there in that the Harbor
Control Post was one of the CP's, or Command Posts, in the anti-air-
craft setup on the Island. The whole anti-aircraft defense of the
Island was headed up by an officer of the U. S. Army Air Forces, a
Brigadier General. It was placed in his hands because he was the
Fighter-Interceptor Commander for the Army, and aircraft attacks
were to be countered by fighters and gunners. The Army Anti-Air-
craft, the Coast Artillery Anti-Aircraf t Brigade, was under the tacti-
cal command of this Air Force General, and the Harbor Control Post
was a Command Post of the Anti-Aircraf t. My recollection is that in
the one or more revisions of this letter, we slightly changed the sectors
which would be covered by various ships in the Harbor, and I think
the second draft of this letter was improved by insuring that at least
one ship should be in any one sector. My recollection is that when we
first put this into effect, and we had drills from time to time, when few
ships were in the Harbor, one sector was left vacant. The guns of the
Fleet were under the control of the Harbor Control Post in Pearl Har-
bor and that Harbor Control Post, which was under the Commandant
of the Navy Yard, was a part of the anti-aircraft and interceptor-
fighter setup of the Island. The Harbor Control Post received its or-
ders and its directions from the Anti-Aircraft Gun Commander.
21. Q. What portions of the anti-aircraft defense were the direct
responsibility of the Army ?
A. All those not mounted aboard ship, with the exception of, I
believe, one battery of three-inch anti-aircraft artillery, mobile, that
the Marines had at the barracks in the Yard. That battery, as I recol-
lect, was part of the equipment of a Defense Battalion which was
forming to proceed to one of the outlying islands.
22. Q. Admiral, what Army guns were placed close enough to Pearl
Harbor to defend the ships there from dive or torpedo bombing?
A. It eventuated that at the time of the attack that there were not
any, except fixed batteries, three-inch guns, at Fort DeRussey, some
distance from Pearl Harbor, and I believe on Sand Island, the western
side of Honolulu Harbor. The Army's anti-aircraft batteries, aside
from fixed batteries, were mobile batteries of three-inch anti-aircraft
guns. I believe that no ninety millimeter modern guns reached the
Island until after the attack. There may have been one battery on the
Island of Oahu, but it was not in operating condition. There were
mobile batteries actively engaged in training and firing target practice
west of Pearl Harbor at a training camp on the beach.
23. Q. Admiral, on the morning of December 7, do you know the
condition of readiness of the Army guns that you mentioned as regards
the presence of personnel and availability of ammunition ?
A. They were not in place in the field, but were in their gun parks
ready to move.
198 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[190] 24. Q. In addition to the one battery that the Marines had
at the Pearl Harbor base, did the Navy have any other shore anti-air-
craft batteries at Pearl Harbor '^
A. Not before the attack ; we had many afterward.
25. Q. Do yon know anything of the condition of readiness of that
one Marine battery ?
A. No, except that it was emplaced on that day.
26. Q. In general terms, will yon describe the anti-aircraft arma-
ment of the ships in the Harbor, by types, as to number and calibre ?
A. Yes. The battleships were equipped generally with 3-inch 50
calibre AA guns which were mounted in emplacements which were
destined to take 1.1 quadruple mounts. They had their regular batter-
ies of 5-inch 25 AA guns, and were equipped with
27. Q. Just give the total number and calibre?
A. Eight 5-inch 25 guns; six to eight 3-inch 50 guns; and about
twelve 50-calibre machine guns. I might state that the 3-inch 50
guns were interim armament in lieu of 1.1 automatic guns, quadruple
mounts. Cruisers were equipped with eight 5-inch 25-calibre guns,
except two which had 5-inch 38-calibre gims. Some had 3-inch 50 AA
guns in lieu of 1.1 quadruple guns, and some had 1.1 quadruple mounts,
four in each case, and eight to twelve 50-calibre machine guns.
There were no 20-millimeter guns mounted in vessels of the Fleet,
nor were there any 40-millimeter quadruple mounts.
28. Q. Admiral, what fire control plans were in effect for coordi-
nating the fire of the ships and the limited number of shore guns
available in the event of an air attack?
A. Speaking of Army guns, now?
29. Q. Overall. Was there any unity of command?
A. The strength of the Army AA defense rested in their mobile
mounts and to my knowledge, none of them went into action on that
day. The plan for the ships was for ships to cover their regularly
assigned sectors, the Senior Commanding Officer in the sector in gen-
eral command of that sector. The alerts and the orders, general
overall fire control orders, were to come from the Harbor Control Post.
The overall command of anti-aircraft defense, in accordance with the
plan, rested in the Brigadier General of the Army Air Forces, whose
station was at the Army Filter Station. He commanded fighters,
interceptors, and the gun defense of the Island, — of Pearl Harbor.
The Anti-Aircraft Brigade Commander, under this Brigadier Gen-
eral, had three commands; gun batteries, automatic weapon batteries,
and searchlight batteries. The gun batteries of the Fleet were under
the command of this Anti-Aircraft Brigade Commander through the
Harbor Control Post.
30. Q. Were those control arrangements really in effect — working
order ?
A. They did not work, sir.
31. Q. Could they have been worked, had the personnel been prop-
erly alert?
A. As a matter of opinion, sir, I would say — probably. Certainly
it would have worked^better than it did, if the mobile batteries had
been properly emplaced.
[191] 32. Q. How would the Central Control Station on shore,
in Pearl Harbor, communicate fire control orders to the ships' guns?
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 199
A. By lights on the big water tower, sir, the signal tower, and by
voice radio.
33. Q. In view of the speed of the targets for aircraft batteries,
do you think such method of communication, would have been ef-
fective, or did you think they would have been effective?
A. Yes, sir. Under the plan which was in effect in the ships, and
I base this opinion on many drills held after the attack, when this
plan, with little or no major change, remained in effect.
34. Q. Where were communications from the voice radio intended
to be received on the ships?
A. Well, I cannot state that exactly, sir ; various ships had various
arrangements. In general a radio watch was kept on that circuit.
No too great dependence was placed on that radio communication.
The regular alert signals, sirens and lights, and search lights flashing
the signal from the water tower were in effect, and before the attack
on Pearl Harbor, and afterwards, actual fighting of a battery aboard
ship was the responsibility of the commanding officer to take the
proper targets under fire. The fire control of the Harbor Control
Post over the ships in the Harbor was one of warning and alerting,
and no attempt was made, before or after the bitter experience at
Pearl Harbor, to require the Harbor Control Officer to pick out tar-
gets and direct fire on those targets.
35. Q. Was the system of assignment of fire sectors for the various
ships sufficient to prevent confusion when various ships were firing?
A. I think when the attack actually came, that any targets which
presented themselves to a ship were taken under fire provided the
guns of that ship would bear. The chief reason for assigning sectors
was to insure the presence of an even distribution, to insure that no
sectors of the 360--degrees around the Fleet anchorage would be left
uncovered; so that guns would not bear on any bearing. When the
attack came, gunners followed the targets through where ever they
presented themselves.
35. Q. Admiral, what fire control orders were actually issued on
the morning of December 7, by whom, and how effective?
A. I do not believe that any orders as fire control other than
those issued by the ships' commanding officers were issued. The
alert came at the moment of the attack. There was one fire control
order which was issued by the Commander-in-Chief on the evening
of December 7, when some ships of the Fleet opened fire on what ap-
peared to us on the Staff to be friendly planes, and there was broad-
cast from the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters, "Cease firing,"
I believe, "friendly planes". In other words, we stepped in.
36. Q. Was any damage done to the friendly planes by that
mistake ?
A. I believe that one or two friendly planes were shot down that
night, sir.
37. Q. Admiral, again speaking in general terms, what was the
condition of readiness of the shipboard anti-aircraft batteries, as
regards presence of personnel and availability of ammunition, im-
mediately prior to the attack on December 7?
[1921 A. I think I would have to refer to this letter, to give an
accurate answer. I was not actually in the Commander-in-Chief's
Headquarters when the attack came, but I believe that the Fleet was
200 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
in Condition 3, in accordance with this letter. I do know, from first-
hand accounts, that ready ammunition was available on the required
ships standing watch in the sectors and that fire against the attacking
planes was promptly taken up.
38. Q. Do you know who issued the order for that condition of
readiness. Condition 3, and when that was put into effect?
A. Well, the Naval Base Defense Officer was the Commandant and
he set conditions of readiness.
39. Q. Admiral, do you know of any modification prescribed with
respect to this Condition 3 in the battleships ?
A. No, sir, I do not. I recollect one modification in conditions of
readiness which was permitted by the Commander-in-Chief and that
was after the attack on Pearl Harbor. He permitted one or two sub-
marine tenders, moored to docks at the Submarine Base, to modify
Condition 3 so that a fewer number of guns need be manned in
Condition 3. That was because of the crew of those ships being
occupied with submarine overhaul. I might state that my recollec-
tion of some of these things is a recollection of immediately before
and after Pearl Harbor, because 1 was Fleet Gunnery Officer for
nine months after the attack.
40. Q. What were the dimensions of the sectors which anti-aircraft
batteries were assigned, which were assigned by 2CL-41?
A. As I remember it, there were four sectors, and refreshing my
mind with the letter, I see there were four.
41. Q. That is ninety degrees each?
A. Not exactly. Admiral. The sector to the southeastward was 135
degrees; the sector to the northeastward was 45 degrees; and the
other two were 90 degrees.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Eeserve, took seat as
reporter and was warned that the oath previously! taken was still
binding.
42. Q. At the time of the attack of 7 December ( these instructions
insured the readiness of only a relatively small proportion of the
total number of anti-aircraft guns which could have fired into the
southeast sector; is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
43. Q. About what percentage?
A. A small percentage actually manned with men on watch.
44. Q. Admiral, did the ships of the Pacific Fleet have on board
their full wartime allowance of ammunition and other ordnance
materials on the morning of December 7 ?
A. The Fleet not only had its full allowance of ammunition
aboard but, in general, had its mobilization allowance, which is an
extra amount of ammunition. This statement applies to all cate-
gories of ammunition. There was, however, a shortage of .50 calibre
ammunition for anti-aircraft machine guns throughout the Navy
and throughout the Fleet. This particular shortage had no effect on
the attack because no ship expended all of its ammunition that it
had on board.
[19S] 45. Q. Were the conditions of ordnance material satis-
factory to you prior to the attack?
A. Absolutely, except for numbers and types which were destined
to come to the Fleet and had not yet reached the Fleet. May I ex-
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 201
plain. Many ships had three inch .50 calibre AA guns which were
interim-armanent and were to be replaced by 1.1 quadruple mounts.
Some ships, notably cruisers, would have a mixed battery of three inch
.50 calibre AA guns and 1.1's, because a sufficient number of 1.1 mounts
had not arrived for the Fleet. The Fleet was destined to receive 20
mm machine guns and only two had been received. Sufficient ammuni-
tion, aside from these shortages I just spoke of, was available in the
ammunition depot and within twenty-four hours all ships, except those
that were very seriously damaged, had their ammunition replaced.
46. Q. Keeping in mind the strained international situation and
the imminence of war, and the war tasks of the Pacific Fleet, will you
give us the views of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as you
knew them at the time, with respect to his satisfaction with ordnance
and gunnery conditions as they existed in the period leading up to
the Pearl Harbor attack.
A. I think that the Commander-in-Chief was well satisfied with
the state of training of the men in the Fleet, considering personnel
shortages which existed in the Fleet and very large turnovers of
men wnich we had had continuously for the previous year. Target
practice allowances had been greatly increased during the previous
ten months. The number of practices that the ships fired had been
increased, in some cases, by using a certain amount of ammuition for
two or more practices, firing less in one practice and a smaller number
of guns. Night surface firing had been stressed and drones had been
made available in quite sufficient numbers, and anti-aircraft firings had
increased, I would say, three or four hundred per cent, considering
the additional targets, drones, and the better anti-aircraft visibility
conditions existing in the islands.
47. Q. Were the status of your fire control doctrines well established
at that time to your satisfaction ?
A. Yes, sir, and I feel that is borne out by the splendid performance
that the anti-aircraft batteries of the Fleet put forth on the 7th of
December. My recollection can be checked by the report of Pearl
Harbor, which I helped draw up, and I believe at least twenty-eight
planes were shot down by vessels of the Fleet. Not a bad performance
for men who had never fired a shot in action and considering the
number of guns engaged. I might state that the planes shot down,
no matter what their number was, were very carefully screened and
identified as to where they landed and what happened to them.
48. Q. In the last several months leading up to the attack, had the
gunnery training of the Fleet involved advance practices ?
A. Yes, sir, of all kinds. First of all, short-range battle practice,
or short-range practice, as we had known it before, had practically
passed out of the picture ; sled targets were used in place of raft tar-
gets. That resulted in higher speeds. I might state, along with
gunnery training, I think this has a bearing, that at Admiral Kimmel's
insistence the Fleet Gunnery Officer, the Force Gunnery Officer, and
Type Gunnery Officer were given flight orders and required to wit-
ness practices of their forces from the air, so that immediate cor-
rective actions could be taken by the ships as soon as they came into
port. No observation parties were allowed to be transferred at sea.
\_194] 49. Q. In these advance practices, using your established
fire control doctrines, were the results obtained satisfactory to the
202 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as practices held in a period
when war was quite imminent?
A. I don't think Admiral Kimmel would have ever been satisfied
with any performance. He was a perfectionist and nothing less than
perfection would do. The people who were responsible for the gunnery
training of the Fleet were greatly pleased with the state of training
and the progress that was bein^ made daily, and I thing secretly
Admiral Kimmel felt that a good job was being done. I don't thinK
Admiral Kimmel would have ever been satisfied with any results;
completely satisfied.
50. Q. Of those twenty-eight enemy planes which you estimated to
have been shot down, how many were recovered and examined ?
A. Admiral, I'd have to refer to the report, because in that report
we actually spotted where the planes landed. Several of them — I
can't give you the exact number — landed in the water. Some of
those that landed in the water were recovered. Several, 7iumber I can
not recollect, landed in the cane fields and burned almost completely.
There was a large recovery of junk.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to
make any further statement covering anj^hing relating to the subject
matter of the examination whi(ih he thought should be a matter of
record in connecion therewith, which had not been fully brought
out by the previous questioning.
The witness made the following statement : Admiral, I would like
to add, even at the expense of perhaps repeating some of the things
I have said here in answer to questions, and in view of the fact that
the apparent readiness and state of training of the Fleet has been one
of the questions that has been foremost here in this testimony, that I
do no know what more could have been done, under a Commander
who was a very hard taskmaster, to put the Pacific Fleet in a higher
state of training than it was on the morning of Pearl Harbor. I think
that state was very high and I know that if there was anthing left
undone in making it higher, it is something that I, as an afterthought,
have not been able to think of.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer read and introduced in evidence a letter dated
16 March 1944, to Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired,
examining officer, from Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy,
who had previously testified, accompanying the return of the tran-
script of his testimony and attesting, under his former oath, that the
testimony given by him on the ninth day of the examination was
correct, appended hereto marked "Exhibit 30".
The examination then, at 4 : 05 p. m., was adjourned to await the
call of the examining officer.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 203
I /'^'^l PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAET INaUIEY
THUESDAY, MARCH 23, 1944
Fourteenth Day
Navy Department,
Washington^ D. C.
The examination met at 11 : 25 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer,
and his comisel and assistant counsel.
Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken
was still binding.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the thirteenth day of the examination until such time
as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with
the examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
Rear Admiral W. S. Pye, who had previously testified, was called
before the examining officer, informed that his oath previously taken
was still binding, and stated that he had read over the testimony given
by him on the eleventh day of the examination, pronounced it correct,
was duly warned, and withdrew.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface
to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station?
A. Vincent R. Murphy, Captain, U. S. Navy, Head of the Post-
graduate School, Annapolis, Maryland.
2. Q. Wliere were you stationed on 7 December 1941 ?
A. I was a member of the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Kimmel's
Staff as Assistant to the War Plans Officer.
3. Q. Where were you at the time the Japanese air attack was
launched against Pearl Harbor on that date ?
A. I was the Staff Duty Officer, and when the attack was launched
I was in the War Plans Office, at the Submarine Base.
4. Q. What was the nature of your duties as Staff Duty Officer?
A. They were the usual duties of a Staff Duty Officer, to represent
the Commander-in-Chief in his absence, to act on routine matters
that might come up, to act on non-routine matters in the absence of
the Commander-in-Chief, if they came within the confines of estab-
lished policy; to refer matters not under my immediate knowledge
204 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to the appropriate member of the Staff who had cognizance, if such
matters came up; and to keep the Commander-in-Chief informed of
unusual or untoward circumstances,
[196] 5. Q. Will you please expand your answer just a little
bit to include your authority and duties in conection with the Four-
teenth Naval District, if any ?
A. The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, commanded a
task force under the Commander-in-Chief which was charged with the
naval defense of Pearl Harbor. He came under the Duty Officer's
cognizance the same as any other task force commander or any other
unit of the Fleet.
6. Q. At what time and date did your tour of duty commence ?
A. As well as I remember, the time of relieving for Duty Officers
was after working hours which, on Saturday, would have been around
12 : 30, when the Chief of Staff went home — on Saturda3^
7. Q. At what time on the morning of December 7th did Admiral
Kimmel, or a member of his Staff senior to you, appear at the Head-
quarters so as to relieve you of these extraordinary functions ?
A. The first member of the Staff was Captain, now Rear Admiral
McMorris, who I would estimate arrived about five minutes after the
attack started, which would be around 8 : 00 o'clock. Admiral Kim-
mel arrived, I would say, about ten minutes after that, but that could
be in error ten minutes either way because I was very busy and he
could have easily come in and I wouldn't have seen him, I think
Admiral McMorris met Admiral Kimmel when Admiral Kimmel
came in.
_ 8. Q. Captain, what information with respect to the international
situation in the Pacific was furnished you when you went on watch as
a Staff Duty Officer?
A. There was no specific information furnished me as Staff Duty
Officer, because I was already cognizant of most of the general pic-
ture, anyway, by virtue of my connection with War Plans, I was
furnished with a memorandum from Captain McMorris giving me
the dispositions of the ships and forces of the Fleet, and giving me
instructions that if war were declared or an attack took place, the
general idea of what to do with the ships. That idea, as well as I
recall, was to get Admiral Halsey's forces, which had been at Wake
and which were or would be, out of fuel, back into Pearl Harbor and
get them fueled ready to conduct the first operation of the War Plans.
Admiral Brown's force was then at Johnston Island, as I recall, get-
ting ready to conduct a practice landing operation. Another force
under Admiral Newton, I think it was a task group under Admiral
Brown, was delivering planes, or on the way to deliver planes at
Midway. The general plan was to get all those ships back and fueled
and proceed with our War Plans, j had that information in a memo-
randum from Captain McMorris. I was also furnished information
that locked in the Operations Office was a chart showing what we
thought to be the location of the force which was operating under
radio silence — Admiral Halsey's force.
9. Q. Were you familiar with the Fleet Intelligence Officer's esti-
mate of the location of Japanese Army and Navy forces ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY . 205
A. Insofar as I know, I was. There may have been something
that the Fleet Intelligence Officer told other people that he did not
tell me, but if there was, I don't know about it.
10. Q. Did you keep advised daily of the situation as he viewed it?
A. To the best of my recollection, the Fleet Intelligence Officer
reported every morning to xA.dmiral Kimmel and summarized the sit-
uation for him. Captain McMorris was generally present at those
conferences, I was not, but Captain McMorris made it a point to
inform me, as to what went on. I am not [197] sure whether
Captain McCormick was in on those conferences or not.
11. Q. Did you feel at that time that you had all the information
of that type that it was necessary for you to have in order to prop-
erly perf onn your duties as Staff Duty Officer ?
A. I felt, at that time, that I had all the information that was
available, but I know of no Staff Duty Officer, or any Commander-
in-Chief-^ who could ever feel that he had all the information that was
necessary.
12. Q. Had you been advised of the receipt, in the week preceding
the attack, of the dispatch containing a war warning received from
the Chief of Naval Operations?
A. Yes, sir ; I had.
13. Q. Had you been advised of the Commander-in-Chief's views
with respect to the significance of the information that was available
to him and his Staff, concerning the international situation?
A. Not altogether. When the message came in, I was sent for, and
to the best of my recollection. Captain Smith, now Rear Admiral
Smith ; Captain McMorris ; myself. Captain, now Rear Admiral W.
S. DeLany; and, I think, Layton, the Intelligence Officer, — were
called into Admiral Kimmel's office and he read the dispatch to us
and he passed it around and he said, "What do you think of it?"
As well as I recall, each one expressed an opinion, and then Admiral
Kimmel said that he would have a conference later on in the after-
noon, with his principal commanders, on the subject. I do not be-
lieve that Admiral Kimmel gave us, at that time, a complete or even
a partial picture of his reaction to the message — inasmuch as none
of us had had time to study the message in any detail. Later that
afternoon, I would estimate around 4 : 00 o'clock, there was another
conference that I think I attended for part, but whether I was there
for the entire time, I can't recall. The best of my recollection of
that conference is that it was attended by the same people who came
that morning, and I think Admiral Calhoun was there. I think
Captain Earle, Chief of Staff, Fourteenth Naval District, represented
Admiral Bloch, but that is subject to correction because there were
many conferences and I can't separate them in my mind — each one.
At that conference, I believe the decision was made to reenf orce Wake
particularly, with planes and radar gear, and to send some planes
to Midway, which consisted of one patrol squadron, as I remember
it, and some fighters, to be delivered by the LEXINGTON. The
movement to Wake was made with particular emphasis on secrecy,
particularly inasmuch as my recollection of the war warning message
specifically warned us against any overt act.
14. Q. Were you, at that time, familiar. Captain, with the Army's
responsibility in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor?
206 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I was familiar with the provisions of Joint Action of the
Army and Navy, which made the Army responsible for the defense
of Naval bases — I interpreted that to include Pearl Harbor.
15. Q. Were you familiar with the Army's setup so as to know
just how capable they were of fulfilling their obligations under the
Plans and Joint Action?
A. They only feature that I was familiar with was their general
airplane picture, and their anti-aircraft gun picture. As I recall it,
they had around 200 fighting planes and about 30 or 40 bombers, and
I think the figure was 56 anti-aircraft guns, although it could have
been 37.
[198] 16. Q. Were you advised as to their condition of readi-
ness, or condition as to alertness on that morning?
A. As well as I recall, the condition of readiness was prescribed
by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
17. Q. I am still speaking of the Army.
A. I was not aware of the details of their condition of readiness.
18. Q. Did you know whether they had been alerted at all, or not?
A. I did not.
19. Q. Were you familiar with the radar and air warning net
setup of the Army ?
A. Only vaguely. I knew that seven or eight stations were in
process of being set up. How many of them were actually set up,
I did not know.
20. Q. Did you know, the morning of the 7th of December, whether
any of them were operating or not ?
A. I did not.
21. Q. Did you have any other instructions or information with
respect to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's plans for im-
mediate action to be taken in event of sudden starting of war, that
is, other than the instructions that were given you by Admiral
McMorris ?
A. The instructions which would govern the situation that actually
occurred were contained in the Joint Plan for the Defense of Hawaii,
I have forgotten the name, and under that there was a specific plan
for the defense of Pearl Harbor which charged the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District, with responsibility for the Fleet's part
of that defense, with the distribution of ships in the Harbor, to assist
in repelling anti-aircraft attack, with the prescribing of conditions
of readiness for the situation, as he might see it.
22. Q. I show you Exhibit 4 before this examination. Do you
identify it?
A. Yes.
23. Q. Is that the plan to which you have just referred ?
A. Yes.
24. Q. Were you, at that time, or had you, at that time, been ad-
vised as to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet's views with re-
spect to a surprise air attack on the vessels and installations at Pearl
Harbor ?
A. Not specifically. I mean by that, by association with the Staff,
particularly the War Plans branch, I was, I think, generally familiar
with the Commander-in-Chief's views, but I was not specifically ad-
vised as to his views of a sudden attack.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 207
25. Q. What were your views, at that time, with respect to such
a surprise air attack ?
A. I did not think that such an attack would be made. I thought
that it would be utterly stupid for the Japanese to attack the United
States at Pearl Harbor. I thought it was questionable whether they
should attack even the Philippines. I thought that the Japanese
could probably have gone into Thailand and Malaya, and even the
Dutch East Indies. I doubt if the United States would have declared
war under those circumstances. I thought that the [^^9] Jap-
anese Staff was faced with the proposition of guessing what the reac-
tion of the United States miglit be if they did not attack the United
States and proceeded with their plans; and, having to weigh that
possibility, against their open flank if they left the Philippmes. I
thought that the Japanese, who, in my opinion, generall follow the
book, might attack the Philippines, just by virtue of being afraid
to leave an open flank — I did not think they would attack at Pearl
Harbor because I did not think it was necessary for them to do so,
from my point of view. We could not have materially affected their
control of the waters that they wanted to control, whether or not
the battleships were sunk at Pearl Harbor. In other words, I did
not believe that we could move the United States Fleet to the Western
Pacific until such time as auxiliaries were available, as the material
condition of the ships were improved, especially with regard to anti-
aircraft, and until such time as the Pacific Fleet was materially reen-
forced. I thought it was suicide for us to attempt, with an inferior
fleet, to move into the Western Pacific.
26. Q. Did you recognize, at that time, the possibility of such an
attack?
A. Yes.
27. Q. With respect to the security of the vessels at Pearl Harbor,
did you have an instructions other than those contained in Exhibit 4?
a". Not that I recall.
28. Q. Did you, at that time, feel that the provisions of Exhibit 4
adequately covered the situation?
A. I felt that the provisions of Exhibit 4 covered the situation as
well as it could, with the other considerations which entered into the
picture, those considerations being the forces available, our own War
Plans, which required almost immediate movements to the attack, and,
the requirements of training in a Fleet which contained a considerable
portion of new officers and men, and which was very deficient in anti-
aircraft defense. The question of patrol plane, all-around search,
had come up many, many times. Much thought had been given to
it. It was a ques1:ion of wearing out our planes over a considerable
period of time, wearing out our pilots, and not knowing when to expect
a declaration of war, to find ourselves completely worn out by prac-
ticing for war, including the psychological aspects thereof, and unable
to fight it when it came.
29. Q. Do you remember the use of the word "deployment" in the
message which contained a war warning ?
A. Yes, sir.
30. Q. What was your reaction when you saw that word ?
A. The first time I saw that word, the word "defensive" or "defense"
was out of place in the message, as I recall it. It said, "Take defensive
208 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
deployment for the tasks of Kainbow 5". My thought was that
"defensive" was not in that, in its right place, that the message should
be : "Take deployment for the defensive tasks of Kainbow 5^'.
31. Q. Did you think that the presence of heavy ships in Pearl
Harbor amounted to a defensive deployment, insofar as they were
concerned ?
A. I thought it amounted to a defensive deployment for the tasks
assigned in Rainbow 5, in that our plan called for the immediate move-
ment of those ships to the attack. I felt that the risk, if it were
greater in [200] Pearl Harbor than it might have been at sea,
had to be weighted against the advantage of an immediate moment.
Had those ships been at sea, it would have been necessary to bring
them back in to port and refuel them, and get them ready to move.
I, personally, wanted to move fast ; I felt that our original plan was
bold for the forces we had available and that a great deal depended
on speed in its execution.
32. Q. Did you then think that those words "defensive" and "de-
ployment" in any way meant security measures ?
A. I was not sure, but I interpreted them to leave it open to us.
I was doubtful.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as
reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still
binding.
33. Q. Captain, I refer back to your statement when you were
giving your estimate of the situation as regards the possibility of sur-
prise air attack on Pearl Harbor. Did I understand you correctly
to say that in formulating your estimate you considered that the Fleet
was not ready to make any westward move, because of the lack of
auxiliaries and lack of material readiness on the part of vessels of
the Fleet?
A. I said that and I would like to add to that that we were, in the
Pacific, an inferior Fleet. I saw nothing in the Far East that could
necessarily have tied up parts of the Japanese Fleet to allow us even
approach equality.
34. Q. Captain, at that time, was it the belief of the members of
Admiral Kimmel's Staff that the Japanese were obtaining rather full
intelligence as to the condition of the Pacific Fleet ?
A. There was a general impression that the Japanese could know
everything that they wanted to know about the Pacific Fleet.
35. Q. In view of those two answers, why was not the possibility
more seriously considered that the Japanese High Command would
be rather anxious to disable the Fleet at Pearl Harbor before it
could remedy these deficiencies which precluded it from striking
westward ?
A. I do not know what the general Staff reaction to that possi-
bility was. For my own part, and I may have been guided more by
a political analysis than a military one, I did not think that they
would attempt to do it.
36. Q. Captain, had you, at that time, formulated any opinion as
to the efficiency of the Japanese naval air arm ?
A. Yes.
37. Q. Would you please state what your opinion was at that time ?
A. My original opinion was that it was poor. That opinion was
altered by a conversation with Admiral Yarnell. I then thought that
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 209
Japanese aviation was probably pretty good, but nowhere near ap-
proaching our own.
38. Q. Did you consider it capable of performing the tasks that it
did perform on the 7th of December ?
A. Yes.
39. Q. Did that consideration enter into the formulation of your
opinion as to the possibility or probability of an attack on Pearl
Harbor ?
A. Yes.
[201] 40. Q. Captain, with respect to your duties as the Staff
Duty Officer, what instructions did you have or what did you consider
to be your duty in connection with advising the Army Command on
Oahu of any niatters of importance that came to your attention ?
A. If anything unusual had come up during my tour of duty, I
would advise Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who would
have advised the Army, as he was charged under Joint Action of the
Army and Navy with (dealings with the Army.
41. Q. Captain, when did you first receive notice of a contact with
any Japanese forces on the morning of 7 December 1941 ?
A. I would say somewhere around 7 : 20 or 7 : 25.
42. Q. What was the nature of that contact?
A. It was a report of the Duty Officer of the Fourteenth Naval Dis-
trict to the Assistant Duty Officer, to the effect that a submarine had
been sunk by the WARD or had been attacked and sunk by the WARD
in the Defensive Sea Area.
43. Q. Please state what action you took, based on that report.
A. At that time, I was in the process of getting dressed in my
quarters. Lieutenant Commander Black gave me the report. He was
Assistant Duty Officer. And I said, "Did he say what he was doing
about it? Did he say whether Admiral Bloch knew about it, or not?"
And he said, "No." I said, "While I'm finishing dressing, call him
and see what he's doing about it and whether or not he's called Admiral
Bloch." I finished dressing, Black came back and said he had dialed
and dialed and the line was busy. It was a dial telephone system.
I said, "All right, you go to the office and start breaking out the charts
and positions of the various ships ; I'll dial one more time and then I'll
be over." I dialed the phone and it was busy. I then dialed the opera-
tor — it was a local dial system — and told him to tell the Duty Officer
to call me immediately and to break in on any conversation he might
be holding unless it was of supreme importance. I went to the office
and as I walked in the office, the phone was ringing. I answered the
phone and it was Ramsey — now Captain, L. C. Ramsey, from PatWing-
Two. He said he had a report from a patrol plane to the effect that
a submarine had been sunk in the Defensive Sea Area. I said, "I have
just had a report that I have not been able to get any more details on,"
and told him what the report was. At that time, the phone rang from
the Fourteenth Naval District and the Duty Officer was on the phone.
He said that Admiral Bloch had been informed, that he had ordered
the ready-duty destroyer out to assist the Ward and to investigate, and
had ordered the stand-by destroyer to get up steam. I said, "Had you
any previous details or any more details of this attack?" He said,
"The message came out of a clear sky. There was no word of prelimi-
nary search or chase of any kind." I then called Admiral Kimmel and
79716-^6— Ex. 144 15
210 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
gave him both messages and told him that Admiral Bloch knew it and
of the ready-destroyer being ordered out and of the stand-by destroyer
getting up steam. He said, "I will be right down." About that time,
and I'm not sure of the sequence, Ramsey called again and said that he
had nothing further and did I have anything further. I said, "No,"
but I thought it might be wise for him to make his search planes avail-
able in case the Admiral wanted them. About that time, the phone
rang again ; it was the Duty Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District.
He said that he had another message from the WARD saying that
she was towing a sampan into Honolulu Harbor and dequesting a
Coast Guard tug be sent to his assistance. I called Admiral Kimmel
and gave him that message. Before I finished that message, the
yeoman [202] came in, said, "There's a message from the
signal tower saying the Japanese are attacking Pearl Harbor and this
is no drill." I gave that message to Admiral Kimmel, either directly
on that one call or a call immediately thereafter. I do not recall exactly
whether it was the same call or thereafter. I then told the Communica-
tions Officer to send a dispatch to Chief of Naval Operations, Com-
mander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, with priority of the Commander-in-
Chief, Asiatic Fleet, over the Chief of Naval Operations, and to our
forces at sea: "JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR.
THIS IS NO DRILL." I then called Ramsey and said, "How many
planes have you got available" — no, I'll correct ; I told the yeoman to
call the signal tower and ask if the Pearl Harbor Defense Plan had been
executed, and he said it had been by Admiral Bloch. I called Ramsey
and said, "How many planes have you got available?" He said, "I
don't think I have any, but I'm scraping together what I can for
search." I then called all the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief ; some
I called myself and some the yeoman called, using every phone we had
in the office. I distinctly remember talking to Captain Smith myself.
By that time, Captain McMorris came in, either just preceded or fol-
lowed by the Admiral, I don't recall, and we drafted a more formal
dispatch to the forces at sea, giving them instructions and information.
From then on, the duties were largely taken over by the regular Staff
and the War Plans Division helped in advising the other people who
had the immediate direction of events,
44. Q. Upon receipt of the contact report, did you formulate any
opinion as to its significance with respect to other possible enemy
movements ?
A. Yes. The contact itself was about the third or fourth of a
series of such contacts. All previous ones had, insofar as actual proof
is concerned, turned out to be negative. This one, I thought, might
be the real thing, but I wanted some information leading to why he
thought he had sunk a submarine so that I could formulate whether
there was a submarine there or whether there wasn't a submarine
there. As in previous contacts, we had never been able to definitely
establish that there was a submarine there. I did not interpret the
submarine attack as possibly being accompanied by an air attack on
Pearl Harbor. I will say this: I had less doubt about the authen-
ticity of this attack than I had had about some of the others.
45. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel express his views as to what signifi-
cance should be attached to the contact when you notified him of it?
A. He said, "I will be right down." That's all he said.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 211
46. Q. Did you notify anyone other than Admiral Kimmel of this
contact, prior to the launching of the air attack ?
A. No.
47. Q. Where were you, physically, during the performance of
these duties which you have just recounted?
A. In the Commander-in-Chief's Offices, in the Submarine Base
Building at the Submarine Base. I was actually in the outer offices. '
48. Q. You've mentioned difficulties in telephone communications
on that morning. Can you tell me anything concerning the general
inadequacy of wire communications in and about Pearl Harbor, in-
cluding those to the Army ?
A. I made some investigation of this when I was War Plans Officer
for the previous Commander-in-Chief. At that time, I can best de-
scribe the communications system, particularly with respect to com-
munication with the Army, as almost non-existent. There was
projected, at that time, the building of a communication center in
which a tie-in with the Army circuits would be provided. That
building, I believe, was almost complete at the time [203] of
the attack, but I do not believe that the facilities or the installations
had been completed, although I am not — or was not, familiar with
the details of the arrangement. I would say that the methods of
conmiunication were most unsatisfactory, in that all the communica-
tion that I had with the Fourteenth Naval District was by telephone,
and likewise with the Army. There was a Harbor defense circuit
by radio in which all ships were connected and which was tied-in with
the Army anti-aircraft system and with the plane system. I mean by
the "plane system", with the control of aircraft in flight, particularly
fighters. I've forgotten the frequency that circuit was on.
49. Q. Was it effective, as yet ^
A. I believe it was, Admiral, but I'm not sure.
50. Q. The difficulties of the telephone system, I understand to lie
in the fact that everything was via the usual peacetime switchboard
arrangement and there was nothing corresponding to a battle tele-
phone circuit ?
A. There was not.
51. Q. Was that also true with communications to the Army and
did they involve the commercial switchboard in Honolulu?
A. I don't know, sir.
52. Q. Keferring to your estimate to the effect that the Japanese
would attack someone else in the Far East and they would probably
not attack the United States. Did you see a dispatch from the De-
partment of about 3 December concerning some steps that the Japs
were taking with their communication equipment ?
A. I did.
53. Q. Did seeing that dispatch alter your mental attitude as to
the direction in which a Japanese attack might take?
A. No, sir. I considered it a routine precaution in case the United
States or Great Britain should declare war and unexpectedly take
over the Japanese diplomatic residences.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged
to make any further statement covering anything relating to the
subject matter of the examination which he thought should be a mat-
212 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought
out by the previous questioning.
The witness made the following statement : I would like to say this.
That the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet was confronted
with an almost irreconcilable situation in that he had a Fleet which
was badly in need of training and materiel improvement, particularly
with respect to new planes and new pilots in the patrol squadrons, as
well as ships themselves. He had to guess how much training he
could do and include in it the possibility of maintaining a continu-
ous alert, which would be destructive both in materiel and, in my
opinion, even more important, the morale of the Fleet. I do not
believe that any force can maintain, for a long period, an attitude of
complete defensive readiness without severe loss of morale. I think
that these considerations weighed heavily upon the Commander-in-
Chief's mind.
(Examination by the examining officer continued :)
[204] 54. Q. Were those thoughts which you have just expressed
with you during that period, November-December, '41 ?
A. Yes, sir.
55. Q. Did anything occur to you which would have remedied those
circumstances and conditions ?
A. Only the thought : "If I can only have full information."
56. Q. Did you advocate, or even seriously consider in your own
mind, definite steps toward basing the Fleet on the Pacific Coast
instead of at Hawaii ?
A. I had advocated those steps in my capacity as War Plans Officer
for Admiral Richardson. I did not advocate it, as well as I recall,
later, because I thought the matter had been settled.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 12 : 35 p. m., took a recess until 2 : 50
p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.
Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel,
and the reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
Captain Vincent R. Murphy, U. S. Navy, who had previously tes-
tified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath
previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over
the testimony given by him on the fourteenth day of the examina-
tion, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.
The examination then, at 2:52 p. m., was adjourned to await the
call of the examining officer.
PROdEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 213
1^05] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY
SATURDAY, MARCH 25, 1944
Fifteenth Day
Navy Department,
Washington, D. G.
The examination met at 10 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer,
and his counsel and assistant counsel.
Jesse Lee Ward, Jr., Yeoman Second Class, U. S. Naval Reserve,
took seat as reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken
was still binding.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the fourteenth day of the examination until such
time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with
the examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
Rear Admiral Willard A. Kitts, III, U. S. Navy, who had previously
testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his
oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read
over the testimony given by him on the thirteenth day of the examina-
tion, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.
Captain Robert O. Glover, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified,
was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath previ-
ously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the
testimony given by him on the twelfth day of the examination, pro-
nounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.
Commander Paul C. Crosley, U. S. Navy, who had previously testi-
fied, 'was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath
previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the
testimony given by him on the thirteenth day of the examination, pro-
nounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 10 : 25 a. m., took a recess until 11 a. m.,
at which time the examination was reconvened.
Present: The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel,
and the reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
214 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Rear Admiral Walter S. DeLany, U. S. Navy, who had previously
testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath
previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the
testimony given by him on the fifth day of the examination, pro-
nounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.
The examination then, at 11 : 05 a. m., was adjourned to await the
call of the examining officer.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 215
1^06] PKOCEEDINGS OF THE HART INUUIEY
MONDAY, MARCH 27, 1944
Sixteenth Day
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.
The examination set at 10 : 08 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer,
and his counsel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as
reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still
binding.
The record of proceedings of the second through the fifteenth days,
both inclusive, of the examination was read and approved.
The examining officer read and received in evidence a copy of a
letter, dated 22 March 1944, from Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S.
Navy, Retired, examining officer, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kim-
mel, U. S. Navy, Retired, informing him of the adjournment of the
examination on March 27, 1944, to such places away from Washing-
ton, D. C, as pertinent witnesses may be found available, which places
are now unknown, and of the examining officer's inability to inform
him further of such times of meetings, appended hereto marked
"Exhibit 31."
The examination then, at 10: 29 a. m., was adjourned to await the
call of the examining officer.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 217
{207} PEOCEEDINGS' OF THE HAET INaUIRY
TUESDAY MARCH 28, 1944
Seventeenth Day
Headquarters Twelfth Naval District,
San Francisco, California.
The examination met at 12 : 50 p. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer,
and his counsel and assistant connsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the sixteenth day of the examination until such time
as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with
the examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to
the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station ?
A. Joseph John Rochefort, Commander, U. S. Navy, Commanding
Officer U. S. S. ABSD2.
2. Q. What were your duties during 1941 calendar year?
A. 1 January 1941 until approximately 15 May 1941, attached to
and serving on board the U, S. S. INDIANAPOLIS as Assistant
Operations Officer and Force Intelligence Officer for Commander,
Scouting Force. During the remainder of the calendar year, I was
officer in charge of combat intelligence, attached to Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District.
3. Q. Did you spend some time in Japan learning that language?
A. Yes, sir, three years, from September, 1929, until September,
1932.
4. Q. Did you qualify as Japanese interpreter?
.A. Yes; interpreter and translator.
5. Q. In addition to attaining that qualification, did you then, or
have you since, made any particular effort towards study of the
mental, moral, and psychological characteristics of the Japanese?
A. Yes, sir. Whenever my duties at sea and ashore permitted,
which were, due to the fact that I was Fleet Intelligence Officer for
two years and Assistant District Intelligence Officer for two years,
rather extensive.
218 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6. Q, Other than from the work of your own unit at Pearl Harbor,
did you have other sources from which you obtained similar informa-
tion?
A. Yes, sir, from the Washington Headquarters, and from the unit
similar to nine attached to Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet.
[208] 7. Q, Was there any other source in particular?
A. Other Government agencies, such as the Army in the Hawaiian
Area, the Federal Bureau of Investigation field office in Honolulu, Fed-
eral Communications Commission office in Honolulu, However, the
information furnished by these agencies was of no value prior to
December 7, 1941.
8. Q. Was there a free interchange of information between units
similar to yours located in Washington and in the Far East, and your
own?
A. Yes, sir, most free, due to the fact that all of our messages were
common to all three offices. That is, any message originating in one
unit automatically was sent to the other two units.
9. Q. Then did you feel that you had access to all the information
which the Navy had available from those two sources ?
A. Insofar as general intelligence was concerned, we had access
to all information available. Certain types of information were
handled either in Washington, alone, or jointly between Washington
and the unit in the Far East.
10. Q. Then the three units did, to a certain extent, specialize in
certain fields within their own general specialty ?
A. Yes, sir.
11. Q. And you were not positive that you received all of the im-
portant information in those particular fields ?
A. No, sir, we did not.
12. Q, To what officials did you report concerning the intelligence
which came into your hands, during the latter half of 1941 ?
A. To the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, personally, and
to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, via the Fleet Intelligence Officer.
13. Q. And you, yourself, or none of your subordinates made direct
contacts with the Commander-in-Chief or other members of his Staff,
other than with his Intelligence Officer?
A. Except in rare instances, I had no contact with the Commander-
in-Chief personally. On several occasions, the Commander-in-Chief
came to my office for discussion of certain points which had been
raised by either Washington, the Far Eastern Unit, or myself?
14. Q. Did your unit engage in study of material gained from the
Japanese Foreign Service ?
A. No, sir.
15. Q. Did you receive, during November and early December,
anything which the other two units obtained from that source?
A. To the best of my knowledge, no, sir.
16. Q. Did you receive from the Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth
Naval District, directly or otherwise, a copy of some communica-
tions in which the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu was con-
cerned, at any time around 1 December '41 ?
A. Yes, sir.
[209] 17. Q. Did those communications amount to much in the
way of volume ?
A. No, sir, I would say, perhaps, ten to fifteen messages.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 219
18. Q. Did they come direct to you from the District Intelligence
Officer?
A. Yes, sir.
19. Q. Did you have any request or any instructions in connection
with them?
A. Yes, sir. He stated he was vitally interested in any information
they might contain.
20. Q. Did you succeed in extracting any information from them?
A. Yes, sir.
21. Q. When?
A. In all except two or three of the messages, within twelve hours ;
the remaining two or three messages on the evening of 10 December.
22. Q. Did the lot which you handled easily contain any important
information ?
A. No, sir.
23. Q. Did the other lot?
A. Yes, sir.
24. Q. Why were you unable to obtain that information at an earlier
date?
A. Because of the inherent difficulties in the task which were such
that we were unable to get earlier results.
25. Did you employ your ablest assistants in that task, and
apiDroximately how much time did they devote to it?
A. Yes, sir. It was made a matter of paramount importance and
approximately twelve to sixteen hours daily were devoted to that
work alone.
26. Q. Was it a part of your duties, or those of your unit, to monitor
radio traffic in the so-called "amateur" status with the object of dis-
closing if any Japanese spies were communicating direct with Japan ?
A. No, sir.
27. Q. Did you know whether any of that work was being done
on Oahu ?
A. In conversation with F. C. C. personally, I received the impres-
sion that it was their function and that they were endeavoring to cover
such channels to the best of their ability.
28. Q. Did you know whether or not it was a sincere and effective
effort on their part ?
A. Insofar as the local personnel on Oahu were concerned, I believe
it was.
29. Q. Did you ever hear of their apprehending any improper com-
munications of that nature?
A. No, sir.
30. Q. Over what channels did the Consular General, Hawaii, com-
municate with his superiors in Japan?
A. Primarily by cable, occasionally by radio.
31. Q. Was there ever any telephone communication in which he
was engaged (I mean trans-Pacific telephone) ?
A. None of which I had been informed.
[210] 32. Q. Now, Commander, I will ask you to state, chrono-
logically, as nearly as possible, the results which your unit obtained
in keeping track of the movement of units of the Japanese Fleet,
beginning on or about 1 October 1941.
A. On 1 October, the general mission of the unit at Pearl was
to endeaver to obtain information from the specific types of traffic
220 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
as assigned by Washington. Secondly, to obtain information, by a
study of radio traffic originated by the Japanese stations. And,
thirdly, to obtain information by radio direction finder bearings. As
of 1 October, the first mission mentioned was being only partially
carried out due to inability on the part of the personnel concerned.
The second and third missions were, with a reasonable degree of
accuracy, being carried out. Late in October and during the month
of November, some minor successes were obtained in the field covered
by the first mission. However, the information thus obtained was
not in any sense vital. Beginning in early November, it became
apparent that certain moves were afoot, and after about three weeks
constant study an estimate was drawn up which was submitted to
the Commandant, who released a dispatch to Washington, Com-
mander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, and Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
To the best of my knowledge, this dispatch was sent out on 26
November. Between that date and the 7th of December, very little
information was obtained by means of radio intelligence, due to the
lack of traffic. During the latter part of November and the first week
in December, information previously unavailable, due to legal re-
strictions, was made available from the files of the communication
companies in Honolulu. This traffic contained the incoming and
outgoing files of the personnel attached to the Consulate General
in Honolulu.
33. Q. On broad lines, what was the substance of that estimate
which you made about 26 November ?
A. The estimate submitted on 26 November consisted, in the main,
of the opinion that the Japanese were concentrating to the south
of Japan, one force proceeding toward Indochina; the direction of
advance of the other force was not known. An additional force
of some strength and containing at least one carrier division was
placed definitely in the Marshalls area.
34. Q. How many carriers did the Japs organize in one division?
A. Two, sir.
35. Q. At about the time of this aforesaid estimate, what were you
getting along similar lines from the other two units?
A. Nothing definite except that the Far East Unit had stated, on
many occasions, that an offensive move was apparent. To the best
of my knowledge, no direction or composition of forces was given
prior to the dispatch of the estimate from Pearl.
36. Q. Narrowing this testimony down to Japanese carriers — do I
understand you to say that you thought you had located two in the
Marshall Islands or proceedmg in that direction?
A. In our opinion, at that time, at least two Japanese carriers
wei'e in the Marshalls area.
37. Q. Did you estimate other Japanese carriers to be to the
southward of, say, Formosa?
A. I do not recall whether the task forces which we included in
our estimate contained carriers south of Formosa, or not.
38. Q. On this subject of location of carriers, of which it is well
understood the Japanese possessed ten, was the unit in the Far East
in agreement with your estimate ?
[£11] A. No, sir.
39. Q. In what respect?
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 221
A. The estimate mentioned previously was not replied to by Wash-
ington. The following day, the Far Eastern Unit, commented on
the dispatch and I believe the Far Eastern Unit was in general
agreement except for the direction of movement and particularly
the placing of at least one carrier division in the Marshalls.
40. Q. Did the Far Eastern Unit suggest that more was known
about the location of Japanese carriers than was shown in your
estimate ?
A. I do not recall.
41. Q. Do you know if the aforesaid estimate and the dispatch
from Com 14, which was based thereon, were communicated to the
Commander-in-Chief ?
A, Yes, sir, the following morning the Commander-in-Chief, ac-
companied by Com 14, came to my offices and discussed the matter at
great length, at least an hour and a half, I would say.
42. Q. Do you recall if that disagreement which came to you from
the other unit in the East was likewise communicated to the
Commander-in-Chief ?
A. I am almost positive that it was by reason of the fact that
all messages of that type were given to the Commander-in-Chief.
43. Q. Were you, at that time, aware of the very tense situation
that existed between us and the Japanese, particularly insofar as diplo-
matic negotiations were concerned?
A. Yes, sir, I believe I was.
44. Q. You did not, however, obtain anything in the nature of a
similar estimate from Washington, is that correct ?
A. No, sir, we did not. I might amend that slightly by stating
that several days after the dispat<;h of our estimate and the dispatch
of the Far Eastern Unit's estimate a warning dispatch was received
from Washington. That was on the 27th. They, obviously, tied
together but there was no direct answer.
45. Q. Did it occur to you, at the time, in view of the importance
of this subject, that you had a right to expect something from Wash-
ington ?
A. No, sir. We had submitted our estimate to our superior officers
in Washington. Whether or not they replied, I considered a matter
within their purview.
46. Q. Did you look upon Japanese battleships and carriers as the
most important units ?
A. Yes, sir.
47. Q. Did you recall any uneasiness of mind because you did not
have a greater number of those ships located ?
A. There was great unease in all of our minds because of the lack
of traffic. The inability to locate more battleships and carriers was
not considered, in itself, as a bad sign by reason of the fact that up
until that time we had generally been unsuccessful in locating the
majority of the larger ships.
48. Q. What particular types of Japanese man-o-war did you feel
you were well in touch with and what importance did you put upon
their movements ?
[£12] ^ A. We maintained close touch with all of the vessels
engaged in building up bases in the Mandates and, generally, with
seaplane tenders, and occasional cruiser divisions.
222 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
49. Q. Did your unit assume that because they did not hear the
large Japanese ships talking that they were all in port?
A. No, sir.
50. Q. From, say, the 27th of November onward, do I understand
you to say that Japanese naval radio traffic was unusually light ?
A. Yes, sir.
51. Q. Did you recall any previous occasion when it was as sparse as
during that period?
A. Yes, sir. During the advance and occupation of Hainan.
52. Q. Did it occur to the minds in your unit that this silence might
be presaging another offensive movement?
A. Yes, sir, we considered that it did definitely presage another
offensive movement.
53. Q. Were you emphatic in calling the attention of your seniors
to the importance of this lack of traffic ?
A. Yes, sir.
54. Q. To whom did you represent that ?
A. To the Commandant and to my opposite number on the Com-
mander-in-Chief's Staff, namely, the Fleet Intelligence Officer. How-
ever, the objectives, insofar as my unit was concerned, did not include
areas to the eastward of the Mandate islands.
55. Q. Keverting to the subject of your general study of Japanese
characteristics, do you recall any conversation in which you engaged
concerning the characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders of that
period," particularly of Admiral Yamamoto ?
A. I do not recall any specific conversations, but I had, over a two-
year period, during which I served on the same Staff as the then
Captain McMorris, many conversations with him and other senior
officers of my opinion as to the characteristics of the various Japanese
naval high command.
56. Q. Do you recall what your general size-up of Yamamoto was at
that time ?
A. Prior to December 7, 1941, I considered Admiral Yamamoto as
not being particularly brilliant, but rather being of a type of General
Araki. In other words, a strong character who might take violent
action even without the knowledge or consent of his superiors in
Tokyo.
57. Q. You thought that he belonged to the so-called younger officer
clique ?
A. Yes, sir.
58. Q. Did you have in mind his previous work in building up the
air force of the Japanese Navy ?
A. Not particularly, sir. In reading the various statements at-
tributed to him, and during the one or two occasions that I met him,
tny estimate was that he was one of the — what we then called "fire-
brands", and might conceivably disobey any order from Tokyo under
certain circumstances.
[£J3] 59. Q. Did you look upon him as dangerous as well as
renturesome ?
A. Yes, sir.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 223
CO. Q. Insofar as you know, were those opinions of yours and the
others with whom you discussed it ever communicated to Admirals
Kimmel or Bloch ?
A. I could not say definitely whether they had, or not, except in
one or two cases where I had prepared, while attached to the Staff
of the Commander, Scouting Force, estimates in connection with the
various Rainbow Plans.
61. Q. Do you recall if the Fleet Intelligence Officer, whom I under-
stand likewise is a Japanese language interpreter, agreed with you
in your opinions ?
A. I have reason to believe that he did, sir.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged
to make any further statement covering anything relating to the sub-
ject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter
of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought
out by the previous questioning.
The witness made the following statement : I would like to men-
tion, briefly, the equipment which was available prior to December 7.
The Pearl Harbor unit was also charged with operating, under the
general supervision of the Navy Department, the mid-Pacific radio
direction finder net. This was not as efficient or as productive of re-
sults as it might have been, due to the type of equipment, lack of
trained operators, and long distances involved which rendered an effi-
cient radio direction finder net operation rather difficult. In the sum-
mer of 1941, the Commandant personally ordered the erection of addi-
tional radio direction finder sets at Midway and Palmyra, after I had
discussed the matter unsuccessfully with the Navy Department. It is
my opinion that the Commandant ordered the erection of these sta-
tions after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief. In connec-
tion with the exchange of information between the three combat in-
telligence units, all traffic, other than purely technical traffic, was also
sent to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. Prior to December 7,
the Army, to the best of my knowledge, was not engaged in any work
comparable to that of the Combat Intelligence Naval Unit in the
Hawaiian Area.
Examination by the examining officer (continued) :
62. Q. Was the Army in Hawaii equipped with material and per-
sonnel to do that kind of work ?
A. No, sir.
63. Q. As regards the Pacific radio direction finder net, did you
ever propose that still further stations be erected ?
A. Yes, sir. In general, our proposal was that additional stations
be set up in the various Pacific naval air bases then being established,
namely. Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, and Midway, as soon as they could
be accommodated. No satisfactory answer having been received, the
Commandant directed the establishment of Midway and Palmyra, and
plans had been made and material had been allocated from the pool
at Pearl Harbor for Wake.
64. Q. Was the equipment of your RDF stations up to date ?
224 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. No, sir, it was perhaps the best available at that time but the
office of Xaval Communications was then developing and had promised
us, to my knowledge, since June of 1941, modern equipment, but it had
not been completed or satisfactorily tested prior to December.
\214] The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examination then, at 2 : 15 p. m., was adjourned to await the
call of the examining officer.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 225
imA PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY
miDAY, MARCH 31, 1944
Eighteenth Dat
Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii.
•
The examination met at 10 : 20 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer,
and his counsel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the seventeenth day of the examination until such
time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with
the examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to
the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?
A. Edwin T. Layton, Captain, U. S. Navy, at present Intelligence
Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
2. Q. What were your duties during the calendar year 1941?
A. Intelligence Officer, Pacific Fleet, Staff of the Commander-in-
Chief.
3. Q. Previous to that time, did you spend some time in Japan learn-
ing the language ?
A, I did, sir.
4. Q. When?
A. From September, 1929, until October, 1932. Again, when I re-
turned to Japan as Assistant Naval Attache in April, 1937, until late
March of 1939.
5. Q. And you are qualified as a Japanese interpreter and trans-
lator?
A. I am, sir.
\215~\ 6. Q. In addition to that qualification, have you made
any particular study of the mental, moral, and psychological char-
acteristics of the Japanese?
A. To the utmost of my ability ; yes, sir.
7. Q. Have you devoted a good deal of effort in that line ?
A. I have, yes, sir, both while in Japan and while in America, con-
tinuing study along things Japanese and Japanese history, person-
79716 — i6— Ex. 144 16
226 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
alities, psychology, and particularly study of the characters in prom-
inent positions in Japan, in civil, economic, and military life.
8. Q. As Fleet Intelligence Officer in 194:1, from what sources did
you obtain information concerning the Japanese Navy ?
A. The principal source was Office of Naval Intelligence, in various
intelligence reports, estimates of ileet organizations position and Fleet
Commanders, also from dispatches from Naval Attache, Tokyo, Naval
Attache, Chungking, and his assistants, also from the Communication
Intelligence Organization, which had sections at Cavite, Guam, Pearl
Harbor, and Washington, D. C; also from Consular and State De-
partment reports forwarded through ONI to the Commander-in-
Chief; also liaison with British intelligence agencies, both through
ONI and direct through a representative attached to the British Con-
sulate in H*onolulu.
9. Q. Do you recall that in, say, October-November, 1941, you felt
that you were obtaining from those sources as much and as good in-
formation as should have been supplied?
A. Intelligence being evaluated information and a commodity of
which you can never have quite enough, it is difficult to say, I thought
at the time in question that our Intelligence coverage was good, always,
of course, leaving details of the picture incompletely filled, the task
of filling which would be monumental. By this I mean it is like a jig-
saw puzzle with parts missing; the whole picture is rarely available
as important pieces are missing.
10. Q. Then as you recall, you, at that time, felt that our intelligence
sources were doing as well as could have been done ?
A. They were doing as well as could have been done Avith the number
of personnel available and the coverage commensurate therewith.
11. Q. Did you feel that available information originating in our
State Department, or its agencies, was adequate as well as reliable?
A. The State Department and Consular reports were largely aca-
demic political studies, and intelligence — that is, military intelli-
gence — goes, were practically valueless.
12. Did you feel that the State Department was probably in pos-
session of information and estimates which would have been valuable
if known to the Commander-in-Chief?
A. Emphatically so. I say that knowing the type of reports made
by the American Ambassador in Tokyo from 1937 until 1939 during a
j)eriod of the beginning of the so-called "China incident." Knowing
the character of those reports, I think that the State Department re-
ports perhaps contained information in the period in question that
would have been of value to the Commander-in-Chief in arriving at
an estimate of the situation.
13. Q. As Fleet Intelligence Officer* did you intimately concern
yourself with the results being obtained by the Combat Intelligence
Organization ?
A. Yes, sir.
[£16] 14. Q. Did you study the relationship between the results
obtained by the three prmcipal organizations?
A. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, the information from all sources
was collected, collated, and used, but the results obtained and made
available to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, were principally
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 227
from the unit at Cavite and the local unit here at Pearl Harbor. In
fact, almost nothing came from Washington.
15. Q, Did you make your own personal estimates of the distribution
of Japanese naval forces ?
A. Yes, sir. These estimates were made and placed in Fleet In-
telligence Bulletins and distributed to the forces afloat, for their in-
formation and guidance in individual estimates.
16. Q. Did you feel that the principal unit in Washington might
have contributed more toward the intelligence picture along those
lines than actually was the case ?
A. I did. As a matter of record, when the Japanese became active
in the militarization of the Mandated islands about December, 1940,
through my liaison with the local Communication Intelligence Branch,
a very careful study and check was constantly made of this move.
The Commander-in-Chief was kept constantly informed of the situa-
tion and when visiting Washington about June, 1941, a discussion
regarding the situation apparently arose resulting in OpNav sending
the Commander-in-Chief a dispatch stating, in substance, that the
Pacific Fleet Intelligence organization apparently had some informa-
tion on the organization and militarization of the Mandate naval units
and requested it by dispatch. It was sent. This information was, at
the same time, available in Washington but, apparently, had not been
either utilized or collated, much less disseminated.
17. Q. How often did you communicate the intelligence available,
concerning the Japanese naval forces, to Admiral Kimmel ?
A. Daily, at about eight-fifteen in the morning. If subsequent
thereto an important dispatch was received, generally from Cavite, or
if important developments took place and reported from local com-
munications intelligence unit, I would take it to Admiral Kimmel at
the first opportunity he was free.
18. Q. Did those daily visits to Commander-in-Chief usually bring
forth discussion concerning the intelligence?
A. Yes, sir. A discussion concerning the intelligence submitted
and as to the Japanese disposition, intentions, and future operations
of the forces concerned, and a general discussion of the situation in
general.
19. Q. Was it usual for any other members of the Staff or any of
the Commanders of the Fleet's task forces to be present during those
discussions?
A. The Chief of Staff was most always present. On important oc-
casions, the senior War Plans Officer and the senior Operations Officer
were called in and a discussion then held. Often during these dis-
cussions, I was no longer required and was permitted to retire. When
Task Force Commanders, who were then operating out two weeks and
in one week, approximately, would return to port, the Admiral would
send for me and have me review for the benefit of the Task Force
Commanders then in port the situation and developments that had
taken place during their absence and a general discussion of Japanese
potentialities, capabilities, strength, would ensue.^ Sonietimes I was
present and sometimes I was excused, as their discussions probably
concerned future operations.
[B17] 20. Q. During those discussions with Admiral Kinimel,
whether or not there were others present, were you in the habit of
228 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
expressing your own estimates and opinions of the situation which
confronted the Commander-in-Chief?
A. I did, sir, and Admiral Kimmel welcomed and encouraged my
independent estimates or opinions, even though we would discuss
them sometime if we did not have the same one.
21. Q. Captain, will you elaborate a little further concerning those
discussions ?
A. The discussions were very general, generally starting with the
Japanese situation, both political and military, the disposition of
the Fleet, and their apparent intentions from the knowledge we had
at hand. The Admiral was particularly interested in the Mandates
and their development, both as air and other bases, and these matters
were discussed in general with the task force commanders and other
officers present, such as whether or not the Japanese had radar,
whether it had been received from the Germans via the trip of the
ASAKA MARU which went hurriedly to Europe by the Panama
Canal, the extent of the air search in the Marshalls, the estimated
air strength in the area, the question as to whether sound contacts ob-
tained off Pearl were true contacts or false contacts, that is, fish and
so forth, a discussion of whether or not it would be proper to start
a depth charge practice on one of these contacts, whether the reported
presence of baby submarines — they were called "submerged subma-
rines" — off Molokai, were submarines or whether the report was true
or false, or things of that nature. The importance of certain Japa-
nese diplomatic moves and its reflection on military policy were also
discussed. The future movements of the Pacific Fleet or its Task
Forces in compliance with the Rainbow War Plan were the subject
of conversations and discussions.
22. Q. During October and November, 1941, did you obtain,
through Combat Intelligence, any definite information which they
gained from the Japanese foreign service?
A. There were several messages that came from Washington re-
garding Japanese foreign service matters, particularly those con-
cerning destruction of cryptographic devices or documents, and one
concerning a hidden broadcast, a pseudo "weather broadcast": if
it's "east wind and rain", it meant war with America, and "north"
wind and clear" meant war with Russia, and "west wind and show-
ers" meant war with England, or some such phrases. There was
another in particular I recall which spoke of an intrigue in Thailand,
wherein the British were to be drawn into crossing the border on the
West coast in reply to an alleged Japanese landing at Singora on
the East coast. Insofar then as the British had crossed the border,
the Siamese were to declare war, as the British had invaded them,
and ask Japan for aid.
23. Q. I hand you a document which is attached to this record as
Exhibit 11. Do you recall having seen that when received?
A. Yes, sir.
24. Q. Give, if you can recall it, your own personal reaction to the
information contained therein.
A. The reaction at that time was that Japan was prepared for war
and was carrying out the previously indicated Southern move and
was making preparations accordingly. The fact that Manila and
Washington were included was considered highly significant.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 229
25. Q. Do you recall if this dispatch was delivered to the Com-
manding General, Hawaii?
[£18] A. I do not recall, sir.
26. Q. Do you recall the receipt from the Intelligence Officer, Four-
teenth Naval District, of copies of certain communications, which the
Japanese Consular General at Honolulu was concerned with, at any
time around 1 December or after?
A. I recall receipt of material received from Commander Rochef ort
on or about 9 December, but definitely after the attack.
27. Q. Then you got nothing from him concerning those prior to
the attack ?
A. Nothing from him, nor nothing from OpNav, or from any other
source.
28. Q. Were you in touch with any measures being employed by
any organization on Oahu toward monitoring the so-called "amateur"
radio traffic which might have been emanating from there?
A. No, sir. This subject had been discussed with the District In-
telligence Officer and with the officer in charge. Combat Intelligence,
and with the Fleet Communication Officer, Comn^ander Curts. It
was pointed out to me at this time, which was considerably before
December, 1941, that this function was not a function of the U. S.
naval service, nor the U. S. naval communication service ; that under
the joint action of the Army and Navy, the control of amateur broad-
casts was vested in the Federal Communications Commission, and
that the monitoring of other radio transmissions was, by agreement,
vested in the Naval Communication Service and the Army Signal
Corps by mutual agreement.
29. Q. Did you, personally, inquire into the efficacy of the meas-
ures which you just mentioned?
A. I did not.
30. Q. And do I understand you to say that you were not put in
touch with any of the results obtained by those organizations ?
A. I received nothing from the F. C. C. or the Army, directly or in-
directly, so far as I know, although the Japanese foreign office
intelligence referred to previously may have come from one of these
organizations via OpNav. I did not ask, nor was it considered proper
to inquire, as to its source. I believe, however, that that was naval
source and not Army Signal Intelligence or F. C. C. I would like to
add that the District Intelligence Officer's office maintained certain
monitoring of Japanese radio broadcasts as a service toward appreci-
ation of Japanese news from the Japanese point of view. I do not
recall the details of this, however.
31. Q. Were you frequently in touch with G-2 of the Hawaiian
Department ?
A. About the early part of October or late September, the G-2
of the Hawaiian Air Force, Colonel Edward Railey, called on me
and said that he had been made, by the G-2 Hawaiian Department,
the liaison between the Army and the Fleet here, insofar as the func-
tions of the x4.rmy Command in this area would rely principally on
air operations, and any coordinated action would undoubtedly be
through the Hawaiian Air Force in conjunction with the naval units
stationed or based here. From that time on, I saw Colonel Railey
almost every day, sometimes two or three times a day, and we main-
230 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
tained intimate liaison regarding the general situation in the Pacific
and, specifically, regarding the rise in Japanese naval air strength
in the Marshalls and the increased Japanese surface forces in that
area also, insofar as they presented a definite problem in connection
with the defense of the Hawaiian Islands.
[219] 32. Q. Did you obtain from Colonel Railey any valuable
information which you had not received from other sources?
A. I did not receive from Colonel Railey, or any Army source, any
information of the enemy. We received reports concerning the flight
of Army B-l7's to Manila by Midway and Wake and northern New
Guinea, and we furnished them with weather and other information
concerning the route.
33. Q. Will you now please state, chronologically, insofar as you
can, the results which were obtained toward keeping track of move-
ments of units of the Japanese Fleet from about 1 October on.
A. Commencing in late October, many reports were received from
China, from pilots in the Chinese Custom service, from our Assistant
Attaches in South China, and through Chinese intelligence sources,
of the movements of considerable numbers of Japanese transports and
troops to the South from Shanghai, from Foochow, from the Canton
estuary, and the movements of troops southward from northern China
through the Shanghai port of embarkation. The Naval Attache at
Tokyo informed us, on about 1 November, that elaborate plans for
the joint Army-Navy occupation of Thailand by the Japanese were
complete and that the combined Fleet was then in the Kure-Sacki
area; that the invasion was to follow the lines of the German blitz-
kreig of Holland and Belgium, and that considerable air forces were
being assembled in the Taiwan-Hainan area, and that the Indo-China
forces were being strengthened to a total of 100,000. The withdrawal
of the Japanese merchant ships from Western Hemisphere waters was
noted locally as well as our being informed by OpNav. The move-
ments of men and materiel to the Mandates was also observed in the
early part of November. Reoccurring reports of movements of
Japanese transports, escorted by destroyers, to the South along the
China Coast, and their arrival in the French Indo-China area and
Haiphong and Saigon were received from time to time. The loadings
of some of these transports — that is, landing craft, tanks, troops, rail-
road equipment, motorboats — led to a belief that amphibious opera-
tions were being contemplated, the area of operations to be in the
South, exact location as yet undetermined. In mid-November, our
best intelligence sources detected the beginning of the formation of
the Japanese surface-force task forces ; concerned and associated with
southern destinations, as well as the movements of naval aircraft to
the Hainan Islands — Southern Formosa region. These were more or
less confirmed by reports from the North China area by Army and
Navy observers, and somewhat substantiated by one report from the
American Consulate at Tsingtao. These groupings and activation of
units of the Combined Fleet with southern destinations were noted
and commented on by Admiral Kimmel, and the Combat Intelligence
Unit, Fourteenth Naval District, specifically noted this activity as the
forerunner of operations, judging from past experience, and Admiral
Kimmel asked what we had received from other units. I replied,
"Nothing yet." He then directed me to tell Commander Rochefort
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 231
that he desired them to initiate a special message concerning the de-
velopments noted to OpNav and Cavite, Guam then being inactive.
This resulted in a dispatch sent by the Com 14 Combat Intelligence
Unit in which a task force organization was laid out in the general
tenor as follows: Tliat a task force under the Commander-in-Chief,
Second Fleet, has been organized, comprised of the Second Fleet, the
Third Fleet which includes the First and second Base Forces and
Defense Divisions, which corresponds, generally, to our amphibious
forces), the combined Air Force of the Shore-based Air Command,
the Destroyer Squadrons of the Second and Third Fleets, plus one
squadron from the First Fleet, plus two Subrons and one Battleship
Division. These were estimated to be forming up for movement to
the South China area and associated with the I'rench Indo-China,
Sama (Hainan Island), and Taihouku and Takao, Formosa. It was
noted, also, that the naval units at Palau were [^0] somewhat
connected with this Second Fleet Commander's activity, and that per-
haps certain of these units might even proceed in that direction. It
was noted, also, that there was a concentration of submarines and air
groups in the Marshalls, and estimated that at least one Carrier Di-
vision, plus about a third of the submarine fleet, were in the Marshalls
area. It was estimated that these forces would operate in the southern
Asia area, with component part possibly operating from Palau and the
Marshalls. Almost coincident with this time was an inquiry from the
Dutch Naval Command as to the possibility of a Japanese seizure of
Portugese Timor and expressed the determination of the Dutch High
Command that should Japanese forces carry out such an indicated
thrust, that the Dutch would consider it an invasion and act accord-
ingly. We were asked to comment on this development, but could
find nothing positive to substantiate the Dutch report. After receipt
of the Combat Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District, estimate of
Japanese formation of the task forces and its indicated direction of
movement, the Cavite unit, under Com 16, confirmed the indications
noted here and estimated that this task force of the First, Second, and
Third Fleets and Submarine Force were comprised into a loose-knit
organization, apparently divided into two major sections. The major-
ity of the strength of cruisers being in the first section and destined
for the South China area. Minor strengths being probably destined
for the Palau area, and that carriers of CarDiv 3 and possibly CarDiv
4 were concerned with the South China area movement of the No. 1
Force. The First and Second Fleet carriers were also estimated to be
in the Sasebo-Kure area. Com 16's unit, however, could not confirm
the supposition by 14's unit that carriers and submarines, in force,
were in the Mandates. Prior to this, specifically on the 25th of No-
vember, the Commander-in-Chief received a dispatch from OpNav
which stated, in substance, that the chances of a favorable outcome
of negotiations then pending in Washington were very doubtful, and
expressed the opinion that a surprise, aggressive movement in any
direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, to be a
possibility, and cautioned against anything that would complicate
an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. On the
27th, as I recall it, a war warning was received from OpNav. I be-
lieve that it was aided by the two dispatches I referred to from the
Com 14 unit and the Com 16 unit. It stated that the negotiations in
232 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Washington had ended and that an aggressive move b;^ the Japanese
within the next few days was expected, that an amphibious expedition
was probablj^ imminent against either the Philippines, Thailand, the
Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo. We were told the War Depart-
ment was sending a similar warning. This message was passed in
paraphrase form, which I wrote myself, to the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, through the liaison officer with the Hawaiian
Department. That same evening, incidentally, the liaison officer with
the Hawaiian Department brought over from the Commanding Gen-
eral, Hawaiian Department, the Army's warning they had received
separately, and showed this copy to the Commander-in-Chief, Chief
of Staff, and other high ranking officers present. I did not see the
Army dispatch, but from the discussion that came up, I could conclude
only that it was almost a duplicate as those words were used. This
Navy Liaison Officer reported to me, subsequently, that he had re-
turned the Army dispatch to the senior officer of the Headquarters,
Hawaiian Department, in the absence of both General Short and his
Chief of Staff, and, at the same time, delivered the Navy's para-
phrased war warning to the same officer, after trying to deliver it
in person to General Short or his Chief of Staff. When unable to
deliver it in person, he gave it to the Senior Staff Officer on duty in
G-3 with the statement that this was a very secret dispatch sent over
from Admiral Kimmel for General Short. On the 28th, information
was received by the British Consul, locally, [221] from a source
usually reliable, stating that the Japanese would attack the Kra Isth-
mus from sea on 1 December without ultimatum or declaration of
war. The main landing was to be at Singora. At this time, the mes-
sage regarding the false weather broadcast to indicate a condition of
war was also received, and from the State Department were reports
of movements of troops and ships in the Saigon and French Indo-
China general area, substantiating previous estimates and reports
of increased forces being rushed to that area. On 1 December, there
was received a dispatch from OpNav, I previously referred to re-
garding the intrigue in Thailand to get the British to attack, and in
this Singora was again mentioned and seemed to fit in with previous
dispatches regarding future Japanese activity in that area. On 2
December, reports received from CinCAF of Japanese submarines
and transports off Saigon and in Camranh Bay, which checked pre-
viously indicated movements and previous information. On 3 De-
cember, there was received a dispatch I was previously shown as Ex-
hibit 11, which tends to confirm the general picture presented to
that time, that is, active military operations were about to commence
with the "Southern Expansion Program" of the Jap Navy to be put
into effect. On 6 December, a report from CinCAF received stated
CinC China had reported a twenty-five ship convoy, six cruisers, and
ten destroj'ers, in a position in the Gulf of Siam, as well as another
convoy of ten ships, ten destroyers, and two cruisers in a different posi-
tion, all on course West. Also that CinCAF forces sighted thirty
ships and one large cruiser in Camranh Bay. On 1 December, the
Commander-in-Chief requested that I present to him a paper showing
the approximate location of the Japanese naval units, which I pre-
pared and submitted. In showed, briefly, that except for Battleships
Divisions One and Two, DesRon One, CarDivs One and Two, and
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 233
Cruiser Division Eight, and possibly CruDiv Six — the latter was
marked "May head for the Mandates?" — that all other important
Japanese naval forces were South of Shanghai, the majority of which
were in the Bako and Takao area, that a considerable concentration
of shore-based aircraft, probably 250, under Commander, Combined
Air Force, were in the Hainan-Takao area, and that the CinC Second
Fleet, in command of the Task Force, cruisers, destroyers, and sub-
marines, was at Takao; that in the Mandates was the usual Fourth
Fleet, consisting of three cruisers, two old cruisers, eight destroyers,
one submarine tender, seven submarines, two minelayers, twelve aux-
iliary minelayers, patrol boats, etc., and thirteen auxiliary trans-
ports, and 140 planes. Admiral Kimmel asked me how well identified
and how well placed in Japan were the battleships and carrier divisions
that I referred to previously. I told him that they were not positively
identified in Japanese ports but were believer to be in Japanese waters,
due to their jjast activity and lack of, or negative information.
34. Q. How many carriers did the Japanese organize in one di-
vision ?
A. Normally two carriers plus two destroyer plane guards to one
division.
35. Q. And how many divisions would that mean, total ?
A. That would mean that they had approximately five divisions.
At the time in question, there was positively identified: Carrier Di-
vision One of the AKAGI and KAGA ; Carrier Division Two of the
SOKYU and HIRYU; Carrier Division Three of the RYUJO and
one unknown carrier ; Carrier Division Four of the KASUGi^ and it
was believed another carrier that we didn't know, nor do I know to
this date; Carrier Division Five of the new SHOKAKU and ZUI-
KAKU were just completing training and had not been particularly
active with the Fleet. These were the two newest and latest carriers.
[222] 36. Q. As regards what type of ship was the main disagree-
ment between those units of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval
Districts ?
A. The only disagreement noted was the Fourteenth unit believed
that a carrier division and one-third of the Japanese submarine force
was in the Marshalls. The Sixteenth District unit said, in substance,
that they could not confirm the supposition that the above forces were
in the Marshalls.
37. Q. Did the two units generally agree as regards the numbers of
carriers in home waters?
A. I don't believe it was ever a matter of disagreement or agreement,
as, at that time, all units forwarded their reports to OpNav and any
disagreement in these matters would be not so much errors in judg-
ment, as the matter of available material, due to distance and other
factors. OpNav made no attempt at this, or other times prior to the
war, to reconcile or evaluate the opinions expressed or clarify the
general picture from the reports produced. There may have been
messages passed between Fourteen and Sixteen, of which I had no
knowledge.
38. Q. At about the time in question, say from 27 November onward,
did you, personally, make anything which constituted an estimate of
the situation on the possibility of an organization containing carriers
striking at Hawaii ?
234 CONGRESSIONAL IN\-ESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I do not believe that such an estimate was made after 27 Novem-
ber, but the possibilities of this occurring had been discussed at some
time previous. Tliis occurred in a discussion vrherein Japanese poten-
tialities and capabilities was being discussed with Admiral Kimmel,
and I told him of their books, written for their own propaganda pur-
poses and increased armaments; that in this book the author stated
that the American Commander-in-Chief, when his Fleet was concen-
trated in Hawaii, would be concerned with three possible Japanese
measures of attack: (1) Attack on Pearl Harbor, using carriers,
cruisers, and fast battleships; (2) An attack on the Aleutians, includ-
ing an occupation force ; and (3) An attack on the American mainland.
The discussion was in a broad sense but I do not recall any of the
details thereof.
39. Q. Did you ever advise Admiral Kimmel that with the set-up
of forces as placed by your intelligence toward the end of November,
the Japanese would be unable to supply cruisers and destroyers suf-
ficient to form a carrier task force which could strike at Hawaii ?
A. I do not believe that point was made specifically. That, how-
ever, was my personal estimate : that with the allocation of forces to
the southern movement, the remaining forces were weak, particularly
in destroyers and cruisers, although potentially powerful in offense;
that is, the carriers. I expressed that as an opinion before the Roberts
Commission and not as an estimate of the situation that I had ex-
pressed, formally or informally, to Admiral Kimmel. I do not
recall having expressed that as a formal or informal estimate.
40. Q. Do you recall any personal concern which you hacl because
of the lack of information from Washington, based on intelligence
sources of the nature which you have just been discussing?
A. I recall that at the time, particularly over the week-end of the
first of December, that I couldnt understand why "Washington didn't
give us more information, but presumed that perhaps they didn't
have it. It was a source of considerable concern both to Commander
Rochef ort and me and we remained at our telephones throughout that
week-end. although I was back at the office on the Sunday to confer
with Admiral Kimmel.
[223] 41. Q. Was it reported to you, during the week or ten days
prior to 7 December. '41, that the lack of radio traffic on the part of the
Japanese Navy was. in itself, an ominous sign ?
A. That is a difficult question because the Japanese changed their
call signs on 1 December, which, in itself, was considered rather
ominous in view of the other information. The lack of identifiable
traffic could be anticipated under those circumstances. The lack of
great volumes of traffic does not always indicate an imminent move
but it fitted very well with the picture of the southern movement dis-
cussed previously.
42. Q. Eevertmg to your answer to my question concerning general
study of the Japanese characteristics and so forth, do you recall any
advice and opinions which you gave Admiral Kimmel during the latter
half of 1941, say, concerning the characteristics of the Japanese naval
leaders?
A. I believe that the discussion regarding Japanese naval leaders
was before the end of 1941 but certainly was in the middle of 1941. I
don't recall the exact date, but there was a discussion as to who the
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 235
Japanese leaders were, particularly when General To jo became the
Premier. There were many discussions as to General Tojo, what sort
of a policy he would follow, and also regarding the character, general
background, of the leading Japanese naval officers. There were also
discussions as to Admiral Nomura, their Ambassador to Washington,
and Mr. Kurusu, and the probable negotiations and mission concerned
therewith.
43. Q. Do you recall any particular estimate which you gave con-
cerning Admiral Yamamoto?
A. I do. I knew Admiral Yamamoto personally. My estimate
was, in effect, that he was verv capable, a very thoroughly grounded
and trained officer; that he possessed more brains than any other
Japanese in the High Command. I illustrated it by saying that he
could win at poker among good poker players, and could play better
bridge than most good bridge players, and that I knew he was a cham-
pion in his own right of the Japanese chess game, "Go." I illustrated
that to show that his mind was keen, alert, and that also from my
personal observation and from general Ja])anese service reputation,
he was an outstanding officer.
44. Q. Did 3'ou consider him one of the so-called ''younger officer"
element ?
A. No, sir, I did not. I do not believe that he was associated with
the so-called "young officer movement".
45. Q. Did you advise Admiral Kimmel of Admiral Yamamoto's
previous experience in building up the Japanese naval air force ?
A. I do not recall the exact details, but I think I discussed the fact
that he was not only the Vice Naval Minister when I was in Tokyo,
but was also the Commander of Naval Aviation Headquarters, the first
that they appointed, and that he was, at the time of the first bombing
of China in 1937, particularly concerned with the welfare and opera-
tion of the Japanese Naval Air Force. I do not recall, however,
as to what degree this was discussed.
46. Q. Did you point out that Admiral Yamamoto was particularly
venturesome?
A. No, sir, other than to say that he was an able opponent at poker
or bridge, and that he always played a poor hand well.
47. Q. Did you ever specifically warn Admiral Kimmel that in view
of these characteristics of Admiral Yamamoto, or of others, there was
probability of a carrier raid upon Oahu ?
[224] A. That matter was discussed at the time, as I previously
mentioned. I gave a brief outline of the Japanese book wherein a
carrier raid on Oahu was specifically mentioned, and he asked me
then what I thought of the chances. I said. 'T only hope we can
intercept them," and that "I hope that the air search will find them
in plenty of time." In the discussion in general regarding Japan's
strength, I believe that the subject of Japan's carriers was mentioned
and that Japan could not afford to gamble too much wherein she
might lose the war in the first battle when she had larger stakes, more
vital stakes, at hand.
48. Q. Do you recall your own reaction to the phrase concerning
war warning in the Department's dispatch of 27 November?
A. As it was the first dispatch that I had ever seen saying "This
is a war warning", I took particular note of it. I thought it over
236 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
considerably. Meanwhile, its subconscious impression was that it
certainly fitted the picture up to date, and that we would be at war
shortly if Japan would decide to leave her Philippine flank open and
proceed southward, hoping, meanwhile, to mollify us through a com-
promise deal via Kurusu-Nomura negotiations. It made me feel that
the picture we had was a good picture, and perhaps complete, and
that the times were verj^ critical and perhaps the Department hoped
for a last minute compromise in view of their statement that nothing
should be done to aggravate an already serious situation. I saw the
Army, that evening, take their condition of readiness, trucks moving,
troops moving, and I thought I saw weapons moving in the street, and
I presumed that they were going into full condition of readiness, in-
cluding the emplacement of anti-aircraft and other mobile weapons
around Pearl Harbor and other important points on Oahu.
49. Q. Did you then estimate that the Japs really would make an
attack to the southward, perhaps beyond Thailand, leaving the Philip-
pine position on their flank?
A. My estimate was unclear. 1 was not convinced that they would
leave their flank unguarded. On the other hand, I was convinced
that they would continue their southern advance perhaps depending
on a compromise settlement in Washington to see to it we remained
out of the hostilities due, first, the threat, and second, our relatively
unpreparedness for war.
50. Q. Did your thinking along those lines at that time take into
account the position in which the Japs found themselves, incident to
frozen credits, under which they could not obtain petroleum products
from the southern oil fields ?
A. It did. The freezing of credits wherein their supplies from
America were cut off, crystalized my belief in the "expansion to the
South" being for the means of obtaining, by military means, if neces-
sary, the petroleum products for which they had fruitlessly negotiated
with the Nei through Yoshizawa earlier in the year.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged
to make any further statement covering anything relating to the sub-
ject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter
of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought
out by the previous questioning.
The witness made the following statement: I have one matter
which I think should be properly included in the record. Admiral
Kimmel, as I mentioned [225] before, always consulted with
his Task Force Commanders, District Commandant, on the war warn-
ing for instance, and had with them, many times in my hearing, a
complete, free, and frank discussion of the situation, and asked and
received their opinions regarding it. I frequently took messages of
secret, ultra-secret, and confidential nature to these Commanders on
their Flagships on specific occasions as there was on Saturday morn-
ing, 6 December, when the report I have mentioned from CinC Asiatic
Fleet, giving the sightings of the Japanese naval and auxiliaries units
in the Gulf of Siam and Camranh Bay by CinCAF forces. I took
that to Admiral Pye on his Flagship, the CALIFORNIA, and there
again a complete and free discussion took place as to what all this
meant, not only this message but others they had seen and discussed.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 237
That was the only place that I recall as having said positively that
the movement into the Gulf of Siam was, I considered, very significant
and that the only problem remaining was whether or not they would
leave us on their flank as a menace or take us out on the way down.
Admiral Pye and his Chief of Staff told me their opinion was that the
Japanese would not attack us. When I returned the message to the
files. Admiral Kimmel asked me what they said. I repeated their
conversation, in abbreviated form. On other occasions, other Ad-
mirals expressed apprehension as to the status of the Asiatic Fleet
and our forces in the Asiatic waters, and were very anxious regarding
the situation, indicating that they were not convinced that Japan
could by-pass our Philippine flank. It was my personal opinion that
the thought of attack on Pearl Harbor at that time was very far from
most people's minds. I want to say this: I had all the information
of intelligence sources, and I had spent all of my time trying to eval-
uate these jig-saw puzzle pieces to make the true picture of events to
come, and I think I was as surprised as anyone when the Japanese
attacked the following morning.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 12 : 12 p. m., took a recess until 2 : 10
p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened.
Present : The examining officer and his counsel and assistant counsel.
The examining officer introduced George Warrington, Jr., Yeoman
First Class, U. S. Navy, who was duly sworn.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface
to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present station.
A. W. L. Calhoun, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander Service
Force, Pacific Fleet.
2. Q. Sir, what duties were you performing on December 7, 1941 ?
A. I was Commander Base Force, U. S. Fleet, on board my Flag-
ship, the U. S. S. ARGONNE at ten-ten dock, Navy Yard, Pearl
Harbor. «8
[226] 3. Q. Admiral, what opportunity did you have to observe
the condition of the officei-s and men of the Fleet on 7 December 1941
in regards to sobriety or drunkenness ?
A. One of my duties as Commander Base Force was in charge of
Shore Patrol. At about twenty-five or twenty-seven minutes after
eight o'clock on the morning of 7 December 1941, I was entering
through the main gate of Pearl Harbor. It was necessary to clear a
way for me as traffic conditions were quite crowded. On one or
two occasions I had to get out of one car and into another car and
I passed many officers and men returning to their ships. Realizing
the importance of getting these men off promptly to their commands,
I stopped long enough to talk to the beach guard and patrol officer
on the dock and saw that both were being efficiently and properly
handled and the people were readily and rapidly being returned to
their ships. At about 0845, I arrived at ten-ten dock and on board
238 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
the AKGONNE and thereafter used all of our boats and com-
mandeered many other boats to return officers and men to the Fleet.
Admiral Kimmel had directed that I take charge of all activities on
the waterfront. Ships not having full crews aboard, getting up
steam, and ready to go to sea were directed to apply to Commander
Base Force and I made up details of men whose ships had already
proceeded to sea and sent them to ships, principally destroyers. I,
personally, rubbed shoulders with hundreds of officers and literally
thousands of men that morning. And it is with a feeling of pride
that I can state that they were extremely orderly and cold sober, nat-
urally, to some extent, awed and surprised by the events of the morn-
ing, but they were all a well-behaved, very sober group of officers and
men, who had only one desire and that was to return to a ship in
which they could render service. One the forenoon of December 7,
1941, 1 sent my Flag Secretary and Flag Lieutenant, whom I ordered
the moment I went aboard the ARGONNE that morning to go to the
various landings and in the yard and circulate among the men with
exactly the idea of seeing what was their conduct. In 1923, I com-
manded the U. S. S. Young, Destroyer 312, lost at Honda. I well
remembered on that Sunday morning, December 7, how the papers of
the West Coast of the United States had commented on drunken-
ness and published cartoons of drunken men and officers in the Honda
wreck. With this thought in mind, that is why I personally sent my
Flag Secretary and Flag Lieutenant to generally observe the conduct
of the men and officers of the Fleet while assisting in boat transporta-
tion and carrying out other waterfront duties while so observing.
My Flag Secretary was Lieutenant E. P. Southwick, now Com-
mander Southwick, and my Flag Lieutenant was Lieutenant Harry
Johnson, now Commander Johnson. Both of these officers and the
Beach Guard Officer on duty at the Fleet Landing that morning
reported to me that the conduct of all hands was excellent. I can
not recall having seen one officer or man who was not cold sober.
That is a fairly large order, as it was a week-end crowd that had been
in town with no idea of sudden return to duty early that Sunday
morning.
4. Q. Sir, were arrests by the Shore Patrol for drunkenness on the
night preceding the attack greater than was usual for a Saturday
night?
A. No, on the contrary our records show that for the two or three
weeks preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor that there had been
almost no disorderly conduct at any time except an occasional boy
here or there who had too many beers in the heat of the tropical sun.
5. Q. Do you recall the orders affecting the men belonging to ships
as to determination of liberty on the week-end ?
A. Yes. All liberty except for special cases and passes, and except
for those married men of the former Hawaiian Detachment who had
their families [^27] here, was up at one a. m. Overnight lib-
erty was granted for Chief Petty Officers and Petty Officers First
Class. Commanding Officers were granted fairly wide latitude and
over this particular week-end a fairly large liberty party was ashore,
consisting of married men. Chief Petty Officers, and Petty Officers
First Class, and other special passes granted to men who had their
homes in the Hawaiian Area. I should state that a great number of
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 239
people who crowded the roadway there when I passed through the
main gate of the Navy Yard were attached to the Fourteenth Naval
District who lived out in the housing area and were quartered there.
There were certainly two or three hundred officers concerned and seven
to eight hundred men who had liberty in accordance with existing
orders. At that time, there must have been at least fifty thousand
enlisted men here in the Fleet and I consider that a very small per-
centage of people ashore over a week-end. A much higher percentage
of officers were ashore than of enlisted men.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged
to make any further statement covering anything relating to the sub-
ject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of
record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out
by the previous questioning.
The witness made the following statement : I became Commander
Base Force when Admiral C. C. Bloch was Commander-in-Chief,
United States Fleet. I served as Commander Base Force, through
the entire period of command of Admiral J. O. Tiichardson who
relieved Admiral Bloch as Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet;
and I continued to serve as Commander Base Force throughout the
entire period of Admiral Kimmel's command of the U. S. Fleet. The
morale, conduct, and behavior of the officers and men of the Fleet were
well known to me. I did not go to sea in task forces. In addition to
my other duties, I was in charge of Shore Patrol, and was also in
charge of the Off-shore — In-shore Security Patrol until relieved of
them by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in February-
March, 1940. The Fleet was in a healthy state of training. The
conduct of the officers and men after the surprise attack on Sunday
morning, and the way they fought back when they did get going, is
certainly one of the finest traditions of the United States Navy. I
attended all conferences. Admiral Kimmel gave to all Flag Officers
in his Fleet every bit of information which he had which he was
permitted to pass along to us. I know that the Commanders of the
three Task Forces, into which the Fleet was divided, Task Force One,
Two, and Three, headed by Vice Admirals Pye, Brown, and Halsey,
when they were in port, received this same information because I sat
there and heard it. I never missed the Admiral's conferences, because
I was always in port. I give as my considered opinion, as one of the
senior Rear Admirals here at that time, that Admiral Kimmel would
have gladly entertained from any officer under his command any
suggestion at any time for the betterment and safety of the Fleet.
He repeatedly asked at conferences, when he informed us what he
was doing, if anybody had any suggestion for change. Having
signed for almost two years the orders for the Security Patrol, which
included the Off-shore destroyer patrols and close-in djestroyer
patrols, until relieved by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval
District some months prior to the Japanese sneak attack, I do know
that most of the emphasis on security was placed on the fact that we
were protecting ourselves against the acts of irresponsible nationals.
The last order issued by me stated : "As an assumption that respon-
sible foreign powers will not provoke war under existing conditions
by attacks on the Fleet or Base, that irresponsible and misdirected
240 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
[^28] nationals of foreign powers might attempt sabotage or
block the channel to Pearl Harbor or to lay magnetic mines outside
of Pearl Harbor, or to make submarine attacks without warning."
I did not hold or entertain any idea that as long as there was a Min-
ister of Peace in Washington, from Japan, that there would be any
imminence of attack. Had I held that opinion, I would have stated
it to Admiral Kimmel and I feel sure that nearly every other officer
here felt the same as I. We did not expect any immediate sneak
attack by the Japanese at the time it came. When I say "we", I mean
from the conversations and discussions which I heard almost daily
in the Commander-in-Chief's office, where certainly some of the best
talent of the Navy was collected. I knew of Admiral Kimmel's orders
for patrol and how he was using what little he had, and did not have
any suggestion to offer to improve the situation. I would have felt
free to make suggestions if I had had them. The attack came as a
complete one hundred per cent surprise to me and it was only the
terrible tragedy of the morning that really made me believe it had
occurred. There was one occasion when acting in charge of Off-shore
patrol that a destroyer reported he had contacted a submerged sub-
marine and asked for instructions. At that time, I was Senior Officer
Present Afloat, the Fleet being out under command of Admiral Rich-
ardson. I gave orders if they had contacted a submarine submerged
in the restricted defensive sea area and could not identify it as our
own to attack it with depth charges and destroy it. These orders
held until Admiral Richardson and the Fleet returned to port and were
very soon thereafter cancelled by him. In giving me this order of
cancellation, he informed me that it was done on the orders of higher
authority. This occurred some time in August or September, 1940,
during a period when the entire Fleet was ordered to sea in secrecy.
The Fleet took a course, later known to be to the South and Eastward
of the Island of Hawaii and stayed out of touch with everybody and
everything, in radio silence, for a period of seven or eight days. I
know that there was much newspaper comment as to where was the
Fleet.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examination then, at 3 : 03 p. m., was adjourned to await the call
of the examining officer.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 241
[m-] PBOCEEDINGS OF THE HAET INQUIEY
SATURDAY, APRIL 1, 1944
Nineteenth Day
Pearl Harbor, Territory of Haw ah.
The examination met at 9 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer,
and his counsel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as
reporter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still
binding.
The examining ofRcer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the eighteenth day of the examination until such
time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with
the examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface
to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. Wliat is your name, rank, ai\d present station ?
A. Granville C. Briant, Commander, A-(V)G, U. S. N. R., Avia-
tion Aide and District Aviation Officer, Fourteenth Naval District,
and Hawaiian Sea Frontier.
2. Q. What duties were you performing during the latter half of
1941?
A. Performing the duties of Aviation Aide to the Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District.
3. Q. That was Admiral Bloch ?
A. Yes, sir.
4. Q. Will you give a brief resume of your naval experience prior
to assuming those duties ?
A. I graduated from the Naval Academy in 1929, was commis-
sioned Ensign following graduation, reported to the TEXAS in
New York Harbor at the time. I was on the TEXAS and acted as
junior watchstander and in the Gunnery Department, later Assistant
Navigator, until I was detached and sent to preliminary flight train-
ing in Norfolk. Upon completion of that duty, I returned to the
TEXAS and joined the ship at Guantanamo. I stayed on the TEXAS
until October— I believe that's correct>^1930, and I went to Pensacola
for flight training. Completed Pensacola and was ordered to U. S. S.
79716—46 — Ex. 144 17
242 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
LANGLEY as a naval aviator in Scouting Squadron One. I, later,
was transferred to the LOUISVILLE as aviator on the LOUIS-
VILLE, Scouting Squadron Ten. From there, I went to Patrol
Squadrons, and, following from Patrol Squadron duty, to the SARA-
TOGA. I resigned from the Navy in November, 1939, and attended
the Harvard Post-Graduate School of Business Administration. I
was in the Naval Eeserve while at Harvard, flying from the Naval
[230] Reserve Base of Squantum. I was ordered to active duty
on the 2nd of June, 1941.
5. Q. Aviation Aide Officer to Admiral Bloch, who, in addition to
other duties, was the Naval Base Defense Officer, do you recall having
given him any advice concerning the possibility of carrier raids into
the Pearl Harbor area in the latter part of 1941 ?
A. No, sir, I do not.
6. Q. Did the probability or possibility of such a surprise attack
enter in your thoughts to any great extent?
A. Vaguely, yes, brought to mind more when Lieutenant Com-
mander Taylor appeared in this area to set up an aircraft warning
system for this area.
7. Q. During November-December, '41, were you one of the District
Watch Officers?
A. Yes, sir.
8. Q. How many were on that watch list ?
A. I think there were eight to ten officers.
9. Q. Over what hours of the day was that watch carried on ?
A. From about four in the afternoon to eight the following morning.
On Sundays, the duty officer was on watch all day.
10. Q. How many hours long were the watches ?
A. The watches — the one officer — the Operations Officer took the
watch, to the best of my memory, from eight in the morning, when he
was there, until four in the afternoon. The District Duty Officer, I
believe it was called, had to sleep on the Base and perform the functions
of District Watch Officer from four in the afternoon until eight in the
morning.
11. Q. Wliere was the regular watch normally stood ?
A. It was a room in the Administration Building, Fourteenth Naval
District.
12. Q. But after working hours, the District Watch Officer was not
required to be physically present ?
A. Yes, he had to be in the vicinity and he could go out for food.
They ate over at the Officers Club.
13. Q. Could he turn in at night?
A. Yes, sir.
14. Q. In his own quarters?
A. No, sir, he had a bunk in the Duty Officer's room. I was only on
that watch list a short time.
15. Q. I show you Fleet Confidential Letter 2CL-41, which is Ex-
hibit 4 before this board; was that available to the District Watch
Officer at all times ?
A. Yes, sir, I believe this was in our Watch Officer's Manual. I
remember having read this.
16. Q. Were there other specific instructions issued by the Naval
Base Defense Officer to the District Watch Officers?
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 243
[£S1] A. There were several directives as to how to proceed on
air raid warning. We had an air raid warning system of sounding
alarm. I don't remember the details of it but I'm sure there was a
procedure in effect for air raid defense.
17. Q. Do you recall whether or not you, as one of the District Watch
Officers, considered those instructions sufficiently definite and as
covering possibilities in case of surprise attack ?
A. At that time, I think the instructions would probably be satis-
factory to an officer with considerable naval experience.
18. Q. Were there any changes made in the DWO's instructions as
the situation with the Japanese grew more tense in November, 1941 ?
A. I believe that the Operation Department continually revised
operation procedure |or defense in this area.
19. Q. Do you recall anything specific which came to you as one
of the DWO's during that period ?
A. No, sir, I don't.
20. Q. Do you recall whether your last tour of duty as DWO was
prior to 7 December ?
A. No, sir, I do not, but my next tour would have been on the
following Saturday night and Sunday morning, through an exchange
of watches.
21. Q. Because of your general naval experience prior to this time,
it would appear that you were sufficiently qualified for the duties of
DWO and were fully acceptable as such. At the time, what was your
own opinion as to the number of officers on the DWO's list who were
also qualified for the duty ?
A. From, possibly, five. The others had not recently been, in my
opinion, in close contact with naval combat activities.
22. Q. Did all the officers on the DWO's watch list have other duties
during working hours ?
A. Yes, sir, to the best of my memory. I do not believe the Opera-
tions Officer was required to stand that watch, except during working
hours. He was senior watch officer, to the best of my memory.
23. Q. Would it have been practicable to so assign the District's
officers that no one would have been included on the list whose qualifica-
tions were doubtful ?
A. Possibly, by including heads of departments.
24. Q. As you recall, were there no other officers available to Admiral
Bloch who could have been given these duties without doubling up, as
additional to their regular duties during regular working hours?
A. No, sir.
25. Q. Outside of working hours, was there anyone in the Duty
Watch Officer's post who was awake at all times ?
A. I don't remember that.
26. Q. Was there a continuous watch of enlisted men for communi-
cation purposes?
[232] A. In the Communication Department, yes, sir. The adja-
cent Communication Office had a twenty-four hour watch.
27. As one of the Duty Watch Officers, did you consider that the
local communications were adequate to carry out the duties which
would result from surprise enemy action ?
A. At the time, the continuous revision of the defense measures was
tending to result in the establishment of a control center which could
244 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
receive information from various parts of the Island. That was set
up within a day or two after the 7th of December. It was in the process
of being set up,
28. Q. Were there available to the Duty Watch Officer any rapid
communication other than the regular peacetime telephone system?
A. There was an air raid warning signal, siren, which was used in
air raid drills. We had air raid drills weekly. Admiral Bloch stressed
the need for it. That's the only outside one that I can remember, other
than the standard communication system.
29. Q. What facilities did the DWO have for coordinating anti-
aircraft fire in case of attack ?
A. The signal tower and the normal communication channels.
30. Q. How could the signal tower function in that respect?
A. Well, they could send a message by semaphore and they had flag
hoists signal, also a signal light. That was the three methods of stand-
ard communications. In the Yard there, it was used the same as the
signal bridge on a ship ; the signal hoists and the usual communica-
tions.
31. Q. And nothing else in addition to the regular Yard telephone
system ; is that correct ?
A. Nothing that I remember other than the siren which, when
sounded a certain number of times, meant air raid warnings, all clear,
etc.
32. Q. Do you recall any changes made in composition of the DWO's
watch list immediately after 7 December ?
A. Yes, sir.
33. Q. What?
A. The Admiral required the immediate Staff be available con-
tinuously — one of the immediate Staff be available continuously on
watch for some period after the 7th (after the attack) until other
officers were trained and watch standees were used as part of the Defen-
sive Control Office.
34. Q. What responsibility did the District Watch Officer have with
respect to the Harbor nets in Pearl Harbor and Honolulu Harbors?
A. To my memory, the Harbor nets were controlled by the Harbor
Control Post and he could have those opened or closed as he saw fit.
35. Q. Did he have to get permission from the Commandant or
higher authbrity?
A. I don't believe he did.
36. Q. What was the routine with resjDCct to the nets as to being
opened or closed, hours that they were opened and closed, and so
forth?
A. I don't remember the exact details on that.
[233] 37. Q. What authority did the District Watch Officer have
with respect to the ready-duty destroyer ?
A. I can not remember that, sir.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged
to make any further statement covering anything relating to the sub-
ject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter
of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought
out by the previous questioning.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 245
The witness made the following statement : In my own opinion, the
message which was supposed to have arrived on the 26th of November,
concerning, the Japanese situation, should have been disseminated
throughout the Staff and to the watch officers. To my mind, no atten-
tion was ever invited to us of the seriousness of the situation.
Examination by the examining officer (Continued) :
38. Q. Then during the latter half of November, and up to 7 De-
cember, '41, the officers of the DWO's list received no specific warnings
of the tense situation which might presage an attack ?
A. No, sir.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 9 : 40 a.m., took a recess until 2 p.m.,
at which time the examination was reconvened.
Present : The examining officer, his counsel and assistant counsel, and
the reporter.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface
to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.
A. Charles H.McMorris, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff
for Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Pacific Ocean Area.
2. Q. l^Tiat duties were you performing during the calendar year
1941?
A. During January, I was Operations Officer on the Staff of the
Commander, Scouting Force, and from 1st of February to the end of
the year, I was War Plans Officer for the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet.
3. Q. As War Plans Officer on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, did you attend the Staff conferences?
A. Yes, almost without exception.
[34'] 4. Q. Were your relations with the Commander-in-Chief
close ?
A. Very close. I had his complete confidence and I believe that
I knew his views extremely well, advised and consulted with him with
the greatest freedom, and was nearly always present at any important
confei-ences with his Flag Officers or with the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department.
5. Q. Did the then Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, welcome the
expression of your views and opinions with respect to matters as they
came up ?
A. I definitely felt so, and certainly had no hesitancy in expressing
my views to him, whether or not he was in accord with those views.
6. Q. Admiral, about when did you receive the basic war plan. Rain-
bow 5 ?
^ A. It may have been immediately on joining Admiral Kimmel's
Staff. If it were not, it was immediately thereafter. No, that was
Rainbow 3 ; Rainbow 5 was not received until about June.
7. Q. Do you recall the nature of the tasks assigned the Pacific
Fleet in that Plan; that is, particularly whether they were offensive
or defensive in nature ?
246 COXGRESSIOXAL IN\^STIGATIOX PE.\RL H-\RBOR ATTACK
A. The Pacific Fleet was charged with maintaining the security of
the territory of ourselves and Alties in the Western Hemisphere, safe-
guarding our communications, etc. The primary offensive mission
was to divert Japanese forces from the Malay Barrier by the activities
of our Fleet forces in the Japanese Mandate islands through denial
and capture of Marshall positions and through raids on enemy sea
communications and positions.
8. Q. Did you feel at that time that you had adequate forces avail-
able to you, or rather to the Commander-in-Chief, for the fulfilling of
these tasks ? By ''that time". I refer to the time leading up to Pearl
Harbor when the planning was at its height.
A. Realizing that enemy raiding forces, or even strong Fleet forces,
could strike over very wide areas, and that the offensive tasks assigned
to the Fleet were few, I felt that we could carry out the missions
charged, although there were many marked deficiencies, particularly
in anti-submarine craft. I felt, of course, the definite lack of suitable
craft for amphibious operations toward the Marshalls and was very
much concerned over lack of suitable craft for the Hawaiian Coastal
Frontier to furnish adequate anti-submarine protection. I appreci-
ated the scarcity of carriers and of aircraft and knew of various ele-
ments of weakness. But I also knew of the power in our Fleet and
expected it to be effective.
9. Q. TVere you sufficiently familiar with the views of the Com-
mander-in-Chief at that time to state how he felt in this respect ?
A, Yes. I believe that he felt that far larger forces could be em-
ployed and that certain weaknesses with regard to aircraft and light
forces were very marked. He was concerned also because the plan
called for the probable detaclmient of a portion of the Fleet for trans-
fer to the Atlantic; and for the movement of a division of cruisers
to the southeast Pacific. I believe, however, that he considered we
did have strong naval forces that could be effectively employed, not-
withstanding some handicaps.
10. Q. At the time, how did you feel with respect to logistics sup-
port of the Fleet in carrying out its war task; the sufficiency of the
logistics ?
A. I felt that our tasks would be made more difficult because of the
current logistics situation and that we might, from time to time, have
to [£3o] determine the operations that would be possible with
the logistics support at hand. I was not happy over the logistic situ-
ation, but certainly not discouraged over it.
11. Q. Will you please state, if you can. the intentions of the Com-
mander-in-Chief. Pacific Fleet, in the several months preceding the
attack on Pearl Harbor, with respect to the carrying out of the war
plans in the event of war ?
A. To clarify this, and any possible future remarks, it should be
mentioned that the plan. Rainbow 5 I believe it was, made provisions
both for our entering the war with Japan a neutral or with Japan in
the war. My remarks will deal only with the aspects of Japan in
the war. His intention was to. at once, sweep for any Japanese mer-
chant ships that might be at sea. unless intelligence had shown that
such an operation would probably be fruitless. It was the intention
to niake an immediate reconnaissance in force of the Marshall Islands.
While it was not expected that the main part of the Japanese Fleet
would be encountered in such an operation, it was intended to have
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 247
^he entire available strength in easy supporting distance of the re-
connoitering forces. Operations to establish ourselves in the Mar-
shalls were to be carried out as expeditiously as possible. Patrol
plane searches in approaches to Hawaii were to be inaugurated.
12. Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, at that time,
feel that the units of his Fleet were ready to carry out such tasks?
A. He undoubtedly recognized many weaknesses and strenuous ef-
forts were being made to improve the efficiency of both materiel and
personnel. Perhaps no Commander is ever completely satisfied of his
complete readiness to fight, but certainly he felt that a fairly high
standard of efficiency was being developed. There were large num-
bers of green officers and men, and the complements of most, if not all,
ships were lower than was to be desired. The anti-aircraft batteries
were, in general, far weaker than we desired, and they were being
improved as rapidly as material could be made available and the yards
could take ships. There was much concern over lack of radars and
the requisite skill in their use. There was also weaknesses in certain
carrier aircraft and some difficulties were experienced with patrol
planes; engines, I believe. The lack of skilled crews in the patrol
planes and the lack of replacement crews was very keenly felt. Trans-
ports and amphibious craft were lacking; and there were disturbing
deficiencies in auxiliary craft and in some materials. Notwithstand-
ing matters of this sort, however, it was felt that the handicaps were
not too great to cope with such situations, as were envisaged as aris-
ing if war commenced.
13. Q. Did you, at that time, sir, concur in the views of the Com-
mander-in-Chief as you have expressed them ?
A. Yes, and it may be that in answering the preceding questions
that I have erred somewhat toward giving my own views rather than
those of Admiral Kimmel, although they were probably substantially
in accord. He was inclined to be somewhat more pessimistic in that
regard than myself.
14. Q. Did you, at the time, feel that everything was being done,
either locally or by making recommendations to higher authority,
to correct the deficiencies and weaknesses that you referred to?
A. We certainly felt that there was much to be done and all hands
were working very hard to overcome deficiencies. I believe that, in
general, suitable representations had been made to higher authority
and that the [236] Commander-in-Chief and his subordinates
were taking all corrective measures that they felt within their own
power to accomplish. It is doubtful if any were entirely satisfied with
the rapidity of progress.
15. Q. Adniiral, going back to the basic Kainbow 5 war plan, what
was your opinion at the time as to how that plan contemf)lated that
war with Japan would start?
A. The plan itself may not, probably did not, directly give such
an indication, but it certainly must have contemplated that such a
war would probably not have been preceded by a formal declaration
but rather that it would arise from such hostile attack on the part of
the Japanese.
16. Q. In estimating the situation with respect to the Pacific Fleet,
was a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor considered as a course of
action available to the Japanese to initiate such a war ?
248 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Probably not. At least, I, as War Plans Officer, did not hol4
such a view with respect to the Hawaiian Area, although I did con-
sider such an act possible in the Philippines or even against Midway
or Wake. It may have been that such a possibility was discussed with
the Cominander-in-Chief or with other members of the Staff. Prob-
ably some such discussions may have taken place, although I have no
specific recollection of such a one.
17. Q. Do you recall that during this planning period any considera-
tion was given to the efficiency of the Japanese naval air forces ?
A. Yes. While specific data was lacking, I, and I believe others
within the Staff, felt that there was a rather high degree of pro-
ficiency in Japanese naval air organization.
18. Q. Do you recall any discussion as to the ability of the Japanese
naval air forces to conduct such an attack as they did on the 7th of
December ?
A. I think perhaps some such discussions, informal discussions,
took place. I do remember giving consideration to dangers of torpedo
attack to ships in Pearl Harbor, particularly after the British night
attack on the anchored Italian ships in the heel of Italy; but even
though some thought and consideration was given to the possibility
of a raid such as occurred on 7 December, I, personally, never con-
sidered it as more than a remote possibility.
19. Q. Admiral, are you able to state the views that the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, held at that time in this respect ?
A. I feel that if he had entertained the idea that there was serious
danger of that nature, I would have heard of it in every emphatic
terms. I am certain that he was not anticipating any such attack.
20. Q. Admiral, in your thinking and planning at that time, that
is the six months leading up to the attack, do you recall what considera-
tion was given to the characteristics of the Japanese naval leaders,
particularly Admiral Yamamoto ?
A. The leadership in the Japanese Navy was discussed from time to
time between Admiral Kimmel, myself, his Chief of Staff, his Opera-
tions Officer, his Intelligence Officer, and perhaps others. As I recall
now, the general impression that obtained was that in case of war we
would have to contend with rather capable and aggressive leadership
on the part of the enemy.
21. Q. Were you, at that time, familiar with the character of
Admiral Yamamoto ?
A; Not especially so, but I did consider him capable and bold.
[237] 22. Q. Do you recall discussing him with Commander
Rochefort, while you were serving together on the Staff of the Com-
mander, Scouting Force ?
A. While I have no specific recollection of such discussionj feel
that it is almost certain that a number of such discussions did take
place; not only when Rochefort and I were serving together in the
Scouting Force, but also after I came to Admiral Kimmel's Staff
and Rochefort was serving with the Intelligence unit in the Fourteenth
Naval District.
23. Q. Admiral, during this planning period leading up to the
attack, do you recall occasions on which the Commander-in-Chief
communicated with naval aviators with respect to the ability of Jap-
anese naval air forces and the possibility of such attack as occurred
on 7 December ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 249
A. No, although it is quite possible that I was present at some such
discussion with Admiral Halsey and Admiral Bellinger or perhaps
other aviation personnel, including Captain Davis, the Staff Aviation
Officer ; but I have no recollection of any discussion with any of them
with the particular idea in view that we should have to contend with
such an attack.
24. Q. Did you have knowledge of any aviator whatever who really
foresaw the raid of 7 December and so expressed himself before that
time?
A. No, sir.
25. Q. Admiral, in the preparation of the Commander-in-Chief's
Contributory Rainbow 5 War Plan, was it contemplated, at the time,
that it might be placed in effect either in its entirety or in part by
order of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, prior to the start
of actual war?
A. I believe it was not contemplated that the plan be placed into
effect, either in whole or in part, by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific,
without reference to higher authority, because of the rapidity of com-
munications; but, on the other hand, I do not believe that that plan
circumscribed the Commander-in-Chief's in any way toward taking
any suitable action to meet whatever circumstances that might arise.
26. Q. At that time, then, what methods did you contemplate using
for alerting ships, should the international situation so require and
before actual start of war ?
A. By preparatory or warning message.
27. Q. Admiral, as I understand your previous testimony, it was
your estimate, as well as the estimate of practically all of Admiral
KimmeP Staff, that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was a remote
possibility. Will you state the basis for that conclusion?
A. For us to make an attack on Japan would have required steam-
ing long distance with probability of detection and then attack in
the face of shore-based aircraft where damage to ships would be likely
and difficulties of returning to our own base would be so marked that
the damaged ships might not regain their base. We felt that the
Japanese would find the same considerations would deter them from
making such an effort against us. It also seemed highly probable that
more attraptive targets could be found to the southard of Japan and
that their naval units could be more profitably employed there. We
felt that even should such an attack be launched, that the Island de-
fenses would be sufficient to make the damage inflicted small and
and that the attacking forces would suffer heavy casualties quite
disproportionate to the damage they might inflict.
28. Q. Do you recall that your thinking along those lines gave due
value [^38] to the power of initiative if employed by the enemy
in a surprise attack ?
A. I don't think so now ; I did think so then. We did anticipate
that heavy submarine concentrations would be encountered in this
area and had considered it quite possible, if not probable, that a mass
submarine attack about the time that considerable forces were sortieing
or entering Pearl Harbor might be the commencement pf the war.
29. Q. Admiral, under the Joint Action, Army and Navy, what
service was primarily responsible for the defense of Oahu?
A. The Army.
250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
30. Q. Were you, in the months preceding the attack on Pearl
Harbor, familiar with the Army's ability to fulfill its commitments
prescribed by that document ?
A. In a general way, yes. I had made a tour of the Island of Oahu
with the Commanding General and some members of his Staff to see
the defenses, and, as a part of that tour, attended a short presentation
at Fort Shafter with particular reference to AA defenses. With my
limited knowledge of the Army requirements and methods of defense,
I, personally, felt they were good and adequate, although I knew,
and the Army authorities too felt that certain improvements should
be made, particularly as to AA.
31. Q. Were you familiar with Admiral Kimmel's opinions with
respect to the ability of the Army to defend the Island?
A. I believe that he felt that there was some deficiencies, particularly
if the Fleet were absent from the area, and I include in the Fleet, the
shorebased aircraft. He had been concerned over the AA defenses
and talked with the Commanding General and with the Chief of Naval
Operations on the subject.
32. Q. Who acted for the Navy in coordinating efforts toward the
defense of Pearl Harbor ?
A. In general, the Commander of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.
33. Q. Would you explain, please, just how the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, felt that he belonged in the picture of the coordina-
tion of the efforts of the Army and Navy in the defense for Oahu,
while he was present here at Pearl Harbor ?
A. In general, he looked to the Commander of the Hawaiian Coastal
Frontier to accomplish that, but recognized the necessity for utilizir^
whatever Fleet units might be present to assist in the defense. He
vised the arrangements because the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier was a
part of his command and because of his immediate concern for what-
ever Fleet units might be present, aside from his general concern of
maintaining the safety of his primary base. He was particularly
active in developing coordination of air operations and communica-
tions between the same.
34. Q. Were your plans, during the weeks preceding the attack on
Pearl Harbor, based on the premise that the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet, would remain in Pearl Harbor after start of a war with
Japan?
A. The Commander-in-Chief, himself, had always been very re-
luctant to accept the idea that he must remain ashore. He had an
operational staff that accompanied him when he went to sea. He was
slowly accepting the fact that if war came, he would, of necessity, have
to be continuously shore-based. That was a matter that I discussed
with him a number of times ; for I never believed that he would, duritig
war, exercise tactical command at sea but felt that he would be habitu-
ally shore-based. The plans, however, were not premised on having
the Commander-in-Chief tied to any shore base.
[2S9] 35. Q. Did this belief on the part of the Commander-in-
Chief cause him to feel any additional personal responsibility for the
defense of Oahu, and particularly Pearl Harbor?
A. That would be difficult to say, although I doubt if he ever felt
that he was divested from the overall responsibility for safeguarding
the Fleet. He did, however, look to the duly constituted authorities
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 251
to protect Hawaii, namely, Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier and
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
36. Q. Did you. at that time, contemplate that the Fleet would take
any part in the defense of Oahu, other than the use of the anti-aircraft
batteries of the vessels of the Fleet in their own defense and the use
of shore-based aircraft located at Pearl Harbor ?
A. We certainly contemplated that any Fleet units that could be
brought into contact with enemy forces actually attacking or threaten-
ing the Hawaiian Islands would be employed as effectively as possible.
That would be true whether the imits (when the enemy was first dis-
covered) were in port or in the coastal waters or further afield. More-
over, it was realized that some of rhe shore-based Fleet aircraft would
have to be made available to the Coastal Frontier Commander even
though employment for them would be desirable further afield. Such
plans or thoughts were necessitated because such aircraft were not
available within the Coastal Frontier for its Commander's use. It was
also realized that some Fleet destroyers would have to be sacrificed
by the Fleet for local anti-submarine protection, even though the Fleet
was far short of the numbers desired. In short, if the Fleet left Pearl
Harbor it would have to be weakened by leaving behind some aircraft
and destroyers. If it were in Pearl Harbor, it would be used to get
at the enemy.
37. Q. Admiral, were you familiar with this letter 2CL-41
(Revised) , which is Exhibit 4 before this examination?
A. Yes, I remember this letter. Although it was prepared by the
Operations Section of the Staff, I had opportunity to review it and
recall having initiated some minor changes in the earlier drafts ; al-
though, at this time, I have no particular recollection of what those
changes were.
38. Q. Were there, so far as you can recollect, any other directives
of a general nature affecting the security or providing for the security
of vessels in Pearl Harbor in effect in the months preceding the attack?
A. I do not now recall whether or not there were. In general, such
directives, if there were any, were prepared by the Operations Section
and I would have seen them and had opportunity to comment before
their issuance.
39. Q. Do you recall whether, at the time, that is, in the months
preceding the attack, you considered this letter, Exhibit 4, to ade-
quately provide for the security of the Fleet units at Pearl Harbor, had
the instructions therein been fully complied with?
A. I recall that we were not entirely satisfied with the arrange-
ments for coordinating air warnings, air operations from the different
services, and anti-aircraft from ships and shore and the like, and that
some discussions and conferences to better perfect arrangements were
i nprogress under the general guidance of Captain DeLany, the Opera-
tions Officer. On the whole, however, I must have thought that the
security arrangements set forth in this letter were satisfactory, else I
would have initiated action to effect a change.
[240] 40. Q. Admiral, do you recall the Joint Coastal Defense
Plan which was signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short prior to
the attack on Pearl Harbor ?
A. I remember that there was such a plan, although whether that
was the exact title or the principal provisions of the plan, I do not
remember.
252 coxGRzssioy.\i- ;v' zs:iG-\Tiox pil^rl harbor attack
41. Q. Do Tou recoiieot whether Admiral Kinimel. as Commander-
in-CSiief. Pacific Fleet, approved tlie plan to which I have jii=t re-
ferred ?
A. Probably, although I can not now say ••yes" or ^o''.
42. Q. Were tou familiar at the time with an annex to that plan
known as the "Xaval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan, Xo.
A-l-il". of which I show you a copy, which was signed by Admiral
Bellinger and General Martini
A. I do not now have specific recollection of this particular plan but
it is aknost certain that I did see it. and acquiesced in its provisions.
43. Q. Were you. at the time, familiar with the annex — I think it
is No. 1 — of that plan which is an estimate of the situation, prepared
by. or under the direction of. Admiral Bellinger and General Martin,
which is Exhibit 24 before this examination i
A. After examining this paper. I have no particular recollection of
it, although it is not only possible but highly probable that I did see it
and probably before it was signed or approved. Admiral Kinimel
frequently conferred with Ad mir als Bloch and Bellinger and Army
authorities and pressed for development of plans for coordinated ac-
tion and for drills by joint forces to test them and to develop skill in
their use.
44. Q. Admiral, do you recall whether or not this operating plan,
including the proposed use of aircraft, was approved by Admiral
Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief. Pacific Fleet (
A. Although I do not have any specific recollection, I would expect
that th^ Commander-in-Chief. Aiiroiral Kinimel. was familiar with
its general terms and indicated his acquiescence even thotigh there may
have been no formal approvaL
45. Q, Admiral, under the plans in effect just prior to the Decem-
ber 7 attack, what was your understanding at the time as to the re-
sponsibility for obtaining early information of the approach of any
possible enemy engaged in conducting a surprise attack on the Fleet
and installations at Pearl Harbor ?
A. It was. in generaL a naval responsibility. Forces available for
such detection, in general, were the Fleet patrol planes of Pat Wing-
Two, but the extent of any search that they might carry on was deter-
mined by the number available for that purpose and that determina-
tion was in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. As a practical
matter, it was impossible, with forces and material at hand, to main-
lain an effective patrol for any but a brief period.
46. Q. Did you. at the time, contemplate any other means of ob-
taining such information prior to declaration of war ?
A. Xo, it was not c-ontemplated that any surface vessels would nor-
mally be used for that purpose. Lack of coastal frontier craft that
might be used for pickets was recognized, but it was felt that destroy-
ers or cruisers could be more profitably employed in offensive opera-
tion. Advantage would, of course, be taken of any intelligence in-
formation, but it certainly was not contemplated habitually using
Fleet forces for picket duty in the approaches to Hawaii.
[£p] 47. Q. Admiral, do you feel that the provisions made for
obtaining such early information of the approach of a possible enemy
were the best that cotild reasonably be made consistent with training
and other demands on the units of the Fleet ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 253
A. AnsTvering now from hindsight, the answer is. "No.'' At the
time, the answer is. "Yes." The number of patrol planes was very
limited. Some difficulties were being experienced with engines. An
extensive patrol planes training program was in progress. Many of
the pilots and crews were green and there were very heavy demands
for furnishing nucleus personnel for new patrol craft being built.
The extent to which searches could be carried on was a matter of seri-
ous consideration by the Commander-in-Chief, his Aviation Officer,
and his Operations Officer, and I was frequently brought into the dis-
cussion. "With the number of search planes available and the nimiber
of crews available, it was felt that only limited sectors could be
searched. At one time- some sectors were searched one day. other sec-
tors another, in order not to hold to a set pattern in case enemy agents
were aware or might become aware of the details. To carry on any
reasonable effective search would have necessitated complete disruption
of the higlily necessary training program, and it was strongly felt that
many engine hours would be put in at a time when the need was not ex-
tremely urgent, and that as a result when the planes were most needed
many of them would be due for engine overhaul. At tlie time, the most
serious menace was expected to be submarine activities in the Fleet
operating areas, and, as a consequence, the searches were very largely
limited to the Fleet operating areas and the approaches thereto, rather
than to distant searches. Subsequent events have shown that the de-
cision in that regard may have been unwise. It is my personal belief
that had training been discontintied and the searches been conducted to
the maximum degi'ee possible of continuous maintenance in what was
regarded as the more probable sectors of approach, that the sector from
which the attack on Pearl Harbor was actually made might easily have
been one not covered. In any event, knowledge of the tenseness of the
situation, the availability of forces, the intelligence at hand, and the
factors which I have mentioned were given careful consideration in
the days immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, and it was
felt we were using good judgment in making our dispositions and
searches.
48. Q. Admiral, are you able to state whether or not Admiral Kim-
mel's views at that time coincided with those which you have just ex-
pressed as your own ?
A. I believe that he had about the same considerations in mind.
49. Q. Did you continue to hold those opinions which you have just
expressed throughout the period October-Xovember-December despite
dispatches from the Department which were more or less warnings of
impending dangers?
A. Substantially, yes. There had been a greater or lesser degree of
tenseness from the time I joined the Staff on 1 February, and several
times training was curtailed in order to increase the searches. In the
latter part of November, a warning was received that indicated the
situation was particularly tense and the considerations mentioned
were considered anew about that time,
50. Q. Admiral, during the period from the middle of October un-
til the time of the attack, what were your views at the time with re-
spect to the accuracy and sufficiency of intelligence available to you
for use in connection with your planning?
254 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. We felt that we would like to know lots more than we did. I
would say that on the whole that we felt that it was somewhat insuf-
ficient, but did not see the probability of achieving improvement.
[^4^] 51. Q. As War Plans Officer, did you conduct a continu-
ing study of the plans then in efl'ect in the light of such intelligence,
particularly with respect to the international situation, as you re-
ceived it ?
A. Yes, and I had been making a habit of giving the Commander-
in-Chief, sometimes daily, sometimes every other day a brief memo-
randum as to the specific action that I thought should be taken if war
eventuated in the succeeding twenty-four or forty-eight horn's.
52. Q. Were any major changes effected in the Contributory War
Plans, based on the intelligence you had as to the international situa-
tion during that period ?
A. No.
53. Q. Did you feel that the basic plan of the Department, Eainbow
5, continued to meet the international situation as it developed from
the middle of October on ?
A. Rainbow 5, in brief, called for the major effort of our forces
to be in the Atlantic. I was not in a position to deteiTnine the merits
or demerits of that ; but accepting that, then the mission given to the
Pacific Fleet was not one upon which I felt that I could improve.
54. Q. Admiral, are you able to state the views of the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in this respect ?
A. My impression is that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
felt that it might be highly advantageous to American interests to
make an earh^ all-out effort in the Pacific.
55. Q. Were you in touch with any informal communications be-
tween Admiral Kimmel and higher authority, either wririen or oral,
which bear upon the subject of this examination, of such importance
that you think a record of what you remember should be made ?
A. Yes. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, exchanged a number of personal letters that
bore on the general situation. This was a practice that existed
throughout my period of service in the Staff. As these letters fre-
quently dealt with matters of the utmost importance, I, once or twice,
suggested to Admiral Kimmel that communications of that nature
between the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and the Chief of Opera-
tions were necessarily official letters rather than personal ones, as
they dealt with official matters of the utmost importance. Although
they were written in a personal vein, they did deal with official matters
and could be and should be treated as official, and suggested that it
might be well to have them in the usual official form : that their secrecy
could be safeguarded just as well and that they would become matters
of permanent record. Those letters frequently referred to the tense-
ness of the situation. It was important that the Commander-in-
Chief receive such information as was contained in those from the
Chief of Xaval Operations. I believe that I read every one of the
letters in question, both incoming and outgoing. Some of the letters
dealt with difficulties in obtaining personnel or materiel and the
reasons therefor. Some of them gave highly secret information
with regard to discussions on international matters taking place in
Washington or elsewhere among important officials. As to the specific
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 255
parts that bear directly on this discussion, I would say that many
of the letters indicated a continuous degree of tension between the
American and Japanese Governments, with the situation being more
critical at some times than at others. They definitely gave the im-
pression that a Japanese war with Great Britain was highly probable
and that we might or might not be drawn into it from the beginning.
In the latter part of the year, there were more frequent indications
that w^e would be in at the very start.
[^43] 56. Q. Admiral, I show you a paraphrase copy of a dis-
patch which is Exhibit 6 before tliis examination. Are you able to
identify that dispatch?
A. Yes, I remember this dispatch.
57. Q. With respect to the wording used, it directs the taking of
certain precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will
not constitute provocative action. Will you please state the meaning
that you gained from these expressions at the time that you first saw
this dispatch.
A. I felt that war was likely to eventuate on short notice and that
if we came into it, it seemed quite possible that the initiation would
probably be the result of hostile action committed by the Japanese.
I considered we should maintain adequate security measures and be
prepared to commence our offensive operations as promptly as possible.
58. Q. Were your plans restudied at that time in the light of in-
formation contained in this dispatch ?
A. Presumably they were. I suspect that the consideration was
primarily given toward making the plans effective with least delay.
59. Q. Do you recall the decisions made as the result of this study ?
A. It was about this time, possibly somewhat earlier, possibly some-
what later, that Flag Officers were advised of the necessity of being
ready to move to distant service on very short notice. They were
enjoined to keep certain limits on their fuel supply, below which ships
should not be permitted to go. They were cautioned to examine
anew their provisions for finally stripping ship, if it were not already
completed. Use of aircraft and submarines for protection of Midway
was increased and submarines were dispatched to cover Wake. I
believe the Commander, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, was enjoined
to push the construction work at Midway, Wake, Johnston, and
Palmyra as rapidly as possible. Consideration was given to putting
aircraft on Wake, but the construction work there at that time would
not permit that Island to receive them. I do not now recall whether
or not any additional Marines were sent to those places, or not, but
certainly the matter was given consideration.
60. Q. Admiral, were you present at any conferences at which this
dispatch. Exhibit 6, was discussed with the Army High Command
on Oahu ?
A, At this late date, it would not be possible to say, with reference
to this particular dispatch, but during the Fall of 1941, 1 was present
at a number of conferences in Admiral Kimmel's office when General
Short and possibly other Army officers were present. It is quite
probable that one of those conferences was a result of this dispatch.
61. Q. Admiral, do you recall any major matters that were caus-
ing Admiral Kimmel concern at this time, other than matters you
have discussed; causing him grave concern at the time?
256 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. He was very much concerned as to the safety of Midway and
Wake, particularly the latter. He was continually concerned, to
a very great degree, at the lack of anti-submarine craft available in
the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. The situation, which, despite nu-
merous and vigorous protests, did not improve.
62. Q. In your planning, was the discussion of war tasks or such
security matters as the lack of patrol craft for Oahu given the major
consideration during these months leading up to the attack ?
A. Our major consideration as to employment of the Fleet was to
use- it effectively to reduce the pressure which we anticipated the
Japanese would [^4-4] be exerting in the China Sea by so oper-
ating our forces -as to cause them to divert important portions of their
own force to oppose us. The lack of anti-suomarine craft, whatever
deficiencies might have existed in the local defenses or even in the
outlying bases under construction, did not deter the Commander-in-
Chief from giving his principal consideration toward utilizing the
Fleet offensively as quickly and as much as possible.
63. Q. It appears that over five weeks elapsed between this dispatch
of 16 October and the next similar dispatch from the Navy Depart-
ment, to which we will come in a moment. During that five weeks,
was anything received from the Department which rescinded the
directive in this dispatch of 16 October to take preparatory deploy-
ments and so forth ?
A. No.
64. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch, Exhibit 7 before this ex-
amination. Were you familiar with that dispatch at the time of its
receipt by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?
A. Yes, I remember this dispatch without having specific recol-
lection as to the date of it.
65. Q. Do you recall the meaning that you attached at the time,
or the significance you attached at the time, to the statement that a
surprise aggressive movement in any direction might be a possibility ?
A. My reaction was, I think, that it contained no new information.
66. Q. Did this dispatch cause you to make any changes in your
current plans at the time?
A. I think not.
67. Q. During the period between these two dispatches mentioned
in the evidence, did there become known to you any change in the
distribution of Japanese naval forces which, to you, seemed sig-
nificant ?
A.' Until sometime in the early Fall, I, personally, had felt that a
Japanese war was certain; but felt that her probable enemy would
be Russia and did not believe that she would take on more than one
major Power. But the situation gradually changed; and sometime
in the late Fall, possibly in late November, our intelligence activities
reported not only a large number of transports in Indo-China Sea,
but indicated that very large numbers of combatant ships were moving
to the southard. I believe that my recollection in the respect is
correct.
68. Q. But you do not remember, other than what you have just
stated, any specific change in distribution of major units which came
to your attention in late November ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 257
A. I feel quite sure that I recall the movement of important units,
approximating fleet size, as being reported moving to the southard
and, if recollection serves, battleships were sighted toward the Indo-
China area, or were reported as sighted. Our information as to
location of all Jap naval forces was incomplete, but we thought we
knew the general location of his principal strength.
69. Q. Do you remember if, at the time, you connected up in your
own mind that intelligence with this particular dispatch of 24
November ?
A. I may or may not have connected the two, but probably did.
And I do recall that it was about that time that I became convinced
that the Japanese war would be directed toward the Malaysia area;
and speculated as to whether 1^4^] the Japanese would dare
risk moving into that area without attacking the Philippines, and
reaching the conclusion that it was improbable.
70. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch dated November 27, 1941,
which is Exhibit 8 before this examination. Do you recall having seen
that at the time of its receipt by the Commander-in-Chief, Paciflc
Fleet?
A. Yes, I remember this.
71. Q. Will you please state, as near as you can remember, the
meaning which, at the time, you gave to the clause or phrase in there
calling for the excution of appropriate defensive deployment pre-
paratory to carrying out certain tasks ?
A. The question that you have just asked was one that within the
Commander-in-Chief's Staff was frequently propounded for some
days, and the general conclusion was that we were practically already
so deployed and that what we should really do was to stay outside
of the Marshalls area rather than to move immediately into that
area. In short, we construed it to mean that war was imminent but
not certain and that we were to avoid taking a deployment to com-
mence offensive operations until there were further developments.
72. Q. You mean that you were not to undertake offensive opera-
tions after a declaration of war or start of war?
A. To amplify: Our plan called for reconnaissance, including at-
tacks in force, on Marshall positions. We felt that we should not
move within easy striking distance where we might be sighted and
possibly disturb any remote chance that still remained of averting
war. As a consequence, our forces were held in close proximity to
Hawaii where they could be kept fully fueled and ready to move
toward the Marshalls. Two groups, each of which included a carrier
that had been carrying aircraft reenforcements to Wake and to Mid-j
way, were exceptions. They were to return to Pearl Harbor as soon
as possible after completing their assigned task.
73. Q. Do you recall whether or not Task Force One entered Pearl
Harbor subseq^uent to the receipt of this dispatch ?
A. Yes, it did.
74. Q. Did you consider that the presence of heavy ships in Pearl
Harbor was consistent with the understanding of defensive deploy-
ment which you have outlined ?
A. W^. determined that we should continue training operations in
the vicinity of Oahu and considered that forces either within Pearl
Harbor or in the general vicinity were in consonance with this
directive.
79716— 46— Ex. 144 18
258 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
75, Q. When you state "we," are you including the views of Admiral
Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?
A. Yes, I think so.
76. Q. Was any other action taken by the Commander-in-Chief,
based on the dispatch. Exhibit 8?
A. The matter was discussed at considerable length, both on receipt
of this dispatch and on subsequent days, and it was determined that
existing plans, operations, and arrangements were in accordance with
existing instructions, including this dispatch. Prudent security ar-
rangements and readiness to commence offensive action on very short
notice were considered to be in effect.
[^^^] 77. Q. Do you recollect whether the defense forces of
the outlying islands were further augmented at the time of the receipt
of this dispatch ?
A. Whether from this dispatch or from those that had shortly pre-
ceded it, additional aircraft were sent to Midway and Wake, arriving
at those places in early December.
78. Q. Do you recollect any additional security measures prescribed
by the Commander-in-Chief at that time ?
A. Except for further warnings, I believe that no additional meas-
ures were taken, other than to direct depth bombing submarine con-
tacts suspected of being hostile and to repel hostile planes that might
be encountered. As I now recall, the directive with regard to attacking
hostile planes was given to both Admiral Newton and Admiral Halsey,
who were in command of the forces carrying reenforcement planes
to Midway and Wake. I do not recall whether those instructions were
written or by dispatch or verbal.
79. Q. Do you recollect any discussion of this dispatch with the
Army command on Oahu ?
A. No, and I'm under the impression that no discussion occurred,
because it was felt that about all had been done that could be done or
should be done. Although a general discussion with General Short,
Admiral Bloch, and others on defensive matters did occur about this
time in connection with a Departmental proposal relative to forces
on Wake and Midway.
80. Q. Were you familiar with the condition as to alertness of the
Army in the week preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor ?
A. No. If I was at the time, I'm not now.
81. Q. Admiral, do you recall receipt of any instructions about this
time, that is 27 November, with respect to the relieving of the Marines
at Wake and Midway and perhaps other outlying islands ?
A. I recall that, at some time, not a great while before the com-
mencement of war, there was a suggestion that it might be advisable
to relieve the Marines at those places, and being present at a discussion
that included, among others. Admiral Kimmel, General Short, and
Admiral Bloch. It was the unanimous opinion that it would be highly
inadvisable to do so, particularly at the critical time that the proposal
was made, and they were not relieved. There was, at that time par-
ticularly, a discussion as to the advisability of using some of the fighter
aircraft (I believe it was only fighter aircraft, as I recall now) from
Army forces on Hawaii. After considerable discussion as to the meth-
ods of getting them there, the difficulties of their upkeep, the virtual
impossibility of withdrawing them, etc., they were not sent. I believe
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 259
that some tests were made in having some of them fly off carriers be-
cause it was believed they could be delivered in that fashion. It was
suggested, during the discussion, that the most effective fighters should
be sent to that area because there was far greater likelihood of their
being usefully employed than there would be from Oahu. I mention
this last fact merely as indicative of the fact that the senior officers,
Army and Navy, afloat and ashore, gave no indication at that time of
anticipating an air attack on Oahu. Incidentally, the War and Navy
Departments were proposing considerable reduction in defenses of
Oahu in order to strengthen Midway and Wake. At that time, only
six Army B-l7's on Oahu were operable.
[^47] 82. Q. However, did it occur to you that in view of that
tenseness of situation, that the proposal as received from Washington
was badly timed ?
A, Yes, sir, that was why we felt it was highly inadvisable to make
any change in the arrangements there, whatever merits the proposal
might have had otherwise. Nonetheless, it was agreed, between Gen-
eral Short and Admiral Kimmel, that the former would organize
several defense battalions for use on outlying islands and would hold
several pursuit squadrons in readiness for such employment.
83. Q. Do you recall if the proposal, which, incidentally, bears
the same date as this dispatch concerning which you are testifying,
in any way vitiated the effect of the statement that the dispatch was a
war warning?
A. No, sir, I did not feel that that vitiated the other dispatch. I
rather felt that it had in mind making available to the Commander-
in-Chief Marine defense battalions for utilization in captured posi-
tions in the Marshalls that might be badly needed and might not other-
wise be available.
84. Q. Admiral, would you say that there was a doubt in the mind
of the Commander-in-Chief and the members of his Staff as to what
the Navy Department intended by its directive of 27 November to
execute defensive deployments, etc. ?
A. I believe that the conclusion reached here was that primarily
the Department wished to appraise use of their belief that the war
was imminent, that we should continue to maintain our security ar-
rangements, but was cautioning us not to take any disposition that
might be regarded as an overt act, such as exposing forces as far as
the Gilberts or the close apj)roaches to the Marshalls. It seemed to
us that they might have thought that in our enthusiasm to strike as
promptly as possible we might advance forces to a position that would
be regarded as threatening and thus destroy any remote chance of
retaining peace. We vrere not so uncertain as to ask the Department
for a clarification.
85. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch dated November 28, 1941,
which is Exhibit 9. Do you recall having seen that at the time of its
receipt by the Commander-in-Chief ?
A. Yes, I remember seeing this dispatch.
86. Q. Did the directions contained therein, with reference to being
prepared to carry out certain tasks, appear to you to be inconsistent
with your view as to the previous dispatch of November 27 ?
A. No.
260 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
87. Q. Was this dispatch, Exhibit 9, the basis for any change in the
existing plans at the time of its receipt ?
A. No, I think not.
88. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch of December 3, 1941, Exhibit
11 before this examination. Did you see that at the time of its receipt
by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet ?
A. Yes, I remember this.
89. Q. Will you please state what significance you attached to this
dispatch at the time?
A. I felt that it was the best indication which had come to our atten-
tion that we would be involved in the war with Japan, from the very
beginning.
90. Q. Can you state any significance attached to this dispatch by
Admiral Kimmel?
A. No, I don't recall any specific expression of opinion from him
with regard to this dispatch.
1^4^] 91. Q. Admiral, I'll ask you a somewhat hypothetical
question. Had you foreseen the full power of that Japanese carrier
raid, which was made on 7 December, what measures, other than those
taken, were open, insofar as the distribution of the battleships was
concerned ?
A. We would certainly not have had them in port. Had intelli-
gence, chance contact, or search have located the enemy forces, it
seems highly probable that we would have concentrated our battle-
ships at sea and had them with attendant light forces disposed to the
westward with the expectation of using them against any enemy forces
that could be reached. As a security measure, they certainly would
not have been in port.
92. Q. The battleships appear to have constituted the primary
target for the Japanese. Actually, what would have been the most
profitable target in and around Pearl Harbor for the Japanese to
have attacked ?
A. The oil tanks. The Japanese apparently, from the nature of
their attacks, determined, from the very beginning, to at least tem-
porarily immobilze our Fleet. Everything would have been com-
pletely immobilized if they had destroyed the oil in Pearl Harbor
and would have remained immobilized for a long period of time. If,
in addition to that, they had destroyed the shops and the dry docks,
our capabilities of waging war in the Central and Western Pacific
would have been nullified for a very long period of time.
93. Q. Did you, at any time during your incumbency as War Plans
Officer to Admiral Kimmel, question, in your own mind, the advisa-
bility of continually basing the Pacific Fleet on Pearl Harbor ?
_ A. Yes, sir, I frequently did but always came back to the conclu-
sion that if, in the existing international situation, the responsibility
were my own, that I would have based them here. There is a consid-
erable divergence of opinion in that regard and it may be idle to go
into the pros and cons of it. I express only my own conclusions.
94. Q. However, will you, briefly, express those pros and cons ?
A. Among other things. Pearl Harbor has but one entrance. If a
a considerable portion of the Fleet were in Pearl Harbor and that en-
trance should be blocked, it would have taken a very long time to clear
it. Whatever units were in here would have been mimobile and there
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 261
would have been no other suitable base in the Central Pacific in which
to base our Fleet. Operating for a considerable period here, habitu-
ally, would make it certain that the Japanese could concentrate con-
siderable number of submarines in one relatively small area. If they
were boldly and skillfully used, they would have found numerous op-
portunities to inflict serious damage. Those are the two major ob-
jections to basing the Fleet here. Such matters as deterioration and
morale, strain on logistics, and matters of that nature could be over-
come. The advantages of basing it here were that it would be a week's
steaming nearer the area of operation. The development of schemes
for ingress and egress, and for berthing and servicing and the re-
pairing of the Fleet, would be developed to a degree that would never
be accomplished unless large numbers of ships were based here for
prolonged period. In other times, temporary expedients had been
arranged for temporarily berthing the Fleet and for giving limited
services; but this area, until the Fleet was actually maintained out
here, had never been developed as a real Fleet base.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
[249] The examining officer informed the witness that he was
privileged to make any further statement covering anything relating
to the subject matter of the examination which he thought should be
a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully
brought out by the previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examination then, at 5 : 35 p. m., was adjourned to await the call
of the examining officer.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 263
i^m PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAET INUUIEY
MONDAY, APRIL 3, 1944
Twentieth Day
Pearl Harbor, Territort of Hawaii.
The examination met at 9 : 15 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer,
and his counsel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the nineteenth day of the examination until such
time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with
the examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as follows : This is a board
acting under a precept by the Secretary of Navy to record testimony,
under oath, surrounding the facts pertaining to the incident of 7
December 1941, comprising the attack on Pearl Harbor. The purpose
is to record testimony which might otherwise be lost and be unavailable
at some future time, when it may be needed and perhaps used in legal
proceedings; or for other purposes. It is necessary for witnesses to
testify from facts known to them on or before 7 December 1941, insofar
as it is possible to do. I ask them to make every endeavor to that end.
I give full opportunity to verify testimony and interpret that liberally
to include amendments, as well as corrections ; this I feel it necessary
to do because of the great amount of elapsed time since those events.
There is a significant phrase in the precept — "pertinent to the facts."
It has been the experience that interpretation of that phrase is required,
which I have to do inasmuch as facts come out in testimony that point
back to other facts which, at first, might not appear to be pertinent.
You are called as a witness whom I consider to be in possession of such
facts.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station ?
A. Richmond Kelly Turner, Vice Admiral (Temporary Grade),
United States Navy, in command of the Amphibious Forces of the
Pacific Fleet.
2. Q. "What were your duties during the calendar year 1941 ?
A. I was the War Plans Officer for the Chief of Naval Operations.
3. Q. How long previously had you been so detailed?
264 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. I reported to that duty on October 25, 1940, having come from
command of the U. S. S. ASTORIA, then a part of the Hawaiian
Detachment of the Pacific Fleet.
4. Q. Were you, particular!}^ during 1941, closely associated with
the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, even beyond the asso-
ciation which the preparation of formal war plans called for?
[^Sl] A. I Avas. I considered myself one of Admiral Stark's
principal advisers. We were close personal friends, as well as closely
associated officially.
5. Q. What was the official designation of the Department's basic
war plan which was current during the latter half of 1941 ?
A, WPL-4G; Rainbow 5, it was known as. That war plan was a
joint plan between the Army and the Navy. It had its basis in an
international agreement with the British Army, Navy, and Air Force.
The conversations with the British leading up to preparation of that
plan were held in February and March of 1941. It was a world-wide
agreement, covering all areas, land, sea, and air, of the entire world in
which it was conceived that the British Commonwealth and the United
States might be jointly engaged in action against any enemy. On the
conclusion of that agreement with the British, the WPL-46 was pre-
pared after a. great many talks with the Army and was approved by
the Joint Board, the Secretaries of War and Navy, and by the Pres-
ident. The Navy issued their form of that war plan in May of 1941,
and it is my recollection the Army form of it was issued about August.
6. Q. Did WPL-46 contemplate any Allies, other than the British
Empire ?
A. It contemplated associated Powers, including the Netherlands
East Indies, and such colonies of British Allies as were still in the war,
for example, the Loyalist French Colonies.
7. Q. Against what prospective enemy nations was the plan
intended ?
A. It was intended against the Axis Powers : Germany, Italy, Japan,
and the Powers that were allied with those principal Powers. It did
not include any particular participation for the purpose of the plan
by the Government of China. It did not include any association by
Russia, as it was prepared and promulgated before the Russians were
at war with Germany. After its promulgation, the War and Navy
Departments made several tentative efforts to brinir Russia within
the scope of this or a modified plan. During the Fall of 1941, the
Joint Board prepared some tentative bases for military conversations
with Russia. The representatives of the Joint Board on two or three
occasions discussed with the Russian military representative in Wash-
ington the quetion of making a common war plan, but nothing ever
eventuated from those conversations during the time I remained in
Washington.
8. Q. Did the plan, as put into effect, envisage alternative combina-
tions of enemy nations?
A. It did. Without referring to the plan to aid memory, I believe
it envisaged war in which either Germany and her European Allies
were the sole enemies, or in which Japan was also engaged. The main
basis of the plan, however, was a global war in which both Germany
and her European Allies and Japan were at war with United States,
the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies. It was
PROdEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 265
agreed that if war was initiated by Japan, Germany would be brought
in by offensive action against her by the United States.
9. Q, Then, during the period immediately preceding the issuing of
WPL-46, 1 understand you to say that there was in the minds of your
organization that the most likely combination of enemies would in-
clude Japan?
A. Yes, sir.
10. Q. In either or both of the alternative enemy combinations, what
attitude, defensive or offensive, did the plan contemplate over the
Pacific Ocean Areas?
A. The plan contemplated a major effort on the part of both the
principal associated Powers against Germany, initially. It was felt
in the Navy [25'2] Department, that there might be a possi-
bility of war with Japan without the involvement of Germany, but
at some length and over a considerable period, this matter was dis-
cussed and it was determined that in such a case the United States
would, if possible, initiate efforts to bring Germany into the war
against us in order that we would be enabled to give strong support to
the United Kingdom in Europe. We felt that it was encumbent on
our side to defeat Germany, to launch our principal efforts against
Germany first, and to conduct a limited offensive in the Central Pa-
cific, and a strictly defensive effort in the Asiatic.
11. Q. At about what date was the Contributory Plan of the Com-
mander, Pacific Fleet, approved by the Navy Department?
A. It was about September. Keferring to the plan, it appears to
have been distributed on July 21. As I recall it, there was some cor-
respondence concerning some of the features, but I believe it was dur-
ing September that it was finally approved by the Department.
12. Q. Was that interim correspondence cause by any particular dis-
agreement on the part of your own organization with what had been
advanced by Admiral Kimmel ?
A. No essential disagreement whatsoever. The delay, as I recall it,
was due, principally to technical reasons and time required for a care-
ful review of the plan, by various agencies in the Department.
13. Q. Do you recall Admiral Kimmel having in any way expressed
disagreement with the defensive versus the offensive attitudes which
were laid down in the basic plan, WPL-46 ?
A. So far as Admiral Kimmel was concerned, his part in the plan
was not defensive. It required a limited offensive through the Cen-
tral Pacific islands. It was realized that Admiral Kimmel did not
have at hand all the material and men and organizations to proceed
immediately with a strong offensive to the Gilberts or the Marshalls.
The Navy Department was making every effort to try to set up base
materiel and organizations that would permit Admiral Kimmel, in
the course of a comparatively short time, to initiate such an offensive.
Admiral Kimmel, whether in writing or orally, I don't recall, ex-
pressed the view that he did not have the forces suitable for conduct-
ing an offensive in the immediate future. There was no disagreement
in the Department with such a view. We felt that the first part of the
war in the Central Pacific would be largely naval and air, and that
some time would elapse before we could seize and hold island terri-
tory. But it would be a grave error for anyone to get the idea that the
war in the Central Pacific was to be purely defensive. Far from it.
266 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR A^ITACK
While the Navy Department believed that our major military effoi't,
considered as a whole, should initially be against Germany — that view,
I may add, was also held by the War Department — we were all in
agreement that the principal naval effort should be in the Pacific.
The British Government did not hold such a view. They felt that
our principal naval effort ought to be in the Atlantic and in the
Asiatic. The United States believed that our strongest naval concen-
tration and naval effort ought to be in the Central Pacific.
14. Q. Other than as you have just testified, were there any other
considerations lying behind the transfer of a considerable detachment
of Admiral Kimmel's forces to the Atlantic, which step was somewhat
concurrent with the date of issue of WPL-46 ?
l^SS] A. In May of 1941, decision was reached jointly with the
British Government to occupy the Azores. The force which was with-
drawn from the Pacific at that time consisted of some Marine troops
and transports, one or two carriers, I think a division of cruisers,
some destroyers, and, as I recall, three battleships. Something like
that was withdrawn from the Pacific for the purpose of supporting
the occupation of the Azores. That project was abandoned and the
occupation of Iceland by American troops was substituted. Some of
the forces which were withdrawn for that purpose were then returned
to the Pacific. The Department consistently made every possible
effort to set up, in all of the theatres, the exact distribution of force
which is set forth in WPL-46, and, at the time of the outbreak of
war, substantially the forces established in that volume were present
in all of the theatres.
15. Q. Did Admiral Kimmel make any particular protest against the
transfer of that detachment from his command ?
A. I recall no official protest. He did not approve it. As a matter
of fact, he was not at once informed of the reasons for it. As I recall
it, he asked to have those vessels returned as soon as they could be
spared from the Atlantic. He felt that his strength here was none
too great. That opinion was also held by the Department. There are
two points that I would like to mention. In the first place, as you have
said, I do not have at hand records of the correspondence which
passed between the Department and Admiral Kimmel prior to De-
cember 7. As an assistant to Admiral Stark, I presented what Ad-
miral Stark considered to be the principal papers in that case to the
Eoberts Commission and they can be found in the transcript of pro-
ceedings of that Commission. I remember most of those letters and
dispatches, but am none too sure about the exact contents of each nor
the dates. The second, statement which I believe is pertinent is that
the feeling by Admiral Stark and by all members of the Department
with whom I ever talked was that of a very complete loyalty to the
principal Commanders-in-Chief, who were Admiral Hart in the
Asiatic, Admiral Kimmel in the Pacific, and Admiral King in the
Atlantic. I know Admiral Stark felt and I know I felt, that war was
coming and we had, in those three officers, the best possible selection of
officers in the Navy for the sea commands. The Department made
every effort possible to hold their hands up, and such adjustments as
had to be made between the three Fleets, due to many reasons, were
considered at length and very carefully before they were made. But
I believe that that feeling of essential loyalty ought to be recorded, as
PROCEEDINGS OF flART INQUIRY 267
well as Admiral Stark's policy of avoiding minor directives and inter-
ferences with the Commanders-in-Chief. He was especially careful,
at all times, to give them as full a scope of action as it was possible to
give.
16. Q. Both parts of that statement are considered to be entirely per-
tinent. There can well be added to the record the general belief
throughout the forces in the field that such trust and confidence ob-
tained throughout the period leading up to the war. There was the
fact that we contemplated Allies, if we became engaged in the war.
The examination returns to the incident of that transfer of forces
from the Pacific to the Atlantic. As you recall the innermost opinions
held by you and your associates, was that transfer in accord with your
own conceptions of what the situation demanded or was it somewhat
overinfluenced by the British insistence?
A. The decision was made after a great deal of discussion. Of
course, there were differences of opinion, but the Department was en-
tirely loyal to that decision. The British did not insist too greatly.
In fact, the expedition was cancelled at the request of the British
when they became [^-5^] couvinced that the Portuguese would
resist the seizure of the Islands.
17. Q. It is in previous testimony that there was, some time dur-
ing the Summer of 1941, a temporary detachment of surface vessels
toward Australia. Did that have any particular part in the overall
picture which was confronting the Navy Department?
A. That detachment went to Australia for the purpose of indicat-
ing to Japan solidarity between the United States and the British
Commonwealth, and to indicate to Japan that if British interests
were attacked that the United States would enter the war on the
side of the British. Admiral Stark kept the Commanders-in-Chief
informed, to the best of his ability, as to the international political
situation and the probabilities of the future. While the Government
could not guarantee that we would enter the war if Japan attacked
Great Britain, they fully believed that we would do so. In our con-
versations with the British, we never could make a firm commitment
that at any particular time the United States would enter the war,
for the reason that unless we were attacked first, the Executive De-
partment did not have the power to put the Country into war.
Conversations were held in the Far East with the Dutch and the
British authorities, and joint plans, not too definite in nature, were
drawn up, but we n6ver could *be sure that if the Netherlands East
Indies or the British were attacked the United States would surely
come into the war.
18. Q. During June and July, 1941, formal action was taken by
our Federal Government to freeze Japanese credits. At that time,
or afterward, did your organization make a reestimate of the inter-
national situation in the light of the probability that the Japanese
would be badly squeezed in obtaining strategic materials and so forth ?
A. The possibility and consequences of action of that nature by the
United States Government against Japan were thoroughly considered
during our conversations with the British and during our preparation
of WPL-46. We felt that that action was going to come sooner or
later. We also felt, and I believe that the War Department felt the
same way, that action of that nature would almost surely result in
268 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
war with Japan within a comparatively short period of time. While
the subject of economic sanctions was discussed, we felt that there
was no necessity for making any change in our planning.
19. Q. Then was it the case that such circumstances had really been
included in the situation estimate which laid behind WPL-46 in the
first place?
A. Yes. ^ i
20. Q. Did it occur to you, during 1941 or previously, that the
Navy Department's general method of preparing, and of the admin-
istrative handling of its war plans, including keeping them in touch
with events and developments, was in any way defective ?
A, I shared the opinion with many others that the war plans which
were in existence during 1940 were defective in the extreme. They
were not realistic, they were highly theoretical, they set up forces to
be ready for use at the outbreak of war, or shortly after, which could
not possibly have been made available, and they were not kept up to
date. Wlien I went as War Plans Officer in October of 1940, I was
shocked at the state of the war plans. There was the feeling then
in Washington, which I did not share, that war with Japan might
eventuate at any moment, and there was no plan for war with Japan.
Immediately after my arrival and after a thorough discussion of the
matter, we initiated the preparation and issue of WPL-43, Rainbow
3, which was a Navy Department War Plan not concurred in by the
War Department. This [255] called for a war with Japan
alone, and with an entirely defensive attitude in the Atlantic. That
plan was issued about January of 1941. We felt that it would be
implemented by the War Department if war should eventuate. It
must be understood that a war plan issued by the Navy Department,
or by the Government, is principally a mobilization plan for placing
in the hands of the Commanders-in-Chief the forces with which they
are to initiate war and to give those Commanders-in-Chief general
directives as to the strategic attitude which they should pursue.
Rainbow 3 was, to all intents and purposes, and so far as the Pacific
is concerned, approximately the same as Rainbow 5. Rainbow 3 did
contemplate association with the British and the Netherlands East
Indies on the Far East, but it did not go so far in tliat regard as
Rainbow 5. Rainbow 3 was an interim plan. It was necessary, we
all felt, to get out a war plan which the Government could carry
out. Therefore, every effort was made to strip from the previous
plans the unrealistic features, and to give to the new plan forces
which could be provided and tasks which could probably be executed
by Commanders-in-Chief. As soon as we issued Rainbow 3 and as
soon as we issued Rainbow 5, the Navy Department immediately began
moving foces to the different theatres in accord with the commitments
made in those two plans.
21. Q. Then am I correct in understanding you to the effect that you
did consider Rainbow 5 realistic, well described by the word "As-ts",
not frozen, and sufficiently elastic insofar as developments could be
seen?
A. Yes.
22. Q. Did you, during the Summer of 1941, make any special
provision for keeping WPL-46 in step with changes in the general
situation and with changes in availability of forces ?
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 269
A. Yes, I organized the War Plans Division into sections charged
with maintaining close cognizance of the different war theatres of the
world, and made every effort to keep Rainbow 5 up to date. Rather
extensive amendments were practically ready for issue when war
broke out. They were not issued in the form in which prepared.
23. Q. In pursuance of that objective, or for any other reasons, were
any estimates of the situation, other than running estimates, made
by the War Plans Division during the period of, say, August to
December, 1941?
A. None other than running estimates. I believed then, and I
still believe that those are the most valuable kind of estimates. The
long, formalized estimates, as used in the War College, are useful for
training, but I have not found them particularly useful during war
or preparation for war.
24. Q. Was there, during that period from August on. any particu-
lar redistribution of the naval forces of our respective Allies actually
made or promised?
A. The British promised to set up the Eastern Fleet as contem-
plated by our Joint Agreement which would consist of about six battle-
ships, two or three aircraft carriers, and some additional cruisers and
destroyers. This Fleet was to be based in the Indian Ocean. Its
principal base was Trincomalee with an advance base at Singapore.
They actually moved the PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE and
four destroyers to Singapore. En route there were, as I recall it,
three battleships and one aircraft carrier additional to the HERMES
at the time of the outbreak of war. Also a few destroyers and one or
two cruisers. They were, so far as possible, making a loyal effort to.
carry out their commitments as to the distribution of forces for war.
They also moved additional troops and additional aircraft to Malaya.
We delivered, [256} under lend-lease, some aircraft to them in
the Far East and sent groups of experts and mechanics out to Malaya
to show them how to use our airplanes. .
25. Q. During the same period, did our own War Department plan
and effect any increase in ground or air strength in the Pacific Ocean
Area?
A. Yes, as soon as Rainbow 5 was agreed to, the War Department
immediately initiated steps for reenforcing the Hawaiian Islands
and the Philippines. They actually moved a considerable number of
airplanes to the Philippines and considerable additional troops. They
also initiated a very greatly accelerated training of Philippine soldiers
and, during the Fall of 1941, undertook what was essentially a mobili-
zation of the Philippine Army.
26. Q. Was your organization kept in touch and frequently con-
sulted concerning other than the basic considerations leading to those
steps ?
A. We were consulted in detail every time the War Department
contemplated a movement of that sort. We had prolonged discus-
sions of ways and means. Our opinion was frequently asked as to the
advisability of such and such a movement. At that time, the War
Department did not dispose of many trained elements which could be
moved overseas without a very bad interruption of their training
program. The War Department, after June of 1941, was, I believe,
as thoroughly convinced as the Navy Department that war with Ger-
many and Japan was not far distant.
270 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
27. Q. Was your organization able to keep touch, during the latter
half of 1941, with the actual ability of the Army forces, Hawaii, to
meet their commitments ?
A. Yes, sir, we had a very definite opinion on the subject. It was
substantially the same as was held, I believe, by the War Department,
that it would be highly desirable to have considerably greater strength
in antiaircraft and airplanes and troops in Hawaii.
28. Q. Narrowing the examination down to the Hawaiian Area and
forces therein ; did the War Plans Division, through the latter half
of 1941, consider that the Pacific Fleet had sufficient forces to carry
out its initial tasks ?
A. We were not at all satisfied with the defensive cover that was
being afforded Hawaii, and continued every effort to set up defenses
in outlying islands, such as Midway, Wake, Palmyra, Johnston Island,
and Samoa. These places were all strengthened, air fields were built
or in process of building, and we were distributing forces to those posi-
tions. The principal reason for building the defenses there was to
detect and ward off enemy attacks against Hawaii, and to afford defen-
sive cover for the sea operations of our Fleet. It was not possible, of
course, to provide such a cover to the northward, and that was always
recognized as a weak spot in our defense. I may say that I, personally,
was not in favor of setting up defenses in Wake. It was too far re-
moved for proper support, and was certain to fall at an early date
after the war broke out unless we could have an early successful en-
gagement with the Japanese Fleet, which seemed unlikely. The other
positions were considered of great value and work was pushed on all
of them to the limit of our available resources. As regards the strength
of the Pacific Fleet, we felt that it was adequate for the tasks assigned
to it, although we would have been happy to have had greater strength.
29. Q. Did 5'^ou consider the Fleet's logistics support to be adequate ?
[^57] A. We believed it to be adequate for the initial Fleet
operations, such as I have mentioned. We did not consider that
it was adequate for an early offensive movement for setting up bases
in the Marshalls. We did not have the units assembled for setting
up such bases and we did not have the shipping to support the Fleet
at an advance base, but we believed that we could obtain those forces
within a reasonable time after the outbreak of war. That estimate,
I believe, has been proved sound by events. We have provided far
greater logistics support in the Pacific Ocean than I would have
believed possible before the outbreak of war. I refer to our tre-
mendous logistic effort in the South Pacific immediately following
the outbreak of war.
30. Q. During the period of preparation of basic Rainbow 5, was
it the opinion in your organization and among your associates that
if war with Japan eventuated, it would be at our initiative or at
that of the Japanese ?
A. Always at the initiative of the Japanese. We did not believe
it politically possible to initiate war against the Japanese. I, per-
sonally, did not believe it politically advisable.
31. Q. And did those opinions endure throughout 1941 up until
7 December?
A. Yes, sir.
32. Q. Please state the methods of liaison with the State Depart-
ment which were in effect from the summer of 1941 onward, or even
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 271
previously, through which you kept in touch with developments in
the diplomatic and political fields, and including also the economic
field, insofar as it was pertinent.
A. The Chief of Naval Operations had a close personal association
with the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State. He con-
sulted them frequently and they consulted him, I might say invari-
ably, before making any particular diplomatic move. In the Office
of Naval Operations, the Chief of the Central Division was appointed
as liaison officer with the State Department. He visited the State
Department and discussed problems with them practically every day.
There was a weekly meeting in the State Department conducted by
the Under Secretary of State, Mr, Welles, usually attended by the
Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of
the War Plans of the Army, Chief of War Plans of the Navy, the
Chief of the Central Division of the Office of Naval Operations, an
officer of the General Staff not in the War Plans Division, and two
or three representatives of the State Department. The matters dis-
cussed at these meetings usually related to events in Western Hemi-
sphere countries. The Army was building a lot of air fields in the
Caribbean and South America. The Navy and the Army, both, had
sent missions to those countries, and at the meetings with the Under
Secretary it was chiefly American affairs that were discussed. Occa-
sionally, possibly once a month, the Secretary of State would hold
a conference with representatives of the War and Navy Departments,
and at these meetings events outside of the Americas were discussed.
From time to time the Secretary of State would call individuals from
the War and Navy Department to discuss particular aspects of world
events. There were other unscheduled conferences between the State
and War and Navy Departments, I participated in a great many
such conferences. From time to time, informal memoranda were
exchanged between individuals of the State and Navy Departments
or exchanged between the Secretary of State and the Chief of Naval
Operations, I would say that relations between the State and War
and State and Navy Departments were very close and were character-
ized by good feeling,
33, Q, Is it your impression now that much transpired in those
relationships with the Department of which no official record was
kept and which rests now only in the minds of individuals ?
[^581 A, I don't know what records the State Department kept.
The Navy Department representative, the Liaison Officer, usually pre-
pared notes of formal conferences which he put in the files, I kept no
notes whatsoever,
34, Q. Was it your impression that there were relationships, con-
ferences, and so forth, on the part of State Department and Army
officials in whidh our representatives had no part ?
A. There were such conferences but, I believe that we were kept
fully informed as to the general features of any such conferences.
35, Q. Insofar as your own participation was concerned, did you
gather the impression that State Dej)artment officials had a correct
realization of the naval and military potentialities on our side and
that they kept their own actions in step therewith,
A. I think any broad generalization in an answer to that question
could not fairly be made. There were individuals in the State \De-
272 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
partment who had an unrealistic point of view, in my opinion, just
the same as there were individuals in the War and Navy Departments
who had an unrealistic point of view of the world situation. I'll say
that on the whole, I have no complaint nor criticism of the attitude
of the State Department.
36. Q. In continuance of your testimony concerning the attitude
of certain individuals, will you go further as respects the individuals
who specialized in the Pacific Ocean Areas.
A. I encountered the opinion, held alike by some people in the
State Department and in the military service, that we could bluff
Japan. I have been fortunate enough to have been associated with the
Japanese on several occasions and had made a considerable study of
the Japanese character and life and history. I was always of the
opinion that you can not bluff the Japanese and that that is not the
way to deal with them. But I believe that I, prior to the war, was in
a very small minority in that view, so that I can not say that I criticize
anyone for holding such views.
37. Q. Do you recall if it was represented to the State Department,
at any time in 1941, and particularly upon the decision to build up
Army forces in our holdings in the Pacific, that the element of timing
in diplomatic and political moves was highly important?
A. That factor was thoroughly considered in every diplomatic and
military move that was made, so far as I recall. The matter would
be discussed as to whether this was the time to do a certain move or
some other time. That was always present. There were sometimes
disagreements as to timing.
38. Q. As an example, and in order to be more specific, was our own
potentiality in the Pacific properly considered when the date for
freezing the Japanese credits was decided upon ?
A. It was considered. The State Department was kept well in-
formed as to our strength and advised as to what we could do. Wliat
considerations lead to that decision at that particular time, I'm not
aware, because I was informed of it after the decision was made and
did not participate in any discussion of it in advance.
39. Q. Admiral, will you make a general statement as to the ade-
quacy and reliability of the intelligence furnished concerning Japan
in all fields through 1941 for the necessary purposes of the War Plans
Division ?
[2S9] A. Of course, we never have enough intelligence. It is
particularly true that, as is well known, correct intelligence concerning
Japan is very difficult to obtain. However, I think our intelligence
regarding Japanese activities and intentions was quite good. In gen-
eral terms, it was adequate for the preparation of war plans and for
the direction of affairs. I believe that the Chief of Naval Operations,
during the greater part of 1941, had a very realistic an^ sound concept
as to Japanese general intentions. We received information from
undercover sources that was of great value. Those who have studied
the Japanese and had realized their character and reactions could
draw conclusions, usually sound, from public statements, actions of
their diplomats, actions of their Government, which were valuable in
estimating their intentions. From these various sources, I became
convinced, even before going to the Department, that war with Japan
was inevitable within the next year or two. I did not believe that
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 273
war was imminent with Japan, unless precipitated by some incident,
until the time it occurred. I did believe, from the fall of the Konoye
Cabinet, which, I believe, was in June or July of 1941, that matters
then were definitely in train for an attack by Japan on the United
States, GreRt Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies. During No-
vember of 1941, I believed that the attack would be made by Japan
about the last day of that month, but during the last ten days of
November, I became convinced it had been postponed for a few days.
The attack of December 7 came as no surprise whatsoever to me, nor
to the Chief of Naval Operations.
40. Q. Were you, however, surprised that one of the objectives of
the Japanese attack was Pearl Harbor itself?
A. Not in the least. I had originated a letter from the Secretary
of the Navy to the Secretary of War in January of 1941 concerning
the defenses of Hawaii, in which an air, sea, and submarine attack
on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor was set forth as one of the most probable
forms that the initiation of war with Japan would take. The Chief
of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army, about that
same time, wrote letters to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
and the Commanding General in Hawaii, pointing out these features
and asking that steps be taken within the power of those officers to be
prepared for such an attack. Those letters were not intended to be
construed as indicating an immediate attack, but they attempted to
initiate rather long-range preparatory plans.
41. Q. Through 1941, and particularly during the months which
saw the increase of tension with Japan, was your organization much
concerned and worried as regards the security of units of the Pacific
Fleet, as based in Hawaiian waters? I mean, in particular, security
against surprise attack.
A. That factor was never absent from our consideration of the prob-
lems of war with Japan. We endeavored to do what we could with
other parts of the Department, and with the Commander-in-Chief, to
push measures that would insure adequate security. The letters and
dispatches on that subject initiated by my office are not many because
we felt, and it was the Chief of Naval Operation's policy, not to nag
on matters of that sort. The problem was put where it belonged, in
the hands of the Commander-in-Chief.
42. Q. In those intra-office discussions, was a surprise attack through
the airparticularly in your mind ?
A. We felt that would probably accompany any attack unless such
attacks were confined solely to submarines. Attacks by submarines
were, of course, an almost certainty, and might well have been the only
form of attack.
[260] 43. Q. While holding that frame of mind, during that
crucial period, did you also have in mind the actual state of readiness
of Army forces, Oahu, for repelling carrier raid ?
A. Yes. On several occasions, we went over in detail the exact
forces the Army had available, both anti-aircraft and air, their dis-
tribution, and whether or not they were deployed in the vicinity of
Pearl Harbor permanently. I am sure there is considerable cor-
respondence in general terms on that subject, but I do not remember
whether or not we specifically asked the War Department to deploy
their anti-aircraft guns permanently in the immediate vicinity of
79716—46 — Ex. 144 19
274 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Pearl Harbor. I know that we asked them orally to keep their prin-
cipal anti-aircraft forqie deployed around Pearlf Harbor, and my
impression is that they carried that out. We knew that the three
inch anti-aircraft gun was not a very able weapon, but the new ninety
millimeter and the Army thirty-seven millimeter and the. fifty calibre
guns were either not available then or available only in small numbers.
I believe that the War Department did everything that they could
to meet these requests.
44. Q. Were you cognizant of the state of training and readiness of
the Army air forces, Oahu, for repelling or interfering with an
air raid?
A. No. We knew the types of planes they had had here were of
the older models and not particularly valuable in combat. In order
to correct that quickly, in the latter part of 1941, we made, I think,
two carrier trips from the Coast carrying the later types of Army
pursuit planes. They were newly formed organizations and we did
not expect their training to be of a very high order. The purpose of
those trips by carriers and the purpose of the Army transfers of the
later types of pursuit planes and bombers in the latter part of '41
was to deal with exactly the situation that occurred.
45. Q. Did you have knoAvledge of the state of readiness of the
Army's radar equipment and organization?
A. In general terms, yes. When I went to War Plans, the Army
had, under manufacture, eight or ten large radar installations of a
permanent type. The priority at that time of assignment was, first
to Panama, and, I think, second on the West Coast of the United
States. On our recommendation, they changed that priority to first,
I think, the Philippines, and, second Hawaii; or it may have been
the other way. I'm not too certain about that. The first may have
been Midway, but the Philippines, Hawaii, and Midway were placed
by the War Department very high on the list. Now the installation,
the permanent fixed installation in Hawaii, I do not believe was com-
pleted at the time of Pearl Harbor, but it was being pushed hard.
The Army had, however, moved out here, quite recently to that date,
several sets of the mobile type of radar, and we knew that these were
being operated.
46. Q. But you did not know anything specific about the relative
inefficiencies of the operation ; is that correct ?
A. That is correct. I knew nothing whatever about radar except
what it was intended to do.
47. Q. Continuing as regards the security of units of the Fleet
against surprise attack while in Hawaii, and specifically Pearl Har-
bor, were there, during the months leading up to the war, any specific
considerations in your organization as to the advisability of continu-
ing to base the Fleet in Hawaiian waters ; if so, please state them.
A. Consideration was given to withdrawing the Fleet from the
Base in Hawaii to California throughout the entire time I was in the
Department, [261] until a very short period before Pearl
Harbor. There were several factors that entered into that considera-
tion. One was political, whether or not the presence of the Fleet here
would be more likely or less likely to bring on war with Japan. An-
other consideration was the welfare of the crews of the ships ; the men
did not like Hawaii, and there was a certain amount of discontent
PROCElEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 275
among them in not getting back more frequently to the States. An-
other was the upkeep of the Fleet. Another consideration was its
safety in case of attack. I suppose the matter was discussed rather
exhaustively a dozen times, and each time the decision was made to
leave the Fleet here. For some time previous to the attack, the use
of the anchorage at Lahaina Koads had been abandoned on the initia-
tive of the Commander-in-Chief, because it was felt to be too exposed,
both against submarines and against air attack. It was believed that
when the Fleet was not at sea, Pearl Harbor offered better protection
than any other place in that vicinity.
48. Q. Then you do not recall any occasion on which decision to
withdraw from these waters to the Coast, for security reasons only,
came anywhere near to being reached ?
A. No, sir.
49. Q. Sir, was the estimate that you stated a few minutes ago that
you considered a surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor a strong possibil-
ity shared by the Chief of Naval Operations and his other senior assist-
ants?
A. Yes, because they approved the letters that we drew up, without
any question. They made some improvements in the letters, but the
Chief of Naval Operations and the Assistant Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, as well as my own assistants, all believed that the letters were
entirely sound.
50. Q. What was the understanding in the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations as to the estimate prevailing in the Office of the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, as regards the possibilities of air
surprise attack on Oahu ?
A. We believed that he held exactly the same views that we did.
What his attitude was towards the imminence of such an attack, I have
no idea, but the fact that he, himself, had abandoned the use of Lahaina
Eoads indicated that his attitude toward attack was entirely correct.
61. Q. Did you feel, at that time, that all necessary steps were taken
to apprise the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet of the apprehension
of the Chief of Naval Operations as to a surprise air attack on Oahu?
A. There was no specific warning sent out against attack on the
Fleet here at the time the war warnings were dispatched. The only
measures that we estimated specifically the Japanese would take were
the general forms of his major attack, which was on Malay, the Philip-
pines, and possibly Borneo, initially. That is, it was the major move-
ment with which we were concerned in the Department. It was
against policy — rightly so, I believe — to be too specific in details as to
tactical matters. The idea was that we would give the Commanders-
in-Chief general tasks, provide them with full information, and assign
to them forces adequate for executing those tasks. We looked to the
officers in the field to decide all tactical matters and methods. We did
not wish to hamper them with detailed instructions concerning matters
within their own fields of action. This was particularly important in
the case of the Pacific and Asiatic Commands, which are so far distant
from Washington that the officers there can never be adequately advised
as to events and conditions.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
[262] Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun, U. S. Navy, who had previ-
ously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that
276 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read
over the testimony given by him on the eighteenth day of the examina-
iion, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.
Commander Granville C. Briant, U. S. Naval Reserve, who had
previously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed
that his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he
had read over the testimony given by him on the nineteenth day of the
examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 12:03 p. m., adjourned until 9:15
a. m., tomorrow.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 277
PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY
tuesday, april 4, 1944
Twenty-first Day
Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii.
The examination met at 8 : 15 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer,
and his counsel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the twentieth day of the examination until such time
as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with the
examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
Richmond Kelly Turner, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, the witness
under examination when the adjournment was taken, entered. He
was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding, and con-
tinued his testimony.
Examined by the examining officer (Continued) :
52. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch dated 16 October, which is
Exhibit 6 in the testimony before this board. Did you have any part
in the preparation of that dispatch ?
A. I prepared the original version of the dispatch. It was discussed
with the Arrny. I think the discussion took place at a joint board meet-
ing, as well as informally between the Staff representatives. I also
prepared the final form which is this dispatch. There was no sub-
stantial change in the wording, except that, in my original form of the
dispatch, instead of l^6S] saying, "There is also a possibility
that Japan may attack Britain and the United States," I made it a
good deal stronger than that. I do not remember the exact wording;
I think it was "a distinct probability Japan will attack Britain and
the United States in the near future". Anyway, that was the meaning.
That was felt by the Joint Board to be too strong a statement, and it
was modified to the final wording.
53. Q. Do you recall that consultations with State Department
officials preceded the sending of this dispatch ?
A. I did not participate in any consultations with the State Depart-
ment concerning this dispatch. As I recall it, the dispatch was shown
to the Secretary of State and was discussed by him and the Chief of
Naval Operations. It also was discussed by the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations with the President. I do not believe it was presented to a
Cabinet meeting. In fact, I'm sure it wasn't; but I have the strong
278 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
impression that the President discussed its general features with the
Secretary of State before it was sent.
54. Q. The next document which the board has in evidence bears
the date of 24 November and is of somewhat similar tenor (indicating
Exhibit 7). The intervening period is thirty -nine days. Do you
recall any action by the Navy Department, any directives and so forth,
of major import concerning the situation of the Pacific Fleet during
that interim ?
A. I don't recall any additional directives. The Navy Department
and the War Department increased their efforts to get additional
strength here in the Central Pacific and in the Philippines during that
period. The situation was discussed at regular and at several special
meetings of the Joint Board, and action was agreed to along several
lines of effort by the Department9.
55. Q. Following your mention of Army efforts, do you recall any
embarrassment coming upon the Navy Department, or its forces in the
Pacific, incident to a very high estimate of numbers of B-17's which
were to be ferried across the Pacific ?
A. I don't recall any embarrassment. We made every effort and
sent out directives to hasten the completion of the air fields at Midway
and Wake, and we had to send additional men out there, in order to
hasten completion of Navy airfields for use by the Army in ferrying
planes to the Philippines. That took some of our shipping. *The
Army asked us to provide shipping for the fields at Canton and
Christmas Islands, but we were unable to provide it for Christmas.
We did provide some for Canton. Those fields had been started on
my recommendation after talking to General Arnold. I told him we
would lose Wake right away as soon as war broke out and if he wanted
to get planes to the Philippines an alernative route ought to be pro-
vided via Australia and Pacific Ocean islands farther to the rear. That
conversation took ]:ilace at Argentia, during the Argentia Conference.
The Navy was alwaj^s heartily in favor of sending the planes to the
Philippines, and we did what we could to assist the Army.
_ 56. Q. Do you recall disappointment because the magnitude of that
air reenf orcement was very much less than what was projected ?
A. Yea. The Navy Department was constantly urging the War
Department to do all they possibly could in the way of getting addi-
tional strength in the Philippines. I will say that the War Depart-
ment was also in favor of it. I think they sent out everything they
could. I would like to add the following as a partial answer to a pre-
vious question regarding major steps that the Navy Department took
which affected the Pacific situation. It was [264] at about this
time that the Navy Department shifted all merchant and military
shipping out of the Central Pacific, and sent it down south of New
Guinea. It was also about this time that a directive was sent to the
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, to withdraw the Marines from
China. The exact date of that dispatch, I do not recall.
57. Q. Do you recall if Mr. Kurusu's mission to Washington caused
any particular change in opinions in your organization during this
period of thirty-nine days?
A._ His mission intensified our belief, already strong, that Japan was
playing for time and was going to make an attack in the near future.
The Kurusu mission seemed almost proof positive, had we not had
proof already.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 279
58. Q. Keturning to the dispatch of 16 October. Do you recall ap-
proximately what steps Admiral Kimmel took to carry out the directive
for a preparatory deployment ?
A. He sent additional troops to the outlying islands and some fixed
anti-aircraft guns and troops to Wake. He could not put the entire
garrison in at Wake because of the large number of civilian workmen
there, so he only sent a part of them out at this time. Then, just as
war was breaking out, he dispatched another contingent to Wake, and
he established an anti-submarine patrol in the Hawaiian Islands. I
think he increased his air patrol, and he issued some orders to our own
submarines, but I don't remember what they were. Our impression
was that he was taking the necessary precautions. We had no doubts
as to the readiness of the Pacific Fleet.
- 59. Q. During the aforesaid interim period of thirty-nine days, were
the Department's directives concerning deployments ever rescinded?
A. No, sir.
60. Q. I pass you a dispatch dated 24 November, which is Exhibit 7
in this testimony. Did you have any part in the preparation of that
dispatch ?
A. I prepared this dispatch. It went through approximately the
same processes as the October dispatch.
61. Q. Do you recall any particular collaboration of organizations,
other than Army and Navy, in the preparation of that dispatch or
which were in its background?
A. There were frequent conferences with the State Department
during this period and frequent conferences between the Chief of
Naval Operations, Chief of Staff of the Army, and the President.
The Office of Naval Intelligence was in close touch with the Army
Intelligence Service and with the F. B. I. concerning preventative
measures being taken in the United States and in the Hawaiian
Islands. I've forgotten just when the Coast Guard was taken over.
I know there were conferences with the Coast Guard and the Treasury
Department during this time in order to fit them into the deployment.
I understood the situation was discussed several times in Cabinet meet-
ings, and I believe that there were several conferences on the subject
between the Cabinet officers most directly concerned.
62. Q. Admiral, I hand you a dispatch of 27 November, which is
Exhibit 8 in this testimony. Did you also have a part in the prepara-
tion of this dispatch?
A. The preparation of that dispatch followed approximately the
same course as the other two. I prepared the original dispatch. It
was considered by the Joint Board and was taken up with the State
Department and [£65] the White House. There were some
few changes made in it until it took this form. As I recall, we were
informed by the Secretary of State, at a small meeting at which I
was present, that the State Department has no further hopes of com-
posing matters with the Japanese. The Secretary of State requested
advice from the Military Services as to any further steps that his
Department might make. It was apparent, from the talks that were
going on between the State Department and Mr. Kurusu, as well as
from information received from intelligence sources, that the Japanese
were killing time preparatory to an attack. We could not estimate
the exact time that the attack would be made, but we knew of troop
movements and naval movements in the Far East toward the South.
280 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
It was at about this time that our search planes first ]3icked up some
of the Japanese ships moving along the coast of Indo-China. I think
it may have been after the date of this dispatch that we instituted
plane search of the China Sea, but we were conscious of definite
amphibious movements being made before the dispatch we are dis-
cussing was sent. The radio traffic, during the first half and middle
of November, had been very heavy on the part of the Japanese, and
suddenly it almost stopped some time between the 20th and 25th of
November, as I recall it. Very little traffic was then sent out. That
convinced us that the Japanese Fleet had put to sea. I was concerned,
and had been through this entire period, over whether or not Japanese
traffic analyses were being made by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet, and I bought the subject up several times with the Director of
Naval Communications and with the Assistant Chief of Naval Opera-
tions. I was assured, each time, that the Commander-in-Chief was
getting everything that we were getting in Washington, and was mak-
ing proper traffic analyses here. Japanese radio traffic analyses were
under the cognizance of the Director of Naval Communications, and
I am not very familiar with the exact methods employed, nor of the
distribution which was made of their deductions. The Director kept
War Plans fully informed as to these deductions.
63. Q. In the discussion over the dispatch as you first drafted it,
do you recall anything in particular as regards the phrase "war warn-
ing"; particularly discussion on what steps those words might lead
the Pacific Fleet to take?
A. The words "war warning" were my own words and seemed to
me to express the strong conviction on the part of the Department that
war was surely coming. We expected all military services and out-
lying detachments to act in every way as if we were actually at war,
except making attacks on the enemy, if encountered, or initiating
movements against enemy forces.
64. Q. Will you, similarly, state what, in particular, the Department
had in mind in the use of the words in this dispatch concerning "a
deployment" ?
A. It will be noted that the dispatch orders a defensive deployment.
We expected all war scouting measures to be undertaken, submarines
to be sent out to protect our Fleet and territory against enemy naval
forces; we expected the carriers with their protective vessels to put
to sea and stand in readiness for war; we expected, in the Asiatic,
the movement of ships to be made to the South in accordance with the
plan agreed on. We expected a high degree of readiness on board
ships against attack of any form; and on shore, we expected a high
degree of readiness of defensive troops, including anti-aircraft. The
dispatch was prepared jointly with the Army. We expected a deploy-
ment of the Army on shore appropriate with a defensive state of readi-
ness, such as manning the coastal guns, and moving troops out to I heir
deployment positions for defense of territory.
[266] 65. Q. Do you recall any discussion, during the prepara-
tion of this dispatch, over inclusion of a directive to Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific Fleet, to report what means he was taking incident to
this dispatch ?
A. We saw the Army dispatch requiring a report as to measures
taken before it went out, but the Chief of Naval Operations and his
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 281
advisers, so far as I can recall, did not even consider sending out such
a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
66. Q. Or the inclusion of such a directive in this dispatch itself?
A. No, that is a point I do not recall coming up.
67. Q. Do you recall any discussion over the advisability of sending
a naval operations officer of authority to Pearl Harbor in order to
insure a meeting of minds ?
A. No, sir. An inspection procedure of that nature was never con-
sidered, so far as I recall, at any time while I was in the Department.
We had, in circulating war plans or agreements with the British, on
one or two occasions, sent an officer to Hawaii and to Manila to go
over the paj)ers with the Commanders-in-Chief to insure that those
officers thoroughly understood the Department's intentions and de-
sires, but I heard no suggestions that an officer be sent out here to
check on what the Commander-in-Chief was actually doing.
68. Q. It appears, from previous testimony, that the Department
sent C-in-C Pacific another dispatch on 26 November, which orig-
inated some hours earlier than the other dispatch, and which pre-
occupied the High Commands in Oahu. It concerned the substitu-
tion of Army air and ground troops in outlying islands as then
garrisoned by Marines. Do you recall that dispatch (showing Ex-
hibit 12) ?
A. Yes, I recall this dispatch and I am sure it was prepared in my
office.
69. Q. Did it occur to you that the timing of these two important
dispatches, sent on the same day, was not altogether desirable?
A. No, sir. In fact, the purpose of the dispatch was to strengthen
Midway against attack, and while this dispatch probably took several
days in preparation, I think we wouldn't have considered it a part of
the war warning series but rather a part of the materiel preparation
matters, on which dispatches were going out practically every day.
I've never had the thought that this would have done anything except
more or less reenforce the idea of complete readiness. The fact that
the planes had to be taken on an aircraft carrier indicated the necessity
for speed.
70. Q. Did the dispatches in question (Exhibits 12 and 13) contem-
plate exchange of ground troops ? I understand from your testimony
that you did not consider that the quite extensive administrative
measures necessitated by such shifts in forces would get in the way
of larger considerations; is that correct?
A. This dispatch does not contemplate the exchange of troops, but
merely exchange of ground crews and personnel of the airplane squad-
rons. The dispatch. Exhibit 13, contemplates reenforcement by in-
fantry units of Marine defense battalions in position in the outlying
islands. There was never any intention to relieve the Marine defense
battalions, but they needed infantry reenforcement for proper security.
Both of these dispatches, in my opinion, relate to a part of the imme-
diate war measures which the Department considered essential. Ad-
ministrative requirements for moving these forces to the forward posi-
tions were necessary. I consider the [^67] dispatches relate
to a movement which would add considerable strength to our de-
fensive position in the Hawaiian Islands. I foresaw no administrative
difficulties that would interfere with a proper defensive attitude of
the Fleet and of the Army forces in Hawaii.
282 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
71. Q. Refering back to your testimony to the effect that you ex-
pected the Pacific Fleet to take up positions in readiness as a part of
their reaction to the phrase "war warning", and so forth ; do you re-
call if the logistic requirements which would be thereby entailed had
ample attention in your minds at that time?
A. The Fleet actually had put to sea prior to this time, and they were
then operating in about three or four task forces, and alternating in
Pearl Harbor. The amount of fuel in Pearl Harbor was a constant
matter of concern to War Plans and other agencies of the Navy De-
partment. We felt that the logistic position out here was secure
enough to execute those movements which we had in mind. I have
never heard that it was not reasonably adequate.
72. Q. But if in consequence of such an understanding on the part
of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, his task groups had been
at sea, for several days prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities, would
they not have had to return to port for refueling?
A. I don't remember whether or not there were enough tankers here
at that time to keep the Fleet at sea continuously without returning to
port. My impression is that there were enough. The rotation of the
task forces in Pearl Harbor was not brought to my attention or the
attention of the Chief of Naval Operations until after December 7.
73. Q. Under the Department's directive as contained in Exhibit 8,
the deployment was stated to be in preparation for carrying out the
assigned tasks in the war plans. Did it occur to you, while framing
that dispatch, that the result might well be the assemblage of the
entire Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor in preparation to jump off on the
initial movement which the plans called for ?
A. There was no question about an immediate amphibious move-
ment. The only thing which was possible, the only tasks of the war
plan which were possible were defensive movements and raids against
enemy outlying positions, and the immediate matter was the defense
of the Hawaiian Islands and our outlying islands. The place to defend
them for the Fleet was at sea.
74. Q. However, the first task imposed upon the Pacific Fleet,
though in the nature of a raid, required heavy forces and a blow pro-
jected at a long distance. In that view, would it have been unfair to
expect that the Commander-in-Chief would assemble all three of his
task forces in Pearl Harbor in preparation therefor ?
A. The wording of the dis^Datch relating to that matter is as follows :
"Execute appropriate deployment preparatory to carrying out the de-
fensive tasks only assigned in WPL-46." That appears to me to be
clear and to rule out, for the time being, any immediate preparation
for an offensive move.
75. Q. Referring to my question regarding a directive to the Com-
mander-in-Chief to state what measures he was taking, did you re-
ceive any report of action by Army forces, Oahu, which contained
any indication that the actions taken in consequence of the 27
November dispatch had not been what was contenplated when they
were sent?
[268] A. I remember a dispatch being received by the War De-
partment from General Short reporting the measures being taken in
compliance with the War Department's directive. A copy of that
dispatch was sent to me by the War Plans Officer of the General Staff.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 283
I did not discuss the dispatch with the War Plans Officer of the General
Staff. The impression made on me by the dispatch was that the Army
was taking satisfactory dispositions, and since the dispatch seemed
satisfactory to the War Department, I did not pursue the subject
further. The dispatch did not create any impression on me that
full and appropriate defensive deployments were not being made by
the Army.
76. Q. I show 5^ou a dispatch from OpNav, which is Exhibit 11
before this examination. Do you recall having prepared it or
having seen it at the time it was sent ?
A. I saw it before it was sent. It was sent by Naval Intelligence.
77. Q. Did the information therein cause ' thought within your
organization and among your associates as to the advisability of any
further warnings or instructions to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific?
A. No, sir. The fact that this was going out in this manner was
considered all that was necessary to insure that the Commanders-in-
Chief and the Commandants of the Fourteenth and Sixteenth Naval
Districts thoroughly undei-stood the urgency of the situation. In this
connection, the Navy Department sent out orders to outlying islands
and positions in China to burn all codes except such as were immedi-
ately essential ; for example, to the ships in the Chinese rivers and to
our stations in China, we sent orders to burn all except a single code and
that was to be destroyed immediately in case of attack. We sent orders
to Guam and orders to the Commandants of the Fourteenth and Six-
teenth Naval Districts concerning the same subject. Most of these
dispatches, or at least several of them, were sent to the Commander-
in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for information. The fact that we considered
it necessary to burn codes was considered by the Department as an
additional advisory warning to the Commanders-in-Chief.
78. Q. Admiral, did you feel that this dispatch of 3 December would
create in the minds of the recipients an impression that the attack
was coming in the Western Pacific rather than any possibility of an
attack on Oahu, since it does not mention Honolulu as one of the
points where codes were to be destroyed ?
A. It is impossible for me to understand how anyone could receive
such an impression. The enemy codes at Washington and Manila were
to be destroyed, which definitely indicates war against the United
States. Once the United States and Japan are at war or approaching
war, then war-like actions may occur any place. Such an impression
as you mention might have been created if neither Washington nor
Manila had been included in the dispatch.
79. Admiral, do you recall anything other than what you have
already testified to m the way of directives, warnings, and so forth,
which were sent to Admiral Kimmel from, say, 25 November onward ?
A, No, sir.
80. Q. Can you explain why the various dispatches from 24 Novem-
ber onward were in minor disagreement as to the actual objectives at
which a Japanese surprise attack might be sent ?
[£69] A. I can not see the disagreement you mention. Exhibit
No. 8 mentions several possible objectives of an amphibious expedi-
tion. Included among the possible objectives is the Kra Peninsula.
Exhibit No. 10, which is a report of what the British Mission in
Washington had been told by their Government, mentions an am-
284 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
phibious expedition against the Kra Isthmus. Therefore, I see no
essential difference.
81. Q. Sir, in the months preceding the chain of dispatches that
appear in evidence in this examination, do you recall aniy other re-
peated warnings that war was imminent, might happen any day, or
words to that effect, contained either in correspondence or dispatches
with Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet?
A. I recall no official dispatches or official letters which gave re-
peated warnings. There were many official letters and dispatches,
and there was personal correspondence between Admiral Stark and
the Commander-in-Chief in which an effort was made to keep the
Commanders-in-Chief constantly advised on the diplomatic situation
and on the general thoughts and attitudes of the Department con-
cerning the possibility of war, and also concerning the prosecution of
measures in preparation for war. I recall nothing in the several
months before Pearl Harbor except this series of dispatches which
might indicate that the Department thought war might break out any
day. I saw most, if not all, of the personal correspondence between
the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commanders-in-Chief and
was permitted to comment on them prior to their dispatch. If
there had been any such thing in his personal correspondence, I cer-
tainly would have recommended its deletion. Admiral Stark's
opinion and mine on the situation were very close together from the
Spring of 1941 on.
82. Q. There is some testimony to the effect that the repeated
warnings to the Pacific Fleet were ineffective and that such repeti-
tion had one undesirable result wherein the recipients got into the
frame of mind which I can most briefly describe as the "cry of
'wolf " of the fable. Did it occur to you, on about, say, 2T Novem-
ber, that the Department could well put in effect certain portions of
Rainbow 5 and thereby most certainly insure that proper steps
would be taken by the Pacific Fleet?
A. I frequently heard that criticism made. I do not consider it in
the slightest degree justified. I'm speaking now of the "cry of 'wolf,
'wolf ". So far as I know, there was only one dispatch that was a
specific warning for war. The other dispatches relate to prepara-
tory measures and were intended in keep the Commanders-in-Chief
fully in touch with the situation as the Department saw it. The
Department would have been, in my opinion, most derelict, had it
permitted the war to approach closely without letting the Command-
ers-in-Chief know that it was convinced that war was coming. That
exact feature of keeping from alarming the people at sea by frequent
alarmist letters and dispatches was constantly kept in mind, and
there were several occasions on which there were recommendations
from one or another officer in the Department to send out prepara-
tory warnings, but these were resisted until the ap^Droach of war was
clear. As to putting in effect part of WPL-46, a careful study of
that document will show that its mechanism does not permit such
a step to be taken. It would be a very complicated procedure if
properly done and would require considerable study on the part of
the Department and the recipient of such messages, in order that the
Commanders-in-Chief could see what the Department's ideas were.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 285
I think nothing could be clearer than to start a dispatch by saying,
"This is a war warning," and indicating the enemy and his probable
major movements.
[270] 83. Q. Inasmuch as you have stated that WPL-46 did
not lend itself to partial execution, would it have been practicable
to have declared a mobilization over certain areas, notably the Pacific
west of our Paci^fic Coast?
A. The fact is that the Navy had been mobilized for months, so
far as its internal arrangements were concerned. Additional mobi-
lization would, I believe, have accomplished nothing valuable, par-
ticularly as the powers that accrue to the military services on the
outbreak of war, regarding to seizure of property and persons and
regarding the interference with civilian activities, can not be under-
taken in peacetime. The organic law of the Territory of Hawaii, I
understand, permits martial law to be declared or to be requested by
the Governor under certain conditions. That could have been done
in peace provided those conditions existed, but would have been nec-
essarily entirely public and would have created a state of mind in
the civilian population and among the civilian officers of the Gov-
ernment that I believe would have had serious repercussions against
the military. It must be remembered that very few people really
believed war with Japan was imminent. Any public declaration,
such as is necessary for establishing mobilization, would have been
the one sure way of insuring war, and I'm positive that had such a
move been made, the Government and the military would have been
most severely criticized. We do not have the mobilization system
which exists in military gountries, and it is my opinion that mobili-
zation by the United States could not legally be effected until a state
of war exists. WPL-43 and WPL(-46 were drawn up after con-
siderable study of the question with the idea that mobilization prior
to war is not practicable for the United States.
84. Q. I show you a' document which is in testimony as Exhibit 5.
Were you familiar with it prior to 7 December?
A. I had read it at the time it was approved by the Navy Depart-
ment during the Summer of 1941.
85. Q. Could that plan, which provides for the defense of the
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, have been made effective at any time
during the few days prior to 7 December?
A. To a very considerable extent that plan was already in effect
prior to December 7, 1941. About the only thing that was not in
effect were matters relating to the commission of acts of war. The
machinery for cooperation between the Army and Navy had either
been set up or was in the process of setting up for some months prior
to the outbreak of war. I do not believe that it would have been
useful to have placed this plan in effect. Rather, I'm inclined to
think that it would have confused the issue.
86. Q. If you can recall, will you please state what constituted
Admiral Stark's principal preoccupation and worry during Novem-
ber, '41, and up to 7 December.
A. I don't believe there was any one outstanding matter, other than
the imminence of war. We were in a position where the military serv-
ices strongly believed that we should have' been in the war against
Germany some months before. We were escorting convoys in the
Atlantic, patrolling against German and Italian submarines and ships.
286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
We liad troops in Iceland. There were many problems in the Atlantic
which required solution and action by the Chief of Naval Operations.
There was the tremendous question as to manufacture of materiel and
the expansion of the Navy. We had been unable to get the [271'\
funds or the authority to expand the Navy as much us we believed it
should have been expanded, and that feature was always near the top
of Admiral Stark's thoughts. There were the situations here in the
Pacific and in the Asiatic which also were considered. Admiral
Stark's thoughts were all about the close approach of war, and con-
stantly in his mind was getting our forces into as complete a state of
readiness as possible. We had established in Washington, since about
April 1 of 1941, a British Military Mission, which grew to large pro-
portions. That Mission had to do both w'ith strategic matters and
with the provision of lend-lease materials to Britain and other coun-
tries. Machinery for handling such materials was in process of ex-
pansion, but all during the Fall, a good deal of Admiral Stark's time
was taken with talks with the British on strategic and lend-lease
matters.
87. Q. During your incumbency as head of the War Plans Division,
did you engage in any negotiations which looked toward the substan-
tiation of the principle of unity of conmiand for the joint action
method which had been agreed upon for some years ?
A. That had been discussed at great length with the Army and, to
some extent, with the British. We never could find, and there has not
yet been found, a general formula for unity of command applicable to
all cases. We struggled with the problem and solved it in certain
cases in WPL-46, as that document provides for a virtual unity of
command between the British and our Army and Navy in certain cases,
but we had never been able to get a satisfactory formula with regard
to the Fleet and troops on shore.
88. Q. Admiral, in the months preceding the Pearl Harbor attack,
was thought given in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to the
vulnerability of the Fleet units in Pearl Harbor to attack by torpedoes
dropped from aircraft?
A. That apprehension existed in the Department prior to the time I
went there as War Plans Officer. I had gone there from duty on a ship
based in Pearl Harbor, and while here, I always felt that our ships
were defenseless against such an attack, if it could be successfully
made. As I recall it, the proposition of using anti-torpedo nets was
put up to them out here first during the Summer of 1940. We again
put it up to them in January of 1941 amongst other measures which
we considered desirable for protection of the Fleet while in port.
The use of anti-torpedo nets around ships in the Harbor was re-
jected by the authorities here in Hawaii, whether by the Commander-
in-Chief or the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, I'm
not certain at this time. I'll say this, that the Bureau of Ordnance
sent out a letter while that matter was under consideration stating
rather categorically that, in their opinion, the water in Pearl Harbor
was too shallow to permit the dropping of torpedoes, and, imques-
tionably, that influenced the authorities here in determining not to
use nets. I, personally, never accepted that opinion of the Bureau of
Ordnance, because I see no reason whatsoever why torpedoes can not
be made to drop in shallow water and run without a deep dive. We
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 287
now know that it can be done. That letter was changed, I think, in
June, 1941, by the Bureau of Ordnance who sent then information
substantially to the effect that they then believed that the Japanese
had torpedoes that could be dropped from planes without diving,
and it was possible to run them in thirty feet of water, as I recall the
figure. Whatever the depth, it was indicated that it was possible to
make successful drops of torpedoes from airplanes in Pearl Harbor.
The subject of nets was then again taken up, but the manner of taking
it up, I don't recall, because it was handled in another division of
Operations and not [27£] by War Plans. The Department
was providing a good deal of anti-torpedo nets and I believe it could
have been made available out here in time. The feeling, generally, in
Operations, was that nets ought to be provided.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to
make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject
matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of
record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out
by the previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examination then, at 11: 50 a. m., was adjourned to await the
call of the examining officer.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 289
PKOCEEDINGS OF THE HAKT INQUIRY
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 1944
Twenty-second Day
Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii.
The examination met at 9 : 15 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer,
and his counsel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the twenty-firet day of the examination until such
time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with
the examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
Captain Edwin T. Layton, U. S. Navy, who had previously testified,
was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath pre-
viously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over the
testimony given by him on the eighteenth day of the examination,
pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.
The examination then, at 9 : 18 a. m., was adjourned to await the call
of the examining officer.
79716 — 46 — Ex. 144 20
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 291
[273] PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY
THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1944
Twenty-third Day
U. S. S. IOWA.
The examination met at 10 : 50 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer,
and his counsel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the twenty-second day of the examination until such
times as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed
with the examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface
to the testimony of Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Record
Page 250.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer:
1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.
A. John L. McCrea, Captain, U. S. Navy, Commanding U. S. S.
IOWA.
2. Q. What duties were you performing during the calendar year
1941?
A. Until May of 1941, 1 was attached to the War Plans Division of
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, but was actually doing
work for Admiral Stark on a variety of subjects as directed by him. I
regard the work which I did for him largely as that required of an
Aide. In May, 1941, I was given orders to report to Admiral Stark
as Aide.
3. Q. Captain, I will ask you a rather general question, setting forth
the various points upon which I believe you are able to testify. The
question will not be in any way complete and you need not confine
yourself to the points as set forth, which are as follows : The closeness
of your association with Admiral Stark to indicate your acquaintance
with the matters of major import which were in his mind; anything
out of the ordinary which you recall as regards t he ba ckground and
the preparation of the War Plan current in 1941 (WPL-46) ; discus-
sions as regards probability of the location, in the Atlantic or Pacific,
of the war which the plans envisaged ; any discussion concerning the
appropriateness of Admiral Kimmel's contributory plan WPI^6;
any considerations lying behind the transfer of considerable detach-
292 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR A.TTACK
merits from the Pacific to Atlantic Fleet in 1941; any discussions or
information gained incident to our Federal Government's action in
June and July in '41 which lead to freezing Japanese credits, thereby
making it difficult for them to obtain important materials ; any discus-
sions as concern the participation of the Allies which WPL-46 en-
visaged (particularly any redistribution of the British naval forces
which might affect the situation in the Pacific) ; any discussion or
knowledge which may have been in the background of the Navy De-
partment's negotiations with the War Department concerning the
readiness of the Army to meet its commitments in Hawaii. Beginning
about September, [i^/^] 1941, any pertinent facts in your recol-
lection as to the background of the various dispatches sent to the
Pacific Fleet indicating the imminence of hostilities with Japan ; any
facts within your recollection concerning the discussions, conferences,
and negotiations with the State Department concerning our relations
with Japan ; any discussion or opinion which you heard expressed con-
cerning the probability of Japanese attack against us, points at which
such attack might be directed, and the character of such attacks; dis-
cussions during 1941 concerning the advisability of continuing to base
the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters — particularly as regards the
security aspect; discussions or opinions expressed incident to Mr.
Kurusu's appearance in Washington as a part of the Japanese Em-
bassy ; discussions concerning the use of Army troops in the outlying
islands (Midway, Wake, etc.) occurring as the Japanese situation grew
very tense in late November. • It is in previous testimony that the
Pacific Fleet received so many warnings of the imminence of hostilities
that the effect was somewhat vitiated, and various witnesses have stated
that in the minds of many at Pearl Harbor, it amounted to the cry of
"wolf". State anything which you recall bearing upon that aspect;
any discussion which you recall concerning the phrasing of those
various dispatches, and whether or not consideration was given to
putting certain war plans in effect wholly or in part; any discussion
concerning the adequacy and correctness of WPL-4C) as the tense
situation grew in the few weeks prior to 7 December ; include also what
you can remember concerning Admiral Stark's and Admiral Ingersoll's
preoccupations during the few weeks preceding the war, insofar as
they seemed to you to affect those officers' mental attitudes.
A. At the outset, I should say that I have available no records from
which to refresh my memory. It, therefore, must follow that my
present recollection of matters, which happened some three years ago,
will probably be incomplete and in error in certain details. In order
that a more complete understanding may be had of my relationship
with Admiral Stark during the critical pre-Pearl Harbor days, I be-
lieve it in order to state the nature of this relationship. I reported
for duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in October,
1940. I was assigned to the War Plans Division for purposes of
record, but to do special jobs for Admiral Stark. In general, my work
consisted in assembling for the Admiral, in brief form, reports on
matters he had under advisement. My job carried me into all the
Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department where my contacts were
generally on a personal basis. Wliere cognizance overlapped between
Bureaus or Offices, I endeavored to get the composite picture. I
attended all of Admiral Stark's formal conferences and many of his
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 293
informal ones. On the other hand, he held many conferences with
officials and officers in the Navy Department and with officers of the
War Department which I did not attend. About the middle of No-
vember, 1940, Admiral Stark informed me that he was going to send
me to Manila to take out to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic
Fleet, the revised War Plans which were then being prepared in the
War Plans Division. I was told that I would also deliver a copy of
the same plan to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. Admiral
Stark directed that I keep in close contact wdth Vice Admiral (then
Captain) Turner (who had reported for duty as Director of War
Plans about the middle of October, 1940), in order that I would be
familiar with the background and considerations upon which these
plans were based. This I did. In late November or early December,
Captain (then Commander) V. R. Murphy, U. S. Navy, War Plans
Officer for the Commander-in-Chief, IT. S. Fleet, arrived in Wash-
ington in connection with his official duties. As the revised plans
(I think this plan was officially known as Rainbow 3, and I shall refer
to it as such hereinafter) were nearing completion, a niunber of
conferences were held by Vice Admiral Turner which were [275]
attended by both Captain Murphy and myself. Free and open
discussion was held and "background" notes were made by me in
the hopes that I might be able to anticipate questions that might be
put to me by Admiral Hart upon delivering the plans to him. Captain
JNIurphy's presence at these conferences on behalf of the Commander-
in-Chief, IT. S. Fleet, relieved me of any responsibility with regard
to that officer. On 13 December 1940, I left Washington with copies
of Rainbow 3 for the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Com-
mander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet. I fell in with Captain Murphy
in San Pedro and proceeded by air to Pearl Harbor where I was under
orders to report to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, for tempo-
rary duty. I continued my trip, leaving Pearl Harbor 1 January
1941, arriving Manila 6 January. Almost daily discussions were held
with Admiral Hart and his Staff during the next ten days in connec-
tion with these plans. I was delayed in Manila awaiting the return
of Rear Admiral (then Captain) Purnell from Batavia where he had
gone to confer with the Dutch, in order that I might take back to
Washington with me the results of his conferences. At Admiral
Stark's direction, while in Manila I called on the U. S. High Commis-
sioner, Francis B. Sayre, and General Douglas MacArthur. I ac-
quainted these officials with Admiral Stark's anxiety about the Far
East.- They, in turn, discussed with complete frankness their own
views on the situation. Briefly, the High Commissioner was opti-
mistic and hopeful that hostilities could be avoided. General Mac-
Arthur thought war "inevitable". I left Manila about 18 January
1941, arriving in Pearl Harbor a few days later where I reported to
the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet (Admiral Richardson). Prior
to my departure from Manila, I received a dispatch from Admiral
Stark directing that I contact Admiral Richardson's prospective relief,
Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel. I had made many notes while in the
East with reference to conditions, personalities, situations, views, etc.,
etc., and I discussed these matters at a conference, as I recall it now,
attended by Admiral J. O. Richardson, Rear Admiral Kimmel, Rear
Admiral S. A. Taffinder, Captain W. W. Smith, Captain W. S. De-
294 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Lany, and Commander Murphy. After this conference, Admiral
Kichardson gave me certain items which he wished me to take up
with Admiral Stark. Admiral Kimmel did likewise. Upon my re-
turn to Washington, I told Admiral Stark of the shape my notes
were in and told him that I would prepare a formal report on the
subject of my trip. He directed that I not prepare a formal report
but to submit my notes to him informally. This was done. I have
a copy of that report among my personal papers at my home in
Washington. One item stands out in my mind with reference to
my second visit to Pearl Harbor. The day I left Pearl Harbor, I
was in a boat with Rear Admiral Kimmel. He directed that I take
out my notebook and record substantially as follows : "Tell Admiral
Stark that the Army must realize the shortcomings of the air defenses
of Pearl Harbor and get busy and do something about them. Tell
Admiral Stark further that I'm not going to get obsessed too much
with any one item. Everything indicates that the Army and I will
get along well together, but we have not yet gotten down to cases,
but, in any event, I repeat they must strengthen the air defenses of
Pearl Harbor. I expect to take up with the Army the cooperation
of Army and Naval aircraft. I want the Army to feel free to use our
fields and I would like to have our land-based planes get experience
in using the Army facilities." After the attack on Pearl Harbor, I
recalled the vigor with which Admiral Kimmel had remarked to me
about the inadequacy of the Army's air defenses of Pearl Harbor that
day in January, 1941. After my return to Washington, I continued
to work on special projects for Admiral Stark. From time to time the
Admiral complained that my office was too far distant from him and
that he wanted me more available to him. Rearrangement was finally
made of office space and in 1276'] May I was moved up to the
"front office." At the same time, I was issued orders by the Bureau of
Navigation to report to Admiral Stark for duty as Aide. There was
no appreciable difference between the duties that I performed as Aide
to Admiral Stark and the ones that I had been performing under my
previous set of orders. Among the many things which I did for
Admiral Stark, I prepared rough drafts of answers to personal mail
which he received from officers in the field, particularly from Admirals
Hart and Kimmel. These officers, being at a distance, wrote rather
frequently to Admiral Stark. Many of the items which they men-
tioned in their letters required that contact be made with the various
Bureaus and Offices in the Navy Department. This I did. The drafts
of the answers to these letters were always placed in Admiral Stark's
hands for revision as he thought necessary. These letters took in a
wide range of subjects, the general tenor of which had to do with the
preparation of the respective Fleets for war. After Admiral Stark
had finished revising the drafts of the letters I had prepared for him,
they would be put in smooth form and returned to the Admiral for
signature. Upon their return to me for mailing, I invariably noticed
that he had included something in the way of a postscript to the effect
that "Time is short.", "War may come tomorrow or it may not come
for months.", "No one knows when the blow will come or from what
direction.", etc., etc. Naturally, certain events occurring in the Sum-
mer of 1941, of interest to the office, fix themselves in my mind more
clearly than do others. Among them, the GREER incident, which
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 295
took place, as I recall it, in early September. There had been sinkings
of our merchant ships in the Atlantic, notably the ROBIN MOOR,
and ships under Panamanian registry in which operators in this coun-
try had an interest. The building program was under almost daily
discussion. The Congress was demanding a report from the Navy
Department on the GREER incident. Everything possible was being
done to put Midway and Wake into operation as effectual staging
points for our aircraft to the Far East. Reenforcements and mate-
rials were being sent to the Far East. Harbor improvements were
undertaken in Guam. The Marines were withdrawn from Shanghai.
We were trying to get authority from the Congress to arm the mer-
chant ships. Aid to Great Britain and Russia was under study, etc.,
etc. The Cabinet change in Japan, which occurred about the middle
of October, 1941, created very much of a stir in the office. Everyone
sensed that war was not far off. I recall that following that change,
a dispatch was sent to the various Fleet Commanders to the effect that
the Cabinet changes pointed the fact that war with Japan was a defi-
nite possibility. As I recall it, Mr. Kurusu arrived in Washington
early in November, 1941, ostensibly on a peace mission. It was known,
however, to us that the Japanese were pressing to the southward along
the Asiatic mainland. It seemed only a matter of a short time until
Japan would be in a position to strike at the Kra Peninsula. Nego-
tiations in Washington with Japan's diplomatic representatives were
gradually breaking down. On 27 November 1941, a dispatch was sent
to all Fleet Commanders which opened up with a statement more or
less reading as follows : "This is a war warning." The dispatch then
went on to state that while war might be expected at any point, it
seemed more probable that it would take place in an attack on the
Philippines or the Kra Peninsula. An earlier dispatch had mentioned
Guam as a possible point of attack by Japan. There was discussion,
as I recall it, as to whether or not the opening sentence, set forth above,
should be included in this dispatch. I recall that Vice Admiral Turner
was firmly of the opinion that it should be included ; that he felt that
the seriousness of the situation warranted this language. To this,
Admiral Stark agreed. The wording of that dispatch left a profound
impression with me. because I [277'\ remember the thought
flashing across my mind that it was a strong statement to make ; that
it went the whole way, and that if nothing eventuated, confidence in
the Navy Department's estimate in future matters might suffer in
consequence. I further recall that when the attack on Pearl Harbor
did occur, I felt how correctly Vice Admiral Turner had interpreted
events and that his foresight had been of a particularly high order.
Three or four days before Pearl Harbor, as I recall it, another dis-
patch was sent from the Navy Department to the Fleet Commanders
to the effect that Japanese diplomatic officials in London, Manila, Hong
Kong, etc., had been given orders to destroy all their codes and secret
papers. With that, everyone in the office felt that war was a matter
of a few days. I have given the above background in order that it
may be available in evaluating the answers which I shall give with
reference to the questions just put to me. I feel that my relations
with Admiral Stark during the period in question were reasonably
close. We discussed, from time to time, in the office, in his home, and
296 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
elsewhere, the proximity of war. I retain the impression that during
the Slimmer and Fall of 1941, he felt war was "just around the corner".
I also retain the impression that he was doing everything in his power
to push all matters having to do with getting the Navy ready for war.
The hurrying of new construction ships, planes, etc., came under his
particular scrutiny. Turning now to specific answers to the questions
put: (a) I do not recall the background and the preparation of the
War Plan current in 1941 (WPL-46). It must be remembered that
I was not then attached to the War Plans Division, ancl that any
knowledge that I might have of such a plan would be only incidental,
(b) I know of no discussion concerning the appropriateness of
Admiral Kimmel's Contributory Plan, WPL-46. (c) I do not recall
any discussions concerning the participations of the Allies which
WPL-46 envisaged with reference to the redistribution of British
naval forces which might affect the situation in the Pacific, (d) I
recall no discussions concerning the adequacy and correctness of
WPL-46 as the tension grew in the few weeks prior to 7 December
1941. (e) I do not recall details of discussions with relation to the
transfer of detachments from the Pacific to the Atlantic Fleet in 1941,
although I do know such discussions were held, (f) I do not recall
any discussions or information incident to the Federal Government's
action during the summer of 1941 which led to the freezing of Japa-
nese credits, (g) I do not have any knowledge as to the Navy Depart-
ment's negotiations with the War Department concerning the readi-
ness of the Army to meet its commitments in Hawaii. I do know,
however, that those matters were under discussion from time to time,
(h) I do not have direct knowledge of any discussions, conferences,
or negotiations with the State Department concerning our relations
with Japan. Such conversations would come under the purview of
the Central Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
(i) I do not recall any discussions or opinions expressed concerning
the probability of a Japanese attack on us or the point of attack; I
might add that I think that most naval officers thought that war witli
Japan, if and when it came, would come without formal declaration
and very little notice. I retain the impression that the general thought
was that Japan would strike either in Guam, the Philippines, or the
Kra Peninsula, (j) I do not recall any discussions during 1941 con-
cerning the advisability of continuing to base the Pacific Fleet in
Hawaiian waters, particularly as regards the security aspect, (k) I
do not recall any discussions or opinion expressed as to Mr. Kurusu's
appearance in Washington as a part of the Japanese Embassy. (1) I
do not recall any discussions concerning the use of Army troops in
the outlying islands (Midwa}^, Wake, etc.) as the situation grew tense
in late November. (NOTE: The fact that I do not recall the discus-
sions referred to above does not in any way preclude their having taken
place. On the contrary, [^75] I know that Admiral Stark was
in daily contact with those under whose jurisdiction such discussions
would naturally come.) (m) As I look back on it now, I do not be-
lieve that so many warnings were issued to the Fleet that these warn-
ings could be regarded as the cry of "wolf". It seems to me that
matters got progressively worse during the Summer and Fall of 1941,
and that warnings were issued accordingly. I am not insensible, how-
ever, to a confused state of opinion that appeared in the public press
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 297
from day to day. As a naval officer, I am also not insensible to th0
fact that "standing by" is very difficult. If officers in the Fleet got
the impression that "wolf" was being cried and that the number
of warnings being sent were too numerous, the thought I have in the
matter is that those in the Navy Department whose job it was to evalu-
ate the situation thought things were rapidly and progressively ap-
proaching a serious state. This proved to be the case, (n) As I look
back at it now, the entire year of 1941 was devoted wholeheartedly
by everyone in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations with whom
I came in contact to getting ready for war. Everyone seemed to feel
that war was in the immediate offing; that there was little that could
be done to stop it. Oh the other hand, everyone was liopeful that in
some manner war could be avoided. By the Fall of 1911, while our
position with respect to Japan w^as growing more tense, it must be
remembered that no warlike actions had been taken by Japan against
us in the Pacific, whereas in the Atlantic our merchant ships were
being sunk and relations with Germany were rapidly approaching the
breaking point. In other words, the Atlantic problem was already
with us. (o) I do not recall that Admiral Stark and Rear Admiral
Ingersoll were preoccupied with any matters aside from those in hand
during the few weeks preceding the war. Because of the nature of
my duties, I came in closer contact with Admiral Stark than I did
with Rear Admiral Ingersoll. However, it is my distinct impression
that both of these officers felt that war with Japan and Germany was
only a matter of a short time. I retain the decided impression that
in the year preceding Pearl Harbor, both of these officers were doing
their utmost to strengthen the naval service in every respect against
the day when war would become a reality.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged
to make any further statement covering anything relating to the sub-
ject matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter
of record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought
out by the previous questioning.
The witness stated tliat he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examination then, at 11 : 45 a. m., was adjourned to await the
call of the examining officer.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 299
V^m PEOCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIEY
SUNDAY, APRIL 9, 1944
TWENTY-FOUBTH DaY
HEADQUARTERS, COMMANDER AIRCRAFT
SOUTHERN PACIFIC FORCE.
The examination met at 9 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Ketired, examining officer, and
his counsel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the twenty-third day of the examination until such
time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed with
the examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to
the testimony of Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Record Page
250.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining oflicer :
1. Q. Will you please state your name, rank, and present station.
A. Rear Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, U. S. Navy, Commander
Third Amphibious Force, South Pacific Force.
2. Q. Admiral, will you please state the duties you performed during
the calendar year 1941.
A. From January 1 to January 30, I was Chief of Staff to Vice
Admiral Andrews, then Commander of the Hawaiian Detachment and
of the Scouting Force. From January 30 to September 26, I was in
command of the U. S. S. MISSISSIPPI. From October 15, 1 think,
until the conclusion of the year, I was director of Naval Intelligence. ,
3. Q. What were your relations with the Chief of Naval Operations
during the time that you were Director of Naval Intelligence ?
A. I was head of the Division of Naval Intelligence which was under
the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
4. Q. Admiral, this examination is endeavoring to get all testimony
available with respect to matters pertfnent to the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. Testimony covering radio and other
combat intelligence'has been obtained, but very little has been recorded
concerning matters coming under your cognizance as Director of Naval
Intelligence. It is expected that the local situation in Hawaii will be
covered by the then District Intelligence Officer and possibly others.
300 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
Admiral Kingman is also expected to testify. Will you please state any
matters of which you have knowledge and which you believe should be
recorded and preserved as pertinent to the attack.
A. At the risk of mentioning basic and earlier matters which might
not be pertinent, I should like to sketch out the organization of Naval
Intelligence, [280] its relationships within the Dep'artment, its
activities both in the foreign field and in the domestic field as ap-
plicable to the Japanese phase, and the actual events, which, to my
recollection, occurred. When I assumed duties as Director of Naval
Intelligence, I found that the organization of that office, under the
Chief of Naval Operations, was divided into three main branches,
with certain subsidiary branches : The Foreign Branch, the Domestic
Branch, and the Administrative Branch. The Foreign Branch was
headed by Captain W. A. Heard. Within that Branch was the Far
East Section headed by Captain A. H. McCollum, assisted by Com-
mander E. Watts and Colonel R. A. Boone of the Marine Corps (all
present ranks). Boone now is Intelligence Officer for ComSoPac.
Watts is Executive Officer of the APPLACHIAN. McCollum and
Watts were Japanese experts by virtue of duty there and subsequent
assignment; and Boone was a specialist on China. In the Domestic
Intelligence, Captain Kingman — then Captain Waller, date of relief
about December 15, I believe, so that Kingman was in charge up to
December 7. That contained one division which covered foreign sus-
pects and members of suspected societies, whether foreign or native.
Commander Hartwell C. Davis, now Intelligence Officer of the Thir-
teenth Naval District, was a Japanese expert and was in charge of the
Japanese Section. Reverting now to the Foreign Intelligence activi-
ties; at the time of my taking over or shortly thereafter, the Japa-
nese-American conversations which had been held intermittently since
the preceding Spring, were reopened. A book of radio intelligence was
shown to the State Department, the White House, Chief of Naval
Operations, Director of Naval Intelligence, Director of War Plans,
and the Secretary of Navy, daily or skipping a day if nothing perti-
nent was at hand. Other sources applicable to Japanese intelligence
were the Naval Attache information, reports of the naval observers,
a consul form of Naval Attache radio direction finder reports, and
contacts which the Domestic Branch thought might be of interest to
the Foreign Branch in order to complete the picture of Japanese ac-
tivities. Such information as we obtained, beyond that radio intelli-
gence distribution I have just mentioned, of the nature of basic or
static information, was compiled by Naval Intelligence and issued
to a wide circulation, including Commanders-in-Chief of Fleets, and
in general Flag Officers, as well as to the offices in the Department
interested. This information was contained in the monograph on
Japan, which was revised from time to time, in papers describing the
organization of the Japanese Fleet and Air Force as discovered by
observers, notes which were a41 too inadequate, however, in view of
the strict secrecy maintained by the Japanese general O. N. I. reports
from Naval Attaches with respect to fortifications, trade connec-
tions, and so on, and the characteristics of principal naval officers,
as information of their appointment was received and insofar as we
had data on them. This basic information was circulated by means
of a mechanism set up and functioning for some years. There was
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 301
not, however, any mechanism established nor effective for the dis-
semination of information of the type of combat intelligence, which
is to say, the immediate movement of enemy ships, fleets, and forces.
I had been concerned for some time, during my tours of sea duty and
my regular line contact with intelligence requirements, although I
had never in any sense been under the Office of Naval Intelligence,
with the lack of organization, both in the Fleet and in the Navy De-
partment, for combat intelligence. This would be, I thought, par-
ticularly important in time of war and it was one of my concerns
when I became Director of Intelligence, to endeavor to improve that
or the framework of it, so as to be better prepared in the Fleet and
ashore for the collection and dissemination and analysis of combat
intelligence. Such combat intellignece as we received, by means of
flash reports and direction finder and otherwise, was compiled and
analyzed, but it was not a function of the organization of Naval
[281] Intelligence to disseminate this information to the Fleet,
but rather to report it to the departmental agencies for such analyses
as they cared t« make, and for dissemination by them. In pursuance
of this, for some months prior to December 7, and, in fact, I think,
prior to my arrival, the Japanese Section had prepared, daily, an
analysis of the situation of Japanese-American relations and of the
movement of Japanese forces insofar as we were aware of them.
These daily situation reports were held very secret and their circula-
tion was limited to Chief of Naval Operations and Director of War
Plans, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval
Intelligence, and the head of the Foreign Branch. They were com-
piled by Commander Watts and checked and issued by Captain
McCollum.
NOTE : The examining officer has identified the memoranda men-
tioned by the witness as being ones now on file in the Far Eastern
Section, Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department. The series
of memoranda, titled "Japanese Fleet Locations", are classified "Se-
cret" and the file presently available indicates that said memoranda
were issued approximately once a week, rather than daily. The series
of memoranda titled "United States-Japanese Negotiations" are
classified "Secret", are addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations,
and were issued almost every date. The last of this series bears date
of 2# October 1941. The examining officer is advised by officers then
on duty in the Far Eastern Section that the written memoranda on
this subject were discontinued on 24 October 1941, and that between
that date and 7 December 1941, this subject was covered by an oral
report each morning by Captain McCollum, the Chief of the Section,
to Rear Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Naval Intelligence, who,
in turn, reported the information orally to the Chief of Naval
Operations.
A. (Continued) I had found that there was a policy in the Depart-
ment extending, I understood, from War College practices, that Intel-
ligence was responsible only for the collection of information and
the supply of data to the operational agencies and was not required
to develop, as I believe is the Army practice, the estimate of the situa-
tion from the enemy point of view. I felt that the Naval Intelligence,
with its experienced personnel in the various fields, could clearly
contribute something in an analysis of the enemy or of prospective
302 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
enemy intentions; and I consulted Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant
Chief of Operations, who confirmed the Navy practice that Intelli-
gence would supply the data but that the Operational side, and par-
ticularly war plans, should make the analysis of enemy intentions. I
said, however, that with his permission I would have such an analysis
. prepared from day to day and periodically summed up, say weekly,
and submit it along with our daily situation for such value as might
be ascribed to it or derived from it by the Operational agencies. With
respect to the relationship of the Director of Naval Intelligence to the
Chief of Naval Operations, contact was usually through the Assistant
Chief of Naval Operations, but there was every access to the Chief
of Operations himself, and, on occasions, when news of importance
appeared, particularly toward the end of the period prior to Decem-
ber 7, Captain McCollum would go direct with me, if I were at hand,
or alone if not, to Admiral Stark and tell him what news he had and
what conclusions he had reached. There was no scheduled conference
with the Chief of Naval Operations in which I, as Director of Naval
Intelligence, sat, but I had every access to him. I recall at least two
occasions, presumably at the end of November and early December,
when the information that I brought down as described, along with
Captain McCollum, interested the Chief of Operations to the extent
of calling in some of his principal subordinates, [^83] such as
Rear Admiral Turner, Admiral Ingersoll, and perhaps the Director
of Communications, to hear the news, and, in brief, to discuss its im-
plications, but I do not recall that at those or any other meetings which
I attended, there was discussion of measures to be taken or informa-
tion to be sent out. On the latter point, however, I may mention, at
the risk of momentarily going too far ahead chronologically, that
early on the morning of December 7, at such a meeting as I have
described. Admiral Stark decided at once as to information which
should be sent to Pearl Harbor and departed to consult with General
Marshall. Returning to the narrative of events as seen from the Office
of Naval Intelligence viewpoint, we had of course followed the
development of the very critical stage of the negotiations as evidenced
by our information from the State Department and otherwise of
diplomatic notes which had been exchanged. We noted a stalemate
apparently between the Japanese and American viewpoints ; Kurusu's
arrival in mid-November, I believe; the United States' statement of
policy about November 25 ; and we learned later, although I do not
know that we were specifically informed, as to the war warning which
was sent out to the Fleet in late November. With regard to the infor-
mation we had of the development of the crisis, aside from these
dispatches, we had noted the Japanese agreement with Indo-China
for the introduction of a minimum of troops ; we had noted the appar-
ent violation of that agreement by the introduction of many more
troops, and their apparent movement toward the China border, and
had concluded that Japan was about to attack China from the South.
Later, we had news of the sighting of a transport convoy just off the
Central Chinese Coast, the evidence of movements into lower Indo-
China, the lack of evidence of enemy movement in the vicinity of the
Philippines, reports of the concentration of transport troops in Cam-
rank Bay, indications of the radio silence of some, if not all, of the
main Fleet, and the consequent doubt as to their location. We had
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 303
come to the conclusion that the occupation of southwestern coast of
Indo-China, Kampot, and possibly Bangkok, or lower Siam on the
Malay Peninsula, was the immediate objective of the Japanese. I
had understood, from a source which I do not recall, that there was a
tentative agreement that the American and British would consider
any movement beyond certain geogi-aphical limits in Southeast Asia
as a casus belli for England and as a matter of grave concern for the
United States. These limits, as I recall, were 100 degrees longitude
and 10 degrees North latitude. At that time, in our fortnightly sum-
mary of international news, issue of December 1, which was intended
rather as current information than as specific war warnings, since
that was the function of the operational side of the Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations, we had put in a note to the following effect:
"Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly
that extensive preparations are under way for hostilities. At the
same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually
down from Japan and Northern China coast ports headed South,
apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present
movements to the South appear to be carried out by small indi-
vidual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now
definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next
few days. To date, this task force, under the command of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two
major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast
Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong
striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the combined air
force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division
of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength
remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.
The equipment being carried South is a vast assortment, including
landing boats in considerable number. Activity in the Mandates
under naval control consists not only of large reenforcements of
personnel, aircraft, munitions, but also of construction material with
[283] yard workmen, engineers, etc." This bulletin was sent, in
the same manner as the basic reports I have mentioned, to a fairly
wide distribution, including all Flag Officers Afloat. It was sent out
by air mail December 1. I do not know the actual date of its receipt
in distant portions of the Fleet, and I do not recall that I checked. It
was intended, as I stated, as a compendium of current intelligence
information. Either this specific text, or the information contained
in it, was discussed with Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner, either
individually or both together, I forget. I believe, however, together,
in Admiral Stark's office. Admiral Turner was of the opinion,
although there were no specific evidences, that the Japanese would
launch an attack on the Philippines coincident with or shortly there-
after their indicated activities to the southward. I did not draw a
direct conclusion to that effect but believed it possible. Admiral
Turner's opinion was obviously correct. This item was the product
of Captain McCollum and the Japanese Section and was included
in the entire bulletin, which covered other items of current naval
interest. I believe that a full set of the daily situation reports as
rendered to the offices I mentioned, plus of course a file of the bi-weekly
304 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
bulletins, will be available in the Office of Naval Intelligence, and if
not in the general files the bulletins can be located in the Japanese
Section. In the latter days, we received several reports of evidences
of Japanese burning codes in Hawaii, notably, and also, as I recall,
in Southeast Asia. We had some indication that instructions had been
sent out to Japanese official agencies iri Allied capitols and ports to
destroy their codes. We presumed that this related to diplomatic
codes and indicated the imminent severance of diplomatic relations,
with the possible reaction of the seizure of the physical properties of
the Japanese posts in the Allied countries. Mindful that there might
be further implications of possible offensive action coincident with or
following the breakage of diplomatic relations, we prepared a dis-
patch to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets,
and the Commandants of the Naval Districts at Hawaii and the
Philippines, stating that such instructions had been given Japanese
agencies. This dispatch was referred to and released by Admiral
Ingersoll on December 3. This actual intention was followed by
physical evidences, such as I have mentioned, of unusual smoke from
one or more Japanese agencies, particularly at that in Honolulu.
5. Q. Admiral, I show you a dispatch, which is Exhibit 11 before
this examination. Can you identify this dispatch?
A. I remember this dispatch as the one I just mentioned.
6. Q. Will you please proceed, sir.
A. Returning now to the question of domestic intelligence, our office
in the section devoted to foreign nationalities — I think we called it
the "Counter-Espionage Section" — attempted to develop charts indi-
cating the ramifications of all seditious organizations and societies,
whether foreign-born, of foreign extraction, or even purely American.
Perhaps the organization of the Domestic Branch might be mentioned
here. In each Naval District, there was a District Intelligence Officer,
who was defined as an Aide on the Staff of the Commandant of the
District. His administrative control was vested in the Office of Naval
Intelligence and his civilian employees were paid through that office,
but his command relationships were direct to the Commandant of
the District, and, in fact, some District Commandants objected to any-
thing in the nature of instructions emanating from the Office of Naval
Intelligence to these District Intelligence Offices. However, these
objections did not seriously impair our functions of using these Dis-
trict Intelligence Offices and their organizations of assisting officers
and so-called [284] "agents" — really a higher type of detec-
tive — in collecting and reporting a vast amount of information on
these societies, their activities, the principal and subordinate members,
and on the general foreign population as a whole. This, of course,
paralleled the Army and F. B. I. organizations, each of which had
District offices reporting in to the Central Office. By informal agree-
ment, the major load of Japanese supervision was accorded to the Navy
because of our long interest in that field ; the then belligerent nationali-
ties to the Army; and subversive American organizations, such as
the Communist Party was then thought to be, in the province of F. B. I.
There Avas, however, a constant interchange and close relationship be-
tween all three organizations and the data obtained by any was made
available to all. In addition, there was a weekly meeting, inspired by
Presidential instructions, between Mr. Hoover, General Miles, then
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 305
head of M. I, D., and myself, at which we discussed relationships
between the several investigatory services and any conflicts of juris-
dictional practice that might arise, as well as measures of coopera-
tion both in head offices and in local offices. I mention this conference
because I shall allude to it later. The collection of all this data was
intended to facilitate laying hands on and sequestering the suspicious
characters at such time as the President might declare an emergency
or might authorize that action. We understood, from inquiries of
Mr. Hoover at these conferences, that the Attorney General, whether
on instructions from the President, or not, would not permit any
arrests on suspicion, even of aliens, unless authorized by the Presi-
dent, since it was understood to be against the law. In consequence,
we ticketed our suspects in three classes, designated by colored cards,
which facilitated ready reference in case of need. One type were
those actually dangerous; one potentially dangerous; and a third
were those suspected but not definitely belonging to either the first
two classes. "We endeavored to keep a running record of the location
of these individuals so that progressively, from the most dangerous
class on, we might, if and when authorized, take them into custody.
This actual taking into custody was to be performed, and was subse-
quently performed rapidly and efficiently after December 7, by the
F. B. I. and Federal civil authorities, with the assistance as required
of the Naval and Military Intelligence Officers, but the civil officials
would make the actual arrests and would retain custody of those taken
until further arrangements might be made. Among the District In-
telligence Officers, there were two whose field was particularly con-
cerned with the Japanese: Commander Ringle, who is now Chief of
Staff Officer to Eear Admiral Ainsworth over in Purvis Bay, Assist-
ant District Intelligence Officer at San Pedro, for the West Coast
and for Hawaii, Captain Mayfield. The principal Japanese popu-
lation of the United States was located on the West Coast and Hawaii.
A large number of cards of the three classes were at hand as to sus-
pects in these territories. My recollection of the West Coast is en-
tirely indefinite. Of Hawaii, I roughly recall from 300 to 500 in the
dangerous class; some 500 in the potentiallv dangerous; and 2,000
in the general suspect, although Captain Mayfield can check this.
Among the dangerous class were the quasi-consuls, who were not fully
accredited as such, to my recollection, but had some semi-diplomatic
status as assistants to the Consul in Honolulu. Their status was some-
what different from the normal civilian, whether alien or American,
in that they were actually agents of foreign governments and hence
required, under a recent law, to register, under penalty of criminal
prosecution. The District Intelligence Officer, in connection with the
local F. B. I. and civil authorities, was greatly concerned with the
activities of these quasi-Consuls and recommended to the Comman-
dant that thev be prosecuted for failure to comply with the law cited.
[285] In November, the Commandant, taking up this recommenda-
tion from the District Intelligence Officer, which was made to him
rather than to the Office of Intelligence, as It was a matter of com-
mand relationship, recommended to the Department, that these pen
be immediately prosecuted, but that he understood that despite a simi-
lar recommendation of the District Attorney, the Commanding Gen-
eral of the Hawaiian Department had urged the War Department
79716—46 — Ex. 144 21
306 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
that their prosecution be withheld in order not to disturb cordial
relations between the Japanese and Americans. Admiral Bloch, the
Commandant, said that he understood that the Department of Jus-
tice had directed the District Attorney not to prosecute the cases,
presumably because of the War Department. We were not too happy
about this situation and pursued it by further inquiry and finally
drafted a letter, which was dispatched by Admiral Ingersoll to Ad-
miral Bloch on December 6, stating that the Secretary of War had
recommended that these agents should be warned to register and should
be given a limited time to do so on penalty of prosecution on failure.
The War Department suggested approximately one month as such
a time, on the recommendation of the Commanding General of Ha-
waiian Department "because of the latter's campaign to enlist the
loyalty of persons of Japanese parentage". This letter notes that
"further investigation is being made to determine what action has
been taken by the Department of Justice on this recommendation of
the War Department". Obviously the next day the situation became
such as to permit the immediate arrest of all these agents, as well as
other suspects. This letter was drafted in the Domestic Branch of the
Office of Naval Intelligence by Commander Hartwell Davis, to whom
I have referred, and his information was obtained through his contacts
with the F. B. I. who are under the Department of Justice, who could,
and doubtless did, disclose the precise status of the matter at that
time. During this critical period, we understood, whether by formal
instructions or otherwise, that the State Department and the Presi-
dent were desirous of maintaining cordial relations with the Japanese
insofar as practicable and not to give rise to any incident which
might impair the success of the current negotiations. Aside from
actual arrests of suspects, there were, however, some counter-espionage
measures which could be and were taken by the intelligence forces
under the District Intelligence Offices, such as limitation of the activi-
ties of fishing boats, inspection of radios, a constant observation of
dangerous suspects, and of society meetings, with a view to counter-
act any activities, whether sabotage or otherwise, that might be indi-
cated. There was some fear, how well based I do not recall, that
public and particularly naval installations on the West Coast and
in Hawaii might be damaged by concerted sabotage at a prearranged
signal or time, and particular attention was paid at meetings and by
information obtained by agents in conversation and otherwise to detect
and counter any such moves. I do not recall that any large scale
sabotage organization or plan was ever developed. There were, how-
ever, very serious limitations upon our activities. We were not al-
lowed to censor the mail nor were we allowed to obtain copies of
dispatches sent by Japanese diplomatic agents. The District Intel-
ligence Officer of Hawaii had sought, both from the Commandant
and from United States authority, to obtain copies of such dispatches
from the local cable companies, but had been advised by the District
Attorney, on instructions, I understand, from Washington, that the
law did not permit interference even by Federal authorities with the
confidential nature of messages entrusted to common communica-
tion carriers. There had been for some time a censorship agree-
ment within the Army and Navy Departments wherein, on emer-
gency when authorized by the President or in war, the censorship of
communications outside the limits of the United States would be
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 307
divided, in that the Army would censor all mail and the Navy would
censor land lines, radio, and cable. Internal land wire was to be the
[286] province of the Army and internal mails were not, as I
recall, to be censored until later developments might require it. A
skeleton organization was erected in both Departments, that in the
Navy Department being under Naval Intelligence, with a view to their
being able to function at the drop of a hat, and to continue under
military control until such time as a Director of Censorship was ap-
pointed by the President. This preliminary organization was con-
siderably hampered by difficulties in obtaining funds for offices and
telephones and civilian assistants, and by the difficulty of securing
sufficient Navy personnel, whether reserve officers or enlisted, in order
to build up a nucleus. At any rate, there was no authority for its
functioning before December 7, and perhaps the organization is not
pertinent. Despite the limitations on obtaining copies of cable mes-
sages, the District Intelligence Offices in Hawaii had arranged to tap
the long-distance telephone and kept a record of the radio telephone
conversations/with Japan. As I recall, however, it was only in the
last few days before December 7 that this was done. In general, the
conversations appeared innocuous and were from civilian sources to
supposedly civilian recipients in Japan. There was one very sus-
picious telephone conversation, however, on the afternoon of Decem-
ber 6, from a doctor in Hawaii to his nephew in Japan, or vice versa,
concerning vegetation in Hawaii, mentioning different sorts of flowers
and trees, the weather, and mentioning numbers of certain plants, as
I recall. This conversation, after translation, was placed on the
wire in Hawaii that night but was not received in Naval Intelligence
until later on December 7, after the actual attack had occurred. This
conversation and the probable contents of the cable dispatches which
we had not been allowed to intercept constituted, as I recall, the
only important information of any Japanese intelligence activities
in Hawaii. Undoubtedly, much was contained in the mails, to which
we had no access. There were rumors of unexplained flashing lights
and illicit radio stations, but prior to December 7, investigation of
most of these reports had disproved them, although of course some
may have been correct. With regard to the internal organization
of the Intelligence organization as the crisis developed, the normal
peacetime routine was the. maintenance of a twenty-four hour watch
in the Domestic Branch and one in the Foreign Branch, in order that
inquiries might be looked up and taken care of and, more particularly,
any emergencies arising could be handled immediately, either by con-
tact with other agencies or by notifying me or the Assistant Director,
and likewise notifying the watch officer of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions and operational agencies. Some two weeks or ten days before
December 7, however, I posted a special twenty-four hour watch in
the Japanese Section alone, as well as the one covering the whole
Foreign Branch, and, shortly before December 7, set up a watch of
the heads of the three Branches and the Assistant Director to be
in the office throughout the twenty-four hours, although it was a
"sleeping watch." In case of any information received in the Navy
Department from Naval Attaches or observers, or elsewhere, it was
normally routed by the Communication Division to both the Naval
Operations watch officer and to our watch officer, but the latter always
308 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
checked with the Operations watch officer to make sure that he had
received the same information that was then available to O. N. I. On
more important matters, when I was called, I indicated what action
appeared desirable at the moment and also inquired whether the mes-
sage had been reported to Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Stark, direct-
ing our watch officers not only to make sure that CNO watch officei
had it but that it had actually been transmitted by the latter. On
occasion, but rarely, and I do not recall specific incidents, I called
up Admiral Ingersoll myself and, once or twice I belive. Admiral
Stark, but in general the liaison in the lower levels appeared adequate,
[287] 7. Q. Admiral, would you please develop your statement
further to cover information available to the Office of Naval Intelli-
gence with respect to the efficiency and capabilities of the Japanese
Naval Air Force, covering also information which was furnished to
the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and other Commanders in this
respect.
A. My recollection is very indefinite. I know that we were aware
of the number of Japanese carriers and of the general plane-carrying
capacity and characteristics of these ships, and of the general organ-
ization of the Japanese air force. I do not recall any specific issue to
the Navy nor the recipients thereof on this subject, but I presume that
in accordance with the mechanism I have outlined, such information
as we obtained was included in the original monograph and subse-
quently supplied from time to time in the form of the briefs of Naval
Attaches' reports and the individual papers which were distributed to
the principal commands, including the Commanders-in-Chief of the
Fleets. These reports were fragamentary, and perhaps might not
have received the attention of a well digested summary brought up to
date, which, from time to time, were issued on various subjects. But
of the last such summary of Japanese air in general or naval air in
particular, I have no recollection. It no doubt can be located in the
Japanese Section of the Foreign Branch and in the General Files
of O.N. I.
8. Q. Admiral, did your information include the status of training
and the preparedness for war of the Japanese naval air force ?
A. Very roughly, because of the secrecy of the Japanese training
operations and general preparedness.
9. Q. Had any evaluation of this material been made so as to bring
out the capabilities of the Japanese naval air force to conduct such an
attack as they did conduct on the 7th of December, 1941 ?
A. I don't know that any specific evaluation of their capabilities
had been done although it was well within the concept of any naval
officer that carriers and carrier aircraft, if permitted to come within
aircraft range, could conduct such an attack. We had, somewhat
unwisely, in our general thoughts as naval officers and not as my job as
Director of Naval Intelligence, conceived that the aircraft searches
made out of Pearl Harbor would be adequate to detect any carrier
force befor6 they could achieve a raiding position. Very probably
the mere detection of this carrier force would not result in an attack
upon it until further decisions were made in Washington, but pre-
cautionary measures in the Hawaiian Islands could be taken. An-
swering your question specifically, I do not know that any definite
analysis of the number of planes which might attack Pearl Harbor
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 309
or the number of carriers which might participate in such a raid was
made.
10. Q. Admiral, do you recall if you, personally, were greatly sur-
prised over the form and power of the surprise attack which did occur
on 7 December, when you first heard of it ?
A. My recollection is that I was astounded that an attack had
gotten in undetected, whether by picking up the ships or by inter-
cepting the planes, by search operations from Pearl Harbor, and I
was amazed at the results of the attack, but I do not recall that I was
surprised that an attack in such force could be made by a Navy of the
type that we know the Japs to have. The subsequent information as
to the nicety of planning and execution of the air attack surprised me,
although I appreciated that with the open avenues for communica-
tion I've mentioned, espionage as to our Fleet movements were simple,
but I had not appreciated the thoroughness of the Japanese naval
planning evidenced.
[288^ 11. Q. But do I understand you correctly as not being sur-
prised over the fact that the Japanese did venture a carrier raid?
A. No, sir. I was surprised in the fact of the raid itself but not in
the force of the raid as it developed. I was surprised that the Japanese
dared to come within presumably certain interception range of our
Fleet and over Hawaii-based airplanes, because I fancied that they
would expect to be picked up and challenged either before or after the
attack, and would be destroyed or suffer severe losses.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to
make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject
matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of
record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out
by the previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
The examining officer introduced W. A. Steveley, Chief Yeoman
(Acting Appointment), U. S. Navy, as reporter, who was duly sworn.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface to
the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. What is your name, rank, and present station?
A. Aubrey W. Fitch, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, serving as Com-
mander Aircraft, South Pacific Force.
2. Q. Were you Vice Admiral Bellinger's predecessor in command
of Patrol Wing Two?
A. Yes, sir.
3. Q. Between about what dates were you based in Pearl Harbor
in that capacity ?
A. In early June, 1940, I relieved Rear Admiral Arthur L. Bristol,
in command of Patrol Wing Two, then based at Ford Island, Pearl
Harbor. I remained in command of Patrol Wing Two until relieved
by Rear Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger in late October, 1940.
4. Q. During that period, did it occur to you that the patrol planes
of your command might be called upon to assist, through air recon-
naissance, the forces regularly assigned for the defense of Oahu?
310 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. Yes, sir. I can best bring that out by describing, briefly, what
I considered my duties in administering the command that I had at
that time. During the Summer and early Fall of 1940, the training
of the Wing and our efforts toward the development of the bases at
Keehi Lagoon, Kaneohe, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and Canton,
were directed primarily towards the perfecting of methods for using
patrol planes to give early warning of the approach of Japanese
forces to Oahu. It was easily demonstrated that with any number
of planes that would probably be made available to us, no adequate
warning of [289] the approach of a high speed force could be
guaranteed from Oahu bases. Therefore, the efforts of all of us were
devoted to : (a) Increasing the war effectiveness and endurance of
available material and crews ; (b) The development of Western island
basess and the formulation of plans for their use to provide distant
searches in conjunction with planes based at Dutch Harbor; (c)
Efforts to obtain a material increase in the size of the Patrol Wing
in Hawaii. Off-shore patrol plane searches were instituted as a routine
from Pearl Harbor. The search Plans and Orders used were changed
at rather frequent intervals by higher authorities. All of these plans
were necessarily unsatisfactory compromises, primarily because the
personnel, material and bases available were inadequate to provide
protection for all possible contingencies. At least partly as a result
of this condition, the searches ordered in 1940 varied from short pe-
riods of maximum effort to times when the only search consisted of
short dawn anti-submarine sweeps in areas where Fleet units expected
to operate.
5. Q. Admiral, a hypothetical question based upon not only your
aforesaid experience in Hawaiian waters but your very long experience
with patrol planes, particularly for reconnaissance purposes : We will
say eighty long-range planes available and employed to the limit of
endurance of material and personnel over, say, a two weeks period;
give me your estimate of the chances which such reconnaissance from
Oahu would have had of detecting the attack made by the Japanese
of 7 December.
A. We, at that time, if my memory serves me correctly, figured that
approximately double that number of planes would be necessary to
maintain, for more or less extended periods, an effective search. With
eighty planes available whose performance equals or betters the Gata-
lina, under the conditions stated, and searching only the most probable
sectors, a search plan could be evolved which could be reasonably ex-
pected to be fifty per cent effective in detecting an enemy attack.
6. Q. Admiral, I am aware that in the few weeks preceding 7 De-
cember 1941 you were actually stationed at San Diego. While there,
and at any time from August, 1941, onward, did it occur to you that
there was any great probability or even possibility that the Japanese
would venture their carriers in a surprise raid upon Oahu ?
A. During the time that I was in command of Patrol Wing Two, that
is, from early June, 1940, until late October, 1940, the efforts of the
Wing were directed toward being as ready as possible for any possible
contingency. Since the only potential enemy in the Pacific was Japan,
the general possibility of Japanese attack was naturally the back-
ground for this work. At that time, it appeared possible but not im-
mediately probable. In direct answer to the question, in the period
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 311
from November, 1940, until immediately before the Japanese attack
on Pearl, I was in command of Carrier Division One, based at Wan
Diego, and during; this time was concerned primarily with an inten-
sified training program. I do not remember of any occurrence or
instance which required an expression of opinion on my part as to
the possibility or probability of a Japanese air attack on Hawaii.
However, I still felt, knowing what was in the process of development
as far as air was concerned in the Hawaiian Islands, that a surprise
attack was possible, but I still did not think it probable.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this wit-
ness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged
to make any further statement covering anything relating to the sub-
ject matter of [^5(9] the examination which he thought should
be a matter of record in connection therewith, which had not been
fully brought out by the previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and withdrew.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface
to the testimony of Eear Admiral W. W. Smith, Kecord Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
1. Q. Please state your name, rank, and present station.
A. George VanDeurs; Captain, U. S. Navy; Chief of Staff, Com-
mander Aircraft, South Pacific.
2. Q. Captain, will you please state the duties performed by you
in Hawaiian waters during your tour of duty there which preceded
7 December 1941.
A. I commanded a patrol squadron in Patrol Wing Two from
June, 1939, until August, 1941. In addition, I performed various
additional duties with the Patrol Wing Staff. From some time in
October, 1940, until January, 1941, I acted as Chief Staff Officer and
Operations Officer for Admiral Bellinger. Shortly after that time,
I served as a member of a joint Army-Navy committee convened to
consider the problem of air command in the Hawaiian Area. There-
after, I acted as an aide or assistant to Admiral Bellinger during
further protracted discussions on this matter with Army Air Corps
representatives. I left the Hawaiian area in August, 1941.
3. Q. Captain, as a part of those joint duties with the U. S. Army
representatives, did you participate in the preparation of a full Esti-
mate of the Situation which was dated about 31 March, 1941, and
ultimately signed by Admiral Bellinger and by General Martin ?
A. Yes. sir.
4. Q. Please give, briefly, your actual participation in that esti-
mate.
A. I, personally, made certain studies and prepared the original
draft of that estimate and submitted it to Admiral Bellinger. After
some discussion, with both Admiral Bellinger and the Army repre-
sentative, I prepared the final draft in the form in which it was
eventually signed.
5. Q. Then, actually, was the aforesaid estimate very largely your
own personal work?
A. Yes, sir, that is correct.
312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6. Q. In that estimate, in setting forth the Courses of Action open
to the Japanese, did a surprise carrier raid in force appear with
prominence ?
A. As I remember it, it was the most probable course of action in
the estimate.
7. Q. Prior to your departure from Pearl Harbor in August, 1941,
about how many years' experience had you had in patrol plane
organizations ?
A. Roughly, about five years in patrol planes.
1^91] 8. Q. Captain, in view of your long experience in that type
and of your particular duties in Hawaii, as shown by your testimony, I
shall ask you a somewhat hypothetical question : Assume about eighty
long-range planes available and used for reconnaissance to an extent
which approached the endurance of personnel and material over a
period of, say, two weeks ; under a reconnaissance plan feature only the
most probable sectors through which Japanese attack would have been
foreseen, please give your estimate of the chances that would have
existed for detectmg the 7 December, 1941, Japanese carrier raid, prior
to their launching their planes.
A. If there were eighty crews trained to Navy standards for over-
seas work, the planes performance was equal to or better than the PBY,
and they were operated as stated in the question, I would estimate the
chances of detecting the Jap force prior to their launching on 7 Decem-
ber at about forty per cent.
9. Q. Reverting to your testimony concerning the estimate of the
situation of 31 March — From, say, October, 1941, onward, do you recall
any opinions which you may have expressed, or even any thoughts
which you may not have expressed, as to the probability or even possi-
bility that a Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor would take the
form which actually eventuated?
A. I don't remember any such expression of opinion by me after the
completion of my work in Pearl. But by the time I had completed my
work on that estimate, I was convinced that a surprise carrier attack on
Pearl would be one of the opening moves of a Japanese war. I also
believed that we would eventually tight a Japanese war.
10. Q. I understand from that, that when you heard of that attack
you were in no way in a surprised state of mind ?
A. The only surprise was the date.
11. Q. Were you surprised by the power and efficiency which the
Japanese naval air showed in the execution of that attack?
A. No, sir, not particularly. Probably because the full extent of the
damage only became known to me gradually over a long period of time.
The examining officer did not desire to further examine this witness.
The examining officer informed the witness that he was privileged to
make any further statement covering anything relating to the subject
matter of the examination which he thought should be a matter of
record in connection therewith, which had not been fully brought out
by the previous questioning.
The witness stated that he had nothing further to say.
The witness was duly warned and witlidrew.
The examining officer then, at 12 : 05 p. m., took a recess until 4 : 15
p. m., at which time the examination was reconvened at Camp Croco-
dile, Guadalcanal, British Solomon Islands.
Present : The examining officer and his counsel and assistant counsel.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 313
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, took seat as re-
porter and was warned that the oath previously taken was still binding.
[292] No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination
were present.
Rear Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson, U. S. Navy, who had previ-
ously testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that
his oath previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read
over the testimony given by him on the twenty-fourth day of the exam-
ination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.
The examining officer then, at 4 : 20 p. m., adjourned until 8:15 a. m.,
tomorrow.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 315
PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY
MONDAY, APRIL 10, 1944
Twenty-fifth Day
Headquarters, Commander Aircraft,
Southern Pacific Force.
The examination met at 8 : 15 a. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, TJ. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer,
and his coungfil and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the twenty-fourth day of the examination until
such time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed
with the examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
Vice Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch, U. S. Navy, who had previously
testified, was called before the examining officer, informed that his
oath previously taken was still bmding, and stated that he had read
over the testimony given by him on the twenty-fourth day of the
examination, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.
Captain George VanDeurs, U. S. Navy, who had previously testi-
fied, was called before the examining officer, informed that his oath
previously taken was still binding, and stated that he had read over
the testimony given by him on the twenty-fourth day of the examina-
tion, pronounced it correct, was duly warned, and withdrew.
The examination then, at 8 : 20 a. m., was adjourned to await the
call of the examining officer.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 317
[.^9S] PROCEEDINGS OF THE HART INQUIRY
wednesday, apbil 12, 1944
Twenty-sixth Day
• Headquarters, Commander South Pacific
Area and South Pacific Force.
The examination met at 2 : 15 p. m.
Present :
Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, examining officer,
and his counsel and assistant counsel.
Ship's Clerk Charles O. Lee, U. S. Naval Reserve, reporter.
The examining officer decided to postpone the reading of the record
of proceedings of the twenty-fifth day of the examination until such
time as it shall be reported ready, and in the meantime to proceed
with the examination.
No witnesses not otherwise connected with the examination were
present.
A witness called by the examining officer entered and was informed
of the subject matter of the examination as set forth in the preface
to the testimony of Rear Admiral W. W. Smith, Record Page 32.
The witness was duly sworn.
Examined by the examining officer :
. 1. Q. Admiral, please state your name, rank, and present station.
A. William F. Halsey, Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commanding South
Pacific Force and South Pacific Area and Third Fleet.
2. Q. Sir, what duties were you performing on 7 December 1941 ?
A. I was Commander Aircraft Battle Force and Commander Task
Force Two.
3. Q. Sir, how long had you been attached to the Pacific Fleet and
in what capacity during 1941 ?
A. During the entire year of 1941, I was in the Pacific Fleet as
Comairbatfor. I assumed that command in June, 1940.
4. Q. Sir, will you state, in general terms and as best you can recall,
the periods during which you were in Pearl Harbor between the
middle of October and the 7th of December, 1941.
A. I should say one-thjrd of the time. I was at sea approximately
two-thirds of the time. Prior to November 28, 1941, we had been
in port for a normal period. When I left with my task force that
morning, I did not let anyone know where we were going until we
were clear of the harbor. At this point, I peeled off the battleships
and destroyers that were not to accompany us. I went off to the
westward and sent them off to the southard and eastward.
5. Q. Sir, on what date did you leave Pearl Harbor prior to De-
cember 7?
A. The last date I left prior to December 7 was 28th of November.
318 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
6. Q. Admiral, how would you describe your relations with the
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the latter half of 1941
with regard to the frequency with which he consulted you and other
senior officers of the Fleet ; the consideration that he gave to the advice
that you and other Flag officers gave him in formulating his decisions?
[£94-] A. On return from sea, I would usually fly into port from
my carrier Flagship and report immediately to Admiral Kimmel's
office. We would have long discussions on the events that had taken
Elace during the period at sea, and he, in turn, would tell me what
appened in Pearl, the messages that he had received, the efforts he
had been making to straighten out the personnel and materiel situa-
tion, w^hat he was doing to try to instill cordial relations with the
Army, his personal relations with General Short, and other members
of the Army forces. I do not remember whether he held any actual
conferences at that time. There w^ere always a number of Flag offi-
cers in his office and we had a free and open discussion. As far as I
Imow, I was kept absolutely au courant on everything that was going
on. My advice was asked and in some cases it was taken and in some
oases it was not. This merely represented a normal difference of
judgment between two people. I saw Admiral Kimmel very fre-
quently in a private way. We were close personal friends. I talked to
him on these occasions probably more freely then than at any otlier
time. Our personal and official relations were extremely close.
7. Q. Sir, were his conferences with you mainly along the lines of
tactical exercises and training of the Fleet, or did they touch on such
questions as the security of the Fleet when in port ?
A. All subjects. The principal worries at that time were the ma-
teriel conditions, the very heavy turn-over in personnel, the question
of balancing security against training and how far he could afford to
let his trained men go and still have his Fleet ready for instant action.
He was constantly going over in his mind how far this should go.
I know that he was very much against the transfer of so many trained
men and the influx of so many recruits under the conditions that
faced us.
8. Q. During the latter half of 1941, what did you consider the
primary mission of the Pacific Fleet?
A. To prepare for war against Japan.
9. Q. Do you feel that Admiral Kimmel was of like opinion, that
he considered that the primary mission of the Fleet?
A. Absolutely.
10. Q. What were the primary tasks assigned in the War Plans
then extant to the Pacific Fleet ?
A. I have forgotten the details. The War Plans directed a raid on
the Marshall Islands and we played it on the game board before the
war. Curiously enough, my first offensive action, after the start of
the war, was the bombing of KAvajalein in the Marshall Islands. This
had been proved impossible on the game board.
11. Q. Admiral, what was the condition of personnel of the Fleet
during the latter part of 1941 as regards their experience ?
A. It was a little bit less experienced than one normally has in peace
times, because of the fact there was a great deal of new construction
going on and we were required to transfer a large number of key
personnel to man this new construction.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 319
12. Q. Was much emphasis placed on the training of the Fleet at
that time?
A. The Fleet spent approximately two-thirds of its time at sea and
during this time we were running under war conditions as regards
darkened ship, anti-submarine protection, and so forth. The whole
period of ten days at [2951 sea was spent in training of per-
sonnel in combat duties and the perfection of inter-type tactics.
13. Q. Did you feel that the training of the Fleet was emphasized
to an extent that preparedness to carry out war tasks was relegated
somewhat to the background ?
A. You cannot carry out your war tasks unless your men were
trained to fight. In your training, you serve a double purpose : You
make fighters out of green men and you add security to your Fleet.
14. Q. In the training schedules, was it your impression that the
programs were directly contributory to training for the initial war
tasks which might face the fleet ?
A. Absolutely.
15. Q. Sir, in general terms, would you tell what transfers of units
of the Fleet were made from the Pacific Fleet to other areas during
the latter part of 1941 ?
A. There were three battleships, one carrier out of the four we had,
and a number of cruisers and destroyers, the exact number I do not
remember. This produced a decided weakening of the Pacific Fleet
and left it, according to my recollection, less strength than the Jap-
anese Fleet.
16. Q. Did you feel that these transfers incapacitated the Pacific
Fleet for carrying out the tasks assigned to it in the war plans ?
A. I felt that it militated against our chances of success in carrying
out these plans.
17. Q. Sir, do you know what Admiral Kimmel's reaction was to the
transfer of these units of his Fleet ?
A. I remember very distinctly that he was very much against the
transfer ; he deplored it.
18. Q. Do you recall what steps he took to call that to the attention
of higher authority ?
A. I am not certain on that, but, as I remember it, there was an
exchange of rather heated dispatches on the subject.
Note: Upon his return to Washington, the examining officer caused a search
to be made of the files of dispatches between the Chief of Naval Operations and
the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the year 1941, in the Office of the
Director of Naval Communications, Navy Department, and was unable to find
any dispatches fitting this description.
19. Q. During 1941, what was your estimate as to the suitability of
basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor rather than on the West Coast of
the United States?
A. Based on the fact that I thought that the Japs would strike
without declaration of war, I thought the closer we had the Fleet to
the Japanese the better off we were. I believed that Pearl Harbor
was the second best place and Manila the first place.
20. Q. Sir, do you know what Admiral Kimmel's estimate was along
those lines as to the wisdom of basing the Fleet at Pearl Harbor?
320 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
A. No, I do not remember. I knew there had been some discussion
about Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel's point of view on
the subject. I've forgotten the exact status of it.
21. Q. Did you ever recommend to Admiral Kimmel that the Fleet
be moved to Manila as you suggested in your previous answer ?
A. I do not remember so doing.
[296] 22. Q. Do you recall, from your close association with
Admiral Kimmel, whether or not he was so much preoccupied in his
daily problems of training, keeping up materiel, that he did not give
sufficient thought to the international situation, the possible immi-
nence of hostilities, and was thus preoccupied about the wrong things?
A. I distinctly know that the international situation was constantly
before us and constantly being discussed, as were the probabilities or
possibilities of an attack. There was a continuous flow of messages
from many sources which might be called "wolf" messages. There
were many of these and, like everything else that's given in super-
abundance, the senses tended to be dulled, but the possibilities of the
international situation were constantly before our minds during our
working hours.
23. Q. Sir, I hand you a copy of a dispatch dated 16 October 1941,
which is Exhibit 6 before this examination. Do you recall the ap-
proximate time that you first saw this dispatch ?
A. I believe I saw this dispatch soon after its receipt.
24. Q. Do you recall any conferences that Admiral • Kimmel had
with his Staff or with Army officials at which you were present at
which this dispatch was discussed ?
A. I am sure that I, personally, discussed the dispatch with him
and members of his Stan, but I can not be sure of any general confer-
ence on the subject.
25. Q. Sir, at that time, what was your interception of the word-
ing "preparatory deployments" in this dispatch ?
A. I believe that was taken up and it was decided that the task
forces at sea and in port were acting in a preparatory deployment,
ready to go in case the order was given. Submarines were sent to the
Far East, as were B-17's. This took away a lot of our attack force
from Hawaii. Submarine patrols were established at Midway and
Wake, and again the question of air fields on Midway and Wake was
brought prominently forward. The question of placing combatant
planes in both Midway and Wake was brought to the front. The
only planes available for use in Midway and Wake were sent; that
is patrol planes. This further weakened the reconnaissance from
Hawaii.
26. Q. Admiral, in your own estimation, insofar as you can recall,
were those the proper measures and dispositions for the Commander-
in-Chief to take in consequence of that dispatch of 16 October?
A. Yes. In addition to that, a great effort, I remember very dis-
tinctly, was made to get ground armament to the outlying islands.
Guns and ammunition were taken, on Admiral Kimmel's own initia-
tive, and placed in these islands. Just where they came from, I've
forgotten at this moment. I remember there was a great deal of
talk about that and the question of authority for placing them in the
outlying islands. Admiral Kimmel took the authority and placed
them.
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 321
27. Q. Do you recall that some weeks elapsed between the dispatch
of 16 October and any further dispatches of a warning nature?
A. I believe so. This particular dispatch, I remember, was taken
very seriously by everybody — the war warning — and, to the best of
my recollection, it was some time before we began to be bombarded
with dispatches.
28. Q. During that period of some weeks, did it occur to you that
you had a right to expect something further from the Navy Depart-
ment indicating whether they wished the preparatory deployments
continued or that they should really rescind that directive ?
A. As I remember, that very point was discussed time and time
again, and [^97 \ the point was also brought up that they should
give us more information or rescind the directive.
29. Q. Sir, I hand you a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions to CinCPac, and other addresses, dated 24 November, 1941, which
is Exhibit 7 before this examination. Do you recall when you first saw
that dispatch ?
A. I believe I saw this dispatch very shortly after its receipt and it
caused a tremendous amount of figuring on where the Japs were likely
to strike. Because of Guam and Philippines being mentioned in the
dispatch, we probably thought more along those lines than of a surprise
attack on Hawaii.
30. Q. Admiral, did you feel that this dispatch, in effect, continued
the directive of the previous dispatch in regard to deployments?
A. That is a very difficult question to answer. I would say that we
felt, during this whole period, that we were subject to imminent war,
and that the measure that had already been taken was sufficient at that
time, with the means at hand.
31. Q. Sir, do you recall being present at any conferences that Ad-
miral Kimmel or members of his Staff had with their opposite num-
bers of the Army after the receipt of this dispatch or at which this dis-
patch was discussed ?
A. There was one conference that I recall very well. That happened
on the 27th day of November. I believe there were preliminary ones
before that conference and thjit it came to a head that day. The deci-
sion was made to send fighting planes to AVake. The field was just then
ready for use.
32. Q. Sir, I hand you a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions to CinCPac, dated 27 November, which is Exhibit 8 before this
examination. Do you recall when you first saw that dispatch ?
A. I probably saw this dispatch at the conference that took place on
the morning of the 27th of November. I might add that I was with
Admiral Kimmel from about niAe o'clock that morning until about six
o'clock that evening.
33. Q. Sir, at that time, what was your interpretation of the sentence
in this dispatch which reads to the effect that certain deployments
were to be carried out?
A. I'm afraid at that particular time I didn't give much thought to
that sentence. I had a very precise task jjiven me to carry fighter planes
for the defense of Wake Island, where the air field was just about ready.
There was a discussion in wliich General Short, General Martin, and
some other Army officers, and Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Brown, Ad-
miral Bellinger, and possibly some more, and I took part. It centered
79716 — 46— Ex. 144 22
322 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
on what planes should be used for this purpose. I remember very dis-
tinctly General Martin proposing that we use some of the old combatant
Army planes because those were the ones we could afford best to lose.
General Short countered with the proposition that if we are going up
against the Japanese we wanted the best we had instead of the worst
and we would use the best Army planes. I then brought out the fact
that I had been informed that the Army was not allowed to fly their
pursuit planes farther than fifteen miles from the coast for reasons of
security of personnel. General Martin stated this was a fact and im-
mediately, because of that and their lack of experience of flying over
water, it was decided to send either Navy or Marine planes. The
Marine planes were finally selected and for security reasons it was
necessary to get those planes on board the ENTERPRISE at sea
the next day without anyone knowing where they [298] were
going. This required a tremendous amount of planning and sub-
terfuge before we hit on a scheme for flying these people aboard.
We told them Ihey were going out for two or three days' maneuvers.
At the same time, to show the Army that it was possible to fly Army
fighter planes off carriers, it was arranged to take two Army fighter
planes aboard from the dock and fly them off at sea to land in Honolulu.
This again required much planning so as not to excite people and break
the security. We worked over this until about six o'clock in the evening
before plans were completed. We sailed the next morning. I was
probably too fully occupied that day to think much about that sen-
tence.
34. Q. Do you recall that the Army participation in outlying island
defense was the subject of a dispatch of 27 November, other than the
one before you?
A. I recall there had been some discussion of Army units going to
outlying bases and that Admiral Kimmel had looked on outlying bases
as part of the Fleet, and, for that reason, he wished to confine the forces
ashore to Marines and naval personnel, insofar as practicable. It soon
became evident that such a process could not be carried out and certain
bases, according to my recollection, were finally picked out to be garri-
soned by Army forces.
35. Q. Admiral, do you feel that the dispatching of Marine planes
to Wake was a consequence of this dispatch that you have had before
you or had that been decided before the dispatch arrived ?
A. I believe it was precipitated by this dispatch and the fact that the
air fields were just ready at that time. In other words, it was a hurry-
up move. One more reason for that was the fact that my task force was
due to proceed to sea on the 28th of November and in order not to vio-
late security, they wanted to make it appear a perfectly natural move.
36. Q. In other words, under the published employment schedules,
you were due to go out on the 28th?
A. Exactly.
37. Q. Sir, on the mission to Wake Island, what were your orders in
the event of sighting Japanese forces?
A. I believe I got the finest orders that were ever given to a man. I«
waited until the conference was over and I asked Admiral Kimmel,
"How far do you want me to go ?" He said, "Use your common sense."
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 323
38. Q. Admiral, had you discussed with Admiral Kimmel the mat-
ter of safety of the outlying; islands, Wake, Midway, Johnston, and so
forth, in the event of war with Japan ?
A. Many times.
39. Q. Would you please state his feelings in the matter. Was he
seriously concerned therewith ?
A. He was very seriously concerned over the matter. He felt the
personnel and materiel was entirely inadequate for the task imposed.
Very shortly before, say, sometime in the early Fall, General Price of
the Marines, who was at that time in command of the Marines on the
West Coast, I think, which included the Hawaiian Department, came
out. Admiral Kimmel, in my presence, asked him to make a very
thorough study of the defenses of Midway and Wake while he was
there; told him about his grave doubts as to our ability to defend them
with what we had ; and asked for his advice and assistance on anything
that could be done to improve the defenses. He stressed, particularly,
that it must be done with what we had or what we might take from the
common pool. It was a constant source of worry.
[299] 40. Q. Do you recall any plans that Admiral Kimmel had
for using Fleet units in the event of hostilities to aid in the protection
of these islands?
A. I do not recall any plans but I am quite certain that he would
not have split his Fleet and let it be taken in detail by sending a
portion out to a given island. He might have sent the whole Fleet
out. I say "the whole Fleet" ; I mean a sufficient task force.
41. Q. As regards our commitment of considerable forces, including
troops and planes on Wake, do you recall any disagreement between
Admiral Kimmel and the Navy Department ?
A. The Navy Department had specified a certain garrison of troops
for Wake and I believe Admiral Kimmel enlarged the garrison out
there, strengthened the garrison, without authority from the Navy
Department. I also believe that the placing of the twelve Marine
fighter planes was done on his own initiative.
42. Q. Admiral, reverting to the wording of the dispatch of 27
November, do you recall your own reaction when you read the words
"war warning"?
A. I remember very distinctly my reactions to that whole day. I
was very serious about it and probably shaking a little bit. I felt
that we were going to be in a fight before I got back to Pearl. The
words "war warning" probably had some effect on my feelings.
43. Q. Did you have time, on that day, for any thought concerning
the securitj^ of Oahu, Pearl Harbor, and so forth ?
A. No, sir, I was entirel}'^ surrounded by thoughts of my own task
force, getting out without people knowing what I was doing.
44. Q. As regards your own task force, upon putting to sea, did
you institute any security measures advanced over those which had
been in effect while at sea for some time previously ?
A. Immediately on clearing the channel, I diverted the battleships,
three in number, cruisers and destroyers, under Admirals Draemel
and Kidd, and told them to carry out exercises in a certain area. I
then headed West with the remainder of my task force. As soon as
we were out of sight of the remainder of the task force, I sent a signal
324 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
to put war heads in all torpedoes; to regard any submarine seen as
hostile and sink it; armed the planes with bombs; gave orders to
shoot down any plane seen in the air that was not known to be one
of our own. We went into Condition 3, as I remember it, and kept
that the entire way out until we got close to Wake and then I went
into Condition 2. In other words, I tried to make full preparations
for combat. I aiso ordered ready ammunition for all guns. I might
add one other thing. I carried out morning and afternoon searches
to three hundred miles, as I remember it, for any sign of hostile ship-
ping. I kept a combat patrol over the ships at certain times.
45. Q. Admiral, referring back to your answer a few minutes ago,
that you felt that on 27 November the United States and Japan would
be at war before you returned from your mission to Wake, did you
have an opportunity to communicate that feeling to Admiral Kimmel,
and, if so, do you recall his reaction to your expressions?
A. I did not intend to convey the idea that I thought they would
be at war before I got back, but I felt that there was a very grave
possibility that I might be attacked or attack before I returned. I
thought it might precipitate war.
46. Q. Did you have an opportunity to express that opinion to
Admiral Kimmel before you sailed?
[300] A. Insomuch as I asked him how far I should go, I think
I expressed my opinion.
47. Q. Did he give his reaction to your expression ?
A. It was perfectly understood by me when he told me to use my
common sense.
48. Q. Admiral, I hand you a dispatch from Chief of Naval Opera-
tions to CinCPac, and other addressees, dated 3 December, which is
Exhibit 11 before this examination. Did you have any information
of the receipt of this before December 7?
A. I did not see it.
49. Q. Admiral, I'll ask you a hypothetical question. If you had
seen this dispatch on 3 December, what would have been your reaction
to it?
A. It would have been cumulative information that had been pro-
gressing for months that we were about to have a fight.
50. Q. Would this dispatch have indicated to you that the beginning
of hostilities was extremely imminent?
A. Not necessarily, in view of all the other dispatches that had been
coming in and the various personal letters, O. N. I. Bulletins, and
various things.
51. Q. Admiral, after you sailed with your task force on November
28, 1941, did you receive from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet,
or higher authority, any additional warnings or instructions with
respect to the security of your task force or similar directive ?
A. I did not. I considered that Admiral Kimmel had faith in what
I was doing and he didn't consider any further instructions than the
ones he had given me were necessary.
52. Q. Did you receive, officially, any additional information with
respect to the international situation or other intelligence ?
A. Nothing official that I recall. However, we were naturally read-
ing the press and we had some garbled message about the Japanese
Fleet being near Palau. That came, as I remember it, in a press
dispatch.
PROdEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 325
53. Q. Sir, in addition to these warning dispatches that were
received by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, what other sources
of information did he have as regards the possibilities of a surprise
attack, or the movement of Japanese vessels, or the general interna-
tional situation, that would cause him to feel concern for the safety
of his Fleet in Pearl Harbor?
A. Everyone that came through Honolulu of any importance from
the Far East was always interviewed by Admiral Kimmel or some of
his Staff, usually by Admiral Kimmel, himself. There were letters
being passed back and forth at all times between Washington and
Admiral Kimmel, and it is my impression that there were certain
O. N. I. and intelligence information coming out. Just how that
arrived, I'm not quite sure, whether it came in dispatch form, or not.
54. Q. Sir, did you feel, at that time, that the sum total of the Com-
mander-in-Chief's intelligence reports was at all adequate ? In other
words, did you feel that the Commander-in-Chief was fairly well in-
formed as to what the Japs were doing or did you feel that you were
operating in the dark there ?
A. I did not feel that we were well informed on what the Japs
were doing and I felt that we were operating in the dark. I had the
personal feeling, entirely personal, that they knew a lot more in Wash-
ington than we knew out there and that we should have been informed.
[SOI] 55. Q. Do you recall any discussions that you had with the
Commander-in-Chief along that line, whether any steps were being
taken to improve the situation?
A. I recall, vaguely, discussions along that line and damning them
for not letting us in on the information. I believe Admiral Kimmel
said he would demand or had demanded that they give him more
information.
66. Q. Sir, in your discussions with the Commander-in-Chief and
members of his Staff, do you recall that any particular consideration
was given to the recent history of the Axis Powers of indulging in
surprise attacks ?
A. We, of course, were all cognizant of the Jap's attack on the
Chinese and again on the Russians, and we felt sure that they would
pull something like that, but we thought it would take place in the
Far East rather than Honolulu, except by submarines, which was the
gist of the conversation. We underestimated their ability to operate
carriers, or we did not give it enough consideration.
57. Q. Do you recall, personally, being particularly impressed by
what you had heard of Yamamoto's characteristics ?
A. Yes, I remember we credited him with being probably a very
good fighter and having a great dislike for the Americans.
58. Q. Did you know, at the time, of his long connection with the
Japanese naval air build-up?
A. Yes, I believe I did. I'm not sure.
59. Q. Sir, what was your estimate, during the three months pre-
ceding 7 December 1941, as to the probability or possibility of a sur-
prise attack by the Japanese on the Fleet based at Pearl Harbor?
A. My estimate was that they would probably attack by subs off
Pearl Harbor and throw the weight of their main attack into the
Philippines or down the South Coast of China towards Malaya^
326 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
60. Q. Sir, can you amplify that just a bit, going into the reasons
behind that estimate or the considerations upon which that estimate
was based?
A. It was based on the fact that they had a strong Army near at
home, that they needed oil, they probably needed rubber, that these
were close aboard where they could easily exploit them and they could
exploit any attack that they made. That they could not, thank God,
or did not, exploit a successful attack on Pearl.
61. Q. Did you know at that time whether or not Admiral Kimmel's
own estimate was similar to yours?
A. I believe that was the general feeling amongst nearly every one
there.
62. Q. Was this a subject of frequent discussion among members
of his Staff and the Flag officers of the Fleet?
A. It was a subject of discussion by all hands around there.
63. Q. In addition to the answers that you have made to the last
three questions, can you give any other reasons why the senior officers
in Pearl Harbor were not more apprehensive of a surprise air attack
there ? The particular significance lies in a Joint Estimate by Army
and Navy Air Officers made back in March, 1941.
[S02] A. The question of an air attack on Pearl was always at
the forefront of everybody's mind. I merely say, in my own per-
sonal opinion, I did not think an air attack was coming. I thought
it would be a submarine attack. There was constant di'illing in air
defense and tracking, both day and night, in port and at sea. If it
was in port, all types of Na\'y and Army planes were flown over the
Fleet for recognition purposes. Attacks were sent in against Pearl
from carriers a hundred or hundred and fifty miles at sea, for pur-
poses of drill and anti-aircraft defense. Sleeve and drone firing, of
course, was always taking place. There were constant drills with
such radars as we had at that time in tracking planes. We had no
means of determining the altitude of a plane from radar in those
days. I, personally, used a squadron of planes, flying them from a
carrier, a distance of a hundred miles on one air level, bring them
up a thousand feet, and fly them back. I did that from 1,000 feet
to 20,000 feet to see if they could determine some method of finding
their altitude. We finally did get a very rough method. Using
curves, we could pick out the plane's altitude, but that was predi-
cated on the fact that he was flying at the same level. It was very
rough. The point I'm trying to bring out is that we were all very
conscious that we were going to be attacked, either at sea or in port,
and constant drills were held day and night on account of this. I
felt that with the radar protection we had, that any attack coming in
would probably be picked up. As we all know, it was picked up and
did not get to the proper authorities.
64. Q. Prior to your going to sea on 28 November, were you par-
ticularly in touch with the state of development and efficiency of the
Army's radar system ?
A. We were a bit perturbed about the Army radar equipment be-
cause, at that time, there had been a very close cooperation and almost
unity of command between the Army and the Navy. This was insisted
upon by Admiral Kimmel, and we felt that possibly they weren't
using the best methods in pJotting radar. We had had a great deal
PROCEEDINGS OF HART INQUIRY 327
more experience with it than the Army. I discussed it with Admiral
Kimmel and I believe it was at his direction that I sent my communi-
cation officer, who, at that time and still is, one of the best radar prac-
tical men — not a technician — we have in the Fleet, to work with the
Army. Again, to the best of my recollection, he made some very
valuable suggestions which were adopted.
65. Q. Did he happen to report to you that the Army was very
backward in their preparations with radar?
A. He did.
66. Q. Do you recall that estimate, mentioned just previously, hav-
ing been the subject of discussion between senior officers at any time
during the months preceding 7 December (the Army and Navy Air
Estimateof MarchSO, '41)? ^
A. My recollection is poor on that subject, but I feel quite certain
that it was discussed.
67. Q. Admiral, in answer to an earlier question, mention was made
of the employment sciiedules of units of the Fleet based at Pearl Har-
bor. Do you recall approximately how often those were published
and disseminated ?
A. I'm not sure whether it was monthly or quarterly; quarterly, I
think.
68. Q. Do you recall the classification that was given to these sched-
ules and how wide a distribution was made?
A. No, but it had a fairly wide distribution until the word went
around that people were talking too much in Honolulu. Again my
recollection is a little faulty, but I think one or two officers were threat-
ened with court martials because their wives knew too damn much.
[303] 59. Q. Was the distribution limited after that situation
was brought to light?
A. I think so, very decidedly. I remember, very distinctly, Admiral
Kimmel got out a very strong letter or order on the subject, and after
that things tautened up very considerably.
70. Q. Wliat was your own reaction to the wisdom of publishing and
giving fairly wide circulation to these employment schedules ?
A. I never had any particular reaction to it. I never trusted, and
do not today trust, any of the people of Japanese descent who are in
the Hawaiian Islands. Anyone from anywheres in the neighborhood
of Honolulu can see the Fleet coming in and going out. By using
a little deduction, they could figure out what was going on. I don't
think these employment schedules had very much to do with it. As a
matter of fact, both sides of the entrance to Pearl Harbor were lined
with Japanese every time we went in and out. I say "lined", there
were a few of them always playing around.
71. Q. Sir, do you know whether any consideration was ever given
to the point that the publication of the employment schedules would
give notice quite far in advance of the presence of units in Pearl
Harbor which might be of great value to the enemy?
A. They undoubtedly would, but I had not given that any con-
sideration at that time.
72. Q. During the few days in late November, while your task force
was in Pearl Harbor, do you recall any conversation or did you give
any thought yourself toward a departure from the scheduled employ-
328 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ment by vir